Multicultural Governance in a Mobile World 9781474428255

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Multicultural Governance in a Mobile World

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MULTICULTURAL GOVERNANCE IN A MOBILE WORLD

Edited by Anna Triandafyllidou

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Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com © editorial matter and organisation Anna Triandafyllidou, 2017 © the chapters their several authors, 2017 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road, 12(2f) Jackson’s Entry, Edinburgh EH8 8PJ Typeset in 11/13 Adobe Sabon by IDSUK (DataConnection) Ltd, and printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 4744 2823 1 (hardback) ISBN 978 1 4744 2824 8 (paperback) ISBN 978 1 4744 2825 5 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 1 4744 2826 2 (epub) The right of Anna Triandafyllidou to be identified as the editor of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).

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Contents

Notes on contributors Introduction Anna Triandafyllidou

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Part I What Has Changed? 1. The Return of the National in a Mobile World Anna Triandafyllidou 2. Reimagining the Nation, Migration and Citizenship: The Role of Cultural Institutions and New Institutional Responses Peggy Levitt 3. Settlers or Movers? The Temporality of Past Migrations, Political Inaction and its Consequences, 1945–1985 Jozefien De Bock

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Part II How Have People Responded? 4. Mobilities against Prejudice: The Role of Social Transnationalism in Europe in Sentiments towards Immigration from Other EU Member States and from Outside the EU Justyna Salamońska 5. Just Visiting? The Weakening of Social Protection in a Mobile World Keith Banting and Edward Koning

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contents Part III How Have States Responded? 6. Multiculturalism without Citizenship? Will Kymlicka

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7. Multiculturalism on the Move: An Australian Perspective 162 Geoffrey Brahm Levey 8. Multicultural Citizenship and New Migrations Tariq Modood

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Part IV What Should We Do to Move Forward? 9. The Migration-Mobility Nexus: Rethinking Citizenship and Integration as Processes 205 Matteo Gianni 10. Raising Claims and Dealing with Claims in a ‘Mobile World’ of ‘Superdiversity’: Institutions and Policies of Accommodation under Pressure Veit Bader 11. On the Reciprocal Subordination of Multiculturalism and Migration Policies Sune Lægaard

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12. Multiculturalism and Temporary Migrant Workers Bouke de Vries

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13. Democratic Representation in Mobile Societies Rainer Bauböck

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Veit Bader was as a teacher and researcher connected to the Free University of Berlin (1966–1976) and to the University of Amsterdam (1976–2009). He is now Emeritus Professor of Sociology (Department of Political and Socio-cultural Sciences) and of Social and Political Philosophy (Department of Philosophy) at the University of Amsterdam and a member of IMES (Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies). He has written on a wide range of issues in critical political economy; critical social theory; social inequalities and collective action; democracy and the rule of law; legal theory; associative democracy; racism, ethnicity and citizenship; multi-culturalism; ethics of migration and incorporation of minorities; global justice; governance of religious diversity. He is currently involved in a research project on ‘Renewing Democracy’ in multi-level polities. Some relevant publications include: (1991) Kollektives Handeln. Protheorie sozialer Ungleichheit und kollektiven Handelns, Teil II. Opladen, e-book: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-663-10493-3; (2007) Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity, Amsterdam UP: http://www.oapen.org/search?iden tifier=341457;keyword=imiscoe; and (2017) ‘Dilemmas of Institutionalisation and Political Participation of Organised Religions in Europe. Associational Governance as a Promising Alternative’, in Francisco Colom González and Gianni d’Amato (eds) Multireligious Society. Dealing with Religious Diversity in Theory and Practice, Routledge, pp. 152–179. Keith Banting is the Stauffer Dunning Fellow in the School of Policy Studies and Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political vii

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notes on contributors Studies, Queen’s University, Canada. A major focus in his recent research has been the politics of the welfare state in diverse societies. In addition to publishing a substantial number of articles and book chapters on these issues, he is the co-editor, with Will Kymlicka, of Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies (Oxford University Press 2006) and The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Rainer Bauböck holds a Chair in Social and Political Theory at the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute. He is on leave from the Austrian Academy of Sciences. His research interests are in normative political theory and comparative research on democratic citizenship, European integration, migration, nationalism and minority rights. Together with Jo Shaw (University of Edinburgh) and Maarten Vink (University of Maastricht), he coordinates EUDO CITIZENSHIP, an online observatory on citizenship and voting rights. Jozefien De Bock received her master’s degree in contemporary history at the University of Ghent. She worked as a historical researcher on several projects dealing with migration before starting her doctoral research at the European University Institute in Florence. There, she successfully defended her PhD in October 2013. Since then, she curated for the Ghent City Museum the open-air exhibition ‘Sticking Around. Over 50 years of migration to Ghent’, in which the results of her research were translated to a wider audience. In October 2015, she obtained a position as a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Ghent, working on a project about return migration and mobility among postwar Mediterranean migrants. At the same time, she serves as the Senior Editor of the European Review of History and continues to work on several international projects dealing with migration and cultural heritage. Bouke de Vries is a post-doctoral researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity in Göttingen. He has a PhD in political science from the European University Institute, where he previously obtained an MRes. Before viii

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notes on contributors coming to Florence, Bouke read philosophy at the University of St Andrews (MPhil) and King’s College London (MA). His research interests include liberal neutrality, toleration, multiculturalism, citizenship and migration. Matteo Gianni is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the University of Geneva, a member of the Institute of Citizenship Studies of the same university, co-founder of the research group on Islam in Switzerland, and currently Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences. Among several research projects financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation, he is leading the research project ‘Citizenship and Immigration: An Empirical and Normative Analysis of Swiss Philosophy of Integration’ with the National Centre for Competence in Research (NCCR) On the Move at the University of Neuchâtel. Interested in the normative theory of citizenship, in the last few years he has conducted several research studies into the political integration of Muslim immigrants in Switzerland and Europe. Edward Koning is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Guelph, Canada. His research focuses on immigration politics and policies in Western democracies, in particular in Western Europe and North America. Some of his recent publications have appeared in Comparative European Politics, Journal of Public Policy, Ethnic and Racial Studies, and Comparative Political Studies. Will Kymlicka is the Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy in the philosophy department at Queen’s University in Kingston, Canada, where he has taught since 1998. His research interests focus on issues of democracy and diversity, and in particular on models of citizenship and social justice within multicultural societies. He has published eight books, including Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford University Press 1995) and Multicultural Odysseys (Oxford University Press 2007). His works have been translated into 34 languages. Sune Lægaard is Associate Professor in Philosophy at Roskilde University in Denmark. He works within political philosophy on a range of issues related to multiculturalism, including nationalism, ix

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notes on contributors migration, secularism, toleration and recognition. He is also editor of the journal Res Publica (published by Springer). Geoffrey Brahm Levey is an Associate Professor and Australian Research Council Future Fellow in Politics at the University of New South Wales, Sydney. He was the foundation director of the UNSW Program in Jewish Studies. His recent publications include, as editor, Authenticity, Autonomy and Multiculturalism (Routledge 2015) and The Politics of Citizenship in Immigrant Democracies: The Experience of the United States, Canada and Australia, with Ayelet Shachar (Routledge 2015). He also is editor of Political Theory and Australian Multiculturalism (Berghahn Books 2008, 2012), and co-editor of Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, with Tariq Modood (Cambridge University Press 2008), and Jews and Australian Politics, with Philip Mendes (Sussex Academic Press 2004). Peggy Levitt is Chair of the sociology department and the Luella LaMer Slaner Professor in Latin American Studies at Wellesley College and co-Director of Harvard University’s Transnational Studies Initiative. Her most recent book, Artifacts and Allegiances: How Museums Put the Nation and the World on Display, was published by the University of California Press in July 2015. Peggy was the CMRS Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the American University of Cairo in March 2015 and a Robert Schuman Fellow at the European University Institute in summer 2015. In 2014, she received an Honorary Doctoral Degree from Maastricht University, held the Astor Visiting Professorship at Oxford University and was a guest professor at the University of Vienna. She was the Visiting International Fellow at the Vrije University in Amsterdam from 2010– 2012 and the Willie Brandt Guest Professor at the University of Malmö in 2009. Her books include Religion on the Edge (Oxford University Press 2012), God Needs No Passport (New Press 2007), The Transnational Studies Reader (Routledge 2007), The Changing Face of Home (Russell Sage 2002), and The Transnational Villagers (UC Press 2001). She has edited special volumes of Oxford Development Studies, Comparative Migration Studies, Racial and Ethnic Studies, International Migration Review, Global Networks, Mobilities, and the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. A film based on her work, Art Across Borders, came out in 2009. x

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notes on contributors Tariq Modood is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy and the founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol and the co-founder of the international journal, Ethnicities. He was awarded an MBE for services to social sciences and ethnic relations in 2001 and was made a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (UK) in 2004 and elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2017. He served on the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, and the Commission on Religion and Belief in British Public Life. His latest books include Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Polity Press, 2nd edition 2013) and, as co-editor, Multiculturalism Rethought (Edinburgh University Press 2015) and Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines (Edinburgh University Press 2016). Justyna Salamońska is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology, University of Warsaw. She leads a project about multiple migrations (financed by the National Science Centre) at the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw. Justyna holds a PhD in Sociology from Trinity College Dublin. She previously carried out research and taught at Trinity College Dublin, the University of Chieti and the European University Institute. Her research and teaching interests include contemporary migrations in Europe, migrant labour market integration, cross-border mobilities, and quantitative and qualitative research methods. Anna Triandafyllidou holds a Robert Schuman Chair at the Global Governance Programme of the European University Institute (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). Before joining the Global Governance Programme in October 2012, she was part time professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies specialising on migration issues (2010–2012). A Senior Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens in the period 2004–2012, she headed a successful migration research team coordinating a dozen international externally-funded research projects on various migration management and migrant integration topics. She has been Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges since 2002 and is (since 2013) the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies. Her recent books include: Muslims in 21st Century Europe (ed., Routledge 2010, reprinted in paperback in 2012), European Multiculturalism(s) xi

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notes on contributors (with T. Modood and N. Meer, eds, Edinburgh University Press 2011), Migrant Smuggling. Irregular Migration from Africa and Asia to Europe (co-authored with T. Maroukis, Palgrave 2012); Circular Migration between Europe and its Neighbourhood. Choice or Necessity? (ed., Oxford University Press 2013); European Immigration: A Sourcebook (ed. with R. Gropas, Ashgate 2014, second edition); What is Europe? (co-authored with R. Gropas, Palgrave 2015); The Routledge Handbook on Immigration and Refugee Studies (ed., Routledge 2015).

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Introduction Anna Triandafyllidou

1. Introduction Migrant integration and addressing the challenges of cultural and religious diversity in liberal democratic societies is arguably one of the pressing challenges of the twenty-first century. During the last twenty-five years there have been intensive political and academic debates on the appropriate normative and policy framework for addressing cultural diversity in Europe and North America. In terms of discourse, many politicians (including David Cameron, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy) and intellectuals have argued that the philosophy of multiculturalism has failed. In terms of policies, integration priorities have increasingly taken a civic assimilationist turn, emphasising a set of common civic and political values to which all migrants and ethnic minorities must adhere. Instead of perpetuating the intellectual and policy debate on the death or resurrection of multiculturalism and whether interculturalism is a more appropriate alternative, this book seeks to advance the academic and policy debate by arguing that the quest for migrant and ethnic minority integration today operates in a different socio-economic and political context compared to that of the 1980s and 1990s, the supposed heyday of multiculturalism. Important research within migration studies, human geography, sociology and social anthropology has charted new patterns of mobility and migration in the last fifteen years, and has identified a new paradigm of mobility without settlement, both in terms of migration patterns but also in terms of migration policies available to newcomers. Nowadays, settlement or citizenship is often

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multicultural governance in a mobile world not offered, visa schemes are multiplied and diversified, their aim often being to keep migration temporary and always ‘on the move’, while highly skilled migrants are given more flexibility as are the holders of dual passports and EU citizens in Europe. However, this paradigm shift in migration/mobility studies has not yet penetrated into our thinking on the governance of cultural and religious diversity. Our models of multicultural citizenship, as developed mainly in political theory and political science, remain predicated on a notion of national identity and national citizenship – perhaps pluralised and opened to accommodate newcomers and minorities, but still with a national basis. This book aims to contribute towards rectifying this anomalous state of affairs by bringing these two research strands together to confront the changing landscape.

2. The twenty-first-century context The last twenty-five years have been characterised by intensive debates on whether multiculturalism is an appropriate normative and political paradigm for integrating culturally diverse populations in liberal and democratic societies. No firm answer has been given to this question even if a lot of ink was spent to argue both in favour and against multiculturalism (see among others Kymlicka 1995, 2001; Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Modood et al. 2006; Modood 2007; Parekh 2008; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Triandafyllidou et al. 2012; Balint and de Latour 2013; Uberoi and Modood 2014). In the meantime, the nature of migration has become more complex and more volatile, creating a different socio-economic and political context within which migrant integration and cultural diversity challenges need to be addressed. Global migration flows have not only increased – particularly in the direction of Europe in the last twenty-five years – they have also diversified. We are witnessing a multiplication of destination countries (which, in Europe, include Southern and Central Eastern European countries); a multiplication of origin countries that no longer follows a post-colonial logic, as countries of origin are increasingly integrated in global migration flows; and a higher level of mobility and connectivity through faster and cheaper IT technologies and means of transport (Castles and Miller 2009; Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014). 2

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introduction Migrants appear to be more transnational than ever: they keep close connections to home and other locations they may have lived or worked in courtesy of IT and ease of transport, while migration becomes less of a lifelong decision. It becomes for many a rite of passage, a mere period in their life that is followed by return or by onwards migration to a third country, and which leads to different types of transnational activities (Gropas et al. 2014). While patterns of such ‘fluid’ (Bauman 2000) mobility differ greatly between countries, and among individuals and households (in line with levels of skills, employment opportunities, visa requirements, life stages of the migrant and his/her family as well as ‘cultures’ of migration), they are becoming a new structural feature of international migration. The settlement and citizenship package is no longer to be taken for granted as the endpoint of the migrant’s trajectory. Destination countries have become increasingly reluctant to provide such ‘integration packages’. Countries such as Canada or Australia, which have historically privileged settlement migration, are now turning to temporary schemes of various sorts to fill their migration quotas and their labour market needs (Basok 2007; Khoo et al. 2007; Lenard and Straehle 2012). Yet temporary migrants, whether in the low-skilled or skilled sector, are faced with limited work and welfare protection compared with long-term migrants. A ‘settlement, integration and naturalisation’ perspective, conceived of as a quasilinear process within the multicultural citizenship framework, is no longer available or at least is not seen as the norm. In the EU the situation is different and probably more polarised. Intra-EU citizens are in theory well protected with full socioeconomic and local political rights, but in practice the situation is different. They often face limited access to their rights and severe exploitation (Triandafyllidou and Bartolini 2015). At the same time, free movement appears to stimulate circular and temporary mobility both among the low skilled and the highly skilled. Thus construction or domestic workers from Romania who lost their jobs in Spain after the 2008 financial crisis are believed to have moved to Italy to seek better employment. At the same time, there is intensified highly skilled migration among EU countries (Trenz and Triandafyllidou 2017). Free intra-EU mobility is however coupled with stringent immigration programmes for non-EU citizens. There are hardly any schemes for low-skill migrants even in sectors 3

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multicultural governance in a mobile world where there are shortages (such as in the care sector, Triandafyllidou and Marchetti 2014). In contrast, highly-skilled foreigners are particularly welcome even if the EU-level Blue Card scheme has so far failed to break through and replace national highly skilled migration programmes (Isaakyan and Triandafyllidou 2014). Despite or perhaps because of this complex landscape of different levels of temporariness or long term-ness (Trenz and Triandafyllidou 2017), integration policies remain tied to the original view of a national citizenship and civic integration therein (reinforced with integration packages upon arrival, compulsory courses and tests) as either the mid-term milestone or the end point of a linear path to full integration at destination. Interestingly, in the EU, intra-EU migrants are seen as automatically integrated because they are EU citizens and hence have no support for their adaptation to the new society. Temporary migrants in Europe, on the other hand, are not seen as legitimate subjects for integration since the plan is that they will go back to their country of origin, while in North America and Australia much the same applies to the initial stay of temporary migrants, even if some are allowed to progress to permanent residency and citizenship. Taking stock of these new trends of high mobility and high connectivity without an assured long-term settlement perspective, sociologists and political scientists have criticised ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2002) for being short-sighted, and have proposed the mobility paradigm for making sense of new, complex and more volatile population movements (Faist 2013). They have cautioned that we should neither celebrate mobility nor consider it as the ‘natural’ condition of humans. Rather, we should consider both mobility and stasis as natural human conditions. And instead of focusing on mobility as opposed to sedentariness, we should look at how the two are intertwined in the lives of people, in their cultures, and in their occupational and life trajectories today (Schiller and Salazar 2013). Vertovec (2006) has coined the term super-diversity to describe and understand the outcome of these new mobility phenomena, pointing to the increasing mixing of identities as well as the multiplication of ‘diversities’ that characterise especially contemporary metropoles like London or New York, but also more generally to signal new migrant and ethnic realities on the ground. Superdiversity has been proposed as a concept that could inform policies 4

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introduction as it conveys the need to go beyond fixed understandings of ethnic and national identity/diversity (Meissner and Vertovec 2015), even though recent studies on social work practices suggest that such perspectives may lead to more confusion than clarity for policy makers and administrators (Boccagni 2015). Governments have experimented with new mobility patterns by proposing schemes of temporary, circular or seasonal migration. These have aimed at both economic benefits (the migrant labour force would respond swiftly to the swinging moods of postindustrial markets and would leave equally swiftly when no longer needed) and socio-political expediency (avoiding the ‘burden’ of migrants’ integration into the destination societies) (Martin 2006; Triandafyllidou 2009, 2013a; Skeldon 2010). However, a review of migrant integration policies in Europe and North America tells a different story: integration is conceived as a process that is best addressed locally as it happens in real life, in neighbourhoods, workplaces and schools. Integration policies can and sometimes should be local, particularly in the case of large cities and global metropoles, which face both special challenges but also dispose of special resources because of their super-diversity and global character (Sassen 2005; Biehl 2015; Padilla et al. 2015). However, for the most part, integration policies and measures are national in their conception and even in the EU where migration and asylum policy have been Europeanised, integration is a prerogative of the nation state and EU policies mainly provide procedural advice and guidance. Thus the integration policy framework remains firmly rooted in the nation state paradigm (even if implemented at the local level) while our understanding of migration realities and processes points to the need for new narratives of belonging that can embrace the dynamics of mobility and temporariness alongside those of settlement. While defenders of multiculturalism have long argued for the need to overcome restrictive nation-centric approaches, the reality is that the new age of mobility poses a challenge to traditional ideas of multiculturalism as well. Research suggests that where multiculturalism has been adopted, it has typically been tightly connected to ideas of national integration, based on assumptions of long-term settlement and future citizenship. Multiculturalism in that sense was a specific interpretation of national citizenship and national 5

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multicultural governance in a mobile world integration. It is far from clear how temporary migrants fit into our established theories and policies of multiculturalism; or how a local-level multiculturalism in a super-diverse city differs from national-level multiculturalism; or even what sort of integration is expected or desired both by the receiving society and the migrants themselves. For multiculturalism to remain relevant for present-day challenges, it may need to be theorised and practiced in new ways. Naturally a word of caution is important here: multiculturalism is not a cohesive, prescriptive set of integration policies nor a political programme which a country or a government can adopt. It is often used in a loose way, to describe the fact of diversity in a given society or to denote a moral approach towards cultural diversity as a positive feature in a society) or indeed as a policy programme. The term has become increasingly politicised and has been also used as a buzzword to condemn integration policies that have been considered to create parallel societies – cultural and ethnic enclaves of post-migration minorities that are reluctant to integrate to their countries of settlement (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). There have been different conceptions and frameworks of multiculturalism adopted in Europe and North America. Thus in the latter multiculturalism includes Native Peoples and Québécois (in Canada notably, see Kymlicka 1995) while in Europe when we speak of multiculturalism even in multinational states like the UK or Spain, we certainly do not think of the Scottish or the Catalans. In Europe, multiculturalism involves a critique of ‘the myth of homogeneous and mono-cultural nation-states’ (Castles 2000: 5), and an advocacy of the right of minority ‘cultural maintenance and community formation, linking these to social equality and protection from discrimination’ (ibid.). Multiculturalism also involves the ‘remaking of public identities in order to achieve an equality of citizenship that is neither merely individualistic nor premised on assimilation’ (Modood 2005: 5). Within the European context it would be more appropriate to speak of multiculturalisms in the plural, notably of different frameworks of policies and norms that share one feature in common: their emphasis on the collective and not just the individual dimension of social and political inclusion of migrants and post-migration minorities (Triandafyllidou et al. 2012). Political multiculturalism (Modood 2013) while liberal in its inception acknowledged that 6

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introduction social life consists not only of individual citizens but has also a group dimension. Thus while individuals have rights, these rights also have a public, collective dimension that needs to be accommodated if the rights are to be recognised to the full. These rights are exercised through mediating institutions such as trade unions, religious or cultural associations, active citizen groups, consultation bodies and public committees. A multicultural mode of integration requires that such institutions and forums adapt to new groups that enter a society with a view to becoming more inclusive and to integrating elements of the new cultures to previous conceptions of national identity and citizenship. While contemporary political theory and sociology debates on migrant integration and multiculturalism risk getting trapped into a circular argument of whether multiculturalism is dead or revived, this book seeks to bypass this controversy and instead ask whether multicultural forms of integration, conceived in the plural, are appropriate for an age of increased temporariness and mobility where citizenship and long-term integration is not affordable to many migrants. To the best of our knowledge there has been little discussion so far on how multicultural citizenship and migrant integration theory and practice need to be rethought today in a context of increased and diversified international migration and mobility.

