Muslims in US Prisons : People, Policy, Practice [1 ed.] 9781626375505, 9781626371682

Citation preview

Muslims in US Prisons

Muslims in US Prisons People, Policy, Practice edited by

Nawal H. Ammar

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2015 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 2015 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Muslims in US prisons : people, policy, practice / Nawal H. Ammar, editor. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-62637-168-2 (hc : alk. paper) 1. Muslim prisoners—United States. 2. Prisoners—Religious life—United States. 3. Prisons—United States. 4. Corrections—United States. I. Ammar, Nawal H., 1958– HV8865.M87 2015 365'.60882970973—dc23 2014041442

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

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Contents Acknowledgments

1 Exploring Islam in US Prisons Mark S. Hamm and Nawal H. Ammar

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Part 1 Context

2 Muslim History and Demographics, in and out of Prison Hamid Kusha 3 Islamic Perspectives on Crime, Punishment, and Prison Nawal H. Ammar 4 Challenges in Research Muzammil Quraishi

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Part 2 Living and Spreading Islam in Prison

5 Religious Rights, Religious Discrimination Kenneth L. Marcus

6 Conversion: Motives, Patterns, and Practices Nawal H. Ammar and Robert R. Weaver

7 Imams in Prisons: Balancing Faith and Religious Politics Nawal H. Ammar and Amanda Couture-Carron Part 3 After September 11

8 Detention Immediately After September 11 Irum Sheikh

9 Prison Islam in the Age of Sacred Terror Mark Hamm

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10 “Prislam” Myths and Realities Timothy Hiller

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12 Muslims in US Security Prisons David P. Forsythe

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11 Policy Responses, Personal Implications Amir Marvasti

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Part 4 Conclusion

13 Building Better Understandings of Religion, Corrections, and Society Nawal H. Ammar References The Contributors Index About the Book

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Acknowledgments

numerous people. I am grateful to all the chapter authors for their patience and rewrites. Without them this book never would have materialized. I appreciate the efforts of the many people who supported me in reviewing the manuscript. In particular I am grateful to Mehek Aref and Michael Perkins, both students at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology at the time of writing the book, for their assistance. The anonymous reviewers of the manuscript provided constructive advice, and I appreciate their time and effort. Without the encouragement, advice, and patience of Andrew Berzanskis, editor, and Steve Barr, director of production, at Lynne Rienner Publishers this book would not have seen the light of day. I am also lucky to have worked with Linn Clark, whose thorough editing improved the manuscript. I am appreciative of the support of my husband, Robert Weaver, and daughter, Soraya Weaver, who helped with and contributed to the book. Last but not least I am thankful to my late parents, Hamed Ammar and Leila Lababidy, for all the years of support, encouragement, and love. Unfortunately neither will see the book. It is dedicated to their memory. This book could not have been completed without the help of

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The discussion of Muslim inmates in prison has been dominated in the last decade by a post–September 11, 2001, framework.

The urgency to understand these waves of “terrorist” acts that some Muslims perpetuated is undeniably important. However, the idea that US prisons have become hubs of Islamic extremism and violence (Colson, 2002; Malkin, 2004; Marks, 2006) has moved the study of this population of inmates from a correctional, crime, and punishment perspective to a war-on-terror approach. In 2006, FBI director Robert Mueller informed the public that “prisons are fertile ground for extremists. Inmates may be drawn to an extreme form of Islam because it may help justify their violent tendencies” (Mueller, 2006). Several years earlier, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) told Congress that “militant Wahhabism is the only form of Islam that is preached to the 12,000 Muslims in federal prisons. These imams flood the prisons with anti-American, pro–bin Laden videos [and] literature” (Schumer, 2003). The goal here, according to congressional testimony by the Center for Security Policy, was “to recruit convicted felons in the US prison system as cannon-fodder for the Wahhabist jihad” (Gaffney, 2005). Shortly after the attempted suicide bombing of a US jetliner bound for Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry (D-MA) released a report indicating that the Christmas Day plot represented the vanguard of an evolving terrorist threat. According to the report, 36 Americans who had converted to Islam while incarcerated in the United States had recently traveled to Yemen, ostensibly to study Arabic, and had “dropped off the radar.” Some of them had reportedly joined al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the organization responsible for the 1

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plot (US Senate, 2010). Academic researchers lent their voices to the doomsday chorus. One prominent study declared that because Islam feeds on resentment and anger all too prevalent in US prisons, it poses a threat “of unknown magnitude to the national security of the US” because “every radicalized prisoner becomes a potential terrorist threat” (Cilluffo and Saathoff, 2006). The message was clear: US prisons had become incubators for radical Islam and terrorist ideology. None of these threats materialized, however. US prisons did not become fertile ground for Islamic extremism, nor did they become incubators for terrorism. The Senate’s 36 US converts who joined AQAP turned out to be an exaggeration; experts were unable to identify any former prisoners who moved to Yemen. Prison converts to Islam were not turned into cannon fodder for jihad, and the threat posed by Wahhabi clerics was dismissed by an FBI study showing that most cases of prisoner radicalization in the United States were instigated by domestic extremists with few or no foreign connections (Van Duyn, 2006). The recent literature on Muslims in US prisons as it stands today is full of gaps. Research in the last decade overlooks the historical developments of prisoners’ rights, black nationalism, the civil rights movement, the Nation of Islam, and the growth of Wahhabism. It also discounts the changing role of the federal courts and the Supreme Court over the years (Herman, 1998; Smith, 2007; Smith 2011). Most existing scholarship silences the role Muslim prisoners have played in shaping the legal system’s treatment of prisoners generally, and the role of religion in prison in particular. The research disregards the diversity and complexity of this group of prisoners, lacking empirical study of either a qualitative or quantitative nature. Moreover, no analysis is available on the extralegal issues that this complex group of prisoners face outside prison—including identity crisis, social and familial dislocation, poverty, racism, and discrimination. This academic discussion of Muslims in US prisons within an ahistoric context seems to address this group of prisoners as though they were not present or had a negligible presence prior to the tragic 9/11 attacks on US soil, or that they were not subject to the pains of imprisonment. This perspective contributes both to confusing the issues and the development of less than rigorous academic work. While the radicalization of Muslims in US prisons is a significant problem, understanding it requires a deeper look at the issues. In a 50-state survey of prison chaplains in the US conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2012), less than 41% of the chaplains interviewed said that religious extremism is “very or somewhat common”

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in the prison where they work. The prison’s security level tended to impact the chaplain’s view of the prevalence of religious extremism. As such, while we must remain diligent in protecting the United States from violence and terrorism, using sound social scientific methods and frameworks to examine the issue of Muslims in US prisons is necessary in order to arrive at a better understanding of this group of prisoners and of the role of prisons within US society. We must include the history of Muslims in the United States inside and outside of prisons, detail the context of Muslim incarceration, explore the traits that they have in common with other prisoners and the ones particular to them, examine their experiences in the post-9/11 environment, and consider only evidence and empirical data about this group of inmates to make systematic, analytic assertions as well as policy recommendations. This approach expands our understanding of this group of inmates and the role of prison radicalization in the United States. Islam in US prisons is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. Rather, in prison the Muslim faith is best conceptualized as a doubleedged sword, capable of producing positive and negative results. As the contributors to this volume demonstrate, Islam can have a moderating effect on prisoners, playing an important role in prison security and rehabilitation. Once on the path to restricting their lives—down to the way they eat, dress, form support networks, and divide their day into periods for study, prayer, and reflection—Muslim prisoners have begun the reformation process, making them less of a recruiting target for terrorists than other prisoners, and certainly less of a target than alienated street-corner youth of the urban ghetto. Programs aimed at reversing self-destructive behavior—including basic education, “manhood” training concentrating on respect for women, information on responsible sexual behavior and drug use prevention, and life skills management—all were initiated by Black Muslims during the US prisoner rights movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Aidi, 2002). Black Muslims set up collect-calling services for inmates to telephone families, established halfway houses and employment services to help reintegrate ex-cons back into their communities, and through their activism created circumstances necessary for civil rights legislation challenging inadequate conditions of confinement (Gottschalk, 2006). Many forget that Muslim inmates played a decisive role in negotiating an end to the historic Attica prison rebellion of 1971 (Wicker, 1975). While Islam is mainly a positive influence inside prison, research presented in this book also shows that certain forces within the Muslim prison community are aligned with the efforts of al-Qaeda and its

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associates to inspire convicts in the United States to conduct terrorist attacks on their own. The number of prisoners who actually turn radical beliefs into terrorist action is remarkably few (Hamm, 2013). Yet their actions should not be glibly dismissed as “hype and hysteria,” as one scholar has described the threat (Atran, 2010). This terrorist threat is fueled primarily by the incarceration of inmates in disorderly, congested, and understaffed maximum-security prisons—by mass incarceration itself. By their very nature, prisons are intended to induce transformative experiences among inmates. However, the movement toward mass incarceration has turned prisons into hotbeds for personal transformation due to the increasingly chaotic nature of prison life that overcrowding causes. Overcrowding has amplified the social marginalization of inmates and deepened their need for bonding, group identity, spiritual guidance, and protection against predatory violence in the maximum-security mix. Islam has thrived under these conditions. A leading theory of prisoner radicalization holds that the effects of mass incarceration are breeding a desire in inmates to defy the authorities who incarcerate them (Neumann, 2010). This creates a condition where other prisoners view “identities of resistance” favorably, representing a sort of “jihadi cool” behind bars (Sageman, 2008). Some scholars argue that Islam, or the “religion of the oppressed,” is fast becoming prisoners’ preferred ideology of resistance, playing the role that Marxism once did (Khosrokhavar, 2009). Along with protection from victimization and the search for meaning and identity, this ideology of resistance has assumed its place as a primary catalyst for inmate conversions to a range of Islamic traditions, including Islamist orientations that may espouse ideologies of intolerance and violence. Foremost among them is the amorphous social movement called Salafism—the narrow, strict, puritanical form of Sunni Islam upon which al-Qaeda is based—and “Prison Islam” groups that are known for using religious medallions and tattoos, along with selective verses from the Quran, to draw recruits from gang subcultures. Once radicalized by these extremist beliefs, prisoners become vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. Islam—in all its forms and fashions—is now sweeping through US prisons, bringing with it both unprecedented security challenges and exceptional possibilities for progressive reform. The growth of Islam is taking place against the backdrop of a global economic meltdown and a rise in religious extremism and ethnic conflict, changes in prisoners’ class and race compositions, a declining interest among

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prisoners in Christianity, new developments in youth subcultures, increased access to smuggled cellphone technology, and the shifting power dynamics of long-term maximum-security confinement—all situated within the context of lingering post-9/11 fear. Islam in US prisons is an issue of such profound sociopolitical complexity that even the wardens who run the prisons barely understand it. This book is timely and highly relevant for contemporary prison administration and counterterrorism policy. In this volume the authors attempt to provide a snapshot of a social scientific and legal perspective on Muslims in US prisons, emerging from current scholarly work and policy developments. As a result, some terms, concepts, and concerns recur in different chapters within varying frameworks. By necessity, the authors also deal with important themes relating to corrections, crime, and punishment. While the authors come from various disciplinary backgrounds and the chapters cover disparate topics, the unifying premise is to underscore the subject’s complexity and to further our systematic knowledge of it. The book includes three parts and a conclusion. Part 1 provides the reader with a historic, theological, and research-based context about Islam and prisons. The topics of Islam in prison and Muslims in prison are scattered in a number of publications and journals, and therefore are not easily accessible, gathered, or sorted. Part 1 attempts to organize these topics to make them accessible for both the novice and more experienced audiences. A number of chapters underscore the differences among the various forms of Islam that exist in the United States. Most importantly, the difference between normative Islam (the Islam that emanated from Arabia in the 7th century C.E.) and the Nation of Islam (NOI), often referred to as Black Muslims—a nationalist/religious movement founded by Wallace (Warith) D. Fard Muhammad in the 1930s and led after his disappearance by Elijah Muhammad until his death in 1975 and since 1977 by Louis Farrakhan. This difference is often glossed over or misunderstood. The NOI’s beliefs are only tenuously linked to the theology of orthodox Islam. The views of normative Islam and the NOI about “God, cosmology, Prophet Muhammad and the afterlife, traditional Islam” (Fishman and Soage, 2013, p. 62) are not only starkly different but are often at odds with each other. Colley writes, “The NOI’s doctrine combined religious influences with African American history and heritage to produce a philosophy that spoke directly to African Americans’ experiences with white privilege” (2014, p. 400). These differences are important to underscore, due to the liberating role that NOI

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played in US prisons in the 1960s and 1970s with African American prisoners, the most famous among them being Malcolm X. Part 2 explores the experiences of Muslim inmates in US prisons and some legal, theological, and subcultural components of their lives within prison walls. While it is difficult to remove the 9/11 impact on any matter that involves Muslims in the US generally, and Muslims in prison in particular, the writers have attempted to discuss the issues that Muslim prisoners in US correctional facilities (at the state and federal levels) encounter on a daily basis. The topics discussed are far from comprehensive, serving only as a starting point to understanding some of the facets of Muslim inmates’ lives in US prisons. Chapter 4 offers a unique perspective for US scholars: lessons learned from a UK researcher. Part 3 explores the multidimensional experiences of incarcerated Muslims: being rounded up and incarcerated immediately after 9/11, the impact of prison Islam on radicalization as well as rehabilitation, and conditions in a variety of security prisons inside and outside the United States. The book’s conclusion discusses the connection among the various chapters, assesses their contribution to the study of Muslims in US prisons, and suggests future research ideas.

Part 1

Context

2 Muslim History and Demographics, in and out of Prison Hamid Kusha In this chapter I provide a brief historical account of Islam’s growth in the United States, including information about penal institutions and inmate conversion to Islam. I divide the chapter into three main sections. Section one gives a brief account of the rise of the US Muslim community, discussing waves of immigration to the United States and the formation of Muslim mosques. I also explore whether US and Muslim ideals can coexist and complement each other. In section two I provide a brief history of the Nation of Islam (NOI) and prominent figures within this organization. Finally I discuss Islam among US prisoners and their motivations for conversion in prison. Because the NOI has played an important historical role in prisonbound conversion, I give some attention to its controversial view of Islam, leadership, and efforts at conversion. Muslim Demographics in the United States Immigration and the United States

Some scholars have suggested that Muslim sailors were long aware of North America. Freed Numan, for example, cites Chinese documents dating as far back as 1178 C.E. to support these claims. For example, Numan asserts that Muslim sailors regularly traveled to Mu-Lan-Pi, what we consider today’s United States (Numan, 1992). Some studies report that the first modern wave of Muslim immigration to North America took place in the 1870s (Kusha, 2009). Most of these immigrants came from the Ottoman Empire provinces of Syria, Lebanon, 9

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Jordan, and Palestine. These immigrants were also from various ethnic groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Turks, and Albanians. The second wave of Muslim immigration took place in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire that followed the conclusion of World War I (1914–1919). Devastated by the war, significant numbers of Muslims from different parts of the Middle East formerly under the Ottoman Empire immigrated to the United States. Consequently, the US Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924, also known as the Johnson-Reed Act. This act limited the annual number of immigrants permitted to enter the United States based on existing US populations; this legislation established a quota of 2% of the existing population (Kusha, 2009). This statute put a decisive stop to this second wave of immigration. Most African, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries were given an annual quota of 100 immigrants; white Europeans received the lion’s share of immigration rights. The preferential treatment gave the lowest quota to Spain (131) and the highest to Germany (51,227); Great Britain and Northern Ireland had a combined quota of 34,007 (Comprehensive Immigration Law, 1924). Smith and Haddad (2002) observed that following World War II, a new wave of Muslim immigration took place that continued intermittently until the 1960s. Accordingly, this cycle of immigration was partially the result of the US Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which dismantled the quota regime of the 1924 legislation. Additionally, the US civil rights movement ushered a new and more liberal perspective into US race and ethnic relations. This third wave of immigration went beyond the mostly Arab Muslims of the Middle East and included immigrants from other Muslim countries in Asia and Africa (Smith and Haddad, 2002). The fourth wave started in the mid-1960s, due to a wholesale change in US immigration law as well as to the post–World War II implementation of global modernization and development schemes. In the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, these schemes created a relatively welleducated, upwardly mobile, and more contemporary intelligentsia in the Islamic world. A segment of this new social class sought better lives and economic opportunity in the United States. For the first time in the United States, an immigrant’s history, education, and technical expertise, as opposed to national origin, became the deciding factor for admittance into the country. In contrast, as Europe stabilized economically, politically, and socially, due to the post–World War II reconstruction under the Marshall Plan, the number of European immigrants to the United States declined noticeably (Smith and Haddad, 2002).

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From the 1980s to the present, two main events have led to the fifth wave of Muslim immigration into the United States. One was the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which toppled the pro-Western Pahlavi monarchy (r. 1925–1979). The second was the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The power vacuum resulting from the Iranian Revolution led to eight years of war with Iraq (1980–1988), the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and state-sponsored terrorism. All of these factors forced an unprecedented exodus of large segments of Iran’s upper and middle classes to Europe and North America. In addition, the Iranian Revolution had a precipitous destabilizing impact on the Middle East, including the radicalization of the Palestine-Israel conflict, which inadvertently led to other regional wars. The Iranian Revolution ultimately resulted in an unprecedented population dislocation. The resulting social and political instability in Caucasia (e.g., between the ex-Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan) and Central Asia, however, is having a discernible centripetal impact on the whole region. For example, a new and deadly form of Islamic fundamentalism has emerged in Afghanistan under the ex-Taliban regime. This regime, now a full-fledged terror network of al-Qaeda, is drastically impacting the emigration of Muslims from many Islamic countries to the United States. Formation of Various US Muslim Communities US Muslim communities comprise diverse racial and ethnic groups that exhibit different social, economic, and educational statuses. The majority of North American Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam, the dominant branch in the Islamic world; fewer adhere to Shiite Islam. Wahhabism, an orthodox Sunni minority approach to Islam favored in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, also has a following among North American Muslims. Finally, a variation of Islam that originated in the United States and popular among some African Americans is known as the Nation of Islam (NOI). The NOI is controversial, with some NOI beliefs that are radically different from the mainstream Islam practiced among the larger US Muslim communities. For example, the NOI official website, on the page titled “The Honorable Elijah Muhammad,” states, “We Thank Allah, Who Came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad for Raising up His Last and Greatest Messenger, The Honorable Elijah Muham-

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mad!!” (Muhammad, 2011). The claim that Allah, the universal God in the vernacular of the Quran, has appeared in the person of Master Fard Muhammad is against the very core of traditional Islam’s understanding of Allah. The Quran (112–1:3) declares that Allah is the one who is and always has been. Allah declares in the Quran unequivocally that he neither begets nor was begotten, and that none compares to him. In addition, the Quran rejects any allusion to Allah’s need for reincarnation in any human form. The idea that Allah has reincarnated in the persona of the Master Fard who has chosen Elijah Muhammad as his “Last Messenger” is antithetical to the Quran and the core dogma of Islam. The Quran states that Muhammad Ibn Abdullah (570–632 C.E.) personifies Allah’s last messenger, the Khatam al-Anbiya. Overall, though, the NOI plays an important historical role in converting African American inmates to its version of Islam. I discuss the issue of Islamic proselytizing in US state and federal penitentiaries in some detail later in this chapter. The Number of Muslims in the United States The US Constitution prohibits a religious-based census, which led to a void in the research. Therefore, the question of how many US citizens adhere to Islam inside or outside penal institutions is not easily resolved through referral to census or inmate population data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons and state prisons. Different studies, however, have tried systematically to determine the approximate number of Muslims residing in the United States as well as estimates for Muslim inmates. A 2001 study conducted by the Graduate Center of the City University of New York profiled the Muslim population and concluded that fewer than 3 million Muslims reside in the United States (Kosmin and Mayer, 2001). The telephone survey posed the central question, “What is your religion, if any?” Out of more than 50,000 surveyed, 219 identified their religion as Islam. This number then served as the base for identifying the number of US Muslims (Kosmin and Mayer, 2001). The study authors cautioned that US Muslims should not be confused with US Arabs. “Muslim” and “Arab” are not interchangeable terms: they do not refer to the same people. This misconception results from the fact that Islam emerged in the 7th century C.E. in Mecca, in the western part of the Arabian Peninsula. At the time most Muslims were

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Arabs, but not all Arabs were Muslims (Ammar, 1994). The Arab American Institute estimates the number of Arabs living in the United States at around 3.5 million. Of this number, 75% adhere to Christianity, and 25% to Islam. Using this 25% as a base to determine the total US Muslim population, one reaches at a total number that would not exceed 3.4 million (Kosmin and Mayer, 2001). Other sources and studies give different estimates of the total number of Muslims living in the United States. The Islam for Today website puts the number at 4 million (Webb, 1995). Another Islamic site puts the number at 5.7 million (New Internationalist Magazine, 2002). The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) puts the number at 7 million (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2011). Studies of US mosques provide yet more information. Mosques in the United States

Observers can discern the growth of US Muslim communities through the growth of mosques in the United States; the growth of the mosque as a religious institution also signals the spread of the Islamic faith in the United States. As of April 2001, the US Department of State’s Office of International Information Programs published the following information, gathered through a survey titled The Mosque in America: A National Portrait (see below): • Mosques in the United States: 1,209 • American Muslims associated with a mosque: 2 million • Increase in number of mosques since 1994: 25% • US mosques that have some Asian, African American, and Arab members: nearly 90% • US mosques with a full-time school: more than 20% • Ethnic origins of regular participants in US mosques: -South Asian (Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi, Afghani): 33% -African-American: 30% -Arab: 25% -Sub-Saharan African: 3.4% -European (Bosnian, Tartar, Kosovar, etc.): 2.1% -White American: 1.6% -Southeast Asian (Malaysian, Indonesian, Filipino): 1.3% -Caribbean: 1.2% -Turkish: 1.1% -Iranian: 0.7%

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-Hispanic/Latino: 0.6% (US Department of State, n.d.) A typical Muslim mosque in the United States, as this list shows, seems neither a racially, ethnically, nor denominationally restricted institution of worship. It functions as a communal hub of congregation and social activism open to all who profess an affinity with Islam. However, not all Muslims necessarily attend mosques. From 1994 to the present, US Muslim mosques have increased in numbers and are present in every state. Most mosques are located in California (227), followed by New York (140) and New Jersey (86) (US Department of State, n.d.). The comprehensive study of US mosques, The Mosque in America: A National Portrait (Bagby, Perl, and Froehle, 2001), appeared in 2001. Funders of this report included the Council on American-Islamic Relations based in Washington, DC; the Islamic Society of North America; the Ministry of Imam W. Deen Muhammad; and the Islamic Circle of North America. Researchers studied eight subject areas in relation to the proliferation of the Muslim mosques in this country (Bagby et al., 2001). The main areas covered were basic characteristics, worship, history, mission, programs, organizational dynamics, and finances. According to the report’s findings, the number of mosques and mosque participants are experiencing tremendous growth. On average, over 1,625 Muslims are associated in some way with the religious life of each mosque. The median number of Muslims associated with each mosque is 500. The average attendance at Friday prayer is 292 persons. Median attendance is 125 (Bagby et al., 2001). In conjunction with similar studies, one can conclude that Islam is a fast-growing faith in the United States, the mosque is an important institution in the life of US Muslim communities, the mosque plays a central functional role in the spread of the Islamic faith in the nation, and the question of the number of US Muslims is relatively difficult to determine with precision. Different social, political, and demographic factors complicate impartial scientific research about this issue, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. Demographic Characteristics of American Muslim Communities

The Pew Research Center, in its 2007 survey titled “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream,” maintained that “Mus-

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lims constitute a growing and increasing segment of American society. Yet there is surprisingly little quantitative research about the attitudes and opinions of this segment of the public” (Pew Research Center, 2007, p. 2). The constitutional prohibition against a religiousbased census and the small Muslim population in the United States are the two main reasons. Further, “The Pew Muslim American survey estimates that Muslims constitute 0.6% of the US adult population. This projects to 1.4 million Muslims 18 years old or older currently living in the United States” (Pew Research Center, 2007). The 2007 Pew report cautioned that this number could indeed be “higher,” because the survey was conducted exclusively over regular telephones and did not include cellphones. In addition, an estimated 13.5% of the general public does not have any phone service, according to the report, thus the rationale for the higher estimates (Pew Research Center, 2007). The most significant results of the 2007 Pew report were not the attempts to determine the actual number of the US Muslim population per se, but that from a socioeconomic perspective, the US Muslim community generally is “middle class” and “mainstream.” According to the report, “The Muslim American population is youthful, racially diverse, generally well-educated, and financially about as well-off as the rest of the U.S. public. Nearly two-thirds (65%) are immigrants while 35% were born in the United States” (Pew Research Center, 2007). Interestingly, Muslims who had immigrated to the United States within the past three decades (1980–2007) gave four main reasons for their migration: educational opportunity (26%), economic opportunity (24%), family reasons (24%), and conflict/persecution (20%); 3% reported “other,” and another 3% answered “don’t know.” In other words, despite all the media hype that Muslims hate the United States and are about to cause Armageddon, half of those who have immigrated to the United States are seeking socioeconomic opportunities for bettering their lot, and almost half cite family or persecution issues. One scholar has characterized US democracy as the most ideal for the blossoming of Islam’s core teachings of peace and progress, with one eye on social justice and the other on law and order (Kusha, 2002). As the Pew report explains, “Although Muslim Americans have distinctive beliefs and practices, their religiosity is similar to American Christians in many respects.” The report concluded, “American Islam resembles the mainstream of American religious life” (Pew Research Center, 2007).

