My Memoirs: Half a Century of the History of Iraq and the Arab Cause 9781626373969

Citation preview

My Memoirs

My Memoirs Half a Century of the History of Iraq and the Arab Cause Tawfiq al-Suwaydi

~

Translated from the Arabic by

Nancy Roberts with an Introduction by

Antony T. Sullivan

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2013 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU „ 2013 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Suwaydi, Tawfiq, 1892–1968. [Mudhakkirati. English] My memoirs : half a century of the history of Iraq and the Arab cause / by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi ; translated from the Arabic by Nancy Roberts. pages cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-1-58826-903-4 (alk. paper) 1. Suwaydi, Tawfiq, 1892–1968. 2. Politicians—Iraq—Biography. 3. Iraq—Politics and government. I. Title. DS79.6.S8A3 2013 956.704'2092—dc23 [B] 2013004962 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

~

List of Photographs ix Foreword, Ali Allawi xiii Preface, Luay Tawfiq al-Suwaydi xv Acknowledgments, Spindrift Beck al-Suwaydi xvii

Introduction, Antony T. Sullivan 1

~

My Memoirs: Half a Century of the History of Iraq and the Arab Cause 51 Dedication 53

1 My Upbringing 55 2 In Public Life: The Literary Forum 61 3 Iraq’s Independence: The Iraqi Congress 85 4 Faisal in Iraq 101 5 Democracy in Iraq 117 6 Oil Concessions 127 v

vi

Contents

7 The Hashemite-Saudi Clash 129 8 On Iraqi Politics 145 9 My First Term as Prime Minister 153 10 ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun 177 11 Nuri al-Sa‘id Enters the Scene 189 12 Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran 191 13 At the League of Nations 225 14 The Ill-Fated Coups Begin 243 15 Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara 257 16 Events on the Brink of War 277 17 At the London Conference on the Palestine Issue 283 18 Unrest in Iraq 293 19 The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes 301 20 The Arab League 341 21 My Second Term as Prime Minister 351 22 The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948 381 23 My Third Term as Prime Minister 403 24 The Era of King Faisal II 421 25 The Baghdad Pact 435 26 Nationalization of the Suez Canal 441 27 A Hashemite-Saudi Rapprochement 465

Contents

28 The Arab Union 467 29 Iraq and Kuwait 475 30 Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958 479 31 The View from Exile 503 32 Conclusion 513 Index 527 About the Book 545

vii

Photographs

~

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, ca. 1910 Yusuf al-Suwaydi, 1920s Tawfiq al-Suwaydi and Ja‘far al-‘Askari, Paris, early 1920s A Lebanese military detchment offers a final salute to deceased Tawfiq al-Suwaydi Arab dignitaries and the mayor of Beirut watch the aircraft bearing the remains of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi King Hussein bin ‘Ali, sharif of Mecca King ‘Abdullah bin al-Hussein, the king of Jordan King Faisal I Al-Suwaydi’s first cabinet with King Faisal I and guests, 1929 ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun Al-Suwaydi and companions, during the visit of King Faisal I to Iran, 1931 King Ghazi Al-Suwaydi as head of the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in Geneva, 1937 Al-Suwaydi at a celebration held in Damascus in his honor, 1938 Al-Suwaydi in Beirut, 1938, with President Émile Eddé and Prime Minister Khalid Shihab Al-Suwaydi with the director of international accounting in Geneva, 1938 Al-Suwaydi with Prince ‘Adil Arslan and Tawfiq Aras in Geneva, 1938 Al-Suwaydi with Anthony Eden in Cairo, 1941 Al-Suwaydi with Prime Minister Hussein Sirri Pasha, Tahsin al-‘Askari, and Khalil Ibrahim in Cairo, 1941 ix

7 17 24 41 42 64 87 99 156 180 214 244 250 260 261 266 271 296 297

x

Photographs

Al-Suwaydi with Ambassador ‘Ali Mahir Pasha and Prime Minister Ahmad Hussein Pasha in Cairo, 1941 Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani Al-Suwaydi with Haj Muhammad Amin al-Husseini Al-Suwaydi with Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah Al-Suwaydi with Hussein Makan and Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, 1946 Al-Suwaydi receiving the British foreign secretary in Baghdad, 1946 Al-Suwaydi at a meeting of the Arab League in Cairo, 1946 Al-Suwaydi with Prime Minister Ibrahim ‘Abd al-Hadi Pasha of Egypt Al-Suwaydi as head of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations, 1949 Al-Suwaydi with Ahmad Khashabah Pasha, 1949 Al-Suwaydi with Charles Malik at the United Nations, 1949 Al-Suwaydi with Nuri al-Sa‘id and ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi Al-Suwaydi with Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah Al-Suwaydi with notable leaders during his third cabinet in Baghdad, 1950 Al-Suwaydi at the signing of the Basic Technical Assistance Agreement between Iraq and the United Nations in Baghdad, 1950 Al-Suwaydi during a speech he delivered to the Arab League Council in Cairo, 1950 Al-Suwaydi as chairman of the Arab League Council in Cairo, 1950 Al-Suwaydi with the prime ministers of Lebanon and Syria in Cairo, 1950 Al-Suwaydi as head of the Arab League Council in Cairo, 1950 Al-Suwaydi delivering a speech in Cairo, 1950 Al-Suwaydi with Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, Muhammad Salah al-Din Pasha, and Baha’ al-Din Tuqan in Cairo, 1950 Al-Suwaydi at the Arab League meeting with Prime Minister Khalid al-‘Azm and Muhammad Salah al-Din Pasha, 1951 Al-Suwaydi with Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah and President Camille Chamoun, in 1953 Al-Suwaydi with President Camille Chamoun in Baghdad, 1953 Al-Suwaydi with President Camille Chamoun, King Faisal II, and Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah in Baghdad, 1953 King Faisal II, bin Ghazi bin Faisal I bin al-Hussein Al-Suwaydi with Muhammad al-Sadr and Jamil al-Midfa‘i Al-Suwaydi as head of the Iraqi delegation to the Arab League Council in Damascus, 1951

299 315 325 348 352 355 361 394 398 399 400 401 404 407

407 409 410 411 411 412 412 414 422 422 423 424 424 429

Photographs

Al-Suwaydi with ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam Pasha Al-Suwaydi with other participants at a meeting of the Arab League Council in Damascus, 1951 Al-Suwaydi and dignitaries as guests of Lebanon’s president after the Arab League Council meeting held in Damascus, 1951 Al-Suwaydi with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Foreign Minister Fadil al-Jamali Al-Suwaydi at the official opening of a major dam in Turkey with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Dr. Fadil al-Jamali Al-Suwaydi with King Sa‘ud King Faisal II and King Hussein bin Talal on the day the Jordanian-Iraqi union was announced Nuri al-Sa‘id King Faisal II beneath a photo of his grandfather King Faisal I ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif Fadil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi Al-Suwaydi at the “People’s Court” Coup-led soldiers trample on pictures of the ruling family Soldiers trample on pictures ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, “The Leader” King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan Al-Suwaydi with King Faisal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Sa‘ud

xi 430 430 431 457 458 466 469 471 481 489 494 495 497 498 499 506 507

Foreword

~

My Memoirs by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi is a fascinating record of the last days of the Ottoman Empire, the birth of the Arab nationalist consciousness, and the founding of the modern state system in the Middle East. They were written by one of Iraq’s most distinguished statesmen. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was born into an illustrious family from the notable classes of Baghdad, a family that traced its origins to the Abbasid caliphs and provided the Ottoman Empire with scholars, religious dignitaries, and high-ranking officials. His memoirs are an invaluable source for the researcher on the evolution of Iraq as an independent state and the turbulent environment in which the modern Arab world came into being. The memoirs, written while the author was living out his last years in unwanted and unwarranted exile in Beirut, are remarkably wide-ranging, succinct, and penetrating in their analyses of events and leading personalities of the times. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi served Iraq in a remarkable career that saw him as ambassador, minister, and then leader of several cabinets in the capacity of prime minister. His span of service covered the entire monarchical period in Iraq from Faisal I to Ghazi to Faisal II, from 1921 to 1958. It was only cut short by the savage, inchoate explosion that accompanied the coup d’état of 1958. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s path crossed that of the major figures who affected the destiny of Iraq and the Arab world in the first half of the twentieth century. The reader will find in these memoirs the perspectives of a person who was, as it were, “present at the creation.” They were written in a vibrant and clear Arabic, which the translator has done well to carry into English. They provide an accurate record of events, and the author does not xiii

xiv

Foreword

fall into the trap of selective memory. They stand alongside the great memoirs of the Arab statesmen of the period. A modern-day reader will find these memoirs a record of a formative period for Iraq and the Arab world. They are also the reflections of a wise person known not only for his political skills, but also for his open-mindedness, moderation, and ecumenism. It is a record of an era that was full of possibilities and promise: a splendid destiny for Iraq and the Arab world, but one that was, in the final analysis, cruelly thwarted. —Ali Allawi

Preface

~

Recent events in Iraq have prompted us to issue this first English-language edition of My Memoirs, penned by my father, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. As a historical document, these memoirs support the conviction that rational thinking and rightly guided policies have the power to make Iraq a thriving modern nation. A great deal has been written about Marxist and other socialist movements in the Arab world; however, little has been published on Arab liberalism and liberal movements. In particular, personal testimonies and accounts of prominent Arab liberals have always been in short supply. Hence, the book we now place in readers’ hands seeks to make a humble contribution toward redressing the current imbalance. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi succeeded to the post of prime minister in Iraq on three occasions: in 1929, 1946, and 1950. In addition, he held the post of Iraqi ambassador to the League of Nations and the United Nations and served several times as a member of the Proxy Committee, the function of which was to represent the king during his absences from the country. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs on multiple occasions. He was the founder of the Iraqi Central Bank and a key member of the Iraqi Development Board, which was the foundation for beginning the modern infrastructure of Iraq. He also founded the Law Faculty in Baghdad, where he taught for a number of years. It is our hope that this publication of my father’s memoirs will serve to remind the current generation of English-speaking Iraqis, Arabs, Arabists, and Westerners alike of the Arab liberal approach and, in so doing, open the door wide to a future marked by democracy, factional reconciliation, and religious tolerance in Iraq and in the Arab world as a whole. —Luay Tawfiq al-Suwaydi xv

Acknowledgments

~

The journey to bring these memoirs into English began with our son, Tawfiq, to whom we are dearly grateful for choosing to write his history honors thesis during his senior year at Dartmouth College on his grandfather’s “liberal experiment of 1946” under the supportive guidance of Gene Garthwaite. As a family, we are thankful to Meir Basri, an Iraqi Jew and published historian, who graciously gave of his time to translate parts of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s published memoirs in support of our son’s thesis. Discussion of our son’s thesis with George and Meredith Friedman of Stratfor.com led to their kind introduction of us to Antony T. Sullivan, an internationally recognized scholar, author, and historian of the Arab and Islamic world. It is to Tony that we are most indebted, and without whose energy and passion for this project it would not have been realized. Tony spent many months conducting research in both published and unpublished sources; his unflagging efforts have resulted in the preparation of an introduction to these memoirs that is in itself a contribution to knowledge. Tony guided us to Nancy Roberts, who created an extraordinarily elegant translation that celebrates the beauty of Tawfiq Pasha’s eloquent turns of phrase. Because of the quality of her translation and her professionalism in creating the manuscript, we feel that this book is a worthy testament to Tawfiq Pasha’s life. Finally, Tony found us our wise and sensitive publisher, Lynne Rienner, for whose guiding hand and support we are most grateful. To Anita Burdett we owe much gratitude for her professionalism in collating quantities of information from the National Archives and the British Library in London; St. Antony’s College, Oxford; and Les Archives des Affaires Étrangères and Les Archives de l’Armée de Terre in Paris and Vincennes. xvii

xviii

Acknowledgments

There are so many people who have been encouraging. We would like to mention Najdat Saffet, who had a personal relationship with Tawfiq Pasha and enlightened our son about our family history and introduced us to Anita Burdett. We received great encouragement from Kenneth Gerbino and Nemir Kirdar, who understood and believed in the importance of publishing this work in English from the very beginning. We have been deeply moved by the memories of Basil Faidhi concerning a number of members of our family. The priceless personal papers in his possession were essential for preparation of the introduction. Gabriella Bassatne and David Schemtob, each in their individual way and through their personal knowledge of Tawfiq Pasha, added insightful clarity and color to our family story. We would like to thank our daughter, Kalita, for her ability to highlight the issues at hand and for her (undoubtedly inherited!) eloquent turns of phrase. To both Tawfiq and Kalita we wish to express our profound appreciation of their impassioned curiosity and their unflagging commitment to the excavation of our family history. With loving grace, I wish to dedicate this English-language publication to my husband, Luay, and to our children, Tawfiq and Kalita. —Spindrift Beck al-Suwaydi

Introduction

~

Antony T. Sullivan

My Memoirs by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi (1892–1968), eminent Iraqi Sunni statesman, diplomat, and lifelong Arab nationalist and liberal reformer, have never previously been published in English. This translation by Nancy Roberts fully captures the elegance of al-Suwaydi’s prose and the great drama that was his life. In places, the memoirs compete well with any good adventure novel. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s account of his desert voyages, wartime stratagems, and flights from state security services make the book a wonderful read. It is difficult to put down. His portraits of kings, statesmen, soldiers, adventurers, and rogues constitute a gallery of leading personalities of the twentieth century, one worth a careful perusal especially given current world events. Perhaps most notably, al-Suwaydi reminds readers of the important Arab liberal tradition of the last century, which recent decades of military dictatorship have largely expunged from popular memory. This book will go far toward helping English-speaking readers understand the deeper background of unfolding events in the Middle East and the epochal developments that have shaped Iraq and the Arab world over the past century and more.1 Readers of these memoirs may be especially grateful for the effort made by the author to avoid reporting rumor or hearsay and to confine himself, as he notes, to those things that he did himself or with which he was personally familiar given the positions he held and the responsibilities he bore. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi states that his objective throughout was to record only the facts and to avoid making any unfounded claims. Although, thankfully, he fails to confine himself merely to the facts and does indeed tell us what he believes many of those facts to mean, these memoirs are remarkably free of special 1

2

My Memoirs

pleading. All of this makes this book a significant contribution to historical understanding and one that deserves the widest possible attention. Born almost three decades before the fall of the Ottoman Empire and a key player in the new Arab Awakening of the early twentieth century, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was the scion of an elite Iraqi family that traces its origins back to ‘Abbas ibn ‘Abd al-Mutallib, a member of the prominent Meccan ‘Abbasid clan, paternal uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, and the individual whose descendants founded the Abbasid Caliphate (751–1258), centered in Baghdad. This ancestry is important because for centuries the family connection to the Prophet Muhammad was key to the eminence of the al-Suwaydis, as well as that of a handful of other Iraqi families resident mainly in Baghdad. Hanna Batatu, author of the authoritative history of Iraq in modern times, notes that “Arabs are . . . a genealogy-conscious people. To the townsmen among them, in particular, a holy pedigree counted for much.” Batatu endorses the al-Suwaydis’ claim to descent from the family of the Prophet, while noting that they were unaccountably left off an Ottoman list of the elite landowning families of ulema and ashraf resident in Baghdad in 1894.2 Strictly speaking, the religiously honorific titles of sayyid or sharif have applied only to descendants of Hassan and Hussein, grandsons of the Prophet, but the House of Muhammad has historically been more widely interpreted to include the descendants of ‘Abbas.3 Of the many Iraqis who claim or have claimed to be ashraf (plural of sharif ) and sadah (plural of sayyid), or descendants of the family of the Prophet, the claim of the alSuwaydi family, buttressed by copious genealogical evidence, is certainly one of the strongest. Unlike many Iraqi families that claim ashraf status, the al-Suwaydis have an actual family tree that makes for interesting reading. In addition to ‘Abbas, the Prophet’s uncle, and various other medieval luminaries, the genealogy shows that Harun al-Rashid (c. 764–809), the famous Abbasid caliph and patron of scholarship and the arts, was a direct ancestor. Islamic judges, quranic commentators, and distinguished scholars appear frequently in the al-Suwaydi ancestral line. One particularly good example of a prominent historian was ‘Abdul Rahman al-Suwaydi (died 1785), author of a variety of historical studies, including History of Events in Baghdad and Basra and The Special Garden in the Biography of the Ministers.4 Like a number of such other wealthy sadah families who have served from time immemorial as administrators of particular shrines or holy places in Iraq, the al-Suwaydis have continued to act as the administrators of the shrine of Shaikh Mar’uf in Baghdad. Batatu coyly remarks that it is impossible to determine whether wealth originally led the al-Suwaydi family to hold that office or whether the office first led to its wealth.5 However, as these memoirs so amply demonstrate, sacred descent is hardly the only quality that has earned the al-Suwaydis the eminence they possess. More notable, especially in the modern period, is their service to Iraq in particular

Introduction

3

and the Arab world in general and their success in numerous business ventures over many decades. At the same time, the memoirs may suggest that the al-Suwaydis and other elite Sunni families had even more influence on events under the British mandate than they actually did. Readers would do well to keep in mind that throughout the four decades between 1918 and 1958, the most decisive leverage over all that occurred in Iraq was retained by the British. Sacred descent in Iraq, true or claimed, has never by itself guaranteed preeminence and respect. More has always been required, the status of sharif being only one important supporting element. As Batatu notes, if the sadah mattered in society, they mattered on some other ground—either on account of their “wealth, or their holding of office, or their knowledge of religion or of the holy law, or their leadership of tribes or of mystic orders, or a combination of two or more of these factors.”6 In fact, the al-Suwaydis qualified on all of these grounds. Like other sadah, or ashraf, they had long been individuals of social prominence and abundant means. Few in Iraq could adduce a more convincing claim, based on the widest possible grounds, to a leadership role in traditional Iraqi society than the al-Suwaydis. The term ashraf is also commonly used to designate those 300 men who either fought on the side of Sharif Hussein of the Hejaz against the Ottoman Empire as allies of the British from 1916 to 1918 or the much smaller group that served in the administrations of Syria and Jordan between the end of Ottoman rule and the establishment of the mandate system.7 Using this second designation, the al-Suwaydi family also qualifies as ashraf. The ashraf so defined who ended up joining King Faisal I in Iraq after 1921 numbered only fifty-one individuals and included three al-Suwaydis. Although neither Tawfiq nor Naji al-Suwaydi (1882–1942) fought with the Hejazi troops during World War I and indeed Tawfiq served as an Ottoman army officer throughout that conflict, both brothers qualify as ashraf because of their administrative and judicial services in Aleppo and Damascus immediately after the end of the war. A third al-Suwaydi brother, ‘Arif alSuwaydi (1886–1978), who later became a cabinet minister and a parliamentary deputy in Iraq, is also part of this very short list. The only other sharifian family so defined to have three members on this list is the al‘Askari family. All of this background should convey some idea of the weight that the al-Suwaydis carried in Iraq before 1958 as both politicians and landowners, and why these memoirs are historically important. A fourth al-Suwaydi brother, Shakir al-Suwaydi (1896–1998), became a medical doctor and was never involved in politics or in management of the al-Suwaydi estate. And then there was a fifth al-Suwaydi brother, Thabit al-Suwaydi (c. 1884–1914), who died far before his time after demonstrating almost unbelievable courage by his public and uncompromising opposition to the

4

My Memoirs

gathering storm of the twentieth century’s first holocaust. In fact, Thabit alSuwaydi was assassinated by agents of the Young Turks8 in mid-August 1914, almost three months before the Ottoman Empire entered World War I, after making clear that he was unalterably opposed to the recently announced policy of the then-governor of Diyarbakir Province in Anatolia to commit genocide against the Armenian and Christian Arab populations of that area.9 Thabit’s death thrust Yusuf al-Suwaydi (1851–1929), father of the five al-Suwaydi sons, into the deepest of mourning. After Thabit’s assassination, Istanbul never had the slightest chance to resolve its differences with Yusuf al-Suwaydi. Yusuf’s anti-Turkification efforts in Iraq in 1913 and those of his son Tawfiq in Paris in the same year were transformed after 1918 into the secular Arab nationalism that dominated Arab discourse and politics for the next half century. The Young Turks knew the al-Suwaydi family well, and not only because of its distinguished lineage. Thabit, like his younger brother Tawfiq, had studied in Istanbul and was personally familiar to the authorities there. Like Tawfiq, Thabit was a gifted student. A graduate of both the Ottoman School of Public Administration (the Mulkiyyahana) and the Istanbul College of Law, Thabit was appointed attaché to the governor (wali) of Baghdad in 1911 and by 1914 was hoping to become the governor of Diyarbakir Province. But any such governorship, like so much else, was simply not to be. Thabit’s outspoken opposition to the gathering massacre of the Armenians persuaded the Turks, after lengthy negotiations, to deny him the Diyarbakir appointment and to dispatch him to serve as district commissioner of Roum Khalah, a remote and unimportant locality in the Province of Aleppo. Even that demotion, however, proved insufficient to satisfy the bloodthirsty Ottoman governor of the Province of Diyarbakir, Rashid Beg al-Jarkasi, as subsequent events were to demonstrate.10 In al-Jarkasi’s opinion, Thabit simply knew too much about what was actually happening to the Armenians and other Christians in Diyarbakir Province and was more than likely to cast a spotlight on the Diyarbakir horrors once he reached Aleppo. Therefore, al-Jarkasi sent his thugs to make sure that Thabit never arrived at his destination. The sad and sudden end of Thabit’s life, and the reaction to Thabit’s death by his father Yusuf, are related in poignant detail by Sulayman Faidhi, a contemporary and personal friend of Thabit in Faidhi’s own memoirs, introduced and edited by his son, Basil Faidhi. By all indications, the following account of these events constitutes the first time this incident has ever been related in English. For his part, Sulayman Faidhi describes in unforgettable fashion his meeting with Thabit alSuwaydi in mid-August 1914, not far outside Aleppo, possibly only an hour or less before Thabit was killed: On August 25, 1914, we [Sulayman Faidhi and the two other representatives of Basra Province who were serving in the Ottoman parliament] left

Introduction

5

Istanbul after attending the [last] session of parliament [before the beginning of World War I]. On our way back to Baghdad and on to Basra we stopped in Aleppo where we visited with the Governor to request that he provide us the needed protection for our unsafe journey to Baghdad. We left Aleppo in three carriages, one carriage for ourselves, one carriage for our luggage, and a third carriage for our guards. Ja‘far al-‘Askari, Commander of the Gendarmerie of the Province of Aleppo, who had arranged the protection for us, and many other young men from Aleppo came to say goodbye. Several hours [after we left Aleppo] we saw some people coming in our direction and when we stopped to greet them we saw that it was Thabit al-Suwaydi and three of his guards. We descended from our carriages and hugged one another. Then Thabit began to tell us this story: “I was District Commissioner (Qaimacam or Kaim-Makam) based in the town of al-Bashairia in the Province of Diyarbakir. An order came from the government [in Istanbul] to the Governor (Wali) of Diyarbakir, Rashid Beg al-Jarkasi, to kill all the Armenians who were living in the Province of Diyarbakir. The governor ordered some of his Jarkas guards to slaughter the Armenians and the Christians. The killing was so brutal that it is too savage to describe. No one was to be spared . . . children, women, and old men were all to be killed. I objected to the killing of the Armenians and also to the killing of Arab Christians. . . . I wrote a letter to the governor [al-Jarkasi] describing the brutal manner in which the Jarkas gangs he sent were killing Arab Christians and the Armenians. The governor has become very angry with me and has accused me of protecting the Armenians and has complained to the government in Istanbul. This is the reason why the Government of Turkey has transferred me to a small place called Roum Khalah in Aleppo Province and you have met me as I proceed to this place.” We rested and we ate together and then we set out on our respective journeys, Thabit to Roum Khalah and we to Baghdad. When we arrived in Baghdad on August 31, 1914 we were received by an enormous crowd of important people, including poets, writers, and those from the newspaper. . . . But missing from the crowd was my great friend, Yusuf al-Suwaydi. Because I knew how much Yusuf cared for me, I went directly to visit him at his mansion. I found him very distressed and sad. When he saw me, he was overcome with emotion. I felt there was something desperately wrong. I began to tell him of my trip and meeting with Thabit. Yusuf began to cry and he said, “They have killed Thabit. They killed him before he reached his destination.” I was overcome with emotion because I had loved Thabit from the first day I met him as he was noble, brave, and sincere. We cried together with heavy hearts. I knew Thabit was extraordinarily courageous. He was extremely loyal to his beliefs and principles. After a while of being with Yusuf, I departed with sadness and the sound of the weeping of the old man still in my ears.11

Although Tawfiq al-Suwaydi does not mention this incident in his memoirs, it does provide context for Tawfiq’s own commitment to ecumenism and his lifelong struggle to combat prejudice and intolerance. He and Thabit were clearly chips from the same block. Yusuf al-Suwaydi raised his sons well, and indeed in a fashion quite extraordinary for Iraq and the Middle East as a whole in his time. Liberalism, pluralism, and especially compassion for those under siege were as much tenets of Tawfiq’s

6

My Memoirs

personal philosophy as they were of his brother Thabit’s. This posture of the al-Suwaydi family was to have a major influence on the course of events in Iraq as the years and decades passed. Many readers of My Memoirs will delight in encountering Tawfiq alSuwaydi, an architect of the enlightened Arab nationalism presaged in Arab student circles in Istanbul and Paris during the few short years before 1914. Successors to two generations of the nineteenth-century Arab activists first described by George Antonius in his classic volume, The Arab Awakening, originally published in 1939, Tawfiq and his student colleagues in Istanbul and Paris honed their teeth on opposition to the Turkification policies and centralizing reforms undertaken by the Young Turks after 1908. They demanded Arab political and cultural autonomy within a reformed, decentralized, and liberalized Ottoman Empire. During those early years, Tawfiq never argued for Arab independence or revolt, and used all of his already considerable influence to make sure that his colleagues did likewise. He hardly needed to have done so. As he makes clear in his memoirs, during the 1908–1914 period, what later became Arab nationalism was notable only by its absence. Tensions had increased between Turks and Arabs in Iraq and elsewhere because of the Turkification policies of Istanbul, but in those prewar years, Arab sentiment did not assume any form that could be recognized as clearly nationalistic. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi specifically mentions the paucity of Arab national sentiment in Iraq at the time and notes that in the Hejaz it was totally absent, with at least urbanite Hejazis insisting that they were in fact not Arabs. He remarks that he personally, despite the good fortune of being born into one of the most educated families in Iraq, thought of himself as an Ottoman Muslim with “only the most illusory sense of myself as an Arab.” And he rightly asks: If this was his particular situation as an early adolescent, what must have been the situation of the general Iraqi population? But all that was to change, and soon. It was in Istanbul, in the very belly of the Ottoman Empire, that Arabs of different ages and degrees of sophistication first came together to create the beginnings of a new, “imagined community,” which shortly after World War I coalesced into what has long been known as Arab nationalism. In truth, one would be only slightly exaggerating to say that when Tawfiq al-Suwaydi first arrived in Istanbul in 1909 at the age of seventeen to continue his studies in law after one year of preparatory work at the Baghdad Law Faculty, he was by his own admission something of a country bumpkin in comparison with the much more cosmopolitan Syrians whose circle he joined. However, intensive discussions with them in and outside of the Istanbul Literary Forum (al-Muntada al-Adabi) provided him a priceless political education, one that he put immediately to good use after his arrival in Paris in 1912 (then speaking no French) to continue his legal studies at the Sorbonne. Subsequent to his graduation in 1914 (by then

7

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as a law student in Istanbul, standing, back row, extreme right, ca. 1910

8

My Memoirs

speaking fluent French), he worked briefly as secretary to a committee charged with revision of Shamsuddin Sami’s French-Turkish dictionary. In 1919, immediately upon his return to Iraq after the war, a very different Tawfiq al-Suwaydi attempted to “awaken” Iraqis to the nascent Arab national movement in order to rally them against the “odious” British administration being established there. In that, as he relates in these memoirs, he was totally unsuccessful, as poverty, ignorance, and low popular morale frustrated his efforts and those of other members of the returning alSuwaydi family. The British noted all of these initiatives and were certainly less than pleased. In 1919, the fact that both England and France blocked trips to Europe that Tawfiq had been invited to make speaks volumes about how he was already regarded by the principal European powers. But all that is getting ahead of the story. In 1913, while still almost a child, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi built on the grounding he had acquired in Istanbul to emerge as an architect and major intellectual catalyst of the seminal First Arab Congress, held in Paris in June of that year. Indeed, Tawfiq was already respected enough to succeed in persuading his colleagues to change the name of the proposed gathering from the Syrian Arab Congress to the more comprehensively Arabist designation of the First Arab Congress. As he observes in his memoirs, some of the deference he was accorded was a direct result of his distinguished family line. Deference aside, and as implied by the new name of the congress, what later became Arab nationalism first manifested itself in Paris. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi played a major role in cultivating this new plant, which was to grow so quickly and proliferate so widely. In Paris, one crucial venue for the transmission of Arabism was a café at the corner of the boulevards Saint Germain and Saint Michel where Tawfiq al-Suwaydi and other young Arabs met regularly in 1912 and 1913 to share plans and dreams for the future. As in the cases of many of his associates, Tawfiq’s activities in Paris were not restricted to conversations over coffee but, as his memoirs attest, also included undercover and far more dangerous ventures. In fact, at different times before, during, and after World War I, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was a member of both al-Fatat (the Young Arab Society) and al-‘Ahd (the Arab Covenant), underground societies of Arab activists strongly opposed to perceived Ottoman repression in Arab lands. Al-Fatat was founded in Damascus in 1911 by Izzat Darwaza, and al‘Ahd in 1913 by ‘Aziz ‘Ali al-Misri. Al-‘Ahd grouped together Arab officers from Mesopotamia serving in the Ottoman army. In 1918, upon the conclusion of World War I, al-‘Ahd created a section for civilians, which Tawfiq promptly joined. Before 1918, for Tawfiq as well as for other Paris al-Fatat cell members such as Ahmad Rustum Haydar, ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Uraysi, Jamil Mardam, ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi, and Rafiq al-Tamimi, detection and arrest by the Ottoman authorities would almost certainly have entailed the gravest of

Introduction

9

consequences. By all indications, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi echoed the values of his elder brother Thabit as a man of high principle and one who from an early age risked his life to advance the positions in which he believed. When Tawfiq al-Suwaydi helped to convoke the First Arab Congress in 1913, he and his colleagues had substantial material in the Levant and Egypt on which to draw. Beirut, of course, had known protonationalist stirrings since the middle of the previous century, and these developments were hardly unknown to intellectuals in Cairo. In 1913, as he notes in his memoirs, the desire for decentralization and Arab cultural autonomy within the Ottoman Empire had come to be represented by the new Reform Society in Beirut and the Decentralization Party in Cairo. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was well aware that the Beirut Reform Society, founded in January 1913 and directed by the modernist Beiruti notable Salim ‘Ali Salam, had almost immediately issued a statement concerning the “Project of Reforms to be applied to the Province of Beirut,” and that this statement had been endorsed by the Decentralization Party in Egypt. The Lebanese delegates to the First Arab Congress met with some members of this party en route to Paris. Financial support for the Levantine participants was provided by a “public subscription,” indicating significant popular approval for their mission. In the event, whatever agreement was thought by the Arabs to have been reached with the Turks and supposedly sanctioned by a great banquet between the two sides crumbled almost before the ink was dry. Recriminations from Beirut and elsewhere swiftly followed, accusing the congressistes in Paris of having allowed themselves to be duped. This episode was hardly the last of the many disappointments that Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was to experience during his long and distinguished career. These memoirs contain the text of the important welcoming address that Tawfiq delivered to the delegates assembled in Paris. In that allocution, Tawfiq spoke of “[rescuing] the homeland” and “[fomenting] a spirit of renewal in defense of the Arabs’ legitimate rights.” He adduced what he optimistically called the “single purpose, the single nation and the single message that unites us.” In particular, he asserted that Iraqis were fully as committed to this campaign as were the Syrians, a claim that was manifestly untrue as he himself makes clear elsewhere in his memoirs. No matter: the moment called for exhortation, not sober analysis of realities, and at exhortation, as at so much else, the youthful Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was already a master.12 Tawfiq, along with his father, Yusuf, and his brothers Naji and ‘Arif, may well have shared some of the general detestation of the Young Turks characteristic of the Iraqi ashraf because of a well-grounded fear that, as provided for in Article 20 of the Young Turk Constitution of 1908, their financial immunities were about to be repealed, and they would be taxed in the future according to their means. For the sadah elite in general, such was

10

My Memoirs

the stuff of nightmares. Worse, according to Article 14 of the Program of the Committee of Union and Progress, their agricultural holdings were to be partitioned and redistributed among the peasantry. On paper, all this portended nothing less than a comprehensive financial and agrarian revolution in Iraq and the end of traditional Iraqi society. As Hanna Batatu observes, “it [was] not only concern for their Arab cultural identity . . . that drove the sadah and other Arab landed magnates to seek autonomy. They sought it also . . . to prolong the life of the old social institutions from which they benefited.”13 Whatever such concerns may have been for young Tawfiq al-Suwaydi and his family, all evidence suggests that Tawfiq’s personal role in convening the First Arab Congress in 1913 stemmed primarily from a heartfelt commitment to precisely those Arabist convictions that these memoirs reveal. The Arab delegates in Paris believed that they had achieved a great victory by reaching an agreement with the Young Turks that satisfied all of their major demands. The Turks agreed, or so they thought, that Arabic was henceforth to be an official language throughout the Arab provinces, that Arab troops in the Ottoman army were to be deployed only within the Arab world in time of war, and that local government in Arab regions would in the future be dominated by the Arabs themselves. The Young Turks smiled but in fact had not the slightest intention of implementing any such reforms. Turkification and centralization were what Istanbul desired and indeed had wanted since shortly after the Young Turk revolution in 1908, which, during its early months, had stirred great enthusiasm in the Arab world. In 1913 as earlier, Arab disillusionment was rapid and bitter. The hopes of the elite of a generation seemed gone with the wind. On their return from Paris, delegates to the First Arab Congress were greeted by widespread anger from important people. For example, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi recounts in his memoirs that Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who would lead the Arab Revolt only three years later, promptly denounced the work of the congressistes in Paris as a betrayal of the Ottoman homeland. More opposition erupted especially in Iraq, where a dissident campaign led by the ever conspiratorial Sayyid Talib al-Naqib of Basra facilitated abortion by the Young Turks of all that they had supposedly agreed to in Paris. Nevertheless, the die had been cast. In only a few short years, what participants in the First Arab Congress briefly thought they had accomplished in 1913 became the foundation for a new and much more demanding postwar Arab political nationalism focused on achieving independence for the Arab mandates placed under the rule of the French and British heirs to the late Ottoman Empire. Giants stride across the pages of these memoirs. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi interacted personally with many of the most important figures of the twentieth century. The verbal snapshots he provides of many of them are riveting: A. T. Wilson, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Adnan Menderes, Gamal Abdel Nasser,

Introduction

11

King Ibn al-Sa‘ud, Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, St. John (Jack) Philby, King Faisal I of Syria and Iraq, Moshe Sharett, the Mufti of Jerusalem Amin al-Husseini, Rabbi Stephen Wise, Anthony Eden, Eamon de Valera, Lord George Curzon, Louis Massignon, Benito Mussolini, George Antonius, Christian Herter, Reza Shah Pahlavi, John Foster Dulles, Habib Bourguiba, and Kings Abdullah and Hussein of Jordan are all here. Tawfiq alSuwaydi, with his international education and command of French, German, Turkish, Farsi, English, and Italian, was for decades the obvious candidate in Iraq for the post of foreign minister, a position that he held on several occasions and one that facilitated his meetings with so many of the major personalities of his time. What were the familial influences that shaped this remarkable individual? What was it like in the 1930s and 1940s to be a child growing up in Baghdad in the household of such an eminent figure as Tawfiq al-Suwaydi? What was the material basis for the eminence of the al-Suwaydi family? Fortunately, personal testimony on these matters by Tawfiq’s son, Luay alSuwaydi, is available, and his recollections and those of others shed light not only on the al-Suwaydi family but also on Iraq itself during the turbulent decades that marked his father’s career. Some attention to these matters will hopefully enable readers to better appreciate the world about which these memoirs were written. When Luay al-Suwaydi was born, Tawfiq’s father Yusuf reportedly threw gold coins on Baghdad’s streets to express his joy at the safe arrival of his new grandson.14 By all accounts the al-Suwaydi household was a harmonious one, and Luay al-Suwaydi recalls a happy childhood. Tawfiq made a point of having breakfast with his children regularly because he often could not take dinner at home as a result of meetings connected with pressing affairs of state. When Tawfiq could eat dinner with the family, conversations not surprisingly revolved around economics and politics. Once the children had reached the age of eight, the al-Suwaydi family would frequently retire to one of the private boxes reserved for government officials or VIPs at one of Baghdad’s major movie theaters to see whatever Englishlanguage film happened to be showing. There the elder al-Suwaydi would translate or summarize the story line in Arabic for the children. Clearly, going to the movies en famille was the way that the al-Suwaydis structured quality family time for themselves and their offspring. Luay recalls being taken as a child by his father to Tawfiq’s Baghdad tailor, where a blue blazer and a pair of gray trousers were made for him. The elder al-Suwaydi was himself an elegant dresser, fittingly so for a scion of the ashraf class. Luay recalls that his father’s favorite tailor was not in Baghdad but on Savile Row in London. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was in fact at home almost everywhere in the world and was uniquely qualified not only for his frequent terms of service as Iraqi minister of foreign affairs, but also

12

My Memoirs

for the ambassadorships he held in Iran and at the League of Nations and the United Nations. Luay al-Suwaydi remembers his mother as a loving woman but says that his father had the greatest influence on him. His mother Fakhriya (née al-Sa‘dun) had a passion for music and was herself a pianist. However, Tawfiq did not encourage his children, and in particular Luay, to develop an interest in music. Fakhriya al-Sa‘dun, daughter of ‘Abd al-Karim al-Sa‘dun, brother of ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun, attended the Alliance Française high school in Basra where she was schooled by French nuns. Since Iraqi women did not attend universities in the early twentieth century, Fakhriya was clearly among the tiny elite of educated women in the country. Although she was not the decisive influence on Luay, all of her children certainly benefited from growing up in a household over which she presided. Fakhriya ‘Abd al-Karim al-Sa‘dun’s marriage in 1924 to Tawfiq alSuwaydi had an enormous influence on the latter’s career. It cemented the already close relationship between the al-Suwaydi and al-Sa‘dun families and won Tawfiq the personal and political patronage of ‘Abd al-Muhsin alSa‘dun (1879–1929), the most important Iraqi politician of the 1920s. This relationship was a critical factor in Tawfiq’s becoming in 1929 the youngest prime minister in Iraq’s brief mandatory history. The al-Sa‘dun family was a wealthy and powerful one, holding vast tracts of land in southern Iraq and long providing the most powerful chiefs of the Muntafiq tribal confederation of Basra Province. As Tawfiq’s memoirs attest, when ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun committed suicide on November 13, 1929, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi lost his greatest political ally as well as an individual who had become his closest personal friend. According to Hanna Batatu, ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun was something of a modernist, having been educated in Istanbul and having served for a decade in the Ottoman parliament. Batatu maintains, however, that alSa‘dun was most definitely not a nationalist. On the contrary, he argues that during most of the 1920s al-Sa‘dun served as a willing conduit for British rule in Iraq. In his memoirs, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi disagrees sharply with Batatu’s assessment. Al-Suwaydi points out that ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun was bilingual in Turkish and Arabic as a result of his long years of service in Istanbul and had come to know the Turks and their permanent geostrategic ambitions intimately. According to al-Suwaydi, ‘Abd al-Muhsin alSa‘dun was highly suspicious of Turkish designs in Kurdistan and was in reality a nationalist soul mate of both Tawfiq and his older brother Naji. Naji, indeed, was one of the few representatives of the first families of Iraq to join the pro-German coup spearheaded by Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani in 1941, a fatal misjudgment on Naji’s part that led to his internment by the British in Rhodesia and his death there in 1942. Concerning al-Sa‘dun, what is noteworthy is that Tawfiq al-Suwaydi goes to some length in these

Introduction

13

memoirs to correct any impression of ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun as merely a tool of the British.15 Tawfiq goes so far as to call al-Sa‘dun a “hero,” and recounts the reasons that al-Sa‘dun personally recounted to him for not confronting the British before the late 1920s. Al-Sa‘dun’s silence, as he himself explained it to al-Suwaydi, stemmed from al-Sa‘dun’s conviction that during the early years of British rule in Iraq, the threats to the country from Turkey, Iran, France, and the Saudi Wahhabis were simply too great to risk losing the shield of British protection. However family connections may have affected Tawfiq’s judgment, it is important to have on the historical record his strongly positive assessment of ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun as an Iraqi patriot and nationalist. Despite the demise of ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun, the careers of both Tawfiq and his brother Naji continued without missing a beat. Indeed, Naji succeeded Tawfiq as Iraqi prime minister, serving from mid-November 1929 until March 1930. In 1931, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was appointed Iraq’s first ambassador to Iran. In Tehran, he spent the next two years focusing on Iraqi-Iranian border issues, the Shatt al-‘Arab, and above all the eternal Kurdish issue with which Iraq, Iran, and Turkey were all deeply concerned. Tawfiq argued consistently in favor of a more flexible policy toward the Kurds than either the Turks or Iranians were willing to countenance. In recognition of a job well done, and especially because of the Assyrian crisis that erupted during the summer of 1933, Tawfiq was urgently recalled from Iran and promoted in October 1933 to serve as Iraq’s first permanent delegate to the League of Nations in Geneva. In early 1934, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi took a hard line in Geneva on the Assyrian issue, which had exploded in August 1933 when Iraqi Kurdish general Bakr Sidqi oversaw the massacre of several hundred unarmed Assyrians in northern Iraq. Indeed, Tawfiq’s dislike of the Assyrians, whom many Iraqis considered mercenaries and traitors because of their military service in Britain’s Assyrian Levies, comes through clearly in his memoirs. Tawfiq Pasha goes so far as to accuse the Assyrians of both “foolishness” and “wickedness.” Quite obviously, Tawfiq’s antipathy to the Assyrians stands in stark contrast to his flexible and accommodating attitude toward the Iraqi Kurds. The fact is that the Assyrian Levies, a well-trained and highly effective military force, were commanded entirely by British officers, operated outside any control by the Iraqi army, and had been used for years by the British to repress both Arab and Kurdish disturbances. It is hardly surprising that, as an Iraqi and Arab nationalist, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi had no use for the Assyrian Levies in particular or the Iraqi Assyrian community in general, which had consistently opposed the Iraqi campaign for independence from Britain. Despite his detestation of Bakr Sidqi, which Tawfiq later makes clear, he says nothing specific in his memoirs about Sidqi’s massacre of the Assyrians and rejects with some contempt the protestations issuing

14

My Memoirs

especially from Britain and Norway concerning Iraqi treatment of the Assyrians subsequent to the massacre. Though they were far from among the largest landholders in Iraq, the alSuwaydis did possess large tracts of agricultural land in Baghdad Province, accumulated by Tawfiq’s father Yusuf and his ancestors. Owning 8,704 dunams of land, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi ranked fifth among Iraqi prime ministers or their descendants in the extent of his holdings as of the year 1958.16 In the same year, Tawfiq’s brother Naji’s direct descendants were in possession of an additional 1,110 dunams.17 In other words, at the time of the Iraqi revolution on July 14, 1958, the al-Suwaydi family collectively owned 9,814 dunams of land, which, although dwarfed by the 34,337 dunams controlled by the descendants of Hamdi al-Pachachi, boosted the al-Suwaydis into third place among the wealthiest landholding families in Iraq who had had a member serve as an Iraqi prime minister.18 Nevertheless, in 1958 they were relatively minor landholders if compared with the fifty-five largest landholding families in the country, defined as those owning more than 30,000 dunams. The al-Suwaydis were not among that elite group in the last year of the monarchy. At that time, the wealthiest landholding family in Iraq was one headed by Jaf Begadah, a Sunni Kurd, who owned the astounding total of 539,333 dunams.19 Whatever the relative amounts of land the al-Suwaydis possessed at various times in the history of Iraq, the revenue they earned undoubtedly provided a comfortable annual income. During World War II, Tawfiq owned a cigarette factory named Western Tobacco, which did very well. In 1950 Tawfiq became the owner of a medical dispensary after acquiring it from an individual named Gourdhi, a Jew departing Baghdad. At approximately the same time he also acquired a 38 percent interest in an Iraqi Coca-Cola franchise. Tawfiq also made shrewd investments in cement factories. In 1947, when the Central Bank of Iraq was established, Tawfiq’s long advocacy of that institution and his general financial acumen were recognized when he was invited to serve as honorary governor. He refused any financial compensation for his services. Readers of these memoirs will have a ringside seat at some of the most dramatic events in the Middle East from 1913 through 1958. The timing of publication could not be more propitious given the momentous events now occurring in the region. Sadly, contemporary examples of those retrograde forces that Tawfiq al-Suwaydi condemned so often in his memoirs now seem to be gathering in parts of the Arab world. This trend would surely constitute a source of concern for Tawfiq were he with us yet. Today, more than two years since the commencement of the so-called Arab Spring, the “liberalism” of the secular and Facebook revolutionaries in Tahrir Square risks being increasingly undermined by something far darker. Nevertheless, the end of the story remains to be written.

Introduction

15

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was extraordinarily fortunate to have enjoyed a cosmopolitan upbringing and an international education that was almost unheard of among Iraqis of his time. In Baghdad, as a child, he studied at the Alliance Israelite Universelle elementary school, where most of his classmates were Jewish. The Alliance Israelite primary school was easily the best in Iraq as the twentieth century dawned, and Tawfiq joined the sons of a few other Muslim sadah who were sent there because of the quality of that education.20 Later, as a teenage student of law in Istanbul, he learned Turkish and was introduced to Ottoman governance and ways of thought. Then followed his sojourn in Paris and his acquisition of French, which he regarded throughout his life with almost as much affection as he did Arabic. The cosmopolitanism of Tawfiq’s formation has surely been rivaled by few others, in Iraq or elsewhere, before or since. Despite his leadership of the second Arab Awakening before World War I, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi proved himself a loyal Ottoman once war began. Unlike so many other prominent Arabs, he did not betray the Turks but served loyally in the Turkish army throughout the conflict. Particularly riveting is his account of how he survived the chaos of the collapse of the Ottoman military in 1918 and subsequently organized and led a camel caravan, which consisted of more than 100 other Iraqis stranded in Palestine at the close of the conflict, to Iraq across the bandit-infested Syrian desert. Those were dramatic days, days of which Tawfiq was to see so many, as the epic events that swirled around him shaped the world in which we now live. These memoirs constitute a magisterial survey of Ottoman and Arab history from the late nineteenth century through the mid-1960s. They stretch from the first stirrings of Arab nationalism in the twentieth century to shortly before the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, which killed an Arab nationalism already deformed by Nasserism and Baathism. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was a master storyteller whose memoirs vividly explain how the Arab world that he knew so well and shaped so significantly came to be. His memoirs are a major stimulus to recollection of a world now gone but once so widespread and attractive. Tawfiq’s moving verbal portrait of that now largely vanished world may be his most important intellectual contribution of all. For centuries the al-Suwaydis produced counselors of state who left significant marks on their times. For example, in the early nineteenth century ‘Ali al-Suwaydi emerged as an authoritative political mentor of Sulayman the Little, pasha of Baghdad from 1806 to 1810. Moreover, the alSuwaydis have consistently been distinguished by their ecumenical leanings, especially and perhaps uniquely so in relation to the Iraqi Shiite community. One early example of such leanings was the attempt mounted in Najaf in 1743 by ‘Abdullah bin Hussein al-Suwaydi, father of the historian ‘Abdul Rahman al-Suwaydi, to facilitate reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites by serving as political emissary for the Mamluks of Baghdad and the Ottoman

16

My Memoirs

Empire to Nadir Shah of Persia. When those negotiations failed and Nadir Shah besieged Baghdad for a second time, ‘Abdullah was so devoid of antiShiite prejudice that he approached the Shiite sadah of Karbala and asked them to act as the guardians of his children, ‘Abdul Rahman being the eldest. This the Karbala Shiites agreed to do, promising not to proselytize on behalf of Shiite beliefs. ‘Abdullah al-Suwaydi’s ecumenical commitments were obviously well known and respected and evoked similarly honorable, transsectarian behavior from the Shiite elite in Karbala.21 Much more recently, Tawfiq’s father, Yusuf al-Suwaydi, played a not dissimilar ecumenical role in helping to organize the great Iraqi revolt of 1920 against the British. He worked vigorously during early 1920 to foster fraternization between Sunnis and Shiites in the mosques of Baghdad and to incite the tribes of the Middle Euphrates to rebellion. That incitement led the British to raid Yusuf’s home in Baghdad’s Karkh district just west of the Tigris shortly after the outbreak of the 1920 revolt. Sheltered long enough by supportive demonstrators outside his residence, Yusuf managed to escape and continue his agitation from other locations. Two years later, in 1922, he was certainly among the leading Sunnis of Baghdad supportive of collaboration with Iraqi Shiites to resist future raids by Sunni Wahhabis from Arabia, such as the one that had killed hundreds of Shiites in southern Iraq earlier that year. Yusuf’s ecumenism has been echoed since the mid-1980s by his grandson, Luay al-Suwaydi, who has long had a Shiite business partner, Ghazi al-Allawi. Clearly, the al-Suwaydi family maintains its centuries-old tradition as an advocate and practitioner of Sunni-Shiite collaboration. An additional word is in order concerning Yusuf al-Suwaydi to illustrate why both Turks and British feared him, and why during most of Tawfiq’s career the British had little use for him, his older brother Naji, or indeed any other members of the al-Suwaydi family. During the period between 1921 and 1958, the British regarded the al-Suwaydis as too independent, too nationalistic, and too well rooted in the Iraqi past to be kept on anything but a very short leash. Archival evidence in particular speaks strongly to the respect and influence the al-Suwaydi family commanded within Iraq on the eve of World War I. In 1913, at the very moment when his son Tawfiq was in Paris demanding an end to Turkish centralization of authority in the Ottoman Arab provinces, Yusuf was arrested by the Turks in Baghdad on suspicion of complicity in the assassination in Iraq of Mahmoud Shevket, the Ottoman grand vizier, who had been a leader of the April 1908 coup that deposed Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II and brought the Young Turks to power. The assassination of such an important symbol of the Ottoman Empire was headline news in 1913. Under threat from the Shammar tribe to which the al-Suwaydis belonged, and lacking any hard evidence of Yusuf’s involvement in the plot to assassinate the grand vizier, the Turks released Yusuf but quietly awaited

17

Yusuf al-Suwaydi, father of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, seated in the garden of his Baghdad estate on the Tigris, 1920s

18

My Memoirs

their chance to remove him from the political arena. That moment arrived in 1914. Although Yusuf was still in Baghdad in the late summer of 1914, the Young Turks shortly thereafter deported him to Konya in Anatolia, where he was held for most of the remainder of the war. French archives show the extent of the admiration Yusuf enjoyed in Iraq in 1913, and this admiration appears to have convinced the Turks that any immediate move against Yusuf al-Suwaydi was neither in their own interests nor conducive to social peace in Mesopotamia. In June 1913, the French consul in Baghdad reported to Paris on the “satisfaction” felt by most Baghdadis at the demise of the grand vizier and the “rejoicing” of most of the city’s leading personalities over his death.22 The consul described the strongly negative reaction in Iraq to the detention of Yusuf al-Suwaydi and his fear that Iraqis from the countryside might storm the city to obtain Yusuf’s release. According to the consul, the arrest of Yusuf al-Suwaydi was ordered by the Ottoman military governor in Istanbul in order to satisfy his personal rancor against Yusuf. Apparently, Yusuf al-Suwaydi’s eminence within Iraq was not at all to the military governor’s liking. In the consul’s words, “[Al-Suwaydi], as a result of his wealth, his dignity, and the important positions he has held as qadi [judge] and most recently as a member of the Administrative Council, counts as one of the most important Muslim notables of Baghdad.”23 This incident, occurring so early in the twentieth century, attests to the stature the alSuwaydis were accorded by their countrymen and foreshadows the important roles that both Yusuf and his sons Tawfiq and Naji were to play over the coming years. The assassination of Thabit in 1914, while perhaps satisfying to certain circles in Istanbul, in no way prevented Yusuf or the alSuwaydi family as a whole from reasserting their leadership role in Iraq as soon as the Great War was over. Interestingly, the French consul noted that the large Shammar tribe had plenty of muscle in rural Iraq. Yusuf al-Suwaydi and his kinsmen belonged to the al-Jarba branch of the mighty Shammar confederation, which today has some 3 million members in Iraq and perhaps a million and a half in northern Saudi Arabia. The consul reported in 1913 that Yusuf had assiduously maintained his relationships with the Shammar, and that his ability to rally Shammar clout on his behalf contributed as much to his political power as did his wealth, family name, and public service. In the consul’s opinion, there existed a clear danger that the Shammar tribe would attack and occupy Baghdad in order to free Yusuf. The Ottomans clearly thought so, as they promptly released Yusuf and those arrested with him. But they definitely did not forget what realities on the ground had forced them to do so. Buoyed by his tribal support, Yusuf al-Suwaydi and others immediately began to demonstrate in favor of “Arab ideas” and their holy grail, decentralization within the Ottoman Empire.24 At precisely the moment when his

Introduction

19

son was orchestrating pan-Arab opposition to Turkification at the First Arab Congress in Paris in 1913, Yusuf al-Suwaydi was rallying Iraqis to the same cause from Baghdad. The simultaneous campaigns of father and son against Turkification, waged so far apart, say much about the commitments of the al-Suwaydi family and the world that Tawfiq al-Suwaydi describes so vividly in these memoirs. As early as 1919, the British were well aware of the al-Suwaydis and their stature as distinguished Iraqi sadah. They developed an (understandable) prejudice against Naji al-Suwaydi, who joined the Rashid ‘Ali alGaylani revolt in 1941 and a (much less understandable) prejudice against Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, whose reputation they sullied for decades up to and including 1958 by helping to circulate rumors that he was both moneygrubbing and extraordinarily corrupt. To support those charges, the British never offered a smidgen of specific evidence. Tawfiq’s memoirs should be read with knowledge of this backdrop reality. The traditional order of Iraqi society, the old world that Iraqis had known for centuries and into which Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was born, was still very much in place in Iraq in 1913. Nationalism and political boundaries aside, these memoirs paint a haunting portrait of an isolated, ignorant, socially retrograde backwater of the Ottoman Empire whose inhabitants knew nothing of the liberal values that Tawfiq al-Suwaydi had imbibed from his parents and had confirmed through his cosmopolitan education in Istanbul and Paris. That traditional world, a product of the catastrophic sacking of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258, followed by centuries of additional invasions, tribal warfare, famines, plagues, droughts, and floods, cast a long shadow extending well into the 1930s, which, as al-Suwaydi explains, had much to do with the poor quality of human capital in Iraq, and the striking fact that for many years even a substantial percentage of the members of the Iraqi parliament were illiterate. As late as 1924, 95 percent of the general Iraqi population remained unable to read or write. Hence, to say that Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was a man ahead of his time would be a monumental understatement.25 The first three years of Tawfiq’s own life were marked by devastating floods in Baghdad, but these pale when compared with the famines and plagues of 1621, 1633, 1635, and especially 1802–1803, when “most of the people of Iraq were annihilated.”26 Meanwhile, Persia made its own contribution to turning Iraq and especially Baghdad into a huge cemetery. For example in 1623, Persia massacred hundreds of thousands of Sunnis and sold thousands of others into slavery. In 1733, Persians laid siege to Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, causing the death of more than 100,000 people from starvation and disease. In 1831, only some sixty years before Tawfiq was born, plague, flood, siege, and famine combined to reduce the population of Baghdad from approximately 80,000 to a mere 27,000 individuals. Batatu is

20

My Memoirs

on solid ground in pointing out that into modern times Baghdad was a “deathtrap” and a “devourer of people.”27 This, truly, was the same ancient world with all its assorted scourges that both Yusuf and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi knew in their childhood and that Tawfiq worked so energetically to improve and uplift throughout his professional career. In his memoirs, Tawfiq paints a vivid portrait of Iraq at the beginning of the twentieth century. For example, in 1905, at the time of the RussoJapanese War, he notes that very few Iraqis had the slightest idea where Japan even was. Certainly, “equality” or “brotherhood” between Muslims and non-Muslims, or any sense of citizenship or a civic polity, was utterly beyond the Iraqi imagination. “Justice” was whatever the sultan did, and freedom, in the Iraqi mind, was the equivalent of fitna, or chaos. As for Iraqi elites at the time, Tawfiq recalls hearing conversations during his childhood between his father and the many distinguished visitors who came to consult with him about politics, agriculture, irrigation, and the latest developments among the tribes. Tellingly, such conversations, as Tawfiq points out, were marked by an air of desperation concerning the Iraqi predicament and a sense that no improvement was possible given the realities of Ottoman rule. These early seminars in Iraqi politics must have played an important role in shaping the liberalism that so prominently characterized Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s subsequent career. Make no mistake: liberalism, in a recognizably modern form, and the cosmopolitan intellectual curiosity essential to any possibility of interfaith cooperation were fundamental characteristics of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s worldview. Early on, he tells us in his memoirs, he developed an interest in language, culture, and politics that served him and Iraq well throughout his lifetime. He was a man of extraordinary intellectual ability, an ability that was recognized early by his teachers in Iraq. In both his nationalist and liberal incarnations, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was opposed to all forms of fanaticism and deeply committed to bringing Iraq and the broader Arab world into the mainstream of twentieth-century history. So much more honestly than many other members of the Arab elite, he faithfully served the cause of Palestine throughout his career. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was a statesman, in the deepest sense of the word, one ever dedicated to fostering what he believed to be best for Iraq and the rising generations in the Arab world. As he notes in these memoirs, Tawfiq was especially concerned with the “psychological liberation” of the Iraqi masses from inherited traditions and restraints. For him, Western European countries, and especially France, were models of the sort of society that Iraq should seek to emulate. Civilization, for Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, was inseparable from acceptance of the modernist path forged by the West. Closer to home, Tawfiq was a great admirer of the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in postwar Turkey. Today, in an age of widespread Islamic fundamentalism, the European and Kemalist models embraced by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi stand out in sharp relief.

Introduction

21

On the political level, Tawfiq’s liberal critique of the Iraqi Constitution of 1924 on the grounds that it deprived Iraqis of “highly significant rights” and failed to create an “unequivocally democratic” political system is noteworthy. More broadly, the fact that he had little use for the monarchy’s continuing reluctance to allow more than the most restrictive parameters for democracy was probably one important reason for the continuing tensions in his relationship with King Faisal I. All this was remarkable for a scion of the Iraqi sadah elite, especially one who frankly recognized the backwardness of so many of his countrymen at the time. Consistently, and certainly at some cost to himself, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi maintained a commitment to a humane liberalism even when adopting other positions would have been more career enhancing and productive of far fewer personal difficulties. More than two decades later, during his second term as prime minister in 1946, he did his best to bestow on Iraq a truly modern, democratic parliamentary system. Had he succeeded, many of the catastrophes of subsequent years might have been avoided, beginning first and foremost with the bloody Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958. But the societal realities against which Tawfiq al-Suwaydi struggled remained monumental throughout his life and indeed far beyond. Arguably, they continue to exist today. In March 1933, no less an authority than King Faisal I commented on the hard truth of the Iraqi situation: “There is still . . . no Iraqi people,” he remarked, “but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common life, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever. Out of these masses we want to fashion a people which we would train, educate, and refine . . . [but given] the circumstances . . . the immenseness of the efforts needed for this [can be imagined].”28 Hanna Batatu notes that “the national or patriotic idea was in 1958 still very weak,” and observes that “even now (in the mid 1970s) it is . . . beyond the comprehension of the masses of the peasants.”29 Although Batatu is speaking here only in the context of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s liberal ministry of 1946, Tawfiq’s grandson arrived at a similar conclusion in 1999.30 Would any of these observations be out of place even today? 31 If Tawfiq al-Suwaydi failed to create the patriotic, ecumenical, and progressive Iraq of which he dreamed, it was surely not because of any lack of effort on his part. In the two turbulent years following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the al-Suwaydis moved among Palestine, Baghdad, and Syria. These memoirs relate some of their peregrinations. Immediately after the Ottoman collapse, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi made contact with Ja‘far al-‘Askari and Yasin al-Hashimi, two individuals who were to play large roles in subsequent Iraqi history. In early 1919, Tawfiq went briefly to Aleppo to help his brother Naji, whom the local population had “elected” to run the city after the Turkish departure. In May and June, father Yusuf, now released from

22

My Memoirs

Ottoman detention, and brother ‘Arif joined Tawfiq and Naji, and all four returned to Baghdad to assess the situation there. Tawfiq’s description of the enthusiastic welcome they received in Baghdad is one more indication of the admiration the al-Suwaydi family enjoyed among Iraqis then and later. As for the British, already well established in Iraq, their reaction was markedly different. In June 1919, with no formal disposition of Iraq having yet been agreed to by the European powers, the British were in no mood to make any commitments concerning the future of Iraq, particularly as far as political independence was concerned. The unsympathetic British high commissioner in Iraq at the time, A. T. Wilson, told Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as much. As Tawfiq notes, the British were candid about their requirements in Mesopotamia, noting that they would have to retain control of Iraq for the foreseeable future in order to guarantee the security of the British Empire in India. Since nothing more could be done at the moment, Tawfiq and Naji departed Baghdad and traveled to Damascus and Aleppo, respectively. In Syria, Tawfiq briefly served as an Islamic judge and taught law at the Damascus Law College. More importantly, he associated himself with King Faisal I, whose unhappy experience as monarch of Syria was terminated by French arms in mid-1920 only four months after Faisal I’s accession to power. This early personal connection with King Faisal I, however, was not necessarily propitious for Tawfiq’s subsequent career. The two men rarely saw eye to eye, Tawfiq’s liberalism and candor never sitting well with Faisal I. As Tawfiq explains in his memoirs, Nuri al-Sa‘id, not he, was always King Faisal I’s man. Nevertheless, King Faisal I did appoint Tawfiq in 1930 as Iraq’s first ambassador to Iran, and Tawfiq was the first to admit that King Faisal I was himself a great man.32 In connection with the immediate postwar years, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s description of the Syrian and Iraqi general congresses held in Damascus in March 1920 is especially important. For Tawfiq, these must have seemed a reprise and validation of the First Arab Congress in 1913. Given the new world that had come into being during the seven years previous and what seemed the political possibilities of the time, the new, postwar demands of Tawfiq and his colleagues were uncompromisingly nationalistic, rejecting the imposition of any mandates and demanding Syrian and Iraqi independence and the departure of all European forces from the Fertile Crescent. Tawfiq chaired the General Iraqi Congress, which proclaimed Iraq an independent state. As he reports, his brother Naji was among those present, along with Ja‘far al-‘Askari, Jamil al-Midfa‘i, and Bakr Sidqi, all of whom would go on to play major roles in Iraqi history. All those present must have realized that their demands were highly unlikely to be realized in the short term, but they clearly believed that the establishment of new, public objectives for the burgeoning Arab national movement was worth the effort.

Introduction

23

From 1921 to 1928, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi served as a legal adviser to the Iraqi government but devoted most of his time to reestablishing Iraq’s Baghdad Law Faculty and serving as its dean. Interestingly, the Law Faculty was almost an al-Suwaydi family institution: moribund since 1914, it had been established by Tawfiq’s father, Yusuf, in 1908, and at age sixteen Tawfiq had been a student in the first class to attend that institution. Despite the challenges of his task as dean, some of which are recounted in his memoirs, one senses that the 1920s were happy years for Tawfiq, providing him an opportunity to engage in the sort of academic work for which he was temperamentally and intellectually so well qualified. During those years in Baghdad he undertook a translation into Arabic of portions of the work of the nineteenth-century French economist Charles Gide. It cannot be determined exactly how much Tawfiq translated of Gide’s two principal works, his Principles of Political Economy and History of Economic Doctrines. However, his objective was apparently to put together work by Gide, who may have been one of his own professors when he studied in Paris, as a textbook in Arabic for use by his students in the Law Faculty. While dean and professor, Tawfiq also wrote copiously and lectured on Roman law, which had been his specialty during his student days in Paris. In short, Tawfiq was clearly an excellent scholar as well as so much else. Future years were only to confirm the breadth of his capabilities. During most of the 1920s, Tawfiq’s only major detours from the academy were his ultimately successful missions, in conjunction with the British, to Saudi Arabia in the middle of the decade to negotiate with King Ibn al-Sa‘ud concerning establishment of security along the Iraqi-Saudi frontier. These he recounts in somewhat amusing detail in his memoirs. In 1928, ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun appointed Tawfiq minister of education, and in 1929 Tawfiq was first called to serve as prime minister. From 1929 onward his career unfolded in the political and diplomatic arenas that Tawfiq discusses in such detail in these memoirs. His business interests, which evolved in parallel with his diplomatic career, are not matters to which he gives attention in his memoirs. Throughout his decades as an internationally recognized Iraqi public figure, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s commitment to Arab nationalism was never challenged. Unlike his more radical or romantic elder brother Naji, who made the fatal mistake of joining Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani’s movement in 1941, Tawfiq’s nationalism was always based on a sober analysis of facts on the ground as they existed at any particular time. Israel was a case in point. On that score, he cautioned his compatriots years later to be “realistic” rather than “sentimental,” and constantly to keep in mind who stood behind Israel. Sadly, too many Arabs, then and later, chose not to listen to Tawfiq but opted to follow the romantic path espoused by Naji. The result was that decades later Arab nationalism, based on what proved to be

24

My Memoirs

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi (standing) and Ja‘far al-‘Askari in the Eiffel Tower in Paris in the early 1920s

exceedingly fragile foundations, collapsed across the Arab region as a colossal failure. In Iraq, many British representatives detested Tawfiq al-Suwaydi and frequently bad-mouthed him in their reports to Whitehall. Tawfiq returned their sentiments in spades, calling Englishmen arrogant, pompous, and uneducated.33 Luay al-Suwaydi recalls his father’s frequent expostulations about the British and related to the author a story of how Tawfiq once virtually defenestrated Archibald Clark Kerr, a British ambassador to Iraq during the 1930s, from his (Tawfiq’s) office. Given this experience, Kerr was unsurpassed in his contempt for Tawfiq al-Suwaydi and the entire al-Suwaydi family. In particular, Tawfiq’s description of the British as uneducated is

Introduction

25

instructive. Tawfiq disdained people who spoke only one language and said that he had never met an Englishman who was other than monolingual.34 As for the British, they regularly cast aspersions on Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. In a communication from the British embassy in Baghdad to Anthony Eden in 1937, both Tawfiq and Naji are described as “old rogues” whose corruption was such that they should be in jail. In 1937, John Simon noted from Baghdad that Archibald Clark Kerr “[detested] Tawfiq Bey and all the alSuwaydi family.” Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was, in the judgment of the British, “not a man of outstanding ability” and had a “reputation for dishonesty remarkable even in Iraq.”35 Here and elsewhere, no specific evidence of Tawfiq’s putative corruption was ever presented. At the same time and much more revealingly, the British described Tawfiq as a “French trained lawyer of the ‘know-all’ type” who was “likely to think that he has no need of the advice of British advisers.”36 It may well be that Tawfiq’s independent streak, with the possibility that as a pan-Arabist he would not be amenable to British guidance, especially concerning Palestine, was the worst of his offenses in their eyes. In his memoirs, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi himself responds to what he argues were some of the scurrilous and unfounded accusations against him. Speaking of rumors that reached King Faisal I in 1929 during his first prime ministership that he was abetting and protecting corrupt behavior, Tawfiq replied with alacrity and in some detail to set the record straight. Integrity, he made clear to the king, was something of great importance to him. One might dismiss this defense as empty rhetoric, but his memoirs reveal a continuing personal commitment to honesty and accountability in very different contexts throughout his career. “Government work,” as Tawfiq reports having reminded fellow cabinet members, was not “something one did for a living” but rather a “responsibility that involved dangers which could only be faced properly by individuals free of personal ambition.” And there is more. Note, for example, Tawfiq’s scathing criticism of the peculation of leading Iraqi army officers who during the late 1930s constantly raided the state treasury by claiming that they deserved indemnification and needed treatment in Europe for “injuries” supposedly sustained in the line of duty. Tawfiq observes that when he was comptroller general he had “[objected] strenuously to [these] despicable [practices]” and had established criteria to bring them under control. But, so he sarcastically reports, these protests were ignored “for fear of arousing the ire of the esteemed officers and their Chief of Staff.” On any reasonable assessment, could these be the strictures of an individual who was himself profoundly corrupt? The strongest evidence that the British were engaged in slander, as far as Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was concerned, is suggested by the fact that during the “People’s Court” show trial immediately subsequent to the Revolution of 1958, no charges of corruption were ever levied against him. The state prosecutor demanded the death penalty for Tawfiq entirely on political

26

My Memoirs

grounds. If Tawfiq al-Suwaydi had any public or long-standing record of corruption, as the British continually suggested, one may be certain that specific evidence to that effect would have been collected by the prosecution and filed in court, almost guaranteeing Tawfiq’s conviction and execution. But the reality was otherwise. Tawfiq spent his final years, during the early and mid-1960s, in exile from Iraq in Beirut. Those final years were in fact his first years of relative repose since the 1920s. Like the 1920s in Baghdad, the 1960s in tolerant and cosmopolitan Lebanon appear to have been a relatively happy time for him, at least until June 5, 1967, and the outbreak of the Six-Day War. On the subject of the United Kingdom, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi never minced words. In these memoirs he describes British policy in Iraq as one designed to “control and corrupt.” Not surprisingly, Britain in his view made the “maximum possible use of whatever was beneficial in Iraq . . . for the British Empire,” but offered only the most “miniscule benefits” to Iraq itself. Worse, England proved itself a dangerous enemy of the Arab cause through its “brutal, irresponsible policy” that constantly endeavored to undermine Arab independence through cooperation with other, anti-Arab European powers. Tawfiq was equally exercised by the fact that he believed Britain to have worked for decades to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Etched in almost elegiac sadness are the words Tawfiq shares with us in his memoirs, compiled so near the end of his life: “I have always striven, with all the strength and ability that God has given me, to be a faithful servant of the broader Arab community, championing its causes, working to achieve its hopes, and striving for its well-being and dignity. . . . I have made no distinction between one Arab nation and another, and . . . in this respect my conscience is clear.” One may wonder whether Israel’s overwhelming defeat of the military forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967 may have played a role in Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s own demise the following year. But Tawfiq’s commitment to the cause of Palestine, and his generally vexed relationship with the British, do not tell the entire story. In fact, during the Great Arab Revolt in Palestine from 1936 to 1939, he worked constructively with the British to find realistic solutions to enormously complex problems. The flexibility Tawfiq demonstrated as Iraqi foreign minister in 1937 during negotiations with the British on Palestine drew British praise. Had the proposals Tawfiq al-Suwaydi made then been accepted in London, the tragic events that occurred in Palestine a decade later might even have been avoided. By contrast, Tawfiq’s brother Naji encouraged Arab nationalists to adopt a totally rejectionist line, undermining everything that Tawfiq, the eminent realist, was attempting to accomplish. For example, in 1937, as president of the Arab National Congress, which had just concluded a meeting in Bloudan, Syria, Naji issued a hard-line, rejectionist statement, which for the British was a nonstarter. Among other demands, it called for the

Introduction

27

annulment of the Balfour Declaration, the abrogation of the British mandate over Palestine, and the termination of all Jewish immigration into Palestine and land sales to Jews. The statement then threatened a general Arab rupture of relations with the United Kingdom unless all of these demands were met. Again, this stance was emblematic of the romantic and uncompromising Arab nationalism that won the day over Tawfiq’s moderate realism and soon enough produced one disaster after another for the entire Arab world.37 Concerning Iraqi foreign minister Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s flexibility on Palestine, J. G. Ward reported from a meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva on September 9, 1937, that “Mr. Edmonds (the British advisor to the Iraqi government who is attached to the Iraqi delegation here) informs me that Tawfiq Bey al-Suwaydi is very anxious to be reasonable over Palestine and does not agree with the rather aggressive attitude adopted by the last Iraqi government. Tawfiq Bey, who unlike many Iraqis is experienced in European ways and realizes the wider implications of Iraqi policy over Palestine, wishes to do what he can to help H.M. government in the matter.” On that basis, Ward noted that Edmonds believed that the British should take Tawfiq al-Suwaydi into their confidence as much as possible given the real possibility that Tawfiq might with time “modify the attitude of his government until it is much more satisfactory from our point of view.”38 This statement indicates a rather different assessment of Tawfiq by some on the British side than that offered by Archibald Clark Kerr and others. Perhaps more importantly, it suggests that Tawfiq adopted a more nuanced position on Palestine than the one he paints in his memoirs. Unfortunately for Tawfiq and perhaps also for British policy in Palestine, Archibald Clark Kerr served as British ambassador to Iraq from 1935 to 1938 and apparently had no interest in the reports by C. J. Edmonds about Tawfiq’s relative moderation on Palestine or Edmonds’s own suggestions that Britain should reconsider its entire approach to the Palestine issue. Nevertheless, what Edmonds related in late 1937 speaks volumes about Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s position on Palestine at the time. Clearly, Edmonds believed that Tawfiq’s suggestions of an alternative to partition might have had some possibility of acceptance by Arabs and Jews alike. In speaking of an interview he had with Tawfiq in Geneva during the autumn of 1937, Edmonds reported that Tawfiq remarked that “if another more acceptable scheme [than partition] could be evolved, he (speaking only for himself personally) would be prepared to use his influence with the Palestinians to accept it.” According to Edmonds, Tawfiq made it clear later that what he had in mind was an “enclave between the Egyptian boundary and a line drawn inland from Gaza that should be given to the Jews for their sovereign state, where all further immigration should take place.” Presumably, Tawfiq was speaking roughly of the northern Negev and Beersheba

28

My Memoirs

region. Tawfiq made clear, Edmonds reported, that the “rest of the country should be included in the Arab state, all Jews already living there to remain and accept minority status with strong guarantees.”39 At the time, what might appear today as an extremely modest proposal took great courage to put on the table. Tawfiq knew well that what he had proposed to the British would be a very hard sell both to the Palestinians and to the remainder of the Arab world, as represented by his brother Naji at the recently concluded Bloudan conference outside Damascus. Edmonds went on to say that in his opinion the Peel Commission of 1936, which had recommended partition, had erred in treating the competing notion of cantonization in an “unjustifiably cavalier fashion.” Cantonization, he believed, allowed considerably “greater elasticity.” He noted that there could be “several Arab and Jewish cantons (a total of twelve would not be excessive) corresponding reasonably closely with the present distribution of the population.” Edmonds made reference to Tawfiq alSuwaydi’s possible support for “setting aside part of the Beersheba district as an additional Jewish canton.” What had become clear in the year since partition had been recommended, Edmonds noted, was that both Jews and Arabs hated it. He inquired: “Is it too much to hope that the task of the next commission might be to prepare a sample scheme of cantonization, which might then form the basis of negotiations at a Round-Table Conference?”40 To that question the answer was clearly yes, and history moved forward in a very different direction. But these exchanges between the British and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi do demonstrate that no comprehensive polarity existed between the two sides and that Tawfiq’s position on Palestine had considerably greater flexibility than is apparent in his memoirs. Nevertheless, it should be clear that, as a committed Arab nationalist, Tawfiq remained fundamentally opposed to European Jewish settlement despite his attempts to be reasonable with the British. In a general discussion at the League of Nations on September 23, 1937, he caustically remarked that Europe had never informed the Arab world “why the Arab country of Palestine should be forced to receive [European Jews], nor why a grateful Europe was proposing to reward the Jews for their services to philosophy and the arts by giving them not a smiling province or two in Europe but somebody else’s property in Asia.”41 Tawfiq went on to say that he was certain that when Arthur Balfour promulgated the Balfour Declaration calling for a Jewish national home in Palestine he never contemplated that “Palestine, or any part of it, would become an independent Jewish state.”42 But in Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s opinion, that mattered little. “The one indisputable fact,” he stated, “is that Mr. Balfour had offered something which did not belong to him and was not his to give.” 43 Never lacking a sense of humor, Tawfiq added that his colleagues “might spend a profitable and entertaining half hour applying in imagination to their own countries the principle that it

Introduction

29

was legitimate to apply the ethnographical status quo of 2000, or 1500 years ago . . . and to give their fairest provinces for the formation of independent states by peoples who were now aliens.”44 He then spoke of the “large and prosperous Jewish communities of Iraq,” which had been settled there since the sixth century BCE. Tawfiq noted that these Jews had the same rights as Arabs and all other Iraqis, and many Jews had held high government office and had long abounded in the civil service. The contrast in Iraq, he added, was “not between [sic] Muslims, Christians, and Jews but between natural born Iraqi citizens and aliens.”45 In reference to Palestine, observations by the delegate from Norway, who argued that Jewish immigration represented the best of advanced Western civilization and had provided Palestine with a community that contrasted vividly with the “primitive civilization of the Arabs,” particularly outraged him. How many times in the decades since have arguments similar to these occurred? Tawfiq’s firm representations in the autumn of 1937 leave no iota of doubt as to what position he himself took on the question of Palestine. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi served as Iraqi prime minister on three occasions: April–August 1929, February–May 1946, and February–September 1950. Only his 1946 ministry merits detailed comment here, since 1946 saw Tawfiq exert his best efforts to bequeath to Iraq a liberal and functioning democratic system. For that effort, he believed that he had the firm support of the regent, ‘Abd al-Ilah, and a sufficiency of parliamentary delegates willing to stay the course. Sadly, he was mistaken on both counts. The failure of Tawfiq’s best attempt to engraft liberalism onto the Iraqi body politic, and the increasing repression imposed soon thereafter by Nuri al-Sa‘id and others, had much to do with the outbreak of the 1958 Revolution and the long night that soon followed. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s efforts in 1946 to bequeath to Iraq the sort of viable liberal political system that he had advocated throughout his life were remarkable. The membership of his cabinet itself provided one example of his liberalism, with fully five of the eleven members being Shiite. Iraq saw enormous liberalization initiated during Tawfiq’s second term as prime minister, which was then totally aborted by late 1946. Nevertheless, from February to May 1946, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi gave Iraqis the briefest of glimpses of a dramatically different political world. In April 1946 he even established his own Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahrar), which survived until 1950. Especially among the rapidly growing and educated middle class, Tawfiq’s liberal endeavor of 1946 was not forgotten. So thoroughly, however, was liberalism emasculated by subsequent policy that when the hour of the monarchy’s trial arrived on July 14, 1958, few from the middle class or any other lent the royal family support. Liberal innovation was originally encouraged by the British, who understood well enough the potentially disastrous implications of continued

30

My Memoirs

sadah political repression in a rapidly changing Iraq. They had no difficulty in rallying the regent, ‘Abd al-Ilah, to the cause, and the regent indeed delivered a formal address at a “tea party” attended by representatives of the Iraqi political elite on December 27, 1945, calling for a new, liberal departure in the country. But neither the British nor the palace were ready to brave the torrent of criticism that erupted in the press and elsewhere once wartime censorship was removed. And both parties found abundant support in the Iraqi parliament itself, where the old tribal elite was still well ensconced and since at least the early 1930s had worked in close collaboration with both the British and the crown. The end came quickly, when parliament refused to approve the state budget for the new year, and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi consequently decided that he had no choice but to step down. What is striking about this liberal experiment of 1946 was just how far Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, who held the offices of both prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, was prepared to go in proposing and implementing reforms almost breathtaking in scope. Notably, he announced that Iraq would seek revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Independence of 1930 with the British, which had enabled Iraq to become a member of the League of Nations in 1932, and “improvement” of conditions of land tenure. These reforms included the abolition of martial law and all other wartime restrictions, the closing of Iraq’s sole detention camp, the termination of press censorship, the granting of permission to form political parties, and the institution of free elections. At the end of Tawfiq’s first week in office his program was reported to have “met with general approval,” there having been “little criticism in the Chamber or the press.”46 But this good start soured quickly. Perhaps of special importance was the prime minister’s statement concerning the necessity of land reform and a “solution to the land problem.”47 The process of land reform was to begin with the expropriation of Muntafiq tribal lands in precisely the area where the al-Sa‘dun family had long been ensconced. There, some 30,000 peasants were hopelessly in debt to their landlords. “It is now proposed,” the prime minister stated, “to solve the problem by expropriation of the landlords and confirmation of tenants in their holdings.” Moreover, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi declared that the policy of his government would be to “[bring] the Amara liwa (district) into line with other liwas with regard to land tenure.” In the Amara district some 120 lessees held land on triennial leases from the government. The intention was now stated to “give them and other peasants firm titles.” Unstated, but obvious enough if one reads between the lines, was the fact that the liberal al-Suwaydi ministry intended more far-reaching land reforms in due course. Good politician that he was, Tawfiq formally stated that everything his ministry was about would follow the principles the regent had announced on December 27, 1945. On the land reform front, the new prime minister made clear privately the true scope of his ambitions. Specifically, in May 1946 he spoke to visiting

Introduction

31

British official W. F. Crawford of the “necessity of breaking up the sheikhs’ rule in Iraq.”48 Tawfiq evinced great interest in agricultural questions and reportedly talked at length about the “model villages” he envisioned for the Iraqi peasantry and to which his government proposed the allocation of a million dinars annually over a period of ten years. The prime minister suggested that Iraq’s principal cash crop might be cotton and noted that a new textile factory then being built might produce half of the country’s needs. Concerning all of this, Crawford described Tawfiq as being “very cheerful.”49 Tawfiq al-Suwaydi may have been in a good mood as far as such matters were concerned, but the tribal shaikhs most definitely were not. They saw the writing on the wall, as did the urban sadah who, like the alSuwaydi family itself, possessed significant amounts of agricultural land. Just as the sadah had done to abort the land reforms decreed by the Young Turks in 1908 and 1909, the established classes moved decisively against one of their own who had broken ranks and revived the thorny issue of radical reform in the system of landownership. Although Iraq in 1946 was a very different place from what it had been some forty years earlier, it was clearly not different enough to tolerate liberal ambitions of the scope of those of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. In foreign policy, liberalism at home was joined with Arabism and Arab nationalism abroad. In March 1946, Iraq, along with other Arab countries, celebrated the first anniversary of the establishment of the Arab League, an organization in whose founding Tawfiq al-Suwaydi had been deeply involved and the establishment of which represented apparent fulfillment of dreams he had cherished since childhood. On March 22, 1946, Tawfiq made an address to the nation in which he “expressed gratification that this dream of centuries has at last been realized.” He remarked that the Arab League had already “proved its influence in supporting the Levant States and combating the menace” that, in his opinion, was posed by Jewish settlement in Palestine. Tawfiq observed that the league was currently “studying a scheme to save Arab lands in Palestine,” as well as “trying to solve the Palestine problem in a way that would please the Arab world.” He concluded his remarks by noting that Iraq regarded the Arab League as the “symbol of cooperation [among] Arab countries” and a “national scheme that is above individual and selfish aims.”50 The many abject failures of the Arab League that followed soon enough, and the bitter political divisions that not infrequently paralyzed it, must have constituted one of the more significant disappointments that marked Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s life. On the issue of Palestine, Tawfiq’s ministry was clear from the beginning. Item (c) of its statement on foreign policy read, “Palestine is an integral part of the Arab Cause, and the amputation of Palestine from the body of the Arab countries will not be tolerated. The cabinet is determined to enforce the boycott of Jewish goods and to assist the Palestine Arabs toward

32

My Memoirs

the attainment of their national aspirations.”51 This vigorous Arab nationalist position was opposed by both ‘Abd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Sa‘id, but in the end it all mattered little. The fact that this articulation of Arab nationalism failed to produce the desired results could have only added to the burden of disappointments Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was destined to carry until the end of his life. Nevertheless, forty-three years after his death, and after decades of proclamations of the death of any sense of an Arabism linking all of the Arab countries, he undoubtedly would have taken great satisfaction in knowing that the pan-Arab reaction to the immolation of one Tunisian street vendor in 2011 shook the entire Arab world as it had not been shaken in almost a century. The Arab Spring demonstrated beyond any doubt that Arabism, as distinct from Arab nationalism, remains alive and well. “If any doubts remain,” F. Gregory Gause III writes, “that Arabs retain a sense of common political identity despite living in twenty different states, the events of this year should put them to rest.”52 With surprising alacrity, both the British and the palace turned against the storm of reforms they had set in motion. Both were terrified by the intensity of the passions released and moved vigorously to suppress them. ‘Abd al-Ilah was the executioner. In fundamental disagreement with Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, he connived with selected figures in the Iraqi Senate to deprive Tawfiq’s ministry of the votes necessary to pass a new budget. This strategy succeeded and Tawfiq, bereft of operating funds, was compelled to resign on May 30, 1946. These sordid machinations, at least tacitly supported by most of the Iraqi political establishment, were judged by British intelligence to have been a deliberate attempt to bring down Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. Among the politicians who directly precipitated the collapse of the alSuwaydi ministry were Arshad al-‘Umari, Mustafa al-‘Umari, Ibrahim Kamal Siddiq al-Bassam, Hamdi al-Pachachi, and Sayyid ‘Abdul Hadi. Perhaps not surprisingly, Arshad al-‘Umari was rewarded by being named the next prime minister in a cabinet that was anything but reformist. Tawfiq alSuwaydi could only start to build a new Iraq in the three short months granted to him, but what months they had proved to be! The brief explosion of land reform, free speech in a suddenly unshackled press, and competitive political parties was remarkable. The newly active political parties included the conservative, pan-Arab Independence Party, Tawfiq’s centrist Liberal Party, the left-leaning National Democratic Party, and two Marxist parties, the National Union Party and the People’s Party. Interestingly, ‘Aziz Sharif, the husband of Basil Faidhi’s older sister, was the head of the People’s Party. The leadership of each of these parties was drawn from the middle-class intelligentsia, and party activity tended to reflect the personal priorities of individual party leaders rather than an attempt to implement particular party programs. In any event, what ensued was a “glowing passion” that characterized all political activities during

Introduction

33

these “fervid months.”53 The liberal initiatives of the al-Suwaydi ministry in 1946 may well have constituted the last, best opportunity to turn the Iraqi ship of state in a direction that just might have avoided the bloody catastrophe of July 14, 1958. During his liberal ministry in 1946, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi could not make any significant progress in achieving a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. However, he was deeply involved in an attempt to do exactly that two years later, in 1948, when he was part of an Iraqi team dispatched by the regent to the United Kingdom to negotiate the soon-to-be-repudiated AngloIraqi Treaty of 1948, also known as the “Portsmouth treaty.” Tawfiq speaks at length about this treaty in his memoirs, minimizing his own role in its negotiation and deploring the lack of preparation, organization, and staffing of the Iraqi delegation. Subsequently, when the treaty encountered bitter opposition from Iraqis and was abandoned by ‘Abd al-Ilah in mid-January 1948 after Baghdad and other cities were paralyzed by demonstrators, Tawfiq nevertheless defended it, rightly pointing out that many of the critics had not even read it. The fact is, however, that Tawfiq’s name appears officially in the text of the treaty as a full minister plenipotentiary representing the government of Iraq. More importantly, given that the Portsmouth treaty merely repeated, sometimes in nearly the same words as the treaty of 1930, an authorization of the special position of Britain in Iraq, it is surprising that Tawfiq expected the new treaty to be acceptable to Iraqis. Although Iraq in over forty years had not changed enough as far as matters of landholding were concerned to permit Tawfiq to move forward with his agrarian revolution, in less than twenty years, since 1930, it had changed dramatically as to what privileges it was willing to grant the United Kingdom. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi had simply misread the postwar reality in Iraq, as had all of his colleagues in the Iraqi delegation that went to London. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi describes most of the salient events of his third term as prime minister in 1950, during which term he also served as foreign minister. During that third prime ministership, from February to September 1950, Tawfiq toyed with the notion of establishing a federation or union between Iraq and Syria, an eventuality that in principle he strongly favored. The Iraqi Development Board, established on his initiative, was a significant contribution to Iraq’s oil industry and to the country’s economic future. Tawfiq’s description of his decisive response to the midnight threat by a drunken Iraqi chief of police, ‘Ali Hejazi, to stage a coup if Tawfiq refused to immediately dismiss Salih Jabr makes one wonder how Iraqi history might have differed had Tawfiq al-Suwaydi been prime minister in 1958. Nuri al-Sa‘id, whom Tawfiq describes in 1950 as already hard of hearing as far as good advice was concerned, went on to become even more so by 1958, as Tawfiq also makes clear, with consequences fatal both to himself and to the entire royal family.

34

My Memoirs

But that was after Iraq had signed on to the Baghdad Pact in 1955, the Suez crisis of 1956 had erupted, the United Arab Republic joining Egypt and Syria had been created, and years of unremitting antimonarchical propaganda by Gamal Abdel Nasser and his radio station, Voice of the Arabs, had seriously eroded support across the Arab world for the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq. In particular, the conversations Tawfiq reports having had with Nasser, especially concerning Voice of the Arabs, make both amusing and tragic reading. This entire legacy must have haunted Tawfiq in early 1958, while he was serving as foreign minister of the Iraqi Arab Union cabinet representing the fusion of Jordan and Iraq. Tawfiq was a lifetime Arab nationalist, and the cruel polarization of the Arab world during the years and months leading up to the monarchy’s bloody demise on July 14, 1958, must have constituted a chronic pain deep in his heart. What these memoirs demonstrate beyond any possibility of misunderstanding is that the 1958 Revolution and the deposition and execution of the monarchy ought never to have occurred. Iraqi, Jordanian, Turkish, and American intelligence services had all penetrated the supposedly secret world of the conspirators and had many of the specific names of those who staged the July coup. So culpable was Nuri al-Sa‘id’s rejection of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s detailed warnings concerning what was about to transpire that one searches in vain for a convincing explanation. Perhaps Nuri had simply stayed so long in key positions on the Iraqi political scene that he had grown impossibly arrogant, inflexible, and old while still in harness. Then again, perhaps Nuri believed that the financial favors long showered on the (mostly Sunni) officer corps constituted an ironclad guarantee of its loyalty. One’s judgment of Iraqi lieutenant general Rafiq ‘Arif, appointed chief of the United Arab Army’s general staff after the Arab Union was created in February 1958, is likely to be even less favorable, if Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s account of his behavior is anywhere close to being accurate. In fact, Rafiq ‘Arif proudly admitted to treasonous conduct at his trial after the July Revolution, as Tawfiq relates, publicly stating that he had been fully aware of what the Free Officers were about but had opted to “overlook their activities” and thereby permit the coup to proceed. Given a security system so compromised by its enemies, and given the fact that the palace was unwilling to act decisively even after receiving ample evidence of its impending overthrow, readers may question whether the Iraqi monarchy would have had any long-term future even if the 1958 coup had been preempted. Concerning all of this, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s detailed documentation of the flow of information he received in the months and days before July 14, 1958, and how he attempted to energize the Iraqi government to act upon it, makes for utterly fascinating reading. Equally fascinating, and even more absorbing than Tawfiq’s description of his desert crossing in 1919, is his account of what happened to him

Introduction

35

personally on July 14, 1958, and the days and years that immediately followed. Here, perhaps even more than elsewhere in his memoirs, the role of chance in history is highlighted. What might have happened had he immediately found a car full of gas on his estate during the hours when maddened crowds were running amuck in Baghdad? What might have happened if the youth who fingered his hiding place to the searching Iraqi security officers had not been present or had chosen not to reveal his location? Was there ever a possibility that Tawfiq might have been able to flee northward into Turkey during those first chaotic hours of the new order? What one does know, from his own eloquent account, is the story of his arrest, trial, condemnation, imprisonment, and eventual exile to Lebanon. Only the Higher Military Court, or “People’s Court” as it was popularly known, requires any additional comment here. The “judicial” proceedings initiated by Fadil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi on July 21, 1958, at the direction of the new Iraqi strongman ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, constituted a show trial par excellence. Al-Mahdawi served as both judge and prosecutor during the trial. The court’s mandate during the balance of 1958 was to convict and condemn prominent personalities of the now ancien régime. The court stayed in session until February 1962, “trying” and convicting various political opponents of Qasim. The wheel came full circle in 1963, when Qasim was overthrown by ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif, Qasim’s former friend and fellow conspirator before 1958, and both he and Fadil ‘Abbas alMahdawi were executed only an hour after they surrendered. During the summer and autumn of 1958, the televised proceedings of the People’s Court easily constituted the most popular show in Baghdad. The entire affair was rather a free-for-all, with spectators frequently standing up in the public gallery to interrupt both al-Mahdawi and the witnesses in order to make their own comments and declarations. At least during the trial’s early weeks, the atmosphere was almost festive and apparently was enjoyed by everyone except those in the dock. Then and later, however, it was widely recognized that the People’s Court was merely a political spectacle, staged by Qasim to discredit the monarchy and bring his own political opponents to heel. Perhaps the greatest irony was that while the monarchical personalities were all accused of interference in Syrian affairs and above all in opposing Communism there, by the spring of 1959 Qasim had launched his own crackdown on the Iraqi Communist Party following a bloody Communist and Kurdish massacre of Turkmen in Kirkuk in February of that year. Qasim sustained his anti-Communist campaign until his overthrow in 1963, the vigor of his anti-Communist measures constituting one component in his own undoing. Several senior officials of the Hashemite regime, including Tawfiq alSuwaydi, were put on public trial in the September–November 1958 period. The charges against all were similar, if not identical. Specifically, Tawfiq and

36

My Memoirs

his colleagues were accused of attempting to pull off an “anti-Communist” coup in Syria during the early months of 1958 in order to install ‘Abd alIlah as king there (in Tawfiq’s case the accusation of meddling in Syria’s internal affairs to combat radicalism was made retroactive to 1950). The antiCommunist interference in Syria in early 1958 by all of the accused, so al-Mahdawi argued, had been orchestrated by the United States with the assistance of Turkey and was designed to enable the Americans to recover the prestige they had lost in the Middle East since the Suez debacle two years earlier. But the accusation of a conspiracy against Syria was in each case wrapped inside a litany of denunciations of imperialism, the United Kingdom, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948 signed in Portsmouth, the Baghdad Pact, and Western support for Israel. In mid-September 1958, some two months before his own trial, Tawfiq was called to testify in the trial of Fadil al-Jamali. A description by the British embassy of his demeanor and performance on that occasion is worth citing. Very sure of himself and apparently quite at ease during his testimony, Tawfiq “looked fit and jaunty and his round rosy face shone happily.” Tawfiq said “nothing that could incriminate al-Jamali.” He stated that he knew nothing about al-Jamali’s involvement in any “intervention” in Syria and that al-Jamali’s views were “perfectly well known from his speeches and articles: he was in favor of Arab nationalism and against Communism, which he did not think was in the interests of Iraq; he believed in cooperation with the West, without allowing that to detract from the independence of Iraq.” Tawfiq “did criticize al-Jamali very mildly by saying that his partiality for the West went a little far and that personally he (Tawfiq) would have preferred a relationship not so completely partial.” Tawfiq proved himself “humorous, quick, clever, courageous and self-possessed,” with a “rapier” that was “more than a match for [al-Mahdawi’s] bludgeon.” Attempts by alMahdawi “to raise laughs at the expense of al-Suwaydi . . . did not appear to have quite the effect he intended. Sometimes the public seemed to be laughing with rather than at al-Suwaydi.” Indeed, the embassy went so far as to report that “many educated Iraqis, including supporters of the present regime,” were “not entirely happy” with the various judicial proceedings.54 At Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s own trial, which took place from October 29 to November 2 in tandem with the trials of Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, the last prime minister of monarchical Iraq, and ‘Abdul Jalil al-Rawi, onetime Iraqi ambassador to Syria, a very different Tawfiq appeared in court.55 Despite the fact that only a few weeks had elapsed since the al-Jamali trial, Tawfiq was described on November 15, 1958, by an observer from the British embassy as now appearing to be in “poor health” and as having remained seated in the dock throughout the proceedings.56 Al-Mahdawi demanded the death penalty for both Ahmad Mukhtar Baban and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. Repeatedly during the trial, al-Mahdawi and much of the Iraqi press referred to Tawfiq

Introduction

37

as “Nuri al-Sa‘id number two.” It was “clear from the antagonistic attitude of the Court,” the British observer reported, that the “majority of the people would prefer to see him suffer the same fate as Nuri.” 57 This attitude was encouraged by al-Mahdawi’s frequent allusions to Nuri’s fate and to Tawfiq’s “good fortune in escaping with his life on July 14.”58 Although he does not mention these specific details in his memoirs, the proceedings must have constituted a truly searing experience for him. The British report on the trial, contrary to what Tawfiq relates in his memoirs, states that Tawfiq did indeed challenge the competence of the People’s Court to try him. Specifically, the British observer reports that Tawfiq argued that the Constitution of the Arab Union was still valid, and that he should therefore be tried by the civilian Supreme Court rather than by any military body. In response, al-Mahdawi insisted that the Arab Union had been “cancelled” by the interim constitution proclaimed by the Iraqi government shortly after the revolution, and that the new government had immediately thereafter passed Law No. 7 of 1958, under which the accused was being tried, and made that law retroactive to 1939.59 Tawfiq nevertheless held to his original position. In his defense statement, Tawfiq emphasized the accomplishments of his liberal ministry of 1946. Its achievements, he pointed out, were “unprecedented,” particularly its granting of freedom of action to political parties and its “cancellation of the Rent Law . . . in the interests of the people.”60 His defense lawyer also underscored Tawfiq’s liberal reforms in 1946 and urged the court to show leniency, a “virtue of the great figures of early Islam.”61 Fadil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi attempted to refute this argument “by saying that leniency . . . did not apply to traitors, spies, and enemies of the people.”62 All of this is suggestive of the general atmosphere of the trial and its intensely political nature. Al-Mahdawi played revisionist historian, articulating the new regime’s novel interpretation of Iraqi history since World War I and the part that Tawfiq al-Suwaydi had supposedly played in it. He placed particular emphasis on the Hashemite monarchy’s “treason” (that is, cooperation with the British). Al-Suwaydi, he observed, was one of those “brought up under corrupt Ottoman rule” who had hastened to offer his services to the British and French after the Ottoman Empire collapsed. Al-Mahdawi spoke of Tawfiq’s putative “corruption,” his accumulation of “illegal” wealth, and his part in negotiating the treaty of Portsmouth.63 But none of these matters were included in the formal charges actually filed against him. On the specific issue of corruption, al-Mahdawi cited the following: “illicit” dealing in copper, whisky, and cigarettes, and moral turpitude (Tawfiq was supposedly once observed dancing with a beautiful woman in Beirut). This last accusation must have provided comic relief, since it quickly became apparent that the individual alleged to have been Tawfiq

38

My Memoirs

had a mustache while Tawfiq had always been clean shaven. As far as can be determined from the reports concerning the proceedings, no documentary evidence was ever introduced by al-Mahdawi to substantiate Tawfiq’s alleged corruption or unethical behavior. Perhaps most interesting of all, the British remained oblivious to the end. “What was surprising about this whole trial,” the British embassy observer reported, “was that al-Suwaydi, who . . . has long had a reputation for personal corruption . . . should have been accused on only one matter, namely the Syrian plot.” The military court, he opined, was “doubtless confident that the Syrian plot alone [was] enough to convict him.”64 But the British were blind to a much simpler and more persuasive explanation of alMahdawi’s apparent restraint: namely, that rumors of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s supposed corruption lacked any substantive basis, even a basis substantial enough to submit in a highly politicized court charged with securing convictions during a revolutionary time. Never, in 1958 or in the decades earlier, did the British appear to have asked themselves whether the reports about Tawfiq al-Suwaydi and his putative corruption were in fact more than hearsay or rumor. As late as March 11, 1958, Sir Michael Wright wrote from Baghdad to British prime minister Selwyn Lloyd stating that Tawfiq, although “able, intelligent, and courageous,” was “notorious for corruption.”65 In the end, this obliviousness is perhaps the best evidence of all that Tawfiq’s own denunciations of British “ignorance,” made decades earlier and sparked especially by his encounters with Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, were not entirely wide of the mark. The formal charges filed against Tawfiq al-Suwaydi track well with what he reports in his memoirs: • Interference in the internal affairs of Syria and conspiracy against the Syrian regime in cooperation with the imperialists, thereby causing the Syrian government to amass forces on the Iraqi frontier and to threaten hostilities against Iraq. • Bringing the country nearer to war by plotting against Syria and encouraging a policy of aggressive military alliances. • Inviting foreign powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Syria and Lebanon. • Squandering public funds in conspiracies against Syria and in Beirut.66 In attempting to make his case, al-Mahdawi presented a document composed by Tawfiq al-Suwaydi and dated August 18, 1955, stating that, “today, the tragedy of the Presidential elections in Syria will take place. It is apparent that Shukri al-Quwatli will win. Syria is sick and the election is not the [proper] medicine.”67 Not denying his authorship of the communication,

Introduction

39

Tawfiq told the court in his typically pungent fashion that his communication did not constitute interference in Syria’s affairs. “I [indeed] believed that Syria was sick,” he stated. “Its chief of the General Staff at the time, Shawkat Shukayr, told me three days before the election that Syria was sick. What have I done? Did I direct my guns against it?”68 In fact, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi had done exactly that, albeit five years earlier, while serving in 1953 as minister of foreign affairs in the coalition cabinet of Jamil al-Midfa‘i. In his own candid account in his memoirs, Tawfiq Pasha describes the plot he hatched in Damascus in 1953 to overthrow the “thieves,” “dictators,” “tyrants,” and “butchers” clustered around the then anti-Hashemite president of Syria, Adib bin Hasan al-Shishakli. Tawfiq alSuwaydi’s personal account of the arrangements he initiated to supply arms, ammunition, and military equipment to support the overthrow of the leftist al-Shishakli regime by his (Tawfiq’s) pro-Hashemite Syrian friends, Sa‘id Haydar and Hashim al-Atasi, constitutes one particularly vivid example of the fascinating vignettes with which his memoirs abound. Clearly, Tawfiq Pasha was convinced that Hashim al-Atasi, an Arab nationalist and strong advocate of a Syrian-Hashemite confederation, offered a far more attractive option for advancing Arab unity than did Adib al-Shishakli and the Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS) with which al-Shishakli was associated. The PPS, which was founded by Antun Sa‘dah in Lebanon in 1932 and has always been outspokenly secular, remains to this day a major political force in Syria and Lebanon. It has long grouped Greek Orthodox, Sunnis, Shiites, and Druze under the same political banner. From the 1950s until today, the PPS has advocated a “Syria First” policy aimed at creating a Greater Syria across the entire Fertile Crescent that might ultimately include even the island of Cyprus. Syrianism, rather than pan-Arabism, has always been the PPS’s political orientation. Whatever the case, both Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah and Prime Minister Fadil al-Jamali, who succeeded Jamil al-Midfa‘i as prime minister, apparently endorsed Tawfiq’s campaign in 1953 to effect regime change in Syria. For their part, Salih Jabr and ‘Abd al-Karim al-Azri, so Tawfiq reports, followed up effectively on what he had begun. In the end, the al-Shishakli regime was overthrown in February 1954, after seven months in office. Hashim al-Atasi succeeded to the presidency and instituted a policy of severe repression of the PPS. Tawfiq Pasha must have felt that it was a job well done. Curiously, in 1958, Fadil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi made no specific accusations against Tawfiq concerning Tawfiq’s involvement in the alShishakli affair. All in all, the verdict of the People’s Court constituted a close call for Tawfiq al-Suwaydi. Although he escaped the death penalty, Tawfiq was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of 21,017 Iraqi dinars. Two other men were tried with Tawfiq al-Suwaydi: Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, who was

40

My Memoirs

sentenced to death and a fine of 52,770 Iraqi dinars, and ‘Abdul Jalil alRawi, who was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment with hard labor. The rest of the story concerning Tawfiq’s last years in Iraq, including the gradual reduction of his sentence, his release from prison and his seclusion at home, and finally his negotiated departure for Beirut in 1962, is well recounted in his memoirs. In the end, the People’s Court’s bark proved worse than its bite. The sentences given to most of the monarchical personalities convicted in late 1958 were soon commuted or reduced. In the end, only four especially notorious individuals charged with offenses under the monarchy were actually executed: Bahjat al-‘Aliyya, former director of the Criminal Investigation Department; ‘Abd al-Jabbar al-Ayyub, director of the prison for political offenders in Baghdad; ‘Abd al-Jabbar Fahmi, a former governor of Baghdad; and Sa‘id al-Qazzaz, former interior minister. But from the perspective of ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, the fall’s proceedings must surely have seemed worth the effort. By the end of the year, al-Mahdawi and the People’s Court had largely succeeded in achieving the ideological objective of discrediting the monarchy and its prominent surviving personalities. The kind of man Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was, and what was most dear to his heart, is perhaps portrayed most vividly by Gabriella Bassatne, who encountered Tawfiq in Beirut shortly before his death. In her twenties when she first met Tawfiq, Bassatne in early 2011 composed an unforgettable portrait of this Iraqi statesman, Arab nationalist, and lifelong Arab liberal. By chance, she and her former husband were living in the upscale Raouché area of West Beirut, in the same seashore apartment building as Tawfiq alSuwaydi himself. A portion of her observations is worth quoting at length: One recollection, still very vivid, is of a conversation I witnessed between my ex-husband and Tawfiq Pasha about Marxist ideology for which one had sympathy and the other bitter contempt. I felt revenged that an ex–Prime Minister, a man of such stature, shared my own opinion on the subject. The discussion soon became quite heated, some of which I couldn’t follow because they were switching between French and Arabic, but it was enough for me to catch the sense of a prophetic message: “They are spreading the poison that will corrupt the minds of humanity and kill their souls.” For once my ex-husband was at a loss for words and my admiration for Tawfiq Pasha was augmented enormously. I was in my midtwenties at the time and did not grasp the full implications of the words of this man-of-vision who could have been my grandfather. I surely did, more and more, later on. By far, the most impressive memory about his words was our last “elevator conversation.” I was with my mother, who had often been a recipient of quite a few compliments about her remarkable elegance from Pasha Tawfiq. He was already in the lift and kept the door open for us. We all said good evening, smiled, and exchanged one or two formal courtesies as the door closed. My mother and I were on our way to play Canasta at my

41

On October 16, 1968, a Lebanese military detachment offers Lebanon’s final salute to deceased Arab leader Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at the Beirut International Airport on the day his remains are transferred to Baghdad.

42 Together with a group of Arab dignitaries, the mayor of Beirut and representative for the Lebanese president look on attentively as the airplane bearing the remains of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, whose passing was mourned throughout Arabdom, prepares for departure for his final resting place in Baghdad.

Introduction

43

friend Liliane’s on the 9th floor, so we pushed the buttons 6 and 9 and off we ascended. Our temperamental lift stopped before the 6th floor and refused to move in any direction so we had no option but to wait for help. “It won’t be long before they free us,” I said. A strange look appeared in Tawfiq Pasha’s eyes: “Freedom is a word too big for this situation,” he said and lowered his eyes. A few seconds later he continued, “Freedom is like life, these two things belong to us from beginning to end, the only difference being that although another man can take one’s life he will never be able to take his freedom.” He paused and then added something that made me shudder: “I comprehended the real meaning of this word when I thought I had lost it.” The lift moved again, stopping at the 6th floor. We said goodbye, smiling to him as he left. He wasn’t smiling. It was the last time I saw Tawfiq Pasha.69

And so it was. These memoirs highlight aspects of the dramatic story of an Iraqi statesman in love with liberty who had a major impact on the politics and policies of his own time and who speaks eloquently to our own. Those who dream of a better Arab future may discover no more reliable pathfinder than Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as inspiration, guide, and counselor. For them in particular, his memoirs should be considered required reading.70

Notes 1. Approximately ten pages of the original Arabic edition of this book, first published in 1969, have not been included in this English version in order to avoid unnecessary repetition. The material from the Arabic volume that has been omitted appears near the beginning of that book and consists primarily of al-Suwaydi’s commentary on his education, on his experience as an academic and judge, and (especially) on Ottoman and Arab history. The omitted information is presented in a more detailed and comprehensive fashion in this English introduction to My Memoirs. 2. See Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba’athists and Free Officers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 154. This book was published with a subsidy provided to Princeton University Press, which the author of this introduction, then a senior officer of Earhart Foundation, Ann Arbor, Michigan, played a role in arranging. Batatu’s magisterial volume (1,283 pages) remains the authoritative work on its subject. 3. See ibid., p. 154 and p. 154, note 7. 4. For a fascinating overview of his career see Hala Fattah, “The Debate on the Iraqi Nation: Artificial Construct or Work in Progress?” paper presented at the Sixth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting of the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Montecatini Terme, March 2005, pp. 1–14. The al-Suwaydis, along with the al-Alusis, al-Jamilis, al-Gaylanis, al-Haydaris, and al-Sinawis, constituted the elite of elites in Iraq for centuries before the 1958 coup and the ultimate descent of the country into the inferno created by Saddam Hussein. 5. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 161. 6. Ibid., p. 153.

44

My Memoirs

7. See ibid, p. 319, and David Pool, “From Elite to Class: The Transformation of Iraqi Leadership, 1920–1939,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12 (1980). 8. Most of the original, so-called Young Turks who seized power in 1908 were neither particularly young nor ethnically or religiously Turkish. Writing almost contemporaneously with their coming to power, British historian and political activist Robert William (R. W.) Seton-Watson noted in The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (London: Constable, 1917, pp. 135–136), “Enver Pasha was the son of a renegade Pole; Djavid belongs to the Jewish sect of Dunmehs [‘converts’] from Salonika; Carasso is a Sephardim Jew from Salonika, Talat is an Islamised Bulgarian gypsy; and Achmet Riza is half Circassian and half Magyar . . . and a Positivist of the school of Comte.” Seton-Watson adds: “The Salonika Jews [were] inseparable from the Committee of Union and Progress. The real brains of the movement were Jewish or Judaeo-Muslim. Their financial aid came from the wealthy . . . Jews of Salonika and from the capitalists . . . in Vienna, Budapest, Berlin and perhaps also Paris and London.” This information is also cited in Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism with a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East (Beirut, Lebanon: Khayats, 1966), p. 89 and footnote 4. For his part, Batatu reports that in 1909 Carasso showed a “fierce zeal” in “advocating the march on [Istanbul] and the overthrow of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II,” and that he “eventually had the satisfaction of being the mouthpiece of the deputation that conveyed to the Sultan the resolve to depose him.” Batatu adds, “Interestingly enough, after his arrest, ‘Abd al-Hamid II was imprisoned in a villa belonging to the Jewish bankers of the Committee of Union and Progress.” As if all that were not enough, Batatu also reports that “Jewish elements” succeeded in forming an “almost impenetrable ring” at the Turkish Admiralty and War Office, so much so that “Germany Embassy officials began paying ‘special court’ to them” (see Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 286). On this subject see also David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace (New York: Henry Holt, 1989). Fromkin goes to great lengths to dismiss the importance of any connection among the Jews, the Young Turks, and the Germans, while acknowledging the fact that historical evidence exists of precisely such a link. 9. For one particularly graphic account of what befell the Armenians during World War I, see Robert Fisk, The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), pp. 317–355. Among much else, Fisk quotes an “Instruction” cabled by Talat Pasha, at the time the Young Turk minister of the interior, to his “Prefect” in Aleppo on September 15, 1915: “You have already been informed that this Government . . . has decided to destroy all the indicated persons [the Armenians] living in Turkey. . . . Their existence must be terminated . . . and no regard must be paid to either age or sex, or any scruples of conscience” (p. 318). Clearly, these plans were being formulated more than a year earlier, and World War I merely offered the Turks an opportunity to carry them out on a broad scale. 10. An undated Iraqi archival source that Dr. Hala Fattah kindly shared with me indicates that Thabit was born in 1304 AH, or about 1887 CE. For his part, Basil Faidhi states that all evidence suggests that Thabit was born in or about 1884 and was therefore some eight years older than Tawfiq. All one can say with certainty is that Thabit was in his late twenties or around thirty at the time of his death. 11. See the Memoirs of Sulayman Faidhi (in Arabic), compiled, edited, and introduced by Basil S. Faidhi (London: Dar al Saqi, 1998), pp. 191, 192. Further light is shed on this depressing story by a fascinating letter written by Naji al-Suwaydi to Sulayman Faidhi and dated April 3, 1939:

Introduction

45

The Governor of the Province of Diyarbakir, Rashid Beg al-Jarkasi, organized the killing of the Armenians living in that area . . . using Jarkas gangs brought in by him after his arrival in the province. These gangs exceeded all human limits in their barbaric actions which included and targeted all Christians of all sects. The Christians of al-Bashairia were Syriac Catholics who spoke Arabic and there was no disturbance, disobedience, or any act to challenge order or security. So there was no cause at all for the killing of innocent people. The District Commissioner (Thabit al-Suwaydi) wanted to stop these acts of killing but the Governor insisted that they should continue. As a result of lengthy correspondence, the District Commissioner was transferred to the town of Roum Khalah in the Province of Aleppo. When Thabit left Diyarbakir to go to Aleppo, the Wali and his lieutenants feared that, once in Aleppo, Thabit would contact the Inspection Authority and in particular Hamid Beg, the ex-Governor of Diyarbakir and an opponent of Rashid Beg al-Jarkasi, and he (Hamid) would publicize the facts concerning the killing and robbery which were taking place. [Consequently], they (Rashid Beg al-Jarkasi and his henchmen) conspired to assassinate Thabit and he was killed only six hours after he left Diyarbakir. Thabit died a martyr, defending humanity and faithful to his duty to protect the innocent. God did not allow Thabit’s blood to be shed in vain, as once the war ended Rashid Beg was arrested and when faced with his crimes he committed suicide. As for the leaders and members of the Jarkas gangs, they were tried and some were executed and others severely punished. More generally, this lengthy letter reviews how Arab liberals like Thabit al-Suwaydi resisted and attempted to limit the slaughter of Armenians and others by the Turks during World War I. I am deeply grateful to Basil Faidhi for directing my attention to this document, copies of which are now in the possession of Spindrift al-Suwaydi and Antony T. Sullivan. The original remains in the possession of Basil Faidhi. Spindrift al-Suwaydi is the American wife of Luay al-Suwaydi, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s youngest child. 12. The First Arab Congress, assembled hastily beginning in April 1913, met in a lecture hall of the French Geographical Society from June 18 to 23, 1913. The event was a remarkable gathering. A good part of the current and future intellectual and political leadership of the Arab world, Muslim and Christian, was in attendance. Twenty-five official delegates were present, but many other Arabs committed to Arab revival and reform attended some or all of the sessions. Al-Fatat, al-‘Ahd, the Committee of Union and Progress (representing Young Turk interests), Najib Azouri’s League of Arab Patriots (founded in 1904), and the Istanbul al-Muntada al-Adabi, the literary society in which Tawfiq al-Suwaydi had recently been so active and whose president, ‘Abd al-Khazen al-Khalil, was to be executed by the Turks for treason in 1915, were all among the organizations represented. In addition to Tawfiq alSuwaydi, those present included ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, who was elected president of the congress and later also executed by the Turks, plus a heavy representation of Lebanese, including Salim ‘Ali Sallam, Rizk Allah Arkash, Shaikh Ahmad Hasan Tabbarah, Ahmad Mukhtar Bayham, Albert Sursaq, Ayyub Thabit, George Samne, Nadrah Mutran, and Khalil Zayniyah. Najib Azouri, author of the immensely influential little book Le Reveil de la nation arabe, was present. Remarkably, two Zionist Jews were also in attendance: Sami Hochberg and Victor Jacobson. Hochberg was a founder of the Zionist-subsidized newspaper Le Jeune turc, which was published in Constantinople and whose purpose was both to promote Zionism and to convince the Young Turks of Zionist loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. Hochberg and Jacobson, who

46

My Memoirs

was then serving as principal representative of the Zionist movement in Constantinople, were invited by the prominent Syrian decentralist Sami Najjar, an Arab journalist who had once been a staff member of Le Jeune turc and consequently knew Hochberg well, to proceed to Egypt and Lebanon to meet with the Decentralization Party in Cairo and the Beirut Reform Society. At those meetings, an agreement was reached that promised Jews equal rights with Arabs under a decentralized Ottoman Empire. Those meetings led to the invitations to Hochberg and Jacobson to attend the First Arab Congress, where they were cordially received. In a detailed report to the Zionist leadership on his earlier meetings in the eastern Mediterranean, Hochberg hauntingly observed: “If Zionism chooses from the start to maintain close ties with Arab nationalism, we will prevent extremists from leading them” (as quoted in Ha’aretz, “Saved from History’s Black Hole,” December 29, 2012). For more on this general subject, see Neville Mandel, “Attempts at an Arab-Zionist Entente, 1912–1913,” Middle East Studies, no. 3, 1965, and Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929 (London: Frank Cass, 1974). Nothing, perhaps, better illustrates the enormity of the difference between the Arab world that the young Tawfiq al-Suwaydi knew and the Arab world that exists today. I am deeply grateful to retired professor Leonard Hochberg (Louisiana State University) for his critical insight into these and assorted other matters. Professor Hochberg is a cofounder, along with Dr. George Friedman, of Strategic Forecasting Inc., which later became the geostrategic forecasting and analysis firm Stratfor. There is no known family relationship between the two Hochbergs. 13. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 171–172. 14. Memorandum of Spindrift al-Suwaydi to Antony T. Sullivan, August 18, 2010. 15. For his largely negative assessment of ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun, see Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 188–192. To his credit, Batatu does note Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s contrary opinion. For his part, the Iraqi-American scholar Adeed Dawisha agrees with Tawfiq Pasha. Dawisha describes al-Sa‘dun as an individual “known for his toughness and fortitude,” and one willing to take decisive action against opponents of the crown even when both the British and the king hesitated to do so. In addition, al-Sa‘dun was not afraid to take on the British themselves, as he did in 1928 by insisting on revision of the military and financial articles of the draft treaty of 1927 to make those provisions more compatible with Iraqi national interests. Surely, al-Sa‘dun understood that he was unlikely to prevail in this particular struggle. In fact, the end came soon enough, with the collapse of his third ministry in January 1929 (see Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009], pp. 23–25, 61, and Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 2001, 2007], p. 62). 16. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 358–359. One Iraqi dunam equaled 0.618 acre. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. See the listing in ibid., pp. 58–62. 20. Shlomo Hillel, Operation Babylon: Jewish Clandestine Activity in the Middle East, 1946–51 (London: Fontana Collins, 1988, 1989), p. 300. 21. For a graphic account of this incident, see Fattah, “The Debate on the Iraqi Nation,” pp. 7–9. 22. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, French Consul in Baghdad M. Dozon to French Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Pichon in Paris, June 21, 1913. The reaction

Introduction

47

to Shevket’s assassination by the Baghdadi elite testified to the existence of strong anti-Turkish feeling at least at the top of Arab society in eastern Mesopotamia well before the outbreak of World War I. Note, for example, the observation by the British official Philip Ireland in 1912 that he had been “much struck of late by the increasing freedom with which . . . anti-Turkish sentiment [is being] expressed [in Baghdad]” (see Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development [New York: Macmillan, 1938], p. 230). To go further, as does Adeed Dawisha in Iraq: A Political History, p. 76, and argue that a “rudimentary nationalist sentiment” (emphasis mine) did in fact exist in Baghdad and Basra before World War I, centering especially on the personality of Sayyid Talib al-Naqib of Basra, confuses the mammoth personal ambitions of Sayyid Talib and the Arab decentralist sentiment regnant among the tiny Iraqi elite with what only later became a clearly discernible Arab nationalist orientation in Iraq and elsewhere. 23. Dozon to Pichon. 24. Ibid. In 1910, one of Baghdad’s deputies to the Ottoman parliament commented that “to depend on the tribe is a thousand times safer than depending on the government, for whereas the latter . . . neglects repression, the tribe, no matter how feeble it may be, as soon as it learns that an injustice has been committed against one of its members, readies itself to exact vengeance on his behalf” (as quoted in Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 21). 25. For a snapshot of that old world, see Batatu, The Old Social Classes, table 2-1, entitled “The Calamities of Which We Have a Record and Which Overtook Baghdad in the 17th, 18th, and 19th Centuries,” p. 15. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. This relentlessly tragic history is explained by the distinguished geostrategist Robert D. Kaplan as primarily due to the unforgiving geography against which most of Iraq abuts. That geography, Kaplan explains, has meant that Iraq has never been left alone, and that occupation has followed occupation throughout its history. He points out that eastern Mesopotamia lies across one of history’s bloodiest migration routes, and that the area that we today call Iraq has never constituted a cohesive political unit. Rather, its north, center, and south have since antiquity “usually been in pitched battle.” Unlike Egypt, its rivers flow perpendicular rather than parallel to the natural route of human movement. Kaplan quotes the great British explorer and travel writer, Freya Stark, who observed that Iraq is “right-angled and obnoxious to the predestined paths of man, from earliest times a frontier province.” To this Kaplan adds that the often prosperous cities on the Tigris-Euphrates flatlands have for millennia provided attractive targets for plunder, especially by the mountain peoples to the north and east. Duly acknowledging Iraq’s functioning parliamentary system between 1921 and 1958, Kaplan argues that the high degree of authoritarianism that has characterized Iraq from ancient times to the present is the largely inescapable legacy of the unforgiving geography in which Iraq is embedded. See Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate (New York: Random House, 2012), pp. 39–40, 304–307. The importance of the interaction between such fundamental realities as geography and demography to historical outcomes identified by the great French historians of the Annales School is especially well illustrated by the case of Iraq. 28. Quoted in Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 25–26. 29. Ibid. 30. See the outstanding but unpublished undergraduate honors thesis of Tawfiq al-Suwaydi II submitted at Dartmouth College in 1999, Civil Unrest, Colonial Intervention, and the Native Ruling Classes: Tawfiq al-Suwaydi and Iraq’s Liberal

48

My Memoirs

Experiment of 1946, pp. 91–94. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi II is the grandson of Pasha Tawfiq al-Suwaydi and the son of Luay and Spindrift al-Suwaydi. 31. For a brilliant overview of the assorted problems, old and new, that continued to afflict Iraq as of 2012, see Kenneth M. Pollack, “Reading Machiavelli in Iraq,” The National Interest, November–December 2012. 32. See the observations on King Faisal I in Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, Personalities (Faces) of Iraqi History (London: Riad al-Rayyes, 1987). This book contains trenchant short commentaries on a variety of Iraqi luminaries whom Pasha al-Suwaydi knew personally. 33. E-mail from Spindrift al-Suwaydi to Antony T. Sullivan, June 12, 2011. 34. Conversations of Antony T. Sullivan with Spindrift and Luay al-Suwaydi, 2010 and 2011. 35. See the telegrams from John Simon to the Foreign Office, August 19, 1937, and December 8, 1937, in Foreign Office document (hereafter FO) 371/2079. 36. Ibid. 37. For the full text of this statement, see the article entitled “Palestine Plan: Arab Opposition to Partition,” The Daily Telegraph, September 13, 1937. 38. See FO 5392/22/31. 39. Ibid. 40. C. J. Edmonds to Archibald Clark Kerr, November 18, 1937, in FO 371/20821. 41. FO 371/20816. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. FO 371/5232. Eugene Rogan, in his The Arabs: A History (London: Penguin, 2009), entirely ignores Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s major contribution to Iraqi and Arab liberalism. Rogan repeats this omission in his eulogy to Foulath Hadid, published in The Independent on October 12, 2012. At least by implication, Rogan’s eulogy allots to Muhammad Hadid and his son Foulath a monopoly over the Iraqi liberal tradition. One may hope that the present volume, in conjunction with Adeed Dawisha’s Iraq: A Political History, will serve as correctives to Rogan’s partial assessment. 47. See Tawfiq al-Suwaydi II, Civil Unrest, Colonial Intervention, and the Native Ruling Classes, pp. 91–94. 48. FO 171/5240. 49. Ibid. 50. FO 371/5232. 51. Tawfiq al-Suwaydi II, Civil Unrest, Colonial Intervention, and the Native Ruling Classes, p. 81. 52. See Gregory Gause, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2011): 88. 53. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 531. 54. FO 371/33068, September 23, 1958. 55. For an interesting overview of the judicial proceedings, see the article entitled “Baban’s Indictment Gives Syria Plot Details,” The Iraq Times, November 23, 1958, in FO 371/133073. This article includes a photograph of Ahmad Mukhtar Baban and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi (both seated in the dock and looking very tired), with ‘Abdul Jalil al-Rawi standing between them. The article notes, as far as Tawfiq specifically was concerned, that the court’s indictment included the statement that Tawfiq was “best described by his own brother [presumably Naji], who said of

Introduction

49

[Tawfiq] that he was a tool in the hands of the British.” Surely, for Tawfiq, this accusation must have been the unkindest cut of all. 56. FO 371/133073-0012. 57. FO 1015/358, November 15, 1958. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. FO 371/133073-0012. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. FO 481/12. 66. Ibid. 67. FO 371/1132922. 68. Ibid. This document is worth reading in its entirety as it provides copious detail on the accusations by the People’s Court against Tawfiq al-Suwaydi for his position on Syria, and Tawfiq’s responses to many of the specific charges made. 69. Memorandum of Gabriella Bassatne to Spindrift al-Suwaydi, undated but composed in the spring of 2011. 70. If the liberalism of the Arab Spring now can frequently seem an illusion, the events of 2011 have guaranteed that nothing will ever be the same in the Middle East again. Olivier Roy puts the matter well in an article entitled “The Transformation of the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 3 (2012): 3. Roy states, “Something irreversible did happen in the Arab Spring. Whatever ups and downs may follow, we are witnessing the beginning of a process by which democratization is becoming rooted in Arab societies. Democratization is very much a process in this case—not a program of government implemented by deep-dyed democrats.” Pasha Tawfiq al-Suwaydi would surely empathize with that assessment and take comfort in the knowledge that his own life’s labor may have provided foundations on which successor generations hopefully can now build.

My Memoirs

Dedication

~

To my nation . . . History bears witness that never have its sons and daughters been in agreement, rallying around ideals that spring from its heart, but that the greatest of states has been built, and the most lofty of civilizations has arisen. And never have they been divided and indolent, lax and indifferent, but that it has been humiliated and abased, a nation trifling and astray. To my nation, out of which has arisen a new generation, a generation whom all those in positions of responsibility have neglected to guide aright. Hence, the nation’s foes have rushed in to fill the void in minds and hearts with alien, corrupt principles that have distanced our youth—the mainstay of our present and our future—from the sound, upright morals we have to give them. As a consequence, the young have spurned their nation and its history, its values and its fundamentals. In so doing they have, through no fault of their own, brought harm upon themselves and upon their nation when all they were seeking was the good, and nothing but the good! To my nation, which now suffers disunity and ignominy. Nor is there any hope that the cloud of sorrow will dissipate, that the crisis will pass, but through a return to that which is most authentic and noble in our heritage and our traditions. Such a return, moreover, must be made with faith and solidarity, with knowledge and foresight, with untiring labor both heartfelt and constructive. For then and then only will we ensure ourselves both invulnerability and dignity, restoring ourselves to our proper place among the nations, namely, at the top and in the vanguard! To my nation, to which I have the proud honor of belonging and to which I dedicate these memoirs, which span a half century spent in its 53

54

My Memoirs

unstinting and earnest service. In return I desire no reward or thanks, nor do I hope for anything but to meet my Lord with peace of heart and mind and a conscience at rest, beseeching the Almighty to lead my fellow countrymen and countrywomen along the best of paths, taking them by the hand and guiding their steps. Thus led, may they labor with conscientiousness and determination to fulfill our most precious and cherished of hopes, namely, that our nation might turn once more and become “the best community that has ever been brought forth for the good of mankind.” —Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, 1967

1 My Upbringing

~

My Birth and Lineage My name is Sulayman Tawfiq, and I was born in Baghdad in March 1309 AH/1892 CE in the Khidr Ilyas quarter near Karkh. I grew up in an atmosphere imbued with piety and the love of knowledge, as I belong to a wellknown Abbasid family known as Āl al-Suwaydi. I am the son of Yusuf bin Nu‘man bin Muhammad Sa‘id bin Ahmad bin ‘Abdullah bin Abi alMuhamid bin Muhammad al-Mudallal bin ‘Abdullah Abu al-Fattuh bin alHussein bin ‘Ali bin ‘Abdullah bin al-Hussein bin ‘Ali bin Abi Bakr bin al-Fadl bin Abi al-‘Abbas Ahmad bin al-Muqtada bin ‘Abdullah bin Muhammad bin ‘Abdullah al-Qa’im bi’amrillah bin Ahmad al-Qadir billah bin Ishaq bin Ja‘far al-Muqtadir bin Ahmad al-Mu‘tadid bin al-Muwaffaq Talhah bin Ja‘far al-Mutawakkil bin Muhammad al-Mu‘tasim bin Harun alRashid bin Mahdi bin Abi Ja‘far ‘Abdullah al-Mansur bin Muhammad bin ‘Ali bin ‘Abdullah bin al-‘Abbas bin ‘Abdullah al-Qurashi.

