Muslim Identity Formation in Religiously Diverse Societies [1 ed.] 9781443885720, 9781443880756

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Muslim Identity Formation in Religiously Diverse Societies

Muslim Identity Formation in Religiously Diverse Societies Edited by

Derya Iner and Salih Yucel

Muslim Identity Formation in Religiously Diverse Societies Edited by Derya Iner and Salih Yucel This book first published 2015 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2015 by Derya Iner, Salih Yucel and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-8075-2 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-8075-6

CONTENTS

Foreword ................................................................................................... vii Introduction: Identifying “Identity” ............................................................. 1 Derya Iner and Salih Yucel Part I: Muslim Identity Formation and Socio-political Involvement Muslim Identity: One or Many? ................................................................ 19 Riaz Hassan Religious and Social Foundation of Singaporean Muslim Identity ........... 36 Mohammad Alami Musa The Transformation of Islamic Political Identity....................................... 55 Halim Rane Civil Society and its Contribution to Democratisation: A Case Study: The Hizmet or Gülen Movement ............................................................... 76 Muhammed Çetin Part II: Ethno-religious Identity in Western Cultural Context Muslim Identity Formation in the West: The Case of Australian, British and American Muslims ............................................................... 105 Nahid Afrose Kabir Muslim Religiosity: An Analysis of Salience and Practice among Muslims Living in Victoria and New South Wales ................................................ 127 Rachel Woodlock A Threefold Sense of Belonging: Practising Home-grown Muslims’ Sense of Belonging to Religion, Ethnicity and Nation ............................ 155 Derya Iner

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Part III: New and Emerging Identities Dissent and New Diversities in Muslim Identity Discourses in the Wake of 9/11...................................................................................................... 181 Sara Nuzhat Amin Muslim Identity Threshold ..................................................................... 208 Mehmet Ozalp and Zuleyha Keskin “My Wife is the Boss”: Muslim Men Negotiating Masculinity in Australia .............................................................................................. 231 Rachmad Hidayat Part IV: Spiritual Influences on Identity Theological Foundations of Human Identity in the Qur’an ..................... 251 Recep Dogan Indigenous Spiritual Light: Reconsidering the Negative Stereotypes on Indigenous Spirituality ....................................................................... 266 Asmi J. Wood Aboriginal Conversions to Islam in Prison: A Substantial Security Threat or Another Moral Panic? .............................................................. 290 John Paget Contributors ............................................................................................. 308

FOREWORD

This book centres on the key concept of diversity and relates it to the identity formation of Muslims. This emphasis hinges on two main factors. First, Muslims across the world live in religiously mixed societies and consequently experience diversity in an increasing fashion, especially through the cyberspace of social networks. A total of 1.6 billion Muslims are dispersed across a large geography where they live as a majority in 45 countries and the remainder live across 149 countries as significant religious minorities. Moreover, most Muslim-majority countries are now religiously varied. Where they are not, Muslim-dominated countries are exposed to people from all religious backgrounds in cyberspace. It seems multiplicity is an unavoidable reality for Muslims from all parts of the world. Furthermore, in this globalised world where borders are increasingly vacillating, Muslim identity formation becomes a matter of concern for Muslims and non-Muslims as well as native and host societies, and in the meantime receives significant attention from academic and nonacademic audiences. Secondly, diversity is an unavoidable concept in identity-related studies since identity formation is a very complex and ongoing process involving not just a single, simple identity, but rather a plurality of identities with reference to multiple sources ranging from internal to external, individual to communal, spiritual to political, and local to transnational contexts. Muslim identity differs specifically within theological, social, political and regional circumstances and discourses. Considering the diversity of societies and the numerous factors contributing to shaping Muslim identity, this book brings together examples from different parts of the world, including Western societies, and each chapter focuses on separate factors in shaping individual, communal, political, institutional, civic and/or national Muslim identities. The overall highlight of the book is the complexity of identity formation and heterogeneity of the Muslim experience of Islamic identity formation. Nevertheless, there is coherence between the chapters since each focuses on certain factors that shape Muslim identity in particular contexts. Each article investigates similar cases in different parts of the world. Also, each is a blueprint for identity studies regardless of which specific society, community or religion is under consideration. In addition to including a variety of themes and cases from different parts of the world, diverse methodologies, including quantitative and

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qualitative research methods, further enrich the book. The authors’ academic backgrounds and organic relationships with their communities enable them to develop their arguments with insight. Furthermore, by giving voice to academics from different locations and nationalities, this book reflects neither a predominantly Western nor a distinctly Eastern approach, but instead gives a balanced view from critical academia globally. Cases drawn from different countries dealing with multiple aspects of identity formation are likely to catch the attention of a large body of academics and students majoring in humanities, social sciences and arts who are interested in Muslims generally as well as those Muslims who live in particular locations, including the West. It will also attract the attention of those majoring in identity studies, which is a popular academic topic in this highly globalised world.

Why Muslim Identity Formation? Identity is a fundamental aspect of human beings and has been widely discussed within the scope of psychological, social and political studies. When compounded with Islam and Muslims, it becomes a much more complicated subject in the contemporary world where Muslim communities are spread widely around the globe and face xenophobia and Islamophobia. Besides that, Muslims’ internal and external transformation through encounters with the West, through migration and through their historical experience of colonisation, nationalism and Westernisation, has left immense imprints in the diverse Muslim psyche wherever Muslims live – Asia Pacific, the Middle East and Africa – making the Muslim identify-formation question inevitably complicated. That complexity is evident in the publication sector with vigorous discussion on the conceptual and geographical landscapes of Muslim identity formation. On one hand, some books focus on major aspects, such as gender, age, ethnicity or religion/religiosity, which are regarded as influential in shaping Muslim identity,1 or shape their themes around a particular region.2 On the other hand, there are books that stand out for their random variety, delving into many aspects in different locational examples.3 This apparent variety of topics and locations does not give the sense of internal coherence. The overarching discourse in the case of Muslims in multicultural societies addresses European and American diversity4 and, in most of the examples given in the notes, Muslim identity is always taken into account within the discourse of negotiation, integration, enforcement and reaction, as if Muslim identity is merely a socio-political phenomenon

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and, in most cases, an issue to be resolved by social engineers and political actors. Nevertheless, the literature is vigorous and growing with many notable examples. This project is a further contribution to this scholarship, which acknowledges the complexity of identity formation, a fact reflected in the way each chapter explores a different but important factor contributing to the shaping of Muslim identities. The effects of religiosity, universal values, state politics, socio-political environment, diaspora, gender relations and conversion to Islam shape the themes of chapters. Also, evenly distributed examples/cases from the different societies of the East, West and Asia Pacific present a comprehensive and realistic picture of the world, which considering the global scope of the subject cannot be reduced to the experience of Europe and America alone. In each chapter, experts in the field from grassroots level offer insights while examining various factors contributing to the formation of Muslim identity. This book includes different case studies from different religious societies in which Muslims live, underlining the different modes of Muslim identity formation and their results. Without being confined to either a Western or Eastern perspective or employing purely sociological or theological paradigms, but taking all of them into account, this book presents an evenly distributed variety with an internal harmony. In so doing, the book aims to reach academic and non-academic audiences from different locations and fields that show interest in exploring the directions of identity formation in a globalised world by looking at Muslims’ experience of living in diverse societies. This book takes the topic of Muslim identity formation and examines it through a multitude of perspectives and angles. In the first of four parts, four authors examine Muslim identity formation through socio-political involvement. While the first part focuses mostly on Muslim-majority countries, the second part examines ethno-religious identity in the Western cultural context, particularly in Australia. The third part looks at the new and emerging identities of Western Muslims in the post-9/11 world. The final part delves into the spiritual influences upon identity formation, with particular attention to theological foundations and case studies within the Australian Indigenous traditions and communities. In the first chapter, Riaz Hassan explores conceptual issues and stereotypes of Muslims in Western and Muslim public discourses. When looking at Muslim identity, he focuses on the impact of state politics in seven Muslim-populated countries upon Islamic identity development. Using self-reported religiosity as a proxy for Muslim identity, his research findings show that globally there exists not one but multiple Muslim