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Can Islam and American Ideals Coexist? Is Islam compatible with the ideals expressed in the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights? Muslim institutions and community leaders have offered different answers, especially after 9/11. For example, the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), in an article titled “The Islamic Foundations of Patriotism,” argues that being a US Muslim not only is nonantithetical to the US notion of patriotism, but in fact is complementary: Our thesis is that the relationship is indeed synergistic: that within the central dogma of Islam, the intellectual development of Islamic thinking and jurisprudence, as well as Islamic history, there are many tenets consistent with, and supportive of, the sentiment of patriotism to the United States. (Muslim Public Affairs Council, n.d.)

Starting with this thesis, the article expounds on five major factors that are intrinsic to both US and Islamic teachings in relation to the essential ingredients of an ideal life, factors that make Islam quite compatible with the mainstream US notion of love for one’s country: sanctity of life, liberty as an essential value, justice as equality before law, justice as due process, and the pursuit of happiness (Muslim Public Affairs Council, n.d.). The article defends these factors by citing different verses from the Quran and from the words and deeds attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. The Nation of Islam Origins and Leadership

The NOI was founded by a mysterious individual named Wallace D. Fard Muhammad in the 1930s in Detroit, Michigan. Information about his background and his alleged mastery of Islamic teachings is scarce. The NOI, however, has accorded Fard the ultimate divine status: We believe that Allah (God) appeared in the Person of Master W. Fard Muhammad, July, 1930; the long-awaited “Messiah” of the Christians and “Mahdi” of the Muslims. We believe further that Allah is God and besides HIM there is no god and He will bring about a universal government of peace wherein we all can live in peace together. (Nation of Islam, n.d.)

This claim to divinity comes despite the fact that, in the early accounts of the rise of the NOI, Fard is portrayed as a silk peddler born

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in the holy city of Mecca in the 1870s who migrated to the United States and founded a “voodoo” religious cult among migrant black workers (Benyon, 1937). The details of Fard’s life, which are almost nonexistent, are beyond the scope of this chapter. Based on some scholarly accounts, though, one Elijah Poole, the would-be next leader of the NOI, enthusiastically embraced Fard’s claim to divinity. Poole eventually became known as the Honorable Elijah Muhammad. In the autumn of 1931, Elijah Poole attended his first lecture given by Master Fard Muhammad. Overwhelmed by the message, Poole immediately accepted it (FinalCall.com News, 2000). Upon the recommendation of Master Fard, Poole changed his name to “Karriem” and assumed the position of a minister in the Temple of Islam, precursor to the NOI. Later, Master Fard elevated Karriem to the position of “supreme minister,” advising him once again to change his name from Karriem to Muhammad. The newly named Honorable Elijah Muhammad is on record that he never considered his Christian name as his own. He explains, “The name Poole was never my name nor was it my father’s name,” because “it was the name the white slave master of my grandfather after the so-called freedom of my fathers” (FinalCall.com News, 2000). Robert Dannin (2002) has done much research on the history of the NOI as well as on Muslim converts in US prisons. He maintains that Master Fard was reported as having had already claimed that he was the true reincarnation of one Noble Drew Ali, another mysterious figure who, based on some accounts, preceded Master Fard in claiming to be Allah reincarnate. Dannin (2002) cautions his readers that in analyzing the veracity of these bombastic reincarnation claims and their impacts on the NOI, we not only have to go back to its precursor, the Moorish American Science Temple, but also to the 19th-century Black Freemasonry movement. These religious-fraternal organizations represented black aspirations within the late 19th century (Dannin, 2002). However, one should not assume that the Moorish Temple’s view of Islam had much ideological affinity with mainstream Islam, whose genesis had emerged in the seventh-century Hejaz region, the old name of what is known today as Saudi Arabia. With the exit of Master Fard, Elijah Muhammad assumed the leadership mantle of the NOI. Muhammad apparently was a man of humble origins but undoubtedly was endowed with remarkable leadership. Under Muhammad’s guidance, unlike other faith-based organizations that preceded it by at least a century, the NOI’s proselytizing efforts had a provocative antiestablishment tone to accompany its denomina-

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tional articulation, which partially accounts for why the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under J. Edgar Hoover closely monitored the NOI and especially its leader from the 1930s to the 1970s. The Nation of Islam and the FBI

The NOI has credited Elijah Muhammad with many accomplishments; however, the FBI had a different view of the NOI and its formative period. Thus, in its early investigation of the NOI, the FBI depicted Muhammad as the founder of the Muslim Cult of Islam (MCI), with its military wing called the Fruit of Islam (FOI). The FBI files on the NOI show that Muhammad was arrested in Chicago on September 20, 1942, charged with the crime of sedition, and was subsequently interrogated by FBI agents. The unsigned interrogation document purports that Muhammad was of the firm conviction that in 1930 he had met Allah reincarnated in the person of Wallace Fard Muhammad. During the 1930–1933 period, Fard, residing in Detroit, held general meetings with an audience numbering around 800 to 900 to teach a religion that was called “Islam.” He is reported to have had regular meetings with Elijah Muhammad. During these sessions, Fard instructed him on Islam’s teachings for a period of nine months and subsequently disappeared altogether, never to be heard from again (Muslim Public Affairs Council, n.d.). What were the contents of these teachings of an Islam that “Allah” had personally instructed to the NOI’s future leader? Under the heading of “Principles,” the FBI interrogatory document quoted Elijah Muhammad as enumerating the following as comprising the principles of Islam: • Belief in Allah • Belief in the prophets • Belief in the scriptures that the prophets bring • The Bible • The Holy Quran • Prayer • Charity (Muslim Public Affairs Council, n.d.)

The NOI has stated that the FBI’s renditions and accounts of the movement’s leadership cannot be trusted because they were concocted to give a bad impression of the NOI. There is no doubt that the FBI, from the inception of the NOI in 1930 to the present, has held a

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negative view of the NOI. In the Red Scare atmosphere of the 1930s, the NOI was considered a dangerous and seditious cult bent on creating anti-US sentiments among the larger black community. Consequently, the NOI had a prominent place on the FBI’s list of those who engaged in “anti-American” activities. Therefore, FBI agents likely neither cared about nor could really understand the NOI’s Islamic principles. Islam and the Nation of Islam: Not the Same

When Elijah Muhammad was describing the NOI to the FBI, he did not mention the Hajj, the obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca that every Muslim must perform at least once. Neither was there any mention of the principle of Ma‘ad, which stands for the Day of Resurrection, one of Islam’s central beliefs. Missing from Muhammad’s view of Islam was also the Saum, the obligatory dawn-to-dusk fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. Most major and minor sects of Islam have adhered to these principles, including the present NOI under the leadership of the Reverend Louis Farrakhan (1975–2007). However, in the early 1930s, as Allah was giving instructions to his “last messenger,” Elijah Muhammad, three crucial pillars of Islam were missing. Additionally, in mainstream Islam—Sunnite or Shiite—it is considered blasphemy to deny that the Prophet Muhammad is the sealer of all prophets, let alone to suggest that a reincarnated Allah has given principles to another “last prophet of God,” some of which contradict original Islamic principles. In addition, a principal belief in Islam is that Allah does not appear to mortal souls through reincarnation, a concept with Hindu roots and intrinsically anti-Quranic. Allah, as depicted in the Quran, is beyond human capacity to fathom, let alone to be spoken to in a reincarnated nature as the NOI claims. Furthermore, some of the NOI’s arguments and claims about Islam are quite controversial—for example, the notion that one of the essential purposes of Islam as a religion is spiritually and physically clean up the “dark people” so they are respected by other civilizations on the earth (Kusha, 2009). The purpose of Islam, like Judaism and Christianity, from its inception to the present has been the purification of the soul and body. However, the Quran does not express this desire for black people per se, but for all faithful and, in fact, for all humanity, regardless of race, class, ethnic origins, or gender. Islam, like its JudeoChristian counterparts, is race neutral in its core teachings, in contrast to the vile and racist remarks that religious extremists (Muslim, Chris-

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tian, or Jew) have thrown against one another in the name of “purity” of the faith. The Quran reminds Muslims time and again that Jews and Christians are people of the book (Ahl al-Kitaab) to whom Allah has sent his most beloved prophets, Moses and Jesus-the-Christ, for guidance, redemption, and salvation. In fact, the Quran is adamant that a “true” Jew or Christian is as much a “true” Muslim as a “true” Muslim is a “true” Jew or Christian; all men and women of true faith “submit” to one God, whom the Quran portrays as Allah. This submission, however, is not coerced, as some Muslim fundamentalists advocate, but is of an ecumenical nature that transcends time and culture. In short, a true Muslim is neither racist nor a religious bigot bent on waging jihad against the rest of the civilized world; a true Muslim can find God in the Muslim mosque, the Jewish synagogue, or the Christian church. This is the meaning of religion in the line of Abraham, a concept that has millennia of tradition behind it. Prominent Figures in the Nation of Islam

Malcolm X One of the most famous members of the NOI is Malcolm X, who converted in prison in the 1950s and who played an important role in the early stages of the movement to convert other black inmates to Islam (Van Deburg, 1992). Prior to his own conversion to Islam, which took place in 1947 when he chose the name “Malcolm X,” he was known by his Christian name of Malcolm Little and had been born into a devout Baptist home in Omaha, Nebraska. In 1946, Malcolm was arrested and charged with burglary. Upon conviction, Malcolm was sentenced to 10 years in a Charlestown, Massachusetts, state prison. During his incarceration, Malcolm became acquainted with the NOI and the teachings of its charismatic leader, Elijah Muhammad. Malcolm’s conversion to Islam had lasting moral and psychological impacts on him, as his writings, sermons, and interviews demonstrate. Malcolm converted to Sunni Islam in 1964 and created his own organization named Muslim Mosque Inc. Different reasons are offered for Malcolm’s break from the NOI. Some argue that it was over strategy; some claim that personality clashes were the cause—between Malcolm and Elijah Muhammad, or with other young disciples of Elijah, for example, the Reverend Louis Farrakhan (Van Deburg, 1992). However, a look at Malcolm’s “A Declaration of Independence” of March 12, 1964, shows that the fallout was due to deeply rooted differ-

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ences between Malcolm and Elijah Muhammad over the NOI’s longterm plans. Malcolm believed in the moral and spiritual power of Islam to inculcate the requisite elements for the rejuvenation of the black sense of self-worth and identity, both of which he proposed African Americans had lost to the North American institution of slavery. On February 21, 1965, Malcolm was assassinated while giving a speech at the Audubon Ballroom in New York City. The ideas, speeches, and charismatic personality of Malcolm X have played significant roles in the rise of black consciousness. Having personally experienced the horrors of prison life and its devastating mental and moral impacts on inmates, Malcolm must have realized the rehabilitative role of Islam for the black community at large and prison inmates in particular (Haley, 1964). However, his assassination deprived the black community of one of its most charismatic young leaders at a critical time in the civil rights era.

Louis Farrakhan The Reverend Louis Farrakhan has played an equally important if not controversial role in Islamic proselytizing efforts during his leadership of the NOI. Born Louis Eugene Walcott on May 11, 1933, in Roxbury, Massachusetts, he gradually rose in the leadership cadre that Elijah Muhammad had built. He collaborated with Malcolm X for some time but later was appointed as minister of the Muhammad Temple when Malcolm left the NOI over unsettled ideological and organizational issues with Elijah Muhammad. Once Malcolm X fell out of favor with the top leader, the time for Rev. Farrakhan to step in had come. Farrakhan and his supporters decided to rebuild the original NOI upon the foundation established by W. Fard Muhammad and Elijah Muhammad. In 2000, Imam Warith Deen Mohammed (W.D.) and Minister Louis Farrakhan publicly embraced and declared unity and reconciliation at the annual Saviors’ Day convention. Farrakhan has been a controversial figure, with critics commenting on his anti-Semitic, racist, and homophobic views (Gardell, 1996). Regardless of this assessment of Farrakhan, the NOI’s contribution to conversion to this form of Islam is beyond any doubt crucial to a discussion of Muslims in US prisons. Islam in US Prisons

The establishment of Islam in US penal institutions dates back to the 1930s, with the “Black Muslims” name given to members of the NOI and the Moorish Science Temple of America (Jenkins, 2003). Ammar

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and colleagues did not consider the NOI as a prominent movement in the area of prison-bound conversion to Islam, stating that their data showed that “most of the Muslims affiliate with the American Muslim Mission rather than with the NOI, irrespective of when they identified themselves with Islam” (Ammar, Weaver, and Saxon, 2004, p. 421) However, the Office of the Inspector General, in its April 2004 report titled “A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers,” had a somewhat different view in relation to the NOI’s role in prisons. The Number of Muslim Inmates

The NOI claims that it has intensified its prison-bound proselytizing activities to convert a large number of black inmates to its version of Islam. However, the actual number of these Muslim inmates is as elusive as the actual number of Muslims living in the United States. Different estimates are made for the rate of conversion to various denominations of Islam, including the NOI. For example, Jane I. Smith, in a comprehensive study of the spread of the Islamic faith in the United States, estimated the number of prison conversions to Islam at 30,000 (Smith, 1999). Nyang (1999) has estimated that prison conversion to Islam is a fast-growing phenomenon among the African American Muslim community, to the effect that one of every 10 African American conversions to Islam take place within the prison settings. Lisa Miller, in her September 1999 article in the Wall Street Journal, observed that “the growth of Islam in US prisons is creating anxiety among some Christian ministers. While the vast majority of inmates in federal prison are still Christian, the number of Muslim inmates has nearly tripled over the last six years to 6,500” (Miller, 1999). Citing data from the American Correctional Association, Miller estimated that Muslim inmates constituted about 20% of the inmate population in Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania. Robert Dannin (1996) has conducted primary research in a number of prisons in New York State, known for housing a large number of African American Muslim inmates. He collected data on the number of black converts during the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 2.1). Dannin states that his “study does not account for the numerous Muslims at New York’s municipal Rikers Island prison, a massive facility holding over 15,000 prisoners where there has been a very active (missionary) da’wa program for many years, apparently under the auspices of a group of Muslim corrections officers” (Dannin, 1996, as

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Table 2.1. African American Inmates Professing Islam in New York Prisons

1989 1992

Total Inmate Population 50,000 60,000

Muslim Inmates 7,554 10,186

Source: Dannin, 1996 (as cited in Kusha, 2009)

Percentage of Muslim Inmates 15% 16.9%

cited in Kusha, 2009). That a similar trend is observable for the first decade of the 21st century is highly probable. Changing one’s religion is a personal and complex decision that can results from many factors. In the following section I outline the motivations for conversion, trying to answer the questions of who converts and why. Islam’s Appeal to Prison Inmates

One premise of this chapter is that adherence to Islam is growing among US inmates, especially African American inmates, who constitute a large percentage of the incarcerated population in state and federal penitentiaries. This growth likely connects to the powerful social justice message of Islam, as well the need to cope with a prison life that is oppressive, violent, and dehumanizing. Survival is one of the main concerns of inmates despite the many rehabilitative, educational, and even recreational programs that have been instituted throughout the past century to make prison life more secure and rehabilitative, and less violent. Additionally, based on the available literature, conversion to Islam seems to connect individual inmates to a protective network inside the prison. However, the fact that Islam is gaining a significant following among black inmates constitutes a powerful challenge to US penology, considering the fact that the North American nations of Canada, the United States, and Mexico have historically used a Judeo-Christian penal philosophy in their criminal justice systems (for example, supporting Penance, reading of the scripture, and individual prayers). Prison-Bound Conversion as a Male Phenomenon

Felicia Dix-Richardson and Close (2002) showed that although black male inmates convert to Islam on a regular basis, black female inmates

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have a marked resistance to Islam. Accordingly, “For over the past 60 years, it has been common practice for African American male inmates to convert to Islam as part of the prison experience. The yearly number of prison converts is estimated at 30,000 (Dix-Richardson and Close, 2002, pp. 107–108). Taking the authors’ estimates of conversion to Islam for the past 60 years at its face value, 1.8 million imprisoned black males have converted to Islam during the past six decades. This, of course, is an estimated number of conversions to Islam on a longitudinal basis subject to the dynamics of demographic change within the prison setting. However, the assertion is an important indicator of the prevalence of Islamic conversion among black male inmates in this country. Why do female inmates not convert to Islam with the same enthusiasm and frequency as male convicts? One main reason might relate to the idea that Islam, like other Abrahamic traditions, is patriarchal, despite a number of important social, economic, and legal rights that the Quran has recognized for women. Prison-Bound Conversion as an Exercise of Religious Freedom

Among the NOI’s prison-directed activities is its effective campaign for the recognition of the right to the free exercise of religion in US penitentiaries. Such rights include holding religious sermons or services, wearing religious emblems, corresponding with religious leaders, and proselytizing (Palmer, 2006). These achievements for the NOI are significant, considering the US public’s apprehension post-9/11 over the possibility of inmate radicalization. Exercise of these rights, though, is not absolute and must be balanced against the security concerns of the prison administrators. Thus, US state and federal courts have responded differently to what is perceived as inflammatory Islamic literature. For example, in Northern v. Nelson (1970), the court did not agree with Muslim inmates’ contention that they were entitled to access copies of the Quran, but allowed access to Muhammad Speaks, a controversial piece of NOI literature (Palmer, 2006). Muhammad Speaks is “a collection of Elijah Muhammad’s words of wisdom, public declarations, and religious views that included, among others, religious sermons whose thrust was that incarceration was a divine test of one’s strength of faith against injustice, a theme that Muhammad vociferously proclaimed” (Kusha, 2009, p. 164).

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Conversion as a Just Cause

Freedom, justice, and racial equality have historically made up the tripartite demands of the NOI that it regularly propagates among inmates. The NOI literature from the time of Elijah Muhammad to that of the Reverend Louis Farrakhan has been adamant that white America has to compensate black America for a wide range of injustices inflicted on blacks during four centuries of slavery and socioeconomic exploitation. The compensation sought is not solely of a financial nature but is more multifaceted, having social, political, and legal dimensions (Clines, 1992). Conversion’s Benefits Outside Prison

Once released from prison, those who have succeeded in becoming good and reliable converts can further benefit from the NOI’s social and communal reward system. In fact, the NOI claims that it has now expanded its rehabilitative outreach and agenda to embrace all inmates and not just Muslim African Americans. For example, in its January 18, 2000, document titled “Nation of Islam Calls on All Prisoners,” addressed to an inmate gathering at the Manchester, Kentucky, Federal Correctional Institution, a Muslim chaplain, Minister Benjamin Muhammad, stated, Some of you thought that the NOI was just concerned with Black people. Yes, we are concerned with Black people, but you cannot be concerned with Black people and not be concerned with all people. In truth, no race, no people are going to survive this planet alone; no ideology of supremacy is going to work. (Muhammad, 2000)

Fatherhood and Conversion

One of the main features of Islam attractive to those who convert to it, within or outside the prison setting, is Islam’s stress on the central role of the family, especially on the father’s role in confronting some of the black community’s main problems. For example, one purpose of the Million Man March organized by the NOI in 1995 in Washington, DC, was to stress that the black family, as an institution, has been in a multifaceted crisis that requires the urgent attention of white and black politicians and social critics. The NOI believes that the problem of the black family not only has not been resolved but in fact is deepening because white and black politicians have failed to address its root causes. Even with this nod toward a biracial solution, NOI literature portrays

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Rev. Farrakhan as the new sine qua non black leader, comparable to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., who is capable of resolving this problem by calling the black community, especially black males, into action. In the Million Man March, pledges were made that from that day onward, the followers of the NOI would not engage in self-destructive behavior, but “will pledge to love my brother as I love myself. . . . strive to improve myself spiritually, morally, mentally, socially, politically and economically for the benefit of myself, my family and my people” (Million Man March Pledge, n.d.). In addition, pledges against drug-induced violence toward women and children were made, as well as against crime. The organizers also made a pledge to continue working to improve black communities and especially the status of the black male. On the 10th anniversary of the Million Man March in October 2005, ten similar pledges were made concerning the issues of unity, spirituality, education, economic development, political power, reparation, the prison industrial complex, health, artistic/cultural development, and peace. Conversion Strengthening the Family

The family occupies a central place both in African American and immigrant Muslim communities. This centrality stems from the fact that the faith of Islam has historically portrayed family as the most important social institution in which Islam’s core values are inculcated. These core values include, among others, family values such as love and respect for parents. The Quran places much stress on the family being characterized as the provider of legitimate goods, discipline, and authority. The Quran also alludes to cooperation between the parents as providers and charges both with the responsibility for maintaining an emotionally fulfilling and nurturing family environment. Notwithstanding the fact that a strictly sexual division of labor has existed in the Islamic world, the faithful believe that only in such a disciplined and yet nurturing home environment are parents in a better position to instill in their offspring a set of anticriminogenic values, such as (1) respect for self, siblings, parents, grandparents, and other members of the society; (2) a conscientious fear of social disrepute preventing the offspring from engaging in deviant, delinquent, or criminal behaviors; and (3) appreciation of the importance of education and positive involvement in the social affairs of the community. In addition, offspring who are brought up in such a positive family environment learn about and appreciate the importance of legitimate authority. Once these offspring adequately internalize such factors, youth

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can better appreciate the repercussions of engaging in deviant or delinquent acts by defying parental authority at home or that of other authority figures in society at large. Conclusion Even in light of the information presented in this chapter, questions remain. For example, are the faith-based prison-bound activities in the name of Islam capable of manifesting Islam’s redemptive powers within penal settings? Do Muslim inmates (black or otherwise) with strong religious beliefs refrain from committing criminal acts while incarcerated? Is there a relationship between the strength of belief and the number of prison-bound infractions? The literature on the subject of the redemptive power of religion in prison is extensive but mostly of a speculative nature, according to Todd Clear and Melvina T. Sumter (2002). They maintain that “during the twentieth century there has been much speculation by scholars in the United States about the relationship between religion and prisoners.” Despite these efforts, “We know little about religion in prison, particularly as it relates to the psychological adjustment of offenders to the prison environment” (Clear and Sumter, 2002, p.125). Clear and Sumter conclude that their research—based on self-report questionnaires of a nonrandom sample of 769 inmates under incarceration in 20 prisons scattered in 20 states— has shown “A significant relationship exists between inmate religiousness and multiple measures of inmate adjustment to the prison environment.” (Clear and Sumter, 2002, p. 147). Similar studies, albeit with different methodological approaches, have reached similar results. For example, O’Connor and Perreyclear studied the relationship between prison-bound religious sermons and offender rehabilitation. They concluded that, after controlling for relevant demographic and criminal record factors, “as religious involvement increased the number of inmates with infractions decreased” (O’Connor and Perreyclear, 2002). Thus, one could argue that those who possess strong religious faith may promote a more harmonious prison existence. Studies on Muslim prisoners have reached similar conclusions, such as research done by Ammar and colleagues (2004). Based on sample questionnaires sent to close to 4,000 Muslim males in Ohio State prisons to assess reasons for conversion to Islam while incarcerated, the authors found demographic, ideological, and ethnographic rationales for conversion.