My View of Life From the time I was young I began to think on a higher plane than my peers. Unlike them, I rebelled against many traditions and criticized the stagnation and rigidity that had come to have such a hold on the Arab East. From time to time I would get into heated discussions with my friends and associates, most of which would end in angry altercations. However, my views did not change. On the contrary, I continued to scrutinize things with 55

56

My Memoirs

the same critical eye, which led me to conclusions that were somewhat foreign to those around me. Essentially, I believed that sound knowledge could only be arrived at through careful investigation, and that careful investigation is only made possible by independent thinking unimpeded by any hindrance or constraint. I relied little on history and traditions. Instead, I adopted a free, scientific method of arriving at the facts I sought, though I was an adolescent who had yet to arrive at facts that might be described as “scientific” in the true sense of the word. Be that as it may, this sort of independent thinking was helpful to me in that it enabled me to remain unaffected by many outmoded ideas, as well as many contemporary notions derived therefrom. I remember talking one day with the renowned Turkish author Sulayman Nazif Bek, who at one time was governor over Baghdad and who was considered one of Turkey’s leading intellectuals and scholars. After a long discussion, he told me that in Iraq and elsewhere he had encountered numerous young people who might be more knowledgeable or higher ranking than I, but who were bound by fetters of a sort that caused them to miss many of the conclusions to which their perceptions and thoughts might otherwise have led them. “In you, on the other hand,” he went on, “I find a distinctive quality, namely, that because of your perceptiveness and breadth of knowledge, you have broken the chains that bind you and have become an independent thinker who goes after objective truth like some European scientist at work in his laboratory.” This bent of mine has been helpful to me throughout my life, and even in my early days it caused me to express points of view that were beyond my years on the issues to which I was exposed. As a young person I was preoccupied with three general concerns: (1) Arab identity and culture, (2) social progress in the East overall, and in the Arab countries in particular, and (3) psychological liberation from inherited traditions and constraints. My concern with Arab identity and culture comes at the top of the list because I belong to an Arab family of ancient and noble origins. From the time I was a young man I saw that Arab civilization had a mission to perform in the Middle East in particular, and in world civilization in general. One reason for this is that Arabs possess an elegant, precise Semitic language that is capable of giving expression to human thoughts and emotions in all their forms and stages of evolution, as a result of which it needs to keep pace with the other languages of the world in its response to new developments, needs, and circumstances. It was this passionate concern of mine for Arab culture and the Arabic language that led me to involve myself in politics when I was only sixteen years old, since I believed that a people who had possessed such a luminous civilization, a civilization that had placed them on a par with the most distinguished peoples on earth, had

My Upbringing

57

no business allowing its torch to go out or flagging in its strivings. I believed that I had a role to play in advancing this civilization in such a way that it would become fit to meet newly developing human needs. This belief propelled me into heartfelt, serious action in the hope that I could contribute in some small way to the tremendous efforts expended by my forebears in the service of this great cause. My attendance at the First Arab Congress, convened in Paris in 1913, and the tyrannical Turkish authorities’ pursuit of me for the purpose of trying me and sentencing me to death, as well as my participation in underground Arab groups such as al-Fatat (the Young Arab Society) and al-‘Ahd (the Arab Covenant), all came about due to a sense of urgency that had me in its grip even before I had finished my university degrees, and before I’d completed my twentieth year of life. My belief in the need for social progress in the East, and particularly in the Arab countries, stemmed from the widespread lethargy and ignorance I was observing and the reprehensible fanaticism that, like a raging stream, was sweeping away what remained of the vibrant Arab heritage we had once known. I feared that this regression would soon reach such critical proportions that Arab society would succumb to indifference and death and then, as an inevitable consequence of this, give way to that which was proving itself to be stronger and more viable, namely, the foreign element, which would then bring the Arab countries into the fold of modernity while depriving them of their own distinctive traits and strengths. Fearful of the collapse of Arab civilization, I struggled to ward off the seemingly inevitable fate toward which our society was progressing at such an alarming rate. At the same time, I could see that this struggle would only succeed through social reform and renewal within Arab life, a reform and renewal that would enable it to keep pace with the contemporary European mindset until, with its European counterpart, it achieved the higher goal of prosperity throughout the Arab world. Hence, I was only inclined to study the past to the extent that I could learn from it, deriving lessons that would pave the way for genuine progress toward a new life. As for psychological liberation from inherited traditions and restraints, I saw it as necessary for Arab society because such liberation would serve as a kind of healing balm that could rid us of the pathogens and illnesses that had come to plague our societal body. Without this liberation, it would not be possible for Arab thought to progress scientifically, academically, and socially toward the achievement of its goals. These three goals consumed all my time and attention, and I would think to myself about how Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had the opportunity to achieve radical reform in Turkey. He took the opportunity, and in so doing he brought great benefit to his country and to the entire East. Twelve years before he achieved what he did, that is, in 1912, I myself had published an article in The Islamic Group, which used to come out of Istanbul, in which

58

My Memoirs

I demonstrated the need to undertake social reform similar to what Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was later to actually carry out. However, the act of advocating reform leads nowhere unless it is backed up by power, and whereas Atatürk had power at his disposal, I as yet had none at mine. Hence, at that time, at least, all I could do was hold it out as a cherished hope and wax eloquent on the subject, but all to no avail.

The Setting My passion for politics was great from the time I began to understand things around me at the age of fourteen. I used to sit often with my father and listen to the conversations that would take place among those who had come to see him about the state of agriculture and irrigation, the tribes, and social and political reform. All these exchanges had an air of desperation about them, as though there was no real hope of any reform under the Ottoman Empire, of which Baghdad was a part. When the Ottoman Constitution was announced in July 1908, no one even understood what a constitution was, nor did anyone comprehend the meaning of the revolution that had taken place. The reality that no one discussed was people’s belief in the need for an end to injustice and decadence in the broadest sense of the term. The prevailing view was that reforming the Ottoman Empire would be no easy matter due to the absence of the means by which to achieve such reform, the ongoing ignorance, bigotry, and tribalism that were rife throughout the land, and a natural unwillingness to imbibe the new spirit that the constitution sought to infuse into public life. If someone said “equality” and “brotherhood,” the response was, “How is this possible when everyone knows that there can be no equality or brotherhood between Muslims and non-Muslims?” If someone said “freedom” and “justice,” the response would come, “What a strange thing to call for, since what the sultan does is justice itself. As for freedom, it is the ally of chaos, which we can well do without.” The speculations that emerged at the time of the overthrow were proved correct, and signs of decadence in the Ottoman Empire to which Iraq was subject were even more in evidence than they had been before. Such decadence was then worsened by the successive wars that took place between Turkey and Italy and then between Turkey and the Balkans. As part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq consisted of three provinces: Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra. Each province was subdivided into a number of districts (Arabic, aliwiyah, singular, liwa’), which were in turn divided into subdistricts (aqdiyah, singular, qada’), each of which was further divided into counties (nawahin, singular, nahiyah), depending on the need for such subdivisions.

My Upbringing

59

Baghdad Province was the center of administrative control and, at times, of political control. This control stemmed from the fact that Basra and Mosul had been districts within Baghdad Province during the days of Medhet Pasha. Baghdad’s other distinction consisted in its serving as the headquarters for the Sixth Army, which exercised military control over all of Iraq, thereby ensuring this province’s unrivaled superiority to the other two. However, for a number of reasons Basra was more fully subject to Baghdad’s authority than was Mosul.

The Ottoman Constitution In the summer of 1908 there were reports from Istanbul, the significance of which was understood only by a few individuals, namely, that the sultan (‘Abd al-Hamid II) had issued an order restoring the Constitution of 1876. Those days were considered a new era in the life of the Ottoman state, which came to be known as the “Era of Constitutional Freedom,” “the Ottoman overthrow,” or “the Young Turk Revolution.” Such appellations were entirely unheard of among the Iraqi population, who had no inkling of what they purported to mean. The only thing that was clear to the Iraqi populace was that this new era would make Muslims and non-Muslims brothers in their common homeland and limit the power of the sultan (caliph). No one in Iraq was in favor of these radical changes. Indeed, when, in the following year, the name of Sultan Muhammad V (Mehmet V) was mentioned for the first time in Friday sermons, most of the mosque-goers wept over their deposed sultan. However, the Turkish element in Iraq had a better grasp of such matters than did the Arab element, since the works that had been written in praise of freedom and the virtues of renewal and the constitution had been penned by Turkish writers the likes of Namiq Kemal, ‘Ali Sa‘awi, and others with whom few Arabs had any familiarity.

Between Two Ideas In reality, a heated debate had arisen in Iraq between adherents of “the old idea” and “the new idea.” This debate led some to class the new current as Turkish and the old one as Arab, though this distinction was not justified. Hence, one found some Iraqis accusing Ottomanists of first advocating renewal, then stirring up Turkish nationalist sentiment. The fact is, however, that at the outset of the Constitutional Era the concept of Ottomanism—that is, support for the Ottoman Empire as an entity that brought together all the nationalities under its reign—enjoyed greater currency than any other, whereas Turkish nationalism only emerged clearly in 1909 and thereafter.

60

My Memoirs

Arab Consciousness In 1909 all the dormant resentments between Turks and Arabs began to surface. Not surprisingly, some of this feeling made its way into Iraq, where it was fomented by certain wealthy, influential individuals in the service of their own aims. A smattering of well-meaning Arab youths were also influenced by the new tide. As the days passed, disaffection between the Arab and Turkish elements began to grow, although it remained within a very limited circle due to the paucity of organized Arab nationalist sentiment in Iraq at the time, since, during the period extending from July 1908 to July 1914, the country was in a state of ambivalence, and its aims lacked clear definition. I was among the Baghdad residents who knew nothing of the earthshaking events that awaited them in connection with their nationalism and their homelands’ fates. I knew I was an Arab Ottoman Muslim, though I only possessed the most ill-defined sense of myself as Arab. Hence, if I was in this position despite belonging to an illustrious Arab family of noble origins, what must have been the experience of those around me? I recall how, when one of my brothers was preparing to travel for a period of time to Istanbul, my father asked him to correspond with him in Arabic, since most of the writing done at that time was in Turkish. All of us abided by our father’s wishes by writing to him in Arabic, which kept the Arab spark in us alive despite the ubiquitous influence of our Turkish milieu.

The Arab Congress Odd as it may seem, we saw Istanbul as being the cradle of the Arab renaissance due to the close contact that took place there between its Arab youth and Arabs of middle age, both in the Literary Forum and other settings. This contact yielded abundant benefits whose effects became apparent in the First Arab Congress convened in Paris in 1913, in the context of which the Arabs made their voice heard in a clarion call for their rights and a declaration of what would best serve their nationalist cause. Arab hopes during this period were not set on complete autonomy; rather, their aim was to revive an Arab nationalism with modern foundations that could convey clearly to the Turks that within the Ottoman Empire there were Arab citizens whose wishes should be respected, and who should be empowered to enjoy their legitimate rights as Ottoman subjects.

2 In Public Life: The Literary Forum

~

The first significant thing I did in my life as an Arab nationalist was to join the Literary Forum, which was founded in Istanbul in 1908. It was through this club that I came in contact with young Syrian Arabs, who made up the vast majority of the club’s membership. It was singularly difficult for Syrians and Iraqis to understand each other, since the colloquial Iraqi dialect that we spoke bore little resemblance to written or literary Arabic. Rather, it was a jumble of Turkish and Persian words, local expressions that bore no connection to the Arabic language, and Bedouin turns of phrase that had never made it into a dictionary. The situation we Iraqis faced in our contact with Syrians made me think of what a Sudanese must experience when relating to an Egyptian. The Syrians far surpassed us on the level of general knowledge, and their obvious superiority to us in this regard left us feeling intimidated and humbled, particularly when it came to Arab history, Arabic literature and poetry, proverbs, verbal expression, and Arab aims. Syrians were extremely knowledgeable on all these subjects and far surpassed their Iraqi associates, who were only beginning to formulate and clarify their nationalist convictions and beliefs, and just starting to experience an awareness of their identity as Arabs. When I first became acquainted with Tawfiq al-Bisat, Fa’iz al-Shihabi, Sa‘id Haydar, ‘Abdul Karim Qasim al-Khalil, Tawfiq al-Natur, Riyad alSulh, ‘Arif al-Khatib, and other students attending higher institutions, I felt like a schoolboy in a class beyond his level who finds himself “in over his head” and at a loss as to how to keep up with his classmates. Be that as it may, the first thing that caught my attention was a particular word that other Arab young people used often in hushed tones: independence. They would discuss the shape of the Arab flag, which consisted of four horizontal stripes: the uppermost white, then black, then green, then red. 61

62

My Memoirs

They loved to sing a line of poetry that al-Rusafi had recited in a poetry reading held in his honor by the Literary Forum in 1909: The truth tells me, And ’tis truth that she utters, “That knowledge avails only over which a banner flutters.” These young people openly declared their hatred for the Turkish nationalist movement, which sought to unite all those of Turkish origin linguistically, culturally, and politically, as well as their fear of the policy of Turkification being pursued by the unionists.

In Paris Immediately after finishing my law degree in Istanbul in 1912, I traveled to Paris to study Western law. I was profoundly influenced by the new culture to which I had been introduced by the young people in the Literary Forum and the friends with whom I had shared living quarters in Istanbul, including Fa’iz al-Shihabi and Tawfiq al-Bisat, as well as my new awareness of the Arab culture from which I had been so isolated in Iraq. All this served to bring me, while in Paris, into closer contact with young people who were more sophisticated and thoughtful than the Arabs I had known in Istanbul. Foremost among these new acquaintances were Muhammad alMuhammasani, Jamil Mardam, ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi, ‘Abd al-Ghani al-‘Arisi, Tawfiq Fa’id, and others whose names I can’t recall after these many years. These young men used to gather regularly at a café at the corner of Saint Germain and Saint Michel streets. I would come to most of their gatherings, and when the idea of calling for a congress in Paris began to ferment, the purpose being to discuss the concerns of Arabs living in the Ottoman Empire, the general consensus was that it should be called the Syrian Congress in view of the fact that the Syrians were the only ones in active support of the nationalist idea and had received no appreciable support from any other Arabs. The Syrian young people’s view that the congress should be considered Syrian was thoroughly justified, since the stance that had been taken toward the Arab cause thus far by Iraq, the Hejaz, and Yemen had not only been unhelpful but, at times, positively harmful to it. The majority of the Hejazis, particularly the city dwellers among them, claimed that they had no Arab origins whatsoever despite the fact that they spoke the Arabic language and imbibed Arab culture. This claim was based on the fact that they had originally hailed from non-Arab countries and had settled where they were in order to earn their keep and/or live in proximity to other people.

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

63

The Hejaz and Nationalist Consciousness Arab nationalist sentiment was likewise foreign to the Bedouins of the Hejaz, and the same was true of the ruling elements in the Hejaz, including both Turks who served in official capacities in the Ottoman administration and Arabs who occupied high positions in the same. They were, one and all, entirely disengaged from any sort of nationalist activity or awareness. Indeed, Sharif Hussein, then emir of Mecca, even protested against the actions that had been taken by the First Arab Congress, actions which he viewed as being in the service of foreign interests and, as such, a betrayal of the Ottoman homeland. I used to keep a copy of the Turkish-language Aqdam newspaper in which a telegram of protest from Sharif Hussein to the grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire had been published. Moreover, whatever can be said about the Hejaz in this connection applies equally to Yemen. As for Iraq, there was such confusion and lack of clarity over its views and aims that in 1911, the Ottoman parliament was convened for consultation, and in the course of the ensuing discussions, it became apparent that certain parliamentarians were saying that Iraq, including Baghdad, was not Arab. In the course of the aforementioned discussion, the late Jamil Sidqi al-Zahhawi offered an impassioned defense of Iraq’s, and particularly Baghdad’s, Arab identity, an admirable position for which he should be remembered with gratitude. A similar situation prevailed in all the Arab lands with the exception of Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem, where young people together with a goodly number of older individuals were expending tremendous efforts to infuse the Arab spirit into people’s hearts. It was eminently understandable that, for the reasons adduced above, the Syrian youths in Paris would have wanted the upcoming congress to be identified as Syrian. However, the effort I made to convince them to identify the congress as Arab rather than Syrian was far more successful than I had expected it to be. I wouldn’t say that it was my eloquence or reasoning that led them to change their minds in the end. Rather, I suspect that it was their own Arab nationalist leanings that helped win the day, and they decided to change a key phrase in the congress’s concluding statement from “the Syrian Congress” to “the First Arab Congress.”

The Arab Muslims The First Arab Congress, convened in Paris in 1913 at the Geographical Society on Saint Germain, turned out to be the theater for a grand quarrel among three distinct factions. The first of these consisted of Muslim Arab youth whose all-consuming preoccupation was to form a nationalist movement aimed at making Arabs’ voices heard by the Ottoman authority. These

64

My Memoirs

King Hussein bin ‘Ali, sharif of Mecca

young people sought to guarantee their legitimate rights as a significant element in Ottoman society; in other words, their aim was to enjoy rights equal to those accorded Turkish subjects of the empire. This group, which enjoyed the support of the majority of middle-age Muslims, made clear that it was neither separatist nor assimilationist. Rather, its members were demanding their rights and calling for reform in a moderate fashion. They wanted to improve their situation and that of their fellow Arab Muslims, and although they were holding the Turks accountable for their errors, they nevertheless harbored no ill will toward them. It was this that caused the second faction to be distrustful of them when it came to concluding agreements with the Turks, and to be wary of relying on them should the need for armed struggle arise.

The Arab Christians The second faction was composed of young, middle-age, and elderly Christian Arabs who were full of bitter hatred for the Turks due to what they had

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

65

suffered at their hands by way of persecution, oppression, and forcible removal from their homelands. Add to this the fact that in terms of language, religion, and tradition alike, they were entirely removed from Islamic Turkish culture, their closest ties being with foreign nations. Indeed, many of them were residing in foreign countries, especially in France, which was pursuing a blatantly colonialist and expansionist policy in Syria.

The Vacillators As for the third group, it was represented by fence-sitters who were torn between their identity as Arabs by birth and upbringing, and their materialistic inclinations. If people belonging to this group were asked to choose between loyalty to the Turks and loyalty to the Arabs, they found it difficult to know what to do, especially if they were presented with glittering promises of the sort they had been receiving from some Turks or government officials. In this respect they were like saboteurs who do their best to thwart any movement they encounter. Fortunately, however, their numbers were few. Intensive preparations for the First Arab Congress began on Wednesday, June 1, 1913. The congress convened on June 18 and adjourned on June 23. The aim that drove the congress participants was that of supporting the Decentralization Party, which had been founded in Egypt, and the Reform Society, which had been founded in Beirut and whose aim was to demand the recognition of Arabs’ rights in the Ottoman Empire and to elevate their political status to a level on which they would enjoy equality with Ottoman Turks. The Arab Congress was originally the brainchild of five individuals, namely, ‘Abd al-Ghani al-‘Arisi, ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi, Muhammad al-Muhammasani, Jamil Mardam, and Tawfiq Fa’id. After discussions with the Lebanese and Syrians in Paris and the requisite correspondence with the Decentralization Party and Beirut’s Reform Society, the decision was made to treat the following subjects in the congress’s various sessions: (1) national life and opposition to the occupation, (2) Arab rights in the Ottoman Empire, (3) the need for reform based on decentralization, and (4) emigration to and from Syria. The congress delegations were as follows: ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi and Iskandar ‘Ammun represented the Higher Committee of the Decentralization Party in Egypt; Salim Sallam, Ahmad Mukhtar Bayham, Khalil Zayniyah, Ahmad Hasan Tabbarah, Dr. Ayyub Thabit, and Albert Sursaq represented the Reform Society of Beirut; my friend Sulayman ‘Anbar and I represented Iraq; Muhammad Haydar and Ibrahim Haydar represented Ba‘albek; Najib Diyab, Mindam Mukarzal, and Ilyas Maqsud represented Arab expatriates in the United States; ‘Abbas Bajani represented Arab

66

My Memoirs

expatriates in Mexico; Shukri Ghanim, ‘Abd al-Ghani al-‘Arisi, Nudrah Mutran, ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi, Charles Dabbas, Khayrallah Khayrallah, Jamil Mardam, and Muhammad al-Muhammasani represented the Arab community in Paris; and ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khalil represented the Arab community in Istanbul. In the first session of the congress, Nudrah Mutran delivered a speech on behalf of the Preparation Committee while President ‘Abd al-Hamid alZahrawi gave a speech entitled “Our Political Upbringing.” In the second session ‘Abd al-Ghani al-‘Arisi spoke on “Arabs’ Rights in the Ottoman Empire,” Nudrah Mutran spoke on “Nationalist Life in Ottoman Arab Countries,” and Najib Diyab spoke on “The Hopes of Expatriate Syrians,” while I gave a speech in which I conveyed Iraq’s greetings and support to the congress participants. In the third session, Ahmad Hasan Tabbarah spoke on “Emigration from and to Syria,” while Iskandar ‘Ammun gave a talk on “Decentralization-Based Reform.” The final session included a speech by President al-Zahrawi in which he extended a word of welcome to the non-Arabs who had attended the congress. A French translation of alZahrawi’s speech was provided by Ahmad Mukhtar Bayham, who then presented a concluding summary of the conference proceedings. The following is the text of the speech in which I greeted those in attendance on Iraq’s behalf: Esteemed Gentlemen, A response to your invitation, participation in your work, and service to your cause are duties that no Arab with a grain of patriotism in his heart could possibly shirk. Consequently, it is a cause of pride for me to stand today among the best minds of the Arab nation, among the gifted, determined, and courageous souls gathered at a convention that seeks to arm the Arab countries with the tools of reform that will assure their future and enable the whole world to see that we are a living nation that has not died and that, by God’s grace, will never die. On my own behalf, and on behalf of the enlightened, thoughtful youth of Iraq, I want to thank those who have organized this solemn gathering for the courage they have demonstrated and the hardships they have endured for the sake of making this great work possible. I thank all the esteemed delegates for their willingness to overcome such great obstacles in order to lend aid and support to their nation and to answer their homeland’s call by representing their fellow Arabs in the worthiest possible manner. I assure you, gentlemen, that your brethren in Iraq are no less aware than their Syrian compatriots of the need for reform, nor are they less prepared than they to foment a spirit of renewal in defense of the Arabs’ legitimate rights. By virtue of the single purpose, the single nation, and the single message that unites us, we strive to rescue the homeland and achieve a life of contentment for this noble nation of ours. The people of Iraq are proud to add their voices and efforts to those of their brethren in all Arab countries in pursuit of reform through decentralization, and my

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

67

colleague and I are here to assure you of the enlightened Iraqi people’s approval of your splendid enterprise and their wholehearted sympathy for your noble aims. In conclusion, I thank you once again in the name of all my Iraqi brethren, who offer you their unreserved support and assistance. Peace be upon you, O elite of the Arab nation and its shield in times of misfortune.

When I finished delivering this short speech, the president shouted, “Long live our Iraqi brothers!” and the conference hall erupted in thunderous applause. Letter after letter came in as the congress was in session, all of them expressing support for our undertaking. Among them was a letter from a group of women in Beirut, on whose behalf it had been sent by ‘Anbarah Salim Sallam, Widad Muhammasani, and Shafiqah Ghurayb. We also received a telegram from the Beirut Reform Society and a letter from Damascus bearing the signatures of many renowned Arab thinkers and artists in Damascus, including the likes of ‘Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, Shukri al-Jundi, Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali, Fakhri al-Barudi, Prince ‘Arif al-Shihab, Khalil Mardam Bek, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Inkilizi, Muhammad Kamil al-Qassab, and Lutfi alHaffar. Missives arrived from the cities of Beirut, Ba‘albek, Homs, Tripoli, Damascus, Sidon, and Jenin. Others reached us from the Arab communities in Istanbul, Birmingham, Brussels, Cleveland, Germany, Montreal, New York, Geneva, Montpellier, Alexandria, and Rio de Janeiro, and from Arab students in Lyon, Jaffa, Zahleh, Basra (signed by Talib al-Naqib), Nablus, Haifa, and Hama. A telegram of support that reached us from Baghdad on 17 Jumada al-Ula 1331 AH/1912 CE read as follows: We want you to be aware of the fact that we have not abandoned our quest to bring people together in the spirit of Arab nationalism, uniting Arabs’ hearts and minds around a single message. The seeds we have planted have now sprouted into a young seedling, whose branches you will see flowering and whose fruits you will reap. We have asked our fellow patriot and brother, Tawfiq Bek al-Suwaydi, an offshoot of the Arab family tree whose grandeur is recognized by Arab and Turk alike, to represent us at this Arab Congress of ours, and we ask you to receive him on our behalf in the hope that he will keep us abreast of your ongoing reawakening.

The signatories to this telegram included ‘Abd al-Latif al-Mudallal, ‘Abdullah al-Tayyar, Muhyi al-Din al-Gaylani, Najib Thaniyan, ‘Abbas Hilmi alShahbandar, Bahjat Zaynal, Muhammad Sa‘id al-Rawi, Muzahim al-Amin al-Pachachi, Ja‘far Sidqi al-Pachachi, Shakir Ghusaybah, Nu‘man al-A‘zami, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, Yusuf Dhiya’, Khulusi al-Nasiri, and other prominent Iraqi thinkers and men of note. In this connection I recall Iraq’s support for the work undertaken by the Arab Congress. However, although many people in Iraq wrote telegrams

68

My Memoirs

and paid the requisite fees to the telegraph employees, the messages were never sent to the congress. After the congress had issued all its resolutions, which were published in a special volume that included full details of the congress’s aims and purposes together with the names of those who had attended and the like, participants parted and returned to their respective locales. It appears that negotiations were being conducted between certain congress participants, most of whom belonged to the “vacillator” faction referred to earlier, and Medhet Shukri, then-secretary-general of the Committee of Union and Progress, who had come to Paris for the express purpose of contacting said participants and drawing them over to the side of the Ottoman government. It later became apparent as well that Shukri, ‘Abd alHamid al-Zahrawi, ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, and others had reached an understanding on the basis of which the government would carry out certain reforms intended to benefit the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, such as the recognition of Arabic as an official second language in Arabic-speaking countries, employment of more Arabs in government positions, and appointment of a number of Arabs to the Ottoman Senate.

Reform in Arab Countries The Ottoman government began, in fact, to carry out the aforementioned agreement, announcing in Beirut and Syria through its provincial governors that it would be willing to carry out the reforms being demanded of it. However, those familiar with the internal state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire were of the belief that these phenomena were nothing more than stalling maneuvers and, when the time was right, a means of bearing down on those who had organized the Arab Congress. Indeed, there was a conflict between many of the Arab youth living in Istanbul and Syria and those who had been instrumental in arriving at said agreement with the Ottoman government. These young people were critical of al-Zahrawi and his supporters for having allowed the government to exploit them by drawing them in with enticements that would do nothing to fulfill the Arab people’s needs and aspirations. Such opposition prompted al-Zahrawi to announce that he would consult with the Decentralization Party in Cairo concerning whether he and his supporters should withdraw from the Senate or the agreement should be carried out as originally planned.

Crises in the Ottoman State Amidst this confusion and debate in Arab circles in Egypt, Syria, and Istanbul, the Ottoman state was facing major internal crises over the harm that it

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

69

might suffer due to the tension that prevailed in the European politics of the day. Indeed, relations between Russia and Germany were so strained over Austria that an imminent outbreak of war seemed a near certainty. The Sarajevo crisis that broke out with the assassination of the Austrian crown prince was followed by Austria’s declaration of war on Serbia, Russia’s declaration of war on Austria, Germany’s declaration of war on France, and Britain’s declaration of war on Germany. Thus began Europe’s ill-fated World War I. Turkey was now obliged to turn its attention to matters of greater urgency than the Arab question, since it had no choice but to determine the direction it would pursue in the war that now raged. Not surprisingly, Turkey tended to sympathize with the German front, since Russia, Britain, and France had all been pursuing policies that were, to say the least, vexing to Turkey and that may even have threatened it with dissolution and collapse. This was therefore not the time for non-Turkish elements in the Ottoman Empire to demand that rulers undertake any action in their favor. Indeed, the Committee of Union and Progress was now determined to do away with minorities through a policy of Turkification and ethnic cleansing. When Turkey entered the war four months after its outbreak, it further crystallized this policy and began to execute it. The existing military units in Arab countries were transferred to other fronts in Anatolia, to the Russian border, or to Çanakkale (Gallipoli, or the Dardanelles) so as to prevent elements that had begun banding together against the Ottoman state from moving freely or inciting others to rebellion because of its new policy. The majority of the Arabs residing in Anatolia were placed under police surveillance so that when the time came, they could be led away to be tried on charges of grand treason. And this is what, in fact, happened: A large number of the finest Arab men were sentenced to death and hanged. Soon thereafter the Turks led away a second group on the same charge, and for the same purpose, and they were brought to trial and hanged as well. They then began making up a third list of individuals that ought to be disposed of through trial and execution. Such lists were actually compiled, and the Turkish authorities began inquiring about the wanted individuals’ whereabouts. However, their efforts on this occasion came to naught, since the people whom they were pursuing were young men who by this time had scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire. It wasn’t easy locating the individuals on the Turkish authorities’ “wanted” list. The list had my name on it as well; however, I managed to elude their grasp thanks to the fact that when they brought my father in and asked him where I was, he replied that he had no idea what had become of me since the time I had left for Paris when, in reality, I was in Turkey. When they contacted my brother ‘Arif, who worked as a judge in the Damascus Court of Appeals, and asked him about me, he gave the same reply

70

My Memoirs

that my father had. A trusted acquaintance of mine, namely Shukri Afandi al-Qurh Ghuli, who represented Baghdad in the House of Representatives, once told me about how he had met with the chief magistrate in Damascus. When he spoke highly to the chief magistrate of my brother ‘Arif and urged that he be promoted, the chief magistrate had replied that although he shared the same high regard for my brother’s services, he would be unable to promote him due to the fact that his brother, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, had been listed as a participant in the First Arab Congress. When Sharif Hussein declared the revolt in the Hejaz in 1916, the Committee of Union and Progress charged that Jamal Pasha al-Saffah (“The Butcher”) was responsible for all of the arbitrary and tyrannical measures the government had taken against the Arabs. It claimed that he alone was the cause of the Arabs’ rage and discontent and that no more lists of those wanted for prosecution and execution should be compiled. Jamal Pasha did, in fact, call a halt to the aforementioned measures, although the displacement of Arab families to Anatolia continued apace.

In Military Service When the Ottoman state had been drawn into the war and had greatly broadened its conscription, I was drafted into the Ottoman army as a reserve officer. I remained in training for quite a long time, going back and forth between one type of training and another until I had spent two years serving in the infantry, where I was trained in telegraph communications and the use of hand grenades and flamethrowers. Eventually I finished my final training, which qualified me to work as a military legal adviser. After spending the requisite period of time in this service, I became legal adviser to the Ministry of War, after which I was transferred to the Telegraph Department associated with the German military mission in the same ministry, which was headed by Marshal Liman von Sanders. From there I was transferred to the post of legal adviser to the fortifications command on the Black Sea, then to Palestine, where I served as legal adviser to the Third Cavalry Division. A week after my arrival in Palestine, the Second Battle of Gaza took place. In this battle the Ottoman army was routed, following which it retreated to Tulkarm, where I remained as legal adviser to the Twenty-First Army Corps until the final battle, which destroyed the Turkish army in its entirety in October 1918. According to a rumor that began circulating in the country during that month of October, the Arab army had attacked and taken over Khirbat alGhazalah, thereby cutting off the Hejaz line, and preparations for an attack were afoot in the British army.

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

71

A Final British Attack in Palestine One night news came from the general command that an attack was imminent, possibly as early as the next morning. That same night we received a visit by Nasrat al-Farisi, a reserve officer and legal adviser to the Sixteenth Division, who spent the evening with me. In the course of our time together, al-Farisi confirmed the news I had heard concerning British preparations for an attack, and he stayed with me until one o’clock in the morning. And in fact, no sooner had dawn broken than the sound of gunfire could be heard the entire length of the front. We awoke in a panic, and when we went up to the roofs to see the front, which was a full fifteen kilometers away, we saw a dreadful band of fire all the way down the front as each side bombarded the other with unrelenting ferocity. Hardly had the sun risen before the Turkish army began to disband and retreat, and British forces appeared from everywhere, taking the remnants of the Turkish army captive. I felt certain that this would be the Turkish government’s last stand in Palestine, if not in all the Arab countries, and after the time I had spent in the army’s service, boredom and fatigue had so overcome me that I detested the thought of staying where I was even for another hour. Hence, I made up my mind that once the Turkish army had withdrawn from the country and the British army had come in, I would contact Baghdad, then under British occupation, and find a way back home.

The Turks’ Withdrawal from Jenin Before the withdrawal of the Eighth Ottoman Army, I wanted to contact its chief of accounting, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Qaysi al-Baghdadi, since he was a friend who had regularly provided me with services and assistance when the need arose. When I saw al-Baghdadi, he informed me that the Ottoman army had received an order to withdraw. He said they would be going to Jenin and that he feared that when they got there they would be taken captive by the British army, which now surrounded them on all sides. For this reason, he also feared that, if they were taken captive, the sizable amounts of gold, silver, and monetary notes in their possession would be taken captive along with them. Hence, he wondered if I would be willing to stay there in order to receive twenty chests of gold and keep them in a safe place until, once things settled down, he could come back to get them. I told him I would contact some people in the country and inform them of the matter right away. Immediately after this I spoke to Shaikh Sa‘id al-Karmi, the local mufti, who expressed his willingness to place the goods in his safekeeping. When I returned to the Turkish soldiers, I found them carrying the gold, silver, and currency away in cars. ‘Abd al-Wahhab Bek told me he

72

My Memoirs

hadn’t had the chance to sort some of the chests as he had planned on doing before giving them to me, so we went our separate ways. The next day I found ‘Abd al-Wahhab bringing his money back under guard by the British army, and to this day I don’t know what became of those chests full of gold, silver, and cash.

The Bombing of Tulkarm At noon on the same day, twenty-five British aircraft flew over Tulkarm and bombed the city. The people fled in terror, seeking refuge in neighboring villages, and I was among them. Together with other Turkish officers, I soon found myself a refugee in a nearby village named Shuwaykah, where I visited the Hanun family. While in the village, we officers monitored the war’s developments without knowing what our fate would be. The other officers were clearly eager to remain where we were rather than rejoin the army, a fact which threatened to spoil my plan to stay in the village alone. Consequently, I did all I could to convince them to leave. Luckily for me, my efforts at persuasion proved successful and they departed, though without knowing where the enemy might come upon them unawares and take them captive. Once the other officers were gone, I quickly removed my military uniform and exchanged it for the simplest possible civilian attire.

An Ambiguous Situation One day as I was seated in the Hanun family’s guest room, word reached them that other Turkish officers were coming to receive their hospitality. Fearing that I would be exposed if I came in contact with them, I withdrew to the women’s quarters, and from there I made my way to the room where grains and fodder were stored. Agitated, I sat down on a heap of grain the nature of which I couldn’t identify. I began putting the grains in my mouth and crushing them, but I found them to be exceedingly bitter. They looked something like oats, and I realized then that it was what the villagers refer to as kirsannah (a kind of chickpeas known as bitter vetch), which they used as animal feed. I stayed there for hours in the same state, racking my brain all the while and waiting for the British army to enter the city and relieve me from the situation I was in, as I had heard that the British army was on its way. However, it was past sundown by this time and the army had yet to arrive. In fact, I’d heard it said that the army wouldn’t advance toward the city by night. The thought of the army’s being delayed placed me in a state of even greater agitation, since I felt increasingly apprehensive, suspended between

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

73

British fire on one side and Turkish fire on the other. Nevertheless, the moon was bright, in the thirteenth day of its cycle, so I took a walk among the village’s threshing floors as I pondered my fate. Meanwhile, all I had by way of money was thirty gold pounds that I had saved up for just such a day as this.

The Situation Becomes Clearer At midnight I saw the villagers going in groups down into the valley. When I asked someone why they were doing this, I was told that they were going down to get the money and other things that had been left along the way by the Turkish army after being bombarded by the British aircraft. When I asked what had become of the Turkish army, I was told that it had made a final withdrawal to the outskirts of Jenin, as a result of which the area was entirely free of soldiers.

Indecision I thought to myself, “All my possessions have gone who knows where with my servant, and I have no way to protect myself or keep myself warm.” I wondered whether the British army would come in without resistance from the Turkish troops, in which case we would be spared needless anxiety and distress, or whether the Turkish army would come back and destroy whatever signs of civilization remained here just as it had done after the Second Battle of Gaza. Would I be able to reach Damascus easily and in time to gather whatever provisions I needed there? All these questions were going through my mind as I watched the villagers descending into the valley. In any case, since I was wearing a peasant’s tunic, which by this time was all the clothing I owned, I decided to go with them. When we reached the place where the Turkish and German armies’ money, ammunition, equipment, and other belongings were strewn along the road, I decided to get myself something to keep me warm. I found some clean, well-made blankets that must have come from an Austrian hospital and took three of them. Then I found a chest filled with fez caps. I couldn’t imagine what they were doing among the other things, since the Turkish army didn’t wear hats, nor did the German or Austrian armies. However, it appeared that some officer had taken the chest from somewhere the way other soldiers take other things when they withdraw from cities they’ve been occupying. Indeed, they had been known to take tiles, iron, and other things far less useful than fez caps. So I took one of the hats, wrinkled though it was, and placed it on my head.

74

My Memoirs

On the Road I began searching for other things that I might need, but found nothing. Contenting myself with a donkey, which, unlike most of the other riding animals, had not been killed or wounded, I went back to the village, hopeful that these provisions would suffice to keep me warm for the time being. When dawn broke the following day, I made a point to go back to the city of Tulkarm so as to be within the British army’s jurisdiction, since from there I would be able to make contact with Baghdad. Traveling on foot, after some time I came upon a British officer accompanied by four cavalrymen. When they stopped me and asked me what had become of the Turks and their army, I replied vaguely that they had gone to Jenin. Then I took leave of them and went on my way. Not long afterward I came upon some frontline troops encamped and eating their morning rations. However, they registered no objection to my passing, since the cavalrymen beyond them had already done the requisite investigation of this lowly peasant.

In Tulkarm When I entered Tulkarm, where I had been the day before, I found many people I knew who, like me, had exchanged their former attire for that of Arab peasants. However, I pretended not to recognize them, and we passed in the streets with nothing more than a sideward glance. Along the way I happened upon a man by the name of Ibrahim al‘Ajlani, a member of Damascus’s well-known al-‘Ajlani family. A former telegraph officer and classmate of mine in the Istanbul College of Law, he was clad in a garment commonly worn by the inhabitants of Hebron. I hailed him and asked what he was doing. In reply he proposed that we go to the home of Shaikh Sa‘id al-Karmi, the mufti of Tulkarm, and stay with him until it became clear what would happen once the British army had entered the city, then advanced elsewhere. And I agreed.

In the Home of Shaikh Sa‘id al-Karmi We went before sunrise to Shaikh Sa‘id’s home, where we sat waiting for him in his guesthouse. An hour later, he came in and welcomed us. He was followed by others who came to his guesthouse for coffee in the mornings as was the custom in Arab countries. After a conversation that touched on a variety of topics, one of the men in attendance informed us that the British army had begun advancing, so we stood in the window, which overlooked a spacious valley. We saw a huge force pouring into the town. The soldiers

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

75

continued their advance until some of them passed in front of us. We were then informed of the arrival of the newly appointed military governor of Tulkarm, who had taken over his duties immediately. He had announced that all Turkish officers in the town would have to report to him, and he threatened to sentence to death any of them who failed to turn themselves in. When this command was relayed to us, the guests in attendance became enormously uneasy, and they advised us to report to the governor and reveal our identities. However, we knew for a certainty that if we were actually to report to the governor as officers in the Turkish army, we would be taken prisoner, and God knows what would become of us then. Our primary concern under the circumstances was to ensure that no one go out and inform the authorities of our presence. At the same time, we needed to find some way of assuring our hosts that we had contacted the authorities ourselves. I decided to withdraw alone in order to come up with a plan that would ensure that we could remain in the town and contact the authorities, yet without being taken captive. Hence, I left al-‘Ajlani with the others gathered there and went out for a walk while I considered what to do next.

Meeting with the Military Governor I went straightaway to the government headquarters, where I found the new military governor sitting with the mayor, Hajj Ibrahim, the father of alSayyid Salim ‘Abd al-Rahman, to his right. I asked Hajj Ibrahim to introduce me to the governor as a native of Baghdad who had been exiled by the Turkish authorities for political reasons. Then I spoke to the governor in Arabic, which he himself spoke with an Egyptian accent. I said to him, “I was exiled here by the Turkish authorities. However, given that they no longer have jurisdiction here, I would like to travel back home, and I’ve come to request that you provide me with transportation there as soon as possible.” He replied, “The state of war we find ourselves in at present doesn’t allow for nonmilitary transport in ports and stations. Consequently, I will have to wait until things settle down, and after that I can look into your request.” This was only to be expected, of course. However, my purpose in reporting to him had not really been to find a way home as I had indicated to him. Rather, my purpose had simply been to reassure others that I had contacted the authorities and thereby warded off any threat they might pose to them. After leaving the government headquarters, I made a point of telling everyone I knew that the governor was a kind man and that he had promised

76

My Memoirs

to send me home. When I reached Shaikh Sa‘id al-Karmi’s house, I announced that I had reported to the military authority and mentioned the promises I had received. Our hosts’ minds were thus set at rest, while we for our part felt assured that they wouldn’t feel compelled to inform the authorities of our presence later.

A Problem However, our problem hadn’t yet been entirely resolved because, given the fact that we would not be able to rely on al-Karmi’s hospitality for more than one day, we needed to arrange some sort of room and board for ourselves. Consequently, al-‘Ajlani and I went out the following day to determine what options we had at our disposal. As we were walking down the street, what should we find but an unoccupied house that was furnished and ready to live in. It had been used for a period of time by a group of German officers who had then left with the army, so we occupied it in their stead. However, we still didn’t know to whom it belonged. We then met an Iraqi soldier who knew me, although I myself didn’t recognize him, and who kindly placed himself at our disposal. Thereafter we would assign him the task of bringing us food, and things continued in this way for a day and a half. We then learned that the house belonged to a friend of ours from the Hanun family. Hence, we contacted him and asked him if he would allow us to stay there until we could leave the city, and he agreed without hesitation.

The Arab and British Armies in Damascus Two days later we heard that the British and Arab armies had entered Damascus. Hence, we wanted to go to Syria. However, the road to Damascus was impassable to us, since no one could travel on it without a permit issued by the military authorities, who weren’t issuing any such permits at the time. Hence, I went again to see the military governor but didn’t find him. The person I spoke to was a young man from the al-Husseini family whom I took to be either the mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini, or his brother. When I asked the young man about a permit to travel to Damascus, he replied that no instructions to this effect had been issued by the supreme command and that consequently, it wouldn’t be possible to grant my request. I went home again, and we began thinking about some other way we could get to Damascus. It so happened that around that time, the British authorities were selling large amounts of war booty to the local inhabitants, including camels, horses, and mules. A certain native of Damascus had bought a sizable number of these animals and was thinking of driving them

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

77

to Damascus in order to sell them there, since Tulkarm was such a small town that it would not be easy to market this many animals there. Hence, it was agreed that we would accompany him, and after a long, arduous journey in the course of which we alternately walked and rode, all the while keeping clear of the military authorities’ watchful eye given our lack of travel documents, we made our way to Damascus.

Damascus Ten days after our departure from Tulkarm and in a pitiful state of hunger and fatigue, we arrived in Damascus. When my friend al-‘Ajlani entered his family’s home there with his bizarre attire and disheveled appearance, neither his father nor his brother recognized him until after they’d engaged him in a personal conversation to verify his identity. While in Damascus I stayed as a guest in the al-‘Ajlani home. When I went out to see how conditions in the city were, I learned that Syria had declared its independence and that Prince Faisal bin Hussein had pledged to rule the country. I went to the large palace where I first met Nuri al-Sa‘id. He escorted me straightaway to the spot where Faisal was sitting and introduced me to him, and I stayed with him for a short time. This was in November 1918.

Jamil al-Midfa‘i I then made contact with the Iraqis I knew, including Jamil al-Midfa‘i, who was position commander in Damascus, and Jamil al-Wadi, who had been a military adviser. After this I began making contacts relating to my involvement with the Iraqi issue and the Covenant Society, with which I had not been associated heretofore due to the fact that when the society was first established it had been strictly military in nature and only later branched into two sections, one military and one civilian. The Iraqis were taken up more or less entirely with Iraqi affairs, since Syria, in their view, had obtained its sought-after independence, as a result of which their efforts should be directed toward helping Iraq do the same.

The Young Arab Society A few days after arriving in Damascus, I found my way to the Young Arab Society headquarters with the help of Dr. Ahmad Qadri. I also made contact with Ja‘far al-‘Askari and Yasin al-Hashimi. Ja‘far al-‘Askari’s task had

78

My Memoirs

been to lead the Arab army, an assignment that had come to an end with the army’s entry into Damascus. As a result, they had begun thinking of appointing al-‘Askari as military governor over Aleppo when the Arab army entered the city. A week later we were informed that the Turkish army had evacuated Aleppo and that the Arab army had come in. After taking over responsibility from my brother Naji al-Suwaydi, whom the local inhabitants had elected as the city’s governor following the Turks’ departure, an Arab administration was established in Aleppo.

Prince Faisal Conditions in Syria at that time were exceedingly troubled, and people’s views were in sharp conflict. The old Turkish elements could only live under Turkish rule, while the non-Muslim elements hoped to see the Turks’ rule replaced by that of some European power, and more specifically, that of France. The local rivalry fanned the flames of this dispute, while the matter of Syrian independence hung in the balance. As for Prince Faisal, he didn’t know what to do. Sometimes he would call for complete independence in order to fire up the masses, assuring them of a future that he himself couldn’t be certain of, and at other times he would preach moderation and the need to reach a mutual understanding with the superpowers of the day. From time to time he would send delegations to Europe, and either lead them himself or let them be led by others. All these efforts were intended to lead the superpowers to an understanding of Syrians’ and Arabs’ right to autonomy.

Britain and Syria’s Independence Britain feared that Arab independence would undermine its influence in the Middle East. Consequently, those in power were sympathetic to the French theory according to which the stronger and more active the Arab element became over time, the more it would use this strength against European influence. And as a matter of fact, the revolts that had taken place in Palestine, the movements that had arisen in Lebanon and along the Syrian borders, and the daily unrest being witnessed in Iraq tended to support the French theory, as a result of which Britain was not inclined to rely on the Arabs. Hence, rather than being straightforward in their pronouncements and timetables, the British now advised the Arabs to wait and see what would come of the peace conference, which was to decide the fate of the Arab countries that were no longer under Ottoman rule.

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

79

The French Stance The French, by contrast, were not inclined to promote such a wait-and-see attitude. On the contrary, they were doing everything they could to foment unrest and division all over Syria. They had sent out spies and contacted influential civilians and tribal leaders in the hope of corrupting them and persuading them that the Arab government would be short-lived and that the final word would belong to France, which would seize control ultimately over all of Syria. Such French propaganda and maneuvering served to weaken the influence of the Syrian Arab government and caused constant disturbances there since, when they became aware of the deceptive propaganda in which France was engaging, loyal patriots feared for their future and, wanting a prompt resolution of the problem lest conditions deteriorate to the point of being beyond repair, rose up in revolt. As for the traitors who had been bought off by the French, they worked to aggravate the turmoil in the hope that the government would collapse, thereby opening the way for further trickery and troublemaking. During those days I was asked on two occasions to go to Europe to defend the Arab cause. On the first occasion, Mawlud Mukhlis, Thabit ‘Abd al-Nur, and I were chosen to travel to Europe in order to speak with the British government with regard to the matter of Iraqi independence. However, the French feared that by our going on this trip we would thwart French designs on Syria. Consequently, they did everything in their power to block our way, and alas, their efforts were successful. Through the renowned orientalist Louis Massignon, who held the rank of chief of staff in the French army, we were informed that there was no ship that could take us from Syria to Europe. Hence, we committed our cause to God.

The Agreement Between Clemenceau and David Lloyd George On the second occasion I was asked, together with Yasin al-Hashimi, to go to Europe in connection with concerns that went beyond the matter of Iraqi independence, namely, the Arab cause itself. This time it was the British who, in view of al-Hashimi’s anti-British attitudes and policies, succeeded in thwarting all efforts in this direction, and we ended up not making the journey. As we were in the midst of this tug-of-war, a rumor began circulating to the effect that Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd George had agreed to resolve the Syrian problem by leaving Syria under French rule. We persuaded King Faisal to reach an agreement with the French on the form that such rule would take. King Faisal did reach an agreement with the

80

My Memoirs

French that, although it was prejudicial to Syrian rights, nevertheless guaranteed Syria’s existence as a political entity. Despite this fact, the agreement was opposed by extremist Syrians and other Arabs, and it came to naught. In fact, King Faisal himself, fearing that the agreement might generate further unrest in the country, ended up repudiating it.

The Arab Awakening George Antonius did a study of all these events and recorded their outcomes in a book entitled The Arab Awakening. However, I don’t consider that I have sufficient basis on which to judge his work, since I was not directly involved in these events at that time. Rather, whatever knowledge I have of them I acquired through what I heard from King Faisal or his men.

British Policy in Iraq A number of factors eventually led to the crystallization of a new trend in British policy, which began to move toward an acknowledgment of the Arabs’ right to self-determination. The British government had begun to understand that no good could come from delaying the resolution of the Arab cause so long as the peace conference had not completed its deliberations on the European issue (on the basis of which the destinies of the Arab countries no longer under Ottoman rule would be determined). Moreover, the British people had begun demanding that British imperial policy be amended in such a way as to impose less of a burden on the British people themselves, including the onus of exorbitant taxes. Meanwhile, we in Damascus realized that in order to advance the Iraqi cause, specific individuals would have to make contact with the ruling authorities there, because the odious military administration in Iraq would not allow any citizen to make clear, frank demands relating to the rights of Arab countries. We thus concluded that we would need to make a trip to Baghdad, in the course of which we hoped to achieve a number of aims. We hoped, for example, to revive people’s willingness to demand their rights by assuring them of the power of the Arab movement outside of Iraq. Given the severe restrictions under which they had been living, and which had isolated them from the outside world, Iraqis were unaware of the developments the Arab movement outside Iraq had witnessed and the things it had accomplished. Hence, by informing them of such events, we hoped to prepare the way for a kind of counterpropaganda on the part of Iraq as a country whereby we could establish a national government led by one of Sharif Hussein’s sons. In this way we could begin working fruitfully inside the country, coordinating efforts and determining the policy that Iraqis should adhere to in relation to their cause.

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

81

Entering Politics Based on the foregoing considerations, we set out from Damascus with Baghdad as our destination. My father was in Damascus after having returned from exile in Istanbul, while my older brother, Naji al-Suwaydi, was provincial governor over Aleppo and I was a judge in Damascus. My brother ‘Arif had come with my father after leaving his post as justice of the peace in Istanbul. The four of us traveled from Damascus to Aleppo and from Aleppo to Maskana. In Maskana we boarded a large, wooden, flatbottomed barge known as a shakhtur, which was propelled by the river’s current. After a ten-day journey down the Euphrates we reached Fallujah, where we boarded a train heading for Baghdad. Arriving in Baghdad in June 1919, we were treated to a tremendous welcome, since the people had high hopes of our being able to alleviate their affliction and improve the miserable conditions of which they complained so bitterly.

Contact with A. T. Wilson After settling in to our quarters in Baghdad during our first week there, we contacted the British civil commissioner, Colonel A. T. Wilson; the military commissioner, Colonel Francis Cecil Campbell Balfour; and other highranking British officials in Baghdad such as Colonel Prescott. In the course of a number of visits with such persons we worked to gain a better understanding of the reality of British policy in Iraq and its new orientations. We understood from Colonel Wilson, who was quite gracious toward us while at the same time being harsh, intransigent, and imperious in his policies toward Iraqis in general, that the British government considered itself an ally of the Arabs. However, the specific ways in which this alliance would be put into practice and the promises to which it gave rise were unclear in view of the fact that no peace treaty had yet been ratified.

The al-‘Ahd Delegates At that time, it so happened that Jamil al-Midfa‘i and Ibrahim Kamal arrived in Baghdad as representatives of al-‘Ahd for the purpose of investigating conditions in Iraq and making contact with nationalist elements and those engaged in grassroots activity. Most of their contact was with the Shaikh Sa‘id al-Naqshabandi. Such a great malaise had settled over the land that some, such as Muzahim al-Amin al-Pachachi, expressed the wish that the country could have become an independent colony. Certain sectors of the population were profiting greatly from their contact with the military authorities, while many

82

My Memoirs

others were in poverty. In short, the overall situation was not good, and morale and nationalist sentiment were at a particularly low ebb. It may be that the arrival of the al-Suwaydi family, followed by the arrival of the two al-‘Ahd representatives, helped galvanize the independence movement and strengthen the newly formed yet relatively inactive “Guardian” Party, which appeared to be divided against itself. Indeed, some of its members were accusing others of loyalty to the military authority or of spying on behalf of Seyyid Talib al-Naqib and St. John Philby.

Colonel Francis Cecil Campbell Balfour When my brother Naji and I went to see Colonel Francis Balfour, Baghdad’s military governor, he made things clearer to us than Colonel A. T. Wilson had. The reason may have been that, unlike Wilson, Balfour was both mild tempered and straightforward. The first thing he told us was that it would be necessary for Iraq to remain under British control in order for Britain to maintain its hold on India. Given this fact, he did not believe it would be possible for Iraq to shed all foreign control, although it might be able to reduce its impact at some future date. When he made this statement, I remarked that if British control over Iraq was necessary in order for Britain to keep India, and if British control over the Balkans was required in order for Britain to keep its hold on Turkey, for example, then necessity might eventually require that Britain impose its control over the entire world in order to maintain its hold on all the other territories it had acquired, especially India. And we all laughed. Then he told me that in spite of such necessities, Iraq and Britain would surely be able to arrive at a reasonable solution that would both satisfy the Iraqi people and preserve British interests.

A Local Government We then broached the subject of the need to establish a local government in the immediate future so that it would be possible to arrive at a definitive solution to the Iraqi question. We said, “Ongoing British occupation and outright British administration in Iraq are not likely to ensure any sort of satisfaction or stability. Furthermore, not only is it tiring for the British to have the burden of responsibility resting on their shoulders alone, but, in addition, it robs the Iraqi people of the benefits they are meant to receive from the government.” Colonel Balfour affirmed his support for this view. He then went on to suggest to my brother Naji that he begin forming municipalities through

In Public Life: The Literary Forum

83

popular elections with the idea of holding further elections later for an Iraqi-run administration. Suggestions like these are typical of the British, who are prone to delaying tactics and procrastination. Hence, although it appeared acceptable at first, we decided that, on second thought, it would take such a long time to carry out this proposal that it would be of little benefit to the Iraqi populace, who were not prepared to wait so long to see such an idea come to fruition. We feared that, were we to attempt to put this idea into practice, we might be taking on a responsibility that, in the end, would not achieve the benefits we had hoped it would. Hence, we concluded that it would be best to leave things to time and wait to see what came of the peace negotiations. And with that, we departed Baghdad in anticipation of further developments.

To Aleppo At noon on July 10, 1919, my brother Naji and I left Iraq, leaving my father and my brother ‘Arif in Baghdad. After a tedious, exhausting eighteen-day journey, we reached Aleppo, where we stayed for two days before continuing on our way to Damascus. The situation that awaited us in Damascus was more tumultuous than it had been when we left, since the Clemenceau– Lloyd George agreement was being discussed, while at the same time, a debate was raging among various political organizations, parties, and the government, which ended with the French occupation of Damascus.

The General Syrian Congress When the situation deteriorated and France received unconditional British authorization to determine Syria’s fate however it saw fit, the Syrian government began to encounter open hostility and attempts at sabotage. Moreover, when the population lost hope of receiving any assistance from the British, it found itself face-to-face with catastrophe. Wanting to rely on themselves and their own devices despite their weakness, the Syrians considered declaring Greater Syria’s independence. Consequently, they carried on with efforts to choose someone to represent the population in the western, coastal region, the eastern, inland region, and the southern region (that is, Palestine) while resolving to convene a general Syrian congress. This congress was convened on March 8, 1920, amidst great fanfare. It published its celebrated declaration of Syrian independence and rejection of any European mandate or protectorate status and declared allegiance to King Faisal as the country’s monarch. The declaration stated, among other things, that

84

My Memoirs Inasmuch as the Arab Revolt came about in order to liberate the Arab people from Turkish rule; inasmuch as the reasons for the declaration of Syrian independence apply equally to the independence of Iraq; and inasmuch as the two regions are bound by indissoluble ties of language, history, economy, natural resources, and national identity, we hereby call for the complete independence of the Iraqi region and for the establishment of a political and economic federation between the sister regions of Iraq and Syria.

3 Iraq’s Independence: The Iraqi Congress

~

The Iraqi Congress In the answering petition that was submitted by the General Syrian Congress to King Faisal I, we read that Before we bring our petition to a close, we are bound to make mention, with the greatest of pride, of the invaluable services performed by our Iraqi brothers on behalf of the Arab revival during the war years. We continue to support our previously stated demand that Iraq be granted its right to freedom and complete autonomy; hence, we hereby express our unconditional support for our Iraqi brothers’ demands for independence, and we urge that the economic barriers between our sister countries be done away with.

Realizing that this was an auspicious opportunity to engage in fruitful activity on behalf of Iraq, which was still under British occupation, the Iraqis in attendance decided to convene a congress to discuss Iraq’s future in particular. Despite the fact that they were far from home and, as a consequence, would be unable to gather a large number of people capable of representing Iraq’s populace, they wanted to convey the Iraqi people’s aspirations to make their voices heard in some way. Meeting on the same day on which the General Syrian Congress was convened, the Iraqi delegates decided to declare Iraq’s independence. In order to enable him to exercise proper authority, they elected Prince ‘Abdullah king and Prince Zayd his deputy. In my capacity as the congress’s chairman, I sent Prince ‘Abdullah the resolution the congress had drafted, the text of which read as follows: 85

86

My Memoirs As the legal representative of the Iraqi people, the General Iraqi Congress, in its session convened in Damascus, Syria on March 8, 1920 (18 Jumada al-Ula 1338 AH), declared the following: In the name of the Arab Iraqi people, we hereby declare that the Arab nation fought in the recent war alongside the Allies in order to shake off the yoke of foreign rule, to reclaim its former glory, and to resume its natural mission of civilizing the East and achieving its nationalist hopes of unity and complete independence. In so doing, the Iraqi people have sought to follow the lead of other peoples who have likewise achieved their autonomy despite being less civilized and advanced than the Arab nation. The respected Allies pledged the Arabs their support toward this end and, on the lips of their countries’ rulers and parliaments, declared that their only aim in the war was to enable other peoples to win their independence and determine their own destinies by choosing which forms their governments would take. To this end, Great Britain concluded the well-known treaty with His Majesty King Hussein. In this treaty Great Britain acknowledged the Arabs’ independence from the Taurus Mountains and northern Mosul to the Arab Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea. US President Woodrow Wilson lent his support to this treaty through the lofty principles that he set forth. These principles were agreed to unanimously by the Allies, who adopted said principles as the basis for a lasting peace. This agreement is confirmed through statements made by British Foreign Secretary Lord Grey before the Foreign Affairs Committee on October 23, 1916, and the statement made by Mr. Briand, prime minister of France, on November 3, 1915. It is likewise reflected in the Allies’ responses to the Middle States Memorandum sent through the US ambassador in Paris, their reply to President Wilson’s memorandum of May 22, 1917, the statement issued by the French House of Representatives on June 5, 1917, and by the French Senate on June 6, 1917, the statement made by Mr. Lloyd George [prime minister of Britain] in Glasgow on June 9, 1917, as well as similar statements calling for the liberation and independence of peoples everywhere who should be allowed the right of selfdetermination, and the cancellation of all secret treaties that are prejudicial to such people’s rights. It is to His Majesty King Hussein I and his venerable sons that the bulk of the credit goes for liberating the Arab nation from enemies in the East and rescuing it from the yoke of slavery and degradation. They fought valiantly, leading the Arab nation from victory to victory against the Turks for three long years during which the blood of the finest sons of Iraq, Syria, and the Hejaz was shed. Indeed, these warriors have earned the admiration of their allies and their enemies alike. All of this, moreover, was in addition to the woes and afflictions the Arab nation had endured in various countries and the noble feats that were performed in support of its rightful cause and in defense of His Majesty and his worthy allies. Thanks to this sustained joint effort the enemy was routed and driven from Iraq, while the British army entered the country as ally and liberator. The British forces declared that Britain had no designs upon the country, nor did it have any desire but to see the Arab nation secure its independence and determine its destiny through the choice of the government that would rule it. Nevertheless, it has now been well nigh a year and a half since World War I came to an end, and the country continues to live under foreign

Iraq’s Independence: The Iraqi Congress

King ‘Abdullah bin al-Hussein, the king of Jordan

occupation, which has caused it serious harm, both material and moral. It has halted the country’s progress and interfered with its economic and administrative interests to the point where it has nearly lost its political balance. Hence, the people have lost patience with conditions as they stand; indeed, the citizenry have risen up against the foreign military government in various places, demanding their autonomy. We the members of this congress, which serves as a valid legal representative of the Iraqi Arab people, openly proclaim the people’s will to bring the country out of this critical situation and the troubled, ambiguous state in which they find themselves. In view of the Arab nation’s natural right to a free life and untrammeled autonomy; the lofty principles affirmed by the venerable allies on more than seventy occasions throughout the course of the recent war; the aspirations expressed by the Iraqi people on 6 Rabi‘ al-Thani 1337 AH (1918 CE) via official documents signed by princes, presidents, leaders, thinkers, and all classes of the people; and what we witness every day of Iraqis’ determination to secure their complete independence by whatever means required, we in our capacity as the people’s representatives charged with the task of expressing their will, unanimously declare the complete, untrammeled independence of the Iraqi territories that were once under Turkish rule with their recognized borders extending from the northernmost limit of the Mosul Province to the Arab Gulf. We lend our full support to Syria’s independence as well, having declared Iraq’s unity with Syria on the political and economic planes, and we

87

88

My Memoirs hereby pronounce His Royal Highness Prince ‘Abdullah constitutional monarch with the title of His Majesty, King of Iraq. Similarly, we assign the position of regent to His Royal Highness Prince Zayd. In so doing, we declare the effective end of the authority exercised by the current military occupation, which shall thenceforth be replaced by a national government answerable to the Iraqi people. In the name of the Iraqi Arab nation, which has authorized us as its representatives and assigned us the task of determining its destiny, we hereby affirm our desire to preserve the friendship of our esteemed allies and our determination to respect their interests and the interests of all foreign states with a presence in our country. At the same time, we respectfully request that they acknowledge this independence of ours and withdraw from our Iraqi lands, to be replaced by national armed forces and a local administration. In so doing, they will enable our Iraqi state to become a force for progress in the civilized world. Based on the foregoing, the Iraqi government will be formed immediately with the task of carrying out the aforementioned resolution dated March 8, 1920, 18 Jumada al-Ula, 1338 AH (1919 CE).

The names of the individuals who represented Iraq’s various districts at the congress, including military personnel, lawyers, writers, employees, and merchants, are as follows: Tawfiq al-Suwaydi (chairman), Ja‘far al-‘Askari, Naji al-Suwaydi, Sa‘id al-Shaykhli, Tahsin ‘Ali, Isma‘il Namiq, Sami alUrfali, Yunus Wahbah, Ahmad Rafiq, Rashid al-Hashimi, Rida al-Shabibi, ‘Abd al-Latif al-Fallahi, Faraj ‘Amarah, Hamdi Sadr al-Din, Nuri al-Qadhi, Sabih Najib, Mahmud Adib, Tawfiq al-Hashimi, Muhammad al-Bassam, Ibrahim Kamal, Nazif al-Shawi, Bakr Sidqi, ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Jamil Muhammad al-Midfa‘i, Makki al-Sharbati, Thabit ‘Abd al-Nur, As‘ad Sahib, al-Hajj Muhammad Khayr, and ‘Abdullah al-Dulaymi. As for the statement issued by the British government in response to the conclusions arrived at by the congress, it held that although those who had organized and participated in the congress were eminent figures whose standing in Iraqi society could not be denied, it nevertheless could not be rightly claimed that they represented the Iraqi people, since no elections had been held whereby they could be recognized as official representatives of the population as a whole.

The Syrian-French Conflict A struggle thus began between the Syrians and the French, and between the Iraqis and the British in their respective territories. Armed bands were formed for the purpose of combating the French in western Syria and stirring people up against them in that region. At the same time, the Iraqis formed armed bands of their own and sent them to the Iraqi borders. The headquarters of these bands was located in Deir al-Zur, whence a small detachment was dispatched under the leadership of Jamil al-Midfa‘i in the

Iraq’s Independence: The Iraqi Congress

89

direction of Sinjar and Tel ‘Afar. This caused a commotion in the British occupation government in Iraq, which sent a force to confront the detachment. However, the detachment only remained for a short time in the area before withdrawing and returning to Deir al-Zur.

France’s Threat When France decided to carry out its plan in relation to Syria and mobilized its forces in the western region, it sent an ultimatum to King Faisal’s government in which it threatened to occupy all of Syria if he failed to surrender to its stated demands.

The Perplexed Government This ultimatum aroused such terror and confusion that the Syrian government was left paralyzed and verging on collapse. It was struggling to decide whether it should accept France’s terms, thereby losing whatever authority it may have had, or reject them, thereby rendering itself vulnerable to the use of a brute force that would utterly annihilate it. The deadline for reaching a decision was seven days, and every day that passed merely served to increase the terror and confusion. On the final day, the Syrian government accepted France’s conditions. However, France for its part was not content with mere acceptance, since this would have restricted its freedom to act. Hence, it chose to ignore the acceptance that had been proffered, since in this way it could pretend that it had no choice but to use force in order to eradicate every last trace of the Arab Syrian government.

Majdal Anjar and the Demise of Yusuf al-‘Azmah Initial clashes took place in Majdal Anjar, a village on the Lebanese-Syrian border. However, the Syrian government was obliged to disband the army first in keeping with France’s demands, then assemble it again. As a result, all its forces were lost and the faltering efforts to bring the army together again came to naught. When order broke down, the minister of war had no choice but to go to the front himself in order to stir up resistance. However, he met his end in the attempt. Hence, the Syrian front collapsed, and at 4:00 p.m. on July 20, 1920, the French armies entered Damascus. The number of troops, led by General Henri Gouraud, came to only 7,000. The day the occupying army marched in was a miserable day both for us and the Syrians, since on that day, all the hopes we had clung to of establishing a glorious rule of our own were crushed. Just as the Iraqis had been

90

My Memoirs

scattered throughout Syria, the Syrians were now scattered throughout Palestine, East Jordan, and Egypt. Hundreds of those who had been unable to flee were led away to detention camps along the coast and on Arwad Island. Numerous Iraqi officers were also rounded up and imprisoned there. All of Syria was in a state of bedlam, and there were feelings of bitter resentment toward the Syrian government, which was perceived as having failed by allowing this catastrophe to befall the country. In fact, however, this was not the case, since the fledgling Arab Syrian government, being still in its early days, had been too weak to stand up to a world-class bully the likes of France. I recall being in Syria at the time of these events, where we sat cowering in our houses for two days, after which things stabilized and the new authorities took over the country with ruthless arrogance. In search of some solace, I left my house one day at around 5:00 p.m. and went to the international club located at the Khawam Hotel in Damascus. I sat down beside an oval pond, where I was joined by a French soldier who didn’t recognize me, nor did I recognize him. He ordered a glass of arrack, then started bragging to me about what had happened to the remnant of the army originally created by Sharif Hussein of Mecca. Needless to say, I was inclined to avoid any conversation with him, so I offered no reply. However, his words ended up provoking me so badly that I had no choice but to break my silence, and, hoping to avoid saying anything more, I replied curtly, “I don’t know anything about it.” He went on, “Did you see the French aircraft bombing the town and the al-Hamidiyah barracks?” “No, I didn’t,” I rejoined. “Did you see air strikes?” In the face of this brazenness of his I blurted out, “Yes! I’ve seen air strikes once in my life.” “Where was that?” he queried. “In Paris,” I replied, “when the Germans bombed your capital at the beginning of the war!” And with that he fell silent himself, emptied his glass, and withdrew without another word.

King Faisal Travels to Haifa When, two days after entering Damascus, the French began to establish themselves in the country, they asked King Faisal to leave Syria. He did as they requested, going first to Dar‘a, and from there to Haifa. While in Haifa, he contacted the British authorities, and from there he went to Italy, where he stayed for a number of months, all the while in contact with the British government. From Italy he went on to London, where, since the

Iraq’s Independence: The Iraqi Congress

91

time he had been installed as king in Syria, he had been represented by Jibra’il Haddad Pasha, former spokesperson for Sharif Hussein. An agreement was reached between King Faisal and the British government according to which Britain would compensate him for what he had lost in Syria by installing him within a reasonable period of time as king in Iraq. It was then that Iraqi policy began gradually to emerge in support of the new state of affairs.

A Feeble Government The French formed a miserably ineffectual government under the leadership of ‘Ala’ al-Din al-Durubi, a native of Homs, Syria, who had been governor of Basra during the Ottoman era. Al-Durubi was a gentle-mannered, good-hearted, guileless man who knew next to nothing about politics. Given this fact, his acceptance of the post of prime minister during France’s occupation of Syria may have been due to the influence of one ‘Abd alRahman Pasha al-Yusuf, who had been a man of significant influence in the Ottoman administration. However, he was not a politician, nor did he have the education or background that would have qualified him for leadership of any kind. At the same time, his wealth and vast landholdings helped him to appear powerful and intimidating. Moreover, since he was of Kurdish origin, he had no sense of Arab identity. On the contrary, he had aided the Ottoman Turks in their resistance to the Arab cause. This being the case, he of course encountered hostility and resistance on the part of the Arab Syrian government when it was formed. Angered at this response, he began to criticize the Arab government and work against it in collaboration with the French. Moreover, being a rather unresourceful man with a limited store of knowledge, he lacked the capacity to serve as prime minister under French rule. Hence, he had no choice but to put ‘Ala‘ al-Din al-Durubi forward as his puppet and pull the strings from behind. The Syrian people’s rancor and hatred for ‘Ala‘ al-Din and everyone who had cooperated with the French grew more and more intense. One day the mandate authority asked the prime minister to go to Dar‘a for the opening of a new school, and he traveled there by train accompanied by ‘Abd alRahman al-Yusuf, Shaikh al-Khatib, and ‘Ata’ Bek al-Ayyubi.

The Death of the Prime Minister When the party arrived at the Khirbat al-Ghazalah station, a crowd fell upon them, killing the prime minister and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf in the most gruesome fashion, after which they stuffed dung in their mouths.

92

My Memoirs

Shaikh al-Khatib and al-Ayyubi managed to flee. However, Shaikh alKhatib died shortly thereafter, apparently from fright!

General Henri Gouraud When we woke in Damascus to the news of this event—which struck terror in the hearts of the French and caused rejoicing among the Syrians—the Syrian resistance movement began for the first time to emerge in an organized way. Not long thereafter, General Henri Gouraud, who was known for his high-handedness, pomposity, and bigotry, took a trip to Quneitra. On the way there, his car was attacked by four cavalrymen, who struck and killed his driver. They struck Gouraud as well with the intention of killing him. However, he was only wounded, though badly so. They also wounded Haqqi al-‘Azm, the last of France’s yes-men, who had been seated beside Gouraud, and then took to flight. Reports had it that the cavalrymen who launched the attack had been led by the extremist patriot Ahmad Maryud, which was later confirmed to me by Maryud himself.

The Syrian People Strive for Freedom The nationalist resistance began in a variety of ways to demonstrate its strength. People would meet in mosques to consult over strategy, since gatherings in any other kind of public or private place were forbidden. It was during this time that King Faisal returned from Europe and headed for the Hejaz. When he arrived in Suez, he sent for my father, who was in Damascus at the time, and Muhammad al-Sadr, asking them to meet him there. So the two men traveled to Suez, and from there the three of them went to Jeddah, where they met with King Hussein Sharif of Mecca. They then went with King Faisal to Basra.

Back to Baghdad At this time also I was asked to return to Iraq. In those days it was no easy thing to travel from Syria to Iraq, however, since the tribes near the Syrian borders were restive and security was almost nonexistent. As for the sea route, it was long. Hence, the would-be traveler was obliged to go through the desert, which was fraught with perils. In spite of all this, I had no choice, like many others in my position, but to travel on dromedary back. The route led through al-Qaryatayn and Tadmur in Syria, then through Kubaysa in Iraq.

Iraq’s Independence: The Iraqi Congress

93

When news of my imminent journey got out, I was approached by many Iraqis who asked me to take them home with me. Agreeing to their request, I formed a caravan of 100 camels. Most of those traveling with me were families and women with no small number of Iraqi officers who had been released from the Syrian army.

The French Intercept Our Caravan When we learned of the security situation in the desert, we realized we would need to arm ourselves. Hence, we acquired several shotguns and cartridges and handed them over to the officers and a number of the camel drivers. We then sent the caravan on ahead from Damascus to al-Qaryatayn with the understanding that I would catch up with them by car. The distance a camel could travel in a day, a car could travel in less than an hour. Hence, when we were certain that they had arrived at their destination the following morning, that is, on October 23, 1921, we left by car and arrived before noon. However, no sooner had we joined them than we learned that the French authorities had stopped the caravan on the pretext that it included officers who had been in the Syrian army. Hence, we were obliged to remain in al-Qaryatayn for two days, though on the second day we were allowed to continue on our way. We reached Tadmur, and there we were faced with a new difficulty when the French authorities again refused to allow the caravan to proceed as long as it included the former officers. They stipulated that if we wanted to proceed, we would have to send the officers back to Syria. However, if we abided by their stipulation, we would be forced to send back a large number of families who were related to the aforementioned officers. Finally, not knowing what else to do, we gathered everyone in the caravan together, including the women and the children, then staged a demonstration before the French military governor in protest against the unjustified delay to which we were being subjected. After hearing our arguments and testimonies, not to mention the women’s weeping and wailing, the governor changed his mind and agreed to allow the officers to travel with the caravan.

In the Heart of the Desert Having paid a visit to the ‘Anzah tribe, we were received hospitably by Shaikh Nayif al-Sha‘lan, son of Shaikh Nawaf al-Sha‘lan and the tribe’s principal chieftain, who, wanting to be of some service to us, assigned a tribesman of his to accompany us on our journey. The following morning, having now added a man from the ‘Anzah tribe to our number to serve as our second escort, we entered the heart of the fearsome desert, which the

94

My Memoirs

Bedouin likened to the sea. And indeed, it was more frightful than the sea itself. We made our way forward with the utmost seriousness by day and by night, and the going was rough. We stopped nowhere unless it was a matter of life or death, since we had been told that there were raiders scattered throughout the land who might come upon us unawares at any time. Hence, it was of the utmost importance that we make it as quickly as possible across the Syrian desert and enter Iraqi territory, since the security situation in Iraq was significantly better than it was in Syria. The Bedouin have names for every nook and cranny of the tract of wilderness known as the desert. Fortunately, then, we could travel by night without fear of losing our way because our primary guide, Shamkal, knew the vast expanse like the back of his hand. There were times when, as we moved along through the dark of the night, we would inquire of him concerning our whereabouts, and he, without the slightest doubt or hesitation, would reply, “We’re in such-and-such a spot,” or “We just left such-andsuch a location and are headed for such-and-such a location.” Whenever Shamkal would tell us the name of this or that place, its correctness would be confirmed by our ‘Anzi escort. The days we spent in the desert took a toll on us. The water we had brought with us from Tadmur ran out, so we were obliged to draw water from brackish ponds, and when we tried to render it potable by straining it through cotton, fabrics, and the like, its color, odor, and taste were so altered that it was of no use to us. Hence, we contented ourselves with boiling it and using it for cooking or making tea. Five days after our departure from Tadmur, we reached a place known as Wadi al-Miyah, or the Valley of Water. This valley was home to the tribe of Ibn Mijlad, a slight man with a piercing glance and a quick wit. Wanting to show us hospitality, he hosted a dinner for us, and the food appeared to be the best fare he offered to any of his guests. However, we ate none of it, since Bedouin cooking is generally not to the liking of town dwellers. Fortunately, we were able to pretend to eat without actually doing so, since the Bedouins generally provide no lighting during meals. Instead, they light a fire some distance from the tent, as a result of which the people inside can hardly see one another. We reached out for the food as though we were eating without touching a thing, and all went well. In a desire to honor our host, we offered him some simple gifts and sweets that we had brought from Damascus. However, a problem arose between him and the Syrian camel drivers when he demanded that they pay what they call ikhawah. Ikhawah is a kind of protection money that involved paying one majidi per camel, a majidi being a Turkish coin equal to one-fifth of an Ottoman gold pound. The man wanted 100 majidis, but thanks to our mediation efforts, he settled in the end for half this amount.

Iraq’s Independence: The Iraqi Congress

95

Raided at Mahyur We set out early the next morning, and three days later we reached a place known as Mahyur, the site of a well that provides abundant sweet water. It was a dangerous place for caravans, since it attracted both raiders and travelers. If raiders encountered wayfarers, they despoiled them, and this is what happened to us: When we were about one kilometer from the well, we received reports to the effect that when a group of us had gone down to draw water from the well, they had found the remains of a campfire, which indicated that other people were nearby. If these people had been fellow travelers, they would naturally have made their presence known to us. However, their failure to do so indicated that they were raiders. Hence, we unloaded our cargo and remained in the valley, waiting to see what would happen next and making preparations to defend ourselves. Needless to say, we didn’t sleep a wink that night. Then suddenly, the raiders descended upon us from where they had been hiding in the adjacent hills. They came riding two men on a camel, with half of them armed, and the other half unarmed. We heard them chanting phrases that we couldn’t make out at first. As they came closer, however, it became apparent that they were saying, “There is no god but God, . . . Sovereign of the Day of Judgment!” thereby identifying themselves as Wahhabis. According to both our guides, the Wahhabis were among the most merciless of all raiders. Hence, the situation was potentially catastrophic, since the caravan was full of women and children, and it was to be expected that these Bedouin robbers would not only steal our money but, in addition, take our camels, leaving us in a desert wasteland at the mercy of the elements, and with no way to seek rescue or arrange some other means of transport to our destination. The officers we had armed for just such an occasion were a laughable, pathetic lot. Despite having been officers in the Turkish and Syrian armies, they threw down their weapons, then began hiding behind the camels and among the women as though they had never fired a shot or witnessed an attack of any kind! Hence, it was up to me to think of some way to deal with the situation and rescue the entire caravan from certain destruction. As I was racking my brain to come up with a plan, I saw the raiders come toward us, then penetrate the ranks of the caravan and rob one person after another. They also began leading the camels away with full loads on their backs. Then suddenly I realized what I needed to do, namely, instruct my charges to raise an uproar and warn their aggressors of the dire consequences of what they were doing, since they were robbing a caravan that belonged to the “pasha” of Iraq.

96

My Memoirs

Obeying my instructions, the members of the caravan began raising the required ruckus, making clear to the raiders that if they robbed my caravan, they would sorely regret it.

A Ruse By some strange coincidence, I happened to be carrying with me a letter that had been penned by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn al-Sa‘ud himself, who shortly thereafter was to become king of the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and which he had sent to my father Yusuf when he was in Damascus. The letter was full of tender affection, as were most of the letters written by Ibn alSa‘ud to those he esteemed. Hence, I decided to show the letter to the raiders in the belief that they were Wahhabis, and that if I explained its contents to them, it would have a salutary influence on the situation. Then I started looking for a way to make contact with their leadership, since it is generally not possible to reach any kind of understanding with such people on an individual level. When I asked who their leaders were, they pointed to two men: ‘Awwad and Hussein. I came up to ‘Awwad and knotted the end of his kaffiyeh, a gesture Arabs recognize as a way of asking to be placed under someone’s protection. I told him that our caravan was under his protection and that I wanted to reach an understanding with him and honor him if he could prevent his men from despoiling and looting our caravan. I told Hussein that I would give him a rifle, 100 cartridges, a cloak, a silk kaffiyeh, and a bundle of clothing, and he accepted the offer. Then I took him aside and read him the letter from Ibn al-Sa‘ud so that he would understand that I was on close terms with the future king and, therefore, someone whose caravan should not be robbed and looted. Satisfied, he instructed his men to stop looting and they obeyed him. However, it then became apparent that the band was divided into two groups, one of which was under ‘Awwad’s command, and the other, Hussein’s. With no time to spare, I would have no choice but to deal with Hussein in the same way I had dealt with ‘Awwad, namely, by bribing him with gifts. However, Hussein refused my offer of gifts. So, to keep ‘Awwad on my side, I offered him even more gifts than before, telling him that if he prevented the others from looting us, I would give him gold. With that, the two bands of robbers turned on each other and a shooting match broke out between them. They now found themselves on the verge of internecine warfare and, at the same time, afraid to attack us. Hence, leaving our camels alone, they took only a few easily lootable items, such as jewelry, dirhams, and the like. Furious with Hussein and harboring some ill will toward him, I showered ‘Awwad with gifts and sent him and his band on their way grateful and

Iraq’s Independence: The Iraqi Congress

97

obliged. I then learned that Hussein belonged to the Shammar al-Jabal tribe led by Ibn ‘Ujayl, an inhabitant of Iraq. So, in order to get back at him for having terrorized our caravan and inflicted such material loss on it, I showered him also with gifts on the condition that he escort me to the Iraqi border. We then resumed our journey with Hussein as our guide, while his men left with ‘Awwad. One day I noticed that Hussein was wearing two cloaks as well as two other long-sleeved garments and that in spite of his cumbersome attire, he managed to perform the five Islamic daily prayers at their appointed times. I asked him, “Is it permissible for a Muslim to pray when he has stolen goods in his possession?” “Stealing is permissible since it’s a way of earning one’s keep,” he replied matter-of-factly. “Besides, the things stolen are a kind of war booty from the raids we make, and raiding isn’t forbidden.” Making no reply, I just smiled to myself, biding my time until we could reach the Iraqi border. Before reaching a place in Iraq known as ‘Azzuz, a patch of land that contains a spring and palm trees and which is home to a community of poor Bedouins, I sent two people secretly to Kubaysa to inform its mayor of the situation and to ask him to bring back a police force to arrest Hussein. The couriers did as they were told and within a few days had returned with a number of young police officers. We then arrested Hussein and led him away, together with his camel and his shotgun, under guard to Kubaysa. We discovered that the mayor of Kubaysa was an acquaintance by the name of ‘Abd al-Karim al-Hamim, who had served for many years as administrator of this Iraqi district or that. He welcomed us warmly and hosted us for a day in Kubaysa. On the same day we met a British man who, claiming to be Muslim, spoke fluent Arabic and went by the name al-Hajj ‘Abdullah. He introduced himself as a customs officer, though we learned later that in reality he was employed by the desert military intelligence division. Be that as it may, for the first time in a long time we felt peaceful and at ease, having escaped a disastrous situation that could easily have been the death of us. The following day we left the caravan in Kubaysa and headed by car for Baghdad. We reached Baghdad on November 3, 1921, praising God for our safety after a journey that, although it had lasted a mere ten days, had been fraught with unforeseen hazards and hardships.

The Revival of al-‘Ahd in Iraq Since the national authority in Syria was not expected to survive, it was now vital that the Iraqis unite themselves and engage in fruitful work on behalf of their own cause. To this end, it was first decided to revive al-‘Ahd in

98

My Memoirs

Iraq, which convened a number of sessions and increased the number of its members and affiliates. There was a trend at this time toward supporting revolutionary movements along the Iraqi borders in the area of Deir al-Zur. By the time King Faisal’s government in Syria was brought to an end, al-‘Ahd had managed to obtain a sum of money from Prince Zayd in order to help finance these independence movements, and it had organized small groups of Iraqis and sent them to Deir al-Zur to unnerve the occupiers in Iraq. These movements had made a great impact on the British authorities in Iraq because, rather than simply unnerving the occupier, they stirred up discontent in the local population, that is, the population of Deir al-Zur. They stood up in the face of the occupation to the point where they were able to join Syria. However, if the people of Deir al-Zur wanted to join the Syrians, this was not because they wanted to be part of Syria but, rather, because Arab rule at that time existed only in Syria. Moreover, the populace in Syria was sympathetic overall to the Iraqi spirit. Throughout the successive revolutions that took place in Deir al-Zur and along the Iraqi borders, some mistakes had been made by the Iraqis that I think it would be unwise and unhelpful for me to record in these memoirs. However, mention can be made of the most major errors, which include the rebels’ seizure of a large sum of gold currency in Deir al-Zur that was being sent from Aleppo to Baghdad, and their having taken some things of value from Iraqi travelers returning from Istanbul to Iraq. Some of this wealth was returned to its original owners; however, the remainder remained in the rebels’ pockets. The Iraqis were taken aback by the Allies’ decision at the San Remo Conference on April 25, 1920, to grant Britain a mandate over Iraq. In response, Iraq’s leading personalities and tribal chiefs of all persuasions began holding meetings of their own, fanning the flames of nationalism and calling upon the people to resist the British mandate. This led to a major revolt that inflicted serious material loss as well as loss of life on the British forces. These unanticipated developments prompted the British government to replace its military commissioner, Colonel A. T. Wilson, with Sir Percy Cox, who was known for his flexibility, shrewdness, and savoir faire. As soon as he arrived in Baghdad, Cox summoned Iraq’s leaders and notables and urged them to work to bring the revolt to an end. In the process, he reaffirmed British promises to work for Iraq’s independence, pledging to establish an autonomous national government in which Iraq’s leaders and notables would be given a prominent role. He addressed a letter of appointment to ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Gaylani, senior representative of the prominent Baghdadi al-Gaylani family, which possessed enormous influence due to its direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Excerpts from this letter, a copy of which was recently obtained from the British Foreign Ministry, are as follows:

Iraq’s Independence: The Iraqi Congress

99

October 25, 1920 High Commissioner’s Office, Baghdad His Highness, Naqib of Baghdad: Your Highness! In view of His Majesty’s desire to establish a national government in Iraq and in order to guarantee the participation of the country’s people in its administration, I have seen fit in my capacity as High Commissioner to establish a council of state whose purpose will be to manage governmental affairs. . . . Moreover, in view of Your Highness’s great influence and the respect that you command among all social groups and classes, you are eminently qualified for a leadership position in such a council. Hence, I am approaching Your Highness with the request that you accept said position, . . . since in so doing, you will have taken the first step toward the establishment of an Iraqi national government. . . . High Commissioner Percy Cox

The first Iraqi national government under ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Gaylani’s leadership was formed on October 27, 1920. On July 11, 1921, the Iraqi cabinet called for Prince Faisal bin al-Hussein to be installed as king over

King Faisal I

100

My Memoirs

Iraq. A plebiscite was held on this proposal, the result of which was 97 percent in favor of King Faisal, who had come from Jeddah to Baghdad via Basra on June 29, 1921. When the results of the plebiscite were made public, there was a great celebration in Baghdad, and on August 23, 1921, Faisal was installed as constitutional monarch over Iraq. In keeping with constitutional protocol, the al-Gaylani government resigned, whereupon King Faisal I assigned al-Gaylani the task of forming the first cabinet of his reign as king. On September 10 of the same year, al-Gaylani formed a powerful cabinet that began laying the foundations of Iraq’s fledgling state.

4 Faisal in Iraq

~

In the Service of the Iraqi Government In November 1921, I became assistant adviser to the Iraqi government. I also served at this time as dean of the Law Faculty with a salary of 1,000 rupees, or 75 dinars, a month. In addition to assisting the government adviser in the Ministry of Justice and serving as director of the Law Faculty in my capacity as dean, I taught Roman law and political economy at the faculty. Most of my efforts were directed toward reforming the Law Faculty, which owed its existence to the efforts of my late father. In his quest to found the faculty, my father had sought out the good offices of Nazim Pasha, a reformer who had come to Iraq in 1907 and who enjoyed wide-ranging powers. At that time, a royal decree had been issued by Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II calling for the establishment of three law faculties in the Ottoman Empire in addition to the one that already existed in Istanbul. The locations of the three new faculties had yet to be determined, although there was talk of locating one of them in Salonika, one of them in Konya, and one of them in Aleppo.

My Father’s Efforts on Behalf of the Baghdad Law Faculty When word of this decree reached my father, he approached Nazim Pasha and asked him to intercede with the central government, requesting that it establish the proposed Aleppo faculty in Baghdad instead. His reasoning was that, since Aleppo was near the sea and was also accessible to other means of transport leading to Istanbul, it would pose no hardship for its residents to travel to the capital in order to further their educations, whereas Baghdad, by contrast, being far from the capital and generally isolated, stood in far greater need of such an institution. 101

102

My Memoirs

After a series of exchanges via telegraph, Nazim Pasha issued instructions for the Law Faculty that was to have been founded in Aleppo to be founded in Baghdad. Its opening in July 1908 coincided with the restoration of the constitution in Ottoman territories and the establishment of democratic parliamentarian administration.

Reform of the Law Faculty As I commenced my efforts to improve Baghdad’s Law Faculty, I was carrying on with the service my father had begun. As a matter of fact, the faculty was in very bad condition when I took it over. It was being headed at that time by a Colonel Bell, chief magistrate in the appeals court, who was being assisted in its administration by Nash’at al-Sanawi. When I was asked to take over its supervision, I stipulated that I be completely autonomous in my work and that no decisions concerning the work be dictated by other parties. When this proviso had been accepted, I set about my administrative duties. The first thing I did was to move the faculty out of the government administration building complex, where it occupied two or three rooms in the courthouse, and into its own quarters in the building that had served previously as the Rushdiyah School on Hasan Pasha Street. Then I set about rearranging its classrooms and designing its entrance examination. It was quite a challenge to put together a complete faculty, since the faculty had stopped offering classes for a period of time because of the war and the state of unrest that had reigned from 1914 through 1918, as a result of which the Turkish faculty members on whose skills I could have drawn were gone, leaving only a very small number of qualified instructors in the country. Moreover, despite the fact that we hired the number of teachers required and resumed regular instruction, the period of concern had also witnessed a drop in the number of high school graduates. Hence, we had to ensure that entering students were capable of pursuing a course of study and understanding easily what they were being taught without having obtained high school diplomas. Given the circumstances, we decided to operate on the basis of a qualifying examination, and each student applying to the faculty would be tested in subjects equivalent to those taught in secondary school classes. All but a very small number of the applicants passed the examination, and those who passed it were registered as regular students in the faculty. One day I was approached by a number of students seeking admission into the faculty. They had come bearing papers signed by Shaikh Shukr, headmaster of the Ja‘fari School, testifying that they had graduated from secondary school. However, I knew full well that the Ja‘fari School had never, whether under the Turks or under the British occupation, offered instruction up to the secondary level. I told the students that they would

Faisal in Iraq

103

either have to get their certificates approved by the Ministry of Education or sit for the entrance examination in order to prove their academic competence. It wasn’t long before I was approached by a second group, who likewise claimed to be graduates of the Ja‘fari School and who came bearing the same peculiar certificate. The names I recall in this connection are ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Azri, ‘Abbas Mahdi, Muhammad Hasan Kubbah, Ahmad Zaki al-Khayyat, Muhammad al-Shamma‘, ‘Abd al-Hamid Mahdi, ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Zahir, Sa‘d Salih, and Ja‘far Hamandi. When I refused to admit them based on the papers in their hands, they appealed to the government and to the royal court. Later that day I received a visit from Muhammad Rustum Haydar, who told me that King Faisal I wished to help these young people by guaranteeing their admission into the faculty! In response, I apprised him of the students’ legal status and again requested that they demonstrate the truth of their claim by getting their certificates approved and stamped by the Ministry of Education. I explained that if they failed to abide by this request, they would have no choice but to take the entrance examination and that beyond this, there was nothing I could do for them. When Rustum Haydar went on insisting that I do everything I could to “help” them since King Faisal I wanted them to be accepted into the faculty, my reply was that the practice of accepting students into institutes of higher learning based on royal decrees had now become a thing of the past. In other words, whereas this had been a common occurrence in the days of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II, the events of 1908 in Turkey had put such practices to an end. Consequently, I regretted that I would not be able to do anything for them unless they did what I asked of them. In response, he stalked out angrily and never came back! I learned later that the royal court had summoned Sati‘ al-Husri, the minister of education, asking him to issue a statement affirming that these students’ certificates were equivalent to secondary school diplomas so that they could enter the faculty without taking the entrance examination. However, the man refused to comply with the court’s request. When he stood firm in his refusal, however, he was forced to issue the statement against his will. When the relevant documents came across my desk, I had no choice but to accept them as equivalent to secondary school diplomas. Strangely, there are people who still believe that I did this willingly, though the facts are otherwise, as I hope to have made clear.

The Law Faculty’s New Regime When I took over my responsibilities in the Law Faculty, it was in a state of near chaos. Rather than operating on the basis of set rules, things went

104

My Memoirs

however the British dean, Mr. Bell, wanted them to go. Hence, I established the rules and bylaws needed to order the institution’s affairs. As a consequence, it acquired a new stability, and things remained this way until 1926, at which time the practice of installing the faculty’s dean by appointment was replaced by that of election. The first year after this transition, Professor Ra’uf al-Jadarji was elected dean, after which I was elected to the deanship, which I occupied until 1929, and during this time I benefited from my involvement in the faculty as a member of the teaching staff as well. It was during these same years that I translated a book by Charles Gide on political economy and published it in two volumes. I also wrote and published a book on Roman law.

Legal Consultations My work as a government legal adviser placed quite a burden on my shoulders over and above the work I was doing at the Law Faculty. One reason for this was that the government’s British legal adviser only wanted to be consulted about the most important matters, of which there were few. As for other matters, of which there were many, it was I who attended to them. So, finding myself overworked, I requested that ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Sanawi and Yusuf al-Kabir assist me as chief clerks, and both of them proved to be highly experienced and skilled.

To the Lausanne Conference In my capacity as government adviser I was asked to accompany Ja‘far al‘Askari when he was appointed Iraq’s representative to the Lausanne Conference in 1921. The Lausanne Conference, which was convened by the Allies and Turkey in response to the Turkish national movement inspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, led to the conclusion of a treaty between them, the purpose of which was to resolve the problems that had arisen from World War I in relation to Turkey and the countries that were no longer part of the Ottoman Empire, including Iraq.

Cairo to Alexandria to Trieste to Paris to London Having been employed as Ja‘far Pasha’s legal adviser, I was to travel with him by air from Baghdad to Cairo. The airplane was expected to cover the distance between the two cities in ten hours, since the military airplanes used by the British army were heavy, cumbersome rattletraps that left their

Faisal in Iraq

105

passengers in a pitiful state. Indeed, we were forced to land in the middle of the desert due to a mechanical failure. So, since we were being accompanied by a second aircraft, we disembarked from the one we had been riding in and boarded the other one, which, after no little discomfort, got us to Ramleh. By the time we made it to Ramleh, we were so exhausted we nearly fell ill, and in fact, we spent that night in the hospital recuperating from the ride. The following morning, a good deal more rested than before, we boarded another airplane, which took us to the Heliopolis Airport. When we entered the Continental Hotel and produced our passports for inspection, the doorman’s eyes darted back and forth in astonishment between our faces and our passports. He could see from the stamps in our passports that we had been in Baghdad only two days earlier, and he was amazed that we could have been in Baghdad yesterday and in Cairo today. When he asked us how we had come, we answered jokingly, “On a flying carpet!” And when we told him that we had come by airplane, he was even more astonished, since, besides being difficult due to the dearth of airplanes, air travel was looked upon as a wild adventure on which only the most foolhardy would dare to embark. Needless to say, if it hadn’t been for our status as governmental officials, there would have been no way for us to reach our destination so quickly, still less to have done so via British military aircraft. After staying in Cairo for two days we traveled to Alexandria, where we boarded an Austrian-made ship under Italian ownership known as the Vienna. The Vienna was considered one of the fastest, cleanest, most luxurious, and most elegant ships in the world. However, it had become quite difficult to travel by sea since the end of World War I due to a shortage of ships and high freight costs. Nevertheless, we managed to book two places on the liner, which took us to Trieste, Italy. The strange thing for me at that time was that when we had left Baghdad in November, the weather had been so warm that we would sleep on top of our roofs at night, whereas when we reached Trieste five days later, we were greeted by bitter cold. We were so unaccustomed to such weather, it seemed that the more clothes we put on to keep warm, the colder we felt! We only stayed in Trieste for one day, and at midnight we boarded a train heading for Paris. After two full days en route, we arrived in Paris in the early morning hours, and from there we continued our journey to Calais, where we boarded a small ship designed for navigation on the English Channel. It was a miserable vessel that provided no comfort whatsoever; on the contrary, thanks to the high winds and the storminess of the sea whose waters it plied, it was guaranteed to produce distress as it meandered through the waves, dancing and bobbing over the water’s surface from departure to arrival. I would far have preferred to travel by some other means, but what was one to do when England was separated from the rest of Europe by such a body of water?

106

My Memoirs

The cold was especially severe along the coast of the English Channel. However, when we entered the Dover port, we felt a bit of warmth thanks to the thick fog that surrounded the land, cushioning it from the wintry winds. The weather was rainy and damp when we got on the train headed for London, which we reached two hours later. Despite the fact that the task assigned us clearly had to do with Lausanne, we nevertheless had to contact London before our departure to ascertain what arrangements had been made by the British delegation to the Lausanne Conference and whether we would be going there as participants or simply as expert advisers to the British delegation. In the course of our inquiries, it became clear to us that in view of Turkey’s refusal to recognize Iraq or the borders that had been defined by the Treaty of Sèvres, it would be difficult for Iraq to participate in the Lausanne Conference. Consequently, our presence was most likely to be that of expert observers whose job was to assist the British delegation in its task when it came time to discuss the Iraqi borders with Turkey. London’s weather in late November was miserable. The fog was so thick, it was impossible most of the time to distinguish night from day. Visibility was so bad that for a good part of the day the streetlights would remain lit, and it rained nonstop. Once I commented to one of my British acquaintances that before visiting London, we had thought that British people’s reputation for liking to travel and see the world was due to their athletic involvement and their love of adventure, but now that we had visited England, we realized that British globetrotters were simply running away from their homeland’s nasty weather!

In the Land of the Britons When I visited London for the first time, my impression of it was a negative one in many respects. Anyone who, like me, had grown up with bright sunshine was bound to feel disgruntled when, upon entering the land of the Britons, he was greeted by nothing but violent, cold winds, thick fog, choppy seas, and days that appeared no different from night. Add to this the fact that people preferred to stay at home rather than be out and about, and that there were no sidewalk cafés or other public gathering places such as bars, restaurants, and entertainment spots, nor any of the other things that one is accustomed to seeing in Paris and other European capitals. The absence of such elements made me restless, and as the days passed, I became all the more determined to make my stay in London as short as possible. To this end, I began pressing al-‘Askari to go with me to the European mainland as soon as possible so that we could be on our way to Paris or Lausanne, both of them home to bright sun, glittering lights, smiling faces, and

Faisal in Iraq

107

spacious, spotless cafés. So imagine my surprise when I heard that the inhabitants of London were pleased with their city and found nothing in it to complain about! When I first met Reader Bullard, who had served as military commissioner over the Karkh side of Baghdad in 1918–1919 and who exhibited that typically British gentility, wisdom, and aplomb, he said to me, “We in this country enjoy a low rate of illness and mortality because, maligned though it be, our weather is better for the health than any other climate.”

The Greatness of Britain’s Heart The greatness, expansiveness, and orderliness of London, a vast city with a population of 9 million, are well known. Besides being the capital of the British Empire, it is the capital of the world: a major hub of financial and economic activity that has benefited undeniably from its distinguished global position, having put this position to use in a manner that has brought it blessing and prosperity. The Briton in Britain and the Londoner in London welcome the opportunity to live side by side with others more than they do when abroad. That is to say, when at home, the British show no resentment toward foreigners, especially if they have come to know them in some country with which England has dealings or common interests. My two-week stay in London provided insufficient data on which to base a definitive opinion of the city and its people. Be that as it may, at the end of the two weeks we departed for Paris, where we spent ten days recovering from the hardships of our time in London!

Paris Once Again I had spent three years studying law at the Sorbonne, and upon returning to Paris I felt tremendously at ease. After all, I’d mastered its language, grown accustomed to its food and drink, and learned the manners of its people, of whom I’d undertaken a thoroughgoing study. After our ten-day stay in Paris, we boarded a fast train that was to have us in Lausanne by the following morning.

With the British Delegation The city of Lausanne was picture perfect: the epitome of orderliness and beauty. We stayed at the Beau-Rivage Hotel with the British delegation, which was being headed by the famed Lord George Curzon, who at that

108

My Memoirs

time was British foreign secretary. Two days later we were invited for dinner by Lord Curzon and his wife. We were received very graciously and spent the evening together without raising any issues related to our mission. Thereafter, we were contacted by Lord Curzon’s private secretary, a gentleman named Voris, a thirty-five-year-old man who was enlightened in his thinking, knowledgeable, intelligent, and courteous. In fact, so numerous were his virtues that we were tempted to wonder whether Lord Curzon’s greatness and world fame were not attributable to his choice of this gifted young man as his secretary. He began grilling us for information that would be of use to the British delegation in relation to Iraq, Turkey, and their concerns. Then one day Voris approached with Hubert Yank, who had been in Iraq previously and had then gone to the Hejaz, where he had taken part in the Arab Revolt with T. E. Lawrence. The two of them explained to us that Lord Curzon was composing a memorandum relating to Iraq’s situation with Turkey and requested some information from us, particularly things of relevance to the promises that Britain had made to Sharif Hussein. We began supplying them with the information they had requested, particularly in relation to the proposed boundaries that had been accepted by King Hussein between the Arab Kingdom and Turkey. These borders were referred to in the aforementioned promises as being located along the thirty-eighth parallel, which corresponds to the borders between Syria and our land to the north. At this point we got into fruitless discussions in which we demanded that the British carry out the promises they had made. The British defended themselves by resorting to a variety of excuses, claiming that they were unable to keep these promises in their entirety, but that they would keep a goodly number of them in relation to Iraq and the Hejaz. In relation to Syria, however, they claimed that they could do nothing of significance in view of its situation vis-à-vis France.

Mahmud ‘Azmi, the Al-Ahram Correspondent During our time in Lausanne we were in periodic contact with a number of journalists and other delegations who were also staying at the Beau-Rivage Hotel. Among the journalists was a young Egyptian by the name of Dr. Mahmud ‘Azmi, a correspondent for Al-Ahram newspaper, who did occasional reporting on the conference. As an Egyptian, ‘Azmi took a political stance that was in opposition to British policy. Consequently, he was kindly disposed to the Turks, whom he defended for the simple reason that they were opposed to the British. He even supported the idea of giving Mosul to Turkey because Iraq had been lost through its subjection to British control. He would say, “Why should we

Faisal in Iraq

109

consign Mosul to even more misery by placing it under British control when it could be annexed to Turkey and enjoy the blessings of independence?” This was his point of view. However, we began explaining to him that Iraq was on its way to gaining its independence and that Britain’s control over it would have to come to an end. As an Arab, therefore, he ought to be defending Iraq’s perspective, according to which it should keep Mosul as an Arab city, since if Turkey closed in on Iraq, this would force Iraq to throw itself in the arms of Britain! On the other hand, assistance from Turkey and from Arab Islamic states would encourage Iraq to struggle for its right to independence. After some time, he acknowledged that he had been mistaken in his thinking. In fact, he became convinced that it was his duty to defend Iraq’s point of view. After the three of us went to London, he communicated with us more and more frequently, having become an all-out enthusiast for the Arab cause.

The Discussions in Lausanne The discussions that took place at the Lausanne Conference were quite complex, and there was an intense tug-of-war going on between Britain and Greece on one hand, and Turkey on the other. However, Turkey, which had succeeded in its struggle against Greece and Britain, was determined to consolidate its gains and not to compromise by accepting any terms that were incompatible with its freedom and autonomy. What Turkey proposed to the Allies was that they (the Allies) disassociate themselves entirely from their former policies, the aim of which had been to subject Turkey to their will, and forget the myth according to which Istanbul and a portion of the land of the Turks were actually Greek territories. Additionally, the Turks refused to discuss the possibility of their paying any indemnification demanded by Britain for damages suffered in the war by Britain, Greece, and their subjects. Britain had begun by demanding that Turkey pay 18 million Iraqi dinars in reparations. However, this sum began to diminish until it had sunk to 1 million Iraqi dinars, and even this amount was not agreed upon. The reason for the British-Turkish wrangling at the conference was that Lord Curzon was a Greek aficionado who had a dislike for things Turkish. Lord Curzon had long been known for such leanings and was more of an author and politician than he was a government official. Hence, he allowed his artistic and literary preferences and his political inclinations to interfere unduly with his duties as head of the British delegation. Having lost his sense of perspective, he began violently attacking the Turks, convinced that England had emerged victorious from the war and had, therefore, vanquished Turkey. However, he had forgotten that the Turks’ victory over

110

My Memoirs

Greece in their recent armed struggle had likewise been a victory over the British themselves. Consequently, Lord Curzon was in the delicate position of being victor and vanquished at one and the same time. And it is this that led to the heated exchanges and derisive verbal sparring matches between representatives of the two parties to the dispute. Curzon’s situation was also amusing in some ways, since he feared being the butt of a violent assault on the part of British public opinion due to his failure to wrest any concessions from the Turks. This failure became apparent when he attempted to delay his departure from Lausanne to Paris by several hours in the hope of arriving at some sort of compromise with the Turks that would enable him to return to the negotiating table. However, this hope was not realized, and he came away from Lausanne empty-handed.

The Failure of the Conference Following the conference’s disappointing outcome, we were obliged to return to London, where we stayed for forty days without any hope of resuming negotiations with the Turks. At that time a decision had been reached in Baghdad to appoint Ja‘far Pasha al-‘Askari as Iraq’s ambassador to London. Consequently, I had to return alone while Ja‘far remained in London awaiting further instructions concerning his new assignment.

London, March 1922 When I returned to London in March 1922, the weather was somewhat better than it had been during the previous November. We would actually see the sun now and then and enjoy it for an hour or more. Whenever we rode the hotel lift, the lift operator, like all other British people, would follow his initial greeting with some comment on the weather. He might say, for example, “Fine weather we’re having today, isn’t it?” to which I would of course reply in the affirmative. One time he added, “And the sun is lovely, too. Do you have sunshine like ours in your part of the world?” “Yes, we do,” Ja‘far Pasha replied. “In fact, our sunshine is so intense that if we had a solar eclipse, it would still be as bright and beautiful as what you have here!” Unfortunately, there is little point in going into detail about my second stay in London, since as of that time, my English was still virtually nonexistent. It bothered me not to know the language, and needless to say, anyone who goes to England without being able to speak English will be as good as lost.

Faisal in Iraq

111

Dr. Naji Asil During the Lausanne Conference I came in contact with Dr. Naji Asil, who enjoyed special influence at that time with Sharif Hussein of Mecca and was, in fact, his personal envoy to London. Dr. Asil’s position afforded him the ability to spend however much he liked, since he made a salary that, from what I had heard, came to £600 per month. Dr. Asil himself was driven by the belief that he had the ability to achieve the aims of the Arab cause and, in his capacity as Sharif Hussein’s spokesman, did his utmost to persuade the British government to keep the promises it had made to the Arabs. However, the British government clung to its position, contenting itself with keeping the promises it was capable of keeping (or so it said) while leaving the rest to the future. When Dr. Asil came to Lausanne to meet with Lord Curzon in the hope of persuading him to meet Sharif Hussein’s demands, Ja‘far Pasha spared no effort to arrange a meeting between the two men, and he contacted Lord Curzon’s private secretary, Voris, numerous times in this connection. When Dr. Asil returned to London with us without having accomplished what he had hoped to in Lausanne, he was in frequent communication with us. Yet, despite our ongoing contact with the doctor, we weren’t at ease with the situation because of his arrogant attitude and his affected manner. He might have had some excuse for this arrogance of his had he been dealing with us solely in his capacity as the sharif’s representative. However, he allowed his conceit to affect the way he related to us personally. Further, if the matter had pertained only to the two of us as young men vying in the arena of personal advantage, it would have been less disturbing than what actually transpired. However, he acted as though he thought of himself as better than Ja‘far Pasha, who had been his commanding officer in the Arab Revolt army. For whereas al-‘Askari had been commander of the Arab armies, Dr. Asil had simply been an army physician with the rank of captain. We recognized that human temperaments rarely break out of the molds in which they were originally formed, or as the saying goes, that a leopard can’t change its spots. Consequently, we could excuse the doctor for his behavior. Nevertheless, there were times when we couldn’t help but feel resentment at his overbearing manner. The first time real tension developed between us was in Lausanne, where we had been invited to lunch at the table of Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi in the Hotel Royale. Seated at the table with us were Dr. Mahmud ‘Azmi and Ihsan Bek al-Jabiri. Ja‘far al-‘Askari was, of course, seated to the right of the khedive, while Dr. Asil was seated to his left. The conversation was pleasant and the food delicious, and everything turned out well. However, we later learned that Dr. Asil had sent someone to inform the khedive that he had taken offense at having been seated to his left, and that he should actually have been seated to his right in view of the

112

My Memoirs

fact that he had been representing Sharif Hussein, whereas Ja‘far Pasha had been representing his son, King Faisal I! I don’t know exactly how the khedive responded to this reproach. However, I don’t imagine he would easily have forgotten it! One day as the three of us were having lunch together in London, the topic of conversation turned to Sharif Hussein, who had also proclaimed himself King of the Hejaz. At one point in the conversation I referred to his majesty as “Sharif Hussein.” Angered by my having referred to King Hussein as “sharif,” the doctor began upbraiding me for what I had said. I replied, “I would have expected you to be better acquainted with the position of the king you take such pride in representing. In his capacity as sharif, the king is even greater than he is in his capacity as king. After all, his status as sharif—meaning, as it does, that he is descended from the family of the Prophet—obtains unconditionally, no matter where he goes, and regardless of whether he is a king or not. Most Arabs and Muslims appreciate this fact, but it seems to have been lost on you! Moreover, if you serve as Sharif Hussein’s representative, and if, in this capacity, you want to come to his defense, you should remember that we’ve known your King Hussein longer than you have, and since before the time you became his envoy!” By this time I was really agitated, since the doctor had done everything he possibly could to demonstrate his superiority. More importantly, though, I told him I feared for his future. I said that I knew that, given the doctor’s zeal for the demands he was making, the sharif had employed him as his representative in the hope of facilitating the achievement of his goals. Yet, alas, these goals wouldn’t be attained easily, and Sharif Hussein was bound to grow weary of repeating his demands, just as he was bound to grow weary of underwriting the doctor’s extravagant lifestyle. Consequently, the day was coming when the sharif would cut him off. When this happened, the doctor would go on spending what he had until it had all run out and he was obliged to return to Iraq. Once in Iraq, he would look for a government job that pays only twenty-five dinars a month. And thus would the doctor’s mission have come to an end, along with his supercilious masquerade. After hearing my tirade, the doctor did his best to placate me and apologized for the way he had spoken to me and Ja‘far al-‘Askari. We accepted his apology, and when I left London, we were on good terms again. However, a year or so later I heard that the doctor’s relationship with Sharif Hussein was strained, that his salary had been cut off, and that for some time he had been unable to support himself, as a result of which his brother in Baghdad had lent him money to travel home. When he arrived back in Iraq he was in desperate need of some way to make a living. When I was minister of education he came to me looking for work, so I gave him a

Faisal in Iraq

113

government job with a monthly salary of just twenty-five dinars. How bizarre a coincidence, and ironic a fate!

Back to Iraq After leaving London for Iraq, I stopped for a while in Paris, a city for which I have a particular affection. After staying in Paris for as long as I was able, I went to Marseilles, where I boarded a sea liner that brought me to Alexandria five days later. Traveling with me on this leg of the journey was ‘Abd al-Jabbar al-Khayyat, a well-known and well-to-do attorney-atlaw. Since the ship was due to remain at harbor in Alexandria for fortyeight hours, I decided to accompany him to Cairo to spend the night there before reboarding the ship. Each of us had brought a small bag containing the items necessary for an overnight stay in Cairo. We got off the ship and were stopped by a customs employee, who asked us to open our bags. Yet try as we might to explain that we had diplomatic passports, the man would not understand, and instead of allowing us through, he led us to a higher-ranking employee to whom we tried to explain the same thing. Yet the second employee, like the first, insisted that we open the bags. ‘Abd al-Jabbar al-Khayyat said he was willing to open his bag since it didn’t contain anything that might cause any problems. However, I refused to let him, insisting that it was a matter of principle, since we were bearers of diplomatic passports, and the Egyptian employee needed to realize what his responsibilities were toward travelers who held this type of passport. Hence, I left ‘Abd al-Jabbar with the bags and went straightaway to see the head of customs and told him about the dispute. A kind and reasonable man, he apologized for the offense his employees had caused and issued instructions for our bags not to be opened. The funny thing was that when I returned with the courier sent by the head of customs to the place where we had left the bags, I discovered that our friend ‘Abd al-Jabbar Pasha had opened them himself, saying, “There’s nothing in them of any importance!” We all laughed over what had happened and I asked him why he had done what he had done. He replied, “I’m a practical man, and I don’t like to make problems. So as long as I’ve got nothing to hide, why shouldn’t I open them?” As though it were simply a matter of opening the bags or not opening them, or whether they contained contraband, or nothing at all! From there we went out to catch the train to Cairo, where we roamed about until noon, then returned to Alexandria. Two days after leaving Alexandria we reached Beirut for a brief stay, after which we went to Baghdad by private car. Upon our arrival in Fallujah on April 15, 1923, we were

114

My Memoirs

received by numerous friends, my brothers among them, in the company of then prime minister ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun.

With Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun The day after my arrival in Baghdad, I received a visit from ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun, who had formed his first cabinet in 1923 following the resignation of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Gaylani. I learned from al-Sa‘dun that the AngloIraqi Treaty that had been concluded in March 1922 was going to be revised in view of the severe tension this treaty had caused between the Iraqi people and the government.

The Mosul Issue The Iraqi public at this time was consumed with the fate of the province of Mosul, which Turkey was demanding be annexed to its own territory. The situation was critical, in part because the British and the Turks had not arrived at a satisfactory resolution regarding the Iraqi-Turkish borders and, in addition, because the Turks had become noticeably more active since the success they had achieved through the Turkish nationalist movements inspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Now that they had settled scores with Greece, they wanted to settle scores with Iraq and the British as well. To this end, they formed armed gangs, which began roaming the borders, harassing the population, and inciting them to rise up against the Britishcontrolled Iraqi government. Among those heading these armed gangs was a high-ranking officer by the name of Ozdemir who advanced as far as Rawanduz. Incensed by this movement and the repeated assaults to which they were being subjected, the British Supreme Command decided to strike back no matter what the cost, and to put Ozdemir in his place. It carried out its decision and succeeded in restoring a measure of calm. It is my belief that it was the operation launched by Air Marshal Saymond that dashed Turkish hopes of success in their Iraqi policy. It was also a notable service to Britain, because it prevented elements not supportive of the Iraqi government from wreaking havoc at a time when peace and quiet were at a greater premium than ever before.

The Second Lausanne Conference In June 1922 the Lausanne Conference was convened for a second time and we were asked to attend. However, we found that there was nothing to be

Faisal in Iraq

115

gained from our presence there in view of the agreement that had been reached at the first Lausanne Conference on virtually all points between the Allies and Turkey. Among the points that had yet to be resolved was the fate of Mosul; however, the border issue was to be presented to the League of Nations Council, which had been assigned to render a verdict in this connection.

Meeting with Ismet Inonu and Ja‘far al-‘Askari In this connection I recall the private interview that took place between Ja‘far al-‘Askari and Turkish army general Ismet Inonu before the conclusion of the first Lausanne Conference. Ja‘far informed me that he had requested an interview with Inonu and had, in fact, managed to meet with him for an hour, during which time he had sought to persuade Inonu that if Turkey showed intransigence toward the British in connection with the issues of Mosul and the borders, this would simply place Iraq at Britain’s mercy, whereas leniency on Turkey’s part in relation to said issues would soften the hearts of the Iraqis and cause them to feel grateful toward Turkey. He assured him that Iraq was fully aware of its responsibility and of the need to gain its independence from the British no matter the cost. This interview, which clarified Iraq’s position to Turkey, may have contributed to the resolution of the Mosul issue, which was settled in Iraq’s favor, in part due to a League of Nations inquiry that ascertained that the people of Mosul preferred to be part of Iraq rather than Turkey.

5 Democracy in Iraq

~

Drafting a Constitution Over and above the problem of Mosul, what was uppermost in people’s minds at this time was the drafting of an Iraqi constitution that could be presented to the Constituent Assembly to be formed at an appropriate time. It was the British authorities who, apparently hoping to make the basic law into something of a mandate, were promoting efforts in this direction, because thus far no mandate over Iraq had been finalized due to Iraq’s objection to the mandate system. It also appeared that the League of Nations’ standing mandate committee was going to require the British government to implement certain wide-ranging guarantees in the realms of administration, politics, and the like given the fact that the British government was the actual mandate power, although Iraq neither accepted nor acknowledged this. The British government was in a delicate position. On one hand, it worked to give Iraqis the impression that it was protecting Iraq’s autonomy, while at the same time it had pledged itself before the League of Nations to act as a mandatory power over Iraq.

The Basic Law By framing the Iraqi basic law or constitution, the British government hoped to reconcile the autonomy sought by the Iraqis with the mandate established by the League of Nations. My brother Naji al-Suwaydi had been appointed to the Constitutional Drafting Committee along with Sasun Hesqil, Muhammad Rustum Haydar, Tawfiq al-Khalidi, Edwik Drower, the government adviser, and a gentleman whose name I recall only as Dawids 117

118

My Memoirs

who was serving as adviser to the Justice Department. The committee had been assigned to examine the existing draft of the constitution and to draw up a new one. Although I had not read the text that had come from London, I understood from Naji that many things, most of which had nothing to do with constitutional issues, had been introduced into the original draft. With the support of King Faisal I, the committee worked to bring greater order and coherence to the document. Because its members were familiar with the constitutions of other states, they realized that the draft constitution as it stood could not serve as a foundation for ruling the country. After prolonged exchanges between the Iraqi and British governments, it was decided to allow the Constitutional Drafting Committee to introduce the needed foundations and rulings into the draft. It was understood that the draft would include certain guarantees for both the Iraqi populace and the British government in relation to the ordinances and laws that had been passed by the British occupation government in Iraq, and which would continue in effect until British rule came to an end and new Iraqi legislation was introduced. It also clarified the rights of minorities and other matters. The Constitutional Drafting Committee went on working for more than a year as I recall. When the final draft had been prepared, the government in London raised no objections to it. Elections were then held for the purpose of forming the Constituent Assembly, which would have the power to study the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty concluded in March 1922, then pass a basic law for the country and an elections law. As for the manner in which the Constituent Assembly would be formed, it posed a major difficulty, because the British were working to garner the largest possible number of supporters for ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which they realized did not meet with popular approval, while Iraqi nationalists were trying for their part to ensure that the treaty was not ratified and, to this end, were working to mobilize elements opposed to it. King Faisal I’s position in relation to all this was a delicate one. However, he was able to set the number of tribal heads who would serve in the Constituent Assembly at fifteen. It was popularly believed that the tribal heads supported the Iraqi government and, indirectly, the British. Hence, if they made up only a small percentage of the Constituent Assembly’s total membership, this would make it easier to underscore nationalist sentiments when the treaty came up for discussion. It should be noted in this connection that when the Iraqi state was first established, the Iraqi people were not in a position to express their views in a knowledgeable or articulate way, since the majority of them had no real understanding of the treaty and its drawbacks, nor of any significant political affairs having to do with the country’s future. This was true not only of the common people, but of their leaders as well, be they tribe-related or otherwise. If the people remained naïve and demanded full independence, the British would be likely to wash their hands of the country and become

Democracy in Iraq

119

mere spectators from afar. However, this would not be achieved easily in view of Britain’s concern to maintain a direct role in Iraqi affairs. Moreover, in view of the general population’s ignorance of what to do in this connection, elections were held without anyone’s knowing exactly how they proceeded anywhere but in the important centers where, particularly in the capital, competition among the candidates was at its fiercest.

The Meeting of the Constituent Assembly When the Constituent Assembly convened on May 15, 1924, there were heated discussions about the proposed Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The prolonged deliberations witnessed violent altercations among assembly members, some of which even led to the use of arms. There were violent demonstrations on both sides of Baghdad in protest against the treaty, and parliamentarians were warned not to ratify it. I remember well how, when King Faisal I realized how confused people were in their thinking, he began working to strengthen those who were weak in their convictions. Oddly enough, however, his efforts backfired, and he became concerned that the majority would end up rejecting the treaty. He was counseled by the British not to get involved in the commotion and to leave it to the Constituent Assembly to work things out among themselves. This counsel seems to have proved successful, and the turmoil subsided to some extent. When the treaty was being considered by the assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee, the government, headed at that time by Ja‘far al-‘Askari, did everything in its power to persuade the committee members to ratify the treaty. Meanwhile, the high commissioner set about distributing lengthy missives among committee members in which he provided clarifications and explanations, assuring them that the treaty contained nothing that would give Iraqis reason to fear for their future. In reality, however, the overall situation, both domestically and internationally, was quite dismal because the Mosul issue had not yet been resolved. If Turkey managed to win its case before the League of Nations and gained possession of the Mosul Province, Iraq would come under threat and be deprived of its best territory, and thereafter it would only be able to guarantee its rights through support from a powerful state like Britain. The only states that had been victorious in World War I and which were now members of the League of Nations were Britain, France, and Italy. Of these three, France and Italy had declared themselves enemies of the Arabs and feared the expansion of Arab influence at the expense of their colonial holdings and interests. Hence, although either rejection or acceptance of the treaty could be dangerous and potentially troublesome, the latter appeared to be the lesser of two evils.

120

My Memoirs

The Treaty Prudent politicians of the day agreed unanimously that acceptance of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was preferable to rejecting it. If they openly declared their opposition to the treaty, they would no longer be able to support it thereafter. Consequently, they worked to convince others to accept it while they themselves remained in opposition to it. And in fact, the treaty was ratified by the Constituent Assembly. Then there began the discussion of the basic law, or constitution, which was ratified without any essential amendments to the draft submitted by the government. There was a general feeling among people that the new constitution was a progressive document that granted them many rights and powers. On closer examination, however, one found that there was little basis for this optimistic view, because the actual contents of the constitution deprived the people of highly significant rights. Similarly, it deprived the king of many of his powers or, at the very least, interfered with them. This constitution did not create an unequivocally democratic situation in which the greater share of power belonged to the people. Nor, on the other hand, was it a constitution that favored dictatorship over democracy. In countries that are well established as democracies, the people express their wishes frankly. Such expression takes the form of parliamentary elections in which individual members of parliament enjoy the people’s confidence and, at the same time, are charged with the fulfillment of their constitutional duties, which include surveillance of the government’s actions in keeping with the constitution and the laws of the land. In such a democracy parliament has the right, should it observe any fault in the government’s performance, to hold it accountable by insisting on its resignation or by punishing those of its officials who deserve to be punished.

The King In this connection, the king is simply a constitutional coordinator who strives to ensure the proper balance between the legislative and executive branches of the government, since he deals with both of them to some extent in the course of carrying out his duties as king. If, for example, in the absence of a senate, he encounters intransigence on the part of the house of representatives and believes that it would be in the best interests of the country to dissolve it due to its failure to support the government in what it is doing, he will call for new elections. If, on the other hand, there is a senate, he will be most likely to consult with the senate, explaining the reasons for his belief that it should be dissolved and asking for its consent. The reason for this is that the senate tends to be more thoughtful and discerning, as

Democracy in Iraq

121

a result of which it is more likely to offer an opinion that will help to resolve the problem that exists between the executive and legislative powers.

The Constitutional Mechanism This, then, is the constitutional mechanism as it operates in a monarchical parliamentary democracy. Powers are distributed among these three branches of government, and stability is achieved and maintained through a kind of “push and pull.” However, no party is to violate the limits set for it in the Iraqi Constitution, which, following its ratification in 1924, was described as a progressive constitution that would pave the way for an advanced form of democratic rule. The first condition for such progressivism and advancement is for the country to be prepared to perform its duty through elections. Unfortunately, however, when the Iraqi Constitution first went into effect, the people lacked a clear understanding of what their duty was as voters or the tasks associated with this duty, nor were they able to place their trust in those who represented them. According to statistics released for 1921–1922 and the years thereafter, the vast majority of the country’s inhabitants could neither read nor write. In fact, the Ministry of Education estimated the literacy rate at 5 percent. Hence, the first condition for the people’s ability to perform their duties was unfulfilled. And as long as the people remained ignorant, they would be vulnerable to deceptive propaganda, like little children being made the butt of adults’ jokes and pranks.

The People A people deprived of knowledge and awareness, both of which are essential components of modern civilization, will be incapable of forming reliable opinions on how to manage their country’s affairs. Consequently, necessity at that time required that the people be controlled by blocs and organizations that were in direct contact with those in power. If the population consisted of tribal members, tribal heads were the ones in control, and if they did not belong to tribes, they were governed by religious leaders and those in positions of influence and prestige. However, this was not sufficient to ensure the crystallization of popular public opinion on a vital issue such as that of elections. Moreover, the executive authority that emerges naturally from the people themselves will, quite naturally, be subject to the very same influences that have been the bane of the people as a whole. As a consequence, leaders see themselves as obliged to go along with the masses in whatever way will enable them to win them over to their side. However, in order for the government to civilize the country—rescuing it from the clutches

122

My Memoirs

of ignorance, illness, and poverty and propelling it toward progress and prosperity—it is not necessary for the people’s way of thinking to be sophisticated or advanced. Among the ministers of the Iraqi government there were people who could neither read nor write, and in order to conceal this scandal, they were referred to as “reserve ministers.” If even government officials were this badly qualified, it made no sense to grant them broad latitude in determining people’s fates or in overseeing the actions of the state. In Iraq, where the constitution stipulated that a senate should be formed, it seemed fitting that the king should appoint to this body individuals who had a great deal of previous experience in service to the state and the resolution of its problems. However, the reality was that in the Senate’s early days, the unqualified senators with no knowledge of politics may well have outnumbered those who possessed some level of expertise in government affairs. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, to refrain from dissolving the House of Representatives while attempting to set the Senate up as referee in the disputes that arose between the legislative and executive branches of the government, for the king could not benefit greatly from the opinion of a senate that had been put together in this way. Hence, it has been rightly said that the people had lost important rights because of their backwardness, powerlessness, and inability to represent themselves properly in parliament. It was this which prompted the government to “manufacture” representatives for the people by appointing them to their positions and claiming that they represented the people. However, although they may well have represented them in their backwardness, they knew but little about their duties and responsibilities. In addition to depriving the people of important rights, the Iraqi Constitution interfered with the king’s proper exercise of power. The constitution stated that “the authority of the people is a trust given to the king.” In this respect, it cannot be said to have been a truly democratic constitution. After all, the people’s authority belongs by right to the people while, at the same time, it involves duty and responsibility. Hence, they must not relinquish this authority to anyone. And if this authority is a trust, it should be entrusted not to the king, but rather to the people themselves. The intention behind this article of the constitution was to enable the king to exercise this authority the way one would wield a sword, the pretext being that the people had endorsed the king and, in so doing, had placed this “sword” in his hand. In this way, the people had surrendered all right to exercise their own authority to oversee and direct those in power. However, this is a right they must claim and exercise if the state under which they live is to be described as parliamentary and democratic. Be that as it may, this text led the king to exercise his powers in such a way that he came to believe that he was an absolute ruler and that he held

Democracy in Iraq

123

unlimited authority in managing the affairs of the state and its security. Meanwhile, the parliament looked on as a virtual outsider at what was taking place around it and the measures that were being taken to cope with the country’s complex problems. If King Faisal I had not been a wise man who tended by nature to be deliberate and farsighted, he may well have exercised the broad-ranging rights given to him in the constitution in an arbitrary, irresponsible way. However, King Faisal I always took care to present himself as a king who respected the wishes of his subjects and the powers assigned to its parliament. He did so not because the constitution required this of him but, rather, because he himself desired to demonstrate such respect. If he had assumed the people over whom he ruled to be refined and sophisticated, he would have fully exercised his right to choose those who would represent him, and he would have sent them to parliament to carry out their duties as required by the laws and customs of the world in a democratic, parliamentary state. The constitution granted the king the right to dissolve parliament whenever he so chose and without being required to provide justification for his decision. How, then, was he to ensure the balance the country required by reconciling the rights of the people with the grandeur and stateliness of the crown? The Iraqi Constitution was fundamentally flawed in this respect, since it neither did justice to the rights of the people nor explicitly granted the king unlimited powers. Rather, it left both parties uncertain as to where they stood. This situation often led the country to adopt policies that were inconsistent and confused. Moreover, in addition to overstating the boundaries between the rights of the people and the authority of the government headed by the king, it contained many secondary rulings that might cease to be valid with changing conditions and circumstances, although, in order to amend the constitution in response to such changes, numerous nearly impossible conditions had to be met. Consequently, the framers of the constitution attempted to reassure the people by promoting it as one of the most progressive constitutions ever to have been drawn up.

