Moshe Sharett: Biography of a Political Moderate 0198279949, 9780198279945

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M OSHE SH A RETT

Moshe Sharett Biography of a Political Moderate GABRIEL SHEFFER

M

C L A R E N D O N PRESS • O X FO R D 1996

Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford 0x2 6dp Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a trade mark o f Oxford University Press Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York ©

Gabriel Sheffer 1996

All rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing o f Oxford University Press. Within the UK, exceptions are allowed in respect o f any fair dealing fo r the purpose o f research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, or in the case o f reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms o f the licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms and in other countries should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sheffer, Gabriel. Moshe Sharett: a political biography/Gabriel Sheffer. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Sharett, Moshe, 1894-1965— Biography. 2. Prime ministers— Israel— Biography. 3. Israel— Biography. 4. Israel—Politics and government. I. Title. DS126.6.S4S53 1995 956.9405'2'092— dc20 [B ] 95^41329 IS B N 0-19-827994-9

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 Typeset by Pure Tech India Ltd, Pondicherry Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd, Guildford and Kings Lynn

To Naom i

PREFACE G rowing up in the 1950s in a small community in northern Israel, which was politically dominated by the Labour movement, meant becoming aware at a very early age of the overwhelming importance of politics. It also necessarily meant a quite early awareness of the tremendous politicization of the new society of Israel. Hence following politics was one of the main preoccupations of most youngsters in this community. Heated debates about political goals and means pursued by the various parties and factions were daily preoccupations, affecting everybody in our peer group. Equally, meeting leading Israeli politicians and listening to their usually long and passionate speeches were part of everybody’s social and political education. Watching from a close range the revered founding fathers of Israel was a special event for us high-school students. Among those senior leaders who occasionally visited this community, Ben-Gurion occupied a unique place. Since it was a homogeneous workers’ community with virtually no supporters of the rightist parties, he was admired by almost everybody there, and even by his more leftist opponents. Second only to Ben-Gurion in our parents’ and in our esteem was Moshe Shertok-Sharett,1 Israel’s first minister of foreign affairs and its second prime minister, who was identified with the United Nations partition resolution that had galvanized most of the Jews of Palestine and of the Diaspora. However, from the first time that I closely watched Moshe Sharett—during a large rally on Israel’s Day of Independence in the early 1950s, which Ben-Gurion and Sharett attended together, and clashed—it was clear that, although Sharett was a loyal leader of the same camp and party, his demeanour, views, and politics were different not only from those of Ben-Gurion but also from those of the rest of the Labour movement’s tough and ruthless front-line leaders. My early, yet strong, impression of this leader and his aptitudes raised my curiosity about the two founding fathers, their ideas and relations. Later, in the 1960s, closely following the acrimonious exchanges between the two leaders during one of the stormiest peijods in early Israeli domestic politics, the period during which the Lavon Affair was raging and shattering the foundations of the Israeli polity and especially of the Israeli Labour movement, the realization that there was an almost unbridgeable gulf between their positions was confirmed. By then, their different ‘political lines’ became more apparent. The struggle between the two, which for about three decades had been conducted behind the

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closed doors of the ruling Labour party’s councils, became known to the interested public only after the 1956 war in the Sinai and during the later stages of the Lavon Affair. It peaked with Ben-Gurion’s resignation as prime minister and his splitting of Mapai, which marked his own political demise. This only enhanced my fascination with the relations between the two men and with their influence on Israeli politics. My academic interest in the two leaders, among whom Ben-Gurion was undoubtedly the more senior, charismatic, and influential, grew further while writing on British policies towards Palestine. During my research on the Zionist and Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) leaders’ reactions to the British government in Palestine, it became clear that Sharett’s political positions and evaluations were more acute and realistic than those of his great rival, Ben-Gurion. My decision to study the then more neglected and obscure political figure of the two—Moshe Sharett—was determined more by the wish to understand the deeper roots of these differences and their wider political significance for the early development of the Jewish state as well as for the study of leadership in general, rather than admiration of Sharett, or dislike of Ben-Gurion and what he symbolized. It was then that I also became interested in the study of the intricate relations between personalities, political ideas, and power. For better or worse, I have decided to explore these relations, as well as the intricacies of making actual political decisions, through a political biography not of the perceived ‘winner’ but of the one who has been regarded as the ‘loser’ between these two prominent leaders. Thus, the last part of this bio­ graphy dwells on the meaning of winning and losing in politics in general and in the Israeli case in particular. Moreover, the ongoing processes of moderation in the Middle East, which eventually may lead towards greater normality in the relations between Arabs and Jews in this part of the world and probably also to a permanent peace, raise the question of whose political philosophy was more appropriate in the longer term. Indeed, in view of the growing interest in Sharett and his moderate political ideology, it seems that more politicians and members of the politically aware public are tending to view him in a new light, appreciating the multiple differences between him and the more charismatic and activist Ben-Gurion, and recognizing the merits of his legacy. The various foci of the study and the fact that it is the first and only biography of Moshe Sharett have determined the scope and hence the length of this volume, for an understanding of Sharett, his views, and his position in the young Israeli polity, which leads to a re-evaluation of

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Ben-Gurion’s mythical power and influence on everything that happened in the Yishuv and Israel, necessitates greater detail. My work on this political biography began in the mid-1970s, when for about a year I collected the initial materials and interviewed the older members of the Shertok-Sharett family and some of his intimate colleagues and associates, who, sadly, have since passed away. This initial work enabled me to publish a monograph and a number of articles, in which I introduced some of my main new ideas about Sharett himself, BenGurion, and the Israeli polity, such as the distinction between Ben-Gurion’s ‘conflict resolution’ and Sharett’s ‘conflict management’ approaches to Israel’s most existential problems in the spheres of defence and foreign affairs; Sharett’s essential role in shaping Israel’s position of non-alignment after its estab­ lishment, as well as its attitudes towards Asian countries, and so on; Sharett’s and Ben-Gurion’s profoundly divergent approaches to the ArabIsraeli confrontation and to Diaspora Jews; the view that essentially the Sinai Campaign was an Israeli ‘war of choice’ and the fact that the hard-liners’ urge to launch such a war had bedevilled Israeli politics since the end of the 1948 war for Jewish independence in part of Palestine. It has gratified me that these and other early conclusions of mine have been quite widely accepted and have influenced further detailed works in this area. Various personal and academic reasons, among then the unavailability of archival materials, staved off the continuation of the work on the full biography until the mid-1980s; it now comes to its final fruition in this volume and in an even more detailed Hebrew version. Yet, the present English version is not a translation of the Hebrew one, but rather a book specially prepared for English readers. One of the main reasons for the postponement of the completion of this book was the unavailability in the 1970s of much of the necessary documentation. Like recent publications of other historians on the formative period of the Israeli polity, the work on this biography benefited greatly from the growing body of academic ‘revisionist’ lit­ erature, which has been produced by a new generation of scholars. Like these historians, I think that access to a vast quantity of private, communal, and governmental documents is of great importance. This in turn was facilitated by the release and publication of various series of documents, which, in addition to secondary literature and interviews, served in preparing this book. The Central Zionist Archives, the Israel State Archives, the Ben-Gurion Archive, the Mapai Archive, the Histadrut, Haganah, and Lavon Archives, as well as the private papers of the Shertok-Sharett family, constituted the indispensable sources of the vari­ ous parts of this book. In retrospect, I am not sorry that the completion

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of this biography has been delayed until now. I feel that it is now fuller and richer, although shortage of space has precluded dealing in great detail with Sharett’s final years as chairman of the Jewish Agency. However, it should be remembered that during these years Sharett was already seriously ill and the scope of his activities was limited. This political biography, for which I have already received the Israel Prime Minister’s Award for works on Israeli presidents and prime ministers, is ‘revisionist’ not only because it uses primary sources, but also because it re-evaluates the position and views of one of Israel’s foremost founding fathers, who for many years was almost totally forgotten, and sheds light on his relations with the legendary Ben-Gurion, highlights the role of the moderates in Mapai and in the Labour party, reassesses the distribution of power among them and the activists, and thus rethinks the structure and patterns of Israeli politics. To achieve these goals the personal side of Sharett’s life has been somewhat played down, but I hope that there is still enough to provide an accurate and vivid portrait of this moderate and pragmatic member of what I have called the ‘service aristocracy’ of the Yishuv and Israel. During the work on this biography I have benefited from support extended by many individuals and institutions which I acknowledge with pleasure. First let me express my gratitude to a number of these institutions. I have received grants and other types of assistance from the Eshkol Institute and the Institute of Contemporary Jewish Studies, both at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, as well as the Histadrut. Most of the work was done during the period that I served as Director of the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University; although I did not receive any grant from the Institute for this project, the Institute and its workers have extended valuable help during my grappling with the biography. Many librarians and archivists in the following institutions helped me and my assistants in collecting the necessary materials: the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem; the Israel State Archive in Jerusalem; the Public Record Office in London; the Ben-Gurion Archive in Sdeh Boker; the Mapai Archive in Kfar Saba; the Haganah Archive in Tel Aviv; the Histadrut Archive in Tel Aviv; and the Lavon Archive in Huldah. To all of them I owe thanks. Similarly I am grateful to all those who agreed to be interviewed by me and my research assistants, some of whom are mentioned in the bibliography. A number o f my colleagues have read parts or all of the manuscript and have extended valuable comments and suggestions. They include the late Yehoshafat Harkabi and Dan (Dindush) Horowitz, Uri Bialer,

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Yitzhak Galnoor, Yosef Gomy, Emanuel Gutmann, Ahuviah Malkin, and Yaacov Sharett. I have discussed various aspects of the work with numerous other individuals in Israel and abroad during my frequent visits to the United States and England, especially during my stays at the universities of Oxford, Cornell, Wisconsin-Madison, CalifomiaBerkeley, and Pittsburgh. I have also benefited from the valuable comments of the two anonymous readers at the Oxford University Press. I should like to extend my sincere thanks to all of them. All the writing was done while I was teaching at the Political Science Department of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and serving as Director of the Leonard Davis Institute. I am grateful to many members of the department and the Institute, especially to Shlomo Avineri, Avraham Diskin, Yitzhak Shichor, Zeev Sternhell, and Dean Gershon Ben-Shakar of the Social Science Faculty for their great encouragement and various types of support during a personally difficult period. At the Leonard Davis Institute, I should like to mention especially the help of my former assistants Noa Padan, Hanna Tee, and Dvorah Levi, and that of the editors David Homik and Aviva Ben-Azar. Special thanks for invaluable help should go to my two research assistants: Bella Stem and Adir Olshanshki. For editing an earlier version of the manuscript I am indebted to Norma Schneider and for its typing to Sarah Shulman. My thanks also go to the Staff at the Oxford University Press: to Chief-Editor Tim Barton who has shown great patience; and to desk editors Vivienne Smith, Hilary Walford, and Dominic Byatt and copyeditor Mary Worthington for their outstanding work. Last but not least I want to mention the great love, understanding, and support that I have always received from my delightful and talented daughters Hadass and Sigal. And, last but by no means least, my beloved spouse Naomi was an endless source of personal and intellectual support, again, during a difficult period. It is to her that this book is dedicated. For errors, inaccuracies, and shortcomings, I alone am responsible. G. S. Jerusalem, November 1994 NOTES 1. Moshe Sharett, like so many other Israeli leaders and officials, translated his original family name—Shertok—to a meaningful Hebrew name.

CONTENTS Abbreviations

XV

Introduction: Sharett’s Forgotten Struggles 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

Roots The Road to National Leadership Ascendance The Second World War Holocaust A State in the Making Preparing for Statehood ‘If Not Now, When?’ Light at the End of the Tunnel ‘We Must Go Forward!’ The First Israeli Foreign Minister Non-Alignment A Lament for Generations to Come? ‘Truce, Yes; Peace, No!’ Membership in the ‘Family of Nations’ American Pressures ‘If I Forget Thee, Oh Jerusalem!’ A Swing towards the West A Year of Troubles ‘A People that Does not Dwell Alone’ A Coalition of Two The ‘Obvious’ Heir A Beleaguered Prime Minister The Mishap ‘A State of Law and Order or of Robbery?’ Selection and Elections The Struggle over the Sharett Line Resignation

1

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6 34 59 104 138 168 207 244 271 301 337 370 395 425 448 469 496 537 569 615 653 680 712 750 770 808 841 859

XIV 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Contents ‘My Country has Deserted Me!’ New Missions ‘Fear and [Political] Greed’ Last Battles The Sharett Legacy The Last Triumph and Demise

888 922 942 959 977 1016

Bibliography

1022

Index

1033

ABBREVIATIONS Bilu

(Hebrew: Beit Yaacov Lechu Venelcha) (Let us go, the house of Jacob), an early Zionist pioneering organization CAB Cabinet Decisions CIA Central Intelligence Agency CP Cabinet Papers CZA Central Zionist Archives DMZ Demilitarized Zone Documents Israel State Archives, Political and Diplomatic Documents, various volumes DPs Displaced Persons Etzel/Irgun (Hebrew: Irgun Zvai Leumi) National Military Organization, the underground military wing of the Zionist Revisionist movement FM Foreign Ministry papers, the Israel State Archives FRUS Foreign Relations o f the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, various years) Haganah (Hebrew: Defence), the mainstream underground militia of the Yishuv HM G His Majesty’s Government Hovevie (Hebrew: The Lovers of Zion) Zion Israel Defence Forces IDF Israel State Archives ISA (Hebrew: Lohamei Herut Israel) (Freedom Fighters LHI of Israel), an extreme right—extreme left Jewish underground military organization Mixed Armistice Commission MAC (Hebrew: Mifleget Poalei Eretz Israel) the Labour party Mapai (Hebrew: Mifleget Hapoalim Hameuhedet) the United Mapam Workers party, a Socialist party Member of Knesset » MK (Hebrew) Israeli co-operative settlement Moshav (Hebrew: Institute) Mossad Lealyia Bet, the organization Mossad for illegal immigration to Palestine North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO National Security Council (US) NSC United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission PCC

XVI PD PRO Raft SACME UJA UNRWA UNSCOP UNTSO WZO

Abbreviations The Personal Diary of Moshe Sharett, published in eight volumes Public Record Office (Hebrew: Reshimat Poalei Israel) The Israeli Workers Party, Ben-Gurion’s splinter party Supreme Allied Command Middle East United Jewish Appeal United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East United Nations Special Committee on Palestine United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization World Zionist Organization

In the midst of the storm and turbulence engulfing us, we need a compass. There can be no other compass but our consciences. For what binds all of us together is moral considerations. (Moshe Sharett, Personal Diary)

Introduction: Sharett’s Forgotten Struggles A lthough largely forgotten at home and abroad, Moshe Sharett was one of the most prominent and well-known founding fathers of modem Israel. As chairman of the powerful and prestigious Political Department of the Jewish Agency in pre-state Palestine, as Israel’s first dominant minister of foreign affairs, and as its second prime minister, he served the Yishuv and the young fledgling Jewish state with inspiration, dedication, and distinction. From the mid-1930s until his death in 1965, he was a renowned and influential member of the small order of visionaries who shaped the main features of Israel. But, above all, Sharett was one of the most humane, realistic, and moderate political leaders during the Yishuv’s period and Israel’s first decade of existence. His humanity, moderation, and political chivalry, that were not characteristic of his arch-rival David Ben-Gurion and of most of his contemporaries, motivated this study of the man and his times. His virtues, that paradoxically led to his political demise in the strenuous Israeli polity, prompted the attempt to go beyond a mere political biography of the leader himself. Any penetrating study of such a pragmatic and prescient statesman, who was an eminent figure in the mobilized political élite that dominated the Yishuv and Israel, must delve into the intricate social and political order as well as into the leader’s relations with other contemporary Zionist and Israeli politicians, in particular with Ben-Gurion. It must also reconsider the complex patterns according to which members of this closely knit political élite converted their visions into critical decisions. In its choice of focus on the motivations, decisions, and actions of Sharett and through him of the entire group of talented and strongwilled leaders, who embarked on one of the most daring national adventures in the twentieth century, and succeeded in realizing their collective dream, this is also a revision of the history of the high politics of both the Yishuv and of Israel. While the time-span covered by this biography is almost an entire century, it focuses on a period of thirty years—the mid-1930s to the mid-1960s. These were the formative decades of the Yishuv and Israel, as well as the crucial period in which the Jews became firmly locked into

2

Introduction

the protracted conflict with both local Arabs and* the Arab states. This was also the most significant and productive period in Sharett’s political career. This volume therefore aims at probing some of the principal dilemmas that vexed the leaders of the Yishuv and the Jewish state during these three decisive decades: their attitudes towards the British and the Americans; their relations with the leaders of the Palestinian Arabs and of neighbouring Arab states; their reactions to the Holocaust and their stance towards the pitiful remnants of what had been flourishing Jewish communities in Europe; their timing of the establishment of the Jewish state; their debates about peace and war with the Palestinians and the Arab states; their orientation towards East and West; their profound doubts about German reparations; their role in the 1954 Mishap in Egypt and in the ensuing politically disastrous Lavon Affair; their arguments for and against the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and their attitudes towards Diaspora Jews. An additional reason for embarking on this project is that the moral and political questions involved in these almost forgotten occurrences, processes, and dilemmas, all of which concerned Moshe Sharett deeply during the half-century that he devoted to building and bolstering the Jewish national home and state, are relevant to current developments in Israel and the Middle East, to Israeli relations with Diaspora Jews, and to the still unsolved aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This study of Sharett and his times provides an account of his hither­ to untold, and again mostly forgotten, struggle with Ben-Gurion, as well as between their respective camps in the Zionist movement and in Mapai—the Land of Israel Workers party. This was the struggle between the ‘moderates’—in terms of their social democratic values and attitudes, realism in domestic and international politics, and readiness for accommodation in international affairs—and the ‘activists’—in terms of what was known as ‘cruel Zionism’ at home and in the dispersed Jewish nation, and hard-line towards the Arabs—in the Labour camp. In more than one sense the story of these struggles is also the history of the moderate camp in the Yishuv and Israel Labour movement, of the compromises reached between the moderates and the activist hard-liners, and of their respective contributions to the establishment and well-being of the Jewish state. This study, which is critical of certain aspects of the accepted narrative about that period, also describes the moderates’ main victories and eyentual defeat. More specifically, it propounds the view that for two formative decades, from the mid-1930s until the early-1950s, the moderates succeeded in influencing the Yishuv’s and state’s operative

Introduction

3

goals and hence in curbing political and military adventures propagated by the hard-liners, and thereby significantly influenced developments in the Yishuv, the state, and the region. Finally, it describes the moderate legacy bequeathed by Sharett and its relevance to the realities of Israel and the Middle East towards the end of the twentieth century. Although viewed from the perspective of a single political figure, this is the story of a peer group of young Jews who, unlike many other members of the Yishuv’s and Israel’s political élite, were educated in Palestine rather than in Eastern Europe. Following their careers, and thereby challenging several assertions that have been made by the dominant activist school in Israeli historiography, this work offers an alternative account of some stormy and controversial events in the history of the Yishuv and Israel. While not attempting to play down Ben-Gurion’s and the activists’ role in shaping the regime and behaviour of the Jewish national home and state, it endeavours to emphasize the contributions of other prominent leaders in the revival of the Jewish polity. In this respect, this volume provides different perspectives on some of the legendary political figures of Israel and on their internecine encounters and struggles. The final open encounter in the protracted struggle between Sharett and Ben-Gurion occurred in February 1965, during the Tenth Conven­ tion of Mapai, then still the hegemonic ruling party in Israel. At this convention, the political future of the party, its leaders, including Ben-Gurion, Levi Shkolnik-Eshkol, Golda Meyerson-Meir, and of Is­ raeli politics in general, was about to be decided. Expecting to witness a unique political drama, a large crowd filled Tel Aviv’s Habimah Audi­ torium to capacity. Even the most experienced and utterly cynical delegates and guests assembled in that hall could not hide their anticipa­ tion as the convention’s first session began. There was silence in the hall as the ailing Moshe Sharett, seated in a wheelchair, was brought by his son, Yaacov Sharett, to the centre of the brightly lit stage. As the ageing and frail leader was taking his place at the presidium table, the crowd spontaneously broke into thunderous applause. Those sitting in the front rows clearly noticed that Sharett’s long and eventually terminal ailment had left its harrowing marks. His face clearly reflected his physical pain, as well as mental agony about the state of the country and his party. His previously thick black hair and moustache were now grey, almost white. His high forehead, heavy eyebrows, and sharply pointed nose had now become so accentuated that his face resembled a death-mask. And, most strikingly, the formerly ever-present light in his dark eyes had faded. Yet despite his obvious

4

Introduction

discomfort, Sharett was as dauntless as ever and probably even more determined than during certain periods in the heyday of his career. The attentive audience felt sympathy towards Sharett, and some even harboured remorse over his political fate. Everyone present there knew that, ill as he was, Sharett planned to use the party’s convention to voice publicly his indignation, which over the years had turned into outrage, about Israel’s and the party’s situation. They knew that he intended to excoriate his former colleague in Mapai’s coalitional leadership, BenGurion, whom he regarded as responsible for the state’s and party’s malaise, to launch his last major political assault on the ‘old man’ (as Ben-Gurion was then called), and to exercise his moral authority to sway the convention’s resolutions—and, through these resolutions, future Mapai and Israeli politics. It was also expected that Sharett would seize this opportunity to align himself with Mapai’s centrist, and mostly moderate, leadership, including Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, Zalman Arrane, and Pinhas Sapir, in an effort to resolve the calamitous Lavon Affair, which had plagued Israeli politics in general and had bedevilled Mapai in particular. Sharett felt the charged atmosphere and knew that everyone, including Ben-Gurion, who had just concluded his own opening speech, was waiting to hear his words with bated breath. As expected, in this last great speech, Sharett forcefully attacked ‘the position, the line, the demands, and the orientation of Ben-Gurion’. Maintaining that BenGurion’s drawn-out campaign during the entire scandalous Lavon Affair had brought about a national political tragedy as well as considerable affliction for Mapai, Sharett implored his fellow delegates to end the party’s and the state’s inadmissable quagmire by marshalling their courage to rebuke Ben-Gurion for his behaviour in the Affair.1 As had been anticipated, to a great extent under the impression of Sharett’s speech, the delegates voted against Ben-Gurion, and eventually the ‘old man’ left Mapai to form a minuscule oppositional party, Rail (the Israel Workers’ party). These were triumphant moments for Sharett and the moderates. During those short moments after his speech, he, his supporters, and other veteran delegates and party members, who remembered the landmarks and turning-points in his life and long political career, were convinced that the ‘Sharett line’ would prevail in Israeli politics. How­ ever, nothing is more fickle and unreliable than the mood and memory of a newly bommation. In reality» in the course of the tumultuous events that have shattered the Jewish nation and state in the second half of this

Introduction

5

century, the national collective memory has jettisoned incidents, pro­ cesses, and leaders, among them Sharett and his legacy. Sharett’s many contributions to the spectacular growth of the Yishuv, to the dramatic establishment of the Jewish state, and to Israel’s early evolution, as well as to the emergence of a politically moderate school in the Jewish polity, have been almost eradicated over the past quartercentury since Sharett’s death in 1965. One of the aims of this biography is therefore to restore Sharett’s reputation and contributions, as well as those of the moderate camp, to the Zionist and Israeli political annals. Thus, the purpose is to reassess the qualities of this leader, his philo­ sophy, his own role as well as the role of moderates and moderation in the history of the Jewish state and their relevance to the present peace process and winds of change in the Middle East.

NOTES 1. Sharett’s speech at Tenth Convention of Mapai, 17 Feb. 1965, CZA, A/245/87.

1

Roots The Shertok-Sharett family saga, which was abruptly cut off with Moshe Sharett’s death in 1965, began a century earlier in the Jewish Pale of Settlement in tsarist Russia. The two individuals at the centre of this saga—Yaacov Shertok and his son Moshe Shertok-Sharett1—shared many physical features, psychological traits, and political inclinations. Moreover, both achieved prominence in the Jewish community in Palestine. As is often the case, a family’s humble beginnings do not presage its distinguished future. This was also true of the Shertok-Sharett ‘clan’, as it was called by the members of the family. The family’s history in the mid-nineteenth century foretold neither its future ascendance nor its pathetic demise. Although for some of his early acquaintances, it was not surprising that Yaacov Shertok’s personality, and his political philo­ sophy, ideas, and style, exerted a profound influence on a group of enthusiastic young men, yet no one could have guessed that his unequi­ vocal devotion to the Zionist dream would result in his son’s playing an important role in its realization. But the consequences speak for them­ selves. Influenced by his revered father, Moshe Sharett, who was groomed for a life of service to the Jewish nation, together with his brothers-in-law Eliahu Golomb, Dov Hoz, and Shaul Meirov-Avigur, and a few other intimate friends, formed a closely knit group that eventually emerged as a distinct segment of the political élite of the Yishuv. As was the case with many of the Yishuv’s and the Jewish state’s renowned founding fathers, the unpretentious origins of Moshe Sher­ tok’s family were in Eastern Europe. In the mid-1860s, the Shertok family lived in Pinsk, a small dreary town on the edge of the Pripet marshes of White Russia. Physically and psychologically, the Jews of Pinsk resided within the Pale of Settlement. Chaim Weizmann, who was also bom in a village not far from Pinsk, lived and was educated in the town, and later became Israel’s first president as well as Moshe Sharett’s patron and elder colleague, would recall that despite the isolation and poverty of thevtown and its Jews, it had once been a significant active Jewish religious and cultural centre. Many generations of prominent rabbis and spiritual leaders lived and worked there.2

Roots

1

The long and rich cultural and intellectual history of his home town would influence the aspirations and career of Yaacov Shertok, who was bom in 1861. Shertok’s childhood coincided with a period in which Russia was undergoing indecisive yet meaningful reforms under Tsar Alexander II. The reforms introduced by the tsar improved the legal, political, social, and economic situation of particular segments of Rus­ sian society, especially of the intellectuals and embryonic middle classes. These moderately liberal reforms also substantially affected the Jews of the realm, who were yearning for change. Along with these reforms the Russian government ceased its efforts to convert Jews to Christianity and to Russify them. It revoked compulsory military service by Jews, limitations on their dwelling outside the Pale, and restrictions on their occupations. As they had with the Russian society in general, the reforms of Alexander II encouraged and expedited the emergence of a Jewish middle class. Yaacov Shertok’s was among these lower-middle-class Jewish families who first were confused and later benefited from the reforms. Like in other families of the same milieu and status, the men in the Shertok family were tom between Jewish orthodoxy and traditionalism on the one hand, and Jewish enlightenment and emancipation on the other. Also typically in families of that background, the women in the Shertok family maintained their traditional customs and attitudes towards the practical and spiritual aspects of life. Yaacov Shertok, who from early childhood displayed a strong will, almost stubbornness, and an inquis­ itive mind, opted for enlightenment and emancipation.3 Showing clear intellectual aspirations and capabilities, as a rebellious youngster he disregarded his parents’ objections, and after completing his elementary studies in a Heder (a traditional religious Jewish educational institute for young boys, usually small), he applied to a non-Jewish Russian high school and was accepted. Upon graduation from this school, with his father’s tacit approval, he began an arduous journey that took him far away from the traditional Hasidic background of his mother’s family. Like many ‘enlightened’ young Jews of that period, he experienced further ideological shifts, which entailed agonizing over his future steps; after many adventures that involved wandering from one Jewish centre to another, in 1880 the 19-year-old Yaacov Shertok reached Warsaw then one of the larger and more energetic centres of Eastern European Jewry. In Warsaw, he came under the mesmerizing influence of the progressive, albeit populist, ideas of the Narodnaya Volya movement, which was engaged with missionary fervour in efforts to transform Russian society and particularly the lives of the peasantry in the empire.

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Impressed by the Narodniks ' emphasis on the intellectuals’ total dedica­ tion to serving the oppressed masses of peasants while living among them, Shertok took up academic studies in agronomy. When he applied these ideas to the Jews who lived under appalling conditions in the realm, he concluded that through agriculture and other modem product­ ive occupations, the Jews could be ‘normalized’ and thereby acquire features similar to those of the majority of Russian society. During his days in Warsaw, Yaacov Shertok hoped that the Jews would be able to attain these goals in Russia without assimilation. Shertok’s dream of embracing an entirely new way of life, and leading his brethren in the same direction in the host country, was not fulfilled.4 In March 1881, his studies of agronomy in Warsaw were abruptly and brutally interrupted by the events that followed the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. After the tsar’s assassination by anarchists, who were not content with the pace and extent of his liberal reforms and who demanded more sweeping change, his son and successor, Tsar Alexander III, revoked most of his father’s reforms from conservative ideological conviction and in revenge for his father’s assassination. As part of this reactionary reversal, the new tsar reintroduced the old repressive polit­ ical order. The Jews in particular were again targeted as scapegoats. This time they were also accused of the economic hardships that had befallen Russia in that calamitous year. Profoundly influenced by his traditional­ ist, nationalistic, and anti-Semitic advisers, the young tsar’s intention was to divert attention from the severe economic conditions Russia was then experiencing. As on previous occasions, to achieve this goal his government initiated and executed a new wave of devastating pogroms against the Jews, which eventually hit Warsaw. However, Yaacov Shertok, who resided in a non-Jewish neighbour­ hood in Warsaw, and behaved and dressed like his fellow Gentile students, did not escape the brunt of the 1881 pogrom. He was not personally hurt by the ugly outburst in December of that year but while he was wandering, dumbfounded, in one of the ravaged Jewish quarters in the city, he was shocked, and later suffered a severe trauma, when he involuntarily witnessed the inhuman smashing of a Jewish infant’s head. That appalling murder of a single child, on top of his despair about the fate of the entire community, struck Shertok like a bolt of lightning, shattering beyond repair his new life and ‘new world’. With that dreadful image on his mind, he abruptly and drastically altered his route. He left Warsaw immediately and returned to the Pale, and thus to Judaism. Symbolically, he did it by returning to Pinsk and defiantly adding Yehudi (Jew) as an additional middle name.5 Back at

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his parents’ home in Pinsk, he joined a secret pre-Zionist student association—Beit Israel Lechu Venelcha (Bilu)—which was then affili­ ated with the fast-spreading Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion movement), a group which was destined to become a legend and source of inspiration to Jews throughout the European Diaspora and Palestine.6 Since he was a determined young man, not long after joining the Bilu association, Shertok drew the ultimate conclusion from his new passion­ ate inclination towards the Jewish national redemptionist movement: he decided to emigrate to the remote and desolate Palestine. After brief stays in Vienna and Constantinople, in June 1882 Shertok, then only in his early twenties, and a fellow Bilu member whom he had met in Constantinople, arrived at the colourful, noisy, and messy port of Jaffa, which then served as the main gateway to the Holy Land. The two young and enthusiastic pioneers were the first members of Bilu to arrive in Palestine. A few weeks after their arrival Shertok and his friend were joined by the other twelve members of the group. Together they formed the first organized contingent of Jewish pioneers to emigrate to Palestine from Russia and Romania in modem times. Other Jews arriving at that period in Palestine emigrated as individuals or with their families. The fourteen members of that small group of enthusiasts were the avant-garde of the first organized Jewish Aliyah, that is, the first wave of Eastern European Jewish emigration to the desolate Palestine, which was, as Yaacov Shertok and his friends soon discovered, under a harshly repressive Turkish rule. Next they ‘discovered’ that Palestine was not an empty country, as many Diaspora Jews had imagined, and that it was populated by a predominantly unfriendly Arab community. To their considerable consternation, the idealistic pioneers also soon found out that the Old Jewish Yishuv—the small, traditional religious Jewish community in Palestine—as well as the first Jewish farmers, were almost equally hostile to the enthusiastic young Lovers of Zion, and that partly because of Turkish neglect, the prevailing economic and physical condi­ tions in the country were far from comfortable. Nevertheless, during the first months in his old-new homeland, Shertok’s stubborn determination to overcome the initial substantial hardships, coupled with his deeply ingrained sense of justice, was already gaining him the respect of his friends in Bilu as well as a reputation among other pioneers m Palestine. Eventually, his reputation spread beyond the new Yishuv to wider circles of the Hovevei Zion movement in Russia. Despite the social isolation, security dangers, political uncertainty, and economic backwardness that he and his friends encountered in the hot, arid, and uncultivated country, Shertok fell completely in love with the

10

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Holy Land. He and his friends were not simply sharing the dream of building a Jewish national home there and thereby ‘normalizing’ the Jewish people, but they also became passionate lovers of Eretz Israel. Motivated by that idea and passion, during their first months in Palestine, after a short struggle with the director, Shertok and his comrades succeeded in earning a meagre income by tilling the land of Mikve Israel, the first Jewish agricultural school in Palestine. From Mikve Israel the group moved and worked for a few months in Rishon Lezion, one of the first Jewish settlements in modem times. Finally, the groups settled in Bilu’s own village, Gedera, where the members of the group, including Shertok, were furnished with their own small plots. However, poor health, together with failure to get the land to produce, and lack of money, caused Shertok to move to Jerusalem, where he joined another small Bilu group that had established a crafts and gift workshop and shop there. The awesome historical background, the holiness, the sleepy beauty, the cosmopolitan aura, and what he deemed as the bright future prospects of the eternal city, cast such a spell on Shertok that, for the rest of his life, he would consider himself a captive of Jerusalem. Later, he bestowed that great affection for Palestine and Jerusalem on his children. Despite his attraction to Jerusalem, his loyalty to Zion, and his dedication to the idea of a Jewish national revival there, Shertok returned unhappily to Russia in 1886. He was temporarily defeated by the primitive conditions in Palestine, the lack of proper employment, the chronic shortage of funds, the sense of great loneliness, and increasing poor health. Once back in Pinsk, Shertok found that neither Russia nor that forsaken town could ever again be home to a passionate lover of Zion, who was hopelessly enamoured with Eretz Israel and dreamt of return­ ing to the Holy Land, despite his five harsh and lean years there. Restless and painfully yearning for his beloved historical homeland, Shertok stayed with his family in Pinsk only briefly. He soon began looking for a wife, suitable employment, and Jewish nationalist comrades. Sensing that his chances of finding all these would be greater in a large city with a sizeable Jewish community, he moved to the bustling cosmopolitan Odessa. This choice was not accidental: part of his family lived there, and the busy Black Sea port was then a significant and prosperous Jewish centre as well as a haven for Hovevei Zion. In Odessa, he soon met and married Fannie Lev, who, like himself, was bom into a Jewish middle-class

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family. A talented, vivacious, and well-educated Jewish teacher, Fannie Lev-Shertok was also a resourceful young woman, who was neither afraid nor reluctant to help to earn a living when the young Shertok family began to grow. In Odessa, and later in Kehrson, where the young couple settled for a longer period and where their son Moshe was bom, Yaacov Shertok found employment as a journalist, writer, translator, and educator. He could engage in these intellectual occupations because his young wife shouldered most of the daily burdens. His relative freedom from such mundane affairs allowed him enough time also for political activities. Consequently, he became a devoted member of the newly established Zionist movement. Although Fannie Shertok was busy running the couple’s small stationery shop and attending to other family affairs, she too showed a keen interest in her husband’s political preoccupations, including his involvement in Zionist politics.7 During the Shertoks’ entire sojourn in Kehrson, which Yaacov described as his ‘new exile’, he maintained continuous contacts with his friends, who were working and suffering in Palestine. He was primarily waiting impatiently for an opportunity to return to the Holy Land. In the mean time, the Shertok family’s life was geared to providing Yaacov with enough time, space, and peace of mind to pursue not just his literary and intellectual concerns, but also his political interests. Although he was an authorit­ arian, somewhat vain, and self-indulgent person, his commitment to his ideas and ideals, as well as care for his wife and children, was such that rather than being resented or feared, Shertok was both loved and admired by his family. Yaacov and Fannie Shertok had five children: three daughters, Ada, Rivka, and Geula, and two sons, Moshe and Yehuda. Ada was the Shertoks’ first child, Moshe was their second, and Yehuda was the youngest. But the obvious favourite son of Yaacov and of the entire family was Moshe, who was bom on 17 October 1894. Like all the Shertok children, Moshe was talented and compassionate. From early childhood, his awareness of and sensitivity to his surround­ ings were such that he showed certain signs of recurrent anxieties, a seemingly great need for the love and appreciation of his elders and peers, and a degree of insecurity. Yet from an equally eirly age, the good-looking Moshe evinced also a harmonious personality: he was good-natured, well-mannered, avoided conflicts with his seniors and peers, and developed a peculiar sense of humour which was both self-deprecating and ironical. He was inclined towards analytical think­ ing and always preferred reasonable compromise to getting his own way

12

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at the cost of antagonizing or humiliating others. He was endowed with a musical ear and displayed a gift for story-telling. Already as a child, he showed clear signs of having an impressive grasp of languages and linguistics. Above all, he had a well-developed sense of curiosity and an ability to analyse complex questions. These qualities and talents prompted the caring Yaacov Shertok to pin high hopes on Moshe and to spend much time, energy, and money on fostering his upbringing and education. His grateful son reciprocated this love, interest, and attention by developing a strong attachment to his father’s national beliefs and political pursuits. Eventually, Moshe Shertok would become inspired by his father’s moderate nationalist and liberal social and political views. In the meantime and in line with his growing adoration of his father and his ideas, Moshe became imbued at an early age with great devotion to Zionist ideas and ecstatic love for the Holy Land and Jerusalem. Thus from early childhood, he was thoroughly acquainted with Hovevei Zion and Zionist jargon and activities. But Moshe was not entirely dominated by his father. He also enjoyed his mother’s affection and attention and showed an equal attachment to her. In accordance with his father’s modem educational ideas, the young Shertok was first sent to a reformed Heder (a Jewish traditional, albeit modernized, equivalent of an elementary school), where he learned secular as well as religious subjects. The purpose of this phase of his education was to inculcate in him moderate religious and national conceptions of Jewishness. When he had completed his studies in the Heder, the question of his future education arose. As Yaacov Shertok remembered his own early and not entirely happy attempts at assimila­ tion, only after great hesitation did he register his son in a local Russian preparatory school, where he was the only Jewish pupil. While Yaacov showed considerable reluctance, Fannie Shertok did not suffer any indecision with regard to where Moshe should study—she avidly sup­ ported sending him to the Russian school. Although initially this school was an intimidating place for the young and delicate student, and the only Jewish one, Moshe’s scholarly talents were soon noted and nurtured by his Gentile teachers. His fortunes there improved as soon as he found a friend in a physically strong fellow Russian stu­ dent.8 Even though the school was by no means free of anti-Semitism, once he had made some friends, Moshe attended it without undue traumatic experiences. In this school he was introduced to the Russian language and culture, which he treasured throughout his life. None the less, he would never forget the hard experience of studying among Gentiles.

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During Moshe’s elementary school years, dramatic new developments were affecting the Jews of the Diaspora, and especially those in Central and Eastern Europe. Once again this Jewry was facing difficult choices between a number of contradictory routes: whether to fortify traditional orthodoxy or to foster religious reforms; whether to adopt Marxist, socialist, or liberal ideas; and whether to promote communal Jewish aspirations in Eastern Europe or to give up and join the massive emigration to the West. To complicate these incompatible cultural, ideological, and practical options further, a shining star was rising on the Jewish horizon in the twilight of the nineteenth century: Theodor (Benyamin Zeev) Herzl, who was then moulding political Zionism that took the form of the World Zionist movement in the mid-1890s. Like most of his friends in Hovevei Zion, Yaacov was swept along with the tide, became an enthusiastic, registered, and active member of the new Jewish national movement, and was soon crowned leader of one of the four separate minuscule Zionist factions that had emerged within the small Jewish community of Kehrson—two consisted of the richer members of the community, one of religious members, and the fourth, which Yaacov led, of younger, poorer, but more intellectually inclined and rebellious members. The very young Moshe Shertok, always close to his father, was present at numerous meetings that were held in the Shertok home and absorbed the gist of the Zionist ideology when following the lengthy and circuitous debates over goals, strategies, and tactics that were held there. Although Moshe could not grasp all the nuances of these debates, he was immensely impressed by the parti­ cipants’ great enthusiasm, their idealistic verve, and deep involvement in the lodge’s activities. In addition to the internal divergent trends then tearing apart Russian Jewry, this community was assaulted by the increasing hostility towards it of its host society which was itself experiencing increasing turbulence. The new afflictions and unrest in Russia, especially after the failure of the 1905 revolution, caused its government to deflect criticism by unleashing a new wave of pogroms on the Jews. When the pogroms finally occurred, they shattered the entire Russian Jewish community, including that of Kehrson. On the other hand, these pogroms served to swell the ranks of the Zionist movement and subsequently to precipitate the Second Aliyah to Palestine. Once again the Shertok family was not directly affected by the pogrom in Kehrson. The fact that they resided in a Gentile neighbourhood saved their lives on this occasion also. But the politically aware Yaacov and Fannie Shertok were among the first whose fears and frustrations

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motivated them to leave Russia. But rather than emigrating to Western Europe or the United States, like so many other Eastern European Jews, they not surprisingly headed for Palestine together with other members of the Shertok ‘clan’. Thus, almost a quarter of a century after his first attempt at immigration and settlement in Palestine, Yaacov Shertok’s unaltered passionate love for Palestine and his pragmatism determined this decision.9 In making it, Yaacov and Fannie Shertok further demon­ strated their unaltered proclivity for combining practical, emotional, and ideological considerations. This basic principle influenced their children’s approach to the personal, social, and political issues which they con­ fronted throughout their lives. There was a marked difference between the First and Second Aliyot (migrations) in general, as well as between Yaacov Shertok’s two personal Aliyot to Palestine in particular. By 1906, the time that Shertok made up his mind to leave Russia again, the New Yishuv was larger, better established, and its leadership more skilled; the Arab-Jewish conflict was more blatant; and Yaacov Shertok himself was almost 45 years old and a veteran member of the Zionist movement. Moreover, as noted, on his second Aliyah, he did not go to Palestine on his own but transplanted the entire ‘clan’, including his wife and five children, his mother, his wealthy bachelor brother, Zeev Shertok, and his sister Gutta Katinsky and her family. On this occasion, Yaacov was resolute in his decision to spend the rest of his life in the East. After arriving in the Holy Land, more experienced but no less idealistic or enthusiastic, Yaacov and the ‘clan’ settled in the Arab-Jew­ ish town of Jaffa for a brief period. Still convinced that only through agriculture could the Jews be redeemed and normalized, he was dream­ ing of working the land and tried to reclaim his old plot in Gedera. Because the land had been given to some of his previous friends and cultivated by them, he failed to regain it. Disappointed with the behaviour of his old comrades, Yaacov Shertok severed his relations with Bilu. Nevertheless, still determined to till the land, he and the entire clan set out on an unprecedented adventure in the Jewish community: Yaacov and Zeev Shertok leased a farm and mill from the rich and influential Husseini family, the family of the notorious Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the future Mufti of Jerusalem, who would eventually become an arch-enemy of the Jewish national home. The farm that the family intended to lease was located near Ein-Siniya, a small, poor, and dusty Arab village on the Jerusalem-Nablus road.10Strongly believing in the fundamental need to settle in the country but realizing the remoteness and isolation of the

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place, the idealistic yet pragmatic Yaacov Shertok and the rest of the elder members of the ‘clan’ had nurtured hopes of convincing other Jews to join them there to establish a larger permanent Jewish settlement. With these hopes and plans in mind, they leased the farm and the mill for two years. On the leased farm, among the local Arab villagers and hired workers, who brought their grain to the mill and shopped at the small store established by the family, the young Moshe Shertok gained a superb knowledge of Arabic (by the age of 12 he had displayed a remarkable grasp of both Oriental and European languages) and first-hand ac­ quaintance with the local Arab community’s structure, culture, and customs. Although Moshe was young when the clan lived on the farm, the intimate interaction with the villagers and the resulting knowledge of the Arab community shaped his early views on Jewish-Arab relations. Although Moshe was very far from showing any hostility towards the Arabs, demonstrating a great deal of empathy and respect for the villagers and the entire Arab community, at this young age he was already palpably aware of the profound differences between his European-Jewish family and the Palestinians, and more generally between the two ethno-religious communities. Life in Palestine under Turkish rule, especially on the isolated farm in the remote Arab village, was gruelling for a cultured middle-class European Jewish family. Thus, while the Shertok family’s legendary attempt to work the bam hills of Samaria generated immense interest and admiration throughout the small Yishuv and among Zionist lodges in the Diaspora, it proved too idealistic and economically almost disastrous for the ‘clan’. Eventually, the attempt to settle in the midst of an Arab area failed despite the Shertoks’ courage, stamina, and substan­ tial investment. It failed because of their lack of expertise in proper agricultural practices, their ignorance of the local conditions, and the paucity of the immense resources needed for embarking on large-scale farming in Palestine from scratch. Moreover, the abysmal failure of the agricultural experiments conducted by the naive and inexperienced family elders did not encourage other Jews to settle in this area. It was to remain out of bounds to Jews until the 1970s. Finally, the^cultural and social isolation and lack of proper schooling for the family’s many talented children caused further frustration and contributed to a recon­ sideration of the entire adventure.11 Circumstantial evidence may create deep-rooted but still false percep­ tions that are not easily eradicated. Thus the widely held belief that Moshe Shertok’s early experience in Ein-Siniya inspired him to adopt an

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inordinately sympathetic or a naïve admiring attitude towards the local Arab community has been exaggerated. It is, however, true that these experiences did steer him towards the view that the Jewish homeland would not be built without arousing a deep and wide-ranging conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. His early experience on the farm was a contributing influence in the development of his view that the conflict was deeply rooted in the parallel development of two different and competing national movements. In 1908, while the Shertok family was still struggling in its attempt to cultivate the leased farm, the Young Turks launched their revolution aimed at political and social reforms in the shrinking Ottoman empire. Since the Turkish regime was utterly corrupt and lacked solid political foundation, the Young Turks succeeded without much opposition. Soon after their coup, the new leaders began implementing some political reforms. When these reforms were introduced in Palestine, they immedi­ ately affected Arab-Jewish relations by enhancing nationalistic tenden­ cies within the Arab community, which in turn exacerbated the looming conflict between the two communities. In retrospect, these reforms probably launched the local Palestinian Arab national movement. They certainly contributed to the emergence of a separate Palestinian identity. This crucial turning-point in the development of the Middle East, Palestine, and the Arab-Jewish conflict also affected the Shertoks. After two arduous and futile years, which was the duration of their lease, the morally and financially exhausted ‘clan’ had no other choice but to leave the farm, a frustrating experience in view of the dreams, hopes, energies, and money which the family had invested in it. The entire family, and particularly Moshe Shertok, who had become enamoured with life on the farm among the Arabs, would always feel nostalgic about those two hard but heroic years. There was, however, some consolation which the family would cherish: its stubborn sojourn among the Arabs would become a symbol of Jewish pioneering as well as of the inherent potential in life side by side with the Palestinians. From the desolate Arab village in Samaria the family moved back to Jaffa. They returned to that mixed Arab-Jewish town rather than to the Jerusalem that Yaacov Shertok loved so dearly, mainly for practical reasons: during the previous few years, the number of Jews in Jaffa had swelled to the point where it had become the main centre of the New Yishuv and the site of its self-governing organizations, therefore—so the family elders postulated—it would be easier to resettle there and to recuperate from their ordeal. Yaacov’s wealthy brother, Zeev Shertok, who had not lost all his money in the Ein-Siniya fiasco, established a

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lumber-importing firm there, in which he employed his elder brother Yaacov and his brother-in-law Yaacov Katinsky. Once again forced to assume a non-productive commercial occupation, Yaacov Shertok be­ came impatient, moody, and dispirited. Partly because of his indignation with his personal situation and partly because of an urge for public activity, he began to look for a more suitable place to live, more friendly intellectual surroundings, a new venue for his political aspirations, and a place with a good school for his gifted children. In 1909, a year after returning to Jaffa, and once again motivated by a combination of Zionist ideology, economic necessity, and other similar practical considerations, the adventurous Yaacov Shertok found a promising ‘Zionist solution’ for his and his family’s predicament in Ahuzat Bayit, a new Jewish suburb of Jaffa, which he and a handful of his enthusiastic friends founded. The Shertok family found this new quarter, which soon became the nucleus of Palestine’s first modem Jewish city, Tel Aviv, a very promising habitat. For Moshe and the other Shertok children, moving from the forlorn Arab village in the Samaria hills to Jaffa, and then to the rapidly growing new Jewish town of Tel Aviv, where they had to establish new friendships with peers from different backgrounds, was a test for their ability to adjust to new environments and circumstances. It also enabled the young Moshe Shertok to look at the qualities of his own family with new eyes. It was in Ahuzat Bayit that the 15-year-old Moshe more fully realized and internalized the fact that his family was combining in a pragmatic fashion practical middle-class considerations, Zionist ideas, and pioneering zest. It was there that he became aware that his family felt equally at home with traditional Jewish, secular Russian, and pioneering Yishuv cultures. There he was also proud to see that the family’s new home, in the heart of Tel Aviv, was again serving as a focal point for the emerging intellectual élite of the small but energetic town, as well as for some of the Yishuv’s liberal and moderate political figures. Yaacov Shertok’s moderate nationalist, pioneering, and intellectual contributions to this élite group, as well as his persistent encouragement of Moshe’s scholarship and talents, would help to shape the young man’s intellectual and emotional qualities and determine jnany of his decisions during his long and demanding climb to communal and national political leadership. Since Moshe Shertok, like his closest friends in Tel Aviv, grew up in the sheltered atmosphere of a loving and protective ‘aristocratic’ family, he was only minimally exposed to the tribulations and tensions involved in revolting against parents’ traditions, which other Zionist and Yishuv

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leaders experienced. On the other hand, he and his friends lacked the hardening ordeal of leaving a caring family and becoming independent during the formative years of adolescence. Therefore, Moshe Shertok and his friends did not acquire the same toughness and tenacity that characterized other future leaders of the Yishuv, in particular some of those in the Labour camp that they would eventually join and contest. In Tel Aviv, Moshe Shertok was registered in the first class of a new high school—the then just established, but already highly regarded, moderately nationalist and liberal Gymnasia Herzliya—where he and his intellectual capabilities were stretched to the utmost.12 It was no wonder that his father made sure of that, for in more than one sense the Gymnasia was the prestigious epicentre of the new, sprawling white town on the sands of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. This high school served as the cultural centre for the town, and provided greatly needed employment for teachers and other staff. Moreover, it soon became a magnet for the offspring of devoted Zionists all over Palestine and far beyond it. Zionists in the Diaspora sent their children to study there, and sometimes followed them to settle in Palestine and especially in the then only Jewish town.13 The Gymnasia, on whose board of trustees Yaacov Shertok served, provided Moshe, his siblings, and his classmates with more than a general liberal education. Moshe Shertok and his fellow students gained not just careful pedagogical attention; they were emotionally and polit­ ically pampered by their teachers, parents, as well as by the entire Yishuv leadership, who inculcated in them a deep love for the country and the community and for everything it was trying to accomplish. The students in this high school were purposefully groomed as the next generation of the Yishuv’s intellectual and social, but not necessarily political, élite. During his first year at the school, the teenage Moshe Shertok met two fellow students who would become his most intimate friends, and later brothers-in-law: Eliahu Golomb and Dov Hoz, who would marry Moshe’s sisters Ada and Rivka. Last but not least, at the Gymnasia he found the total love, admiration, and devotion of Zipora Meirov, whom he would marry about a decade later. Thus Moshe became a member in a very intimate, closely knit, and emotionally highly supportive group of peers, among whom he was probably the most talented, and of whom he was certainly the acknowledged intellectual. To the great satisfaction of their parents, Moshe Shertok and his friends showed a strong inclination to become involved and active in the evolution of both the Jewish community in Palestine and of Tel Aviv. Initially, however, they were reluctant to become formally affiliated with

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any political party, and in particular they avoided the three small Jewish workers’ parties that had just been established in Palestine: Agudat Hapoalim Hahaklaim (known as the Non-Partisans), led by Berl Katznelson; the Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion), led by David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi; and Hapoel Hatzair (the Young Worker), led by Yosef Aharonovich and Yosef Sprinzak. Moshe Shertok himself was disin­ clined to become involved with these parties, since he was influenced by the liberal and General Zionist views which his father shared with most of the teachers in the basically apolitical Gymnasia. Soon he and his friends, influenced by the pioneering and enlightened nationalist spirit propounded by the school, and by the avid sense of mission instilled in them by the Yishuv leaders, their parents, and teachers, did feel an urge to establish an association that would enable them to participate more effectively in building the Jewish national home in Palestine. Together with a few other students of the 1913 class,14 Golomb, Hoz, and Shertok founded the secret students’ association, Hahistadrut Hametzumzemet Shel Bogrei Hagymnasia Herzliya (the Smaller Association of the Graduates of the Gymnasia Herzliya).15 Following perpetual internal ideological debates regarding its nature and political leaning, which resulted in compromises on the part of the handful of friends, the founders of the Smaller Association felt that it was closer in ideology and temperament to the moderate nationalist and socialist Hapoel Hatzair. Initially, Moshe Shertok opposed the adoption of such a political orientation, but his intimate friendship with Golomb, Hoz, and the other members who were inclined towards the small socialist parties, was stronger than his and his family’s non-socialist political inclinations; consequently he accepted the Association’s slow drifting towards that workers’ party. In this respect, Moshe Shertok did not follow his father, who was opposed, almost hostile, to the budding Labour movement in Palestine.16 The platform adopted by the Association’s founders reflected their deep disapproval of selfish individualist careerism, of formal affiliation with any of the existing parties and o f ‘shallow politicking’. Instead, their ultimate goal was to create a group of dedicated and committed workers, whose principal purpose would be to serve the entire Jewish^community, rather than any particular political bloc or party, preferably through agricultural work, and alternatively through educational, legal, and political activities. Despite the rapid deterioration of the Ottoman empire, the growing unrest in Palestine, the approaching Great War, and strongly influenced by their parents’ blend of ideological commitment and pragmatism, the friends planned to accomplish their goals under the

20

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existing Ottoman regime. The principal operative maxim of the Associ­ ation was that social and political action, rather than abstract political theorizing, should be their main contribution to the Jewish national movement and to the embryonic national home.17 Although founding the Association meant that Moshe Shertok had, albeit at first without realizing it, to give up his dream of studying Arabic or linguistics, his involvement reinforced the mutual respect, cama­ raderie, and amity between him and his two intimate friends. Sub­ sequently, throughout their lives all members of that small core group would maintain an intense affinity and loyalty to their comrades that would help them overcome emotional, exacting periods and, no less important, ideological disagreements. On the eve of the First World War, this group provided Moshe Shertok with the consolation, sympathy, and moral support that helped him to overcome his deep sorrow over the premature death of his father in 1913. Though Yaacov’s deteriorating health should have prepared the closely knit Shertok family for the grim eventuality, when it happened they, and all of little Tel Aviv, were deeply moved and distressed. Virtually everybody in the young town participated in his funeral, one of the first there. His father’s death created in Moshe Shertok a deep sense of loss; but it also served as an emancipating experience and hence a turning-point in his still young life. The young Shertok and his friends who grew up in Palestine and obtained virtually all their education there, formed a new breed of Jews and Zionists. These pampered and confident ‘princes’ were Palestinian Jews to the core. Unlike other Yishuv leaders, they knew Eretz Israel through and through, loved it, and regarded it as their natural homeland and habitat. Their bitter-sweet memories of adolescence in the Yishuv, their moderate nationalist education, and full awareness of the tribula­ tions facing their families and the entire community, would serve to endow them with a distinct personal outlook and demeanour, unique social traits, and with a lucid ‘political mentality’. Notwithstanding his total commitment to the Jewish community in Palestine, Moshe Shertok embarked on a highly emotional and memor­ able trip to Russia after graduating with distinction from the Gymnasia Herzliya soon after his father’s death in the summer of 1913. It was Fannie Shertok who encouraged her son to make this educational and sentimental trip. Besides acquainting Shertok with the physical land­ scape and social background in which his family had its roots, the trip to Russia provided him with the opportunity to meet his relatives in Odessa and Kehrson, and, above all, to become familiar with the

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realities of life in a Jewish community in the Diaspora. This was a sobering experience for the young Shertok. Immensely impressed by the cultural and ideological dynamism, economic strength, and aura of self-confidence that, to his great surprise, he had discovered among the Jews in southern Russia, he gained new and more realistic perspectives on the actual size and strength of the Jewish community in Palestine. This trip raised in this sensitive and inquisitive young man some disturbing questions about the viability and future prospects of the Yishuv; such questions would continue to bother him intellectually and practically during the next few years. In this sense, the trip to Odessa became an unforgotten lesson in his cultural and political education. Immediately after that memorable visit, Shertok and a few other members of the tiny students’ association left for Turkey, where Shertok began reading law at the University of Constantinople. His decision to study law in a Turkish university, rather than Arabic in Egypt or Syria, was not an easy one; it was the result of the sort of pragmatic compromise that he, his parents, and his friends had been making since settling in Palestine. For Moshe Shertok himself, this decision was bearable since it tallied with both his father’s wish that he should undertake academic studies, and with his friends’ and his own intention to obtain Ottoman citizenship and to co-operate with the Turkish authorities to ensure and enhance the security of the Yishuv.18 In Constantinople Shertok and his fellow students from the Gymnasia met other future leaders of the Jewish Labour movement in Palestine, who were also obtaining Turkish education and hoping for Ottoman citizenship. Most notable among these older students were David BenGurion, who was about eight years older than Shertok and his friends, and then one of the aspiring leaders of Poalei Zion, which still adhered to a revolutionary socialist ideology, and his colleague Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, who would much later become the second president of the state of Israel. Neither great ideological affinity nor personal friendship flourished between Shertok and his friends, who still leaned towards the more moderate Hapoel Hatzair, and the more radical and activist Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi. Partly because of the age difference and partly because of differences in temperament and ideology, the two small groqps remained separate and even alienated in that large Muslim city which was hostile to all Palestinian Jews studying there.19 By the time Shertok came to Constantinople, his features and body shape had taken on their mature form. He was slim and of medium height, with rather dark skin and wavy black hair. He had a high forehead, and his charm and deeply seated humane attitudes were

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reflected in his warm and sparkling dark eyes. He had also grown the moustache that would become a life-long trademark. Although well aware of his charm and talents, Shertok showed neither aloofness nor arrogance. He was friendly and compassionate, and always maintained warm relations with his family and other members of the ‘clan’, as well as with his old and newer acquaintances. He demonstrated an impressive knack for making friends, and in return, he gained the warmth and sympathy of his relatives and many intimates. At the same time, he was ambitious. His drive was fuelled by the desire to fulfil his father’s expectations, and by the urge ‘to prove to the entire world that I am worthy of the Shertok name’. Thus, even after his death, Yaacov’s image and teachings constantly accompanied Moshe and motivated his steps.20 The young Shertok detested his life and studies in the suffocating atmosphere of Constantinople during the twilight of the Ottoman empire. He was appalled at the low standard of both the scholarship and the teaching in the law faculty, despised his boorish fellow students, agonized over his social isolation, and grieved over his alienation from the local Jewish community, which had not reflected much warmth towards the students from Palestine. Above all, he missed his family and friends as \yell as his beloved Palestine. In any case, because of his family’s difficult financial situation, he could not afford to continue his studies in Constantinople. He therefore received the news of the impending closure of the university because of the approaching Great War21 almost as manna from heaven and re­ turned willingly to his family, although his passion for academic studies was unabated. Reunited with his family, his friend Zipora Meirov, and his intimate comrades, he settled down to teach Arabic, Turkish, as well as European languages at the Gymnasia in Tel Aviv. In accordance with his late father’s wishes and with the maxims of the Gymnasia Students’ Association, he became increasingly involved in Tel Aviv’s cultural affairs and communal services. As the war drew closer, the small Old and New Yishuv became more deeply divided over the question whether to enhance its security by obtaining Ottoman citizenship and serving in the Turkish army, or to continue to rely on the protection of the foreign powers through their embassies in Turkey, and especially the Russian, German, and French consulates in Palestine. Naturally, this major ideological and practical controversy greatly concerned Shertok and the other members of the Students’ Association. Like the majority in the Yishuv, including BenGurion, Ben-Zvi, and many of their friends in both the Poalei Zion and

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Hapoel Hatzair, Shertok let his apprehensions over the future safety of his family and the Yishuv overshadow his political insight, regarding the grim outlook for the ‘Sick Man of the Bosphoros’. He and other graduates of the Gymnasia, therefore, advocated that the Palestinian Jews should not only assume Ottoman citizenship but also enlist in the Turkish army. Despite an increasing number of ominous indications of Turkish and Arab hostility towards the Yishuv on the eve of the war, little did they suspect that the war would have extremely traumatic consequences for their community and families, and that it would profoundly alter their personal and political fortunes. Some of these unforeseen calamities were rapidly materializing. Thus, as soon as the Turkish government formally declared war against the Allies on 29 October 1914, all Ottoman territories in the Middle East, and especially Palestine, experienced rapid economic and political de­ terioration. Determined to enhance its security and prevent a forced evacuation, the alarmed Yishuv leaders called upon the Palestinian Jews to demonstrate their loyalty to the failing Ottoman empire, and upon all eligible yoùng men to assume Turkish citizenship and enlist in the army. The response was positive—thousands of disciplined Palestinian Jews applied for citizenship and the younger ones registered for military service. This self-imposed demonstration of loyalty towards the govern­ ment somewhat alleviated the Yishuv’s hardship during the initial stages of the war. Remembering the pogroms of Eastern Europe, the blows previously inflicted on the Yishuv by the Turkish authorities, as well as the recurrent attempts of Palestinian Arabs to attack Jewish settlements, some far-sighted Yishuv leaders and rank and file simultaneously pro­ moted the idea of Jewish self-defence. On the other hand, a few Jews were engaged in establishing secret connections with Great Britain. While Shertok pursued the first course, his closest, but more activist friends followed the second strategy. In the mean time they played a pivotal role in the various voluntary committees set up to protect Jewish life and property in Jaffa and Tel Aviv.22 During the first year of the war, while still teaching at the Gymnasia Herzliya, thus contributing to his family’s sustenance, and actively participating in communal cultural activities, Moshe Shertqk was also busy building the Larger Students’ Association in the Gymnasia. This interim situation, however, did not last long. In view of the growing demands of the expanding war, the Turkish government soon began to enlist those young Palestinian Jews who had registered for the army. Sensing that he would soon be drafted too, Shertok travelled to Damascus. For a while, he worked there with Arthur Ruppin, then the

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Yishuv’s representative in that centre of Turkish government, and Nahum Wilbuschewitz, who was engaged in private business there. It was a combination of the desire to secure the Yishuv’s well-being, the wish to comply with his family’s tràdition to serve the community, and the inclination of the majority of the Gymnasia students—in other words, for both pragmatic and ideological considerations—that event­ ually brought him to enlist in the Turkish army in late 1916, along with a few fellow high-school graduates and a couple of hundred other pro-Turkish young activists. Shertok and the other newly enlisted young Palestinian Jews received their basic military training in Damascus and were then sent to serve on various fronts in the Middle East. Although in general the frail Shertok found the early part of his protracted service in the Turkish army emotionally harsh and physically demanding, the conditions were some­ what improved and life became tolerable once he was commissioned as a petty officer in the Signal Corps. Still later, when his superiors became aware of his linguistic talent, which eventually included the mastery of eight languages, Shertok was seconded as an interpreter to a unit of German engineers attached to the Turkish army. In early 1917, while Shertok was serving in that unit of the Turkish army, the military authorities in Palestine launched the evacuation of the Jews from Tel Aviv and its vicinity from fear that the Jews would collaborate with the British and Australians, who were fighting in the Middle Eastern theatre and preparing for their major offensive on Palestine. It was then that the members of the Shertok family had the humiliating experience of moving to their place of exile in Rosh Pina in the northern region of Palestine. Shertok was relieved to learn that his beloved mother and the rest of the family found a relatively safe refuge in that small, poverty-stricken, but tranquil Jewish village in Upper Galilee. Moving around the Middle East with the German engineers, he was occasionally able to visit his family in their place of refuge. During these short leaves, the attachment and intimacy between Shertok and Zipora Meirov, whose family had fled to Haifa, grew further. These trips to Palestine also enabled him to witness intimately the full extent of devastation and humiliation inflicted on the land and the Yishuv by the Turks and the Palestinian Arabs. These gruesome sights, in a sense similar to his late father’s dramatic encounters with the effects of the pogroms in Warsaw and Kehrson, had a lasting effect on Shertok and his friends. This was his own personal trauma, which was shared with his friends, all of whom loved Palestine and cared for the Yishuv so much.

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Although he gained nothing but tremendous contempt for the Turkish army and was physically, emotionally, and mentally drained by his service with it, and by the traumatic sight of the destruction in the Yishuv, Shertok’s ingrained stubbornness, sense of loyalty and duty, as well as profound anxiety about the fate of his family, all combined to prevent him from defecting. Hence, unlike his friend Dov Hoz, who deserted his unit after a rather short service and hid out in Tel Aviv, Shertok continued to serve until the final collapse of the Turkish empire and its army in the Middle East.23 While Moshe Shertok was dutifully serving in the Turkish army, Eliahu Golomb and, after his defection from his unit, Dov Hoz became immersed in the Yishuv’s self-defence endeavours, and willy-nilly in its politics. Despite their youth and inexperience in high politics, during the war their voices were heard loud and clear in the innermost councils of both Tel Aviv and the Yishuv.24 Notwithstanding their previous reluctance to be so involved, the two were rapidly becoming absorbed in politics and politicking because of the leadership vacuum created by the war. Moreover, in the vacuum created by the expulsion of both leaders and rank and file from southern Palestine and the destruction of their towns and villages, Golomb and Hoz joined the very small leadership that remained active. These two thriving young men did not forget the third member of their intimate group. Despite the breakdown of communications in the crumbling Ottoman empire, the three comrades managed to remain in constant touch either by mail or by meetings during Shertok’s visits to Palestine throughout the war. For Shertok, who by then was loathing every minute of his military service, these meetings and the extensive correspondence with his friends in Palestine were a godsend, particularly as the latter kept him in touch with events in the Yishuv and, no less important, with his family and his friend Zipora Meirov.25 In the mean time the activists Golomb and Hoz were gaining greater political acumen and acquiring further recognition as aspiring leaders of the movement for self-defence. Moreover, in view of the victorious British army’s advance in Palestine during the second half of 1917, the two became outspoken champions of Jewish co-operatioq with and service in the British army. Their realistic and pragmatic rationale was clear: the Yishuv must actively demonstrate its loyalty to the conquering British forces, thus establishing close relations with the future rulers of Palestine. Golomb and Hoz were not content merely to advocate this idea in the close councils of the Yishuv’s leadership, but also spent their inexhaustible energies on fostering the idea of service in the British army

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among young Palestinian Jews who had not joined the Turkish army, or who had defected from that faltering war machine. As they had anticipated, by promoting these ideas, they were setting themselves against the cautious established leadership of their parents’ generation, who had advocated persistent loyalty towards the Ottoman government and had supported the continued service in the Turkish army on the one hand, and were slow in adopting a pro-British orientation on the other. Golomb’s and Hoz’s new leaning also meant that they were drifting away from their families’ General Zionist political tradition and moving closer to the more activist elements in the workers’ parties. Initially, Shertok was sceptical about the wisdom of this clear shift in his friends’ position and hesitant about joining them. However, when he learned about the real dimensions of the devastation of the Yishuv, he changed his view on this fundamental issue. It was in October 1917 that General Edmund Allenby launched the Allies’ major attack on Palestine. The invasion was highly successful— on 11 December 1917, led by General Allenby, the British and Austra­ lian troops formally entered Jerusalem. Thus, towards the end of 1917, the British conquered southern and central Palestine. In the mean time, on 2 November 1917, the British government secretly issued the con­ troversial Çalfour Declaration, which would have far-reaching political implications in Palestine and the Middle East. As soon as the British government, prodded by Zeev Jabotinsky and other Zionist and Jewish leaders, acquiesced in establishing three Jewish battalions in the British army (one in the USA, one in Britain, and the third in Palestine), Golomb and Hoz enlisted in the Jewish 40th Battalion, which was recruited in Palestine.26 Their role in organizing Jewish self-defence and in co-ordinating efforts to protect Jewish property in Tel Aviv and Jaffa, which had been deserted during the later stages of the war, as well as their noticeable contribution to the establishment of the Jewish regiment in Palestine, marked not only Golomb’s and Hoz’s further veering towards the Labour movement that fully supported this effort but also an important step in their ascension to the political élite of that emerging camp and of the Yishuv. Shertok, who belatedly realized that he had made a major error in joining the Turkish army and then refusing to desert it, and greatly regretted it, would be strongly influenced by, and politically benefit from, the impressive political achievements and enhanced status of his two friends in Palestine. Regardless of the geographical and attitudinal differences between the three friends, during the harrowing period towards the end of the Great

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War the bond between them was strengthened, especially through the substantial correspondence that they had conducted throughout that war. In these revealing emotional letters, the three bitterly lamented their separation, their families’ tribulations, and, above all, the devastation brought upon Palestine and the Yishuv by the war. It was Eliahu Golomb who succinctly summed up the joint sentiments of the three when he wrote: ‘this war constituted a major disaster for the entire Jewish nation. Jewish blood had been shed on all fronts. This blood was useless and wasteful. For it was not the nation’s blood but rather the blood of individual Jews.’ The remedy that he prescribed was equally clear: ‘If we want to prevent Jewish blood from being wasted in the future, we must find a way to concentrate the Jews together and mould them into a nation that will fight when it decides to.’27 This signalled a major shift in Golomb’s basic position. Although Shertok and Hoz did not concur with all the ingredients of Golomb’s new activist approach, nevertheless, towards the end of the war they also made a firm vow energetically to participate in this enormous national venture. Ironically, but typically, considering the situation of many split Jewish communities during that war where Jews were fighting against their brethren serving in the opposite side, while Golomb and Hoz began their service in the British army, Shertok continued to serve in the Turkish army until the end of the war. He was not reunited with his family, with Zipora Meirov, and his friends until mid-1919, that is, long after the Balfour Declaration which called for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, had been accorded to the Zionists by the British government, and long after the British army had occupied Palestine. It is easy to imagine the great relief that his family and friends felt when Shertok arrived, emotionally and physically exhausted but unharmed, in Palestine. For a short while, the reunited Shertok family remained in Rosh Pina, but as soon as security conditions permitted, later in 1919 Moshe Shertok moved his family back to their cherished Tel Aviv. There, he set about redeeming what he had come to perceive as his shameful military service by dedicating himself to rebuilding the community and its organizations. Because of this vow, there was hardly a more satisfied man than Shertok when he was appointed political secretary of the Section for Land Acquisition and Arab Affairs of the Zionist Commission, that was then working in the liberated country. He was appointed, of course, because of his family and his own connections with the leaders of the commission, who in turn valued his superb command of the Arabic language, his intimate knowledge of Arab customs, and his great

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familiarity with the country. The Zionist Commission, organized and led by Chaim Weizmann, who soon would become the president of the World Zionist Organization,28 was composed of Western European Jewish leaders and politicians, and it wäs dispatched to Palestine by the World Zionist Organization in agreement with the British government and in accordance with the stipulations of the Balfour Declaration. The commission’s main task was to help the British and the Zionist move­ ment survey the destruction in the Yishuv, assess the damage, and undertake most of the financial and organizational burdens of rebuilding it. Since one of the commission’s main tasks was to co-ordinate the implementation of the various stipulations of the Balfour Declaration, Shertok could not have found a more suitable venue for his burning desire to contribute to the revival of the devastated Yishuv, nor could he have found a more useful means for advancing his new political ambitions. Like his late father, Shertok now viewed both goals not only as desirable but also inseparable. The Zionist Commission’s arrival in Palestine and its subsequent activities in rebuilding the Yishuv triggered a harsh backlash both on the Balfour Declaration and on Jewish attempts to implement its stipula­ tions on the part of Palestinian Arabs, who expressed their frustration in recurrent violent eruptions initially directed mainly against Jews and Jewish settlements and later also against the British. In his new position, Shertok found himself dealing with some of the consequences of these outbursts, but as a general rule he dealt with less dangerous matters. During the turbulent eighteen months following the Great War, he served under the legendary Yehoshua Hankin, then the head of the Section of Land Acquisition and Arab Affairs of the Zionist Commission, who fondly became known as the ‘Land Redeemer’. Acting as Shertok’s second revered tutor in the intricacies of local Arab affairs, Hankin introduced his younger associate to the inner complexities of Jewish-Arab relations. As always, Shertok was a good pupil. Negotiat­ ing with the Arabs over land-leasing and purchase on his own, he became even more intimately acquainted with the country, its people, as well as with its politics and politicians. Thus, like his two friends, but again on his own, Shertok, who was no stranger to the Yishuv’s intellectual and political élites, began to acquire recognition among Zionist and Yishuv leaders. While Golomb and Hoz were active mainly in the sphere of defence, Shertok, although not oblivious to security matters, was focusing on administration, diplomacy, and politics. In a way, this implicit division of labour between the three friends would be maintained in the future. But as Shertok would later demonstrate, the

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line delineating these spheres was always blurred to the point where there was no real separation between them. As representatives of the Zionist Commission, Hankin and Shertok did not confine their land-purchasing and land-leasing activities to Palestine west of the Jordan River. They harboured wider hopes and designs on the Golan Heights and Transjordan, which had not yet been administratively separated from Palestine.29 Travelling widely in the country to perform his various missions, Shertok was repeatedly shocked by the extent of the wreckage that had been inflicted upon the country and the Yishuv during the war—for example, the virtual levelling by the Turks and local Arabs of Jewish villages and other settlements, the destruction by the Turks of all the forests, as well as the pollution of water sources. Witnessing these appalling consequences of the war, he became even more determined to help to rebuild the Yishuv. During that year and a half, Shertok had elaborated two mutually reinforcing attitudes: a solid Palestinocentric social and political perspec­ tive, aroused by the urgent need to rebuild the Yishuv, while seizing the opportunity created by the Balfour Declaration, and a deep under­ standing of the roots of Arab nationalistic inclinations, stimulated by numerous meetings with Arabs. As these meetings and other Arab political and military reactions to the Zionist Commission’s activities had taught him, the gap between Jews and Arabs was rapidly widening beyond any easy possibility of bridging it. However, during this early period in his political career, Shertok had already become convinced that it was the Jews who must find a way to foster better understanding with the Arabs, especially if they wished to facilitate immigration, landpurchase, and settlement, and that this must be accomplished by becoming more attuned to the Arabs’ social, economic, and national needs and aspirations.30 By then, Shertok already believed that, while a compromise with the Arabs might be found and implemented, neither definite reconciliation nor permanent peace was on the cards. These views gradually created a growing ideological distance between him and his two close, albeit more activist, friends and correspondingly a growing proximity to more moderate Zionist leaders, such as Chaim Weizmann, who led the Zionist Commission, and Arthur Ruppin, who was in charge of the commission’s operations in Palestine. Yet because of his strong ties with his two friends, Shertok was carefully following developments within the Labour camp. He soon realized that as the war came to an end in the Middle East and Palestine, the more prominent leaders of the three small Jewish workers’ parties, who, like Golomb and Hoz, were still serving in the Jewish regiments of

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the British army, were deeply involved in serious efforts to unite the small Jewish Labour movement. As usual with most leaders of the Yishuv, including the leaders of the workers’ bloc, the motivation for this attempt at unity was also a combination of the ideological and the practical. On the ideological level, the Socialist and Social Democratic leaders emphasized common elements, mostly with regard to the need for national Jewish revival; and on the practical level, they believed that, united, they would stand a better chance of overcoming the economic hardships and political trials facing the Yishuv, and of broadening their hold on the Zionist movement. The leader who spearheaded this attempt at unity was the charismatic Berl Katznelson, who had led the small Non-Partisan faction together with Yitzhak Tabenkin and David Remez. Since Katznelson was then regarded as a middle-of-the-road socialist, who pursued relatively moderate nationalist goals, Golomb, Hoz, and later also Shertok, who, it should be remembered, had shown clear sympathy towards the moderate nationalist socialist Hapoel Hatzair party before the war, both followed and assisted Beri’s relentless effort to form a united Labour party. Their enthusiastic identification with their new ‘Rabbi’, and their substantial contributions to this process, further solidified their political position ia the emerging Labour élite. As a result of protracted negotiations between the leaders of the three Labour parties, towards the end of 1919, two of the three factions, that is, Berl’s Non-Partisan group and Poalei Zion, merged to form Ahdut Haavodah (Labour’s Unity).31 This new united party was destined to play an indispensable role in the development of both the Palestinian Labour movement and the entire Yishuv. As a result of that merger between the two groups, as well as a result of its constitution and organization, the various governing bodies and the leadership of this united party were distinctly coalitional. The leadership’s top echelon consisted of Berl Katznelson, Yitzhak Tabenkin, David Ben-Gurion, David Remez, and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi. Shertok’s intimate friend, Eliahu Golomb, who had played a significant role in the merger, was very close to this group of founding leaders of Ahdut Haavodah. Despite their previous political leanings and intellectual commitment to the more moderate Hapoel Hatzair, which maintained its autonomy for another decade, Shertok and Hoz formally joined Ahdut Haavodah mainly under Golomb’s influence and prodding. For Shertok'this was a meaningful ideological and practical transfor­ mation, bordering on a political rebirth. By following Golomb into that activist Labour party, he had not only failed to adhere to his father’s

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political teachings, but had also considerably modified his own previous political orientation. Shertok essentially switched allegiance to the new party because of his strong personal urge to maintain the close associ­ ation with his two friends, and because Ahdut Haavodah promised to rehabilitate and strengthen the Yishuv more rapidly and more thorough­ ly than any other splinter party. He was profoundly impressed by the new party’s Palestinocentric orientation, and by its strong vow to increase communal security, create and provide more work for the unemployed pioneers, speed up the ‘normalization’ of the Jewish people, and foster organized Jewish immigration to Palestine. All these, so he believed, would rapidly revitalize the Yishuv and free it, and himself, from the twin traumas generated by the war: the destruction in the Yishuv and his military service in the despised Turkish army. Subsequently, contrary to their initial abhorrence of politics and especially of ‘shallow politicking’, the ‘students’, as most leaders halfjokingly referred to the threesome, were attracted to the bold political goals and moves of the new party, primarily out of their concern for the devastated Jewish community in Palestine, rather than out of strong socialist convictions or personal loyalty to its leaders.32 Eventually, the three friends became deeply involved in internal party politics. Their ‘aristocratic’ families, liberal education at the Gymnasia Herzliya, activities in Jewish self-defence, Golomb’s and Hoz’s security activities during the Great War, and the former’s consequential role in establishing Ahdut Haavodah, and Shertok’s own work with Hankin, soon catapulted the three friends into the small leadership of the new party. It was also not long before the moderate Shertok and his two activist friends were regarded as full-fledged members of the party’s core élite. Thus, not surprisingly, by 1920 Shertok had already risen both to the Executive and Central Committee of the young party and was moving upward in its hierarchy.33 Recognized as an intellectual and a political and diplomatic prodigy, he was soon assigned to some delicate political missions. Watching their rapid ascendance, almost everybody involved in Yishuv politics was predicting that the ‘students’, and particularly Moshe Sher­ tok, were destined for distinguished political careers. Nine years later, Shertok would write about that formative period: » There are among us those who were destined to establish Ahdut Haavodah [apparently, this reference was to leaders like Berl Katznelson, Yitzhak Tabenkin, and David Ben-Gurion]. By the same token, there are among us those who were ‘created’ by Ahdut Haavodah. The party showed the latter the right way, and paved the road to the future for them. Many of us joined the party not only out of logical considerations, and not only as a result of the impact of harsh

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reality, but rather because we had fallen in love with it. We had fallen in love with the kind of Zionism [not socialism!], whose lustre the party had renewed. The secret of the party’s magical attraction, which appealed to new political activists as well as to many other young people, was its grand declaration regarding the need to master the future of both nation[!] and country, its grand declaration regarding the huge areas to be conquered by the workers: that is, labour and organization, immigration and settlement, defence and political activity, culture, literature, and educating the young.34

Essentially, Golomb, Hoz, and Shertok joined Ahdut Haavodah because it promised ‘to march in the right [national political] direction’.35 Thus Shertok’s enthusiastic sentences written in 1929 constitute the main key for understanding his own and his friends’ decision as well as their future political careers and achievements.

NOTES 1. On the origins of the family’s name, see M. Sharett, A Personal Diary (Heb.) 8 vols. (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), 1966. 2. C. Weizmann, Trial and Error (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Shocken, 1949), 28. 3. Sharett, Personal Diary, 1957, 1986-7. 4. S. Laskov* The Biluim (Heb.) (Jerusalem: The Zionist Library, 1979), 45; Sharett, Personal Diary , 1960. 5. Laskov, Biluim , 44-5; Sharett, Personal Diary, 1956-7, 1968. 6. Sharett’s draft memoirs about his father, CZA, A/245/178; Laskov, Biluim , 38-41. 7. Sharett, Personal Diary, 1976, 1978, 1986; and see Yaacov Shertok to Pines, 1887, CZA, A/109/2; Laskov, Biluim, 416. 8. Sharett, Personal Diary, 1982. 9. Laskov, Biluim , 417. 10. Sharett, Personal Diary, 1964-5. 11. Ibid. 1985; and see the entire file, CZA, A/268/7. 12. Laskov, Biluim , 416-20; Sharett, Personal Diary , 1984-5; Interview with Yehuda Sharett, 12 Mar. 1973. 13. B. Ben-Yehuda, The Story o f the Herzlyia High School (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Herzlyia High School, 1970), 37; Sharett, Personal Diary, 1984-5; M. Sharett, ‘Education and Immigration’, a speech in a seminar organized by the Herzlyia High School, 1954, CZA, A/245/87. 14. Sharett on Golomb, in E. Golomb, The Source o f Power (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Davar, 1950), i. 7-8; Interview with Yehuda Sharett, 12 Mar. 1973; Interview with Shaul Meirov-Avigur, 20 Nov. 1973; and see Sharett to Berl Katznelson, 29 Jan. 1931, CZA, A/245/66. 15. Golomb, Source o f Power, i. 9, 11, 17-18; Ben-Yehuda, Story o f Herzlyia High School, 79.

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16. Ben-Yehuda Story o f the Herzlyia High School, 79, 160; interviews with Ben-Yehuda, Oct. 1973, and Shaul Meirov-Avigur, 20 Aug. 1973; Golomb, Source o f Power, i. 86; M. Sharett, ‘The First Volume’, Ot (June 1965). 17. The entire platform of the Association is in Golomb, Source o f Power, i. 137-8, and see also pp. 83, 90. 18. Ibid., 347-8; interview with Yehuda Sharett, 12 Mar. 1973; and see Shertok’s belated account of the visit to Russia, in Moshe Shertok to Zipora Meirov, 7 Jan. 1922, CZA, A/245/128. 19. B. Habas, David Ben-Gurion and his Generation (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1951), 207-9; Sharett, Personal Diary, 237; S. Teveth, David's Jealousy (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Shocken, 1977), 211; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: A Political Biography (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), 88-9. 20. Moshe to Rivka Shertok, Jan. 1914, Sharett family archive. 21. See Shertok to Usishkin, 9 Dec. 1913, 30 Dec. 1913, 5 Jan. 1914, CZA, A/24/125/106; Moshe to Rivka Shertok 1914, and Shertok to Golomb, 1914, as well as other letters from and to Moshe Shertok from the same period, Sharett family archive. 22. The History o f the Haganah (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1959) vol. ii, bk. 1, pp. 315-31. 23. Shertok to Baharav, 9 Apr. 1918, CZA, A/245/123; and see the series of letters grouped under the title: ‘Military Service* in the Sharett family archive. 24. Golomb, Source o f Power, i. 124, 349-50; History o f the Haganah, vol. ii, bk. 1, p. 387. 25. See e.g. Shertok to Friends, 1917, CZA, A/245/123; and see Shertok to Haviv, 1917, Labour Archive, 104 II/Sharett; Shertok to his family, 1918, CZA, A/245/123. 26. Golomb, Source o f Power, i. 146-7,149-50,354-61; History o f the Haganah, vol. ii, bk. 1, 501-10. 27. Golomb, Source o f Power, i. 152. 28. M. Sharett, Dimmed Lights, (Heb.) (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1959). 29. See Sharett’s diary and other notes from that period, in CZA, A/245/128 VIII, A. 30. See Shertok’s draft memorandum submitted in early 1920 to the Zionist Commission, CZA, A/245/131/I. 31. On these processes leading towards unity in the Labour movement, see Teveth, David’s Jealousy, i. 437-8, 450, 453; A. Shapira, Berl, (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1980), 145, 148-9. 32. Golomb to Shertok, 14 Dec. 1918, quoted in Golomb, Source o f Power, i. 169, and see also pp. 13, 170. 33. See the resolutions of the first Convention of Ahdut Haavodah, 1920, written by Shertok, in Golomb’s files, in the Haganah Archive, 25/116. * 34. M. Shertok, Kuntress, 19/382, 23 Apr. 1929. 35. Ibid.

2

The Road to National Leadership Y oung men have their own perceptions about personal priorities. Thus just when it seemed that Shertok was ready to follow the path designed for him by his closest friends and his party’s leaders and plunge into the day-to-day activities of Ahdut Haavodah, he surprised his acquaintances in the party and the Yishuv. For he decided to make a pause in his budding political career and resume the academic studies that had been interrupted by the Great War, that is, by his deplorable military service and by his activities on behalf of the Yishuv in the wake of that war. This decision, which did riot surprise his intimate friends, and which was intended to honour his late father’s wish and to satisfy his own intellectual curiosity and cravings, gained the blessing of only a few Zionist and Yishuv leaders, among them Chaim Weizmann, Zeev Jabotinsky, who was then still close to the Labour camp, and, somewhat unexpectedly, David Ben-Gurion. Although Shertok’s resolute decision was no surprise, it was not popular among his intimate friends. They and the majority of his party’s leaders denounced his intention, particularly at that precarious juncture in the history of Palestine, the Yishuv, and the Labour movement. They were then under the disturbing influence of a new wave of violent clashes between Jews and Arabs, that was a continuation of the previous wave which had rocked Palestine from the beginning of 1919. These new clashes began on the Syrian border in the Upper Galilee region, where they resulted in the total destruction of several Jewish settlements and the death of their defenders, including the renowned Yosef Trumpeldor and his fellow settlers in Tel-Hai. In early 1920, in reaction to the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference at San Remo on the future status of Palestine as a territory under British Mandate, the unrest spread to other parts of the country, including Jerusalem. This latest outburst of violence astounded the Yishuv’s political élite, some of whom, such as Zeev Jabotinsky and David Eder, then active in the Zionist Commission, viewed it as a clear proof of the already unbridgeable gap between the Arab and Jewish communities, and consequently argued for total separation. The majority of the Jewish leaders, however, thought that the main reason for those violent erup-

The Road to National Leadership

35

tions was the behaviour of the basically anti-Semitic British military authorities, who, notwithstanding the stipulations of the Balfour Decla­ ration and the government’s pledge to the Zionist leaders, not only passively favoured the Arabs but also discriminated against the Jews. Other leaders attributed the disturbances to continuous agitation by the religious and economic Palestinian Arab élites, who were opposed to the Yishuv’s growth on religious anti-Jewish grounds or from fear of the Yishuv’s economic dominance. Fully aware of the implications of these developments in both security and politics, as well as of the opposition to his departure, Shertok was nevertheless determined to go ahead with his academic studies. Already regarded as an accomplished expert on Arab affairs, before he left he expressed his views in the controversy about the roots of Arab discon­ tent which led to the violent outburst in 1920. Thus, after the stormy events in Palestine, he prepared a memorandum for the Zionist Execu­ tive.1 Basing his views on an elaborate analysis of the deteriorating situation in the country, he attributed the violence to the diverse national goals of the two communities. He severely criticized the Zionist and Yishuv leaders for failing to do more to improve relations between the Jewish and Arab communities. Lamenting their lack of understanding in domestic, regional, and international politics, and their consequent disregard to political planning, he also chided the Yishuv leaders’ complacency in accepting the League of Nations’ resolution to entrust the Mandate to the British and in expecting the British government to alleviate the tension, through its first Jewish High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel. Thus, already at that early stage of the Arab-Jewish conflict, Shertok’s Palestinocentric views led him to oppose total reliance on the British and other actors on the international scene on the one hand, and to advocate direct talks and to seek compromise with the Arabs, on the other. ‘Once and for all we should understand’, he wrote, ‘that by relying only on external forces, or on rights granted to us by the powers, we will not be able to secure a sound political position in Palestine.’ Such a sound position could only have been attained if the leaders had tried ‘to reach a compromise on the basis of respect for our neighbours in the country and region, and to Require [the Arabs’] recognition of, and consent to, the basic political principles involved in the establishment of our national home’. In the latter part of this frank exposé, Shertok suggested a number of practical steps, including a comprehensive campaign aimed at explaining to the local and regional population the Yishuv’s political and economic position.

36

The Road to National Leadership

Believing even in those early days that some form of compromise with the Arabs was both necessary and possible, Shertok asserted that such agreement depended on planned and systematic efforts on the part of the leaders of the Yishuv and of the Zionist movement. He felt that since the Palestinian Arabs constituted an integral part of the entire Arab nation, the leaders of the neighbouring Arab states should be consulted and convinced that they should endorse such an agreement. Always the political realist and pragmatist, Shertok knew that a dialogue with either Palestinian Arab leaders or the governments in the neighbouring coun­ tries would not yield immediate fruits; but he also postulated that it was of paramount importance to show the Arab élites that ‘the Yishuv greatly valued a compromise with them, one aimed at closing a gap that might lead to many disasters’. Apart from his genuine persistent belief in the need for and possibility of reaching an agreement with the Arabs, a chief reason for adopting this conciliatory strategy towards them was his concern that mounting tensions in the territory would cause a British withdrawal from the Mandate.2 In coming out early in his political career with this approach, Shertok demonstrated intellectual honesty and courage, and of course a strong inclination towards moderation in the Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine. Shertok’s distinct ‘line’ in regard to the escalating conflict stemmed from a combination of his Palestinocentric ideas, a realist perception of the Yishuv’s capabilities and basic interests, an ingrained inclination towards compromise as a method of reducing the level of the conflict, and an understanding of the overriding need to maintain open channels of communication with local and regional Arab leaders. In this, he preceded other Zionist leaders, especially of course the activist leaders, such as Ben-Gurion, who still held naïve socialist views about the possibility of full reconciliation between the two sides, based on the purported common interests of the working classes in the two com­ munities. His anxieties about the future of his family and community in view of the events in Palestine did not stop Shertok from pursuing the coveted academic studies away from Palestine. His decision was not made lightly, since the pressures to stay in Tel Aviv were substantial, beginning with his own hesitations over ‘abandoning’ his family, party, and community. Then there were pressures applied by his mother, mainly from financial considerations, as well as by Golomb and Hoz, who wanted him to stay and assist them in dealing with day-to-day matters of politics and defence. Finally, there were the pressures exerted by many of his party’s leaders and by the rank and file. None the less, despite

The Road to National Leadership

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these pressures and despite the knowledge that he would severely jeopardize his political career by leaving Palestine at that critical junc­ ture, Shertok was stubbornly firm in his decision to go his own way and to follow Lis father’s wishes. Once his colleagues realized that Shertok was bent on fulfilling his dream for higher education, compromises were made to accommodate his desire in the best tradition of the internal politics of the Zionist movement, the Yishuv, and his party. Since Britain then ruled Palestine, it was readily understood that Shertok would study at the very centre of the British empire—London. Since by now he had pledged absolute allegiance to the socialist Ahdut Haavodah, it was also decided that he would study at the young and flourishing London School of Economics, which was founded by the Fabians Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Also, since he had loathed studying ‘dry law’, and since it was felt that, in view of the Balfour Declaration promises, Yishuv leaders needed more training in political economy in order to facilitate the development of the Yishuv under British rule, it was agreed that he should read this subject in London. Finally, since he wished to maintain his position in the party, and the party wished to retain his allegiance and make use of his dedication and talents, it was decided that he would be appointed as Ahdut Haavodah’s representative in London. Towards the end of 1920, notwithstanding a further severe deteriora­ tion of security in the Holy Land, and despite rearguard opposition to his studies still coming from Ahdut Haavodah leaders, such as Berl Katznelson, Yitzhak Tabenkin, and Shmuel Yavnieli,3 Shertok left family, party, and community for London. Those he left behind had no other choice but to respect his decision and try to help him in his new endeavour. Unlike his previous departure for the Turkish university in Constanti­ nople, this time Shertok was more than a young, inexperienced, and humble student; he was now 24, more mature and self-confident, and moreover, he felt satisfied with his appointment as the chief repres­ entative of his party in the centre of the British empire, especially since he expected a modest pay for his services. Characteristically, once in London, he would do his utmost not to let down those whp supported his decision to go there. As his supporters expected, he would faithfully combine academic studies on political economy, under the tutelage of such British Labour party luminaries as Sydney Webb and Harold Laski, with hard work for his own party and with giving private Hebrew lessons to earn the money he needed for paying his tuition and living expenses.4

38

The Road to National Leadership

Overburdened as he was with his studies in the prestigious London School of Economics and with his work for his party and his living, Shertok did not, however, diminish his unremitting concern for his family, friends, and the Yishuv in troubled Palestine. Thus, after a brief period of adjustment to his new surroundings, he became deeply involved in fund-raising and weapon procurement for the Haganah (Defence), the clandestine Jewish paramilitary organization which his friends Golomb and Hoz were leading and promoting. He also parti­ cipated in an endless round of political activities on behalf of his party, among both Jews and Gentiles, in London and other parts of England, as well as in special missions to purchase weapons for the Haganah, especially to Austria, which then served as an important centre for the Yishuv’s clandestine activities. While executing missions for the Yishuv and for the party, Shertok became closely acquainted with, and gained the respect of, several British and European Zionist leaders and Jewish dignitaries. These experienced and shrewd men liked Shertok and appreciated his intellectual qualities, organ­ izational skills, dedication to the Zionist movement, and his determination to promote and protect its interests, as well as his pleasant demeanour and polished behaviour. Chief among his new mentors and supporters in London were Chaim Weizmann, Zeev Jabotinsky, and members of the Sieff and Marks ‘family’, who were then building up Marks & Spencer. Shertok had hardly adjusted to his new life in London when he was confronted with a fresh dilemma. The budding Palestinian Arab national movement launched yet another round of riots that ran through 1921. These riots were not entirely spontaneous, since, to an extent, this outburst was initiated and orchestrated by the newly established Su­ preme Muslim Council, then the Palestinian Arab Community’s main central organization. This time, the violence erupted in reaction to a combination of developments: the birth of more militant political and economic organizations within both the Arab and Jewish communities; difficulties of both communities in adjusting to the British rule in the Middle East and in Palestine; and mounting apprehensions about British preparations, including a visit by then colonial secretary, Winston Churchill, for radical solutions to Britain’s new predicaments in the region and Palestine. In Yishuv and Zionist circles, a popular explana­ tion for the protracted violent outburst in Palestine was the British government’s hesitation in dealing with its instigators. The Palestinians adopted a mirrör image view of the situation. Hearing about the turbulence and the Yishuv’s new tribulations, the guilt-stricken Shertok interrupted his studies, and immersed himself in

The Road to National Leadership

39

fund-raising for the Haganah as well as in political activities intended to obtain support for the besieged Yishuv. As part of his efforts, he again travelled to Vienna where he became involved in a fervent attempt to buy weapons and smuggle them into Palestine. These developments also called for a political response on the part of the Yishuv and Zionist leaders. Since Shertok was regarded as one of the most knowledgeable experts on Arab affairs, and since he was strategic­ ally positioned and in close touch with the British political scene, his colleagues in Palestine asked him to provide a strategic analysis of the situation. He willingly produced a detailed evaluation. His diagnosis and recommendations were based on the assumption that the riots con­ stituted an authentic manifestation of Arab nationalist fervour. In a thoughtful and well-argued letter personally addressed to Ben-Gurion, who had attributed the riots to the machinations of corrupt and sometimes absentee Effendis (Arab landlords) and to British inaction, Shertok maintained that the Yishuv was facing the emergence of a proud national movement on the part of the Palestinian Arab masses. Sceptical of Ben-Gurion’s analysis of the situation and unrealistic proposals to remedy it by promoting co-operation between Arab and Jewish workers, Shertok passionately claimed that the riots were caused by the inherent conflict between Jewish and Arab national aspirations. Asserting that there would be no easy solution to this existential inter-communal conflict, he concluded with a stem warning to the Yishuv leaders to prepare for a protracted confrontation by encouraging Jewish immigra­ tion, increasing land purchase, establishing more settlements, and, last but not least, improving their shaky relations with the British govern­ ment and Arab leaders.5 Shertok’s unconventional views collided with those of the party’s more activist leaders—Katznelson, Ben-Gurion, Tabenkin, as well as his best friend, Golomb—and came closer to the moderate views of Weizmann and Chaim Arlosoroff, a brilliant and aspiring young leader of the still independent Hapoel Hatzair. The protracted violent clashes in Palestine also affected Shertok emotionally. Since the riots were not abating, he was planning to return to Palestine out of great concern for the fate of his family and community. But just as he was ready to leave London, Shertok was instructed by the Ahdut Haavodah leadership to stay there and continue his activities in Britain and Europe. Reluctantly, Shertok complied, and out of his feeling of guilt for being so far from Palestine, he augmented his efforts to raise funds and buy weapons. Only when these riots, which constituted a further major crisis in Palestine under British rule, subsided in early 1922, was Shertok able to

40

The Road to National Leadership

resume his studies seriously and invest more time in attending to his personal affairs. During this lull in his activities on behalf of his party and the Haganah, Zipora Meirov, his sweetheart ever since the more carefree days at the Herzliya high school, joined him in London. Initially the couple lived together ‘in sin’ as the secular Shertok used to say mockingly, in a small apartment in London, sharing it with his close friend David Hacohen and with visitors from Palestine. Soon afterwards, the couple decided to marry, undergoing both civil and religious cere­ monies in November of that year, and the newly-weds established their home in a yet smaller apartment in London. Following a Shertok family tradition, Zipora Meirov-Shertok decided to study agronomy at the University of Reading and reside there. Because of a chronic lack of financial resources the young couple could meet only occasionally at weekends and during vacations. Their shaky financial situation, espe­ cially bad because they tried to reduce their dependence on help from their impoverished families in Palestine, also meant that they had to borrow from wealthier members of the Shertok clan, such as Moshe’s uncle Zeev Shertok, as well as from his rich friends in London—and then had to work hard to repay these debts. All the scrambling around to keep body and soul together had an adverse affect on Shertok’s merciless self-assesspient of his studies and academic accomplishments—unjustly, he was convinced that he was failing in this sphere. At about the same time in Vienna, where they were studying music, his sisters, Rivka and Ada, married Hoz and Golomb. This created even closer relationships between the three friends, as well as with Zipora Shertok’s brother, Shaul Meirov-Avigur, who squared the former triangle of friend­ ship. Eventually, the foursome became known throughout the Yishuv and the Zionist movement as the ‘brothers-in-law’. These three marriages made the expanded ‘Shertok clan’ the single most eminent family in the Yishuv’s political élite. Moreover, their middle-class background, higher education, a certain newly acquired aloofness, and refined manners led many in the Labour movement to regard them as the ‘princes’, or as members of the Yishuv’s ‘aristocracy’. Their self-perception was different—they preferred to regard themselves as a ‘service aristocracy’ totally dedicated to the redemption of the Yishuv. The new relationship was of particular significance for Moshe Shertok, who always needed emotionally warm surroundings. This was, however, hardly a three-to-one-way relation­ ship. Shertok was capable of and willing to extend to his brothers-in-law valuable support, advice, and assistance when they needed it. The Shertoks remained in England until 1925. During the rest of their stay there, Moshe was engaged mainly in pursuing his studies at the

The Road to National Leadership

41

London School of Economics and in his political activities as repres­ entative of Ahdut Haavodah. In this capacity, he became involved in rebuilding British Poalei Zion, the Ahdut Haavodah sister party in England. It was also during this period that he successfully established solid connections with the British Labour party that helped lay the foundation for the long-term, albeit problematic, co-operation between the British and Yishuv Labour movements.6 While he continued to expand his circle of influential and rich acquaintances and admirers during these years, Shertok’s most enduring contacts would be those with the president of the Zionist movement, Chaim Weizmann, and with Weizmann’s associates, such as the Sieff family, Lord Balfour’s niece. Lady Blanche Dugdale, Professor Selig Brodetsky, and the noted his­ torian, Louis Namier, all of whom were working in the London branch of the Zionist movement with the particular aim of formulating and implementing the movement’s foreign policy. Despite his earlier apprehensions about his academic achievements, Shertok completed his studies and obtained his degree with flying colours. He was highly praised by his tutors at the London School of Economics, and maintained lifelong contacts with some of them, espe­ cially with Harold Laski. For many years, Laski, as well as Shertok’s other professors at the London School of Economics, would fondly remember their bright student from Palestine. These connections would be maintained and utilized for promoting the Yishuv’s interests at later stages in Shertok’s political and diplomatic career. After obtaining his degree, the Shertoks stayed in London for a few additional months. The delay in the couple’s return to Palestine was caused by Shertok’s determination to earn enough to pay his debts, by his wife’s desire to complete her own studies of agronomy at Reading, and by some urgent activities connected with his future undertaking in Palestine. When Shertok returned to Palestine in 1925, it was to participate in the editorial board of Davor, the new daily newspaper of the Labour movement. The newspaper was sponsored by the Histadrut, the Jewish trade-union movement in Palestine. The chief editor was Shertok’s political mentor, Berl Katznelson. The latter, together with a small group of Labour and Histadrut leaders, had begun planning as far back as 1923 the establishment of a newspaper that would cater for the better-educated Jewish workers and Labour-Zionist intellectuals. When, during his visits to London, Berl had broached the idea to his younger admirer there and suggested that he should join its board of editors, it was with the knowledge that, among other things, Shertok had been writing successfully for various Labour publications in Palestine, such as

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The Road to National Leadership

Kuntress and Hapoel Hatzair, as well as for British newspapers and journals. Berl had elaborated his plans for the newspaper to Shertok in long and detailed letters. In these communications, he had explained the political rationale and various purposes of that endeavour, and Shertok responded enthusiastically. Shertok had grasped the political oppor­ tunities that might be open to their party, and not less personally to himself, as a member of the newspaper’s editorial board. Thus, while he was preparing for his final examinations at the London School of Economics late in 1924, Shertok helped his mentor in establishing connections with European and British news agencies, editors, and journalists, as well as in solving technical matters related to the news­ paper’s establishment, such as the purchase of equipment and paper. For a short while, Shertok had even contemplated interrupting his studies and returning to Palestine to work with Berl and the evolving editorial board. Sensing, however, that he would never have another chance to satisfy his middle-class dream of academic education, and from his usual determination to execute fully whatever mission he undertook, Shertok remained in London until he successfully completed all the requirements for his academic degree and repaid all his debts. As the ambitious plan for establishing Davor materialized, early in 1925 Shertok finally returned to Palestine, where he joined Berl and three other distinguished colleagues on the editorial board of the new paper. Zipora Shertok returned to Palestine later, after completing her own studies on agronomy. On Zipora’s return, the couple settled down in a tiny apartment in Tel Aviv not far from the Shertok family house in which the Golombs had settled after returning from Vienna. Then Zipora Shertok began working in a small training farm in Tel Aviv. This idealistic couple consciously adopted a modest style of living during the first few years after their return from London. The fact that Davor was sponsored and financed by the Histadrut was a significant aspect of the latter’s pivotal political and economic role in the Labour movement in Palestine as well as in the entire Yishuv. This also affected the status of all the members of the newspaper’s editorial board, including, of course, Shertok’s. Beri’s invitation to Shertok to join Davafs editorial board had been more than just a simple journalis­ tic affair; it was a political appointment par excellence. Like all other political bodies in the highly politicized Yishuv, and especially in the Labour movement, this editorial board was carefully balanced to repres­ ent the Histadrut’s two main partners: Ahdut Haavodah and Hapoel Hatzair. Although Shertok formally represented Ahdut Haavodah, he maintained his old ideological affinity and personal friendly relations

The Road to National Leadership

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with the more moderate leaders of Hapoel Hatzair. Typically, this dual loyalty led him to try to build bridges between the leaders of both parties.7 Back in Tel Aviv, eager to re-establish his own power base in the party, Shertok resumed some of his old political activities, such as co-ordinating the party and the young youth movements, and renewed contacts with his many old and new colleagues in an attempt to establish a constituency. In addition to his several political tasks in the party and Histadrut, he would continue working for Davor until 1931, eventually becoming deputy editor. On his part, Berl had some vague plans that his gifted disciple would replace him as chief editor of the newspaper. In the meantime, Shertok immersed himself in the work in Davar, where he was in charge of editing the front page and of reports on international and regional politics. In addition to his editorial responsibilities he was contributing analytical articles on a variety of international and domestic affairs. Subsequently, whenever Shertok was asked about his profession, he would always proudly respond that he was ‘a journalist’. His was of course mobilized journalism. In 1929, about four years after his return to Palestine from London, Shertok’s dedication to the Yishuv’s and to his party’s renewal and efforts on their behalf, together with his talent for languages and his command of English, led him to accept the editorship of Davar9s English supplement. Initiated after the 1928 riots and actually established during the 1929 riots that rocked Palestine and especially the surprised British, this supplement was intended to serve as a means of communication between the Yishuv’s Labour movement, Jews in English-speaking countries, and especially British officials, officers, and foreign journalists. This too was mobilized journalism bordering on propaganda, and in any case* it was a significant political appointment.8 Rather than being his sole function, Shertok’s task in the English supplement of Davar was in addition to his regular duties on the Hebrew paper. In this new capacity, he used to write on world affairs in general, and in particular on Middle Eastern and Palestinian affairs. During this period he also continued to write for the main Hebrew edition of Davar on such concerns of the Jewish working class in Palestine as the protracted minerÿ strike in Britain, the appalling situation of workers in the USA and European countries during the great depression, the British Labour Party, as well as on Arab-Jewish relations, developments within the Palestinian Arab community and the Arab countries. He was then writing under his own name or using one of his two purposely symbolic pen names: M. Ben-Kedem (literally, Son of the East), or M. Karov-Rahok (literally,

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The Road to National Leadership

close-distant).9 His work on the editorial board of the then popular, innovative, and authoritative Davar, coupled with his frequent visits to Ahdut Haavodah branches and the many speeches and lectures that he delivered in all quarters of the Yishuv, made Shertok well known in the Labour movement throughout the Jewish community. His work as editor of Davar9s English supplement added to his growing reputation in British and Zionist circles inside and outside Palestine. Like all aspiring politicians, Shertok was trying to expand further the scope of his activities in order to increase his visibility, constituency, and thus his power base. During his six years on the editorial board of Davar, and as a consequence of continuous and hard political work, he utilized his unobtrusive personality, growing prominence, and popularity in Ahdut Haavodah and the Yishuv, as well as his intimate relations with his influential brothers-in-law and friends, to improve his position in the party’s élite. Thus, he was either elected or appointed to serve on most of the party’s powèrful and prestigious committees in which policy was formulated, and to be a part of those organs of the party which were responsible for drafting its platforms and for some far-reaching reforms and restructuring of both the party and the Histadrut organization. Through participation in these efforts, Shertok became known as a political reformer. Like his attitude to other aspects of life and politics, he approached the complex issues of organizational reforms with his customary seriousness, prudence, and liberalism, that is, truly as a social democrat. Out of this conviction, in these attempts, he always stressed the importance of the individual over class, society, and nation, and was for allowing substantial freedom to individuals and opposition within all organizations and institutions.10 In pursuing these social democratic principles, he was in a minority among the still social-revolutionary class-oriented Ahdut Haavodah élite. Unlike most of his colleagues in the party’s leadership, his main concern was to reduce organizational controls over individual members and thereby minimize their depend­ ence on central decision-making and planning. Needless to say, he opposed all impersonal bureaucracies. Always opting for the liberal over the authoritarian, the humane over the impersonal, and in a moderate, gradualist, and pragmatic way, Shertok was able to contribute to some reforms in Ahdut Haavodah and the Histadrut, and also to the slow movement towards unifying his party and the moderate socialist and nationalist Hapoel Hatzair. His long­ standing contacts with younger members of the Labour movement led him also to assume responsibility for building up the Labour camporiented youth movements and for encouraging young people to join the