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The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) “houses approximately 150,000 inmates in 105 BOP facilities nationwide. According to the chief of the BOP’s Chaplaincy Services Branch, approximately 9,000 inmates, about 6% of the inmate population, seek Islamic religious services. While Muslim inmates are not required to report which sect of Islam they identify with, inmate self-reporting indicates that Muslim prisoners can generally be classified into four groups: Sunni, Shiite, Nation of Islam, and Moorish Science Temple of America. Approximately 85% of BOP inmates who identify themselves as Muslim are Sunni or Nation of Islam” (Office of the Inspector General, 2004). In any case, prison-bound conversion to Islam in the United States is a fact, whether the result of the NOI’s or the more mainstream immigrant Islam’s proselytizing activities. One advantage of religious belief is that it could organizationally link the convict with a respective church, synagogue, or mosque in the surrounding community as well as with the regional or national headquarters of that denomination. Once linked up with the larger religious organization, the whole dynamic of incarceration changes, depending on the overall linkage that a religious denomination has established with its inmate faithful in state or federal penitentiaries. In this respect, faith-based prisonbound activities have provided a powerful challenge to US penal philosophy.

3 Islamic Perspectives on Crime, Punishment, and Prison Nawal H. Ammar

justice system has received little attention in English-speaking academic writings. For a long time, among English-speaking academics, prisons and Islam related mainly to the experience of Black Muslims and their conversion, and was an issue for comparative research. Demographics of prisoners and the events of the last decade render the understanding of prisons and prison as a form of punishment in Islamic law as an important domestic US issue with internal racial implications and global political consequences. According to King, Mauer, and Huling (2004), since the 1970s there has been more than a 500% rise in the number of people incarcerated in the nation’s prisons and jails, resulting in more than 2.2 million people behind bars. This growth “has been accompanied by an increasingly disproportionate racial composition, with particularly high rates of incarceration for African Americans, who now constitute 900,000 of the total 2.2 million incarcerated population” (Mauer and King, 2007, p. 1). While the increase in the rate of African American incarceration does not imply a direct increase in Muslims in prisons, it is nevertheless a good indicator of an increase in potential converts within the prison walls. The precise number of Muslims in this exploding population in prisons, according to Kusha (2009), is mostly anecdotal. Nonetheless, a Citizens against Recidivism (2009) report provides an idea of the magnitude of the Muslim population in New York State’s prisons. The report indicates that 30% of African Americans in prison nationally are Muslims. An estimated 350,000 Muslims are housed in federal, state, or local prisons around the country. About 5% of all Muslims in the United States and 12% of The subject of prisons as punishment in the Islamic criminal

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all African American Muslims are in prison or jail across the country. About 80% of those seeking faith while in prison come to Islam. The number of Muslims in US prisons renders an understanding of the Islamic conceptualization of prisons and prisoners a constructive endeavor, not only for program implementation in US prisons and jails, but also for beginning to understand such a group from a social scientific perspective beyond media and religious leadership interpretations (Center against Recidivism, 2009, p. 1). In this chapter—based on a review of original and secondary sources of Islam as well as interviews with two religious clerics—I examine Islam’s position on crime, punishment, and prisons.1 I ask a variety of questions to define and understand the structure and function of prisons within Islamic penology. These questions include issues regarding the meaning of prisons in Islam, the role prison plays in the Islamic concept of punishment, classifications of prison types, the nature of prison sentences, the Islamic ethic of treating prisoners, Islamic law and prisoners’ behavior, and alternatives to prisons. The importance of understanding the Islamic perspective on prisons is at the core of understanding Muslims in prison. In comprehending how Islam perceives prison, crime, and punishment, prison administrators are able to more precisely and effectively interact with and react to the ever growing Muslim inmate population. Scholars concerned with prison conditions, prisoners’ rights, the effectiveness of prison as punishment, and the abolition of prisons as punishment can also benefit from a clearer understanding of Islam’s legalistic and theological understanding of prison, crime, and punishment. Before addressing the main themes of this chapter, however, I briefly describe and outline Islamic law and its sources in order to frame the discussion that follows. Islamic Law and Its Sources Interpretations of Islam have varied throughout the centuries, as have the diverse cultures within which the religion is practiced. Muslims disagree about some interpretations, and variances have created heated debate. Most Muslims, however, would agree that the sources of Islam are the following: the Quran, which is composed of the words of God transmitted through the angel Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad; the sunnah, or the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad; the hadith, or the sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad; and the sharia, or code of law based on various interpretations, or mathib (Ammar, 2001).

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The human interpreters of divine revelation in Islam developed the science of jurisprudence, Ilm al-fiqh. The Arabic word fiqh is used to denote the basis of law and as a means of understanding the reason or cause of the speaker’s words. The content of fiqh, however, varies with the distinct schools of thought. Strictly speaking, one can argue that there are six schools of fiqh across the two major divisions of Islam: the Sunni and Shiite sects (Bahnasi, 1983a). The four schools in the Sunni sect include Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, and Hanabli (Ammar, 2001). In Shiite Islam the two main schools of interpretation are the Jafari and the Ithnaashaar (Khoja, 1978). These schools vary in their interpretations in both process and content. The process by which knowledge is derived from the sources also varies according to the schools of interpretation. Some include pure questions of faith (Hanafi school), others see the strict interpretation from divine sources as the only basis for interpretation (Shafi), and yet others view the application of reason as essential (Maliki; Khoja, 1978). Schacht (1982) claimed that in the 10th century C.E. the doors of interpretation, ijtihad, closed for Sunni Muslims. Melchert (1997), however, notes that this is not possible and that the ijtihad gate cannot close as long as a Muslim jurisprudent delivers opinion in a systematic and rational way. In Shia Islam the issue of interpretation of the divine revelation and the sources of the law are different.2 While Sunnis view the literary and explicit meaning of the text, Shias (including Sufis) look at the internal and hidden symbolism. This difference for Shia Muslims lies in the concept of “Imam’s judgment.” According to the Shiites, “The Imam is not there by the suffrage of people, but by divine right. . . . And He is the final interpreter of the Qur’an” (Khoja, 1978, pp. 54– 58). The Shia disagreements based on the right to succession are further divided into many schools. For the Shia, the Prophet’s sayings are a source of law. However, the Sunnis have developed a science, Ilm alhadith, to ascertain genuine from fabricated hadiths, whereas the Shia accept only hadiths related by the imams who have descended from the Prophet (Khoja, 1978). US Islam and Pluralism The issue to underscore is that neither Islam as a religion nor its sources are monolithic. Today, with more than 1 billion Muslims living in more than 85 countries who speak more than 200 dialects, discussing Islam as an ideology with a singular interpretation is impossible (Ammar, 2003). The interpretations of Islam have varied through-

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out the last 15 centuries, along with the diverse cultures within which the religion is practiced. Such interpretations have been diametrically opposed, and the variances have often caused serious dissension. To this diversity of interpretation, one can add the growth of Islam in the United States and Canada. Islam is a universal and growing religion in North America. Today, it is estimated that Muslims constitute the largest “minority religion” in the United States, comprising over 2.6 million adherents in 2010 (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2011). This point is essential in the history of Islam, since as a religion it has thrived more as a majority than as a minority religion. As such, on the American continent, Islam is reexperiencing its earlier history of being a minority religion. While such an experience is not new to Islamic law, the context in which it is appearing in North America is different. Over the centuries Islam has become a minority religion in a number of countries and not in the context of colonization. Sikand (2002), speaking of Islam as a minority religion in India—a situation closer to North America’s—asserts that classical Islamic law developed in a context of Muslim political authority. Hence, the classical jurists devoted little attention to the status of Muslim minorities, and none at all to what was then only a hypothetical situation. In contemporary India, in theory at least, Muslims are neither rulers nor the ruled, but equal citizens along with people of other faiths. While Muslims in the West, and in North America in general, are in principle minorities of equal status within the larger society, in reality various issues such as race, ethnicity, ethnocentrism, immigration, and meaning of nation or community complicate this equal status. Duderija emphasizes that as a direct result of moving from a “majority religion/culture context into a minority one, new immigrants belonging to minority religions undergo significant changes in the way their identity is constructed” (2007, p. 153). This change renders religion a locus of identity construction. This new locus of identity, Cesari (2003) notes, becomes a decisive element in the transformation of Muslim practices and their relationship to Islam. In addition, the case of Islam, in particular, as a minority religion in the United States—unlike in Europe or Canada—encounters a historically oppressed minority community: African Americans, whose practice of Islam, the Nation of Islam, was infused with issues of racism and liberation. Many scholars have described the Nation of Islam community in depth (Allen, 1996; Austin, 2003; Evanzz, 1999; Haley, 1964; Kusha, 2009). Nonetheless, I offer next a brief view that frames the two main forms of Islam practiced in US prisons: normative Islam and the Nation of Islam.

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Islamic Diversity in the United States The existing community of Muslims in the United States includes a number of religious divisions, including the Nation of Islam, the Five Percenters, and the Moorish Science Temple of America. The more dominant politically and demographically among those divisions has been the Nation of Islam (NOI). The adherents of NOI were often referred to as Black Muslims, a name they do not encourage (Tinaz, 1996). The NOI was founded in 1930 by W. D. Fard (Wali Fard; Tinaz, 1996). According to Haley, Fard taught that “God’s true name was Allah, that His true religion was Islam, that the true name for that religion’s people was Muslims” (1964, p. 211). Austin argues that “Islam in the Nation of Islam was an idiosyncratic mixture of ideas from orthodox Islam, Christianity and other sources” (2003, p. 59). In 1934 Fard disappeared mysteriously, and Elijah Muhammad assumed leadership of the group in Detroit and then moved the headquarters to Chicago (Lomax, 1979). Austin (2003) reports that Muhammad encouraged members to read the Quran and to pray five times a day, and in 1970 he instructed his followers to fast in the month of Ramadan according to the Islamic calendar. He even made a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1959. Austin (2003) notes further that upon his return from Mecca, Muhammad renamed his then “temples” to “mosques.” In 1975 upon Muhammad’s death, his son Wallace Muhammad became the new leader (Tinaz, 1996). As the new leader, Wallace (later Warith Deen) gradually initiated a process of reconstructing and aligning the organization with the international Islamic community, moving toward Sunni Islamic practice, and eventually renamed the group the Society of Muslims (Tinaz, 1996). In 1977, Minister Louis Farrakhan, a national spokesman for the NOI, was dissatisfied with the way the group was going and formed an independent organization by “reactivating and duplicating the old forms of the movement which reiterated the original teachings and ideals of Elijah Muhammad” (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 2009). The theological premises and the historical context of the Nation of Islam and normative Islam (both in its Sunni and Shia forms) as practiced in the Middle East vary. Most Muslims view the contribution of the NOI in the struggle against racism in the United States as monumental. More recently and after September 11, 2001, Muslims experienced some of the same oppressions that African American Muslims have endured for years (Talhami, 2008). Nonetheless, the differences between those interpretations of Islam are irreconcilable theologically.

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Normative Islam, like the other Abrahamic religions—Judaism and Christianity—is built on a nonanthropomorphic view of God. God will neither reproduce nor was born. The theology of creation is very similar to the other Abrahamic faiths, where Adam and Eve play a prominent role in producing the human race regardless of color. The Quran is clear about the creation of one human race: O Humankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. (49:13)

According to the theology of the NOI, however, Wali Fard was believed to be “Allah in person” (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 2009). Austin (2003) notes that in the NOI creation story, non-European whites were descendants of “the Original Man,” a race of Asiatic good scientists known as the Tribe of Shabazz. The Tribe of Shabazz founded the Holy City of Mecca in Arabia. On the other hand, Tinaz (1996) explains that the NOI’s perception of the difference in origin between the Asiatic tribe and the whites lies with the story of Yakub, who was believed to be an evil scientist who created a race of whites through genetic engineering. Consequently, the whites he created turned out to be devils. According to the teachings, Allah has allowed the race of white devils to rule the world for 6,000 years, a period about to end with the destruction of the world in the “Battle of Armageddon,” after which a new world will be ruled by a nation of righteous blacks. These differences make the two theologies not only distinct but also at odds with the two core theological concepts of their conception of human creation and God. Moreover, the histories of the genesis of the two religions are different not only in the sense of time, place, and sociopolitical context but also in terms of integration. According to Austin (2003), Muslims from the Middle East (Arabs and Persians) were often not allowed to enter NOI temples or mosques. The few who did enter were connected to the leaders of NOI, including Muhammad and Malcolm X. Tinaz (1996) summarizes the main difference between the two theologies by noting that the NOI’s focus on Islam was secondary, used mostly to boost its doctrines and eschatology. NOI leaders sought to combine black identity with the culture of Islam to form the myth of black supremacy. In US prisons, Middle Eastern Sunni Islam became the visible and approved form of Islam beginning in the 1980s (McCloud and Al-

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Deen, 2008). In the next section, I examine normative Islam’s view of crime and punishment, providing a comparative perspective between the US legal system and normative Islam’s understanding of such issues. Normative Islam’s View of Crime and Punishment Given the complexity of Islamic opinions on legal matters, space limitations make it necessary to focus on one major source of jurisprudence; here I discuss the Sunni schools (Mathahib). My choice of the Sunni opinions and jurisprudence is based on the fact that 80% of Muslims in the world are Sunni, most Muslim US prisoners practice the Sunni tradition, and it is the main theology approved for Muslims in most state and federal prisons (Ammar, 2001). Normative Islam, according to Houidi, is generally not “obsessed” with crime and punishment (1994, p. 73), as evidenced by the fact that only 30 Ayah (units of revelation) out of 6,236 address crime and punishment. Muslim jurists consider the function of the punishments named in the Quran as “deterrence and suppression” (Al Alfi, 1979, p. 279). Punishment in this life, according to Islamic law, is penance, but it does not guarantee forgiveness on the Day of Judgment. However, the Islamic view of crime does not resort to punishment until it has exhausted all possible means of crime prevention (Ammar, 2001). Islamic jurisprudence, however, has systematized the field of crime and punishment within Islamic political systems, starting from the seventh century until today. Islamic penology divides crime and punishment into two classes: those mandated in the Quran (hudud and qisas) and those left to the discretionary powers of the ruler or the ruler’s designee (ta’zir; Bahnasi, 1983a). These categories indicate different bases of infringed rights and obligations: God’s right (the individual’s obligation toward God’s creation for public and communal good) or an individual right (the individual’s obligation to God’s creation for personal enjoyment). Hudud Crimes and Punishments

Hudud crimes are the most serious of crimes and their punishments are the harshest, because the individual has violated God’s right (Haq Allah), by injuring the harmony of the community that is God’s creation—a public right. These crimes and their punishments are pre-

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scribed in a general manner in the Quran (Bahnasi, 1983b). They include seven crimes: theft, adultery, slander, drinking alcohol, highway robbery, rebellion, and apostasy (Ammar, 2002). An offender can only be punished for hudud crimes under specific conditions: the offender must have committed the act under no coercion, have been an adult, have been in full possession of one’s mental faculties, and must not have been ignorant of the law; also, evidence must prove guilt without doubt (Ammar, 2002). The had (singular for hudud) crime is difficult to prove and execute; for that reason, the crime and punishment are often reclassified to the lesser level of qisas or ta’zir (Ammar, 2001). Jurists disagree regarding the type of mandated hudud punishments since the Quran prescribed only general rules, leaving conditions and applications to other sources, including the Prophet’s hadiths and sharia (Ammar, 2002). Qisas Crime and Punishment

Qisas is the second category of crime in Islamic criminal fiqh. These crimes include all types of murder—voluntary and involuntary—and crimes against persons, including assault, battery, mayhem, and other bodily harm, that result in injury or death (Bassiouni, 1982). The types of rights that are violated in qisas are subject to debate. Modern Islamic jurists, however, agree that this category combines both public and private rights in the case of intentional homicide. Qisas is public because humans are God’s creation and private because the victim’s family has lost a loved one. The Quranic verse states, Oh ye who believe the law of equality are prescribed to you in cases of murder: the free for the free, the slave for the slave, the woman for the woman. But if any forgiveness is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any reasonable demand and compensate him with handsome gratitude. This is concession and mercy from God. (Al-Baqarah 178)

To guarantee the equitable application of punishment in qisas crimes, the administration of justice should be in the hands of an “appointed guardian” (Wali al-Amr)—a mediator—who can be a judge or local administrator and not left to the community, the victim, or the victim’s family. Qisas crimes can only be adjudicated at the request or initiation of the victim or the victim’s family (Bahnasi, 1984). Jurists agree that there are thee kinds of homicide: willful murder, quasi-intentional murder, and killing by mistake (Qaiyd, 1997; Shah,

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1999). Only willful murder is punished by qisas. According to Shah, the other kinds of murder and their punishment are “quasi intentional murder [which] is punishable by an aggravated amount of diyah [monetary reparation]; and killing by mistake [which] is reparable with normal diyah” (1999, p. 160). For all the determined and fixed punishments, high standards exist for evidentiary rules. When evidence is not sufficient, the punishment is relegated to qadi (judge) justice and not jury justice. Death as punishment in Islamic law can apply to qisas crimes. The rules that apply to punishment by death in qisas crimes have been subject to debate among the various schools of jurisprudence. Some argue that retaliation by death is prescribed; others advocate for equal-harm retaliation; and yet others negate the prescription of murder for crimes other than adultery, apostasy, or highway robbery (Ammar, 2001; Bahnasi, 1988). Forgiveness is a recommended practice in qisas crimes, particularly after reading verse 178 of Al-Baqarah: “But if forgiveness is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any reasonable demand and compensate him with handsome gratitude” (Houidi, 1982). Forgiveness in qisas crimes, notes Bahnasi (1988), does not abrogate the state’s right to punish less punitively by either imprisonment or compensation. Within the pre-Islamic context of retaliating against the murder of one person by annihilating entire clans, the Quran stated the range of possible punitive measures: “O ye who believe the law of equality are prescribed to you in cases of murder: the free for the free, the slave for the slave, the woman for the woman” (Al-Baqarah 178). The Quran cautions against vengeful retaliation as a punishment for the crime of murder: We ordained therein for them life for life, eye for an eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth and wounds for equal. Anyone remits the retaliation by way of charity; it is an act of atonement. (Al-Maidah 45)

Alternatives to the retributive death punishment exist in the case of qisas crimes. These include giving a diyya (victim’s compensation) or reconciliation. Either Wali al-Amr (the appointed guardian/arbitrator), the victim, or the victim’s family can order the forgiveness and consider the alternatives. Such cases have been documented by many sociologists and anthropologists of the Middle East (Ammar 1954; Antoun 1972; Ammar 1988). Diyya (compensation) in qisas crimes is procedurally complex. Generally, diyya is due in cases of doubtful evidence, of involuntary

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manslaughter, where a juvenile is the perpetrator, and where the offender is insane (Bahnasi, 1983a). Bahnasi (1988) notes that the offender should accept diyya as an option; otherwise the qisas punishment applies. The amount of compensation that the offender pays is according to a predetermined amount and over a prescribed period of time (Bahnasi, 1983a). In cases where the offender has neither the funds nor the resources to pay, the immediate blood relatives are responsible. If, however, the offender is a female or a juvenile, then their immediate relatives are exempt from payment (Bahnasi, 1983a). If the offender has no immediate blood relatives living, then the state is responsible for paying the compensation (Bahnasi, 1983a). Diyya can be revoked in cases where the guilty is found innocent, or (according to the Maliki school) if the victim requires the cessation of payment and then dies (Bahnasi, 1983a). Some argue that after a period of 15 years without legal inheritors, diyya payment should stop (Bahnasi, 1988). Solh (reconciliation) is not an alternative to compensation or diyya, but rather an additional step in the process (Ammar, 2001). It is highly recommended in cases where injuries have not led to death. Solh takes the place of forgiveness and requires negotiations in the presence of an appointed arbitrator [Wali al-Amr]; (Bahnasi, 1983a). Solh does not have to occur between all injured parties and offenders, but can be partial—for example, between the offender and one of the injured (Bahnasi, 1983a). Ta’zir Crimes and Punishment

Ta’zir is the third category of crime in Islam. This category includes all other crimes for which the Quran did not prescribe a penalty. The word “ta’zir” is a classical Arabic word meaning “chastise.” The punishment of chastisement is subject to the politics of the larger society and its conditions (Bahnasi, 1983a). The objective of any punishment under the ta’zir category is for the public good and not individual vengeance. Under ta’zir, punishment is left to the discretionary power of the ruler and the ruler’s delegates (Bahnasi, 1984). The discretionary power of the judge, the contextual setting of the society, and the status and personality of the offender contribute to the definition of a crime and the implementation of a penalty. For ta’zir crimes and punishments, forgiveness and minimum punitive measures are central features (Bahnasi, 1988). Penal sanctions can be abolished in four cases: the death of the convict, the granting of grace (‘afw; initially by the victim and then by

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the judge/arbitrator), if the victim and the offender had forgiven each other prior to the matter appearing before the judge or sovereign, and if the offender has repented (Benmelha, 1982). This category of crime is the most amenable to transforming justice in the Islamic criminal justice system from retributive to restorative justice. Prison as Punishment in Islam Prison and imprisonment as punishment—in most cases—fall within the ta’zir category in Islamic penology (Ammar, 2002). In certain hudud crimes, incarceration is used either as a last resort or an initial step toward punishment (Bahnasi, 1983b). Incarceration in other crimes is not prescribed by God and has thus been subject to human interpretation. As such, Islam presents a large number of sources and debate about prison (Ammar, 2002). History of Prisons in Islam

Prisons were known in Arabia prior to Islam. Hence when the Prophet Muhammad established a state in the urban center, Medina, in the seventh century C.E., the concept was not a strange one. The Quran contains nine references to prison or imprisonment as an institution (Ammar, 2001).3 Most of the references come from Surat Yusuf (Joseph) relating to pre-Islamic times. The other two references relate to notions of faith and prayer. Other forms of incarceration or detention can also be found in the Quran.4 The Prophet Muhammad and his first successor (caliph) had no specific space for imprisonment, but placed people in custody in homes or mosques or kept people under someone’s guardianship while they were at home (house arrest; Al-Jaryawi, 1997). Not until Islam had expanded beyond the bounds of Arabia did the second caliph, Umar, buy a home in Mecca and transform it into a prison. As such, a great deal of disagreement persists on whether Islam views prisons as legal. Regardless, however, the prison became an institution of punishment later in Islamic civilization. The first Islamic penitentiary was built by the fourth caliph, Ali Ibn Abi Talib, in the city of Kufa, located today in Iraq (Al-Jaryawi, 1997). The penitentiary, known as nafi’a, literally means “beneficial or benefiting.” The caliph imprisoned people where clear punishment was not prescribed or for recidivists, as was particularly the case with thieves who were not deterred by the severing of a hand (Ammar, 2001).