A Representative Council, Not a Legislative One The Constituent Assembly completed its task of passing the elections law, which was of dubious value, since it saw no need to stipulate that voters, be they primary or secondary as stipulated by the Ottoman law still in force, or even members of parliament, know how to read and write. Moreover, according to the elections law, the House of Representatives would be representative only, not legislative.

124

My Memoirs

The difference between a representative and a legislative council can be explained as follows: A representative council is a gathering of various citizens who are not required to be competent but, rather, simply to be present as participants in the actions of the state so as to justify the state’s claim that its actions are supported by everyone in the country. The government approaches the council and presents matters to it in a way that is simple enough for its members to understand. The government then asks them to approve whatever measures it has already taken or intends to take. Members of a representative council of this sort obviously have no need to be able to read and write. As for a legislative council, it differs entirely from a representative council, since it actually takes part in passing laws. I fail to see how a man who can neither read nor write would be able to comprehend the contents of a draft law, be it bad or good, then take action to correct whatever stands in need of correction and shield the people from harm. Hence, it is obvious that members of the House of Representatives must be able to read and write. Nevertheless, this fact was entirely overlooked by the elections law. And what applies to members of the House of Representatives applies likewise to secondary voters, whose knowledge of affairs, be it through what they have heard or what has been suggested to them, must of necessity depend on some degree of knowledge or investigation. Be that as it may, the Constituent Assembly completed its deliberations and people turned their attention to new parliamentary elections, with people vying for seats in the soon-to-be-formed council. However, this interest in the parliament was not a response to people’s sense of patriotic duty as it would be in more advanced and sophisticated societies. Rather, it was motivated by the desire to ward off some evil, to ensure some personal gain, or to win increased influence here or there. For although such ignoble aspirations are to be found everywhere, they tend in other societies to be secondary, since the primary aim behind this sort of popular action in more advanced communities is to choose one out of a number of upright individuals to represent the nation, and to determine who would be most fit to take part in sound governance.

Elections The election process continued, as did the turmoil and feuding that accompanied it. The upshot was the choice of a number of candidates whom the king and the minister of foreign affairs—backed by the British adviser and the prime minister—had agreed to appoint. This list of candidates was kept confidential until the day of the elections, at which point it was communicated by telephone to the provincial governors, who were asked to do everything they

Democracy in Iraq

125

could to ensure these candidates’ success. On more than one occasion candidates were asked to make a written pledge, a copy of which was to be kept with the prime minister, that if they were elected to parliament as candidates from the government, they would support the government consistently until its resignation, at which point they would lend their support to any government appointed thereafter by King Faisal I. Although this approach was decidedly arbitrary and robbed the people of their rights, it nevertheless yielded undeniable benefits most of the time. The reason for this was that through its support for the government’s actions, the government bloc within the parliament helped to ward off the evils of personal manipulation and the resentments that tended to arise among parliamentarians over actions that went against their interests or thwarted their ambitions. In the absence of an organized party or parties that controlled the parliamentary situation, it made most sense at that time for the government to adopt an approach that ensured that it received the backing of an overwhelming majority. Nor should it be forgotten that the establishment of the Iraqi government itself was, in reality, nothing more than a compromise settlement, the purpose of which was to reconcile the conflicting interests of Britain and Iraq. If it had been up to Iraq entirely, it would never have signed a treaty with Britain to begin with, nor would it have agreed to the presence of any British advisers or other British officials on Iraqi soil. Britain’s acknowledgment of Iraq’s independence was, in actuality, conditional upon the preservation of British interests in Iraq, such as the airlines that connected Britain to its colonies and other territorial holdings, access to various types of concessions, and the ability to keep watch over other states from which it had something to gain. It would not have been possible to find an easier solution than the one that was actually agreed on either internationally, through the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, or domestically, through the promulgation of a constitution and the holding of elections. The prudent and thoughtful among the Iraqi population were not, in fact, dissatisfied with this state of affairs despite the evident corruption and incongruity it entailed, since they feared that if too much freedom were granted to the Iraqi people before they were prepared to make proper use of it, chaos would reign, and the country would be threatened from without. Neighboring states did not always harbor the friendliest of sentiments toward Iraq, and in fact, they may have entertained ambitions that would have prompted them to grab the first opportunity to exploit Iraq. Add to this the fact that Iraq had witnessed undeniable progress in the areas of education, the economy, and social organization, a fact that demonstrated that the Iraqi people were gifted with resources that had hitherto been unrecognized. Individual incomes rose and, as a consequence, there was increased contact between the Iraqi citizenry and the outside world,

126

My Memoirs

and new educational institutions were established. Iraqis began to feel as though they were governing themselves and their country, and little by little there developed a greater sense of responsibility and of the seriousness of self-rule. Although everyone complained that the new parliament was impotent and lacked a sufficient understanding of its duties, and despite the restrictions imposed upon it by the ruling authorities, who were liable to take it in directions that were not in keeping with the people’s best interests, the country nevertheless witnessed progress, while people of goodwill continued to hope that things would get better over time. And this, in fact, is what happened.

6 Oil Concessions

~

One of the important issues that were raised during the term of the first parliament was that of oil concessions. There was a wealthy British man of Jewish origin in Turkey by the name of Sir Ernest Cassel who was involved in major business ventures. He had become aware of the benefits of gaining control of oil production after observing the brilliant success achieved by William D’Arcy, who had been granted an oil concession in Iran and in 1908 had founded the AngloPersian Oil Company. Cassel had also founded an enterprise by the name of the Turkish Oil Company and, by soliciting support from the British government, had sought to obtain permits to prospect for oil in Turkey. Cassel succeeded in obtaining several permits, including one to drill for oil in the Iraqi territory adjacent to Khanaqin. It appears that the outbreak of World War I prevented Cassel from making progress in these endeavors. In fact, when he passed away, all the Turkish Oil Company had left were these permits, which were managed by Britain after the war’s end. Iraq was then approached by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which, with the backing of the British government, asked to be acknowledged as the rightful claimant to this concession. It then commenced work in the Muhawwalah territories near Khanaqin along the Iraqi-Iranian border. (Before the determination of the Turkish-Russian border over the years from 1905 to 1911, the Muhawwalah territories had been inside the Iranian borders; later, however, they became part of Turkey.) When oil was discovered in this region, the rights of the company were recognized, based, first of all, on the drilling permit it had obtained previously and, second, on its discovery of oil through use of the various technologies it possessed. This all took place before the formation of the official 127

128

My Memoirs

Iraqi government. Iraq’s occupation government of course facilitated and supported the company’s efforts, a fact which confronted the Iraqi government with realities it could not ignore. As for the company, it applied for a concession, and, after protracted negotiations in the course of which the British government threatened and cajoled, the concession was granted. The Iraqi government’s justification for granting the company the concession was that Britain would thereby come to have a certain material stake in Iraq that would motivate it to support Iraq in its claims to independence. It should also be remembered that, although the Anglo-Persian Oil Company represented British interests to a great extent, it also represented the interests of American, Dutch, and French companies. It was hoped that by granting this concession, relations between Iraq and these other states would be strengthened, thereby ensuring greater and more effective support on their part for the Iraqi cause. Iraqi politicians who were unaware of these considerations, however, found it difficult to accept the Iraqi government’s decision to grant the concession. Violent altercations took place, the aim of which was to win over world public opinion more than it was to serve the Iraqi cause. After the Khanaqin concession was granted to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, another British company with close ties to the former sought an oil concession in Kirkuk. The British government exerted efforts similar to those it had exerted earlier in connection with the Muhawwalah region. However, the new concession would cover a far vaster geographical area, namely, all of Iraq with the exception of the Muhawwalah region. Consequently, the issue merited close attention on the part of the Iraqi government, since it involved potentially worrisome implications due to the direct impact it might have on the country’s vital installations. Fortunately, the government was able to reach a solution that was satisfactory to both parties, as the concession ensured Iraq a significant income, which it earmarked for major projects that would contribute to the country’s economic progress. In fact, given its precision and the fixed, realistic criteria that governed it, the Kirkuk oil concessions became a model for oil concession agreements that were concluded thereafter in neighboring countries. Iran, for example, cancelled the D’Arcy concession, the terms of which had been seen to be unfavorable to the Iranian government by comparison with Iraq’s Kirkuk oil concession agreement. When Iran was negotiating a new oil concession with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1933, the Iraqi agreement was adopted as a model for the new concession. Similarly, King Ibn al-Sa‘ud emulated Iraq in negotiating the concession granted to Standard Oil Company and other firms.

7 The Hashemite-Saudi Clash

~

Iraqi public opinion was focused for some time on a conflict that had arisen between the Iraqi and Saudi governments. When ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd alRahman Āl Faisal al-Sa‘ud was a young man, he and his father sought refuge with Mubarak al-Sabah, the shaikh of Kuwait, after the Ottoman state, via Ibn al-Rashid, drove the Saudis out of Riyadh and took over their possessions and positions there. It was quite understandable, then, that Ibn al-Sa‘ud would befriend the British government given the Ottoman government’s persecution of him, and as the Ottoman state weakened, he began working to reclaim his rights. The first outward step Ibn al-Sa‘ud took against the Ottomans was to seize the city of al-Ahsa’ in the north Arabian Peninsula. Turkey then took measures to subdue him and force him out of the city. However, it failed, because by this time, the Ottoman Empire was breathing its last. Not only this, but it was busy opposing the Balkan armed guerrillas on one front and Turkish dissidents on another.

The Failure of the al-Ahsa’ Campaign The Ottoman campaign to retake al-Ahsa’ having come to naught, Ibn alSa‘ud took over the city’s governance and administration. This victory on his part marked the first phase in the reclamation of his lost glory. Thereafter, Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s continued success was paralleled by the progressive decline of Turkey until the outbreak of World War I. At that time he entered into negotiations with the British government, the outcome of which was an agreement in which the British government recognized his rule. Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s influence and power thus expanded to the point where, after the Ottoman Empire fell 129

130

My Memoirs

during World War I, he was able to do away with the rulership of Ibn alRashid and expand his rule over the entire Arabian Peninsula with the exception of the Hejaz. One may conclude on the basis of correspondences and reports from reliable sources that Ibn al-Sa‘ud had originally intended to be content with what he had and to pursue friendly ties with King Hussein. He wrote a number of letters to the king expressing his desire for the two men to be on good terms. However, his missives were met with responses that were not to his liking. Specifically, King Hussein replied to the effect that he was king of the Arabs and, as such, the rightful successor to the Ottoman state on the Arabian Peninsula as well as in the other Arab countries that had once been under Ottoman rule. If Ibn al-Sa‘ud wished to be an emir in his own country and subject to him (that is, to King Hussein), he was welcome to do so. However, he would be expected to demonstrate his obedience to King Hussein at all times. As a result of the bitterness and resentment generated by this demeaning treatment, Ibn al-Sa‘ud began searching for an opportunity to do away with King Hussein himself, and it wasn’t long before he had begun mustering the forces necessary to carry out his intention. As for King Hussein, he was preoccupied with his pursuit of the Allies to ensure that they kept the promises they had made him. This preoccupation weakened him greatly, however, because, as a consequence, he did not exert sufficient effort to order his affairs in the Hejaz and to fortify himself in the face of the Saudi threat. Nevertheless, based on what I learned from sources familiar with internal workings of things, he continued in his intransigence toward Ibn al-Sa‘ud.

The Battle of Turbah It was to be expected that Ibn al-Sa‘ud would avail himself of the earliest opportunity to take action against King Hussein. This opportunity presented itself at a location known as the Valley of Turbah, where their first bloody confrontation took place. Ibn al-Sa‘ud and his men dealt a heavy blow to King Hussein’s army, only a few of whose numbers survived. King Hussein’s army was led on this occasion by the Sharif ‘Abdullah bin al-Hussein, and this event marked the beginning of the violent struggle between the House of al-Sharif and the House of al-Sa‘ud.

King ‘Ali Ibn al-Sa‘ud began advancing until he had surrounded the Hejaz and captured Ta‘if. He then approached Jeddah and took Mecca as well. Sometime

The Hashemite-Saudi Clash

131

prior to this, King Hussein had been exiled from the Hejaz to Cyprus, leaving his reign to his eldest son, King ‘Ali. However, King ‘Ali remained only for a short time in Mecca, since Ibn al-Sa‘ud had threatened him, forcing him to relocate to Jeddah.

Iraq and Ibn al-Sa‘ud Given the fact that King Faisal I, son of King Hussein, was now the Iraqi monarch and circulated occasional propaganda against the Wahhabis, the overall feeling in Iraq was quite naturally one of hostility toward Ibn alSa‘ud. Iraqi tribes were now in danger of being attacked by Saudi tribes, and before long the situation had worsened to the point where the outbreak of war between the two countries was a real possibility. Iraq was now in crisis. King Faisal I was understandably distraught over what had happened to his father and his brother and the loss of their rule due to the clash between them and Ibn al-Sa‘ud. Of course, in principle he stood ready to come to their assistance with every means at his disposal. However, given the fact that Iraq was still a fledgling state, and given the presence of the British army (which would not have allowed any confrontation to occur between Iraq and Ibn al-Sa‘ud), he was unable to mobilize an armed force capable of providing effective military support.

Britain and Ibn al-Sa‘ud Who knows? It may be—and this is most likely the case—that Britain was pleased with the idea of Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s taking over leadership of the Arabian Peninsula. After all, he had proven himself to be more capable than others of guaranteeing security in the desert and in countries that were controlled by desert Arabs more than they were by city dwellers. Britain had, in fact, stated that it was working to prevent any armed confrontation between Iraq and Ibn al-Sa‘ud. To this end, it contacted Ibn al-Sa‘ud, urging him to be patient and not to provoke Iraq. However, King Faisal I was so up in arms that he was on the verge of declaring war on Ibn al-Sa‘ud. As for the Iraqi government at that time, it did not agree with the king given its belief that if something like this were to occur, it might destabilize Iraq when it was still a fledgling state that stood in greater need of order than of warfare and conflict. Hence, thanks to pressure from the British and repeated British attempts to mediate with Ibn al-Sa‘ud, an agreement was reached according to which problems between Ibn al-Sa‘ud and Iraq would be discussed at a conference in which delegates representing Ibn al-Sa‘ud, Iraq, and Britain would all take part.

132

My Memoirs

The ‘Ujayr Conference The ‘Ujayr conference was held as a follow-up to a conference held earlier between the British and the Saudis at Muhammarah, and the participants managed to prevent an actual armed clash, at least for a period of time.

Britain and the Conference The British government, which shared responsibility for preserving Iraq’s external security, deemed it most suitable to bring these conflicts to an end. In order to accomplish this, it sought to prevent armed raids and to organize the transfer of Iraqi and Nejdi tribes, which were often at odds with each other over grazing lands and the like. It also encouraged Iraq to build police stations along the length of the Iraqi-Saudi border. This suggestion roused the ire of Ibn al-Sa‘ud, who viewed such an action as a threat to him. Hence, some of his forces attacked the laborers who were building the stations and damaged some of the buildings, thereby exacerbating the conflict between him and the Iraqis. In order to justify what was being done, Britain and Iraq decided to send someone who could explain to Ibn al-Sa‘ud that the police stations being constructed were not directed against him but, rather, were for the purpose of ensuring desert security. They appointed General Sir Gilbert Clayton to the task of allaying Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s fears and persuading him to agree to the building of the police stations. General Clayton traveled from London and asked the Iraqi government to appoint a representative of its own who would accompany him on his journey and act as an expert adviser who could provide him with vital information when necessary.

My Appointment as General Sir Gilbert Clayton’s Adviser By the Iraqi government’s order, it fell upon me to escort General Clayton on his mission to Ibn al-Sa‘ud. I left in September 1925 and traveled by air. I traveled on the same airplane that had taken me three years earlier from Baghdad to Cairo, and it was the same pokey rattletrap it had been before! Even the time it took to make the trip was the same as it had been in 1922.

George Antonius I was scheduled to meet General Clayton in Cairo. When we met, he was accompanied by a young man by the name of George Antonius, whom he had employed as his private secretary. Originally from Laodicea, George’s family had settled in Palestine, where he had been raised and educated.

The Hashemite-Saudi Clash

133

After graduating from Oxford, he had returned to Palestine and found employment as an inspector for the Palestine government’s Directorate of Education. In view of George Antonius’s broad knowledge, excellent educational background, and strong English skills, General Clayton had developed a great appreciation for him during his days as civil secretary of Palestine, a position that was tantamount to that of the presidency. When, after his retirement, the general was asked to go on a mission to Ibn al-Sa‘ud, he decided to take George with him given his vast knowledge, perspicacity, and expertise in Arab affairs.

In the Sudan In early October 1925, the three of us boarded a train departing Cairo at eight o’clock in the evening. By noon of the following day we had arrived in Luxor, where the weather began to grow hotter. By the time we reached Aswan, we felt the way we might have in Baghdad during the month of June. After sundown we reached a place known as “The Waterfall” (alShallal) on the Nile River, where the railroad comes to an end. From there we were to board a riverboat that would take us to a place in northern Sudan known as Halfa. The trip was expected to take three days. The trip on the Nile riverboat was reminiscent of trips from Baghdad to Basra during the hot summer months. Most of the time it was exhausting due to the intense heat, and we would try to alleviate our discomfort by taking cold baths.

Smoking Jackets One of the most exhausting things about the trip was the fact that we were obliged to wear black smoking jackets when we came to dinner on the boat, since we had brought nothing white to wear. This garment with its various accessories was miserable in the intense heat. Hence, in order to avoid having to put it on in keeping with this stuffy British custom, I was obliged to excuse myself from dinner on the pretext of being in ill health. In spite of the discomfort, however, the trip was extremely valuable in and of itself, since we passed through vast tracts of land that, with the exception of the developed, populated areas that dotted the landscape, bore a notable resemblance to Iraq. Although the country struck me as being more developed than Iraq, life there was nevertheless quite similar and even primitive. When we arrived in Halfa at high noon, we were sweating so profusely, one would have thought we were arriving from Basra and getting ready to enter the Baghdad customs office in the month of July or August.

134

My Memoirs

‘Atbarah We spent the entire afternoon in Halfa. Then at sundown we boarded a luxurious train that took us by night through a barren desert expanse known as Abu Hamad that bore no sign of human habitation. As noon approached, we reached Sudan’s central railroad station in ‘Atbarah, a town located on a river bearing the same name. We stayed there for a period of time hoping we might go to the capital city of Khartoum, which was only two hours away. Unfortunately, however, we had to change trains in order to continue our journey southward.

Port Sudan We boarded another train that night, and by sundown of the following day, we had reached Port Sudan. The weather in Port Sudan was so hot and muggy it sapped our strength. Nevertheless, as Sudan’s only port and its sole outlet onto the Red Sea and other seas, it is a city of importance. Whoever visits the city, which is home to communities of mercenaries from a variety of countries, especially Italy and Greece, realizes immediately that it is far from civilization, its overall conditions being still quite primitive with the exception of a number of large buildings constructed by the Sudanese government for its own purposes. We spent the night in the railroad hotel, which was relatively comfortable since it was under European management and the oversight of the Sudanese Railway. However, the night we spent there was oppressive, since the humidity made it impossible to get anything but an occasional breath of fresh air.

Jeddah As in Iraq, the temperature would begin rising in the morning until it had reached a peak of 120 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade accompanied by searing gusts of wind. In this oppressive weather, we left Port Sudan the following day in a British armored cruiser that had been set aside to transport the general and his entourage from there to Jeddah. Having been designed not for comfort, but for work, this vehicle proved to be more deadly for us than Port Sudan itself. Its every compartment was hot day and night, as a result of which we could hardly bear to remain clothed at all and found ourselves peeling off one layer after another. Low-ranking marines and officers alike ended up stripping down to loose trousers with nothing covering their upper torsos. We spent that day and the following night in a state

The Hashemite-Saudi Clash

135

of fatigue. As noon approached, however, we found ourselves at the Jeddah harbor. Despite the passage of time, the city of Jeddah had remained virtually unchanged, touched by neither reform nor organization. Indeed, there was nothing in this port to indicate that its inhabitants were living in the twentieth century. It had neither buoys on which to tie ships when they were far from the dock nor lighthouses to guide them to shore. Nor had they done the excavations needed in order to allow ships to drop anchor at the wharf. As a result, incoming ships were obliged to stop several miles from shore, then allow commercial and noncommercial skiffs to load and unload cargo and passengers. The condition of the port and the city at large witnessed improvement after 1950. However, when we asked why ships were unable to drop anchor near the wharf, we were told that there were large boulders inside the port that needed to be removed by modern means, and that the port itself would have to be deepened in order for ships to get close to land. These things had yet to be done, as the governing authority in the Hejaz was fragile and unstable, and thus far no one knew for certain to whom the country should look for leadership: to Ibn al-Sa‘ud or to King Hussein. Such a situation delayed progress and organization as a matter of course. Muhammad Rida ‘Ali, the governor of Jeddah, came to meet us on the ship. Originally from Singapore, Muhammad Rida ‘Ali was an elderly man who belonged to the well-established Rida family of Iran that had taken up residence in the Hejaz. Yet, despite his Singaporean origin, he spoke no English. Once onshore, we got into a car and went straightaway to the British consulate, where we would be staying for a short time. By comparison with all the other residences nearby, the consulate was the most luxurious by far, with an electrical generator that supplied it with lighting and powered a number of ceiling fans and other fans as well. Such things were basically unheard of elsewhere in Jeddah, which still relied on oil lamps for lighting and knew nothing of electric fans.

Guests of the British Consul The British consul, a gentleman by the name of Gordon, was a kind, cordial, hospitable man who did everything he could to put us at ease. We were scheduled to go from Jeddah to the place where we would meet with Ibn alSa‘ud, since General Clayton’s mission was to negotiate with Ibn al-Sa‘ud over the issue of the desert police stations. After taking Mecca, Ibn al-Sa‘ud had come as far as Jeddah but had stopped outside the city, since King ‘Ali’s resistance had temporarily prevented Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s forces from advancing any further.

136

My Memoirs

With King ‘Ali We would have to communicate with Ibn al-Sa‘ud through the British consulate in order to set a time for our departure from Jeddah and our arrival in the place where he proposed to meet us. However, when the communications went on for more than three days, King ‘Ali insisted on hosting me in a private house while General Clayton stayed at the British consulate, and I had no choice but to accept his invitation. King ‘Ali was in a precarious position, having lost control over all the cities of the Hejaz with the exception of Jeddah. He was also burdened with expenses that he was unable to meet, as a result of which he was forced to seek financial help from his father, now in exile in Cyprus. And since it was not always possible for him to receive assistance from his father, he would sometimes appeal to King Faisal I for aid. The prevailing belief was that sooner or later, King ‘Ali would have to leave Jeddah and surrender the entire country to Ibn al-Sa‘ud, in comparison with whom he had no real power to speak of. It appears that what had prevented Ibn al-Sa‘ud from going into Jeddah was, in fact, the intervention of the British, who had wanted to give King ‘Ali time to find himself a way out of his predicament. Fifteen days after our arrival in Jeddah, during which time arrangements were made for us to travel to a place referred to as “the trenches,” where the soldiers defending Jeddah were stationed, we made our way to the opposite front, where we were to be received by Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s military authorities.

Umm al-Qurun We first came to a place called Umm al-Qurun located between Jeddah and Mecca, which, being set back some distance from the main road, was invisible to travelers. There we found numerous tents that had been furnished with everything one might need for comfort. Tents constructed out of wellmade white fabric had been set up for sleeping, resting, sitting, and eating.

General Sir Gilbert Clayton Meets Ibn al-Sa‘ud After we had rested for a while, the general was informed that Ibn al-Sa‘ud was ready to receive him. He left with George Antonius, but I wasn’t told in detail what transpired between them. A few hours later I was told that Ibn al-Sa‘ud wished to meet with me, so I went to see him. It was the first time the two of us had met. Ibn al-Sa‘ud received me warmly, telling me that he had spent his youth in Basra and Kuwait and that he was quite familiar with Iraq and its eminent

The Hashemite-Saudi Clash

137

families. The first of the families he mentioned were the Alusis and the alSuwaydis. He told me that he didn’t know my father personally, although the two of them had corresponded on occasion, and he expressed his pleasure at having seen me, knowing that I belonged to the al-Suwaydi family.

With Ibn al-Sa‘ud It was Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s custom to talk at great length and not to let his interlocutor get a word in edgewise. Nevertheless, I managed to tell him about my perspective on Iraq as it pertained to the problems that were always arising between us, the conflicts among our respective tribes, and the harm they caused. I also told him that we wanted to reach an agreement with him that would eliminate all cause for confrontation.

The Iraqi Point of View Then I added, “Although General Clayton is here in his capacity as representative of the British government, the Iraqi government has assigned me to escort him so that I can voice its views in a way that will set Your Majesty’s mind at rest in relation to the current disputes between our country and yours.” When I became aware of Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s discomfort over the fact that King Faisal I, a member of the Hashemite family, was presiding over the Iraqi state and that the dispute between him and King Hussein might lead to warfare between him and Iraq, I reassured him that unlike the Hejaz or Nejd, where the king had the final word in all affairs, Iraq was being ruled by a parliamentary government in which numerous individuals—including ministers, members of parliament, and other political leaders—were responsible for undertaking the tasks of governance. Hence, rather than being the country’s sole sovereign, the king simply oversaw the operations of the state. I explained that Iraq harbored no ill will or resentment toward either his person or his country but, rather, viewed the events that had transpired as an outcome of issues that concerned the Hashemite and Saudi families. Hence, Iraq’s only concern was to see the issue resolved in a way that would preserve both families’ dignity and well-being.

Ibn al-Sa‘ud Expresses His Love for Iraq After we had discussed a number of inconsequential matters the details of which I don’t recall entirely, Ibn al-Sa‘ud expressed his affection and respect

138

My Memoirs

for Iraq, its people, and its policies, directed as they were toward the furtherance of mutual understanding between Iraq and neighboring countries. The next day we gathered in the tent of Shaikh Fu’ad Hamzah, who was standing in for ‘Abdullah al-Damluji, minister of foreign affairs during the latter’s absence in Egypt. We also met Shaikh Hafiz Wahbah and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, whose official position was that of private clerk to the king, but who also worked as editor-in-chief of the Umm al-Qura newspaper.

The Bahrah Agreement After a prolonged, acrimonious discussion between these men and George Antonius, who was well versed in the art of dialogue, we managed to draft an agreement that was referred to as “the Bahrah Agreement” although the place where we were located was called Umm al-Qurun. When we asked why they had not named the agreement after the place where it had been drawn up, they replied that they viewed the name “Umm al-Qurun” as an evil omen. So, given the fact that there was a nearby town by the name of Bahrah, they chose to name the agreement after it. After the texts were drawn up, reviewed, and signed, we began our journey back to Jeddah, where, two days later, we boarded an Italian ship headed for Suez.

Preparing to Travel As soon as we got back to Jeddah, we began restlessly awaiting the day of our departure, so miserable was its heat and so anxious were we to be free of its oppressive atmosphere. However, the Italian ship was late in arriving, as a result of which we were obliged to travel on a Khedivial Company ship, a small, simple vessel named Al-Mansurah that came to Jeddah every fifteen days. General Clayton had another mission to attend to in Yemen, so we parted ways in Jeddah and I headed for Suez. A few hours before my departure I received a visit from Mr. Gordon, the British consul, who told me that he was placing the consulate’s steamboat at my disposal to take me and my things to the ship at 11:00 a.m. When, at 11:30, the steamboat had still not arrived, I took another boat to the ship. Once aboard the ship, I heaved a sigh of relief. As for the British consul, he didn’t get to the ship until an hour later.

Suez to Cairo The ship put out to sea in Jeddah’s oppressively hot weather, and five days later we reached Suez, where we stayed for one day. We also visited

The Hashemite-Saudi Clash

139

Isma‘iliyah, which is essentially nothing but a European outpost that was established in 1869 when the canal was completed and officially opened. Most, if not all, of its residents are Europeans, being either company employees, company servants, or laborers. From Isma‘iliyah we traveled to Cairo, where we stayed for ten days. The Bahrah Agreement of which I made mention earlier had resulted in a palpable improvement in the situation pertaining to Iraqi and Saudi tribes, and hence, in relations between Iraq and Ibn al-Sa‘ud. It also served to buttress the ‘Ujayr and Muhammarah agreements by producing greater clarity and thereby reducing problems. Yet, despite these remedies, there continued to be visible tension between the two countries, since King ‘Ali’s situation had worsened to the point where he had been forced to leave Jeddah and seek asylum in Iraq, an event that dealt a painful blow to the al-Sharif family in general and to King Faisal I in particular.

Ibn Mashhur In late November 1926, King ‘Ali arrived in Baghdad accompanied by some members of his retinue who had likewise come seeking refuge. King ‘Ali was now in steady contact with King Faisal I and would periodically goad him to take revenge on his behalf, a fact which provoked various types of crises between Iraq and Ibn al-Sa‘ud. The incident involving Ibn Mashhur and other tribal leaders associated with Ibn al-Sa‘ud who sought asylum in Iraq served further to stir up rancor between the two sides. Not long thereafter an even more critical development took place when the Iraqi government began constructing police stations in three highly sensitive locations, namely, Nuqrat al-Salman, al-Shabakah, and al-Basiyah.

Conflicts over Iraqi-Saudi Border Police Stations A party of Saudi tribes then attacked al-Basiyah, where groups of policemen were encamped. The laborers who had been constructing buildings to house the policemen were killed, as were a number of policemen, while the rest fled. The tribesmen who had launched the attack explained their actions by saying that they could not allow police stations to be constructed in these locations because they would be a threat to Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s kingdom. Tensions were now at an all-time high. Realizing that they would have to resort once again to mediation, the British asked General Clayton, in view of his previous experience and contact with Ibn al-Sa‘ud, to work toward a solution of this problem and to persuade Ibn al-Sa‘ud to stop provoking and attacking Iraq. The task before us was to persuade Ibn al-Sa‘ud that the construction of police stations in the desert on Iraqi soil posed no threat to him. However,

140

My Memoirs

we were well aware of the fact that whatever we said in our capacity as representatives of the Iraqi government would avail little unless we were supported by the British. Hence, two separate delegations were formed, one of them led by General Clayton, to represent the British government, and the other led by me, to represent the Iraqi government. At that time, the cabinet of ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun was in power, and I was minister of education. When the delegations were formed, I chose Major Baha’ al-Din Nur to accompany me as my military adviser and Ahmad Hamid al-Sarraf as my secretary. The British delegation headed by General Clayton supported Iraq in its attempt to persuade Ibn al-Sa‘ud that he had no reason to be suspicious of the police stations being constructed by Iraq. However, as ill fortune would have it, powerful propaganda was being circulated by St. John Philby according to which the construction of the police stations had been engineered by the British (although it was being carried out by the Iraqi government) in order to guarantee desert security and protect British oil pipelines and interests. Moreover, it was being said that the police stations might pose a threat to Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s well-being, since they would serve as strategic intelligence outposts. I left Iraq in July 1928 and traveled by air to Cairo. As for General Clayton, he left Britain and came to Port Said, where we met at the British consulate. A gentleman named Mr. Palmer, the British consul, was an old acquaintance whom I had met in 1919–1920 when he was the British liaison officer in Syria. The next day we boarded the British ship Worcestershire, which would take us to Sudan.

In Sudan Once Again We arrived in Port Sudan four hours later. Traveling on the Red Sea is arduous in all seasons, but especially in the summer. Hence, despite the excellent facilities and comforts provided on the ship, the heat took its toll on us. We did not stop for long in Port Sudan. In fact, no sooner had we reached the port than we were informed that a British warship was waiting in the harbor to take us to Jeddah. Hence, we went directly to the British ship, which set sail at sundown. We spent the entire night crossing from Port Sudan to Jeddah, which we reached at around noon of the following day. We were received by the port superintendent and others who had come with him. After taking a brief rest, we went down to the dock with the superintendent and, after a gun salute exchanged by cannons on the shore and on the warship in keeping with the prevailing custom, we boarded the boat.

The Hashemite-Saudi Clash

141

A Visit to Ibn al-Sa‘ud From the pier we were taken by car to al-Kandarah, a place that had been prepared for distinguished guests of the government. The general visited King Ibn al-Sa‘ud in Jeddah, as he had come there for the express purpose of meeting with him. I, too, visited the king, who received me warmly. Nevertheless, I spoke little, limiting myself to polite formalities and friendly chitchat. The next day, the king visited us in al-Kandarah with his brother and his son, Sa‘ud. In an amusing exchange, the general asked Ibn al-Sa‘ud how many sons he had, to which he replied that he had eighteen. “What!” his brother interjected. “You’ve got more than that, may God preserve them!” The king then took a set of prayer beads and began listing their names, one name for each bead. Having done this, it became apparent that he had twentyone sons, not eighteen. We laughed, and so did he!

Border Police Stations: Negotiating a Solution Following this we got down to the actual negotiations with the king and his assistants. As I recall, their names were Shaikh Hafiz Wahbah, Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, and Shaikh Fu’ad Hamzah. As for our delegation, it consisted of General Clayton, George Antonius, and me. I had spoken previously with St. John Philby—otherwise known as Hajj ‘Abdullah Philby—who had also met on more than one occasion with the general. In a separate conversation, Philby made clear to me that he fully supported Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s objection to the construction of police stations along the Iraqi-Nejdi border because, in his view, these police stations were part of a British plan to continue surveillance over the desert with Iraqi assistance. Philby supported this view by pointing out that a project to lay oil pipelines between Kirkuk and Haifa was about to be carried out. Therefore, it seemed most likely in his estimation that Britain wanted to have the police stations built in order to protect the proposed pipelines with the help of the Iraqi police. Consequently, he intended to advise Ibn al-Sa‘ud to reject our request to build the stations. I tried to help Philby see that the police station construction project was unconnected to any British designs or plans and that, on the contrary, it was intended to coordinate police functions in the desert and ensure better security for Iraq, not for Britain. I added that in his capacity as an expert adviser, he shouldn’t base his advice to Ibn al-Sa‘ud on hastily formed conclusions, since this was liable to lead to even greater conflict between Iraq and the Saudi territories.

142

My Memoirs

When I met with General Clayton the next day and mentioned my conversation with Philby, he was furious, since he had apparently heard Philby say the same things I had. General Clayton was so angry, in fact, that he told me he was going to ask the British government to cut off the retirement pay that Philby was collecting due to the blatant hostility he was demonstrating toward Britain and the unfounded accusations he was making. During our talks with King Ibn al-Sa‘ud and his aides, the dispute between us centered on how to understand certain terms of the ‘Ujayr Agreement, according to which the two contracting parties pledged not to dig wells or set up military checkpoints and the like “around the borders.” According to the Iraqis’ interpretation of this phrase, it meant places located within approximately one to three kilometers of the borders. This, in my view, is what was meant by this term of the ‘Ujayr Agreement. As for the Saudis, they interpreted the phrase “around the borders” to include distances of up to 100 kilometers from the borders. I tried to help them understand that it was impossible to interpret the aforementioned phrase in the way they were interpreting it, but my efforts came to naught. Hence, I had no choice but to call for the formation of an arbitration committee to be composed of either Europeans or high-ranking Egyptians or Turks. The Saudis totally rejected the idea of having Europeans serve on the arbitration committee. As for the idea of having Egyptians arbitrate the dispute, this, too, they rejected because they feared that Egyptian arbitrators would be biased against them. When the Saudis proved intransigent on the matter of building the police stations, we returned home despondent. The general left two days before I did and traveled through Port Sudan, whereas I chose to go back to Iraq via Suez. We rode on the Khedivial Company’s newest ship (Tulat Dur), which was making its first voyage and which, despite its relatively small size, was undoubtedly the best of all the ships that plied the waters between Suez and Jeddah. It was so fast, in fact, that whereas the trip from Jeddah to Suez normally took five days, it now took only three. From Suez we went to Cairo, and from there we traveled by air back to Baghdad. A month after our return to Baghdad, we were informed by Ibn alSa‘ud that he had agreed to submit the issue of the police stations to arbitration, and he expressed his willingness to accept whatever verdict the arbitrators might come to. In fact, it wasn’t long before Ibn al-Sa‘ud changed his mind about the matter entirely, accepting Iraq’s request and dropping all objections to the border police stations. Given this change of heart on Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s part, the Iraqi government set about completing construction of the stations. Once in place, the stations brought great benefits not only to Iraq itself, but, in addition, to the desert regions of Nejd, since the modern means of communication and transportation with which they were equipped, including wireless radio, armored cars,

The Hashemite-Saudi Clash

143

and the like, made it for easier for both the Iraqi and Saudi governments to maintain control over the desert areas. In fact, Ibn al-Sa‘ud decided to establish additional police stations and military checkpoints within the Saudi borders. The stations also proved beneficial in facilitating the enforcement of the Bahrah Agreement, which had prohibited armed raids, classifying them as a crime punishable by law. Thanks to the modern equipment now available and the swift measures the stations were capable of taking, it was possible for the Iraqis to stop raiders before they reached their targets or pursue them after a raid had been carried out, then arrest and punish the perpetrators and reclaim the stolen goods.

8 On Iraqi Politics

~

‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun, the Warrior The al-Sa‘dun cabinet was fighting on three different fronts: the first was with the people, the second was with the king, and the third was with the British. No other Iraqi cabinet, either before or since, had engaged in such a three-way battle. The cabinets that came before it were led by Naqib ‘Abdullah al-Gaylani, who sought the help of the British while battling the people and the king, or were so-called ‘Askari-royalty cabinets led by Ja‘far al‘Askari, who relied on the king while battling the people and, to some extent, the British. However, no one but al-Sa‘dun had taken on all three fronts at once. And in order to eliminate the causes of the problems and conflicts that continually arose among these three parties, it would be necessary to reconsider Iraq’s relationship with Britain.

A Violent Struggle When ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun took over his duties as prime minister for the second time, there were certain envious, embittered Iraqis who were not pleased to see him succeed in the new nationalist policy he had crafted. Such people would deliberately create problems for him, claiming that he was Britain’s yes-man, that he was backed by the British high commissioner, and that he didn’t meet with the king’s approval. As a matter of fact, however, it was al-Sa‘dun’s second cabinet, in which I served as minister of education, that initiated the struggle against the British themselves. It was likewise al-Sa‘dun’s second cabinet that initiated opposition to the policies 145

146

My Memoirs

of the king. The people were resentful of the cabinet because they believed that it was siding with the British, since it had been unable to achieve their demands for autonomy and sovereignty. Meanwhile, the king was resentful of it, not because it was siding with the British but, rather, because it was thwarting his actions and resisting his advice with respect to domestic and foreign policy.

Two Policies At that time there were two policies in Iraq: the policy of the king and the policy of the Iraqi government. These two policies agreed some of the time and disagreed most of the time. Iraq’s position internationally and its links to Britain in accordance with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (concluded in 1922 and amended in 1926) were the principal sources of these problems. The king was obliged to foster the appearance of being in agreement with the British and, at the same time, in agreement with the Iraqi people. However, the people were not in agreement with the British, the point of conflict lying in the realm of policy. Every Iraqi cabinet, and every individual who took on any kind of responsibility in the Iraqi government, ended up being hated and despised by the British. This was what happened to ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun’s second cabinet of 1928–1929. Sometime prior to this, King Faisal I had approached the British government with the request that the 1922–1926 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty be amended. However, the British were unwilling to consider any substantial amendment to the treaty. Moreover, in order to cause the blame for this failure not to fall on the king, al-‘Askari was scapegoated, and it was said that it was al-‘Askari’s lack of expertise and ability that had caused the 1927 negotiations to fail. However, such claims were patently unfair.

The New Treaty Eventually a new treaty was concluded and signed by al-‘Askari in London when he was with King Faisal I. Although the new agreement differed little from the 1922/1926 treaty, it was touted as a significant step forward. However, those who made this claim for it were later obliged to distance themselves even from the ratification process, and when it was submitted to alSa‘dun’s cabinet, it was rejected. Thus was the curtain lowered over the final attempt at amending the 1922 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Nevertheless, it had been necessary for the Iraqi government to enter into new negotiations with Britain in view of the fact that the fiscal and military agreements that had been appended to the 1922 treaty had now expired. In order to negotiate amendments to these two

On Iraqi Politics

147

agreements with the British government, the Iraqi government appointed a ministerial commission composed of the minister of education, the minister of defense, and the minister of finance. I was minister of education at the time, Yusuf Ghanimah was minister of finance, and Nuri al-Sa‘id was minister of defense. The commission was asked to prepare comprehensive amendments to the two aforementioned agreements in the hope that concrete improvements could be made in the nature of Iraq’s ties with Britain. After the necessary foundations had been laid and approved by the Iraqi cabinet, negotiations began in the office of the high commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, who was accompanied by Air Marshal Edward Ellington and the high commissioner’s financial secretary. In the first session held between the Iraqi negotiators (the same ministers who had been appointed to the aforementioned commission) and the high commissioner and his aides, it became apparent that it would not be easy to arrive at any sort of rapprochement between the two sides. Sir Henry Dobbs, the high commissioner, who had long experience in British colonial policy, did not believe sufficient time had passed since the conclusion of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty for Iraq to be ready for complete independence and mature enough to improve its own political situation. In short, Dobbs thought it best to renew the treaty with only minor revisions and to maintain the status quo until Iraq had achieved enough observable progress in the various areas of its life that it would be justified in demanding that the British government approve a change in its status. Iraq, by contrast, held that it had been coerced into signing the treaty of 1922/1926 and that its current relationship with Britain was, in reality, nothing more than a type of mandate. Hence, it insisted on being granted independence based on the wishes of its people.

Iraq’s Point of View The details of these negotiations were recorded in official reports, which the negotiators submitted to the government and which were then filed with the Iraqi cabinet. However, the important thing to note in this connection is that al-Sa‘dun’s second cabinet had initiated a confrontation with the British government. And although the negotiations between Iraq and Britain had not led to any visible success, the confrontation was nevertheless a beneficial one. For when the huge gap between the Iraqi and British positions became apparent and the negotiations came to a halt, Iraq informed the British government that it was no longer legitimate for British troops to remain on Iraqi soil and that, as a consequence, they would have to be withdrawn in the absence of a new agreement with the Iraqi government that justified their presence. Moreover, the Iraqi government made clear that it viewed the British government’s conditions as unacceptable.

148

My Memoirs

‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun’s Promises Al-Sa‘dun had promised the House of Representatives that if the Iraqi government did not succeed in obtaining its demands through the then-current negotiations with the British, he would resign. When the negotiations came to a halt, he kept his promise and submitted his resignation. At this juncture, the situation became even more confused than it had been before, the nature of the ties between the two states became more ambiguous, and nerves were on edge. As a way out of this dilemma, Britain would have to come up with a new solution that differed from the approach it had taken to the 1922/1926 treaty. Specifically, it might have to abolish the treaty and allow Iraq to join the League of Nations, since in this way it would gain an international presence on the basis of which it could justify its demand for independence. During the cabinet crisis—which went on for a recordbreaking ninety-one days—al-Sa‘dun’s cabinet had officially resigned, but no other cabinet had yet been formed, so al-Sa‘dun’s cabinet was operating by proxy to keep the government running. This was because King Faisal I had expressed the view that he could not assign anyone to form a new cabinet that would go on operating in the manner that had caused the country so much suffering prior to that time. With things as they were, then, the current policy would have to be amended before he could issue orders for a new cabinet to be formed.

The Dobbs Reports The reports submitted by Sir Henry Dobbs to the British government had given rise to a conviction that could not easily be shaken, namely, that Iraq had not yet matured sufficiently to demand greater autonomy. This was the prevailing belief among British officials in London, a fact that prolonged the ministerial crisis and delayed arrival at a reasonable solution that would enable a new cabinet to take over. Hence, if the cabinet in London had not changed hands from the Conservatives to the Labor Party, and if Sir Henry Dobbs had not been replaced as high commissioner, the two states might never have been able to arrive at a new understanding.

From Sir Henry Dobbs to General Sir Gilbert Clayton It so happened that Sir Henry Dobbs had been suffering from a serious illness on account of which he refused to renew his contract despite London’s urgent attempts to persuade him to do so. Hence, he returned home and was

On Iraqi Politics

149

succeeded by General Sir Gilbert Clayton, who arrived in Baghdad to commence his duties in April 1929. When al-Sa‘dun resigned his post, he wanted to visit the high commissioner and thank him for his assistance during his time in office. He asked me to accompany him on this visit, which was scheduled for April 21, 1929.

‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun’s Exchange with the High Commissioner During the conversation that took place between the two men and for which I served as interpreter, General Clayton asked al-Sa‘dun why he insisted on resigning in spite of the fact that King Faisal I had expressed his wish that he remain in his post. He added that in his capacity as high commissioner, he appreciated al-Sa‘dun’s efforts and hoped that he would do as the king was requesting. In response, al-Sa‘dun stated that he had promised the Iraqi parliament that he would submit his resignation if he did not succeed in convincing the British to amend the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and that since he had, in fact, not succeeded in this endeavor, he had no choice but to step down. However, he went on, if the British government was willing to demonstrate greater flexibility toward Iraq in relation to the question of amending the treaty, he could continue in his post. Al-Sa‘dun and the general then got into a detailed discussion for which I had laid the groundwork. I said, “However the two sides may try to gloss over the reality of the situation, the 1922 treaty is, in essence, a mandate. On the practical level, the mandate approach has proved a failure, since none of the parties involved—whether the king and the high commissioner on one hand, or the Iraqi government and the parliament on the other—has truly fulfilled its responsibility. The parliament has lost patience with the government, since it views it as incapable of fulfilling the country’s desire for independence and needed reforms. As for the government, it dares not admit the truth to the parliament and the people, namely, that it lacks sufficient authority to accomplish these tasks. His Majesty the King is also in an awkward position, since he is unable to reconcile the need to abide by British policy and the strictures of life under a mandate on one hand, and the people’s desire for liberation on the other. The British and the king have shirked their responsibility to speak forthrightly about such matters, leaving this burden to the parliament and the cabinet members, who are not free in their actions. This and other matters have become a heavy burden on this country, depriving it of opportunities to develop its resources, achieve economic progress, and improve its social conditions.”

150

My Memoirs

An Abnormal Situation Given the muddled system—or, as Naji al-Suwaydi described it, the “abnormal situation”—under which we were operating, it was not going to be easy for anyone to take responsibility. Consequently, it would be necessary, first and foremost, to put an end to the situation. In order for it to come to an end, Iraq would need to join the League of Nations at a time to be determined by Iraq itself, not by the British government, which had made this event dependent on conditions and circumstances that it alone had the right to assess. If, for example, the British government made an explicit promise to inform the League of Nations that it was going to nominate Iraq for membership in the year 1932, at which time the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty would expire and be replaced by another treaty based on broader and more complete foundations with respect to the country’s independence, it would be possible to form a new cabinet. Al-Sa‘dun was unwilling to form a cabinet before such promises had been officially made by the British government. However, the British government was attempting to persuade King Faisal I of the need to form a new cabinet right away given the fact that the continuation in power of a cabinet that had officially resigned nearly three months before was not likely to be in the country’s best interests.

The King’s Promise The king then came forward in an attempt to form a new cabinet and asked al-Sa‘dun in his capacity as the outgoing prime minister who he thought should form the new cabinet. In response, al-Sa‘dun nominated me as the new prime minister. He reinforced his nomination by noting that my cabinet would be supported by the Progress Party, which at that time was the majority party in the parliament, and of which he was the leader. However, the king hesitated to accept al-Sa‘dun’s proposal in view of the fact that he had personally always favored Nuri al-Sa‘id. He tried to persuade al-Sa‘dun of his point of view, but without success. Al-Sa‘dun insisted that he would not accept responsibility for supporting a cabinet formed by Nuri al-Sa‘id, and he listed the reasons for his position, although he was not willing to explain his reasons to just anyone. The king was in a difficult position now, since he had apparently already promised Nuri al-Sa‘id that he would assign him to form the new cabinet. Hence, in order to resolve his dilemma, he arranged with al-Sa‘dun for both Nuri al-Sa‘id and me to come to see him, whereupon he would assign us to form the new cabinet together. In this way, then, he would be keeping his promise to Nuri al-Sa‘id and, at the same time, be taking al-Sa‘dun’s advice!

On Iraqi Politics

151

With the King When I went to see King Faisal I, Nuri al-Sa‘id had already arrived. Addressing his words to both of us, the king said that he appreciated the service we had rendered to the country. He told us he was counting on us to work together, and that he was assigning both of us to form the new cabinet. This sort of dual assignment was very peculiar. However, al-Sa‘dun had apprised me of it in advance and I knew what the king wanted. Hence, I spoke up quickly, saying, “I thank His Majesty for his kind regard for me, his appreciation of whatever minor service I may have rendered the country, and his generosity in assigning me to form the cabinet with brother Nuri. However, I would like to make a personal request, namely, that His Majesty assign this honorable task to Nuri alone. I will be most happy to cooperate with him in any way I can. However, there is no need to assign two people to a task that can only be performed properly by one.” Then I fell silent. After thanking King Faisal I for his kindness, Nuri al-Sa‘id said that he, for his part, proposed that the king assign me to form the cabinet. He said he was weary and that he hoped he might be exempted from taking part in the cabinet I would be forming. A long discussion then ensued in the king’s presence, after which we adjourned the meeting without having arrived at any conclusion. Of course, the purpose of this three-way meeting among the king, Nuri al-Sa‘id, and myself had not been to arrive at a decision concerning who would form the cabinet but, rather, to release King Faisal I from the promise he had made to Nuri al-Sa‘id to appoint him as the new prime minister.

9 My First Term as Prime Minister

~

The King Invites Me to Form a Cabinet The following day I was invited to the royal court to have dinner privately with King Faisal I. When he arrived, he spoke to me about the country’s problems and difficulties and again appointed me to form the ministry. In response, I said, “I beg Your Majesty’s pardon if I decline this appointment. The reason for it is simple, namely, that I feel myself to be inexperienced in political matters. For although I have been educated to some extent in the theoretical aspects of the political process and may have performed some paltry service in this area, I still need to gain a great deal more experience and practice. Also, I feel I am too young to take on this responsibility. (I was thirty-seven years old at the time.) If I were to accept this appointment, I might be envied by many political leaders who are older than I am and who have much more experience in the field. All these factors together would work against my ability to serve the state and achieve its aims. Hence, if His Majesty wants me to be a helpful element in the government, perhaps he would be content to allow me to serve again as minister, but for a longer period than the one I served in the outgoing cabinet.” I could see that the king was offended at my refusal. He said, “When you are free of responsibility yourself, you treat politicians to merciless tongue-lashings, accusing them of ineptness, neglect, and lack of knowledge. But when you have the opportunity to take responsibility yourself, you try to shirk it! I would have hoped that you would demonstrate the courage needed to face up to problems directly.” 153

154

My Memoirs

As we were in the midst of this conversation, King ‘Ali, King Faisal I’s elder brother, entered the room. After they had exchanged greetings, King Faisal I resumed what he had been saying, only now he addressed his brother, saying, “Look, sir, at this ambitious young man! He wants to reform the country, but not by dint of his own efforts. Rather, he wants to remain uncommitted himself while asking others to do the work for him. Young people like this want to shirk responsibility while reserving the right to criticize others!” Having heard what his brother had said, King ‘Ali in turn encouraged the idea of my forming the new cabinet. When I sensed that King Faisal I was serious about what he was saying rather than, as I had feared previously, having some hidden agenda, I said, “Based on what His Majesty has said, it seems that he really does want to appoint me and to introduce new leadership into the government, which stands in need of fresh input. So, if this is truly His Majesty’s wish, it would be unthinkable for me to refuse his request. I accept his appointment, then, on one condition, namely, that His Majesty support and encourage me in the work I do. If this condition can be met, I accept His Majesty’s appointment to form the cabinet.” Visibly pleased, the king spoke kindly to me, and we went to dinner. Not long afterward I excused myself, knowing that the king was in the custom of retiring early, since he needed to be in bed by 11:00 p.m.

With ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun The next day I spoke with al-Sa‘dun, who considered me his confidant, and who was my refuge and the source of my strength. After we had discussed the matter, he informed me that the king had not been serious about appointing me, since he still would have preferred to appoint Nuri al-Sa‘id, but that, when he had met with al-Sa‘dun’s opposition and became aware of the difficulties that, according to al-Sa‘dun, were likely to result if Nuri alSa‘id formed the cabinet, he had had no choice but to appoint me instead. Hence, he told me, the things King Faisal I had said in order to persuade me to accept the appointment had not been from his heart. Nevertheless, he and the Progress Party had no option but to appoint me to form the cabinet. Al-Sa‘dun lent me his full and unreserved support, hoping that once I had been appointed, the king would see good reason to back me himself. To this end, he took it upon himself to contact Nuri al-Sa‘id and Naji Shawkat, both of whom had served in his most recent cabinet, and they agreed to serve in my cabinet as well. Hence, the only ministerial post that changed hands between the outgoing cabinet and mine was that of minister of education, in which position I was succeeded by Khalid Sulayman.

My First Term as Prime Minister

155

Nuri al-Sa‘id’s Conditions Everything went smoothly before the ministers’ appointments. Little by little, however, signs of distrust of the sort that al-Sa‘dun had feared began to surface. For although he had agreed to be part of my cabinet, Nuri al-Sa‘id tried to embarrass me by stipulating a number of conditions that he did not expect me to be able to fulfill before the formation of the cabinet. His first condition was that the British administrative inspectors withdraw from the districts in which they were currently resident and be stationed instead in the administrative headquarters, whence they would come out from time to time to inspect their respective districts based on orders from the minister of the interior. In this way, the British influence exercised through these inspectors would be reduced. His second condition was that the high commissioner agree to the approval of a mandatory conscription law by parliament. He explained that the parliament was prepared to pass such a law, but that the former high commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, had periodically voiced opposition to the idea, which had discouraged some tribal leaders in the parliament from supporting and passing the law. I told Nuri al-Sa‘id that I would do my best to secure the high commissioner’s agreement to these two conditions before the formation of the cabinet. Then I asked him whether, if these two conditions were fulfilled, he would have any objection to my forming the cabinet, and he replied that he would not.

Negotiation with the High Commissioner Based on this understanding, I negotiated with the high commissioner, and after a brief conversation with him, he agreed unconditionally to both requests. However, when I informed Nuri al-Sa‘id of what had happened, he was taken aback, even incredulous. So I showed him the written agreement I had reached with the high commissioner. When he saw the paper and confirmed that what I had told him was true, he found himself in a difficult position, since he had apparently been looking for a way to get out of his commitment and was at a loss as to what to do next. Hence, he started to hedge, and as though that weren’t enough, he influenced Naji Shawkat also to withdraw his pledge to serve in my cabinet. When I reported back to al-Sa‘dun and told him about the traps that were being set for me, this only increased his determination to see things through. He urged me not to be daunted by what had happened and to look for others to take these two men’s places. Consequently, I invited ‘Abd

156

My Memoirs

al-‘Aziz al-Qassab to be minister of the interior and he accepted. Then I invited Muhammad Amin Zaki (a Kurd from Sulaymaniyah) to be minister of defense, and he too accepted my appointment. Hence, we were able to carry on with the work, and the cabinet was formed and duly sworn in. My first cabinet thus took the following form: Tawfiq al-Suwaydi (prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of religious endowments), ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qassab (minister of the interior), Yusuf Ghanimah (minister of finance), Dawud al-Haydari (minister of justice), ‘Abd al-Muhsin Shallash (minister of works and transportation), Salman al-Barrak (minister of irrigation and agriculture), Khalid Sulayman (minister of education), and Muhammad Amin Zaki (minister of defense).

The Cabinet’s Platform The following is the policy speech I delivered before parliament. In it I clarified the reasons behind the failure of the negotiations between Iraq and Britain to amend the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, as well as other important reformrelated issues. The Negotiations Gentlemen: Given the confidence placed in us by His Majesty the King and the support we hope to receive from this honorable assembly, my colleagues

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s first cabinet, 1929, with King Faisal I; his guest ‘Inayatullah Khan, king of Afghanistan; Ra‘uf al-Jadarji; Mahmud Subhi al-Daftari; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qassab; and Khalid Sulayman

My First Term as Prime Minister and I are pleased to present to you what our cabinet intends to accomplish during its term in office, and to apprise you of the negotiations that took place between Iraq and its ally last autumn.

The Treaties Gentlemen, you are aware of the fact that Iraq only accepted the 1922 treaty with its heavy restrictions out of a concern to preserve its wellbeing as a political entity, and as an expression of confidence in the goodwill of its esteemed ally, which has on numerous occasions expressed its willingness to help Iraq achieve progress and unity to the end that, before long, it would be able to take up its own cause and bear the burdens attendant upon being an independent state. With the passing of the days, Iraq has made rapid progress both socially and politically. Its initial hope was that the year 1928, at which time the 1922 treaty was to expire in keeping with the protocol of April 30, 1923, would mark the beginning of a critical new phase in the country’s political life and that during this phase, the many anomalies that had characterized the situation that prevailed under the terms of the aforementioned treaty would be done away with. However, the Mosul issue and Iraq’s need to maintain sovereignty over all its territories necessitated the conclusion of the 1926 treaty, which extended the provisions of the first (1922) treaty for twenty-five years. Unfortunately, this latter treaty delayed achievement of the aim to which every sincere Iraqi aspires, namely, to end the exceptional relationship that has existed between the two allies as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the 1926 treaty grants Iraq the right, every four years, to demand that its ally reconsider the issue of Iraq’s entry into the League of Nations, or introduce amendments into the fiscal and military agreements in effect between the two countries.

A New Treaty When the time for consideration of the two aforementioned issues drew near, it was found that it would be desirable to conclude a new treaty that would replace the 1922 treaty, and which would nominate Iraq for membership in the League of Nations by a specific date. Consequently, negotiations were conducted between Iraq and Britain, and the result was the treaty of 1927. However, it was agreed that this latter treaty would not go into effect until the military and economic agreements had been amended so that all the aforementioned documents could be ratified and go into effect simultaneously. Our cabinet sees no need to comment on the changes introduced by the treaty of 1927 into Iraq’s political status, since the provisions of this treaty have not been enforced to this day. Rather, after the negotiations over amendments to the military and economic agreements ended in failure, the 1927 treaty ceased to receive any attention.

The October Negotiations The Iraqi government needed to move quickly to amend these two agreements, and negotiations began in October 1928 between the former high commissioner and the former air force commander, who represented the

157

158

My Memoirs Iraqi government. The aim of the Iraqi government was to secure amendments that reflected the progress Iraq had made over the course of the previous four years. However, after in-depth discussions it became apparent that there were intractable differences of opinion on a number of issues. The Iraqi government did everything in its power to overcome the obstacles to reaching a mutual understanding; however, its efforts were unsuccessful.

The Points of Disagreement The points on which no agreement could be reached may be summed up as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Whether Iraq would assume full responsibility for its own defense. Leadership of the joint forces. Administration of martial law. The authority to be wielded by the air force commander. The number of British officers in the Iraqi army. Iraq’s air defense. The duration of the military and fiscal agreements. Iraq’s fiscal responsibility for its land and air forces. Expense allowances for the high commissioner and his staff. Exemption from customs duties. The railways.

Terminating the Treaties Following the failure of the aforementioned negotiations, the previous cabinet had to consider another way in which it could fulfill the country’s hopes and aspirations, namely, that of terminating the then-current treaties by Iraq’s entry into the League of Nations. To this end, it exerted unremitting efforts to secure a definitive, unconditional declaration of support for Iraq’s nomination for membership in the league.

Hope in Spite of Everything These efforts have yet to bear fruit. However, there is no reason to lose hope of obtaining the desired declaration if the matter is approached in a patient, purposeful manner, and our cabinet is hopeful that it might announce the release of such a declaration in the near future. Successive Iraqi governments have occupied themselves with negotiations without anything to show for it. On the contrary, this preoccupation has prevented them from devoting their attention to improving conditions inside the country. Moreover, the prolonged absence of a responsible government that assumes the burdens of self-rule has inflicted great harm, which the country cannot afford to endure any longer. For this reason, our cabinet has decided to adopt a practical approach that has the potential of raising the economic and educational level of the population. At the same time, it will make a concerted effort to improve the political situation and to take advantage of every opportunity to achieve the country’s nationalist aspirations. We have no intention of making dazzling promises that we are

My First Term as Prime Minister

159

incapable of keeping. Rather, we intend to take realistic steps that are in keeping with the country’s financial capabilities. Specifically, we will act in accordance with the provisions of the 1922 treaty and its supplements, as well as the 1926 agreement, including the provisions of the fiscal and military agreements as they pertain to Iraq’s assumption of full responsibility. We will continue to claim the rights granted to us in these documents. We will make free use of our constitutional powers while striving to reinforce a sense of the responsibility that comes with such powers and the cabinet’s accountability before parliament.

An Official Census In the view of our cabinet, an official census needs to be conducted as soon as possible in order to determine the country’s exact population. In addition, we believe that there is an urgent need to assess state expenditures and to economize by allocating funds only for those projects that promise to be profitable and beneficial.

The Army It is unacceptable in our view for the army to continue in its present state, and the country should not be expected to go on bearing the burden of its upkeep without receiving any concrete benefit in return for such support. Our cabinet is determined to resolve this problem by presenting definitive proposals relating to the country’s military system to parliament in its coming regular session.

Major Enterprises As for the other beneficial undertakings, such as the Habbaniyah and ‘Aqar-Quf project, telephone repair, reduction of telephone rates, solving the housing problem, improving public works, resolving issues relating to the national currency and the national bank, improving domestically made products such as tobacco, cotton, and dates, encouraging their export and promoting them successfully in foreign markets, as well as other matters of importance, these are among our cabinet’s most fundamental tasks. Our cabinet sees no need to present lengthy lists of actions it intends to undertake, nor does it wish to waste this dignified assembly’s precious time on promises that it may be impossible to fulfill in the immediate future. Therefore, we shall content ourselves with the foregoing, requesting the support and assistance of this distinguished legislative body and asking God Almighty to grant us success in fulfilling the hopes of our people.

Signs of Agitation in the Royal Court We assumed our duties in the new cabinet, and within less than a week, signs of discontent in the royal court began making themselves felt. At the same time, politicians of various stripes started forming blocs among themselves in

160

My Memoirs

opposition to my cabinet, although no two of them agreed on anything else. They first accused me of facilitating the achievement of Britain’s aims and the success of its policies by forming the cabinet at a time when, according to them, we should have been boycotting the formation of a cabinet as a way of forcing Britain’s hand and obliging it to accept our demands.

Accusations Then they accused me of taking the advice of the high commissioner and of being under his thumb, as it were, thereby endangering the interests of the country. My response to these accusations was to say that I had only formed the cabinet based on King Faisal I’s wishes, which he had, as I mentioned above, expressed to me with great urgency. To this I added that the high commissioner had agreed in principle to the notion of making substantial amendments to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and had sent a confidential missive concerning this matter to London in June 1929. Then, when I took over my duties as prime minister, he expressed to me the hope that he would receive a reply in no more than forty days. Given the circumstances, therefore, there was nothing in my formation of the cabinet that would have hindered the achievement of our country’s aims and demands. On the contrary, it had the potential to facilitate the achievement of our nationalist aspirations. As for the claim that my actions were being dictated by the high commissioner, nothing could have been further from the truth. The two of us were bound by ties of personal friendship. I had made two journeys with him to meet with Ibn al-Sa‘ud, in the context of which our trust in and goodwill toward each other had grown significantly. All of these facts were likely to facilitate rapid progress in my work and reinforce my influence with the high commissioner. The first indication of the truth of this impression came when, as conditions for his participation in my cabinet, Nuri alSa‘id had stipulated the high commissioner’s agreement to certain changes relating to the British administrative inspectors and the military conscription law. Contrary to Nuri al-Sa‘id’s expectations, the high commissioner had agreed without hesitation to both conditions. Moreover, the decisive measures being taken by my cabinet should have served as clear evidence to any thoughtful observer that, given support by the likes of those who were criticizing it, my cabinet would be capable of achieving more than a cabinet presided over by someone other than myself.

The Tawfiq al-Suwaydi Cabinet Keeps Working Despite the many difficulties that were being created by its opponents, my cabinet continued working based on the support it was receiving from the

My First Term as Prime Minister

161

Progress Party headed by ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun, and based on its belief that the measures it was taking were for the good of the country.

The Trade Agreement Between Iraq and France Among the notable events that took place during my term as prime minister was an attempt by France—which had been given a mandate over Syria and Lebanon—to conclude a friendship and trade agreement with Iraq. A representative of the French high commissioner had been sent from Syria and Lebanon to Baghdad to negotiate the proposed agreement. However, he was informed that although Iraq wished to establish the best possible ties with its sister state Syria, it was not prepared to achieve this end under French auspices. Rather, it requested that France leave the way open for Syria to acquire independence and freedom, at which point it could approach Iraq to conclude a treaty of friendship and trade in its own right. Under these conditions, Iraq and Syria might grant each other concessions of various types based on their belonging to a single people that shared a single aim. However, Iraq did not believe it to be in its best interests, nor in the best interests of the Arab nation as a whole, to grant France any sort of concession in the name of Syria, nor would it be able to relate to France on this basis. Hence, the French delegate went away empty-handed. The second event of note was the establishment of Iraq’s first political ties with Iran.

Political Ties with Iran Given the domestic stability it had achieved thanks to the efforts of Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iran had improved its international standing and had begun to entertain aspirations of extending its influence beyond its borders. Every Iranian was concerned that his country be on good terms with Iraq given the presence of Shiite holy places there. However, Britain strove to persuade Iraq of the precariousness of its position in relation to neighboring countries. It sought to make Iraq feel that it was threatened by the Turks, by the Iranians, by the Saudis, and by France as well given the latter’s mandate over Syria. In short, the British were keen to convince Iraq that it was surrounded by those who would like nothing better than to take it over for themselves and, in this way, to discourage it from going too far in its nationalist demands. Feeling vulnerable in the face of all these dangers, Iraq would thus look to Britain for assistance and protection and be willing to do whatever was necessary to arrive at mutual understanding between the two countries. Needless to say, Britain had a great deal to gain from such a situation, since in this manner it could buttress its already distinctive position

162

My Memoirs

in Iraq. Consequently, when the Iraqi government first received word from the high commissioner that Iran wished to establish political ties with its neighbor to the west, its initial response was to be fearful. This fear arose, of course, from the threats of which Britain was continuously reminding Iraq so that it would remain loyal to Britain, the ally that could be counted on to rescue it from would-be aggressors.

Fears The most skeptical of all concerning the possibility of reaching mutual agreement with Iran was King Faisal I, who believed that Iran posed a genuine danger to Iraq. Specifically, he feared that Iran would put forward certain demands, such as the demand that it be allowed to take part in mixed tribunals (courts in which there were foreign judges), or that the judges in such tribunals include Iranian citizens. It might also express its concern that Iraqi tribunals were weak and ineffectual and request guarantees from Iraq that would address such concerns. Further, Iran might request the right to oversee the holy places or the movements of Iranian citizens who visited Iraq, or reopen the question of the Iranian-Iraqi borders in the region of the Shatt al-‘Arab. These were among a number of possibilities that British officials raised whenever the opportunity arose. Be that as it may, Iraq did agree to the establishment of political ties with Iran. In response, the Iranian government sent its first chargé d’affaires, ‘Inayatullah Sami‘i, whose arrival in Baghdad was attended by great fanfare. He was intelligent and experienced and, unlike other Iranians, not in the least arrogant or pretentious.

Laying the Treaty’s Foundations The first official meeting with the Iranian chargé d’affaires, the aim of which was to lay the groundwork for the treaty, was thorough and painstaking for the reasons mentioned above. However, although he began by speaking about Iran’s major interests and its many citizens, he made no mention of any of the topics we had feared he might. Rather, he focused entirely on the fact that some foreigners enjoyed certain privileges in Iraqi courts when one of the parties to the dispute was non-Iraqi, and he requested that such privileges be extended to Iranians residing in Iraq as well. I explained to him that Iraq had been obliged to accept the currently prevailing court procedures, and that the privileges currently afforded to nonIraqis were less extensive than those that had prevailed under the Ottoman state. Furthermore, I explained, Iraq had not expected an Islamic state such

My First Term as Prime Minister

163

as Iran, which was bound to Iraq by ties of neighborliness and a common religion, to insist on demands that served to reinforce Europeans’ claim that Islamic peoples are incapable of governing themselves or guaranteeing equality among those residing on their soil. I concluded by stating that although Iraq was bound for the time being to grant certain privileges to non-Iraqis, it would spare no effort to do away with them at the earliest opportunity. The meeting lasted for no more than an hour, during which time draft treaties were presented and approved on the understanding that they would be signed later.

The King’s Surprise When I went to the royal court and informed King Faisal I that we had concluded the treaty, he was incredulous. In fact, it took me an entire half hour to convince him that I was telling him the truth!

Tendentious Claims This situation made clear to me that people who had been spreading misinformation about me and my cabinet had managed to blow things out of proportion to such an extent that the king no longer believed that his fears were unfounded. The next day a dinner banquet was hosted in my home in honor of the Iranian diplomat. We both made speeches expressing the two Islamic monarchies’ mutual goodwill and intentions. We then drank toasts and everything ended smoothly. This was a significant event in the context of that time, because a danger that the British had so insistently warned Iraq of had vanished.

Signing the Treaty At a private ceremony held on August 11, 1929, we signed a good-neighbor and friendship treaty between Iraq and Iran that is still in effect to this day. On this occasion, I made a speech in which I presented an overview of Iraq’s policies, the things my cabinet had achieved, and further actions it intended to take. The text of the speech is as follows: Gentlemen, On the occasion of the new step that Iraq has taken in the international sphere by concluding a two-way agreement with Iran, I would like

164

My Memoirs to address you concerning the overall political situation in Iraq at the present time, the circumstances in which our cabinet was formed, and its accomplishments to date. By means of these accomplishments, our cabinet has been able to fulfill its patriotic duty despite the storms that have blown and the delicate situation through which the Iraqi cause has passed in recent days. Such an overview is of particular importance in view of the fact that the negotiations between the previous cabinet and the British high commissioner had been broken off following disagreements over major issues of direct relevance to the future of the country and the life of the Iraqi people, who long for complete freedom and autonomy.

The Price of Passivity As all of you are aware, gentlemen, our cabinet was formed under exceptionally difficult circumstances, so difficult, in fact, that certain factions held that the best course would be to adopt a passive approach by refraining from taking the reins of power. Nevertheless, despite the difficulty of the situation and the pessimistic outlook that prevailed, such an approach was viewed by the vast majority, both inside and outside parliament, as a political defeat and an imprudent attempt to flee from the battlefield. Our country, like neighboring countries before it, has experience with this sort of fruitless policy, which has yielded nothing but the most disastrous consequences.

The Progress Party This may be the source of the conflict between the Progress Party and its opponents, who view the party’s willingness to assume the burdens of government as a repudiation of the statements it released when al-Sa‘dun’s cabinet stood up in defense of the country’s rights and nationalist demands. However, the fact is, gentlemen, that the insistence on not forming a cabinet unless foreign states submit to our demands is incompatible with the freedom and autonomy we seek. Indeed, the formation of a cabinet or the establishment of a state is one thing, and conducting negotiations or responding to demands is another. Iraq’s negotiations with Nejd, Iran, Turkey, and other countries came to a halt. However, does this mean that Iraq should have refrained from forming its last cabinet on the pretext that these countries did not agree to its demands?

An Admission of Weakness It would be no exaggeration to say that making the formation of a cabinet conditional on Britain’s acceptance of Iraqi demands would be tantamount to an admission to Britain’s claim that the people of this country are incapable of bearing responsibility for its administration. Needless to say, such an admission would be utterly at odds with the domestic and international autonomy we seek for our country. Numerous cabinets were formed in the Nile Valley under the leadership of ‘Adli, Tharwat, Zaghlul, and Nahhas without their stipulating as a precondition that Britain agree to Egypt’s demands. Rather, they laid the foundations on the basis of which they would proceed, pledging to

My First Term as Prime Minister

165

achieve the country’s national goals and its brightest hopes. And it is in their footsteps that we now follow.

No Turning Back There are those who say that the formation of my cabinet in keeping with the 1922/1926 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty represented a major setback in our political struggle. Perhaps those who make such a statement are unaware of the fact that this treaty is the only document to which appeal can be made with our British allies in support of our demand for our country’s rights— rights it is high time they recognized. I have no respect for anyone who, although he is aware of this fact, nevertheless chooses to disregard it and, instead, exploits the 1922/1926 treaty as a pretext for intimidation and browbeating. Do these political opponents want Iraq to discount this solemn covenant, relinquishing the rights it grants and the promises it makes, forgetting the fact that it was these rights and promises that served as the foundation for the previous negotiations and that will likewise be the foundation for whatever negotiations are conducted by future cabinets, whatever their political leanings happen to be? It is on the basis of the 1922/1926 treaty that Iraq insists on assuming responsibility for itself militarily, exercising its right to represent itself internationally and make decisions for itself on the domestic and financial fronts in a manner that is consistent with the steps it has taken thus far and the competence it has demonstrated during its brief lifetime.

The Progress Party Stays the Course I hope through these brief words to have made clear the factors that led the Progress Party to assume the burden of ruling the country. For as the majority political party, it would have been beneath its dignity to turn on its heels and surrender to defeat in the political sphere, and its determination to take over decisionmaking power again was an expression, not of a lust for power or political ambitions as its opponents would have had others believe, but, rather, of a sense of responsibility.

The Cabinet’s Action Plan Our cabinet presented parliament with an action plan that was free of all ambiguity. It was on the order of a charter that gave the people the right to hold us accountable should we deviate from the pledges we had made. I thank God for having enabled our cabinet, despite the trying conditions under which it was operating, to accomplish the majority of the tasks it had set for itself by dint of hard work and unflagging determination. I am also proud of the fact that our cabinet managed to reduce the 1928–1929 budget by 29 million rupees when it was threatened with a huge deficit, yet without allowing these cuts to hurt the interests of the state. In keeping with the previous budget, it continued to allocate funds for things such as the purchase of armaments, banks, and defense of the southern borders. In addition, it allocated 1.5 million

166

My Memoirs

rupees to the Census Department. For after it had been decided to abolish this department, our cabinet decided to make it into the General Statistics Bureau, which would provide a precise measure of the nation’s progress in the areas of health, development, finance, and the economy.

Appropriations Despite the serious problems the country was facing, our cabinet was able to come to the aid of disaster-stricken farmers with 200,000 rupees in loans and collect a significant amount in contributions in order to provide relief aid. In addition, it drew up plans for a major irrigation project, namely, the Habbaniyah Project. The cabinet decided to earmark 125 million rupees to carry out this project, to improve the country’s agricultural production and irrigation, and to rescue the agricultural sector from the dangers of the catastrophic floods that afflicted the land on a regular basis.

National Defense In faithfulness to the pledge our cabinet had made in relation to national defense, it formed a committee to look into the future of the Iraqi army and to determine the most beneficial way of maintaining its numbers, be it mandatory conscription, volunteering, or a combination of the two. And despite the fact that our opponents accused us—though without believing their own accusations—of taking the country backward by adhering to the terms of the 1922/1926 treaty, the number of British officers we employed came to no more than thirty-two, whereas even during the days of nationalist fervor, the number of British officers on the Iraqi army’s payroll had come to no fewer than forty-six. Moreover, the minister of defense was able to save nearly 10 million rupees in the military budget over and above the 10 million rupees that had been saved in the general budget. As a consequence, he was prepared to form two regiments that were to be added to the army’s current forces. The country undoubtedly appreciated these efforts, which resulted in savings of more than 28 million rupees of the army’s budget in addition to the formation of two new regiments in which the country could now take pride.

Closing the Doors to Mercenaries The most important matter with which our cabinet concerned itself was that of closing the doors to foreign mercenaries, who had come from far and wide and by a variety of means in search of employment in our country.

My First Term as Prime Minister

167

The reason for this step was to open up opportunities for Iraqis who, by virtue of the many tragedies they had suffered, had been deprived of chances to serve their country. Our cabinet met with considerable success in its efforts to dispense with the services of these foreign workers. The number of Indian employees went down noticeably in government offices, and although the large number of Indians working on the railways resulted from the fact that the railways were not free to determine their own policies, efforts were made to replace them with competent Iraqi workers.

A Committee The ministers of finance and defense formed a committee to negotiate with the representatives of the high commissioner’s office concerning the progress being made on the railway issue. This committee continued with its work to conclude the negotiations and to resolve this issue separately from the anticipated negotiations with Britain. The government also succeeded in preparing a port draft law, which was studied by parliament.

Islamic Religious Endowments Our cabinet devoted particular attention to the Ministry of Islamic Religious Endowments, which it released from the political restrictions under which it had been laboring in its capacity as an autonomous ministry. Specifically, our cabinet turned the Ministry of Islamic Religious Endowments into a general directorate after cutting back significantly on its landholdings and expenditures. It also abolished the post of British inspector. There is no more eloquent testimony to the service our cabinet performed for the country in this connection than the fact that whereas the budget of the Ministry of Islamic Religious Endowments had been estimated at 26 million rupees, it now stood at a modest 17 million rupees. In fact, the actual size of this budget may have come to no more than 15 million rupees, since it was not permissible for Islamic religious endowments to require huge expenditures on structures or arrangements that performed no concrete function. Hence, religious endowments were expected to flourish now that their expenditures had been limited to necessities, and to the revitalization of the state’s extensive landholdings.

Education In keeping with the Iraqi nation’s long-standing penchant for sophistication and progress, our cabinet focused its efforts on reforming the educational

168

My Memoirs

curriculum. To this end, it established the College of Advanced Sciences, whose purpose was to graduate specialists in political management, financial management, and jurisprudence. This college consisted of five classes, two of which were devoted to general subjects and theory, and the remainder of which focused on finance, law, or administration. Having increased its budget by 64,000 rupees over its previous level, the Ministry of Education decided to complete secondary schools that were under construction and to establish such schools in districts where there were none. It also laid plans to build a preparatory school in each subdistrict and a primary school in every county. All such measures were reason to be grateful. Nevertheless, there were those who attempted to poison people’s minds with false claims and propaganda to the effect that the ministry intended to make English the language of instruction. In fact, however, so great was its concern to maintain the Arabic language that the Ministry of Education negotiated with a select group of the finest scholars of Arabic literature in order to employ them for the purpose of promoting Arabic culture and the formal Arabic language among youth. As a sign of their blatant ignorance, some opponents took the teaching of chemistry in the English language as a pretext for waging war on the ministry when they knew full well that the purpose for this policy was to enable graduates of the Teachers’ College and secondary schools to master English in such a way that they could understand the materials taught in European and American universities. Japan itself, which was looked to in the Middle East as an example and model, had chosen to teach the sciences in the English language, yet none of its ministers or specialists had been accused of being refractory or spurning the language of their fathers and forefathers. However, there was a devious group that took advantage of people’s naïveté and gullibility in order to obfuscate, deceive, and spread harmful propaganda without regard for truth, duty, or conscience.

Commercial Speculation Before treating political matters and the issues our cabinet had resolved on the international scene, reference should be made to the distortions that had been spread by certain politicians based on groundless rumors and the media campaign that was launched in connection with the issue of commercial speculation. Our cabinet presented the House of Representatives with a rebuttal of the accusations that some people had hurled at us. In fact, rather than responding directly to such claims, we left it to the appropriate authorities to undertake a free and fair investigation, which showed that the speculation that occurred was not a result of secrets that had been divulged by

My First Term as Prime Minister

169

individuals knowledgeable of these affairs. Rather, they were motivated by certain merchants’ hunches and guesswork in response to speeches that had been delivered before the House of Representatives concerning the need to impose customs duties on various kinds of merchandise. Nevertheless, in the view of our cabinet, it would take more than the release of a statement to enlighten public opinion. Consequently, we were fully prepared to meet directly with the House of Representatives, which represented the entire nation, and to offer an account of our actions. Similarly, we were willing to accept the outcome of any parliamentary investigation of this matter. This willingness, moreover, was derived from our sense of fairness, our sincerity, and our firm belief in the untruth of the accusations being made against us.

The US-Iraqi Treaty As for what our cabinet accomplished in the arena of foreign relations, what comes first to mind is the US-Iraqi Treaty. This treaty, which I view as one of the finest agreements ever concluded by an Iraqi government with a major world power, guaranteed Iraq rights and interests that would greatly enhance its trade and exports. It was also our cabinet that oversaw negotiations with our neighbor, Iran. One of the distinctive features of the IranianIraqi agreement was its bilateral nature. That is to say, it involved no third party, and this new step taken by Iraq was worthy of commendation. Iraq most certainly stood to reap significant benefits from this agreement, which overcame a number of long-standing conflicts between the two countries, thereby restoring an atmosphere of confidence and peace between two states bound by ties of religion, geographical proximity, and a multitude of shared interests. It gave our cabinet great pleasure to help Iraq reap the benefits offered by this agreement and to see the ties of friendship and loyalty between these two great Eastern peoples grow strong.

The Oil Agreement Among the most important achievements of our cabinet was its evenhanded interpretation of certain terms of the oil agreement. After hearing the enlightened views of certain men of state who had been instrumental in arranging the concession or who had taken part in the negotiations that preceded or followed it, our cabinet managed to arrive at a solution that guaranteed Iraq complete control and unquestioned authority over the investment of its abundant treasures in the hope that this new solution would serve Iraqi interests well and yield great benefits for the country as a whole.

170

My Memoirs

Concerning the Cabinet’s Resignation At this juncture, I would like to draw attention to a legal theory that has been frequently discussed in the absence of the parliament. By this I mean the issue of the cabinet’s resignation. Our cabinet came out of parliament supported by an overwhelming majority. Our cabinet saw itself, constitutionally speaking, as accountable to parliament for everything it did. Moreover, it believed that the constitution supported its continuation in power until the following session, at which point parliament would either lend its approval to the cabinet’s policies, on the basis of which it would carry on with its work, or withdraw its support from it, in which case it would be replaced by another cabinet that enjoyed parliament’s support and confidence. The continuation of a cabinet in power, then, is based on the texts of the constitution. However, the opposition was keen to bring our cabinet down. Issues having to do with policy, constitutional questions, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and other matters of importance were of less concern to them than were rumors and fabrications, a fact that aroused resentment on the part of the king and increased his reservations concerning whether our cabinet should continue in power. According to one of the false rumors circulated by the opposition, the king was threatened with the possibility of not being able to return to Baghdad if he traveled out of the country, and the prime minister was not providing the king with certain sums of money that he needed for medical treatment. There was, in fact, an incident that lent credence to the opposition’s claim that the prime minister was withholding funds the king had requested for medical treatment. What happened was that the king had been accustomed to asking the government for a sum of money whenever he traveled to Europe for treatment, and he had asked for such a sum at the beginning of the summer. However, the government had refused his request, arguing that the king had already received sufficient allocations to cover all his personal requirements, including travel and medical expenses, and that, additionally, the purpose for the king’s trip to Europe was not to undertake some political mission that needed to be supported out of the public treasury. In this connection, I recall visiting the king one day and finding him in a disagreeable mood. It was my habit to be frank and to lance the boil, so to speak, whenever there appeared to be a problem of any sort. Consequently, I asked him why he was so withdrawn, and whether he was upset. In reply, he told me that there were rumors circulating to the effect that Basra’s chief magistrate, Hajj ‘Ali al-Shawwaf, was lacking in integrity, since he had bought fifteen plots of land planted in date palms for a sum that was out of proportion to his income as a government employee, and that he enjoyed protection from the al-Suwaydi family.

My First Term as Prime Minister

171

Then he said, “Judge Muhammad Sa‘id al-Hadithi, Baghdad’s Islamic court magistrate, is lacking in integrity as well, and he owes his position to your protection.” After pointing out to the king that his comments on these two individuals were a response to the lies and conjectures being circulated among members of the opposition and others with an axe to grind, I also mentioned Nuri al-Sa‘id and his group. I said, “Basra’s Islamic court magistrate is a fair-minded, devout man who is widely known for his virtue and integrity. As for his purchase of the aforementioned plots of land, he made the purchase not for himself but, rather, for the religious endowment being administered by his brother, ‘Abd al-Malik al-Shawwaf. From what I know of the matter, the waqf [religious endowment] landholdings in Basra administered by ‘Abd al-Malik alShawwaf had made profits that had accumulated in the waqf ’s associated fund and have not been spent. Hence, the executor felt it would be best to use the money to buy some date palms to be added to the existing endowment. I should also add that the al-Shawwaf family is not associated with the al-Suwaydis and has not sought out their protection. Nor does Judge Muhammad Sa‘id al-Hadithi enjoy protection from the al-Suwaydi family. If there is anything in his record to indicate that he has acted negligently or demonstrated a lack of integrity, I am prepared to conduct an investigation into the matter without delay. If this judge does enjoy any sort of protection, it is due to his association with ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun. I am pleased to see that Your Majesty is concerned about correcting errors and punishing those who make light of the law. However, I feel it my duty to remind Your Majesty of certain events that called for stern measures at an earlier time and to which I drew your attention, including exploitative actions on the part of certain individuals that needed to be exposed. For example, Ja‘far al-‘Askari placed his hands on extensive sections of shoreline property in al-Majidiyah that belonged to the government. He simply took them without paying for them, and after distributing some of the land among his friends, he kept a large plot for himself. The incident sparked gossip among the citizenry, which must have come to Your Majesty’s attention. In fact, the minister of the interior, Sasun Hesqil, presented the case to Your Majesty, but you registered no concern about the matter, and this played into the hands of those who make it their business to usurp government lands.”

The Cabinet Faces a Storm of Propaganda During my cabinet’s term in office, public opinion was affected by organized propaganda that was a mixture of honesty and patriotism on the one

172

My Memoirs

hand, and trickery and malice on the other. Those with sincere intentions were moved by the desire to work for the achievement of the country’s legitimate aspirations, while those who bore a grudge against me were fearful that I might enjoy some success in my work, thereby dashing their hopes by keeping them out of power. Hence, they labored to win those with sincere intentions over to their side by claiming that I had formed the cabinet in order to delay the fulfillment of the nationalist demands that they wanted people to believe that they, not we, were capable of fulfilling on their behalf. As a consequence, they united in their war against me, although their motives differed from one individual to another.

A Cautious Stance We were waiting for a response to the proposals I had made to the high commissioner, who had presented them in writing to the British government and had promised to have an answer for us within forty days. However, the fact that we were still waiting for said response prevented me from being able to make any statement that could reassure the public, lest I be perceived as having made promises that couldn’t be kept. This situation, not surprisingly, encouraged the opposition to escalate its negative propaganda and to seek our cabinet’s speedy resignation in order to open the way for another, more powerful cabinet composed of prominent political figures who would be capable, in the opposition’s view, of fulfilling the country’s hopes. I attempted to reason with members of the opposition. However, their biases and personal interests prevented them from listening to what I had to say. Then, as we were in the midst of this tug-of-war over the country’s demands and political aims, a strange thing happened on the home front.

The Customs Duties The minister of finance asked me in my capacity as prime minister whether I thought there was a need to modify the customs duties and taxes on certain types of merchandise. The taxes under consideration included those levied on sugar, tea, and alcoholic beverages. The prevailing practice was for the Ministry of Finance to keep such matters strictly confidential. However, without my knowing how it happened, this information was leaked to certain merchants, who began buying up large amounts of sugar in the hope that the customs tariff and tax would go up, which would be to their profit. The opposition then exploited this event to the hilt, claiming that I had tipped off the merchants in question for some hoped-for material advantage.

My First Term as Prime Minister

173

The Investigation King Faisal I, who did not want to see my cabinet continue in power, was all too willing to listen to such accusations. Hence, I was obliged to conduct a thorough investigation through the Bureau of Criminal Investigations in order to ascertain how and why this information had been leaked. I was given a detailed report, which confirmed that the leak had taken place through the Ministry of Finance and that the individuals who had bought up the large amounts of sugar were in touch with members of the opposition.

The King Is Informed of the Incident I presented the report to the king in order for him to be aware of the truth and, on this basis, to realize that neither the government nor the prime minister in particular had done anything to merit such vicious attacks from the opposition. After seeing the report, King Faisal I was convinced that we were innocent of the charges leveled against us. However, he also remained persuaded that my cabinet needed to step down immediately.

With King Faisal I I made clear to the king that I was prepared to resign my post if he so desired, but that, in view of the false rumors that had been spread by the opposition and to which numerous individuals in the royal court had contributed, it would not be the right time to resign, since I feared that I would be seen as having been forced to resign as the Egyptian prime minister Nahhas Pasha had been by King Farouk. The investigation had demonstrated that I had had nothing to do with the customs tariff leak; that it had, rather, taken place through low-level departments of the Ministry of Finance; and that numerous members of the opposition had used this information to expose the government to attack. Hence, it was only reasonable that King Faisal I should refrain from intervening for a suitable period of time so that, when the dust had cleared, I could submit my resignation.

Another Opinion In his capacity as high commissioner, General Sir Gilbert Clayton had sent a telegram to the British government supporting the Iraqi government’s demands in relation to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Moreover, he said that we would need to wait forty days before receiving a response from the British

174

My Memoirs

government. We now had eleven more days to wait. Hence, I deemed it wise to announce the result of the negotiations that had been made possible through my efforts and the understanding I had arrived at with the high commissioner. Once I had done this, a new page would be turned in the life of the country, and another cabinet would step in to take our place.

The King Is Persuaded Despite the numerous countermaneuvers being engaged in to ensure that our cabinet would have to resign, I managed to convince the king to give me time to decide when I ought to submit my resignation. And approximately one week later, General Sir Gilbert Clayton passed away.

The British Government’s Response Two days after General Clayton’s death, we received the British government’s positive response to Iraq’s proposals as delivered to it by the late high commissioner. The British government’s response was delivered by the air force commander then serving as deputy high commissioner to King Faisal I and the Iraqi government, which issued the following statement: After negotiations between the British and Iraqi governments over amendments to the fiscal and military agreements between them were broken off last winter, the Iraqi government identified another way in which we might fulfill the country’s hopes and dreams, namely, that of abolishing the treaties formerly in effect through Iraq’s entry into the League of Nations at a particular time.

The Iraqi government had discussed this possibility with the late General Sir Gilbert Clayton, who had expressed his willingness to support the Iraqi government’s point of view and to present it to the British government with all due speed. After the Labor cabinet took office, General Clayton had begun impressing upon the new cabinet the need to make a prompt decision with regard to the Iraqi government’s proposals. The following is the text of the British government’s reply: 1. His Majesty’s government is prepared to support Iraq’s nomination for membership in the League of Nations as of the year 1932. 2. His Majesty’s government will inform the League of Nations assembly in its upcoming meeting that it has decided not to proceed with the 1927 treaty. 3. His Majesty’s government will inform the League of Nations assembly in its upcoming meeting that, in keeping with Paragraph A, Article 3 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1926, it will recommend that Iraq be admitted into the League of Nations in the year 1932.

My First Term as Prime Minister

175

It will be noted based on the foregoing that the British government has hereby lifted all restrictions and conditions associated with Iraq’s entry into the League of Nations. Moreover, given the need to conclude a new treaty before 1932 to order relations between Britain and Iraq following its entry into the League of Nations, measures will now be taken to prepare the draft of a treaty based on the new proposals for the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

This, then, is the text of the British government’s response to Iraq’s proposals. The regrettable thing in this connection is that before its arrival, General Sir Gilbert Clayton breathed his last, and it would undoubtedly have given him great pleasure to be able to deliver it personally to the Iraqi government.

My Resignation A few days later, the atmosphere calm as I had expected it to be now that the British approval of my proposals had been received, I submitted my resignation to King Faisal I. When he received it, he kissed me twice and commended me for my efforts. Then he said, “Before you accepted the post of prime minister, I had hoped you would decline to form a cabinet and, in this way, force the British to respond to Iraq’s demands.” Surprised, I said, “If the purpose for refusing to form a cabinet would really have been to force the British to accept Iraq’s demands, then we now know that such a refusal wasn’t necessary after all. Your Majesty is aware of the agreement I reached with the high commissioner and the acceptance of the proposals we made to Britain. This being the case, we’ve received the response we had wanted all along, and consequently there was no need to boycott the formation of a cabinet after all, especially in view of the country’s need for an accountable cabinet to manage its affairs.”

Defense I reminded the king that at the time, I had not realized that he would have preferred that I not form the cabinet. On the contrary, the things he had said during the personal interview he so graciously granted me had indicated clearly, or so I had thought, that he was convinced of the need for me to form the cabinet. In fact, the things he had said as he enlisted the help of his brother King ‘Ali in convincing me to accept his appointment were still ringing in my ears. He had told me that when young people like me were out of power, they would hurl stinging criticisms at the cabinet, but that when they were offered responsibility themselves, they ran away!

176

My Memoirs

What I had understood all this to mean was that the king honestly wanted me to accept his appointment, and I had never suspected that my understanding was mistaken. After I had formed the cabinet, however, things changed, and I discovered that in a rather crafty way, he had said things that were diametrically opposed to what he actually believed. I told King Faisal I that I felt as though I had been thrust into a theatrical production in which he had mastered his role to a tee! Upon hearing this, he looked a bit discomfited and offended. However, I implored him not to interpret my words as a challenge of any sort. Then I took my leave, thanking him for the support he had lent me during my term as prime minister despite the difficulties I had faced, and which I had successfully overcome.

Nuri al-Sa‘id Reenters the Scene The person who had been expected to form the next cabinet was Nuri alSa‘id. However, the king was unable to appoint al-Sa‘id this time, because there was now a general consensus among the leading politicians and the high commissioner that ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun should be invited to form a cabinet in which certain prominent figures would be brought together.

10 ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun

~

Al-Sa‘dun Is Invited to Come to Baghdad ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun was spending his summer vacation in Lebanon when I tendered my resignation, and he was requested to return immediately to Baghdad. So he returned and began forming his cabinet, which brought together a considerable number of well-known figures such as Naji al-Suwaydi (minister of justice), Yasin al-Hashimi (minister of finance), Nuri al-Sa‘id (minister of defense), Naji Shawkat (minister of the interior), ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qassab (minister of irrigation and agriculture), ‘Abd alMuhsin Chalabi (minister of education), and Muhammad Amin Zaki (minister of works and transportation). If the truth be told, al-Sa‘dun was not happy about the idea of coming back to work and forming a cabinet, as he had grown weary of bearing the burdens of public policy in delicate times such as those through which we had been living. He had voiced this complaint to me on a number of occasions and had even expressed his willingness to withdraw from political life for good, since he suffered from diabetes and his health had been declining. However, at our insistence and the insistence of most of his friends, he agreed grudgingly to stay on. His ambivalence surfaced especially in relation to what he needed to do in order to obtain endorsement for his policies, as he didn’t know how to please the king, Britain, and the capricious Iraqi people all at the same time!

Al-Sa‘dun Once Again Among the Three Powers Al-Sa‘dun did not believe the king’s policies to be solid enough to serve as a foundation for opposition to British policy. As for the people, they were 177

178

My Memoirs

essentially helpless and were making demands that could not be fulfilled anytime in the near future. Hence, he bore these conflicting responsibilities alone. Sometimes he would be accused of favoring the British in a way that was harmful to the interests of the country, and this despite the fact that from the time he had formed his second cabinet (the current one being his third), he had devised a plan of action that reflected greater firmness than he had ever demonstrated before.

The Immortal Hero Plays His Role I recall a number of situations that testify to al-Sa‘dun’s patriotism and the service he rendered to history, though his actions were met for many years with ingratitude in his country. I was on intimate terms with the man; in fact, I was his confidant and was usually privy to all aspects of his various concerns, particularly those relating to domestic policy. Prior to the 1924 elections, the prevailing approach in Iraqi politics was a negative one that involved various sorts of boycotts of and political attacks on Britain, stirring people up against British policy while seeking to placate the masses in whatever way possible, and other things that were generally considered to be an inevitable part of “patriotism” and loyalty to one’s country.

The Elections In keeping with the prevailing mood in the country, organized propaganda began circulating in all quarters calling for a boycott of the elections. Then, in order to provide this negative policy with religious sanction, Shiite clerics issued a number of legal rulings to the effect that Islamic teachings supported the boycott. However, al-Sa‘dun was of the view that this sort of negative approach would do no good, since it would leave a vacuum in the life of the country, delay its organization, and weaken its internal structures. After all, without a legitimate power structure based on a class of individuals who had been duly elected and who, for this reason, were entitled to speak in the name of the country, there was no hope of reform and independence. Consequently, al-Sa‘dun felt obliged to press forward toward the goal of holding elections whatever the cost.

The Clerics In order to make this task easier for himself, al-Sa‘dun deemed it necessary to gather up the clerics who had been inciting the people to boycott the

‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun

179

elections and send them out of the country. This action on his part was justified by the fact that the majority of these clerics were Iranian by nationality. After this step had been taken, the atmosphere cleared and elections were held for the Constituent Assembly and then for parliament. Conditions continued to improve thereafter to the point where the country was able to demand more extensive rights; this was followed by the conclusion of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Al-Sa‘dun’s decisive actions, which as I see it reflected his earnestness and astuteness, bolstered domestic security and chastened those who were wont to disrupt it. In this connection I recall an incident that took place in the Muntafiq district, through which al-Sa‘dun demonstrated an admirable staunchness.

Divided Responsibility Responsibility within the country was divided at that time between the British and the Iraqis. The Iraqi tribes benefited from this division, since it made it more difficult for anyone to penalize them if they disturbed the peace or refused to obey the government. Given that responsibility for domestic security was shared jointly by the British and Iraqi armed forces, including both the police and the army, the Iraqi government was incapable of taking any actions or measures without the agreement of the British, who virtually always dragged their feet in such situations in order to spare themselves trouble, expense, and effort even if this meant exposing the Iraqi people to harm and humiliation.

Al-Sa‘dun Responds with Force and Courage It was during this time that the Bani Asad tribe, who lived in the Jabayash region, staged a rebellion in the course of which they brutally murdered a number of policemen. In so doing, they issued a blatant challenge to the government’s authority. Hence, the Iraqi government had no choice but to put down the uprising and chastise the wrongdoers. At that time al-Sa‘dun was both prime minister and minister of the interior. When he brought the matter before the British authorities, they made light of the matter in order to avoid problems for themselves. When the Iraqi government requested that the British supply them with airplanes in order to launch an air strike on the rebels, the British air force commander, not wanting to bear responsibility for the strike, hesitated to grant the request. Consequently, al-Sa‘dun had no choice but to take matters into his own hands without any air support from the British. He set about organizing the campaign himself with the result that the rebels were routed and security was restored. The action taken by the Iraqi government thus served

180

My Memoirs

‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun

as a powerful lesson for other Iraqi tribes, since it demonstrated that the government would be prepared to take the same measures again should any of them entertain thoughts of rising up against it.

Al-Sa‘dun’s Unimpeachable Character It should be noted here that al-Sa‘dun’s inward purity, his gracious manners, his conscientiousness, his absolute integrity, and his fair dealings with others gave rise to an unshakable conviction among the people that if he was at the helm, this alone would be sufficient to create an atmosphere of tranquility in the country that would not have been possible under anyone else’s rule. This, in and of itself, was an invaluable service to the Iraqi people, since it produced a degree of stability that enabled the country to grow, develop, and prosper.

Distrust of Turkey The most important stances al-Sa‘dun took on Iraq’s foreign relations had to do with his stern policy toward Turkey. He had spent most of his life in

‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun

181

Istanbul, he had always kept abreast of developments in Turkish society, and he was equally fluent in Arabic and Turkish. Nevertheless, he was convinced that the greatest danger that faced Iraq was Turkey itself. One reason for this was that, given the Turkish mentality, it would not have been easy for Turkey to accept the loss of large tracts of land that had once been part of its empire. Add to this the fact that a section of Iraq that was adjacent to Turkey was home to a mixed population consisting of Kurds, Turks, Arabs, and other nationalities, as a result of which it was a region in which it would be easy to stir up sentiments against the Iraqi state. Consequently, parties opposed to Iraq, Turkey included, might exploit such elements for the achievement of their own ends. So in al-Sa‘dun’s view, Iraq could spare itself a great deal of trouble by closing the door in Turkey’s face.

Al-Sa‘dun’s Resistance to British Influence The second position of al-Sa‘dun’s that comes to mind here is his opposition to British influence. One might divide al-Sa‘dun’s political career into two phases. The first of these extended from 1922 to 1928, while the second extended from 1928 to the time when he took his life. His policy during the first of these two phases was one of understanding and leniency toward Britain. After 1928, however, he changed his approach and became a die-hard patriot. Once I asked him what accounted for this change. He told me that when he had come to Iraq after its first national government had been established, he had found that the Iraqi state was not yet sufficiently mature to bear direct responsibility for the country’s affairs. The danger posed by the Turks was a looming presence, the Iranians’ concern for access to sacred religious sites located in Iraq likewise emerged from time to time in a disturbing manner, and France’s designs on Syria since its triumphal entry into Damascus in 1920 posed a threat to Iraq as well. And as if these dangers weren’t enough, there were the unresolved differences between the Hashemite and Saudi dynasties. Al-Sa‘dun reasoned that if Iraq had taken over direct responsibility for its own affairs without obtaining any assistance from Britain to ward off the foreign threats that surrounded it or to ensure internal security, chaos would have reigned on the domestic front. The state would have been weakened internationally, and Iraq would have become easy prey for neighboring powers, which would have obliged Britain to intervene and to maintain control over Basra in order to protect its imperial interests. Hence, it was al-Sa‘dun’s belief that Iraq needed to adhere to a policy of tolerance in relation to Britain in order to benefit from its assistance both domestically and internationally with the understanding that, when there were sufficient elements qualified to take responsibility for Iraq’s affairs, when the spirit of Iraqi patriotism had grown strong enough, and when the various nationalities living on Iraqi soil

182

My Memoirs

had melted sufficiently in the Iraqi crucible, Britain’s influence would gradually wane until it had vanished altogether.

Al-Sa‘dun’s View of Patriotism Then he added, “If I moved away from my original policy and became—as you put it—a die-hard patriot in the year 1928, the reason is that I believe that we now have the elements required for the country to administer its own affairs. Given the new spirit of patriotism and national identity, the time has come for us to do whatever we can to come out from under Britain’s wing.” The failure of the Anglo-British negotiations over amendment of the 1922 treaty then reinforced this conclusion, confirming the need for a radical change in his overall policy.

With Sir Henry Dobbs I also recall an exchange that took place between al-Sa‘dun and the high commissioner Sir Henry Dobbs, who attempted to persuade him to extend the military agreement appended to the 1922 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Dobbs said, “If you consider the period of this agreement to have expired, what will you do if the Turks want to take over your country and you have nothing with which to repel them? Do you not think that you are placing yourselves in danger by demanding an end to our military responsibility for Iraq?” In reply, al-Sa‘dun told the high commissioner that he did not believe that Britain was spending these exorbitant sums and sending thousands upon thousands of its soldiers out into distant, scorching desert expanses to protect their beloved Iraqis from the treacherous Turks. Rather, he said, Britain was enduring these hardships for the sake of its own interests alone. Then he added, “In order to prove to you that we have no fear of the Turks and whatever threat they happen to pose, I invite you to withdraw all your troops from Iraq. And if you do so, you’ll find that the Turks will not terrorize us as you are so certain they will.” He then confirmed what he had said in a letter to the high commissioner, a letter that is still preserved in the Iraqi government archives.

An Honorable Position Taken by al-Sa‘dun The following is an interesting situation in which al-Sa‘dun found himself, and of which I was a part. While al-Sa‘dun was prime minister, the British

‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun

183

government decided that it wanted Iraq to pay British soldiers additional wages over and above the stipends they already received based on the fact that they were far from home and serving in a country whose climatic conditions were hard on their health. These additional wages had been estimated at £40,000 per year based on the number of British soldiers in Iraq at that time. Moreover, if circumstances required that the number of troops be increased, the figure would go up accordingly. Given the instability and weakness that had often afflicted the Iraqi government, some of the ministers in al-Sa‘dun’s cabinet indicated to the British that they would be willing to take on this expense, which strengthened the high commissioner’s position while weakening that of al-Sa‘dun’s cabinet during the treaty negotiations. However, after discussing the matter we decided that, given the fact that Iraq was a poor country that would not be able to pay any sum for this purpose, we would have to reject Britain’s proposal. In support of our decision, we noted what al-Sa‘dun had said to the high commissioner about the possibility of removing all British troops from Iraq without exposing Iraq to any danger as a result. We then asked the high commissioner to make clear to his government that our refusal was not negotiable. A considerable amount of time then passed, after which we were informed in a letter from the high commissioner that “the British Royal Treasury has not accepted the Iraqi government’s arguments in support of its rejection of the aforesaid proposal.” The letter went on to say that the British government would, unfortunately, be obliged to present the Iraqi government with the selfsame proposal once again so that a solution could be found. And it concluded with the words, “It will be sufficient for Iraq to agree to the principle of bearing these expenses and record this as a debt in Britain’s favor. As for the actual payment, this can be left to time.” We were well aware, of course, as was Britain, that Iraq would be benefiting from oil revenues at some point in the future. Hence, if we agreed to this principle and recorded it as a debt, the British government would lay its hands on our oil revenue. We didn’t spend a long time wrangling over the issue. Rather, we contented ourselves with a droll riposte to match the petulance reflected in the high commissioner’s last communication to us. In reply we wrote, “The arguments adduced by the Iraqi government in support of its position and which have been rejected by the British Royal Treasury remain unaltered, and the Iraqi Royal Treasury in turn rejects the point of view expressed by the British Royal Treasury. Therefore, we have nothing further to add in this connection.” And that was that! No further mention was ever made of these additional wages, which, had Iraq agreed to pay them, would have remained a millstone around its neck for many years to come. Al-Sa‘dun took numerous other commendable stances both domestically and internationally during his terms as prime minister. I have made

184

My Memoirs

mention here of only the most salient. As for the rest, they are included in what I have written about myself in the course of this book.

Al-Sa‘dun’s Grievance As of November 1929, al-Sa‘dun’s cabinet, which included a number of prominent political figures, was still at work. However, the inner workings of things gave little reason for optimism concerning its success in the task it had taken upon itself, namely, that of completing the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which the British government had promised would be similar in its foundations and aims to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

Al-Sa‘dun’s Suicide Al-Sa‘dun was disgruntled over the policies being supported by his colleagues and associates, who appeared not to be in agreement with his overall strategy. There were some who, like Yasin al-Hashimi, Naji al-Suwaydi, and Naji Shawkat, were inclined to be extremist in their thinking, while others were supportive of his moderate, gradualist policy. And then a terrible thing happened: on the night of November 13, 1929, ‘Abd al-Muhsin alSa‘dun committed suicide in his home after leaving a message explaining why he had done what he had done. According to the note al-Sa‘dun left, he was confused and at his wits’ end. The people were making demands that Britain could not be forced to accept, and he felt that politicians and other Iraqi officials were neglecting their duties, while the country was incapable, both materially and spiritually, of persuading Britain to accede to its demands. Meanwhile, the policy of procrastination was still in effect both domestically and internationally just as it always had been. Consequently, he wanted to free himself from this predicament and redeem his country by giving his own life in the hope of being an example to others of sacrifice and self-denial.

Naji al-Suwaydi Takes the Helm The late al-Sa‘dun was succeeded in his post by Naji al-Suwaydi, who had been next in line for leadership of the Progress Party. He formed the cabinet and kept all its ministers in place, adding only Khalid Sulayman to fill the vacancy that had been left by al-Sa‘dun’s passing. At that time I was speaker of the House of Representatives. Under the new cabinet, problems increased and grew even more intractable, since the unspoken ambitions that had not

‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun

185

dared to rear their ugly heads under al-Sa‘dun’s leadership were freer to reveal themselves now. As for the policy that prevailed in the House of Representatives, it rested on attempts to embarrass Britain or, rather, to embarrass Naji al-Suwaydi and thereby bring down the cabinet.

More Problems The ministers in Naji al-Suwaydi’s cabinet would latch on to the most trivial reasons to provoke a conflict with the high commissioner. They claimed that the country needed to be moving toward complete independence and, as a result, should be taking immediate action to achieve this aim even if it was not possible to conclude the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. To this end, they even began cutting the salaries being paid to British advisers, British administrative inspectors, and other British bureaucrats out of the various government budgets. The outcome was a serious crisis with wide-ranging ramifications between the cabinet and the high commissioner. The ministers saw themselves as acting in accordance with the new Iraqi policy. As for the high commissioner, he held that nothing should be changed until a new Anglo-Iraqi treaty had been concluded, at which point the country could proceed based on the new treaty and its provisions.

Deliberate Provocations I am certain that these provocations of the British by Naji al-Suwaydi’s associates were deliberate, their purpose being to put the cabinet in such a tight spot that it would have no choice but to resign. And the provocations did, indeed, help them in achieving their aim, since it was a known fact that the foundations of the new treaty had been drawn up by the new high commissioner, Sir Francis Humphrys. After this it was examined by Iraq’s royal court along with a number of others deeply involved in this issue. However, the provocateurs wanted to take over the government and negotiate the treaty themselves so that in this way, they could assure themselves of an advantage by means of which they could enhance their positions in the future. In fact, Naji al-Suwaydi was obliged to resign for no apparent reason. After the resignation of any prime minister, it was the custom for him to pay a visit to the high commissioner in order to thank him for his cooperation and support during the outgoing prime minister’s time in office. When Naji al-Suwaydi requested an appointment with the high commissioner, he was asked to bring me with him. I still didn’t understand what had led to this most recent crisis and my brother’s resignation. So, seeing the upcoming

186

My Memoirs

visit to the high commissioner as an opportunity to satisfy my curiosity, I accompanied my brother without hesitation.

The High Commissioner Asks My Brother to Withdraw His Resignation When we arrived in the high commissioner’s office we realized that he, too, was baffled by my brother’s resignation. Naji offered an explanation for his action to the high commissioner, although I didn’t feel that the reasons he adduced actually justified the step he had taken. Hence, I stressed the importance of arriving at a settlement of the points that were in dispute. The high commissioner seemed inclined to accept my suggestion, and he urged my brother to withdraw his resignation. Then we left the high commissioner’s office, uncertain as to how to inform King Faisal I that the crisis— which he himself had helped to engineer—had now been resolved. After consulting together, we decided that the best thing to do would be to present the situation to the king himself and ask him to intervene in order to remove the misunderstanding between the prime minister and the high commissioner, disregarding the fact that the misunderstanding had already been resolved.

Royal Resentment That same day we happened to be invited for dinner with King Faisal I. When we arrived and informed him of the crisis that had arisen, he feigned surprise and dejection. We then went on to tell him that we had gone to see the high commissioner, that we had suggested a number of solutions that had met with his agreement, and that if the king was willing to use his influence with the high commissioner, we believed the crisis could be brought to an end. This time, however, his cheeks flushed with anger and, in a trembling voice, he said, “The high commissioner ought to be ashamed of himself! How dare he say that the crisis can’t be resolved, then turn around and agree to such suggestions!” We had been expecting exactly this reaction from the king, in fact, since we suspected that the crisis had been of his own making. This being the case, we attempted to reassure him and to give him credit beforehand for resolving the crisis. Then, realizing that he had been working not to resolve the problem but, rather, to make it worse, and that he was highly likely to do something to sabotage the understanding we had managed to reach with the high commissioner, we took our leave of him, placing our fate in the hands of the Almighty.

‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun

187

Kinahan Cornwallis True to our expectations, we learned that on the following day, the king sent the adviser to the minister of the interior, Kinahan Cornwallis, to the high commissioner to reprimand him for having agreed to resolve the crisis. He asked how he could have agreed with us and not with him! The following morning, the high commissioner was obliged to go to the king and attempt to absolve himself of responsibility for the agreement he had reached with us. Apparently everything had been arranged beforehand between the two of them. My brother was asked to come to see both men together. The high commissioner began the conversation by saying that he regretted that there had been a misunderstanding among him, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament, and that he had not agreed entirely to their suggestions as to how to resolve the crisis. He then made a request that, although he said he did not expect the cabinet to accept it, he felt he had to insist on, namely, that the salaries allocated to foreign employees, including administrative inspectors and others, be reinstated in the Iraqi government’s budget, and that no more cuts in such allocations be made. I remembered the high commissioner having agreed, when my brother and I went to see him in his office the first time, to the idea of our giving these allocations another designation, that is, “allocations for repatriation of foreign employees.” We in turn had agreed to this suggestion based on the understanding that the process of reducing the numbers of British inspectors with a view to eliminating them entirely had begun and that it would be possible to arrange their salaries out of these allocations until the process of negotiating the new treaty had been completed. In response, Naji remarked that if he had been the only person who had heard what the high commissioner had said, it might have been possible for him to claim that there had been a misunderstanding between the two of them. However, he pointed out that I had been present at the session as well and had spoken with the high commissioner myself. Consequently, he said, it was inconceivable that there could have been a misunderstanding of this nature between the high commissioner and both of us. Be that as it may, he told the high commissioner that there was no need for him to burden himself over the matter of what he had or hadn’t promised, since he (my brother) had no intention of remaining in power without the king’s approval. Furthermore, if it would not be in the country’s best interest for him to remain in power, he was determined to resign and would request that the king accept his resignation. Having heard this, the king’s mind was put at rest, and he accepted my brother’s resignation.

11 Nuri al-Sa‘id Enters the Scene

~

Naji al-Suwaydi’s cabinet resigned after four months in power and was succeeded by the cabinet of Nuri al-Sa‘id. King Faisal I had long wanted to see al-Sa‘id in the post of prime minister, but his efforts to appoint him had not met with success. Nuri Pasha’s cabinet announced that it would enter into negotiations with the British in order to conclude a new treaty in keeping with the promise that had been made on this score by the British government.

The Negotiations After three months of negotiations, the treaty was drafted, and it was signed on July 30, 1930. Thereafter the House of Representatives was dissolved and elections were held on the basis of the new treaty. King Faisal I was of the belief that the British would give him full responsibility for the country and that he would exercise this authority jointly with Nuri al-Sa‘id.

My Withdrawal from Politics On a personal level, I deemed it wise to withdraw from local politics for a time. King Faisal I’s belief that he would be taking over full leadership of the country was bound to lead him to adopt policies that allowed no criticism or opposition. As a result, I would be thrust into the position of gadfly and dissenter, which was something I did not want. 189

190

My Memoirs

The Iraq Badge of Honor At the same time, plans were being made to meet with the Iranian government, which was establishing its first diplomatic mission in Baghdad, as well as an Iraqi diplomatic mission in Tehran. King Faisal I insisted that I be Iraq’s first chargé d’affaires in Iran, and I accepted. On this occasion he awarded me the Iraq Badge of Honor of the second order. It had been agreed that the first-order medal would only be granted to kings, presidents of republics, and emirs of the ruling family. As for the second-order medal, I was now the second person to have been decorated with it, the first person having been ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun.

12 Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

~

The Iraqi Legation in Tehran The Iraqi diplomatic mission in Tehran was established and I was appointed ambassador. Having prepared myself for the journey, I left Baghdad on March 12, 1931, and the following day, which was a Friday, we reached the Iranian border. On Sunday we arrived in Tehran and set about establishing the mission. We found a large house belonging to the Sufir family that we thought would serve as an ideal location, and we agreed with them to rent it for three years. Then, in keeping with prevailing custom, I went to meet with Iran’s minister of foreign affairs. When I first arrived at the ministry, I was received by a number of low-ranking officials. Not long thereafter there appeared a hefty man with a broad face who spoke fluent, eloquent French and who introduced himself as the chief of protocol. He led me into a large room, in the center of which there stood a man with a dignified bearing who, the moment I walked in, came up to me, his face glowing with pleasure. He greeted me and asked me how my journey had been. I soon realized that this distinguished man was Iran’s minister of foreign affairs. I replied that my trip had been pleasant and comfortable. Then I continued, “Allow me to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the kindness and warm welcome I’ve received since I set foot in this land. I do not feel your country to be in the least alien to me, so striking is the resemblance between its landscape and sights and those of my home country.” After exchanging pleasantries during which I was treated to a cigarette and a cup of tea, I bade him farewell, saying, “I consider myself fortunate to be Iraq’s first diplomatic representative to the imperial government, and I will do my best to strengthen the ties of friendship and goodwill between 191

192

My Memoirs

our countries. I hope to demonstrate that we are, and will continue to be, loyal friends and brothers to the Iranian people.” The minister thanked me for the sentiments I had expressed, saying that he agreed with me concerning the need to build solid bridges between our countries, whose mutual goodwill and brotherhood called for nurturance and protection. After I shook the minister’s hand and headed for the door, he followed me with such deliberate steps, it was as though he wanted to make sure he didn’t escort me all the way out! As we stood there before my departure, he informed me that Reza Shah Pahlavi would like to receive me as soon as possible, requesting that I deposit a copy of my letter of appointment with the chief of protocol so that the ceremony for the presentation of my credentials could be held without delay. In reply, I told him I feared I might not yet be in a position to fulfill all my duties in proper fashion in view of the fact that we didn’t yet have a suitable place to receive visitors. Consequently, I asked him to allow me to discuss the matter with the chief of protocol so that some alternative arrangement could be made. When I broached the subject with the chief of protocol, he told me it would be better to present my letter of appointment sooner rather than later, since Nawruz, the Persian New Year, was coming up, and the ceremony needed to be conducted before this so that I could take part in the official celebrations that were customarily hosted on the holiday in honor of the various diplomatic missions. As for the matter of a diplomatic headquarters, he said there was no need to worry about this, since it would be possible to receive visitors anywhere until the new embassy was ready. I agreed with this arrangement and promised to send him a copy of my letter of appointment in French as well as a copy of the speech I would be giving before the shah, the understanding being that I would present my credentials one day before Nawruz.

Meeting at the British Embassy I then contacted a gentleman whose family name I recall as Yar who was then serving as the British chargé d’affaires in Tehran and made arrangements to visit him at 4:00 p.m. on March 17. On the day agreed upon, I went to the British embassy and Mr. Yar received me hospitably, explaining to me that the British ambassador, Sir Robert Clive, was away on vacation. Yar mentioned that he knew me personally, since I had had dinner with him at the headquarters for the high commissioner in Baghdad when Gilbert Clayton had held this post. Our meeting was also attended by an individual named Mr. Howard, the British embassy’s Eastern secretary. A tall man, Howard spoke fluent French and had held his post at the embassy for nearly twenty years.

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

193

The Iranian Economy Our conversation touched on numerous issues, the most important of which was the political conditions affecting Iran, which Howard described as being extremely unstable due to the economic system the Iranian government had put in place. Yar mentioned that no one could interfere with the Iranian trade restriction law, even if it brought great harm to Iranian citizens, as long as its enforcement brought no harm to the foreigners in the country. He expressed the view that it would probably be best to wait until the outcomes of this harsh law had become more fully apparent. Howard said the law held out no benefit either for Iranians or for foreigners, and he wondered how merchants could be required to export as much as they were importing when there was known to be such a vast difference between imports and exports. How could merchants be forced to export quantities that were neither available in Iran nor in demand elsewhere?

Russian Trade Then the conversation turned to Russian trade with Iran. From the things that were said on this topic, I concluded that British policy in Iran was not being negatively impacted by Iranian policy. In fact, Yar and Howard spoke highly of the current Iranian administration, though they were wary of the motives behind Russian policy in the realm of economics and other areas.

The Official Ceremony Difficulties arose in connection with the fact that no suitable place had yet been prepared for the reception of visitors. In addition, the imperial palace band had not yet learned the Iraqi national anthem, which it was expected to play during my inauguration ceremony. So I agreed with the minister of foreign affairs that the ceremony should be postponed until after Nawruz, and it was rescheduled for April 9. At 9:00 a.m. on that day, two cars from the imperial court pulled up in front of the Iraqi embassy. Clad in formal attire, the assistant to the chief of protocol rode with me in the first car, while First Secretary ‘Abbas Mahdi and First Attaché Ahmad Wasfi rode in the second.

Golestan Palace The minute we appeared at the door of the Golestan Palace, a military band struck up the Iraqi national anthem. We walked 100 yards or more to the

194

My Memoirs

entrance of the main palace, where we were received by the foreign ministry’s chief of protocol. Sporting a brocade-trimmed uniform, he escorted us to the reception hall, where we joined the master of ceremonies with the Foreign Ministry’s chief interpreter. The four of us chatted for approximately fifteen minutes, during which time I was asked what I intended to do with the sadarah, the traditional Iraqi headgear: that is, whether I intended to wear it or take it off. I replied that I would take it off and treat it as a cap. And this is what I did when we were told to proceed to the first floor. A flight of stairs led up to a small entryway. Once there, we were invited in by the master of ceremonies, so I stepped alone into a spacious, elegant hall whose walls and ceiling were decorated with gold, chandeliers, and other exquisite ornamentation. I saw Reza Shah Pahlavi standing in the center of the great hall, to his right the minister of the imperial court, ‘Abd al-Hussein Teymourtash, and to his left the minister of foreign affairs, Muhammad ‘Ali Farughi. I took two steps forward and bowed in respect.

The Exchange of Speeches I took the speech I had prepared, which was written in Arabic, and read it. When I had finished, I bowed again, after which the chief translator for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs translated it into Farsi. When he had finished delivering the speech in Farsi, the shah took a piece of paper containing something written in Farsi from the minister of the court and read it with some difficulty, after which the interpreter delivered the shah’s speech in French. When he had finished, I was approached by the master of ceremonies, who brought me my letter of appointment on a gold platter. I took the letter and presented it respectfully to the shah, who handed it to the minister of the court and shook my hand. Then he began speaking with me in Farsi while the minister of the court translated what he was saying into French.

A Conversation with the Shah The shah asked me, “Have you ever been to Iran before?” “No, this is the first time,” I replied. “However, when I set foot on Iranian soil, I felt I was entering a friendly realm that is similar in many ways to my home in Iraq.” Then I added, “It is an honor for me to bring you greetings from His Majesty, the King of Iraq!” The shah then said, “I remember telling Rustum Bek Haydar that I intended to demonstrate my heartfelt goodwill toward our esteemed neighbor,

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

195

Iraq. And I assure you that you will find me true to my word, and more than true to it. If anyone should doubt my desire to be on good terms with Iraq, he need only note the fact that it was I who first sent a representative to Baghdad, whereas Iraq’s representative was delayed in his arrival here.” Sensing the gentle reproach in his words, I said, “I beg Your Majesty to believe me when I say that there was no delay in the matter of sending a representative from Iraq to Tehran. However, the representative who was appointed to come to Tehran after our two countries had established friendly ties was prevented by a serious illness from coming at that time. Hence, the delay in his arrival was due to factors over which the Iraqi government had no control.” “These clarifications are more than sufficient!” the shah said with a laugh. Then he went on to say, “Please convey my greetings and respect to His Majesty King Faisal.” And I promised to do so. Then I said, “Please allow me to introduce the members of our embassy staff.” So, with Reza Shah Pahlavi’s permission, the first secretary and the first attaché entered the room, and I introduced them to him. “Well, well, well!” he said after shaking their hands. “They’re in fine health and fine-looking. Are they Arabs?” “Yes,” I said with a smile, “they are Arabs!”

With the Minister of the Court and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Noting that the conversation was drawing to a close, I excused myself, whereupon the shah shook my hand and left through a back door. Meanwhile, I stayed on in the great hall with the minister of foreign affairs, who came up to me and extended his congratulations. Then, after escorting the shah to the back door, he came back with the minister of the court, shook my hand, and told me how pleased and grateful he was to have made my acquaintance. I said, “I had been hoping for an opportunity to meet you, but only now has that opportunity come! I am ever so pleased to have had the honor of meeting both the shah and you.” As we left for another hall to take a break, I commented to Teymourtash, the minister of the court, “I was touched by the things His Majesty the Shah said to me. He spoke with a sincerity and candor that befit the rank of the great soldier that he is.” Teymourtash replied, “Yes, one of His Majesty’s distinguishing traits is that he is heartfelt and sincere in everything he does and says. In some

196

My Memoirs

situations this may be a shortcoming. However, he insists on being the way he is, no matter what the cost.” “I don’t see it as a shortcoming, but as a virtue,” I said. “In fact, it may be his most admirable quality.”

The Iranian Prime Minister It was after this that I made my official visit to the Iranian prime minister, Mahdi Hidayat, a staid, dignified man over seventy years of age who, from what I understood, spoke fluent French, German, and Russian. However, our visit was little more than a courtesy call and involved nothing but the discussion of a few minor issues.

The Minister of the Court In any case, I come now to the visit I paid to the minister of court, the enormously influential ‘Abd al-Hussein Teymourtash. I went to the shah’s palace, which is located on Khiyaban Pahlavi Avenue. Whoever entered the modern palace surrounded on all sides by lush gardens might easily have imagined himself in the heart of Europe. Soon after entering the waiting area, I was invited into a small room in the center of which Teymourtash stood waiting for me. Upon seeing me at the door, he approached me with a big grin on his face and shook my hand in welcome. Hailing originally from northern Iran, Teymourtash had studied at the General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg and spoke excellent Russian and French. He was generous but hot tempered, sharp-witted, and extremely energetic. He was also a man who tackled problems in a thoroughly knowledgeable way. In appearance he was no different from any distinguished European, and it seemed to me that despite the many years I had spent in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq and the many men I had come to know during those years, I had never met anyone in all the East more intelligent, refined, or tactful than he. At the same time, he claimed to dislike Europeans, whom, given their unspeakable miserliness and greed, he considered to be a scourge on the East.

The Kurdish Issue We sat in a corner of the room and began by talking about the weather. Then we moved on to the issue of the Kurds, which seemed to be a major preoccupation among the Iranians, since Iranian policy at that time was

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

197

relentlessly opposed to Kurdish aspirations and, to all appearances, was bent on snuffing them out.

Mahmud al-Barzanji Teymourtash said to me, “Do you know anything about how things are now in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the measures being taken against Shaikh Mahmud al-Barzanji?” I said, “Movements aimed at putting Shaikh Mahmud in his place will begin soon, as soon as the weather is suitable for military campaigns.” “I fear such campaigns will do you no good. As I see it, the Kurds are receiving encouragement from foreigners (by which he meant the British) who don’t want to see security established in your country. So that region promises to remain fertile ground for their machinations and influence!” I replied, “I don’t know whether these movements will end in success or failure! The future is impossible to predict. Who knows? Maybe Shaikh Mahmud will flee to Iraq or Turkey the way Isma‘il Simko and other antiIranian Kurdish rebels have done. As for your concern about foreign encouragement of the Kurds, I’m sure such encouragement is no longer forthcoming. Those who encouraged the Kurds in the past may regret having done so, since their encouragement of them led to a frightening reaction that has now become a serious threat to their interests. So, as I’ve said, I don’t believe they’re receiving such encouragement anymore. And even if they were, it would make no sense for such encouragement to be offered to Shaikh Mahmud, who is still opposed to the British.”

The Iraqi Government and the Kurds “Besides,” I added, “the British and Iraqi governments’ policies toward the Kurds are quite clear. No doubt you have heard about the League of Nations resolutions to the effect that the rights the Kurds enjoy now are all they can hope to attain, and that they are not entitled to demand more than this.” Yet despite all the evidence I had offered him to the contrary, Teymourtash insisted that the Kurds were being moved from behind the scenes by the British. In support of what he was saying, Teymourtash noted that there was an undeniable renaissance taking place in the East in general, and in Arab countries in particular. In order for such countries to advance, they would have to close the doors that had heretofore been open to colonialism and investment, thereby facilitating the marketing of European merchandise and

198

My Memoirs

the perpetuation and increase of European influence and power. Britain, he noted, had many ambitions and interests in the East, including its desire for the petroleum exported to the sea via Haifa and the railways, and ongoing influence in the Persian Gulf. How, he asked, could one be certain that there were no plans afoot to create divisions between the Kurds and the Arabs in Iraq, and why should we not be prepared to thwart such plans? I replied, “Your conclusions are logical and reasonable. However, they don’t reflect the actual situation, since the British aren’t at odds with Iraq. On the contrary, there is an ongoing mutual understanding between them. Why would the British go to the trouble of weaving conspiracies when they already have what they need in order to advance their interests in Iraq? As long as things are proceeding well based on mutual understanding between the British and the Iraqis, the British have no need to offer encouragement to the Kurds. A serious conflict between Iraq and the British could arise over this or that issue in the future. However, we are on the alert for such developments, just as the Iranians for their part need to keep close watch on the situation so as to prevent any untoward movements.”