3. Contents of the book The book is organised in four parts. Contributions to the first part invite a reflection on how globalisation and international migration patterns have altered the nature and role of the nation and the national state, and how new forms of transnational cultural expression or organised social protection emerge. This part also puts the book into its historical context by reviewing the temporal character of post-war migrations and the related integration policies (or lack thereof). More specifically, in Chapter 1, I argue that nations are faced today with a new set of social and economic challenges: economic globalisation has intensified bringing with it a more intense phase of cultural interconnectedness and political interdependence. Globalisation has also further driven and multiplied international flows not only of capitals, goods and services but also of people. National states have seen their capacity to govern undermined by 7

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multicultural governance in a mobile world these processes. However, in Europe, the nation continues to be a powerful source of identity and legitimacy. This chapter offers a reflection on the centrifugal and centripetal forces which challenge the nation today and the kind of analytical tools that we need to connect wider socio-economic transformations with nationalism theories. The chapter is organised as follows. I first briefly review globalisation as a socio-economic phenomenon and the changes it brings at the identity level, leading to what Bauman has termed liquid modernity. In section three, however, I argue that the increased and diversified types of international migration and mobility that globalisation brings, lead to the re-emergence of the nation as a relevant point of reference for identification as well as a relevant political community that can protect people and tame the forces of globalisation. Finally, I survey developments in several European countries showing how citizens seek refuge from the social and economic challenges of globalisation and international mobility in the warm embrace of the nation that offers both the promise of political sovereignty and legitimacy and that of a feeling of shared destiny – something that for instance regional formations like the EU cannot offer. Chapter 2 by Peggy Levitt discusses the role of cultural institutions as sites where notions of citizenship, integration and diversity are renegotiated in a context of heightened mobility and permanent impermanence, where large numbers of migrants are long-term partial members of their societies of origin and settlement. Her chapter explores actually how one type of cultural institution – museums – are responding to immigration and globalisation around the world and are actually reshaping concepts of citizenship, nationhood and pluralism. She then proceeds to discuss how this permanent impermanence is also renegotiated in the field of transnational social protection mainly through the rise of bottom-up responses which however further shape a world on the move. In Chapter 3 Jozefien De Bock urges caution in considering that temporariness and mobility is only a feature of contemporary population flows. She looks at how those who are now considered ethnic minorities or naturalised citizens started off as temporary migrants in the post-World War II period. Indeed, in Europe, temporary migration programmes have a long history. In the period after World War II, a wide range of legal frameworks were set up to import temporary workers, who came to be known as ‘guest 8

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introduction workers’. In the end, many of these ‘guests’ settled in Europe permanently. Their presence lay at the basis of European multicultural policies. However, when these policies were drafted, the former mobility of ‘guest workers’ was forgotten. This chapter focuses on this guest worker mobility, comparing the period of economic growth 1945–1974 with the years after the 1974 oil crisis. Further, it looks at the kind of policies that were developed towards guest workers in the era before multiculturalism, showing how their consideration as temporary residents had far-reaching consequences for the immigrants, their descendants and the receiving societies involved. The chapter finishes by suggesting a number of ‘lessons from the past’. If the mobilitygap between guest workers and present-day migrants is not as big as generally assumed, then the consequences of previous neglect should serve as a warning for future policy making. The chapter by De Bock concludes the first part of the book, reflecting on what and how has changed in terms of national identification and mobility today. The second part moves on to examine how people – those settled or ‘native’ of a given country, the non-movers – have responded to these conditions of new mobility. Justyna Salamońska in Chapter 4 discusses new patterns of not just mobility but also of social transnationalism in Europe. She points out that migrants coming from outside the EU along intraEuropean migrants have changed the landscape of migrations with their diverse mobility projects. At the same time European citizens residing in their countries of origin are mobile in multiple ways when they engage in travel and consumption across the borders or they connect to family and friends based in other countries. Thus Salamońska argues that increased social transnationalism has brought about a change in their thinking about mobility of others who migrate from other EU member states and beyond. Using the Eurobarometer data the chapter illustrates how attitudes towards intra- and extra-European migration differ, with largely positive sentiments towards migrants coming from within the EU and predominantly negative attitudes towards migrants from outside the EU. However, determinants of these attitudes remain similar, irrespective of whether they are directed at European movers or thirdcountry nationals. Among examined determinants of sentiments, engagement in cross-border practices seems to coincide with more positive opinions about migration, leaving us with a degree of 9

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multicultural governance in a mobile world optimism as to how complex patterns of mobility may favour openness towards newcomers. Banting and Koning in Chapter 5 dig deeper into this question by looking at what kind of rights and protection are afforded to temporary migrants compared to settled ones in four countries: Sweden, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Comparing them, the authors find that migrants on a temporary permit are among the most weakly protected in each of these countries, but that the exclusion is more severe in countries where politicians face considerable political pressure to appear tough on immigration and where there are few institutional protections to protect temporary residents from such pressures. These findings highlight both the fragility of social protection in a world of mobility and the importance of firmly entrenched protections of equal treatment. This chapter offers a bridge to Part III which focuses on how state policies of integration and multicultural citizenship react and adapt to new realities. Will Kymlicka (Chapter 6) focuses on Canada and argues that the model of multiculturalism which emerged in Canada in the 1970s was intimately linked to national citizenship. Multiculturalism was premised on the assumption that immigrants would settle permanently and become citizens, and multiculturalism was seen as an attribute of Canadian citizenship, and a way of enacting citizenship. This tie to citizenship arguably served the interests of both immigrants and the native-born majority. For immigrants, it ensured that multiculturalism did not become a pretext for social exclusion and political marginalisation; and for the native-born majority it helped ensure that multiculturalism was domesticated, as it were, tying recognition of diversity to a shared social and political order. But this model has faced two major challenges in recent years: a neoliberal challenge, which sought to reorient multiculturalism more towards market principles than citizenship principles; and a mobility challenge, which sought to reorient multiculturalism away from ideas of permanent settlement and national citizenship towards ideas of temporary migration and liquid mobility. Critically evaluating these two challenges, the chapter focuses in particular on how they understand horizontal relations amongst residents/citizens and vertical relations between residents/ citizens and the state. Kymlicka concludes that we are yet to find a compelling alternative to multicultural national citizenship which 10

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introduction needs to be upheld even in conditions of increased and diversified international migration. Further in Part III, Geoffrey Brahm Levey (Chapter 7) argues that temporary migrants are ill-served by Australian multiculturalism and examines the ramifications of temporary migration for Australia’s successful multicultural society. To this end, the chapter pursues three questions: first, is multicultural policy accessible to temporary residents even if it is not intended for them? Second, how are the difficulties temporary residents face linked to multicultural policy? Third, what is the best way forward for addressing the situation and increasing numbers of temporary residents? The chapter reaches several conclusions. Multicultural policy is much more accessible and beneficial to temporary migrants than is often claimed. An approach that valorises citizenship and which provides clear and reasonable pathways to permanent and temporary migrants for becoming citizens is still the most effective model available. Levey concludes that multicultural policy should be further developed to meet the circumstances of the growing number of temporary entrants to Australia; however, he warns, this effort is currently hampered by some incongruities in government policy. In Chapter 8 Tariq Modood offers a normative conceptualisation of the case of Britain and asks what is the relationship between the post-immigration normative project of accommodating citizensmarked-by-origin and the managing of current flows of migrations and mobilities. While multiculturalism requires reconceiving citizenship and shared identities, it has assumed that a collective of citizens in the form of a state/polity has the right and the capacity to control immigration and that migrants want to be and should be accepted as citizens. But what if the nature of immigration (and other relevant circumstances) change such that difference is no longer so salient an issue, citizenship no longer seems to be so normatively prized by migrants, and immigration is less amenable to control, asks Modood. Does multiculturalism still have traction in these new circumstances? British multiculturalism was developed in a context of immigration control and does not challenge the right of the state to control immigration, while insisting that it must not be exercised in ways that are discriminatory or stigmatising in relation to the composite and overlapping criteria of race, ethnicity and religion that are at the heart of post-immigration British multiculturalism. While a cosmopolitan version of multiculturalism is also present in 11

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multicultural governance in a mobile world Britain and is largely compatible with a more political, communitarian national multiculturalism, the two seem to have incompatible views on national identity concerns and so on immigration control. This is seriously problematic for progressive politics today concludes Modood, but a solution is not clear. Despite the pessimistic conclusion of Tariq Modood, Part IV of the volume offers some forward thinking investigating the challenges that the new conditions bring and how they could be addressed. In Chapter 9, Matteo Gianni recommends bringing integration – a much contested and often misunderstood term – back in. Gianni argues that the notion of integration can and should define the perimeter and the modalities of the accommodation of minority groups. However, he argues, the dominant existing conceptions of integration and citizenship implicitly assume the immobility of immigrants thus failing to tackle today’s challenges. The chapter discusses the concept of integration in distinguishing two main conceptions of it, namely integration as adjustment and integration as an intersubjective process of negotiation and/or reinterpretation of the specific content of common values and of common belonging. On the basis of the moral superiority of integration as process over integration as adaptation, there are not compelling reasons that this should preclude mobile individuals. Immobility is not needed to deliberate about democratic norms of common belonging. But this cannot result in the diminution of the rights and resources of individuals who do not have the choice of mobility. Thus, multicultural terms of fair integration are therefore still needed to accommodate societies where minority groups are marked by difference. Veit Bader in Chapter 10 takes stock of a situation of superdiversity and asks what this entails for the settlement, citizenship and integration package. The chapter focuses on changing sociopolitical conditions of collective action offering a critique of the competing, fashionable concepts of ‘intersectionalism’, ‘transnationalism’, ‘mobility’ or ‘superdiversity’. Bader starts from the assumption that the diagnosis of super-diversity is empirically true. He then asks if and to what degree cultural practices get more radically flexible and fluid, and whether we should expect claimsmaking to change. He warns that under such conditions of fluidity and super-diversity immigrant ethno-religious minorities of all kinds would lose collective voice. He argues that contrary to the normative praise of super-diversity and ‘individualization’ and of 12

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introduction ‘diversity-policies’ this would be – in the real world of structural power-asymmetries – not a praiseworthy utopia but a nightmare. Chapter 11 by Sune Lægaard contributes further to the normative discussion about migration and multiculturalism and their relationship and interaction. Lægaard argues that multiculturalism and migration are about different things. Migration is about movement of people across borders. It raises political questions about state sovereignty, territorial rights and freedom of movement. Multiculturalism is rather about political measures for handling and accommodating diversity within a given society. It raises political questions about equality, discrimination and integration. Therefore, while there are connections, multiculturalism and migration should be theorised differently and discussed on the basis of different principles and considerations. This distinction between multiculturalism and migration has nevertheless been blurred in recent policy developments. The blurring happens in two opposite directions. The multiculturalism backlash, i.e. the criticism of and hostility towards multiculturalism policies, has been extended to migration: because of hostility to diversity within societies and multiculturalism policies supposed to accommodate this diversity, migration itself has become an object of criticism and hostility. Migration policy has been subordinated to concerns relating to multicultural diversity. Conversely, an analogous migration backlash, i.e. the widespread political unease about migration, has led to increased demands being placed on minorities already present: they are being subjected to harsher integration requirements, lower social benefits and more severe conditions for family-unification and naturalisation. Multiculturalism policies have been subordinated to concerns relating to migration. The chapter identifies the empirical developments leading to these forms of subordination, provides a theoretical account of them, and argues that both forms of subordination are normatively problematic. Following up from these necessary conceptual and empirical distinction, Bouke de Vries (Chapter 12) takes issues with a specific normative problem, notably what kind of cultural rights should temporary migrant workers have. More specifically the chapter asks whether the cultural needs and preferences of temporary migrant workers should be accommodated or even supported by receiving states (‘culture’ is construed broadly so as to include religious needs and preferences). Adopting a liberal perspective, the chapter asks 13

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multicultural governance in a mobile world when, if ever, temporary migrant workers should have access to three kinds of cultural rights: (1) cultural exemptions from laws and working regulations; (2) cultural subsidies; and (3) cultural recognition. Asking this question is important not just to fill a lacuna in the literature on multiculturalism (most of which is concerned with the cultural entitlements of citizens), but also from a practical point of view, as many countries harbour large numbers of temporary migrant workers. Last but not least, Rainer Bauböck turns to the puzzle of democratic representation in mobile societies. He notes that multiculturalism and transnationalism have transformed the traditional assimilationist and statist perspectives of immigrant integration studies. Yet these progressive approaches have not yet fully addressed the new challenges raised by the ‘mobility turn’. In highly mobile societies, the distinctions between the cultural majority and minorities, which are the starting point for multiculturalism, and the distinctions between migrants, receiving and destination societies, which are still maintained in a transnational perspective, become increasingly blurred. Once these categories can no longer be distinguished, the normative case for differentiated multicultural and transnational citizenship becomes weaker too. The chapter identifies three challenges of mobility – representing temporary migrants; bridging cleavages between mobile and sedentary populations; and organising democratic representation in hypermobile societies with sedentary minorities – and seeks to offer plausible normative answers.

References Balint, P. and Guerard de Latour, S. (eds) (2013) Liberal Multiculturalism and the Fair Terms of Integratio, London: Palgrave. Banting, K. and Kymlicka, W. (eds) (2006) Multiculturalism and the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Basok, T. (2007) ‘Canada’s temporary migration program: A model despite flaws’. Available at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/canadas-temporary-migration-program-model-despite-flaws Bauman, Z. (2000) Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press. Biehl, K. S. (2015) ‘Spatializing diversities, diversifying spaces: housing experiences and home space perceptions in a migrant hub of Istanbul’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, 4: 596–607. Boccagni, P. (2015) ‘(Super)diversity and the migration–social work nexus: a new lens on the field of access and inclusion?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, 4: 608–620.

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introduction Castles, S. (2000) ‘International migration at the beginning of the 21st century: global trends and issues’, International Social Science Journal 52, 165: 269–281. Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. (2009) The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World (4th edition), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Dobbernack, J. and Modood, T. (eds) (2013) Tolerance, Intolerance and Respect. Hard to Accept?, London: Palgrave. Faist, T. (2013) ‘The mobility turn: a new paradigm for the social sciences?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36, 11: 1637–1646. Gropas, R., Triandafyllidou, A. and Bartolini, L. (2014) ‘Conceptualising the integration-transnationalism nexus’. ITHACA project paper. Available at: http:// cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/33654 Isaakyan, I. and Triandafyllidou, A. (2014) EU Management of High Skill Migration, Policy Brief, Global Governance Programme, EUI, 2014/4. Khoo, S.-E., Voigt-Graf, C., McDonald, P. and Hugo, G. (2007) ‘Temporary skilled migration to Australia: employers’ perspectives’, International Migration, 45, 4: 175–201. Kymlicka, W. (1995) Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: OUP. Kymlicka, W. (2001) Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, Oxford: OUP. Lenard, P. T. and Straehle, C. (2012) Legislated Inequality: Temporary Labour Migration in Canada, Toronto: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Martin, P. (2006) ‘Managing labor migration: temporary worker programmes for the 21st century’. Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/ turin/Symposium_Turin_files/P07_Martin.pdf Meissner, F. and Vertovec, S. (2015) ‘Comparing super-diversity’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, 4: 541–555. Modood, T. (2005) ‘Remaking multiculturalism after 7/7’, openDemocracy, 29 September. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/556464/Remaking_multiculturalism_after_7_7 Modood, T. (2007) Multiculturalism. A Civic Idea, London: Polity Press. (Second edition 2013.) Modood, T., Triandafyllidou, A. and Zapata Barrero, R. (eds) (2006) Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach, London: Routledge. Padilla, B., Azevedo, J. and Olmos Alcaraz, A. (2015) ‘Superdiversity and conviviality: exploring frameworks for doing ethnography in Southern European intercultural cities’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, 4: 621–635. Parekh, B. (2008) A New Politics of Identity, London: Palgrave. Sassen, S. (2005) ‘The global city. Introducing a concept’, Brown Journal of World Affairs XI, 2: 27–43. Schiller, N. G. and Salazar, N. (2013) ‘Regimes of mobility across the globe’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 39, 2: 183–200. Skeldon, R. (2010), ‘Managing migration for development. Is circular migration the answer?’ Available at: http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/committees/ fccd/Upload/library/skeldon_2010_managing_migration_for_development_-_ is_cm_the_answer_en.pdf

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multicultural governance in a mobile world Trenz, H. J. and Triandafyllidou, A. (2017) ‘Complex and dynamic integration processes in Europe: intra-EU mobility and international migration in times of recession’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43, 4: 546–559. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1251013 (published online 10 November 2016). Triandafyllidou, A. (2009) Managing Migration in the EU: Mobility Partnership and the European Neighbourhood, ELIAMEP Thesis, 1/2009, policy paper available at: www.eliamep.gr/en/ Triandafyllidou, A. (2013a) ‘Circular migration at the periphery of Europe: choice, opportunity or necessity?’, in A. Triandafyllidou (ed.) Circular Migration between Europe and its Neighbourhood. Choice or Necessity?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 212–237. Triandafyllidou, A. (2013b) ‘National identity and diversity: towards plural nationalism’, in J. Dobbernack and T. Modood (eds) Tolerance, Intolerance and Respect. Hard to Accept?, London: Palgrave, pp. 159–186. Triandafyllidou, A. and Bartolini, L. (2015) ‘Irregular employment of migrant workers in Europe’. Paper prepared for the OECD, International Migration Outlook 2017 edition, not published. Triandafyllidou, A. and Gropas, R. (eds) (2014) European Immigration. A Sourcebook, Aldershot: Ashgate. Triandafyllidou, A. and Marchetti, S. (2014) (eds) Employers, Agencies and Immigration. Paying for Care, Aldershot: Ashgate. Triandafyllidou, A., Modood, T. and Meer, N. (eds) (2012) European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Uberoi, V. and Modood, T. (eds) (2014) Multiculturalism Rethought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Vertovec, S. (2006) The Emergence of Super Diversity in Britain, COMPAS Working Paper no. 25, WP-06-25. Vertovec, S. and Wessendorf, S. (eds) (2010) Multiculturalism. A Backlash, London: Routledge. Wimmer, A. and Schiller, N. G. (2003) ‘Methodological nationalism, the social sciences, and the study of migration: an essay in historical epistemology’, International Migration Review 37: 576–610. DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003. tb00151.x.

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Part I What Has Changed?