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After the early period of Islamic history known as the Orthodox Caliphate (632–661 C.E.), prisons had become an established form of punishment (Ammar, 2002). The clear historic theme is that the more authoritarian and brutal the ruler—often because his legitimacy was questioned—the more prisons were built (personal communication with cleric, 2003). By the time the ruling caliphs were the Abbasides, who moved the center of Islamic rule to Baghdad (762 C.E.), prisons had developed into a central punitive institution for the Islamic state (Bahnasi, 1988). Prison Categories

There are two types of prisons in Islamic history. Linguistically the words habs and sijn are used interchangeably to mean the place where people are incarcerated. As a result, much confusion exists about the difference between the two types of prisons. According to sharia, habs is the equivalent of a jail in the US criminal justice system. In the Quran the word is mentioned in two verses: Hud 8 and Al Maidah 106. In both, habs refers to a short-term confinement pending investigation, trial, or arbitration (Al-Jaryawi, 1997). Sijn, on the other hand, is mentioned 10 times in the Quran (Yusuf 25, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 41, 42, 100; Al Shura 29; Al-Jaryawi, 1997; Bahnasi, 1988). In all verses, sijn refers to punishment. Jurists agree that the duration of short-term confinement in habs should not exceed the time required for a speedy investigation. According to the Shafi school of jurisprudence, speedy investigation should not take longer than a month (Bahnasi, 1988). Some argue that the habs confinement could be as short as the duration of the Friday prayer (Abedl Hadi, 1993).5 As to the duration of the long-term confinement, sijn, juristic opinion varies. Some argue that the sentence length is left to the qadi’s discretion; others, such as the Shafi jurists, limit the longterm sentence to six months, and yet others note that both the Quran and Islamic history permit life sentences (Bahnasi, 1988; Abedl Hadi, 1993).6 Islamic criminal justice uses incarceration as a last resort for juveniles (Al-Husaini, 1995). Other forms of deterrence are recommended for juveniles below age 15. Incarcerating juveniles should be for the purpose of rehabilitation and not punishment, according to jurists.

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Prisoners in Islam Treatment of Prisoners

Rules and regulations for treating prisoners were established at the end of the ninth century during the reign of Al-Rashid in Baghdad (AlJaryawi, 1997; personal communication with cleric, 2009). According to Abedl Hadi (1993) and Bahnasi (1988), jurists agree that in Islamic prisons inmates should: • • • •

Not be chained so that they can pray. Be chained if they were charged with murder, but only at night. Be given ample food and drink. Be given clothing suitable to the winter and summer seasons.

Education and rehabilitation are essential components of Islamic prison life. Muslim prisoners must learn about their religion and educate themselves in science and philosophy. According to Qaiyd (1997), each prison should have, at minimum, a religious teacher. Moreover, prisoners should be permitted to have access to reading and writing materials. Prisoners can briefly leave prison in special circumstances, including praying during the high feasts, visiting a sick person, attending a close relative’s funeral, or testifying in court (Abedl Hadi, 1993). Caring for the health of prisoners is an essential component of the Islamic prison system. Supplying care for ailing prisoners outside the place of incarceration is permissible, provided that safety precautions against escape are in place (Abedl Hadi, 1993; Bahnasi, 1988). Prisoners who die with no family members to claim their body should be prayed for and buried in an Islamic way (personal communication with cleric, 2009).7 According to sharia, those who leave prison after completing their sentence should be given a written document indicating their legal release and another indicating the skills they learned and worked with in prison (personal communication with cleric, 2003). Prisoners who have money held by the prison authorities should get it back at the time of release, while those who are indigent should be given a stipend to cover initial expenses (Abedl Hadi, 1993). Released prisoners should be visited periodically to ensure that they are managing well and have not returned to the ways that led them to prison (Bahnasi, 1988).

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Prisoners’ Religious Behavior

In Islamic sharia, according to Abedl Hadi (1993), prisoners must maintain their cleanliness and the purity required for prayer. They should maintain a tidy look, with shaved hair, groomed moustaches, and a clean long beard. Sharia also regulates prisoners’ behavior regarding prayer, almsgiving, fasting, and pilgrimage.8 Muslim prisoners can pray at approximate times and are forgiven if they do not pray at the exact prescribed times.9 While it is recommended that they pray in clean clothes after ablution (ritual cleansing with or without water), they are also permitted to pray in dirty clothes if no other way is possible. Prisoners are also allowed to shorten their prayers if the circumstances of their incarceration demand it. Almsgiving is a duty for prisoners who own property and are wealthy (Abedl Hadi, 1993). Fasting during the month of Ramadan is a duty for all Muslims, including those in prison. However, if prisoners are forced to eat during this month, they are forgiven for such a behavior (Bahnasi, 1983b). Muslim prisoners cannot fast as a protest. The Quran emphasizes selfpreservation very clearly when it says, “And make not your own hands contribute to [your] own destruction” (Al-Baqarah 196), and “Nor kill [or destroy] yourselves; for Allah hath been to you most merciful” (AlNisa 29). While the Quran makes pilgrimage obligatory for “those who are able and can afford it” (Ali Imran 97), Muslim prisoners are not required to go on pilgrimage and are treated theologically like the sick— unable to travel (Abedl Hadi, 1993). Forgiveness and Prison Sentences

Most prison sentences are the result of ta’zir, a punishment left to the discretionary power of the ruler and the ruler’s delegates, the qadi. Prison as a punishment (with the exception of two cases) is not divinely prescribed in the Quran and is left for humans to formulate. In ta’zir crimes and punishment, forgiveness and minimum punitive measures are central features of punishment (Ammar, 2001). The Quran addresses forgiveness as a quality of God and a recommended quality for humans directly: Allah does not forgive worshiping others with Him, but he forgives everything else. (Al Nisa 48)

But Forgive and overlook till Allah accomplishes His purpose. (Al-Baqarah 109)

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Hold to forgiveness, command what is right, and turn away from the ignorant. (Al Araf 199)

More particularly, the Quran addresses forgiveness in relation to punishment when it states, The recompense for an injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree): but if a person forgives and makes reconciliation their reward is due from Allah: for Allah loves not those who do wrong. (Al-Shura 41)

In general, Islamic texts are clear about the value of forgiveness and reconciliation. Not only is Allah forgiving, but humans (judges, the community, and victims) should also be forgiving. These practices help in the restoration of community and well-being among believers. Conclusion Spalek notes, “Within criminological textbooks and research studies, diversity and difference have been viewed in terms of race or ethnic identity, thereby largely omitting the issue of religious diversity” (2002, p. 2). In reality, a perusal of criminology, criminal justice, or comparative textbooks shows that we either teach our students nothing about the nature of crime in religion or we select certain stereotypical forms, especially when it relates to Islam, such as the severing of hands in the case of theft (Ammar, 2002). In reality, punishment in Islamic fiqh is not all derived from religious law. Out of the three classifications of punishment only the first, hudud, is subject to theological dictates. The other two forms, qisas and ta’zir, are human- and judge-directed and are the result of interpretation. Prison is one of the human-directed punishments in Islam. The structures, conditions, and treatment of prisoners in Islam are humanconstructed visions of the institution. The general framework of prisons is informed by a religious view that necessitates humane conditions for the imprisoned. Prisoners must be provided with good nutrition, freedom of movement, the right to practice the religion (within the bounds of the walls),10 and an educational environment where they can read more than the Quran, with rehabilitation programs if needed. Prisoners are also able to leave the prison under certain circumstances. The prison must provide a proper environment for the inmates to practice almost all of their religious rituals to their fullest. The religious obligations, however, are flexible to accommodate the prison environment.

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Release and reintegration of prisoners in the community is part of the prison framework in Islamic penology. However, the process by which such integration takes place is not clear in many of the writings on the issue. The concept is generally underdeveloped, and further guidelines are necessary. In some categories of crime in Islamic criminal law, reintegration is very important, especially those of ta’zir, where human judgment provides the rules and institutions of punishment. Hence, scholars of Islamic law need to develop the idea of reintegration within Islamic fiqh more clearly in order to help facilitate reintegration policies and programs. Finally, in Islamic penology forgiveness is a core component. In the qisas and ta’zir categories of crime and punishment, penal sanctions can be abolished, provided that certain conditions are met. However, forgiveness is a process initiated outside the courtroom and is a right that the victim may or may not exercise (Ammar, 2001). To many interpreters of Islamic law (fiqh) (Schacht, 1949; Coulson, 1969; Kadduri, 2002; Hourani, 2007), sharia is the outcome of a historic process and linked to current social, political, and economic conditions. Bahnasi (1988, p. 22) refers to the idea of criminal punishment as “siyasit al-uquba”—the politics of punishment. In other words, punishment in Islamic law is dynamic and is often conditioned by its sociopolitical environment. Within the US sociopolitical context of prison as punishment, Muslims in prison are faced with numerous unique conditions. Islam in US prisons is a racialized issue combined with historic conditions of African American oppression, a domestic problem of disproportionality of incarcerated African Americans (some of whom are Muslim), a complex international situation of radicalized political anti-US Islam, and economic conditions that drain resources of state budgets, inevitably affecting nonmainstream services, including those involving Muslim prisoners. The general understanding of normative Islam’s perception of crime and punishment, the specific human-made sharia in relation to prison, alternatives to incarceration, and forgiveness can be helpful in the context of US prisons. Such understanding can provide a context for prison administrators and policymakers that can help them in treating Muslim inmates by developing programs and policies that support the practice of Islam inside prison as well as rehabilitation and reintegration.

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Notes 1. The two clerics prefer to remain anonymous. However, one of the clerics was from Bahrain, and I interviewed him in 2003. The other is from Egypt, and our interview took place in 2009. 2. Sunni Islam is often referred to as “Orthodox” Islam, and Shia Muslims are depicted as seceders. The reality is that the difference was initially a difference on the question of succession after the death of the Prophet. Shia Muslims considered Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, the rightful successor after the Prophet’s death, and they denounced the idea of election (Shura) in leadership. The theological difference that eventually developed between Shia and Sunni had to do with questions of legitimate rights to ruling the Muslim nation. 3. Al-Maida 106; Hud 8; Yusuf 25, 23, 35, 33, 36, 39, 41, and 42. 4. Al-Nisa 15; al-Anam 27; al-Anfal 30. 5. The Friday prayer is a weekly communal noon prayer and is the longest of the noon weekly prayers. 6. The Quranic verse about adulterous women says, “Confine them to houses until death claims them or Allah ordains for them some (other) way” (Al-Nisa 15). Also the Prophet’s successor (caliph) Omar imprisoned a sorcerer till death. 7. In Islam the body should be washed in a particular way and wrapped with a white cloth called a Kafan. It should also be buried prior to the first sunset after death. 8. These are four of the five pillars of Islam. The fifth is declaration of faith (as-Shahaadah). 9. Muslims pray five times a day at a prescribed time: dawn, noon, midday, sunset, and evening. 10. This is a relevant point in view of the release of the only person convicted of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, Abdelbeset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi, age 57, who was sick with advanced prostate cancer. He was released on compassionate grounds in August 2009.

4 Challenges in Research Muzammil Quraishi

ological. These issues include the ethics of doing research, building rapport and trust, the not-so-neat packaging of insider/outsider components in research, identification of prisoners as Muslims, the patterns of conversion, protection of research data, and the post–September 11, 2001, environment. I divide this chapter into two sections. The first part provides insight into the populist and academic commentary on the meaning and consequences of a rising Muslim prison population in the United Kingdom. Studies have shown that prison imams (religious leaders) do not facilitate radicalization in prison; in fact, imams play a role in countering extremism (Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar, 2005; Marranci, 2007; Spalek and El-Hassan, 2007). In the second part of the chapter I outline the key methodological challenges facing qualitative prison research on Muslim populations, such as negotiating a role in a prison setting, maintaining confidentiality, and experiencing negative attitudes. The above challenges come from personal experiences conducting research on prisoners who are Muslim. A large number of issues in this chapter are mainly method-

Muslims in Prison: The UK Context The Prison Act of 1952 (PA 1952) provides legislative protection for prisoners not belonging to the Church of England to practice their faith in prison. PA 1952 also compels prison administrators to record the self-declared religious affiliation of prisoners upon reception, and it remains the only branch of the criminal justice system that records 47

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an inmate’s faith. Therefore, in contrast to other European countries, such as France or Denmark, researchers in the United Kingdom have been able to chart the religious affiliation of prisoners over a number of decades (Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar, 2005). Between 1995 and 2005, the Muslim prison population grew by more than 150%, and it presently accounts for approximately 11% of the prison population in England and Wales (Peacock, 2006; Ministry of Justice, 2008). The latest statistics do not provide a gender breakdown for the Muslim prisoner population. Nevertheless, in September 2000, on average, the female Muslim prison population represented 3% of all incarcerated females and male Muslim prisoners represented 7% of the total male prison population (Guessous, Hooper, and Moorthy, 2001). The prison population should be contrasted against the percentage of Muslims in the general British population. The Census of 2001 was the first to include voluntary questions about religion. Ninety-two percent of respondents answered the question on religious affiliation, which revealed that 2.7% (1.6 million out of a total population of almost 59 million) of the UK population declared Islam as their faith (Office for National Statistics, 2003a). The trend thus illustrates significant over-representation of Muslims in prison as compared to their density in the general population. The British Muslim population is ethnically diverse. However, the majority of Muslims claim South Asian ethnicity with 658,000 Pakistanis and 260,000 Bangladeshis out of the 1.6 million UK Muslims. Furthermore, 8.5% of the Indian population in the United Kingdom are also Muslim (Office for National Statistics, 2003a). Therefore, one may expect the ethnic composition of British Muslim populations to be reflected in the incarcerated population. However, in the year 2000, Muslims of black ethnicity in prison constituted 34% of the total Muslim inmate population while Asian Muslims constituted 42% (Guessous, Hooper, and Moorthy, 2001). The percentage of Muslims who declared black ethnicity in the Census of 2001 is very small, with black Caribbean Muslims recorded as 0.29% and black African Muslims as 0.09% of the total UK Muslim population (Office for National Statistics, 2003b). These statistics show that black Muslims are overrepresented in prisons, as they make up approximately 0.38% of the UK population and 34% of the Muslim inmate population. Although no statistics on conversion to Islam in prison have been published, the evaluation above suggests that many black prisoners are converts to Islam and qualitative research illustrates that some black prisoners convert while in prison (Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar, 2005).

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Media and Government Perspectives of Radicalization

The British media has produced a plethora of articles raising concerns about potential radicalization among Muslim prisoners and problems prompted by a rising Muslim prison population (Akbar and Peachey, 2001; Bhat, 2006; Edwards, 2009; Ford, 2006, 2008; Goodchild, 2001; Pidd, 2008; Travis, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b). The articles are, in part, reactions to the release of official reports and observations from prison-related organizations and watchdogs, including the Prison Officers Association, Independent Board of Monitors, and HM Inspectorate of Prisons, that have painted an ominous picture of prison and their harmful potential. Radicalization concerns center upon the perceived vulnerability of prisoners to influences from extremist inmates, including those detained pursuant to terrorist offenses, and in some rare cases from prison imams. Reports tend to focus on maximum-security prisons or institutions where the Muslim prison population is particularly large. The HMP Belmarsh prison facility has attracted notable media attention on account of some of its high-profile inmates. HMP Wandsworth has also attracted attention over allegations of rival Muslim factions and disagreements between Muslim prisoners and an imam (Ford, 2006; Travis, 2007a). The government perceives the problem of radicalization as a genuine and escalating issue, with the Ministry of Justice predicting a tenfold rise in the number of terrorist suspects held in prisons in England and Wales over the next ten years (Travis, 2007b). The Home Office has recently extended policy to provide a nationwide “deradicalization” program and the deployment of £12.5 million for countering terrorism, including counter-radicalization in prisons (Home Office, 2008; Travis, 2008b). Furthermore, the Metropolitan Police Authority has acknowledged the operation of discreet deradicalization teams headed by Islamic scholars to deprogram extremist prisoners theologically in some UK prisons (Metropolitan Police Authority, 2007). The Academic Challenge to Concerns over Radicalization

Unlike the British context, the very development of US prisoner litigation was likely prompted by religious cases brought by Black Muslim prisoners in the 1960s, which in turn inspired academic evaluation in this field (Cripe, 1977; Smith, 1993). This early attention to

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Muslim prisoners has also been supplemented by more recent academic engagement in the post-9/11 context (Ammar, Weaver, and Saxon 2004; Hamm, 2009). In the United Kingdom, the upward trend in the Muslim prison population, identified in the late 1990s, prompted a few academics to explore issues of faith provision, discrimination, and the institutionalization of Islam in prison (Beckford, 2001; Beckford and Gilliat, 1998; El-Hassan, 1999; Quraishi, 2005; Spalek, 2005b; Spalek and Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 2000). Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar (2005) undertook the first detailed evaluation of Muslim prisoners in Britain. The study made comparisons with France that provided a qualitative evaluation of the experiences of Muslim prisoners in three UK prisons. Focusing on the issues of discrimination, racism, and access to religious support, the study also evaluated how prison staff, including chaplains, interpreted the rise in Muslim prisoners and whether it presented the prison with particular challenges. The main conclusions of this study highlighted significant experiences of discrimination as perceived by Muslim prisoners and imams, as well as an assertion that Islam was effectively being institutionalized in prison via the creation of the Office of the Muslim Adviser to the Prison Service and the appointment of full-time Muslim chaplains (Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar, 2005). The latest report of the HM Inspectorate of Prisons is the first to allow differentiation on religious grounds. The report highlights that the experiences of Muslim prisoners and their perceptions of discrimination are significantly more negative than non-Muslims in prison. For example, No Muslims believed complaints were sorted out fairly; fewer than one third believed staff treated them with respect; half said they had been victimised by staff; a third said they had been victimised by other prisoners; nearly two thirds had felt unsafe. These findings come as a surprise to prison managers and appeared to indicate a considerable chasm between staff and Muslim prisoners. (Owers, 2008, p. 27)

A study by Basia Spalek and Salah El-Hassan (2007) examined the experiences of Muslim converts in two English prisons. These scholars explicitly challenged the populist assertion that converts to Islam in prison are vulnerable to extremist ideology. The study claims that converts utilize Islamic teachings not only to cope more easily with the conditions of incarceration but also for the provision of a moral framework in preparation for their postincarceration life (Spalek and El-Hassan, 2007).

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The latest and most comprehensive study has been undertaken by Gabriele Marranci, who spent four years interviewing over 170 Muslim prisoners and ex-prisoners from Scotland, England, and Wales (Marranci, 2007). As with the two previous studies, Marranci challenges the moral panic centered upon the potential for prison imams to radicalize prisoners. His findings echo those of Beckford et al. (2005): Marranci found no evidence to suggest that prison imams were facilitating radicalization (Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar, 2005; Marranci, 2007). As with the findings of Spalek and El-Hassan (2007), Marranci emphasizes the positive role that prison imams play in countering extremism in prison (Spalek and El-Hassan, 2007; Marranci, 2007). His study also highlights the complexity facing prison authorities in formulating coherent and practical guidelines to identify behavior among Muslim prisoners that signals “radicalization.” While rejecting radicalization among prison imams, Marranci does conclude that some disassembled militant organizations try to “talent scout” young former Muslim prisoners (Marranci, 2007). Furthermore, he expressed concern that some of his respondents had “formed an Islamic gang,” having converted their group to Islam (Marranci, 2007). Importantly, Marranci’s study claims that prison authorities, by overemphasizing extremism, have neglected the more pressing problem of challenges facing the reintegration of Muslim ex-offenders into society (Marranci, 2007). All of these misconceptions warrant further research into the experiences of Muslim prisoners. However, this research can be difficult to conduct, as I address in the next section of this chapter. Key Methodological Challenges1 The qualitative data framing the following discussion originates from my work as researcher for the Muslims in Prison (MIP) project at the University of Warwick. 2 The study compared the experiences of a sample of Muslim prisoners in England and Wales to Muslim prisoners in France. The objectives of the study included an evaluation of how Muslim prisoners were treated in these nations’ prisons and to evaluate whether Muslim prisoners were subjected to discrimination because of their religious identity (Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar, 2005). I undertook the main primary fieldwork in three male prisons in England and Wales, while a team at the Centre d’Analyse et d’Intervention Sociologiques (CADIS) in Paris carried out the fieldwork in France.

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An ethnographic approach to the project provides insight into how I, as a practicing Muslim of Pakistani ethnicity, undertook complex research within a setting where I had to negotiate the expectations, suspicions, and preconceptions of staff and prisoners around the particularly sensitive areas of faith, identity, and discrimination. I expected prisoners to be cautious of me, prison staff to be wary of the research, and the Christian chaplains to be suspicious of a Muslim. Protecting the Vulnerable While Negotiating a Role

Prison research presents a number of ethical questions pertaining to confidentiality, anonymity, and researcher independence. The present study was guided by the British Criminological Society’s code of ethics for researchers in the field of criminology (Gelsthorpe, Tarling, and Wall, 1999). In line with such guidelines, the research team agreed that the identity of each prison would remain anonymous. Prisoners are quite likely to consent to being interviewed, largely due to the monotony of prison life. However, respondents evaluate what may be termed the “research bargain” (Martin, 2002)—in essence, what the prisoner perceives one can gain or achieve from agreeing to the interview. This benefit may simply be a break from the monotony; in other cases, it may be a perception that the research can in some way help improve their position. This improvement could take the form of putting in a good word with managers or prison officers, assistance in drafting informal or formal letters, or an opportunity to argue their particular case with regard to a grievance. The researcher decides what consideration this bargain holds and how to maintain impartiality while developing rapport and encouraging trust. The present study emphasized in preinterview disclosure and talks to congregations that the broad aims of the research were exploratory but focused on finding out about the lived reality of prison life for Muslim prisoners and what challenges, concerns, and practical issues the Muslim prisoner population presented for staff. Prisoner respondents were encouraged to participate largely on altruistic grounds for the benefit of future prisoners. Some prisoners were motivated by wanting to get their story out or expose discrimination that the researcher could perhaps investigate. The situation was slightly more complicated by the formal hierarchy among uniformed staff. 3 Individual senior officers would be approached to ascertain who would agree to an interview. In the major-

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ity of cases, the senior officer would prompt certain officers to come forward. While these officers could refuse to participate, they rarely did so; perhaps refusal would have been perceived negatively in the eyes of their commanding officer, raising the consideration that senior officers may be filtering participants and presenting those likely to give favorable responses. In order to facilitate the research I was based in the chaplaincy department of each prison. Since my prisoner respondents were Muslim, I shadowed the imams in each institution. The purpose and focus of the research were detailed in advance and throughout the entire period to each imam. My concern was that people in the prison would associate me with the chaplaincy as a scholar of religion, an imam trainee, or a Prison Service employee. Officers often thought I was an imam, despite the absence of a beard. For example, during one prison visit, prison officers mistook me for the imam and signaled the release of prisoners from their cells to the chapel building for Friday congregational prayers (field notes, Prison 1, August 3, 2001). I was very careful not to establish any hierarchy between Muslim prisoners who attended congregational prayers and myself. I specifically informed the imams in each prison that while I would willingly join the congregation to pray, I did not wish to lead the prayers, deliver sermons, or do anything that would risk presenting me in any supervisory role. Unfortunately, in one prison, one of the temporary imams spoke little English and asked me to translate part of his khutbah (sermon) for the congregation. This only happened on one occasion (field notes, Prison 1, August 2001). Fortunately, the incident occurred after I was able to develop a meaningful rapport with Muslim prisoners who attended these Islamic classes. Everybody’s Friend—Nobody’s Foe

While there is an onus on researchers not to affect the functioning of the institution they research, believing that a genuine fly-on-the-wall approach is possible in prison is naive. A researcher’s presence necessarily influences the complex dynamics of a prison’s day-to-day functioning in minor and sometimes major ways. Social researchers deem prisoners a “vulnerable group.” Hence, measures should be taken to prevent them from self-incrimination, protect privacy, maintain sensitivity, and provide anonymity and confidentiality (Gelsthorpe, Tarling, and Wall, 1999; Gray, 1979). However, confidentiality is not absolute but conditional. While the Crimi-