Confidence in Iraq’s Position Teymourtash told me he appreciated the stance Iraq had taken during the recent oil negotiations. He said he had heard Sir John Cadman (who had served as chairman of both the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Iraq Petroleum Company) grumbling over them, which he took to mean that we were now in a position to deflect any initiatives that might threaten our natural resources and treasures. Teymourtash assured me that in everything he said to me in future, he would do his best to be entirely frank. After all, he said, he was not addressing a British representative but, rather, an Iraqi representative who appreciated the need for openness, honesty, and mutual understanding. He told me that this manner of relating to each other was certain to help Iran and Iraq to develop strong ties of friendship, adding, “In everything I say to you, I’ll be sincere and forthright. I see no reason why we should have to tiptoe around the issues, since if we do this, we’ll never achieve what we’re striving for, namely, friendship and solid ties in circumstances that have brought our two countries closer together.”

Russia Perceived as a Threat Moving on to the topic of Russia, Teymourtash said, “Russia poses a threat to the entire world, which is in the throes of a crisis resulting from overproduction. Russia is fanning the flames of this crisis so that she can set all

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

199

of Europe on fire. It’s often been said that the current crisis will be the end of Russia itself, since the activities it’s engaged in are out of sync with the Russian people’s actual needs. It won’t be long before Russia is seen for what it really is, and the world will reject it the way an organism rejects a deadly foreign body. “However,” he added, “I don’t believe this is the case and I’m not banking on these possibilities, because Russia won’t reveal her weakness as long as the peoples living there are meek and submissive. “The Russian people languished for more than a hundred years under the yoke of the Mongols, and under the tyranny of the czars for longer than that, and God knows what fate they will meet in the future. One thing that is certain, however, is that the Soviets are still in control of these unfortunate people. Consequently, they can limit their concern to that of production and export in order to take over world markets even if it means killing 15 million or more Russians by starvation. What does it matter to those in control when the entire Russian population comes to more than 150 million?”

With the Minister of Foreign Affairs On Sunday morning, April 12, 1931, I paid a visit to Iran’s minister of foreign affairs, Muhammad ‘Ali Farughi. Farughi was a man of note in Iran: well versed in philosophy and a capable author. The French ambassador to Tehran had informed me that the things Farughi had written in French placed him on a par with the best native French authors. In addition, he was a respectable man, well known in both Iranian and foreign circles for his perspicacity, purity of character, and gentility.

Iranian-Iraqi Relations Once we had touched on some matters of mutual concern, arranged how work would be conducted, and discussed how I could contact the Foreign Ministry should the need arise, Farughi said, “Whenever I think about relations between our two countries, I find it impossible to imagine anything that could harm or undermine them in any way. How could they be harmed when all of us are followers of a single religion? We even speak the same language as you do with some minor changes in style and function! Did you know that 80 percent of the Farsi language is of Arabic origin, and that the other 20 percent is nothing but particles and connectors? Did you know that our culture is identical to yours as well? Why, then, should we not be in perfect accord? And why should we not go on being friends and brothers?”

200

My Memoirs

“Everything you have said is true,” I agreed. “So then,” he said, “be assured that I welcome hearing about anything that can bring benefit to you, or to both our countries together. And remember that as someone who has been employed by my government to engage in this work, it’s my duty to be at your service.” I told the minister that my government was intending to lay the groundwork for a permanent treaty that would cover a variety of issues, since the treaty we had concluded on August 11, 1929, had been referred to as a “temporary agreement.” He promised to look into the matter in preparation for a future discussion that would deal with this matter in particular.

Britain’s Chargé d’Affaires Diplomatic protocol requires that after presenting his credentials to the head of state, a newly appointed ambassador should send letters of notification to the heads of the other diplomatic missions in the capital in which he has been stationed informing them of his desire to meet them. After this, he pays each of them a formal visit. Hence, after receiving the British embassy’s reply to my letter of notification, I requested an audience with Sir Robert Clive, the British ambassador to Tehran, and on Monday, April 13, 1931, I went to see him. Slightly built and in his late fifties, Clive was a genial man with an even, precise manner of expression. We began our conversation by talking about Tehran’s weather, which didn’t agree with him since the city’s high elevation kept his heart in a constant state of turmoil. When I asked him about the political situation in Iran, he thought at length. Then he said, “Iran’s political situation is certainly far better than it used to be. If you had been in Tehran before, you would see the progress that has been made in recent years. The current shah [Reza Shah Pahlavi] has made great efforts since he took the throne to strengthen the authority of the central government, eliminating petty kings and making significant economic and social improvements in the country. However, what we have yet to make sense of is his military policy!”

The Army in the Shah’s Policy The British ambassador went on, “During the first year of the shah’s new regulations, the Iranian army stood at 30,000 troops, and it now stands at 50,000. Nevertheless, the shah is working tirelessly to build up the army even more in terms of both numbers and war matériel, the goal being to bring the number of troops to 60,000 by the end of this year. However, even

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

201

this increase isn’t enough in his view, as he aspires to bring the final number to 100,000. Imagine! The expenses involved in such a buildup are far more than poor Iran will be able to bear. And if the shah does manage to achieve it, what then? What does he intend to accomplish through this incessant escalation? Does he intend to establish security in the country and use his army to strike at the hopes of power-hungry tribal chiefs and others who have fought to acquire power or influence? Or does he want to counter external aggression? If he does intend to go to war against some neighboring state, he needs to know which of these states he has in mind. There are numerous states surrounding Iran, namely, Russia, Afghanistan, British Baluchistan, Turkey, and Iraq. Starting with Russia, it has no intention of going to war against Iran at the present time. If it did desire to do so, it would have all the needed resources at its disposal. In fact, it might be able to overcome Iran even without resorting to the use of military force given its economic control over northern Iran. And supposing it did attack Iran with its army, even a standing army of 100,000 on Iran’s side would be powerless to prevent Russia from winning the day! As for Afghanistan, it is in no position to oppose Iran in any way, since its current situation, which is bad to begin with, might well deteriorate in the future. With regard to British Baluchistan, it goes without saying that it would never occur to any Englishman to initiate hostilities against Iran, since the British with holdings in Baluchistan simply want peace and quiet there. “And as for Turkey, nothing has happened between it and Iran to disturb the peace. The only issue that comes to mind in this connection is the question of correcting the borders in the vicinity of Qara Dagh. But neither this nor any of the other issues that have come up between the two countries would justify the outbreak of war. If we supposed for the sake of argument that war was imminent, what could a force of 100,000 soldiers do in the face of Turkey’s immense army and its vast population? “Given all these considerations, one wonders what the shah hopes to accomplish through military preparations that are so far out of proportion to the country’s capabilities. Iran’s army isn’t large enough to defend the country from external aggression, while, at the same time, it is more than what Iran needs to guarantee internal security. In short, it is a mystery I have yet to figure out!”

Iranian Kurdish Policy Moving on to a discussion of Iranian policy in relation to the Kurds, I said, “Since coming to Tehran, I have been asked about the Kurdish issue more than once by Iranian officials. So I take it that Iran is quite concerned about this matter, and that it views every positive step taken by Iraq in relation to

202

My Memoirs

Kurdish aspirations as a blow to Iranian policy and as a threat to its own interests. “I also understand that Iranian policy depends on assurances that the Kurds will not be given any further assistance. So I’m wondering, given the fact that this issue has become such a serious preoccupation for Iranian politicians, whether you might fill me in on it a bit further?” Sir Clive replied, “I’ve had many a discussion of the Kurds with Teymourtash. In fact, we’ve gotten into some heated arguments over them! One thing I know is that Turkey’s policy toward the Kurds living on its soil is one of repression, extermination by any means possible, and Turkification. Iran’s policy toward the Kurds is one of studied neglect in the sense of not providing them with education, health care, reforms, and the like. The idea is that eventually they will become too weak to resist and, as a consequence, have no choice but to assimilate into Iranian society and die out as a distinctive ethnic group. As for Iraq’s policy toward the Kurds, it differs, I believe, quite clearly from the policies of its two neighbors.” Then he continued, “Due to certain political circumstances, there have come to be two major ethnic groups—the Kurds and the Arabs—in a country that has now become an independent state, namely, Iraq. These two groups are quite distinct from one another in many aspects of their morals and customs. In this respect, they might be compared to the British and the Spanish, who bear hardly any resemblance to one another culturally speaking. However, given that these two groups are now joint subjects of the Kingdom of Iraq, their respective national identities need to be preserved, and each of them needs to be empowered to become a contributing, beneficial part of the country’s population. Hence, if the Kurds in Iraq are granted certain rights and privileges, this doesn’t mean that Iraq wishes to place obstacles in the paths of Iran and Turkey or to pose any threat to their well-being. “This is what I told Teymourtash,” he continued. “I also recall that in one of our conversations, he said that if he were a Kurd, he’d rather be an Iraqi one than an Iranian one!” I said, “During the conversation I had with Teymourtash two days ago concerning Iraq’s Kurdish policy, I explained to him that the assistance and consideration Iraq has granted the Kurds doesn’t mean that it wants to encourage them to pursue Kurdish autonomy. Nor is it intended as a means of using the Kurds to thwart Turkish and Iranian aspirations. Rather, the Iraqi government’s intention is to recognize the Kurds as an important part of Iraqi society and prepare them to fulfill their duties as Iraqi citizens and, in this way, to contribute to the welfare of the country. I told him that since the Iraqi government has done everything it can for its Kurdish subjects, it would adopt a stern line toward any movement that aimed to abuse Kurdish rights by nurturing a spirit of separatism or divisiveness, by seeking to draw

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

203

Kurds away from the Iraqi fold, or by facilitating contact between Iraqi Kurds and those living in Turkey and Iran. At the same time, I don’t see anything that’s happened thus far as being harmful to Iran’s interests.” Then I added, “Teymourtash seemed reassured when I told him that no one was encouraging the Kurds in Iraq to demonstrate hostility toward Iran or to stir up Kurdish nationalism there. He told me that the clarifications I had provided were consistent with the reassurances he had been given earlier by British officials.”

The Russian Ambassador The following day, that is, Tuesday, April 14, at 4:00 p.m., I went to see the Russian ambassador, Adolf Petrovsky, at the Russian embassy. Iraq had no diplomatic ties with Russia at that time. However, contact between members of the various diplomatic missions by way of courtesy calls and the like was a common practice even in the absence of official diplomatic ties between their respective countries. So, in keeping with this practice, I felt it my duty to pay the Russian ambassador a visit as well.

Iraq’s Relationship with Russia British policy was aimed at keeping Russia and Iraq at a distance from each other, and Iraq, of course, abided by Britain’s dictates. Consequently, there was little hope of establishing any sort of official ties between Russia and Iraq at that time. A rather dark-skinned man who looked around forty-three years old, Petrovsky received me with kindness and respect. He spoke French easily, though with noticeable errors. I learned through our conversation that prior to the establishment of the Soviet regime, he had practiced law in Warsaw. However, the czarist state had then sent him into exile in Siberia, where he had spent the better part of his youth. He had thus suffered persecution for many years. When the Soviets came to power, they had reinstated him and he had entered the diplomatic corps. After discussing a number of general topics, we went on to talk about Russian policy toward the countries of the East in general, and toward the Arab countries in particular. The Russian ambassador said, “Soviet Russia’s policy with respect to the Eastern countries in general, and Arab countries in particular, is one that it inherited from its leader, Lenin, and to which it adheres to this day. According to this policy, these countries should be allowed to fulfill their nationalist aspirations, and they should enjoy the right to a life of freedom and happiness. Therefore, it is Russia’s duty to voice its support for these aspirations at

204

My Memoirs

every opportunity. And in fact, Russia has demonstrated its commitment to this principle in numerous situations. However, it is also of the belief that if Arab demands for autonomy were fulfilled all at once, this could pose a danger to the Arabs themselves, since we know that the Arab countries are not yet in a position to handle complete freedom and independence. This being the case, there needs to be a gradual progression toward full autonomy. When the Hejaz and Nejd won their independence, we entered into friendly relations with them. We also grant preferential trade status to Eastern and Arab countries, being lenient with them in pricing and granting them special concessions.” When I asked the Russian ambassador whether Russia had made arrangements with respect to trade with Iraq, he replied, “Russian goods have reached Iraq, and there are plans under way to establish Russian trade organizations and a commercial agency there in order to facilitate Russian imports and the purchase of the goods Russia needs from Iraq. However, this process may take time, since it calls for negotiations between Iraq and Russia.”

The French Ambassador On Wednesday, April 15, 1931, I visited the French ambassador. I had hardly been waiting in the parlor for a minute when I was approached by a tall, clean-shaven man with a narrow face and somber features. He greeted me and shook my hand, then led me solicitously to his office, which, being rather poorly furnished, looked out of place somehow in a French embassy. During our conversation I asked him about his most recent trip to Baghdad, his encounter there with France’s ambassador to Iraq, and the settlement that had been reached concerning whether King ‘Ali bin Hussein would take the throne in Syria. In reply he said, “I went to Baghdad as a tourist. As for my information about this matter, it may be out-of-date by now, from the days when I served as secretary general for the high commissioner’s office in Beirut.” In this connection he mentioned some reports concerning what had been going on in relation to the throne of Syria a year or more prior to that time, and about his meeting with Nuri al-Sa‘id at the high commissioner’s office concerning France’s wish to place King ‘Ali or one of King Hussein’s other sons on the throne in Syria. Then he said, “Nuri al-Sa‘id Pasha understood at that time that France had no objections to setting one of Hussein’s sons on the throne in Syria if this was what the Syrians wanted. However, the Syrians were divided among themselves, with the majority of them supporting a republic and others a

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

205

monarchy. At the same time, it was impossible to discern whether the sons of Sa‘ud or the sons of Hussein enjoyed the greater support, so the matter remains unresolved to this day. “It seems that France had been disposed toward the possibility of reaching a mutual understanding with His Majesty King Faisal I. However, I don’t know what happened after that.” As for me, I had no doubt that the French ambassador knew very well every last detail of the negotiations that had taken place over Syria. So, hoping I might get him to tell me something I didn’t already know, I said, “A couple of days ago Iranian newspapers published a telegram from Jerusalem according to which France had announced its decision to have King ‘Ali ascend the throne in Syria, and I hear from informed sources that the process is nearly complete. Have you heard nothing about this?” “No, nothing at all,” came the terse reply. “So, then,” I said with a chuckle, “I know more about these things than you do!” However, my attempt at provocation got me nowhere, since all he said was “Perhaps you do.”

The Turkish Ambassador I met with the Turkish ambassador to Tehran, Khosrau Bek, at noon on April 16, 1931. After a bit of small talk, the ambassador told me that he wouldn’t be content with mere formalities between us, and that he was grateful for the opportunity to make my acquaintance. Moreover, he assured me, he meant every word he had said. After all, he continued, rapprochement and mutual understanding among Islamic countries was something that, in his view, merited concern and interest on everyone’s part. He said, “The common Islamic heritage shared by Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan has a significant role to play in relations among these states. Rapprochement might lead eventually to the conclusion of a political agreement among them. In fact, I wouldn’t be surprised if such an agreement were concluded in the near future.” The Turkish ambassador said, “I understood from discussions with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during my visits to Ankara that Crown Prince Ghazi and the Iraqi government have the most positive sentiments toward Turkey and wish it only the best. The same applies to their view of a friendly policy toward Iran.” Then he continued, “I have received clear instructions from my government with regard to Turkish policy toward Iran. The Turkish government

206

My Memoirs

wants to see a solid, powerful, self-sufficient government in Iran that aspires to renewal. This is the sum and total of what Turkey hopes for Iran.”

The Sa‘dabad Pact Approximately one month after my talks with the Turkish ambassador, he came personally to see me one day and informed me that the agreement Turkey had hoped to conclude among the four Muslim states of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq was about to become a reality. Expressing the hope that official communications among the four states could commence soon, he told me of his government’s intense interest in this matter and even divulged certain details concerning the contents of the proposed fourway agreement.1

The Iraqi Embassy in Tehran Once the aforementioned official visits had been made, our credentials had been presented, Iranian government offices had been contacted, ways of contacting important figures in Iran had been ascertained, and channels of communication among Iraqis living in Tehran had been established, we turned our attention to the matter of choosing a site for the Iraqi embassy and furnishing its offices. I set about furnishing the new embassy in May of the same year. The Sufir family, Iraqis of the Bahai faith, owned a large piece of property (10,000 square meters) on Hafat Da‘askatah Street on which there were several buildings set amidst lush gardens. We agreed to sign a three-year lease with an annual rent of 200 dinars, then set about furnishing the place. The problem we faced, however, was that the funds allocated for the embassy in the Iraqi government’s 1931 budget came to no more than this same amount—namely, 200 dinars, or around $972. This meant that we had hardly enough money to cover one-quarter of the embassy’s requirements. Consequently, I requested funds from the government, stating my willingness to buy whatever was needed out of my own pocket so that we could get the embassy up and running on the understanding that I would be reimbursed out of Iraq’s 1932 budget allocations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to my request. Hence, I arranged personally for the purchase of what the embassy needed by way of furniture, carpets, desks, and the like. I chose the furniture and oversaw its arrangement, while the first secretary, ‘Abbas Mahdi, and the first attaché, Ahmad Wasfi, made the purchases and collected the receipts. When all the work had been accomplished and we had everything we needed to run the embassy, we turned to the tasks at

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

207

hand with a focus on contacts, invitations, and interviews. The entire process took around four months.

Iraq-Iran Relations: As Bad as They Could Be! Contrary to outward appearances, relations between the Iraqi embassy and the Iranian government were about as bad as they could possibly be. There were numerous reasons for this state of affairs, one of which was the concentration of power in the hands of the shah, who was to be answered to concerning virtually all things, from the most momentous to the most trivial. If, for example, our embassy was dealing with a matter that required it to consult with the minister of foreign affairs, be it border incidents or other, more major problems, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not authorized to take the necessary measures of its own accord. Rather, it would be obliged to appeal either to the Ministry of Defense, which was under the shah’s immediate supervision and control, or, in some cases, directly to the shah. Despite his judiciousness and his excellent position as both a highranking government official and an intellectual widely recognized for his knowledge and understanding, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs lacked the courage to approach the shah concerning the issues to which we were demanding solutions. Our petitions would invariably either be buried somewhere in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense or be delayed for months on end. In order to conceal the fact that it was stalling, the Foreign Ministry would do its best to create problems and raise objections to our appeals so as to prolong the required communications and gain time for itself. In one of the most amusing incidents that I recall from that period, one day we received a letter of protest from Baghdad that we were asked to pass on to the Iranian Foreign Ministry. The letter had to do with an incident that had taken place along the Iran-Iraq border. In brief, a number of Iranian policemen had crossed over into Iraqi territory and set up camp at a location inside the Iraqi border. When the Iraqi authorities asked them to vacate the spot and return to Iran, they had flatly refused. As proof of Iraq’s claim, the letter made mention of the fact that the site on which the Iranian police force was encamped was located near a cemetery that contained a domed tomb belonging to a certain Muslim saint. This same tomb had been mentioned in connection with the drawing up of the Iran-Iraq border as being inside Iraqi territory. When we contacted the Iranian Foreign Ministry and presented all the clarifications and arguments we had received from Baghdad, it asked us to give it time to clarify the matter through consultation with the Iranian Ministry of Defense. Several months later, the Iranian Foreign Ministry responded to

208

My Memoirs

the letter of protest by saying that although the aforementioned tomb was indeed located on Iraqi territory, the Iranian police force in question was not camped anywhere near it. It utterly denied the Iranian policemen’s presence on Iraqi soil. Not only that, but it called for an investigation into what it termed the Iraqi police’s unfounded accusations against the Iranian police. When we sent the reply we had received to Baghdad, the authorities there responded by sending us an aerial photograph of the site in which the dome appeared quite clearly, and alongside it the Iranian police force’s tents. When we presented this damning evidence to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we received no reply, of course, since the evidence we had provided was irrefutable. Nevertheless, the ministry asked us to give it time once again to consult with the Ministry of Defense. Weeks and weeks went by, during which time we issued a number of additional statements calling for a response, but all to no avail. When Baghdad’s Central Police Department saw that the issue was not going to be resolved by diplomatic means, it sent out a number of armored cars, had them park near the Iranian policemen’s tents, and threatened to fire on them unless they removed themselves without further delay behind the Iranian border. And the threats worked: they picked themselves up and disappeared into Iranian territory. As for us, we had spent weeks talking ourselves blue in the face in our attempts to convince the Iranian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense that the photograph we had shown them wasn’t a fake. And this is only one of countless similar incidents from our diplomatic stint in Tehran. As for the waters of Zurbatiyah, Shammar (Tuqah), and Mandali and other vital matters relating to the cutoff of the water needed by Iraqi farmers during the summer, none of them have yet been resolved to my knowledge. It seemed to have been decided beforehand that whatever we said, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would object to it, deny its existence, or be slow to clarify or respond to it. As for us, we would respond in kind to whatever concerns were raised by Iran. Consequently, no progress whatsoever was being made between us. When serious conflicts would arise, the only solution we had at our disposal was to approach Teymourtash, who, with his power and broad-ranging influence, would instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to agree without further delay to our request. However, it wasn’t possible to appeal to Teymourtash in all situations.

The Kurdish Issue Trouble arose repeatedly between Iraq and Iran over the matter of the Kurds, complications along the borders, extradition of criminals, and other

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

209

problems. Whenever a Kurd rebelled against the Iranian government and was pursued by the Iranian authorities, he would flee to Iraq. This would set off a flurry of communiqués and, not infrequently, spark heated argument over the individual concerned. The same thing would happen in reverse if a Kurd rebelled against Iraqi authority and was pursued by the law: he would flee to Iran, and the same miserable cycle would begin all over again. I personally believe that Iran’s policy toward the Kurds was overly harsh. Moreover, Iran’s severity toward the Kurds was in clear contrast to the stance taken by the Iraqi government, which would frequently drag its feet when it came to handing Kurdish rebels over to Iran. The cases of Ja‘far Sultan, Hamah Rashid, Mahmud Dazi, Shaikh Mahmud, and others are among the most complex cases ever written about, yet with little to show for it. When it came to the Kurds, Iran and Turkey were agreed on a policy of harshness, force, and repression. As for Iraq, its policy toward the Kurds was one of lenience and moderation. Needless to say, the nature of Iraq’s policy in this area tempted Kurdish rebels in Iran to seek refuge on Iraqi soil. Time and time again, Iran and Turkey sought to conclude special agreements that would put an end to these problems and prevent Kurdish rebels from benefiting from Iraq’s “relaxed” policy. Yet their efforts always met with failure.

The Arabs in Khuzestan In addition to the problems mentioned thus far, all of which led regularly to severe friction between Iran and Iraq, there were other issues of no less importance. These issues included the condition of Arabs in Khuze stan, on which account numerous complaints were exchanged by the two governments. The Iranian government believed that the Iraqi government was encouraging the Arabs of Khuzestan to rebel. As for the Iraqi government, it believed that Iran’s domestic policy was inflicting great harm on the Arabs of Khuzestan. This policy triggered frequent uprisings among these oppressed people, who would then be forced to flee from Iran into Iraq. During the period from 1932 to 1934, the Iraqi government considered the possibility of agreeing with Iran to allow the Arabs of Khuzestan, if they so chose, to come to Iraq, where they would be given land to farm and be free to enjoy their own traditions and language. However, it was exceedingly difficult for the Iranian government to broach this matter with the shah. In fact, it claimed that no one in all of Iran would dare speak to him about it.

210

My Memoirs

Shatt al-‘Arab The third matter that called for an exchange of views between the Iranian and Iraqi governments was the question of Shatt al-‘Arab and whether Iraq was entitled to the entire waterway, including both its eastern (Iranian) and western (Iraqi) shores. The first time we discussed the possibility of King Faisal I paying a visit to Tehran and the need to clear up all outstanding issues between the two countries, Teymourtash approached me about the Shatt al-‘Arab question. According to Teymourtash, there were universal, set principles and rules to which nations adhere when establishing boundaries between their respective territories. Prominent points along certain topographical features such as a river, a valley, or a mountain might be identified as dividing lines between the countries concerned. However, he noted, it is not customary for a major river such as Shatt al-‘Arab to be adopted as a boundary between two countries such that the entire river, including both of its shores, is designated as belonging solely to one of the two countries. The Iranians argued that they had only accepted this unnatural boundary, which had been set in the year 1905, because the mixed Boundary Assignment Commission had not included a single Turk or Iranian. Rather, its membership had been composed entirely of Russians and British, who had drawn the boundaries in a manner that served their own interests rather than those of the Iranians or the Turks. The agreement concluded between Britain and Russia delineated the two states’ regions of influence in Iran: it gave Britain free and exclusive rein in the south of Iran and gave Russia free and exclusive rein in the north. Given that the Anglo-Russian agreement had taken this form, it served British interests only, since British designs on Shatt al-‘Arab and the Persian (Arab) Gulf were well known to all and required that British navigation there not be hindered in any way. Britain’s designs on Iraq necessitated that Shatt al-‘Arab in its entirety be given to Iraq, where Britain could pursue its aims unhindered. At that time, the city of Abadan had not yet risen to prominence, since oil wells had not yet been drilled there. Hence, given that there was no need yet for oil transport services, nor were there large numbers of ships arriving to carry the oil away, the city had no great need for a port on Shatt al-‘Arab. Now, however, things were different, and it was neither reasonable nor in Iran’s interests for the boundaries to remain the way they had been in 1905. Iran wanted to have a section of Shatt al-‘Arab’s shore designated as part of the city of Abadan so that it could function fully as a port, with the boundaries of this coastal area to be agreed upon by both sides. Iran mentioned no more than this when we first discussed the issue. However, the Iranian demands seemed to increase later: they wanted navigation to be supervised, and they wanted this supervision to be done jointly by Iran and Iraq, since they sought a share in the income generated by the port of Basra.

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

211

I sent a detailed memorandum to Baghdad in which I summarized all the discussions of the Shatt al-‘Arab issue that had taken place between Teymourtash and me. I presented Iran’s point of view both generally and in some detail so that the Iraqi government could study the matter and, in the event that the issue was opened again from the Iranian side during King Faisal I’s visit to Tehran, the Iraqi negotiator would be able to offer a practical and reasoned response to it. And in fact, the Iraqi government gave careful consideration to Iran’s proposal, then left it up to Iran to pursue the issue further whenever it saw fit.

King Faisal I and King Ibn al-Sa‘ud Once Iraq had become a more or less autonomous political entity, King Faisal I wanted to begin carrying out a policy of personal contact and acquaintance with neighboring states. The first thing that comes to mind in this connection is his contact with King Ibn al-Sa‘ud and his efforts to eliminate or, at least, to mitigate the rancor and ill will that had grown up over the years between the two monarchs, and to alleviate the ill effects of King Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s takeover of the Hejaz, the homeland of the sharifs and the center of their religious and political influence. It was difficult for King Faisal I (as it was for others of the Hashemite family) to reconcile his feelings as a member of a family that had been deprived of its right to rule in the Hejaz with his sense of duty as a king who had adopted a policy that differed in clear ways from that of his father, as well as that of his brother, King ‘Ali, who had been forced to abdicate the throne. By virtue of his wisdom and strength of nerve, King Faisal I was apparently able to overcome the effects of the complaints he heard constantly from his brother, King ‘Ali, or from members of his court concerning the woes they had suffered. Taking the bull by the horns, the king made up his mind to meet with King Ibn al-Sa‘ud as the sovereign of Iraq, whose interests required that he establish positive ties with neighboring heads of state. The British government mediated on his behalf in this connection and thus helped to prepare the way for him. The presence of my brother, Naji al-Suwaydi, as prime minister at that time also helped to facilitate the process given the influence he enjoyed with King Faisal I and the respect he was accorded by King Ibn al-Sa‘ud. When the meeting had been arranged, King Ibn al-Sa‘ud traveled to al-Hasa (al-Ahsa’), and from there to the Arab Gulf, where the two kings met aboard a British warship. Upon seeing each other, they embraced and engaged in pleasant conversation, thereby demonstrating that they were ready to leave the past behind and establish a new foundation for their relationship as the leaders of two friendly Arab nations. Needless to say, this encounter had a salutary effect on all.

212

My Memoirs

King Faisal I Visits Turkey Not long thereafter negotiations were under way to arrange a visit for King Faisal I to Turkey, which took place that same year. This visit was clearly one of the best possible ways of improving ties between the two countries.

King Faisal I’s Visit to Tehran As a new sovereign of a fledgling state, it was vital that King Faisal I pay a visit to Tehran. Realizing this to be the case, he invented a pretext for Muhammad Rustum Haydar to go to Tehran so that he could do the necessary groundwork. Once there, Haydar contacted Iranian officials in order to make arrangements for the proposed visit. When he returned, everything had been arranged, and all that remained was for the proper occasion to present itself. When diplomatic relations were established between the two countries and the Iraqi embassy had been established in Tehran, it meant that the time for the visit had come. King Faisal I was scheduled to leave Baghdad on April 25, 1931, and I was asked to come to the capital to escort the royal procession from there. On the day scheduled for his journey, King Faisal I left Baghdad at around 3:00 p.m. He was accompanied by Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa‘id, my brother Naji al-Suwaydi, the head escort Jawdat al-‘Azzawi, another escort by the name of Shakir al-Wadi, the chief of protocol Tahsin Qadri, his assistant Baqir al-Husseini, and his private physician Sir Harry Sanderson. Then we spent the night at Khanaqin, where the king owned a farm. Early the next morning we resumed our journey and crossed the IraqIran border, where we were met by a special delegation that had come to receive the king. The delegation included the chief of protocol for the imperial court, a delegate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, another delegate from the Ministry of War, and Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad. After a simple ceremony in which the Iranian delegate was introduced to King Faisal I, the procession continued on its way to Shahabad, which we reached at around noon.

Shahabad Shahabad is a small city whose lands belonged in their entirety to the shah. Hence, it was his private property, subject to his disposal alone. King Faisal I was served lunch there, after which he received a lengthy telegram from

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

213

the shah of Iran. Filled with words of welcome and adulation, the telegram spoke of the shah’s pleasure at King Faisal I’s visit and his desire to meet with him at the earliest opportunity. It concluded by saying that the shah was awaiting his arrival in Tehran.

Kermanshah Then we continued on our way once again until, just before sundown, we reached Kermanshah, where we had dinner and spent the night. Wherever our procession went, we were given a marvelous welcome. At noon the following day, the royal procession reached Qazwin, where we ate lunch and stayed the night. The next morning we reached Karaj, a site located fortythree kilometers from Tehran, and spent the night there. The following morning at 11:00, the procession reached Tehran. Pavilions had been erected at the entrance to the city, and in one of them the shah awaited King Faisal I’s arrival surrounded by ministers and a large retinue of government officials. The two monarchs embraced and their two retinues were introduced, after which they took a brief rest following a cannon salute that was fired in honor of King Faisal I’s arrival. When it came time for the visiting delegation to be escorted to its quarters, the shah rode to the left of King Faisal I, and the procession started on its way in the midst of great fanfare. The streets were filled with crowds shouting, “Long live Iraq, and long live its king!” I was assigned to ride with the minister of war, Sardar As‘ad Bakhtiyari, who was an old and dear friend of mine. Descended from the Bakhtiyar clan, which enjoyed great influence in southern Iran, As‘ad was looked upon by the Iranians as a singularly virtuous and upstanding individual and one of the highest political authorities in the land, and this despite the fact that he was not as educated as some of the country’s other elites. The two monarchs were escorted to the Golestan Palace, an extension of the shah’s palace, which had been designated as King Faisal I’s place of lodging. There then began the official ceremonies that were customarily conducted during the visit of a foreign monarch to this or that capital city.

The Official Banquet The first thing Reza Shah Pahlavi did was to host an official banquet in the Golestan Palace in King Faisal I’s honor. It was attended by 100 people, and the two monarchs both made speeches that gave voice to the most positive sentiments and the most heartfelt desire to strengthen the bonds of goodwill and friendship between their two countries.

214

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Husam al-Din Jum‘ah, Shakir al-Wadi, Naji al-Suwaydi, Nuri al-Sa‘id, Sir Harry Sanderson (personal physician to King Faisal I), Baqir Sirkamshak, Karim Thabit, and Ibrahim Hilmi al-‘Umar in Tehran in 1931, during the visit of King Faisal I to Iran when Tawfiq al-Suwaydi was Iraqi ambassador to Tehran

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

215

The Two Kings’ Speeches I had been asked to meet with Teymourtash in order for us to discuss the speeches that were to be given by the kings at the upcoming function and to prepare a French translation for each of them, which would be printed up and distributed among the foreign ambassadors in attendance. At noon Teymourtash and I met and finalized the French texts. It was decided that the shah would deliver his address in Farsi while King Faisal I would deliver his in Arabic, and that rather than providing an oral translation of the speeches, it would be sufficient to distribute copies of them in French to those at the banquet. So this is what we did.

At the Iraqi Embassy King Faisal I’s stay in Tehran lasted only three days. On one of these days, the Iraqi embassy had the honor of hosting him for lunch, while the rest of his stay was packed with countless invitations, receptions, outings, and more.

Iranians’ Understanding of Iraq A peculiar thing to note is that, despite the Iranians’ need to come to Iraq in order to visit their holy pilgrimage sites, they nevertheless knew hardly anything about Iraq. I recall numerous incidents that made clear to me that Iranians were completely ignorant of Iraq. The reason for this may lie in the change that had come over the Ottoman Empire such that “the land between the two rivers” with which Iranians had once been familiar had now become an autonomous state known as “Iraq.” (I discovered that there is an Iranian province by the name of ‘Iragh, also known as Sultanabad.) Whatever the reasons, modern Iraq was an entity that was difficult for Iranians to recognize. Iranians’ ignorance of Iraq had been further exacerbated by the fact that since Reza Shah Pahlavi came to power, Iranians had stopped making pilgrimage to Iraq’s holy places. Iranians lacked clear knowledge of what lay beyond their borders. It was as though they had come to believe that the political success and economic and social organization they had established under Reza Shah Pahlavi’s rule had rendered Iran superior to the countries around it. Add to this the fact that Iranians seemed to be arrogant by nature. If other peoples were mentioned, the Iranian considered himself more sophisticated than they, and if other countries were mentioned, he set about trying to prove that his country and its people were the best, the most beautiful, and the most refined of all that God had made!

216

My Memoirs

King Faisal I’s Personality Although this may have been the prevailing state of affairs in Iran, King Faisal I’s visit to Tehran was like a spark released in the darkness. In the person of the Iraqi monarch and his entourage, Iranians from all stations in life, from the most simple to the most educated, from the powerless to the all-powerful, found something that led them to believe that beyond their Western borders there was a people worthy of their acquaintance. Besides, the personal bond that was formed between King Faisal I and the shah was an extremely powerful one. Reza Shah Pahlavi—who had succumbed to a spirit of self-importance since becoming the emperor of Iran, a man with such power and charisma that other major states had come to fear him or curry his favor—had now, in the presence of King Faisal I, become a meek, affable man who had nothing but words of praise and admiration for Iraq and its people!

The Effects of the King’s Visit King Faisal I’s visit to Tehran was highly beneficial to relations between Iran and Iraq. On the material plane, however, the results of the king’s visit to Iran were difficult to discern. The reason for this may have been that the government in Iran was based on a bureaucracy whose wheels turned with a painful sluggishness, with power concentrated in the hands of a few. This reality as a matter of course had a negative impact on the way things progressed in government departments, since it was a burdensome task for government officials to discuss and properly inform themselves concerning what actions they needed to take in the exercise of their powers both domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, there was a reasonable degree of improvement on the material level as well. Furthermore, the king’s visit opened a door to greater progress toward the conclusion of the Sa‘dabad Pact, the details of which began to crystallize during the four years that followed.

A Successful Visit All in all, then, it can be said that King Faisal I’s visit to Tehran was a success, in part because the king was possessed of a winning personality that was at once commanding and genial. His contact with various classes of Iranians led to the establishment of new relationships between the two peoples, which in turn made it easier for the two countries to make significant strides toward better understanding and closer cooperation.

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

217

A Critical Meeting On the third day of King Faisal I’s visit to Iran, which fell on April 28, 1931, a meeting for government officials was scheduled at the shah’s court. The meeting was attended by Farughi and Teymourtash on behalf of Iran and by Nuri al-Sa‘id and Muhammad Rustum Haydar on behalf of Iraq. The discussion at the meeting revolved around three points, the first of which was the issue of Shatt al-‘Arab. Teymourtash explained Iran’s perspective on this issue at length, justifying the Iranian government’s demand that a portion of Shatt al-‘Arab be set aside as a port area for the city of Abadan. However, since the Iraqi participants were not in a position to issue an immediate judgment on the matter, they promised to study the issue carefully and provide the Iranians with a response later. The discussion then turned to the possibility of cooperation between Iranian and Iraqi oil companies. This issue was problematic; hence, a decision was made to have qualified experts look into the matter, then present their findings to both governments. When the discussion turned to the third point of importance, namely, formulating a joint Iraqi-Iranian policy toward the Kurds, it became apparent through the clarifications provided by Teymourtash that Iran and Turkey had agreed to adhere to a stern approach to the Kurds living on their soil, thereby closing the door to any sort of nationalist Kurdish demand. Teymourtash tried without success to win us over to the idea of joining Turkey and Iran in their approach to the Kurds. Instead, he was given to understand that Iraq’s policy toward the Kurds was one of flexibility and tolerance, not one of majority versus minority. It was also explained to him that Iraq would need to continue to adhere to this policy in the future as well, though at the same time, it would not allow anyone to make nationalist demands that threatened Iraqi unity or made the Kurdish people into an autonomous political entity. As for those who might want to disturb the peace between Iran and Iraq or cause trouble along their borders, it was agreed that decisive measures would be taken against them. Then, early on the fourth day of the king’s visit, he departed from the Golestan Palace accompanied by the shah and his retinue.

Kahrizak Large tents had been set up in a place known as Kahrizak, and King Faisal I rested there, after which the farewell ceremony was held. The procession then headed out and at noon it reached Qum, where we had lunch in a place that

218

My Memoirs

had been specially prepared for the occasion. King Faisal I was accompanied by the Iranian minister of the interior, Aghay ‘Ali Mansur, who had been assigned to escort the royal procession to the Iranian border with the imperial court’s chief of protocol and a delegate from the Ministry of the Interior.

Sultanabad After lunch the royal procession set out once again. We reached Sultanabad near sundown, then spent the night there. The next morning we left Sultanabad. We reached Borujerd in the late afternoon, then spent the night there. We then continued on our journey to a place known as Khorramabad, where we had lunch, then continued on our way to Salehabad. After spending the night in Salehabad, we set out again. We reached Ahvaz at noon and had lunch there; then after a brief rest we continued our journey. We reached Khorramshahr (al-Muhammarah) in the late afternoon and had tea in the center for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Basra That evening we boarded a private ship that was returning to the port of Basra and had dinner on board. The following morning we reached Basra, where we stayed for one day. The following evening we boarded a train, which took us across the Iraqi plains heading for Baghdad, which we reached on May 1, 1931.

The Iraqi Embassy in Tehran The establishment of an Iraqi embassy in Tehran in 1931 was a significant event in the life of Iraq on the international scene, since, of the two Iraqi embassies in existence at that time, it was the most active and productive. The other Iraqi embassy was the one in London, which, from the time it was established, had undertaken nothing but the most minor tasks, because the British embassy in Baghdad took care of all communications and correspondence, as well as mediating solutions to problems between the two governments. In short, virtually everything that occurred took place through the mediation of the British embassy in Baghdad, which made our embassy in London—which concerned itself with the problems of Iraqi students studying abroad, purchases for the army, passports, and other minor matters—more or less redundant.

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

219

Our Embassy in Turkey As for our embassy in Ankara, which was established after the one in Tehran, it was unable to do anything of importance due to an overall lack of communication. Another reason for the embassy’s ineffectiveness was the insignificance of the commercial and political interests shared by the two countries, since Turkey’s new policy was directed entirely toward the West, and it thus paid virtually no attention to the East. However, when the Iraqi embassy in Tehran was established, Iraq’s contact with other states became more extensive than it had been before. There was no Soviet representation in Iraq at that time, for example. However, thanks to the presence of Iraq’s embassy in Tehran, it was able to make contact with the Soviet embassy, which in turn enabled it to identify the Iraqi products that Russia needed such as dates, barley, wool, and other raw materials. The Iraqi embassy in Tehran also made contact with Japan, thereby paving the way for the establishment of diplomatic ties through a treaty signed by the two countries, and with Afghanistan, with which it concluded a trade and friendship treaty. Similarly, it was through the Iraqi embassy in Tehran that Iraq made contact with Poland, Holland, and Czechoslovakia. All of these contacts were made through Iraq’s embassy in Tehran. Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus devoted half of its efforts to the embassy in Tehran, and what remained to Iraq’s embassies elsewhere. The Tehran embassy also became a source of information for European embassies whenever they were in need of news or commentary on events in the Near East. Whenever an event of note took place there, the German, French, British, Russian, and other embassies would come to the Iraqi embassy to request clarifications of points relating to these events or to receive new information of relevance to their own countries.

Oil Iranian policy was now beginning to reflect greater self-confidence. This development led to a confrontation between the Iranian government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that touched upon my role as Iraq’s representative in Tehran.

The D’Arcy Company It was said that William D’Arcy, born in Britain, was employed by British intelligence. Be that as it may, he had sought by a variety of means to obtain

220

My Memoirs

a concession to drill for oil in southern Iran. As luck would have it, he met an Armenian man by the name of Calouste Gulbenkian who mediated for him with the Iranian government and who, by dint of bribes and other enticements, managed to win the coveted concession. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was then established and went to work. However, although the company both benefited and brought benefit to the Iranian government, the Iranian government nevertheless continued to believe that it was being shortchanged, claiming that the concession had been granted at a time when the Iranian government was weak and that it had settled for a smaller share of the oil proceeds than it was entitled to. Indeed, Iran’s share at that time came to only 11 percent of total production. Hence, it began looking for an opportunity to alter the situation to its benefit. When Reza Shah Pahlavi came to power, he abolished the D’Arcy oil concession, claiming that the company had been negligent in carrying out its duties under the terms of the concession.

A Slap in the Face for Britain This action was like a slap in the face for Britain, not only because it was intended to secure a greater share for Iran in its oil wealth but, in addition, because of the harsh manner in which the concession was cancelled. At the same time, the fierce competition that now existed between Russia and Britain had weakened both countries while strengthening Iran in such a way that it now possessed real leverage with both of its powerful neighbors. Britain dared not do anything that would undermine Iran’s position internationally, thereby giving Russia an opportunity to exploit Iran’s weakness by returning to its former policy of expropriation and infiltration into Iran. Consequently, the British government responded in the most reserved manner possible despite the blow it had suffered to its dignity. It instructed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to reach an understanding with the Iranian government on new foundations by means of which it could guarantee new benefits for Iran while preserving its own interests as well.

A New Oil Concession Fifty-one percent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was owned by the British government itself. However, after a series of discussions between the company and the Iranian government, a new concession was agreed upon, the terms of which increased Iran’s share of the profits by 100 percent. Hence, after having received profits that amounted to approximately

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

221

$19 million a year, Iran now received roughly $38 million a year. And thus ended the oil problem between Iran and Britain. The new oil concession was one of the most significant events that occurred during my time as Iraqi ambassador to Iran.

‘Abd al-Hussein Teymourtash Another event of note that dates back to the same period is the misfortune suffered by Teymourtash, chief of the imperial court. ‘Abd al-Hussein Teymourtash, a pureblooded Iranian from the region of Mazandaran, was possessed of a number of distinguishing characteristics. In addition to those I have already had occasion to mention, he had the innovative impulses of a European secularist and believed that the reason the East had suffered as it had was that it had distanced itself from European culture and civilization. His modus operandi was to do away with the old and replace it with the new, his goal being to establish a modern Iran that could keep pace with newly arising developments and needs. Teymourtash was not partial to Europeans, however. In fact, he felt some bitterness and hostility toward them for the greed with which they had approached the East in general and his country in particular. At the same time, he acknowledged the competence and ability that had enabled Europeans to achieve such superiority over other peoples. He had persuaded the shah to do away with outmoded traditions and customs so as to restore youth to his country, but in a modern way. He had placed Iran on the right track, and all that remained was for the country to close the huge gap that remained between it and the modern world. On a personal level, Teymourtash seemed to have a soft spot for me. This became apparent from the fact that whenever I came to him with any request, he would spare no effort to fulfill my wishes. I recall how once, when I was telling him about something I wanted, he agreed to the request even before I’d finished what I was saying! Laughing, I said, “I hadn’t even finished explaining what I wanted, and you’ve already agreed!” He replied, “I trust you, and I think that everything you request is reasonable. That’s why I agree with whatever you ask for ahead of time!” And we laughed again. On another occasion I came to ask him to have the Iranian government allow its subjects to visit the holy sites in Iraq if they wished to do so, since quite a number of Iraqis went to visit the shrine of Imam Musa Reza in Mashhad, and in the course of their visits they would spend sizable sums of money in Iran. Such visits, then, represented a source of income for Iran

222

My Memoirs

that, in my view, Iran ought to compensate Iraq for through Iranians’ visits to the holy places in Iraq. “What you’re saying may be true,” he replied, “that is, if Iraqis continue to come to Iran in order to visit the shrine of Imam Musa Reza. However, I wonder why the Iraqi government allows its citizens to make this visit? Rather than demanding that Iran compensate it for what Iraqi visitors spend in Iran, Iraq should forbid its citizens to come to Iran in the first place, since in this way, each country’s wealth will be kept where it is, and there won’t be any need for either demands or compensation. Iran is determined not to allow its citizens to visit Iraq because poverty-stricken Iranians slave away all year long in order to save up, out of their meager wages, a sum of money that they then spend in Iraq with nothing to show for it. This money goes to mercenaries who have nothing better to do than to swindle poor people like these and rob them of their hard-earned dirhams. So if Iran is determined not to allow such people to go to Iraq, it would be better for Iraq not to allow its citizens to visit the holy places in Iran. If it were to do this, the problem would be solved, since the money such people spend in their own countries would support their own economy, which would contribute to their own prosperity and well-being.” This, then, is the way the man thought. Teymourtash enjoyed favor with the shah, and his word was a powerful force behind Iran’s guiding policies. However, there were those who envied him his prestige and position and who sought to poison the shah’s mind against him. The accusations that were made against Teymourtash might have been justified in view of certain practices that, carried along by environmental influences or Iranian traditions that had prevailed from time immemorial, he was known to engage in. Gift giving, for example, is a widespread phenomenon in Iran, and while there are, in all countries, those who stand willing to exploit circumstances to their own benefit, the numbers of such people are greater in Iran than they are elsewhere. Teymourtash’s outward appearance and lifestyle were several cuts above those of others, and the vast expenditures these undoubtedly required led some to suggest that he was taking improper advantage of his position. Was this happening through bribes, through gifts, or in some other fashion? No one could say for certain. However, Teymourtash maintained three mansions filled with the most elegant and sumptuous of furnishings, and every one of which contained the most modern, luxurious comforts, not to mention the fact that he was the owner of three private automobiles and employed untold numbers of servants. So it was obvious that his salary as a government official would not have been sufficient to cover half of what he spent regularly on himself and his three households. Add to this the fact that he was given to gambling and, as rumor had it, would lose large sums on a regular basis. It was even reported by those familiar with events behind the scenes that

Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran

223

when the shah heard of Teymourtash’s gambling losses, he would take it upon himself to give him bonuses to keep him afloat.

‘Abd al-Hussein Teymourtash’s Demise Be that as it may, given Teymourtash’s widespread fame and his powerful influence in affairs of state, a major French newspaper published a caricature of Iran in which the state was represented by a large cart driven by Teymourtash. The cart was being drawn by two feeble-looking horses, the first of which was the shah of Iran and the other of which was Iran’s prime minister. The caricature’s clear implications and the anecdotes and stories about Teymourtash that accompanied it may have helped to arouse the shah’s suspicions and a growing fear of Teymourtash’s influence. If we assume that, as people were claiming during his fall from grace, Teymourtash’s misfortune was the fruit of his own wrongdoings, the bribes he took, and the like, then how does one explain the fact that these things came to light at that time in particular, whereas Teymourtash had occupied this position of his for years on end, during which he had been engaging in the same sorts of behavior and maintaining the same sort of lifestyle? Nevertheless, the only obvious way Teymourtash could be isolated based on an edict from the shah that would result in his trial and imprisonment would be to claim that he was guilty of actions that had been corrupt and harmful to the state. Teymourtash was convicted and sentenced to prison, and his wealth was confiscated in compensation for the damage he was said to have caused. He had hardly been in prison for two months when we learned of his death. The investigation revealed that he had consumed a large quantity of opium. Hence, it seemed that after being consigned to a life in prison, he had decided that he couldn’t bear to go on living, and he committed suicide. Thus ended the life of a man who had undoubtedly been the most powerful driving force behind Iran’s modern renaissance.

Note 1. The Sa‘dabad Pact was a nonaggression treaty signed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan on July 8, 1937. The pact was signed in Sa‘dabad Palace outside of Tehran.

13 At the League of Nations

~

To Geneva In October 1933, I received a telegram from Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking me whether I would be willing to go to Geneva as a permanent delegate to the League of Nations. I agreed to do so provided that I be allowed to travel to Geneva at the beginning of April 1934. I also requested a vacation in Baghdad. I was granted the vacation I had requested. However, the ministry did not agree to my other stipulation, namely, that I be able to leave for Geneva during the new fiscal year. When I arrived in Baghdad it was explained to me that I needed to be present in Geneva no later than January 1934, because the Assyrian issue was going to be presented to the League of Nations Special Committee on the Assyrians. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus insisted that I leave as soon as possible. My duties in Tehran were thus terminated and there was no need for me to return there in order to present my letter of farewell to the shah in keeping with the usual protocol, since this could be done by my successor when he presented his credentials. I asked the chargé d’affaires who had replaced me in Tehran to facilitate my family’s departure and to prepare an official inventory of the embassy’s assets and furnishings, then send me everything that was itemized in these records. I also explained to him that I was going to donate to the embassy a good number of my own things, which I would not be needing in Baghdad in view of the fact that I would be leaving immediately for Europe. These included chairs, dishes, utensils, and other domestic items. On December 18, 1933, I left for Geneva on the Taurus fast train, leaving my family in Baghdad. I arrived in Istanbul on December 24 and spent 225

226

My Memoirs

Christmas there, then continued on my way to Switzerland. On December 30 I arrived in Geneva, where I celebrated New Year’s Day.

The Permanent Iraqi Delegation I had been given the arduous task of establishing the headquarters of the permanent Iraqi delegation to Geneva and fitting it out with everything it needed by way of household effects, furniture, and the like. I say “arduous” because, given the strain I had been under in Tehran, the last thing I needed was to be responsible for the establishment of yet another Iraqi mission abroad. Nevertheless, I rose to the occasion, the delegation’s headquarters were made ready for operation, and we began our work as delegates to the League of Nations. Iraq’s job on the international committee assigned to look into the Assyrians’ situation was a highly demanding one, since the members who represented the various states on the committee, and who had been appointed by the League of Nations Council to look into the Assyrians’ petitions, thought in one way, while we and the Assyrians thought in another. The Assyrians in Iraq had come to the country in the hope of establishing a national homeland in the north and restoring the glory of their forefathers. Moreover, they anticipated assistance in their effort from the colonialist British state, since through them Britain would be able to keep close watch on everything taking place in Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. In this way, the Assyrians would be able to facilitate application of Britain’s policy of “control and corrupt” in the Middle East, and their enclave would provide safe haven for all manner of foreign intrigues. Unfortunately for them, they were overly anxious to see their demands fulfilled, since they were apparently quite inexperienced in life, and most of them were simpleminded, opportunistic folk who understood little about the requirements of the age in which they were living or the intricacies of politics.

The Assyrians’ Folly When they found themselves supported by the power of Great Britain, the Assyrians assumed that it was just a matter of time before their demands were met. So, instead of acting reasonably, they turned reckless and, in the grip of blind arrogance, began provoking people with their terrorist acts, cruel behavior, and open insults to the people of the country. Although they had hoped to hasten the fulfillment of their demands, the Assyrians became vulnerable to the loss of their positions, homes, and shelters in Iraq, and they suffered a mortal blow. They were removed from the country and fled to Syria, and those remaining were entirely eliminated.

At the League of Nations

227

Mar Shimun and the Archbishop of Canterbury The Assyrians had powerful spokespersons outside of Iraq whose voices were heard here and there—particularly among the British people—because their patriarch, Mar Shimun, was on good terms with the archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Cosmo Lang. A senior official in the Anglican church, Dr. Lang favored Mar Shimun, a conceited young man at the time, with various sorts of assistance and protection. Thanks to his position of prominence in Britain, the archbishop exerted a significant influence on the British government, which requested that a special committee, to be known as “The Assyrians’ Committee,” be formed to look into their affairs and provide them with safe havens or residences in countries other than Iraq. However, responsibility for their upkeep would be laid upon Iraq, whose economic situation was already quite bleak, as was its political situation. Iraq bore what it could of this responsibility and refused what it could. We were in an awkward position on the aforementioned committee, as we were faced with questions and inquiries that, frankly speaking, we found laughable. Nevertheless, we replied to them tactfully to avoid placing ourselves in impossible positions.

Silly Questions Committee members would ask about the comfort level of Assyrian migrants, a large percentage of whom had been housed in tents in Iraq and who now awaited relocation to permanent residences outside of Iraq if such could be found. They would ask, for example, whether the migrants were able to take a hot bath every day, whether each family had been provided with a bathtub, and how much chlorine was allotted to each individual migrant for the purpose of sterilizing wash water. In reply to such embarrassing questions, we would tell them that we treated the Assyrians the same way we treated the country’s native residents, and that if these people (that is, native Iraqis) were being assured of a life of ease, including daily baths and other creature comforts, we would not deny such things to the Assyrian refugees. The harshest of all the committee members was a woman representing Norway, who asked the most nitpicking, embarrassing questions of all and launched vicious attacks on us, asking us at the same time to do the impossible for these disaster-stricken refugees. We treated her with courtesy, doing everything in our power to persuade her of our position. In the end, however, it was only Divine Providence that delivered us from the wickedness of the Assyrians, who asked to be allowed to emigrate immediately to any location they chose or to leave their tents and scatter throughout the

228

My Memoirs

country. We agreed to their request, which cost us quite a large sum. Many of them wanted to join relatives living in Syria, and we allowed them to do so. In this way we were able to resolve this dilemma in a manner that coincided with Iraqi interests, although the expenses borne by Iraq as a result of this problem amounted to nearly 1 million dinars.

The League’s Weakness and Strength In the political sphere, one sign of the league’s weakness was that it avoided making decisions on international issues, resorting instead to procrastination and stalling lest it arouse the ire of this or that country and risk exacerbating the situation even more. In the technical sphere, by contrast, the efforts exerted by this organization were commendable, and its staff included some of the best experts in the world in the areas of economics, statistics, social science, and the like. As a result, the League of Nations’ detailed research and publications relating to nonpolitical issues in virtually every branch of human activity were highly useful. Examples include its work on social problems, such as unemployment and its causes, drug use and the reasons for its spread, prostitution and the circumstances and conditions that accompany it, and others. In all these areas its work was quite impressive.

Iraqi Delegation Withdraws from the League of Nations Once the issue surrounding the Assyrians’ situation had been resolved, Iraq’s function in the League of Nations became quite limited, since Iraq was not yet a state whose international interests required it to be in frequent contact with other states, nor had it achieved a political status that gave it full freedom to act of its own accord. Consequently, I proposed that at the appropriate time, we save the sizable sums of money that were being spent on the Iraqi delegation in Geneva, particularly in view of the fact that the League of Nations had been steadily losing strength and influence due to the intense disagreements that had emerged between the major powers. Germany was preparing to withdraw from the league, as was Japan, and even Italy had threatened from time to time to pull out. In fact, the League of Nations had been sickly since its birth, since the United States had never joined it and had actually held itself aloof from the organization, which had weakened it even in the prime of its youth. Contrary to the high expectations that had been inspired by its founding charter, the league had become incapable of solving the world’s problems. So,

At the League of Nations

229

given Iraq’s lack of stature in the realm of international politics, what point was there in its maintaining a permanent delegation in Geneva? As a weak participant in a weak international forum, Iraq found it clearly unwise to pursue this particular involvement. For all the reasons mentioned thus far, I was determined that we should withdraw the Iraqi delegation at the proper time. After spending eight months in Geneva, I returned to Iraq on vacation. I decided to go back by way of Italy, which I had never seen before. The presence of a friend of mine, Ihsan al-Jabiri, who had been planning to travel to Syria, was an added incentive to make the visit. Ihsan al-Jabiri was intimately familiar with Rome and was a friend of Italy’s dictator, Benito Mussolini.

To See Mussolini I traveled to Rome with Ihsan al-Jabiri on May 8, 1934, and we arrived there that evening. We contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and explained that I would like to meet with Il Duce, as Mussolini was known among them. Thanks to al-Jabiri’s good offices, an appointment was made for me to meet him on May 10 at 3:00 p.m. At the agreed-upon time, we were sent a private car from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that remained at our disposal until we left Rome. While in the hotel, the chauffeur gave me colored pieces of paper— some of them white, some yellow, and some red—and instructed me in how to use them when I got to the palace. After telling me to produce the white papers at the palace entrance to the person who received us, he escorted me to the elevator. He then drove me to the Venezia Palace, where Mussolini’s office was located. An old building with an old architectural style, it was nevertheless spacious and graced with the most opulent old furnishings. When we got to the first floor I was received by two men to whom I showed the yellow pieces of paper. I then walked with them to a parlor, where we were received by two more men, to whom I showed the red papers. We remained in the parlor for some time while I awaited a signal for me to go in to see Italy’s dictator. At least twenty minutes later, I was approached by a man who gestured to me respectfully to proceed inside, whereupon I accompanied him to an entranceway whose door he opened for me. We then entered a large room nearly thirty meters in length and fifteen meters wide, which was devoid of furniture with the exception of a chair on which Mussolini sat, a huge desk, a leather-upholstered sofa, and a huge armchair. When I entered the room, Mussolini got up from where he had been seated at a distance and advanced slightly in my direction. When I reached the place where he was standing, I shook his hand respectfully and was received with a smile. I found that Il Duce spoke fluent French, albeit with a noticeable Italian accent.

230

My Memoirs

After being queried about my journey, whether I liked Rome, and other introductory questions, I said, “What brings me to Rome isn’t the desire to see its ancient ruins, mention of which fills history books all over the world and which have taught the entire world about the glory of Rome and its empire, since these things have now become common knowledge. Rather, what brings me here is my interest in seeing Fascist Rome. I want to see how Italy has been able to throw off the yoke of foreign domination, regain its freedom, and progress toward the recovery of its ancient glory. We Arabs have suffered for some time under European colonialism and we are still struggling to win our freedom. We lack knowledge of the things that have enabled Italy to achieve its nationalist aims. Hence, I have come to Rome to study these means and methods and apply them in my own country.” Then I continued, “Everyone who works in international affairs should make a careful study of the rapid development Italy has achieved politically, economically, and socially. As Iraq’s permanent delegate to the League of Nations, I feel a constant need to study the affairs of European countries with their various systems and types of government.” Pleased with my introductory remarks, Il Duce replied by saying that, although he knew little about Iraq, he knew more about the condition of the Arabs as a whole and about their former glory in history. He told me that he had been delighted to see Iraq beginning to enjoy greater autonomy and freedom, since he had entertained the hope that it could restore the legendary golden age of Harun al-Rashid. Then he added, “Although it’s been said that the treaty that binds Iraq to the British has undermined Iraq’s political freedom, I believe the British are sincere in the promises they have made, and that they want only what is good for Iraq. In my view, therefore, it is in Iraq’s best interest to reach a mutual understanding with Britain.” Then he asked me about King Ghazi’s recent marriage to ‘Aliya, daughter of King ‘Ali of the Hejaz and thus his paternal cousin. Then he added, “I would have expected King Ghazi to marry the daughter of one of the kings of the neighboring Arab states or some other Islamic country for the sake of cementing ties between them. If he’d had the opportunity to marry one of Egyptian king Fu‘ad’s daughters, this would have been better for both sides since, in my view, there is no point in remaining within the narrow circle of blood relations when it would be better for their respective countries to allow marriage to become a way of broadening their horizons.” Mussolini went on to speak of the personal friendship that existed between King Fu‘ad of Egypt and the king of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III, who had known each other since childhood, and how King Fu‘ad spoke Italian better than the Italians themselves. Then he said, “Italy’s ties with Egypt are still strong, and it was a great disappointment to me that Egypt failed in its aspiration to cancel foreign concessions. I regret the fact that Italy was obliged to go along with the

At the League of Nations

231

foreign states that possessed these concessions, and the fact that it didn’t help Egypt to cancel the concessions. Nevertheless, I am willing to agree to their cancellation despite the plots France is hatching to keep the concessions in effect. I would like to see Italy’s ties with the Arabs grow stronger and stronger. Consequently, I plan to fund a special chair in Arab literature and history at the University of Rome so that Italians can learn more about the glory the Arabs once knew and Iraq’s golden age.” My conversation with Mussolini went on for around forty-five minutes. After I had thanked him for his gracious reception of me, he kindly escorted me to the door. I learned later that the welcome I had received and the length of the time I had spent with Il Duce had been a rare occurrence, since it was generally understood that no one was granted an audience with him for more than fifteen minutes.

A Service to Egypt I also learned that Il Duce had been quite enthusiastic about our meeting. So, wanting to be of service to Egypt in this connection, I went forthwith to the Egyptian embassy in Rome to see ‘Abd al-Karim Safwat, the embassy’s first secretary, whom I had known in Tehran when he was a low-ranking secretary at the Egyptian embassy there. I told him of my desire to speak with the Egyptian ambassador in Rome at that time, Sadiq Wahbah Bek, and he in turn spoke to the ambassador on my behalf. When I went in to see him, he received me warmly, and I said, “I feel it my duty toward Iraq’s sister state, Egypt, to do anything I can to further its aspirations for autonomy and judicial independence.” I mentioned to him that in my conversation with Mussolini, he had expressed his willingness to agree to the cancellation of foreign concessions in Egypt if the Egyptian government persevered in its demand for such and if it pursued this demand vigorously through judicial channels. I also told him of the way Mussolini had condemned France, accusing it of plotting to prevent these concessions from being abolished. The Egyptian ambassador then sent a telegram to Cairo in which he informed the Egyptian government of what I had said. I later learned that the king of Egypt and the Egyptian government had deeply appreciated this gesture of mine, and when I met with King Fu‘ad for the first time later, he expressed his gratitude to me.

Doing Rome I stayed in Rome for fifteen days, and it was a very useful visit, as it was the first time I had had the opportunity to become personally acquainted with Italy. The following three factors made the visit even more useful.

232

My Memoirs

First, I had a rapid means of transportation available to me thanks to the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had kindly placed a luxurious car at my disposal for the duration of my stay, as a result of which we were able to go wherever we wanted. Second, the company of my friend Ihsan Bek al-Jabiri, who had long been in close contact with Italy’s leading men, including Mussolini, and who was well informed about its public affairs, was a great help to me in the process of learning more about the country. Third, since I was not bound by other commitments during my visit to Italy, I was free to devote the time necessary to observing events, sights, and people. Like everyone who comes to Rome, of course, I had to visit its archeological sites, which are so numerous it is well-nigh impossible to see them all in such a short time. The Roman Forum and the palaces of ancient Roman emperors found in various locations throughout the country, not to mention the ruins of Pompeii and other famous sites, are well worth any tourist’s time and attention. There are no fewer than 400 churches in Rome, from St. Peter’s Basilica to the Scala Santa, or Holy Stairs. Hence, these sites alone would have been sufficient to take up our every moment. As for the Vatican and the Christian heritage it contains, it is beyond description. It seems to me that if anyone undertook a thorough study of what is found in the Vatican Palace by way of historical artifacts, documents, and the like, he would need a lifetime to complete it.

The General State of Affairs in Italy The general state of affairs in Italy at that time was one of complete, abject submission to the will of Il Duce. Based on numerous conversations with well-informed individuals in Italy, I concluded that in the beginning of Fascist rule, the efforts made by Il Duce had been of great benefit to Italy, having transformed it from a backward, poverty-stricken country, which, policy-wise, had for long years been at the mercy of Britain and at the mercy of Europe for the meeting of its material needs, into a country that commanded others’ respect and had a significant role to play in European politics. Prior to the coming of Fascism, Italy had been close to becoming Communist and anarchist. A number of factory workers had actually taken over and occupied factories, then began running them however they saw fit. However, this ignorant management of theirs had done nothing but destroy productivity in the factories and led Italy to the brink of collapse. In fact, it was the actions of those who referred to themselves as Fascists that rescued Italy from ruin.

At the League of Nations

233

Fascism The use of the word Fascist was intended as a reminder of Rome’s bygone glory and as a symbol of the unification of sincere, active, patriotic elements that had once been scattered and ineffectual and which, now that they were unified, had become a source of strength. The Italian word fascio hearkens back to the Latin fasces, which was an axe surrounded by a bundle of rods held by guards, or lictors, who stood at either side of the magistrate in a Roman court, thereby reminding those in the court that they were in the presence of both power and justice. If anyone violated another’s rights or the sanctity of the state, they would punish him by beating him with the rods and breaking his head with the axe. The Fascists adopted this symbol in order to express their determination to coordinate their efforts and form themselves into a power that would drive foes out of their land and defeat the anarchic forces that had been unleashed among the populace. From there this slogan went on to become a social and political philosophy that ordered Italy’s affairs quite well, at least in the beginning. However, through their own misconduct, the Fascists widened the gap between themselves and the populace, taking all decision making into their own hands and waging war on everyone who had a mind to oppose them or criticize their actions. Consequently, Fascism’s reputation began to suffer and the movement lost effectiveness. With dreams of restoring Rome’s long-lost glory and establishing a far-flung Roman empire that would encompass the Mediterranean Sea as though it were nothing but a large Italian lake, the Fascist government entered into petty quarrels with other European states and distanced itself from European policy as a whole. In order for Fascist Italy to be able to oppose the rest of Europe, it had to tighten its belt and strive for material self-sufficiency, which was far from an easy task. This policy, not surprisingly, impoverished and alienated the Italian people. Something I noted during my visit there were people’s constant complaints over the terrible injustice they were suffering, including backbreaking taxes. However, there was nothing they could do to improve their lot, since the Fascist regime with its crushing power was set to destroy any individual who dared stand up to it. A wealthy man by the name of Count Ricardo with whom I became acquainted during my visit to Italy and who owned a good deal of real estate told me that every time elections were held in Italy, he would try to get elected to parliament. However, despite his vast wealth and the fact that his farmers and others associated with him could have elected him single-handedly without intervention from anyone, he was unable to win a seat in parliament, since his own efforts toward this end would avail him nothing without the support of the Fascist Party itself. In order to win such support, he would have had to enter into negotiations with the party, pledge his loyalty to it, and

234

My Memoirs

present it with a sizable gift. In addition, he would have had to pledge his parliamentary allowances to the party for the duration of his time in office. Only in this way would he have been able to enter parliament while preserving his influence and keeping his property safe from harm. As for mismanagement, corruption, bribery, and the like, Count Ricardo told me that such phenomena had run rampant in Italy under Fascist rule.

Back to Baghdad: The Jamil al-Midfa‘i Cabinet We then left Rome for Naples, Italy’s magnificent port, where we boarded a ship to Port Said. From there we continued our journey to Beirut, Damascus, and lastly, Baghdad, which we reached on June 6, 1934. Jamil al-Midfa‘i’s first cabinet was formed at a time when the political situation was unstable. His cabinet included two powerful figures who were vying for influence, namely, Nuri al-Sa‘id, minister of foreign affairs, and Muhammad Rustum Haydar, minister of transportation and public works. Two months after the cabinet was formed, it became apparent that mutual understanding among its members was an impossibility, and it resigned. The challenge faced by the next person to form a cabinet, namely, Jamil alMidfa‘i himself, was to appoint one of the two contenders for influence and exclude the other. In the process of making the relevant decisions, alMidfa‘i consulted my brother, Naji al-Suwaydi, who advised him to appoint neither of the two men. If he followed my brother’s advice, however, the cabinet would lack the types of prominent personalities whose presence in a cabinet was considered desirable by public opinion. It would thus be necessary to find one or two influential people to replace them. Together with ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, head of the Royal Administrative Office, the prime minister sought to persuade Naji al-Suwaydi to join the cabinet, and by dint of great effort, as well as the intercession of King Ghazi, who insisted that Naji accept the invitation, they succeeded.

Jamil al-Midfa‘i’s Second Cabinet Al-Midfa‘i’s second cabinet was thus formed without Nuri al-Sa‘id, Muhammad Rustum Haydar, or Nasrat al-Farisi, who had been minister of finance. A dispute had arisen among these three men when the minister of transportation and public works challenged the authority of the minister of finance by failing to consult him over the Gharraf project and other matters. As a result, Nuri al-Sa‘id was replaced as minister of foreign affairs by ‘Abdullah al-Damluji, Nasrat al-Farisi was replaced as minister of finance by Naji al-Suwaydi, and Muhammad Rustum Haydar was replaced

At the League of Nations

235

as minister of transportation and public works by ‘Abbas Mahdi. During its four months in office, al-Midfa‘i’s second cabinet exhibited weakness in its foreign policy. Hence, in an effort to strengthen itself in this area, it was decided to appoint a new and more effective minister of foreign affairs. I was approached about this matter by the prime minister while I was on vacation. However, I hesitated to accept his invitation for a number of reasons. The first of these was the fact that if a cabinet is weak after four months in office, it is difficult to revive it by introducing new elements. I had also intended to remain in the diplomatic corps for a longer period of time and was not inclined to return to work in the central government. Third, the element on which a cabinet generally relies for its longevity, namely, a political party to support it from within parliament, was missing, as there was no such party to support al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet at that time. Moreover, I was acutely aware that no leadership could be expected from King Ghazi, who had little interest in the affairs of state and was unwilling to assume the responsibilities associated with his position as the nation’s highest authority.

‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi and the Cabinet The final reason I cited for my unwillingness to accept an appointment as minister of foreign affairs was that the presence of two brothers in the same cabinet, although it was permissible and had happened on previous occasions, was nevertheless bound to lead to envy and strife in view of Iraqi politicians’ petulance, intolerance, and unfortunate tendency to squabble over inconsequential matters. After listing all these reasons for my refusal, I advised the prime minister to resign and leave the matter to ‘Ali Jawdat alAyyubi, whom I knew to be quite anxious to form a cabinet. For although he was attempting to conceal his wishes, he wasn’t doing a very good job of it. In a meeting I attended at the royal court with the prime minister, my brother Naji, and ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, lengthy discussions led ultimately to the conclusion that Jamil al-Midfa‘i and ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi would need to remain in their posts. At that point there was even greater pressure on me to accept an appointment as minister of foreign affairs. I ended up succumbing to the pressure and accepting the appointment. However, all the problems I had anticipated became a reality, and following my decision to join the cabinet, it survived a sum total of forty days. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, was approached with requests to have King Ghazi persuade the prime minister to resign. The king made clear to the prime minister that he was not satisfied with the way things were going in his cabinet and obliged him to step down. The cabinet secretary then requested that we attend an unexpected meeting in

236

My Memoirs

which the prime minister informed us that, because governmental affairs were not proceeding in a manner satisfactory to the king, he had tendered his resignation and it had been accepted.

‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi’s Cabinet Thus was the way prepared for the formation of a cabinet by ‘Ali Jawdat alAyyubi despite the fact that when we had discussed the matter forty days earlier and agreed unanimously that Jamil al-Midfa‘i ought to step down and allow a new cabinet to be formed under either his leadership or that of Naji al-Suwaydi, al-Ayyubi had rejected the idea. Al-Ayyubi’s cabinet was based on foundations even more flimsy than those that had upheld the previous cabinet. Specifically, it faced an intractable problem, namely, that ‘Abd al-Wahid al-Hajj Sukkar and others in al-Furat, a town some thirty kilometers southwest of Baghdad, had been opposed to alMidfa‘i’s cabinet based on the fact that it was supported by al-Ayyubi. How much more, then, could they be expected to oppose al-Ayyubi’s own cabinet? The weakness of the new cabinet was evident from its very inception. It encountered intense opposition in the Senate, which was headed by Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani. The dispute between these two branches of the government reached a point where the Senate decided to stall on the budget that had been approved by the House of Representatives. Hence, when, after its approval in the House, the budget went to the Senate, action on it came to a halt, and whenever the cabinet tried to get the Senate to discuss it, its efforts came to naught. Lawyers and a good number of politicians led impassioned demonstrations against the new cabinet, and demonstrators decided to meet in a wellknown location in al-Salihiyah to make protest speeches. However, they were forbidden to do so by the police on the pretext that they had not received a permit from the government, although the aforesaid meeting was to be held in a roofed-in area and therefore required no permit. In view of the evident lack of support for his cabinet, al-Ayyubi was obliged to submit his resignation, and it was accepted. Jamil al-Midfa‘i was then appointed to form his third cabinet. However, by now the atmosphere was even more explosive than it had been before. No sooner had arrangements been made for the swearing-in ceremony than reports came in of a powerful revolt in al-Furat, as a result of which the government prepared to launch a military campaign against it. This was followed by reports of a similar uprising in the region of Abu Sukhayr and al-Shamiyah, where rebels had set fire to the wooden bridge over a certain waterway in order to prevent the government forces from reaching them. An investigation revealed that the rebel movement was being supported by a large number of politicians, including Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani and Yasin al-Hashimi. As for

At the League of Nations

237

Nuri al-Sa‘id, it appeared that, although he had not taken part in the movement, he was nevertheless among its supporters.

Commander ‘Abd al-Latif Nuri’s Report The Ministry of Defense was headed at that time by Rashid al-Khawjah, and the Ministry of the Interior by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qassab. It therefore fell to these two men to make the necessary preparations for the government’s military campaign against the rebels. However, clear thinking and decisive action on the part of the government were constantly being hampered by political maneuvers, and the army’s supreme command was guilty of unconscionable sluggishness and indecisiveness in its preparations for the contemplated campaign. The cabinet had asked the minister of defense to make ready for the campaign, in response to which he prepared a report that was presented to the cabinet by General Commander ‘Abd al-Latif Nuri via Lieutenant General Taha al-Hashimi, chief of general staff. According to this report, there was no benefit to be gained from launching such a campaign because weather conditions were bad, the soldiers were not properly equipped and organized, and there were insufficient means of transportation. Conditions were so discouraging, the report went on to add, that there was reason to fear that some of the government forces might join the rebels, since some of them belonged to the rebel tribes. In sum, the report was filled with such patently unreasonable and unrealistic arguments against the feasibility of launching the disciplinary campaign that the cabinet had reason to wonder whether it had been penned by the commander of the Iraqi armed forces or by the leader of the rebels himself. And in fact, some members of the cabinet asked the prime minister and the minister of defense to take measures to have the general commander removed from his post and replaced by someone whose words and actions reflected greater astuteness and foresight. It was later revealed that the commander had received instructions from certain politicians to use the report he had been asked to prepare as a means of demoralizing the government in relation to the proposed campaign, thereby aggravating the situation in such a way that the cabinet would be forced to resign, after which it could be replaced by a cabinet composed of politicians who supported the rebellion.

The Sulaykh Conference There was talk here and there about something termed the Sulaykh Conference, which was a meeting that had taken place between rebel leaders in al-Furat and politicians in Baghdad. The purpose of the meeting had been

238

My Memoirs

to embarrass King Ghazi and force him to form a cabinet headed by Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani, Yasin al-Hashimi, and others. When the cabinet began its discussion of whether the government should take steps to quell the rebellion or resign, the prevailing mood was one of powerlessness and irresolution, and there was virtually no inclination to adopt a firm stance. Rather, the approach most of them favored was that of retreat, then resignation. The prime minister and I were the only two people in favor of taking decisive, forceful action. However, we agreed to summon Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, in view of his long experience, as well as the chief of general staff, General Taha al-Hashimi, in order to discuss the commander’s report with them. The two men joined us at a late hour of the night. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis was of the view that the government should take immediate steps to bring the rebellion to an end, since failure to do so would have dire consequences for the future of the state. As for the claim that the government forces were too weak to cope with the situation, he denied its validity. In fact, he asserted, the police force alone would be able to defeat the rebels. As for the chief of general staff, the only unequivocal thing he had to say on the matter was that his job was to carry out whatever instructions he received from the government without question. Hence, if the government decided to strike back at the rebels, he would take whatever measures were needed to launch a campaign against them. As for the army commander’s report, he described it as exaggerated and distorted. When the meeting was adjourned at 2:00 a.m., no decision had been made. Hence, it was obvious that the cabinet wanted simply to stall and procrastinate. It even opened the door to negotiations with the rebels through the mediation of the minister of the interior, who was asked to travel immediately to al-Furat to investigate the matter, then report his findings to the cabinet. All these feeble attempts to address the situation were eloquent proof of the cabinet’s lack of cohesion and fortitude. Their talk of the need to withdraw and avoid striking the rebels similarly betrayed their lack of resolve. Seeing this, I told them that if they wanted to do themselves and the country a favor, they would avoid cabinet positions in the future, since government work wasn’t something one simply did for a living but, rather, a responsibility involving dangers that could only be faced properly by individuals free of personal ambition. As the ministers adjourned their meeting, reports were coming in from time to time indicating that conditions in al-Furat were deteriorating.

Muhammad Rustum Haydar The following day I was approached at the Iraq Club by Muhammad Rustum Haydar, chief of the royal court, who said he wished to speak with me

At the League of Nations

239

about an important matter. He began by saying that he did not believe our cabinet had the strength to strike down the rebels, since the minister of the interior was not convinced that this was necessary and was actually doing everything in his power to delay any decisive disciplinary action. Moreover, although such a delay was bound to be harmful to the country, it was futile to try to force him to take measures that he himself wasn’t willing to take. In response, I said, “When this cabinet was formed, I asked the prime minister to give me the Ministry of the Interior, but he refused to do so because he knew me to be a hard-liner and he feared that I might cause problems for the cabinet as a result. Instead, he gave me the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of the Interior went to Nuri al-Sa‘id.” Then I added, “If I were given responsibility for this situation, I would take measures that would put down this rebellion in short order and restore security to the country. My only stipulation would be that I be given complete freedom to act as I see fit, and that the royal court not succumb to weakness, hesitation, and misgivings the way it’s been known to do for so long.”

With the Minister of the Interior Muhammad Rustum Haydar then asked me to accompany him to the Ministry of the Interior so that we could encourage ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qassab, who was vacillating and seemed incapable of decisive action. By this time it was 11:00 p.m. When we arrived, we found the minister deep in thought, contemplating all manner of scenarios, most of which were entirely unlikely, and all of which supported his inclination not to take the situation in hand. The next day we were asked to attend a cabinet meeting in which the prime minister told us that he had tendered his resignation to King Ghazi, and that it had been accepted.

The Yasin al-Hashimi Cabinet The most recent cabinet had lasted all of twelve days, after which Yasin alHashimi was appointed to form the new cabinet. Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani was given the Ministry of the Interior, Nuri al-Sa‘id the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ja‘far al-‘Askari the Ministry of Defense. As for the rebellion, it ended as a matter of course, since its demands had been met and its friends had come to power.

The Tribes Celebrate The rebels organized an armed motorcade in which they entered the capital as victors, then came to the prime minister offering their congratulations to

240

My Memoirs

the new cabinet. However, the city was in an uproar over the realization that these tribal heads had come to enjoy such influence in the country. And as a matter of fact, within a few months these tribal chiefs had begun demanding special rights and powers for themselves and insisting that scores be settled in ways that were beneficial to them and harmful to others in relation to lands, property, influence, and the like. Not surprisingly, this development alarmed the cabinet, whose members began to wonder what would become of the country if things continued in this manner, especially now that those opposed to the rebels envied them the favor they now enjoyed with the government.

Striking the Tribes Those opposed to the current situation had growing reasons for concern, since they were now at the mercy of both the government and the rebel leaders. At the same time, the rebels themselves had begun opposing the government and were doing everything they could to resist its authority. As a consequence, the government was forced within months of its accession to power to strike back at the rebels. Its first campaign, in which it bombarded the outskirts of al-Furat, was a brilliant success and dealt the death blow to any hope that the government would kowtow to whoever sought to impose his will on it. It then organized a second campaign in southern Iraq, which was likewise a great success. Wherever the government sent its forces, their efforts were crowned with success, and its influence and prestige grew accordingly. These events supported what I had told al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet sometime before, namely, that if it wished to ensure its survival and preserve its dignity, the government would have to take harsh measures against those who rose up against it. My point of view had also been supported by Sir Kinahan Cornwallis in his capacity as an expert on Iraqi internal affairs. And in fact, security was now restored all over Iraq. At the same time, however, the government remained in the hands of a bunch of plebeian politicians and their cronies, who managed its affairs with a reckless self-confidence that bordered on conceit and arrogance. Yet even in the midst of all this confusion, the royal court lifted not a finger and did nothing to contribute to any sort of order. On the contrary, it was content to remain subject to the will of the government.

The Ministers Are Split down the Middle The government was riddled with personal ambitions. At the same time, disagreements had emerged among the ministers themselves, who were

At the League of Nations

241

now divided into two camps. One of these was represented by Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani and Yasin al-Hashimi, while the other was represented by Nuri al-Sa‘id and Ja‘far al-‘Askari. Each of these two pairs controlled a number of the remaining ministers on whom they relied for support. As a consequence, the cabinet was being pulled to and fro by two competing policies. In this connection, I recall being invited once to a dinner being hosted by the prime minister in honor of the emir of Kuwait, Shaikh Ahmad Jabir alSabah, and at which all of the ministers were present. At the time I was serving as comptroller general. I had chosen this position so that I could distance myself from the rough-and-tumble of politics, which I felt offered no benefit either to me or to the country, particularly now that political life seemed to consist of nothing but endless intrigue and revolution.

Ja‘far al-‘Askari Speaks Disgruntled over the actions of the prime minister, Yasin al-Hashimi, and the minister of the interior, Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani, Ja‘far al-‘Askari once complained to me that they were running the cabinet like a couple of despots and that they did whatever they thought would increase their own influence without regard for the interests of the country. In response, I told him that either he could prevent them from doing things that he considered harmful, or he could step down from the cabinet and leave them to do as they pleased. He apparently didn’t like what I had to say, so he avoided answering me, contenting himself instead with more grumbling and complaining.

Serving as Comptroller General As was to be expected, popular resentment against the conduct of the prime minister and the minister of the interior was on the rise. As for me personally, I was only in contact with the government insofar as it pertained to my work as comptroller general. When I was asked what I thought about something, I would state my opinion to the prime minister, with whom I was on good terms. Toward the end of his time in office, the prime minister tried to appoint me as minister of justice, but I declined, reminding him of my determination to steer clear of politics to the greatest extent possible. I was the successor to a very capable British man by the name of Barlby, who had occupied the position of comptroller general for upwards of twenty-five years. I found that this man had been meticulous in his work. However, he had lacked authority over other governmental departments, and the objections that he would raise occasionally in his specialized capacity

242

My Memoirs

tended to fall on deaf ears. Consequently, it fell to me to establish the Comptroller’s Office as a more influential organ and to set it in better order so that it would be in a position to keep strict watch on governmental expenditures. I also added to its list of functions that of overseeing appointments, promotions, vacations, property registration, and other matters that were, in actuality, more sensitive than that of expenditures alone. My efforts in this regard met with success, as evidenced by the fact that other governmental departments would now think twice before making decisions involving monetary expenditures, since they knew they would be answerable to me for any impropriety or wrongdoing. Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashimi was entirely supportive of my work as comptroller general, which was a great help in performing my job effectively. During my time in this position, promotions that were unmerited or that exceeded a single rank came to an end, as did appointments based on illegal criteria, unregulated leaves of absence, and other practices that had been commonplace up to that time. However, the comptroller general’s influence continued to be weakened by the fact that there was no authority to whom appeal could be made to put an actual end to illegal practices and thereby restore things to a proper state of affairs. Rather, all the comptroller general could do was to present a detailed report to the House of Representatives on whatever violations or mistakes had occurred. However, the House of Representatives lacked the time to scrutinize these reports, which would pile up without any concrete action having been taken. The only way any concrete benefit could be achieved was for the comptroller to arrive at an understanding with the relevant governmental departments if such an understanding was possible. Otherwise, the mistakes and violations would continue to be ignored given the absence of any state organ with the authority to correct them.

14 The Ill-Fated Coups Begin

~

The Death of King Faisal I King Faisal I possessed a number of distinctive qualities that placed him in the ranks of the Orient’s greatest men. Acutely intelligent, calm, and selfcomposed, he was a magnanimous man possessed of a powerful resolve that, although it wasn’t always present, would erupt from time to time, then subside again. Thanks to the fortuitous combination of these traits, he filled a huge gap in the life of Iraq. However, after being afflicted with severe arteriosclerosis, his strength began to wane steadily until, on Friday, September 8, 1933, he passed away in Switzerland. The loss of this great man was an earthshaking event, because he had not completed the task he had begun when he became head of the Iraqi state. In the area of foreign policy he had given the country a recognizable direction for a long time to come. However, on the level of domestic policy he had not resolved any of its problems, nor had he provided helpful direction in this sphere. Moreover, his son was not in a position to fill the vacuum that had been left by his father’s demise, in part because he was still so young and inexperienced, and in part because he lacked sufficient intelligence and sophistication. King Ghazi took the throne at a time when the country knew little about where it was going, nor was there any leader to whom the masses felt they owed respect and obedience, since the persona of the deceased monarch had eclipsed, if not obliterated, all other personas. Now, however, the country was in the hands of a king who was buffeted about by his own whims and passions, and it no longer possessed a self-respecting leadership 243

244

My Memoirs

King Ghazi

capable of compensating for what the new king lacked by way of knowledge and skill.

The Army Interferes in Politics As chaos crept into the army’s ranks and officers increasingly interfered in political affairs, a Pandora’s box was opened wide for the exploitation of the army’s power for political ends. King Ghazi acceded to the throne at the time when Yasin al-Hashimi was prime minister. However, Yasin al-Hashimi was someone who liked order and precision and whose policies in relation to affairs of state were not to the king’s liking. Specifically, the prime minister sought to relegate the king to the role of a mere symbol rather than allowing him to be an effective joint ruler. This policy of al-Hashimi’s angered King Ghazi, either because he felt that it limited his freedom to act or because of political intrigues against him carried out by various elements. In any case, King Ghazi was anxious to be out from under the guardianship of the “pashas,” and particularly that of Yasin al-Hashimi. It

The Ill-Fated Coups Begin

245

appears that King Ghazi had been meeting periodically with certain ambitious army officers to whom he had expressed his dissatisfaction with his situation. In fact, it was even said that he was provoking them to work against the government. As I have mentioned, there was disagreement among some of the ministers in Yasin al-Hashimi’s cabinet. Nuri al-Sa‘id, minister of foreign affairs, and Ja‘far al-‘Askari, minister of defense, were not pleased with the expansion of al-Hashimi’s influence, nor with that of his colleague Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani, minister of the interior. Hence, they were unwilling to go on working with these two men; at the same time, however, they did not wish to relinquish power by withdrawing from the government. King Ghazi’s displeasure with the prevailing state of affairs, combined with that of Nuri al-Sa‘id and Ja‘far al-‘Askari, both of whom enjoyed significant influence in the armed forces, thus paved the way for a kind of mutual agreement between the three of them and the army to stage an uprising and use force to oust the current cabinet, then ensure its succession by a cabinet whose policies they approved. The personal rivalries and veiled resentments among members of alHashimi’s second cabinet had contributed to the rise of a high-ranking army officer by the name of Bakr Sidqi. Every one of the influential ministers was doing his best to win Bakr Sidqi over to his side in the hope that Sidqi would support him against his rivals. Making the most of the situation, Bakr Sidqi began entertaining unprecedented ambitions, including the thought of claiming greater power for himself. Whenever he considered actually rising up against the government, he was assailed by fears and misgivings. However, his resolve appears to have been strengthened thanks to encouragement from King Ghazi and certain disgruntled ministers in alHashimi’s cabinet. He was likewise encouraged by contacts with a number of his friends, including Colonel Shakir al-Wadi, who enticed him with the hope of the glory that awaited him if his uprising was successful and he managed to succeed Taha al-Hashimi, whom he disliked, as commander of the Iraqi army. Given the foregoing factors, Bakr Sidqi began laying a plan of action. He had been working for some time to build up a sizable military force at some distance from the capital so that he could use it in an attack on the city. At last the opportunity to do so presented itself when he was called upon to lead ordinary military maneuvers that were to be conducted on the outskirts of Jalulah (about 130 kilometers northeast of Baghdad). Making the most of this occasion, Bakr Sidqi threatened to advance on the city and take it over by force if al-Hashimi’s cabinet remained in power. On the morning of October 29, 1936, two military airplanes flew over Baghdad dropping leaflets that contained the aforementioned ultimatum. They then dropped two bombs near government buildings as a way of making clear that the words contained in the leaflets were no idle threat and that

246

My Memoirs

the warning would be backed up with action if al-Hashimi’s cabinet failed to resign. The cabinet did, in fact, resign on that very day, after which the king appointed Hikmat Sulayman, whose name had been listed in the warning leaflets dropped over Baghdad as the sole candidate for the post of prime minister, to form a new cabinet. The president of the Senate, the speaker of the House of Representatives, the minister of defense, and the minister of foreign affairs met in the royal court. They were then joined by the prime minister, and together they agreed that Hikmat Sulayman should form the new cabinet. Ja‘far al-‘Askari had asked the king to allow him to go out personally to meet the advancing army in an attempt to stop it or, at least, to ascertain its intentions. Those gathered at the royal court tried to prevent him from carrying out his idea due to the seriousness of the situation and the possibility that he might place himself in great danger. However, he insisted on proceeding with his plan. Hence, he went out, taking with him a letter addressed to the army by King Ghazi in which the king commanded it not to advance toward the capital because the former cabinet had resigned and Hikmat Sulayman had been appointed to form a new cabinet. However, al‘Askari never returned, and there was no news of him until the very end of that long day. As for the new cabinet, it had not yet been formed, and there were conflicting reports concerning who would fill the various ministerial posts. According to the last report that had been received in this connection, Ja‘far al-‘Askari and Nuri al-Sa‘id were to be included in the new cabinet. However, when undeniable reports confirmed that al-‘Askari had been assassinated by the approaching army, things changed in a major way, and the new cabinet was formed thereafter with unprecedented speed. Moreover, it included figures who had never served on a cabinet before. Certain well-informed individuals interpreted al-‘Askari’s precipitous move, which had been opposed by virtually everyone who learned of it, as a sign that he had been intending to join the rebel forces along the way, then return with them to the capital to head the revolutionary movement and to remove his rivals from the cabinet. However, his plans had been foiled when the rebels discovered a telegram that he had sent in his capacity as minister of defense to all military units instructing them to wipe out the rebel movement. Once Bakr Sidqi learned of the telegram, he issued instructions for al-‘Askari to be killed without further delay. Those who had engineered the military takeover sought to present themselves as saviors who had come to rescue the country from the clutches of chaos and from the tyrannical rule of the pashas. They promised the people that their policy would be radically different from that of their predecessors, and that they would introduce innovations and improvements into all government facilities and services.

The Ill-Fated Coups Begin

247

It bears noting that it was after this revolution that the workers’ movement emerged for the first time in Iraq, as certain extremists in search of fame and personal advantage set out to form labor unions, and the new government provided them with material and moral support. As for the army, which considered itself a liberator of sorts, it succumbed to a spirit of selfimportance and autocracy and began dictating its wishes to the state in matters great and small. Things deteriorated to the point where certain fanatical officers would insult people in the streets. Worse still, some of them began acting like highway robbers and looting passersby on the Mu’askar alRashid Road. Unfortunately for them, one of their victims turned out to be an expatriate connected to the British embassy, and they were exposed and arrested. Nevertheless, this state of affairs continued all over the country. Terrorism had reached crisis proportions, and death threats had spread to the point where they had become an everyday occurrence. Dhiya’ Yunus, the cabinet secretary, was actually killed, though the circumstances surrounding his murder remained shrouded in mystery. Some claimed later that he had been in possession of documents having to do with Jewish espionage that Yasin al-Hashimi had placed in the cabinet vault and later given to Dhiya’ Yunus for safekeeping. When certain individuals to whom the documents were relevant asked Dhiya’ Yunus to hand them over to them, he had refused and was killed. The state of the country thus went from bad to worse. In order to control the army and guarantee its loyalty and obedience, Bakr Sidqi would work at persuading the government to provide officers and other military personnel with various sorts of concessions, privileges, bonuses, and gifts, none of which served the country’s interests. As for the system to which the previous government had adhered in relation to expenditures and their oversight, it was totally disregarded. Checks were written for hundreds of thousands of dinars to officers who were authorized to purchase airplanes and war equipment on their own. Sent abroad at the government’s expense and without the least oversight, they would spend money like water. Things went on this way for months, and the situation was the cause of increasing concern for those who had the people’s best interests at heart and who feared for both themselves and the future of their country. Consequently, they began forming clandestine blocs in the hope of bringing down this alien, odious regime in whatever way they possibly could so as to deliver the country from the hardships that had been brought upon it. On numerous occasions they attempted without success to assassinate Bakr Sidqi. Then at last, when he was on his way to Turkey on an official mission, they lay in wait for him at the Mosul airport and, upon his arrival there, fell upon him and killed him. There were a number of reasons for these goodhearted people’s desire to do away with Bakr Sidqi. For one thing, his policy was entirely inconsistent with Arab policy in general. Second, he was a merciless tyrant who had corrupted the order on the basis of which the state

248

My Memoirs

had been operating heretofore, replacing it with a terrorist state in which virtually everyone felt afraid for himself, his possessions, and his future. When Bakr Sidqi was killed on August 9, 1937, his reckless regime had been in power for nine months. One of the reasons for the disaffection felt by people all over the country under this regime was its lack of a clearly defined, studied plan of action. When Hikmat Sulayman’s cabinet was formed immediately after the coup, it did not spell out the reforms and improvements it would seek to achieve despite the country’s dire need for them. Sometimes it would act like a pan-Arab regime, and at others like one focused on Iraq first. The majority of the time, however, it was dithering and spineless. Does it make sense for the prime minister to require the government to strengthen its influence and declare its authority by striking out at tribesmen and others who dare rise up against it while at the same time objecting strenuously whenever the government wants to take the disciplinary actions necessary for the welfare of the state? Nevertheless, when the new regime grew feeble and began to crumble, a number of its ministers—being keen to preserve their own reputations, fearing the loss of their influence, and dreading the prospect of becoming nothing more than part of the ruins of a regime now gone with the wind—decided to cut their losses. To this end, they began objecting to the military measures that were being taken by the government against the tribes, alleging that they bore no responsibility for the dictatorial rule represented by Bakr Sidqi. They then proceeded to resign, knowing, of course, that nothing had changed to justify such a move on their part. After all, controlling people by striking terror in their hearts and neglecting good governance and the interests of the population had been the order of the day from the time the dictator had taken the reins of power. As long as they had been in his good graces and had been the beneficiaries of his odious regime, not a word of protest had they raised. However, when they sensed that the end was near and wanted to conceal their failure as its fellow colluders, they distanced themselves from the regime on flimsy pretexts in an attempt to capitalize on its defeat.

Back to the League of Nations In August 1937 I was in Geneva on my way somewhere for tea. I turned on the car radio to listen to the world news on the Lausanne station, and what should I hear but that Bakr Sidqi had been murdered in Mosul. The following day I went to Paris, where I contacted the Iraqi embassy. While there I received a telegram from Jamil al-Midfa‘i telling me that he had formed a cabinet and that he wanted to appoint me as minister of foreign affairs. After I had wired back my acceptance of the appointment, he asked me to

The Ill-Fated Coups Begin

249

attend the meeting of the League of Nations, so I traveled again to Geneva that September. The League of Nations normally met once a year. During its annual session the General Assembly would be presented with topics of relevance to world politics. Other issues of importance would also be presented to the Administrative Council, which would meet from time to time. The meeting I attended was a regular meeting; hence, it had not been convened to discuss any one particular issue. However, I felt that the time had come to bring the issue of Palestine to the league’s attention. Hence, I first contacted the states that had signed the Sa‘dabad Pact, asking their representatives to support Iraq in its effort to promote Palestine’s cause and to draw attention to it on an international level. By presenting this issue to the League of Nations, my intention was not to ask the league itself to resolve it. Rather, I simply wanted to see the cause crystallize in such a way that it could be promoted more fully at the appropriate time. At the meeting of the Sa‘dabad Pact signatories, which was held at the headquarters of the Iranian delegation in Geneva, Turkey was represented by its foreign minister, Tawfiq Rushdi Aras. Others who attended included Muhammad Khan, Afghanistan’s representative to the league who later became minister of foreign affairs, and ‘Inayatullah Sami‘i, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs. It became apparent from the ensuing discussion that Turkey wanted to avoid direct involvement in the issue. Hence, it contented itself with saying that it would support Iraq in its efforts as Iraq had requested, but that it would not deliver a speech on the issue or engage in any prominent action in this connection. A similar response was forthcoming from Afghanistan, which took its lead politically from Turkey in its every move. As for Iran, it expressed a willingness to help in a more decisive way and promised to support us in the league’s Political Committee (or the Sixth Committee), which generally discussed whatever topics were raised during its meetings. As for Egypt, it offered us the most powerful support of all even though, unlike Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, it was not a signatory of the Sa‘dabad Pact. The Egyptian government and its representatives were actually eager to deal with the Palestinian cause as a way of reassuring Egyptian public opinion. The reason for this was that, thanks to the press and certain prominent Egyptian figures who were continuously raising the issue, the Palestinian cause had become better and more widely understood than before among the Egyptian people. Hence, Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, Egypt’s prime minister, had wired the Egyptian delegation to the League of Nations, asking them to contact us in order for us to agree on a unified plan. In the event, ‘Abd al-Fattah Yahya, Egypt’s minister of foreign affairs, made an important speech in which he assailed British policy in relation to Palestine and demanded fair treatment of Palestine’s Arab population, the

250

In Geneva, in 1937, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as head of the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in his capacity as Iraqi minister of foreign affairs

The Ill-Fated Coups Begin

251

prohibition of Jewish immigration to Palestine, the placement of restrictions on land sales, and the formation of a national Palestinian government. It was the custom in the League of Nations for the delegate of each member state to give a speech in which he discussed either a topic of relevance to world politics or one or more topics of special relevance to his or her own country. The day after the Egyptian foreign minister’s speech before the league’s Political Committee, I gave a speech in which I reiterated the points made by ‘Abd al-Fattah Yahya, but in a more forceful tone and with more stringent demands. During the discussion that took place in the General Assembly, I delivered a second, more detailed speech in which I set forth historical arguments that refuted Zionists’ claims to possess a greater historic right to Palestine than did the Palestinian Arabs. Having agreed a week before this to take on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I could do no more than this, so, contenting myself with these efforts, I returned to Baghdad.

Jamil al-Midfa‘i’s New Cabinet The new cabinet’s policy, that is, the cabinet now led by Jamil al-Midfa‘i, was vague and vulnerable to criticism on a number of points. At the same time, the task before it was a difficult and sensitive one. It was claimed that the cabinet’s policy was vague in the sense that it had not made a clear statement of the plan it would follow when it came to power. It was a wellknown fact, of course, that the new government had succeeded a rebel cabinet that had done away with personal freedoms and left the entire citizenry in doubt as to their personal well-being and dignity and the safety of their property. The new cabinet could not deal in an impromptu fashion with the malfunction that had occurred in the state apparatus due to the measures taken by the previous cabinet. Therefore, it stated simply that it would pursue a policy of “lowering the curtain” on what had gone before by way of destructive actions, mistakes, and violations. The new cabinet’s approach was latched on to by disgruntled opponents from the ousted regime, who had hoped that they themselves would be brought to power now, since in this way they would be in a position to carry out their own agendas and satisfy their thirst for revenge on the leaders of the former regime. As for al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet, it was of the view that it was necessary to punish members of the former regime who had violated the law if the law specified penalties for the actions taken and the crimes committed. Nevertheless, there had not yet been sufficient time for the new cabinet to clarify its policies to the public. This fact played into the hands of the opposition, which alleged that, although the new cabinet may not have been in collusion with the former regime, it was nevertheless incapable of restoring to the people the freedoms they had lost. In support of its

252

My Memoirs

claim, the opposition noted that the new cabinet included someone who had been minister of the interior in the former era, namely, Mustafa al-‘Umari, who had remained in close contact with the former prime minister. The lack of clarity that dogged the new cabinet’s policy significantly weakened it. Moreover, the difficulty of the task it faced was evident in the vehemence of the opposition and in the restlessness and discontent among army personnel with the “lowered-curtain policy” as it pertained to actions committed in the past. The cabinet was in an especially awkward position because of the general amnesty that had been proclaimed by the former cabinet, which had exonerated everyone who had been involved in the revolution. Public opinion was in favor of punishing those responsible for the revolution and its disastrous consequences. However, the government knew that, in light of the parliament’s having absolved the leaders of the revolution of all responsibility for what they had done, it would not be feasible to take measures to bring them to justice. This situation, combined with the vehemence of the opposition, naturally had a negative impact on the standing of the new cabinet. Yet despite all this, al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet was looked upon as one that had saved the day and had, beyond that, managed to pursue a policy of moderation that had led to a good number of reforms and constructive steps. Consequently, it managed to survive for a longer period of time than most other cabinets. It was also aided by the prevailing mood of the population, who had grown weary of successive revolutions and neverending unrest. The new cabinet represented a kind of palliative and a source of reassurance in the midst of people’s anxiety and vexation. Hence, it proceeded with its day-to-day affairs both domestically and internationally.

Basra’s Oil One of the important issues facing the new cabinet was that of the Basra oil concession. The government had begun by negotiating with an American company known as the North Iran Oil Investment Company, directed by Charles C. Hart, whom I knew from the time he had served as US minister plenipotentiary to Tehran in 1931–1933. When he came to Baghdad to negotiate an oil concession in Basra with the Iraqi government, I encouraged him, since I was anxious for Iraq to be rid of the influence of British oil companies. The Basra region had been part of the Iraq Petroleum Company’s (IPC) concession, one of the requirements of which was that the company only drill wells after having chosen plots with known boundaries in the vast region contained within its concession. However, the IPC appears not to have been able to choose such plots based on geological and technical assessments alone, that is, without engaging first in actual exploration and drilling. Consequently, it objected to this article of the oil concession

The Ill-Fated Coups Begin

253

agreement and called for a reexamination of the issue so that it could limit its efforts to known plots that were more likely to be productive than others. This situation gave the Iraqi government a chance to reconsider the entire concession and to secure terms that would be more suitable to it than those that had obtained previously. According to the new terms that were negotiated, the Basra region would now be excluded entirely from the IPC’s concession. Consequently, the government now had the right to exploit this area by itself or to grant some other company the right to invest in it on terms the government found suitable to its interests. It was the government’s intention to conclude an agreement with any company that could offer it the best terms for the Basra area. Consequently, it welcomed Charles Hart and expressed its willingness to negotiate a new oil concession with him. However, after perusing the IPC’s concession, Hart opted to withdraw from the negotiations, saying it would not be possible for any company to offer terms more suitable than those found in the IPC’s concession. Hence, in order to enable the negotiations over the Basra oil concession to succeed, he suggested that the terms of the new concession be similar to those of the one granted to the IPC. However, the Iraqi government did not agree to his suggestion, so he withdrew, leaving only the IPC to negotiate with the government from there on out. The negotiations between the Iraqi government and the IPC, which continued for a month in oppressively hot weather, yielded terms that were better than those of the previous concession. The company was represented in the negotiations by John Sakaleros, while the Iraqi government was represented by me in my capacity as minister of foreign affairs and Ibrahim Kamal in his capacity as minister of finance.

A Favor to Syria In this connection, I recall a maneuver I engaged in with the help of Ibrahim Kamal as we were negotiating with the company. The purpose behind the maneuver was to get the company and, with it, the British government to influence French policy in Syria. We knew that France owned a certain number of shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, or APOC (formerly known as the D’Arcy Company), although it had kept them in certain subsidiary oil companies. Hence, some of the negotiating company’s shares were owned by France given its link to the APOC, which was the single largest shareholder in the IPC. Consequently, we asked Sakaleros whether France owned shares in the company that was to drill for oil in Basra. He tried at first to evade the question. In the end, however, he had no choice but to confess that France was connected in this way to the new Basra oil concession.

254

My Memoirs

As for us, we replied that we were not prepared to give France a share in this concession, the reason being France’s colonialist policy in Syria and Lebanon in particular and in the Arab East in general. We told him that if France persisted in its policy, we would not be likely to enter into any contracts or agreements with it, and we asked him to confirm to us in writing that France would not be connected in any way to the Basra concession. Otherwise, the Iraqi government would not be able to grant the concession. Then, for added effect, we told him that when either the Senate or the House of Representatives heard that France was known to be connected to the concession via the IPC, they had threatened to stage an all-out rebellion if the government agreed to grant the concession. And if that happened, the concession was bound to be rejected by parliament. Visibly worried, the negotiator protested that he and his company weren’t involved in politics and that he couldn’t promise that the company would accept our conditions. However, he did promise to raise the matter with his superiors. This, of course, was what we had expected, since it had not been our intention to negotiate with him over a political matter such as this. Rather, our aim had been to get him to communicate this demand of ours to his company, which would communicate it to the British government, which would in turn make certain that France learned of it. We knew that economic interests play a significant role in politics, and what had happened had borne out our expectations. I had witnessed this same type of effect when I went to London and Paris in the summer of 1938. After discussions at the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was promised that France would be pressured in connection with the proposed 1936 treaty between France and Syria, which finally was to be ratified in 1938. I then went to Paris, where the director of the French Petroleum Companies mediated on my behalf with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Officials there were willing to engage in a meaningful exchange with me over the matter of the aforementioned Franco-Syrian Treaty. In short, this maneuver of ours was successful and beneficial, since it enabled me to open the door to French politics, a door that had heretofore been firmly shut in the face of anyone who sought to intervene in Syrian affairs. Mustering all the force I could, I demanded the fulfillment of our Syrian brothers’ nationalist aspirations, including that of concluding the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which France and its military party had been unwilling to ratify.

The Oil Refinery Al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet, in which I served as minister of foreign affairs, studied the issue of establishing an oil refinery in Baiji, Iraq, at the government’s

The Ill-Fated Coups Begin

255

expense. This project was important for the economic, political, and military benefits it had to offer. Preparations for the project’s completion had reached the point where, if al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet had remained in power for six months longer than it did, the refinery could have been established and would have brought enormous benefit to the country. In the interests of time, I do not wish to go into further detail on this topic. Suffice it to say that the project’s specifications, which are on record to this day in the relevant governmental departments, had been prepared by qualified specialists. Curses on the personal interests that led to the armed uprising of October 21, 1938, in the wake of which al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet was removed from power!

15 Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara

~

The Franco-Syrian Treaty In August of 1938, I decided to travel to Geneva to attend the League of Nations’ annual meeting in my capacity as minister of foreign affairs. I left on August 18 for Damascus, where I stayed for three days. During my stay in Damascus, I contacted members of the government and a number of French officials, and in the course of my talks I found that the Syrians were in dire need of assistance and support in their dealings with France. The Syrians were also eager to be of assistance to Iraq, which had championed Arab causes ever since its establishment as a state. By this time French policy appeared to have undergone some change, and there were signs of new attitudes that augured well for expanded freedoms and greater mutual understanding with the Syrians despite the fact that the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance had yet to be concluded. However, such change was limited for the most part to outward appearances. Consequently, Syrian efforts were focused on conclusion of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, which promised to establish needed boundaries between French and Syrian authority. France, for its part, was resistant to concluding the treaty, since such boundaries would introduce clarity into the then-existing confused state of affairs, which served France’s interests so well. France was slow to acknowledge Syria as an autonomous state, since this would deprive the French of numerous benefits and of a significant degree of control over the Middle Eastern region. Hence, it vacillated between support for Syria’s autonomy and unwillingness to relinquish its potent influence in Lebanon, Syria, and elsewhere in the Middle East. Senior French officials would make contradictory 257

258

My Memoirs

statements about liberation on one hand and keeping things in check on the other. They would claim, for example, that they loved Syria and Lebanon and wanted to serve them in any way they could. In the next breath, however, they would argue that the Syrian and Lebanese peoples had little or no political experience and would, therefore, not be able to handle their own affairs if they were given full independence. I, in turn, would challenge the justifications they offered for their policies. I insisted that their fear that the Syrians and Lebanese were unfit for independence was unfounded, since there were figures in both of these countries who were more capable and competent than there were in other Arab countries that had won their independence and were handling their own affairs without difficulty. I encountered numerous situations in which I was called upon to mediate between the Syrians and French officials and in which I sought to counter French officials’ comments on the future of an independent Syria. I advised my Syrian compatriots to be moderate, reasonable, and well organized in everything they did, since in this way they would deprive the French of any excuse for criticizing them or claiming that they were lacking in competence, knowing, as I did, that by making such claims, the French were seeking to distort the facts in such a way that they could justify prolonging French administration over Syria. The Syrians were rightly offended at the mandate regime under which they were living and its misguided policies and mismanagement. The Syrians had expressed a willingness to join Iraq in whatever way they could in order to free themselves from a situation that they considered intolerable. I learned from Sa‘dallah al-Jabiri that they even hoped that Syria might be annexed to Iraq. However, France’s thorough control over Syria’s political fortunes prevented them from initiating any plan in this regard. Iraq was pursuing a policy of distancing Syria from French influence so that it could become autonomous and exercise its right to self-determination, be it through independence, through the formation of a federation with Iraq, or by being annexed to Iraq in some fashion. To this end, I persevered in the campaign I had begun in Baghdad with the representatives of the Iraq Petroleum Company. In Baghdad, I informed France’s chargé d’affaires that Iraq objected to France’s having a part in the forthcoming Basra oil concession in the hope that he would pass on the details of Iraq’s position to the French government, and this is what he did. I apprised him of the details of the intense campaigns being directed by the Iraqi parliament and other politicians against the French government demanding that France be excluded from the Basra oil concession. And as a matter of fact, the French chargé d’affaires, who was seen as a friend of Iraq, fully supported these campaigns. Meanwhile, I was preparing for talks in Paris and London on Syria and its treaty with France, where I planned to stress the need to move quickly to conclude the treaty given its importance to the Syrians.

Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara

259

Following my three days in Damascus, in the course of which a number of banquets were hosted in my honor and I spoke with a good number of leaders and prominent figures, I headed for Lebanon. Upon my departure from Damascus, I was escorted to the border with great fanfare. When I got to the Syrian-Lebanese border, I was received by the Lebanese Foreign Ministry’s chief of protocol in the prime minister’s car. He kindly invited me to drive from the border to Beirut, where I was treated to a warm and enthusiastic welcome by its local authorities. During my stay in Beirut, I followed up with the French high commissioner on the efforts I had commenced in Iraq in relation to the Basra oil concession.

Lebanon Honors Me Interestingly, I found that the aforementioned chief of protocol, an elderly man from the Eddé family and a relative of the president of the republic, Émile Eddé, knew nothing about Iraq. His lack of knowledge revealed itself when he referred to Iraq as a republic and inquired about its president. I explained to him that we didn’t have a republic in Iraq but, rather, a constitutional monarchy. Then, assuming that he was unaware of these things, I went on to offer him some information about the state of the country, its population, its area, and its political and social conditions. When we were out of others’ ear range, I told him that every Lebanese ought to know a reasonable amount about neighboring countries such as Syria and Iraq. When I reached Sofar, I rested for a while in its sizable hotel, where I was received by the deputy to the high commissioner and the head of the political division of the high commissioner’s office. I then continued on my way to Beirut, where I stayed at the Iraqi consulate.

Émile Eddé Once in Beirut I received a visit from the prime minister, Prince Khalid Shihab, and I in turn paid him a visit. I came to learn that the prime minister possessed no authority, since the president of the republic, Émile Eddé, had concentrated all governmental powers in his own hands and was supported in this by the French high commissioner. Nevertheless, I had to visit President Eddé at the State House rather than at the presidential headquarters based on the fact that the president of the republic was, in effect, acting as prime minister, who was based officially at the State House. In my conversation with President Eddé, I noted that, in light of the many ties between our two countries, there needed to be more contact between them both economically and culturally. However, my words received little response.

260

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at a celebration held in Damascus in his honor (on his way to Geneva) in 1938 with a select group of “free men” and nationalist leaders, including Sa‘dallah al-Jabiri, Riyadh al-Sulh, Lutfi al-Haffar, ‘Ata’ al-Ayyubi, Nasuh al-Ayyubi, Fakhri al-Barudi, Rashid al-Husami, Dr. Munir al-Sadat, Karim Thabit, Amin al-Mumayyaz, Ibrahim al-Huqbari, ‘Abdullah Bakr, Muhsin al-Rafi‘i, and Tawfiq al-Hayyani

Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara

261

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi in Beirut on his way to Geneva in 1938 with President of the Republic Émile Eddé and Prime Minister Khalid Shihab

The president insisted on speaking with me in French, which he spoke like a native, and as he spoke, the brief comments he made from time to time about national affairs were unrelated to the critical issues of relevance to Lebanon’s neighboring countries. Rather, his focus was entirely on purely domestic affairs that had nothing to do with higher policy. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Shihab sat listening to the president of the republic as though he had no idea what he should say. I wanted to get the president to speak with me in Arabic, and my initial efforts to do so met with little success. However, whenever he said anything in French, I would respond to him in Arabic. I kept doing this until at last I succeeded in getting him to speak in Arabic without reverting to French the way most people in Lebanon did. At the same time, I didn’t want him to think that I only preferred to speak in Arabic because I knew no other languages. Hence, when a high-ranking figure from the high commissioner’s office came to see the president, I took the opportunity to get to know the man and, in the process, spoke to him in cultured French. In this way I hoped to help the president see that I preferred to speak Arabic with fellow Arabs even though I was fully capable of speaking other languages as well. From that time onward, the president and I spoke nothing but Arabic for the duration of the interview, which ended on a warm, happy note for both of us. However, we hadn’t broached a single topic of relevance to politics.

262

My Memoirs

On this occasion, I would like to say that I found Émile Eddé to be a soft-spoken, sagacious, sophisticated, yet humble man with refined moral sensitivities and a firm grasp of political affairs. My meeting with him left me with a highly favorable impression of the man. I then met with Count du Martel, who was about to complete his term as high commissioner of Lebanon and Syria. Du Martel stated that he would continue supporting Syrian efforts toward conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with France, of which he was a staunch defender. In fact, he seemed quite dissatisfied with French policy and the pressure the military party was exerting on the French government not to conclude the treaty. The count expressed his willingness to persevere in his efforts to persuade his government to settle the matter, and when I informed him that I would be passing through Paris and meeting with the French minister of foreign affairs to discuss the matter with him, I asked him to support me in my mission. On the day I was to leave Beirut, the French authorities were keen to see me off in the most gracious way possible. However, not wanting my departure to become an occasion for the masses to demonstrate on the pretext of bidding me farewell, they devised an ingenious plan to get me out of Beirut a full three hours before my ship was to set sail. They claimed that the soldiers who would be present for the official ceremony at which I would be escorted to the ship would need to leave for supper at 6:00 p.m. and therefore asked me to be at the port to receive the military salute shortly before then. At this time they expressed their appreciation for me and their support for my mission in defense of the interests of Syria and Lebanon in relation to the treaty issue. They were aware, of course, as were the crowds, that the ship wasn’t due to leave until 8:00 p.m. In this way, then, the French authorities succeeded in keeping the crowds away from me until the Italian ship Esperia set sail at eight o’clock that evening. This ship was, by the way, elegantly furnished, distinguished in its service, and very fast. In fact, so superior was it to all other luxury liners plying the seas between the Near East and the West that it was referred to as “the Mediterranean Mermaid.”

In Egypt The next afternoon we arrived in Alexandria. I was received there by a representative of the mayor of Alexandria, who congratulated me on behalf of the Egyptian government on my safe arrival. He was accompanied by the chargé d’affaires at the Iraqi embassy in Cairo, ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani, who informed me that Egypt’s minister of foreign affairs, ‘Abd al-Fattah Yahya Pasha, was inviting me for dinner at his home in al-Raml. An old friend of mine and now both prominent and wealthy, the minister of foreign

Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara

263

affairs was an articulate, skilled man with perfect manners and long experience in his field. That evening I went to the Ras el-Tin Palace, where the king of Egypt resided, and in keeping with prevailing custom recorded my name in the guest book. From there I proceeded, together with the chargé d’affaires, to the home of the foreign minister for dinner. Among the guests was a gentleman named Beeman, the chargé d’affaires who served as adviser at the British embassy and who was standing in for the British ambassador in the latter’s absence. Also invited that evening were the shaikh of Al-Azhar University, Mustafa al-Maraghi, ‘Ali Mahir Pasha, and a few others who brought our number to no more than twelve. The guests were being received by ‘Abd al-Khaliq Hassunah Pasha in his capacity as the Foreign Ministry’s assistant deputy. The season was hot, muggy, and enervating. Even so, the heat there was nothing by comparison with what I experienced in Baghdad during the month of August, and when I sat on the balcony, then went to the table in the dining room, I didn’t feel the same lassitude or exhaustion that I would have felt if I had been in Baghdad. The conversation was engaging on all the topics that came up, foremost among which was the Palestinian issue. However, Egypt at that time was not well informed about this topic, since it was still preoccupied with its own internal affairs, be they political, developmental, or administrative. Moreover, for quite some time the attention of Egyptians had been focused so exclusively on the West that they had no energy or interest left for the East or even Africa. If you addressed an educated Egyptian about world affairs, it was difficult enough to ascertain what he thought about Europe or the United States, still less about events to the east of the Suez Canal. If you spoke to them about this region, they would listen to you in silence as though you were telling them tales about unexplored regions in China or Timbuktu. This, at least, was the state of affairs in Egypt at that time. Later, however, it underwent changes that required the people of Egypt to pay closer attention to the Middle Eastern region of which they were a part and the countries with which they shared common borders. The following day the ship departed from Alexandria for Genoa, Italy, where we dropped anchor three days later. The journey was comfortable and interesting despite the weather, which was so hot and humid at times that it made me short of breath. Genoa is a magnificent city and is Italy’s principal port with its excellent geographical location and its enchanting climate. An industrial city par excellence, Genoa is home to most of Italy’s industrial and economic activities, as well as the power plants belonging to the famed Ansaldo company. In short, the town is an appealing place to be and its weather remains balmy and mild as though it were springtime all year round. How I would have loved to stay on in that lush, shady paradise and basked in its gentle breezes. I lodged in the Miramar Hotel, a luxurious,

264

My Memoirs

immaculate abode that overlooked the sea. In fact, its name was descriptive, since the word miramar means “sea view.” The following day I boarded a train headed for Switzerland, and two days later I arrived in Geneva, where I stayed in the headquarters of Iraq’s permanent delegation to the League of Nations as a guest of Iraq’s League of Nations delegate, Sabih Najib al-‘Azzi. From the time I arrived, al-‘Azzi was my constant companion, placing himself entirely at my disposal. In this way he saved me untold effort during my stay in Geneva, and for this I remember him with the utmost appreciation and esteem.

Negotiations in Paris I arrived in Geneva several days before the opening of the General Session. However, preferring to spend this time in Paris, I went there and contacted the French government concerning a number of issues of concern to Syria, particularly the problem of concluding the proposed Franco-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. The international scene was very tense, and harbingers of war were on the horizon. Now in its heyday, the French military party was in complete control of French policy and political affairs. Increasingly frightened by the specter of war, the French government may have felt it couldn’t afford to show any leniency toward Syria or any other countries subject to its influence. Hence, given the state of crisis that prevailed on the world scene, it was obvious that it would be difficult to reach an understanding with France on the issue I was planning to raise. Nevertheless, I intended to go ahead with my plan to contact French officials in Paris and gather more information about the problems surrounding the treaty and the reasons for the delay in its ratification. To the unbiased observer, it was clear that the proposed Franco-Syrian Treaty fell short of what Syria needed in order to achieve its national objectives given the restrictions and interventions the treaty would allow. In this respect, it differed little from the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed on June 30, 1930. Nevertheless, the quest to conclude the Franco-Syrian Treaty had the potential to move Syria forward several steps that were bound eventually to help the country achieve full independence. It was for this reason that both the Iraqi government and I, as the person with primary responsibility for Iraqi policy at that time, were so concerned to see Syria achieve this aim. I arranged an interview with an individual named Garoud, head of the Middle Eastern Affairs Section of France’s Foreign Ministry, whom I found to be an intelligent man with a good grasp of both Arab policy and the problems faced by Syria and the Middle East. I also discovered that he was already quite keen to see the Franco-Syrian Treaty ratified. Consequently, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the power being wielded by the military

Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara

265

party and the control it exercised at that time over the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I gave Garoud an overview of the international situation in the Middle East and what measures would be required to guarantee the Allies broad regions in which they would be able to maneuver freely if war broke out between France and Germany. I went on to remind him that volatile conditions in Syria would not contribute to security or stability when the Allied armies were in Arab countries. Hence, it would be better, I told him, for the Arabs to be reassured that their nationalist demands were being respected, since in this way, they would be far more inclined to support the Allies’ war efforts. I also told him that the situation in Turkey would not help France and the Allies to achieve their aims in the future, since there was a good possibility that Turkey would cooperate with Germany as it had during World War I. In this event, it would pose a threat to Syria and, hence, France as well. Also of relevance in this connection was the fact that no understanding had been reached between Turkey and Britain, and that the East Mediterranean security charter between the two states had not yet been ratified. After clarifying a number of points concerning the information I had given him, Garoud promised to present it to the minister of foreign affairs. I explained that the reason I had come to see him before seeing the minister of foreign affairs was that I believed that in this way I could facilitate things for everyone, since this would allow the minister of foreign affairs to familiarize himself with the issues before our meeting the next day. The next day at 5:00 p.m., I went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and after a brief wait in the reception area I went in to see Georges Bono. Though he was a pleasant, courteous man, Bono was distressed by my visit because he had apparently not received the information I had presented the day before to Garoud and, as a result, was not properly informed about the topic I had come to discuss with him. I came to understand later that Garoud had given Bono some files, but that Bono had not had time to go over them. Hence, Bono felt quite awkward when I came to see him. He took no initiative to discuss the topic I had come to see him about, as a result of which I had to get things going myself. As I spoke, the minister simply listened to me without knowing how to respond. As for me, I interpreted his silence as a sign of conceit or disdain. Agitated, I blurted out, “Why do you have no reply to make to what I am saying? Is it because you, as foreign minister of the mighty France, are speaking to the foreign minister of trifling Iraq? Is it because you prefer not to waste your precious time speaking with someone of my low stature? Or is it because the subject is too difficult for you, so you take the easy way out by remaining silent?” Moved by my words, he apologized immediately, vehemently denying the first of the hypotheses I had suggested. He then went on to explain that he had not been able to prepare himself for our meeting, since he had not

266

My Memoirs

managed to meet with Garoud for a briefing the day before. Consequently, he told me, he did not know enough about the topic at hand for him to be able to discuss it intelligently with me and give me a reassuring response. All he could say was that there were some difficulties surrounding the issue of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, that the French government was on its way toward removing these difficulties, and that he hoped he could be instrumental in overcoming these obstacles. This said, our interview drew to a close and I took my leave of him.

Addressing the Palestine Issue in Geneva A few days later I returned to Geneva, where the League of Nations’ regular annual session was about to commence. One part of my mission there was to deliver a speech before the league’s General Assembly on the Palestine issue. The Egyptian delegation, which was attending the General Assembly for the first time since joining the league, had received instructions from the Egyptian government to raise the issue of Palestine and to help Iraq in this connection. The Egyptian foreign minister and I agreed that he would give a speech on Palestine and that I would follow him with a second speech. We also agreed on the content of his speech, which would be similar to

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with the director of international accounting in Geneva, 1938

Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara

267

mine in many ways but would also contain greater detail given Egypt’s location on the Mediterranean Sea and its numerous contacts worldwide. I then began contacting representatives of the Sa‘dabad Pact signatory states in order to garner their support on the matter of Palestine. In the course of making these contacts, I learned that after meeting with the mufti of Palestine, Shaikh Amin al-Husseini, in Tehran in 1932 when the latter was on his way back from a trip to India, the shah of Iran had become convinced that Iran ought to do more in support of Palestine and its cause. To this end, the shah began encouraging the Iranian press to explore this issue and asked the government to demonstrate its sympathy with the Arabs of Palestine. Muzaffar A‘lam, Iran’s minister of foreign affairs, who was present at the meeting of the Sa‘dabad Pact signatories, told me that the shah had instructed him to support us in relation to the Palestine issue. At the same time, however, he was hesitant to make any bold moves for which he might be taken to task. Consequently, he did not deliver a speech on the topic as Iraq and Egypt had done. However, he was eager to help us on the league’s Political Committee, also known as the Sixth Committee, when the issue came up for discussion. As for Turkey, it was apparent from the statements made by Dr. Tawfiq Aras, Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs, that Turkey was attempting to avoid involvement in the issue, while Afghanistan was following Turkey’s lead. Using the Political Committee as my platform, I raised an uproar over British policy not only among Arab countries, but among other countries as well. Prior to the committee meeting I had contacted the infamous Eamon de Valera, prime minister of Ireland. I spoke to him about the appalling conditions that prevailed in Palestine and the injustice that had been done to its Arab population as a result of Britain’s Zionist policy. When I spoke with de Valera, I found him to be ill informed about Palestine and its affairs. However, he was visibly distressed when he learned the facts, and in consequence, he expressed his willingness to provide me with all the help I had requested of him. So I asked him to deliver a speech before the Political Committee condemning British policy in Palestine, and he promised to do so. When the committee commenced its meeting and the subject of mandates came up for discussion, I delivered a hard-hitting address in which I lambasted British policy and denied the Jews’ right, from a historical and political point of view, to claim priority over Palestine’s Arab inhabitants. I followed my speech with a request that other states help to resolve this problem by showing their compassion and concern for Jewish refugees by helping them move to countries other than Palestine. Despite its prolixity, this last speech had a profound effect on those present. It was followed by a succinct written speech delivered by the Iranian delegate in support of what I had said earlier. The Iranian delegate decried the British policy being implemented in Palestine for the way it trampled upon

268

My Memoirs

Arab Palestinians’ rights and demanded that they be given fair treatment. De Valera then stood up and launched into an angry diatribe against British policy that was clearly disconcerting for both Britons and others present. He said that all the woes of the world came from Britain’s policies, the most contentious of which was its ill-advised policy in Palestine, and he called for its abandonment. The floor was taken next by the head of the French delegation, Paul Boncour, who had nothing new to say and no concrete suggestions to offer. He said he wanted everyone to take part in solving this delicate problem; however, he did not wish to launch a violent attack on British policy. Consequently, his position came across as laughable and unconvincing.

Harbingers of War By this time the international situation was tense in anticipation of the Munich Conference, and everyone fully expected war to break out soon. In view of this charged atmosphere, I held out no hopes of any breakthroughs in relation to the Palestine issue. I had been planning to travel to Britain after the League of Nations session had finished in order to make contact with the British government and discuss certain issues of relevance to our two countries’ policies. The gravity of the international situation provided no incentive for me to undertake such an action at that time, so I continued waiting for the outcome of the Munich gathering, but when it became clear that the specter of war had been held at bay, if even just temporarily, I decided to go to London after all. Wanting to give the British government an idea of my agenda so that it could study the topics to be discussed before my arrival, I contacted the deputy head of the British delegation in Geneva and gave him a list of the issues I wished to discuss in London. He promised to send it on immediately. Then I left Geneva for Paris and, a few days later, left Paris for London.

Negotiations in London My mission in London took me all of twenty days, during which time I raised a variety of topics, including the issues of standardizing Iraqi and Kuwaiti customs duties. I sought to show the harm that Iraq was suffering as a result of the huge discrepancy between Iraq’s customs duties and those of Kuwait. I mentioned to the negotiators, who were headed by Lord Halifax, Britain’s minister of foreign affairs, that customs duties in Iraq ranged between 10 and 35 percent, where Kuwait’s had been frozen at a mere 4 percent. Consequently, the merchandise that came into Kuwait, after it had

Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara

269

paid this paltry customs fee, would be shipped through the desert and smuggled into Iraq, where it would cause losses of up to 30 percent. In fact, I went on to note, the sums garnered through these differences in customs rates were costing Iraq no less than 2 million dinars a year. Hence, in view of the fact that Kuwait was a British protectorate, I asked Britain to pledge to bring Kuwait’s customs duties more into line with those of Iraq or to standardize customs duties entirely and apply them simultaneously to Iraq and Kuwait. I obtained a promise from Britain to study this issue and to agree on a reasonable solution that would relieve Iraq of this undue financial burden. I then broached another topic of no less importance, namely, Iraq’s desire to establish a seaport that would require the use of a large portion of the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. I went on at some length about the benefits that would accrue to both Iraq and Kuwait from the proposed port due to its close proximity to both of these islands, and the ways the people of Kuwait might benefit from it as far as labor and imports were concerned. I remember them saying in this connection that the decision over whether to grant this request rested with the shaikh of Kuwait, who would have to agree to give Iraq Kuwaiti lands in return for compensation. To this I replied that if they would stop intervening between cousins, it would be a lot easier for them to solve their problems! “Besides,” I added, “who says that Warbah and Bubiyan are Kuwaiti lands? But if they are, there’s no reason we couldn’t compensate the Kuwaitis with some date palms and other lands from Basra.” The details of my negotiations with the British government concerning the aforementioned problems and other matters are found in an official report on my trip abroad in the year 1938, and I believe that, provided it has not been tampered with, it should still be in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the cabinet archives, and the archives of the Presidency of the Royal Administrative Office in Baghdad.

