Multilingualism and Politics: Revisiting Multilingual Citizenship [1st ed.] 9783030407001, 9783030407018

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Multilingualism and Politics Revisiting Multilingual Citizenship

Edited by Katerina Strani

Multilingualism and Politics

Katerina Strani Editor

Multilingualism and Politics Revisiting Multilingual Citizenship

Editor Katerina Strani Department of Languages and Intercultural Studies Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-40700-1    ISBN 978-3-030-40701-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40701-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and ­transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: DrAfter123 / Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank the contributors of this volume for their meticulous work, for their collaboration and patience in this endeavour. There would have been no book without your excellent contributions. I hope we can work together again soon. I would also like to thank Cathy Scott and Alice Green at Palgrave for their useful guidance, for their patience and professionalism. Special thanks to the anonymous reviewers of the book proposal and the manuscript for the fair, constructive and useful feedback. Some of the ideas in this volume were presented at the ESTIDIA conference organized by Cornelia Ilie in 2014, where Jef Verschueren kindly gave me some guidance on how to take these forward. I would like to thank them both for their constructive and encouraging comments. Heartfelt thanks to the Scottish Division of the Chartered Institute of Linguists, the Edinburgh University TESOL and Applied Linguistics Research Group, and the Edinburgh Active Citizenship Group for inviting me to share some ideas on multilingual democracies with their respective audiences. I am also grateful to the following people: All my colleagues in the Department of Languages and Intercultural Studies, both in the Centre for Translation and Interpreting Studies in Scotland and in the Intercultural Research Centre at Heriot-Watt University. It is an honour, a privilege and great fun to be working with you. v

vi Acknowledgements

Máiréad Nic Craith for her comments on earlier drafts of Chap. 2 and for her meticulous feedback on the structure and contents of the volume. Antonella Sorace for her useful insights and encouragement regarding the potential of this collection. Alison Phipps for her feedback, for sharing her expertise and ideas, and also for her incredible kindness. John-Paul Marney for his advice and help with statistical methods. Dan Ridley-Ellis for introducing me to Bright Club and encouraging me to do stand-up comedy on my research. It was one of the most difficult and most rewarding tasks I have ever had to do. Thankfully, I have a day job. Evans Fanoulis for the endless discussions on discourse theory, political science, academic life and the unbearable lightness of being Greek. My husband Rodney, my soul geek, and his devil’s advocate hat for forcing me to reconsider my premises through constant and provoking, but always well-meaning, debate. You have introduced me to the intricacies of cross-cultural argumentation, which will hopefully be the topic of another book. And finally, heartfell thanks and all my love to my father for the endless political discussions, heated arguments and laughter. I am a political animal thanks to you. Στον πατέρα μου, τον πολιτικό. Στη μητέρα μου, την κοινωνική. Στην Άννα-Μαρία, την πολύγλωσση. Katerina Strani

Contents

1 Introduction  1 Katerina Strani 1.1 Rationale of the Book and Research Gap   1 1.2 Themes and Contents of the Book   3 References 11 Part I Multilingualism in Politics  15 2 Multilingualism and Politics Revisited: The State of the Art 17 Katerina Strani 2.1 Language and Politics  17 2.2 Multilingualism  19 2.2.1 Unpacking the Concept  19 2.2.2 The Multilingual Condition  22 2.3 Multilingual Publics  24 2.3.1 Mapping Out Multilingual, Migrant and Minoritised Publics  24 2.3.2 Language and Space  28

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2.4 The Role of Translation  29 2.4.1 Translation and Citizenship Practices  29 2.4.2 Translation as a Political Act  33 2.5 Multilingualism and Politics Revisited  35 References 38

3 Diverting Linguistic Diversity: The Politics of Multilingualism in the European Parliament 47 Martijn Mos 3.1 Introduction  47 3.1.1 Linguistic Diversity and European Democracy 50 3.1.2 Multilingualism Matters: The Language Policy of the European Union  53 3.1.3 An Analysis of Language Politics within the European Parliament  58 3.1.4 An Analytical Summary of Norm Contestation in the European Parliament  66 3.2 Conclusion  68 References 69 4 The Grilling: An Ethnographic Language Policy Analysis of Multilingualism Performed in the European Parliament 77 Péter K. Szabó 4.1 Introduction  77 4.1.1 The EP Floor as a Multilingual Setting of Indexical Differentiation  80 4.1.2 Analysis of an Observed Performance of EU Multilingualism 82 4.1.3 Discussion  96 4.2 Conclusions  98 References 99

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5 Flagging the Homeland: Interpreting Brexit à la Nigel Farage in the European Union105 Morven Beaton-Thome 5.1 Introduction 105 5.1.1 Heteroglossia, Multilingualism and the European Parliament 108 5.1.2 Interpreter Positioning 113 5.1.3 Discourse, Populism and Nigel Farage 115 5.2 Conclusion 124 References 124 6 Multilingualism and the Brexit Referendum129 Roland Kappe 6.1 Introduction 129 6.1.1 Theoretical Background 131 6.2 Hypothesis, Data, and Methods 139 6.3 Data Analysis 142 6.4 Limitations 146 6.5 Conclusion 147 Appendix 149 References 152 7 Multilingual Citizens, Multicultural Citizenship? Somali People’s Experiences of Language, Race and Belonging in Contemporary Scotland157 Emma Hill 7.1 Introduction 157 7.2 Migrant, Multicultural Multilingualisms and Citizenship Discourses in the UK 159 7.2.1 Citizenship and English Language Ability 161 7.2.2 Language Policy in Scotland 162 7.3 Somali-Scots’ Language Experiences in Glasgow 166 7.3.1 Interpreting Services and Linguistic Barriers to Public Space 170

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7.3.2 Burdens of Representation 7.3.3 Racialising Language Acquisition 7.4 Conclusion References

172 174 176 177

8 Managing Multilingual Spaces: Negotiating Linguistic Inequality in Repatriation Programmes181 Katy Brickley 8.1 Introduction 181 8.2 IOM, Refugee Action and the AVR Programmes 184 8.3 Linguistic Repertoires, Multilingualism and Literacies187 8.4 How Caseworkers Negotiate Written AVR Information When Advising Applicants 190 8.4.1 Contesting Institutional Construction of Applicants’ Literacy: Lena, Quinn and Frank 190 8.5 Reflections and Conclusion 197 References 200 Part II The Politics of Multilingualism 205 9 Monolingualism and National Identity: Lessons from Europe207 Simona Guglielmi 9.1 Introduction 207 9.2 From the Formation of the National States to National Identities: Beyond the Civic/Ethnic Dichotomy210 9.3 Empirical Analysis 215 9.4 Conclusion 224 References 225

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10 Galician-Portuguese and the Politics of Language in Contemporary Galicia231 Alejandro Dayán-Fernández and Bernadette O’Rourke 10.1 Introduction 231 10.2 The Politics of Standardisation in Galicia: A Battle of Elites 236 10.2.1 The Galician Case: Contextualisation 236 10.2.2 Standardisation and Minoritised Languages237 10.2.3 A Historical Overview of the Standardisation Process in Galicia 239 10.3 The Interplay between the Politics of Language, Policy, and Language Ideologies for Galician 240 10.3.1 Autonomism 242 10.3.2 Reintegrationism 243 10.3.3 Reintegrationist Activism 245 10.3.4 Negative Effects of Both Standardisation and Lack of Agreement in the Galician Context245 10.3.5 Questioning the Language Policy Undertaken248 10.4 Standardisation Policy Activism at Play: ProPortuguese Law and Linguistic ‘Apartheid’ Claims in Galicia250 10.4.1 Galician and the Lusophone World: Grassroots Activism Influencing Policy 251 10.4.2 Standardisation and Citizenship: Claims of Linguistic ‘Apartheid’ 253 10.5 Concluding Remarks 255 References 255 11 China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Opportunities and Linguistic Challenges for Hong Kong261 Tae-Hee Choi and Bob Adamson 11.1 Introduction 261 11.2 Belt and Road Initiative and Hong Kong 265

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11.2.1 Belt and Road Initiative 11.2.2 Hong Kong’s Engagement with Belt and Road Initiative 11.3 Multilingualism and Belt and Road Initiative 11.3.1 Multilingualism in Hong Kong Prior to Belt and Road Initiative 11.4 Language Acquisition Planning in Response to Belt and Road Initiative 11.4.1 Government Level 11.4.2 Institutional Level 11.5 Challenges and Ways Forward References

265 266 270 271 274 274 277 278 280

12 For Whom the School Bell Tolls: Minority Language Politics in the Croatian Educational System285 Kristian Lewis, Anita Skelin Horvat, and Filip Škiljan 12.1 Introduction 285 12.2 Review of the Croatian Legislation Regarding Minority Language Education 287 12.2.1 The Legislative Framework of Multilingualism in Croatia: Historical Overview288 12.2.2 The Legislative Framework of Multilingualism in Croatia: Current State 293 12.3 Method 298 12.4 In Their Own Words: Members of National Minorities on Education in Minority Languages 299 12.5 Conclusion 305 References 306 13 Multilingualism from a Monolingual Habitus: The View from Scotland309 Argyro Kanaki 13.1 Introduction 309 13.2 Theoretical Underpinnings 310



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13.3 Scotland’s Legislative Obligations Regarding Languages in the Educational System 313 13.4 Efforts to Promote Linguistic Vitality and Language Revitalisation316 13.5 1+2 Scottish Language Policy 319 13.6 Concluding Remarks 325 References 326 14 Linguistic Jacobinism on French Caribbean Soil: Teachers as Public Policy Engineers in Guadeloupe333 Sally K. Stainier 14.1 Introduction 333 14.1.1 From Ideology to Policy: A Nation’s Tongue in the Making 335 14.1.2 A Monolingual Odyssey 338 14.1.3 From Policy to Practice: The Need for Renewed Transdisciplinarity 342 14.1.4 The Case of Guadeloupe 347 14.1.5 Teachers as Glottopolitical Engineers 351 14.2 Conclusion 353 References 355 Index359

Notes on Contributors

Bob  Adamson  is Visiting Professor in Curriculum and Comparative Education at the University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China. He publishes in the fields of English language teaching, teacher education, comparative education, curriculum studies and higher education. His recent research focuses on multilingual education for ethnic minorities in China. In 2013, he was awarded the title of “Kunlun Expert” by the Qinghai Provincial Government in the People’s Republic of China in recognition of his 30 years’ work in Chinese education. Morven  Beaton-Thome is Professor of the Theory and Practice of Interpreting at the Institute of Translation and Multilingual Communication at TH Köln–University of Applied Sciences, Cologne, Germany. Her research focuses on interpreter agency and ideological positioning in institutional settings, and the impact of interpreters as gatekeepers of multilingual discourse. Katy Brickley  is a research associate and ESRC Wales DTP Fellow at the School of English, Communication and Philosophy at Cardiff University. Her 2015 PhD thesis focused on Communicating Assisted Voluntary Return programmes in the UK: examining tensions in discursive practice at the Centre for Language and Communication Research, Cardiff University. She is interested in language, accessibility and migraxv

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tion and is investigating the use of accessible formats in service encounters with disabled asylum seekers and refugees. Tae-Hee  Choi is Assistant Professor at the Education University of Hong Kong and a fellow of the UK Higher Education Academy. She has published in the areas of policy and reform processes, language-in-­ education policies and teacher development. Her research focuses on neoliberal policy agendas and their implications for quality and equity of public schooling. She has also participated in policy development and advisory, teacher education and English language teaching in diverse contexts, and has published over 30 English language learning and teaching resources. Further details of her research are available at https://www. researchgate.net/profile/Tae_Hee_Choi Alejandro Dayán-Fernández  is a doctoral researcher in Sociolinguistics at the University of Glasgow after several years working in Linguistic Project Management for international organizations. His PhD research explores the sociolinguistic, cultural and identity dynamics of the Galician diaspora in London. He is also co-investigator for the Galician project at the interdisciplinary research programme on Sustaining Minoritized Languages in Europe funded by the Smithsonian Center for Folklife and Cultural Heritage. Simona Guglielmi  holds a PhD in Sociology and an MA in Statistics. She is a researcher at the Department of Political and Social Sciences of University of Studies of Milan. She is a member of Italian team of European Social Survey (round 8 and 9). Her main research interests lie in the relationship between collective identity, culture and political system. Her most recent publications focus on conceptualizing and measuring national and European identity and relationship with attitudes towards multiculturalism. She has expertise in the collection and management of survey data. Methodological interests include comparative studies and cross-national equivalence. Emma  Hill is a research fellow in Sociology at the University of Edinburgh. She holds a PhD from Heriot-Watt University and her thesis, entitled “Somali Voices in Scotland: Who Speaks? Who Listens?”, has won the MacFarlane Prize for outstanding contribution to research. She

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is part of the JPI Urban-funded Governance and Local Integration of Migrants and Europe’s Refugees Project and is an associate editor for Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power journal. Anita  Skelin  Horvat  studied general linguistics and phonetics at the University of Zagreb. In 2009, she completed a PhD on language and identity of the Croatian teenagers. She has been working at the Institute of Linguistics at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb since 2003 and is now a professor. She teaches sociolinguistics, contact linguistics and linguistic anthropology at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb. Her recent interest is in researching language and identity of minority groups, and she has completed a project on language identity of Croatian migrant communities in Argentina. Argyro  Kanaki is Lecturer in Education and Social Work at the University of Dundee. She is an experienced language teacher, and she researches the field of language awareness. Competent in five modern European languages, and qualified as a teacher in four of them, her teaching focuses on the pedagogy of modern foreign languages, issues around culture and debates in international education. Kanaki researches pupil metalinguistic awareness and its relations with language policy and language practices. Roland Kappe  is Lecturer in Political Economy in the Department of Political Science at University College London. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Stony Brook University and works on comparative political economy, public opinion and elections. Kristian Lewis  studied Croatian and Russian language and literature at the University of Zagreb. His research interests include Croatian language in education. During his work at the Institute of Croatian Language and Linguistics (2001–present), he has focused on adapting dictionaries and orthography manuals for primary school pupils. He received the City of Zagreb Award in 2013 for outstanding theoretically founded achievement in the popularization of science in education. In 2017, he received the Croatian National Award “Ivan Filipović” for raising awareness of language culture in primary education, awarded by the Croatian Parliament and Ministry of Science and Education.

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Martijn  Mos  is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Institute of Political Science, Leiden University. His PhD research focused on the contestation of national and sexual minority rights in the European Union (EU). For this project, he conducted extensive fieldwork in Brussels and two recent member states (Lithuania and Slovakia) between January 2016 and April 2017. Since then he has published on sexual minority rights and the politics of homophobia, and he is working on a book project on the behaviour of political actors concerning two of the EU’s core principles as they apply to national and sexual minorities: (1) non-discrimination and (2) respect for minorities. This research was funded by the Luigi Einaudi Fellowship of the Cornell Institute for European Studies, a visiting fellowship from the WZB/Berlin Social Science Center, the Haas Fund Fellowship of the European Union Studies Association and Cornell’s Department of Government. Bernadette  O’Rourke is Professor of Sociolinguistics and Hispanic Studies in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures at the University of Glasgow. Her research focuses on the dynamics of multilingual societies, language policy and minority language communities. She is co-editor of The Palgrave Handbook of Minority Languages and Communities (2019) and was Chair of the EU COST Action IS1306 “New Speakers in a Multilingual Europe: Opportunities and Challenges” between 2013 and 2017. She holds a fellowship at the Smithsonian Center for Folklife and Cultural Heritage and is exploring grassroots revitalization efforts in Galicia as part of its interdisciplinary research programme on Sustaining Minoritized Languages in Europe. Filip Škiljan  studied history and archaeology at the University of Zagreb. He worked at the Jasenovac Memorial Site as a curator, and since 2008, he was part-time lecturer in Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb. From 2006 to 2010, Škiljan worked as head of the Archives of Serbs in Croatia in the Serbian National Council. His (2009) PhD thesis was on Croatian Zagorje in World War II. Since 2010, he has been working at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies as a research associate. His main research focus is on World War II and national minorities in Croatia. Sally K. Stainier  is a Political Science PhD candidate at the University of the French West Indies, working on language policy as public policy in the context of Guadeloupe’s school system. An active teacher, translator

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and conference interpreter, her academic research is continuously stirred by a practical experience of local politics as well as first-hand observation of language choice/power struggle in the regional, transnational public sphere. Katerina Strani  is Associate Professor and Head of Cultural Studies at the Department of Languages and Intercultural Studies, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh. Katerina has a background in languages and politics, having previously taught translation and interpreting for 10 years, and worked as a freelance translator, interpreter and later as a researcher for the shadow interior minister in Greece. She has published papers on intercultural dialogue, racist discourse, discourses of Europeanness and hate speech. She has also led EU-funded projects on racism and discrimination, intercultural training for educators, language and culture apps for newly arrived migrants and refugees, and a language and culture app for indigenous languages. Péter K. Szabó  is a PhD candidate at Tilburg University, the Netherlands, completing his thesis, a comprehensive ethnographic language policy analysis of the discursive and social practice of EU multilingualism in the European Parliament. He has worked at the European Parliament as a conference interpreter since 2004 and as a lecturer of interpreting at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics. He holds a Master’s degree in Comparative Literature, Conference Interpreting, and Communication and Information Sciences.

List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2

Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4 Fig. 10.1 Fig. 10.2 Fig. 10.3 Fig. 12.1

Fig. 12.2

Percentage of people aged 25–64 who speak no foreign language at all Lack of language skills and Euroscepticism. Notes: Percentage of respondents who agree “[Country] could better face the future outside the EU” from Eurobarometer 86 (European Commission 2017). Percentage of adults aged 25–64 reporting they know no languages beyond their mother tongue. Data based on the 2016 Adult Education Survey (Eurostat 2016) Difference in referendum vote by language skills Balance plot showing common support Picture taken during a fieldwork trip to Santiago de Compostela, April 2019 Banner at the ‘social centre’, A Gentalha do Pichel— Fieldwork Trip—April 2019 Picture taken during a fieldwork trip to observe the Galician national celebrations in July 2018. Pamphlet by the sovereignty movement National minority schools in Mainland Croatia 1945–1946. (This map, as well as the following one, was made exclusively for this chapter by Joža Horvat, PhD, Institute of Croatian Language and Linguistics) National minority schools in Mainland Croatia 2017–2018 (Model A)

130

136 144 152 234 235 250

290 293 xxi

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 6.1

Parliamentary resolutions on linguistic diversity Percentage of foreign language speakers and Remain voters by gender, education level, and ethnic and parental background in the BES dataset Table 6.2 Matching estimates of the effect of speaking a second language on the referendum vote choice Table 6.3 Variables and operationalisation Table 6.4 Summary statistics and correlation with multilingualism and remain vote for age and personality factors Table 6.5 Covariate balance pre- and post-matching Table 8.1 “… a lot of a lot of my applicants have low literacy or and sometimes no literacy in their own language …” Table 8.2 “… obviously not everybody … reads …” Table 8.3 “… don’t forget our guys are illiterate” Table 9.1 Some people say that the following things are important in order to be truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is … (% of answers “very” important) Table 9.2 Multiple regression analysis for estimating the effect of “language as national marker” on support for multiculturalism (rating from 1 to 10) Table 10.1 Iconic differences of Galician orthographic strands Table 11.1 List of websites accessed

58 141 145 149 150 150 191 193 195

217 223 244 264 xxiii

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Table 11.2 BRI languages of the minorities in Hong Kong examined and taught at different levels of education Table 12.1 Primary schools in national minority languages in late socialism. (The data were taken from: Učenici osnovnih i srednjih škola po narodnosti, nastavnom jeziku, socijalnom poreklu i starosti: rezultati popisa škola na kraju 1951/1952. školske godine [Primary and Secondary Schoolchildren by Nationality, Medium of Instruction, Social Origin and Age: Results of School Census at the End of the School Year 1951/1952], Belgrade 1953; Adresar osnovnih škola, srednjih škola, viših i visokih škola [Address Book of Primary and Secondary Schools, Colleges and Higher Education Institutions], Zagreb 1963; Statistički godišnjak SR Hrvatske 1975. [1975 Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Croatia], Zagreb 1975; Statistički godišnjak Republike Hrvatske 1991. [1991 Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Croatia], Zagreb 1991)

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1 Introduction Katerina Strani

Politics is the art, and language the medium. John E. Joseph

1.1 Rationale of the Book and Research Gap Multilingualism has always existed in society and politics at all levels— from the Ancient World, the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, to nineteenth-­century France, to today’s Belgium, Switzerland, Canada and South Africa. In contemporary societies, it includes new modalities and communication spaces. The link between multiple (and sometimes competing) languages in political argumentation and the ensuing questions of access, language status, language choice, translation and interpreting in political deliberation are central in the identity and construction of

K. Strani (*) Department of Languages and Intercultural Studies, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 K. Strani (ed.), Multilingualism and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40701-8_1

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contemporary publics. Multilingualism also constitutes an integral part of post-national citizenship, in which political argumentation may defy linguistic barriers. Today’s “new” nomadic citizens are characterised as polyglots travelling in between languages, in a permanent stage of (self-) translation (Meylaerts 2013, p. 540). In this way, multilingualism affects both the social construction of cosmopolitan civic identities and the actual conduct of democratic politics, with new concepts of citizenship and new forms of deliberation. Linguists and political researchers have pointed out the tension between the multilingual reality and a monolingualist ideology in the way contemporary democracies function (Doerr 2012, 2018; Pym 2013; Piller 2012 and others). “Emergent publics” (Angus 2001; Koller and Wodak 2008), “counter-publics” (Fraser 1993, 1995) and diasporic public spheres are no longer defined solely by their agonistic nature but also by the way this is expressed through their (choice of ) language. Multiple languages representing multiple cultures signify multiple competing rationalities in essentially agonistic public spheres. Power differentials in these multilingual—physical and virtual—public spheres are not rooted in status, education or access, for instance, but instead on the language chosen for communication. In cases where a lingua franca is used, the power differentials are clearer between competent and non-competent speakers of that language. In diasporic public spheres, power differentials may also derive from different stages of integration. Against this backdrop, this volume aims to make a contribution to the relatively underexplored area of the interplay between multilingualism and politics, in the context of contemporary socio-political developments. It focuses on multilingualism as a key element of the social construction of contemporary public spheres. The 14 chapters of this edited collection study multilingualism both as a concept and as a phenomenon through the interdisciplinary lenses of languages and politics and, more specifically, the combination of politics, sociology, sociolinguistics, language policy, translation and interpreting studies. With this in mind, the volume is divided into two main sections: (a) “Multilingualism in Politics”, which draws on politics, sociology, interpreting studies and discourse studies and focuses on European Union (EU) institutions and the UK; and (b) “The Politics of Multilingualism”, which draws on

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sociolinguistics, language policy, education and minority languages, and includes case studies from the rest of the world.

1.2 Themes and Contents of the Book The first section, on Multilingualism in Politics, revisits the topic of multilingual publics and political translation. It uses case studies from multilingual debates in the European Parliament (EP) to show the effects of linguistic diversity on deliberation, and examines how multilingualism and European identity affected the Brexit campaign. It also looks at migrant publics and specifically Somali people’s experiences in terms of language and belonging in Scotland, and at communicative practices in Assisted Voluntary Returns (AVR) encounters. Strani critically revisits the nexus between multilingualism and politics in academic scholarship and in contemporary societies in Chap. 2. She starts with a good overview of the literature on multilingualism in/and politics, focusing on multilingual publics, including migrant, diasporic and minoritised publics, translation and citizenship practices, and translation and activism. In defining multilingualism, she moves beyond the distinction between its individual and social variants, beyond any references to language competency and beyond “reified conceptions of language” (Strani, this volume). Following Blommaert, Leppänen, and Spotti’s (2012) conception of multilingualism as not something that people have or can acquire but as a social practice, Strani argues that multilingualism can be a source of legitimation and emancipation. She also urges us to rethink our definition of language and its role in conferring legitimacy to its speakers, in constructing publics, in making political statements, declaring alliances and practising citizenship. A broader, dynamic and porous definition of language as something that changes and is influenced by its socio-political and linguistic environment leads to a definition of multilingualism that includes “broken languages” (Buden et al. 2011 on heterolinguality), urban languages (metrolingualism) and other sociolinguistic variants. This chapter then looks at multilingual publics in the contemporary context of the multilingual condition (Kramsch 2009), considering the

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work of Doerr (2018) on Political Translation and its emancipatory role in contemporary democratic processes, Baker (2016), Carcelén-Estrada (2018) and others on translation and activism, and Meylaerts (2018) on the politics of translation in multilingual states. The work of political scientist Patrizia Nanz (2007) on the role of language in the construction of a European public sphere is also examined. Strani emphasises the role of translation as a political act in bridging inequalities (cf. Doerr 2018) and being a citizen. She concludes by urging scholars and practitioners to join existing efforts in decolonising multilingualism (Phipps 2019 and others) and broaden research beyond the European or Western focus, and beyond spoken languages. The following three chapters focus on multilingualism in the European Parliament. Mos looks at the politics of multilingualism in the European Parliament and scrutinises the European Union’s claim of linguistic diversity—enshrined in its motto “united in diversity”. In his study, Mos builds on recent advances within the critical-constructivist school of International Relations to argue that this results in norm contestation over the meaning and scope of linguistic diversity as a value. Such semantic vagueness, Mos argues, creates an opportunity for minority rights activists to push for greater recognition and protection of minority languages by the EU. These actors interpret linguistic diversity in a broad manner to incorporate minority languages (which include signed languages). However, the ambiguous meaning of linguistic diversity similarly empowers their opponents, Mos argues. Nationalist or statist actors offer a narrower interpretation, arguing that linguistic diversity covers only the official languages of the 28 member states. Both sides claim to uphold the value of linguistic diversity, but they seem to contest its true meaning. Starting with the importance of language for the construction of identity and of linguistic diversity in a supranational institution such as the EU, Mos analyses the following data in attempting to show how political representatives in Brussels try to use the ambiguity of linguistic diversity to their advantage: (1) debates on relevant resolutions of the European Parliament, especially the 2013 Resolution on Endangered Languages and Linguistic Diversity; (2) the activities of the European Parliament Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and

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Languages; and (3) interactions between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and civil society organisations such as the European Language Equality Network, the Network to Promote Linguistic Diversity and the Federal Union of European Nationalities. Mos’s analysis of his fieldwork and collected data shows that everyone appears to be a champion of linguistic diversity inside the European Parliament. However, the study shows that whereas minority rights activists use this value in order to motivate Brussels to act where their national governments will not, their opponents instead interpret in a way that helps them maintain the domestic status quo. Szabó also looks at multilingualism in the European Parliament in Chap. 4, but focuses on a specific (heated) economic policy debate in 2013 and 2014. He offers a thick description and a sociolinguistic analysis of an interpreted hearing in the Committee of Economic and Monetary Affairs in 2013, focusing on the interventions and interactions of the then Dutch Minister of Finance and President of the Eurogroup Jeroen Dijsselbloem with the Chair of the Committee Sharon Bowles and other Committee members. Szabó provides an emic perspective, since he worked as a simultaneous interpreter during that session. The analysis presents orders of indexical meanings elicited by the observed performances in the multilingual speech event. The results are interesting. Szabó finds that, despite claims to the contrary, argumentative deliberations in this European Parliament setting are reminiscent of the “ethnolinguistic assumption” (Blommaert) and reflect ideologies of “hegemonic multilingualism” (Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2011). Continuing with the theme of multilingual political debates, Beaton-­ Thome looks at interpreted European Parliament debates on Brexit in Chap. 5, but through a different methodological lens from Szabó’s study. Beaton-Thome uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) tools, looking particularly at the interpretation of particular key terms, in- and out-­ group positioning, and key historical and emotive images and references evoked in debates, particularly as they relate to immigration and nationalism. Building on previous work on interpreter positioning in the EP (Beaton-Thome 2013), the chapter illustrates that multilingual and interpreting policy functions centripetally as a gatekeeper (Wodak 2007, p. 82) to democratic debate in the institution. Data analysis concentrates

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on the English and German versions of European Parliament debates on Brexit, both pre- and post-referendum, with particular focus on the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and Nigel Farage. The data comprise original interventions and their respective interpretations, the monolingual English and German versions (both original and interpreted utterances), as well as the respective press coverage in English and German. Using Billig’s (1995) notion of flagging the homeland and homeland deixis, Beaton-Thome’s study emphasises how UKIP interventions in English are actually directed at the UK audience “back home” instead of the MEPs in the room. It also thematises the hegemonic role of English in its broader discussion on the relationship between language, power and identity, and shifting hegemonic alliances in the European context. In a similar theme but different context, Kappe looks at multilingualism, European identity and Brexit in Chap. 6. His study examines whether the lack of foreign language skills in the UK contributed to the outcome of the Brexit referendum. Kappe starts from the premise that the literature on European identity and Euroscepticism suggests that foreign language skills and multilingualism form a component of transnationalism or cosmopolitanism (Mau et al. 2008), which in turn contributes to an individual’s sense of a European identity and support for the European Union (Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2015). More generally, however, speaking a “foreign” language may also directly affect cultural identification and has been shown to reduce perceptions of cultural distance between one’s native culture and speakers of the other language (Benet-­ Martínez and Haritatos 2005; Díez Medrano 2018). Based on these two theoretical perspectives, Kappe hypothesises that multilingual individuals can be expected to show a higher level of European identity and are more likely to have voted to remain in the European Union. He tests this hypothesis using data from the referendum wave of the British Election Study (Fieldhouse et  al. 2017) and propensity score matching to take into account factors such as education, age, income and political ideology, and estimate the effect of foreign language skills on the Brexit decision and European identity more generally. Kappe’s study contributes to the literature on European identity, Euroscepticism and the causes of Brexit. While a variety of demographic, personality and attitudinal factors have been linked to the Brexit decision (Clarke et  al. 2017),

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multilingualism (or monolingualism) has so far not been discussed as a contributing factor. The final two chapters of this section focus on the theme of migrant publics. Hill’s study focuses on civic citizenship as multilingual citizenship in Scotland. Using a case study on Somali people’s experiences of the limits of languages and belonging in Scotland, Hill argues in Chap. 7 that, despite public commitments to plural (multilingual and multicultural) citizenship in Scotland, experiences of new multilingual populations suggest otherwise. Based on two years’ ethnographic fieldwork with Somali people in Glasgow, Hill analyses Somali people’s experiences of multilingualism in public life. She considers the extent to which racialised, anti-migrant and anti-Muslim discourses intersect with issues of language and linguistic ability and analyses the extent to which this crystallises in Somali people’s experiences of (not) belonging in Scotland. Finally, she offers an analysis and critique of the gap between elite narratives of plural, multilingual citizenship and the reality of Somali people’s everyday experiences in Scotland. Brickley’s study examines multilingual practices in Assisted Voluntary Returns (AVR) encounters in Chap. 8. Brickley explains that AVR programmes in the UK offer a repatriation service for asylum seekers to return to their countries of origin. These programmes are funded by the British government and the EU and include a resettlement package. Brickley highlights that AVR in the UK is controversial and has attracted criticism as to the extent to which it can be described as “voluntary”. With this in mind, she argues that AVR is ideologically charged and occupies what McGhee and Bennett (2014) describe as a “contested space”, with varying ideas over what is actually taking place in this bureaucratic process. Brickley then combines a review of “top-down” institutional approaches to linguistic diversity, with semi-structured ethnographic interviews with staff from the two different organisations that had previously been contracted to provide the AVR service in the UK. She examines how caseworkers from these two organisations orient to their clients’ superdiversity (Vertovec 2007). She explores how the caseworkers devise unofficial multilingual and multimodal strategies to enable clients to access AVR information and prepare for return. Finally, Brickley argues that this institutional awareness about clients’ linguistic repertoires must

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be more comprehensive and consistent if clients are able to make a “voluntary” return based on an informed decision. The second part of the book, on the Politics of Multilingualism, examines national languages, minority languages and education as a political tool. Specifically, it looks at the politics behind the standardisation of Galician, minority languages politics in the Croatian and Scottish educational systems, challenges and opportunities in China’s One Belt One Road initiative for minority language users in Hong Kong, and the role of teachers as public policy actors in Guadeloupe. Guglielmi discusses monolingualism and national identity in Europe in Chap. 9. She conducted a comparative study between France, Germany, Spain and Switzerland with data from “National Identity III”—International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2013 and 2003. Through her study, she investigates the structure of meanings of national identity, with particular references to the role of language, among other markers. She also asks to what extent different meanings of national identity influence attitudes towards multiculturalism and immigration. The results are noteworthy. Unsurprisingly, Guglielmi has found that language is central in the perception of national identity, however, more importantly, “the perception of language as a national boundary […] influences attitudes towards migrant integration and cultural diversity” (Guglielmi, this volume). She concludes by highlighting that, evidently, national narratives still matter on intergroup relations. In continuing with the language and national identity nexus, the rest of the book focuses on minority languages. In Chap. 10, Dayan-­Fernandez and O’Rourke focus on Galician-Portuguese and the Politics of Language in Contemporary Galicia. They investigate the tensions around the legitimisation and contestation of the institutionalised standard variety for Galician and examine governmental language policies through the lens of standardisation activism. This refers to the tension between integrationist and isolationist views of the Galician language, which see it either as part of the Lusophone world or as a separate, independent language respectively. The chapter looks at how the politics of language operates by focusing on continuing orthographic conflicts and their connection to language revitalisation efforts in contemporary Galicia. Based on ethnographic work in Galicia, the authors examine two recent events in which

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the reintegrationist movement has come into the public sphere with an unconventional narrative to influence both the institutional and public discourses’ status quo. In doing this, the authors show how “grassroots activism is a driving force in altering language perceptions and attitudes and as such deserves more attention” (Dayan-­Fernandez and O’Rourke, this volume). In Chap. 11, Choi and Adamson investigate the challenges and opportunities for minority language users in Hong Kong in the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Choi and Adamson’s study explores the possibilities that this initiative offers to Hong Kong as one of China’s Special Administrative Regions and to its linguistic minorities in particular. The authors critically review the current state of support for minority language users in Hong Kong. They find that, despite Hong Kong government’s emphasis on multilingualism, the commitment has mainly focused on Chinese and English, apparently overlooking the potential contribution of language minority groups. The authors conclude by proposing a policy agenda “to address issues of language rights, transformative education, and enhanced life chances” (Choi and Adamson, this volume). The final three chapters focus on minority languages and education. Lewis, Horvat and Škiljan examine minority language politics in the Croatian educational system. They offer a brief historical review of multilingual legislation in Croatia and present their qualitative study on the level of satisfaction of students and teachers of minority languages, based on interviews and focus groups. Previous case studies (Škiljan 2017; Škiljan and Babić 2014) show that the main negative aspect, as seen by national minority students, is the feeling of segregation and ghettoisation. Lewis, Horvat and Škiljan’s study confirms this, as well as challenges such as teaching Roma students, lack of qualified teachers and using the unofficial textbooks that have not been approved by the Ministry of Education. Positive aspects of minority education are the possibility to continue the education in the country of origin of national minority language, to obtain the information regarding the country of origin of their ancestors, to learn and to know another language, and to preserve national minority identity. The authors conclude that minority languages in the educational system is an exclusively political matter and give

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recommendations for further strengthening the capacities for minority language teaching and learning at all educational levels. Continuing with the education theme, Kanaki offers a critical study of multilingualism in Scottish schools in Chap. 13. She presents a case study on multilingualism from a monolingual habitus in Scotland in attempting to dispel the myth of a monolingual country. Kanaki’s study explores Scotland’s legislative obligations and the place of language in relation to the UK’s legislative context. She then focuses on the Scottish language  landscape as it is articulated in contemporary Scotland through two mechanisms: (1) efforts to promote linguistic vitality and language revitalisation with the development of new curricula and pedagogies, and (2) the working of governing mechanisms and policy instruments, especially the 1 + 2 Language Strategy. Kanaki explains that each of these mechanisms presents ways in which “efforts for multilingualism end up promoting it as the default position for both individual speakers and the state”. However, monolingual practices and ideologies are strengthened through what Kanaki considers superficial policies on academic competence, skills and competitiveness, as well as displayed, illustrated and rehearsed through socio-political means, inside and outside education. The chapter concludes that efforts to “overcome” monolingualism encounter the social proliferation of conservative ideological reinforcement and recuperation practices in the Scottish language ecology. Finally, Stainier’s chapter looks at linguistic Jacobinism in Guadeloupe and considers teachers as public policy actors. Stainier provides a useful account of linguistic Jacobinism in Guadeloupe and “state glottopolitics” (Adrey 2009). Approaching language planning through the lens of public policy analysis, Stainier’s study sheds light on teachers as mediators—that is, prime translators and contributors—of the government agenda. The chapter is based on a six-month study in Guadeloupe consisting of 12 semi-structured interviews and preceded by a year of participant observation. This aimed to unearth discursive expressions of sociolinguistic as well as professional representations, caught between State affiliation and practical considerations. Stainier concludes that there is a “rather peculiar civil servant’s relation to the surrounding language ecology”, which may alternately act as a “catalyst, revealer and neutraliser” of state glottopolitics.

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These varied and multifaceted approaches attest to the need, and indeed urgency, to continue to explore the ways in which multilingualism and politics/policy/polity interrelate in different contexts and countries. In this respect, the book is missing the crucial perspective of D/deaf studies,1 in studying, for example, D/deaf publics, sign language users in politics, in activism, in translation, the use of a lingua franca in signed languages and so on. Strani’s chapter on revisiting multilingualism and politics includes a consideration of the scholarship on D/deaf publics and on modalities of signed languages in urban and other spaces. It also includes signed languages in the category of minoritised languages in the relevant sections of that chapter. The original intention was to include a case study on D/deaf sign language users in public spaces as a chapter in this volume, but this was not possible in the end. I acknowledge this weakness in the book and hope to be able to include such studies in a future volume.

References Adrey, J.  B. (2009). Language, Nation and State in French Linguistic Nationalism: History, Developments and Perspectives. In Discourse and Struggle in Minority Language Policy Formation. Palgrave Studies in Minority Languages and Communities. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Angus, I.  H. (2001). Emergent Publics: An Essay on Social Movements and Democracy. Pennsylvania: Arbeiter Ring Pub. Baker, M. (2016). Translating Dissent. Voices from and with the Egyptian Revolution. London: Routledge. Beaton-Thome, M. (2013). What’s in a Word? Your Enemy Combatant Is My Refugee. The Role of Simultaneous Interpreters in Negotiating the Lexis of Guantánamo in the European Parliament. Journal of Language and Politics, 12(3), 378–399.

 Napier succinctly explains the D/deaf convention, originally established by Woodward in 1972: “‘Deaf ’ people are those who identify themselves as members of the Deaf community and regard themselves as culturally Deaf, whereas ‘deaf ’ people are those who do not sign and regard themselves as having a hearing impairment” (Napier 2002, p. 141). The term D/deaf is meant to include both categories and not make a distinction between culturally Deaf and hard of hearing people. 1

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Benet-Martínez, V., & Haritatos, J. (2005). Bicultural Identity Integration (BII): Components and Psychosocial Antecedents. Journal of Personality, 73(4), 1015–1050. Billig, M. (1995). Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Blommaert, J., Leppänen, S., & Spotti, M. (2012). Endangering Multilingualism. In J.  Blommaert, S.  Leppänen, P.  Pahta, & T.  Räisänen (Eds.), Dangerous Multilingualism (pp. 1–21). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Buden, B., Mennel, B., & Nowotny, S. (2011). Europe as a Translational Space. The Politics of Heterolinguality (eipcp). http://www.leslaboratoires.org/en/ article/europe-translational-space-politics-hetero-linguality-article. Carcelén-Estrada, A. (2018). Translation and Activism. In J.  Evans & F.  Fernandez (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics (pp. 254–269). London: Routledge. Clarke, H. D., Goodwin, M., & Whiteley, P. (2017). Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Díez Medrano, J. (2018). Multilingualism and European Identification. Sociological Inquiry, 88(3), 410–434. Doerr, N. (2012). Translating Democracy: How Activists in the European Social Forum practice Multilingual Deliberation. European Political Science Review, 4(3), 361–384. Doerr, N. (2018). Political Translation: How Social Movement Democracies Survive. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., Evans, G., Schmitt, H., van der Eijk, C., Mellon, J., & Prosser, C. (2017). British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 8. https://doi. org/10.15127/1.293723. Fligstein, N. (2008). Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fraser, N. (1993). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. In C.  Calhoun (Ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (pp. 109–142). London: MIT Press. Fraser, N. (1995). What’s Critical about Critical Theory? In J. Meehan (Ed.), Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse (pp.  21–56). London: Routledge. Koller, V., & Wodak, R. (2008). Introduction: Shifting Boundaries and Emergent Public Spheres. In R.  Wodak & V.  Koller (Eds.), Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere (pp. 1–21). Berlin: De Gruyter. Kramsch, C. (2009). The Multilingual Subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Krzyżanowski, M., & Wodak, R. (2011). Political Strategies and Language Policies: The European Union Lisbon Strategy and Its Implications for the EU’s Language and Multilingualism Policy. Language Policy, 10(2), 115–136. Kuhn, T. (2015). Experiencing European Integration: Transnational Lives and European Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mau, S., Mewes, J., & Zimmermann, A. (2008). Cosmopolitan Attitudes Through Transnational Social Practices? Global Networks, 8(1), 1–24. McGhee, D., & Bennett, C. (2014). What Is the Role of NGOs in the Assisted Voluntary Returns of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants? Source. http:// www.cpc.ac.uk/projects/36/Tried_and_Trusted_The_role_of_NGOs_in_ Asylum_Seekers_and_Irregular_Migrant_Voluntary_Returns#Publications_ Activities. Meylaerts, R. (2013). Multilingualism as a Challenge for Translation Studies. In C. Millán & F. Bartrina (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation Studies (pp. 537–551). London: Routledge. Meylaerts, R. (2018). The Politics of Translation in Multilingual States. In J. Evans & F. Fernandez (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics (pp. 221–237). London: Routledge. Nanz, P. (2007). Multiple Voices. An Interdiscursive Concept of the European Public Sphere. In J. E. Fossum, P. Schlesinger, & G. O. Kværk (Eds.), Public Sphere and Civil Society? Transformations of the European Union (pp. 11–28). Oslo: ARENA. Napier, J. (2002). The D/deaf—H/hearing Debate. Sign Language Studies, 2(2), 141–149. Phipps, A. (2019). Decolonising Multilingualism: Struggles to Decreate. Bristol: Multilingual Matters. Piller, I. (2012). Multilingualism and Social Exclusion. In M.  Martin-Jones, A. Blackledge, & A. Creese (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Multilingualism (pp. 281–296). London: Routledge. Pym, A. (2013). Translation as an Instrument for Multilingual Democracy. Critical Multilingualism Studies, 1(2), 78–95. Škiljan, F. (2017). Mađari u Zagrebu [The Hungarians in Zagreb]. Zagreb: Vijeće mađarske nacionalne manjine Grada Zagreba. Škiljan, F., & Babić, D. (2014). Romi u Podravini i Međimurju i uključenost u hrvatsko društvo: od predrasuda i stigmatizacije do socijalne distance i diskriminacije [The Roma in Podravina and Međimurje and the inclusion in the Croatian society: from prejudices and stigmatization to social distance and discrimination]. Podravina, 13(25), 141–159.

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Vertovec, S. (2007). Super-diversity and Its Implications. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(6), 1024–1054. Wodak, R. (2007). ‘Doing Europe’: The Discursive Construction of European Identities. In R. C. Mole (Ed.), Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics (pp. 70–94). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Part I Multilingualism in Politics

2 Multilingualism and Politics Revisited: The State of the Art Katerina Strani

2.1 Language and Politics The link between language and politics has been studied extensively since ancient times.1 In her study of the importance of translation in deliberative practices, political scientist Patrizia Nanz gives a critical overview of language philosophy from Humboldt to Habermas to Putnam and Bakhtin, with an emphasis on Bakhtin’s heteroglossia (Nanz 2006). Sub-­ disciplines such as Political Linguistics (Blommaert), Political Discourse Analysis (Van Dijk) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, Van Dijk, Wodak) have existed since the 1990s, and indeed there has never been a lack of interest or scholarship in the language of politics from  For a thorough account of such studies, from Socrates and Plato to contemporary scholars, see Xenos (1988). 1

K. Strani (*) Department of Languages and Intercultural Studies, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 K. Strani (ed.), Multilingualism and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40701-8_2

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language-related disciplines. However, the centrality of language in political processes such as deliberation, public sphere communication, public opinion formation and democratic participation in general, has not been as widely recognised and researched by political scientists. Political scientists tend to focus on the centrifugal forces of language, not in the original Bakhtinian sense, but in arguing that multilingualism constitutes an obstacle to the construction of a demos instead of a fundamental element of demoi (Bärenreuter et al. 2008; Lacey 2017). This may derive from public sphere scholars advocating a common language as a prerequisite for the construction of a (still chimerical) European public sphere (Brüggemann 2005; Perez 2013; Kielmannsegg 1994; Gerhards 1993). Addis (2007) discusses this in his thorough overview of responses by deliberative democracy scholars to linguistic pluralism (pp. 127–139) and calls it “the functionalist argument” of “unilingualism as a prerequisite for deliberative democracy” (op. cit., p. 129). Others dismiss the view that language is an issue for deliberative democracy (op. cit., p. 127). They either argue that concepts such as communication and understanding supersede language, or they demote language to a code or a medium. Sociolinguists have thematised and investigated the interplay between language, citizenship practices and translation through several prisms. Important work has been done in the fields of translation and politics, the politics of multilingualism and multilingual publics, which needs to be considered before revisiting the interplay between multilingualism and politics. Wodak (2009) provides a comprehensive overview of the amount of literature dedicated to language and politics. She starts from Blommaert’s Political Linguistics (1999) as a first attempt to create an academic discipline for researching political discourse and then presents frameworks for political discourse analysis (e.g. Chilton 2004) before focusing on Critical Discourse Analysis. More recently, Ricento, Peled and Ives (2015) have provided a great addition to the literature of both political theory and sociolinguistics. Their collection is focused on valuable theoretical explorations of political theory and language policy, which includes, but is not limited to, normative aporias. It also examines the epistemological obstacles to the engagement between political theory and language policy, as well as the challenges that linguistic diversity poses to democratic theory.