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identities and, in contrast with stereotypes, only a small proportion of Muslims construct their Muslim identity based primarily on religiosity. Muslim identity is not a biological or fixed phenomenon, but rather a socially constructed reality, based often on heritage. Moreover, while modern Muslim societies are religiously diverse, they publicly and legally privilege only Muslim identity grounded in the hegemonic religious traditions and do not provide adequate opportunities for the expression and growth of identities grounded in minority Muslim sects, heritage and cultures. As a consequence, they contribute to the institutionalisation of privilege through a range of laws and oppressive norms and practices. Such practices are creating different categories of citizenship and are not conducive to the emergence of vibrant, open and fair civil societies. In the second chapter, Mohammad Alami Musa examines the Singaporean Muslim identity using Abdullah Saeed’s framing of “participants” versus “isolationists” in categorising Muslims in secular states. The mainstream response is participatory, accepting the status quo and believing it is in the true spirit of Islam to live in a secular context. The minority view that prevails among some segments of Singaporean Muslims is isolationist as they believe they should not live in a secular state. In the third chapter, Halim Rane discusses the contemporary evolution of Islamic political identity and the key internal and external factors that have contributed to the emergence of second-generation Islamic-oriented political parties. Driven by Islamic political leaders, the higher-objectives approach, or maqasid, asserts such principles and goals as democracy, good governance, economic development, human rights and pluralism as “Islamic” objectives. This chapter explains the role of maqasid along with its implications for political Islam, Muslim identity and relations between Islam and the West. In the final chapter of the first part, Muhammed Çetin analyses the Hizmet Movement’s members’ faith-based identity. Contrary to the political Islamists who employed the ideas of “sameness” and “otherness”, the Hizmet Movement rejected such essentialist notions of identity, especially because they regard the reduction of religion to a political ideology as a great betrayal of religion. The Muslim and civic identity formed by Hizmet encompasses principles that lead to inclusiveness, education, dialogue and altruism. He tracks the development of the Hizmet Movement to show how successfully the civic-minded identity can thrive and contribute to society. After the threat of the Cold War was over, the Western world shifted its focus to a considerable extent toward the Muslim world. Terrorist

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attacks and wars increased the scrutiny of Muslims and called into question the loyalty of Western Muslims and the nature of their identity. The second part of this book begins with an examination of Australian, British and American Muslims’ identities. Nahid A. Kabir surveyed 48 youths in three countries to assess the role of families and engagement with wider communities to determine the bicultural stance of participants. In the next chapter, Rachel Woodlock analyses public and private religiosity among Australian Muslims through a survey of 600 people to measure its impact. The research looks at the impact of individuals’ assessments of the degree to which religion is important to them. It takes a multidisciplinary approach, because despite decades of valuable research, there is no universal model of religiosity that can explain and predict religiosity. The final chapter by Derya Iner segues into Muslims’ religiosity and its role in developing a sense of belonging in Australia. The attention is on 343 Muslims either born or raised in Australia with immigrant backgrounds to research the complex interplay of different identities. Through a questionnaire targeted at those who claimed to be practising their faith, this work investigates the hard-to-measure fluidity of Australian Muslim identity as it is influenced by many factors, and is negotiated and combined with other identities. Global crises like 9/11 and the London bombings put Muslims of Western societies under scrutiny. The third part will explore the formation of Muslims’ individual and collective identities under Western sociopolitical circumstances. Sarah Nuzhat Amin’s unique topic of the different and new kinds of oppositional voices and diversities in Muslim communities in post-9/11 Canada and the United States is fascinating. In the aftermath of 9/11, Muslims were vulnerable and bracing themselves for a backlash by the dominant majority, but were surprised to receive criticism from within their own ranks in the form of “progressive Muslim” identities and organisations. The new voices have generally been either ignored or discounted for their marginality in the community or to mainstream leadership. In their chapter on the Muslim identity threshold, Mehmet Ozalp and Zuleyha Keskin consider, in light of the fact that religion always finds expression within a cultural setting, whether a distinctive Muslim identity can emerge in the West. They question the incompatibility of Western and Muslim identities and investigate the conditions needed for the emergence of a new identity. They recognise the fallacy of expecting immigrants to integrate quickly and discuss the evolution of integration, setting out the five phases of the migration experience: survival, settlement, relationship

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building, independent existence and international interdependence. They also point to the challenges posed by three groups – assimilationists, isolationists and Islamophobists – that deter integration. The focus of the final chapter, by Rachmad Hidayat, is on South Asian Muslim men and their situation as minorities in Australia negotiating family leadership and masculinity. Religious discourses that provide men with the dominant gendered religious identity are normative in Muslim majority societies, but challenged in liberal and secular contexts due to the demand for individual freedoms and autonomy. This paper examines issues and challenges faced by 20 Muslim men in their practice as husbands and how they negotiate their status as the leader of the family. The final part of this book looks at spiritual influences on identity. Recep Dogan sets out the Islamic theological foundation of identity to understand the sources that affect the shaping of Muslim identity. Focusing on the empirical, emotional and rational sides of humans, he discusses the mechanisms that accentuate a human soul, and the place of human reason in this mechanism. Through examining the attributes of humankind, the attributes of God are better understood as there is a relationship between God and creation in terms of representing Him in the human dimension. This is key to the formation and development of Muslim identity on a larger scale. The second chapter, by Asmi Wood, studies a specific spiritual tradition of the Australian Indigenous people and draws parallels with the Abrahamic faiths, mainly Islam. Key to mainstream Australia accepting the importance of Indigenous spirituality is understanding the causes that adversely affect the evolution of Indigenous traditions and finding synergies and analogies within dominant traditions. This can show that Indigenous spiritual values are congruent with those of the Abrahamic faiths. This work looks at the Indigenous cosmologies and creation stories within the broader Abrahamic religious landscape and compares “creationist” aspects with the “totemic” system of connection with animals and the land of one’s traditional country, an examination done in the context of the British settlement of the continent. John Paget’s final chapter looks into a particular case of conversion to Islam by Aboriginal male inmates in a high security “super-max” NSW prison, which led to several alarmist reports from 2005–2007, namely that the inmates, already classified as notoriously violent and volatile, were allegedly leaning toward fundamentalism at the expense of their Aboriginal identity. Paget investigates the possible reasons for the conversions, implying that the Aboriginal inmates’ affinity with Islam was more an act of identity as oppressed minorities than an act of faith. He

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points to the recognised lack of knowledge, understanding and processes in the corrective services and the manner in which media coverage of the conversions influences criminal justice policy. This book is valuable because it is one-of-a-kind in the developing discourses about Muslim identity. It serves various functions as it looks into the sources that form Muslim identity, tackles unresolved issues and poses necessary questions about the future of Muslims in the world. For this, we express our gratitude to all the contributors for their research on diverse topics and their presentation of a range of views. The combination of the Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation (CISAC) at Charles Stuart University and the Islamic Sciences and Research Academy of Australia (ISRA) enabled the compilation and editing of this work. We thank the staff at Cambridge Scholars Publishing for their support and guidance in making this book available to readers far and wide. Derya Iner and Salih Yucel Sydney, 2015

Notes 1

For instance, Yvonne Yazbeck Smith, Jane I. Moor & Kathleen M. Haddad, Muslim Women in America: The Challenge of Islamic Identity Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Nahid Afrose Kabir, Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010); Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Not Quite American?: The Shaping of Arab and Muslim Identity in the United States (Texas: Baylor University Press, 2004); Gabriele Marranci, Faith, Ideology and Fear: Muslim Identities Within and Beyond Prisons (New York and London: Continuum, 2011); and Ron Geaves, The Sufis of Britain: An Exploration of Muslim Identity (Cardiff: Cardiff Academic Press, 2000). 2 For instance, Suha Taji-Farouki & Hugh Poulton, Muslim Identity and the Balkan State (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Muhammad Sani Umar & Louis Brenner, Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993) and Wasif A. R. Shadid and P. S. van Koningsveld, Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in Non-Muslim States (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996). 3 For instance, Cara Aitchison, Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender and Belonging (Burlington: Ashgate, 2007) looks into Turkish migrants, Iranian youth, gender relations and masculinity, the impact of 9/11, sports and politics through investigating different geographies like the cities and countries of Europe, Central Asia and America.