Mediation Between Syria and Turkey When I was in Geneva, I was approached by Turkey’s foreign minister, Dr. Tawfiq Aras, about two issues. The first of these was the situation of Alexandretta, and the second was the suggestion that if I were to pay a visit to Ankara, it could help greatly to improve ties between Iran and Turkey. Dr. Aras assured me that Turkey had no objections to Syrian independence, and that Syrians’ bitterness and rancor toward Turkey were unjustified since Turkey did not approve of France’s continued control over Syria. In order to demonstrate the sincerity of his invitation, he asked me to convey to the Syrians that Turkey would be willing to arrive at an understanding with the Syrians and to support them in their nationalist claims. He

270

My Memoirs

added that if the Syrians agreed not to raise the issue of Alexandretta but, rather, accept its annexation to Turkey, Turkey would even be willing to supply them with arms, ammunition, and anything else they might need in order to achieve their nationalist aims and obtain their independence. I had previously been involved with the Alexandretta issue, and before I left for London in 1938, we had been close to resolving it in a manner that would have been more favorable to Syria. I had offered Iraqi mediation to help resolve the dispute between Turkey and Syria over Alexandretta and had proposed that the region be divided into two parts, whereby the part inhabited by Turks would go to Turkey and the part inhabited by Arabs would go to Syria. Turkey had agreed to this solution, since it was unhappy about the prospect of this dispute’s remaining unresolved at a time when the world was about to witness the outbreak of a major war. Meanwhile, Britain needed a clear and unambiguous situation in the Eastern Mediterranean region so that, in the event of such a war, it could guarantee access to Alexandretta as a port that would serve the Allies’ war aims. The only unresolved issue related to the city of Alexandretta itself and how we could ascertain which group—Turks or Arabs—made up the majority of its population. The Turks claimed that the vast majority of the city’s inhabitants were Turkish, while Syria claimed that the city was primarily Arab, with its environs being populated largely by Turks. While we were in the midst of working out this problem, France caught wind of the fact that Iraq had been acting as a mediator between Turkey and Syria and that we had been able to reach a settlement that would be satisfactory to both parties to the dispute. Meanwhile, Britain itself was in a hurry to clarify the international situation in the Eastern Mediterranean regardless of whether Alexandretta went to Turkey or to Syria. In order to thwart the imminent settlement by stealth, France hurriedly concluded an agreement with Turkey in accordance with which Turkey would take all of Alexandretta. Turkey then went back on its agreement to accept Iraqi mediation and the partition of Alexandretta, saying that the solution I had proposed was impractical. In this way, the Arabs, and Syria in particular, lost the opportunity to resolve the issue in Syria’s favor, and the entire region became Turkish territory. However, Iraq continued to remind Turkey from time to time that it was not amenable to this solution and that the agreement that had been reached between Turkey and France was not legal, since it was not permissible for France in its capacity as a mandatory power to cede Syrian territory to Turkey. Consequently, the step France had taken in this connection was tainted with illegitimacy, and we even hinted at the possibility that we might raise the issue before the League of Nations. This, apparently, was what had prompted Aras to bring this point up with me and ask me to inform the Syrians of Turkey’s willingness to help them in every way possible in return for their willingness to drop the Alexandretta issue and not pursue the dispute any further.

Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara

271

I contacted Syrian prime minister Jamil Mardam Bek, who was in Geneva at that time, and in the presence of Prince ‘Adil Arslan, I relayed to him everything I had been told by Dr. Aras with respect to Turkey’s willingness to help the Syrians achieve their nationalist aims by any means necessary. However, he replied that he had reason to hope that the FrancoSyrian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance would be ratified soon, and that as a consequence, they might not need any help from Turkey. He added that the Syrians were skeptical of Turkey’s offer of assistance. I then went with Prince ‘Adil Arslan to see Dr. Aras so that he could hear what Aras had to say for himself, explaining to Aras that the Syrians did not feel they could rely on the Turks’ promises, which they viewed as little more than a ruse to gain time. Dr. Aras then repeated to Prince Arslan everything he had said to me earlier and reaffirmed the sincerity behind everything he had said. However, I later learned that no understanding had been arrived at between the Turks and the Syrians, and that Jamil Mardam Bek’s efforts toward ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty had come to nothing.

Meeting Mustafa Kemal Atatürk I agreed to Dr. Aras’s idea of my visiting Ankara on my way back to Iraq, whereupon he informed his government of my proposed visit and we

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Prince ‘Adil Arslan and Tawfiq Aras, minister of foreign affairs for Turkey, during al-Suwaydi’s mediation efforts between Syria and Turkey in Geneva, 1938

272

My Memoirs

scheduled it for early in November 1938. I departed from London on the fast train for Istanbul, which I reached in early November. I stayed there for three days as a guest of the government, and then departed Istanbul for Ankara to spend three days there. My first meeting was with Turkey’s prime minister, Jalal Bayar, whom I had met previously when he visited Iraq in 1936 as minister of finance along with Dr. Tawfiq Aras, then minister of foreign affairs. I found Bayar to be amiable and a pleasant conversationalist, as well as a man who was intelligent, knowledgeable, and especially well versed in economic affairs. I was then granted an official interview with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, president of the Turkish Republic, in the presidential headquarters. Our interview, which was scheduled for 5:00 p.m. on the day after my arrival in Ankara, lasted for around an hour, during which Atatürk was affable, courteous, and humble. He spoke to me about some of his memories from the early days of the Kemalist movement, after which he turned to the subject of economic reform. He described the need he had felt for such reform in Turkey and his efforts to establish the first Turkish bank with funds that had been paid to the Turks from the Ottoman Bank as compensation for money it owed them. He talked about how these banknotes had been stuffed into dirty bags and very poorly preserved. He had used this money as capital for the Turkish Bank, which had proved a successful experiment. He had then founded other banks that contributed to a variety of economic activities, which in turn helped further to direct and develop the country. I told him how impressed I was with the progress Turkey had witnessed since the time I’d last been there fifteen years earlier. My impressions of the Turkish leader were out of sync with what one might expect from a man who had achieved greatness through his dazzling accomplishments and his iron will, the renewal he had brought about in such a short time, and the distinguished position he had achieved for his country among the nations of the world. I couldn’t help but be moved by the kindness and consideration he showed me during our interview. That evening, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted an elegant dinner party in the minister’s residence, which was attended by many of the state’s prominent figures and ministers. The soiree, which went on past midnight, was interspersed with a variety of exchanges having to do with conditions and problems in our respective countries. It was as though I were conversing with people close to me in understanding and culture, who shared many of my sentiments and faced difficulties and problems similar to mine in their lives and work. The warm welcome I received from the Turkish government during my stays in Istanbul and Ankara bespoke a spirit of genuine goodwill and friendship, and this wonderful visit was well worth whatever inconvenience or hardship it had entailed. When, at the conclusion of my visit, I left Ankara for Baghdad, the Turkish government placed at my disposal a private car with sleeping

Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara

273

compartments, as well as a second, restaurant car on a train that took me as far as Kawjak (or Tel Kawjak), where the railway line came to an end. From there I traveled by car to Mosul, then on to Baghdad.

Unrest in Iraq Once back in Baghdad, I found the political situation in a state of confusion, with full-scale riots being staged against the government. The people who had been ousted by Bakr Sidqi’s movement had not returned triumphantly to power, which had been a cause of bitterness and resentment on their part, since they saw themselves as more worthy than anyone else to govern the country after having been so unceremoniously dislodged from their positions of influence and sent into exile. At the same time, however, their demands would not be easy to achieve, since by this time they were scattered outside of Iraq and were not able to oppose Bakr Sidqi’s revolution. Hence, it was the forces that had remained in Iraq that had done away with Bakr Sidqi and his followers, and it was only natural that these same forces would succeed Bakr Sidqi in power for the simple reason that they were the most proximate to the situation. It should also be remembered that public opinion did not favor “the pashas’ cabinet” as it was referred to at the time of Bakr Sidqi’s uprising. On the contrary, the people were bitterly offended at the actions and measures that had been taken by the “pasha government.” In view of prevailing public sentiment, then, it would not have been acceptable for the men who had previously been in power to take the reins again, particularly in view of the fact that they themselves had done nothing to bring Bakr Sidqi’s government down. Or, if they did do something, it was quite insignificant and hardly noticeable among the wider population, such as mobilizing young people under the pretext of nationalism or mobilizing the army in this way or that. As a result of this latter action, however, the army itself had been provoked to rise up against the ruling cabinet, and when it did so, it had taken place under the very noses of the government and the king, who had not lifted a finger to forestall the danger or prevent the situation from reaching crisis proportions.

The Army and Politics Jamil al-Midfa‘i, then prime minister, was complacent, fully certain that he enjoyed support from the army. Consequently, he made no effort to oversee the movements being made by army officers and other military personnel. This unstable situation grew steadily worse until, on December 25, 1938, most of the army assembled at the Rashid Military Camp under the leadership of

274

My Memoirs

Lieutenant General Hussein Fawzi. Speaking on the army’s behalf, senior officers contacted the prime minister by telephone, saying that they did not want the current cabinet to remain in power. The prime minister attempted to persuade them of the seriousness of what they were doing and the difficulty of carrying out their aims. However, the self-appointed military spokesmen insisted that the army would revolt if the cabinet did not resign. They cited numerous reasons for their uprising, one of which was their dissatisfaction with Sabih Najib al-‘Azzi, the minister of defense, who had only been appointed forty days earlier. When al-‘Azzi was appointed minister of defense, the army had been expected to be pleased with this development, since he was a capable man with long experience in the Iraqi army. He was a staff officer and was considered to be distinguished in his performance. However, reality is often quite different from the way one sees it. At 8:00 p.m. on December 25, 1938, the prime minister asked the members of the cabinet to come to his home. Once they had gathered, he informed them of what had happened, adding that for security reasons, he had tendered his resignation and that he was waiting for the new cabinet to be formed. All the members of the cabinet were present with the exception of Mustafa al-‘Umari, the minister of justice, who claimed not to be able to attend for health reasons. However, the prime minister insisted that he come, and after a delay of several hours, he arrived. It was understood that the reason the minister of justice had been slow to attend the meeting was that he was peeved at the government because, when he had been minister of the interior, it had blamed him for actions that had stirred up rumors in the public sector and sparked complaints among his fellow cabinet members. He had therefore been asked to transfer to the Ministry of Justice as a facesaving measure. However, he had also been given to understand that if he refrained from moving to the Ministry of Justice, he would be obliged to resign, and if he refused to resign as well, he would be removed from his post. Hence, opting for the lesser of two evils, he agreed to serve as the minister of justice. At the same time, however, he began colluding with the opposition and those with unspoken ambitions in the army. He was assisted in his clandestine movements and intrigues by the fact that his paternal cousin, Major General Amin al-‘Umari, occupied a respectable position in the army. As for the larger movement of which the army’s maneuvers were a part, it was under the direction of Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani, Nuri al-Sa‘id, and Taha alHashimi along with secondary figures who had gathered around them. It was to be expected, of course, that the army would suggest that the post of prime minister be given to Nuri al-Sa‘id and nominate for the cabinet others who had cooperated with it in its new mission. The mood in the royal court was one of great distress, and King Ghazi was at a loss to know what to do. Ultimately, however, he condemned what

Geneva, Paris, London, Ankara

275

the army had done and asked the government to accompany him to Kirkuk by night, and from there to use what remained of the military forces outside of Baghdad to fight the rebels. The prime minister sagely advised against this, arguing that the country would not be able to bear such bloodshed. Instead, he expressed his willingness to withdraw from the government, in which case there would be no more cause for clashes that might do harm to the kingdom. In response, the king began to negotiate the formation of a new cabinet. Yet, despite attempts to get the process moving as quickly as possible, it proved unworkable to put the cabinet together by the end of that night. The next day, the king met with the rebel leaders, who sought to deny all responsibility for the army’s uprising, claiming that the army had acted of its own accord and out of loyalty to the nation, since it was dissatisfied with the al-Midfa‘i cabinet’s so-called lowered curtain policy, the outcomes of which it saw as harmful to the country. In the end, it was these opposition figures who took over power. Hence, the new cabinet was formed with Nuri al-Sa‘id as prime minister, Taha al-Hashimi as minister of defense, and Muhammad Rustum Haydar as minister of finance. At the outset, Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani remained uninvolved. However, when he was offered the position of head of the Royal Administrative Office, he accepted the post. The process of forming the cabinet thus proceeded smoothly and steps were taken to implement a “lifted curtain” policy. However, the new cabinet soon discovered that it would not be able to take legal measures against those who had been involved in Bakr Sidqi’s movement due to the amnesty that had been declared by Hikmat Sulayman’s cabinet before them. Hence, all the new cabinet could do was to take arbitrary, partisan measures, which it set about to do. As in the days of Bakr Sidqi, order in the army was disrupted, and it began throwing its weight around. Its officers would assault people in broad daylight, and eventually things got so out of hand that some military personnel took to stationing themselves on outlying roads and looting passersby like so many highway robbers. It was even said that some of the officers assaulted women as well.

16 Events on the Brink of War

~

The modus operandi adopted by Nuri al-Sa‘id’s cabinet was to seek the favor of this gang of officers and win them over in this way or that. The officers would be hosted by one of the ministers in his home or elsewhere, where they were plied with food and drink and entertained with wine, women, and song, none of which promised to do anything but destroy all semblance of order and subordination in the army’s ranks. The door now opened wide to the army’s operation in the sphere of politics. Rival politicians would try to stake a claim to the post of prime minister by luring a number of these officers to their side in order to strengthen their respective positions. Fierce competition had arisen behind the scenes between Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani and his officers on one hand and Nuri al-Sa‘id and his officers on the other. Meanwhile, Taha al-Hashimi vacillated in his allegiance to one side and the other and, in this rather perverse way, preserved a kind of balance between the competing powers. As for naïve public opinion, it fell prey with the greatest of ease to the enticements and resounding propaganda at which each both camps were so adept. Each camp accused the other of siding with foreign colonizers while presenting itself as the champion of patriotism and pan-Arabism, while each side decried the foreign policy that it claimed was controlling the country and that its opponents were said to be supporting.

Axis Propaganda Nazi Germany stood to gain from this state of vacillation, weakness, and decadence among Iraqi politicians. Hence, it began pumping huge sums 277

278

My Memoirs

into propaganda designed to mold Iraqi public opinion and win people over to its side through powerful elements in the army. King Ghazi was distracted from the affairs of state and incapable of controlling anything. Meanwhile, certain ne’er-do-wells and opportunists had fed him the notion that by expressing patriotic sentiments directed against the British he would endear himself to the people. Hence, he began voicing vehemently nationalistic political views through the radio programs that he broadcast from Zuhur Palace. Using the radio station as his platform, he began ranting against British policy and demanding that Kuwait be annexed to Iraq on the pretext that this would fulfill one of the aims of the Arab nation. Nevertheless, Nazi Germany’s objective in encouraging all of this was not to achieve the aims of Iraq or the Arab nation but, rather, to poison the atmosphere, create turmoil, and make problems between King Ghazi and the British so that his control would be undermined and a spirit of intolerance would spread among the people. Once these aims had been achieved, Iraq would be viewed as partial toward Nazi Germany, and, when war broke out, Nazi Germany might exploit Iraq as a center of Axis activity (its fifth column) that it could direct however it pleased.

Fritz Grobba Evidence for the existence of such a “fifth column” loyal to the Axis could be seen in a certain inquiry made by Fritz Grobba, Germany’s chargé d’affaires in Iraq, who contacted me one day and, in the course of our conversation, asked what Iraq would do if war broke out between Britain and Germany. Germany apparently considered itself a friend of Iraq, since Hitler had delivered two speeches in which he decried British policy in Palestine and defended the Arabs’ rights. Grobba’s inquiry, in both its form and its substance, was an expression of feigned ignorance and even came across as rather silly, because, prior to the outbreak of World War II, Iraq was bound by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty with Britain and would thus, quite obviously, be Britain’s ally in any world conflict. What, then, did Germany mean to accomplish by making such an inquiry when it already knew these things? Through a bit of investigation and inquiry of my own, I realized that what Germany intended to do here was to obtain a statement from Iraqi’s minister of foreign affairs indicating that if al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet remained in power, Iraq would go forward with the implementation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in the event of a war between Britain and Germany. This, of course, was not to Nazi Germany’s liking, and Grobba hinted quite clearly that he would prefer that Iraq annul this treaty as soon as war had been declared. So, since my reply was not what he had wanted to hear, he clearly intended to use it as an excuse to take action against the al-Midfa‘i government. To

Events on the Brink of War

279

this end, he would make it clear to the Iraqi army, which had been transformed overnight into a hotbed of Nazi extremism seething with hatred for all things British, that it would need to act quickly to topple al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet. I told the German chargé d’affaires, among other things, that in the event of war, Iraq would do its duty pursuant to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Astonished, he said, “How can this be, when Germany is your friend?” I replied, “Germany may be our friend, but Britain is our ally! We have no choice but to reach an understanding with any state that places its hands on India and the Arab Gulf. If Germany happened to succeed Britain in the position it now occupies in relation to these two regions, we would be willing to reach an understanding with it as we have done with Britain. Don’t forget! We are a weak people with a small state that has no business fighting superpowers. Hence, the best thing for us to do is to stay as far away from giants’ brawls as circumstances will allow!” In this way, then, the link between the “Nazi” Iraqi army and the German embassy in Baghdad was confirmed. Thanks to the efforts of Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani and Taha al-Hashimi—each of whom had his own separate agenda—a new military uprising was engineered. Rashid wanted the uprising in order to get rid of Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah (who had become regent after King Ghazi’s untimely death in an automobile accident on April 4, 1939), whereas Nuri al-Sa‘id and his adherents wanted the revolt in order to clear the playing field for themselves so that they could come to power. As for Taha, he wanted a movement—any movement—that would prove to Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Sa‘id that he, Taha, was in control of the army. However, they were disappointed one and all and, as I will have occasion to describe in its proper context, their dreams had evaporated within less than two short months.

The Assassination of Muhammad Rustum Haydar During the prime ministership of Nuri al-Sa‘id, whose cabinet succeeded that of Jamil al-Midfa‘i in early 1939, a number of significant events occurred, one of which was the death of Muhammad Rustum Haydar, the minister of finance. Haydar was assassinated by a man whose motives for committing such a vile deed were never ascertained. Speculation was rife concerning the assassin’s motives, and accusing fingers were pointed at a number of politicians, including Ibrahim Kamal, former minister of finance, Sabih Najib, former minister of defense, and a number of other individuals. They were arrested and brought in for questioning, then tried on charges of conspiring to assassinate Muhammad Rustum Haydar. In the course of these investigations and trials, political and

280

My Memoirs

personal influences, including the desire for revenge, came into play, as a result of which the question of motives became even more difficult to answer. In any case, the murderer was given the death penalty, while the others received lighter sentences that were clearly motivated by a desire to settle scores. During the course of this same cabinet’s term, other events, no less peculiar than this one, also transpired.

Taha al-Hashimi Gets Revenge Taha al-Hashimi was a principal player in Nuri al-Sa‘id’s cabinet. The man of the hour, he was the problem solver who possessed veto power in the name of the army. At the same time, he harbored an inveterate hatred toward Hikmat Sulayman for having taken part in Bakr Sidqi’s coup d’état, which had been directed first and foremost against Taha al-Hashimi himself. Hence, al-Hashimi began carrying out a plan to punish Hikmat for what he had done to him. Hikmat Sulayman was accused of conspiring to assassinate King Ghazi, whereupon he was led away to the military tribunal and placed on trial. The testimonies that were given evidenced such blatant disregard for the truth that they were legendary examples of falsification and distortion. Nevertheless, Sulayman received a death sentence. Sometime later, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and he was sent to Sulaymaniyah to serve it out there. However, this latter sentence was likewise commuted to house arrest. Sulayman remained under house arrest until the coup of 1941, at which time he was released and pardoned. The measures taken against Hikmat Sulayman were a kind of compensation offered to his opponents for the general amnesty he had issued during his term as prime minister and by means of which he protected himself from any legal or political measures that might be taken against him.

The Corruption of the Army Army discipline continued at an all-time low, and for months the atmosphere was tainted by unrest and provocations. Whenever this or that group rose up under the leadership of some power-hungry man, efforts were made to restore calm and to appease those making demands. In addition, King Ghazi would be brought into the fray on the advice of whoever it was that stood to gain from such intervention. This situation continued to the point where the army’s senior officers came to believe that they were the center of government policy and the ones who guided the state’s actions, a fact that helped to prepare the way for the uprising of 1941.

Events on the Brink of War

281

The Iraqi government’s slavish adherence to army dictates could be seen in the fact that it would consult the army on numerous issues and decisions even when the advice it received was inconsistent with economic and industrial realities. For example, it had been the government’s intention to employ its legal right, in keeping with the oil concession then in effect, to inform the oil company that it had decided to build an oil refinery in Iraq and to take responsibility for the oil’s local distribution. All that remained was to choose the most appropriate location for the refinery once the government had begun carrying out its plan. When the government consulted the army in this connection, its advice was to locate the refinery near Baghdad due to strategic considerations, and this despite the fact that it had already been decided to locate it in Baiji, north of Samarra’, based on a number of well-thought-out technical considerations. In a kind of unthinking obedience to the army, the government decided to locate the oil refinery near Baghdad. After it was built, however, it became apparent that its close proximity to Baghdad placed the capital in danger of attack. Not only this, but the refinery itself was a source of terrible air pollution, and whenever a southeasterly wind arose, it would carry a stench into the capital city. The army was vehemently opposed to connecting Iranian railroad lines from the direction of Kermanshah to Iraqi railroad lines, since this would give Iran access to European railways. In a similar fashion, the army strongly advised against allowing any connection between Iraqi and Turkish railroad lines to the north on the pretext that this would threaten Iraq’s security. On these and other issues, the government would rush mindlessly to carry out whatever decisions the army leadership advised, then bear the consequences of all the army’s whims and dictates. One of these whims was a steadily increasing hostility toward Britain for not having rushed to provide the army with whatever it requested by way of arms and equipment and for not having shown flexibility by allowing military equipment to be purchased in installments. The resulting rancor created numerous openings for the influx of Nazi and Fascist propaganda while paving the way for a new military overthrow. Still further evidence of the army’s sway over the government was the latter’s decision to grant a distinguished position to the army chief of staff in terms of salary, allocations, honors, and housing. He was given a luxurious home that was rented, furnished, managed, cooled, and heated at the government’s expense. Similarly, retired pilots were given extravagant pensions, bonuses of more than 1,000 dinars (the equivalent of $4,860), or a house purchased by the government. These were only some of the capricious behaviors in which the government engaged in order to ward off the evil or curry the favor of these men, who had been lavishly educated, fed, clothed, and housed with the people’s money, and who now lived in the lap of luxury and enjoyed the respect of all in their coming and goings.

282

My Memoirs

An arbitrary practice that had long cost the state treasury exorbitant sums was that of sending ailing army officers to receive medical treatment in Europe at the government’s expense if it could be shown that their illnesses were a result of their military service. This privilege had been scandalously abused, since every officer without exception was allowed to obtain a medical report stating that he was in need of treatment not available in Iraq and that his illness had resulted from his military service! When I was comptroller general, I remember objecting strenuously to this despicable practice and demanding that the government correct the weaknesses in its system so that before an officer was sent abroad to be treated at the government’s expense, it would have to be proven definitively that (1) his condition was actually a result of his military service, and (2) the treatment he needed was unavailable in Iraq. However, no one gave heed to my complaints for fear of arousing the ire of the esteemed officers and their chief of staff.

17 At the London Conference on the Palestine Issue

~

The London Conference One of the significant events that took place during those days, and in which I had a part by virtue of a task I’d been assigned by the Iraqi government, was the London Roundtable Conference on Palestine. In an attempt to reconcile Zionist aspirations and Arab rights and hopes as they pertained to the land of Palestine, the British government in early 1938 invited Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen to attend a meeting in London with delegates from the British government. After agreeing to attend the meeting, each of the five Arab states appointed a delegate to represent it. The representatives chosen by Egypt were Prince Muhammad ‘Abd al-Mun‘im, ‘Ali Mahir Pasha, ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam Pasha, and Egypt’s ambassador in London, Hasan Nash‘at Pasha. Iraq appointed only its prime minister, Nuri al-Sa‘id, while Saudi Arabia appointed Prince Faisal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and a number of senior officials. Jordan appointed its prime minister, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, while Yemen appointed a number of delegates as well. As for who would represent Palestine, this was the subject of a lengthy discussion between Britain and the Arab states that had been invited to the conference. In the end, Britain agreed on a Palestinian delegation headed by Jamal al-Husseini and a number of other Palestinian leaders, including Musa al-‘Alami, George Antonius, Hussein Fakhri alKhalidi, and Ya‘qub al-Ghusayn. It did not include the grand mufti, Haj Amin al-Husseini, since it was understood by all that the majority of the Palestinian delegation represented the mufti and his views. Since it would not be feasible to bring the various parties together in a single forum, the British government decided to bring Jews together in 283

284

My Memoirs

London and meet with them separately, then bring the Arabs together and meet with them separately as well. The meeting, which was opened at the St. James Palace on February 7, 1939, between the delegates of the aforementioned Arab states and the British delegates, was referred to as the Roundtable Conference on Palestine. A few days after Nuri al-Sa‘id had traveled to London to attend the Palestine conference, I received a visit from Muhammad Rustum Haydar, then head of the Royal Administrative Office. When he first arrived, he began talking about general affairs relating to politics. It was his custom to begin with roundabout, theoretical introductions to things, which he did on this occasion as well. At last, however, he came to the subject of Palestine. He said, “The Palestine issue is an Arab cause that concerns all the ministers in Iraq. And you, although you aren’t a member of the current cabinet, are called upon to serve this cause. The prime minister has gone to London to attend the Palestine conference. However, he won’t be able to stay there as long as he would need to in order to take part in all the discussions, since his responsibilities in the government require him to be back home as soon as possible. Consequently, he will be returning shortly and will need to be replaced by someone who does good work. And the most qualified person I can think of for the job is you.” Then, as if to close off any possibility of my declining the task, he said, “Even if you aren’t presently in a position of responsibility in Iraq, you are, as an Arab man of state, still answerable for the ordeal Palestine is enduring and responsible for seeking an end to it.” The conversation ended with my agreeing to travel to London as soon as possible in order to head the Iraqi delegation to the Palestine conference. The date was February 12, 1939, and within three days’ time I had left Baghdad by train for Kirkuk, where many ministers, along with Rustum Haydar and the British ambassador, Dr. Morris Peterson, were waiting to see me off. From Kirkuk we traveled in Rolls-Royces belonging to the Railway Company. We spent the night in Mosul, then left the following morning in a heavy, cold rain. The roads leading to Tall Ziwan had just recently been opened and were as yet unpaved, which made it exceptionally difficult to cover the distance with any kind of speed. There was also the danger of going off the roads, since bulky luxury automobiles tend to spin out of control if they skid on muddy surfaces. Nevertheless, by sundown we had reached Tall Ziwan, albeit in a state of exhaustion, and when we boarded the train, we felt as though we had walked into a sumptuous palace! After a six-day journey, I arrived in London in the evening hours. I was received at Victoria Station by Captain Lu’ay, Nuri al-Sa‘id’s personal secretary, who was accompanied by Colonel Crank, chief of protocol for the Palestine conference. I was taken to the Hyde Park Hotel, where I was to be put up by the British government. An hour after my arrival there Nuri al-Sa‘id came

At the London Conference on the Palestine Issue

285

to see me, delighted that I had come and grateful for my having agreed to head the Iraqi delegation despite my differences with him. He then gave me a briefing on how the conference had gone thus far, expressing his pessimism as to what benefits could be gained for the Palestinians given the pressure being exerted on Britain by the Americans, who in turn were under pressure from the Jews. He informed me that the British had actually convened two conferences in London on the Palestine issue, one of them Arab and the other Jewish, and that Britain’s representatives were in contact with both groups as the negotiations proceeded. The following day I went with him to the conference, where he introduced me to the delegates present at the session we were attending. The conference was being presided over by Malcolm MacDonald, British secretary of state for the colonies and son of Ramsey MacDonald, the former prime minister. Malcolm MacDonald rose and welcomed me as the new head of the Iraqi delegation, after which I rose myself, thanked him for his warm reception of me, and wished the conference participants success in their mission under his leadership. Nuri al-Sa‘id stayed on in London for approximately three days after my arrival. During this period, the British were working on ways to put the Arab delegates and Jewish leaders in contact. However, the contacts that resulted led nowhere. Or rather, they resulted in nothing but friction between the two sides and, on a few occasions, nearly led to insults and name-calling. On one such occasion the British took the risk of bringing the Arabs and Jews together at a single table, but the outcome was disastrous, because when the Jews talked about Palestine, they would brazenly speak of themselves as returning to their homeland, which aroused objections from both the Arabs and the British. And when the Arabs talked about the same topic, they would enumerate the injustices that Britain had committed in the course of establishing and carrying out its mandate over Palestine during the previous twenty years, bringing “dispossessed vagabonds” (by which phrase they were referring to the Jewish delegates in attendance, including Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Rabbi Stephen Wise from New York City, and others) to displace the Arabs on their own land. So, realizing that bringing the two sides together in a single session would do no good, the British reverted to their original practice of indirect mediation.

Chaim Weizmann One of the ways in which the British sought to facilitate communication between the Arab delegations and the Jews was to arrange personal visits by Chaim Weizmann to the Arab delegation heads. One morning as we were gathered in the Hyde Park Hotel, we were informed that Weizmann had come to visit Nuri al-Sa‘id, so we received him. He came across at first as

286

My Memoirs

refined, polite, and scholarly. However, he then began making a devious attempt to persuade us that the Zionist movement aimed at nothing more than the creation of a national homeland for the Jews, and that it made no demand for a Jewish state within Palestine. However, Nuri al-Sa‘id rolled his eyes in disbelief and began poking fun at Weizmann’s “clarifications.” I finally broke in, demanding that Nuri hear Weizmann out. Weizmann then resumed his crafty arguments, whereupon Nuri resumed his derision and wisecracks. He asked Weizmann, for example, how he could claim that the Zionists would be satisfied with a national homeland when they were in the process of mobilizing armed forces and gangs to wage war on the Arabs of Palestine and drive them out. Things went on this way for around two hours until it became impossible to go on with the discussion, and Weizmann left in a huff.

Zionist Ambitions Some contacts between the Jews and Arab delegates took place spontaneously in the context of formal receptions or other social functions held over the course of the conference. One such exchange involved Moshe Sharett, who spoke Turkish, Arabic, English, French, and Russian, and who, in an encounter with a number of Arab conference delegates, said, “We haven’t come here to butter the Arabs’ bread. Rather, we’ve come to snatch the butter off their bread!” On a similar note, David Ben-Gurion (who was fluent in English) said, “We want there to be a federal Arab union of which we are a part.” (In other words, they wanted a Jewish state!) Weizmann was planning to give a speech in the presence of Lord Halifax, Britain’s minister of foreign affairs, and all the conference delegates. In this speech he intended to clarify the reasons for the Jews’ insistence on establishing a national homeland for themselves in Palestine and claiming Jerusalem as a spiritual center for the Jews of the world. However, when the Arab delegates realized what he hoped to do, they made clear to the British that they would not attend any session in which Weizmann was given the floor on any subject whatsoever. They also said that if the purpose for his proposed speech was to explain the aims of Zionism to Lord Halifax, then Lord Halifax could have a private conversation with Weizmann or any other individual who wished to feed him more Zionist lies, allegations, and sophistry. As for Rabbi Stephen Wise, he was rude and presumptuous. He said he did not know why the Arabs wanted to prevent the Jews from returning to the homeland of which they had been deprived for so long due to the force of conquerors, or why the British were helping these Arabs in their rebellion and ignorance of the facts of history. His insolence was consistently met by Arab delegates with the denunciations and insults he deserved.

At the London Conference on the Palestine Issue

287

Another strategy the Jews sought to exploit in order to bring about contact between the Arab delegates and their (the Jews’) leaders was for British Jews known for their moderate views to host soirees or banquets in honor of this or that leading Arab figure. Despite their moderate stances, these Jewish hosts were nevertheless operating under Zionist leadership. Hence, they were essentially acting as brokers or go-betweens on behalf of the Zionist Jews.

A Debate with a “Moderate” Jew Among these “moderate” British Jews was a sixty-year-old man bearing the family name of Cohen who headed the board of directors for the Shell Company, which was known for its wide-ranging influence and authority in oil circles. The Shell Company represented the Dutch and British venture capitalists who held shares in a number of British companies, including the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company, and the Basra Petroleum Company. This Jewish “lord” hosted a dinner banquet to which he invited a number of Arabs, namely, ‘Ali Mahir, Fu’ad Hamzah, ‘Abd alRahman ‘Azzam, and me, as well as a number of Jews, including the son of the former distinguished British viceroy of India, Lord Rufus Isaacs Reading. After the ladies had withdrawn as usual following the meal, there ensued a discussion of the problems being encountered in the conference on Palestine and the thorny issues before it. Cohen, the first to speak, introduced himself as a non-Zionist who did not support the policy of promoting a Jewish state in Palestine. He mentioned the younger Lord Reading, the banquet’s host, and the others seated around the table as all being in support of his position. Nevertheless, he then began expounding on the conditions of Jews in the world, the way they had become scattered from their homes, and their need for a safe haven where they could find peace of mind, a place that could serve as a symbolic homeland to which they could repair for refuge in times of affliction. From there he went on to talk about establishing a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine, the purpose of which would be to provide Jews with spiritual solace by enabling them to preserve their language and their literary and religious traditions. When I heard Cohen speaking so exhaustively on the topic, I asked him if he could specify the aims of this national homeland in a clear and unambiguous way. I also asked him, if he didn’t mind, to write these aims down on a piece of paper. My request alarmed ‘Ali Mahir Pasha, who feared that the Jews would try to lure us into some kind of agreement, if even just an agreement on the principle of a Jewish national homeland. I assured him that we would not commit ourselves to anything, and that my purpose was simply to make it possible for us to acquaint ourselves with the views of

288

My Memoirs

“moderate” Jews in Britain. This way, I said, we could compare Cohen’s views with what was being said by the “moderate” Weizmann, and by extremists such as Ben-Gurion, Sharett, and Wise. Agitated, ‘Ali Mahir whispered to me in Arabic that the Jews knew how to get people to sign promissory notes for huge sums of money! Undaunted by the pasha’s reservations, I pressed forward in the discussion with Cohen until the end of the party. Even so, I didn’t manage to get him to put anything down in writing that would clarify the stance of moderate Jews and what they hoped to accomplish in relation to the Palestine problem. To me, this was clear evidence of dubious intentions on their part. Soon thereafter Nuri traveled back to Baghdad, leaving it to me to preside over the Iraqi delegation. Relations between the Arab delegates and the British were at their most difficult by this time. In one session after another, the Palestinians—represented by Jamal al-Husseini—launched scathing attacks on the British for the violations, injustices, and coercive measures of which Britain had been guilty in carrying out its mandate policy in Palestine in keeping with Zionist aims. Al-Husseini’s speeches, delivered in his impeccable English and eloquent style, made the British bow their heads in shame as he detailed the outcomes of things the British government had done as it labored to Judaize Palestine and give the Jews the upper hand throughout the period of its mandate.

Supporters We, the delegates of the various Arab states, listened supportively to what the Palestinians had to say. However, we left it to them to manage the negotiations themselves in the hope that this would yield positive outcomes for them. Yet of the many suggestions that were made, some in formal sessions and others in less formal encounters, not one of them led to any concrete results. When the two sides—the Palestinians, with us present as their support, and the British—failed to arrive at a solution that was agreeable to all, the British government announced its intention to declare a solution of its own regardless of whether or not it was satisfactory to the Arabs and the Jews!

Hopes Evaporate Two days later, as we were preparing to depart for our respective countries, the colonial secretariat invited us unexpectedly to a meeting to discuss the British government’s proposals. At the agreed-upon hour, most of the Arab delegations were in attendance. The undersecretary of state for the colonies rose and said that after the negotiations had come to a halt, the British

At the London Conference on the Palestine Issue

289

government had prepared a special plan that it wanted to present to the Arab delegations. The plan consisted of the following premises: (1) that an independent, unified state of Palestine would be established, and that both Jews and Arabs would be subjects of this state; (2) that representation in councils, administrations, and jobs would be in the ratio of three Arabs to one Jew; and (3) that Jewish immigration would be strictly forbidden until the declaration of Palestinian independence, after which immigration into the independent Palestinian state would be reconsidered. The undersecretary of state for the colonies stated that if the Arab states agreed to these proposals, they would be presented to the secretary of state for the colonies and that if he likewise supported them, they would be presented to the conference delegates in the name of the British government. I don’t recall if other things were mentioned as well, nor do I recall the names of all the Arab delegates who heard the proposals. I do recall, however, that they were studied by the Arab delegations, which tentatively approved them in the hope that they would also be approved by the secretary for the colonies and thereafter be presented to the conference delegates. It was also hoped that whatever amendments were introduced into the proposals in the course of subsequent discussions would be favorable to Arab interests. I also recall that one day at around that time when I was feeling rather out of sorts, I received a visit in the Hyde Park Hotel from Lord George Lloyd, former British high commissioner in Egypt, and Kinahan Cornwallis, former adviser to Iraq’s minister of the interior. I told them that in view of the proposals we had heard from the undersecretary for the colonies, I had come to believe that the problem of Palestine was on its way to being resolved, and that it was now only a matter of waiting for approval from the secretary for the colonies, who could then present them to the conference. Both men expressed their approval of the proposals. However, Lord Lloyd voiced doubts as to whether the secretary for the colonies would actually approve them, since the United States might not do so. And in fact, a few days later we received the regrettable news that Malcolm MacDonald, secretary for the colonies, had not approved the proposals after all.

US Support for Zionism I learned later that the Zionists, backed by officials from the United States, had exerted such pressure on the British government that it had been forced to change its mind and bury the proposals alive. Nevertheless, the British government continued to adhere to the MacDonald White Paper, which it attempted to impose on both the Arabs and the Jews for years thereafter, although its terms were acceptable to neither group.

290

My Memoirs

The Death of King Ghazi The various delegations then broke up and prepared to return to their various countries, while I for my part left London for Paris. Before leaving Paris for Marseilles, where I was to board the ocean liner Marit Pasha, I stayed in the Astoria Hotel near the Arc de Triomphe. During my stay there I was called to the telephone, and the speaker was Shukri al-Quwatli, then speaker of Syria’s House of Representatives. “Have you heard the news from Baghdad?” he asked. “No!” I replied. “King Ghazi died last night after his car ran into a telephone pole near the Zuhur Palace.” In this connection I remember that while in London I had met an individual named Butler who was Britain’s permanent undersecretary for foreign affairs. In fact, I had met with him more than once, because he used to sit in a room that had been designated for him in the St. James Palace, where the Roundtable Conference on Palestine would meet to follow up on discussions and contact the British delegation. Whenever I came to the palace I would pass by to see him and we would discuss topics relating to politics in the Middle East. On one of my visits, he complained bitterly about the propaganda King Ghazi was broadcasting in relation to Kuwait from his radio station in the Zuhur Palace. He told me frankly that, given King Ghazi’s simplemindedness and his tendency to rush headlong into carrying out advice he had received from people who came across as sincere in their intentions but who, in actuality, were Axis spies and agents, the king failed to see things the way they really were. Then he added, “The king doesn’t realize that by acting in this way, he’s playing with fire, and I’m afraid he’s going to get burned one of these days!” I reached Marseilles and boarded the Marit Pasha, where, to my surprise, I met up with al-Quwatli, who was traveling on the same ship. It was a pleasant surprise for both of us, as the trip would afford us ample time to talk about Arab and Middle Eastern affairs. The day after our departure from Marseilles, by which time we were well out to sea, we received news by wireless radio that the Iraqi parliament, including both senators and representatives, would be meeting to elect the new regent after calling for King Faisal II to be crowned monarch of Iraq.

My View on the Naming of a New Regent The individual who would customarily have been nominated for the position of crown prince was either Prince Zayd bin al-Hussein or Prince ‘Abd

At the London Conference on the Palestine Issue

291

al-Ilah, the son of ‘Ali, former king of the Hejaz. However, since both of these individuals were the subject of a good deal of controversy and criticism, I wired the prime minister in Baghdad while I was still at sea, saying, “I understand that the parliament will be discussing the matter of who serves as the next regent. However, I strongly support the idea of nominating not a single regent but, rather, a regency council.” After my arrival in Alexandria, I went down to Cairo, where I saw ‘Ali Mahir Pasha, head of the Royal Administrative Office, who had arrived several days earlier. He informed me that the Egyptian delegation, headed by Egypt’s prime minister Muhammad Mahmud Sulayman Pasha, leaned toward rejection of the MacDonald White Paper, which had yet to be published. However, he went on, it would be necessary to wait for the arrival of the Palestinian delegation, which would be coming to Cairo to discuss the matter prior to the official announcement of the Arabs’ rejection of the white paper. This Palestinian delegation differed from the one that had been present in London, since the name of the mufti of Palestine was on everyone’s lips as its preferred head. Egypt and the Arab countries that had been represented at the London Roundtable Conference on Palestine had hoped that the mufti and his group would attend the upcoming discussions in Cairo, the purpose of which was to arrive at a final position on the MacDonald White Paper. However, the British authorities in Egypt did not want the mufti in particular to come, as a result of which a number of others, including Emille al-Ghuri, were elected to represent him.

The MacDonald White Paper The representatives of the mufti, or, rather, of the Higher Arab Committee on Palestine, arrived in Cairo and met with the Egyptians, Iraqis, Jordanians, and Saudis in the reception area of the Continental Hotel. After lengthy discussions, the Egyptians insisted on rejecting the white paper given the Palestinians’ rejection of it. As for the other delegations, they sat listening until it was my turn to speak. I said, “The mission of the Arab states in relation to the Palestinian cause is to offer unanimous support for the Palestinians in their legitimate claims. In my capacity as Iraq’s representative, I must express my government’s willingness to support the Palestinians’ rejection of the MacDonald White Paper. However, in my capacity as someone who has personally labored on behalf of the Palestinian cause for many years, both officially and unofficially, and in a variety of places and circumstances, I urge my Palestinian brothers not to reject this document in haste before making a careful examination of its content. Let them first ascertain what benefits it has to offer them as well as the disadvantages it entails. For the essence of politics

292

My Memoirs

is not emotion but, rather, careful and accurate appraisal. Let us look to see in what ways this document can serve the Arabs’ interests. For even if it fails to achieve the Palestinians’ greater aspirations at the present time, its acceptance will do no harm, nor will it involve waiving their right to their homeland. In short, the policy of ‘accept and demand’ is the most prudent approach the weak can take in relation to the strong. “This document, which the Jews have rejected, has the potential to make the Arabs and the British into a united front, and in so doing, to turn the tables in our favor. For whereas the British and the Jews have heretofore been in control of things in the country, with the Arabs on the outside, the white paper could shift control to the Arabs and the British, leaving the Jews on the outside. This document might open the way for the Arabs to deploy their weight more effectively than they have been able to do in the past. Hence, they should hold on to the leverage available to them by being ready to reach a mutual understanding with the British. As for the investigation of other solutions, such as that of the cantons of Switzerland or elsewhere, such a process will help the Arabs to secure more and broader freedoms.” Yet, despite my arguments in favor of accepting the white paper, the Palestinians were unanimously in favor of rejecting it, and the Egyptians backed them in this negative stance. As for the remaining delegations, they remained essentially passive, content to support the Palestinians in whatever they decided. And that was that.

Personal Interests I learned later that certain opportunists with personal axes to grind, who were concerned not about the white paper or the Palestinians but, rather, about their own political interests, had suggested to Muhammad Mahmud Sulayman Pasha that if the white paper was accepted, this would mark a victory for ‘Ali Mahir Pasha and increase his influence, and that it might even lead to his election as prime minister. Hence, Muhammad Mahmud began focusing more than any other Egyptian figure on the idea of rejecting the white paper. When I visited him in his headquarters, I noticed that he was suspiciously enthusiastic about rejecting the initiative. Two days later, seeing no reason to stay on any longer in Egypt, I boarded the seaplane Sanderland headed for the Habbaniyah Airport. And on May 12, 1939, the British government issued its white paper in an official statement.

18 Unrest in Iraq

~

Iraq Is Troubled Upon my arrival in Baghdad, I found people totally unconcerned, at least for the moment, about either Palestine or the McDonald White Paper. Instead, they were gripped by the accident that had led to King Ghazi’s death. It was easy to see that the public did not believe that what had happened had been mere fate or divine decree. Rather, they tended to believe that a conspiracy had been carried out by night. In fact, particular individuals were being accused of involvement in what was said to have been King Ghazi’s murder. Consequently, public opinion was demanding that government officials conduct a thorough investigation in order to unearth the secrets that had been lost with the disappearance of the servant who had been riding in the king’s car when the accident took place. I saw no evidence in Baghdad of either calm or rationality among the masses. Besides, political stability was all but lost on account of Axis propaganda and the indiscreet, impulsive actions that had been taken by agents and simpletons under the army’s auspices. Things went on this way, with the army in control and intervening in the affairs of state behind the scenes until a new, grave development took place. Certain armed forces had presented demands to the government and had threatened Regent ‘Abd al-Ilah with dire consequences unless he agreed to replace the cabinet led by Nuri al-Sa‘id with one led by Taha al-Hashimi. These forces were well aware, of course, that Taha al-Hashimi was fiercely opposed to the regent and supported the army uprisings that aimed to take over power and rid Iraq of British influence at any price. In the face of 293

294

My Memoirs

these threats, the regent had no choice but to adopt a policy of compliance and circumvention. Hence, he met the armed forces’ demands despite his knowledge that numerous sections of the army would have supported him had he refused.

In the Foreign Ministry Taha al-Hashimi was appointed to form the new cabinet while the regent worked tirelessly to frustrate the process. Nevertheless, the new cabinet was successfully formed in early February 1941. By this time there was only one vacancy remaining, namely, that of minister of foreign affairs. Over the course of three days I was approached numerous times by Taha alHashimi in attempts to persuade me to accept the post. However, he was unsuccessful for numerous reasons, one of which, in my opinion, was that any cabinet that had been formed at the behest of the army was doomed to instability and would enjoy no freedom to direct its own affairs. Rather, it was bound to face obstacles, intrigues, and jesters’ loud antics, especially in view of the fact that Taha al-Hashimi’s cabinet would include a good number of prattlers, opportunists, and hypocrites who prided themselves on their association with the new political leader and sought refuge under his wing. My brother Naji al-Suwaydi also sought to persuade me to serve on Taha al-Hashimi’s cabinet, though I wasn’t convinced at first by his arguments. However, he went on to say that my presence in the cabinet might help to ward off a number of disasters in the international sphere, especially in relations with Britain and other states. By agreeing to serve on this cabinet, therefore, I would be performing a valuable service to my country in trying and critical circumstances. So in the end, I agreed, placing my fortunes in the hands of the Almighty! A week later, I was visited at the Foreign Ministry by British ambassador Sir Basil Newton, who informed me that Anthony Eden, Britain’s foreign secretary, would be arriving in Cairo in two days’ time to look into important matters having to do with the Middle East and the war effort. Newton added that Eden had wanted to come to Baghdad on his way from Cairo but that he had heard from reliable sources that he might be given such a bad reception in Baghdad that it would cause severe harm to AngloIraqi ties. Moreover, the spread of Axis propaganda in the country at the hands of the army and paid enthusiasts was bound to make matters still worse. Given the aforementioned considerations, the ambassador suggested that I contact the prime minister and inform him of the British foreign secretary’s wish to meet with him in Cairo. The ambassador expressed his

Unrest in Iraq

295

hope that in the proposed meeting in Cairo there could be a discussion of unresolved issues between Iraq and Britain so that they could arrive at a mutual understanding and mend the rift between them. I conveyed the ambassador’s request to the prime minister, who responded with an unequivocal refusal accompanied by curses and insults directed at those who did not want to supply the Iraqi army with the arms and equipment it needed! When I suggested to him that his meeting with Eden and senior British army commanders in Cairo might help to correct the situation he was complaining about, he replied that he was not prepared to meet with Eden for any reason or in any way whatsoever, regardless of what results such a meeting might achieve. When the ambassador was apprised of the prime minister’s response, he was visibly upset and perplexed. After all, here was a prime minister who was making numerous demands of the British government yet who refused to be in communication with any of its officials or those who, like Eden, were responsible for managing its policies. Nevertheless, he proposed a compromise solution, namely, that I come to Cairo to meet Eden in the prime minister’s place. In order to encourage me to accept his proposal, he told me that my meeting with Eden promised to be more fruitful than a meeting between Eden and al-Hashimi, whose crustiness and unsociability might not sit well with the British negotiator and therefore be counterproductive. After discussing the matter with the prime minister, who persisted in his refusal to go to Cairo, I decided to go in his place and, to this end, made arrangements to travel there aboard a Vickers Wellington bomber.

Negotiations with Anthony Eden By the next day the airplane had been readied for the journey, and the embassy consultant, a gentleman by the name of Hallman, was to be my travel companion. After bidding farewell to the British ambassador, who had come to see us off, we departed Baghdad Airport and reached Cairo at around noon. Once there, Hallman set about making the necessary contact with the British authorities, and a meeting with Eden was scheduled for one o’clock that afternoon. During our interview Anthony Eden treated me with kindness and consideration and listened attentively as I explained the reasons why the situation in Iraq had deteriorated in relation to its attitude toward Britain. One of the reasons I mentioned was the spread of pro-Axis propaganda in the country. I also explained that the army had gained authority over the government in Baghdad. I said, “If we don’t correct the situation soon both in the army and in the country as a whole, there is a good possibility of a military coup. And if

296

My Memoirs

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Anthony Eden, minister of foreign affairs of Great Britain, in Cairo in 1941

that happens, there will be a fundamental change in the political situation that will not only hinder the British war effort but, in addition, turn Iraq against the British in a frightening way.” When Eden asked me what practical solutions I saw to these difficulties, I made the following suggestions: (1) equip the Iraqi army with new, modern arms in order to complete its current formations, (2) allow Iraq to pay for weapons and equipment in a series of modest installments, (3) accept Iraqi officers into British military colleges and institutions in London at lenient tuition rates, (4) provide the Iraqi government with the loans necessary to alleviate the economic crisis that had resulted from the war and its associated restrictions, and (5) adopt a policy toward Iraq that would calm the general mood by convincing its people that Britain was still Iraq’s friend and ally and willing to support Iraq in its concerns. Eden said, “I’m aware that the Iraqi army has, unfortunately, become a hotbed of Nazism and Fascism, and that the sums of money that have entered Iraq from German and Italian sources via Japan have been distributed among many people, including some officers. I’m also aware that disgruntled Iraqi military personnel justify their antagonism toward Britain based

Unrest in Iraq

297

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Hussein Sirri Pasha (prime minister of Egypt), Tahsin al-‘Askari (Iraq’s chargé d’affaires in Egypt), and Khalil Ibrahim, in Cairo in 1941

on the latter’s not having supplied the Iraqi army with needed weapons and equipment. As you know, however, Britain is at war right now, with all the harshness and austerity this entails. What this means is that Britain can only give arms and ammunition to those who cooperate with it in the war effort, and the Iraqi army is being far from cooperative. “Besides,” Eden continued, “one wonders why the Iraqi army insists on obtaining weapons when it faces no threat from anyone. Does it want to arm itself so as to wage war on us, as certain fanatical officers have been heard saying? Even some civilians have declared themselves Britain’s foes. However, we might be able to supply the Iraqi army with a sizable amount of arms that we obtained as booty from the Italians in Benghazi. If you agreed to this, we would be quite lenient on prices. In fact, we might give them to you free of charge.” Eden went on, “With regard to the acceptance of Iraqi officers in British training colleges and institutions, we are still committed to the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in this connection. The system adhered to in times of peace in these colleges has undergone radical change since the war began. However, we will try to reconcile your needs with the circumstances we face to the extent possible. Furthermore, we have no hesitations about providing the Iraqi government with the funds it asks for if it makes a reasonable case for its request. As for the matter of adopting a policy toward Iraq that will help to reassure public opinion there, I assure you here too

298

My Memoirs

that we have consistently sought to adopt the most conciliatory approach toward your country. But tell me: Is the prevailing mood in Iraq one of friendship and appreciation for Britain, or is it charged with hostility toward us as a result of Axis funding and propaganda and the other Arab causes in relation to which most Arabs view Britain as the villain? If the Iraqi government wants to stand up to Axis-based propaganda and needs our material and moral support in order to do so, we are prepared to help you in any way you wish. Don’t forget, though, that we’re faced with an all-out war that could destroy us if we fail to keep up our guard to the very end.” Following this I contacted the British ambassador and the British army commander in the Middle East, with whom I discussed our problems in Iraq, as well as the problems of Arab countries such as Syria and Lebanon and France’s role there. I learned from Ambassador Lord Killearn, Sir Miles Lampson, that Britain was not willing to take any action against France in Syria or Lebanon because, in order to win the war, Britain needed France in its struggle with the Germans, and any action it took against France would be tantamount to treason. As for General Archibald Wavell, commander of the British army in the Middle East, he said to me, “The Iraqi army clearly places a great deal of importance on receiving weapons from Britain. But can you guarantee to me that, if it were to obtain such weapons, it would not turn around and use them against us? If I were certain that this suspicion was unfounded, I would be the first to supply the Iraqi army with the weapons it’s requesting. After all, this is an army that we once viewed as our ally and friend. Now, however, Axis propaganda and money have turned it into an opponent, indeed, into a mortal enemy!” I assured the general that the Iraqi army harbored no intention of using British weapons against the British. Then I added, “Generally when wars end, regardless of their outcomes, they cause a degree of turbulence in the countries adjacent to those that were at war. Hence, Iraq believes that the end of the current war is bound to trigger some dangers in the countries adjacent to us, such as Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. In view of this possibility, Iraq feels it should build up its army in such a way that it would be in a secure enough position to defend itself. Given these considerations, there is no justification for saying that its purpose for arming itself is to use such weapons against Britain.” In sum, my mission in Cairo would have been highly successful if it had been met with a readiness on the part of the Iraqi army to overcome its hostility to Britain. However, the situation was charged with tensions, and there was little reason to be hopeful that an understanding between Britain and Iraq could be reached. On the contrary, all the signs pointed to a readiness to declare enmity, and even war, against the British. Yunus al-Sa‘dawi, who was in close communication with Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, leader of

Unrest in Iraq

299

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with ‘Ali Mahir Pasha (in his home), the Turkish ambassador, and Ahmad Hussein Pasha, prime minister of Egypt, in Cairo in 1941

the rebel movement, used to say openly, and everywhere he went, that Iraq ought to wage a vicious war on Britain no matter the cost. Those who wish to apprise themselves of the details of this mission of mine to Cairo may consult the archives of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the prime minister’s office, or the royal court, to each of which I sent a copy of the report I had presented to the government shortly after my return to Baghdad.

The Palestinians’ Activity During my weeklong absence from Baghdad, it became apparent to me that the Palestinians had been fanning the flames of discord everywhere and in every way possible in Iraq. I still recall the meetings and discussions I had with the grand mufti of Palestine, Haj Amin al-Husseini, and his group in the mufti’s home. They were utterly convinced, and sought to convince me and others as well, that the war was bound to end with the defeat of the Allies, including Britain, and that for this reason, the wisest course of action was to arrive at an understanding with the Germans and their Axis allies in order to stabilize the foundations of the Arab cause, a principal aspect of which, of course, was the Palestinian cause. In their view, it was necessary to do everything possible to oppose the British and to ensure their defeat in

300

My Memoirs

the ongoing war so that Palestine could be delivered from its ordeal. This agitation on the part of the Palestinians served to hasten the coup d’état of 1941, which was led in the political sphere by Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani and in the military sphere by Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh. Then, one day during my term as minister of foreign affairs in the cabinet of Taha al-Hashimi, I was visited at home by a number of Haj Amin alHusseini’s men, who had come to ask me to contact the British ambassador, Dr. Basil Newton, and inform him that they had agreed to the MacDonald White Paper issued by the British government in 1939 as a solution to the Palestinian question, and that they wanted to see it implemented in the form in which it had been issued. Upon hearing their request, I repeated to them what I had said to the Palestinian delegates I had met with at the Continental Hotel in Cairo after my return from London and soon after the British government’s issuance of the white paper, namely, that they should accept the white paper in keeping with the principle of “accept and demand.” I added that, although I was sure they had lost their chance to take such a stance, I was willing to go to see the British ambassador, who lived not far from me, and speak to him about the matter. This said, I went to speak with the British ambassador, leaving the visitors in my office to wait for his response. Being well informed concerning his government’s policy in relation to Palestine, the ambassador was able to give me an immediate reply, namely, that the Palestinian delegation’s reconsideration of the white paper had come too late and that no British official could occupy himself with such matters now that Britain was at the mercy of German threats and bombardment. Hence, his advice to them was to wait for the outcome of the war and whatever peace settlements were concluded at that time. This, he told me, was all that he could tell them. I returned home and informed my guests of what had transpired between the ambassador and me. Without their saying a word, it was easy to see that they sorely regretted rejecting the offer the British had made them before the war began.

19 The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

~

The Crisis Erupts Meanwhile, the state of organized agitation being created by proponents of Nazism and Fascism in Iraq under the cover of patriotism continued unabated. The Communists were being assisted in their efforts by sympathetic democrats; individuals on the Axis powers’ payroll who had been planted among the patriots; people who were up in arms, whether rightly or wrongly, over things the government had done; and ignorant folk who would dance to any pipe or drum in the belief that good lay in changing hands and faces no matter how bad the outcome happened to be. When I returned from Cairo and reported on my mission there, the proposed solutions I had set forth were rejected sight unseen. Meanwhile, clouds gathered and, in keeping with a studied plan, a storm began to brew. Then at last a crisis erupted. The crisis took the form of a rebellion staged by four army officers (colonels and division commanders) who refused to obey orders to transfer to other units more distant from the capital. Their rebellion was facilitated by the fact that General Taha al-Hashimi, who had served as chief of general staff prior to his formation of the cabinet, had been declaring openly for some time that the political balance that was lacking in the government apparatus could only be achieved through military force, and that although he had ordered the aforementioned transfers, he had not really believed them to be appropriate. Eventually things reached the point where Taha al-Hashimi himself interceded with the regent, asking him to overlook the officers’ insubordination. However, his intervention took the form of a threat according to which, if the regent insisted on enforcing the transfers, dire consequences would result. 301

302

My Memoirs

As a result of this altercation between Taha al-Hashimi and the regent, the latter’s favored associates, including civilians, clan chiefs, and the like, began making group visits to the royal court in a show of support for the regent’s position and of disapproval for any move, whether by these officers or by others, that smacked of insubordination or disrespect for the supreme commander. However, none of these initiatives could do anything to prevent or even delay the catastrophic seizure of power, plans for which had been under way for quite some time. The four officers whose intrigues lay at the root of the mayhem were Colonels Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, Fahmi Sa‘id, Kamil Shabib, and Mahmud Salman al-Janabi, the first three of whom were division commanders and the fourth of whom was the colonel in command of the air force. At one o’clock in the morning on April 1, 1941, the chief of police, Husam al-Din Jum‘ah, came to my house and asked to see me, saying that he had come concerning a matter of great importance and urgency. After being roused out of a sound sleep, I agreed to meet with him. He said that the minister of the interior, ‘Umar Nuzmi, had asked him to inform me that a cabinet meeting was to be convened that very night in the prime minister’s home, and that my presence was required. As a matter of fact, there wasn’t a minister in the entire cabinet who hadn’t expected the army to stage a coup sooner or later. Consequently, I wasn’t surprised when the chief of police told me that the army had made such a move. When I asked him what had happened, he said, “Two hours ago, four senior officers went to the prime minister and told him that they wanted him to cooperate with Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani by resigning and allowing al-Gaylani to form a new cabinet in which Taha al-Hashimi would serve as minister of defense. In response, the prime minister expressed his willingness to resign. In fact, he actually wrote out his resignation and gave it to the officers, and we didn’t know what would happen after that.” When I got to the prime minister’s house, I found the entire cabinet gathered there and waiting for me. When the meeting began, the prime minister described what had taken place between him and the officers. He informed the cabinet that he had resigned and gave them the letter of resignation. When I objected to the approach the prime minister had taken and his decision to tender his resignation directly to the officers rather than postponing a decision until after he had met to discuss it with the cabinet, he replied that he had grown weary of the army’s maneuvers and threats and the harassment of these four officers, and that he no longer had the energy to bear the burdens of the government under such trying circumstances. Hence, Taha al-Hashimi had relinquished responsibility just like that, and on the pretext of “weariness.” His justifications were a tacit acknowledgment of the truth of what I had said to him before agreeing to join his cabinet, namely, that he would not be able to man the helm of state when

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

303

the army was in control of its destiny. His claim at that time to be in control of the affairs of state, and of the army in particular, had thus been groundless. Be that as it may, the cabinet began discussing how to maintain security until a new cabinet had been formed. As the night wore on, we would receive updates from Jalal Khalid, Baghdad’s provincial governor, and Husam al-Din Jum‘ah, the chief of police, on the latest developments, including movements of Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani, ‘Ali Mahmud al-Shaikh ‘Ali, and Yunus al-Sab‘awi and their contacts with the officers and others. Later in the course of our meeting, it became clear that the letter of resignation that Taha al-Hashimi had given to the officers had not been presented to the regent, because when the people who had gone to deliver it reached the Rihab Palace after midnight to see him, they were told that the regent was not at home and that no one knew where he had gone. A pall descended upon the officers following this unexpected development, and the conspirators, having been deprived of a way to finesse the situation in what appeared to be a constitutional manner, were terror-stricken. Furious, they began accusing the regent of not doing his constitutional duty and of shirking the responsibilities entailed by his position when the country, according to them, needed a new cabinet without delay. After all, without the regent’s acceptance of the prime minister’s resignation, no new cabinet could be formed. What with this type of buffoonery and lame reasoning, things were in an uproar all night long. Even the government radio station began announcing that the regent had betrayed the country, since he had absented himself in order to avoid having to carry out his constitutional responsibilities.

The Colonels’ Discussion At five o’clock that same morning as the cabinet was still gathered at the prime minister’s home, we were informed that the four officers wished to meet with us to clarify their position. Such a maneuver indicated that the regent’s absence and the uncertainty surrounding his whereabouts had raised fears among the conspirators that things might backfire on them due to their failure to ensure the formation of a new cabinet with at least a semblance of legitimacy. When the four officers came in to see us, you would never have known from the looks on their faces that they had just brought the country to the brink of disaster or that they had embroiled the entire state in a dilemma. They came across as people who failed utterly to appreciate the consequences of what they had done or who wanted others to believe that they had been obliged to do what they had done in self-defense or in defense of

304

My Memoirs

the beloved homeland. As their leader, al-Sabbagh, spoke, the ministers listened with rapt attention, motionless except for their eyes, which darted nervously to and fro. When al-Sabbagh had said his piece, I took the floor myself, not giving the prime minister a chance to speak before others in his capacity as the head official. My action was justified by the fact that the prime minister was in a state of speechless indignation and seemed unwilling either to utter a word or make a move. Without rebuking them in any way, I said, “The prime minister is a man whose patriotism and sincerity are well known to you, as is his heartfelt concern for the army and yourselves. When he formed the cabinet, he was counting on the army’s complete support and obedience to the government so that he could achieve needed reforms in the country, including efforts to arm, equip, and upgrade the army. As for your notion that the government would hold some kind of grudge against you and seek revenge on you, this is nothing but an illusion. To the extent that you act in adherence with the constitution and the law, no one will suspect you of insubordination. Frankly, however, the way you have conducted yourselves in this situation is in flagrant violation of the constitution, because although you have been given the task of preserving and defending the realm, your responsibility is limited to that of carrying out the decisions made by the country’s constitutional government. This government is overseen by the Iraqi people, who are represented by its parliament. Have you stopped to think about the moral and material harm that might come to the country as a result of this reckless action of yours? How can you reconcile such an uprising with your duty to submit yourselves to the law of the land? If you asked me what needs to be done in order to restore things to their proper order, my advice to you would be to go straight to your barracks and wait for instructions from the government, which will do everything necessary to safeguard your rights and preserve your dignity, since it is willing to view what you have done today as a blunder that is in neither your interests nor those of the country.” Answering both for himself and for the other officers, Salah al-Din alSabbagh replied that they agreed with my advice and would return to their barracks. He apologized for the way they had conducted themselves and expressed the hope that the government would pardon them for their error. Having heard this, the prime minister and the entire cabinet heaved a sigh of relief and voiced their appreciation to the officers for their willingness to listen to the voice of reason. At the same time, everyone congratulated me on the stance I had taken and the way I had managed to bring the officers back to their senses. The four officers then took their leave of us. However, they did not, as we had imagined they would, go back to their barracks. Rather, they went to see the original instigators of the uprising and consulted with them concerning

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

305

their next move. I should reiterate here that, perhaps because he was in a state of panic or disorientation in response to the difficult situation, the prime minister said absolutely nothing throughout the entire meeting and made no contribution to the discussion that had taken place between me and al-Sabbagh. What he seemed to be saying through his silence was, “Everything that has happened is my fault, because I believed in the theory that says that the army should be the referee in the political game being played by politicians and the royal court.” This theory, of course, was mistaken and led to the army’s interference in politics as though it were the sole party capable of creating order, exercising control, and correcting errors. When, about five hours after the officers had left us, the prime minister learned that they had broken their promise, he insisted even more forcefully on resigning. However, he had no choice but to remain in his post, since the supreme authority in the land had been suspended by virtue of the regent’s absence, and since the government was unaware of his whereabouts. Hence, he would have to carry on in office in order to keep the country from degenerating into chaos and, at the same time, hold the officers to their promise to keep their noses out of state affairs. By sunup on April 1, 1941, we were dog tired, having been awake the better part of the night. We decided that each of us should go home to get some sleep and that, after that, we should go as usual to our respective offices so that the government could deal effectively with the problem that had arisen so unexpectedly. So, after a light breakfast with tea in the prime minister’s home, we parted on the understanding that we would meet again in a few hours’ time.

Exciting News I had come home in a state of severe exhaustion. So, needing to renew my strength, I slept until 10:00 a.m. When I woke up, I received reports to the effect that after the army had withdrawn from many of the places it had been occupying in keeping with its promise to the cabinet, incendiary campaigns were launched by certain individuals, most specifically Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani, ‘Ali Mahmud al-Shaikh ‘Ali, and Yunus al-Sab‘awi, who told the officers that if the army went back on the task it had begun, the government would chastise it severely and force the offending officers to retire, as well as punish numerous others who had also been involved in the uprising. Terrified by these threats, the officers once again left their barracks and things went back to the way they had been during the night. When these reports had been confirmed, we realized that we would have to withdraw from power, leaving matters to fate and divine providence,

306

My Memoirs

and relinquish authority to whichever military figures succeeded. Meanwhile, we would wait to see what name they chose for the new government, be it the Government of National Defense or some other name.

The British Ambassador At exactly eleven o’clock that evening, I was informed that the British ambassador wished to see me. I replied that I was not prepared to meet with him yet, but that I would pass by to see him the following afternoon at the British embassy. In the meantime, I asked others to inform him that the Iraqi government had resigned and was therefore no longer officially in office. At 4:30 the next afternoon, I went to the British embassy, and in the ambassador’s office I saw Sir Basil Newton, the outgoing ambassador, who was scheduled to leave Iraq that day for Tehran, whence he would be going to India on his way back to Britain, and the new ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, who had occupied his post two days earlier. After a bit of chitchat, the new ambassador asked me whether I wasn’t still, legally speaking, the Iraqi minister of foreign affairs. “In the eyes of the Iraqi Constitution, I believe I still am,” I replied. “Practically speaking, however, I’ve been ousted by a military overthrow.” “And what do you think can be done in this connection? Are the Iraqi people and their government prepared to defend their constitution?” I replied, “Every one of us in this country has the duty to defend the constitution. And it’s most especially the duty of the Iraqi government if it has the means to do so.” Then I added, “So, what stance would the British government take if the Iraqi government or some individual Iraqi wanted to rise to the defense of his constitution?” The ambassador replied, “The defense of the Iraqi Constitution is something that needs to be done by the Iraqi people themselves. It isn’t the task of the British government. However, in its capacity as Iraq’s ally, and given the fact that Iraq has committed itself to fulfilling certain duties in keeping with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty during a grueling war such as this, the British government feels it has a duty to assist anyone who rises to the defense of his or her country’s constitution and honor. In my capacity as British ambassador to Iraq, I can affirm Britain’s willingness to provide both moral and material support for any action taken by Iraq’s legitimate authorities and its people in defense of the Iraqi Constitution. Now, if it is found that the regent has managed to get away from the capital and that he is safe now somewhere in Iraq, do you think it would be possible to form a cabinet under his leadership, and that this cabinet could then take measures to punish those who have treated the constitution with such contempt?”

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

307

I replied, “I’m not the one to answer this question, since it has to do with the Iraqi government led by Taha al-Hashimi. If you will allow me, I will pass your question on to him and find out whether he would be willing to join the regent wherever he is so that, together, they could take whatever measures are necessary to defend the constitution.”

With the Prime Minister Based on my conversation with the outgoing British ambassador, who told me he would be leaving Iraq in an hour’s time, I asked the incoming ambassador whether I could follow up on the matter with him within a few hours. Then I went to see Taha al-Hashimi and described the conversation I had had with the British ambassador. Al-Hashimi’s response was to say that he had resigned for good, that he would not be willing to join the regent, and that, consequently, he did not think he would be able to take the kinds of measures the ambassador had spoken of. When I told him that I personally was willing to join the regent and that most of the other cabinet members felt the same way, he said, “In that case, I’ll give you my resignation and you can present it to the regent when you see him. At that point, the regent can form a new cabinet wherever he is, after which the newly formed cabinet can take whatever measures are called for.” Seeing that al-Hashimi was not going to change his mind about the matter of resigning, I agreed to the arrangement he had suggested, took his resignation in hand, and bade him farewell. His letter of resignation is still in my possession, in fact.

A Failed Attempt to Join the Regent At six o’clock that evening I contacted the ambassador and told him that according to the arrangement we had agreed on, Taha al-Hashimi would resign as prime minister and that I and the other remaining members of the cabinet would join the regent and form a new cabinet. The ambassador indicated that the regent was in Basra on a British ship, and that we could join him by traveling to Basra by any means available. When I contacted the other members of the cabinet, I found that ‘Ali Mumtaz, minister of finance; Siddiq al-Bassam, minister of the economy; and ‘Abd al-Mahdi, minister of education, were willing to join the regent with me. Hence, the four of us set about making preparations to flee Baghdad and make our way to Basra. Our initial plan was to go to Basra by train. However, we then learned that the rebels had cut off all means of transport out of Baghdad. Hence, if

308

My Memoirs

we were to travel by land, we were certain to be intercepted by rebels and sent back to where we had come from. We then arranged with the director of transport services at the railroad station to allow us to board a freight train, where we could hide among the merchandise being shipped aboard the train. However, although he agreed to the arrangement, he expressed grave doubts as to whether the operation would succeed. Abandoning this plan, then, we thought of taking a steamboat down the Tigris River. To this end, we obtained access to a boat through Kamil Hasan al-Khudayri. However, not long afterward al-Khudayri informed us that precautionary measures had been taken the entire length of the river to prevent any floating body from passing, and that instructions had been issued to open fire on any vessel that failed to come ashore when it was asked to do so. We were then told that we might be able to go to the Sinn al-Dhubban Airport, where we could get an airplane to Basra. However, when we began trying to carry out this idea, we learned that when ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi had tried to leave Baghdad for Ramadi, he had encountered major problems and had been forced to turn back despite the fact that he was not a government official, nor was there any reason for anyone to suspect him of anything. So if someone like ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi had had this much difficulty leaving Baghdad, what fate awaited us as government ministers if we attempted the same, especially given the fact that the roads leading to Sinn al-Dhubban were filled with rebel patrols? As we sat gathered in my house that night, we discussed every possible aspect of these various arrangements and possibilities. However, we were unable to settle on any plan that would guarantee our safe arrival in Basra. The British embassy was now under siege. So, since we needed to inform British officials that we had not succeeded in arranging a way to travel to Basra and ask them whether they had any other solutions to propose, the following morning we tried communicating with them through the US embassy. At this point it was suggested that we try one of two solutions. The first was to go to al-Qayyarah, where we might be able to board an oil company airplane that could take us to Basra. The second was for us to go by way of ‘Aqar-Quf, where we could cross the Euphrates to Habbaniyah in a boat, then fly to Basra. When we began carrying out the first plan, we found that Hamdi al-Pachachi had wanted to go to some land of his in al-Mushahadah but had been prevented from doing so. This meant that we would not be able to reach al-Qayyarah, since the only way to travel there was through al-Mushahadah. We then contacted ‘Abd al-Razzaq ‘Ali al-Sulayman with regard to the possibility of going to Habbaniyah. We asked him to secure a boat for us and let us know when it was ready. Once that had been done, we would try reaching the seashore via a route that was not under surveillance

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

309

by the rebel authorities. However, ‘Abd al-Razzaq was apparently unable to secure the boat we needed, and he never reported back to us. After all these attempts of ours had ended in failure, we had no choice but to stay in Baghdad.

The Regent Departs for Transjordan A few days later we learned that the regent had been joined in Basra by Jamil al-Midfa‘i and ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. However, they were unable to stay there because the military forces rose up against them, forcing them to depart for Transjordan. At that point it became extremely difficult to communicate with the regent in any way. At the same time, the Government of National Defense in Baghdad had begun establishing its authority. To this end it had seized control over all state facilities and had taken draconian measures that demonstrated a clear lack of experience and flexibility. Internationally, the British were tightening the noose around the rebel government on the financial and economic level, as a result of which it was difficult for the new regime to obtain the funds it needed to cover its daily administrative expenses. Despite the zeal that drove their extremist elements, the officers who had led the uprising had begun succumbing to a sense of disappointment and failure. Hence, mediators who were laboring to arrive at a mutual understanding between the Government of National Defense and the new British ambassador were able to arrange frequent meetings between Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani and the ambassador in the home of Cecil John Edmunds, adviser to the Ministry of the Interior.

British Recognition of Iraq’s Government of National Defense By this time the two parties had agreed on two fundamental points: (1) that Britain demanded nothing of Iraq other than to adhere to the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and (2) that given the war in which Britain was involved, it was obliged to do everything it could to ensure Iraq’s adherence to the terms of this treaty. Hence, if the Government of National Defense was willing to grant Britain sufficient guarantees of such adherence, the British government would take two basic steps. The first of these was to put the new Iraqi government on a kind of probation. It would issue a de facto recognition of the new government and be in contact with it, such that if it found that this recognition helped the new government to carry out its tasks decisively and

310

My Memoirs

to maintain control over affairs of state, a de jure recognition of the new government would follow. In this case things would then proceed normally, thereby ensuring the fulfillment of both parties’ demands and sparing them the woes of further deterioration in relations between the two governments. The British government thus recognized the new Iraqi government, and the British ambassador contacted the Iraqi prime minister. Pictures were taken of their meeting and published in the local newspapers. However, the extremists in the army and Axis agents, not pleased to see such a mutual understanding taking shape between the two governments, worked to stir up resentment against the prime minister, accusing him of betraying the nationalist cause and bringing harm and destruction upon his country.

The Extremists Two or three days later, Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani received a visit from Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh and Yunus al-Sab‘awi, who made it clear to him that the Iraqi government’s policy of mutual understanding with Britain did not sit well with the army. They told him that Britain’s aim was simply to gain time so that, in the end, it could force the Iraqi government to take stern measures against the army’s senior officers and others in positions of responsibility, and in due course to do away with them. This being the case, they warned him not to be drawn into this so-called mutual understanding, saying that if he continued on this course, the army would teach him a lesson he was certain never to forget. Consequently, al-Gaylani informed the British that he would no longer be able to cooperate with them. In this way, then, the new Iraqi government failed the very first test to which the British had subjected it. It was now clear that Britain would not be able to count on Iraq to fulfill its commitments based on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, nor would it be able to guarantee stability in the country.

Calling Up Indian Forces This being the case, efforts were begun to summon troops from India, which would be landed in Basra on the pretext that army supply services required such measures, since the British government intended to provide Turkey with whatever it needed to ward off an imminent German attack. The stage had thus been set for a confrontation between British and Iraqi forces. When the first British ships headed for Basra appeared, the Iraqi government objected to the landing of troops, claiming that this was in violation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and demanding that the British government

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

311

obtain permission from the Iraqi government before bringing British troops to Iraq for whatever reason. The Government of National Defense also insisted that permission for such moves needed to be obtained well in advance of troops’ arrival in Iraq. The British government did not agree with this point of view, however, claiming that it was inconsistent with Article 3 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and the duties it entailed on Iraq’s part. I had a number of opportunities to discuss Iraq’s stance with British citizens and other foreigners, and I was told that even if Iraq’s claim that the British government was under obligation to obtain Iraq’s permission every time it wished to bring in troops, deliver supplies, or take this or that measure in Iraq was valid, it entailed totally unrealistic expectations in view of the fact that the Iraqi government had declared itself an ally of the Axis powers and was, therefore, opposed to the Allies. As a matter of fact, it might be said that the Iraqi government at that time was a fifth column in the full sense of the word, since there was reason to believe that the best war intelligence available to the Axis powers at that time could be counted on to reach Berlin from Baghdad within twenty-four hours. This, at least, was what was being said by those who objected to Iraq’s claims. To this they added that, assuming Iraq’s claims to be true, it would have been necessary at the very least to form a government that included some elements which were supportive of the Allies so that, if permission were obtained for British movements into and within Iraq, the Iraqi government could be trusted to keep such information confidential rather than leaking it forthwith to the Axis powers. From a practical standpoint, the Iraqi government needed to be well informed concerning how things were progressing with the British military chain of command in India and the Middle East at the very least. However, given the fact that the Iraqi government had proven itself not to be committed to the Allies’ cause but, on the contrary, an ally of the Axis powers, it would not have been acceptable for it to be privy to such information. In fact, I could find no one who supported Iraq’s point of view from a legal or theoretical standpoint.

Waging War on the British Nevertheless, the reality of things in this connection was clear, namely, that the Government of National Defense headed by Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani and his military clique was literally looking for ways to pick a fight with the British government and thereby to precipitate a crisis. Numerous members of the ruling regime had expressed such a desire openly. Yunus al-Sab‘awi, for example, had stated publicly that we ought to wage war on the British, if not immediately, then within days or weeks.

312

My Memoirs

It was thus clear that as long as power was in the hands of people with this kind of mentality, it would be impossible to arrive at any sort of mutual understanding between Iraq and the British. As a natural outcome of this orientation on the part of the Government of National Defense and its supporters, numerous and rapid steps were taken in the direction of a clash with the British. The army was constantly badgering the government to do whatever it could to trigger such a conflict. Once, for example, the army requested a meeting of what it termed “the Supreme Defense Council,” which was composed of ministers and commanders under the leadership of the prime minister. The council’s purpose was to discuss political and military matters and make decisions relevant to these spheres. As for the meeting that had been requested by the army, its purpose was to make a decision that would justify the aforementioned collision in the name of self-defense. The army wanted to prove to the public that the British were using all means at their disposal to commit aggression against Iraq, violate its integrity, and interfere in its affairs, since in this way the government could claim that it would be legitimate for Iraq to resort to selfdefense. And in fact, the aforementioned council decided to do just this.

The Political Aspect The primary political action in which the Government of National Defense was engaged was that of attempting to get rid of the regent. However, it could only achieve this aim by convening the Supreme Defense Council and issuing a decree calling for his removal based on the fact that he had shirked his responsibilities by fleeing Iraq.

The Regent and Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani One day Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani paid me a visit in which he told me of the government’s intention to convene the Supreme Defense Council and raise the issue of calling for the regent’s removal. For my part, I told him that in my view the government should not be concerning itself with the regent. However, I added, in order for the government in power to carry on in a constitutional fashion, it could appoint a deputy regent or a regency council so that, over time, it could look into the matter of who would serve as regent. As for the current regent, who was at that time far from the capital, he might agree to this temporary arrangement so that the country could resolve his case in a reasonable manner. Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani endorsed the solution I had proposed. However, he was unable to carry it out in view of the pressure that was undoubtedly

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

313

being exerted on him by the ruling clique of military figures and other extremists. When I realized that the government was serious about convening the council by any means possible in order to act on this matter, I tried to convince as many members of parliament as I could not to attend the session so as to prevent it from having a quorum. Together with some friends of mine, I managed to convince thirty-two members of parliament to stay away from the meeting, my brother Naji being among those who promised me not to attend. We had reason to hope that a quorum would fail to materialize due to the fact that, first, many parliamentarians were scattered across Iraq at that time and, second, such a significant number had agreed not to attend. However, we were aware that the government was resorting to pressure tactics, enticements, and threats to persuade these individuals to attend after all. In the end, the government succeeded in gathering the required quorum, and a session including both houses of parliament was convened under the leadership of Senator ‘Alwan al-Yasiri. As planned, the Government of National Defense raised the issue of the regent and presented the reasons for its request that the Supreme Defense Council remove him from his post and appoint someone else in his place. I was quite surprised to find that, in spite of the promise he had made me, my brother attended the session and as usual delivered a speech. In it Naji attempted to reconcile opposing points of view and proposed that a deputy regent be appointed in place of the regent. In so doing, he was proposing the solution that I had suggested to Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani. However, this proposal did not meet with the approval of the government, which forced the council to issue a resolution by virtue of which the regent, ‘Abd al-Ilah bin ‘Ali, was stripped of his title and replaced by Sharif Sharaf. In this way the government solved the problem of supreme authority and state leadership. At the same time, it solved the problem of the legitimacy of the Government of National Defense. For as soon as the new regent was chosen, Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani was appointed to form a new cabinet. As the new prime minister set about choosing members of his cabinet, he pressed my brother Naji to join him, but he refused. Whenever the prime minister came close to persuading my brother to work with him, I would do everything I could to foil his efforts, working to persuade my brother not to be part of a cabinet that I viewed as illegitimate because it based its influence on the use of force and neutralization of the king or those who represented him by depriving them of the freedom to exercise their constitutional functions. Despite all these efforts on my part to influence my brother, I realized in the end that a large number of people, both Iraqis and non-Iraqis, had gone to my brother urging him not to dismiss Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani’s request but, rather, to base his decision on the fact that the country was going

314

My Memoirs

through a terrible ordeal from which it needed to be rescued through outstanding individuals like him. In this way they managed to convince him to undertake an action that both he and I suspected would yield no results.

My Brother Accepts the Appointment Thus it was that, rather reluctantly, my brother Naji became part of a cabinet that had been thrown together overnight, and which began its work under circumstances that were growing steadily worse on all fronts. This ill-fated cabinet faced issues and tasks of colossal proportions, since it was in a situation that required everything to be turned upside down in one fell swoop. For it was expected to enter into an actual state of war with the Allies, and with the British in particular, despite the fact that it had not prepared any means of achieving such an aim, be it in terms of military might or organizational structures inside or outside the country.

Suicide The things Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani’s cabinet did were suicidal in nature. However, rather than being limited to the fate of a single person, or even a few people, they affected the entire country. I tried everything I could think of to persuade the government of the necessity of adopting a balanced, prudent approach. However, my ties with this particular cabinet were quite weak. In spite of the requests I’d received from the new regent and the new prime minister to come and offer them my congratulations, I did not do so, since I didn’t feel I could do such a thing when I considered neither of them to be legitimate. Consequently, relations between us were fraught with tensions, although they weren’t open to public view. Yet, despite my distance from the government, I would periodically voice my views, either directly or through someone else, concerning the need for those in power to mend their ways and set the country on a sound course lest it be afflicted by out-and-out disaster. By this time, however, the course of events had been set, and all that anyone could do was to look on helplessly as things moved inexorably toward impending doom. When it became clear to the British that al-Gaylani’s government would not be able to follow through on its commitments in accordance with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the British embassy took no further steps to demonstrate its support for it, since it realized that such support would only serve to further strengthen its radical elements. Instead, the British began looking for ways to bring in military forces and land them in Basra on the pretext

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

315

Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani

that this was required by the war effort when, in fact, their intention was to enter into a confrontation with the Iraqi government.

The Sinn al-Dhubban Threat The ruling elements in Iraq decided that it might best serve their interests to threaten the British government from the direction of the Sinn al-Dhubban Airport in Habbaniyah in order to deter it from its plan to land forces in Basra. At the same time, they began carrying out a decree issued by the Supreme Defense Council calling for a large, well-equipped force to be deployed on the hills facing the Habbaniyah military base in the Dulaym district (Anbar Province). Once there, the force set up camp and began fortifying itself against air attacks while making ready to bomb the Habbaniyah Airport in order to prevent airplanes from taking off or landing.

Al-Gaylani Asks Me to Mediate for Him with Britain On Thursday, April 30, I was sitting in my yard when I received a telephone call in which I was told that Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani wished to see me, and I

316

My Memoirs

agreed to meet with him. It was only a matter of minutes before al-Gaylani was standing before me, his face sallow and knotted with tension. He was clearly in a state of terrible anxiety. After greeting me politely, he chided me playfully, saying he didn’t know why I wasn’t working with them and helping them in their ordeal. Replying with the same kindness and playfulness, I told him that since they had acted on their own without consulting me, they would have to finish what they had begun without consulting me. Besides, I added, what they had done might lead to great good. Then I said, “I notice that you and I seem to be in different worlds. If you had really been keen to follow my advice, you could have proven this by not convening the Supreme Defense Council or issuing a resolution you knew me to be adamantly opposed to. It wasn’t necessary to convene the council under those trying circumstances. Instead you could have sent someone to mediate for you with the regent, who could have been persuaded to stand aside and authorize someone else to serve in his place during his absence. The British, as far as I know, would have been willing to help you achieve this aim. However, you didn’t allow them to get involved. It seems to me from what has happened since then that you agree with a great deal of what I’m saying. However, either you don’t want to do what we both think you should, or you’re unable to do it because the ruling elite that has taken over the government has become stronger than you and everyone else. So what’s the use of discussion and consultation if nothing concrete is going to come of it?” Not wanting to take responsibility for going back on what both of us agreed he ought to do and, at the same time, not wanting to admit that he was unable to do it, he objected, “On the contrary, I can do what we agree that I should.” “If what you say is true,” I replied, “then I want you to understand that your interpretation and application of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty is invalid. The reason for this is that the independence spoken of in the treaty is conditional on Britain’s well-being. If the British had known that Iraq’s independence would cause them problems in facilitating their war effort and receiving needed assistance from Iraq, they would never have agreed to Iraq’s independence. And you know these things better than anyone else. It states clearly in Article 3 of the treaty that Iraq is required within the limits of its capabilities to provide assistance to Britain if Britain is at war with another state. So how can we refuse to provide such assistance, or make it dependent on conditions that are impossible to fulfill?” Then I said, “I’m sure that Iraq is in a weak position legally speaking in the way it wants to apply the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and in the claims it’s making in this connection. I’m so sure, in fact, that I’m willing to make a wager of 1,000 dinars in return for just 100 dinars from you. We present our case for arbitration, and if the ruling is in your favor, you get the thousand dinars, and if it’s in mine, you pay me the hundred.”

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

317

Laughing, he said, “Now isn’t the time for such discussions. In fact, I came to see you about something else entirely. I sense that we’re about to come to blows with the British, and I don’t want that to happen. We had arrived at a certain degree of mutual understanding with them: they were going to recognize my government and allow it to operate in keeping with the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. But in the end, they rejected this arrangement, and now we’re on the brink of the abyss. For our part we’ve mobilized troops near Habbaniyah, and for their part, they’ve begun harassing us, demanding that we allow them to land troops here. We’ve agreed to the landing of troops in Basra. In fact, we’ve appointed a senior officer to oversee and organize the operation in agreement with the British authorities. However, they keep looking for ways to aggravate the situation as though they want to spark hostilities between their side and ours. So how can we defuse the situation?” Before I could reply, al-Gaylani went on, “Would you be willing to meet with the British ambassador and explain to him that I bear the British no ill will, and that I’m prepared to cooperate with them? If they agree to recognize the legitimacy of my government, I’m willing to fulfill my duties in keeping with the treaty. In addition, we’ll allow them free passage of their troops through Iraq. They can stay in Iraq as long as the war effort requires, even if there are a million of them.” I replied, saying, “I’m sorry to see that we’ve missed our chance to reach an understanding with the British. However, I won’t be able to contact the British ambassador now, since his embassy is under siege and being watched by spies from the Iraqi government. And if I were able to contact him, all sorts of rumors would be flying about, the least of which would be that I’m a spy myself. Given the madness that has the public in its grip now, I’m not willing to get involved in activity that could have disastrous consequences for me.” I went on to explain to al-Gaylani that he himself was at the root of the misunderstanding, since the British no longer trusted him or his word. After all, how many times had he made promises and not kept them? He had talked a lot but done little. Consequently, if he continued to act in an untrustworthy way, I didn’t believe any understanding would be forthcoming. And I added that if I were able to speak with the British ambassador, I didn’t think I would be able to say anything that would set his mind at rest. When I kept refusing to seek out the British ambassador, al-Gaylani asked me in desperation what I thought he should do. “There’s a simple thing you can do to save yourself and the country,” I said. “And what might that be?” he asked. “The minute you leave here,” I told him, “go to your office, get your passport, then contact moderates from our cabinet that you can trust. If possible, take them with you, and if not, go by yourself, this very night, to

318

My Memoirs

Khanaqin and cross the Iranian border. Then, in a private statement, announce that you have left the government because you only formed the cabinet based on the understanding that in so doing, you would be rescuing the country from harm. However, when you began your work as prime minister, you discovered that it was impossible to reach an understanding with the military leaders because they had become extremists who neither appreciate wisdom nor judge things based on sound reasoning. Consequently, you had no choice but to distance yourself from the situation, and you have now washed your hands of the army’s actions. In this way it may be possible for your government to be dissolved and for another group—one that is moderate and discerning—to try to repair the breach. You’ll recall that this is what happened in the cabinet you led prior to the last one. That cabinet took a hard-line stance, went on the offensive, and ended up in a state of terrible commotion. As for you, you hesitated and withdrew from the government, giving someone else the opportunity to take responsibility and restore order. “This is the only solution I can propose to you, since the other directions I’ve suggested seem to involve things you’re not able to do because of the army and the extremists. However, what I’m suggesting to you now will put you in a position to resolve this dilemma with a single, simple move.” Al-Gaylani thought for a moment, then said, “I like your suggestion, actually. But, if the extremists got wind of it, they would be sure to do me in.” “What concern would the extremists be to you if you decided to travel to Iran all on your own?” I asked. “You wouldn’t need to let anyone know.” “I’ll consider it,” he said. “However, I ask you again to consider meeting with the British ambassador tonight if you can, since that might lead to a reasonable way out of this predicament.” Then he took his leave of me, not thinking that I would try to contact the British ambassador. As I came down from the roof on Friday morning, May 1, 1941, my servants handed me a flier that had been thrown over the garden gate. When I read it, I found it to be a statement signed by the British ambassador, Kinahan Cornwallis. It was a vehement attack on the four officers who headed the military at the time and on Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani’s government. I took the statement as an indication that a confrontation had actually occurred between the Iraqi and British forces early that morning. I also concluded that the flier must have been prepared at the British embassy the night before and given to a gentleman named Bailey, a British engineer at the Telegraph and Post Office, who had distributed it here and there by car. So at last we had entered into a state of war. Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani and his group had long boasted of being immune to such a development. They hadn’t believed it would actually happen despite the fact that they had been approaching it at breakneck speed. Then all hell broke loose.

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

319

Catastrophe: War Between Britain and Iraq Early the following morning, British aircraft flew over Baghdad. The government had taken some minor defensive measures against air attacks, such as setting up air raid sirens and bomb shelters. However, none of it would be of any avail if the catastrophe actually struck. Sirens wailed in warning, while boy scouts and other youth organizations went to work preparing to administer first aid as airplanes hovered over the capital. The British aircraft made further visits of this sort at least three or four times that day while strategic locations such as the Rashid Camp, the airport, and the railway yard where certain military forces had their headquarters were subjected to occasional bombardment. The bombs being dropped were small, weighing no more than fifteen kilograms. Nevertheless, the bombing terrorized the entire capital, and there was a terrible collective rush to get out of the city. That same day it was reported that some Iraqi aircraft had launched an air raid on Habbaniyah, which inflicted significant damage.

Conditions on the Home Front The state of affairs inside Iraq was one of anxiety, distress, and chaos marked by looting and pillaging, as well as attacks on Jews. Knowing Iraq’s predicament to be a dire one, we worked around the clock to find a solution that would bring the state of war between Iraq and Britain to an end. When rumors began circulating to the effect that Turkey, Egypt, and even Iran had made separate offers to mediate a peace treaty, we heaved a collective sigh of relief. We were told that Iran was disturbed over what had happened and sorely regretted seeing Iraq become involved in such action, while Turkey had expressed a similar point of view. As for Egypt, it condemned what Iraq had done in the most categorical terms, a fact which aroused no little resentment among Iraq’s military leaders. The rebels and their supporters then began spreading deceptive propaganda with the help of Siddiq Shanshal, the foremost propagandist of that era, to the effect that neighboring states were in favor of the anti-British movement in Iraq. However, no one who was aware of the facts was taken in by it.

The British Forces On Thursday, May 7, 1941, it was reported that after the British troops massed in Habbaniyah began advancing on Fallujah, the Iraqi troops were

320

My Memoirs

forced to fall back across the Euphrates. The Iraqi army then considered blowing up the Fallujah Bridge in order to turn the Euphrates River into a barrier between them and the British. Following these events, I called my brother Naji, who confirmed the reports I had heard. However, he said he didn’t think the situation was serious, since there had only been minor skirmishes, and the Iraqi army had decided to move permanently to the east bank of the Euphrates and fortify itself there. I said, “I personally don’t share your optimism. I believe things are worse than you think, and that the harebrained policy Rashid ‘Ali alGaylani and his cronies have adopted has gotten us into a predicament that will bring the country to ruin.”

A Political Mission My brother told me that he would be going that very day to see Ibn al-Sa‘ud on a private mission in order to tell him about the situation in Iraq and to hear what Ibn al-Sa‘ud had to say about it. I said, “This is a rare opportunity to get away from the stifling atmosphere here. So once your mission is complete, why don’t you just stay away from Baghdad?” “I was considering doing just that,” he said. I continued urging my brother to stay away and to wash his hands of all responsibility for the things being done by the Iraqi government. He promised to do what I had urged him to and left on his trip. When he reached alNajaf, he informed me that he was going to carry out the idea we had discussed. Then, eight days later, he showed up in Baghdad. When news of his return reached me, I was furious with this man who made promises but didn’t keep them. He had promised me not to attend the joint session of parliament in which it was decided to remove the regent, and then he had attended it. He had promised me not to serve on Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani’s cabinet, and then he had served on it, though he never tired of explaining to me why he had been obliged to do what he had done. And last, he had promised me not to return to Iraq, and he hadn’t kept this promise either. My meeting with Naji following his visit to Ibn al-Sa‘ud was rather backward and interspersed with a number of harsh words on my part. Given all we’d been through during the previous three weeks on account of the state of war in which we found ourselves, with few means of defense at our disposal and no organization to speak of, I was feeling hopeless and my nerves were frayed. What was to become of us and our country if we carried on with these meaningless battles? I said to him, “Whatever it was that prompted you to come back here after promising me you’d stay away, I’m going to let you enjoy the creature

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

321

comforts you have in abundance here. But in the meantime, I’m going to take both my family and yours to Iran and leave you to your own fate.” I may have been overly harsh in these words of mine. However, the bleakness of the situation justified everything I said. In fact, after we’d parted, he called me and told me he was prepared to go with me to Iran, but that he would leave one day after me. I paid no attention to what he said, though, since I figured he’d decided to break this promise just as he’d broken the promises before it.

The Army The domestic situation from May 1 to May 7, 1941, was dismal. Not knowing what to do, the army was preoccupied with changing its commanders and creating imaginary fronts to which it referred variously as “the Western front,” “the Eastern front,” “the Euphrates front,” and so on, none of which had any basis in reality. The actual truth, however, was that this army was totally lacking in organization and so ineffectual that it couldn’t even manage to deliver sufficient rations to soldiers stationed a mere fifty kilometers from the capital, treat its wounded, or provide its men with the arms they needed. The stories and incidents related by soldiers and their officers and the unjustifiable deprivation and danger to which they were being exposed augured the army’s steady disintegration, and this despite the fact that the force against which it was warring was not a European army fully equipped for battle. Rather, the opposing forces were a motley assortment of Assyrians and Circassians who served as volunteers in the Transjordan army under the leadership of British officers, who in turn were answerable to General Glubb Pasha (“Abu Hunayk”).

Fleeing to Tehran On May 19, 1941, I left Baghdad with my family and headed for Khanaqin. It was no easy thing to get an exit visa at that time. However, we managed to obtain one in four days. When we got into the cars and passed through our vast capital city, the streets were empty as though we were in a ghost town. The overall mood was one of apprehensive silence and the air was thick with angst, especially in view of the fact that not long before, certain ruffians had begun behaving in ways that boded ill for the Jews, whether they were out on the streets or cowering in their homes. However, since there was no actual racism in the country, many Jews took refuge during this outburst of anti-Semitism (which had been engineered by the Germans and their agents) in the homes

322

My Memoirs

of Muslims and Christians, where they received protection and hospitality throughout the crisis. We left without knowing whether we would be able to get safely across the Iraq-Iran border, since British aircraft hovering overhead would intimidate people traveling the roads for fear that they were associated with military units, their objective being to prevent them from reaching their destinations. Moreover, because it was difficult to distinguish between military and civilian vehicles, the British aircraft would swoop down on any car on the road outside the capital and strafe it with machine-gun fire to prevent it from passing. Fortunately, however, and despite the presence of a number of British aircraft in Khanaqin itself, nothing happened to disturb our progress, and to our great relief we reached the Iran-Iraq border at Khusrawa without incident. Once there, we were able to enjoy our food and sleep through the night for the first time in around three weeks, since the British aircraft, although they inflicted little damage, had been a constant menace, filling the air with their droning night and day in a cruel war of nerves that had made it impossible to enjoy even the slightest degree of tranquility. After resting for half an hour or so in Khusrawa, we continued on our way, and reached Kermanshah before sundown. After staying two days in Kermanshah, we left for Hamadan. While we were in Hamadan, my brother Naji called us to let us know that he had arrived in Kermanshah and that he was on his way to Tehran. However, rather than waiting for him, we continued on our way. At noon we reached Karaj, located thirty kilometers from Tehran, where we rested and ate lunch. We were received by ‘Abd al-Malik al-Khudayri, a relative of ours, some employees from the Iraqi embassy in Tehran, and a number of friends who had heard we were coming. When we reached Tehran, we went up to Shemiran (the northern part of the city), then to Darband, a mountain resort near the capital, where we stayed in a newly constructed hotel, which was said to be one of the most luxurious in the Middle East. The hotel was owned by the shah and managed by the municipality through a company known as Iran Tour. Apparently, the company’s influence over hotel management was minimal, with control coming directly from the municipality, which took its orders from the shah. However, despite the sumptuousness of the architecture and the décor, the food was unpalatable, and the service unsatisfactory. It was there that we met up with Salih Jabr, who was staying in the hotel after having left Iraq on account of tensions between him and the Government of National Defense. Jabr had been the provincial governor of Basra at the time of the military overthrow and the establishment of the so-called Government of National Defense. The new government had asked him to cooperate with it, and when he refused, they classified him as a hostile element who was

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

323

likely to rise up against them. Consequently, he was arrested and brought to the capital under guard. My brother had mentioned to me that when he heard about this incident he reprimanded Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani and called for Salih Jabr’s release, saying that you don’t gain someone’s loyalty through force and coercion. Hence, if Salih Jabr wasn’t willing to work with his government, this did not mean that he ought to be imprisoned and humiliated. Rather, he should be allowed to go his way and be given the freedom to choose where he wanted to live, whether in Iraq or elsewhere. Based on my brother’s counsel, Salih Jabr was released and told that he could travel to Iran if he so chose. Hence, he had come to Iran, and thus it was that our paths crossed. When we discussed these events, he mentioned my brother’s valiant intercession on his behalf.

The State of Affairs in Iran The then-current state of affairs in Iran was quite precarious. The country was laboring to maintain its neutrality, which was no easy task. The Iranian government knew that the country had become a breeding ground for propaganda on behalf of a number of different states then embroiled in World War II. Such propaganda caused a degree of resentment among the warring parties, particularly the Allies, since the Iranian government’s bias in favor of the Axis powers was obvious. However, Iran exploited its official stance as neutral to conceal this bias, saying that because it was “neutral,” it had no objections to the propaganda generated by the various warring parties inside Iran so long as such propaganda did not compromise its security and well-being. In addition, Iran was selling its products to the Axis powers more than it was to the Allies on the pretext that in order to revive its industry, it needed access to goods and machinery, which the Allies were unable to provide but which were available in Germany. In response, Britain established a private company by the name of the United Kingdom Commercial Company, one of whose tasks was to purchase all the raw materials available in Iran, Turkey, and elsewhere in the Middle East in order to prevent them from being exported to the enemy even if this meant having to leave the merchandise at its point of origin because there was no way to get it out of the country. Hence, the work this company did had a purely negative aim, namely, to prevent the Axis powers from benefiting from these raw materials. The Allied powers exerted tremendous efforts to prevent German influence from penetrating Iran. However, these efforts proved to be of little avail, since the Allies were in a weaker position than were the Axis powers. Iran, like others, may have believed that victory would go to the Axis

324

My Memoirs

powers. As a consequence, it disregarded the Allies’ wishes, a fact which caused steadily increasing difficulties.

Iraq’s Failed Revolution On May 30, 1941, the revolutionary movement in Iraq was defeated so thoroughly that all its leaders were forced to flee to Iran. This was followed by Germany’s attack on Russia on June 22, 1941. Thus, the Allies had no choice but to deal forcefully and decisively with the political situation in Iran and Iraq, leaving nothing to chance. I am reminded in this connection of an amusing incident: On the evening of May 30, we received reports that the Iraqi Revolution had fizzled and that Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani had reached the Iranian border that morning. The report had even appeared in some of Iran’s evening newspapers. Knowing how badly the situation in Iraq had disintegrated, we were inclined to believe such reports. In fact, it never occurred to us to doubt them. However, the famed merchant Gabriel George ‘Abdini, who considered himself a close friend of Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani, was furious when he heard the reports. So furious, in fact, that he vehemently denied that they were true despite the fact that, apart from his personal affection for alGaylani, he had no basis for such a denial. Peeved at ‘Abdini’s passionate disavowals, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Muzaffar challenged him, saying, “These things have really happened, and Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani has fled to Iran.” So the two men bet 200 tomans, or the equivalent of around $15, with al-Muzaffar supporting the news and ‘Abdini denying it. The next morning, Iranian newspapers reported the failure of the revolution, at which point ‘Abdini lost the bet and had to pay al-Muzaffar $15. The following day I heard news of the arrival of many of the revolution’s leaders, including Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the ministers in the National Defense Cabinet, and military commanders. All of them came to stay in Darband with the exception of al-Gaylani, who stayed at the Firdawsi Hotel in central Tehran. It was said that the Iranian government had offered to provide al-Gaylani and Haj Amin al-Husseini with room and board at the shah’s behest. However, we were never able to confirm such reports. One day I passed by the Firdawsi Hotel and, seeing that neither was there at the time, left my card for them. The next day al-Gaylani came to visit me in the hotel, and he was followed by al-Husseini, the result being a gathering filled with mutual recrimination. I reminded them of the views I had expressed in the past, the correctness of which had been borne out over time, as well as the views they themselves had expressed, which had been proven wrong by subsequent events. Even so, my chiding was polite and jocular. As for them, they expressed regret for having conducted themselves in a way that had brought

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

325

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Haj Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, grand mufti of Palestine

such catastrophe upon the country. At the same time, however, they tried to justify their positions by saying that what they had done, they had done in defense against Britain’s attacks and its attempts to drag Iraq into the war. In this connection, I told Amin Bek al-Tamini, who had come with the mufti, that al-Husseini had the right as a leader of Palestine who had done battle for so many years defending his country from those who wanted to reestablish a Jewish state in Palestine to use every means at his disposal to achieve his nationalist aims. As far as I was concerned, in fact, he had the right to make a pact with anyone, even with the devil himself, in order to defend his homeland—anyone, that is, but Germany, Japan, or Italy. Nor, I added, did he have the right to embroil Iraq in an ordeal that would neither guarantee benefits for Palestine nor protect Iraq from disaster, because if Iraq was weakened, this would weaken Palestine’s defense as well. Hence, it followed that weakening Iraq would not be in Palestine’s best interests. Both al-Gaylani and the mufti agreed with what I had said, explaining that they had never anticipated Iraq’s becoming so involved and, as a result, so compromised. However, in response to Britain’s attempts to involve Iraq in the war, they had consulted with certain individuals in positions of power at that time in an attempt to frustrate Britain’s aims and keep themselves out of the conflict. Whatever the influences that had led the mufti of Palestine to play such an active role in Iraq’s fortunes from 1940 to 1941, it should be said in all fairness that Haj Amin al-Husseini was a knowledgeable, capable man with

326

My Memoirs

vast experience whose intention was to deal with issues of importance to the Arabs in a manner that would ensure their success and well-being. Never once had he flagged in his loving devotion to the Arab nation without preference for one region at the expense of another. Consequently, it had not been easy for him to see a particular part of the Arab world become embroiled in such a perilous situation. However, his belief that Germany was bound to emerge victorious from World War II and that the anti-Axis alliance would dissolve led him to adopt a policy that was frequently criticized as shortsighted.

Machinations The nets of wartime intrigue had been spread wide in Tehran. Wherever one went there were groups of Russians, Germans, British, and their allies speaking in hushed tones about this or that. The Iranian government took pride in not having entered the war and, in this way, having been spared its horrors. In fact, it had been strengthened by the war and now dictated its will to the Allies in a variety of ways.

Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani’s Disappearance One day in June 1941 we heard that al-Gaylani, who had arrived in Tehran some three weeks earlier, had traveled to an unknown destination, most likely Istanbul. The mufti, too, was said to be trying to get away from Tehran and go to Germany or one of the other Axis countries. However, he kept postponing his departure from one day to the next. We would hear bizarre tales about the al-Gaylani revolution and its champions in Baghdad, who had acted one and all in ways that lacked any semblance of wisdom or forethought. After the rebels’ withdrawal from Baghdad on June 1, 1941, we heard reports of riots, murders, and lootings, most of whose victims were Jews.

The Soviet-German War Things had been going steadily from bad to worse. People had been hoping the crisis would be resolved and their suffering alleviated, when, what should they find but a fierce new war breaking out between Germany and the Soviet Union as an inevitable result of Hitler’s assault on Russia. Begun on June 22, 1941, this earthshaking event had the effect of reassuring Britain and the Allies of the future of the war, since it was now a virtual certainty that, having embroiled itself in a conflict with Russia, Germany

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

327

would come out the loser. It was even said that on the day the war between Germany and Russia began, the British, drunk with joy, were dancing in the streets. As for the Axis powers themselves, they were convinced that, despite new setbacks they might suffer due to the Soviet-German war, they would emerge victorious from the conflict. However, the Axis enthusiasts, who were not only zealous for the war effort but, in addition, concerned about their own interests, were clearer-headed and more accurate in their prognostications than were the Axis powers themselves. Apprehensive over this most recent development, some of them believed that despite the rapid progress being made by the German army through Russia and the defeats being suffered by the Russian army, the tide had now turned decisively against Germany.

Patterns of Thought Interestingly, Iraqis in Tehran were divided into two camps over the war. Heated arguments would sometimes flare up between them, after which the flames would die down again and they would be on good terms the way they had been before. However, whenever an occasion for friction arose between the two camps, the flames would quickly be fanned anew. Supporters of the Axis would go to extremes in glorifying the Axis powers and making glowing predictions of victory for their side, as would members of the Allied camp, who would make much ado about their opinions and prognostications, be they pessimistic or optimistic. In reality, however, neither camp realized the seriousness of the situation it was in until it became aware of the new role that would be played by the Allies in Iran. Whichever camp they happened to belong to, these enthusiasts hoped the war would come to an end while they were in Tehran, after which events would further play out as peace treaties were negotiated and concluded. However they played out, they were hopeful that there would be nothing for them to be punished for by either side. Nevertheless, the Allies, who harbored no little resentment toward Iran for its lenient policy toward the Axis and the arrogance with which they themselves had been treated, were secretly planning how to settle scores with Tehran. The secret was a well-kept one, and no one had any inkling of the plan until just a few short days before its execution.

Britain Takes Iran by Storm Now that the dust had begun to settle in Baghdad, I was planning to return and spend most of the summer there. I enjoyed a long-term acquaintance

328

My Memoirs

with the British ambassador to Tehran, Reader Bullard, who invited me to have lunch with him before I left. I went to the embassy accompanied by ‘Abd al-Malik al-Khudayri, chargé d’affaires at the Iraqi embassy in Tehran. The British ambassador had also invited his embassy staff to join us. Sometimes the conversation would deal with Iraqi affairs, sometimes with Iranian affairs. When the conversation turned to the shah, I was astounded to find the British ambassador launching an all-out verbal attack on the Iranian monarch. His candor was particularly astounding in view of the fact that in diplomatic circles it was the custom to keep sentiments of this sort to oneself. The ambassador said to me, “This silly man thinks he’s become so powerful that he can impose his will on Britain and Russia however he pleases. Not content to play the dictator in his own country, where he treats the people’s wealth as though it belonged to him, he’s even got his eye on the superpowers, which he intends to exploit for his own ends in this way or that. He’s lost sight of the fact that if Britain has elected to remain silent about his mistakes and abuses on the domestic front, this isn’t because we’re incapable of seeing the corruption he’s been involved in. Rather, it is simply because we want to reinforce Iran’s position in order to prevent a return to the old policy of dividing Iran into regions of Russian and British influence. The wisdom and forethought in Britain’s approach to Iran and the assistance it has given it have been misinterpreted by the shah, who prefers to understand these things as evidence of Britain’s dwindling power. Consequently, he’s turned his country into a haven for the Axis powers and their plots. Whenever we draw his attention to the harm being done to the Allies’ interests by the Axis propaganda his government allows in Iran, he dismisses our concerns as of no account, claiming that his country is neutral and that the Allies are free to exercise their influence here. But when it comes to achieving certain nonmilitary benefits for the Allies, he stalls and places obstacles in our way. It’s a ridiculous, disgraceful situation that’s got to end.” After lunch, the first secretary at the British embassy asked the Iraqi chargé d’affaires whether he would like to return to Baghdad, and he replied that he would. “You’d be well advised to travel as soon as you can, then,” added the British secretary, “since a delay could have unwanted consequences.” And he said nothing more. When we left the British embassy, the Iraqi chargé d’affaires and I talked about the British official’s comment on the importance of leaving Iran as soon as possible. We discussed the various ways we might interpret what the man had said and concluded that something was about to happen in Iran, though exactly what, we couldn’t tell.

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

329

It was doubtful whether anyone knew what was in the offing. Moreover, given our status as refugees, it was only natural that we wouldn’t be in contact with official circles, be they foreign or Iranian, a fact that prevented us from obtaining any sort of useful news pertaining to likely political developments. Even so, we decided to move up our departure date by four days while taking needed precautions for our personal safety. On the morning of the day we were to set out, we left Darband and drove down to Tehran, our intention being to bid farewell to the Iraqi chargé d’affaires, then continue on our way. When we arrived at the Iraqi embassy, the chargé d’affaires, who had only come to Iran a few days earlier, informed us that we would not be able to leave the country, since the British army had marched into Iran from the west that morning, while the Russian army had marched in simultaneously from the north. Hence, we had no choice but to stay at the Iraqi embassy, vexed at having been detained by these unexpected developments. The British and the Russians had thus become aware that since the Germans had penetrated, or nearly so, into the Caucasus, Iran had begun playing a significant role in the balance of power so crucial to the course of the war. Needless to say, if Iran were to remain in a state of feigned neutrality when, in fact, it was siding with the Axis powers, this would do profound harm to the British army’s position in the war. Consequently, Britain would have to remove the shah from power and make Iran into a satellite state in order to ensure the success of its military plans. The British had asked the Iranian government to let them march troops through Iran from the west to the north and vice versa in order to reinforce the Russian front in its struggle against the Germans. However, Iran refused this request, insisting that this would compromise its neutrality. This being the case, the British had no choice but to infringe upon Iran’s alleged neutrality by force. When the Allies crossed over into Iranian territory, they were met with minimal resistance that lasted for no more than a few hours, whereupon the Iranian army scattered and the Iranian government was more or less paralyzed. In short, Iran surrendered within twenty-four hours and the shah fled from Tehran to Esfahan. When, two days later, he returned to the capital city, he expressed his willingness to abdicate the throne to his son, Crown Prince Mohammed Reza. Thus did Iran’s role in World War II come to an end. However, although security had been established as far as the Allies were concerned, it had been significantly undermined with respect to the authority of the Iranian government and its control over the country, since the army had disintegrated and soldiers had scattered all over the country selling arms and ammunition for a pittance, then gone home. Meanwhile, the tribes rose up against the government and chaos reigned.

330

My Memoirs

The Arrest of Arabs in Iran Meanwhile, the Iraqi government had reportedly decided to take stern measures against everyone who had backed al-Gaylani’s movement, each according to what he had done. The government had issued decrees amending laws then in effect as a means of facilitating such measures. We heard a summons on the radio addressed to individuals who were identified by name. The individuals named were instructed to appear in the military court and were given a grace period during which they could prepare themselves for trial. Through the mediation of its chargé d’affaires in Tehran, the Iraqi government then began urgently demanding that the Iranian government and the British authorities in Iran arrest the Iraqis and other Arabs who had aided al-Gaylani’s movement and confine them somewhere until their fates had been decided. In response to pressure from the British, the Iranian government carried out the Iraqi government’s demands. It assembled the aforementioned individuals, who were a mix of Iraqis and non-Iraqis whom they referred to as “the fifth column,” in places where they could be kept under surveillance so that their cases could be ruled on without delay. Once these steps had been taken, it was only a matter of days before the authorities issued orders for these individuals to be gathered together and taken from Tehran to Ahvaz. The intention was to deport them to British-controlled countries, where they would stay until the war had ended and security had been ensured along the Iranian borders. As for us, we decided to leave Iran and, and after minor difficulties along the way, we reached Baghdad around mid-September 1941.

The Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani Revolt Ends The military revolution that had begun early in April 1941 was brought to an end in late May of the same year, at which point the legitimate Iraqi government returned to the country under the leadership of the regent. The British army assisted in this process by driving out or apprehending the rebels, who were turned over to the Iraqi government. On June 1, 1941, a new cabinet was formed under the leadership of Jamil al-Midfa‘i and remained in power until September 1 of the same year. Al-Gaylani’s revolution had led to the deaths of a number of British subjects in various locations in Iraq. His supporters had also been implicated in looting, humiliating, and mistreating British subjects, and the identities of those who had committed such acts were known. Hence, when the time came for scores to be settled, the British embassy demanded that British subjects employed by the Iraqi government who had been subjected

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

331

to such treatment be compensated monetarily for the harm they had suffered. The embassy also demanded that those responsible for such mistreatment of British subjects be investigated and prosecuted. In addition, the British embassy held that it would be necessary to do away with the “fifth column” in the country. For although its source of strength—namely, the army and the rebel government that had upheld it— had now been neutralized, its effective elements had continued to be active, albeit on a reduced scale. The war was still raging and the fate of the Allies was unpredictable; in fact, developments did not appear to be in the Allies’ favor. Nevertheless, the British embassy insisted that members of this gang, which it referred to as the fifth column, be denied access to positions of influence or political power that would enable them to stir up public opinion, since it was they who, according to the British embassy, had caused the tumult of June 1, 1941, that had led to the deaths of some 100 Jews and a number of Muslims. The embassy called for the establishment of one or more internment camps to which specified elements of this column could be sent until the military situation improved or the war was over entirely.

Jamil al-Midfa‘i’s New Government The services done for the country by al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet were outnumbered only by the difficulties it faced, as it established security in the country and resolved many of the problems that had resulted from the revolution. At the same time, however, the cabinet lacked a fixed, clearly formulated plan based on the needs of the country and the demands of the British. Wanting to maintain its popularity with the public at any cost, the alMidfa‘i government was slow to manage definitive solutions to the dilemmas it faced. It made a number of indecisive moves in the direction of prosecuting lawbreakers from the previous government in keeping with British demands, but such moves were far from adequate. As for the notion of setting up internment camps, the al-Midfa‘i government did not favor it. Hence, there was a kind of covert dispute going on between the Iraqi government and the British embassy, which was attempting to handle things with sufficient prudence and self-control that it would cause no embarrassment to al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet. When I reached Baghdad in September 1941, al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet was on the verge of resigning. When I contacted government officials to find out how serious the differences within the cabinet actually were, it became apparent that the prime minister was displeased with certain things being done by the royal court. Al-Midfa‘i complained that the court had been interfering in governmental concerns without taking any responsibility of its own. It would hinder the work of the state or advise the state to undertake

332

My Memoirs

certain actions, yet without being willing to take responsibility for any negative consequences to which such actions happened to lead. This, at any rate, was what the prime minister was unhappy about. As for the royal court, it denied the validity of such complaints, saying that it had not interfered in any governmental concerns or hindered any actions the government wished to undertake. Rather, it simply wanted governmental affairs to be conducted in a way that ensured some degree of mutual understanding between the prime minister and the regent. In sum, there appeared to be neither empathy nor coordination between the royal court and the prime minister, and the government would find it difficult to carry on with its work as long as the domestic situation remained as it was. As for the British embassy, it had expressed no displeasure with what the current cabinet was doing. In fact, the British ambassador had conveyed his government’s satisfaction with what Jamil al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet had accomplished since the time it had come to power. And although the British felt that the lack of clarity surrounding the measures that needed to be taken in connection with a range of issues had caused a kind of stagnation to set in, they did not believe there was any reason for the current cabinet to resign if it wished to carry on with its work. As mentioned earlier, however, what had prompted the prime minister to consider resigning was his fear of becoming involved in something that would tarnish his cabinet’s reputation even if the action concerned held out potential benefit for the country. It was this fear that led the prime minister to tender his resignation to the regent, especially now that there was a major difference of opinion between al-Midfa‘i and one of his most prominent cabinet members, Ibrahim Kamal, who was prepared to carry out whatever stern measures were needed under the circumstances in the belief that they were necessary in order to preserve law and order in the country.

Nuri al-Sa‘id Forms a New Cabinet The minister of finance had already been expected to resign. Hence, wanting to beat him to the punch and relieve himself of the burdens now facing his cabinet, the prime minister tendered his own resignation first, after which a new cabinet was formed under the leadership of Nuri al-Sa‘id. The new cabinet included none of the ministers who had served on the previous cabinet. The first thing the new cabinet did was to begin prosecuting those who were suspected of having committed crimes in connection with the military revolution. It also set up internment camps on al-Faw Peninsula, which were soon populated with inmates who were known to have been leading figures in the fifth column. It then began imprisoning others until the number of inmates at the Faw Detention Center came to 300.

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

333

These measures had two outcomes. First, they struck terror in people’s hearts on all levels of society and, as a consequence, did away with political dissension. Sending someone to the internment camps required neither lengthy procedures nor meticulous investigations, as a result of which virtually everyone was afraid his name might end up on the list and he would find himself behind bars. Overall, then, there was a withdrawal from all local political activity, and a great stillness descended over the country. Second, such measures alienated the populace, although people rarely expressed their anger publicly or in any sort of concrete way unless some innocent individual had been falsely accused and imprisoned for no reason, or unless large numbers of intellectuals and artisans were deprived of their professions and forced to resign themselves to life in places that provided no comfort, restricted their freedom, and robbed them of the fruits of their labor. Yet despite these bitter realities, there was an overall feeling that the internment camps were necessary in order to spare the country something even worse than the injustices and deprivation being suffered by such individuals. It is not my intention here to deprive the unbiased historian, who is not driven by sympathy or zeal for one side or the other, of the freedom to decide for himself whether or not the Iraqi government should have taken these measures. In the end, however, the task of assessing the import of specific local circumstances falls to those who lived through them, not to those who sit in judgment upon them after the fact.

The Iraqi Government’s Weakness The new cabinet was in a weaker position than the one that had preceded it because the British had been intervening on a wider scale than before. Such intervention manifested itself in relation to rationing arrangements, the police, security, and the country’s contacts with neighboring states. There was a time during which the country had been under out-and-out military occupation. This was justified by the exigencies of war and strategic necessity, to which the Allies were now giving utmost priority. However, the state had lost all of its powers, and foreign influence made its way into virtually all spheres of life. Instructions were issued from London, the Allies’ Middle East headquarters, and the Supreme Command in Iraq and Iran, and the Iraqi government did obediently whatever it was told. The situation in Iraq remained this way for four entire years. Iraq was now hosting a huge number of Allied soldiers who had been deployed all over the country, while British employees kept surveillance over its administrative affairs both in the capital and elsewhere. Consequently, any movement that led to a clash between Iraq and the Allies was bound to destroy its freedom, if even for a limited period of time. Hence, it might be said that if Iraq had not made a realistic assessment of the circumstances and adjusted

334

My Memoirs

itself to them, it would have been unable to maintain any semblance of autonomy on the local level.

Provisioning The Allies undertook to provide Iraq with whatever it needed by way of manufactured goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, and the like, working with Allied experts to increase and organize local production. As a result, Iraq enjoyed substantial benefits that kept the scourge of deprivation, hunger, and nakedness at bay. In these respects, then, Iraq was far better off than some European countries, which had suffered the horrors of war far more than we had. In fact, Iraq was in far better shape than its neighbors, including Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. Every cloud has a silver lining, as they say. Hence, it might be said that if Iraq had not endured the affliction of Allied occupation and control, it would not have enjoyed the degree of blessing it did during that arduous period. At the same time, no measures taken in any country, at any time, are entirely sound. As a matter of fact, there were sometimes terrible interference and appalling waste on the part of Allied personnel, unfair restrictions were imposed, and bribery, theft, and misappropriation were rife. However, if, as the Arabic saying goes, “Necessity justifies what would otherwise be prohibited,” then the necessities of war gave people reason to indulge in transgressions and misbehaviors that would otherwise have been a cause for shame.

Nuri al-Sa‘id’s Cabinet Faces Difficult Decisions Nuri al-Sa‘id’s cabinet engaged in actions that Jamil al-Midfa‘i’s government had not been willing to undertake, such as detaining those who had been involved in Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani’s movement and enforcing emergency laws on a wider scale than before. Al-Sa‘id’s cabinet had been expected to be amenable to Britain’s wishes. This expectation was borne out by al-Sa‘id’s choice of ministers, who were, if not Britons themselves, on good terms with the British. Salih Jabr, minister of the interior, and Dawud al-Haydari, minister of justice, were the two most prominent pro-British elements in al-Sa‘id’s cabinet. Beyond this, the principal preoccupation of al-Sa‘id’s cabinet, indeed, of the whole country, was the question of whether to bring the leaders of the 1941 revolution back to Iraq from South Africa where they were now in detention. The Iraqi government was in favor of bringing them back to be tried and sentenced for what they had done. Consequently, the British

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

335

government was being flooded with requests to bring these men back to Iraq, and there was evidence that the British had initiated some consultations concerning this matter. To this end they had contacted a number of relevant figures, asking them to express their opinions as to what should be done, that is, whether these men should be brought back to stand trial or whether they should be left where they were. One day I was contacted by the Eastern secretary at the British embassy, who asked me to come to the embassy to meet the British ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. I came to the embassy as I had been requested to do, and after we had discussed a variety of topics, the ambassador said to me, “I want to ask you a question, and I want you to answer me with complete honesty.” Then he said, “If you were an official in the Iraqi government—if, for example, you were the prime minister—would you agree to bring the four officers implicated in the 1941 movement back to Iraq to stand trial now, or would you take some other measure?” Without hesitation I replied, “If I were in charge of the Iraqi government, I would leave them right where they are. I wouldn’t want to open the door to a new round of troublemaking at a time when what we need more than anything else is a good dose of peace and quiet. Our focus should be on avoiding the mistakes of the past and rebuilding what’s been destroyed.” I asked, “What would be the purpose behind bringing these men back to stand trial? If the purpose would be to punish them, they’re already being punished where they are. With a status lower than that of war captives, they’re at the mercy of the British authorities, and far from home. As I see it, this alone is sufficient punishment for them and a sufficient example to others. Consequently, there is no need to take any further measures. Furthermore, if the prime minister were to take harsh measures in this country, he would want them to have long-lasting effects, even if he himself won’t go on enjoying the privileges of power for very long. As a citizen who may live in this country for life, he needs to be on good terms with his associates, or with those who are associated with the people against whom such measures are to be taken. Don’t forget that there are people in this country who revere these men as heroes who fought to throw off the yoke of foreign oppression. They have relatives, supporters, and friends who number in the thousands and whose bitterness and resentment the prime minister would have to cope with for years to come. Besides, what would you gain by bringing them back, putting them on trial, and punishing them at this time in particular? Would you do it in order to distract the public from the war policy or from opposing the Allies in these trying times? Or would it be in order to prove that the Allies are powerful enough to make an example of people who dared stand up to them? Would it really be in the best interests of the Allies and the Iraqi state to hold such trials just when the Iraqi state

336

My Memoirs

has finally been able to clear the air to the point where it has reason to be hopeful of the future?” In sum, I told the British ambassador that this issue should be kept closed until the war had come to an end, at which point we could consider issuing an amnesty, commuting their sentences, or finding some other solution more in keeping with the conditions of peacetime. In reply, the ambassador told me that, of the more than ten people he had consulted about the matter, I was the only one who had taken the position I had, as all the rest had favored bringing the exiled men back for trial. And in fact, within a few months’ time I heard that a number of them had arrived in Iraq to be tried. Nuri al-Sa‘id’s cabinet was in a difficult position, since it was faced with demands from the British authorities that were both complex and restrictive, and it had to look for appropriate ways in which to reconcile the necessities of war with the needs and demands of the population. Besides this, the army was in the worst possible condition, since it required more care and coordination than usual in order to keep abreast of the country’s needs and safely distant from political influences. At the same time, relations between the cabinet and the royal court would do pendulum swings from bad to good, then back to bad again. No one ever knew when they were going to dramatically improve or deteriorate miserably. Blown to and fro by the winds of competing personal persuasions and subtle propaganda and vulnerable to the maneuvers of people who were after some sort of material gain, the court never adopted a policy clear enough to enable the government to work steadily and fruitfully even for a minimal length of time. Consequently, the cabinet had been under fire ever since it had come to power from virtually all quarters, particularly from those connected in this way or that with the royal court. This cabinet of Nuri al-Sa‘id’s, despite the effort he expended to be flexible and patient, was unable to operate for more than a few months. Consequently, the prime minister began to think of forming a new cabinet. Nevertheless, the act of replacing the cabinet promised to be little more than a stalling maneuver and a way of distracting the public from the fact that nothing had changed in concrete terms. Consequently, Nuri al-Sa‘id decided to reshuffle the cabinet, since he believed this would make it more responsive to popular inclinations. One day he spoke to me about the matter, saying, “Healthwise, I’m not in a position to go on bearing the burdens of government work. I need rest. So I want to prepare the way for someone to succeed me. And I’ve been thinking that if I could form a cabinet with you as deputy prime minister, you could take some of the burden off my shoulders, and this would be better for everyone.” After a lengthy exchange, I agreed to the idea of his forming a cabinet in which I would be deputy prime minister. It was also agreed that I would

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

337

take no other ministerial post. I was asked, in fact, to serve as minister of foreign affairs, but I declined, since this ministry was certain to take a great deal of my time and would prevent me from devoting my efforts to affairs of state.