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nal Law Act 1967 (secs. 4 and 5) does not confer a general statutory duty on researchers to reveal previously undisclosed criminal actions to the police, researchers must reveal such information if police specifically ask for it. There are very prudent grounds for maintaining “conditional” rather than “absolute” confidentiality. Revealing information from a prisoner or member of the staff could place the researcher in a difficult moral dilemma. While acknowledging the difficulty, on the one hand, of encouraging disclosure of personal (and often disturbing) experiences and developing trust, the respondent should know the responsibilities attached to the researcher’s information gathering. To help overcome this dilemma, a preinterview research protocol was drafted that informed the respondent that the researcher could not maintain confidence if the respondent divulged information that contravened security or put at risk their own life or the lives of others. Contrary to prior concerns about the prison communities greeting me with suspicion, my role became one of confidant, not only for prisoners, but for chaplains, imams, and uniformed officers alike. In Prison 1, a chaplain agreed for a Pakistani prisoner to use the chaplaincy phone, provided I monitored what he was saying. I frequently accompanied chaplains to collect books or sacks of stamps, or to speak with the mentally ill in the hospital wings. In Prison 2, a female officer asked whether she could speak with me in “confidence” about an incident whereby she felt that fellow officers were telling Muslim prisoners that food was halal when she believed it was not (field notes, Prison 2, February 12, 2002). In Prison 1, occasionally I would accompany one of the chaplains out of the prison to buy lunch. Upon reentering the prison, we would be subject to the usual security checks, but the chaplain would put my lunch in his bag to prevent me from being subject to further delay at the gate. On another occasion, a chaplain permitted two of my respondents to smoke, even though it is prohibited, indicating to me that the chaplain felt comfortable transgressing some of the prison rules while in my company. Being Muslim Researching Muslims

No published accounts address the methodological implications of being a Muslim and undertaking criminological research on Muslims. However, issues of personal biography and its impact on qualitative work have been addressed comprehensively in the related disciplines

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of anthropology and ethnography (Chaudry, 1997; Coffey, 1999; Crick, 1992; Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw, 1995). The research team approached the project with certain assumptions about the incarcerated male Muslim population. These assumptions came from not only the few published academic sources about religion in prisons but also from popularly held perceptions about the Muslim population in the United Kingdom. Since the public face of Islam in the United Kingdom is overwhelmingly South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi), it was reasonable to expect that such demographics would be replicated to a certain degree in prison. Hence, one would assume that employing a bilingual Muslim researcher of South Asian ethnicity would overcome the research dilemma of “having to become the phenomenon.” That is to say, each researcher possesses complex subjective biographical qualities that can enrich as well as limit the undertaking of qualitative fieldwork (Pogrebin, 2002). As a practicing Muslim, my experiences of the prison facilities provided an insight to the prisoners’ complaints. When I entered an empty cell, I was able to imagine how difficult it would be to perform ablution (cleansing of the body), and when I actually did perform ablution in the chapel, the experience contextualized the accounts that prisoners relayed to me: There was an empty cell across the corridor, and I went to assess what it felt like to be in it. The cell had a foul smell and despite it being empty it was far from clean, I could only stay in the cell for a few seconds but I made a mental note that if I was in such a cell I would find it extremely hard to consider myself cleansed through ablution and worthy of praying considering the poor level of hygiene. (Field notes, Prison 1, September 24, 2001)

In the World Faiths Room . . . With some difficulty I performed ablution in the toilets using the wash basin. There were no mats or provisions to conduct this adequately. I had to balance myself and wash my feet, and rest each foot on my shoe to avoid touching the toilet floor which is considered impure. (Field notes, Prison 1, August 22, 2001)

In developing contact with Muslim prisoners, I felt compelled to join them during Friday prayers, since this was one of the rare occasions they could meet in significant numbers. I was invited by the temporary imam and prisoners in Prison 2 for their Eid-al-Adha prayers and to eat with them following prayers. 4 This represented a personal sacrifice for me since Eid is normally spent with family, but I felt it was necessary to maintain rapport with my prisoner respon-

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dents. In the same prison, there was no full-time imam, so I was in the curious position of pointing out to the management that they had the incorrect day scheduled for Eid; rapid logistical changes had to be made to accommodate the celebrations. Had it not been for my observation, the prisoners would not have been able to celebrate on the correct date (field notes, Prison 3, February 3, 2002). Such biographical factors are essential to formulating the qualitative picture and the lines of inquiry, tactics, and interpretations of field data. In developing and maintaining rapport, the researcher perhaps seeks commonalities between himself or herself and the respondents, yet the relationship is based on factors of ethnicity, language, gender, and class (Martin, 2002). In the present study, my personal biography connected with respondents on a number of conscious and unconscious levels. I shared a similar ethnic origin, language, and age group with many respondents. Where these differed, I emphasized common religious beliefs. Nevertheless, upon deeper reflection, significant differences remained between my prisoner respondents and myself, based on contrasts in language, education, and class. However, the difference of race or ethnicity, rather than class or language, is perhaps more significant in such research environments (Duneier, 2004). Respondents were certainly aware that I was a Muslim, not only from formal introduction and my name but also from praying alongside prisoners. Perhaps unanticipated was that in many cases my ethnicity and linguistic skills would not correlate with those of the prisoner respondent, given the fact that the prison Muslim population was more ethnically diverse than the civilian Muslim British population. I immediately became conscious of my role’s complexity, which echoed the concerns of Jacobs, who asserts that prison research is a daily negotiation of legitimacy, content, and boundaries (Jacobs, 1977). I was responsible for gathering information about the treatment and experiences of Muslim prisoners. I was interested in the prisoners’ perspective, but also the perspectives of the civilian and uniformed staff as well as members of the chaplaincy team. A letter and request to participate in the study had been distributed to prisoners, members of the chaplaincy team, uniformed officers, and management staff prior to my fieldwork in each prison. However, the majority of respondents were apparently informed about the research during direct conversations with me. In the case of prison officers, I had to emphasize that I was not a trainee imam, as assumed in Prison

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1, an assumption fostered by my dependence upon the imam or a chaplain to accompany me around the prison. I became the imagined conduit for resolving prisoners’ personal gripes about and suspicions against officers, as one example shows: The Muslim prisoner had an arm in plaster, he said he was not ill and wanted to be moved from the cell, he said they were all mad in this cell and that he was not mad. He spoke in Urdu, he informed us that he felt that the prison officers had deliberately driven him to take drastic measures. He said they had not been sending his mail, despite the fact he had stamped the envelopes himself. He claimed that he had not received his wages for the work he had done. He said he had maintained politeness at all times and did not swear at the prison officers. He said the prison officers were aware of his condition and deliberately encouraged the suicide attempt on by moving him to a cell on his own. (Field notes, Prison 1, July 26, 2001)

Part of the challenge in undertaking this research was dealing with specific forms of greetings among Muslim men. Observers of rituals and social customs are familiar with the fact that etiquette between Muslim men includes not only reciprocal verbal greetings but also varieties of physical contact, including firm hand shaking, hugging, and in the case of some Muslim cultures, kissing on the cheeks. While such greetings are part of everyday social exchange in wider Muslim society, they present particular consideration within the prison setting. As a fellow Muslim I rapidly became aware of a need to maintain rapport and encourage trust but also maintain a prudent distance between myself and all respondents so as not to give the impression of bias, prejudice, or overfamiliarity with either prisoners or staff. Furthermore, I was acutely aware that too much physical contact, such as hugging prisoners, would certainly influence perceptions of my independence among prison officers, especially those who may be less aware of the symbolic significance of greetings between fellow Muslims. Also, security considerations dictated that physical contact should be kept to a minimum, to avoid accusations of prohibited articles being exchanged between persons as well as to guard against potential outbursts of violence from prisoners. I was constantly faced with greeting dilemmas when meeting Muslim prisoners. The frequency of these dilemmas increased as respondents became more accustomed to seeing me in the prison and the more often they wished to stop and speak. Often I would be travelling from one wing or section of the prison to another, sometimes accompanied by a staff member and sometimes alone. Occasionally a group of Muslim prisoners

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would be in the process of being escorted by officers and would want to greet me. Greeting them all would be impractical, so I would place my outstretched palm to them and wave by way of salaam (an Arabic and Muslim greeting). While this technique seemed to be reciprocated, I soon developed a more heartfelt greeting. 5 This greeting begins with the same outstretched right palm but then involves folding the arm inward to rest on the chest. This motion removed the need for physical touch but maintained sincerity. Being a Muslim in Prison: A Risky Occupation

Researchers may face a risk of physical danger inherent in situations of violent social conflict or among groups where such violence is common (Lee, 1999). Two types of risks prompted by certain research are presentational and anonymous (Yancey and Rainwater, 1970). Presentational danger or risk may be considered to arise when the researcher’s presence or actions evoke aggression, hostility, or violence from those within the research setting (see Bourjois, 1989; Carey, 1972). Anonymous danger arises simply due to the researcher having to be in a particular location or social setting in order to carry out the research. Prison research offers both presentational and anonymous risk, not to mention the likelihood of encountering a prison riot (see Bryans and Jones, 2001). Despite practical measures to limit violence in prison, researchers have highlighted the use of everyday items as effective weapons, including “a sock containing a PP9 battery; a glass jar full of jam or margarine, which is used as a cosh; bladed weapons fashioned out of toothbrush handles with razor blades embedded in the end; syringes secreted inside pens; and boiling sugared water” (Martin, 2002, p. 224). During the research period, across all three prisons, I was shown a wide variety of self-fashioned weapons made by prisoners and discovered during routine searches by uniformed staff. These included a dagger carved out of a plastic toilet seat, various chains and truncheons, and perhaps most remarkable, a pump-action shotgun made from a metal bed leg. In Prison 3, access to all nonuniformed staff was restricted due to a shotgun cartridge being found during a cell search. Security staff conducted a detailed search of the prison to locate a firearm or further ammunition within prisoners’ possessions (field notes, Prison 3, May 10, 2002). The issue of violence in prisons has prompted academic inquiry in the United States also. James Mar-

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quart undertook research in a Texas maximum-security prison during the 1980s (Marquart, 2003). He had opted for covert research as a fully employed prison officer. As an active covert participant, Marquart endured physical assault from a prisoner, which secured his legitimacy in the eyes of staff and inmates. His role included breaking up fights, taking “bleeding self-mutilators” or suicidal prisoners to the prison hospital, and using legitimate force in subduing inmates. Marquart even “wrestled with and took a knife away from an inmate who slashed open his own stomach out of despair” (2003, p. 385). Although the full-participation context Marquart was in must be distinguished from my research in the United Kingdom, there was nevertheless a genuine risk of physical harm throughout my fieldwork period. In Prison 1, following 9/11, all prison staff were “encouraged to inspect their own cars daily” following concern that government buildings were potential bomb targets for terrorists (field notes, Prison 1, September 12, 2002). Perceptions of physical threat raised themselves on only two occasions during the research period. One related to an altercation between two respondents in Prison 1, causing me to intervene physically (field notes, Prison 1, September 6, 2001), and another in the same prison where an interview took place in a prisoner’s cell during which the prisoner blocked access to the door (field notes, Prison 1, August 16, 2001). Security training was offered in two out of the three prisons researched, and both incidents of perceived threat or risk occurred in one of the prisons where security training had not been formally offered or undertaken. Furthermore, in Prison 1 there was a period when I was locked in the chaplaincy building while the chaplain attended to various duties. I noted that even the fire doors were padlocked (field notes, Prison 1, August 24, 2001). Still, physical attacks on nonuniformed workers or visitors to prison are rare (Martin, 2002). Furthermore, providing security training can considerably reduce risks to the researcher. It became clear from undertaking the research that the prison environment is usually well-equipped to deal with incidents of violence quite rapidly, via the comprehensive use of closed-circuit television, alarm switches, and trained personnel. My ethnicity and faith certainly played a part in two incidents in Prison 1, where I was subject to racist language and verbal abuse from prison officers. In the first incident I had been waiting for my respondents to arrive at the chapel, and the officer in question had just accompanied a group of Sikh prisoners for their lessons. He sat

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beside me while the Sikh prisoners attended their lesson. He turned to me and asked what I was there for, and I informed him about the Muslims in Prison project. This prompted the officer to vent xenophobic views about immigration and how he would never attend any race relations training because he was opposed to it in principle. He grew quite agitated and eventually left the Sikh prisoners unattended in the chapel (field notes, Prison 1, August 1, 2001). In the second incident I was sitting in the reception area when three officers walked past me heading for the main gate and exit. It appeared to me that two officers were visiting the prison, because they did not have their ties on, while a third uniformed officer was leading them. One of the visiting officers spoke to his host and said words to the effect of “What’s it like here?” The uniformed officer met my gaze and stared at me before replying, “You have to watch out for all the fucking niggers on your way out!” (field notes, Prison 1, September 24, 2001). Needless to say, these incidents left me feeling humiliated and powerless but remained officially unreported because of the problems I perceived they would cause with regard to developing rapport with prison officers. Conclusion In this chapter I have highlighted some of the complexities of undertaking research in the prison setting, but particularly in relation to British Muslims in UK prisons, who are subject to increased suspicion. The fieldwork commenced shortly before 9/11, and the research was able to chart the impact of this event upon the changing focus of security, including in prison. Part of this change was a shift toward increased scrutiny of the researcher, which, in my case as a Muslim, increased challenges to the legitimacy of a project that explored discrimination experienced exclusively by Muslim prisoners. Despite such suspicion, the fieldwork also indicates my positive reception as a researcher among the prisoners, chaplaincy staff, and some prison officers. In negotiating a role, it was apparent how those in prison constructed perceptions of the researcher as confidant, adviser, or witness. The research demonstrated the degree to which a researcher may feel compelled to participate in the life of a prison, whether attending congregational prayers or experiencing direct discrimination due to one’s own faith or ethnic identity.

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The declaration of faith by prisoners is the means by which their religious rights are provided for in the closed institution of a prison. It also provides an identifiable Muslim population to approach for research. However, once prisoners are released from prison, either upon the expiry of their sentence or parole, the capacity for criminal justice practitioners to identify them on grounds of faith rapidly diminishes. This lesson is one I have learned while engaged in my current project evaluating the life experiences of Muslim ex-offenders, including the challenges they face after incarceration. 6 Little is known about the faith-based needs of Muslim ex-prisoners and the challenges they face in resettlement after incarceration. The researching of prison experiences, and the continued exploration of such by academics and practitioners, is vital to identify strategies for meeting the pastoral, spiritual, and practical needs of ex-offenders. Once released from the institutional setting, further questions are raised: Will Muslim ex-offenders orient themselves around faith-based identities and needs, or is their declaration of faith and corresponding demand for religious rights simply a necessity in institutional settings? Will such religious needs continue among ex-offenders? How will these needs be facilitated, and by whom? Such an evaluation may permit commentary upon how faith groups mobilize and politicize issues in pluralistic communitarian societies such as Britain, while assessing whether present provisions for resettling offenders are excluding the important aspect of faith-based needs. Notes 1. See Quraishi (2008) for further discussion of these issues. 2. See Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar (2005). 3. Some researchers have highlighted perceptions of ranking between uniformed and civilian staff; see Finkelstein, (1993). 4. There are two Eids in the Islamic calendar. Eid-al-Fitr marks the end of Ramadan, and Eid-al-Adha is the Feast of Sacrifice. 5. I confess to having borrowed this form of greeting from an Uzbek friend. 6. Funded by the Islamic Foundation UK.

Part 2

Living and Spreading Islam in Prison

5 Religious Rights, Religious Discrimination Kenneth L. Marcus

their numbers are rapidly rising (US Commission on Civil Rights, 2008).1 The post–September 11, 2001, surge in the Muslim prison population has stirred deep-seated fears and resentments, including the specter that the US prison system will become a breeding system for “radicalized Islam” (Colson, 2002). With these fears have come restraints on Muslim religious expression, as prison officials cite a need to maintain orderly prison administration and ensure homeland security (Atkins, 2008). People of religious minorities have always faced mistreatment within the prison system. Treatment of Muslim prisoners frequently conflicts with recent legislation enacted to protect prisoners from further religious discrimination. A decade ago, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) (USC, 2000).2 RLUIPA was passed in part to protect prisoners from religious discrimination. Five years later, in the case of Cutter v. Wilkinson,3 the US Supreme Court unanimously upheld RLUIPA against constitutional challenge. Despite this legislation, Muslim prisoners continue to document countless examples of discrimination in facilities around the country (AlAmin, 2008). Recent anti-Muslim allegations have included refusal to honor halal dietary restrictions, to allow prisoners to wear religious garb (such as the keffiyeh or hijab), and to obtain access to chapels or religious services. Additionally, prison officials have denied prisoner access to the Quran and other religious materials and interfered with the observance of Muslims constitute nearly a tenth of the US prison population, and

Parts of this chapter were previously published as “Jailhouse Islamophobia: AntiMuslim Discrimination in American Prisons,” Race and Social Problems 1(1), (2009). They are used here with permission.

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holidays such as Ramadan, Eid-Ghadir, and Muharram. Furthermore, Muslim inmates have been forced to participate in Christian religious services. Such cases have increased sharply over the last few years. Ironically, while Congress directed the courts to apply the most stringent form of judicial scrutiny to these cases, the courts continue to reject most claims. One reason is that, despite RLUIPA and Cutter v. Wilkinson, many courts are applying a diluted form of the applicable legal standard. Indeed, the “war on terror” has justified increasing deference to prison administration to the detriment of incarcerated Muslims. In this chapter, I examine the recent development of legal protections for inmates’ religious freedom in US prisons. In particular, I make reference to Muslim inmates and their experiences in view of such protections. Anti-Muslim Discrimination in the US Prison System Institutional Intolerance of Religion

Some scholars report that religious activity is not well tolerated, and in some institutions, even discouraged (Nolan, 2008). Members of virtually all religions, including mainstream Christian denominations, have testified that they have been denied basic religious freedoms while under incarceration, including access to Bibles and religious services and programs. Prison staff, fellow inmates, chaplains, and faith-based service providers have all been involved in perpetrating religious discrimination in prison. Prison chaplains report that religious services are often delayed, interrupted, or cancelled for no apparent reason. Custodial staff are perceived as dismissive or contemptuous of those who participate in religious self-improvement programs (Al-Amin, 2008). Correctional staff often distrust prison chaplains and volunteers ministering to prison populations, questioning the motives of those who minister to people who have not conformed to social conventions (Atkins, 2008). Further, some staff may consider it appropriate to punish prisoners, on an ad hoc basis, by denying them access to religious worship (Friedman, 2008). Additionally, inmates who are a part of a minority religion may face persecution by other inmates; after all, prisons do house neo-Nazis, “Christian Identity” supremacists, and others convicted of religiously motivated hate crimes. Moreover, some chaplains exacerbate these problems by denigrating religious-minority prisoners, notably Muslims, in a manner that provokes physical conflict. Finally, faith-based service providers, servicing contracts with federal and state prisons, have provided various special material benefits to inmates of their faith that are denied to others (Luchenitser, 2008), and have

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disparaged prisoners of other faiths. In some cases, discrimination may arise from an unconscious presumption in favor of mainstream Protestant religious practice (Friedman, 2008), which Chaplain Patrick M. McCollum calls the “Dominant Religion Lens Factor” (McCollum, 2008) or an explicit bias in favor of fundamentalist or evangelical programming (Friedman, 2008). As a consequence of these policies and practices, nonmainstream religions of all kinds report higher levels of religious animus (McCollum, 2008).4 This particularly includes Muslim inmates but also extends to institutionalized persons of other faiths (Al-Amin, 2008). Wiccan inmates, for example, have been denied access to appropriate clergy while dying and have been refused chemotherapy except on the condition that they remove an approved Wiccan pentacle medallion (McCollum, 2008). Discrimination Specifically Directed Against Muslims

While other minority religious prisoners face discrimination, the situation facing Muslim prisoners is larger and more complex, due to their substantial percentage of the prison population, concerns about Islamic radicalization in prison, and in particular, animosities held toward members of the Muslim faith (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008). During the 2001–2006 period, Muslims brought the greatest number of religious discrimination claims under RLUIPA: 62 out of the 229 cases analyzed (US Commission on Civil Rights, 2008). This number represents 27% of the cases, or roughly three times Muslims’ share of the prison population. Muslim prisoners and their advocates report being denied access to religiously required (halal) meats5 or other compliant foods,6 even when institutions have been presented with opportunities to acquire halal meat at lower costs than the noncompliant meats currently provided (Al-Amin, 2008). Under RLUIPA, courts have generally, but not always, been receptive to inmates’ claims regarding religiously motivated dietary restrictions (Dilg, 2008). On the grounds that inmates are required to wear prison uniforms, prison officials have prohibited a variety of traditional Muslim practices. These include prohibiting facial hair longer than one-quarter-inch beards,7 or prohibiting the wearing of any beards at all,8 and banning kufi prayer caps,9 the traditional loose thawbs (prayer robes),10 or the use of prayer beads around necks and under shirts.11 Muslim prisoners have reported being prevented from performing the khutbah sermon during the Friday weekly prayer,12 participating in Jumu’ah services,13 or reciting Quranic texts in Arabic.14 In other cases, they have been required to choose between access to Muslim services or

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access to a law library,15 been denied access to a Muslim chaplain,16 or been penalized for participation in Muslim religious services.17 In some facilities, Sunni Muslims are required to pray jointly with Shiite Muslims18 or with members of the Nation of Islam.19 Some Shiite prisoners have alleged refusal to allow separate Shiite Jumu’ah services as part of prison practices systematically discriminating against Shiite practices.20 Similarly, they have reportedly been barred from attending holiday services and eating holiday meals in their cell, while kept in disciplinary keeplock.21 Prisoners have reported being denied access to free Qurans;22 restricted in their access to the religious literature of some Muslim sects, such as the Five Percent Nation23 (a spin-off of the Nation of Islam); and denied the possession or use of prayer oils24 or other religious items, such as incense, a compass, leather socks, and halal toothpaste.25 They have been barred from possessing prayer rugs or from placing linens or towels on the floor as a prayer surface.26 The Bureau of Prisons attempted to address the problem of prisoner radicalization, discussed earlier, through its now-abandoned Standardized Chapel Library Project (Cilluffo, 2008). This program was developed to purge all prison chapel libraries of all items except for a handful of items on an approved religious reading list. This controversial program elicited widespread outrage, and many commentators have questioned its constitutionality (Varner, 2009). Muslim inmates also must cope with prison officials’ mistreatment of loss of religious objects. When this mistreatment is negligent or when, at any rate, the inmate cannot prove that the mistreatment is intentional, the responsible officials are shielded from federal liability. In 2008, the Supreme Court denied recovery to a Muslim inmate based on the Bureau of Prison’s allegedly negligent loss of his Quran, prayer rug, and various religious magazines, holding in a divided opinion that the Federal Tort Claims Act exempts this form of negligence from its waiver of federal sovereign immunity.27 Muslim prisoners have reported that they have been barred from celebrating Ramadan,28 Eid el Fitr,29 or other holidays; that they have been unable to participate in Ramadan worship for breaking the fast;30 and that prison authorities have refused to acknowledge Shiite holidays, such as Eid-Ghadir or Muharram.31 As the above section highlights, many instances involve the discrimination of religious minorities within the prison system. In the following section I highlight the justifications prison officials use to perpetuate further discrimination based on religion.