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Their important collection does not include, however, the translation and interpreting studies dimension, which is central to multilingualism and politics. This chapter, and indeed this collection, aims to fill this gap. It argues for the need to revisit the connection between multilingualism and citizenship practices and broaden our research beyond sociolinguistics, beyond the European (and Western) focus and beyond spoken languages. To this end, the  chapter starts with a critical overview of the literature on multilingualism and an explication of the contemporary multilingual condition. It then looks at multilingual publics before focusing on translation and citizenship practices and translation as a political act, with an emphasis on translation and activism. The chapter ends with revisiting multilingualism and politics in the current historical moment.

2.2 Multilingualism 2.2.1 Unpacking the Concept A critical demarcation of the concept of multilingualism is not an easy endeavour. Multilingualism in society and politics does not simply refer to people speaking multiple languages, or even speaking them confidently (I deliberately avoid using the term ‘fluently’). Such definitions of multilingualism conflate its individual and social dimensions. They are also monolithic and presuppose that languages are bounded and finite entities that can be acquired. This chapter moves beyond reified conceptions of language and understands languages as living, dynamic and porous, “expressing” and “symbolising” cultural reality (Kramsch and Widdowson 1998, p. 3). It follows Nanz’s (2007, pp. 17–18) premise: there is no such thing as a clearly defined, transparent language. All utterances are situated in specific cultural and social-historical contexts and are framed by their respective expressive modes or “speech genres”.

The porosity of language is crucial in the creation of regional, urban, generational varieties and variations. Indeed, studies in language and languaging increasingly consider sociopolitical contexts of language use and

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adopt this broader understanding of language (e.g. Becker 1991; Jørgensen 2008). Multilingualism is not something that people have or can acquire because it refers to language practices rather than language competency (Heller 2007; Blackledge and Creese 2010; Blommaert et al. 2012). This includes a fascinating and dynamic interplay of sociopolitical contexts where the communication of the self and of groups takes place. Multilingualism is not static but dynamic and contingent upon power differentials that affect the status and legitimacy of languages and their speakers. As “a product and process of economic activity” (Duchêne and Heller 2012), multilingualism is “what the environment, as structured determination and interactional emergence, enables and disables them to deploy” (Blommaert et  al. 2012, p.  213). Someone’s language can be promoted, demoted, ignored, challenged or systematically rejected. Moreover, multiple languages representing multiple cultures signify multiple competing rationalities in essentially agonistic public spheres (Strani 2014; McDermott et al. 2016). In this sense, multilingualism is an inherently political matter and an inherently political process in terms of motivations, practice and impact. The theoretical and analytical premises of multilingualism have been explored by a number of scholars from the perspective of their own disciplines. Scholars of sociolinguistics have studied multilingualism both as a concept and as a phenomenon (Edwards 2002; Blackledge and Creese 2010; Martin-Jones et al. 2012; Blommaert 2013; Aronin 2017; Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004), with a focus on education and pedagogy (Blackledge and Creese 2010, 2014; O’Rourke 2011; Pavlenko et  al. 2001; and many others), and more recently from the perspective of superdiversity2 (Blackledge and Creese 2018; Blommaert 2013; Aronin  Focusing on Britain, anthropologist Steven Vertovec (2007, p. 1) defined superdiversity as follows:

2

Britain can now be characterized by ‘super-diversity,’ a notion intended to underline a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything the country has previously experienced. Such a condition is distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants who have arrived over the last decade. Blommaert (2013, p. 6) adds that superdiversity “is driven by three keywords: mobility, complexity and unpredictability”.

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and Singleton 2012). Blommaert (2010) argues that contemporary multilingual practices should be studied through the “sociolinguistics of globalisation” in light of heightened social and communicative complexity within conditions of superdiversity (Vertovec 2007; Blommaert 2013). Finally, O’Rourke, Pujolar and Ramallo (2015) have studied the category of ‘new speakers’ (borrowed from the Galician neofalantes) of minority languages in multilingual contexts. Blommaert, Leppänen and Spotti (2012) argue that multilingualism belongs to the “science” of sociolinguistics. However, its impact on society, citizenship, communication and politics has also been studied by other disciplines. Nic Craith (2004), Phipps (2019) and other cultural studies scholars have focused on language and citizenship and on linguistic heritages in dominant monolingual societies—although Blackledge and Creese (2018) have also contributed to the debate from an applied linguistics perspective. And the link between language and politics has also been investigated through the disciplines of critical discourse studies (Fairclough, Van Dijk, Wodak, Krzyżanowski and others), translation studies (Baker, Carcelén-Estrada, Doerr), and some politics scholars with an interest in public spheres (Nanz, Doerr, Van Parijs, Sinardet). Such critical investigations and focused case studies have shown the different manifestations of multilingualism in contemporary social and pedagogical settings, as well as its political dimensions with the policies and practices of heritage languages. It is precisely this diversity of manifestations, practices and implications for individuals, communities, society and politics that has resulted in terminological variations referring to the above processes. Scholars who wish to emphasise educational and communitarian aspects use the term plurilingualism (Boeckmann and Lasselsberger 2012; Council of Europe 2007). Interestingly, the Council of Europe’s 2007 report on Plurilingual Education refers to multilingualism as “the presence of several languages in a given space, independently of those who use them”, and instead considers plurilingualism both “as a value and as a competence” that is linked to linguistic tolerance and intercultural education. Indeed, the concept is rarely found outside educational discourse and scholarship. Polylingualism is a concept mostly used when studying linguistic production and variations within the same language depending on cultural

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and generational settings. This may include metrolingualism, urbilingualism and translanguaging (see next section). Jørgensen (2008, p. 161) explains polylingualism as speakers “combin[ing] three, four, or more different sets of features (i.e. so-called ‘languages’) in their linguistic production”. He refers to this act of mixing different sets of linguistic features “polylingual behaviour” (op. cit., pp. 169–70)—similar to what linguists call code-mixing (see Wei 2018). Its lexical opposite, oligolingualism, coined by sociolinguist and linguistic anthropologist Jan Blommaert (1996), does not refer to the lack of this combination of variants, as one would expect, but instead to a state policy of “reduction of languages in a given territory for better state management” (Blommaert et  al. 2012, p. 6). This inevitably leads to language hierarchies (ibid.), minoritisation, marginalisation and endangerment. I return to this later. Overall, it is worth noting that when plurilingualism and polylingualism are juxtaposed with multilingualism, this is done by reducing multilingualism to its erroneous sense of simply speaking many languages. It could be said that Blommaert’s oligolingualism also seems to be based on the same premise; however, the implications of reduction of languages in oligolingualist settings go far beyond structuralist conceptions of language. This chapter, and indeed this  collection, understands multilingualism as an umbrella term and a critical category that includes all the above values and processes.

2.2.2 The Multilingual Condition The complex and rich ecology of linguistic practices and landscapes, where multilingualism is both a “philosophy” (Aronin and Singleton 2012; Aronin 2017) and an everyday practice, and where it constitutes the norm instead of an exception that needs to be thematised and exoticised, has been described as “new multilingual realities” (Martin-Jones et al. 2012, p. 9) or the “new linguistic dispensation” (Aronin 2017). I borrow Kramsch’s (2009) term “the multilingual condition”, as it better reflects the omnipresence of multilingualism and its defining role in contemporary societies. In addition to the characteristics described in the previous section, the multilingual condition is also defined by ‘new’ (or at

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least more recently studied) processes, such as translanguaging, truncated multilingualism and metrolingualism/urbilingualism. Translanguaging was coined in its original Welsh, trawsieithu, by Williams (1994) in his unpublished doctoral thesis, which studied bilingual Welsh-English classroom practices. Since then, Baker (2001), García (2009), Creese and Blackledge (2015), Wei (2018) and others have examined the concept, referring to multilingual speakers’ practices of mixing languages and modes in communicative acts through code-­ switching and heteroglossic practices (Blackledge and Creese 2014). Like languaging, translanguaging does not separate languages from their users and includes multimodal and non-verbal dimensions. As a result, translanguaging is particularly important in D/deaf and sign language settings, where signers’ “sign, gesture, writing, speaking and mouthing are used together to co-produce meaning” (Kusters 2019). “Truncated multilingualism” (Blommaert et al. 2005) refers to linguistic competencies that are limited to specific topics, for example, ‘translocal’ business activities where the use of another language is specific, topical and bound. It is a direct result of globalisation and global business and may include elements of language crossing “where there are sharp differences in knowledge of relevant language varieties across a group of interactants” (Blommaert et al. 2012, p. 200). Language crossing in the sense of adopting linguistic practices associated with other groups, belonging to a different class or ethnicity, is more prevalent in metrolingualism (Otsuji and Pennycook 2010). Metrolingualism, or urbilingualism, refers to new language varieties that emerge mostly in urban environments but, fundamentally, through new media and their associated new literary forms. These may include microblogging, use of avatars, emojis, GIFs and memes. Although such practices are indeed new and the result of globalisation and urbanisation, the crucial difference between the contemporary multilingual condition and that of previous centuries is that the multilingual condition is a defining feature of contemporary societies (see Aronin 2017, p.  177). Indeed, multilingual communities, societies and countries are not a new phenomenon. The Ottoman, Habsburg and Qing Empires were all multilingual, and so was nineteenth-century France, for example. Today, countries such as Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, India and South

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Africa are officially multilingual. Translation studies scholar Reine Meylaerts (2013) notes that, while multilingualism is certainly not new or an exclusively Western phenomenon, “its modalities have changed due to recent technological, political and other developments” (p. 547). More importantly, the multilingual condition is part and parcel of contemporary societies, where multilingual practices cannot be separated from their cultural, social and political dimension—in the case of translanguaging, language crossing and even choice of language, for example. In this respect, the relationship between multilingualism and social inclusion and exclusion has been studied extensively (Piller 2012; Blommaert et al. 2005, 2013; Blackledge and Creese 2010). Sociolinguist Bernadette O’Rourke’s studies of new speakers of minority languages have also highlighted the sociopolitical implications of language status and processes of promotion and marginalisation.

2.3 Multilingual Publics 2.3.1 M  apping Out Multilingual, Migrant and Minoritised Publics3 The multilingual condition has resulted in the profusion of new forms of multilingual publics. I use publics in the political, Habermasian, sense of people coming together to debate on current topics of specific interest to them for the purpose of contesting authority and generating public opinion (Habermas 1992 and elsewhere). This is different from communities, in the sense that publics are less diffuse and more thematised as “carriers of public opinion” (ibid.). Although multilingual publics may not be new (they existed in multilingual empires and countries centuries back), their structure and ways of communication have changed. Such publics can be part of language-defined public spheres of minority or diasporic languages, for example  Gaelic publics in Scotland, Turkish publics in  Meylaerts (2013, p.  548) uses Bourdieu’s  linguistic power relations to  argue that minority and majority languages do not refer to numbers but to relations of power. In this sense, minoritised publics are those who have purposely been demoted to a weaker public of lesser status with access to a narrower pool of resources, even if their language is widely spoken. 3

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Germany or D/deaf publics in general. They may also include non-native speakers speaking the dominant language(s) in public sphere settings, such as UK publics of EU nationals, or, conversely, many languages spoken within the same public in (officially) multilingual countries. Perhaps the newest—and more diffuse—form of multilingual publics is online publics. These can include language-defined publics, non-native speakers and the use of multiple languages within publics, but they also include exclusively online translingual communities such as gamers. The multilingual condition has also resulted in new forms of debate. Social media has facilitated debate and widened the agenda of generalised interests (for a distinction between general and generalised interest, see Habermas 1996). It has also allowed synchronous and asynchronous interactions between many participants, allowing different types of end-­ users such as media, policymakers and practitioners, citizens, NGOs and so on. At the same time, it has sparked the profusion of ‘fake news’, trolling and flaming. The use of emojis, GIFs, memes and images has also introduced a multimodal dimension to debate that was not as central to deliberation before the advent of the Internet. It is important to note that multilingual communication in social media platforms is presented as unproblematic or even worthy of praise thanks to speakers of different languages being able to communicate through translation software, the inadequacy of which, however, and the resulting impact on debate, should not be ignored. And yet, despite these developments and observations, states and societies still do not seem to have moved away from monolingualist ideologies and policies. Even in countries with more than one official language, as seen in examples from Finland above, as well as Belgium, Spain, Switzerland or Canada, language groups are either territorialised in line with the ‘territorial imperative’ or are managed by federalisation, where any demands of political recognition and self-government are directed to the federal authority (Van Parijs 2010). In both these cases, multilingualism is managed by decentralisation or oligolingualist policies under the pretext of administrative simplification. The resulting clusters of monolingual-­dominant, monolingual-minoritised publics have serious implications. Monolingual public spheres are by definition exclusionary practices.

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But even in cases where publics are multilingual, the different status of languages and their speakers in these publics is also problematic. There are power differentials in all publics, but in multilingual publics these are not only rooted in status, education or access, but also in the language chosen for communication, how well the dominant language is spoken (Doerr 2012, 2019, cf. Fraser 2007), how well the minority language is spoken, which may in itself be an indicator of status, education, or belonging, identity and pride, as well as whether a language is spoken or signed. In this respect, power differentials are also pronounced in speakers at different stages of integration in diasporic public spheres, and in argumentation styles if we accept that different cultures argue differently. The role of interpreters and translators is crucial in this process, and this is examined in the following section. The choice of language in deliberation is always a political choice, because language defines identity and political communities (cf. Harris 2006). To return to the issue of fluency, Collins and Slembrouck (2005, p. 192) highlight that in the official-dominant view “immigrants are not multilinguals, they are perpetual language learners”. Their main goal according to this view should be to learn the dominant state language, and, in many cases, there are language learning and translation and interpreting provisions to help them along the way. Their own languages, and the multilingualism they bring to communities, are “invisible and, implicitly, undervalued” (Nikula et  al. 2012, p.  62) along with their actual language practices. Moreover, minoritised publics, who deliberate in a language different from the dominant one, would fall under the category of minority “counterpublics” (Fraser 1993) or “emergent collectives” fighting for recognition (Asen 2000). Counterpublics “invent and circulate counterdiscourses” (Fraser 1993) to contest authority and to eventually be promoted to publics and gain an equal place (and space) in the public sphere. In addition to issues of status, recognition and equal participation in public life, this categorisation also creates the false perception that such publics have one voice and are part of a single community (Hill 2016). In linguistic counterpublics, their language and related identity may supersede any other aspects, and lead to the assumption of uniformity of needs, views and arguments. Minoritisation in this way may lead to demotion of languages and their speakers instead of

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promoting them through appropriate language policies (see Dayan-­ Fernandez and O’Rourke in this volume), which would be in line with state-imposed oligolingualistic strategies (Blommaert). Many important studies on migrant publics in diasporic public spheres have been conducted (Volkmer 2014; Hill 2016; and many others). We need to recognise and thematise the liminality of such publics, who, partly because of their heterolinguality,4 shift between counterpublic and ‘mainstream’ publics, or are often part of culturally enriched hybrid publics. Beyond the European focus, there have been numerous studies on multilingual public spheres in Japan (e.g. Uchiyama 2018),5 South Africa (Webb 2009; Desai 2001), Nigeria (Akinnaso 1990), Africa more generally (Altmayer and Wolff 2013), the Caribbean (Bröring and Mijts 2017; Malena 2018) and others. These studies have highlighted recurring themes of multimodal practices, inclusion and exclusion, language hierarchies and linguistic oppression because of what Blommaert (1996) calls “the ethnolinguistic assumption” that an ethnic or cultural identity is rigidly associated with a specific language. They have also revisited the grand questions about what is considered a language, what it takes to acquire language status and how the pecking order of language hierarchies is negotiated and constructed. Research on the status of speakers of migrant and minority languages (these may include heritage or minoritised local languages) has questioned the concept of fluency and who is considered a native speaker (O’Rourke et al. 2015), which has implications for everyday communication, language policy as well as social attitudes and everyday communication, not to mention belonging and self-identification of these speakers. The contribution of D/deaf studies’ scholars is noteworthy here, as it offers a much-needed perspective on minoritised publics. Kusters (2017, 2019) focuses on the languaging and modalities of deaf signers, including metrolingualism, in public settings in India and elsewhere. Tapio and  A concept developed by Naoki Sakai (1997), “the heterolingual address” includes social and political aspects of translation in a way that homolingual address does not. Buden, Mennel and Nowotny (2011) take the concept further and argue that heterolinguality, or the heterolingual condition, must take into account hybrid and other forms of language that transcend what they see as restrictive language communities. 5  Uchiyama’s fascinating study focuses on the nineteenth-century Meiji era in Japan. 4

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Takkinen’s (2012) case study on Finnish Sign Language (FinSL) and Deaf culture also provides a powerful example of state strategies that restrict language use and oppress its users. In this case, D/deaf publics are seen exclusively as ‘subaltern counterpublics’.6 This may be because signed languages, as in the case of other minority languages, do not enjoy equal status with dominant languages; indeed, in some countries they may not have language status at all (see De Meulder et al. 2019). A lack of recognition of signed languages as languages will mean lack of awareness (and recognition) of Deaf culture and D/deaf people’s citizenship practices.

2.3.2 Language and Space Arguments on language status and hierarchies also point to the centrality of space in communicative practices, and multilingual practices in particular. Language needs space and produces space at the same time, in a circular poetic manner. Publics are created and public spheres emerge through communication (Benhabib 1993, p. 87), as linguistically constructed spaces of discourse. At the same time, and more specifically, multilingual and migrant publics create spaces with their language use that are crucial to their thematisation and legitimacy. In examining the connection between space and language, Collins and Slembrouck (2005) argue that spatial analysis “problematizes units of research” in terms of language communities and globalised localities (p.  191) and “forces us to confront the obverse of belonging, that of  According to political scientist Nancy Fraser (1993), subaltern counterpublics include historically oppressed groups that have been excluded from the dominant public sphere by legal or extralegal means: 6

Members of subordinated social groups—women, workers, peoples of colour, and gays and lesbians—have repeatedly found it advantageous to constitute alternative publics. I propose to call these subaltern counterpublics, in order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpenetrations of their identities, interests, and needs. (Fraser 1993, p. 123) Fraser argues that these counterpublics function as spaces of “withdrawal and re-groupment” (op. cit., p. 124) and as bases and training grounds for “agitational activities directed toward wider publics” (ibid.).

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displacedness, of semiotic form and meaning making practices ‘out of place’” (ibid.). In examining spatialising practices, they highlight language contact and the link between contact and practice as central in understanding the production of space through language, and how language scale relations are negotiated (p. 192). Indeed, just like languages, publics are also porous and linguistic practices of one public will have an effect on another, especially when these are space-creating. An example would be the widespread use of Yiddish in New York slang. Blommaert, Leppänen and Spotti (2012, p. 201) agree that “the presence of immigrants in an urban environment not only affects the multilingual repertoires of the immigrants […] but also those of the autochthonous population”, with noticeable results. The porosity of publics is also evident in interdiscursive settings of “constant interchange between the discourses of different publics”, which is characteristic of the multivoicedness of public discourse (Nanz 2007, p. 21). Space is important not only as a linguistic construction but also as a topography of language. The study of linguistic landscapes, defined as urban public writing and public signs in streets (Blommaert 2013; Pavlenko and Mullen 2015; and elsewhere), has shown the importance of visibility of languages in public spaces and its role as a legitimating factor in the case of minority or heritage languages. Gorter, Marten and Van Mensel (2012) also provide a rich collection of studies on linguistic landscapes, covering geographical regions from Eastern Latvia, Ireland, Italy, the Basque country and Russia to Israel, North Calotte and Brunei Darussalam.

2.4 The Role of Translation 2.4.1 Translation and Citizenship Practices The multilingual condition is a constant process of translation7 and interpretation. The condition of the migrant, in particular, “is the condition  The argument has been made by many scholars, but perhaps Meylaerts’s has been presented more emphatically: “At the heart of multilingualism we find translation” (Meylaerts 2013, p. 546). 7

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of the translated being” (Cronin 2006, p. 45), whether local or migrant languages are used—in the former case, it would be a condition of self-­ translation (Meylaerts 2013, p. 540). Translation in this sense does not refer only to texts but is used broadly in the sense of conveying meaning between and across languages; in this case, therefore, it also includes interpreting. It is a fundamentally social relation that goes beyond language, because of the heterolinguality that characterises the multilingual condition. Heterolinguality includes linguistic forms of expression such as language-mixing and code-switching, as seen in the previous section. The constant translation processes between all these forms of language in multilingual, migrant and minoritised publics affect their citizenship practices, because the status and structure of publics and their languages affect people’s civic participation. Citizenship is a form of commitment to a specific polity and to a set of rights of obligations—which is why it is also connected to legitimacy (Bauböck 2010; Kockel 2010). Such a commitment implies a personal sense of belonging as well as ascribed belonging from the state. This citizenship-belonging nexus (Bauböck 2010) means that citizenship can never be culture-blind (Nic Craith 2004; Habermas 2005). The opportunities in societies where citizenship is multilingual (and multicultural), and therefore people’s existence is legitimised through their commitment to certain values, include flourishing communities, a redefinition of ‘common interests’ and enrichment of public life. Pym (2013) makes an important connection between translation and democracy and highlights the role of translators and interpreters in creating and sustaining multilingual democracies. In his critique, Pym revisits the “false opposition” (2013, p.  88) between translation and language learning and argues that, while both are expensive, they are different processes that serve different purposes; indeed, the latter is a more sustainable communication strategy. While he uses Habermas’s (2005) cultural rights arguments in the context of migration, however, he chooses to focus on the technical side of translation, its cost, benefits and limitations in contemporary democracies, as well as new translation practices and

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potential with the advent of new technologies.8 Pym does not focus on the social, deliberative or participatory aspects of translation which are becoming increasingly more important for the construction of demoi, although he does consider the role of translation for language learning in Catalonia, for example, in discussing how bilingual/multilingual democracies work (op. cit., p. 90). Mos (Chap. 3 in this volume), Szabó (Chap. 4 in this volume) and Beaton-Thome (Chap. 5 in this volume) look at the role of translation in democracy by offering original and useful analyses of multilingual debate in the European Parliament. Communication through interpreters and translators adds a level of contingency related to the filtering processes that are associated with interpreting in particular. More importantly, it adds a level of power differential between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ of language, the interpreter/ translator and the user, which is frequently ignored. Provision for interpreting and translation is not equally allocated either. The point of language hierarchies, minoritised languages and the fact that some languages are more important than others has already been made above, and it is clear that languages and their communities cannot be separated from their political dimension. Translation in this context becomes a fundamentally unequal process between the haves and have-nots of language and resources, which in turn affects the citizenship practices and status of speakers. Scholarly work on translation and activism is worth mentioning here. Nicole Doerr’s work on Political Translation is crucial in the field of multilingual politics. Her 2012 study on interpreters at the European Social Forum yielded interesting results on respecting linguistic and cultural differences in a multilingual environment facilitated by interpreters. Through her research into strategies used by volunteer and activist translators and interpreters in their attempt to address power imbalances and reduce inequality, Doerr has since advocated the emancipatory role of translation in contemporary democratic processes (Doerr 2018a, b). Furthermore, Mona Baker’s work on Translating Dissent (2016) focuses on activist translators who worked during the Egyptian Revolution.  Addis (2007, p. 136) makes a similar point regarding translation, highlighting its high cost and complex management. 8

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Carcelén-Estrada (2018) also offers valuable insights on activist translation strategies from her work on movements in the Americas. Meylaerts (2018) highlights the politics of translation in multilingual states as a rich research topic and urges for more case studies in the field. In addition to studies on translation and citizenship (Baker 2016; Malena 2018; Meylaerts 2018; Nic Craith 2004; Pym 2013; Uchiyama 2018; see also Balibar 2004 on the overarching topic of transnational citizenship), there is also a distinct focus on EU citizenship and the role of translation at a European public sphere level. Nanz’s work on the European public sphere is particularly useful because it focuses on the public sphere’s interdiscursive dimension. Emphasising the “transnational ‘intercultural’ dialogue and citizenship practices” (2006) in her conceptualisation of the European public sphere, Nanz’s model remains connected to changing and emergent communication practices, especially post-­ national multilingual—and multicultural—citizenship.9 Focusing on the European Public Sphere in particular, Nanz (2006) and Eder (2007) have examined how linguistic variation in the EU has affected the creation of a European public sphere. The work of Buden, Mennel and Nowotny (2011) on heterolinguality is also important here, as it views Europe as a space of translation in its social sense: Europe, in whatever “final shape” (or even non-shape), cannot exist without translation. Although everybody would agree on that fact, very few are aware of how far-reaching its consequences are. Even fewer would be prepared to think of translation, an otherwise so modest concept of general linguistic and literary practice, as playing such a central role in the formation of Europe as a political project.

Yet Nanz laments that political studies scholars either do not seem to acknowledge “the problem of translation or multicultural literacy” (Nanz 2006, p. 79) because of the “common mind” (Taylor, cited in Nanz 2006, p.  79) that the demos seems to acquire through intersubjectivity processes, or they consider it “insurmountable” (ibid.) because of distinctly  European culture and heritage scholar Máiréad Nic Craith (2004) also makes important connections between language and citizenship, focusing on the importance of language in identity and belonging. 9

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differing worldviews. Indeed, even though it is true that “there is no need to speak the same language to communicate in a meaningful way” (Risse and Van de Steeg 2003, p. 14), the implications of translation on public sphere communication and citizenship practices in terms of power asymmetries should not be overlooked. Fraser (2007) argues that a lack of a common language in the EU does not prevent linguistic hegemonisation (of English and French, for instance) and Doerr (2012, p. 5) refers to this as “hegemonic multilingualism”. Fraser (2007) also points out that the use of a lingua franca may also disadvantage those who do not speak it for various reasons (e.g. the elite or educated). Overall, Nanz’s work in particular was paramount in demonstrating how political theory can benefit from language and translation studies10 and among the key studies that informed Doerr’s pivotal work on Political Translation (see Doerr 2012, 2018a).

2.4.2 Translation as a Political Act Few would immediately associate translation with politics, let alone consider translation as a political act. Its fundamental role in democracies is often overlooked, especially in the context of the multilingual condition. Yet we have seen the dependence of (multilingual/multicultural) citizenship on translation above. Translation constitutes a political act not only because it is a process of meaning-making by selection, but also because of power differentials and asymmetries between languages and their speakers, and the ensuing role of translators in fostering equal and inclusive citizenship practices. In her work on translation and activism, Carcelén-Estrada (2018) notes: Translation redresses power asymmetries and smuggles alternative meanings to incorporate different worldviews and concepts into an imperial grammar putting an end to monolingualism. (p. 255)  For example: “The procedures of democratic politics can be understood as methods for translating and eventually revising worldviews and articulating, examining and cooperatively weighing conflicting interests. […] The discursive practice of translation can thus be regarded as a model for deliberative procedures in democracies where conflicts of ethical/cultural perspectives and interests prevail” (Nanz 2006, p. 84). 10

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In this respect, translators have the role and mission to counter these power asymmetries and intervene when minority groups are silenced, communicating “non-hegemonic thinking while appearing to comply with the official language of the state and rule of law” (op. cit., p. 254). Translation in this sense becomes a “philosophy” and an essentially “political endeavour” (Clausius 2017, p. 250). In line with this, Doerr (2018b, p.  3) makes a crucial distinction between linguistic and political translation: I analyse political translation, distinct from linguistic translation, as a disruptive and communicative practice developed by activists and grassroots community organisers to address the inequities that hinder democratic deliberation, and to entreat powerful groups to work more inclusively with disempowered ones. The insights I derive from the conscious efforts and effects of those who took on the explicit role of political translators in these local forums apply to other situations in which inequalities in communication threaten to undo a democracy.

Political translation focuses on the role of the translator to both represent individuals and ensure direct participation, and to intervene when inequalities are observed in a hegemonic linguistic setting. This is different from, and in fact seems to contradict, the perceived role of linguistic translators as invisible. Indeed, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of practising translators and interpreters who are asked to ‘just translate’ when asking for clarifications, talking over interruptions or refusing to interrupt a speaker while they are still talking. In political translation, translators are aware of the power dynamics at play in the interaction, which may go beyond the roles of interactants in a particular setting (administrative authority, higher socioeconomic status, speaker of dominant language(s), translator/interpreter, etc.) but may also be ingrained in the languages people (choose to) speak and the ideologies that these languages represent. Political translation is connected to translation and activism, and it includes interpreting, as seen above. Tymoczko (2010) and Wróblewska (2020) give a good overview of translation, resistance and activism in theory and in practice, pointing out the emancipatory role of translation

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as a political act. In his work on cultural translation as well as on translation and conflict, Balibar (2004) also argues for the potential of translation to contribute to universal emancipation.11 Baker’s (2010, 2016) work on translating narratives of dissent is crucial in this respect, as well as Carcelén-Estrada’s (2017, 2018), Aiu’s (2010) and Ngũgı ̃’s (2020) work on decolonisation and indigenous resistance through translation. Mattoni and Doerr (2007) studied transnational and multilingual networks of activists in their work on the Euromayday parade; Fathi (2020) studies urban activism in terms of US migrant’s access to interpreters; and scholars such as Hill, Nic Craith and Clopot (2018), Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh (2020), Fani (2020) and others look at the politics of translation in refugee contexts. In all these studies it is evident that the presumption of equality of languages and their speakers is false, and more importantly the role of translators (and interpreters) in bridging these equalities “as the disruptive and persuasive third voice within deliberation” (Doerr 2018b, pp. 10, 46) by speaking up and intervening is a paramount requirement for equal democratic practices.

2.5 Multilingualism and Politics Revisited In 2007 multilingualism was given its own portfolio and a dedicated Commissioner in the European Commission, Leonard Orban. However, this was short-lived, and in 2010 multilingualism was incorporated into the portfolio of the Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth. Focusing largely on language learning, this half-hearted attempt did little for language rights, linguistic minorities, the fostering of multilingual political practices and citizen engagement towards a European polity.12 The current historical moment is one where the interplay of multilingualism and politics needs to be firmly emphasised by sociolinguists, political scientists and cultural studies scholars. It also  Kellman (2000, p. 36) goes a step further and suggests that if the Whorfian hypothesis of our worlds being limited by our language is correct, then multilingualism itself “is emancipation”. 12  For a critique of EU language and multilingualism policy, see Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2011), where the authors argue that democracy, European values and social cohesion seem to have been secondary in EU policy documents and superseded by economic skills and competitiveness. 11

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needs to be revisited and enriched beyond studies on the “strong publics” (Fraser 1993, p. 134) of politicians or even of citizens in online public spheres, to include the “weak publics” (ibid.) that are part of the “uncivil society” (Wodak) and are more diffuse, more multilingual and more marginalised. Research needs to be broadened beyond the European and Western focus, and beyond spoken languages. There are examples of such efforts in the sections above, however, more work is needed to move away from West-centrism as well as audism, when it comes to including signed languages. The role of multilingual (or plurilingual) education, of translation and interpreting in citizenship practices and of translators and interpreters “to intervene, discipline, empower and marginalise” (Doerr 2018b, pp. 97–100) is crucial in this respect. The type of political translation that is central in citizenship practices of minoritised publics is an inherently critical and dialectic process. The power of the translator in such contexts should not be left unused. These considerations need to be accompanied with a fresh thinking on what we consider as languages, which has implications on attitudes, access, resources and speakers’ citizenship. Multilingualism in this respect needs to be situated in its sociopolitical context and not reduced to (degrees of ) language competence when we are discussing its role in communities and societies. The distinction between individual and social multilingualism is important here, and although it is not new, it is often forgotten and these two forms tend to be conflated. Multilingualism as a philosophy and social practice cannot be reduced to language learning. That is not to say that language learning is not essential in multilingual societies, but the multilingual condition requires more than that. Widening the pool of languages offered to include migrant, minority or heritage languages would be a good start to move away from selective or hegemonic multilingualism. In this respect, scholarly and activist work on decolonising multilingualism is timely and essential. Phipps’s (2019) latest piece on decolonising multilingualism adds to the increasing voices by academics and educators to decolonise curricula, methodologies, teaching and education in general. Phipps presents a “manifesto for decolonising multilingualism” (2019, p.  1), by asking whether our language-speaking and cultural openness are limited to colonial languages and cultures. Inspired

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by Spivak’s work, in particular on the politics of translation (2000), where Spivak laments the tendency of people to learn the most powerful, colonial, mostly European languages and not African ones, for example, Phipps takes a step back and lets multilingual poems, songs and other artwork illustrate the centrality of language and the “pain of decreation” (Phipps 2019, p.  19). Drawing on personal experiences and extensive international research, Phipps and her co-authors provide perspectives of decolonising practices in language learning with a focus on indigenous languages (such as te reo—Maori, and African languages with a focus on Ghana’s languages) and languages spoken by asylum seekers and refugees in the UK (such as Eritrean). She also urges scholars to move away from extractivist methodologies of collecting data on indigenous people and their languages without giving anything back, only to return to the researcher’s privileged existence elsewhere. In revisiting the connection between multilingualism and citizenship practices, Blommaert, Leppänen and Spotti (2012, p. 1) maintain that “not all forms of multilingualism are productive, empowering and nice to contemplate”. In their reconsideration of multilingualism and its role in politics and society, they warn against the generally accepted claim that multilingualism is something to be celebrated, encouraged, and its positive aspects being taken at face value. Without rejecting it, Blommaert, Leppänen and Spotti are adopting a much-needed critical stance and provide an important consideration of some contemporary multilingual practices that are “still unwanted, disqualified or actively endangering to people” (ibid.). Using case studies from Finland, the authors argue that multilingualism in all its forms is seen by the state as not just something that needs to be managed, but tamed and coercively controlled (op. cit., p. 13). Tapio and Takkinen’s case study on FinSL and Deaf culture provides a powerful example of such state strategies (2012, pp. 284–308). The authors demonstrate that lack of recognition of FinSL as a language and of Deaf culture as a culture has a profound impact on access and equal treatment in services, such as health and schooling, as well as sense of belonging in Finnish society for Deaf people. Pietikäinen and Kelly-­ Holmes’s chapter on Sami and Irish minority media (2012, pp. 194–204) illustrates another example of “normativity” (p. 194) imposed by the state that denies minority languages any digression from the norm, any

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internal richness, actual everyday hybrid uses of the language or other impurity (ibid.). Pitkänen-Huhta and Hujo’s case study on how elderly people experience multilingualism in a remote rural village highlights in an interesting, but not entirely convincing, way the socially excluding effects of multilingualism for those who do not have the opportunities to develop skills and adapt to it (2012, pp. 261–283). Scholars have already argued (very convincingly) that multilingualism cannot be separated from its cultural and social dimensions. The point that perhaps has been less emphasised, with the exception of works cited in this chapter, is that multilingualism cannot be separated from its political dimension, and indeed it should not. Multilingual societies, where there is a constant process of translation and negotiation of self and identity, are characterised by these fundamentally political processes. Political theory and sociolinguistics can learn from each other, especially in the areas of societal multilingualism and impact on communities and state policies, deliberative politics in multilingual contexts, the political dimensions of the status and use of heritage and minority languages, and the contingencies of multilingual political argumentation.

References Addis, A. (2007). Constitutionalising Deliberative Democracy in Multilingual Societies. Berkeley Journal of International Law, 25(2), 117–164. Aiu, P. D. (2010). Ne‘e Papa I Ke ō Mau: Language as an Indicator. Of Hawaiian Resistance and Power. In M. Tymoczko (Ed.), Translation, Resistance, Activism (pp. 89–107). Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Akinnaso, F. N. (1990). Toward the Development of a Multilingual Language Policy in Nigeria. Applied Linguistics, 12(1), 29–61. Altmayer, C., & Wolff, E. (2013). Africa: Challenges of Multilingualism. Frankfurt: Peter Lang AG. Aronin, L. (2017). Conceptualizations of Multilingualism: An Affordances Perspective. Critical. Multilingualism Studies, 5(1), 174–207. Aronin, L., & Singleton, D. (2012). Multilingualism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Asen, R. (2000). What Puts the ‘Counter’ in Counterpublic? Communication Theory, 10, 424–446.

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Baker, C. (2001). Foundations of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism. Multilingual Matters. Baker, M. (2010). Translation and Activism: Emerging Patterns of Narrative Community. In M.  Tymoczko (Ed.), Translation, Resistance, Activism (pp. 23–41). Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press. Baker, M. (2016). Translating Dissent. Voices from and with the Egyptian Revolution. London: Routledge. Balibar, É. (2004). We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bärenreuter, C., Brüll, C., Monika, M., & Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2008). An Overview of Research on the European Public Sphere. EUROSPHERE Working Paper Series (EWP) 3, Eurospheres project. https://ideas.repec. org/p/erp/ewpxxx/p0027.htmln. Bauböck, R. (2010). Studying Citizenship Constellations. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(5), 847–859. Becker, A. L. (1991). Language and Languaging. Language & Communication, 11(1–2), 33–35. Benhabib, S. (1993). Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition and Jürgen Habermas. In C.  Calhoun (Ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (pp. 73–98). London: MIT Press. Blackledge, A., & Creese, A. (2010). Multilingualism. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. Blackledge, A., & Creese, A. (2014). Heteroglossia as Practice and Pedagogy. In A.  Blackledge & A.  Creese (Eds.), Heteroglossia as Practice and Pedagogy. Educational Linguistics (Vol. 20). Dordrecht: Springer. Blackledge, A., & Creese, A. (2018). Contesting ‘Language’ as ‘Heritage’: Negotiation of Identities in Late Modernity. Applied Linguistics, 29(4), 533–554. Blommaert, J. (1996). Language Planning as a Discourse on Language and Society: The Linguistic Ideology of a Scholarly Tradition. Language Problems & Language Planning, 20(3), 199–222. Blommaert, J. (2010). The Sociolinguistics of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blommaert, J. (2013). Ethnography, Superdiversity and Linguistic Landscapes: Chronicles of Complexity. Bristol: Multilingual Matters. Blommaert, J., & Bulcaen, C. (Eds.) (1999). Political Linguistics. Belgian Journal of Linguistics, 11. John Benjamins Publishing Company. Blommaert, J., Collins, J., & Slembrouck, S. (2005). Spaces of Multilingualism. Language & Communication, 25, 197–216.

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Blommaert, J., Leppänen, S., & Spotti, M. (2012). Endangering Multilingualism. In J.  Blommaert, S.  Leppänen, P.  Pahta, & T.  Räisänen (Eds.), Dangerous Multilingualism (pp. 1–21). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Boeckmann, K., & Lasselsberger, A. (2012). Promoting Plurilingualism: Majority Language in Multilingual Settings. Austria: Council of Europe. Bröring, H., & Mijts, E. (2017). Language Planning and Policy, Law and (Post) Colonial Relations in Small Island States: A Case Study. Social Inclusion, 5(4), 29–37. Brüggemann, M. (2005). How the EU Constructs the European Public Sphere: Seven Strategies of Information Policy. Javnost-The Public, 12(2), 57–73. Buden, B., Mennel, B., & Nowotny, S. (2011). Europe as a Translational Space. The Politics of Heterolinguality (eipcp). http://www.leslaboratoires.org/en/ article/europe-translational-space-politics-hetero-linguality-article. Carcelén-Estrada, A. (2017). Weaving Abya-Yala: The Decolonial Aesthetics of Indigenous Resistance. New Diversities, 19(2), 103–116. Carcelén-Estrada, A. (2018). Translation and Activism. In J.  Evans & F.  Fernandez (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics (pp. 254–269). London: Routledge. Chilton, P. (2004). Analysing Political Discourse, Theory and Practice. London: Routledge. Clausius, K. (2017). Translation ~ Politics. Philosophy Today; Charlottesville, 61(1), 249–266. Collins, J., & Slembrouck, S. (2005). Multilingualism and diasporic populations: Spatializing Practices, Institutional Processes, and Social Hierarchies. Language & Communication, 25, 189–195. Council of Europe. (2007). From Linguistic Diversity to Plurilingual Education: Guide for the Development of Language Education Policies in Europe, Language Policy Division, Strasbourg: Council of Europe. https://rm.coe. int/16802fc1c4. Creese, A., & Blackledge, A. (2015). Translanguaging and Identity in Educational Settings. Annual Review of Applied Linguistics, 35, 20–35. Cronin, M. (2006). Translation and Identity. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. De Meulder, M., Murray, J., & McKee, R. (2019). The Legal Recognition of Sign Languages: Advocacy and Outcomes Around the World. Bristol: Multilingual Matters. Desai, Z. (2001). Multilingualism in South Africa with Particular Reference to the Role of African Languages in Education. International Review of Education, 47(3–4), 323–339.

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Doerr, N. (2012). Translating Democracy: How Activists in the European Social Forum Practice Multilingual Deliberation. European Political Science Review, 4(3), 361–384. Doerr, N. (2018a). Translation and Democracy. In J.  Evans & F.  Fernandez (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics (pp.  64–78). London: Routledge. Doerr, N. (2018b). Political Translation: How Social Movement Democracies Survive. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Doerr, N. (2019). Migration and Civic Dialogue in Denmark: Is Speaking Danish a Precondition for Integration? In Discover Society, Special Issue of Denmark. Duchêne, A., & Heller, M. (2012). Language. In Late Capitalism: Pride and Profit. London: Routledge. Eder, K. (2007). The Public Sphere and European Democracy: Mechanisms of Democratisation in the Transnational Situation. In J.  E. Fossum & P. Schlesinger (Eds.), The European Union and the Public Sphere (pp. 44–64). London: Routledge. Edwards, J. (2002). Multilingualism. New York: Routledge. Fani, A. (2020). What Is Asylum? Translation, Trauma and Institutional Visibility. In R. R. Gould & K. Tahmasebia (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Activism. London: Routledge. [forthcoming]. Fathi, S. (2020). The. Right to Understand and the be Understood: Urban Activism and US Migrants’ Access to Interpreters. In R.  R. Gould & K. Tahmasebia (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Activism. London: Routledge. [forthcoming]. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., & Qasmiyeh, Y.  M. (2020). Citation and Recitation: Linguistic Legacies and the Politics of Translation in the Sahrawi Refugee Context. In R. R. Gould & K. Tahmasebia (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Activism. London: Routledge. [forthcoming]. Fraser, N. (1993). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. In C.  Calhoun (Ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (pp. 109–142). London: MIT Press. Fraser, N. (2007). Transnationalizing the Public Sphere. On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World. Theory, Culture & Society 24(4), 7–30. García, O. (2009). Bilingual Education in the 21st Century: A Global Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell. Gerhards, J. (1993). Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 22(2), 96–110.

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Gorter, D., Marten, H. F., & Van Mensel, L. (Eds.). (2012). Minority Languages in the Linguistic Landscape. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Habermas, J. (1992). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. London: Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (2005). Truth and Justification. London: MIT Press. Harris, R. (2006). ‘My Culture’, ‘My Language’, ‘My Religion’: Communities, Practices and Diasporas. In S.  Wright & H.  Kelly-Holmes (Eds.), New Ethnicities and Language Use (pp. 117–147). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Heller, M. (2007). Bilingualism as Ideology and Practice. In M. Heller (Ed.), Bilingualism: A Social Approach. Palgrave Advances in Linguistics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hill, E. (2016). Welcoming Nations? Hospitality as a Proxy for National Identity: A Consideration of British and Scottish Contexts. In A.  Haynes et  al. (Eds.), Public and Political Discourses of Migration: International Perspectives (pp. 193–206). Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield. Hill, E., Craith, M., & Clopot, C. (2018). At the Limits of Cultural Heritage Rights? The Glasgow Bajuni Campaign and the UK Immigration System: A Case Study. International Journal of Cultural Property, 25(1), 35–58. Jørgensen, J. N. (2008). Polylingual Languaging Around and Among Children and Adolescents. International Journal of Multilingualism, 5(3), 161–176. Kellmann, S. G. (2000). The Translingual Imagination. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Kielmannsegg, G.  F. (1994). Läßt sich die Europäische Gemeinschaft demokratisch verfassen? Europäische Rundschau, 22(2), 23–34. Kockel, U. (2010). Re-visioning Europe: Frontiers, Place Identities and Journeys in Debatable Lands. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kramsch, C. (2009). The Multilingual Subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kramsch, C., & Widdowson, H.  G. (1998). Language and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Krzyżanowski, M., & Wodak, R. (2011). Political Strategies and Language Policies: The European Union Lisbon Strategy and Its Implications for the EU’s Language and Multilingualism Policy. Language Policy, 10(2), 115–136. Kusters, A. (2017). Gesture-based Customer Interactions: Deaf and Hearing Mumbaikars’ Multimodal and Metrolingual Practices. International Journal of Multilingualism, 14(3), 1–20. Kusters, A. (2019). Deaf and Hearing Signers’ Multimodal and Translingual Practices: Editorial. Applied Linguistics Review, 10(1), 1–8.