Nuri al-Sa‘id’s New Cabinet The new cabinet having now been formed, it was believed that because its members had been appointed on the basis of their similar persuasions, this would help the government to be more effective in achieving its aims. However, no sooner had the reshuffling been completed than new difficulties appeared on the horizon. The first problem that surfaced consisted in the fact that, although the royal court had agreed to the cabinet reshuffling, it was nevertheless not pleased with the outcome. Hence, from time to time it would express its dissatisfaction with the new cabinet. This, in turn, encouraged the opposition, which set out to promote its own agenda from the first time it met with parliament. After being appointed deputy prime minister, I came to understand that the arrangements made prior to the cabinet reshuffling had not been sufficiently serious to enable the new cabinet to work effectively. This became apparent with the emergence of a problem relating to the creation of the post of deputy prime minister, namely, the question of whether this post was constitutional or not. Once the opposition got wind of this development, it went to work to capitalize on it. The cabinet had done its utmost to demonstrate that the post was, in fact, fully constitutional, having shown this to be the case through exhaustive legal studies whose results were presented to parliament and published in the newspapers. Nevertheless, the cabinet was ultimately obliged to appeal to the Supreme Court to rule on the post’s constitutionality, since those who had raised the issue had done so not in order to preserve the constitution but, rather, in order to embarrass the cabinet and force it to resign. This issue did, in fact, cause major embarrassment to the cabinet, and a decision was made to appeal to the Supreme Court based on a suggestion by the House of Representatives. Of course, when I had stepped forward to work with the prime minister, I had done so based on the belief that, at the time when he formed the cabinet, he had already persuaded the royal court of the validity of what he was doing so that we, for our part, would be able to do something useful for the country. The only reason I had agreed to serve as deputy prime minister was that in this way I would be able to step in for the prime minister if he happened to be abroad for medical treatment or in the fulfillment of some mission relating to his governmental duties. However, it had now become apparent that what we had been thinking of doing was based on little more than a mirage. Hence, I decided that in such a case, discretion was the better part of valor,

338

My Memoirs

and I opted to pull out midstream even if it caused me some hardship. However, I then came to realize that the new cabinet itself wasn’t viable, which meant that the prime minister himself would need to resign as well, although I had no right to insist that he do so. As it was, within just days of my resignation, the prime minister was obliged to withdraw as well. And thus it was that our most recent attempt to ensure the cabinet’s ability to carry on with useful and needed service to the country ended in failure. At this point both the royal court and the country faced still another problem, since there was no easy way of predicting the outcomes of the transitional phase that followed the resignation of Nuri al-Sa‘id’s cabinet. The propaganda that had been infiltrating the royal court for the previous two years and exercising such an overwhelming influence over it was claiming that older politicians had accomplished nothing of significance for the country and that the way should be opened for new blood to succeed them. However, if “new blood” meant younger politicians, the problem was that there were no younger politicians who could be counted on, since they lacked experience.

Hamdi al-Pachachi A days-long debate over this issue resulted in a “solution” that was far from reassuring: namely, neither the old elements with competence and experience nor the new elements with knowledge and enthusiasm were to be given encouragement. Summer was approaching, and in keeping with his usual custom, Nuri al-Sa‘id was planning to leave Iraq for rest and relaxation. So he resigned and asked Hamdi al-Pachachi to form a cabinet for the first time. In his sixties, al-Pachachi had been uninvolved in governmental affairs for the past ten years, and the only ministerial posts he had ever held were those of minister of Islamic endowments some twenty years earlier and minister of social affairs in the cabinet led by Taha al-Hashimi for a period of two months. In short, the choice of al-Pachachi as prime minister came as a slap in the face to old and young alike. Al-Pachachi chose cabinet members from among a pool of young people who had never held ministerial posts before. The objective of this approach was to communicate to the public that the “old-style” ministers they had complained about were now being eliminated with the stroke of the new prime minister’s pen. During its term in office, the new cabinet’s performance ranged between bad and worse. Strangely, however, although this cabinet’s lifespan was thought of by people as having been short, it actually survived longer than any other cabinet in the history of the country up until that time. As far as Nuri al-Sa‘id and numerous other people were concerned, this cabinet’s sole purpose was to be a space filler until Nuri could

The al-Gaylani Movement and Its Outcomes

339

finish his summer vacation and reconsider the new cabinet’s fate. However, things didn’t turn out quite the way he had planned. The decision to appoint Hamdi al-Pachachi to form a cabinet had come as a surprise to people much as the appointment of Muzahim al-Pachachi before him had, the difference being that, unlike Muzahim, Hamdi was graced with good morals and a clean past. However, he lacked experience and a forceful personality, as a result of which he was ill equipped to take on such monumental responsibilities. Another of his weaknesses was his tendency to use his position in ways that brought personal benefit to him and to the members of his extensive family. Yet despite all this, the new prime minister managed affairs with a moderate degree of success, and his “temporary” cabinet continued in office for a record-breaking eighteen months. Thanks to his good conduct, humility, and generous hospitality, Hamdi al-Pachachi was met with acceptance and appreciation by Arab officials in Syria and Egypt. His genteel manner, his harmonious contacts with the Arab League during its early days, and the fact that, being relatively new to the Iraqi political scene, he did not have a history of differences with other Arab politicians also helped him to achieve mutual understanding among the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

20 The Arab League

~

The Arab League’s Establishment Speaking of the Arab League, I remember doing everything I could to help complete its formation and organize its administration. The idea of establishing an Arab union as envisioned by the Egyptians never materialized; instead, they did nothing but applaud the idea without doing anything to make it a reality. The idea of an Arab union began to crystallize when Nuri al-Sa‘id met with Mustafa Nahhas Pasha for the first time in Cairo. It became apparent from this contact that what was meant by the aforementioned union was the creation of a material basis for sound cooperation among Arab states. The idea was that once the Arab states had united, the scale of cooperation could be expanded through the creation of a federation, alliance, or some other means of bringing the Arab states closer together. When Nuri al-Sa‘id returned to Baghdad after his meeting with Nahhas Pasha in Cairo, he came bearing the minutes of the sessions the two men had held. He then showed the documents to people he believed would be able to understand their purpose and translate this purpose into action. I was one of the people to whom Nuri al-Sa‘id presented the minutes, and I was asked to think of a practical way of achieving the kind of Arab union to which Egypt and Iraq aspired. When I thought about the matter, however, I saw no justification for creating an Arab union among countries that differed in so many ways. Consequently, I told Nuri that I thought we needed to find a way of promoting communication among the Arab states and participation in pan-Arab cultural efforts that was more in keeping with the Arab states’ current circumstances and potentials. I had envisioned a federation based on a set of fixed themes or concerns to be decided upon by the federation’s founders. The first thing that came to 341

342

My Memoirs

mind was a political federation, a military federation, a cultural federation, a financial and monetary federation, and a transportation federation, for example. The federation would thus revolve around six themes: (1) foreign affairs, (2) the armed forces, (3) education, (4) money and finance, (5) transportation and roads, and (6) legislation and legal coordination. Once these themes had been fixed, they would be presented to the various Arab states, which could choose to participate in the federation on the basis of all or some of these themes. Each country would then commit itself to the federation in relation to the particular theme or themes it had chosen. States that were similar in terms of their institutions and structures—such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and even Jordan, once it gained its independence— might choose most or all of the six themes listed above. As for Saudi Arabia or Yemen, they might be expected to choose the first and/or the second theme, or the fourth and the fifth. Hence, the choice of theme would depend on the interests of the state concerned, though all of them would have entered into the federation in terms of outward form. A special mechanism would then be developed for managing and organizing the themes chosen. It was my view that this organization, to be referred to as the Federation of Arab States, should be an enduring entity through which participating states could strengthen their ties and ascertain the benefits of their participation based on this or that theme. Then, if any of them found that it would be in its best interest to increase or decrease the number of themes on the basis of which it was taking part in the federation, it could submit a request to do so. This type of loose federation would be entirely consonant with conditions in the Arab states and the various degrees of progress they had achieved, and over time these countries might witness an attenuation in their differences and disagreements. If those engaged in negotiations were not convinced that it would be a good thing to institute a loose federation at that time, I recommended that we revert to the idea of close cooperation among the Arab states with the understanding that we might move in the direction of an actual federation at a later time. During his ongoing communications with Nahhas Pasha, his aides, and other men in his party, Nuri alSa‘id told me that the idea of a league, which had been proposed by Professor al-Hilali, had met with more acceptance than that of a union or federation, which was viewed as impractical at that time. The notion of a league was also consistent with my idea of creating a special mechanism designed to foster closer cooperation among Arab states.

The League Charter On this basis, efforts were commenced to carry out the idea of close cooperation among the Arab states. However, King Ibn al-Sa‘ud had misunderstood the notion of close cooperation to mean that an actual “center” would be

The Arab League

343

established, that this center would have broad rights and effective powers, and that the secretary-general of this center would be in control of Arab countries’ fortunes. Consequently, efforts had to be made to disabuse King Ibn al-Sa‘ud of the notion that membership in the Arab League would require Arab states to surrender to the will of the league’s secretary-general. It took quite some time to get this idea across to the king. Ultimately, however, he was won over to the side of those who supported founding the league. Delegates from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon then held a meeting in which, after a lengthy discussion, they drew up and signed the charter for the League of Arab States. Egypt hosted a grand celebration of the league’s official establishment, and the signatory states exchanged hearty congratulations. The first secretary-general to be appointed in keeping with the league’s charter was ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam. When I read the league’s charter, it was clear to me that its framers had been influenced by my idea of a loose federation whose activity would revolve around six major themes or areas of concern, since the Arab League’s charter called for the formation of a standing political committee, a standing financial committee, a standing military committee, and a transportation committee. In addition, the first thing the league did was to draw up a cultural charter that would be concerned with education, broadcasting, publication, and other issues that fell under the third category of concerns to be addressed by the loose federation I had proposed. My cooperation with the secretary-general (in my capacity as assistant secretary-general) grew out of a number of factors. The first of these was my concern to establish a permanent center for the study and coordination of avenues of cooperation among Arab states. The second was my close friendship with the secretary-general, who had confidence in my ability to manage affairs and to help the league achieve its aims. And the third was my willingness to work on a volunteer basis, without any sort of material compensation. I enjoyed the sense of doing my patriotic duty, since in this way I set my conscience at rest and worked toward realizing hopes I had cherished for some fifty years. In view of my tireless efforts in the league’s service, the secretary-general proposed that the league’s council elect me chairman of the Standing Financial and Economic Committee. I agreed to his proposal and the council elected me to this position, which I occupied for twelve years, that is, from the time the league was first established until the debacle of July 14, 1958. The Arab League’s Standing Financial and Economic Committee fulfilled its duties in the most competent manner whenever it was asked to meet and issue an opinion on economic or financial initiatives and issues. It was a personal aspiration of mine to standardize Arab currency, to establish a central bank that would issue such a currency, to coordinate financial systems in Arab states, and to harmonize their bylaws and regulations in a way that would open the way for their standardization in the future. I asked Paul

344

My Memoirs

van Zeeland, a renowned Belgian financial expert, to come to Cairo to discuss this important matter, which he did. Professor ‘Arif Zahir Shaykhiyah also shared in my efforts and was of great assistance to me. However, Arab states, and the Egyptian government in particular, offered few incentives for this type of work, a fact which dampened my enthusiasm and led me ultimately to shelve the project. Nothing further has been done on it since.

The Postwar World When World War II came to an end, the Allies claimed that they were organizing the world on new foundations of peace and prosperity. If they really meant “the world,” this meant that Iraq would receive a share of the benefits, including needed reform. The Allies, including the British, had begun talking constantly, and in more than one place, about the need to create a new direction for democratic nations that would enable them to best fulfill their responsibilities. This being the case, Iraq would need to prepare itself for a new policy guided by the spirit of democracy and freedom, which would in turn require the creation of local political and social organizations to coordinate and organize public opinion.

British Propaganda and the Regent’s Speech Allied propaganda had apparently had some effect on the atmosphere in Iraq and in Iraqi government circles. Its echo could be heard in a lengthy speech delivered by Crown Prince and Regent ‘Abd al-Ilah on January 27, 1946, in which he discussed, among other things, the need to renew Iraq’s internal organization; to achieve reform through the introduction of broader, more inclusive responsibilities; to grant general freedoms; and to develop and revitalize national forces. Everyone felt that the country was on the threshold of a critical development that would yield great benefits, especially now that general freedoms, which had been suppressed in so many ways and for so many years, were about to be restored and help the people achieve real progress. The Iraqi public was optimistic that the goals set forth in the regent’s speech could be realized. The important thing now, however, was to create the means to bring these developments about. So how could this be done? This was the question that was on everyone’s lips. Although the current cabinet had expressed its willingness to proceed in this direction if it remained in power, it then resigned. In order to achieve these hopes, then, negotiations were begun for the appointment of a new cabinet.

The Arab League

345

Political Turmoil However, these negotiations were both protracted and unsuccessful. The reason for this was a lack of coordination among politicians and their points of view and the absence of organized blocs that thought in a consistent, unified manner such that, if they were asked to present their point of view to the prime minister or the regent, their perspectives would be well thought out and point to a clear conclusion. However, the politicians in Iraq were, unfortunately, insistent on working individually rather than on teams. Each of them would work to gather supporters by any means possible, including the use of enticements of various sorts. Then, once he had gotten what he was looking for and was about to achieve his aim—that is, a place in power—he would deftly, tactfully weasel out of any and all promises he had made or plans he had proposed. I heard, for example, that when twentyfive politicians were consulted on a given matter, no one’s opinion agreed with that of anyone else, which did nothing but produce further uncertainty for the person who had sought out their advice. In this kind of atmosphere it was obviously not going to be possible to ensure the fulfillment of people’s hopes. Nor would it be possible to create an ideal political class when the society itself was so damaged, since, after all, the dough is inseparable from the yeast. It had become virtually impossible to seek reform or improvement in the country’s facilities and in the way in which people practiced politics. However, even if something cannot be realized in full, one should seek to realize it in part. Consequently, it would be necessary to watch closely for whatever miracles of development might take place in Iraqi politics. It thus seemed that the time had come for Hamdi al-Pachachi’s cabinet, which survived longer than it had been expected to, to resign.

I Am Invited to Form a Cabinet As I sat one day contemplating the latest state of affairs on Iraq’s political front, I was called to the telephone. The speaker was Arshad al-‘Umari, who wanted to see me. The date was Tuesday, February 20, 1946. When al‘Umari arrived, he launched into a long spiel, the upshot of which was that the regent had wanted to appoint him to form a new cabinet, but that in response, he had told the regent that he would prefer that he choose an eagle rather than a sparrow. In other words, he thought the regent’s choice should have fallen on me, and that he should be left in peace, without responsibility. Al-‘Umari then went on to add that when he made this suggestion to the regent, he had sensed some uncertainty on the regent’s part as to how I

346

My Memoirs

would react, what my perspective on things would be, and whether I would be willing to form a cabinet in a spirit that differed from the intransigence and sternness for which I had been known in the past. In reply, I told him that he had been wrong to decline the regent’s appointment. After all, I pointed out, if the regent had this much confidence in him, then he really had no choice but to do as he was being asked to do. My words apparently emboldened al-‘Umari, since suddenly he seemed to have a change of heart. He said, “So if I did form the cabinet, would you serve on it?” “No,” I replied, “I’m not prepared to serve on any cabinet!” “So then,” he said, “how will I manage to form a cabinet if I’m not joined by good-hearted folks like you?” “That’s where I stand,” I replied, “and I don’t intend to budge.” “All you have to do, then,” he said, “is to accept my invitation and form the cabinet yourself!” “That doesn’t matter much to me,” I said. “What matters to me is for the crown prince to have thought of me and to have been willing for me to form the cabinet. However, I have no desire to be prime minister. Rather, it’s enough for me to be nominated for the post. I don’t want to make new problems for myself, problems that will be costly to me without benefiting the country. As for talk about my taking a course that differs from the one I took earlier in relation to the king, I think the things said about this in the past were exaggerations. Everything I did in my first term as prime minister I did out of necessity or self-defense. I consider myself to have been loyal to His Majesty. In fact, whatever I said or did as prime minister was motivated solely by this loyalty, and by nothing else.” Al-‘Umari told me he would convey what I had said to the regent (who was now also crown prince), who might ask to see me. Then he left. Late that night I received another telephone call from al-‘Umari. He told me he had conveyed what I had said to the regent and that the latter would contact me on Wednesday at 1:00 p.m. to arrange a time for us to meet. At the specified time I was called to the telephone, and the speaker was the regent, who told me that he would like to see me at 5:00 p.m. that same day. When we met, he began the conversation saying, in effect, that he wanted to open up new opportunities for me to use my talents and experience and that, since Nuri al-Sa‘id had failed to form an effective cabinet, he hoped I could form a new one. The problem that Nuri al-Sa‘id had faced was that he had wanted to unite elements that were too disparate to work well together. The regent told me that he had first approached Nasrat al-Farisi about forming a cabinet. Al-Farisi’s response had been that he couldn’t give the regent an answer right away and that he would have to study the matter first. Then he had left and never come back.

The Arab League

347

I said, “I thank Your Highness for thinking of me as worthy to undertake this onerous task even though it’s been nearly fifteen years since my first term as prime minister. During these fifteen years I have performed many duties to the best of my ability. I’m greatly honored that His Highness has asked me to form the cabinet. However, I must graciously decline.” I then went on to list some reasons for my decision to decline the post of prime minister, one of which was that the parliament then in office would be impossible for me to work with. When the regent asked how long it would be before the parliament’s term ended, I said, “It’s now in its third year, so it has only one year left in its term. It wouldn’t do a bit of harm if this last year were omitted altogether. Affairs of state aren’t going well, and something needs to be done about it. If the new cabinet doesn’t stay in power long enough, it won’t be able to do anything useful for the country.” I went on to mention the state of confusion that reigned in both houses of parliament, the unstable political situation, and the lack of coherence in the overall state of the country as a result of the war, all of which gave me pause when I thought of taking on a task involving so many burdens and responsibilities. “After all,” I said, “if I fail to perform my duties in the best possible way, I’ll only feel ashamed of myself.” Nevertheless, the regent insisted that I form the cabinet, assuring me that he wouldn’t interfere in any way in my choice of appointees. As for the parliament, he told me that if I requested that early elections be held, he would ensure that this happened. He also expressed his willingness to dissolve parliament and postpone the elections for a suitable period of time if this would create an atmosphere in which the new cabinet could work more effectively. I replied, “I don’t believe it’s necessary to dissolve parliament at this time or to postpone the elections, since the new cabinet may be able to work with parliament for a suitable period of time. But if we find it impossible to cooperate with the parliament in its present form, we will ask Your Highness to dissolve it and, possibly, to postpone the next elections until a suitable point in the future.” With this, I excused myself and went to consult with the appropriate individuals. On my way back from the Rihab Palace I passed by to see Nuri alSa‘id. Before telling him about the latest developments, I asked him why he hadn’t been able to put together a new cabinet. In reply, he mentioned a number of different factors, none of which seemed to relate to any of the others. From what he told me, I concluded that after a great deal of hesitation, he had agreed to form a cabinet and had gotten to work on the task. However, he had wanted to bring together individuals who were entirely at odds with each other, due to either personal animosities or disagreements

348

My Memoirs

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah

over political issues. He had been persuaded to adopt this approach by a friend of his whom he had hoped would serve on the new cabinet. This person had embroiled him in such contradictory choices that in the end, he was unable to put the new cabinet together, so he had gone to the regent and told him he would have to decline his appointment as prime minister. I then mentioned to him that the regent had wanted Nasrat al-Farisi to form a cabinet. However, it became clear that this had not been an official request. Rather, the regent had simply wanted to sound out al-Farisi concerning his willingness to form a cabinet if he were to ask him to do so. I told Nuri al-Sa‘id that I was on my way back from the Rihab Palace, that the regent had assigned me the task of forming a cabinet, and that I wanted to know how I should go about choosing its members. I mentioned

The Arab League

349

the names of those I was intending to appoint to the various ministerial posts, and he was in favor of my choices. In fact, he asked me to put the cabinet together as quickly as I could. He said he considered that my cabinet was his cabinet, since it contained essentially the same elements that he himself would have chosen if he had been forming it himself. So I started contacting people, and within four hours I had managed to complete the required list. In the process, I encountered a few minor difficulties, but I surmounted them easily, and by the end of the day, all that remained was to set a time for the ministerial appointment ceremony.

21 My Second Term as Prime Minister

~

In this second cabinet of mine I included a number of new faces and powerful elements who were known for their competence, patriotism, integrity, and impeccable reputations, all of which would help to ensure their acceptance by and popularity with the general public. At the same time, such qualities would make for the kind of harmonious cooperation that would ensure the cabinet’s success in dealing with the weighty tasks and responsibilities that lay before it. After all, this was a cabinet that had come to power in the wake of a major world conflict and regrettable local disturbances, and at a time when the country was on the threshold of critical developments that called for a proper response. Such developments would likewise require us to grant greater freedoms and establish the foundations of a new era of stability and prosperity. With these considerations in mind, I formed my cabinet as follows: Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; Sa‘d Salih, minister of the interior; ‘Abd al-Wahhab Mahmud, minister of finance; ‘Umar Nuzmi, minister of justice; Isma‘il Namiq, minister of defense; ‘Ali Mumtaz, minister of transportation and works; Najib al-Rawi, minister of education; Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, minister of social affairs; ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Zahir, minister of economy; and ‘Abd al-Jabbar Chalabi, minister of provisioning.

The Ministerial Appointment Ceremony On February 23, 1946, the ministerial appointment ceremony was held for my second cabinet. In keeping with tradition, the ceremony was attended 351

352

My Memoirs

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, as prime minister, in a meeting with Hussein Makan, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban (head of the Royal Administrative Office and representative to the UN), and an unidentified UN delegate, 1946

by Sharif Hussein bin Nasir, deputy head of the Royal Administrative Office. I delivered a speech, which I commenced by asking the sharif to convey my profound appreciation and heartfelt thanks to the crown prince for affirming his confidence in my ability to assume responsibility for forming a cabinet. I then turned to those present and said, You, brothers, who have been placed by the state at the head of its various ministries and departments, undoubtedly sense the greatness of the responsibility you now bear, and the value of the confidence that has been placed in you. Nevertheless, it behooves me to draw your attention to the implications of the anomalous circumstances that have prevailed over the past number of years, including a major world conflict. These events have resulted in an unwanted slackness in managing the interests of our citizenry, whose confidence in the state’s competence and seriousness has been understandably shaken. However, while such slackness and neglect might have been justified by the conditions that prevailed during the war years, they can no longer be justified in the present era as we move from a phase of conflict and austerity to one of peace and prosperity. You have now heard the royal decree by means of which I have been called upon to assume leadership of the state. Therefore, allow me to take this opportunity to affirm my intention to ensure that the government operates with the utmost efficiency, organization, competence, and seriousness,

My Second Term as Prime Minister

353

and that anyone who attempts to hinder the state’s progress will be summarily dismissed.

The formation of this second cabinet of mine was greeted with no little relief in nationalist circles. People had grown weary of persecution, detentions, unreliable provisions, and arbitrary methods of rule. This, at any rate, was what was said by the newspapers after the new cabinet’s inauguration. During that same period of time I was approached by a reporter from Baghdad’s Al-Zaman newspaper, who asked me a number of questions about the new cabinet’s duties and responsibilities. The newspaper then published some of the things I had said, including a statement to the effect that in order to restore things to normal, it would be necessary to abolish all restrictions and exceptional laws that had been in place during the war, as well as the Economic Condition Act that only permitted the allocation of funds for the importation of such basic necessities as spare parts for machinery and specified food staples, specifically precluding the import of any “luxury” goods such as automobiles, for the duration of the conflict. On March 5, 1946, I presented my cabinet’s action plan to parliament. The text of the plan was published in the newspapers, one of which declared that it had been awaiting the plan’s release “as one awaits the new moon that augurs a blessed holiday.” After the inauguration ceremony, the members of the cabinet went to the royal court. In visibly high spirits, Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah received each of the ministers in turn and spoke to him in a notably friendly and cheerful tone. When the gathering broke up, pictures were taken of the cabinet members with the prince, after which we all went to our respective ministerial offices.

A Hopeful Mood The new ministry had expressed its willingness to apply the principles that the regent had set forth in a speech he had delivered before the previous cabinet on December 27. Consequently, it was given a very positive reception by the public, which looked upon the new government as a beacon of hope, since it set out to fulfill demands that the Iraqi people had been making for years on end. As soon as it was sworn in, the new cabinet began to lift the restrictions that had been imposed on civil liberties and freedom of the press. It also set about closing the detention camps. Hence, by the time I actually presented the cabinet’s plan to parliament, most of the promises it contained had already been fulfilled, a fact to which I drew attention in my parliamentary address.

354

My Memoirs

Political Currents During that period of time, the country was plagued by a variety of violent currents. Among these was a rightist current that was fanatically pan-Arab and attached to the notion of restoring bygone glories. This current called for the fulfillment of an uncompromising pan-Arab vision. Another was a moderate, middle-of-the-road current that sought to strike a balance among the glories of the past, the social necessities of the present, and the requirements of the future. It also promoted a number of other goals that promised to be quite doable. Still another current inclined more to the left than it did to the right, although its ties to the right remained. However, its preference for social reforms or, as it termed them, progressive action was more prominent than its concern for bygone glories and pan-Arab goals. Hence, it devoted less effort to pan-Arabism than it did to progressive social action. Then there was a purely leftist current, which differed from one subgroup to another. However, all of its offshoots agreed on one point, namely, that what they referred to as “progress and construction” was the best orientation toward the future. Although this movement appeared to be sympathetic to pan-Arabism, it only fostered this impression in order to avoid alienating public opinion. It was as though it viewed popular displeasure as a curse that would threaten its very existence and that needed to be warded off at all costs. In actual fact, it leaned toward populism. Indeed, it was not long before this movement had embraced Communism lock, stock, and barrel. In a volatile environment such as this one, seething with all manner of competing currents, those in government were all too aware of the weight of responsibility they bore and the challenges that awaited them.

Foreign Policy So much for the domestic front at that time. As for the international front during the same period, it must be viewed with respect to (1) Iraq’s ties with Britain and (2) Iraq’s ties with the Arab League. Iraq’s relations with Britain had been positive from the time it became a member of the League of Nations in 1932 and remained so until 1939. Despite a number of serious errors, the conduct of the Iraqi government during that period of time had had little effect on the British. Security in Iraq had been disturbed on a number of occasions and there had been uprisings in the army and among Iraq’s clans and tribes. However, ties between Iraq and Britain had continued normally, and the Iraqi and British governments were both aware of their responsibilities toward each other as allies. Then 1941 witnessed what came to be called the “Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani revolution.” It was not actually al-Gaylani’s revolution, of course, but,

My Second Term as Prime Minister

355

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi in Baghdad in 1946 receiving the British foreign secretary, who made an official visit to Iraq during al-Suwaydi’s 1946 term as Iraqi prime minister

rather, a revolution staged by the army for the fourth time, and with which al-Gaylani came to be associated as a titular leader just as, in previous military revolutions, Hikmat Sulayman, Bakr Sidqi, Amin al-‘Umari, and others had come to prominence. The al-Gaylani revolution shook the British government’s confidence in Iraq such that, rather than depending on Iraq as an ally, it came to liken the situation in Iraq to a pile of smoldering embers that, though it might be concealed by ashes from time to time, was bound eventually to be revealed for what it really was. The reason for all of this was Iraq’s feeling that its ties with Britain, although it might describe them as ties of friendship and alliance, were in reality nothing more than the ties that bind a strong man to a weak one. They were ties that allowed the British Empire to benefit maximally from Iraq, but which offered only the most miniscule of benefits to Iraq itself. British policy as it related to the Arab cause was a brutal, irresponsible policy that sought out all means possible to undermine Arab autonomy and aid the enemies of the Arab cause, such as Italy, France, and even Germany if circumstances required. And then there was its most heinous crime of all, namely, that of working behind the scenes to fulfill Zionists’ dreams of a “homeland” in Palestine. It was this that caused ongoing discontent with the unequal manner in which Iraq and Britain were yoked.

356

My Memoirs

The British Perspective The British had been in an extremely critical position during World War II. By the time Russia and the United States entered the war, Britain had been literally fighting for its life. Consequently, it was no small thing for the British to discover that they had been stabbed in the back by their Iraqi allies at the very time when they needed someone to nurse their wounds and offer them concrete assistance of whatever sort it may have been. In order to avenge themselves on Iraq for the way it had attacked them during their time of affliction, the British had intended to unleash the full force of their wrath on the Iraqis when their troops took over the country following the al-Gaylani revolt. However, the prudence and reasoned moderation that sometimes manifest themselves in British thinking and behavior, together with the presence of Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (a friend of the Arabs and the Iraqis and among the people who had labored to establish the state of Iraq) as British ambassador to Iraq at that time, prevented this vindictive impulse from finding expression and helped to preserve what remained of the appearance of Iraqi autonomy.

Anthony Eden’s Declaration Britain sought by a variety of means—from flattery, to conciliation, to the statements released by the renowned Anthony Eden following the end of the revolt in Iraq—to repair the situation. Yet despite all these efforts, relations between Iraq and Britain remained strained and fragile. In order to compensate for this fragility, the new cabinet had to find some other way to address the wishes of all parties involved, and to extinguish smoldering resentments. It began by reassuring the public that it would approach the British government concerning the need to amend the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in keeping with developments that had grown out of the Atlantic Charter. The cabinet concluded that the text dealing with this issue should be presented to the British embassy, since it was a matter of relevance not only to Iraq but to Britain as well. This was a courteous gesture that was sure to be appreciated. The Arabic text was thus translated into English and sent to the British embassy, which issued a spoken statement accepting the wording of the document.

Iraq and Arab Policy Meanwhile, the second front in Iraqi foreign policy, namely, Iraq’s relationship with the Arab League, was almost at the breaking point.

My Second Term as Prime Minister

357

Certain Arab public opinion leaders would meet from time to time to discuss what should be done to unite the efforts of Arab countries. The question they all seemed to be posing was whether it would be possible to create a true Arab federation among the various Arab countries when their leadership was disunited, when their stances on issues, their regimes, and their internal systems contrasted so sharply, and when their relations with other powers were so lacking in coordination. Some of us were uncertain whether we should or even could work toward a federation or a union. In the end, the leaders concerned concluded that neither a federation nor a union would be feasible in the immediate future. Thus far I had been the first to express the view that a federation, if it were achieved, would need to be based on specific, agreed-upon themes. This time I suggested seven themes rather than only six. These would be foreign affairs, military affairs, cultural affairs, telegraph and post, transportation, currency-based unity, and customs duties. Each Arab state could choose to be united with other Arab states on the basis of one or more of these themes. Such a federation or unity would depend on the relevant states’ receptivity, their internal structures, their ways of thinking, their level of cultural development, and so forth. The more culturally and structurally advanced the Arab countries concerned happened to be, the more areas there were in which they might cooperate. The first meeting to be held on this subject took place when Jamil Mardam Bek, prime minister of Syria, visited Iraq in April 1943. During this visit, he met with Nuri al-Sa‘id, prime minister of Iraq, and with me in my capacity as deputy prime minister. We engaged in a lengthy discussion of the issue, and Jamil Mardam Bek expressed Syria’s willingness to enter into a federation with Iraq on the basis of all of the seven themes I had proposed. Highly supportive of the idea, the Syrian prime minister stated, “Syria can unite with Iraq in all these areas. As for other Arab states, we will leave it to them to decide which of these areas they are prepared to cooperate in.”

The Critical Sofar Meeting The following year I spent the summer in Sofar, Lebanon, particularly in view of the fact that Shukri al-Quwatli, Syria’s president of the republic, was spending his summer there, and many of his Arab friends had made their way there to see him. A meeting held at a spacious hotel in Sofar was attended by Shukri al-Quwatli, Sa‘dallah al-Jabiri, Jamil Mardam, Riyadh al-Sulh, Nuri al-Sa‘id, Jamil al-Midfa‘i, and me. The notion of an Arab federation was discussed, as were the seven areas or themes that I had proposed. In this connection I remember al-Quwatli saying that this formula was one of the best he had ever seen for the creation of an Arab federation,

358

My Memoirs

and he was seconded in this view by Sa‘dallah al-Jabiri. They even asked me to prepare a draft program for the Arab League of Nations that they intended to establish for this purpose. I prepared the program they had requested, and once this had been done, everyone waited for an invitation from Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, prime minister of Egypt, to meet in Cairo.

Bringing Ibn al-Sa‘ud on Board One day, after al-Quwatli had traveled back to Damascus, another meeting was held in the home of Jamil Mardam Bek. The meeting was attended by the same people who had attended the previous one, in addition to Hamdi al-Pachachi, then prime minister of Iraq. The discussion that took place was similar to the one that had taken place at the previous meeting, except that this time participants were concerned that King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Sa‘ud (Ibn al-Sa‘ud) would not agree to join the new organization. Ibn al-Sa‘ud was said to be afraid that the new organization would be led by Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, in which case Ibn al-Sa‘ud and other Arab states would be required to submit to Nahhas’s authority. Ibn al-Sa‘ud, who wanted nothing to limit the absolute freedom he enjoyed in his realm, could never have agreed to such a thing. In short, then, Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s concern was that if he joined this new Arab forum, he would lose some of his autonomy and power. The focus of the discussion thus shifted to the need to win over Ibn al-Sa‘ud and bring him into the organization. As we discussed ways in which Ibn al-Sa‘ud could be persuaded to join us in our efforts, it was suggested, among other things, that Nuri al-Sa‘id and I go to Nejd in order to make contact with Ibn al-Sa‘ud. It then became apparent that due to personal circumstances, Nuri al-Sa‘id would not be able to accompany me, so Jamil al-Midfa‘i was chosen to take his place. Our hope was to go first to Cairo and contact Ibn al-Sa‘ud from there. Then, if we sensed that it would be possible to reach an understanding with him, we would go to see him and work toward reaching an agreement with him. The meeting was then adjourned. However, as luck would have it, we learned to our surprise three days after our meeting that the Saudi monarch’s representative, Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, had announced that he would be coming to Syria and Lebanon. Hence, we made plans to contact him during his visit in the hope of accomplishing part of our mission through him. After Yusuf’s arrival we discussed the matter with him, and he explained the Saudi monarch’s fears relating to the loss of freedom and influence in his country. We in turn reported to him on what had taken place in our previous meetings, explaining the purpose for which we wanted to establish the proposed Arab organization and reassuring him that there was nothing in the

My Second Term as Prime Minister

359

organization’s function or structure that would restrict the freedom of its member states. In this and other ways we sought to overcome the king’s doubts and correct his misunderstandings. Shaikh Yusuf Yasin then promised to present our views to King Ibn al-Sa‘ud. We then went our separate ways. Sometime later we learned that a further contact had taken place between Egypt and Ibn al-Sa‘ud, also with the purpose of setting his mind at rest concerning the proposed Arab organization, and that ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam, who enjoyed excellent relations with Ibn al-Sa‘ud, had been instructed to go see the king. ‘Azzam Pasha went on his mission, and his efforts were crowned with success, as Ibn al-Sa‘ud was convinced at last of the worthiness of the proposed organization. ‘Azzam’s efforts were further reinforced by a visit from King Farouk to Saudi Arabia. By this time, all King Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s fears had been allayed, and all that remained was to meet in Egypt to draw up the principles of the new organization.

The Arab League Charter The aforementioned meeting was held and, after lengthy discussions, the charter of the Arab League was drawn up. The Arab states saw this development as a hopeful sign, and Egypt even ordered a 100-cannon salute in celebration of the organization’s founding. Everything, in short, went very well, although not quite in the way I had anticipated, since my hope had been for there to be seven specific areas of cooperation from which Arab states could choose as the basis for their union with other Arab states. In fact, what I had wanted was for an international organization on the order of the United Nations to be created. In any case, the Arab League charter was hailed with the words “It’s the best thing it could possibly have been.” Article 3 of the Arab League charter clearly reflects the influence of the seven areas of interest that we had discussed prior to the league’s establishment, as it calls for the creation of six committees whose concerns cover many aspects of these seven interest areas. The league’s first meeting was marked by great enthusiasm. However, this enthusiasm soon began to wane because of differences over the Palestine issue.

Tensions Between Iraq and the Arab League There were those who held that the Palestine issue should be addressed by all means possible, including the donation of large sums of money by Arab states. Others, by contrast, held that although it was necessary to help Palestine, such help should be provided in reasonable degrees and in realistic ways. As for large infusions of capital, these parties felt that unless the Palestinians clarified the means by which such funds would be used and the ways in which

360

My Memoirs

their stated goals would be achieved, the money would simply be wasted. Therefore, the Arab states that intended to provide financial support for the Palestinian cause needed first to decide what they could do for the cause and then earmark the funds needed for the actions that had been decided upon. This sort of wrangling among the member states of the league went on for quite some time, a fact that undermined relations between the Arab League and Iraq. There was a palpable sense of relief in the corridors of the Arab League when it was announced that my cabinet had been formed. Consequently, I knew I needed to put this sentiment to use for the common good and do everything I could to overcome the alienation between Iraq and the league. I also knew that it would not be enough to include some vague reference in my cabinet’s platform to our determination to pursue a policy of goodwill and brotherhood toward the league’s member states. Rather, I would need to provide concrete proof of the Iraqi government’s willingness to move in this direction. My cabinet’s platform was duly presented to the members of parliament, who received it with long, thunderous applause, since in it they detected a new spirit and a solid determination to act. In addition, they could see that everything included in the platform had either already been accomplished or was on the verge of being accomplished. Add to this the fact that, rather than being filled with lofty promises that would be impossible to keep, it was brief, realistic, and to the point. As such, it was a practical, reasonable plan of action whose successful execution would constitute the fulfillment of a significant patriotic duty.

Political Revival It happened that the various currents mentioned earlier and their associated groupings experienced a kind of revival as a door of hope was opened before them, since it was now possible for them to communicate with the government, express their views, and demand the rights that were duly theirs so long as they were law-abiding citizens. As petitions began pouring in from numerous groups to be allowed to form political parties, the Ministry of the Interior set about conducting the necessary background checks in order to process their applications in the proper fashion.

The Arab League Council A meeting of the Arab League Council was scheduled for April 15, 1946. So, in keeping with my stated aim of reassuring Arab League officials of Iraq’s desire to cooperate with the league in every way possible, I would need to attend the meeting personally.

My Second Term as Prime Minister

361

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at a meeting of the Arab League in Cairo in 1946, with Isma‘il Sidqi Pasha (prime minister of Egypt), Sayf al-Islam Abdullah (Yemeni minister of foreign affairs), Yusuf Yasin (special envoy of King Ibn al-Sa‘ud of Saudi Arabia), and Najib al-Rawi (Iraqi ambassador to Egypt)

It was decided that I would attend the Arab League Council meeting at the head of a delegation consisting of ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Iraq’s ambassador to the United States, Najib al-Rawi, minister of social affairs, Tahsin al-‘Askari, Iraq’s chargé d’affaires in Cairo, and whatever secretaries would be required for the journey. The day before our departure, I went to see the regent and informed him of my plan to travel the following day. I also asked him to allow me to make an overview of the situation in the Arab world so that I could ascertain whether there were any concerns that needed to be addressed. In this way I could ensure that, when I attended the Arab League Council meeting, I would be prepared to improve ties between Iraq and the Arab League member states to the greatest extent possible.

Iraqi-Jordanian Relations I then began reviewing the situation as it pertained to Iraq and Transjordan, saying, “Our relations with Transjordan are good. At the same time, other Arab states hold us responsible for actions taken by the state of Transjordan, which I consider to be patently unfair. Consequently, I think Iraq should announce a policy that makes it clear to all that Transjordan’s actions and decisions are its own responsibility, and not Iraq’s. Transjordan is Transjordan and Iraq is Iraq, and what’s said in Transjordan can’t be interpreted as having anything to do with Iraq’s positions on things. Do I have His Highness’s permission to convey this point of view to officials in Transjordan?” The regent responded by lending me his full support.

362

My Memoirs

“You’re right,” he said. “Iraq shouldn’t be held responsible for anything done by the government of Transjordan unless Iraq has some hand in the action or has agreed to it in one way or another.” Then he added, “At the same time, since Prince ‘Abdullah is my paternal uncle and the eldest in the family, I couldn’t express such a point of view directly to him. As you know, members of the sharif line have certain traditions that govern how a younger member of the family addresses one of his elders.” “In light of what you’ve just said,” I replied, “I’ll do my best to convey this point of view to His Highness the Prince in my capacity as prime minister.” “Yes,” he agreed. “There’s no reason for you not to do so if the way opens up.”

Iraqi-Syrian Relations I then asked the regent whether he thought there was anything that needed to be corrected or improved in Iraq’s relations with Syria so that, when I passed through Syria, I could work on whatever changes needed to be made. “I don’t think there’s anything that calls for attention in this area,” he replied. “However,” I objected, “His Highness must have noticed that when the Syrian president of the republic made an unofficial visit to Iraq two years ago, there were difficulties related to the reception he was given when he was in the capital. I know that al-Quwatli isn’t the type to be overly concerned about formalities, since he told me as much at that time. At the same time, I realized that some offense had been caused in Syrian government circles and those closest to the Syrian president. Besides this, there continues to be a great deal of friction between Syria and Transjordan over the matter of Greater Syria, a problem Iraq has yet to extricate itself from even though it has nothing to do with it and hasn’t taken sides with anyone. We need to make clear to the Syrian government that we’re aware of our duties and responsibilities toward our fellow Arab countries and toward the Arab League in particular, and that anything that has been said to the contrary should be taken with a healthy dose of suspicion.” And the regent agreed with me.

Iraqi-Lebanese Relations When we moved on to Iraq’s relations with Lebanon, I explained to the regent that our previous policy had been to support Iraqi-Lebanese relations, not with the intention of strengthening them for the benefit of all Arab

My Second Term as Prime Minister

363

countries but, rather, in order to “sandwich” Syria between Lebanon and Transjordan like a delicious morsel just waiting to be eaten. I said, “I don’t know who the know-it-all was that thought up the idea of forcing Syria to accept the idea of ‘Greater Syria.’ However, Iraq shouldn’t rely on this type of policy. The best possible ties between Iraq and Syria are those that are based on a spirit of genuine cooperation. Syria is the heartbeat of the Arab world, and if Iraq and other Arab countries pursue a policy that alienates Syria, no good can come of it. I should add further that what I’ve said isn’t at all inconsistent with the need to establish the best possible relations between Iraq and Lebanon.”

The Iraq-Syria Axis I continued, “The Iraq-Syria axis should be fundamental to Arab policy. Policies directed toward other Arab countries should be seen as peripheral, their purpose being to support and strengthen this central policy. So, although we should strengthen and support Iraqi-Lebanese ties, such ties are less central than our ties with Syria. At the same time, however, I will do my best when I am in Lebanon to reassure the Lebanese public that Iraq supports Lebanon’s autonomy within its natural borders and within the Arab League as well. “Our relations with Egypt are marked by a notable degree of transparency and mutual understanding. The position taken by King Farouk several years ago on the Arab cause and the efforts he expended in its support have led all of Egypt to the Arab front. This is an undeniable gain for Iraq, particularly in view of Egypt’s strengths in the economic, cultural, political, and geographical spheres. Hence, Iraq should encourage Egypt to persevere in this policy and to strengthen its ties with other Arab countries as well. “It’s also worth noting that after the success he experienced in persuading King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Sa‘ud (Ibn al-Sa‘ud) to join the Arab League and the benefits this brought to Arab countries as a whole, King Farouk began thinking of expanding his focus to include other Arab countries as well and strengthening his personal ties with their rulers. To this end, he’s likely to express interest in paying a visit to Iraq. So if he suggests this idea, should I encourage it?” The regent replied, “Although Baghdad still lacks the palaces that would be fit as residences for the king of Egypt, I think the facilities we have would suffice to make him comfortable for a short period of time. So I think we should assure Egypt’s monarch of the warm welcome he would receive were he to visit Baghdad.” Following this overview of Iraqi relations with its Arab neighbors, I respectfully took my leave of the regent, who offered me encouraging words of advice and wished me Godspeed and success in my mission.

364

My Memoirs

The Saboteurs Those who made it their business to sow discord among members of the Arab League didn’t welcome the news that I had taken it upon myself to deal with the issues that had roiled the waters among us. My trip to Cairo to attend the meetings of the Arab League Council in its ordinary session aroused no little resentment among these saboteurs, who wanted more than ever to tear down rather than build up. They saw this journey of mine as an ideal opportunity to drive a wedge between my cabinet and me and, in this way, to sink our ship for good, so they set about to make trouble. I traveled to Cairo by air, accompanied by the entire Iraqi delegation. At 5:00 p.m. on the same day, we reached the Almaza Airport, where we were welcomed by a large gathering of Egyptians and representatives of Arab states. Those who had gathered to meet us were in high spirits, hopeful that the Iraqi delegation in its new capacity had come not to stir up rancor and discord as it had in the past, but in pursuit of mutual understanding. Given that no issues of great urgency were on the council’s agenda, my coming to Cairo took on added importance as a sign of the Iraqis’ willingness to overcome any misunderstanding and ill will that may have prevailed heretofore. Apart from the things we accomplished in the council’s sessions—where the Iraqi delegate was asked his opinion on every issue that was raised for discussion—this alone was sufficient to highlight the service we had come to perform. All in all, the atmosphere was one of harmony between the Iraqi delegation and the delegations of other Arab countries. This sense of harmony was confirmed when I met with the king of Egypt, who showered me with such kindness that I felt embarrassed. Once our task had been completed, I flew back to Iraq, leaving ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi to stand in for me at the remaining sessions.

Public Policy When I returned to Iraq, the royal court had yet to adopt a consistent manner of relating to the new cabinet. This was due in part to the fact that it continued to be influenced from time to time by appeals from disgruntled parliamentarians or other politicians who took delight in seeing the country’s affairs in a shambles. No matter what efforts were made by my cabinet and no matter what I did personally to instill a sense of trust on the part of the royal court by demonstrating the cabinet’s willingness to bring about reforms, to cope with whatever problems arose, and to facilitate the state’s daily affairs, be they ordinary or extraordinary, the royal court’s suspicion of negligence on our part persisted. There seemed to be nothing that either

My Second Term as Prime Minister

365

I or anyone else could do to overcome it or even to alleviate it. Rather, it seemed to have become a chronic condition.

Nuri al-Sa‘id and the Treaty with Turkey The situation within the cabinet itself was one of complete solidarity. At the same time, there was a feeling of hostility and disapproval toward Nuri alSa‘id, who was serving as head negotiator of an economic treaty between Iraq and Turkey. For although I had repeatedly stressed the importance of his not going beyond the limits of his economic mission, he had wired the cabinet during my trip to Cairo telling us that he intended to conclude a political treaty with Turkey. The cabinet then convened a meeting chaired by the regent in which it decided to reject any political treaty with Turkey, and Nuri al-Sa‘id was informed of this decision. Nevertheless, he went ahead and signed the political treaty and informed Iraqi officials that he would take personal responsibility for what he had done. This, of course, only aroused greater condemnation on the part of the cabinet. The situation would have to be handled in the most prudent manner if we were going to manage a way out that would preserve Turkey’s dignity and, at the same time, not place a new obstacle in the way of the British policy that, according to the British foreign secretariat, aimed at promoting mutual understanding among the countries of the Middle East. Not surprisingly, a good deal of resentment toward Nuri al-Sa‘id had built up by this time among members of the cabinet, who gave voice to their feelings on numerous occasions. To the attentive observer, the best solution to the crisis was simply to accept the treaty that Nuri al-Sa‘id had negotiated provided it was free of articles that would be prejudicial to Iraq’s interests. Fortunately, the treaty did not contain any articles or terms of this nature. As an extra precaution, however, it was decided that it would be best to request clarification of certain aspects of the document. To this end, the Iraqi government posed a list of questions about the treaty to the Turkish representative, and in this way, it was able to elucidate a number of relevant points. As it turned out, Turkey refused to provide any clarifications beyond what was written in the treaty itself. Hence, after hearing the explanations offered by Nuri al-Sa‘id and a number of experts who had taken part in the negotiating process, the cabinet was obliged to append the following two caveats to its ratification of the treaty: (1) that the Iraqi government understood Article 2 of the treaty to mean that Turkey did not, and would not, raise any objection to the Arab League charter, and (2) that the treaty overall could be interpreted to mean that Turkey shared the Iraqi government’s perspective on the Palestine issue.

366

My Memoirs

The decision to ratify the treaty together with these caveats was approved by the regent.

The Cabinet and the Parliament Relations between my cabinet and the House of Representatives were satisfactory; however, the same could not be said of its relations with the Senate. For, although the majority of its members supported the cabinet, this majority’s influence was weak because of a certain group of seven senators, the majority of whom had served on Hamdi al-Pachachi’s cabinet. AlPachachi’s cabinet, it should be noted, had come in for severe criticism by Sa‘d Salih, who was now minister of the interior, as well as by colleagues of his such as the ministers of finance and education. It was only natural, then, that these seven senators would be tempted to retaliate against their former harassers by doling out the same treatment to which they themselves had been subjected during their terms as cabinet members. As for the senators who had not served on al-Pachachi’s cabinet, their attitudes differed depending on their circumstances and on whether they had other reasons to foster a spirit of goodwill and cooperation in relation to members of my cabinet. In this troubled atmosphere, Iraq was groping for direction, and I often likened it to a ship being buffeted by the waves without a seasoned skipper at the helm to bring it safely to port. Defamations, false accusations, and fabrications all sold well on the market of higher policy, where the otherwise beneficial measures being taken by my cabinet were exploited for base purposes. The actions we were taking were made to appear as though their purpose was to spread anarchy and unrest even though, in reality, they were intended to benefit the country by safeguarding the freedoms that for long years people had demanded in vain. Even my decision to attend the meetings of the Arab League Council was exploited in an appalling way despite the fact that my aim in doing so had been clear, namely, to promote an atmosphere of brotherhood and goodwill between Iraq and the league. This unconscionable exploitation was rather influential with those in high places who, as I have mentioned, had not determined any of the country’s policies and had set no specific goal for anything they did. Rather, their only concern was to mark time, numb people’s perceptions, and recruit ineffectual elements for the government so that if things didn’t go well and people spoke up in complaint, the response could be “And what are we supposed to do when no one in the whole country can be depended on to be either loyal or competent?” I honestly don’t know whether this approach had been adopted based on a plan cooked up by these same high-ranking figures themselves or by foreign elements.

My Second Term as Prime Minister

367

Two Contrasting Moods Whatever the case may be, the political mood manifested itself in two remarkably contrasting ways. The overwhelming majority of the populace found reason for hope in the things my cabinet had promised to do, and which it had set about doing with prompt measures and good intentions. As for high-level political circles, they were impatient and hard to please, and although they themselves had no concrete alternatives to offer, they were determined to remain bitter, resentful, and uncooperative. Sluggish, negligent, and unable to settle on any concrete plan of action of their own, such high-ranking figures ended up manufacturing a cabinet crisis that had no basis in reality.

The Budget When my cabinet was sworn in on February 23, 1946, the state budget had not yet been prepared. Hence, the cabinet set to work preparing a budget, which it presented to the prime minister’s office in the month of April. However, the budget’s ratification was being delayed because of unresolved questions relating to whether parliament would extend the existing elections law and whether parliament was going to be dissolved. The regent and I had discussed the matter of dissolving parliament on numerous occasions. However, as I had explained to Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, I hoped to be able to cooperate with the existing parliament, especially given the fact that it was expected to consider a new elections law that would ensure greater freedom in the electoral process. Once the new law had passed, parliament could be dissolved and elections could be held on a sounder basis than before. Maneuvering over the new law then began in the corridors of parliament and, sensing that obstacles were being placed in its path, the government began looking for a way to ensure that the law was passed as promptly as possible.

Parliament and the Elections Law When my cabinet tried to get parliament to consider the new law, it ran into difficulties, so I went to see the regent and explained to him that we would need to find another way of resolving the problem. I was given definitive promises that if the new elections law was passed, parliament would be dissolved. If, on the other hand, the government failed to get the new elections law passed by parliament—if, for example, it got held up in committee or on the floor—then the government could request that parliament be dissolved in order to conduct elections based on the old law.

368

My Memoirs

With this understanding, my cabinet tried again to get the parliament to pass the new law, an effort in which the regent offered valuable assistance. The law was then passed by the House of Representatives with a substantial majority and was sent on to the Senate. In the meantime, opponents of the government raised a hue and cry over the fact that the government had been slow to present the budget for ratification. When the cabinet realized that the new elections law had been passed by the House of Representatives and that, in keeping with the promises it had received from the regent, the House of Representatives was certain to be dissolved whether the law passed the Senate or not, there was no more need to occupy parliament and the government with the lengthy process of examining the new budget—a tedious process that could well have taken over two months in stifling heat.

Article 99 Consequently, the government decided to wait until the parliament’s regular session had run out, at which point parliament would be dismissed and Article 99 of the Iraqi Constitution could be applied. According to this article of the constitution, the old budget would continue in effect until an appropriate time in late September. At that point, the government would be able to call upon parliament once again to consider the budget if it felt this to be necessary. This course of action, which had been agreed upon unanimously as the ideal solution, was entirely constitutional and had been subjected to thorough study by the government with the help of legal experts. However, at the highest echelons of power, things progressed on a basis that had nothing to do with the facts per se, since the voicing of a single opinion to the effect that the aforementioned solution was unconstitutional was sufficient to upset the entire apple cart by calling into question all the studies, all the consultations, and all the views expressed by experts at one fell swoop. Every day the cabinet found itself confronted with a new problem that it thought it had already dealt with and resolved. This process kept repeating itself until at last a definitive conclusion was reached, namely, that it would not be desirable after all to dissolve parliament through a royal decree, then apply the old budget in keeping with Article 99 of the constitution. As a consequence, it would be necessary to extend parliament’s regular session in order to complete the new budget.

Stepping Down A definitive ruling such as this was an embarrassment to the cabinet and embroiled it in problems that it could well have done without. As a result, I

My Second Term as Prime Minister

369

decided that, before things reached a crisis point or some further development triggered an overt confrontation between the regent and me, it would be best for me to resign my post as prime minister and leave matters to someone else. Strangely, the view supported by the regent according to which it would be best to present the new budget to parliament immediately and to extend its regular session for this purpose was suddenly dropped. Instead, a royal decree calling for the dissolution of parliament in the way I had suggested was issued with my signature on it even though I was no longer prime minister. The previous budget then went into effect as I had suggested and affairs of state continued on this basis. Hence, the trivial concerns that had been raised, and that appeared to benefit certain parties by depriving parliament of the opportunity to examine the new budget, had apparently concealed unspoken motives. And even stranger than the act of dissolving parliament and allowing the old budget to continue in effect for a period of time was to question its constitutionality. Following my resignation, this question was brought before the Iraqi Supreme Court, which lent this action its definitive support. The court upheld all the studies I had conducted and all the consultations in which I had engaged. Clearly, then, the maneuvers that coincided with my cabinet’s resignation were prompted by motives that had nothing to do with the constitutionality of the solution I had proposed.

The Oil Refinery Before I end this description of the cabinet I led in 1946, I should mention one other matter that was, in fact, one of my cabinet’s most significant achievements, namely, its execution of a plan to establish an oil refinery at the Iraqi government’s expense and to take over the job of oil distribution from the Khanaqin Oil Company. I spoke with Dr. Nadim Pachachi, an oil expert and a general director in the Ministry of the Economy, explaining what I had in mind in connection with the government’s use of its right to the oil company concession. I then asked him to do a wide-ranging study that would make clear to us if it would be in the government’s best interest to let the company build the refinery or if the government should undertake this task. About a month later, Dr. Pachachi presented me with his report together with a detailed explanation of its contents. The upshot of the report was that before the deadline for making a decision had run out—and the deadline was fast approaching—the company should be notified that the government would build the refinery and take over all responsibilities connected with its operations. I instructed the Ministry of the Economy to inform the company of our decision before the deadline stipulated in the oil concession. In this way I

370

My Memoirs

protected the government’s rights in the future such that if it was able to undertake this task, it could do so, and if not, it could find some other solution in keeping with its interests. The Khanaqin Oil Company was sorely disappointed at the government’s decision, and not long after receiving the relevant notification, I was visited by its British CEO, who was surprised and dismayed that the Iraqi government would decide to take on a task as massive as that of setting up an oil refinery when it still needed money to run its own affairs and when it lacked needed experts and technicians. He said, “In view of the government’s situation and its current lack of qualified personnel, we had hoped the company would be assigned to this task.” In this connection, I had learned through other contacts that Muhammad Amin Zaki, then Iraqi minister of the economy, had for some reason given company officials to understand that the government had no intention of exercising its right of choice in this connection and that everything would be done according to the Khanaqin Oil Company’s wishes. I did my utmost to come up with the sums required for the construction of the oil refinery. When I was appointed in 1948 to head the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in New York, I went to Washington, DC, and applied to the World Bank for a loan of 5 million British pounds to fund the oil refinery’s construction. I was assisted in the negotiating process by ‘Ali Mumtaz al-Daftari, a member of Iraq’s UN delegation. In the course of the negotiations, however, it became apparent that interested British oil companies, supported by the British government, had managed to block all assistance to Iraq for constructing the aforementioned refinery. The committee appointed by the World Bank to negotiate with us claimed that the bank only granted loans to states engaged in productive ventures, whereas the construction of an oil refinery was not a productive venture; rather, they said, it was nothing more than a source of support for domestic oil ventures that the state itself would be required to fund on its own. When we asked the committee to clarify the distinction between productive and nonproductive ventures and why the bank had given a loan to Holland for the purpose of improving its cargo ships and navigational capabilities, we received no reply. Our struggle with this committee, which was clearly biased in favor of the British oil companies, was grueling. In the end, however, we succeeded in securing the loan we had requested. We also managed to persuade the World Bank to pay the sum agreed upon as soon as the Iraqi government needed it. We then began preparations for the construction project, and when oil revenues became available, it was possible to spend them as needed. The construction of this oil refinery turned out to be one of my cabinet’s most important contributions, since it brought significant benefit to the country. It was our intention to carry out other similarly beneficial projects. However, a number of factors beyond our control conspired not only

My Second Term as Prime Minister

371

to impede the cabinet’s work but to bring it down entirely in response to whims, desires, and aims that had nothing to do with a concern for the public interest.

Beyond Resignation It came to my knowledge after my resignation that Nuri al-Sa‘id, who had supported the cabinet when it was first formed, had suddenly turned against it due to the fact that some of its members had opposed the idea of his concluding a political treaty with Turkey, and because some of them had spoken out against his ideas on numerous occasions. This opposition was a response to the propaganda he had been engaging in to garner support for the Iraq-Turkey Treaty, and also to the general domestic situation. Prior to my appointment as prime minister, Arshad al-‘Umari had been hoping to form a cabinet of his own. Hence, when I declined to serve on a cabinet under his leadership, al-‘Umari knew he would find himself in a weak position were he to form a cabinet. Consequently, he felt obliged to support my formation of a cabinet based on the belief that any cabinet I would form would include ministers who were friendly toward him. However, when he came in for gruff treatment by my minister of the interior, Sa‘d Salih, he turned angry and vociferous and joined hands with others who had likewise been attacked by Sa‘d Salih and who wanted to get even with him by launching a counterattack on my cabinet. Meanwhile, the regent had grown indifferent to things political. He rarely took a clear stance or set himself a specific goal as it pertained to the formation of this or that cabinet. Instead, he was buffeted to and fro by competing interests and personal vendettas, which made things difficult for the ministers in my cabinet and for me in my capacity as prime minister. For no sooner had he arrived at a decision about this or that than he would be assailed by a wave of people with axes to grind, whereupon he would be taken off course anew, and whatever he had begun to build would be razed and replaced with something entirely different. Consequently, I thought it best for me and my cabinet to finish the tasks at hand as quickly as possible, then step down before something happened to tarnish our reputations. Otherwise, we were likely to be attacked by the same disgruntled elements with agendas of their own. For if the regent witnessed such developments from behind the scenes, my cabinet members would lose prestige and respect without anything to show for their suffering by way of real benefits to the country. It was thus clear to me that if the regent continued to adopt such a vague and unpredictable approach, my cabinet would be undermined. And this, in turn, would do nothing to help the country achieve real and comprehensive reform.

372

My Memoirs

Those who made it a habit to criticize and oppose everything merely for the sake of criticizing and opposing it had banded together against my cabinet. The prevailing belief was that if my cabinet, which had become known as a champion of freedom, tolerance, and public accountability and accessibility, were to resign, everything it had achieved and everything it had stood for would be in danger. Hence, when word got out that Arshad al‘Umari would be forming the next cabinet, the news was met with a stunned silence on the part of public opinion.

Arshad al-‘Umari and the “Provisional” Cabinet The intolerance and impetuosity for which Arshad al-‘Umari was known were sufficient to convince people that an unpopular cabinet was about to enter the scene, and this despite his superficial efforts to put people’s minds at rest. People’s angst was so palpable, in fact, that he tried to give the impression that his cabinet was a provisional one that would conduct elections, then resign. Nothing, however, could have been farther from the truth, since al-‘Umari, who enjoyed the confidence of the regent and fulfilled all the criteria for a successful man of state, had stated unambiguously that his government would remain in power for as long as it possibly could. After Arshad al-‘Umari had formed his cabinet, I went to see him in the cabinet’s administrative office to extend the traditional handshake. When I arrived and found him in the company of Mustafa al-‘Umari, Salih Jabr, and ‘Abd al-Mahdi, I laughed in spite of myself and exclaimed, “So! Here I am in the midst of the conspirators! They’ve come to receive people’s congratulations with the prime minister for their shared success!” When I saw the regent not long afterward, I mentioned the incident in order to help him see that what had happened had been the result of conspiracies he had failed to see—unless, of course, he had had a hand in them himself. Hardly a month had passed before the new cabinet was inundated with problems. In addition, signs of rebellion had begun to surface. The reason was that the cabinet was brazenly making known its intention to abolish the liberties that had been achieved by the former cabinet and cancel all or most of what the previous cabinet had achieved, thereby destroying whatever gains it had achieved for the Iraqi people.

The Communist Party The Communist Party, which had been on the lookout for any problems it might use for its own benefit, sought to divide the people into competing

My Second Term as Prime Minister

373

blocs. At the same time it urged them to stage loud demonstrations calling for the overthrow of the prime minister and his cabinet. The government attempted to put down the demonstrations by force and eventually resorted to the use of arms. There was some loss of life, and from that time onward the prime minister realized that no good had come from his reassuring statements and gestures, since his real agenda—which had been to destroy the freedoms people had been given under the previous cabinet and restore things to the way they had been during the war and under martial law—was known to all. A cabinet that begins its term with problems will not be free to devote itself to beneficial action. In addition to the repressive policies it was pursuing, the new cabinet had invited attacks by appointing ineffectual ministers. Al-‘Umari even went so far as to say that he was managing the affairs of state single-handedly because his colleagues didn’t understand their jobs and were consequently incapable of doing them. In this way the new prime minister compounded his original weakness. The bonds of cooperation and understanding among the ministers in his cabinet were broken, and the government went on floundering to the point where it could no longer do anything useful whatsoever. It was now clear to everyone that the “mastermind” who had tooted his own horn, paying loud tribute to his extraordinary capabilities, had now become a burden to the country. Yet in spite of it all, he still held out hope that he enjoyed the regent’s support and that the situation might be remedied if his cabinet resigned and he was appointed to form another in its stead. Efforts were thus made to persuade certain individuals to join hands with al-‘Umari in a second attempt to form an effective cabinet. However, when one doesn’t succeed the first time around, the wisest course of action may be to admit defeat. It became apparent through closer examination that al-‘Umari’s volatility and the impatience with which he approached affairs of state had caused even the British embassy to chafe. The policy the British government appeared to be pursuing in its confrontation with Communism was to avoid taking harsh measures against workers or leftists while, at the same time, carrying out reforms and social improvements so that Communism would find no fertile ground in which to sow its seeds. Strangely, however, al-‘Umari paid no attention to British policy. Instead, he adopted a policy of force and exemplary punishment that relied on the stick alone without the carrot. The British government was understandably skeptical as to whether the Iraqi government’s policy would succeed. British newspapers and British officials in both London and Baghdad then began harping on this theme, taking the Iraqi government to task for its harsh approach and declaring quite frankly that it would do nothing to improve the situation. The press and officialdom did their best to persuade the

374

My Memoirs

royal court of their point of view, but to no avail. In fact, no one could explain the royal court’s ongoing support for a government that had proven itself to be utterly inept domestically and lacking in foresight internationally. There were even people who claimed that some sort of ulterior motive underlay the regent’s unwavering sympathy and support for Arshad al‘Umari.

A Surprise In any event, toward the end of al-‘Umari’s term in office an unexpected development occurred. People had thought that on the following day, it would be announced that al-‘Umari had been appointed to form a second cabinet. Instead, however, the news to which they awoke early the next morning was that the task of forming the new cabinet had been assigned to Nuri al-Sa‘id. A number of trustworthy folks checked out the story in hopes of ascertaining the reason for this sudden change of plan. What they found was that the change had taken place at midnight in response to a telegram from Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, pleading with the regent not to allow al-‘Umari to form a second cabinet. In any case, this is what I was told. Thus was the curtain lowered on a cabinet that had given people virtually nothing good to remember it by.

Nuri al-Sa‘id’s Coalition Cabinet Nuri al-Sa‘id initially wanted his new cabinet either to have a pan-Arab stamp or to be a coalition government that included representatives of parties that, being neither extremely to the left nor extremely to the right, he did not view as dangerous. He distanced himself from the Independence Party while attempting to foster closer ties to the National Democratic Party and the Free Men’s Party, both of which he convinced to take part in his cabinet and from each of which he appointed one minister. Having done this, he felt certain that he had overcome significant obstacles. However, what he had forgotten was that insubstantial measures such as these would neither satisfy popular desires nor counter the fact that the ministers he had appointed were individuals that the people neither liked nor trusted. What the new prime minister was trying to do was to mix incompatible elements, and for this reason, his cabinet was not expected to succeed. And as a matter of fact, only days after the formation of his coalition cabinet, the bickering began, with his ministers accusing each other of imposing their views on others and trying to monopolize the affairs of state. Consequently, Nuri

My Second Term as Prime Minister

375

al-Sa‘id issued a decree calling for parliament to be dissolved and for new elections to be held.

Nuri al-Sa‘id’s Elections Nuri al-Sa‘id played a number of outlandish roles in these elections of his. He wanted to put himself across as being committed to a policy of freedom and noninterference in the elections. To this end he began harping on the theme of freedom, so much so, in fact, that people grew suspicious of his loud protestations. When the primary elections got under way, they revealed some of the aims the prime minister had been striving to conceal. It became obvious that the elections had been engineered for the purpose of bringing about the results the government wanted. Whenever the various parties tried to attract supporters, they would come up against resistance from local operatives who had received clandestine orders to work against certain members of certain parties. When the secondary elections began, the threats began in earnest, either to get voters to change their views or to force candidates to withdraw so as to clear the playing field for the government’s people. The parties were uncertain how to proceed because, if they entered the electoral fray, they were certain to be defeated, whereas if they stayed out of it, it would be said that they had lost their popular support. As a result, they decided that the best course of action was to steer clear of any involvement in the elections, since it was a foregone conclusion that the prime minister would take measures to ensure that they lost to the candidates he wanted to win, and this despite his insistence that the elections were not subject to any governmental interference. During the final round of elections, problems multiplied even further. However, the prime minister knew he would find himself in an awkward position if he contacted the relevant parties to hear their complaints and inform himself of the fabrications being circulated, so he decided he was better off playing sick and staying at home. Hence, he let things proceed according to his plans, but in a befuddled sort of way. This forced the royal court to intervene by gathering the administrative officers for a special meeting in the capital and giving them instructions concerning the candidates who were being ignorantly chosen by the prime minister. It was only natural, given this development, that some sort of mutual understanding would be worked out between the royal court and the prime minister concerning the majority of the candidates. Hence, the outcome of the elections could easily be seen to have been arranged by the ministers in the court, and no one could doubt that the resulting appointments had come about as a result of a carefully thought-out plan.

376

My Memoirs

Thus ended Nuri al-Sa‘id’s elections, which he had claimed would take place in an atmosphere devoid of any governmental interference.

My Election Clear evidence of the government’s concerted, thoroughgoing efforts to ensure the victory of certain candidates over others could be seen in what happened to me during these very elections. The new elections law, whose foundations had been laid by a special committee with me as its chair, had created a fundamental reciprocity in Iraqi election procedures, thereby bringing them closer to democracy than previous elections laws had done. The new law established important guarantees that would protect the people from governmental manipulation of election results. Among those who supported this type of election reform was Nuri al-Sa‘id, who had been prime minister when the law was drafted. When the special committee presented the law to him, he expressed his satisfaction with the democratic methods it had put in place, which were consistent with the country’s needs yet not an exaggerated expression of what people term “popular democracy.” When Nuri al-Sa‘id took office in the cabinet that had conducted the most recent elections, he had spoken to me about the need for freedom and the importance of helping people understand that they were no longer under any restriction with regard to whom they elected. In fact, he expressed an idea that struck me as odd, namely, that he ought to resign from the Senate and nominate himself as a candidate in the upcoming elections in order to demonstrate to people that these elections would be conducted in an atmosphere of freedom and that, for this reason, elections could be relied on as the only means of achieving people’s aspirations for self-representation. I felt reassured that the man was serious about what he was saying. Moreover, since I had helped to draw up the legislation, and since it was during my term as prime minister that it had been ratified by parliament and signed into law, I felt I ought to carry out the same experiment so that, together, we could offer an even more persuasive example to the people. Hence, I decided to nominate myself as a representative of Karkh (Baghdad’s sixth district). Many of my friends had expressed support for this decision, which encouraged me even more. Add to this the fact that some people who had wanted to run for office in the same district had withdrawn their names when they learned that I was planning to run for office. Then one day I heard that a group of conspirators who had opposed my cabinet were looking for individuals who would be willing to run against me. The only man they found who would be willing to cooperate with them was Shakir al-Wadi, minister of defense. They had enticed him with an offer

My Second Term as Prime Minister

377

to provide whatever support he needed, including the funding of his election campaign. None of this was being offered for his sake, of course, but, rather, in order to oppose me. When I was informed that Shakir al-Wadi was planning to nominate himself for the sixth district, which elects a single representative, I was quite surprised, since he, along with his brothers, had benefited from my assistance and support in the past, and he had considered himself my friend. Consequently, I could see no justification for what he was doing unless there had simply been a misunderstanding on his part. So I contacted him and explained the reasons for my decision to nominate myself, telling him that it would be better for us not to clash, especially given the fact that he, being a minister, could use his influence as a government official to nominate himself for any district he chose. However, it proved impossible to reach an agreement with him about anything. Rather, he argued that I was bound to be appointed as a member of the Senate regardless of the elections’ outcome. So why, he asked, should I bother to run at all? I told al-Wadi I was more likely to be elected than to be appointed. I went on to say that I would be willing to put in a good word for him with the prime minister or the regent to ensure that he was appointed to the Senate. If, on the other hand, he insisted on nominating himself as representative for the sixth district, my appointment to the Senate would have to be issued before the elections ended. Hence, if he agreed to be appointed to the Senate, we would save ourselves a lot of trouble, and there would no need for him to run for office. However, he didn’t listen to me. Instead, he insisted on moving forward with his plan, which confirmed to me that, as rumor had it, the man was not a serious contender for elected office in his own right but, rather, was being used as a means of achieving other people’s aims. Al-Wadi had no real popularity with the electorate in view of things he had done in the past that were not in keeping with the country’s nationalist goals or the goals of Arab unity. These included the support he and his father had given the Turks during the Ottoman era; the role he had played in Bakr Sidqi’s plot, which had introduced corruption and decadence into the country for a period of around a year; and other things that would not sit well with people who knew him. So, since it was a matter of personal dignity and honor, it was a virtual certainty that a man of his ilk could only expect to be defeated if he ran for election on his own merits. I, for my part, kept on with my struggle. As for Shakir al-Wadi, he resorted to blatant arm-twisting, bent on ensuring his triumph by using all the influence he could muster and taking full advantage of his position as minister of defense. He even deigned to promise certain riffraff and ruffians, among them Mazhar al-Shawi, that he would issue a special amnesty for imprisoned relatives of theirs in return for their support. The struggle went on until al-Wadi’s defeat was more or less a foregone conclusion given the large number of voters I had on my side. However, if I

378

My Memoirs

drew the regent’s attention to the fact that the minister of defense was exploiting his position in order to make gains in the elections, or if I asked the prime minister to intervene to ensure that the electoral race was conducted in a civil, legal fashion, my words would fall on deaf ears. Indeed, both of them were content to disregard what was going on even if it happened to be unabashed military intervention by everyone from army recruits to plainclothes officers whose task was to do battle with anyone who supported me. As for the prime minister, the safest course for him personally was simply not to listen to anything I had to say and not to take measures to address the situation but, instead, to throw up his hands and exclaim that he couldn’t do a thing, not even preserve law and order. Working through its minister of defense, the government had resorted to every possible tactic to get what it wanted, including threats and pressure on voters who were government employees and firing those with competing interests or government ties until, at last, the minister of defense was able to garner three more votes than I did. A fiasco par excellence, it demonstrated the degree of freedom that had marked the elections and the calm, peaceful atmosphere in which they had been conducted. Or, at least, so said the prime minister at every available opportunity.

Salih Jabr Succeeds Nuri al-Sa‘id Members of the House of Representatives were elected and that was that. The prime minister resigned, having accomplished the precious “mission” that guaranteed the country what he termed free, fair, and transparent elections. Efforts had been made beforehand on behalf of Salih Jabr, who had apparently been handpicked to succeed Nuri al-Sa‘id. These efforts had been made by a number of parties; in fact, it was said that most of the resources had been supplied by British intelligence agencies. By virtue of the facts that had been created on the ground, Salih Jabr was now the sole candidate for the post of prime minister, since Nuri alSa‘id, by means of his “free” elections, had equipped the foot soldiers needed to prop up the new prime minister without any effort on his part. Salih Jabr formed the new cabinet and the new session of parliament was opened, whereupon the cabinet presented parliament with a prolix platform filled with hopes and dreams that the country would have needed half a century to fulfill. Nevertheless, the cabinet continued on its preset course. Salih Jabr took over all state functions and, like his predecessor, Arshad al-‘Umari, began complaining that the ministers he had appointed were inept and unfit for their jobs, which meant that he alone was qualified to run the affairs of state. Moreover, in order to demonstrate to others, and particularly to the

My Second Term as Prime Minister

379

British government, that he was an innovative, decisive leader with an appreciation of governmental organization and reform and a firm grasp of the country’s needs, Jabr recruited a host of foreign experts, whose numbers on the government payroll eventually swelled to more than 450, and most of whom had been enticed into government service through offers of exorbitant salaries. Then, wanting to portray himself as a popular leader with a concern to win the approval of the people, Salih Jabr increased state expenditures and created large numbers of government positions for which there was no need. Moreover, the people he appointed to these positions were chosen not on the basis of ability but, rather, on ties of friendship between them and the prime minister or partisan political considerations. The state of the Iraqi government thus continued to go from bad to worse. Actions being taken by government departments came in for severe criticism as their validity, legality, and fairness were challenged. Meanwhile, protests were raised from all quarters as people found it increasingly difficult to defend their rights or combat injustice.

22 The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

~

A New Treaty Is Negotiated It was being rumored that the outlines of a new treaty had been drawn up between the Iraqi government and British government representatives who had come to Iraq in secret. In early January 1948, I was informed by the royal court that I had been invited to a meeting to be held with the regent at the Rihab Palace. I tried to find out what the topic of the meeting would be but was unable to glean any information apart from the fact that it might be related to the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and its foundations. At the scheduled time I went to the Rihab Palace, where the others who had been invited to the meeting had begun arriving. When the regent arrived, all of us went to the dining room and took our seats around the table. There were eighteen of us, including the head of the Royal Administrative Office and a number of his aides. In his introductory remarks, the regent told us that when he had gone to Britain the previous summer, he had discussed the need to amend the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty with a number of officials there. Following his return to Iraq, two British military officers had come to Baghdad, where they had contacted the regent and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to discuss what contact the two governments’ military personnel needed to pursue in relation to the new treaty. He then mentioned the difficulties he had faced and the objections British officials had raised in connection with amending the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty at that particular time. Nevertheless, he said, some groundwork had been laid toward tempering the provisions of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. 381

382

My Memoirs

The regent added, “I would like to know what you think about the foundations and aims of this treaty.” However, he made no gesture toward the prime minister indicating that he should add additional clarifications or supply those present with the information they would need in order to form an informed opinion on the matter. When the regent had finished what he had to say, everyone sat there in glum silence. All eyes were on the prime minister, Salih Jabr, who had a distracted, vacant look on his face as though he weren’t a part of the discussion, or as though he were pretending not to be involved so that no one would say anything to him. I tried to get the discussion going with a few general comments on the topic. When there was still no response from the group, I added, “I would have liked to hear the prime minister say something on the topic the regent prince has proposed for discussion.” Then, looking straight at the prime minister, I asked, “What do you think?” In response, the prime minister announced without hesitation that he had nothing to say. Consequently, I explained what needed to be done in view of the differences in defense tactics that had arisen since the end of World War II. I also mentioned a number of other issues that might have a direct bearing on our situation with the British. I spoke decisively about the need to replace the defense system associated with the old treaty with something less cumbersome, even if this meant doing without air bases. The regent replied that the British military authorities were not in favor of giving up the currently existing air bases, although it might be possible to grant Iraq more power over the bases and greater authority to oversee them during peacetime. The conversation then shifted to the question of whether those present felt it necessary to conclude any sort of treaty with the British, and if so, whether it should be a military and political alliance or a treaty of some other kind. At this point, those present began voicing their views. Most agreed that it would be necessary to conclude a military and political alliance with the British. However, Nasrat al-Farisi and Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi insisted that the actual text of the treaty should be presented to those in attendance and that the Iraqi government’s own position should be made clear. On this basis, an open discussion of the issue could be conducted; otherwise, they held that they would not be able to express their views frankly. Similarly, Jamil al-Midfa‘i and Hikmat Sulayman chose to remain silent rather than participate in the discussion. When they were invited to speak, they explained that because they were not members of parliament, they preferred to listen to the discussion without contributing anything of their own. The statements made by those in attendance were recorded in full by the head of the Royal Administrative Office. As for the names of those

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

383

present, I didn’t get them all. However, I do remember that Jamil alMidfa‘i, Nuri al-Sa‘id, Salih Jabr, Hikmat Sulayman, Hamdi al-Pachachi, Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi, Nasrat al-Farisi, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, and Shakir al-Wadi, among others whose names I can’t recall, were all at the meeting. The regent and his government appeared to be contenting themselves with vague statements in the belief that those present would be prepared to approve the treaty without having seen it for themselves. However, this belief was mistaken. After the meeting had been adjourned and the regent had left the dining room for the reception area to bid us farewell, I came up to him and said, “Salih Jabr’s cabinet is too weak to undertake the responsibility of negotiations, which require concerted effort and thorough preparation. So you’ll need to form a cabinet that would be prepared for these challenges.” Then I left, as others were approaching him to greet him on their way out. Before leaving, I went back into the dining room. Taking Nuri al-Sa‘id by the hand, I said, “I’ve just spoken with the regent and told him thus and such. I’m asking you to second my opinion with him, since the matter of negotiations is a serious one that calls for new participants and major effort.” However, Nuri al-Sa‘id disagreed with me. He said that in his view, Salih Jabr’s cabinet was capable of negotiating and concluding the new treaty, after which it would be free to resign. Two days later I was asked to come see the regent at the royal court. When I arrived, he said to me, “I’ve thought about what you said about a negotiations cabinet. As I see it, it would do no good to replace the current cabinet at this time. However, I have another idea that might be more practical, namely, that we support the existing cabinet by sending powerful negotiators with Salih Jabr to London. After all, I don’t think he is capable of engaging in the negotiations alone. So I’ve appointed Nuri al-Sa‘id to accompany him to London, and I’d like to appoint you to go with them as well.” “I don’t agree to this appointment,” I replied, “since I couldn’t work well with the prime minister.” He said, “If you went to London, you wouldn’t be working with the prime minister. Rather, you would be overseeing and directing the negotiations. I know very well how ill prepared he is for this mission.” “All right, then,” I replied, “allow me to postpone a decision until after I’ve had the chance to study the draft of the treaty.” “Fine,” he said. “We’ll be meeting again today at the Rihab Palace to study the text of the treaty.” Then I excused myself and left. At 5:00 p.m. that afternoon I went to the Rihab Palace, where I found Crown Prince Regent ‘Abd al-Ilah, Salih Jabr, Nuri al-Sa‘id, and Ahmad

384

My Memoirs

Mukhtar Baban. When our number was complete and we had drunk a cup of tea, each of us was given a copy of the draft treaty in English. When I asked for a copy of the treaty in Arabic, I was told that none was available yet, so I began translating major portions of it into Arabic for Ahmad Mukhtar, who didn’t speak English. After some exchange among us about the document, I concluded that it contained nothing highly objectionable in the area of politics, especially after I had pointed out certain articles that I thought should be deleted due to excessive restrictions they imposed on Iraq. We also reviewed the draft treaty’s preamble and conclusion. When we came to the military portion of the document, I said, “It isn’t clear to me.” To this Salih Jabr replied, “The text has been thoroughly studied and agreed upon in this form, and there’s nothing objectionable in it.” Neither Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah nor Nuri al-Sa‘id offered any suggestions as to how the draft treaty might be amended or improved. As for Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, it seemed that he was rather uninvolved in the issue and that he preferred simply to listen and learn rather than offer commentary. After the meeting was over, Nuri al-Sa‘id asked the regent to exempt him from going to London, saying that everything was settled now and that as a result, there was no reason to exert further effort on negotiations. Shooting Nuri a look of reproach, the regent said testily, “I prefer that there be no discussion of this matter.” When I made the same request based on the same argument, I was treated to the same look and tone as Nuri alSa‘id had been. A moment or so later, the regent left the room while the rest of us carried on with our conversation. I told them I regretted not being able to go to London, but that traveling by air had become harmful to my health. When I inquired about the number of delegates and was told that the minister of defense, Shakir al-Wadi, would be among them, I suddenly had one more reason not to make the journey. I announced quite frankly that I had no intention of traveling in the same airplane with the man, and that the other delegates, whose efforts and expertise were certain to suffice, should go without me. And with that we parted ways. As I was about to get into the car, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban invited me to have dinner with him the following night to talk about the delegation’s trip, and I accepted. The next day I learned that Baban had told the regent what I had said about not making the trip to London and the reason for this decision as it related to al-Wadi. Consequently, they had agreed that the evening’s dinner invitation would be a fitting way to bring about a reconciliation between me and the minister of defense through the regent’s good offices.

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

385

So at the agreed-upon time we went to Ahmad Mukhtar Baban’s house, where the regent asked me to accept Shakir al-Wadi’s apology. In this way a kind of reconciliation came about, although I continued to insist on not making the trip. After a lengthy discussion during which the regent continued to insist that I accept the mission he had assigned to me, I finally agreed to go to London provided that the doctors approved of my making the trip, hoping to keep an escape hatch open for myself until the next day. When, the next day, the Senate met to consider the government’s request that Nuri al-Sa‘id and I be sent to London as negotiators, I reiterated my hope that my attending physicians would allow me to make the trip. However, my saying this prompted Nuri al-Sa‘id to pay me a special visit, asking me not to hesitate any longer and not to create any more difficulties. Meanwhile discussions were being held to schedule our departure date. The prime minister said that Ernest Bevin, who had been planning to leave London on holiday for fifteen days, was going to delay his departure so as to receive us and that, in view of what had been agreed on with the British embassy, we ought to leave right away. “On the contrary,” I objected, “I think we should postpone our departure until after Bevin has returned from his holiday. This will give the negotiators time to contact the relevant individuals to discuss points of relevance to the upcoming talks. This is especially important given the failure of the efforts that were made to persuade the government to discuss the treaty at the Rihab Palace meeting.” I asked the prime minister to consult with people in positions of influence, either individually or in small groups, concerning essential aspects of the treaty. However, he said he wouldn’t be able to do this for fear that if he adopted this approach, it might lead to the same kind of sabotage that accompanied the Sidqi-Bevin draft agreement of 1946. If, for example, the Egyptian negotiators and the British had moved more quickly and signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, they wouldn’t have opened the way for the kinds of hesitations that delayed resolution of the Egyptian issue. On this basis it was decided that we would leave on Tuesday from the Habbaniyah Airport. We departed Baghdad in the evening and arrived at Habbaniyah’s Air Command Headquarters at eight o’clock. We had dinner, and early the next morning we boarded a large, four-engine military aircraft in the midst of a heavy downpour. The delegation consisted of Prime Minister Salih Jabr accompanied by his wife and a companion of hers, Fadil al-Jamali (minister of foreign affairs), Shakir al-Wadi (minister of defense), Nuri al-Sa‘id and me as advisers, and the adviser to the British embassy. It was 7:00 a.m. when the aircraft took off from Habbaniyah, and we arrived in Malta at one o’clock in the afternoon after a comfortable journey.

386

My Memoirs

After disembarking we rested and ate lunch at the officers’ restaurant, and at two o’clock we got back on the airplane. The weather was so windy that we considered postponing our departure until the next day. After thinking the matter over, however, we decided to carry on with our trip, and we left Malta. At 8:30 p.m. London time we reached North Poole Airport. Before landing, however, the airplane had to circle the airport for over half an hour waiting for permission to land. Whenever we asked why we hadn’t been able to land yet, we were simply told that the ground wasn’t suitable for landing. After some jolting and swaying that caused us enough discomfort to make up for the entire rest of the trip put together, we managed to land. Once on the ground, we discovered that the airplane that landed before us had crashed, and that what had delayed our own landing was the process of transporting some of its passengers to the hospital. It gave us all a strange feeling to realize that we had had breakfast in Baghdad and would be having dinner in London on the very same day. After being received by a group of Britons and Iraqis headed by Prince Zayd, the Iraqi ambassador to London, we left the airport for Claridge’s Hotel, where a number of rooms had been reserved for the members of the delegation. Interestingly, despite the fact that our delegation was comprised of numerous leading personalities and had come to fulfill a mission of no little importance, it had no secretariat, nor had it brought any papers or established any set system for the work it was assigned to do. In fact, it had not brought a single clerical worker along. The prime minister was apparently intending to depend in this connection on himself and on the foreign minister’s secretary, both of whom were awaiting us in London. It should be remembered here that these two men had been outside of Iraq for around a year and had had no involvement in the negotiating process. Consequently, I suggested that the prime minister and the foreign minister set up a secretariat in the hotel, and that they have some of the embassy staff in London work with them so that the members of the delegation could do their work more efficiently. My suggestion was well received. However, the outcome was less than positive, since in fact, no secretariat was established, and the Iraqi embassy in London was not asked to work with the delegation. Consequently, a number of fundamental errors were made in the draft treaty, including formatting errors and ambiguous wording. I was in a strange position in relation to the delegation. I wasn’t in a position of direct oversight, as a result of which I didn’t have a clear sense of responsibility for the way things were being handled, and I lacked the authority to handle affairs in the way I would have liked. Nor was I a total outsider to the process. Nevertheless, my work was limited to that of giving my opinion whenever I was asked to do so. I once advised the prime minister

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

387

not to be in a hurry to begin the negotiations when we were in Baghdad, but rather to postpone them for fifteen days. However, he rejected my advice. I then expressed the view that we shouldn’t finish drafting the treaty until we had had a chance to look at the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. However, because things were so disorganized and no one was taking any responsibility, they were unable to secure a copy of this document from the Iraqi embassy, the Egyptian embassy, or even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To make matters worse, the prime minister fell ill for three days or more, during which time everything ground to a complete halt and no one could predict what might happen from one day to the next. When I tried to modify the wording of the draft, no one supported my efforts. Instead I was told that the negotiations or consultations had already dealt with this or that text, as a result of which it would be difficult to change it now. In the end, then, I had no choice but to edit what was there by hand. I suggested removing the paragraph dealing with complete, frank consultation between the British and Iraqi governments concerning all foreign affairs that might have an impact on the contracting parties, and my suggestion was accepted. I then suggested that we modify the treaty’s preamble, which, like the preamble to the 1930 treaty, was filled with vague references that the British hoped to be able to interpret in ways favorable to their interests and that were certain to cause problems in the future. Hence, we removed unnecessary prolixity and ambiguity from the preamble. We did the same thing in relation to the treaty’s conclusion, especially in view of the fact that the 1930 treaty had explicitly guaranteed the British air force ongoing access to Iraqi airspace even after the treaty had expired. Certain corrections that my colleagues helped me to introduce made the political section of the treaty so clear and precise that no one could have found fault with it. As for the military section, we figured it out with the help of Iraqi military experts. Based on the information supplied by these experts, I concluded that the military agreement contained in the treaty was in Iraq’s favor, since it would help the country build up its defenses by equipping and arming itself in the manner outlined in the military appendix. The government responsible, the negotiators, and those closely connected to the negotiations all strongly supported the final formulations contained in the treaty as it stood. No one can claim knowledge of things that are outside his area of specialization but, rather, has to rely on the opinions of experts in the area of concern. If I had been presented with any objection in connection with military concerns or if I had been asked to defend the need to amend something in the military section of the treaty, I would not have hesitated for a single moment to do my duty in this connection. However, I would not have been

388

My Memoirs

able to express views or make comments beyond those that had been voiced by the experts. Hence, I contented myself with what had transpired, persuaded that we had made a significant improvement in the 1936 treaty.

The End of the Negotiations The negotiations thus came to an end. We were told that the signing would take place on a small island called Portsmouth, because Bevin, who had cut his holiday short on account of the negotiations, would be resuming his holiday and spending the rest of it in a location near Portsmouth once the signing had been completed. The reason the treaty was not named after the place in which it was to be signed is that a well-known treaty had been concluded there at the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, and none of the British officials wanted the name of Portsmouth to be associated with the more recent treaty lest the two be confused, especially in view of the fact that the earlier treaty had marked the end of an armed conflict between Russia and Japan, whereas the later one was a treaty of friendship and alliance between Britain and Iraq. After the treaty had been initialed by the heads of the new negotiating delegations, I suggested to the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs that the news of the treaty’s signing not be published in either Britain or Iraq until after the Iraqi delegation had returned to Baghdad in order to avoid any ambiguity and in order to enable the Iraqi government to defend the treaty at an appropriate time. However, for reasons I never understood, the prime minister allowed the British to publish the treaty immediately following its signing while at the same time attempting to prevent its publication in Baghdad. As a result, the Iraqis were led to suspect that the treaty contained things the Iraqi government was afraid to publish in Baghdad but not in London. On January 15, 1948, the delegation left London by rail in a private coach and arrived in Portsmouth two hours later. The members of the delegation were received warmly by the local authorities, who escorted them directly to the municipality building for a reception to be held in their honor. A special place in the municipality building’s reception hall had been reserved for the event, and many local notables were invited to attend. After everyone had taken their places, Bevin delivered a speech in which he set forth the purpose of the gathering, expressing his pleasure that a new treaty was being concluded between Iraq and Britain and, at the same time, expressing his hope that this treaty would be the first of many to come between Britain and Arab states toward greater security and prosperity in the Arab East. After saying a number of other things suitable to the occasion, Bevin was followed by the Iraqi prime minister, who delivered a brief

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

389

speech in which he expressed his gratitude for the hospitality with which the Iraqi delegation had been received during its stay in London. These speeches were followed by the signing ceremony, in which the British delegation signed first, followed by the Iraqi delegation. Some military exercises were then conducted in honor of the visiting delegations, and the festivities concluded with a sumptuous lunch on board the worldrenowned HMS Victory, which had been the admiral’s flagship during the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. Short speeches that were restricted to the usual courtesies were exchanged at the luncheon by the British foreign secretary and the head of the Iraqi delegation. The delegation was then honored with an invitation to visit a number of the many warships in the harbor. At 5:00 p.m. we boarded the train for our return to London, where we had tea, by which time Bevin had left Portsmouth to finish out his holiday. All in all, the gathering at Portsmouth was a very solemn occasion, as it brought together all the most prominent officials in the British Empire at that time, and the communication between the two sides was forthright and engaging. My contact with the members of the delegation throughout this time was quite limited, since the only events I attended with them were formal social gatherings that were hosted either by the delegation or on its behalf. Once the negotiations had been completed and the prime minister was satisfied that things had gone as he had hoped they would, he considered himself to have earned a long vacation, which he intended to spend in Europe, especially given the fact that he and his wife had both fallen ill and were now in need of some rest and recovery time.

Baghdad in an Uproar As fate would have it, however, just two days after the treaty’s signing, telegrams began pouring in from Baghdad with reports of angry demonstrations against the treaty, meetings that had been held subsequently at the royal court, and other news that was hard to take in at first. After all, it was difficult to imagine why this treaty would have aroused such indignation on the part of Iraqis. However, the prime minister’s low approval rating and the unpopular things he had done during his term in office had conspired to bring about a general state of unrest and a receptivity to any movement against him that happened to come along. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the Communists, who viewed Salih Jabr as their mortal foe, had taken advantage of the situation by goading the masses in a variety of ways to rebel against the treaty. The Communists had also joined hands with the Zionists, who had learned of Bevin’s inclination to support the Arab position on Palestine and his hostility to Zionism. The Communists as well as the Zionists were troubled by the fact that the treaty contained articles

390

My Memoirs

that might be seen as a major victory for the Arab cause in Palestine at the expense of Zionist interests and hopes. Disturbed over these reports, the British government inquired of Salih Jabr about the truth of the telegrams coming from Baghdad. Jabr tried to downplay the reports and sent a handwritten message to the head of the Eastern Section at the British Foreign Office with the request that he deliver it to Bevin. In the note, Jabr stated his belief that the reports coming from Baghdad were exaggerated. Moreover, he added, Iraqi public opinion was not well informed about the real situation and was being stirred up by subversive elements and disgruntled individuals with particular axes to grind. Salih Jabr sent this note to Bevin so that when he briefed the House of Commons the following day, he could use its contents to alleviate the anxiety that had been aroused in British circles by news of events in Baghdad.

Return to Baghdad The British government began insisting that the prime minister return without delay to Baghdad in order to enlighten Iraqi public opinion about the real state of affairs. To this end it prepared a private airplane, which departed from London on January 25, 1948, and reached Baghdad on January 26. After landing at the Habbaniyah Airport, Salih Jabr began contacting others in order to determine what the current situation was. Based on his inquiries, he learned that there was such a great upheaval that it was taking on the proportions of a revolution, and that the local authorities feared that the returning delegation might be met with a violent demonstration that could lead to undesirable consequences if it reached Baghdad at a preannounced time.

The Clouds Darken The prime minister decided to go to Baghdad right away by private car. As for the rest of us—including Nuri al-Sa‘id, Fadil al-Jamali, the adviser to the British embassy, and me—we stayed behind in Habbaniyah waiting for a more suitable time to travel to the capital. We would periodically receive reports by telephone indicating the seriousness of the situation. Finally, however, private cars were sent to take us to Baghdad as well, and we traveled with Sabah al-‘Id and Dhiya’ Ja‘far. We had been told how difficult and tumultuous the situation was, and when we reached the capital, we were asked to attend a meeting that was to be held at the Rihab Palace. When we arrived at the meeting place, the ministers in attendance were disconcerted and ill at ease. A few minutes later, the cabinet convened a meeting chaired by the regent, and those present began a comprehensive review of the situation.

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

391

Some said that the protests weren’t simply demonstrations but, rather, a stormy uprising that needed to be dealt with in an appropriate fashion, be it through force or through mutual understanding. Others said they were nothing to be concerned or frightened about so long as the government was decisive and courageous and put a clear end to them. Still others said that the demonstrations needed to be addressed through stern measures in order to preserve the state’s dignity and reputation. This latter view, advocated by Salih Jabr and Nuri al-Sa‘id, failed to find the support of a good number of the ministers. When I was asked for my opinion, I said, “I can see that the members of the cabinet are not in agreement as to a specific plan. So I move that the prime minister meet with the members of his cabinet to discuss the matter. If they are able to agree on something, we can voice our opinions on what means need to be adopted. However, as long as they themselves are in a state of confusion, it wouldn’t be wise to express any point of view.” Then I added, “It’s quite reasonable to think about the need to preserve the government’s dignity and reputation and not to allow troublemakers to endanger the country’s well-being. But given the intractable differences that seem to exist among members of the cabinet, it needs to be known who will undertake this task.” During the discussion I had noticed that the royal court was not in favor of resorting to stern measures but, rather, was attempting to ward off problems in some other way, although what this way was, it had not made clear to anyone. Then the meeting was adjourned.

The Demonstrations Continue We all went home, but the demonstrations went on, and clashes between the police and demonstrators were at their height in the streets and city squares. At 6:00 p.m. that evening, I called Nuri al-Sa‘id to ask him what steps the government intended to take. He told me that the current cabinet was most likely to resort to force, since people’s agitation was directed against it and the prime minister. Then I spoke with Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, head of the Royal Administrative Office, about various solutions that would be appropriate to the situation, though without letting on which of these solutions I personally favored. Baban indicated that they were still looking into various courses of action but had not arrived at any conclusions. At 8:00 p.m. I was summoned to the Rihab Palace, and when I arrived I was shown a paper containing a draft announcement from the prime minister to the citizenry. The announcement stated that the commotion that had arisen was a result of people’s lack of clarity concerning the government’s point of view on the recently concluded treaty. Therefore, the announcement

392

My Memoirs

added, the government stood ready to offer any needed clarifications of its position.

The Movement Against Salih Jabr I then told the regent that although, in our previous meeting, I had advocated the idea of preserving the government’s dignity by the use of coercive measures, I had, between noon and sunset of that same day, acquired new information that led me to believe that the movement had developed in response to the person of the prime minister himself. If this was the case, I said, it might be possible to avoid further clashes between the people and the government by asking the prime minister to resign. We could then see what effect this had on the overall atmosphere in the country. The regent agreed that an announcement of this sort was likely to have a calming, reassuring effect on the populace. However, he added, it would not be possible to find a suitable successor to the prime minister if he were to resign immediately. “I can’t be certain about anything I’ve said,” I replied. “So I leave it to His Highness the Regent and the government to try whichever solution they believe would be best.” Then I left the Rihab Palace and went home. When the announcement I had been shown earlier by the prime minister was broadcast over the radio, it had a decidedly negative impact on the public mood. It was in fact interpreted as a veiled threat, as though he were throwing down the gauntlet and telling the people that unless they bowed to his will, the government would resort to the use of force. Consequently, people grew even more agitated and conditions grew steadily worse not only that night but the next day as well. Matters continued in this way until one o’clock the following afternoon, at which time the government broadcast an official statement in which it threatened the use of force if the disturbances continued. But it did no good. On the contrary, it generated nothing but louder outcries and worsening tensions until eight o’clock that evening, at which time the regent broadcast the news that the cabinet had resigned, that its resignation had been accepted, and that arrangements were being made for the formation of a new cabinet.

Muhammad al-Sadr’s Cabinet The following afternoon we learned that the regent had approached several different people concerning the possibility of forming a new cabinet, but without success. Among these individuals was Muhammad al-Sadr, who

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

393

had been asked to form a cabinet that would include a significant number of individuals whose presence in the government would help to set people’s minds at rest. The first time he was approached about the matter, al-Sadr declined. He was approached a second time, and again, he declined. This tug-of-war went on until, at midnight, it was announced over the radio that al-Sadr had agreed to form a cabinet and that he was in the process of appointing individuals, the majority of whom had been opposed to the recent treaty between Britain and Iraq. By late morning on January 29, 1948, the new cabinet was complete. The new cabinet began its term by promising to make a careful examination of the treaty that had just been concluded and to issue a definitive and timely judgment on it. However, the people were being driven by all sorts of motives and influences, including Communist propaganda and organizations, and were not content with the cabinet’s pronouncements and promises. Unfazed, they were determined to make their voices heard in whatever way they could, including unremitting demonstrations, which by this time had become thoroughly alarming to the government and to the prime minister in particular. As a consequence, he finally issued a rebuke to the demonstrators and threatened to resign if such disturbances weren’t brought to an end. However, this brought no response. In fact, the demonstrations became even more frequent and widespread. The Communists began funding the various dissident factions and paying daily wages to those who took part in the demonstrations. As a result, the demonstrations took on an overtly Communist flavor, with the demonstrators calling for food rations and guaranteed employment for everyone. Demonstrators made public pronouncements to the effect that the Jews were their brothers, which was clear evidence of the movement’s CommunistZionist origins. When certain individuals who had renounced their Communist beliefs later published their confessions concerning Communism’s aims and actions, both overt and covert, they stated that the Wathbah (“The Leap”) uprising sparked by the 1948 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty had been CommunistZionist through and through. They even made mention of the fact that the policeman who was murdered and whose corpse had been burned at the Bab al-Shaikh Police Station had been killed by Communists, among whom was a girl who had removed some of her undergarments, dipped them in petroleum, and used them to set fire to the man’s body and other articles nearby. Given the unrest, terror, and fear that now prevailed in the capital, the cabinet met and decided to repudiate the recently concluded treaty with Britain. It then informed the British government of its decision as though it believed it was freeing itself and the people from a terrible nightmare. Prior to these developments I received a visit from Prime Minister Muhammad al-Sadr. In the course of our conversation, I compared the new treaty to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, reminding him of the benefits Iraq had gained

394

My Memoirs

through the earlier agreement. I asked him whether he had read the new treaty, and he replied that he had not. In fact, he said, he had no intention of reading it. Rather, he intended to repudiate it without having read it because this was what the people wanted. And I thought to myself: incredible, the ignorance out of which these people operate. I later received a visit at home from the speaker of parliament, ‘Abd al‘Aziz al-Qassab, who was intensely agitated. When I asked him whether he had read the new treaty, I understood from his reply that he had not. These encounters convinced me of the correctness of what I had said to the regent after the meeting of politicians at the Rihab Palace, namely, that if Salih Jabr introduced troublemaking elements into his cabinet that needed to be silenced, his cabinet would have to resign and be succeeded by a cabinet that would be prepared and qualified to enter into the needed negotiations. I had also told the regent that the anticipated opposition might result as much from people’s dislike of Salih Jabr as from their condemnation of the new treaty itself.

Muzahim al-Pachachi Now that Muhammad al-Sadr’s cabinet had sought to set people’s minds at rest by nullifying the new treaty with Britain, thereby exposing the government as weak and ineffectual, there was no longer any justification for it to

To Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s right are Ibrahim ‘Abd al-Hadi Pasha (prime minister of Egypt) and Hafiz ‘Afifi Pasha, and to his left, Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha and Muzahim al-Pachachi

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

395

stay in office. Hence, it resigned and a new cabinet was formed under the leadership of Muzahim al-Pachachi, whose rise to power was as peculiar as it was dramatic. Al-Pachachi had left the country and lived abroad for twelve years as Iraq’s chargé d’affaires in Rome and Paris. During this time he had had little to do with Baghdad’s political and parliamentary life, having chosen a life of seclusion and increasing wealth. Instead of doing something useful for the country, he had become obscure and irrelevant. During his terms as chargé d’affaires, al-Pachachi had engaged in activities that did nothing to enhance his reputation. His political past was likewise tainted in every respect. Add to this the fact that by the time he returned to Iraq after his long absence, he had been dismissed from the diplomatic corps. So what had happened to transform this man’s dark past into a story of such grace and light that the country was suddenly in dire need of his political finesse and genius? Everyone was asking the same question, but no one had an answer. There were those who said that when the British ambassador, Sir Henry Mack, was in Vienna, he had become acquainted with alPachachi and had been impressed with certain qualities he’d seen in him. The ambassador had then begun speaking well of al-Pachachi and had mentioned him in passing to the regent. Others said that Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, wanting to prove his skill at identifying potential candidates for the office of prime minister, had persuaded the regent to seek out this man’s rare genius. During a conversation with Baban a week after the new cabinet had been formed, I realized that the second scenario was the correct one. It appears that the regent, wanting to avoid having to appeal again to Nuri alSa‘id, Jamil al-Midfa‘i, or other veteran politicians, had encouraged the head of his administrative office to suggest the names of people who might be assigned to form the new cabinet, and Muzahim al-Pachachi was the person he happened to suggest. One day when I was at home following an afternoon nap, I was told that Muzahim al-Pachachi had come to see me and was waiting outside in the garden. The news surprised me, since we hadn’t been on good terms. When I came out to see him, he said, “I was woken a while ago by the telephone. When I answered, someone said, ‘Get up! Get up! You’re the new prime minister!’ So I’m putting together my cabinet, and I’ve come to ask if you would help me by agreeing to serve on it.” I congratulated him on his appointment, but said that unfortunately, I wouldn’t be able to serve on his cabinet. “If you can’t,” he went on, “then try to persuade ‘Ali Mumtaz to join me.” I told him that ‘Ali Mumtaz happened to be in my living room and that I would do my best to persuade him, then let him know what had happened. After al-Pachachi had left, I went in and spoke with ‘Ali Mumtaz, who was amazed to hear that al-Pachachi had been appointed to form a cabinet and

396

My Memoirs

even expressed skepticism as to whether it was really true. However, I assured him that it was. ‘Ali Mumtaz made clear that he wasn’t willing to serve on al-Pachachi’s cabinet but promised to call him after leaving my house. In the end, however, he agreed to al-Pachachi’s request. The news that Muzahim al-Pachachi had been appointed prime minister came as a surprise to everyone for the reasons I’ve mentioned. Predictions were being made that al-Pachachi wouldn’t succeed in putting together a respectable cabinet. And even if he did succeed, it was generally agreed that he would only be able to stay in office for a short time, since people were aware of his dismal record. The predictions of al-Pachachi’s failure as prime minister were validated shortly after he took office. His fate was further sealed by the outbreak of the 1948 war in Palestine following the British troops’ withdrawal, which had left most areas of the country to the Jews. As al-Pachachi struggled to address the Palestine issue as it pertained to Iraq and the activity of the Arab League, he complained bitterly of the Arab states’ negligence, and particularly the actions of Jordan and Iraq in their capacity as Hashemite kingdoms that appeared not to want the Arab League campaign to succeed. At the same time, he supported Egypt and its policy in relation to the Palestinian campaign despite his awareness of the fact that Egypt had repeatedly been guilty of dithering, holding back, and foiling others’ efforts. During his term as prime minister, Muzahim al-Pachachi achieved nothing to speak of in the political sphere, since the war in Palestine took up all his energy, especially since he was pursuing a policy of “hit and run” in an attempt to play the various Arab states off of one another. He spent most of his time shuttling back and forth among Baghdad, Amman, Cairo, and Damascus, yet without achieving a concrete agreement to unify the Arab armies’ military leadership and operations. Another shortcoming to which al-Pachachi fell prey was that he limited his efforts to attacks on the Hashemites in Amman and Baghdad, whom he portrayed to the Egyptian government as the primary reason for the Arab forces’ defeat. Eventually he concluded a pact with the Egyptian prime minister on the basis of which neither Iraq nor Egypt would criticize or defame the other for a period of four years. The four years specified in the pact coincided with the period during which Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah would remain regent. The belief was that it was the regent who was making trouble between Egypt and Iraq and working to undermine the Arab armies’ morale. When the regent learned of what the prime minister had done without first contacting him or consulting with any other Iraqi officials, he was incensed. Hence, Muzahim al-Pachachi tendered his resignation three months after forming his cabinet. As a well-meaning, patriotic man, Muzahim al-Pachachi was frustrated by the fact that the Arab states’ efforts to deal with the crisis in Palestine had failed to achieve victory over Israel. He was convinced that the Arab

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

397

states were not doing everything in their power to win the war, and as he saw it, the direct cause behind this failure lay in the actions and attitudes of King ‘Abdullah and Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, who, al-Pachachi claimed, were colluding with the British in their plan to leave a significant portion of Palestine under Jewish control and allocate what remained to Transjordan. Facts were buried and hopes were disappointed in the flurry of accusations being hurled back and forth by the various states involved in the Palestine war. Be that as it may, one fact that is certain is that not one of these states had been prepared for the war in Palestine, and once it had begun, none of them devoted the necessary attention to it. A major reason for this was that military experts had met with the Arab armies’ chiefs of staff and, after studying the situation and the resources it would require, had agreed unanimously that even if they were to pool all their resources they would still be unable to win the war against Israel if it continued. I know this because, even though I wasn’t serving on any cabinet at the time, I read the report that was presented by the panel of army chiefs of staff and military experts.

Parliament Investigates the Palestine Debacle Al-Pachachi’s cabinet was succeeded by a cabinet headed by Nuri al-Sa‘id. Then, in view of the foolish clamor that had been raised by the Arab press, and the Egyptian press in particular, and the truce that had guaranteed Israel the right to exist but which Iraq had not signed even though it had taken part in the war against Israel, Nuri al-Sa‘id’s cabinet asked parliament to pass a resolution calling for the formation of an investigative committee. The committee’s purpose would be to confirm and document the facts in order to ascertain what had happened, what had been said, and what accusations had been circulating. Chaired by Dr. ‘Abdullah Damluji, the twelve-member committee thus set to work. The report that the committee presented to the House of Representatives three months later in no way supported the accusations that had been made against Jordan and Iraq. Rather, it highlighted the negligence of virtually all the Arab states that had taken part in the war on Israel, foremost among them Egypt. As the months passed, Nuri al-Sa‘id’s cabinet avoided fruitless discussions with other Arab states, including their newspapers and magazines, concerning the catastrophe that had befallen Palestine. Propaganda was circulating in Iraq concerning betrayals that had taken place in the leadership of the Iraqi armed forces and Jordan’s role in these betrayals. However, the parliamentary committee’s report, which had been presented to the House of Representatives and made public, contained irrefutable evidence that placed everything relating to the Palestine issue in a realistic, evenhanded perspective.

398

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as head of the Iraqi delegation to the United Nations in 1949

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

399

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Ahmad Khashabah Pasha (minister of foreign affairs of Egypt) at the United Nations in 1949 during the struggle for Libya’s independence and unity

Efforts on Libya’s Behalf at the United Nations In March 1949, at which time Nuri al-Sa‘id was prime minister, the UN General Assembly held one of its most important sessions. I was appointed to head Iraq’s large and powerful delegation. During that most significant of sessions a number of issues were dealt with, the most urgent of which for us was whether Libya would be partitioned into areas of influence or mandates (a British mandate in Tripoli, an Italian mandate in Benghazi, and a French mandate in Fezzan). Both in meetings and behind the scenes we exerted tremendous efforts in the hope of winning the battle once the issue was put to a vote. We worked to coordinate the Arab delegations’ perspectives, to persuade and guide the Islamic delegations, and to win over the delegations of other countries that were either neutral or kindly disposed toward Libya. After days of grueling efforts, we achieved the prize we had been working for, namely, recognition of Libya as an autonomous, united

400

My Memoirs

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Dr. Charles Malik (minister of foreign affairs of Lebanon) at the United Nations in 1949

Arab kingdom under the reign of King Idris Sanusi, who had fought for long years on behalf of his people and his country. In this connection I recall that prior to that time there had been a movement to annex Jaghbub (an oasis in the eastern province of Cyrenaica) to Egypt. However, I alerted King Sanusi to the plots that were being woven in secret to achieve this aim, and, by doing everything possible to foil this effort, we helped Libya to maintain its full territorial integrity. I am proud to say that during this important session of the United Nations—as in other sessions, whether in the United Nations, the League of Nations before it, or other international forums—I have always striven, with all the strength and ability God has given me, to be a faithful servant of the broader Arab community: championing its causes, working to achieve its hopes, and striving for its well-being and dignity. In so doing I have fulfilled a sacred duty and trust, and I thank God for His assistance. I have made no distinction in these efforts between one Arab region and another, and I’m honored to say that in this respect my conscience is clear.

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948

401

From left to right, Nuri al-Sa‘id, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi

‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi’s Cabinet Nuri al-Sa‘id’s tenth cabinet resigned on December 6, 1949. Following a series of consultations and maneuvers, ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi formed his second cabinet on December 10, 1949. During the term of this latter cabinet, which remained in office for only two months, a number of developments took place. The most important of these developments was the support shown by al-Ayyubi and his deputy prime minister, Muzahim al-Pachachi, for the conclusion of a five-year truce with Egypt (as al-Pachachi had wanted to do at an earlier time). A delegation headed by al-Ayyubi traveled from Iraq to Egypt to pursue the matter. The delegation also included Najib al-Rawi, minister of education. However, rumors began circulating concerning certain aspects of their conduct that were said not to have preserved their personal dignity or the dignity of the state they were representing. It was felt that they acted obsequiously toward Egypt and its leader, Mustafa Nahhas Pasha. These events contributed to the destabilization of alAyyubi’s cabinet and its resignation early in February 1950. This was followed by the usual consultations leading to the formation of a new cabinet. Nuri al-Sa‘id’s name immediately came up as a candidate to be prime minister, but he was not appointed.

23 My Third Term as Prime Minister

~

Forming a Coalition Cabinet At 5:00 p.m. one day early in February 1950, I was asked to come to the Rihab Palace. When I arrived, the regent told me he wanted me to form a coalition cabinet composed of party members and independents. As I recalled, this had been Nuri al-Sa‘id’s idea at one time, and I asked to be given twenty-four hours to think about how I might put the idea into practice. As soon as I left the palace, I went to see Nuri al-Sa‘id in his home. When I first told him what had transpired between the regent and me, he seemed bewildered and even incredulous, as though he had still been hoping that he would be the one to form the next cabinet. However, when he saw that he’d missed the train, so to speak, he began trying to sell me on the idea of a coalition cabinet. After giving the matter some thought, I decided that I would probably be able to appoint three or four members of Nuri al-Sa‘id’s Constitutional Federation Party, which was actually the ruling party at the time. However, I didn’t see how I could appoint members of the weak opposition parties, since I was determined, if I became prime minister, to arrange things in such a way that I would be able to work quickly and effectively, whereas the opposition parties, by virtue of their makeup and traditions, made it their business not to go along with the existing system but, instead, to place as many obstacles as they could in its way. The next day I went back to the Rihab Palace and told Prince ‘Abd alIlah that I would be willing to appoint four ministers from the Constitutional Federation Party but that I wouldn’t be able to work with the other parties, since it would be too difficult for us to reach any sort of mutual understanding. At the same time, I added, I would try to appoint two members 403

404

My Memoirs

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah

of the Independence Party to secondary ministerial positions if they agreed to this arrangement. Otherwise, I would simply proceed without them. In keeping with this idea, I appointed Shakir al-Wadi, Khalil Kinnah, Dhiya’ Ja‘far, and Jamil al-Urfali, two of whom would be full ministers and two of whom would be ministers without portfolio. As for the Independence Party, my negotiations with its leading figures, first through mediators and then directly, were as laughable as they were regrettable. What happened was that I offered to appoint their party chairman, Muhammad Mahdi Kubbah, as minister of social affairs and to appoint another party member of their choosing as a minister without portfolio with the understanding that he would work in the Foreign Ministry for Arab Affairs. However, they rejected this offer and asked instead to have their party chairman be appointed deputy prime minister, and for the other two party leaders, Fa’iq al-Samurra’i and Siddiq Shanshal, to be appointed as minister of the interior and minister of foreign affairs. (This way, as they put it, the party could be certain that the state’s foreign policy was moving in the right direction!) I replied that I did not want a deputy prime minister in my cabinet lest I give more power to Salih Jabr, who would have had more right

My Third Term as Prime Minister

405

than anyone else to this position by virtue of his seniority and the fact that he was a former prime minister. Salih Jabr and I had agreed that he would be minister of the interior. Hence, there was no way that I could appoint anyone from the party as either deputy prime minister or minister of the interior, since it would not be fitting to go back on the promise I had made to Salih Jabr. As for the Foreign Ministry, I told them I had reserved it for myself along with the post of prime minister given my specialty in foreign affairs and my long experience in the field. I assured them that the state’s foreign policy would be in good hands as long as I held this post. If, on the other hand, they had no confidence in my policies or in me, then I wondered how they could agree to serve on my cabinet. I went on to say that it wouldn’t be reasonable for my cabinet to include four ministers belonging to the Constitutional Federation Party, which had more than seventy members in parliament, and three ministers from the Independence Party, which had only two members in parliament. After protracted negotiations, the party leaders eventually began to back down from their inflated demands until at last they were content with three ministerial posts, whatever they turned out to be, to be assumed by Muhammad Mahdi Kubbah, Fa’iq al-Samurra’i, and Siddiq Shanshal. By the time the negotiations were over, I had grown weary of these three men and of the process as a whole, and I made it clear to them that I couldn’t possibly give their party more than two ministerial posts. One of them replied jocularly, “So it looks as though you want to cause a split in the party!” What he meant by this was that if I appointed two of the three party leaders to my cabinet, the third might take offense, and the party might be split. It was clear now that these three men—who represented a party that, in its writings, speeches, demonstrations, and protests, claimed to be the sole repository of patriotism, pan-Arab zeal, dedication, fairness, and willingness to sacrifice—had nothing more important to worry about than who won certain ministerial posts. So I broke off the negotiations and proceeded to form my cabinet without them. I was wary of their inflammatory tactics and the impact they might have on the serious endeavors I wanted my cabinet to engage in. In other words, I feared that they might hinder our work by the fact of their having to consult periodically with individuals with whom they were connected politically and ideologically both inside and outside the country. Even so, words cannot describe the shock, the dismay, nay, the revulsion I felt when, the very next day, their party newspaper came out with huge, sensational headlines featuring these men’s strident pronouncements to the effect that they had been offered ministerial posts in my cabinet but had turned them down because their party’s patriotic principles wouldn’t allow them to be part of a cabinet run by individuals whose policies were suspect and who had the people’s blood on their hands! What a ludicrous

406

My Memoirs

stance to take! These individuals, who claimed to be fair-minded, principled patriots, had, alas, thoroughly hoodwinked many of our good-hearted, innocent, naïve students and young people. Unfortunately, Arab countries are rife with such imposters, who have contributed immeasurably to our miseries and afflictions. But how are people to know the facts and learn from them when misinformation and misleading propaganda carry the day, turning truth into falsehood and falsehood into truth, and when most people are taken in by deceptive appearances, resounding oratory, and eloquent, flowery proclamations? On February 5, 1950, I finished putting together my third cabinet, which consisted of the following individuals: Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; Salih Jabr, minister of the interior; ‘Abd al-Karim al-Azri, minister of finance; Hasan Sami Tatar, minister of justice; Shakir al-Wadi, minister of defense; ‘Abd al-Mahdi, minister of transportation and works; Dhiya’ Ja‘far, minister of the economy; Tawfiq Wahbah, minister of social affairs; Sa‘d ‘Umar, minister of education; and Hazim Shamdin Agha, Jamil al-Urfali, and Khalil Kinnah, ministers without portfolios. As usual, I included in my cabinet certain new people who had exhibited competence and dedication. The day before the official swearing-in ceremony, Nuri al-Sa‘id, head of the Royal Administrative Office, and I were meeting with the regent when, quite unexpectedly, Nuri al-Sa‘id announced that the state was in a precarious financial situation and that he sincerely doubted whether it would be able to pay its employees’ salaries for the coming month. My cabinet began its work with incompatible elements. However, by dint of determination and diplomatic skill, I managed to unify the leadership and provide the needed direction despite the difficulties we faced. Some of these difficulties were caused by the minister of the interior, Salih Jabr, who was aware that I did not need his help and that I had not wanted him on my cabinet. I had made this fact clear to him when the cabinet was first formed. However, Nuri al-Sa‘id’s testimony and statements made by Ahmad Mukhtar Baban had provided me with the needed assurance that he would not hinder any work that I felt needed to be done or any measures that needed to be taken in order to redress the state’s precarious financial situation or any other situations that called for coordination. Salih Jabr did, in fact, try to create problems for me. However, rather than doing so overtly, he would conceal his attempts in various guises. Once, for example, as a way of promoting himself, he issued instructions to certain areas of the country to send groups headed by his supporters to the capital on the pretext of congratulating the new cabinet on its appointment. The real motive behind such visits, however, was for them to express their pleasure at seeing Salih Jabr in the cabinet. Realizing immediately what was going on, I issued definitive instructions to the Ministry of the Interior

407

During Tawfiq al-Suwaydi’s third cabinet, in Baghdad in 1950. To his left sit Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah and Jamil al-Midfa‘i, and to his right sit Salih Jabr and Shakir al-Wadi. Standing behind them are Ahmad Mukhtar Baban and ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi.

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi at the signing of the Basic Technical Assistance Agreement between Iraq and the United Nations in Baghdad in 1950

408

My Memoirs

not to encourage visits by such delegations, since the cabinet members were busy carrying out their duties and had no time to receive well-wishers. Nevertheless, I was surprised one day to receive a telephone call from Salih Jabr telling me that a delegation from the Muntafiq tribal confederation headed by Shaikh Muhan al-Khayrallah had arrived in the capital. The delegation had already reached the Ministry of the Interior and wanted to congratulate me on my appointment as prime minister. When I reminded Salih Jabr of my request that he not encourage visits from this type of delegation, he replied that this particular delegation had set out before he had received my instructions. The delegation was made up of a large number of people, only a few of whom were known to me. Be that as it may, when they reached my office, they told me how grateful and happy they were over Salih Jabr’s inclusion in a cabinet for the first time since his withdrawal from governmental affairs following the Portsmouth treaty debacle. After their leader, Muhan al-Khayrallah, had said a few words in expression of the delegation’s satisfaction at seeing my cabinet take office, I replied with a few brief words of thanks, after which I pointed out to them that they had come during the agricultural growing season, and that it would make more sense for them to spend their time and energy taking care of their fields and crops. In this way, I told them, they would be doing a greater service to their country than they were by coming all the way to Baghdad just to see the prime minister. In conclusion, I said I hoped they would return home as soon as possible so as to increase their productive activity and achieve the greatest possible benefit for their country. However, I made no mention of politics. In this way I tried to make clear to others of their ilk, as well as those who had been encouraging them to make such visits, that the government did not welcome such initiatives but, rather, viewed them as a waste of time and empty propaganda.

Cabinet Initiatives My cabinet took all measures necessary to reduce state expenditures and increase revenues. In this way it was able to balance the budget and to pay all government employees’ salaries without delay. In addition, I reinstituted a practice that I adhered to whenever I served as prime minister. I announced in the newspapers that every Wednesday would be set aside as a day on which people could come to the prime minister to register complaints or appeal injustices they had suffered. Between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. on the first Wednesday thereafter, we received fourteen petitioners. I had appointed one of the cabinet’s most experienced clerks to record all pertinent points, then approach the relevant government departments (with the exception of the courts) on my behalf to obtain whatever information was necessary so that we could follow up on the complaints that had been

My Third Term as Prime Minister

409

made. The secretary was to ask those who had registered complaints to come back a week later so that he could tell them what further steps were required of them if their complaints had been found to be valid. I regret to say in this connection, however, that more than 70 percent of the complaints we received in this way turned out to be either invalid or not subject to redress in view of the fact that there was no way for anyone to intervene in the legal course they were now taking.

The Development Board One of the most important things we accomplished during my cabinet’s term in office was to pass the Development Board Act. After commencing its work in 1952–1953, the Development Board came to be known throughout the Middle East for its exemplary seriousness, organization, and accomplishments. During my third term as prime minister I headed a delegation to Cairo, where I chaired the Arab League Council in one of its most important sessions.

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi during a speech he delivered as head of the Iraqi delegation to the Arab League Council in Cairo in 1950. To his left is Sa‘d ‘Umar (Iraq), and to his right is Baha’ al-Din Tuqan (Jordan).

410

My Memoirs

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi during his days as chairman of the Arab League Council, with Mustafa Nahhas Pasha (prime minister of Egypt) and Hussein al‘Uwayni (prime minister of Lebanon), in Cairo in 1950

My cabinet worked assiduously and enthusiastically for some seven months, during which time it enjoyed an excellent reputation, especially considering the fact that the regent, who was known for being hard to please, was satisfied with the work my cabinet was doing and supported it in whatever measures it took. Throughout this time nothing happened to disturb the peace with the exception of a few trivial incidents. One such incident was the decision by the chief of police, ‘Ali Hejazi, to make a rash move that was not supported even by his closest friends. With the support of the royal court, and this in part due to his being of Hejazi origins and a faithful supporter of the Hashemite family, ‘Ali Hejazi had risen to the rank of chief of general police. He had also acquired a good deal of influence and prestige through the measures he had taken against the Communists, including publication of an encyclopedia of Communism that contained a wealth of information about Communists’ attitudes, actions, activities, and intrigues. This latter accomplishment appeared to have gone to his head, however, since he began throwing his weight around without regard for the laws to which he, like everyone else, was subject. I learned from a trusted source that one day ‘Ali Hejazi had been sitting somewhere with one of the

411

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi in Cairo in 1950 during his days as chairman of the Arab League Council with Riyadh al-Sulh (prime minister of Lebanon), Jamil Mardam (prime minister of Syria), Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, and Ghalib al-Yafi

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi in 1950 during his days as head of the Arab League Council in Cairo

412

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi delivering a speech as head of the Arab League Council in Cairo in 1950. To al-Suwaydi’s left is Sa‘d ‘Umar (a minister in Tawfiq Pasha’s cabinet), and to his right, Baha’ alDin Tuqan (minister of foreign affairs of Jordan).

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi in Cairo in 1950 during his days as chairman of the Arab League Council, with Mustafa Nahhas Pasha (prime minister of Egypt), Muhammad Salah al-Din Pasha (minister of foreign affairs of Egypt), and Baha’ al-Din Tuqan (minister of foreign affairs of Jordan)

My Third Term as Prime Minister

413

owners of the Roxy Cinema by the name of Hayawi Sawda’i and the famous singer ‘Afifah Iskandar. Addressing himself to ‘Afifah, ‘Ali Hejazi said, “Collect a thousand dinars from Hayawi.” Then he turned to Hayawi and said, “Pay ‘Afifah a thousand dinars [$3,300].” Hayawi agreed without hesitation, expressing his willingness to do so whenever ‘Afifah came to him about it. The reason for this whole thing was simply that ‘Ali had wanted to honor the lucky singer at Hayawi Sawda’i’s expense. Hence, he came across as someone who disposed of money at the dictates of his whims and occasional fits of generosity. ‘Ali Hejazi’s inflated sense of personal power led him into such a state of conceit and capriciousness that he nicknamed himself “the hero of antiCommunism.” It appears that relations between him and Salih Jabr had been strained for quite some time. Hence, when he learned that Salih Jabr was a candidate for the position of minister of the interior in my cabinet, he began working to prevent Jabr from being appointed. However, no one listened to what he had to say. When Salih Jabr’s appointment came to pass, Hejazi flew into a rage, and one night, when he was in a nightclub and had had too much to drink, some people with grievances of their own egged him on in his desire for revenge. At 12:30 a.m., just as I was about to go to bed, the telephone rang, and it was ‘Ali Hejazi. It was clear from his slurred speech that he was drunk, and he said to me, “Unless you dismiss Salih Jabr from your cabinet tomorrow, I’m going to stage a coup!” Then he hung up. I called Salih Jabr right away. He was asleep when I called, but I had people wake him up. I told him what I had heard from ‘Ali Hejazi and asked him to do whatever was necessary to deal with the situation. I called Shakir al-Wadi in his capacity as minister of defense. I informed him of what had taken place and instructed him to have the chief of police arrested forthwith. I told him to do whatever was necessary to deal with the threat Hejazi had uttered and to inform me of any new developments so that I could respond accordingly. Last, I called the Rihab Palace and asked officials there to inform the regent of what had happened as soon as he woke up, adding that the minister of defense would contact him for instructions. Within the hour I had received calls from both the minister of defense and the minister of the interior, who confirmed that ‘Ali Hejazi had been arrested and had been sent under guard to the royal court at the regent’s request. Hejazi was now being held in a room under surveillance by the royal guard, and everything was back to normal. At 4:00 a.m., the regent asked me to come to the palace, and when I arrived, I found him in his nightclothes. He described the measures that had been taken by the minister of defense as the latter had recounted them to him. He added that ‘Ali Hejazi was still being held in a room under guard and that he would see him in the morning and teach him a lesson he was sure never to forget.

414 Tawfiq al-Suwaydi in 1951 at the Arab League meeting with Khalid al-‘Azm, prime minister of Syria, and Muhammad Salah al-Din Pasha, the minister of foreign affairs of Egypt

My Third Term as Prime Minister

415

He said, “That despicable good-for-nothing exploited his ties with the royal court to the point where he thought he had the right to impose his own ideas on the government however he pleased. I’m asking the government to take all possible legal and disciplinary measures against him without delay. Maybe then Mr. Big Pants will realize how far out of line he was when he called himself a ‘hero’ and started pushing people around.” The next day I learned that the regent had not asked that ‘Ali Hejazi be brought in to see him, and that when Hejazi had requested to see the regent, he had refused to see him. Instead he had given orders for him to be sent to prison to await trial. Later that same day, the cabinet met and decided to have ‘Ali Hejazi dismissed from his position for five years pending a full investigation into his conduct, a trial before a court of law, and a verdict concerning the punishment he deserved. The reason ‘Ali Hejazi had been so furious with the minister of the interior was that he had heard that the minister had asked the cabinet to transfer him from the Central Police Station (in Baghdad) to the Sulaymaniyah Province. The minister of the interior had justified his request by saying that, given Hejazi’s unwarranted contacts with opposition figures and the open disdain he had been showing for members of the cabinet, particularly the minister of the interior, it had become impossible for Hejazi to serve as a loyal, effective assistant and guarantor of security from the Central Police Station in Baghdad. Two months or more after this event, the investigation was completed, and ‘Ali Hejazi was tried and sentenced to two years in prison. In this way the Iraqi police force and security apparatuses rid themselves of a man who, although he may have had some virtues, had more than his share of vices, from smugness and arrogance to volatility and stupidity. And as if these vices weren’t enough, he also suffered from a lack of honesty and a penchant for abuse of power, either through the use of money or by providing illicit pleasures for himself or his close friends. By now my cabinet had completed the minimum term expected of Iraqi cabinets in general in keeping with foolish customs that had developed in Iraqi political circles. In fact, it had remained in office for seven months without anything happening to undermine its stability. However, after the parliament had completed and ratified the budget, having now entered the fourth year of its constitutionally recognized term and being about to adjourn for the summer, I felt the time had come for me to speak to the regent about the difficulties I was facing because of the incompatibilities among the various members of the cabinet and the interior minister’s interference in affairs of state that fell outside his jurisdiction. From time to time he would issue instructions bordering on commands to other ministers, who would complain to me about the behavior of both the minister of the interior and the minister of finance.