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1

The Return of the National in a Mobile World Anna Triandafyllidou

1. Introduction Nations today are faced with a new set of social and economic challenges: economic globalisation has intensified, bringing with it a more intense phase of cultural interconnectedness and political interdependence. Globalisation has also further driven and multiplied international flows not only of capitals, goods and services but also of people. National states1 have seen their capacity to govern undermined by these processes. However, in Europe, the nation continues to be a powerful source of identity and legitimacy (rivalled only occasionally by religious allegiance). This chapter offers a reflection on the centrifugal and centripetal forces that challenge the nation today and the kind of analytical tools that we need to connect wider socio-economic transformations with nationalism theories. On one hand, we seem to be witnessing a comeback of nationalism as public and political debates on the Eurozone and current refugee crisis seem to suggest. Governments and many citizens appear to think that re-nationalising control, erecting borders, separating from fellow EU member states will make them more capable of addressing the global challenges of migration, asylum or economic globalisation. On the other hand, we also seem to witness opposing trends. Through the power of information and communication technology we feel now much more related (and are actually more informed) about what is happening in other regions of the world (e.g. the Middle East, among others) and on how this affects our own lives (whether through a refugee surge or through a 19

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part i: what has changed? decrease in oil prices). International terrorism and foreign fighters from European countries joining ISIS over the last two years are one side of this coin, showing how cultural and political globalisation can transfer local integration problems and grievances to link up with international geopolitics breeding transnational extremism. At the same time, the various Indignados and Occupy movements across Europe, youth mobilisation in support of the Arab Spring and Ghezi Park movements, and transnational commemorations of the victims of international terrorism testify to how globalisation can also reinforce transnational solidarity and mobilisation for common transnational causes like peace, equality or democracy. Taking into account these contrasted tendencies and phenomena, this chapter offers an empirical and analytical reflection on how the nation and national identity are challenged by the forces of globalisation and related intensified mobility across national borders and increasing cultural diversity within national borders. I use the term mobility here to speak of the new reality of international migration flows which defy old pathways of post-colonial or periphery-to-thecentre movements and emerge now in multiple directions, including (as I shall outline in section 3) not only migration from developing to developed countries but also migration between developing countries and migration from developed to developing regions. Mobility is a term that encompasses both labour-related migration but also asylum-seeking flows as today it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between people moving in search of better jobs and those who flee persecution – usually people have mixed motivations that are mobilised by the global interconnectedness that globalisation brings. Mobility may be seen as a fluid term and may encompass not only geographical flows but also social or economic flows (e.g. upwards class mobility or de-skilling as downwards professional mobility) (Urry 2002, 2007). I contend that today socio-economic mobility can hardly be independent from territorial movement and hence the term mobility may be more useful than international migration in signalling the fluidity of the flows (which may no longer satisfy the classical international migration definition of crossing an international border and staying at destination for at least twelve months). Indeed mobility is a term that can express better circular migration patterns of different types (see also Marchetti 2013; Triandafyllidou 2013) as well as transnational mobility for instance (Bartolini et al. 2015). 20

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the return of the national in a mobile world This chapter starts by discussing how globalisation creates both heterogeneity and homogeneity, challenges the nation and the national state and leads to a state of constant mobility and uprootedness. Following the arguments of Appadurai and Bauman among others I am considering the fundamental ‘lightness of being’ that liquid modernity creates. This lightness of being, however, concerns mainly those that Bauman called the ‘tourists’ notably the global elites who can take advantage of the physical and virtual mobility that contemporary society offers. However this lightness of being of the ‘tourists’ is challenged by the cultural and economic threat of the ‘vagabonds’, of the losers of globalisation who challenge national borders in search of a better life for themselves and their offspring. My argument here is that increased and diversified international migration, and its particularly fluid form of constant mobility through legal or undocumented means, plays a pivotal role between globalisation and the nation. In other words, globalisation and its socio-economic transformational forces generated intensified and diversified mobility flows. These flows undermine the importance of the national state as a political unit and of the nation as a form of collective identification because of their global and fluid character. However, it is precisely these same flows that create a sense of threat to the nation – both at the political or economic level – a threat of ‘invasion’ – and at the identity and cultural level – a threat of losing one’s ‘authenticity’ or majority culture. These flows thus reinforce a sense of national belonging among citizens. Such forms of national belonging which emerge out of real or perceived interaction with migration, mobility and increased diversity can be better understood in terms of plural versus monist nationalism rather than in terms of ethnic versus civic forms of nationhood, as traditionally has been the case in the nationalism and ethnic studies literature. The chapter is organised as follows. I first briefly review globalisation as a socio-economic phenomenon and the changes it brings at the identity level, leading to what Bauman has termed liquid modernity or what Beck (1992) has called risk society. In section 3 of the chapter I argue however that the increased and diversified types of international migration and mobility that globalisation brings lead to the re-emergence of the nation as a relevant point of reference for identification as well as a relevant political community that can protect people and tame the forces of globalisation. 21

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part i: what has changed? Finally, I turn to the developments of the last couple of decades in Europe with regard to the challenges that migrant communities pose to national majorities. I survey developments in several European countries showing how both increasing cultural and religious diversity resulting from past and more recent international migrations, and intensified intra-EU mobility, are framed as challenges to both the national state and the nation. Answers are not sought to a clash-of-civilisations-type of approach as was perhaps the case in the early 2000s (after 9/11) but rather on a return to the national, both at the political and the identity level. Citizens seek refuge from the social and economic challenges of globalisation and international mobility in the warm embrace of the nation that offers both the promise of political sovereignty and legitimacy and that of a feeling of shared destiny – something that for instance regional formations like the EU cannot offer.

2. Globalisation and social and political challenges to the nation Globalisation is essentially about interconnectedness. More specifically, it ‘refers to the widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnectedness’, and can be described and understood in terms of four socio-spatial dimensions (Held et al. 2003: 67–68): density, referring to the stretching of social, political and economic activities across borders; intensity, the intensification of interconnectedness and of patterns of interaction and flows; velocity, the speeding up of global interactions and processes; and impact, deepening enmeshment of the local and global in ways that local events may affect distant lands.2 Partly at least, interconnectedness is fuelled by the technological advances of the past few decades. Following Castles (2000: 271), we could agree that if transnational flows (of capital, goods, services, people, media images, ideas or pollution) are the keyindicators of globalisation, and transnational networks (of corporations, markets, governments, NGOs, crime syndicates, cultural communities) are its key organising structure, then information and communication technologies are its key tools. Globalisation entails numerous political implications, for it brings a series of challenges to the national state as a politico-territorial form of social organisation. The national state appears to surrender 22

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the return of the national in a mobile world to supranational institutions or private actors while its borders are transcended by multiple flows and networks. Sassen (1996) identified a partial de-nationalisation of national territories and a partial shift of some dimensions of sovereignty, while others remain intact. Especially when it comes to immigration, argues Sassen (ibid.: 59) ‘the national state claims all its old splendour in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders’. While early accounts over-stressed the powerful tendency of globalisation to undermine state sovereignty and erode national borders, more recent approaches underlined the (re-)bordering processes advancing hand-in-hand with globalisation forces (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010). Indeed today in Europe, with the refugee crisis in full swing, we are witnessing a very strong re-bordering process which is putting into question the very European integration process and one of its main achievements notably the Schengen no-internal-border zone. Despite political decisions shaping globalisation, the de facto transfer of the control of national economic policy instruments (monetary policy, interest rates, fiscal policy, etc.) to supranational institutions and the domination of market forces over politics have severe implications for democracy and the legitimacy of governments by popular mandate. At the same time, policies at the national level and beyond are being challenged by transnational social movements such as the recent protest movements of Indignados and Occupy that swept several European countries in 2012– 2013 (Hardt and Negri 2000; Castells 2010b). Indeed exposure to global forces at a time of generalised cuts in public spending deprives states from their earlier function of providing social protection for their citizens, thus further undermining their legitimacy and the appeal of the nation as a main community of belonging. The cultural dimensions of globalisation are complex and multidimensional. The proliferation of electronic digital media and communication tools not only raises a planetary consciousness but also radically transforms the patterns of human interaction and experience of time, space and place (Appadurai 1996; Castells 2010a). It crucially contributes to the instant spread of media images and information across the globe, which not simply brings closer distant places or cultures, but irreversibly distorts distinct cultural forms and conduces to increasing homogenisation under the prevalence and worldwide diffusion of ‘Western’ lifestyles and a global culture of consumerism. 23

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part i: what has changed? Globalisation involves contrasted dynamics in the sphere of culture however. On one hand it creates cultural homogenisation through the increased flows of cultural goods, capitals, media images, and technological applications rendering culture a fluid, fragmented, de-nationalised and de-territorialised category (Appadurai 1996; Bauman 2011). On the other hand, globalisation provokes increased flows of people and hence diversity within societies which then may stimulate identity-related conflicts related to racism, nationalism and religious fundamentalism (Appadurai 1996; Castells 2010b). It has been nearly twenty years since Zygmunt Bauman first theorised on the increased freedom and mobility that characterises late modern and post-industrial, post-Fordist societies, together with pointing to the accelerated anxiety and the existential uncertainty and angst that globalisation brings to citizens (Bauman 1998, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2011). Bauman argued that the present time of ‘liquid modernity’ has melted ‘the bonds which interlock individual choices in collective projects and actions – the patterns of communication and co-ordination between individually conducted life policies on the one hand and political actions of human collectivities on the other’ (2000: 6). The very emancipation of the individual from the forces of nature or religious belief achieved in modernity has entered a new phase, a stage B of modernity argued Bauman. Thus while free individuals in modernity were to use their freedom to find the appropriate niche in which to settle and adopt the rules and modes of conduct identified as appropriate for that location, free individuals today have lost their stable orientation points. We have moved from a national to a post-national or a-national mode of being. While individuals are still dependent effectively on both their subjective freedom (their own imagination and their setting of their own limits) and their objective freedom (their actual capacity to act), they no longer have pre-allocated reference groups (such as those provided by class, kinship, ethnicity, religion, locality). Their point of reference is universal comparison, argues Bauman, generating too many patterns and configurations available to the individual. The responsibility of the pattern-weaving is left entirely on the individual’s shoulders, while patterns of dependency, interaction, cooperation or solidarity have become too volatile for one to rely on them. Indeed globalisation and its socio-economic consequences leave individuals free of communal ties albeit with an ‘unbearable lightness 24

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the return of the national in a mobile world of being’ – to use Milan Kundera’s words. This lightness influences all, but in different ways. There are those who Bauman called the ‘tourists’, notably the global elites who can take advantage of the physical and virtual mobility that globalisation offers. But there are also those who Bauman called the ‘vagabonds’, notably the underprivileged groups, who are forced to move because ‘they find the world within their reach unbearably inhospitable’ (Bauman 1998: 93). Indeed as Bauman argues (1998: 87) there is a global elite of travellers who move ‘sans papiers’ in the sense that border controls and travel restrictions are reduced for them and all they need is their passports, the ‘right’ passports. Further, there is a growing number of ‘sans papiers’ who actually hold the ‘wrong’ passports and are expected to stay put, not taking part in this great new world of mobility. According to Bauman’s argument, global mobility and access to it becomes today a major stratifying factor, while other sources of community, identity and other forms of inclusion/exclusion and equality/ inequality lose their significance. The more systemic perspectives on globalisation and late modernity which point to its cultural and political consequences for the national state, and the closer focus of Bauman on the consequences of globalisation for the individual who becomes uprooted and disengaged, seem to suggest an overall retreat of both the national community and religious affiliation – forces that traditionally tied down individuals to their communities in symbolic affective and ultimately also political and economic ways. It is my contention however that if we look more closely we shall see that this intensified and diversified mobility (and liquidity) situation that globalisation creates, bears with it the seeds of new solidities, the revival of rootedness. Intensified and diversified international migration actually raises important challenges for national states as well as individuals leading the latter to seek protection and anchoring anew in the former rather than becoming either tourists (if elites) or vagabonds (if non-elites). In the next section I will take a closer look at the links between globalisation and international migration to highlight how international migration actually modifies social and economic realities contributing less to a world of vagabonds and tourists and rather more to a world divided in national communities. The beholders of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ passports do share a set of opportunities as well as challenges and perhaps a common fate (of cosmopolitans travelling light, or of 25

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part i: what has changed? marginalised vagabonds) but they are also divided among themselves by precisely their very ‘passports’, which testify to their citizenship and national belonging.

3. Globalisation, international migration and the nation There is today a differentiation of migration as there is a multiplicity of types and forms of migration and a diversity of migratory channels and routes, partly resulting from evolving and fragmented migratory policies implemented by national states. In addition, the migration transition – i.e. the process by which a country shifts from being a country of origin to a country of destination of international migrants – no more follows explicit linear patterns as in the past, and several countries or entire regions emerge at the same time as sending, receiving and transit ones. Moreover, in all major regions one may observe an acceleration of migratory flows. In the past half-century, the numbers of international migrants have surged: from approximately 77 million in 1960 to 155.5 million in 2000, 195.2 million in 2005 to nearly 214 million in 2010 and 232 million in 2013 (United Nations 2016). While, in abstract terms, the root causes of migration remain essentially the same as ever, i.e. economic need, security and better quality-of-life prospects (including a future for one’s offspring), there has been diversification, blurring and overlap of the specific factors fuelling migration on a global scale. The integration of the world economy, the rapid growth of international trade, the progress of digitalised technology are important levers of socioeconomic globalisation which intensify interconnectedness and facilitate the flow of information, goods, services, capital and raw materials. Such developments are drivers of increased international migration. They intensify grievances and opportunities which lead people to seek better living and working opportunities in distant lands while also facilitating transport and communication. In addition, today we speak of mixed motivations of migrants and asylum seekers rather than mixed flows. We have difficulty in clearly distinguishing whether people escape persecution or violence, or whether they search for better work, income and a future for their children or indeed a varied combination of both. This mixity of motivations is particularly acute in the recent refugee crisis in Europe where people flee war in Syria but they also flee 26

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the return of the national in a mobile world continuing unrest and insecurity in Afghanistan, although in theory Afghanistan has in the last few years stabilised both economically and politically. This fluidity of the causes of migration is also evident in intensified population flows from sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria that suffer both from poverty and Boko Haram terrorism. The rise of international migration in the last decades is linked to growing inequalities, but also to the growing interdependence and interconnectedness, economic or otherwise, which the forces of globalisation propel (King 1995; Stalker 2000; Koser 2007; Castles and Miller 2009; Solimano 2010). Indeed the dramatic rise in global inequalities takes place at a time of deepening long-distance ties and of improved infrastructure for mobility and information. Even if information may reach prospective migrants in an often-distorted way, people are increasingly aware of potentially better prospects elsewhere through images transmitted by global media and the internet, but also by those already departed, their stories and visible benefits to relatives left behind, e.g. from remittances and Western-style consumption. Homogenising lifestyles and consumer habits increasingly diffuse a sense of relative deprivation in comparison to ‘Western’ living standards and the possibilities for personal development in the North (Koser 2007; Castles and Miller 2009), thus rendering spatial mobility a generalised means for social mobility (Bommes and Sciortino 2011: 214). Cheap payphone cards, Skype and other ICT tools help people keep in touch while abroad, essentially transforming the figure of the migrant from an uprooted person to a connected one (Diminescu 2008). Established transnational social networks and diaspora communities abroad not only affect migration decisions, but may also assist with movement itself and provide support or employment in destination (Cohen 2008; Vertovec 2009). In addition, advances in transportation have made travel more affordable, bringing distant lands to the reach of more and more people. Indeed, we witness today interesting niche phenomena of migrant transnational mobility – people who travel back and forth between the country of origin and that of destination in pursuit of economic or civic projects (Bartolini et al. 2015). Circular migration is also an interesting phenomenon which may emerge out of choice – for a more flexible lifestyle that allows one to ‘live’ in the home country but ‘work’ at destination (Marchetti 2013), or out of 27

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part i: what has changed? necessity – because people cannot make ends meet either at destination or at origin and hence engage into circular movements being temporarily employed or pursuing some economic activity project (including trade or transport, and different types of work) in one or the other (for more, see Triandafyllidou 2013). In this context of increased and increasingly multi-directional mobility, increased inequality but also increased awareness of opportunities and lifestyles elsewhere, the nation comes under pressure as mobility affects not only migrants themselves but also those who are sedentary, those at destination who receive the newcomers, and those at origin who are left behind. Mobility thus becomes part of the reality of all people, both mobile and sedentary, through what Abdelmalek Sayad (1992) called the paradox of alterity twenty-five years ago: migrants are missing from where they should be (their country of origin) and are present where they should not be (at destination). They thus defy the fundamental principle of the national order notably that territorial and ethnic/cultural boundaries should coincide. It is precisely this challenge to the national order that globalisation and intensified and diversified international mobility create that however has the potential of bringing the nation back in as an important political actor (in the form of the national state) and as a primary source of belonging for individuals. The national state appears as a deus ex macchina or a last resort to tame the forces of economic globalisation through its national policies regarding labour market regulation, welfare provision but also trade regulation and migration management. Recent debates on the refugee crisis and the need to close national borders, or protests against the signature of broad trade agreements (like TTIP) between North America and other world regions are but two expressions of this return to the national as a way of protecting oneself from the forces of globalisation. Similarly protest movements like Indignados, Occupy and similar which have emerged during the global financial crisis and particularly the Eurozone crisis in Southern European countries for instance show that ultimately at times of recession and high unemployment the citizens ask for the national government to protect them from decisions taken elsewhere – in the case of the Eurozone crisis from decisions perceived to be taken in Brussels with the connivance of international (IMF) and European institutions and elites, at the expense of the national citizens. 28

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the return of the national in a mobile world While actually these movements and protests also have a transnational element, in that they are oftentimes connected through social media and may organise simultaneous demonstrations at different places for instance, they remain focused on the national level – seeing the national governments as both the legitimate and capable units to act in their interest/for their protection. The nation is called upon in relation to existential and identity concerns which arise from increased and ever-diversified mobility. European countries are particularly challenged by new migration which adds new layers of cultural and religious diversity: migrant second generations and their quests for recognition and accommodation; new labour migrations from very different parts of the world; increased intra-European mobility; and, on top of this, in the last twenty years international terrorism along religious lines. The difficulty of ensuring social and cultural cohesion, in a deeply liquid economic and employment context, creates important challenges for national identity. On one hand national identity discourses cannot hold to static representations of the nation whether as an ethnic or as a civic, albeit fixed, entity. However, the nation still provides for an important response to the increased diversity and mobility of current times, by offering a social psychological and cultural anchor. The nation responds to the need for a sense of continuity that goes beyond the individual and his/her family and replies to the question of where we come from and what is our destiny by providing a narrative of both common origin and shared fate. This narrative – whether ethnic or civic – has to be a dynamic one that reacts to challenges and incorporates new members responding to the need for a lively and relevant identity under conditions of increased diversity and mobility. In the section which follows I will review the challenges that increased mobility and diversity has posed to Europe and how different European countries have responded to it.

4. Challenges of migration and diversity and the return to the national The societal transformation that Bauman (1998, 2000) and Sennett (1998) were already describing and analysing in the late 1990s have acquired a particular configuration and intensity in Europe in the post-1989 period. The defeat of Communism as a political and 29

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part i: what has changed? economic system has brought with it the reconnection of Europe but has also led to the dominance (if not outright hegemony) of the consumer culture and of the free market economy that Bauman and Sennett among others have critically analysed. Differences between left-wing and right-wing ideologies have thus become rather vague and the citizen has been left to wonder what the alternative is. The EU has offered the institutional framework for the reconnection of Europe overcoming the World War II legacy and Cold War divisions. A notion of European identity and European culture has brought together the different nations of Europe and their minorities, even if this has not happened in a level playing field and nor have cultural hierarchies and closures towards specific minority identities been avoided (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015). It is in this context of enthusiasm for a social, economic and political reconnection of the continent, and a promotion of the EU as a platform that would strengthen European national states economically and geopolitically, and would provide for an additional layer of identity for European nations and their members, that Europe has been faced, over the last fifteen years, with important tensions between national majorities and ethnic or religious minorities. Such conflicts have included violence in Northern England between native British and Asian Muslim youth (2001); civil unrest amongst France’s Muslim Maghreb communities (2005); and the Danish cartoon crisis in 2006 following the publication of pictures of the prophet Muhammad. After 9/11, international terrorism has also entered the picture. Arab and Asian communities have come under intense scrutiny in the wake of the terrorist events in the United States (2001), but also after the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bombings in the summer of 2005. After a period of relative calm, a new wave of terrorist events overtook Europe in 2015–2017 (Paris in January and November 2015, Brussels in March 2016, Nice in June 2016, Berlin and Stockholm in December 2016, and London, Manchester and once again Paris in spring 2017) making citizens feel completely unprotected in the face of what is termed as a ‘liquid threat’. There is indeed growing concern amongst European citizens as to whether migrant integration has failed overall (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010, Triandafyllidou et al. 2012) or whether these events and the rise of international terrorism are rather the outcome of wider geopolitical transformations and conflicts happening elsewhere 30

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the return of the national in a mobile world and particularly in the Middle East (but also in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa). The debate on diversity and migration has been further complicated by the intensification of intra-EU mobility after the 2004 enlargement and also after the 2007 accession of Bulgaria and Romania and the progressive lifting of restrictions in terms of the new member state citizens’ access to the labour markets of the old member states (Trenz and Triandafyllidou 2016). There has been a rising concern that intra-EU migration includes welfare tourism and while it was Nicolas Sarkozy’s government in France in 2009 that provoked widespread condemnation in relation to its (Romanian) Roma expulsion practices, in recent years such debates have been the favourite topic of UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) former leader Nigel Farage (Preston 2015; Marangozov 2016). Thus, what was initially seen as an issue mainly of second-generation migrant youth and of Muslim communities became a wider anxiety that national governments and national majority groups are losing control over their territory, labour market and national identity. Paradoxically in this context the European integration process was seen as one expression of globalisation pressures and of lack of national and hence popular control over important social and economic issues. The debate has been intensive in the media, in political forums as well as in scholarly circles as to what is the way forward for the different European countries. In policy terms, the main conclusion drawn from such debates was that multicultural policies have failed and that a return to a civic assimilation approach (emphasising national culture and values) is desirable. The Netherlands for instance, which has been a forerunner in multicultural policies since the 1980s, has shifted towards a view establishing integration courses for newcomers to the Netherlands and even a civic integration test to be undertaken by prospective migrants before departure from their country of origin (Ter Wal, 2007; Vasta 2007). Indeed this pre-departure ‘integration’ test has been used rather as a cultural profiling of the ‘right’ type of immigrants (applied even to spouses of Dutch nationals), who should come to the Netherlands only if they have the appropriate values or at least can accept the values of the Dutch national majority (Groenendijk 2011). In the face of mounting civil unrest and the social exclusion of second-generation immigrant youth, the French government 31

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part i: what has changed? has reasserted its Republican civic integration model banning religious symbols from schools, in place since 2004 (Guiraudon 2006; Kastoryano 2006), but also today in the face of terrorist attacks since 2015. The Déchéance de Nationalité bill – notably the possibility of stripping terrorism suspects of their nationality if they have another nationality (because they or their parents originate from a different country) – brought for discussion in the National Assembly in February 2016 and eventually rejected, testifies to the crisis of French Republicanism but also to its reassertion of the importance of the nation, national solidarity and national cohesion (Beauchamps 2016). In a similar vein, the far right party Front National has engaged in a patriotic turn in recent years under its new leader, Marine Le Pen, emphasising the importance of love of country and of French habits and values, blending together civic and ethnic elements of French nationhood and excluding both intra-EU mobile citizens and non-EU migrants. Germany, home to one of the largest Turkish (and hence Muslim) immigrant communities in Europe, is a somewhat ambivalent case. On the one hand, politicians officially acknowledged that Germany is an immigration country and a multicultural society making integration the new buzzword; on the other, the restrictive implementation of the liberal citizenship law of 2000 led to a decrease in naturalisations (Green 2005; Schiffauer 2006). After Angela Merkel’s famous declaration in October 2010 that multiculturalism has utterly failed, Germany is seeking to find a ‘third way’ to integration that follows neither the civic assimilation tradition with no religion in public life model of France nor the multiculturalism model of the Netherlands which is perceived to have led in ‘parallel societies’. And while Germans of Turkish origin are increasingly integrated in public and political life as prominent figures, thus testifying to the civic turn of the German concept of the nation, Germany has rediscovered a sense of an ethnic national pride after having elaborated the Holocaust legacy. These contrasting tendencies are best epitomised in the fault line that divides ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ Laender not only as regards unemployment or productivity levels but also in relation to voting preferences and the resurgence in the eastern Laender of strong, radical rightwing nationalism movements such as Pegida (Sorg 2015). Here too while the ‘problem’ of diversity is oftentimes defined as one of religious faith, notably Islam, rather than ethnicity or nationality (see 32