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camp and party. These activities not only enhanced Shertok’s reputation and increased his informal standing within his party, but reduced his dependence on the party machinery and bureaucrats, and brought him closer to the actual power centres in the Labour movement. The status that Shertok obtained and his power bases in the party were particularly significant in view of signs of profound change that appeared towards the end of the 1920s in Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine and in the internal politics of the expanding and more prosperous Yishuv. . One of the overriding issues then facing the Labour movement in view of the tense atmosphere in the country was the urgent necessity to consolidate its forces by means of a merger between Ahdut Haavodah (which, as it has been noted, was itself the coalitional result of the merger between Poalei Zion and the Berl’s Non-Partisan party) and Hapoel Hatzair. Well aware that unity within the Labour movement was essential if it was ever to be the hegemonic political force in the Yishuv and the Zionist movement, Ahdut Haavodah leaders were engaged in endless talks and negotiations with their counterparts in Hapoel Hatzair, and necessarily moderated some of their ideological positions to prepare the ground for an eventual union. Because of his centrist ideological and organizational position as well as his continued contacts with aspiring leaders of Hapoel Hatzair, such as Chaim Arlosoroff, Shertok was instrumental in the slow and convoluted march towards the estab­ lishment of a unified party. His service on most of Ahdut Haavodah’s committees set up to pave the way for such a merger was welcomed by Hapoel Hatzair’s leaders who knew that his ideological positions were not far from theirs, and trusted his sincerity and genuine desire for unity. At the Fifth Convention of Ahdut Haavodah, held after a new wave of Arab-Jewish clashes, which added to the sense of urgency concerning the merger o f the two parties, towards the end of 1929 Shertok avidly supported a bold move in the direction of the final merger of the parties in order ‘to protect the very essence of Zionism’. Advocating the need ‘to create a broad and comprehensive Social-Zionist front whose centre is the Palestinian workers’ camp’, because the growth of the Zionist movement depended on the Jewish workers’ capability to catapult it to a pivotal position in the Jewish nation, Shertok went on to st$te that ‘in this case, action [that is, an actual merger] means realizing as far as possible our grand vision’. When the convention voted to continue moving towards a full merger with Hapoel Hatzair, Shertok was influential in ensuring that the proposed platform of the united party was only moderately nationalistic with regard to claims over Palestine and relations with the Arabs, and that it called for a gradualist approach

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The Road to National Leadership

to social change instead of revolutionary methods.11 When the final steps towards unification were made, he kept reminding his colleagues that, like other social democratic parties, they too should emphasize ‘unity of work over unity of view’, namely, that ideological diversity and plu­ ralism would facilitate and cater best to the needs of the Jewish workers in Palestine.12 It was no surprise, therefore, that Shertok participated in drafting the new party’s platform and formulating its future strategies, especially in the spheres of defence and foreign affairs, the two fields in which he would come to excel and co-operate with Hapoel Hatzair’s leader, Chaim Arlosoroff. Shertok’s experience and increasing involvement in both defence and foreign affairs had been enhanced by his participation in the discussions with the British commissions of inquiry sent to probe into the sources of, the disturbances that had been launched by Palestinian Arabs in 1928 and 1929. This new round of hostilities was related to a new phase with long-term consequences in the political radicalization of the Palestinian Arab community on the one hand, and on the other to the perception by the Arabs of the menacing expansion and greater prosperity of the Yishuv which was not affected by the approaching world economic crisis. More immediately, these clashes were provoked by Jewish activists trying to change the status quo that had been imposed by the mandatory power regarding such sensitive political and religious arrangements as those concerning the status of the Western Wall. Chief among these Jewish activist groups were the supporters of the increasingly ultranationalistic views of Zeev Jabotinsky, who himself had supported Shertok’s pleas to study in London and with whom Shertok had co-operated in Palestine and London about a decade earlier. His previous friendly relations and political collaboration with Jabotinsky notwithstanding, Shertok strongly opposed such provocations and one-sided attempts to change the status quo. Shertok was gradually becoming an avid opponent not just of these attempts to ‘establish facts’, but of most of the Revisionists’ social, political, and economic ideas propounded by Jabotinsky and his disciples. As soon as the 1929 inter-communal riots had subsided, as became the custom in the wake of all crises in Palestine, the leaders of the various parties and political groups in the Yishuv reassessed their attitudes vis-à-vis the two major forces in Palestine: the British government, under its essentially pro-Arab, third High Commissioner, Sir John Chancellor, and towards the Palestinian Arab community, under the leadership of the increasingly powerful Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. The main issue under reconsideration was whether, and to what extent,

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the riots had been carried out by a genuine organized national move­ ment, or whether they were instigated by Arab leaders motivated by their own selfish interests and encouraged by the British government’s passive stance, and the High Commissioner’s well-known sympathy for the Arab and his hostility towards the Jews. Based on a comprehensive re-evaluation of the balance of forces in Palestine in general and in the Arab community in particular, Shertok adhered to his view, formulated in the early 1920s, that ‘like other groups, the Palestinian Arabs have demonstrated evident sentiments of a nation, of a collective entity, of a race [in the ethnic sense]’, and were reacting to the perceived threat of a large-scale Jewish immigration that might radically change the demo­ graphic balance in the territory. Unlike most of his colleagues in Ahdut Haavodah, Shertok was politically honest enough to see that, although individual Arabs might benefit from the Yishuv’s economic growth as a result of renewed immigration, in the long run and on the whole, the Arab community was bound to lose by such developments. He equally rejected the notion that the riots were taking place only as a result of British anti-Jewish machinations and tolerance toward extremist Arab elements. Instead, Shertok firmly argued that the Arabs’ nationalist and religious fervour was genuine.13 Consequently, he did not hesitate to draw the appropriate conclusions: while of course supporting the Zionist goal of establishing a national home in Palestine, he thought that the Yishuv must find ways to assuage the Arabs and reach a compromise agreement with them. In view of the new political challenge facing the Yishuv, created by the continuous radicalization of the Palestinian community and the eco­ nomic uncertainty, which had been caused by the depression, Shertok was among those who advocated an immediate merger of the workers’ parties. Thus, at the last separate council meeting of Ahdut Haavodah in 1929, he argued that only such a move would guarantee ‘the creation of the ultimately responsible body that will ensure the future of our national enterprise in Palestine’.14 As always, his emphasis was on the national aspect of the Jewish revival in Palestine. The much coveted merger between Ahdut Haavodah and Hapoel Hatzair was finally accomplished in January 1930. This was Jhe birth of Mapai, the Palestine Workers’ party. By combining Ahdut Haavodah’s zeal and organizational strength and Hapoel Hatzair’s creativity and pragmatism, the new unified party would soon become the most vital, dynamic, and powerful political force in the Yishuv. As expected, once the merger was accomplished, Shertok served on most of Mapai’s governing bodies: on its central and political committees, as well as on

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several ad hoc committees formed to deal with the ideological and organizational questions created by the merger. It was also almost natural that his leanings would be towards the less orthodox socialist and more moderate nationalist segments in the united party. As a further sign of his ascendence in the Mapai hierarchy, Shertok became a regular senior delegate to World Zionist Congresses and reported on them in Davor. Characteristically, in his reports from both the 1929 and 1931 congresses, he expressed opposition to Weizmann’s authoritarian style of leadership as president of the World Zionist Organization, although certainly not to the latter’s moderate orientation and policies vis-à-vis the gradual development of the Yishuv, com­ promise with the Arabs and co-operation with the British. Thus, unlike some of his colleagues in Mapai’s leadership, Shertok whole-heartedly supported Weizmann’s drive to establish the Enlarged Jewish Agency, some of whose aims, as specified by the Mandate, were to facilitate co­ operation and co-ordination with the British government. Like Weizmann, Shertok strongly supported the inclusion of non-Zionists in the proposed organization. Showing his independent approach, he could not resist writing that ‘the most important achievement [of the 1929 con­ gress] is the organization that has been established before our own eyes [i.e. the Jewish Agency], and the new horizons that it has opened to the Zionist movement. The capacity that it has shown demonstrates the benefit to be gained by focusing all our energies in one direction.’ Nevertheless, Shertok also could not resist reminding Davar readers that the General Zionist president of the movement, Weizmann, then at the height of his power in the movement, controlled it almost singlehandedly. Tom between his agreement with Weizmann’s political views and his inherent opposition to any non-democratic leadership, Shertok maintained that, while Weizmann’s leadership style should be challenged, Mapai must maintain its coalition with him and step up its involvement in the affairs of the Diaspora.15 To his great satisfaction, in the early 1930s Mapai began to assume a pivotal role in Zionist politics and continued to support Weizmann’s ‘line’. Shertok was pleased not just because of Mapai’s augmented power in the nation, but also because this political development enhanced his own position in the emerging Jewish polity in Palestine. Once Mapai was formed and established, Shertok did not desist from assisting the Labour affiliated youth movements, such as Hamahanot Haolim (the Ascending Camps), the pioneering groups in the Jewish Scouts’ movement in Palestine, and Baharut Socialists (Adolescent Socialists), which was the organizational framework for the younger

The Road to National Leadership

49

members of Mapai. Together with Berl Katznelson, Shertok was re­ garded as being in charge of the informal ‘youth portfolio’ in Mapai’s councils. As always, his efforts in this sphere were intended to foster both his own standing in the party, and that of his party in the Yishuv. Shertok and his brothers-in-law were now ready to take the major plunge into the deep waters of Zionist and Yishuv high politics. Golomb and Hoz had been building their own bases of political power in the party: the activist Golomb was first among equals in the Haganah’s leadership, and the more moderate Hoz was active both in the party’s external relations and in the Histadrut. Their ascendance in the party corresponded to the meteoric rise of Chaim Arlosoroff, whose ideolo­ gical origins were in Hapoel Hatzair. At that critical juncture, inobtrusively, so as not to offend Berl, Shertok himself, who felt that he had exhausted the potential inherent in his involvement in Davar, was seeking a major change in his political career, which would also mean a promotion. Because of the new political realities in the Yishuv and Mapai, the ambitious Shertok knew that such a change was within his reach. This occurred when Weizmann was defeated as president of the Zionist movement at the stormy 1931 Seventeenth World Zionist Congress, and when consequently Mapai had formally joined the movement’s ruling coalition (previously Mapai only supported Weizmann’s coalition) and was about to get significant portfolios in the Zionist and Agency executives. As was their practice, at that critical turning-point, Mapai leaders re-evaluated their positions, goals, and strategies. Aware that the other two main political camps in the Yishuv—the religious and the civic (right of centre) blocs—had elaborated their organizations and increased their constituencies, that the Revisionists had become ‘a large camp which is full of national pathos’, as well as being aware of the General Zionists’ growing strength, especially in the Diaspora, Mapai leaders realized that this was the right moment formally to assume the decisive role in shaping the political features of the Yishuv and the Zionist movement and in actually leading it. Mapai leaders had also realized that, despite the Yishuv’j purported ethno-national and cultural cohesiveness, it was ideologically deeply segmented and split. They were aware that by the early 1930s the Jewish polity was already distinctly divided into three ideological blocs—La­ bour, Religious, and Civic—and that each of these blocs were led by small but highly organized and mobilized political élites that were in firm control over their respective blocs, and that despite their divergent

50

The Road to National Leadership

ideologies, these élites co-operated on important political and economic issues behind the scenes. Moreover, notwithstanding their deep divisions, most of the leaders of the three blocs were reluctant to do anything that would rupture the image of unity vis-à-vis the British and the Arabs. This led them to agree upon some general communal goals, such as the need to foster immigration, settlement, and absorption of immigrants. In addition to their resultant ability to reach consensus about such sweep­ ing national goals, the three camps also maintained sophisticated formal (i.e. the pure proportional electoral system) and informal (i.e. behindthe-scenes negotiations) mechanisms for an equally strict proportional allocation of all resources at the community’s disposal, as well as representation in both the World Zionist Organization and the Yishuv’s governing bodies. The awareness of Mapai’s leaders that the Yishuv was acquiring such segmented social and political features, together with their ability to draw the necessary practical conclusions, were indispensable to the party’s success in navigating its own and the Yishuv’s political ships. Hence, once Chaim Weizmann was for all intents and purposes unseated as president of the Zionist movement (as a result of accusations that his authoritarian control over the Zionist movement on the one hand, and his conciliatory policies towards the British on the other, had led to the restrictive 1930 White Paper, known as the Passfield White Paper), Mapai leaders, especially the impatient and ardent Ben-Gurion, who only then was becoming a national figure, decided that it was imperative to assume the leading role in the movement’s ruling coalition. Generally supporting this drive and strategy, Shertok was convinced that while the new coalition would not allow full control by a Zionist socialist party, nevertheless, its establishment would assure the consensus necessary to eject the Revisionists out of the movement, or at least keep them in a status of permanent minority, and conduct a realistic policy towards Britain and the Arabs. He also supported the instrumentalist approach which advocated that Mapai should acquire control over the Zionist movement’s and the Jewish Agency’s political departments, rather than over its economic or service departments. As his views in this respect tallied with those of the party’s mainstream, Shertok would eventually be rewarded for ardently promoting them. Thus, as soon as Mapai succeeded in gaining control over both the political and financial departments in the 1931 Zionist Congress, and Chaim Arlosoroff was appointed to head the Agency’s Political Department in Jerusalem, Shertok was immediately appointed as member of the small advisory committee that Mapai formed to assist Arlosoroff, along with such

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senior Mapai leaders as Berl Katznelson, David Ben-Gurion, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, and Shertok’s brother-in-law, Dov Hoz. Shertok’s membership of this small and powerful committee brought him yet another step closer to the centre of political action. When Arlosoroff took over the pivotal Political Department of the Jewish Agency, which either supervised or directly handled all of the Yishuv’s political and diplomatic affairs, including relations with the British and other powers as well as with the Arabs, he unequivocally insisted that Shertok, who by then had acquired a reputation, as Labour’s most knowledgeable expert on international, British, and Arab affairs, should be appointed as the department’s political secretary, which was equivalent in rank and function to that of a director general p f a ministry. Arlosoroff, who did not speak Arabic and was not intimately versed in Arab affairs, pressed for Shertok’s appointment, since he had planned to conduct comprehensive talks with Arab leaders and felt that Shertok’s experience in this field, his command of Arabic, as well as his organizational talents, were indispensable to the successful outcome of a significant new orientation, which would lead to some concrete actions in this sphere.16 This demand by the new dynamic chairman of the Political Department, made with Shertok’s consent and encouragement, would mark a coveted major turning-point in his political career and serve as the launching pad for further ascent to autonomous political power. N ot everyone on the Mapai Central Committee was, however, ready to accede to Arlosoroff’s demand. Thus, not for the first time, the Central Committee meeting of 2 October 1931 was the scene of yet another heated debate over Shertok’s future career (the first occasion was the debate in the central committee of Ahdut Haavodah over his request to study in London in 1920, and the second over his appoint­ ment as a member of Davar’s editorial committee in 1924 and 1925).17 One of the leaders adamantly opposed to Arlosoroff’s ultimatum was Berl Katznelson. He argued that Shertok’s removal from the Histadrut newspaper would deprive Davar’s editorial board of one of its most efficient members, destroy the successful English edition of the news­ paper, leave the party without one of its best minds and most dedicated spokesmen, and tarnish Shertok’s impeccable image as an intellectual in the Yishuv. At the same meeting, once again Berl divulged a widely known secret: that he had hoped Shertok would eventually succeed him as chief editor of Davar. Among those who supported Shertok’s appointment as political secre­ tary of the Department were his brother-in-law Golomb, Ben-Zvi, and

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Ben-Gurion, who revealed that he himself had contemplated recom­ mending Shertok for a powerful position in the Histadrut. W hat made Ben-Gurion approve the Jewish Agency post was that ‘while we have many candidates for other tasks, I cannot see any alternative except Shertok for the task in the Political Department’.18 Ben-Gurion added that only someone like Shertok, who could work harmoniously with Arlosoroff, but whose political origin was Ahdut Haavodah, should be entrusted with this position. Arlosoroff himself repeatedly told the party leaders that the job he offered Shertok was not bureaucratic, but political, and asserted that the Mapai Central Committee had no better candidate for serious and high-level political work with both Arab leaders and the British politicians and officials. Thus, despite Berl’s vehement opposition, accompanied by an explicit threat to resign from both Davor and the Mapai Central Committee, Shertok was nominated for this post. The Central Committee was careful to stipulate that Shertok’s was a political, rather than an administrative, or bureaucratic, appointment. Armed with this firm assurance, Shertok himself was ready to assume his new senior position. In those days a change-over from one political position to another was swift. Thus, only a few weeks after the debate in the Mapai Central Committee, Shertok left his desk at Davar in Tel Aviv and began to work in the offices of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency as Arlosoroff ’s right hand, and also as former Ahdut Haavodah’s watch­ dog over Arlosoroff. This new assignment compelled Shertok to move his wife and his 4-year-old first son, Yaacov, to Jerusalem, thereby also fulfilling his father’s dream that his offspring should be rooted in the eternal city. The modest Shertoks rented a rather small apartment in Beit Hakerem, a new Jewish suburb in West Jerusalem, mostly inhabited by members of the Labour bloc intelligentsia. Soon afterwards the workaholic Moshe found himself immersed in Zionist and Yishuv high politics. It did not take long for Shertok to discover how well the new political and diplomatic role suited him. Nor was it long before his party and the Zionist movement realized how well Shertok and Arlosoroff, these two bright, relatively young, and energetic members of the party élite, worked together to bring about a major change of direction and style in the crucially important Political Department. Thus, the highly motivated couple were able to increase the staff by recruiting young workers, such as Eliahu Epstein-Elath, Eliahu Sasson, and Reuven Zaslani-Shiloah, to create an efficient intelligence unit, establish friendly relations with many of the foreign consuls stationed in Jerusalem, as well as with the new British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Arthur Wauchope, who

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generally speaking was pursuing an even-handed policy towards Jews and Arabs, but was personally favourably inclined towards the Yishuv. Above all, Arlosoroff and Shertok were introducing a significant change in the Yishuv’s foreign orientation. As Arlosoroff and Shertok had shrewdly planned, they first established cordial relations with the British officials, thus ensuring an easy constant access to Wauchope. Arlosoroff eventually established an intimate and warm personal friendship with Sir Arthur, based on mutual cultural and intellectual interests. After creating such goodwill among British officials and officers, their next step was to launch a series of wide-ranging talks with Arab leaders, beginning with members of the powerful Husseini family, who controlled some of the main power centres in the Palestinian Arab community, with the leading opposition to the Husseinis, the large and rich Nashashibi family, with the leaders of the radical pan-Arab Palestinian Istiqlal party, and with Arab leaders in neighbouring coun­ tries, including Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. Since this pair of aspiring politicians and consummate diplomats shared the view that because of its unusual depth and complexity, a comprehensive and permanent resolution of the emerging conflict was already almost unattainable, their talks with Arab leaders were aimed at buying time to allow the promotion of the Yishuv’s political and economic interests, but also gradually and substantially to reduce tensions between Jews and Arabs in order to reach a tolerable modus vivendi. Shertok would adhere to these ideas during his entire political career. The most important contribution of the Arlosoroff-Shertok team to the Yishuv’s development was their utterly realistic policies and prag­ matic moves vis-à-vis both friends and foes. They applied this approach to the most delicate political issues then confronting the Yishuv, namely, Jewish immigration, land purchase, settlement, and the development of the Haganah. Moreover, in their extended secret talks with Sir Arthur Wauchope, they focused not only on day-to-day practical issues, but also on wider philosophical and historical issues pertaining to the Yishuv’s growth, British rule in the Holy Land, and the intricate triangular relations between British, Arabs, and Jews. The gradual and increasingly moderate approach that the two pursued was encouraged on the one hand by the majority of the Jewish Agency Executive, and on the other by the High Commissioner. This approach paved the way for a major political success when, after much hesitation and consultation, Wau­ chope significantly increased the quota of Jewish immigrants to Palestine in April 1932; in fact it was doubled in comparison with the previous

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one. Essentially, Wauchope’s was a political decision, but it was justified by an impressive improvement in the economic conditions in the territory.19 Later, Sir Arthur would reveal that his aim in permitting that much larger Jewish immigration was eventually to create equal Arab and Jewish populations in Palestine as a means for the permanent solution of the conflict between these two ethnic national groups. Undoubtedly, Arlosoroff’s, and later Shertok’s, ideas, persuasion, and prodding in­ fluenced the High Commissioner and the British government to consider such a solution. The coveted breakthrough in this sphere marked the beginning of the relatively large and mostly urban Fifth Aliyah, which would be of unequal importance for the development of the Yishuv (in 1932 the total number of Jewish immigrants was 12,500; in 1933 37,000; in 1934 45,000; in 1935 66,000), as well as for the next stages in its escalating conflict with the Arabs. The intimate and harmonious relations between Shertok and Arloso­ roff were unprecedented in the usually petty, bellicose, and competitive leadership of the Jewish community, its national bodies, and its various parties. The trust between the two was so profound that whenever Arlosoroff made one of his frequent trips abroad, Shertok performed most of his formal and informal political and administrative respons­ ibilities. Hence, during the relatively calm two years after his appoint­ ment in 1931, Shertok gained much insight and experience in this complex sphere of the Yishuv development. Together, the two not only made the proper decisions about practical matters, but they were able also to effect long-term changes in the structure and procedures through which the Agency shaped and executed its relations with international, regional, and Palestinian actors. By introducing sophisticated intel­ ligence collection and processing practices, by broadening the consult­ ation with outside experts, by mending fences with Weizmann to prepare the ground for his eventual return to the presidency of the Zionist movement, and by creating new channels of communication with the British and the Arabs, they profoundly influenced ipso facto the Agency’s grand strategy, tactics, and policy implementation. For a while, it looked as if this successful partnership was destined for spectacular political and diplomatic achievements. The partnership between Arlosoroff and Shertok was abruptly and tragically broken by the still-unsolved assassination of its senior partner. On 16 June 1933, immediately after returning from a trip to Poland and Nazi Germany, Arlosoroff was shot and killed by two unidentified persons on a dark Friday night, while walking with his beautiful wife,

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Sima, along the beach in Tel Aviv. The main purpose of his last trip to Central Europe had been to participate in the major electoral campaign launched by Mapai prior to the critical Eighteenth Zionist Congress of 1933, and in complex secret negotiations with Nazi authorities on the ‘transfer’ of Jewish immigrants’ property and money to Palestine in the form of German products. Ever since the mysterious assassination, unfounded rumours have persisted that the Labour leader was assassi­ nated either by Nazi agents, or by Palestinian Arabs, or by members of the Revisionist movement, who bitterly opposed the Arlosoroff-Shertok orientation, or by British agents, or even by Mapai members who were disenchanted with Arlosoroff ’s meteoric political ascendance and suc­ cess. The truth is that despite a prolonged and convoluted trial, many commissions of inquiry, and numerous learned articles and books written at the time and later, which produced fantastic speculations and thus exacerbated internal conflicts, the identity of the perpetrators has remained a mystery. The fact that Shertok had worked so closely and harmoniously with Arlosoroff and that he had served as acting chairman of the Political Department during Arlosoroff’s absence just prior to the traumatic murder would prove to be highly significant in enhancing his political career.20 Assassinations, even in democratic societies, often profoundly alter general political patterns as well as the fate of individual politicians. This was to be the case with the murder of Arlosoroff. At the level of the emerging Jewish polity in Palestine, the most immediate consequence was a severe blow to the morale of Mapai and the entire Yishuv. Yet of greater importance was the immense intensification of the acerbic struggle between the Revisionists and the Labour movement for control not so much of the Yishuv but of the Zionist movement. Partly out of genuine conviction that the Revisionists were behind the murder, espe­ cially after the arrest and identification by Sima Arlosoroff of Avraham Stavsky, a member of the Revisionist movement, as one of the two perpetrators, at the house of one of the more extremist leaders of this movement, Abba Ahimeir, and partly because of cynical calculations regarding how this would affect the forthcoming elections of the dele­ gates to the Eighteenth Zionist Congress, Labour leaders, and first and foremost among them Ben-Gurion, singled out the Revisionists and openly accused them with planning and executing Arlosoroff ’s assassi­ nation. Leaders of the Labour bloc and the intelligence service of the Haganah were instrumental in the arrest and trial of Stavsky and Ahimeir. The ensuing vehement struggle between the two political

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movements, which sullied the 1933 Zionist Congress, induced the Revi­ sionists, led by Jabotinsky, to leave the 1933 Congress, and eventually to split off from the coalitional Zionist movement in 1935, and to establish their independent New Zionist movement. While the Labour-Revisionist feud bedevilled the Yishuv and Zionism for more than three decades, at the time it contributed to Labour’s spectacular victory in the elections and elevation to its long-held position as hegemonial party in the Yishuv and the World Zionist Organization. In turn, Mapai’s overwhelming victory in the elections resulted in a major shift in the coalition governing the Jewish Agency, and in a spectacular promotion of younger Mapai leaders, including Moshe Shertok. Thus, among other upheavals, Mapai’s substantial electoral victory marked also the next stage in Shertok’s impressive ascendance to the role of national leader. The possibility that he would be summoned to serve as the chairman of the Agency’s Political Department prompted Shertok to prepare for the task by re-evaluating the contemporary political scene. Beginning with Arab-Jewish relations, he was among the first Labour leaders to note and openly argue that, rather than shrinking, the cultural, political, and national cleavages between the Arab and Jewish communities were continuing to grow. This led him to conclude that the widening gap was occurring mainly because of similar tendencies toward separation that each community had harboured and exhibited. Shertok’s disillusionment in 1933 about the chances of rapprochement with the Palestinian Arabs was consistent with his earlier assessments of the depth of the conflict that produced the political impasse in Palestine. Nevertheless, determined as always, he was still for seeking pragmatic solutions to the Yishuv’s predicament, through strengthening it by large-scale immigration, gradual land purchase, settle­ ment, and a further build-up of the Haganah—and all while continuing to conduct talks with Palestinian and other Arab leaders to minimize tensions and to prevent new outbursts of violence. Undeterred, he firmly believed that, for moral and political reasons and also to facilitate the Yishuv’s continued growth, calm was needed in Palestine. Shertok’s conclusions regarding the Palestinian Arab community and its relations with the Yishuv were almost free of socialist dogma, which he considered largely irrelevant for the immediate foreign and security policies of the Yishuv. This was due to the fact that he had grown up in Palestine, that he held firm Palestinocentric views, and that he was fully aware of the severity of the conflict between Arabs and Jews. Very soon after Arlosoroff’s assassination, even before Shertok’s formal nomination as the chairman of the Political Department, he

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made it clear that, if elected as the department’s chairman, he intended to continue to pursue political and diplomatic ideas, similar to those that had been developed and pursued by his dead colleague, but different from those of many of his activist colleagues in the Jewish Agency and Mapai.

NOTES 1. See Sharett’s draft memorandum, not dated, CZA, A245/131/I. 2. Ibid. 3. See the protocols of the meetings of the Ahdut Haavodah Executive, Labour Archive, 404/TV/Ahdut Haavodah/B-A-1. 4. On his first days in London, see e.g. Shertok to ‘My Dear Friends’, 30 Oct. 1920, CZA, A/245/130; Shertok to ‘My Darlings’, 6 Feb. 1921, and Shertok to his family, 10 Mar. 1921, Sharett family archive; Shertok to Berl, 7 Mar. 1921, Mapai Archive, series 201. 5. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 24 Sept. 1921, Labour Archive, 104/IV/Ben-Gurion/6/C. 6. Y. Gorny, The Ambiquous Tie, The British Labour Movement and its Attitudes to Zionism. 1917-1947 (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1982). 7. For a detailed account of the establishment of Davar see e.g. A. Shapira, Berl: A Biography (Heb.), 2 vols. (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1980), i. 241-69. 8. On his various functions in Davar see e.g. Zipora Shertok to Rivka Hoz, 26 Mar. 1925, in the Sharett family archive; Shertok to Berl, Apr. 1925, CZA, A/245/132/11; Berl to Shertok, 8 Apr. 1925, 23 Apr. 1925, and Shertok to Berl Monday (1925), also in the Sharett family archive. 9. For an early summary of his functions in Davar see, M. Shertok, ‘The Pages of Davar’, Davar, 1 June 1926. 10. On Shertok’s role in these reforms see e.g. the protocols of Ahdut Haavodah Council of 1925, the Labour Archive, 404/Ahdut Haavodah/B; and the protocols of the Ahdut Haavodah Council of Apr. 1927, Labour Archive, 4/the Central Committee of Ahdut Haavodah/404; and the protocols of Ahdut Haavodah Council, Nov. 1927, ibid. 11. During that period, Shertok had extensively written about the process of unification, see e.g., M. Shertok, ‘Final Words’, Kuntress, 19/182 (1929). 12. Shertok in Kuntress, 19/371 (1929). 13. On Shertok’s positions as presented at the meeting of the Joint Secretariat of Hapoel Hatzair and Ahdut Haavodah, 10/11 Oct. 1929, Haganah Archive, Dov Hoz/10/111. * 14. M. Shertok, ‘Final Words’. 15. See Shertok’s ‘Letters from Zurich’, Davar, 11-12 Aug. 1929, 16 Aug. 1929; ‘Letters from the Agency’s Council’, Davar, 22-3 Aug. 1929; ‘Letters from Basle’, Davar, 8-9 June 1931; and Shertok’s ‘Before the Seventeenth Zionist Congress’, Davar, 2 July 1931; ‘Letters from the Congress’, Davar, 10 July 1931; ‘Letters from Basle’, Davar, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21,23, 24, 31 July 1931, 2 Aug. 1931.

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16. See Arlosoroff, in Mapai Executive Committee, 6 Aug. 1931, Mapai Archive 23/31. 17. Mapai Central Committee, 2 Oct. 1931, Protocols Book, Mapai Archive, 23/30; A. Shapira, Berl, i. 377-9; M. Getter, Chaim Arlosoroff: A Political Biography, (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1977), 143; S. Avineri, Chaim Arloso­ roff {Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1991). 18. Mapai Central Committee, 2 Oct. 1931, Protocols Book, Mapai Archive, 23/30. 19. C. Arlosoroff, Jerusalem Diary (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Mapai, 1945), 255-61,263,295; G. Sheffer, ‘Political Consideration in British Policymaking on Immigration to Palestine’, Studies in Zionism , 4 (Oct. 1981). 20. See protocols of the Jewish Agency’s Executive, 9 Apr. 1933,23 Apr. 1944, CZA.

3 Ascendance H itler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933 signalled a crucial turningpoint in world history, and also, of course, a tremendous watershed in the history of the Jews, especially of those in Europe. Initially, however, this critical development only marginally affected Palestine and the Yishuv. Despite yet another eruption of Arab violence towards the end of 1933, an eruption that was not connected to developments in Europe, the main immediate change in Palestine was rather a further increase in Jewish immigration and settlement. As noted, this was the beginning of the largest wave of Jewish immigrants during the entire period of the Mandate. It would decrease after October 1935, when the British government reversed its immigration policy. Although it was not until mid-1936 that Arab leaders launched a violent protest against this upsurge in Jewish immigration, settlement, and economic growth (incidentally, only a minority among these immi­ grants were German Jews), the ensuing developments in Palestine had profound consequences in the longer run. Eventually, Jewish immigra­ tion dramatically enhanced the Yishuv’s demand for land and permits for additional settlements, thus introducing new political and economic dynamics that would be felt for the next several years. In the meantime, complementing their more favourable policy in regard to Jewish immigration, the British also permitted additional land purchase by the Jews and relaxed their policy in regard to Jewish settlement on these lands. As on previous occasions in Palestine, the change in British policy stemmed primarily from their own interests and designs, and only to a limited extent as a result of Arlosoroff ’s and Shertok’s skilled diplomatic efforts and close relations with the High Commissioner. Internally the situation in the Yishuv and the Zionist njovement was more stormy. Severe unrest in the wake of Arlosoroff’s assassination and the impending trial of the purported Revisionist perpetrators accused of it, intensified the existing tensions between Labour and the nationalist right in the Yishuv. This upheaval meant that Labour leaders, including Shertok, had to expend more of their energy in seeking means to ameliorate the situation and remove obstacles on the way

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towards further growth. It was their task to tackle these cumbersome internal issues, since the profound change in the Yishuv’s and the Zionist movement’s politics had made Mapai the single largest party in the Jewish polity. This party won 135, i.e. 45 per cent of the 306 seats at the 1933 World Zionist Congress, leaving 23 per cent of seats for Weizmann’s party, the General Zionists, 14 per cent for the Revisionists, 12 per cent for the national-religious Mizrahi movement, and 5 per cent for the rightist nationalist Radical party. Although Mapai won this sweep­ ing victory in the elections, it did not control enough seats to function on its own without coalitionâl partners—a pattern that would persist in the Yishuv and later in Israel for more than forty years. Paradoxically, however, this pattern contributed to a remarkable internal stability and continuity that lasted until the late 1970s, when Menachem Begin’s Likud (Unity) came into power. As a clear indication of his newly elevated position in the Mapai leadership, and as the acting chairman of the Political Department of the Agency following Arlosoroff ’s assassination, Shertok was placed fourth on the party’s list of delegates in the campaign for the 1933 Zionist Congress (the entire list consisted of a couple of hundred candidates), following only the three older founding fathers of Mapai—Katznelson, Ben-Gurion, and Sprinzak. In view of his advancement in the élite, prior to leaving Palestine for the 1933 Zionist Congress, Shertok outlined the approach that he intended to follow were he formally elected to replace Arlosoroff as chairman of the Political Department. Shertok’s basic philosophical assumption was that politics constituted a continuous process of incremental change rather than a series of single idiosyncratic leaps forward or irreversible retreats. Therefore while continuing Arlosoroff ’s effort to discuss with both British and Arabs long-term interests and relations, he would emphasize the importance of ceaseless negotiations concerning gradual modifications in British policy as well as in Arab positions towards the Yishuv. Thus he would continue to conduct a ‘trench war’ with the British on immigration, land pur­ chase, and settlement, and launch a carefully measured propaganda campaign at the Arabs, aimed at imparting the notion that the Yishuv was ready to reach agreement with them. Elaborating his basic approach to politics, Shertok then mentioned ‘other small and great practical actions which depend on persistence and prudence that may add up to something real—to a basis for further development’. In this connection he praised highly Arlosoroff ’s actions, which he defined as ‘a continuous struggle to attain productive results, rather than a fruitless campaign for the sake of sheer battle’. He went on to mention four principles that

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would remain the touchstone of all his political activities: the Yishuv must take into consideration world and regional developments and establish close relations with friendly powers; it must not sever relations with the British government; it must not engage in ‘political adventur­ ism’; and it must concentrate on building a political and bureaucratic leadership capable of preparing and carrying out the necessary strategic plans for coping with an uncertain and dangerous future. Adhering to his rigid Palestinocentric line, he warned none the less against any thought of the liquidation of the Jewish Agency, which was needed ‘to block separation [between the Yishuv and the Diaspora] in political activities on behalf of the Yishuv’. Yet Shertok could not overcome his inherent Palestinocentric approach and concluded this exposé of his political views by declaring that ‘if [the Jewish community in] Palestine did not show cruelty [explicit demands for immigration and support] towards the Diaspora, only for the latter’s benefit and redemption, nothing would happen’.1 As expected and as a result of an a priori coalitional agreement, another pattern that would be maintained in Yishuv and Israeli politics, during the 1933 Congress Shertok was officially elected as Arlosoroff’s successor on the Jewish Agency Executive. Following his election to the Executive, he was nominated by Mapai, and approved by all coalition partners, as co-chairman, with David Ben-Gurion, of the Agency’s Political Department. This co-chairmanship was only pro forma, since Ben-Gurion would spend most of his time in Tel Aviv as secretarygeneral of the Histadrut and would be engaged in frequent trips abroad, while Shertok, who resided in Jerusalem, would be deeply involved in the day-to-day control of the department.2 This change in his status and responsibilities led him to move his family of four, for now he had a daughter, Yael, to a rented apartment in Rehavia, a more fashionable neighbourhood in West Jerusalem, closer to the offices of his department. Unlike some other Mapai leaders, including Ben-Gurion, who by then had finished building a spacious house in Tel Aviv, he insisted that his family should maintain an austere life-style. In certain respects, Moshe Shertok’s family life resembled that of his parents—it was organized to allow him the greatest possible freedom to pursue his intellectual and political interests. It meant that Zipora Shertok had to shoulder daily responsibilities, including most duties concerning the education of their two children. Moshe Shertok used this freedom to plunge into Zionist and Yishuv politics. His appointment to one of the most important and powerful positions in the Zionist movement, the Yishuv, and Mapai marked the end of

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Shertok’s political apprenticeship and the beginning of his personal political career. Soon after the 1933 Congress, Moshe Shertok became the Yishuv’s and Mapai’s chief spokesmen on foreign affairs. His appointment as the chairman of that prestigious department also sig­ nalled a change in his self-image, since he had taken an additional large step towards the innermost circle of the entire national élite. In addition to his formal responsibilities, within this small élite, he would perform a particular task, that of mediating between his two more senior leaders— Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, who also participated in the formulation and execution of the foreign and defence policies of the Zionist move­ ment and the Yishuv. This also boosted his political status. No less important, Shertok assumed a key position in the emerging moderate camp within Mapai, essentially composed of younger leaders, who, on the whole, had been affiliated with Hapoel Hatzair. First and foremost, however, Shertok was a loyal member of a coalitional leadership. This structure characterized the Zionist move­ ment, the Jewish Agency, local politics in Jewish towns and settlements, and all parties, especially Mapai. Hence neither Katznelson, Tabenkin, Sprinzak, nor even Ben-Gurion himself, who had been one of the chief architects of Mapai’s 1933 electoral victory, were powerful enough to ‘go it on their qwn’. On most occasions, Mapai’s founding fathers, including Ben-Gurion, had no other choice but to comply with the decisions, and sometimes even the whims, of their colleagues as well as of other partners in the coalitions that Mapai formed. On the Jewish Agency Executive, Ben-Gurion shared power mainly with two younger aspiring leaders of the Mapai—Shertok and Eliezer Kaplan, who was appointed as chairman of the equally powerful Finance Department. The principles of collective and coalitional leader­ ship were also religiously applied within Mapai. Thus, the veteran leaders of the two previous Labour parties, Ahdut Haavodah and Hapoel Hatzair, Katznelson, Tabenkin, Ben-Gurion, Ben-Zvi, Sprinzak, Remez, and younger leaders, such as Golomb, Kaplan, Hoz, and Shertok, had to work together to formulate and implement all major decisions. Moreover, although Weizmann had lost power and had still not recaptured the presidency of the Zionist movement, he and his General Zionists party were a force to be reckoned with in the coali­ tional leadership of the movement. Weizmann’s diminished political power balanced to a degree by his continuous involvement in shaping the movement’s'politics, by his growing involvement in fund-raising and rescue activities for German and Central European Jews, and by his perceived influence in Westminster and Whitehall, only enhanced the

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leadership’s collective character. It allowed the Mapai leaders to increase their own power without totally excluding their partners, and it allowed their partners to participate in policy-making. Once the Labour movement became the linchpin in the World Zionist Organization, its representatives and functionaries could begin to imple­ ment a new round of reforms in the movement’s organization and policies. As co-chairman of the Agency’s most important department, Shertok could engage in the political and diplomatic manoeuvring necessary to effect such reforms in the structure and procedures of the entire organization. Moreover, as part of his new role in the Agency, he was the Yishuv’s senior representative in the continuous political ex­ changes with the British, the Arabs, and international organizations, such as the League of Nations. It became a significant part of Shertok’s and his department’s task both to initiate and sustain these political and diplomatic contacts. His favourable reputation among British politicians and officials in London as well as the perception that he was a ‘product’ of a British university, enabled Shertok to improve further relations also with the British government and the military in Palestine, and to elicit beneficial policies concerning such controversial issues as the continua­ tion of generous immigration quotas, increased land purchase, per­ mission to evict Arab occupants and farmers from newly acquired lands, and approval of British development projects primarily advantageous to the more developed Yishuv. The sense of urgency driving Shertok to intensify his work in these areas stemmed from his and his friends’ increasing awareness of the dangers facing the Yishuv and Diaspora Jews, especially in Central Europe, from the rapidly soaring power and influence of the European Revisionist powers, that is, Germany and Italy, as well as of the ways in which the Yishuv might profit, in terms of increased immigration and financial resources, from that worsening situation. In this respect Sher­ tok and his moderate colleagues held similar views to those of BenGurion, Tabenkin, and other activists. The leaders of both camps in Mapai were not oblivious of the adverse developments in Central Europe and realistically sensed both the potential long-term dangers and immediate benefits of the Nazi and Fascist threat. As far §s the dangers were concerned, Shertok publicly stated that ‘our ships are burning behind us, and those ships that have remained intact are now catching fire’.3 While this sense of urgency led Shertok to press harder for substantial changes in British policy towards the interlinked issues of immigration, land purchase, and settlement, he always couched his demands from the British in rational terms and was always ready to

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compromise with the sympathetic fourth British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope.4 Since Weizmann was not formally representing the Yishuv, and Ben-Gurion was engaged in the internal political affairs of the Yishuv and the Labour camp (he held still the post of the Histadrut secretarygeneral), between 1933 and 1936 Shertok’s and his officials’ relentless political and diplomatic efforts were responsible for the most spectacular growth and development of the Yishuv under the British mandatory government. Thus Jewish immigration reached unprecedented rates in the period after he was elected as chairman of the Political Department until 1935—as noted, the annual rate went up from about 10,000 in 1930-2 to 60,000 in 1933-5. In conjunction with the substantial relaxa­ tion in British immigration policy, the Jews were also able to purchase, for exorbitant sums of money, mainly from Arab absentee landlords, large tracts of land in the Huleh valley, on the Coastal Plain north of Tel Aviv, in the Beit Sheari area, and in the northern Negev. Shertok and his department also succeeded in obtaining permits to reclaim larger areas, especially in the northern part of the country, on which new settlements were established. Together with the influx of immigrants from Germany and the ‘transfer’ of their property, an arrangement that had been initiated by Shertok’s late mentor and friend, Chaim Arlosoroff, these developments facilitated substantial economic growth in the Yishuv, that only indirectly affected the well-being of the Palestinian Arabs. All this was accomplished in relative political security and calm, except for the short-lived riots at the end of 1933, which the Palestinian Arabs had directed primarily against the British authorities on the pretext that the local government did not confiscate weapons smuggled into Palestine by Haganah agents.5 None the less, these limited riots were a sign that underneath the relatively tranquil surface there were ominous forces at work. During these three work-ridden but rewarding years, Shertok, who proved to be a democratic and compassionate chief of an increasingly complex political and administrative organization, was able to exercise full control over his staff that had grown as a result of reorganization. This in turn necessitated further promotion of talented young persons, like Eliahu Sasson and Zeev Sharef, who would later become politicians in their own right and be appointed as ministers in the Israeli govern­ ment, or highly accomplished and respected diplomats, intelligence officers, and political analysts, such as Eliahu Epstein-Elath, Reuven Zaslani-Shiloah, and Leo Kohn. Shertok established rigorous criteria for recruiting, training, and promoting staff members that improved the

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quality of the officials working in his department and other Agency units. In co-operation with his brothers-in-law, Eliahu Golomb, Dov Hoz, and Shaul Meirov, he expanded further the political intelligence staff and its activities in Palestine and the neighbouring Arab states,6 and increased considerably the Haganah’s budget, as he was politically and administratively responsible for this clandestine organization until 1939. Shertok, who was known for his understanding and insight in regard to organizational structures and administrative procedures, established new sections in his department and abolished old ones to rationalize its performance. As was his custom when starting in a new position, he introduced elaborate procedures for external and internal consultation and for the participatory formulation of policy. Above all, he succeeded in generating an open and friendly atmosphere, which enhanced the democratic nature of decision-making in his domain. With his good memory, being capable of sustained work, showing an interest in both overarching ideas and the minutest details, and being a workaholic, Shertok was involved in all minor and major issues dealt with by his department.7 Shertok gradually gained extensive political practice, profound know­ ledge of the intricacies of Mapai’s and the Yishuv’s internal politics, and intimate contacts with the intertwined Yishuv and Zionist political élites. Moreover, although he would always experience anxiety before every public appearance, during that period he improved his oratorical capa­ bilities and became an accomplished speaker who could attract large crowds. These indispensable aspects of his political activities bolstered his self-confidence. His newly acquired prominence was partly due to the rather prosaic fact that Weizmann, who permanently resided in London, Ben-Gurion, Berl, as well as other senior leaders of Mapai, regularly spent long months outside Palestine during these years. Unlike these travelling leaders, Shertok spent most of this period in Jerusalem, which rather than London, was then becoming the political centre of the entire Zionist movement. Incidentally, the political diaries that these leaders kept and dispatched to their colleagues at home, and which have served as an indispensable source of information about their thoughts, goals, and activities, were written during their frequent trips ab ro ad / In one respect the new team of leaders eventually changed the practices that had been introduced by Arlosoroff—Weizmann’s, BenGurion’s, and Shertok’s endless discussions with the British in London and Palestine were aimed less at clarifying complex abstract ideological and strategic issues than at arriving at practical solutions and

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implementing specific policies. Since these policies were essentially Palestinocentric, in the sense that the immediate needs of the Yishuv took precedence over other Jewish and Zionist interests, including the further deteriorating situation of European Jews, there was no better spokesman for this approach than Shertok. Shertok’s personal traumatic experiences, especially during the First World War, and his adherence to his party’s operative platform, served as a basis for pragmatic agreement between himself and Ben-Gurion, whose personal and political background and temperament were so different. Although as early as the mid-1930s Shertok’s relations with Ben-Gurion were marred by an occasional disagreement over both strategy and tactics, his co-operation with his older and more senior co-chairman was not in doubt. None the less, the inherent differences in their views, temperaments, and styles gradually surfaced. Thus for example in November 1933, when the wave of violent Arab protest against the British for their purported pro-Jewish policies was over, when the British government nevertheless was considering a change of course regarding immigration, land purchase, and the reaffirmation of their intention to establish a Legislative Council comprising Britons, Arabs, and Jews, Ben-Gurion, in one of his frequent bad moods, argued for escalating the Yishuv’s political and diplomatic struggle against the British and for focusing it on the promotion of the ultimate Zionist goal: a Jewish state, Shertok felt that he must respond. Though he agreed that in view of purported British intentions to impose limitations on the Yishuv’s development, protests against the mandatory government should be stepped up, he insisted on a carefully measured use of political pressure rather than on an open rift. When the Jewish Agency’s Executive adopted Shertok’s position, Ben-Gurion had no choice but to comply and to pursue this moderate line. This policy of restraint contributed to the temporary amelioration of the situation in the country. Shertok was also critical of the way in which Ben-Gurion had conducted talks with Palestinian Arab leaders (mostly organized by Shertok), especially during his meetings with Musa al-Alami, who was a close associate of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, held towards the end of March 1934, with Riad al-Sulh, the Lebanese leader, held in mid-June 1934, with Awni Abd al-Hadi, the leader of the Palestinian Istiqlal party, held in mid-July 1934, and with Amin Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabri, of the Syrian-Palestinian Committee, held in Geneva late in September 1934. Shertok firmly believed, and secretly disclosed to some of his colleagues, that by discussing with these Arab

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leaders his ideas about the establishment of a large Jewish state within an Arab federation, by adopting a rigid and uncompromising position, and later by leaking information about these talks in public speeches and interviews, Ben-Gurion closed the door for further dialogue with Pales­ tinian and other Arab leaders. In mid-1934, British self-confidence in their ability to pursue the ‘politics of notables’, that is, to control through manipulation, persua­ sion, and coercion the Jewish and Arab leaders and in turn, the two communities that were now even more rapidly drifting apart, and thereby ensure stability in the territory, was abating. This deterioration in British nerve was further augmented by explicit and implicit threats about the renewal of violence in the country. Realization of the limita­ tions of his ability to manipulate the ‘native’ leaders and control the situation prompted Sir Arthur Wauchope to revive the idea of estab­ lishing a Legislative Council, formally embedded in the Mandate for Palestine as a means for leading the country towards political autonomy and eventually towards independence. The proviso to establish such a Council was an essential ingredient of the moral and diplomatic justi­ fication for Britain’s presence in the country, and hence Wauchope’s determination either to reach Jewish-Arab agreement about its im­ plementation, or equal rejection by both sides. The British plan to revive this idea caused the Yishuv’s leaders to conduct frantic discussions about their immediate moves. In the Yishuv’s internal councils Shertok pursued his traditional pessimistic, sceptical, but realistic line concerning the future relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. He both opposed Ben-Gurion’s notion that the Arab-Jewish conflict could be solved through federative arrangements and criticized his updated plan for a Jewish-Arab federal state. He also dismissed Berl’s idea of rejecting the Legislative Council proposal out of hand as a British ploy aimed at harming the Yishuv. Adhering to his view about the desirability of measured dynamism in Zionist politics, he also discarded the notion of maintaining the status quo. Following the late Arlosoroff and his new ally, the greatest Zionist leader of the day, Chaim Weizmann, and adopting his usual far-sighted stance vis-à-vis the projected Legislative Council, Shertok opposed total rejçction of the High Commissioner’s plan, positively advising his colleagues to present their own proposal for ‘parity’ in such a council. In the meantime, he said, their best hope was to inform the High Commissioner that, in any case, the Jewish Agency would consider participating in such a council only after it had been successfully negotiated with both Arabs and Jews. He was thus trying to propose a conciliatory move that would also put

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the ball back in the British and Arab courts.8 Shertok was, therefore, relieved to hear, in mid-November 1934, that for the time being, mainly because of the calmer atmosphere in Palestine, the British had decided to postpone the plan to establish such a Legislative Council.9 After the excitement had abated over the violent outburst of the Arabs in late 1933 and the short-lived revival of the plan to establish a Legislative Council, had Shertok reverted to attending to ‘daily’ matters. Thus, towards the end of 1934 and throughout 1935, the perennial issues facing the Yishuv, and therefore Shertok and the Political Department, were again immigration, land purchase, settlement, and development. With regard to immigration, the most critical issue that the Agency and Shertok had to tackle was the dilemma of legal versus illegal immigra­ tion. Fully aware of the Jews’ worsening situation in Central Europe, but also of Sir Arthur Wauchope’s serious intention to stop uncontrolled immigration that would lead to the unrestrained growth of the Yishuv, Shertok characteristically proposed to his colleagues to stop Jewish illegal immigration, sacrificing it for the sake of continued legal immi­ gration at satisfactory levels. The Agency Executive endorsed Shertok’s Palestinocentric position and temporarily refrained from promoting large-scale illegal immigration.10 As to land purchase and settlement, Shertok and the Executive were successful in persuading Sir Arthur Wauchope to postpone an­ nouncement of the new restrictive Land Law which he had been considering. This favourable but temporary response encouraged the Agency to accelerate land purchase, especially in the Beit Shean area and the northern Negev. Indicating the scope of their interest and hope during this period, Yishuv leaders thought that ‘a small Jewish state might be established there [in the Negev]’.11 Therefore, they stepped up actual settlement efforts. Shertok was in the forefront of these activities, which he perceived as crucial if the Yishuv was to continue prospering in the hostile environment that was emerging in Palestine, the Middle East, and Europe. Unlike the Activists, however, Shertok shared Weizmann’s view that these goals should be attained in a gradual manner, agreed upon with the British and accepted by the Palestinian Arabs. Shertok’s approach to handling the deteriorating situation in these three arenas was based on an in-depth analysis that he had prepared in late 1934. Based on this analysis, he had realistically concluded that neither the British government in London nor Wauchope in Palestine were basically opposed to the Yishuv’s development, but ‘no British government can fully identify with the Jewish nation . . . the government

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will always remain British by nature, and will always be guided by its own psychology and attitudes: for them the “Jewish question” is not a matter of life and death’.12Basing his observations on these assumptions, Shertok accurately assessed that the order of priorities of both Wauchope and his superiors in London was to foster security in the territory, to allow controlled Jewish immigration and settlement in order to enhance the economic development that would benefit Jews and Arabs, as well as reducing the British taxpayers’ burden, to help the Arab community’s economy, and to enhance British commercial interests. Shertok’s views on relations with the Arabs were no less lucid. He asserted that ‘peace with the Arabs, and friendly relations between the two nations will never be possible as long as one of these communities maintains a sense of injury and deprivation’.13 And his inevitable conclusion was that ‘it is impossible to enhance the well-being, security, development, and power of the Jewish Yishuv on a continuous deterior­ ation of the Arab community’, since an economically poor and politic­ ally powerless Arab community would initiate endless clashes with the Jews, such clashes would lead to greater hostility, and such hostility would in turn reduce the Yishuv’s capacity for development. He also believed that such a situation would lead to lower standards of living that would plague not only the Yishuv, but the entire country. At this point Shertok was particularly prescient; he soberly assessed, almost sixty years ago, that ‘one community’s growth at the expense of the other community would adversely influence its humane disposition for a very long period’. He argued, therefore, that ‘a “line” intended to strike a balance between the basic interests of both communities should be based on realistic considerations’. Accordingly, he rejected both ‘the [Jewish] plan to expel the Arabs from this country’, as well as ‘the [Arabs’] intention to engulf the Yishuv in blood and push the survivors into the sea’.14 The ‘transfer’ of Arabs was just as abhorrent to him as the ‘annihilation’ of the Jews at the hands of Arabs. In addition to his moderate views about the Yishuv’s foreign policy especially with the Palestinians, in this analysis, his ingrained social democratic and essen­ tially urbanite convictions were clearly evident. The political tranquillity and economic prosperity that ^characterized Palestine towards the end of 1935 were deceptive. This* calm surface concealed submerged antagonistic forces that led to a new round of Arab-British-Jewish confrontation of great severity six months later. Sensitive political observers, like Shertok and his staff, had been aware of the subtle shuddering that preceded the approaching political and military earthquake. By the end of 1935, against the backdrop of the

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Abyssinian War, which was closely monitored by the Palestinian Arabs, leading them to conclude that Britain was weakening, Shertok’s ap­ prehensions regarding a possible major outburst were greatly amplified by the rate at which modern political organizations were created within the Palestinian Arab community, by the greater number, accelerated growth, and more frequent attacks launched by Arab paramilitary groups against both British and Jewish installations and settlement, as well as by the degree to which the nationalistic tendencies in other Arab countries were permeating and influencing the Palestinian community. Shertok’s growing awareness of these potentially explosive forces led him to alter his views regarding the establishment of a Legislative Council. Although he did not espouse its immediate creation, the British plan for the encouragement of self-rule in the Arab and Jewish communities through such a council now seemed to him as the lesser evil which might contribute to the moderation of the Palestinians. Therefore Shertok urged his col­ leagues at the Agency Executive to open negotiations with the British authorities in Palestine and London, as well as with local Arab leaders and with dignitaries and politicians in neighbouring Arab states, concerning such a council. His main purpose was to postpone another major violent eruption for as long as possible. Once again the Executive endorsed this position and publicized it. At the same time, however, because of strictly internal Zionist considerations for the Yishuv, connected to mounting tension between Labour and Revisionists, Shertok secretly pleaded with Wauchope to postpone further negotiations regarding the Council to a period after the impending Nineteenth Zionist Congress, in 1935. Since the self-confident Wauchope was not fully alert to the submerged deterioration of the situation in the Arab community, he decided to accept Shertok’s arguments concerning the postponement of the negotiations.15 The Nineteenth World Zionist Congress held in 1935 was expected to be a stormy event marking a significant turning-point in the history of the Zionist movement. This outlook was not just because of the ever-growing turbulence in Europe and the Middle East, affecting the Jewish Diaspora and the Yishuv, but also because of the expected next stage in Labour’s and General Zionist’s struggle against Jabotinsky’s Revisionists, whose main political bases were in Jewish communities outside Palestine, and because of the intention to reinstate Chaim Weizmann (whom Ben-Gurion described then as ‘one and only in his generation, beyond any comparison [with all other Zionist leaders]’), as the president of the Zionist movement. Not surprisingly, in his first speech at this Zionist congress, Shertok presented a rigid Palestinocentric as well as a staunch anti-Revisionist

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position. Responding to criticisms directed at the Agency’s Executive on the part of the Revisionist and centre-right parties, clearly demonstrating his Palestinocentric predilection, he said that ‘a Zionist Executive is a body that concentrates on, and directs the energies of the Jewish people toward building Palestine, with the primary purpose of creating a large and free Jewish community in that territory. Therefore, the Executive can not undertake the protection of all Jewish minorities in the world.’ He did call for a thorough re-examination of the political tools used by the Executive in its struggle on behalf of both the Yishuv and the Jewish nation, on the grounds that the Zionist movement was still far from establishing a solid power base in Palestine. Here the principal goal should be, he said, the further growth and fortification of the Yishuv. He also urged the delegates to refrain from pursuing uncontrolled demonstrations or more radical means of protest in Palestine and Europe, a strategy proposed by the Revisionists as well as by activists in his own Labour movement.16 As part of the gradual process of rapprochement and closer co­ operation between Weizmann and the Labour movement that took place after he was ousted from the presidency in 1931, and as part of the General Zionists’ and Mapai’s struggle against the Revisionists, as well as on the basis of his personal ideological affinity, Shertok was con­ spicuous among those who actively supported Weizmann’s return to the presidency of the WZO after four years in the political wilderness. While still holding an ambivalent attitude towards Weizmann’s authoritarian leadership style, but well aware of the urgent need for his backing and co-operation, Labour leaders intended to support Weizmann’s comeback as primus inter pares, but not as the ‘dictator’ they deemed he had been during his personal rule over the movement throughout the 1920s.17 Only after much bickering regarding Weizmann’s political pre-conditions for renewing his formal coalition with the Labour bloc and officially resuming his activities as president of the Zionist movement, could his party—the General Zionists A—and Mapai arrive at the compromise formula that finally paved the way for the return of the ‘old Lion’ to the presidency. It was intended that as part of this compromise, Ben-Gurion, who had also put forward his own pre-conditions for co-operation with Weizmann, would be elected chairman of the Agency’s Executive in Jerusalem and Shertok would serve as the sole chairman of the Political Department. Shertok’s protracted efforts before the congress to stimulate the rapprochement with Weizmann in order to secure his re-election as president, the resultant growing political affinity between them, and his

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continued role as intermediary between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, augmented Shertok’s status in the Zionist movement, the Agency’s Executive, and Mapai. Consequently, at this Zionist congress, he achieved his coveted goal when he was elected as sole chairman of the Agency’s Political Department. On this occasion, Shertok demonstrated his intimate familiarity with the political practices of both the Zionist movement and Mapai: although one term of working with Ben-Gurion, as co-chairman of the Political Department, had left relations between the two leaders far from idyllic, since they had by then already clashed over a number of strategic and tactical issues, Shertok participated in the political ritual and manoeuvring involved in the attempt to persuade the vain Ben-Gurion to resume his place on the Executive as its chairman in Jerusalem. The compromises, which led to a renewed coalition between the Labour camp, the General Zionists, and the nationalist religious party, Hamizrahi (later known as the ‘historical coalition’), were based on the presupposition that during the 1935 Zionist congress Jabotinsky’s Revisionists would make a dramatic move. As expected, the profound and still growing ideological rift between the Revisionists and the rest of the Zionist parties concerning immediate strategies and long-term polit­ ical goals did lead to the Revisionists’ withdrawal from the Zionist movement'. The Revisionists were arguing for an intensified struggle against the British and Arabs, and were for openly proclaiming an unyielding demand for a Jewish state; they were also engaged in the fierce fight to gain control of such resources as immigrant certificates, national funds, and land for settlement. It was in the wake of this congress that the Revisionists leader, Zeev Jabotinsky, established the separate New Zionist Organization. Although in 1934 he supported Ben-Gurion’s abortive attempt at reconciliation with Jabotinsky and the Revisionists, during the 1935 internal crisis in the Zionist movement and the ensuing split, Shertok intensified his public ideological opposition to the Revisionists. Never­ theless, as always, he supported continued negotiations with Jabotinsky and other Revisionist leaders concerning a new modus vivendi in both the Zionist movement and, the Yishuv. Being a gentleman, Shertok would treat the New Zionist Organization with great fairness. During the period from 1933 to 1935, political modernization of the traditional Arab community in Palestine continued. It led this com­ munity to extremism and flagrant hostility towards real and imaginary foes. It was not Ben-Gurion alone, as his biographers have argued, but Shertok and his associates in the Political Department as well, who were

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not surprised by these developments. As 1936 approached, it became clearer to Shertok and his staff that radicalization within the Arab community, coupled with fierce internal competition between rival political factions, that had increased the tensions in that community, as well as the influence of nationalist trends in other Arab countries and the deepening inter-communal rivalry with the Yishuv, were bringing the Palestinian Arabs to the brink of yet another violent eruption.18 British attempts to soothe the Arab community, through placating its notables and offering some political concessions, and Jewish restraint, failed. Later, as the British tried to appease Arab leaders by cutting off Jewish immigration in mid-1936 and reviving the idea of a Legislative Council, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok publicly rejected the intended restrictions on immigration in the light of the growing plight of German and Central European Jews. Behind the scenes, however, the Jewish leaders negotiated with the British in order to cut their losses and at least obtain a reduced quota. As one of the chief architects of this pragmatic approach, Shertok accepted the traditional British view that a clear distinction should be drawn between the 'Jewish problem’ in Europe and the Yishuv’s need to grow. In this connection, he wrote to Ben-Gurion that ‘it is unthinkable that the Jewish Agency should put forward a demand for granting immigration certificates to Diaspora Jews only because their situation is difficult and without being sure that they have jobs in Palestine’. Under his influence, to accommodate both Arabs and British the Agency Executive even reduced its demand for immigrant certificates.19 For a short while modest British measures, intended to placate the Arab leaders, and secretly endorsed by the Agency, seemed to be effective. These included increased investment in the development of the Arab sector, and a renewed, albeit vague, promise to establish the coveted Legislative Council. During this short period, despite growing unrest among the Palestinian Arab leaders after the war in Abyssinia and enhanced Italian and German involvement in the Middle East, Palestinian Arab leaders still maintained their basically pro-British disposition. This had been a calculated policy. In return for a demon­ stration of loyalty they hoped to gain further and greater concessions from the British government. Consequently, in late November 1935, still showing restraint, a large delegation of Palestinian leaders presented the High Commissioner with their demands for the full stoppage of Jewish immigration, prohibition of land sales to the Jews, and the establishment of an essentially Arab Executive Council in the territory. Initially, the British had been inclined to comply with some of these demands, but a

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dramatic change in the situation occurred when the Abyssinian crisis ebbed in early 1936 and the British no longer felt the same need to pacify any Arab leader, including of course the Palestinian Arab ones. Even though this reversal in British policy resulted in further radicalization in the Palestinian camp, in growing demands for the estab­ lishment of an independent Palestinian state, the total stoppage of Jewish immigration into the country, and the curtailment of land purchase and settlement, Shertok held to his view that the Agency should continue its moderate policies towards both British and Arabs, since, as he explained, by stepping on the brakes, especially in regard to Jewish immigration, which was drastically reduced in the October 1935 half-yearly schedule, the British had introduced only necessary adjust­ ments in their essentially even-handed policies towards Jews and Arabs in Palestine. In this he, as well as other moderate Agency leaders, clashed again with Ben-Gurion and the activists, who were convinced that, because of the abysmal results of the Abyssinian war for the British, they were about to introduce a major change of course and make substantial concessions to the Palestinian Arabs in regard to Jewish immigration and the sale of land to the Jews. On the other hand, Shertok reiterated that the changes in British policy were a result of long-term processes which were neither new nor unexpected.20 The truth, of course, fell somewhere in between the strategic assessments and the policy recom­ mendations of these two leaders and their respective camps. Matters came to a head in mid-April 1936, when the Palestinian Arabs launched a general strike of their entire community. The strike was called partly to protest against what the Palestinians viewed as British procras­ tination in complying with the Arabs’ persistent demands for sovereignty in the territory and for halting the development of the Yishuv, partly against the rapid and conspicuous growth of the Yishuv, and partly in connection with the high tide of Arab nationalism then sweeping Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. As the strike, which indeed encompassed the entire Arab community, was further deteriorating into guerrilla warfare against both British and Jews, the mandatory government shelved its modest plans for palliative solutions, for by then neither a Legislative Council nor the imposition of further restrictions on Jewish immigration, land pur­ chase, and settlement, could stave off Arab violence. Moreover, the British were aware that they needed new ideas on how to deal with the rapidly mounting crisis in the Holy Land, especially since they knew that in any event it would be a protracted and messy affair. The exact timing, scope, and duration of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Palestine, which, as Shertok would eventually admit, had

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been foreseen neither by him nor by the intelligence experts in his department,21 meant that the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, and Shertok as its chairman, would willy-nilly find themselves in the eye of the storm. During the tribulations of the next three years, he, together with Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, formed a small élite cartel that guided almost single-handedly the Yishuv and the Zionist movement through that gruelling period. In retrospect, however, the threesome determined the Agency’s stance on foreign affairs not just during this crisis, but for more than a decade. Again in retrospect, of the three, Shertok was the one personally to benefit most from the new situation, since politically he was becoming almost indispensable to his two older colleagues. Thus, not only was his department strong enough to deal professionally and effectively with the ongoing and escalating crisis, but he also became both the mediator and, to some extent, the balancer, between the more moderate Weizmann and the activist Ben-Gurion. True to his lifelong pragmatic approach to international politics and conflict, Shertok supported the policy of Havlagah, that is restraint, during thè initial stages of the general strike and uprising. He supported this controversial orientation despite mounting Arab attacks on British military units and installations, on Jewish settlements, and particularly on roads used by Jews. His main reason for adhering to the strategy of restraint was the hope that it would reduce the level of violent friction with the Palestinian community, restabilize the situation in the territory, and thereby help the Yishuv to maintain the close connections it had established with Wauchope in Jerusalem as well as with the British authorities in London. In this there was full agreement between Shertok and Ben-Gurion. On the whole, Havlagah proved successful. The Agency’s Executive, and particularly Shertok and his department, were able to claim more than minor achievements during the period that followed of hardship but also of growth on the part of the Yishuv. The net result of their policy was that despite opposition from pro-Arab British politicians and officials and from Arabs, Jewish immigration continued, albeit at a diminished level; sizeable units of Jewish supernumerary policemen, which proved to be of vital importance to the Haganah’s future develop­ ment as well as to the Yishuv’s capacity for self-defence, were estab­ lished; the British government allowed the Yishuv to build a small port in Tel Aviv, and to operate it independently of the old port of Jaffa, which was a hotbed of Arab unrest. The government granted this coveted right in view of the Arab boycott on imports for the Jewish community through Jaffa, and the strike of Arab longshoremen there

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and in Haifa. Moreover, land purchase was nbt prohibited, and the establishment of Jewish settlements accelerated. In the best tradition of British colonialism, in view of the unveiling crisis, the High Commis­ sioner and the British government enhanced co-operation with the Jewish Agency. Contacts with both British civilian officials and army officers were conducted at a higher level compared to that of the earlier period. Moreover, unlike some of his socialist colleagues, who still adhered to a bi-national solution to the conflict, Shertok was far from opposing the growing separation between Arabs and Jews in Palestine caused by the strike and evolving uprising. Later Shertok would justifiably take great pride in the fact that the policy of separation, restraint, realism, and pragmatism had paid off handsomely during the early days of the strike. And subsequently these became typical dovish positions in the Jewish community and Israel. By May 1936, however, it became clear that the situation in the country was deteriorating to the point where ad hoc solutions were not sufficient and more permanent arrangements would be required. N atur­ ally, each of the actors in the Palestinian scene propagated his own cherished solution: the Arabs claimed the end of the British Mandate and its corollary—their own sovereign state in all of Palestine; the Jewish Agency, led by Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok, was ready to continue the gradual development of the Yishuv, under the British Mandate and in political parity with the Arabs—although some Jewish leaders, including Weizmann and Shertok, began seriously to consider the need for territorial separation between the two communities through various forms of cantonization; and the British were still primarily interested in maintaining their control over that strategically important territory at the lowest cost to British taxpayers and to pursue an even-handed policy towards the two warring communities. There was just one common facet in Jewish and Arab intentions and behaviour: each side showed a clear inclination to escalate its political and military struggle in order to secure the implementation of its own solution. Within this framework the British government decided to suppress the Arab rebellion, through diplomacy and politics if possible, and the use of force if necessary. After much controversy, including considerable debate and tension between Wauchope and the frequently changing generals commanding the Royal Air Force and army deployed in Palestine, the British substantially increased their garrison in the terri­ tory and plannçd to impose military government. At the same time, however, in their search for a permanent political solution, the British government in London decided to dispatch to

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Palestine a high-powered Royal Commission, headed by Lord Peel and staffed by a number of experienced British politicians, senior officials, and academics. The official task of the commission would be to probe into the situation and suggest means for restoring stability, if not tranquillity, to the troubled territory. These intentions pronounced by the British government unleashed a heated debate within the Jewish leadership, during which Ben-Gurion on the one hand, and Weizmann and Shertok on the other, adopted opposing attitudes. Questioning the need for such a commission in the light of the dubious recommendations concerning the Yishuv’s future development produced in the early 1930s by the Shaw and HopeSimpson commissions of inquiry, Ben-Gurion adamantly called for non-co-operation with the Royal Commission. Shertok initially thought that the Royal Commission was aimed at placating the Arabs and shared Ben-Gurion’s negative attitude, but later, when he learned more about the government’s intentions, he failed to see any major political harm resulting from such an inquiry. On the contrary, he even welcomed this commission.22 After a period during which the Executive publicly re­ jected the idea, a typical compromise was reached, according to which the Peel Commission was to be neither totally rejected nor enthusiasti­ cally welcomed. The Executive were to demand the postponement of the commission’s establishment and dispatch to Palestine until law and order were restored in the country. Thus, during his interview with the High Commissioner early in May 1936, Shertok was already hinting that the Agency would not boycott the Royal Commission, but also that during the Agency’s appearance before the commission it would not adopt a defensive line and rather publicly accuse the government for its insufficient support of the Jewish national home and its ineffective conduct of affairs.23 Later in May 1936 the members of the Jewish Agency Executive again debated their position vis-à-vis the Arab uprising and British reaction to it. In this debate, Shertok began by stating that despite the High Commissioner’s vacillating policy, Sir Arthur was not an enemy, but had just intended to allow the development of the Yishuv within the limits delineated by the British government, and in accordance with their imperial and economic interests. Moreover, he expressed his under­ standing of the rationale behind the behaviour of the Palestinian Arab national movement, attributing it to their fear of Jewish domination in Palestine. Here he repeated his ingrained view of the hopelessness of any attempt to resolve the conflict in its entirety, emphasizing ‘that there always are insoluble problems. Only time can solve these problems, and

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we cannot predict with any degree of accuracy in which direction such a solution may evolve.’ He added that the maximum that the Jews could hope for was the reduction of tension through clever ‘conflict manage­ ment’ and through planned political and diplomatic efforts to restore a stable balance among the three sides. Almost alone among his fellow leaders, and increasingly in opposition to his brother-in-law, Golomb, Shertok insisted that continued contacts with Arab dignitaries was the Yishuv’s only choice for reducing the intensity of the inter-communal conflict. According to him, this attempt should be made ‘out of maxi­ mum respect towards the Arabs, and with minimal friction and provo­ cation. This demands a great deal of will power, and I don’t see it among us.’ Repeating his gradualist views, he typically concluded that such a strategy ‘will pave the way towards an additional stage, and then towards yet another stage [ultimately leading to stability and tranquill­ ity]’.24 Thus, as early as mid-1936, Shertok was already espousing several elements of what has come to be known as the dovish step-by-step approach to the resolution of the Arab-Jewish conflict. In a direct answer to Shertok, Ben-Gurion rejected pessimism regard­ ing the possibility of an early permanent solution to the conflict. Unlike his younger colleague, he believed that the Yishuv could, and should, be midwife to a lasting comprehensive solution, which should, of course, suit the Yishuv’s own interests. From this period onward, similar debates between the two leaders concerning grand strategy would linger for the rest of Shertok’s political career, and would be one of the main bones of contention with Ben-Gurion.25 Brushing off Ben-Gurion’s implicit and explicit disapproval of his position, Shertok was politically honest and stalwart enough to be first to call the Palestinian uprising by its proper name: a rebellion. Also on this occasion, he repeated his contention that ‘the Palestinian Arabs have healthy national instincts which motivate them to stage opposition to us’,26 thereby challenging the accepted view among the majority of his colleagues that the local community had an ‘Arab’ or ‘Muslim’ identity, and not a genuine Palestinian national character. From this realistic evaluation of the prevailing situation in Palestine, Shertok insisted that the Yishuv must meet and conduct negotiations with Palestinian Arab leaders, including Hajj Amin al-Husseini, through his representatives. Again, Shertok’s views provoked a heated exchange with Ben-Gurion and other leaders of Mapai and other parties. Initially, the Executive rejected Shertok’s initiative to conduct such talks with Palestinian leaders about a possible agreement. Only towards the end of June 1936 could Shertok resume his talks with Musa al-Alami, but at the height of

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the rebellion, these failed to lead to any operational agreement between the Yishuv and the Palestinians.27 Immediately after this internal debate, late in May 1936 Ben-Gurion left Jerusalem for London to serve as Weizmann’s ‘watch-dog’, and Shertok remained in charge of the Yishuv’s foreign and defence policy in accordance with the principle, unanimously accepted by Mapai’s leaders and, since they had gained hegemony in the Zionist movement and the Yishuv, also by the Agency, that Jerusalem was the centre of policy-making. In June 1936, while the Palestinians’ general strike was still at its peak, Shertok was summoned to Cairo to conduct a secret coded telephone conversation with Ben-Gurion, who was then in London trying to generate support for the Yishuv. Ben-Gurion informed him of the British government’s final decision to quell the rebellion, if necessary by force, and then to dispatch the Royal Commission to conduct an inquiry into the immediate and longer-range causes of the crisis in the territory. Characteristically, Shertok’s immediate response was that the Agency must co-operate with the commission, but that such co-operation should depend on the commission’s personal composition, its terms of reference, and the commissioners’ attitude towards Jewish craving for a national home in Palestine. Additionally, since Shertok was acquainted with the details concerning the military situation of the three sides in Palestine, since he was well aware that the Arab rebellion was far from subsiding, and that the Yishuv’s military strength had not grown to the point where it alone could defend the Jews of Palestine, he maintained that the Jewish community would benefit from helping the British to stabilize the situation in the country and to defend the British, as well as the Yishuv’s, strategic assets such as roads, railways, and oil pipelines. He therefore warmly supported the proposal put forward by his brother-inlaw, Eliahu Golomb (by then the recognized leader of the Haganah) to form small Jewish commando units within the British forces stationed in Palestine to combat the Arabs, this on top of his own attempt to obtain the British government’s permission to expand the Jewish supernumer­ ary police force. The activist Ben-Gurion naturally fully concurred with these proposals. Soon afterwards, Shertok sounded out \yauchope on these two complementary proposals. To his surprise, the High Commis­ sioner did not dismiss the ideas out of hand; he informed Shertok that he himself had intended to examine favourably the possibility of establishing such units to serve alongside the British forces fighting against the Palestinians in the northern part of the country. A few weeks later, the British government in Palestine began the practical

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preparations for recruiting and training these Jewish units. From this small beginning, these mobile units would develop into a major facet of the Yishuv’s co-operation with the British, as well as lead to a revolution in the Haganah’s structure, and most importantly, in its conceptions regarding military strategy and operations. The strategy would be changed from a static-defensive to a mobile-offensive one. The implementation of this idea would also bring together Shertok and the legendary British military innovator and rebel, the pro-Zionist Captain Orde Wingate, who was sent to Palestine to command these units. Eventually, the two would become close friends who would co-operate in pursuing and implementing British-Jewish collaboration in the sphere of non-conventional guerrilla operations. Even these dramatic events did not lessen tensions among the Zionist political élite. Thus, early in July 1936, Shertok was among the small group of Mapai leaders (the others were Berl and Kaplan), who thwarted Ben-Gurion’s disguised attempt to unseat Weizmann from his position as president of the World Zionist Organization, when he travelled from London to Palestine especially for this purpose. BenGurion’s pretext for this move was Weizmann’s half-hearted agreement to stop Jewish immigration for the duration of the Royal Commission inquiry and limit it afterwards, an agreement which had been arrived at during a meeting with the Iraqi foreign minister, Nuri al-Said Pasha. Like his colleagues, Shertok argued that, knowing Weizmann’s political weaknesses, it was not the right moment to oust the president, and that the only action necessary was to give him greater moral support, to put in place more watch-dogs (it was decided to dispatch Dov Hoz and Berl Locker to help Ben-Gurion in carrying out this task), and to draft a communication warning him against a repetition of such a tactical mistake.28 Even after this unfortunate incident, it was no accident that Shertok continued to call Weizmann ‘my dear chief’. Ben-Gurion’s unkind attempt to unseat Weizmann for the sake of avoiding similar mistakes, for the advancement of his own personal political ambitions, and for reasons of envy, only added to a latent but slowly growing alienation between Shertok and Ben-Gurion. In accordance with their decision in late June 1936, and after de­ ploying additional British military forces during August and September of that year, the British government introduced more stringent security measures aimed at restoring law and order and paving the way for the Peel Commission’s arrival in the country (the Jewish special units serving under Wingate actively participated in these efforts to quell the rebel­ lion). But British hesitation in utilizing to the full the large military

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forces deployed in Palestine—close to 20,000 strong—defeated their ambiguous decision to crush the rebellion rapidly. Extremely worried about the lingering crisis, Shertok was among the Jewish leaders who felt that while diplomatic contacts with the British must not be allowed to flag, the time had come for the Yishuv to further strengthen its paramilitary forces. On the other hand, this activist position in regard to security did not preclude Shertok from leading the campaign for restraint and for the avoidance of retaliation. In line with these dovish principles, he initiated yet another series of negotiations with the British, including the frustrated Wauchope, regarding possible political and diplomatic steps aimed at alleviating the situation.29 Since the Yishuv was maintaining its policy of restraint, the British responded favourably to Shertok’s initiative to create special Jewish units in the police force also. The British knew that most of the young men expected to serve in these units were active, or potential members of the Haganah. The government’s consent was, therefore, perceived by Shertok and his colleagues in Jerusalem as a political achievement amounting to an informal legitimation of that clandestine paramilitary organization—no negligible attainment for its commanders and political patrons. After a series of successful military operations conducted by the British army throughout September and October 1936, aimed at putting down the rebellion, a lull in the uprising was secured. It was the result of the growing fatigue and loss of nerve among the Palestinian Arabs, and of diplomatic mediation with the British on the part of the rulers of neighbouring Arab countries. During this lull, the British government made final preparations for dispatching the Peel Commission to the Middle East.30 On the eve of the Peel Commission’s arrival in Palestine in early November 1936, Shertok was busy supervising the preparations of the ‘sea’ of position papers intended to present the Yishuv’s case before that commission, and simultaneously serving as the principal mediator be­ tween Ben-Gurion and Mapai on the one hand, and Chaim Weizmann and his supporters and associates on the other. Shertok thought that such mediation was imperative, since Ben-Gurion and other activists feard that Weizmann would still be inclined to make too many conces­ sions to the Arabs, especially in regard to the most sensitive issue of the stoppage of Jewish immigration, constantly demanded by the Palesti­ nians. He and the activists were also apprehensive that Weizmann might accept cantonization, informally promoted by the British Colonial Office. Ben-Gurion’s deep concern that Weizmann would agree to a halt

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in immigration and to cantonization was deepened by the rumours that the president of the Zionist movement had expressed his readiness to do so in secret meetings in London with both the influential Iraqi foreign minister, Nuri al-Said, and the British colonial secretary, William Ormsby-Gore. During the entire period of preparation before the arrival of the Royal Commission, Shertok maintained continuous contact with the ageing and ailing president, consulting his ‘dear chief ’ on numerous details of the Yishuv’s case. The growing political co-operation and personal intimacy between Weizmann and Shertok during that period proved significant in enhancing the moderates’ position and in the development of Shertok’s future political attitudes and career. The British pre-condition for dispatching the Peel Commission to the Holy Land was the end of the general strike and the rebellion it engendered. Once the British military operations and the mediation of Arab rulers of Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, and Egypt persuaded the exhausted Palestinian leaders to suspend the rebellion in October 1936, the Royal Commission left for Palestine to review the situation in the territory and gather information from British officials and Jewish and Arab leaders. Although publicly committed to impartiality, the Peel Commission arrived in Palestine in early November 1936 only after it had conducted intensive consultations with the foreign and colonial ministers, senior officials, and army officers in Whitehall. It meant that the commission’s members were versed in Whitehall’s intentions—mainly with the Colonial Office idea of cantonization (that is, of establishing autonomous Jewish and Arab cantons within a federal framework that would eventually obtain independence). Since local Arab leaders boycotted the commission until almost the end of its stay, at which point a few of them did agree to appear before it, the commission had to confine most of its hearings to British and Jewish witnesses. According to the script that Shertok had prepared and Weizmann and a reluctant and disgruntled Ben-Gurion had approved, the Jewish Agency’s first witness before the commission was an energetic, deter­ mined, and highly emotional Weizmann (his approval of this arrange­ ment notwithstanding, Ben-Gurion would never forgive Shertok for not placing Ben-Gurion’s own presentation immediately after Weizmann’s).31 The president of the World Zionist Organization proudly reviewed on the one hand the ancient, as well as recent, history of successful Jewish settlement in Palestine, and the impressive growth of the Yishuv, and on the other, the increasing plight of European Jews, as

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well as the intensifying Arab-Jewish conflict. Weizmann concluded his first exposé by forcefully putting forward the Jewish demands for the continued and unhampered development of the national home, which should serve as a haven for Jews escaping from Central Europe. Next to speak on behalf of the Yishuv and the Zionist movement, Shertok followed Weizmann and focused on the necessity to ensure that Palestine’s Jews receive the fair treatment required to continue building their national home in the territory, especially in view of the need to provide a safe refuge for Europe’s increasingly oppressed Jews. He also repeated the Executive’s official formula concerning the relations with the Palestinian Arabs—the Yishuv would neither dominate the Palesti­ nians nor pursue a policy of transfer. Shertok particularly impressed the members of the commission in pointing out that, whereas the unyielding demands for ownership of the entire country and violent protests of Arab leaders had led to the rebellion, by contrast, the Jewish Agency was bent on co-operation with the government.32 Shertok’s performance when facing the Peel Commission’s ruthless examination and crossexamination was so effective that even the ultra-activist Tabenkin labelled it ‘a continuation of the Jewish martyrology that began during the Middle Ages—[Shertok] experienced something like the Inquisition’. Ben-Gurion, never known for his generosity in complimenting his colleagues, and especially Shertok, admitted that ‘Shertok’s presenta­ tions during the open and closed sessions of the Commission concerning immigration, public works, the Haganah and the Yishuv’s activities during the disturbances, were especially respectable. He showed pro­ found knowledge of our affairs, demonstrated his talent for succinctly presenting our case, was wise, assertive, and tactful. . . throughout the whole gruelling ordeal.’33 After further presentations by other Agency representatives and ex­ perts, including (after much bickering, tension, and internal controver­ sies) Ben-Gurion, on immigration, land, economics, public works, defence, and the Yishuv’s role in quelling the rebellion, the commission, as well as the British and Jewish witnesses, settled down to the quintes­ sential political issue at hand: the desirability and feasibility of con­ tinuing the British Mandate over the territory, and , the idea of cantonization based on the evident inability of the Arabs and Jews to maintain a unitary polity. The plan to cantonize Palestine under British tutelage, although strongly supported by Ormsby-Gore and his officials in the Colonial Office, was rejected by both Jews and Arabs. The Jews, directly, and the Arabs, circuitously, made it clear that neither com­ munity favoured this solution. The majority in the Jewish Agency

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supported the idea of numerical and political ‘parity’ as the optimal solution for the inter-communal conflict. At this critical juncture, when it seemed that they might have reached an impasse, since there was no way to attain an agreed solution, members of the Royal Commission privately began contemplating partition and the eventual establishment of two separate states and British enclaves in the territory. However, before openly proceeding along what was then viewed as a revolutionary idea, Weizmann was invited to a closed session of the commission, purportedly to discuss cantonization once again. Thén on 8 January 1937, when it seemed that Weizmann’s presentation of the Agency’s case, expounded by himself, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok against cantonization and for parity had allowed him to deflect the idea, one of the commission members, Reginald Copeland, Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford University, asked Weizmann a startling question: ‘If there were no other way out to peace, might it not be final and peaceful to terminate the Mandate by agreement and split Palestine into two halves, the plain being an independent Jewish State, and the rest of Palestine, plus Trans-Jordania, being an independent Arab State?’34 By his question, Professor Copeland, a well-known authority on colonialism, had altered the course of events and created a significant turning-point in the political and diplomatic history of Palestine and especially of the Yishuv. Weizmann’s immediate response was that this would mean ‘cutting the child in two’, and he pleaded for time to contemplate this startling idea and consult his colleagues. As soon as Copeland broached the partition idea, which despite the general yearning to establish a Jewish state previously had not been amply explored by the Yishuv’s leaders, an enthralled Weizmann hastened to consult secretly with his then two political partners, BenGurion and Shertok. Weizmann thought that, ‘The Jews would be fools not to accept it even if it were the size of a table-cloth’. Sensing the tremendous political potential of Copeland’s rather vague suggestion, Ben-Gurion was immediately enthusiastic about it, and totally changed his previous ‘course’, which had emphasized large Jewish immigration and a federative solution. Initially, the more prudent and conscientious Shertok ‘had severe doubts about the [feasibility of the] plan’, since ‘partition is the last resort. It would mean termination of the Mandate. And if it is not implemented, we will remain empty-handed.’ Realisti­ cally, his main concern was neither the Yishuv’s ability to establish a state, nor Arab opposition to such a state, but Britain’s lack of courage and stamina to implement such an innovative plan, especially in view of

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its traditional vacillation in regard to this territory. Shertok thought it would be a tactical mistake to accept it immediately. Soon afterwards, however, when he detected British determination to implement the plan, he too adopted Weizmann’s and Ben-Gurion’s passionate support of parution. When Weizmann met Copeland and other members of the commission at Moshav Nahalal a few days after the idea had first been presented to him, he informed Professor Copeland that under certain conditions he and his associates would support the idea of partition. For under­ standable reasons the three watchful leaders agreed to keep the proposal under a thick veil of secrecy from the rest of the Yishuv and Zionist movement for the time being, but to no avail.35 From the minute it was brought up, the three Jewish leaders were well aware that the idea of partition would be met with vehement opposition not only among the Arabs, but also among members of their own parties, of the opposition, and particularly of the Revisionists and ultra-orthodox factions. Their tactic was, therefore, to create the im­ pression that the Yishuv opposed the plan, and if the British were courageous and firm enough to implement it, they should impose it not just on the Arabs but also on the Yishuv. Behind the scenes the three leaders did their utmost to promote the idea and secure its approval by Yishuv and Zionist bodies. Indeed, when the partition proposal was leaked to Zionist and Yishuv leaders in February 1937, it created a storm and, as anticipated, was severely criticized by opponents from all parts of the political spectrum. In fact, all Zionist parties were split down the middle with regard to partition—much as the Israeli society and political parties would be in the 1980s and early 1990s, when the Jewish state would face similar critical questions in regard to the possibility of repartitioning the area west of the Jordan River. In the mean time Shertok carefully re-examined his position concern­ ing partition. He came to support it because the risks involved in adopting the idea were small in comparison to the potential political gains regardless of whether the idea was accepted by the British or shelved. Once Shertok overcame his initial scepticism about the feas­ ibility of the partition solution, he became probably thç most ardent supporter, certainly among the members of the triumvirate, of the idea of a Jewish state in part of the Mandate territory. This would become a mainstay of the dovish approach in the Yishuv and Israel. In mid-February 1937 Shertok arrived in London to serve as Weiz­ mann’s temporary watch-dog, to deal with various political and eco­ nomic problems that he was unable to solve in Jerusalem, and mainly to

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lobby for the best possible partition plan, nameiy, to secure as much territory as possible and the most favourable borders possible for the Jewish state.36 In this context, one of his more important and revealing meetings was with the pro-Zionist colonial secretary, William OrmsbyGore. For in this meeting, Shertok immediately raised the question of partition, saying that, emotionally and practically for the Yishuv, Solomon’s Judgement would mean a very painful operation, yet its leaders would be ready to compromise under two conditions: the granting of real independence and sufficient room for development.37 By February 1937 this was already the secret but actual line that Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok pursued. Everything else was tactics. However, some differences could have been discerned in the positions of the three leaders who navigated the Zionist boat. In his careful readiness to accept a small territory for the Jewish national home and later for a Jewish state, Shertok differed from Ben-Gurion and the activists, who nurtured grandiose plans eventually to expand the terri­ torial size of the future independent Jewish state. Shertok was also sceptical about both the idea of federation that the British harboured in March 1937,38 and the idea of collusion with Amir Abdullah of Trans­ jordan that Ben-Gurion contemplated. Moreover, unlike Ben-Gurion and certain members of the Peel Commission, Shertok opposed any imposed exchange of population, or ‘transfer’ of Arabs, arguing: ‘where can they go? what can they get in compensation [for their lost property]? and what can they be offered? . . . at this stage, we cannot fool ourselves in comparing this plan with the population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Conditions there were totally different. Therefore, they [the Palestinians] should stay . . . ’. Later, he added that an imposed transfer ‘will unquestionably cause bloodshed more widespread than any wit­ nessed in this country until now’.39 After long and convoluted deliberations and internal controversies in London and Jerusalem, it was leaked that the Peel Commission had recommended that two independent states and three small British enclaves should be established in Palestine, and the Arab state would be part of a federation with Amir Abdullah’s Transjordan. During the weeks that followed the leakage of these rumours about the com­ mission’s main recommendation, and despite fierce attacks on Shertok, launched by the anti-partitionists in the Jewish political élite, he devoted a lot of time and energy in persuading various groups of politicians in London, and after returning to Jerusalem in early April 1937, in the Yishuv and the Zionist movement, to accept the Peel Commission’s proposal.

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In this context, Shertok firmly rejected what he termed the ‘Revision­ ists’ mystical opposition to partition’. In this debate with the anti­ partitionists he stated: Even a region [in part of Palestine] which is inhabited only by Jews has significant mystical charm in my eyes. . . [Unlike the Revisionists,] we must examine actual practical issues, assess the advantages of a partition plan and the problems that it would pose. In this context, I see the following advantages: a. a possibility of rapid growth; b. an opening which would allow us maximally to use all our capabilities for development; c. a maximal possibility to demonstrate our creative power; d. a new stature and a greater political w eight. . . But I will accept such a plan only if we receive reasonable areas and authority.40

He would also say that ‘the partition plan is relatively, if not absolutely appealing, especially in comparison with the practical alterna­ tives facing us [such as cantonization, or the continuation of British rule]’.41 During the interim period until the official publication of the Royal Commission’s report, Shertok and his emissaries launched a series of talks in various neighbouring countries and with Palestinian leaders and digni­ taries such as Awni Abd al-Hadi, Rajib al-Nashashibi, and Jamil Mardam. These talks were intended to gauge the mood in the Palestinian community and the Arab states, but mainly to ‘demonstrate that even under current conditions, when there are talks about partition and the establishment of a Jewish state, we wish peace with the Arabs’.42 Though there was a propaganda angle to this statement, he basically believed in it. As the time of publication of the commission’s report was approach­ ing, under the influence of Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok, the Zionist Actions Committee adopted a double-edged tactical resolution stating that any partition plan should be rejected, but that, simul­ taneously, the Jews would conduct negotiations with the British govern­ ment to ensure that the actual plan would be favourable to the Yishuv.43 This ‘dual formula’ was neither the first nor the last that the leaders of the still weak Yishuv adopted. To members of the Mapai Political Committee, Shertok explained that although this was known as ‘BenGurion’s line’, in fact, Weizmann and he himself were equally respon­ sible for its formulation.44 In the mean time, Shertok immersed himself in a familiar traditional Zionist and Yishuv activist strategy of ‘estab­ lishing facts’—he was convinced that ‘despite all security and financial difficulties, politically, there is no more urgent and effective task than to establish settlements on the land that we have already purchased, and thus establish facts’.45

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The British government publicly declared the adoption of the partition plan on 7 July 1937. Naturally, this famous and controversial White Paper further electrified Jews, Arabs, and interested bystanders. In the Yishuv, the debate was not confined to small groups of politicians and political activists, for as expected, a fierce struggle over the adoption of the principle of partition began to rage in the Yishuv and the entire Zionist movement, involving ever widening groups of rank and file. During this controversy, talking to members of the Mapai Council and Central Committee, Shertok staunchly defended the proposal on the basis of the assumption that fundamentally ‘there can be no compromise between Jewish and Arab aspirations in Palestine. . As an after­ thought he added: ‘it does not mean that there will never be a com­ promise between Jewish and Arab cravings; but if we examine the situation not as we would have liked it to be but as it is n o w . . . the conclusion must be the same’. Because the Yishuv’s aspiration to become the majority was anathema to the Arabs, as was the Arabs’ wish ‘to attain exclusive rule over Palestine in its entirety’ to the Jews, he concluded that it was the task of the Jews to decide ‘not what is ideal, but what we wish to accomplish under the given circumstances. And if the choice is between a continuation of the Mandate as it is proposed in the report, and partition as it is proposed in the report, I opt for partition.’46 Thus, pragmatically and realistically, Shertok whole­ heartedly supported partition (which he regarded as ‘our immense victory and an Arab defeat’), not as the ideal solution but as the lesser evil. In accordance with its long tradition of maintaining consensus almost at all costs, Mapai’s prominent anti-partitionist Katznelson and the pro-partition Shertok submitted a joint compromise proposal to the Mapai Council: in the mean time the Mandate should be maintained, and the practical recommendations of the Peel Commission, especially those concerning the borders of the proposed Jewish state, should be amended to make them more acceptable to the Jews. This was yet another double-edged formula that the Mapai leaders adopted in prep­ aration for the forthcoming 1937 Twentieth Zionist Congress. It was intended to overcome possible emotional and cognitive dissonance as well as difficult actual political controversies between anti- and pro­ partitionists. By adopting this double-edged formula, the Council sanc­ tioned partition de facto if not formally. Out of conviction, under Mapai’s leadership and in view of this party’s hegemonial position, the Jewish Agency Executive adopted a similar stance. Weizmann’s, BenGurion’s, and Shertok’s next mission was to shepherd it through the forthcoming World Zionist Congress, scheduled for September 1937.

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Naturally, the debate over partition was the main item on the agenda of the 1937 congress. As the pivotal party in the Zionist movement and the Yishuv (controlling 45 per cent of the delegates, against the General Zionists’ 25 per cent and Mizrahi’s 15 per cent), Mapai and its leaders played a decisive role in shaping its strategic decisions and subsequent operational policies. None the less, it was only after a massive confron­ tation between the anti- and pro-partitionist camps in the congress, in which Shertok played a very active role. During this debate in the congress, Shertok repeated his view that ‘the choice facing us is not between two good but two bad solutions, between two forms of limitations’, but also that ‘we should not choose the road of least resistance, we must choose the road towards the greatest possible progress, which is the harder way’. He, the prudent and moderate leader, added that ‘our choice must not be passivity . . . the question is what do we want, and we must fight for whatever we want. It is not true that the Jewish state will be “given” to us—to achieve it, we must fight as we fought to obtain the Balfour Declaration [in this, he invoked the memory of Weizmann’s great achievement during the Great War].’ Shertok’s speech in the congress was ‘factual and sober’, it gained substantial praise from both anti- and pro-partitionists, such as Kaplan, Zalman Rubashov-Shazar, Golda Meyerson, Louis Namier, and Eliahu Golomb. Shertok was particularly touched by Sima Arlosoroff ’s reac­ tion—she wept during his speech, and later told him that she wanted to embrace him because it reminded her of the views of her late husband, Shertok’s friend, the great Chaim Arlosoroff. The president of the Zionist movement, Chaim Weizmann, also applauded his role in obtain­ ing the plan as well as his polished speech, and as Shertok was stepping down from the podium he stopped him and kissed his forehead. Moreover, in his concluding speech in the congress, Weizmann paid Shertok a further warm personal tribute by dwelling once again on his role in achieving the partition plan. Initially, Shertok was flattered by the president’s profuse praise, but he soon realized that while Weizmann praised him, he entirely disregarded Ben-Gurion and his role. As expected, Ben-Gurion was deeply insulted, and would hold this affront not just against Weizmann, but against Shertok as well. These incidents, coupled with the fact that most of the acknowledged léaders of the Mapai faction in the congress, including Katznelson, Sprinzak, Golomb, Hoz, Kaplan, Locker, and Shertok, supported Weizmann’s rather than Ben-Gurion’s operative proposals, only added to the latent tensions between Ben-Gurion on the one hand, and Weizmann and Shertok on the other, and in turn to the latter’s drift towards his ‘dear chief ’, Chaim

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Weizmann. To add further insult to injury, Weizmann hand-picked Shertok, again rather then Ben-Gurion, to accompany him to the next meeting of the League of Nations, that would discuss the situation in Palestine.47 In spite of these insults and resultant tensions, under the joint influence of Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok, and with Katznelson’s indirect support, the compromise that had been adopted by Mapai was endorsed by the congress. Hence, the final resolution of the congress represented a resounding success for the pro-partitionists,48 to whom it signalled the chance to fulfil the Zionist dream of a Jewish state. Like the Israeli doves in the 1980s and 1990s, the pro-partitionists, including Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok, were not ‘defeatists’, as they were portrayed by their ‘mystical’ opponents, but rather among the most passionate advocates for increasing Jewish power in Palestine. In view of the pro-partitionists’ victory, and as a matter of course, Shertok was re-elected by the Twentieth Congress as a member of the Executive, and later as chairman of the Jewish Agency Political Depart­ ment. Encouraged by this renewed mandate and in view of the possibility that the British government might try to implement partition, on his return to Palestine Shertok concentrated on ‘establishing facts’, intended at enhancing Jewish presence and security in the Holy Land. In this context, he assumed the chairmanship of a secret joint security commit­ tee, in which all the Jewish national organizations in Palestine parti­ cipated (that is, the Agency, the Histadrut, and the Vaad Leumi—which was a national committee elected by all members of the Yishuv). Among other tasks, this joint committee was responsible for the Haganah’s expansion, reorganization, and financing. Thus, in addition to being a consummate diplomat, who continuously cautioned against the uncon­ trolled use of force, Shertok showed that he was both willing and able to take an active part in ensuring the security of the Yishuv. Moreover, by accepting the chairmanship of this joint committee, he became the senior politician, who controlled and supervised the Haganah’s activities—a little-known facet of his activities during that period, since his work in this sphere was then shrouded in almost total secrecy. Yet another aspect of Shertok’s involvement in defence and security matters was more open: his intimate friendship with the famous innovative British military leader, Captain Orde Wingate. Wingate was then creating and training small joint British-Jewish units to defend the country’s roads, railways, forests, and pipelines against attacks by local Arabs. In late 1937, against the background of the worsening situation in Europe and renewed Arab violence on an immense scale in Palestine, the

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British government came under increasing pressure, especially from King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, from most Arab leaders, and from the British Foreign Office, to retreat from the Peel Commission’s recommendation and withdraw its initial support for partition.49 In the light of such mounting pressures, in early January 1938 the British government appointed typically yet another commission, headed by Sir John Woodhead, to investigate the situation and submit recommenda­ tions on the viability of the idea of partition and the feasibility of the plans for its implementation. Upon the Woodhead Commission’s arrival in Palestine, late in April 1938, Shertok was ready to present the Agency’s case for partition, on the basis of elaborate position papers prepared by six planning committees which he had established in order to gather intelligence on the situation and to prepare the Jewish presentation. Although the commission pursued its deliberations in Palestine for four months, by May 1938 Shertok and his colleagues were already aware that the foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, and his officials had begun to prepare the ground for a total withdrawal from partition. As if to confirm their apprehensions, by mid-September 1938 Weizmann informed Ben-Gurion and Shertok that the colonial secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, had hinted at the possibility that partition would be ‘dropped’ and that in this event there would be a need for a new formula for a three-sided agreement between Jews, Arabs, and British, in which restriction of Jewish immigration would be an essential component. This was repeated by MacDonald during further meetings with Weizmann, held in late September, October, and early November 1938.50 Shertok correctly assessed the British position. He told his colleagues that since the British politicians were aware that a major European war was imminent, the government was reshaping its policies towards the Middle East in general and Palestine in particular. He added that the government would shape its policy in view of global rather than regional or Palestinian developments.51 In this, the report of the Woodhead Commission, ironically called the ‘Repeel Commission’, and stability in the territory were essential factors. The Woodhead Commission indeed submitted its report to the British government on 9 November 1938, after the British army had succeeded in quelling a year-Jong wave of Arab violence in Palestine. The report outlined three schemes for partitioning Palestine. Not surprisingly yet to the immense dis­ appointment of Shertok and his pro-partitionist colleagues in the Agency and the Zionist movement, the commission came to the conclusion that, since none of the three alternatives would satisfy both sides, the partition idea must be rescinded. The British Foreign Office, which had been

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greatly instrumental in pressuring Whitehall to withdraw the partition plan which had mainly been supported by the Colonial Office and pro-Zionists in cabinet, viewed the decision with great relief. For, although the British had just dealt the death-blow to Czechoslovakia by brokering the Munich Agreement in a last-ditch effort to maintain ‘peace in our time’, it was evident that Hitler would not stop at the Sudentenland and that his sinister ambition would lead to a major war. Under such circumstances, it was understandable that the British wished the Arabs on their side in the event of such a war. In this respect, the Woodhead Commission’s report was in line with the government’s general strategy regarding the Middle East, and it was therefore accom­ panied by a White Paper stating that the political, administrative, and financial difficulties entailed in implementing partition and the estab­ lishment of two independent states were so immense that the entire plan was impractical. The White Paper called for a four-sided round-table conference to include representatives of the Yishuv, the Palestinian Arabs, those Arab countries who by then were deeply involved in the Palestine affair, and the British government, to reconsider the situation in an attempt to reach understanding. The infamous Kristallnacht occurred only one day after the publica­ tion of the Woodhead Commission’s report. This ominous affair focused the attention of Jewish leaders, including Shertok, on the urgent need for a renewed intensified struggle for Jewish immigration to Palestine, that had been severely curbed since the beginning of the Arab rebellion and that the government intended to crush it further. Nevertheless, once he had recovered from the shock of this heinous attack on the Jewish community in Germany, Shertok reverted to his long-standing view about the overriding necessity of maintaining negotiations with the British and the Arabs, which, among other things, meant avoiding major clashes with the British over Jewish immigration. ‘Withdrawing from co-operation with the [British] government [as a form of pressure to elicit an increase of Jewish immigration] may sometimes satisfy our wounded feelings and pride,’ he explained, ‘but such a policy of non-co-operation would endanger our practical interests. We must do whatever is possible to increase our power to its maximum and we must do this during a very short period. But, first of all, we must grab now what might not be offered to us tomorrow.’52 Shertok’s view was shared by the majority of the members of the Agency Executive. Subsequently, he and his department set about preparing the Jewish case yet again for the planned round-table con­ ference in London. Considering the political atmosphere of appeasement

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still being touted by the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, and Britain’s determination to maintain the goodwill of Arab rulers, the task facing the Zionists was formidable.53 Not only did they have to repel British plans to freeze the further development of the Yishuv, especially immigration, (or as they called it, ‘repelling the Repeel’) they had also to prepare for the expected world war, which would certainly affect European Jews and possibly even reach the Yishuv. Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and their colleagues, who loathed the British intentions to appease the Arabs, gradually formulated a new realist double-edged strategy. It was based on the notion that, despite Britain’s intention to implement restrictive policies in Palestine, this world power was still the only truly reliable ally of the Jews in general, and of the Jewish community in Palestine in particular, and therefore the Yishuv should continue to co-operate with the ‘devil’ they knew, but at the same time should not succumb to Britain’s plan to appease the Arabs and should continue to resist the British intention to limit its growth. While this double-edged strategy would later be hailed (especially by Ben-Gurion’s admirers, who attributed its ‘invention’ to their hero) as highly sophisticated and far-sighted, in retrospect, it merely reflected the wisdom of the poor. For in view of the storm looming on the horizon, what else could the beleaguered leaders of the Yishuv say or do?54 Also restrospectively, it is evident that this formula was the outcome of necessity and yet another compromise between Zionist activists and moderates. At the same time as the British were planning their retreat from partition, which signified a submission to Arab demands, to Foreign Office priorities, and a blow to the pro-partitionists in the Yishuv and the Zionist movement, Weizmann and Shertok were busy laying the foundations for what would become known as the Yishuv’s and Israel’s ‘peripheral strategy’, that is, establishing close relations with the rulers of non-Arab countries, such as Iran and Turkey, to balance the hostility of the neighbouring Arab countries. Thus, just when the British were announcing their retreat from partition, Shertok, who had again begun by being sceptical, was actively, even enthusiastically, assisting Weiz­ mann in this new diplomatic effort. In late November 1938, with the warm encouragement and formal blessings of the British government in London and its representatives in the Middle East, Weizmann and Shertok travelled to Turkey to try to change that country’s pro-Arab and pro-German orientation by offering their Turkish counterparts diplomatic connections in both Britain and the United States as well as financial inducements. Although these particular and pathetic negotia­ tions resulted neither in any formal Zionist-Turkish agreement nor in

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any change in Turkey’s relations with Britain, they did facilitate the establishment of connections between the two Zionist leaders and senior Turkish politicians and officials. This acquaintance with Turkish politics and politicians eventually provided a basis for the creation of an active Zionist office in Istanbul during the Second World War, which was essential to the Yishuv’s ability to maintain tenuous contacts with Jewish communities under the yoke of Nazi Germany. But this and other similar attempts to conduct talks with Arab leaders with the intention of improving the Yishuv’s position in the region before the war, as well as Shertok’s continuous efforts to maintain an ongoing dialogue with Palestinian leaders, were soon dwarfed and eventually overshadowed by the approaching world war.55 The troubled British-Arab and British-Jewish conference that took place in London’s St James’ Palace in February and March 1939 was preceded by industrious preparations on the part of Shertok and his department and by a long period of constant, but frustrating struggle for an increase in Jewish immigration, made urgent by the demand for immigration of tens of thousands of Jewish children from Germany. On the eve of this conference, Shertok was among the majority of Yishuv and Zionist leaders who opposed Ben-Gurion’s new activist plan (event­ ually termed by Ben-Gurion ‘fighting Zionism’), which called for a Jewish revolt against Britain’s restrictive policies, to begin with thousands of well-trained fighting immigrants arriving in Palestine, followed by a total Jewish uprising in Palestine, ultimately leading to the establishment of a Jewish state there. Instead, Shertok’s position, formulated before the London conference, was that outwardly the Zionists should present an extremely tough position, but, at the same time, avoid boycotting the conference and, if necessary, show readiness to compromise in order to maintain good relations with their only allies, the British. ‘Non-cooperation with the government’, he repeated again and again, ‘may satisfy our injured feelings—but at the same time it may hamper our real interests. I cannot understand what good it would do us to give up the use of our main weapon—political pressure.’56 Furthermore, signalling the beginning of a profound change in his position vis-à-vis the Jewish Diaspora, which began after Kristallnacht,57 but would fully emerge only after the war, for the first time in his political career, Shertok side-stepped his unshaken Palestinocentric attitude to suggest that the plight of Europe’s Jews, which as early as December 1938 he termed Shoah (holocaust),58 should be stressed by the Jewish delegation during the conference. Shertok was actively involved not only in hammering out the Zionist strategic positions and tactical moves, but during the period of prépara-

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tions for the London conference, he was again called to serve as mediator between Weizmann and the activist leaders, chief among them Ben-Gurion, who were still suspicious of Weizmann’s willingness to compromise with British and Arab intentions to freeze the development of the Yishuv, mainly through curbing Jewish immigration to Palestine.59 To save Weizmann from the humiliation of being criticized by his colleagues before the official opening of the conference, Shertok drafted a masterful speech for him to deliver at the first working sessipn of the conference. But lack of consensus and trust within the Zionist leadership resulted in the redrafting of the same speech in a series of meetings of senior leaders and their assistants. None the less, Shertok’s imprint was still evident in the powerful, yet graceful, final version of the important Zionist exposé delivered by Weizmann. In that speech the Jews’ deep frustrations, apprehensions, needs, and hopes were eloquently spelled out. Despite the sad news about the untimely death of his beloved youngest sister, Geula, during the St James’s conference, Shertok characteristically overcamé his deep sense of loss and grief to continue his political and diplomatic work, remaining one of the most prominent Jewish repre­ sentatives at that utterly frustrating conference for the Jewish leaders, who knew that the Central European Jews were doomed. His first speech there was memorable, since in spite of his personal grief on the one hand, and his moderate position on the other, he forcefully and bluntly demanded the uninterrupted continuation of Jewish immigration into Palestine, insisting firmly that British policies towards the Yishuv, including those regarding immigration, had to be adjusted in accordance with the new circumstances. Indicating his shifting mood, in this presen­ tation Shertok combined a staunch Palestinocentric position with a growing concern for European Jews. Of all the speeches delivered in the conference, Shertok’s was the one that attracted the fire of the British. The colonial secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, focusing on Shertok’s assertions and accusations that the British were hampering the further development of the Yishuv and the rescue of European Jews, retorted that the British government rejected all such claims, especially those concerning immigration, on the basis that it had also to protect the interests of the Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere in the Middle East.60 During the London conference, it became even clearer that the main goal of the British was to secure the loyalty, or at least neutrality, of Arab leaders in the coming war, and that they were therefore ready to impose severe, if temporary, restrictions on the Yishuv, which in its turn, in the event of war, would have no alternative but to remain loyal to

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Britain. When this became apparent, many of Shertok’s colleagues, chief among them Ben-Gurion, called for a withdrawal from the conference. However, although opposed to British positions expressed during the conference, Shertok insisted on staying, no matter how frustrating the ordeal, and on continuing to co-operate with the British in the hope that the Agency would be able to salvage some threads of the previous favourable policies. Moreover, Shertok convinced the Jewish leaders to meet their Arab counterparts in the conference to discuss the possibility of inter-communal accommodation. While the ensuing secret talks be­ tween Jews and Arabs were conducted in a friendly atmosphere, the asymmetry of the antagonists’ positions was too great to allow any substantive agreement. In view of the unfavourable political tide evinced at the conference, and notwithstanding his readiness to continue negotia­ tions with both the British and Arabs, Shertok urged his colleagues and assistants in Palestine to expedite land purchase and to establish as many new settlements as possible. In this, he persisted in his previous efforts to promote and assist in all respects the intensive Homa Umigdal (Wall and Tower) settlement project, which he had helped to launch two years earlier. Unlike Ben-Gurion, who was still toying with his activist idea of fighting against the British, Shertok’s position was that ‘our power in Palestine is insufficient to force Britain to establish the regime that we favour, but it may be sufficient to prevent a regime we oppose and should protest against’.61 By early March 1939, Shertok’s intelligence sources had discovered that the price Whitehall was ready to pay for tranquillity in Palestine for the duration of the war entailed substantive concessions to the Arabs, especially in the sphere of Jewish immigration and land purchase.62 Since this information confirmed their worst fears, despite severe internal disagreements the Jewish leaders were determined to maintain a façade of unity in the process of the formulation of a new policy to counter the negative attitudes of the British and potential dangers laying ahead for the Yishuv. None the less, some of these internal disagreements surfaced. Thus, Weizmann and Ben-Gurion refused to attend the last few sessions of the conference, leaving Berl Katznelson and Shertok to face the hostile British politicians and officials. As Shertok had anticipated, the new British policy decisions proved so harmful to the Yishuv that after hearing MacDonald, the colonial secretary’s final statement, in which he announced the British government’s firm determi­ nation to restrict severely the future development of the Yishuv, even Shertok’s adamant reaction was: Tn defeat—defiance!’63 Thus Shertok shared this sense of defiance with all other Zionist leaders. And it led even him to support total rejection of the new British policy

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towards the Yishuv, albeit also to suggest that the Yishuv should maintain a minimal degree of co-operation with the British. It also influenced his unyielding desire to further develop the Haganah, as well as to encourage Jewish settlement and land purchase. Yet, although Shertok realized that the Zionists were facing unpre­ cedented difficulties on the eve of a brutal world war, he was confident that the Yishuv would survive the heartless freeze on its further growth (which was regarded by many Jews and Gentiles as a resounding defeat for Weizmann and to an extent also for Shertok’s pro-British posture), and that the Zionist movement would recover from the merciless blow it had been dealt by the British and the worsening situation in Europe.64 Aware that the Jewish leaders had no other choice but to attend to their wounds, return to their daily activities, and search out alternatives, during the latter part of the conference, Shertok urged Weizmann to visit the USA to launch political and fund-raising campaigns there on behalf of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv. When Weizmann, then in one of his darkest moods of utter depression and frustration, declined the mission, it was offered to Shertok himself. But he too preferred to stay in London, where he could engage in fund-raising and political activities on behalf of the Yishuv and still remain involved in the complex negotiations with the British over current affairs in Palestine.65 In pursuing these parallel lines, Shertok was exposed to one of BenGurion’s most ferocious attacks against him until then, for Ben-Gurion felt that the Jews should boycott the British and unforgivingly expose their willingness to gain Arab loyalty at the cost of Jewish distress. Ben-Gurion also resented Shertok’s close connections with Weizmann. Shertok, nevertheless, was not deterred by this vicious attack. Towards the end of March 1939, it became abundantly clear that the imminent war would soon hit the large Jewish communities of Central and Eastern Europe, and especially Polish Jewry. Considering the rapid deterioration of these communities, Zionist leaders felt that the situation called for an urgent visit there by a prominent Jewish Palestinian figure. Since Shertok was still in London, since he had been intimately ac­ quainted with the Transfer Agreement with the German government concerning the property of Jewish immigrants to Palestine, which had been concluded by Arlosoroff and the Political Department as early as 1933, and since he was well known in wide circles of the Zionist movement, Polish Jewish leaders insisted that he and he alone should visit Warsaw. Despite the substantial uncertainty and danger involved in travelling to Eastern Europe through Berlin, because nobody could predict when the war would break out, Shertok agreed to undertake this

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unsafe mission.66 In undertaking it, Shertok intended to demonstrate the Yishuv’s solidarity with the large Polish Jewish community in general, and with the large Labour movement there in particular, and to negotiate with the Polish government over Jewish immigration and the transfer of their property along the lines of the Transfer Agreement which had been concluded with the German authorities. After a traumatic flight from London, which included a brief but haunting stop-over in Berlin, where he first personally encountered the rude behaviour of Nazi soldiers and officials, Shertok arrived in Warsaw at the beginning of April 1939. Once in that large and active, but already doomed, Jewish centre, he participated in numerous meetings and rallies, where he delivered dozens of speeches in an attempt to bolster the Jews’ morale. During his visit to Poland, he found his contacts with the helpless and impoverished rank and file of the Polish Zionist movement extremely depressing, but his discussions with the Polish Jewish Labour movement, then mobilizing for emigration, were more encouraging.67 As planned, he also conducted negotiations with senior Polish officials to try to work out an agreement regarding the transfer of property of the Polish Jewish immigrants to Palestine. Although he was confronted by political and administrative difficulties in promoting such an agreement, partly because of the harmful intervention of the Revisionist movement in Poland, which was aimed at preventing such transfer, he was on the brink of a breakthrough towards the end of the visit. The attempt to wrest an agreement from the Polish government had to be abandoned, since it was not concluded during Shertok’s visit, and it was never to be achieved, for soon afterwards the war broke out.68 On his way back to London, Shertok felt that he had been carried away by his emotions while in Poland, and had focused too greatly on the Jews’ chances for survival there instead of preaching more aggress­ ively that they should emigrate to Palestine, or, if that was not possible, that they should prepare for their self-defence. Shertok also regretted that he had been so carried away by the sight of these Diaspora Jews in distress that he had almost forgotten his traditional Palestinocentric priorities.69 Only much later would he realize that he had not thought at all about the possibility of that community’s total annihilation and hence about the need for helping them to prepare for their self-defence. Evidently, however, Shertok was tom between his growing sympathy towards Diaspora Jews and his deeply rooted Palestinocentric views, that had begun to crack before the Second World War. At the same time, the growing realization that Britain was inflexible in its intention to implement strait-jacket policies in regard to the Yishuv

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(by issuing a highly restrictive White Paper, which Shertok had endlessly implored them to postpone until more of Europe’s Jews were safely in Palestine), and especially that the war was very imminent, convinced the Zionist leaders to shift part of their activities from London to the USA.70 The leading trio—Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok—were in agree­ ment that a new United States branch of the Jewish Agency should be established without any further delay in order to generate political support and enhance fund-raising among American Jews. Shertok even proposed that the next World Zionist Congress should be convened in New York to demonstrate conspicuously the urgent need for the support of American Jews and Gentiles for the Yishuv.71 Another idea that again surfaced before the war, and, which Shertok worked hard to promote, was that Palestinian Jewish units be estab­ lished in the British army. The guiding principles behind this renewed idea were that the Yishuv must join the British in their pending struggle against Germany, which by then was perceived by the Zionist leaders as Jewry’s greatest enemy, must recapture British goodwill, increase its military capability, and thus prepare for possible assault by the Arab community in the event of the Germans being perceived as winning during the first stages of the war. To this end, while he was still in London after the conference and his trip to Warsaw, Shertok joined Weizmann in a series of extended talks with British politicians and officials, including the the secretary of war, Leslie Hore-Belisha. Al­ though the British response at that time stressed that it was premature to discuss the subject,72 Shertok became identified with the idea of the establishment of such Jewish units in both Jewish and British eyes. Stubbornly, he would not give up on this self-imposed mission, promot­ ing it until its successful implementation—but under utterly tragic circumstances.