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For instance, Assaad Elia Azzi et al., Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies (Wiley Online Library, 2011) and Aziz Al-Azmeh & Effie Fokas, Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

INTRODUCTION: IDENTIFYING “IDENTITY” DERYA INER AND SALIH YUCEL

Identity is a complex phenomenon. The Merriam Webster dictionary defines identity as “sameness” in essence or character even in different instances.1 That sameness “constitutes the objective reality of a thing” and in the meantime, distinguishes one individual or group from the others. Likewise, the Oxford dictionary defines identity according to the criteria of “distinguishing features” and “determining characteristics”.2 The former may include a person’s name, photo or signature, whereas the latter may include aspects of gender, ethnicity, nationality, religion and so on. While close similarity and natural affinity may be reasons to categorise similar people together, being different relative to the majority also shapes the way members of a group view themselves and “the other”. As Richard Jenkins states, similarity and difference are the dynamic principles of personal identification.3 Accordingly, “identification” in relation to similarity and difference is the “systematic” establishment and signification between individuals and collectivities, and between “us” and “them”. Jonathan H. Turner and Jan E. Stets4 as well as Henri Tajfel5 draw attention to shaping emotions, such as the sense of belonging or ownership, through membership of a group identity. Recognition, approval and acceptance by the group also stimulate and enhance self-esteem.6 Put differently, disowning, disapproval and rejection lead to negative emotions that result in breaking up the relationships and then joining other disowned members and groups in gangs and fringe organisations. Psychological aspects emphasise an individual’s emotional and cognitive understanding of self as distinct from others, whereas the sociological aspect of identity connotes affiliation of oneself with similar ones, thereby constituting an in-group identity differentiated from the out-group. Considering such issues, identifying the nature of identity is similarly a complex endeavour, made more difficult by the futility of freezing the fluid nature of identity and forcing the intangible nature of identity into

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tangible concepts. Paul Gilroy finds “identity” problematic because identifying one in relation to others inevitably creates divisions.7 When identification is done with some hidden agenda, mostly by asking priority order questions (e.g. either religion or nationality comes first), it gets more problematic because such classification contributes not to reflection, but to restricting the complex nature of identity. An accurate identification does not confine an entity to a single definition or a broad category, but creates sub-categories to make it as specific as possible. Therefore, even in a very simple identification procedure in daily life, human beings are asked to further qualify themselves with their surnames, dates of birth, places of residence and other evidence of identity, illustrating the complexity and diversity of any human being. Moreover, codifying a person’s inner and outer self as an individual and societal entity is undoubtedly much more difficult than identifying one with their given names and a series of numbers. Nevertheless, human beings are always identified with certain generic terms, such as gender, age, ethnicity, nationality, religion etc. Identity is one of the most frequently addressed and discussed phenomena of the modern era. Since globalisation has made physical borders easily crossable, human identity stands as the sole border of individual and in-group formation.8 The effects of globalisation, such as de-territorisation and destabilisation, have shaken the old, stable and simple formulas of identity formation. As the agrarian civilisations gave way to modernity, people became subjects of the rulers in monarchies and the individual’s problem of “Who am I?” was defined simply according to the ruler–subject relationship, with little credit given to the individual in such societies. Similarly, collective identities were sufficiently simple to divide the world into “us and them”, “East and West”, “Christendom and the Islamic world” up until the turn of the twentieth century. Following the collapse of empires and kingdoms, division of territories into nation states with thick borders accompanied by equally broad nationalist discourses enforced the growth of salient national identity. Consequently, nationality not only identified people, but it also artificially divided accumulative civilizational products like food, music and culture. The era of monolithic identifications (i.e. with the ruler, religion, nation, national territory and nationalist discourse) was overthrown with the rise of globalisation that brought a speedy flow of people, goods and information across the old national borders. Cyberspace has gone much further by completely removing barriers of time and space, thereby blurring borders even further through virtual interconnectedness. Such an unimaginable and uncontrollable amalgamation with its unforeseeable and unavoidable

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outcomes and side-effects has increased anxiety for individuals, parents and communities as well as nations, and has made the identity question a timely issue for everyone. Gilroy states, “identity is an anchor in globalisation”.9 Identity becomes a beacon in the middle of vacillating borders and a shield to protect one from being everything or nothing at the same time. Consequently, from individual to national levels, every entity is searching for its own definition by locating the self somewhere in the new global deterritorised space. Such an effort of location necessitates drawing borders between oneself and the others who live not in another continent, country or city but often right next door. Indeed, the other is sometimes found indoors, in one’s inner world, and in one’s intimate relationships – surviving, for example, in the cultural genes of one’s children from an interreligious or intercultural marriage. Cyberspace is much more demanding.

Religion as an Identifier Identifying oneself with something is inevitably needed more than ever to attribute a meaning to one’s existence. Sovereign Western nation-states previously identifying themselves with a superior Western civilisation and ethnic nationality lament the loss of their former national supremacy. Nation-states that took the role of providing security, identity and cultural comfort10 by homogenising society11 with a set nationalist discourse are now uncomfortable and alarmed by the uncontrollable amalgamation. The absorption of waves of migration into homogenous Western societies seemed manageable at first on the assumption that the glare of a superior Western civilisation would be enough to mesmerise immigrants into assimilation. Although the rigid formulas like assimilation and acculturation have evolved into integration, social cohesion and coexistence rhetoric over time, post-colonial reactions to ethnocentric social engineering persist in new garments. Contrary to commonly held presumptions, the second generation of immigrant populations was attracted neither to the “superior Western” civilisation nor to its secular rationalism. Nor did they completely divorce their parental cultures and religions, which were assumed to be outdated and backward. Unexpectedly, returning to one’s roots has been observed in third generation migrants of all religions.12 As Marcus Lee Hansen argues with his “principle of third-generation interest”,13 religion can provide important answers to questions about identity and belonging for the third generation who witnessed neither pre- nor post-migration process but was

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born into a whole new culture. According to Hansen’s theory, religion is what remains as a static identifier while everything else is transformed over the generations with migration.14 In addition to generational or personal reasons, the association by others of one’s identity with religious classifiers also plays a part in selfidentification with religion. Migrants in Western countries are broadly categorised either through their religion or their ethnicity. Although singling out people by ethnicity is considered discrimination and in some jurisdictions is covered by anti-vilification laws, similar coverage is not applied in the case of religious discrimination, perhaps due to the indifference and distancing brought about through the secular nature of Western societies. As a consequence of being identified by others in relation to religious differences, new generations’ awareness and reconnection with their ancestral religion are increasing. Alasdair Crockett and David Voas observe that minority ethnic people are more religious than the white population in Britain while, in contrast, Christians in European countries overwhelmingly self-identify with their respective nationalities rather than with their faith.15 Maria O’Beirne also confirms, in the findings of a 2001 Home Office Citizenship Survey, that religion is more important as a self-identifier for people from minority faith communities16 and ethnic backgrounds in comparison to Christians and those from the white majority. She also notes that Muslims and Sikhs are more concerned about religious discrimination than people from other religions.17 A distinction from the majority is especially made in the case of Muslims. Most people with a Middle Eastern complexion are assumed to be Muslim even if they are Arab Christians. Likewise, most dark skinned people are assumed to have Arabian or subcontinental backgrounds and are therefore Muslim by default unless proven otherwise. Consequently, Sikhs are often confused with Muslims in most Western countries. A significant portion of the Muslims in the world live as a religious and ethnic minority in majority non-Muslim societies. They are, therefore, influenced in their identity-formation process by the consequences of living as a minority. According to a Pew 2009 report entitled “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” one-fifth of the world’s Muslim population lives as a religious minority.18 Two of the ten countries in Europe with the largest number of Muslims living as minorities are Russia (16 million) and Germany (4 million). Thus the number of Muslims living as a minority is quite significant, with a large population in Europe.19 The Muslim population continues to increase more rapidly relative to the rest of the population. Yet at the same time, a less than expected dissolution is

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observed in their attachment to ethno-religious heritage. This rings alarm bells for societies who assume a significant Muslim presence can cause a major change in their social dynamics. Significantly, the continued increase of the Muslim population and the projection of future Muslim population growth in the West illustrate the change in societal dynamics in the long run. Europe’s Muslim population is projected to exceed 58 million by 203020 and the United Kingdom is expected to have the largest Muslim population increase, doubling from 2.9 million in 2010 to 5.6 million in 2030 (an increase from 4.6% to 8.2%). The increase in two decades is expected to be from 4.1 million to 5.5 million in Germany21 and from 4.7 million to 6.9 million in France.22 When this growth is compared to the non-Muslim population in Europe, the relative percentage of Muslims displays a greater rate of growth.23 In the United States and Canada, growth in the Muslim population between 2010 and 2030 is projected to be more dramatic. In the United States, the Muslim population is expected to more than double from 2.6 million to 6.2 million,24 while Canada’s Muslim population is expected to nearly triple, from 940,000 in 2010 to 2.7 million within two decades.25 The usual exaggeration of these numbers in Islamophobic articles and online publications discloses an increasing level of discomfort and anxiety over the increasing Muslim population in the West. Adrian Michaels in the Daily Telegraph claims the European Muslim population is growing exponentially by doubling every quarter of a century and Muslims will make up 20% of the European population by 2050. He magnifies the numbers to argue this increasing population is a “Demographic Time Bomb” set to transform the European continent.”26 On a similar note, in the article “Number of Muslim Children in British Cities May Eclipse Christian Children in UK” Leah Marieann Klett claimed Muslims are overtaking their Christian counterparts, citing birth statistics in the 2011 census in some British cities like Birmingham.27 Because religion is not asked for at birth registration, such findings are apparently generalisations based on identifying different sounding names as Muslim. While these are interesting investigations, the motivational force behind such studies and calculations of future Muslim population in the West is questionable. In addition to Muslim population growth, their attachment to religious identity is a matter of concern in the West. Home-grown Muslims’ relative indifference to secularism and the “superiority” of the West surprised the ethnocentric social engineers28 who interpreted ethno-religious heritage as a “burden” to be left behind as they “get more connected and committed to their host countries”.29 The failure of secularism and rise of postcolonialism in Muslim countries, coupled with the unforeseeable impacts