416

My Memoirs

All these things had led me to reconsider the status of the cabinet. However, I first wanted to know whether the regent would agree to the immediate dissolution of parliament so that elections could be held and the parliament could convene a regular session at the beginning of the following January. If so, I could reshuffle the cabinet and appoint the needed ministers in preparation for the new elections. When secondary elections had been held some months earlier, the minister of the interior had acted as though he were prime minister, choosing whichever members of parliament he wanted on the pretext that he enjoyed personal ties with those in high places, that this or that candidate was affiliated with him in some way, and the like. In this way he had gathered about him a coterie of supporters that impacted the balance of power in parliament, which needed to be redressed through a new election that would restore the required equilibrium. After all, the current political situation called for a majority that wasn’t beholden for its existence to this or that official, but which, rather, was in a position to support the government whose head would be elected and presented to parliament by the king. The regent supported me in what I had proposed to him and agreed to the dissolution of parliament following the summer holiday, that is, at any time I chose after the month of July. However, having apparently been influenced by some sort of malicious counsel, he then began hedging on his commitment to the idea of dissolving parliament. When I noticed what was happening, I made it clear to him that I was willing to step down as prime minister if necessary if he preferred to find a more suitable solution in cooperation with someone else. Soon thereafter it was discovered that Queen ‘Alia was seriously ill, on account of which the regent was obliged to leave straightaway for London, and, as a consequence, we were unable to settle the matter. I later learned that Nuri al-Sa‘id, who had also gone to London to visit the ailing Queen ‘Alia and offer his assistance, had spoken with the regent about the anticipated cabinet crisis. He told the regent that if I were to form the cabinet, I would not appoint Salih Jabr, which might not be in the government’s best interests, and that the best solution would be for him to form the cabinet and to bring both me and Salih Jabr on board with him. Persuaded by Nuri’s arguments, the regent sent a telegram to Deputy Crown Prince Zayd, telling him that I had tendered my resignation and asking him to accept my resignation and to inform him once this had been done. Prince Zayd communicated the contents of the telegram to me, whereupon I submitted my resignation and it was accepted. Prince Zayd then informed the regent of what had transpired. The regent then issued instructions for Nuri al-Sa‘id to be appointed prime minister with the understanding that he would appoint both me and Salih Jabr to his cabinet. Nuri al-Sa‘id returned to Baghdad and was appointed to form the new cabinet. When he contacted me, I told him I wasn’t willing to serve on his cabinet, especially if he

My Third Term as Prime Minister

417

expected to appoint Salih Jabr to a ministerial post as well. He pressed me to accept, but I refused. At the same time, I wanted Nuri to see that if Salih Jabr served on his cabinet, he would hinder its performance. If Salih Jabr was appointed, he would not be willing to enter Nuri’s cabinet alone, but was sure to ask that ‘Abd al-Mahdi be appointed along with him. I told Nuri, “If you want your cabinet’s affairs to run smoothly, it would be better for you to spare yourself the problems Salih Jabr would be sure to cause you.” However, he didn’t listen to what I had to say. Instead, he invited Salih to meet with him and appointed him to the post of deputy prime minister. Surprised, Salih asked whether I would agree to this, and I replied that I would. Reassured on this point, he suggested that ‘Abd al-Mahdi also be appointed to the new cabinet, but Nuri rejected the suggestion and offered a number of reasons for his refusal. Not satisfied with the reasons Nuri had adduced, Salih pressed his case, but Nuri remained adamant. Salih asked to be given an hour in which to make a final decision, and then left with a gloomy look on his face. Not long thereafter, he called Nuri and told him he would not be serving on his cabinet. Given what had just transpired, I berated Nuri for this unworkable plan of his, telling him that he wasn’t willing to listen to sound advice. “This being the case,” I said, “count me out of this new cabinet of yours.” Then I left. It was a hard thing for Nuri al-Sa‘id to pass up a chance to form a cabinet. So, after having been turned down by both Salih Jabr and me, he appointed Ahmad Mukhtar Baban as his deputy prime minister, thereby ensuring the support of the royal court. He then proceeded to fill the other slots in his cabinet with second-rate individuals whom he could count on to do whatever he said. He then went on to give leadership to a cabinet that managed to stay in office for over two years. If the truth be told, this cabinet of Nuri al-Sa‘id’s accomplished a great deal in the fields of both legislation and the economy, especially once oil revenues began making their way into the state treasury. The Development Board also achieved a number of significant goals, including the construction and maintenance of Iraq’s oil refinery. As I see it, the reason for this cabinet’s prodigious output was precisely the fact that none of its ministers was a senior politician, which made it possible for Nuri al-Sa‘id to run the affairs of state by fiat, with full assurance that his ministers would carry out his instructions without question. Nor should it be forgotten that the presence of Ahmad Mukhtar Baban in the post of deputy prime minister spared Nuri many of the difficulties that might have arisen between him and the royal court given the favor and influence Baban enjoyed with the regent. During this long-lived cabinet of Nuri al-Sa‘id’s there was a military coup in Egypt that led to the overthrow of King Farouk and the establishment

418

My Memoirs

of a military dictatorship whose attitudes differed notably from those of the previous Egyptian government. The former government had tried to avoid problems with Arab League member states. When the earlier government’s aims or attitudes were at odds with those of other states, it strove either not to make them known or to put them across in a way that was neither violent nor defiant. As for the new, revolutionary government, it clearly had a different approach, as it would take unilateral measures and then insist that they be accepted by other Arab states. If any of these states happened to criticize Egypt’s measures or strategies, it was accused of betraying the sacred Arab cause and failing to join the Arab march toward progress. The Egyptian military regime at that time was still in its infancy, and its manner of relating to other Arab states had not yet taken on the aggressive, strident tone that was to become its hallmark in later years. Nevertheless, the bombastic Egyptian propaganda that claimed to champion the causes of “liberation” and the granting of freedoms to Arab peoples, as well as the radio broadcasts that came out of Cairo—both of which bespoke an alleged determination to bolster the “democratic” spirit—strengthened the position of Communism in Egypt and other Arab countries and, in so doing, prompted subversive elements to broaden the scope of their activity. None of this sat well at all with Nuri al-Sa‘id, who expressed his readiness to take stern measures against the Communists. However, not one of the many politicians in Iraq at that time supported him in this policy. On the contrary, they adduced numerous cogent reasons for their unwillingness to assist Nuri alSa‘id in carrying out such a policy on the ground.

Mustafa al-‘Umari Nuri al-Sa‘id was now faced with two options: he could employ force against the Communists and the opposition figures who, in essence, differed little from each other, since they all shared in the desire to destroy the existing regime and establish another in its place, or he could leave it to others to resolve the conundrum in whatever way they could. In the end he chose the second option and withdrew. He was then succeeded by Mustafa al-‘Umari, who formed a cabinet that was said to be passionate to protect freedoms and to open the way for political activity of all sorts, including Communist activities and those of other parties that, though they differed from Communism in name, nevertheless shared in its seditious aims. In fact, however, the new cabinet was a tumbledown affair marked primarily by weakness, disunity, and a lack of awareness, courage, boldness, and initiative. I had said what I thought about the new prime minister before he formed the cabinet, and about the cabinet as a whole thereafter. I had warned that a cabinet of this type would bring disaster in its wake, but

My Third Term as Prime Minister

419

my words fell on deaf ears. It wasn’t long, however, before the facts began coming to light and my prophecies began to be fulfilled as the ongoing, organized Communist demonstrations became more violent by the day. The minister of the interior, Husam al-Din Jum‘ah, informed the prime minister that he had instructed the police not to use arms against the demonstrators, which encouraged the Communists to be even bolder and more persistent than before. When the new ministers discovered that their appointments involved not only an honor bestowed but, in addition, risks and responsibilities, a spirit of discontent began to make its way through their ranks. It began with the minister of finance, Ibrahim al-Shabandar; it, then spread to his colleagues, including, of course, al-‘Umari himself. One day during the ongoing unrest, he tendered his resignation and pressed the powers that be to accept it without delay. When he was told that he would need to remain in his post for a short time until a new cabinet had been formed, he promised to do so. However, he went back on his promise and announced his resignation over the radio before it had been officially accepted, which led to further deterioration in the security situation. A group of politicians then met at the Rihab Palace in keeping with tradition. There ensued lengthy, exhausting discussions that consumed nearly the entire night, yet without leading to any definitive outcome, since every suggestion that was made met with opposition of one sort or another. Eventually, Jamil al-Midfa‘i was appointed prime minister and went to work straightaway choosing the members of his cabinet. When he chose Nuri al-Sa‘id as minister of defense, the whispers and winks began, which were followed by individual contacts among the members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Within barely an hour of these events, al-Midfa‘i announced that he would have to postpone forming the cabinet till the next day, at which time he would consult with party leaders, then finish putting his cabinet together. This sudden decision was certain not to serve the public interest in the slightest degree given the fact that the riots had gone on until sunset and were sure to begin even more fiercely the next morning, thereby making the formation of the cabinet even less likely. Consequently, his announcement was met with stunned silence. Meanwhile, Mustafa al-‘Umari, who was pressing more and more urgently to have the new cabinet formed as quickly as possible, was growing more restive by the minute. Seeing the state he was in, I said to him in everyone’s hearing, “For years you worked to tear down every cabinet that took office so that you could come to power. And now here you are, in the driver’s seat at last, and what do you do? You run away from your responsibility! Why are you in such a hurry? For the sake of the common good? Because you’re a coward? Or what?” When, the following day, things continued in an uproar, al-Midfa‘i consulted with the political parties’ leading figures, who were delighted with

420

My Memoirs

this turn of events and gleeful over the widespread destruction. They told him, in effect, that they had no way of halting the tide, and that those who had assumed responsibility for affairs would have to handle things however they saw fit. Having heard this, al-Midfa‘i excused himself and withdrew.

An Emergency Cabinet Soon thereafter, the regent appointed Marshal Nur al-Din Mahmud, army chief of staff, to form an emergency cabinet. Nur al-Din forthwith declared martial law and issued orders for certain army divisions to patrol the streets, as a result of which the situation grew calmer immediately and things returned to normal. Then a royal decree was issued calling for the dissolution of parliament and for new elections to be held under the supervision of the emergency cabinet. Stern measures were taken against subversives and anarchists and, after a troubled week during which a curfew was imposed, then lifted, the country began to witness a greater degree of stability.

24 The Era of King Faisal II

~

A Nationalist Cabinet Unfortunately, the success with which Marshal Nur al-Din’s efforts had been met went to his head, and he began to believe that he was the savior who had delivered the country from perdition. Oblivious to the law, he began taking advantage of his position by promoting certain small-minded individuals to positions for which they were woefully unqualified. When he was told that such a practice was illegal, he would say, in effect, “Wasn’t it I who brought the country out of its time of tribulation and set it on its feet again? In reward for the glorious feats I’ve performed, I deserve to be allowed to do things however I please.” In short, Marshal Nur al-Din had set out to control the affairs of state in ways that were entirely unwarranted. When his mission had been completed and the regent suggested to him that he withdraw with compensation (he had been rewarded for his efforts with an appointment to the Senate after he had been on the verge of retirement), his response was an ominous refusal to step down. Realizing the gravity of the situation, the regent hastily put together a nationalist cabinet under the leadership of Jamil al-Midfa‘i, whose members included ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Nuri al-Sa‘id, me, and a significant number of forward-looking nationalist elements. The date was January 29, 1953, and it was during this period of time that the new Lebanese president, Camille Chamoun, paid an official visit to Iraq.

King Faisal II’s Era The most significant event to take place during this cabinet’s term in office was King Faisal II’s assumption of his constitutional powers on May 2, 421

422

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as Iraq’s deputy prime minister in the royal family’s automobile with Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah and President Camille Chamoun, of Lebanon, during his official visit to Iraq in 1953

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon during his visit to Baghdad in 1953

The Era of King Faisal II

423

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, during President Camille Chamoun’s official visit to Baghdad in 1953, with King Faisal II and Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah

1953. This event brought an end to the executorship of King Faisal II’s maternal uncle, Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, which had witnessed so many major developments in Iraq, in the Arab world, and on the international scene. In this connection I will allow myself to divulge a piece of information that I have kept secret for many years. For some time after King Faisal II formally assumed his duties as Iraq’s monarch, I, like many others, would occasionally hear reports to the effect that Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah was still behaving as though he were king or regent and pursuing certain policies of his own that were the cause of great resentment on the popular level. After some effort on my part, I managed to persuade Muhammad al-Sadr and Jamil al-Midfa‘i to attend a secret meeting with the prince. The purpose of the meeting was to persuade the prince to leave Iraq, as an ambassador to England or the United States, for example, in order to open the way for King Faisal II to exercise his constitutional powers uninfluenced by his uncle and his directives. I believed that in this way, the young monarch would be better able to win the people’s confidence and trust. When we had all gathered and I opened the conversation, Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah was visibly offended and dismissed the idea. I later heard from Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, who was head of the Royal Administrative Office at that time, that before leaving the Baghdad Airport for one of his final trips abroad, Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah had called Ahmad Mukhtar over to his side and, speaking in a whisper, told him that he might

424

King Faisal II, bin Ghazi bin Faisal I bin al-Hussein

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Muhammad al-Sadr (center) and Jamil al-Midfa‘i (left)

The Era of King Faisal II

425

not be returning to Iraq. He did return, however, and pursued the same policies as he always had until events took a decided turn for the worse. By dint of diligent, lively effort, Jamil al-Midfa‘i’s nationalist cabinet succeeded in establishing an atmosphere of stability and calm in the country during its seven months in office. The cabinet would have been able to pursue its work for a longer period of time had it not been for the prime minister’s sensitivities and his proneness to be swayed by the simplest, most trivial matters. This was due in part to the fact that he was under the influence of his minister of the interior, Husam al-Din Jum‘ah, who based his actions on hearsay more than he did on solid facts and concerns. One of the foreign affairs–related issues that confronted our cabinet was the defense of the area that consists of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq from the Russian forces that faced them. This region had come to be known as the “empty front,” and there was an ongoing discussion of how to fill it by mustering the forces needed to complete the line of defense that ran from Pakistan to Turkey, and which was interrupted in the center by Iran.

The Empty Front The Americans and the British had thought of completing the line of defense that was broken in Iran, and which they referred to as the “empty front,” by introducing Iran into the plan that Turkey had created with Pakistan, then supporting the aforementioned line of defense with a rear line that would include Iraq and Syria. This rear line of defense would reach the Suez Canal on its western end via Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In the southeast, they would thus have formed a closed circle that began from the Indian Ocean with Pakistan in the southeast and ended with Saudi Arabia and the British protectorates, forming a ring of countries that would be easy to employ in defense if the need arose. The empty front’s rear line of defense was termed “the Western line.” In order to facilitate discussion of these matters, the US ambassadors to the Near and Middle East met for two days in Istanbul with British ambassadors in the same regions. I learned from US ambassador Edward Savage Crocker II that the task of coordinating the western line had been assigned to Britain, which bore responsibility for contacting the relevant states. In response, I made clear to Crocker that Iraq would not accept the mediation of any third state between itself and the United States, and that if there was a need to exchange views on the western line as it pertained to Iraq’s interests, the United States would have to contact Iraq directly, without British mediation, and clarify its plans in this connection. I stressed these points to the US ambassador in such a way that he would realize that I hadn’t simply mentioned them in passing. I then asked

426

My Memoirs

him to pass on what I had said to his government and to the British ambassador to Iraq so that they would all be aware of what we were thinking. He assured me that he would speak with the British ambassador about the matter. However, in order to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of the British ambassador, who might conclude that some sort of special arrangement had been made between me and the US government, he suggested that I speak to the British ambassador and explain my point of view. Hence, I asked to see the British ambassador, Sir John Troutbeck. I told Troutbeck what I had said to the US ambassador and asked him to convey these things to the British government. The position I had taken with the US ambassador had a powerful impact on US officials in Washington, DC, and a few days later, the US ambassador came to me and informed me that his government would be sending military experts to discuss matters relating to the western line with Iraqi government and military authorities. About two months after the Iraqi prime minister resigned in September 1953, Burton Berry, the US ambassador who had succeeded Crocker, asked to meet me in my home. When he arrived, he informed me that my efforts to bring about direct, unmediated communication between Iraq and the United States had been successful and that Class A military assistance, the same type that was being allotted to Turkey, would now be extended unconditionally to Iraq as well. He congratulated me on this achievement, which had come about through my initiative despite the fact that at that time I held no government post.

Fadil al-Jamali’s Cabinet Jamil al-Midfa‘i was succeeded by Fadil al-Jamali, who proceeded to put together a new cabinet. In doing so, Fadil al-Jamali committed the first of a number of blunders by appointing young men who were fresh out of university so that, as he put it, his “cabinet” could stage a white revolution. As it turned out, however, these young graduates were championing not the reform that was being sought by those with a true grasp of the facts on the ground but, rather, the spread of mayhem in any way possible. Their appointment to al-Jamali’s cabinet led to factory strikes of various types and all manner of sabotage and destruction. Hence, their so-called revolution was bound to be nothing but a grand riot, be it white or red. One of the factors that contributed to these workers’ movements and opened the way for Communist activities was the presence of such young graduates in the cabinet and their enthusiasm for a kind of “reform” the nature and extent of which they had not defined. The workers’ movements in the Basra Oil Company were echoed in workers’ circles in the Iraq Petroleum Company, tobacco companies, and others. When the companies’ directors and owners

The Era of King Faisal II

427

appealed to Hasan ‘Abd al-Rahman, the minister of social affairs, who was viewed as an authority on workers’ affairs, he simply advised them to do whatever they could to appease the workers and keep them quiet by treating them with flexibility and tolerance. What he had failed to notice was that these were the very workers who had destroyed parts of the factories as well as their most essential machinery and equipment. However, Hasan ‘Abd al-Rahman was not a Communist but, on the contrary, was said to be a rightist nationalist with a university degree. It was clear that al-Jamali would not be able to establish any kind of influence for himself in his cabinet unless the actions of his ministers were well coordinated and harmonious. Instead, however, every one of them was essentially acting autonomously, and would deliver speeches and issue statements that were entirely inconsistent with a spirit of shared responsibility. Then, in cooperation with his minister of the interior, Sa‘id al-Qazzaz; his minister of finance, ‘Abd al-Karim al-Azri; and his friend Salih Jabr, the prime minister began to focus more on drawing attention to the Syrian issue than on domestic affairs. In this connection I recall the following events: During my term as minister of foreign affairs in Jamil al-Midfa‘i’s 1953 coalition cabinet, I was sent on a mission to Cairo where I was to chair the Arab League Council on Iraq’s behalf. On my way to Cairo I stayed for two days in Damascus, where I found conditions to be deplorable. The al-Shishakli regime was at the peak of its animosity toward Iraq at the time, and the Iraqi embassy in Damascus was surrounded by spies who tracked the movements of everyone who frequented the premises. During my time in Damascus I received a visit from Sa‘id Haydar, who had been my friend for many years. I asked him how things were in Syria. “Unbearable,” he replied. “Do the people want to free themselves from the rule of these miserable butchers and dictators?” I asked. “Of course they do,” he replied. “If so,” I said, “then you need to contact influential people and tell them that if they want to liberate their country from this band of thieves, Iraq will supply them with money and arms. The only thing Iraq hopes to gain from their liberation is to see its sister state, Syria, achieve peace and stability and rule itself through its upstanding citizenry.” Then I added, “I’m going to Cairo, and in a week’s time I’ll be in Beirut. If you manage to make contact with people of influence and explain the matter to them and if they agree to work to overthrow the tyrants that rule them, come to Beirut and tell me about it.” As I had told Sa‘id Haydar I would, I spent a week in Cairo, then returned to Beirut. Once I was back in Beirut, Sa‘id Haydar came to meet me there and reported to me on the contacts he had made with Syria’s opposition

428

My Memoirs

leaders, foremost among them Hashim al-Atasi, as well as a good number of other individuals whom I knew for the valuable service they had offered to the Arab cause. He told me that these men were prepared to go to work and to receive assistance from Iraq. I then made my way back to Baghdad, where I explained the situation to the prime minister, Jamil al-Midfa‘i, the leading members of his cabinet, and Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, all of whom were completely supportive of the stance I had taken. However, al-Midfa‘i’s cabinet did not remain in office for long after these contacts had been made. Instead, al-Midfa‘i insisted on resigning and his cabinet was succeeded by that of Fadil al-Jamali. Al-Jamali’s cabinet followed up on this issue by contacting Hashim alAtasi and his supporters and completing the arrangement described above. This in turn encouraged these men to convene a conference in Homs in which they denounced the then-existing regime and enumerated its weak points. Led by Salih Jabr and ‘Abd al-Karim al-Azri, the Iraqi government proceeded to make good on the promises it had made to Hashim al-Atasi and his men by supplying them with funds, rations, firearms, and equipment. There thus emerged a powerful movement—based in Homs and supported by Aleppo—which uprooted the al-Shishakli regime and turned over the reins of power to the legitimate president of the republic, Hashim alAtasi, and his comrades. As for the exact sums Syria received from Iraq and the amounts of arms and equipment with which it was supplied, I was not privy to such information, since by that time I was no longer a government official. However, I learned sometime later from the Iraqi embassy in Beirut that the sums it had received for the purpose of funneling them to the appropriate parties in Syria came to no more than 170,000 Iraqi dinars (which at the time was the equivalent of $561,000). In the aftermath of these events I stopped concerning myself with what was happening in Syria, since the changes that ensued in Syrian domestic policy were so numerous and varied that it was difficult for someone following events from the outside to monitor and interpret them properly.

Memories of Syria However, while I’m on the subject of Syria, I have some interesting, albeit bittersweet, memories of the country. Once when I was on an official visit to Damascus, I noticed that I was being watched by the infamous Syrian secret service, and the surveillance to which I was being subjected was both suffocating and inappropriate. One day I was riding in a car belonging to Syria’s prime minister, who was sitting next to me, when I noticed that we were being followed rather aggressively.

The Era of King Faisal II

429

Turning to the prime minister, I said, “Is it you that’s being watched, Mr. Prime Minister, or is it me?” To which he replied, “It’s both me and you, Pasha!” In March 1951, Syria’s military strongman Adib al-Shishakli was at the peak of his hostility toward Iraq and had formed alliances with Iraq’s enemies. However, when Syria became the target of Israeli attacks and came to Iraq for help, Iraq responded without hesitation, supplying Syria with everything it needed by way of aircraft, artillery, troops, and equipment. It was during this same period of time that the Arab League Council held a meeting in Damascus at which I headed the Iraqi delegation in my capacity as deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. One day during the time when the council was meeting, al-Shishakli paid me a visit in which he thanked me for the assistance Iraq had extended to Syria in its time of need and expressed his regret for the way he had attacked Iraq and its policies. Akram al-Hurani—the first or, at least, one of the first people to sow the destructive seeds of Socialism in Arab lands and set off the first sparks of class hatred—once met with me privately in Syria. When we met, he began assailing the Baghdad Pact with such ferocity that I concluded that he must not be aware of its contents. So I said to him, “Tell me, have you read the pact?” And he admitted that he hadn’t.

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi as head of the Iraqi delegation to the Arab League Council meeting held in Damascus in 1951

430

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam Pasha, head of the Arab League in Damascus (Adib al-Shishakli, president of Syria, appears behind them)

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Hashim al-Atasi, president of Syria; Hussein al-‘Uwayni, prime minister of Lebanon; and Dr. Muhammad Salah al-Din Pasha, minister of foreign affairs of Egypt, during the meeting held by the Arab League Council in Damascus in 1951

The Era of King Faisal II

431

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi in Beirut with Prime Minister Hussein al-‘Uwayni of Lebanon, Prime Minister Hamid Zaki Pasha of Egypt, Foreign Minister Dr. Muhammad Salah al-Din Pasha of Egypt, President (Shaikh) Bisharah al-Khuri of Lebanon, and Prime Minister Khalid al-‘Azm of Syria as guests of Lebanon’s president of the republic after the Arab League Council meeting held in Damascus in 1951

So I upbraided him, saying, “If you consider yourself to be a leader, don’t your followers have the right to have you read the text of this agreement that you’ve so royally lambasted? Otherwise, how can you claim that your judgment on it is that of an informed politician who realizes his patriotic responsibilities?” He told me that Iraq’s entry into an alliance that included Britain was sufficient reason for Syria not to enter into a federation with Iraq. “So,” I asked, “if we cancelled our alliance with Britain or excluded Britain from it, would you work to achieve the federation?” He replied, “I would discuss the matter with my coworkers in the party, and then I would give you an answer!” Then he added, “Iraq is ruled by a monarchy, but we have a republic.” “I will have you know,” I retorted, “that as an Iraqi government official, I have been given complete authorization by the royal family to declare, in their name and to whom it may concern, that they are fully prepared to abdicate the throne and make Iraq into a republic if their rule is a hindrance on the path to achieving an Iraqi-Syrian union.” Taken by surprise, he said, “I’ll discuss the matter with my coworkers and tell you what we’ve concluded.” However, he never told me anything, of course, since he, like others who flaunt their alleged aspirations for Arab unity but don’t mean a word

432

My Memoirs

they say, wasn’t really serious about the idea and didn’t want to see it carried out in any sort of concrete terms. What I told him about the authorization I had received from the royal family was true, in fact. This matter was raised in Fadil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi’s court, and I affirm it here for the sake of posterity.

The Ending of Fadil al-Jamali’s Cabinet As for al-Jamali and his supporters, they busied themselves so thoroughly with events in Syria that they had no time for domestic affairs. Alarmed by this imbalance, the parliament was stirred up against the cabinet for what it perceived as its negligence toward Iraq’s own people and its failure to devote the necessary attention to domestic needs and issues. The parliament’s resentment toward the new cabinet was exacerbated by the fact that when it took office, it had announced its determination to stage a “white revolution.” In fact, however, it achieved nothing but anarchy and decay in the state apparatus as a result of sheer neglect. In one particularly rowdy session of parliament, representatives were launching such fierce attacks on the cabinet that the prime minister concluded that any move his cabinet made, if it required the parliament’s confidence, would bring it nothing but disaster. So he went to the royal court and made it clear to the crown prince that his cabinet had no choice but to resign due to a lack of support from parliament, and the resignation was accepted. Observers saw the lack of mutual understanding between the cabinet and the parliament as a result of the parliament’s dissatisfaction with measures that had been taken by certain ministers. They thus concluded that replacing these ministers with others might be in the country’s best interests. However, since al-Jamali had offered assistance to Syria that had brought the latter out of a troubling crisis and achieved a dazzling victory for Iraqi policy in Syria, it was feared that it would not be in Iraq’s best interest to release the prime minister so hastily and replace him with someone else. Following his resignation, therefore, it was decided to reappoint him to form a new cabinet. What al-Jamali’s defenders had failed to notice was that his weakness as prime minister had resulted not from things done by his cabinet members, whether domestically or internationally, but, rather, from weak leadership skills. Even the developments that had taken place in Syria, and which had been viewed as a victory for Iraqi policy there, had not come about as a result of the prime minister’s efforts alone but, rather, had resulted from the cooperation of the minister of the interior, Sa‘id alQazzaz, and the minister of finance, ‘Abd al-Karim al-Azri. In fact, the prime minister had not even been informed of the details of all the measures

The Era of King Faisal II

433

that had been taken by the Iraqi government at that time. Hence, when alJamali set about to form a new cabinet, he ended up replacing ministers right and left, but all to no avail. His second cabinet found it impossible to function and was obliged to resign within around two months. For the record, it should not be forgotten that it was al-Jamali’s first cabinet that concluded the foreign aid agreement with the United States of America, an agreement that brought significant benefit to Iraq, since it stipulated no conditions that would have restricted Iraq’s freedom or its ability to work toward preserving its national interests. Nuri al-Sa‘id’s long-standing policy had been not to allow any significant period of time to go by without his occupying some official government post. If necessity required him not to take on official responsibilities for a period of time, he would facilitate the appointment of someone else, be he experienced or new to the political scene. Then he and his supporters would take the incumbent prime minister and his cabinet to task for the slightest mistake so that, when people began to see that he would need to take office again, the royal court would be obliged to approach him with a request to return. From this position of strength he would stall and hesitate, which would cause the court to insist all the more urgently on his return. Finally, as he prepared to take office again, he would begin stipulating conditions and imposing his will on the royal court in the name of reform or improvement. Then, promises in hand, he would take office armed with a wealth of broad-ranging powers and plans in the making, which would help him to remain in power on the pretext that the reforms he was implementing required him to remain at the helm for as long as possible.

Nuri al Sa‘id Returns to Power After al-Jamali’s resignation, Nuri al-Sa‘id was assigned to form a new cabinet. He appointed members of his Constitutional Federation Party who he believed would carry out his orders without question. When Nuri Pasha’s new cabinet set to work, it accomplished a great deal. One of the things that contributed to the breadth of this cabinet’s activity and influence was its interest in the Development Board and in passing numerous laws having to do with taxes, the press, political parties, and other matters. In fact, this cabinet of Nuri al-Sa‘id’s, which remained in office for nearly three years, was responsible for the passing of an unprecedented volume of legislation. Nuri Pasha would give the orders and his ministers would rush to carry them out, as a result of which things got done with speed and efficiency. Nuri al-Sa‘id’s cabinet had more strengths than weaknesses, although its weaknesses were publicized more widely. Be that as it may, Nuri al-Sa‘id’s

434

My Memoirs

influence over the government and its various institutions had now reached its zenith. People used to quip that he enriched whomever he pleased and impoverished whomever he pleased, and that he was capable of all things! This fact was exploited by opportunistic individuals who were close to Nuri Pasha. His son, Sabah, came to be a heavy burden on his family, besmirching its reputation by associating with ne’er-do-wells whom he welcomed unthinkingly into his father’s sphere of influence. Thanks to their sycophantic overtures to Nuri Pasha and his son, such individuals amassed unimaginable influence, power, and wealth. If the truth be told, most of Nuri al-Sa‘id’s downfalls related somehow to his son Sabah, who engaged in activities that reflected badly on his father and that the latter would never have approved, including Sabah’s womanizing and his mixing with ruffians who were good at nothing but inciting people’s ire. There was, for example, the story of Khalil Lalo and “the jockeys,” as well as rumors that circulated about a number of his ministerial appointees.

25 The Baghdad Pact

~

The Baghdad Pact began as a simple reciprocal cooperation agreement concluded by Nuri al-Sa‘id and Adnan Menderes of Turkey. When Turkish prime minister Adnan Menderes made his first visit to Baghdad in 1955, during which he was treated to a warm reception, he did his utmost to conclude an agreement with Iraq resembling the one that had been concluded previously between Pakistan and Turkey. However, Nuri al-Sa‘id hesitated to take such a step before laying the groundwork for the pact with other Arab states in keeping with the terms of the Arab League charter. I remember well how, when Adnan Menderes suggested such an agreement to Nuri al-Sa‘id during his visit to Baghdad, Nuri drew back, being clearly apprehensive of entering into any sort of commitment with Turkey. However, Menderes pressed the issue even to the point of pleading. He desperately wanted to get something down on paper so that when he returned home, he wouldn’t be faced with malicious glee on the part of his opponents and criticism on the part of his friends, especially after Nuri had promised to conclude an agreement sometime earlier. The content of the “reciprocal cooperation” document that was drafted in the beginning consisted of a mere two articles, neither of which imposed any obligation or responsibility on anyone. When Nuri al-Sa‘id consulted about it with a number of leading personalities, someone commented that what Adnan Menderes was proposing was actually lighter than water, since it contained nothing that involved any sort of responsibility, be it material or otherwise. What harm could there be, then, in a few inconsequential paragraphs that would have essentially no effect on either state? As fate would have it, however, these two “inconsequential” articles came to have far greater weight and significance than they had been intended to have, as 435

436

My Memoirs

the “reciprocal cooperation” of which the agreement spoke came to be understood by its opponents in various Arab states as an “alliance.” Neither Nuri al-Sa‘id nor those who took part with him in this process, be they ministers in his cabinet or political figures whose counsel and support he received, had initially looked upon this document as having the force of an alliance or treaty. Rather, they had simply wanted to help improve relations between Iraq and Turkey and to bring about a better understanding between the two countries. After all, Turkey was Iraq’s neighbor to the north, and mutual understanding between the two neighbors was bound to be of great benefit in protecting Iraq’s interests, including secure borders, internal stability, and the possibility of securing Turkey’s support for the Palestinian cause. If this document developed into something more powerful and the Arab states became signatories to it, it might help to fill the gap on the Iranian-Russian front. Hence, despite the simplicity of this document in Iraq’s estimation, it was destined to open up a new way in which the West could achieve a long-cherished hope, namely, that of concluding a mutual defense pact in the Middle East. Since Iraq’s refusal to ratify the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948 negotiated at Portsmouth by Ernest Bevin and Salih Jabr, Iraq had begun to demand more and more insistently that the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty be abrogated. Hence, in the event that the negotiations between Britain and Iraq reached a point that justified the nullification of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and its replacement with Britain’s entry into the Iraq-Turkey reciprocal cooperation agreement, neighboring states, both Arab and non-Arab, could then be encouraged to sign it as well, which would in turn help to reinforce the front facing Russia. After Britain agreed to the termination of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, withdrew some of its remaining air forces, and handed the two air bases in Habbaniyah and Sha‘biyah over to the Iraqi government, Pakistan signed the agreement. Sometime later, after some hesitation, Iran decided to sign it, which brought the number of signatories to more than three. The pact’s ministerial council held its first meeting in Baghdad and decided to call the agreement “the Baghdad Pact” in recognition of the efforts Iraq had exerted toward developing the initial document of reciprocal cooperation into a full-fledged pact that would help regulate international efforts toward ensuring stability and peace in the Middle Eastern region. Those who initiated the reciprocal cooperation project had intended to bring the Arab states into it in order to expand the front with Russia until it extended as far as Suez in the west and the Indian Ocean in the south. However, the struggle for dominance in which Arab leaders had embroiled themselves had caused the Arab states to hold back on signing the original reciprocal cooperation document, as well as the Baghdad Pact. The longstanding Saudi-Hashemite rivalries and resentments, not to mention Arab

The Baghdad Pact

437

leaders’ selfish whims and ambitions, all contributed to this odious mix to the point where the Baghdad Pact was being portrayed without reason as a major crime that Iraq had perpetrated against the Arab states’ dignity and autonomy. I contacted numerous leading Arabs and questioned them about the blind hatred they had been fomenting, and I found, to my great sorrow, that they weren’t even aware of what the original reciprocal cooperation document had said, not to mention its evolution into the Baghdad Pact. At the same time, they insisted on referring to it as the Baghdad Alliance, their motive being to play up the alleged dangers it posed and to present it as a partnership that had placed Iraq at the mercy of Western nations and excluded it from the Arab “procession,” as though this highly touted “Arab procession” was something they had achieved themselves through their cooperation as members of the Arab League. How ironic that they should engage in such doublespeak when the Arab League in which they took such pride had become a modern-day Tower of Babel where confusion and division were the order of the day, and whose leaders dictated their own whims and desires to member states, persuading them through threats and promises to move in whichever directions would best serve their own interests. And woe to anyone who failed to keep pace with the runaway Arab bandwagon that had careened so wildly off the path of nobility and brotherhood. Once during the days when I was visiting Cairo on a regular basis in my capacity as chairman of the Arab League’s Standing Financial and Economic Committee, I received a visit from my friend and former student, Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, who by then served as a Saudi minister who enjoyed favor and influence with the Saudi monarch. Shaikh Yusuf reminded me that the day he had come to see me—the same day when the Baghdad Pact’s ministerial council was to hold its first meeting—was “a black day” for the Arabs. He then launched into a diatribe against the Iraqi government newspaper, headed at that time by Nuri al-Sa‘id, for taking up the cause of the Baghdad Pact (which he referred to as “the Baghdad Alliance”). After sitting quietly through his impassioned lament over Iraq and the Baghdad Pact, I said, “Actually, I hadn’t noticed that today was the day when the Baghdad Pact’s ministerial council was to meet. Be that as it may, you view this day as a black one in the history of the Arabs. I’ve always regarded you as an astute, highly intelligent politician. But what you just said makes me wonder how you could fail to notice the dazzling victory Iraq achieved today. Have malice and envy so blinded you that you now turn the facts on their heads, making truth out to be falsehood and refusing to listen to reason? What happened in Baghdad today was one of the most glorious events the city has witnessed since the golden age of Harun al-Rashid. On this day, Baghdad received Britain’s prime minister and foreign secretary; the prime ministers and foreign ministers of Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran; and

438

My Memoirs

the US secretary of state, whose prestige extends the world over. All these individuals, together with their respective escorts, came to our capital of their own accord and undoubtedly felt honored to be present in the general headquarters of the Baghdad Pact, so named in honor of the noble efforts expended by Iraq toward ensuring better relations with its neighbors and benefactors. “Tell me, if you can, what you know about this pact, whose signing has, in your estimation, turned this day into a ‘black day’ in the history of the Arabs. Have you studied it? How many minutes of your precious time have you spent reading what it has to say? Have you read the two brief articles whose framers originally referred to them as ‘the document of reciprocal cooperation’ between Turkey and Iraq? Where are the clandestine arrangements that you and others claim to be hidden between the lines of this document and which, in your envy and resentment, you view as a reason to pity your poor Iraqi brethren? I personally had no part in drafting this pact. But as an Iraqi who realizes what kind of situation his country is in, I support it without reservation. This document represents neither a confederation nor an alliance. Rather, it is simply an expression of Iraq’s willingness to work for mutual understanding; to decry the destructive, godless Communist front; and to defend its territory and its dignity should it come under attack by any foreign power. If such a power were Communist, Iraq’s readiness to defend itself would be all the more unyielding, since it recognizes Communism as an enemy to its national identity, its religion, its heritage, its traditions, and its freedom. “This, in sum, is what the Baghdad Pact is all about. And just as, through this pact, Iraq has demonstrated its goodwill toward the West and its readiness to defend itself, the West, for its part, is supplying Iraq free of charge, and unconditionally, with everything it needs by way of arms, ammunition, and technical assistance to sustain and support its army and police force. As a result, Iraq’s army now ranks among the finest in the Arab world and the wider Middle East. From the day Iraq evinced its willingness to pursue mutual understanding with the West, it has been the recipient of the best British tanks, access to which is restricted to the finest armies in Europe, as well as the most modern artillery and transport vehicles. Add to this the free publicity Iraq has received as an advanced nation that has, among other things, achieved social justice and improved the lot of its poorer classes in terms of health, education, and housing. So I ask you, Shaikh Yusuf, is there any justification for the attacks you and other Arab leaders are launching on Iraq’s domestic and foreign policy? Iraq is engaged in an ongoing campaign, both locally and internationally, against Communism and other leftist ideological movements and philosophies, including Baathism, for example, that share common means and ends with Communism. So what do you want

The Baghdad Pact

439

from us and from poor Iraq, which is doing its best to build itself up and achieve progress in every imaginable area?” This marked the end of my conversation with Shaikh Yusuf, who had no choice but to acknowledge the truth of everything I had said, but who asked that this acknowledgment on his part be kept confidential in view of his circumstances.

26 Nationalization of the Suez Canal

~

Speaking of the Baghdad Pact, I did contribute some efforts in this connection. When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, other Arab states agreed with neither the way Egypt had gone about doing what it had done nor the aim that Egypt had wanted to achieve. However, Egypt found itself in need of other Arab states’ support in the stormy crisis it had triggered so singlehandedly. Indeed, it had made its decision without consulting any of its Arab neighbors or even the Arab League itself. Iraq, for one, held that in doing what it had done, Egypt had needlessly endangered both itself and other Arab countries and believed that despite the fact that such an action might have been acceptable in some respects, the nationalization of the Suez Canal was bound to bring as much harm as it did good. Egypt’s dictatorial government appears to have felt that the act of strengthening its position internationally was even more important than the material benefit it stood to gain through the nationalization process. At the same time, we mustn’t forget the frustration it must have felt after its failure to obtain the hundreds of millions of dollars it needed in order to build the High Dam. In any case, the Arab states as a whole were now victims of the harsh conditions that the Egyptian government had brought on itself by setting out to prove its ability to defy the West. However, the only state that spoke up freely when Cairo’s policy was being discussed was Iraq. As for the remaining members of the Arab League, they either vied with each other to see which of them could show the most support for Cairo, chose to remain silent, or feigned regret over what they could see was an ill-chosen policy, but which they claimed not to be able to do anything about. 441

442

My Memoirs

The Egyptian Leadership’s Approach The deed now done, Egypt announced the desire to obtain other Arab states’ support in the crisis it now faced. As for Iraq, it had two choices before it: it could either object openly and strenuously to the decision Egypt had made and bear the consequences of this objection, which was certain not to sit well with the Iraqi people, or it could allow itself to be swept along on the tide of support for Egypt and pretend, against its better judgment, to approve of what Egypt had done. After choosing the second of these two options, the Iraqi government asked me to represent it at the Arab League when this thorny issue came up for discussion. I accepted the assignment and traveled to Cairo, where I attended a raucous session that ended with the adoption of a resolution by the Arab League Council to support Egypt in its adventure. During this period of time I had the opportunity to meet with the Egyptian leadership’s representative, which gave me a better understanding of a number of issues that had been unclear, in relation to both the Suez crisis and Egypt’s stance on the Baghdad Pact. During my meeting with the representative, which went on for a full three hours, I learned that the Egyptian leader was aware of the dilemma in which he had embroiled himself through his haste and that he did not know how to handle the situation with Britain, especially now that he faced the threat of war with Britain and France but wasn’t certain exactly when the crisis would erupt. He acknowledged that he regretted taking the action he had taken. Yet all he could do at this point was to apologize for having failed to consult with his Arab neighbors and ask for their support despite the mistakes he had made. For my part, I explained that as leaders of other Arab states, we were being asked to support an action about which we knew nearly nothing and which we hadn’t been given the chance to study properly. Hence, we had been bound by necessity to support what Egypt had done without being given time to think about it in advance or voice our views on the matter.

The Egyptian Leadership and the Baghdad Pact Quoting to him the saying that goes, “Come to your brother’s aid whether he’s right or wrong,” I explained that our support for the Arab League Council’s resolution was simply a response to a sense of duty. We then had a lengthy and important discussion of the Baghdad Pact, in the course of which it became clear to me that Gamal Abdel Nasser, like others, had never read the document of reciprocal cooperation that had originally been signed by Turkey and Iraq, and which had later served as the foundation for the Baghdad Pact. When I presented him with the brief, simple articles of which the pact consisted, he was amazed.

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

443

“So that’s all the alliance amounts to?” he asked. “Yes,” I replied. “In fact, it isn’t an alliance but, rather, a pact that originally involved two states, and which Britain later signed as well as a means of ending the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Pakistan signed on to it later, followed by Iran, and it received US support. And that’s the extent of it.” “To be honest,” he said, “I hadn’t been familiar with the contents of this ‘alliance.’ And now that I know what it involves, I promise not to oppose it anymore. Once it expires [it also became apparent that he had not known how long the pact was to last, since he asked me about it, and I told him that it was for five years, of which about a year and a half had already gone by], we’ll sit down with you as brothers and discuss what needs to be done at that point. The fact is, I’m sorry to have taken a stand against it!” Gamal Abdel Nasser asked me about a wide range of issues, including the strength of the Iraqi army in terms of arms, organization, and numbers, and I asked him for similar information as it pertained to the Egyptian army. Over the course of our lengthy meeting, which was also attended by our ambassador in Cairo, Najib al-Rawi, we exchanged views quite frankly. Overall I judged our talk to have been a success, since we had dealt with all the outstanding issues between Egypt and Iraq and discussed a number of ways to deal with our differences. When we left the Egyptian leader’s office, I asked the ambassador for his impressions, and he replied that he was pleased with what had transpired and hoped things would crystallize between Cairo and Baghdad in the form of mutual understanding and agreement in the future. However, not all our hopes are fulfilled, and one can’t be certain what motives others conceal. The answers I had received to my questions and the attitudes the Egyptian leader had expressed had given me reason to believe that he was someone I could like and trust. In any case, having finished what I had come to Cairo to accomplish, I departed for home, stopping in Beirut on the way. While in Beirut, I was informed by knowledgeable sources both at the embassy and elsewhere that the Voice of the Arabs radio station was still lambasting the Baghdad Pact and calling for a three-way defense agreement among Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Two days later, Cairo Radio announced that this three-way agreement had actually been signed. This quite took me by surprise, since the information I had gleaned through my talk with the Egyptian leader had led me to believe that there would be no more criticism of the Baghdad Pact and that, accordingly, there would be no more justification for an agreement that would be directed against Iraq based on the notion that by signing this pact, Iraq had undermined joint Arab defense. For some time I was bewildered over Egyptian policy, unable to get a clear idea of what it was about. However, I finally concluded that the Egyptian leader’s about-face had to mean one of two things. I said to myself, either he wasn’t being straightforward in the things he said to me, or he didn’t possess sufficient power to carry out his promise to stop opposing

444

My Memoirs

the Baghdad Pact either because the Revolutionary Council had not supported him in such a pledge or because he was under pressure from other, more distant parties. As for the possibility that he had been dissembling, my personal feeling in the course of our encounter was that he was sincere in the statements he was making. Consequently, I ruled out the possibility that he had simply been lying and tended to believe, rather, that the about-face I had witnessed was due to the fact that the Revolutionary Council or certain recognized foreign parties opposed the Egyptian leader’s desire to pursue a policy of mutual understanding and to let bygones be bygones in Egypt’s relations with Iraq. When I reached Baghdad, I presented a detailed oral report of my meeting with the Egyptian leader, including everything he and I had said, and his discovery of facts he hadn’t been aware of before. I concluded with information about the Egyptian leader’s retreat from the support he had offered for the Baghdad Pact and the ongoing diatribes against it via Voice of the Arabs, as well as the signing of the three-way defense pact among Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia and my speculations as to how to explain the conflict between the Egyptian government’s words and actions. In the weeks and months that followed, Egyptian policy conformed to much the same pattern as before, namely, that of hurling various sorts of insults and accusations at the Iraqi government. Moreover, not content to castigate Iraq through its own radio station, Egypt incited those of Syria and Saudi Arabia to follow suit. Judging from these three countries’ propaganda, you would have thought that the Baghdad Pact and Iraqi policy had become the single greatest threat to Arab countries and their sacred freedoms!

The Suez Crisis Still bent on defying the West through its foreign policy, Egypt began leaning toward Russia and the Communist camp and threatened to shift its allegiance from West to East. This policy led to the conclusion of new agreements between Egypt and Russia that enabled Egypt to secure certain benefits that it had sought without success from the West. Most importantly, these benefits included financing for construction of the Aswan High Dam and for the purchase of arms. The demands demonstrated defiance of the West and were a way to seek out closer ties with Russia. An alliance with Russia was made all the more attractive by the fact that the post of US secretary of state was occupied at that time by an obdurate, vainglorious man by the name of John Foster Dulles, who refused to allow any state, be it Western or Eastern, to rebel against his international policy directives. This, not surprisingly, served only to exacerbate Egypt’s intransigence, an intransigence that Dulles never expected to lead to an event as earthshaking as the nationalization of the Suez Canal. I learned from those in close communication

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

445

with the Egyptian leader that ever since the revolution of July 23, 1952, he had entertained hopes of nationalizing the canal. However, his motives for doing so were not purely economic as one might have thought. Rather, what he wanted to do was to perform some heroic feat by means of which he could demonstrate his power and his ability to defy the nations of the West, first and foremost Britain, especially in view of Europe’s interest in this strategic location and the pride Britain took in its distinguished position as the nation that oversaw the Suez Canal’s operations and wielded control over its fate. In any case, whatever the motives for Egypt’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, the news of what Egypt had done was not received enthusiastically by moderate, foresightful Arab planners and policymakers. After all, not only did it threaten Egypt’s autonomy, but it also posed a potential threat to all the Arab League member states in the event that the crisis led to war. When moderate thinkers such as these examined Egypt’s arguments in favor of nationalization, they found them wanting. First of all, it would bring little economic benefit when weighed against the major harm that might result from such a precipitous act (assuming that by some miracle Egypt and its fellow Arab states managed to avoid the horrors of war and economic conflict). In the beginning, Egypt argued that it had nationalized the canal because it needed a new source of income to finance the High Dam, which was expected to cost it at least £385 million. It later became clear that prior to its nationalization, the canal had been bringing in gross annual revenues of £42 million or slightly more. Following the canal’s nationalization, however, administrative expenses and the expenditures involved in improvements and maintenance, not to mention the compensation Egypt would have to pay to former shareholders, would now have to be deducted from the aforementioned revenues, which would leave nothing but a few pounds in Egypt’s pocket at the end of the day. And these few pounds would amount to very little indeed by comparison with the sums required to build the High Dam. All such calculations, moreover, were based on the assumption that the nationalization process went smoothly. If, however, it came up against obstacles or resulted in a catastrophic war as actually happened, then the revenues for the eleven years that Egypt would have had to wait before taking possession of the canal free of charge and without suffering any upheavals would be consumed in self-defense. Another point worthy of note is that Egypt lost huge amounts of arms and equipment to the Israeli enemy, as well as a considerable number of prisoners of war who were taken captive on the Sinai Peninsula. It also spent huge sums on self-defense at the site of the canal itself and in Port Said, as well as on other contingencies whose costs ran into additional millions. Egypt and other Arab countries were harmed politically by Israel’s being freed from the restrictions that had heretofore hindered Israel’s navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, Sharm el Sheikh, and the islands located at the

446

My Memoirs

entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba by enabling Egypt to prevent Israeli ships from dropping anchor at Eilat. This unwanted situation outweighed any material benefit that Egypt stood to gain through control over the Suez Canal. Consequently, those who studied the matter from all angles rightly concluded that the act of nationalizing the canal had brought clear harm to the interests of Egypt and its Arab neighbors. Nevertheless, Egypt continued to insist that its decision to nationalize had been the correct one and that the outcome represented a clear victory for it!

With the Egyptian Leadership Once Again Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal and shortly before the outbreak of armed conflict, I had the chance to go to Cairo again on the occasion of a meeting being held by the Arab League’s Standing Financial and Economic Committee. During my stay in Cairo I met with Gamal Abdel Nasser for nearly three hours, during which time we reviewed the current state of affairs in Egypt as well as issues we had discussed sometime earlier. I told him of my fear that Egypt’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal might lead to war with Britain unless the Egyptians contained the situation by finding an appropriate solution or by expressing their willingness to work out an alternative agreement with the British. To this I added the observation that economic conditions in Cairo had deteriorated, that unemployment was on the rise, and that the common people feared a devastating crisis that would dash any remaining hopes of improvement. I asked, “Why does Egypt sell its cotton to the Soviets and their satellites for 20 percent less than what Britain and the European countries pay for it? Surely you can see that this does Egypt harm, and for no apparent reason!” Nasser freely admitted that Egypt was selling its cotton at a loss to Communist countries, saying that Britain and its allies didn’t want to buy Egyptian cotton. However, the facts didn’t support his claim. I was aware of the plots being hatched by the British against the Egyptian leader and his regime. Hence, I informed him briefly of what I had learned in this connection and warned him of the consequences of his extremist policies, advising him to ward off the dangers his country faced by adjusting his approach in a way that would be in keeping with Egypt’s interests. However, although his facial expression indicated that he had taken my warning to heart and decided to adopt a more moderate policy, events would demonstrate that he was paying no attention to what I had said. When I discovered through general contacts that the British were readying their forces for a strike on Egypt, I contacted the British ambassador in Beirut and told him frankly that I sensed what was happening and

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

447

that although I might not be able to prevent Britain from engaging in such an act of folly, I could at least register my indignation and alarm at the idea that Britain would cooperate with France in such a campaign, since the Arab countries were still sorely offended at France’s policies in the Middle East. Hence, I said, if Britain claimed that it was fighting in response to an affront to its dignity and a violation of its interests, it should, at the very least, undertake such an action on its own. After stating my case to the British ambassador in no uncertain terms, I urged him to communicate my views to his government, bearing in mind that the person who had expressed them was well informed concerning the conflict between Egypt and Britain over the Suez issue. When I returned to Iraq in October 1956, I was invited by Nuri al-Sa‘id to his villa on the Tigris River for a meal of delicious local fish. When I arrived, the British and American ambassadors, with no small number of other guests whose names I don’t recall, were already gathered, and before long, Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah arrived as well. During brief private conversations with the British and American ambassadors, I was asked about reactions to the rumors circulating in Middle Eastern political circles to the effect that Britain was preparing to attack Egypt. In answer, I told them what I had heard in Beirut and Egypt, and what I had read in world newspapers about these preparations. I repeated to Sir Michael Wright, the British ambassador, what I had told the British ambassador in Beirut about how vital it was not to give France a part in any military operation undertaken by Britain. As for the United States, I believe it was aware of what Britain was intending to do. Indeed, my conversations that evening with the two aforementioned officials made clear to me that Britain was making no attempt to conceal its plans. My intuitions and speculations were confirmed, and the battle was on. It became apparent that Britain had agreed with France on a plan in accordance with which Israel would attack Egypt, after which the two European powers would intervene in order to protect the canal and Egypt from Israel’s attempted takeover. At this point, the revolutionary regime would be ousted and the appropriate measures would be taken to ensure that the state of Israel achieved maximum benefits from these turns of events. Israel’s position would thus be enforced, Egypt and the surrounding Arab counties would be obliged to conclude a truce with Israel, and everything Israel had ever hoped for would come to pass. This interpretation was supported by Anthony Eden, who, in his published memoirs, admitted frankly to the plan that had been so carefully pieced together. At the same time, however, he admitted that Dulles’s irascibility and the United States’ zeal for its own interests prevented the plan from being carried out. Yet regardless of the distressing nature of this plan, which almost succeeded in reimposing the restrictions under which Egypt and the surrounding

448

My Memoirs

Arab states had been laboring fifty years earlier, the neutral observer of history can’t help but recognize that the party who bore responsibility for these perilous developments was the regime that ruled in Egypt at that time. The stance taken by Dulles from early on was soon backed by a similar stance on the part of Russia, whose leaders held that the situation had not called for such drastic measures. Moreover, the slapdash nature of the plan itself aroused the antipathy not only of Arab and Islamic states but of some European powers as well. Had it not been for these factors, the plan would have succeeded and the new regime (the regime that had wanted to defy the West and was duly put in its place) would have become a thing of the past. There were intense reactions to the so-called Tripartite Aggression in Arab countries, where a loud hue and cry was raised against the invasion. Yet for all their intensity, such reactions could do nothing to prevent Israel from advancing into the Sinai Peninsula, seizing Egyptian war matériel, taking thousands of Egyptian soldiers captive, and reaching the canal with the greatest of ease. Iraq was among the countries that witnessed a huge outcry against the Tripartite Aggression. Those who protested so loudly appeared to be more interested in destabilizing Iraq’s ruling regime than they were in supporting Egypt in its time of affliction. Nevertheless, Iraq’s cabinet gathered together a consultative council that met with the king in the royal court to discuss the situation in Egypt. The prevailing view among the cabinet members was that it was time for the ruling regime in Egypt to go, and as the hours passed they awaited news to the effect that the fighting had ended and Egypt had surrendered. Nevertheless, in order to reassure the Iraqi public and to silence the uprisings taking place, it decided to freeze political relations with Britain and to cut them off entirely with France while voicing support for Egypt’s right to take whatever measures it deemed necessary in order to ward off this reprehensible act of aggression. Some members of the consultative council advocated a complete severance of relations with Britain. However, in view of Iraq’s economic, financial, and commercial ties with Britain, the government feared that such an act would spell disaster for the country. In short, taking such a step would do nothing to help Egypt, while bringing certain devastation on Iraq. Yet in spite of the measures taken by the Iraqi government and its expression of the strongest possible brotherly support for Egypt, certain parties continued to circulate bitter invective portraying Iraq as having failed to stand by ailing Egypt, and this despite the fact that no attempt was made to specify the nature or aim of the aid that Iraq should have extended! Should Iraq have declared an unwinnable war on France and Britain? If Egypt, with its vast population and military strength, had been helpless to ward off this attack, how could Iraq have possibly succeeded where Egypt had failed? Yet despite the clarity of such facts, Egypt clung to the notion that it had been betrayed by other Arab states. Hence, it proceeded to accuse certain people of

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

449

treason while exempting certain others depending on the circumstances and whether or not this or that Arab state had gone along with Egyptian policy. And where the truth lies, only God and certain highly informed Egyptians know.

The Voice of the Arabs Makes Trouble Meanwhile, the Voice of the Arabs radio station carried on with its aggressive strategies, which were entirely devoid of courtesy or a sense of Arab brotherhood. In fact, it even concerned itself with Iraqi officials’ purely personal affairs, exposing family secrets that had nothing to do with political matters. When, during one of my meetings with the Egyptian leader, I asked him to justify the Voice of the Arabs’ crazed ranting and the glaring inconsistencies between the things being said over the air and the moderate, conciliatory statements he himself had made concerning Iraq and its responsibilities, he replied that he had no control over the aforementioned station, which was free to say or broadcast whatever it liked, and that he bore no responsibility for what it did! Yet, when I had the pluck to ask him, “And who pays this station’s expenses?” his unhesitating, unabashed reply was “Egypt!”

The Voice of the Arabs and the Baghdad Pact As I’ve had occasion to mention, the Egyptian leader had told me explicitly that he supported the Baghdad Pact after I had familiarized him with its contents. He also told me clearly that it had been unfair of him to oppose said pact. He had then promised me never again to oppose the Baghdad Pact in any way. Yet none of these promises and pledges, nor his admission of the facts, deterred the Voice of the Arabs radio station, Egyptian newspapers, or others who had jumped on Egypt’s “liberation” bandwagon from hurling insults and vituperations at the Baghdad Pact and gossiping viciously about those who had concluded it, supported it, or taken part in it. After all, by this time, attacking the “Baghdad Alliance,” as they liked to term it, had become second nature to them. However, the Baghdad Pact was unaffected by any of these attempts to disrupt it and continued on course for quite a long time. Thanks to this pact, its signatory states witnessed greater stability and began opposing Communist movements and systematically breaking up their organizations and blocs, which prompted Moscow to launch a propaganda offensive against them. In this endeavor it received assistance from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and this despite the fact that there was a huge and obvious disparity between

450

My Memoirs

the Soviets’ outlook and that of these Arab states. Moscow was concerned about the actions the Baghdad Pact signatories might take against the Communist movement. As for nonsignatory Arab states, they claimed to be apprehensive lest the pact facilitate colonialist control over the Arab region. In reality, however, they were enraged over the prominent international standing Iraq had won through the pact, a standing that threatened to deprive these other states of similar favor and influence with the West. I was informed by a highly reliable source that when, in 1955, the government of Iraq announced a five-year plan that involved spending 500 million dinars (the equivalent of approximately $1.3 billion) on domestic development, this had been a cause for major concern on the part of Egypt’s Revolutionary Council. After a series of thorough inquiries and investigations, the council concluded that if this project was implemented, it would elevate Iraq’s status to a level that would enable it to vie with Egypt for the position of leader in the Arab world. As a result, its members voted unanimously to take whatever measures were necessary to thwart the project’s implementation and bring Iraq down. When my source first heard this from a man in close contact with the Revolutionary Council, he claimed not to believe that the Revolutionary Council might actually have done such a thing. By feigning incredulity, of course, he had challenged the man to offer proof for what he was saying. Not long thereafter, this same high-ranking official came to his friend bearing a photostatic copy of the Revolutionary Council’s resolution and gave it to him. And when my source reported these things to me, the copy was still in his possession. Add to this the material benefits that were accruing to Iraq through the Baghdad Pact. These benefits came to millions of dollars annually in the form of modern tanks, artillery, armored cars, and aircraft that were being supplied to Iraq free of charge by the United States government. In little more than a year, the US government had supplied the Iraqi army with around 100 British-made Centurion tanks, each of which cost approximately $150,000, and 2,000 new passenger and freight cars worth a total of almost $6 million. In addition, the Iraqi police force had received jeeps, light artillery, communication devices, and other equipment, all of it free of charge. I was once present during a technical consultation in Karachi among military experts, some of whom were American, on the subject of how 150 US-made fighter aircraft would be divided among the signatories of the Baghdad Pact. It had been hoped that the airplanes would be distributed in proportion to the recipient nations’ populations. However, the US officials had been instructed by their superiors to give 50 airplanes to Iraq and divide up the remaining 100 among the other Baghdad Pact signatories, namely, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, according to specified ratios. When experts representing these various states asked why the distribution had been handled in this way, they were told that Iraq possessed greater expertise

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

451

than the other member states in the areas of technical competence, leadership, and maintenance. Iraq had anticipated the fifty airplanes’ arrival in early April 1958, then in early June of the same year. However, their delivery was delayed, and when the July 14, 1958, coup took place, the whole operation was canceled and none of the airplanes ever reached Iraq. The Baghdad Pact created a rapprochement among its signatories that was closer to a brotherhood than it was to an agreement, a statement of cooperation, or anything else. Military, technical, economic, and cultural delegations made their way back and forth among the member states, while the exchange of opinions and the study of projects having to do with roads, railways, aviation, and landline and wireless communications increased with every passing day. Observers viewed the pact as a kind of Islamic arrangement given the fact that most of its signatories were Islamic states. As for Britain’s role in the pact, it was that of a fellow participant more than that of overseer or guide. As for the United States, it gave itself over completely to upholding and strengthening the pact. The US government stated on numerous occasions that even though it had not entered the pact as an official signatory, it was, in actuality, more involved in it and committed to it than any of its members.

The United States and the Baghdad Pact One day as we were having lunch at the Iraqi embassy in Ankara, we asked John Foster Dulles why the Unites States had refrained from entering the Baghdad Pact as an official member. He replied, “The US government has wanted to sign on to the Baghdad Pact for some time now. However, in order to do this it would have to secure approval from Congress. A good number of congressmen have stipulated that in order for them to grant such approval, the US government would have to issue a statement committing itself to guaranteeing the state of Israel its current borders. However, this is a commitment we aren’t prepared to make. Consequently, we decided that the best way to proceed was to continue with our present policy of assisting the Baghdad Pact members to the best of our ability, but without becoming a formal signatory.” The 1957 meeting of the Baghdad Pact ministerial council held in Ankara was convened eight months or more later than its officially scheduled date due to Iraq’s refusal to receive the British delegation because of the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt. When the meeting was held at last, Nuri al-Sa‘id raised the issue of Palestine and the Board of Arbitration, which had previously been composed of representatives from the United States, Britain, and France. He objected to this composition based on France’s stance in opposition to the hopes of Arab states and to the way in which the United

452

My Memoirs

States and Turkey had gone along with France in its support for Israel, and he asked that the aforementioned board be replaced with another one whose composition reflected support for Iraq’s demands for a resolution of the Palestine issue. Dulles promised to look into the matter during the following September, that is, September 1958, to remove France from the board, and to instruct representatives of the United States and Turkey to proceed in accordance with Arab wishes and aspirations. However, by the time September 1958 rolled around, the Iraqi government was populated with new faces that were as far as far could be from such concerns and which were, in fact, diametrically opposed to them.

The Ankara Talks and the Baghdad Pact The above-mentioned meeting of the Baghdad Pact ministerial council was also the occasion for a special discussion of Iraq’s intention to raise the Palestine issue with US president General Dwight Eisenhower, as well as the political deterioration that had occurred recently in Syria as a result of Communist infiltration there. Numerous Communist organizations had established themselves in Syria under a variety of names, and all of them strove to take over the government. The Turks’ concern over the Communist activity being witnessed in Syria was articulated by the Turkish prime minister Adnan Menderes, who stated, “It won’t be long before we are surrounded by Communist forces from the north [by which he meant Russia] and the East [by which he meant Syria]. Once that happens, we will be forced to go to war on two separate fronts, which is more than we can handle. Consequently, we’re asking the council to devote serious attention to this matter.” He then continued, saying, “Two days ago we received reports from Syria that confirm our fears.” Iraq’s position in all of this was awkward, to say the least. If it took up Turkey’s cause and fought with it against the Communist forces in Syria, it would be accused of committing aggression against a fellow Arab state and supporting “brute colonialist powers,” as they were referred to by Moscow, Cairo, and Damascus. If, on the other hand, it refrained from doing so, the situation in Syria would deteriorate even further, thereby exposing Iraq and Turkey to serious danger. It was this dilemma that prompted us to consider the idea of using armed force to drive the Syrian army out of power in Damascus, the aim being to deliver the country into the hands of its people and to banish military power from the realm of politics. The need for such action appeared especially urgent in view of the fact that command of the Syrian army had recently been taken over by corrupt elements. The most recent addition to these corrupt elements had been ‘Afif al-Bizri, who had

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

453

long been officially registered as a member of the Communist Party. Even so, we were hesitant to take on a mission of this nature. For its part, Turkey was prepared to take action if the Baghdad Pact allowed for it. However, it also realized that such a step might be viewed as a provocation by other Arab states, which would claim that Turkey was attempting to reclaim its former territories by laying hands on Syria. Consequently, the best approach would be for Iraq to undertake this mission after studying the situation and determining which means and measures would best lead to the desired end. Allow me to repeat, however, that the purpose for the action being contemplated was to preserve Syria’s autonomy and to wrest power in the country from the hands of Communist military elements in order to restore it to the Syrian people, thereby securing for them the freedom to rule themselves.

Our Trip to Washington, DC After attending the Baghdad Pact ministerial council meeting in Ankara in late January 1957, we headed with Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah to London. After staying in London for three days, we boarded an aircraft known as the Stratocruiser. A two-tiered aircraft, it had been very popular in its early years of service, then fallen into obsolescence. Nevertheless, our embassy in London, attached somehow to this particular airplane in view of its fame in earlier years, reserved seats for us on it. When I heard about our travel plans, I remarked that this model of aircraft, however big a name it might bear, was now out-of-date and didn’t promise to afford much comfort. It would be better, I suggested, for us to travel on an airplane known as the DC-7C, which was not only new, but quite fast and safe. In response, I was told by one of the embassy staff that the reservations had already been made and that there was no reason to be afraid to travel on the Stratocruiser. We boarded the old aircraft at around eleven o’clock the following morning. Within fifteen minutes of our takeoff from the London airport, we were informed that part of the airplane wasn’t functioning properly and that the pilot would have to take us back to the airport. After being emptied of most of its fuel so that it could land on its belly if necessary, the airplane circled the airport for nearly an hour and a half, during which time we were worried sick over what would happen to the airplane and to us if it had to land in the way that had been described to us. When at last the fuel had nearly run out and it was time to land, the airplane descended normally, and fortunately, no one was hurt. Upon our return we found that many people, worried for our safety, had come equipped with first aid supplies in the event that we were faced with an emergency. This incident delayed our journey for twenty-four hours, after which we boarded a new airplane of

454

My Memoirs

the type I had mentioned to them earlier. When, on our newly scheduled travel date, we boarded the plane, the weather was stormy and the air turbulent. Consequently, our trip from London to New York, which would normally have taken ten hours at the most, lasted for fifteen fright-filled hours as the airplane wobbled, shuddered, and lurched this way and that. The reason for the delay was that due to the inclement weather, the pilot had to veer off in the direction of Canada where the air currents were calm. It then approached New York City from the north via Boston, which made the trip 50 percent longer than it would have been otherwise. After a safe, albeit tardy, arrival in New York City, we rested there for four days, then finished out our trek on an express luxury train. We rolled into Washington, DC, at sundown and checked into the Shoreham Hotel. While in Washington, DC, we had the opportunity to meet with the undersecretary of state as well as the heads of departments that concerned themselves with Arab affairs and Palestine. I attended the sessions with Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Salih Jabr, Fadil al-Jamali, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, and Staff Brigadier General ‘Ali al-Daghistani. Fadil al-Jamali spoke first, after which I added some comments. We touched on a number of topics, including current conditions in Syria, the issue of severing oil pipelines because of the 1956 events and the resulting damages that were suffered by Iraq and other Arab states. We then went on to discuss the Palestine issue and the injustice that had been suffered by the Arab countries and the Palestinian refugees. Specially appointed clerks recorded the discussions, and the issues raised were responded to by the undersecretary of state and other officials. We later learned that Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah would be the only person to visit President Eisenhower. At the scheduled hour, however, Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah and ‘Ali al-Daghistani went together to meet with the president, after which the prince reported to us that they had dealt with the topics we had raised earlier at the State Department. We weren’t informed of the outcome of his talks with the president. However, it was believed that he and Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah had discussed military matters, including the equipment of the Iraqi army. The prince may also have spoken to the president about preparing an armed Iraqi force that would move to oust the military from power in Syria—an issue that had also been discussed in special meetings in Ankara. Our trip to Washington, DC, was not expected to yield any immediate results, especially in view of the fact that the prince was being secretive about the details of the action being planned in relation to Syria in the spring of 1958. In any event, when we had finished our mission and it was time for us to head home again, we all went to New York. Once there, some of us decided to travel the rest of the way on the Queen Elizabeth ocean liner, while others opted to fly back to Iraq with the prince. On the day we were to board the ship, the harbor workers decided to stage a strike, so the

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

455

Queen Elizabeth stayed at the Port of Halifax in Canada, and we had to go to meet it where it was. Hence, we boarded a smaller ship that took us to Halifax in the space of around twenty hours. The trip to the Port of Halifax wasn’t a comfortable one, as the sea was choppy. However, as soon as we reached the larger ship at midnight, it departed without delay for Southampton, which we reached in only four days. Traveling aboard the great ship Queen Elizabeth was truly enjoyable. We didn’t feel as though we were traveling over the ocean, which was bound to be troubled at times. In fact, we felt as though we were in a five-star hotel! There were three of us: ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, and I, and while on the ship we happened to meet ‘Abbas Mahdi, who had been sent to New York to attend a regular session of the United Nations.

Our Trip to Morocco We reached Southampton in Britain via the French port at CherbourgOcteville, then went by train to London, where we stayed for four days. We learned from Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah that he had met with British officials with whom he had discussed army-related matters, and that Britain had given the Iraqi army three new Hunter aircraft, each of which was worth 250,000 Iraqi dinars (approximately $715,000). One day before our departure from London, we were informed that a private Iraqi airplane had arrived in London to take us to Morocco, where Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah would be paying a visit to King Muhammad V. The following day we boarded an Iraqi-owned Viscount aircraft, leaving Salih Jabr and Fadil al-Jamali in London. Late that afternoon we arrived in Rabat, where Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah was given a formal reception headed by Crown Prince Hasan and a large gathering of state officials. Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah was to be lodged in the Moroccan crown prince’s sumptuous villa, while some of us stayed in the home of the minister of foreign affairs, and still others in a hotel. That evening a dinner banquet held at the king’s palace went on until 11:00 p.m. The following day we were told that we would be going to the state of Marrakesh, the capital of the region of Marrakesh–Tensift–al Haouz, not far from the Atlas Mountains. It was a four-hour trip by car that took us through numerous towns and villages where groups of local officials welcomed our procession, which included Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, Prince Hasan, and a number of state officials. We ate lunch in Marrakesh and stayed the night. Marrakesh is a large town with an important place in Moroccan history and political life. For a good part of its history it was the country’s capital, whose name came to be applied to the entire kingdom. A desert town, it boasts large numbers of lofty date palms whose fruits are famed for their excellent quality.

456

My Memoirs

The day after this we went to the Atlas Mountains, the majority of whose inhabitants are Berber. Performances had been organized for us in which the locals, both men and women, sang and danced, and we had lunch in tents. This excursion, which familiarized us with a good bit of the country and numerous sectors of its population, was a source of no little enjoyment and refreshment, and we received the hospitality with gratitude. We returned in the late afternoon to Marrakesh, where we spent the night before continuing on our way the next morning to Casablanca. We reached Casablanca the following afternoon, visited the mayor in his office, then had tea in the home of the head of the Chamber of Commerce. We then continued on our way to Rabat, which we reached near sundown. The day before we were scheduled to leave Rabat, a farewell banquet was hosted for us in the royal palace. The conversations that took place over the meal revolved around our impressions of our tour and the things we had seen. Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah was seated across from King Muhammad V and I to his right, which gave me the opportunity to speak to the king about a number of matters. In the course of our conversation I made some passing remarks about the name of his kingdom. I told him that his kingdom went by various names in other countries. In Turkey people referred to it as Fez, while those in Arab countries referred to it as Marrakesh. Others, such as the French, called it Maroc, while those from the United States and the British called it Morocco. Then I said, “I note that there is a large province in your esteemed country known as Marrakesh. So unless you specify your country’s name more precisely, confusion is bound to arise in correspondences, intelligence operations, and the like. So I suggest that you adopt the name Marrakesh for the entire kingdom. As for the province, you could call it the Atlas Province, of which the city of Marrakesh is the capital. If, on the other hand, you would like to keep the name Marrakesh for a province, then I propose that you refer to your kingdom as a whole as alMaghrib, which would overcome any ambiguity outside the country.” “That is a good suggestion,” the king replied. “We shall give it careful consideration.” On the day we left Rabat and this pleasant, goodly kingdom, having basked in the kindness of its generous, noble-minded rulers, Prince Hasan came to the villa where Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah had been staying. He had with him two boxes containing medals of honor, the first of which he gave to Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, and the second of which he gave to me. He explained that his father had wanted to present medals to the other Iraqi men of state as well, but that they didn’t have enough to go around. Consequently, he promised to send others to us not long after our arrival in Iraq. As we departed Rabat, everyone talked in glowing terms about the wonderful tour they had been given. After passing over Algeria, then Tunisia, we flew out over the open sea. That afternoon we reached Malta,

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

457

where we learned that the ground was so icy at the Istanbul Airport that it was unable to receive incoming aircraft, though it was expected to be able to receive incoming flights by the following day. So we decided to go to Athens. We reached Athens near sundown and spent the night there, and on the following day we flew to Istanbul and got there in the late afternoon. It had been Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah’s intention to travel with us all the way to Baghdad. However, he then decided to stay in Istanbul for a short visit, and our embassy in Ankara and our consulate in Istanbul were apprised of this development. As for me, ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, and our ambassador to Morocco, ‘Abd alGhani al-Dalli, we continued on to Baghdad. When we arrived in Baghdad shortly before sundown, we found Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa‘id, the ministers in his cabinet, and quite a number of others waiting for the prince, who wasn’t with us. So we had this splendid reception all to ourselves! Several days after our return from Morocco, I met with the Moroccan ambassador to Baghdad, Haj al-Fatimi bin Sulayman, who informed me that in a royal decree issued a week earlier, it had been announced that the name of the kingdom we had visited so recently was henceforth to be alMamlakah al-Maghribiyah (the Maghrabine Kingdom). Laughing, I related

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of Turkey (right) and Foreign Minister Fadil al-Jamali of Iraq (left)

458

Al-Suwaydi at the official opening of a major dam in Turkey with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Dr. Fadil al-Jamali

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

459

to him the conversation I had had with the king on this subject, and he was amused.

Adnan Menderes and Iraq Following his initial visit to Baghdad during which he concluded the reciprocal cooperation pact with Nuri al-Sa‘id, Adnan Menderes made numerous visits to Iraq. In fact, he had a visible love for our country and seemed to enjoy visiting whenever he had the chance. One time he came for a threeday stay during which he made contact with many Iraqi political figures, among whom I was one. Besides being mild-mannered and humble, Menderes was an amiable, witty, widely read man and a delightful conversationalist. At times he would express a desire to be in touch with other, non-Iraqi Arabs. At the same time, however, he lamented the fact that this desire of his had met with little encouragement from these individuals. More than once he told me he wished he could speak with Gamal Abdel Nasser as well as Shukri al-Quwatli. However, he said, he had never been able to do so and didn’t understand their unwillingness to meet with him. He said, “I’m determined to see the Egyptian leader one of these days, no matter what it takes.” Then he added with a chuckle, “If he throws me out the door, I’ll come in again through the window!” During one of his visits to Baghdad Menderes expressed his belief that in order to strengthen the ties of friendship and brotherhood between our countries, it wasn’t enough for their contact to be restricted to the realms of politics and formalities. Rather, he said, we needed to find ways in which Turks and Iraqis could become acquainted with each other’s countries on a more intimate and comprehensive basis. For this reason, he said he was intending to invite a number of Iraqi notables and political figures, including civilians, tribal leaders, and others, to visit Turkey and become acquainted with its life and activities, and he encouraged the Iraqi government to extend a similar invitation to Turkish officials. As part of this initiative, he invited me to visit Turkey the following summer as a guest of the Turkish government, which would facilitate my travel to any part of the country I wished to see so that in this way I could familiarize myself with the various aspects of Turkish economic activity. Hence, after going to Beirut for a summer vacation in July 1957, I boarded a Turkish ocean liner to Istanbul. When I reached Istanbul five days later, Adnan Menderes welcomed me most graciously. King Faisal II and Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah spent almost every summer on the Bosporus aboard the yacht Queen ‘Alia, and they happened to be there with their families that year. Given the presence of both King Faisal II and Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, it was customary for parties to be hosted and meetings to be held with the

460

My Memoirs

Turkish president of the republic, Jalal Bayar, who, like Adnan Menderes and other government officials, generally shuttled back and forth between Ankara and a private residence on the seashore. At one of these gatherings, which involved exchanges of ideas and opinions on politics and the economy, I reminded Adnan Menderes of the Baghdad Pact ministerial council meeting that had been held in Ankara the previous January, and the intense concern that he and the Turkish foreign minister Fatin Zorlu had expressed on that occasion over developments in Syria that were seen as posing a threat to both Turkey and Iraq. Then I added, “Since all of you—King Faisal, the prince, Turkey’s president, you, and your foreign minister—are all here in Istanbul, this might be a good opportunity to meet and discuss matters of relevance to Syria, and we might be able to arrive at some conclusions as to what to do.” Latching on to my suggestion right away, Adnan Menderes made the needed arrangements for a meeting of the Iraqis and the Turks in the famed Yildiz Palace. However, he cautioned us that the time, place, and content of our meeting should be kept totally confidential lest any news of it reach the local or foreign press.

The Yildiz Meeting At 11:00 a.m. on the day the meeting was to be held, King Faisal II, Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, Fadil al-Jamali, and I gathered at the Yildiz Palace. Also in attendance were Iraqi chief of general staff Rafiq ‘Arif and Ghazi al-Daghistani on behalf of Iraq, and on behalf of Turkey, the Turkish president of the republic Jalal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Zorlu, and other staff members of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The meeting was held in an enormous reception hall whose floor was covered by a carpet that may well have been one of its kind, since it was nearly thirty meters long and ten or more meters wide, and we were told that it had been handwoven inside the very room in which it was spread. When the meeting came to order, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented documents and telegrams containing detailed information about the state of affairs in Syria. These documents had been obtained not only from Turkish institutions in close contact with Syria, but from London, Washington, DC, Paris, and other distant locations, a fact which indicated that Turkey’s foreign intelligence apparatus was functioning with maximum preparedness and efficiency. After a discussion of the subject of Syria and recent events there, the Turks urged that we contact Britain and the United States before making any final decisions and suggested that the meeting be postponed for a few days.

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

461

The meeting was adjourned at 3:00 p.m. with the understanding that we would gather again when the next meeting had been scheduled. The next day I learned that the Turkish government had contacted the US and British ambassadors, and that Louis Henderson, head of the Middle Eastern Affairs Section of the US State Department, was expected to attend the next meeting on behalf of the United States. Two days later this report was confirmed, and it was said that Henderson would arrive within several days. However, I held no official position in the Iraqi government at that time and had attended the initial meeting in a purely personal capacity. So, since I needed to get to Beirut as soon as possible, I left Istanbul and reached Beirut in a single night. When Adnan Menderes learned of my sudden decision to leave, he came unexpectedly to the airport to bid me farewell. He also urged me to stay on until Henderson’s arrival. However, I replied that I was certain that the Turkish and Iraqi officials who remained would do a fine job of handling the issue. A few days later in Beirut, I learned that Henderson had reached Istanbul and had attended a meeting at the Yildiz Palace, though I heard nothing about what had transpired there. A number of well-informed individuals who arrived later in Beirut told me that Henderson had encouraged military preparation with a view to forcing the military junta in Syria to step down and place the administration of state affairs in the hands of civilians in keeping with the Syrian Constitution. In addition, there were reports to the effect that Iraq had been chosen to carry out the aforementioned mission, with explicit promises of assistance and support toward its successful completion.

The Baghdad Pact in Karachi The Baghdad Pact’s ministerial council was to meet in Karachi in late May 1957. Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa‘id asked me to accompany him there, and after some discussion of the matter, I agreed to go with him and Fadil alJamali. On the day we were scheduled to leave, we were joined by a Turkish delegation headed by Adnan Menderes along with the Turkish foreign minister Fatin Zorlu and a number of Turkish parliamentarians who often accompanied him to Baghdad Pact meetings. We left Baghdad on May 28, 1957, on a private aircraft that the Iraqi government had reserved to transport both the Iraqi and Turkish delegations, and after a six-hour flight we reached Karachi. Fadil al-Jamali and I were hosted by Iskander Mirza, Pakistan’s president of the republic. Both we and the others with us were welcomed warmly. Alas, the weather was so hot and muggy it sabotaged all the efforts to make us comfortable. President Mirza was a model of gentility and kindliness, as was his wife, while Prime Minister Suhrawardi was, by

462

My Memoirs

contrast, quite the prattler. As for Foreign Minister Feroz Khan Noon, he was a man of great virtue and poise who knew himself and who assessed others with a balance of wisdom and deliberation. The military committee met before the ministerial council, which formed subcommittees to study and analyze the topics proposed for discussion in keeping with our usual procedure. Due to the oppressive weather, both the council and the subcommittees worked to get their tasks finished as quickly as possible, and within four days we were making preparations to return home. However, when we boarded the Iraqi aircraft for our return flight from Karachi that evening, our takeoff was delayed for three hours because members of the Turkish delegation were late getting back from a trip out to purchase items to take home with them. These included alcoholic beverages, which were cheaper in Karachi than they were in their native Turkey. On the morning of June 2, 1957, we arrived in Baghdad, exhausted from having had to stay up so late the night before and having slept little during the flight home. When we got to the airport we were saddened to hear that Salih Jabr had passed away after suffering a heart attack while giving a speech before parliament. As for the Turkish delegation, it stayed in the airport for an hour during which it rested and ate breakfast, departing thereafter for Ankara. The meeting in Karachi did not appear to us to have accomplished much of importance. However, we learned from government officials that the 150 US airplanes to which I referred earlier had been divided among the Baghdad Pact members there. As mentioned earlier, Iraq was to receive 50 airplanes while the remaining 100 were to be divided among Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Hence, it was clear that Iraq enjoyed a respected position both inside and outside the framework of the Baghdad Pact despite the fact that, by comparison with the other member states, Iraq had lower capabilities in various areas as well as a smaller population and geographical area.

With Yusuf Yasin in Baghdad In April 1957, I was visited at home by Yusuf Yasin, who had come to Iraq with King Sa‘ud bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. After exchanging views on various issues of concern in the Arab world and internationally, we came, of course, to a discussion of the Baghdad Pact. I said to him, “You undoubtedly take a dim view of the Baghdad Pact. However, I have a suggestion that may relieve you of your worries in this connection, namely, that we agree to replace the Baghdad Pact with something to be known as the Middle East Pact, which would include both members of the current Baghdad Pact and the other Arab states. This ought to solve the problem.”

Nationalization of the Suez Canal

463

Shaikh Yusuf replied that the idea merited study and that it might be pared down to include nothing but Arab and Islamic states while excluding Europe and the United States. I said, “If the countries you’ve mentioned are excluded from the pact, the remaining member states will have about as much value as so many zeroes to the left of a number. Our experience with the Baghdad Pact has shown us that the major world powers are an invaluable source of assistance and guidance to alliances that would otherwise have no direction or support.” “Your idea as it stands might be acceptable to us,” he said. “And it might meet with acceptance on the part of other Arab states too once they’ve had a chance to study it properly.” That evening at the formal reception being held in King Sa‘ud’s honor, I took the US ambassador aside and asked him, “If the Arab states agreed to enter into a new pact with the members of the current Baghdad Pact under a new name such as the Middle East Pact, for example, do you see any reason why we couldn’t replace the current pact with a new one?” The ambassador replied without hesitation, “When we supported the Mutual Cooperation Pact between Turkey and Iraq we were hoping that all the Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon, would join it as well. In view of developments relating to the influence of Egypt and its internal affairs, we encouraged conclusion of the Baghdad Pact in its present form, in which Iraq is the only Arab member state. However, this arrangement is weak in principle and lacks effectiveness. Consequently, I think any change in the Baghdad Pact in the direction of making it more comprehensive and powerful would be acceptable to the United States.” Shortly thereafter I contacted Khalil Kinnah and told him about my talks with Yusuf Yasin and the US ambassador about the possibility of replacing the Baghdad Pact with another treaty that would include a larger number of Arab states. Then, knowing of the influence and favor he enjoyed with Nuri al-Sa‘id, I asked him to inquire as to whether Nuri al-Sa‘id considered it a viable plan and to report back to me. The next day Khalil Kinnah approached me with a glum look on his face. He said, “I explained everything you told me to Nuri al-Sa‘id and he was apprised of all the relevant details. However, he told me to ask you, even to beg you, not to take a single step further in this direction. He’s convinced that replacing the Baghdad Pact with something else would do Iraq great harm. So this idea needs to be avoided at all costs.”

27 A Hashemite-Saudi Rapprochement

~

There were long-standing differences between the governments in Riyadh and Baghdad over political matters both local and international. Then, of course, there were the residues of the age-old feud between the Hashemite and Saudi dynasties. On numerous occasions I discussed such matters with my friend Prince Faisal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Sa‘ud in the hope of paving the way for greater mutual understanding between the two brother nations. When I visited Cairo in 1950 in my capacity as Iraqi prime minister, Prince Faisal and I discussed numerous issues of concern to our countries with a view to clearing the air and joining hearts and minds. Over the years I continued working to unify the Arab voice by overcoming differences among the Arab states and their peoples. After all, no one but our enemies stood to gain from such disagreements. After ongoing efforts on my part, it was agreed that King Faisal II and Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah would travel to Saudi Arabia in order to reciprocate King Sa‘ud’s earlier visit to Baghdad. The plan was for them to go to Riyadh, since it was the Saudi Kingdom’s capital. The visit was scheduled for November 1957, and the necessary arrangements were made. Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah asked me to join him on the visit, and I agreed to go. So, on the scheduled day, I departed for Riyadh with King Faisal II, Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, Prime Minister ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, ‘Ali Mumtaz as a representative of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, Minister of Finance ‘Abdullah al-Damluji, and a number of assistants who regularly escorted the king on his travels aboard the Iraqiowned Viscount aircraft. Two hours later we stopped in Dhahran, and sometime after noon we arrived in Riyadh, where we were received by King Sa‘ud and his leading men of state. (Prince Faisal was away in Italy receiving medical treatment.) As for the welcome accorded King Faisal II and his crown prince, it was warm and heartfelt. 465

466

My Memoirs

One day during our visit I was invited to attend a meeting that was to be held between the two monarchs and the princes. Hence, I went to the meeting, though not many were in attendance. The discussion began with matters relating to Egypt’s hostile policies and the vituperations and insults being spewed forth by the Voice of the Arabs radio station. All the suggestions centered on the need to unite Iraq’s and Saudi Arabia’s efforts to ward off the danger posed by Egypt’s insolent assaults and subversive propaganda. Observers judged this visit to be of great benefit given its potential for overcoming the disaffection between our countries. It was through this visit that the Iraqi government obtained King Sa‘ud’s approval of Iraq’s policy toward Kuwait whereby Britain would be urged to grant Kuwait complete autonomy, then help Iraq to introduce Kuwait into the Arab Union that was being planned between Iraq and Jordan. It became clear through the conversations that took place during this visit that King Sa‘ud had no desire to see any harm come to the Sabah family and was, indeed, keen to protect them, since he esteemed them for the protection and assistance they had extended to the Sa‘ud family during the days when they were far from the seat of power and were being persecuted by the Ottoman state.

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with King Sa‘ud bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Sa‘ud of Saudi Arabia

28 The Arab Union

~

Arab unity had been a cherished hope of mine for as long as I could remember. It was the grand purpose for the sake of which the father of the Arab awakening, king and martyr Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali of Mecca, had staged the Great Arab Revolt, after which he abdicated his throne. 1 A martyr for the sake of principle, he had been unwilling to surrender any of the Arabs’ rights to freedom and sovereignty or a single handspan of Arab land to non-Arabs. For the sake of achieving Arab unity, his children and grandchildren continued to promote the noble cause of Arab nationalism and worked with dedicated fellow Arabs to make their dream come true. They persevered despite the difficulties and obstacles being placed in their paths by the champions of colonialism, who labored tirelessly to thwart the Arab nations’ well-intentioned efforts to unify themselves in word and deed. Such people opposed all efforts of this kind, agitating against them and those who supported them by means of nefarious, demagogic ploys. Their duplicitous propaganda presented truth as falsehood and falsehood as truth while portraying calls for unity or union among Arab countries as a colonialist enterprise! In reality, of course, and God is my witness, it was the Arab supporters of colonialism—whose primary concern was to preserve their personal interests even if this could only be done at the expense of their nation’s unity, strength, well-being, and prosperity—who resisted every endeavor to do away with the artificial boundaries that had been established by colonialism between the various regions of the Arab world. God is my witness that such hypocritical Arabs, making bogus claims of patriotism and loyalty to the Arab cause, have been the first to carry out colonialism’s wishes and designs. 467

468

My Memoirs

King ‘Abdullah attempted to unify Jordan and Syria. However, numerous obstacles were placed in his way. The idea of establishing a union or federation joining Iraq and Syria was also proposed, and although enthusiasm and support for this idea witnessed a periodic ebb and flow, freethinking patriots in both countries (who owed nothing to colonialist dictates) nevertheless worked to make it a reality because they could see that all the factors required for the establishment of such a union were present in full. These men could see that the establishment of such a union would be a source of tremendous blessing to both countries and to the Arab community as a whole, particularly in view of the fact that they had worked together from the time of the Ottoman era: they had worked in secret societies to liberate and unite their countries, they had fought in the Great Arab Revolt under the banner of Hussein bin ‘Ali, and they had striven together to establish the Syrian state during the days of King Faisal I, followed by the Iraqi state. However, the Arab servants of colonialism had resisted all these ideals and strivings, supporting their nay-saying with a variety of flimsy, spurious arguments in the service of narrow interests and ambitions, personal gain, and preferment. After all, colonialism’s most cherished aim was to weaken the bonds of the wider Arab community, by which means it could destroy its unity and rob it of its dignity. At around this time, and God knows for what reasons, there was a flurry of activity centered on the goal of establishing a union between Syria and Egypt under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and this despite the differences, disagreements, barriers, and distances between the two countries. For compared to the natural commonalities that existed between Iraq and Syria, for example, or between Iraq and Jordan, or Syria and Jordan, there was hardly anything that would have made an Egyptian-Syrian union viable. Consequently, those who were in a position to make a knowledgeable and objective appraisal of the situation could see clearly that it would be exceedingly difficult to establish such a union, and that in the event that it was established, it would not endure. Hence, when contacts commenced among those who wanted to see an Egyptian-Syrian union come into being, a sizable group of leading Arab figures in Iraq, Jordan, and elsewhere began urging Iraqi and Jordanian officials to take prompt action to establish a union composed of Jordan and Iraq. It should be noted that this was not a new idea. On the contrary, it had been discussed on previous occasions and efforts had been made to make it a reality. For in both form and substance, the idea of an Iraqi-Jordanian union was realistic and sound in view of the long-standing dialogue, complementarity, similarity, and shared interests that joined the two countries. The notion of an Iraqi-Jordanian union was lent further credence by the fact that they were both being ruled by grandsons of Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali, the architect of the Arab resurgence, the leader of the revolution, the liberator of the Arab nation, and the bearer of

The Arab Union

469

the message of unity. Hence, the call to form such a union was welcomed by officials in Iraq and Jordan and the preliminary procedures were set in motion. Given the determination of those involved and the purity of their motives, obstacles were soon overcome and things proceeded without incident. On February 11, 1958, I headed an Iraqi delegation to Amman whose purpose was to conduct the final negotiations. The delegation included Burhan al-Din Pasha A‘yan, Iraqi minister of foreign affairs; Nadim alPachachi, minister of finance; ‘Abd al-Rasul al-Khalisi, minister of justice; ‘Abdullah Bakr, head of the Royal Administrative Office; Baha’ al-Din Nuri, Iraqi ambassador to Amman; and Lieutenant General Muhammad Rafiq ‘Arif, the Iraqi army’s chief of general staff. As for the Jordanian delegation, it was headed by Ibrahim Hashim, Jordan’s prime minister, and its members included Samir al-Rifa‘i, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; Sulayman Tuqan, minister of the royal court; Khulusi alKhayri, minister of national economy; Ahmad al-Tarawinah, minister of education and minister of justice; Bahjat al-Talhuni, head of the Royal

King Faisal II of Iraq and King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan on the day the Jordanian-Iraqi union was announced

470

My Memoirs

Administrative Office; ‘Afif al-Fayiz, minister of defense and minister of agriculture; Farhan Shabilah, the Jordanian ambassador to Baghdad; General Habib al-Majali, the Jordanian army’s chief of general staff; and his assistant, Major General Sadiq al-Shar‘. The negotiations were overseen by King Faisal II, King Hussein bin Talal, and Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah. We spent three days and nights in continuous negotiations and discussions, doing everything we could to close gaps between differing perspectives, overcome obstacles, and agree on the spirit and letter of the union until we had framed a constitution. This document, which I view as one of the most successful, complete, and sound constitutions ever to be drafted for such a union, left the door open for any and all Arab countries to join the union if they so desired. Although this honorable burden—the burden of conducting the negotiations and framing a constitution for the nascent union—had fallen for the most part on my shoulders, I must also acknowledge the sincere cooperation and dedicated efforts that were forthcoming from all my brothers in both delegations, particularly Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa‘i. A man of distinctive moral probity, al-Rifa‘i was possessed of rare political acumen, diplomatic skill, competence, sagacity, and worldly wisdom, not to mention undying devotion to his country and his king. And this was as it should be, since he was one of the founders of the state of Jordan from the era of King ‘Abdullah. Given his strength of character and long experience, al-Rifa‘i had become a first-class man of state who cooperated fully and diligently with me along with all the members of both delegations. Moreover, the happy outcome of this cooperation was that on February 14, 1958, the Arab Union of Jordan and Iraq was declared. King Faisal II was to be head of the union, and in the event of his absence, his position was to be filled by King Hussein. Each of the two states would retain its international identity, previous agreements, local government and system of rule, and own parliament. There were to be, in addition, a union government, a union parliament, and a union supreme court. The union government would handle affairs relating to the executive, foreign affairs, defense, and finance in preparation for the gradual standardization of education and other areas of concern as time went on in response to newly arising exigencies and interests. There was a general consensus that I should be appointed to the post of the head of the union. However, King Faisal II and Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah approached me in private one day, saying, “Both the Iraqi and Jordanian sides would like to see you serve as prime minister of the union. But, given the fact that Nuri al-Sa‘id is elderly and in failing health, and given the long service he has rendered to the Arab community and the cause of Arab unity, what do you say we appoint him as the prime minister of the union in appreciation of his long-standing efforts?”

The Arab Union

471

Nuri al-Sa‘id, prime minister of Iraq

I agreed to their proposal without hesitation, content to have heard from King Faisal II, Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, King Hussein, and the members of both delegations that my efforts had been appreciated and that they had wanted to give me the position of prime minister of the union. I gave them my unreserved blessing, since I myself couldn’t deny Nuri’s efforts and contributions. Indeed, he was my colleague and my friend, and no one could have rightfully denied his long, illustrious career in the service of the Arab nation and its causes. Hence, the union’s government took the following form: • Nuri al-Sa‘id, prime minister (Iraqi, former prime minister) • Ibrahim Hashim, deputy prime minister (Jordanian of Palestinian origin, former prime minister) • Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, minister of foreign affairs (Iraqi, former prime minister) • Sulayman Tuqan, minister of defense (Jordanian of Palestinian origin, minister of the royal court, and former cabinet minister)

472

My Memoirs

• Brigadier General Sami Fattah, deputy minister of defense (Iraqi, an air force commander in the Iraqi army) • ‘Abd al-Karim al-Azri, minister of the treasury (Iraqi, former cabinet minister) • Khalil Ibrahim, secretary-general of the federal prime minister’s office (Iraqi, former general director of publicity in Iraq) The announcement of this noteworthy and auspicious event came as welcome news to all well-meaning Arabs, and telegrams of congratulations came pouring in from Arab monarchs and other heads of state, as well as from many other sincere proponents of Arab unity throughout the Arab world. By means of this blessed union, a long-cherished hope was fulfilled. In the face of the wave of euphoria that had swept through the Arab world, even the Egyptian leader himself—who, on a previous occasion, had said worse things about Iraq and Jordan than those said by Imam Malik about the evils of wine—had no choice but to send a telegram of his own to King Faisal II, titular head of the new union. The text of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s message (for the sake of posterity!) was as follows: To His Majesty King Faisal II, King of Iraq—Baghdad: The Arab Union that has joined Iraq and Jordan on this day is a blessed step to which the entire Arab nation looks with great hope, since it is an initiative that derives its strength from the depths of the Arab conscience. We are confident that this union will be a source of strength for all Arabs against their foes. The days through which the valiant Arab nation is now passing are both memorable and glorious, and the events our nation has witnessed in recent times are evidence that the dawn of unity has broken upon Arab horizons. Arab patriots will take pride in the step you have taken in Amman today, confident that it brings us closer to the dream of complete unity. Your Majesty’s youth, your faith, and your sincere dedication will undoubtedly prove to be a motivating force toward fulfillment of the Arabs’ dearest hopes, and as I send you this missive of congratulations, I ask God with all my heart to grant you success, to guide your steps, and to bless your heroic people. Gamal Abdel Nasser

Lovely, stirring rhetoric, this. However, no sooner had the ink dried than its author began driving wedges wherever he could, chipping away through attacks and insults at the unity we had begun to achieve until, with the destruction of the Iraqi entity on July 14, 1958, and the subsequent dissolution of the Arab Union, the hopes of those who had declared enmity against Arabdom, both near and far, were fulfilled! These base designs were furthered through speeches and pronouncements, through well-known newspapers and radio stations, and through leaders and agents with Communist

The Arab Union

473

sympathies both locally and abroad. The Egyptian leader even had the gall to deliver a speech in Syria in which he gloated publicly over the ill fortune of those who had suffered and died in the events of July 14, 1958, and their aftermath, which will go down in Arab history as one of its blackest chapters.

Note 1. “Abdicated” does not fully explain what occurred. Although Sharif Hussein did abdicate his throne in 1924 in favor of his youngest son ‘Ali, that abdication occurred only because of the relentless military pressure Sharif Hussein was under from the encroaching and fearsome Wahhabi army, which was commanded by Ibn Sa‘ud, founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Sharif Hussein’s son ‘Ali held the throne only briefly before he also fled. The Hejaz was then incorporated into the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Sharif Hussein did take refuge in Cyprus but soon moved to Transjordan where his son ‘Abdullah was king. Sharif Hussein died in Amman, Jordan, on June 4, 1931.

29 Iraq and Kuwait

~

The story of Iraq and Kuwait is a complex one that goes back many years, and space does not permit me to go into its details. In short, however, it has its roots in the Ottoman era and in successive developments that grew out of Kuwait’s link with Iraq. Such developments relate to the border issue that arose between the two countries, the widespread practice of smuggling goods across the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border in both directions due to the growing disparity between the two countries’ customs duties, and the flow of oil from Kuwaiti wells that transformed it into a country of note that captured the world’s attention for its wealth and enormous potential. It was this latter development that spurred Iraq, particularly after the Arab Union was established between Iraq and Jordan, to exert efforts with Kuwaiti and British officials to end Kuwait’s status as a British protectorate so that, as an independent state, it would be free to join the union as a full-fledged member. Selwyn Lloyd, the British foreign secretary, had come for a visit to Baghdad in late winter 1956 on his way to Southeast Asia to attend a meeting of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. Making the most of Lloyd’s visit, Iraq pressed for Kuwait’s independence in the hope that it could join the Arab Union that was soon to be established. Lloyd responded by saying that he would present the matter to the British cabinet, and he kept his word. As a result, the British government authorized him to work on the issue with Iraq. There ensued a series of intermittent exchanges between Iraq and Britain, after which, speaking through its ambassador, Sir Michael Wright, Britain expressed its willingness to grant Kuwait its independence, with the result that Kuwait would now have the freedom to join the Arab Union if it so chose. Events then followed in succession, and for a period of time Kuwait was inundated by a wave of extremist currents. Given Kuwait’s growing 475

476

My Memoirs

importance in the region, Cairo now aspired to turn it into a center of operations for its propaganda apparatus in the Arab Gulf in the hope of achieving its long-term expansionist goals. As a matter of fact, the huge numbers of Egyptians who had gone to Kuwait during that period of time as experts, advisers, and employees set about to carry out Egypt’s plans. It was then that misinformation directed against Iraq, Jordan, and, occasionally, Saudi Arabia began to spread in Kuwait. Consequently, Iraq began exerting urgent efforts to ensure that Kuwait won its independence and joined the Arab Union, in part in order to see Kuwait win its freedom and in part in order to do away with the hostile propaganda that had begun spreading so dangerously in Kuwait. Iraq also hoped to benefit from Kuwait’s economic strength as a source of support and assistance for Jordan, which, with its poverty and its limited resources, was located along the single longest line of fire with the state of Israel. After the union between Iraq and Jordan was established in February 1958, Iraq stepped up its efforts to secure Kuwait’s independence. One of the most important steps taken in this connection was the Iraqi government’s decision in early April 1958 to authorize me in my capacity as deputy prime minister to travel to Lebanon to conduct secret talks with Shaikh ‘Abdullah al-Salim of Kuwait. The talks that took place, during which critical issues were raised, were both lengthy and highly significant. I later resumed these talks with Shaikh al-Salim in the presence of King Faisal II when the shaikh visited Baghdad in June of the same year. However, this subsequent round of talks failed to yield any positive results. Over time, Iraqi officials came to believe that Britain was working to prevent Kuwait from gaining its independence. This belief led to some disaffection and even outright tension between Baghdad and London and caused Iraqi officials to further intensify their pressure on the British, whom the Iraqis held responsible for the ongoing spread of extremist currents and activities in the region. At last, however, I was approached by the British ambassador, who informed me that his government had agreed in principle to the idea of Kuwait’s being granted its independence and joining the Arab Union.We agreed that the relevant details would be discussed in a special meeting to be attended by the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the Arab Union and Britain. The meeting was to be held in London on July 24, 1958, at which time and place a meeting of the Baghdad Pact’s ministerial council was also scheduled to be held. I was then instructed to form a special committee composed of officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The committee’s task would be to prepare an exhaustive, persuasive, and fully documented memorandum. However, when, several days before our departure for London, I was about to publicize the memorandum at a press conference in support of the position we would be taking at the negotiations, the British ambassador

Iraq and Kuwait

477

came to see me and requested urgently that I not do anything in this connection before the upcoming meeting in London. He said that refraining from such an announcement would help to ensure that affairs took their natural course, which he said he believed would lead to a positive, satisfactory outcome. Hence, I did as he had requested. This, at any rate, was what had been happening in public. As for the plots being knit in secret, they were known only to the Knower of the Unseen! This encounter with the British ambassador, which occurred on July 11, 1958, was to be my last, since the ill-fated coup d’état would take place on the morning of July 14, 1958, that black day in the history of Iraq and the Arabs.

30 Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

~

Fate in the Making King Faisal II’s preparations to travel to Europe to meet his fiancée were moving apace. The king was anxious to be on his way and in a hurry to set a date for his departure. At last he decided that he would be leaving on July 8, 1958, and he wasn’t likely to listen to any arguments in favor of a delay. On July 7, however, I was approached by ‘Abd al-Karim al-Azri, the Arab Union’s minister of finance, who informed me that the union’s Foreign Service Act and Federal Currency Standardization Act had been finalized and that they would be made public within two days. Hence, since he had been hoping that King Faisal II would sign them before his departure, he had asked him to postpone his trip, but the king had been unwilling to delay it beyond July 7. Consequently, he had come to ask me if I might persuade the king to delay his travels for two days, that is, from July 7 to July 9, and I promised to do what I could. Two hours later I went to the royal court and spoke with the king on the minister of finance’s behalf. I assured him that delaying his departure by a couple of days would have no material effect on anything, and although he chafed slightly at the request, he laughed, saying, “All right, then, I’ll postpone it until the ninth of the month.” Fate was cruel in this case, because, through this postponement, it hastened the onset of what was to befall the unsuspecting young monarch. On July 8, 1958, we received a telegram from the shah of Iran, who was in Washington, DC, saying that he had met with President Eisenhower and that he had a great deal of information he wanted to share with the Baghdad Pact’s ministerial council. So, since he would be arriving in Istanbul on July 14 for a short stay there before returning to Tehran, he proposed that 479

480

My Memoirs

the monarchs and prime ministers of the Baghdad Pact member states meet in Istanbul for a discussion. It was through these seemingly unrelated events that the stage was set for the tragedy that was to befall the king and his kingdom! King Faisal II was obliged to postpone his travels once again, this time from July 9 to July 14 at 8:00 a.m., and in this fashion, destiny prepared the way for the end of a regime that had lasted from August 21, 1921, to July 14, 1958. As King Faisal II, may he rest in peace, signed the two newly drafted laws in keeping with the wishes of the Arab Union’s minister of finance, he was, in essence, signing his own writ of execution. By some peculiar, cruel coincidence in the course of an individual’s life, he may see a host of factors and influences come together within the space of a few moments, a process that necessitates a particular conclusion that we refer to as “one’s appointed time,” “providence,” “divinely ordained destiny,” or any number of other terms with which we express our resignation to the painful realities of existence. King Faisal II had agreed to postpone his departure from Baghdad from July 7 to July 9, then from July 9 to July 14 in response to a variety of factors, all of which worked together to deliver him into the hands of his executioners, who put an end to his life in a massacre that could well be termed one of the most malevolent, barbaric crimes ever conceived. Meanwhile, other factors were at work determining the fate of the crown prince ‘Abd al-Ilah. What happened was this: The prince had gone to Istanbul with the intention of either spending the summer there or traveling from place to place during his time away from Iraq. Then, without warning, what should he do but return to Iraq in its very hottest, most miserable season of the year. When I asked him why he had chosen the heat of Iraq over the pleasant breezes of Istanbul, he replied that through a number of contacts as well as information he had received from inside Iraq, he had learned that certain saboteurs were planning to make unwanted moves during his and the king’s absences from the country, so he had decided it would be best for him to stay in Baghdad during King Faisal II’s time in London. In this manner, then, the crown prince had likewise signed his own death warrant, choosing the path that would deliver him into the hands of his enemies at exactly the moment that had been determined by fate in all its irony. We then come to the role played by Nuri al-Sa‘id and the circumstances that led him back to Baghdad despite the fact that he had left the country with the intention of spending the summer abroad. Nuri al-Sa‘id had left Baghdad with his wife late in June 1958 for London, where he had apparently settled for the summer, and no one had heard from him since his departure. After agreeing to my request that he delay his departure for London from July 7 to July 9, King Faisal II turned to the head of the Royal Administrative Office, ‘Abdullah Bakr, and said to him, “Don’t forget, ‘Abdullah,

Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

481

King Faisal II beneath a photo of his grandfather King Faisal I

that when Nuri Pasha left for London, he asked me to send him a telegram asking him to come back to Baghdad. So it’s time to give him what he asked for!” And he laughed. Then he said, “I don’t know what prompted Nuri to make this request. Does he have some urgent work he needs to come back to Baghdad to do, and does he want to save himself the cost of the plane ticket by having me summon him back?” And he laughed again. These three men were precisely the individuals that needed to be all together in one place so that those lying in wait for them could descend upon them in one fell swoop and the coup could take effect. It was as though fate had brought them together in ways they could never have predicted and for seemingly trivial reasons that could hardly have justified their all being in Baghdad simultaneously during the days of its most unbearable heat. One of the witnesses in Fadil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi’s military court later stated that ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and his men had been waiting for just such a happenstance for a long time. He mentioned that ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim had informed his gang before it went to work on the night of July 13, 1958, that conditions were now ripe for the overthrow they had been planning,

482

My Memoirs

since, by virtue of this confluence of factors, all three men were in Baghdad at the same time.

Intentions and Attempts It later became apparent that numerous previous attempts had been made to overthrow the government, but that they had not succeeded because one or more of the three men they were targeting happened not to be present with the others in the same time and place. Hence, I suspect that if Nuri al-Sa‘id had not been present in Baghdad on the eve of July 14, 1958, the overthrow would not have taken place, and history would not have recorded the tragedies that befell Iraq and its leadership under the guise of “revolution.” The reason I say this is that when the conspirators were unable to locate Nuri al-Sa‘id during the first day or two of the coup, they were in an obvious panic over his disappearance. They even offered a reward of 10,000 dinars to anyone who provided them with information that might lead to his capture, dead or alive. When Nuri al-Sa‘id was discovered and he saw that he was doomed to perish, he committed suicide by shooting himself in the head. Consequently, the rebels were relieved of the task of doing away with him and proceeded blithely to carry out their demonic designs, which, in the succeeding days, would unleash a string of the most heinous betrayals and crimes, unspeakable destruction and sabotage, monstrous assaults on dignity, life, and property, and the decimation of the stability and prosperity Iraq had once enjoyed.

The View from Istanbul Let us shift now for a moment to Istanbul where, at 10:30 a.m., July 14, 1958, a reception party awaited the arrival of the airplane on which the king of Iraq and his delegation were expected to arrive. The following is what was related to me about the scene by our ambassador to Ankara, Najib alRawi. He said, The clock struck 11:00 a.m., and the king’s entourage had yet to appear. As the delay grew longer, Turkish officials exchanged nervous whispers amid mounting anxiety. Adnan Menderes came up to me, and taking me by the hand, took me aside and said to me, “There appears to have been some unrest in Baghdad this morning, and it must have affected the travel plans of the king and his delegation.” A few moments later, one of Menderes’s escorts whispered something in his ear. Upon hearing what the escort had said, Menderes said, “We’ll have to go back. There’s no use waiting any longer. Please come by to see me at one o’clock this afternoon for a consultation.”

Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

483

A few minutes later it was officially announced that a military coup had taken place in Baghdad and that King Faisal II and his entourage had not left the city. Hence, the would-be reception party left the airport and went their separate ways. At one o’clock that afternoon I went to Adnan Menderes’s office as he had requested, and he gave me the full story on the military overthrow that had taken place. He said, “We’ve prepared two divisions to advance toward the Iraqi border to put down the rebellion. However, I think it best that we first contact the British so that any military action we take will be based on a mutual agreement, since a British military force has landed in Amman and a US force from the Sixth Fleet is in the process of landing in Beirut. If you pass by to see me at nine o’clock tomorrow morning, I hope to be able to update you on developments.” When I went to Menderes’s office the next day, he seemed dejected and there was no sign of the enthusiasm that had had him in its grip the day before. Unfortunately, my impression was confirmed when he said to me, “The situation has changed. The British don’t support any military action against the rebels in Iraq, and the only hope now is that the new powers that be will show themselves willing to arrive at some sort of understanding with us and ensure stability in the country. However, there’s no justification for taking any measures at the present time.” With no news coming out of Baghdad, we felt shaken, deflated, at the mercy of fate. So imagine how we felt when we learned that the king, the crown prince, and all the members of the Hashemite household, men and women, had been mown down in cold blood by the “revolution”! They’d gone now to be with their Lord: another procession of martyrs from among the Prophet’s descendents.

And now we return to Baghdad, the theatre in which the terrible overthrow took place, to examine some of the information that became available months, days, and sometimes only hours before the event, and which sheds light on the many factors and influences surrounding this painful series of developments.

The Regime and Its Executioners The regime that was established in Iraq on August 21, 1921, under the leadership of King Faisal I and overseen by the British—who worked together with the Iraqis with varying degrees of loyalty and sincerity—had, over time, grown to maturity, progressing slowly but surely into a full-fledged state. However, differences among the various elements that lived under the rule of the new state over political perspectives, social progress, and reform throughout the country bred rancor and resentment. Consequently, the door was opened to intrigues that had their origins in other countries, particularly Israel and France. On the local level, the army emerged as a force that aspired to run the country and determine its direction. It first tried its hand in the political

484

My Memoirs

sphere in the 1936 uprising led by Bakr Sidqi. This was followed by another uprising on December 25, 1938, against the cabinet of Jamil al-Midfa‘i, then by the dangerous rebel movement led by Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani in 1941, as well as a number of other uprisings that didn’t meet with success. As for the last military uprising on July 14, 1958, it was facilitated, both directly and indirectly, by the Arab front led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and Shukri alQuwatli, international Israeli and Zionist intrigues, and France, which looked upon any revival in any Arab state as a sign of its failure to sufficiently oppose the Arabs. (Sometime earlier Iraq had initiated an intense campaign against France in both the Middle East and the West.) Another source of support for the revolution of 1958 was the large numbers of disgruntled Iraqis who claimed that they were bearers of a progressive, reformist message that was being resisted by the Iraqi government then in power. But the most important source of all was the local Communist Party as well as Communist parties and organizations worldwide, which viewed the government of Iraq at that time as their mortal enemy.

A Wicked Plot All these forces and elements, varied as they were in terms of direction and belief, shared a common hostility toward Iraq and a desire to make an example of it. On this basis, they formed a single front whose task was facilitated by Iraq’s overconfidence in its own stability, its reliance on its allies, and the reforms and overall improvements its government had introduced, all of which caused it to turn a blind eye to the plots being woven both outside and inside the country. Leaving its fate to chance, it failed to take any precautions that might have helped to keep calamity at bay. Following the events of July 14, 1958, it became apparent that the coup had received its greatest support and impetus from Communism. The remaining elements that cooperated with those who staged the coup consisted of either discontented individuals who wished the government ill, or patriotic but illinformed people who had not yet gained a clear grasp of Communism’s unstated agenda.

Fatal Neglect The Iraqi government in office at that time was blithely indifferent to the danger that threatened it. The following are examples of the reports it had been receiving about dissident movements both inside and outside the army, and to which it paid no attention whatsoever.

Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

485

First, in his published memoirs, King Hussein mentions receiving documented evidence that indicated the presence of a group within the Iraqi army that was being organized and readied for a military takeover of the government. Hence, he contacted Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah and asked him to send a trusted party to meet with him, saying that he had important information that he wished to send back with him. The crown prince then appointed Lieutenant General Rafiq ‘Arif, the United Arab Army’s chief of general staff, to go to Amman. When ‘Arif met with King Hussein, the general was given documented information about the rebel movement in the Iraqi army, as well as the names of some of those involved in it. To this information the general came back with a characteristically derisive and nonchalant reply. In effect, he denied the existence of the rebel movements the king was cautioning him against. In fact, he added, he had information indicating that a military coup was about to be staged by the Jordanian army! Seeing that the Iraqi emissary had not come with a view to receiving classified information and passing it on to his superiors in Iraq but, rather, to argue and criticize Jordan, King Hussein made clear to him that his job was to receive and deliver, not to discuss. In short, all King Hussein was asking the emissary to do was to convey faithfully the information that had been entrusted to him to Iraq’s monarch, crown prince, and prime minister. Second, during a visit made by Nuri al-Sa‘id to Istanbul more than a month before the July 14 coup, Adnan Menderes mentioned to Nuri, in the presence of Najib al-Rawi, Iraq’s ambassador to Ankara, that according to documented evidence in Menderes’s possession, a military overthrow was being planned in the Iraqi army. Nuri al-Sa‘id retorted that such information was incorrect, and that he didn’t believe a word of it! Third, whenever Bahjat Turkoman, Turkey’s ambassador to Iraq, came to see me, he would share with me information he had received about the seriousness of the situation on the popular front, as well as discontent in the army. I would then pass on what I had heard from the Turkish ambassador to Nuri al-Sa‘id, who was serving at that time as prime minister of the Arab Union. But when Nuri heard what I had to say, he would simply reply with a condescending smile. Fourth, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, who was serving as Iraq’s prime minister at the time of the July 14 coup, once told me that Bahjat ‘Atiyah, director of public security, had come to him three or four days before the coup and presented him with a report containing information on a movement being led by a number of Free Officers, some of whom he mentioned by name, saying that a military coup was imminent. After reading the report, Bahjat ‘Atiyah and the director of public security went straightaway to the royal court. When they reached the Royal Administrative Office, they presented it to Nuri al-Sa‘id, prime minister of the Arab Union. After Nuri

486

My Memoirs

al-Sa‘id had read the report, the three of them showed it to Prince ‘Abd alIlah. The prince put in a call to Rafiq ‘Arif, chief of general staff, who not only flatly denied everything the report said but went on to say that the prince should put no store by any information he happened to receive from the director of public security! Fifth, Dr. Fadil al-Jamali had been sent to New York to work with Charles Malik, Lebanon’s minister of foreign affairs, who was defending a claim being made by Lebanon against Egypt according to which the Egyptian government had been behind a Syrian invasion of Lebanon. When alJamali returned to Baghdad, he visited me at the Arab Union’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and gave me a report on his trip. He said, “I wasn’t able to meet with John Foster Dulles before I left, since he was away on a trip. However, I managed to meet with Mr. Christian Herter, the undersecretary of state, and we talked about a number of issues. I asked him about the matter of delivering the fifty aircraft that Iraq had been promised last June but had never received, and after providing me with some information on this matter, he said, ‘Based on documented information coming to us from Baghdad, it appears that there are a number of movements and currents in the Iraqi army whose existence gives us reason to believe that the army would not be willing to obey government orders if it were asked to move on this or that front. There is also evidence of discontent with the government on the level of the Iraqi public, as well as other matters that are cause for concern. To your knowledge, is this information correct?’ In reply, I told him that his information wasn’t correct, and that the overall situation in Iraq was stable and calm.” I then instructed al-Jamali to contact the Arab Union’s prime minister, Nuri al-Sa‘id, and inform him of what had transpired between him and Herter so that the prime minister could be aware of the situation. The following day I was visited by the US ambassador in my official quarters, and I told him what Herter had said to al-Jamali. At that moment Nuri al-Sa‘id walked in and went to his office, and I told the ambassador that I would ask the prime minister about the matter and tell him what he had said. Once Nuri was settled in his office, I went in and asked him what he thought about what al-Jamali had said. His reply: “The army is 100 percent loyal to the king, and the people are 80 percent loyal to the government.” So I passed on what Nuri al-Sa‘id had said to the US ambassador, and God knows I did what I had to do! Sixth, Shaikh Ghazi al-‘Ali al-Karim, head chieftain of the al-Bu‘isa clan in Samurra’, a shrewd and well-informed clansman and someone whose word I trusted, said to me, “On July 11, 1958, I learned from a trusted source that a military coup was in the making, and that if it was carried out, the intention was to do away entirely with the existing regime. As soon as I heard this I went to the king and told him what I’d heard. Then I

Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

487

went to the crown prince and shared the information with him as well. However, the crown prince told me that my information was incorrect, and that I would be better off minding my own business! On July 14, all the reports I had heard were confirmed. However, I was afraid to go to the royal court again, since I knew I’d hear the same loathsome rebuke from the crown prince. So I didn’t do anything more.” Seventh, Jamil ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who served as minister of justice in Ahmad Mukhtar Baban’s final cabinet, told me that he had obtained reliable information about a military takeover that was expected to take place within a matter of days. So he informed Nuri al-Sa‘id, who responded with the usual disbelief and denials. Eighth, I was told by a reliable source that he had gone to the home of Nuri al-Sa‘id at 11:00 p.m. on the eve of July 14, 1958, and had informed him that the warning that was normally issued when troops were mobilized had not been issued on the occasion of the dispatch of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Brigades from Iraq to Jordan. When Nuri al-Sa‘id contacted the chief of general staff and inquired of him about the matter, he was assured that all necessary measures, including “the warning,” had been taken. However, it later became apparent that in violation of the usual procedure adhered to in the event of a military action requiring that the army pass through Baghdad, no such warning had been issued. Ninth, when Lieutenant General Rafiq ‘Arif, the Iraqi army’s chief of general staff, was placed on trial, he proudly acknowledged that he had been lenient with the Free Officers, deliberately overlooking their activities, and that he had refrained from taking any measures against them even though he was fully aware of what they were about! In sum, the Iraqi government, along with its king, its crown prince, and all its leading figures, had fallen into a deep slumber like that of the Seven Sleepers,1 and when at last they awoke on July 14, 1958, it was to the sound of bombs and artillery fire.

The Black Coup At six o’clock on the morning of July 14, 1958, I woke as the sun was rising. As I was gathering up some briefcases and arranging their contents, the maid came in and said, “I hear the sound of gunshots coming from a distance.” However, we paid little attention to her comment. A few minutes later the telephone rang and I was told that Muhammad ‘Ali al-Imam was on the line. When I answered the call, he told me that a military coup had taken place and that Nuri al-Sa‘id’s house was surrounded by soldiers. Consequently, he advised me to get away from my house, and he offered to come by and escort me to his home. I agreed to his suggestion and waited

488

My Memoirs

for him to come, but he never arrived. We tried to contact the Rihab Palace. The first time we called, they said they didn’t know anything. The second time we called, they acknowledged that there had been a coup. Then the lines were cut off. When I heard this, I moved quickly to get away from home. The first thing I did was to get into a jeep and go to a place where I was told I would be safer. When we reached the aforesaid location, we found construction work in progress. So I decided to go to al-Kazimiyah, then to the region inhabited by the Mushahadah clan where I owned agricultural land with a large number of farmers on it, including the clan head and his followers. When we reached the land and told the clan head what had happened an hour earlier, everyone showed concern for me and began offering assistance of whatever kind I might need. The first thing we did was to turn on the Baghdad radio station and listen to the news. We found out that ‘Abd al-Salam Muhammad ‘Arif had announced the establishment of a republic and was inciting the masses to rise up and take vengeance on the king, the crown prince, and everyone in positions of power in the government by destroying their homes and putting them to death. The leader of the revolution then issued orders for all the commanders in the Iraqi army to be forced to retire. At ten o’clock one of our servants came and told us that the king and the crown prince had been murdered and their bodies dragged through the streets and that people were in a state of near hysteria. Realizing what all of this meant and what the rebels were after, I decided to leave Shaikh Dawad al-Zahir’s house and head north in the hope of reaching Mosul by afternoon, then make my way to the Turkish border. A new Chevrolet was available for the trip, but it needed gas, and the gas stations were refusing to sell more than a couple of gallons to each customer. We did our best to round up the largest possible amount of fuel, but it was certain not to be enough for the journey. Then we thought of moving to another farm we owned in Abu Ghurayb. The problem this time was that the road leading to Fallujah was patrolled by soldiers, which meant that we might be searched and arrested. So we started looking for ways we might reach our destination without having to take a public road. We managed to find someone who could serve as a guide for us. However, Shams al-Zahir, the shaikh’s son, who was a thoughtless prattler, had been sent to al-Jawadayn for some fuel. While at the gas station he had mentioned, whether intentionally or unintentionally, something that tipped them off to my whereabouts. It wasn’t long, of course, before the news had reached spies and those lying in wait for me and, from there, the military discipline commander. At five o’clock that afternoon three cars appeared in the distance. As they approached the al-Zahir residence, we could see that there were two military vehicles and a taxi, which was apparently serving as their guide. Those present scattered to various parts of their houses, while we ran for cover to some abandoned residences. I sat

Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

489

‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif says, “I was the mastermind, the director, the instigator of the blessed revolution! Peace be upon Iraq.”

down in a spot that was out of sight and stayed there for an hour while the soldiers looked for me. However, they didn’t manage to figure out where I was hiding. They seemed to have grown weary of the search and were about to leave. However, a Communist spy who was with them saw a little boy nearby and said to him, “We have your father locked up, and if you don’t tell me where Tawfiq al-Suwaydi is hiding, we won’t let your father go.” In response, the child said, “The pasha was here. Then he went that way, into some abandoned houses.” With that, the search was on again, and it wasn’t long before they found me and led me away under the command of an officer with the rank of captain whose name I don’t recall. However, he was better-mannered than his men, who bound my hands and robbed me of all the money I had on me, which came to more than fifty dinars, as well as my gold ring. When the officer joined us, I introduced myself to him and asked him to take the cuffs off my hands, which he did. However, he wasn’t able to retrieve my money for me, since the soldiers denied having taken anything. Hence, he said nothing more, and neither did I. It was about seven o’clock in the evening by this time. On our way, the soldiers started singing in a loud, obnoxious way, and I started thinking about how, if these ruffians

490

My Memoirs

kept up with their singing until we got to the city, it might draw a crowd, which could lead to unpleasant consequences. I asked the officer, who was sitting beside me in the front seat, to have them stop. So he ordered them to be quiet, and they obeyed. Then I asked him to take a shortcut by going to the Ministry of Defense via the A’immah Bridge and al-A‘zamiyah. When we got to the Ministry of Defense, many people were gathered at the entrance, most of them soldiers and officers. I was taken in immediately to see Mahmud ‘Abd al-Razzaq, the military discipline commander, who received me with a wordless apathy, though he was neither harsh nor rude. After I’d taken a seat in his office, he ordered me a cup of tea, and I drank it. He told me that “this man” (referring to ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim) had risked his life by doing what he had done that morning. He reminded me that many people had been killed and their bodies dragged through the streets, and that I should thank God that I was still alive. Then he rose and left the room. More than fifteen minutes later, an officer with the rank of major came in and asked me to come with him to the Rashid Military Camp, which was being used by the engineering regiment. I got in the car with him and he introduced himself to me as a resident of the Sitt Nafisah Quarter, from the al-Khattab al-‘Umar family, and more specifically, the son of Salih al-‘Umar. Grateful for this coincidence, I said to him, “My father was in the 1920 revolution. When he was on the run from the authorities, he went jumping from one roof to the next until he got to your grandfather’s house. Your grandfather took him in for a day before he moved on to al-Kazimiyah. And now I happen to have ended up in your car! I hope you’ll take care of me as well as your grandfather took care of my father.” He reassured me that he would get me safely to our destination, saying that he was thankful to be able to perform this service for me. When we got to Ghazi Street we found a huge demonstration in progress, so he turned and headed for Shaikh ‘Umar Street instead. When we reached the Rashid Military Camp, he turned me over to the military prison superintendent, then headed back where he had come from. I was taken to a room where Bahjat ‘Atiyah, director of public security; ‘Abd al-Jabbar Fahmi, Baghdad’s provincial governor; and ‘Ubayd ‘Abdallah al-Madayifi, commander of the Royal Guard Brigade, were being held. We exchanged whatever information we had and spent the night there without being given anything to eat. The next day I sent word to Dr. Muhammad ‘Ali al-Imam, my sister’s grandson and director of the camp’s military hospital, who brought an ambulance right away. He asked the prison superintendent for permission to see me, but, after contacting his superiors about the matter, the superintendent refused his request. Nor was I allowed to go to the hospital even though I was ill and had a heart condition. So he went back to the hospital

Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

491

and from there, sent me a mat to sleep on, a blanket, food, and a number of other items.