NOTES 1. Mapai Central Committee, 28-9 July 1933, Mapai Archive, 23/33. 2. On the discussions in Mapai about his appointment see Mapai Central Commit­ tee, 24 Feb. 1933,18 June 1933,1 Oct. 1933, Mapai Archive, 23/3Ô; the protocols of the Agency’s Executive, 14 Sept. 1933,26 Sept. 1933,2 Oct. 1933,4 Oct. 1933, CZA; on Ben-Gurion’s role in the Agency during this period, see Teveth, David's Jealousy , iii. 70-1. 3. The protocol of Shertok’s talk with the British government chief secretary, 19 Sept. 1933, CZA, 24/10381; Hall to Shertok, 22 Sept. 1933, Shertok to Hall, 29 Sept. 1933, CZA, S25/32; Shertok’s talk with Moodey, 3 Oct. 1933,

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4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

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CZA, S25/4225; the quote is from Shertok to Wauchope, 27 Oct. 1933, CZA, S25/4225. See in this context, G. Sheffer, ‘Political Considerations in British Policy Making on Immigration to Palestine', Studies in Zionism , 4 (1981); A. Halamish, ‘Was the Year 1933 a Turning Point in the Zionist Immigration Policy’, Studies in Zionism, the Yishuv and the State o f Israel (Beersheba: Ben-Gurion University Press, 1993), iii. See Shertok’s evaluation of the political situation in Mapai Central Committee, 4 Nov. 1933, Mapai Archive, 23/33. I. Black and B. Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A H istory o f Israel’s Intelligence Services (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), ch. 1. Mapai Political Committee, 13 Nov. 1933 and 15 Nov. 1933, Mapai Archive 23/33; D. Ben-Gurion, Memoirs (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1971) i. 692-6; M. Yegar, ‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Structure, Practices, and Lessons in View of Sharett’s Diaries’, Kivunim (Heb.), 10 (Feb. 1984). Shertok in Mapai Council 21/2 Sept. 1934, Mapai Archive, 22/9; Shertok in Agency’s Executive, 3 Oct. 1934, 7 Oct. 1934, CZA; on Ben-Gurion’s federative scheme see, Y. Gomy, Policy and Imagination: Federal Ideas in the Zionist Political Thought—1917-1948 (Heb.) (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1994), 56-64. Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 31 Oct. 1934, Mapai Archive, 23/34; and see a protocol on Shertok’s meeting with the High Commissioner, 10 Nov. 1934, CZA, S24/17. Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 11 Dec. 1935, Mapai Archive, 23/35. Shertok’s talk with the High Commissioner, 12 Dec. 1935, CZA, S25/17; the protocols of Political Department, 12 May 1935, 24 June 1935, 5 Aug. 1935, CZA, S25/443. Shertok’s lecture at a seminar organized by the Jewish Agency, entitled ‘The Political Policy of the Jewish Agency’, 30 Nov. 1934, CZA, S25/1549. Ibid. Ibid. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 1 May 1935, Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 3 May 1935, Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 7 May 1935, 10 May 1935, Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 14 May 1935, Shertok to London, 22 May 1935, London to Shertok, 28 May 1935, Shertok to Wauchope, 5 June 1935, Shertok to Lourie, 5 June 1935, CZA, S25/6298; Agency Executive, 5 May 1935, 9 June 1935, CZA; Mapai Central Committee, 9 May 1935, Mapai Archive 23/35; Shertok’s talk with the High Commissioner, 16 June 1935, CZA, S25/6298, Ben-Gurion, M em oirs , ii. 300, 329. See Shertok in 4th session of the Nineteenth Zionist Congress, 27 Aug. 1935, CZA, S25/1546. Y. Goldstein, On the Way Towards Hegemony: The Formation o f M a p a i’s Policy, 1930-1936 (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1980), 155-67; D. Ben-Gurion, Letters to Paula and the Children (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968), 100-24; 145-9; on Ben-Gurion’s grave doubts see Teveth, D avid’s Jealousy , iii. 120-8; G. Sheffer, ‘A Charismatic Leader out of Office’, in G. Sheffer (ed.), The L etters and Papers

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18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35.

36. 37. 38. 39.

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o f Chaim W eizm am . 1933-1935 (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Transactions, 1978) series A; vol. xv. Shertok’s analysis in Agency’s Executive, 23 June 1935, 22 Sept. 1935, CZA; Shertok to the Executive’s London branch, 3 Oct. 1935, CZA, A/173/0. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 20 Oct. 1935, CZA, S25/1449; see again Halamish, ‘Was the Year 1933’; Sheffer, ‘Political Considerations’. Shertok in Agency’s Executive, 19 Jan. 1936, CZA; Mapai Central Committee, 26 Jan. 1936 and 29 Jan. 1936, Mapai Archive 23/36; cf. Teveth, D avid’s Jealousy , 136-8. Shertok to the members of the Jewish Agency’s Executive in London, 7 May 1936, CZA. Shertok in Agency’s Executive, 3 May 1936, CZA; Shertok in Mapai Political Committee, 4 May 1936, Mapai Archive, 23/36. Shertok’s report on his talk with High Commissioner, CZA, S25/443. Shertok in Agency’s Executive, 21 May 1936, CZA. Ben-Gurion in Agency’s Executive, 22 May 1936, CZA. Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 9 June 1936, CZA, A245/168; Shertok to Ben-Gurion 14 June 1936, Mapai Archive 20/1/34. Shertok in Mapai Political Committee, 21 June 1936, CZA, S25/3434. Tevetli, D avid’s Jealousy , iii. 140-50; Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 9 June 1936, Mapai Archive. Shertok in Agency’s Executive, 14 June 1936, CZA; Wauchope to Shertok, 6 July 1936, CZA, S25/4169. G. Sheffer, ‘The Involvement of Arab States in the Palestinian Conflict’, Asian and African Studies , 10/1 (1974). Teveth, D avid’s Jealousy, iii. 184-9. For details about Shertok’s appearance before the Peel Commission see M. Sharett, The M aking o f Policy: The Diaries o f M oshe Sharett (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968) i. 363-77. Ben-Gurion’s diary, 26 Jan. 1937, Mapai Archive, 30/6/24. For details on this exchange, see Usishkin in Agency’s Executive, 10 Jan. 1937, CZA; Weizmann in the Zionist Action Committee, 13 Jan. 1937, CZA, S5/302; Sharett, M aking o f Policy , ii. 13-16; Teveth, D avid’s Jealousy , iii. 195; and S. Dothan, Partition o f Eretz Israel in M andatory Palestine , The Jewish Con­ troversy (Heb.) (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1980), 37-8. Shertok in an internal discussion about the situation, 8 June 1937, as quoted in Sharett, M aking o f Policy , ii. 178; and see Dothan, Partition o f Eretz Israel, 38. About his various activities in London see Sharett, M aking o f Policy , ii. 23-105. Ibid. 41, 70. * Ibid. 49-50; cf. A. Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan (Oxford: Oxford Univer­ sity Press, 1988), 58-62. Shertok in Zionist Actions Committee, 22 Apr. 1937, as quoted in Sharett, M aking o f Policy , ii. 109; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 17 June 1937, as quoted in ibid. 201-4; Shertok to Lourie, 17 June 1937, CZA, S25/1665; Shertok to Weizmann, 17 June 1937, CZA, S25/1716, Agency’s Executive, 17 June 1937,

102

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

Ascendance CZA; Shertok in Mapai Political Committee, 23 June 1937, Mapai Archive, 23/37; Shertok in Agency’s Executive, 3 July 1937, CZA. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , ii. 107-8. Ibid., 21 June 1937, ii. 212-14; Shertok in Mapai Political Committee, 23 June 1937, Mapai Archive 23/37. Shertok, M aking o f Policy , ii. 117-18; cf. Shlaim, Collusion , 59-60. Shertok, M aking o f Policy , ii. 147-8. Ibid. 226. Ibid. 172-3. The Protocols of twelfth Mapai Council, 9 July 1937, Mapai Archive, 22/12; Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 9 July 1937, ii. 251-61. Ibid. 279-80; Teveth, David's Jealousy , iii. 224-31. See Shertok’s speech in Twentieth Zionist Congress, as quoted in Sharett, M aking o f Policy , ii. 267-73; and see e.g. Shertok to Zipora Shertok, 15 Aug. 1937, as quoted in ibid. 274-6, 279-80. Sheffer, ‘The Involvement’. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , ii. 271, 293-4, 296. Ibid. iii. 307-8. Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 7 Dec. 1938, Mapai Archive, 23/38; Shertok to Members of the Executive of the Agency, 19 Jan. 1939, in Sharett, M aking o f Policy , iii. 9-14. G. Sheffer, ‘Appeasement and the Problem of Palestine’, International Journal o f M iddle Eastern Studies , 2 (1980). Shertok in Agency’s Executive in London, 6 Jan. 1939, 10 Jan. 1939, 23 Jan. 1939, 24 Jan. 1939, CZA, S25/1720; Palestine P ost , 9 Jan. 1939. Shertok, M aking o f Policy , iii. 332-3, 338-42. Ibid. iv. 9-14. Ibid. iii. 336-7. See e.g. ibid. 344. Shertok and Ben-Gurion, in Agency’s Executive in London, 1 Feb. 1939, CZA, S25/1720. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 13 Feb. 1939, iv. 47-51; Shertok’s speech in the London Conference, 13 Feb. 1939, CZA, 24/10318/B; Palestine P ost , 22 Feb. 1939. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , iv. 90. Ibid., 14 Mar. 1939, iv. 155. Ibid., 15 Mar. 1939, iv. 157-9, 161-5. Ibid., 16 Mar. 1939, and 23 Mar. 1939, iv. 168-71, 189; Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 1 Apr. 1939, Mapai Archive 37/119. Sharett, M aking o f Policy, 16 Mar. 1939, 18 Mar. 1939, 23 Mar. 1939, iv. 172-9, 189; Teveth, David's Jealousy, iii. 312-13. Sharett, M aking o f Policy, 27 Mar. 1939, 30 Mar. 1939, iv. 197, 202-20. Ibid., 6 Apr. 1939, 10 Apr. 1939, 16 Apr. 1939, 17 Apr. 1939, 18 May 1939, iv. 214-20, 223, 228-9, 230-1, 232. Ibid., 19 Apr. 1939, 234-7. Ibid., 21 Apr. 1939, 246.

Ascendance

103

70. Ibid., 1 May 1939,11 May 1939, 261,277-8; Shertok to Bernard Joseph, 3 May 1939, CZA, S25/45. 71. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 26 Apr. 1939, iv. 253; cf. Teveth, David's Jealousy , iii. 312-13. 72. Sharett, M aking o f Policy, 2 May 1939, 5 May 1939, 7 May 1939, 8 May 1939, 12 May 1939, 24 May 1939, iv. 263, 264, 269, 271, 272, 282, 299; Agency Executive, 8 May 1939, CZA, S25/1720.

4 The Second World War The growing certainty that the Second World War was imminent affected all actors involved in the Palestine quagmire, and particularly the British. Their fervent desire to ensure the loyalty of Arab leaders in view of the perceived strategic, political, and economic significance of the Arab states, overrode all other considerations concerning the Middle East. Therefore Weizmann’s and Shertok’s stubborn efforts, made during late April and early May 1939, to persuade senior British politicians and officials to postpone the government’s decision to publish a new White Paper, failed miserably. The prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, the foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, and the colonial secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, remained unmoved in their decision to issue a White Paper reflecting Britain’s proposals to the Palestinian representatives and the representatives of the Arab governments at the London conference.1 After his distressing visit to Poland, which he undertook from the traditional belief (strongly influenced by Weizmann’s approach) that ‘our struggle against the principles underlying the restrictive land and settlement policies does not relieve us from our duty to fight over every Jew and every piece of land that we can include in our legal [!] work’,2 Shertok tried to obtain the approval of his colleagues in Jerusalem to work towards the amendment of the impending White Paper. To his great chagrin, the frustrated leaders in Jerusalem did not approve of such an attempt. In the mean time, in order to secure Arab loyalty during the war, the British had as early as April 1939 divulged their intention gradually to transfer to the people of Palestine, that is to an Arab majority and Jewish minority, an increasing role in the government of the territory, to protect the holy places, and to establish a quota of 75,000 Jewish immigrants for the following five years, after which no additional Jewish immigration would be permitted without Arab consent, and to prohibit all sale of land to Jews. The exact provisions of the infamous 1939 White Paper were revealed to Jewish Agency representatives in early May 1939, just a few days before its publication on 17 May 1939. Not only Ben-Gurion, as would

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later be suggested by his devoted followers, but the entire Jewish Agency Executive was outraged by Britain’s blatant disregard of the plight of both the Yishuv and the Jews of Europe in favour of the nebulous support of Arab governments during the impending war. The Jews resorted to the only political tool that they had thought appropriate— protest. In Palestine, the Yishuv staged a general strike (Weizmann and Shertok pleaded on this occasion also that clashes with the British should be limited), and in London, written and oral briefings, prepared by Shertok, who remained there to serve as Weizmann’s watch-dog and supervise the political activities, for both pro-Zionist and pro-Arab Labour and Conservative Members of Parliament, journalists, and political commentators, and supplied effective ammunition for all proZionists before yet another parliamentary debate on Palestine. In this debate, held in the wake of the publication of the 1939 White Paper, compassionate MPs from both parties attacked the government viciously and demanded that it should alter its restrictive policy, especially in view of the mounting plight of European Jews. Some of these sympathetic MPs, such as Winston Churchill, were motivated by imperial consider­ ations, others by empathy with the Jews in general and the Zionists in particular, and still others by opposition to the political aspirations of the Arabs. But all these efforts were to no avail. Disregarding the massive opposition to the White Paper, and basing themselves on only a slim majority in Parliament, Chamberlain and his ministers were determined to publish the White Paper—which the government did later that month. The first official Jewish response to the May 1939 White Paper was by Shertok during a press conference held by the Executive at London’s Savoy Hotel. Shertok told the assembled journalists that, although the White Paper constituted a disgraceful conclusion to a friendly chapter in the relations between the Yishuv and the British government, the Yishuv would nevertheless insist that the mandatory power keep all its commit­ ments to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine as laid out in the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations Mandate, and the Peel Commission partition plan. This initial reaction to the White Paper clearly indicated the double-edged policy that of necessity the Yishuv’s leadership planned to pursue vis-à-vis the British.3 * These stormy political events on the eve of the war altered not only the national fortunes but also the personal future of many participants in the Palestinian drama, including that of Shertok. During and after the London conference, Shertok gained additional political experience, in particular exposure in British and world media, in Jewish and Zionist

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circles, as well as among British politicians and officials. In the Yishuv, Shertok established himself as the undisputed third, though still the weaker pole in the triangular relations between Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and himself. In this respect, he continued to act as the semi-official go-between for his two older and more senior colleagues, as well as between the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem and its London branch. Yet, he would pay a high personal and political price in the future for his undertaking the thankless task of mediating between the two charismatic arch-enemies—particularly with regard to his relations with Ben-Gurion. On the other hand, the pivotal position that he gained in the Zionist movement would significantly boost his status in the Yishuv. A more prominent position in a small and tense political élite makes politicians such as Shertok more willing to express openly their own views. Thus after spending almost six months in London, upon his return to Palestine in early June 1939 Shertok criticized more openly and explicitly the views that Ben-Gurion had expressed in reaction to the White Paper. In so doing, Shertok was answering Ben-Gurion’s unreal­ istic argument that the British would remove the new restrictions that they had imposed on the Yishuv once they realized the full extent of what the anticipated war would mean to Europe’s Jews. Shertok maintained instead that, because of their wider strategic and economic interests in the Middle East and Europe, the British would not change their policy once the war had broken out. This was the main reason why he insisted on his own strategy of making from Jerusalem unceasing attempts to obtain immediately any and all concessions possible, rather than cutting off contacts with the mandatory power.4 During the months immediately preceding the war, Shertok continued to warn his colleagues, who were still traumatized by the publication of the White Paper and harboured hatred towards Britain, to refrain from severing all connections with the British authorities in Palestine and London, and to use self-restraint in carrying out protests against the government. He feared that a non-co-operative posture towards both Whitehall and the government in Jerusalem would result in clashes with the British army in Palestine, which in turn would lead to the imposition of even more stringent restrictions on the development of the Yishuv, and that ultimately this might cause the British to desert the Jewish community if the Germans invaded the Middle East.5 Here, too, the Weizmann-Shertok moderate approach prevailed, and despite British government restrictive policies and limitation on the activities of the Haganah, co-operation between the Yishuv and the British civilian and military authorities grew rather than diminished before and during the

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entire war. It was in this mind-frame that Shertok joined the majority of Mapai’s and the Agency’s leadership that rejected Ben-Gurion’s unre­ lenting demands to initiate a major confrontation with the British government through a vastly enhanced illegal armed Jewish immigra­ tion.6 Moreover, during a meeting held in London in late August 1939 with General Henry Pownall, in which he offered the Yishuv’s assistance during the unfolding crisis, Shertok stated that ‘regardless of the government acceptance or rejection of our proposal, it should know that we feel that this is not only Britain’s war. We pray for her success.’7 Shertok’s intimate association with Weizmann led his colleagues in the Executive and Mapai to try again to get him to remain in London to resume his task as Weizmann’s watch-dog and to assist the WZO president during the difficult period before the war. Although he in­ tended to participate in the 1939 Zionist Congress, which would be the last before the war, nevertheless, Shertok refused to undertake either the watch-dog assignment or a prolonged sojourn in London. His main reason for insisting on returning to and staying in Jerusalem was his scepticism about the success of any attempt to put pressure on Whitehall to sway its grand strategy. He regarded it as almost a total waste of precious energy and time. In view of the approaching storm, he preferred to stay close at home to the Yishuv and family. In the mean time, like all his colleagues, Shertok was anxiously awaiting the results of the biennial elections in the Zionist movement. He and other Mapai leaders had good reason for anxiety. Essentially because of Weizmann’s immense prestige and popularity, they did indeed eventually lose some seats to Weizmann’s General Zionist party in the election of delegates to the Twenty-First World Zionist Congress scheduled for August 1939. To Ben-Gurion’s obvious irritation, the results enhanced Weizmann’s position and his influence over Zionist and Yishuv affairs, and ensured his re-election as president of the movement. Consequently, Shertok’s own political status was, of course, strengthened both in the Agency and the movement. When they convened, the delegates to the Twenty-First Zionist Con­ gress, held in Geneva late in August 1939, knew that war was almost upon them. Their mood was further lowered by the nçws, received during the congress, of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. In the melancholic speech that Weizmann delivered at the opening session of this gloomy Zionist gathering, he outlined Zionist goals, strategy, and policy in view of the menace of war: an unceasing struggle against the May 1939 White Paper coupled with the restraint necessary to ensure Britain’s protection of the Yishuv, and co-operation in regard to the

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rescue of European Jews. This stance met with the approval of all partners to the coalition that controlled the movement. Generally, Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and the Mapai leadership shared Weizmann’s views, and therefore Shertok actively participated in draft­ ing a declaration calling on world Jewry to unite in condemning the ‘annihilatory campaign’ being conducted against them by the Nazis and their partners and collaborators.8 He also supported a resolution oppos­ ing the White Paper, stating that the Jews would launch a carefully controlled but widespread political campaign against it. Like all dele­ gates to the congress, Shertok was greatly moved by the concluding words of his ‘dear chief in this last Zionist gathering before the impending catastrophe: ‘If, as I hope, we are spared in life and our work continues, who knows—perhaps a new light will shine upon us from the thick, black gloom .. .’.9 The intention to oppose the May 1939 White Paper in Palestine notwithstanding, Shertok was again asked to travel to London to conduct a series of talks with senior British generals, including Henry Pownall, Archibald Wavell, and Edmund Ironside, as well as with pro-Zionist politicians and ministers, such as Walter Elliot, concerning security arrangements in Palestine and the creation of Jewish units in the British army. Since the various goals of this mission were better defined, this time he agreed to undertake it. Accordingly, once in London, he reopened the subject of establishing Jewish units in the British army to serve in Palestine and elsewhere, as well as the intertwined triple issues of Jewish immigration, land pur­ chase, and settlement. While the government and the military, influenced by unfavourable developments in Europe, were initially receptive to the idea of creating such Jewish units, after further consultation in Whitehall and with its Middle Eastern representatives, London again postponed the implementation of this request. Nevertheless, despite the lack of immediate success, Shertok was neither discouraged nor deterred, for his endless meetings with senior British politicians, generals, and journalists, held in London in late August 1939, laid the grounds for a protracted campaign to achieve that goal. On the other hand, Shertok was utterly frustrated by the lack of success of his talks in regard to immigration, land sale, and Jewish settlement. Consequently, a sense of impasse in their political relations with the British civilian government, and a glimmer of hope about possible co-operation with the British army, would influence* not only the double-edged formula that they adopted, but also the behaviour of Shertok and other Zionist leaders, including Weizmann.

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Barely a week after Shertok had concluded his unsuccessful talks in London, Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, and two days later Britain and France declared war on Germany. The only immediate readjustment in Palestine brought about by the long-awaited outbreak of the Second World War was economic. Thus, strangely enough, despite grave apprehensions among British and Zion­ ists alike, the outbreak of the war that would decimate the Jews of Europe did not result in any major immediate change in the situation in Palestine. But it did of course pose new challenges to the leadership of the small and insecure Yishuv. As one of the Jewish leaders in Palestine who was aware of both the tremendous dangers and the opportunities presented by the war, Shertok, then chairman of the highly powerful Jewish Agency Political Department as well as a member of the Political Committee of Mapai, called for the creation of a ‘central command’, whose main task would be to co-ordinate comprehensive political planning at party, communal, and national levels. For, he said, if Mapai and the Agency wished to meet the challenge and danger created by the war, both must devise a coherent and comprehensive strategy that would help them prevent spreading their limited capabilities too thin and stretching their restricted resources too far. Such a central command should ‘oversee all our [the Yishuv’s] activities and be able to consider as many options as possible’.10 As to his assessment of the long-term consequences of the war, Shertok predicted that ‘the end of this war will introduce a new order also in this part of the world, and we must achieve our main political goal in this new order: a nucleus of Jewish independence in one form or another, as part of an Arab federation’.11 Thus at that stage, Shertok again shared with other Yishuv leaders, among them BenGurion, the view that the Jewish state should be part of a Middle Eastern federation. His realistic assessment of the limited resources and power of the Yishuv and his Palestinocentric attitude notwithstanding (to his col­ leagues in the Mapai Central Committee he said: ‘If we chose military activism during the war, we must act as Zionists and place Palestine at the epicentre [of our plans]’),12 Shertok called for those Palestinian Jews who enlisted in the British army to be ready to serve not only in Palestine but wherever they would be needed, and in whatever unit tney would be assigned. The main reason for this almost sacrilegious idea was his conviction that the ‘fate of the world, the Jewish people and our fate in Palestine, are intertwined’, and again, his unaltered wish to main­ tain co-operation with the British. As expected, it was opposed by the Haganah chiefs, among them his beloved brother-in-law, Eliahu

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Golomb. The compromise that resulted from the clash between Shertok’s unorthodox proposal and the Haganah’s position was that the Jewish Agency should neither encourage nor object to Palestinian Jews serving outside Palestine, or in non-Jewish units.13 With some alter­ ations, this would remain the Yishuv’s policy throughout the entire war. When it turned out that Shertok was accurate in pessimistically assuming that the British would not alter their restrictive policies in regard to the Yishuv’s growth, at least during the first few months of the war, the disheartened Zionist leaders, including Shertok himself, began to explore short- and long-term alternatives to their cumbersome politi­ cal dependence on the British. Weizmann, with Shertok as his temporary watch-dog, and only out of great curiosity and despair, began examining a fantastic plan, proposed by the British veteran mystery man Harry St John Philby, regarding co-operation between King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia and the Yishuv. But, although the Saudi leader and Winston Churchill did at first express some interest in Philby’s idea— that Saudi Arabia would promote the notion that Palestine in its entirety be given to the Jews, in exchange for twenty million pounds to resettle all Palestinian Arabs in his kingdom—both Weizmann and Shertok were highly sceptical of this plan and explored it mainly because they liked the idea of Philby proposing to Ibn Saud that Palestine should be given to the Jews and transfer the Arabs. The plan, of course, never materi­ alized.14 Simultaneously with this diplomatic non-starter, Weizmann, BenGurion, and Shertok agreed that they should begin actively promoting relations with the United States government, in the hope of gaining the support of the White House and of public opinion for the establishment of a Jewish entity as soon as the war ended. While Weizmann and Ben-Gurion were pursuing this new direction in the USA and monitoring each other’s moves and activities very closely, the sober chairman of the Political Department was again free to engage in the ‘mundane’ day-to-day struggle for the survival and coveted growth of the Yishuv.15Thus, during the bleak weeks that Shertok spent in London towards the end of 1939, the main issues that he dealt with were the British intention to issue a new restrictive land law; Jewish units in the British army; recruitment of Jews to serve in British units deployed in Palestine; recruitment of British Jews in the army; fund-raising for local British-Jewish and Yishuv needs; immigration; economic and financial matters, such as loans to Jewish local municipalities, customs and excise duty on Yishuv imports and products, help to the citrus industry, and political lobbying in Westminster and Whitehall. At that

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time his favourite expression was: ‘we should fight for the good cause, but also prepare for the worst case.’16 While in London, Shertok was also engaged in persistent attempts to build bridges with the Soviet Union, whose general attitude towards the Yishuv was still ambiguous.17 Although he was far from being an orthodox pro-Soviet socialist, Shertok felt that even this problematic avenue should be explored if it would help the interests of the Yishuv and, increasingly, those of Central and East European Jews who were either under Soviet control or had fled to the Soviet Union. However, when he met Soviet diplomats stationed in London, including Ambassa­ dor Ivan Maisky during the latter part of 1939, these officials confirmed that the Soviet government would not support the Zionist movement and the Yishuv as long as Jewish leaders expressed blatant anti-Soviet sentiments. However, not only did the Soviets change their attitude later in the war, but, in retrospect, it appears that Shertok’s initiative and ensuing meetings with the staff of the Soviet embassy in London laid the groundwork for the USSR’s favourable policy towards the Yishuv and the Jewish state later during the war and after it. In the mean time, encouraged by the fact that the Soviet diplomats were ready to continue to meet him, he would pursue these contacts further throughout the war. Unable to do much more than keep some lines open to American and British politicians and officials, Zionist and Yishuv leaders set about to foster the Yishuv’s military capability. They were determined to strengthen the clandestine part of the Haganah’s activities, increasing both the number of its soldiers and the size and quality of its arsenal. It was only natural that the politically moderate Weizmann and Shertok, would also be active in this sphere. Thus for example, the two, who operated as a team, were effective in securing the release of forty-three Haganah soldiers and commanders (among them the young and already adventurous Moshe Dayan), who had been arrested during illegal military exercises that the Haganah had conducted in Palestine. The efforts of the two and Ben-Gurion, who arrived in London especially to deal with this issue, were tremendous, since they interpreted it as a premeditated British attempt to delegitimize the Haganah. During Ben-Gurion’s visit to London in mid-November 1939, he clashed directly with Shertok and indirectly with Weizmann over the question of boycotting the colonial secretary, Malcolm MacDonald. During this debate between the two men, some differences in their most fundamental ideological positions surfaced: when Shertok said that they must meet the colonial secretary to obtain immigration permits for German Jews, Ben-Gurion retorted that the political future of the

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Yishuv was more important than the fate of those Jews. Shertok answered: ‘I don’t accept the view that the immigration of Jews, which means their rescue, contradicts our political needs. Our political success is questionable, the rescue of Jews is real. Our ability to facilitate the immigration of Jews despite MacDonald’s opposition means a political success.’18 Shertok prevailed in his determination to meet all British politicians and officials who might be of assistance to the Yishuv. Weizmann and Shertok were equally successful in preventing the British from launching surprise searches for illegal weapons in Jewish settlements in Palestine. No less consequential was their achievement in finally eliciting from a reluctant British government a firm pledge to establish immediately special Jewish units in the British army if the Germans invaded the Middle East.19 Throughout 1939 and in early 1940, the main problematic issues facing the Yishuv were those championed by Sir Harold MacMichael, who in 1938 had succeeded the more emphatic Sir Arthur Wauchope as High Commissioner in Palestine. MacMichael’s determination to follow a strictly even-handed policy towards each of the two communities and to implement the main stipulations of the 1939 White Paper was impeding Jewish efforts to purchase large tracts of land still being offered by Arab absentee landlords. Ultimately, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok ironed out their differences and worked together to persuade the British government, through the colonial secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, to be more flexible in meeting their requests. In this connection, Shertok used one side of the Agency’s double-edged formula and told the colonial secretary, ‘We hope that during the war we could co-operate with you as if the White Paper did not exist.’20 But when fierce arguments and mild threats failed to move the British politicians and senior officials, the Yishuv and the Zionist movement launched a series o f mass demonstrations in Palestine, England, and the United States against the government’s restrictive policy. This time, even Shertok was active in organizing demonstrations and other forms of protest in London, and refused to accede to the London Agency Executive’s request to postpone them. ‘We are a nation,’ he replied to moderates critical of this activist posture, ‘we have offered our help to the [British] government as a nation, and it should be interpreted only in this way. Until the government are not convinced that we are a determined nation and not only their obedient subjects, we are going to faôe troubles, and they are going to experience failures.’21 Ever cautious, however, Shertok did repeatedly warn his colleagues to control closely these manifestations of dissatisfaction and to prevent

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undesirable friction with the government; moreover, he persistently continued to discourage violent encounters with the British in either England or Palestine. Although Shertok had managed to bring Weizmann and Ben-Gurion to co-operate on several issues, the latter did not desist from his unending ‘small wars’ against Weizmann as well as against his suppor­ ters in Mapai and the Labour movement. These inner confrontations caused countless minor crises, and when they were not resolved in Ben-Gurion’s favour, he brought forth his time-worn threat to resign from the Agency Executive. It was a great pity that most of the squabbles were triggered by real problems that called for the joint effort of the entire leadership rather than engaging in personal rivalries and useless feuds. One of these useless clashes, bom only out of personal vengeance and jealousy, occurred just after Malcolm MacDonald had told Shertok of his decision to enforce all of the White Paper stipula­ tions, and Shertok had relayed it to his colleagues in Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion’s immediate demand was that the Executive should activate what was euphemistically known as ‘Politics B’, that is, expanded illegal immigration and maximal settlement. Ben-Gurion’s pugnacious demand created the need for Shertok’s hasty return to Jerusalem. But Shertok, who was apprehensive that he would no longer be able to organize, and especially control, the protests against the British government then taking place in London, and that he would not be able to pursue further his efforts to alter Whitehall’s negative position vis-à-vis Jewish units, postponed his voyage back to Palestine. Eventually, except for a short trip to Palestine that he had made in January 1940, he would not leave London until Weizmann returned from what turned out to be a politically and financially successful trip to the United States.22 Thus only in early April 1940 did Shertok leave his London post, where in Weizmann’s absence he was in charge of all the Agency’s political operations, and return to Palestine to join his colleagues in an attempt to resolve the lingering crisis in the Yishuv leadership caused by Ben-Gurion’s resignation on 29 February 1940, following his insistence on escalating activities against the British. In the mean time, encouraged by the results of his American trip, Weizmann’s, and for that matter also Shertok’s, firm conclusion was that since the USA and the American Jewish community had already become extremely important political actors in the Palestinian arena, and since a great deal of work should, and could, have been accom­ plished in Washington, a stronger emphasis must be put on Zionist activities there. This view did not contradict Ben-Gurion’s own opinion;

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the only ‘minor’ question was who would control and execute these planned activities in the USA. This question was added to other numerous reasons for the élite’s vicious infighting even during that terrible period for the Jewish people. Ultimately, it would be solved in a nasty way only after the war.23 Immediately upon his arrival in Palestine in April 1940, Shertok plunged into the lingering internal crisis involving Ben-Gurion’s de­ mands and threats to stop his participation in the Agency Executive. Shertok warned Ben-Gurion and his other colleagues in the Agency that they should not further escalate their struggle against the British, since in fact the Yishuv was pursuing Ben-Gurion’s ‘Politics B’ through enhanced illegal immigration and land purchase. He pleaded with his colleague to rescind his resignation. After long deliberations, BenGurion himself, as well as the other activist members of the Executive, accepted Shertok’s view, and he resumed some of his activities. Thus this matter was solved without loss of face on Ben-Gurion’s part. No less significantly, on that occasion Shertok restated his firm position against any policy of ‘permanent unrest in Palestine’. He explained: T do not oppose some unrest, but I cannot accept such a general line. I am not concerned about the damage that it would inflict on the British, I am concerned about the damage that would be inflicted on the Yishuv. Before penhanent unrest could cause any damage to Britain, it would cause tremendous damage to us, up to the point where we would not survive!’ On the same occasion, he reiterated that such unrest would not lead to the British rescinding the notorious 1939 White Paper.24 Shertok’s and his supporters’ refusal to concur with Ben-Gurion’s activist approach initially moved the latter to exert greater pressure on his colleagues, even threatening early retirement and complete with­ drawal from politics. But, when it became clear that Shertok had openly joined the moderate opposition and that it constituted the majority in the Executive, Ben-Gurion was forced to take the new balance of power into account and, however reluctantly, to accept the moderates’ position. As expected, the net result of this crisis was yet another compromise between activists and moderates, whereby only carefully measured and strictly controlled retaliatory activities against the British would be pursued.25 As a means of further alleviating the internal crisis, Shertok encouraged Ben-Gurion to leave Palestine temporarily and to replace Shertok himself in London as Weizmann’s watch-dog. Ben-Gurion took this opportunity, to save face. He. was absent from Palestine for almost a whole year, spending some time in London, and then moving to the USA.26

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Once this internal crisis was first diffused and then resolved, back at his desk in the Political Department offices in Jerusalem, Shertok’s political power was enhanced in accordance with the principle that those who remained in Palestine were ultimately in charge of determining not only Yishuv but also Zionist strategy and tactics. Hence, during BenGurion’s long periods of absence during the Second World War, Shertok, in consultation with his colleagues in Mapai and the Agency Executive, was almost solely responsible for shaping the Yishuy’s politi­ cal actions. Under his guidance, the policies adopted by the Agency Executive during the first stages of the war became known as ‘sane activism’, that is, carefully measured reactions to British and Arab actions and provocations. Also during this period Shertok kept remind­ ing his colleagues that from the point of view of their impact on Britain, more violent actions would be counter-productive, since they would aggravate British antagonism, and that from the Yishuv’s own point of view, they would only foster unfounded optimism regarding their ability to achieve their goals, and would ultimately lead to the deterioration, disappointment, and decline of rank-and-file morale.27 As the war intensified and the free world found itself profoundly threatened, many of its leaders, especially the Zionists, anxiously awaited the resignation of Neville Chamberlain and the sweeping changes that this would bring in Britain’s war cabinet. When this long-awaited switch finally occurred, and the veteran ‘pro-Zionist imperialist’ Winston Chur­ chill became prime minister, his new coalitional war cabinet included yet more Tory and Labour pro-Zionists. Thus, in addition to Churchill and Clement Attlee, Shertok regarded the Secretary for India, Leo Amery, the Secretary for Information, Alfred Duff-Cooper, the Secretary for Air, Archibald Sinclair, Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, the Secret­ ary for the Navy, Albert Alexander, and even the Secretary [of State] for Labour, Ernest Bevin, as friends of the Zionist idea and the Yishuv. Although the Whitehall reshuffle did result in a more friendly attitude towards the Yishuv, Shertok was among the more sober Jewish leaders who cautioned the Yishuv against expecting any imminent substantial changes in actual policy towards Palestine. Shertok therefore preached that the Yishuv should maintain equally its twin policies of self-restraint and self-reliance, and that in the best Weizmannite tradition, it should prudently ‘create facts’ in regard to legal, and especially illegal immigra­ tion, land purchase, and settlement, that would improve its position whether or not the pro-Zionist cabinet members were able to alter the May 1939 White Paper.28 But he was more optimistic about the possib­ ility of establishing Jewish units in the British army.

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The war had approached the Middle East by the spring of 1940. The reports that the Arabs rejoiced with every bit of news about Axis victories only further contributed to the Yishuv’s and to Shertok’s worsening mood. Taking his cue from British officials and officers in the region and in London, Shertok was initially not unduly perturbed by the advances that had been made by the Italian and German armies in North Africa and southern Europe. However, his apprehensions grew in June of that year, when the Free French were defeated in Syria by the collaborationist Vichy regime. Pragmatic and intellectually honest as always, Shertok admitted that now the Yishuv had a more vital stake in keeping the British in Palestine than the latter had in keeping the territory. Consequently he and his department pursued what they had regarded as two complementary policies of building up the Yishuv’s autonomous paramilitary forces to the maximum strength possible, and planning the community’s defence in the event of a German invasion and occupation of Palestine on the one hand, and contributing to the British war effort, on the other. In pursuing these policies almost single-handedly, Shertok shouldered the thankless task of recruiting Jews to British units deployed in Palestine but not in the neighbouring countries, on the assumption that such service was of utmost importance ‘morally, humanely and nationally’.29 In other words, with the growth of the imminent threat to the Yishuv, Shertok changed his previous view that Jews should serve anywhere the British saw fit. Now his modified position tallied with that of his brothers-in-law, Golomb and Meirov, who were among the most senior leaders of the Haganah. Once this agreement between the three brothers-in-law was attained, they fought together to change the British government’s position. Their immediate practical goals were to persuade the British to increase the numbers of Jewish recruits to the British army, and if and when the British started to do so on a large scale, to deploy these Jews in Palestine. But first they had to win Weizmann and Ben-Gurion over to this new line. Driven by a sense of great urgency, Shertok communicated these views to his two colleagues and won their concurrence.30 Once the brothers-in-law had succeeded in convincing Ben-Gurion and Weizmann to support the establishment of Jewish units in Palestine, Shertok engaged in an endless series of talks with the British to achieve this goal that he regarded essential to the Yishuv’s short- and long-term defence against a German invasion as well as the threats posed by Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states. In addition, while Ben-Gurion was out of Palestine, Shertok also had to assume again the political responsibility for the Yishuv’s central defence committee that formulated

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short- and long-term Haganah policies and supervised their implementa­ tion (as noted, in 1939 he had been replaced as chairman of the committee by Ben-Gurion). After much prodding by Shertok in Palestine and Cairo, and by Weizmann and Ben-Gurion in London, in June 1940 the British govern­ ment and military finally agreed to recruit 1,800 Palestinian Jews to various units of the British army in Palestine. Encouraged by this positive British decision, for which he had fought so hard, Shertok launched a major public drive to enlist young Jews in a large rally in Tel Aviv, followed by similar events in other parts of the country.31 The major breakthrough in this sphere, however, occurred only after Sher­ tok’s crucial meetings with General Wavell, the British commanderin-chief in the Middle East, held in July 1940 in Cairo. During his first in this series of meetings with General Wavell, Shertok made a classic Zionist statement: ‘We, the Jews, are not many in Palestine, and we don’t own much of the country, but whatever we have in Palestine is all that the Jewish nation owns, and we are responsible to the entire Jewish nation about it.’ Using this as well as additional and less passionate strategic arguments, Shertok was able to persuade Wavell to give the go-ahead for a massive recruitment of Palestinian Jews. Shertok’s understanding with Wavell regarding the scope and conditions for enlisting Palestinian Jews, in addition to the 1,800 recruited in early September 1940, facilitated the approval by the British government of mass recruitment of Jews and Arabs into special, but separate, units in Palestine. Significantly, the British also agreed that the Jewish Agency should be the sole agent for recruiting young Jews for this purpose. In this meeting he was also able to secure Wavell’s consent to desist from attempts to disarm the Haganah. Satisfied with these achievements, Shertok attributed them to his gradualist strategy of ‘using every small opportunity to promote the piecemeal but steady building of this thing [Jewish units], and thus of creating the nucleus of a Jewish military force. This is the case even though these [units] are still small and scattered.’32 Simultaneously with Shertok’s negotiations in Cairo and Jerusalem, Weizmann in London was engaged in incessant talks with Churchill and his lieutenants which would have no less profound ramifications than Shertok’s agreement with General Wavell. As a result of these protracted talks, in mid-October 1940 the British government approved in principle a plan to recruit larger Jewish units that would replace British units in Palestine, to train Jewish officers and to form special British-Jewish units for fighting the Germans outside Palestine. However, after consulting

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with his friend Orde Wingate, who was then stationed in London but visiting Cairo, the cautious Shertok warned Weizmann to insist that the British should formally guarantee that most of the enlisted Palestinian Jews would serve in Palestine.33 Despite the slow progress of the negotiations with the British govern­ ment, but encouraged by his, and especially by Weizmann’s, initial success in this sphere, adhering to the gradualist approach, Shertok did not desist in his efforts to cash in on British promises. Accordingly, his next target was autonomous Jewish units in the British army. As a token of recognition for his relentless efforts in this direction as well as his previous achievements, he was accorded the appellation ‘M r Jewish Army’. Far from being modest in this respect, Shertok was convinced that this flattering title should have been bestowed on him long before. During this period, he used to repeat that his involvement in security issues and his role in nurturing the Yishuv’s defence forces had preceded the Second World War, and that in fact he had been involved in the growth of the Haganah since its inception. This of course was directed at the activists in the Yishuv leadership. As the war progressed, it became clear that the Yishuv had to do more than manage its own political, economic, and security affairs, and deal with the British authorities and with the Arab community. Also the alarmingly complex issue of rescuing Jews under Nazi occupation began to loom larger in the thoughts of Shertok and other Jewish and Yishuv leaders. In November 1940 the leaders’ dilemmas in this sphere were highlighted by the capture and arrival in Haifa of three ships of illegal immigrants, the Pacific, Melos, and Atlantic. Towards the end of November 1940 the difficulties involved in carrying out rescue operations were brought to the fore by the tragic drama of the refugee ship Patria. An old and shaky ship, the Patria was loaded with the illegal immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, who had arrived on the first two ships and were waiting for their deportation from Haifa to Mauritius for the duration of the war. As the Patria was awaiting the order to sail, despite the Yishuv’s collective, and Shertok’s own ardent efforts to prevent the deportation, a Haganah demolition squad was sent to blow a hole in the hull to thwart the sailing. But both the age of the ship and the miscalculations of the demolition squad caused it to Sink before the refugees could disembark. The devastating result was that more than 240 Jews and several British policemen on duty on Patria were drowned. Haunted by the fate of those wretched illegal immigrants and the policemen, Shertok launched a massive effort to prevent the deportation of the survivors. This time, while Shertok conducted secret negotiations

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with the British, with his consent the Yishuv organized a massive protest, staging mass demonstrations and hunger strikes. More successful than in his initial efforts to prevent the deportation of the entire group, after the shock created by the accident and the ensuing protest, Shertok was able to have most of the survivors from the Patria detained in special camps in Palestine, rather than on an island in the Indian Ocean. Later, Shertok was the only senior Palestinian Jewish politician who really cared for these survivors as time passed. Unperturbed by the difficulties involved, he kept bombarding the British to release them from the detention camps in Palestine. Shertok was far less successful in prevent­ ing the deportation of most of the illegal immigrants that had arrived on the Atlantic. On 9 December 1940 they were rounded up, forcefully loaded on a deportation ship, and sent to Mauritius. Yet, contrary to what might have been expected under those tragic circumstances and in view of the frustrating efforts to release the survivors, Shertok bitterly, but typically, concluded that the Patria tragedy 'made any suggestion about non-co-operation with the British utterly impractical’.34 In view of the Patria tragedy and the deportation of the Atlantic immigrants, which many Jewish leaders at the time erroneously at­ tributed to the rigid and inconsiderate policies of the British High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMichael, Shertok and his associates in the Executive sought MacMichael’s replacement by a more sympathetic and accommodating official. Yet, in accordance with his generally prudent approach, Shertok demanded that the campaign to replace the High Commissioner should be conducted in London and through political and diplomatic channels. Moreover, once again Shertok warned the activists in the Yishuv’s leadership to refrain from launching any irresponsible retaliatory actions against the British, saying that ‘we cannot expect a situation in which we will have total freedom in choosing the means for our war against the British. [Hence,] we should accept the limitations which our fate imposes on us in each situation. It is possible of course to say that if we were different—than . . . etc., etc., for by saying it, we are loosing our touch with reality.’35 The first year of the war ended with yet another tragedy for the entire Shertok clan. Shertok’s second sister Rivka, his beloved b/other-in-law Dov Hoz, their daughter Ora, and his brother Yehudah’s wife, Zvia, were all killed in a car accident on their way to Tel Aviv. It is easy to imagine the shock that this accident created in the Shertok family and in the Yishuv. This tragic event only further strengthened the affin­ ity, mutual care, and family bonds among the remaining members of the clan. As he had done when his sister Geula died, Shertok

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characteristically buried his enormous affliction and anguish over his personal loss, which was also political in the case of Dov Hoz, and concentrated even more obstinately on carrying out his public activities and political duties. During that dark period in the history of mankind and of the Jews, Shertok and Weizmann, who was in charge of whatever rescue oper­ ations were carried out by the Zionist movement, came to share increasingly similar views on how to ameliorate the fate of their doomed brethren in Europe. Essentially, Shertok concurred with Weizmann’s statement: our colleagues [in the USA, and to an extent also in Palestine] are still far from realizing the terrible disaster that has befallen Jewry, which we will have to digest and cope with long after the victory over Germany. I think that European Jews are now experiencing irreversible destruction, and that when the curtain is raised, we will find only remnants, troubles, and poverty. I am terrified to think about the problems that will face those who survive this catastrophe. It is probable that only two Jewish communities will remain unharmed—those in America and in Palestine.36

At that point both moderate leaders also agreed that the Jewish anomaly would be solved only upon the establishment of a Jewish entity, but that this entity could only be created with the help of the great powers. Hence, in the debate that raged between an activist camp led by Yitzhak Tabenkin and Berl Katznelson and Weizmann’s moderate camp, Shertok sided of course with Weizmann. In reaction to Berl’s repeated suggestion that the Yishuv should adopt more stringent measures against the British, Shertok, very much like Weizmann, as­ serted that ‘since the war has precluded the actual possibility of initiating a political offensive against the White Paper’, the real issue was what the Yishuv leaders should do ‘in view of tiie offensive initiative that the [British government] has launched against us’. And once again, he firmly prescribed that any steps taken against the British should be carefully measured and purely pragmatic.37 Even during that period the relations within the small élite actually leading the Zionist movement and the Yishuv were far from consensual. The internal rivalries and enmities surfaced at the beginning of 1941. On this occasion, it was in reaction to Weizmann’s request that Shertok should replace him in London while he spent time in the United States on behalf of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv, a visit that Shertok had urged him to make for more than one year. This time, however,

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Shertok refused his ‘dear chief preferring to deal with what he regarded as the more urgent matters in Jerusalem until Ben-Gurion returned to Palestine from his own protracted visit to the USA. Although Weizmann bombarded his younger colleague with requests for him to depart for London, Shertok prevailed, and subsequently he was one of the small group that welcomed Ben-Gurion upon his arrival in Palestine. During his periodic, but not too frequent, visits to Palestine, BenGurion always consulted first Shertok, and only then other political colleagues on his new major proposals for revised Zionist strategies in foreign affairs. This was also the case with the ‘Guide-lines for a [new] Zionist Policy’ that Ben-Gurion revealed to Shertok upon his return to Palestine in mid-February 1941. In the draft that Ben-Gurion had shown to Shertok, he argued that the main Jewish problem after the war would be that of dealing with millions of their surviving displaced brothers. According to him, this problem could only be solved through the establishment of an independent Jewish state as soon as the war was over. Ben-Gurion’s immediate recommendation to this end was that the Jews should not delay in preparing the grounds for such a major historical leap forward, should explicitly fight the 1939 White Paper, and openly express their opposition to the establishment of an Arab state in the process of their preparations.38 Shertok agreed in principle with Ben-Gurion’s emphasis on the histor­ ical necessity to demand a radical solution of the Jewish problem, but in the Weizmannite tradition, he accepted only some elements of BenGurion’s diagnosis, prognosis, and prescriptions, viewing them as pro­ viding a conceptual framework, but not a sufficiently developed political plan. Fully aware that such an openly declared radical solution for the problem of displaced Jews would exacerbate Arab opposition, he stated that ‘outwardly we cannot ask for an imposed [by outside powers] Arab-Jewish agreement, and I cannot envision any agreement that would be acceptable to us’.39 Since the Arabs’ claims would be maximal, he went on, the Jews should respond by presenting their own maximal demands; but the quintessential question according to him was that of short-terms means rather than long-term goals. Shertok’s solution for this dilemma was ‘Jewish rule’ in Palestine rather than a ‘Jewish state’. This formulation was more than a matter of style; it expressed an entirely different view from Ben-Gurion’s on international relations as well as on the Jews’ place in the world and in Palestine. Since he believed that this notion could better serve the Jews in eliciting a solution from Arabs, the British, and the international community, he suggested that they should refrain from stating their final goal explicitly and

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concentrate on the means to achieve goals agreed upon by the entire nation, and at the least by the Zionist movement. In this vein, he advised Ben-Gurion, as well as other Jewish leaders, to defer any open state­ ments, to hold back the exact number of Jewish refugees who would immigrate to Palestine after the war, and to avoid using Ben-Gurion’s term ‘conquest’ in regard to achievement of sovereignty. Finally, he repeated his maxim that under almost all circumstances the Yishuv must maintain co-operation with the British government.40 Essentially, what Shertok had adhered to was the moderate Weizmannesque approach. This placed the erudite Labour leader squarely in the centre of Mapai’s and the Yishuv’s unofficial dovish bloc. Later, he would only further moderate these views and this centrist position. The ensuing controversy over the Yishuv’s and Zionist’s final goals widened the gap between Shertok and Ben-Gurion. For Shertok, but not for Ben-Gurion, participation in the war effort was an ‘imperative moral obligation’ as well as a political necessity, despite the restrictions of the 1939 White Paper, for while he too prayed for an autonomous Jewish political entity, like Weizmann, Shertok felt that this goal must be achieved through slow building from the foundations upward, which should be buttressed by the powers’ continuous support. He therefore rejected Beq-Gurion’s claim that any allocation of Zionist and Yishuv resources to help the Allies win the war meant that the Yishuv’s defence would suffer.41 This was also when the quintessential ideological controversy regard­ ing ‘the Arab Question’ between Shertok’s group on the one hand, and the by now separate Ben-Gurion and Tabenkin camps on the other, heated up. Shertok could not accept Ben-Gurion’s and Tabenkin’s assertions that ‘there is no Arab Question in the sense that there is a Jewish Question and that the Arab Question is a Jewish invention’. Rather, he insisted that ‘there is an Arab Question, and the answer is not going to be an easy one, but we cannot escape this difficulty’. Shertok suggested that, while for both historical and current reasons the Jews must put forward major claims towards the end of the war, they should also realize that such claims would exacerbate the situation vis-à-vis the Arabs. Very gloomily he added that ‘since this would wipe out any illusion that it is possible to reach an agreement, as well as the illusion of the absence of an Arab Question, we will have to prepare for a major war to attain our claims’.42 Occasionally, even aggressive and combative leaders know when they should retreat. Thus when Ben-Gurion realized that ultimately Shertok’s moderate group would carry the day, he modified his proposal, deleting

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the word ‘State’ from the title of his ‘Guide-lines’ and replacing it with ‘commonwealth’. This was more than a mere semantic and limited modification; it represented Ben-Gurion’s admission that the moderate camp had grown in strength to the point where he could not dominate Mapai and the Agency by threatening to resign if he did not get his way. Essentially, this was how the small political élite of the Yishuv reached the next compromised formula that would direct its future steps. Although Shertok felt that it was politically expedient to hold off explicit demands for a Jewish state in Palestine, he firmly opposed the bi-national idea which was then being revived in the Yishuv by Hashomer Hatzair, a pioneering socialist movement. His firm belief was that ‘the Yishuv must operate in a political regime based on a lack of agreement with the Arabs, and should fight for the redemption of Eretz Israel—but not through suppressing [the Arabs]’.43 These strategic ideo­ logical internal debates were conducted against an ever-worsening situ­ ation, and therefore, with hindsight, they seem ludicrously unrealistic. For, by the spring of 1941 the German army had routed the British from the Balkans and deepened its drive into North Africa. These German military successes, coupled with the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali al-Kilani rebellion in Iraq, meant that the threat to Palestine was becoming more immediate and menacing. Shertok, who played a sub­ stantial role in the planning of the Yishuv’s strategy in the event of a German invasion of the Middle East and their occupation of Palestine— an eventuality that he considered remote—including enthusiastic support for the establishment of a permanently mobilized and mobile task force in the Haganah in May 1941 (these units would become known as Palmah [Strike Companies] ), adamantly opposed any plan to evacuate Jews from Palestine. He opposed the evacuation of all Jews, including those who had escaped from Germany and found refuge in the Yishuv. He believed that the main efforts the Yishuv must make would be accelerating the establishment of the defensive capabilities of the Haga­ nah, intensifying fund-raising for that organization and, most import­ antly, expediting the recruitment of young Jews to the British army. In this context, he also advocated a massive international propaganda campaign aimed at ‘demonstrating to the world the fundamental di­ fference between the possibility and the implications of a Nazi invasion into Palestine, and such an invasion to any other country in the world’, meaning, of course, that a German invasion of Palestine would bring about the annihilation of every single Jew there.44 This was yet another demonstration of his well-known, yet somewhat modified, Palestinocen-

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trie views. These views, however, did not mean that his department was any less active in regard to the rescue of European Jews. As recent re-evaluations of the behaviour and role of various leaders has shown, Shertok was one of the Yishuv leaders who demonstrated greater sensitivity to the plight of the European Jews. Yet the main responsibility for these efforts did not lie with his department. It was the direct responsibility of Yitzhak Gruenbaum’s Immigration Depart­ ment.45 The successful British invasion into Lebanon and Syria in June 1941, actively assisted by Palmah officers and soldiers, including Moshe Dayan (who lost his eye in this operation) and Yigal Allon, reassured Shertok and his worried colleagues about the Yishuv’s immediate future. Sub­ sequently, not only had Palestine reached a degree of temporary, albeit precarious, stability and tranquillity on the external front, but also the local Arab community, which began to realize that after all the British would win the war, became more interested in exploiting the economic opportunities created by the war than in the exercise of violence against the British or for that matter the Jews. In this the Arab community resembled the Yishuv, which had been bent on capitalizing on the economic opportunities created by the war. This relative calm was, however, marred by rumours that British and Arab politicians were reviving pre-war plans to establish a Middle Eastern federation that would include Palestine. These rumours were substantiated by Anthony Eden in his Mansion House speech of 29 May 1941. In this speech the British foreign secretary hinted at such a possibility. Although during earlier stages of the war Shertok had shown interest in a federative solution, albeit not under Amir Abdullah,46 in mid-1941 he strongly opposed the idea, on the basis that ‘even a young child can understand that an Arab federation would involve terrible dangers for us’, which would stem from permanently remaining a negligible minority within a large Arab political entity. Although BenGurion was not averse to this idea, since a federation might include an independent Jewish state, the majority of the Executive accepted Shertok’s sceptical view that he had formed after series of talks about this renewed idea with various Arab politicians and intellectuals. According­ ly, after establishing congenial relations with Oliver Lyttleton, the British resident minister in Cairo, Shertok informed him of the Yishuv’s opposition to such a plan.47 Subsequently, when it seemed that the British had shelved the notion of a federation, Shertok made additional, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to renew a dialogue with Arab leaders in Palestine and in the neighbouring state, concerning post-war political

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arrangements in the Middle East and Palestine. Seeing no progress emerging from this effort, he turned to attend other urgent matter. Shertok now focused once more on the establishment of Jewish units in the British army. To facilitate the attainment of this goal, on numerous occasions during the ensuing months Shertok reiterated the axiom that the Yishuv should refrain from instigating an open struggle against the British, and from boycotting the British government in Jerusalem. Typically, he opted for a parallel policy of co-operation and altercation with the British, and effectively vetoed any suggestion of massive anti-British activities. Not accidentally, this was just a different variation of the famous double-edged formula that Ben-Gurion also used at the time, proclaiming that ‘we [both the Yishuv and the Zionists] would support the British as if there was no White Paper, and we will fight them as if there was no war with the Germans’.48 During those nerve-racking months and years, most of the Jewish leaders behaved like political schizophrenics. Thus in his talks with British senior politicians and generals in Cairo, who had demonstrated sympathy towards the Yishuv, Shertok revealed the actual prevailing mood among his colleagues, stemming from their acute sense of extreme isolation, despondency, and marginality. On the other hand, among his own colleagues, and especially among the rank and file, he felt compelled to present a more optimistic attitude, always arguing that the Yishuv should appreciate the advantages gained from its collaboration with the British. But he also cautioned his colleagues that they should always soberly examine the real world, and only then launch their political initiatives.49 As is well known, in December 1941 the Japanese attacked the American Naval base at Pearl Harbor, and consequently the USA finally joined the war. This decision, which constituted a turning-point in world history, was also a boon to the Zionist movement, to a few leaders of the American Jewish community, and the Yishuv. For once America, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, made this critical formal step and relinquished its previous non-committal position, that power became an important recipient of accelerated Zionist representations. That potentially the USA was now ready to lend a more sympathetic ear to the Zionists was communicated to Shertok by Roosevelt’s personal envoy in the Middle East, William Bullitt, who urged him and his colleagues to step up Zionist presence and activities in Washington. Shertok took Bullitt’s advice as an invitation. Then he presented it as such to the members of the Agency Executive. He was relieved to find that his colleagues, including Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, had been

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thinking along similar lines. Subsequently, one of the first objectives that Shertok suggested in the deliberations on the form the Agency activities should take in the United States was that it must explicitly demand Jewish self-rule after the war, but since this was certain to arouse ‘a negative British reaction’, the Agency itself should not present the demand, but should leave it to those American Jewish leaders, who had been pressuring the White House and Capitol Hill to enter the war since 1940.50 These more optimistic plans were silenced by the incredible news about the Nazis’ exterminatation of European Jews. For by the begin­ ning of 1942, Yishuv leaders, including Shertok (and, despite his perhaps not so strange denial of this knowledge, Ben-Gurion as well) received from various reliable sources definite information about the horrible ‘final solution’. Reeling under the impact of the shocking and debilitat­ ing information as to what Hitler and his death squads were planning and what they had already accomplished in this respect, in April 1942 Shertok told General Claude John Eyre Auchinleck in Cairo: the extermination of the Jewish race is a basic component of Nazi doctrine. The accurate reports that we have recently received and circulated show that this policy is being executed with undescribable cruelty. Hundreds of thousands of Jews have already died as a result of mass executions, enforced evacuations, as well as hunger and the diseases spreading throughout the ghettos and concen­ tration camps of Poland, the Balkans, Romania and the occupied provinces of Russia.51

Astounded by Auchinleck’s cool reception of this horrific disclosure, Shertok repeated his statement in a public speech delivered in Tel Aviv, entitled ‘On the Eve of a Dangerous Era’, in which he affirmed that Hitler and his Nazi gangs would not be satisfied until they had ‘annihilated the Jewish race [.ric!] from the face of the earth’. These statements demonstrated that although too late, nevertheless, at an early stage of the Holocaust, Shertok and other leaders of the Yishuv were fully aware of the situation of European Jews, but that, utterly frustrated, they were capable of doing only little in this respect. In the face of the Yishuv’s and Zionists’ inability to impress the British and American leaders, who could alleviate the situation of the European Jews, and with the knowledge that the German army was still close to Palestine, a powerless and bewildered Shertok again concentrated his efforts on enhancing the Yishuv’s measures for self-defence via the Haganah and Jewish units in the British army.52 With the full co­ operation of his brother-in-law and friend, Eliahu Golomb, then the

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Haganah’s most prominent and admired leader, he was determined to provide all that this clandestine paramilitary organization needed to protect the Yishuv, which he deemed as the most pressing need at that stage. Once again, however, Shertok was forced to interrupt his varied political activities to intervene in the ongoing injurious struggle between Ben-Gurion and Weizmann, who both were in the USA to promote political interest in and raise money for the rescue of Jews, for the activities of the Zionist movement, and for the defence of the Yishuv. The irony, in fact tragedy, was that both his older colleagues were in quite close agreement as to what had to be done to gamer support for achieving their ultimate goal. Both wished to meet President Roosevelt and other leading American politicians and officials to bolster the American Zionist movement’s general position and particularly its ability to exert political pressure on the White House and Capitol Hill; both were determined to bring the European inferno to the attention of the Americans; both were anxious to lay the groundwork for improving the political situation of the Yishuv after the war ended, and both felt the same urgent need to convene a Zionist and non-Zionist conference that would call for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine after the war. Hence in early 1942 the clash between them was as a result of not so much either ideology or strategy, but had evident personal under­ tones. Primarily, it was over the supreme leadership of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv. But this clash would not become open and merciless until after the Biltmore Conference of May 1942. The Biltmore Conference was convened in New York by the American Zionist leaders under the influence of both Weizmann and Ben-Gurion. At this gathering, six hundred prominent American Jewish leaders gave birth to a new Zionist platform. The two most significant clauses of this important and famous political programme called for: international recognition of the right of the Jews to take an active part in the war and thereby to protect their national home in Palestine and their brethren in Europe and elsewhere, mainly through service in the British army; and the establishment of a semi-sovereign ‘Jewish commonwealth’ in Pales­ tine, that would be endowed with the authority freely to determine the scope and pace of Jewish immigration to Palestine.53 Although neither of these ideas were new, the fact that they were adopted by so many renowned American Jewish leaders tremendously amplified the Zionist movement and the Yishuv’s desperate call for a radical change in the Jews’ status after the war. From then on, the Biltmore Program would serve as the main Zionist battle-cry. The plan gained special resonance

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against the backdrop of the excesses of the Holocaust and Germany’s victories in North Africa, as well as that of the Struma Affair, in which over seven hundred Jewish refugees perished in Istanbul harbour. In various passionate speeches made in Palestine, Shertok supported the idea of a Jewish commonwealth: At present we don’t have a state, but in every aspect of our life, in every stage of our activity the vision of a state is inherent. There can be a major debate over terms—in the event of a different term better expressing consensus [both within the Yishuv and in the Diaspora], I myself am ready to give up the term ‘state’. But, the state is continuously being established, in this sense the state is approaching.54

While the Biltmore Program constituted a turning-point in twentiethcentury Jewish history, it also triggered yet another serious clash between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, one which turned into a titanic struggle for the leadership of the Zionist movement. This renewed escalation of antagonism in the relations between these two leaders was fuelled when Weizmann published a widely read article in the prestigious Foreign Affairs that focused on the need to establish an independent Jewish entity in Palestine; it gained in strength when Weizmann was symbol­ ically crowned as Herzl’s successor at a reception accorded him during the Biltmore Conference, and it culminated with the latter’s practical preparations to establish an Agency office in Washington intended to function as an additional centre for the formulation and execution of policy to those in Jerusalem and London. Since it was Ben-Gurion who had actually organized the Biltmore Conference, and who had promoted the Biltmore Program, he felt that Weizmann was stealing his thunder.55 But what the envious and conniving Ben-Gurion was really fighting for was Weizmann’s predominant position in the Zionist movement and the no less vain and vindictive Weizmann was defending his position. When Ben-Gurion unleashed his vicious campaign against the older, ageing, and sick Zionist leader, Shertok was not surprisingly dragged into the imbroglio by both leaders, even though he was then totally absorbed in solving urgent problems in Palestine. Thus, Ben-Gurion informed Shertok that he was immediately leaving his ‘post’ as Weiz­ mann’s watch-dog in America and returning to Palestine. On the other hand, in his correspondence with Shertok, Weizmann claimed that he alone should be in charge of political activities in the United States and could no longer tolerate Ben-Gurion’s negative and denigratory attitude and behaviour towards him.56 Shertok initially tried to conceal the personal aspect of this rift, but when stories of the true dimensions of the clash between the two

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egotistical men percolated down to the rank and file of the Zionist movement, Shertok was moved to react. He did so by recommending his usual compromise aimed at reinstating the old balance between the two leaders and their respective camps. But this time, neither Shertok’s attempt at mediation, nor those of American Jewish leaders, such as Ben-Gurion’s ally Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, had much impact in quelling the storm.57 Since his genuine efforts to solve the new internal crisis through remote control from Jerusalem did not affect the two outraged antagonists and left the centre of the storm unabated, Shertok proceeded to examine the deeper psychological and ideological roots of the new clash. Having done so, his intellectual and emotional inclinations were to side with Weizmann.58 None the less, despite the real threat to the unity of the Zionist movement created by the Weizmann-BenGurion feud, Shertok had more important and immediately pressing concerns. In May and June 1942 Rommel’s German and Italian units had reached the borders of Egypt at al-Alamein and were preparing to attack the Suez Canal and to keep marching towards the Holy Land. The tireless workaholic Shertok helped to step up Jewish volunteering to the British army and oversaw preparations for the total mobilization of the Yishuv, both ‘in spirit and in body’.59 Shertok’s extended efforts culminated in the establishment of the Centre for the Recruitment in the Yishuv for registering all adult men and women, calling up high-school students for training, and conducting a giant public campaign for enlisting in the army and against draft evaders. Simultaneously, to supplement and reinforce these moves, Shertok initiated an elaborate system of voluntary taxation to finance the activities of the Centre and of the Haganah. Moreover, new and more comprehensive information about the sys­ tematic extermination, especially of Polish Jews, which reached Palestine in July 1942, prompted Shertok to insist that ‘the Jews of Palestine would fight even if they had to do so with their backs to the wall’ should the British be forced to withdraw from that territory and the Middle East. The situation was so fraught with harrowing possibilities that all hostile political camps in both the Zionist movement and the Yishuv called a temporary halt to their ongoing internal battle. Shertok, who had been in favour of an immediate agreement with the Revisionists in the mid- and late 1930s, was now able to extract a decision from the Agency Executive to co-operate with Jabotinsky’s Revisionist disciples in Palestine for the advantage of the whole community. Despite the impending existential menace and Mapai’s readiness to strike an

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agreement, negotiations with the Revisionists lasted for several months and did not result in an agreement.60 When the Allies’ situation in the North African theatre deteriorated even further, Churchill planned a visit to Cairo late in August 1942 to inspect his troops, try to boost their morale, closely examine the situation, and review the options for repulsing the Germans. Expecting accurately that the prime minister would announce changes in both British strategy and command while he was there, Shertok arranged one of his numerous visits to Egypt for the same time in the hope of meeting Churchill to discuss with him the burning issues of the defence of the Yishuv. Despite warm recommendations by his British friends in Cairo and London, his request to meet Churchill was denied. Nevertheless, he brought home from Cairo some good news—about Britain’s decision to create four Jewish battalions in Palestine in the event of a German invasion of the territory, a step that Shertok felt paved the way for the establishment of an autonomous Jewish fighting force within the British army. Back in Palestine, he could only pray that on the one hand, the Yishuv would remain immune from a massive German attack and that on the other, his colleagues would establish a modicum of internal political tranquillity that would allow him to resume both his urgent political tasks as well as longer-range planning. But his prayer was not answered. For exactly' at this critical point at the beginning of October 1942, Ben-Gurion returned to Jerusalem, bringing with him all his and Weizmann’s internecine squabbles. As expected, Ben-Gurion’s report to the Executive on recent developments in the American Zionist move­ ment naturally centred around the Biltmore Conference and the plan approved by its participants. Upon concluding his comprehensive report on the conference, he asked for the Executive’s approval of the Biltmore plan and at the same time, demanded that Weizmann’s authority should be curbed.61 A new Shertok emerged during the ensuing acerbic debate. Aware that his political and diplomatic achievements already placed him at the very peak of the Executive and the Mapai leadership, he evinced a new aura of self-confidence and assertiveness. Indicating that he would support the Biltmore plan, he nevertheless stipulated that the Arabs’ fears of the proposed ‘Jewish commonwealth’ must be addressed and allayed since, once the war ended, Arab-Jewish relations would constitute a para­ mount factor in Palestine. From this point of view, Shertok baldly stated that ‘there is no Arab Question, only a Jewish Problem’. In other words, Shertok did not shrink from reminding the Executive members that the Arabs constituted the majority in Palestine, that their national move-

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ment was an inseparable part of the ‘Jewish problem’, and that the Yishuv was therefore facing a strategic problem of enormous magnitude. This was why he believed that ‘Jewish rule’ in Palestine had to be attained through a combination of support from the great powers and reliance on the Yishuv’s own resources. Shertok’s middle-of-the-road approach was aimed at creating a con­ sensus among the many and conflicting Zionist views—which ranged from ‘leftists’ who supported a bi-national solution, to ‘rightists’ and ‘nationalists’, who supported the creation of a Jewish state in the entire territory. Since Ben-Gurion presented a similar compromise formula, the continuing disagreement with Shertok was somewhat alleviated. This emerging consensus at the top facilitated the Agency Executive’s and Mapai’s approval of the Biltmore Plan. It also helped Shertok to conceal his support for Weizmann to a certain extent and thus to lessen the acerbity of the strife between Ben-Gurion and Weizmann. Consequently both Mapai and the Executive left the questions of Weizmann’s position and his relations with Ben-Gurion unresolved.62 Towards the end of 1942, Shertok was greatly troubled by the theoretical and practical implications of what he regarded as the ‘shat­ tered ideological assumptions’ of Zionists and of the Yishuv. He had serious doubts whether the Yishuv would really be able to provide a refuge for the ‘millions of Jews remaining in Central Europe, those who would survive the sword, annihilation, property confiscation, and humil­ iation’.63 This traditional Zionist principal assumption had been shat­ tered and might be further thwarted by continued British restrictions on Jewish immigration and settlement. In this connection, nevertheless, he refused to compromise with the Arabs, on immigration, as some minimalist Yishuv leaders had suggested when they proposed accepting quotas not much higher than stipulated in the 1939 White Paper. A second ‘shattered assumption’ was that after the war Mapai would remain a single united party. He came to realize this sad possibility in view of steps taken by activist leaders of Mapai, who organized a faction within the party, eventually adopting the evocative name Ahdut Haavodah, who seemed preparing to split Mapai and establish their own party. Since Shertok zealously believed that Mapai was more thaï* ‘a temporary grouping of people; for this is an organic and continuous unity’, he could not hide his despair over this turn of events. Finally, now he was profoundly sceptical about the viability of his old assumptions of unity in the Yishuv. In particular, he was perturbed by the lack of progress in attracting the Revisionists to rejoin the main Zionist stream on the one hand, and with the interminable personal strife

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between Ben-Gurion and Weizmann that implicated large groups within the movement on the other.64 Somewhat improving his bad mood was a growing sense that the British were softening their position on forming Jewish units in their army—Weizmann’s and Shertok’s brainchild. Against this baffling backdrop, in late November 1942 he decided that he must go to London to check personally developments on this and other fronts. When the Agency Executive approved his trip to London, nobody, including Shertok himself, imagined that the trip would lead him to become involved in the most acerbic confrontation yet between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, this time with himself in the middle rather than as the mediator. T h e Middle East is on the verge of a new era,’ Shertok told a correspondent of the Tribune upon his arrival in London early in December 1942, and therefore the Yishuv should both watch current developments and step up its preparations for the post-war period. This part in the interview led the journalist to describe him as ‘a highly talented politician motivated by a cause and mission’. Noting, however, that not all Yishuv leaders were in agreement with Shertok’s moderate approach, the Tribune commented that Shertok was none the less more than capable of conducting negotiations on behalf of the entire com­ munity with his usual vigour even in that dark period in world and Jewish history. The Tribune interview concluded with Shertok’s state­ ment that if he were confronted with a choice between maintaining the status quo and adopting a more radical solution, intended to change the status of the Jewish people after the war ended, he would opt for the radical solution.65 Coming from a moderate politician like Shertok, these were bold words mainly intended to prepare the ground in his negotia­ tions in Whitehall. In London Shertok not only started a diplomatic campaign for the establishment of the special Jewish units promised by Churchill and his government, but also officially broached, for the first time publicly, the idea of establishing Palestinian Jewish commando units to serve in the British army. He suggested that these special units would engage in espionage, sabotage, and other covert operations behind German lines in Europe, and also bolster Jewish resistance to the Nazis, which would put additional strain on the German war machine. Maintaining a murderous pace, Shertok conducted more than a hundred meetings with British politicians, generals, and officials on this short trip, most of these aimed at establishing Jewish units in the British army. Shertok also emphasized the need for finding ways and means to rescue Jews from the Holocaust. In this respect, his most immediate

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concern was the need to rescue Russian Jews who had been evacuated to the Central Asian areas of the Soviet Union, Polish Jews who had succeeded in escaping to various parts in the Soviet Union, and the Jews of Bulgaria, where deportation and extermination were imminent. Knowing full well that both the British and American governments showed nothing but utter apathy and passivity in the face of the threat to these Jews, Shertok called upon the British Jewish community to arouse public opinion in Britain and demand that the Allies rescue Jews then facing annihilation.66 To this end, he organized a delegation of British Jewish leaders, including Lord James Rothschild, Lord Herbert Samuel, and Rabbi Jacob Hertz, to meet the foreign secretary, Anthony Eden. The meeting was aimed at altering Eden’s position on this issue and allowing immigration to Palestine prior to a parliamentary debate on the Jewish plight, which was scheduled for mid-December 1942. However, the much-awaited meeting between the British foreign secre­ tary and the Yishuv’s ‘foreign minister’ and the other Jewish dignitaries, ended in disappointment: although Eden admitted that there was ample space in Palestine to absorb all Jewish refugees, he refused to promise their free entry to the territory. Instead, he vaguely indicated that Britain would try to convince neutral states to provide refuge to Jews in distress, and that it would also approach the Vatican with a request for it to help Jews.67 Similarly, Shertok’s meetings with other British politicians and offi­ cials, including Oliver Stanley, then colonial secretary, James Greig, then secretary of war, as well as Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, and Herbert Morrison, who were members of the war cabinet, also ended inconclu­ sively. Shertok was distressed that even then, these prominent British politicians, who before the war had sympathized with the Yishuv, were reluctant to make clear political commitments. However, he did not allow his frustration to overcome his determination. Instead, he pursued the issue in additional meetings, with the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, with Polish leaders, such as General Sikorsky and Count Edward Raczynski, as well as with the famous and sympathetic Czech leaders, Edward Bene§ and Jan Masaryk, who greatly impressed him. Finally, he met Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle, whom he described as a vain and abrasive leader, who demonstrated aloofness towards his interlocutors. According to Shertok’s report, the general was highly cryptic about possible future relations between the Yishuv and France after the war. De Gaulle was ready to say only that France ‘would be friendly towards all those who were friendly towards us during our hours of distress’ and that France would co-ordinate all its policies

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with Britain. Shertok of course was immensely disappointed with this statement.68 Despite his considerable disappointment and frustration at the reac­ tion, or rather lack of favourable reaction of these and the many other leaders of the free world whom he met in London, Shertok, on behalf of the Agency Executive in Jerusalem, never flagged in fighting the British restrictions on land purchase and settlement in Palestine, although he was almost alone in this self-appointed task. Despite his failure to get the British to take a new look at the stipulations of the 1939 White Paper, and in view of the combative spirit that he had helped to arouse in British Jewish leaders, Shertok clung to his and Weizmann’s line, stating that ‘under no circumstances should we despair of Britain and rely totally on the USA . . . Instead, we should dig the tunnel from both ends’.69 This attitude continued to prompt the disagreement of leaders of the activist segment of Mapai, such as Ben-Gurion and Berl Katznelson, who had then placed their entire hope on the United States. The old-new internal political storm that had involved Shertok in the past was now rapidly gathering momentum. For, contrary to BenGurion’s explicit opposition, Shertok finally accepted Weizmann’s oftenrepeated invitation to join him in the USA. Ben-Gurion, who was in Jerusalem at the time, interpreted Shertok’s planned trip from London to America as the clearest indication of Shertok’s personal allegiance to Weizmann and the Weizmannite line and camp. Ben-Gurion’s feeling that Shertok was betraying him personally and Mapai collectively by joining his ‘dear chief ’ in Washington created a permanent rift in the relations between the two leaders.70 Moreover, Ben-Gurion openly displayed his displeasure by once again announcing his decision to resign from the Agency Executive on the same day that Shertok left on a dangerous trip to America via Lisbon and the war-tom Atlantic Ocean. Ben-Gurion insisted that he would only continue his work in the Executive until Shertok’s return home.

NOTES 1. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 10 May 1939, 11 May 1939, 12 May 1939, iv. 277, 280, 282-3. 2. Ibid. 258-9. 3. Ibid., 17 May 1939, 18 May 1939, 19 May 1939, 290, 291, 292; Palestine P ost , 18 May 1939, 19 May 1939, 20 May 1939. 4. Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 14 June 1939, Mapai Archive, 23/35.

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5. Shertok in Agency Executive, 25 June 1939, CZA; and see Ben-Gurion and Shertok, in Zionist Smaller Actions Committee, 26 June 1939, CZA, S25/1835. 6. Teveth, David's Jealousy , iii. 326-31. 7. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , iv. 331-2. 8. See the protocols of Twenty-First Zionist Congress, held in Geneva in August 1939, CZA. 9. See the protocols of congress. 10. Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 21 Sept. 1939, Mapai Archive, 23/39; and see in the same context, Weizmann to Shertok, 24 Sept. 1939, CZA, S25/1716. 11. Mapai Central Committee, 12 Sept. 1939, Mapai Archive 23/39. 12. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 21 Sept. 1939, iv. 346-7. 13. Mapai Central Committee, 21 Sept. 1939, Mapai Archive, 23/39; Shertok in Agency Executive, 24 Sept. 1939, CZA; and see Shertok’s meeting with General Barker on 25 Sept. 1939 as reported to Mapai Secretariat on 25 Sept. 1939, Mapai Archive, 23/39. 14. Shertok’s London Diary, 6 Oct. 1939, CZA, S25/198; and see Y. Porath, In Search o f Arab Unity, 1930-1945 (Heb.) (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1985), 94-7. 15. Shertok’s London Diary, 7 Oct. 1939, CZA, S25/198. 16. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , iv. 456. 17. Ibid. 406; and see a report on his contacts with Soviet diplomats in London, Shertok’s London Diary, 14. Oct. 1939 and 27 Oct. 1939, CZA. 18. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 13 Nov. 1939, iv. 487-8. 19. Shertok’s London Diary, 15 Nov. 1939, 16 Nov. 1939, 20 Nov. 1939, CZA. 20. See the discussion in Agency Executive, 26 Nov. 1939, CZA; Political Committee of Mapai, 27 Nov. 1939, Mapai Archive, 23/39. 21. Shertok’s London Diary, 11 Oct. 1939,13 Oct. 1939,16 Oct. 1939,17 Oct. 1939, CZA; and see report on his talk with MacDonald, 11 Oct. 1939, CZA, S25/7563. 22. Agency Executive, 29 Feb. 1940, CZA. 23. Agency Executive, 7 Mar. 1940, 12 Mar. 1940, CZA; Shertok’s report to Executive, 1 Apr. 1940, CZA; Shertok’s report to Mapai Central Committee, 9 Apr. 1940, Mapai Archive 23/40. 24. Agency Executive, 8 Apr. 1940,9 Apr. 1940, CZA; and Teveth, D avid’s Jealousy , in. 340-1. 25. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 14 Apr. 1940, v. 46-8. 26. Agency Executive, 21 Apr. 1940, 17 May 1940, CZA; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 13 May 1940, CZA, S25/10582; Teveth, D avid’s Jealousy, iii. 341, 343-5. 27. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 14 May 1940, CZA, S25/10582; Agency Executive, 21 Apr. 1940, 22 Apr. 1940, 30 Apr. 1940, CZA. 28. Mapai Central Committee, 14 May 1940, Mapai Archive 23/40; and see Ben-Gurion’s evaluation as it is summarized in Teveth, D avid’s Jealousy , iii. 346. 29. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 26 May 1940, CZA, S25/10582; Agency Executive, 2 May 1940, 3 June 1940, 9 June 1940, 14 June 1940, CZA; and see Shertok on his talk with General Giffard, 1 June 1940, CZA, S25/10582. 30. Agency Executive, 3 June 1940, 9 June 1940, 14 June 1940, 16 June 1940, 19 June 1940, CZA; Shertok in fifteenth session of Mapai Council, 14-16 June

136

31.

32.

33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

The Second World War 1940, Mapai Archive, 22/15; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 10 June 1940, CZA, S25/10582; Mapai Central Committee, 26 June 1940, Mapai Archive, 23/40. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 27 June 1940, CZA, S25/10582; and see reports about Shertok’s speeches in various rallies, Palestine P ost , 7 July 1940, 9 July 1940, 10 July 1940. Shertok in an internal political seminar held on 12 June 1940, CZA, S25/6911; Shertok’s report on his talk with General Neam, 6 Sept. 1940, CZA, S25/6911; Agency Executive, 12 Sept. 1940, CZA; Mapai Political Committee, 18 Sept. 1940, Mapai Archive; Shertok’s concluding speech, Mapai Political Committee, 29 Oct. 1940, Mapai Archive, 23/40. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 29 Oct. 1940, v. 117-22. On the Patria disaster, see Shertok in Political Committee of Mapai, 21 Nov. 1940, 9 Dec. 1940, 12 Dec. 1940, Mapai Archive, 23/40; Shertok in Agency Executive, 28 Nov. 1940,9 Dec. 1940, CZA; B. Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews o f Europe, 1939-1945 (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1982), 64-6; 67-9; 69-71; Mapai Central Committee, 15 Feb. 1941, Mapai Archive 23/40. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 12 Dec. 1940, v. 140-3; Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 15 Feb. 1941, Mapai Archive, 23/40. Weizmann to Shertok, 3 Jan. 1941, CZA, S25/7682. Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 9 Jan. 1941, Mapai Archive, 23/41; and see also Executive, 2 Feb. 1941 and 16 Feb. 1941, CZA. Teveth, David's Jealousy , iii. 375-7. Shertok in Agency Executive, 16 Feb. 1941, 23 Feb. 1941, CZA; cf. Teveth, David's Jealousy , iii. 375-7; and A. Gal, David Ben-Gurion: Towards the Establishment o f a Jewish State (Heb.) (Beersheba: Ben-Gurion University in the Negev, 1985), 101-31. Shertok in Agency Executive, 9 Mar. 1941, CZA. See e.g. Shertok in forty-third session of Histadrut Council, 8 Mar. 1941, CZA, S25/858. For Ben-Gurion’s position, see his ‘Guide-lines’; for Shertok’s response, see Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 19 Mar. 1941, Mapai Archive, 23/41. Shertok in forty-third session of Histadrut Council, 8 Mar. 1941, CZA S25/858. Shertok in Agency Executive, 27 Apr. 1941, 4 May 1941, 11 May 1941, CZA; and Shertok during seventeenth session of Mapai Council, 24 Apr. 1941, Mapai Archive 27/17; Shertok in Zionist Smaller Actions Committee, 7 May 1941, CZA, S25/1856. e.g. H. Eshkoli, Silence, M apai and the Holocaust, 1939-1942 (Heb.) (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1994), passim. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 3 May 1940, v. 55-6, 27 June 1940, v. 90-2; Shlaim, Collusion , 70-1. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 2 June 1940, v. 203-5, 8 June 1940, v. 207-9. Ibid. Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 7 Jan. 1942, Mapai Archive 23/42; nineteenth session of Mapai Council, 14 Jan. 1942, Mapai Archive, 22/19. Shertok in Agency Executive, 5 Jan. 1942, CZA; Palestine Post , 28 Dec. 1941.

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51. Shertok to General Auchinleck, 17 Apr. 1942, CZA, S25/5089; D. Porath, An Entangled Leadership: The Yishuv and the Holocaust, 1942-1945 (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1986), 44-50. 52. Shertok in Agency Executive, 19 Apr. 1942, CZA; and see Shertok’s speech ‘On the Eve of a Dangerous Era’, 2 May 1942, CZA, A245/102. 53. S. Dothan, The Struggle fo r Eretz Israel (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence 1981), 220-4; Teveth, D avid’s Jealousy , iii. 410-11. 54. Sharett, M aking o f Policy , 22 Apr. 1942, v. 304. 55. Teveth, D avid’s Jealousy , iii. 409-11. 56. Ibid. 411-14. 57. Ibid. 416-19; Weizmann to Shertok, 12 Aug. 1942, CZA; 25/1217; Agency Executive, 16 Aug. 1942, CZA. 58. Agency Executive, 10 May 1942, CZA; Shertok’s speech in concluding session of the Fifth Convention of Histadrut, 22 Apr. 1942, CZA, S25/858. Shertok in Agency Executive, 14 June 1942, CZA. 59. See Shertok's summary of these efforts in Smaller Actions Committee, 6 May 1942, CZA, S25/312; Shertok in Mapai Secretariat 30 Apr. 1942, Mapai Archive, 23/42. 60. Agency Executive, 30 Aug. 1942, 6 Sept. 1942, CZA; Smaller Actions Commit­ tee, 9 Sept. 1942, CZA, S25/314. 61. Teveth, D avid’s Jealousy , iii. 431. 62. Agency Executive, 4 Oct. 1942, 6 Oct. 1942, 10 Oct. 1942, 11 Oct. 1942, CZA; Shertok in third session of Fifth Mapai Convention, 29 Oct. 1942, Mapai Archive, 21/5/3. 63. Shertok in a gathering of Mapai members, Degania , 9 Oct. 1942, Mapai Archive, 15/2/42. 64. Ibid. 65. Tribune , 4 Dec. 1942. 66. Report on Executive’s meeting in London, 14 Dec. 1942, CZA, Z4/302/26; Shertok’s report on his visit to London, Jewish Agency Executive, 25 Apr. 1943, CZA; see his report to Mapai Secretariat, 27 Apr. 1943, Mapai Archive 24/43; cf. D. Porath, A n Entangled Leadership , 78-9; Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews o f Europe , 144-7. 67. Shertok’s report to Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 25 Apr. 1943, CZA; Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews o f Europe , 149. 68. Shertok’s report on this meeting, Executive in London, 4 Jan. 1943, CZA, Z4/302/26. 69. Shertok’s report on his visits to England and the USA in Mapai Secretariat, 27 Apr. 1943, Mapai Archive, 24/43. 70. Agency Executive, 10 Jan. 1943, 7 Feb. 1943, CZA; Shertok to Golomb, 26 Jan. 1943, CZA, Z4/10397.

5 Holocaust I t took some time before the majority of Zionist and Yishuv leaders and the rank and file, but not Shertok and his colleagues in the Executive, were able to overcome their shock, then denial, and later disbelief at what initially seemed as incredible information they were receiving about the Holocaust throughout 1942. Stunned and horrified by the terrible reality, they were tom between a deep sense of helplessness and a burning desire to establish Jewish sovereignty in Palestine so that another Holocaust could never again take place. Their response to the unfolding genocide was support for the Biltmore Program, which they viewed as both a symbolic and a practical fink between the Holocaust and the traditional hope of establishing a Jewish state. Immediately after the plan was approved in Jerusalem, the Jewish Agency began seeking a means to implement this ambitious scheme. It was to help this goal, to legitimize Weizmann’s activities in the USA, and this time also to serve as the latter’s self-appointed watch-dog, that Shertok agreed to travel to the USA from London at the end of 1942. But the vagaries of the war which made it difficult to cross the Atlantic and the objections of both hesitant friends and determined foes delayed his arrival there until the beginning of February 1943. This was Shertok’s first official visit to the USA in his capacity of chairman of the Jewish Agency Political Department. Thrilled to be working side by side with Weizmann again, immediately upon his arrival in New York Shertok began to acquaint himself with and assess the American scene, focusing on the situation in Washington. Based on his initial but thorough survey of conditions there, Shertok was confident of his ability to contribute to a change in both government and Jewish positions. Only then did he inform his old and new American acquaint­ ances that the goals of his visit were to provide American Jewish leaders with updated information about the political situation in Palestine and London, to gain first-hand knowledge of the political conditions prevail­ ing in Washington and the American Jewish rank and file, and, finally, to conduct negotiations with American officials over the Yishuv’s most pressing needs. All these were genuine goals; nevertheless, Shertok’s main reason for this controversial trip was to help Weizmann to obtain

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American support, to serve as his watch-dog, and to ensure that he did not commit too many political blunders with regard to basic Zionist and Yishuv demands. In anticipation of Shertok’s arrival in New York, Weizmann had, indeed, postponed contacts with the American Congress and administra­ tion. Evidently, the ageing lion, who had been receiving assistance from some American Zionist leaders, such as Louis Lipsky, Robert Szold, and Nahum Goldmann, needed the moral, political, and diplomatic support of a senior Palestinian leader, and preferably—for tactical reasons—one from the Labour camp.1 It was equally clear that Weizmann had sought Shertok’s support since, of all Labour leaders, Shertok was closest to him psychologically and ideologically. Moreover, the president of the WZO knew that Shertok had more experience than any other Yishuv leader in mediating between the activists and moderates, and especially between himself and Ben-Gurion. Once Shertok had adequately acquainted himself with the political and administrative situation in the USA, Weizmann and his associates, now including Shertok, resumed their secret talks with the former Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, and with his assistant, Wallace Murray. However, when in this context Shertok was informed that the Americans were promoting negotiations between Ibn Saud and Weiz­ mann, something along the lines of the famous Weizmann-Feisal talks held after the Great War, Shertok rejected this attempt in view of the Executive’s and his own great disappointment over St John Philby’s similar dubious project. Since Weizmann knew that Shertok’s political support was crucial, he did not overrule Shertok in this matter and this plan was consequently shelved. During the first round of talks with Welles and Murray, Shertok, the main speaker, described in great detail the complex problems facing the Zionist movement and the Yishuv, and did not hesitate to point out that the Americans could only benefit, politically and strategically, from assisting them. He suggested particularly that by granting continuous assistance to the Yishuv the Americans would gain an important foothold in a region into which they were just penetrating. To Shertok’s pleasant surprise and satisfaction, Welles answered that the American government had already notified the British of its interest in develop­ ments in Palestine, and that it expected the British to make no major decisions regarding the territory and the Yishuv without consulting them.2 For Weizmann, Shertok, and their colleagues this was probably the most significant and encouraging information that they obtained for a long period and which would change their political outlook and

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behaviour. Based on that information, the Zionist strategy in future months and years would be predicated on the assumption that such an American interest indeed existed and that the Americans intended gradually to replace Britain in the Middle East. On the other hand, to his considerable indignation, Shertok found that American public opinion, the media, and most political leaders at state and local levels were largely unaware of developments in Palestine and for that matter of the genocide of European Jews. To remedy this situation, he embarked upon a series of meetings in which he offered elaborate ‘lectures’, almost diatribes, to individuals and to groups of American politicians, officials, and journalists. He did it before gather­ ings in large venues such as Carnegie Hall, in several radio broadcasts, and in small gatherings. Because of his radio talks, articles in the Jewish press, and his eloquent public speeches, which were covered by the media, Shertok became quite well known among both interested Ameri­ can Gentiles and Jews.3 During that visit, he also became aware that, despite Ben-Gurion’s previous long periods in the USA, and the exten­ sive political work that he had done during these visits, the Zionist base in that huge country was still small and politically insignificant. In yet another shock to his system, Shertok found that American Jews evinced widespread apathy and lack of interest, not only in the Yishuv, but even in the Holocaust. Since the country, the Jewish community, and the perceived needs were so enormous in this particular regard, Shertok realized that he could do little to improve the situation no matter how many talks, lectures, and broadcasts he made or how strongly he harangued the American Jews to think about their less fortunate co-religionists. All he could do was report back to Jerusalem and strongly advise the Executive to establish a substantial section in America and to initiate an intensified campaign among American Jews and Gentiles. Despite his sense of the urgent need to help European Jews, Shertok himself declined from participating in the American-British sponsored Bermuda Conference of April 1943, whose pronounced purpose was to discuss rescue operations for European Jews. Shertok’s reluctance to participate in that conference stemmed from his deep feeling of frustra­ tion and the suspicion that it was being convened as a sop to the Jews and to the convenor’s own bad conscience, and that it would not result in any effective action on the part of the Allies to keep Jews from Hitler’s blazing crematoria. He did, nevertheless, help to prepare the presenta­ tion that Nahum Goldmann made at the conference on behalf of the Agency. As on previous occasions, Shertok’s pessimistic assessment was

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right; under British pressure, the Bermuda Conference did not consider Palestine as a place of refuge, and no other government expressed willingness to accept large numbers of Jewish refugees.4 In close collaboration with Weizmann, Goldmann, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, and other American Jewish leaders, Shertok focused his efforts on attempts to create a unified forum of the major American Jewish organizations to deal with the rescue of Jews, with the consequences of the Holocaust, and with the future of the Yishuv. In this framework, he was active in laying the groundwork for the first ever conference of all major American Jewish organizations, convened in Pittsburgh in March 1943, which brought together representatives of more than thirty import­ ant Jewish organizations. Shertok was delighted when the delegates to this conference endorsed the Biltmore Program, thereby placing it on the agenda not only of the Zionists but also of the non-Zionist segment of the American Jewish community.5 These activities marked the beginning of Shertok’s long-term deep interest and involvement in American Jewish politics. Moreover, his first intensive encounter with American affairs, coupled with his growing realistic evaluation of the Holocaust’s horrors and possible outcomes, marked further serious cracks in Shertok’s previously orthodox Palestinocentric view of the Jewish political world. One of Shertok’s conclusions during this visit to the USA, especially in view of the American war effort on the one hand, and the abject failure of the Bermuda Conference on the other, was that the Yishuv should accelerate its preparations for the post-war period. In this, he also concluded, it should closely link its economic and political planning. Moreover, since, unlike Ben-Gurion, he remained sceptical about the possibility of establishing after the war a Middle Eastern federation that would include a Jewish entity, Shertok began thinking instead of ad hoc functional alliances between the countries in the region. To his way of thinking, these pragmatic alliances would be based on the concrete economic needs of both Arabs and Jews. As expected, he preferred practical smaller projects rather than larger sophisticated schemes that had not, in any event, contributed to the solution of the Arab-Jewish conflict to date. Shertok, therefore, showed great interest in the Laudermilk Plan for using the water from the Jordan River and fof establishing a Jordan River Authority modelled on the American Tennessee Valley Authority. He would not lose interest in either combined political and economic planning or water problems, and would try to implement solutions based on these ideas in the years to come. Shertok stayed in the USA until mid-April 1943, conducting extensive discussions with American politicians and officials and absorbing infor-

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mation and impressions concerning the American scene. Throughout his stay he was well aware that upon his return to Palestine, he would be subjected to a fierce onslaught from Ben-Gurion,6 for not only had he joined Weizmann in the USA against Ben-Gurion’s expressed wish, but he also supported Weizmann’s plans—if not the authoritarian manner in which his 'dear chief ’ elucidated them—for revamping and reorganizing political Zionist work in New York, and the establishment of a small Agency office in Washington. As he had expected, upon his return to Palestine in early May 1943, Ben-Gurion launched a particularly vicious attack on Weizmann and Shertok, following the latter’s detailed report to the Agency Executive in Jerusalem on his long trip to London and the USA.7The pretext for this assault was Shertok’s comment that the political activities that Weiz­ mann had initiated while in the USA were strictly in line with the premisses of the Biltmore plan. When the raging Ben-Gurion challenged Shertok with a long list of hostile questions pertaining to his and Weizmann’s purported negative activities in the USA, Shertok re­ sponded to Ben-Gurion’s insulting questions and manner in full detail. Refusing to play Ben-Gurion’s pugnacious game, and wishing to estab­ lish his autonomy in the Yishuv’s leadership, Shertok started his mild counter-offçnsive by saying that he would answer questions only about facts, not about intentions. Elaborating first on Weizmann’s attitudes and activities, Shertok repeated that, politically, none of the actions or plans of the president of the World Zionist Organization contradicted or exceeded the authority delegated to him by the Agency Executive. Shertok argued that Weizmann was asking only for some tactical leeway in his diplomatic efforts. In his characteristically honest fashion, Shertok also criticized some of Weizmann’s political and diplomatic mistakes in the USA. Turning to his own activities, Shertok said that he had gone to the USA mainly to hold talks with White House and State Depart­ ment officials, and to help in strengthening the ties between the Ameri­ can Jewish community and the Yishuv. Then he forcefully rejected Ben-Gurion’s allegation that he had legitimized Weizmann’s sceptical position regarding the possibility of the implementation of the Biltmore Program. Shertok concluded his response to Ben-Gurion’s onslaught by stating that despite his wavering and his readiness to consider some concessions to the Arabs, Weizmann was still the most import­ ant living Zionist leader, that he would therefore continue to support him whenever he felt the WZO president was right, and that his expulsion from the presidency would mean a major disaster for the movement.