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the return of the national in a mobile world Yurdakul 2009), the answer to the problem emerges at a nationalist rather than religious level. The emphasis is on German origin rather than Christian faith. Britain is perhaps the only European country (along with Sweden) which has maintained in practice (even if it changed the terminology used) a political multiculturalism approach (O’Toole et al. 2013). Concerns for cohesion, however, and an underlying need to retrieve an inclusive understanding of Britishness – particularly in the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings – have led recent governments to introduce a ‘Life in the United Kingdom test’ (a civic integration test) and civic ceremonies (Meer and Modood 2008). Interestingly when David Cameron spoke of muscular liberalism as an antidote to the state multiculturalism that has eroded social cohesion and British values (in February 2011), the Labour Party’s then-opposition leader, Ed Milliband, responded with his speech in October 2012 on ‘One Nation’. Indeed, while tensions were here again portrayed as mostly religious rather than ethnic (see also Modood 2013) the emphasis has been on Britain as a multinational state, a civic container of cultural and religious diversity that should provide the answer to these diversity challenges while also guaranteeing for the security of the citizens. At the same time intra-EU mobility has provided for a convenient vehicle on which to channel public discontent about increasing inequality, austerity and ‘liquid’ livelihoods. ‘Taking back control’ at the national level – the main slogan and actually the main motivation for voting for Brexit – exemplifies precisely this return to the national as a source of economic and identity security. Within this tense context, the rise of international terrorism and particularly events taking place in European capitals and major cities have sent shock waves across the continent. Debates on the social integration of migrants and the accommodation of cultural and religious diversity have been tainted with a strong element of (in)security. While the broad media and political debate has distinguished between European Muslims who are peaceful and law abiding and jihadist terrorism, the already strong turn away from multicultural citizenship to civic integration (registered already since the early 2000s in several European countries including the Netherlands and Denmark but also France, Italy and Germany) has further intensified. Greater emphasis has been given to the fact that migrants and ethnic minorities should subscribe to an ‘integration contract’ 33

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part i: what has changed? where they agree and commit to abide by the civic and political values of the host society while keeping their religious and cultural specificities for their private lives and/or to the extent that they do not conflict with the dominant civic culture of the host country. Such approaches have actually argued that previous multicultural citizenship concepts (Modood 2013) were too flexible, too open to the cultural and religious claims of the newcomers to the point of eroding national identity, cohesion and ultimately also security. The strategy for returning to safety and security – both actual and identity-related – has been to return to the national (state) framework and re-emphasise that need for national controls at borders, even in the economy (as the scepticism towards the Euro and the overall EU integration project testifies) and the need to clarify what national identity is about and who can and cannot fit within it. The multiculturalism and international terrorism crisis has of course also affected Southern Europe, the so called ‘new’ hosts of immigration, notably Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. The multiculturalism crisis came at a time when these countries had just started to acknowledge their de facto multicultural and multiethnic composition. However, the perceived failure of the cultural diversity approach adopted by the ‘old hosts’ discouraged multicultural integration policies in Southern Europe, reinforcing the view that immigration may be economically a good thing provided that immigrants become assimilated into the dominant national culture (Triandafyllidou 2002; Calavita 2005; Zapata-Barrero 2006). In addition these countries have been faced with a severe economic crisis that has further reinforced a quest of citizens for national state protection in terms of cuts in welfare, steeply rising unemployment and poverty that was perceived as being imposed from abroad, from the European institutions and the IMF (Triandafyllidou et al. 2013). The case of Greece is of particular interest here as the country has found itself in the eye of the storm both as regards the Eurozone crisis and the recent refugee crisis, even though Greece has not suffered any international terrorism events of a religious matrix. Greece, until the 1990s a largely ethnically homogenous country which in addition professed a strong ethnic nationalism narrative (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002), has experienced an increasing immigrant and particularly Asian asylum-seeking and 34

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the return of the national in a mobile world irregular migrant population, which was, however, largely invisible until the last few years. The vast majority of Muslim immigrants in Greece were in fact of Albanian origin during the 1990s and early 2000s, and hence not practising Muslims, raising no claims for mosques, headscarves or religious education. The Southeast Asian immigrants who had arrived in Greece during the last two decades were also mainly male workers who had left their families back home in Pakistan or Bangladesh. Hence there were no challenges of integration of Muslim children in schools, and hardly any women wearing the veil (hijab), let alone the niqab or burka, in public places (Lazarescu and Broersma 2010). In the early 2010s, however, the situation changed as Islamophobia gave a good moral and political argument – notably that these new migrants are incompatible with Greek/Western culture and religion – for excluding Asian and sub-Saharan African migrants. Thus what was fundamentally a socio-economic or humanitarian issue turned into a question of culture and religion and favouring the emergence of a nationalist intolerance towards cultural and religious diversity (Triandafyllidou and Kouki 2013). The experience of Central Eastern European countries with regard to immigration, however, has been different from that of both Northern and Southern Europe. These countries joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 and have had to adopt, among other measures, specific policies protecting native minority rights in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria for accession. At the same time, they have had to adopt migration policies that are geared towards securing the external EU borders disregarding regional specificities of crossborder trade and labour mobility. The 2004 member states do not face a serious challenge of incoming migration; hence migrant integration is not a prominent issue on their agendas. Rather, their concern is with emigration of their nationals towards other member states. However, the EU migration policy emphasis on border control contributes to making these countries reluctant to address cultural diversity issues. Thus, while the rights of native minorities are guaranteed, there are no provisions for integrating newcomers under similar conditions of tolerance and/or respect (Buchowski et al. 2010; Fox et al. 2010). Thus, there is a clear division between cultural diversity which is considered to belong to these countries in historic terms and ‘alien’/foreign cultural diversity. Indeed, the absence of any reflection on immigration and the imposed 35

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part i: what has changed? adoption of EU migration and asylum legislation has left Central Eastern Europe completely unprepared to face cultural or religious diversity challenges and/or to rethink of themselves as immigrant hosts rather than origin countries. This has become all the more prominent in the current refugee crisis where, for example, the predominant Hungarian response has been that ‘Hungary is an ethnically homogenous country’, it is not ‘accustomed to migrants and cultural diversity’ and therefore it should stay that way.

Concluding remarks UN data (2016) suggest that today people migrate more than before and most importantly in hitherto unexplored trajectories. Post-colonial relations and previously existing migration systems are less influential in shaping people’s mobility projects. The development of information and communication technologies and faster and cheaper transport have brought the different world regions closer to one another, even though socio-economic inequalities both within and among countries and world regions have increased. This landscape of increased and multi-directional mobility affects not only migrants themselves but also those who are sedentary, those at destination who receive the newcomers, and those at origin who are left behind. Mobility thus becomes part of the reality of all people, both mobile and sedentary, through what twenty-five years ago Abdelmalek Sayad called the paradox of alterity: migrants are missing from where they should be (their country of origin) and are present where they should not be (at destination). They thus defy the fundamental principle of the national order, notably that territorial and ethnic/cultural boundaries should coincide. It may seem paradoxical that within this context of intensified communication, higher mobility and increased interdependence, national identity remains the most pertinent form of political affiliation, a primary identity that indeed, if necessary, overrides all others. This chapter has delved into this paradox arguing that it is precisely because the word is more mobile, more uncertain and more interconnected, it is because we live in a world of liquid modernity (Bauman 2000), of liquid jobs and liquid threats, that we are witnessing a return to the national. Even in the face of religiously inspired terrorism, answers are not sought in transnational 36

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the return of the national in a mobile world frameworks nor by reference to religion. It is the national state that has to ‘take back control’ and protect the citizens. Indeed the feeling of threat has culminated in Europe in the last couple of years both in relation to the refugee emergency and to the rise of international terrorism. In contrast to discourses in the 1990s about the clash of civilisations between West/Christianity and East/Islam (Huntington 1993), or the confidence in the 2000s that EU integration (including free mobility and a common currency) would provide the necessary buffer to transnational challenges, today responses emerge at the national level, with the rise of populist parties that evoke a sense of patriotism and of national sovereignty. As this chapter illustrates, the nation re-emerges with increased emphasis as the last bastion for national protection from an uncertain and insecure world where immigration is too intensive, cultural diversity challenges impossible to manage and decisions are taken behind closed doors with the simple citizen unable to have a say. At these times of crisis in Europe citizens rediscover the ‘old solidity’ of the national state and the nation as their main point of political and cultural reference; even if they recognise that cultural and religious diversity is by now an inherent feature of European societies, they ask for governments to provide for national solutions to transnational challenges.

Notes 1. The term national states is used instead of nation states to denote that most states are usually characterised by a dominant (numerically and politically) national community that thinks of itself as the owner of the state and several minority or migrant groups. 2. The discussion on globalisation builds on Hatziprokopiou and Triandafyllidou (2013), ‘Governing irregular migration at the age of globalisation. States, actors and intermediaries’, IRMA Research Project, Concept Paper, available at: http://irma.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/IRMA-Concept-PaperEN.pdf (last accessed on 24 July 2015).

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part i: what has changed? Sassen, S. (1996) Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization, New York: Columbia University Press. Sayad, A. (1992) Immigration ou les paradoxes de l’alterité, Paris: Seuil. Schiffauer, W. (2006) ‘Enemies within the gates – the debate about the citizenship of Muslims in Germany’, in T. Modood, A. Triandafyllidou and R. Zapata-Barrero (eds) Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach, London: Routledge. Sennett, R. (1998) The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism, Boston, MA: W. W. Norton and Company. Solimano, A. (2010) International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sorg, C. (2015) ‘PEGIDA: a post-Nazist uprising?’, openDemocracy, 26 March 2015. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/ christoph-sorg/pegida-postnazist-uprising (last accessed 20 December 2016). Stalker, P. (2000) Workers Without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalization on International Migration, Geneva: ILO. Ter Wal, J. (2007) ‘The Netherlands’, in A. Triandafyllidou and R. Gropas (eds) European Immigration: A Sourcebook, Ashgate: Aldershot. Trenz, H. J. and Triandafyllidou, A. (2016) Complex and dynamic integration processes in Europe: intra-EU mobility and international migration in times of recession’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, published onlinie on 10 November 2016. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1251013 Triandafyllidou, A. (2002) ‘Religious diversity and multiculturalism in Southern Europe: The Italian mosque debate’. Available at: http://www.socresonline. org.uk/7/1/ triandafyllidou.html Triandafyllidou, A. (ed.) (2013) Circular Migration between Europe and its Neighbourhood. Choice or Necessity?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Triandafyllidou, A. and Gropas, R. (2015) What is Europe, London: Palgrave. Triandafyllidou, A. and Kouki, H. (2013) ‘Muslim immigrants and the Greek nation: the emergence of nationalist intolerance’, Ethnicities 13, 6: 709–728. First published online on 22 April 2013. DOI: 10.1177/1468796813483287. Triandafyllidou, A. and Veikou, M. (2002) ‘The hierarchy of Greekness’, Ethnicities 2, 2: 189–208. Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R. and Kouki, H. (eds) (2013) The Greek Crisis and European Modernity, London: Palgrave. Triandafyllidou, A., Modood, T. and Meer, N. (eds) (2012) European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. United Nations (2016) International Migration Report: Highlights. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/ migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015_Highlights.pdf (last accessed 20 December 2016). Urry, J. (2002), ‘Mobility and proximity’, Sociology May (36): 255–274. Urry, J. (2007) Mobilities, Cambridge: Polity Press. Vasta, E. (2007) ‘From ethnic minorities to ethnic majority policy? Multiculturalism and the shift to assimilationism in the Netherlands’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, 5: 713–741.

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the return of the national in a mobile world Vertovec, S. (2006) The Emergence of Super Diversity in Britain, COMPAS Working Paper no. 25, WP-06-25. Vertovec, S. (2009) Transnationalism, London: Routledge. Vertovec, S. and Wessenderof, S. (eds) (2010) The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices, London: Routledge. Yurdakul, G. (2009) From Guest Workers into Muslims. The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Zapata-Barrero, R. (2006) ‘The Muslim community and Spanish tradition: Maurophobia as a fact, and impartiality as a desideratum’, in T. Modood, A. Triandafyllidou and R. Zapata-Barrero (eds) Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach, London: Routledge.

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2

Reimagining the Nation, Migration and Citizenship: The Role of Cultural Institutions and New Institutional Responses Peggy Levitt

1. Introduction During the summer of 2016, musician Paul Simon sat down with a writer from The New Yorker magazine to talk about craft. He described the session in which he recorded his Grammy-winning album, Graceland. The day before, an accordionist and percussionist had laid down a track. Although he liked the drum line, he did not like what the accordionist had done, so he asked a guitarist to take another pass. The guitarist said that the drum solo reminded him of American country music (which is why, Simon remarks, that he probably liked it too). As the guitarist began to play, he suddenly switched from a major to a minor chord, a move that, according to Simon, is very rare in South African music. ‘Why did you do that?’ Simon asked. Because he had heard Simon play those chords before, he replied. ‘So here’s Ray’, recalls Simon, ‘who is playing what he thinks is American country and adding a chord structure that he knows from my music to a beat that came from an accordion track that has nothing to do with this and then when he gets to the chorus he goes into a kind of African blues . . . so what we have here really is world music, it’s really people doing what they heard and vaguely remember and trying to imitate what it was’ (The New Yorker 2016). I begin this meditation on cultural pluralism in our mobile world with this anecdote because it speaks to the part of our scholarly conversation that so often gets left out. The fact that culture migrates along with people to produce world music, world 42

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reimagining the nation literature and the like means that culture both reflects and is part of the toolkit we have to respond to the fundamental changes in social and political life that migration brings about. The move from national music to world music or, more generally, from national culture to global culture mirrors and contributes to an understanding of the world as a place, where by choice or by force, with great success or great struggle, permanent impermanence is the rule rather than the exception. If the object of this volume is to reconsider citizenship, integration and diversity in this context, then we need to understand how and where it becomes possible to imagine these categories differently. We also need to understand how and where we create different kinds of social institutions which better reflect this changing world on the move.

2. Permanent impermanence The world is in the throes of a terrible refugee crisis. According to the UNHCR (2015), in 2014 there were almost sixty million refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) around the globe – approximately one in every 122 people. That is roughly the equivalent of all Italians being forced to leave their homes. It does not include the many Syrian refugees who flee each day (UNIS 2014). Forced migration is just one category of movement on the rise. In 2014, William Swing, Director General of the International Organization for Migration, reported that in addition to the 214 million international migrants, there are an estimated 740 million internal migrants (IOM 2015). That means that nearly one billion people (or roughly one out of every seven people) are moving within or beyond their nations, either voluntarily or by force. These individuals are increasingly moving within the global south. When they do move north or westward, they encounter countries in demographic decline, where the numbers of retired workers in need of care and a pension are greater than the working-aged population, and where large numbers of redundant workers cannot find wellpaying, steady employment at the same time that social welfare entitlements are shrinking. Many of these migrants continue to remain active in the economics, politics and social life of their homelands. They vote, invest in businesses and participate in civic associations in their countriesof-origin at the same time that they buy homes, open stores and 43

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part i: what has changed? join community groups in the places where they settle. For some migrants, living across borders comes easily. They have the education, skills and social contacts to take advantage of opportunities anywhere. Many more are forced into transnational lives because they cannot gain a secure foothold back home or where they move. These dynamics challenge long-standing assumptions about how people live – how and where they raise their families; how livelihoods are earned; how race, class and gender are constituted; and where the rights and responsibilities of citizenship get fulfilled. But most people still believe, and most social welfare institutions are still organized, as if the nation-state is the logical container within which social life is organised. They take stasis, rootedness and citizenship as the ultimate goal for granted while, as the chapters in this volume demonstrate, more and more people are longterm residents without full rights. Increasingly, the social contract between state and citizen is national, but people’s lives are not. So how, where and for whom is the cultural work being done that allows us to understand the world differently – to shift our understanding from permanent settlement and integration into bounded nation states to one in which mobile people, with varying levels of membership in and protection by home, host and supranational institutions, identify with several places at once? Who are the new winners and losers in this changing panorama? In the first part of this chapter, I explore how one type of cultural institution – museums – are responding to immigration and globalisation around the world. I ask if and how they are changing notions of citizenship, nationhood and pluralism. The second half of the chapter looks at new forms of transnational social protection that are arising in response to heightened mobility and permanent impermanence.

3. Museums and the cosmopolitan-national continuum Benedict Anderson (1983) described nations as imagined political communities, based on ‘a deep, horizontal comradeship:’ a ‘fraternity’ that is so compelling it can inspire members to die for its cause. Culture plays a starring role in his argument. Along with capitalism, print technologies and vernacular languages, he also credits museums with creating nations and national citizens by forging unified ‘teams’ out of millions of people who recognise themselves in the shared customs, knowledge and traditions on display. 44

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reimagining the nation But, in today’s global, mobile world, what kinds of citizens are museums creating? Under what conditions do they help visitors imagine a different kind of nation and different kinds of social relations both within and beyond national borders? To find answers, I visited museums in Europe, the United States, Asia and the Middle East (Levitt 2015).1 I talked with museum directors, curators and policymakers about current and future exhibitions and collected their stories about the paintings, iconic objects and benefactors that define their collections. In the United States, I compare museums in allegedly parochial Boston with their counterparts in the so-called centre of the national cultural universe, New York. In Europe, I focus on Copenhagen, Gothenburg and Stockholm, former bastions of tolerance which have become, to varying degrees, hotbeds of anti-immigrant sentiment. I then ask if museums in Singapore and Doha create Asian or Muslim global citizens. How does the tension between globalism and nationalism play out outside the West? No museum I visited told an entirely national or global story. Instead, the nation always reared its head in depictions of the cosmopolitan, and cosmopolitanism always came with something of the national. Rather than seeing these as competing, I think of cultural institutions as falling along a continuum of cosmopolitannationalism whose two constantly changing parts mutually inform and transform each other. Not surprisingly, the variations I discovered in how museums combine national and global citizenship creation have to do with their histories, funding, collections and their curatorial expertise. They have to do with whether they are public or privately funded and with their scope – whether they began life as museums of art or artefacts collected by colonisers to display their superior power. But they also have to do with: (1) a city’s cultural armature and, in particular, its diversity management regime; (2) its position in the global cultural hierarchy and, therefore, how much it influences and is influenced by global museum assemblages; and (3) where the nation is in the arc of its nation-building and world-claiming projects. Let me discuss each in turn. Where museums stood on the cosmopolitan-nationalism continuum was, in part, determined by its city’s cultural armature – the social and cultural policies in place, its history, and the character and values undergirding its long-standing institutions. This armature 45

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part i: what has changed? reflects deep cultural structures – how old ways of thinking and doing still leave their traces in the bricks and mortar of today. For example, deeply held convictions about community, equality or the collective good do not disappear but continuously echo in the ways museums operate. They continue to influence what is displayed and what is invisible, what is spoken about and what is silenced. A key piece of this cultural armature is the urban and national diversity management regime (which are not always the same). By that I mean, if and how diversity gets talked about; the categories, labels and metrics used to discuss and regulate it; whether diversity and immigration are seen as opportunities or problems; and what policies are put in place to enhance or remediate it as a result. These strategies and the values they reflect strongly affect what cultural institutions do. For example, in the United States many people claim a hyphenated identity (i.e. Chinese-American, IndianAmerican, etc). Embracing their Irish, Indian or Chinese ancestry does not discount the American side of their attachment. In fact, some argue that that is what it means to be an American. This ability to openly declare one’s ancestry, and the belief that it empowers rather than marginalises the individual and group, is mirrored in the cultural institutional landscape. The Museum of the American Indian, the National Museum of African American History, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the National Museum of Women in the Arts, are all institutions on the National Mall in Washington, DC which tell a specific group’s story. They are represented but set apart – a separate but equal strategy that can let encyclopaedic institutions off the hook because the Native American or African American story is ‘already taken care of’. In contrast, the same labels that are believed to encourage inclusion in the US context are seen as socially marginalising in Scandinavia. Few people would publically identify as an Iraqi-Dane or a Pakistani-Swede because these labels, rather than empowering, are seen as limiting social mobility and integration. Therefore, few museums in the region are dedicated to the experiences of particular groups and issues of ethnic and racial diversity are seldom highlighted. A second factor influencing how cultural institutions create national and global citizens is a city’s position in the global cultural hierarchy. Just as countries are ranked politically and economically, so they are ranked culturally. More and more, forces at work 46