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of parental upbringing over the second generation, result in different formulations within the Muslim-ethnic-national identity of secondgeneration Muslims.30 Yet the overarching result in those formulations show that religion is significantly important for Muslims’ selfidentification. The war on terror discourse, the “othering” of Muslims since 9/11 and sensational media news coverage about Islam and Muslims not only distress mainstream society but they also make Islam more visible and facilitate the reconnection of upcoming Muslim generations with their religious identity. Surveys illustrate that the level of secularisation of Muslims in the West is low despite generational transitions and the highly secular nature of host societies. The ratio of “never attended any religious service” for Muslims is 17% whereas for non-Muslims it is 61% in France.31 Similarly, the non-attendance ratio for Muslims is 33% whereas it is 62% for nonMuslims in the Netherlands.32 Although Muslims’ level of religiosity varies and its combination with the cultural expression of religion is not clear in these findings, these ratios are significant in showing that Muslims are highly adaptable to secular societies and are religiously resilient people. Furthermore, studies show Muslims give greater importance to religion in comparison to people belonging to other religions. Contrary to 29% of non-Muslims, 70% of American Muslims find religion important in their daily lives. Likewise, 82% of German Muslims find religion important in their daily lives compared to 33% of non-Muslims.33 In a study involving 200 Australian Muslim participants, Rachel Woodlock34 found that Muslim identity is extremely important for 72.5% and very important for 12.5%, whereas only 0.5% found Islamic identity not important at all. Surprisingly, not only adults but also Muslim primary school children are significantly more likely to cite religion as “very” or “fairly” important when compared to their Christian counterparts.35 To sum up, Western life and secularism have relatively less influence in reducing the religiosity of second-generation Muslims. Indeed, as Vaos and Fleischmann highlight, contrary to their parents, some home-grown Muslims are cautious about cleaning the “real” Islam from cultural practices.36 Incompatibility theories37 speculated in the media, academia and dramatised in movies in an Islamophobic climate fuel the growing level of anxiety. Since 9/11 and the launch of the “war on terror”, Muslims have been under heavy scrutiny. The loyalty of Muslim citizens to the host societies is questioned while immigration policies and anti-terror laws are implemented curtailing the civil liberties and freedoms of individuals who are Middle Eastern-looking and apparently Muslim. The burden upon

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moderate Muslims is not only to prove their loyalty and integrity, but also to incessantly try to detach Muslims and Islam from the ideology and actions of the loud minority. There is an increased discomfort among moderate Muslims who feel vilified by the host society’s over generalising attitudes on the one hand and victimised by fringe groups’ malign behaviours on the other.

Identity Surgeons Identifying oneself with Islam in the twenty-first-century world is not easy because of its historical, Orientalist, socio-political and recently violent connotations against the global (specifically Western) backdrop. The agony is exacerbated by the obliviousness of those assimilated into Western culture and by the numbness of those who have isolated themselves from the rest of Western society. To address these issues, there are those who might be called “identity surgeons” who are keen to operate on such overwhelming trends to relieve the pain. Few of them are keen to sear the wound. They are insensitive to the risk they run of killing identity entirely, or leaving deep scars on both Muslim identity and the view of Muslims in the social psyche. While they grievously damage the positive image of Islam, the whole body of Muslims (umma) trembles at such outdated and blindfold operations. In sum, Muslim identity, a generic image in the public mind, suffers in the hands of such self-appointed, ignorant and cruel identity surgeons. The other group of identity surgeons, who are the silent or unheard moderate majority, are too busy sanitising the wound from the internal and external germs to authenticate Muslim identity with the synthesis of text and context, both of which are meant to be inclusive of every variable, so long as they do not contradict the scripture and Prophet Muhammed’s sayings. Theory is in hand and upcoming generations will prove how much it is achievable with the unpredictable variables and fluctuating circumstances in the socio-political global arena. Yet, aligning with the global reality that identity is multi-layered, situational, fluid and in continuous formation,38 they are likely to be more successful than those identity theorists who prescribe stabilising and moulding the identity in particular forms. There are two mainstream approaches to identity in Muslim-majority as well as Muslim-minority countries. The actors developing the same approach towards identity are not necessarily from the same party. In fact, they are sometimes fierce opponents yet they use same mentality and strategy to form the anticipated identity.

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Introduction: Identifying “Identity”

The Reductionist Approach to Identity The first group is reductionists who are prone to stabilise and standardise identity mostly in line with certain agendas and motivations for social engineering purposes. They aim to either isolate or demonise Muslim identity. In Muslim countries, the motivation for stabilising and emphasising a particular Muslim identity is to react against the aftershocks of colonisation, extreme secularisation and prevailing Western ethnocentrism. Protecting and dignifying the endangered and denigrated Muslim identity and implanting pride, courage and self-esteem for being Muslim are the primary goals of Islamic and Islamist leaders. Once everything and everyone is brushed with Islamic colour they assume all problems will be resolved. Circumventing the arduous process of identity formation in personal and social context with jumps and shortcuts is indeed an illusion. The goals of Islamic revolution and/or the establishment of an Islamic state aim to use state power in a top down approach, infringing upon the natural process of societal identity formation. In fact, a societal change requires groundwork initiated and energised within itself and digested by all segments of society over time. Yet, a rapid increase in exploitation of the material, intellectual and spiritual capital of Muslim societies following colonialism stimulated hasty solutions formulated by Muslim ideologues who promised to Islamicise the country, ironically following in the footsteps of the same secular processors they heavily criticised (e.g. covering women by force in a way similar to their secular predecessors’ practice of uncovering women by force). In the meantime, using puritanism as an unaltered religious legacy that lays the foundations of a “religious nationality”,39 another branch of Islamism is served up to the global market as Wahhabism/Salafism, a puritanical strain in modern Islamic discourse that defines its own identity by excluding itself from others. Puritans’ reductionism can be traced in the reduction of revelation to its literal meaning40 and the reduction of Muslims’ individual and societal experience to a specific stereotype.41 Another group, not necessarily residing in one continent or belonging to one nationality, disclose their frustrations with being socioeconomically disadvantaged, educationally backward and spiritually and mentally exhausted due to denigration. They are stuck in the nostalgia of Islamic civilisation’s heyday and obsessed with the successful stories of those days so much that they cannot wait for a gradual transformation, which requires constructing infrastructure and superstructure with selfless

Derya Iner and Salih Yucel

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effort. Although they dream of a powerful caliph,42 some of them are unable to differentiate whether caliphal power and prestige were causes or outcomes of that heyday. Overnight and upside down attempts to bring back the caliphate are a naïve demand from those who have no knowledge of Islamic history and spirituality. Apart from them, a handful of individuals ambitious to master the world by frightening the rest use the same naïve discourse to win over the hearts of the subordinated ones.43 In short, all of these simplistic approaches, ranging from the innocent to the ill-intentioned, skip the procedural work and ambitiously want to get the results by shortcuts. They use a “Muslim identity” rhetoric that is as simplistic as their strategy for a Muslim victory. They mainly overemphasise a reductive, “one size fits all” approach to Muslim identity. Another reductionist approach to identity has been shaped by the Islamophobic segments within Western societies who have particular motivations and agendas by stabilising and standardising Muslim identity. In their perception, as their societies are mixed with waves of migration, the concern for taming the seemingly fluid diversity increases and an emphasis on establishing unity under one set identity takes priority. Eventually, the long, intricate time and effort required for identity formation is sacrificed through social engineering in favour of creating one unifying identity. Research in the hands of social engineers has been a powerful tool to conquer the unknown, curb potential harms, and stabilise and standardise identity in favour of national benefits. Migration studies of the World War II era were an effort and product of social engineering that aimed to explore ethno-cultural characteristics, to homogenise them through acculturation and to scrutinise their socio-economic deficiencies in discovering paths for social cohesion. Yet, the immigrants have always been seen differently from the national family and were prone to marginality with the risks of isolation and poverty.44 The underlying mindset behind these studies was that “immigrants are potential security risks, as culturally others, as socially marginal and as an exception to the rule of territorial confinement”.45 Such concern is always embedded in those studies, which set multiple and ontologically different identifiers (such as ethnicity, religion and national identity) against one another and expect one sole identity to override the others.46 Consequently, overgeneralisations and distortion of the real voices of research participants within biased research design and loaded multiple choices are subject to critique by subaltern, minority and feminist studies. They collectively draw attention to the created hierarchies between the researcher and research participants, most of the latter being disadvantaged people as members of third world countries, women and minorities.47 The

10

Introduction: Identifying “Identity”

researchers’ prior agenda in those studies is to uncover evidence that proves and justifies the predetermined mind-sets within the research design.48 Muslims as third world people in global, social and anthropological studies, Muslim geographies in regional and political studies, Muslim women in women and gender studies, Muslim immigrants and their offspring in minority and migration studies take their share from such researchers’ prejudices and agendas that bring forward a stereotypical Muslim identity that is seemingly (in fact, deceptively) “academic”. Thus, identity is an intricate process and does not accept particular formulation. Ignoring this fact, social engineers, whether from Muslim or non-Muslim societies, attempt to formulate and then impose particular prescriptions that stabilise and standardise Muslim identity within their own cultural paradigm. These attempts are hasty solutions that do not promise a long-term effect and carry the risk of unforeseeable side-effects for three main reasons: first, such formulas are not aligned with the reality of identity and the impact of globalism on identity; secondly, their manner is mostly imposing and demanding from the top down rather than igniting a light at the grassroots level to make a bottom-up change; and thirdly, their proposed solution is not to understand and accommodate the individuals’, communities’ and societies’ tendencies, needs and expectations but to impose their ready-made strategies on the existing crowds.