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This bitter duel between Ben-Gurion and Shertok was not the end of the debate about Weizmann’s position in the Zionist movement. It also triggered a caustic debate about Shertok’s own position in the movement and in Mapai. The painful exchanges that ensued would be remembered by those who witnessed them for many years to come. In essence, Ben-Gurion alleged that by supporting the wavering and unreliable Weizmann, Shertok had betrayed Ben-Gurion’s plan, him personally, and Mapai. Shertok would never forget these blunt accusations, espe­ cially since they were made in front of the members of the coalition in the Executive rather than during a meeting between the two or an internal discussion among Mapai’s leaders.8 It should be reiterated here that the continuing controversy between Shertok and Ben-Gurion did not begin at this Executive meeting; it had been lingering since the early days of Shertok’s co-operation with Weizmann in the mid-1930s. But this outburst certainly exacerbated it in a major way and further widened the already existing gap between the two leaders. The harsh criticisms in the Agency Executive meeting of 2 May 1943 were only Ben-Gurion’s first shots in the blitzkrieg against Weizmann and his politics as well as against Shertok personally. At the Mapai Political Committee, Ben-Gurion resumed his fierce attack on the moderates and focused on Shertok as Weizmann’s ‘faithful emissary’. At the height of his diatribe in this forum, referring to Weizmann’s dictatorial behaviour, Ben-Gurion said that ‘a king is either a responsible person or above responsibility’, but that Weizmann ‘is neither a king nor a responsible leader’. And further, ‘there are elements of corruption [s/c!] in Weizmann’s public and internal appearances’. What seemed to irk Ben-Gurion most was that, as a result of the legitimacy allegedly given to Weizmann by Shertok as head of the Political Department, Weizmann ‘would speak in our name. And he needs such legitimacy to conduct things on his own.’9 Once again Shertok answered Ben-Gurion fearlessly. He reminded his colleagues in the committee that as a senior politician he had autonomy in determining his moves, including the right to go to the USA without asking Ben-Gurion’s approval, and that while there, he had seen to it that Weizmann did not reveal in public his reservations on the Biltmore Program and his thoughts about the desirability of establishing a bi-national state. Finally, he categorically rejected the notion that by merely travelling to the USA he had given Weizmann legitimacy to act on his own.10 Because of the consensual nature of Mapai’s, and in fact of the entire Yishuv’s politics, the almost inevitable outcome of these unpleasant

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exchanges was, of course, another compromise. The majority of the members of the Mapai Political Committee felt that Ben-Gurion’s vicious attack on Weizmann and Shertok was extremely exaggerated, and therefore Shertok’s position concerning the desirability of keeping Weizmann in office as WZO president was endorsed. Moreover, as on previous occasions, the Political Committee approved the establishment of a new office in Washington, but stipulated that it should not be staffed by Weizmann’s appointees. In accordance with Ben-Gurion’s own pro­ posal, it was also decided to send him to the USA, but also that Shertok would replace Ben-Gurion there if he were needed in Palestine.11 Despite this expected compromise, the breach between Shertok and Ben-Gurion had widened to the point where it could only grow further. The debate between the two was resumed after Weizmann returned to London and conducted intensive talks with the politicians there in June 1943. Again Ben-Gurion thought that these meetings had not been authorized and therefore that they were extremely harmful. During a secret discussion of the Mapai Political Committee in mid-June 1943, Ben-Gurion protested again that ‘Zionism is not a private business. Therefore, I totally oppose Weizmann, since he regards Zionism as a private business.’ Concluding his renewed attack, he demanded Weiz­ mann’s resignation. Shertok admitted again that occasionally Weizmann was not reliable, that ‘basically, he [Weizmann] does not like maximal­ ism. And it is a fact that he is far from being happy with the Biltmore Program.’ But he added: T know that on this I am not in agreement with Ben-Gurion. I also know that occasionally Weizmann is not reliable as far as holding on to his political position. Nevertheless, I think that his resignation now means disaster. Moreover, the nation thinks that he is a great Jew. I think too that despite his great shortcomings, he is a great Jew!’ Later in this discussion, most of the participants, including Katznelson, Sprinzak, Kaplan, Golomb, and of course Shertok, opposed a call for Weizmann’s resignation, but supported a demand for his visit to Palestine to clarify the disagreements between himself and Mapai’s leadership. Ben-Gurion, who had again threatened to resign from the Executive, postponed it for the time being.12 The next clash between Ben-Gurion and Shertok occurred against the backdrop of what became known as the ‘Recruiting Centres crisis’. This affair began as soon as the British government tried to change the prevailing procedures, and recruit Palestinian Jews directly, that is, rather than through the Yishuv’s recruitment centres, which had been regarded as extremely significant tools for enhancing the Yishuv’s authority and security. As could have been expected, Ben-Gurion

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stubbornly demanded that in reaction to the British decision, the Yishuv’s response should be non-co-operation. Shertok, who had al­ ready discussed the matter with the Foreign Office’s representative, Richard Casey, who was then visiting Palestine, suggested that they seek Weizmann’s and the British Zionist Lord Melchett’s help in London to reverse the British government’s decision. This innocent pragmatic proposal only served as a red flag for Ben-Gurion, who regarded it as submission to both the British and to Weizmann, as their ‘agent’. Ben-Gurion was blunt in explaining the rationale for his objection: although he had ‘lost London to Shertok’ and ‘lost Washington to Weizmann’, he had no intention of ‘losing Palestine’ to either of his moderate colleagues. Hence, when to Ben-Gurion’s great chagrin, the Mapai Secretariat, the Histadrut and Agency Executives, and the Zionist Smaller Action Committee, all endorsed the moderates’ position, BenGurion had yet another grudge to bear against Shertok.13 Bureaucratic practices in Whitehall did not allow the Recruiting Centres crisis to be solved there. All that the basically pro-Zionist colonial secretary, Oliver Stanley, could do in response to Weizmann’s and Melchett’s repre­ sentations was to refer the two respected Jewish dignitaries back to the Palestine government, which refused to change its position primarily out of concerns for prestige.14 Shertok, however, was determined to solve the problem once and for all for two reasons: first, to facilitate on its merits the recruitment of young Jews in Palestine, and secondly, because of his unending conflict with Ben-Gurion. Typically, his solution to the impasse was to try to bypass the British government in Jerusalem. In the beginning of June 1943 he raised the issue of these centres with the British authorities in Cairo. During one of his frequent visits there, he succeeded in extracting reassuring promises from British officials and generals about reinstating the status quo ante. Shertok also reached an agreement with General Douglas McConnel, the commander of the British forces in Palestine, whereby the British would distinguish between the recruitment of new soldiers (leaving this part of the process to the Jewish Agency) from the treatment of the men and women after they were enlisted by the army. General McConnel concluded his written confirmation of the agreement with Shertok by saying, T hope that as a result of our open and sincere talks, the Agency would continue with its cooperation with and help to British authorities, that had been evident in past.’15 While the agreement and McConnel’s letter helped Shertok to overcome Ben-Gurion’s unwill­ ingness to co-operate with the British, it was only after additional rearguard skirmishes with his older colleague that he succeeded in

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negotiating the reopening and full operation o f the Jewish Agency’s recruitment centres.16 The new agreement with the British was endorsed by a majority of Zionist leaders of all parties in the coalition: Yitzhak Ben-Zvi and Eliezer Kaplan of Mapai; Emil Shmorak and Yitzhak Gruenbaum of the General Zionists; Moshe Shapira of Hamizrahi; and Werner Senator of the non-Zionists, who were partners to the coalition in the Jewish Agency. On the other hand, Ben-Gurion was supported only by the well-known activist Rabbi Yehuda Leib Hacohen Fishman. Shertok did not hide his satisfaction, for it was clear that this was a small victory for his compromising and co-operative approach as well as evidence for his strong position in the Executive. More importantly, the outcome of the vote in the Executive was part of a political pattern in the making: almost whenever needed, Shertok could command a moderate majority, defeating Ben-Gurion and the activists in the Executive. The long period during which the recruitment centres were closed and Jews did not enlist in the British army for lack of alternative channels had caused frustration among the leaders, demoralization among rank and file, as well as difficulties in drafting more Palestinian Jews when the centres were finally reopened. Facing this new situation, Shertok com­ plained about his solitary efforts to ensure a stream of volunteers, and directed his criticism mostly against Ben-Gurion, who as chairman of the Executive had not contributed even a fair share of effort in this sphere. Nevertheless, despite the immense practical difficulties and lack of support, Shertok was determined to continue with this mission and did not desist from promoting the idea of volunteering for the British army. He was convinced that it was tremendously important not just for the war against Nazism and for the sake of rescuing European Jews, but also for strengthening the military capability of the Yishuv. It should be pointed out here that for Shertok the Jewish revival in Palestine had to be based ‘on justice, interest and force’. Unlike the activists, already at that stage, he argued that force should be limited to defensive purposes. In this context, at that juncture he formulated a rather modem conception of deterrence: ‘There is no need for outbursts, or demonstrations of our force. It is sufficient that the other side knows that we have accumulated such a force.’ On the political level, his conclusion was, ‘We must neither push too hard, nor further widen the gap with the British, and, finally, we should not lose sight of the connection between the various struggles that we are involved in.’17 As the Allies began pushing the Wehrmacht out of North Africa and making gains in Italy, during the latter part of 1943 American and

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British politicians resumed their secret deliberations regarding the future of the Middle East and of Palestine. These discussions resulted in the revival of the partition idea. Despite the veil of secrecy that enveloped these deliberations, Shertok and his colleagues sensed that something was brewing behind the scenes in London, and that the emphasis was shifting from military to political issues. Shertok could discern this shift in emphasis during his periodic visits to Cairo, where, among other things, he was exposed to increasing requests and pressures by British politicians and officials to promote renewed contacts between Jews and Arabs. Since there was an a priori agreement between Ben-Gurion and Shertok about the desirability of such contacts, Shertok felt no com­ punction in pursuing this avenue. Thus, he again met Nuri al-Said of Iraq, among other Arab leaders, to discuss options for solving the Arab-Jewish conflict. To his great satisfaction, during his talks with the new resident minister in Cairo, Lord Moyne, Shertok gathered that the British had discarded the idea o f a Middle Eastern federation and were again reviewing partition. Indeed, later it turned out that in July 1943 the prime minister, Churchill, appointed a powerful cabinet subcommittee, chaired by Herbert Morrison, to re-examine this option. Greatly pleased that the British had finally rejected federation in favour of partition, the solution he preferred, Shertok was nevertheless apprehensive ‘that the impression that the 1939 White Paper is already dead, and that the British are talking again about partition, will spread throughout Pales­ tine. Since this news may create enthusiasm about partition on the one hand, and opposition to it on the other, it should not be amplified.’18 Along with their renewed interest in partition, partly in response to continuous Zionist pleas and partly due to cynical calculations that because of the Holocaust the numbers of potential Jewish immigrants to Palestine would be small, in mid-1943 the British somewhat relaxed their restrictive immigration policy regarding Jewish refugees who had escaped through Turkey either to Palestine or other parts of the Middle East.19 And since neutral Turkey had become the most promising route for Jews escaping from the European hell, Shertok decided to visit Istanbul in August 1943. His immediate goal was to help;in the efforts to rescue a thousand Bulgarian Jews; his wider purpose was to help to reorganize the rescue operations on behalf of the Yishuv. To Shertok’s great surprise and annoyance, he and his colleagues encountered enormous obstacles in facilitating the attempt to rescue the Bulgarian Jews, because of the lack of organization of the Bulgarian Jewish community itself, as well as the unexpected reluctance of the

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Bulgarian government to let them go. Only after great additional efforts did some of these Jews eventually escape from Europe and go to Palestine. At the same time, Shertok was encouraged to discover that, although the situation of the Romanian and Hungarian Jews was deteriorating quickly, the Antonescu and Horthy regimes were still willing to permit some of ‘their’ Jews to leave. The main obstacle in these two cases was a shortage of ships to carry the immigrants to Palestine and the dangerous voyage in the Black Sea. Since Turkey served as ‘a window, or rather peeping hole, to Eu­ rope’,20 one through which the Zionist and Yishuv could maintain meagre channels of communication with Jews under the Nazi yoke, Shertok reactivated some of the contacts that he and Weizmann had developed during their visit to Turkey of 1938. These yielded some positive results such as an implicit permit to the Yishuv to base more of its rescue activities in that country and thus to enlarge the Palestinian delegations operating there. He also took the opportunity to dispatch a famous and touching letter to all those Jews who still survived in Central and Eastern Europe. In this emotional communication, Shertok admitted that the Yishuv had not done much, and had even missed many opportunities to rescue Jews. But, he added, ‘for the first time in modem history, when disturbances occur there is a home for Jewish refugees that is ready to embrace them. One [the British government] should only open the gates and let you in.’21 Although he could not report any spectacular achievements in regard to rescuing Jews, as a result of that short visit, his renewed contacts with Turkish politicians and the local Jewish community contributed some­ what to a successful attempt to improve the lot of Slovak Jews, to develop further channels for sending food packages to the inmates of Theresienstadt, and of a few other concentration camps in Transnistria and Hungary, and finally, in streamlining and co-ordinating the acti­ vities of the vast number of Jewish and Yishuv rescue organizations then operating from Turkey. Back in Palestine, Shertok made several recom­ mendations aimed at expanding the rescue operations through Turkey, but few of these were adopted and implemented, mainly because of the lack of financial means and continued petty rivalries among the members of the Executive and other Yishuv organizations on the one hand and their representatives in Turkey on the other. Similarly, old rivalries persisted and were even exacerbated among the leaders of the élite. Thus the personal struggle between Ben-Gurion and Weizmann, involving of course Shertok, erupted again against the

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backdrop of the discussions in the British cabinet about the favourable recommendations of the Morrison subcommittee concerning partition. During a private meeting, Churchill disclosed these facts to Weizmann, who communicated them to Jerusalem. This time, Ben-Gurion’s pretext for resuming the skirmishes with his older colleague were Weizmann’s disregard for the Jerusalem Executive and new rumours that he was ready to make concessions on clauses in the Biltmore Program. Despite his elaborate attempts to reduce the tension and contain the situation, Shertok was unable to achieve a compromise. Moreover, when Weiz­ mann turned down Shertok’s plea on behalf of the Executive that he visit Palestine to discuss policy, saying that T don’t want to come to Palestine empty-handed and would not sit to the same table with Ben-Gurion’, Ben-Gurion yet again threatened to resign from the Executive if Weiz­ mann was not ousted as WZO president. Publicly, Shertok maintained a balanced position between the two, saying that the resignation of either Ben-Gurion or Weizmann would cause grave damage to the Zionist movement and to the Yishuv. Nevertheless, although Shertok publicly recommended that the Executive refuse to accept Ben-Gurion’s resigna­ tion, he could not see any real reason for the Ben-Gurion-Weizmann feud except for Ben-Gurion’s ire at the power Chaim Weizmann had accumulated. He ‘failed to see which is the greater evil, Weizmann’s or Ben-Gurion’s resignation’. He therefore asserted that ‘either of these will cause equal damage’, and added that ‘a tragic situation has been created, whereby two dominant figures in Zionism have destroyed their personal relations’.22 Behind closed doors his comments regarding this latest threat were less restrained and flattering. It goes without saying that Shertok’s public even-handedness with regard to this latest clash did not improve his relations with Ben-Gurion. Nor did Weizmann’s concilia­ tory dispatches to Jerusalem, in which he said that he was not conduct­ ing negotiations with the British about a withdrawal from the Biltmore Plan and that he was only gathering information about their future moves, alleviate the criticisms that were directed at him. It was in this context that Weizmann repeated that he was surprised to hear about Ben-Gurion’s resignation at that crucial historical juncture and suggested that he should change his mind about it. Bjpn-Gurion did not heed these pleas, but on the other hand could not gather enough support to oust Weizmann. Indeed, most of Ben-Gurion’s colleagues in the small Yishuv political élite, including Eliahu Golomb (who com­ mented that ‘Ben-Gurion has been stricken by a blindness that is inflicting a calamity on all of us’), David Remez, Zalman Rubashov, and Yosef Sprinzak of Mapai, also harshly criticized Ben-Gurion. Even Berl

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Katznelson, not a great admirer of Weizmann’s politics and style of leadership, went so far as to say that in this fight Ben-Gurion had lost his political wits, and that ‘somebody should teach Ben-Gurion a few lessons in logic’. With no handy ‘compromise’ on the horizon, not for the first time the practical burden of solving the crisis was relegated to Berl and Shertok.23 Despite the gloom then engulfing the political élite of the Yishuv because of on the one hand the continuous infighting within the movement, which was hindering positive plans to help Europe’s Jews, and, on the other, because of information that the Nazis were accelera­ ting the pace at which they were exterminating the Jews, 1943 ended with a glimmer of hope. During Churchill’s trip to Cairo in December 1943, which Shertok visited simultaneously, the Prime Minister made his famous and startling confession: ‘I have always been a Zionist!’24 Then to Shertok’s great satisfaction, Churchill repeated the pro-Zionist state­ ment he had made during his private meeting with Weizmann in October 1943 to the effect that the British government and he himself had not deserted the Jews and the Yishuv, and that he intended to work hard for a solution in Palestine, presumably through partition. Shertok not only sensed that Churchill’s statement would pave the way for closer co­ operation with the British, but he also took it to mean that Weizmann had not lost his golden political touch and was still an indispensable asset to the Zionist movement. Later he did his utmost to impart this notion to his colleagues in Palestine in an effort to thwart any attempt to cause his resignation. While in Cairo Shertok was successful this time in his contacts with Soviet diplomats at the embassy there. Although Ambassador Novikov himself did not meet him and relegated this task to his officials, Shertok was satisfied to find that Sultanov, then the head of the embassy’s Middle Eastern section, showed deep interest in the Yishuv’s develop­ ment and vagaries. Sultanov concluded their long conversation by suggesting further talks with Shertok. No doubt, in this and some further meetings with Soviet diplomats in Cairo, Shertok opened a new political channel to Moscow, in addition to what he had created in his meetings with Maisky in London. Afterwards, he made a point of meeting Soviet representatives whenever he visited Cairo.25 After returning from Cairo to Jerusalem, Shertok, Berl Katznelson, and two other members of the Executive—Ben-Gurion’s activist friend Rabbi Fishman and the moderate Shmorak—intensified their endeav­ ours to discover new ways of solving the crisis between Ben-Gurion and Weizmann as well as the resultant rift between Ben-Gurion and the

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Agency Executive, caused by his resignation. It was in this context that Shertok was asked to travel to meet Weizmann in London, since, as another member of the Executive, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, commented: ‘he [Shertok] is respected by all sides9. Moreover, Ben-Gurion himself, who had begun to temper his position and seek a way to withdraw his resignation, announced, ‘if Shertok thinks that he can mend the fences, let him try9. Shertok was willing to undertake mediation only on condition that the two rivals, and especially Weizmann, were ,ready to accept the principles of collective responsibility of all coalition members. As a result of further intensive informal efforts at mediation, Weizmann and Ben-Gurion indicated that they were ready to accept this condition.26 Before finally mending the fences in the Zionist élite, Shertok was involved in the attempt to prevent a split in Mapai. Being a loyal and caring member o f the party, which he regraded as ‘home9, he was genuinely concerned about the growing gap between Faction B, led by the activist Tabenkin, and the party’s mainstream. To prevent the impending split, in his many public appearances towards the end of 1943, he preached the gospel of party unity. Realist as he was, he did not regard a split as inevitable, and therefore urged all factions to restore unity and harmony in the party. Yet his and other leaders9 pleadings could not prevent the split. In February 1944 Shertok, Fishman, and Shmorak began the difficult and dangerous journey from Palestine to London. In London, after only brief discussions with Weizmann, the small delegation succeeded in attaining the latter’s assurance that he would respect all rules of the game demanded by Ben-Gurion. Moreover, although Weizmann bitterly complained about Ben-Gurion’s inconsiderate behaviour, rudeness, lack of sensitivity towards his colleagues, extreme aloofness, and inaccurate reporting, after additional prolonged and circuitous discussions on the official aspects of the crisis as well as on the personal enmity between the two, Shertok and his associates were able to reach an agreement with the president of the Zionist movement regarding a new modus vivendi. According to this tentative understanding, Weizmann would strictly follow the rules of collective leadership by consulting his col­ leagues on the Agency Executive in Jerusalem before taking any political or diplomatic step. With this conciliatory move on the part of Weiz­ mann, towards the end of February 1944 this particular crisis was virtually over. As expected, Ben-Gurion accepted the agreement and formally withdrew his resignation.27 To Shertok it seemed that this stormy round in the struggle resulted in a draw. As far as he himself was concerned, although he had lost in

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the course of his efforts at mediation some intimacy and credibility with Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, his position in the Zionist movement and in Mapai was not adversely affected, but rather reinforced. Once the internal crisis seemed to be solved at least for the time being, and while still in London, Shertok embarked upon straightening out various political matters in Whitehall. Before approaching the British, however, he had to formulate with Weizmann the strategy to be used. He found out that by then this was not an easy task any more, since the two viewed both the current situation and future developments some­ what differently. Disappointed with the slow progress of their endeav­ ours to influence American policy with regard to European Jews as well as to the Yishuv, Weizmann asserted that they should revert to their traditional concentrated efforts in Britain. This meant meeting no one other than the prime minister, Churchill, himself, with the goal of eliciting from him a firm promise on the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a sovereign Jewish entity there, which after the war would enable them to absorb the remainder of European Jewry. Shertok, on the other hand, felt that, notwithstanding Churchill’s dominant position in the war cabinet, his keen interest in Zionism and the Yishuv, and his co-operation with Roosevelt, because of the numerous common interests involved in Palestine and in the ‘Jewish Question’, and since the British had no intention of changing their policy on partition at this juncture, he would be powerless when it came to promoting partition. Therefore, Shertok argued, for tactical reasons it would be safer to adhere to the Biltmore Program and continue to seek modifications in the White Paper policy. Unlike Weizmann’s conclusion that they should approach only Churchill, Shertok’s recommendation was that they should proceed on two fronts: in London and Washington.28 Despite their discordant views regarding the future, Weizmann and Shertok effectively co-operated in a further attempt to modify White­ hall’s immediate policies towards a number of troublesome issues. Thus, the two did wrest an agreement from Whitehall on allowing Jewish refugees that had escaped through Turkey into Palestine. To their disappointment, it would turn out that even this meagre achievement was a mixed blessing, since the British planned to deduct the number of permits granted to these displaced Jews from the quotas allocated for Jewish refugees from Middle Eastern countries, whose immigration the entire Executive had been interested in promoting. In view of his dedicated political endeavours in London, most mem­ bers of the Jerusalem and London Executive, including Ben-Gurion, implored Shertok to remain there, to continue his work side by side with

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Weizmann and to ensure that personal and organizational relations between Jerusalem and London ran smoothly. Shertok refused. He felt that he was needed more in Jerusalem and wanted to be with his wife and three children during that gloomy period. The Agency Executive in Jerusalem had no other choice but to approve his request. On his way back to Palestine, he did, however, visit the Palestinian Jewish soldiers then fighting side by side with the British in Italy. He was greatly gratified to hear what the British and American commanders had to say about the bravery, dedication, solidarity, and self-discipline of these Jewish soldiers. Shertok regarded this warm appreciation and the compliments as a well-deserved tribute not only to the soldiers but to the Yishuv, and also to himself, as he had almost single-handedly fought for their recruitment.29 By the beginning of 1944 it was evident that the Allies would win the war. And by then it was equally apparent that millions of Jews had been exterminated by the Nazis. The growing realization of the dimensions of this national catastrophe prompted the exasperated Yishuv leaders both to step up their actions on behalf of the European Jews, and to prepare for the post-war period. With this in mind, the Yishuv leaders began seeking new avenues for the rescue of Jews from the death camps, for smuggling the survivors out of Europe, and for facilitating their legal and illegal immigration into Palestine. These attempts involved indirect contacts with Nazi officers, who were offering diabolical plans for allowing Jews to escape the raging fires of the crematoria. Although the Agency’s Political Department was not directly responsible for the activities in this sphere, Shertok became a senior partner in planning the political and diplomatic aspects of some of the more serious operations in this sphere. Thus he and his department were deeply involved in an attempt to rescue 29,000 children, as well as adult Jews, of Transnistria. Shertok and his staff were also involved in initiating and designing the ‘Plan of Europe’.30 Because of his role in shaping the policy of the Yishuv towards European Jewry during the war, and in its execution, Shertok also became implicated in what was the most famous, or rather infamous, of these proposed deals—the Nazis’ offer to ‘sell’ a large number of Jews, that is, in what became known as the ‘goods for blooâ’ deal. This preposterous plan was revealed in May 1944, when one of the Agency’s representatives in Istanbul, Venia Pomerantz-Hadari, informed BenGurion and Shertok of the proposals hammered out during prolonged negotiations between the Hungarian Jewish Rescue Committee members Joel Brand and Rudolph Kastner on the one hand, and Gestapo officers,

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first and foremost among them Adolph Eichmann, on the other, for the release, or ‘exchange’, of 800,000 Hungarian Jews in return for 10,000 trucks and large quantities of foodstuffs, in addition to ransom money. Despite the Satanic nature of the plan, Shertok and his staff deemed it worthy of further exploration, and signalled to Pomerantz that there was interest in the ‘project’.31 While the Germans were stepping up the deportation and extermina­ tion of Hungarian Jews, Shertok was summoned to Turkey to meet Joel Brand, who arrived there, accompanied by a German-British double agent, Shendor Gross. However, since the British had interned Brand in Aleppo, Syria, after he had tried to reach Palestine, once British Intelligence realized why Brand was flown in a German plane to Turkey, the meeting was held in Aleppo. During this meeting, Shertok interro­ gated Brand at great length, and only then became convinced that he carried a serious message and offer.32 On the basis of his positive report after that meeting with Brand the Jewish Agency authorized the experi­ enced and cautious Shertok to pursue the plan further with British authorities in the Middle East and Britain. From the beginning of this affair, the reaction of the British government was extremely ambiguous; on the one hand it rejected it as dubious and impractical, but on the other, it agreed that the Jews should explore its potential. This ambiguity persuaded Shertok and the Agency to pursue it further. In the mean­ time, Shertok was informed that the Americans had also learned about the affair, and that, like the British, they were interested in letting the Jews continue.33 To this end, Shertok travelled to London in June 1944, where he intended to deal primarily with this unusual Nazi proposal, but also with other matters pertaining to the Biltmore and partition plans, Jewish immigration to Palestine, and the establishment of a Jewish brigade in the British army.34 In London Weizmann joined Shertok in attempting to discuss with the British their proposals with regard to a deal with the Nazis. But it was to no avail. The foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, avoided meeting ‘these two Jews’ until July 1944, by which time the Allies’ authorities had all secretly decided to reject the idea. However, even when their meeting with Eden was held, he grossly misled them by repeatedly stating that the British were awaiting the results of discussions on the matter with the Americans and the Russians. Shertok, who was highly attuned to what lay behind the actual words of foreign politicians, immediately sensed that the British had already rejected the proposal.35 Weizmann and Shertok used their meeting with Eden to raise, among other issues, the Allied bombing of the concentration camps in Germany

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and elsewhere in the Nazi empire.36 Although Churchill, to whom Weizmann’s and Shertok’s two requests were referred, joined those who thought that the Eichmann deal should be rejected, he promised to give careful consideration to bombing the camps. But as is well known, this proposal was also eventually to be rejected by the Allies, on flimsy grounds.37 Totally upset by the foot-dragging and duplicity of the British and the Americans, Shertok and his colleagues took some heart when, at the beginning of July, the Nazi puppet in Hungary, Admiral Miklos Horthy, was reported to have issued orders to stop the deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz. But, since the Germans had invaded Hungary in March 1944, Horthy was no longer master of his own country and the Jews continued to pour into the ovens of Auschwitz. Weizmann’s and Shertok’s joint and separate reports to the Executive on the complete failure of their talks in London on the ‘goods for blood’ deal and on the bombing of the camps are among the most depressing and touching reflections of the agony and powerlessness that Jews, Zionists, and the Yishuv leaders felt in the face of the unfathomable horrors of the Holocaust on the one hand, and the Allies’ apathy and inaction on the other. Nevertheless, Shertok had shown great persistence in pursuing his goals regarding the Hungarian Jews. Foreign Office officials attested to the fact that Shertok staged an aggressive fight for extracting a positive decision upon which, so he had said, the lives of tens of thousands of people depended. On his part, Shertok would summarize his frustrating experience in London by commenting somewhat dryly that: It absorbed most of my time, my entire energy, as well as the energies of our friends in London, during almost two months. A hundred and twenty telegrams were sent about this affair, which was heartbreaking and frustrating. . . there were endless discussions even about some modest proposals, all of which drove us to the brink of despair.38

Shertok’s main achievement during this visit to London was, however, one of his most spectacular diplomatic accomplishments to date: after almost four years of recurrent delays, Whitehall finally approved the establishment of a special Palestinian Jewish brigade in the British army. This was the fulfilment of a dream that Shertok had refused to relinquish throughout the war. And it was achieved despite the tremendous scepticism of many of his friends and foes, including Ben-Gurion, and despite serious reservations about its desirability at that late stage of the war, when many deemed it essential that young Palestinian Jews should

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stay in Palestine, join the Haganah and prepare for all the eventualities that might occur after the war. When Ben-Gurion and other Palestinian leaders congratulated Shertok on this great accomplishment, he characteristically minimized his personal role in its attainment.39 Shertok attributed the favourable British decision to a number of factors: the removal of the threat that the Germans might occupy the Middle East, the urgent British need for additional troops to fight the Germans in Europe, the growing evidence of the full dimensions of the Holocaust, and British guilt over their previous apathy towards that genocide. Responding to Shertok’s at­ tempt to downgrade his success, this time Ben-Gurion, who was ob­ sessed with Jewish military power, said, ‘you [Shertok] may regard it as insignificant, I view it as a very big attainment’. Indeed, Ben-Gurion would always remember this as Shertok’s greatest achievement.40 Shertok’s satisfaction with the British cabinet’s decision to form the Palestinian Jewish brigade in August 1944 was somewhat diminished by the pre-condition attached to it: for every Palestinian soldier serving in the Jewish Brigade, a young Jew was to volunteer for a regular British unit. Thus, even after the favourable decision, Shertok spent additional time and energy negotiating with various British authorities the minutest details connected to the establishment of these units. However, when the Jewish Brigade finally became a reality, in August 1944, it was acknow­ ledged by Mapai’s leadership that ‘this was the achievement of one person—Moshe Shertok!’41 As the war was then nearing its end, Zionist leaders, and particularly Shertok, turned to the political aspects of the arrangements that would prevail after it was over. Hence, the last matter that he had attended to during his visit to London was drafting a major political document to be submitted to the British cabinet summarizing Zionist positions and expectations for the post-war period. While he stressed the Zionists’ wish to continue the Yishuv’s co-operation with Britain, he, in accordance with the Biltmore Program, boldly stated that the movement’s ultimate goal and demand was the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine linked to the British empire. He concluded the document by stating that this commonwealth should be predicated on the cre­ ation of a Jewish majority in Palestine that would encompass most of the territory of the Mandate. After some inconsequential redraft­ ing by other members of the Executive, Shertok’s document was sub­ mitted to the British cabinet on 20 August 1944, and would become a primary formulation of the Zionist position and desiderata after the war.42

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The entire Labour movement, Mapai, and Shertok, were shocked by the premature death of Berl Katznelson on 12 August 1944. The vacuum created by the death of the ‘Rabbi’, unquestionably one of Mapai’s greatest, most likeable, and intellectually most influential leaders ever, was one of the reasons why Shertok was requested to return from London to Palestine. For Mapai’s leaders, as well as for the party’s rank and file, it looked as if the old guard was disappearing, and that its established political élite was shrinking. The naked truth was, however, that although he sincerely grieved over Berl’s untimely death, Shertok also felt a certain sense of relief that he would no longer be subjected to the bitterness that Berl had harboured against him ever since he had left Davar more than a decade earlier, to join Arlosoroff in the Agency Political Department.43 Upon his hasty return to Palestine, Shertok advised his colleagues on the Agency Executive in Jerusalem that the British cabinet had sus­ pended its decision on partition until the end of the war, since discus­ sions on the subject had resulted in a deadlock between Churchill and the other pro-Zionists, who supported partition, and the pro-Arabs in the cabinet, who opposed the idea. This stalemate in the cabinet notwithstanding, the British government did replace the controversial High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMichael, with the honest but imposing General Lord Gort. While Weizmann, who regarded Mac­ Michael as ‘the Yishuv’s executioner’,44 was satisfied with this new appointment, Shertok feared that, as more of a soldier than an intellec­ tual or astute politician, Lord Gort would not be able to comprehend to the fullest extent the various ramifications of the Yishuv’s goals. No doubt Shertok’s model of an exemplary High Commissioner was still Sir Arthur Wauchope, with whom Arlosoroff and he himself had established special relations.45 The new circumstances called for a critical re-evaluation of the Yishuv’s future among the nations in view of its place and role in world Jewry. Being fully aware of the special circumstances, as soon as Shertok returned to Jerusalem he produced a sober and detailed assessment of the unfolding situation. In his detailed evaluation, he confessed that as a result of his realization of the full dimensions of the disaster that had befallen European Jews, he was compelled to reject the conventional Zionist notion that large numbers of Jews would remain in Europe after the war, and that those who did survive it would wish to emigrate to Palestine. Instead he had reached the bitter heretical conclusion that, in fact, very few Jews would survive the Nazi extermination, and that most of the surviving remnants would either adjust to post-war European

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conditions or opt to migrate to other destinations rather than to Palestine. In view of this pessimistic, but basically accurate prognosis, Shertok strongly suggested that the Zionists’ main emphasis should be on encouraging the immigration of Jews from other Diasporas, espe­ cially from English-speaking host countries. He then repeated his stem warning that the Yishuv leadership must refrain from their almost natural inclination to employ terrorist tactics against the British, since this might deter Anglo-Saxon Jews from making Aliyah. Such tactics, he warned, would also deter the powers from supporting the establishment of the much-coveted Jewish commonwealth.46 Interconnectedly, by then Shertok had begun to develop his theory that there was no escape from involvement of the great powers in any attempt to solve the Arab-Jewish conflict. In this vein he said, The focus of our political activities must be the Yishuv’s relations with the great powers, which more than any other factor, will determine the fate of the world after the war, [for] the Jewish nation constitutes a global problem, which is of great interest to the big powers. The Jewish Problem affects the entire civilized world and burdens it with a great responsibility.47

Then he turned to possible solutions of the ‘Jewish problem’. After refuting the federative solution for Palestine, Shertok insisted that despite the growing American presence and influence in the Middle East and Britain’s dwindling power there, the latter would remain the main power in the region immediately after the war. Therefore, the Zionist movement must not relinquish its activities in London. American sup­ port, he maintained, would depend on the Yishuv’s ability to maintain cordial relations with London, rather than on direct pressure on the American administration or on Congress. Shertok foresaw that after the war the Soviet Union would emerge as a major power, probably equal to the USA. On this assumption, it should be remembered, he had established contacts with the Soviets and continued to meet with Soviet representatives in London and Cairo during the war. These contacts, he asserted, should now be placed high on the Zionists’ political agenda, even though many ideological, political, and communication obstacles would have to be overcome before a better understanding could be achieved with this nascent superpower. Finally, Shertok preached that the Yishuv should base its moves on pragmatism in it&relations with all powers, especially with Great Britain, in order to win their support for an independent Jewish entity in Palestine in the face of Arab opposition. ‘In politics,’ he concluded,

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‘results based on accurate perceptions are more important than good intentions.9 This was, of course, a realistic position par excellence.** It is not easy to keep frustrated leaders of a national movement from resorting to terrorist activities to attain their goals. Nevertheless as expected, in this, Shertok did not join the activists who demanded the use of such means. In November 1944 his worst apprehensions about the adverse consequences of such tactics were realized when (on 6 Novem­ ber) the British minister-resident in Cairo, Lord Moyne, who was one of Churchill’s closest friends, was assassinated by LHI (the Stem Gang), the most militant anti-British dissident Jewish group in Palestine. As Shertok anticipated, the assassination of Churchill’s personal friend damaged relations between the now legendary British prime minister and the Zionist movement almost beyond repair. For many months after the assassination, Churchill would refuse to meet any Zionist leader. Re­ viewing the new situation, Shertok felt that ‘the assassination destroyed an entire political relationship’. He and Weizmann decried this auda­ cious act of thoughtless terrorism, and insisted that the continuation of such acts, whether by ‘organized Yishuv’, or by dissident groups, would preclude the renewal of friendly relations with Churchill and with the pro-Zionist members of his cabinet.49 The only redeeming fact was that this irresponsible act of terrorism did not seem to have disturbed the Yishuv’s relations with the new High Commissioner in Palestine, Lord Gort. As a precautionary measure, Shertok made certain that his department and the entire Agency Executive increased their efforts to co-operate with the High Commissioner. By openly advocating this stance, he thereby became leader of those who opposed all terrorist activities, and who advocated undeterred co-operation with the British. Moreover, Shertok would fully support the Haganah operation against the two dissenting paramilitary organizations, the Irgun and LHI, which would become known as the ‘[Hunt] Season’. During this operation, which lasted until March 1945, the Haganah captured members of the two organizations, interrogated them, and denounced them to the British authorities. Shertok’s next important task evolved later in November 1944, when Weizmann visited Palestine for the first time since the beginning of the war. This visit was one of the most momentous political events in the Yishuv towards the end of the war. Large cheering crowds welcomed the ageing leader, who was celebrating his seventieth birthday. While Ben-Gurion was of course far from elated about the visit, Shertok greeted it as an opportunity to reconcile Weizmann with other Yishuv leaders, and especially with Mapai’s leadership. It was therefore only

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natural that Shertok should be responsible for the semi-official reception extended to Weizmann jointly by the British government and the Jewish national organizations of the Yishuv. As Shertok accompanied Weiz­ mann throughout his visit, the two had ample opportunities to discuss pending political questions and to revive their old friendship marred by the various clashes during the previous two years. It was evident to all who saw them together that Weizmann and Shertok were tied by a powerful bond based on ideological affinity, political convenience, and personal fondness. On a number of occasions, both privately and publicly, Shertok acknowledged his political indebted­ ness to Weizmann, maintaining that he viewed his own task as ‘merely adjusting the well-formulated and tested political maxims generated by the Weizmann school to present circumstances’. Among Weizmann’s ideas that he had adopted were the need to follow a gradual but safer road in the implementation of Zionist goals; the imperative liberal principle that means must match ends; and the staunch belief in the benefits to be gained from close co-operation with the powers, especially Britain. Also like Weizmann, Shertok stressed that the attainment of these goals hinged on gradually increasing the number of Jews living in Palestine and maximizing the amount of land they would control. These moderate but realistic views were opposed by activist members of Mapai as well by activists in other parties.50 By the beginning of 1945, with the actual victorious end of the war in sight and in view of the relative prosperity the Yishuv enjoyed then, most Yishuv leaders agreed that the time was ripe for reactivating the open campaign for the establishment of a politically autonomous Jewish entity in Palestine. They sensed that this was urgent because of two major factors: Europe had been almost completely freed from the Nazi yoke, and, five years after its purported temporary implementation, the 1939 White Paper was about to expire. These leaders were so unyielding in regard to their goal that the debate within the Zionist camp focused not on the nature of the future Jewish entity, but on the timing and tactics to be used in implementing it. It was in this context that Shertok admitted for the first time, in an article in Davar, that after the publication of the notorious 1939 White Paper, the Agency Executive had not decisively fought it because the demand for immigration certificates on the part of European Jews, and therefore also for land and settlements, had not warranted a fierce battle on the eve of the war. Implicitly applying the same logic to the situation that the Yishuv was facing after the war, in fact, Shertok was suggesting that there was no reason why the Biltmore Program or, better still, partition,

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could not be implemented in a gradual manner and as a result of agreement with Britain. While this argument was welcomed by the moderates, it was of course anathema to the activist camp.51 When he repeated this startling statement at a meeting of the Executive, he pointedly positioned himself between Ben-Gurion and Weizmann. Sub­ sequently, he, as well as some of his moderate colleagues in Mapai, such as Eliezer Kaplan, Yosef Sprinzak, and David Remez, continued to serve as the mediators and balancers between the two older leaders.52 By the end of 1944, these moderates constituted a not insignificant group in both the Agency and Vaad Leumi. Thus for example, they controlled the planning subcommittee of the Agency Executive. More­ over, after the split of the activist Faction B from Mapai, the moderates increased their standing in the party too. Therefore, when Ben-Gurion excoriated the moderate line and Weizmann’s policies in the Executive, the moderate, gradualist camp prevailed in the ensuing bitter debate. This was a significant development, since from that point onward, the moderates largely determined the direction and scope of both the political and the military activities of the Yishuv. The deliberations on tactics to be utilized in presenting the case for the autonomous Jewish entity proved to be quite timely. For, at the very same time, the future of the Middle East, although not specifically of Palestine, was being discussed at Yalta, as well as during President Roosevelt’s famous meeting with Ibn Saud on the decks of an American warship in the Red Sea. After this meeting, in which Ibn Saud stated that under no circumstances would he agree to Palestine becoming the main refuge for Holocaust survivors, the celebrated American president com­ mented that he had learned more about the Middle East and Palestine during his short encounter with the Saudi monarch than he could have learned from endless letters and talks on these subjects with Jewish leaders. Indeed, notwithstanding his previous promises to American Jewish leaders, Roosevelt henceforth showed great reluctance to commit himself to the idea of an autonomous Jewish entity in Palestine. Most Jewish leaders, and Shertok among them, vowed to do their utmost to alter this American stance.53 Concurrently, the ‘magic number’ of ‘one hundred thousand’ dis­ placed European Jews surfaced. There is strong evidence that this number, which would later be adopted particularly by American politi­ cians and officials, originated with the Jewish Agency. To help deal with the painful issue of the displaced Jews (known as the DPs—Displaced Persons), as well as with preparations for presenting the Zionist and Yishuv position at the San Francisco Conference, at which the United

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Nations would be bora, the Agency Executive considered dispatching Shertok to the USA in April 1945, where he would also launch a massive fund-raising campaign. But, since Ben-Gurion was then in London, Shertok felt that he could not leave Jerusalem, where he was acting chairman of the Executive. He therefore suggested that both the activist Ben-Gurion and the moderate Eliezer Kaplan should go to the USA in his place.54 The fact that he refused to travel to the USA himself did not prevent Shertok from guiding Nahum Goldmann, then the Executive’s representative in Washington, in presenting the Jewish Agency’s position in San Francisco. The memorandum that Goldmann would submit to the conference specified the Zionist desiderata in general, as well as the Yishuv’s expectation that ‘Jewish rule’ would be established in Palestine after a transitory period, during which the British would gradually hand over authority to the Jews. Among the operative desiderata drawn up by Shertok were the abolition of the White Paper; free Jewish immigration into Palestine; granting the Jewish Agency the sole right to represent the Yishuv politically during the transitory period; and accrediting a Jewish delega­ tion to the United Nations once the Jewish commonwealth was estab­ lished. Goldmann, who was still pursuing an activist line, was not too happy with the moderate instructions issued by Shertok, but he had no other choice but to follow them. At the time, the Weizmann-Shertok line was the right one, since it would be adopted by a number of delegations to San Francisco, including those of the USA and France. Following these guide-lines, and notwithstanding the staunch opposition of five Arab delegations present there, the Zionist delegation succeeded in quashing a draft resolution to replace Britain with any other power as the mandatory power in Palestine, and in extracting another one recognizing the rights of Jews in that territory.55 In the mean time, Shertok enjoyed some hours of satisfaction during a trip that he made in April 1945 to Italy and Greece. In Italy, he visited the Jewish Brigade and told its enthusiastic officers and soldiers that, Our national flag is hoisted here as a symbol of our revenge on the [Nazi] enemy, as a symbol of the revived honour of our massacred brothers, who could not stage a war against their executioners. We hoist it as a sign of our redemption, as a symbol of the Yishuv on whose behalf, and in whose name, you have volunteered and fight in this war.

These few sentences were part of the emotional ‘flag speech’, that Shertok delivered during a stirring ceremony held partly in his honour

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by the commanders of Jewish Brigade. On the same occasion, Shertok was greatly moved to hear the various tributes paid to the Jewish soldiers and officers of the brigade by their tough British and American comman­ ders, General Mark Clark and Field Marshal Alexander.56 During this trip to Italy, he was given a personal audience with Pope Pius XII. During this audience, the Pope indicated that the Vatican’s views and leanings with regard to Palestine were already well known: Palestine had not been vacant before the Jews arrived in large numbers, the Arabs constituted the majority there, and therefore they were entitled to rule the country. The Pope also mentioned that Christianity had traditional interests in Palestine in general and in Jerusalem in particular, and that the Vatican would guard them. The Pope was not showing any sign that the church intended to alter this position. And indeed, it would serve as the basis for the Vatican’s policy towards Palestine during the next decade. What saddened Shertok most on this trip was the appalling condition of the previously proud and prosperous Italian and Greek Jewish communities that had miraculously survived the war. He was particular­ ly appalled to see that one of his worst predictions regarding the surviving remnants seemed to be coming true: these Jews were endeav­ ouring to revive Jewish life and assimilate into their host societies.57 And the worst political blow that Shertok suffered during the trip was delivered, during a stop in Cairo, by Sir Edward Grigg, the British minister-resident in Egypt, who made it very clear that the British had no intention of modifying their policy concerning displaced European Jews, or for that matter, the 1939 White Paper. After his utterly depressing encounter with the remnants of the Holocaust in Italy and Greece, this British attitude alerted Shertok to the tremendous problems facing the Yishuv leaders in their attempts to facilitate the ingathering of those remnants who would be willing to migrate to Palestine. For Shertok and his fellow Jewish leaders in Palestine, four events marked the end of one era and the beginning of a new one: the San Francisco Conference, which signalled a hope that a new world order was in the offing; the death of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, which signalled the end of American war policies; the ^elevation of Vice-President Harry Truman to the White House, which marked a new, albeit uncertain, period in the Yishuv relations with this emerging superpower; and, of course, VE-Day, on 8 May 1945. When the news that the war in Europe was officially over reached Palestine, thousands of Jews took to the streets of towns and villages throughout the country in celebration. And as was their habit on such

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solemn occasions, many Jerusalemites thronged together in the crowded courtyard of the Jewish Agency building, the political heart of the entire Yishuv, to express a mixture of joy about the long-awaited victory, and deep sorrow about the fate of their brethren who had perished in Europe. Now that the war was over, many in that crowd discarded the solemn restraint that had characterized their previous behaviour, and waved banners blatantly calling for free immigration to Palestine, the annulment of the hated White Paper, and the right to maintain openly defence forces for self-protection. Henceforth, similar slogans would reappear in every demonstration against the British and their restrictive policies towards the Yishuv. Since the chairman of the Agency Executive, Ben-Gurion, was still out of the country, on 9 May 1945 it was Shertok who delivered the main address to the assembled crowd from the balcony of the Agency building. As acting chairman of the Executive, Shertok expressed the mood of many gathered there, when he spoke of his mixed sentiments at the war’s end. Characteristically, he concluded his speech by declaring his confi­ dence that the powers would do justice to the Jewish nation’s burning wish for revival in its historic homeland when they made their decisions on the future of the Middle East.58 These words would become worn-out clichés by the time the State of Israel was established three years later. Yet, somehow, they seemed completely authentic and genuine on that highly emotional occasion. For they accurately reflected the deeper feelings of most of those gathered in the Jewish Agency courtyard on the day on which a tragic chapter in the history of the Jews was sealed.

NOTES 1. The previous and following pages are based mainly on Shertok’s report to Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 27 Apr. 1943, CZA. 2. Shertok’s report to the Agency Executive, ibid.; the protocol of the talks with Wallace Murray, 3 Mar. 1943, CZA, A245/N/207; Y. Porath, In Search o f Arab Unity (Heb.) (Jerusalem: Yad-Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1985), 112-13. 3. See e.g. Sharett’s ‘Palestine in the War*, Doar H ayom , 17 Mar. 1943, and ‘The Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine’, Jewish Frontier , Apr. 1943. 4. See discussion in Agency Executive in Jerusalem on Shertok’s possible participa­ tion in the Bermuda Conference, 4 Apr. 1943, CZA; on the failure of the Bermuda Conference, see Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews o f Europe , 159-84; D. Porath, A n Entangled Leadership , 269-77; Y. Weitz, Aware but Helpless, M apai and the Holocaust, 1943-1945 (Heb.) (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1994), 62-5.

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5. On this conference see, M. Kaufman, American Non-Zionists in the Struggle over the Jewish State, 1939-1948 (Heb.) (Jerusalem: The Zionist Library, 1984), 84-92. 6. Shertok to Weizmann, 29 Mar. 1943, Weizmann to Shertok, 30 Mar. 1943, 31 Mar. 1943, CZA, 25/1404; Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 27 Apr. 1943, CZA. 7. Agency Executive, 2 May 1943, CZA. 8. Sharett, Personal Diary , 182-3, 184. 9. Mapai Political Committee, 3 May 1943, Mapai Archive, 26/43; Shertok to Goldmann, 13 May 1943, Goldmann to Shertok, 21 May 1943, CZA, 25/1217. 10. Mapai Political Committee, 3 May 1943, Mapai Archive, 26/43. 11. Ibid. 12. Mapai Political Committee, 16 June 1943, Mapai Archive, 26/43; Agency Executive, 20 June 1943, CZA. 13. For background see Y. Gelber, Jewish Palestinian Volunteering in the British A rm y during the Second World War , ii, The Struggle fo r a Jewish A rm y , 42-6, 68-71; Shertok to Secretary of the Palestine government, 29 Apr. 1943, CZA, S25/5091; Agency Executive, 2 May 1943,9 May 1944, CZA; Mapai Secretariat, 5 May 1943, Mapai Archive, 24/43. 14. Gelber, Struggle fo r a Jewish A rm y , 71-5. 15. Mapai Political Committee, 13 June 1943, Mapai Archive, 26/43; Agency Executive, 13 June 1943, 20 June 1943, CZA; McConnel to Shertok, 17 June 1943, CZA, 24/15169; Gelber, Struggle fo r a Jewish A rm y, 78-80. 16. Agency Executive, 20 June 1943, CZA; Zionist Smaller Actions Committee, 24 June 1943, CZA, S25/298. 17. Shertok’s lecture to officers of the Haganah and the Palmah, 22 July 1943, CZA, A/245/103. 18. Agency Executive, 25 July 1943, 8 Aug. 1943, 22 Aug. 1943, CZA; Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 24 Aug. 1943, Mapai Archive, 23/43; Shertok to Berl Katznelson, 13 Sept. 1943, CZA, 25/1217; Y. Porath, In Search o f Arab Unity , 118-19, 140-5; Dothan, Struggle fo r Palestine , 246-52, 257-8. 19. Shertok in Agency Executive, 18 July 1943, CZA; High Commissioner to Shertok, 26 July 1943, CZA, S25/2515. 20. Shertok letter to ‘Our Dear Brothers in Europe!’, 10 Aug. 1943, CZA, A245/125/7; and see D. Porath, An Entangled Leadership , 217-63. 21. Shertok, letter to ‘Our Dear Brothers in Europe!’. 22. Agency Executive, 17 Oct. 1943, 26 Oct. 1943, 31 Oct. 1943, CZA; the quotes are from Shertok’s speech in Political Committee of Mapai, 3 Nov. 1943, Mapai Archive, 26/43; see Ben-Gurion to Central Comittee, 8 Jan. 1943, Mapai Archive, 3/41; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: A Political Biography (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), 473-4. * 23. The quotes are from Agency Executive, 7 Nov. 1943, and see also, 9 Nov. 1943, 14 Nov. 1943, CZA; Mapai Central Committee, 8 Dec. 1943, Mapai Archive, 23/43. 24. Shertok’s report to Agency Executive, 28 Dec. 1943, CZA; Zionist Smaller Actions Committee, 28 Dec. 1943, CZA, S25/1820; Mapai Political Committee, 29 Dec. 1943, Mapai Archive 26/43.

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25. Agency Executive, 22 Nov. 1949, 28 Nov. 1943, CZA; Zionist Smaller Actions Committee, 30 Nov. 1943, CZA, S85/1818; Mapai Central Committee, 8 Dec. 1943, Mapai Archive, 23/43; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 477. 26. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 477-8. 27. The protocols of the meetings with Weizmann in London, 14 Feb. 1944,15 Feb. 1944, 17 Feb. 1943, 22 Feb. 1944, CZA, 24/302/28; Agency Executive, 20 Feb. 1943, 27 Feb. 1943, CZA; Shertok’s report to Agency Executive after his return from London, 7 May 1944, CZA; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 477-8. 28. See Agency Executive in London, 16 Feb. 1944, 17 Feb. 1944, 18 Feb. 1944, 21 Feb. 1944, 23 Feb. 1944, 7 Mar. 1944, 13 Mar. 1944, CZA, Z302/28; Agency Executive, 12 Mar. 1944, CZA; Shertok’s report to Agency Executive in Jerusalem after his return from London, 7 May 1944, CZA; Shertok’s report in Smaller Actions Committee, 11 May 1944, CZA, S25/154; Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 8 May 1944, Mapai Archive, 23/44. 29. Agency Executive, 19 Mar. 1944,9 Apr. 1944, CZA; Shertok’s report on his visit to Italy, 14 May 1944, CZA, S25/1544; interview with Shertok, Palestine Post, 7 May 1944; Shertok’s report in Mapai Central Committee, 8 May 1944, Mapai Archive, 23/44. 30. D. Porath, A n Entangled Leadership, 309-91. 31. On the initial stages of this affair, see Shertok’s ‘Dorchester Report*, submitted to Agency Executive in London, 27 June 1944, CZA, Z4/14870; D. Porath, A n Entangled Leadership, 391-7; Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews o f Europe, 204-14. 32. Agency Executive, 25 May 1944, CZA; Hall to Weizmann, 5 June 1944, Weizmanp to Eden, 6 June 1944, CZA, Z4/15202. 33. D. Porath, A n Entangled Leadership, 359-60; Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews o f Europe, 206-8; Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 4 June 1944, 14 June 1944, CZA; Shertok to Linton, 15 June 1944, CZA, Z4/10389; Weizmann to Hall, 23 June 1944, Hall to Weizmann, 23 June 1944, CZA, Z4/15282. 34. Agency Executive, 24 June 1944, CZA; cf. D. Porath, An Entangled Leadership, 368. 35. Weizmann’s and Shertok’s report on the meeting with Eden, 6 July 1944, CZA, Z4/15202. 36. Weizmann’s and Shertok’s memo to Eden, the report on their meeting with Eden, and Shertok to Ben-Gurion, all of 6 July 1944, CZA, Z4/15202; see Agency Executive, 9 July 1944, CZA; and see the memo about bombing the concentration camps, 11 July 1944, CZA, Z4/15202. 37. D. Porath, A n Entangled Leadership, 392-403. 38. See Shertok in Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 20 Oct. 1944, CZA. 39. For Ben-Gurion’s support of the establishment of the Jewish Brigade at that late stage of the war, see Mapai Executive Committee, 22 Aug. 1944, Mapai Archive, 25/44; see Ben-Gurion’s analysis of the Brigade’s significance, Agency Executive, 22 Aug. 1944, CZA. 40. See Shertok’s report to Agency Executive, 22 Oct. 1944, CZA; Gelber, Struggle fo r a Jewish A rm y, ii. 392-429. 41. Mapai Executive Committee, 22 Aug. 1944, Mapai Archive, 25/44; the twentysixth session of Mapai Council, 31 Oct. 1944-2 Nov. 1944, Mapai Archive, 22/26; Palestine Post, 2 Sept. 1944, 29 Oct. 1944.

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42. The document is in Z4/14696, CZA. 43. Shertok on Berl in M. Snir (ed.), On Berl Katznelson (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1951), 217. 44. Shertok on this appointment in Agency Executive, 22 Oct. 1944, CZA. 45. Ibid. 46. Shertok’s speech in twenty-sixth session of Mapai Council, 1 Nov. 1944, Mapai Archive, 22/26; and on the need for immigration of Jews from Anglo-Saxon countries, Shertok in Agency Executive, 20 June 1944, CZA. 47. Shertok’s speech in twenty-sixth session of Mapai Council, 1 Nov. 1944, Mapai Archive, 22/26. 48. M. Shertok, ‘Main Factors in Zionist Politics’, Jewish Frontier, (Aug. 1944). 49. Agency Executive, 7 Nov. 1944, 19 Nov. 1944, 16 Dec. 1944, CZA; Mapai’s Political Committee, 8 Nov. 1944, Mapai Archive, 26/44; Shertok in a public meeting in Jerusalem, 12 Nov. 1944, Palestine Post ; Shertok in Zionist Smaller Actions Committee, 19 Nov. 1944, CZA, S25/1884. 50. Shertok’s speech, published in Davor , 6 Dec. 1944; and Shertok in Agency Executive, 10 Dec. 1944, CZA. 51. Mapai Political Committee, 15 Jan. 1945, CZA, S25/848. 52. Agency Executive, 31 Dec. 1944, CZA. 53. Shertok in Agency Executive, 12 Feb. 1945, CZA. 54. Agency Executive, 21 Jan. 1945, 25 Feb. 1945, CZA. 55. Shertok to Goldmann, 20 Mar. 1945, Goldmann to Shertok, 29 May 1945, CZA, 25/815; Shertok’s report in Zionist Smaller Actions Committee, CZA. 56. Palestine P ost , 6 Apr. 1945; and Shertok’s report to Agency Executive, 22 Apr. 1945, CZA. 57. Shertok’s report to Agency Executive, 22 Apr. 1945, CZA. 58. See report on the event, Palestine Post , 10 May 1945.

6 A State in the Making Official dates marking significant historical events, like the formal beginning or end of wars, do not necessarily mark meaningful political turning-points. Thus, Yishuv leaders regarded the formal end of the Second World War in Europe as a significant watershed only in so far as it signalled the end of a global cataclysm and of the Holocaust. Shertok himself did not see in the formal transition from war to peace a promise for an immediate political change in the Middle East or in Palestine. This was accentuated by the fact that like most of his colleagues in the Agency Executive, he went on coping with the same perennial matters that he had been dealing with before as well as during the war, such as defence, security, immigration, land purchase, and settlement. As in the past, in handling these issues after the war, he was striving to maintain a balance between the needs of the Yishuv and the DPs, and the constraints on their attainment imposed by the British. But the brutal facts of the Holocaust and the ‘one hundred thousand’ DPs languishing in refugee camps in Austria and Germany prompted him and his colleagues to press harder for the establishment of a Jewish political entity in Palestine. Notwithstanding the activists’ call for the urgent establishment of a Jewish commonwealth, in his keynote speech at the ceremony marking the end of the war in the amphitheatre of the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus—from which the assembled throng could view the magical landscape of the empty Judean desert— again he was his usual sober self, and recapitulated his views on the desirability of pursuing better relations with the British and Arabs through moderate policies and restraint. And it was in his Mount Scopus address that he coined the motto ‘insistent demands but not denial’, by which he meant that, while Jewish demands must be emphatically presented in the post-war period, these should not be attained by denying the rights of Palestinian Arabs.1 Among the major sensitive issues brought to the surface by VE-Day was whether the Jewish Brigade should be redeployed in Germany, as the British army had planned, ör disbanded. The future of Shertok’s brainchild and massive efforts raised significant moral, political, and security issues. These were further complicated by Palestinian Jewish

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soldiers’ misgivings about serving in Germany and their desire to return home. Despite pressures coming from the Jewish soldiers and Haganah leaders, Shertok insisted that the Brigade should be stationed in Ger­ many, since only that option meant that it could be maintained intact. His rationale was that in addition to assisting in the rescue of the displaced persons from Germany and helping to dispatch them to Palestine, as it had done for Jews in Italy while the Brigade was fighting there, it could be instrumental in the legal and illegal purchase of weapons for the Haganah, and also provide a solid and well-trained basis for a Jewish military force in Palestine. The Executive approved this position; and in view of the great opposition that it aroused from Haganah commanders, and especially from his brothers-in-law, Golomb and Avigur, Shertok hastened to ‘create facts’ by negotiating for the British authorities the continuation of the Brigade’s deployment in Germany. But word of these negotiations caused such an outcry in the Yishuv that one bitter mother wrote to Shertok: ‘Yield, Mr Shertok, the Yishuv is not behind you!’2 Despite such passionate opposition and criticism, Shertok did not retreat. He answered his critics that he had not overlooked either the emotional difficulties involved in serving in Germany, or the need for bringing the Jewish soldiers back to Palestine in the event of an Arab uprising against the Jews. Arguing that the entire Jewish community in Palestine had supported the establishment of the Brigade because of its long-term potential to defend both the Yishuv and Diaspora Jews, he pleaded for patience and perseverance. According to him, the Brigade’s deployment in Germany would mean that the Yishuv was participating in world politics. And it would mean marching shoulder to shoulder with all the nations of the world in matters in which their interest coincides with ours.’3 Moreover, stationed in despised Germany, the Brigade would be carrying on the Jewish war against the Nazis through redeem­ ing the DPs as well as helping to capture fugitive Nazi officials and officers. He promised that the Brigade’s sojourn in Germany would be temporary, and that as soon as it had completed its various missions there, it would be transferred back to Palestine, where its presence would enhance the Yishuv’s security and enable it to continue the organization of a massive Jewish Palestinian defence force. It took an arduous struggle on the part of Shertok and his supporters, that is, all those who preached continued co-operation with the British, before his position on the Jewish Brigade was approved by the various political bodies of Mapai and the Yishuv. In May 1945 his position was also adopted by the Zionist Larger Actions Committee. Eventually,

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although the Brigade was not sent to Germany, the widespread realiz­ ation of the massive aid that the Brigade had extended to the DPs in Europe and the political and defence benefits that resulted from the decision to refrain from demanding the return of the Brigade to Palestine altered the views of many who had contested it. Moreover, many of those who initially criticized his idea to maintain the Brigade were later among those who implored Shertok to extend the Brigade’s service in Europe. They realized the immense advantages involved in it also for illegal immigration to Palestine.4 In any case, at the time the decision was taken, in order to ward off any additional criticisms, Shertok was careful simultaneously to enhance the Yishuv’s security by carrying on a fierce campaign with the British to increase the number of Jewish supernumer­ ary policemen in Palestine, who were stationed in Jewish towns and settlements. The struggle over the control of the Yishuv’s legal military and illegal paramilitary forces was conducted not only with the British, but also with such dissident Jewish clandestine organizations as the Irgun Zvai Leumi (Etzel) and the even more militant LHI (Stem Gang). During the last stages of the war and immediately after it, the ‘organized Yishuv’ was adamantly opposed to any breaches of the Agency’s strategy of Havlaga (restraint), especially by these dissident underground organiza­ tions. For this reason and in view of the grave political consequences of Lord Moyne’s assassination, the Haganah and Palmah launched the Hunt Season. While this controversial operation was initially ex­ ecuted by regular Haganah and Palmah units, after March 1945 such activities were conducted by the Shai—the Haganah’s intelligence ser­ vice. Towards the end of the Season, Yaacov Eliav, then one of the Irgun’s senior commanders, approached Haganah leaders, including the brothers-in-law, Eliahu Golomb and Shertok, with a new offer to resolve their perennial conflict by concentrating on practical issues rather than on ideological fundamentals. The Irgun explicitly asked Shertok to participate in these talks, since they had great confidence in his political wisdom, pragmatism, and utter honesty. Flattered by the request and eager to promote such an agreement, Shertok told Eliav that he hoped that the two sides ‘would lay sound foundations on which mutual understanding can be based, which will pave the way towards greatly needed co-operation, and will eventually lead to the operative merger [of the organizations]’.5 Eliahu Golomb, who had emotionally supported Shertok and was actively involved in the early stages of these talks with the dissidents, abruptly died before the completion of the new attempt at reconciliation.

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Although this was not the first time Shertok himself and the entire ‘clan’ had lost one of its prominent members, the untimely death of Golomb was a particularly severe psychological blow. Although there had been mounting disagreements between the two brothers-in-law regarding strategy and tactics—Golomb had been adopting more activist positions as Shertok continued on the path to greater and more explicit moder­ ation in foreign and defence matters—on the one hand, Golomb’s death not too long after that of Dov Hoz shattered Shertok emotionally, and on the other, it left him as the undisputed head of the ‘clan’. Being totally devoted to ensuring the well-being of his extended family, Shertok would perform this duty with great care. In his emotional eulogy at the Mapai Central Committee, Shertok spoke not only of Golomb’s unique qualities as a political and military leader, but also of their great affinity and friendship. To the rhetorical question why the talented Golomb had dedicated his life to developing the Yishuv’s self-defence forces rather than to theoretical and ideological issues, Shertok reminded his listeners that one of the earliest decisions of the Herzliya high school ‘students’ was ‘to dedicate [their] life to the service of the community . . . to disregard all personal m atters. . . to concentrate on the most difficult problems facing the Yishuv . . . without neglecting the wider issues pertaining to the great vision of national redemption’.6 These, of course, also characterized Shertok’s own inclina­ tions and concerns. To his immediate family Shertok confided that, on hearing of Go­ lomb’s death, he had been ‘affected by a very deep sense of black and horrible loneliness’, and that he could not ‘imagine my future spiritual life without Golomb’.7 His sense of irreplaceable personal loss was enhanced by a growing realization that the most talented and dedicated Yishuv leaders were passing away just when the difficulties facing it were rapidly multiplying. New post-war conditions, doubts and uncertainty about the future of the Brigade, and Golomb’s unexpected death called for a reorganization of the Haganah’s supreme command. Shertok was a member of the committee of three, including Golda Meyerson and Yosef Sprinzak, who were assigned the task of this reorganization, and of nominating those who would assume Golomb’s position in the Haganah and the other political positions that he had occupied. As the leader best versed in the Yishuv’s security and its clandestine self-defence forces, during the work of this committee Shertok assured Meyerson and Sprinzak that the Yishuv’s situation in this sphere was reasonable, but that it must not be complacent, since the Arabs could unleash torrents of violence at any

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moment. He therefore insisted that Mapai leaders shoidd make a great commitment to self-defence. But in line with his long-held belief that the link between politics and defence was inseparable, he also argued that ‘the major consideration regarding the party’s involvement in security matters must stem from a recognition of their decisive political signi­ ficance’.8 This was also the reason why Moshe Sneh of the General Zionists was appointed as new chief of the Haganah. On Golomb’s death, and in view of this reorganization, Shertok wrote to his elder son Yaacov, then serving in the Jewish Brigade, that ‘life and work have their own demands, and life must go on!’9 Following his own maxim, Shertok was deeply immersed in all major issues then facing the Yishuv in the spheres of defence and external relations. In the spring of 1945 the anxious Zionist leaders called for a gathering of movement leaders and activists from throughout the world to discuss their future plans. Some Zionist activists had thought that the end of the war and the Holocaust warranted a fully-fledged congress. But the Jewish Agency Executive was reluctant to convene a formal World Zionist Congress because of its uncertainty about the situation of various Jewish communities in the Diaspora, about the new Truman administration in the USA, and about the new British Labour govern­ ment’s reaction to demands for a Jewish national entity in Palestine. Hence, an informal Zionist conference was planned in London for the end of July 1945. Only after much hesitation and deliberation did Shertok decide to leave his pressing tasks in Jerusalem to travel to London. Eager to avoid any waste of his precious time, in addition to participation in the conference, he planned to deal there with other urgent political matters, such as immigration and the future of the Jewish Brigade.10 The Zionist Conference in London was held after the British Labour party’s astounding victory in the general elections and the establishment of Attlee’s cabinet. Unlike the unfounded enthusiasm among rank and file in Palestine in view of the Labour government’s establishment, the reactions of all moderate and most activist leaders were more realistic and reserved. In his speech at the conference, Weizmann expressed his belief in the eventual establishment of a Jewish state, but added that in view of the new bosses in Whitehall he would be satisfied with a British decision gradually to revoke the 1939 White Paper over the next five years. This position created a storm among the activists. As expected, Ben-Gurion’s position was entirely different. He said that if the Labour government maintained the hated White Paper intact, the Yishuv would literally fight it. He was strongly supported by Moshe Sneh, the new

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Haganah chief, who openly called for a Jewish uprising in Palestine against the British. Shertok and the moderates were totally surprised by their appointee’s stand. As expected, Shertok’s keynote speech at the London Zionist Con­ ference included a number of revelations on some highly sensitive and controversial issues pertaining to the Holocaust and the Executive’s behaviour during the war. After presenting a detailed review of the Yishuv’s social, political, and economic development during the war, he proceeded to address the rampant criticisms that the Yishuv’s leadership had not done enough to rescue European Jewry. To refute this accusa­ tion, made particularly by ultra-religious and rightist representatives, he argued that the Yishuv leadership had neither been unaware of the situation nor silent about it. He then said that in addition to making extensive political efforts on behalf of all Jews in distress, maintaining communication with European Jews, participating in rescue operations, and organizing illegal immigration, the Yishuv leadership had attempted to restore the honour of the entire Jewish nation by establishing the Jewish Brigade and the special units that had operated behind Nazi lines in occupied Europe. This was the first time that these daring operations had been mentioned publicly. Here he disclosed to his colleagues the heroic but tragic story of Hana Senesh, the courageous young Kibbutz member who had volunteered to parachute into Hungary, and who was caught and executed by the Gestapo, reading her magical verse that began with the words: ‘Lucky is the match which was burnt and ignited the hearts [of young men and women to sacrifice their life fighting the N azis]. . . ’. Shertok concluded his first address at the London Zionist Conference with an analysis of current Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine, to him always the crux of the Yishuv’s predicament. His main argument in this regard was that the dilemma could not be solved without massive intervention on the part of the great powers. He again rejected the idea of a bi-national state on the basis that only separation between the two antagonistic communities could reduce the growing tensions in the territory.11 As far as strategies for attaining a Jewish state were conçemed, there were already two distinct camps competing for the hearts and minds of the Zionist movement: the activists, who demanded an open struggle for a state; and the moderates, who supported Weizmann’s gradualist approach. For this reason, the delegates to the London Conference once again reached a compromise by reaffirming their general support for the Biltmore Program, but avoiding militant operative resolutions. And once

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again, Shertok was a pivotal moving force behind the compromise resolution. In promoting this decision he collaborated closely with Weizmann and other moderates in Mapai, Hashomer Hatzair, and Hadassah closely, which further widened the gap between himself and Ben-Gurion. During this Zionist gathering, it became further evident that Shertok had become a leading figure in the moderate camp, whose acknowledged leader was Weizmann. On the declaratory level, the conference vehemently attacked the 1939 White Paper and called for its immediate annulment. At a practical level, it adopted various organizational and economic resolutions, and called for a World Zionist Congress to be convened in 1946. In retrospect, Shertok thought that the chief function of the conference had been to bridge the gap between the pre- and post-war periods and to revive the activities of the Zionist organizations, which had come to a halt during the war, rather than to make any fundamental changes in ideology or practical policy. He was also greatly relieved that in principle the Biltmore Program, calling for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine, had been revalidated, as this precluded a ‘theoretical’ controversy as to the ultimate goals of the Zionist movement. More specifically and revealingly, Shertok had feared that ‘Ben-Gurion would propose more radical plans and insist that they be considered during the [London] conference. This would have caused endless infights, and the adverse consequences of such scenario can easily be imagined .. .’.12 In the mean time, the new Labour government in Britain, under the prime minister, Clement Attlee, was preparing an extremely unpleasant surprise for the Zionist leaders. Even the prudent Shertok was taken aback when Attlee refused to receive a Jewish delegation at the time of the London Conference and by his appointment in August 1945 of a cabinet-level planning subcommittee (again chaired by Herbert Morri­ son, who was said to be far from sympathetic to the Zionist cause), to discuss five alternative schemes for solving the Palestine imbroglio. After intensive work, not heeding President Truman’s repeated exhortations that Britain should permit the immigration of the 100,000 DPs to Palestine, that cabinet subcommittee submitted its conclusions in early September 1945. When the two former pro-Zionists, the prime minister, Attlee, and foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, gave their blessing to a compromise proposal, which the cabinet adopted in mid-September 1945, Shertok and his colleagues were even further disturbed. For the cabinet decided to maintain the 1939 White Paper intact, to increase the quotas of Jewish immigrants to Palestine only slightly, to conduct negotiations on this concession with Arab leaders, to increase the British

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garrison in Palestine, and to inform the USA that in the event of a stalemate in Palestine, Britain would refer the entire issue to the newly established UN. Once these cabinet decisions were leaked to the leaders in charge of Zionist foreign policy, that is, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok, the trio immediately began pulling strings in an effort to pressure the British into revoking them.13 To achieve this immediate goal, among other political and diplomatic activities, Weizmann intensified his meetings with British politicians and officials and Shertok flew from London to Paris to conduct a series of talks with the pro-Zionist French Socialist leader, Leon Blum, and other sympathetic politicians and officials, the main purpose of which was to enlist their active support in persuading the British Labour government to alter the cabinet decision. Here it is important to note that during that period a most important alliance was created—between France and the Jewish Yishuv. While in Paris, Shertok attended to yet another urgent matter regard­ ing the collaborationist Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, who had recently been brought from Germany, and was then held by the French and British authorities in Paris. Shertok knew that Haganah agents, who had were tracking the Mufti wherever he went, were planning to assassinate him. Shertok arrived in Paris on the eve of the planned assassination and issued an order for its cancellation. The most likely reasons for this decision were the wish to avoid a diplomatic crisis in the Jewish Agency’s relations with the French and British govern­ ments at a critical moment, and to prevent the Mufti becoming a martyr of the Palestinian Arab national movement.14 There is some evidence suggesting that Shertok took this decision on the spot and on his own. For better or worse, his decision was based on sound considerations. It was not fortuitous that the British had kept the Americans, but not the French, informed of their plans for Palestine. The British consulted regularly their closest allies in this regard, mainly since the USA was becoming increasingly involved in the interlocking Middle Eastern and Palestinian drama as it gathered momentum. American interest in Palestine took a great leap forward after the publication of the famous report that Earl Harrison, dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, submitted to President Truman towards the end of August 1945. Harrison’s report, based on an on-the-spot survey by Jewish welfare teams, severely criticized the treatment of the 100,000 DPs in the camps of Europe, particularly in Germany and Austria, and suggested that their emigration to Palestine would alleviate the situation. These recom­ mendations were accompanied by persistent pressures exerted by the

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American military authorities in Germany to close down the DP camps, because of their purported disruptive influence on Germany’s political reconstruction and economic revival. For the Zionists, the import of the Harrison report lay in the close tie that it had established between the situation of Diaspora Jews and the Yishuv, a connection that the British had carefully refused to recognize during the entire period of the Mandate.15 In August 1945 President Truman had much more on his plate than just the Jewish and Palestinian issues. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by atom bombs that he had decided to use, and a dumb­ founded Japan was compelled to surrender to the USA. Truman, however, did not let up on the shocking situation of the Jews in Europe even in the midst of the American trauma over the use of the atom bomb on the one hand and the pall that this cast over the end of the war in the Pacific on the other. Thus on 31 August 1945, two days before the official Japanese surrender, Truman dispatched the Harrison report to Britain’s prime minister, Attlee, along with an emotional personal letter urging the latter to help solve the problem of the surviving Jewish remnants by increasing the number of immigrant certificates for Pales­ tine. Bearing in mind Britain’s wish to maintain control of the situation in the Middle East and Palestine, and its apprehensions about violent reactions in the mandatory territory as well as in other parts of the region, after two weeks of intense deliberations Attlee rejected Truman’s appeal. The president did not give up, continuing to apply pressure on the British government in regard to Jewish immigration, but to no avail. It was against this backdrop, and the contact that Weizmann had established with the American Secretary of State, James Byrnes, during the latter’s visits to London, that the Americans decided to launch a comprehensive investigation into the situation in Palestine and into possible solutions. Since Attlee, in conjunction with his foreign secretary, Bevin, realized that the Americans were already deeply involved in Palestine, that the connection between the DPs and Palestine had already been firmly established, and that the Jews would not let up the pressure, he proposed establishing a joint American-British committee of inquiry to be dispatched to Palestine.16 These plans were initiated amidst persistent rumours that Bevin had refused to meet Weizmann to discuss the entire gamut of open issues between the Zionists and the British government, because purportedly he did not have faith in Weizmann’s ability to control Ben-Gurion and the activists, which in itself had led to yet another flare-up between the two

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Zionist camps. N ot surprisingly, this new internal clash erupted as soon as it became clear that despite American intervention, Britain would not annul the 1939 White Paper. Ben-Gurion seized that opportunity to suggest deviously that Weizmann should issue a strong statement against the British and resign as president of the Zionist movement as a gesture of protest, and a signal that a new and a more activist era was needed in Zionist politics. Realizing that this was a ruse to promote, and in fact secure, Ben-Gurion’s own candidacy as next WZO president, Weizmann not only declined to resign, and in this he was supported by the majority of Zionist leaders, but he also decided to take the opportunity to reassert decisively his authority in the movement as well as his control over its policies.17 It surprised nobody that Ben-Gurion escalated his anti-Weizmann and anti-moderates campaign, yet again using the time-worn threat of resignation if the centre of Zionist political and diplomatic activities were not moved from London, and from Weizmann’s influence, to Jerusalem and the USA. To enhance the new internal crisis, Ben-Gurion proposed rescinding Havlagah and stepping up the Yishuv’s struggle against Britain, including the use of force. Only after extremely bitter debates in the Agency Executive, resulting in a new compromise between moderates and activists, but by no means only under Ben-Gurion’s influence, did the Executive agree, on 1 October 1945, that Ben-Gurion should instruct the Haganah chief, Moshe Sneh, to resume massive illegal immigration into Palestine, preparing for violent clashes with the British in this connection; to establish a command post of the Haganah in Paris to be headed by Ben-Gurion’s supporters Shaul Avigur and Ehud Avriel; to co-ordinate training and the purchase of illegal arms in Europe; and to pave the way for the creation of a joint underground federative com­ mand with the Irgun and LHI. On the surface it looked as if these decisions marked a decisive victory for Ben-Gurion and the activists. Indeed, later Israeli historians support­ ing the Ben-Gurion line did interpret this as the turning-point in Ben-Gurion’s domination of Zionist and Yishuv policies. However, this was not the case; At the end of 1945 there were actually neither victors nor vanquished in the endless struggle between activists and moderates in both the Labour camp and in the ruling coalition, since neither camp could survive the internal and external vagaries without co-operating with the other.18 In reality, an uncomfortable and beleaguered coalition of moderates and activists still controlled the movement. And in this coalition, the moderates from Mapai, the religious parties, and the General Zionists, formed the majority.

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There have been conflicting reports on Shertok’s position in this critical controversy. Members of the Executive reported that ‘Shertok tried hard to prevent a split in policy and action between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, for Shertok viewed himself as a great compromiser. While he was totally pessimistic regarding the concessions the British govern­ ment would be ready to make, he was also apprehensive of clashing with that government.’19 In fact, as the legal adviser of the Political Depart­ ment, Bernard Joseph, attested, Shertok favoured a tough public re­ sponse to the Labour government’s ‘betrayal’, but at the same time he resisted any suggestion of provoking Weizmann’s resignation or launch­ ing massive and violent opposition against the British. Reports about the internal controversy over policy towards Britain were leaked to the London News Chronicle by Shertok and his senior assistants, Walter Eytan, Eliahu Epstein-Elath, Eliahu Sasson, Teddy Kollek, and Reuven Zaslani-Shiloah. This internal information, which was leaked by the moderates and intended as a threat to the British in an effort to prevent the need for the use of blatant opposition and protest, was interpreted, however, as denigrating the activists’ positions, and only further exacer­ bated the bitter struggle between the two groups.20 This complex general internal situation did not improve the already strained personal relations between Shertok and Ben-Gurion. The internal controversy was further fuelled by secret proposals by Loy Henderson’s Near East section in Washington, and by the colonial secretary, George Hall, in London, that Palestine be partitioned. Typic­ ally, the Agency Executive’s secret response, communicated to the British and Americans through Weizmann in London and Nahum Goldmann in Washington, was that although formally it still abided by the Biltmore Program’s principle of a Jewish commonwealth in all of Palestine, and was inclined to launch a violent struggle against the British government, the Zionists would not reject partition out of hand if it was offered. By supporting this pragmatic position, Shertok indi­ cated his true leanings towards Weizmann who, unlike Ben-Gurion, was ready to accept a small Jewish state in part of Palestine. Political pressures, coming from the American administration as well as from American and British Jews, coupled with news of the first Jewish joint attacks on British forces launched by the united resistance move­ ment in Palestine, composed of all three clandestine paramilitary organ­ izations, that is, Haganah, Irgun, and LHI, led the furious Bevin and Hall to summon Weizmann and Shertok on 1 November 1945, to ask openly whether the Jews had ‘declared a war’ on Britain, and to demand that terrorist activities be halted forthwith. During this meeting, Shertok

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was no less adamant than Weizmann in stating that the Jews had not yet declared war against Britain, but would not hesitate to do so if Britain retained its restrictive policies. Shertok’s impression was that Bevin’s intentions to crush the Yishuv were sincere, but ambivalent. He thought that the foreign secretary was not versed in Palestinian affairs, that he was highly impressed by the Yishuv’s advances, but also flabbergasted by the Jews’ attacks on Britain. Shertok added that Bevin still had immense confidence in his ability to handle both Arabs and the Jews. Once Bevin had publicly warned the Yishuv to refrain from violent action against the British on 13 November 1945, but had also announced the increase in immigration quotas that the cabinet had approved a few months earlier, and the appointment of the Anglo-American committee, Shertok started making preparations to return to Palestine. He arrived in Palestine towards the end of November 1945, and immediately joined his colleagues in the debate over strategy and in planning the Jewish Agency’s, tactics when they appeared before the new committee.21 On the assumption that Bevin would become more sympathetic towards the Yishuv as he got to know more about Palestine, Shertok opposed Ben-Gurion’s recurring calls for Weizmann’s resignation as a token of protest against Bevin’s policy, and proposed that the Executive should accept the slightly increased immigration quota offered by the British as it would somewhat alleviate the DPs’ situation, and should keep pressuring the British for further increases in immigration quotas. Ben-Gurion, however, opposed this pragmatic suggestion because, he asserted, it would only weaken the Jewish national struggle. When the Agency Executive voted to approve Shertok’s two proposals on 22 November 1945, Shertok was relieved that Weizmann would not be unseated and that some DPs could begin entering Palestine. He was still resentful that it had taken so long to reach the decision.22 In any case, encouraged by the Executive’s resolution, he made efforts to persuade those who had voted against it that the moderate line was the only approach effective in the negotiations with the British and Americans. As expected, he also urged the Executive to co-operate with the AngloAmerican Committee of Inquiry when it arrived in Palestine.23 As had been the case since the mid-1930s, the Agency Executive ultimately split over the issue of co-operation with the new committee of inquiry. Shertok, of course, supported co-operation because he thought it was unavoidable and that it would promote the Yishuv’s vital interests. Naturally, he was gratified when again his camp carried the vote in the Executive, albeit not as a result of massive support from the

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Palestinian members, but rather because the Diaspora members on the Executive had voted with him and the Palestinian moderates.24 During the deliberations preceding the arrival of the committee, Shertok ob­ served that the new body represented an additional victory of the British Foreign Office approach which opposed partition, over that of the Colonial Office which traditionally supported it as a cheaper means to ensure British control over Palestine and the region. After presenting also a fair and balanced picture of the Arabs’ position, he went on to express his profound disappointment in the British Labour government. ‘Britain is on the decline,’ said Shertok, ‘there is a tremendous fear of Russia as well as of the enormous increase in America’s economic power in comparison to that of Britain. Furthermore, the mandatory power is experiencing a transitory period from war to peace, and above all, the future of the empire is very uncertain.’ This is why, Shertok continued, the British were trying to appease the Arabs by turning against the Yishuv. None the less, since the Yishuv’s principles of morality and expediency did not permit the use of excessive violence, and since Gandhi’s philosophy of passive resistance would not help to solve the burning questions facing it, the best strategy was that which combined political tools and prudent use of force, based on careful monitoring of British, American, and world opinion. He added that it was imperative to co-operate with the Anglo-American committee since the emerging power in world and regional affairs, the USA, was an equal partner in this body, and since its recommendations might serve as a basis for the eventual deliberations of the UN mandates’ commission once the issue was brought before it. This sober analysis led to Shertok’s operational conclusion: that the Yishuv must co-operate with the Anglo-American committee’s inquiry, while simultaneously demonstrating its ability to use political protest and firmly controlled force. Ben-Gurion, of course, opposed Shertok’s proposal that the Agency should co-operate with the committee, calling this proposal, as well as Shertok’s behaviour during the 1939 London Conference, nothing less than ‘defeatism’. This time Shertok took the bull by the horns and attacked Ben-Gurion’s political logic. He maintained that if the Yishuv had refused to participate in the London Conference, its position during the war would have been much worse.25 Although sixteen out of the eighteen members of the Mapai Political Committee supported Shertok, Ben-Gurion was not deterred, and the matter was consequently brought up in the Zionist Smaller Actions Committee. Ben-Gurion’s suggestion was that the Agency should not appear but, instead, the various Yishuv and Zionist organizations should give witness. But here too Shertok

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pointed out that this was not the first time Ben-Gurion had followed ‘his peculiar inner logic’, which made very little political sense but would cause unnecessary complications in representing the Yishuv’s interests. And here, too, Shertok was vindicated. He therefore began work on preparing the Agency’s formal presentation to the new committee.26 The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was charged with four complementary tasks: to examine, first, the situation of Jewish DPs, secondly, the social, economic, and political conditions in Palestine that might impinge on the DPs’ immigration to that territory, and, thirdly, the possibility of resolving the inter-communal conflict there. The committee’s fourth task, requested by both governments, was to view these three aspects in connection with the situation in neighbouring Arab countries.27 It began its work in early January 1946, in Washing­ ton, where its evenly divided American and British members had meet­ ings with President Truman, who asked them only to expedite their work because of the worsening situation both in the DPs camps in Europe and in Palestine. The members of the committee also met Truman’s assistants and a host of Jewish and Gentile luminaries, including Albert Einstein, who had agreed to give witness on behalf of the Zionists. As Shertok had expected, the views presented by the Jewish witnesses in Washington ranged from strong support for the immediate estab­ lishment of a Jewish entity, to total rejection of such an idea, as well as almost as wide a range of recommendations on how to solve the problem of the Jewish DPs. Towards the end of January 1946, the AngloAmerican Committee moved to London, where it heard the views of the British government, including that of Bevin, who urged them to expedite their deliberations and be courageous enough to propose radical solutions. Whereas in the USA the committee members had heard Jewish leaders, in London they listened to an equal number of Arab spokesmen. In early February 1946 the committee split into four working groups, each investigating the situation of the Jewish refugees in another part of ruined Europe.28 One would have thought that, with the committee expected in Pales­ tine in early March 1946, Shertok would have been confined to the preparation of the Agency’s presentations. This, however, was not the case. He had also to spread the gospel of the need to co-operate with the committee among the generally hostile Jewish public, to con­ vince his own party members that such co-operation would gain the Yishuv precious support, would not mean automatic acceptance of the committee’s recommendations, and was essential if the Yishuv had any

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hope of counterbalancing the weight of the five Arab UN members, who would no doubt make their views known to the commission. ‘If fate makes us appear like poor people humbly standing at the gates of the commission,’ Shertok told the Mapai Council, ‘then we have no other option but to again appear like poor people at the gate. That is because we are fighting a war for the entire Jewish nation on the only battle­ ground that is still open to us.’29 The Executive not only approved Shertok’s line by a substantial majority, but also voted to endorse his recommendation that it accept the immigration quota set by the British, and this, it should be remembered, despite Ben-Gurion’s opposition. This decision to co-operate with the committee, and by implication also with the British government, kept the gates of Palestine open to Jewish refugees, and avoided total stoppage of immigration that would have been affected had the Agency rejected this quota. Yet again the line adopted by the coalition in the Agency represented a compromise between the activists and the moderates. Thus, in return for Ben-Gurion’s consent to appear before the committee of inquiry, which also meant his readiness to address alternative political solutions for the Palestine problem, Shertok had to agree to present to the committee a demand not only for new formulas concerning immigration, but also demands for a comprehensive solution of the Yishuv problem in the spirit of the Biltmore Program. Within this framework, although highly sceptical of the political wisdom of Ben-Gurion’s proposal for demanding the immigration of a million Jews to Palestine within a year or two after the war, he nevertheless agreed to accept this notion if Ben-Gurion would modify his timetable for this number of immigrants from ‘a year or two’ to ‘a number of years’. This way, Shertok felt, the British government would face an easier decision, and the Yishuv would not be embarrassed if the approved quotas were not filled. As noted, Shertok predicted immense difficulties not only in finding a million European Jews ready to immigrate to Palestine, but also in absorbing those who were waiting to be rescued from DP camps. By this time the disagreement between Ben-Gurion and Shertok was such that neither could make a proposal without the other objecting in principle. Thus, although Ben-Gurion was enraged by anyone daring to dispute his demand for massive immigration, in the end he had to make a partial retreat and admit that he was thinking about a million immigrants ‘not in statistical but rather in political terms’.30 Since it was now clear that the views of the three politicians who were shaping the foreign policy of the Yishuv and also increasingly that of the entire Zionist movement, diverged widely, Shertok had to proceed with great

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caution to maintain a measure of consensus in the leadership during his preparation of the Agency’s position for the committee. (In the Yishuv the saying was that there were three approaches: that of the Irgun and LHI; that of the activists in the new Ahdut Haavodah, Mapai, and part of the General Zionists; and that of parts of Mapai, including Shertok, Kaplan, and Sprinzak, Hashomer Hatzair, and the General Zionists. Once the Anglo-American Committee began its inquiry in Palestine, foreign and local journalists were also made more aware than ever before that the Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok trio was leading the Jewish delegation, shaping its attitude during the hearings, but forming two groups.31 Thus the ageing and ailing Weizmann was again the first to appear before the committee in Jerusalem, having been carefully coached by his two associates. Notwithstanding his age and progressive blindness, Weizmann’s testimony was forceful and vivid. Against the cynical British argument that the problem of the Jewish DPs should be solved by the countries from which they originated, Weizmann said that anti-Semitism rendered any situation other than a sovereign Jewish entity impractical as far as ensuring the rescue and well-being of the Holocaust survivors was concerned. He also reminded the committee that the great powers ‘owed’ the Jews a state of their own since they had done little either to protect or rescue them during the Holocaust. During the debriefing after Weizmann’s appearance, Shertok praised the old leader’s testimony, but Ben-Gurion, who had kept a watchful eye on all of Weizmann’s moves and words, compelled him to correct some minor factual mistakes made during his testimony and to send these corrections to the committee.32 It is easy to understand that Ben-Gurion’s behaviour did not contribute to the improvement of his relations with Weizmann, and for that matter with Shertok. Ben-Gurion’s own testimony, like so many of his addresses during those years, was delivered bluntly and aggressively. In it he emphatically stated that the Jews were returning to Palestine to rebuild their national home there as a right and not as a favour. Moreover, he said that the Jews always harboured a dream of redemption, and loathed remaining dependent on external actors, who had only subjected them to servility or annihilation. Finally, he was confident that the Jews would re­ establish their independence in their homeland, no master what the opposition and cost. When questioned about military operations and outright terrorist activities then being carried out by the Yishuv, without recoil, Ben-Gurion flatly denied both the existence of the Haganah and the united resistance movement, but did say that issues of the Yishuv’s security were closely connected to the question of self-defence, which

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would be greatly enhanced by the increased immigration that had been requested by the Jewish Agency.33 Third to give witness to the committee was Shertok. Being the senior Jewish expert on Arab affairs, and as part of the division of labour between himself and his two older colleagues, he dedicated much of his testimony to an analysis of Arab-Jewish relations. Shertok repeated his feeling of respect for the Arab position, but insisted that the Yishuv’s, as well as the Jewish DPs’, most pressing problem was immigration to Palestine and that it was therefore objectionable to allow Jewish immi­ gration to depend on Arab consent. More than either Weizmann or Ben-Gurion, Shertok sensed that the problem of Arab-Jewish relations was becoming uppermost in the minds of the committee members, therefore he did not hesitate to emphasize the notion that ‘the crux of the matter in Palestine is the political conflict between Jews and Arabs who live there’. Unlike Ben-Gurion, he ad­ mitted that the Haganah actually existed, and described in general terms its structure and functions. He too concluded by calling for the estab­ lishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine with an Arab minority. While the committee was not impressed by the evasive Ben-Gurion, its members, so it was reported, regarded Shertok’s testimony as ‘a master­ piece, and as the best summary that [it] has heard from any Jewish representative’.34 Shertok was followed by Eliezer Kaplan and Emil Shmorak, leaving no doubt that under Weizmann’s and Shertok’s influence the Jewish Agency had decided to present as moderate a position as possible. After completing its work in Palestine towards the end of March 1946, and visiting Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo to hear various witnesses there, the committee’s members returned to Europe to continue their deliberations in Lausanne. In early April 1946 Shertok left for London, Brussels, Paris, and finally Lausanne, to head a large team of Agency experts, whose task was to monitor the preparations of the committee’s report. According to intelligence reports at his disposal, he felt that several of the British committee members, such as Richard Crossman, and the Americans, James MacDonald, Frank Buxton, and Bartley Crum, would revive the idea of partition. The intelligence reports were based on information that some of the committee’s members were pressing for a compromise, yet fundamental solution to the Palestine problem.35 This news was welcomed by Shertok and some of his colleagues, for despite their overt commitment to the Biltmore Program, most Agency leaders, including Shertok, Kaplan, Emanuel Neumann, and Ben-Gurion himself, were ready to accept partition. In fact, they

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had put forward a claim for all of Palestine to counter the Arabs’ similar demand. In reality, when Weizmann and the committee member Cross­ man had met privately, Weizmann had reminded his British counterpart that, since 1937, he and the majority of the Zionist movement had supported partition as the only just solution to the situation.36 Shertok’s lobbying in Lausanne was thus aimed at reviving the Zionist élite’s preferred solution. He and the other Zionist leaders felt quite optimistic about the committee’s decision in this regard. They, however, had not envisaged the need for a compromise between the committee members themselves. It was therefore with great chagrin that Shertok and the other Zionist leaders received the committee’s recommendations to the American and British governments of 1 May 1946: that a single, bi-national state should be established in Palestine, that it would be based on the principle of political parity, and that the Mandate would be transformed into a UN trusteeship. This British victory, it is true, was counterbalanced by the committee’s American co-chairperson, Joseph Hutcheson’s, success in swaying the majority of the committee’s mem­ bers to recommend that a hundred thousand Jewish refugees should be given immigration certificates for Palestine. In fact, this compromise was adopted by the committee’s pro-Zionists, who had de facto adopted the Weizmann-Shertok line that immigration was more important than the immediate establishment of a Jewish entity.37 Since the Anglo-American Committee’s report was bom out of a compromise, neither Jews nor Arabs could be expected to rejoice in it. Generally, the moderates, including Shertok, were satisfied with what they regarded as the operative part of this report. Thus, in a long speech he delivered in London on 9 May 1946, Shertok rejected the committee’s political recommendations, asserting that the Jews would accept the recommendations on immigration, but continue to fight for annulment of the 1939 White Paper as well as for a change in the committee’s recommendation to establish a bi-national state in Palestine. An import­ ant argument in support of Shertok’s unyielding demand was the formal independence which had been granted to Amir Abdullah’s Transjordan. Shertok insisted that to ensure the Jews’ security, there was a need for symmetry. * On the other hand, in internal discussions on the ramifications of that report, Shertok continued to oppose violence and terrorist activities against the British.38 He was particularly opposed to acts like the execution of seven British soldiers by the Haganah, to stealing weapons from British camps, and especially to the demolition of all bridges connecting Palestine with the neighbouring countries on the night of 17

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June 1946. Shertok and his colleagues therefore derived great satisfaction from President Truman’s statement, made upon receipt of the report and without any prior consultations with the British, that, while he welcomed the committee’s recommendations on the refugees, he was not making any commitment with regard to the bi-national solution.39 Although flabbergasted by the escalation of Jewish terrorism in Palestine and by Truman’s move, the members of the Attlee cabinet, who were aware of Britain’s increasing dependence on American eco­ nomic aid, did not dare to reject out of hand the committee’s recommen­ dations. But they did delay action on the recommendations by raising the questions of the end of Jewish terrorism, the disarming of the Jewish paramilitary forces, and relative responsibility by the British and Amer­ icans as far as footing the bill for the immigration and absorption of the refugees was concerned. Only after great hesitation and pressure did Truman answer that the USA would extend the necessary financial support and would also participate in a committee to study how the main recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee could be implemented. This was the origin of a new inquiry, this time by the Morrison-Grady Committee. All the frustrated Shertok could do was to report back to his colleagues that Ernest Bevin’s right hand and pro-Arab expert on Palestine, Harold Beeley, promised that the Jewish Agency would be invited to testify before this new committee.40 Shertok was now facing a dilemma about his future position. He still supported co-operation with the British government and the M orrisonGrady Committee as the lesser of two evils, telling the Zionist Smaller Actions Committee that ‘certificates for an additional one hundred thousands Jews during a short period brings us closer to a Jewish State than the powers’ disagreement to this notion. This is my conclusion in view of past Zionist dynamics.’41 Shertok’s middle-of-the-road position was adopted by the Zionist movement. But, the British foreign secretary, Bevin, and his close adviser, Harold Beeley, frustrated even this decision by shaping a policy so anti-Zionist, and for that matter also antiAmerican, that it was bound to clash even with any Jewish moderate orientation. The realization that the Yishuv was on a collision course with Britain prompted Shertok and his colleagues to renew their internal debate ‘about what is known here as a Line’, and to re-evaluate the Zionist political strategy. Neither Shertok nor his associates were naïve enough to think that ‘they had the power, or were interested in ejecting the British from Palestine. Nevertheless, we should make it clear [to the British] that they should pay a price for i t . . . [their harsh policy towards

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the Jews] that the country belongs to somebody, and that we are among those to whom it belongs.’ But, the Yishuv would have to pay a price too, ‘since our spine is not strong enough, since we are alone in this struggle, since this is our special war, since this is our war of inde­ pendence [!], and since this is a very difficult battle—it must also be premeditated and carefully calculated.’ Partly because it would be a very costly exercise for the small Yishuv community in view of possible British retaliation, and partly because of the moral issues involved, Shertok still deplored massive acts of Jewish terrorism and thus was for the continuation of Havlagah,42 The looming clash with Britain became more of a reality in June 1946, when the legendary commander-in-chief of the British forces, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery returned to London from a brief and secret visit to Palestine. On the basis of his short review of the situation in the territory, he was confident in the ability of his troops in Palestine to crush all clandestine Jewish paramilitary forces, especially the Haganah, which he had regarded as more dangerous to Britain than the Irgun arid LHI. As expected, Bevin supported the proposals of the famous Second World War hero, and instructed preparations to begin for a large operation against the Yishuv. On 20 June 1946, while British, Jewish, and Arab experts were still examining the Anglo-American Committee’s report, the British government decided to launch Operation Broadside, mainly aimed at crippling the Haganah. However, once again, even before the British government had made its decision, the Haganah’s intelligence service had obtained information about this British design and leaked it in a sensational broadcast on the clandestine Haganah radio on 15 June 1946. The purpose of the leak had been both to deter the British authorities from searching for illegal weapons and arresting commanders and fighters, and to warn the Yishuv’s political leaders that the British had ordered their arrest.43 Notwithstanding the information at their disposal, some Jewish leaders and the Haganah chiefs did not have enough time to prepare for the British operation. Moreover, except for some Haganah commanders, most of the Yishuv’s leaders then in Palestine, including Shertok, courageously decided to remain visible instead of going into hiding or fleeing Palestine, and to wait for the operation. On 29 June 1946, which became known as Black Saturday, the British government activated the 100,000 soldiers and 15,000 policemen sta­ tioned in Palestine to launch the planned operation. When it began, the British surrounded twenty-five Jewish settlements throughout the country, thoroughly searched the offices of the Jewish national organizations,

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imposed on the Yishuv a total curfew, and conducted door-to-door searches. All in all, the British arrested almost 3,000 Jews, among them most of the leaders who had stayed in the country, such as Rabbi Yehuda Leib Fishman, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, Bernard Joseph, and David Hacohen. To cap it all, four Jews were killed and many others wounded during Operation Broadside. Since he was among the most senior Jewish leaders then in the country (Weizmann was in London and Ben-Gurion in Paris), Shertok had known that he would be a prime target for the British. Nevertheless, he did not leave Palestine. Indeed, on the Friday night before the operation, he participated in an emotional and inspiring public memorial ceremony for his beloved brother-in-law Eliahu Golomb, held in Tel Aviv. When the ceremony was over, he walked back to his hotel in the company of his wife Zipora and a few friends in highly defiant mood, to await his expected arrest. When the owner of the hotel where the Shertoks were staying came to tell him that British soldiers and policemen had come for him, he calmly completed his preparations and went with them. Later, his wife Zipora reminisced, ‘The British took him to Latrun [the site of their concentration camp] in an armoured car. There, standing under the car’s machine-gun, he was visible to all passers-by in Tel Aviv and all along the road to Latrun. It was as if they were determined to show all other Jews that this is what would happen to every rebellious leader in the Yishuv.’44 The traumatic events of Black Saturday were widely covered by local and foreign media. News of Shertok’s poised behaviour was broadcast from Palestine to the world, his arrest especially becoming a metaphor for British cynicism on the one hand, and of Jewish cool courage and proud defiance on the other. The reactions to the British Operation were acrimonious to say the least. As to Shertok’s arrest, headlines around the world asked the question: ‘Is it really necessary to arrest moderate leaders like Shertok?’ The famous socialist historian and philosopher, Harold Laski, who had been Shertok’s tutor at the London School of Economics, called his arrest ‘a challenge to the entire Jewish nation’. Other personalities, like the well-known Jewish British historian and ardent Zionist Sir Lewis Namier, wondered why the flexible Shertok, the prophet of Jewish-British understanding, who had helped to establish the Jewish Brigade, had been incarcerated in a concentration camp. In defence of their decision to arrest Shertok, the British claimed that he was behind the illegal immigration to Palestine, public protests, as well as many terrorist activities, including the planning and authorization of the mining of Palestine’s railway system of 15 October 1945.45

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Yishuv leaders who were still free set about establishing secret means of communication with Shertok and the other six senior leaders also being held in Latrun—David Remez, David Hacohen, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, Yehuda Leib Fishman, Bernard Joseph, and Mordechai Shatner. They succeeded in establishing such sophisticated methods that Shertok and his comrades were able to continue to participate in the deliber­ ations of the Agency Executive and to guide the officials of their respective departments. Partly because of the possible adverse impact it would have on the Yishuv, and partly out of concern for his own position on the Executive, Shertok instructed his colleagues in Jerusalem to take their time replacing those arrested.46 The dramatic events culminating in the arrest of Shertok, his six colleagues, and the Haganah soldiers and officers reopened the internal debate on the Yishuv’s strategy vis-à-vis the British government. How­ ever, even from the Latrun concentration camp, Shertok still warned against unrestrained action, particularly in view of the impending meetings of the Morrison-Grady Committee. He, and Weizmann in London, were referring, among other things, to Haganah’s chief, Moshe Sneh’s, plans to blow up the King David Hotel, which then served as British military and intelligence headquarters in Palestine, as well as to raid British camps and capture weapons, and to LHTs preparations to blow up British offices in Jerusalem. In order to prevent further violent clashes with the British and to win the sympathy of world public opinion, from his gaol, Shertok approved only mild protests and demonstrations, but not violent operations or brutal sabotage. Thus, Shertok did not sanction suggestions by Golda Meyerson, who with his blessing had been appointed as Acting Chairman of the Political Department of the Agency, to launch larger demonstrations or terrorist attacks on the British at the very least until the end of the work of the M orrison-Grady Committee. While Shertok did not disregard ‘the important factors that dictate action: the need to teach [the British] a lesson, to demonstrate the Yishuv’s ability to resist oppression, to defy British boasting that the Yishuv’s senior leaders and commanders have been neutralized, and to boost Jewish morale’, he added: * Personally, I think that the political considerations [concerning restraint and co-operation with the British] are decisive, especially when there is a possibility that the ‘alchemist* [Weizmann] may resign. And if he resigns now, I am afraid that from both external and internal points of view, an intolerable situation might be created. This is the case, especially since there would follow serious restrictions [imposed by the British].47

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Shertok’s views became known in the Yishuv, and added to his reputa­ tion as first and foremost among the moderate leaders. In view of Weizmann’s and Shertok’s opposition to the use of violence, Moshe Sneh, who had succeeded in escaping arrest by going into hiding, mooted the continuation of terrorist activities with ‘Com­ mittee X’, the code-name of the civilian body then supervising the Haganah. But, since the majority of this committee comprised moderate leaders, such as Peretz Bernstein of the General Zionists, Yaacov Riftin of Hashomer Hatzair, Moshe Shapira of Hamizrahi, and Levi ShkolnikEshkol of Mapai, Committee X supported the Weizmann-Shertok view—once again reflecting the actual balance between moderates and activists on that committee, as well as in other Jewish national organi­ zations. Faced with the committee’s decision against his view, Sneh resigned his position in the Haganah and fled the country to join Ben-Gurion and the handful of activist leaders, who throughout that period had remained in Paris to avoid British arrest. Before leaving Palestine, Sneh did, however, order all three clandestine organizations, that is, Haganah, Irgun, and LHI, to cancel all planned sabotage operations. From his detention camp, it was Shertok who appointed the new Haganah chief—Zeev Feinstein.48 Ben-Gurion was now placed in a difficult position. In the serious controversy over violent operations against the British then engaging the Jewish Agency Executive, he himself veered between continuing acts of defiance and proceeding with moderation and caution. For even he realized that Weizmann and Shertok were right in opposing violent actions at that juncture, since it would be counter-productive as far as the Morrison-Grady Committee’s recommendations were concerned. Moreover, no matter how much he disagreed with Weizmann and Shertok, Ben-Gurion despised British attempts to drive a wedge between the activist and moderate camps of the Agency Executive by direct and indirect contacts with Weizmann and other moderates, by encouraging the installation of a new leadership headed by Weizmann, and including other moderate leaders such as Yosef Sprinzak, Eliezer Kaplan, Berl Locker, Werner Senator, and even more leftist and moderate leaders. Although publicly Weizmann rejected these British feelers, in view of his long-standing controversy with the activists, and particularly with BenGurion, he was privately tempted to form such an alternative leadership. On the other hand, though Ben-Gurion was publicly confident that ‘the British will find nobody, neither ön right nor left, that is, no Jew, no Zionist, no Petain or Quisling, who would be ready to participate in such an Agency [sponsored by the British]’, nevertheless, like some of his

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colleagues, he privately sensed that ‘this is a decisive hour, a time of great confusion and helplessness’.49 In short, by launching Operation Broadside, the British almost succeeded in both crushing the Yishuv’s paramilitary forces and splitting the Yishuv leadership. However, while Ben-Gurion bowed to the will of the majority—and thus to what was prudent—the Irgun did not accept the new rules of the game. Thus, even though the Yishuv leaders were kept hostage in Latrun until Jewish terrorism stopped, the Irgun commanders decided to go ahead with the plan to blow up the King David Hotel, which they did on 22 July 1946, killing ninety British, Jews, and Arabs and wounding many others. In view of the devastating results of this act of terrorism, and despite a certain ambiguity about whether Moshe Sneh had indeed cancelled the orders to carry out the attack on the King David, as well as its adverse political ramifications, the Jewish Agency could, of course, do nothing else but condemn the bloody attack. Even Ben-Gurion, who remained in Paris for the months that the other leaders were held at Latrun, denounced this act. But nothing could deflect the British and American outrage that followed. President Truman published a strong condemnation, including a threat that such acts of terrorism would not advance but, on the contrary, would retard the efforts to solve the Jewish problem. Much of the criticism was directed at Ben-Gurion and the activists, who were indeed the chief architects of escalated Jewish terrorist acts against the British. There is, however, no doubt that, just as Britain’s Operation Broadside created ‘facts’ in the Yishuv, the bombing of the King David Hotel had a divisive effect on the British government and parliament. For, while Bevin and Montgomery now vowed to step up efforts to crush the Haganah, the Irgun, and LHI, opposition leaders, including Winston Churchill, were advocating British withdrawal from Palestine. Internally, the blasting of the King David infuriated Weizmann, who accused his veteran activist rivals Ben-Gurion and Sneh for allowing it to happen. Even Shertok did not escape the Weizmann rage this time, the older leader castigating his supporter for not adopting a more stringent position than he had against Jewish terrorism. Weizmann’s fierce attack on all forms of activism signalled the inauguration of a major onslaught against it by the Yishuv’s moderates. A group of Mapai leaders, who ideologically were close to Shertok, led by the former Hapoel Hatzair members Kaplan, Sprinzak, and Yosef Baratz, and other moderates, initiated a debate in Mapai by signing a pamphlet calling for ‘A Re-examination of Our Course’. The group began to draft and lobby for a resolution calling for a halt to terrorist acts against the

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British. Reading the new internal and external political map correctly, Ben-Gurion succumbed and joined the moderates in condemning terror­ ist activities. From the Haganah headquarters that he had established in Paris, he issued new orders to stop military attacks against British forces. This prompt decision helped to cool down pressure inside Mapai as well as between Mapai and the other parties in the national movement.50 The debate inside the Mapai and Agency leadership about strategy heated up again at the end of July 1946, when the Anglo-American Experts Committee submitted what became known as the M orrisonGrady Plan. Basically, the plan returned to the old cantonization idea, whereby Palestine was to be divided into four cantons: two British, one Arab, and one Jewish. The committee proposed that the Jewish canton should be smaller in size than the Jewish state envisaged by the Peel Commission in 1937 (17 per cent of the entire area of Palestine was allocated to the Jews, 40 per cent to the Arabs, and the British would retain 43 per cent). According to the plan, the cantons would be granted limited autonomy and, in fact, the British would maintain control over the territory. The British hoped that this revived cantonization plan would be acceptable to President Truman, since it would allow for the absorption of the 100,000 refugees, that were deemed to be Truman’s main concern.51 Indeed, after overcoming certain hesitations, Truman and his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, supported the M orrisonGrady Plan. As expected, Jewish reaction to the new plan was fiercely and adam­ antly negative. From his prison in Latrun, Shertok added his own protest based on a summary of the main reasons for its rejection: the area allotted to the Jews was too small; the Dead Sea and the Negev (which were known to be rich in various minerals) were excluded from the proposed Jewish canton (the Negev was included in the two British cantons); the Galilee was granted to the Arabs; self-government was too limited (Shertok calling it a ‘major bluff’); and it entailed severe limitations on Jewish immigration. Through these critical comments, however, Shertok set forth the Yishuv’s minimum demands and hinted that an improved plan might be acceptable to the moderates in the Executive.52 His rationale for not rejecting the plan out of hand was that while it might lead to a bi-national solution, which he abhorred, it might also lead to partition, which he always favoured. The majority of Zionist leaders were, however, more extremist than Shertok in rejecting cantonization in accordance with the M orrisonGrady Plan. Therefore they applied strong pressure on the White House, especially on James Byrnes, who was then in Paris. Moreover, probably

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for the first time ever, the arguments presented by American Jewish leaders, as well as by their supporters, such as Senators James Mead and Robert Wagner of New York, as well as James McDonald, were connected to ‘the Jewish vote’. For Truman was up for re-election in November 1946, and was aware that political analysts had been predict­ ing that this vote would determine his chances. Under continuous pressure, applied by the Zionists and their supporters, including the president’s special assistant for minority affairs, David Niles, on 30 July 1946 Truman announced that he was postponing his final decision on the cantonization plan.53 The controversy between activists and moderates within the Zionist movement over the Morrison-Grady Plan meanwhile threatened to reach a conflagration when it became known that, far from rejecting cantonization like all his colleagues, Weizmann had discussed it with the British colonial secretary, George Hall, prior to the publication of the M orrison-Grady Report. Among Weizmann’s pre-conditions for fullyfledged negotiations over the plan’s stipulations were the immigration of 100,000 refugees, defensible borders, and the release of the Agency’s leaders from Latrun. The entire issue was put on the agenda of the first meeting of the Agency Executive since Black Saturday. The Executive met on 2 August 1946, in Paris, since Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sneh would have been arrested by the British in Palestine or in Britain. Although Weizmann decided to abstain from that meeting, he was represented by Meyer Weisgal and his position received support from a large contingent who participated in that meeting, including Berl Locker, Lewis Namier, and Nahum Goldmann. Shertok, who was still detained in Latrun, joined these moderate Jewish politicians.54 Since the moderates had revived the idea of partition in July 1946, the battle within the Executive was fierce and not confined just to the use of force in the struggle against the British. In fact, the debate was about the political solution of their predicament. Although Nahum Goldmann became the public spokesman for the moderate partitionist orientation, it was Shertok and his Palestinian colleagues who had initiated its revival behind the scenes. Very much as in 1937, Shertok and Ijis colleagues intended that partition should be proposed and ‘imposed’ by other actors, such as the British and preferably by the Americans. He was therefore furious that Goldmann’s immense vanity led him to announce it as a Zionist, and especially as his own plan. ‘What should have appeared as a plan to which we would agree only very reluctantly,’ wrote Shertok from Latrun, ‘now [after Goldmann’s unwise statement] appears

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as our own plan.’ It was a long time before Shertok would forgive Goldmann for exploiting ‘the strange circumstances that prevailed [due to his and other moderate leaders prolonged detention in Latrun], to become the main figure in this process’. None the less, through the clandestine channels that enabled the detainees to communicate with the outside world, Shertok supported the idea of partition when it was discussed in the Agency Executive in Paris.55 In view of the substantial support for reviving their endorsement of the partition plan and information from Washington that the Truman administration might reject the M orrison-Grady Plan and support partition, Ben-Gurion again found himself facing a dilemma: while he was reluctant to relinquish the Biltmore Plan for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in the entire Palestine, which he regarded as his most significant political achievement since he had become involved in Zionist politics, he realized the tremendous pressures to accept a com­ promise solution. He therefore agreed to ‘renew discussions on the establishment of a viable Jewish state in an adequate part of Palestine’, but only if it were adopted by the powers and implemented immediately. In accordance with the new concensus among the Zionist leaders, Goldmann drafted a new compromise resolution amounting to the acceptance of the partition principle, and an independent demand for the immigration of the 100,000 DPs. This draft won the support of a large majority of the Executive. Just for the sake of protocol, Ben-Gurion did not support it. Later, however, Shertok would intimate that, though Ben-Gurion had been one of the fathers of the Biltmore Program for Jewish sovereignty in the entire territory west of the Jordan River, he had never relinquished the idea of partition, since he ‘always strongly emphasized the need for complete sovereignty rather than the need for the whole territory. Don’t people remember his great enthusiasm for partition during the 1937 congress?’56 On 5 August 1946 the Executive voted to support Goldmann’s new draft. Shertok, who had been willing to support an even more substantial compromise, of course supported this resolution.57 Goldmann then continued with the campaign to enlist further support for the idea of a Jewish state in part of Palestine in the White House and the administration.58 As a result of persistent lobbying on the part of the Zionists, the US cabinet’s subcommittee on Palestinian affairs recommended that President Truman rescind the M orrisonGrady Plan, support partition, and present it to the British. But the British, under conflicting pressures from the Americans, the Zionists, and the Arabs, again tried to deflect the inevitable by proposing yet another round-table conference in which all sides would participate. The

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Truman administration was veering towards adopting this idea. Thus, Goldmann was premature in calling his mission to Washington an unqualified success. Much additional effort would be needed before there was any real change in the situation.59 In any case, the most important fact was that Goldmann’s optimistic reports from Washington did bring the Agency Executive once again to commit itself openly to partition. Shertok, who had been behind the entire process, was very pleased with this major change, but insisted that under any partition plan the strategically important Negev must be included in the Jewish state. Hence, this was not only Ben-Gurion’s personal obsession. Moreover, it was shared not only by Shertok but by others on the Executive. Armed with the Executive’s readiness to negotiate partition with the British, Weizmann and Goldmann resumed their talks in London. On 16 August 1946, Weizmann dispatched a formal letter to the colonial secretary, George Hall, indicating that the Zionists were willing to participate in explicit negotiations, but ‘only if their purpose would be the establishment of a viable Jewish State in an adequate part of Palestine’.60 Knowing that Ben-Gurion’s formal objec­ tion to partition was merely a tactic aimed at securing larger territory, Shertok wrote from Latrun, ‘there was no member of the Executive who was more responsible for Weizmann’s letter of 16 August 1946, than Ben-Gurion’.61 Notwithstanding his prolonged detention by the British, Shertok urged his colleagues to be available during the forthcoming negotiations in London. Moreover, he strongly felt that a cessation of all hostile acts on the part of the Yishuv would buy the Zionists time to reorganize the Yishuv’s forces, both political and military, and to prepare the ground for successful negotiations concerning partition. Since Shertok was still put out by Weizmann’s unjust accusation that he had not done enough to block Jewish terrorist acts, and since he did not respect Goldmann’s diplomatic abilities, especially doubting his personal and political integ­ rity, he proposed that Ben-Gurion be on the team negotiating with Hall and Bevin in London. He also insisted that the Yishuv should have a free choice of the members of the delegation to London, and therefore that he and his colleagues should be released from Latrumand join the delegation. Although the members of the Agency Executive had decided to enter negotiations with the British, they also announced that because of the Jews’ complex and uneasy relations with the British, they would respect any Jewish organization in Palestine that wished to abstain. Simulta­ neously, and with Shertok’s hearty blessing, the Jerusalem branch of the

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Agency Executive appointed Golda Meyerson as acting head of its Political Department. Shertok, who maintained his seat on the Jewish ‘government’, had expected that she would conduct just the day-to-day affairs of the Executive there.62 Always the perfect gentleman and the supporter of women’s rights, he sent her a warm letter of congratulation from Latrun, saying that ‘I am very satisfied that you occupy my office. Both because of your qualities and as a woman. The latter fit my beliefs.’ Much later, however, he would greatly regret this gentlemanly move. More important, however, was the Executive’s decision to welcome the unconditional return of the Revisionists to the World Zionist Organization, that was scheduled to take place formally at the next World Zionist Congress, whenever that was to be convened. Shertok, who was always for unity in Zionism, the Yishuv, and the Labour movement, of course supported this decision. The Executive’s agreement to reconsider partition also prompted Shertok to initiate the renewal of the political dialogue with neighbour­ ing Arab rulers, such as Egypt’s prime minister, Ismail Sidqi and King Abdullah of the newly established ‘independent’ Transjordan. Through the clandestine communications network, connecting the detainees in Latrun and the Executive in Jerusalem, Shertok guided Elias Sasson’s missions to .Egypt and Transjordan aimed at promoting these ideas. When Sasson reported that Abdullah and Sidqi had hinted at their half-hearted blessing for partition, but that Abdullah still strongly preferred a Transjordanian-Palestinian federation, Shertok instructed him to repeat the offer of two independent states west of the Jordan River that would be part of such a federation, but in the event of the king rejecting it, to suggest that the proposed Arab part of Palestine should be annexed to the Hashemite kingdom. What concerned Shertok most was that this round of negotiations should not end in the same failure as the plan proposed by the Peel Commission. Thus, he instructed Sasson to be as accommodating as prudent in his future meetings with Abdullah, and even to offer him a ‘sweetener’ in the form of 5,000 Palestinian pounds. ‘First and foremost,’ Shertok instructed Sasson, ‘we should ask for what we need most: a substantive part of Palestine, and sovereignty in this part of the territory. As for the rest of the country, basically it is not for us, but rather for [the Arabs] to decide . . . whether it will be separated or included [in the Hashemite kingdom].’63 Shertok’s instructions were communicated to the governments of both Egypt and Transjordan, but Sasson’s talks in the two Arab capitals collapsed when the Sidqi government resigned in September 1946, and when Abdullah insisted on a Middle Eastern federation under his

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tutelage. Sasson, who always acknowledged Shertok’s superior political position and knowledge of the ‘Arab world’, later wrote that Shertok himself should have participated in the talks, since he was the only senior Zionist leader capable of listening patiently and talking sensibly with Arab leaders. Sasson added that all other leaders, such as Goldmann, were ready to talk with Arab leaders, but just for the sake of boasting about it.64 Shertok’s extended detention was also felt in the context of the negotiations with the British that had been scheduled for August 1946. His absence and the difficulties in communicating with him about these issues, created a sense of confusion about the desirability and feasibility of these negotiations. Once again, Shertok, unlike Ben-Gurion, unequi­ vocally supported the Weizmann-Goldmann position about the need to participate in such talks despite the Arab refusal to join round-table talks and Britain’s refusal to release him and his colleagues from Latrun, which was one of the Executive’s pre-conditions for entering into these talks. Shertok extended his support since at that point he regarded it as the sole way to exert pressure on London to withdraw from Palestine, especially when the Americans, including formerly anti-Zionist Jews, were ready to put pressure on Whitehall. This, of course, exemplified his traditionally preferred method of conducting international relations. His position was that the Jews must persuade the Americans that they were ready to discuss all plans with the British. Therefore they ‘must declare that although it is very doubtful that we will reach an agreement with the British, we will negotiate with them. We must do it to protect all our rights and fight for the renewal of our independence. In this process, we are not committed to any proposal that has been or will be put forward.’ This was his determined position, but always the disciplined politician and devoted party member he added, ‘If, as I suspect, Ben-Gurion’s position is diametrically opposed [in regard to participation in the negotiations], my view should not be discussed in public, in order to avoid publicizing a controversy we do not have the possibility of discussing privately.’ And, as an afterthought, he added: ‘Oh! What a mess! What a mess!’65 The situation inside the Zionist movement and the Yishuv leadership was as complex as it had ever been. This was due mainly to the ongoing personal feud between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, but more immedi­ ately, the movement was in disarray over the colonial secretary, Hall’s letter of 20 August 1946, in which he invited the Jews to participate in the round-table discussions. On his part, Shertok believed that the letter hinted that each side would be able to present its own proposals, and

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that the British might agree to release the detainees in time for the conference; he therefore reiterated his full support for the Executive’s participation in the conference. The Jews’ quandary was solved by other participants in the complex Palestinian game. In view of the firm Arab boycott of the round-table conference, the British retracted their promises and half-promises; they now insisted that the negotiations should be conducted only on the basis of the Morrison-Grady Plan. They also refused to release the detained leaders, including Shertok, from Latrun. Learning about these new British positions, Shertok knew that the Zionists were approaching the thin line between compromise and capitulation. Disagreeing with his fellow detainees David Remez and Yitzhak Gruenbaum, and not hiding his basic inclinations, he instructed Golda Meyerson, Tf there is no change [in the British position], we should desist from joining [the negotiations]. Any compromise concerning our demand that the British should retract their official position means political shame outside and moral disaster inside. I stress these aspects particularly, since I am regarded as a bom and sworn supporter of co-operation.’66 Simultan­ eously, Shertok remained adamant about the urgent need for the further development of the Yishuv—and in particular of rapid settlement in the northern Negev, of massive illegal immigration, and primarily, of intensified political and diplomatic actions in ‘Jerusalem, Cairo, London, Paris, Washington, the UN, and in indirect fashion also in Moscow’.67 He included Moscow in this directive, for although never a great admirer of Communism, Shertok continued to be the tireless architect of close relations with the Soviet Union, which he had begun to establish in the late 1930s. The mounting tensions between the British government and the Yishuv once again raised the question of the use of force in that national struggle for independence. Like his moderate colleagues in the Yishuv, Shertok had always felt that political efforts should be exploited to the utmost before resorting to force, and that if such action did have to be taken by the Yishuv, it should be carried out so that it did not ‘lead to our own destruction’. That is to say, that the use of the Yishuv’s force ‘requires a great deal of consideration and succinct calculation. Hence the unavoidable short, and also longer, lulls in the use of force, hence the absolute need for very careful selection of goals and means, hence the need for extreme sensitivity about the circumstances in which we use our force,’ and he could not resist adding that ‘it was true that the glory of Jewish history was revealed in the [actions of the] zealots of Jerusalem [here he was hinting at Ben-Gurion and all other activists], but their

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courage did not prevent the destruction of the second temple’. Thus, his dovish views preceded the establishment of Israel, the escalation on its borders, and the hard questions about the need for retaliation and pre-emptive and preventive wars. On that same occasion, and in connection with his reflections on the use of force, Shertok now also expressed profound regret that he had been among those who had led the ‘Season’ (the operation against the dissenters), since it had caused bloodshed and an unholy co-operation with the British; nevertheless, he still thought that the general problem of dissent had not been solved.68 The Political Department operated smoothly while Shertok was de­ tained in Latrun. This was due not so much to Golda Meyerson, as to the experienced and dedicated staff that Shertok had hand-picked, recruited, and trained over the years; therefore, it was no surprise that most, although not all, of his staff were protecting his political and administrative interests. Among their other activities, his devoted lieutenants agitated on behalf of his release by planting articles, editor­ ials, and Other bits of information in local and British newspapers. Thus, for example, Shertok, utterly exasperated at his prolonged detention, took advantage of his staff’s acumen in manipulating the press by instructing them to arrange publication of a piece that he himself had written and which included the following passage: It is surprising that the British are detaining Moshe Shertok at this time, since he is probably the only Jewish leader who is capable of inducing the Jewish Agency to enter serious negotiations with HMG. His detention on the eve of the commission of inquiry’s appointm ent. . . had removed an important positive and moderating influence on the Jewish Agency’s deliberations. It is an open secret that, despite the Yishuv’s negative reactions to Bevin’s declarations, and the American Zionist movement’s staunch opposition to such negotiations, Shertok had succeeded in persuading the Agency to appear before the AngloAmerican Committee.