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reimagining the nation beyond national borders shape the objects that museums put on display, the administrators and curators who make these choices, the strategies and techniques they use, and the visitors crossing their thresholds. The position and strength of a city’s embeddedness within this transnational social field affects how much it influences and is influenced by what I call global museum assemblages. Assemblages are clusters of people, technology, objects and knowledge, which circulate through the social fields that museums inhabit, coming together in different constellations depending on where they land. These assemblages include changing repertoires of displaying, seeing, educating and organizing objects that are vernacularised differently depending upon where they land. The Masters Degree in Fine Arts, Museum Education or Curatorial Studies programmes offered around the world are part of this assemblage. It is constituted by the gift shops, gourmet restaurants and blockbuster exhibits that are now a standard part of the museum visit. It seeps into the stone of iconic museum buildings, designed by a select group of ‘starchitects’ whose work features prominently on many continents. It is regulated by institutions of global governance, like the International Council of Museums. A transnational class of museum directors, administrators, curators and educators, some of whom circulate regionally, if not globally, form part of these assemblages but also carry pieces of it in their laptops, suitcases and portfolios each time they move from post to post. Finally, where museums fall on the cosmopolitan-nationalism continuum is influenced by how cities and nations understand their historical position on the global stage and what their aspirations are for the future. How far a nation is along the road to consolidation and towards achieving its goals for regional and/or global prominence also strongly affects what its cultural institutions display. Let me try to make this more concrete by offering a few brief examples. The Swedish museums I studied were the farthest towards the cosmopolitan side of the cosmopolitan-nationalism continuum. This was because Sweden has historically played a more prominent regional role than Denmark and has seen itself, and its social welfare system, as a moral example for the rest of the world. Former Prime Minister Olaf Palme proclaimed long ago that solidarity does not stop at national borders. But embracing the global is also a way for Swedish museums to sidestep the national. Putting the nation on display would force Sweden to deal with events in its 47

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part i: what has changed? history it would rather ignore, such as its activities during World War II, its eugenic experiments, and its treatment of the Sami. The nation’s internal diversity is also only quietly showcased because the national diversity management regime holds that ethnic and racial labels lead to greater social exclusion. New York’s museums were more likely to highlight internal diversity and, increasingly so, because of the growing recognition that the people inside museums do not look enough like the people outside them. In fact, several museums, like El Museo del Barrio in Manhattan, are dedicated to the experiences of particular groups. At the Queens Museum the immigrant experience is also front and centre. The former director, Tom Finkelpearl, who is now the Commissioner of Cultural Affairs for New York City, believed that just as libraries provide resources to their users, museums should too. The museum offers English language classes, programmes for autistic children and film showings for the LGBTQ community, and will soon house a branch of the Queens Public Library. The Queens Museum also forges relationships with the artistic and cultural communities from which its potential visitors come. One project involved an Ecuadoran artist who made an installation working with Ecuadoran truck drivers who park nearby. Since many were undocumented and could not visit their families, she helped them write ‘video letters’ to send home, which the museum then showed publicly. Thus began a series of curatorial exchanges, artistic projects and public programmes. ‘I always joke’, said Prerana Reddy, Director of Public Programs, ‘that there might be more people in Ecuador who know about this museum than there are in Brooklyn.’ Museums in New York, however, while more cosmopolitanoriented than their Boston counterparts, are not as global as their Swedish counterparts. In the nineteenth century, New Yorkers believed it was their God-given right to become the cultural capital of the world, just as it was the nation’s manifest destiny to expand westward. Political hubris and cultural hubris go hand and hand. Because of its prominent economic and political status, many Americans came to equate globalisation with Americanisation – the world should come to the US rather than the other way around. In most museum narratives in the Northeastern US, therefore, the national, rather than the global, lay at the heart of the story. Finally, in Doha, where twelve to sixteen museums were on the drawing board as I did my fieldwork, all museums tell a national 48

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reimagining the nation and global story at the same time. The Museum of Islamic Art, for example, says to Qataris that they are part of a deep, rich culture that extends back centuries and across continents. It also tells visiting tourists and businesspeople that this is an important country, capable of creating a world-class museum, in a world-class building, with a world-class collection of Islamic art. It is a country that is cosmopolitan on its own terms, taking what is culturally compatible with Islam from the West, such as tolerance, critical thinking and creativity, and rejecting human rights and gender equality, which go against the national grain. In this context, however, citizenship means everything and nothing. Qatari citizens, who make up only about 12 per cent of the country’s residents, are entitled to free education, land and an estimated income of US$87,000 per year. They do not pay taxes. Noncitizens fall into two broad camps: elite professionals brought in to help Qatar realise its social and economic vision, and the hundreds of thousands of construction workers, taxi drivers, nannies and maids that build and staff it (Human Rights Watch 2008; Fromherz 2011; Kamrava 2013). Non-citizens enjoy few rights and protections; many work under difficult, if not deplorable, conditions. So while citizenship means everything, it also means very little – theoretical displays of citizenship are far removed from its actual exercise. In sum, the ways in which museums in New York, Stockholm and Doha displayed the internal diversity of the nation and its place in the world varied, in part, because of the cultural armature of each city, its position in the world’s cultural ranking, and its nation-building and world-claiming stage. To be sure, what happens inside museums is not going to solve the problems of unequal political membership and voice. But museums, and cultural institutions in general, can aid the struggle. They can shift how people understand different forms of citizenship, help them embrace their rights and responsibilities to both national and global communities, and showcase the permanently impermanent who are too often invisible. They can provide spaces for finding common ground, for renegotiating the national self-portrait and for convening difficult conversations. Indeed, it is their responsibility to do so. But what next? Once we understand that nations are transnationally constituted and that permanent settlement with full rights is increasingly uncommon, how and where do we go from here? 49

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part i: what has changed?

4. Transnational social protection Imagine the following: an undocumented Mexican migrant in Denver, Colorado, unable to access the US healthcare system takes her child to the Mexican consulate in Denver to be vaccinated so she can enrol in a US public school. A young German family, struggling to care for elderly grandparents given the retrenchment of state-supported welfare, hires a low-wage Filipino migrant to provide elder care in their home. The Filipino migrant in turn sends her wages back to the Philippines to protect and provide for her family in the spaces where the Filipino state’s welfare programmes fall short. An Indonesian construction worker in Australia cannot access social security or public health services while in Australia, although he receives the portion he was required to pay into the system when he returns home. The dilemmas raised by these vignettes are also produced by a world on the move. They hint at the ways in which mobile families, with all combinations of full and partial membership, piece together social protections by using resources from multiple levels and sites of governance. In this next section, I suggest a framework for conceptualising and mapping these arrangements. I draw on work I’m doing in partnership with my colleagues at the Transnational Studies Initiative at Harvard University (Levitt et al. 2016).2 Our work focuses on how people on the move (whether they be documented or undocumented, voluntary or forced, permanent, short-term/seasonal, or circulating) are protected and provided for. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) designates the following categories as basic ‘social protections’ to which all should have access: pensions, unemployment insurance, survivor benefits, disability, family and child care, health, job training, and housing. To these, we add education to capture the growing number of bi-national teacher training, student retention, and reciprocal credentialing schemes being put in place. We also add, under the category of labour, the efforts of states and NGOs, such as unions, to protect worker safety and guarantee certain basic rights. We identify four possible sources of protection. States provide social protections through a range of institutions that operate subnationally, nationally or supranationally. Markets provide social protections such as private health insurance or contracted childcare 50

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reimagining the nation to those who can afford them. Third sector organizations, including NGOs, church groups, and labor unions, often provide low-cost protections including healthcare, employment training, education, housing, and more. Individual social ties include networks of family, friends, neighbours, co-workers and others upon whom individuals call to help with housing, childcare or finding work. We define ‘transnational social protection’ as the policies, programms, people, organisations and institutions that provide for and protect programmes in the above areas in a transnational manner. Our main focus is on social protections for mobile individuals, but non-migrants and refugees also benefit from these policies and programmes. We include grounded actors that provide for and protect people who move transnationally, transnational actors that provide for and protect grounded individuals, and transnational actors that provide for and protect transnational individuals. Migrants clearly move between spaces where the strength and breadth of the state and the footprint of the rule of law varies considerably. In countries in the global north, there is likely to be some kind of state-provided social safety net for citizens and documented migrants, although we are witnessing a period of serious cutbacks and these vary considerably in different sub-national jurisdictions (Bossert 1998; Holzmann et al. 2005; Avato et al. 2010). In the global south, where the state is often weaker, underfunded or effectively non-existent, and the rule of law only weakly established, NGOs and individual and community social networks are likely to be the primary sources of social protection. In fact, it is non-migrants in Ghana who often help their relatives through economic downturns in the Netherlands by providing financial support (Mazzucato 2011). There are also increasing numbers of examples where sending states step in to care for emigrants by providing services they cannot access in their countries of settlement. For example, as described earlier, the Mexican government offers healthcare to emigrants who cannot afford to purchase it at mobile clinics located in its consular offices. We suggest the concept of a ‘resource environment’ to help scholars map, analyse and understand the rapidly transforming world of transnational social protections (TSP) and how access to TSP varies over time, through space and across individuals. An individual’s resource environment is constituted from a combination of all the possible protections available to him or her from our 51

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part i: what has changed? four potential sources (states, markets, ‘third sector’, and social networks). The cluster of protections that is ultimately available depends upon the nature of the market, the strength and capacity of sending and receiving states, the third sector organisational ecology (i.e. the number and types of organisations, what they do, and their capacity to provide), and the characteristics of individual migrants and their families. An individual’s resource environment may change as they move across different sub-state or state environments, as their legal or economic status changes, and as their social networks transform. While the logic of coverage in receiving states tends to be administered and regulated at the nation level, in many countries, particularly those with highly decentralised political systems, access and benefits vary considerably across states and regions. In the US and in Spain, for example, sub-national and local jurisdictions have a great deal of discretion with respect to migrant coverage (Dobbs and Levitt 2016). Migrants’ access to public systems of health insurance and healthcare provision, schooling, social welfare and pensions largely depends on place of residence and legal status. Therefore an undocumented Mexican migrant from Puebla who settles in New York City will have access to a package of resources and benefits based on what he/she is eligible for in his/her village of birth, as a resident of the state of Puebla and as a Mexican national, as well as the services offered by New York City, New York State and the US. His or her resource environment will differ markedly from a similarly undocumented Mexican counterpart from Zacatecas who moves to Los Angeles, because the services provided at each level of governance, in each country, are not equal (Dobbs and Levitt 2016). Furthermore, a Mexican immigrant with similar levels of education, skills and language capabilities who moves to Wyoming faces a different set of challenges. As I already noted, her resource environment will differ because of the very different US and Mexican federal, state and city-level government benefits provided to immigrants and non-migrants. But it will also differ because the third sector is much more developed in Los Angeles and New York than it is in a new destination such as Wyoming. The strength of the labour market in each locale will also be different, such that varying numbers and types of employers will be more or less amenable to hiring undocumented workers and to offering benefits. 52

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reimagining the nation Finally, that migrants would be more visible in Wyoming than in New York City or Los Angeles, for example, may make it more dangerous for them to access resources even when they are available (Schmalzbauer 2014). Let me now offer several illustrations to make these ideas clearer. Consider the resource environment of a female collegeeducated, employed Swedish citizen residing in Sweden. This particular individual has access to a wide array of social protections from the state, including affordable childcare, paid parental leave, excellent schools, old age pensions, and so on. Given her education and employment, she is also probably in a position to buy additional protections from companies in the private market, to access benefits from third sector organisations, and to avail herself of supports provided by family and friends. Her resource environment is largely found within her nation state, and she has little difficulty meeting her needs, even in emergency situations or medical crises. Now let’s compare the resource environment of a similar female college-educated, employed US citizen residing in the US. The resources available from the state have shrunk in comparison to Sweden and the market becomes a bigger factor in covering needed protections, precisely because the state is a less important provider and protector than in Sweden and because this individual can afford to purchase care from the private market. This individual is also able to secure support from the third sector and from personal social ties. For example, when an elderly parent becomes ill and homebound, this person can rely on the state’s Medicare programme to cover health costs, she may purchase additional pharmaceutical insurance coverage from the market, and she may also access not-for-profit organisations working with the elderly to support her parents with home visits and other forms of emotional assistance. If we were next to imagine the resource environment of a female US citizen living below the poverty line, her resource environment would again differ. In this case, the state would offer additional (means-tested) social protections, while the market would offer fewer. Instead, she would most likely rely on social protections provided by third sector actors (humanitarian NGOs, food banks, charitable organisations, etc.) and on informal social support from social networks of friends, family members, neighbours and co-workers. 53

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part i: what has changed? What motivates this research agenda is that, more and more, each of the four sources of protection, which constitute resource environments, cross borders. Now let’s imagine a female Mexican citizen who currently lives in Los Angeles without documentation from the US government. She works in the informal economy, cleaning houses and preparing traditional Mexican foods to sell to Mexican construction workers at their work sites. Due to her undocumented status, she has no access to social protection provided by the US federal government, nor does she make enough money to purchase protections from the US market. California, however, along with Hawaii, Washington, New York and Minnesota, offers public benefits to ‘non-qualified’ (as determined by federal law) immigrants (Fortuny and Chaudry 2011). It stands out as the US state which has moved most aggressively to extend publicly funded health coverage to immigrants with and without documents. Therefore, our hypothetical individual can apply for Covered California, a publicly subsidised, state-backed healthcare programme. Although undocumented immigrants are technically ineligible for this programme, the application process may determine that they are eligible for Medi-Cal, the state healthcare programme for low-income residents.3 Medi-Cal coverage for undocumented immigrants is not comprehensive. It is generally limited to prenatal care, emergency services, and long-term care services. Our hypothetical subject can also access some social protections from the Mexican government. The Mexican government created the Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME or Institute of Mexicans Abroad) to serve emigrants. The migrant can access an array of civic, health, education and financial services from the Mexican state through its programmes. Moreover, if she returns to Mexico when she retires, she will also be insured by the Seguro Popular (Popular Insurance) system in Mexico (although she cannot access these supports while living in the US unless she travels back to Mexico). This individual has also purchased a form of social protection from the Mexican market; she invested in a property in her home community where she will live when she retires. Nevertheless, most of this migrant’s social protection in the US is derived not from states or markets but from social ties and third

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reimagining the nation sector support. Her California church has a food pantry which she accesses when work is hard to find and she does not have money for meals. She also takes free English classes offered by a migrant-support NGO operating in their Los Angeles neighbourhood. And she relies heavily on family and friends in Los Angeles to provide temporary housing, credit and job references. Meanwhile, her son lives in Mexico, so she relies on social ties in Mexico (specifically to her mother) to raise him in her absence. Her child’s social protections are also increasingly transnational, even though he has never left their home village. He relies on the Mexican state for healthcare and market-based supports paid for by remittances from his mother. Moreover, the child benefits from an early-education intervention programme provided by a local Mexican not-for-profit organization but funded by a grant from the Netherlands. Three things stand out about this woman’s experience. First, rather than having most of her needs provided by one, nationallybound source, she must piece together social protection for herself and her family from a large number of disparate, informal and transnational sources. Second, none of the possible social protection sources from which she draws can on its own cover her major social protection needs. Third, the largely transnational sources on which this migrant relies are in no way contractually guaranteed, thus are relatively unreliable and ephemeral. Whereas laws contractually obligate states to provide for citizens, and whereas market forces ensure that most purchased protections will be provided, there is no such security for those who rely primarily on social ties and third sector organisations, each of which can withdraw their resources at any time and without recourse for the migrant and her transnational family. Let me now make this more concrete by offering a few empirical examples. Labour Since so many people move to find work, it is not surprising that transnational schemes have been put in place to protect migrant workers, who are often more vulnerable to economic and physical abuse than workers with citizenship. In some cases, extending

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part i: what has changed? transnational social protections to workers gives rise to new legal statuses that broaden existing protections to include new categories of migrants. For instance, New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Employers Scheme started in 2006 to offset shortages in the horticulture and viticulture industries by bringing in temporary workers, but also by curbing ‘labor and immigration violations through the expansion of regular labor migration avenues’ (International Organization for Migration 2015). More than 100 New Zealand firms registered with this programme which hires 8,000 workers from Pacific Island countries annually. As documented migrants, seasonal workers entering New Zealand even for a few short months are entitled to regular work protections including minimum wage, paid public holidays, sick leave, workplace safety training, and accident compensation. In cases where labour migrants are not afforded sufficient social and legal protections in host countries, sending countries often step in. Saudi Arabia is particularly notorious for failing to extend basic rights and services to the more than 1.5 million migrant domestic workers, largely from Asia, who work within its borders. Domestic workers are subject to harsh and often violent treatment by their employers, who control their passports and prevent them from communicating with the outside world. When accused of crimes, domestic workers enter a hostile legal environment where they may not have access to translators or basic legal services even if they face execution (Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2008). Such circumstances led Indonesia to institute an extreme measure of social protection for its citizens: a total ban on migration to Saudi Arabia to perform domestic labour. The ban was lifted in 2014 following the successful negotiation of an agreement between the Indonesian and Saudi governments which guarantees Indonesian domestic workers the right to monthly pay, time off, the ability to communicate with their families, and to retain their passports (‘Indonesian maids get Saudi rights’ 2014). While the Filipino government does not prohibit its citizens from leaving, it is also one of the governments most actively involved with its citizens abroad through the efforts of private, public and third sector actors. This is important because workers are one of the country’s biggest ‘exports’ and the government relies heavily on the remittances they send home. The Philippine Overseas Employment

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reimagining the nation Administration (POEA) is responsible for processing workers’ contracts and pre-deployment checks, as well as for licensing, regulating and monitoring private recruitment agencies. Because demand is so high, thousands of licensed and unlicensed recruitment agencies are also active in the market. The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) is responsible for migrants and their non-migrant family members once they leave the country, providing programmes and services to permanent emigrants. Taken together, this package of services is one of the most comprehensive in Asia, extending from pre-departure to return and reintegration. Despite these efforts, excessive placement fees, not paying or withholding wages, and deplorable or dangerous working conditions are still all too common, particularly among women. In response, the Philippines was also the first Asian nation to pass a law to ‘establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress’ (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act, 1995). Some of its provisions include: (1) only sending workers to countries where certain basic standards are met; (2) assisting overseas Filipinos with their legal problems; (3) providing advisory/information, repatriation and reintegration services; and (4) protecting ‘the dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of the Filipino abroad’. NGOs and INGOS are also active in the fields of workers’ rights. In 2012, strikes by foreign workers in Singapore over unacceptable living conditions led to the creation of the Dormitory Association of Singapore. It works to improve the welfare of the more than one million migrants working in the construction, shipping, manufacturing and service industries in Singapore and sets minimum standards for their living accommodation (http://foreignworkerdormitory.com/). Senior Care Due to its rapid demographic transition, the high cost of labour and labour shortages, Germany has become a leader in outsourcing care for the elderly. Even though long-term care insurance has been mandatory in Germany since 1995, it is still too expensive for many families. Therefore, caring for the elderly in the long-term

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part i: what has changed? care facilities of neighbouring countries with lower labour costs, such as Poland, Slovakia or the Czech Republic, is a more attractive option. In 2012, about 7,000 German pensioners were living in facilities abroad. Countries like Spain and Thailand are also becoming increasingly popular destinations (Connolly 2012; Deutsche Rentner 2014; Schlötzer 2014). Private companies developed transnational models for longterm care in the 2000s, most commonly in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. For example, companies from Germany and other ‘Western’ European countries began to build new senior care homes across their national borders, particularly in the Visegrád nations (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). The senior care facilities built in the Visegrád offer German-language services for German or Austrian nationals at lower rates than these individuals could find in their home nations. Local senior care companies within the Visegrád nations, seeing an opportunity for economic growth, increasingly moved into the high-end sector targeting German and Austrian citizens, sometimes renovating old care facilities with support from the European Union and then opening them for the lucrative foreign clientele.4 At the same time, the Visegrád nations experienced an increased demand for senior care from their own citizens, as labour migration and the demographic transition undermined the traditional, family-based model of senior care, and as available senior care homes targeting foreigners were priced out of their reach. Since Visegrád citizens can often not afford the local senior care homes created for foreign clients, local frims are developing transnational care approaches of their own. Specifically, they are building senior care homes for Visegrád citizens in bordering nations with even cheaper labour forces, like the Ukraine. In sum, the underfinanced German care sector facilitates the import of net-payers in its social security system (young immigrants who come to Germany to provide elder care), and the export of net-users (the elderly) into the neighbouring Visegrád states’ facilities. The Visegrád states increasingly provide care for the relatively wealthy seniors of their Western neighbours, while exporting their own senior citizens to homes across their Eastern borders. Public debate about this issues has been highly emotional, with one German social rights organisation calling the export of the elderly a ‘deportation’ (Connolly 2012; Deutsche Rentner 2014; Cohen 2015). 58

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reimagining the nation These European dynamics reflect broader global trends as babyboomers around the world reach pension age and need long-term care. Singapore is also outsourcing elderly care to Malaysia where private investors are exploring underdeveloped markets (Shobert 2013). Similarly, US senior citizens are moving to Mexico to retire, where the costs of living and long-term care are much lower than in the US. While Medicare benefits are not accessible outside of the US, there are increasing demands that the programme be extended across borders (Blahnik 1999; Paxson 2012).