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Lacey, J. (2017). Centripetal Democracy: Democratic Legitimacy and Political Identity in Belgium, Switzerland and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Malena, A. (2018). Politics of Translation in the ‘French’ Caribbean. In J. Evans & F.  Fernandez (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics (pp. 480–493). London: Routledge. Martin-Jones, M., Blackledge, A., & Creese, A. (2012). Introduction: A Sociolinguistics of Multilingualism for Our Times. In M.  Martin-Jones, A. Blackledge, & A. Creese (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Multilingualism (pp. 1–25). London: Routledge. Mattoni, A., & Doerr, N. (2007). Images Within the Precarity Movement in Italy. Feminist Review, 87, 130–135. McDermott, P., Nic Craith, M., & Strani, K. (2016). Public Space, Collective Memory and Intercultural Dialogue in a (UK) City of Culture. Identities, 23(5), 610–627. Meylaerts, R. (2013). Multilingualism as a Challenge for Translation Studies. In C. Millán & F. Bartrina (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation Studies (pp. 537–551). London: Routledge. Meylaerts, R. (2018). The Politics of Translation in Multilingual States. In J. Evans & F. Fernandez (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics (pp. 221–237). London: Routledge. Nanz, P. (2006). Europolis: Constitutional Patriotism Beyond the Nation State (Europe in Change). Manchester: Manchester University Press. Nanz, P. (2007). Multiple Voices. An Interdiscursive Concept of the European Public Sphere. In J. E. Fossum, P. Schlesinger, & G. O. Kværk (Eds.), Public Sphere and Civil Society? Transformations of the European Union (pp. 11–28). Oslo: ARENA. Ngũgı ̃, M. W. (2020). Against a Single African Literary Translation Theory. In R. R. Gould & K. Tahmasebia (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Activism. London: Routledge. [forthcoming]. Nic Craith, M. (2004). Culture and Citizenship in Europe: Questions for Anthropologists. Social Anthropology, 12(3), 289–300. Nikula, T., Saarinen, T., Poyhonen, S., & Kangasvieri, T. (2012). Linguistic Diversity as a Problem and a Resource – Multilingualism in European and Finnish Policy Documents. In J.  Blommaert, S.  Leppänen, P.  Pahta, T. Virkkula, & T. Räisänen (Eds.), Dangerous Multilingualism (pp. 41–66). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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O’Rourke, B. (2011). Negotiating Multilingualism in an Irish Primary School Context. In C.  Hélot & M. Ó Laoire (Eds.), Language Policy for the Multilingual Classroom: Pedagogy of the Possible. Bristol: Multilingual Matters. O’Rourke, B., Pujolar, J., & Ramallo, F. (Eds.). (2015). Special Issue: New Speakers of Minority Languages: The Challenging Opportunity. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 2015(231), 1–20. Otsuji, A., & Pennycook, A. (2010). Metrolingualism: Fixity, Fluidity and Language in Flux. International Journal of Multilingualism, 7(3), 240–254. Pavlenko, A., & Blackledge, A. (Eds.). (2004). Negotiation of Identities in Multilingual Contexts. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters. Pavlenko, A., & Mullen, A. (2015). Why Diachronicity Matters in the Study of Linguistic Landscapes. Linguistic Landscape, 1(1/2), 114–132. Pavlenko, A., Blackledge, A., Piller, I., & Teutsch-Dwyer, M. (Eds.). (2001). Multilingualism, Second Language Learning, and Gender. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Perez, F. (2013). Political Communication in Europe: The Cultural and Structural Limits of the European Public Sphere. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Phipps, A. (2019). Decolonising Multilingualism: Struggles to Decreate. Bristol: Multilingual Matters. Pietikäinen, S., & Kelly-Holmes, H. (2012). The Dangers of Normativity – The Case of Minority Language Media. In J. Blommaert, S. Leppänen, P. Pahta, T. Virkkula, & T. Räisänen (Eds.), Dangerous Multilingualism (pp. 194–204). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Piller, I. (2012). Multilingualism and Social Exclusion. In M.  Martin-Jones, A. Blackledge, & A. Creese (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Multilingualism (pp. 281–296). London: Routledge. Pitkänen-Huhta, A., & Hujo, M. (2012). Experiencing Multilingualism – the Elderly Becoming Marginalized? In J.  Blommaert, S.  Leppänen, P.  Pahta, T. Virkkula, & T. Räisänen (Eds.), Dangerous Multilingualism (pp. 261–283). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Pym, A. (2013). Translation as an Instrument for Multilingual Democracy. Critical Multilingualism Studies, 1(2), 78–95. Ricento, T., Peled, Y., & Ives, P. R. (2015). Language Policy and Political Theory: Building Bridges, Assessing Breaches. London: Springer. Risse T., & Van de Steeg, M. (2003). An Emerging European Public Sphere? Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Clarifications. Paper presented at the ­conference ‘Europeanization of Public Spheres, Political Mobilisation, Public Communication and the European Union’, Berlin, 20 June.

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3 Diverting Linguistic Diversity: The Politics of Multilingualism in the European Parliament Martijn Mos

3.1 Introduction The European Union (EU) likes to present itself as a community of values. As José Manuel Barroso, in his position as President of the European Commission, claimed: “The European ideal touches the very foundations of European society. It is about values, and I underline this word: values” (European Commission 2013). Linguistic diversity is one of the anchors of this European ideal. Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights both commit the EU to respecting this diversity. Androulla Vassiliou, the Commissioner tasked with language policy, even referred to linguistic diversity as “the heart of Europe’s DNA” (European Commission 2014). As official documents and policymakers’ rhetoric thus make clear, the EU is committed to respecting, protecting and promoting the diversity of languages within its borders. This commitment enjoys widespread

M. Mos (*) Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 K. Strani (ed.), Multilingualism and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40701-8_3

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support; everybody, it seems, is a champion of linguistic diversity. Yet, as is true for the EU’s official motto of unity in diversity (McDonald 1996), this commitment is not without its tensions. Belying the apparent consensus is a fundamental disagreement over what linguistic diversity precisely entails. A core issue concerns the value’s scope: while a minimal understanding reduces linguistic diversity to the 24 official languages of the 28 member states,1 a more encompassing definition also includes regional and minority languages. Whether linguistic diversity encompasses sign language remains up for discussion. Drawing on the International Relations literature on international norms, this chapter explores the politics of norm interpretation: while most political actors claim to support linguistic diversity, they attach different meanings to it. Through an analysis of debates on language policy within the European Parliament (EP), I show how political rivals make similar use of the norm’s ambiguity by questioning the precise meaning and scope of linguistic diversity. The proponents and opponents of a supranational policy that includes minority languages engage in what I call the act of norm contestation. Deciphering the meaning of linguistic diversity is far from a semantic exercise. Whether a language is officially recognized or not impacts, as the European Network to Promote Linguistic Diversity (NPLD n.d.) claims, “the degree of vitality of a language community.” Moreover, setting the principle’s boundaries has implications for the quality of European democracy. The first part of this chapter explores these implications. Some scholars have argued that linguistic diversity poses an obstacle to the formation of a European public sphere and, concomitantly, contributes to the EU’s democratic deficit (Kraus 2000, 2007; Wright 2009). Others believe this obstacle is not insurmountable (Ammon 2006; Doerr 2012; Grimm 1995; Habermas 2001; Kraus 2000; Van Parijs 2011). Yet, linguistic diversity may also increase support for the EU. If a language is recognized at the supranational level, its speakers may perceive the Union more fondly. Indeed, support for the EU has been disproportionately high among members of national minorities, who believe that “European integration offers the best chance to assert their national ambitions”  A possible Brexit would not affect the number of official languages.

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(Csergő and Goldgeier 2009). Disenchantment with the EU’s unambitious approach to national minority rights has already eroded some minorities’ trust in Brussels (Cianetti and Nakai 2017). The first section thus argues that the precise contours of the value of linguistic diversity matter. However, the subsequent section, which provides a brief overview of supranational policies related to languages, shows that the EU has largely left these contours fuzzy. Linguistic diversity remains a lofty principle without a set definition. Even if the value is undefined on paper, in practice the Union reduces linguistic diversity to multilingualism. It prioritizes language learning over language rights. Furthermore, multilingualism policy largely concerns the official languages of the member states; the inclusion of minority languages is haphazard at best. Minority activists therefore consider the EU’s working definition of linguistic diversity as multilingualism, or the mastery of several languages, to be an impoverished one (interviews, Davyth Hicks and Vicent Climent-Ferrando; NPLD n.d.). At the same time, sociolinguists have noted that the EU’s institutions are not all cut from the same cloth when it comes to language issues. In particular, the European Parliament has been “the key player” in trying to insert minority languages into the Union’s language policy (Nic Shuibhne 2007, p. 129). While scholars have pointed out the EP’s relative enthusiasm for an inclusive understanding of linguistic diversity, they have not yet analysed language-related debates within the Parliament itself. The third section builds on theories of norm contestation in International Relations to offer such an analysis. I show that the general validity of linguistic diversity as a core value is unquestioned. What this value concretely entails, however, is subject to debate. I argue that political representatives on opposite sides of the spectrum are both trying to use the value’s semantic ambiguity to their advantage. Pro-minority Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), along with their allies within civil society, push for an inclusive understanding of linguistic diversity. They believe that this value encompasses regional and minority languages. Their detractors argue instead that linguistic diversity should be understood exclusively to cover only member states’ official languages. Bringing minority languages into the conversation oversteps the EU’s legal boundaries and risks

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fomenting extremism. Opposing sides thus embrace the same value, but attach incompatible meanings to it. This chapter offers, to my knowledge, the first analysis of the politics of linguistic diversity within the European Parliament. Methodologically, I conduct a form of discourse analysis—often referred to as critical discourse or critical frame analysis—that centres on “the struggle over meanings and interpretations of terms and discourses” (Wodak 2012, p.  217; see Verloo and Lombardo 2007). Holzscheiter (2011) refers to this struggle as “power in discourse.” I thus aim to uncover the interpretive battle that MEPs waged over the meaning of linguistic diversity. To do so, I analyse the plenary debates on the four resolutions with an explicit focus on linguistic diversity and multilingualism that the European Parliament has adopted since 2004.2 That year ten new countries acceded, most of which are located in Central and Eastern Europe, where minority languages are arguably more controversial than in the majority of older member states. The analysis is further informed by 155 interviews that I conducted for a larger project on the contestation of national and sexual minority rights in the EU (Mos 2018). The data provide a clear picture of political representatives agreeing on the general importance of linguistic diversity as a core value, but seeking to define it in radically different ways.

3.1.1 Linguistic Diversity and European Democracy The Union’s institutions are often said to lack the legitimacy and accountability that their domestic counterparts enjoy (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Tsakatika 2007). This debate on the democratic deficit typically touches upon the facelessness of the Commission’s unelected officials, the absence of true ‘European’ elections and MEPs’ relative lack of power and visibility (e.g. Meyer 1999; Schmidt 2013; Suleiman 2003). Linguistic diversity is not a common theme in these discussions. Yet, it has important implications for European-level democracy. Two such implications are particularly  The analysis covers oral and written statements, including explanations of votes.

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germane: the possibility of a transnational public sphere, and minority support for European integration. First, because it prevents a constructive debate from taking place among citizens about the Union’s institutional set-up and policies, linguistic diversity may be at the heart of the democratic deficit. Every “common political project needs a community of communication” (Wright 2009, p. 97). Lack of a common language hampers the formation of such a community. There is no EU-wide public sphere, understood as “a nation-transcending communicative context” (Grimm 1995, p. 295) or a “society engaged in critical public debate” (Habermas 1989, p. 52). Only a patchwork of national public spheres exists (but see Fraser 1990; Nanz 2006; Van de Steeg 2002).3,4 The value of linguistic diversity thus confronts the EU with “a major political dilemma”: “to the extent that it promotes multilingualism in order to protect cultural diversity, it may be reducing the possibilities of creating an integrated transnational space of political communication” (Kraus 2007, p. 70). Several commentators have suggested that the solution may be to use a lingua franca within the EU (Grimm 1995; Habermas 2001; Van Els 2005; Van Parijs 2011). However, adopting a lingua franca would amount to an admission that linguistic diversity and democracy are irreconcilable. Other scholars are less prepared to admit defeat. They, too, observe a tension between linguistic diversity and democracy, but suggest several ways of easing it. A common suggestion is to opt for a plurality of working languages rather than a single lingua franca (Ammon 2006). Kraus (2000, p. 161) calls for a system of “plural pluralism” in which different language regimes coexist. In her study of the European Social Forum, Doerr (2012) finds that meetings at the European (and multilingual) level, in which the debate was facilitated by volunteer interpreters, were in fact more inclusive than national-level (and monolingual) gatherings. Yet, even these  According to Nanz (2006, p. 4), a European public sphere consists of “a multiplicity of continuous and overlapping civic dialogues conducted across cultural and national boundaries that lead to the mutual formation and change of individual perspectives.” 4  Consider, for example: “There can be no European democracy because there is no European public sphere; there can be no European public sphere because there is no European people […]; and there can be no European people because there is no common European language” (Kraus 2000, pp. 14–15). 3

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authors acknowledge that a European public sphere necessarily struggles to thrive in a linguistically diverse environment; their solutions aim to overcome or reduce linguistic diversity, instead of championing this fundamental value. Another perspective holds that linguistic diversity could improve the EU’s democratic credentials, with an emphasis on regional and minority languages. These languages may be relatively small, but together they are spoken by approximately 40–50 million people, or 10 per cent of the EU’s population. Some are not at all officially recognized by their respective states, whereas the recognition of others is partial or subject to territorial limitations (Vizi 2016).5 Suggestive evidence of a widespread preference for linguistic uniformity over diversity can be found by looking at the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. As of August 2018, 13 EU member states have refused to sign and ratify this treaty of the Council of Europe, which, because it is “the first legally binding document for the protection of minority languages” (Hogan-­ Brun and Wolff 2003, p. 4), is arguably the continent’s most important text on language policy. Many speakers of minority languages consequently experience a sense of democratic exclusion (McDermott 2017; O’Rourke 2011; Taylor 1998). Inclusive democracy requires greater recognition of a state’s linguistic diversity (Williams 2008). This reasoning also holds true at the supranational level. The EU could boost its democratic credentials by ensuring that linguistic minorities feel included (European Parliament Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages 2014). This could be achieved in various ways, for instance by allowing citizens to use minority languages when reaching out to the EU institutions; by allowing all language communities to participate in supranational initiatives; or by adopting, as the European Citizens’ Initiative “Minority SafePack—One Million Signatures for Diversity in Europe” suggests, an EU Recommendation for the Protection and Promotion of Cultural and Linguistic Diversity in  Recognition varies both across and within states. Within the United Kingdom, for instance, Irish, Scottish Gaelic and Welsh receive more official support than Cornish, Channel Island French and Scots (Hornsby and Agarin 2012, p. 100). Basque is a regional language in France and Spain, but the rights of its speakers are different across the two countries (see Trenz 2007). See Liu (2017) for an account of how group size affects the recognition of minority languages. 5

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the Union (Anon 2017). Linguistic minorities have long hoped that democratic inclusion at the supranational level would be able to compensate for democratic exclusion in the national domain. Over time, however, this belief in the EU’s salvific potential has given way to a disillusioned form of pragmatism. Minority activists, according to Cianetti and Nakai (2017, p. 277), have been forced to respond to “what they perceived as the European institutions’ betrayal of initial promises on minority rights.” Instead of pinning all their hopes on Brussels, activists now use the language of European values in order to legitimize their demands and to put pressure on national governments. Williams (2009, p.  186) sombrely concludes that “the promise of robust, rooted governance and enhanced deliberative democracy has not yet been realized” in the EU. A closer look at the Union’s language policy helps to explain why this is the case.

3.1.2 M  ultilingualism Matters: The Language Policy of the European Union Notwithstanding the frequent references to linguistic diversity in official speeches, scholars and activists have criticized the EU’s language policy as unambitious. A common charge concerns the understanding of linguistic diversity, which is reductive in three ways: (1) only the member states’ official languages contribute to the diversity of languages within the Union; (2) linguistic diversity is treated as synonymous with multilingualism, which implies an emphasis on language learning rather than on the rights of linguistic minorities; and (3) such multilingualism is understood primarily in economic terms, since the mastery of multiple languages can give EU citizens a competitive advantage. First, regional and minority languages are seldom given pride of place. Linguistic diversity instead centres on the equality of the official languages. Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2011) refer to this approach as “monolingual multilingualism.” Its roots can be traced back to the founding of the European Economic Community: Regulation 1 assigned the official languages of the founding countries, with the exception of Luxembourgish, the status of official and working languages. The regulation remained silent on minority languages. This approach by and large

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persists until today, not in the least because the Union has limited competences in language matters. Hoping to “bring the Union closer to all its citizens,” the Council (2005) made it possible for official documents to be translated into certain non-official languages and for citizens to write to EU institutions in these languages. Member states, however, would have to bear the costs themselves. Spain accordingly facilitated the use of Basque, Catalan and Galician. Arzoz (2008, p. 7) accordingly observes a “double standard”: Many voices support multilingualism within the EU institutions and the granting of equal status to every Member State language, while they insist on, or are in no way concerned about, cultural homogeneity within their nation-states and the privileged status of a national language.

The irony is that the same actors who see the Anglicization of the EU institutions’ work as a violation of the principle of linguistic diversity do not believe the Union should do more to protect regional and minority languages. Minority languages are eligible for funding under supranational initiatives for language education and training, such as the Erasmus+ programme. The Commission’s financial support for the European Bureau of Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL), a non-governmental organization, was particularly noteworthy in this regard (Kelly 2010; Williams 2009, p. 189). This funding was, however, discontinued in 2004 and EBLUL closed up shop (Faingold 2015, p. 39).6 While lesser-used languages are now eligible for mainstream EU language funds, this equal access, as one activist told me, means little in practice: It wasn’t a level playing field. The small language NGOs were up against the British Council, Alliance Française, other big state-run bodies. When competing for language projects, they didn’t have a chance because they didn’t have expertise, they didn’t have enough manpower.7

 The European Language Equality Network replaced EBLUL in 2011.  Interview, Davyth Hicks.

6 7

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Furthermore, linguistic minorities make up a tenth of the EU’s population, but receive far less than their share in funding. In 2003 roughly 5 per cent of EU language funding was allocated towards regional and minority languages; “today, that figure is something like 0.001 percent.”8 Even the EU’s most inclusive initiatives in the linguistic realm are thus evidently exclusive. The solution does not lie in making more money available. Financial support cannot substitute for the creation and implementation of “a successfully holistic language policy” (Nic Shuibhne 2007, p. 141). Such a policy simply does not exist, and what policy does exist struggles to incorporate linguistic minorities. Second, while the principle of linguistic diversity makes frequent appearances in Eurocrats’ speeches, official policy instead speaks of multilingualism. Indeed, Commissioner Vassiliou made her comments on the importance of respecting linguistic diversity in her position as Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and Youth (European Commission 2014). The use of the term ‘multilingualism’ has important implications. It has allowed the Union to concentrate on language learning, while steering clear of sensitive discussions on the rights of linguistic minorities. Take, for instance, the “New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism.” The European Commission (2005, p. 3) advanced a two-part definition of multilingualism as “both a person’s ability to use several languages and the co-existence of different language communities in one geographical area.” The strategy’s emphasis, however, is on stimulating citizens’ ability to use multiple languages.9 Language learning—as opposed to, say, institutionalizing language rights—then logically becomes the policy tool of choice. The aim “to encourage language learning and promoting linguistic diversity in society” (European Commission 2005, pp. 3–4) could be achieved, for example, through digital learning, by using foreign language assistants and by funding class exchanges (European Commission 2005, p.  4). Conflating linguistic diversity with multilingualism in this way reduces the former to the acquisition of foreign languages.  Interview, Davyth Hicks.  The European Commission’s (2005, p. 3) multilingualism policy aimed to promote “a climate that is conducive to the full expression of languages, in which the teaching and learning of a variety of languages can flourish.” 8 9

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This is evident in other communications as well. The 2002 Barcelona Council established the objective of enabling citizens to speak two languages in addition to their mother tongue (European Council 2002, p. 19). In 2004, the Commission published an action plan on “Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity” (European Communities 2004). The 2008 document “Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment” stands out for its commitment to teaching languages through lifelong learning (European Commission 2008). All of these documents almost exclusively see linguistic diversity as multilingual ability. Third, and relatedly, the Commission primarily depicts multilingualism as an economic asset. At the height of the EU’s financial woes, Commissioner Vassiliou pitched foreign language acquisition as a tool for exiting the crisis (Hall 2013). The 2008 strategy, “Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment,” refers to multilingualism as a “springboard for competitive business and employability” (Häggman 2010, p. 193). This reductive understanding of multilingualism is well established in the literature (Zappettini 2014). Climent-Ferrando (2016) derides it as a form of “linguistic neoliberalism.” Krzyżanowski and Wodak’s (2011, p. 132) comprehensive discourse analysis shows that the EU “has only intermittently allowed for the inclusion of non-economic arguments.” Kraus and Kazlauskaitė-Gürbüz (2014, p. 518) see the EU’s language policy “working in favor of a version of multilingualism that reduces the value of linguistic diversity to economic criteria.” In short, linguistic diversity is predominantly an asset to the knowledge-based economy; its role in defining the personal identities and shaping the Union’s cultural heritage is occasionally acknowledged in preambles but does not meaningfully inform supranational language policy. Thus, all lofty proclamations aside, the Union operates with a narrow conception of linguistic diversity. Kraus and Kazlauskaitė-Gürbüz (2014, p. 529) consequently reach a sobering conclusion: The EU concern with minority language rights does not embody a principled commitment to uphold the equal dignity of the citizens’ diverse linguistic identities. Rather, it is reducible to a vague normative rhetoric of respect, subordinated to, and controlled by, the Member States’ agendas.

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It would be unfair, however, to resort to such a damning overall assessment of EU language policy without taking the European Parliament’s views into consideration. Indeed, scholars have noted that the Parliament is more ambitious in its understanding of linguistic diversity as a shared value (e.g. Kraus and Kazlauskaitė-Gürbüz 2014, pp.  531–533; Nic Craith 2006; Nic Shuibhne 2007). The EP is more willing to accommodate regional and minority languages alongside the member states’ official languages. It also sees linguistic diversity as going beyond language learning. Already in 1981, for example, a resolution called for Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures (European Parliament 1981). Various other resolutions on the position of linguistic minorities were subsequently adopted (Ó Riagáin 2001). Finally, the Parliament also understands linguistic diversity in cultural rather than economic terms. Take, for instance, the Council’s decision in 1997 to use a treaty article on industry competitiveness as the legal basis for a multiannual programme for promoting linguistic diversity in the information society. Favouring instead an article on “the flowering of the cultures of the Member States” as a legal basis, the Parliament (unsuccessfully) called upon the European Court of Justice to overturn the Council’s economic rationale (European Court of Justice 1999). The EP, in short, stands out because it has long argued “that minority languages are a part of the common European heritage and that their protection is an important resource for European unity” (Stolfo 2009, p. 41). In sum, although linguistic diversity is unquestionably seen as a fundamental principle of the EU, it is nowhere formally defined. The Commission and Council nonetheless operate on the basis of a working definition that is reductive in various regards. The understanding of linguistic diversity of the European Parliament as a whole is more inclusive of regional and minority languages than that of the Commission and, especially, the Council. Less attention has, however, been paid to how this position came about. The next section therefore focuses on the politics of interpretation concerning linguistic diversity within the European Parliament.

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3.1.3 A  n Analysis of Language Politics within the European Parliament Despite the more evident support of linguistic diversity by the EP, this institution does not have a consensual understanding of linguistic diversity. Although all parliamentarians recognize the general validity of this principle, they define it in very different ways. I draw on the International Relations literature on norm contestation to explain this interpretive disagreement. In a nutshell, I argue that opposing sides try to use linguistic diversity’s semantic ambiguity to their advantage. To illustrate the argument, I turn to a discourse analysis of debates on four parliamentary resolutions. Table 3.1 provides an overview of these texts.

A Brief Note on the Parliamentary Resolutions Since 2004, the European Parliament has passed four resolutions that have a clear focus on linguistic diversity. The texts in Table  3.1, while building on each other and on earlier resolutions, differ in important respects. This subsection briefly describes the different texts. The Mavrommatis Report (2006) was a response to the Commission’s proposal to objectively measure language proficiency via a European Indicator of Language Competence. It approached linguistic diversity Table 3.1  Parliamentary resolutions on linguistic diversity

Resolution

Year

Promoting multilingualism and 2006 language learning in the EU Framework strategy for 2006 multilingualism Multilingualism: an asset for Europe and a shared commitment Endangered European languages and linguistic diversity

2009

2013

Rapporteur

Vote (For/Against/ Abstentions)

Mavrommatis (European 435/22/23 People’s Party (EPP)) 537/50/59 Joan i Marí (GreensEuropean Free Alliance (Greens-EFA)) Graça Moura (EPP) 335/279/69

Alfonsi GreensEuropean Free Alliance (Greens-EFA)

645/26/29

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from an educational perspective only. The most controversial part of the resolution concerned support for the Commission’s view that the European Indicator “in the initial phase” should only be applied to “the five most widely taught languages in the Union’s education and training systems (English, French, German, Italian and Spanish).” The report nonetheless noted that the indicator should subsequently be extended “to a wider range of official Union languages” (European Parliament 2006c). It did not explicitly mention regional or minority languages.10 That same year Parliament responded to another Commission initiative: a Framework Strategy for Multilingualism. This time, MEPs, referring to regional and minority languages as “a major cultural treasure,” made it clear that their specific recommendations also applied to these lesser-used languages (European Parliament 2006b). However, not all representatives welcomed this broad understanding of linguistic diversity. Spanish conservatives, for example, objected to the report that a Catalan MEP, Bernat Joan i Marí, drafted. The third resolution responded to the Commission’s next major communication on multilingualism. In addition to its endorsement of language learning, the text reiterated the importance of linguistic parity between the EU’s official languages, of linguistic diversity’s cultural and scientific dimensions, and of promoting regional and minority languages. The latter were “cultural assets that must be safeguarded and nurtured” (European Parliament 2009b). Unlike the other resolutions, the Alfonsi Report (2013) was not a response to a concrete proposal from the Commission. This own-­initiative report was a clarion call. Many European languages were under “extreme threat”; “just like biodiversity in nature,” they risked extinction (European Parliament 2013a). The EU therefore ought to take the principle of linguistic diversity more seriously. The report urged the EU institutions and the member states to undertake a series of measures—ranging from combatting linguistic discrimination to the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and from loosening the eligibility requirements of EU funding streams to capitalizing on the  It only mentioned that “standards of teaching and development in respect of other languages not assessed by the indicator” should not be undermined (European Parliament 2006c). 10

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potential of new technologies and digital media—to protect and promote endangered languages. Although the resolutions differed in their precise details, a commitment to linguistic diversity evidently underpinned all four. However, MEPs competed over the correct interpretation of this principle.

Norm Contestation in International Relations Constructivist scholars of International Relations have shown that norms, understood as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein 1996, p. 5), have regulative and constitutive effects in international politics. The first generation of constructivist scholarship was primarily concerned with showing that norms mattered, which was no mean feat given the dominance of rationalist approaches at that time. To accomplish this task, however, they froze the meaning of norms; actors were assumed to have a clear understanding of a norm’s content and its prescriptive implications (Hoffmann 2010). More recently, various critical constructivists have questioned this assumption that norms are clear. Wiener (2004, p.  191), for example, argues that the conventional “behaviorist approach operates with stable norms, while the reflexive approach works with the underlying assumption of norm flexibility.” The meaning of norms, according to this latter perspective, is always in flux. This makes it difficult to measure norm compliance. The concept of norm contestation serves as a useful alternative (Jose 2018; Wiener 2014). It concerns conflicts over the meaning of norms (Wiener 2004, p.  219). Some scholars see such conflict as relatively innocuous or even advantageous. Contestation could help clarify international rules and even improve the legitimacy of global governance (Sandholtz 2008; Wiener 2018). However, norm contestation potentially also has a more strategic side. Actors can capitalize on a norm’s ambiguity by defining the norm in a self-serving manner. For example, even when the general validity of a norm is beyond dispute, actors may try to narrow or broaden its scope of application (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2013). Alternatively, actors

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may redefine core principles. Prominent examples of norm contestation come from the War on Terror.11 The Bush administration claimed that so-called enhanced interrogation techniques did not constitute torture (Birdsall 2016). It also held that the prohibition against torture could be suspended in times of “exceptional necessity” (Liese 2009). Furthermore, the administration also created a new legal category of “enemy combatants,” which in effect restricted the applicability of the laws of war to civilians (Venzke 2009). Norm contestation is thus a form of strategic action (Groß 2015). It is within this theoretical vein that I proceed.

Contesting Linguistic Diversity in the European Parliament On the surface, the European Parliament is wholeheartedly supportive of linguistic diversity. An overwhelming majority backed three out of four resolutions; only the Graça Moura Report (2009) proved controversial. Nevertheless, interpretive disagreement lurks underneath this apparent consensus. Four distinct positions—inclusive, exclusive, Eurosceptic and non-committal—emerge from a discourse analysis of 160 plenary speeches.

Inclusive Versus Exclusive Interpretations Especially important is the contrast between inclusive and exclusive interpretations. According to the latter, only the member states’ official languages fall under the principle of linguistic diversity at the supranational level. The inclusive view, on the other hand, holds that this principle also extends to other languages, most notably regional or minority languages, but potentially even immigrants’ mother tongues. The disagreement thus centres not on the general validity of linguistic diversity as a normative principle, but on its scope of application. For instance, when MEPs discussed the European Indicator of Language Competence, the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe pushed for the inclusion of regional and minority 11

 Other examples, of course, exist (e.g. Blok 2008; Groß 2015; Welsh 2013).

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languages. As Henrik Lax, a Finnish MEP of the Swedish People’s Party, argued: For those of us who live in multilingual societies, it is only natural that the EU’s multilingual strategy should not be limited to just a handful of languages. […] It is neither cosmopolitan in spirit nor compatible with the EU’s interests to turn our backs on a large part of our population. (European Parliament 2006d)

Concerned with the situation of the Slovenian minority in Carinthia and Italy, MEP Ljudmila Novak saw it as “beyond comprehension that certain politicians should build their political power on the limiting of the rights of minorities to use their mother tongue” (European Parliament 2006d). The rapporteur simply shot back that non-official languages fell beyond his report’s scope: “they do not refer to this specific report […] and do not agree with the objectives of the indicator of linguistic competence” (European Parliament 2006d). Yet, Mavrommatis suggested that they could be covered in the resolution on a Framework Strategy for Multilingualism, which a Catalan MEP, Bernat Joan i Marí, was already preparing. Joan i Marí’s report indeed proved more inclusive. The Catalan MEP built his report on the conviction that the EU “must support not just the main languages, but all languages, in order to improve diversity.” Another Catalan representative, Maria Badia i Cutchet, summarized the inclusive position as follows: The Charter of Fundamental Rights has made respect for linguistic diversity one of our fundamental values. This principle does not just apply to the official languages, but also to the many regional and minority languages spoken within the Union, including those of immigrant communities.

The Irish party of Sinn Féin agreed that linguistic diversity covered “the whole range of European languages.” Other MEPs, especially within the centre-right Spanish People’s Party, objected to what they saw as norm stretching. Alejo Vidal-Quadras lamented “the rapporteur’s opportunistic attempt to use the report to make nationalistic proposals”; “respect for

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diversity is one of the Union’s principles but using languages to split up States along ethnic and linguistic lines is an outrage” (European Parliament 2006a). Whereas some politicians believed they could use linguistic diversity as a tool for protecting minorities, others thus baulked at “the use of what are referred to as minority languages for the purposes of nationalist extremism” (European Parliament 2006a). The Graça Moura Report on the Commission’s communication “Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment” saw this dispute between pro-minority voices and the defenders of what Williams (2009, p. 186) calls “Jacobin-inspired states” come to a head. Controversy arose over a clause that underscored “the vital importance” of allowing parents to choose “the official language in which their children are to be educated in countries with more than one official or regional language” (European Parliament 2009c). The rapporteur, Vasco Graça Moura, originally included this clause; MEPs instead voted for an alternative resolution, prepared by the Spanish Social Democrats and regionalist parties, which did not feature this sentence. The latter camp feared that the original formulation would jeopardize regional administrations’ ability to offer minority-language teaching. The Liberals, Socialists and Greens joined forces to remove “rather explicit criticisms against the linguistic teaching policy practiced in several areas within EU member states” from the report (EurActiv 2009). Thus, respect for linguistic diversity not only entails respecting regional and minority languages, but also respecting the decisions that regional authorities make regarding said languages. The alternative proposal infuriated many MEPs, especially within the European People’s Party. The rapporteur denounced it as “unacceptable protection of nationalist tendencies,” which flew in the face of “our fundamental rights and freedoms and even the principle of subsidiarity” (European Parliament 2009d). Luís Queiró, a Portuguese Christian-­ Democrat, expressed the exclusive position as follows: I cannot accept that a correct idea of respect for linguistic diversity and for individual and family freedom can or must be used as a weapon in an argument for extremist nationalism […] Multilingualism is and must be pro-

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moted in the name of an idea of respect for the linguistic and cultural diversity of Europe, in this case. However, this is neither the time nor the place for another type of fight, particularly one that rejects subsidiarity and freedom. (European Parliament 2009a)

Importantly, these MEPs did not dispute the value of regional and minority languages; they simply claimed that at the EU level linguistic diversity first and foremost concerned the parity of official languages. The principle of subsidiarity, as in Queiró’s statement, was invoked to police the boundaries of linguistic diversity. Four years after this heated debate, François Alfonsi’s own-initiative report treaded more carefully. Its focus on endangered languages—that is, those languages that were threatened with extinction, as opposed to all regional and minority languages—proved uncontroversial. Only a small contingent of French representatives openly objected. Gaston Franco, for example, reasoned that while “regional languages are a European treasure,” the linguistic traditions that member states have acquired throughout their histories must be allowed to evolve according to their “destiny and not according to some administrative court” (European Parliament 2013b). Subsidiarity, in other words, restricted the scope of application of linguistic diversity to the member states’ official languages. With each new resolution related to languages, the Parliament thus re-enacts a discussion over the true meaning of linguistic diversity. Pro-­ minority voices advocate for an inclusive understanding of this norm. They hope to use the European Parliament as a springboard for the protection of minorities’ language rights in the Union. Other MEPs argue that linguistic diversity, no matter how valuable other languages may be, only concerns the Union’s official and working languages. They argue that EU institutions would only overstep their bounds if they advanced a more expansive interpretation.

The Eurosceptic Position Notwithstanding their dominance, the inclusive and exclusive views are not the only ones expressed by MEPs. Some politicians take up a Eurosceptic position. Here the question is not whether the EU should

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broaden its involvement to lesser-used languages; instead, the claim is that matters of language should be left up to the member states. Respecting linguistic diversity is essentially seen as an admirable objective, but not one that the supranational institutions should act upon. For example, Tom Wise, a representative for the UK Independence Party (UKIP), opposed “any attempt at harmonizational convergence” because “Member States have different priorities, different trading links and traditions” (European Parliament 2006d). Representatives of a Danish Eurosceptic party, the June List, cited both cost and competence in its rejection of an initiative to promote multilingualism: while the initiative would only “burden taxpayers even further,” language learning was also simply “not a matter for the EU” (European Parliament 2009d). This view seldom rejected linguistic diversity as such. John Bufton (UKIP), for instance, explained that “as a Welsh MEP” he was “hugely supportive” of minority languages (European Parliament 2013b). These representatives simply opposed supranational action on the issue. However, some traditional Eurosceptics actually welcomed EU involvement. They did so primarily in order to call attention to either the status of their national language within the EU institutions or the vulnerable position of regional languages within their own country. Concerning the former, the Austrian Freedom Party, for instance, argued that German “is the language with the most native speakers in the EU.” It therefore called for “the consistent use” of German as a working language of the EU, alongside English and French (European Parliament 2009a). Representatives of the Italian Lega (Nord), in addition to calling for a more prominent role of the Italian language within EU institutions, saw the neglect of language rights as symbolic of the state’s centralizing agenda. As MEP Mario Borghezio noted, “local languages are disappearing in a truly shameful fashion, when they should be protected, as is the case in Italy with the federalist reform that we are trying to propose and implement” (European Parliament 2009a). He worried about the fate of the Piedmont and Sardinian languages in Italy. Notwithstanding their general resistance to supranational decision-making, these Eurosceptic parties thus had an interest in backing resolutions on linguistic diversity.

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Th  e Non-committal View A final position endorses linguistic diversity without specifying what this principle means. I refer to this as a non-committal view, because it could be consistent with both an inclusive and an exclusive interpretation of linguistic diversity, even when these, as we have seen, are actually irreconcilable. The following explanatory statement is exemplary in this regard: “cultural and linguistic diversity within the European Union is a treasure which makes an effective contribution to ‘unity in diversity’” (European Parliament 2009d). Apart from the circular reasoning, it is unclear whether or not the MEP believes that linguistic diversity covers linguistic minorities. The non-committal position is frequently taken up by MEPs who are not actively involved on the issue, but nonetheless want to communicate to their voters why they voted a certain way. More cynically, these explanations could be seen as an easy way of appearing active. These speeches are, for example, one of the indicators used by rankings such as MEPRanking.eu and, until recently, VoteWatch Europe. MEPs can thus inflate their ranking by making many explanatory speeches. These speeches, as the non-committal view suggests, often lacked substance. MEPs invoked platitudes about the general value of linguistic diversity (“multilingualism is a great asset of the European Parliament”); the increasing importance of languages in a globalizing world (“globalization and emigration are contributing to the broad palette of languages used by Europeans every day”); and the importance of staying true to the EU’s motto (“cultural and linguistic diversity within the European Union is a treasure which makes an effective contribution to ‘unity in diversity’”) (European Parliament 2009a).

3.1.4 A  n Analytical Summary of Norm Contestation in the European Parliament In sum, both among and within EU institutions there is near-unanimous agreement on the importance of linguistic diversity. It is seen as one of the EU’s core values. The discourse analysis of parliamentary debates did nothing to disturb this picture; not a single

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parliamentarian disputed the general validity of linguistic diversity. However, competing interpretations of this principle undercut this apparent consensus. The conflict is primarily between inclusive and exclusive understandings of linguistic diversity. Whereas one bloc of MEPs argues that the principle covers regional and minority languages, an opposing bloc charges that the EU should restrict itself to the diversity of the member states’ official languages. This interpretive conflict should be seen as a type of norm contestation. As Hurd (2005, p. 501) argues, “reinterpretation […] can be a powerful strategy for undermining the power of legitimated institutions.” Linguistic diversity is undoubtedly a legitimated institution: it is enshrined in core EU documents and frequently invoked in speeches. The third section showed, however, that the Union’s language policy is premised on a reductive understanding of linguistic diversity. The term is equated with multilingualism, or the ability to speak multiple languages, which is seen as an economic asset. The emphasis is consequently on language learning rather than on language rights. What is more, regional and minority languages play only a marginal role in EU language policy; according to the dominant perspective, the member states’ official languages are the main contributors to linguistic diversity. Within the European Parliament, a motley group of pro-minority and regionalist MEPs has consistently challenged this dominant understanding. As one representative of the Hungarian minority in Romania explained: We are thinking how to challenge the borders of the treaty a little bit. You know, when you are driving a car and there’s not enough space, you even smash the metal fence, if you are a little bit crazy. And when you are a minority, you need to be a little bit crazy to challenge the borders. (Interview, Csaba Sógor)

Capitalizing on linguistic diversity’s ambiguity, these MEPs have questioned the principle’s narrow scope. The reasoning is straightforward: regional and minority languages also contribute to the Union’s linguistic diversity and should therefore be both promoted and protected. The Strasbourg Manifesto on the Protection of National Minorities and Languages within the Framework of the European Union, which the EP’s

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Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages adopted in 2014, is exemplary in this regard.12 According to this inclusive interpretation of linguistic diversity, the EU’s language policy needs to systematically incorporate regional and minority languages. Relatedly, others argue that sign languages fall under the principle (interview, Helga Stevens).13 However, the discourse analysis showed that a second group of MEPs staunchly opposes this line of reasoning. While underlining the value of non-official languages, they denounce this reinterpretation as a dangerous form of nationalist extremism that threatens to tear the Union, and its constituent countries, apart (interview, Herbert Dorfmann). In the words of one French Republican, it called into question “the indivisibility of the Republic, equality before the law and the unity of the French people” (European Parliament 2013b). A Spanish MEP accused regionalist parties of “linguistic Talibanism” (interview, Teresa Giménez Barbat). The exclusive position is that the EU should only concern itself with the diversity of the member states’ official languages.

3.2 Conclusion The votes on the four resolutions showed that a majority of MEPs are willing to support the inclusive reinterpretation of linguistic diversity. Yet, this support has its limitations. First, the resolutions are formulated very carefully. They maintain a clear focus on language learning and speak of endangered languages instead of regional or minority languages more generally. Such language makes the proposed texts more acceptable, but, concomitantly, lessens their potential for radical change.

 “[It] stresses that the European Union has to be an area where respect for ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity prevails, and where people are neither excluded nor marginalized in any way; points out that the EU needs to adopt a systematic approach to the preservation and protection of minority languages and cultures” (European Parliament Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages 2014). 13  See Krausneker (2000). 12

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Second, parliamentary resolutions have only a limited impact. Ultimately, it is up to the Commission and the Council to formulate the Union’s language policy. The legalistic approach of the former and the consensual decision-making in the latter significantly lower the odds of a truly inclusive understanding of linguistic diversity. Activists have therefore sought recourse to alternative instruments, such as the Minority SafePack Initiative, in order “to improve the protection of persons belonging to national and linguistic minorities and strengthen cultural and linguistic diversity in the Union” (Anon 2017). It remains to be seen whether these attempts at norm contestation will succeed. In the meantime, the EU can offer linguistic minorities little more than access to funding schemes. Erasmus+ is a prominent example. This programme for education, training, youth and sport has already funded various projects related to regional and minority languages. The Digital Language Diversity Project, for instance, seeks “to advance the sustainability of Europe’s regional and minority languages in the digital world” (DLDP 2015). Another research project, ‘Advancing the European Multilingual Experience,’ endeavours to “increase our understanding of what it means to speak multiple languages in Europe today” (AThEME 2016). The European Commission’s Directorate-General on Education and Culture remains committed to the promotion of multilingualism. Linguistic minorities will undoubtedly benefit from these various efforts. Nevertheless, current projects are based on a narrow understanding of linguistic diversity: while emphasizing language learning and awareness, they fail to see linguistic minorities as rights-bearing individuals. Linguistic diversity continues to be about multilingualism, rather than minority language rights.

References Ammon, U. (2006). Language conflicts in the European Union. International Journal of Applied Linguistics, 16(3), 319–338. Anon. (2017). Minority SafePack Initiative: You Are Not Alone. One Million Signatures for Diversity in Europe. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/documents/1721.

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Arzoz, X. (2008). Introduction: Respecting Linguistic Diversity in the European Union. In X.  Arzoz (Ed.), Respecting Linguistic Diversity in the European Union (pp. 1–13). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. AThEME. (2016). Understanding What It Means to Speak More Than One Language. Retrieved from https://www.atheme.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2016/04/Flyer_AThEME_def.pdf. Birdsall, A. (2016). But We Don’t Call It ‘Torture’! Norm Contestation During the US ‘War on Terror.’. International Politics, 53(2), 176–197. Blok, A. (2008). Contesting Global Norms: Politics of Identity in Japanese Pro-­ Whaling Countermobilization. Global Environmental Politics, 8(2), 39–66. Cheneval, F., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2013). The Case for Demoicracy in the European Union. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(2), 334–350. Cianetti, L., & Nakai, R. (2017). Critical Trust in European Institutions: The Case of the Russian-Speaking Minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Problems of Post-Communism, 64(5), 276–290. Climent-Ferrando, V. (2016). Linguistic Neoliberalism in the European Union: Politics and Policies of the EU’s Approach to Multilingualism. Revista de Llengua i Dret, 66, 1–14. Council of the European Union. (2005). Council Conclusion of 13 June 2005 on the Official Use of Additional Languages within the Council and Possibly Other Institutions and Bodies of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union, C(148), 1–2. Csergő, Z., & Goldgeier, J.  M. (2009, November 17). Virtual Nationalism. Retrieved August 18, 2017, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/17/ virtual-nationalism/. Deitelhoff, N., & Zimmermann, L. (2013). Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of Contestation Affect the Validity of International Norms. PRIF Working Paper No. 18, Frankfurt. DLDP. (2015). The Digital Language Diversity Project. Retrieved from http:// www.dldp.eu/en/content/project. Doerr, N. (2012). Translating Democracy: How Activists in the European Social Forum Practice Multilingual Deliberation. European Political Science Review, 4(3), 361–384. EurActiv. (2009, March 25). Parliament Split Over Language Teaching. Retrieved from http://www.euractiv.com/section/languages-culture/news/parliamentsplit-over-language-teaching/. European Commission. (2005). A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism. COM (2005) 596 Final: Brussels, 22 November.