The Accommodating Aapproach to Identity The second approach is identity accommodation, which gives room to religious identity in relation to and in interaction with other elements that influence identity. The proponents of this approach recognise religion as an important part of identity, but not its sole source.49 In line with the conditions on the ground and the complex nature of identity, they mediate the components of identity for practical and positive outcomes. This approach to identity is not an imposed theory, but an experienced reality of most Muslims in the global context. Likewise, some Western Muslim ideologues navigating in the middle of this intricate nexus recognise its complexity and propose to accommodate formulations by retrieving supporting examples from the Islamic text and history. Since attempts to stabilise and stereotype Muslim identity have not produced any good outcome so far, turning towards the latter trend seems the best alternative. According to the accommodating approach, intersectionality, multilayers and different affiliations in different contexts and amounts are inevitable and necessary. Likewise, identity is an ongoing process that

Derya Iner and Salih Yucel

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cannot be restrained with particular words and terminologies and cannot be set against other components within itself. Accepting and appreciating all the components, and mediating and harmonising all within itself, are therefore crucial. One step further is to bring to the foreground the overlaps and mutually strengthen the existing connections and loyalties, which would be most satisfactory for all parties involved, requiring full attention and loyalty to the different components of identity. Intersectionality brings forward not only religion but also race, ethnicity, class, age, gender, sexuality and countless other components.50 Salient identity above all is the one that is central to the individual in selfidentification and identification by others.51 At this juncture, positioning one’s salient identity by oneself and the larger society can only provide a generic map for those who share similar features, conditions, geographies and time periods. Yet, when the unique individual variables are entered, the road map offers different directions no matter whether the destination is the same. Studies in diverse parts of the world demonstrate that being Muslim is a central and therefore salient identity for the majority of Muslims.52 Pew research on Middle Eastern countries also demonstrates an increase over a year in choosing Islam as the first identifier.53 Being Muslim comes first for many Western Muslims as well.54 Considering that identity formation is two-way (i.e. how one identifies oneself and how one is identified by others) and two-fold (i.e. identifying oneself in regards to one’s in-group and out-group relationships), Muslims’ identity formation is not independent from how Muslims are defined, treated and introduced to the world in the global era. Thus, on one hand, the majority’s primary connection to Muslim identity attaches them to the entire Muslim world as members of the umma and gives them a concern with the local, national and international discourse on Muslims. On the other hand, what it means to be Muslim, its intersectionality with culture and parental upbringing and to what extent religion and religiosity take part in this identification depend on Muslims’ individual, parental, communal and societal circumstances. Although shared and unique aspects shape both shared and individual Muslim identities, it is not a complete work. Constantly changing circumstances make identity formation a work in progress. As Garry D Bouma points out, even a change from one suburb to another, from one job to another, or from one marital status to another causes identity to fluctuate. Surely, the acts of migration from one country to another and starting a completely new life in a new land inevitably have powerful effects on one’s identity.55 Considering the multiple, constant and accelerating ebb and flow across borders and even the removal of those

12

Introduction: Identifying “Identity”

borders in cyberspace, global forces lead to considerably fluid, hybrid and cosmopolitan identities. Since the accommodating approach is intricate and inclusive and promises numerous possibilities, it requires Muslims to work actively in the foundry of identity formation with all necessary components for the desired result. This approach also requires Muslims to meaningfully combine and then disclose multi-layered loyalties and bicultural skills,56 resulting from simultaneously belonging to multiple worlds. To sum up, Muslim societies and Muslims as minorities are undergoing a dramatic transformation exposed to multifarious circumstances and acted on by numerous forces. Depending on the type of identity formation they adopt (i.e. reductionist or accommodating), how much effort they exert (i.e. active founder or passive recipient), how they include religion in responding to or initiating change (i.e. steadfastness or bigotry), one can predict the direction of identity formation for some Muslim communities, groups and individuals. Nevertheless, a blueprint is always impossible since each has unique circumstances and each processes identity formation differently compared with another. Indeed, human beings’ exposure to a cosmopolitan and constantly changing range of conditions complicates the formation procedure and sets it going for the modern people of the global era. One thing is certain though, identity is never constant and it is forming and reforming in every time and place. Nevertheless, the complexity and fluidity of identity in the global era is not an indication of the randomness of being lost in numerous variables. One can still propose that, if being Muslim is the salient identity for the majority of Muslims, the universal values of Islam can be taken into account to accommodate other emerging identities. Contemporary Muslim identity comprises three influences: local culture, Islam and Western influence. The first two often appear as superior to the third. This implies that an Arab Muslim in the Middle East is different from an Arab in the West due to the varying degree of influence by the local and Western culture. Unless the natural flow of identity formation is artificially interfered with, the latter in the given example is expected to be Muslim by religion, but Western by culture. Regardless of the assimilated and isolated ones, the moderate majority is seeking to create a meaningful combination. This combination is expected to adapt to the mainstream culture and so become localised over time. Until then, the integrity and loyalty of the minority groups will always be questioned by mainstream society. Another way forward could be a mutual effort to start a dialogue that will trigger mutual acceptance, appreciation and integration, which would lead to a transformation of

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society for the better through collective effort. If Muslims are given the freedom to practise their faith and called to a mutual effort for integration, they are more likely to develop a constructive Muslim identity in harmony with their ancestral and Western culture. Such members of society would contribute to building essential bridges between the Western nations and the Muslim world.

Notes 1

Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, online ed., s.v. “identity”, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity accessed January 25, 2015. 2 Oxford Dictionary, online ed., s.v. “identity,” http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/identity accessed January 25, 2015. 3 Richard Jenkins, Social Identity (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 73. 4 See Jonathan H. Turner and Jan E. Stets, The Sociology of Emotions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 5 Henri Tajfel, “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations,” Annual review of psychology 33, no. 1 (1982): 1–39. 6 Jenkins, Social Identity, 83. 7 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 202. 8 In-group is a social group with which an individual identifies whereas an outgroup is a social group with which an individual does not identify. 9 Paul Gilroy, Between Camps: Race, Identity and Nationalism at the End of the Colour Line (London: Penguin, 2000), 113. 10 Anthony Smith, Nation State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985). 11 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983). 12 Based on 1278 parent–child matches in Britain. The Home Office Citizenship Survey and its accompanying Young People’s Survey provide a relatively rare example of individual-level and inter-generational British data on religious transmission. Cited in Jonathan Scourfield et al., “Religious Nurture in British Muslim Families: Implications for Social Work,” in Intergenerational Transmission of Islam: Evidence from the Citizenship Survey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 35. 13 Jonathan Scourfield, Chris Taylor, Graham Moore, and Sophie Gilliat-Ray,“The Intergenerational Transmission of Islam in England and Wales: Evidence from the Citizenship Survey,” Sociology 46 (2012): 91-108. 14 Cited in Scourfield et al., Intergenerational Transmission of Islam, 91–92. 15 Alasdair Crockett and David Voas, “Generations of Decline: Religious Change in 20thǦCentury Britain,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 45, no. 4 (2006): 567–584. 16 Maria O’Beirne, Religion in England and Wales: Findings from the 2001 Home Office Citizenship Survey (UK: Home Office London, 2004), vii–x.