This draft, which, in addition to its advocacy of Shertok’s release, reflected his views, was published with very minor changes by the Palestine Post on 9 September 1946, and was then quoted by other papers in Palestine and abroad.69 * From Latrun, Shertok persisted in opposing a bi-national solution and preaching the gospel of partition, saying that the essential elements required for its successful implementation were: Sufficient quality land; enough water for irrigation and for electricity generation to satisfy both current and future needs; land reserves in both the hills and plains

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for further growth and development; joint borders with Lebanon for facilitating co-operation with the Christians there; ownership of the Naharaim and Dead Sea concessions; assurances that the Jewish State would be politically viable, i.e., that it would be accepted for membership in the UN; and immediate control over immigration and security.

He was confident that if these pre-conditions were assured, a majority of the Yishuv would support partition. In this same context, he repeated­ ly pleaded with the Agency Executive to ‘move the wheels so that our settlement plans, primarily in the South, are implemented as soon as possible’.70 For he was apprehensive (he actually wrote: ‘my heart is bleeding over the thought’) that delays in firmly controlling what was Jewish land before partition would mean that the unsettled land would be awarded to the Arabs. Still interned in Latrun, Shertok was approaching his fifty-second birthday. When his birthday approached, he mused sadly that his gloomy mood had been caused ‘not only by grief over my personal fortunes, but by grief for the entire community. I am sad for all the members of our group [of leaders], for I am the youngest among them. [But,] this does not mean that we are leaving the political stage.’ This melancholic aura, however, did not drive him to despair, but rather led him to argue that there was an imperative need to groom younger people to take over as leaders. He was particularly worried about the fact that only few of those on the staff he was so proud of had deep roots in the Labour movement.71 Shertok was also distressed by Ben-Gurion’s ceaseless manœuvres against Weizmann, whom Ben-Gurion envied passionately and almost hated. In mid-September 1946, from Paris, Ben-Gurion publicly announced that he no longer supported any form of co-operation with the British and would resign all his duties on the Executive rather than attend the London Conference. This time his threats were so effective, that even Weizmann tried to appease him. Using terms and arguments resembling those used by Shertok, Weizmann pleaded with Ben-Gurion to refrain from taking any step that would sabotage the conference.72 Once again, without any major immediate political gains, Ben-Gurion allowed himself to succumb to the combined pleas of Weizmann and other Zionist leaders, including Shertok, to withdraw his threat to resign and continue negotiations with the British. Once this minor crisis was over, the pre-conference negotiations with the British concentrated on the release of the political detainees, which had been one of the Yishuv’s essential pre-conditions. Simultaneous to the efforts that the Executive was making in London, American Jewish leaders and their supporters in the White House and

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on Capitol Hill exerted pressures on the Truman administration to reaffirm its support for partition, to persuade the British government to grant immigration permits to Jewish refugees, to release the detained leaders in Latrun, and, more generally, to support the Jewish Agency in its struggle with the British. After much discussion and controversy about the advisability of using the ‘Jewish vote’ as a means for putting pressure on the administration, the American Zionist movement, assisted by pro-Zionists, such as the leaders of Hadassah, finally agreed to promote the vital interests of the Yishuv in the forthcoming US by-elections of November 1946. Consequently, a united Jewish leader­ ship—including Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Emanuel Neumann, Bernard Rosenblatt, and Leo Sack—approached Truman’s associates and ad­ visers David Niles, Bartley Crum, Robert Hannegan, John Snyder, Samuel Rosenman, and Clark Clifford, to apply additional pressure on President Truman to issue a pro-Zionist declaration. The cumulative efforts made by these Jewish and Gentile leaders forced President Truman to cross the Rubicon. On 4 October 1946, the eve of Yom Kippur, Truman issued a declaration concerning Palestine that signalled a major turning-point in the struggle for a Jewish state. This was the first time ever that an American president went on record as recognizing partition as the best means of carrying out the urgent need to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Even if some American Jewish activists, like Rabbi Silver, felt that Truman’s statement was not strong enough, it was one of the first indications that American Jews had a certain power to influence White House deci­ sions. No wonder, therefore, that this declaration served as the founda­ tion of the belief that the Jews wielded pervasive political power in the USA.73 After carefully analysing Truman’s Yom Kippur declaration, Shertok communicated to his friends on the Executive that ‘despite all its shortcomings, it is of very great value at this grave time’.74 However, since he still believed that the Zionists’ main problem was rather the British government, Shertok felt that the Jews must lose no time in translating the president’s goodwill into pressure on Whitehall to post­ pone the date of a new conference in London, to alleviate thé restrictions on immigration and land sale, and, in the longer run, to change its basically favourable orientation towards the Arabs. This sense of ur­ gency stemmed from his generally pessimistic view of politics and politicians, and hence from his fear that President Truman might reverse his decision once elections had taken place. Effective action by Washington would, Shertok added, depend on unified action within the American

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Jewish community to remove the many obstacles still to be overcome within the Truman administration. Shertok’s anxieties were not exaggerated. Despite mounting American pressures, the British government was still unmoved, maintaining that as it had given up the cantonization idea, only a bi-national solution was appropriate and feasible under the prevailing circumstances in Palestine. Nevertheless, continued American pressure did lead Whitehall to try to improve relations with the Zionists in October 1946, by promoting the more sympathetic Arthur Creech-Jones to replace George Hall as colonial secretary. The removal of the hated General Evelyn Barker (who, among other things, was responsible for the execution of Oper­ ation Broadside) also helped in creating a more agreeable atmosphere for the resumption of informal pre-negotiation talks with the Jews on the territorial aspects of any future arrangement, and on Shertok’s and the other detainees’ release from Latrun. Subsequently, Bevin as well as other cabinet ministers were indicating that they might be leaning towards partition, and getting ready to free the leaders from Latrun.75 To Shertok, it looked as if at last the British were indeed seeking a new formula regarding their relations with the Yishuv and a permanent solution to the Palestinian question. The British intended partially to fulfil these vague promises. Thus early in November 1946, but not before the Agency had reiterated its opposition to the use of terrorism,76 the Yishuv’s leaders, including Shertok, were released from Latrun after 130 days of detention. The freed leaders were all feted at enthusiastic receptions in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the press focusing on Shertok as the most senior and celebrated of those detained.77 In retrospect, Shertok realized that his detention was a blessing in disguise, for his long months in Latrun had gained him a great deal of public sympathy and had contributed to his image as a leader who was not prepared to compromise with the British to the detriment of the Yishuv. He was therefore able to reassert his control over the Agency Political Department, and to get on with business as usual. Ironically, his very first task in Jerusalem was to meet the British High Commis­ sioner and his officials to discuss Jewish terrorism, which had not stopped despite the tacit agreement with the British.78 The release of Shertok and his colleagues, including the detained Haganah commanders, marked the beginning of an intense period of political and diplomatic activity, for the Agency Executive had to prepare for the new round-table talks as well as for the first World Zionist Congress to be held after the Second World War, and its

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members had only a month to do so as both events were scheduled for December 1946. These two impending events prompted Ben-Gurion to leave Paris for the USA to establish co-operation with the activist leaders of America’s Zionist movement, such as Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, in order to form a more militant coalition. While Ben-Gurion kept Shertok informed about his activities, these did not bode well for the moderate Weizmann coalition, to which Shertok really belonged.79

NOTES 1. Shertok’s speech at Hebrew University, Palestine Post, 14 May 1945; and see Shertok’s speech in a meeting of Journalists’ Association, Palestine Post, 16 May 1945; Shertok’s speech to representatives of the various local chapters of Mapai, 4 June 1945, Mapai Archive, 15/1/45. 2. Shertok in Agency Executive, 22 Apr. 1945,29 Apr. 1945, CZA; Mapai Political Committee, 29 Apr. 1945, Mapai Archive, 26/45; Gelber, Jewish Palestinian Voluntèering in the British A rm y during the Second World War, iii: The Standard Bearers , 318-29. 3. Mapai Secretariat, 15 May 1945, Mapai Archive, 24/45. 4. Mapai Political Committee, 15 May 1945, Mapai Archive 26/45; Larger Actions Committee, 31 May 1945; CZA, S25/1804; Agency Executive, 3 June 1945; CZA; Gelber, Standard Bearers, 318-26. 5. See correspondence between Eliav and Shertok, 20 Feb. 1945, 25 May 1945, 28 May 1945, Haganah Archive, Golomb’s files, 12/116. 6. Shertok’s eulogy for Golomb in Mapai Central Committee, 12 June 1945, Mapai Archive, 23/45. 7. Shertok to Yaacov Shertok, 28 July 1945, CZA, A45/176. 8. Mapai Political Committee, 14 June 1945, Mapai Archive, 26/45; Mapai Central Committee, 26 June 1945, Mapai Archive, 23/45; Mapai Secretariat, 24 July 1945, Mapai Archive, 24/45. 9. Shertok to Yaacov Shertok, 28 June 1945, CZA, A245/176. 10. Shertok in Agency Executive, 8 July 1945, CZA. 11. On Shertok’s speech see Palestine Post, 1 Aug. 1945. 12. See the resolutions of London Convention, held between 1 Aug. 1945 and 13 Aug. 1945, CZA, S25/1912; and Shertok to Leo Kohn, 28 Aug. 1945, CZA, A223/27. 13. Shertok to Leo Kohn, 28 Aug. 1945, CZA, A223/27; Agency Executive, 18 Sept. 1945, CZA; CP, 8 Sept. 1945, Cab. Con. 129/2, PRO; and see W. R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 383-96. 14. Interview with Ambassador Hanan Eynor, Jerusalem, May 1988; and see Z. Elpeleg, ‘Why was “Independent Palestine” Never Created in 1948’, Jerusalem Quarterly , 50 (Spring 1989).

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15. On British attitudes towards this issue, see G. Sheffer, ‘Sir Arthur Wauchope and the Jewish and Arab Notables’, Keshet (Heb.), 51 (1971); id., ‘Political Consider­ ations in Shaping British Immigration Policies in Palestine’; on the impact of the Harrison Report, see e.g. Z. Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945-1948 (New York: Holms & Meier, 1979), 30-8. 16. Agency Executive, 23 Sept. 1945, CZA; Mapai Political Committee, 25 Sept. 1945, Mapai Archive 24/45; Shmorak’s report to Agency Executive, 21 Oct. 1945, CZA; Louis, British Empire , 390-3; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 42-3. 17. See a report on this new clash by Bernard Joseph to Mapai Political Committee, 25 Sept. 1945, Mapai Archive, 24/45. 18. See Ben-Gurion’s letter of 1 Oct. 1945, Ben-Gurion Archive; and see e.g. a report in the Sunday Times , 5 Nov. 1945. 19. Bernard Joseph’s report in Mapai Secretariat, 11 Oct. 1945, Mapai Archive; Agency Executive, 21 Oct. 1945, CZA. 20. See again Joseph’s report to Mapai Political Committee, 11 Oct. 1945, Mapai Archive. 21. Agency Executive, 11 Nov. 1945, CZA; Mapai Secretariat, 12 Nov. 1945, Mapai Archive, 24/4. 22. Memo, 2 Nov. 1945, CZA, S25/7566; Agency Executive, 28 Nov. 1945, CZA; Shertok to Yaacov Shertok, 11 Dec. 1945, CZA, A245/176. 23. Walter Eytan to Teddy Kollek and Leo Kohn, 25 Nov. 1945, CZA, S23/6367. 24. Agency Executive, 16 Dec. 1945, CZA. 25. Mapai Political Committee, 10 Dec. 1945, Mapai Archive, 24/45; and Shertok’s speech in a convention of local Mapai leaders, 10 Jan. 1946, Mapai Archive, 15/46. 26. Shertok to Yaacov Shertok, 11 Dec. 1945, CZA, A245/176; Palestine P osty 3 Dec. 1945; Agency Executive, 16 Dec. 1945, 27 Jan. 1946, CZA; Mapai Political Committee, 23 Jan. 1946, Mapai Archive, 26/46; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 55-6; D. Horowitz, A State in the M aking (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Shocken, 1951), 86-8. 27. For a detailed discussion of the composition of the Committee and of the positions of its members, see Louis, British Empire , 397-405; on the background to the appointment of the Committee in the USA, see E. Elath, The Struggle fo r Statehood, Washington 1945-1948 (Heb.) 3 vols. (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1979-82), i. 294-302, 304-8; and see M. Sharett, A t the Gates o f Nations (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1958), 15-16. 28. Louis, British Empire , 405-8, 408-10. 29. Agency Executive, 10 Feb. 1945, CZA; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 86-8; thirteenth session of Mapai Council, 4 Feb. 1946, Mapai Archive 22/30, Palestine Post , 21 Jan. 1946, 31 Jan. 1946, 7 Feb. 1946, 14 Feb. 1946. 30. Agency Executive, 24 Feb. 1946, CZA; for the position of the government, see ‘The Government of Palestine: Survey of Palestine, Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946, for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry’ (Jerusalem: Government of Palestine, 1946). 31. e.g. Palestine Post , 5 Mar. 1946.

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32. ‘The Jewish Agency, the Jewish Case, Statements and Memoranda’ (Jerusalem: The Jewish Agency, 1947), 25-6, 42-3; and see Weizmann’s letter to the committee in which he clarified his positions, ibid., 52; Agency Executive, 10 Mar. 1946, CZA. 33. ‘The Jewish Case’, 94-100. 34. Shertok’s speech, ‘The Jewish Case’, 101-29; Sharett, A t the Gates, 16-45; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , i. 339. 35. Agency Executive, 10 Mar. 1946; and cf. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , i. 340-1; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 114-18. 36. Louis, British Empire, 412; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 59-60; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 117-18. 37. Louis, British Empire , 417; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 124-6. 38. Shertok’s speech to United Palestine Appeal convention in London, 9 May 1946, as reported in Palestine P ost , 10 May 1947; and Shertok’s report to Agency Executive, 19 June 1946, CZA. 39. Shertok’s report of 19 June 1946; Louis, British Empire , 420-1; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , i. 344-5; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 61-4. 40. See Shertok’s report to Agency Executive, 19 June 1945; Sharett, A t the Gates, 55; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 65-9; Shertok’s report to Zionist Smaller'Actions Committee, 23 June 1946, CZA, S5/355; Palestine Post , 21 June 1946. 41. Agency Executive, 19 June 1946, 20 June 1946, CZA; Shertok’s report to Zionist Smaller Actions Committee, 23 June 1946, CZA, S5/355. 42. Shertok’s report to Zionist Smaller Actions Committee, 20 June 1946. 43. M. Naor, The Black Saturday (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1981), 35-41. 44. Ibid. 53-4. 45. For the wide coverage of the operation and the arrests and for the reactions to Shertok’s arrest, see e.g. Palestine Post , 2 July 1946, 19 July 1946, 25 July 1946, 29 July 1946. 46. Naor, Black Saturday , 146-7; Shertok, to ‘My Free Friends’, 1 July 1946, CZA, A245/105. 47. Shertok’s letters from Latrun, 4 July 1946, 7 July 1946, CZA, A245/105; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 73-7; Palestine Post , 30 July 1946. 48. Naor, Black Saturday , 112-15; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , i. 544. 49. Shertok’s letter to ‘Abudan* (David Horowitz) and ‘Atara’ (Golda Meyerson), 10 Oct. 1946, CZA, A245/105; Naor, Black Saturday , 116-19; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , i. 544-55; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 139-40. 50. About Ben-Gurion’s position then, see Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 546-7. 51. Sharett, A t the Gates, 54-5; Louis, British Empire, 433-6; Ganin, Tnânan, American Jewry and Israel, 65-79; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , i. 362-71; Y. Heller, ‘From Black Saturday to Partition’, Zion (Heb.), 43 / 3-4 (1986), 314-61. 52. See Shertok’s letter from Latrun, 11 Aug. 1946, CZA, A245/105; Sharett, A t the Gates , 55. 53. Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 80-3; Louis, British Empire , 431-3, 436-7; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , i. 368-71.

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54. Shertok’s letters from Latrun, 11 Aug. 1946, 24 Aug. 1946, 1 Sept. 1946, CZA, A245/105. 55. Ibid. 56. Shertok to ‘Atara’ and ‘Abudan’, 10 Sept. 1946, CZA, A245/105. 57. See the resolutions of Agency Executive in Paris, 5 Nov. 1946, CZA; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 83-9; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 549-51; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, i. 357-81. 58. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, 381-5; Kaufman, American Non-Zionists in the Struggle fo r the Jewish State, 163-4. 59. Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 89-94, 94-8; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, i. 386-7, 387-90. 60. Weizmann to Hall, 16 Aug. 1946, CZA, A245/105. 61. Shertok to ‘Abu Yaniv’, 15 Aug. 1946, 16 Aug. 1946, CZA, A245/105; Agency Executive in Paris, 15 Aug. 1948, CZA; Shertok to ‘Atara’, 10 Sept. 1946, CZA, A245/105. 62. Shertok to Sasson, 11 Aug. 1946, CZA, A245/105; E. Sasson, On the R oad to Peace, (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1978), 364-74; Shlaim, Collusion, 72-80. 63. Shertok to Sasson, 11 Aug. 1946, CZA, A245/105. 64. Sasson, On the R oad to Peace, 364-74. 65. Shertok to ‘Hedo’ (Zeev Sharef ), 29 Aug. 1946, CZA, A245/105; Shertok to ‘Atara’, 11 Sept. 1946, ibid. 66. Shertok to Meyerson, 2 Sept. 1946, Shertok to Friends, 3 Sept. 1946, CZA, A245/105. 67. Shertok to Meyerson, 7 Sept. 1946, CZA, A245/105. 68. Ibid. 69. Shertok to ‘Hedo’, 7 Sept. 1946, CZA, A245/105; and see Palestine Post, 15 Sept. 1946. 70. Shertok to ‘Atara’, 10 Sept. 1946, Shertok to ‘Lapidot’, 16 Sept. 1946, CZA, A245/105. 71. Shertok to Berl Locker, 17 Sept. 1946, ibid. 72. Weizmann to Ben-Gurion, 15 Sept. 1946, Weizmann Archive. 73. See a detailed discussion of this issue in Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 104-6; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, i. 417-24; Dothan, Struggle fo r Eretz Israel, 331-40. 74. Shertok to ‘My Dear Friends’, 8 Oct. 1946, CZA, A245/105. 75. Gorny, The Ambiguous Tie, 305; Louis, British Empire, 443-50; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 113-14; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, i. 444-6. 76. Shertok’s report to Mapai Political Department, 25 Nov. 1946, Mapai Archive, 24/46. 77. See e.g. Palestine Post, 6 Nov. 1946, 7 Nov. 1946, 12 Nov. 1946. 78. Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 112; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, i. 430-6, 447-50. 79. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 7 Nov. 1946, Ben-Gurion Archive.

7 Preparing for Statehood I n the wake of the Second World War that wreaked havoc on the European Jewish Diaspora, the stage was set for drastic change in the Zionist movement and in its positions and tactics. The members of the Zionist movement expected that such change would emerge in the preparations for and in the course of the World Zionist Congress, scheduled for Basle in December 1946. Shertok had begun thinking about the need for policy change during his detention in Latrun by composing his ‘Lines for the Debate during the Campaign for the 22nd Zionist Congress’.1 His analysis began with a re-examination of the 1942 Biltmore Program. In this context, he reiterated the absolute necessity of establishing a ‘Jewish commonwealth’ with all due speed, first of all because Britain’s continued application of the 1939 White Paper might easily lead instead to establishment of either a bi-national state or a unitary Arab state with a Jewish minority. Shertok’s second reason for pressing for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth was that the Yishuv’s massive economic development during the Second World War had merely demonstrated the gap between actual achievement and what it would be capable of achieving were it free to expand without repressive British policy. The fact that the impact of the Holocaust came only third in Shertok’s ‘Lines’ underlines the degree of importance Shertok accorded this aspect vis-à-vis the needs of the Yishuv, and indicates that for a while he reverted to his previous orthodox Palestinocentric attitude. But it is only fair to add that he also mentioned the need for a large Jewish immigration to Palestine, partly to alleviate the situation of the DPs. In addition to these arguments, he referred to the simultaneous spectacular development of the Arab states, to the establishment of the UN, and the need for membership in this world organization. Above all, he was motivated by a strong pragmatic sense of ‘when, if not now?’ which was common to almost all Zionist leaders.2 Once again they realized that they were facing a window of opportunity on the one hand, and great difficulties on the other. To allay British and Arab fears, Shertok took pains to add: ‘A Jewish State in the entire area of Palestine is a maximal, not a minimal [and practical], plan, [since] only stupid zealots would adopt a plan based on

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the notion of either everything or nothing . . . Practical statesmanship must anticipate compromises, solutions based on narrower boundaries, as well as partial achievement of goals.’3 In other words, he was thereby both indicating what moderates regarded as the real goal of the Zionist movement and warning maximalists within the Zionist camp that sober policy-makers must anticipate either a Jewish entity with limited boun­ daries or less sovereignty than hoped for. He also maintained that only politicians like himself, who combined realism with pragmatism, would be able to decide which concessions should be made. Moreover, the ‘Lines’ made it clear that a Jewish demand for the entire Mandate territory ‘ignores current conditions, is divorced from Jewish history, and disregards the immense needs dictated by the present awesome hour’. As at previous critical moments, he concluded that the Yishuv must, in the end, opt for the ‘lesser of two evils’.4 Among all hypothetical options put forth, Shertok still favoured partition. This went against the Labour bloc activists (mostly members of Ahdut Haavodah—Faction B), who supported the continuation of the Yishuv’s struggle over partition on strategic grounds, and also against Hashomer Hatzair which favoured the bi-national solution. Shertok pointed out to these two socialist factions, which had split from Mapai, that in contradistinction to their respective approaches, the mother party line called for a ‘Zionist struggle on all fronts’, which nevertheless permitted the application of only strictly controlled vi­ olence, and even that only in close synchronization with political action. During one of the meetings of the Agency Executive after his release from the Latrun camp, he again distanced himself from the antipartitionist activists and bi-nationalists by stating, ‘I will regard it as the only possible positive act of our own generation if we succeed in establishing a Jewish State in part of Palestine.’5 While the activists in Mapai and in the General Zionists, led by Ben-Gurion and Rabbi Silver, were ready to join the moderates and temporarily accept full Jewish sovereignty in only part of Palestine, they stood in firm opposition to the Morrison-Grady Plan for cantonization under continued British jurisdiction. Thus, Ben-Gurion’s formula was ‘Mandate [in its pre-1939 form], or a state!’ These two leaders of the activist camp in the Zionist movement argued that the Yishuv was strong enough to reach a reasonable modus vivendi with the Arabs after full withdrawal of the British from the territory. In this connection, Ben-Gurion and' Shertok differed in their opinions about readiness on the part of the British to reach a compromise on the scope of Jewish sovereignty, about the Yishuv’s ability to withstand an onslaught by

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both the Arabs and the British should talks with the Arabs fail—as well as about the perennial question of the continued use of terrorism against the British, who showed little inclination to offer anything other than the M orrison-Grady Plan.6 These, and the precarious political balance of power in the Zionist movement, were some of the more salient questions that were on Shertok’s mind when he left Palestine on his way to the congress. The Twenty-Second World Zionist Congress opened in a singularly gloomy atmosphere. Although hundreds of thousands of Jews throughout the world, especially in the USA, had joined the Zionist movement in the aftermath of the Holocaust, so that the number of registered members had almost reached the two-million mark, there was no escape from the sense of tremendous loss cast over the congress by the missing European Jewish communities and by the many thousands of members and Zionist leaders who had perished in the Holocaust. Moreover, older Zionist leaders also had to face the sad fact that many of their veteran colleagues, who had not perished in the Holocaust, had died or retired since the last congress in 1939. This, together with the increasingly important role of ascending younger leaders, such as Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres, who for the first time participated in this congress, and the clear sense that Zionist politics were about to undergo a drastic change, led veteran leaders to regard the past and the present as painful, and the future as obscure.7 As anticipated by Shertok and other seasoned delegates, the main struggle within the movement was not over ideas, goals, or strategy but over leadership and leadership positions. Everyone knew that the chief contenders were the activists Ben-Gurion and his ardent ally Rabbi Silver on the one hand, and Weizmann and his moderate supporters on the other. (There were 370 delegates at this congress: General Zionists,— 31 per cent, who were split into a moderate Weizmannite group and an activist group supporting Rabbi Silver; Mapai—26 per cent; Hamizrahi— 15 per cent; Revisionists— 10 per cent; Hashomer Hatzair—7 percent; Ahdut Haavodah—6 - per cent). The delegates to the congress also knew that, his age and ailments notwithstanding, Weizmann had no intention of givjng up the presidency without a fight. Indeed, Weizmann opened his main speech at the first session of the congress with an all-out attack on his opponents. Claiming that Zionism had been shaped by a liberal modem approach to urgent national issues, he argued that discarding this approach would greatly harm the movement and thus the entire nation. He therefore called for the establishment of a Jewish state through

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political means and categorically opposed the use of terrorism, which he termed ‘cancerous’, in the sacred national struggle. In a highly dramatic tone, he decried what he termed the new ‘Masada Complex’, calling upon the delegates to stand up for sobriety, sanity, and the avoidance of ‘a collective suicide’.8 Weizmann’s blatant attack on the activists naturally drew heavy criticism from leaders such as Abba Hillel Silver, and Moshe Sneh, who responded in kind: they expressed their vehement opposition to giving in to the British by resuming negotiations; instead they demanded a continued unyielding struggle against the mandatory government. When Shertok rose to address the congress, he supported Weizmann’s non-violent and gradualist approach to the development of the Yishuv, and to the struggle against Britain, although without labelling it as such in order to pre-empt further criticism of his moderate ideas and prevent an exacerbated battle between the two approaches. Calling for realism and leaving all options open in order to attain ‘maximum independence’ in Palestine (that is, by implication he supported partition), he cautioned the delegates against disdaining real modest achievements. Turning to the use of violence and hence to the Irgun and LHI, he warned that ‘neither the Yishuv nor the Zionist movement would tolerate being seen by the world as murderous and bloodthirsty monsters’.9 Ben-Gurion, on the other hand, summarized his approach in one word—‘resistance!’—stating that this could be conducted by utilizing the massive force that the Yishuv had already built and enhancing that force with the strength of the immigrants who would certainly be arriving in Palestine in the not-too-distant future. When Weizmann launched his counter-attack on Ben-Gurion and Ben-Gurion’s most outspoken supporter, Moshe Sneh, he denounced the need for brutal force against the British on the basis that, once begun, such force might be difficult to stop when the ‘right time’ came, and that it could easily lead to the complete destruction of the Yishuv by the British, who certainly had overwhelming military superiority. Weizmann concluded his impassioned speech by warning, ‘Don’t adopt false alter­ natives, don’t choose diversions, don’t follow deceitful prophets, don’t subscribe to sweeping generalizations. . . I wish I had the fiery tongue and power of the true prophets, so I could warn you against adopting the ways of Babylon and Egypt, for Zion should be rebuilt in justice— and not through any other means.’10 Throughout the entire Twenty-Second Zionist Congress, the con­ troversy over tactics was inextricably entwined with the struggle for prestige and position, especially that of the presidency of the Zionist

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movement, with the majority of the Yishuv’s Mapai delegates support­ ing Ben-Gurion’s attempt to demote Weizmann to the post of honorary president, which the ageing ‘chief immediately declined. On the other hand, the Mapai moderates, led by Sprinzak and Kaplan, Shertok himself adopting a neutral position in this struggle, combined forces with the Mapai world movement Ihud Olami (world union), and together succeeded in forming a majority in the entire Labour delegation in support of Weizmann and of joining the impending conference in London. At that point, Ben-Gurion again waved the red flag, threaten­ ing to resign and to walk out of the congress if Weizmann was elected president. At this critical moment his threat was effective. The combined Mapai delegation reversed its position in a desperate attempt to prevent Ben-Gurion from leaving the congress and from splitting the party. Apparently this was Shertok’s main reason for keeping a low profile and for desisting from explicit support of Weizmann. Even then, however, the activists at the congress were not able to form a majority. Consequently it was Weizmann himself who contributed to his own defeat by making the fatal tactical mistake of calling for a vote of confidence on his proposal to join the round-table conference with the British. The proposal was defeated by a strange and unprecedented coalition of religious delegates, the General Zionists, the Revisionists, who had just returned to the movement, and the two socialist parties Ahdut Haavodah and Hashomer Hatzair, which had defected from Mapai. Ironically but not surprisingly, in accordance with the decision taken previously, Ihud Olami itself supported Weizmann’s position.11 Although Weizmann had called the vote to consolidate the moderate position, and not as a vote of confidence in himself, when the proposal was rejected by the majority, the end of his presidency was unavoidable. Consequently Weizmann did not declare himself a candidate for the presidency, and immediately left the congress for London. Shortly after the vote, Weizmann publicly lamented the demise of both the Zionist movement and its leadership. Hurt more by the manner of his ejection than by the act itself, he wrote Shertok that he ‘left the Congress depressed not so much by the blow that I havq suffered but by the way that it was done’.12 In this context, he had harsh criticism for all those who had ‘betrayed’ him, and especially Shertok, whom he rightly accused of showing loyalty to Mapai rather than to his principles, out of selfish concern for his position in the party élite.13 Shertok’s ‘betrayal’ of Weizmann added to his image as a vacillating politician.

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The reality was that relations between Shertok and his ‘dear chief ’ had begun to deteriorate before the congress, when Shertok reconsidered Weizmann’s concessionary attitude towards immigration, which in his Palestinocentric approach had always been a major consideration for all members of Mapai, including Shertok. He became particularly sensitive to this issue after the Holocaust. Sensing Shertok’s ambivalent position, already evident during the congress, the elderly leader had severed his relations with his younger colleague. Subsequently, when Shertok asked to see him to mend broken fences, the old lion responded saying, T have nothing to tell you, and I have no wish to recall the nightmare of Basle.’14 A month after the congress, Weizmann confided in David Ginzburg, ‘Shertok is capable, he works hard, but he is under the total influence of his master, whoever that may be at the moment. There is a need to boost his courage, since his spine is very soft indeed.’15 The alienation between Shertok and Weizmann lasted until late 1947, when Shertok finally succeeded in altering Weizmann’s hostile attitude to­ wards him by constantly keeping the old leader informed about political developments, consulting him about most moves, expressing personal loyalty to him, and pursuing his policies. The outright hostility between the two eventually lessened, but the old intimacy was irrevocably shattered and never restored. Despite his deep sense of betrayal and loss, immediately after the congress, Weizmann tried to stage a come-back through organizing a new faction whose aim was to launch a ‘coup’ in the Executive, but he failed in obtaining support for this idea. Like Shertok, the moderate members of the Agency Executive on whom Weizmann had formerly relied—Kaplan, Sprinzak, Locker, Chaim Greenberg, Rose Halperin, and Goldmann—were now unwilling to go out on a limb to ensure a successful counter-attack on his behalf. As far as Shertok was concerned, as noted, he extended a conciliatory hand to his previous mentor and colleague in the hope that: Weizmann would understand he must collaborate with the new Executive [that had been elected towards the end of the Twenty-Second Congress] because it is the only Executive that the Jewish people has, and t h a t . . . in a parliamentary situation created by the people’s wish, [it] cannot be different. If, as a result of his own desire, he shows readiness to co-operate with the Executive, the Executive will not refuse to be helped by Weizmann, by the glory of his personality, and by his great influence.16

Here it should be noted that Ben-Gurion’s followers are not accurate when they claim that the Weizmann-Ben-Gurion controversy was over

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strategy alone and that the gap between their strategic positions was unbridgeable. In fact, the political attitudes of the two were not that far apart—basically, since 1936 both had supported partition. The struggle between them had most to do with personal style and animosity. Moreover, to a certain extent it was one-sided with Ben-Gurion envying his elder colleague almost to the point of outright hatred.17 In retrospect, however, in this congress Shertok did not draw the proper conclusions from the previous stages of the Weizmann-BenGurion clash in terms of his own political interests. It is likely that he would have fared much better if he had continued explicitly to support Weizmann and more closely collaborate with moderate leaders, such as Kaplan and Sprinzak, towards the end of 1946, than he did by implicitly supporting Ben-Gurion and thus alienating Weizmann. Although his short-term alliance with Ben-Gurion contributed to unity in Mapai and helped him to improve and consolidate his position in the Labour élite, and although he did eventually revive his full identification and intimate relations with the leaders of the moderate camp to become one of its most senior ones, in the longer run he would pay very dearly for that decision in both personal and political terms. Later he too would clash violently with Ben-Gurion, who did not forget Shertok’s alliance with Weizmann, and then, mirroring Shertok’s own behaviour during the 1946 congress, some of the moderates were to withdraw their support for him during subsequent critical moments. At the time, however, as a result of his support for Ben-Gurion and the realignment in the 1946 World Zionist Congress, he did succeed in establishing himself as the senior spokesman on foreign affairs not only for the Yishuv but also for the entire Zionist movement. Out of respect for Weizmann and in order to prevent a new split in the Zionist movement, the delegates to the Twenty-Second Zionist Congress refrained from electing a new president of the movement at the same venue where he had been so severely defeated. Hence, the activists Ben-Gurion and Silver had to content themselves with less than they had hoped for in the way of completing the ‘chief ’s’ defeat and taking over the Agency Executive. Subsequently, a three-sided coalition comprising Mapai, the General Zionists, and Hamizrahi was formée} during the congress, further consolidating what was to become known as the ‘historical alliance’ between these three parties; until the 1960s these parties would serve as the nucleus of almost all governmental coalitions in the Yishuv and Israel. In accordance with the electoral system of Proportional Representation practised by the Zionist movement and the Yishuv, the seats on the enlarged Executive were divided proportionally

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among the coalitional partners. Consequently, Ben-Gurion was re-elected chairman of the Executive, his deputies were the activist Rabbi Yehuda Leib Fishman of the Hamizrahi, and the moderate Yitzhak Gruenbaum of the General Zionists, and the rest of the seats were divided between moderates and activists. The overall balance in the Executive, however, was still in favour of the moderates. Thus the carefully structured delicate balance was restored in the movement. Even though the activists had not succeeded in winning enough votes to go it alone, another significant result of the Twenty-Second Congress was the increased importance of Rabbi Silver, the activist leader of the American Zionist movement, and the removal of Silver’s main oppo­ nent, the moderate Rabbi Stephen Wise, from his influential position. Another of Weizmann’s moderate associates, Nahum Goldmann, was ‘exiled’ from the increasingly important Washington office to the now dwindling London office. The ascent of a few activist leaders in the USA did not essentially alter the composition of the élite. The balance between moderates and activists was maintained at the top of the élite with Shertok’s unanimous re-election as the chairman of the Political Department, with Eliezer Kaplan’s re-election as chairman of the Finance Department, and the presence of, other moderates, such as Chaim Greenberg, Eliahu Dobkin, Berl Locker of Mapai, Peretz Bernstein, Selig Brodetsky, Nahum Goldmann, Rose Halperin of the General Zionists, Moshe Shapira and Shmuel Zalman Shragai of Hamizrahi. However, the fact that BenGurion and Sneh were given the defence portfolio in addition to the chairmanship of the Executive paved the way for Ben-Gurion’s grad­ ually increasing power on the Executive. The current and expected increasing significance of the political and diplomatic dimension of the ‘Palestine problem’ indicated that Shertok, by now the widely acknowledged ‘foreign minister’ of both the Zionist movement and the Yishuv, would have to spend most of the following months out of Palestine. Becoming aware of this possibility, he intro­ duced a number of functional changes in the Political Department in Jerusalem. Much like his revered mentor Arlosoroff, he began delegating the responsibility for the daily affairs of the department, asking Golda Meyerson, who was a new member of the Executive, to carry on as the Jerusalem Department’s head. This left him free to assume direct responsibility for the activities of the Political Department branches in New York and'Washington, as well as for the overall supervision and co-ordination of the activities of all four existing branches. His pre­ dominance in his department was not jeopardized by his consent that the

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department’s two US branches would be run in close consultation with the American Jewish leadership. This reorganization also meant that the Agency’s Political Department would grow in both number and in the diversity and complexity of the tasks at hand. Shertok therefore hand­ picked a large group of younger people to work closely with him.18 Most of these men eventually became central to formulating and executing the foreign policy of both the Yishuv and Israel. This group included Walter Eytan, David Horowitz, Elias Sasson, Arthur Lourie, Mordechai Eliash, Eliahu Epstein-Elath, Aubrey Eban, Zeev Sharef, Teddy Kollek, Moshe Toff, Gideon Ruffer-Rafael, and a few other talented officials. Since most of these appointments or promotions were political in nature, it is not surprising that the majority of those chosen were either loyal members of Mapai or had shown an affinity towards the Labour camp. During the few months after the congress, Shertok also consolidated the intelligence section of the Political Department that was led by Reuven Zaslani-Shiloah and Ezra Danin. Once the reorganization of the Executive and its various departments was completed, it hastened to confirm Weizmann’s caustic observation that it was not his political views that had caused the rift between him and them; for this old-new group almost immediately began to seek diplomatic rapprochement with the British to negotiate future possible arrangements in Palestine and, generally speaking, reintroduced Havlagah. However, when Shertok, who arrived in London in early January 1947, communicated to the British that the Executive was willing to resume talks with them, his diplomatic feelers were publicly rebuffed by the Foreign Office on the grounds that the Agency’s pre-conditions, as well as its wider goals, were incompatible with British needs and intentions. Yet Shertok was not disheartened, for during that period the Colonial Office, led by Creech-Jones, showed a certain degree of optim­ ism concerning the possibility of reaching agreement with the Jews.19 At this point the Executive made a major political decision, which would have significant implications. In view of the disappointing British response to its feelers, albeit without severing contacts with Whitehall, the Executive decided that it must shift the centre of its activities from London to Washington.20 Accordingly, on 13 January 1947#Shertok left London for the USA on a short fact-finding mission, to organize the work of the Political Department, and to make initial preparations for his planned prolonged sojourn there. Later, his wife, Zipora, and their two younger children, Yael and Chaim, would join him. As soon as he arrived in the USA for his initial short visit, Shertok moved to establish his authority in the rapidly expanding Agency

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machinery. Then and there, he accepted the resignation of Weizmann’s appointee Meyer Weisgal as the political secretary of the Agency’s New York branch, and appointed his own associate Arthur Lourie instead. He also approved the appointment of another confident, Eliahu EpsteinElath, as the director of the Washington office of the Political Depart­ ment. Having completed the first round of personnel changes in the senior and middle echelons in the USA, Shertok was ready to take up the political and diplomatic tasks that lay ahead of him, including preparatory talks with the Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and with the influential director of the State Department’s Near Eastern department, Loy Henderson. Although Henderson initially showed some faint empathy for Shertok and for the Yishuv’s position, his superior, Acheson, was cool both towards the Zionist cause and Shertok. Thus during Shertok’s first meeting with these two seasoned American diplomats, they already made it unequivocally clear that the State Department was not going to approach the British with regard to the impending negotiations in London. In view of the disappointing results of this first meeting, Shertok insisted on a meeting with President Truman’s close adviser David Niles, but all that the staunch pro-Zionist could promise Shertok was that the president would not alter his position concerning the necessity of allowing Holocaust refugees to immigrate to Palestine. Niles also strongly suggested that Shertok should make a careful study of the administration’s policy-making patterns and maintain as close contacts as possible with the State Department, which he said played an enor­ mous role in American policy formation towards the Middle East and Palestine.21 A major reshuffling of personnel in the State Department that coin­ cided with Shertok’s visit did not augur well for the Yishuv’s position. In this reshuffle, George Marshall replaced James Byrnes as Secretary of State; Robert Lovett succeeded Dean Acheson as Under-Secretary of State; Colonel William Eddy was appointed chief of research and intelligence; George Kennan became chief of political planning; and Charles Bohlen and Michael McDermott were appointed advisers to Marshall. This reshuffling, the promotion of pro-Arab officials and diplomats, together with the retention of veteran ‘Arabists’, such as Loy Henderson, Gordon Merriam, and Fraser Wilkins, indicated to the American members of the Jewish Agency Executive and to Shertok that they would face'major obstacles on the Zionists’ way to independence. While Shertok was trying to sort out the situation in Washington, the British were about to open the simultaneous ‘informal’ talks on the

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M orrison-Grady Plan with the Arabs and the Jews. Ben-Gurion came to London from Jerusalem to participate in what would become known as the ‘Second St James’s Conference’ (the first was the London Conference of 1939, leading to that year’s infamous White Paper). In view of Britain’s troubles concerning the future of India, the military and political deterioration in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and the severe economic crisis at home, the British government, and especially the foreign secretary, Bevin, imparted to Ben-Gurion and his colleagues, as well as to the American government, that they were ready to relegate the complex and insoluble Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine to the UN. But as Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and their associates soon found out, there was a catch in this position: Bevin was not ready to make any firm commitment that Britain would co-operate with the world body on the complex issues involved, or even recommend a feasible solution.22 In fact, however, the British cabinet was divided on the subject, one camp supporting Bevin in the hope that the UN would create a unitary Arab state which would have a Jewish minority even after it accepted 100,000 Jewish refugees. The other camp was led by Creech-Jones. At this point Creech-Jones and his supporters reverted to the traditional Colonial Office position—partition. From Bevin’s point of view, the talks with the Arabs and the Jews were designed to show the world that the two sides were totally at odds, supporting diametrically opposed solutions, and that only the UN had any chance of finding a feasible solution. Bevin re-emphasized then that Britain would not submit any proposal for the solution of the problem. Bevin and the prime minister, Attlee, both expected the Arabs to hold the upper hand in the UN and ipso facto that they would secur British strategic interests in that part of the world.23 The Agency Executive, none the less, was committed to participate in the new round of talks. Shertok arrived in London on the eve of the conference, which the colonial secretary, Creech-Jones, labelled ‘periodic consultations’ and in which both communities would present their views. The separate talks with the Jewish and Arab delegations opened on 29 January 1947, with Creech-Jones and Bevin heading the British delegation and Ben-Gurion, with Shertok, leading a large Jewish group. Of these two, only Shertok felt sadness as well as some remorse that the third member of the old triumvirate, Chaim Weizmann, was missing from these talks. Creech-Jones opened the Anglo-Jewish section of the London Con­ ference by posing questions designed to examine the degree of the Jews’ commitment to partition, which had been rejected by the Arabs. One of the questions that he put forward to the Jews was whether at all an

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agreed solution might be found. Leading a large Jewish delegation to a major international conference for the first time, Ben-Gurion responded first by expressing the Jews’ undaunted commitment to statehood, their determination to obtain changes in British policy concerning immigra­ tion, land, and settlement, and to re-establish good relations with the government. Finally, again in accordance with recent Zionist resolutions, he also hinted that they would consider statehood in a part of Palestine, that is, they might consider partition, promising to respect any Arabs who were citizens of such a Jewish state. Bevin then responded that Britain was opposed to partition, mainly on the grounds that a small Arab state in only a part of the territory would not be a viable political and economic entity, and that therefore it would be highly unstable and cause irreversible deterioration in the region. On this occasion he called the Balfour Declaration a ‘disaster’, because it had made ‘dual promises’ in regard to Palestine, thus serving as the root cause of the troubles in the Holy Land. Since Ben-Gurion formally led and personally dominated the Jewish delegation, all Shertok could do in his sporadic interventions was to elaborate on the Jews’ demands for sovereignty and outline the official Jewish position on the interim arrangements until the establishment of a Jewish entity, which were in line with his conception of gradual develop­ ment towards independence. But he was able to reiterate loud and clear his profound belief that there was a real possibility of attaining an agreement with the Arabs, although not a permanent solution.24 At the end of the first informal and non-structured meeting, the Jewish delegation was asked to submit its reactions and proposals so that the British could present them to the Arab delegation. In the second meeting, held on 3 February, the Jewish delegation presented its oppo­ sition to cantonization, territorial autonomy, and a bi-national state, and restated its support of partition, but refused to submit its map of their conception of the borders of a Jewish state. The ambiguous Jewish response determined to a certain degree the next British move. On 7 and 8 February 1947 the British presented the ‘Bevin Plan’ to both the Arabs and the Jews. In essence this plan was based on the M orrison-Grady Plan and proposed that Britain should maintain the Mandate for an additional five years as a UN trusteeship, during which period the old-new mandatory power would prepare the ground for the establishment of a unitary bi-national state in Palestine with autonomoûs Jewish and Arab regions. The submission of this problematic plan was in accordance with Britain’s hope that it would be either categorically accepted or rejected by the two communities. As

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noted, the British fail-back position was to submit the entire issue to the UN. Creech-Jones, who had demonstrated pro-Zionist attitudes in the past and endorsed the Colonial Office’s traditional support for partition, endeavoured to explain to his Zionist friends the imperial strategic considerations that dictated the retreat from his previous position. But the true reason for his switch was that he owed political allegiance to Bevin and that the Foreign Office was more senior and powerful in the political hierarchy than the Colonial Office for which he was respon­ sible.25 As expected, the Jewish delegation promptly rejected Bevin’s new plan, calling it a far worse solution than the Morrison-Grady Plan, which they had previously rejected. The Jewish delegation regarded the Bevin Plan as ‘a return to the hated 1939 White Paper’. But nothing the delegates said could sway Bevin, who nevertheless showed an interest in finding out what the Agency Executive viewed as the appropriate boundaries of a Jewish state. He therefore asked the Agency to present their map of such a state. The Jewish delegation retorted that they would be ready to do so only if the British presented their own map of the proposed autonomous Jewish regions. Ben-Gurion then made a move that he himself had severely criticized Weizmann for: when asked again to draw a map of the coveted borders of the Jewish state, he set up a secret tête-à-tête meeting between himself and Bevin in which he hoped to reach agreement with his tough opponent, but to no avail. During a subsequent meeting, in which Shertok and the economist David Horowitz participated, Ben-Gurion and Shertok submitted a map of a Jewish state, which had been drawn by them together with a few other members of the Executive. When Bevin and the two Jewish leaders compared their respective maps, it soon became clear that the Jewish and the British notions of what a Jewish state and the autonomous regions would comprise were substan­ tially different. Significantly from the Yishuv’s perspective, as a result of these discussions with Bevin, Ben-Gurion and Shertok learned that the British had major strategic plans for the Negev, which the Yishuv leaders wanted dearly, and which, mainly out of strategic considerations, the British had allotted to the Arabs.26 Shertok, and especially Ben-Gurion, would not forget this aspect of Bevin’s position and it would determine many of their policies in the future. In the mean time, appalled by this train of events and by the unacceptable British proposals, the Jewish leaders went public to pro­ mulgate their position. During a widely attended press conference, and in a communication to The Times, Shertok squarely rejected the ‘Bevin

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Plan’.27 Then, as Shertok had expected, the Arabs also rejected the plan because they adamantly claimed sovereignty over all of Palestine. Sher­ tok was forced by the logic of the situation and against his better judgement, to air the Agency’s own intention to take the matter to the UN.28 The fifth meeting between the two British ministers and their assistants and the Jewish delegation was held on 13 February 1947. The colonial secretary, Creech-Jones, opened this meeting by saying that neither the Arabs nor the Jews could agree to any one plan and that the Jews did not submit an explicit plan, therefore, the government would have no other choice but to submit the Palestine issue to the UN. Answering the British ministers, Ben-Gurion outlined the Agency’s order of priorities; the implementation of the Biltmore Program; reverting to the Mandate as implemented before 1939; and partition. In his response, Shertok insisted that the British also must submit their recommendations to the UN, some of which should be favourable to the Jews. This hope was repeated in Ben-Gurion’s secret letter to Bevin which again emphasized the Jews’ links to the West, their adherence to liberal norms, and the traditional close relations between the Palestinian and British Labour movements. This was yet another major turning-point in the history of Palestine, and one that hastened the establishment of the Jewish state. During two stormy cabinet sessions (on 14 and 18 February), Bevin and CreechJones reported on the equal rejection of their new plan by Jews and Arabs, and obtained Attlee’s, and the entire cabinet’s, support for rejecting the partition idea and referring the Palestine issue to the UN in the next regular session the coming September. During the interim period, Bevin and Creech-Jones suggested, the British must maintain a restrictive policy, particularly in regard to Jewish immigration.29 Bevin communicated the cabinet’s decisions to George Marshall, who, mainly out of American considerations, demanded that the issue be taken up immediately in the UN’s Trusteeship Council rather than in the assem­ bly, but also pressed the British to increase immigration quotas, a matter which became crucial for the Americans in Europe and at home. After a few additional cabinet meetings, the British realized they had no other choice but to announce in Parliament, on 25 February 1947, their failure to solve the Palestine problem and therefore to refer it to the UN. In the same speech, Bevin launched a vicious attack on President Truman and on the ‘New York Jews’, who had allegedly frustrated the routine development of Palestine.30 Historians still debate the real intentions behind the cabinet’s, and especially Bevin’s, moves, but at the time, Ben-Gurion and Shertok, who

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in the aftermath of the 1946 Zionist Congress had re-established a cordial working coalition, agreed that the British were planning to evacuate Palestine sooner or later, and that the Yishuv would then be attacked by both Palestinian Arabs and the neighbouring states. Since they expected the main diplomatic arena to be the UN, and the main military battlefield of course in Palestine, the two set out to prepare for the struggle that would be waged in these two arenas, dividing the tasks that each would be responsible for. This was the starting-point of a process during which two autonomous domains were established and which would come to compete for supremacy in the Yishuv and especially in Israel: Ben-Gurion would control defence and social policy, and Shertok establish his autonomy in conducting foreign affairs. The third partner in this coalitional arrangement was another ‘dove’—the ‘economic tsar’ Eliezer Kaplan. Consequently, by March 1947 Ben-Gurion had inaugurated his fa­ mous ‘seminar’ (namely, self-education, survey, and evaluation) on the security and defence issues facing the Yishuv, and the best military strategies to attain its goals. Simultaneously, Shertok was already absorbed in the preparations for the political and diplomatic struggle that would lead to the long-awaited establishment of the Jewish state in a part of Palestine. Hence instead of returning to Palestine for a reunion with his family, department, and party, immediately after the end of that London Conference Shertok travelled to the USA to set the wheels in motion for the tasks in his domain. As soon as he arrived in New York on 23 February 1947, he plunged into a dizzying whirlpool of activities and meetings, aimed at counterbalancing British actions and denigrating Bevin himself. Shertok particularly insisted on the need for pressures concerning immigration and land regulations. Interestingly, notwith­ standing both his and Ben-Gurion’s agreement on policy, as well as his anti-British campaign, Shertok had second thoughts about whether the British really intended to withdraw from the Mandate and evacuate Palestine.31 Unlike Ben-Gurion, who was totally convinced that the failure of the London conference marked ‘the end of an affair [the British mandate]’, Shertok regarded it as a transitory period. * Internally, to create new arrangements and establish ‘facts’ as quickly as possible during this transitory period, Shertok hastened to reinforce his authority in the American branch of the Jewish Agency. Despite the opposition of activists on the American Executive, Shertok decided to recall the moderate Nahum Goldmann from London to head the New York office, because of his excellent contacts there. However, to balance

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this blatant affront to the activists, Shertok worked hard to establish good working relations with the powerful activist Abba Hillel Silver. Knowing well that Jerusalem was the centre and Shertok’s senior position there, Silver willingly co-operated with Shertok, and soon complimented him on his political and diplomatic acumen. Shertok then defined the scope of the moderate Eliahu Epstein’s responsibilities and authority in the Washington office. Having set the two American Executive offices into operation in accordance with his design, Shertok took another daring step: he prepared the grounds for Weizmann to be invited to confer with President Truman. Disregarding his critics, Sher­ tok argued that his former mentor was indispensable in establishing effective Yishuv relations with the White House, since Truman still regarded Weizmann as a discussion partner of equal calibre on the future of Palestine. During that short visit to the USA, Shertok also met the Secretary of State, George Marshall, and, in the old Arlosoroff tradition, he focused mainly on long-range philosophical and historical issues throughout this meeting. On that occasion, Marshall promised to discuss the issues Shertok had raised during his next planned meeting with Bevin in Moscow.32 Important political decisions have a life of their own; thus whether or not it had been intented, the British cabinet’s decision to submit the Palestine question to the UN served as a catalyst to processes that it would have been difficult to stop. Shertok therefore had to deal with the ramifications of that British decision, especially in the light of the Agency’s publicly proclaimed readiness to face the challenge. It was in this context that he met the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, and learned that he had already developed his own ideas regarding the Palestine problem. Shertok’s evaluation was that these ideas were inspired by, and co-ordinated with, the British delegate to the Security Council, Sir Alexander Cadogan, who had demanded to expedite the procedure of submission of that problem to the world organization. And indeed, Trygve Lie had decided to form a committee to deal with the issue. None the less, the UN Secretary-General promised Shertok that the Jews would be invited to testify before this committee. After his initial talks with Lie, Shertok felt that the Secretary-General was a neutral and objective international official, and that his contacts with him would be valuable in the future—an assessment that proved to be correct. Shertok intended to cultivate friendly relations with Lie. In the mean time, and closely following David Niles’s advice, Shertok began his own ‘seminar’, that is, acquainting himself with the intricacies of the US administration and other influential figures in Washington,

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such as former Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, who then was preparing a series of articles on the Palestine imbroglio. During his meetings with such figures, Shertok learned that the administration was far from enthusiastic about the U N ’s role in the Middle East, especially in view of the danger of Soviet penetration or intervention in the region, which, under George Kennan’s influence, was deemed strategically very significant for ensuring various American needs and interests, such as oil and political support. Nevertheless, Shertok became also aware that the US government was interested in maintaining Britain’s involvement there, mainly because it did not wish to over-extend its forces by assuming responsibility for solving the Palestinian quagmire. Therefore, as he discovered, the Americans were preparing to suggest yet another expert Commission of Inquiry to investigate the situation in Palestine, this time under the auspices o f the UN. Armed with this information and alarmed by its meaning, Shertok finally returned to Palestine for consultations with his associates on the Agency Executive, together with a group of American Jewish leaders who had come to conduct their own investigations in the Holy Land. As soon as Shertok landed in Lydda airport, he sensed that indeed the country was in the middle of a growing imbroglio. For during his time in the USA, the security situation had deteriorated to the point where Shertok and the Jewish American leaders could not join their relatives and hosts and had to spend the night of their arrival at the airport, which had been sealed off became of the threat of a major Arab attack.33 In fact, in March 1947 the Irgun and LHI also stepped up their struggle against the British. The Irgun was responsible for the killing of eighteen British civilians and soldiers, and LHI boasted killing more than three hundred British. To protect their Middle Eastern imperial interests, the lives of their officials, and in reaction to the growing strife in the territory, the British deployed more than a hundred thousand soldiers in the country. In Jerusalem on the day after his arrival in Palestine Shertok found himself thrust into the centre of political developments that would further enhance his position in the Yishuv and the world Zionist movement. Contrary to later arguments by activist leaders, including Ben-Gurion, in March 1947 the Jewish Agency Executive was heavily involved in the possible ramifications of the impending submission of the Palestine question to the UN. For example, the witty Nahum Goldmann rightly commented at the time that the Agency Executive was expecting the UN to ‘make a new Balfour Declaration’.34The Executive was ready to invest maximal effort to extract a favourable resolution from that organization.

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And it was Shertok who was chiefly responsible for planning and executing the gigantic political and diplomatic operation in this direc­ tion. The comprehensive campaign that Shertok was about to launch in 1947-8 was succinctly planned during that visit, and later meticulously executed. In addition to his senior staff, which was composed of all those younger, brilliant, and dedicated Jewish officials and diplomats, he recruited experts such as the legal adviser to the World Jewish Congress, Dr Jacob Robinson, who had gained valuable experience and fame as special adviser to the Jewish, delegation at the 1945 San Francisco Conference. Appropriately, Robinson was charged with the supervision of the collection and assessment of background material on the position held by a variety of national delegations and the personalities of their heads. Consequently, Shertok was very well versed in these matters, and, thanks to his phenomenal memory and impressive ability to digest vast quantities of information, could use it very effectively during his future encounters with these politicians and diplomats. Shertok was also the natural leader of the systematic discussions held within the Executive in preparation for the grand battle in the UN. In the first of these series of strategic planning meetings, he quoted Sumner Welles’s advice to take the UN exceedingly seriously because its resolu­ tions would be of quintessential importance in the future of Palestine. In accordance with this basic assumption, which he fully accepted, Shertok proposed that all members of the UN, except for the five Arab countries which participated in the organization, should be the targets of their campaign. Moreover, in stressing the overriding role of the three great powers, Shertok predicted that the role of the Soviet Union would be critical in any decision taken at the UN.35 He therefore concluded that he himself should continue developing close relations with Soviet politi­ cians and diplomats in the USA. He then divided into four groups the rest of the UN members that should be approached—the representatives of the British Commonwealth, European, Latin American, and Asian countries. In this context, he admitted that China, but not India where his emissaries had visited and conducted in-depth talks, was a total enigma to him and that special efforts should be made to approach its delegation. Since every country would have a vote on whatever resolu­ tion was brought before the General Assembly, he also concluded that the Zionists had to ‘decentralize’ their efforts rather than ‘concentrate’ them on a few states. Hence, he warned himself and those who were to be involved in thè diplomatic operation that they must not neglect the peripheral member states.36 Here Shertok made special mention of what he called ‘the anti-imperialist circle’, especially the Latin American

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states, where ‘there was no anti-Zionist ploy’, which, he hoped, would serve as their main source of support. Yet he warned that the Arab countries, and established Arab communities in Latin America, would exert great pressure on these UN members, and that the Vatican would do everything possible to protect the interests of the Church and its Arab allies in that part of the world.37 In the anticipated political and diplomatic struggle, Shertok planned to rely primarily on activities centred in a command post that he was setting up in New York, rather than on activities of the local Zionist organizations. For this purpose, he specified the tasks assigned to each member of the American Agency Executive. According to his division of labour, he would be responsible for co-ordinating the entire campaign and contacts with a number of important members, such as the Soviet Union and China, Rabbi Silver and himself would be responsible for contacts with the US administration in Washington, and other members of the American Executive would be responsible either for a group of UN members or for special tasks. In view of these detailed preparations, most of the Executive members expressed their confidence that this campaign would be highly efficient. As could have been expected, it was not long before Shertok and Ben-Gurion, who was deeply engaged in the realms of defence, disagreed over the next political and diplomatic moves. While Ben-Gurion op­ posed any form of trusteeship in place of the British Mandate, Shertok advised flexibility also in this respect, reminding Ben-Gurion that the recent Zionist Congress had passed a resolution to the effect that the Zionist movement would only object to a trusteeship that prevented Jewish independence. While this resolution meant that Shertok could overrule the opposition of Ben-Gurion, Silver, and their activist partners in this context, the disagreement between the two camps created the need for further ‘compromises and synthesis’, in which Shertok’s hand would be clearly visible. Worried about the possibility of chaos in Palestine, the Jerusalem Executive instructed its representatives in the USA to adhere to the resolutions adopted at the Twenty-Second Zionist Congress, and demand from the USA and the UN that the British continue to implement the Mandate until Jewish and Arab sovereignty was estab­ lished. On his part, Shertok was able to influence the ^Executive to instruct its representatives in the USA to consider any compromise solution that ensured the Jews’ rights for large-scale immigration and settlement in part of Palestine.38 By late March 1947 most Jewish leaders felt that they were finally on the way towards the establishment of a Jewish state. In Shertok’s words,

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‘the Jewish demand for the ingathering and the revival of the State of Israel [there is no doubt that this was an early use of this combination of words] is based on the right, on the needs, and on the power of the Yishuv.’ However, there still existed disagreement among the Zionist leaders regarding the extent to which the British could be trusted. BenGurion and his followers called the recent British move towards a UN-imposed solution a cover for their desire to maintain the Mandate. But by then, Shertok felt strongly that British withdrawal from the territory was almost a foregone conclusion once they formally submitted the Palestine issue to that body. Following his generally more flexible and trusting approach towards co-operation with the powers and international bodies, Shertok was determined to concentrate his own and his staff ’s energies on securing American and Soviet support for partition when the problem came before the UN. This was closely linked to his belief that since Britain emerged extremely weakened from the Second World W ar and France was devastated, the USA was the only real Western superpower, which could therefore exert pressure on Britain, France, and China, that the American Jewish lobby was an effective force, that through the Truman Doctrine the USA was deeply involved in Middle Eastern politics, and that this doctrine had shown the Americans’ commitment to solve regional problems.39 Shertok’s accurate perceptions during this critical period constituted a significant influence on the way in which the Jewish Agency developed its ‘American orientation’, neglecting neither its ‘British orientation’, which had been associated with Weizmann, nor the attempt to secure the support of the Soviet Union for the establishment of a Jewish state. Thus Ben-Gurion was not alone in emphasizing the need to co-operate closely with the Americans, as some of his adherents have maintained. Among the countries that Shertok said the Jews should maintain regular contacts with was Transjordan, whose ‘independence is a fact, and no power would be able to change this fact in our lifetime, unless there will be a new Sodom and Gomorrah’.40 Furthermore, he main­ tained that the size, development, and historical rights of the Transjor­ danian Bedouin tribes to maintain an independent entity rendered the Yishuv’s claim for Zionist independence more emphatic. In pressing this point, Shertok emphasized its potential tactical diplomatic use: that Transjordan’s independence signalled the de facto partition of Palestine, and also that the Jews, too, were entitled to their own state. Since he did not respect King Abdullah, this position stemmed from necessity rather than trust and genuine hope for co-operation.

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While the British, Arabs, and Jews were planning and organizing their diplomatic campaigns in the UN, the security situation in Palestine continued to deteriorate. The situation was exacerbated by a further marked escalation of terrorist activities by the Irgun and LHI, including the blowing up of a British officers’ club in Jerusalem and scattered attacks against civilians who worked for the mandatory authorities. Jewish terrorism against the British was carried out alongside, but also triggered, Arab terrorism against the mandatory power, as. well as against Jews and Jewish property. The deterioration in Palestine led Shertok, who never lacked the political or personal courage to speak out when necessary, to grapple with some of the more fundamental ques­ tions facing all combative national liberation movements. Subsequently he became the standard-bearer in the combat against Jewish terrorism, which triggered British retaliatory action not just against the dissident militias, but also against the Haganah, and Arab terrorism against both British and Jews. Shertok’s accusation against the Irgun and LHI was based on plain and basic moral arguments as well as on his staunch belief in the efficacy of non-violent methods. Hence not only did he feel ‘the need to maintain the purity of the Yishuv struggle’,41 but he was also convinced that uncontrolled terrorism obstructed the political and diplo­ matic campaign he was about to begin. In this spirit, Shertok launched a fierce attack against Jewish terror in Palestine as well as against the political activities of the Irgun in the USA. In this he did not hesitate to use the term ‘fascists’ when describing them, in the sense that they were striving ‘to establish a power base within the framework of the democratic structure of the Yishuv, and then to dominate it’.42 Stating that ‘terrorism is a monster that indis­ criminately destroys everything’, he added that the leaders of these dissident groups ‘were in a cognitive and mental cellar’. Thus, he told the Mapai Secretariat that the Yishuv’s military struggle should be conducted wisely and ‘closely co-ordinated with political efforts’, with an open eye on wider political implications as well as on immediate results.43 N or did Shertok content himself with making these arguments in Palestine; he repeated them publicly after his return to the USA in early April 1947—which added to his emerging reputation as a*moderate in both government and Jewish circles in that country. Shertok returned to his post in the USA in time to take advantage of the atmosphere created by America’s suspicions about possible Soviet intervention in the Middle East and Jewish pressure that had been exerted on the White House. In the wake of Britain’s official request in early April 1947 that the Palestine problem be discussed by the UN, and

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its commitment to accept (but not undertake the implementation o f) any resolution supported by two-thirds of the delegates to the UN Assembly, Trygve Lie scheduled a special General Assembly Meeting for 28 April 1947. The growing awareness that this assembly was going to discuss substance as well as procedures made it imperative that the Yishuv be officially represented and take part in the UN deliberations. Therefore Shertok and Silver dispatched a passionate letter to most of the delega­ tions requesting them to support the Yishuv’s participation in the forthcoming discussions. To their great indignation, the American ad­ ministration initially adopted a neutral stance, pointing out that only full members had this right, and that a change in this respect to the advantage of the Jewish Agency, which did not have even an observer status, would mean acceding to similar requests from the Palestine Arab Higher Committee on the one hand, and other Jewish organizations on the other. The American position, which had been closely co-ordinated with the British, drew heated fire from Jews in Palestine and the USA; but the Americans remained firm.44 Uruguay, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, however, were more forthcom­ ing on this matter. Although initially few observers attached any significance ,to the position of the latter two states, Shertok, who had been the architect of the Yishuv’s close connections with Central and Eastern European countries, took heart. And indeed the wider implica­ tions of the support given by these two East European countries in regard to the Agency’s status in the forthcoming discussions in the UN, became evident when—in a startling diplomatic development and con­ trary to all expectations—Andrei Gromyko, then deputy foreign minis­ ter, and the head of the Soviet delegation to the UN, warmly supported the Jewish Agency’s request for participation in these deliberations. Only then did embarrassed Western delegations realize that the Poles and the Czechs had not made their move in isolation, and only then did it become known that Shertok and his associates had been in continuous contact with the Soviet Union. Armed with the Soviet support, Shertok and Epstein approached Loy Henderson in an attempt to change America’s position on seating an Agency delegation at the Special Assembly. But both the American and British delegations remained adamantly opposed to the Agency’s request, agreeing only to support the appearance of representative Arab and Jewish organizations before the UN Political Committee, but not in the General Assembly. Moreover, the Americans and the British endeavoured to suppress continued Agency agitation for representation by approaching and encouraging

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other Jewish organizations to request similar rights. Nevertheless, Shertok and Silver were able to stifle most of these attempts and maintain a united Jewish front; only the ultra-Orthodox Agudat Israel, and the American branch of the Irgun continued to demand that right to appear separately before the UN committees.45 In view of the political deadlock created by the Americans and British, Shertok sensed that the time had come to approach President Truman directly. Through a series of preliminary talks with White House pro-Zionists, such as David Niles and Clark Clifford, Shertok located the source of opposition to the Agency’s request for a meeting with Truman: the State Department’s legal adviser and its Arabists. To ward off this opposition, he and Rabbi Silver then launched a concentrated campaign to organize Jewish pressure on Truman. As part of this campaign, Shertok himself made a series of public speeches in early May 1947. This campaign ultimately proved successful. On 7 May 1947 Truman instructed his Secretary of State, George Marshall, and the US delegation to the UN, to support the Agency’s demand to represent the Yishuv, änd in fact the Jews in all UN bodies. Silver and Shertok rejoiced even with these tactical achievements; they were confident that such small attainments served their main strategy. Shertok also prided himself that, despite the new sympathetic Amer­ ican position, the Soviets did not alter their support for the Agency and the Yishuv. Although this might have looked like an insignificant diplomatic achievement, it indicated the crystallization of a political orientation that would persist for over five years, and a jumping-off point for further diplomatic attainments. Moreover, this was the break­ through that Shertok and Silver had been seeking: to create a situation in which the Americans and the Soviets could co-operate, even impli­ citly, in supporting the Jewish cause. Indeed, this tacit agreement prompted the UN Special General Assembly to allow the representatives of Jewish and Arab communities to participate in the deliberations of the U N ’s First Committee.46 Besides paving the way for tacit American-Soviet co-operation, the successful campaign for representation at the UN meant that the Jewish Agency was officially recognized as the main representative of a large segment of the Jewish people and a legitimate international political actor. In turn, this achievement necessitated the establishment of an advisory body composed of all the major Jewish organizations that had shown interest in Palestine, as well as a further and very significant move which Shertok willingly sponsored: extending the Jewish Agency by including representatives of these organizations on the basis of parity,

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with the Jerusalem centre maintaining its supremacy in the enlarged body. Again it was Ben-Gurion who vehemently rejected a proposal that Shertok either initiated or sponsored. On this occasion, Ben-Gurion did not content himself with rejecting this proposal behind the closed doors of the Jerusalem Executive, but promised to oppose it to the hilt in the USA during his next visit there. In this case, he won the majority of the Executive over to his view, and the idea, which Shertok supported, was not implemented at that time.47 Even then, however, the ‘enlargement’ of the Agency was not a dead issue; its implementation was only postponed, for Shertok had identified a real emotional and political Jewish need whose fulfilment he would help to realize in 1948. Once the obstacle of representation at the UN was removed, Shertok and Silver could concentrate on preparing for their appearance before the UN Political Committee, which was scheduled for 5 May 1947. In spite of his ingrained scepticism concerning the UN role in achieving independence, the vain Ben-Gurion accepted Shertok’s invitation to join him and Silver in the USA for the first appearance before the First Committee.48 Since Shertok did not want to further offend Ben-Gurion, it was Rabbi Silver who finally delivered that initial speech, since Ben-Gurion was unable to arrive in New York by the designated time. In this inaugural speech, Silver described the critical situation of the Jewish nation after the Holocaust and continuous Arab assaults in Palestine, outlined the Yishuv’s national and political goals, and stressed the Agency’s confidence that the UN would find the means to solve the Palestine imbroglio fairly. He concluded by pointing to the inseparable connection between the issue of the Jewish refugees and the solution to the Palestine problem. When Shertok took over from Silver, he followed a traditional Zionist line of advocacy, presenting the movement as a unique phenomenon, essential to the continued existence of the Jewish people, adding that even established and secure Jewish Diaspora communities could not ensure the national existence. Moreover, he concluded, a Jewish state was not only essential but inevitable, since peace in Palestine depended on its establishment. During his maiden appearance before the UN committee, Shertok clashed with the Palestinian Arab delegate Emil Ghuri about the Mufti’s co-operation with the Nazis during the Second World War, an exchange that generated much coverage in the American and international press. This incident, together with Shertok’s own powerful presentation, led additional observers to identify Shertok as a brilliant spokesman for the Zionist movement and the Yishuv. ‘His profound and comprehensive command of the material, and his long

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political and diplomatic experience, made Shertok the most prominent person in the Agency’s delegation and in the leadership of the Zionist struggle in its various stages in the UN,’ was how the Palestine Post put it to its readers.49 In the mean time Ben-Gurion arrived in New York and joined Silver and Shertok. His speech to the committee sounded excessively blunt, rigid, and aggressive in comparison with the polished speeches of his two colleagues. The reactions of the other delegations and in the press were so unanimously hostile towards Ben-Gurion that Shertok had to straighten out some of his colleague’s points in his own next appearance before the committee.50 The coolness towards Ben-Gurion himself and the hostility towards his presentation deepened his already suspicious attitude towards the world organization. Moreover, the fact that his performance was unfavourably compared to those of Silver and Shertok added especially to his animosity towards his younger moderate colleague.51 The main question bothering the senior Jewish leaders was the merit of presenting an explicit demand for the establishment of an independent Jewish state. After heated internal deliberations, particularly in view of rumours that Loy Henderson and Warren Austin were suggesting a gradual phasing out of the British Mandate and its replacement by a new UN trusteeship, they decided that this demand was crucial.52 Shertok and his colleagues were well aware that such a new trusteeship would frustrate any hope for independence. In an internal discussion of the New York Executive, Ben-Gurion suggested yet another solution that had no real chance under the prevailing circumstances: the Jews should demand immediate inde­ pendence in those areas of Palestine where they already constituted a majority, and a trusteeship for the rest of the territory. Ben-Gurion’s new proposal was based on a traditional activist notion that a small Jewish state would sooner or later expand—a view that would guide his actions in years to come. It was a view that Shertok and Nahum Goldmann opposed as ‘most fantastic’, since it would be unacceptable to the powers, it did not provide any quid pro quo for the Arabs, and would shut off too many political options.53When this latest controversy became the subject of a public debate in both the Yisfcuv and the American-Jewish community, it further fuelled the unending and multi­ faceted debate between Ben-Gurion and Shertok, especially because, in this case, the latter had allied himself with Goldmann, who, it should be remembered, was a close associate of Weizmann. As the UN Special Assembly was nearing the end of its investigations and deliberations, Shertok was pleased with the Jewish Agency delega-

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tion’s overall performance and achievements. In line with his desire to maintain an open channel to Moscow, Shertok had supported the Soviet Union’s attempt to get a political foothold in the Middle East by being seated on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UN­ SCOP), which had been established during that assembly. Quite natur­ ally, the USA and Britain had objected to the Soviet demand, arguing that the committee should be comprised of the smaller UN members. Shertok’s support was based on the assumption that having larger powers on UNSCOP must benefit the Zionists, as this would enable the committee to adopt bolder decisions, which in turn would favour the Yishuv. Although the final composition of the committee was the result of a compromise among its own members, it included a large number of delegations, such as Uruguay, Guatemala, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Peru, and Yugoslavia, whom the Jews regarded as friendly. It also included Canada, Sweden, and Australia, which were still unknown political quantities, despite Shertok’s numerous talks with their respec­ tive foreign ministers, and Iran and India, who were regarded as proArab.54 The final draft of UNSCOP’s terms of reference was also agreeable to the Jewish Agency: it could discuss both short- and long-term problems and solutions, it could conduct its investigations in both the Middle East and Europe (thus enabling it to hear not just Arab and Jewish witnesses in Palestine and the Middle East, but also the DPs in Europe), it was requested to take the demands of Palestine’s three religious communities (Arabs, Jews, and Christians) into account, and submit its recommendation no later than September 1947 in time for their deliberation during the regular session of the assembly.55 Before the last session of the Special General Assembly in mid-May 1947, the Soviet Union again surprised everybody. Spotting Shertok and his chief assistant Eliahu Epstein in the lobby of the UN building, Gromyko told them that he had not said his last word yet. Then, during the session, he said that it would be unjust if the Assembly avoided considering the Jews’ wish for their own state, and negated the right of the Jewish nation to fulfil this hope, especially if one took into considera­ tion all that had befallen the Jewish nation during the Second World War. Those present were stunned, for what was immediately thereafter dubbed as ‘Stalin’s Balfour Declaration’ signified a major turning-point in Zionist hopes at the UN. This startling development enhanced Shertok’s prestige, for he had been advocating and nurturing relations with the Soviets Tor years, he had been one of the two Zionists to whom Gromyko first confided his ‘scoop’, and first and foremost, because he was probably the staunchest supporter of partition.

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Shertok attributed the Kremlin’s declaration in favour of a Jewish state in part of Palestine to several factors. In addition to the Agency’s and his own continuous contacts with the Soviets, he thought that the Kremlin had adopted a positive realist approach, stemming from their reassessment of world affairs, which led them to attach greater import­ ance to a number of small American Jewish Socialist groups sympathetic to their political and economic positions. He attributed it also to the Soviets’ wish to rid themselves of the Jews in Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. Most importantly, Shertok attributed this surpris­ ing support of partition to the Kremlin’s new global strategy, where­ by the Soviet Union would support the Jews since the Americans seemed to be favouring the Arabs. As Shertok had ascertained in secret talks with Soviet diplomats in Washington, which arose out of their desire to maintain good relations with the Arabs, tactically, the USSR’s official position would be support of a unitary bi-national state, but if this solution proved politically unfeasible, to advocate partition.56 Shertok, who then conducted frustrating talks with Robert Lovett and Loy Henderson, told his staff that their main political problem was with the Americans, because of the State Department’s supreme goal of maintaining close ties with the British and their reluctance to dictate a solution to them. Therefore their principal goal must be enhancing contacts with the White House and Capitol Hill, but this was not to be at the expense of further improving relations with the Soviet, Polish, and Czech representatives.57 In his first public reaction to Gromyko’s statement, during a meeting with the leaders of the American Labour movement, Shertok expressed the Yishuv’s gratitude to the USSR for removing the Palestine issue from competition between the two great powers. He took this occasion also to warn Bevin and the British government to respect UNSCOP and the U N ’s decisions, and to prevent chaos and destruction in Palestine. Although Shertok and his colleagues were aware that it was easy to show support during the initial stages of the discussion on Palestine, he expressed his hope that the USSR would not retreat from its initial decision to support some form of independence for the Jews in Palestine, and his confidence that the UN resolutions would create new options for the Jews. Shertok then left for Jerusalem on the same plane as the UNSCOP experts and administrative staff, who would prepare for the arrival of the entire committee. During the long flight, Shertok, who excelled in spotting young talent, established friendly relations with the talented

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American UN official Dr Ralph Bunche, who would play a major role in the development of the Jewish state in 1948 and later.58 Upon his arrival in Palestine on 10 June 1947, Shertok and the UNSCOP team found that the number of British soldiers had grown to more than a hundred thousand, and that they were preparing for a major confrontation between the Jews and Arabs. Shertok also learned that the count of both Arab and Jewish attacks and terrorist activities had increased to the point where British officials were forced to live behind barbed wire in the closely guarded quarters, known as the ‘Bevingrads’, where the Jewish and Palestinian communities lived in fear, and that the Palestinian economy was showing clear signs of a major recession. In the midst of these growing tensions, the Jews were making their ill-fated attempt to bring the 4,500 illegal immigrants on the Exodus to the shores of their promised land. On the other hand, Shertok found it difficult to assess the Yishuv’s mood and the state of its preparedness for the struggles ahead o f it. Before the Agency Executive could begin to deal with the problems involved in preparing for the UNSCOP inquiry, it had to weather yet another clash between its activist and moderate camps. On 18 June 1947, two days after the main group of the UNSCOP members arrived in Palestine, the two groups were still fighting over Sneh’s and Shertok’s opposed proposals concerning trusteeship. A large group of Executive members, including veteran moderates, such as Goldmann, Gruenbaum, Dobkin, Locker, Kaplan, and this time, also activists, such as BenGurion and Meyerson, were ready to accept partition.59 This group passed a resolution that the Agency should take the initiative by publicly announcing its position, and then enlisting the UNSCOP members to support it. However, when Shertok and his moderate colleagues tabled an additional resolution intended to guide Agency representatives to refrain from forwarding a general claim for the entire territory (their purpose was to remove any ambiguities about the longer-range Jewish goals), the proposition was rejected by a majority of one vote, probably that of Ben-Gurion. Thus the moderates and Shertok had to content themselves with the original formula, which thus became the formal immediate goal of the entire national movement. But this was not the end of this debate. The next clash between Ben-Gurion and Shertok centred around the possibility that trusteeship would replace the British Mandate for an interim period. Shertok proposed that ‘Trusteeship, not necessarily in the specific technical sense, but any regime that would fit our needs more than the Mandate that now exists’, should be considered seriously. His proposal was again

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supported by Kaplan, Sprinzak, and Peretz Bernstein, but was rejected by a small majority, including Ben-Gurion, who said, ‘We oppose the continuation of the British Mandate, we oppose its replacement by a trusteeship, and we demand a Jewish State in Palestine, therefore, we will declare before the Committee [UNSCOP] and outside it that we are ready to discuss a compromise about a viable state, and if we find such a compromise adequate, we will submit it for the approval of the Zionist Congress.’60 Although Shertok had no other choice but to accept this resolution, personally, he remained open to the idea of a new trusteeship for a limited period, if this was the best that could be wrested from the UN. On the other hand, he was successful in imposing a moratorium on Jewish terrorist activities and on wholesale establishment of new settle­ ments for the duration of the UNSCOP hearings.61 Although his proposal for a more flexible position had been rejected, it was Shertok who prepared the Agency materials and planned the strategy for its appearance before UNSCOP. It emphasized the spirit of the Executive’s decisions: explicit condemnation of the 1939 White Paper, an outline and explanation of the history of the Yishuv’s antagonistic relations with the Arabs, and, ultimately, presentation and defence of the partitionist solution that they preferred. In this context and in order to demonstrate the viability of even a small Jewish state, he decided to employ an old Zionist tactic, that is, to underline the spectacular economic development of the country and community, including its benefits to the Arabs. He would also emphasize the fact that all segments of the Yishuv, including the Orthodox camp, were unified behind the Agency and would accept its rulings. The latter was intended to allay moderate Arab and especially Christian fears that the Jews might establish a Jewish theocracy in Palestine. To mend fences with his old mentor, Shertok invited Weizmann to testify before the committee, appointing the astute young Jewish diplo­ mat Aubrey Eban, whom he had ‘discovered’ in the mid-1930s, to assist Weizmann in preparing his presentation.62 In his own presentation, the first Jew to appear before UNSCOP, Shertok was again ‘preaching the familiar gospel’ of Jewish, history and the goals of the Zionist movement. He concluded his clear and impec­ cably structured presentation with the statement: ‘You are facing a nation in the making, a de facto politically and economically inde­ pendent entity. And you should be aware that some of the reasons for the present crisis are in contradiction between our de facto and de jure position. It is imperative that the committee should approach the

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problem from this perspective!’63 Shertok was careful to present the Agency position in a balanced fashion and insisted that for the duration of the committee’s work in Palestine all major military actions by the Haganah and planned establishment of new Jewish settlements be postponed. It was a tremendous human tragedy when the thousands of DPs on the Exodus were finally packed into old British transport ships and deported back to Europe. Politically, however, it could not have come at a more fortunate time for the Agency. The pragmatist Shertok and his colleagues did not hesitate to exploit it to the fullest. Thus they made certain that the chairman of UNSCOP, Emil Sandström, and committee member Granados Garcia, as well as UN officials, including Ralph Bunche, were present in the port of Haifa to witness the cruel evacuation of the refugees. The committee members ‘pale with shock’, decided on the spot to establish a special subcommittee to investigate the situation of Jewish DPs in Europe and the limitations on their immigration to Palestine.64 The depressing impressions that the deportation of the Exodus refu­ gees created were somewhat diminished by the escalation of Jewish terrorist activities, resulting in the hanging of Irgun fighters on the one hand, and British officers in revenge on the other. These developments forcefully demonstrated the tensions in British-Arab-Jewish relations and the impasse which they had reached. Subsequently, in spite of the Agency’s sophisticated strategy to win the hearts of the UNSCOP members to its cause, the committee decided to visit various Arab capitals before formulating its recommendations—a decision that was warmly welcomed by the British.65 This decision caused Shertok to fear that the Agency’s demand for Jewish independence in Palestine had already been rejected and might hamper the partition alternative, for which he and his colleagues were hoping. In order to prevent such an eventuality, on 18 June 1947, in a meeting held in the Shertok’s Jerusalem home, he and the other members of the Executive hammered out a strategy aimed at persuading U N ­ SCOP members to adopt partition. As a result of these deliberations, to help convince the committee members that partition was indeed the optimal and feasible alternative, the Yishuv leaders were ready for the first time to disclose details about the Haganah’s structure, force, and the organization’s readiness to defend the community, should the Arabs attack it after partition was approved. The chairman of UNSCOP, Sandström, was given the same information about the Irgun during a secret meeting with its leader, Menachem Begin. The summing up of the Agency’s position was entrusted to the veteran trio—Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Shertok. In retrospect, it seemed to

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Shertok that it had been a sound idea to persuade Weizmann to testify before UNSCOP, for in emphatically calling for partition, Weizmann delivered one of his greatest and most effective addresses. Once again, the favourable impression that he made on the committee members was offset by Ben-Gurion’s aggressive speech. Hence, it was left to Shertok to try to rewin the sympathy of the committee without retreating from the Agency’s position on partition. He succeeded in doing so by arguing that neither a federation nor a bi-national state would solve the problem, which ‘was not that of a country but rather of a nation’. Demanding justice for the suffering Jews of Europe and for the embattled Yishuv, he emphasized that the link between the nation and the land was through the right of Jewish return. His thoughtful and well-balanced conclusion was that the Jews sought immigration, land, and the chance to develop, and only lastly sovereignty that went hand in hand with partition.66 During UNSCOP’s last days in Palestine, when Shertok and his associates became aware of the concern with which the various UN members were awaiting the committee’s recommendations, the Agency Executive did their utmost to persuade UNSCOP members to propose partition when it reconvened in Geneva in the latter part of July 1947. Naturally, Shertok was deeply involved in this phase of the committee’s work. Throughout the five tense weeks in which the committee was conducting its final deliberations in Geneva, the task of ensuring a favourable verdict devolved mainly on Shertok. For this purpose, he and his senior associates, David Horowitz, Eliahu Sasson, Leo Kohn, Moshe Toff, Gideon Ruffer-Rafael, and Aubrey Eban, packed their suitcases and followed the committee to Switzerland. Shertok later recalled that during the UNSCOP deliberations there, ‘the fate of essential principles, of entire regions [of Palestine], and of essential rights and authorities, changed from day to day’, and that ‘coalitions [within the committee] were formed and disbanded within a matter of hours’. Yet the enormous investment that Shertok and his staff made in Geneva helped to influence UNSCOP’s final recommendations. Later, all members of the Execu­ tive’s delegation would praise Shertok for his leadership, for he led his associates by emphasizing team-work. During those gruelling weeks he demonstrated great care for his staff and maintained a friendly intimate atmosphere, which enhanced their motivation and facilitated their achievement. By the end of August 1947, and as a result of the substantial efforts of the chairman of UNSCOP, Sandström, and constant prodding from Shertok’s team,67 the committee slowly and gradually inched towards consensus on principles and directions. The importance of this stage

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cannot be exaggerated, since this was when many of the steps that would lead to the actual establishment of Israel were determined. Thus it was during this phase that the committee reached the conclusion that the British Mandate had to be abolished and that the Jews and Arabs must be accorded independence. This was also when it was decided that the transition period should be kept as short as possible, and that it should be spent under a UN trusteeship. Ultimately, a majority of seven UNSCOP members, including the representatives of Holland, Uruguay, Guatemala, Peru, Canada, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia—who accepted the view that the Jews constituted a nation, and recognized that large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine would only be possible under Jewish sovereignty—recom­ mended partition. A minority of three—the representatives of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia (to where Shertok flew especially to persuade Tito and his government to alter their position)—proposed a federative solution, and Australia abstained. This was a great preliminary political victory for the Zionists, and especially for Shertok and his team. But even then, their work was far from completed. For on the extremely sensitive issue of territory and borders there was a real possibility of what Shertok called a ‘total disintegration’ of the majority supporting partition. Thus, in view of the danger that UNSCOP would be split by three separate notions of borders, and without consulting Jerusalem, Shertok agreed to certain territorial concessions in order to prevent any ‘disintegration’ that might play into the hands of the anti-partitionist minority in UNSCOP. Shertok was ready to make such concessions especially in the Negev and in the Lower Galilee. To his and the Agency Executive’s great relief, on 31 August 1947, the night before its report was due, the committee reached an acceptable consensus on borders. According to this compromise, the Jewish state would include parts of the Galilee, the fertile Huleh and Jezreel valleys, the Coastal Plain, and the Negev. To Shertok’s great satisfaction, the area allotted to the Jewish state by UNSCOP was larger than what had been proposed in any previous partition or cantonization plan. It comprised 62 per cent of the entire area of Palestine west of the Jordan River. Shertok had no difficulty in realizing that these borders were even more generous than the ‘Peel plus the Negev Plan’, which had originally been demanded by his colleagues and by himself on behalf of the Agency. When an ecstatic Shertok rushed'to a map to check the exact borders allotted to the Jews by the generous new plan, he was delighted to find that only very few existing Jewish settlements had been left in the Arab territory. He

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rejoiced in these results, which he partly attributed to his own successful efforts.68 As soon as he was officially informed about the contents of the UNSCOP report, Shertok rushed from Geneva to Zurich, where the Zionist Smaller Actions Committee was anxiously awaiting him. With­ out any preliminaries, he recounted to them the report’s contents, secretly adding, ‘Despite all the severe shortcomings of this plan [espe­ cially the complex shape of the borders] it is a concrete and encouraging step forward, which should release us from the severe limitations of the 1939 White Paper, and lead us towards freedom—towards the renewal of Israel’s independence through the approval of the supreme interna­ tional organization.’69 Although this was an enthusiast’s description of the UNSCOP report, it also constituted a realistic evaluation of the results and possibilities. Some Zionist leaders were apprehensive about the complex nature of the partition plan, especially the shape of the borders, the elimination of what they regarded as most important areas of the territory allocated to the Jewish state, that is, the Galilee, part of the Coastal Plain, and parts of Samaria. Thus an exasperated Peretz Bernstein of the General Zionists exclaimed, ‘The entire thing is a nightmare!’ But it was Ben-Gurion who immediately retorted, ‘My greatest dream is to see the fulfilment of this nightmare!’70 This spontaneous response by Ben-Gurion accurately reflected Shertok’s own view. After his initial euphoria concerning the report, Shertok himself became a bit more restrained and sceptical. In this spirit, he wrote to Golda Meyerson, ‘Although I don’t have to repeat the self-evident enormous advantages embodied in the [UNSCOP] majority’s report, I also don’t have to repeat the minimal chances of its implementation by the UN, in view of the American and British [negative] positions.’71 However, when David Horowitz and Aubrey Eban were sent to London to gauge the British government’s attitude to the new plan, they found the Foreign Office so defeated by the UNSCOP recommendations that voices in Whitehall, as well as that of the Prime Minister, Attlee, were calling for both an immediate termination of the Mandate and with­ drawal from Palestine. But hardliners in the cabinet, and theichiefs of the British army were determined to prepare Britain’s case for maintaining control in Palestine for the regular General Assembly meeting scheduled to be held a few weeks later. Furthermore, a majority of the British cabinet agreed to maintain the restrictions of the White Paper.72 Nor was the mood in the US Department of State more favourable towards either the plan or the Jews, since the Americans’ most important consideration

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was that the dissatisfied Arabs might ‘go Russian’. This was the line taken by the Secretary of State, George Marshall, when he instructed members of the American delegation to the UN on 15 September 1947, as well as when he spoke to the General Assembly two days later.73 Digesting these negative reactions from the British and the Americans, the Zionists felt compelled to step up their efforts to lay the groundwork for a favourable resolution in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. Again dividing the task between them, Rabbi Silver assumed responsibility for lobbying the US Congress, while Shertok and his lieutenants, who by then were back in New York, took on the task of winning over the administration. In addition, Shertok and his assistants were responsible for intensifying contacts with the foreign embassies in Washington. Later, when Shertok and Silver met to discuss their progress, it seemed that Shertok’s team had been securing the support of the Soviets and Eastern Europeans, and that Silver had persuaded some Senators, Congressmen, and leading journalists to support the Zionist cause. More importantly, Eleanor Roosevelt and Major General John Hilldring, who were on the American delegation to the UN, and who were known to be sympathetic to the Jewish cause, were also approached and consequently promised their unequivocal help. Thus the $tage was set for the next steps that would be taken at the UN General Assembly and then at the Security Council, which were about to meet at the prophetically named Lake Success.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

See his ‘Lines’, 15 Oct. 1946, CZA, A245/105. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Agency Executive, 11 Nov. 1946, CZA. Ben-Gurion to Weizmann, 28 Oct. 1946, Weizmann Archive; Bar-Zohar, BenGurion , i. 555-7. W. Laqueur, A H istory o f Zionism (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Shocken, 1974), 451; Dothan, The Struggle fo r Eretz Israel, 343. The 22nd World Zionist Congress, Basle, 19-24 Dec. 1946, A Report, CZA. Ibid. Ibid. Laqueur, H istory o f Zionism, 451-3; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 560. Weizmann to Shertok, Jan. 1947, Weizmann Archive; Weizmann, Trial and Error , 430.