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European Commission. (2008). Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment. COM (2008) 566 Final: Brussels, 18 September. European Commission. (2013). State of the Union Address 2013. SPEECH/13/684: Strasbourg, 11 September. European Commission. (2014). Linguistic Diversity: The Heart of Europe’s DNA. SPEECH/14/492: Brussels, 24 June. European Communities. (2004). Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004–06. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. European Council. (2002). Presidency Conclusions. SN 100/1/02 REV 1: Barcelona, 15–16 March. European Court of Justice. (1999, February 23). European Parliament v Council of the European Union, No. C-42/97. European Parliament. (1981). Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities. Official Journal of the European Communities, C(287), 106–107. European Parliament. (2006a). A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism (Debate). A6-0372/2006: Strasbourg, 14 November. European Parliament. (2006b). Framework Strategy for Multilingualism. P6_ TA(2006)0488: Strasbourg, 15 November. European Parliament. (2006c). Promoting Multilingualism and Language Learning in the EU. P6_TA(2006)0184: Brussels, 27 April. European Parliament. (2006d). Promoting Multilingualism and Language Learning in the EU (Debate). A6-0074/2006: Brussels, 26 April. European Parliament. (2009a). Explanations of Vote: Report: Vasco Graça Moura (A6-0092/2009). A6-0092/2009: Strasbourg, 24 March. European Parliament. (2009b). Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment. P6_TA(2009)0162: Strasbourg, 24 March. European Parliament. (2009c). Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment. A6-0092/2009: Brussels, 24 February. European Parliament. (2009d). Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment (Short Presentation). A6-0092/2009: Strasbourg, 23 March. European Parliament. (2013a). Endangered European Languages and Linguistic Diversity. P7_TA(2013)0350: Strasbourg, 11 September. European Parliament. (2013b). Explanations of Votes: Endangered European Languages and Linguistic Diversity. A7-0239/2013: Strasbourg, 11 September. European Parliament Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages. (2014, April 17). The Strasbourg Manifesto on

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the Protection of National Minorities and Languages within the Framework of the European Union. Retrieved from http://www.e-f-a.org/fileadmin/user_ upload/documents/Studies_on_EFA_and_other_texts/Strasbourg_ Manifesto_Intergroup.pdf. Faingold, E. D. (2015). Language Rights in the European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon. Language Problems and Language Planning, 39(1), 33–49. Follesdal, A., & Hix, S. (2006). Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(3), 533–562. Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. Social Text, 25/26, 56–80. Grimm, D. (1995). Does Europe Need a Constitution? European Law Journal, 1(3), 282–302. Groß, L. (2015). The Journey from Global to Local: Norm Promotion, Contestation and Localisation in Post-war Kosovo. Journal of International Relations and Development, 18(3), 311–336. https://doi.org/10.1057/ jird.2015.16. Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (2001). Why Europe Needs a Constitution. New Left Review, 11, 5–26. Häggman, J. (2010). Multilingualism and the European Union. Europäisches Journal Für Minderheitenfragen, 4(2), 191–195. Hall, M. (2013, March 6). Learning Languages a Way Out of Crisis, Says Vassiliou. EurActiv. Retrieved from https://www.euractiv.com/section/languages-culture/news/learning-languages-a-way-out-of-crisis-says-vassiliou/. Hoffmann, M.  J. (2010). Norms and Social Constructivism in International Relations. In R. A. Denemark (Ed.), The International Studies Encyclopedia (Vol. 8, pp. 5410–5426). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Hogan-Brun, G., & Wolff, S. (2003). Minority Languages in Europe: An Introduction to the Current Debate. In G. Hogan-Brun & S. Wolff (Eds.), Minority Languages in Europe: Frameworks, Status, Prospects (pp.  3–15). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Holzscheiter, A. (2011). Power of Discourse or Discourse of the Powerful?: The Reconstruction of Global Childhood Norms in the Drafting of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Journal of Language & Politics, 10(1), 1–28.

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Meyer, C. (1999). Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union’s Communication Deficit. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(4), 617–639. Mos, M. (2018). Normative Ties That Bind? Contesting National and Sexual Minority Rights in a Post-Enlargement Europe. PhD dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca. Nanz, P. (2006). Europolis: Constitutional Patriotism Beyond the Nation-State. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Nic Craith, M. (2006). Europe and the Politics of Language: Citizens, Migrants and Outsiders. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Nic Shuibhne, N. (2007). Minority Languages, Law and Politics: Tracing EC Action. In D. Castiglione & C. Longman (Eds.), The Language Question in Europe and Diverse Societies: Political, Legal and Social Perspectives (pp. 123–147). Portland: Hart Publishing. NPLD. (n.d.). The European Roadmap for Linguistic Diversity: Towards a New Approach on Languages as Part of the European Agenda 2020. Brussels. Retrieved from http://www.npld.eu/uploads/publications/313.pdf. Ó Riagáin, D. (2001). The European Union and Lesser Used Languages. International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 3(1), 33–43. O’Rourke, B. (2011). Galician and Irish in the European Context: Attitudes Towards Weak and Strong Minority Languages. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sandholtz, W. (2008). Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules Against Wartime Plunder. European Journal of International Relations, 14(1), 101–131. Schmidt, V.  A. (2013). Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput.’. Political Studies, 61(1), 2–22. Stolfo, M. (2009). Unity in Diversity: The Role of the European Parliament in Promoting Minority Languages in Europe. In S. Pertot, T. M. S. Priestly, & C. H. Williams (Eds.), Rights, Promotion and Integration Issues for Minority Languages in Europe (pp. 32–43). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Suleiman, E. N. (2003). Dilemmas of Democracy in the European Union. In T. K. Rabb & E. N. Suleiman (Eds.), The Making and Unmaking of Democracy: Lessons from History and World Politics (pp. 134–159). Abingdon: Routledge. Taylor, C. (1998). The Dynamics of Democratic Exclusion. Journal of Democracy, 9(4), 143–156. Trenz, H.-J. (2007). Reconciling Diversity and Unity: Language Minorities and European Integration. Ethnicities, 7(2), 157–185.

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Tsakatika, M. (2007). Governance vs. Politics: The European Union’s Constitutive ‘Democratic Deficit.’. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(6), 867–885. Van de Steeg, M. (2002). Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in the European Union. European Journal of Social Theory, 5(4), 499–519. Van Els, T. (2005). Multilingualism in the European Union. International Journal of Applied Linguistics, 15(3), 263–281. Van Parijs, P. (2011). Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Venzke, I. (2009). Legal Contestation about “Enemy Combatants”: On the Exercise of Power in Legal Interpretation. Journal of International Law and International Relations, 5(1), 155–184. Verloo, M., & Lombardo, E. (2007). Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in Europe: Introducing a Critical Frame Analysis Approach. In M.  Verloo (Ed.), Multiple Meanings of Gender Equality: A Critical Frame Analysis of Gender Policies in Europe (pp. 21–49). Budapest: Central European University Press. Vizi, B. (2016). Territoriality and Minority Language Rights. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 23(4), 429–453. Welsh, J.  M. (2013). Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect. Global Responsibility to Protect, 5, 365–396. Wiener, A. (2004). Contested Compliance: Interventions on the Normative Structure of World Politics. European Journal of International Relations, 10(2), 189–234. Wiener, A. (2014). A Theory of Contestation. Heidelberg: Springer. Wiener, A. (2018). Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, C. H. (2008). Linguistic Minorities in Democratic Context. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Williams, C. H. (2009). Let Freedom Reign: The Impress of EU Integration on Minority Survival. In E. Prügl & M. Thiel (Eds.), Diversity in the European Union (pp. 185–203). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wodak, R. (2012). Language, Power and Identity. Language Teaching, 45(2), 215–233. Wright, S. (2009). The Elephant in the Room: Language Issues in the European Union. European Journal of Language Policy, 1(2), 93–119.

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Zappettini, F. (2014). ‘A Badge of Europeanness’: Shaping Identity Through the European Union’s Institutional Discourse on Multilingualism. Journal of Language and Politics, 13(3), 375–402.

Interviews Climent-Ferrando, Vicent. European Network to Promote Linguistic Diversity, face-to-face interview, Brussels, 26 February 2016. Dorfmann, Herbert. MEP (EPP/Italy), face-to-face interview, Brussels, 20 April 2016. Giménez Barbat, María Teresa. MEP (ALDE/Spain), face-to-face interview, Brussels, 23 May 2016. Hicks, Davyth. European Language Equality Network, phone interview, 26 April 2016. Sógor, Csaba. MEP (EPP/Romania), face-to-face interview, Brussels, 18 February 2016. Stevens, Helga. MEP (ECR/Belgium), face-to-face interview, Brussels, 15 March 2016.

4 The Grilling: An Ethnographic Language Policy Analysis of Multilingualism Performed in the European Parliament Péter K. Szabó

4.1 Introduction The European Parliament (EP), with 751 members elected from 28 member states, is a supranational institution practising, performing and publicly representing European Union (EU) multilingualism. The EP was divided in the 2014–2019 term into eight Political Groups of European party families deliberating and drawing up legislation with the support of translation and interpreting services. This multilingual practice on the EP floor is exhibiting quantifiable changes noted in recent surveys and research (e.g. Wright 2007; EP 2012; Kruse and Ammon 2013; Gazzola 2016). These accounts indicate that interacting agents increasingly often choose to deploy a linguistic resource other than the official national language(s) of their member state. Most language policy research and language policymaking conceptualize these trends as a

P. K. Szabó (*) Tilburg University, Tilburg School of Humanities (TSH), Tilburg, Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 K. Strani (ed.), Multilingualism and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40701-8_4

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zero-­sum game between lingua franca practices,1 dominated by English, and what they frame as the use of official national languages by native speakers. The latter practice is often conveniently identified with multilingualism itself, in a discursive framing described in the critical concept of EU multilingualism as a “collective container of parallel separate monolingualisms” by Rindler-Schjerve and Vetter (2012, p. 54) and analysed as discursive constructs of “hegemonic multilingualism” by Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2010). In this conventional perspective, actually existing EU multilingualism is often seen as an external factor, a hindrance, or at best a quality deficit to transnational communication potentially moving towards the formation of a European Public Sphere (EPS) or a European polity.2 At the opposite end of the political spectrum, it is identified as a threat to the status planning and corpus planning position of national languages in essentialist ideologies often manifested in anti-EU political argumentation. In both discursive framings, a fundamental dichotomy of binary opposition in language policy conceptualizations juxtaposes the use of official national languages with lingua franca practices, mostly in lingua franca English (LFE). Deriving from this dichotomy, language policy discourses3 postulate a further dichotomy in the split between a more or

 The use of Lingua Franca English (LFE) is included in my understanding of lingua franca practices as deployments of linguistic resources as a common means of communication for speakers of different first languages (L1s). 2  The question is raised by Strani (2014, p.  34), if the increasing multilingualism of debates in globalizing deliberative public spheres with increased complexity and mediatization may constitute a case of “pseudo-communication” and hence “false consensus” (Habermas 1970, p. 205). In the specific case of the EP floor where deliberation and consensus are constantly monitored by agents and audiences with a wide range of resource competence, and are checked against interpreted speech and translated texts, this question may be less relevant. As the ethnographic discourse analysis of the European Social Forum by Doerr (2009, p. 149) concludes: “the absence of one common language within the European assemblies, contrary to what one might intuitively suppose, does not reduce the quality of democratic deliberation, as compared to the national context”. 3  Including language policy regulations, like the EP’s Code of Conduct on Multilingualism (EP 2014). 1

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less discreet and distinct institutional, and a societal EU multilingualism (e.g. Van Els 2005; De Swaan 2007; Wright 2007; EP 2014). In the following, the empirical validity of these language ideological dichotomies in language policy conceptualizations of EU multilingualism, relevant to the potential characteristics of an EPS emerging through communicative and social practice, is investigated in an ethnographic analysis of situated multilingual practice observed in a parliamentary hearing. In this epistemological perspective, EU multilingualism is not only a collection of languages understood as distinct conduit channels for the exchange of referential meanings in argumentative policy debates, as most language policy conceptualizations frame it. It is observed as a deictic medium for the partition of social space through communicative performance. In this research framework, indexical meaning-making in the social domain of the EP floor is accessed through performances of recognized resource contrast, and meta-pragmatic reflections on them, by agents. The ethnographic analysis of this practice is pursued from the emic position of the participant observer, which I can claim to possess, having worked as an EP conference interpreter for a decade, attending and co-constructing the speech event under analysis from the interpreters’ booth. In this study, the discursive co-construction of social contexts and the perpetual dyadic acts of identification and authentication by participants through speech is observed as it unfolds in multilingual European Parliament encounters. The aim is to explore emergent socio-political configurations of normativities and social organization potentials towards a communicative space and a collective constituted by this communicative space and developing it, even in contestation. This social practice is observed and analysed according to what Michailidou and Trenz (2013, p. 262) propose as a “reconceptualization of EU political representation as a triadic and mediatized communicative act between political agents, constituents and the audience (to) apply the notion of ‘audience democracy’ to the representative politics of the EU”.

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4.1.1 T  he EP Floor as a Multilingual Setting of Indexical Differentiation The EP floor is a key site of public discourse production, circulation and representation, and it can be conceptualized in terms of an emergent “transnational community of communication (…) in which speakers and listeners recognize each other as legitimate participants in a common discourse”, as Risse and Van de Steeg (2003, p. 21) describe a salient feature of European public spheres.4 It is a polycentric and multi-scalar setting of meaning-making and of discursive and social action. A speech held on the floor is a performance in both the ontological-perlocutionary and dramatic sense (Wodak 2009; Hajer 2006), which is made meanings of, and is often explicitly addressed to, various publics in various places and temporalities. These performances are multilingual. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) deploy increasingly plurilingual repertoires that include lingua franca resources, as diachronies of their repertoire performance in code choices indicate.5 Simultaneous interpreting is provided in some or all of the now 24 official languages in most session meeting formations. In the conceptual framework hosting the present analysis, the observed discursive and social practices of identification in the unfolding semiotic-cum-social organization through interactions are understood to perform what Gal defines as “an axis of differentiation that allocates contrasting values to linguistic forms” towards “discursive formulation and institutional achievements” (Gal 2011, p. 29) in the language ideology underlying language policies of EU multilingualism. In this research framework, the observed deictic6 and intersubjective language-ideological accomplishments on the floor are connected to social identifications by differentiation through their indexical effects.  Quoting one of the three conditions originally conceptualized by Eder and Kantner (2000).  Available under the “contributions to plenary debates” link of individual MEPs in the speech records archive accessible at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/home. 6  The dialectical relationship between micro-contexts of interaction and macro-sociological categories, through the indexicality of deployed and perceived semiotic repertoires is explained by Silverstein (2003, p. 202): “…we think macro-sociologically of conventional or institutionalized qualitative and perhaps quantitative frameworks of social differentiation—partitions and gradiations of social space, we might term them—that are presupposed/entailed in-and-by the specifics instantiated in micro-context as it develops during an interaction”. 4 5

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The dialectical connection of ethnographically observed and analysed interactional micro-practices of contrast to macro-sociological categories is not only inherent in the epistemology of the ethnography of language policy (see Pérez-Milans 2018 for a recent summary) but is specifically relevant to the EP floor, which functions as a multi-scalar mediated public site of the performance and uptake of discourse. The broadcast and Internet availability of political discourse in EP meetings to potential publics means that acts of speech on the EP floor have at least two parallel audiences and addressed participant frames: those physically present, mostly fellow politicians, and a variety of mediated or virtual participants, including politicians, professionals, journalists and citizens attending by means of the new and conventional media in a variety of temporalities and physical locations in member states or beyond. On the EP floor, discourse practices of “institutional co-performance” (Ilie 2010, p.  66) project addressees and audiences, in a process of identity co-­ construction, which thus result in a “discursive mix of voices and participants frames” as Kjeldsen (2013, p. 21) refers to the dialogic heteroglossia (Bakhtin) of EP speeches. Therefore, the EP floor understood as a forum of public deliberation entails, beyond the actual arena of the physical confines of the participatory framework in the debating chamber, various galleries of meaning-­ making in various locations and temporalities. The two dimensions are assigned to the “arena” and the “gallery” (Gerhards and Neidhardt 1991) of public deliberation, the latter supplemented in later extensions of the model with the backstage (Rinke 2016), also conceptualized specifically for MEPs in the EP by Wodak (2009) and includes public communicators, politicians and journalists who prepare and interact out of public sight. Multi-scalar re-contextualizations can thus take a minute verbal exchange on the floor into a media discourse context transposed into a public sphere, and/or may directly impact legislation by the amendment of a law text being debated in the given session. These simultaneous leaps or trajectories of potential entextualizations (Baumann and Briggs 1990) of utterances across context levels is how EP speeches travel on trajectories across scales and domains (Agha 2005) in the mediated “audience democracy” (Michailidou and Trenz 2013) of the layered, multi-scalar and polycentric potential of the EP floor. This feature of contemporary

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parliamentary discourse opens the linguistic anthropological setting of the EP floor, and its interacting agents observed in the following as a Community of Practice (CofP) (e.g. Eckert and  Wenger 2005; Holmes and Meyerhoff 1999; Moore 2010) to broader social domains (Agha 2005, 2007) and macro-sociological scales of meaning-making in EU multilingualism practice. The CofP concept is specifically employed to analyse parliamentary assemblies by Harris (2001) and Ilie (2010), and for the EP per se by Wodak (2009). In the following analysis of the observed CofP of an EP Committee, further groupings are seen to take shape within the institutionally cut one, through extending and overlapping boundaries of differentiation negotiated and/or emerging in participant engagements in the progressing practice of observed multilingual interaction. In this emic description of observed encounters, the heuristic application of analytical models, all related to Goffman’s (1967) concept of face-work, include Face-Threatening Acts (FTAs), specifically applied for parliamentary discourse in terms of impoliteness strategies7 by Harris (2001) and Ilie (2001). The constitutive discursive processes of propositional and indexical differentiation are explored in the following in a debating session on the EP floor.

4.1.2 A  nalysis of an Observed Performance of EU Multilingualism The Setting of the Speech Event The speech event takes place during a hearing by the Committee of Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the EP. ECON is one of the most powerful political and policy-making bodies of the EP with 50 full and 49 substitute members from 26 member states, with 23 official languages, representing seven Political Groups and including three independent MEPs. The data were taken in the sixth EP term between 2013 and  These discursive strategies are defined in the framework of politeness theory (Brown and Levinson 1987) and its critical re-conceptualizations (see Kádár and Haugh 2013 for a recent summary) and broader accounts of sociopragmatic competence. 7

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2014, and political groupings and membership have changed since. This should be noted without, however, impacting the sociolinguistic relevance of the observed multilingual interactions. In the pursuit of the negotiated joint enterprise of policy-making through mutual engagements, members of this CofP come together in one- or two-day Committee meetings set out in the EP sessions agenda every month, through the deployment of joint semiotic resources from their shared repertoire for negotiating meanings (Wenger 1998: 85), facilitated by simultaneous interpreting. In exercising its supervisory powers, ECON invites the President of the Eurogroup, a top EU Council formation of the Ministers of Finance of the Eurozone member states, twice a year to a hearing termed the Economic Dialogue. At its meeting on 21 March 2013, the ECON Committee for the first time exercised this legislative prerogative and invited the newly appointed Eurogroup President, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Minister of Finance of the Netherlands. Dijsselbloem would report on crucial policies of increased Community powers and to give an account of the Eurogroup’s actions and plans on safeguarding the common currency, as well as of EU-level economic policy measures in general. As a leader of a co-legislating EU Institution, Dijsselbloem holds a thoroughbred EU community job to be enacted by leading the college of finance ministers of member states in a primus inter pares position. This entails a duality of roles and institutional identities, being at once a Minister of Finance of a member state, and leader of a top community legislator, under which he is summoned to the hearing. The occasion is of high relevance, the general theme being the signs of recovery from the financial and economic crisis, the standing of the Euro, and the burning topical issue of the banking crunch in Cyprus to be remedied by a disputed multibillion bail-out plan by member states. There is an impression that the EP, a co-legislator along the intergovernmental Council, had not been sufficiently involved in the deal, strengthening the general atmosphere of critical resentment in the Chamber. This tension was

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reflected in the Europarl media report of the event, which called it a “grilling”.8 The interest in the issues to be discussed and in the person of the freshly appointed 48-year-old president is keen. There is a full house attendance and a strong media presence, and the whole meeting is web-­ streamed and broadcast online, recorded in archived format by the EP TV on the web.9 Interpretation is provided in full regime in and from all the 23 languages. The Chair of the committee, Bowles (ALDE—UK), is seated with the two vice-chairs and two officials of the committee secretariat to her right and the guest to her left, the latter aided by a single officer to stand what is evidently going to be a difficult exercise. The meeting is the first point in the morning agenda, and as the guest is led to his seat, the murmuring subsides in expectation, resembling the start of a theatre performance. The Chair calls for order, and at 9.05 the hearing begins. In a lengthy introduction of recent events, Bowles ushers in the guest in standard English rich in professional terminology, and in a polite but definitely critical vein, refers to the hearing as a “baptism by fire”. She also explains the rules for floor appointment, speaking times and turn-­ taking, according to the habitual scripts of the Committee’s practice. Then, Dijsselbloem is given the floor.

The Sociolinguistic Analysis of the Performance Dijsselbloem makes a confident ten-minute introductory speech, coherently couched in an idiosyncratic resource characterized by an ease of flow and exact professional terminology, delivered in a consistent register and articulate style, smoothly adapting to the institutional genre laid out by the previous speaker. In contrast to Bowles, however, his performance exhibits a set of perceptual features widely dubbed in empirical

 “Euro group chief grilled over Cyprus,” Europarl TV, 21.03.2013, retrieved at: https://www. europarltv.europa.eu/programme/others/eurogroup-chief-grilled-over-cyprus. 9  The video archive of the entire meeting is retrievable at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/ en/committees/video?event=20130321-0900-COMMITTEE-ECON. 8

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participant practice, and by some researchers, as Euro-English.10 This first impression effected by a range of aural-auditory signs within a broader realm of the semiotic repertoire deployed, strikes the participant’s ear in cues of prosody and pronunciation. After listening for some time, lexical, morpho-syntactical and discourse organizational features would also come to be encapsulated in the assessment11; however, the immediate identification relies on paralinguistic and linguistic features of voice quality, intonation and pronunciation. In this process of sociolinguistic co-­ construction, the contexts available and accessible in indexical terms for assessment by members of the CofP, bounded by shared practices of multilingual verbal and written exchanges and meaning-making, are open even to participants without native competence in either the L1 or L2 of the speaker, including myself in the participant observer position. The primary indexical signs of identification and contextualization, acoustic and phonetic cues, are taken up as soon as the speaker begins talking, with a significantly more restricted pitch-range, rhythm and intonation pattern, in contrast to the prosody exhibited by the interlocutor’s standard Native Speaker English (NSE) resource. The agile pitch movements within a wider pitch range, for example, descent high falls, the phonation types of creaky voice (Keating et al. 2015) characteristic of native intonation and voice quality, and the typical pre-glottalization, the so-called glottal stops, so distinguishable in NSE, including RP realizations (Milroy et al. 1994), are also absent from Dijsselbloem’s utterances. The indexical effects towards the identification of speaker and contextualization of the speech event connecting micro-level practice to macro-­ sociological categories of valorization in EU Multilingual practice extend  This is not the place to take a stance on whether Euro-English is developing as a distinct variety of its own on a par with the New Englishes of the Expanding Circle or not. Authors sceptical about the claim (e.g. Mollin 2006) also describe phonological, lexical and morpho-syntactical features relevant to European lingua franca English corpora (for Dutch English, also Edwards 2014). Understood in the strict sense as the linguistic practice customary in professional meetings and communications of EU institutions, it is a shared resource type in overlapping repertoires of professionals with various European L1s. 11  To what extent recognition is available beyond the prosody/phonetics level has not been systematically enquired by research. As Edwards (2014, p.  139) points out, “(a)lthough ESL varieties show widespread and systematic nativisation of features at the phonological, morphosyntactic, lexical and pragmatic levels (…), to date, no comprehensive study within the World Englishes paradigm has considered the linguistic forms of Dutch English”. 10

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beyond simply identifying the participant talking as a Non-Native English (NNE) or LFE speaker. A more fine-grained sociolinguistic identification is accessible and available to the general participant by further indexical cues, in perceptual effects by transfer phenomena of features and patterns from the speaker’s L1 phonological and phonetic systems and prosody, into the L2 realization. Most salient in the idiolect is perhaps the voicing of consonants and some confusion or unstable realizations of the fortis/lenis contrasts (F-f ) in stressed syllables, which result in the under-voicing of English lenis fricatives in the speaker’s utterances (e.g. “value”, “vital interest”). This general characteristic of English production by standard Dutch L1 speakers (Collins and Mees 2003), especially in word-final positions and assimilations, is a marker which is evidently present and often appears in the speech unfolding (e.g. “imperative”, “inevitable”), along sporadic, but marked consonant realizations, where Dutch /f –fˇ/ is confused with English /v/ as in “native”, or the Dutch type assimilation /fˇ/ in “advice”. At some points the English /dʒ/ is realized as the alveolo-palatal affricate Dutch /dj/, like in the utterance “legislation”, or the English /tʃ/ is substituted by Dutch beetje-type sequence /tj/, like in the utterance “future exchanges”. These emblematic utterance tokens betray the auditory judgement of most participants, members of the CofP with the shared repertoire of practised EU multilingualism, and of the broader social domains of meaning-making, the LFE production of a Dutch L1 speaker. This identification does not require native competence in either English or Dutch, and is effected by indexical features of what is labelled, and variously conceptualized and analysed in recent research, along different language ideologies, as “Dutch English” (Edwards 2014), “Dutch accented English” (Van Doel 2006) or the “Polder-English” variety dubbed by Koet (2007). This perception is further confirmed, and perhaps fine-tuned, by other cues of the Dutch phonological inventory slightly transpiring at times in the vowel quality of the diphthongal glides (Dutch diphthongs /ɛi/ and / œʏ̯//oʊ̯//aʊ̯/) at points when realizing English phonemes, slightly and sporadically detectable to the observer, as in “watertight”. This feature, however, is much less marked in the idiolect than what the characteristically strong diphthongization of some Northern or Randstad Dutch L1

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speakers of LFE exhibit. Another marked Northern feature, the “Amsterdam shibboleth” (Koet 2007, p. 52) in the “dullness” of the articulation of the English /z/ closer to the English /∫/ or the Dutch /sj/, is totally absent from the clear /z/ realizations in the utterances (e.g. in “easy”). The same goes for another emblematic Randstad Dutch token, the specific uvular, so-called bunched /r/ or (in Dutch) brouwende /r/ (Collins and Mees 2003, p. 179; Koet 2007, p. 53), which is practically absent from the utterances. Realizations of the /r/ allophones, moreover, to most participants with some knowledge of, or exposure history, to Dutch— available to participants in the Belgian capital—perceivably shows that the L1 is presumably not Belgian Dutch (BD), but rather Dutch of the Netherlands (ND). The /r/s in the utterances are mostly alluvial, and at times retroflex, resembling the Standard American English (SAE) but never the trill or tongue r type (BD) Flemish speakers customarily produce in many positions. Beyond his usual tapped /r/, some sporadic definite and rhotic retroflex realization of the consonant (e.g. in “require”), gives the impression that the resource, although mostly accommodated to a British RP phonology, shows a slight North American—or perhaps Irish—colour influence and acquisition trajectory. This impression is supported by the /ae/ of the reference vowel TRAP instead of BATH in his utterance of “pass”, accessible even to participants with no Dutch competence. To very competent or native speakers of Dutch, the particular LFE production would certainly provide indexical assessment availabilities towards a more fine-grained identification of the chronotopic voice, including spatio-temporal and social contextualization, and identification of a regional and socioeconomic position and acquisition trajectory ascribed to the speaker. This diachrony is available to them by the acoustic assessment of prosody and allophones of the L1 variety transpiring in the synchronic LFE production.12 The performance thus carries the  This availability of regional recognition by dialectal inferences from the L1 into the L2 is implied in conventional phonetics studies of EFL pronunciation by and for Dutch L1 speakers (Gussenhoven and Broeders 1997, pp. 72–73) or in the “error analysis” of Collins and Mees (2003). That this recognition is happening in social practice and has a social effect of positioning and judgement is confirmed by Koet (2007), who, by a weak but significant statistical correlation, found a “sociolin12

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virtual (Hülmbauer 2013, p. 60) potential of English as a lingua franca speech, defined as an integrated and integrating practice tapping resources from within the code, and from without, coming from, and indexing, resources from speakers’ plurilingual repertoires, including their L1. The more particular repertoire category of Euro-English within LFE resources displaying more or less discernible features of European L1 substrates, sometimes evident and stereotypical, sometimes hardly noticeable to other European L1 speakers with some LFE competence, has become increasingly native in the EP. To the observer, the performance of the LFE resource accommodates to the linguistic forms and discourse patterns relevant to the genre, register and style attributed to the incumbent multifaceted community of the EP floor, while revealing traces of its origin of “coming from somewhere” particular. Meanwhile, contrasted with the introductory speech by Bowles, it does not give the impression of any essential contrast, inferiority, or deficit: neither in terms of the linguistic form (an LFE, contrasted to her NSE resource, strictly juxtaposed by normative beliefs of prevailing conventional language ideologies), nor in linguistic anthropological terms of community membership (sharply differentiated by the institutional roles determining the event). The idiosyncratic resource deployed here blends into the joint repertoire of the CofP, doing business in discourses bounded by a characteristic register, style, terminology and jargon, deployed in the L1s of the members but increasingly often in an L1-coloured L2, predominantly LFE. The genred performance (Baumann and Briggs 1990) of multimodal semiosis staged by the guest approximates to the broadly defined shared repertoire (Wenger 1998, p. 82.) of the addressed community; we might term this the ECON style of speech. Honing in analytical attention within this repertoire to the narrower set of linguistic forms and their chronotopic (spatio-temporal) indexical information available for meaning-making in the observed context, it certainly does. Such institutionally shaped and genred LFE discourse performances of policy-framing deliberation, indexically nuanced by guistic halo effect” in that “Dutch listeners are influenced by characteristics of the speakers’ Dutch that they perceive in the speakers’ English (whereby) it stands to reason that these are characteristics that they associate with varieties of Dutch, to the speakers of which they also attribute personal and social characteristics” (Koet 2007, p. 101).

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European L1 substrate features, claim an “aperspectival objectivity” (Woolard 2008, p. 309) attributed to the global expert of supranational EU voices. These voices have by now become authentic phenomena in the “discursive political economy of economics” (Maesse 2015) in EP policy debates through discursive strategies of expert identity construction and legitimation towards a powerful, hegemonic position of EU multilingualism practice emergent on the EP floor.13 After Dijsselbloem’s introductory speech, the floor is opened for questions. Following interventions in French, Portuguese, German and Greek, responded to by Dijsselbloem in English, the chair gives the floor to the head of the Dutch delegation  in the European Peoples’ Party (EPP), Wortmann-Kool. As she begins, however, a substitute non-aligned member of the Committee from the radically anti-EU Partij voor de Vrijheid of the Netherlands, Zijlstra, interrupts in English and points out, in polite and precise terms, that according to the housekeeping rules of the Committee, after the round of Group speakers it is his turn as a non-­ attached member to pose a question. He is an MEP without a parliamentary Group, which means that he and his fellow party members of the PVV have not applied or were not invited by any Group to join them—a fact which not only deprives them of various benefits in parliamentary work enjoyed by others (e.g. speaking time) but also casts the shadow of an outsider position over them, strengthened by their stance of negating the whole political system, institution and discursive forum they are after all part of, and make use. Measured against the three dimensions of CofP membership within the hierarchy, this position is a delicate one, moving on an outbound trajectory towards a peripheral or marginal status (Davies 2005; Moore 2010) due to the evident deficits in the “joint enterprise” component. On the other hand, the discursive, semiotic and behavioural resources of the “shared repertoire” deployed throughout interactions of “mutual engagement” seamlessly fit into the genred practices of the CofP, as also confirmed by the observed exchange presented here. In response to the intervention, Bowles, a central member of the CofP, evidently  This observation is in line with what Williams and Williams (2016) conceptualize as a recent shift of dislocated discursive nodal points towards a new discourse formation re-defining language ideologies and superseding the incumbent one underlying the high modern nation state. 13

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annoyed and reluctant, approves the legitimate request but at the same time calls upon time constraints: Keep the time frame! If you don’t, you won’t get an answer.

Zijlstra, thus manifestly pushed by the interlocutor towards the periphery or margins of the CofP, announces that he will address the guest in Dutch. Questioning the integrity of the interlocutor with otherwise deferential lexical choices of “rule-governed rudeness” (Lakoff 1989, p.  123), he delivers face-threatening acts (FTAs) without much redress. The acts can also be explained by social pragmatics research as elements of an impoliteness strategy (e.g. Culpeper 2011; Harris 2001), a resource customarily harnessed for parliamentary debates. Commenting on Dijsselbloem’s record and posing in part rhetorical questions, not actually requesting information, to highlight the futility of the entire European project and his role within that, he focuses on Dijsselbloem’s statements on the Euro, made a few days earlier in the Parliament of the Netherlands. During the intervention, Dijsselbloem repeatedly shakes his head and turns away from the speaker, towards his aide on the left, to have his negation and disapproval confirmed. He does not have his headset on. The Chair, with a headset on, looks annoyed and hardly waiting for Zijlstra (and the interpreter) to finish, gets rid of the head-set with relieved impatience and interjects: You have taken nearly all the time, so you won’t get answers necessarily.

The atmosphere in the room palpably stiffens, and so does Dijsselbloem, who delivers his answer in English from the very outset and faces off Zijlstra’s performance, bluntly challenging the truth of his words in what amounts to a face-invading act: Thank you for your concern, we are doing just fine … Secondly, you misquoted me, what I was supposed to have said in the national Parliament […] … ehmm, I was asked by the Socialist Party in the Dutch Parliament, would I … err, [turning to aside to his aide] … how do you say… his is, ehmm, errr … I am thinking about the Dutch debate now [with rotating

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gestures of the hand around his head, simulating rewinding, or putting on a hat] … so I’m having a translation problem, err … but I made it quite clear that first of all it had nothing to do with the deposit guarantee system, though I understand that there was confusion on that … I was very, very specific and clear on that. …just a small amount from the money machines, whether that’s an … err, imposur …, impositi…, err, how do you say [looks at his aide] … a breach of the … errr … free capital [looks aside again, by now the aide is alert and helps him out in a whisper] … movement, thanks … my English is giving up all of a sudden.

Bowles interrupts and offers Dijsselbloem a way-out: Bowles: “You can speak in Dutch…” Dijsselbloem: “Huhh uhh, ehhmmm, hmm, er, no and I don’t think it’s true, we are within the legal frameworks…”

At this point Dijsselbloem not only acts as his own interpreter and is meta-pragmatically discussing this duality of roles connecting two distinct speech events, but he also reflects from an external position, also with and by means of linguistic choice, upon a past occurrence he had enacted in a different and distinctly detached subject position. As the Bakhtinian insight into the “invokable histories” (Blommaert 2015, p. 110) by chronotopes and the heteroglossic nature of meaning-making through dialogically evolving points of view, voices, identities and the interactions among them is explained by Wang and Kroon (2017, p. 9), “each chronotope installs its own discursive frames and orders of indexicality (and, thus, of authenticity)”. And these are neither homogeneous nor monotonous. As the discursive and semiotic performance falters for an instant, the effect of the dialogically orchestrated performance of the two voices, sources of two points of view from two time-space realities, reveals its own internal dialogic clockwork. One time-space reality the voice, invoked in one resource—“Dutch”—went through interferes with the performance of another time-space reality to be performed with another resource—“English”—in the immediate spatio-temporal envelope of the observed event.

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The guest, in the immediate context of the EP floor performing an identity in the multilingual discursive space of EU multilingualism as the head of a supreme Community entity concurrent and parallel to the EP, also literally re-interprets into English a discursive action performed in another context from another position, in another resource. The speech act he performed in the Tweede Kamer, the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament, as the Minister appointed by the Labour Party of the government coalition to be responsible for executing the national budget of the Netherlands, back in a past moment, vis-à-vis taxpayers, citizens and voters of the country, is transposed in a sudden discourse trajectory into the context of the ECON hearing of the EP.  In the here and now of this hearing, he acts as a leader responsible for the common currency and essential economic conditions of an entity integrating 333 million people in 17 states and determines outlooks for the other 70 million. The performance is to be staged on a polemical note, refuting a challenge to the integrity of his word, under a face-invading threat. The act is not a simple one, and he indeed lapses in keeping up the fluency of the skilled performance, one that happens to deploy the English resource of indexical choice. In a vulnerable moment of linguistic solitude turning to his aide, recruiting a third voice in a meta-pragmatic distress call about the discourse channel itself, he remarks: “How do you say… I have translation problems”. Then, continuing in a meta-linguistic remark, he reflects on his role as his own interpreter and on his lapse in the performance in the resource, and the identification and contextualization it is to index: “My English is giving up all of a sudden”, while Bowles, experienced in using the interpretation service in the House, comes to his aid: “You can speak in Dutch”. He just does not do that. These possibilities of meaning are available to interlocutors and discourse participants in the context co-constructed by them. For a comparative hypothesis, it is intriguing to imagine the same intervention being made by the speaker in Dutch. Responding to the face-invading act negating the legitimacy of his stance in his L1 would not only have deprived the speaker of performing a stark indexical contrast to the challenger in the multilingual arena but also have kept the argument and the exchange within the confines of a Dutch discourse with participants with no—or limited—competence in the resource, following in simultaneous

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interpretation the relaying of a polemic exegesis of semantic and pragmatic, perhaps dialectal indexical, nuances of intended meanings in another language, and discursive context, detached from the immediate setting and social situation defined by the community of most participants physically present in real time. The debate would have remained more in the spatio-temporal envelope of the Tweede Kamer rather than enter the EP floor. Responding in English, however, a resource most people in the room listen to directly, has palpably transposed it into a different context and community domain of meaning-making, to which the Tweede Kamer lies outside. Exactly in line with the assumed intentions of the speaker to inhabit a persona distinct from the one who had spoken in there, and most definitely other than whom Zijlstra is invoking. Listening to the exchange, it also seems that Zijlstra, like many other speakers in the genre of hearings, appears to strive to make a statement, rather than to pose a genuine question requesting information or sustain a dialogue by engagement. The speech is more like a press release, only occasioned by the presence of the guest, rather than an actual interactional turn of deliberative engagement. The performance seems to deploy rhetorical and semiotic resources to access a mediated and mediatized EP audience of the multi-scalar gallery/-ies and backstage/-s as a third party and primary scale, rendering the face-to-face participatory framework of the incumbent CofP as secondary in terms of relevance to the meaning-­ making of the utterances, in spite of gaze, body orientation and physical arrangements of focused attention in the Chamber. This footing shift effects an audience design of a collective third party of “alleged overhearers”14 (Dynel 2011, p. 25), with no conversational responsibilities and not including the nominal ratified addressees, fundamentally reconfiguring the context of the event. This option seems to be open to the interpretation of other co-participants, for instance, those speaking Dutch for the most part, and renounced by Dijsselbloem’s persistent and  To the multi-scalar EP floor, the concept of alleged overhearers is especially relevant. It is a modification of Goffman’s framework to cover “ratified participants (third parties) when speakers not only are heedful of them, but also intend to be listened to by them” (Dynel 2011, p. 25) in situations when “speaker may overtly address one participant, while intending to communicate meanings primarily to another ratified hearer (in) the complexity of polylogues where differentiating between the addressee and another participant, i.e. third party may not always be possible” (op. cit., p. 11). 14

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contrasting code choice of local differentiation, co-occurring with an effect of foregrounding orientation to the incumbent CofP of the actual participatory framework present for engagements. It is now Wortmann-Kool (E P P -NL), an opponent of Dijsselbloem’s in the party-political spectrum, who is given the floor: Dank U wel, Voorzitter, het is niet verbazend mijnheer Dijsselbloem dat Uw Engels erop achteruitgaat, als mijn voorganger … een Nederlands debat ervan probeert te maken, maar wij zijn hier in het Europese Parlement en dank voor uw komst, naar deze Commissie. U maakt geen gemakkelijke start (…) Thank you Chair! It is no wonder Mr. Dijsselbloem that your English flounders, for the previous speaker … attempts to turn this into a Dutch debate, whereas we are in the European Parliament here, and I thank you for coming to our committee. You did not have an easy start….

Discursively co-constructing the speech event and the social domain, affected by it and affecting it through contextualization(s) and identification(s), Wortmann-Kool reflects upon a link between the preferential semiotic resources, the discursive performance, and the identity outcome of the utterances. This meta-pragmatic rationalization of talk, and meta-linguistic commentary on resource forms, is contextualizing the performance and creates a direct link between the linguistic form and social meanings of indexical group alignment by signs of an identity in an explicit denotational assertion. At this crucial juncture, adequation and distinction (Bucholtz and Hall 2010) are accomplished at various levels and in different configurations by the very same utterance and speech act. It is evident that although the speaker’s position according to political party and institutional loyalty is in opposition to Dijsselbloem’s, she chooses to discursively enter a subject position by propositional statements which overlaps with his, and with Zijlstra’s party stance outside the CofP boundary which this shift creates. It should also be noted that nationality/ethnicity does not factor in, but rather sharpens the visibility of the interplay of configurations of relative identity positions this discursive and social positioning of self and other, or “we” and “them”, is going through, catalysed by the position Zeilstra

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is performing. Moreover, the speaker propositionally asserts preference for keeping the discourse in a European framing and not letting it slip back to a national debate confined to the matters and interests of the political community of the Netherlands. What is intriguing, however, is that this is done in the denotational code of Dutch, contrary to the speaker’s diachronic record of speaking strictly in English in committee meetings and alternately speaking Dutch or English only in Plenaries, and in spite of the conscious meta-pragmatic and metalinguistic language policy reflection on the link between preferred code and ascribed identity in the actual context of the unfolding speech event. Interestingly, whereas on the propositional and meta-discursive level the speaker is perceived as taking side with the guest, thus effecting adequation, on another level her utterances effect distinction in the subject position accomplished by the discourse in exhibiting resource contrast within the shared repertoire. The code choice and indexically invoked subject position of Dijsselbloem are accommodated and confirmed both propositionally and by indexical choice in a speech act by Berman, a Dutch Socialist from the political party family of the guest. Towards the end of the meeting, in a half-joking tone, without being formally given the floor, he interrupts Bowles and comments, in English: …this almost leads to a question to the Minister of Finance of the Netherlands!

His remark in the LFE form and function points out the mutable duality of roles and thus propositionally confirms the explicit boundary between the identification of the guest posited to be relevant from the alternate subject positions and social personas ambiguously attributed to the guest by participants throughout the speech event. The utterances in an LFE form of contrast effect a semiotic authentication (Bucholtz 2003) of the performance by the guest and at the same time propositionally confirm and foreground his preferred identification (i.e. not the Minister of Finance of the Netherlands). This propositional, linguistic-indexical, discursive-political, intersubjective and positively polite act, evidently supporting and enhancing his face wants, even at the cost of challenging the

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authority of a central figure of the CofP—the Chairwoman—is reacted upon with visible alleviation and gratitude by Dijsselbloem: I know, I know {laughter} and I try to be as frank and open as I can … and I know, to address this issue we have to do it internationally and in the European Union together, together!

4.1.3 Discussion In the observed practice of mutual engagements among agents, the shared repertoire of the CofP integrates various resources in the broad perceptual range of multimodal semiosis. In terms of the linguistic segment within the semiotic spectrum, the performance of the guest deploying an LFE-­ dominated repertoire, including the extensive and skilled use of accommodation and code-switching strategies, exhibits a high degree of fluency in appropriating and enregistering15 to the semiotic and discursive styles incumbent in the ECON committee. Enregisterment (Agha 2005, 2007) to this dynamic and multi-scalar benchmark of authenticity16 or “enoughness” (Blommaert and Varis 2011, p. 5) by perpetually engaging in intersubjective tactics of authentication (Bucholtz 2003, p.  408) with interlocutors accrues to the institutional outcomes between authorization and illegitimation conferred by incumbent participants. Ultimately, it is being shaped by and is shaping the context of the event and the distribution and valorization of sociolinguistic resources across it. In this sociolinguistic game contextualized by and contextualizing the EP floor and unfolding in a process along dyadic identification contrasts wrestling for authenticity, the guest of the hearing and MEPs with Dutch L1 in their repertoires engage in a typically late-modern or superdiverse practice of authentication towards what Wang and Kroon, (2017, p. 23)  According to Agha (2007, p. 18), repertoires can become enregistered via “processes and practices whereby performable signs become recognized (and regrouped) as belonging to distinct, differentially valorized semiotic registers by a population”. 16  Authenticity is defined by Guignon (2004, p. 79) as “our identity-conferring identifications (…) that are drawn from, and are answerable to, the shared historical commitments and ideals that make up our communal life-world (and) involves (…) the ability to be a reflective individual who discerns what is genuinely worth pursuing within the social context in which he or she is situated”. 15

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call a “new order of authenticity” to be accomplished through “semiotic manoeuvring, targeting recognisability for multiple centres and scales” (Wang and Kroon 2017, p. 24) on the mediated EP floor which is open to discourse uptake by various public spheres. Simultaneous interpreting is factored into this sociolinguistic game to abridge mismatching repertoires and to alleviate linguistic disenfranchisement (Ginsburg and Weber 2005; Gazzola 2016) in discourse uptake by publics. At the same time, the communicative competence by the performed linguistic form seamlessly adapts to locally valid conventions of correspondence while allowing for identifications of being from somewhere, with specific origins detectable by participants even in the generic code of LFE on a subscale of accent. This recognizability, perpetually redefining the social domain of EU multilingualism through engagements by agents, confirms the virtual property of LFE, an integrated and integrating practice within and beyond conventional multilingualism, summarized by Hülmbauer (2013, p.  60) as “both integrated into larger multilingual environments and integrative of the plurilingual resources available through these environments”. The indexicality of this linguistic form-type in relation to other contrastive resource types, such as “official national languages”, can also be explored through ideologies of linguistic authority composed, according to Woolard (2008), of its perceived authenticity and anonymity. This specific concept of authenticity in participant identification of being from somewhere specific is dialectically opposed to the anonymity of the performance, defined by the indexical valorization of an aperspectival voice of the “disembodied, disinterested public freed through rational discourse from the constraints of a socially specific perspective” (Woolard 2008, p. 303), with no apparent associations to a particular origin and interest from somewhere specific, accommodating an emergent hegemonic voice in late modern European settings.17  Williams and Williams (2016) conceptualize recently emerging language ideologies of EU Multilingualism, and their language policy manifestations, as an attempt at a discourse formation and a discursive hegemonizing project in the recent discursive struggle around the dislocated nodal points of the nation state, revealed in floating and empty signifiers in articulations, with new configurations in the institutionalization of language in language policy debates wherein “ (a)s both subject and object of practice, language becomes an independent force with its own determining influence” (2016, p. 293). 17

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In these circumstances, the idiosyncratic LFE performed by the guest positions itself along with other institutional LFE practices with undertones of recognizable or non-recognizable European L1s (dubbed Euro-­ English) by qualities valorized as those of the global/supranational/ European/EU institutional voice of the expert/political representative, indexing a trans-local “place” worth pointing to. In the observed practice, these authoritative attributes of the voice conferred by the anonymity of the linguistic form are relationally juxtaposed to non-LFE speech varieties of the CofP repertoire publicly deployed in the event as contrasting performances of monolingualism in resources identified as various national languages. These contrasts accrue authority through contesting valorizations as to which is the more relevant or authentic set of registers at a given moment of the unfolding event. The contrasting deployment of the resource types, however, is not a zero-sum game, as most language policy conceptualizations of EU multilingualism postulate it, where “English” would crowd out “national languages” or vice versa. Contrasting use is rather a variational stylistic resource itself with the dynamic valorization options of indexical fields (Eckert 2008) performed in the setting as stylistic practice for identification and authentication, recruited in meaningful juxtapositions within the same domain play of meaning-making. It is also a noteworthy finding that the CofP’s repertoire may be heterogeneous, but its coherence accrues into a distinctive style of multilingual ECON talk, where LFE and non-­ LFE or “native language” resource types and their variation indexing multi-scalar identifications and contextualizations in EU multilingualism can be sociolinguistically conceptualized as a changing “social semiotic system capable of expressing the full range of a community’s social concerns” (Eckert 2012, p. 94), where nationality/ethnicity is not a straightforward explanatory variable.