“Revolutionary” Treatment That afternoon the prison superintendent told us that we would be moved to a place where our comfort would be amply provided for, though he didn’t specify where. He also mentioned that we would be leaving after sundown. At midnight, several trucks appeared along with a number of armored cars, and after all the arrangements had been made, they told us to get in. There were around fifty of us. We sat on the floor of the truck with heavily armed, glowering guards breathing down our necks. A rumor had begun circulating among us to the effect that even though the stated purpose of the transfer was to take us to the place where armored cars were kept at the Abu Ghurayb Prison, the reality was that they might dispose of their “cargo” along the way, and that none of us would arrive! Considering the ferocity of the guards and their cruelty to some of the prisoners, it wasn’t hard to believe that the rumor might actually be true. At one point, for example, they brought on two prisoners who were handcuffed together. They made the first of the two get into the truck while the second was still on the ground, after which they pushed him roughly on board without the slightest concern for whether he had been injured. So, given the dispositions of the guards toward their charges, it was easy to believe that they might in fact be intending to liquidate us before we arrived at our supposed destination. Yet all these realities notwithstanding, the caravan did in fact reach Abu Ghurayb, and the barracks guards received the detainees one by one, and even by name. They placed us all in four rooms, each of which would normally have held four people. Into the first they stuffed eight; into the second, twenty; into the third, fifteen; and into the fourth, which they had to empty first, the remaining prisoners. It should be remembered that it was July 15, and that the rooms packed with these masses of humanity had their doors and windows closed. None of the officers or privates heard our cries for help and our pleas to open the windows. The temperature had to have been at least 30 degrees Centigrade that night, with no access to water and no opportunity to answer the call of nature. The next morning, by which time we were in a pitiful state, we were given nothing to eat, although they did let us out—under heavy guard—long enough to relieve ourselves. At ten o’clock, Muhammad al-Shawwaf, the army’s general director of medical affairs, came to see us and we registered complaints concerning the bad treatment and deliberate harm being done to us. He issued orders for the windows to be opened and for us to be fed whatever happened to be on hand. Hence,

492

My Memoirs

they brought us whatever they could scrounge up as though we were hardened criminals. Thus the cruelty went on, both material and psychological. Casting us looks of contempt and malicious glee, the officers would sometimes ask one of us what his name was, and when they received an answer to their question, they would call him every name in the book and hurl the vilest insults one can imagine at him and his family. One of the prisoners who met his end on that ill-fated night was a man by the name of Na’il, who had worked as assistant to the director of public security. Na’il had been active in opposing Communism and, as a result, had been targeted for especially harsh treatment. For two days and two nights he was allowed neither to eat nor to relieve himself. Although he suffered from a heart condition, no physician came to see him and no one gave him even the most minimal care. In short, he was left to die like an animal. Things went on this way from July 16 to July 19. On the morning of the twentieth, we were told that we would be transferred to another location that was part of the general prison across from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As usual, they delayed the transfer until after dark. This time, however, we were cared for better along the way. We were taken to “the stopping place,” as they called it, which was inside the Central Prison Building. When we got there, the soldiers in the corridors barraged us with vile language and ugly epithets, the mildest of which was “traitor.” God knows how many times we heard that term in particular during that week. However, they allowed us to sleep in the open area within the garrison. Hence, we got to breathe fresh air again after having been packed like sardines into suffocating spaces for the five days previous. The following day they brought us a meal consisting of tea, milk, eggs, and bread, telling us that we were now under the supervision of the general prison system and that we would be allowed to read, write, and have some basic items such as chairs, light tables, and the like. Consequently, we were hopeful of better days ahead. However, the optimism didn’t last long. Before noon of that same day, we heard reports that the highest military authorities had not agreed to our being placed under the general prison administration, since they wanted to be directly responsible for us. As a result, they reverted to the harsh, militarystyle treatment that was being meted out previously. The guards went from being civilians employed by the regular prison to a dense array of military personnel, some of whom would stand at the garrison door, and others of whom were stationed on the roofs brandishing Stern rifles. The next day we also learned that Rif‘at al-Hajj Sirri, director of military intelligence, harbored the most violent enmity toward our group. Consequently, he kept close tabs on how the prison and military authorities were treating us, and if he got wind of the slightest leniency toward us or anything that might afford us a bit of comfort, he would go on a rampage, ranting, raving, and making threats.

Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

493

Interrogation Things went on this way, with sixty-eight prisoners in the garrison ranging from a former prime minister to the murdered Sabah al-Sa‘id’s chauffeur. Careful attention was given to ensuring that we were properly guarded and treated with the requisite harshness. If someone tried to bring food to any of us, it would be sent back with its bearer or eaten by the soldiers. Then the would-be giver would be sent away with an empty plate and told, “No one is allowed to take food into the ‘political detention center’”—the euphemism they now applied to “the stopping place” but that they regularly proved through their actions to be a cruel misnomer. Between the tenth and the thirtieth of the month, the number of detainees rose continuously until it came to around eighty. Prisoners who had already been sentenced, and who were being housed not far from our garrison, would target us with bawdy songs that made clear what satisfaction they took in our miserable lot. Some of these ne’er-do-wells, when they were hauling materials from one place to another as part of their prison detail and happened to pass near our garrison, would shout out hateful expressions as though we were now in a lowlier station than they were. One night some of them even threw some garbage and old shoes our way to the tune of more vulgar ditties and abusive language. On July 30 the myrmidons came and informed me, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, and Bahjat ‘Atiyah that we were being summoned for interrogation. So after handcuffing us and putting us in a military vehicle, they took us to the Ministry of Defense. They took us to a room where we rested for a while, then began calling for us one after the other. The special investigative committee was made up of a lieutenant colonel by the name of Mahmud ‘Abd al-Razzaq, a major, a captain, and a civilian judge. After confirming my identity, they showed me a small piece of paper and asked whether the signature that appeared on it belonged to me. I replied in the affirmative. Then they said to me, “Why did you write this and send it to Nuri al-Sa‘id?” I replied, “Let me read it first. Then I can answer your question.” I then read the note, which was a communication I had addressed to Nuri al-Sa‘id from my summer home in Lebanon. I told him that I was in a place where the temperature was 23 degrees Centigrade while the temperature in Baghdad was over 40. Then I commented, “You’re undoubtedly aware of the disastrous results of the Syrian elections. In any case, time will be the judge of that.” This was all the note said. Nevertheless, the authorities considered it to be an act of interference in Syria’s elections, and thus, a violation of Act No. 7 of the year 1958.

494

My Memoirs

As for the rest of the accusations, none of them was discussed by the special investigative council because they were of no actual substance. The government declared its willingness to receive any complaint or testimony pointing to misconduct, misuse of power, or injustice of any kind. However, the only people to come forward were those who wanted to ingratiate themselves with the new regime, and even these people’s testimonies were not heard by the investigative committee because they were irrelevant to the accusation. After our second and third sessions, the committee restricted itself to general questions about Iraqi policy and its previous directions. When the committee found no basis for making any further accusations, the focus shifted to preventing the case from going to trial. However, when it contacted the higher authorities, it was forbidden to issue any verdict that would clear me of the charge against me. It was then asked to send my papers to the Supreme Command, and it did so. A few days before the trial was to begin, I learned that the military prosecutor was about to press fabricated charges that would require me to be tried for violation of Act No. 7, and that he was asking the court to hand down the death sentence. And in

The infamous Fadil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi, chief of the Higher Military Court, the “People’s Court,” and a sublime, perfect model of “revolutionary justice,” in all his dignity, nobility, impartiality, and solemnity

Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

495

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, after fifty years in the service of the Arab community, was now in Fadil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi’s hands before the “People’s Court”

fact, when the trial began and I read the public prosecutor’s official statement, I found that he was demanding the death sentence, and that the trial be conducted based on Section 13 of the Baghdad Penal Code and Act No. 7 of 1958.

The Fadil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi Court Like most other trials, mine became an arena for verbal fencing matches between its chief, al-Mahdawi, from his post on the judge’s bench, and the opposing party. Space doesn’t permit me to go into all the circumstances that attended the trial, nor is there any need to do so, since they are recorded in a work entitled The People’s Court (mahkamat al-sha‘b). I daresay, the modern history of Iraq should devote a special chapter to this court entitled “The Tragi-Comedy.” However, there is one point to which reference should be made in this connection, namely, the way in which the sentence under consideration was commuted from the death penalty to life imprisonment with hard labor. The crime the court wanted to convict me of was that of deliberate interference in Syria’s internal affairs. However, it had become clear through the ongoing

496

My Memoirs

interrogations that there was no basis for accusing me of committing this act of treachery! Hence, bearing in mind that the court was under orders from its superiors to convict me of this very offense, it sought evidence from another sphere in the hope of convicting me. Specifically, it sought evidence of my interference in Syrian affairs based on the attempt to prove that I had attended the meeting of the Iraqi and Turkish prime ministers, other men of state from both countries, and the US special envoy Louis Henderson, at the Yildiz Palace in Istanbul. Efforts were made to demonstrate that I had attended this meeting, although the court knew that I had not held any official position in the Iraqi government at the time when the meeting was held. Although a number of witnesses claimed that I had been present at the aforementioned meeting, I refuted their testimonies by producing my passport, which showed beyond the shadow of a doubt that I had gone to Beirut two days prior to the meeting attended by Henderson. Circumstances thus made it impossible for the court to prove this claim. Hence, in the event of my conviction, it would have no choice but to commute the sentence from capital punishment to life imprisonment—an outcome that must have disappointed it sorely! I did attend the first meeting that was held at the Yildiz Palace, although I was not present for the one that was attended by Henderson, since I had, in fact, gone back to Beirut prior to that time. Toward the close of the trial, I devised a practical plan by means of which I could defend my case without causing any kind of provocation of the court and the Communist elements that controlled it. I simply responded in the most matter-of-fact, brief, and deliberate possible way to every point raised by the public prosecutor, refuting his claims with convincing arguments. The reason I adopted this approach was that, based on what I had heard from others outside the courtroom, these elements were waiting for any slipup on my part. More specifically, they hoped I might broach sensitive points relating to the legitimacy and legality of the court and its proceedings as well as other matters about which I might be tempted to launch into a passionate diatribe as others before me—such as Sa‘id al-Qazzaz, Muhammad Shaqra, and others— had done, and as a result of which they had lost their lives. I was well aware of all the circumstances surrounding the trial and the motives that lay behind the court proceedings. I knew that the court was bent on reaching the verdict that the Supreme Command and the Communists who stood behind it wanted it to reach. Consequently, I knew it would do no good to launch into passionate defenses of the ousted government or to attack the court or the government it served. At the conclusion of the trial I was sentenced to life imprisonment. Then fate began to work its will in the destinies of those who had been wronged by these despicable tyrants.

497

Coup-led soldiers trample on pictures of the ruling family to whom they had sworn their lifelong allegiance

498

My Memoirs

Soldiers under the leadership of still another coup trample on pictures of “the sole leader.” After all, such is the way of military coups. If only they would learn.

Imprisonment I was detained in the general prison, which was referred to as “the political detention center,” for three years, at the end of which the supreme military command deigned to commute my sentence from life imprisonment to ten years. This was followed by a pardon that exempted me from serving the remaining seven years. On July 14, 1961, I was informed of the pardon I had been granted. In keeping with the ruling regime’s custom, I was asked, along with the others who had been included in the pardon, to meet with “The Leader.” Then we were to go to our respective homes. The Leader was known for being given to idle chatter. Hence, after agreeing amongst ourselves that we would say as little as possible during the interview and not open the way for The Leader to launch into one of his prolix, boring monologues, we headed to the Ministry of Defense. As it happened, however, we found him to be quite restrained in his speech on that day. Rather than treating us to a long sermon, he contented himself with a bit of self-congratulation and a listing of the beneficial things he had accomplished for the country.

Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

499

When he had finished, I thanked him on behalf of the whole group for shortening our sentences and said that we wished him success in his future endeavors. Then I fell silent again. However, seemingly oblivious to what we had agreed on beforehand, Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani, who had also been included in the pardon, waxed eloquent in The Leader’s praise, going on ad nauseum about his inimitable virtues. Thus ended the farcical theatrical production starring ‘Abd al-Karim alQasim and his cronies on the Iraqi stage. Led by this motley mix of disgruntled Communists, enviers, and revenge-seekers, the country suffered a fifty-year regression into the past in the political, social, and economic spheres alike.

Leaving Baghdad For an entire year after being released from prison I largely secluded myself at home, mixing very little with anyone outside my family and close friends. At the end of that year, a man from the Public Security Department came to inform me that the director of public security, ‘Abd al-Majid alJalil, wanted to see me in the next few days, although he didn’t specify a time. Hence, I went to see the man, whom I found to be gruff and affected in his speech and manners. After I had sat down, he began telling me about the meticulous way in which his department went about its work. His

‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, “The Leader”

500

My Memoirs

department, he assured me, was aware of everything that went on in both public and private, including the games played and the plots woven by saboteurs whose aim was to destroy this regime that the country had welcomed and in which it had found reason to hope for its future. The Public Security Department, he added, was indebted to the country’s ingenious Leader, who had sacrificed himself and his comfort for the sake of his country. At the conclusion of this vacuous discourse he said, “We have received reports to the effect that you are still doing things to undermine The Leader’s actions and policies. In fact, The Leader had been thinking of sending you back to prison. However, he has decided to give you another chance provided that you avoid doing anything that would make him angry. As for me, I asked to see you so as to let you know where you stand.” I replied, “I have neither said nor done anything to undermine the current government’s policies or actions. Rather, I’ve chosen to stay at home, limiting my contact to relatives and a few close friends. So the reports you have received don’t reflect the reality of things. Besides, I see that you have been making a point to have me watched and tracked in every way possible. If this situation continues, it’s bound to be tiring for you and harmful for me. Hence, the best solution I can think of is for us to remain friends but to part ways. In other words, I’m suggesting that you give me a passport so that I can leave the country right away, which would make things easier for both of us.” He agreed immediately to my request, so I thanked him and left. After dealing with a number of difficulties relating to the Department of Internal Revenue, I was issued a passport, and around two weeks later, on June 9, 1962, I left Baghdad for beloved Lebanon. At long last I felt free, far from the prison that had hung like a pall not only over me but over all of Iraq, and I heaved a sigh of relief as though I had been brought out of darkness into the light. Lebanon, by the way, has a special place in my heart. The weather is superb, the scenery is captivating, and its people are intelligent, witty, and highly refined and educated. It has an unparalleled intellectual climate where one enjoys freedom of thought, speech, and action. Its policies are marked by fairness, perspicacity, and wisdom, a fact that has blessed the country with a fair degree of prosperity despite difficulties it occasionally faces and despite the caprices and currents that rock its near neighbors from time to time. I hope the Lebanese people appreciate the blessings they enjoy. Indeed, they should thank God for what they have and cling to it with all their might so that Lebanon can continue to be an oasis of freedom and prosperity. Given their intelligence, patriotism, and concern to preserve their homeland’s well-being and national unity, the Lebanese people undoubtedly have what it takes to preserve the rare blessings they enjoy.

Iraq’s Catastrophe: July 14, 1958

501

Note 1. A reference to “the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus,” a group of Christian youths who, during the persecution of Christians under the Roman emperor Decius in the third century CE, went into a cave either to seek refuge or, after being banished there, to die for being Christians. According to one version of the story, they remained in the cave for 180 years, after which they emerged during the reign of the Christian emperor Theodosius II before dying. The Byzantine calendar recognizes them with feast days on August 4 and October 22. Surah 18 of the Qur’an, “The Cave,” takes its name from this account, which is related Qur’an-style in verses 9–26 of this surah, and draws a number of spiritual lessons from the story.

31 The View from Exile

~

I chose to reside in dear Lebanon in order to spend the remainder of my life in a place where I could enjoy peace, quiet, and relaxation after half a century of toil in the service of my nation. Yet, although I had decided to content myself with observing events from a distance, I remained in contact with various individuals on the margins. Hence, I would like in what remains of these memoirs to describe some of these contacts, two of the most significant of which were my visits to Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

In Jordan As I’ve had occasion to mention, on the day when the First Arab Congress, which called for Syria to be granted independence and for King Faisal bin al-Hussein to be installed as its monarch, was convened, I presided over the First Iraqi Congress, which called for Iraq to be granted independence and for King ‘Abdullah bin al-Hussein to be recognized as its sovereign. From that time onward I came to have a special place in the heart of King ‘Abdullah, who loved and respected me and who from time to time would invite me to Jordan. Whenever I went to see him he would give me a warm welcome. In addition to seeking out my advice on numerous legal, political, and constitutional matters, he would sometimes call upon me to act as a mediator in order to resolve crises that had erupted between him and other Arab states. I also had the opportunity to visit Jordan during the reign of King Hussein bin Talal. A young ruler, King Hussein was someone who commanded one’s admiration for his intelligence, courage, manliness, and heroism. 503

504

My Memoirs

Gifted with both wisdom and steadfastness, King Hussein enjoyed other qualities as well that, particularly in view of his tender years, his circumstances, and his country’s limited resources, set him apart as an extraordinary human being: devoted, perceptive, noble, and bighearted. This was the impression I had formed prior to the disaster that befell Iraq on July 14, 1958. However, my last visit to Jordan further increased my admiration for King Hussein and my appreciation for his talents and fine qualities. He was the ruler of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which at that time was made up of both banks of the Jordan River: the East Bank, known as Transjordan, and the West Bank, which was what remained of Arab Palestine after the establishment of the enemy state of Israel. King Hussein’s people thus included both native Jordanians (“East Bankers”), who professed undying allegiance to him, and Palestinians, who were accorded better treatment in this kingdom than they had been in any other Arab country in terms of equal rights and responsibilities and access to professional positions, although never at the expense of the native Jordanian population. Nevertheless, many Palestinians residing in Jordan were still prone to being influenced by hostile Egyptian propaganda. Many a dangerous conspiracy was hatched, then exposed and thwarted under King Hussein’s rule. Yet he persevered, unflagging, too dignified to respond in kind to his enemies’ insults, demagoguery, and subversive propaganda. At the same time, Jordan was a poor kingdom whose budget was virtually always in the red, particularly after Britain cut off aid to it in response to King Hussein’s patriotic stances. As for the United States, it stupidly bargained and haggled over its own aid to Jordan. Another major difficulty that confronted Jordan’s young monarch was the fact that his country formed the first line of defense against Israel, and its outstanding army—however well trained and armed it may have been and however high its spirits and its readiness to sacrifice—was stationed along an enemy front whose length extended a full 650 kilometers. King Hussein spared no effort to strengthen his army and gave it all the nurture and support it required, as a result of which he enjoyed a high degree of loyalty among its ranks. Despite all the difficulties facing the country, this faithful, daring ruler was leading his country and his “Jordanian family,” to use his words, swiftly along the path of progress, self-sufficiency, advancement, and prosperity. However, a cause of concern to anyone who cared about the well-being of King Hussein and his kingdom was the fact that nearly all affairs of state in Jordan were based on the king’s own person. Consequently, if—God forbid—anything were to happen to him, only God knows what would ensue. One must recall here that, given his courage and daring, the king would sometimes go beyond the limits of what would appear to be prudent for someone whose life was not solely his own. In fact, there were times

The View from Exile

505

when he seemed to approach these things as a kind of adventure as, for example, when he would fly airplanes and take part in car races and other types of dangerous sports, not to mention the abandon with which he would fight alongside his men on the front lines. Still another thing that I viewed as not being in Jordan’s best interest was the hostility I had observed among some Jordanian men of state, or, at least, the fierce competition among them for positions of power. Whoever happened to be in power at the time would rush to defend the status quo, whereas if he left power, he would bemoan the country’s miserable fate. Every camp would place responsibility for the country’s ruin on someone else. This phenomenon was detrimental to the country’s well-being, the prestige of those currently ruling it, the state apparatus, and the morale and dedication of its employees and citizens, particularly given the fact that Jordan was in a delicate position that called for tireless dedication, effort, vigilance, caution, and readiness to confront danger. Although such observations might be viewed by some as an overstepping of my bounds, it should be remembered that they are motivated by the fatherly affection I felt toward King Hussein, the daring monarch, and my concern for his best interests and those of dear Arab Jordan, whose paths he worked to straighten and whose progress he sought to achieve with what sometimes appeared to be superhuman energy. In all this he was assisted by his commanding and lovable personality, his intelligence and worldly wisdom, and his distinctive manhood, sincerity, and faith.

In Saudi Arabia I made a visit to Saudi Arabia not long after allegiance was pledged to King Faisal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Sa‘ud, whom I had known for quite some time. King Faisal was a first-class politician with tremendous acumen, depth, and knowledge, as well as penetrating foresight, realism, and humility. Thanks to his long experience in government, politics, diplomacy, and international relations, King Faisal had gained a huge store of expertise and worldly wisdom over and above the innate intelligence and perspicacity that he had brought to his rulership as a young man. So given over was he to the task of improving his people’s lot and achieving progress in the kingdom over which he ruled that he paid scant attention to his opponents’ insolent attacks in newspapers and over radio broadcasts, not to mention the plots they were continuously hatching against him. Signs of progress had become rapidly apparent in Kuwait once oil was discovered there, since Kuwait is a small country in terms of both landmass and population. In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, with its vast land area and large population, oil resources were insufficient to enable it to achieve

506

My Memoirs

King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan

rapid, clearly discernible, comprehensive progress. However, King Faisal proceeded apace toward the goal of advancing his country in a studied, sound manner. Hence, even if the fruits of his efforts were not immediately apparent, they were bound to become evident in time. King Faisal labored assiduously to organize governmental affairs in a way that would transform Saudi Arabia into a state in the modern sense of the word. As such, he was interested first and foremost in development and education and strove to achieve an Islamic rapprochement that he believed would further Arab causes. Foremost among these was the cause of Palestine which, given the holy places located there, he viewed as being not only an Arab concern but an Islamic one as well. In this noble quest of his on behalf of his people and homeland, as well as the broader Arab and Islamic world, King Faisal was supported by a select group of ministers, consultants, and assistants who, with enthusiasm, competence, and good faith, had dedicated themselves to the service of their country and their nation under his able leadership. Concerned for his people’s present and future welfare, he worked together with them, as the Holy Quran puts it, to rule “in all matters of common concern [through] consultation among themselves.”1 This he did day and night with

The View from Exile

507

all the strength he could muster in order to offer his people and his nation everything a shepherd could possibly offer his flock. King Faisal was of the belief that the modern currents of thought that had begun taking our countries by storm were dangerous to the history and heritage of the Arab-Islamic nation and, therefore, to our region as a whole. Consequently, he held that it was the duty of Arab Muslim kings, heads of state, and other leaders who had not entered the Communist orbit to join hands in an effort to ward off the evils of Communism and its venomous intrigues and, in this way, to preserve their countries, their religion, and their pan-Arab identity. After speaking with King Faisal about King Hussein’s dedication and sincerity as well as the challenges he was facing, I encouraged him to cooperate with King Hussein given their mutual interests and their shared duty toward the Arab and Islamic community, toward their countries, and toward themselves. When I did so, I found him very receptive. Indeed, he had a genuine appreciation for King Hussein and, accordingly, a desire to work with him and support him to the greatest extent possible, since it was clearly in their mutual best interests to join together to confront the looming Red threat. At the same time, I found that King Faisal believed, and rightly so, that the tragedy of Yemen2 was an unforgivable offense against Arabdom and a gaping wound in its collective body.

Tawfiq al-Suwaydi with King Faisal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Sa‘ud of Saudi Arabia

508

My Memoirs

President Habib Bourguiba Tunisian statesman Habib Bourguiba made an official visit to Lebanon during which his young, energetic ambassador, Ahmad ben ‘Arafah, invited me to meet with President Bourguiba. Hence, I went to the palace that the Lebanese government had designated as his guest quarters, where I had an interview with him that was brief but moving. In a show of noble generosity, President Bourguiba extended me a heartfelt invitation to visit his country, saying, “I hope you will do us the honor of visiting us in Tunisia. If you were to do so, I might be able to repay in some small way the tremendous service you have done for me, for Tunisia, and for the Tunisian cause.” I remember the support Iraq extended to Habib Bourguiba when he was a Tunisian leader fighting for his country’s independence. We received him when he was a homeless freedom fighter and provided him and the Tunisian cause with moral and material support. We also defended the cause of independence for Tunisia in international forums. In so doing, we were simply being consistent with our traditional policy in Iraq, namely, that of supporting and assisting all Arab nationalist movements and helping fellow Arab states in their legitimate struggles for autonomy. I also remember offering a number of services in this connection in a personal capacity. However, whatever support or assistance I or other Iraqi officials had extended to Tunisia and its great leader, Habib Bourguiba, had been nothing more than the fulfillment of our duty. Consequently, I was deeply moved by President Bourguiba’s invitation and his heartfelt gratitude. Indeed, this outstanding man had become widely known for his sincerity and good faith. Moreover, in an age when these character traits have become such a rarity, one rejoices even more when one encounters them in someone one knows. It delights me to think that I’ll soon have the chance to visit lush Tunisia and to see firsthand the all-embracing revival about which I have heard so much in the fields of science, development, and culture and to which President Bourguiba has devoted himself with such energy since achieving independence for his country. After all, these achievements were made only after a long, bitter struggle that cost him exile, imprisonment, and homelessness. At last, though, his efforts were crowned with success, and he led his country along the path of progress in keeping with a focused, studied policy marked by practicality and realism. It was precisely President Bourguiba’s realistic bent, even in his policies toward the international community and especially toward the other Arab states, that made him the target of subversive propaganda and destructive conspiracies, particularly when he refused to bow to Egypt’s attempts to impose its policies on all Arab states without distinction. President Bourguiba also maintained a distinctive perspective on the Palestine issue. Some approaches that Bourguiba viewed as being practical

The View from Exile

509

and realistic were seen by others as being inconsistent with the hopes and sentiments of the wider Arab community. However, Bourguiba was willing to take positions and express opinions without regard for whether they happened to conform with the most popular trends. After all, a leader’s duty is to raise the understanding of the general public to his level rather than descending himself to their level in search of some sort of cheap popularity. In this connection, I recall how, during World War II, at which time the Tunisian people, like most other Arab peoples, were being swept along on a wave of pro-Axis fervor, Habib Bourguiba protested against this blind willingness to conform to other people’s points of view, warning others of its dangers and unwelcome consequences and affirming—contrary to what so many were saying—the inevitability of an Allied victory. Bourguiba remained unfazed by the widespread popularity the Axis powers enjoyed with the Tunisian people and other Arab populations. And in fact, later events demonstrated that, like other discerning Arab leaders of that era, Bourguiba had been right all along. Another distinctive feature of Bourguiba’s approach was his belief in a gradualist policy that, when the policy of stony negativism failed, he adhered to with highly beneficial outcomes. When Tunisia was admitted into the Arab League and took part for the first time in the league’s meetings, Bourguiba had his representative, Habib al-Shatti, deliver a forceful speech in which he demanded that all member states be accorded complete equality. He insisted that Egypt cease its attempts to set itself up as a guardian over the other member states, treating the league as though it were nothing more than a section of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. Bourguiba also made statements in which he warned against the imported doctrines that gained circulation at a later time in the Arab world and that did so much harm to the Arabs and their causes. Bourguiba expressed views that, at that time and at first glance, may have appeared strange and unpalatable to those most zealous for the Palestinian cause. However, with the passing of the days and years, it became apparent how foresightful, valid, and truly patriotic Bourguiba’s views had been. I still have copies of the speeches that were delivered by Arab kings and heads of state at the First Arab Summit Conference convened in January 1964. Among these is the speech delivered by President Bourguiba in which he criticized the ways in which Arab states were dealing with the Palestinian issue. In Bourguiba’s view, these approaches to the issue were lacking in force and realism, being driven more by emotion than by reason and common sense. Specifically, he held that the issue of Palestine was not an issue of Arabs and Jews in Palestine or of a conflict between Arab states and Israel but, rather, an issue having to do with colonialism. This being the case, he did not believe that it could be resolved, or Palestine liberated, by a conventional war between the Arabs and Israel. Consequently, he called

510

My Memoirs

upon Palestinian Arabs themselves to initiate a resistance movement against Israel on occupied Palestinian land—in city streets, in desert expanses, on the mountaintops—with well-guided, informed leadership and with the understanding that all Arab states would embrace and nurture this movement in an ongoing, effective manner no matter what sacrifices it entailed. At the same time, he called upon the Arab states to launch a political, diplomatic, and media campaign the aim of which would be to draw the world’s attention to the Palestinian cause, mobilize international public opinion, isolate the enemy in the international arena, and turn the international community against the Israeli state. Bourguiba demanded in his speech that the Arab states establish a joint Arab command and prepare themselves to cope with any and all eventualities. In order to do this, of course, they would have to be willing to rise above their petty squabbles, which did nothing but dissipate their energy and resources and undermine their efforts. This is the point of view Habib Bourguiba bravely set forth in his address to the First Arab Summit Conference in early 1964. In delivering this address, he challenged the prevailing views of the day, unconcerned as to whether the response would be applause or censure. At the same time, he made it clear that whatever the greater Arab community decided, Tunisia, for one, would not hesitate to spend its resources in the service of the Palestinian cause. In what I have written here, my intention has been neither to support nor refute President Bourguiba’s views on the Palestinian issue, or any other issue for that matter. Rather, the point I wish to make is that courage and authenticity consist not in a leader’s descending to the masses’ level of thinking, then proceeding to play on their emotions and exploit their goodheartedness in pursuit of a personal glory that might well be at the people’s expense. Rather, courage and authenticity consist in a leader’s willingness to guide his people based on his own heartfelt convictions, to bring his nation face-to-face with reality, and to lead public opinion rather than allowing public opinion to lead him.

In Lebanon Given my many visits to Lebanon over the years, it was only natural that I should have opportunities to meet with a number of its leading figures and with friends of mine there who showered me with such kindness that I felt as though I were in my own country and in the midst of my own family. I had the honor of meeting with President (General) Fouad Chehab and former president Camille Chamoun. In addition, I had frequent opportunities to see many dear brothers who had positions of prominence in Lebanese and Arab social and political life, including ambassadors to Lebanon from

The View from Exile

511

a variety of Arab and Islamic countries. I often met with Syrian and Iraqi brethren residing in dear Lebanon. From that verdant oasis of freedom, we observed events from afar with bitterness and apprehension, all the while bemoaning the fate of this nation God had afflicted through a group of its native sons who had debased those who had once been honored, reviled those who had built its state and won its independence, and wrought wanton, reckless destruction in the land. May God guide them back to the right path and restore to our beloved nation its freedom and dignity, its autonomy and prosperity.

Notes 1. Surat al-Shura (Consultation) 42:38. 2. This is a reference to the 1962–1970 North Yemen Civil War. The war began with a coup d’état staged by republican leader Abdullah al-Sallah, who overthrew the newly established monarchy of Imam al-Badr. Imam al-Badr escaped to Saudi Arabia, where he rallied popular support. The royalist side was supported openly by Jordan and Saudi Arabia and covertly by Britain, while the republican side received support from the Soviet Union and Egypt. Egypt’s involvement in Yemen’s civil war is viewed as having harmed its performance in the 1967 Six-Day War. In fact, it was so disastrous that it has been referred to by some as Egypt’s Vietnam. After an initial deployment of only 5,000 troops in 1962, Egypt had been forced to increase its troop levels repeatedly to nearly 70,000 by the time it withdrew in 1967. The war ended with a republican victory.

32 Conclusion

~

In the course of writing these memoirs, I have done my best to record nothing but those things that I did myself or with which I became familiar in a direct way by virtue of the positions I held and the responsibilities I bore. In this way I hope to have recorded the facts alone and avoided making any claims of which I am uncertain. However, as I bring this chronicle to a close, I ask readers to bear with me as I come out of my seclusion for a time and take them on a tour of the Arab world from my personal perspective. In the course of this tour, I will touch briefly on the views I have formed on recent developments based on personal experience and observation, yet, this time, without having any part to play in such events. For after half a century of heartfelt, informed service to my Arab and Islamic nation, I hope to have earned the right to express my personal opinions. Together with an elite group of noble, good-hearted, trustworthy brethren from a number of different Arab countries—some of whom have passed away—I helped to rescue the Arab world from the clutches of Turkish rule and its policy of Turkification, the aim of which was to melt down its Arab subjects (and others of its subjects who were likewise non-Turks) in the crucible of Turkish nationalism. Left with the legacy of Turkish rule, our countries were lacking in resources. They were disjointed and in need of administrative organization and the ability to focus their efforts on the problems at hand. At that time, Arab countries lacked even the most basic foundations for civilized, structured governance. Hence, after working together as a group on behalf of Arab countries as a whole, we went our separate ways to work on behalf of our countries individually. It was during this phase that I began working with my Iraqi brothers for the improvement of our country. We worked diligently and energetically, 513

514

My Memoirs

with devotion, enthusiasm, and a spirit of self-sacrifice, until we had won our country’s independence. We then continued our labors to help the country achieve greater organization and progress. Step by step and stone by stone, we built up the constituents of a robust modern state until at last, by God’s grace, we managed to make Iraq into a prosperous independent state with a place of respect and influence in the Arab world and within the international community. All the signs at that time augured well for further progress of the same kind for Iraq, assuming, of course, its perseverance along the same auspicious path. However, it was soon to suffer setbacks that would rob it of the gains it had made and the advantages it had won, including its international position and its leading role in the world, causing it to collapse and regress with shocking rapidity. How easy it is to tear down, and how difficult to build up! Admittedly, the system of rule in some Arab countries exhibited a number of weaknesses. Yet, however real they may have been, such weaknesses were hardly worth mentioning by comparison with what they came to suffer later under the tyrannical regimes that had now come to rule them, regimes that were ridden with administrative corruption, egotism, classism, exploitation, and monopolization of power. Moreover, the weaknesses that plagued the systems of governance in Arab countries in their early days would not, by themselves, have been sufficient to stoke the fires of hatred and resentment to the point where they destroyed the entire foundation and replaced it with something worse. However, the forces driving international Communist propaganda and their local mouthpieces had begun infecting the minds and hearts of good-hearted people with a rancorous, rebellious spirit that presented black as white and white as black. Yet even this would not have been sufficient to influence the situation in a decisive way had it not been for the fact that a handful of officers responded to the call of Satan, as it were, as an outlet for an innate penchant, in fulfillment of repressed desires, and as a result of greed for gain or positions of power. When this response crystallized, it derailed the country and sent it careening into a bottomless abyss. Repeated bitter experiences point to an obvious fact, namely, that the only proper, sound path for the military leads straight from the barracks to the front. If any army digresses from this path, the country will inevitably spin out of control like a train that goes off track. Military personnel are not trained to rule and manage state policy either domestically or internationally. Rather, their functions are to protect their country’s borders in times of danger, to preserve order domestically in times of emergency and disaster, and to protect the constitution and the law in the event of intrigues and civil unrest. These are the sacred functions of the military—not the transgressing of its bounds by turning on its homeland, breaking solemn oaths, and succumbing with the masses to the urge to tear down and destroy. Of course,

Conclusion

515

when certain military figures take over power, they are the first to advise other military personnel not to interfere in politics! They apparently fail to note the fact that the sword that brings down one regime in favor of another is a two-edged one. Woe betide the government whose cart is drawn by one or both of the following steeds: the army, and the masses! Yet alas, this is the woe that has afflicted some of our beloved Arab lands. In addition to the bane of military coups, a plague that has swept through the region in a most frightening way is that of Socialism, also known variously as Marxism, Communism, and the like. This noxious, destructive philosophy, whatever its name, form, or hue and in whatever guise it appears, is a doctrine of corruption, atheism, and hatred. A doctrine that impoverishes the rich without enriching the poor, it works to turn out a generation of youths who deny belief in God and religion, nationalism, history, heritage, and spiritual and moral values. The generation this philosophy seeks to produce is one that denies its own nation, with its rulers and systems, its past and its present, the traditions of society, the laws of the earth, and the laws of heaven. It is a generation saturated with hatred and bitterness, small-mindedness and idiocy, and a thirst for destruction and sabotage. It believes in nothing but Socialism and its infernal methods of roiling the waters, poisoning wells, confounding minds, burning bridges, turning things upside down, razing foundations, and destroying what others have built. These new, “progressive” sources of corruption have rent bonds asunder, divided peoples, placed distance between hearts, squandered trust, sown the seeds of discord, wasted talent and expertise, and excluded us from the forward march of civilization and our lofty national aims, foremost among which is to recover the right to the homeland that was taken from us and to liberate those Arab regions that are still fighting for their freedom and autonomy from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arab Gulf. Our aim is to establish a perfect unity based on solid, reasoned foundations, and to build a modern society whose citizens enjoy not only sufficiency but prosperity, social justice, advancement, and progress. Moreover, we strive to achieve such things gradually through cooperation, not through pressure and coercion, robbing and looting, force and subjugation, bloodshed and degradation, nor through recalcitrance, thanklessness, and a refusal to acknowledge our history and our spiritual and cultural distinctiveness as a nation. Is it not shameful that we Arabs and Muslims, who number more than 100 million and 500 million, respectively, should submit ourselves passively to the humiliating challenges that come our way from Israel and elsewhere? Is it not high time that the prudent and dedicated among us went to work to repair the breach and unite our ranks so that we can become a power that commands respect among the nations of the world? When will our leaders and officials begin working in a spirit of earnestness, faithfulness, and integrity, aware of their religious and patriotic duties?

516

My Memoirs

When will they work consistently for the sake of tolerance, rapprochement, and cooperation rather than doing so only when it suits their fancy? When will they give up their conspiracies, intrigues, and adventures, their cursing, insulting, and reviling, their accusations of treason and espionage? Do they not see that these types of accusations have lost their meaning? When will they lay down the poisoned daggers that have kept us divided for so long and join hands in confidence and determination? When will those of us who believe in God, our nation, and our religion unite our efforts in the face of the criminal wave of Marxism, Socialism, and Communism that is sweeping over our lands? When we do, we might just be able to win back those who have lost their way and preserve our faith, our patriotism, our national identities, and our values. It is not only a desirable thing but a compelling duty for us to pursue cooperation and mutual understanding between the Islamic solidarity movement and the Christian ecumenical movement. By establishing close cooperation between these two blessed movements we may be able to thwart the efforts of those who seek to sow the seeds of corruption and the myrmidons of international Communism and their agents in our countries, thereby enabling spirit to gain victory over matter, faith over atheism, and virtue over vice. So long as God is one, our aim is one, and our enemy is one, it behooves the leaders of these two movements to engage in constructive dialogue and exchange messages of goodwill, since they are united by the same ideals and human values. When Karl Marx in 1848 issued his spiteful Communist Manifesto—crying, “Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win!”—the Communists united and set to work all over the world spreading corruption and atheism. So why don’t non-Communists unite? Why don’t the believers, the prudent, and the sincere unite and work together? Why don’t they hold out steadfastly in the face of the forces that target them, their faith, their doctrines, and all the values and concepts they believe in? Indeed, such forces target their possessions and their very lives, their dignity and that which they hold most sacred. We have an inescapable duty to lend these matters the attention they deserve. Therefore, the leaders of the Islamic solidarity movement and the Christian ecumenical movement would do well to form joint committees that could exchange opinions and advice, draw up plans for collaboration, and undertake detailed studies in preparation for concrete action to follow. Higher committees could be divided into subcommittees and formations to be run by well-educated clergy, intellectuals, scientists, communications specialists, psychologists, and others with a profound understanding of the nature of communities and individuals. The task of these committees would be to prepare for a focused, comprehensive consciousness-raising campaign

Conclusion

517

aimed at eliminating the pernicious effects of Communist, Marxist, and Socialist propaganda and putting to death the noxious seeds of atheism and hatred that have been planted in people’s psyches. It should be remembered in this connection that were it not for the frightening spiritual vacuum that our ignorant, negligent, dim-witted clergy and educators have failed to fill by presenting religious and moral values in ways that resonate with the spirit of the age, and by educating our youth in modern intellectual disciplines without neglecting our religious and national heritage, such seeds would never have found fertile ground in people’s minds and hearts. It isn’t an easy task by any means. Neither, however, is it an impossible one if motives are sincere and determination is strong, particularly if those involved in such consciousness-raising encourage one another to persevere in the task before them in order to reach their goal before it is too late, before that day when no effort will any longer bear fruit, and when regret will be of no use. After all, the advocates of atheism aren’t working haphazardly or extemporaneously, merely leaving things to chance. On the contrary, they are applying carefully thought-out theories based on a profound, comprehensive understanding of people’s strengths and weaknesses, thought patterns, psychological makeups, and circumstances. For centuries on end our Arab peoples have held out steadfastly in the face of invading armies and tyrants. So why is it that they now surrender to others’ blows as though they had rendered them senseless? Why is it that they remain silent in the face of things they would never have tolerated before? Why is it that they allow their interests to be violated, and the traditions they hold sacred to be desecrated before their very eyes? Why have they laid down their arms, whether voluntarily or under duress? It should be clear to everyone in our nation, to young and old alike, to its political parties and their leaders, which of the past regimes provided the greatest hope, peace, prosperity, and development for our Arab countries after having established states on their behalf, achieved their independence, and laid sound foundations for orderly self-rule. Similarly, it should be clear to them which of the past regimes instilled anxiety in people’s hearts by burdening them with hardships and successive crises, by spreading poverty, repression, and terrorism far and wide, by sowing the seeds of disunity, by thwarting their efforts to achieve the good, by robbing their countries of security and stability, by weakening their economies, and by sowing hatred between one state and another, between ruler and ruled, between one party and another, between employers and employees, between peasants and landowners. Such regimes have also embroiled some of our Arab countries in civil unrest that has led in turn to bloodshed, wasted efforts, and wasted energy. Instead of ordering their affairs, prospering their peoples, and preparing themselves to confront enemies from a position of strength, they were preoccupied with

518

My Memoirs

disagreements, conspiracies, and overthrows. Indeed, it is no secret to anyone in our nation which of its former eras and regimes brought blessings and peace in their wake and which of them brought angst and affliction. It is not in the nature of the Arab nation to remain silent in the face of injustice, to submit meekly to what it knows to be wrong, and to capitulate without a struggle to the tyrant. Nor is it in its nature to yield to despair. The history of the world’s people is rife with tyrants, some of whom have ruled their people in the name of the people while at the same time afflicting them with all manner of repression and persecution. How often have our peoples languished under the rule of power-hungry despots? Yet sooner or later, they have always managed to crush them and be liberated from their chains. Where, for example, is Bakr Sidqi now? Where is ‘Abd alKarim Qasim? Where, in Syria, are Husni al-Za‘im and Adib al-Shishakli? Where is King Farouk of Egypt? Where are Lumumba, Nkrumah, and Sukarno? Where are Hitler and Mussolini? Where is Nero? How many are the Neros of our modern age, and in our own countries! There is no reason for despair. The night is bound to end, and there will be a dawn in which our nation awakens to defeat the tyrants who refuse to listen to the voice of their consciences and turn to the right path. Our nation will remove the debris and ruins they have left and work to rebuild, to establish governments that provide them with peace of mind, prosperity, stability, material comfort, dignity, strength, and the ability to resist foreign invasion. In so doing, it will fulfill its hopes and prepare itself to take its rightful place among the nations as a powerful, respected nation in which peace reigns and that keeps pace confidently and worthily with the march of civilization. Indeed, the time is coming when our nation learns to distinguish good from evil, the righteous from the unrighteous, and the malicious from the kindhearted, and in which it clings to truth and crushes untruth underfoot. Gone are the days of dictatorial, one-man rule enforced with soldiers’ spears, police terrorism, secret agents and spies, propaganda and its deceits. Gone are the days of tyranny, although vestiges thereof remain in our land—vestiges that must needs vanish, never to return. It is a given that among our principal goals are the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity. When it comes to the liberation of Palestine, we have to be realistic and practical rather than sentimental in our approach. It isn’t enough for us to say, “Palestine, here we come!” Nor is it enough to say, “We’re going to crush this so-called Israel and cast her into the sea!” We must all understand that the liberation of Palestine is an awesome task, the accomplishment of which requires that we do a careful accounting of all our resources as well as those of the enemy, both locally and internationally. It would be better, for example, for us to enter the battlefield two years from now after having properly equipped ourselves than to enter it a year from now without having done whatever was necessary to ensure victory. It

Conclusion

519

is a battle that calls for total preparedness, not only militarily but politically, psychologically, economically, and in the realm of communication and the media. This preparedness must exist locally, in all the Arab countries, and in the international arena as well. After all, we mustn’t forget who is behind the enemy. Consequently, we have to do our utmost to win the enemies’ allies over to our side by removing the blinders from their eyes and making them aware of what there is to gain from supporting the Palestinian cause and what there is to lose by not doing so. Unfortunately, there are states that have been blinded by their own interests or by deceptive propaganda, or whose leaders and politicians have been taken in by the enemy’s wiles. Hence, let us labor to protect ourselves from the harm they might do us and threaten their interests if they continue on their present course. Let us also work to win support from other states whose backing could shift the balance of power in our favor on the international scene. We have, in the Islamic states of the world, a significant counterbalance that we would do well to appreciate in its proper measure. We need to nurture friendly relations with these states in particular and, in this way, to guarantee their unqualified support in various spheres. I feel certain that such states would be both qualified and willing to grant us such support if we comported ourselves in the appropriate manner. In the realm of foreign policy there is another point to which we must also lend attention, namely, that Arab states that struggled and sacrificed for long years in order to win their freedom must beware lest they, for emotional reasons, replace a Western colonialism with an Eastern one. We need to realize that there is no state, be it Western or Eastern, which wishes us well or otherwise except to the extent that this will serve its own interests. We must also understand that economic, political, and military colonialism is something that, sooner or later, by one means or another, we can liberate ourselves from. As for doctrinal or ideological colonialism, it may not directly impact our economy, for example, or our military bases, our facilities, our airports, and so on. However, it impacts us on a far deeper level, since it co-opts our faith, our minds, our hearts, our souls, and our thoughts. In short, it takes over everything! This, of course, is by far the worst sort of colonialism, since there is no way to free oneself from it: not today, not tomorrow, and not the day after tomorrow. Western colonialism has receded for the most part from our Arab lands. Therefore, let us not replace it with a new Eastern colonialism. It is right and proper to demonstrate appreciation for what others have done for us, yet without becoming dependent on them or subject to them, still less groveling or crawling on our bellies. After all, never has a state on the face of the earth taken a position supportive of our causes but that it was tainted or suspect to one degree or another. At the same time, we must not be overly or consistently biased toward either East or West. Rather,

520

My Memoirs

we should maintain a flexible, judicious foreign policy consistent with our own interests without either opposing or subjecting ourselves to any one state at all times. And throughout, let us continue to show ourselves strong, playing a positive, humane, constructive role in the international arena in keeping with our time-tested ideals and the sublime values and traditions we have inherited. And now I come to the military aspect of the country’s life. We need to face the regrettable fact that our armies eat away unnecessarily at our budgets. We undoubtedly have a duty toward our soldiers, who have pledged themselves heart and soul to defend their homeland. It is our duty to provide for their comfort and everything they need. However, to provide for their comfort to the point of excess is bound to lead to undesirable consequences. After all, a soldier needs to understand that his duties extend from the barracks to the front and back, and no further. His responsibility is to maintain order, to obey his superiors, and to concern himself with training, armament, and whatever else pertains to purely military matters. It is a criminal act to press military personnel into service as politicians, to drag them into partisan affairs, and to assign them to administrative and governmental positions for which they have not been prepared and for which they are neither suited nor qualified. Such practices have the potential of corrupting both the positions assigned and those to whom they have been assigned, which in turn is harmful to the public interest. When appropriating funds to the military, it should be borne in mind that many types of arms and military equipment are not only exorbitantly expensive but also highly subject to obsolescence due to the frequency with which they undergo changes and improvements. Consequently, if a state purchases weapons or equipment in excess of its actual requirements, it may be weakened both financially and militarily, particularly if these types of weapons and their associated ammunition become obsolete, in which case they are worth no more than the metal that went into them and, as such, cease to have any war-related or strategic value. This is a fact which I assume is known to military specialists in Arab countries, although some of them are prone to disregard it. It also behooves Arab states to standardize their military affairs, at least on the levels of terminology, weapons, and ammunition. In fact, this should be one of the highest priorities for states that are preparing to enter the battlefield together as a single nation, in a single region, and against a single foe. Disregard for this priority is bound to harm states’ interests by weakening their capacity for effective joint military operations, including the ability to coordinate lines of attack and defense. It should also be remembered that if we wish to achieve our major goals, foremost among which are the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity, then each Arab state has the duty to take care of itself first in order to

Conclusion

521

become powerful in its own right, for only then can the Arab states be strong as a group. We don’t want ourselves to be an impotent set of zeros to the left of a number, which, no matter how numerous they happen to be, never increase its value. Rather, as I have said, each Arab state needs to take care of itself first and foremost, ordering itself on foundations that have shown themselves to be sound. By these I mean democratic, constitutional, legal, parliamentary foundations on the basis of which a country’s destiny is determined by rulers and representatives who are elected freely and fairly. We have no interest in seeing repeats of the regrettable farce that was witnessed in Syria not so long ago, when Adib al-Shishakli was elected by a rigged landslide, or similar events elsewhere. Those who are elected freely and fairly by the people can be assured of the people’s trust and support, just as the people can have confidence in their leaders’ policies and actions. It is thus essential that the state’s administration be as decentralized as possible in order to ensure that affairs are run smoothly and efficiently. In the economic sphere, I believe that the most suitable approach for our countries is to adopt the free market system and to encourage individual initiative. At the same time, restraints must be imposed on those who seek to establish monopolies or exploit others out of greed and who, in so doing, do harm to both themselves and their countries. There are a number of ways in which the state can order economic affairs and prevent practices that would bring about economic exploitation and harm. One of these is the imposition and strict enforcement of progressive taxation. Arab states should also work to promote agriculture, break up large agricultural landholdings, and do away with the vestiges of feudalism, cronyism, and tribalism. However, such measures must not be imposed suddenly and through brute force and humiliation, which would simply make things worse by sowing seeds of hatred and resentment. Rather, they should be introduced gradually and with kindness and consideration for the citizens concerned. As for industry, we should not strive to promote it through rapid leaps but, rather, through gradual development, since it would be neither reasonable nor helpful for a country that for many years was entirely agricultural to become entirely industrial overnight. Nor would it be in our interests to squander our wealth by building huge factories that might then be forced to halt production for one reason or another, such as a loss of raw materials or spare parts, a lack of experience or expertise, or any number of other unanticipated events and side effects of overly rapid expansion. Alas, there have been numerous examples of this very thing in Arab countries in recent years. On the subjects of the economy, business, agriculture, and industry, I believe that our Arab states ought to demonstrate special concern for peasants and workers. In fact, their concern should focus on all those with limited incomes, granting them dignity and peace of mind by assuring them of access to health care, housing, and education. The state should beware of

522

My Memoirs

doing injustice to either peasants or landowners, workers or employers. To this end, it must respect and protect the rights of all by instituting systems that affirm justice and good sense while shunning injustice and exploitation. It is the state’s duty to raise the consciousness of its citizens and to encourage them to work and be productive, not to leave their schools, offices, fields, factories, or even their military camps for the sake of attending “patriotic” meetings or festivals. Nor should people be driven like so many herds of cattle to stage demonstrations or marches, applauding, cheering, and shouting empty slogans. None of these things does anything but waste the nation’s precious energy and resources by reducing people’s productivity and corrupting their morals. Rather, we need to persuade every citizen that he serves his country best by mastering whatever job he does. If we desire truly to liberate Palestine and other regions of the Arab world while establishing a powerful unity amongst ourselves, we must revere God in the way we use our wealth, our abilities, and our time, taking care not to waste them on anything that fails to benefit our peoples and serve our legitimate goals. Our tendency to resort to propaganda through the press, radio, and television, both at home and abroad, consumes inordinate amounts of our wealth and resources. If such propaganda serves to promote our national and pan-Arab causes, then it is clearly a necessity. If, on the other hand, its only function is to glorify certain rulers—making them appear larger than life, praising them with lyre and cymbal while distorting the facts in their favor, portraying noble struggles as acts of treason and crimes and conspiracies as acts of noble service, assailing and slandering their opponents and besmirching their reputations—then it is improper and unacceptable. Similarly, when it comes to intelligence activity, including everything from investigations to criminal prosecutions, police work, and the prevention or unmasking of terrorism and conspiracies, it costs the state dearly, very dearly. If intelligence serves to preserve state security and citizens’ well-being by pursuing enemies and exposing their subversive plots, then it is necessary and clearly worth the price. However, it is unacceptable to use intelligence simply to preserve the personal well-being of individual rulers by pursuing those who refuse to bow to their wishes, persecuting everyone who criticizes them or fails to sing their praises however egregious their errors happen to be, making an example of partisan or doctrinal opponents without the slightest compassion or sense of humanity, and threatening and destabilizing any Arab state whose leaders refuse to pledge allegiance to them. If, to our national income, we add the debts owed to us by other countries and loans received from others, as well as grants and aid from wealthy world powers and international economic development institutions, we end up with quite a fortune. If Arab states spend this fortune on development

Conclusion

523

and recovery, on strengthening themselves, on helping their people achieve progress and prosperity, this is all to the good. However, they have no right to fritter it away on propaganda on behalf of their rulers and on attempts to destroy their opponents. Nor is it acceptable for them to spend it lavishly on their supporters and agents, on adventures and conspiracies, on efforts to sabotage, overthrow, or assassinate leaders in neighboring Arab countries who hold opinions that conflict with theirs or refuse to submit to their dictatorial whims and desires, or in support of one leader over another or one regime over another for no reason but that they have an ideological affinity with the leader thus supported. After all, a state’s national income is not a bequest a ruler simply inherits from his illustrious ancestors. The loans and foreign aid a ruler receives in billions of dollars, rupees, pounds, and marks are not provided by other states or international institutions as honoraria or “tips” for the country’s ruler (whoever he may be), who has the right to dispose of them however he pleases. Rather, such wealth is the property of the state as a whole. As such, it belongs to every individual ruled by the state, and every citizen is entitled to a share of it. Hence, it must be spent and distributed in proper measure and in a manner that will contribute to the wellbeing of the state and all its citizens. Last we come to that most precious goal of all, that of Arab unity, which has been a dream of mine since I was a schoolboy and which I labored to achieve as a youth, as a young man, and in middle age, and in my capacities as student, soldier, politician, and ruler. Those who have labored to fulfill this aim have sacrificed both materially and spiritually. Our finest men, as individuals and as groups, have fought on the battlefield and in the political arena, in clandestine societies and movements, in historic congresses, in diplomatic circles and international forums. Some went to the gallows under brutal Turkish rulers, some faced the bayonets of arrogant French soldiers and the bullets of British colonialists. Others endured internment, exile, and prison, suffering all manner of persecution and humiliation, affliction, and exemplary punishment. And all of this for the sake of Arab unity. We began this struggle of ours some fifty years ago when others, including some who are rulers today, had yet to be formed in their mothers’ wombs, and who now thanklessly turn on us, making all manner of false accusations against us and demonstrating no fear of God in the way they treat their nation, its history, and its future generations. They take no account of truth or conscience, nor do they recognize the sacredness of sacrifices made, battles joined, or glory earned. Yes, we began our struggle for the liberation and unity of our nation more than fifty years ago. Then we continued the struggle with everything we had until we left—or, rather, were banished from—public life. One of the bitterest regrets I have in this connection is that my striving for the sake of unifying the Arab people,

524

My Memoirs

including the regions and states in which they live, was met with opposition by those near and far, by fellow Arabs as well as foreigners, by brothers and by enemies alike. When the weak join forces with the weak, their weakness is only compounded. Hence, as I have said, the first step that needs to be taken is that of working to ensure that our unity is founded upon strength, that it is a coming together of entities that are powerful in and of themselves rather than a string of zeros. Each of our Arab states, then, must work diligently and speedily to strengthen itself on all fronts. Once Arab states become powers with weight and value of their own, then, and only then, can the next phase begin, the phase of preparing psychologically to establish a comprehensive unity. This preparation must take place first through a unification on the level of sentiment, by finding and creating ways to promote tolerance, rapprochement, compassion, love, and goodwill among our peoples. This must then be followed by the unification of our hopes so that unity is the goal that every Arab state—nay, every citizen of every Arab state—believes in and strives for in every way possible and with unreserved faith and conviction. Until such psychological preparation and grassroots mobilization take place, our states must work to recruit specialists, intellectuals, politicians, economists, educators, military personnel, professionals, and jurists to hold meetings, seminars, and conferences in order to discuss and explore the meaning of unity and its implications on all levels. After carefully considered, comprehensive, focused plans have been drawn up, they can be presented to special committees for further study and critique. In the next stage, all the committees from all our states can come together to agree on final formulations of their plans with a view to implementing them in ways that are both theoretically and practically sound, that is, consistent with both reason and all the facts on the ground. Improvisation will lead to nothing but setbacks and disappointment, while haste will yield nothing but failure and regrets. I daresay no one would disagree with the proposition that the most important thing our Arab states should work to achieve is intellectual unity. The way to achieve this type of unity is through the standardization of educational curricula, since in this way we can put an end to the pitiful state of chaos that reigns at present and prepare to graduate generations of Arab adults with the ability to understand others, build bridges, and work toward harmony with others on the levels of thought and culture. For only this kind of ability will enable them to achieve and preserve that greater unity of which we dream. Our Arab states can set about gradually to unify their diplomatic corps and standardize their military terminology and training, their weaponry and ammunition, their financial, economic, and monetary systems, their customs duties, and their agricultural, industrial, commercial, and social sectors. Proceeding in this fashion, these states can go on to integrate their various laws

Conclusion

525

and regulations to the point where it becomes possible to think about political unification. However, the unification of forms, borders, and outward appearances needs to be preceded by the unification of minds, hearts, and interests. The process of political unification should also be approached in a gradual fashion. Based on mutual consent, understanding, and cooperation, two, three, or more of our neighboring states that are homogeneous in many of their systems and affairs can join themselves into a union or federation. When such a union or federation is first formed, each state will retain its own separate identity. The union’s formation can be followed by closer and closer cooperation among its member states, as well as among different unions or federations. Through mutual understanding and cooperation, the differences and barriers between this and that state or this and that federation will diminish to the point where the greater unity we seek becomes a reality. Once the notion of Arab unity has been properly understood, developments such as these can become realities over time. However, the process needs to take place naturally and spontaneously, without pressure, coercion, preference, discrimination, encroachment on people’s rights or dignity, disregard for facts, deceit, challenges, or provocations. After all, any union that comes into existence based on such unsavory phenomena, or which comes about prematurely or hastily, may well alienate rather than embrace, divide rather than unite. It must never be forgotten that in past years, unfortunate events and serious mistakes distorted the concept of unity in the minds of many. Hence, we need to approach issues relating to this concept in a deliberate, unhurried fashion, careful to ensure that we are on the right path. Given the proper circumstances, sound motives, and assistance from God Almighty, we will be able over time to overcome the obstacles before us. It is my fervent hope that these cherished dreams might be realized in our lifetime. This is the noblest aspiration I can conceive of and the greatest thing I could possibly ask of the Almighty. Yet in the event that my hope is deferred, my spirit will hover about my children and grandchildren when they bring these hopes to fruition, pronouncing its joyous blessing upon them. I ask God Almighty to fulfill the Muslim Arab nation’s hopes: leading its rulers and peoples along the path of righteousness, taking its upright leaders by the hand and guiding their steps on the path of goodness and glory so that this nation can once again become, in the words of Surat Āl ‘Imran from the Holy Quran, “the best community that has ever been brought forth for the good of mankind.” For He is the Best of all protectors, and the Best of all who offer succor.

Index

~

Abbasid Caliphate (751–1258), 2 ‘Abd al-Hamid II, 16, 59 ‘Abd al-Ilah, 348(photo), 404(photo), 407(photo), 488; Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948, 381–384; Arab nationalism, 32; Arab Union, 470; Axis propaganda, 279; British liberalism, 30; Chamoun’s visit, 423(photo); al-Gaylani uprising, 307–309, 312–314; Ghazi’s death, 290–291, 293–294; Hashemite-Saudi rapprochement, 465–466; impending revolution, 485–487; Morocco visit, 455–456; move toward democracy, 344–345; Nur al-Din’s nationalist cabinet, 423; officers’ uprising, 301– 303; opposition to Arab nationalism, 33; overthrow and death of, 480; Palestine issue, 397; request for Tawfiq’s cabinet formation, 345–349; Suez crisis, 447; supporting Iraqi regime change, 39; Syrian coup, 36; Tawfiq’s democratic ambitions, 29; Tawfiq’s ministerial appointment ceremony, 353; Tawfiq’s visit with Menderes, 459–460; Washington visit, 453–455; Yildiz meeting, 460–461 ‘Abdini, Gabriel George, 324 ‘Abdullah, Sayf al-Islam, 361(photo) ‘Abdullah bin al-Hussein, king of Jordan, 87(photo), 397, 468, 503 Abu Ghurayb Prison, 491–495 Abu Sukhayr, 236

Academia, 23 Afghanistan, 219; Palestine issue, 249, 267; Sa‘dabad Pact, 223 (n1) ‘Afifi, Hafiz, 394(photo) Agha, Hazim Shamdin, 406 Agriculture: government appropriations for, 166; Iran-Iraq border dispute, 208; policy recommendations, 521–522. See also Land tenure al-Ahsa’, 129–130 al-‘Ajlani, Ibrahim, 74–77 Al-‘Ahd (the Arab Covenant), 8–9, 57 A‘lam, Muzaffar, 267 al-‘Alami, Musa, 283 Aleppo, Syria, 78, 81, 83 Alexandretta issue, 270 Alexandria, Egypt, 113 Al-Fatat (the Young Arab Society), 8–9, 57 Al-Furat, revolt in, 236–240 ‘Ali, ‘Ali Mahmud al-Shaikh, 303 ‘Ali, Muhammad Rida, 135 ‘Ali bin Hussein (King), 291; asylum in Iraq, 139; Faisal-Ibn Sa‘ud relations, 211; Franco-Syrian relations, 204; Ghazi’s connection to, 230; HashemiteSaudi clash, 135–136; Hussein’s exile, 131; Tawfiq-al-Sa‘id, Nuri cabinet formation, 153–154 ‘Alia (Queen), 416 al-‘Aliyya, Bahjat, 40 Alliance Israelite Universelle, 15

527

528

Index

Allied powers: aftermath of al-Gaylani government, 333–334; Alexandretta issue, 270; Iran’s stance, 323–324, 326; Lausanne Conference, 104, 109–110; Middle East situation, 265; provisioning Iraq, 334; Soviet-German war, 329 Al-Shamiyah, 236 Al-Zamun newspaper, 353 Anarchy in Italy, 232 Anglican Church, 227 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 385 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1922), 114, 118–120, 125, 146–151, 157–159; cabinet factionalization over, 160; cabinet formation, 165; Clayton’s death postponing review of, 173–175; military agreement, 182–183 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930), 30, 33, 393– 394; conclusion, 179; elections of 1930, 189; Franco-Syrian Treaty and, 264; al-Gaylani’s interpretation, 314– 317; Government of National Defense, 309–310; Mussolini’s view of, 230; Nazi propaganda, 279; al-Sa‘dun’s suicide, 184 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1948), 33; demonstrations against, 389–392; Iraq’s refusal to ratify, 436; negotiations over terms, 381–389; protests against, 389– 394 Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 127–128, 198, 219–221 Anti-Communist efforts, 35–36, 38 Antonius, George, 6, 80, 132–133, 138, 141, 283 ‘Anzah (clan), 93–94 The Arab Awakening, 6, 80 Arab Awakening, Second, 15 Arab Christians, 5, 45(n11) Arab Covenant, 57 Arab League, 361(photo); charter, 342– 344, 359; council of, 360–361; formation, 341–342; Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s involvement, 358–359; Iraqi foreign policy, 356–357; Iraqi tensions with, 359–360; Iraqi-Lebanese Relations, 362–363; Iraq-Syria Axis, 363; alPachachi’s efforts, 396; sabotage attempts, 364; Sofar meeting, 357–358; Suez crisis, 441, 445; Tawfiq’s democratic ambitions, 31; Transjordan, 361–362; Tunisian admission to, 509; Turkey, 365

Arab League Council, 409(photo), 411(photo)–412(photo), 414(photo), 427, 429, 429(photo) Arab nationalism and unity: roots of, 6; Yusuf’s commitment to, 18–19; Zionism and, 46 (n12) Arab Revolt, 108 Arab Spring, 32, 49 (n70) Arab Union, 37, 467–473, 479–480 Arab unity, 518–519; Arab Union, 467– 473; national defense and security, 520–521; struggles, sacrifices, and recommendations for, 523–525 Aras, Tawfiq Rushdi, 249, 267, 269–273, 271(photo) ‘Arif, ‘Abd al-Salam Muhammad, 35, 488, 489(photo) ‘Arif, Rafiq, 34, 460–461, 469, 485–487 al-‘Arisi, ‘Abd al-Ghani, 65–66 Armenians, 5, 45(n11) Arslan, ‘Adil, 271, 271(photo) Ashraf, 3, 9–10 Asil, Naji, 111–113 al-‘Askari, Ja‘far, 24(photo); Anglo-Iraqi Treaty ratification, 119; ashraf, 5; ‘Askari-royalty cabinets, 145; Dr. Naji Asil and, 111–112; factionalization of the al-Hashimi cabinet, 241, 245; First Arab Congress, 22; al-Gaylani movement, 239; illegal land acquisition, 171; Ismet Inonu’s meeting with, 115; Lausanne conference, 104–107; military coup, 246; political battle, 146–151; Sulayman cabinet, 246; Tawfiq’s connection to, 21; Young Arab Society, 77–78 al-‘Askari, Tahsin, 299(fig.2), 361 Assassinations: Haydar, 279–280; Mahmoud Shevket, 16–18, 47(n22); Thabit al-Suwaydi, 18, 18, 45 (n11) Assyrian issue, 13–14, 225–226 Assyrian Levies, 13 Assyrian military, 321 Astronomy, 10 Aswan High Dam, 444–445 al-Atasi, Hashim, 39, 428, 430(photo) Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 20, 57–58, 205, 272 ‘Atiyah, Bahjat, 485, 490, 493 Atlantic Charter, 356 Autonomy: Franco-Syrian Treaty, 257– 258; Kurds, 202–203

Index Axis powers, 310; Bourguiba’s anti-Axis stance, 509; al-Gaylani uprising, 301–306; Iran’s stance, 323– 324; Iraqi alignment with, 310–311; Soviet-German war, 327 al-Ayyub, ‘Abd al-Jabbar, 40 al-Ayyubi, ‘Ali Jawdat, 234; Arab League, 361, 364; cabinet, 236–237; al-Gaylani uprising, 308–309; Hashemite-Saudi rapprochement, 465–466; al-Midfa‘i cabinet, 235; second cabinet, 400–401; Washington visit, 454 al-Ayyubi, ‘Ata‘ (Bek), 91–92, 260(photo) al-Ayyubi, Nasuh, 260(photo) al-’Azm, Haqqi, 92 al-’Azm, Khalid, 414(photo), 431(photo) ‘Azmi, Mahmud, 108–109 Azouri, Najib, 45 (n12) al-Azri, ‘Abd al-Karim, 39, 406, 427, 432–433, 472, 479 ‘Azzam, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 283, 287, 343, 359, 430(photo) al-‘Azzawi, Jawdat, 212 al-‘Azzi, Sabih Najib, 264, 274 Baathism, 438–439 Baban, Ahmad Mukhtar, 352(photo), 485, 493; ‘Abd al-Ilah and Faisal’s ascension, 524–525; Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948, 383–385; coalition cabinet, 406; al-Pachachi and, 395; People’s Court, 39–40, 48– 49(n55); al-Sa‘id cabinet, 417; Tawfiq’s second cabinet, 351; trial of, 36–37; Washington visit, 454 Baghdad Law Faculty, 23 Baghdad Pact (1955), 34, 435–439, 441, 443–444, 449–453, 459, 461–463, 480 Baghdad province, 58–59 al-Baghdadi, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Qaysi, 71–72 Bahrah Agreement, 138–139, 143 Bakhtiyari, Sardar As‘ad, 213 Bakr, ‘Abdullah, 260(photo), 469, 480–481 Balfour, Arthur, 28–29 Balfour, Francis Cecil Campbell, 81–83 Balfour Declaration, 27–29 Bani Asad (clan), 179 Bank development, 272 al-Barudi, Fakhri, 260(photo) al-Barzanji, Mahmud (Shaikh), 197

529

Basic Technical Assistance Agreement, 407(photo) Basra Oil Company, 426–427 Basra province, 58–59, 252–253, 258– 259, 322 al-Bassam, Siddiq, 32, 307 Bassatne, Gabriella, 40–41 Bayar, Jalal, 272, 460–461 Bayham, Ahmad Mukhtar, 66 Bedouin, 93–97 Bek, Sulayman Nazif, 56 Ben-Gurion, David, 285–286 Berbers, 456 Berry, Burton, 426 Bevin, Ernest, 374, 385, 388–390, 436 al-Bisat, Tawfiq, 62 al-Bizri, ‘Afif, 452–453 Boncour, Paul, 268 Bono, Georges, 265–266 Border disputes: Franco-Syrian Treaty, 257–258; Hashemite-Saudi clash, 139– 143; Iran-Iraq relations, 162, 207–208; Iraq and Turkey, 108; Mosul, 114–115, 119; Shatt al-‘Arab, 210–211 Boundary Assignment Commission, 210 Bourguiba, Habib, 508–510 Boycott, elections, 178 Britain: ‘Abd al-Ilah’s meeting on military affairs, 455; aid to Jordan, 504; Alexandretta issue, 270; Anglo-Iraqi war, 356; Arab self-determination, 80– 84; Assyrian issue, 226–227; Assyrian Levies, 13; attack on Tawfiq’s reforms, 32; ‘Azmi’s opposition to, 108–109; British employees’ salaries, 185; casualties of al-Gaylani revolution, 330–331; Communist protest, 373–374; customs duties disparity, 268–269; divided responsibility for domestic security, 179–182; empty front, 425– 426; Faisal’s agreement, 90–91; FaisalIbn Sa‘ud relations, 211; Franco-Syrian Treaty, 265; al-Gaylani uprising, 306– 309, 311–312, 314–319, 333–336; Government of National Defense, 309– 310; guests of the consul in Jeddah, 135; Hashemite-Saudi clash, 131–132, 136–138, 140–143; hostility toward Iran, 328–329; Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s influence, 129–130; Iran and the Anglo-Persian oil company, 219–220; Iran-Iraq ties, 161–162; Iran’s WWII stance, 323–324; Iraq policy, 26–28; Iraqi approach toward, 178; Iraqi

530

Index

congress, 86–87; Iraqi Constitution, 117–119; Iraqi diplomatic mission in Iran, 192; Iraqi embassy in, 218; Iraqi independence, 22; Iraqi oil refinery, 370; Iraqi revolt, 16; Iraq’s national defense pan, 166; Kurdish issue, 197– 198; Kuwaiti independence, 473–475; Lausanne Conference, 106–110; liberal innovation, 29–30; Naji’s rejectionism, 26–27; Nazis’ propaganda campaign, 277–278; oil concessions, 127–128; Palestine issue, 70–72, 267–269; Portsmouth Treaty, 33, 33, 37, 388, 408, 436; prejudice against Tawfiq and Naji, 19, 24–26; pro-Axis factions of Iraqi military, 294–298; return of the legitimate government, 331–332; revival of al-‘Ahd in Iraq, 98–99; Roundtable Conference on Palestine, 283–292; Russian-Iraqi relations, 203–204; al-Sa‘dun cabinet, 12–13, 46 (n15), 145–146, 181–182; al-Sa‘id cabinet, 334–335; al-Sa‘id’s political conditions, 155–156; Shatt al‘Arab, 210; Soviet-German war, 326– 327; Suez crisis, 445–447; Syria-Iraqi relations, 430–432; Syrian independence, 79–80; Syria’s independence, 78–84; Tawfiq’s foreign policy, 354–355; Tawfiq’s putative corruption, 38; treaties, 157–159; Turkish army in Palestine, 70–72; ‘Ujayr Conference, 134–135; war against Germany, 69; war with Iraq, 319–331; Yemen civil war, 511(n2). See also Anglo-Iraqi Treaty British Army, 72–77 British inspector, post of, 167 Brotherhood, call for, 58 Bubiyan Island, 269 Budget allocations, 166–168; British employees’ salaries, 185, 187; equitable economic provision for military, 520; Tawfiq’s cabinet initiatives, 367–368, 406, 408–418 Bullard, Reader, 107, 328 Cadman, John, 198 Cairo, Egypt, 113, 139 Camel caravan, 92–97 Cantonization of Palestine, 28 Cassel, Ernest, 127 Census Department, 166 Central banks, 14, 344

Chalabi, ‘Abd al-Jabbar, 351 Chalabi, ‘Abd al-Muhsin, 177 Chamoun, Camille, 421, 423(photo), 510 Chehab, Fouad, 510 Christian ecumenical movement, 516–517 Christians, Arab, 64–65 Circassian soldiers, 321 Citizenship, 20 Clayton, Gilbert, 132–133, 135–142, 149, 173–175 Clemenceau, Georges, 79–80, 83 Clerics: elections boycott, 178–179 Clive, Robert, 192, 200–202 Coalition cabinet, 374, 403–406, 408 College of Advanced Sciences, 168 Colonialism: Arab unity and, 467; French concessions in Syria, 254; Palestine issue, 509–510; replacing Western colonialism with Eastern, 519–520 Commercial speculation, 168–169 Communism: Baghdad Pact, 429–430, 438–439, 449–450; as corrupt influence, 514–517; Faisal’s hatred of, 507; influencing 1958 coup, 484; Syrian, 452–453 Communist Manifesto (Marx), 516 Communists: Axis powers and, 301; Egyptian coup, 418; Italy, 232; progress and construction movement, 354; protests against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948, 389–390, 393; provisional cabinet, 372–374; Qasim’s crackdown, 35–36; al-Sa‘id’s dilemma, 418–420 Comptroller general, 241–242 Conscription law, 155 Conspiracy: King Ghazi’s death, 293– 294; provisional cabinet, 372 Constituent Assembly, 118–120, 123–124, 179 Constitutional Drafting Committee, 117– 118 Constitutional Era, 59–60 Constitutional Federation Party, 403–406, 433–434 Constitutional monarchy, 100, 121, 259 Constitutions: budget considerations, 368; drafting Iraq’s, 117–126; al-Gaylani uprising, 306–307; Ottoman, 58–59; Tawfiq’s critique of, 21 Cornwallis, Kinahan, 187, 235, 238, 240, 306, 318, 335–336, 356 Corruption: allegations of, 170–171; Allies provisioning Iraq, 334; of the

Index army, 280–282; Fascist Italy, 234; Jabr’s spending, 379; military regime, 247–248; al-Pachachi, 395; People’s Court, 25–26; socialism as, 514–517; Tawfiq’s trial, 37–38; Teymourtash, 223 Coups d’état, 33, 36; Bakr Sidqi, 280; Egypt, 417–418; leading up to 1958 revolution, 483–484; military as political actor, 514–515; pro-Axis propaganda, 295–297; replacing Bakr Sidqi government, 273; Syria’s alShishakli overthrow, 39; Yemen, 511(n2). See also Al-Gaylani, Rashid ‘Ali; Revolution (1958) Cox, Percy, 98 Crawford, W.F., 31 Crocker, Edward Savage, II, 425–426 Cronyism, 521 Culture: education reforms, 168 Curzon, George, 107–111 Customs duties, 172–173, 268–269 Cyprus, 136 al-Daftari, ‘Ali Mumtaz, 370 al-Daftari, Mahmud Subhi, 156(photo) al-Daghistani, ‘Ali, 454, 460–461 al-Damluji, ‘Abdullah, 138, 234, 465–466 D’Arcy, William, 127–128, 219–220 Darwaza, Izzat, 8 Dawisha, Adeed, 46(n15) de Valera, Eamon, 267–268 Death penalty, 495–496 Decentralization Party (Egypt), 9, 65 Defense minister, 167 Defense pact, 436 Democracy: Arab Spring, 49 (n70); Iraqi Constitution, 21; post war new world order, 344; the regent’s speech, 344– 345; Tawfiq’s efforts to engender, 29– 30 Deputy prime minister, Tawfiq as, 337– 338 Development Board Act (1952–1953), 409 Dimluji, ‘Abdullah, 397 al-Din, Hamdi Sadr, 88 al-Din, Muhammad Salah, 412(photo), 414(photo), 430(photo)–431(photo) Diplomatic mission to Iran, 195–196, 211; Arabs in Khyzestan, 209; British chargé d’affaires, 200–201; completion of, 225; Faisal’s visit to Iran, 212–218;

531

French embassy, 204–205; Iran, 191– 192; Iran-Iraq relations, 199–200, 207– 208; Iraqi embassy, 206–207; Kurdish issue, 196–198, 208–209; Russian embassy, 203–204; Shatt al-‘Arab dispute, 210–211; Teymourtash, 196; Turkish ambassador, 205–206 Diplomatic passports, 113 Disease, 19–20 Dispute, 210–211 Diyab, Najib, 66 Dobbs, Henry, 147–149, 155, 160 Domestic policy, Faisal’s, 243 Drower, Edwik, 117 du Martel, Count, 262 Dulles, John Foster, 444–445, 447, 451– 452, 486 al-Durubi, ‘Ala’ al-Din, 91–92 Economic Condition Act, 353 Economic issues: free market system, 521–522; Iranian, 193; Kuwait’s economic strength, 476; policy recommendations, 521–523; Tawfiq’s initiatives, 33 Ecumenism, 5–6, 15–16 Eddé, Émile, 259, 261, 261(photo), 262 Eden, Anthony, 25, 294–298, 296(photo), 356, 447 Edmunds, Cecil John, 27–28, 309 Education: Fakhriya al-Sa‘dun, 12; firstterm reforms, 167–168; Iraqi military officers, 296–297; Law Faculty, 102– 104; social welfare, 521–522; Tawfiq, 15 Egypt, 262; Anglo-Iraqi war, 319; Arab League, 343, 359, 363; Baghdad Pact, 443–444, 449–451; central bank, 344; Communist leanings, 444–445; customs dispute, 113–114; HashemiteSaudi rapprochement, 466; Italy’s ties, 230–231; Kuwaiti independence, 476; military coup, 417–418; al-Pachachi’s efforts, 396; Palestine issue, 27–28, 249, 251, 263, 266–267, 283–284, 291–292; Palestinians in Jordan, 504; protonationalism, 9; Roundtable Conference on Palestine, 283–284, 291–292; Suez crisis, 441, 444–447; Syria-Egypt union, 468; truce negotiations, 400–401; ‘Ujayr Conference, 133; Yemen civil war, 511(n2) Eisenhower, Dwight, 452, 454, 479

532

Index

Election law, 367–368, 376 Elections: boycott, 178–179; Constituent Assembly, 124–125; Italy, 233–234; Jabr succeeding al-Sa‘id after, 378– 379; al-Sa‘id’s protestations of freedom, 375–377; Syria, 38–39, 493, 521; Tawfiq’s decision to stand, 376– 377 Ellington, Edward, 147 Emergency cabinet, 420 Emergency law, 334–335 Employee rights, 522 Empty front, 425 England, 8 Equality, call for, 58 Europe: effect of fascist Italy on, 233– 234; Iran’s hostility toward, 221–222; Jewish settlement, 28–29; Ottoman political crises, 69; Syrian independence, 78–80. See also specific countries Executions, 35 Executive authority, 121–122 Exile, 499–500 Fahmi, ‘Abd al-Jabbar, 40, 490 Faidhi, Basil, 32, 44(n11) Faidhi, Sulayman, 44–45(n11) Faisal bin ‘Abd al-Aziz al Sa‘ud, 507(photo); Hashemite-Saudi rapprochement, 465–466; Roundtable Conference on Palestine, 283–292; social progress, 505–507 Faisal I of Iraq, 99(photo), 156(photo), 468; ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun cabinet, 177–178; Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 149–150; antipathy to democracy, 21; ashraf, 3; cabinet factionalization, 160; cabinet formation, 153–154; cabinet resignation, 170; constitutional duties, 122–123; constitutional monarchy, 99– 100; death of, 243–244; discouraging Iran-Iraq ties, 162–163; Dr. Naji Asil and, 112; draft constitution, 118; First Arab Congress, 503; forming a new cabinet, 151; Hashemite-Saudi clash, 131, 136–137, 139; Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s relations with, 211; Iran visit, 190, 212–218; Iraqi independence, 85; Law Faculty reform, 103; Naji’s resignation as prime minister, 186–187; Nuri alSa‘id as prime minister, 189; parliamentary elections, 125; regime establishment and progress, 483–484;

al-Sa‘dun cabinet, 145–146, 148; Syrian independence, 77–80, 98; Syrian national resistance, 92; SyrianFrench conflict, 89–91; Tawfiq’s association with, 22; Tawfiq’s cabinet resignation, 173–175; Tawfiq’s integrity, 25; Turkish visit, 212 Faisal II of Iraq, 423–424, 423(photo)– 424(photo), 469(photo), 481(photo); Arab Union, 470; assumption of powers, 421, 423, 425; death of, 479– 481; Ghazi’s death, 290; HashemiteSaudi rapprochement, 465–466; Kuwaiti independence, 476; Tawfiq’s visit with Menderes, 459–460; Yildiz meeting, 460–461 Family history and connections: close ties with, 11–12; Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s familiarity with the al-Suwaydis, 137; Ibn alSa‘ud’s sons, 141; political distinction, 15–16; al-Sa‘dun connections, 12–13; Sharif Hussein, 112; Tawfiq’s genealogy, 2–3 Famine, 19–20 Fanaticism, 57 al-Farisi, Nasrat, 234; Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948, 382; British attack on Iraq, 71; request to form a cabinet, 346, 348 Farouk of Egypt, 359, 363, 417–418 Farughi, Muhammad ‘Ali, 194, 199–200, 217 Fascists, 230, 232–234, 281, 296–297, 301 Fattah, Sami, 472 Faw Detention Center, 332 Fawzi, Hussein, 274 Fayid, Tawfiq, 65 Federal Currency Standardization Act, 479–480 Federation, Arab League as, 341–342 Feudalism, 521 Fifth column, 330–332 First Arab Congress (1913), 45–46(n12), 503; factions, 63–68; Hejaz and nationalist consciousness, 63; opposition to Turkification, 19; reflection of nationalist fervor, 60; resources for, 9; speech of Iraq’s greetings, 66–67; Syrian and Iraqi general congresses and, 22; Tawfiq’s commitment to social change, 57; Tawfiq’s role and importance at, 8; Tawfiq’s values, 10; Turks’ wanted list, 70

Index First Arab Summit Conference (1964), 509 First Iraqi Congress, 503 Fisk, Robert, 44 (n9) Foods, 19–20 Foreign elements, 57 Foreign policy, 31, 243, 354–357, 519– 520 Foreign Service Act, 479–480 France: Allies’ pledge of independence, 86; Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 119; conflict with Syria, 88–90; Franco-Syrian Treaty, 254, 257–259, 257–259, 262, 262, 264–266, 264–266, 271; FrenchIraqi agreement, 161; Iranian embassy, 204–205; Iraqi coup of 1958, 484; Mahmoud Shevket, 18; as model for Iraq, 20; Palestine issue, 268; Suez crisis, 447; Syria occupation, 90–92; Syrian oil concessions, 253– 254; Syria’s independence, 78–80; view of Tawfiq, 8; war against Germany, 69 Franco-Syrian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 254, 257–259, 262, 264–266, 271 Free Men’s Party, 374 Free Officers, 485, 487 Free speech, 32 Freedom, 41 Friedman, George, 46 (n12) Fu’ad, King, 230–231 Gause III, F. Gregory, 32 al-Gaylani, ‘Abd al-Qadir, 262 al-Gaylani, ‘Abd al-Rahmar, 98–100 al-Gaylani, Naqib ‘Abdullah, 145 al-Gaylani, Rashid ‘Ali, 236–238, 315(photo), 484, 514–515; attempt to negotiate with Britain, 315–318; attempt to remove the regent, 312–314; British confrontation, 311–312, 318– 319; British resistance to al-Gaylani government, 314–315; British response to the uprising, 354–355; cabinet formation, 239; consequences for supporters, 335–336; disappearance, 326; factionalization of the al-Hashimi cabinet, 241, 245; failure of the revolution, 324–326; military uprising, 279, 302–306, 309; Naji’s connection to, 12, 19, 23–24; pardon of, 499; political suicide, 314–315; reneging on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 310; replacing Bakr Sidqi government, 274–275, 277;

533

return of the legitimate government, 330–331; trial of supporters, 330 Gaza, 27–28, 73 Genealogy, 2–3 General Iraqi Congress, 22 General Statistics Bureau, 166 General Syrian Congress, 83–85 Genoa, Italy, 263–264 Geography affecting Iraqi security, 47(n27) Germany: Axis propaganda, 277–278, 294–295; Communist sympathies, 301; coup attempt, 12; Eden-Suwaydi negotiations, 295–298; Iran’s preference, 323–324; League of Nations, 228; Soviet-German war, 326–327, 329; war against France, 69 Ghanimah, Yusuf, 147 Ghazi of Iraq, 244(photo); alleged assassination plot, 280; ascension to the throne, 243–244; Axis propaganda, 278; corruption of the army, 280; death of, 290, 293–294; disinterest in politics, 235; al-Hashimi ministry, 244–246; Iraqi-Turkish relations, 205; marriage of, 230; al-Midfa‘i cabinet, 234–235; military coup, 245–246; replacing Bakr Sidqi government, 274– 275; Sulaykh Conference, 238 Ghuli, Shukri Afandi al-Qurh, 70 al-Ghuri, Emille, 291 al-Ghusayn, Ya‘qub, 283 Gide, Charles, 23, 104 Golestan Palace (Iran), 193–194, 213 Gouraud, Henri, 89, 92, 264–266 Government of National Defense, 306– 310, 315, 322 Great Arab Revolt, 26, 467 The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East, 44(n9) Greece, 109–110, 457 Grobba, Fritz, 278–279 Gulbenkian, Calouste, 220 Habbaniyah Project, 166 Hadi, Sayyid ‘Abdul, 32 al-Hadi, ‘Awni ‘Abd, 65 al-Hadi, Ibrahim ‘Abd, 394(photo) Hadid, Muhammad, 48 (n46) al-Hadithi, Muhammad Sa‘id, 171 al-Haffar, Lutfi, 260(photo) Halifax, E.F.L. Wood, Lord, 268–269, 286 al-Hamim, ‘Abd al-Karim, 97 Hamzah, Fu’ad (Shaikh), 138, 141, 287 Hanun family, 72, 76

534

Index

Hart, Charles, 252–253 Harun al-Rashid, 2 Hasan, Prince of Morocco, 456 Hashemite-Saudi conflict, 139–143, 204– 205 Hashemite-Saudi rapprochement, 465– 466 Hashim, Ibrahim, 469, 471 al-Hashimi, Taha, 280; al-Gaylani uprising, 301–305, 307; King Ghazi’s death, 293–294; al-Midfa‘i cabinet, 237; military uprising, 279; replacing Bakr Sidqi government, 274–275; Sulaykh Conference, 238 al-Hashimi, Yasin, 177; al-Ayyubi cabinet, 238; cabinet, 239; Dhiya’ Yunus’ murder, 247; extremist policies, 184; factionalization of the al-Hashimi cabinet, 241; military interference in politics, 244–246; Syrian independence, 79–80; Tawfiq as comptroller general, 242; Tawfiq’s connection to, 21; Young Arab Society, 77–78 Hassunah, ‘Abd al-Khaliq, 263 Haydar, Muhammad Rustum, 212, 234– 235, 275; assassination, 279–280; Faisal’s visit to Iran, 217; al-Gaylani movement, 238–239; Iraqi Constitution, 117; Law Faculty reform, 103; Palestine issue, 284 Haydar, Sa‘id, 39, 427–428 al-Hayyani, Tawfiq, 260(photo) Hejaz: ‘Ali’s loss of control over, 136– 137 Hejazi, ‘Ali: boundary dispute, 108; coup threat, 33, 414–415; extravagant behavior, 410, 414; Hashemite-Saudi clash, 130–131 Hejazi nationalism, 62–63 Henderson, Louis, 461, 496 Herter, Christian, 486 Hesqil, Sasun, 117, 171 Higher Arab Committee on Palestine, 291 Hilmi, ‘Abbas, 11–112 Hilmi, Ahmad, 411(photo) History of Economic Doctrines, 23 Hochberg, Leonard, 46 (n12) Hochberg, Sami, 45–46 (n12) Holy sites, 215, 221–222 House of Representatives, 122, 169, 242, 337, 368 al-Huda, Tawfiq Abu, 283 al-Huqbari, Ibrahim, 260(photo) al-Hurani, Akram, 429–432

al-Husami, Rashid, 260(photo) al-Husri, Sati’, 103 Hussein, Ahmad, 299 Hussein bin ‘Ali, Sharif of Mecca, 64(photo), 473 (n1); Arab unity, 467– 469; ashraf, 3; boundary dispute with Turkey, 108; Dr. Naji Asil and, 111– 112; First Arab Congress, 10; Hejaz revolt, 70; Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s clash with, 130–131 Hussein bin Nasir, 352 Hussein bin Talal of Jordan, 469(photo), 470, 485, 503–505, 506(photo), 507 al-Husseini, Baqir, 212 al-Husseini, Haj Amin, 76, 267, 283, 298, 324–326 al-Husseini, Jamal, 283, 288 Ibn Mashhur, 139 Ibn Mijlad, 94 Ibn al-Rashid, 129–130 Ibn Sa‘ud: Hussein’s abdication, 473 (n1) Ibn al-Sa‘ud ‘Abd al-‘Aziz: Anglo-Iraqi war, 320; Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 128–129; Arab League, 342–343, 358– 359, 363; Bahrah Agreement, 138–139; General Clayton and, 136–137; Hashemite-Saudi clash, 130–131, 135– 136, 139–143; letter to Yusuf alSuwaydi, 96; love for Iraq, 137–138. See also Saudi Arabia Ibn ‘Ujayl, 97 Ibrahim, Khalil, 299 (fig. 2), 472 al-‘Id, Sabah, 390 Identity, cultural: Arab, 56–57; French puppet in Syria, 91; Iraqi and Ottoman, 6; Paris acquaintances, 62; rise of Arab consciousness, 60 Ideological colonialism, 519–520 Ikhawah (protection money), 94 al-Imam, Muhammad ‘Ali, 487–488, 490 ‘Inayatullah Khan, king of Afghanistan, 156(photo) Independence, political: Allies’ pledge of, 86–88; British antipathy, 22; declaration of, 22–23; First Iraqi Congress, 503; Kuwait, 475–477; Syria, 77–80; Tunisia, 508 Independence Party, 374 Independent thinking, 55–56 India, 310–311 Indian mercenaries, 167 Infrastructure, 159 Inonu, Ismet, 115

Index Integrity, 170–171 Intelligence activity, 522 Internment camps, 331–332, 353 Intolerance, 5–6 Iran: Anglo-Iraqi war, 319, 321–322; Arabs in Khuzestan, 209; Baghdad Pact, 450–451; British embassy meeting, 192; British hostility toward, 327–329; British protection from, 13; diplomatic missions, 190, 193–195; economy, 193; Faisal’s visit, 212–218; Farughi, 199–200; first political ties, 161–165; al-Gaylani’s flight to, 318, 324–326; Iran-Iraq relations, 191–192, 199–200, 207–208, 218; Kurdish issue, 196–198, 201–203, 208–209; military policy, 200–201; Palestine issue, 249, 267–268; Russian threat, 198–199; Sa‘dabad Pact, 223 (n1); Shatt al-‘Arab dispute, 210–211; Soviet-German war, 327, 329; Tawfiq as ambassador to, 22; Teymourtash, 221–223; trial of alGaylani supporters, 330; World War II stance, 323–324, 326 Iranian-Iraqi agreement, 169 Iraq Badge of Honor, 190 Iraq Petroleum Company’s (IPC), 252– 254, 426–427 Iraqi Congress, 85–88 Iraqi Development Board, 33 Ireland: Palestine issue, 267–268 Ireland, Philip, 47 (n22) Irrigation project, 166 Iskandar, ‘Afifah, 414 Islamic court, 171 The Islamic Group, 57–58 Islamic Religious Endowments, 167 Islamic solidarity movement, 516–517 Israel, 504; 1967 war, 26; Baghdad Pact, 452; Sinai Peninsula, 445–446; targeting Syria, 429; Tawfiq’s commitment to nationalism, 23. See also Jewish state; Palestine issue Istanbul Literary Forum, 6 Italy: Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 119; fascist rule, 232–234; League of Nations, 229; Tawfiq’s Rome visit, 231–234; visit to Mussolini, 229–232 al-Jabal, Shamar, 97 al-Jabiri, Ihsan (Bek), 111, 229, 232 al-Jabiri, Sa‘dallah, 260(photo), 357–358

535

Jabr, Salih, 407(photo); Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948, 382–386; coalition cabinet, 406, 408; coup threat, 33; death of, 462; al-Gaylani uprising, 322–323; Hejazi’s attempt to sabotage, 414–415; hindering cabinet performance, 417; Portsmouth Treaty, 436; protests against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 390–392; provisional cabinet, 372; succeeding Al-Sa‘id, 378–379; supporting Iraqi regime change, 39; Syrian issue, 427; Tawfiq’s coalition cabinet, 404–405; Washington visit, 454 Jacobson, Victor, 45 (n12) al-Jadarji, Ra’uf, 104, 156(photo) Ja‘far, Dhiya’, 390, 404, 406 Ja‘fari School, 102–103 al-Jalil, ‘Abd al-Majid, 499–500 al-Jamali, Fadil, 36, 39; Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948, 385–386, 390; cabinet resignation, 432–433; nationalist cabinet, 426–428; New York visit, 486; Washington visit, 454; Yildiz meeting, 460–461 al-Janabi, Mahmud Salman, 302 Japan, 20, 229 al-Jarkasi, Rashid Beg, 5, 45 (n11) Jeddah, 130–131, 134–136, 138 Jenin, Palestine, 71, 73 Jewish state, 26–28, 286 Jews: Baghdad looting, 326; casualties of the al-Gaylani revolution, 331; First Arab Congress, 45–46 (n12); flight during the Anglo-Iraqi war, 321–322; of Iraq, 29; Roundtable Conference on Palestine, 283–288; Tawfiq’s education, 15; Young Turks, 44 (n8) Jordan: Arab federation, 342; Arab League charter, 343; Arab Union, 469– 470; attempts to unify Syria and, 468; Hussein’s reign, 503–505; Iraq’s 1958 revolution, 485; al-Pachachi’s efforts in Palestine, 396; Roundtable Conference on Palestine, 283–284, 291–292; Yemen civil war, 511 (n2). See also Transjordan Jum‘ah, Husam al-Din, 214(photo), 302– 303, 419 Justice: aftermath of al-Gaylani revolution, 335–336; early Iraqi ignorance of, 20; al-Mahdawi trial, 481–482; People’s Court, 25–26, 35, 35–40, 48–49 (n55), 494(photo), 495, 495(photo)

536

Index

al-Kabir, Yusuf, 104 Kahrizak, Iran, 217–218 Kamal, Ibrahim, 81, 253, 279–280, 332 Kaplan, Robert D., 47 (n27) al-Karim, Ghazi al-‘Ali, 486 al-Karmi, Sa‘id (Shaikh), 71, 74–76 Kerr, Archibald Clark, 24–25, 27, 38 Khalid, Jalal, 303 al-Khalidi, Hussein Fakhri, 283 al-Khalidi, Tawfiq, 117 al-Khalil, ‘Abd al-Karim, 68 al-Khalil, ‘Abd al-Khazen, 45 (n12) al-Khalisi, ‘Abd al-Rasul, 469 Khan, Muhammad, 249 Khanaqin Oil Company, 370 Khashabah, Ahmad, 400(photo) al-Khatib, ‘Arif, 91–92 al-Khawjah, Rashid, 237 al-Khayrallah, Muhan (Shaikh), 408 al-Khayri, Khulusi, 469 al-Khayyat, ‘Abd al-Jabbar, 113 Khosrau (Bek), 205–206 al-Khudayri, ‘Abd al-Malik, 322, 328 al-Khudayri, Kamil Hasan, 308 al-Khuri, Bisharah, 431(photo) Khuzestan, 209 Kidayat, Mahdi, 196 King, constitutional duties of, 120–123 Kinnah, Khalil, 404, 406, 463 Kubbah, Muhammad Mahdi, 404–405 Kurdish issue, 13, 91, 196–198, 201–203, 208–209, 217 Kurdistan, 12 Kuwait, 475–477; customs duties, 268– 269; propaganda, 290; social progress, 505–506 Lampson, Miles, 297 Land tenure: allegation of corruption, 171; land redistribution, 10; alSuwaydis, 14; Tawfiq’s reform proposal, 30–31, 33 Lang, Cosmo, 227 Language: Arab identity, 56–57; command of English, 110; debate on official language, 10; education reforms, 168; maintaining an Arab identity, 60; multilingualism, 24–25; Syrian Arabs, 61–62; Tawfiq’s education, 15 Lausanne Conference (1921), 104–111, 114–115 Law, 23 Law Faculty, 101–104

Law school, 15 Lawrence, T. E., 108 League of Nations, 250(photo); AngloIraqi Treaty, 148, 150; Assyrian issue, 226–228; British mandate requirements, 117–118; FrancoSyrian Treaty, 257–259, 264–265; Iraqi membership conditions, 30; Iraq’s function in, 228–229; Mosul dispute, 115, 119; Palestine issue, 27, 248–249, 266–268; Tawfiq as delegate to, 13; Tawfiq’s negotiations for addressing, 225–226; treaties, 157; weaknesses and strengths, 228 Lebanon, 42(photo), 508; Arab League, 343, 362–363; exile, 26; First Arab Congress, 45–46 (n12); Franco-Syrian Treaty, 257–259, 262; hospitality in, 510–511; Kuwait’s economic strength, 476; protonationalism, 9; Tawfiq’s exile, 500 Legal adviser, 104 Legislative council, 124 Legislature, 122–123 Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahrar), 29 Liberalism: Arab Spring, 14, 49 (n70); events shaping, 20–21; foreign policy, 31; Rogan’s omission of Tawfiq, 48 (n46); Tawfiq’s commitment to, 5–6; Tawfiq’s efforts to engender democracy, 29–30; Tawfiq’s ministry accomplishments, 37 Libya, 400(photo) Life imprisonment, 495–496 Literacy, 19, 121 Literary Forum, 61–62 Literature: education reforms, 168 Lloyd, Selwyn, 38, 473 Lloyd George, David, 79–80, 83, 86 London, England, 106–107, 110 Loot, 73 Lowered-curtain policy, 251–252, 275 MacDonald, Malcolm, 285 MacDonald, Ramsey, 285 MacDonald White Paper, 291–292 Mack, Henry, 395 al-Madayifi, ‘Ubayd ‘Abdallah, 490 al-Mahdawi, Fadil ‘Abbas, 35–39, 432, 481, 494(photo), 495, 495(photo) Mahdi, ‘Abbas, 193, 206, 235 al-Mahdi, ‘Abd, 307, 372, 406

Index Mahir, ‘Ali (Pasha), 283, 287–288, 291– 292, 299(photo) Mahmud, ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 351 Mahmud, Nur al-Din, 420–421 Makan, Hussein, 352(photo) Malik, Charles, 399(photo), 486 Mansur, Aghay ‘Ali, 218 al-Maraghi, Mustafa, 263 Mardam, Jamil (Bek), 65, 271, 357–358, 411(photo) Marx, Karl, 516 Marxist ideology, 40. See also Communism Maryud, Ahmad, 92 Massignon, Louis, 79 Mecca, 130–131, 135 Mediation between Syria and Turkey, 269–273 Memoirs of Sulayman Faidhi, 44 (n11) Menderes, Adnan, 435–439, 452, 457(photo), 459–461, 485 Mercenaries, 166–167 Middle East Pact, 462–463 al-Midfa‘i, Jamil, 39, 407(photo), 424(photo); al-‘Ahd representation, 81; Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948, 382; Axis sympathy, 279; Bakr Sidqi’s death, 248; cabinet policy, 251–252; First Arab Congress, 22; al-Gaylani uprising, 309; lowered-curtain policy, 275; military involvement in politics, 273–274; nationalist cabinet, 424; Nur al-Din’s nationalist cabinet, 421; oil concessions, 254–255; return of the legitimate government, 330–332; second cabinet, 234–236; Sofar meeting, 357; Syrian independence, 77; Syrian-French conflict, 88–89; withdrawal from government, 419–420 Migrants, Assyrian, 227–228 Military forces: Anglo-Iraqi Treaties, 165, 182–183, 381–382, 384, 387–388; al‘Askari’s Service, 111; Assyrian Levies, 13; British resistance to al-Gaylani government, 314–315; Communist demonstrations, 373; corruption of the army, 280–282; defense of the empty front, 425–426; equitable economic provision, 520; foreign mercenaries, 166–167; al-Gaylani movement, 301– 303; hazards of political involvement, 514–515; Indian forces, 310–311; Iranian army and policy, 200–201; Iraq’s 1958 revolution, 485–487; Iraq’s

537

war with Britain, 319–321; Jordan, 504; justice for al-Gaylani supporters, 335; national defense plans, 166; officers’ speculations, 25; Ottoman Army, 10; People’s Court, 35–40; political aspirations under Faisal I, 483–484; political involvement, 245– 247; pro-Axis propaganda, 295–298; reforming Iraq’s, 159; revenge for coup, 251–252; Sinn al-Dhubban threat, 315; standardization of, 524– 525; strength of Egypt’s and Iraq’s, 443; Syrian-French conflict, 89–90; ‘Ujayr Agreement, 142–143; uprising against ‘Abd al-Ilah, 279; Yemen civil war, 511(n2); Yildiz meeting, 461. See also Coups d’état; Al-Gaylani, Rashid ‘Ali; Revolution (1958) Military regime, replacing, 273–274 Military service, 70–71 Ministerial commission, 147 Mirza, Iskandar, 461–462 al-Misri, ‘Aziz ‘Ali, 8 Morocco, 455–456 Mosul province, 58–59, 87–88, 108–109, 114–115, 157 Movies, 11 Muhammad (Prophet), 2 Muhammad V (Mehmet V), 59, 455–456 al-Muhammasani, Muhammad, 65 Mukhlis, Mawlud, 79 al-Mumayyaz, Amin, 260(photo) Mumtaz, ‘Ali, 307, 351, 395–396, 465– 466 al-Mun‘im, Muhammad ‘Abd, 283 Muntafiq tribal confederation, 408 Music, 12 Muslim Arabs: First Arab Congress, 63– 64 Mussolini, Benito, 229–232 Mutran, Nudrah, 66 Mutual Cooperation Pact, 463 al-Muzaffar, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 324 Nadir Shah, 16 Nahhas, Mustafa, 249, 341–342, 358, 402, 410(photo) Najib, Sabih: Haydar assassinations, 279– 280 Najjar, Sami, 46(n12) Namiq, Isma‘il, 351 al-Naqib, Talib, 10, 47(n22), 82 Nash’at, Hasan, 283

538

Index

Nasser, Gamal Abdel: Arab Union, 472– 473; Baghdad Pact, 443–444; eroding support for the Hashemite monarchy, 34; Menderes and, 459; military uprising of 1948, 484; Syria-Egypt union, 468; Tawfiq’s concerns over Egyptian alliances, 446 National Democratic Party, 374 National security: divided responsibility for, 179–182; empty front, 425; al-Furat revolt, 240; importance to Arab unity, 520–521; replacing Bakr Sidqi governmental, 274; review of Iraqi army conditions and policy, 166 Nationalism: European Jewish settlement, 28–29; First Arab Congress, 60; alGaylani uprising, 301–306; Hejazi Bedouins’ lack of awareness, 63; Nur al-Din’s cabinet, 421; Ottomanism and Turkish, 59–60; Palestine policy, 32; pre World War I, 47 (n22); rise of Arab consciousness, 60; shaping the masses, 21; Syrian Congress, 62–64; Syrian resistance to French rule, 92–93; Tawfiq’s commitment to, 23–24; Turkey’s support of Syria, 269–273; Turkification of the Arab world, 513– 514 Natural disaster, 19–20 Nazim Pasha, 101–102 Newton, Basil, 294, 306 Noon, Feroz Khan, 462 North Iran Oil Investment Company, 252 Norway: Assyrians’ Committee, 227–228 al-Nuqrashi, Mahmud Fahmi, 394(photo) Nur, Baha’ al-Din, 140, 469 al-Nur, Thabit ‘Abd, 79 Nuri, ‘Abd al-Latif, 237 Nuzmi, ‘Umar, 302, 351 Oil concessions: Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 127–128, 219–221; armed uprising curtailing, 255; Basra, 252– 253, 258–259; French concessions in Syria, 253–254; Iran-Iraq cooperation, 217; Iran’s view of, 198; Kuwait’s social progress, 505–506; review of the oil agreement, 169; Shell Company, 287 Oil refinery, 369–371 Ottoman Empire: Constitutional Era, 59– 60; internal political crises, 68–70;

Iranians’ ignorance of Iraq, 215; Kuwait and Iraq, 475–477; Lausanne Conference, 104; Law Faculty, 102; loyalty, 15; need for reform, 58; political and social reforms, 68; roots of Arab nationalism, 6, 8–10; Saudi actions against, 129; Turkification of the Arab world, 513–514; Yusuf’s career, 16–18. See also Turkey al-Pachachi, Hamdi, 32, 308, 338–339, 345, 358 al-Pachachi, Muzahim al-Amin, 81–82, 394–397, 394(photo), 400–401 al-Pachachi, Nadim, 369–371, 469 Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, 161, 192, 194–196, 200, 213–216, 220, 222, 267, 328–329, 479–480 Pakistan, 425, 450–451, 461–462 Palestine, Tawfiq’s World War II experiences in, 15 Palestine issue, 522; Antonius’ background, 132–133; Arab League activities, 31; Baghdad Pact, 436, 451– 452; Bourguiba’s view of, 508–510; British policy, 26–28; British support for Zionism, 355; cantonization, 28; effect of Iraq’s failed revolution, 325– 326; Egypt’s lack of involvement in, 263; Faisal’s interest in, 506–507; foreign policy, 31–32; increasing discord in Iraq, 298, 300; Iraqi tensions with the Arab League, 359–360; League of Nations address, 249, 251, 266–268; military service, 70–72; national defense and security, 520–521; al-Pachachi’s efforts, 396–397; as PanArab cause, 518–519; Roundtable Conference on Palestine, 283–292; alSa‘id cabinet, 397; Tawfiq’s concern for, 20; Transjordan, 504; Turkey, 365; Washington visit, 454 Pan-Arabism, 32, 354 Paris, France, 15, 24(photo), 62–64, 90, 107, 113 Parliamentarians, 124–125 Parliamentary government, 137, 179, 367–368, 397 Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS), 39 Partition plan, 27–28 Patriotism: of al-Sa‘dun, 178; al-Sa‘dun’s view of, 182. See also Nationalism Peasants and workers, policy recommendations for, 521–522

Index Peel Commission, 28 People’s Court, 25–26, 35–40, 48–49 (n55), 494(photo), 495, 495(photo) People’s Party, 32 Peterson, Morris, 284 Petroleum Company, 258 Petrovsky, Adolf, 203–204 Philby, St. John, 82, 140–142 Pilgrimage sites, 215, 221–222, 506–507 Pluralism, 5–6 Police forces: Hashemite-Saudi clash, 139–143; Hejazi’s personal power, 410, 414–415; Iran-Iraq border dispute, 207–208 Political parties, 32–33 Politics: Iraqi Constitution, 21; military involvement, 514–515; passion for, 58; al-Sa‘dun cabinets, 145–151; Tawfiq’s withdrawal from, 189 Populism, 354 Port draft law, 167 Port Sudan, 134, 140 Portsmouth Treaty, 33, 37, 388, 408, 436 Prime minister, Tawfiq’s first term as: action plan, 165–166; cabinet platform, 156–159; cabinet resignation, 170–176; commercial speculation, 168–169; Faisal’s request, 153–155; French-Iraqi agreement, 161; Iran-Iraq ties, 161– 165; oil agreement, 169; political factionalization, 159–160; propaganda against the cabinet, 171–172; al-Sa‘id’s conditions, 155–156; US-Iraqi Treaty, 169 Prime minister, Tawfiq’s second term as: budget considerations, 368–369; cabinet formation, 345–349, 351; foreign policy, 354–355; oil refinery, 369–371; political currents, 354; public acceptance, 353; resignation, 368–369; al-Sa‘id’s opposition, 371–372 Prime minister, Tawfiq’s third term as: cabinet initiatives, 408–418; coalition cabinet, 403–406, 408; Development Board Act, 409 Principles of Political Economy, 23 Progress Party, 161, 165, 184–185 Progressive social action, 354 Propaganda: Anglo-Iraqi war, 319; antiBritish, 277–278; call for “new blood,” 338; Ghazi perpetuating, 290; Iran’s World War II stance, 323; Palestinians in Jordan, 504; pro-Axis, 281, 294– 298; the regent’s speech, 344–345;

539

Tawfiq’s cabinet, 171–172; as wasteful activity, 522–523 Protests: Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948, 389–392; Communist demonstrations, 373 Provinces, Iraqi, 58–59 Provisional cabinet, 372 Provisioning Iraq, 334 Psychological liberation of the Iraqi masses, 20, 56–57 Qadir, Tahsin, 212 Qadri, Ahmad, 77–78 al-Qasim, ‘Abd al-Karim, 40, 481–482, 490, 499, 499(photo) al-Qassab, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 156, 177, 237, 239, 394 al-Qazzaz, Sa‘id, 40, 427, 432–433, 496 Queen Elizabeth liner, 454–455 Qum, Iran, 217–218 al-Quwatli, Shukri, 290, 357–358, 459, 484 al-Rafi‘i, Muhsin, 260(photo) al-Rahman, al-Sayyid Salim ‘Abd, 75 al-Rahman, Hasan ‘Abd, 427 Raiders, 95–97 Railroads, 281 Rashid Military Camp, 273–274, 490 al-Rawi, ‘Abdul Jalil, 36–37, 40, 48–49 (n55) al-Rawi, Najib, 351–352, 361, 361(photo), 443, 482–483, 485 al-Razzaq, Mahmud ‘Abd, 490, 493 Reading, Rufus Isaacs, Lord, 287 Rebellions, revolts, and revolutions: Bakr Sidqi coup, 273–275; Bani Asad, 179– 180; al-Furat, 236–240; al-Gaylani movement, 301–303; Iraq’s failed revolution, 324–326; al-Jamali’s nationalist cabinet, 426–428; military coup, 246. See also Coups d’état; AlGaylani, Rashid ‘Ali; Revolution (1958) Reciprocal cooperation document, 435– 439 Reform of the Law Faculty, 101–104 Reform Society (Lebanon), 9, 65, 67 Refugees: Assyrian, 227–228; SyrianFrench conflict, 90 Regime type: strengths and weaknesses, 514; struggling against tyranny, 517– 518 Rejectionist stance, 26–27

540

Index

Religion, Communism and, 515–516 Representative council, 124 Resistance: to British mandate in Iraq, 98–100; Syrian resistance to French rule, 92–93 Revolution. See Coups d’état; Al-Gaylani, Rashid ‘Ali; Rebellions, revolts, and revolutions; Revolution (1958) Revolution (1958): ignoring signs of impending coup, 484–487; military action, 487–491; Nasser’s public gloating, 473; People’s Court, 25, 25– 26, 35–40, 48–49 (n55), 494(photo), 495, 495(photo); preemptive measures, 34–35; Tawfiq’s capture and imprisonment, 489–495, 498–499; Tawfiq’s interrogation, 493–495 Reza, Imam Musa, 222 al-Rifa‘i, Samir, 469–470 The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans, 44 (n8) Roundtable Conference on Palestine, 283 Royal Administrative Office, 275 Russia: defense of the empty front, 425; Egypt’s Communist leanings, 444–447; Germany’s attack, 324; Iranian relations, 193, 198–199, 203–204; political crises, 69; Shatt al-‘Arab, 210; Soviet-German war, 326–327, 329; Yemen civil war, 511(n2) Russo-Japanese War (1905), 388 al-Sabah, Ahmad Jabir (Shaikh), 241 al-Sabah, Mubarak, 129 al-Sabbagh, Salah al-Din, 302, 304–305, 310 Sa‘dabad Pact, 206, 216, 223 (n1), 249, 267 Sadah, 2–3, 9–10 Sa‘dah, Antun, 39 al-Sadat, Munir, 260(photo) al-Sa‘dawi, Yunus, 310–311 al-Sadr, Muhammad, 392–394, 424(photo) al-Sa‘dun, ‘Abd al-Karim, 12, 46 (n15) al-Sa‘dun, ‘Abd al-Muhsin, 140, 180(photo); Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 114, 148–151; Bani Asad rebellion, 179– 180; cabinet, 154, 176–177; character of, 180; discontent in Tawfiq’s cabinet, 161; dual cabinet formation, 155–156; elections boycott, 178; Iraq Badge of Honor, 190; Islamic court connections, 171; military agreement with Britain, 182–183; patriotism, 182; politics, 145;

resistance to British influence, 181– 182; suicide of, 184; Tawfiq’s appointment to education ministry, 23; Tawfiq’s defense of, 12–13 al-Saffah, Jamal, 70 Safwat, ‘Abd al-Karim, 231 Sa‘id, Fahmi, 302 al-Sa‘id, Nuri, 214(photo), 447, 471(photo), 493; aftermath of alGaylani revolution, 334–339; AngloIraqi Treaty, 383–386, 390–392; Arab League formation, 342; Arab Union, 470; Axis sympathy, 280; Baghdad Pact, 435–439, 461, 463; cabinet crisis, 416; cabinet resignation, 400–401; coalition cabinet, 374–375, 403, 406; Communist threat, 418–420; coup of 1958, 485–487; coup threat, 33–34; discontent in Tawfiq’s cabinet, 160; dual cabinet formation, 150–151, 154– 156; economic treaty with Turkey, 365; election reform, 376–377; factionalization of the al-Hashimi cabinet, 241, 245; failure to create a new cabinet, 347–349; Faisal’s visit to Iran, 212; First Arab Congress, 22; Franco-Syrian relations, 204–205; Ghazi’s death, 293–294; Jabr succeeding, 378–379; al-Jamali’s resignation, 433–434; al-Midfa‘i cabinet, 234–235; military uprising, 279; as Ministry of the Interior, 239; Nur al-Din’s nationalist cabinet, 421; opposition to Arab nationalism, 32; opposition to Tawfiq’s cabinet, 371– 372; overthrow, 480–481; al-Pachachi cabinet, 338–339; Palestine issue, 397, 451–452; People’s Court, 37; prime minister, 189–190; protestation of freedom, 375–377; replacing Bakr Sidqi government, 274–275, 277; resignation of al-Midfa‘i cabinet, 332– 334; Roundtable Conference on Palestine, 283–286, 288; al-Sa‘dun cabinet, 147, 176; Shatt al-‘Arab, 217; Sofar meeting, 357; Sulayman cabinet, 246; Syrian independence, 77; taking office repeatedly, 433; Tawfiq’s cabinet formation, 346–349; Tawfiq’s democratic ambitions, 29; winning over the military, 277 Sakaleros, John, 253 Salam, Salim ‘Ali, 9 Salih, Sa‘d, 351 al-Salim, ‘Abdullah, 476

Index Sami‘i, ‘Inayatallah, 162, 249 al-Samurra’i, Fa’iq, 404–405 San Remo Conference, 98 al-Sanawi, ‘Abd al-Qadir, 104 Sanderson, Harry, 212, 214(photo) Sa‘ud bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Sa‘ud, 462– 463, 465–466, 466(photo) Saudi Arabia, 505; al-Ahsa’ campaign, 129–130; Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 129; Arab federation, 34; Arab League charter, 343; Baghdad Pact, 449–450, 462–463; Hashemite-Saudi rapprochement, 465–466; Ibn alSa‘ud’s influence, 129–130; Kuwait and Iraq, 476; Roundtable Conference on Palestine, 283–284, 291–292; Shammar Confederation, 18; Tawfiq’s negotiations, 23. See also Ibn al-Sa‘ud; Ibn al-Sa‘ud ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Scientific method, 56 Seaport, establishment of, 269 Security, geography and, 47 (n27) Self-determination, Syria, 258 Senate, 122, 368 Seton-Watson, Robert William, 44 (n8) Seven Sleepers, 487, 501 (n1) Sèvres, Treaty of, 106 Shabib, Kamil, 302 al-Shabibi, Rida, 382 Shaikh Ma’ruf, shrine of, 2 al-Sha‘lan, Nawaf (Shaikh), 93 al-Sha‘lan, Nayif (Shaikh), 93 Shammar Confederation, 16, 18 Shanshal, Siddiq, 319, 404–405 Shaqra, Muhammad, 496 Sharaf, (Sharif), 313 Sharett, Moshe, 285–286 Sharif, ‘Aziz, 32 Shatt al-‘Arab, 210, 217 al-Shatti, Habib, 509 al-Shawi, Mazhar, 377 Shawkat, Naji, 154–155, 184 al-Shawwaf, ‘Abd al-Malik, 171 al-Shawwaf, Muhammad, 490–491 al-Shawwaff, Hajj ‘Ali, 170–171 Shaykhiyah, ‘Arif Zahir, 344 Shell Company, 287 Shevket, Mahmoud, 16–17, 47 (n22) Shihab, Khalid, 259, 261, 261(photo) al-Shihabi, Fa’iz, 62 Shiite community, reconciliation with Sunnis, 15–16 al-Shishakli, Adib bin Hasan, 39, 429, 430(photo), 521

541

Shukayr, Shawkat, 39 Shukri, Medhet, 68 Shimun, Mar, 227 Sidqi, Bakr, 13, 22, 246–248, 273, 275, 280, 355, 377, 484 Sidqi, Isma‘il, 361(photo) Simon, John, 25 Sinai Peninsula, 445–446 Sinn al-Dhubban threat, 315 Sirkamshak, Baqir, 214(photo) Sirri, Hussein, 299 (fig.2) Sirri, Rif‘at al-Hajj, 492 Slavery: Persian massacre, 19 Smoking jackets, 133–134 Social progress: Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 149; first cabinet proposals, 159; Tawfiq’s commitment to, 56–57 Social reform, 57–58 Social welfare: policy recommendations, 521–522 Socialism. See Communism Sofar, Lebanon, 357–358 Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, 473 Sovereignty: treaties, 157–158 Soviet Union. See Russia Standard Oil Company, 128 Standing Financial and Economic Committee (Arab League), 343–344 Stark, Freya, 47 (n27) Sudan, 134, 140 Suez Canal, 138–139, 142, 425, 441, 447 Sufir family, 206 Sugar tariff, 172–173 Suicide: al-Sa‘dun, 184; Teymourtash, 223 Sukkar, ‘Abd al-Wahid al-Hajj, 236 Sulaykh Conference, 237–238 Sulayman, Hikmat, 246, 248, 275, 280, 355, 382 Sulayman, Khalid, 154, 156(photo), 184 Sulayman, Muhammad Mahmud, 291– 292 al-Sulayman, ‘Abd al-Razzaq ‘Ali, 308– 309 al-Sulh, Riyadh, 260(photo), 357, 411(photo) Sunni community, 15–16, 19, 34 Supreme Court, 337 Supreme Defense Council, 312, 316 al-Suwaydi, ‘Abdul Rahman, 2, 16 al-Suwaydi, ‘Abdullah bin Hussein, 15–16 al-Suwaydi, ‘Ali, 15 al-Suwaydi, ‘Arif, 3, 9, 22, 69–70, 81 al-Suwaydi, Fakhriya, 12

542

Index

al-Suwaydi, Luay, 11–12, 16 al-Suwaydi, Naji, 3, 12–13, 214(photo); Aleppo, 78, 81; Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 150; Anglo-Iraqi war, 320–322; antipathy to Young Turks, 9; British delaying tactics, 82–83; British prejudice against, 19; conflict with Tawfiq’s policies, 26; draft constitution, 117–118; extremist policies, 184; Faisal’s visit to Iran, 212; Faisal-Ibn Sa‘ud relations, 211; alGaylani movement, 23–24, 313–314; al-Hashimi cabinet, 294; Iraqi independence, 22; mayor of Aleppo, 21–22; al-Midfa‘i cabinet, 234–236; Palestine partition, 28; al-Sa‘dun cabinet, 177; al-Sa‘dun’s suicide, 184– 187; Salih Jabr’s arrest, 323; Thabit’s assassination, 44–45(n11) al-Suwaydi, Naji (uncle), 16 al-Suwaydi, Thabit, 3–6, 45 (n11); assassination of, 18, 45 (n11); birth and death, 44 (n10); Tawfiq’s respect for, 9 al-Suwaydi, Yusuf, 17(photo); antiTurkification, 9, 18–19; Baghdad Law Faculty, 23; British and Turkish, 16– 18; detention, 22; engendering political passion, 58; Faisal’s return, 92; landholdings, 14; Law Faculty, 101– 102; Thabit’s assassination, 5–6; Turks’ wanted list, 69–70 Syria, 37; Alexandretta issue, 270; antiCommunist plot, 38–39; Arab federation, 342; Arab League, 343, 357, 362; Assyrian issue, 226–228; attempts to unify Jordan and, 468; bittersweet memories of, 428–432; camel caravan, 92–97; Communist activity, 452–453; conflict with France, 88–90; France’s support of Hashemites, 204–205; Franco-Syrian Treaty, 254, 257–259, 257–259, 262, 262, 264–266, 264–266, 271; French occupation, 90– 91; French oil concessions, 253; honoring Tawfiq, 260(photo); independence, 77–80, 87–88; Iraq’s support of independence, 427–428; Iraq-Syria axis, 363; People’s Court, 495–496; proposed confederation with Iraq, 33; protonationalism, 9; puppet prime minister, 91–92; rigged elections, 493; al-Shishakli overthrow, 39; Syria-Egypt union, 468; Tawfiq’s service in, 22–23; Turkey’s support of

nationalist claims, 269–273. See also Franco-Syrian Treaty Syrian Arabs, 61–62 Syrian Congress, 62–63 Syrianism, 39 Tabbarah, Ahmad Hasan, 66 al-Talhuni, Bahjat, 469–470 al-Tamimi, Amin (Bek), 325 al-Tarawinah, Ahmad, 469 Tatar, Hasan Sami: coalition cabinet, 406 Terrorism: Assyrian issue, 226; military coup and regime, 247–248; by military personnel, 275 Teymourtash, ‘Abd al-Hussein, 194–198, 202–203, 208, 210–211, 215, 217, 221–223 Trade: French-Iraqi agreement, 161; Iranian restriction, 193; SovietEgyptian, 446–447; US-Iraqi Treaty, 169 Traditional life, 55–56 Transjordan, 504; Arab League, 361–362; army, 321; Hussein’s abdication, 473 (n1) Treason of the monarchy, 37 Treasure, 71–72 Trial of Tawfiq, 36–39 Tribal culture: leadership, 240; military regime, 248; political awareness, 121– 122; rebellion, 179–180 Tribalism, 521 Trieste, Italy, 105 Troutbeck, John, 426 Tulkarm, Palestine, 72, 74–75 Tunisia: Bourguiba, 508–510 Tuqan, Baha’ al-Din, 409(photo), 412(photo) Tuqan, Sulayman, 469, 471 Turbah, Battle of, 130 Turkey, 210; Alexandretta issue, 270; ambassador to Iran, 205–206; AngloIraqi military agreement, 182–183; Anglo-Iraqi war, 319; Baghdad Pact, 435–439, 450–452; benefit of Kemalist reforms, 57–58; disposition of Mosul, 108–109; economic treaty with Iraq, 365; empty front, 425–426; FrancoSyrian Treaty, 265; Iraqi coup of 1958, 482–483, 485; Iraqi embassy in, 219; Kurdish issue, 217; Lausanne Conference, 109–110; Mosul dispute, 114–115, 119; oil concessions, 127– 128; Palestine issue, 249, 267;

Index Sa‘dabad Pact, 206, 223 (n1); alSa‘dun’s stern policy toward, 180–181; Syria’s coup, 36; Syria’s nationalist claims, 269–273; Tawfiq’s flight from the rebels, 488–489; Tawfiq’s visit with Menderes, 459–460; Yildiz meeting, 460–461. See also Ottoman Empire Turkification, 6, 513–514 Turkish Bank, 272 Turkish Oil Company, 127 Turkoman, Bahjat, 485 Tyrants, 517–518 ‘Ujayr Agreement, 132, 139, 142 ‘Umar, Sa‘d, 406, 409(photo), 412(photo) al-‘Umar, Ibrahim Hilmi, 214(photo) al-‘Umar, Salih, 490 al-‘Umari, Amin, 274–275, 355 al-‘Umari, Arshad, 32, 345–346, 372, 378 al-‘Umari, Mustafa, 32, 252, 274, 372– 374, 418–419 Umm al-Qurun, 136–138 Underground groups, 57 United Arab Republic, 34 United Kingdom Commercial Company, 323 United Nations delegation, 398(photo)– 400(photo), 407(photo) United States: ‘Abd al-Ilah’s visit, 453– 455; aid to Jordan, 504; Allies’ pledge of independence, 86; Baghdad Pact, 451–452; Basra oil concessions, 252– 253; empty front, 425–426; Iraq’s impending revolution, 486; League of Nations, 229; Palestine issue, 285; Suez crisis, 444–445, 447; Syria’s coup, 36; US-Iraqi Treaty, 169; Yildiz meeting, 461 al-Urfali, Jamil, 404, 406 al-‘Uwayni, Husseini, 410(photo), 430(photo)–431(photo) van Zeeland, Paul, 343–344 Vatican, 232 Victor Emmanuel III, king of Italy, 230 Voice of the Arabs radio, 34, 443, 449, 466 Von Sanders, Marshal Liman, 70 al-Wadi, Jamil, 77, 407(photo) al-Wadi, Shakir, 212, 214(photo), 376– 377, 384–386, 404, 406 Wahbah, Hafiz (Shaikh), 141 Wahbah, Sadiq, 231

543

Wahbah, Tawfiq: coalition cabinet, 406 al-Wahhab, Jamil ‘Abd, 487 Wahhabis, 95–97 Warbah Island, 269 Ward, J.G., 27 Wasfi, Ahmad, 193, 206 Wavell, Archibald, 297–298 Weapons supplies, 296–298, 444–445, 450–451, 462 Weizmann, Chaim, 285–286, 288 West Bank, 504 Western line, 425 Westernization: replacing Western colonialism with Eastern, 519–520 Wilson, A. T., 22, 81–82, 98 Wilson, Woodrow, 86 Wise, Stephen, 285–286 Workers’ movement, 247, 426–427 World Bank, 370 World War I: ashraf, 3; bombing of Paris, 90; British and Turkish armies, 72–74; Ibn al-Sa‘ud’s influence, 129–130; Iraqi independence, 86–87; Lausanne Conference, 104; military service, 15, 70–72; oil concessions, 127; Sarajevo crisis triggering, 69; Syrian independence, 77; travel to Damascus, 76 World War II: aftermath of al-Gaylani government, 332–334; Anglo-Iraqi war, 356; Bourguiba’s anti-Axis stance, 509; British hostility toward Iran, 327–329; al-Gaylani movement, 301–306, 330, 332–334; al-Husseini’s alignment, 326; Indian forces, 310–311; Iraq’s failed revolution, 324–326; Iraq’s war with Britain, 319–331; new world order, 344; Palestinians increasing discord in Iraq, 298, 300; pro-Axis factions in Iraq, 295–298; return of the legitimate government, 331–332; al-Sa‘id cabinet, 334–335; Soviet-German war, 326– 327, 329; Tawfiq’s holdings during, 14; trial of al-Gaylani supporters, 330 Wright, Michael, 38, 447 al-Yafi, Ghalib, 411(photo) Yahya, ‘Abd al-Fattah, 249, 251, 262–263 Yank, Hubert, 108 Yasin, Yusuf, 138, 141, 358–359, 361(photo), 437–439, 462–463 al-Yasiri, ‘Alwan, 313 Yemen: Arab federation, 342; Arab nationalism, 62; Civil War, 511(n2);

544

Index

lack of nationalist consciousness, 63; Roundtable Conference on Palestine, 283–284; tragedy of, 507 Yildiz Palace, Turkey, 460–461 Young Arab Society, 57, 77–78 Young Turk Revolution, 59–60 Young Turks, 6, 9, 16–18, 44(n8)–44(n9), 45–46(n12) Yunus, Dhiya’, 247 al-Yusuf, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 91–92 al-Zahir, ‘Abd al-Hadi, 351

al-Zahir, Dawud, 488 al-Zahir, Shams, 488 al-Zahrawi, ‘Abd al-Hadi, 45(n12), 66, 68 Zaki, Hamid, 431(photo) Zaki, Muhammad Amin, 156, 370 Zayd bin al-Hussein, 85, 88, 98, 290 Zionist movement, 251; British support, 355; First Arab Congress, 45–46(n12); protests against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948, 389–390, 393. See also Palestine issue Zorlu, Fatin, 460–461

About the Book

~

These memoirs of the distinguished Iraqi statesman Tawfiq al-Suwaydi (1892–1968) evocatively recapture a now largely vanished Arab world and are an eloquent reminder that Iraq was once a far more open and tolerant society than it is today. Al-Suwaydi served as Iraq’s prime minister three times (1929, 1946, 1950), as foreign minister on numerous occasions, and as ambassador to Iran, the League of Nations, and the United Nations. He frequently undertook sensitive diplomatic missions on behalf of the Iraqi monarchy. Among the major world figures with whom he interacted personally were Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Adnan Menderes, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, John Foster Dulles, Anthony Eden, George Curzon, Benito Mussolini, George Antonius, and Kings ‘Abdullah of Jordan, Faisal I, Hussein of Jordan, and Ibn al-Sa‘ud. From this vantage point, he wrote with an insider’s detail about the diplomatic, political, and geostrategic issues that vexed Iraq and the entire Arab world from the early twentieth century through the mid-1960s. A comprehensive essay by Antony T. Sullivan, senior associate for Middle East affairs at TerraBuilt Corporation International, introduces this first English-language edition of the memoirs.

545