5. Conclusion More and more people choose or are pushed into living lives that cross borders – earning livelihoods, raising their political voices, caring for family members, and saving for retirement in more than one nation state. They will call many places home – the scattered sites where their dispersed family members live, where they work or study, the places they remember and dream of, and the homes they long to return to and rebuild. Their movements diversify societies that still insist that they are not diverse, bringing languages, faiths, traditions and histories into daily contact. They also produce levels of political stratification previously unknown. When large numbers push or choose to settle without integration, without full rights or voice, which states, at which levels of governance, will protect them is up for grabs. This chapter extends the conversation about these developments in two ways. First, I call attention to the relationship between migrating people and migrating culture and argue for the power of culture as an underutilised tool for coming to terms with the challenges migration raises. Museums are just one type of cultural institution which shifts the discursive backdrop against which discussions about nationhood, citizenship and identity take place. They can interject new understandings and framings which push debates forward in unexpectedly positive ways. They can also, just as easily, reinforce power dynamics, narrowing the frame rather than expanding it. Either way, at some fundamental level, ameliorating cultural inequality by making visible cultural producers and products from certain parts of the world, and calling into question the skewed categories that sanctify certain products and disregard others, is a precursor to eliminating political and economic inequality. They are, I believe, two sides of the same coin. 59

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part i: what has changed? Second, I propose new ways to think about social protection in contexts of permanent impermanence and partial membership. Despite pockets of institutional change, the provision of social protection, and the policymaking that undergirds it, remains largely confined to the nation. This is out of sync with how family life is lived, livelihoods are earned, and political voice is exercised. Rethinking social protection transnationally, and mapping how individuals and households construct resource environments, is an important next step. What it looks like so far, based on our initial foray, is that a patchwork quilt of rights and protections – sewn together using sending and receiving country resources and actors, that is sometimes luxuriously fluffy or often ridden by holes – is created. Inequality is not being eradicated but simply rearranged. The responsibility for social protection and provision is offloaded by states onto private, third sector actors or family members and friends. This is not the automatic outcome but safeguards must be put in place to make sure that states still fulfill their end of the social contract. Despite the current climate of nationalism and protectionism in the US and Europe, globalisation will not disappear, and transnational migration will remain an inevitable aspect of our world. Even if the new US president manages to build the Great Wall of Trump or the European Union succeeds in closing its borders, it will not stem the large numbers of migrants and refugees who will live without full rights or voice. In fact, it is likely that more and more people will choose or be forced to migrate. The sooner we come to terms with that the better the situation will be, or can be, for everyone.

Notes 1. The ideas which are very briefly summarised in this section are developed more fully in my book, Artifacts and Allegiances: How Museums Put the Nation and the World on Display (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015). 2. Our team also includes Jocelyn Viterna, Charlotte Lloyd, Armin Mueller, Sonia Parella, Alisa Petroff and Simone Castellani. 3. Undocumented immigrants are eligible for Medi-Cal, and legal non-citizen residents do not have to meet the five-year eligibility requirements required for federal benefits programmes. 4. Such facilities include the ‘Sonnenhaus’ in Senec, Slovakia, and the ‘Gemütlichkeit’ in Galanta, Slovakia.

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reimagining the nation

References Anderson, Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nations, London and New York: Verso Books. Avato, Johanna, Koettl, Johannes and Sabates-Wheeler, Rachel (2010) ‘Social security regimes, global estimates, and good practices: the status of social protection for international migrants’, World Development 38: 455–466. Blahnik, T. (1999) ‘The elderly become a new export’. Ethics of Development in a Global Environment. Bossert, Thomas (1998) ‘Analyzing the decentralization of health systems in developing countries: decision space, innovation and performance’, Social Science and Medicine 47: 1513–1527. Cohen, I. Glenn (2015) Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism, Law and Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press. Connolly, K. (2012, 26 December) ‘Germany “exporting” old and sick to foreign care homes’. The Guardian. Available at: http://www.theguardian. com/world/2012/dec/26/german-elderly-foreign-care-homes Deutsche Rentner (2014, 27 October) ‘Verdrängen Senioren in Osteuropa Aus Den Pflegeheimen’ [‘German pensioners crowd out the elderly from nursing homes in Eastern Europe’], Deutsche Wirtschaftsnachrichten. Available at: http://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/2014/10/27/deutsche-rentner-verdraengen-senioren-in-osteuropa-aus-den-pflegeheimen/ Fortuny, Karina and Chaudry, Ajay (2011) A Comprehensive Review of Immigrant Access to Health and Human Services. Available at: http://www.urban. org/research/publication/comprehensive-review-immigrant-access-health-andhuman-services/view/full_report Fromherz, Allen James (2011) Qatar: a Modern History, London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Holzmann, Robert, Koettl, Johannes and Chernetsky, Taras (2005) ‘Portability regimes of pension and health care benefits for international migrants: an analysis of issues and good practices’. Discussion Papers 0519. The Global Commission on International Migration. Available at: http://siteresources. worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP Discussion-papers/ Pensions-DP/0519.pdf Human Rights Watch (2008) ‘Policy brief: Qatar’s human rights record’. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/01/policy-brief-qatars-humanrights-record ‘Indonesian Maids Get Saudi Rights’ (2014, 19 February) BBC News. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26259326 International Organization for Migration (2015) ‘World Migration Report 2015’. Available at: https://www.iom.int/world-migration-report-2015 (last accessed 15 March 2016). Kamrava, Mehran (2013) Qatar: Small State, Big Policies, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Levitt, Peggy (2015) Artifacts and Allegiances: How Museums Put the Nation and the World on Display, Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

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part i: what has changed? Levitt, Peggy, Viterna, Jocelyn, Mueller, Armin and Lloyd, Charlotte (2016) ‘Transnational social protection: setting the agenda’. Oxford Development Studies. DOI: 10.1080/13600818.2016.1239702. Mazzucato, Valentina (2011) ‘Reverse remittances in the migration-development nexus: two-way flows between Ghana and the Netherlands’, Population, Space and Place 17: 454-468. Paxson, M. R. (2012, 3 September) ‘Assisted living and nursing care in Mexico’. Blog post. Available at: http://www.mexperience.com/blog/?p=2620;%20http:// usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-08-15-mexnursinghome_N.htm Schlötzer, C. (2014, 13 December) ‘Gülen Verurteilt ‘Hexenjagd’ in Der Türkei’ [‘Gülen condemns ‘witch-hunt’ in Turkey’], Süddeutsche Zeitung. Available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/erdoan-kritiker-guelen-warnt-vor-hexenjagd-in-der-tuerkei-1.2264520 Schmalzbauer, Leah (2014) The Last Best Place? Gender, Family, and Migration in the New West, Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press. Shobert, B. (2013, 22 April) ‘Will demographics trump borders as Singapore pursues a senior care solution?’ Blog post. Available at: http://healthintelasia. com/will-demographics-trump-borders-as-singapore-pursues-a-senior-caresolution/ The New Yorker (2016) ‘Episode 42: the honorable John Lewis and the inimitable Paul Simon’. Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/podcast/ the-new-yorker-radio hour/episode-42-the-honorable-john-lewis-and-theinimitable-paul-simon United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2015) ‘UNHCR warns of dangerous new era in worldwide displacement as report shows almost 60 million people forced to flee their homes’. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/ texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=55813f0e6&query=60%20million%20 refugees (last accessed 15 March 2016). United Nations Information Service (2014) ‘232 million international migrants living abroad worldwide–new UN global migration statistics reveal’. Available at: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2013/unisinf488.html (last accessed 9 September 2015).

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3

Settlers or Movers? The Temporality of Past Migrations, Political Inaction and its Consequences, 1945–1985 Jozefien De Bock

1. Introduction Historically, those societies with the longest tradition of multicultural policies, Canada and Australia, are settler societies. This does not mean that all immigrants who ever set foot there also settled permanently. During the nineteenth century, between a quarter and a third of European migrants overseas eventually returned to their countries of origin (Harper 2005). It does mean however that these countries expected most of their immigrants to stay and therefore focused on the development of policies aimed at the permanent settlement of newcomers. Temporary labour migration programmes were never as important there as they have been for example in Europe, especially in the period after World War II, when the booming economies of the European core were in dire need of labour. Labour-receiving countries set up bilateral agreements with (potential) sending countries on both sides of the Mediterranean with a view to temporarily importing workers (Messina 2007: 23). The immigrants who moved in the framework of these agreements came to be known as ‘guest workers’. Derived from the German ‘Gastarbeiter’, this concept clearly indicated that they were not meant to settle. Even though some countries like France and Belgium did encourage a longer-term settlement of guest workers relatively early on (Martens 1976: 127–133) and local authorities in all receiving 63

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part i: what has changed? countries quickly did pay attention to the question of integration (Oltmer et al. 2012: 14), in the minds of most national governments guest worker migration continued to be a matter of temporary labourers. The policies devised to deal with guest workers were informed by labour market concerns rather than concerns about equal opportunity and social justice. Only in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis did national authorities begin to think about longterm integration. Over the course of the 1980s then, one decade later than had been the case overseas, most European receiving countries adopted some form of multicultural integration policy. The arrival of multicultural policies in Europe is generally perceived as a much delayed answer to the societal challenges caused by the ongoing settlement of labour migrants and their families. Even though it is clear that the awareness of national policy makers concerning this settlement did lag behind (Messina 2007: 23), the idea that this was merely the result of a refusal to see beyond the official guest worker discourse needs to be called into question. In this chapter, I argue that their perception was in fact supported by the high degree of geographical mobility that characterised guest worker migration during the first decades after the war. Whereas researchers and policy makers notice ever-increasing levels of immigrant mobility today, there is a case to be made for the opposite evolution taking place from the mid-1970s onwards. When the first multicultural policies in Europe were drafted, the immigrants who had arrived in the postwar period no longer were a highly mobile group of people. In collective memory they mistakenly came to be represented as having been ‘stable settlers’ from the start. However, for those of us concerned with the impact of a high degree of mobility on integration policies today and in the future, there is much to be learnt from this large-scale experiment with temporary workers. I begin this chapter by retracing the history of guest worker migration to the period 1945–1974, demonstrating how guest workers initially exhibited rates of mobility that compete with those witnessed today. I then look at the impact of the 1973 crisis, showing how this mobility was thwarted, albeit not to the effect the immigrant receiving states had hoped for. In the second part of this chapter, I study the policies developed towards guest workers by the receiving states in the era before multiculturalism. I show how, for a long time, there was hardly any coordinated policy 64

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settlers or movers? making aimed at the long-term integration of these immigrants, despite the awareness or sometimes even active promotion of longterm settlement. This changed in the aftermath of the crisis, when public pressure resulted in political action – although not necessarily the kind that would solve the immigrants’ problems. In the third part of this chapter, I summarise the findings of contemporary research dealing with the impact of integration policies – or the lack thereof – on the lives and trajectories of guest workers and their families, both in the short and in the long run. I focus on the issues of housing, language and the schooling of immigrant children. I close this chapter by putting to the fore a number of lessons from the past. If the mobility-gap between guest workers and present-day migrants is not as big as generally assumed, then the consequences of previous neglect should serve as a warning for future policy making.

2. Guest workers in postwar Europe: A highly mobile population Until recently, the most important episode in Europe’s history as an area of immigration undoubtedly was the guest worker migration of the postwar period. Over the three decades following World War II, several millions of migrants, mainly from the countries around the Mediterranean, migrated to the booming economies of the European core. After the war, the economies of Western Europe experienced a relatively quick recovery. By the early 1960s, this had turned into a full-fledged economic boom, absorbing practically all of the available labour force. Already before that, there had been structural shortages of workers in specific sectors, especially for work which local labourers were no longer willing to perform. Western European governments and employers then decided to turn to immigrant labour in order to solve these problems. At first, they drew on the labour reserves of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. From the 1960s on, as demand and competition among the recruiting states increased, other Mediterranean countries such as Morocco, Turkey, Tunisia and Yugoslavia also became involved (Hollifield 1992; King 1993; Bade 2003; Castles 2003; Messina 2007). The arrival of these guest workers was framed by a set of bilateral agreements, regulating the exit of labour as well as the legal, economic and social position of the migrants in the receiving societies (Rass 2010). In the framework of 65

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part i: what has changed? these agreements, official recruitment structures were set up through which hundreds of thousands of immigrants made their way north. At least as many immigrants again arrived in Western Europe ‘on their own’, travelling on a tourist visa but with the firm intention to stay (Wilpert 1992; Reniers 1999; Akgündüz 2008). This practice was encouraged by several receiving countries, who, in times of economic growth, almost automatically granted residence status to those ‘tourists’ who were able to find work (Messina 2007: 41). Although, initially, their stay was assumed to be temporary, a number of coinciding economic, social and political developments led many guest workers to settle down permanently (Hollifield 1992). However, the fact that many of them eventually did settle does not mean that they always had the intention to do so. Neither does it mean that none of them returned, or even that these returnees were only a minority. In the first section of this chapter I argue that, in fact, a large part of guest workers did not stay in Western Europe. Although it is hard to quantify this group exactly – as macro-scale data are often lacking or, if available, far from precise, and microscale data remain largely unpublished – the available numbers do indicate a much higher degree of mobility than generally assumed. After World War II and until the late 1950s, the recruitment of foreign labourers remained the prerogative of a small number of economic sectors, particularly mining and agriculture. These had a long history of labour shortages which no longer could be filled by attracting workers from within national boundaries or neighbouring countries. As the need for labour in these sectors was structural, the guest workers they attracted were relatively sure of employment for a longer time. Nevertheless, their migration was characterised by a high turnover, not only at the level of the company but also at the level of the receiving country. In Switzerland, for example, where between 1946 and 1957 almost two million labour migrants arrived, the net immigration figure did not exceed 250,000 – over 85 per cent of immigrants left the country within ten years (s.n. 1959: 149). The data for Belgium also show a high turnover for the period 1948–1957, with only 185,000 of over 420,000 immigrants staying in the country, or 55 per cent leaving – and probably more, as the Belgian records of departure were notoriously defective (s.n. 1959: 144). This extraordinary mobility was very much related to the strict immigration policies wielded by these states, ensuring the restriction of immigrant workers to the heavy industries they had been recruited 66

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settlers or movers? for, as well as the repatriation of those who were unwilling or unable to keep working there (Caestecker and Luyckx 2015). During this period, guest worker migration remained relatively limited, both quantitatively and in the number of countries involved, with France, Belgium and Switzerland drawing in the majority of workers. From the 1960s onwards, previously nonrecruiting countries such as Germany and the Netherlands began to recruit guest workers as well. In this context of heightened competition, many receiving countries loosened their control on the entry of immigrant labour (Hollifield 1992). These liberal entry regimes led to a period of high labour mobility, in which the movement of labour migrants seemingly matched the business cycle, as illustrated by the immediate drop in arrivals and peak in returns with the economic slowdown of 1966–1967 (see Figure 3.1). A study ordered by the OECD found that between 1966 and 1967 the number of foreign labourers in Cologne (Germany) had gone down by 24.9 per cent (Kayser 1971: 148, 157). This was partly due to a downturn in the number of work permits granted, but also as a consequence of the decisions made by the immigrants

Figure 3.1 Migration from the Mediterranean to Europe (Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Yugoslavian, Greek and Turkish). Source: Note statistique sur la migration europeènne 1972.

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part i: what has changed? themselves. The 1966–1967 crisis saw thousands of unemployed migrants voluntarily leave Western Europe for their home countries. Apparently, these guest workers did indeed fulfil the function of a temporary workforce, ebbing and flowing with the fluctuating need for labour ( Bade 2003: 230–231; von Oswald et al. 2003: 25) The economic slowdown of the mid-1960s did not last, and with the revival of the economy came a new upsurge in guest worker migration. Throughout the ‘Long Sixties’ rates of mobility remained high, with for example in the Netherlands 75 per cent of Spanish and more than 60 per cent of Italians arriving in the period 1964–1973 leaving the country within ten years of arrival (Nicolaas and Sprangers 2007: 39). But this economic revival was also short-lived. In the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973, Europe experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Already from the beginning of the 1970s, demands for a more restrictive immigration policy had been gaining support. With the outbreak of the crisis, many receiving countries decided to pay heed to public opinion and put an official halt to the arrival of new labour migrants (Germany in 1973, France and Belgium in 1974, and the Netherlands in 1979). The first two years of the crisis saw a steep drop in arrivals and a slight rise in returns, as can be seen in Figure 3.2, representing the arrival and departure of immigrants in and from the Federal Republic of Germany.

Figure 3.2 Immigrants to and Returnees from the Federal Republic of Germany in Absolute Numbers, 1967–1980. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Statistische Jahrbuch für die BD, 1967 ff. (from Körner 1984).

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settlers or movers? However, already in 1976, numbers of arrivals started rising again and numbers of departures went down, even though the overall economic situation did not improve. By 1979, arrivals again surpassed those of 1974 and departures were at the lowest point of the decade. Only now, Mediterranean immigrants who wanted to move to Europe could no longer do so through the channel of labour migration – with the exception of Italians who, as EEC citizens, were granted the freedom of movement from 1968 onwards. They could still come as family migrants, students or asylum seekers – migration channels that remained open, and that now came to be used also by migrants with mainly economic motivations. Candidate-immigrants who did not manage to make it through these channels often ended up in Western Europe anyway, but then as socalled ‘illegal migrants’ or ‘undocumented aliens’, a category that would become more important in the following decades. By now, it has been more or less agreed that – completely against all intentions – the restrictive immigration policies of the receiving countries were less effective in keeping new immigrants out than in keeping those immigrants who were already there from returning home, out of fear they would not be allowed back in. This way, a previously highly mobile population was effectively turned into a stationary one (Lucassen 2005: 149; Abadan Unat 2011: 117). The data presented in Figure 3.3 showing the migratory behaviour of

Figure 3.3 Number of Emigrants and Returnees from and to Italy, 1970–1980. Source: compilation by CENSIS of data from ISTAT, from Calvaruso 1984.

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part i: what has changed? Italian migrants – who were not subjected to restrictive regulations – help to understand the actual impact of policy changes on top of economic factors. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, we see the same evolution as for all nationalities together (see Figure 3.2): an initial decrease in the number of emigrants and increase in the number of returnees, and a reversal of this trend in 1976. However, from 1977 onwards, the Italian data show a stabilisation in the number of emigrants, as opposed to the constant increase in new arrivals shown by the general data. Further, the Italian data also show how returns continue to outnumber departures, exactly the opposite of the fast-increasing emigration deficit shown by the general data from 1978 onwards. Italians clearly returned home more often than other migrants. They had nothing to lose by doing so, as they could always try their luck again later. This was not the case for non-EEC citizens, who found their mobility effectively blocked.

3. A lack of policy initiatives aimed at the long-term integration of guest workers The reality of guest worker migration in the 1950s and 1960s as highly mobile and temporary is also reflected in the research and policy briefs of the era. In 1959 for example, the ILO claimed that ‘the distances in the case of continental migration are generally shorter [than in the case of intercontinental migration, ed.], and as a result even the longer-term movements which they include are often of a temporary nature’ (s.n. 1959: 136). Still, the seemingly rock-solid belief of contemporary observers that postwar guest workers would never settle is baffling. Take these excerpts from a 1967 study by Dutch migration specialist R. Wentholt as an example: The phenomenon of international commuting however is not a new form of migration. Both are – alternative – forms, the first one newer, the other one older, of international mobility. The difference in dynamics between them is primarily a consequence of the temporality of the ‘working stay’ of the international commuter, as opposed to the in general permanent complete settlement of the international migrant . . . Globally, we can expect half of them to have left the country after one year, 70% after 3 years and more than 90% after 6 years. 70

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settlers or movers? Also, one can hardly say that the same numbers would stay longer if they had been able to take their families with them. The flow back and forth of millions of foreigners we are now dealing with, characterized by the non-commitment of the arrival, the short duration of stay, the high mobility, and the speedy and continuous to and fro, would not have come into being in that case. (Wentholt 1967: 89–91)

Thinking of guest worker migration as ‘international commuting’ inhibited this and other contemporary commentators from seeing that many immigrants were actually staying much longer than planned. Some receiving countries, like Belgium and France, even pushed for the stabilisation of their foreign workforce through the active encouragement of family reunification (Martens 1976: 101– 103, 126–131; Khoojinian 2006: 77). The reasons for this were manifold. Not only would a more stable immigrant population provide employers with the labour force they needed at the time, the settlement of families would also ensure a replenishment of the younger, economically active strata of an ageing population and a reproduction of the labour force in the decades to come. Early on in the guest worker process, these states decided not only to freely grant residence permits for families, but even to provide financial and logistic help with their actual move and settlement (Lyons 2006: 500). In Belgium for example, from 1965 onwards, immigrant workers could get half of the travel costs of their spouse and children reimbursed by the Belgian state (Martens 1976: 132–134). More recent immigration countries like Germany and the Netherlands did not introduce such measures. The German authorities did little to facilitate the reunion of guest worker families, and often refused visas to family members (von Oswald et al. 2003: 24, 34). For a long time, the Dutch authorities even used restrictive family reunification policies as an instrument to keep their immigrants mobile (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011: 127). But also these countries could not hold on to the idea of a strict rotational system. Historical research on the German case has shown that already from the 1960s onwards, economic, humanitarian and foreign policy concerns led the authorities to shy away from actually removing families who had illegally entered the country, thus allowing family reunification in practice. By 1974, 59 per cent of male and 90 per cent of female respondents to a survey were living in Germany with their spouse, and of the 63 per cent who had children, 46 per cent had brought 71