4.2 Conclusions The qualitative patterns of practice analysed reveal an ongoing language ideological change through the valorization of “native” and “lingua franca” resources across indexical fields. The observed mutability between

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linguistic form and partitions of social space, or languages and identities, was shown to be locally and perpetually authenticated in the constitutive practice of EU multilingualism. The observed practice not only is exhibiting changing social concerns of differentiation but also affects the perceived stability of the forms themselves, most evident in the changing roles, functions and perceptions of LFE, a salient example of integrating and integrated linguistic form type in idiosyncratic performances of EU multilingualism. Furthermore, the observed mutability of the locally emerging indexical valorizations of variables contradicts in many points the established conventions of language policy research underlying the regulations applied to EU multilingualism. Lingua franca practices and deployments of their L1 by agents are not simple binary oppositions of multilingualism and its negation. EU multilingualism is a dynamically polycentric and multi-­ scalar medium of propositional and indexical meaning-making but cannot be split into distinct institutional and societal realms. Overall, the micro-practices across the collective in the observed late modern communicative space in various instances contradict and transgress what Blommaert et al. (2013) describe as the ethnolinguistic assumption, the incumbent discursive construct of language ideology with taken-for-granted relations among the postulated stable entities of resource forms, identifications and political subjectification, determining and determined by conventional language policy conceptualizations of EU multilingualism, and inherent in the very notion of transnational communication.

References Agha, A. (2005). Voice, Footing, Enregisterment. Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, 15(1), 38–59. Agha, A. (2007). Language and Social Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bauman, R., & Briggs, C.  L. (1990). Poetics and Performance as Critical Perspectives on Language and Social Life. Annual Review of Anthropology, 19, 59–88.

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5 Flagging the Homeland: Interpreting Brexit à la Nigel Farage in the European Union Morven Beaton-Thome

5.1 Introduction On the day of the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union (EU) on 23 June 2016, few could have predicted that the United Kingdom’s EU Exit, or Brexit as it came to be known, would still be dominating the political headlines more than three years later. Brexit has impacted dramatically on the British political landscape, with populist ideas gaining traction in the traditionally mainstream political parties, particularly in the kingmaker role of the European Research Group (ERG) in the Conservative party, chaired until September 2019 by Jacob Rees-Mogg, and the appointment of Boris Johnson as Leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister in July 2019. Brexit has also led to rupture in the traditional party-political landscape, with a number of pro-European Conservatives and Labour Members of Parliament (MPs) M. Beaton-Thome (*) Institute of Translation and Multilingual Communication (ITMK), TH Köln - University of Applied Sciences, Cologne, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 K. Strani (ed.), Multilingualism and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40701-8_5

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leaving to form a new party, The Independent Group for Change; the implosion and shift of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) towards the right; the official launch of The Brexit Party, led by Nigel Farage, on 12 April 2019; and the removal of the whip from 21 Conservative MPs for voting against the party line on the No Deal bill in September 2019. In the EU itself, Brexit has strongly influenced the constitution of the European Parliament (EP) in the legislative period 2019–2024, with The Brexit Party returning a record number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) following the elections on 23 May 2019.1 Indeed, discourse on Brexit could be viewed as indicative of a more general European and global shift towards a more populist politics. The emotionally charged discourse around Brexit that has flanked these changes in the EP provides rich pickings for the analyst interested in political discourse, in general, and how that discourse is translated and interpreted into other languages, in particular. Whereas the lead-up and aftermath of the Brexit referendum campaign and the resulting discourses of Brexit have prompted a concentration of discourse analytical studies (Wodak 2016; Musolff 2017; Koller et  al. 2019; Bennett 2019; Krzyżanowski 2019; Zappettini 2019), there has been little published work on mediated multilingual discourse in this field. This chapter should therefore be viewed as making a contribution to a growing body of literature in three fields: (1) institutional multilingual policy and practice, (2) interpreting studies literature on agency and positioning of interpreters in political discourse and political conflict and (3) research on the discourses of populism in general, and Brexit in particular, in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). I argue in this chapter that the multilingual setting of the EP constitutes an ideal backdrop to investigate the positioning of (1) British Eurosceptic MEPs in the very institutions they are seeking to challenge and (2) EP interpreters as institutional representatives (both staff and freelance) charged with the task of interpreting such disruptive discourse into other languages in that institution. Indeed, debates in officially  The Brexit Party successfully fielded high-profile candidates such as Jacob Rees-Mogg’s sister Annunziata Rees-Mogg and the former Conservative Home Secretary, Ann Widdecombe, in the elections to the EP on 23 May 2019 and has secured a total of 29 MEPs in the 2019–2024 legislative period. It is thus the joint-biggest party in the EP (BBC 2019). 1

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multilingual institutions, such as the EU, that are interpreted and translated as a matter of language policy, provide rich data for the investigation of interpreter positioning and agency. In mediating such discourse, the interpreter is faced with new and challenging argumentation strategies. In this context, Farage is well-versed in employing what Wodak terms “strategies of discursive provocation” (Wodak 2014), intended to incite media or public comment (Deacon and Wring 2016), strategies which call into question traditional interpreting ethics and codes of practice (AIIC 2018). This chapter begins by conceptualizing the function and position of interpreting and interpreters in EU multilingual policy, drawing on Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism (Bakhtin 1981) to illustrate the tension between centrifugal and centripetal forces in multilingual practice in the EP. Section 5.1.2 focuses on the use of simultaneous interpreting in EP plenary sittings and details the characteristics of, and constraints inherent in, this particular setting and form of multilingual communication. Specific interpreting strategies, whether used wittingly or unwittingly by EP interpreters in plenary, are introduced and defined. The concept of positioning (Davies and Harré 1990) to refer to the visibility of speaker and interpreter agency is examined and the usefulness of the concept for the case study presented. The case study in Sect. 5.1.3 concentrates on the English and German versions of EP debates on Brexit from January 2016 until September 2019, with particular focus on the Eurosceptic MEP Nigel Farage, in his function as a representative and (former) leader of both the United Kingdom Independence Party and The Brexit Party. Central to the data analysis in the case study is the Foucauldian understanding of discourse and the procedures of exclusion via discourse policing (Foucault 1981), alongside Billig’s concept of banal nationalism (Billig 1995). Methodologically, this chapter uses CDA tools for analysis, looking particularly at othering strategies via pronominal use, evaluative and emotive language and lexical labelling.

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5.1.1 Heteroglossia, Multilingualism and the European Parliament Theoretical underpinnings for this chapter are drawn from the work of Bakhtin (1981) and his concept of heteroglossia or multivoicedness (raznorechie). Although Bakhtin focused primarily on discourse in the novel and used the concept of heteroglossia to refer to different types of language within the novel (such as the narrator’s voice contrasting with the dialect of the peasant and, in turn, with the society language of the nobleman), his work is equally as pertinent to (1) the presence of different languages and (2) the presence of multiple voices used to perpetuate or contest particular ideologies. Bakhtin writes of centripetal (towards the centre, unitary or authoritative) and centrifugal (towards the periphery, heteroglossic or hybrid) forces in discourse (1981, pp. 270–272), a concept that is particularly salient in institutional settings, both in terms of the presence or absence of lived multilingualism in practice and the actual language used in original and interpretation. The EP plenary sitting can be investigated in Bakhtinian terms as one potentially characterized by heteroglossia, in which (1) multiple languages are present and (2) the word (slovo), or lexis in CDA terms, becomes a site of struggle between different ideological positions, contested both in the original language and in the language(s) of interpretation (Beaton 2008;  Beaton-Thome 2013). This chapter focuses on the presence of multiple languages and the concept of equality of language versions in the EP and examines the tension inherent in the presence of heteroglossia in principle, and the centripetal forces acting on negotiating such heteroglossia in practice. Multilingualism is firmly anchored in the institutional architecture and legislation of the EU as a democratic and levelling principle.2 Indeed a recent legal briefing on multilingualism in the EP states, “For the EU, legally guaranteed multilingualism is not a matter of communication only, but also a question of democratic legitimacy towards citizens and respect for the cultural diversity of the Member States” (Mańko 2017,  Multilingual practice in the EP is based on four main legislative texts (European Union 2012a, b, European Parliament 2014, 2019b). 2

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p. 7).3 Baaij (2012, p. 15) refers to these principles as Linguistic Diversity and Language Equality and Democratic Legitimacy. A number of issues are of interest when discussing Language Equality, in particular. The concept of Language Equality refers to creating and maintaining equality between languages in the EU institutions, a policy clearly aimed at encouraging centrifugal and diverse forces in EP debate. However, the European Parliament Code of Conduct on Multilingualism (European Parliament 2014) introduced two interesting concepts which relativize this principle and work centripetally. First, the concept of “resource-­ efficient full multilingualism” (Article 1, Paragraph 3) is introduced, which means that “the resources to be devoted to multilingualism are managed on the basis of users’ real needs, measures to make users more aware of their responsibilities and more effective planning of requests for language facilities” (Mańko 2017, p. 5). Second, Article 2 ranks the settings in which interpretation is provided. Apart from plenary sittings at the top of the list, a type of event which is instrumental in creating a European Public Sphere (Adam 2015; Grande and Kriesi 2014; Risse 2014a; Trenz 2004) and European demos (Kantner 2014; Risse 2014b), namely the press conference, is towards the bottom, rather than the top of the list. The principle of Language Equality also applies to equality between language versions. The equality and original status of each language “version” are enshrined in legislation, which is the most tangible manifestation of the ideology of multilingualism in the EU. If we view the plenary debate as a hypertext (Pöchhacker 1995, p. 35), defined as “an overarching sort of text comprised of a number of individual texts”, this principle assumes that each listener in EP plenary sittings (whether this be the MEPs, the representatives from the European Council and Commission, invited dignitaries, visitors in the visitor gallery, viewers following the debate via live streaming on the Internet or on Europe by Satellite [EbS]) listens to entire debate in one language and responds (in the case of those listeners permitted to speak) to those interpreted or original language utterances in that language. Following this logic, a native English-­ speaking MEP would listen only to the English “version” or text of the  This briefing paper is, interestingly, available only in English.

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plenary sitting. However, in interpreter-mediated communication, and to a lesser extent in translator-mediated communication, this definition is problematic as the likelihood of the English native-speaking MEP having a sufficient command of French to follow the French interventions in the original, for example, is relatively high. This assumption that each language “version” is equally valid, which pervades the translation activity of the European Union (Wagner et al. 2002, p.  7), has been diluted somewhat for the interpreted version by means of a disclaimer which states that The simultaneous interpretation of debates provided by the European Parliament serves only to facilitate communication amongst the participants in the meeting. It does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation of that speech is authentic. Where there is any difference between the simultaneous interpretation and the original speech (or the revised written translation of the speech), the original speech (or the revised written translation) takes precedence. (European Parliament 2018)

This is of interest on two counts. First, there is a clear centripetal move on the part of the institution by awarding the institutionally sanctioned, revised written translation higher prestige and hence a stronger claim to validity than the oral interpretation. This statement also effectively absolves interpreters from any responsibility regarding their role and positioning and erases their very presence in the official record of the debate. Second, for MEPs in the chamber, it is the interpreter’s interpretation and not the revised written translation (produced several weeks later) which constitutes the account of all statements made in the EP in languages that the MEP does not understand. Therefore, the response of the MEP in the parliamentary sitting is to the interpreted version, not the original intervention (and certainly not to the revised written translation). This cannot fail to lead to inconsistencies in the revised written translation account of proceedings. While it is understandable on a legal and pragmatic level, such a disclaimer reduces the heteroglossia present in interpreted multilingual debate and could be viewed as evidence of a centripetal move towards language control that contradicts the official

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centrifugal ideology of multilingualism which the institution claims to represent and defend. Indeed, these developments point to a move away from language viewed as an expression of identity and towards an economic value being placed on multilingual dialogue. Climent-Ferrando labels this trend “linguistic neoliberalism” (Climent-Ferrando 2016) and concludes his in-­ depth analysis of EU multilingual policy pointedly by stating: The analysis of the interplay between the EU political rhetoric and the actual policies on multilingualism has served to surface the tensions between two dimensions of the EU policy on multilingualism: a sentimental dimension, which is often advocated in the EU narrative under the name of linguistic diversity and associated with the notions of culture, identity, respect, intercultural dialogue and EU values, but does not translate into concrete policy initiatives; and the utilitarian dimension, which has been clearly prioritized and focuses entirely on the functional importance of language skills and the economic value of languages for the economy, growth, and jobs. Whereas the first dimension—the sentimental one—would be applied to the EU’s regional or minority languages (and much more recently to migrant languages, which are increasingly gaining ground in the EU’s language, education and integration policies), the utilitarian dimension would be applied to the EU’s hegemonic languages. (Climent-Ferrando 2016, p. 10)

The degree of overlap of such language policy in plenary with the actual language profiles of the European Union electorate also has notable impact on issues of access and exclusion which cannot be addressed in detail here. This results in certain parts of the EU population being denied interpretation for plenary debate in their “own” language (e.g. Irish or migrant languages). Interestingly, there is also very little lived personal multilingualism without political agenda in the EP plenary sittings, with language switching between French and Flemish on the part of Belgian Commissioners and MEPs often appearing to be paying lip service to the non-native

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language.4 This prevalence of what Krzyżanowski refers to as performative or de facto individual monolingualism ties in with the conclusion that the monolingualism of MEP’s is strongly politically driven, since, when using their ‘national’ languages, the MEPs want first and foremost to be accountable to their own constituencies rather than to their fellow MEPs or to the EU institutions. (Krzyżanowski 2014, p. 116)

In addition to such exclusion, there is also a tendency in EP plenary for EU officials and MEPs to elect to speak in English, even though simultaneous interpreters are present for their native language. It could be argued that this also adds to an exclusion of particular sections of the electorate which they have been elected to represent. This also suggests a type of ranking of official languages, whether wittingly or unwittingly, by the EU officials and the MEPs represented in the EP. Indeed, proposals to use English as a Lingua Franca in the European institutions (Baaij 2012) are bound to increase as the European Union continues to expand, a move which would strengthen hegemonic and centripetal forces in the EU in general and the EP in particular. Given the two factors of (1) selection of official languages (bound to the nation state, hegemonic rather than representative) and (2) the prevalence of English, it would appear that multilingual practice, far from acting centrifugally to encourage diversity, rather could be viewed as functioning centripetally as a gatekeeper (Wodak 2007, p. 82) to democratic debate in the institution. This contrasts significantly with the principle of Language Equality enshrined in policy. Just as the potential for simultaneous interpreting in the EP to work centrifugally is constrained somewhat by aspects of multilingual practice, there are a number of characteristics intrinsic to simultaneously interpreted discourse which also affect the ideological impact of the interpretation. These are discussed in conjunction with the concepts of role and positioning in Sect. 5.1.2.

 Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who spoke in both French and German, was a notable exception.

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5.1.2 Interpreter Positioning In recent years, sociologically informed research on interpreter role and positioning has provided strong evidence to suggest that when multilingual discourse is interpreted, the language behaviour of interpreters can have significant ideological impact on that discourse (Beaton-Thome 2013). Far from analysing all such shifts as wilful manipulation (although this can and does occur in interpreted discourse as in any discourse), or intended choices on the part of the interpreter, a descriptive approach can prove valuable in first describing the shift and the impact it has, before examining the context for the reasons for the shift. One potential reason for such shifts could be that they are inherent in the process of simultaneous interpreting itself. The need to implement interpreting strategies such as anticipation, compression, syntactical reformulation and decalage management (Kalina 1998) would be one example of interpreter behaviour that could potentially trigger ideological shift without any deliberate choices being made by the interpreter. In the fast-paced discourse of the EP plenary sitting where interventions are often prepared in written form and read out at high speed, interpreters may be forced by time pressure to employ emergency strategies such as generalization and may experience difficulties in allocating sufficient processing capacity to all components of the simultaneous interpreting process, resulting in problems in comprehension, analysis or production. Relay interpreting, where interpreters use a pivot language (such as the English interpretation) as their source as they do not have competence in the original language, can also lead to knock-on shifts in multiple languages. Nonetheless, if the researcher does not assume that all interpreter choices are made intentionally, simultaneous interpreters’ “online” response to ideological stimuli (as opposed to the response of translators who have had more time to reflect on the ideological impact of their choices) can provide interesting data for analysis. Indeed, research has shown that interpreter ideological response is frequently not coherent both by individual interpreters and within language booths, suggesting a complex process of constant negotiation of ideological stimuli.

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Against this backdrop, Davies and Harré’s concept of positioning proves a useful theoretical construct for the analysis of the agency of the simultaneous interpreter. Positioning is defined as: the discursive process whereby selves are located in conversations as observably and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story lines. There can be interactive positioning in which what one person says positions another. And there can be reflexive positioning in which one positions oneself. (Davies and Harré 1990, p. 48)

Although Davies and Harré developed this concept in relation to conversation, and the concept has been applied in Interpreting Studies to the positioning of interpreters in Dialogue Interpreting settings in which the interpreter is visible and actively involved in floor negotiation and turn-­ taking (Mason 2005, 2009), it is equally applicable to the simultaneously interpreted, highly adversarial parliamentary debate analysed in this case study, where the interpreters are continuously positioning the speakers and themselves. Indeed, unlike the static concept of role, positioning allows for a lack of coherence in interpreter behaviour, even by the same interpreter, and grants individuals (both speakers and interpreters) agency. This is not to say that positioning is necessarily intentional (Davies and Harré 1990, p. 48), but that it is sensitive to the complexities of adversarial encounters and allows for the analysis of potentially contradictory, shifting behaviour as the discourse unfolds. Complementing discourse analysis of interpreting output with ethnographic interviews is also an approach which can enable the researcher to examine the reasons for such shifts in more detail. Indeed, discourse-­ analytical findings that EP interpreters use more institutional (and hence hegemonic) language in their interpretations than MEPs do in their original interventions (Beaton 2008) have been confirmed by ethnographic research on interpreters at the European Union (Duflou 2015). This study underlined the importance of situated learning in interpreting competence and illustrated that interpreters actively seek to belong to both a professional community of practice of conference interpreters and the institutions which employ them. Whereas situated awareness of institutional practices is of immense significance in interpreting practice,

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awareness of the danger of co-optation into the institution (Inghilleri 2007) in which interpreters overidentify both sociologically and linguistically in order to pass as an expert (Beaton-Thome 2018) also deserves attention and will be addressed in the case study in this chapter.

5.1.3 Discourse, Populism and Nigel Farage Founded in 1993 by historian Alan Sked, UKIP came to prominence in 2006 when Nigel Farage took over as the party leader and garnered broader support by capitalizing on fears around immigration, particularly among the white British working class. Nigel Farage played a key role in the party until December 2018, when he left UKIP to found The Brexit Party. He held the party leadership of UKIP permanently twice (from 12 September 2006 to 27 November 2009 and from 5 November 2010 to 16 September 2016) and once on an interim basis (4 October 2018 to 29 October 2016). Despite having held the party leadership for the last time in September 2016, he remained UKIP’s most prominent MEP in the EP, having served a total of four five-year terms since 1999 (1999–2004, 2004–2009, 2009–2014 and 2014–2019). In the European elections in 2014, UKIP returned 24 MEPs to the EP but party in-­ fighting, defection and the appointment of former English Defence League (EDL) leader Tommy Robinson as a special advisor on rape gangs and prison reform saw that the number reduced to three UKIP sitting MEPs in April 2019 shortly before the May 2019 elections. Farage was re-elected as an MEP, this time for The Brexit Party, in the 2019 elections to the EP where he sits as a Non-Attached Member (NI) alongside the other 28 Brexit Party MEPs. No UKIP MEPs were elected to the EP in the 2019 elections. Farage draws repeatedly on his background of having foregone University and started work in the City directly after leaving school, trading commodities at the London Metal Exchange. This contributes partially to his layered Self-presentation as a “Jack the Lad” character, which tempers “his xenophobic views with an avuncular style intended to cast him as an erudite everyman rather than an ex-merchant banker” (Deacon and Wring 2016, p. 175), and is instrumental in his repeated claim that

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MEPs have never done a day’s work in their lives, despite having been a European career politician himself for over 20 years. Data analysis concentrates on the English originals and German interpretations of Nigel Farage’s interventions in EP debates on Brexit from January 2016 to September 2019. All relevant interventions and their simultaneous interpretations were accessed via the European Parliament website (European Parliament 2019a). This study is firmly rooted in the discourse analysis tradition, based on a Foucauldian understanding of discourse as a system of knowledge (episteme) and hence social practice (Foucault 1997), as “a conceptual terrain in which knowledge is formed and produced” (Young 1981, p. 48). In Farage’s Brexit discourse, particular statements are viewed as true and gain currency via constant repetition. These include statements referring to the EU as a military machine, describing EU figures as unelected and characterizing the elite as career politicians who have never worked a day in their lives. By including particular “truths” in his discourse and excluding others, Farage creates a coherent discourse in which that which is excluded is relegated to the realm of ridicule and madness. This is what Foucault terms exclusion (1981, p. 52). According to Foucault, in every society (and hence group or institution), the production of discourse is “at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality” (ibid.). Foucault refers to this as the “procedures of exclusion” (Foucault 1981, p. 52). This process of exclusion/inclusion is governed by the rules of a discourse “policing” (Foucault 1981, p.  61) by means of prohibition (Foucault 1981, p. 52), the opposition reason/madness (Foucault 1981, p. 53) and the will to truth (Foucault 1981, p. 55). It is particularly exclusion via the opposition of reason and madness that will form the basis of my analysis of Farage’s discoursal manoeuvring. A number of themes emerge in Farage’s interventions over the three-­ year period that are distinctly populist in nature, if populist discourse is understood as “pitting a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, p. 3).

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Key to Farage’s discursive positioning on Brexit in the EP plenary is the creation of a number of (at times overlapping) “dangerous others”. The most prevalent oppositions in the data analysed are (1) the British people versus the EU itself, (2) the people versus the elite(s) and (3) reason versus madness. These first two categories overlap with current discourse-­ analytical research on Farage’s populist discourse (Lorenzetti 2018). The demonizing of opponents (e.g. José Manuel Barroso, George Soros, Goldman Sachs, Angela Merkel) and exaltation of (potential) allies (e.g. Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, Five Star Movement) is also characteristic of Farage’s discourse in the EP plenary. These techniques of constant repetition and the use of stark dichotomies, also employed by Donald Trump5 and in the Leave campaign during the Brexit Referendum, are common in populist discourse and are key to transitioning opinions to facts. CDA tools are used for analysis, looking particularly at Farage’s positioning via pronominal use (us vs. them), evaluative and emotive language, and othering via lexical labelling.

The British People Versus the European Union A recurrent theme in Farage’s Brexit discourse is the opposition between Britain and the EU, between a “nation state democracy” with a rich and proud history and identity, and the technocratic and dogmatic European Union. Central to this discourse is the role of national symbols such as flags and anthems. Farage’s view on this can be seen in extract 1 from the Debate with the Prime Minister of Belgium, Charles Michel, on the Future of Europe on 3 May 2018 (European Parliament 2018). Extract 1 Original: There are some like Mr Verhofstadt here who seem to think that this flag represents a European identity—and he clearly identifies as a European, many of you in this room identify as Europeans—but you are missing something. The peoples of Europe do not identify with that  The influence of Trump’s rhetoric on Farage is also seen in his use of the name “Theresa the Appeaser” (European Parliament 2017) to refer to Theresa May, clearly drawing on Trump’s strategy of referring to his political enemies by using descriptors such as “Crooked Hillary”. 5

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flag. They do not identify with these institutions [.…] But actually, out there in the real world, there is not a European demos, there is not a European identity Interpretation: Wir haben Herr Verhofstadt, der meinte diese Flagge sei eine Repräsentation der europäischen Identität … und viele hier im Saal identifizieren sich als Europäer … aber Ihnen fehlt doch etwas. Die Völker Europas identifizieren sich nicht mit dieser Fahne. Sie identifizieren sich nicht mit diesen Institutionen […] jetzt hier, in der realen Welt….gibt es keinen europäischen Demos, es gibt keine europäische Identität English gloss: We have Mr Verhofstadt, he thinks that this flag is a representation of European identity … and many here in this room identify as European … but you are missing something. The peoples of Europe do not identify with this flag. They do not identify with these institutions […] now here, in the real world … there is no European demos, there is no European identity. This statement essentially sums up Farage’s view towards the European Union and is an argument that he has voiced multiple times in previous debates. In terms of performing national identities, Billig’s concept of banal nationalism, defined as a “collection of ideological habits (including habits of practice and belief ) which reproduce existing nations as nations in everyday life” (Billig 1995, p. 6), is useful in this context. Despite pertaining to act for the people, Farage carries out the practice of such banal nationalism in exactly the same way as the political elites in Billig’s approach do, by the continual “flagging”, or reminding of nationhood (1995, p. 8), via “frequent, numerous and inconspicuous references to the national collective”. This then becomes so ingrained that “the homeland is made to look […] beyond question and, should the occasion arise, worth the price of sacrifice” (1995, p.  175). Juxtaposed with “hot” nationalism, that is, the more overt and “irrational form of nationalism” (1995, p. 56), belonging to others, and more often the subject of outraged analysis, banal nationalism can prove insidious and creep into all areas of life. Linguistically, this flagging takes place via the use of what Billig terms homeland deixis, most notably pronouns of belonging and deictic markers. Thus the “crucial words of banal nationalism are often

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the smallest: ‘we’, ‘this’ and ‘here’” (1995, p. 94). Although other factors are clearly at play in shaping this banal nationalism, including schooling traditions, particularly the teaching of history in schools,6 Farage draws on a number of banal signifiers mentioned by Billig. The most prominent of these is the Union Jack, which is key to Farage’s performance of Englishness/Britishness. His strategic placing of the Union Jack at his seat and at the seats of UKIP/The Brexit Party MEPs in the plenary sitting could be viewed as an attempt to package a clear provocation as mere banal nationalism—his argument would be that simply happens to be a symbol so entrenched in his English psyche that it needs no further comment, that is, akin to what Billig terms the “the metonymic image of banal nationalism, not being a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building” (1995, p. 8). In this extract, Farage repeatedly refers to what he views as the instrumentalization of banal signifiers by pro-Europeans, mocking Verhofstadt’s use of the European flag and European anthem, claiming that a European demos to sustain such symbolism does not exist. Farage’s use of terms such as “nation-state democracy” and the use of the pronominal forms “we” and “them” is also revealing, particularly in his claim to speak for “the British people”. The interpreter in extract 2 has already interpreted the previous part of this intervention which was full of sarcasm and copes well with the ideological pitfalls and dialogical interaction in this extract. However, she is excessively animated, almost to the point of tipping over into mocking Farage. This phenomenon of prosodic overcompensation, analogous to lexical overcompensation, could be viewed as a distancing strategy, in the sense that there can be no confusion that this is the interpreter “interpreting” rather than speaking from her own “I” position.

 For an in-depth study on the interplay of curricular guidelines, textbook, teachers’ reflections on history education, material discursive classroom interactions and pupils’ communication about colonialism in German history classes, see Macgilchrist et al. (2017) and, more broadly, the work of the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (http://www.gei.de/en/ home.html). 6

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The People Versus the Elite(s) One theme in Farage’s interventions is that of situating himself within a broader populist movement. Extract 2 from 14 February 2017  in the debate on the institutional set-up of the European Union (European Parliament 2017) neatly encapsulates much of that rhetoric: Extract 2 Original: Mr President, I feel like I am attending a meeting of a religious sect here this morning. It is as if the global revolution of 2016—Brexit, Trump, the Italian rejection of the referendum—has completely bypassed you. You cannot face up to the fact that this bandwagon is going to roll across Europe in these elections in 2017. Interpretation: Vielen Dank. Also ich habe den Eindruck, dass ich heute Morgen eine religiöse Sekte … an einer Sitzung teilnehme. Gut … äh … Brexit … Trump … italienische Zurückweisung des Referendums und so weiter. Gut … ich meine, man muss doch feststellen, dass hier doch dieser … Sturm einfach über Europa heranzieht und die Wahlen 2017 … äh … beeinflussen wird. English gloss: Many thanks. I am of the impression that I am taking part in a religious sect … in a meeting. Good … eh … Brexit … Trump … Italian rejection of the referendum and so on. Good … I mean one has to conclude that here in actual fact this storm is simply brewing over Europe and will influence the elections in 2017. The German interpretation of this extract illustrates the difficulty on the part of the interpreter to recognize the internal logic of Farage’s discourse and thus convey his voice. One potential reason for this could be the excessively long decalage7 between the original and the interpretation, probably caused by the use of relay interpreting8 of the President’s utterance which preceded this intervention. Farage’s use of the term “sect” can be clearly heard in the original before the interpreter switches on the  Decalage, or ear-voice span, refers to the time lag between the source text input and the interpreter’s target text (Timarová et al. 2011). 8  Relay interpreting is described by Shlesinger (2010, p. 276) as “the practice of interpreting from one language to another through a third language”. 7

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microphone and begins her interpretation. While acknowledging that this may have caused time pressure and the need to use emergency strategies in the interpretation of Farage who is well known in the EP for being a fast and difficult speaker, the ideological effects of the shifts in the German interpretation remain. In terms of evaluative language, the positive evaluation of the listed events as evidence of a “global revolution” is omitted completely, and the cohesion of these being events that have bypassed those in power in Europe is also omitted. Far from being a one-off reference, Farage repeatedly refers to this “global revolution” and “populist wave” in a number of other individual interventions, suggesting that the positive evaluation of populist successes is not arbitrary. The choice of the term “bandwagon” in the original English is also somewhat marked and is challenging to interpret as the term is most often used in the somewhat critical collocation “to jump on the bandwagon”, defined as “to join an activity that has become very popular or to change your opinion to one that has become very popular so that you can share in its success” (Cambridge Dictionary 2019). However, the shift in the German interpretation is significant with the metaphor of the movement as a “bandwagon” replaced by the more ominous collocation of a “Sturm” (storm) and “heranzieht” (is brewing). This interpreting choice adds a negative connotation to the statement as a whole. Indeed, this shift in evaluation is continued with the omission of the evaluative adjectives and the shift in perspective in the entire second part of the utterance in extract 3. Extract 3 Original: A lot of citizens now recognise that this form of centralised government simply does not work, whether it is the miseries inflicted upon a country like Greece by the Euro, the unemployment caused by bad regulation, or the feeling that none of us are as safe in our cities because of the disastrous common asylum policy. Interpretation: Und… äh… diese Art der zentralisierten Regierung funktioniert ganz einfach nicht. Ich meine, wir sehen das jetzt mit Griechenland und dem Euro, dann die Arbeitslosigkeit durch schlechte

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Verordnungen und schlechte Regelungen oder eben auch die Sicherheit unserer Bürger aufgrund der gemeinsamen Asylpolitik. English gloss: And … eh … this type of centralized government simply doesn’t work. I mean we are seeing that now with Greece and the Euro, then unemployment as a result of poor Regulations and poor regulations or also the security of our citizens as a result of the common asylum policy. Rather than Greece clearly being portrayed as the victim of the misery caused by the Euro (and by extension the European Union itself ), both Greece and the Euro are simply mentioned as problems (almost as if Greece caused the problem itself ). This lack of evaluation (and hence positioning) is particularly striking in the final point where Farage speaks of “the feeling that none of us are as safe in our cities because of the disastrous common asylum policy”. This is simply rendered as the neutral “die Sicherheit unserer Bürger aufgrund der gemeinsamen Asylpolitik” (the security of our citizens as a result of the common asylum policy). The omission of the evaluative adjective “disastrous” is significant here, as is the omission of the use of the inclusive “we”. The additional institutional and ideological overcompensation of the interpreter in the use of the EU term “Verordnung” (the prescribed EU equivalent in German for the EU English term “Regulation”) also adds to the neutral and institutionalized positioning of Farage in this context and is an example of interpreter overcompensation. This can be defined as when interpreters overidentify both sociologically and linguistically in order to pass as an expert member of the group or institution (Beaton-Thome 2018), in this case the EU. Although acknowledging that this is a single case and not wishing to overstate the findings of this analysis, it does seem reasonable to interpret the cumulative effect of these shifts as a dilution of Farage’s rhetorical intent and a shift of positioning in the German interpretation. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, such centripetal manoeuvring can, incrementally, play a role in supporting the hegemonic and institutional order at the expense of heteroglossia.

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R  eason Versus Madness One consistent theme in Farage’s interventions is his repeated accusation towards pro-European MEPs in the EP and EU civil servants that they are members of a cult, a means of excluding discourse that is deemed to be mad and irrational. Extract 4, from the State of the Union debate on 14 September 2016 (European Parliament 2016), serves to illustrate this use of lexical labelling from the domain of (fanatical) religion: Extract 4 Original: If you were to think of this building as a temple, Mr Verhofstadt is the high priest, a fanatic. […] If you stick to the dogma of saying that for reciprocal tariff-free access to the single market we must maintain the free movement of people…. Interpretation: Wenn man sich dieses Gebäude als ein Tempel vorstellt, Herr Verhofstadt ist der hohe Priester—ein fanatischer… ein Fanatiker. […] English gloss: If you imagine this building as a temple, Mr Verhofstadt is the high priest—a fanatic (adj.), a fanatic (noun). […] The lexical field of (fanatical) religion is employed repeatedly by Farage when referring to the EU, particularly when addressing Guy Verhofstadt, with terms such as “religious sect”, “zealot”, “temple”, “high priest of Brexit”, “high priests of Euro-federalism”, “dogma” and “devotee”. In extract 4, the German interpreter clearly identifies the imagery and manages to maintain it cohesively in the interpretation, with the exception of the omission of the term dogma in the final utterance. This shows that the imagery is accessible and understood in German as in English, indicating that the problems of recognition of the ideological import of particular textual features in rendering multiple voices, observed in extract 1, is not inherent to simultaneous interpretation. In conclusion, the data analysis shows that individual interpreters in individual contexts respond differently to ideological stimuli. Extracts discussed showed (1) evidence of a weakening of Farage’s

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anti-immigration stance through omission of evaluative adjectives and the introduction of EU jargon when none was required; (2) prosodic overcompensation; and (3) recognition and interpretation of religious lexical labels allocated to pro-Europeans, thus retaining the reason/madness dichotomy vital for processes of exclusion.

5.2 Conclusion In this chapter I have sought to critically conceptualize the role of interpreting and interpreters in the European Parliament as laid down in the various policy documents and in interpreting practice. I argue that the existence of a multilingual policy or the provision of interpreting in itself does not serve to ensure that democratic debate can occur, but that a recognition of the multiple voices involved in democratic decision making and debate, and a sensitivity towards the implication of interpreter behaviour and impact, both sociologically and linguistically, is required. Further research is needed which combines the concepts of theoretical conceptualization of the role of interpreters and interpreting in institutions, and the role they can play in the creation of a thriving European and/or transnational public sphere. The potential for interpreters in institutions such as the EP to work centrifugally to widen access to lived multilingualism and heteroglossia inherent in debate could be explored by building on Dörr’s research on political translation (Dörr 2018) into deliberative democracy in the alter-globalization movement. Combined with ethnographic study and discourse analysis of interpreted debates, a picture of lived multilingualism in the EU could emerge, which pays tribute to its complexity and hybridity and the agency of simultaneous conference interpreters.

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6 Multilingualism and the Brexit Referendum Roland Kappe

6.1 Introduction This chapter provides a case study of the role of multilingualism in politics by looking at the relationship between multilingualism and Brexit. Political science—and specifically the study of public opinion and political behaviour—often uses data from nationally representative surveys to make inferences about what explains people’s political behaviour and attitudes. In this case, data from the referendum wave of the British Election Study (BES) allow us to investigate the relationship between multilingualism and the vote in the Brexit referendum. Compared to citizens of other European countries, fewer Britons speak foreign languages. More than 65% of Britons aged 25–64 know no foreign languages at all. Figure  6.1 shows the data for the UK and other European Union (EU) member states (Eurostat 2016).

R. Kappe (*) Department of Political Science, University College London, London, England e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 K. Strani (ed.), Multilingualism and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40701-8_6

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Fig. 6.1  Percentage of people aged 25–64 who speak no foreign language at all

Is it possible that this relative lack of foreign language skills contributed to the outcome of the Brexit referendum? Theoretical work suggests that speaking foreign languages reduces perceptions of cultural distance and contributes to the formation of transnational identities (Benet-­ Martínez and Haritatos 2005; Kuhn 2011). Recent research also shows a link between language skills and European identity (Kuhn 2015; Díez-­ Medrano 2018). Applying this theoretical framework to the case of the “Brexit referendum” in the UK leads to the hypothesis that there is a relationship between language skills and the Brexit vote. This chapter uses data from the referendum wave of the British Election Study (Fieldhouse et  al. 2017) to test this hypothesis empirically. The data show that in the June 2016 referendum on membership in the European Union, those with foreign language skills voted in favour to remain a member of the EU (58%), while those who speak no second language voted 54–46% in favour of Brexit. This leads to the question

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whether this is a genuine effect, or whether foreign languages skills are essentially epiphenomenal and simply a marker of education more generally, which is a well-established contributor to the Brexit decision (Goodwin and Heath 2016; Clarke et al. 2017). To answer this question, this chapter uses matching methods to take into account factors such as education, age, income, and location and estimate the effect of foreign language skills on the Brexit decision. The results show that even after matching on a wide range of plausible confounders, language skills have an effect on individuals’ decision to vote for or against Brexit. This chapter hopes to contribute to the literature on language and politics, specifically multilingualism and political identity, as well as the work on European identity, Euroscepticism, and the causes of Brexit. Firstly, the Brexit referendum provides an important test case, as the vote decision is consequential, going beyond just responses to a survey-based attitudinal measure of European identification. Secondly, while a variety of demographic, personality, and attitudinal factors have been linked to the Brexit decision (Clarke et al. 2017), multilingualism (or the lack of it) has so far not been discussed as a contributing factor. Furthermore, questions of language go beyond the established narratives of age, education, and the economically or culturally “left behind” (Goodwin and Heath 2016). This is especially important as many established factors that contributed to Brexit—demographics and location, for example—are difficult or impossible to influence. Language skills and language learning in contrast are one of the variables that can actually be affected by government policy, for example, through curriculum reforms or funding choices. This leads to the third contribution which is the recognition that EU policies in support of language learning and exchange are important tools for creating a European identity and cohesive union. The evidence showing that language skills have affected the Brexit referendum provides support for the idea that these programmes are indeed vital.