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Introduction: Identifying “Identity”

O’Beirne, Religion in England and Wales, 26. Roughly 317 million Muslims living as minorities and about three-quarters – live in five countries: India (161 million), Ethiopia (28 million), China (22 million), Russia (16 million) and Tanzania (13 million). Pew Research Centre, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/ accessed January 15, 2015. 19 Pew Research Centre, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population.” 20 Brian J Grim and Mehtab S Karim, The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010–2030 (Washington DC: Pew Research Center, 2011), 121. 21 Grim and Karim, The Future of the Global Muslim Population, 127. 22 Grim and Karim, The Future of the Global Muslim Population, 123. 23 Grim and Karim, The Future of the Global Muslim Population, 123. 24 According to the former US president William J Clinton, the American Muslim population in the 2000s was 6 million, which is a significant difference from the Pew Research Centre’s findngs. The Muslim population as being over 6 million is cited in different paltforms and resources as well. William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1998, Book 2: July 1 to December 31, 1998 (Washington:Government Printing Office, 2000), 1632, accessed March 12, 2015. 25 Grim and Karim, The Future of the Global Muslim Population, 137. 26 Adrian Michaels, “Muslim Europe: The Demographic Time Bomb Transforming Our Continent,” Daily Telegraph, August 8, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/5994047/Muslim-Europe-thedemographic-time-bomb-transforming-our-continent.html accessed January 9, 2015. 27 Leah Marieann Klett, Gospel Herald Society, September 15, 2014, http://www.gospelherald.com/articles/52536/20140915/number-of-muslimchildren-may-eclipse-christians-in-u-k-leader-warns-weve-got-to-stand-up-forchristian-values.htm accessed January 12, 2015. 28 Karen Phalet, Fenella Fleischmann, and S Stoijcic, “Ways of Being Muslim: Religious Identities of Second-Generation Turks,” in The European Second Generation Compared: Does the Integration Context Matter?, ed. Jens Schneider Maurice Crul, and Frans Lelie (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012). 29 Nancy Foner and Richard Alba, “Immigrant Religion in the United States and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?,” International Migration Review 42, no. 2 (2008): 360–392. 30 Phalet, Fleishchmann and Stoijcic, “Ways of Being Muslim,” 342. 31 Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 236. 32 Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam, 310. 33 Gallup, Religious Perceptions in America with an in-Depth Analysis of U.S. Attitudes toward Muslims and Islam, ed. Dalia Mogahed (New York: Gallup Press, 2009). 18

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34 Rachel Woodlock, “Being an Aussie Mossie: Muslim and Australian Identity among Australian-Born Muslims,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 22, no. 4 (2011): 391–407. 35 Cited in Scourfield, Intergenerational Transition, 107. 36 David Voas and Fenella Fleischmann, “Islam Moves West: Religious Change in the First and Second Generations,” Annual Review of Sociology 38 (2012): 538. 37 For example, Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1996); Daniel Pipes, “Who Is the Enemy?,” Commentary 113, no. 1 (2002): 23–24, 26; Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 3 (1990): 47–60; Leon T Hadar, “What Green Peril?,” Foreign Affairs (1993): 27; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 347. 38 Avtar Brah and Annie Coombes, Hybridity and Its Discontents: Politics, Science, Culture (New York: Routledge, 2005); Avtar Brah and Ann Phoenix, “Ain’t I a Woman? Revisiting Intersectionality,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 5, no. 3 (2013): 75–86; Woodlock, “Being an Aussie Mossie,” 397; Peta Stephenson, “Home-Growing Islam: The Role of Australian Muslim Youth in Intra-and Inter-Cultural Change,” NCEIS Research Papers 3, no. 6 (2010): 4, 8. 39 Piety via strict and segregated ruling aims to formulate a religious nationalism unique to Saudis. Madawi Al-Rasheed, A Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics and Religion in Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 65. 40 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft (US: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005), 106. 41 Al Fadl, The Great Theft, 86. 42 The meaning and role of the caliph is subject to change in different rhetoric because some people attribute different roles and missions to the caliphate independent from its historical mission and context. 43 Any terrorist group such as ISIS to Boko Haram can fall into this category. 44 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation–State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences,” Global networks 2, no. 4 (2002): 310. 45 Wimmer and Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond,” 311. 46 Although hard sciences (especially health sciences) create numerous sub categories for each generic category and take all of them into account for the sake of an accurate definition, sampling and outcome, social sciences are still beyond projecting that complexity. Hard sciences are compelled to capture the complexity because a fault in authentication could always result in fatal failures. Therefore no room is given for prior agendas or conflict of interest. 47 Daphne Patai, “Us Academics and Third World Women: Is Ethical Research Possible?,” in Women’s Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History, ed. Sherna Gluck and Daphne Patai (New York: Routledge, 1991), 175–188. 48 Daphne Patai, “When Method Becomes Power,” in Power and Method: Political Activism and Educational Research, ed. V Apple Michael (New York: Routledge, 1994). 49 Lori Peek, “Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity,” Sociology of Religion 66, no. 3 (2005): 220.

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Introduction: Identifying “Identity”

50 Steven Vertovec and Alisdair Rogers, Muslim European Youth: Reproducing Ethnicity, Religion, Culture (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). 51 Joanna Anneke Rummens, “Conceptualising Identity and Diversity: Overlaps, Intersections, and Processes,” Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal 35, no. 3 (2003): 12. 52 Riaz Hassan, Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society (Oxford University Press, 2003). 49% Muslims see themselves first Muslims while 26% see themselves first as American. Muslim Americans, “No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism,” Mainstream and Moderate Attitudes (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2011), http://www.peoplepress.org/2011/08/30/muslim-americans-no-signs-of-growth-in-alienation-orsupport-for-extremism/ accessed January 8, 2015. 53 The increase in identification firstly with religion from 2005to 2006 is as follows from 79 to 87%in Pakistan, 63 to 67% in Jordan, 43 to 51% in Turkey. Muslims In Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity (Washington DC: Pew Research Center, 2010), accessed January 8, 2015, http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/07/06/muslims-in-europe-economic-worries-topconcerns-about-religious-and-cultural-identity/254-15/ 54 81% first chose Islam whereas 7% chose citizenship in Britain; 69% first chose Islam whereas 3 chose citizenship in Spain; 66% first chose Islam whereas 13% choose nationality in Germany and 46% first chose Islam whereas 42% chose citizenship in France. “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity.” Pew Global Attitudes Project (July 6, 2006), accessed January 5, 2015, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php? ReportID=254. 55 Garry D. Bouma, “An Introduction to Religious Settlement in Australia,” in Many Religions All Australian Religions Settlement, Identity and Cultural Identity, ed. G. D. Bouma (Kew, Victoria: The Christian Research Association, 1999), 70. 56 Nahid Afrose Kabir, “A Study of Australian Muslim Youth Identity: The Melbourne Case,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 31, no. 2 (2011): 243–258.

PART I MUSLIM IDENTITY FORMATION AND SOCIO-POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

MUSLIM IDENTITY: ONE OR MANY? RIAZ HASSAN*

Introduction Identity is a complex and contentious concept and the subject of much scholarly debate in social sciences.1 In this paper I define it as a conception and expression of selfhood. It is a product of socialisation involving two processes which operate simultaneously. The first process involves identification with one’s group’s values, goals and purposes and the second involves internalisation of these values, goals and purposes to regulate one’s social behaviour in society. It is, therefore, not a biological or fixed phenomenon but rather a socially constructed reality which gives stability and meaning to a person’s conception and expression of selfhood or who she or he is. It also entails the cognitive ability to see oneself from the perspective of others. This is the conceptual framework which informs the contents of this paper. Muslim identity, thus, is the ability to imagine and express oneself as being a Muslim. It is a subject of intense interest in the modern world because one out of every five human beings, or around 1.6 billion people, imagine and identify themselves and are defined by others as Muslims. The extent of interest in the topic can be gauged from the fact that if you Google the words “Muslim identity” you will get over 36 million hits. While in my own research I have not focused on Muslim identity per se, the findings of my research on the sociology of Muslim societies over the past twenty years offer some interesting insights. I begin by locating the topic in various public discourses on Islam and Muslims in the modern world and then share the findings of my research. The first part explores the stereotype of Muslims in Western public discourses, the second part will examine the Muslim intellectual discourses on Islamic consciousness and the last part gives insight from my empirical research on Muslim religiosity and identity. I argue that modern Muslim countries/communities are religiously diverse but they publicly and legally privilege only the Muslim identity

Muslim Identity: One or Many?

20

that is grounded in the hegemonic religious traditions and do not provide adequate opportunities for the expression and growth of Muslim identity/identities grounded in heritage and culture. As a consequence, they contribute to an institutionalisation of hypocrisy through a whole range of laws and oppressive norms and practices. Such practices are creating different categories of citizenship. Such practices are not conducive to the emergence of vibrant, open and fair civil societies.

Islam and Muslims in Contemporary Popular and Scholarly Discourses The size of Muslim populations in the world, the social pervasiveness of Islam in the modern world and the socio-political and religious trajectories of Muslim countries raise important questions which warrant a carefully grounded understanding of Islam as a religion, culture, society and Muslim identity. But unfortunately the “public square” image of Islam and Muslims in the world is anything but that and is based on a casual mixture of ignorance and indifference so brilliantly captured in Edward Said’s seminal book Orientalism. Table 1: Asia: Estimated number and percentage of Muslims, 1990– 2030, in thousands 1990

2010

2030

Asia (total)

673,278

1,005,507

1,295,625

South Asia

317,571 (47%)

507,284 (50%)

683,793 (53%)

Central-West Asia

167,142 (25%)

240,005 (24%)

303,691 (22%)

South-East Asia

188,339 (27%)

257,715 (25%)

307,256 (23%)

In 1990, 0.8 per cent of Asia’s Muslim population lived in the Pacific (Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands). In 2010 the percentage was 1.4 and it will be 2 per cent in 2030. Source: Pew Research Centre 2011.