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part i: what has changed? them there. Twenty-eight per cent of those interviewed had been living in the FRG for at least seven years (Mehrländer 1974, as cited in Chin 2007). Even though there certainly were voices in each of the receiving countries which were concerned about the long-term integration of guest workers, in this era of economic boom national authorities generally considered these immigrants in a purely functionalist way. They were meant to fill out vacancies in the residual sector of the labour market or to ensure a more balanced population pyramid. Such a functionalist stance led to functionalist policy making. The most important initiatives at the national level were taken in the field of immigration policy, regulating these immigrants’ entry and exit, and that of labour market policy, regulating their rights and duties as labourers. In Belgium for example, the right of guest workers to reside in the country was inextricably linked to their occupation: no residence permit without a job. Labour market policies in turn restricted the kind of work immigrants were allowed to carry out as well as the duration of their contract. This was done through a system of work permits, the granting of which was left to the arbitrary decision of the Ministry of Labour. This decision was based on the situation of the labour market: when labour was scarce, permits were granted for more sectors and longer periods; in times of rising unemployment, they were restricted again (Martens 1976). Similar systems were in place in all receiving countries. They were ‘designed to relegate newly arrived foreigners to the least popular occupations and to reserve the benefit of expanding employment and resulting opportunities of occupational advancement for nationals of the country and resident foreigners’ (s.n. 1959: 234). A similar reasoning lay behind the Belgian and French interest in family reunification, only here not only the newcomers but also their descendants were meant to be relegated to such second-rate positions. This period did see the development of a number of integration policies, but these were mostly meant to avoid conflicts and suppress non-conformist behaviour from the side of the guest workers (Schönwälder 2006: 90). For example, the French Fonds d’Action Sociale (an umbrella organisation set up by the national government in 1958) was mainly aimed at ‘solving the Algerian crisis’ and later ‘managing the immigration problem’, rather than ensuring the equal participation of immigrants in French society in the long 72

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settlers or movers? term (Lyons 2009). For the most part, national governments limited their involvement by providing financial help to players at the local level, who were seen as better fit to take care of the newcomers’ needs (Wentholt 1967; Lyons 2006; Chin 2007; Abadan Unat 2011; Thränhardt and Winterhagen 2012). This national lethargy was aided by the fact that, apart from those locals who were directly confronted with them at work or in their neighbourhood, the broader public did not yet contest the presence of guest workers. This lack of public interest, in combination with the large turnover of the guest worker population, resulted in a lack of incentive to develop coherent, forward-looking integration policies. Reports of international organisations such as the OECD confirmed national authorities in their inaction, when stating that: An important part of immigrant workers is not looking for the right conditions for their integration in the region. What these people aspire is to gather here the means to live a better life once returned . . . In fact, for all temporary migrants, it’s not about looking for the right conditions for assimilation at any price – or deploring that these conditions are not offered – but rather about adapting provisionally to a society in which they are but in transit. (Kayser 1971: 155)

At the same time, hundreds of thousands of workers and their families were living their daily lives in these receiving countries. They were confronted with many problems, most urgently – and most visibly to the outside world – their housing situation. All over Western Europe, immigrants were living in horrible conditions, caused by housing shortages and aggravated by limited incomes and discrimination on the housing market. From the early 1970s onwards, these housing problems, as well as the perceived development of immigrant ‘ghettoes’, came to shock the general public all over Europe, resulting in a call for action (von Oswald et al. 2003: 26; Berlinghoff 2009). Still, as long as the need for immigrant labour was high, no real measures were taken. It was only with the outbreak of the economic crisis that governments finally responded. This response almost exclusively translated into a crackdown on new immigration. One by one, the countries of the European core (with the exception of Luxembourg) announced their respective migration stops. The 73

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part i: what has changed? rhetoric behind these measures was that the problems immigrant populations were struggling with could only be properly addressed if new arrivals were limited (Berlinghoff 2009). However, throughout the 1970s, national authorities did not actually address any of these problems. Most of them continued to rely on a policy framework that had nothing but the economic interests of the nation and its own labour force in mind (Chin 2007: 91). Rather than helping immigrants, policy makers devised strategies to complicate their settlement and even to get them to leave the country. One way of doing this was to implement ever more restrictive regulations for family reunification (Hollifield 1992: 84). Another way was to introduce voluntary return schemes, offering assistance to those who wanted to return to their home country. Such schemes relied on the heavily contested assumption that the departure of immigrants would solve or at least alleviate national unemployment (Körner 1984; Lebon 1984). They were eventually abandoned as the number of candidates dropped and the idea of aided return itself was heavily criticised by political and human rights activists and by the authorities of the sending countries (Gastaut 2004). Only from the 1980s onwards, under the pressure of the increasing popularity of right-wing extremist parties, did governments begin to develop actual integration policies aimed at the many guest workers and their descendants who by then had become long-term settlers in their countries and whose integration had been subject to decades of neglect (Gastaut 2004).

4. The consequences of neglect The long-standing deficit of integration policies towards guest workers, in combination with their own perception of temporality, has had seriously negative consequences for these immigrants and for the societies in which they settled, some of which I briefly discuss here. Housing The national authorities of most receiving states did not consider the housing of guest workers their responsibility, even though some states did (co)finance the construction of hostels that were run by employers or volunteers (Castles and Kosack 1985: 246). Most 74

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settlers or movers? of the bilateral agreements between sending and receiving states referred to the duty of employers to provide their immigrant workers with housing (Rass 2010: 357–458). This employer-provided accommodation tended to be far below standard and brought about a high degree of segregation, as immigrant workers were generally housed separately from locals (Vogel 2005: 92; Abadan Unat 2011: 62). Guest workers who were not officially recruited tended to live in similar conditions: crowded rooms in hostels and lodging houses, or temporarily housed by family or friends in small, bad quality housing (De Bock forthcoming). The advantage of this kind of housing was that it did not entail competition with locals. This changed when immigrants tried to move into other types of housing, for example because they were joined by their family. When looking for affordable, decent family accommodation, immigrants were confronted with an enormous discrimination on the private rental market, against which the authorities took little action (Byron and Condon 2004: 135–138). In theory, most immigrant families should have been able to benefit from social housing. In practice, also there they encountered high degrees of discrimination, based in no small part on the idea that they could not be trusted to uphold ‘modern’ housing standards (Castles and Kosack 1985: 304–309). Over the course of the postwar period, former slum residents in France for example were moved into regular social housing only after they had ‘learned how to behave like proper French families’ through ‘educational courses and home visits’ in so-called cités de transit (Lyons 2006: 511–512). In these cités de transit, as in the many slums that popped up in the periphery of France’s main cities, immigrant families lived completely segregated from local families. Elsewhere in Europe, they lived in more mixed neighbourhoods. The locals there, however, generally belonged to the marginal strata of society, which limited the social capital these potential contacts entailed (Castles en Kosack 1985: 312–314). In addition, the bad quality of most housing had serious consequences on immigrants’ health, family life, children’s school results, etc. Adequate policies to combat discrimination both in the private and in the social rental market, as well as an assistance programme focused on equal opportunities rather than differentiation, could have made a big difference on the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. 75

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part i: what has changed? Language Today, one of the main reproaches against former guest workers is that they do not sufficiently speak the language of the receiving societies. This reproach is corroborated by the available data, showing for example how only one-third of first-generation Turks in Germany speak German (Lucassen 2006: 36). For many guest workers, learning the language of the host society indeed was no priority. As target earners, they considered it a waste of time, both in terms of what they could earn whilst working instead, and of its usefulness back home. An enquiry in 1963 among Turkish labour migrants in Germany showed that only 17 per cent of the interviewees were enthusiastic about the language courses offered to them (Abadan Unat 2011: 62). Finally, as most labour migrants did heavy work for long hours, many of them just did not have any energy left to learn a new language (Castles and Kosack 1985: 97; Venturini 2004: 235). However, putting the blame entirely on the immigrants themselves would be too easy for the receiving states, who blatantly did not put in the effort needed to convince newcomers or even to provide the necessary infrastructure. Of the different language courses offered in the Belgian city of Ghent over the period 1960–1980, for example, only one was set up by the Provincial Authorities and one was partially funded by the City, whereas dozens of initiatives were organised by immigrants’ associations, religious institutions or individual volunteers. Many of these private initiatives did not have the time and means to provide proper linguistic education. Further, many courses were not adapted to the skills and needs of the immigrants they were targeting (De Bock 2013: 162–163). The fact that immigrant workers did not speak the language, or did so only in a limited way, had immediate consequences for their professional careers. Together with many other factors, their lack of linguistic proficiency blocked their upwards mobility, so that they remained stuck doing jobs that were heavy, hazardous and/or badly paid (Castles and Kosack 1985: 98). One of the many negative consequences thereof was their higher vulnerability in times of crisis. Indeed, typical immigrant jobs suffered more than average from the economic crisis of the mid-1970s. Once they had lost their job, widespread discrimination, rendered semi-legal through the argument of linguistic deficiency, made it hard for them to compete 76

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settlers or movers? on the ever-shrinking labour market (Hollifield 1992: 85–86; Bade 2003: 233; Venturini 2004: 235). Additionally, immigrants’ lack of fluency in the language of the receiving society hindered their social contacts with locals, not only at the workplace but in most social environments. Unfortunately, whilst the economy was booming, neither the receiving states nor the employers had an active interest in getting the immigrants to learn the language beyond the most basic vocabulary needed to carry out their job. Also family migrants, who were assigned a primarily reproductive role, were not deemed to need linguistic skills to raise a next generation of labourers. And even this next generation was for a long time not targeted by integration policies. Education Indeed, one of the most let-down groups in the whole guest-worker story are the children of guest workers, and especially those who were born or arrived in the receiving countries before the 1980s. When these children were the target of specific policies, these were generally developed from the point of view of their imminent return or, alternatively, their integration into a secondary segment of the working class, much like their parents (Skutnabb-Kangas 1984). In Germany, the authorities did not even develop any specific policies for guest worker children. Those subjected to compulsory education were sent to school with German children, without any language training or special assistance. In fact, the most common solution to these children’s language problems was to put them one or more years below their age, or even in schools for children with lower intellectual capacities (Abadan Unat 2011: 115–117). This caused a large group of immigrant children to never fully learn the language and miss out on the opportunity for good schooling, leading them to fall behind not only in the short term but also in the long term. Over the course of the 1970s, several receiving states began to experiment with part- or full-time education in the immigrant children’s mother tongue. In the Netherlands and the Flemish part of Belgium, this idea was developed under the name of ‘Education in the Mother Tongue and Culture’ (OETC), and comprised the introduction of linguistic and cultural courses referring to the home country into the curriculum of immigrant children. Until 77

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part i: what has changed? the 1980s, however, these experiments were mainly aimed at their return rather than their integration (Skutnabb-Kangas 1984: 42; De Caluwe et al. 2002: 115–116). From the side of the sending societies, children were the focus of attention very early on in the migration process. Most sending states quickly began supporting the organisation of classes in the official language of the home country. In the Belgian city of Ghent for example, the Italian organisation Bel-Italia, the Spanish Asociación de padres de familia and the Algerian and Moroccan Amicales offered such classes to immigrants’ children with the financial help of their respective consular services (De Bock 2013: 136). These classes were not merely language courses, but were meant to educate immigrant children on the history, geography and literature of their home country. The aim was to help these children reintegrate in the sending state’s school system when they eventually moved back, but even then their problems continued. Most sending states put very little effort into the reintegration of guest worker children in the school system once they had returned. For example, Italy only started paying attention to them from 1977 onwards, after two decades of mass emigration and return migration. Many of these children lagged significantly behind in school (Favero and Tassello 1984: 129–136). Also here, the consequences of a lack of (re)integration policies were long-lasting.

5. Conclusion The three postwar decades of economic boom in Europe saw the development of a large-scale system of labour migration. In the minds of those involved, including the migrants themselves, this migration was of a temporary nature. Looking at the size of the ethnic minority populations that came out of this so-called guest worker migration, one might be inclined to think that this temporality was but a myth and that contemporary policy makers were hopelessly out of touch with reality in thinking that the guest workers would return. In retrospect, their migration project has come to be represented as an inherently permanent one, in contrast to that of temporary labour migrants today. However, when we look at the actual data, it becomes clear that for many, if not the majority of guest workers, migration was in fact temporary, especially during the period of economic boom when the 78

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settlers or movers? boundaries of Europe were relatively open. In this era, none of the receiving countries put in any real effort to develop coherent policies that would ensure the long-term integration of guest workers and their families. Guest worker migration was seen from a purely functionalist perspective, and the fact that there was a high turnover seemingly absolved policy makers from having to anticipate its long-term consequences. Even though the possibility of a permanent settlement was widely debated from as early as the 1960s, the ‘prerogative’ to deal with its consequences was left to local authorities, private initiatives and to a large extent to the employers. The categorisations policy makers worked with did not succeed in keeping up with the dynamic reality of this migration. As we now know, the changing economic context and especially the introduction of highly restrictive immigration regimes in the mid-1970s induced many individual migrants and their families to turn their temporary project into a permanent one. By then, though, decades of political neglect fuelled by the expectation that they would return had already created major problems. As the economic boom came to an end, these problems gained visibility. While the abominable living conditions of guest workers were one cause for public indignation, it was the call for a migration stop that most caught the ear of policy makers. Arguing that a closure of the borders was a necessary first step also for helping those immigrants who were already resident, most labour-importing countries shut their doors to new immigration. Actual integration policies were developed only in the 1980s, under the threat of ‘ghettoisation’, revolting immigrant youth and the electoral success of the extremist right. By then, the majority of former guest workers, their families and their descendants had been effectively pushed into a category of second-class citizens, from which they have still to emerge. There are lessons to be learnt from this European experience. A first one is that we cannot predict the future, especially not in matters of mobility and return. The guest worker story has shown how even mobile populations can end up staying permanently. Migration movements are highly complex, depending on changing contexts and individual decisions that we cannot foresee. Often, we do not even notice these changes as they happen, as our policies tend to codify migration in ways that obscure its dynamics. A second lesson to be learnt then is that we need to constantly monitor the situation on the ground. Failing to do so results in 79

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part i: what has changed? unawareness not only of the profile and needs of immigrants now but also of the changing composition and demands of our populations in the future. In the past, it was the local authorities which were generally much more aware of the latest developments in migration. Paying better attention to what they have to say would be a good start. Further, awareness needs to followed by action. A third lesson from the guest worker story is that failing to address the long-term perspectives of temporary migrants in the receiving societies can have disastrous consequences when these migrants end up settling permanently – an option which can never be fully excluded in the context of a liberal democratic state. Of course, even in the most well-to-do countries, means are limited and not everyone who arrives can be assisted in the same way. Clearly, a selection needs to be made, but at this point in time, no one knows how many of today’s temporary migrants will become permanent or who they are. Also here, however, the past provides a clue. Research on guest worker migration has shown that labour migrants who are living together with their families are much more likely to settle permanently than those who remain on their own (De Bock 2013: 109–110). Policies might focus on these families, and especially on their children, in order to give them the best possible start in what could become their home country. From a historical perspective, it makes sense to include them in those integration programmes developed for permanent immigrants, such as language courses, help with schooling, career support, etc. The former neglect of the long-term integration of guest workers and especially their children has a negative impact until today, including the rise of ‘home-grown terrorism’, a problem that has recently come to take centre stage. The past has taught us that not offering these people the necessary tools to turn their temporary project into a successful permanent one is not a viable option. Hopefully, its lessons will not go unheeded.

References Abadan Unat, Nermin (2011) Turks in Europe, 1957–2007: From Guestworker to Transnational Citizen, New York: Berghahn Books. Akgündüz, Ahmet (2008) Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960–1974: A Multidisciplinary Analysis. Research in Migration and Ethnic Relations series, Aldershot: Ashgate.

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settlers or movers? Bade, Klaus J. (2003) Migration in European History. Making of Europe. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Berlinghoff, Marcel (2009) ‘L’arrêt de la politique d’immigration de travail en france et en allemagne et ses répercussions sur l’image des étrangers’, in A chacun ses étrangers ? France-Allemagne de 1871 à aujourd’hui, Arles, Paris: Actes Sud – Cité nationale de l’histoire de l’immigration, pp. 101–105. Byron, Margaret and Condon, Stéphanie (2004) Migration in Comparative Perspective: Caribbean Communities in Britain and France. Routledge Research in Population and Migration, London: Routledge. Caestecker, Frank and Luyckx, Lieselotte (2015) ‘Inclusion, exclusion and autonomy of displaced persons in the Dutch and Belgian political economies’, in Personnes déplacées et guerre froide en Allemagne occupée, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 177–196. Calvaruso, Claudio (1984) ‘Return migration to Italy and the reintegration of returnees’, in The Politics of Return. International Return Migration in Europe, Roma, New York: Centro Studi Emigrazione, Center for Migration Studies, pp. 123–128. Castles, Stephen (2003) The Age of Migration (3rd edition), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Castles, Stephen and Kosack, Godula (1985) Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (2nd edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chin, Rita C.-K. (2007) The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. De Bock, Jozefien (2013) ‘”We have made our whole lives here.” Immigration, settlement and integration processes of Mediterranean immigrants in Ghent, 1960–1980’. PhD dissertation, European University Institute, Florence. De Bock, Jozefien (forthcoming) Parallel Lives Revisited: Mediterranean Guest Workers and their Families at Work and in the Neighbourhood, 1960–1980, Oxford: Berghahn Books. De Caluwe, J., Geeraerts, D. and Kroon, S. (2002) Taalvariatie en taalbeleid. Bijdragen aan het taalbeleid in Nederland en Vlaanderen, Den Haag: Nederlandse Taalunie. Favero, Luigi and Tassello, Graziano (1984) ‘Schooling of children returning to Italy: problems in the system’, in The Politics of Return. International Return Migration in Europe, Roma, New York: Centro Studi Emigrazione, Center for Migration Studies, pp. 129–136. Gastaut, Yvan (2004) ‘Français et immigres a l’epreuve de la crise (1973–95)’ [‘French natives and immigrants tested by crisis, 1973–95’], nr. 84 (oktober): 107–118. Harper, Marjory (ed.) (2005) Emigrant Homecomings. The Return Movement of Emigrants, 1600–2000, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. Hollifield, James Frank (1992) Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kayser, Bernard (1971) Migration et main-d’oeuvre et marchés du travail, Paris: OECD. Khoojinian, Mazyar (2006) ‘L’acceuil et la stabilisation des travailleurs immigrés turcs en Belgique, 1963–1980’, Cahiers d’Histoire du Temps présent 17: 73–116.

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part i: what has changed? King, Russell (1993) ‘European international migration 1945–60: a statistical and geographical overview’, in Mass Migrations in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, London: Belhaven, pp. 19–39. Körner, Heiko (1984) ‘Return migration from the Federal Republic of Germany’, in The Politics of Return. International Return Migration in Europe, Roma, New York: Centro Studi Emigrazione, Center for Migration Studies. Lebon, André (1984) ‘Return migration from France: policies and data’, in The Politics of Return. International Return Migration in Europe, Roma, New York: Centro Studi Emigrazione, Center for Migration Studies, pp. 153–169. Lucassen, Leo (2005) The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe Since 1850. Studies of World Migrations, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Lucassen, Leo (2006) ‘Poles and Turks in the German Ruhr area: similarities and differences’, in Paths of Integration: Migrants in Western Europe (1880–2004), IMISCOE research, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 27–45. Lucassen, Leo and Lucassen, Jan (2011) Winnaars en verliezers: een nuchtere balans van vijfhonderd jaar immigratie, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker. Lyons, Amelia H. (2006) ‘The civilizing mission in the metropole: Algerian immigrants in France and the politics of adaptation during decolonization’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 32, 4: 489–516. Lyons, Amelia H. (2009) ‘Social welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France: the case of the Fonds d’action sociale’, Patterns of Prejudice 43, 1: 65–89. Martens, Albert (1976) Les immigrés. Flux et reflux d’une main d’oeuvre d’appoint, Louvain: Presses Universitaire de Louvain – editions vie ouvrière. Messina, Anthony W. (2007) The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nicolaas, H. and Sprangers, A. (2007) ‘Buitenlandse migratie in Nederland 1795–2006: de invloed op de bevolkingssamenstelling’, Bevolkingstrends, pp. 32–46. Note statistique sur la migration europeènne (1972) Genève: Comité des églises auprès des travailleurs migrants en Europe occidentale. Oltmer, Jochen, Kreienbrink, Axel and Sanz Diaz, Carlos (eds) (2012) Das ‘Gastarbeiter’-System. Arbeitsmigration und ihre Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westeuropa, München: Oldenbourg Verlag. Rass, Christoph (2010) Institutionalisierungsprozesse auf einem internationalen Arbeitsmarkt: Bilaterale Wanderungsverträge in Europa zwischen 1919 und 1974. Studien zur Historischen Migrationsforschung 19. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schönigh. Reniers, Georges (1999) ‘On the history and selectivity of Turkish and Moroccan migration to Belgium’, International Migration 37, 4: 679–713. Schönwälder, Karen (2006) ‘Assigning the state its rightful place? Migration, integration and the state in Germany’, in Paths of Integration: Migrants in Western Europe (1880–2004). IMISCOE research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 78–87. Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove (1984) ‘Children of guest workers and immigrants: linguistic and educational issues’, in J. Edwards (ed.) Linguistic Minorities,

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settlers or movers? Policies and Pluralism: Applied Language Studies, London: Academic Press, pp. 17–48. s.n. (1959) International Migration 1945–1957. Studies and Reports, New Series 54. Geneva: International Labour Office. Thränhardt, Dietrich and Winterhagen, Jenni (2012) ‘Der Einfluss der katholischen Migrantengemeinden auf die Integration südeuropäischer Einwanderergruppen in Deutschland’, in Das ‘Gastarbeiter’-System. Arbeitsmigration und ihre Folgen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westeuropa, München: Oldenbourg Verlag, pp. 199–215. Venturini, Alessandra (2004) Postwar Migration in Southern Europe, 1950–2000: An Economic Analysis, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press. Vogel, Jaap (2005) Nabije vreemden: een eeuw wonen en samenleven. Cultuur en migratie in Nederland, d. 4. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers. von Oswald, Anne, Schönwälder, Karen and Sonnenberger, Barbara (2003) ‘Einwanderungsland Deutschland: a new look at its post-war history’, in European Encounters: Migrants, Migration and European Societies since 1945, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 19–37. Wentholt, R. (1967) Buitenlandse arbeiders in Nederland. Een veelzijdige benadering van een complex vraagstuk, Leiden: Spruyt, Van Mantgem & De Dres NV. Wilpert, C. (1992) ‘The use of social networks in Turkish migration to Germany’, in International Migration Systems: A Global Approach. International studies in Demography, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Part II How Have People Responded?