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13. Weizmann to David Ginzburg, 10 Jan. 1947; Weizmann to Yarblum, 17 Jan. 1947, Weizmann to Ginzburg, 23 Mar. 1947, all in the Weizmann Archive. 14. Weizmann to Shertok, Jan. 1947, Weizmann Archive. 15. Weizmann to Ginzburg, 23 Mar. 1947, Weizmann Archive. 16. Shertok in Mapai Secretariat, 19 Mar. 1947, Mapai Archive, 24/47. 17. N. Rose, ‘Weizmann Died, but the Weizmann Line Won’, H aaretz , 25 Nov. 1993; Cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 564-6. 18. Agency Executive, 29 Dec. 1946, CZA; Palestine Post , 30 Dec. 1946, 31 Dec. 1946. 19. Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 2 Jan. 1947, Ben-Gurion Archive; Palestine Post , 31 Dec. 1946, 6 Jan. 1947, 7 Jan. 1947. 20. Agency Executive, 12 Jan. 1947, CZA. 21. For Epstein’s report on these talks, see Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 32-8; Secretary of State to US Embassy in London, 15 Jan. 1947, F R U S , 5, 1006. 22. Palestine P ost , 16 Jan. 1947, 19 Jan. 1947, 22 Jan. 1947, 23 Jan. 1947, 24 Jan. 1947; for a very detailed discussion of these developments see, G. Cohen, ‘Britain’s Policy on the Eve of the War of Independence*, in Y. Wallach (ed.), We Were like Dreamers (Heb.) (Tel-Aviv: Masada, 1985), 27-8, 33-4. 23. Cohen, ‘Britain’s Policy’; Louis, British Empire , 452-7; Gomy, The Ambiguous Tie , 306-8; A. Ilan, The United States, Britain and Palestine (Heb.) (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1979), 247-50. 24. Louis, British Empire , 457-60; Gomy, The Ambiguous Tie , 308; Ilan, The United States, Britain and Palestine , 250-5; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 158-64; the protocol of the first meeting, 29 Jan. 1947, CZA, S25/7709. 25. G. Sheffer, ‘A Test of Principles: British Policy in Palestine 1939-1948’, in Y. Shavit (ed.) Struggle, Uprising and Revolt, (Heb.) (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1987); CAB, 129(47), 7 Feb. 1947, PRO; cf. Cohen, ‘Britain’s Policy’, 50-3; Gomy, the Ambiguous Tie , 308-10; Louis, British Empire , 460-2; Ilan, The United States, Britain and Palestine , 258-9. 26. See the report about the first Bevin-Ben-Gurion talk, 12 Feb. 1947, CZA, S25/770; and for the entire development, Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 171-3; Dothan, Struggle fo r Palestine , 347; Palestine Post , 12 Feb. 1947. 27. The Times , 15 Feb. 1947; the Agency’s memo in response to the ‘Bevin Plan’, 30 Mar. 1947, CZA, S25/7709. 28. The protocol of the last meeting with the British ministers, 13 Feb. 1947; Ben-Gurion to Bevin, 14 Feb. 1947, CZA, S25/7709; Executive, 16 Feb. 1947, CZA; Palestine P ost , 17 Feb. 1947. 29. Cohen, ‘Britain’s Policy’, 50-64. 30. Ibid. 85-99; Gorny, The Ambiguous Tie , 312-19; cf, Louis, British Empire , 462-3; and see Ilan’s interpretation, The United States, Britain, and Palestine , 264-5; as well as Dothan, Struggle fo r Eretz Israel, 348-56; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 176-8, 188-9; and see correspondence between Marshall and Bevin, F R U S 1052-3, 1054-5. 31. D. Ben-Gurion, The Restored S tate o f Israel (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), i. 69-73; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 645-9; Agency Executive in New York, 24 Feb. 1947, CZA, 25/2362; Palestine P ost , 27 Feb. 1947.

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32. On his talk with Marshall, see F R U S 1059. 33. Shertok’s report to Agency Executive, 14 Mar. 1947, CZA; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood', ii. 53-7, 63-4; Palestine P ost , 9 Mar. 1947. 34. Agency Executive, 18 Mar. 1947, CZA. 35. Shertok’s report to Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 18 Mar. 1947, CZA. 36. Agency Executive in New York, 7 Apr. 1947, CZA, Z5/2362, and see e.g. the schedule of the diplomatic meetings in April 1947, CZA, 25/248. 37. Shertok in Agency Executive in New York, 7 Apr. 1947. 38. Mapai Secretariat, 19 Mar. 1947, Mapai Archive, 24/47; Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 21 Mar. 1947, CZA. 39. Mapai Secretariat, 19 Mar. 1947; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 69. 40. Shertok in a meeting of the representatives of the Mapai chapters in Tel Aviv, 27 Mar. 1947, Mapai Archive, 15 Jan. 1947. 41. Ibid. 42. Mapai Secretariat, 19 Mar. 1947; Palestine P ost , 27 Mar. 1947, 8 Apr. 1947. 43. Mapai Secretariat, 19 Mar. 1947. 44. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 72-5; and see a memo about Shertok’s talk with Acheson and Henderson, 23 Apr. 1947, F R U S 1073-7. 45. Kaufman, American Non-Zionists in the Struggle fo r the Jewish State, 175-80; on the American position see a memo by Marshall, 29 Apr. 1947, F R U S 1080. 46. Ilan, The United States, Britain and Palestine, 270; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 75-82; Palestine Post, 8 May 1947. 47. Executive in Jerusalem, 4 May 1945, CZA. 48. Ibid; and see Palestine Post on the telephone call from Shertok to Ben-Gurion in which me latter was invited to New York, 5 May 1947. 49. Palestine Post, 13 May 1947. 50. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 101-2; Sharett, A t the Gates, 63-72. 51. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 102-3. 52. Ilan, The United States, Britain and Palestine, 272; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 124-8. 53. Agency Executive in New York, 13 May 1947, CZA; and see questions addressed to Shertok in this regard during a press conference after his return to Palestine, Palestine Post, 18 June 1947. 54. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 104-7. 55. See Shertok’s comments in the Executive in Jerusalem, 15 June 1947, CZA. 56. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, 107-10; Ilan, The United States, Britain and Palestine, 270-2; for an American assessment of the USSR’s move, see F R U S 1088-9. This report was prepared by Dean Rusk; Shertok in Mapai Secretariat, 11 June 1947, Mapai Archive 24/47; Shertok, in Mapai Central Committee, 26 June 1947, Mapai Archive, 23/4; Dothan, Struggle fo r E retz Israel, 358. 57. Shertok in Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 5 June 1947, CZA; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, 111-12; on his meetings in Washington, see F R U S 1093-6. 58. Shertok to Tamar Gidron, 8 June 1947, Sharett family Archive; and see Shertok in Mapai Secretariat, 11 June 1947, Mapai Archive, 24/47; Palestine Post, 19 May 1947,4 June 1947; Shertok in Àgency Executive in Jerusalem, 15 June 1947; Sharett, A t the Gates, 74.

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64. 65. 66.

67. 68.

69. 70.

71. 72. 73.

Agency Executive, 18 June 1947, CZA. Ibid. Ibid. On Weizmann’s speech see A. Eban, Memoirs (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), i. 77; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 190-1. Sharett, A t the Gates, 74-91; Walter Eytan to Shertok, 6 July 1947, Shertok to Eytan, 9 July 1947, CZA, S25/2955; Eban, Memoirs , 77; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 191-3, 197-202, 208; and see a report about UNSCOP first week in Jerusalem and Shertok’s initial speech, F R U S 1107-12. Eban, M emoirs , 78; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 208. Louis, British Empire , 470-1; on the Committee’s meetings in Amman, see Shlaim, Collusion , 86-95. For Shertok’s speech, see Sharett, A t the Gatest 92-117; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 206, 207-8; see report on the fourth week of the work of UNSCOP, F R U S 1123-8, and of the fifth and final weeks, 1128-31. See detailed descriptions in Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 224-41; Dothan, The Struggle fo r Eretz Israel, 359-62. Shertok, A t the Gates, 120; Eban, Memoirs , 82; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 248; Shertok to Meyerson, 7 Sept. 1947, CZA, S25/1523; for American and British’reactions see F R U S 1143-4; 1147-51. Shertok to Meyerson, 7 Sept. 1947. See Shertok’s report to Agency Executive in New York, 18 Sept. 1947, CZA, Z5/54; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 249-55; Eban, M emoirs , i. 83-5; Cohen, ‘Britain’s Policy*, 100-1. Shertok to Meyerson, 7 Sept. 1947. Shertok’s Report, 18 Sept. 1947. Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 126-8; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 112-98, 217-19.

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8 ‘If Not Now, When?’ F rom the Zionists’ vantage-point the outlook for the next round in the UN looked promising. Far from harming the Yishuv, the support of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites—and after Shertok’s visit to Belgrade, the support also of Yugoslavia—only created ‘a healthy political tension’ that forced the USA towards greater and more favourable involvement in the Palestine drama. The American media— especially the New York Times, Washington Post, Herald Tribune, and Christian Science Monitor, and several radio stations, all supported partition as the lesser evil in comparison to any federative or bi-national solution for both the USA and the Yishuv. Most of the American Jewish press adopted a similar stance. Moreover, outstanding Republican politicians, such as Thomas Dewey and Robert Taft, and Congressman Joseph Martin, added their authoritative voices to the pundits of partition. Slipport for partition became even more pronounced among most Democrats, who exerted pressure on President Truman to alter his equivocal position. According to Shertok’s evaluation, which was based partly on Weizmann’s contacts with British politicians, such as Stanley Oliver, in London, more voices than ever before were calling for withdrawal from Palestine and for its partition.1 While the move towards British retreat from the troubled territory began with Conservatives such as Churchill, Labour ‘rebels’ later joined those who felt it was time for Britain to leave the Middle East, and certainly Palestine. It was then that Eliahu Epstein informed Shertok that, unlike Loy Henderson and other Arabists in the State Department, who were still adamantly anti-partitionist and opposed the establishment of a Jewish state, the Pentagon might be in favour of this idea. According to Epstein’s report, which was based on talks with a few Pentagon intelligence officials, the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Greater Syria under the ambitions King Abdullah of Transjordan would solve somç of the major political problems in the area. Since this intelligence originated in the Pentagon, which until then had been terra incognita for most Zionist leaders, including Shertok, and since the Agency was then engaged in significant complex negotiations with the

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Hashemite ruler about the possibilities of co-operation, Shertok deemed Epstein’s information highly weighty. Hence Shertok was not slow in urging his colleagues in Palestine to expedite the talks with Abdullah. His goals in promoting these talks were to ensure that Transjordan became a UN member, in the hope that it would serve as a moderating voice in the Arab camp, providing additional support for ideas of partition, and to prevent it from invading Palestine when the British withdrew. However, when the British categorically rejected Abdullah’s plan for Greater Syria, and put a firm veto over its implementation, the Pentagon also lost interest in the scheme.2 Any serious national struggle for independence must leave only little to chance. Thus despite later notions that the Yishuv and the Zionist movement had relied on improvisation as the main means for making decisions, at the time, some of its senior leaders understood the need for well-planned and co-ordinated action. This was especially true of Sher­ tok, who had always been an ardent advocate of the systematic gathering of background information, the charting of major political options, rational decision-making, and premeditated moves. He imparted this view to some of his colleagues and especially to his younger associates. Consequently, the group responsible for planning and implementing the Yishuv’s foreign policy comprised a substantial number of talented and dedicated politicians and officials, well versed in these practices. It was no wonder therefore that during Shertok’s absence from the USA, his team there was systematically preparing for the next stage. Hence, when Shertok returned from Europe to New York on 11 September 1947, only a few days before the next General Assembly session, he was able to step into a smoothly running operation. And ‘once again he succeeded in creating an atmosphere of trust and co-operation among the members of the delegation, and unifying the delegation’s advisers and assistants around himself.’3 Shertok was able to achieve such loyalty, unity, and co-operation because of his warm and friendly personality as well as his special connections through the various Jewish and Zionist political networks. This prominence was further enhanced by the fact that he had also gained an informal superiority over his activist colleague Rabbi Silver as the senior Palestinian Jewish politician in the US/V, and by his closer and better acquaintance with the way his colleagues in the Yishuv élite thought and operated. Indeed, the respect and trust accorded to him by his associates in New York was based on their knowledge of his intimate communication with those in Jerusalem, including Ben-Gurion. The structure of the Jewish delegation to the UN, which had been designed largely by Shertok, was simple but efficient. It comprised five

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members of the American Executive, under the chairmanship of Abba Hillel Silver, as well as Shertok and Nahum Goldmann. In addition to the general task of formulating middle-range policies and solving imme­ diate problems, each member of the group was responsible for obtaining and maintaining the support of a group of countries. An advisory political committee, which had been elected by the last Zionist Congress strictly in accordance with the proportional principles that governed all aspects of Zionist politics and designed to maintain an exact balance between activists and moderates, was charged with the tasks of assisting in planning, obtaining support, monitoring relevant developments, and providing ample feedback. The work of all these experienced Jewish politicians was supported by a staff of Agency officials hand-picked and recruited especially for the UN campaign: the Americans, Lionel Gelber and Cy Kenen, and the Palestinians, David Horowitz, Aubrey Eban, Walter Eytan, Michael Comay, Gideon Ruffer, Moshe Toff, Menachem Kahany, as well as Eliahu Epstein and his staff in the Agency’s Washing­ ton office—all attentively followed the frequent political changes in Washington and New York. Shertok also employed a number of experts, such as Jacob Robinson. At the time, there was no doubt that, both politically and administratively, Shertok was in charge of the entire operation. On the eve of the General Assembly session, Shertok and his efficient staff had gathered information to the effect that the US delegation would formally adhere to George Marshall’s public promise of basic support for the UNSCOP majority’s plan, but that actually it would follow a ‘let’s wait and see’ policy, which would also be slightly inclined towards the Arabs. These new rumours drove Shertok to seek the good offices of American non-Zionists to help improve the Agency’s relations with the State Department and thus its opening position in the UN, a step which eventually led to a growing intimacy in his relations with these leaders. As for Eastern Europe, Shertok’s team found out that the Soviets were maintaining their positive attitude towards partition, which Gromyko had proclaimed during the previous special session of the Assembly. Here it should be mentioned that very intensive negotiations were simultaneously proceeding with the Czech government over a substantial arms deal—undoubtedly with the blessing of the Soviet Union. At the time, the most popular interpretation of Soviet motivation to support partition was that the Kremlin showed an interest in promoting the goodwill of what’they regarded as the highly influential American Jewish organizations, especially the socialist ones, which indicated their over­ estimation of these small organizations’ clout.4

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Shertok’s growing awareness of the potential influence on future political developments in Palestine of the American Jewish non-Zionist organizations, which should be carefully distinguished from anti-Zionist organizations, led him to conduct intensive talks with their leaders, aimed at forming either a loose federation or a firmer coalition with the Zionists. (Incidentally, this form of Jewish co-operation proved easier to accomplish and maintain than the enlargement of the Jewish Agency, to which activists such as Ben-Gurion had objected.) Shertok’s substantive efforts in this direction resulted in a conference of American Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish leaders towards the end of September 1947, attended by such leaders as Morris Perlzweig of the World Jewish Congress, Isaac Levine of Agudat Israel, Louis Lipsky of the American Jewish Con­ ference, Jacob Blaustein of the American Jewish Committee, as well as leaders of smaller non-Zionist organizations. This conference proved highly instrumental in bringing the non-Zionists yet closer to the Agency Executive in Jerusalem, rather than to the more activist American Zionists and New York Executive. Important for the pending struggle in the UN, Shertok could now claim that the Agency was leading a wide national front supporting partition. Moreover, the institutionalization of this comprehensive Jewish front had a clear impact on the votes of a number of countries on the Palestine question. Purely organizational arrangements were not the only matter on the agenda of that summit gathering of Zionists and non-Zionists; it goes without saying that the leaders of the new coalition also discussed significant political strategic issues. During this dialogue, Rabbi Silver spoke out forcefully against the UNSCOP minority proposal, warning those non-Zionist leaders who were inclined to accept a federative solution of the dangers involved in it. Shertok then focused the discus­ sion on the more immediate strategic goal of securing a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, in favour of partition, and a simple majority to ensure that the coveted resolution would be implemented—a task, as he pointed out, which was no less crucial than the resolution itself. To attain these goals, he emphasized, most important would be the absolute necessity of presenting a united front, of being ready to take concerted action and to apply persistent pressure on the White House and the State Department.5 By any standards, this conference was an extraordinarily important event. Louis Lipsky, a seasoned observer of world and American Jewish politics, later maintained that the meeting had signalled the beginning of operative and practical co-operation between the major American Jewish organizations regarding the establishment of a Jewish state. Similarly,

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President Truman’s senior adviser, David Niles, commented that the Jewish united front not only contributed to the establishment of the State of Israel, but that its activities, together with representatives of the Yishuv centred around Shertok, made a considerable contribution to the unity of the American Jewish community itself.6 Despite this progress and achievements on several fronts, in midSeptember 1947 the struggle to win over the American delegation to the UN was still far from over, but there was some glimmer of hope. Thus Shertok and the Agency delegation were somewhat encouraged when George Marshall stated at the opening session of the General Assembly on 16 September 1947, that while the final decision of the Assembly must await the detailed consideration of the UNSCOP report, the US govern­ ment attached great weight not only to the recommendations which had met the unanimous approval of the Special Committee, but also to those recommendations, which had been approved by the majority of that Committee. True, his statement was flimsy and ambiguous, but Shertok was encouraged by Marshall’s seeming readiness at that early stage to support a partition resolution. Although Shertok and Silver agreed that the statement was designed to buy time for the Americans, they were cheered to find that it was far more positive than they had expected in view of Lpy Henderson’s and his associates, internal lobbying and memoranda. Shertok and Silver found it encouraging that Marshall expressed the wish to conclude the deliberations of the UNSCOP report during the forthcoming session, and that the delegations that had produced the UNSCOP majority report had been selected by the USA in the first place.7 As a result of co-ordination with Silver and Shertok, the UN Secre­ tary-General, Trygve Lie, had arranged that the ‘Palestine Question’ should be submitted to a Special Ad Hoc Committee, which in fact comprised all UN members. The main actors in the Ad Hoc Committee, including its chairman, the Australian foreign minister, Herbert Evatt, were all known to Shertok and other Jewish representatives. By this time, the Zionists were operating on all fronts at both the UN itself and at the embassies of its members who were closely monitoring the process. Hence when the British colonial secretary, Creech-Jones, announced, on 26 September 1947, the second day of the Ad Hoc Committee’s deliber­ ations, that his government intended to evacuate Palestine as soon as possible, Shertok and Silver were not surprised as they had already received a confidential report from London to this effect.8 Silver and Shertok were pleased when Creech-Jones went on to clarify further the British position: according to its current policy, which was adopted by

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the government on 20 September 1947, Britain would only help to implement a UN resolution that had been accepted by both Arabs and Jews, i.e., that it would not undertake to impose a solution on either side; Whitehall would consider favourably a solution to the Palestine imbroglio which was based on a new trusteeship; but in the absence of an agreed settlement of the inter-communal conflict, the British would evacuate Palestine at the earliest possible time, and then the UN would be compelled to create ample mechanisms for the implementation of its decisions. Creech-Jones’s somewhat clearer statement did not terminate the ongoing debate between Shertok and Ben-Gurion over British inten­ tions. While Ben-Gurion was still sceptical about whether the British intended to evacuate Palestine, a scepticism which was based on an analysis of the internal balance in Whitehall which favoured evacuation before incurring prohibitive costs, Shertok was now acting on the assumption that the British decision to do so was definite. This disagree­ ment between the two leaders was more than academic; the gap in their perceptions and predictions would create many difficulties, particularly in policy formation. In any case, although Shertok was still far from ready to come to blows with the British, and felt that any statement issued by the Agency should be cautiously balanced in order to prevent overwhelming international opposition and panic in Palestine, he de­ cided that Creech-Jones’s remarks required a Zionist response. Accord­ ingly, in a carefully worded release to the press, Shertok stated that, since the British had decided to evacuate the country, the weakened government of Palestine should abolish the policy dictated by the hated 1939 White Paper and allow large-scale Jewish immigration into the country. Regardless of his deep suspicion of British intentions and disagreement with Shertok, two days later, Ben-Gurion made a similar statement during a meeting of the Jerusalem Executive, which was widely reported in the media. To refute the widespread scepticism, shared by the activists on the Agency’s Executive, over the sincerity of their proclaimed intention to withdraw from Palestine, the British reiterated their determination on several occasions during the final two weeks in September and the beginning of October 1947.9 In a frank exchange between Creech-Jones and Silver and Shertok, on 7 October 1947, the colonial secretary urged his two interlocutors to reach an agreement with the Arabs, especially with the protégé of the British, Abdullah, in view of their decision to evacuate Palestine.10 When this as well as other pieces of information along the same lines came to Shertok’s attention, he ‘concluded that not

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only because of the reliable indications we have received, but for reasons connected to their general orientation, we should take [British] state­ ments at face value and confront the challenge before us squarely. It is safer to assume that the British are serious, and that in fact we should expect a complete and early evacuation of their forces from Palestine.’11 This evaluation was based on his conclusion that the forces supporting evacuation within the British cabinet were far stronger than those calling for continuation of the Mandate, as well as on the notion that resolute statements, like that made by. Creech-Jones, create a momentum of their own that is almost irreversible. By early October 1947 Shertok and his team of experts estimated that the British would withdraw from Palestine in March or April 1948. This realistic evaluation produced an early warning that gave the Yishuv a green light for expediting preparations for establishing the Jewish state and arming against either an invasion of regular Arab armies (informa­ tion about the plans had been circulating since the Bludan Conference held in Lebanon in June 1946) or attacks by irregular Palestinians. A few days later, at a meeting of the Executive in Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion concurred with Shertok’s strategic evaluations, and stated that the Yishuv must prepare both politically and militarily for the great, albeit dangerous,> moment when the British left.12 Ben-Gurion then suggested that the Agency should establish a special team to lay the groundwork for the enormous task of state-building and leading the Yishuv during the transition period. The fact that this political body, known as the ‘Situation Committee’, met for the first time in October 1947, that is, before the famous UN resolution on partition, demonstrated the Yishuv leaders’ conviction that the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state was not far off. In other words, one may argue that, not only because of the deterior­ ating security situation in Palestine, the Yishuv’s war for independence began in October 1947 rather than the following May. In the mean time, however, the Zionists were engaged in an uphill struggle to gain America’s firm support for partition, without which, as Shertok and Silver thought, there was little chance of transforming other favourable elements into an effective political act. But this task was turning out to be more complicated and difficult than they had anticipated. Thus, Shertok and Silver knew that American Secretary of State, Marshall, had met with Arab representatives on 23 September 1947, and it was subsequently leaked by the State Department’s Arabists that the meeting had confirmed Marshall’s and President Truman’s reluctance to support partition. According to this version,

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both the president and the Secretary of State were apprehensive that the implementation of partition would necessitate the employment of US forces in order to enforce it or to protect the Jewish community. This prompted Shertok to ask for an urgent interview with Marshall. But what Shertok and Silver, who were strongly supported by the large coalition of the Jewish organizations and trade unions, did not know when they met Marshall on 26 September 1947, was that, despite the staunch opposition of the State Department’s Arabists under the leader­ ship of Loy Henderson, Marshall and the American UN delegation had met a day after that meeting with the Arabs, and in fact had decided to support partition. Generally speaking, however, in order to placate the Arabs, the Jewish state envisioned by the American administration was to have considerably narrower borders than those suggested by UN­ SCOP.13 The meeting between Marshall and the two Zionist leaders started off with a planned blunt question. Shertok, who led the discussion, pro­ ceeded according to a scenario prepared well in advance and based on a psychological profile of Marshall, prepared by Shertok’s and Silver’s associates. Thus, rather than exerting pressure on Marshall, he merely asked the Secretary of State to confirm or deny the rumours allegedly leaked from his office that he was not firm in his support of partition. The manœuvre succeeded. Marshall’s exasperated reaction to this un­ diplomatic query seemed genuine enough for the Zionist politicians to conclude that the rumour was not true. Once the initial storm had subsided, Marshall repeated his commitment to partition but declined to disclose the tactics that the US delegation planned to use during the forthcoming UN debate. All he would say was that the US administra­ tion was concerned and therefore focusing not on the issue of partition itself, for which there was much support, but rather on the means for implementing it. Marshall’s sincerity was underlined by the strongly pro-Zionist General Hilldring, who had been at the meeting in question. This only confirmed the information and assurances given to Shertok by Loy Henderson in a secret meeting the day before their meeting with Marshall. After these two meetings, although Shertok was aware that Truman himself was still wavering over partition, he felt more confident that the final result would be positive, and turned to deal with more immediate issues. But Zionist insecurity and mistrust was such that, despite these and several other assurances given to them by American politicians and officials, they continued to pressure the White House and the adminis­ tration, behaviour which backfired since it left Truman with the strong

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impression that the demanding and pushy Jews would never be satisfied.14 Once Shertok and Silver were somewhat assured of US support for partition at the UN, they informed the Advisory Committee that the time had come to plan for the interim period until the establishment of the state and the expected comprehensive Arab attack.15 That the two were speaking about the possibility of a war was no wonder, for by October 1947, it was leaked to the Agency that not only the British and Arabs, but also American politicians and generals had begun seriously to ponder the multiple implications of a vacuum in Palestine in the wake of British evacuation, and a possible invasion by Arab armies. Naturally, this was the central issue in Shertok’s next talks with the US Secretary of Defense. Answering James Forrestal’s questions on the subject, to augment the Yishuv’s image and as a warning to the Arabs, Shertok replied somewhat prophetically that if this were the scenario, ‘the Yishuv would try to occupy as much territory in Palestine as possible, and establish a government there’.16 When the Secretary of Defense prodded him about the extent of the territories that the Yishuv would try to control, Shertok retorted that it would be larger than those which had been proposed in the UNSCOP majority report. In reality Shertok said that the Jews would try to occupy ‘the largest possible area in accord­ ance with the circumstances’. In other words, even a moderate like Shertok was not averse to seizing open windows of opportunity to acquire additional territory for the Jewish state under the ‘proper’ conditions. For many years to come, this intentional ambivalent position would characterize the thinking of the Israeli élite, including doves like Shertok. The hints dropped by the Americans finally reassured even Shertok. Therefore, even before the formal declarations by the Americans and Soviets about their support of partition, by the end of the first week in October 1947, Shertok notified his colleagues in Jerusalem that Silver and himself were positive about the favourable result of the vote in the General Assembly, and that they were already negotiating for ‘the various implications of the implementation of the UNSCOP [majority] report. [We are discussing the implications of] an immediate vs. a gradual process, a slow vs. a rapid process of handing over authority, with or without British forces, [deployment of] international forces, symbolic international forces of the big powers, of smaller states, etc., a Jewish army, Who would run it, etc.’17 The accurate information gathered by Silver and Shertok, the sober evaluations they dispatched to Jerusalem, and especially their efforts in

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Washington and New York, make it clear that preparations for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and for an impending invasion and war did not rest solely on Ben-Gurion’s prophetic powers. Partly as a result of their prodding, the formal US announcement that it now supported partition was made on 11 October 1947, six days after Truman and Marshall had met to phrase the exact text and determine the timing of the statement that would be made at the U N .18 In a politically clever manœuvre, the Americans timed their announcement at a point when it was evident that, without a move on their part, the Palestine question would remain bogged down with no chance of solution. In accordance with the decision, the American representative, Herschel Johnson, had set the stage for the move by stating that the USA had been interested in the Holy Land since the 1924 AngloAmerican agreement on American rights in Palestine. Repeating his government’s preference of a unanimous UNSCOP resolution, however, Johnson confirmed US support of the majority position on partition and Jewish immigration, and stated unequivocally that, subject to certain amendments and modifications, his country was prepared to help to implement such a resolution once it was adopted by the General Assembly. The main drawback in that statement was US objection to the relatively large area that the UNSCOP majority had allocated to the Jews. Subsequently, even the activist and Republican Rabbi Silver had to adm it that Truman’s intervention had proved timely, and that the statement was as good as could reasonably be expected. It was not surprising that the American statement caused an uproar in Arab countries. The Soviets followed suit, having waited for the American statement out of tactical considerations for their relations with the Arabs. On 13 October 1947 Gromyko summoned Shertok, whom he knew well by then, and disclosed the contents of the statement that the Soviet representative, Semen Tsarapkin, would make the next day at the UN. Shertok was not surprised by this positive statement; however, he was particularly touched by the section in which it was asserted that a grave historical injustice would be committed if the Jews were deprived of their own state. Moreover, prior to his talk with Gromyko, Shertok had gathered from various sources in Eastern bloc delegations, especially from his friend Ambassador Bebler of Yugoslavia, that the main factor behind the Kremlin’s final decision was that a single Arab state in all of Palestine, or a bi-national state, would remain in the British orbit of control. Given the existing global political arrangements, once the two emerg­ ing superpowers had publicly expressed their support for partition, it

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became evident that this option would be adopted by the entire General Assembly. Therefore the discussion in the Assembly then turned to the nature of the arrangements in Palestine, such as the borders and the constitutions of the two states. The Arab delegations were, of course, extremely disgruntled by the turn of events. They were so perturbed after the Soviet declaration that they somewhat reduced their involvement in the process at the UN and concentrated on military preparations. This change was in accordance with the Arab League decision of 7 October 1947 at its conference held in Aley in Lebanon, to the effect that military preparations would supersede politics and diplomacy. There was no longer any major doubt that on the one hand the game at the UN would end in a spectacular victory for the Yishuv, and that on the other Arab armies would invade the Holy Land. In accordance with the explicit decisions of the Arab League, the neighbouring governments and the Palestinians were gearing themselves for an all-out war against the Jewish community, warning the USA and Britain of their plans if partition were not prevented. They began by co-opting the chiefs of Arab armies to the Arab League councils, organizing a military committee chaired by the Iraqi General Ismail Safwat, and deploying Syrian and Lebanese units close to the northern border of Palestine. Moreover, none of the Arab governments bordering with Palestine, except for Transjordan, which had shown reluctance to join in these preparations, concealed their enhanced military preparations for war, openly organizing recruitment centres for the Arab Liberation Army of Fawzi al Qawuqji. They even dispatched the pro-Nazi Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, to the League’s meetings in Lebanon, where the League’s members accepted him as an equal partner in all deliberations on their future moves. However, they still maintained vestiges of their political campaign in the West, in order to explain the Arab position. Overtly, through a speech made by Creech-Jones in the General Assembly on 16 October 1947, and covertly, through secret communica­ tions, the British encouraged the Arab governments in their preparations for war. Creech-Jones’s statement at the UN had its effect also on the White House, for, simultaneously, under the influence of the allegedly anti-Semitic, Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, President Truman was reconsidering the American promise that it was ready to help to implement partition; yet the president was still firm in his support for partition itself, he even sent a message to Silver and Shertok to refrain from bombarding him with presentations since he did not intend to retract.19

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Carefully monitoring these political developments, Shertok took ad­ vantage of Soviet readiness to continue close relations with the Yishuv during that period of uncertainty. Undoubtedly the main architect of this relationship, Shertok stepped up talks with their most senior representatives after Tsarapkin’s declaration in favour of partition. Moreover, on Shertok’s explicit instructions, these contacts were con­ ducted openly and in full view of the Americans. Thus through a series of premeditated moves but also by trial and error, Shertok was devel­ oping the Yishuv policy of non-identification, which was to persist until the mid-1950s. The inevitability of a war between Jews and Arabs in Palestine prompted Shertok to step up his activities in the military realm also. Thus, as soon as his old acquaintance Fares al-Khouri, head of the Syrian UN delegation, secretly informed him of the extent of Arab military preparations and the planned major role of the Transjordanian Arab Legion in these preparations, he decided, on his own, to resume close contacts with King Abdullah in an effort to neutralize the ‘foxy gentleman’ and prevent him from joining the rapidly growing Arab coalition. In this vein, Shertok instructed his staff in Jerusalem to offer the king Jewish support in Washington to facilitate American diplomatic recognition of Transjordan for its neutrality in the escalating conflict. To demonstrate the seriousness of his intention to keep developing the ties that he had been conducting with Abdullah for many years, Shertok immediately began discussing such recognition with Loy Henderson and General Hilldring, letting the Transjordanian know about it.20 King Abdullah welcomed Shertok’s personal intervention, for like many other Arab Leaders, he placed more trust in Shertok than in any other Jewish leader. He deviously assured Shertok that he had not yielded to the pressures exerted on him by the Arab League leaders, and that all reports about military plans and pan-Arab unity were unfounded. These contacts between Amman and Jerusalem would continue during the following weeks and months and would create the impression of collu­ sion between Amman and Jerusalem. Shertok then set out to overcome the main fear of the Americans that US forces would be required to protect the Yishuv, which*in the mean time had become the dominant obstacle for American support of partition and eventually a Jewish state. Moreover, although he did not participate in the negotiations himself, he encouraged and supervised the massive efforts made by the special agents of the Agency in arranging large-scale purchases of the weapons necessary if the Yishuv were to protect itself against invading Arab armies. In this connection, during

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one of his frequent talks with General Hilldring, he suggested that ‘there would not be any point in supplying weapons and other military equipment to the Yishuv after the British evacuation, since by then the Yishuv would be in the soup, and that will be too late’.21 In the same vein, Shertok worked towards the establishment of a special UN police force, staffed by Palestinian Jews. Finally, he supervised all efforts to purchase weapons, and became deeply involved in the recruitment of senior American Jewish veterans to serve in the Yishuv’s fighting forces. Throughout these activities, Shertok was determined to maintain soph­ isticated co-ordination between foreign and defence considerations and policies. At the diplomatic level, Shertok and his associates knew that they would not have many chances to speak during the UN Ad Hoc Committee deliberations. They therefore carefully recorded the respon­ ses of all those who opposed partition until the end of the debate, and this was the stage in which Shertok was given an opportunity to respond to previous speakers, including the brilliant Pakistani representative, Zafrulla Khan, who had unleashed a vicious attack on the Yishuv and its national aspirations. Since Khan’s speech had gained substantial coverage in the American and international press, Shertok focused his own not inconsiderable oratorical talents on countering the attack on Zionism and on refuting the bi-national notion mooted by Khan.22 This response was particularly important because the bi-national solution was still looming over the Jews, and had influential adherents in Britain and the USA, as well as among Yishuv and Diaspora Zionists, such as the eloquent president of the Hebrew University, Rabbi Yehuda Leib Magnes. Shertok’s refutation of the bi-national solution made reference to the UN charter, in which it was stipulated that all nations should be treated equally in regard to their right of self-determination. Since, he argued, ‘the Palestinian Jews [s/c!] already constitute a nation, they deserve rights equal to those granted all other smaller and larger nations. Hence, we deserve the right of self-determination. We are ready to co-ordinate our right for self-determination with the rights of others, but this should be reciprocal. Thus we are not ready to give up our right, or to accept that the right of the others is greater than ours.’23 Emphatically rejecting Kahn’s argument that the Jews are not a nation, he emotionally denounced all ‘scientific’ studies to this effect, arguing, ‘policy should deal with actual facts and not with theories that lead nowhere. The question of the origin of the Jews did not bother Hitler or the Mufti of Jerusalem one bit when they were exterminating Jews.’ After vehemently dealing with the objection to a Jewish state based on the false notion that

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Jews were not a nation deserving of its own state, Shertok noted that the Zionists had only agreed to partition as a compromise—one that seemed the most ethical and practical solution for the Arabs as well as the Jews. He wound up his forceful address with the cry that: ‘The Jewish nation must have a state—its own Jewish State. If it is deprived of it, it will fight for it. But the Jews also strongly desire peace. I am confident that one day in the near future we will be understood and accepted as equals.’ Shertok was highly praised for this address, which many delegates labelled the most comprehensive and balanced speech delivered by Jewish representatives during that period.24 The last two to address the Ad Hoc Committee were the Mufti’s aide and Arab Higher Committee representative, Jamal al-Husseini, who warned the UN that the Arabs would oppose the implementation of partition with all their combined might, and Chaim Weizmann, who was invited to address the UN as a result of Shertok’s and Silver’s persistent efforts. Weizmann’s visit to the USA and his UN speech were made possible partly by the recent improvement in his relations with Shertok, which had been disrupted during the previous Zionist Congress. Since Weizmann was then losing his sight, and could not read a speech, he had to improvise on the main themes agreed upon with Shertok. In this speech, he emotionally called upon the Assembly to accept the Jews as equal partners in the international community in order that they might once again become a ‘normal’ nation capable of implementing the ingathering of their dispersed brethren, and he concluded by adamantly demanding the partition of Palestine.25. The time had now come for the Ad Hoc Committee to vote on the draft resolution submitted by Sweden and the USA, proposing that the UNSCOP majority report should serve as a basis for further deliber­ ations by yet a new special small UN committee. When this resolution was rejected, the Australian chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Dr Evatt, suggested instead that a special subcommittee be established to consider partition. At this point the Arab delegation demanded that in the first place a subcommittee should be established to look into the question of the U N ’s authority to deal with the Palestine issue. To get out o f this new impasse, Evatt suggested that a second subcommittee should be established and charged with looking into the minority report, and a third be established to investigate ways to reconcile the two communities and establish peace in the Holy Land. The Jews were invited to participate in the deliberations of the first subcommittee and the Arabs in the second; however, the latter boycotted ‘their’ subcommittee, since they refused to discuss not only partition, but also

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cantonization or a federation, both of which had been recommended as possible options in the minority report. At the end of this round, it seemed that the gap between the Arab and Jewish positions was unbridgeable. Although Shertok initially objected to discussing the Palestine issue piecemeal in separate committees, he soon realized the multiple advant­ ages inherent in a subcommittee that would deal only with partition— especially since that subcommittee comprised only those who favoured partition in the first place, including the USA and the Soviet Union. Shertok’s confidence grew when he learned that even the British observer on this subcommittee, Sir John Martin, was a staunch advocate of this option, as he had served as secretary of the Peel Commission, which proposed partition in 1937. When it began its deliberations the ‘majority’ subcommittee focused mainly on the thorny questions of boundaries, Jerusalem, the implementation of partition, and on the related economic problems. Once the preliminary stages towards a favorable UN resolution had been concluded, Shertok used the short lull in the deliberations and negotiations to launch an evaluation of the Zionists’ position and to discuss future moves. In these discussions, his sober assessment was that, in spite of the Zionists’ best efforts, a strong and united ‘Asian front’ had been formed against partition and thus against the Yishuv. He thought that Pakistan, with its vast Muslim population, was a ‘lost case’. Although Nehru was known to favour partition, he maintained that India would support the Arabs by opposing it in order to increase its chances in the battle with China over the leadership of an emerging Third World. Other Asian UN members, such as Indonesia, were either indifferent or hostile towards the Jews. Though far from being totally discouraged by these assessments, Shertok foresaw troubles ahead in ensuring the two-thirds majority in the Assembly. On the other hand, with British intentions still somewhat ambiguous, Shertok was relieved that the Agency’s contacts with the Soviets were developing nicely. Also in this context, on the basis of his sources at the White House, Shertok sensed that the Americans thought that it was in their best interest for Palestine not to remain without the protection of the military forces of the super powers, and since they were not ready to send their own troops, they were frightened by the British determination to evacuate the territory. He knew that the oil factor was also important as it was not merely of commercial but also of strategic importance. Most important,valthough Marshall had promised to mobilize additional support for partition, Shertok was still apprehensive about the American position. For he speculated that if the Americans succeeded in convinc-

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ing the British to leave troops in the territory, the cost to the Jews would be immense—especially with regard to the allotment of the strategically significant Negev, which the British wished to maintain for strategic reasons. Finally, he noted that France’s foreign policy establishment with its intrinsic pro-Arab inclinations had led the government to consider a withdrawal from their pro-partitionist position.26 After communicating his strategic evaluations to the Agency Execu­ tive, Shertok added, ‘Since our manœuvres and statements [in the subcommittee meetings] will carry a great deal of weighf, it was imperative to ascertain the extent of the concessions to the Arabs the Yishuv was prepared to accept in the face of American and French demands. In this connection he suggested that Jaffa, which was basically an Arab town, be conceded to the Arabs, and that he should demand that only the western part of the Galilee should be added to the Jewish state. He also needed clear indications of how strongly he could oppose the allocation of the Negev to the Arabs without alienating the Yishuv’s supporters as well as Mapai’s partners in the coalition. Finally, he suggested three options regarding the future of Jerusalem: to adopt the UNSCOP’s majority proposal, to demand the expansion of the Jewish controlled area there to either west or east, and to accept the division of Jerusalem into Arab, Jewish, and international boroughs.27 Thus Shertok was ready to make concessions to secure maximum international sup­ port for the Yishuv, and to remove obstacles on the road to partition and subsequently to independence. Responding to Shertok’s queries concerning the boundaries of the Jewish state, the Palestinian members of the Agency Executive, led by Ben-Gurion, instructed him only to demand the right to extend Jerusa­ lem towards the east, a step aimed at avoiding the annexation of areas heavily populated by the Arabs. As to his other questions, Shertok was authorized to act as he saw fit in accordance with developments. This was a significant delegation of authority which demonstrated the con­ fidence in his judgement and concentrated a great deal of power in his hands, especially since the discussions at that stage were focused on the implementation of partition, a primarily Palestinian issue, that some­ what diminished Rabbi Silver’s and his American colleagues’ role in the diplomatic process. * ‘To watch the birth of the Jewish State through the keyhole of Committee Room Number 12 is a difficult experience—almost as difficult as it is to watch a child being bom ,’28 was how one observer described the work of the subcommittee on partition, which began its labours on 29 October 1947, and which was immediately divided into

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small task forces which dealt with various aspects of partition. On the whole, Shertok was satisfied with the work of this subcommittee, ‘since it has accomplished much concentrated work in a calm atmosphere. Every detail in the [UNSCOP] majority report has been checked and rechecked, and many changes have been introduced.’29 Closely watching the deliberation of this subcommittee, he was apprehensive mainly about the fate of boundaries and of Jerusalem. As Shertok anticipated, the first great clashes in the subcommittee occurred over the territories that would be allotted to the Jews in the northern part of the country! Shertok was fighting hard to retain as much land as possible for the Jewish state. With regard to the Galilee, he was only partially successful, since the subcommittee was following the American principle that demography should determine the territorial shape of the two envisioned states. Thus, he was only able to secure parts of Lower Galilee, ‘losing’ Safed and its environs, which was then largely populated by Arabs. He ‘lost’ certain Arab parts of the western slopes of Samaria for the same reason, but was able to ‘gain’ Lydda airport in exchange. Shertok was more successful in obtaining the eastward exten­ sion of the borders of Jerusalem. The area from Jerusalem all the way to the Dead Sea was awarded to the Jews, as was Masada, because of its enormous symbolic value for the Yishuv.30 In other words, there was much give-and-take involved in drawing the map of the future Arab and Jewish states by the ‘majority subcommittee’. The next major battle was fought over the southern part of the Negev (the Aravah) and Aqaba (Eilat), an area to which both Shertok and Ben-Gurion attributed almost supreme strategic importance because of its opening to the Red Sea, and through it the possible connection to East Africa and Asia. But, hard as he fought, Shertok could not overcome Britain’s stubborn objection to awarding this significant part of Palestine to the Jews. The British still deemed this area as essential for the protection of their strategic assets in both Transjordan and the Suez Canal zone, which was the overriding reason for British inter­ est there. To Shertok’s great annoyance, the Americans did very little to help the Zionists in this respect. On the contrary, in order to obtain their main objective here, they used the ‘salami tactics’ in imposing concessions on the Jews. The main reason for the Pentagon’s intense interest in the territories under discussion was their proximity to one of America’s most essential assets in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia. Therefore, in order to avoid ‘losing’ Eilat and perhaps even jeopardizing the entire partition plan, Shertok was forced to ‘give up’ Beersheba and part of the western Negev, including the Nizana area. This imposed

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concession would create substantial political and military difficulties in the future. However, when the Americans tried to cut Eilat out of the Jewish state after Shertok had ceded Beersheba and the western Negev, he removed the gloves of compromise and fought back against the formidable American Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, and the State Depart­ ment’s Dean Rusk. When it seemed that the Zionists were on a collision course with the Americans over this matter, Shertok decided that only President Truman himself could counter the adamant stance of Mar­ shall, Forrestal, and their associates on the subcommittee. He therefore resorted, among other things, to the Yishuv’s old-new ‘secret weapon’— Weizmann. Like the veteran warrior he was—Weizmann was delighted when requested to deal with exciting diplomatic assignments like the big fight over the Negev and Eilat, having been relegated to the sidelines. Eventually, on 19 November 1947 Truman and Weizmann held a cordial meeting, arranged through the good offices of David Niles, during which the American president agreed to re-examine the Yishuv’s territorial requests. What Weizmann did not know was that the American ambas­ sador, Herschel Johnson, had been so disappointed by Arab rigidity that he had already convinced Marshall and Lovett to moderate the Amer­ ican position on the fate of the southern Negev and support allotting it to the Jews.31 Here it should be mentioned that during these negotia­ tions, Shertok was ready to grant the Arabs passage through the Jewish state via a road connecting Egypt and Jordan. Also this proposal would later resurface whenever a solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict was considered. When it came to the question of Jerusalem—the Eternal City—things became more complex. Well aware that ‘the entire Christian world, both Catholic and Protestant, has united in insisting on an internationaliza­ tion plan [for Jerusalem]’, Shertok attacked the problem on two fronts simultaneously. While conducting an all-out struggle against turning Jerusalem in its entirety into an international city under the aegis of the UN, he called for the Jewish part of the city to be included within the borders of the Jewish state, and a corridor to connect this part of Jerusalem to the rest of the planned state. But the representatives of an impressive coalition of Latin American Catholic countries, as well as of Protestant countries such as Sweden, made it clear that if the city were not internationalized they would not support partition. The Jewish leaders, in accordance with Shertok’s recommendations,32 had no other choice but to content themselves with guarantees on the status of the Jewish part of the city. With this momentous decision, which would

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become part of Israeli policy up to 1967, the territorial problems seemed to be settled. This paved the way for the submission of the subcommit­ tee’s report on partition. Discussions on the transition period between British evacuation of Palestine and the establishment of the Jewish state, including various related legal arrangements, had been in progress simultaneously with the battle over borders. Since the American and the Soviet delegations had different ideas on the dates when the two independent states should be established, on how this should be carried out, and on Soviet participa­ tion in the international force that would be deployed in Palestine after partition, on 3 November 1947 yet a fourth subcommittee was formed to tackle these issues and find a compromise. However, the process of closing the gap between the two emerging superpowers was exasperatingly slow. Only Britain did not alter its position, repeating its threats to refrain from assisting in the implementation of any solution unless Jews and Arabs reached consensus. During those excruciating days, Shertok worked around the clock, for he knew that bridging the gap between the USA and the USSR would mean more than merely an agreement between any other two countries; it was evident that without thé support of both superpowers, partition was doomed. When it appeared as if the coalition between Forrestal, Admiral William Leahy, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, all of whom opposed partition on military grounds, were gaining the upper hand, Shertok again requested David Niles’s intervention with President Truman. This time, Niles’s intervention proved effective; Truman in­ structed the American UN delegation cautiously to co-operate with the Soviets to break the deadlock in the subcommittee. Consequently, on 11 November 1947, Herschel Johnson and Semen Tsarapkin submitted a joint proposal calling for the British to evacuate Palestine at the beginning of May 1948, and for the Arab and Jewish states to be established in July 1948. The proposal also called for a small UN committee, under the aegis of the Security Council, to supervise the termination of the Mandate and the creation of the two states. This proposal was unanimously adopted by this subcommittee on procedures for the implementation of partition.33 At the same time, Loy Henderson initiated the arms embargo to Arab states and Palestine, which was approved by his superiors. These decisions, and the conclusion of the discussion on the boun­ daries and Jerusalem, constituted the breakthrough that led to final accord between the two superpowers. In view of this consensus, on 13 November 1947 Alexander Cadogan reiterated the British government’s

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position that it would not remain in Palestine any later than August 1948, and would not undertake to oversee the transition period before evacuation. Three days later, Shertok therefore submitted the Agency’s counterproposals on how the interim period should be managed. To allow immigration from the DPs’ camps in Europe and Cyprus to begin as soon as possible, he proposed that the Mandate be terminated no later than March 1948. As a gesture towards the Soviet Union, which was opposed to American soldiers protecting the emerging Jewish state, he suggested that the Jews should establish their government at the same time as the British withdrawal. If, in addition, the Jews were allowed to acquire weapons and other military equipment, they would be solely responsible for their own defence. Finally, and with Ben-Gurion’s strong objection, Shertok won the Jewish Agency’s endorsement for his pro­ posal that an international committee should supervise Palestinian affairs during the transition period.34 This meant that the UN subcom­ mittee which favoured partition could present a unique joint SovietAmerican proposal, a fact that the media did not fail to note during a period of mounting tension between the two superpowers that eventually led to the protracted Cold War. By this time, Shertok had become known as the most prominent and effective Zionist leader at the UN, a reputation that stemmed from his inexhaustible capacity for consistent hard work, his warm but dignified personality, his ability to inspire co-operation and reduce tension—as well as from his position as the most moderate senior Palestinian representative in New York.35 His mettle was tested mainly between 17 and 28 November. During these ten tense days, the entire Jewish delegation experienced excrucia­ ting anxiety while they, the Arabs, and the British, conducted campaigns of unprecedented intensity in the offices, corridors, and halls of the UN. As the prime moving forces of the Jewish delegation, Shertok and his Palestinian associates stepped up their already back-breaking schedule of meetings to recruit supporters for partition. This was partly in response to extremist speeches by Arab leaders, ‘which moved from declarations regarding their objection to partition to threats of a war of fire and blood. It is evident that these are not empty words.’36 Shertok already knew that the pan-Arab conference, held in Aley in Lebanon at that time, had passed resolutions calling for a Jihad, that is, a holy war, against the Jews and their supporters. But, Shertok maintained that ‘despite this intensifying war of nerves, there has not been a shred of feeling among the Jewish delegation that the battle should be given up. For, if not now, when?’37

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Shertok was also informed that in accordance with his initiative, on 17 November 1947 the acting chairwoman of the Political Department in Jerusalem, Golda Meyerson, had met King Abdullah in Naharayim and that the two discussed a scenario in which the Jews would assist the king to occupy and annex the Arab part of Palestine to his kingdom, gaining American recognition and support for Transjordan’s membership in the UN, and in increasing their financial support for the king. On the other hand, the king would not collide with the Jews nor collaborate with their enemies, in the event of an Arab invasion, and would only occupy the Arab part, keep law and order, and forestall the Mufti. Finally, he was ready to sign a written agreement to this effect.38 The Yishuv leadership hoped that it would prevent war on the Eastern front. Jewish determination and Shertok’s hard work in New York and Washington notwithstanding, for a short while it looked as if the great prize would be snatched away from the Jews. For, when the entire UN Palestine Committee renewed its deliberations, the British announced that they, and they alone, would determine the date on which they would terminate their rule over Palestine, and that they would transfer auth­ ority only when they evacuated the country. Moreover, they reiterated their refusal to co-operate with the UN during the transition period. To the sensitive, overworked, and moody Shertok the situation looked grim. The picture became even more discouraging when several other delega­ tions, such as those of Denmark and New Zealand, which had supported partition, threatened to alter their stance partly because of the British position. At this stage, partition was ‘saved’ by Ambassador Herschel Johnson, on his own initiative. Apparently without clear authorization from his superiors, Johnson called for the immediate implementation of partition, saying that ‘the matter cannot wait any longer. The hour of decision has come!’39 Encouraged by this bold statement of the American ambassa­ dor, and in order to prevent the defection of other pro-partitionist countries, Shertok pointed out that the Yishuv had made substantive concessions in the Galilee, in the Beersheba area, and in the Negev, all this in order to ‘satisfy delegations that had expressed support for partition, but who had also proposed that the territory of the Arab state be extended in southern Palestine’.40 He therefore again enlisted Weizmann to use his influence with politicians such as the prime minister of New Zealand, Peter Fraser, and the French finance minister, René Meyer. As the UN General Assembly vote on partition was getting nearer, on 24 November 1947 Shertok delivered his concluding speech. This time

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his speech was deliberately rather short and sharp: he asked the General Assembly to recognize that the Jews’ rights to immigrate to and settle in part of Palestine was no less legitimate than that of the Arabs. Asserting that the Jews did not wish to exacerbate conflict in the Holy Land, he dismissed the Arab claim to an independent Arab state in the entire territory. ‘A nation that has in a period of six years, lost six million,’ he concluded, ‘will not be deterred from its attempt to base itself in the only spot on earth that it views as belonging to itself.’41 On the other hand, Jamal al-Husseini summed up the Arab cause by reiterating their absolute rejection of partition and their unqualified demand for an independent state in all of Palestine. After these two speeches, delivered by two eloquent representatives of the two sides in Palestine, the Assembly was about to vote. Although the partition proposal had been adopted by the Palestine Committee, in the first vote the size of the majority was smaller than the two-thirds necessary for its approval in the General Assembly itself. Since the committee comprised of representatives of every country in the General Assembly, the pros­ pects for partition looked very gloomy indeed. Realizing this, the Jewish delegation leaped forward like a group of people obsessed, and Shertok and his staff activated every supporter they could get to, marshalling all their influence in New York, Washington, and almost every capital of UN member states, using both accepted and ‘non-conventionaP means of persuasion. Shertok focused his own effort and that of the delegation in two directions: persuading countries like France, China, and the Philippines, which had abstained in the Palestine Committee vote, to join the supporters of partition, and enlisting the help of President Truman in convincing other countries in the American orbit that partition was the best solution to the Palestine quagmire. Although Truman balked at first, his basic wish to get rid of the burden of the Jewish DPs, heavy pressure on the part of pro-partitionists in the American political system, as well as his own pro-Zionist advisers David Niles, Clark Clifford, and General Hilldring, finally, merely one day before the voting, brought him to instruct the US delegation to the UN to fulfil the Zionists’ request.42 On Friday, 28 November 1947 hundreds of Jews were assembled outside the UN building at Lake Success, hoping to witness'the birth of the Jewish state. As expectations and tensions grew, Shertok and his colleagues opposed any further delay and pushed hard for an immediate vote, since they believed that in the mean time they had succeeded in winning over the two-thirds majority needed for approval of partition. But, encouraged by Bevin’s chief adviser on Palestine, Harold Beeley, the

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Arab filibuster succeeded in getting the vote postponed for yet another day, on the basis that the British were making last-ditch attempts to find a compromise accepted by the Jews and Arabs. In fact, however, they merely wished for additional time to persuade pro-partitionist govern­ ments to defect from that camp. ‘Twenty four hours later,’ Shertok remembered, ‘on Saturday after­ noon, 29 November 1947, the General Assembly reconvened. The feeling in the Assembly Hall, which was packed with Jews who had come to watch the voting, was that the UN had reached the permissible limit, and that it was time to cast the dice.’43 Before the actual vote, the French representative, Alexandre Parodi, who had joined the attempt to forge agreement, was not able to show any progress towards compromise. The Lebanese representative, Camille Chamoun, called again for estab­ lishment of a federation. But when Herschel Johnson made a call for partition, and Andrei Gromyko buttressed the American position, in a rare show of co-operation for those days, the Assembly president began polling the delegations one by one. The resultant thirty-three to thirteen votes more than met the two-thirds majority rule. ‘On that sleepless Saturday night, Jews all over the world were sitting attached to their radios, counting one by one the votes of the world’s nations, which had gathered to give their verdict on whether the Jews would live'in freedom or in continued slavery.’44 When the results were announced, the world’s Jews were swept by a wave of enthusiasm similar to the one that followed announcement of the Balfour Declaration. Although as late as two days before the voting, Shertok was not confident of a favourable result, as soon as the polling was over, he exclaimed, ‘now that the entire nation has heard the voice of the great trumpet proclaiming our nation’s redemption . . . with the blessing of the organized worl d. . . all the shortcomings and pitfalls of the plan have been forgotten’. Even Ben-Gurion, who had not trusted, and would never trust, the UN, and who would later dismiss its role in facilitating independence, now joined in praising the partition resolution: ‘Despite everything, this is probably the single greatest achievement of the Jewish people in its entire history. From a political vantage point, it is the first time in human history that a new state’s establishment has received a priori affirmation by a majority of humanity.’45 Immediately after the vote in Lake Success, thousands of enthusiastic Jews celebrated inside and outside New York’s Saint Nicholas Arena. When Weizmann—who among other achievements had ensured France’s vote in the UN with a telephone call to Leon Blum in Paris—was ushered into the arena, he was given a hero’s welcome amidst

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calls for his appointment as the first president of the Jewish state. Shertok, also greeted enthusiastically, was hailed by many as first foreign minister of the Jewish state, or ambassador to the United States. Thousands of miles from New York, in Palestine, as a gesture of respect and gratitude to Shertok, a group of youngsters gathered outside his in-laws’ house in Holon, to celebrate with the joyous old couple. Then, cheering, singing, and dancing, they joined the rest of the Yishuv in the spontaneous celebrations that broke out wherever there were Jewish settlers. In the first meeting of the Mapai Central Committee held after the UN resolution, and in his absence, Shertok was generously praised by many speakers. Yosef Baratz, who had known Shertok since their days in the Herzliya Gymnasia, said, ‘these two—Ben-Gurion and Shertok—are chiefly responsible for the victory that we are now witnessing’. Shmuel Dayan, the father of Moshe Dayan, exhorted all those present to remember the role ‘of Arlosoroff ’s successor, Moshe Shertok, who has fought so forcefully [for the resolution]’. The activist Bernard Joseph, who had ju st returned from New York, where he had served as a member of the Agency Advisory Committee, proclaimed Shertok as ‘the man who shouldered the main burden of the enormous undertaking of the fight for our rights. I find it essential to emphasize this, since I feel that it would be a crime against our history if his role were not made clear.’46 The debate over the relative importance of Shertok’s role in the political and diplomatic struggle for the establishment of the Jewish state versus Ben-Gurion’s role in the ensuing War of Independence, will probably never be resolved. However, according to David Horowitz, a Jewish Agency representative at the time and an acute observer of these and later events, but admittedly a moderate, If we take into account only the material factors, and follow a cool political analysis, two very clear and undeniable conclusions emerge: the first, the intervention against us [of Arab states and unfriendly powers during the 1948 war] was limited and ambiguous, and this was due to the November 1947 UN resolution. Moreover, if a resolution negating our position had been adopted by the Assembly, our enemies would have had much greater support. There is no doubt that such support would have changed the direction of the* entire war in a battle in which victory and defeat were very close, and led to our political and physical defeat; and the second conclusion, without the UN resolution [in our favour] the British evacuation and the end of the British government would not have happened at a l l . . . Moreover, the process at the UN represented international recognition of Jewry as a unique and independent national and

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ethnic unit. Finally, when the new chapter [the 1948, war] began, we had far better cards .. 47

Another very prominent Jewish leader—Ben-Gurion himself—went even further. Upon Shertok’s return from Lake Success, he said: Moshe [Shertok] has just returned to Palestine after a battle that I deem the greatest political battle in the history of any nation for at least the past two thousand years . . . I must say that I don’t know of any other individual in the Jewish nation today who could have completed this mission that Moshe has undertaken, with great knowledge, rationality, tact—and, we can now say, greater success—than he. We, the Jewish nation, and our movement, do not grant medals, but it seems to me that our paean [to him] should be that his actions up till n o w . . . serve as a pathway to the future fruitful activities that he will live to conduct on our behalf after the establishment of the State.48

NOTES 1. Shertok in Agency Executive in New York, 18 Sept. 1947, CZA 25/54; also Shertok in the joint meeting of Agency Executive in New York with Advisory Committee of the major American Jewish organizations, 8 Oct. 1947, CZA, Z5/2402, and on the co-operation with Jewish organizations during that period, see Kaufman, American Non-Zionists in the Struggle o f the Jewish State , 188. 2. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 209-13; Shlaim, Collusion, 84-104; Henderson’s Memorandum, 22 Sept. 1947, F R U S 1153-8. 3. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 202. 4. Ibid. 214-19, 223-5; Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 25 Sept. 1947, CZA; F R U S 1162-3, this was a memo by Hilldring of 24 Sept. 1947, on the American Delegation’s position; and see a memo on State Department position, 30 Sept. 1947, F R U S 1166-70; and a memo on a meeting at Marshall’s office, 3 Oct. 1947, F R U S 1176-7. 5. Agency Executive in New York, 18 Sept. 1947, CZA 25/54; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 134-6, Kaufman, American Non-Zionists, 188-92. 6. Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 134-6; Kaufman, American NonZionists, 188-92. 7. See Shertok’s and Silver’s explanation of the American position during the joint meeting of Agency Executive in New York and the leaders of the Jewish Organizations, 17 Sept. 1947, CZA, Z5/2364; Cf. Elath’s comments on Marshall’s speech, Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 232-44; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 128-30. 8. For the background see Cohen, ‘Britain’s Policy’, 99-128; Louis, British Empire, 473-7, and seevShertok’s report to Agency Political Advisory Committee, 8 Oct. 1947, CZA, Z5/2402.

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9. Agency Executive in New York, 26 Sept. 1947, CZA; Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 28 Sept. 1947, CZA; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 247; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 130. 10. Silver’s report to Agency Executive in New York, 8 Oct. 1947, CZA, Z5/2371. 11. See Shertok in Agency Advisory Committee, 8 Oct. 1947, CZA, Z5/2402. 12. Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 12 Oct. 1947, 19 Oct. 1947, CZA. 13. Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 133; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 232-8, 253; F R U S 1162-4. 14. Agency Executive in New York, 26 Sept. 1947, CZA; Shertok to Advisory Committee, 8 Oct. 1947, CZA, 25/2502; cf. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 253-6. 15. Shertok in Advisory Committee, 8 Oct. 1947, CZA, Z5/2502. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Hilldring’s memo to Marshall, 9 Oct. 1947, F R U S 1177-8; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 255-8. 19. For reactions in the Middle East, see F R U S 1187-8; and see Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 287-9. 20. Shertok in Agency Executive in New York, 13 Oct. 1947, 22 Oct. 1947, CZA, Z5/2371; see his talk with Henderson on 22 Oct. 1947, F R U S 1196-8; Shlaim, Collusion 108-9. 21. See Shertok on the establishment of a special police force by the Yishuv, and on weapons purchase, in Agency Executive in New York, 13 Oct. 1947, 14 Oct. 1947, 22 Oct. 1947, CZA. 22. Shertok’s explanation about his tactics in Agency Advisory Committee, 8 Oct. 1947, CZA, Z5/2502. 23. Sharett, A t the Gates, 121-45. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Sharett, A t the Gates , 146; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 327-32; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 279-82. 27. Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 26 Oct. 1947, CZA; and see Shertok’s discussion with Henderson and his officials, 22 Oct. 1947, F R U S 1196-8. 28. Palestine Post , 29 Oct. 1947. 29. Sharett, A t the Gates, 146; Palestine P ost , 29 Oct. 1947, 31 Oct. 1947; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 357. Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 283-4. 30. Palestine Post , 29 Oct. 1947; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 357; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 283-4: for the American position see memo prepared by the US delegation to the UN, 24 Oct. 1947, F R U S 1202-7. 31. See McClintock to Rusk, 19 Nov. 1947, and McClintock’s memo, 19 Nov. 1947, F R U S 1270-2; Sharett, A t the Gates , 147; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 394-411; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 286-8; Ganin, Trwfian, American Jew ry and Israel , 138-42; Palestine Post , 28 Nov. 1947. 32. Sharett, A t the Gatesy 146; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 381-6; Palestine P ost , 18 Nov. 1947. 33. Cohen, ‘Britain’s Policy’, 150-62; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 364-78; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 304-6; Austin to Marshall, 4 Nov. 1947, and

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34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

I f Not Now, When?'

memo by Knox, 4 Nov. 1947, F R U S 1231-8; Austin to Marshall, 7 Nov. 1947, F R U S 1242-3; Austin to Marshall, 11 Nov. 1947, F R U S 1249-53. Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 16 Nov. 1947; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 379-81; Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 312. Zipora Shertok to Ada Golomb, 6 Nov. 1947, Tamar Gidron Archive; Palestine Post , 27 Nov. 1947, 30 Nov. 1947. Sharett, A t the Gates, 147-8. Ibid. Danin, ‘Meeting with Abdullah’, 17 Nov. 1947, S25/4004, CZA; Sasson to Shertok, 20 Nov. 1947, S25/1699, CZA; Shlaim, Collusion, 110-15. For the background to Johnson’s statement, see F R U S 1281-2; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 418-19; Palestine P ost , 23 Nov. 1947. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 418-19. Sharett, A t the Gates, 148-51. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , 439; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 143-6; Palestine Post , 25 Nov. 1947; and see Lovett’s memo on his talk with Truman on 24 Nov 1947, F R U S 1283-4. Sharett, A t the Gates, 152. Ibid. Ben-Gurion in the Histadrut Executive, 3 Dec. 1947, Ben-Gurion Archive. Mapai Central Committee, 3 Dec. 1947, 8 Dec. 1947, Mapai Archive, 23/47; Palestine P ost , 1 Dec. 1947, 8 Dec. 1947. Horowitz, A State in the M aking , 318-23. Ben-Gurion in Mapai Secretariat, 30 Dec. 1947, Mapai Archive, 24/47.

9 Light at the End of the Tunnel While Diaspora Jews and the Jewish community of Palestine were celebrating the UN resolution on partition of 29 November 1947, supported by the Arab League and Arab governments, the Palestinian Arabs intensified their struggle against its implementation. The contem­ porary assessment of most politicians, strategists, and other observers of Middle Eastern affairs was that the resolution also marked a new stage in the Jews’ struggle for independence. This escalation in the confronta­ tion signalled the military beginning of the 1948 War. At the same time, for understandable reasons, the third party to the Palestinian imbroglio, the British, were reluctant to activate their mili­ tary forces on a large scale. Hence when both the Jewish and Arab communities stepped up their violent clashes, including attacks on British military and police units, the British government was for the most part passively observing developments in the territory, making only half-hearted attempts to calm the situation and focusing primarily on protecting their officials and soldiers and the remnants of their strategic interests there. The relative British passivity during the preliminary stages of the 1948 War gave the green light to local Palestinian Arab paramilitary forces, reinforced by armed ‘irregulars’ as well as some regular military units from Arab states, to launch frequent attacks on Jewish settlements, especially on public and private transportation in the territory, Jewish commercial centres in mixed towns, such as the notorious attack on Ben-Yehudah street in Jerusalem, and on isolated Jewish settlements, all of which caused considerable damage to the Yishuv. During that interim period between the partition resolution and the establishment of Israel, the leaders of the Yishuv and the Haganah were engaged in a massive effort to protect Jewish life and property, and were simultaneously preparing for the full-scale protracted war, which they were certain still lay ahead. While successful Arab attacks against Jewish transportation, towns, and neighbourhoods in mixed towns inflicted more death and damage, and added to the Yishuv leaders’ anxieties, British inaction served to augment the Yishuv leaders’ determination to fight back. Their pessimistic but defiant mood was reflected in the community’s mobiliza-

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tion, as well as in its military, political, and diplomatic moves in Palestine itself and in the United States. The deterioration of security in Palestine and the escalation towards the fully-fledged war, which followed the UN partition resolution, prompted the Agency Executive to demand the implementation of UN resolution 181 concerning partition. This also meant that Shertok, who would remain in the USA until May 1948, had no time to recover from the political and diplomatic ordeal that had led up to the UN resolution before he was compelled to plunge again into the muddy waters of Palestinian and Middle Eastern politics in the UN. At this stage, Shertok was particularly concerned about the designs and future moves of the United Nations Palestine Commission which was appointed in Decem­ ber 1947 to assist the British government, but also to monitor its actual behaviour during the transition period. He realized that its composi­ tion—six of the smaller UN member states, which had appointed junior diplomats to represent them—would weaken its ability to function effectively. His apprehensions were well founded, for the Jews, as well as the UN Palestine Commission, would be trapped between the General Assembly’s partition resolution and Britain’s non-co-operative policy towards its implementation.1 The UN Palestine Commission began operating under the assumption that there would be an orderly transition period, during which the responsibility for ruling the territory would gradually be transferred to the two separate governments that were to be established there. The British on the other hand planned to withdraw their administration and military forces from Palestine at a still unspecified date, and to leave the issue of authority up for grabs. Since this would create a political vacuum, or even chaos, Shertok feared that the absolute majority needed in the UN Security Council for every significant decision in regard to the implementation of partition would be jeopardized if the Council had to step in before the British had completed their withdrawal from the territory. Shertok was also greatly disturbed by the tone of the discussions in the UN Trusteeship Council on the economic prospects and future organiz­ ation of the two states, on the possibility of an economic federation between them, and on the future of Jerusalem. Concerning the latter issue, he still believed that the best policy would be to maintain one united municipality in the Holy City and establish separate autonomous Jewish and Arab boroughs outside the wall, an arrangement which at the very least would ensure that the municipality, in which the Jews would have a share, controlled the Old City. Shertok’s line was approved

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in Jerusalem.2 Also this idea would much later be revived and become known as Teddy Kollek’s plan for Jerusalem. To top it all, it became clear that American support for partition was rapidly waning in the light of the increased violence in Palestine and the US fear that this violence might spread to the entire region. The prospect that this would necessitate active American military intervention, en­ danger US relations with the Arabs, and threaten the needed supply of Middle Eastern oil, enhanced the power of the already strong antiZionist coalition within the American administration. Among others, this coalition consisted of State Department Arabists, Loy Henderson, and George Kennan, who was then involved in political planning in the State Department and the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, and the Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall. This mighty group, which had been advocating a basically pro-Arab orientation, now stepped up their agitation against partition. In early December 1947 Shertok’s concerns did not end with the rapidly accumulating threats and pressures from outside; the Agency Executive in Jerusalem was incessantly imploring him to increase his efforts to obtain financial aid for the Yishuv’s defence (for this purpose he was joined by his moderate colleague the chairman of the Finance Department, Eliezer Kaplan, who was trying to obtain a five-hundred-million-dollar loan), to recruit retired US army officers to help train, command, and guide the Haganah, and especially to find better ways and means of purchasing weapons. The latter was deemed particularly urgent in view of the arms embargo that the State Depart­ ment had imposed on both the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine. Since Shertok, like most of his colleagues in the Yishuv’s élite, was used to operating under a thick cloak of secrecy, and since he had trained himself to think primarily in terms of the Yishuv’s interests, he confided his substantial worries only to his diary and to his intimate associates. To the outside world he continued to project an aura of self-confidence and a firm conviction that the Yishuv would be able to withstand any and all military and political assaults.3 Internally, the additional power and prestige that Shertok had gained within the small political élite of the Jewish community as a result of his ifiajor political and diplomatic achievements at the UN meant that his views were being sought by his colleagues, including Ben-Gurion, on key political and military matters. Hence he became an almost indispensable participant in the delicate process of decision-making and co-ordinating most of the Yishuv’s political and military steps.

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During the period that followed the UN resolution on partition, this pivotal role in national policy-making included crucial decisions regard­ ing illegal immigration to Palestine. Thus in early December 1947 Ben-Gurion consulted with him on the sailing of two large ships, the Pan York and the Pan Crescent, carrying several thousand Jewish refugees, which had been anchored in the Romanian port of Constanza since November of that year, awaiting instructions from Palestine. The delay in their sailing had been the result of an explicit request to Shertok by the US State Department that the Agency hold it up until after the 29 November, the date of the UN vote on partition. In view of the new friction between the Zionists and the American administration concerning the implementation of partition, economic aid, and the supply of weapons, Shertok advised Ben-Gurion to refrain from giving the green light for sailing until the Americans could be brought round. Although these considerations caused Shertok to over­ rule the recommendation made by the mysterious and influential head of the Mossad for Illegal Immigration—his own brother-in-law, Shaul Meirov-Avigur—Ben-Gurion and the rest of the Executive endorsed Shertok’s position. Ben-Gurion explained his support for Shertok by saying, ‘Even if I did think as you [Meirov] do, it is now my duty to follow their [Shertok’s and his colleagues in the USA] views.’ When he discovered that Shertok was the one who had initiated the veto against the refugee ships sailing, Meirov approached him directly. Shertok, who was far from being oblivious to the plight of the DPs stranded on the ships, or to the urgent political and military need for increased immigra­ tion to Palestine, and who had certainly not meant to immobilize the Mossad indefinitely, phrased his response to Meirov’s renewed plea in somewhat ambiguous terms. As Shertok should have expected, Meirov interpreted his ambiguous answer as a definite green light to dispatch the ships. Consequently, despite the State Department’s stern warnings and Shertok’s objection, on 28 December 1947 the ships began their tortuous voyage to Palestine. In the light of possible severe American reactions, and since it was too late to reverse the order to sail, Shertok made a hasty trip from New York to Geneva to confer with Meirov on arrangements concerning strict secrecy during the voyage to Palestine and the landing of the immigrants after their arrival. Shertok, and Shertok alone, was responsible for these decisions, including the mis­ understanding involved.4 On the other hand, while not hesitating to take such steps, he was in constant contact with his colleagues in Jerusalem regarding future political and diplomatic moves in Palestine. This was also the case when

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the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, invited representatives of the Jewish Agency to confer with him in London on imminent developments in the territory. Shertok was tempted to go, but, bent on preventing any hint that the Agency might be willing to deviate from its course towards the establishment of a Jewish state, Ben-Gurion argued that a senior and, one should add, moderate, politician like Shertok should not go to London. After long deliberations with his staff, Shertok acceded to Ben-Gurion and remained in the USA. He did, however, dispatch his close associate, the talented but erratic Nahum Goldmann, to London to explore the feelers sent to them by Bevin. While there had been a fair amount of co-ordination and co-operation between Shertok and Ben-Gurion regarding Bevin’s initiative and invi­ tation, the two still disagreed over other aspects of the Yishuv’s immediate policies. Hence among other pressing matters, this permanent tension between the two leaders and their assistants necessitated further co-ordination between them and their respective factions. Shertok planned to visit Palestine for such consultations in January 1948. It was therefore only natural that the next Mapai Convention was scheduled for the same time.5 In Palestine, the situation continued to deteriorate rapidly. Clashes between the Jewish and Arab communities were on the increase, as was the likelihood that the Arab states would soon become actively and directly involved in the crisis. Since the British were still doing little, if anything, to protect the Yishuv, the latter was in desperate need of weapons and other military material. But the American decision to impose a strict embargo on the sale of weapons to the two contesting communities in Palestine had dealt a crippling blow to Yishuv efforts in this sphere and to growing anxieties about their chances of withstanding a major assault. While the Palestinian Arabs were receiving weapons, purchased from third parties, through other Arab states, the Yishuv had been effectively cut off from the legal purchase of weapons in the USA. Shertok’s last major campaign in Washington, before leaving for Pales­ tine in January 1948, was aimed at reversing the administration’s decisions in this respect. Based on previous experience, Shertok decided that in addition to appealing to American public opinion, the US Congress, and Truman himself, he would focus his attention on the administration. At that level, he conducted long talks with Robert Lovett, Loy Henderson, and their assistants, as well as with the sym­ pathetic General John Hilldring. In these talks Shertok did not hesitate to argue that if the USA continued to cut off the Yishuv’s right to purchase weapons, the Agency would have no compunction in approaching the

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Soviet Union. However, even though the Americahs were aware of the Yishuv’s ongoing negotiations with the French, the Bulgarians, and the Czechs concerning the acquisition of weapons, Shertok’s arguments were futile; the administration was determined to maintain the embargo that principally affected the Yishuv. After his attempts to exert additional pressure on the administration, through direct appeals to the American public, had failed, Shertok again enlisted Chaim Weizmann’s help in fighting the embargo. This time, however, even the old Zionist warrior’s passionate communication to President Truman was to no avail. Truman responded by preaching the need for greater and more enduring calm in Palestine. N ot being one to give up when the very future of the Yishuv and perhaps even the Jewish state itself was at stake, Shertok maintained his persistent political crusade through both pressure on the administration and public appeals against the embargo during the next few months.6 From desperation, the continuing and unyielding American stance led Shertok and Yishuv leaders to improve and strengthen their relations with the Soviet Union and France. Just before Shertok left for Palestine, the Yishuv’s arms and financial situation was deemed so critical that Ben-Gurion asked him to join the fund-raising campaign for the Haganah that his political ally Eliezer Kaplan was then leading in the USA. In order to convince Shertok, who until then had not wanted to embarrass Kaplan, to become more deeply involved in the campaign, Ben-Gurion secretly communicated to him that Kaplan had been a failure in raising the needed funds.7 The faithful Shertok did not reveal these allegations to his friend, and not only participated in the campaign himself, but managed to recruit Weizmann as well before the old leader returned to London. Weizmann and Shertok, who were then at the height of their popularity among American Jews, succeeded in infusing new life into the campaign, which resulted in a significant increase in both pledges and cash donations. On the eve of Shertok’s visit to Palestine in January 1948, intended to provide him with first-hand information and an opportunity to consult with his colleagues, he was also preoccupied with the question of the establishment of the Jewish provisional government and parliament. He insisted that, since time was running out, these issues should be dealt with in the immediate future. He persisted in reminding his colleagues in Jerusalem that the Zionist Smaller Actions Committee had decided to establish these tyvo central political bodies as early as April 1947, but that the Executive had taken no further steps in this direction because of internal political bickering. What made the matter even more urgent

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was that, somewhat surprisingly, it was raised during Shertok’s frequent meetings with Soviet officials such as Arkady Sobolev, who was then UN Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the administration of the Security Council. Sobolev of course reflected the Kremlin’s position; on its part the Kremlin was interested in accelerating the British evacuation of Palestine, and felt that a Jewish provisional government must be established before January 1948, when the UN Palestine Commission was scheduled to discuss the implementation of partition. For similar reasons, the issue was also raised in Shertok’s talks with the British colonial secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones. Consequently, the question of an early establishment of a provisional government and parliament became the subject of intense exchanges between Shertok and his colleagues in Jerusalem on the one hand, and between the Jewish Agency Executive and the great powers—especially the USA and the USSR—on the other.8 Exhausted by his long and demanding period away from Palestine, during which he had increasingly felt the lack of on-the-spot knowledge of the situation there, Shertok was glad to return to Jerusalem on 30 December 1947. Upon his arrival, he soon found that the situation of the Yishuv was far from encouraging. For by then the Yishuv was so deeply engaged in the violent skirmishes with Palestinian and other Arab forces that Ben-Gurion had felt compelled publicly to announce that a comprehensive war had already been declared against the Jews. In his usual methodical fashion Shertok immediately set out to conduct his own private ‘fact-finding mission’, during which he met with politicians and senior Haganah commanders to evaluate security condi­ tions, the Yishuv’s military preparedness, and its capability of winning the impending war. At the end of his short but intensive ‘seminar’, Shertok, who, as has been noted, was no novice in defence matters, concluded that Britain’s ability and desire to control the territory was declining rapidly and that the British must therefore be planning the evacuation of the territory much earlier than August 1948, the date that they had set earlier. This meant that free movement and transportation on the roads of Palestine would be in serious jeopardy and would contribute to a further deterioration of the general security.situation. On the other hand, Shertok was relieved when he learned that his colleagues’ assessment was that if during the transition period the British military and police remained neutral, the Yishuv would be able to repulse the attacks of Palestinian Arabs. To his great chagrin, however, Shertok also found out that the internal social and economic situation in the Yishuv was worse than he had been

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led to believe while he was still in the USA. Not only was it on the verge of financial and economic collapse and in urgent need of basic military equipment, but mobilization was not proceeding in line with the troops required to withstand sporadic Arab attacks, let alone a massive inva­ sion by the armies of the Arab states. This last bit of information was particularly ominous in view of what seemed as dramatically enhanced preparations for war on the part of the Palestinian Arabs and Arab governments. Shertok recorded the difficulties in co-ordinating the moves and actions of the ‘organized Yishuv’ with the dissident paramilitary organizations. In this connection, however, Shertok noted that Abdullah had not succeeded in gaining full British support for his grand design of occupying the territories allotted to the independent Arab state by the UN resolution, about which he was also negotiating with the Political Department’s representatives.9 He also recorded the slow collective military preparations by the joint command of the Arab League, and the fact that numerous Palestinians had already begun their totally un­ expected exodus from their homeland.10 Despite their growing preoccupation with the worsening security situation and the correlated growing admiration demonstrated towards military leaders, many Jews in Palestine still appreciated the Yishuv’s political achievements attained through diplomatic acumen and dedica­ tion. Hence Shertok was awarded a very warm welcome upon his return to Jerusalem. This respect and even adoration of large groups in the Jewish community were balm to the personal vanity that he shared with many of his colleagues. It was therefore in a mood of somewhat false self-effacement, which followed the traditional Mapai ritual, that he told his colleagues on the Mapai Secretariat: T have always felt that events supersede our actual capabilities, and the gravity of these events is growing and becoming more awesome. [Under these circumstances,] the actions of individuals are unimportant; instead, it is collective accomplishments that are significant.’ On the same occasion, he stated that he had shared Ben-Gurion’s apprehensions that ‘this victory [at the UN] would be regarded [by rank and file] as the end of our trials. Since I had a clear notion about what would follow, my most difficult days were those during which I received news about the Yishuv’s celebra­ tions.’ Then, in the same vein, he concluded by praising the contribu­ tions of Ben-Gurion and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver to the victory in the UN. On that occasion of mutual self-congratulation, he did not forget to emphasize and praise the efforts of moderate leaders like Weizmann, Goldmann, Neumann, and their many associates, who had assisted him in gaining votes for the partition resolution ‘in full camaraderie, co-oper-

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ation, internal harmony and inspiration’.11 It looks therefore as if, despite their very real apprehensions concerning the approaching war, this meeting of Mapai elders was a psychologically much-needed occa­ sion for celebration. During his short stay in Palestine, Shertok’s colleagues in Mapai and the Agency Executive consulted him on the next round of political and diplomatic activities as well as on strategies for the forthcoming war. Although almost twenty of the most senior leaders and officials partici­ pated in the brainstorming marathon conducted on 1 and 2 January 1948, there was no doubt that Ben-Gurion and Shertok were listened to with the most respect. The two were joined by Golda Meyerson, who was serving then as head of the Jerusalem Political Department of the Agency, the Arab affairs experts Eliahu Sasson, Gad Machnes, and Ezra Danin, political advisers such as Zeev Sharef, and the Haganah lay leaders and commanders Israel Galili, Yohanan Ratner, Yigael Yadin, David Shaltiel, Yitzhak Sadeh, Yigal Allon, and Moshe Dayan. A substantial part of these deliberations were centred around the question of the use of force and military retaliation against the Arabs. The discussions were based on the following conclusions of Yishuv ‘Arabists’: that Palestinian Arab violence had been initiated and was being guided by the Mufti; that the Mufti’s political rivals, such as the Nashashibis and the Istiqlal, also supported the use of violence; that most of the fighting Palestinian Arabs had been trained in Syria; and that King Abdullah was likely to join the Arab League in the war against the Jews. This last assumption indicates that these experts were not relying on an agreement or collusion, explicit or tacit, with the king. Prior to as well as during these secret deliberations, Shertok and his assistants were naturally confronted with the crucial question: ‘If there is a war, are we going to win or lose it?’ Significantly, Sasson, a close associate of Shertok and who frequently expressed then the latter’s views, said: In such a war, we should not rely on our [military] force alone. We must also find a way to reach an understanding with the Arabs. We will not succeed in this effort if we seek direct contacts with the Arabs only through the [Jewish Agency’s] Political Department. Instead, we should try to find a f e s te m power that would offer its good services.12

Sasson’s statement was an accurate reflection of Shertok’s own ap­ prehensions about using uncontrolled retaliatory measures against the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states, and of his enduring belief in the need for both direct and indirect dialogue with the Arabs. In this,

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Shertok’s apprehensions were based on a fear of the military repercus­ sions involved, and on the hesitant American posture. Shertok’s cau­ tious—and, as usual, moderate—approach, as presented by Sasson, was buttressed by his own observations, and by more recent reports from the Yishuv envoys in the USA, conveying the American government’s clear disapproval of any escalation of violence in Palestine, whether initiated by Jews or by Arabs. Shertok knew, and imparted to his colleagues in Jerusalem, that America’s main interest was regional stability, which would protect their oil supply, ensure friendly relations with other Arab states, and keep the USSR out of the region in accordance with the containment policy. Also as usual, this strategy marathon resulted in a compromise between the activists and the moderates among the élite, as represented by Ben-Gurion and Shertok, respectively. Thus, according to the guide-lines formulated at these meetings, the Yishuv’s strategy was to be based on ‘active defence achieved through massive counter-offensives’, launched in reaction to specific Arab attacks. This formula meant that any retaliation against Arab attacks should be immediate and massive, but also that it should be restricted to the forces actually engaged in the fighting as well as to the area in which the attack had taken place. These two chief political and military strategists also concluded that ‘it would be preferable to conduct fewer, but more devastating, painful, and deterring counter-attacks, than many small and painless operations’ that might extend the war to unaffected areas.13 These basic and broad strategic guide-lines, formulated as a compromise between Shertok and Ben-Gurion, would serve as the foundation of Israeli defence strategy for almost a decade; that is, until the eve of the 1956 Sinai Campaign. As the Yishuv’s most accomplished expert on Arab affairs, Shertok played a major role in shaping the élite’s attitudes towards the Arabs in general and towards the secret negotiations that were still being con­ ducted with King Abdullah in particular. The contacts with Transjordan evolved around the understanding that had been hammered out between Abdullah and Golda Meyerson on 17 November 1947, according to which the Yishuv would agree to refrain from hampering the Hashemites’ efforts to occupy the part of Palestine that was allotted to the independent Arab state by the UN. Unlike Ben-Gurion, who was highly sceptical about the British game behind the scenes of these negotiations, and hence also about Abdullah’s real designs, Shertok fully supported such an agreement during his visit to Palestine. However, during that same visit, the Agency’s Political Department received intelligence re­ ports that Brigade Commander Clayton, then British liaison officer with

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the Arab League in Cairo, was endeavouring to torpedo the JewishTransjordanian understanding. It was reported that to protect British strategic interests in Palestine and its surroundings through the Arab League, Clayton was trying to persuade Abdullah to co-operate with the other neighbouring Arab states by pointing out that eventually this co-operation might allow him to occupy all of Palestine. In the light of this disturbing and inaccurate intelligence,14 Shertok instructed his en­ voys Danin and Sasson to inform Abdullah, who had expressed a wish to meet him, that time did not permit a visit to Amman. He also, however, sent word warning Abdullah to adhere to his understanding with the Jews and to refrain from nurturing ideas of joining other Arab states in the hope of occupying the entire country. In fact, Shertok, who until then had been one of the most ardent and persistent supporters of a Transjordanian-Zionist agreement, began to consider the possibility that the ‘Foxy Gentleman’ in Amman might reverse his previous orientation and commitments. Shertok therefore recommended again that the Yishuv should offer Abdullah political and diplomatic assistance in the USA and the UN, but only if he adhered to his understanding with the Agency.15 In any case, these exchanges with Abdullah increased Shertok’s suspicions about the king and contributed to his slow and gradual withdrawal from his long-held strategy of co-operation with Transjordan. For the Yishuv’s leaders, as well as for Shertok, this period marked a critical juncture on the road to independence; this was when prepara­ tions for the establishment of the Jewish state went into full swing. Thus during this visit, Shertok chaired an extended discussion in the Political Department on the Yishuv’s political and diplomatic strategy, and more specifically about the creation of a foreign ministry. Towards the end of January 1948, and strictly in accordance with his guide-lines as well as under his close and constant supervision, his senior assistant, Walter Eytan, drafted a blueprint for the structure, procedures, and modes of operation of the ministry. Eytan proposed that the ministry should operate as a unitary body, in other words, that there should not be any distinction or separation between those who served in the diplomatic corps abroad and those who happened to serve as the ministry’s staff at home. According to Eytan’s plan, seven geographical and six functional departments were to be established, and an elaborate structure of advisory bodies would complement these departments. Eytan’s docu­ ment proposed that the ministry’s office of director general should be patterned on the same post in Britain’s Foreign Office, i.e. that the director general should be almost completely independent in executing

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his functions. In order to economize, embassies were to be established only in Washington, Moscow, London, and Paris; consulate generals should be installed in a relatively large number of the world’s capitals and major cities, and consulates opened in smaller cities abroad. The heads of these legations would be appointed by the cabinet, and ambassadors were to hold a rank equivalent to that of a director general, granting them substantial autonomy in running their embassies. Finally, the foreign ministry was to be established no later than 15 May 1948, which was the target date for establishment of the new state. It was estimated that about seventy officials would be needed to staff all positions in the new ministry, of which about forty would perform diplomatic functions abroad and the rest administrative tasks at home. The proposed annual budget was £300,000 (approximately the same size as the budgets of the foreign ministries of the smaller Arab states at that time). Greatly satisfied with Eytan’s draft, Shertok gave the green light for its eventual implementation.16 Despite their recurrent disagreements, the Shertok-Ben-Gurion coali­ tion was functioning quite smoothly during this period. It was therefore not surprising that on the eve of Shertok’s return to the USA, the two leaders met for a private tête-à-tête at which they held a frank discussion on almost all aspects of the Yishuv’s future strategies and moves. Operatively,' the two agreed that the Yishuv immediately needed about five million dollars for defence purposes, which would cover the cost of an army of approximately twenty thousand soldiers, that is, two divi­ sions. Pondering the structure of the military and its equipment, the two agreed on the urgent need to establish an infantry division and to recruit more veteran officers, especially among Jews in the USA. Most import­ antly, Ben-Gurion and Shertok decided to do their utmost ‘to expedite the evacuation of the British army and government, since a crumbling and inefficient British regime only hampers our activities, and the dangers which it generates are increasing daily’. Finally, they agreed not to make a direct request for weapons from the USSR, but to approach Soviet Eastern European satellites instead.17 In retrospect, this meeting probably represented the high point of the co-operation between the two men. Immediately upon his return to New York on 18 January 1948, Shertok began to implement the main decisions taken at his tête-à-tête with Ben-Gurion. He was trying to expedite the British evacuation and the raising of money for the Jewish army and facilitating an agreement with Czechoslovakia about arms. The attainment of these closely related goals became extremely urgent in view of new information from Pales-

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tine on yet further deterioration in security, persistent rumours about Abdullah’s intention to withdraw from the agreement with the Jews, and the related British intention to postpone their evacuation. Subsequently, Shertok’s efforts included an appearance before the UN Palestine (Implementation) Commission on 15 January 1948, where he stated emphatically that Britain had shown itself incapable of providing ad­ equate protection for the Jewish community in the territory, since it had tried too little and too late to stop Arab violence.18 He continued by urging the Commission’s members that there was therefore a compelling need for weapons to ensure the establishment of a Jewish militia. A few days later he submitted to the Commission a rather long list of demands comprising thirty-one items that it should solve to prevent substan­ tive damage to the Yishuv. Addressing the US government in a sim­ ilar manner, he made an impassioned plea to lift the arms embargo so that the Jewish militia could be established and could gain the cap­ ability to defend the Yishuv in the absence of British protection. Responding to Shertok’s request himself, President Truman refused to lift the embargo, and reiterated his support for the establishment of an international police force to keep peace in the territory during the transition period.19 Since he seemed to have reached an impasse in his talks with the administration on weapons acquisition, Shertok intensified his activities in the other crucial sphere: fund-raising in the American Jewish com­ munity. The American Jewish community’s response to his pleas was disappointing. In view of the growing needs of the Jewish community in Palestine, Shertok was therefore relievëd to learn that Golda Meyerson had volunteered to make a prolonged visit to the USA to lend a hand in this campaign.20 Further disheartening news from Palestine—that irregular Palestinian Arab forces, assisted by regulars of the Liberation Army, which had initially penetrated the territory from Lebanon, had begun to launch well-organized large-scale attacks on isolated Jewish settlements in the northern region and around Jerusalem and Bethlehem—made it clear to Shertok, who lacked updated information about developments in Pales­ tine, that a new stage had begun in the escalating struggle over the Holy Land. Thus Shertok was first among his colleagues in tfew York to receive news about the killing of thirty-five Haganah soldiers, who had been sent as reinforcements to the besieged Etzion Bloc, south of Bethlehem, which was then under heavy attack. This grave news about further deterioration in security was coupled with alarming reports about the abysmal economic situation of the Yishuv.

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Being so distant from the scene of these growing economic difficulties and mounting violent skirmishes, and unwilling to undermine the activities of the Haganah, Shertok was loathe openly to repudiate Ben-Gurion’s insistence that the Yishuv should react more aggressively to Arab attacks. The need, Ben-Gurion maintained, was ‘not for local but rather for comprehensive defence of the entire community; not for static but for mobile defence; not for the security of the settlements but of the entire Yishuv and its communications network. In short, there is a need to ensure the security of the entire country, [to protect] the Yishuv’s borders, for the sake of free immigration and for inde­ pendence.’21 While Shertok supported this line publicly, advocating it in speeches throughout the USA, in his secret communications, he urged his colleagues in Jerusalem to maintain caution with regard to military operations, but also to expedite plans for establishing nine new settle­ ments in the north and in the Negev—advice that reflected his views on the importance of gradually developing the state by creating ‘solid facts’ in the form of these settlements, wherever possible without resort to an excessive use of violence. He explained that the creation of such settlements would have both practical and symbolic value. N ot only would it boost morale in Palestine and among Diaspora Jews, thereby serving as a new rallying point for fund-raising in the United States, but it would also foil the British ploy to drive the Jews out of the southern and northern parts of Palestine. When Ben-Gurion presented this aspect of Shertok’s proposals to the Jerusalem Executive, it was readily endorsed.22 The somber news from Palestine, together with persistent intelligence that the Americans were reappraising their position on partition, came to a head during the third week of January 1948. The purported American change of heart was attributed to the looming crises in Germany and the Balkans, which, because of expected urgent political and military needs, induced the United States and Britain to hammer out a tacit agreement about the continuation of the Mandate over Palestine. These rumours only served to intensify Ben-Gurion’s long-standing, almost obsessive enmity towards Bevin, and distrust of the British, which also adversely affected his attitude towards King Abdullah. Since the continuation of the British Mandate would cause the postponement of independence, Ben-Gurion urged Shertok to launch a new public cam­ paign against the alleged new American-British ploy. It took ShertQk a few days to ascertain that there was no such plan. He received information from London that Hector McNeil, the proZionist junior minister in the British Foreign Office, had not only rejected

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the rumours as false, but had emphasized that the British government regarded the establishment of a Jewish state as a fait accompli. To Shertok’s dismay, he learned that the source of the rumours about the purported American-British collusion was his own envoy in Washington, Eliahu Epstein, who admitted that his information had not been accurate. However, still sensing that there was something brewing in the minds of the State Department’s Middle East hands, Shertok regarded the situation as perilous. He therefore used yet again his ‘secret weapon’, and approached Weizmann for help in easing the situation with the Americans.23 His constant co-operation with and reliance on his moderate ‘dear chief’, created by circumstances in Palestine, only added to the latent and explicit tensions between Shertok and Ben-Gurion’s activist camp. On the other hand, in early 1948 Shertok and Ben-Gurion were in agreement that all Arab countries would invade Palestine as soon as the British left, and that the Yishuv would be on its own in defending itself against this invasion. Both leaders concurred in a realistic assessment of the gravity of the security situation and of its implications. At least Shertok hoped that King Abdullah would respect the unwritten under­ standing that he had reached with the Yishuv. This strategic assessment triggered a significant shift in the balance between the Yishuv’s political and military sectors. Defence, which was Ben-Gurion’s province, was now seen as essential and as taking precedence over diplomacy. How­ ever, despite the temporary downgrading of political and diplomatic activities, Shertok maintained his influence on decision-making, includ­ ing in the sphere of defence. The shift meant that he became more deeply involved than he had been in ‘pure defence’ matters, and obtained even greater autonomy in various activities in the grey area between defence and foreign affairs. It was in this context that in his address before the UN Palestine Commission in late January 1948—which gained wide coverage in the world media—he severely criticized Britain for its substantial arms sales to the Arabs while withholding weapons and military equipment from the Yishuv. If Britain and the United States refused to sell military materials to the Jews, he argued, the Yishuv would not be able to establish a militia consisting of the five brigades called for in the UN partition resolution. Shertok also insisted on the urgent establishment of the international police force staffed by units from the major powers, also stipulated in the UN resolution, in order to curtail Arab aggression against the Jews. Many journalists, including Drew Pearson, accurately interpreted this speech as not only reflecting Shertok’s own position but as representing the official position of the emerging Jewish government.24

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Despite the speech’s positive reception by both politicians and journal­ ists in the USA, Shertok knew only too well that the relevant depart­ ments in the American administration—State and Defence—were still wavering about the very establishment of the Jewish state. His inform­ ants had warned him that the State Department’s George Kennan and Loy Henderson were even then conducting a hardline campaign against partition. Since a clear American pro-partition stance was essential in the international sphere as well as for the Yishuv’s flagging fund-raising campaign in America and its severe problems with regard to arms purchase, Shertok consistently emphasized in all his many meetings in Washington the United States’ historical responsibility for helping to ensure the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state. The need for US support could not have been overstressed. For at that critical moment, the American Jewish community, careful as always to avoid the ‘dual loyalty’ quandary and demonstrate its faithfulness to the USA, was weakening in its support for the establishment of a Jewish state, in line with its government’s shilly-shallying.25 Alongside his determined exertions to move the US administration and American Jews, Shertok continued to serve as a prime mover in the immediate establishment of the political institutions of the future Jewish state. To this end, he urged his colleagues in Jerusalem to establish a provisional legislative body in accordance with the U N ’s recommenda­ tion. In order to persuade Jerusalem to expedite their efforts in this direction, he reminded them that on many occasions the Palestine Commission had advised the Jewish Agency to take steps towards demonstrating again that it was the sole representative body of the Yishuv, and that it would be ready to undertake governmental respon­ sibilities as soon as the British evacuated Palestine. Excited by the chance of ‘normalizing’ the Yishuv’s political position through the establishment of various state organs, Shertok put unremit­ ting pressure on his colleagues to obtain the formal agreement of the Vaad Leumi (National Committee), the only elected body of the Pales­ tinian Jewish community, to establish the provisional legislature and government. Despite his endless prodding, the usual coalitional con­ troversies and haggling over personal appointments held up formal endorsement until the first week of February 1948. Upon learning that the Vaad Leumi had finally endorsed the establishment of the legislative body, Shertok immediately informed the UN about it. Then he had a harder time moving Jerusalem to serious action on the formation of a provisional government. It was only after persistent pressure on his part that the slow and cumbersome process of creating the necessary provi-

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sional governmental departments began to take shape. The controversies and bickering in Palestine none the less continued for many weeks, delaying the presentation of these bodies to the UN.26 In the mean time, the formidable anti-partitionist coalition was gaining more force within the US administration, and consequently President Truman again evinced hesitation about both the partition plan and America’s role in its implementation. Among his arguments against partition, in addition to the objection concerning dispatching American soldiers to Palestine, the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, who was a prominent member of that coalition, resorted to rather bizarre pre­ texts—for instance, that there had been large-scale penetration of the Yishuv by Soviet intelligence agents—as reasons for withdrawing Amer­ ican support for the plan. (This allegation would linger for months to come and impair the Yishuv’s relations with the Americans.) Not content with waging his battle against partition in the administration, Forrestal brought it into the general political arena, where he endeavoured to turn it into an issue between the Democratic and Republican parties. In an attempt to persuade Forrestal to moderate his anti-partitionist posture, and at least to neutralize his opposition, Shertok recruited noted personalities such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr., and the Jewish financier and public figure, Bernard Baruch. But neither Forrestal nor the Secretary of State, George Marshall, and his State Department Arabists, Lovett and Henderson, could be moved to alter their opposition.27 These anti-partitionists had been very effectively assisted by the influential George Kennan, who had adopted the official British argu­ ment that, especially in view of persistent Soviet attempts to penetrate the Middle East, Palestine was of the greatest strategic value to the West. The staunch anti-Communist Kennan was afraid that a prolonged Arab-Jewish armed conflict would encourage the Soviet Union to penetrate more deeply into the area, thereby endangering America’s wider strategic interests which were foremost in his mind. In view of America’s deteriorating relations with both the Arabs and the Soviets, he concluded that the USA must refrain from any action that would facilitate the implementation of partition. He therefore also objected to dispatching either an American or a UN force to Palestine and favoured maintaining the US embargo on arms sales to both sides. Ih addition to minimizing the pro-partition arguments, Kennan felt that the US gov­ ernment should press for a unitary state in Palestine, in which the Jews would remain a minority. Dean Rusk, the State Department’s director of UN affairs, further bolstered the anti-partition coalition by suggesting that the USA should advocate a new trusteeship for the territory.

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On 29 January 1948 Forrestal, Lovett, Henderson, and their assis­ tants, met to discuss the situation. All those present accepted Kennan’s ideas as well as Henderson’s contention that the partition plan had been impractical from the outset. They agreed that a new attempt must be made to persuade the president to accept Dean Rusk’s trusteeship plan. The group’s decision to intensify the battle against partition was encour­ aged by the British representative to the UN, Alexander Cadogan’s, statement before the UN Palestine Commission. In this statement, Cadogan had firmly rejected the Commission’s intention to go to Palestine and to take control of the territory.28 This time, Shertok decided that, in the face of such formidable opposition to the UN resolution, he should consult his colleagues before taking any further steps. While in Jerusalem there was general agreement that tough political action was necessary, the Executive held a heated debate on whether to try rational persuasion or to apply unmitigated political pressure on Washington and initiate a protest campaign all over the USA. As might have been expected, Shertok supported the former approach. Equally predictably, the Agency leadership settled on its usual compromise. Thus in order to ward off the attack on partition, they decided that Weizmann, who was already in the USA at Shertok’s invitation, and Eleanor Roosevelt should arrange a meeting with Pres­ ident Truman and George Marshall, At which the Zionist elder states­ man and the ardent American pro-Zionist should do their best to prevent the president from abrogating his agreement to support parti­ tion. Simultaneously, public figures who had supported the Jews’ cause—such as Bernard Baruch, Governor Herbert Lehman of New York, the member of the US delegation to the UN John Foster Dulles, the former Secretary of State, Harold Stimson, and former Under­ secretary of State, Sumner Welles—would bombard Truman with personal letters, retired generals Hilldring and Donovan would warn Marshall of the dangers to the US political and military postures involved in a formal change of position, and Capitol Hill pro-Zionists Robert Taft, Arthur Vandenberg, and Adlai Stevenson would enlist support in Congress in the fight to prevent partition from being stifled. Shertok and his associates did not neglect any channel of communica­ tion and influence to ensure the implementation of partition, thus, for example, the respected British historian and philosopher Isaiah Berlin was also recruited to lobby his wartime friends in the State Department. The sense of urgency behind this desperate effort was not unwar­ ranted, especially since the basically anti-partitionist National Security Council was then also reconsidering American support of the partition

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plan, and about to present its own negative recommendations on the subject.29 Somewhat reluctantly, Shertok also decided to endorse Nahum Goldm ann’s call for secret talks with the British, despite the repercussions that such talks were likely to create among his colleagues in Jerusalem, and especially, of course, with regard to his relations with Ben-Gurion, who had adopted an unyielding anti-British position. Through Goldmann, then, Shertok asked the British to clarify their political and military intentions regarding Palestine, in particular, their plans concern­ ing King Abdullah’s role in Palestine, and to indicate whether discus­ sions with the Agency had any chance of leading to agreement with the Yishuv. The firm response of the British was that they had no intention of altering any of their basic positions in regard to withdrawal from the territory and handing over authority.30 Since the security situation in Palestine was deteriorating more rapidly than ever, as a growing number of attacks were being launched on Jewish transportation and settlements, and since the British were waging a determined war on illegal Jewish immigration, Shertok, Golda Meyerson, Kaplan, as well as other members of the Executive then in the USA, were under formidable pressure from Jerusalem to obtain results—and quickly. The main source of this pressure was Ben-Gurion himself, who seemed to be panicking because the Yishuv was ill prepared and because the military initiative was then almost completely in the hands of the Arabs, in particular the Arab military units that had penetrated the territory. Ben-Gurion’s assessment was that the seven weeks until mid-March 1948 would be critical. He assumed that by then the Yishuv would had received the weapons purchased by Yehuda Arazi on the free market in the USA, and by Ehud Avriel from Czechoslovakia and other West European countries. To finance these deals, Ben-Gurion demanded more money from Shertok and Golda Meyerson, who had been success­ ful in her fund-raising efforts. Of Shertok he also demanded assurance that an international police force would be established and that the USA at least would lift the arms embargo. Shertok, who had never needed any goading when the Yishuv’s existence was at stake, reminded Ben-Gurion that he had forwarded these demands to the proper American politicians and officials many weeks earlier.31 * These were probably the worst days for the Yishuv and for all its leaders before the establishment of the Jewish state. Much affected by the situation in Palestine and by the American tendency to reverse its support of partition, Shertok became even more dejected when Truman’s close adviser and staunch Zionist supporter David Niles reported that

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the strength of the anti-partitionist coalition was' still growing and its influence increasing. Shertok was somewhat relieved, however, when he took a hard look at the balance of power in US politics and concluded that Truman’s domestic political interests, particularly his special rela­ tions with the Jewish community, which traditionally leaned towards the Democratic party, implied a strong likelihood that he would finally support partition. He was also encouraged by Marshall’s substantive concern for the UN, and his implied unwillingness to undermine its resolutions, and by persistent evidence that the pro-Zionist factions in America had not lost their loyalty and dedication. None the less, Shertok could not ignore the spectre of the strategic importance which had been attributed to Middle Eastern oil since the end of the Second World War, or of the threatened Soviet penetration into the core of the Middle East. Already at that early stage of the Cold War he had to admit that US concern over the Kremlin’s designs in the area was not purely academic, for in his ongoing contacts with Gromyko and his lieutenants, he too could sense the Soviets’ growing interest in the region and their eagerness to penetrate it. Shertok did, however, dismiss as mere pretext the American claim that US-Soviet conflicts—over Berlin, China, and Czechoslovakia—necessitated a change in US Middle Eastern policy. In this context, he confided to his friends, ‘Only by the force of this spectre of danger to the USA are they able to break the wall of [the supporters of] 29 November [partition resolution] within the administration. This [invocation of major international crises] has covered up many crimes of the American administration.’32 Indeed, Cold War arguments had deterred friends of the Zionist cause in Washington—such as Senators Robert Taft and Arthur Vandenberg, as well as Governor Thomas Dewey—from intervening more ardently on behalf of the Yishuv.33 Shertok was also shocked and disappointed that, despite the precari­ ousness of the military position of the Yishuv, the adoption of the partition resolution had rather reduced the readiness of Zionist groups in Washington and New York to raise their voices in support. In this connection, Shertok later related to his friends in the provisional government that the Secretary of State, George Marshall, was disap­ pointed by the poor performance of the Haganah, very much as Lord Balfour had been disappointed by the Bolsheviks’ performance during the New Economic Plan period. These acerbic comments were directed at Ben-Gurion, who was in charge of defence. Shertok ascribed the military vulnerability of the Yishuv, and its adverse implications, to Ben-Gurion, who had thus far failed properly to prepare the Jewish community either for protecting itself against Palestinians’ sporadic

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attacks on settlements and transportation, or for the coming full-scale Arab invasion and war.34 In the mean time Shertok attached great importance to this American concern that it would be forced to protect the Yishuv. Shertok’s reports to his colleagues back in Palestine were always straightforward, detailed, and meticulously accurate. Thus in his com­ muniqués to Jerusalem, he admitted that America’s wavering position on partition made it impossible to gauge the results of the Security Council deliberations on the establishment of a Jewish militia, which had been intended to serve as a cover for the illegal activities of the Haganah, and that the only hope of eliciting a positive US stance on participation in an international police force, as well as cutting off American aid to the Arabs, was by persistent pressure on Truman and Marshall. It is important to note here that neither Shertok nor his colleagues in Jerusalem were aware of a simultaneous major change in Britain’s policy towards King Abdullah. Towards the end of January 1948 Bevin decided to support Abdullah’s plan to occupy the Arab part of Palestine and avoid clashing with the Jews. Although the Yishuv leaders had tried hard to obtain information about British-Transjordanian relations, they were oblivious of the fact that Bevin endorsed the king’s plan during his meeting with Transjordan’s prime minister, Abul Huda, on 7 February 1948. Because of extreme secrecy and compartmentalization, in the British policy-making process, this change was also not detected by the Americans, the Palestinian Arabs, and the leaders of the Arab states. The result was unwarranted Jewish suspicion of the British government’s intentions during the critical period fröm January 1948 to May 1948 as well as of Abdullah’s stance. The latter, it must be noted, tried to allay the Yishuv’s fears, albeit with no great succcess. These inaccurate perceptions of both Britain and Transjordan precluded the possibility of greater co-ordination and co-operation between the Yishuv and Trans­ jordan rather than fostered collusion.35 In addition to pulling out all stops to solicit America’s help and continuing to pursue the ever-evasive British co-operation during the period before their final withdrawal from Palestine, Shertok redoubled his efforts to prompt his colleagues in Jerusalem with regard to forming the provisional government. He sensed that this was becôming urgent after a further conversation with the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie. Shertok’s insistence, however, was mainly connected to the worsening security situation in Palestine and not to threats coming from the UN, for he intended to approach the Security Council with a formal request for recognition of such a government, which would then be in a position

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to create its own militia—a move intended to enhance security and to allay American fears that they would be committed to send their own troops to the territory. He therefore endlessly prodded his colleagues to establish a government which would be based on the widest possible political coalition, including the religious parties. This last proviso was intended to demonstrate the existence of a general political consensus and mobilization in the Yishuv.36 Shertok’s exhortations finally began to make things move in Jerusa­ lem. Moreover, his suggestion for a broad coalitional government was backed by the Vaad Leumi, whose members nurtured hopes of gaining positions in such a government, as well as by Ben-Gurion and his activist supporters on the Jerusalem Jewish Agency Executive, Eliahu Dobkin and Rabbi Yishuv Leib Fishman. The activists’ reasoning was obvious: only a large coalition would stand a chance of commanding an activist majority. However, moderates such as Kaplan, Gruenbaum, Bernstein, and Shapira, who constituted the majority in the Executive, called for establishing a smaller provisional government of only nine to eleven ministers. This debate created a temporary impasse in Jerusalem. When asked to break the deadlock, Shertok sided with the moderate group. Consequently, the resolution adopted reflected the usual compromise between the two blocs: the Executive decided that the provisional government should reflect the composition of the Executive itself, and comprise thirteen portfolios.37 No sooner was this compromise reached, than the Executive and Vaad Leumi became bogged down in infighting as to the individuals who would compose the government. The turmoil surrounding this process was so intense that the observant Zeev Sharef, who was directing the activities to establish the future state’s governing bodies and was intimately involved in the political negotiations over the personal composition of the first Jewish government, complained to one of his associates: ‘Let’s pray that the nation will survive its leaders and emerge alive despite this infighting [about positions].’38 In mid-February 1948 Shertok discovered that his uncertainty about the American position on partition had been well founded. Thus, on 17 February 1948, under a heavy veil of secrecy, the US National Security Council submitted its recommendations on this issue to President Truman. The NSC’s two main strategic assumptions were that the Soviets should not be allowed to penetrate the Middle East under any circumstances, and that the USA must refrain from alienating the Arabs and maintain their friendship at almost any cost. In the light of these two assumptions, the NSC advocated that the USA should support the establishment of a new trusteeship regime in the troubled territory.