In popular and scholarly discourses, Muslims, Islam and the Muslim society and culture are often portrayed in tendentious and schematised form, a kind of undifferentiated universe, similar in content and outlook everywhere. This is testified by and reflected in an avalanche of books and articles by social scientists, journalists and other inspired writers with

Riaz Hassan

21

different backgrounds on the subject in recent years, seeking to educate us about “understanding Islam”, jihad, fundamentalism, extremism, liberal Islam, Muslim women, Islamic state, the Qur’an, sharia, Muslim identity etc. to name some of the topics on offer. These contemporary popular and scholarly discourses/works on Islam, Muslim culture and society can be grouped into two main approaches, namely “civilisation” and “Muslim culture, thought and practice”.2 The “civilisation” approach generally refers to “Orientalism” – that is, the world historical, textual, philological European university tradition of Islamic studies based on an underlying contrast between Christendom and the Islamic world. In recent years academics like the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington and Princeton University historian of Islam and the Middle East Bernard Lewis have been its most prominent and well-known exponents. For Huntington, the irreconcilable foundational values of the “West” and the “Islamic world” will inevitably lead to a “clash of civilisations” along “the bloody borders” that divide the Islamic from the Christian worlds.3 Bernard Lewis’s two recent books What Went Wrong: the Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East4 and The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror5 have become the standard account of the “us-and-them”, war-of-the-worlds, believers-and-infidels conceptions of the Muslim mind. Lewis’ argument in summary is that Muslims the world over are caught up in a resentful mourning over the loss of a cultural primacy that was once theirs and now has been lost. They are enraged at the West, infidels, modernity, colonialism and secular nationalism for causing this, as well as at themselves for having allowed this to happen. This rage at Muslim failure has led to the rise of fundamentalism, calls for jihad and terrorism which have become a threat not only to the West but to the whole world. If the fundamentalists are correct in their calculations and succeed in their war, then a dark future awaits the world. The empirical evidence, however, undermines some of the key assumptions of this approach.6 Studies focusing on “Muslim culture, thought and practice” seek to explain the transformation of Islamic identity in response to internal and external forces impacting Muslim societies. Their focus is transformation of Islam to Islamism, from quietist worship to an activist, reformist and increasingly determined struggle to capture political power and use it for spiritual renaissance. The rise of Islamism is attributed to a cultural revolution inspired and directed by the teachings of religious intellectuals against the rise of secular modernising nationalism. Muslim identity in this perspective is seen as rooted in the impulses of Islamic theology.7 It is allegedly associated with revolt against the impulses of modernity. This also is grounded in the ideology of “us” and “them” brilliantly portrayed in

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Muslim Identity: One or Many?

novels like The Reluctant Fundamentalist by Pakistani novelist Mohsin Hamid.8 In this perspective, the implied image of Muslim identity or being Muslim is characterised by fanaticism, anger and resentment. Such an image is patently wrong, misleading and mischievous because it completely ignores the ubiquity of compassion, charity and common humanity in the ordinary rhythms of life in the Muslim world.9

Muslim Intellectual Discourse on Muslim Identity and Consciousness The Islamic variant of this approach has focused on explaining the nature of Islamic consciousness and its implication for the formation of Muslim identity. Among its prominent exponents is Arab-American legal scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl whose work focuses on the rise of interpretive communities that emerge to contextualise meanings of the sacred texts which shape religious consciousness and identity. According to El Fadl, religious consciousness in a Muslim society is shaped by the interaction between that society’s interpretive communities and its dominant theological orientations. Interpretive communities arise among members of social groups to develop explanations of the events that shape their personal lives, collective history and temperament to reinforce and strengthen the moral foundations of the group. This universal social process, essentially a type of intellectual discourse, has a strong influence on all forms of religious consciousness.10 Theological orientations are the dominant forms of religious ideas and practices transmitted through families, communities and institutions and are profoundly influenced by society’s interpretive communities. These are the building blocks of Muslim identity formation. Just as the foundational community of Arabia shaped many of Islam’s fundamental beliefs and practices, the succeeding historical epochs have nurtured and shaped the theological orientations that followed. The conditions of economic underdevelopment, technological backwardness and powerlessness have given rise to three types of Muslim religious consciousness which have been a powerful influence in shaping Muslim identity in the modern world. These are Apologetics, Salafism and Wahhabism. The following section provides a brief overview of their nature and character.

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23

Apologetics A common feature of most Muslim societies is a shared history of colonialism under European dominance. This socio-political experience was accompanied by a culture of Orientalism: an assumption of Western superiority combined with a condescending trivialisation of Islamic cultural achievements. The onslaught of these processes led not only to loss of power by political and religious elites in the lands of Islam, but also to the devaluation and deprecation of Islamic beliefs and institutions. The dominant intellectual response of Muslims to this challenge from around the middle of the eighteenth century came from apologetics. The apologetic approach was an impressive and elegant attempt to offer interpretations and construct meanings about this challenge. Apologetics attempted to defend and salvage Islamic beliefs and traditions by simultaneously emphasising the compatibility between Islam and modernity and adopting pietistic fictions about the supremacy of Islamic traditions. Such fictions eschewed any critical evaluation of Islamic traditions and celebrated the presumed perfection of Islam. A key argument of apologetics was that most meritorious and worthwhile modern institutions were in fact invented by Islam. According to apologetics, Islam liberated women, created democracy, endorsed pluralism, protected human rights and introduced social welfare long before these institutions ever existed in the West. One implication of this was that, since Islam had invented most modern institutions, there was no incentive to engage in any further thinking or analysis, except on very marginal issues. Apologetics embraced the idea of resisting the destructive effects of modernity and Western hegemony, affirming self-worth and attaining a measure of emotional empowerment. The main effect of their efforts, however, was to contribute to a sense of intellectual self-sufficiency which often descended into a moral arrogance similar to that displayed by the orientalists. The apologetics produced an arrogant culture that eschewed self-critical and introspective insight, instead embracing fantasy and projecting blame as a way of instilling self-confidence. The decline and disintegration of traditional institutions of Islamic learning and authority under the yoke of colonialism virtually ensured the irrelevance of true Islamic intellectuals. By undermining the authority and authenticity of Islamic institutions, this disintegration produced an intellectual vacuum. Under these conditions, virtually any Muslim could regard himself or herself as an authoritative spokesperson for Islamic tradition. Using the rhetoric of apologetics, these self-proclaimed experts,

24

Muslim Identity: One or Many?

whose knowledge of Islamic tradition and law was very superficial, sought to position themselves as authorities in Islamic theology and law by proclaiming such vacuities as “the Islamic world is backward and powerless because it is devoid of the practice of true Islam”. Such symbolism, driven by the desire to overcome a pervasive sense of powerlessness in the face of Western political and cultural hegemony, became a means of voicing nationalistic aspirations for political, social and cultural independence. Islam thus came to be seen as a kind of anticolonialist resistance ideology capable of restoring Muslim pride and political power. Political liberation anchored itself in a religious orientation and identity that was puritanical, supremacist and opportunistic.

Wahhabism Wahhabi theology was founded by the eighteenth-century Arabian evangelist Abd al-Wahhab (d.1792) as a response to the Ottoman rule of Arabia. With puritanical zeal, al-Wahhab sought to rid Islam of all “corruptions” and “aberrations”, such as mysticism, intercession, intellectualism, sectarianism and rationalism, in order to restore its pristine purity. He proclaimed that Islamic purity was reclaimable with a literal implementation of Islamic texts and the commands and precedents of the Prophet and through a strict adherence to correct ritual practice. Wahhabism resisted the indeterminacy of the modern age by retreating to a strict literalism in which the sacred texts became the sole source of legitimacy. Any form of moral thought and ideas not completely dependent on these texts was treated as a form of idolatry. Wahhabism viewed rational inquiry with deep suspicion and hostility. It rejected any attempt to interpret Islamic law that would accommodate modern conditions and exigencies and treated classical jurisprudential tradition as a corruption of the true and authentic Islam. Religiously puritanical, it rejected all interpretations of the sacred texts except those of Wahhabism. Many prominent Islamic jurists of the time regarded it as a fanatical ideology. It was resuscitated in the early twentieth century when tribal and religious leader Abd al Aziz ibn Saud adopted Wahhabism, allied himself with the tribes of Najd and succeeded in establishing the modern state of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism might have remained just a local sect if it had not been for the sharp rise in the price of oil in 1972. With this rise, the Saudi Arabian state gained the financial resources to spread Wahhabism throughout the Muslim world – partly as a counter-ideology in response to the challenges created by the socialism and nationalism practised in neighbouring Arab states.