6.1.1 Theoretical Background Why should there be a relationship between people’s language skills and the decision to vote to leave the European Union in the Brexit

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referendum? This section presents several complementary theoretical perspectives that imply such a link. First, it broadens the lens and discusses some of the wider literature on language and identity that are relevant as a theoretical background. In a second step, it reviews some of the evidence that suggests a direct relationship between language learning and perceptions of cultural distance which in turn could affect how close or distant UK voters feel to other Europeans either through the learning process itself or opportunities for contact. The third part concerns the link between foreign language skills and the possibility of a European public sphere—participation in which may enable the perception of the EU as a legitimate political entity. The final and arguably most important theoretical mechanism can be found in the literature on European identity, where foreign language skills have been considered as indicative of cosmopolitanism or transnationalism—which in turn contributes to an individual’s sense of a European identity. The section concludes with a brief overview of other factors that have been found to be related to the leave vote and that could potentially confound the effect of foreign language skills on the Brexit decision. There is a long-standing historical view that a common language and national identity are intricately linked (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). A common language facilitates the formation of a shared culture through discourse and the construction of cultural meaning that is shared by members of a community. Shared cultural constructs in turn can form the core of a national identity. As proto-national communities exceed the experiential sizes of groups in traditional societies, the construction of shared culture happens through, for example, the printing press and a mediated public sphere. Anderson (1983) describes this process of emergence and labels nation states as “imagined communities” because their members cannot all interact directly. Using the Austrian case, Wodak et al. (2009) nicely unpack the micro-processes that underlie this construction of national identity. At the same time, common language and culture then also allow for the formation of a perceived in-group that becomes visible mainly in contrast to out-groups that do not share either the cultural constructs, or the language, or both. This links the literature on nationalism and identity to the social psychology literature discussed later. The relationship is not one-directional, however: In the nineteenth

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and twentieth century, nation states also actively promoted language homogeneity (Blommaert and Verschueren 1992; Wright 2016). So, language can be seen as both a part of the origin and as a consequence of the formation of the modern nation state. The centrality of language to national identity persists today. Countries regularly require speaking the national language as a condition for residence or citizenship, and a recent analysis of cross-national data from Pew Research Center’s “Global Attitudes Survey” shows that in most countries, people say that speaking the language is more important to national identity than someone’s birthplace (Stokes 2017). It is perhaps not surprising then, that following a more open, transnational period, a nationalist backlash finds fertile ground in monolingual environments. This is, in part, what this chapter attempts to show using the Brexit case study. Social psychologists, linguists, and education researchers have also analysed the relationship between language and identity. A large body of work explores these questions particularly as they relate to multilingual societies (Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004), or immigration experiences, and the creation of amalgamated identities, for example, Latinos in the US case (e.g. Padilla and Perez 2003, Schecter and Bayley 2005). One of the major contributions from cross-cultural psychology in this respect is bicultural identity integration theory (Benet-Martínez et al. 2002; Benet-­ Martínez and Haritatos 2005). Benet-Martínez and co-authors unpack the process underlying the integration of dual cultural identities and analyse how these processes relate to perceptions of identity and other cognitive processes such as “cultural frame switching” and “code switching”. For the question at hand, effects of foreign language learning outside an immigration or minority context, for example, in school are perhaps more relevant, and the relationship between language instruction and learning about the culture of speakers of the language has been explored in education research (Byram 1994). The fundamental idea is that learning a foreign language usually also exposes the student to the culture of the people whose language is being studied.1 Finally, speaking  For an in-depth theoretical framework and case studies of the role of culture in language learning, see Byram (1994). 1

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a foreign language also increases opportunities for direct interaction with speakers of this language, either with immigrants in one’s own country, or abroad, for example, on holiday. There is strong evidence that direct contact with members of an out-group reduces prejudice and negative attitudes towards this group (Allport 1954). This intergroup contact hypothesis has been expanded and replicated in various settings (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006 for a meta-analysis). Interestingly, there is even some evidence that simply imagining interactions with a member of another group can lead to more positive perceptions of this group (Crisp and Turner 2009). If true, this of course points to the possibility of activities like role plays in a language classroom, and cultural learning more generally, affecting out-group views. Overall, speaking a foreign language increases opportunities for direct intergroup contact which reduces prejudice, and it has also been shown to reduce perceptions of cultural distance between one’s native culture and speakers of the other language (Benet-Martínez and Haritatos 2005). In turn, this reduction in prejudice and increased perception of proximity towards other Europeans among speakers of foreign languages in the UK could then plausibly have had an effect on the Brexit vote. Narrowing the focus from more general questions of language and identity to research that directly relates to the particular connection of foreign language skills and the European Union, two topics stand out as having received widespread attention in the literature: The question of a common language as a precondition in the development of a European public sphere on the macro-level, and the role of language skills in the formation of a European identity on the micro-level. These are examined below. The question of the emergence of a European public sphere is of particular interest for a study on language and Brexit. The basic idea is that for the European Union to be perceived by citizens as a legitimate and democratic supranational authority, a European public sphere, in which Europe-wide political debate and public discourse can take place, is required (Risse 2015a). Public opinion and media discourse about European issues should be transnational, or at least harmonised between the individual member states, rather than compartmentalised and idiosyncratic. The work of Jürgen Habermas (1974, 1981), specifically his

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theory of communicative action, is the starting point for attempts at definition, systematic theorising, and empirical analysis of the concept of a public sphere, but his work also blends systematic analysis with a normative component.2 Detaching from this and focusing on a purely analytic perspective, Gerhards and Neidhardt (1990) provide a thorough conceptual systematisation and analysis of emergence, function, structure, role-­ differentiation, actor-strategies, and public opinion processes of a “public sphere”. The concept received much attention by scholars focusing on European Union politics (Eder and Kantner 2000; Risse 2003; Trenz and Eder 2004; Eriksen 2005; Koopmans 2007). These scholars at the core try to answer the question of the possibility of a European public sphere, and what constitutes evidence of this emerging public sphere. Thomas Risse’s contribution (2015a) on the interplay of the emerging European public sphere and European identity and a recent edited volume (Risse 2015b) offer an excellent overview of the current state of research, while Pana (2015) and Walter (2017) clearly distinguish between different theoretical models of the public sphere that underlie some of these debates. The implicit assumption in much of this field has been that a genuine deliberative European public sphere requires a common language—or common languages—or at least the ability to follow and participate in the discourse in a foreign language. This is where the questions surrounding a European public sphere relate to the issue of foreign language skills and Brexit. Being unable to follow the public discourse in say France or Germany limits the opportunity of individual citizens—but in many cases also of elites such as journalists or politicians—to participate in the European public sphere which in turn has negative consequences for views about the EU and support of the European project. Breidbach (2002) discusses the role of foreign language teaching for the development of a European public sphere. For an interesting counterpoint on the assumption of a common language as a necessary condition for a European public sphere, however, see Doerr (2012) who analyses debates and exchange by grassroots activists who intentionally use translation

 For important work in this tradition, see, for example, Calhoun (1996), Fraser (1990), and recently Strani (2010, 2014). 2

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practice as a method of deliberation in the multilingual European Social Forum. Theories concerning a European public sphere have in common that they are necessarily describing the emergence of a macro-level phenomenon—and a possible feedback mechanism in the form of effects on European identity or Euroscepticism in the aggregate. When looking at average language skills and Euroscepticism on the cross-national aggregate level, however, foreign language skills are also not a panacea. Figure 6.2 shows the relationship between the percentage of adults aged 25–64 reporting they know no foreign languages (Eurostat 2016) and the

Fig. 6.2  Lack of language skills and Euroscepticism. Notes: Percentage of respondents who agree “[Country] could better face the future outside the EU” from Eurobarometer 86 (European Commission 2017). Percentage of adults aged 25–64 reporting they know no languages beyond their mother tongue. Data based on the 2016 Adult Education Survey (Eurostat 2016)

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percentage of respondents who see a better future for their country outside the EU (European Commission 2017). While the UK—with a low level of foreign language skills and high level of support for leaving the EU—fits the expected pattern, there are also several countries with high levels of Euroscepticism despite relatively good average foreign language skills. It is therefore necessary to look beyond the aggregate level and investigate what this relationship looks like on the individual level. Do foreign language skills contribute to the formation of a European identity on the individual level? Two potential mechanisms are covered by the literature. The first rests on intergroup contact theory which has already been discussed above (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Foreign language skills allow for transnational interactions, and transnational interactions are related to European identity directly (Fligstein 2008), or lead to generally cosmopolitan attitudes (Mau et  al. 2008), which in turn might contribute to an individual’s sense of European identity and ultimately support for the European Union (Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2015). The second theoretical mechanism treats foreign language skills as a component of individual transnationalism (Kuhn 2011) and embeds individual transnationalism in the theoretical framework on security communities by Deutsch et  al. (1957). In this view, security communities can be created by increasing and institutionalising cross-­ border transactions. If they are sustained over time and multidimensional, these institutionalised transactions then increase trust between the countries’ populations and support for the security community. Kuhn (2011) applies this logic to the European Union today. The motivation for Kuhn’s (2011) article is the apparent contradiction between increased transnational interactions and European integration on the one hand, and recent increases in Euroscepticism across many member states on the other hand. Following Deutsch et al. (1957), the exact opposite should occur. Transnational interactions should drive support for further integration. Kuhn resolves this puzzle by noticing that these transnational interactions are—for the most part—concentrated in a small part of the population, as also argued by Fligstein (2008). Transnationalism should therefore be measured at the individual level. Kuhn defines three dimensions of individual transnationalism: Direct transnational practices such as stays abroad, having a transnational

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background, such as being foreign-born, and possessing transnational human capital. While the concept of transnational human capital can be defined widely, foreign language skills are the crucial factor (Kuhn 2011, p. 814). Specifically, transnational human capital is operationalised using Eurobarometer survey items on “self-assessed preparedness to buy a product in another EU language”, and “having read a newspaper, book, or magazine in a foreign language in the past 12  months” (Kuhn 2011, p. 820). Using Eurobarometer data from 2006, her analysis supports the hypothesised relationship between individual transnational human capital (i.e. foreign language skills) and lower Euroscepticism. More recently, Díez-Medrano (2018) provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between multilingualism and European identification. He uses Eurobarometer data from 2010 to test the effect of the number of languages an individual speaks on European identity, measured as the answer to “Thinking about the fact that you are European, how important is being European for you personally?” on a four point Likert scale, and finds a modestly sized but statistically significant effect of about 6% of the outcome variable’s inter-quartile-range. In a second step, he uses mediation analysis to see how much of this effect can be attributed to actual interaction (e.g. in the form of holidays, living, or working abroad). The data suggest that while about a third of the effect is attributable to actual transnational interactions, a large part remains unexplained. This opens up the possibility for the more complex sociopsychological effects associated with foreign language learning, multilingualism, and perceptions of cultural distance and transnational identity I presented above. To summarise, theoretical perspectives and empirical work from diverse disciplines point to a complex relationship between multilingualism and (European) identity. On the macro-level historians have explained national identity based on language, and scholars of European politics have discussed the role of a European public sphere. On the micro-level, work by social psychologists and linguists points to intergroup contact theory and the effect of foreign language learning on perceptions of cultural distance, while those working on European political behaviour relate language and European identity via individual transnationalism. All these theoretical mechanisms and the body of evidence supporting them have in common that they lead to an expectation that multilingual

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individuals exhibit a higher level of European identity. Applying this general relationship to the case of the 2016 Brexit referendum leads to the hypothesis that multilingual UK citizens were more likely to embrace a European identity and should be more likely to have voted to remain in the European Union. The next section outlines how this conjecture can be tested using data from the 2016 referendum wave of the British Election Study and presents a testable hypothesis. Various other factors have been put forward to explain the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum. While the work discussed above points to the lack of foreign language skills having played a role in the vote, many other factors are likely to have been more influential overall. Furthermore, some of these such as age and education are also related to foreign language skills. It is therefore necessary to take these into account in the following analysis. In terms of factors that have been identified in several analyses of the Brexit referendum, core demographic factors, including education level, income, gender, and age are usually relevant (Hobolt 2016; Clarke et al. 2017). Factors associated with voters’ geographic location, for example, in debates surrounding areas of “economic decline” versus areas that have seen immigration and “cultural backlash”, are perhaps the most prominent (Goodwin and Heath 2016; Carreras et  al. 2019). Research also finds effects of party identification due to elite cue taking (Hobolt 2016; Clarke et al. 2017), as well as—while not directly modelling the Brexit vote, but in terms of support for the Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)—effects of voter personality (Kappe 2015).

6.2 Hypothesis, Data, and Methods The hypothesis is that there is a relationship between language skills and the Brexit vote. This chapter provides an empirical test for this relationship. Using BES survey data, it tests whether there is a relationship between self-reported language skills and the Brexit vote. The referendum wave of the British Election Study (Fieldhouse et al. 2017) was conducted between May and June 2016 in the run-up of the Brexit referendum. The survey asked a nationally representative sample of

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33,502 respondents about a variety of political attitudes, identifications, their vote intention in the referendum, as well as demographics, including knowledge of other languages. Specifically, it asked respondents whether they “speak a language other than English at conversational level”.3 The hypothesis thus is: Hypothesis  Voters who “speak a language other than English (or Welsh) at conversational level” are more likely to have voted to remain in the European Union in the 2016 referendum. The British Election Study only includes this question on language skills. A potential problem with this survey item is misreporting, or an overly generous assessment of what “conversational level” means. While problems with self-reported language skills have been identified in the literature (Edele et  al. 2015), no simple alternative is readily available, and misreporting only poses a threat to inference if it is systematically related to the Brexit vote. Furthermore, the question wording is similar to—for example—the Eurobarometer survey which asks respondents about their mother tongue and “what other language(s) do you speak well enough to be able to have a conversation?”, which is widely used as a measure of multilingualism (e.g. Díez-Medrano 2018). As mentioned above, factors other than foreign language skills have already been identified to be associated with vote choice in the Brexit referendum (Hobolt 2016; Clarke et al. 2017). They include education, age, gender, income, location, as well as family background in terms of minority status or foreign-born parents, personality factors, and party identification. All of these can be measured using variables in the BES dataset and will be accounted for in the following analysis. A complete list of variables and operationalisation can be found in Table 6.3 in the appendix. In terms of summary statistics, the sample corresponds nicely to the referendum outcome with 49% of those intending to vote choosing Remain and 51% Leave. Table  6.1 in the next section shows the  For respondents from Wales, the question wording is “Do you speak a language other than English (or Welsh) at conversational level”. 3

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Table 6.1  Percentage of foreign language speakers and Remain voters by gender, education level, and ethnic and parental background in the BES dataset Male Female Education No qualifications GCSE D-G GCSE A∗-C A-level Undergraduate Postgrad Non-white background White background Foreign-born parent(s) UK-born parents All

Overall %

Multilingual %

Remain %

49 51

22 24

48 50

8.2 4.9 22 21 33 11 8.4 92 13 87

6.4 8.4 11 21 32 44 56 19 48 19

25 31 33 49 62 73 65 48 59 47

100

23

49

percentage of foreign language speakers and Remain voters by gender, education level, and non-white and parental background in the sample. Table 6.4 in the appendix provides summary statistics and the correlation with multilingualism and Remain vote for age and personality factors. The data analysis presented here uses propensity score matching. With matching, it is possible to compare the Brexit vote of people who differ in terms of language skills, but who are otherwise very similar—or identical—in terms of education, income, age, gender, and possibly party identification and personality characteristics. While language skills necessarily pre-date the vote choice, and many plausible confounders can be controlled for using matching, the identification strategy ultimately relies on observational data, which limits the possibility of claiming this to be a well-identified causal effect, as possible unobserved confounders could bias the results. That being said, matching methods allow for a careful controlled comparison, and the analysis tries to cover possible confounders and is clear about the underlying assumptions. The estimated average treatment effects appear statistically significant, robust to the inclusion of additional covariates, and realistic in terms of magnitude.

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6.3 Data Analysis Did Britons’ relative lack of foreign language skills contribute to the outcome of the Brexit referendum? To answer this question, this section tests the hypothesis set out above. Firstly, is there a difference in the referendum vote between those who speak a foreign language and those who only speak English (or Welsh in Wales)? Looking at the data from the referendum wave of the BES, Fig. 6.3 supports the original assumption. Among those who only speak English, 54.6% voted to leave the European Union, while among those who speak an additional language, only 41.3% voted to leave the EU. This leads to the question whether this is a genuine effect, or whether the factor of foreign languages skills is epiphenomenal. Foreign language skills could—for example—simply be a marker of education more generally which is a well-established contributor to the Brexit decision (Goodwin and Heath 2016; Clarke et  al. 2017). Similarly, those who have foreign-born parents or belong to an ethnic minority might simultaneously have language skills beyond English and be less inclined to support Brexit, for example, due to the nativist and xenophobic messaging of the Leave campaign. In sum, there are a variety of possible confounding variables that could plausibly affect both language skills and the referendum vote. I am interested in the difference in the referendum vote between those who speak another language and those who do not. The fundamental problem of course is that we cannot observe the outcome for participants both with and without this “treatment”. Furthermore, the two groups are different in a variety of respects, such as age, education, and other characteristics. Table 6.1 shows the percentage of foreign language speakers and Remain voters by gender, education level, and ethnic and parental background in the sample. To address this problem, matching methods can be useful. Matching allows us to limit our analysis to a comparison of voters who differ in terms of language skills, but who are otherwise identical—or very similar—in terms of observable confounders such as education, income, age, gender, and possibly other factors such as party identification and personality characteristics.

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As an example of how different the two groups are, it is worth looking at education in Table 6.1. In the sample overall, 23% of UK respondents claim to speak a foreign language at conversational level, but only 6% of those with no qualifications do, while this rises to 44% amongst those with postgraduate educational qualifications. Using matching methods is therefore suited to the data at hand, as in the overall sample, the difference between the treatment and control groups is large in terms of observable confounders.4 This can make the use of standard regression analysis problematic, as the treatment and control groups may lack common support such that differences between treatment and control would be based on extrapolation. Matching is generally useful in situations where the observable confounders (e.g. education level, age) that (1) are related to the outcome (Brexit vote), but (2) also would have affected whether someone received the treatment (has learned to speak a foreign language), and (3) are plausibly exogenous to the “treatment decision”. In other words, factors such as age and education affect both the Brexit vote and whether someone learned a foreign language, but neither the Brexit decision nor the reported language skills can plausibly have retroactively affected a respondent’s highest level of educational qualification. Testing the raw difference between the groups—as it is visible in Fig. 6.3—can be misleading, as treatment and control groups may differ in characteristics that are related to both the vote choice and foreign language skills which would confound our estimates. Absent randomisation, matching methods can still be used to estimate average treatment effects if two requirements are met: (1) conditional on observed covariates, potential outcomes are independent of treatment, that is, the “conditional independence assumption”, and (2) there is “common support”, meaning sufficient overlap in the distributions of the treatment and control groups. This second assumption is testable—and the matched data indeed provide sufficiently similar groups, as can be seen in the balance  Table 6.3 in the appendix provides a complete comparison of standardised differences between the two groups in terms of a variety of potential confounders for both raw and matched data (using model 4 below). While there is no universally agreed cut-point, standardised differences greater than 0.25 are often considered evidence of imbalance and marked with an asterisk in the table (Rubin 2001). 4

R. Kappe

.8

144 

.7

54.6 %

0

.1

.2

% vote Leave .3 .4 .5

.6

41.3 %

No

Yes

"Do you speak any language other than English (or Welsh) to a conversational level?"

Fig. 6.3  Difference in referendum vote by language skills

tests in Table 6.5 and the overlap plot in Fig. 6.4. Threats to conditional independence due to unobserved confounders on the other hand are invisible. That being said, the tests reported below are an attempt at a conservative estimate by matching not only on obvious, plausibly exogenous, predictors of foreign language skills such as demographics and education that are also related to the Brexit vote, but by also showing estimates for models that additionally match on strong predictors of political opinions, namely party identification and personality, that are less obviously related to language skills. Propensity score matching first estimates a model for the propensity of being treated—in this case being conversational in a language other than English—conditional on a set of covariates. This propensity score is then used to match one or more observations from the control group to the treated observations, so that the matched control group resembles the treatment group (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). The difference in the referendum vote between the matched treatment and control groups is our estimate of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT).

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Table 6.2 provides different ATT estimates using propensity score matching with different sets of covariates. The first column just shows a raw t-test between the two groups. As we saw from Fig. 6.3, those speaking a language other than English are 13% more likely to have voted to remain. This is a large effect, no doubt in part due to the fact that monolinguals and multilinguals are different groups of people in a variety of respects. To address this, the estimate reported in column 2 is based on a model that uses propensity scores to match voters speaking another language to voters who are identical (or similar) in terms of education, age, gender, income, region, being non-­ white, and having foreign-born parents, but who crucially do not speak another language. The difference between these groups is a more credible 5%, and statistically significant. It means that voters who speak a foreign language are 5% more likely to have voted for Remain than a group of otherwise very similar voters with no foreign language skills. In order to provide an additional benchmark, it is worthwhile to consider whether there are characteristics that are known to strongly determine the Brexit vote choice and that may be related to foreign language skills, and potentially indicative of other unobserved confounders. Factors such as personality factors and party identification fit this description. While this technically goes beyond what propensity score matching is intended to be used for, it can be considered a Table 6.2  Matching estimates of the effect of speaking a second language on the referendum vote choice

Average treatment effect (ATT) Standard error p-value Demographics (age, gender, income, region, education, non-white, foreign-born parents) Party identification Personality N

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Raw t-test

PSM

PSM

PSM

13.27 (0.82) 0.001

5.29 (1.55) 0.001 ✓

3.20 (1.39) 0.021 ✓

3.76 (1.49) 0.011 ✓

✓

20,600

✓ ✓ 13,167 13,167 12,353

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robustness check as it should bias the treatment estimate down. The model in column 3 adds party identification to the list of covariates to match on, and column 4 also includes values of the big five personality traits.5 The results show that even after matching respondents on personality factors and party identification, as well as demographics, there remains a 3–4% difference between those who speak another language and those who do not.

6.4 Limitations In terms of limitations, the analysis presented here is constrained by the available data. Survey questions on self-reported language skills are potentially problematic in a variety of ways (Edele et al. 2015). The most obvious problem being misreporting, or in this case an overly generous assessment of what “conversational” means. If this is not random, but systematically related to other individual characteristics such as personality or educational background due to social desirability bias or interviewer effects, results could be biased. Furthermore, if especially Europhile, cosmopolitan or “transnational” individuals feel a stronger need to report having foreign language skills, or overestimate their abilities more, results would certainly be biased. It would therefore be desirable to have better questions on foreign language skills. A simple alternative would be to make the questions more concrete by giving respondents examples of situations in which they would use their languages skills, for example, “are you able to order food/discuss politics/ discuss a film in a foreign language…”. A good example of a similar attempt is in Eurobarometer 65 (cited in Kuhn 2011), which asked: “In the last 12 months, have you read a book, newspaper or magazine in a language other than your mother tongue”. A more complex alternative would be to actually test language skills. Since surveys are computerbased and increasingly completed online, these could, for example, include a few—ideally standardised—survey items that test actual skills in commonly spoken foreign languages following the self-­ report  Descriptions of all variables are in Table 6.3 in the appendix.

5

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question. While challenging to design and validate, this would allow for a much more thorough assessment of actual language skills. Perhaps this would be an interesting project for linguists interested in survey research. A further problem concerns the lack of causal identification of the estimated effect of foreign language skills. While matching methods using sufficiently large surveys and rich respondent data provide a good attempt at estimating the average treatment effect, they ultimately do not provide causal identification in the way a randomised trial or other causal identification strategy does. Field experiments or analyses of quasi-­ experimental data following educational reforms or, for example, school boundary changes could be used to verify the causal nature of the findings presented here. Finally, the interplay of foreign language learning, personality, actual transnational interactions and experiences, and identity is highly complex. While the analysis focuses on one specific effect of foreign language skills and tried to provide a clear estimate, more theoretical and empirical work is needed to unpack the underlying mechanisms and understand how these concepts and processes relate to each other. This is where sociologists and political behaviour experts can learn much from work in linguistics and psychology.

6.5 Conclusion This chapter argued that the UK’s relative lack of foreign language skills has contributed to the outcome of the Brexit referendum. Theory suggests that speaking foreign languages reduces perceptions of cultural distance and contributes to the formation of transnational identities. Research also shows a link between language skills and European identity (Kuhn 2015; Diez-Medrano 2018). The hypothesis that voters who “speak a language other than English at conversational level” are more likely to have voted to remain in the European Union finds support. Data from the referendum wave of the British Election Study show that voters with foreign language skills overwhelmingly voted to remain. Voters with foreign languages skills are however quite different from those without in

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a variety of ways, most notably in terms of educational attainment, income, and family background, for example, being foreign-born. Using matching methods, which allow for a paired comparison of otherwise similar respondents in terms of these demographic differences, it is possible to estimate the effect of foreign language skills on the referendum vote. The effect of foreign language skills—while taking into account differences in education level, age, gender, income, region, and family background in terms of being non-white or foreign-born parents—is about 5%. This means otherwise very similar voters who speak a foreign language were 5% more likely to have voted for Remain. The analysis also indicates that a significant effect of foreign language skills remains, even when taking into account additional factors such as party preference and personality differences. The analysis presented here lends support to theories that link foreign language skills and (European) identity formation. It speaks to the literature on language and politics, showing that multilingualism can have an important influence on political behaviour, and it also corroborates general findings from the European public opinion and European identity literature in the context of the UK’s highly consequential 2016 referendum on membership in the European Union. Overall, this chapter has attempted to make three contributions to the literature on language and politics, specifically multilingualism and political identity, as well as the work on European identity, Euroscepticism, and the causes of Brexit. The main contribution is the identification of the (lack of ) foreign language skills as a factor that may have affected the Brexit decision. A large variety of important influences have already been discussed and analysed in the literature sparked by the Brexit referendum (cf Hobolt 2016; Clarke et al. 2017), but the exceptionally low level of foreign language skills in Britain has so far been overlooked. Another contribution lies in the fact that the Brexit referendum provides an important test case. Much of the extant research on language, transnationalism, and European identity relies on a variety of purely attitudinal measures of European identification. The Brexit vote choice was an example of highly consequential political behaviour. Finally, the question of foreign language skills goes beyond more established narratives of age, education, and the economically or culturally “left behind” as causes of

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Brexit. This is important because these factors such as age, education, location, and personality, are difficult or impossible to influence. Language skills and foreign language learning by contrast are one of the variables that can actually be affected by government policy. In this sense, this chapter does also provide a policy implication. European Union policies in support of language learning and transnational exchange are considered important tools for creating a European identity and a cohesive union. The results presented here support this view with evidence, as the data suggest that the lack of foreign language skills played some part in the outcome of the Brexit referendum.

Appendix Table 6.3  Variables and operationalisation Concept

Operationalisation

BES variable name

Multilingualism

“Do you speak a language other than English [or welsh] at conversational level”. “If you do vote in the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, how do you think you will vote?” Respondent’s highest education level: No qualifications, GCSE D-G, GCSE A∗-C, A-level, undergraduate, postgraduate Respondent’s age Dummy variable based on question “Are you male or female?” Fifteen income categories based on question “What is your gross household income?” Dummy based on question “To which of these groups do you consider you belong?” Dummy based on question “Were either of your parents born outside the United Kingdom?”

languageSkills, languageSkillsWelsh

Referendum vote

Education

Age Gender Income

Non-white background Foreign born parent(s)

euRefVote

profile_education_ level

Age Gender profile_ gross_household profile_ ethnicity

parentsForeign

(continued)

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Table 6.3 (continued) Concept

Operationalisation

BES variable name

Region Party identification

UK government office region “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as labour, conservative, Liberal democrat or what?” Respondent’s score on 0–10 scale for the “big 5” personality factors: Openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism based on ten item personality inventory (TIPI)

profile_GOR_pdl partyId

Personality

personality_ openness personality_ conscientiousness personality_ extraversion personality_ agreeableness personality_ neuroticism

Table 6.4  Summary statistics and correlation with multilingualism and remain vote for age and personality factors Summary Statistics

Correlation with

Variable

Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Multilingualism Remain vote

Age Agreeableness Conscientiousness Extraversion Neuroticism Openness

53.7 6.09 6.84 4.09 3.67 5.52

15.3 1.77 1.84 2.18 2.19 1.71

18 0 0 0 0 0

96 10 10 10 10 10

−0.21∗ −0.01∗ −0.07∗ −0.01 0.03∗ 0.10∗

−0.02∗ −0.01 0.02∗ 0.08∗ −0.03∗ 0.14∗

Table 6.5  Covariate balance pre- and post-matching Standardised differences Age Gender Income Region North west Yorkshire and Humber East midlands West midlands East of England London South east

Variance ratio

Raw

Matched

Raw

Matched

−0.008 0.046 0.239

−0.012 0.013 0.001

1.162 1.000 1.141

1.224 0.999 1.016

−0.058 −0.048 −0.065 −0.051 −0.042 0.290∗ −0.025

0.060 −0.029 0.028 −0.044 0.023 −0.024 −0.003

0.855 0.868 0.803 0.853 0.889 1.777 0.947

1.202 0.918 1.112 0.871 1.071 0.966 0.993 (continued)

6  Multilingualism and the Brexit Referendum  Table 6.4 (continued)

South west Wales Scotland Education GCSE D-G GCSE A∗-C A-level Undergraduate Postgrad Non-white background Foreign born parents Personality Agreeableness Conscientiousness Extraversion Neuroticism Openness Party ID Labour Liberal democrat SNP UKIP Green party Other No—none Don’t know

Standardised differences

Variance ratio

Raw

Matched

Raw

Matched

−0.070 0.054 0.031

−0.007 −0.011 0.019

0.810 3.003 1.060

0.978 0.858 1.036

−0.203 −0.395∗ −0.091 0.353∗ 0.396∗ 0.490∗ 0.509∗

−0.013 0.036 0.019 −0.053 0.017 0.044 0.017

0.336 0.518 0.868 1.206 2.393 3.757 2.521

0.911 1.096 1.035 0.994 1.025 1.070 1.018

−0.016 0.047 0.175 −0.063 0.331∗

−0.044 −0.032 0.035 0.033 −0.030

0.968 1.080 1.107 1.018 1.098

0.924 1.063 1.027 1.059 1.125

−0.005 0.109 −0.011 −0.142 0.093 0.067 −0.019 −0.025

−0.016 −0.009 −0.040 −0.019 −0.022 0.010 0.033 0.023

0.996 1.411 0.955 0.617 1.673 1.995 0.966 0.874

0.987 0.976 0.850 0.928 0.903 1.090 1.068 1.143

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Fig. 6.4  Balance plot showing common support

References Allport, G. W. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Perseus. Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.. Benet-Martínez, V., & Haritatos, J. (2005). Bicultural Identity Integration (BII): Components and Psychosocial Antecedents. Journal of Personality, 73(4), 1015–1050. Benet-Martínez, V., Leu, J., Lee, F., & Morris, M. (2002). Negotiating Biculturalism: Cultural Frame Switching in Biculturals with Oppositional Versus Compatible Cultural Identities. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 33, 492–516. Blommaert, J., & Verschueren, J. (1992). The Role of Language in European Nationalist Ideologies. Pragmatics. Quarterly Publication of the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA), 2(3), 355–375.

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7 Multilingual Citizens, Multicultural Citizenship? Somali People’s Experiences of Language, Race and Belonging in Contemporary Scotland Emma Hill

7.1 Introduction In the latter half of the twentieth century, multiculturalism has emerged as an ‘outgrowth’ of liberal models of citizenship (Meer and Modood 2015, p. 183). Predicated on a ‘respect for cultural diversity’ (Tully 2002, p. 102), multicultural frameworks have sought to negotiate ways in which ethnic, racialised, religious, cultural and linguistic plurality might be incorporated into models of citizenship. Multiculturalist approaches to citizenship therefore have potential to offer a vision of citizenship in which linguistic difference—and indeed, linguistic diversity—is both accommodated by the state and entrenched in an understanding of what it means to participate and be represented in the polity. The reality of this

E. Hill (*) Department of Sociology, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 K. Strani (ed.), Multilingualism and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40701-8_7

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potential, however, is complex. In recent decades, multiculturalist projects have come under increasing pressure and critique from both the political left and right, creating an ‘uncertain’ environment in which ‘difference’ might be ‘accommodated’ (Meer and Modood 2015, p.  181). Meanwhile, without formalised protections for linguistic diversity (Zolberg and Woon 1999), state approaches to linguistic pluralism have veered towards the protectionist, creating situations in which a person’s access to citizenship is directly related to their abilities in the state-­ sanctioned language. In a UK context, Scottish approaches both to language policy and to multiculturalism have not entirely adhered to the trend. Since the devolution of the Scottish Parliament in 1999—and with it, the devolution of powers over language policy—the Scottish Government has increasingly ‘diverged’ (Mulvey 2015, p.  358) from prevailing UK attitudes towards multilingualism, which have been on a more conservative trajectory (Meer et al. 2019). Refashioning multiculturalist models of citizenship into (aspiring) pluralist approaches (Meer 2015a), and entrenching these within a rhetoric of participatory, multiformed and multilingual democracy, contemporary approaches to citizenship in Scotland offer a welcome alternative to conservative models of linguistic and cultural assimilation elsewhere. However, though Scottish political elites have made a commitment to a multiply-voiced, languaged and plural citizenship in Scotland, this has not always translated into the experiences of multilingual populations in Scotland, particularly for minority and multilingual populations, who encounter persistent barriers to the public and civic spheres. This chapter is informed by the experiences of one such population—the Glasgow-based Somali-Scots population. Somali people have lived in Scotland for the past century, but a substantial population has only been established in the last 20 years. Formed initially in the early 2000s by people seeking asylum, the contemporary population is made up of several generations of experience, with local, national and transnational connections (Hill 2017). Somali-Scots are overwhelmingly multilingual—with competence in at least English and Arabic, and usually with additional competences in Somali variants, Swahili variants and various European languages. In this sense, the Somali population embodies many of the qualities of a plural and multilingual citizenship

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espoused by pluralist rhetoric in Scotland. However, Somali people in Glasgow rarely experience life in these terms. Instead, they find that their linguistic abilities remain embedded in discourses of integration, so that their language practices are implicated in the extent to which they are seen as ‘citizen’. This chapter is based on a three-year ethnographic project conducted as part of my PhD research between 2014 and 2018 with various Somali groups in Glasgow. The framework for the research was ethnographic, drew on the disciplines of Cultural Studies and Anthropology, and was shaped by anti-racist and decolonial scholarship. It is informed by interviews, conversations and group discussions with 40 people of Somali backgrounds, as well as conversations with language practitioners and policymakers in Scotland. Interviews were often conducted in English and Somali, with the aid of Somali/English interpreters. Interviews were transcribed by a translator with expertise in both English and Somali, who also provided English-language translations of the  interpreted, Somali interview contributions. Analysis of interviews has been undertaken through an inductive, informal coding system, and arguments were developed  in collaboration with Somali participants. In the following sections, this chapter will discuss and analyse Somali people’s experiences of multilingualism in public life in Scotland. It will consider the extent to which racialised discourses intersect with issues of language and linguistic ability, and analyse the extent to which this crystallises in Somali people’s experiences of (not) belonging in Scotland.

7.2 M  igrant, Multicultural Multilingualisms and Citizenship Discourses in the UK In the latter part of the twentieth century, multiculturalist models of citizenship were adopted by some states in the Global North as a way of accounting for ‘difference’ amongst citizens. Born out of the migratory movements of the past century and post-colonial and post-war environments, multiculturalist approaches sought to develop the tenants of ‘liberal egalitarianism’ (Modood 2013, p.  8) by entrenching a ‘respect for cultural diversity’ (Tully 2002, p. 102) within norms of citizenship and

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belonging. In practice, state approaches to the accommodation of ‘difference’ have focused on the relationship between citizenship, ethnicity and nationhood—concerns which have been crystallised in policy, legislation and discourse relating to particular categories of ‘difference’, primarily, race, ethnicity and nation, but also religion and language (Zolberg and Woon 1999). In theory, multiculturalist approaches to citizenship and belonging therefore offer a framework through which linguistic difference might be accommodated by the state and entrenched in an understanding of what it means to participate and be represented in civic and political spheres. In practice, this is complex. Across the Global North, multiculturalist approaches in broad terms are divergent (Kymlicka 2011), providing an inconsistent framework from which the accommodation of linguistic ‘difference’ might be hung. In the UK, where reserved UK Government multiculturalist approaches have moved between assimilationist and integrative models respectively, multiculturalism as both a political and a philosophical project has a decidedly ‘uncertain’ future (Meer and Modood 2015, p.  181). Since the 2010s, prevailing attitudes by UK Government representatives have variously announced the ‘failure’ of multiculturalism (Werbner 2009), amplified anti-migrant and anti-­ minority rhetoric and pursued restrictive border regimes. These approaches sit in contrast to policy pursued by the devolved Scottish Government—with broad cross-party support within Scotland—that has aspired to a ‘pluralist’ model of citizenship (Meer 2015a), sought to encourage immigration and developed distinctive strategies for ‘integration’ and race equality. Such divergent approaches even within a singular state show that the implementation of a multiculturalist approach relies on political support—but also on political interpretation. Policies may espouse a multiculturalist approach but may be based on political agendas that are distinctive and support very different outcomes. As a result of distinctive social and political environments, there is no one prevailing approach to how a state might ‘accommodate’ linguistic diversity within a multiculturalist framework. Within this diversity of social and political interpretation of multiculturalism, however, the accommodation of linguistic difference is consistently nebulous. Zolberg and Woon (1999) observe that though many of

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the categories of multiculturalism have protections in international or national law, which shape the way in which states subsequently accommodate them, equivalent protections for language are not forthcoming. Contrasting states’ commitments to linguistic freedom with religious freedoms, they comment: Whereas their commitment to religious freedom requires liberal states to go beyond respect for the rights of individuals and at least accept or sometimes even positively sustain a measure of institutional pluralism in the religious sphere, no such obligation arises in connection with freedom of speech, which is generally construed to refer primarily to the contents of speech (broadly speaking) rather than choice of linguistic vehicle. Accordingly, the sphere of language rights is more limited than that of religious rights. (Zolberg and Woon 1999, p. 21; emphasis added)

The absence of formal international protections for linguistic difference (Hill et al. 2018) has typically enabled states to associate language policy with mechanisms of statehood in ways that are not possible for other categories of ‘difference’. There is not, for instance, a linguistic equivalent for the separation between church and state (Zolberg and Woon 1999, p.  21). As a result, even within states which have adopted progressive multiculturalist agendas, language policies have broadly tended to be more conservative in character than their overall approach to citizenship—so that, for example, admission to the state is fairly constantly associated with competency in the chosen language(s) of the state (Meer et  al. 2019). The first act of violence to which ‘guests’ of the state (migrants) are subjected, Derrida and Dufourmantelle observe, is the demand from the ‘host’ (the state) to ‘speak the language’, a skill, it is inhered, from which follows onto the migrant ‘speaking the language’ of the state ‘in all senses of the term, in all its possible extensions’ (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000, p. 15).

7.2.1 Citizenship and English Language Ability Within the UK context, the acquisition of English language is directly related to many aspects of citizenship, including bordering practices,

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access to welfare support, access to employment and education and access to the civic sphere. Applications for British citizenship combine a ‘citizenship’ test and a threshold for English language competency; for refugees, access to both the job market and welfare support are often linked to attendance of English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) classes (Phillimore and Goodson 2006). In these situations, the close association of the bordering apparatus of the status with English language ability places makes visible the manner with which the state mobilises language discourses to regulate who might (not) have access to British citizenship (Meer et al. 2019), and who is and who is not a citizen. Indeed, the association by the state of English language ability with the border enables an easy transition from discussions about what English language ability says about who is a citizen of the UK to what English language ability says about who is British—in other words, the relationship between English language ability and ethnicity is conflated, so that a person’s linguistic habits are read as a metonym for how ‘British’ they are (Phipps and Fassetta 2015). High-profile cases (see, e.g. Mason and Sherwood 2016) in which politicians and the news media have used ethnic minority populations’ (perceived) English language ability to call into question their right to citizenship in the UK demonstrate how easily the bordering of linguistic ‘difference’ translates into ‘everyday’ limitations on civic participation and representation, even for those who have full citizenship rights.

7.2.2 Language Policy in Scotland Language policy in Scotland has diverged significantly from approaches espoused by the UK Government. Falling under the Scottish Parliament’s devolved powers for education, Scotland has officially been a multilingual country since the Gaelic Language Act (2005) established legislation to protect and revive one of Scotland’s ‘heritage’ languages. Legislation today recognises English, Scots, Gaelic and British Sign Language as ‘official’ languages of Scotland. Languages other than English are in regular use in Parliament and other political forums, and have included MSP Humza Yousaf being sworn-in to the Scottish Parliament in both English

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and Urdu, and (then) leader of the SNP in Westminster, MP Angus Robertson, making a post-Brexit intervention in German (Phipps 2017, p.  96). Within the devolved policy area itself, distinct approaches to language-­learning can be found in Scottish education policies, and in the ground-breaking Sign Language (Scotland) Act (2015a). Further commitments to supporting linguistic pluralism are evident in the Scottish Government’s New Scots 2018–2022 (Scottish Government 2018) Strategy, a document which sets out Scottish approaches to ‘integration’ and inclusion of Scotland’s (post)migration communities. The initiative itself is distinctive within UK politics for the manner with which it frames its approach to integration as ‘multilateral’ (Phipps 2017, p.  98), as a ‘two-way’ process that places responsibility on migrant and established communities alike. Within this broad approach to integration, language dynamics are among the initiative’s five priority areas. Alongside making provision for interpreting services and English language acquisition, New Scots also seeks to raise the profile of ‘home languages’ used by refugees and establish a community learning and development approach to minority languages (Scottish Government 2018, p. 51). Commitments in Scottish policy to linguistic diversity can also be linked to broader discourses about citizenship in Scotland. Research suggests that in the two decades since the reinstatement of the Scottish Parliament, there is an observable trend in Scottish politics across all political parties towards ‘aspirational pluralism’ (Meer 2015a). Within this framework, claims-making on both the civic and public spheres is arguably informed by multiculturalist principles, which sit somewhere between the ‘first and second generation’ liberal norms of freedom and equality and their commitment to freedom of speech and equality of access, and a ‘third generation’ egalitarian approach to ‘cultural diversity’ (Tully 2002, p. 102). Within this model, citizenship is based not on place of birth or ancestry but on a combination of factors that move away from ‘blood and soil’ caveats to citizenship, and towards qualifiers which include residency within Scottish territories, and an identification with Scotland as a place of settlement (Hill 2017). The form of citizenship offered by Scottish political actors is strictly civic—immigration remains reserved to the UK Parliament and formal citizenship within the UK is decided by the Home Office. As a result,

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people in Scotland remain subject to English language-related restrictions on any element of citizenship associated with immigration, including access to welfare support and the determination of citizenship rights. In Scotland however, the divergent approach taken in policy and by political elites to questions of civic and linguistic pluralism also has some influence. As is evident in the discussion of language policy above, Scottish political actors to a degree have sought to move away from an approach that only sees (English) language acquisition as a ‘technology of government’ (Foucault 1991) and towards an approach that cements communicative pluralism in the bedrock of civic practice. Philosophically too, Scottish pluralist approaches see citizenship as an inherently communicative act (Hill 2017). With communication at the core of a modern Scottish citizenship, political elites have thus taken pains to advocate for equality of access to the vehicle of communication—language (Hill 2017)—and the support for linguistic pluralism that this requires. Of course, caveats to this approach remain. Arshad (2008) has noted that though Scottish approaches to civic citizenship espouse equality of participation and representation, historically, the movement’s approach to ‘difference’ has given insufficient consideration to how institutional barriers and social penalties impact equality of access to the civic sphere, especially for ethnic minority populations. Recent scholarship by Davidson et  al. (2018) indicates that a ‘no problem here’ approach to ‘difference’—and particularly racialised difference—is both persistent in and detrimental to Scottish attitudes to citizenship. Research also finds that though pluralism has gained a political consensus in Scotland, its implementation and implications for ethnic minority populations’ everyday lives continues to remain ‘aspirational’ (Meer 2015a; Hill and Meer 2020). Meanwhile, though Scotland’s embrace of its multilingual status sets a rhetorical tone, tensions and inconsistencies persist in its practice. Current language policy distinguishes between Scotland’s ‘heritage’ languages and its ‘community’ languages. Within this framework, ‘heritage’ languages are defined in terms of their historic territorial roots in Scotland, whilst ‘community’ languages are associated with ‘new’ languages brought to Scotland by migrant populations (Fought 2006, p. 21). The distinction

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has arguably created a stratification of language statuses (Phipps and Fassetta 2015). As a ‘heritage’ language, Scottish Gaelic is also one of Scotland’s ‘national’ languages and therefore receives prestige and increased Government support for its dissemination and development, including integration into programmes for education. Though ‘community’ languages also receive resourcing from the Scottish Government, they do not have an equivalent level of infrastructural support—for instance, and with a few exceptions (Hancock 2014), ‘community’ languages are largely absent from Scottish school curriculum (Phipps 2017, p. 97). The differentiation between ‘heritage’ and ‘community’ languages also carries connotations beyond resourcing. The designation of Gaelic as a ‘national’ language—and the parallel exclusion of any ‘community’ languages from this description—reveals norms that inform what can and cannot be considered a ‘national language’. Meer notes: when the question is raised of bringing other minority languages into the fold which are more frequently spoken than Gaelic and appear to be taking on distinctive Scottish forms in terms of dialect, there is consensus amongst respondents that Scottish Urdu and Scottish Punjabi could not warrant a status as one of Scotland’s national languages. In this assessment, historical multilingualism is seen as a feature of the national identity whereas migrant multilingualism is viewed as potentially divisive. (Meer 2015b, pp. 5–6)

The differentiation between ‘heritage’ and ‘community’ languages reveals prevailing ideas about the Scottish nation, who ‘belongs’ in it and who is excluded from it. That ‘community’ languages are seen as potentially ‘divisive’ to ‘the nation’ suggests that (in this environment at least) the limits of national belonging are defined in terms of favour of ‘heritage’—of territory, inheritance and ethnicity—a construction of citizenship which contrasts sharply to the pluralist rhetoric above. The culmination of this environment is a series of tensions. Though Scottish approaches to multilingualism may on the one hand be held as a progressive alternative to prevailing assimilationist approaches to language policy, on the other hand, support for multilingual citizenship is tangled in unresolved ideas about the limits of nation and belonging. In the meantime, though the research above indicates (1) that ethnic

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minority populations in Scotland are likely to experience racialised or ethnic barriers to the public sphere and that (2) speakers of ‘community’ languages in Scotland are likely to experience resourcing and rhetorical limits to their support, there is little that indicates how the two might interact. How, for instance, is multilingualism in Scotland ethnicised? To what extent is multilingualism racialised? And with what impact? The remainder of this chapter turns to Somali experiences of language dynamics in Scotland to pursue grounded responses to these questions.

7.3 S  omali-Scots’ Language Experiences in Glasgow Formed primarily over the last decades by people brought to Glasgow under the UK Government’s Dispersal Scheme (UK Government 1999), there is now a population of up to 4000 people of Somali backgrounds living in Glasgow (Hill 2017). The population is made up of people with first- and second-generation migration experiences, and encompasses populations of various ethnic Somali backgrounds, including people of ‘majority’ Somali ethnicities and people from ‘minority’ Somali groups (Hill 2017).1 The vast majority of people with whom I worked were multilingual, though language profiles varied widely. Of people from ‘majority’ ethnicities, Somali and English were the languages most frequently used at home or in public. The 2011 Scotland Census finds that 1050 people regularly used Somali as a home language (Scottish Government 2011). The School Pupil Census locates the 121 Somali-speaking pupils in Glasgow North East, 87 in Glasgow South and 60 in Glasgow North West (Scottish Government 2015b). Many people also had competency at least in one more language, and frequently more. Common additional language competencies included ability in: Arabic, Amharic, Scots, Italian, French, Dutch and German. One participant with whom I spoke listed seven languages in which he was competent. Language competencies for people from ‘minority’ Somali groups were usually  distinctive,  There is a small population of people who identify as Somali-Bajuni in Glasgow, a non-lineal, minority Somali clan (see Hill et al. 2018; Hill 2017). 1

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and included abilities in Swahili, Swahili variants such as Kibajuni,2 English and Arabic. As is discussed above, language approaches in Scotland are designed to accommodate multilingual experiences. Language policy in Scotland supports access to and the use of multiple languages. In Glasgow, the public sector provides some interpreting services for many of the languages used by Somali-Scots, including Somali, Arabic and Kibajuni. In the meantime, should they require it, Somali-Scots have access to a range of English language tuition. In Scotland, English language provision is available through two routes. English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) makes provision for adults, aged 16 and above, to attend English classes in college or community settings (Scottish Government 2015c). Parallel to this provision, English as an Additional Language (EAL) embeds English language tuition for school-age children and young adults into Scotland’s school system. Situated in between these two types of provision, small-scale, time-limited community programmes, such as the Sharing Lives Sharing Languages (Scottish Government 2018) initiative, offer speakers of English and of other languages the opportunity to mutually learn each other’s language in an informal setting. These policies apply to all minority groups who are speakers of ‘community’ languages; however, their socio-political consequences—and their implications for accessing political citizenship—for Somali-Scots manifest in specific ways. The first of these is associated with the uneven weighting of language resourcing by government towards English language acquisition, and the impact this has for ‘community’ languages. This is evident in a number of fields, including the provision in secondary education of ‘community’ language support. Though provisions for speakers of languages other than English have been made in the education system for them to acquire English, parallel provisions have not been made for languages designated as ‘community’ languages. As a result, Somali language is not currently taught in Scottish schools, and language tuition instead relies on home and community settings. Meanwhile, though interpreting services exist  Kibajuni is the preferred language of Somali-Bajuni people. The 2011 Scotland Census identifies 1571 Swahili/Kiswahili speakers in Scotland, a figure which is likely to contain speakers of Kibajuni; however, the Census does not provide a detailed breakdown of Swahili dialects (Scottish Government 2011). 2

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for speakers of Somali or other languages spoken by Somali people, Somali-Scots often found them difficult to access and often unfamiliar with Somali contexts or cultures. One Somali-Scot participant, a young man who occasionally worked for Somali interpreting services in Scotland, observed that public sector providers appeared unaware of these linguistic complexities. On another occasion, he recalled, he was asked to interpret for an elderly Somali woman who spoke a variant of Somali with which he was unfamiliar. On this occasion, service providers explained that they were unaware of Somali language variants and asked him to continue, despite clear difficulties in communication. The difficulties arising in both these incidents can be related to a lack of knowledge or understanding of (1) East Africa, (2) the Somali language and (3) interpreting dynamics on the part of individual public sector service providers. An absence of cultural or linguistic knowledge in these incidents resulted in situations where language provision was inadequate, dysfunctional and inappropriate. Acknowledging that in Scotland, where there are over 175 ‘community’ languages spoken (Scottish Government 2014), there are clear practical and resourcing challenges to realising ‘community’ language education provision, it is also necessary to note the impact of the absence of ‘community’ language support in schools for ‘community’ language speakers, including Somali and Kibajuni speakers. By choosing to resource and provide educational support to English language acquisition by ‘community’ populations, current Scottish Government language policy creates a hierarchy of languages. Activities related to the acquisition of English language in schools are resourced and supported by government funding, allowing for the comprehensive provision of funded and trained language tutors, funded venues and accredited language qualifications. In contrast, though ‘community’ language provision may receive some funding, this is not embedded in language policy, with negative implications for tutoring, training and venue hire. In practice, what this means for Somali-speakers is that as Somali languages are not currently taught in Scottish schools, language tuition instead relies on home and community settings. The acquisition or maintenance of Somali languages for populations of Somali backgrounds therefore currently has an informal character, and is not a skill that can be

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recognised or accredited by the Scottish Qualifications Authority. The designation of a language as a ‘community’ language, meanwhile, means that issues relating to the acquisition of ‘community’ languages are framed initially as ‘community’ issues, removed from prevailing language policy related to English language acquisition. By allowing government to distance itself from ‘community’ language acquisition, language policy sets a precedent for government to also be distant from language dynamics that affect ‘the community’, and from ‘the community’ itself, whilst the responsibility for the acquisition of Somali or other ‘community’ languages is placed upon ‘community’ actors. Amongst the people with whom I worked, there was a strong feeling that though a majority of Somali-Scots spoke English, a good grounding in Somali remained essential not only for engagement in the community, but also for navigating internal community dynamics. The term ‘Somali language’ itself encompasses a range of Somali language variations, including the Northern variety, Benadir and Maay varieties. A mix of majority Somali language varieties was in use in Glasgow, and reflected the range of Somali regions to which people are connected. Being able to pick up differences in language variants and understand their significance was associated by the community with linguistically grounded, socio-­ political competence: it allowed individuals to identify the backgrounds of their interlocutors, their likely social, and possible family connections. Whilst an individual may have passable skills in a Somali language variant, if these skills were not accompanied by a socio-cultural understanding, many participants felt they were not wholly ‘speaking the language’. This dynamic was most keenly felt by the younger generations of the population, who were likely either to have left Somalia at a young age, or to have been born outside the country, and thus had had limited Somali language exposure. Young adult participants noted that whilst they could understand Somali language conversations, they did not have the linguistic, socio-political competences of their parents and felt that they sometimes missed the nuances of some situations. On the opposite side of the dynamic, elder generations lamented younger generations’ language competencies, and took it as a symptom of an increasing cultural distance between the younger generations and Somalia.