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Three days later, on 21 February, the CIA submitted similar recommen­ dations to Truman.39 These new recommendations indicated that the anti-partitionist coali­ tion in Washington was even broader and more formidable than Shertok and his colleagues had assumed. Thus, according to Eliahu Epstein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative, General Alfred Gruenther, had also told Truman that support for partition would have negative repercus­ sions on American interests throughout the world.40 This warning, together with a special report of the UN Palestine Commission about the insurmountable difficulties that it had been encountering in its efforts to implement partition, motivated President Truman to accept Marshall’s advice that a major change was called for in regard to the US position. Consequently, in an important consultation held on 19 February 1948, Truman approved searching for alternative ways to solve the ArabJewish conflict which did not involve partition. The US administration cloaked its change in basic orientation under a heavy veil of secrecy. Shertok, sensing that something ominous was simmering behind the scenes in official Washington, could not ascertain what it was. He tried to illicit first-hand information from Lovett and other officials, but they stubbornly evaded the issue by agreeing to discuss only general ques­ tions. Thus, while the security situation was further deteriorating in Pales­ tine, and with the perturbed Ben-Gurion prodding Shertok harder to push through the establishment of an international police force, the State Department was completing preparations to move in the opposite direction, that is, to withdraw from partition.41 Once the American position was made public, Shertok was reminded of the way thé British had manoeuvred their policy concerning withdrawal from partition in the late 1930s. This feeling would not enhance Shertok’s sympathy toward the USA, it would induce him to try to balance the dependence of the Yishuv and later of Israel on the USA by maintaining cordial relations with the Soviet Union as well as with Third World ‘non- identified’ states. The American reversal was carefully orchestrated. President Truman decided that America’s withdrawal from partition should be made in two stages: the first immediate, and the second when opportunity dictated delivering it. Accordingly, the first step came on 24 February 1948, when the American Representative to the Security Council, Ambassador Warren Austin, argued that the Palestine issue was the Council’s first major international crisis, and that its handling of this situation would determine the course of its future as a world body. Since the most that

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could be hoped for in Palestine was a cease-fire, Austin continued, the Council should avoid the unfortunate beginning which the imposition of partition in Palestine would represent and instead initiate a new round of efforts at mediation between Jews and Arabs. Calling on all govern­ ments to refrain from violence in the mean time, Austin concluded by suggesting that a new commission comprising the Security Council’s five permanent members should be appointed to monitor the situation in Palestine and instruct the UN’s future moves with regard to the territory. Although Austin stated that the partition resolution was to be maintained, Robert McClintock, who drafted Austin’s ambiguously worded speech in the Security Council, had admitted that in fact it ‘knocked off the partition plan’.42 Shertok, whose great political and diplomatic achievement had been jeopardized, was utterly pessimistic after Austin’s speech. He wrote: The situation is not good. Our position in Washington is bad, and the administration almost completely avoids us. The UN Palestine Commission is unhealthy, and there won’t be any international police force since the smaller countries won’t participate in it unless the larger powers do. But the US doesn’t want to, and certainly won’t allow the Soviets to participate in such a force. The new Commission proposed by the Americans means a compromise agreement [by the main UN delegations].43

The new negative development notwithstanding, Shertok intended to press further for an international police force. This was due more to his apprehensions about ‘the Yishuv’s lack of ability to launch an offensive against the enemy’,44 than to any belief in the ability or even the desirability of UN involvement. Ben-Gurion, more confident about the Yishuv’s long-term ability to withstand the Arabs, did not accept your [Shertok’s pessimistic] conclusion (if apprehensions can be regarded as conclusions). For if we receive the needed [military] equipment on time, we will be able not only to defend ourselves but also to deliver deadly blows to the Syrians . . . and gain control over the entire country. Therefore, the only matters that now bother me are not the manœuvres of the various forces in Washington and Downing Street, and not even formal resolutions of the UN. I am only interested in [receiving] sufficient high-quality military equipment at the right moment. It is on this that everything else hinges!45

These were bold words. Nevertheless, soon afterwards Ben-Gurion would send gloomier messages to Shertok. In reaction to Warren Austin’s deliberately vague statement about the new American position, Shertok appeared before the UN Security Council. In a desperate attempt to repudiate Austin’s allegations, he

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warned, ‘Any new delays and complications [in implementing partition] would endanger the entire plan and cause further deterioration in Palestine’, and strongly demanded that partition and all other earlier relevant resolutions be strictly implemented. His final statement before the Council was an uncharacteristically aggressive one: For us, the partition plan that has been adopted by the General Assembly is the last and final compromise. Ours is a historical problem, and its positive solution is one that will greatly contribute to the vitality of this great international organization. We call upon all members of the Security Council to take the action within the boundaries of their authority, and translate it into the language of reality.46

Because of his own bold statements, Shertok’s speech received subs­ tantial public exposure. On the other hand, it also drew forth an emphatic rejection from the British colonial secretary, Creech-Jones. Only to very few of his closest friends in the USA did Shertok reveal that he had always preferred ‘a clear definition of the political attitude to a bald refusal to talk [with the other side]’,47 meaning that despite the adamant American position he favoured further attempts to discuss matters with them. But even the arrival in Palestine of a small group representing the UN Palestine Commission did not seem to help to clarify or alter the situation in the territory, the British official position, or the range of possible future actions on the part of the Security Council. Since the international situation was both confused and confusing, Shertok tried at least to clarify things at home. Yet also in this respect he was totally disappointed. For although he insisted that the estab­ lishment of a provisional Jewish government would be a necessary step in the right direction, he had still not received any reactions from Jerusalem on the matter. He therefore took the initiative of drafting a plan for such a government on his own, which he presented to the UN’s Palestine Commission. Apparently this step prompted his colleagues to sort out their disagreements. When finally the stalemate in Jerusalem was resolved on 5 March 1948, the plan drafted by the Executive called for a cabinet comprising four Mapai, two Mapam, two Mizrahi, two General Zionist, one Sephardi, and one Haredi Agudat Israel repre­ sentatives, with the thirteenth seat still undecided.48 * There was little doubt that the Mapai ministers would be Ben-Gurion, Shertok, Kaplan, and Remez. Significantly, this list included three moderates (Shertok, Kaplan, and Remez) and one activist (Ben-Gurion), Ben-Gurion and Remez from the former Ahdut Haavodah, Kaplan from Hapoel Hatzair, and Shertok leaning towards the latter. In order

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to attain a better balance between the two groups, as well as to have a woman in the future cabinet, Ben-Gurion proposed that Golda Meyerson be appointed minister, but his proposal was not adopted. On 5 March 1948 Shertok also received details concerning the proposed composition of the provisional legislative body. He was informed that it would comprise thirty-six members from both the Agency and the Vaad Leumi, in strict proportional representation, based on the parties partici­ pating in recent Zionist congresses. Though Shertok and his aides in New York and Washington escalated the campaign against the American anti-partitionist proposal, and the Soviet delegation supported this effort, time had run out. Partly as a result of the information supplied by Shertok concerning the situation in Palestine, on 5 March 1948 the Security Council adopted a resolution on the lines proposed by the Americans, that is, creating yet another Commission for Palestine, made up of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The task of this commission was to take a fresh look at partition vis-à-vis other solutions to the Palestine imbroglio. Unable to ward off the anti-partition trend and the resultant vote, Shertok took some consolation in the Security Council’s expression of readiness to recognize the Jewish provisional parliament and government.49 Having succeeded in obtaining UN endorsement of the American first step in the retreat from its formal support of partition, on the same day as the UN approved the appointment of the new commission, George Marshall was preparing the grounds for the second step in this retreat. Thus he circulated a memorandum to his colleagues in the cabinet stating that, since conditions did not seem to favour the peaceful implementation of partition, the American delegation to the Security Council should call for a special assembly that would adopt a different solution. As soon as Marshall had obtained President Truman’s endorse­ ment of this proposal, he instructed Warren Austin to proceed with full speed to set the stage for the second step at the UN. This step would be the suggestion for a new trusteeship in Palestine.50 At this point it was not only the situation in Washington and at the UN that was unsatisfactory for the Jews. Ben-Gurion had passed on to his colleagues in the Executive reports from Chaim Herzog, then the Yishuv’s liaison officer with the UN Commission in Palestine, con­ firming Shertok’s information that there was virtually no chance that an international police force would be established by the UN in time to help the Yishuv and thus save partition.51 On top of all this, Ben-Gurion, who only a few days earlier had shown a remarkable degree of self-confidence in his secret communications with Shertok, cabled his colleague as

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follows after holding discouraging talks with the British High Commis­ sioner, Sir Alan Cunningham: It now seems that the termination of the Mandate on 15 May 1948 will mean British withdrawal from national and international legal responsibility [for Palestine], leaving behind only the British army. This will disrupt the work of the UN, help the Arab League achieve its goals, by giving the Arab armies a free hand to destroy the Yishuv, and cripple Jewish independence.

Ben-Gurion, who distrusted the UN from the outset and would continue to ridicule the world body, nevertheless implored Shertok to warn both the Security Council and the American government that they would have to shoulder the responsibility for the ‘coming catastrophe’ unless they immediately supplied military equipment to the Yishuv, recognized the Jewish provisional government, curbed the activities of the British army after 15 May, and took decisive steps to prevent Arab armies from invading the territory.52 Three days later Ben-Gurion repeated his desperate call for help, concluding, ‘It is imperative that [the powers and the UN] understand that more than the fate of the UN resolutions is at stake; the physical existence of the Yishuv is also in the balance. Is this understood among our friends?’53 Although Ben-Gurion and his followers would soon forget the panic that had led him to besiege Shertok with his frantic calls for action, his almost hysterical messages enveloped Shertok, his colleagues, and assis­ tants in the USA in a morose atmosphere that lasted for weeks and influenced their mood and actions.

NOTES 1. Louis, British Empire , 495. 2. Shertok in Mapai Secretariat, 30 Dec. 1947, Mapai Archive 24/47; Sharett, A t the Gates , 155-6; Comay to Gering, 3 Dec. 1947, State of Israel, Israel State Archives, Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947-M ay 1948 (Jerusalem: The Government Printer) (hereafter Documents 47-8), 13-18; Shertok to Meyerson, 11 Dec. 1947, Documents 4 7 -8 , 49-50; Palestine P ost , 5 Dec. 1947. 3. Ben-Gurion, War Diary (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence Press, 1982), i. 1 Dec. 1947; Palestine P ost , 4 Dec. 1947. * 4. Ben-Gurion, War Diary , i, 1 Dec. 1947, 2 Dec. 1947, 9 Dec. 1947, 10 Dec. 1947, 17 Dec. 1947, 18 Dec. 1947, 24 Dec. 1947, 25 Dec. 1947; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 1 Dec. 1947, Documents 47 -8 , 47-8; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, ibid. 57-8; Mossad to Shertok, 17 Dec. 1947, ibid. 78; Agency Executive to Shertok, 20 Dec. 1947, ibid. 89; U. Millstein, The War o f Independence (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1989), i. 161-6.

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5. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 2 Dec. 1947, 24 Dec. 1947; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 5 Dec. 1947, Documents 47-8 , 32; Shertok to Linton, 6 Dec. 1947, ibid., 33; Palestine Post, 5 Dec. 1947, 7 Dec. 1947. 6. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 499-502, 504-6; on the negotiations with these three countries see Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 11 Dec. 1947, 39, 41; Weizmann to Truman, 9 Dec. 1947, Truman to Weizmann, 12 Dec. 1947, Weizmann Archive; Shertok to Roosevelt, Jr., 24 Dec. 1947, Documents 47-8, 102-2; Palestine Post, 19 Dec. 1947; U. Bialer, Between East and West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 174. 7. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 9 Dec. 1947, Documents 47-8, 40-3. 8. Z. Sharef, Three Days (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1965), 38-9; on Shertok’s talk with the Soviet representative, 26 Dec. 1947, Documents 47-8, 110-12, and see a report about these talks, ibid. 121-2; and see a discussion in Agency Executive, 7 Jan. 1948, CZA. 9. Shlaim, Collusion, 127-9. 10. See Shertok’s report to Agency Executive in New York, submitted after his return to the USA, 10 Jan. 1948, CZA, Z5/39; and Ben-Gurion, When Israel Fought in Bettle, (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Mapai, 1951), 20-3; Millstein, War o f Independence, ii. 11. Shertok in Mapai Secretariat, 30 Dec. 1947, Mapai Archive, 24/47. 12. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 1 Jan. 1948. 13. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 1 Jan. 1948, 2 Jan. 1948; and see Shertok’s report in New York Branch of Agency Executive, 10 Jan. 1948, CZA, Z5/39; Shlaim, Collusion, 145-8; Millstein, War o f Independence, ii. 170-2. 14. Shlaim, Collusion, 124-6. 15. Danin to Sasson, 4 Jan. 1948, Documents 47-8, 126-9; Sasson to Abdullah, 11 Jan. 1948, Documents 47-8, 143-7; Sasson to Shertok, 13 Jan. 1948 Documents 47-8; Shlaim, Collusion, 149-50. 16. Eytan to Shertok, 19 Jan. 1948, Documents 47-8; the draft, dated 30 Jan. 1948, is in ISA, FA, 2379/1; Sharef, Three Days, 45; Yegar, T he Foreign Ministry’. 17. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 4 Jan. 1948. 18. Sasson to Shertok, 20 Dec. 1947, Documents 47-8, 90; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 27 Dec. 1947, ibid. 114; Heydt to Shertok, 4 Jan. 1948, ibid. 125; Danin to Sasson, 4 Jan. 1948, ibid. 126-9; Sasson to King Abdullah, 11 Jan. 1948, ibid. 142-7; Sasson to Shertok, 13 Jan. 1948, ibid. 156-7; Shertok’s speech in Palestine Commission, 15 Jan. 1948, ibid. 164-82; Shertok to the chairman of the Commission, 20 Jan. 1948, ibid. 196-200; Sasson to Meyerson, 27 Jan. 1948, ibid. 246-7. 19. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 513-15, 518-19. 20. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 13 Jan. 1948; G. Meir, M y L ife (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1975), 155-8; Executive in Jerusalem, 9 Feb. 1948, CZA. 21. Ben-Gurion, When Israel Fought, 34; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, 19 Jan. 1948, esp. p. 164. 22. Shertok to Ben-Gurion and Kaplan, 14 Jan. 1948, Documents 47-8, 157-8; Executive in Jerusalem, 18 Jan. 1948, CZA. 23. Epstein to Meyerson, 19 Jan. 1948, Documents 47-8, 186-7; Shertok to BenGurion, 19 Jan. 1948, ibid. 187; Linton to Berl Locker, 20 Jan. 1948, ibid. 204;

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24.

25.

26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

299

Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 23 Jan. 1948, ibid. 217-18; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, two telegrams, 26 Jan. 1948, ibid. 237; report on a conversation between Easterman and McNeil, 26 Jan. 1948, ibid. 238-40; Epstein to Ben-Gurion, 28 Jan. 1948, ibid. 254; Executive in Jerusalem, 25 Jan. 1948, CZA. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 29 Jan. 1948, Documents 47-8 , 257-58; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 29 Jan. 1948; ibid. 261-2; Ben-Gurion, War Diary , i, 31 Jan. 1948; Palestine P ost , 28 Jan. 1948, 29 Jan. 1948, 29 Jan. 1948; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 515-16. Gass to Kaplan, 29 Jan. 1948, Documents 4 7-8 , 265; The Agency’s memo to the UN Palestine Commission, 30 Jan. 1948, ibid. 267-76; Kaplan in Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 9 Feb. 1948; CZA; the Planning Staff memo 19 Jan. 1948, F R U S v. 2, 546-54; Dean Rusk’s memo, 26 Jan. 1948, ibid. 556-62; memo by Kopper, 27 Jan. 1948, ibid. 563-6; Kennan’s memo, 29 Jan. 1948, ibid. 573-81. Shertok to Zaslany and Sharef, two telegrams, 30 Jan. 1948, Documents 47-8, 266-7; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 6 Feb. 1948, ibid. 312; Shertok to Chairman of the Palestine Commission, 6 Feb. 1948, ibid. 318-19; Executive in Jerusalem, 9 Feb. 1948, CZA; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, 12 Feb. 1948; and see the Emergency Plan to Establish the Government of the Jewish State, 8 Feb. 1948, ISA, FM. 41/128; and see summary of Vaadat Hamazav, 22 Feb. 1948, ISA, FM. 41/271. Epstein to Ben-Gurion, 4 Feb. 1948, Documents 4 7-8 , 292. Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 148-51; Elath, Struggle fo r State­ hood, ii. 519-29. See memo of 4 Feb. 1948, Documents 47-8, 294-7; Weizmann to Truman, 10 Feb. 1948, ibid. 327-8; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 150-1; Goldmann to Easterman, 4 Feb. 1948, Documents 47-8, 300-5; Linton to Locker, 6 Feb. 1948, ibid. 312. Ben-Gurion to Golda Meyerson, 11 Feb. 1948, War Diary, i. 232; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 12 Feb. 1948, Documents 47-8, 332-3; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 13 Feb. 1948, ibid. 336. Shertok in Provisional Government, 12 May 1948, protocols, CZA; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 53. See Shertok’s analysis in the Provisional Government, ISA. ibid. Shlaim, Collusion, 132-54. Memo, 15 Feb. 1948, Documents 4 7 - 8 , 339-49; Shertok to Kaplan, 18 Feb. 1948, ibid. 358; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 13 Feb. 1948. Agency to Shertok, 16 Feb. 1948, Documents 47-8, 352-3; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 12 Feb. 1948, 24 Feb. 1948. Sharef to Hana Even-Arie, 14 Apr. 1948, ISA, 41/479. See draft memo by Rusk, 11 Feb. 1948, F R U S 617-18; memo*by the Policy Planning Staff, 11 Feb. 1948, ibid. 619-25; notes by McClintock, undated, ibid. 627-8; draft report by the NSC, 17 Feb. 1948, ibid. 631-2; memo by Marshall on his talk with Truman, 19 Feb. 1948, ibid. 633; Louis, British Empire, 494-504; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 151; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 538-9, 541.

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40. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, 541. 41. Shertok to Lovett, 22 Feb. 1948, Documents 4 7 -8 , 368-72; Linton to Locker, 22 Feb. 1948, ibid. 372-4; Kaplan to Shertok, 23 Feb. 1948, ibid. 374-5; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 544-6. 42. Louis, British Empire, 504-5; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 549-54. 43. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 28 Feb. 1948. 44. Goldmann to Kaplan, 25 Feb. 1948, Documents 47-8, 381. 45. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 27 Feb. 1948, Documents 47-8, 384. 46. The Hebrew version of this speech is in Sharett, A t the Gates, 157-71; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 564-6. 47. See e.g. Shertok to Freda Kirchway, 1 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8, 397-8. 48. Mapai Secretariat, 3 Mar. 1948, Mapai Archive, 24/48; Mapai Central Commit­ tee, 6 Mar. 1948, ibid., 23/48; Agency Executive to Shertok, 7 Mar. 1948, and also a telegram to Shertok, 12 Mar. 1948, CZA, S25/1783; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, 6 Mar. 1948; Davar, 1 Mar. 1948. 49. On the Agency’s position in the UN, see Documents 47-8, 379-81; about the preparedness for the war, see Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 15 Mar. 1948, ibid. 428; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 6 Mar. 1948. 50. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 579-80, 588. 51. Herzog’s report, 8 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8, 433-8; Ben-Gurion, W ar Diary, i, 8 Mar. 1948. 52. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 11 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8, 450-1. 53. Ben-Gurion to Shertok and Meyerson, 14 Mar. 1948, ibid. 459-62.

10 ‘We Must Go Forward!’ The military struggle, in which the Yishuv was already deeply involved, evolved on three fronts: with the British military forces that had begun their withdrawal from the territory; with local Palestinian Arab paramil­ itary groups; and with Arab ‘irregulars’, who were infiltrating Palestine in growing numbers. By March 1947, mainly as a result of the growing numbers and escalating operations of the irregulars, the security situ­ ation of the Yishuv had become perilously dangerous. As with the struggle for physical survival, the Yishuv’s political and diplomatic battles in the UN for the establishment of the long-awaited Jewish state were being conducted on three fronts: in the Security Council, in which the unending discussions stemmed from the un­ founded notion that agreement was still possible between Arabs and Jews; in the Trusteeship Council, which was then locked in debate over Jerusalem; and in the Palestine Commission, which was weighing the establishment of provisional governments by the two communities. In regard to the last question, Shertok urged the Palestine Commission to recognize the provisional government that the Agency and Vaad Leumi had just agreed to establish as a result of his prodding. Shertok’s main concern was the expected talks between the Five Powers in the UN (more accurately, the Four Powers, since Britain refused to participate in these consultations).1 From the first meeting of the Four, on 8 March 1948, and throughout the activities that followed, the Americans made great efforts to dominate these talks, for by initiating and guiding them, the Americans had hoped to reach an agreed resolution of the conflict between Jews and Arabs without implementing the UN partition resolution. But their efforts were severely frustrated when Trygve Lie announced the ruling of distinguished international jurists that the Security Council was authorized to decide on partition and finalize the arrangements in Palestine. As expected, while the Americans rejected this interpretation of the UN Charter, the Soviets strongly supported it. In an effort to break this new deadlock, the other two parties to the talks, France and China, prepared ten questions to be answered by Jews, Arabs, and British concerning the feasibility of partition. When these questions were presented to Sir

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Alexander Cadogan, the senior British representative to the UN, he stated categorically that his government was going to evacuate Palestine by 15 May, and that in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation there, an international force must be created immediately if even a bare minimum of security was to be maintained and whatever political arrangements finaly decided upon were to be implemented. As it was clear that the Americans were out to hamper partition, Shertok spent more time co-ordinating his moves with the Soviet Union’s UN delegation, which had now become a valuable source of political and psychological support. He and Gromyko held a lengthy meeting to discuss the ten questions that had been handed to him, and asked for the latter’s advice on how he should answer them before the Four. Since the Soviets were well aware that if the USA’s position were not adopted it might decide to boycott the Four, Gromyko (as well as Trygve Lie) advised Shertok that the Yishuv should not boycott them. Although Shertok badly needed the boost he received politically and personally from these contacts with the Soviets and the SecretaryGeneral, he was uneasy over the rapidly spreading impression that ‘the Yishuv had gone Soviet.’ None the less, his consultation with Gromyko over whether or not to appear before the Four bolstered his own long-standing views on how a small community like the Yishuv should behave in the international arena: T am one of those who is never afraid to appear [before commissions of inquiry]. Our previous appearances before such commissions have not hampered our interests.’2 Once the Executive was informed that Gromyko would personally participate in the discussions of the Four, it endorsed Shertok’s proposal not only to appear before this forum but also to submit written answers to the ten questions.3 When Shertok and Rabbi Silver met with the Four, the latter began by commenting on the dangers inherent in staving off partition, and Shertok followed by presenting the Yishuv’s detailed answers to the various questions. Shertok explained once again that the Jewish Agency Executive had accepted both partition and the plans for implementing close economic co-operation between the proposed Jewish and Arab states. He pointed out that under the situation prevailing in Palestine, it was his sad conclusion that partition could not be achieved peacefully. He did, however, feel that a limited agreement between the two nations was feasible, and that once the Jews had assumed sovereignty, they would do their l?est to establish cordial relations with those Arabs who chose to remain within the Jewish state boundaries, including granting them full political rights. Next, he reiterated what the Agency Executive

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deemed the most crucial issues: statehood, sovereignty, territory, control over the immigration of Jews, and membership of the UN. He stressed that the Executive would not settle for anything less than what had been stipulated in the partition plan, which had been drawn up in accordance with the U N ’s resolutions. Then he addressed a new idea which was aired at that stage and would become a major source of tension between all actors in this evolving drama: to the French envoy Alexandre Parodi’s question about a truce until the formal end of the Mandate, Shertok replied that the Jews would comply with such a truce once they had witnessed Arab compliance.4 Despite persisting rumours o f a deep rift and disagreements between Shertok and the activist Rabbi Silver, the two saw eye to eye on the Jewish strategy concerning acceptance and compliance to a truce. Thus when they reached the conclusion that it would be militarily and politically beneficial to accept this proposal, they decided to approach the Jerusalem Executive together and recommend its approval. And it was with regard to this issue that yet another aspect of Zionist policy­ making at that time was revealed: in addition to the formal communica­ tion to the Executive jointly signed by himself and Rabbi Silver, Shertok wrote a secret letter to Ben-Gurion in which he specified his own attitudes in this respect. From these communications it becomes clear that, between them, the two Yishuv leaders, Shertok and Ben-Gurion, rather than the American Jews involved, had almost complete control of defence and foreign policy, and that they always tried first to reach consensus or compromise. Also in his secret communications with Ben-Gurion Shertok had written that the Executive should reject the term ‘truce’, since it would not allow any distinction between aggressors and victims. He also asserted that they must insist that irrespective of any truce, the im­ plementation of partition should continue, and they reserved the right to take all legitimate steps in that direction. That is, he insisted that they must oppose any attempt to impose a ‘political moratorium’ on parti­ tion. With regard to the proposed truce, the Jerusalem branch of the Agency Executive recommended a positive reply based on the following pre-conditions: the withdrawal of all Arab irregulars, the prevention of new infiltration, and the continuation of the work of the UN’s Palestine Commission. On 16 March 1948 Ben-Gurion informed Shertok and Silver that, as they had recommended, the Executive would agree to a truce.5 Once again, however, Shertok’s hope that now the road was free for the establishment of the Jewish state was almost shattered. A negative

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report from the UN Palestine Commission, togethèr with the diametric­ ally opposite answers to the Four’s ten questions from Jews and Arabs, coupled with the British utter rejection of partition, prompted George Marshall to activate the second US step in the planned retreat from partition. Accordingly, on 16 March 1948 he instructed Ambassador Warren Austin to deliver the second part of the speech that had been prepared and approved by Truman in February 1948, in the Security Council. This was an assertive call for a new trusteeship regime admin­ istered during an interim period by Britain if the Security Council failed to implement partition.6 While the US administration was planning this devastating step from the Jews’ point of view—of which Shertok and his colleagues were only faintly aware—the Truman-Weizmann meeting that Shertok had helped to orchestrate took place two days later. The president extended his usual warm personal welcome to Weizmann but almost in the same breath bitterly complained about the unceasing Jewish pressure on him and his administration. After attempting to assuage Truman in regard to the Jews’ persistence, Weizmann relayed the Agency’s requests for safeguarding and maintaining the Yishuv’s defence as well as support for the implementation of partition. Truman assured Weizmann that he had not altered his basic commitment to partition, only if it could be implemented without American military involvement. He also promised to give careful consideration to Weizmann’s requests, especially in regard to cancelling the arms embargo. Weizmann, the incurable optimist, who was unaware of the forthcoming Austin speech in the Security Council, left the White House confident that the Americans would maintain their support of partition.7 Since Weizmann did not fail to share with Shertok and other members of the New York Executive his impression that all would be well as far as the implementation of partition was concerned, and since his col­ leagues were inclined to accept his assessment, the following day, 19 March 1948, would be remembered by Shertok and his colleagues as ‘Black Friday’. For that was the day on which the American Ambassa­ dor to the UN, Warren Austin, read the USA’s formal retreat from partition to the Security Council—after having shown the text to the Chinese, the French, as well as to a number of Arab diplomats. Although President Truman had not been consulted on the exact timing of the move, which caused him embarrassment, he endorsed it after it was made, as he had done when the idea was first presented to him by the anti-partitionists’ coalition in. his administration. During the ensuing debate on this new American proposal—which the Chinese and the French supported and the Soviets opposed—Rabbi

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Silver made it clear that, if the UN Palestine Commission were not able to implement partition, the Jews would go their own way.8 In Shertok’s absence (he was then touring the USA desperately raising money on behalf of the United Jewish Appeal, which was becoming the main source of foreign currency for the Yishuv), Silver expressed deep disappointment about what he termed America’s submission to Arab extortion. In Palestine, a furious Ben-Gurion revealed his attitude towards the UN, saying that the US move only served to undermine the U N ’s power, and adding: Nevertheless, this negative American position is not going to alter either the basic situation in Palestine or our determination to establish a Jewish State . . . In effect, the establishment of the Jewish State does not depend upon the November 1947 UN resolution—though that resolution has had immense moral and political value. A great deal will depend on our ability to win a [military] victory . . . and only this will determine the fate of the country. We have already laid the foundations for a Jewish State, and we are going to establish it.9

Naturally, Shertok was also infuriated when he learned of the Ameri­ can statement and reacted during a fund-raising speech in Indianapolis. Emphasizing that the American proposal for a new trusteeship was no better for the Yishuv than the old British Mandate, and that it was highly doubtful whether the UN General Assembly would approve such a move, Shertok told his audience, ‘The Jews control their own fate! The Jewish State will be established because it is the wish of the Jewish people and because it is the only possible outcome of historical develop­ ments that cannot be stopped.’10 The audience was deeply moved by his words, and at the end of his unyielding speech, the organizers of Shertok’s tour received cheques totalling half a million dollars. After his initial shock, Weizmann followed his two colleagues’ defiant statements with a resounding denunciation of the new American position.11 To counter the adverse implications of the American step, the ada­ mant Shertok again moved for the immediate establishment of a provisional government in Palestine. Now concurring with Shertok’s impassioned call, Ben-Gurion convened the Zionist Smaller Actions Committee and insisted that it must issue a statement to the effect that the establishment of a Jewish state was a fa it accompli, *and that an independent provisional government would begin functioning on 15 May, the day on which the Mandate was scheduled to end.12Throughout this tense period, Shertok, Ben-Gurion, and their respective camps maintained a political truce that created a firm consensus about the necessary actions. But the New York Executive under the leadership of

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the activists Rabbi Silver, Emanuel Neumann, and Zeev Gold, advo­ cated the immediate establishment of the Jewish state, even though the authority of its government might be limited until the final British withdrawal in May 1948. Silver, Neumann, and Gold, who were appre­ hensive that once the momentum was lost the urgency of the estab­ lishment of the Jewish state would dissipate in the minds of Americans and of the smaller member states of the UN, also suggested that American political recognition of the Jewish state must be sought immediately. On the other hand, Shertok confided to his closest colleagues that in view of the internal coalition of the Arabists within the administration, the adverse American move should not have surprised them. With the benefit of hindsight, he added that the Americans had only waited for the right moment to implement that change, and that the worsening situation in Europe, the exacerbation of the Cold War at the global level, and the traumatic events in Czechoslovakia especially, were used as the pretext for the premeditated reversal. Then came the punch line of his message: he stated that he was highly sceptical about the wisdom of establishing a Jewish state with a power­ less government, and was concerned that such a move would incite negative responses both internally in the Yishuv and internationally. Moreover, he was apprehensive about the British reaction. He specu­ lated that this reaction might include new military operations and police raids directed at the Haganah and the Yishuv’s leaders. Shertok there­ fore advocated awaiting final British evacuation before a Jewish govern­ ment assumed responsibility. Nevertheless, he concluded this message by an expression of great confidence in the inevitability of the establishment of the state. Shertok’s position was supported by the moderates Nahum Goldmann and Haim Greenberg, while Rose Halperin wavered between the activist and moderate approaches. In one of his secret communica­ tions to Ben-Gurion, Shertok acknowledged the merits of Silver’s proposal, but added that he had joined the more moderate members in order to allow the Jerusalem Executive a free hand. Ben-Gurion was equally ambiguous: he too agreed with the Silver proposal, but had decided to join the majority in approving Shertok’s proposal. In the mean time, the American Jewish Emergency Committee, an American Jewish umbrella organization, which had been created to help in the establishment of the Jewish state and had been activated after the American administration had announced its change of position, had already approached the US Congress and demanded the recognition of the Jewish state as soon as it was established. Shertok still insisted that

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it was preferable to seek recognition only after the actual establishment of the state, that is, after 15 May.13These proposals were the background of the rather wild rumours (and later, political stigma) that Shertok had objected to the establishment of the Jewish state. At the time, however, Shertok’s image was not yet tarnished and his political status inside the Yishuv and in the entire Zionist movement was determined by his position as a well-known spokesman for the moderate blocs in both Jerusalem and New York. This was borne out by the Jerusalem Executive which had adopted his proposal on this occasion also. Consequently, on 23 March 1948 Shertok and Silver were instructed by Jerusalem to inform the Security Council that the Jewish Agency had been stunned by the American proposal and would oppose any attempt to postpone establishment of the Jewish state, including a new trustee­ ship, even for an interim period. They were also instructed to inform the Security Council that immediately upon the British evacuation, and not later than 16 May 1948, a provisional Jewish government would be established. The Jewish government would co-operate with the UN representatives in the country, and hoping for peace with the Arabs, it would endeavour to impose law and order in the territory during the interim period. In addition to the message to the New York Executive, Ben-Gurion dispatched a special personal telegram to Shertok stating that the Agency position was in accordance with that proposed by him. As should have been expected, the activist Silver was not too pleased with the decision, but had no other choice but to read Ben-Gurion’s telegrams to the Agency’s New York Executive.14 Without rejoicing, the moderates knew that they had gained the upper hand. In view of the forthcoming votes in the UN, the Jerusalem branch of the Agency Executive finally took steps to actually establish provisional legislative assembly and government. Thus thirty-six members were nominated for the provisional legislative assembly, and thirteen members for the provisional government. The Executive had also decided that, until these essential political arrangements had been approved by the UN, a committee of five—Ben-Gurion, David Remez (then chairman of the Vaad Leumi), Eliezer Kaplan, Moshe Shapira of the Mizrahi, and Peretz Bernstein of the General Zionists (Shertok was not included because of his sojourn in the USA)—should be appointed*to supervise the Yishuv’s immediate affairs. As soon as he learned about these moves, a more content Shertok approached the UN to request approval of the provisional assembly and government. Yet once again, he was disillusioned by the world body. For Ralph Bunche now told Shertok, on behalf of the Palestine Commission, that the time was not ripe for

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the establishment of these two bodies and for their approval by the U N .15 Here it should be noted that it did not escape the attention of experienced political observers, both Jews and Gentiles, that the moder­ ates were in the majorty in the committee of five that was established to run the affairs of the Yishuv. Meanwhile, the American decision to rescind support of partition had unleashed a public storm. The White House was heavily bombarded with a barrage of messages from Jews and their Gentile supporters, who demanded a reversal of this decision. This wave of organized and spontaneous public protest was effective and triggered a cautious modi­ fication of the new US position. As the first step in this direction, on 23 March 1948 President Truman instructed George Marshall to ‘clarify’ that the proposed trusteeship was intended only as a temporary arrange­ ment. Two days later, Truman himself announced that trusteeship was not an alternative to partition, and that trusteeship together with a truce in the territory was intended only to ensure the implementation of UN Resolution 181 at a later stage. Part of the attempt to mend relations with the Jews was an invitation to Shertok, who was about to leave for Palestine, to meet Marshall and his assistants. As it turned out, however, the meeting revolved around the trusteeship idea, to which Shertok voiced vigorous opposition, and the truce, to which he agreed under the conditions that the Executive had endorsed. Shertok’s impression of that meeting was that, although the Americans were anxious to improve the situation, they still showed no readiness to change their basic course.16 During those tense days, Shertok was called upon to deal with yet another minor crisis, this time created by his staff in Jerusalem. Against the backdrop of the Yishuv’s initial military failures at the beginning of 1948 (euphemistically termed as the ‘convoys’ crisis’ by Haganah histo­ rians, which involved the loss of two convoys—one to the Etzion bloc, that the British forced to surrender its weapons and retreat, and the total failure of a second large convoy to get through to isolated Jewish settlements in Western Galilee), towards the end of March 1948, senior officials of the Agency Political Department, who had been stranded in Jerusalem by the blockade of the city, launched a ‘rebellion’ against the activists. These officials—Walter Eytan, Arie Levavi, Chaim Herzog, Chaim Berman, and Eliahu Sasson, all of whom then supported the moderate line professed by Shertok, protested at the failure of the Executive to heed a ‘dovish’ memorandum that they had submitted earlier that month.17 The memorandum had severely criticized the activists’ assumption that the conflict with the Arabs could only be

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resolved by military means. The moderates believed that it was both urgent and possible to deal with the threats posed by the Arab states by political means. The action they envisioned should be simultaneously directed at the Western powers and the Arab states. Starting with the premiss that neither a Jewish state nor the Arabs should ever overlook the need to find a face-saving political formula that might break the stalemate, in other words, the need for a solution that could lead to peace, the moderates warned against burning bridges with the USA. Repeating Shertok’s ‘gospel’ that ‘our political efforts should never compromise our practical plans for protecting the Yishuv and the [future] state’, yet they advocated the need to set clear political principles and to adhere to them, ‘rather than taking decisions in a haphazard fashion, or under the influence of constantly changing moods’.18 This last remark constituted harsh criticism of Ben-Gurion, who was known to act in accordance with his frequently changing moods. The group also advocated conti­ nued adherence to the fragile cease-fire in Jerusalem, that had been implemented a few days before but which was on the verge of collapse. Although fully supporting the approach of his moderate officials, Shertok hastened to send calming messages to them from his office in New York. He explained, ‘Fear your [appreciation] Tel Aviv [namely, of Ben-Gurion and other members of the Executive in Tel Aviv] one-sided. They succeeded averting major catastrophe throughout country [namely, outside Jerusalem].’ As expected, he strongly opposed the evacuation of endangered Jewish settlements, as well as the mutual evacuation of Jewish and Arab settlements, which was also suggested by his officials, on the basis that it set a dangerous precedent and that the Arabs might occupy or reoccupy the settlements they abandoned. In addition, Sher­ tok assured his officials that he was doing everything possible to guarantee the continuation of the cease-fire in Jerusalem. Although the ‘revolt’ eventually subsided, these officials kept up a barrage of messages to Shertok urging him to moderate his policies and public speeches in the USA even further, rightly pointing out that he, and not Silver, was regarded as the authentic voice of the Yishuv in the USA.19 Thus the senior staff of the Jewish Agency Political Department served as a source of moderate inspiration, as well as of strong moral and political support for Shertok, during those nerve-racking \freeks in New York. The assessment of his officials and friends in Jerusalem and their pleas for moderation and restraint were eerily accurate. For it was true that American Zionists and non-Zionists were approaching a confrontation with the US administration, which was now dragging its feet in regard

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to a reversal of its support for trusteeship. Thèse American Jewish leaders were determined to act, since in view of the worsening Cold War in Central Europe, and the situation in Palestine itself, on 30 March 1948 the Americans, who were primarily interested in stabilizing the Middle East, submitted two draft resolutions to the Security Council. One contained a call for a cease-fire leading to a truce, and the other for convening a Special Assembly to discuss trusteeship. This time, even Shertok’s reaction was fierce: in a speech before the Security Council, he stated that the two sides to the conflict were not in any way being treated symmetrically, especially in view of the fact that it was the Arab states that had invaded Palestine. Since the Arab leaders admitted the invasion, Shertok argued, the USA was committing a grave historical mistake and shouldering an immense responsibility by altering its position on partition. He concluded this part of his speech with the charge that the new American position represented open defiance of previous Security Council and Assembly resolutions. If the world wanted a cease-fire in Palestine, he went on, the UN should see that all foreign forces, including the Arab Legion, were withdrawn from the territory, all violent actions on the part of the Arabs stopped, free movement in Palestine guaranteed, and a UN commission dispatched there to super­ vise the transition period in view of Britain’s anti-Yishuv policy and actions. Finally, Shertok reiterated the Yishuv’s determination to estab­ lish a sovereign state. But neither this fiery speech nor a Zionist-sponsored diplomatic campaign prevented the Security Council from adopting the American resolutions. The result was, as the methodical Shertok put it, ‘messy discussions about the cease-fire’.20 While Shertok had been busy cam­ paigning against the resolutions in New York, the Yishuv’s military forces were preparing for their first major military operations, especially for an all-out attempt to open the road to Jerusalem (Operation Nahshon, which would be carried out during the first and second weeks of April 1948). Since this was a major shift in the Yishuv’s strategic behaviour, Ben-Gurion needed Shertok’s view on the matter. Under­ standing their strategic and morale-boosting significance, Shertok ap­ proved these military steps. While accelerating military preparations, Yishuv leaders did not ignore the need to continue to lay the political foundations necessary for establishing the Jewish state. Among other urgent matters on their agenda, the leaders planned a meeting of the Zionist Larger Actions Committee for the beginning of April 1948, which Shertok had been advocating for many weeks. The purpose of the meeting was to conclude

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the formalities involved in the establishment of the provisional political institutions of the new state. As for Shertok himself, once he learned that the proposed cease-fire might postpone the establishment of the Jewish state, he and his subordinates—far from caving in under anti-partition pressure as he would later be accused of doing—generally hardened their stance. More specifically, as noted, they endorsed the planned military operations, and Shertok advised Ben-Gurion that they should kill any resolution in favour of trusteeship that might be proposed in the Zionist Actions Committee.21 Unperturbed by the Jews’ persistent protests, the USA continued its efforts to put off any major change in Palestine (incidentally, this was the main reason why Shertok had postponed his planned trip to Palestine). On the eve of the Special Assembly on Palestine, scheduled for 5 April 1948, the USA presented its trusteeship proposal to the Security Council. But it soon became clear that it did not find consensus among the permanent members of the Council. Thus, for example, the French criticized it because of their friendly relations with the Arabs, and the Soviets rejected it because of their guarded support for the Yishuv. Shertok reported to Jerusalem that Trygve Lie, with whom he had been maintaining close contact, was under the impression that there was a great deal of confusion and lack of leadership among members of the Council, and that Lie had learned that the American ambassador was instructed to discuss with the British ways out of the stalemate.22 Shertok was not surprised by the negative Soviet reaction to the US proposals, since the Soviets had solemnly promised they would oppose any American proposal that might postpone partition and the estab­ lishment of a Jewish state. Shertok also obtained the support of most of the Latin American member states for the Jewish position. Although a number of other UN representatives, including the president of the Security Council, the Colombian Alfonso Lopez, tried to persuade Shertok to change his rigid opposition to trusteeship, he rejected all suggestions that the establishment of the Jewish state should be post­ poned, emphasizing, ‘political standstill on our part is unthinkable while other factors, including the USA, UN, fully active’.23 However, in view of the Arab Legion’s successes in the Etzion bloc, and the possibility that the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem might be lost to the new state, he did agree to discuss the cease-fire in the Holy City. Shertok was not acting on his own. For there was consensus among both activists and moderates in the Yishuv that the American position should be rejected and the Jewish state established immediately. Thus

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Weizmann called on Truman to resume his support of partition, saying: ‘The clock cannot be put back to the situation which existed before 29 November. I would also draw attention to the psychological effects of promising Jewish independence in November 1947, and attempting to cancel it in March [1948].’ He concluded his missive with the following dramatic call: ‘The choice for our people, Mr President, is between statehood and extermination. History and providence have placed this issue in your hands. I am confident that you will yet decide in the spirit of the moral law.’24 Truman did not answer Weizmann’s letter. Nor did he respond to the many thousands of letters and telegrams that he received from Jews throughout the USA on the very same day, protest­ ing against White House policies. Needless to say, this barrage was initiated by Shertok and the American branch of the Executive.25 Despite Truman’s overwhelming disregard, Zionist leaders did not cease their attempts to change his mind and that of his administration. While in his own contacts with senior American officials, such as Lovett and Rusk, Shertok took the toughest possible stand, in his secret communications with Tel Aviv, he began testing his colleagues’ flexibility with regard to a general cease-fire. And while strongly supporting preparations for the establishment of the state, he also continued to insist that the Yishuv should refrain from any provocation vis-à-vis the Arabs. In other words, he continued to advocate a carefully measured balance between the application of the political and military instruments at the Yishuv’s disposal. When Shertok’s proposals for a cease-fire in Jerusalem were discussed in the Jerusalem Executive, Ben-Gurion op­ posed them, mainly from his enduring emotional distrust of anything agreed to by the British and Abdullah. For the time being the Executive accepted his position.26 While Shertok was encouraged by the success of some of the Haganah’s military operations in early April 1948, he was distressed when the Irgun and the LHI began launching attacks on their own. One of the most outrageous among these operations was the slaughter of Arab civilians in Deir Yassin by the Irgun’s soldiers on 9 April 1948. Reports of this brutal massacre devastated Shertok, who had always opposed all forms of terrorism in the service of politics. He therefore supported an Agency communication to King Abdullah, expressing the Yishuv’s profound disapprobation of the operation. Shertok regarded such a message as advisable on moral grounds as well as in view of his hope that Abdullah would content himself with occupying only those parts of Palestine that the UN had allotted to the Arab state in the partition resolution. At that stage he still supported the active search for an

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agreement with Transjordan. Indeed, during the last few weeks before the establishment of the Jewish state, Shertok continued to serve as chief advocate of this orientation as well as of strict control over the dissident Jewish military organizations.27 Moreover, after the Deir Yassin massacre, and in complete consensus with the Agency Executive in Jerusalem, Shertok reversed his initial negative reaction to a general cease-fire in Palestine. He adopted this position partly because of that massacre and partly because he had some new ideas about possible amendments to the American draft resolution. He therefore informed the Security Council that, despite the clear increase in the illegal infiltration of Arab fighters into Palestine, and the escalation in violence in the country, the Agency Executive was ready to agree to a cease-fire ‘in order to put an end to destruction and bloodshed. The pre-conditions for this are that the cease-fire should not be a cover for further military operations, or for preventing the estab­ lishment of the Jewish state.’ Reminding the Security Council that this was not a new Agency position, he added yet again that any Jewish agreement to a general cease-fire would depend on weapons imports and uninterrupted Jewish immigration.28 Shertok’s successful influence on Agency policies at this juncture included his efforts to finalize the establishment of the provisional government. Thus after additional internal exchanges and negotiations over appointments and spheres of authority, and after unremitting pressure exerted by Shertok, the Zionist Larger Actions Committee was convened during the second week of April 1948, and finally approved the establishment of the provisional government. On 16 April the personal composition of this government was announced: Ben-Gurion would be chairman and defence ‘director’, Eliezer Kaplan was appointed finance director, and Shertok as director of foreign affairs; other depart­ ments were allocated to senior members of the coalition in the Agency. The first unofficial meeting of this provisional government was held on 18 April 1948, in Tel Aviv.29 Although Shertok, who was still in New York, of course could not participate in that meeting, the fact that he was a main proponent of such a body, together with his new title, only further enhanced his political and personal status. And above all, he was genuinely satisfied that yet another step had been taken on the road to independence. These were formative weeks for the future of the Jewish polity. In line with the discussion on 11 April in the Larger Actions Committee on the division o f functions and authority between the future government and the Jewish Agency, and after intensive consultations with Shertok, it was

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agreed that the Agency should retain control over several spheres, including immigration of adults and youth, settlement, Zionist propa­ ganda, Jewish culture and education in the Diaspora, the development of Jerusalem, and fund-raising. In other words, the Agency’s activities were to be confined to areas in which there would be explicit links between Diaspora Jews and the new state. This basic principle governing the division of functions between the government and the Agency would, at least formally, remain in force until the early 1990s. Because of immense difficulties in communications with the increas­ ingly isolated and embattled Yishuv in Palestine, its delegation in the USA in general, and Shertok in particular, depended on their colleagues in Palestine for reliable information and strategic evaluations of the military and political developments there. Only in mid-April 1948, BenGurion was able to communicate to Shertok and his associates in New York encouraging news regarding the unfolding war. Also secretly, he informed Shertok that, as a result of the fact that some of the needed weapons were actually arriving in Palestine, and ‘in the wake of the offensive operations [especially Operation Nahshon and the battle in Mishmar Haemek, in which Qawuqji’s forces were defeated] that we have launched, the situation has changed radically in our favour’.30 As usual the reality, however, was more complex, confusing, and dangerous. For in almost the same breath as he described the Haganah’s initial success in opening the road to Jerusalem, the growing failures of Arab irregulars in the northern regions of the country, and his belief that the fate of the Yishuv ‘hinged not so much on what would happen in Lake Success, but on getting weapons’, Ben-Gurion insistently urged Shertok to continue to seek a general cease-fire. Thus it seemed as if Shertok had managed to somewhat alter Ben-Gurion’s notion that the British and their sinister designs had been behind the U N ’s cease-fire proposal. More importantly, Shertok kept warning Ben-Gurion to halt all military operations as long as the Arabs maintained a lull in their military activities. Since Shertok was closely acquainted with BenGurion’s real outlook and intentions, he did not hesitate to warn Ben-Gurion that he had ‘conducted truce negotiations not in order to provide ourselves with alibi for non-compliance, but in earnest effort achieve truce which believed we needed badly’.31 Typically, Ben-Gurion’s reply was completely ambiguous and almost cryptic: ‘If Arabs cease-fire, we shall act likewise . . . This does not mean acceptance proposed truce conditions.’32 To the punctilious Shertok, these unclear signals looked ominous and sounded a warning bell.

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The activist Jewish leaders were not the only ones who were sceptical about accepting a cease-fire. In parallel with Jewish opinion, the Pales­ tinian Arab leader Jamal al-Husseini, who was then in New York as a representative of the Arab League, also rejected the proposal on the basis that the Jews would continue their military endeavours in any case. And indeed, while the UN continued its discussions on the cease-fire, news of such Jewish military successes as the occupation of Haifa and Tiberias, as well as of the accelerated Arab exodus from Palestine, were taken as proof that the Jews were not seriously interested in a cease-fire. Shertok found it encouraging, however, that during these discussions in the Security Council, Gromyko delivered a speech denigrating and attacking the Arab states and those he termed their backers—the USA and Britain. His speech understandably reinforced the rapidly spreading impression that the Yishuv was co-operating closely with the USSR. Although this co-operation between the two unequal partners was not as close as many suspected, the image produced some nice political benefits. Thus the favourable position of the USSR influenced the Americans to offer a token of their goodwill to the Yishuv by helping to introduce proposals aimed at ensuring the uninterrupted immigration of Jews young enough to serve in the Haganah. Although this was a welcome softening in America’s positions in the UN, it only very partially met the Yishuv’s needs. Shertok therefore again petitioned the UN to establish an international police force, this time to supervise the cease-fire in Jerusalem. Since at that stage in the war, the Jews in Jerusalem were suffering great losses, the Agency Executive, including Ben-Gurion, was inclined to endorse Shertok’s new initiative. Conse­ quently, unable to reach any other breakthroughs, the Security Council focused on this issue.33 While his colleagues in Palestine were rushing through their deliber­ ations over the cease-fire in Jerusalem, Shertok and the Zionist delega­ tion to the UN were anxiously preparing for the second Special Assembly scheduled for 16 April 1948, exactly one year after the Assembly that had led to the 29 November 1947 resolution. On the eve of this assembly, the various delegations were considering the UN Palestine Commission report, which assessed the worsening situation in the territory in the wake of the invasion of Arab irregifiars, and the violent clashes between the three sides. Yet again, Shertok and his associates had good reason for being apprehensive, for the report’s statement that partition was impracticable seemed to pave the way for a renewed discussion of trusteeship. Since at this point Shertok and his associates had received the American draft resolution in advance, they

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were better prepared than they had been when* the Americans first sprung their retreat from partition. Realizing that the Americans were determined to pursue their line, the main concern of the Jewish delega­ tion was now how to keep the White House and State Department from influencing other states to vote for trusteeship, which they rightly feared would hamper the establishment of a state, as had been intended by the Americans.34 All Jewish political pressure and diplomatic manœuvres notwithstanding, the Americans were not prepared to budge, prompting Yishuv leaders to reassess their relations with the USA; the outcome of this reassessment would be reflected in Israel’s policy of non-alignment, to which Shertok’s input cannot be exaggerated. In the mean time, in accordance with President Truman’s instructions, Ambassador Warren Austin presented the trusteeship and truce propo­ sals to the Special Assembly. When it actually happened, Shertok and his assistants were unsettled. Consequently Shertok approached David Niles asking for urgent help to ward off the American onslaught, but the latter told him that the main reason the president had approved the step was his firm belief that a cease-fire was urgent for everybody involved in the imbroglio, including the Jews in Palestine whose situation was improving then. Very significantly, however, in the same breath Niles added that Truman was losing interest in trusteeship. Nevertheless, the only positive spark that Shertok could extract from the American proposal was a faint hint that the USA might be prepared to consider participating in a multinational force to supervise the truce and the implementation of trusteeship. Desperately seeking a new political initiative, and in view of the scant information about developments in Palestine at his disposal, Shertok decided to take two parallel steps: to demand the Security Council’s intervention with regard to the expected invasion of Arab regular armies, and to participate in the debate on trusteeship, where he would argue that it was simply neither feasible nor acceptable.35 Fortunately for the Jews, it began to look as if the Americans were heading towards a débâcle on the Palestine issue. Thus their proposal of 20 April 1948 for trusteeship drew severe criticism from such delegations as Australia, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union, the last explicitly demanding the implementation of partition. While these reactions of UN members satisfied Shertok and everyone else in the Agency, it did not convince the Americans and British that they should cease agitating against partition. Although Shertok communicated to his colleagues in Jerusalem that the American rigidity was based on the wish to postpone any major alteration of the status quo in Palestine and the Middle East, and that therefore there was no real reason to add to the growing

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alienation between the Yishuv and the USA, the Executive in Palestine was overwhelmingly in favour of repudiating the USA in any way possible. But nothing the Jews or their allies did, including Rabbi Silver’s militant speech against the US position at the UN, moved the adminis­ tration. On the contrary, the Americans tried to exploit the ideological gap between Shertok and Silver and their respective camps in an effort to split the united Jewish front at the UN and thus weaken the Jewish Agency position. Thus, through the good offices of Judge Joseph Proskauer, president of the American Jewish Committee (which basically by then still maintained a non-Zionist posture), they invited Shertok to discuss a plan for a cease-fire in Palestine with Dean Rusk. The ever-flexible Shertok met Rusk, who merely repeated the familiar Amer­ ican plan for trusteeship and truce. Shertok reacted to this US move by reiterating the Agency’s, and his own, firm refusal to consider this plan. However, on the one hand at Rusk’s insistance, and on the other in order to keep this channel to the US foreign affairs establishment open, Shertok asked for additional time to consult with his friends in Pales­ tine.36 Though Shertok considered the American proposal for a comprehens­ ive cease-fire useless, none the less, he still claimed that the Jewish delegation should continue its talks with Washington. Moreover, he was careful to inform the Jerusalem Executive that the majority of the New York Executive supported his position. His report on the various meetings with the Americans was, as usual, succinctly analytical and outlined the pros and cons for the Jews of a cease-fire in the entire country. On the positive side, the report pointed out that a cease-fire would buy time for military recuperation and reorganization, for obtain­ ing financial aid from American Jews, for the establishment of the state’s sovereign political institutions, and provide the besieged Jews of Jeru­ salem with a chance to regroup their forces and break the blockade on the city. Moreover, agreement on a cease-fire would imply Arab consent for Jewish immigration and prevent invasion by additional Arab forces, thereby curbing Arab military operations in Palestine. In the same methodical fashion, Shertok enumerated the disadvantages: the im­ plementation of a cease-fire would postpone the declaration of inde­ pendence, furnish added legitimacy to the idea of trusteeship, and probably postpone arms deliveries to the Yishuv from East European sources. In addition, it would involve unnecessary co-operation with the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee. But, truthful to the end, Shertok did not fail to mention that a refusal by the Agency to accept a cease-fire might trigger increased American threats to cut off political support for

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the Yishuv, would exacerbate the alienation between the American Jews and US administration, and endanger both fund-raising for the Yishuv and the transfer of donations to Palestine.37 At this stage, Shertok reported to Ben-Gurion on a talk that he had with the British colonial secretary, Creech-Jones, on the latter’s initia­ tive, and in which Creech-Jones had made a great effort to repudiate the sinister British image prevailing then among the Jews and to reassure Shertok that Abdullah’s intentions were just to occupy the Arab part of Palestine and to co-operate with the Jews. Shertok would repeat this information in his meeting with Marshall a few days later. Moreover, this information would serve as a contributing factor in an additional and last attempt before 15 May 1948 to hammer out an agreement with the King.38 Far from the ‘vacillating politician’ that his political opponents would later say he had been during this period, Shertok did not succumb to American pressure, but advocated expediting preparations to establish the Jewish state. This included expanding and enhancing the Yishuv’s central administrative bodies, occupying additional strategic points be­ fore the final British evacuation, and accelerating preparations for controlling the roads in Palestine to secure regular transportation. In the same vein, when George Marshall publicly stated that the Jews and Arabs had actually reached agreement about a cease-fire, Shertok did not hesitate and vehemently denied it, emphasizing that the main reason why the two communities could not reach such agreement was that a cease-fire might delay the establishment of the Jewish state. Yet despite his public rebuttal of Marshall, Shertok still tried to keep channels of communication with the USA open. At this stage, the only concession he was willing to make was to attain a cease-fire in Jerusalem scheduled to begin on 2 May 1948—by which time the Haganah was expected to have occupied completely two important strategic points in the city—the Katamon quarter and the vicinity of the Saint Simon monastery.39 During those demanding days, the moderates on the Jewish Agency Executive, and Shertok prominent among them, found themselves under enormous and continuous American pressure to accept a general cease­ fire, to agree to trusteeship, and thus to accept the postponement of the establishment of their state. Despite these immense pressures, Shertok did not take seriously the American threats as to the consequences of the Yishuv refusing to concur with the American position. For example, he agreed with the assessment that tfie Soviet Union would recognize the Jewish state as soon as it was established, but rejected as sheer nonsense the American warning that this would lead to a Third World War. Tom,

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however, between these conflicting pressures, Shertok further probed the Executive’s stance on a three-month cease-fire. Since all developments were very rapid but communications with his colleagues in Palestine very slow, scant, and unsafe, towards the end of April 1948 Shertok asked for a meeting with Ben-Gurion somewhere half-way between New York and Tel Aviv and was anxiously awaiting his colleague’s reply.40 In early May 1948 American apprehensions about their future rela­ tions with the Arabs, together with a desire to save face, forced the USA to continue to exert heavy pressure on Jewish leaders, particularly Shertok, in an effort to persuade them to accede to their intentions. The State Department’s new aim was to delay the proclamation of the Jewish state by any means. A significant channel for putting pressure on Shertok was Judge Proskauer. But the Americans soon realized that there were no realistic chances for a three-month cease-fire, since both the Jews and the Arabs were escalating military operations. Backing down, the Americans then suggested a cease-fire for only ten days—from 5-15 May—and a delay of another ten days before the Jews issued their declaration of independence. The administration also proposed to fly representatives of the Yishuv, of the Arab side, and of the three states which still maintained active consulates in Jerusalem (that is, the USA, France, and Belgium) to Palestine—in the president’s private plane. Unwilling to create a split in the New York Executive, Shertok kept silent in the discussions there on these latest American suggestions. To the Americans’ considerable dismay, although Nahum Goldmann, who had kept up his secret contacts with the State Department and informed them about the internal situation in the Executive, called upon the Executive to consider these new American proposals, a majority rejected them.41 In view o f a possible political crisis with the Truman administration, and perhaps more importantly from a deep apprehension about Shertok’s own position, it was now Rabbi Silver who suggested that Shertok should fly to Palestine for urgent consultations with the Executive, which was now sitting in Tel Aviv, but neither on the same day that was proposed for the American flight nor on the same plane. In contrast to his silence in the New York Executive meeting, Shertok was quite outspoken when the Advisory Committee to the Agency V U N delega­ tion met, composed only of Yishuv leaders and officials. In this more intimate forum of Palestinian Jews, Shertok stated that he saw no harm in flying with the Arabs and the representatives of the three powers, since merely to join them on the same plane would not mean that he accepted their proposals, but might help to repair relations with the Truman

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administration. At that meeting, slightly more than half of the Advisory Committee (nine to seven) supported the notion that the Executive should re-examine the pros and cons of postponing the declaration of independence and that Shertok should fly in the president’s plane. However, totally loyal to his colleagues on the Executive both in New York and Tel Aviv, as well as to Zionist and Yishuv rituals, procedures, and norms, Shertok disregarded the Advisory Committee’s vote and formally rejected the new American proposals.42 Shertok’s secret speech at the Advisory Committee, in which he advocated the continuation of the talks with the Americans, and the acceptance of a cease-fire, further fanned the wild rumours regarding his position in general and his attitude concerning the immediate estab­ lishment of the Jewish state in particular. Internally, and as he had been doing all along, Shertok explained during that period the pragmatic considerations behind his views and actions concerning the continuation of the talks with the Americans and the serious evaluation of their various proposals. Admitting that he had been perturbed by the lack of replies to the numerous cables he had sent to Palestine, he told the Advisory Committee that updated information on developments at home was essential for a pragmatic politician like himself, and that the absence of such accurate information caused him to adopt a pessimistic view of the Yishuv’s chances in a war; and since he did not have such intelligence, he had been inclined to accept the new proposal about cease-fire in order to gain time for military reorganization and recuper­ ation. As to the question of an Agency initiative, the military successes of the Yishuv and the defeat of the trusteeship idea at the UN, together with the Palestinian Arabs’ sufferings and bitterness towards their own leaders as well as towards the Jews, led him to believe that it was in the Yishuv’s best interest to propose a serious comprehensive peace plan to the Arabs and the powers before the expected ‘formal’ invasion into the territory. In this he was supported by the more senior officials in the Political Department, especially Sasson. Moreover, notwithstanding the military and political disadvantages involved in a cease-fire, the Yishuv had a good chance of emerging out of it better prepared for the struggle ahead. Unlike other members of the Executive in New York, who believed that the American proposals were only a delaying tactic for further plans to curb Jewish independence, Shertok suggested that these were serious proposals reflecting some deeply rooted notions in the Department of State concerning the inadvisability of changing the status quo in Palestine. Finally, he argued that in the longer run the rejection of all American proposals could create grave strategic

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difficulties for the Yishuv. However, even for Shertok all these reserva­ tions and proposals for co-operation with the USA hinged on their willingness to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish provisional govern­ ment, and its eventual recognition, in other words, on their support of a substantial step towards independence.43 Shertok knew the weight that his recommendations usually carried with his colleagues in Palestine, therefore he again explained that his inclination to agree to a cease-fire was predicated upon Arab com­ pliance, and the operation of a provisional Jewish government. As an afterthought he added that, ‘as [he] saw no prospect this being accepted by the Arabs, regarded whole arrangement as illusory’. His unavoidable conclusion was that the Jewish leaders were facing only a tactical problem. ‘Believed we should indicating—if by [May] fifteenth no agreement [with the Arabs] effected, [we] proceed as intended [to declare the state].’44 He also enquired whether, in any event, he should return to Palestine before 15 May. Ben-Gurion, who feared that Shertok might succumb and make concessions to the Americans, replied on behalf of the Executive that they did not agree with Shertok’s proposed tactics, and insisted that he should indeed return to Palestine before 15 May. The activist members were not the only ones who opposed Shertok’s suggestions; even his moderate associate Eliezer Kaplan rejected Sher­ tok’s tactical plan and urged him to return to Palestine.45 The great irony here is that Ben-Gurion’s messages to Shertok were confusing, while Shertok was consistent in his position (thus even Ben-Gurion’s admiring biographer Michael Bar-Zohar had to admit that ‘Shertok had not retreated even in view of the tremendous Ameri­ can pressures’).46 In a cable dispatched by Ben-Gurion on 4 May and received by Shertok two days later, Ben-Gurion told Shertok that he would object to any delay in proclaiming the state that would prolong British rule in Palestine, which he regarded as the main cause of the growing blood-bath there and of the invasion of the Arab armies. But in another cable sent on the same day, Ben-Gurion told Shertok that he could see no harm in a ten-day cease-fire, and that it was only the proposal to delay the declaration of independence that bothered him.47 Naturally, Shertok, who was far from the arena of the mounting crisis, who lacked up-to-date information on the situation in Palestine, who was extremely worried about the fate of the Yishuv, and, under Amer­ ican pressures, found it difficult to navigate in such circumstances. Shertok was not the only Zionist outside Palestine who was encounter­ ing immense difficulties in deciding on the right course during those critical and stormy days. Even the more aggressive and activist Rabbi

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Silver faced similar confusion. Thus on 5 May, subsequent to the Arab and Jewish rejection of the American proposal of a joint delegation to Palestine, one of Dean Rusk’s aides asked for a meeting with Shertok to see if there was any chance of the State Department reaching an agreement with the Jewish Agency. Well aware of the delicacy of the situation, and of the wild rumours surrounding his own position, Shertok insisted that Rabbi Silver also be invited. During the meeting, and in accordance with the Agency’s official position, Silver said that he would advocate accepting a cease-fire that the Arabs also subscribed to, if the American government was prepared to guarantee that the Jewish state would be established immediately afterwards. Since the American reaction was ambiguous on the last question, both Shertok and Silver rejected the idea. At the same meeting, it was Shertok who took a hard line regarding the establishment of the Jewish state. He told those assembled, in no uncertain terms, that if the Arabs proclaimed a state covering the entire territory of Palestine the Jews would do exactly the same thing.48 When Shertok’s inflexible position on statehood became evident to the Americans they finally gave up their attempt to drive a wedge between him and the activists in New York and Palestine. Agreement between Silver and Shertok was then complete; the two were co-operating in fully promoting the twin goals that they agreed upon— to prevent the Americans from frustrating the establishment of the Jewish state and to prevent the invasion of Arab armies into Palestine. Nevertheless—and this is where the view that Shertok was opposed to the immediate establishment of a Jewish state took on additional weight—Shertok decided to make one more attempt to alter the Amer­ icans’ attitude in view of the Yishuv’s longer-term needs. As soon as plans for his trip to Tel Aviv, which he and his colleagues in Palestine agreed was absolutely necessary, had been finalized, Shertok asked for the meeting with George Marshall which contemporary rumours and later history books attribute to an American attempt to exert a final pressure on the Jews through Shertok. Shertok’s purpose in asking for that meeting was to obtain updated information on the American position and to make one last attempt to change their attitude. That controversial meeting was conducted on 8 May 1948, that is on the same day that he was leaving for Palestine.49 At the beginning of that meeting, Marshall’s associates, Lovett and Rusk, accused the British government of confusing and complicating the situation in Palestine and asked Shertok to report to the Secretary, of State on his talk with the British colonial secretary, Creech-Jones, held in New York a few days earlier. Shertok told Marshall and the two

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officials that Creech-Jones had dismissed the idea of trusteeship out of hand and related to him that Britain wished to prevent an Arab invasion. This was why Creech-Jones had said that the Jews should keep trying to reach ‘collusion’—that is, an agreement with King Abdullah ensuring that the king would gain control of the area of Palestine allotted to the Arabs. On his own initiative, Shertok also told Marshall and his aides about the secret talks then under way with high-ranking officers of the Arab Legion to pursue just such an agreement.50 It is easy to see why this report incensed the Americans and also how it affected Shertok’s position: the Americans realized that despite their continuous attempts to co-ordinate a policy with the British, the latter still pursued their own line. Next, Shertok explained that he had requested the meeting with Marshall to ascertain whether there was still time for an American-Jewish understanding about the declaration of the Jewish state. Indicating his willingness to continue to conduct talks with the Americans, how­ ever, Shertok made it clear that the Jewish Agency was not prepared to make any concessions in return for such an agreement. The most crucial question, he said, was ‘whether the United States Government wanted or did not want a Jewish state to arise. Everything depended on that issue.’ Then he declared that the Yishuv could not postpone the establishment of the state any longer since they ‘were on the threshold of the fulfilment of the hopes of centuries—a consummation of continu­ ous striving of generations past. The State was within our physical grasp. To let go now might be fatal. There was a feeling of, either now or never.’ After describing the process that the Agency envisioned as leading towards independence, he added, ‘The determination of the Jewish people to achieve statehood is not fully realized; that determina­ tion was unshakable [by recent events or by the expected Arab states’ invasion]. The Jewish people can be overpowered by superior forces, but it can never be prevailed upon to give up striving.’ Finally he reiterated his wish to rectify any wrong impression about why he had requested the meeting; he had asked for it because he was particularly anxious to achieve clarity in view of the wrong impression that had apparently spread in Washington as to my personal attitu d e. . . That impression might have arisen from the fact that I showed willingness to talk. This I did in my anxiety to explore every possible avenue in order to reach an understanding with the United States Government at the present juncture. I was anxious as before to achieve this, but I saw little hope of it if the position of the United States Government remained as formulated in the present draft [resolu­ tion about the truce].

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Marshall listened silently during most of the meeting, letting Lovett and Rusk do the talking. Thus, Lovett and Rusk again tried to persuade Shertok to postpone proclamation of the state, claiming that it posed a grave threat to the Yishuv. It was not until the end of the meeting that Marshall made three short comments: the first concerned the political difficulties that the Zionists had been creating for the administration; the second emphasized Marshall’s full understanding of the urgency of Jewish immigration into Palestine, and in the third he advised Shertok, and through him all Jewish leaders, against relying on promises made by their generals, whose inclination would be to minimize the dangers involved in an all-out war with the Arabs should they proclaim the state. Shertok later reported that Marshall had ended the meeting with these controversial words: ‘If we, [the Jews] succeed [in establishing a state], well and good. He [Marshall] would be quite happy; he wished us well. But what if we failed? He did not want to put any pressure on us. It was our responsibility and it was for us to face it. We were completely free to take our decision, but he hoped we would do so in full realization of the very grave risks involved.’ Shertok listened very attentively to what the Secretary of State had to say so that he could report on the meeting in detail to his colleagues in Palestine.51 Not wishing to rely only on his oral presentation, Shertok left Marshall a letter in which he explained his views and motivations for seeking the meeting, which should have served to rebut all rumours about his alleged ‘softness’ towards the Americans. Also in this letter he stressed the impracticability of postponing the establishment of the provisional government that would lead to independence, as well as the impracticability of the British continuing to govern the territory.52 Moreover, upon leaving Foggy Bottom for New York, from where he would fly to Palestine with his daughter Yael, he told the media waiting for him that, contrary to earlier rumours, there was no agreement with the USA, either on a cease-fire or on postponing the declaration of independence.53 Shertok’s letter to Marshall and his statements evince no hesitation about the urgent need to establish the Jewish state. The rumours that later circulated were based on views he had expressed a week earlier, in which in the context of the discussions about a possible truce, he had considered the desirability of a tactical postponement—a position that he had changed before he requested the meeting with Marshall. The reports that Shertok wavered at a time when he should have held firm originated with Ben-Gurion’s camp, and are based on unverifiable statements by people who have long since died. While these statements

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were unjustified but understandable, less understandable are the inaccur­ ate reports by Shertok’s supporters—such as David Hacohen or Eliahu Epstein-Elath, who were with him in Washington and New York— which painted Shertok in unflattering colours.54 Immediately after his meeting with Marshall, Shertok and his daughter began the long voyage to Palestine via Paris and Athens. His wife Zipora and his youngest son Chaim remained in New York to allow Chaim to finish his school year, and on the assumption that Shertok would be returning to the USA to conclude his endeavours there. Many years later, Yael would recount that her father had left the USA hoping, but not absolutely certain, that the Jewish state would soon be estab­ lished. She would say that when they left for Palestine, Shertok was talking about the possibility that the state would be proclaimed after all oh 15 May 1948-^despite the fact that the timing was probably not ideal and the dangers immense.55 While Shertok was on his way to Palestine, the UN General Assembly continued its deliberations over the situation in the Holy Land. Accord­ ing to Shertok, the result of these convoluted deliberations was that ‘the [American] trusteeship proposal has been drawn in the swamps of the debate, while amendments of the initial American proposal, and amend­ ments to these amendments were piling high’.56 At this juncture the Americans came up with the idea of yet another subcommittee, and more importantly, a UN mediator to be selected by the five permanent members of the Security Council—a last-ditch attempt to prevent the war that they feared would break out in the territory in the wake of the British evacuation.57 Since Palestine was already cut off from the rest of the world, a special small plane was sent from Tel Aviv to Athens for the last leg of Shertok’s trip home. With violence raging all around, he and Yael finally landed at a small and darkened military airport near Tel Aviv on the night of 11 May 1948. According to both Yael Sharett-Medini and one of BenGurion’s biographers, who tried to show that the establishment of Israel should be attributed solely to Ben-Gurion, Shertok was taken to see the ‘old-man’, as Ben-Gurion was called then, straight from the airport.58 According to the same account, which is based solely on Ben-Gurion’s personal recollections long after his major clash with ^Shertok, he implored Shertok to refrain from opposing proclamation of the state, as well as from mentioning that he concurred with Marshall’s ‘advice’ to the Yishuv leaders, who were eagerly waiting to hear his report and views. At the very least, this version of what went on at that secret meeting should be taken with more than a grain of salt.

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The night of 11 May 1948, and the next day, 12 May, were filled with hectic political activities, for these were probably the most critical hours prior to the proclamation of the state. Shertok’s role in these activities was as crucial as that of any other Israeli political figure active at that time, including Ben-Gurion, who was assuming the position of primus inter pares.59 In order to assess correctly Shertok’s position in the critical discus­ sions conducted on 11 and 12 May by Mapai and the provisional government, one must take into account both the determination with which he presented the Yishuv’s case during his last days in Washington and New York, particularly during his talk with Marshall, and the two cables that he received from New York upon his arrival in Tel Aviv. One cable, sent by his confidant Arthur Lourie, reported that Bartley Crum, who had been a member of the 1946 Anglo-American Commission, had come out of a meeting with President Truman ‘quite optimistic’ about the American position on the establishment of the Jewish state. The same cable included an indirect message to the Agency from political adviser Clark Clifford suggesting that the Jews could go ahead and establish their state, as Truman was planning to recognize it formally as soon as the Jews established it. The second cable also from Lourie informed Shertok that Dean Rusk had told the former State Department legal adviser, Charles Fahy, that the American dele­ gation to the UN would stop pressing for a cease-fire proposal, and that the American government was reconciled to the fact that ‘the inevitable Jewish State will be proclaimed’. Rusk, however, reminded the Jews that they should not expect American military intervention on their behalf in the event of an Arab invasion. Here it should be recalled that Marshall had issued the same warning to Shertok during their last talk.60 The State of Israel and its government were bom on 12 May 1948. But this was hardly a dramatic event. Beginning at ten o’clock that morning, the provisional government met for a marathon session that lasted almost until midnight. The ten tired men (two other members were stranded in Jerusalem, and the thirteenth was unable to return from the USA on time for the declaration) who were assembled in Tel Aviv allowed the agenda to evolve as the meeting progressed, and thus the provisional government was reacting to developments in Palestine, New York, and Washington. Ben-Gurion, who chaired the meeting, opened it with a review of the recent reports received from New York and Washington about the political moves during the previous few days since Shertok left the USA. The state was established on 15 May 1948.

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Then Ben-Gurion called upon Golda Meyerson, who was not a member of the provisional government, to report on her dramatic clandestine meeting with King Abdullah in Amman the day before. Golda dejectedly reported that the king had completed preparations for an invasion of Palestine and a war against the Jewish state, but suggested that the war would be called off if the Jews were to remain a small autonomous minority in the districts in which they lived in an Arab state. The dismal meeting ended without any promise on Abdullah’s part to cancel the planned invasion of Palestine by the Arab Legion. The king’s position was interpreted as a definite and full withdrawal from the understanding (later dubbed the ‘collusion’) that he and Golda had previously achieved regarding strategic co-operation between the Ha­ shemite kingdom and the Yishuv, which was to allow Transjordan to control the area of Palestine allotted to the Arabs under the partition plan. Golda added that Abdullah had expressed a wish to meet Shertok, with whom he felt he might have a better rapport.61 After hearing this report, the ‘directors’ understood that the Yishuv was going to have to fight on three fronts—the north and south, and now the east as well—always an abhorrent thought to the Yishuv’s and Israel’s strate­ gists and planners. This shift in Abdullah’s position would have a tremendous effect on the war, and on the stance of the Jewish leaders, especially that of Shertok, who, despite his inherent mistrust of Abdullah, had for many years done everything in his power to cultivate a working relationship with the king. At that juncture, however, all Shertok could do in that regard was to instruct his envoys in the USA to relay the depressing new information to Truman and ask him to do what he could to deter the Arab states, particularly Transjordan, from invading Palestine. Thus, despite Marshall’s warning that the USA was neither willing nor able to help the Jews militarily, Shertok did endeavour to gain such American support.62 As soon as Golda Meyerson had completed her report, Shertok gave his own lengthy report on political and diplomatic events in the USA and the UN since November 1947. In great detail he repeated his assessment of the various causes for the fluctuations in the American position during the period (domestic political consideratibns; the dis­ banding of the special delegation to the UN consisting of a number of pro-Zionists such as Eleanor Roosevelt, General Hilldring, Dulles, and Herschel Johnson, the Yishuv’s military weakness, and the coming of the Cold War), suggesting that the trusteeship idea was not new and had always been in the minds of the Americans. Reporting on the small but

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highly effective political forces that had been opposing the coalition of Arabists and anti-Zionists in the administration, he said that ultimately their activities had put the idea of trusteeship to rest. In discussing the American cease-fire proposals and the inherent political dangers in­ volved in it, Shertok again explained his tactic ‘to refrain from saying no to a cease-fire, not to reject totally and in advance [any] American proposals, but to try and amend them, without committing ourselves to accept them, unless they suited all our needs’, thereby underlining his persistent pragmatic approach to international affairs in general and the powers’ support in particular. Before concluding with a report on his final meeting with Marshall, Shertok told the directors that his ‘second thoughts about endangering our relations with the USA [i.e. his readi­ ness to proclaim the state despite American objections]’ was based in part on positive evaluations regarding the strength and performance of the Jewish paramilitary forces that—he then revealed to his colleagues— had been prepared by Pentagon experts. Shertok indicated that he now believed that the passage of every hour diminished the ability of the USA, or of any other power, to prevent the establishment of the state. Despite Ben-Gurion’s growing impatience with Shertok’s lengthy report, the latter then went on to mention that Weizmann, too, was against any further postponement of the proclamation. And at this stage he presented and analysed in full detail his last meeting with Marshall and his assistants. Then he raised the procedural question of how the directors should ‘formulate the step that we are going to make [establishing the state]. The question is about the name of the step that we are going to make.’ Eventually, merely the fact that he raised this question would add to the rumours that he opposed the proclamation of the state. But what he had actually meant was that, although in principle he supported the step, he had some questions about the tactics that should be pursued. Speci­ fically, he raised the question of whether the provisional government should declare that it would both maintain the spirit of the UN 181 resolution and act in accordance with the stipulations of this resolution. For, he argued, according to the Resolution, on 15 May 1948 no change should take place. According to the Resolution, on 1 April the provi­ sional government should have been established, on 1 August the British evacuation should have been completed, and only on 1 October 1948 should the state be declared. He himself felt that as much as they would be required to fill the ‘physical void’ created by the British evacuation, they would also be expected to deal with a ‘judicial void’ created by a situation in which the UN was absent from the scene. He then added

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that they should fill such a void, but the issue would be how they would term their next step. He said that they could say that they were rushing things. Therefore he suggested that they should find a formula to declare the provisional government so it would be clear that the independent state existed without explicitly declaring that a sovereign state existed. All this ‘to avoid any argument that we have made our own decisions’ in disregard of the exact stipulations of the UN resolution. Ben-Gurion’s angry reaction to Shertok’s suggestion was his famous phrase, ‘Time is running out!* The ‘old man’ then added that both the impending Arab invasion and the British evacuation made it imperative to act quickly in order to avoid a power vacuum. He of course meant that they should unequivocally declare the state as soon as possible. Joining in the heated exchange, the rest of the members of the provisional government drifted from the point and began discussing the imminent Arab invasion and the proposed truce. In order to examine accurately the military situation, possible outcomes, and the advantages and disadvantages of truce, the directors decided to hear the views of the Haganah chiefs. While awaiting the Haganah political chief, Israel Galili, and the chief of military operations, Yigael Yadin, they continued to discuss the cease-fire in Jerusalem without reaching any firm conclu­ sion. When Galili and Yadin arrived, they disproved Marshall’s warn­ ings to Shertok that military men usually exaggerated the potential of their forces. The two were repeatedly emphasizing the possibility that the military and security situation was likely to deteriorate further in the event of the invasion of the Arab regular armies and that they doubted the ability of the young state to withstand the attacks following an invasion. Ben-Gurion then asked the two about their thoughts regarding the three-month cease-fire that Shertok and other moderates were still considering. While Yadin was hesitant, Galili said that it might be a great help to the Yishuv’s defence forces, but that it also had to be viewed in the context of the general political situation. Not slow to understand that Galili’s statement might influence his moderate col­ leagues to accept the cease-fire, which would freeze military and political actions in Palestine and thus also postpone the formal establishment of the state, Ben-Gurion spoke at length about the Yishuv’s ability to withstand an invasion, and of the significance that art immediate proclamation of the state would have for its future among the nations and especially in the Middle East. He concluded his dramatic speech by asserting that establishing the government and the state would mobilize the Yishuv ‘to withstand [the Arab onslaught] and win!’ In the wake of this passionate call, the directors again asked Yadin for his assessment

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of the Yishuv’s military preparedness, and his* repeated ambivalent evaluation of it and of the advantage of a cease-fire only served to increase the woeful mood in the meeting-room. Sensing that gloom was overtaking the members of the provisional government, Ben-Gurion demanded a vote on whether or not to issue a declaration of independence. However, the vote was delayed while the directors again discussed a cease-fire in Jerusalem, which both BenGurion and Shertok supported out of pragmatic evaluation of the precarious Jewish position there. While those present implicitly decided to enter negotiations with the UN over a cease-fire in Jerusalem—provided that the UN and the Arabs agreed to let the Jews retain all captured positions and that the road to Jerusalem be opened—there was no similar consensus concerning a general cease-fire. When the directors asked Shertok about the American position, he again assured them that according to his information the USA would not react strongly to the proclamation of the state. On the other hand, some of those present were affected by Galili’s and Yadin’s reluctance to issue a clear statement on the military situation and the state’s ability to survive a massive invasion and attack—especially in view of news that arrived during the meeting regarding the Arab Legion’s occupation and destruction of the Jewish settlements in the Etzion region. Finally, the directors could no longer put off revealing their views on the formal proclamation of the Jewish state. Six members of the provisional government—Ben-Gurion and Shertok of Mapai, Aharon Tzisling and Mordechai Bentov of Mapam, Moshe Shapira of Mizrahi, and Peretz Bernstein of the General Zionists—were for the immediate formal establishment of the state, and the other four moderate members present—Eliezer Kaplan and David Remez of Mapai, Pinhas Rozenblueth-Rozen of the Progressives, and Bechor Shitrit of the Sephardic party expressed their view for postponing it. Hence, this fateful collective decision was a result of the determination of both activists and moder­ ates to establish the Jewish state at that crucial moment. This inclination, rather than the dictate or persuasion of Ben-Gurion and his activist friends, was behind that critical decision taken in the provisional cabinet in which the moderates had a decisive majority.63 Once this decision had emerged, the provisional cabinet members returned to some of the issues Shertok had raised, particularly to the link between the declaration and UN resolutions concerning Palestine, and the timing and nature of the declaration. Agreeing to proclaim the Jewish state two days later, on Friday, 14 May 1948, the members then

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also concurred by a majority of five to four to refrain from any reference to the delicate matter of borders in the declaration, and adopted Shertok’s moderate position that they should adhere to all the legal and procedural UN stipulations concerning the establishment of two states in the territory. With the exception of one issue—which would be the cause of bitter controversy between Ben-Gurion and Shertok— the cabinet in effect adopted all of Shertok’s procedural suggestions. The bone of contention was the reference to the UN resolutions. Instead of Shertok’s proposal that the proclamation should mention the fact that the state was to be established ‘in accordance with the UN resolutions’, the cabinet accepted Ben-Gurion’s formula, that its establishment ‘would be based on the UN resolutions’—which implied a weaker commitment to and acknowledgement of the U N ’s role in the creation of the state. Further, the cabinet decided to establish a committee of five, including Shertok, to revise a draft declaration that had previously been prepared by legal advisers and Jewish Agency officials. Towards the very end of the marathon meeting, the provisional government formally decided by a majority of seven that the name of the Jewish state would be Israel.64 The decisions taken during that fateful day were collective and coalitional. Far from being determined by Ben-Gurion, Shertok was the single leader who might have changed the course of events in the provisional government as well as in the Mapai Central Committee. For he could have defeated Ben-Gurion and his activist minority if he had come out against the declaration along with the majority of moderates, since he would no doubt have convinced additional moderates to oppose the declaration with him. But, like the other members of the majority, he was committed to the immediate establishment of the state. The provisional government was not the only political body anxiously awaiting Shertok’s views. The Mapai Central Committee, which had been in continual session on 11, 12, and 13 May 1948, was also waiting to hear him. When an exhausted Shertok arrived to speak to his closest associates, the secretary-general of the party, Zeev Isserzon, greeted him with the following words: This evening we welcome among us Moshe [Shertok], the soldier, the fighter on the front of Lake Success. We extend him a warm, a passionate welcome . . . We await his views and recommendations, in accordance with which, and together with him, we will chart the way towards the fateful decisions facing us during these historical days, when we shall free our nation from the yoke of foreign rule and establish the State of Israel and its government.65

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According even to Ben-Gurion’s biographer, the members of the Central Committee ‘highly respected Shertok’s view, and indeed were anxiously awaiting his speech. It was clear that his words would carry much weight in shaping the Central Committee’s opinion.’66 Shertok opened his long speech by telling those assembled that he was well aware ‘of the point [the date of the declaration of the state] on which the tension is focused, and it was for this purpose as well as to participate in the resolution of this tension . . . that I have returned to Palestine’. Then he proceeded to deliver the entire analysis that he presented at the meeting of the provisional government. During his speech at the Mapai Central Com­ mittee, Shertok already began refuting the rumours raging among the members, as well as in wider circles, that he opposed the immediate establishment of the state. In this vein it is important to note that he told his colleagues that ‘already during the last days at Lake Success, I had formulated the view that the risk involved in postponing the proclama­ tion of the Jewish State or the government would be worse than that involved in proclaiming it’. At the end of his address, which was delivered to a rapt audience, he stated: ‘We are facing a very difficult situation, but it seems that we have no other choice, and we must go forward!’67 Ten years later, one of the more perceptive members of the same Central Committee wrote that ‘Shertok’s conclusions were very different from those that had been expected . . . And therefore his speech carried much weight in determining the position of all the undecided.’68 Here it should be noted that many of the undecided were moderates, including Yosef Sprinzak and Pinhas Lubianiker-Lavon, who, as has been men­ tioned, had been members of Hapoel Hatzair. In the wake of the extended debate following Shertok’s speech, the Central Committee decided to postpone its decision on if and when to proclaim the Jewish state. Only on 13 May, and according to usual party ritual, did a vast majority of the Central Committee recommend that the provisional government should ‘declare the establishment of the Hebrew state and its provisional government immediately upon the termination of the mandate’, which was 15 May 1948. In spite of Shertok’s efforts in this direction, wide circles in the new-born state would abound with rumours that he had been against establishing the State of Israel. Ben-Gurion, who had never been over-generous to any of his colleagues, and certainly not to Shertok, made an uncharacteristic effort to refute these rumours. In a letter to a certain Pinhas Neeman from Afula, dated 13 May 1948, Ben-Gurion stated that ‘all the “shocking rumours”, etc. about Shertok’s “painful

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mission” are stupid lies. Shertok, like every one of us, is for the immediate establishment of the State of Israel.’69

NOTES 1. Shertok to Carl Lastex, 9 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8, 443-4. 2. New York Executive, 12 Mar. 1948, CZA, Z5/2382; and see New York Executive’s memo to the permanent members of the Security Council, 12 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8, 455. 3. Elath, The Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 591-5. 4. Ibid. 595-600. 5. New York Executive to Ben-Gurion, 15 Mar. 1948, Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 15 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8, 462-3; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 16 Mar. 1948, ibid. 467, 472; Shertok to Trygve Lie, 17 Mar. 1948, ibid. 472-3; Ben-Gurion, War D iary , i, 16 Mar. 1948; cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 692. 6. Louis, British Empire , 505-8; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 588-9, 609-10. 7. Louis, British Empire , 511; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 167-8; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 611-12. 8. Silver’s statement in Security Council, 19 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8 , 475-8. 9. Ben-Gurion, War D iary, i. 313; and see Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 20 Mar. 1948, Documents 4 7-8 , 484. 10. On Shertok’s speech, Palestine Post, 24 Mar. 1948. 11. Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 160-9; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 612-13, 624-35, 641-2. 12. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, two cables, 20 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8 , 481; Ben-Gurion, War D iary , i, 22 Mar. 1948. 13. New York Executive to Ben-Gurion, 20 Mar. 1948, CZA, Z5/2384; New York Executive to Ben-Gurion, 22 Mar. 1948, Documents 47 -8 , 489-90; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 22 Mar. 1948, Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 22 Mar. 1948, ibid. 490; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 24 Mar. 1948, ibid. 496; Louis, British Empire , 511-12. 14. Ben-Gurion, War D iary, i, 22 Mar. 1948, and 23 Mar. 1948; Ben-Gurion and Remez to Shertok, 23 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8 , 493-4; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 23 Mar. 1948, ibid. 496; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 23 Mar. 1948, ibid.; Sharett, A t the Gates , 172-3. 15. Agency Executive, 25 Mar. 1948, CZA; Ben-Gurion, War D iary , i, 25 Mar. 1948; Shertok to the Chairman of the Palestine Commission, 25 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8, 506-7; Bunche to Shertok, 29 Mar. 1948, ibid., 531-5; Shertok to Bunche, 31 Mar. 1948, ibid., 537-40; cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 693-4. * 16. See a report on Shertok’s talk with Marshall, Lovett, and Henderson, 26 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8, 509-21; Epstein to Agency Executive on his talk with Henderson, 29 Mar. 1948, ibid. 528-31; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 30 Mar. 1948, CZA, A245/124; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 643-9. 17. Memorandum by W. Eytan, A Levavi, C. Herzog, C. Berman, and E. Sasson, 26 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8, 522-4.

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18. Ibid. 19. See memorandum of 26 Mar. 1948, Documents 47-8, 522-4; Herzog to Shertok, 26 Mar. 1948, ibid. 524; Officials of the Political Department to Shertok, 28 Mar. 1948, ibid., 524; Sasson to Ben-Gurion, Meyerson, and Kaplan, 30 Mar. 1948, ibid., 536; Shertok to Sasson, 4 Apr. 1948, ibid., 553-4; Berman and Eytan to Shertok, 13 Apr. 1948, ibid., 626. 20. For the Hebrew version of his speech see, Sharett, A t the Gates , 173-91; Executive of the Agency in New York to Ben-Gurion, 2 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 547-8; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 665-9. 21. Shertok to Ben-Gurion and Meyerson, 4 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 553. 22. Shertok to Meyerson, 6 Apr. 1948, Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 6 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 564-5; Shertok to Ben-Gurion and Meyerson, four cables, 8 Apr. 1948, ibid., 574-7; the American draft resolution can be found in ibid 606-7; for the Executive’s reaction, see Eban to Ross, 12 Apr. 1948, ibid. 608-21. 23. Shertok to Ben-Gurion and Meyerson, four telegrams, 8 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 574-7. 24. Weizmann to Truman, 9 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 588-90. 25. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 673-8. 26. See Shertok’s reports about his talks with the American officials, 9 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 591-600; Shertok to Ben-Gurion and Meyerson, 9 Apr. 1948, ibid. 600; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 11 Apr. 1948, ibid. 604-5; the protocols of Agency Executive, 11 Apr. 1948, CZA. 27. See the letter of the Agency Political Department to Abdullah, 12 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 625-6; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 22 Apr. 1948, ibid. 667; Sasson to Shertok, 23 Apr. 1948, ibid., 670; Shertok to Zaslani, 25 Apr. 1948, ibid., 674; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 26 Apr. 1948, ibid., 674-5; more on Shertok’s position in regard to Transjordan, see ibid. 666; Shlaim, Collusion, 158-9, 164-5; cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 700-2. 28. Sharett, A t the Gates, 192-202; Documents 47-8, 632-42; Executive, 16 Apr. 1948, CZA; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 16 Apr. 1948. 29. Agency Executive, 10 Apr. 1948, 11 Apr. 1948, CZA; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, i, 16 Apr. 1948, 18 Apr. 1948, Sharef, Three Days, 38^10, 49-51. 30. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 16 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 647-8. 31. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 17 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 652; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 19 Apr. 1948, ibid. 653-4. 32. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 19 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 653. 33. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 21 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 664; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 22 Apr. 1948, ibid., 665; for the resolution see ibid. 670-1; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 26 Apr. 1948 and Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 27 Apr. 1948, ibid., 683; Agency Executive, 28 Apr. 1948, 29 Apr. 1948, CZA; Sharett, A t the Gates, 200-7; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 684-7. 34. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 17 Apr. 1948, Documents 4 7 - 8 , 650-1; and see also, ibid. 687-8; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 682-4. 35. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 20 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8, 664; Sharett, A t the Gates, 207; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, 687-8.

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36. Agency Executive in New York, 24 Apr. 1948, CZA, Z5/2386; Proskauer to Shertok, 27 Apr. 1948, Documents 4 7 -8 , 684; Shertok to Proskauer, 29 Apr. 1948, ibid. 698-9; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 688-9; Kaufman, American N on-Zionists , 254-6. 37. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 28 Apr. 1948, 29 Apr. 1948, Documents 47-8 , 692-3; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 29 Apr. 1948, ibid. 695. 38. Shertok to Zaslani, 1 May 1948, Documents 47-8 , 712. 39. Shertok to Marshall, 29 Apr. 1948, ibid., 695-6; Shertok to Proskauer, 29 Apr. 1948, ibid. 698-9; Ben-Gurion to the Agency Executive in New York, 30 Apr. 1948, ibid. 705; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 2 May 1948, ibid. 705; Linton to Brodetsky about Shertok’s position, 2 May 1948, ibid. 714-18; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 704-6; Kaufman, American Non-Zionists , 257. 40. Agency Executive in New York, 27 Apr. 1948, 2 May 1948, CZA, Z5/2386; Linton to Brodetsky, 2 May 1948, Documents 4 7 -8 , 717. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 720-1. 41. Agency Executive in New York, 3 May 1948, CZA. 42. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 3 May 1948,4 May 1948, Documents 47-8 , 720; Shertok to Rusk, 4 May 1948, ibid. 728-9; Executive in New York to the Executive in Palestine, 7 May 1948, ibid., 746-7; Sharett, A t the Gates, 224; Kaufman, American Non-Zionists , 258-60; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 722-3. 43. Shertok in the Advisory Committee, 4 May 1948, CZA, Z5/43. 44. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 5 May 1948, Documents 47-8 , 737. 45. Comay’s memo, 5 May 1948, Documents 47-8, 733-6; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, two cables, 6 May 1948, Kaplan to Shertok, 6 May 1948, CZA, S25/1559. 46. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 727, and passim. 47. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, two cables, 4 May 1948, Documents 47-8, 729. 48. F R U S (1948), 917-20; Rusk’s memo to Marshall about the talks with Shertok and about his positions, 8 May 1948, F R U S 930; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 726-7. 49. Shertok’s talk with Marshall and his aides, 8 May 1948, Documents 47-8, 757-69, Cf. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 728, and Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 729-30. 50. Shertok to Zaslani, 1 May 1948, Documents 47-8 , 712-13; Zaslani to Shertok, 3 May 1948, ibid. 721-2. 51. See again, Shertok’s talk with Marshall and his aides, 8 May 1948, Documents 4 7 -8 , 757-69. 52. Shertok to Marshall, 7 May 1948, Documents 47-8, 749-50; Epstein to Agency Executive in New York, 7 May 1948, ibid. 748-9; Marshall to Bevin, 8 May 1948, F R U S 940-1. 53. Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 730-4. 54. Cf. ibid. 731, and Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 729-35. * 55. Interview with Yael Medini, Oct. 1989. 56. Sharett, A t the Gates, 229. 57. See the assembly’s resolution about the appointment of a mediator, 14 May 1948, Documents 4 7-8 , 786-7. 58. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 732.

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59. S. Teveth, ‘A Critical Decision’, H aaretz , 6 May 1973.. 60. Lourie to Shertok, 11 May 1948, two cables, Documents 4 7 -8 , 776-7; also a report on the talk with Crum in Ginsberg to Silver, 11 May 1948, ibid. 775-6. 61. See Meyerson’s report in ‘The State of Israel’, Protocols of the Provisional Government, Jerusalem: May 1978; Shlaim, Collusion , 205-10. 62. Chaim Berman and Leo Kohn to Zaslani, 12 May 1948, Documents 4 7 -8 , 782; Eytan and Berman to Zaslani, 12 May 1948, ibid. 783; Shertok to Goldmann, 13 May 1948, ibid. 791; Shertok to Lourie, 13 May 1948, ibid. 791-2; Shlaim, Collusion , 210-14; Sharef, Three D ays , 61-6. 63. See the Protocols of the Provisional Government, especially, 105-15; and cf. Sharef, Three D ays , 99; Ben-Gurion, War D iary , i. 412 n. 6; Teveth, ‘A Critical Decision’; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 740-1. 64. On the entire discussion in the provisional government see Sharef, Three D ays , 88-106; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , esp. 733 and 741; and also see S. Nakdimon, ‘Where are the Mapai Protocols?’ Seven Days, the W eekly M agazine o f Yediot Aharonot, 12 Nov. 1989. 65. For Shertok’s speech in Mapai’s central committee see Sharett, A t the Gates , 229-38; Shertok in the Central Committee, CZA, A245/124. 66. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 732-5. 67. Shertok’s speech in Mapai Central Committee. 68. Eliezer Leibenstein-Livneh article, Yediot Ahronot, 15 May 1959. 69. Ben-Gurion to Neeman, 13 May 1948, Ben-Gurion Archive; and see the editor’s note in Ben-Gurion, War D iary , i. 412.

11 The First Israeli Foreign Minister T he news about the decisions taken by the provisional government and the central committees of Mapai and other parties on 12 and 13 May 1948, to establish the State of Israel spread quickly in the Yishuv. Hearing the news, the Jews demonstrated both excitement about inde­ pendence and apprehensions about the approaching war with the Pales­ tinians and the Arab states. Since the Yishuv was preparing for the war, all celebrations were muted. Once the fateful decision to proclaim the state had been taken and the initial excitement was over, Shertok and his associates—like all leaders involved in such major historical events—turned to the more mundane and urgent issues for which they were responsible. Shertok, who two days after the Declaration of Independence would be named the first foreign minister of the new state, was separated from most of the staff of his Political Department, who were still stranded in a besieged Jerusalem. He therefore set up a small office in Tel Aviv on 13 May, where he and a handful of officials began dealing with political and diplomatic matters of importance to the new state, as well as with its foreign affairs.1 The first major political item on Shertok’s agenda was revising the draft of the Declaration of Independence which had been prepared by legal advisers and Jewish Agency officials. The difficult security situation and absence or preoccupation of the other four ministers on the committee assigned to this task meant that Shertok redrafted the document by himself. He presented the results of his labours at the provisional government’s meeting on 13 May, a day before the procla­ mation ceremony was scheduled. The new draft comprised three sections and twenty-two clauses in all. In the first section, he presented the philosophical, historical, and international legal reason^ behind the overriding necessity to establish an independent Jewish state. The second section included the proclamation of independence itself and details on the bodies which were to govern the state until its democratic institutions were established and elected. In the third section, Shertok laid out the ideological foundations of the Jewish state and its orientation in domes­ tic and foreign affairs.