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The Homeland Security Justification and Muslim Inmates In many cases, prison authorities have justified restrictions on Muslim prisoners as a necessary means of ensuring not only prison safety but also homeland security. Their argument is that Muslim religious services may be used as a means of fostering Islamic radicalization. Radicalization within prison is a phenomenon that has been defined as “the process by which inmates . . . adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes” (Homeland Security Policy Institute and Critical Incident Analysis Group Prisoner Task Force, 2006, p. 6). It is a global phenomenon, encountered to a greater extent in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America than in the United States (Cilluffo, 2008). However, it is a particular source of concern for the United States, with the world’s largest prison population and highest incarceration rates, and an enormous challenge in the prospect that radicalized prisoners could become terrorists as a result of their experiences under incarceration (Cilluffo, 2008). This concern has developed in response to numerous examples of terrorist incidents that were advanced in some measure by the radicalization of certain prison inmates. As Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has said, “Prison makes our fight stronger” (Homeland Security Policy Institute and Critical Incident Analysis Group Prisoner Task Force, 2006, p. 1). This phenomenon takes many forms, but observers have expressed concern with two particular variations: the so-called Jailhouse Islam, which incorporates violent prison culture into religious practice using a cut-and-paste version of the Quran, and “Prislam,” in which prisoners join Islamic gangs for protection and convert out of necessity (Cilluffo, 2008; see Chapters 9 and 10 in this book for a more detailed discussion of Prislam). Prisons are fertile environments for radicalization, since inmates exhibit high-risk characteristics such as unemployment and alienation, as well as psychological factors such as high levels of personal distress, cultural disillusionment, lack of intrinsic beliefs or values, dysfunctional families, and dependent personality tendencies (Homeland Security Policy Institute and Critical Incident Analysis Group Prisoner Task Force, 2006). Overcrowding and prisoners’ need for protection (Cilluffo, 2008) in an inherently violent environment (Homeland Security Policy Institute and Critical Incident Analysis Group Prisoner Task Force, 2006), also encourages radicalization. Ironically, anti-Muslim discrimination in US prisons may worsen the problem of prison radicalization. For example, the inadequate number of legitimate Muslim religious providers may create an opportunity for ex-

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tremists to fill the role of religious service providers (Cilluffo, 2008; Homeland Security Policy Institute and Critical Incident Analysis Group Prisoner Task Force, 2006). As Frank Cilluffo has observed, increasing the availability of legitimate Muslim religious services may decrease the opportunities for prison radicalization (Cilluffo, 2008). A Legal Frame for First Amendment Religious Freedom Jurisprudence US prisoners were granted little religious freedom during the early years of the United States. Interestingly, the term “penitentiary” was first used in 18th-century Pennsylvania to describe institutions established to induce convicts to reflect and repent (Harvard Law Review Editors, 2002).32 This ideal, which developed out of William Penn’s history of incarceration, did not survive through the 19th century. In claims for the free exercise of religion, early cases hinted at an inchoate free exercise right for incarcerated persons, but courts usually considered an inmate to be, in an often quoted formulation, “a slave of the State” (Harvard Law Review Editors, 2002). Some Protestants had limited ability to worship, but persons of other faiths were not much tolerated (Mushlin, 1993). During the 1960s and 1970s, however, federal courts became increasingly responsive to prisoners’ religious claims. This change was largely instigated by demands from Black Muslim prisoners (Harvard Law Review Editors, 2002; Smith, 1993). At the time, the Court’s explicit doctrine was highly protective of religious free exercise generally, announcing in Sherbert v. Verner that “the door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.”33 In Sherbert, the Court held that strict scrutiny is required when generally applicable, racially neutral government action places a “substantial burden” on the exercise of religion, such as when an individual must choose between adhering to religious conviction or enjoying governmental benefits.34 As the Supreme Court explained in another case during this period, “Prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.”35 This period of relative tolerance for prisoner religious exercise ended when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.36 In that case, the Court announced that it would not apply heightened scrutiny for prisoner free exercise claims. Instead, it would ask only whether the prison’s actions were “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” In the years between Sherbert and O’Lone, the Court

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professed to apply strict scrutiny to cases in which a substantial burden on religious activity was alleged. In fact, in all but a handful of cases, the Court’s application of this standard of review was quite lax, leading prominent scholars to assert that the standard was “strict in theory, feeble in fact” (Eisgruber and Sager, 1994; see also Winkler, 2006). In 1990, the Court pulled back more broadly (i.e., outside the prison context) from the liberality it had shown in Sherbert, announcing in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith37 that the Free Exercise Clause of the US Constitution does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid, neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religious conduct.38 The Court continued to recognize an exception, however, when government actions manifestly target religious practice.39 Academic commentators and public officials have roundly criticized the Supreme Court’s opinion in Smith. Congress and the president responded to the decision by passing two important statutes. In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).40 A Senate report notes that “as applied in the prison and jail context, the intent of [RFRA] is to restore the traditional protection afforded by prisoners to observe their religious rights which were weakened by the decision in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz” (Fischer, 2001, pp. 243–244). RFRA provides that “government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest” (Fischer, 2001, p. 2000). This statute (which the Supreme Court later found unconstitutional as applied to the states and its subdivisions in City of Flores v. Boerne41) continues to govern federal actions, including the conduct of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.42 State prisoners did not fare well under RFRA. During the four years between RFRA’s passage and its partial invalidation, lower courts ruled against prisoners in over 90% of cases (Lupu, 1998), effectively gutting its enforcement (Gaubatz, 2005). As Ira C. Lupu has shown, the principal way in which courts weakened RFRA during its four years of general applicability was to disregard the “least restrictive means” test and forgive government regulations that were supported by practical or budgetary considerations (Lupu, 1998, p. 596). Since this result could not be easily squared with the text of the legal standard, courts typically relied instead on a Senate committee report on RFRA (Gaubatz, 2005), Against this backdrop, RLUIPA appeared to represent a remarkable change (Gaubatz, 2005). In 2000, responding to RFRA’s partial invalidation, Congress held a number of hearings over a three-year period to gather facts about the extent of re-

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ligious discrimination across the country (Gaubatz, 2005). For example, Congress heard that in one Ohio prison officials refused to provide Muslims with halal food, although they provided kosher food to Jewish inmates, and that Qurans and other prayer books were frequently confiscated, damaged, or discarded (Gaubatz, 2005). In a joint statement, the bill’s sponsors, Senators Edward Kennedy and Orrin Hatch, concluded that “whether from indifference, ignorance, bigotry, or lack of resources, some institutions restrict religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary ways” (Gaubatz, 2005, p. 716). Congress passed RLUIPA to ensure that state and local prison inmates would undergo the same stringent standard of review applied to federal prisoners under RFRA. Strikingly, the Senate and the House of Representatives were unanimous in its passage.43 RLUIPA prohibits federal and state agencies from undertaking actions that impose a “substantial burden” on the religious exercise of an incarcerated person, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government can demonstrate that imposition of the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and is the “least restrictive means” of furthering that interest (Gaubatz, 2005, pp. 504–505). While RLUIPA does not define such terms as “compelling government interest” or “least restrictive means,” the legislation clearly intends to reinstate the strict scrutiny test that prevailed, at least in theory, between Sherbert and O’Lone/Smith. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed RLUIPA against an Establishment Clause challenge in Cutter v. Wilkinson.44 In Cutter, Ohio prison inmates sued the state’s department of corrections for failing to accommodate their religious exercise of nonmainstream religions (e.g., Satanist, Wicca, and Asatru religions, and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian; Gaubatz, 2005). Specifically, they alleged that prison officials retaliated and discriminated against them by denying them access to religious literature, denying them the same opportunities for group worship afforded to adherents of mainstream religions, forbidding them to adhere to religiously required codes of dress and conduct, withholding religious ceremonial objects, and failing to provide them with a chaplain trained in their faith (Gaubatz, 2005). In response, the prison officials contended that RLUIPA’s institutionalized persons provision improperly advances religion in violation of the Establishment Clause (Gaubatz, 2005). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the unanimous opinion for the Court, affirming RLUIPA against this challenge, but doing so in a way that may undermine the statute’s effectiveness. The decision was initially received as a significant victory for religious freedom, but a closer look suggests that the victory was far from complete. While Justice Ginsburg

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reasoned that the statute alleviates “exceptional government-created burdens” on religious exercise, she also emphasized that the statute does not improperly elevate accommodation of religion over penal officers’ interest in maintaining order and safety. In particular, Ginsburg indicated that lawmakers were mindful of the urgency of prison security, and that they anticipated that courts would apply RLUIPA with “due deference” to the “experience and expertise” of prison administrators in establishing rules to maintain order, security, and discipline consistent with budgetary considerations. For this reason, Ginsburg stated that while “prison security is a compelling state interest,” nevertheless “deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area” (Gaubatz, 2005; 544 US 709 [2005]). There is an unavoidable tension between Justice Ginsburg’s affirmation of RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny test—which is by definition the opposite of deferential—and her insistence that the courts should nevertheless apply it in a deferential manner. By having it both ways, as it were, Ginsburg may appear to strike a moderate compromise, but the result is an incoherent legal doctrine. Courts are directed to apply strict scrutiny but to do so in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of that standard. Ironically, Ginsburg explicitly relies on an earlier opinion that has been criticized on particularly that basis. Citing the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in the University of Michigan affirmative action litigation, Ginsburg explains that “context matters” in the application of strict scrutiny, by which she means that different degrees of deference are required depending on the circumstances. In that case, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion, applying the same test in a deferential manner to the use of race-preferential affirmative action in university admission, was strongly criticized for undermining the standard of review.45 Although some courts now give the “hard look” to prisoners’ religious freedom claims that RLUIPA and its strict scrutiny standard require, others do not (Nelson, 2009). Despite the traditional requirements of strict scrutiny, some lower courts uphold substantial burdens on prisoners’ religious rights based on considerations of mere administrative convenience or budgetary considerations; accept cursory assertions by prison officials rather than requiring convincing demonstration; forgive the absence of serious consideration, or any consideration, of less restrictive means of achieving governmental objectives; refuse to make institutional comparisons to determine whether other facilities have been able to extend religious accommodations without suffering adverse consequences; and tolerate wide inconsistencies among the treatment of prisoners.46 At least one court has acknowledged this problem with surprising candor:

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Unfortunately, this has indeed been a consequence of the manner in which the Ginsburg opinion selectively incorporated the legislative record. The lower courts’ frequently ineffective and inconsistent use of RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard can be seen, for example, in its disparate treatment of grooming issues, such as the permissibility of facial hair, which are of great importance to many Muslim prisoners and are frequently litigated in the courts. The recent split between the US Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Sixth Circuits over RLUIPA grooming standards shows the difficulty that the courts are having with this issue. In two illustrative cases, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits reached opposite conclusions in cases in which prisoners refused to cut their hair for religious reasons. In Warsoldier v. Woodford, the Ninth Circuit rejected the California prison system’s argument that its hair grooming policy was the least restrictive means of promoting security, enabling quick identification of inmates, preventing inmates from hiding contraband in their hair, and preserving health and safety.47 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the policy is too sweeping, that it applies to all male inmates but not to any female inmates regardless of security threat, that it does not distinguish between maximum- and minimum-security levels, and that it provides no accommodation for religious differences.48 The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, affirmed the Ohio prison system’s similar policy in Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, giving “due deference to the judgment of prison officials, given their expertise and the significant security concerns implicated by prison regulations.”49 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit reversed a lower court decision striking down Ohio’s policy, admonishing that the court “improperly substituted its judgment for that of prison officials.”50 The court relied heavily on “expert testimony” provided by Ohio prison officials, who provided conclusory justifications for their refusal to provide religious accommodations.51 The Sixth Circuit was most impressed with the warden’s testimony that “individualized exemptions are problematic because they cause resentment among the other inmates, a copycat effect, and problems with enforcement of the regulation due to staff members’ difficulties in determining who is exempted and who is

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not.”52 All of these arguments prove too much. They can be applied to any request, in any religious context, whether prison-related or not. Moreover, the “resentment” argument, also known as the “heckler’s veto,” is the classic example of an argument that cannot be considered “compelling” because it is inconsistent with all forms of accommodation and with virtually any system of individual rights. The resentment argument is equally clear in cases where prisoners seek access to halal or other religiously mandated foods. The recent trend in RLUIPA cases is for the lower courts to treat prison budgetary concerns as a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify substantial burdens on prisoner religious exercise, including refusal to provide religiously required foods (Block, 2009). This willingness to treat cost as a compelling interest diverges sharply with the manner in which the strict scrutiny test is used in nonprisoner cases (Block, 2009).53 Indeed, it is contrary to the very notion of strict scrutiny and inconsistent with the intent of Congress to provide an elevated level of review in cases of prisoner religious discrimination (Block, 2009). It is as if the courts are going through the motions of applying strict scrutiny review, because this is what RLUIPA requires, when they are in fact applying the more deferential level of review that preceded RLUIPA’s passage. The particular danger here is not just that prison officials are getting away with making statutorily impermissible trade-offs between prisoners’ religious freedom and prisons’ budgetary concerns—although clearly they are. Rather, the deeper problem is that the courts are abdicating their responsibility to scrutinize these trade-offs in order to determine whether they mask an underlying animus against prisoners who practice disfavored minority religions such as Islam. This failure is particularly troublesome in light of Congress’s findings regarding the prevalence of religious discrimination against incarcerated persons. Conclusion In short, the Cutter court’s strong reliance on legislative “deference” comments has undercut RLUIPA’s insistence upon strict scrutiny leading to weak, inconsistent opinions by the lower courts. Unfortunately, as long as the courts continue to apply diluted versions of the compelling interest standard, improper, discriminatory conduct by prison officials will continue to take place. The degree of deference provided by many lower courts, with apparent congressional and Supreme Court approval, is inconsistent not only with the concept of strict scrutiny, but also with everything that we know about the conduct of prison officials in matters of religious

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free exercise. This failure to apply proper strict scrutiny standards amounts to a willful blindness by the courts to the documented discrimination that Muslim inmates and other incarcerated persons continue to face. A decade after Congress unanimously passed RLUIPA, incarcerated persons still face the same challenges that motivated the bill’s sponsors to initiate the legislation. As Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy had jointly announced at the time, “Institutional residents’ rights to practice their faith is at the mercy of those running the institutions.”54 The condition of Muslim prisoners is important, not only for obvious humanitarian reasons, but also because prisoners now represent more than 1% of the US population (The Pew Research Center, 2007). In this sense, the increased deference afforded to prison administrators under the war on terror has potential hidden civil liberties costs not only for incarcerated Muslims but also for the population at large. Civil liberties aside, the failure of US courts and prison administrators to fulfill the promise of RLUIPA during the post-9/11 period may not be surprising, but it creates additional nonobvious risks for the general population. Ironically, the failure to accommodate mainstream Muslim religious practice in US prisons has negative ramifications for homeland security to the extent that it creates a vacuum within the prison system that radicals may then fill. In this sense, homeland security justifications for limiting Muslim religious practice tend to have the perverse effect of frustrating the very interests that they are intended to serve. A potentially effective way to prevent anti-Muslim discrimination in US prisons is for courts to apply RLUIPA’s liability standard as written, rather than give undue deference to prison officials in a manner that is inconsistent with the rigors of judicial strict scrutiny; for the Justice Department to enforce these cases aggressively; and for Congress to establish a process for administrative complaint resolution. Currently, processes exist for prisoners to raise complaints within their own prison systems and, if necessary, seek Justice Department intervention. Given the rarity of Justice Department involvement and the weakness of internal administrative reviews, Congress should provide for federal administrative reviews of prisoner complaints at federally assisted state and private prisons, just as such review is provided in the educational, health, employment, and housing sectors. Notes

1. The report indicates that Muslims constitute approximately 9.3% of the US federal prison population but only 0.6% of the general adult population; see also Al-Amin,

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2008 (discussing the surge in Muslim prison conversions). Muslims have become an even larger portion of some European prison populations, which has also fueled fear and resentment in Europe. See Bawer (2006). 2. 42 USC. §§ 2000cc et seq. 3. 544 US 709 (2005). 4. “While practices differ from state to state, I have found discrimination against non-traditional religions everywhere” (McCollum, 2008, pp. 1–2). 5. Spruel v. Clarke, Case No. C06-5021 RJB, W.D. Washington, 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 39772, *7–8, May 31, 2007; Bilal v. Lehman, C04-2507 JLR, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 93152, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 89430 (W.D. WA); Phipps v. Morgan, CV-045108, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 12199 (E.D. WA. 2006); Pratt v. Corr. Corp. of America, 124 Fed. Appx. 465 (8th Cir. 2005); Al Ghashiyah v. Wis. Dept. of Corr., 250 F.Supp.2d 2016 (E.D. WI. 2006). 6. See, e.g., Allah v. Jordan Duster, et al., 04-1083, 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 56631, *4 (W.D. Ill.), August 3, 2007; Mayweathers v. Hickman, Civil No. 05-CV-713 WGH (CAB), 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 95882 (S.D. Cal. 2006); Holiday v. Giusto, 2004 US Dist. LEXIS 16348 (D.OR 2004). 7. Barnes v. Molett, V-05-014, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 69303 (S.D. TX. 2006); Nicholas v. Oxmint, 8:05-3472-RBH, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 67592 (D.S.C. 2006); Daker v. Wetherington, 2005 US Dist. LEXIS 44485, 469 F.Supp.2d 1231 (N.D. GA.); Taylor v. Groom, Cockrell, 02-21316, 74 Fed. Appx. 369 (5th Cir. 2003). 8. Williams v. Ferguson, S-04-0998, 2006 US LEXIS 61586 (E.D. CA. 2006). 9. Aziyz v. Tremble, Civil Action No. 5:03-cv-412 (HL) (M.D. Ga.), 2008 US Dist. LEXIS 7079, January 31, 2008. 10. See Abdullah v. Frank, 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 13215, *4 (Case No. 04C1181), 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 13215 (E.D. Wisc. February 26, 2007). 11. Charles v. Frank, 101 Fed. Appx. 634 (7th Cir. 2004). 12. Shabazz v. Ark. Dept. of Corrections, 157 Fed. Appx. 944 (8th Cir. 2005). 13. Eley v. Herman, 1:04-cv-416, 2007 US LEXIS 42197 (N.D. IN. 2007); McCree v. Pocock, CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:06-CV-1279-TWT (N.D. GA.), 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 44594, June 18, 2007; Larry v. Goetz, 06-C-197, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 32164 (W.D. Wis. 2006); Earl v. Gould, 192 Fed. Appx. 226 (4th Cir. 2006); Thomas v. Saafir, C 06-0184, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 32187 (N.D. CA. 2006); Muhammed v. Page, 02-298, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 16630 (S.D. Ill. 2006); Walmuller v. Bennett, 2005 US Dist. LEXIS 35066 (D.ID. 2005). 14. Stephens v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 06-CV-319-JBC, 2006 US. Dist. LEXIS 72955, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 79389 (E.D. KY.). 15. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2006). 16. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2006). 17. Mayweathers v. Terhune, Newland, et al., 328 F.Supp.2d 1086 (E.D. CA. 2004); Abu Qadir Al-Amin, Head, United Model Muslim Communities of America and imam, San Francisco Muslim Community Center, “Religious Discrimination and Prisoners’ Rights: A Muslim’s Point of View,” testimony before US Commission on Civil Rights, Br. on Religious Discrimination and Prisoners’ Rights, February 8, 2008, p. 9. 18. Pugh v. Goord, 345 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2003); El Isquierdo v. Crawford, Case No. 1:05CV192 CDP, E.D. Mo., 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 71608 * 1 (September 26, 2007). See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2006). 19. Abdullah, Perez, et al. v. Wis. Dept. of Corrections, 2005 US Dist. LEXIS 27999 (E.D. Wis. 2005). 20. Orfan v. Goord, 411 F.Supp. 2d 153 (N.D. N.Y. 2006). 21. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2006).

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22. See, e.g., Eley v. Herman, 1:04-cv-416, 2007 US LEXIS 42197 (N.D. IN. 2007); Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2006); Grant v. Sutton, 04-326-JPG, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 70076 (S.D. Il. 2006); Larry v. Goetz, 06-C-197, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 32164 (W.D. Wis. 2006); Larry v. Goetz, 06-C-197, 2007 US Dist. LEXIS (W.D. WI. 2007). 23. Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2002); Marria v. Broaddus, 200 F.Supp.2d 280 (S.D. N.Y., 2004). 24. See, e.g., Hammons v. Saffle, No. 02-5009, 348 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2003); Charles v. Verhagen, Grank, Litscher, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003); Shidler v. Moore, et al., Case No. 3:05-CV-804 RM, N.D. IN, 008 US Dist. LEXIS 8872, February 4, 2008; Salgado v. Grams, 06-C-598-C, 2006 US. Dist. LEXIS 7564, 2007 US. Dist. LEXIS 26213 (W.D. WI). 25. Vega v. Lantz, 3:04CV1215, US. Dist. LEXIS 69120 (D. Conn.). 26. Mohammad v. Kelchner, 2005 US Dist. LEXIS 40762 (M.D. PA. 2005). 27. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons (No. 06-9130), 204 Fed. Appx. 778 (2008). 28. Earl v. Gould, 192 Fed. Appx. 226 (4th Cir. 2006); Mallory v. Winchester 4:06CV-136 AS, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 90581 (N.D. IN. 2006). 29. Couch v. Jabe, 2006 US Dist. LEXIS 68216 (W.D. VA.). 30. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006). 31. See, e.g., Rahman v. Goord, 04-CV-6368 CJS, W.D.N.Y., 2007 US Dist. LEXIS 32680, *2, May 3, 2007. 32. Quoting Richard G. Singer and William P. Statsky, Rights of the Imprisoned: Cases, Materials and Directions, 4 [1974]). 33. US 398, 1963. 34. 374 US at 406. 35. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 US 520, 545 (1970). 36. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 US 342, 348 (1987). 37. 494 US 872 (1990). 38. 494 US at 879. 39. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 US 520 (1993). 40. 42 USC. §§ 2000cc et seq. 41. City of Flores v. Boerne, 521 US 507 (1997). 42. See, e.g., O’Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2003). 43. See S.2869, Bill Summary and Status for 106th Congress (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:SN02869:222L&summ2:m&. 44. 544 US 709 (2005). 45. Grutter, 539 US at 374-75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 46. Grutter, 539 US at 2080-2092. 47. 418 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2005). 48. Ibid. 49. 422 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2005). 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. See, e.g., Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 US 250, 263 (1974). 54. Joint Statement of Senators Hatch & Kennedy, 146 Cong. Rec. at S7775.