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The experiences above show how the resourcing implications of Scottish Government language policy for Somali-Scots go beyond quality of language acquisition to broader social, cultural and political issues within community settings. In these experiences, a double standard arises: the Scottish Government recognises that the acquisition of English language by Somali-Scots may help facilitate community and communicative relationships in Scotland; however, it does not apply the same logic to Somali language education, which has consequences for Somali community development.

7.3.1 Interpreting Services and Linguistic Barriers to Public Space Another of the resources provided by the Scottish Government for speakers of ‘community’ languages is interpreting services for people trying to access public spaces. However, Somali-Scots often found them difficult to access. One issue raised in interviews was that a base-level competence in English was often required in order to access Somali language interpreting services. An elderly Somali-Scots man observed that access to some basic council services required English language competencies, which some in the Somali-Scots population did not have. In Somali, he observed: Soomaalida maad aragteen kumuunitiga soomaalida luqada dad badan oo aan garaneyn ayaa jira. Qofku markii uusan luqad garaneyna muxuu dadka kula hadlaa? Marka in uu kumuunitigiisa u tago weeye. Kumunitigisuna ay marka u dalbaan.3

His friend interprets his comments into English: If the person understands the language there is a book they can have emergency contact, they speak fluent, good English language then they speak  These comments directly translate into the following: ‘the problem is that many people in the Somali community don’t speak the language so what is the point of contacting the council if you don’t speak the language? You will have to contact the [Somali Organisation instead]’. 3

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themselves and solve the problem themselves. Most of the elderly community, they may not understand well how to phone then mostly they come to the [community organisation] and they ask the [organisation] for help

In the example above, the English language requirements of the Council services actively turned some Somali-Scots away from accessing their services or engaging with their systems. Similarly to the situation with ‘community’ language (non)resourcing discussed above, this dynamic had implications beyond singular instances of linguistic inaccessibility. Just as Somali language competences have a generational dynamic within Somali-Scots populations, so too do English language competences. In this case, however, generational expertise was reversed. Where Somali-­Scots of younger generations were likely to have had consistent English language education (either through the schooling system, or through ESOL provision), Somali-Scots of older generations were less likely to have had a parity of access. Though ESOL education is available to all adult migrants in Scotland,4 adult ESOL learners often have to juggle English language acquisition with job seeking, employment, childcare or administration related to migration status (Meer et  al. 2019). Research by Akua-Sakyiwah with Somali populations in London shows that people in receipt of Job Seekers’ allowance felt obliged to miss ESOL classes to attend Job Centre Plus appointments in order to avoid welfare sanctions (Akua-Sakyiwah 2012, p. 161). Akua-Sakyiwah also highlights that as Somali women tend to take on childcare duties— and as there is an absence of childcare support for ESOL attendees— there are additional barriers to ESOL education for Somali women (Akua-Sakyiwah 2012, p. 161). In Glasgow, the acquisition of English through ESOL provision therefore took on both generational and gendered dynamics. Somali-­Scots of older generations were less likely to have experienced consistent English language education, whilst Somali-Scots women of older generations may also have experienced additional barriers to ESOL attendance.

 The Scottish Government waives ESOL education fees for asylum seekers, refugees and EU migrants who qualify for welfare support. 4

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If an individual was able to access interpreting services, there was also potential for the services to be incorrect or inappropriate. A young man who occasionally worked for Somali interpreting services in Scotland observed that public sector providers appeared unaware of the complexities of Somali language variants and their associated politics. In some cases, he noted, public service providers appeared to be unaware even of differences between different East African nationalities. On one occasion, he recalled that he was asked to interpret for a man from another East African country on the assumption that they shared the same language (they did not). Whilst these sorts of linguistic dysfunctions might be dismissed as micro-level inconveniences, the experiences above demonstrate that they create linguistic pressure points in the everyday lives of SomaliScots, who have to do additional linguistic labour to resolve them. It is worth noting that the experiences above also occurred in public sector environments—that is, at the first points of access to the public sphere. Whilst the examples above are individual experiences, the repetition of similar experiences in other public sector settings establishes a pattern that creates accumulative barriers to everyday communicative and civic citizenship.

7.3.2 Burdens of Representation The examples above show how the language policies relating to and the resourcing for the acquisition of skills in both English language and Somali language(s) are closely related to complex cultural and socio-­ political dynamics within Somali-Scots communities. The combination of internal and external language environments raised questions about representation and power. For instance, referring to situations that were similar to those described by the elderly man above, women of older generations noted a combination of internal and external language dynamics that often displaced them from positions of representation. In situations where Somali language variants were dominant, elder Somali men would often seek to speak for ‘the community’, even though elder Somali women

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were competent in Somali. In situations where English was dominant, elder Somali women with fewer English language skills often relied on their children to speak (English) for them. In these situations, the different gendered and generational dynamics associated with English and Somali language competencies intersected, so that elder Somali women were often removed from positions where they had opportunity to speak for themselves. Somali-Scots of younger generations also had to contend with the intersection of language and socio-cultural dynamics. For instance, for 17-year-old Abdulrahman, a negotiation of Somali and English language dynamics involved (1) generational inversions in situations where his English language skills meant that he represented his mum in public, English-dominated settings and (2) generational consolidation in community settings when his Somali language competences were subordinate to those of his mum’s: because, English, you need [it] to communicate with people around here, right? and Somali, you need to communicate with your community and your family, and if you cannot communicate with your family [then] … cos my mum doesn’t know that good a English, so you have to speak Somali in the house, [so] you don’t forget Somali, so it’s quite good

As Abdulrahman’s experiences above indicate, the language environments inhabited by Somali-Scots required a near-constant process of social and linguistic translation in order to participate in either internal or external spheres. Though the language environment in Scotland ostensibly supported the multilingual environment in which Somali-Scots lived, its (1) persistent institutional preference for English language competency and (2) absence of knowledge about Somali language(s) meant that the burden of linguistic and social translation was placed almost entirely upon individuals, or under-resourced ‘communities’. As the experiences above demonstrate, this type of translation was an integral part of Somali-Scots’ participation in public and civic settings; however, the additional linguistic labour required to successfully do so  was not institutionally recognised.

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7.3.3 Racialising Language Acquisition The accumulation of linguistic labour to participate in the public sphere has the potential to become a prohibitive element in Somali-Scots’ experiences of civic citizenship. For all of those with whom I spoke, this labour was also performed in the context of experiences of ‘everyday’ and institutional racism in Scotland. Somali-Scots experienced multiple racisms in Scotland (see Hill 2017; also Hopkins 2004). Individuals experienced anti-Black abuse, as well as anti-Muslim abuse in public spaces. People also were subjected to ethnic stereotypes about Somalis, as well as xenophobic and anti-migrant abuse. The groups and individuals with whom I worked observed that their experiences of racism impacted their everyday lives in Glasgow, from their experiences of public spaces, to interactions with the public and public officials (Hill 2017; Omar and Hill 2018). Individuals with whom I spoke described how living in Glasgow’s urban spaces involved a negotiation of whiteness (Ahmed 2007): of being aware of, avoiding or developing contingencies for spaces and situations in which a person might be vulnerable to racist abuse or racial profiling. In most cases, people described such negotiations in terms of material space—in terms of location, the built environment and type of space; however, some also noted that racism impacted their communicative experiences, including linguistic experiences. For instance, 30-year-old Jamal recalled that a regular experience when he worked as an interpreter in the public sector was that even before he could name the person for whom he was interpreting, receptionists would regularly refer him to the only other Black person in the room: when I was an interpreter, […] you know the front desk people? […] they will just point out in the room like, oh that’s the black person in there, they’re waiting for you. But I didn’t arrive just because they’re black, you know. They identify you by association, and it is embarrassing [for them]

The situation above makes visible how language norms are racialised. First, the receptionist makes the assumption that Jamal and his client are associated not because they have information that indicates this, but

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because Jamal and his client are both Black. By identifying Jamal in this way, the receptionist’s actions indicate that they understand any of Jamal’s or his client’s activities primarily through a racialised lens. By requesting Jamal’s services, his client has already been labelled as ‘without (English) language’, a narrative that (1) plays into stereotypes that (2) Black people are migrants, or from ‘somewhere else’ and that (3) mobilises anti-Black, racist stereotypes that associate Blackness with ‘primitive’ cultures. These two narratives subsequently interact and are transferred to Jamal: as a Black man, their logic goes, he too is ‘without culture’ and ‘without language’. The receptionist, their logic concludes, therefore has no need to speak to Jamal; he can simply be directed to the other ‘racialised Other’ (Virdee 2014) in the room. The interaction of language norms with racist discourses also occurred in other public spaces. Eighteen-year-old Ali recalled experiences in which white people had associated his skin colour with an absence of (English) language ability: I’ve seen it like you know like some [white] lassies, the moment that they see you they will keep some distance but when they see that you know the language they will be more friendlier than before, so, yeah … the language is the key

As in Jamal’s experience, Ali is seen primarily in terms of his skin colour, and is perceived as a ‘racialised Other’ in public space. The white women assume he is in some way a threat, mobilising stereotypes about Black hypermasculinity. These stereotypes are disrupted only when Ali starts speaking English and he is seen as less ‘threatening’. The womens’ reactions to Ali’s English language ability also reveals how language ability itself is racialised: if ‘not speaking (English) language’ is associated with the ‘threat’ of Black hypermasculinity, speaking English is seen to dilute the racialised ‘threat’. Within this framework, Ali arguably becomes ‘less threatening’ to the women because speaking English is perceived to whiten his occupation of communicative space: it makes him less racialised ‘Other’, more citizen.

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Jamal’s and Ali’s respective experiences suggest that racism and white privilege also play a considerable part in Somali people’s linguistic experiences in Scotland. The racialisation of language dynamics is not conducive to a multilingual public sphere, particularly for people from Black and ethnic minority populations. In spaces in which whiteness is the norm, their linguistic activity will be racialised, made hypervisible and/or erased. By denying their linguistic skills and language ability, the racialising and racist scripts to which Ali and Jamal are subject above attempt to place Somali people in marginal communicative— and social—positions.

7.4 Conclusion Though language policy in Scotland seeks to encourage and support multilingual citizenship, Somali-Scots’ lived experiences suggest that there is considerable work to be done in balancing  the weight of English language norms in Scotland’s public sphere. Somali-Scots remain multilingual citizens of Scotland; however, the prioritisation and resourcing of English acquisition does little to formally support this. Meanwhile, Somali-Scots’ language experiences highlight the double-bind to which Black and ethnic minority, multilingual populations in Scotland are subject. Where language norms demand of speakers of ‘community’ languages that they do additional labour to accommodate their multilingualism in the public sphere, racialised language norms seek to build barriers to prevent any access at all. Research on political and social dynamics in Scotland has traced how racism plays an active part in creating barriers for Black, Asian and ethnic minority people to the public sphere. However, there is still little that considers the interaction between racism and multilingualism, or the role that whiteness plays in establishing certain language norms. This chapter has sought to begin a conversation on these topics, and highlights the need for further work on the relationship between multilingualism, multiculturalism, citizenship and racialised norms in the public sphere.

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References Ahmed, S. (2007). A Phenomenology of Whiteness. Feminist Theory, 8(2), 149–168. Akua-Sakyiwah, B. (2012). Somali Refugee Women’s Perception of Access to Services in the UK. York: University of York. Arshad, R. (2008). Teacher Activism in Equity and Anti-discrimination in Scotland: An Interpretive Study. PhD, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh. Butler, J. (1997). Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. London: Routledge. Davidson, N., Liinpää, M., McBride, M., & Virdee, S. (2018). No Problem Here: Understanding Racism in Scotland. Glasgow: Luath Press Limited. Derrida, J., & Dufourmantelle, A. (2000). Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond (R.  Bowlby, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press. Foucault, M. (1991). The Right of Death and Power Over Life. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thoughts (pp. 258–272). New York: Penguin. Fought, C. (2006). Language and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hancock, A. (2014). Language Education Policy in Multilingual Scotland: Opportunities, Imbalances and Debates. Language Problems and Language Planning, 38(2), 167–191. Hill, E. (2017). Somali Voices in Glasgow City: Who Speaks? Who Listens? An Ethnography. PhD, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh. Hill, E., & Meer, N. (2020). Ethnic Minorities and Political Citizenship in Scotland. In M.  Keating (Ed.), Oxford Handbook for Scottish Politics. Oxford: OUP. Hill, E.  C., Craith, M.  N., & Clopot, C. (2018). At the Limits of Cultural Heritage Rights? The Glasgow Bajuni Campaign and the UK Immigration System: A Case Study. International Journal of Cultural Property, 25(1), 35–58. Hopkins, P.  E. (2004). Young Muslim Men in Scotland: Inclusions and Exclusions. Children’s Geographies, 2(2), 257–272. Kymlicka, W. (2011). Multicultural Citizenship Within Multination States. Ethnicities, 11(3), 281–302. Mason, R., & Sherwood, H. (2016). Cameron ‘Stigmatising Muslim Women’ with English Language Policy. Guardian. Retrieved June 26, 2017, from theguardian.com/politics/2016/jan/18/david-cameron-stigmatisingmuslim-women-learn-english-language-policy.

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Meer, N. (2015a). Looking Up in Scotland? Multinationalism, Multiculturalism and Political Elites. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(9), 1477–1496. Meer, N. (2015b). Race Equality in Scotland: Challenges and Opportunities. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. Retrieved from strathprints.strath. ac.uk/53556/1/MeerN_IPPI_2015_Race_equality_in_Scotland_challanges_and_oppurtunities.pdf. Meer, N., & Modood, T. (2015). Migration and Cultural Diversity Challenges in the Twenty-First Century. In A. Triandafyllidou (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Immigration and Refugee Studies (pp. 180–189). London: Routledge. Meer, N., Peace, T., & Hill, E. (2019). English Language Education for Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Scotland: Provision and Governance. Edinburgh: GLIMER Project. Retrieved June 6, 2019, from glimer.eu/outputs Modood, T. (2013). Multiculturalism. London: Wiley. Mulvey, G. (2015). Refugee Integration Policy: The Effects of UK Policy-­ Making on Refugees in Scotland. Journal of Social Policy, 44(2), 357–375. Omar, M., & Hill, E. (2018). New Scots? (Re)writing Somali Histories in Scotland. BSA Black History Month Editorial Series. Retrieved June 6, 2019, from https://www.britsoc.co.uk/about/latest-news/2018/october/ new-scots-re-writing-somali-histories-in-scotland/. Phillimore, J., & Goodson, L. (2006). Problem or Opportunity? Asylum Seekers, Refugees, Employment and Exclusion in Deprived Urban Areas. Urban Studies, 43(10), 1715–1736. Phipps, A. (2017). Language Plenty, Refugees and the Post-Brexit World: New Practices from Scotland. [Online] Version. Retrieved December 4, 2017, from link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-65169-9#about. Phipps, A., & Fassetta, G. (2015). A Critical Analysis of Language Policy in Scotland. European Journal of Language Policy, 7(1), 5–28. Scottish Government. (2005). Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Retrieved November 11, 2018, from legislation.gov. uk/asp/2005/7/contents. Scottish Government. (2011). Scotland Census: Language Used at Home Other than English (detailed), Scotland. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Retrieved November 5, 2018, from scotlandscensus.gov.uk/ods-web/data-warehouse. html#additionaltab. Scottish Government. (2014). Scotland’s Census 2011: Language Detailed. Retrieved from www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/documents/censusresults/release2a/rel2A_Language_detailed_Scotland.xls.

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Scottish Government. (2015a). British Sign Language (Scotland) Act. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Retrieved November 5, 2018, from legislation.gov.uk/ asp/2015/11/contents/enacted. Scottish Government. (2015b). School Pupil Census. Retrieved April 16, 2016, from http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/SchoolEducation/dspupcensus. Scottish Government. (2015c). Welcoming Our Learners: Scotland’s ESOL Strategy 2015–2020. The English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) Strategy for Adults in Scotland 2015. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Retrieved from http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/22892/2/ESOLStrategy2015to2020_ tcm4-855848_Redacted.pdf. Scottish Government. (2018). New Scots Integration Strategy 2018–2022. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Retrieved February 12, 2018, from gov. scot/Publications/2018/01/7281/downloads#res530097. Tully, J. (2002). The Illiberal Liberal. In P.  Kelly (Ed.), Multiculturalism Reconsidered. Cambridge: Polity. UK Government. (1999). Immigration and Asylum Act (1999), London: UK Government. Retrieved June 5, 2017, from legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/1999/33/part/VI. Virdee, S. (2014). Racism, Class and the Racialized Outsider. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Werbner, P. (2009). Revisiting the UK Muslim Diasporic Public Sphere at a Time of Terror: From Local (Benign) Invisible Spaces to Seditious Conspiratorial Spaces and the ‘Failure of Multiculturalism’ Discourse. South Asian Diaspora, 1(1), 19–45. Zolberg, A.  R., & Woon, L.  L. (1999). Why Islam is like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States. Politics & Society, 27(1), 5–38.

8 Managing Multilingual Spaces: Negotiating Linguistic Inequality in Repatriation Programmes Katy Brickley

8.1 Introduction Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programmes are used by governments around the world to incentivise rejected asylum seekers and undocumented migrants to return to their countries of origin with resettlement packages. These packages often include impartial advice, assistance with flights and other travel costs, passports and travel documents and a reintegration grant. Grants can be used towards setting up a business, training, education, healthcare and accommodation. Applicants are encouraged to plan how they intend to use the funds before they return. Although the UK government and the United Nations (UN) consider AVR the preferred option for rejected asylum seekers in the UK (IOM 2004; Ruben et  al. 2009)—AVR is cheaper to administer and widely regarded as a more dignified process than forced removal—it is a K. Brickley (*) School of English, Communication and Philosophy, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 K. Strani (ed.), Multilingualism and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40701-8_8

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remarkably understudied area of migration (Kuschminder 2017). Despite a rich research literature from a discourse-analytic standpoint on other aspects of asylum-seeking and irregular migration (e.g. Blommaert 2001; Good 2007; Inghilleri 2012; Jacquemet 2011; Maryns 2006), and a growing body of research on AVR from a sociological and political stance (e.g. Bak Riiskjaer and Nielsson 2008; Bradley 2006; Davids and van Houte 2008; Georgi 2012; Koser 2001; McGhee and Bennett 2014; Ruben et al. 2009; Kuschminder 2017), little research has been undertaken on the communicative processes within AVR schemes. The integrity of AVR—particularly in the UK—is heavily debated, with researchers in the field of migration describing these programmes as “fiercely controversial” (Black and Gent 2004, p. 7), predominantly due to the queried ‘voluntariness’ of the AVR programmes. There are two key elements that are considered central to this voluntariness: firstly, that applicants have freedom of choice (and are under no physical, psychological or material pressure to return); and secondly, that applicants can make an informed decision, with accurate and objective information (International Organization for Migration Helsinki 2015). It has been the former that has received the most focus (Black and Gent 2004; Blitz et al. 2005; Burnett 2009; Strand et al. 2011), with critics questioning whether AVR can be described as ‘voluntary’ in the UK when many applicants have few feasible sustainable alternatives, and may fear being detained. The UK Home Office’s policy to withdraw welfare support from asylum seekers after rejecting asylum claims has led to accusations that the Home Office employs an unofficial ‘policy of destitution’. Webber, for example, doubts the accuracy of the label ‘voluntary’, “where the alternative is utter destitution, with denial of accommodation, basic support and the opportunity to work”, (2011, p. 104). This material (in International Organization for Migration’s [IOM’s] terms) pressure to return, along with the Home Office’s broader policy of a ‘hostile environment’ for individuals without permission to remain in the UK (recently downgraded to a ‘compliant environment’ after widespread media criticism), shifts the institution’s ethical burden onto AVR caseworkers. They carry the responsibility for the applicant’s decision to be informed, in an environment where rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants face such pressure to leave. AVR exists in a context of widespread lack of trust

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within the asylum system, where the quality of the wider asylum process is questioned, particularly the quality of the initial decision (e.g. Blitz et al. 2005; Bloch 2014; Jones et al. 2017). It is therefore key for AVR caseworkers to ensure that their applicants fully understand the legal ramifications of applying for AVR and have explored any possibilities to remain, should they want to. Taking an approach grounded in Linguistic Ethnography (LE; e.g. Creese 2008; Rampton et al. 2004; Tusting and Maybin 2007; Copland and Creese 2015) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (e.g. Fairclough 1992; Wodak and Meyer 2009), in this chapter however, I focus on this other aspect of voluntariness—applicants’ opportunities to make an informed decision about AVR. In doing so, I foreground the importance of AVR information and the process of information-giving in a voluntary return. I regard the opportunity to make an informed decision about AVR as crucial: giving one’s consent willingly necessitates knowing what one consents to (Rock 2016). The data presented here is part of a broader doctoral study (Brickley 2015) which sought to investigate how social inequality was created, maintained and challenged within AVR programmes. During research conducted between 2010 and 2015, I explored applicants’ opportunities to make an informed decision and prepare for return by examining how caseworkers negotiate top-down approaches to applicants’ diversity in ethnographic research interviews. In this chapter, I show how caseworkers at times challenge the institutional provision of AVR information, and challenge institutional constructions of applicants as, for example, uniformly ‘literate’. I explore how caseworkers devise unofficial multilingual and multimodal strategies (with the resources they have available to them) to enable applicants to access AVR information and prepare for return. This chapter aims to develop our understanding of how institutional representatives negotiate perceived institutional ideologies, multilingualism and applicants’ linguistic resources. I consider what this may mean for applicants’ opportunities to access AVR information, elements of the programmes, and to prepare for return and reintegration. Boccagni (2015) calls for a top-down and bottom-up approach to diversity. I conclude that this institutional awareness about applicants’ linguistic repertoires must be more comprehensive and consistent if applicants are able

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to make a ‘voluntary’ return based on an informed decision with a full understanding of the legal ramifications of an application, and, furthermore, prepare adequately for return. I propose that governmental resources must be directed towards training for AVR staff in basic language and communicative awareness, so that they are equipped to provide the pre-departure operational work they are tasked to do. Before going further, it is useful to give a brief background to the two institutions which administered AVR during the period of this project— IOM and Refugee Action—as well as the AVR process itself.

8.2 IOM, Refugee Action and the AVR Programmes In 1999, the inter-governmental migration agency the International Organization for Migration (IOM) launched the first AVR programmes in the UK on behalf of the UK government, co-financed by the European Union’s Returns Fund. IOM, now a UN agency, is the largest provider of AVR programmes in the world; however, it is also involved in many other migration projects to “ensure the orderly and humane management of migration” (IOM 2018) which it administers on behalf of governments around the world. IOM sub-contracted the ‘pre-decision’ advice work (a service offering impartial advice to people to explore their options before return) to the charity Refugee Action, which aims to support refugees and asylum seekers “to get them the basic support they need to live with dignity” (Refugee Action 2018). In April 2011, Refugee Action was successful in its bid for the whole project and took over all operational aspects of AVR in the UK. However, on 1st January 2016 the UK Home Office took over the delivery of the AVR service itself. AVR applicants at IOM and Refugee Action could either make enquiries by telephone, email or visit the offices in person. Once someone has decided to return, they can complete an AVR application form with the caseworker in the office, with staff in a regional office, with their solicitor or an advice agency, or by downloading the form from the IOM or Refugee Action website and submitting by post or fax. The application is

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then processed by the caseworker and sent to the AVR team in the Home Office for approval. Upon approval, applicants begin to arrange their travel documents with the caseworker’s assistance, visiting their embassy or consulate if required. Caseworkers and applicants often keep in regular contact throughout this period arranging return dates and planning how to want to use the reintegration assistance. Meetings with applicants varied between a short visit, for example to submit documents, and a longer meeting to discuss reintegration needs and plan return. Applicants could only access their reintegration funding upon return and were mostly required to submit receipts to access the funds. The extent to which applicants planned reintegration spending before departure varied: some applicants had written an entire business plan or secured their place in an educational establishment long before they fly, while others preferred to decide how they use their reintegration assistance upon return. Communicative processes within AVR are intrinsic to labelling AVR ‘voluntary’, but it is also vital for the goal of a sustainable return. The aim of the reintegration element of these AVR programmes (what is institutionally considered a ‘successful’ return) was to provide applicants with a sustainable return to their countries of origin. Return migration is a “complex, many-faceted process” (Bak Riiskjaer and Nielsson 2008, p. 20), and although migration researchers and practitioners cannot agree to which factors contribute to a ‘sustainable return’ (Arowolo 2000; Black and Gent 2004; Koser 2001), there is a consensus that an applicant’s preparedness for return affects the extent of a returning migrant’s reintegration (Arowolo 2000; Cassarino 2008). It seems likely, therefore, that the better access applicants have to AVR information (in a format and language they understand), the more opportunity they have, firstly, to make an informed decision about return, and secondly for being better prepared for return, if they do indeed decide to apply. This would arguably result in a greater chance for applicants to benefit from sustainable reintegration upon return. AVR caseworkers therefore—as front-line institutional gatekeepers of the AVR programmes—hold great power in exerting bureaucratic and linguistic control over AVR applicants and their ability to gain information about AVR. Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital (1992) is useful in understanding how applicants may face barriers in accessing this

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information. Thompson summarises cultural capital as “knowledge, skills and other cultural acquisitions” (1992, p. 14), of which linguistic capital is a form. Within the field of AVR, applicants can be seen to have reduced linguistic capital because mobility can lead to individuals’ linguistic competences not being recognised or having value. Blommaert (2001) considers the consequences of differences in linguistic capital within high-stakes gatekeeping encounters such as asylum interviews, arguing that asylum seekers’ voice (Blommaert’s term for an individual’s ability to make themselves understood) and comprehension can also be limited by institutional representatives’ refusal to provide information in another modality (e.g. the written mode). Codó (2008a), who conducted a linguistic ethnography in a state immigration department in Spain, found that the office denied written requests from applicants for information about their applications. Similarly, officials refused to write down their verbal answers, even when applicants explicitly requested this for comprehension reasons. Codó argues this constitutes a structural disadvantage for applicants not competent in spoken Spanish, reflecting the institutional representatives’ “general disregard for their interlocutors’ difficulties in comprehension” (2008a, p. 66). The exclusive provision of information in verbal form in this gatekeeping encounter resulted in profound inequality. In their examination of information exchange in bureaucratic settings, Sarangi and Slembrouck remind us that institutional staff members are not “passive agents” (1996, p.  37), and that “bureaucrats have to decide whether to advertise or volunteer information without being asked to or to give information only on request and whether that information should be given in writing or not” (1996, p. 38). In this multilingual AVR setting, with applicants from around the world, it is therefore essential to understand how organisations address the diversity of their applicants, and to examine institutional practice and assumptions regarding literacy and language.

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8.3 L inguistic Repertoires, Multilingualism and Literacies When analysing how caseworkers negotiate institutional approaches to diversity, I regard an individual’s knowledge of a ‘language’ in terms of being a linguistic repertoire, moving away from a more traditional, static understanding of language. Developing Gumperz’s (1964) original definition of repertoire, Hymes refined it as, “the mixes of means and modalities people actually practise and experience” (1996, p. 207). Blommaert and Backus usefully describe a linguistic repertoire as entailing “a myriad of different communicative tools, with different degrees of functional specialization” (2013, p. 25). Individuals’ linguistic repertoires therefore include different—sometimes multilingual—communicative resources, which individuals draw on depending on the context. Blommaert and Backus argue that the way people learn languages (both informally and formally and using a variety of different language and literacy resources) results in a patchwork of skills or ‘communicative resources’ within their linguistic repertoire. My linguistic repertoire, for example, includes an ability to read basic French (stemming from formally learning the related Romance language Spanish, plus some holidays in France), but minimal understanding of spoken French. Competency in my French is therefore not uniform: people should not assume that because I can understand written French, I can also understand spoken French—perhaps obvious to most language teachers. As Blommaert and Backus argue, competence in one area “does not imply fluency in any other” (2013, p. 25), highlighting the risks of assuming functionality across the board. Thinking of people as having linguistic repertoires rather than a simple binary of ‘knowing or not knowing a language’ allows for a more detailed understanding of potential communication barriers within AVR. However, assessing someone’s competence in spoken or written production or reception within a language can be challenging, particularly in a fast-­ paced service environment. This is of course something which many people with public-facing roles must manage, however is a particularly crucial task for AVR caseworkers when assigned the substantial

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responsibility of ensuring their applicants have made an ‘informed decision’ about return, in the pressurised political context described above. Regarding people as having a set of communicative tools is well established in the tradition of New Literacy Studies (NLS) (e.g. Barton 2007; Barton et al. 2005; Tusting 2013). NLS views literacy as “a set of social practices” (Barton and Hamilton 2000, p. 8), with literacy practices being described as “common patterns in using reading and writing in a particular situation” (Barton 2007, p. 36). The concept of people having different and multiple literacies—depending on the different domains of their lives—is useful in examining institutional multilingual practice and understanding applicants’ potential for access to vital information. Chiming with the concept of a linguistic repertoire, Barton contests the notion of a uniform and singular literacy; he argues there is “not one way of reading and writing, there is not one set of practices” (Barton 2007, p. 37). Literacy is defined by Barton as “a stable, coherent, identifiable configuration of practices such as legal literacies or the literacy of specific workplaces” (2007, p. 38). As such, we can understand that caseworkers and applicants have different literacies, which form part of their linguistic repertoires and are used in different contexts and times. As Blommaert warns, institutional processes “that emphasise uniformity in communication practices will exclude, marginalise and silence people whose repertoires do not match the normative expectations” (2008, p. 4). As such we must recognise that institutions have the power to perpetuate the myth of uniformity in applicants’ literacy, and increase exclusion and marginalisation. By analysing how caseworkers represent institutional approaches to diversity and specific literacy practices during ethnographic interviews, I can consider how literacy practices within AVR administration may be shaped by the institutional context, but also mediated by the caseworker. Taking a qualitative approach, I combine methods and concepts from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (e.g. Fairclough 1992; Wodak and Meyer 2009) with Linguistic Ethnography (LE) (e.g. Creese 2008; Rampton et al. 2004; Tusting and Maybin 2007; Copland and Creese 2015), investigating how the potential for unequal power relationships is challenged, maintained or managed through language and discourse. This chapter brings together an analysis of ‘top-down’ (or macro) institutional approaches to linguistic diversity, with data from ethnographic

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semi-structured interviews with IOM and Refugee Action staff collected as part of doctoral research. In doing so, this chapter can be regarded as “problem-oriented” research (Wodak and Meyer 2009, p. 2), exploring practices in which caseworkers provide AVR information in an ethical and accessible way, so that AVR applicants can make both an informed decision about return, and can adequately prepare for it. In my examination of how institutions accommodate multilingual and diverse AVR applicants—and how caseworkers negotiate the institutional approach— my work follows others exploring multilingualism in institutional encounters (e.g. Blackledge and Creese 2010; Codó and Garrido 2010; Jansson 2014; Maryns 2006; Moyer 2011; Reynolds 2018). Operational staff at IOM were allocated applicants based on applicants’ nationality and assisted each applicant through the entire AVR application process, from the initial contact through to departure. While IOM largely divided the workload according to country, Refugee Action split the work according to task, having pre-approval, logistics and reintegration caseworkers who focused on those specific duties. I conducted semi-structured ethnographic interviews with ten operations caseworkers at IOM, and eight logistics caseworkers at Refugee Action, with all staff fulfilling broadly the same role, but assigned to AVR applicants from different countries. Interviews lasted approximately an hour and data used here came from interviews that took place in their workplaces. Interviews were analysed thematically (Roberts and Sarangi 2005) and were utilised—as Codó advises—both in terms of being a means to gather contextualising data and to understand caseworkers “views, values, and attitudes towards their own and others’ linguistic practices” (2008b, p. 159). This study does not take ‘self-report’ data at face value: as Agar cautions, “sometimes people do what they say, and sometimes they don’t” (1996, p. 157).

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8.4 H  ow Caseworkers Negotiate Written AVR Information When Advising Applicants In this section I examine how caseworkers negotiate ideologies around literacy in this AVR setting, challenging assumptions regarding the primacy of written language and applicants’ literacy inherent in top-down institutional approaches to diversity. I show how caseworkers orient to applicants’ perceived linguistic resources and devise unofficial (micro) multimodal strategies to enable applicants to access AVR information. Both IOM and Refugee Action—like many large organisations—take steps to respond to the diversity of their applicants through multilingual strategies, with Refugee Action being particularly innovative regarding sector terminology and acronyms. However, in contrast to other research in this field, in which top-down managerial decisions regarding multilingualism went unquestioned (Moyer 2011; Codó and Garrido 2010), caseworkers in this AVR setting at times represent the default institutional response as potentially constraining applicants’ understanding and ability to access information in this gatekeeping scenario (see Brickley 2015 for the full dataset).

8.4.1 C  ontesting Institutional Construction of Applicants’ Literacy: Lena, Quinn and Frank Caseworkers display criticality in their consideration of whether translations are helpful for all applicants, and display creativity when flouting the institution’s rules or norms of language and behaviour (Li 2011, p.  1223), strategically employing a different modality for multilingual purposes. In the example below Lena raises the topic of literacy, something she returns to again and again in the research interview. Here she responds to a much earlier question I asked: “do you find there’s anything … difficult or frustrating about the role [of caseworker]” (Table 8.1). Lena (Refugee Action) represents literacy as a key challenge when providing AVR information to applicants from this particular country. By

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Table 8.1  “… a lot of a lot of my applicants have low literacy or and sometimes no literacy in their own language …” Lena (Refugee Action):  1. L you mentioned earlier one of what are the m-problems I find with the programme I  2.  think one of the things that’s really concerning me is literacy [K: uhuh] so um a lot of a  3.  lot of my clients have low literacy or and sometimes no literacy in their own language?  4.  K oh right  5.  L so even the reintegration information that I give them you know they’ll say you know ‘I  6.  can’t read [language 7]’ and  7.  K so even if it’s in [language 7]?  8.  L yeah but then um the last time that happened I still gave them the reintegration  9.  [K: yeah] information and you know someone else can read it to them [K: ah OK]  10.  so it just it means it’s there for them if they need [K: yeah] some clarification  11.  [5 lines omitted]  12.  L um I think it’s yeah so that’s tricky because you’re working with people on the phone  13.  and by distance so you’re sending them letters [K: yeah] you have to keep letters really  14.  really simple [K: OK] and talk things through a lot  15.  K and do you er with um the letters do you ever have to get them translated or do you just  16.  kind of—sorry ((……))  17.  L no (exhales) I don’t I don’t get them translated um—sometimes the letters I mean they  18.  sort of they don’t know exactly what’s in the letter but they know I want to talk with  19.  them  20.  K oh OK  21.  L so then they’ll call me and so that’s that can be useful if I’m trying to get in touch with  22.  them  23.  K OK yeah that’s interesting (laughs)  24.  L yeah (laughs) yeah  25.  K they just kinda see the logo and think gotta call [Lena]  26.  L yeah that’s it

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representing herself as concerned about this topic—with the marker “really” (line 2) and the use of “I” and “me” pronouns—Lena implies that this is something the institution and few other caseworkers are concerned about, portraying her approach as an individual one. In doing so she distances herself from the institutional, conventional response, and displays criticality in her problematisation of “received wisdom” (Li 2011, p. 1223) within AVR programmes. In lines 2–3, Lena frames the problem as not only about applicants’ inability to understand documents in English, but also in the applicants’ own language. She represents literacy here as existing on a spectrum (“low literacy”). In this way she disputes the institutional construction of applicants as literate in the language of the country of return, recognising that applicants’ linguistic resources are not uniformly ordered within their linguistic repertoires (avoiding the assumption that because an applicant can speak a language, they can also read it). Lena’s use of “even” in “so even the reintegration information that I give them” (lines 5–6) evaluates reintegration information as important to understand and displays surprise that they cannot access it in their own language. This negatively evaluates top-down multilingualism as inadequate in addressing the diversity of applicants. Barton reminds us that the functions of written or spoken modalities are different, and that our choice of modality “usually has other implications beyond a simple choice of medium” (2007, p. 42). This is evidently the case with Lena, who reports using translated written information as a back-up (“for clarification”, line 10) to her verbal information (lines 8–9), presupposing that someone else will be able to read aloud the information to her applicant (line 9), acting as a type of ‘mediator of literacy’ (Baynham 1997) if the applicant is unable to read it themselves. In this way, Lena positively evaluates functions of the written modality (e.g. as a ‘contract’ or as reference material), orienting to this crucial linguistic resource of a type of community/shared literacy (Barton 2007, p.  62). Her use of “the last time” in line 8 suggests she takes a fluid approach, adapting her communicative strategy depending on the applicant and the context. Lena’s reference to keeping letters “really really simple” in lines 13–14 treats this as unproblematic, presupposing that this “simple” language would be appropriate for each applicant and that, as Solomon suggests (1996) in

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an examination of presuppositions within the Plain English campaign, she would know what language format they would find “simple”. However, Lena also reports sending letters in English to function, at minimum, as prompts for applicants with “low literacy” to call her, rather than as a medium to share information (lines 18–19), bringing in the symbolic visual (logos) and numeric (phone numbers) mediums of literacy. Although not raised by caseworkers in interviews with IOM staff, this is a communicative method I have also witnessed at IOM during ethnographic observations. It echoes a similar method I witnessed of caseworkers calling an applicant’s mobile phone, anticipating they would not answer but would recognise the number and then visit the office. Her reference to “talk[ing] things through a lot” in line 14 represents her taking an approach which integrates the written word (with its distinct functions) with the spoken word, switching between modalities as she deems appropriate. This reported mode-switching behaviour can be regarded as an unofficial caseworker-led approach, to surmount the limitations of top-down institutional multilingualism. Caseworkers position the problem as both an applicant problem in that applicants are represented as lacking Table 8.2  “… obviously not everybody … reads …” Quinn (Refugee Action):  1  K regarding the information that Refugee Action produces is there anything that p-find  2  particularly useful when kind of talking to clients or when or in your previous role  3  Q um yeah um:: well we would um: give them a copy of the legal consequences to the  4  programme in their own language [K: OK] so we’d explain it um through if they don’t  5  speak English through an interpreter [K: uhuh] and then we’d tell them um um you  6  know ‘I can give you a copy in your own language’ um obviously not everybody is reads  7  um but I think it’s better that someone has it than not has it [K: yeah] cos you know they  8  might have a friend that can read it out to them if they forget something um: so that  9  that was really useful

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language skills and an institutional one, reflecting the environmental model of multilingualism (Blommaert et al. 2005), in that it is the institutions’ responsibility to respond to applicants’ linguistic resources. When discussing AVR literature, fellow Refugee Action caseworker Quinn also challenges the institutional presupposition of a ‘literate’ applicant, questioning the assumption that all applicants can read the language of their country of return (line 6), positioning this as shared knowledge (“obviously”, line 6) (Table 8.2). Although Quinn recognises the limitations of written texts for some applicants, she still values written information as it is “better that someone has it than not has it” (line 7). Here she is perhaps orienting to functions of the written modality relating to legal processes and trust, and, due to its permanence, its use for confirmation and reminding purposes, and the potential to be accessed at some later point. In this sense Quinn’s practice reflects Moyer’s reminder that “written materials allow the spatial and temporal disembedding of information, and migrants can also get help from their social network outside the institution” (2011, p. 1214). Quinn references the idea of a ‘shared’ literacy (in line 8) in which applicants may read texts with friends or family. Her reported practice here echoes Lena’s above, where the written modality was used as a reinforcement of the oral modality. In this way, due to inevitable financial restrictions resulting in the institutions being unable to translate all AVR documents in all languages, Quinn and other caseworkers are positioned by the institution as having to rely on this assumption that applicants will find someone to read the AVR information to them. This is of course a well-documented literacy practice (Barton 2007, p. 62), however not all applicants necessarily have close friends/family who they are willing or able to share this AVR information with or who can read. AVR and return can be a stigmatised topic, so an institutional reliance on this method of communicating crucial return information is flawed; assuming applicants have been able to understand the text may restrict applicants’ ability to prepare for return. Like Lena and Quinn, Frank also challenges the institutional construction of a ‘literate’ applicant, implicitly negatively evaluating IOM’s approach to multilingual applicants when discussing what he finds frustrating about his job (Table 8.3).

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Table 8.3  “… don’t forget our guys are illiterate” Frank (IOM):  1.  F ((……)) maybe there’s other things and don’t forget our guys are illiterate  2.  K oh right  3.  F a lot of illiterates  4.  K oh really  5.  F [line omitted for anonymisation]  6.  K ah right  7.  F the poor classes become destitute totally destitute  8.  K oh right  9.  F so all the people come here during eighty—up to ninety it is destitute people destitute  10.  generation  11.  K yeah  12.  F no education at all so that’s the reason when you ((……)) (laughs) when I talk ten minute with  13.  somebody [K: yeah] I definitely know if the education of this person [K: oh really] if he’s  14.  illiterate or not  15.  K oh OK  16.  F but the question he asked me about Heathrow never heard Heathrow what’s the  17.  postcode of Heathrow because I was child I heard I know this Heathrow [K: yeah]  18.  ((……)) I mean really really like basic information  19.  K so they? OK  20.  F they haven’t so I know this person is is is er illiterate without question if the coach  21.  station is not there  22.  K yeah OK  23.  F ‘if they closed coach station tonight the problem is I have a ticket what can I do’  24.  K mm  25.  F only if you are educated if you have basic [K: yeah] you don’t ask these question  26.  K OK  27.  F all this question that we pay price for because they are illiterate

IOM caseworker Frank’s experience of applicants from this country of origin (also his own) as “illiterates” (line 3) echoes Lena’s experience at Refugee Action. Like Lena, Frank is explicit in representing some of his applicants as unable to read or write, representing them as disadvantaged by

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their own background. He aligns literacy in lines 12–14 with cultural understanding of the UK, employing ‘literacy’ as a kind of shorthand for knowing specific cultural pieces of information. For Frank in this context, literacy is synonymous with being “educated” (line 25) and highly acculturated to British life, making a perhaps unhelpful leap that because someone does not have cultural knowledge of the UK, they cannot speak English. But unlike Lena, Frank represents applicants as burdening busy caseworkers with multiple questions as a result of their inability to read AVR information: “all this question that we pay price for because they are illiterate” (line 27). Later in our interview Frank negatively evaluates the use of written AVR information for his applicants, regarding pre-­ departure letters to his applicants (which are sent out in three languages) as “useless” because he still receives the same questions. In doing so, Frank questions the institutional primacy of written AVR information, as well as the institutional construction of applicants as literate. Although Frank represents this reliance on oral information above written as his preferred default approach for applicants, he represents it as burdensome: “so our task is … all the time tell them tell again and again”, repeating information which is sent in the letter. Frank’s insistence that applicants do not understand his letters suggests perhaps that he does not make use of or rely on ‘shared’ literacy in which friends/family could support the applicant by reading the information with them. Frank’s firmness in categorising some of his applicants as having no literacy in “a lot of illiterates” (line 3) appears to represent literacy as complete, rather than a scale, as Lena does. Lena’s and Frank’s different conceptions of literacy may relate to how they make use of AVR literature: a scalar metaphor perhaps explains Lena’s reported use of AVR written texts as a back-up (just in case), while Frank’s totalising notion of literacy suggests he may regard letters and perhaps all written AVR information as being either useful or useless for applicants gaining knowledge about AVR, and little in between. Like other caseworkers from both IOM and Refugee Action, Frank displays criticality here when questioning the default institutional response. However, in doing so, he represents his switching between modalities to communicate AVR information not as a strategic pro-active choice but displays his frustration that the impermanence of the spoken modality means he must keep repeating information.