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4

Mobilities against Prejudice: The Role of Social Transnationalism in Europe in Sentiments towards Immigration from Other EU Member States and from Outside the EU1 Justyna Salamońska

1. Introduction Over the decades, Europe has received many and diverse flows of people from around the world. Migrants coming from outside the EU along with intra-European migrants have changed the landscape of migrations with their diverse mobility projects. Yet mobility characterises not only migrants, but also stayers, that is European citizens residing in their countries of origin. Stayers engage in mobility when they travel, consume or connect to family and friends living in other countries. In this chapter I will argue that while European stayers themselves have become more mobile, engaging in cross-border exchanges and interactions, these processes have also brought about a change in their thinking about the mobility of others who migrate from other EU member states and beyond. The context in which we study migrations has changed considerably in recent decades. This chapter adds to the existing literature analysis of the impact of Europeanisation and globalisation at the individual and country levels. Europeans can take advantage of free movement within the EU, crossing borders without the need for visas and passports within the Schengen area. Online shopping within the EU is not subject to customs duties. Study abroad has become easier than before thanks to the Erasmus exchange programme. Apart from travel, shopping or studying abroad, Europeans also stay in 87

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part ii: how have people responded? touch with people based in other European countries. Altogether, many Europeans cross the borders of their nation states in different ways (Mau 2010; Kuhn 2015; Salamońska and Recchi 2016). These different cross-border practices in Europe are defined as ‘activities spanning over different national contexts . . . performed by any possible individual agent in any aspect of everyday life’ (Favell et al. 2011), and constitute a form of transnationalism of non-migrants, so called ‘social transnationalism’ (Mau 2010). The cross-border practices are introduced to the study of sentiments because they provide a form of generalised contact with the ‘other’, which, as this chapter will argue, impacts positively on sentiments towards immigration. As I shall show in the following analysis, these processes reduce the negative sentiments produced by the sense of threat usually found among more vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the social contexts in which individuals operate provide them with different opportunities for meeting the ‘other’. Globalisation offers unprecedented possibilities for new social encounters, and this social rather than economic dimension of globalisation, defined as growing social connectivity on the macro level, will be examined as a context that facilitates more welcoming attitudes (cf. Kaya and Karakoç 2012; Mewes and Mau 2013). Attitudes towards migrants, moreover, are a function of the characteristics of the incomers (for an overview see for example Fetzer 2012). This is why the analysis in this chapter makes a distinction between attitudes directed at two different groups of migrants: intra-EU movers and third-country nationals. These two groups can make use of different rights regarding their access to the EU member states, possibilities for settlement and further mobility within the EU and beyond. They are also subject to different sentiments. However, it is predominantly migrants heading from nonWestern countries towards Western destinations (for exceptions see Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Meuleman et al. 2009; Kaya and Karakoç 2012) who constitute the topic of academic enquiries about attitudes towards the outgroup, with intra-EU immigration so far considered to be rather ‘unproblematic’. Comparative analyses of sentiments towards intra-EU immigration are rarer, despite the famous ‘Polish plumber’ or the issue of European immigration as an argument for pro-Brexit campaigners. This chapter provides a comparative view on what the sentiments towards different migrant groups are and their determinants. 88

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mobilities against prejudice The chapter starts with a literature review presenting the frameworks traditionally employed in studies of attitudes. It introduces new elements to the existing debates by employing literature on the impact of individual cross-border practices in Europe and globalisation on outgroup sentiments. I then move on to describing the Eurobarometer data employed in the analysis and the multilevel logistic regression analysis performed. Next, I provide a crosscountry overview of attitudes differentiating between sentiments directed at intra-EU and extra-EU migration. While the majority perceive migration of fellow EU citizens as positive, the opposite is the case regarding migration from outside the EU. Most Europeans express negative views towards migration from outside the EU. Finally, a multilevel logistic regression analysis reveals the impact of individual cross-border practices in Europe on the attitudes towards migrants, irrespective of whether they come from within or outside the EU. In the conclusion I delineate the limitations of the analysis and point to possible ways of developing this study.

2. Theoretical framework for sentiments towards immigration Literature on sentiments towards immigrants and immigration largely fits into two strands: theories about group threat and intergroup contact. This chapter builds on this work in a distinctive way. It brings in the social transnationalism perspective (at the individual level) and globalisation (at the country level) into an analysis of outgroup sentiments. The chapter thus places sentiments towards immigration in the context of a mobile world, where mobility can also be a feature characterising destination societies. I will argue that this mobility constitutes a form of contact with the ‘other’, and as such it is a relevant issue to be included in studies of attitudes. This chapter examines in parallel feelings towards migration from other EU member states and from outside the EU. It distinguishes between intra- and extra-European migrants because other research suggests that different characteristics of migrants matter for sentiments (see for example Helbling and Kriesi 2014; Kootstra 2016). The chapter considers individual-level and country-level triggers and suppressors of prejudice in cross-national contexts (e.g. Quillian 1995; Schneider 2008) 89

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part ii: how have people responded? The classical attempt at incorporating contact with foreigners to studying outgroup sentiments is intergroup contact theory, originally proposed by Gordon Allport (1954). The premise behind this theory is that more positive attitudes between the in- and outgroup can be built through interactions between their members. Allport described a variety of possible contacts taking place in neighbourhoods, work and education contexts, which can improve attitudes towards migrants. The personal, rather than impersonal, quality of these contacts was what was expected to affect the attitudes the most. Since Allport wrote in the mid-1950s, we have also observed how contemporary lives in Europe have become more mobile, making more contacts between different cultures possible. This chapter takes this new context into account, and thus ‘intergroup contact’ also incorporates various ways in which Europeans now cross borders. In the text of the Maastricht Treaty the notion of European citizenship appeared, later on reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty (Maas 2007). European citizens can avail themselves of free movement rights when they choose to relocate for labour, education, family and other motives (Recchi and Favell 2009; Krings et al. 2013). They interact and bond across borders, with a gradually rising number of Euromarriages (Díez Medrano et al. 2014). European citizens travel, physically, not limited by visas, and virtually, with the majority using the internet in their daily lives. They shop in other countries, which has been made even easier within the Eurozone, including second-property acquisition being popular among the more affluent classes (Wickham 2007). This list of different mobilities is hardly exhaustive. However, what matters here is that transnationalism, since its inception in the early 1990s, has been a concept which has only applied to migrants. In particular, though, the work of Mau (2010) sheds new light on multiple ways in which lives of non-migrants involve daily mobility practices that cross national borders. Thinking about these cross-border practices (which Mau terms ‘social transnationalism’) is a new way of understanding contemporary societies. The original work of Deutsch (Deutsch et al. 1957) may explain why we should make cross-border practices a topic of enquiry. It has been claimed that crossing borders builds trust and thus changes sentiments towards the ‘other’. Recently, an emerging 90

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mobilities against prejudice strand of research has linked mobility behaviours and attitudes, with mobilities in Europe analysed for their attitudinal and identitarian consequences – among them Euroscepticism (Kuhn 2015) and attachment to Europe (Salamońska and Recchi 2016). Similarly, research conducted in Germany suggests that crossing borders and connecting to family and friends abroad coincide with a more cosmopolitan outlook with ‘the proliferation of transnational interaction . . . broadening people’s cognitive and normative horizons’ (Mau et al. 2008: 16; see also Mau 2010).2 Generally, this strand of research suggests that there is a link between the individual volume of transnationalism and more pro-European and more tolerant stances. In line with this, cross-border practices in their variety amount to opportunities for meeting the ‘other’ via a range of physical, virtual or imaginative travel, and can potentially improve the sentiments towards foreigners (this proposition is not dissimilar to Allport’s original work, albeit in a new context of increased volume of individual mobilities within the EU). Hypothesis 1 therefore proposes that more transnational practices on the individual level will be related to more positive attitudes towards the outgroup (from both within and outside the EU). Not only are individuals’ daily lives more mobile, but also the contexts in which they live facilitate – or do not – new social interactions and exchanges. Again, these contexts can affect sentiments in different ways. Globalisation (similarly to transnationalism) has been defined in many ways, and it is therefore important here to focus on the dimensions of globalisation relevant to immigrant attitudes. Some authors (Kaya and Karakoç 2012; Mewes and Mau 2013) introduce a question about the civilising versus destructive effects of globalisation on prejudice. Globalisation can have civilising effects because it brings about increased connectivity, which, in turn, is expected to affect attitudes positively. In contexts with a higher volume of social globalisation, people are more exposed to the presence of others. Through globalisation, different cultures come into contact, and engaging in new interactions can build tolerance. With a higher (overall) volume of globalisation, trust in others is stronger (Norris and Inglehart 2009). Similarly, work on new cosmopolitanism describes the potential of globalisation for diffusion of tolerance and respect towards the other (Beck 2000). Kaya and Karakoç (2012) find that economic dimension of globalisation does affect attitudes, but this leads to more prejudice. 91

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part ii: how have people responded? Welfare chauvinism could be one explanation: negative feelings towards the outgroup may be linked to natives rejecting acquisition of social rights by foreigners. Contrary to this claim, however, Mewes and Mau (2013) find no effect of social and economic globalisation for the dependent variable of welfare chauvinism. I build on this work by focusing on the civilising potential of social globalisation at country level, with higher social globalisation expected to reduce negative sentiments towards immigration from within and outside the EU (hypothesis 2). However, contact with the ‘other’ as a result of globalisation may not be linked directly to more positive sentiments. Rather it may depend on the extent to which individuals are a part of this interconnectedness. According to hypothesis 3, therefore, in highly socially globalised contexts individuals who do not normally engage in cross-border exchanges are expected to be more negative about immigration originating from the EU and beyond. While the previous paragraphs described the development of attitudes towards foreigners in the context of increased mobility of individuals and growing international connectedness, what surely matters for sentiment formation is the economic context. In a mobile world, the question of inequality and competition for resources remains valid. Group threat theory explains the processes behind the emergence of the feeling of threat in the presence of the outgroup. Anti-immigrant prejudice is a function of competition over resources (material resources, services, etc.) which leads to other groups feeling threatened (Blalock 1967). In the presence of migrants, sense of threat may relate to power, status and the prerogatives of an individual or the entire ingroup (Blumer 1958). Prejudice does not necessarily stem from a real threat, but is also a sense of threat (Bobo 1983) that may have an impact on prejudice. Group threat theory explains why it is vulnerable persons who are most prone to express prejudice. Vulnerable individuals may include economically disadvantaged persons but also those who negatively judge their individual economic situation or that of their ingroup. Thus hypothesis 4 proposes that a more vulnerable individual position (including unemployed status, lower educational attainment, or holding negative views about one’s individual and country’s economic position) is linked to a higher probability of holding negative attitudes towards both intra- and extra-European migration. 92

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mobilities against prejudice Threat to economic position is particularly relevant when many individuals have been affected by the economic crisis, but threat may also be experienced with regard to values and identities (e.g. Sides and Citrin 2007). For instance, in nation-building us is juxtaposed against a real or imagined them. In this respect, the outgroup may be interpreted as a threat to a society, endangering homogeneity, because of their different culture or ethnicity. As a consequence, people with stronger identification with their nation state should be more negative about intra-EU and especially more culturally distant extra-EU immigration (hypothesis 5). Moving beyond individual determinants of prejudice, the general economic context also matters. The economic situation in countries has been operationalised via a number of measures, including GDP, unemployment level and size of outgroup (Meuleman et al. 2009). During the economic crises, the competition between natives and foreigners is expected to increase as the pool of available resources shrinks. Indeed, research suggests that continuing recession in Europe may increase competition over available employment, and consequently increase prejudice. However, the impact of unemployment may be more complex, with some studies documenting how higher unemployment coincides with a drop in prejudice (Rustenbach 2010; Markaki and Longhi 2013). In addition, according to the original conceptualisation the larger the group the greater the perceived threat (Blalock 1967), yet some authors note that there are more possibilities for interactions between the in- and outgroups in places where foreigners’ presence is more pronounced (Schneider 2008); this should work towards countering prejudice. I expect that in more vulnerable contexts (with lower GDP, higher unemployment levels and a higher share of EU/non-EU migration), prejudice is more likely (hypothesis 6). Finally, a sense of threat is expected to be higher and sentiments more negative among individuals concerned about the economic situation in more vulnerable contexts (hypothesis 7).

3. Data and methods The analyses presented in this chapter draw on Eurobarometer data, designed and coordinated by the European Commission, Directorate General for Communication (European Commission and European Parliament 2015). Since its inception in 1973, Eurobarometer 93

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part ii: how have people responded? has provided data about European citizenship, covering a variety of topics including individual identifications, concerns expressed by Europeans, health, environment and new technologies. Attitudes towards immigration and immigrants in Europe are among the topics covered, and because of its cross-national coverage (data is collected in 28 EU member states) Eurobarometer has also been utilised in studies of prejudice (e.g. Quillian 1995; Semyonov et al. 2006; Gang et al. 2013). In this chapter I make use of Eurobarometer 82.3 data collected at the end of 2014. Eurobarometer 82.3 includes responses from 27,901 interviewees resident in the EU member states (with around 1,000 interviews per country3), and this chapter employs a final sample of 26,145 respondents who were nationals of the EU country in which they were interviewed. The data come from face-to-face interviews, which enhances their quality. Cross-validation of the Eurobarometer against another cross-national dataset, the European Values Survey, shows converging results regarding ingroup sentiments towards the outgroup (Schlueter et al. 2013). The analytical strategy of this chapter was twofold, including examination of how sentiments towards the outgroup vary at individual and country levels. For analysis at the micro level I employed binomial logistic regression modelling. In the second step I used multilevel logistic regression model with mixed effects (Snijders and Bosker 1999), which allows both individual- and country-level variables to be included in order to examine their impact on prejudice. These models were specifically aimed at testing the theories described in previous sections. In this chapter I utilise two dependent variables regarding sentiments towards immigration. The first dependent variable was attitudes towards immigration coming from within the EU; the second one was attitudes towards immigration originating from outside the EU. This distinction between sentiments directed at two groups of migrants was possible thanks to utilising the Eurobarometer data, as the other data sources do not distinguish between the attitudes towards different migrant groups in Europe. The question asked to Eurobarometer respondents read: ‘Please tell me whether the following statement evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from other EU member states/from outside the EU’. Possible answers included: very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative, very negative. The answers 94

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mobilities against prejudice were dichotomised into 0 (fairly positive and very positive) and 1 (fairly negative and negative). The independent variables included variables measured at individual and country level. The level of individual border crossings was operationalised via the ‘transnationalism index’ (as originally named in the Eurobarometer, cf. Kuhn 2015). This index variable combines information from five different variables, all pertaining to individual mobility in Europe: whether a person (1) visited another EU country; (2) read a book, newspaper or magazine in a language other than his/her mother tongue; (3) socialised with people from another EU country; (4) watched TV programmes in a language other than his/her mother tongue; and (5) used the internet in order to purchase a product or a service from another EU country. The index score is higher for individuals engaging in more mobility practices. The transnationalism index was converted into dummy variables, with three groups: high, medium and low transnationals (this last was most numerous and hence was utilised as a reference group). Other individual-level independent variables included: socioeconomic positioning (respondent’s situation on the labour market, concerns about respondent’s economic situation4 and country economic situation,5 social class and educational attainment); and identification (exclusively national identity compared to other forms of identifications). Control variables included gender, age, position on left–right political scale, and city dwelling. Moving to the macro level, one of the explanatory variables pertained to social globalisation (measuring the degree of social connectedness: personal contact, information flows and cultural proximity6), as defined by the KOF Social Globalization Index (Dreher 2006). Unlike the KOF Economic and Political Globalisation Indices, social globalisation focuses on the social dimension of global interconnectedness, defining expression of social globalisation through ‘spread of ideas, information, images and people’ (Dreher 2006: 1092). The KOF Index of Globalization provides annual data for 207 countries (including all EU countries) for the period 1970 to 2012. KOF measures have been used in other studies linking globalisation to attitudes towards immigrants (e.g. Mewes and Mau 2013). Among other country-level explanatory variables are GDP per capita (in PPP), unemployment level and proportion of foreign-born 95

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part ii: how have people responded? individuals (EU-born and non-EU-born for the two models referring to intra- and extra-EU immigration respectively), all referring to 20137 in order to account for the time lag between the country situation and how it is subjectively experienced.

4. Prejudice and its determinants on micro and macro levels – results from empirical analysis As existing cross-national research on prejudice has demonstrated, attitudes towards migrants differ, depending on the country. This chapter also distinguishes between migration from different origin countries, demonstrating differences in sentiments depending on whether they are directed at migration coming from within or outside the EU. In general, the majority of Europeans hold positive feelings about migration from other EU member states (Figure 4.1). When asked about immigration from outside the EU, on the other hand, negative sentiments prevail (Figure 4.2). One country which stands out as the most welcoming towards migrants, regardless of their origin, is Sweden. Less than 20 per cent of respondents in Sweden were negative towards migration originating from within the EU. Just over a quarter of Swedes were negative about immigration from outside the EU. At the other extreme, Latvia seems to be the least welcoming country, as over two-thirds of respondents report negative sentiments towards EU immigration. More than eight in ten have a negative attitude towards migration originating from outside the EU. In addition to Sweden, in Northern Europe residents in Finland and Denmark also have a positive approach to intra-EU migration. The residents of multilingual Luxembourg are likewise positive. In Poland and Romania, new EU member states which became net senders of emigrants to the EU, the sentiments towards EU migration are largely positive as well. In Hungary, Slovakia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and Latvia, the majority of respondents express negative views concerning intra-EU movement. Among the old member states, negative views about migration originating from within the EU are prevalent in the UK and Italy. In general, however, respondents from the old member states have more appreciation for migration of fellow EU citizens than interviewees from the new member states (38 versus 45 per cent respectively are negative about intra-EU immigration). 96

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mobilities against prejudice

Figure 4.1 Negative (Very Negative and Fairly Negative) Attitudes towards Immigration from another EU Member State (proportions). Note: EB 82.3, weighted data (‘don’t know’ excluded).

The majority of Europeans are negative about immigration originating from outside the EU. There are some exceptions to this trend. Extra-European immigration is seen in a predominantly positive light in Sweden, but also in Spain and Portugal (the latter have long-standing migration links with non-EU countries, including former colonies). In the new member states, the majority of Romanians and Croatians express positive views about migration 97

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part ii: how have people responded?

Figure 4.2 Negative (Very Negative and Fairly Negative) Attitudes towards Immigration from outside the EU (proportions). Note: EB 82.3, weighted data (‘don’t know’ excluded).

from outside the EU. The most negative respondents in the old member states are Italians and Greeks. However, the attitudes are even worse in some of the new member states, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which have not experienced any substantial inflows of migrants from outside the EU. As in the case of attitudes towards migration coming from within the EU, the respondents resident in the old member states seem to be more tolerant than those in the new member states (57 versus 69 percent respectively are negative about immigration from outside the EU). 98

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mobilities against prejudice From the descriptive statistics we can observe a variation in the levels of prejudice depending on the origin of the immigration. This is an expected result considering that prejudice is linked to the characteristics of immigrants. However, the determinants behind the shaping of attitudes were expected to work similarly in the case of intra- and extra-European immigration. These determinants can be examined with multivariate models. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present a set of logistic regression models with two dependent variables: attitudes towards immigration from other EU countries (Table 4.1), and towards immigration from outside the EU (Table 4.2). Model 1 (M1) is a binomial logistic regression model incorporating individual-level independent variables. Individuals with medium and higher levels of transnationalism (compared to those rarely engaging in cross-border practices) are less likely to express negative sentiments towards immigration. This result applies both to immigration from within the EU and to that coming from outside (hypothesis 1 corroborated). As outlined earlier, a variety of border crossings in Europe seems to constitute a more generalised form of meeting the ‘other’, through which the sense of threat is replaced with a sense of trust. These processes seem to work in the case of sentiments towards migration in general (including migration from outside the EU). These results are in line with other research on social transnationalism at an individual level linking cross-border practices and attitudinal stances regarding Europe (e.g. Mau 2010; Kuhn 2015). The main contribution of this chapter is to examine the impact that individual transnationalism in Europe has on attitudes towards foreigners. Additionally, the analysis checked a number of other individual characteristics. While it seems that more individual transnationalism protects against prejudice, there is also an increased sense of threat (and hence more negative attitudes) among more vulnerable individuals. Individuals with lower educational attainment8 and those concerned about the economic situation (both of the household and the country) are more likely to express xenophobic views (hypothesis 4 corroborated). Surprisingly, it is not unemployed persons who are statistically significantly more prone to be negative about migration, but rather people concerned about their own economic position and their country’s economic standing. In addition to the sense of threat over material well-being, concerns for the society’s cultural and national heterogeneity of society 99

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100

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Note: EB 82.3, N = 23,308. * p