6 Conversion: Motives, Patterns, and Practices Nawal H. Ammar and Robert R. Weaver

conversion, such as adjustment and coping in prison (Clear and Sumter, 2002; Dammer, 2002; Johnson, 1987; Maruna, Wilson, and Curran, 2006), the role it plays in enhancing the sense of safety in prison (Jiang and Winfree, 2006; Thomas and Zaitow, 2006), the impact incarceration has on prosocial behavior and rehabilitation (Clear, Hardyman, Stout, Lucken, and Dammer, 2000; Colson and Van Ness, 1989; Kerley, Matthews, and Blanchard, 2005; O’Connor, 2004, 2005; O’Connor and Perreyclear, 2002), and the influence imprisonment has on recidivism (Gartner et al., 1990; Gendreau, Little, and Goggin, 1996). However, despite the increase in the number of Muslim inmates in US prisons, few studies have focused on conversion to Islam in them. Such a focus is becoming more important, given the growth in the number of Muslim inmates in US prisons.1 The available research about conversion examines the historical context of conversion to Islam in US prisons (McCloud and al-Deen, 2008; Dix-Richardson and Close, 2002), the challenges that incarcerated Muslim converts pose to normative US penology (Kusha, 2009), the characteristics of converts (Ammar, Weaver, and Saxon, 2004), the reasons inmates convert (Dannin, 1996; Hamm, 2009; McCloud and al-Deen, 2008), and the processes by which inmates convert to Islam (Ammar and Weaver, 2006; Hamm, 2009; Johnson, 2004; Spalek and El-Hassan, 2007). In this chapter we use survey data collected from Muslims incarcerated in the Ohio State prison system to explore core questions surrounding their conversion. We examine questions related to who converts, why they convert, when they convert, how conversion is manifested, and the implications of this conversion in a correctional setting. Criminologists have explored a number of issues related to prison

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Conversion to Islam in the Correctional Setting: Literature Review A few good predictors of who might convert to Islam while incarcerated are derived empirically or theoretically. A number of scholars (Allievi, 2002; Nieuwkerk, 2006) have proposed that inmates convert to Islam because it becomes a means of articulating problems in one’s own social context. Conversion to Islam thus serves an individual psychological function for prison inmates. Mufti suggests ideological and spiritual reasons for conversion to Islam in prisons: [Islam’s] egalitarianism appeals particularly to African Americans. From my personal experience as a chaplain in the US Federal Penal system, Islam is most impressive for prison inmates because of its simplicity, comprehensiveness, universal egalitarianism and the brotherhood of its community. It has special appeal to those who are oppressed and are not tied to any privileged class. Thus African Americans are historically attracted to it. (2001, pp. 2–3)

Other scholars have pointed out that conversion to Islam in prisons serves inmates’ daily adjustment to life in prison. Dannin (1996) argues that conversion to Islam in a correctional setting represents resistance to the prison’s own stringent discipline. McCloud (1991) finds conversion to Islam in US prisons to be a reaction to the prevailing racism both inside and outside prisons. Hamm (2008) identifies five main reasons for inmates’ conversion to Islam that include individual and institutional explanations. These reasons are personal crisis, spiritual dimensions, protection, manipulation of the system, and influences from the outside world. Scholars studying Islam recently have shown that some of the commonly held ideas about conversion do not apply in the case of Islam. For example, Dix-Richardson and Close (2002) emphasize that Muslim inmates take issue with the idea that they convert to Islam in prison for protection. In many ways, converting to Islam may even expose them to more harassment than protection because Muslim inmates tend to stand out from other prisoners because of the way they dress, among other behaviors. Research indicates that the initial impetus for conversion to Islam typically comes from the immediate familial and social milieu of a convert-to-be (Dutton, 1999; Krstic, 2009; McCloud, 1991). More specifically, Allievi (2002) proposed a typology of relational versus rational conversion to Islam. Relational conversion is induced by relationships to family members, friends, and other significant social actors. The relational convert is attracted to belonging to a different culture and a sense of community. Rational conversion, on the other hand, represents a personal transformation induced by an intellectual search for meaning (Al-

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lievi, 2002). Converts here adopt a more specific Islamic exchange of ideas and thoughts. Islam is appreciated for its clarity and simplicity. It is perceived as having sources that everyone can consult and no mediators in the form of priests or a religious hierarchy. Additionally, Kose (1996) has disputed the idea of conversion being a reaction to a personal “crisis,” noting that the prevailing view of “crisis” or failed socialization contributing to conversion among adolescents did not apply to his study of British Muslim converts. A number of scholars studying Muslim conversion (Kose, 1996; Roald, 2004) found that some youths’ conversion is directly related to adolescent rebellion against their society. Others (Beckford, 1999) observe that encounters with Muslims are an important factor influencing conversion to Islam. According to Nieuwkirk (2006), the process of conversion to Islam is often gradual and not coercive. To many converts, conversion to Islam is an intellectual process of gradual belief in God rather than an engagement with the supernatural or an epiphany (Eaton, 1994; Roald, 2004). In the balance of this chapter we explore the patterns and practices of Muslim converts in Ohio’s prison system. The data collection and the analysis were guided by the ideas in the literature on conversion both inside and outside prison. Method and Data The difficulties in accessing inmates for research traverses the scope of this chapter, and we have explored elsewhere the particular problems in this research setting (Ammar, Weaver, and Saxon, 2004), as does Chapter 4 in this volume. We gained access through numerous meetings with a variety of prison administrators, including the head chaplains of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC). The process of approval took three years from beginning to end (1998–2001). Eventually the chaplains appreciated the value of the research, and prison authorities supported it.2 According to the official definition used by the Ohio prison system, inmates who declare that they believe in the Ramadan fast (whether they actually fast or not) are considered to be Muslim. In the Ohio prison system in 1999 and 2000, 1,440 (a little less than 25%) of inmates were identified as Muslims (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 2000). Our sample was derived from this population of 1,440 inmates. The sample was a nonprobability snowball sample. We requested that chaplains pass along our survey questionnaires to the imams (Muslim religious leaders) in their institutions, who have more direct and, presum-

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ably, more trusting relationships with the Muslim inmates. The imams then identified Muslim inmates and offered them an opportunity to participate in the project by completing the questionnaire. Despite access to inmates the response rate was low. Two hundred and twenty-seven surveys (16%) were received. Many respondents completed most, but not all, of the questionnaire. Hence, the number of respondents varies according to variable or question. We also received 25 letters from inmates discussing a number of issues but not responding to the survey questions. We later learned that the imams themselves were not convinced of the usefulness of the project and deterred inmates from responding. One of the inmate’s letters said, I found the survey interesting and your motives suspect. . . . Is this study designed to gain justice and equality for Muslim inmates? Will this study promote brotherhood and better understanding among the various Islamic communities? Is this study of yours designed to motivate programs to help the men here who have suffered from legal injustices receive justice? If not any of the above mentioned then I must ask what?

Sample Table 6.1 compares the sample demographics to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2000) survey data, a time closer to the period when this research was conducted. Such a comparison, though outdated in terms of dates and numbers, nevertheless places the research sample within the context of the overall incarcerated population in Ohio at the time the research was conducted. Our sample of Muslims had a higher median age and larger portion of its population in the higher age groups than the total inmate population in Ohio (see Table 6.1 for specific data), but this difference is only slight. With respect to ethnicity, a large majority (87%) of our respondents identified themselves as African American, which was higher than the total African American male inmate population in Ohio (53%). Our sample also included few Arabs (1.4%), Arab Americans (1.8%), and European Americans (2.7%). The remainder of those responding identified their ethnic background as “other” (6.8%). The majority of respondents reported being legally unattached to anyone outside of the prison. Over half (54%) of the participants responding were never married, about one-fifth were married (20%), about one-fifth were divorced (19.5%), and a small number were either widowed (1.4%) or specified “other” (5.1%). This corresponds roughly to the 1991 survey

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data of state prison inmates presented by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (1993; see Table 6.1 for comparison). Levels of educational attainment among Muslim inmates in our sample were somewhat higher than the Bureau of Justice Statistics survey data reported in 2000. At least some portion of the discrepancy may be attributed to the inflation of educational attainment (of the general US population and that of the inmate population in particular) that has occurred over the past decade. Either way, however, level of educational attainment is substantially lower among the Muslim sample when compared with the broader population of Ohio (official figures for the Ohio prison population are not available). Eighteen percent of those in our sample ages 25 or older had not received a high school degree, compared with 12.6% of the entire population. Almost 8.0% of Muslims in our sample received a bachelor’s degree or higher, compared with 21.1% of the Ohio population (US Census Bureau, 2000). Table 6.1 Comparing the Sample of Muslims with Larger Inmate Populations

Age Median 17–29 30–45 46+ Race/Ethnicity African American Arab American Arab European American Other Marital Status Never married Married Divorced Widowed Other/Separated Education No HS degree HS graduate (or GED) Some college Associate degree BA or BS degree Graduate degree HS Diploma, Equivalent, or more Crime Against persons (excludes sex offenses) Sex offenses Against property (includes burglary) Drug related

Muslim Sample

Total Inmate Population

36 27% 51% 21%

33 41% 47% 12%

54% 20% 19.5% 1.4% 5.1%

55% 18% 19% 2% 6%

87.3% 1.8% 1.4% 2.7% 6.8%

18% 48% 26.5% 1.5% 7.5% 0.5% 82%

59.9% 11% 13% 17%

53.2% na na na na

na na na na na na 59% na na na na

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In sum, the Muslim inmates we sampled appear similar to the larger inmate population in age, marital status, and educational attainment. They differed significantly in terms of racial or ethnic identification. A much larger portion of the sample identified themselves as African American than is the case in the broader population. Educational attainment was higher when compared to the broader population. Data Collection Mailed surveys were used to collect data. The survey, Muslims in Ohio Prisons Questionnaire, included both open- and close-ended questions designed for use with a diverse population. The questionnaire covered the following topics regarding inmates: demographic characteristics, experiences while growing up (e.g., childhood), processes leading to identification as a Muslim, subscription to Islamic beliefs, engagement in Islamic practices, criminal records, and personal understandings of crime and punishment in Islam. Measures The data collection instrument contained a number of measures to identify certain patterns of conversion, adherence, religiosity, and content of practices. Measures included • Identifying place of conversion to Islam: in prison or Muslim prior to incarceration. • Timeframe of conversion: gradual or sudden (epiphany). • Exposure to Islam in terms of context: familial or other relational exposure to Islam prior to conversion. • Exposure to Islam in terms of developmental stage: age exposed to Islam. • Religious background of inmate: measured by religious training during school years, attendance of church regularly while growing up, and having parents who attended church.

The data collection instrument also developed a measure for identifying Muslim inmates’ adherence to Islam generally, which we titled scale of devotion. This scale included four main measures: reading the Quran, attending Friday prayer, praying five times a day, and fasting during Ra-

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madan. These measures were then classified within a framework of frequency: often, sometimes, rarely, and never (see Table 6.2). The more devoted adherents practiced more measures within the scale range of often or sometimes. The inmates were asked three open-ended questions regarding crime and punishment to understand the extent their views departed from or coincided with Islamic texts. The three questions were, • What are the general views of Islam on crime and punishment? • What are the general views of Islam about repentance and justice? • What is Islam’s general view of reconciliation, peacemaking, and restorative justice?

Results Characteristics of Converts

Out of the 198 inmates who responded to the question about conversion, 66% (n=131) converted to Islam during incarceration. Almost 88% (n=115) of these converts are African American, and the other converts who responded to the question were Caucasian (3.8%, n=5) and “other” (4%, n=7). The data do not show a conclusive finding about the pattern of conversion as an epiphany (a turning point) or gradual evolvement. Thirtysix percent (n=72) of all the respondents reported a gradual conversion, while almost 29% (n=57) reported their conversion as an epiphany. A large number (45%, n=89) of all the converts heard about Islam at the age when they were first incarcerated (17–33 years old). Just under 14% (n=27 out of 198) and 10% (n=20) heard about Islam before the age of 16 or after the age of 45, respectively. None reported hearing about Islam between the ages of 33 and 45. Those who converted to Islam during incarceration (n=131) were previously either Christian (80%, n=105) or from other religions (20%, n=26). Almost all of those who identified with Islam while incarcerated (94%) indicated that neither of their parents was a Muslim. However, the prison converts in the sample (n=131) reported being exposed to some religious education in their childhood, which we measured by variables such as religious training during school years and attendance of church regularly while growing up. Seventy-seven percent (n=101) of those who converted to Islam during incarceration had some religious training as they were growing up. Almost one-half (55%, n=56) of those who attended a religious institution (such as church) once or more a week, 32.6% (n=33) attended once or more a month, and 38.6%

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(n=39) attended once or twice a year. The prison converts in the sample reported having relatively religious parents, as reflected by regular attendance at religious institutions. However, mothers seemed to be more frequent attenders of religious institutions than fathers. Less than 15% (n=18) of the converts’ mothers never attended a religious institution. A little more than 40% (n=55) of the converts’ mothers attended a religious institution once or more a week, 15% (n=20) attended once or more a month, and 8% (n=11) attended once or twice a year. By comparison, a little more than one-third (n=49) of the converts’ fathers never attended a religious institution. Twenty-two percent (n=29) of the converts’ fathers attended a religious institution once or more a week, 6% (n=8) attended a religious institution once or more a month, and almost 15% (n=19) attended once or twice a year. The reaction of the inmates’ family members to their conversion to Islam in prison was generally affirmative. Almost half (42%) of those who converted while incarcerated reported that family members were positive about the conversion. However, almost a quarter (23%) of those who identified with Islam while incarcerated reported that their conversion provoked a negative response from family members (i.e., anger, resentment, or at best, ambivalence). The Content of Conversion: How Is This Conversion Manifested?

The ODRC installed Middle Eastern Sunni Islam as the standard version against which most policies and practices were measured after the Lucasville riot in 1993.3 This Middle Eastern Sunni Islam, however, was not the only form of Sunni Islam practiced in the Ohio prisons. One of the inmate’s letters to the researchers illuminates this diversity even within Sunni Islam: You see here at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility we do not have an imam from the street, so through communications with letters Allah has allowed us to get the guidance from Manlius Lama of South Africa. They have helped our community which we refer to as Jama’tul Haq (the rightful community). I am appointed as the Amir of Education and Information.

One of the prisoners sentenced to death after the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility riot (better known as Lucasville uprising), for being perceived as one of the riot leaders, was very actively involved with the rightful community of South Africa. While this sect follows Sunni Islam, their religious perspective is modeled more after the long history of the

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political struggles of South African blacks against white oppression in prisons. Additionally, 21% of the respondents (out of 125, n=26) to our question belonged to the Nation of Islam (NOI), 57.6% (n=72) were Sunni Muslims, and 16% (n=20) were not sure. Of all those who converted in prison answering this question, 15% (n=11) noted that they belonged to the NOI. The data regarding the number of adherents to NOI ought to be understood within the general framework of imposing Middle Eastern Sunni Islam by the Correctional Services and the fear of the respondents (inmates) of being either identified by or reported to the authorities. The significance of the diversity (even when suppressed) is best seen in relation to inmates’ reactions to the nature and content of the religious services in prison. Almost one-third of the inmates preferred a combined service and mosque for the adherents of both the Muslim Mission and the NOI. Sixty percent (n=89) of the 148 opposed the combined worship setting, and almost 45% (n=66) strongly opposed. Such an opposition is worth noting given its potential for generating conflict. Despite the potential conflict and difference between Sunni Islam and NOI, still 80% (n=20) of the 25 NOI adherents rated high on all items of a traditional Sunni scale of devotion (the frequency of reading the Quran, the closeness to praying five times a day, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and regular attendance of the Friday [Jumah] prayer). This result is perplexing, given that the beliefs and practices of NOI adherents are different from those of Sunni Islam. This high rating on a Sunni Islamic devotional scale becomes even more perplexing in view of a number of letters the researchers received. For example, one inmate who identified himself as belonging to the NOI used Sunni Islamic discourse in his letter. Nevertheless, his concerns were much more in line with the historic struggles the NOI adherents have expressed in prison. He wrote, I wish not to offend you. . . . I’m a Muslim and member of the Nation of Islam under the leadership of Minister Louis Farrakhan. . . . I love Islam and I try my best to obey Allah (God) and his messenger. I believe in unity with whoever is willing to accept God and obey him. I also believe in Atonement and responsibility and that every man is responsible for his action. I also believe in brotherhood with all Muslims, if one believes in Allah and his messenger. Allah is one and so is his community. . . . It is as if Uncle Sam said, “we can’t oppress them physically anymore . . . but we can change our strategy to a mental and economic oppression. The reaction has been to lead black men into jail cells like herds of cattle.

The amalgamated discourse by the adherents of NOI in this sample is not a reflection that the two groups have undergone a fusion in this prison

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setting. The statement of another inmate who recently converted to Sunni Islam dispels such a conclusion. He wrote, I am a novice in the religion. . . . As I was completing your questionnaire I realized I had some concerns regarding a few of the questions asked and where they were leading to because Muslims have a hard enough time in prison. . . . My concerns relate to questions D (1), (2) and (3) on page 5 [Referring to the mail survey].

1. Islamically speaking the Nation of Islam has temples not mosques. 2. The Nation of Islam do not have Shahada [declaration of faith that is one of the Pillars of normative Islam] or practice Islam as set forth by Allah or his Prophet.

However, the syncretism of NOI’s rhetoric and Sunni Islamic discourse could be understood as a result of the prison authorities’ imposition of the latter as the standard version. While our survey did not explore this issue in depth, we nevertheless asked about inmates’ mosque affiliation on the outside. Approximately 20% of the 198 responding inmates (n=47) reported that they are affiliated with something other than a Sunni mosque. Such a response rate indicates that further work needs to be conducted that focuses more on questions related to NOI adherents’ adjustment within a predominantly Sunni Islam framework of religious practice. Practice of Islam in Prison

Table 6.2 identifies four core principles associated with Islam and the extent to which inmates in our sample practiced them. The data suggest a high level of commitment to the practice of Islam among all adherents (i.e., those who identified with Islam before and during incarceration). Table 6.2 shows little variation between Muslim inmates who converted before or while incarcerated in their commitment to Islamic practices on the devotional scale. The major variation between the two groups of converts is found in the practice of attending Friday prayer. Inmates who converted to Islam while incarcerated attend Friday prayers 41% more often than inmates who identified with Islam prior to incarceration. Table 6.2 also shows that more than 90% of all those incarcerated reported that they pray five times per day either often or sometimes. Similarly, large majorities in all the groups adhere to the practice of fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. Those who converted in prison and those who adhered to Islam prior to incarceration differed somewhat in terms of the extent to which they reported reading the Quran and attending Friday prayer. A slightly greater percentage of prior adherents to Islam

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Table 6.2 Commitment to Islamic Practices Among Muslim Inmates

Reads the Quran Often Sometimes Rarely Never Attends Friday Prayer Often Sometimes Rarely Never Prays Five Times a Day Often Sometimes Rarely Never Fasts During Ramadan All prescribed times Most prescribed times Several days A day or two I do not follow this practice

Identified with Islam Before Incarceration N %

Identified with Islam While Incarcerated N %

45 5 6 0

80 9 11 0

92 29 1 5

72 23 1 4

42 10 2 3

74 18 4 5

97 20 6 3

77 16 5 2

37 6 4 8

52 1 1 0 4

67 11 7 14

90 2 2 0 7

99 9 1 10

108 1 0 1 14

83 8 1 8

87 1 0 1 11

reported that they read the Quran often, whereas a few more recent converts indicated that they never read the text. On the other hand, more recent converts were more likely to report that they often attend Friday prayer. Inmates in our sample seemed substantially devoted to the practice of rituals associated with Islam. As such, we do not hear anything about other practices in Islam (treatment of people, dealing with immediate surroundings, fiscal practices, etc.). In part, this may be because of the sampling procedures themselves and the mode of data collection, which constitutes a limitation of the present investigation. In terms of the extent to which the inmates’ views depart from or coincide with Islamic texts, we found that the 99 inmates who responded to the question about crime and justice corresponded closely to those normative interpretations. This is not surprising insofar as the inmates use Quranic standards as their source for understanding these issues, which most appear to do. In Muslim jurisprudence, Islam considers crime an act of injustice toward society, a sin against oneself, and a transgression against Allah (Bahnasi, 1983b; Ghitan, 1995). Every Muslim is required to defend his or her property, or others and their property (Ammar, 2003).

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This principle is based on the Islamic rule that humans have to do good and avoid evil. Additionally, there are several prophetic sayings, among which is, “Anyone who witnesses evil should remonstrate upon it by hand, and then mouth, or heart, the last is the weakest of faith” (Imam Ahmad, quoted in Izzi Dien, 2004, p. 25). According to some interpretations, Islam permits crime or breaking the societal rules under certain conditions (Ammar, 2003). These include self-defense, defending others, fighting against oppression, and defending one’s property. The following are examples of the responses given by some of the inmates regarding crime and conduct: .

• Crime and violence is a sin. • Islam has no tolerance for crime or violence. • Islam teaches all Muslims to adjoin what is right conduct and abstain from what is wrong. • To never be the oppressor and when [a Muslim must] ask for peace, give peace, and fight only in the cause of Allah, which is called jihad. • It’s a big injustice to one’s own soul whosoever does this. • Islam translates into peace. A Muslim is a peacemaker. • It’s haram [religiously not permissible]. And victims justifiably have redress. • No matter how many sins a person commits, Allah will forgive them all as long as the person does not persist in what wrong they have done.

The inmates’ responses to the question about repentance also closely corresponded to the normative Islamic theological explanation (or Quranic standards). The meanings of repentance the inmates gave in their answers corresponded closely to normative Islamic interpretations and are supported by ample textual evidence. The Quran states this meaning in numerous chapters—for example, “Surely Allah loves those who turn unto him in repentance and loves those who purify themselves” (AlBaqarah 2:222), and “Whoever does evil or wrongs himself but afterwards seeks Allah’s forgiveness, he will find Allah Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful” (Al-Nisa 4:110). The following are examples of the responses given by some of the inmates: • We believe that we repent to Allah and do not do it again.

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• Acceptable until the approach of the Day of Judgment, or when the sun rises from the west. • Allah is forgiving, most merciful, to repent 5 times a day every day for the rest of your life. • In a time of repentance, a Muslim should always turn to Allah and make two raka’at [unit of prayer], ask forgiveness for whatever sin he or she has committed. • The views about Islam always stress tawba [repentance]. • It involves a commitment to living according to the spiritual principles of truth, justice and righteousness with sacrifice and efforts made to demonstrate sincerity.

Inmates’ responses to the question about forgiveness, reconciliation, and restorative justice also reflected close adherence to textual prescriptions. Several inmates understood that, unlike Buddhism’s nonviolent struggle, Gandhi’s concept of nonharm (Satyagraha), or Christ’s dictum “to turn the other cheek,” Islam considers war/violence as a viable form of struggle against injustice or oppression. They also understood that this form of struggle, however, operates only under limited conditions and protocol—as a last resort when other attempts at nonviolent reconciliation and peacemaking have failed. According to the Quran, first “invite (all) to the way of thy lord with wisdom, and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious” (Al-Nahl 16:127). Persuasion and patience should first be employed as a form of struggle. The following are examples of the responses given by some of the inmates: • There is no “turning the other cheek.” However, Islam expresses respect, humility, peace, and to show love for all of Allah’s creatures. • There is only one distinction in Islam, either you are a Muslim or you are not. It’s not ethnicity or which region you are from. All men are to be respected (despite views) and as long as violence or hostility is not brought at the Islamic community, then there is no violence. But in the state of war/violence, no woman or child is to be blamed, rather just the aggressor to be killed. Islam doesn’t teach to kill or get one specific person you can bomb the entire village city, or country. Only fight, kill the aggressor until there’s no more aggression. • Allah says He made us as a nation. Not that we may hate one another but that we may learn from one another (Al Hujurat 49:11). Islam means peace and love for all people of humanity. That is our way of life as Muslims.

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• The Holy Quran clearly instructs the Muslims to make peace with those who make peace with you, the same as the other religions. As for non-violence look in the Bible and compare the standards. Surah 42, eye for an eye, tooth for tooth, ear for ear, but the best resolution is to forgive, make peace whenever you can and kafirs [non-believers] still have rights we can’t violate. Conclusion In conducting this research we experienced great difficulties in accessing Muslim inmates (for a more detailed discussion concerning the difficulties of doing prison research, see Chapter 4). Once the prison authorities allowed access we found out that the imams and inmates were both very suspicious of the intent of the research. One inmate wrote the researchers saying, After I received your questionnaire I read and read it. Your concerns leave us (the believers) at a standstill pertaining to your questions and deeper “intent.” Many of the believers trashed the forms and others are waiting for explanations. Who are you “really”? You have the name of a believer [referring to one of the researchers] but your questions are questions of a deceiver. Why (reason, cause, and purpose), would you want to know about our past life, jobs, marriage, schools, how many times we read the Quran, our father, mother. . . . Where are you leading us other than the slaughter house.