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8.5 Reflections and Conclusion In this chapter, I have addressed some communicative practices that may help and hinder AVR applicants’ opportunities to become informed about AVR. This is of course important in itself (particularly with regard to legal ramifications of an AVR application), but also crucial to labelling the programmes ‘voluntary’, as discussed earlier. The selected data included in this chapter exemplify how caseworkers negotiate applicants’ linguistic resources and the institutional provisions made for the diversity of AVR applicants. In examining how multilingualism and multimodality intersect in this setting, contrary to findings from other multilingual gatekeeping research (e.g. Moyer 2011; Codó and Garrido 2010), we can see how caseworkers at IOM and Refugee Action do at times problematise assumptions inherent in their institution’s general approach to the diversity of its applicants. It has illustrated how, when faced with the “challenges of novelty and newness” (Phillimore 2015, p. 578) of diversity, caseworkers adopt discursive processes which are effective in promoting equality in this specific institutional encounter. They value positive strategies of communication and in doing so implicitly acknowledge that an applicant’s linguistic repertoire is not uniform (Blommaert and Backus 2013). Caseworkers can be considered to have a type of linguistic control (Codó 2008a) or power over applicants; providing or restricting opportunities to access crucial AVR information. In describing these work practices in my research interviews, caseworkers implicitly display an awareness of their gatekeeping ability to provide access to AVR information, and orient to aspects of ensuring applicants make an ‘informed decision’, which they represent as difficult. Via these represented practices, the caseworkers ‘open the gate’ for the applicants to access AVR information and, hence, opportunities to prepare. In her review of studies on multilingualism in the workplace, Angouri argues that “[t]he ways in which the co-existence of multiple languages is managed at the micro level by the interactants and at the macro level by the company often reveal contradictory ‘realities’ that show a conflicting top-­ down and bottom-up understanding of language practice” (2014, p. 2). This appears to be an accurate description of what is happening here too.

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Moyer, when discussing her research into multilingualism in an institutional setting, concludes that “[c]omplementary and multilingual modalities such as non-standard language, visual materials or interpreters would be relevant for improving overall communication” (2011, p. 1217). My research also finds that within these two AVR settings, multilingual modalities are routinely considered complementary by caseworkers and are vital in contributing towards applicants’ opportunities to become informed about AVR and return. We might expect workplaces such as IOM and Refugee Action which have “migration and mobility at their heart” to act as trailblazers in such multilingual practices, as De Saint-­ Georges (2013, p. 3) writes regarding Wodak’s work on multilingualism in EU institutions. And although Refugee Action shows itself to be creative in its approach to making asylum-specific terminology and acronyms accessible to its superdiverse applicants, possibilities do seem to exist for both institutions to benefit further from mixed modalities. By better addressing the diversity of AVR applicants, the current provider of the service—the UK Home Office—can offer a service which seeks to accommodate linguistic resources that “are differently distributed and functionally allocated within the repertoire” of the applicant (Blommaert and Backus 2013, p. 23). Although mode-switching by individual caseworkers appears to be a key method of providing AVR information and maximising opportunities for applicants to access AVR information in this context, it seems to be sporadic and dependent on the individual caseworker. To avoid some applicants’ repertoires being truncated (Blommaert 2005) by not being able to use their linguistic resources in this inevitably financially limited institutional setting, I propose that caseworkers’ awareness of applicants’ diversity and the potential of mode-­ switching (e.g. in relation to using the written modality to reinforce the spoken, and vice-versa within the interaction) could be shared across the institution. Institutional awareness about language, literacies and linguistic competences must be more comprehensive and consistent across all staff if applicants are able to make a ‘voluntary’ return based on an informed decision. Ladegaard and Jenks argue in their paper on language and intercultural communication in the workplace that it is vital that academics, practitioners and NGOs, among others, “work together, drawing on each other’s

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expertise to solve complex communicative problems in the workplace and together propose ways to move forward” (2015, p. 3). An immediate outcome of gatekeeping research is often a call for increasing meta-­ communicative awareness of speakers in the practice setting, for example in training-based research such as the work of Baptiste and Sieg (2007). Jacquemet (2011), perhaps rightly, cautions that this approach may be sociolinguistically optimistic. Like Codó (2008a), he argues that a training-based response fails to acknowledge the power dimensions at work in the interaction, which is particularly relevant in high-stakes gatekeeping encounters like those within the asylum process where the relationship is asymmetrical from the outset. He asserts that institutional staff may intentionally employ communicative strategies to restrict access to the institution’s resources; he suggests that meta-communicative awarenessraising would do little to solve these communicative difficulties. Although perhaps wise to consider this, it seems important to make explicit these potentials for miscommunication through training. Furthermore, given the concern expressed by staff in this particular setting, it seems unlikely to be the case that strategies are employed to restrict access to information. Indeed, some caseworkers propose changes to the AVR programmes to include ‘multilingual modalities’ in order to improve communication about AVR, such as information in audio visual formats and complementary verbal/written information in applicants’ preferred languages. Staff recognise that applicants who cannot read AVR documents may be better able to access this information in an audio format (such as on CD/MP3 or online). Audio versions of AVR information would share the functionality of written information: listeners could enjoy the same longevity/permanence and mobility/reference as the written modality, allowing the applicant to take the information away to listen and refer to at their leisure, or with family/friends. The audio versions would also benefit, of course, from the oral modality in terms of being in a language and/ or modality the listeners may understand. Providing texts in an audio format (in any language) is an approach already employed by some institutions, such as the police force (Rock 2007, p. 39), to assist people who cannot access the written text to understand institutional documents. And, of course, audio formats are also widely used to enable people with a visual impairment to access written texts both on- and offline. This

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approach has, somewhat frustratingly, been slow to gain momentum in other service settings. As the new AVR providers, it is imperative that the Home Office sincerely commits to a service that is sensitive to diversity and divergent literacies and linguistic competences. The Home Office must make vigorous efforts to ensure applicants can make an ‘informed decision’, ensuring that AVR information is provided to people in a language and format they can understand. Otherwise it risks jeopardising the sustainability of return, it risks applicants being unaware of what they are signing up to and it risks providing fundamentally unethical AVR programmes.

References Agar, M. (1996). The Professional Stranger (2nd ed.). London: Academic Press Limited. Angouri, J. (2014). Introduction: Multilingualism in the Workplace: Language Practices in Multilingual Contexts. Multilingua, 33(1–2), 1–9. Arowolo, O. (2000). Return Migration and the Problem of Reintegration. International Migration, 38(5), 59–82. Bak Riiskjaer, M., & Nielsson, T. (2008). Circular Repatriation: The Unsuccessful Return and Reintegration of Iraqis with Refugee Status in Denmark. New Issues in Refugee Research [Online]. UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service. No. 165. Retrieved June 1, 2019, from http://www. unhcr.org/48eb34c72.html. Baptiste, M., & Sieg, M. (2007). Training the Guardians of America’s Gate: Discourse-based Lessons from Naturalization Interviews. Journal of Pragmatics, 39(11), 1919–1941. Barton, D. (2007). Literacy: An Introduction to the Ecology of Written Language. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Barton, D., & Hamilton, M. (2000). Literacy Practices. In D.  Barton, M. Hamilton, & R. Ivanič (Eds.), Situated Literacies: Reading and Writing in Context (pp. 7–15). Abingdon and Oxford: Routledge. Barton, D., Hamilton, M., & Ivanič, R. (Eds.). (2005). Situated Literacies: Reading and Writing in Context. Abingdon and Oxford: Routledge. Baynham, M. (1997). Code Switching and Mode Switching: Community Interpreters and Mediators of Literacy. In B.  Street (Ed.), Cross-Cultural Approaches to Literacy (pp. 294–304). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Black, R., & Gent, S. (2004). Defining, Measuring and Influencing Sustainable Return: The Case of the Balkans. Sussex Centre for Migration Research Working Paper T7 [Online]. Retrieved June 4, 2019, from https://www.gov. uk/dfid-research-outputs/working-paper-t7-defining-measuringand-influencing-sustainable-return-the-case-of-the-balkans. Blackledge, A., & Creese, A. (2010). Multilingualism. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. Blitz, B., Sales, R., & Marzano, L. (2005). Non-voluntary Return? The Politics of Return to Afghanistan. Political Studies, 53, 182–200. Bloch, A. (2014). Living in Fear: Rejected Asylum Seekers Living as Irregular Migrants in England. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(10), 1507–1525. Blommaert, J. (2001). Investigating Narrative Inequality: African Asylum Seekers’ Stories in Belgium. Discourse and Society, 12, 413–449. Blommaert, J. (2005). Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blommaert, J. (2008). Grassroots Literacy: Writing, Identity and Voice in Central Africa. Abingdon and Oxford: Routledge. Blommaert, J., & Backus, A. (2013). Superdiverse Repertoires and the Individual. In I. De Saint-Georges & J. Weber (Eds.), Multilingualism and Multimodality: Current Challenges for Educational Studies (pp.  11–32). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Blommaert, J., Collins, J., & Slembrouck, S. (2005). Spaces of Multilingualism. Language and Communication, 25(3), 197–216. Boccagni, P. (2015). (Super)diversity and the Migration-Social Work Nexus: A New Lens on the Field of Access and Inclusion? Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(4), 608–620. Bourdieu, P. (1992). Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bradley, M. (2006). FMO Research Guide: Return of Forced Migrants. [Online]. Retrieved April 8, 2010, from http://www.forcedmigration.org/ guides/fmo042/. Brickley, K. (2015). Communicating Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) Programmes in the UK: Examining Tensions in Discursive Practice. PhD Thesis, Cardiff University. Burnett, J. (2009). No Direction Home? The Politics of Return for Refused Asylum Seekers. [Online] Retrieved June 1, 2019, from https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/ Record/cronfa40558. Cassarino, J. (2008). Conditions of Modern Return Migrants—Editorial Introduction. International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 10(2), 95–105.

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Codó, E. (2008a). Immigration and Bureaucratic Control: Language Practices in Public Administration. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. Codó, E. (2008b). Interviews and Questionnaires. In L.  Wei & M.  Moyer (Eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Research Methods in Bilingualism and Multilingualism (pp. 158–176). Oxford: Blackwell. Codó, E., & Garrido, M. (2010). Ideologies and Practices of Multilingualism in Bureaucratic and Legal Advice Encounters. Sociolinguistic Studies, 4(2), 297–332. Copland, F., & Creese, A. (2015). Linguistic ethnography: collecting, analysing and presenting data. London: SAGE. Creese, A. (2008). Linguistic Ethnography. In K. King & N. Hornberger (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Language and Education (Volume 10: Research Methods in Language and Education) (2nd ed., pp. 229–241). New York: Springer. Davids, T., & van Houte, M. (2008). Remigration, Development and Mixed Embeddedness: An Agenda for Qualitative Research? International Journal on Multicultural Studies, 10(2), 169–193. De Saint-Georges, I. (2013). Multilingualism, Multimodality and the Future of Education Research. In I. de Saint-Georges & J. Weber (Eds.), Multilingualism and Multimodality: Current Challenges for Educational Studies (pp.  1–8). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. Georgi, F. (2012). For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration and Its Global Migration Management. In M. Geiger & A. Pécoud (Eds.), The Politics of International Migration Management (pp.  45–72). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Good, A. (2007). Anthropology and Expertise in the Asylum Courts. London: Routledge. Gumperz, J. (1964). Linguistic and Social Interaction in Two Communities. American Anthropologist, 66(6), 137–153. Hymes, D. (1996). Ethnography, Linguistics, Narrative Inequality. Abingdon and Oxford: Taylor and Francis. Inghilleri, M. (2012). Interpreting Justice: Ethics, Politics and Language. London: Routledge. International Organization for Migration (IOM) Geneva. (2004). Return Migration Policies and Practices in Europe. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. International Organization for Migration (IOM) Geneva. (2018). About IOM. [Online]. Retrieved September 5, 2018, from http://www.iom.int/ about-iom.

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International Organization for Migration (IOM) Helsinki. (2015). Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration. [Online] Retrieved September 15, 2015, from http://www.iom.fi/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i d=110:assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration&catid=42:themescategory&Itemid=110. Jacquemet, M. (2011). Crosstalk 2.0: Asylum and Communicative Breakdowns. Text & Talk, 31(4), 475–497. Jansson, G. (2014). Bridging Language Barriers in Multilingual Care Encounters. Multilingua, 33(1–2), 201–232. Jones, H., Gunaratnam, Y., Bhattacharyya, G., Davies, W., Dhaliwal, S., Forkert, K., Jackson, E., & Saltus, R. (2017). Go Home? The Politics of Immigration Controversies. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Koser, K. (2001). The Return and Reintegration of Rejected Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants (IOM Migration Research Series) (Vol. 4). Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Kuschminder, K. (2017). Taking Stock of Assisted Voluntary Return from Europe: Decision Making, Reintegration and Sustainable Return—Time for a Paradigm Shift. EUI Working Papers. RSCAS 2017/31. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance Programme-268. Retrieved June 1, 2019, from https://core.ac.uk/reader/131933667. Ladegaard, H., & Jenks, C. (2015). Introduction. Language and Intercultural Communication in the Workplace: Critical Approaches to Theory and Practice. Language and Intercultural Communication, 15(1), 1–12. Li, W. (2011). Moment Analysis and Translanguaging Space: Discursive Construction of Identities by Multilingual Chinese Youth in Britain. Journal of Pragmatics, 43(5), 1222–1235. Maryns, K. (2006). The Asylum Speaker: Language in the Belgian Asylum Procedure. Manchester: St Jerome Publishing. McGhee, D., & Bennett, C. (2014). What is the Role of NGOs in the Assisted Voluntary Returns of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants? Retrieved June 4, 2019, from http://www.cpc.ac.uk/projects/36/Tried_and_Trusted_The_ role_of_NGOs_in_Asylum_Seekers_and_Irregular_Migrant_Voluntary_ Returns#Publications_Activities. Moyer, M. (2011). What Multilingualism? Agency and Unintended Consequences of Multilingual Practices in a Barcelona Health Clinic. Journal of Pragmatics, 43(5), 1209–1221. Phillimore, J. (2015). Delivering Maternity Services in an Era of Super-Diversity: The Challenges of Novelty and Newness. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(4), 568–582.

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Rampton, B., Tusting, K., Maybin, J., Barwell, R., Creese, A., & Lytra, V. (2004). UK Linguistic Ethnography: A Discussion Paper. UK Linguistic Ethnography Forum. Retrieved November 15, 2017, from http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fss/ organisations/lingethn/documents/discussion_paper_jan_05.pdf. Refugee Action. (2018). Our Vision [Online]. Retrieved September 5, 2018, from http://www.refugee-action.org.uk/about/our_vision. Reynolds, J. (2018). Multilingual and Intercultural Communication in and Beyond the UK Asylum Process: A Linguistic Ethnographic Case Study of Legal Advice-Giving Across Cultural and Linguistic Borders. PhD Thesis, Durham University. Roberts, C., & Sarangi, S. (2005). Theme-Oriented Discourse Analysis of Medical Encounters. Medical Education, 39, 632–640. Rock, F. (2007). Communicating Rights: The Language of Arrest and Detention. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Rock, F. (2016). Talking the Ethical Turn: Recruiting Tick-Box Consent in Policing. In S.  Ehrlich, D.  Eades, & J.  Ainsworth (Eds.), Discursive Constructions of Consent in the Legal Process. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ruben, R., van Houte, M., & Davids, T. (2009). What Determines the Embeddedness of Forced-Return Migrants? Rethinking the Role of Pre- and Post-return Assistance. International Migration Review, 43(4), 908–937. Sarangi, S., & Slembrouck, S. (1996). Language, Bureaucracy and Social Control. Harlow: Longman. Solomon, N. (1996). Plain English: From a Perspective of Language in Society. In R.  Hasan & G.  Williams (Eds.), Literacy in Society (pp.  279–307). Harlow: Longman. Strand, A., Bendixsen, S., Paasche, E., & Schultz, J. (2011). Between Two Societies: Review of the Information, Return and Reintegration of Iraqi Nationals to Iraq (IRRINI) Programme [pdf ] CMI Report R 2011:4. Retrieved June 1, 2019, from http://issuu.com/cmi-norway/docs/4155-between-two-societiesreview-of-the-informati/1?e=0. Tusting, K. (2013). Literacy Studies as Linguistic Ethnography. Working Papers in Urban Language and Literacies (p. 105). London: King’s College. Tusting, K., & Maybin, J. (2007). Linguistic Ethnography and Interdisciplinarity: Opening the Discussion. Journal of Sociolinguistics, 11, 575–583. Webber, F. (2011). How Voluntary are Voluntary Returns? Race and Class, 52(4), 98–107. Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (2009). Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage.

Part II The Politics of Multilingualism

9 Monolingualism and National Identity: Lessons from Europe Simona Guglielmi

9.1 Introduction Two centuries have passed since the idea of monolingual nationalism made their entry in the history of Europe. Nevertheless, the nexus between monolingualism and nation seems far from being dismissed. This chapter deals with this nexus, by focusing on language as a symbolic boundary of national identity. The expectations concerning the mechanisms that promote or inhibit this outcome derive from two theoretical sources. The first is the debate within history, sociology, and political science on the different ideas of nationhood and Europe, while the second consists of socio-psychological studies based on Social Identity Theory. At the risk of overgeneralising, it could be argued that two main national narratives arose in the Golden Age of European nationalism, stressing the association between language and nation in different ways. The first is embedded in the German Romanticism, the second one in the

S. Guglielmi (*) Department of Social and Political Science, University of Milan, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 K. Strani (ed.), Multilingualism and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40701-8_9

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French Enlightenment. On the one hand, according to a Herderian perspective (Barnard 1969; Trabant 2009), linguistic differences mark the “natural” differences between nations (Patten 2010). On the other hand, following Renan’s approach (Dahbour et al. 1995), language can be conceived of as a powerful medium of national inclusion/assimilation. Actually, a lot of things have changed. Nevertheless, the nexus between monolingualism and nation seems far from being dismissed. Recent survey data show that language is one of the most important attributes of national identity in Europe (Pew Research Center, Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey). Moreover, several European Member States require immigrants to pass language and culture tests as a condition for naturalisation and various types of legal residence (Van Oers et  al. 2010; Joppke 2017). In this regard, it has become commonplace to analyse monolingualist nationalism in Europe as an ideology transmitted by the elites’ public discourse, schools, textbooks, and so on (Bourdieu 1991). Yet we know little about the ways in which the masses perceive the national narratives and the effect on both national identity formation (Wright 2011) and attitudes towards ‘outsiders’. This chapter aims to contribute to this topic by exploring the “normative” dimension of national identities which refers to the norms, beliefs, and values perceived as prototypical of group identity (Citrin and Sides 2004).1 The link between narrative and social identity was well stressed years ago by Margaret Somers (1994), who argued that narrative plays a central role in social identity formation: “Narratives and narrativity as concepts of social epistemology and social ontology (…) posit that it is through narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identity” (ibid., p. 606). Therefore, national narratives have not only played a key role in historical nation-state-building (Carretero et al. 2013) but also in everyday  This definition is different from the normative approach concerning what national identity ought to be. Referring to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1981), and in particular to the definition of social identity introduced by Marilynn Brewer (2001), Citrin and Sides (2004) proposed a conceptualisation of political identity based on three dimensions: (1) cognitive, that is, self-categorisation as a group member (who am I?); (2) affective, that is, the strength of the emotional attachment; and (3) normative, that is, the beliefs about the criteria for inclusion in the group/the attributes of the prototypical member (who are we?). 1

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in-group versus out-group identity formation. (Huddy 2001) They provide the symbolic material to build boundaries distinguishing the national in-group (“us”) from the outsiders (“them”) and they posit the limits to fellow-feeling and loyalty within a diverse society. For example, there is empirical evidence that an ethnic conception of national identity has negative consequences for attitudes towards immigration and support for immigrant rights, while civic conception tends to have more positive consequences (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Theiss-Morse 2009; Transue 2007; Reijerse et al. 2013; Wright et al. 2012; Verkuyten Martinovic 2015). Against this background, the chapter aims to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between national narratives,2 national identity, and attitudes towards migrant integration. The focus is on perceived criteria of national belonging, with particular reference to the role of language in Europe, among other prototypical national ‘markers’/‘boundary’ (such as ancestry, religion, respect for laws, or feeling of belonging). The research questions are the following: (1) To what extent do individuals imagine their nationhood because of countries’ national narratives (with particular reference to language)? And (2) to what extent do their beliefs about language as national boundary influence their attitudes towards migrant integration/cultural diversity? The chapter has the following structure. First, it deals with the historical and theoretical side of national state and identity formation. It presents the historical rooting of European linguistic nationalism, with particular reference to the different positions of the French school and German romanticism. After this brief excursus, the chapter focuses on the nexus between language and national identity from a cognitive perspective. This theoretical approach considers ethnicity and nationhood as ways of perceiving, interpreting, and representing the social world rather than “things” in the world (Brubaker 2004). The civic/ethnic dichotomy and its theoretical and methodological limits are also discussed here. The following section empirically investigates the relationship between national narratives, national identity, and attitudes towards multiculturalism and migrant integration.The empirical investigation is based on  I adopt here the basic definition of national narratives as stories “about the nation” and “told by official documents or representatives of the nation” (Shenhav 2006, p. 248). 2

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survey data, taken from the ISSP (International Social Survey Program)— National Identity Module, carried out in 2003 and 2013. A comparative approach is used to check whether national narratives influence individual attitudes. Four countries are investigated: France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland. The choice of the first two is obvious, given that they are presented in literature as “prototypical” cases (Brubaker 2001). Germany and France exemplify, respectively, differences between a Kulturnation and a Staatsnation (Meinecke 1970), or between an ethnic and a civic nation (Kohn 1961; Brubaker 1992).3 Besides these two key cases, Switzerland and Spain were selected as interesting benchmarks. Both are characterised by linguistic pluralism, but respective national narratives framed the nexus between language and nation differently. In Switzerland, political narratives celebrate common national identity based on civic/ political will despite the linguistic and religious diversity (for the scholarly debate, see Dardanelli and Stojanović 2011). Instead, in Spain, ethno-national movements based on linguistic differences challenge Spanish nationalism, showing the unresolved tension between the ethnic and political poles of national belonging (Álvarez Junco 2011). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the results.

9.2 F rom the Formation of the National States to National Identities: Beyond the Civic/Ethnic Dichotomy The language-nation pairing is one of the revolutionary concepts that arose in the Golden Age of European nationalism. In the international political order, the principle of cuius regio eius religio ratified by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was gradually replaced by that of cuius natio eius lingua (Lapierre 1988). In the Middle Ages, travellers were not faced with  However, it should be stressed that the two countries have moved in different directions: “While France shows a remarkable stability in its citizenship and integration policies over time, with only minor concessions towards the accommodation of diversity and slightly more restrictive naturalization regulations, Germany has considerably extended its access to citizenship and recognition of cultural rights, and has overtaken France with regard to the inclusiveness of their policies” (Trittler 2017, p. 669). 3

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language barriers (or rather language differences were not perceived as such), but instead continuums of communication. To use an effective phrase by Billig: “The mediaeval peasant spoke, but the modern person cannot merely speak; we have to speak something, a language” (Billig 1995, p. 31, italics in the original). By contrast, the ideology that accompanied the formation of nation-states in Western Europe was built on the welding of land, language, and nation (Connor 2018). An enormous amount of literature exists on the origins of nation, with a division between primordialists and instrumentalists. This dichotomy is a simplification of the wealth and complexity of the debate, which cannot be dealt with in detail here. For the topic tackled in this chapter, it suffices to remember that both approaches attribute language an important role in the formation of national identity. In brief, for the primordialists, language is a primordial characteristic bearing witness to an “ethnic” commonality existing before nationalisms (Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1975), while for the instrumentalists it is a powerful tool used by the elite to socialise the masses on the union between politics and culture at the basis of the modern nation-state (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991; Breuilly 1993; Hobsbawm 1991; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). These different theoretical interpretations find a parallel in the different national narratives and the different systems of access to citizenship, with the German and French cases acting as prototypes of the respective models (Brubaker 1992). The definition of national belonging in linguistic terms permeates German romanticism which, in stark contrast to the rationalism and universalism of the French Enlightenment, emphasised the almost mythical image of the people (Volk) with its deep cultural, religious, and historical roots and origins. Herder’s writings (1744–1833) affirm the insoluble bond between language and nation: the first not only ensures social cohesion but, by joining past and future, gives the group identity (Barnard 1969; Trabant 2009; Patten 2010). In the speeches that Fichte made to his fellow countrymen between 1807 and 1808 during the occupation of Berlin by Napoleon’s troops, we find one of the most eloquent and suggestive calls to the unity of language and nation: “Those who speak the same language (…) belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole. Such a whole, if it wishes to absorb and mingle with itself any other people of different descent and language, cannot do

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so without itself becoming confused, in the beginning at any rate, and violently disturbing the even progress of its culture” (in Fichte 1968, pp.  193–194). Diametrically opposite is the position of the French school, whose main exponent was Renan (Dahbour et al. 1995). In the famous conference held at the Sorbonne in 1882, Renan strongly asserted the idea that language is not a constitutive component of nationality nor that it can be considered a source of collective identification: “(…) language invites people to unite, but does not force them to do so. (…) Switzerland, so well made, since it was made with the consent of her different parts, numbers three or four languages. There is something in man which is superior to language, namely, the will” (in Bhabha 1990, p. 16). Paradoxically, in France it was precisely the explicit rejection of the equation between language and national identity that boosted the drive towards linguistic standardisation, seen by the republican state as an indispensable tool for overcoming instances of particularism and for individuals to effectively exercise their full citizenship rights and duties. Actually, France’s linguistic policy was no different to those implemented by other European nation-states in the years of their affirmation. To understand the entity of this operation, suffice it to remember that in 1789 over 50% of the French did not know French and only 13% spoke it correctly (Hobsbawm 1991). Diffusion of the standardised national language, supported by the state’s political power and its institutions (school, the army), therefore went hand in hand with modernisation (Hobsbawm 1991; Hroch 1985; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991). At the end of the First World War, the national criterion was established as the principle for the political division of states. Wilson’s principle of making states correspond to nationality—of which language had become a practical indicator, useful for resolving issues of international politics—soon revealed its limits. In reality, the new states were multinationals or had a strong presence of minorities. Despite these contradictions, the state borders that were set like this lasted for a long time, a stability that helped to create the idea of a cultural/linguistic homogeneity within nations and that perhaps can explain the astonishment towards the subsequent ethnic revival in Europe (Smith 1981; Hobsbawm 1994). Given these historical premises, it is not surprising that today language remains a key element of symbolic boundary configurations of national

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belonging (Pew Research Center 2017; Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016; Wright 2016). However, we know little about the extent to which individuals associate the mastery of language to other membership criteria (such as ancestry, language, respect for law, custom and traditions, etc.) because of their countries’ master narratives. In the literature, this area of investigation is dominated by the ethnic/civic dichotomy approach. This distinction was drawn by Kohn more than six decades ago (1961), and it is employed by contemporary scholars (Brubaker 1992, 2004; Miller 2000; Shulman 2002). Particularly well known is the study by Anthony Smith (1991), which presented a typology based on the historical analysis of different kinds of national identity, mostly in terms of a civic (Western) model opposed to an ethnic (non-Western) model. This approach contends that there is not only the civic versus ethno-cultural legal system, but also national self-identification based on this distinction. Moreover, ethnic and civic representations of national identity are supposed to influence attitudes towards people perceived as “outsiders” (Koning 2011). Ethnic conceptions should be associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants and multiculturalism. In contrast, civic conceptions should promote attitudes that are more inclusive. Actually, there is no clear empirical evidence to back up these claims (Reijerse et  al. 2013; Smeekes et al. 2015). Although conceptually the ethnic/civic dichotomy has been widely criticised,4 it has been so successful that it has strongly influenced the empirical study of national identity. Specific survey questions have been designed to investigate the elements which respondents deem important in order to “truly” be a member of a country (such as language, ancestry, religion, respect for laws and institutions). The aim was to explore the extent to which the meanings that most people attach to their national group mirror the idea of nationhood developed by the macro-sociologists and historians (see ISSP National Identity module 2003, 2015; European Commission 57.2, 2012; Pew Research Center, Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey and European Values Study 2017). Actually, empirical  As a matter of fact, scholars have pointed out that this distinction, when applied to the masses, suffers from many weaknesses. Among them, the major shortcomings are the normative and “Manichaean” vision of nationalism and analytical ambiguity (Shulman 2002). 4

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studies very often fail to ­demonstrate that the conceptions of nations shared by people fit clearly with the conceptual distinction between ethnic and civic components (Jones and Smith 2001; Jiménez et al. 2004; Björklund 2006; Haller and Ressler 2006; Heath et al. 2009; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016; Trittler 2017). Some scholars have preferred an interpretation in terms of ascribed versus achieved characteristics of national identity (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001; Wright et al. 2012). These results seem to be consistent with theoretical perspectives of the scholars that have gone beyond the binary and simplified approach. Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995) proposed distinguishing three ideal types of symbolic codes of collective identity construction: primordial, cultural, and civic (or civil). The primordial code focuses on boundaries based on traits perceived as “natural” (gender and generation, kinship, ethnicity). The cultural code relates collective identity to the realm of the sacred (God as well as reason or progress) and implies a universalistic orientation, even if inclusion is possible only by conversion. The civic/civil code concerns familiarity with rules of conduct, tradition, and institutional arrangements. This code is often largely implicit: “civic codes of collective identity maintain the boundaries not mentioning it” (ibid., p. 81). Inclusion is possible by adopting local customs and routines (including, but not limited to, those linked to the political domain). Kymlicka (2001, 2015) too goes beyond the traditional ethnic/civic dichotomy. He distinguishes cultural national traditions and habits from civic (in the sense of inclusion by citizenship) and ethnic dimensions. In a similar way, Shulman (2002) considers language, religion, and tradition as part of a “cultural” component, besides ethnic and civic ones. Finally, Brubaker (1999, 2004) and Smith (2000) argued in favour of the interrelation between different components rather than a clear separation between them. Against this background, to understand the nexus between language and national identity, it seems necessary to look at the association between language and other national markers. National language is only one of the typical criteria used by individuals to distinguish ‘co-nationals’ from ‘outsiders’ (among others such as ancestry, religion, residence, respect for laws, subjective belonging, etc.). It is worth to stress two points based on previous cross-national survey research on national boundaries. First,

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being able to speak the national language does not seem to refer to traditional ‘ethnic’ national markers (such as ancestry or religion). Using data collected in 2003 from 33 countries, Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) found a dimension based on speaking the language, respecting the law, and feeling a citizen (a civic conception of citizenship). More recently, we found similar results using a different data set, which compared 15 European countries. In any of them, mastery of the national language is associated to ‘ethnic’ national boundaries (Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016). Second, the extent to which this item is likely to measure civic identity shows cross-national differences (Heath et al. 2009; Trittler 2017; Alemán and Woods 2018). Do national narratives contribute to explain these differences? It is a matter of empirical testing.

9.3 Empirical Analysis The aim of empirical analysis is twofold: (1) to investigate the nexus between language and national identity, by comparing four countries (France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland), which are completely different in terms of state and nation-building and the elites’ national narratives; and (2) to study to what extent different national boundaries configurations relate to attitudes towards migrants’ integration/cultural diversity. Therefore, the main aim is not to map the differences between countries (even though they will be described), but to use them to check if different national narratives/institutional setting have influenced the way in which citizens imagine the social boundaries of the nation and its consequences in terms of attitudes towards ‘outsiders’. The data are taken from National Identity III—ISSP International Social Survey Program conducted in 2003 and 2013. ISSP National Identity module deals with several issues, such as respondents’ global, national, or ethnic identification, aspects of national pride and support for their own nation, attitudes towards national and international issues, attitudes towards foreigners and foreign cultures, and views on what makes someone a true member of one’s own nationality. Given the aim of this chapter and the space limitations, I focus only on two themes: individual definition of national boundaries and attitudes towards immigration.

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As regards the first research question, in the ISSP survey, respondents were questioned about the criteria they considered important in order to be ‘truly’ French/German/Spanish/Swiss. Eight different criteria were listed: speaking the country’s language, being born in the country, having legal citizenship status, having lived in the country for most of one’s life, adhering to the dominant religion, respecting the laws, feeling a member of the community, and having national ancestry.5 One should expect that people living in countries where national narratives stress the link between language and nation would attribute more importance to language than to other criteria. This is the case of France and Germany, even though the respective national narratives framed this association in a different way. As a matter of fact, as shown in Table 9.1, being able to speak the country’s language not only plays a key role everywhere, but over time it has become more and more important in all the countries considered here.6 In France and Germany, where already in 2003 a large part of the population shared the idea that mastery of the country’s language was “very” important in order to be a true member of the nation (respectively, 61.8% and 63%), the increase was of just a few points (respectively, 72.4% and 68.4%). On the other hand, in Switzerland and Spain it went up dramatically, from 51% to 71.6%, and from 33.2% to 56.3% respectively. Having ascertained that the association between language and nation, typical of nineteenth-century European nationalism, is still widely rooted  Note that COUNTRY’S NATIONALITY refers to the nation that the survey is being conducted in. If there are sub-national units, it refers to the nation as a whole, so British would be used for Great Britain, not English”, Scottish, or Welsh. As regards ‘dominant language(s)’, the translation rule is that if two or more languages are recognised nationwide, both are included in the question. However, if there is one national lingua franca (Spanish, Russian), only this language is given (see ISSP codebook). 6  It is worth pointing out that recent survey data show that language is one of the most important attributes of national identity in several countries (Pew Research Center, Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey; data collected in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, Hungary, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States). Among the countries considered, the number of people who believe it is very important to speak the national language in order to be a “true” compatriot is around six out of ten in Italy, Canada, and Spain, and this figure goes up to about eight out of ten in Germany, the United States, Hungary, and the Netherlands. The same survey shows that, at least in the European countries considered, the percentage of people attributing great importance to language (77%) is largely higher than the numbers reached on average in the same countries by other markers, such as the sharing of national customs (48%), place of birth (33%), or religion (15%). Unfortunately, this more recent survey does not include questions measuring attitudes towards multiculturalism. Instead, data from the last round of the European Values Survey (where both dimensions are measured) were not yet available at the time of writing this chapter. 5

72.4 79.8

62.9 59.4 35.2 22.6 8.5 34.2

61.8

70.9

60.5

52.2

32.1

23.1

8.3 30.6

France 2013

11.2 23.9

20.7

25.8

38.5

31.2

37.7

64.0

Germany 2003

8.6 29.1

15.0

23.6

40.4

32.4

52.9

68.4

Germany 2013

13.7 31.7

24.2

37.3

36.1

36.1

33.9

33.2

Spain 2003

13.9 39.5

33.6

37.3

43.3

46.0

34.9

56.3

Spain 2013

15.8 24.4

12.7

20.4

39.6

29.5

34.9

51.0

Switzerland 2003

13.4 31.0

15.8

25.5

38.0

40.3

56.8

71.6

Switzerland 2013

Note: The answer scale was: Not important at all, Not very important, Fairly important, Very important. Entries are row percentages. Cases are weighted by the ISSP design weight factor Source: Personal elaboration on ISSP survey data (ISSP-National Identity Module 2003 and 2013)

To be able to speak [country’s language] To respect [country] political institutions and laws To feel [country’s nationality] To have [country’s nationality] citizenship To have been born in [country] To have [country’s nationality] ancestry To be a [religion] To have lived in [country] for most of one’s life

France 2003

Table 9.1  Some people say that the following things are important in order to be truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is … (% of answers “very” important)

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in the population today, it is now possible to go further. Indeed, the distribution of the answers in Table 9.1 does not reveal which items empirically belong together in the minds of citizens. An exploratory factor analysis was performed to check whether the latent structure of national identity ‘markers’ reflects a country’s national narratives. From this, the same two-factor structures emerge in all of the countries (principal components analysis, varimax rotation).7 Items related to the traditional ethnic conception of nationhood are loaded on the first factor: having [country’s nationality] ancestry, having been born in [country], having lived in [country] for most of one’s life, and being a [religion]. This conception is not far from the one proposed by nineteenth-century European nationalism save one, important, difference: national language is not included in this dimension. In the minds of French, German, Spanish, and Swiss citizens, being able to speak the country’s language is associated with aspects that we are used to linking to the civic dimension of belonging, that is, respect for political institutions and laws, and feeling of belonging.8 This second factor reminds that the “civility code” proposed by Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995) is a third option instead of the clear contrast between the civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity. It refers to those implicit and “banal” contents (in the sense proposed by Billig in 1995) of the national identity, which are reaffirmed in everyday social interactions. The stability of this factor solution and its cross-national and over-time invariance was tested using Multi Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA). The first step was to test the models simultaneously on the four groups, but without imposing any equality constraints (configural invariance). Configural invariance implies the same number of factors in each group and the same pattern of fixed and free parameters. This represents the basic level of invariance and provides evidence of the similarity of the factorial structure in the four countries. From the substantive point of view, given that the four countries are different in terms of state-­ building and national narratives, if the latent structure is the same across  Because of the strong cross-loading on both factors of the “having [country’s nationality] citizenship” item, it was not included in the next statistical analysis (MGCFA). 8  These results are consistent with those found by Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) and Guglielmi and Vezzoni (2016) in their analysis of a wider cross-national sample (see paragraph 1). 7

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countries, it means that these historical differences have not been influential in the national self-identification process in the countries under investigation. The goodness of fit is quite satisfactory (CFI  =  0.92; RMSEA = 0.09; SRMR = 0.04).9 It is worth noting that two factors are distinct but interrelated, especially in Spain in 2013 (the correlation is 0.87, while in 2003 it was 0.57) and Germany (0.70 in 2003 and 0.73 in 2013). In Switzerland the correlation between the two factors amounted to 0.57 in 2013 and 0.63 in 2013. In France it was 0.48 in 2003 and 0.56 in 2013. The Multi Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis confirmed that being able to speak the country’s language is not only one of the most important symbolic national boundaries in all of the countries, but also that it goes hand in hand with the concepts that are the pillars of a civic and more inclusive conception of the national community. Moreover, two points emerged from further statistical analysis that are worth emphasising here. First, in all of the countries there is a positive association between the importance attributed to the linguistic national marker and the national attachment. In detail, respondents thinking that mastery of the country’s language is very important in order to be a ‘true’ member of a nation are more likely to feel very close to their nation. Note that this positive correlation also concerns the other criteria (ancestry, respect for laws, etc.). This is nothing new. It is consistent with the Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner et al. 1987) that emphasises the cognitive determinants of social identity. In this approach, identification with a social group is the result of the salience of the social category, which is a salience of the boundaries of that particular group. People can only perceive each other  The interpretation of the indices is discussed in the literature, but from a practical point of view there is concurrence on the following cut-off values. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) varies from 0 to 1 and, by convention, if it equals 0.95, the model can be accepted, indicating that 95% of the covariance observed is reproduced by the model (values above 0.90 are also considered satisfactory). This index is affected by the number of cases in the sample. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is not modified by the size of the sample and is not based on comparison with the null model. Its value is 0 when the model is a perfect fit for the data; values between 0 and 0.05 are considered indicators of a good fit, but values lower than or equal to 0.08 are accepted as indicators of a satisfactory level of fit. A RMSEA value falling in the range of 0.08–0.10 is deemed to indicate a fit which is neither good nor bad. The Standardised Root Mean square Residual (SRMR) is an absolute measure of fit: a value of zero indicates a perfect fit; a value less than 0.08 is generally considered a good fit (Hu and Bentler 1999; Billiet 2003). 9

220 

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as belonging to the same in-group if they recognise a prototype representing and differentiating it from the out-groups. Following this approach, group attachment follows the perceived salience of the symbolic boundaries (in our model, criteria defining a ‘true’ member of a nation). Nevertheless, what is worth stressing here is that France is the country where the relationship between the perceived salience of mastery of the country’s language and national attachment is the weakest, at least at the bivariate level. In detail, 64% of French people who think that mastery of the language is very important in order to be truly French affirm that they are very close to the nation, compared to 50% of people who think that linguistic criteria are not important. A similar picture also emerges in Germany (36.3% vs. 14.9%). In Switzerland and Spain, the gap is greater, respectively 52.5% versus 27.5% and 62.6% versus 22.2%.10 It might come as a surprise that the link between language and national attachment is less strong precisely in those countries where the national narratives have been built around the concept of linguistic nationalism. Indeed, this might be another sign of the fact that in France and Germany most of the association between language and nation is now part of that “banal” nationalism (Billig 1995) that citizens take for granted in everyday life. The second point revealed by the descriptive statistics is that individual characteristics such as age and education do not influence the level of importance attached to language as a national marker at all. This is true for Germany, France, and Switzerland. It means that in these countries the idea of language as a national marker is deeply rooted in the population and transversally shared. In Spain, the picture is slightly different, where people more educated, aged over 65 are more likely to think that mastery of the country’s language(s) is important in order to be a “true” Spaniard.11 Once analysed to what extent national boundary configurations reflect countries’ master narratives, it is possible to deal with the second research question. To what extent thinking that the mastery of national language is one of the most important national membership criteria does affect attitudes towards migrant integration/cultural diversity? And does this  Data not presented here. Available on request.  Analysis not presented here due to the space limitations; available on request.

10 11

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relationship differ across countries characterised by different national narratives? The expectation is that in France and Germany—where the national narrative emphasises the language-nation nexus, albeit in different ways—those who think that being able to speak the national language is very important in order to be a “true” member of the nation will be more inclined towards assimilation than to multiculturalism. On the contrary, no relationship should be found in countries where national narratives stress the fact that domestic linguistic pluralism does not hinder national cohesion (Spain and Switzerland). In statistical terms, it means that the (negative) effect of the importance attached to language as a national “marker” on support for multiculturalism would be stronger, all other things being equal, in Germany and France rather than in Switzerland and Spain. To test this hypothesis, a linear regression model was developed, where the dependent variable was the index of “support for multiculturalism”. The model included interaction between the importance attached to mastery of the language as a national marker and the country. The control variables—included to avoid spurious relationship—were a set of usual indicators related to alternative explanations of attitudes towards migration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). These were: the other criteria used to define a “true” member of a nation and the level of attachment to the nation (identity-based approach); occupational status, age, education (material interest-based approach); and left/right position of party voted in the last national election (politics-based approach). Moreover, an index of global attitudes towards migrants was included (factorial scores based on seven Likert scales concerning opinion about immigrants12). The dependent variable is an additive index of “support for multiculturalism and cultural diversity” computed by adding three Likert scales.13 In detail, to capture the tension between assimilation and multiculturalism, people were asked about their level of agreement with the following sentences (scale from one to five):  Factorial analysis and index computing not presented here due to the space limitations; available on request. 13  The unidimensionality of the item response data was tested with an Exploratory Factor Analysis (not presented here due to the space limitations; data available on request). 12

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1. It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’s] customs and traditions to become fully [COUNTRY’S NATIONALITY]. 2. Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions. 3. [COUNTRY’s] culture is generally undermined by immigrants. The index varies from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates low support for multiculturalism and 10 high support. Note that the distribution of the index in Germany, Switzerland, and Spain is identical: the mean is equal to 4.8 and the median to 5, which means that half the population, roughly, is in favour of and half is against multiculturalism. In France, on average, the citizens seem to be less supportive of multiculturalism (the mean is 4 and the median is 4.1). Table 9.2 shows the result of the regression statistical analysis. The first model only includes the main independent variables: as expected, ceteris paribus, thinking that being able to speak the national language is very important in order to be a true member of the nation has a negative effect on support for multiculturalism (regression coefficient B is equal to −0.83; first model). This negative effect decreases, but remains after the introduction of control variables (regression coefficient B is equal to −0.18; second model), but disappears when the interaction terms are included (regression coefficient B is equal to 0.16 and it is not statistically significant; third model). As expected, the perceived salience of national language as a national marker has a varying impact on support for multiculturalism depending on the country. Specifically, the effect was negative and strong for German (regression coefficient B is equal to −0.56) and most French citizens (regression coefficient B is equal to −1.05), while it was negative but not statistically significant in Switzerland and Spain. In other words, however “banalized” (Billig 1995) in everyday practice, linguistic nationalism seems to produce greater consequences on attitudes towards migrant integration/cultural diversity in those very countries where the national narrative has stressed the nexus between language and nation, albeit with very different meanings.

0.11 0.10 0.10

–0.40 0.16 –0.68

0.068

0.23 0.06

7.26 –0.83

0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.07

–0.10 0.05 0.09 –0.23 –0.29 –0.04 –1.14 –0.01 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.356

∗∗∗

0.10 0.09 0.09

–0.60 –0.17 –0.52

∗∗∗

0.26 0.06

7.30 –0.18

SE

∗∗∗ ∗∗∗

B

–0.01 0.00 0.18 0.29 0.363

∗∗∗ ∗∗∗

∗∗∗

–0.30 –0.03 –1.11

–0.10 0.06 0.09 –0.23

–0.56 0.10 0.12 –1.05 –0.56 –0.18 –0.20

6.17 0.16

B

∗∗∗

∗∗ ∗∗∗

∗∗

∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗∗∗

Model 3

Source: Personal elaboration on ISSP survey data (National Identity Module 2013) Note: Entries are unstandardised coefficients/standard error; ∗ = p