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Salafism Salafism is an intellectual response that developed to fruition under the conditions of post-colonial Muslim societies whose governments failed to deliver the fruits of the “‘national project”; that is, jobs, economic development, welfare for citizens and equality of citizenship. It was the kind of response that said to the ruling elites: “You have failed to deliver the fruits of the national development because you were using secular laws; use the law of God and you will succeed.” Salafism in its original incarnation strived to establish an Islamic state, but unlike Wahhabism, it did not reject pluralistic interpretations of Islamic texts. More recently, however, the terms Wahhabism and Salafism have often been used interchangeably. Salafism maintained that Muslims ought to return to the original textual sources of the Qur’an and sunna of the Prophet and interpret them in the light of modern needs and demands without being slavishly bound by the interpretive precedents of earlier Muslim generations. In this respect, it was a distinctive intellectual project. Salafism advocated a kind of mindset in which anyone was qualified to return to the divine texts and interpret their messages. Unlike Wahhabism, it was not hostile to competing Islamic juristic traditions, Sufism or mysticism. A great impetus for the rise of Salafism came from Muslim intellectuals who were influenced by the tradition of apologetics and who were eager to argue that modern developments such as democracy, constitutionalism and socialism were embedded in the foundational texts of Islam. Salafi intellectuals were more interested in demonstrating that Islam was compatible with modernity than in maintaining the integrity of the juristic tradition and method. Salafi ideology concerned itself with making Islam into a political force that might transform the umma (the universal community of Muslims) and with providing a solid basis for Islamic identity in the Muslim struggle against neo-colonialism and the underdevelopment of Islamic lands. As a result, it became essentially a part of Muslim identity and identity politics. Salafi ideology also failed to confront the challenge posed by nationalism. Unable to muster power (except in Saudi Arabia), Salafism responded by restructuring and redefining itself and, over time, became an unprincipled and diluted moral force. In the post-colonial period, Wahhabism and Salafism gradually began to merge; by the 1970s, they had become practically indistinguishable. Both imagined a golden age of Islam, a historical utopia that they claimed was entirely retrievable and reproducible. Both remained uninterested in critical historical inquiry and

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Muslim Identity: One or Many?

responded to the challenge of modernity by retreating to the secure haven of the sacred texts. They placed such strong emphasis on the selfsufficiency of Islam that their viewpoint bordered on arrogance, and the egalitarianism and anti-elitism they advocated was so extreme that rational enquiry and intellectualism were viewed as corruptions of the purity of Islam. As dominant forms of religious orientations, these three forms of religious consciousness function to counter the destructive effects of colonialism, globalisation, cultural pluralism, nationalism and capitalism on Muslims and Muslim societies. While the three have distinctive features, they share the following characteristics: a supremacist puritanism that compensates for feelings of defeatism, disempowerment and alienation; a belief in the self-sufficiency of Islamic doctrines and a sense of self-righteous arrogance vis-à-vis the “other”; the prevalence of patriarchal, misogynist and exclusionary orientations; the rejection of critical appraisals of Islamic traditions and Muslim discourses; the denial of universal moral values and rejection of the indeterminacy of the modern world; use of Islamic texts as the supreme regulator of social life and society; literalist, anti-rational and anti-interpretive approaches to religious texts. To varying degrees they anchored themselves in the security of Islamic texts. These texts are also exploited by a select class of readers to affirm their reactionary power. In arguing thus, they exaggerate the role of the texts and minimise the role of the human agent who interprets them. In their paradigms, the subjectivities of the interpreting agents are irrelevant to the realisation and implementation of the divine commands contained in the text. They also play a role in Muslim identity formation in the modern world.

Empirical Explorations of Muslim Identity Formation My research on Muslim religiosity offers insights into Muslim identity formation. An important part of this research explored the relationship between self-reported religiosity and an objectively constructed index of religious beliefs in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Iran and Turkey. The data was collected from over six thousand Muslim respondents as part of an Australian Research Council (ARC) funded multi-country survey of Muslim religiosity. The data on self-reported religiosity was generated by asking the respondents the following question: Would you regard yourself as: a very religious person; a somewhat religious person; a not very religious person; not religious at all.

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The religious intensity was ascertained through a scale comprising 20 items on key Muslim beliefs. The objective measure is a composite of the responses to 20 questions that include how people viewed the Qur’an and sharia, how they saw the status and position of women in society, how much importance should be given to sharia as the guiding legal structure, should Islamic punishments be strictly enforced and whether Islamic identity could only be preserved through faithful adherence to traditional Islamic beliefs and duties. These questions are given in Appendix A. The scale items were assigned weights ranging from 1 to 5, with low scores indicating very strong agreement and high scores indicating very strong disagreement. A religious intensity score was computed and a mean value was calculated by dividing the score by 20. This mean constituted the “index of religious intensity” used in the analysis.11 Table 2 gives the distribution of self-reported religiosity for different countries. The modal response in all countries except Kazakhstan was “somewhat religious”. Kazakhstan was a communist country for much of the twentieth century when it was part of the USSR. During this period of its history, the anti-religious policies of the Soviet Union all but eliminated Muslim teachings and restricted the role of the religious institutions. Only after it became an independent country in 1991 was the control over religious teaching and institutions relaxed. It should therefore not be surprising that the modal response in Kazakhstan is “not very religious”. Globally 8 per cent of the respondents described themselves as “very religious” and “not religious at all” respectively. In four countries – Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia and Malaysia – the percentage of “not religious at all” was less than three per cent but surprisingly it was comparatively higher in Iran. The variations in the percentage distribution of respondents in countries like Kazakhstan and Turkey can be ascribed to their secular political systems. The other factor affecting these scores, at least as it applies to the other five countries, may be due to cultural differences in the public description of self-religiosity. In some cultures people shy away from using extreme adjectives in public. One way to explore further the issue of the meanings and contents of various religious labels is to examine the level of an objectively constructed measure of religious intensity associated with each one of them.

Muslim Identity: One or Many?

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Global

Egypt

Indonesia

Iran

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Pakistan

Turkey

Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Self-reported Religiosity, by country

8

13

4

11

5

4

15

7

Somewhat religious person

57

76

70

47

25

57

65

45

Not very religious person

27

9

25

30

48

38

17

23

Not religious at all

8

2

1

13

22

1

3

25

Very religious person

Self-Reported Religiosity and Religious Intensity How does the subjective religious identity compare with the objectively derived measure of religious intensity? Table 3 below gives the values of the index of religious intensity by country and types of self-reported religiosity. The low values of the index indicate stronger religious intensity and the high values indicate weaker levels. The most interesting trend displayed by the data in Table 3 is that in every country respondents who labelled themselves as very religious also had a comparatively higher level of religious intensity. The general trend is that those who say they are very religious possess a more intense religiosity compared with those who say they are somewhat religious or not very religious.12 Another trend worth noting is that the meaning of being very religious appears to be different in Kazakhstan and Turkey from that in the other five countries. In these two countries very religious persons tend to have comparatively

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lower levels of religious intensity. They consider themselves religious but do not subscribe so strongly to the articles of faith.

Global

Egypt

Indonesia

Iran

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Pakistan

Turkey

Table 3: Mean religious intensity index scores for different types of self-reported religiosity, by country (low score = high intensity)

Very religious person

1.67

1.43

1.91

1.96

2.33

1.63

1.39

2.04

Somewhat religious person

1.92

1.65

2.05

2.10

2.49

1.70

1.61

2.51

Not very religious person

2.27

1.92

2.11

2.40

2.80

1.90

1.79

2.86

Not religious at all

3.11 1.69* 2.45*

2.83

3.18 1.76*

2.27

3.59

N.B. * indicates 10 or fewer responses

There is a positive and statistically significant correlation between selfreported religiosity and an objectively derived index of religious intensity. In other words, Muslims who see themselves as very religious also tend to achieve stronger scores on objective measures of religious commitment compared to those who describe themselves as not religious. The strength of the relationship between self-reported religiosity and intensity of religiosity, while statistically significant, is weaker in Malaysia and Indonesia than globally or in other countries. This may be an artefact of the sample size and distribution of different types of selfreported religiosity in these countries, or a result of cultural differences among South East Asian Muslims.

Muslim Identity: One or Many?

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Egypt

Indonesia

Iran

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Pakistan

Turkey

Would you regard yourself as a religious person?

Global

Table 4: Correlation of Intensity of Religious Beliefs by Self-reported Religiosity

.426 **

.233 **

.108 **

.343 **

.336 **

.174 **

.228 **

.602 **

** All correlations are positive and highly significant, p