As such, this study presents exploratory findings that could aid the formulation of theoretical concepts and future research questions and not generalizable data. The findings point to a number of issues that could inform both policy and future research. The first issue concerns aspects of the inmates’ conversion process. Kose notes that conversion can be “an experience of increased devotion within the same religious structure, a shift from no religious commitment to a devout religious life, or a change from one religion to another” (1996, p. 1). The inmates in this study belong to the last category of converts. A large number of the converts report involvement with practicing a previous religion (namely Christianity). The majority of the inmates had religious education while they were younger. Understanding that previous religious experience can help predict some kind of conversion is helpful to prison authorities, as it will enable them to understand the authentic context of inmates’ behaviors. The results in this study, however, do not leave us with a conclusive result about the time frame of the inmates’ conversion. The percentage of those who converted gradually (39%, n=51) compared to those who experienced an epiphany (61%, n=80) make it necessary for future research

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to reach deeper into this question. Scholars studying conversion time frames (Kerley and Copes, 2009; Mahoney and Pargament, 2004) often indicate the difficulties and complexities involved in identifying the period when the conversion took place. The fact that conversion narratives (discussions) are backward events makes them subject to numerous revisions and social constructions and, hence, are difficult to gauge or measure definitively (Nieuwkerk, 2006). Regardless, the importance of the time frame of conversion to Islam in prison—for both practitioner and scholar alike—lies in the ability to guide and influence religious mentorship, which in turn can facilitate prison adjustment and safety. If more inmates convert gradually, then prison authorities have a better chance to plan for an increase in the number of converts, to provide better religious instruction, and to observe the process by which religion is transmitted through practice. One interesting finding of this study that requires further investigation is the relational patterns of the inmates who converted in this sample. A substantive number (almost half, n=62) of those who converted received a lessthan-positive reaction from their family about their conversion. This lessthan-positive relational pattern with family members and friends begs questions about reintegration upon release and recidivism at a future time. To many, the incarcerated are viewed as having weak and disintegrated families, and hence, less-than-favorable reaction by families is not significant. However, Haley (1964) reminds us of the impact family has on the incarcerated, even in cases such as Malcolm X’s disintegrated and fragmented family. In Haley’s book, Malcolm X said, “I was turning again to my sister Ella. Though at times I’d made her angry at me, beneath it all, since I had come to her as a teen-aged hick from Michigan, Ella had never once really wavered from my corner” (1964, p. 324). While Malcolm X’s experience cannot be generalized, it nevertheless reminds us qualitatively of the importance of family in prisoners’ lives and the impact conversion can have on family relations after release. Understanding the nature of the less-than-favorable reaction to conversion that inmates receive from their families requires future research. Additionally, how such reactions impact an inmate’s reintegration after release needs to be explored. There is also a need for more research about the relational nature of friendships that inmates have with other Muslims. A large number of those who converted to Islam during incarceration (55%, n=72) report that they had close friends who were Muslims. It is important, therefore, to consider whether such friendships are confined to the prison setting or whether they include friendships outside prison. It is also important to un-

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derstand the social setting of such friends in terms of their involvement in crime, gangs, and so on, and the impact such relationships will have on the reintegration of prisoners after release. This study puts forward another finding that requires further investigation. The syncretism uncovered with NOI inmates and their devotional level within Sunni Islamic practices presents us with many unanswered questions. Is this syncretism a temporary accommodation to prison restrictions on worship? Or is it a new form of Islam that we need to understand better? Or is it, as Hamm (2009), indicates Prison Islam? Such syncretism between NOI and Sunni Islam seems strange in view of the historic suspicion that Sunni Muslims have vis-à-vis NOI adherents worshiping with them. Jenkins (2004) discusses this issue by referring to it as a “float between groups” and gives a variety of reasons as to why some incarcerated Muslims will declare belonging to Sunni Islam while ideologically being aligned to the NOI. These reasons include fear of being more closely scrutinized, not being aligned completely with all the NOI ideology, and admiring the NOI’s views about racial oppression. Within this context of diversity of Muslim inmates’ conversion, this study has only scratched the surface about questions such as: How NOI adherents are integrated within this imposition of Sunni Islam in prison? What is the impact of such an imposition? Could the emergence of Prison Islam be a consequence of these internal impositions? Exploring such questions can provide prison authorities and criminologists a new look at Muslims inside prisons beyond the external influences of terrorism. Understanding a group of prisoners who are perceived as potential breeders of radical Islam can only benefit prison authorities and policymakers. Such an understanding, however, requires a shift in the paradigm of thinking that radical Islam is only produced by gang-related activity, radical preachers, and systematic attempts of Wahhabism to control US prisons. Prison policies and suppression of certain activities can also create countermovements that are more a response to prison conditions than external forces. Notes 1. The exact number of Muslims in US prisons is unknown, but we know that it is growing—largely due to the conversion of many inmates after incarceration. Kusha (2009) warns us that the information we have about the spread of Islam in US prisons is anecdotal. 2. Some of the research was conducted after the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

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3. On Easter Sunday, April 11, 1993, 450 prisoners rioted and took over the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), in Lucasville, Ohio, for 11 days. According to Lynd, “the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) refers to [the uprising] as ‘the longest prison siege in U.S. history where lives were lost’” (2004, p. 1).

7 Imams in Prisons: Balancing Faith and Religious Politics Nawal H. Ammar and Amanda Couture-Carron Muslim experience in prison (Ammar and Weaver, 2006; Ammar, Weaver, and Saxon, 2004; Beckford, 1999; Dix-Richardson and Close, 2002; Hamm, 2009; Joly, 2007; Kusha, 2009; Moore, 1995; Spalek and El-Hassan, 2007; Useem and Clayton, 2009; Wilson and Sharp, 1998). Little work, however, has been conducted on religious mentoring (pastoral care, chaplaincy, or imamship) of Muslims in prisons. The scholarly work conducted on the topic has focused specifically on England (Beckford and Gilliat, 1998; Gilliat-Ray, 2008; Spalek, 2005a, 2005b), a country whose history of Muslim inmates’ pastoral care begins at least three decades after that of the United States.1 Recent work on the topic exists (Bowers, 2009); however, it is still sporadic and scattered. In this chapter we explore the question of Muslim chaplaincy in prisons from the perspective of incarcerated inmates in the United States. First, however, we begin with a description of the context and meaning of Islamic mentorship (chaplaincy, pastoral care) in US prisons.

There is an emerging literature on various aspects regarding the

The Context of Islam in US Prisons Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Muslim chaplaincy crisis in US jails as well as state and federal prisons has received a lot of attention (Colson, 2002). The influence of Wahhabism, a zealots’ version of Islam, on Muslims who enter prisons as chaplains (Schwartz, 2003), as well as cases of extremism—including Jose Padilla, the “dirty bomber,” and Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber”—have led to warning remarks from figures such as Colson (2002), of the Prison Fellowship, against Muslim 97

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chaplains fostering radical Islam behind bars. This post-9/11 political environment has made prison officials and politicians concerned about Muslim inmates and prison-grown terrorism. However, neither the Muslim chaplaincy crisis nor radical Islam is particular to post-9/11 US prisons. The continuing need for enough qualified Muslim imams surfaced publicly as early as 1993 during the uprising at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) in Lucasville. While a number of problems converged to lead to the uprising, the radicalization of a group of Muslim inmates by an unqualified imam was considered to be one important factor fueling the riot (Ammar et al., 2004). The growth of the incarcerated Muslim population took place in the 1980s when African Americans began to enter prisons in a disproportionate number due to a reduction in employment opportunities (Duncan, Huston, and Weisner, 2007) and the war on drugs (Tonry, 1995). Experts observe that between 1986 and 1991, the prison population reversed from one where Caucasians were the majority (53% whites and 46% African American) to one where African Americans became the majority (53% African American and 46% whites) (Duncan et al., 2007; Henderson, Cullen, Carroll, and Feinberg, 2000; Kusha, 2009; Tonry, 1995). The increase in the African American prison population meant an increase in the number of converts to Islam. In reality, the majority of Muslims in American prisons are African American and not Middle Eastern (Ammar et al., 2004; Kusha, 2009; McCloud and al-Deen, 2008). The pattern of racial imbalance in the prison population remains the same in US jails and prisons today. According to 2008 Bureau of Justice Statistics data, African American males were incarcerated at 6.6 times the rate of Caucasian males—despite the decrease in the percentage of incarcerated African Americans (from 41% at mid-year in 2007 to 37% at mid-year in 2008). The increasing number of Muslim inmates in US prisons coupled with the lack of budgetary and staffing resources affected the ability of overcrowded correctional facilities to carefully screen and process ministers and volunteers for minority religions. As a result, inmates were left to either mentor each other or be mentored by chaplains who were unqualified to work within correctional facilities (Schwartz, 2003).2 This pattern of unqualified Muslim chaplains remained even after the 9/11 tragedy. Therefore, while the terrorist threat against the United States is a new (and real) problem, the shortage of qualified chaplains who have the potential to reduce radical Islam in US prisons has been an ongoing and unsolved problem for correctional facilities for over two decades. Historically, inmates who converted to Islam have subscribed to all the varieties of Islam including, but not limited to, Sunni Islam, Shiite Islam,

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the Nation of Islam, Five Percenters, and Moorish Science Temple (McCloud and al-Deen, 2008). A Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General report affirms that federal inmates still subscribe to the same groups, with 85% of the inmates following either Sunni Islam or the Nation of Islam (2004). Today, Wahhabi Islam, a more conservative form of Sunni Islam, dominates Muslim religious mentorship both in state and federal prisons (McCloud and al-Deen, 2008). This domination is being blamed for radicalizing Muslim inmates in US prisons. For example, in the United States, Schwartz writes, “All of the federal and state chaplains representing Islam in this country’s prisons are Wahhabis. That is, they are certified by groups originating in Saudi Arabia; the curriculum they follow was created there, and they go into our prisons and preach an extremist doctrine” (2003, p. 1). This domination, however, must be understood in its historic and political context. Historically, the practice of Islam in prison was rooted in the struggle for racial equality in the United States. The civil rights movement, the assassination of Malcolm X (El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz), and the success of the various prisoners’ rights lawsuits (Fulwood v. Clemer [1962] and Cooper v. Pate [1964]) all resulted in the recognition of the Nation of Islam (often referred to as the “Black Muslims”) as a religion (Moore, 1995). The Black Muslims’ religion, the Nation of Islam (NOI), was a result of the sharply race-conscious US society. Curtis (2006) places the NOI not as a national movement, but as a separate belief system within the African American religious understanding that is influenced by race and slavery in the United States. The US government treated the Black Muslims with suspicion both outside and inside prisons. Talhami discusses the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) pursuit of the NOI saying, “Surveillance of the NOI began early, predating FBI focus on the leadership of the civil-rights movement by decades. During the Second World War the FBI feared that Elijah Muhammad and his NOI followers were helping the Japanese” (2008, p. 132). Later, notes Talhami (2008), the rise of Malcolm X and his increased racial rhetoric further heightened the FBI’s monitoring of the NOI. This fear of a black revolution, where prison was a recruiting ground, resulted in various expressions to control the NOI in prisons. One such manifestation is a prison culture in which Christians and other varieties of Islam stigmatize the NOI. In a Christian Science Monitor article, Porter, a volunteer counselor for the Pennsylvania Prison Society, said, “You can almost assume that the more aggressive type [of inmate] is part of the Nation of Islam” (Kaslow, 1996, p. 4). In an attempt to control the NOI’s threat in US prisons, in the early 1990s a number of facilities at the state and federal levels established

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Sunni Islam as the official version of Islam (Ammar and Weaver, 2006). McCloud and al-Deen note that in US prisons, “Sunni Islamic norms sometimes held up as the criteria by which all other Islamic groups are measured” (2008, p. 368). The pouring in of resources from Saudi Arabia (the major proponent of Sunni Wahhabism) in the form of free religious materials, expensive bilingual Qurans, and support from various Islamic national groups expedited the transformation of Sunni Wahhabism as the legitimate, approved form of correctional Islam. Post-9/11, however, this Sunni Wahhabism in US prisons, while a new threat, is being treated with the old strategies used to control the NOI threat. Just as Sunni Wahhabism replaced “radical” NOI, there are attempts to create a new “nonradical” Islam that could supplant radical Sunni Wahhabism. The introduction of Sunni Wahhabism as a criterion of Islamic norms to control the NOI’s potential radicalization of prisoners in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted in pitting the varieties of Islamic interpretations against each other. Hamm comments on this situation by noting, “Conflict within inmate Islam is growing as various factions of the faith compete for followers, pitting the Nation of Islam against Sunnis, Sunnis against Shiites, and Prison Islam—which encompasses gang values and fierce intragroup loyalties based on ‘cut-and-paste’ interpretations of the Quran” (2008, p. 1). Muslim Chaplaincy in US Prisons: Shifting Paradigms Chaplaincy in prison is a particularly US-created institution. Criminological research (Clear et al., 1992; Sundt, Dammer, and Cullen, 2002) has established the positive impact of chaplains on the rehabilitation of inmates. However, in traditional Islam there is no clergy or hierarchal religious order. The spiritual relationship in normative Islam is between the individual human and God (Gilliat-Ray, 2008). In the standard Sunni interpretation, being an imam or a Muslim chaplain is not a profession, nor is it a qualification. The imam is imam only as long as he is leading the prayer.3 Lewis (2006) describes imams in Pakistan as poorly paid employees with little status or power. The case of imams in the United States is not different from Pakistan. Nyang (1999) describes four styles of leadership in US mosques: imamled, president-led, group-led, and hybrid. Each leadership style reflects certain ideologies and levels of integration with the outside US society. Often the imam is hired from their home country, knows little about US society, and speaks little English. The imam-led mosque, according to Nyang

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(1999), is one whose community is most fearful of integration with, and more isolated from, the larger US society. There is a trend in Europe and the United States to professionalize the role of imams to include the general traits in chaplaincy (Geeves, 2008; Spalek and Wilson, 2001). According to Baghby, Perl, and Froehle (2001), mosque leadership, including but not limited to imams, is gradually professionalizing. The Hartford Seminary, in Hartford, Connecticut, is the first in the nation to offer a degree program for professional Muslim chaplains. However, the professionalization of Muslim religious leaders is still in its infancy. For example, the Association of Professional Chaplains in 2000 had 1,600 certified chaplains, only one of whom was Muslim (Jones, 2007). In 2005 there were 2,000 association-certified chaplains, and four of them were Muslim (Jones, 2007). Part of the professionalization of imams into chaplains needs to focus on training. According to the Hartford Seminary Chaplaincy program, A chaplain is a professional who offers spiritual advice and care in a specific institutional context, such as a military unit or a college campus, hospital or prison. Although chaplains often provide religious services for members of their own faith communities, the main role of a chaplain is to facilitate or accommodate the religious needs of all individuals in the institution in which he/she may work as a chaplain. (Duncan Black Macdonald Center for the Study of Islam, 2009, p. 1)

The professionalization of Muslim chaplains also needs to focus on the historic way chaplaincy or religious mentoring has been delivered to Muslim inmates. According to Gardell, the NOI Prison Reform Ministry “reaches out to the incarcerated in a combined rehabilitation and recruiting drive” (1996, p. 482). The goal is to transform convicts into law-abiding, disciplined, and productive men. The underlying objective of such change is to recruit reformed black men, once released from prison, into the NOI to become the “foundation for a new African country” (Kusha, 2009). A number of non-NOI volunteers who work in prisons as counselors and ministers admire the ministering that goes into restoring black prisoners’ dignity while in prison. However, the content of the ministering was a transformation for separation from the mainstream community. The Wahhabi imams in state and federal prisons adopted this message in their ministering to African American and other Muslim inmates. The objective here was to create a dominant Wahhabi Islam in the United States (very much like NOI). There was a concerted effort by the Saudis in the 1990s to recruit African American imams and send them to Saudi Arabia to be trained. The intent was to spread and control their version of Islam in the United States (Schwartz, 2003).

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A professional cadre of Muslim chaplains in prisons whose focus is more on rehabilitation and theological guidance, not on any political form of Islam and proselytization, would shift the prevalent paradigm of “transformation for separation” of rehabilitated Muslim prisoners from the larger community. Such a shift requires cooperation from federal and state correctional authorities rather than the creation of barriers and fear. Such a paradigm shift also needs systematic research on Muslims in prison, something that British and French scholars (Beckford and Gilliat, 1998; Gilliat-Ray, 2008; Spalek and El-Hassan, 2007; Spalek and Wilson, 2001) have engaged in far more than in the United States. Schwartz notes, “Historically, in Britain, France, and Germany, the main Western countries with significant Islamic minorities, traditional scholars have been a buffer against extremism in Islam, and for various sociological and demographic reasons, American Islam lacked a stratum of such scholars” (2003, p. 1). Prison chaplaincy scholarship in the United States must be critical and ask questions about Islam beyond the traditional ones including the Islamic sect, radicalization, and history of Islamic conversion. In the balance of this chapter, we engage in one such investigation, namely, understanding what Muslim inmates in one Ohio state prison system look for in chaplains, imams, and religious mentorship. Method and Data Sample

According to the official definition used by the Ohio Department of Corrections (ODC), inmates who declare that they believe in the Ramadan fast (whether they actually fast or not) are considered to be Muslim. Prisoners in the Ohio system identifying as Muslim totaled 1,440 in the 1999–2001 period,4 representing about 3% of the total number of male inmates (48,000) in the United States. Surveys for the 26 nonspecialized correctional male institutions were sent to the administrative chaplain of each institution. Sixteen out of 26 correctional institutions returned their surveys. Two hundred and twentyseven Muslim inmates (16%) completed the survey, and 15 inmates used their allotted envelope and stamp to return long narratives about their experiences as Muslims in prisons. Many respondents completed most, but not all, of the survey questions. The Muslim inmates who were in the sample appeared to be similar in marital status but had a higher educational attainment compared to the

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larger inmate population in Ohio. Of those who responded to the question (n=220) over half of the inmates were never married (54%, n=118), about one-fifth were married (20%, n=44), almost one fifth (19.5%, n=43) were divorced, and a small number were either widowed (1.5%, n=3) or specified “other” (5.9%, n=12) for the marital status item (Ammar et al., 2004). The majority of inmates (65%, n=148) in the Muslim sample had an educational attainment of high school or less, 8.0% (n=18) in the sample received a bachelor’s degree or higher, and none of the respondents had less than an eighth-grade education. The Muslim inmates in the sample were on average three years older than the general population in Ohio prisons at the time (Ammar and Weaver, 2006). The majority of the respondents identified themselves as African American (87%, n= 193), a larger majority than that found in Ohio’s state prisons at the time (53%). The sample included very few Arabs (1.4%, n=3), Arab Americans (1.8%, n=4), or European Americans (2.7%, n=6). Those remaining in the sample identified themselves as “other” (6.8%, n=15; Ammar et al., 2004). The majority of the inmates identified with Islam while incarcerated (66.2%, n=131) versus those who identified with Islam before incarceration (30%, n=59). The types of crime for the Muslim sample also closely corresponds with those of the general population in Ohio’s state prisons. For both the general Ohio prison population and the Muslim sample in this study, crimes against persons were the main reason for incarceration. The Muslim sample, however, had a larger percentage of inmates (55.7%) incarcerated for crimes against persons than the general population (36.0%). Drug offenses and property crimes represented the second most common reason for incarceration among the inmates both in the Muslim sample and the general population. Sex offenses represented the lowest crime type for both the Muslim sample and for the general population of inmates (Ammar and Weaver, 2006). Questionnaire

The questionnaire consisted of a variety of items that pertained to the nature of Islamic conversion, the so-called sect of Islam with which the respondent affiliates, the religious affiliation of relatives and friends, the type of crime for which the respondent was incarcerated (e.g., crimes against persons, sex offenses, property crimes, drug offenses), and demographic attributes (e.g., age, race or ethnicity, education; Ammar et al., 2004). A number of questions in the instrument were also related to the importance of some skills for an imam/chaplain in a correctional system, including positive attributes of imams and areas for improvement.

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Procedure

In this section, we analyze the Muslim inmates’ answers to the above questions regarding the qualities the inmates felt were most important in an imam. In particular, we looked at the extent of the inmates’ devotion to Islam, the time of their conversion to Islam (i.e., before or after incarceration), and the types of crimes they committed—all in relation to the qualities they would prefer to have in an imam. The qualities of imams were identified in the survey by eight skills based on historical/cultural characteristics perceived as important (Antoun, 1989; Gaffney, 1994). Antoun describes the importance of the preacher (the religious leader or imam who conducts the Jumah sermon) as a “culture broker” who merges the “great” and “little” traditions (of Islam), thereby acting as a local interpreter to “the relationship of popular religion to the religion of the specialists . . . [Preachers, like other leaders are] key figures who must accept, reject, reinterpret, or accommodate the diversity of local custom with the ordinances of religion, be they ritual, ethical, legal, or theological” (1989, p. 17). The “great” and “little” traditions for an anthropologist like Antoun refer to rural-urban or popular-classic cultures. This conceptualization, however, can be applied to prison chaplains who deal with the local culture or subcultures of prison (including local regulations, security needs, rehabilitation programs, etc.) versus the larger culture of US society where Islam is practiced. The reconciling/mediating qualities of imams identified in the survey included three spheres for mediation between the “little” and “great” cultures. These include three community building, two inmate-related, and four theological spheres. More particularly the survey operationalized them as follows: I. Community-Building Sphere I.i Seeks to bring Muslims back into correct religious practices I.ii Understands the prison system and can mediate between the prison authorities to allow them to meet Islamic laws I.iii Encourages persons in the Muslim community to visit, write, and perhaps be sources of job contacts on their release

II. Inmate-Related Sphere II.i Has counseling skills for the individual inmate II.ii Has counseling skills to benefit the inmate with family matters

III. Theological Sphere III.i Maintains Islamic standards in prayer, food, and behaviors III.ii Is a good preacher III.iii Is fluent in Arabic, the language of the Quran III.iv Is well trained in Islamic law, sharia

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Koenig, McCullough, and Larson (2001) discussed dimensions of religiosity that include organizational religiosity (i.e., attendance at religious services) and subjective religiosity (i.e., the importance of religion and self-rated religiosity). The context and the methodology of this research impose limits on exploring the subjective religiosity of Muslim inmates in the sample. The data was obtained by surveys emailed to the correctional institution and returned by the head chaplain. Hence, the researchers were not able to engage in any in-depth or face-to-face discussions about subjective religiosity. As a result, religiosity was constructed to reflect organizational religiosity. The term “extent of devotion” is used to reflect an Islamic theological term. Hence, the extent of devotion to Islamic rituals in the analysis was measured by a scale of four practices: the frequency of reading the Quran, the closeness to praying five times a day, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and regular attendance of the Friday (Jumah) prayer. The scale identified the practice of all four rituals as very devoted, three of the rituals as quite devoted, two of the rituals as somewhat devoted, and one of the rituals as not devoted. The variable “time of conversion to Islam” was measured by the question: When did you firmly identify yourself as a Muslim? Conversion to Islam is not a “born again” experience or a “religious epiphany” (Mahoney and Pargament, 2004; Thomas and Zaitow, 2006). Recent research indicates that the initial impetus for conversion to Islam typically came from the immediate familial and social milieu of a convert-to-be (Dutton, 1999; Krstic, 2009). Spalek and El-Hassan (2007) agree that the process of conversion to Islam in prison is similar to the one identified by Kose (1996) for those outside prison. That is, a process of discovery with Islam often precedes conversion, accompanied by personal contact with Muslim friends or acquaintances and a period of experimentation with Islam (Kose, 1996). As a result, the question was worded to capture this conversion process. Results Qualities of a Religious Leader

The Muslim inmates in the sample indicated the following qualities to be of importance in an imam, arranged by order of the most to least important: 1. Maintains Islamic standards in prayer, food, and behavior (75%, n=170). 2. Is well trained in Islamic law (69%, n=157).

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3. Understands the prison system and can mediate between the prison authority and the prisons to allow them to meet Islamic laws (68%, n=154). 4. Seeks to bring Muslims back into correct religious practices (67%, n=152). 5. Encourages persons in the Muslim community to visit, write, and perhaps to be sources of job contact on their release (63%, n=142). 6. Has counseling skills for the individual inmate (57%, n=129). 7. Is a good preacher (53%, n=120). 8. Has counseling skills to benefit the inmate with family matters (52%, n=119). 9. Is fluent in Arabic, the language of the Quran (44%, n= 99).

The above descriptive analysis of the inmates response shows that their top-five important qualities for religious leaders include theological knowledge (two qualities) and competencies to mediate community issues (three qualities) both inside and outside the prison. Extent of Devotion and Qualities for a Religious Leader

Inmates’ devotional level reflects different patterns in preferences of religious leaders’ qualities. Cross-tabulations of the variable “extent of devotion” (a combined measure of the frequency of reading the Quran, the closeness to praying five times a day, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and regular attendance of the Friday [Jumah] prayer) and the nine qualities identified above show four qualities that were significantly related to the level of devotedness: 1. Has counseling skills for the individual inmate. Ninety-eight (72%) of the 136 respondents who were devoted compared to 15 (56%) of those who were not as devoted reported that this was a very important quality (Cramer’s V=.273, Chi square=12.169, p