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The excessive length, high-flown Hebrew, some archaic terminology, and complex composition led Shertok’s draft to be criticized by other members of the provisional government, nevertheless a number of them, including David Remez (who, like Shertok and Ben-Gurion, was an amateur linguist), liked and fully endorsed this version. Although Shertok hoped that the provisional government would finally approve his draft, one of the directors suggested that a new subcommittee, composed of three activists—Ben-Gurion, Rabbi Yehuda Leib Fishman, and Aharon Tzilsing—and the moderate Shertok himself, should make yet another revision. When this suggestion was adopted by the govern­ ment, Shertok declined to participate in the single meeting of that drafting subcommittee, perhaps out of a sense of insult. His absence allowed Ben-Gurion, who was more attuned than Shertok to dramatic historical events, to undertake the final revision of the declaration. What Ben-Gurion did was to shorten, simplify, and render Shertok’s draft more direct and precise; the structure and all the elements Shertok had included were maintained in Ben-Gurion’s final draft. The main difference between the two versions was that, as he had attempted to do earlier and in another context without success, Ben-Gurion now made certain that the November 1947 UN resolution (clearly one of Shertok’s major political achievements) was played down in the declaration. He also eliminated some of Shertok’s phrases calling on the international community to support the Jewish state. Hence, the draft that was finally approved by the Provisional National Assembly a few hours before the proclamation ceremony, contained all the basic elements that Shertok had thought should be included in such a document. Thus the Israeli Declaration of Independence was a joint endeavour of Ben-Gurion and Shertok—as well as of the officials who drafted the original version.2 As in other aspects connected to the establishment of Israel and its history in the first decade, the entire credit for this important document, however, went solely to Ben-Gurion. While, in accordance with the division of labour between them, Ben-Gurion continued to concentrate his activities in the sphere of defence, Shertok became immersed in the foreign affairs of the em­ bryonic state. His first major goal was to secure recognition for the new state by the UN and the major powers. Since Ben-Gurion was totally preoccupied with reorganizing the Haganah, supervising the estab­ lishment of the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) and directing its operations, and with many domestic matters connected with state-building, Shertok was free to consolidate his dominant role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. On the other side, Ben-Gurion did not enjoy

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the same freedom in making strategic military and defence decisions, since Shertok and a small group of other senior cabinet members such as Kaplan, Rozen, and Bernstein, also had not insignificant input in determining such decisions. Hence in addition to running the foreign ministry, Shertok was a senior partner to critical decisions concerning the ensuing conduct of the war.3 On the eve of the proclamation of the Jewish state, the most awesome defence issue facing the Yishuv was, of course, the imminent invasion by regular Arab armies. O f particular concern to the Israeli political and military planners was the long-term strategic threat posed by King Abdullah (on 13 May, Shertok received a message from the king urging the Jews to postpone the declaration of the state, otherwise his army would invade Palestine), as a protracted conflict with Transjordan involved fighting on three fronts and against the British-backed Arab Legion, which despite its smallness had superior organization, training, weapons, and equipment to those of the Haganah and, for that matter, to those of the other Arab states. To try and stave off this danger, again Shertok approached the US government through his representatives in Washington, imploring the Americans to issue stem warnings to Abdul­ lah as well as to the Egyptians, to refrain from carrying out their sinister design of invading Palestine. Brushing aside his previous bitter experiences and grave disappoint­ ments over American behaviour, Shertok persuaded the provisional government to turn again to the USA and to use whatever ammunition they had at their disposal for this purpose. In this vein, he asked Weizmann and his Washington envoy Epstein to approach Truman, Marshall, and the State Department officials. Truman’s close advisers David Niles, Max Lowenthal, and Clark Clifford were also enlisted to put pressure on the president. However, on the eve of Israel’s estab­ lishment, Marshall and his officials had succeeded in preventing any change in the USA’s pro-Arab policy, especially in regard to lifting the arms embargo on Israel. The pro-Arabists also managed to obstruct early US recognition of the new state.4 It is highly doubtful, however, whether American intervention could have changed the main chain of events in the Middle East enough to prevent an Arab invasion. Thus by 13 May 1948, the British flag had been removed from all flag-posts and governmental offices, the last British High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, left the territory on Friday, 14 May, and the Syrian, Iraqi, Transjordanian, and Egyptian armies were on the verge of invading Palestine. Despite these and other ominous signs, such as the severe shortage of weapons and ammunition,

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acute lack of foreign currency, and grave lack of food, the Yishuv’s leaders were determined to proclaim the state and take their chances in the imminent war. The provisional government, including Shertok, voted to approve Ben-Gurion’s version of the Declaration of Independence late in the morning of 14 May 1948. Then, they all changed into formal attire and—on that hot Friday afternoon—hurried to the Tel Aviv Museum for the historic ceremony in which the long-awaited Jewish state was formally proclaimed. Shertok and the rest of the provisional government were seated at the presidium, table facing members of the Provisional National Assembly, other Yishuv dignitaries, a few celebrities, and local and world media. Together with all the other participants, he listened attentively while Ben-Gurion read the Declaration of Independence of the new-born State of Israel, cheered the declaration, and then signed the document along with the other members of the Assembly; ironically, Ben-Gurion signed first and Shertok last (though according to Mapai’s rituals, signing last was a great political honour). Despite all Shertok’s inherent anxieties about the future developments in the region and the country, and the new state’s ability to withstand the difficulties lying ahead, like all his colleagues, he relished the event and would always cherish it as the most inspiring moment in his political life. On the following Sunday, the Israeli newspapers reported that when Shertok signed the Declaration, the audience applauded him warmly, and when he left the hall, the crowd assembled outside cheered him and greeted him even more enthusiastically. This was of course in appreci­ ation of his direction of the political struggle in the United Nations during the year preceding the UN resolution of 29 November 1947, and the later struggle, which culminated in the proclamation of the State of Israel.5Like Ben-Gurion, Shertok basked in the appreciation and respect of the Israelis. While Friday, 14 May was undoubtedly one of the most cherished moments in the lives of the founding fathers of Israel, these leaders were not given the opportunity to rest on their laurels by savouring their interim political and military victories. For Shertok and his colleagues, the transition from the exciting activities leading to the establishment of Israel, the pace-setting actions involved in founding the state, and the highly emotional and symbolic ceremony of the declaration to routine matters was abrupt. Yet, even in the midst of their tremendous efforts, these highly experienced and pragmatic politicians kept on probing the complex historical and philosophical questions that would in the long run shape the Jewish state. Turning, however, from the excitement of the

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last few days—indeed months—to the business of running the new sovereign state and particularly its foreign affairs, Shertok was deeply satisfied to learn, on that same Friday, that, against all odds, the intensive political lobbying of Weizmann, Silver, and Epstein had had some positive effects: as a result of their pressure, as well as that of Niles, Clifford, Rosenman, Herbert Lehman, and Eleanor Roosevelt—the Truman administration would grant de facto recognition to the new state as soon as it had been proclaimed in Tel Aviv. Still on that same extraordinary Friday, Shertok learned that Niles and then Clifford called Epstein to suggest that he formally approach the White House and State Department to obtain official US recognition.6 Since Marshall and his State Department aides were exerting pressure on the White House to postpone formal recognition until they could study details on the nature and main orientation of the new state, Shertok instructed Epstein that the request for recognition must state specifically that Israel would be a democratic republic and that it would be established within the borders allotted to it in the UN partition resolution. Although the latter ran counter to the decision of the provisional government of 13 May to refrain from mentioning the issue of borders, Shertok approved both the style and wording of the letter. Once this letter and Epstein’s clarifica­ tions were received and analysed by Washington, the Americans had no other choice but almost immediately to extend a de facto recognition to the new state.7 Encouraged by this first, but significant, act of diplomatic recognition, Shertok and his excited staff in Tel Aviv began their efforts to obtain formal recognition from the UN itself ànd other states, especially from the other four members of the UN Security Council—the Soviet Union, France, China, and Britain. Partly as a result of this effort, and partly from their own considerations, the USSR was the second state to recognize the Jewish state, a move that both Shertok and Ben-Gurion considered ‘a light in the darkness’.8 The two Israeli leaders were hoping that this recognition would mean the establishment of an Israeli embassy in Moscow, entailing easier access to Soviet Jews and an enhanced and open purchase of weapons from this emerging superpower. Recognition by South Africa followed, thanks to the good offices of Weizmann, who had at Shertok’s request approached his old friend Jaif Smuts, the much-admired prime minister and minister of external affairs of South Africa. These first three acts of political recognition paved the way for other governments to follow suit. Since New York and Washington were still the most obvious and pivotal centres of political and diplomatic activity for Israel and for

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Shertok, its minister of foreign affairs, the latter planned to be in New York when the UN General Assembly reconvened. He wished personally to thank all those who had supported the establishment of the state, and to discuss matters with Gromyko such as the Soviet Union supplying weapons to Israel and Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe, and also to bask in the glory following the establishment of Israel, which had captured the imagination of Jews and Gentiles alike. Ben-Gurion ob­ jected to Shertok’s plan to visit the USA, arguing that the foreign minister should stay and share the burden of decision-making at that critical period, but no doubt also because Ben-Gurion resented his colleague’s growing popularity and wished to keep it to a minimum. This conflict erupted into a minor crisis in the young Israeli cabinet, in which the prime minister, Ben-Gurion, was overruled by the cabinet, which agreed to leave the final decision in Shertok’s own hands. Although Epstein and Eban, Shertok’s envoys in Washington and New York, recommended the visit urgently, Shertok himself opted to delay it for two reasons: to prevent further clashes with the prime minister and because of his heavy burdens at home.9 As noted, in the political and diplomatic arenas, Shertok operated in an autonomous manner. Thus he was determined to improve Israel’s relations with Great Britain despite Ben-Gurion’s profound and unre­ mitting mistrust of the former mandatory power. But to the great disappointment of the pragmatic and generally speaking Anglophile foreign minister, the British government rejected Israel’s formal request for recognition towards the end of May 1948. However, Shertok tirelessly continued to seek avenues for improving Israel’s relations with Britain, France, and other Western capitals, explaining that, in addition to the fact that Britain was still a significant actor in the region, he was determined to avoid putting all of Israel’s eggs in one basket (i.e., that of the USA).10 In this Shertok was following a classic strategy of small and weak states to diversify their relations. While the United States, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and about three dozen other states had already granted Israel de facto recognition, the U N ’s Political Committee was still discussing the future of what it still considered ‘the territory’. But when the provisional government formally proclaimed the state, and the USA and the Soviet Union recognized it, all ideas about trusteeship finally faded. The Committee then adopted two draft resolutions that the USA was nurturing, the first calling for appointment of a UN mediator between Israel and the Arabs, and the second laying out a plan for the internationalization of Jerusa­ lem. After adopting only the first resolution, the General Assembly

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disbanded the special Palestine Commission, a body that had been detested by Shertok and his colleagues. Simultaneously, however, the Assembly adopted a joint American-British draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire in the entire territory. Subsequent to these decisions, on 22 May the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, announced the fateful appointment of Count Folke Bemadotte, a distinguished Swedish politi­ cian and diplomat, as mediator, and the Assembly adopted a new British draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire in the country. Only after long and heated internal discussion did the Israeli cabinet adopt Shertok’s position that they should welcome both the mediator and the call for an immediate cease-fire. Thus again the cabinet rejected Ben-Gurion’s intention to continue the war in order to save threatened isolated Jewish settlements and to expand the territories under Israeli control. Since the Arab governments rejected this call, many foreign governments and much of the world’s media praised Israel for its moderation and willingness to co-operate with the UN. More important, the asymmetry in the attitudes of Israel and the Arab states allowed it to continue its military operations for some time without too many reprimands.11 Naturally, Shertok was gratified when the restraint that he was advocating was paying off. N ot only the initial military successes, but the political and diplomatic successes as well opened up a new era for Israel, as well as for Shertok and his foreign ministry. For Shertok’s previous and more recent impressive political and diplomatic achievements, coupled with the strict proportional and coalitional nature of Israeli politics, which encouraged the establishment of autonomous political and administrative fiefdoms, permitted the foreign minister further to increase his freedom in the formulation and implementation of Israeli foreign policy. This was also reflected in his control over his ministry. In organizing the work of the young Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he followed the blueprint that he and his officials had prepared in early 1948. One of his first steps, in accordance with this plan, was to separate the Israeli legation in Washington, headed by Ebstein, from the consulate in New York and legation to the UN, which was headed by Aubrey Eban—whose star had risen when he assisted Shertok during the campaigns for partition and recognition of the state.12 In this and other personal and organizational changes Shertok tried to keep a balance between old hands and the younger generation of diplomats, such as Eban and Levavi, whom he had hand-picked and promoted. Israel was still in the throes of an equivocal military situation on the eve of the expected visit of Count Bemadotte. On the one hand, as a

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result of the ID F’s impressive performance, the Israeli government was already in control of territories allocated to it by the UN partition resolution, as well as of areas around Jaffa, in Western Galilee, a narrow corridor precariously connecting the Coastal Plain and West Jerusalem. On the other hand, the Israelis had lost the Etzion region, the Jewish settlements north of Jerusalem, and the northern part of the Dead Sea, which had been allocated to the Jewish state. To the great chagrin of the government, it meant that the invading Arab armies had scored some impressive successes. Especially successful was the Egyptian army, which had occupied large parts of the northern Negev up to the Hebron area and south of Rehovot. The Egyptian army was thus threatening the Tel Aviv metropolitan area which was the main centre of the Jewish population in the country and the Arab Legion was threatening the Eastern borders of Israel on the West Bank.13 Ben-Gurion felt that the main Israeli military effort should be directed towards opening up the road to Jerusalem for free military and civilian travel and transportation (until then all land communication with Jerusalem was maintained by military escorted convoys) and expanding the corridor connecting the Coastal Plain and the Holy City. Already before the establishment of the state, he had exerted great pressure on the Haganah chiefs to assign larger military forces to capture the areas between the Jewish settlements on the Coastal Plain and Latrun, where the Arab Legion based its forces that controlled the road to Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion’s push for a major operation in this area, however, was held in check by the ID F General Staff, together with the Cabinet’s moder­ ates led by Shertok. The main reasons for restraint were the moderates’ evaluation that the IDF was ill prepared for major attacks and oper­ ations and a wish to explore all political and diplomatic avenues towards the pacification of the territory. The Arab Legion’s military successes towards the end of May 1948, especially the destruction of the Jewish settlements in the Etzion Bloc, north of Jerusalem, and in the Latrun area, on the Jerusalem-Jaffa road, caused a crisis within the Israeli government. The angry prime minister and his activist minority sought to launch a major attack on Latrun by a newly created brigade, almost totally manned by untrained new immigrants from Europe. One of Ben-Gurion’s major considerations in initiating such an onslaught was the imminent cease-fire that Shertok and the moderates had advocated. It was clear that Ben-Gurion was anxious to consolidate new territorial aquisitions before being compelled by his colleagues to implement the cease-fire. The government was tom then between incessant demands by Ben-Gurion to launch the attack,

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and by Shertok’s and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ attempts to expedite the cease-fire. When Ben-Gurion’s ardent admirer Shlomo Shamir, commander of the unit which had been selected to carry out the attack (the Seventh Brigade), announced his readiness to undertake the mission, and that regardless of the fact that his soldiers were newcomers, did not speak Hebrew, lacked even basic training, and were ill equipped, the government could not procrastinate any longer. Despite his intransigence and later claims of predominance in policy­ making, Ben-Gurion was usually careful not to make controversial decisions on his own, even in major defence matters. On this occasion also, he consulted his two most senior colleagues in the party and government, Shertok and Kaplan. While Kaplan voiced staunch objec­ tion to the operation in accordance with his pacifist beliefs, the more pragmatic Shertok supported it since he agreed with the strategic need to improve Israel’s positions in that region and to open up the road to Jerusalem. Thus this political and military decision was actually taken by Ben-Gurion and Shertok. In spite of substantial opposition to this operation voiced by military experts, the orders were given, and that ill-prepared and ill-equipped Seventh Brigade launched its attack. As so many in the IDF had feared, the attack turned out to be a complete military catastrophe, in which dozens of Israeli soldiers were sacrificed. This was an additional trauma that neither Ben-Gurion nor many Israeli military leaders would forget for many years. Ben-Gurion’s and Shertok’s reactions to the military débâcle were characteristically polarized: while Ben-Gurion insisted that the ID F immediately launch various counter-attacks to erase the imm­ ense bitterness and humiliation of defeat, Shertok was adamant that the government should expedite the cease-fire to give the military time to recuperate and augment its forces. Later, he would explain the rationale for his insistence on a cease-fire: (1) All our fronts were extremely tenuously held; (2) Those holding them . . . were excessively tired . . . (3) The above two circumstances were the joint result of the numerical inadequacy of our fighting strength to cope with the extension of effective warfare . . . (4) Our marked inferiority in planes, guns, tanks and heavy armour, made the execution of certain urgent tasks virtually impossible .. .l4

Nevertheless, this time Ben-Gurion prevailed. Upon Ben-Gurion’s re­ peated requests, the government decided that the army would launch two counter-attacks, both of which also failed miserably.15 The decision to approve these military operations would lead to new tensions within the cabinet, as well as to a political crisis between the

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government and the Jewish Agency in New York,’ which continued to function in parallel with the Israeli legations in New York and Washing­ ton. For despite the severe blows that the Seventh Brigade and other IDF units had suffered in the battles around Latrun, Ben-Gurion stubbornly planned to continue operations aimed at occupying the same area, the Lod-Ramle region and contested neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, and therefore was adamantly against the cease-fire. Although the cabinet members were not swayed by the prime minister’s arguments, Shertok and his moderate colleagues endorsed the proposal because they feared that a cease-fire at that crucial moment would facilitate King Abdullah’s designs to occupy larger parts of Jerusalem. But when Shertok instructed Eban in New York to relay this decision to the Agency Executive there, in view of the persistent demands by the American administration to stop the war, a majority of the New York Executive strongly opposed the decision taken by the Israeli cabinet.16 This was the first of many clashes between the new Israeli government and the Jewish Agency that now represented the interests of the well-organized American Jewish Diaspora, who had co-operated with the Yishuv in establishing the state. To a great extent, this clash was over the definition of the boundaries of the Diaspora’s influence on the decisions of the Israeli sovereign government. Notwithstanding Shertok’s detailed instructions about the càbinet position, the members of the New York Executive succeeded in persuading Eban to postpone the publication of the Israel government’s blunt rebuke of the U N ’s hesitation in calling for a cease-fire. Shertok’s reaction was prompt and tough: Eban was reprimanded and instructed to follow Tel Aviv’s orders whether or not they agreed with the convictions of the New York Executive—or his own. In forcing Eban to comply with the cabinet decision, the Israeli government had taken its first step in the gradual process of asserting political dominance over the Jewish Diaspora. For the new-born Israeli government, including Shertok, who was by then sensitive to this aspect of national politics, was determined to become predominant in this relationship. It was therefore not surprising that, once Epstein and Eban had grasped the implications of this clash and the Israeli govern­ ment’s position, they firmly supported the cabinet’s intent to transfer the authority for representing Israel from the Agency to the Israeli legations. Indeed, on 8 June 1948, at the conclusion of a special discussion in the cabinet, it was decided that only state agencies would be entitled to represent Israel abroad.17 This formal decision marked an important turning-point on Israel’s road towards hegemony over the Jewish people

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that would last until the 1970s. Shertok himself would change his position in this respect in the late 1950s. As to the cease-fire, when the Security Council adopted on 29 May a British-French resolution calling for a month-long cessation of hos­ tilities, Shertok instructed Eban and Ruffer in New York to express the government’s acceptance. The Israeli government needed this respite and intended to utilize it to reorganize and increase its military forces. After issuing the Declaration of Independence and the establishment of the state, Shertok, his associates in the cabinet, and Israeli repre­ sentatives abroad were dealing very carefully with the highly sensitive issue of borders, in an effort to avoid a major conflict with the UN and the major powers, especially of course the USA and Britain, which still maintained significant strategic interests in Palestine and the region. During the early stages of the war, one of Shertok’s first delicate tasks in this respect was to communicate to Israeli representatives throughout the world the official government position on borders: Israel had accepted the boundaries as specified in UN Resolution 181, namely the establishment of an Arab state in parts of Palestine and an internation­ alized Jerusalem. If either of these two elements did not materialize, the fate o f Jerusalem and of Jewish settlements outside the Jewish state would have to be reconsidered, particularly if the Arabs persisted in invading and attempting to annex these parts. Israel would fight for the purpose o f ‘retaking and holding it pending final settlement’. Using the same reasoning, Shertok had no qualms over rejecting Weizmann’s suggestion that Israel withdraw from Jaffa and Acre. Shertok made it clear to the representatives abroad that, since the war was being conducted with Arab states who had no justified claim to any territory in Palestine, neither Juffa or Acre, nor any other territory that Israel might occupy, would be evacuated at its conclusion. Here there was full agreement between Shertok and Ben-Gurion, as well as among their respective camps. For they all agreed that the Arab countries had changed the rules of the game by invading Palestine, and that Israel had the right to seize this opportunity to improve its territorial position.18 The next task of the Israeli political élite was to hammer out a unified position on how to deal with UN mediator Count Bemadotte, when he arrived in Israel on 31 May 1948. Sometime before his expfected arrival, Shertok had been informed—and he informed the rest of the govern­ ment—that Bemadotte planned to tackle the Arab invasion first and then to focus more on the tricky questions of the proper political arrangements for his mediation, borders, limitations on Jewish immigra­ tion which were still in force, the arms embargo, and Israel’s member-

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ship in the UN. The mediator’s agenda and order of priorities created evident anxiety among the cabinet ministers. But after the Count’s first meeting with Shertok, immediately upon his arrival in Israel, Shertok was relieved to find that Bemadotte ‘was concentrating on high politics, rather than on the trifles of the cease-fire’, and also that initially the Swedish diplomat had not intended to focus on the tricky issue of borders.19 In his ensuing meeting with Ben-Gurion and Shertok, Bema­ dotte discussed a truce and other possible interim solutions that might limit the war, but also made it clear that he was prepared to do everything in his power to facilitate a full and permanent peace. The Israelis focused on issues pertaining to interim arrangements, and in accordance with the cabinet’s decisions, voiced their apprehensions especially about besieged Jerusalem and its Jewish inhabitants, request­ ing the mediator’s help in alleviating the conditions particularly of the Jews in the Old City. Replying that he too was concerned about the Holy City, ‘the Count’, as he was referred to in political circles in Jerusalem, said that he would consider a Transjordanian occupation a major cause for concern. During these preliminary talks with the mediator, the political and temperamental disagreements between Ben-Gurion and Shertok became quite apparent. While Ben-Gurion displayed his impa­ tience and hostility towards the Count, Shertok—as usual—was prepared to negotiate with an open mind and demonstrated warmth and friendliness towards the visitor. But this did not mean that he was any more ready than the prime minister to concede vital Israeli interests as collectively defined by the cabinet.20 Together Ben-Gurion and Shertok decided to approach the cabinet and attain a decision concerning the mediator’s proposals for a truce in the entire country. In view of additional clarifications from the mediator, and without any outside pressure, on 1 June 1948 the Israeli government voted to accept a general cease-fire with the following six pre-conditions: strict bilateral observation of the cease-fire; an embargo on weapons to the Arab forces in Palestine; cease-fire in place; freedom of transport­ ation to Jerusalem; freedom of sea and air transportation to Israel; and no additional Arab forces to invade the territory. The mediator’s first task was to persuade the Arab governments to accept the cease-fire, and when he succeeded in securing Arab agreement to these pre-conditions with surprising ease (the Arabs were already showing marked signs of exhaustion),21 everyone in Israel began waiting for the fighting to stop. Determined tp ensure that Israel kept all its political and diplomatic commitments in connection with this cease-fire, Shertok and his moder­ ate colleagues blocked additional large military operations, especially in

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the Negev, in order to try to create a new modus vivendi with Egypt. However, when the Arabs failed to implement the cease-fire immedi­ ately, he did sanction military operations aimed at improving Israel’s positions, especially in western and northern slopes of the Samaria hills (in the area known as the Triangle, defined by the Arab towns of Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nablus), which failed, and the use of the additional time thus bought to complete an alternative route to Jerusalem, which became known as the ‘Burma Road’, which succeeded. Because of intelligence reports about the possibility of the invasion of additional Arab units, he also supported the bombing of Amman. Although Ben-Gurion had not been in favour of either mediation in general or the decision to accept the cease-fire immediately, since he and the IDF planned to occupy the strategically important Lydda (Lod) area before a prolonged cease-fire actually took place, Shertok and his envoys, Epstein from Washington and Eban from New York chief among them, exerted pressure in favour of both.22 From then on it was mainly Shertok who directed Israeli policy in connection with Bemadotte’s mediation effort. Unlike his later image of softness and hesitation, he did so with considerable toughness especially in regard to ensuring that Israel’s pre-conditions were strictly met—in particular freedom of immigration, which had always been close to his and the entire nation’s heart, and was regarded also as strategically significant in supplying new manpower both to the IDF and to the failing economy. The sensitive issue of Jewish immigration was compli­ cated both by Arab opposition and by British reluctance to let the immigrants out of the camps in Europe and especially in Cyprus, which was under their immediate control. Backed by the Israeli cabinet, and with his usual moderation stiffened by stubbornness, Shertok was encouraged to find that US public opinion favoured Israeli positions during the lull in the fighting, and that Britain might be starting to modify its attitude towards the Jewish state.23 Like many of his colleagues in the cabinet, Shertok worked round the clock during those arduous weeks of the war. Unlike other cabinet members, however, he was always ready to have lengthy talks with his many friends, to meet most of those who requested interviews with him, and to attend cultural events—particularly performance^ by the re­ nowned Israel Philharmonic Orchestra and plays which theatrical com­ panies continued to perform to boost the people’s morale.24 This interest in music, theatre, and linguistics, enhanced his public image as a compromising intellectual rather than an ardent politician toughened by a long career in the Labour camp.

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Moreover, Shertok had to face a great deal of duplicity in the political arena, for even in that period there was a wide gap between appearance and reality in Israeli politics. Thus notwithstanding the tactical manœu­ vres that had been aimed at postponing the cease-fire, or Ben-Gurion’s hostile attitude vis-à-vis Bemadotte, whom he regarded as a British agent, Shertok and his moderate cabinet colleagues felt that achieving and subsequently maintaining the cease-fire was essential for both military and political reasons. He explained that from the military point of view a lull in the war was needed for the following reasons: the IDF units were extremely tired; many vital positions were held tenuously; more than half of the recruits, which totalled 40,000, were still untrained; Jerusalem was under siege, and as rations steadily diminished, the fear of starvation and bombing by the Arab Legion was sapping morale; and the continued embargo on weapons and immigration was devastating for Israel. As if to comply with these Israeli needs, on 7 June 1948 Bemadotte finally succeeded in arranging a four-week cease-fire to begin on 11 June. This was a cease-fire applied in the entire territory west of the River Jordan, and included stipulations for stoppage of entrance of any further Arab troops into the territory, an arms embargo on both sides, and limited Jewish immigration. Without any American ‘encouragement’, the Israeli cabinet, including Ben-Gurion, who was bragging about Israel’s military might which would determine the entire outcome of the war, unanimously agreed to the arrangements. Thus the first cease-fire of the 1948 war, or Israel’s War of Independence went into effect and, under the moderates’ influence and vigilance, was carefully observed by the IDF. Except for an attack on Mishmar Haemek, not far from Haifa, the lull in the fighting was equally observed by the Arabs.25 Significant political and bureaucratic arrangements that affected the Israeli government’s structure and procedures were determined in June 1948. Some of these also had implications for the position of Shertok’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among other developments, this was the time when the structure of the Israeli intelligence community was being determined: the government established a military intelligence unit, headed by Isser Beeri and Chaim Herzog, which, in addition to gathering information about military issues, was to be responsible for censorship as well as field security; an internal General Security Service (the Shin Bet) headed by Isser Harel; and a .service for external espionage (later to be known as the Mossad) headed by Reuven Zaslani-Shiloah. All these services were under Ben-Gurion’s control. Aware that he would lose an

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important power base if his ministry had no role in intelligence-gathering and processing—especially since some of his old Jewish Agency Political Department agents in Arab countries had been discovered, sentenced, and jailed or executed, Shertok insisted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintain a relatively autonomous intelligence unit, called the Political Division, to be headed by his protégé Boris Guriel. Guriel was in charge of all operations and assessments, and chief of operations in Europe was Asher (Arthur) Ben-Natan. Guriel and Ben-Natan were supervised by Shertok’s Adviser on Special Duties Reuven Zaslani-Shiloah, who was also responsible for liaison between the main departments of the foreign ministry which dealt with Arab affairs (the Political Division, the Research Unit, and the Middle East Affairs Department) and the Ministry of Defence and the IDF Intelligence Service. However, Guriel’s division, which was originally designed to gather political intelligence abroad, did not develop properly, and eventually withered away because of the discovery of Eastern European spies in its ranks, competition with the other intelligence organizations, lack of money, poor personnel, and the problematic leadership of Boris Guriel.26 In spite of this oversight on his part, Shertok would continue to receive all intelligence reports from all agencies and play a senior role in policy­ making in this sphere. In view of the circumstances, Shertok and his ministry became deeply involved in weapons purchasing and obtaining economic aid for Israel in addition to their regular political and diplomatic missions. Since weapons and economic aid were probably the two most critical issues then facing Israel, his office’s involvement in these activities won him and his officials prestige and power. In the effort to obtain a loan of a hundred million dollars from the US Export-Import Bank, and to acquire weapons in the West, Shertok approached the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, to help clear the loan and lift the embargo on weapons sales. In his communications with Marshall, Shertok combined emotional arguments about the urgent need for transporting the Jewish DPs from Europe to Israel—hoping that this would touch Marshall—with a rational presen­ tation of how this would help Israel to overcome military obstacles and develop a proper economy. In this sphere the foreign ministry suc­ ceeded—President Truman instructed the administration to deal with Israeli requests just as it dealt with similar requests from other states; consequently, after somewhat prolonged negotiations Israel obtained the loan.27 From this point onward, however, it was becoming clear that economic considerations in view of the deteriorating situation were playing a growing role in Israeli government decisions.

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Shertok and his officials were actively involved also in the complex three-sided negotiations between Israel, the USA (which was interested in securing a continuous flow of oil to support European reconstruc­ tion), and Britain, concerning resumption of operations in the Haifa refineries and the use of the relatively large quantities of oil stored there. While obtaining financial, economic, and military aid was an essential element of Israeli-American relations, the purchase of weapons was an integral part of the Israeli-Soviet connection. As indicated earlier, the Soviet Union had been a primary, prominent, and permanent target for Shertok’s political initiatives since the late 1930s. Since he spoke excel­ lent Russian, was well acquainted with Russian culture, and especially since he was the chief architect of close Israeli-Soviet relations, the affable Shertok had met and conferred with many leading Soviet diplomats and politicians over the years. He must therefore have been quite disappointed when his request of mid-June 1948—delivered through Eliahu Epstein to the Soviet embassy in Washington—that the Soviets should receive an Israeli delegation to Moscow to discuss the possibility of the massive purchase of weapons and grains, was turned down on the basis that it would contradict the stipulations of the cease-fire. None the less, unperturbed, Shertok decided to continue his long-term policy of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union by establishing a relatively large department in the still small Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal exclusively with the USSR and the Eastern bloc. In explaining this move, especially to the Americanophiles among the Israeli élite, Shertok first of all cited the need to obtain de jure recognition by the Soviet Union, as well as Israel’s urgent need for military aid. In the second place he mentioned the immense political and military power of the Eastern bloc. Then there were also the large Jewish communities in these countries and thus the potential for Jewish emigra­ tion, as well as of close trade relations (including the purchase of oil from Romania) and cultural ties. Finally, he said, there was a growing Soviet interest and political presence in the Middle East. In other words, as the foreign minister maintained, although ‘the Israeli government’s orientation is to make great efforts to keep the friendship of the United States, this should not contradict our relations with the East European bloc’, especially when Israeli leaders were still greatly apprehensive of sinister British intentions.28 This was an early formulation of the policy of ‘non-identification’, or non-alignment, that Shertok would initiate and pursue. Even before the USSR’s de jure recognition of Israel, relations with that superpower through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were picking

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up speed when the government began discussing the appointment of senior Israeli political figures—Golda Meyerson and Israel Barzilai—as envoys to Moscow and Warsaw, and of experienced officials to Israeli legations in other capitals in the emerging Eastern bloc. Although the defence ministry had its own representatives in certain countries in the Eastern bloc, especially of course in Czechoslovakia, development and further elaboration of these relations were almost entirely in Shertok’s domain—an additional source of political influence in a state that still respected the Soviet Union for its adamant military struggle against the Nazis and its opposition to a German revival. Despite the existence of issues on which they agreed, the deepening of political disagreements between Shertok and Ben-Gurion did not dissi­ pate during the War of Independence; indeed, they rather widened and multiplied. Surfacing during the cease-fire and in anticipation of the Count’s proposals, the deep gaps in a number of basic attitudes were clearly articulated by each of the two leaders during a cabinet review of Israel’s military and political situation on 16 June 1948. Shertok’s basic argument was that, since the two emerging superpowers and several other states had accepted Israel’s sovereignty as a fait accompli and had recognized it, the young Jewish state, within its current borders, would face no existential problems at the international level. He did, however, warn that the powers would raise the issue of borders, especially those in Jerusalem, in which almost all bystanders were interested, as well as in the southern part of the Negev, where the USA and especially Britain had strategic interests. Shertok argued that, even if the stipulations of the UN partition resolution might at some future point become meaningless, Israel was legally and politically committed to observe it in the mean time. Although he was in principal in favour of holding on to all the territories already conquered, including the central parts of the Galilee, in order to create a link with Lebanon, and an extended corridor to Jerusalem, Shertok pointed out that they might face the question of border modifications through exchanges, beginning with that of the southern Negev, which they might be requested to swap for the Western Galilee. He told the government that he was not opposed to such exchanges, and that Israeli public opinion was not very concerned about Aqaba and the southern Negev. To his close associates, Shch as Eban and Goldmann he intimated that ‘Nevertheless, Aqaba has its fierce protagonists, including Ben-Gurion, who would definitely give back Western Galilee rather than give up Aqaba. So the issue in our thinking is still in the balance and even the remotest allusion at a commitment must be avoided.’ In principle, Shertok was for territorial continuity and

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against complex border arrangements. For external consumption, how­ ever, he rejected any idea of transferring the Negev to the Arabs as totally fantastic and unacceptable. As far as Jerusalem was concerned, Shertok firmly believed that it was open to revision because the claim of the Christian world for an international and partitioned Jerusalem was morally bankrupt as it deserted Israel and that the Jews would be able to reach an agreement with Abdullah on how the city could be partitioned and governed.29 The mass exodus of about three-quarters of a million Arabs, who either fled Israel out of fear, in view of the approaching war, as a result of information and rumours about Israeli behaviour, or following the behaviour of their brethren, or were expelled by force and pressures, as well as the future of those who chose to remain under Israeli control (Shertok estimated their number at 100,000),30 was commented on by Shertok: ‘The most spectacular event in the contemporary history of Palestine—more spectacular in a sense than the creation of the Jewish state—is the wholesale evacuation of its Arab population which has swept with it also thousands of Arabs from areas threatened and/or occupied by us outside our boundaries. I doubt whether there are one hundred thousands Arabs in Israel today.’31 For Shertok this was a cause of utmost concern. He regarded as repulsive any form of forced Arab eviction by' the Israeli army, or of ‘persuasion’ on the part of Israeli politicians or officials to ‘facilitate’ their flight. As to their non-compulsory exodus, he was both stunned and disappointed. Yet he was not ready to issue a call for the stoppage of the exodus. In other words he was not averse to voluntary movement out of the areas either held by the Jews, or conquered by the IDF. He prophetically told the cabinet and the Mapai Central Committee that, Eventually, this flight which was more overwhelming than the establishment of the Jewish State, will necessitate the understanding of the enormous significance of this change from the points of view of Jewish settlement and security, the soundness of Israel’s political structure and the solution to very difficult social and political issues that will cast their shadow on the future of the state. This is one of those revolutionary changes, in the wake of which history never turns back.32

While the exodus was still in progress, Shertok insisted that Israel be ready to pay for the land and other property that the Arabs were leaving behind, in order to enable them to resettle and rehabilitate in their host countries.33 Like many other moderates at the time and later, however, he was quite inflexible that, once having left, whether by force or voluntarily,

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‘They shall not return. This is our policy: They shall not return.’ In accordance with his persistent support of partition, he added, The reversion to the status quo ante is unthinkable. The opportunities which the present position opens up for a lasting and radical solution of the most vexing problem of the Jewish State, are so far reaching as to take one’s breath away. Even if a certain backwash is unavoidable, we must make the most of the momentous chance with which history has presented us so swiftly and so unexpectedly.34

However, it is little known that in order to sweeten somewhat this rigid policy, and in contrast with most of his colleagues, Shertok proposed that the government should consider giving up part of the Negev in compensation for the lands left behind by the Arabs. Moreover, at the time, as well as in the years that followed, he emphasized that, ‘We must consider this phenomenon [of the Arabs exodus] very seriously. And we must maintain a completely open mind about it, without any form of prejudice or preconception.’ As always, he repeated in this context also that ‘our policy should be in accordance with UN [resolutions and treaties]’. During that same cabinet meeting, Shertok also stated that T therefore assume like all of us, that there will be an Arab Palestine’. He then considered the pros and cons of letting king Abdullah annex it and the possibility of establishing such an independent state.35 Fully in line with his activist creed, Ben-Gurion’s unequivocal re­ sponse to Shertok’s analysis and proposals were that, ‘The UN resolu­ tions of 29 November 1947 are dead[!]’, and nobody was interested in their implementation. Only if the war ended in a draw and there was no other option would it be possible that somebody would advocate ‘the implementation of November 1947 resolutions’. Furthermore, in total opposition to Shertok, the prime minister was thoroughly convinced that the future of Israel ‘would be determined by military force. Now the political question is in fact a military one.’ Even if the war were not resumed, he went on to assert, forcing on the Arabs the borders of the new state as well as sealing these boundaries against an Arab return, would still be achieved through military rather than political means. In any case, he said, ‘If we are not prepared for the continuation of the war—we shall lose the political game. The UN resolutions are not binding. And we should not build on 29 November 1947.’ And he continued, ‘The war has not ended. This is only cease-five. If the war resumes, for us this will be a war for life or death. For us—not for them. . . . If we fail—we will be destroyed.’ In diametrical opposition to Shertok, Ben-Gurion also said that he was not at all surprised by the Arabs’ invasion, the Jews’ ability to

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withstand this invasion, and the Arabs’ flight, in view of the Arab character. Categorically stating that the Arabs should not return to the places that they had left, Ben-Gurion also decried Shertok’s idea about relinquishing the southern Negev, calling it ‘a tremendous Zionist asset, which has no substitute in any other part of Eretz Israel. It lacks only water—which is a shortcoming which can be overcome.’ In the same context, and as a complete rebuttal of Shertok’s view on the sources of Israel’s current difficulties, he asserted that Britain, rather than the Arabs, was ‘the most horrendous obstacle [facing Israel]’. Although of course he did not contemplate any military action against British forces stationed in the Arab Middle East, since the ID F was not strong enough to carry out such a mission, he blamed the British for directing the Arabs’ actions against Israel, including their exodus. Thus the only chance for improved relations with the British would be after they had withdrawn all their forces from the region and rescinded their control over the Arab states, only then would there be a chance for rapproche­ ment with the Arabs. Finally, he maintained, ‘One thing became clear: the Palestinian Arabs constitute neither a military nor a political force.’36 This bitter exchange at the government meeting of 16 June 1948 provided a new manifestation of some of the most fundamental disagree­ ments between the two leaders. Yet despite their divergent political philosophies, as well as their roots in different sections in Mapai, the prevailing military and political conditions and Israel’s precarious situation compelled Shertok and Ben-Gurion to continue their uncom­ fortable ‘coalition’. To Shertok’s satisfaction, the first cease-fire was holding. The pro­ longed lull in hostilities, he felt, might create a mechanism for ensuring that foreign troops did not penetrate or smuggle war materials into the territory. Most significant from Shertok’s viewpoint, the cease-fire pro­ vided a backdrop for the attempt to conduct political negotiations with the Arab countries. This possibility was enhanced by Bemadotte’s stubborn efforts which started immediately after securing the cease-fire, to achieve a permanent peace between Israel and the Arab states. In this context, the mediator met with the political committee of the Arab League, and consequently informed Shertok that he would establish his headquarters on the island of Rhodes. After hearing the Arab League’s proposals, Bemadotte requested that Israel appoint liaison officials (Shertok chose his confidants Reuven Zaslani-Shiloah and Leo Kohn for this mission) to,present Israel’s terms for peace. Shertok affirmed that Israel too was prepared to discuss interim arrangements, which he felt had been incorporated in the various UN resolutions, but also perma-

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nent peace. Having received these assurances, Bernadette raised the thorny issue of borders, which Shertok had expected. To this query and regardless of the government’s official position that it would abide by the UN resolution, Shertok replied that Israel was determined to retain the Western Galilee, which the UN had not allocated to the Jewish state, and that the government was only prepared to consider minor adjust­ ments to the existing borders. In his talks with Bemadotte, Shertok did not hide his satisfaction in how Israel had fared up until that point, despite his disappointment in the U N ’s inability to safeguard the arrangements that it had stipulated. He also voiced his displeasure at Britain’s continued support of the Arabs. And once again he expressed his astonishment at the massive Arab exodus from the country.37 While Shertok was in the midst of his negotiations with the UN mediator, a crisis was brewing that would have traumatic effects on Israeli society and politics. On 15 June 1948, Shertok, in Tel Aviv, received word from Weizmann in London that two ships loaded with Jewish immigrants of military service age and war materials had left France for Tel Aviv in Israel before the cease-fire went into effect. (In fact, only one ship—the Irgun’s Altalena—had sailed from Port-de-Bouc in southern France.) Weizmann implored Shertok to keep the cease-fire intact by doing everything in his power to prevent the ships from unloading their human and military cargo in Israel. It soon became clear that there were 900 Irgun-trained fighters on the Altalena, and that the weapons on board had been purchased with the active help of officials of the Quai d ’Orsay, about which Shertok lodged stiff complaints with the French government. Once they became aware that the ship’s depar­ ture from France had been discovered, the Irgun commanders tried to alter the ship’s course, but failed because of poor communications with its people on the ship. As soon as it became evident that either the Altalena could not be stopped or the Irgun leaders refused to do so, Menachem Begin and other representatives of the organization met with the deputy minister of defence, Israel Galili, and that ministry’s director general, Levi Eshkol, to discuss the fate of the ship. Under pressure from Shertok, Ben-Gurion had secretly instructed his deputy and director general to allow the ship to land on a remote beach in order to protect Tel Aviv alfe well as to prevent jeopardizing the position of the state by letting it be known that Israel was breaking the cease-fire agreement concerning the embargo on bringing in fighters and weapons.38 Begin, Galili, and Eshkol agreed to land the ship away from Tel Aviv and that some of the weapons would be directed to Irgun units which were still fighting separately in

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Jerusalem. The agreement faltered when Begin adamantly demanded that the rest of the weapons be given to Irgun units within the ID F rather than the IDF in general or only to the Irgun units in Jerusalem. When Galili and Eshkol understandably refused to accede to this demand, Begin escalated his pre-conditions by asking that all the weapons be brought to Irgun caches. The internal crisis in the young state was intensifying as the ship made its inexorable approach to the shores of Israel. Irgun fighters were gathering on a beach north of Tel Aviv to help unload the ship, some of them having deserted their ID F units despite stiff warnings from their commanders. The hot news about Altalena and the political crisis were leaked to the local and international media. While everyone in Israel and abroad awaited the response of the government, the cabinet was con­ vened to respond to this first major challenge to its authority. In this meeting, Shertok analysed the history of the crisis and set the tone in the discussion on the Altalena by expressing great concern over the domestic and international ramifications of the affair. Surveying developments since the ship’s departure from France, he pursued a tough line as to the required government reaction by proposing that the ID F concentrate large forces on the beach, disperse the Irgun members by force if necessary, arrest all those disembarking from the ship, and confiscate their weapons. Other members of the cabinet, including Mapam’s moderate member of cabinet Mordechai Bentov, agreed with Shertok, and some adopted even more stringent positions. Galili and the IDF chief of operations, Yigael Yadin, assured the ministers that the military would be able to deal with the situation, but requested its steadfast political support during what was certain to be a messy operation. Bentov proposed that the minister of defence, Ben-Gurion, be auth­ orized ‘to deal with the situation in accordance with the state’s laws’, including Begin’s arrest. Ben-Gurion retorted that he would act in accordance with the law only if there were enough political will on the part of the entire cabinet and troops at his disposal, ominously adding that ‘to act will mean to shoot’. In the end and in accordance with Ben-Gurion’s demand, the cabinet unanimously decided to authorize the ID F’s General Staff to use force in dealing with the situation if it were able to organize sufficient units in time.39 True to his principles, Shertok immediately informed the chief of staff of the UN observers’ force, Colonel Thorde Bonde, about the affair and the government’s determination to solve it. Worried about the fate of Jewish refugees fit for recruitment to the military, he also instructed Zaslani and Kohn to let Bemadotte, who was already in Rhodes, know

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that the main problem with the Altalena was the weapons on the ship, but that what was on board would not affect the military balance between the Arab states and Israel.40 However, because of the Irgun’s stubbornness, the affair was not to be resolved in accordance with the cabinet’s scenario. Since the ID F could not stop the ship, it did dock on the remote beach and most of the Irgun fighters succeeded in disembark­ ing. Moreover, after unloading the fighters, the Altalena proceeded to anchor on the Tel Aviv beach, and ironically, just opposite Haganah headquarters. At a second stormy cabinet meeting, Shertok expressed his apprehension that the weapons had fallen into the hands of the Irgun soldiers, but Ben-Gurion assured him that they were still on board. When the interior minister, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, contended that the government could defuse the crisis only by capturing the weapons and thus letting the Irgun leaders go free, Shertok’s firm response was: ‘The major issue is the authority of the state of Israel.’ Referring to the wider implications of the crisis, Shertok, who now was mainly concerned with the affair’s political implications for the young polity, said that on the one side sits the government, and on the other side is the Irgun, an organization that has revoked an agreement and is now trying to make political gain out of this fact. The question is: government, or no government? I think that we must impose compliance [with the Government’s authority] through the use of all means, including force.41

During the same cabinet meeting it was reported that the Irgun soldiers on the remote beach had surrendered to the IDF and that during this clash there had been four casualties: two IDF soldiers and two members of the Irgun. The report about the casualties only increased the tension and strengthened the determination of most cabinet members, including Shertok, that the ID F should capture the ship if the Irgun commanders did not back down from their intention to unload the weapons on board. However, the cabinet’s stance did not deter the Irgun and therefore, Yigal Allon, commander of the ID F’s élite Palmah unit, who was in charge of the operation, remembering Ben-Gurion’s previous orders to use force, decided to bombard the ship, which set it on fire. In the ensuing clash, fourteen Irgun members and one Palmah soldier were killed and dozens of Irgun members arrested. Shertok openly supported the bombarding of the ship.42 This was not the end of the affair. Israeli public opinion was deeply divided on the behaviour of the govern­ ment and the Irgun, as was the cabinet. Things came to a head in the government when two Mizrahi ministers, the moderate and ardent Shertok supporter Moshe Shapira and staunch activist and

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Ben-Gurion’s supporter Rabbi Fishman, resigned when their demand for the release of all detained Irgun soldiers was rejected. In view of this coalitional crisis, the cabinet had no choice but to convene the Provisional Council of State to discuss the affair, which, after the bombardment of the ship, became known as the ‘Holy Canon Affair’. The entire crisis, and especially the Irgun’s defiant behaviour, raised some basic constitutional questions. Thus, during the Council’s debate, Shertok rejected all attempts to distinguish between the state and its government. Asserting that the government is the very embodiment of the state, he emphasized the critical importance of keeping to the terms of agreements to which the state is a partner. Therefore, he argued, the Irgun deserved the blows inflicted on it by the ID F since it both continued fighting after the cease-fire had been declared, and abrogated the original agreement regarding surrender of the Altalends weapons. Whole-heartedly supporting the order to bombard the ship, Shertok concluded by stating: ‘There will be no anarchy in this state.’ On the next day, 23 June 1948, the Provisional Council of State approved the cabinet’s actions and established a committee to formulate clear yard­ sticks for the creation of a unified army. In the name of his moderate social democratic ideals, Shertok supported the rational and pragmatic approach that promoted these actions. However, while Shertok demon­ strated an inflexible attitude towards the Irgun and its leader Menachem Begin within the cabinet, in order to heal the wounds created by the crisis, when it subsided, he was more conciliatory in public. Hence, during a ceremony marking the swearing-in of ID F units, he called for the Irgun deserters to return to their units because ‘we fight for one state, for one nation, and not two’.43 In any case, the Israeli government was fortunate that the negative impression created by the Altalena affair was to some extent balanced when the Egyptians broke the truce by launching a major attack on two Jewish settlements in the northern Negev, Kfar Warburg and Beer Tuvia. Under Shertok’s pressure, the chief of the U N observers force, Bonde, was forced to admit that Israel was entitled to use military force in retaliation to these Egyptian provocations. Shertok believed that the way he dealt with this incident (that is, first consult the UN, and only then use military force) should become the norm. Ben-Gurion, who had developed an obsession about this world organization, strongly opposed this approach. At the same time, that the ID F reacted to the Egyptian attacks, Shertok made a stiff warning to all Arab states against similar actions. This immediate reaction to the Egyptian attack created a

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situation whereby, with the exception of some letters of protest issued by the UN observers to the Israeli government, the Altalena affair passed without any major international ramifications. Most importantly, it did not affect the influx of Jewish immigrants, which had been uppermost in Shertok’s pragmatic mind during the crisis.44 Generally, that was a gratifying period for Israel and for its foreign minister from both the political and diplomatic as well as the military points of view. Thus, for example, Eddie Jacobson, a close friend of President Truman, confided to the Israelis that the USA would not support demands for Israeli withdrawal from any areas it had been allocated by the partition plan, that de jure US recognition would be accorded to Israel shortly after the cease-fire expired and that the Export-Import Bank would grant the hundred-million-dollar loan that Israel had requested. Also according to this report, Truman expressed great bitterness towards Britain, especially toward Bevin who had rendered the solution of the Palestine question almost impossible. Jacobson also related to the Israelis that Truman promised to remove Loy Henderson, who was regarded as the father of America’s anti­ partitionist, anti-Zionist, and anti-Israeli policies, from his position at the State Department and appoint him an ambassador, and finally that he would nominate the veteran pro-Israeli diplomat, James McDonald, as the first American ambassador to Israel.45 Shertok knew very well that this modest change in the White House position was primarily based on the Pentagon’s favourable assessment that the young Jewish state was capable of protecting itself, but also on domestic calculations connected with the forthcoming presidential elec­ tion. For Jewish votes and campaign contributions became significant in what looked a very close race between Truman and another pro-Israeli American politician—Thomas Dewey. Actually, the Jews’ position was ambivalent since the Republican party and platform were propounding a very positive stance towards Israel in the presidential campaign. Also, in regard to the Pentagon’s position, Shertok knew that this change should be attributed to its growing recognition of Israeli military capabilities and Arab military weakness. Hence Shertok did not fail to note that Israel was operating then in a more certain international environment than many observers (at the time and later)* postulated. Shertok needed these assurances about the US stance in preparing Israel’s next political and diplomatic moves. The news from Jacobson was of particular importance when Shertok approached the thorny issue of peace when the UN mediator Bemadotte, who was preparing then his detailed proposals. Unlike the profound

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suspicion shown by most Israeli politicians towards Bemadotte, Shertok, who was more intimately acquainted with the mediator and his assistants than any other cabinet member, believed that the Count approached the Palestine problem from a realistic and fair starting-point. Free of Ben-Gurion’s phobias against the outside world and especially against the UN and Britain, Shertok was confident that Bemadotte started off with the assumption that Israel was a fait accompli, that it was a powerful and important factor in the region, that it would not relinquish its vital interests, and that the major problem was to persuade the disunited and rejectionist Arab states to reconcile themselves to these facts. Based on the reports of his envoys, Shertok also deprecated Weizmann’s and Ben-Gurion’s insinuations that Bemadotte was a British stooge.46 Indeed, in view of the mediator’s constant consultations with the Americans, and not the British, Shertok’s assumption was accurate. Bemadotte’s proposals for peace between Israel and the Arab states were received both in Jerusalem and Arab capitals on 27 June 1948, along with the information that these were not final proposals, only initial ideas that should be given great attention and kept secret. Shertok’s and his associates’s analysis was that the assumptions under­ lying the Count’s proposals were that there was an overriding inter­ national as well as regional need for peace between Israel and the Arabs, that Israel’s existence was a fact, that Israel would not compromise its vital interests, that there was great potential for Israeli-Arab economic co-operation, and that the quintessential problem was how to move the Arabs to accept these facts. Practically, the Count suggested that what had been Palestine and Transjordan together should be regarded as one confederated territorial unit with two ‘member’ sub-units whose borders should be determined by negotiations between these sub-units, through the good offices of the UN mediator, but not according to the UN partition scheme. The confederated bodies would function as such mainly in the realms of foreign relations, economic co-operation, and the provision of certain services, all through joint institutions. Despite Shertok’s initial cautious welcome of the mediator and his guarded optimism about the possibilities inherent in this plan, he became more sceptical when Bemadotte suggested controlling Jewish immigration and reaffirmed the right of all Arab refugees to return to Israel. This suspicious attitude was augmented by Bemadotte’s position in regard to borders. For thç mediator also drew a highly problematic map with the Negev as part of the Arab sub-unit; the Galilee part of the Jewish sub-unit; Haifa and Lydda as free ports serving both units; Jaffa’s fate

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to be decided in talks between Jews and Arabs; and Jerusalem to fall in the Arab sector with autonomy granted to the Jews living in the Holy City.47 Once again there was a gap between appearance and reality in Shertok’s attitude: his immediate public reaction was in line with the government’s formal position to reject the entire scheme if only because of the mediator’s proposals on immigration, borders, and Jerusalem. Actually, however, his views were more complex and flexible. In guiding Eban in New York, Shertok was more specific: Government’s reaction Count’s suggestions utterly negative, views objectionable not all features, but we not interested be first to reject, Therefore playing for time letting Arabs show hand first. Also our armies vitally interested extension truce at least another 6 weeks, therefore [general] trend our tactics should be categorically oppose specific provisions, without total rejection, so as drag our negotia­ tions. Myself consider rejection key feature, which unavoidable, tantamount to total rejection, will cause Count report failure.48

Shertok was not worried about the cease-fire collapsing at that point, since all sides except for the Arab states were interested in its continua­ tion—the United States because of the weight of public opinion there and the administration’s wish to prevent further Arab humiliation, and Britain because of its growing dependence on the USA and Bevin’s weakening position in the British cabinet. Reporting to the Israeli cabinet on progress in the talks with the mediator in early July 1958, Shertok again displayed a far more flexible approach than the one he had voiced publicly—one in which the door would be left open for negotiations with the Arabs through the good offices of Bemadotte. Still ready to swap territories, including land in the southern Negev, and to compensate Arab refugees, he also supported the internationalization of parts of Jerusalem. In this context his arguments were that ‘We should protect Israel and prevent a clash with the UN at almost any c os t . . . [especially since] the United States wants to prolong the cease-fire until at least December 1948, that is, until after the [presidential] election there’.49 Ben-Gurion reacted to Shertok’s appraisal by repeating his own suspicions of the mediator’s motives, repeating his accusation that the mediator was Bevin’s proxy, and saying that he was only willing to accept mediation in order to try and extend the first cease-fire beyond the thirty days, that had started on June 11th, just out of military considerations. To his way of thinking, an indefinite cease-fire had no great significance, since on the basis of ID F reorganization, the weapons

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that it obtained and further recruitment and training of new soldiers, he was confident that within a month Israel would be prepared to defeat the Palestinians and all Arab states. Finally, he rejected any proposal that compromised Israel’s sovereignty over the territories that it ac­ quired, not mentioning relinquishing parts of Jerusalem. At that stage Ben-Gurion demanded direct talks with the Arabs, which would become a basic Israeli principle in all peace talks since then.50 Ben-Gurion and Shertok could agree just on the advisability of postponing Israel’s response to the Count on tactical grounds: from various sources, including Trigve Lie, they learned that Arabs were about to reject these proposals. Their assessment was accurate. TTiese discussions in the Israeli cabinet reflected not only the deepening split between Shertok and Ben-Gurion, but also a shift in the internal balance of power. For, with the resignation over the Altalena affair of the activist Rabbi Fishman, only two ministers—Gruenbaum of the General Zionists and Tzisling of Mapam—supported Ben-Gurion’s ‘nos’: that is, ‘no’ reliance on the UN, ‘no’ talks with King Abdullah, ‘no’ chance for an agreement with the Arabs and ‘no’ chance for a diplomatic solution. It is important to note that Shertok also noticed that during the discussions in the cabinet, Ben-Gurion reiterated that ‘The matter will not be solved through diplomacy and peace, but rather through force’. He felt that this attitude was driving them further apart.51 It is equally important to note that Pinhas Rozen of the Progressives, Peretz Bernstein of the General Zionists, Rabbi Levin and Moshe Shapira of Mizrahi, Bechor Shitrit of the Sephardi party, Bentov of Mapam, and Kaplan and Remez of Mapai, all supported Shertok’s position. At that particular juncture and later, this group of moderates determined many of the young Israeli government’s foreign policies. The moderates’ support was also an essential political deterrent that was an important component in maintaining the Ben-Gurion-Shertok political coalition. Thus in order to ensure less moderate resistance in the cabinet, Ben-Gurion had to reckon with Shertok’s views. It was just because both surmised, as noted, that the Arabs would reject the mediator’s proposals that the Shertok and Ben-Gurion split did not tear the cabinet apart. As it was, the cabinet approved Shertok’s suggestions that a general and ambiguous negative public statement be issued, but one that did not answer Bemadotte’s proposal in too many details. Accordingly, Shertok would express Israel’s resentment that the relevant UN resolutions had not been mentioned by the mediator, specifying only that the govern­ ment opposed the attempt to disregard or tamper with Israel’s sover­ eignty or curb the right of Jews to immigrate to Israel. As to the

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proposals regarding Haifa, Lydda, and Jerusalem, all were unacceptable. Finally, he said that the government preferred direct negotiations with its Arab counterparts.52 This compromise, intended to leave an open door for further mediation, was approved by a vast majority in the Provisional Council of State. The Israeli press, however, carried head­ lines to the effect that Israel had totally rejected the mediator’s plan. Since Bemadotte made it clear that his proposals had only been a starting-point for discussion, he resented both the government’s secret and public reactions. It then seemed that the mediation effort was at an impasse. Responding to the mediator’s allegations, in further talks with him, Shertok denoted that ‘the one counter-proposal we had to make was that the Arab world should make peace with the State of Israel’.53 But when the two discussed the possibility of prolonging the cease-fire for an additional thirty days, Shertok assured Bemadotte that Israel was all for it—the Israeli government deemed it necessary to complete its military preparations for the next round of fighting. During that round of talks with Bemadotte, Shertok also focused on immediate problems such as the. further release of Jewish refugees from the camps in Cyprus, the demilitarization of Jerusalem, and Arab states’ (especially Trans­ jordan) free access to Haifa and Lydda. Shertok himself was inclined to agree in principle to the mediator’s proposal about the demilitarization of Jerusalem, but only for the duration of the cease-fire, a position that the government had approved.54 In early July 1948, it indeed became clear that the Arabs were not willing to continue the cease-fire, even for the three days needed to allow the safe withdrawal of the UN observers from their positions in between the two armies. Shertok sensed that a new round in the war was about to start. Since Ben-Gurion was bed-ridden with high fever, Shertok, who replaced him as acting prime minister, and General Yigael Yadin, instructed the Israeli army to resume fighting that very night. From the military point of view and concerning the borders, this second round of fighting, that would last for ten days, was crucial. During those ten days, Israel would solidify its holding over its territory and extend it further. Although the cease-fire had not been extended, Shertok did succeed in wresting some last-minute concessions from Bemadotte: the Jewish refugees would be released from the British camps in Cyprus, and—in an arrangemet that would last until 1967—Mount Scopus would be demilitarized.55 Thus, despite the moderates’ ability to influence the government to extend the cease-fire and continue negotiations with the Arabs through the UN mediator, on 9 July 1948 Israel again found itself in the thick of war.

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1. On the political and administrative preparations involved, see Sharef, Three Days, 125-34. 2. Sharef, Three D ays , 176-80, 217-18, 220-5; and cf. Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 86-7; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 744-5; Teveth, ‘A Critical Decision’, H aaretz , 6 May 1973. 3. See e.g. Ben-Gurion, Jffcr ZMary, ii, 14 May 1948. 4. Shertok to Epstein, 15 May 1948, Documents 47-8, 765-8; Shertok to Epstein, 17 May 1948, Documents, i. 13; Sharef, 77iree Days, 183-93; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood , ii. 768-74. 5. Sharef, Three Days , 226-33, and esp. 230. 6. Epstein to Shertok, 14 May 1948, Documents , ii. 3-4; Epstein to Shertok, 15 May 1948, ibid. 4, 5. 7. Sharett, fAe Gates, 241-2; Elath, Struggle fo r Statehood, ii. 772-8; Ganin, Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 170-86. 8. See documents 6, 7, 12, in Documents , i; see Molotov to Shertok, 18 May 1948, ibid. 22-3; Weizmann to Shertok, 18 May 1948, ibid. 24; Ben-Gurion, War D iary, ii, 18 May 1948. 9. Shertok to Goldmann, 17 May 1948, Documents , i. 17; Lourie to Shertok, 20 May 1948, ibid. 37-8; Shertok to Epstein, 20 May 1948, ibid. 59; Ben-Gurion, War Diary , ii, 16 May 1948. 10. Goldmann to Shertok, 18 May 1948, Documents , i. 22; Shertok to Goldmann, 19 May 1948, i. 33; on Israeli-French relations see minutes of provisioned government, i, 30 May 1948, ISA. 11. Trygve Lie to Shertok, 21 May 1948, Documents , i. 52; Shertok to Eban, 24 May 1948, ibid. 68; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii. 450, 452. 12. Eban to Shertok, 18 May 1948, Shertok to Eban, 21 May 1948, Documents, i. 53; and see A. Eban, Memoirs , i. 114-15. 13. See the appendix to Eban’s letter to Lie, 22 May 1948, Documents , i. 62-4; Sharett, A t the Gates, 242. 14. Shertok to Goldmann, 15 June 1948, Documents, i. 162. 15. Shertok to Eban, 25 May 1948, Documents, i. 47; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 22 May 1948, 23 May 1948, 24 May 1948; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 761-70. 16. Shertok to Eban, 25 May 1948, Documents, i. 74; Agency Executive in New York to Shertok, 25 May 1948, ibid. 75. 17. Shertok to Eban, 26 May 1948, Documents, i. 80-1; the Israeli delegation to the UN to Shertok, 29 May 1948, ibid. 93; Shertok to Eban 31, May 1948, ibid. 104; Eban to Shertok, 3 June 1948, ibid. 115-16; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 26 May 1948, 30 May 1948, 8 June 1948. 18. Goldmann to Shertok, 31 May 1948, Documents , i. 106; Shertok to Epstein, 26 May 1948, ibid. 81; Shertok to Epstein, 27 May 1948, ibid. 86; Ben-Gurion to Locker, 1 June 1948, ibid. 110. 19. Shertok in Mapai Secretariat, 13 June 1948, Mapai Archive, 24/48. 20. Goldmann to Shertok, 26 May 1948, Documents, i. 84-5; Shertok to Eban, 26 May 1948, ibid. 105; Shertok in Mapai Secretariat, 13 June 1948, Mapai

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21. 22.

23.

24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

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Archive, 24/48; Ben-Gurion, War D iary , ii, 31 May 1948; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel , i. 143-5. Shlaim, Collusion , 250-1. Eban to Lie, 1 June 1948, Documents , i. 108-9; Shertok to Eban, 2 June 1948, ibid. 112-13; Eban to Shertok, two cables, 2 June 1948, ibid. 113-14; Eban to Shertok, 3 June 1948, ibid. 119; Epstein to Shertok, 3 June 1948, ibid. 119-20, Eban to Shertok, 4 June 1948, ibid. 124-5; Ben-Gurion, War D iary , ii, 2 June 1948. Shertok to Eban, two cables on his talks with Bemadotte, 4 June 1948, Documents , i. 120-2, and on the continued talks with the mediator particularly about immigration, 6 June 1948, 129-30; Shertok to Bemadotte, 7 June 1948, ibid. 131; Ben-Gurion, War D iary , ii, 4 June 1948; on the cabinet endorsement of Shertok’s position, Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 152-7; on the British change of attitudes see Louis, British Empire , 532-40. Palestine P ost , 8 June 1948. Shertok to Eban, 7 June 1948, Documents , i. 132; Shertok to Goldmann, 15 June 1948, ibid. 162-4; Bemadotte to Shertok, 8 June 1948, ibid. 133-6; Shertok to Bemadotte, 9 June 1948, ibid. 144-6; on American pressure see Burdett to Kohn, 9 June 1948, 143; Ben-Gurion, War Diary , ii, 7 June 1948, 8 June 1948, 9 June 1948; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 158-60. Shertok in the Mapai Secretariat, 13 June 1948, Mapai Archives, 24/48; Ben-Gurion, War Diary , ii, 7 June 1948; H. Eshed, One M an ‘M ossad’, Reuven Shiloah: Father o f Israeli Intelligence (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1988), 80-1; I. Black and B. Morris, Israels Secret Wars (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 71-2. Shertok to Marshall, 8 June 1948, Documents , i. 141; Gass to Kaplan, 16 June 1948, ibid. 169-70. The quote is from Levavi’s memo, 13 June 1948, Documents , i. 155-7; and see minutes of provisional government, 30 May 1948, i, ISA; and see Shertok to Epstein, 9 June 1948, Documents , 149; Shertok to Epstein, 23 June 1948, ibid. 206; Eban to Shertok, 17 June 1948, ibid. 176. Shertok to Eban, 15 June 1948, Documents , i. 158; Shertok to Goldmann, 15 June 1948, ibid. 162-4, and see the minutes of provisional government, 16 June 1948, i, ISA. B. Morris, The Birth o f the Palestinian Refugees Problem, 1947-1949 (Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); N. Masalha, Expulsion o f the Palestinians (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992); and the minutes, 16 June 1948. Shertok to Goldmann, 15 June 1948, Documents , i. 163; minutes, 16 June 1948; and on Shertok’s future role in this matter see, Morris, Birth o f the Palestinian Refugee Problem , passim ; B. Morris, 1948 and A fter: Israel and the Palestinians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), passim. * Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 13 June 1948, Mapai Archive, 24/48; Shertok in the cabinet, minutes, 16 June 1948; also quoted in Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel , i. 163-5; Sharett, A t the Gates , 247. Shertok in the cabient, minutes, 16 June 1948; and as quoted in Ben-Gurion, Restored S tate o f Israel , i. 163-5.

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34. Shertok to Goldmann, 16 June 1948, Documents, i. 163. 35. Shertok in thirty-sixth session of Mapai Council, 18-19 June 1948, Mapai Archive, 22/36. 36. Ben-Gurion in the government’s meeting of 16 June 1948, minutes, ISA; and as quoted in Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 165-7; and see Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 774-6; and cf. Morris, Birth o f the Palestinian Refugee Problem , ch. 4. 37. See report of the talks between Shertok and Bemadotte conducted on 17 and 18 June 1948, Documents, i. 181. 38. Weizmann to Shertok, 15 June 1948, Documents , i. 161; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 16 June 1948; S. Nakdimon, Altalena (Heb.) (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1978). 39. Minutes of provisional government, iii, ISA; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 179-81, Bar- Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 776-84. 40. Minutes of provisional government, iii, ISA; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 179-81. 41. Ibid. 42. Shertok to Bonde, 21 June 1948, Documents, i. 197; Zaslani to Shertok, 22 June 1948, ibid. 204-5. 43. Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 181-5; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 22 June 1948. 44. Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 190; Palestine Post, 24 June 1948, 4 July 1948. 45. Epstein to Shertok, 22 June 1948, Documents, i. 203; Epstein to Shertok 24 June 1948, ibid. 208; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 26 June 1948; for a detailed discussion of these two issues, see M. J. Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 224-37. 46. On Zaslani’s view on Bemadotte’s position, see Zaslani to Shertok, 25 June 1948, Documents, i. 219-20; and on the question of Bemadotte’s approach, see Louis, British Empire, 540-2. 47. Bemadotte to Shertok, 27 June 1948, Documents, i. 230-4; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 29 June 1948; Ben-Gurion, Restored S tate o f Israel, i. 213-14. 48. Shertok to Eban, 1 July 1948, Documents, i. 246; Eban to Shertok, 2 July 1948, ibid. 250; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 216. 49. On the debate in the cabinet, see minutes of provisional government, iii, ISA; and Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 215-22. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. See Shertok in the Provisional Council of State, 5 July 1948, and cf. Sharett, A t the Gates, 248-9; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 214-15. 53. Shertok to Bemadotte, 5 July 1948, Documents, i. 262-4; Shertok’s talk with Bemadotte, 6 July 1948, ibid. 279-87. 54. On the prolongation of the cease-fire, see Bemadotte to Shertok, 5 July 1948, Documents, i. 265-6; Shertok to Eban, 5 July 1948, ibid. 267; Bemadotte to Shertok, 6 July 1948, ibid. 288-9. 55. Shertok to Eban, 7 July 1948, Documents, i. 292; Shertok’s talks with Bema­ dotte, 7 July 1948, ibid. 295-7; Reedman to Shertok, 9 July 1948, ibid. 305-6,

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and see Shertok in Provisional Council of State, 8 July 1948, ISA, FO, 2446/9; Sharett, A t the Gates , 257-63; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 223-4.

12 Non-Alignment N on- alignment, the international political orientation that became the corner-stone of Israeli foreign policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, was clearly, but almost as if unintentionally, publicly formulated by Shertok during a debate in the Provisional Council of State on 5 July 1948.1 In response to an attack on him triggered by rumours that he boasted of Israel’s intimate ties with the West, Shertok hastened to explain that ‘Israel cannot adopt any slogan [i.e. policy] of an exclusive tie to any particular side. We need the support of both East and West. We are not going to give up our connection with the West, but the foundation of Israel is based on the UN [character and various resolutions].’ In his reference to the UN he wished only to emphasize Israel’s strong inclination to keep a middle-ofthe-road policy between the emerging blocs. Shertok expressed these same ideas when writing to Soviet and American leaders thanking them for their prompt de facto recognition of Israel immediately after 14 May 1948. These, however, were only the first shots in a long drawn-out battle which Shertok would conduct over this matter. On the internal front, like all cabinet members, Shertok could not escape becoming deeply involved in the ‘Generals’ mutiny’ that took place during the first cease-fire. Thus, during June 1948 Ben-Gurion, his acting deputy Israel Galili, the ill ID F chief-of-staff Yaacov Dorf, the chief of operations Yigael Yadin, and other officers and officials, had been engaged in planning the reorganization of the army and the appointment of new senior officers. On 24 June 1948, the brilliant officer and later archeologist Yigael Yadin submitted his plan for such a reorganization. Five days later, BenGurion, who showed a great deal of disdain for Yadin’s scheme, handed to the deputy chief-of-staff, Zvi Ayalon, and to chief of operations, Yadin (the chief-of-staff, Yaacov Dori, was then ill but supported some of Ben-Gurion’s proposals) his counter-proposals for the reorganization. When the two generals had digested this scheme, they implicitly warned the ‘old man’ that there would be a wholesale rejection of his plans by most of the senior officers. »Ben-Gurion was adamant that the acting deputy defence minister, Israel Galili, and the generals should carry out his instructions.

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In the mean time, Ben-Gurion was informed that ‘Yadin and probably somebody else are preparing some obstruction’.2 When, in reaction to Ben-Gurion’s instructions, Galili and a number of senior officers, includ­ ing Ayalon, Yadin, and Ben-Hur, submitted their resignation, BenGurion viewed it ‘as a kind of a political mutiny in the army, and an extremely serious matter [that] may endanger our entire war effort which is a struggle for life and death’.3 On 2 July 1948 Ben-Gurion reported to the government and demanded that the cabinet endorse the firing of Galili, expressing his readiness to testify before a cabinet subcommittee charged with investigating Galili’s and the generals’ opposition to his reorganization plan and their resignations. A subcommittee of five was indeed established, headed by the activist minister of the interior, Gruenbaum, with three moderates—Shertok, Shapira, and Rozen—and another activist Aharon Tzisling of Mapam, who sided with the generals, some of whom had been either members of or identified with this socialist party. Although he had not been appointed chairperson, it soon became evident that Shertok would play a decisive role in this subcom­ mittee and hence in the entire affair. Once the subcommittee began hearing witnesses, it became clear that those testifying not only resented Ben-Gurion’s substantive proposals for reorganization, but especially his autocratic style, the way in which he was administering the country’s defence, and his intention of disbanding Palmah. After a few meetings, it turned out that the majority of the subcommittee members formed the view that Ben-Gurion’s reforms should be shelved and the status quo maintained.4 Shertok knew the brunt of Ben-Gurion’s enmity and vengeance well, nevertheless he stated that, ‘It has turned out that the main subject under discussion is Israel Galili. The latter contributes much to every matter that he undertakes. Moreover, there is a natural inclination to maintain his freedom of action in order to benefit from his future contributions.’5 The report that came out of the cabinet subcom­ mittee presented an evident intention to somewhat shear Ben-Gurion’s authority in the conduct of the war, by proposing the establishment of a war cabinet (which Shertok opposed) and creation of a new position of an associate director general for the Army within the Ministry of Defence. The subcommittee report also stated that neither the minister nor the director general of the defence ministry responsible for the IDF should intervene in professional decisions of the chief of staff or the generals. In fact, Ben-Gurion was also overruled with regard to Galili and the other personal changes that he had proposed. In brief, the subcommittee was inclined to restore and maintain the status quo ante as far as personnel changes were concerned. It is evident that the main

372

Non-Alignment

aims of the majority of the subcommittee were to maintain Ben-Gurion’s position as minister of defence and power, but to prevent him from becoming unduly involved in purely military affairs.6 When Ben-Gurion realized the direction of the subcommittee’s recom­ mentations, his reaction was predictable: he resigned from both his posts as prime minister and minister of defence. When Shertok was asked to persuade the prime minister to withdraw his resignation and accept the subcommittee’s recommendations, he found that, as usual, during acute crises, Ben-Gurion had become extremely ill. Refusing to discuss the substantive matter at hand, the bed-ridden ‘old man’ categorically stated that he had ceased to serve as prime minister and minister of defence, and therefore Shertok should replace him.7 Himself an ambitious politician, as well as a vain person, Shertok did not conceal the fact that he was pleased with his new status of acting prime minister, especially since the crisis augured well for the possibility that such a shift might become more permanent. For, under the impression of the testimonies they had heard in the subcommittee’s meeting on 6 July 1948, some of Shertok’s colleagues on the subcommit­ tee, especially Tzisling of Mapam, tried to persuade him to lead a political ‘coup’ by permanently ejecting Ben-Gurion from the cabinet. Now Shertok was faced with a grave dilemma. Although he might have been tempted to oust Ben-Gurion, the affair had occurred during the war that, for better or worse, Ben-Gurion had conducted. Aware of BenGurion’s possible enraged reactions, and of the catastrophe that the latter’s ejection from the government would bring down upon Mapai vis-à-vis Mapam, Shertok, who was utterly loyal to his party and equally disliked Mapam’s ideology and politics, rejected the idea of such a major political shift as well as far-reaching reforms in the conduct of war. He was therefore quite relieved to learn that on the same day, that is 6 July 1948, Ben-Gurion had realized that this time he had gone too far, and was ready to retreat. Ben-Gurion’s pre-conditions for resuming his political functions were shelving the subcommittee’s proposals, the creation, instead, of a small permanent cabinet committee to oversee the defence system. Since the IDF generals, too, understood the severity of the crisis they had created in one of the war’s critical moments, Yadin went to see the still sick Ben-Gurion at his home, and proposed that overall reorganization of the ID F be postponed and only the new commanders of the various fronts be appointed for the time being. Ben-Gurion agrçed to this compromise. On 7 July 1948 Shertok as acting prime minister chaired the meeting at which the cabinet was expected to approve this informal compromise.

Non-Alignment

373

By allowing Mapam ministers to launch a fierce attack on Ben-Gurion, who was not present, and Mapai members to defend their senior colleague, he turned the issue into a partisan matter. While advocating only minor reforms and advising the cabinet to make a serious effort to pull Ben-Gurion back into politics and into the cabinet, Shertok stated that Ben-Gurion had created and shaped the IDF, and compared him to an enormous volcano, or a bulldozer, that was capable of moving tremendous matters forward but at the same time burning, or de­ stroying, everything in its way.8 On that occasion Shertok preferred to avoid any destruction that he knew Ben-Gurion was capable of, but equally Ben-Gurion’s ejection from the cabinet. When the compromise proposal was put to the vote, six ministers supported Ben-Gurion’s return, appointment of a small committee to supervise the conduct of war, the two Mapam ministers opposed it, and two abstained. Although this did not represent an outstanding victory for Ben-Gurion and his supporters, the cabinet decided to shelve its subcommittee’s recommen­ dations; to establish a permanent defence committee, which was identical in its composition to the subcommittee of five, and on which Shertok maintained of course his place; and to postpone the military appoint­ ments. The ‘old man’ had achieved one of his main goals—he did succeed in ousting Galili, who lost his position in the defence ministry. Because of his ambivalent position vis-à-vis Mapam, Shertok had no great qualms about the departure of this senior leader of this party. At the same time, a loyal Shertok lost a first chance to succeed Ben-Gurion, replace him as prime minister and Mapai’s leader, and create an image not only of an astute politician but also as a tough one. Instead, his image as a hesitant and ‘soft’ politician who was loyal to his senior colleaque was augmented. Yet the new permanent defence cabinet subcommittee, which Shertok supported, became a long-term feature of the Israeli government, and served to constrain Ben-Gurion’s more outrageous activist notions and bloc his wildest plans.9 Politically, although Shertok and the moderates missed an opportunity to grab power, they emerged from this governmental crisis stronger and more influential. Personally, Shertok would not forget Tzisling’s suggestion that he take over the premiership of Israel. Most important, however, when the war was resumed oA the night of 9 July 1948, the ‘generals’ mutiny’ had been diffused and the government crisis was over. Now Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and the rest of the cabinet could turn to the military and political developments that were ahead of them. Alert to the possibility that a new cease-fire might soon be imposed by the UN, Ben-Gurion and Shertok were busy preparing their

374

Non-Alignment

position on such an eventuality. The two were aWare that the powers were interested in putting a halt to the fighting since Israel had already occupied most of the territories allocated to the Jewish state in the 1947 partition plan before the first cease-fire went into effect. In addition, pressures were emanating from the Israeli political élite itself to stop the war before the entire country was taken. Thus the minister of finance, Eliezer Kaplan, who held even more moderate positions than Shertok vis-à-vis the Arabs, and who was aware of Israel’s disastrous economic and financial situation, staunchly argued that the war should be ended as soon as possible. This intervention of the third member of the top leadership ‘trio’ was indicative of a pattern that would continue as economic and financial considerations played an increasing role in determining Israel’s foreign policy. In the case of the war then about to be resumed, these considerations tallied with the wider political views of the moderates. Ben-Gurion, however, feared that a continuation of the cease-fire at that point would mean the end of the war—before the ID F had at least taken Latrun, which had been a thorn in his flesh since the débâcle of the Seventh Brigade a few months earlier, Lydda, Ramie, and the entire Old City of Jerusalem. He was also seeking for a chance to deliver a major blow to Egypt which he had perceived as Israel’s main adversary. One must admit that as far as these targets went, most of the cabinet, including Shertok, supported Ben-Gurion. While all of them agreed that this would represent less than a complete victory, it would constitute a meaningful improvement in Israel’s military and political position and would later warrant calling a halt to the confrontation. In the longer run the compromise that created consensus on these limited goals influenced the conduct of the next stage of the war. Between 8 July 1948, when the first cease-fire ended, and 18 July 1948, which has become known as the ‘Ten-Day Battles’, Ben-Gurion in­ structed the ID F to occupy as much territory as possible around these towns before a permanent truce was declared and the war over. The ‘generals’ mutiny’ notwithstanding, the first cease-fire was properly used by the Israelis for military reorganization and the absorption of new weapons. Hence, this new phase in the 1948 war that lasted for ten days, marked a quantum change in Israel’s capabilities that enabled it to conduct larger military operations aimed at extending Israel’s boun­ daries beyond what had been allocated to the Jewish state by the partition resolution. Thus when hostilities were resumed the ID F was instructed to remove the Egyptian threat to Tel Aviv, to capture the Lydda and Ramie area, to occupy Latrun, to enlarge the corridor to Jerusalem, to launch major operations on the Coastal Plain and in the

Non-Alignment

375

Galilee to remove threats to Jewish settlements. Most of these objectives would be attained. At the time, Aubrey Eban, who would later be known for his moderate views regarding the Arabs and the conflict, maintained a rather hawkish view. From New York, he repeatedly urged Shertok to do whatever possible to impede Bemadotte’s attempts at mediation, and to demonstrate rigidity with regard to Israel’s pre-conditions for the next cease-fire agreement. However, consistent in his attitude, Shertok told Eban that he thought it ‘extremely unwise to immediately reject any possibility for political negotiation at any time’.10 Since an American proposal for a new cease-fire was worded in more favourable terms towards Israel than the first one, he succeeded in persuading not only Eban, but other officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as his colleagues in the Israeli government to accept this ‘line’ that he had held for more than two decades. In this context, Shertok endorsed the formula that Israel would accept a second cease-fire on all fronts, on condition that the Arabs adopted the same terms, and that subsequently the talks with the mediator about a permanent peace would be resumed, but he instructed Eban to oppose any Arab pre-condition that might create undue constraints for Israel, and especially not in the sensitive spheres of an embargo on arms sales to Israel and on Jewish immigra­ tion. On the other hand, he instructed Eban to ‘insist categorically our attitude no question [return of Arab refugees] while war lasts, whose duration includes truce, and after war will depend general settle­ ment’.11 By accepting the American proposal for a cease-fire Shertok and the Israeli government gained Washington’s and world sympathy. When the Arab governments rejected this proposal, the Security Council basically adhered to the American proposal and denounced the Arabs for starting the new round of fighting on 9 July 1948. On 15 July, the Security Council stated that the Arabs had abrogated the first cease-fire, but since the situation in Palestine posed a threat to global peace, the two sides must stop all military activities at a time that would be determined by the mediator. As soon as Bemadotte announced the conditions on 16 July 1948, Shertok exerted pressure on the cabinet to agree to a cessation of the fighting on all fronts, including Jerusalem. Since otfter ministers, including Ben-Gurion, were aware only too well that, despite the ID F’s great achievements and growing image of invincibility, it was over­ extended and needed time for rest, training, reorganization, and the absorbtion of new weapons, Shertok’s position was endorsed by the government without many reservations.

376

Non-Alignment

The agreement between Shertok and Ben-Guriori on the desirability of a second cease-fire did not, however, preclude new clashes over the strategic goals to be attained in the period before it began: Shertok insisted that the IDF should direct its attacks against the Egyptians on the southern front, and not in the Latrun area or on the road to Jerusalem, while Ben-Gurion advocated launching a major attack on the eastern front. Shertok’s rationale for avoiding a fresh offensive on the eastern front was that instead it would be both feasible and beneficial to renew negotiations with King Abdullah regarding a long-term under­ standing, and that a major operation on the southern front would save the Negev, which he cherished no less than Ben-Gurion. Although Ben-Gurion repeated his view that the king was just a lackey of the British and lacked autonomous power, and that extending Israel’s borders on that front would provide greater security to Jerusalem, Shertok’s view prevailed, and the Israeli army did not launch an offensive against Transjordan.12 When the second cease-fire was announced on 18 July 1948, the Arabs, who finished that round bleeding heavily, abided unwillingly. The preceding ten days of intensive offensives had resulted in the addition of another thousand square kilometres—which had not been allocated to Israel, but which removed the immediate threat to the metropolitan area of Tel Aviv.' In one of the more famous operations within that offensive Lydda and Ramie were captured, and the Arabs there driven out of their homes despite the explicit protests of Shertok and moderates such as the minister of minorities, Bechor Shitrit. The corridor connecting the Coastal Plain and Jerusalem was extended during those few days, as was the Jewish area in the Sharon and the Galilee, including the occupation of Nazareth. Finally, the Egyptian army suffered heavy casualties as the IDF extended its control in the northern Negev. These additional military conquests created a certain political relief. Moreover, the Arabs’ definite rejection of all calls for a new cease-fire, the diminished British capability of supporting them, and the approach­ ing elections in the United States, which meant the administration’s greater susceptibility to Jewish pressure, and not less the sheer weight of Israel’s military successes, added to the Israelis’ growing sense of security and self-confidence. Internally, these victories enhanced the political power and prestige of Ben-Gurion and his activist camp. Although like everybody else Shertok and his moderate colleagues rejoiced in these spectacular conquests, it did not escape them that with Ben-Gurion’s growing popularity they were losing political ground. It also did not escape Shertok and his colleagues that the effort to be accepted as a UN

Non-Alignment

377

member still had to be won. This was an important issue in view of Shertok’s, and Ben-Gurion’s, similar assessment that when the war ended, the U N ’s role in hammering out a political solution would be substantially enhanced.13 Four days after the beginning of the second cease-fire, Bemadotte informed Shertok that UN observers had been redeployed on all the new fronts. This new lull in the war prompted Shertok to re-evaluate Israel’s strategic and tactical positions. He maintained that concurring with the cease-fire demonstrated Israel’s goodwill towards the UN and the powers while being able to consolidate its conquests during the ten days of fighting and subsequently to exhibit its self-confidence and determination to hold on to these territories. According to him, the decisive reason for accepting the cease-fire had been Israel’s international considerations. For, while Shertok, like Ben-Gurion, was convinced that the war was still not over and the second cease-fire was merely yet another phase in this same war, he also held that the political campaign for Israel’s legitimacy had not been won. At a special meeting of the Mapai Central Committee on 24 July 1948, Shertok’s first major, and highly controversial, point was that Israel’s existence and position were determined by a combination of the UN resolution of 29 November 1947, and its military victories—two assump­ tions that would become the corner-stones of Shertok’s line. By empha­ sizing these two bases of Israel’s sovereignty and legitimacy, Shertok was underlining his and his officials’ contribution to the establishment of the Jewish state. At the same time, however, it was an essential element in his campaign against activism and its great prophet, Ben-Gurion. In his report to the Mapai Central Committee, Shertok frankly stated that while the first cease-fire had been decreed to prevent the spread of the war to the entire territory and to protect Israel, the second was aimed at containing the war while Israel was making military advances. The initiative for this cessation of military operations also meant a further demonstration of British weakness in the region, for it was caused by Britain’s tense relations with the USA, its profound disagreements with various Arab governments, and the great losses in British weapons and equipment which had been supplied to the Arabs. However, he re­ emphasized, it had also won Israel a markedly better position in the eyes of the USA, especially with regard to the fact that American troops were not implicated in the fighting, and to a growing American recognition of Israel’s military capability. Turning from strategy and high politics, Shertok then outlined Israel’s two immediate political problems: membership in the UN, which had

378

Non-Alignment

become quite significant in view of Bemadotte’s activities and increased UN involvement in the area; and relations with Great Britain, especially in view of the question of the Haifa Refineries, the Jewish refugees still being held in Cyprus, and the Yishuv’s considerable financial reserves frozen in British banks14 On various occasions during the second cease-fire, as in his anlaysis of the situation presented to the Provisional Council, to the Mapai Central Committee, and in a very detailed letter to Weizmann, Shertok turned to more objective human issues, such as the Arabs’ right of return to their lands and homes, an issue which he—unlike many other Israeli leaders—regarded as essential because of its humanitarian and ethical dimensions, because Israel’s intransigence in this respect might serve as a rallying point around which its enemies could unite, and, last but not least, also because the American government showed great interest in the matter. It should be noted that already at that early juncture he was modifying his initial rigid views in this sphere. In his letter to Weizmann he expressed his most ‘hawkish’ position at the time: With regard to the refugees, we are determined to be adamant while the war lasts. Once the return starts, it will be impossible to stem it, and it will prove our undoing. As for the future, we are equally determined—without, for the time being, formally closing the door to any eventuality—to explore all possibilities of getting rid, once and for all, of the huge Arab minority which originally threatened us. What can be achieved in this period of storm and stress will be quite unattainable once conditions get stabilized. A group of people from among our senior officials has already started working on the study of resettlement possibilities in other lands and of the finances necessary. W hat such permanent settlement of ‘Israeli’ Arabs in the neighboring territories will mean in terms of making surplus land available in Israel for the settlement of our people requires no emphasis. As so often in the past, we are helped in this matter by the Mufti’s intransigence: he is dead against the return while the State of Israel stands, and has made out a very strong case in support of his policy.15

In his other two presentations his attitude was milder. In these he was linking this crucial and sensitive problem with general, and preferably direct, negotiations with the Arabs. Shertok attempted to clarify his view of Israel’s goals in this respect again in the form of a double-edged formula: The question is whether it is desirable that the Arabs return? Even if their return is undesirable, this does not mean that we must tie our hands by adopting a negative position ôn the return of any Arab. Rather it means that we should do everything possible to prevent their general return, [even if this means that] we

Non-Alignment

379

are not able to prevent every Arab from returning. . . On the other hand, if their return is desirable, that does not mean that we will welcome the return of all of them.16 It meant that Shertok, who opposed mass return of Arab refugees, insisted that the government should adopt his flexible double-edged formula in order to facilitate a political solution through peaceful means. He also insisted that if both sides were interested to maintain stable and enduring peaceful relations, the prevention of a mass return by the Arabs had to benefit both the Palestinians, Israel, and the Arab countries. It was a reflection of his staunch belief that the two com­ munities could not live together within the framework of one unitary state—a belief which he had adopted more than a decade before the establishment of the Jewish state, that is, during the Peel Commission’s exploration of the partition idea. In this he opposed any formula of a bi-national solution, then still advocated by some of Mapam’s leaders. In addition to his outrage at Mapam’s split from Mapai and their pronounced pro-Soviet posture, this was the main factor in determining his enmity towards this ‘sister party’ of Mapai. Moreover, Shertok, who excelled in systemic and systematic political analysis, firmly believed that the Arab refugee problem must be tackled to ‘avoid continued complications and the root causes for intervention in our internal affairs’. Moreover, he insisted that ‘the solution of the problem of the Oriental Jewish communities, particularly those com­ munities in Arab countries’, must be part of the entire settlement.17 To him this was an issue that Israel must put on the agenda of any conference with the Arabs about a permanent peace. In the same vein, since the Arab exodus and possible return was inseparably linked with the fundamental issue of Israel’s borders and their possible modification, and since the Arabs were still far from recognizing Israel and its borders, the issue should be postponed until peace was closer. Practically, he did not object to a discussion of these issues during the second cease-fire, but strongly maintained that any solution should be implemented only after negotiations about a stable peace. Finally, these positions should be kept secret; he even did not disclosed his actual position to Weizmann with whom he was mending fences. ; The next significant issue on Shertok’s agenda was that of Jerusalem. Here too he distinguished between the shorter and the longer term. He disclosed the government’s next step to the Mapai Central Committee: ‘To announce that those sections of the city held by Israel constitute a conquered area, that is, that we will not proclaim their annexation.

380

Non-Alignment

[From this] it should be clear that we are not declaring Israeli sover­ eignty over Jerusalem, [but] only Israeli authority over these parts of the city.’18 Thus in Une with his traditional philosophy of refraining from discarding any political or military options, his short-run position (due to ‘the city’s geopolitical conditions as a city surrounded by Arab territory’, as well as the stiff opposition from the Vatican and the great powers) was to postpone the demilitarization of Jerusalem; for the long run, he proposed a retreat from traditional Jewish support of interna­ tionalization. As Shertok had further refined his thoughts on these issues, he presented them before the Provisional Council of State on 29 July 1948. On that occasion, in addition to outlining the formal Israeli positions he had secretly presented at the Mapai Central Committee, he declared that the government would not tolerate any restrictions on Jewish immigration to Israel, and then turned to the thorny issue of Arab refugees: There is no doubt that we are confronted with a very severe human problem. From humanitarian and political points of views we cannot disregard the issue and we cannot be oblivious to the suffering [of the Palestinians]. Yet human experience—the historical experience of previous periods as well as of recent years—clearly shows that any separation between the human and other issues, any attempt to deal with it out of context and to deal with it as just a human issue, without considering its very severe political, economic, and military implications—not only hardly deni­ grates those critical considerations but it also misses its purpose—that is, it does not achieve the alleviation of human suffering. In reality these issues cannot be separated or simplified. If we are looking for a concrete and positive solution, one must squarely face the problem with all its complexity and nuances.

His conclusion was also clear: As long as the war continues, Arab refugees will not be allowed to return . . . their future is an open question which requires a positive solution . . . a solution which can only be attained when we and all relevant Arab factors sit around the negotiating table to discuss the specifics of a peace agreement and the arrange­ ment of our relations in the future.

As to Jerusalem, ‘The government views it as an open issue, and we will consider all plans and all proposals from this point of view. If we decide to demand annexation of the Jewish part of Jerusalem to Israel, we shall do so without being constrained by any limitations that we undertook without [first] considering its full consequences.’ Then he repeated his known view that under no circumstances should the old city be internationalized in the near future.

Non-Alignment

381

Turning to UN mediation, Shertok asserted that, ‘The problem that should concern us is peace and not mediation . . . We do not distrust the mediator as a person, we only oppose mediation in which the target is a [further] compromise between one we have already accepted [the parti­ tion plan] and the rigid extremist position of the other side.’ He then gave formal expression to the basic principle that, ‘The War of Inde­ pendence modifies the borders of the partition plan’, a situation, he added, that he regarded Arab intransigence was responsible for. None the less, he concluded, ‘It is our duty and in our interest not only to demand that the Arabs show responsibility and lawful behaviour, but also to call urgently for peace.’19 Shertok did indeed pursue any and every potential path towards peace with the Arabs, including, for example, Eliahu Epstein’s (incorrect) contention—based on information from his friend Hafez Afifi, an Egyptian economist and politician who was then president of the al-Misr Bank—that Egypt had no expansionist intentions in the Negev and that it was interested only in ejecting the British from the region. Thus foreign office officials established in Paris a ‘centre’ whose task was to encourage direct talks and contacts with Arab states.20 Shertok was not only checking out political initiatives with regard to Egypt. He instructed his senior aides, Walter Eytan, the director general of his ministery, and his personal adviser, Leo Kohn, to prepare a ‘grand diplomatic offensive’ that would redefine all Israel’s foreign-policy con­ cepts, which would indicate that Israel was no longer content to ‘hide under the U N ’s wings, and feel secure as long as we did not clash with that organization’.21 Taking such an initiative at this particular juncture, before the end of the war, required political courage, since it involved re-examining previsously held vague formulations in favour of a more succinct definition of Israeli national goals and interests, including its borders. While—unfortunately for Shertok, and Israel—it would turn out that the rest of the political élite did not have the courage to follow him in this effort, the ideas generated by Shertok and his aides formed the basis upon which he would call upon the Arab states, through the good offices of the UN mediator, to begin direct peace negotiations with Israel.22 ^ Since he was convinced that peace with the Arab countries hinged on improving the lot of the Arabs who had remained within Israel and showing sensitivity to their predicament and needs, Shertok instructed Leo Kohn to prepare recommendations with this guide-line in mind. Kohn’s main suggestion was that, first and foremost, Israel must make concrete efforts to integrate Israeli Arabs into all of its social and

382

Non-Alignment

political institutions. Though this was not completely altruistic (for it included the argument that satisfied Israeli Arabs might object to the return of their brethren), they were not totally devoid of genuine concern for that frightened community. With this in mind Shertok approached the minister for minorities, Bechor Shitrit, with the proposal that ‘any arrangement for an internal government for Arab citizens in the occu­ pied territories [sic] . .. should depend on those leaders and groups who have co-operated with us in the past’, and with the instruction that, ‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will determine the political line in all these matters’. But it was in the next point that he made to Shitrit that Shertok frankly showed his move towards an even more distinctly dovelike and startling position with regard to the Arabs: ‘Although we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the Arab part of Palestine West of the Jordan River will be annexed to Transjordan, we must prefer the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in Western Eretz Israel.’23 In this, Shertok undoubtedly preceded many of his colleagues in Mapai and in the Israeli polity in general. Shertok was not just preaching this gospel, he endeavoured to imple­ ment his ideas. Taking advantage of the lull in the war, in early August 1948 he seriously planned and implemented the ‘major peace offensive’ that his ministry had prepared. He and his assistants recalled Eliahu Sasson to Jerusalem from Paris, where the veteran hand in Arab affairs (and later director of the Middle Eastern Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and two of his own assistants, Zalman ZeliksohnDivon and Tuvia Arazi, were attempting to resume their multiple direct talks and contacts with Arab leaders. Sasson had already been able to re-establish contact with Transjordan’s ambassador in London, Amir Abdul Majid Haidar. Shertok now instructed Sasson to communicate directly to King Abdullah himself that, basically, Israel had lost faith in him and in his intentions because of his invasion into territory that had been allotted to the Jewish state; that in any case Israel might prefer an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank; but that Israel was still prepared to negotiate peace directly with the king and his government, and to support Transjordan’s efforts to join the UN, under the following conditions: Transjordanian recognition of the 1947 partition borders with substantial modifications in return for Israel’s consent to the king’s annexation of the rest of the territories to Transjordan, agreement to settling Palestinians in Transjordan, negotiations towards Israeli-Transjordanian economic co-operation, West Jerusalem to remain in Israeli hands, East Jerusalem to be held by the Transjordanians and the old city

Non-Alignment

383

jointly with an international umpire, and mutual management of Dead Sea concessions by both governments. It is easy to detect the similarity between these proposals and the main arrangements which would later be adopted and maintained until 1967.24 Shertok was not content with this initiative towards Abdullah. Re­ sponding to a query from Sasson in Paris, who dedicated most of his efforts there to re-establishing contacts with Abdullah, Shertok in­ structed the small delegation of Arab-affairs experts in Paris to attempt simultaneous contacts also with other Arab governments and especially Egypt. In various interviews he gave in early August 1948, Shertok established one of the main lines of argument in regard to these contacts with Arab representatives, that is, Israel’s readiness to promote econ­ omic co-operation with the neighbouring countries. In addition to his proposals about economic co-operation, Shertok began to indicate that Israel might agree to making Haifa a free port, and allowing Arab countries, especially Transjordan, free access as had been suggested by Bemadotte. This was not totally altruistic, but was a counter-proposal to the mediator’s suggestion to internationalize that port.25 Shertok and his ambassadors and consuls—as noted, all of them hand-picked by the minister himself—also found time during the second cease-fire to meet Israeli businessmen with contacts in Italy, to encour­ age them to pursue contacts with the Vatican in the hope that this might contribute to an improvement in Israel’s relations with the Holy See. These contacts were made as part of his attempt to find a peaceful solution to the entire Palestine problem, since Shertok regarded the Vatican as an important actor especially in regard to Jerusalem but also as a possible channel to Arab governments. N or did Shertok fail to continue to nurture Israel’s relations with the Soviet Union. Since the American ambassador designate, James Mc­ Donald, was already on his way to Israel, and the Soviets had not moved in regard to appointing their own ambassador to Israel, he instructed Epstein to initiate a series of talks with the Soviets in Washington to expedite a similar move on their part. Equally, he was extremely satisfied with what Mordechai Namirovsky-Namir had accomplished during a visit to Bucharest, especially in the latter’s meetings with Romania’s Jewish foreign minister, Anna Pauker, who had facilitated Ihe purchase of Romanian oil, which Israel needed desperately, and with what the Communists called the ‘repatriation’ of 5,000 Romanian Jews per month to Israel. On the basis of this initial agreement, including a handsome ransom for each immigrant, during the next few years Romania would become a significant source of immigration to Israel.26

384

Non-Alignment

Although Shertok welcomed the protracted cease-fire because it gave him and his officials in Tel Aviv the time to promote all these diplomatic initiatives, this was not the case with all Israeli politicians, especially Ben-Gurion—who hoped that it would last only until the end of August or the beginning of September 1948. He insisted that, ‘If the invading Arab armies do not withdraw by then, we are going to drive them out [of Palestine]’. Since Ben-Gurion did not hide his sentiments on the subject, repeating them on several occasions in closed fora, it was no surprise that someone leaked it to the press and it gained substantial publicity. Shertok too—although not in public—‘subscribed to the prime minister’s view that if this cease-fire were to continue indefinitely, it would become an enormous burden from the political, military and financial points of view’. But unlike the prime minister, Shertok believed that it was in Israel’s best interest to end the cease-fire in order to ‘move things towards any conclusion, either political or military’. Therefore he suggested that, rather than issuing an ultimatum about the date of termination of the cease-fire, Israel should mentionxjts desire for its end from time to time, along with its demand that all Arab troops evacuate the territory, while ensuring Israeli capacity for massive retaliation. As on other occasions during that period, the cabinet accepted Shertok’s suggestion.27 In accordance with the Cabinet’s decision, rather than calling for the end of the second cease-fire, Shertok did state publicly only that Israel would not hesitate to retaliate if Egypt broke the cease-fire in the Negev. Such Egyptian action should have also been the pretext for a resumption of the war.28 Shertok’s statement on the Negev implied a profound change in Israel’s war goals, which had been approved by the cabinet on 2 August 1948. In consequence of an agreement between the prime minister, the foreign minister, and generals Yigael Yadin and Yigal Allon, then commander of the southern front, the Negev and parts of Sinai were to become Israel’s next major target. This new policy represented a victory for the Shertok line, which advocated that Israel should refrain from occupying the West Bank, and leave the door open for negotiations with Abdullah or with the Palestinians, but was very costly to him in the long run.29 After the Israeli government’s simultaneous decision of 1 August 1948 to launch a ‘peace offensive’ had been communicated in writing to the mediator, it gained a great deal of publicity in the international press, and won Israel additional sympathy especially in Washington. However, first King Abdullah, then Egypt, then the Palestinians, and after that the other Arab governments, rejected the Israeli initiative. Abdullah indi-

Non-Alignment

385

cated that his was rather a postponement because of the leak of these negotiations.30 Most cabinet members, who deep in their hearts hoped for another chance to extend the boundaries of the Jewish state, rejected UN and American proposals for a partial agreement with the Arabs. At that stage, unwillingly and only as a result of the negative Arab position, Shertok supported this political and military stance, which among other things meant that he also supported annexing West Jerusalem to Israel. Under his influence, Bernard (Dov) Joseph-Yosef, who had been the legal adviser and Shertok’s senior aide in the Jewish Agency Political Department, was appointed military governor of Jerusalem. Moreover, since the proposals for the reorganization of Israel’s rule in Jerusalem had emerged out of Shertok’s talks with Count Bemadotte, he was deeply involved in shaping all political and administrative arrangements there. Among other things, he insisted on dismantling Irgun and LHI separate units in Jerusalem and stopping their dissident political acti­ vities there.31 As a senior partner in the process of shaping Israel’s defence and foreign orientation, as well as the government’s main spokesman on these matters, it was also up to him to present the government position at the first convention of the Mapai World Union, held in mid-August 1948. It was on that occasion that he formulated what he perceived as two additional indispensable principles of Israel’s orientation in the international sphere—the first concerning the direct link between defence and foreign affairs, and the second in regard to Israel’s non-alignment posture. Regarding the first issue, he conceded that, since Israel was still at a crucial stage of nation-building, during which military operations were more essential than diplomatic campaigns, Israel’s foreign policy must cater ‘primarily to our daily and hourly needs’, and therefore ‘For the time being . . . the most important tasks of our foreign policy are to serve defence policy, to serve the war effort, to help us attain a victory’. But he was emphatic that this should be the case only ‘as long as the ultimate victory is still far away, and the revival and existence of our state depends on such a military victory’.32 It indicated that Shertok had recognized only the temporary predominance of the .Ministry of Defence, but felt that foreign policy should precede defehce after the victory had been achieved and the war ended. This position would become the cause of some additional major clashes between Shertok and Ben-Gurion. Similarly, as the politician who shaped Israel’s non-alignment posture, which would dominate the Jewish state’s foreign policy during the first

386

Non-Alignment

few years after independence, Shertok called for the avoidance of any policy which might hinder obtaining aid from both superpowers or which would cut off contacts with any segment of Diaspora Jewry. ‘Therefore/ he said, ‘when we declare that our international policy is primarily based on Israel’s connection with the UN, it is not an empty slogan. And when we dispatch envoys to the United States and to the Soviet Union it does not mean that we are joining one camp or another.’ Calling upon US and Soviet leaders to accept, sympathize with, and respect Israel’s non-alignment, Shertok concluded his presentation at the Mapai World Union by saying that ‘Non-alignment is not an easy posture. But we have no other alternative. This is the only posture that we can adopt also out of a sense of responsibility for the Jewish people. Any other posture will include suicidal elements.’33 On the following day all Israeli newspapers carried huge headlines stating that Israel would remain non-aligned. Willingly, or unwillingly, BenGurion agreed with this policy, which Shertok had been nurturing for some time. As if to buttress Shertok’s point, Yakov Malik, the new Soviet envoy to the UN, told his Israeli counterpart Eban that the Soviet Union had approved the military assistance being given to Israel by Eastern bloc states and the economic and commercial ties because it served Soviet interests. Indicating that the Soviets would continue to support Israel, but did not intend to turn it into a Soviet satellite, Malik stated that Israel’s desire to consolidate relations with the West, especially with the USA, was in Soviet interests. As if to approve the three-sided tacit agreement that Israel could pursue its non-alignment orientation, the American and Soviet envoys submitted their credentials within a few days of each other.34 Encouraged by the superpowers’ tacit acceptance of Israel’s non-aligned position, Shertok was determined to extract the utmost from it. In the Israeli case, non-alignment had yet another significant source— the Jewish state’s ‘special relations’ with the Diaspora. Unlike many of his colleagues in the cabinet, and especially unlike Ben-Gurion, Shertok strongly believed in the imperative need of maintaining intimate contacts with these segments of the Jewish people. Thus in the first meeting of the Zionist Actions Committee after the establishment of Israel, Shertok declared that Israel’s isolation, the international imbroglio that had been created as a result of the establishment of the state, the ongoing war, the fact that Palestine was sacred to three religions, and, most importantly, the fact that millions of Jews were scattered around the world, all determined the need for Israel’s special sensitivity to its connections with

Non-Alignment

387

the world. These factors have converged in delineating Israel’s main road in foreign affairs, this is a middle road without preference for either side but not out of a negative attitude towards either side.35 Shertok’s deep and persistent intellectual and emotional involvement in the search for a political solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict created an impetus of its own. Thus in mid-August 1948, having promoted the peace initiative and established contact with the Arab governments, he stood up against Ben-Gurion’s desire to terminate the cease-fire and thereby continue the drive to extend Israel’s borders. Shertok intended to prolong the cease-fire and link it to peace talks with the Arabs. Hence on 16 August 1948 he instructed Epstein to seek a meeting with Truman to request the president’s help in persuading the Arab rulers to sit down and negotiate with Israel if they did not want the war to be resumed.36 Not entirely surprisingly, this initiative eventually brought some en­ couraging positive results: after a short while, the Belgian consul general in Jerusalem informed Shertok that, partly as a result of American presentations and partly after his own considerations, King Abdullah had indicated interest in resuming talks about a political solution. However, like most secret Israeli contacts with Arab governments, this too was leaked to the press. Greatly perturbed by the leak, Abdullah relegated the task of talking with Israel to his representatives in Paris. The king also issued a message to Shertok that the road towards effective negotiations would be a long and arduous one, and the Transjordanian representatives in Paris suggested to Sasson that since like Shertok, who had to fortify his flanks against attacks coming from Israeli activists, the king had to protect his flanks against the Arab League members, the talks would be slow and could be resumed only at the annual session of the UN General Assembly which was scheduled to be held in Paris in September 1948. Here it should be remembered that Bemadotte also was expected to submit his initial report during that session.37 To prepare for this meeting of the General Assembly in Paris was Shertok’s next major mission. This time the preparations were compli­ cated by Bemadotte’s first report on the situation in Palestine and the US position. In spite of Truman’s personal promise that the USA would change its course, the State Department was still basically pife-Arab, and Truman no longer felt compelled actively to placate American Jews, since the Republicans and Democrats had agreed to eliminate the Arab-Israeli conflict as an issue in the forthcoming electoral campaign. Shertok also became aware that there had occurred a negative swing in American public opinion and that it had begun to view Israel as

388

Non-Alignment

aggressive since it had broken the cease-fire several times, especially along the Egyptian front, and its government had gone public with its ‘no-return until peace policy’ regarding the Palestinians who had been expelled from, or fled Palestine. Above all, he calculated that worsening American-Soviet relations, especially against the backdrop of the 1948 Berlin crisis, might induce the USA to impose an even-handed solution to the Palestine problem, and at best to impose the continuation of the cease-fire. Consequently, because of these expected difficulties, Shertok was urged to participate at the General Assembly session in Paris. This idea was strongly supported by the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, who promised that he would accord Shertok the status of ‘foreign minister of a non-member state’. Although the main reason for Shertok’s attendance would be to signal to the Arabs that the time had come seriously to negotiate with Israel about peace, he thought that his personal participation would also enhance the ability of the Israeli delegation to take some tough political decisions on the spot. Apparently he also wanted to bask in the limelight of that august body.38 Shertok’s assessment of the American position was accurate; the proposals submitted to Shertok by American envoy to Israel, James McDonald,s confirmed that Marshall and the State Department still predominated in policy-making towards Israel and the Middle East, and that the USA was continuously in touch with Britain on all aspects of the Palestine problem.39 In a second meeting held two days later, McDonald conveyed to Shertok and Ben-Gurion that the Americans were preparing a draft resolution on the exchange of territories captured by Israel and Transjordan, the internationalization of Jerusalem, and the improvement of the situation of the Palestinian refugees in neighbouring Arab countries. The two experienced Israeli leaders, in turn, hoped to discourage the Americans from raising the question of boundaries, and hinted at the possibility that they would be flexible with regard to the solution of the Arab refugees problem.40 When the activists in the cabinet attacked this moderate position, Ben-Gurion told them that the response to the American proposals ‘was determined by the fact that for many weeks we were unable to reach any coherent collective conclusion’,41 a response which both reflected the process in which decisions were taken in view of the balance between activists and moderates in the government, and expressed implicit criticism of the predominance of Shertok’s line in the cabinet that dictated his agreement to these moves.

Non-Alignment

389

Unlike his cautious compromise response to the American proposals, when he met with Bemadotte, who was then preparing his report for the UN, an angry Shertok said that the defeated Arabs were trying to use the cease-fire to facilitate political achievements, and made it absolutely clear that ‘Israel would not relinquish any of its basic principles in regard to borders, sovereignty, or Jewish immigration’. Shertok’s rigid position on the one hand, and the Arabs’ unwillingness to deal with his proposals on the other, led the mediator to state that he would resign if no decisive action in regard to the continuation of the cease-fire and moves toward peace were be achieved at the Paris UN meeting.42 The delicacy of the issues involved persuaded Shertok that he must go to Paris. Probably because he hoped it would kill Shertok’s mission, Ben-Gurion was reluctant to hold a cabinet discussion on Israel’s position in the General Assembly before Shertok left for Paris. Shertok, however, insisted on a cabinet meeting devoted to the strategy he would employ at the Assem­ bly. In a document circulated to cabinet members he proposed that Israel should participate only if accorded official status, that Israel’s request for UN membership be presented there, and that he would demand the termination of Beraadotte’s mission and its replacement by bilateral negotiations with the Arabs. Although Shertok said that he would try to prevent a discussion on borders, he also proposed demand­ ing territorial exchanges if the subject were raised, and recognition of the annexation of West Jerusalem, as well as the entire Galilee and Jaffa, to Israel if the internationalization of the city were to prove impossible, and finally reiteration of Israel’s official position concerning the refugees, namely that it would be discussed only within the framework of general peace talks. On 12 September 1948, the cabinet approved all Shertok’s proposals, except the one in which he suggested that as a result of peace negotiations Israel should be ready to render a small part of West Jerusalem to the Arabs on the condition that for a certain period Jerusalem would not serve as the capital of either state. However, when he insisted that this was necessary if the cabinet wished to avoid the internationalization of the entire city, and after an additional debate, the cabinet approved this move on 20 September.43 The approved pro­ gramme for his activities in Paris again showed Shertok’s and the moderate camp’s power in the cabinet. * While the cabinet and Shertok took a strong political stance towards Bemadotte, there were small segments of Israeli society that were actively hostile towards the mediator and his mission, partly since he had been secretly co-ordinating his moves with the British and the Amer­ icans. As a result of this co-ordination he dropped the economic

390

Non-Alignment

unification between Israel and Transjordan and the annexation of Jerusalem to the Arab state, but included the internationalization of Jerusalem and the annexation of the southern part of the Negev to Egypt in the report that he signed in Rhodes on 16 September 1948, just one day before travelling to the Middle East for talks with the regional governments. Bemadotte’s trip to Jerusalem to discuss his plan with the Israeli government ended in tragedy. On 17 September 1948, while he was on his way to a meeting with Bernard Joseph, the Israeli Governor of Jerusalem, at the West Jerusalem YMCA, an unidentified jeep blocked the Count’s small convoy, and three men dressed in khakis got out, one of whom approached the Count’s car and shot Bemadotte and Colonel Serot who accompanied him. The Frenchman died immediately, and Bemadotte died of his wounds two days later, on 19 September. After an all-out hunt for the perpetrators on the part of an embarrassed Israeli government, a fanatic faction of the Stem Gang, led by Yitzhak Yezemizky-Shamir, later Israel’s prime minister, was found to be responsible for the assassination. Ben-Gurion’s immediate reaction was: ‘Amest all LHI members!’ This ‘catastrophe’, as Ben-Gurion referred to the assassination, served as the pretext that the government had sought for disbanding all separate Irgun and LHI units in the IDF. During the deliberatiohs on this move, Shertok staunchly supported action against the dissidents. But the damage had already been done. For in the wake of this assassination, the Bemadotte report became a will and testament that his assistants, particularly his depty, Ralph Bunche, vowed to see through. Although Shertok had been against allowing Irgun and LHI members to fight side by side with regular IDF soldiers, and now disassociated the government from the brutal murder, he knew that the demise of Bemadotte would serve to benefit Israel in the long run; for the effects of the ‘sacred testament’ of the dead mediator were rather minimal in comparison with what a person of Count Bemadotte’s calibre and stature could have accomplished if he had lived.44 Bernadotte’s recommendations, which were published posthumously, were welcomed by the British, Americans, and French, but flatly rejected by the Arabs. As to Israel, the discussions about a proper reaction led to yet another new controversy between Ben-Gurion and Shertok. For, in his usual wishful manner, Ben-Gurion said that if Bemadotte’s report were disregarded it would eventually be forgotten. On the other hand, Shertok insisted that there was an urgent need to react to the report lest Israel’s silence be interpreted as acceptance. Yet once again, it was

Non-Alignment

391

Shertok’s position that was adopted by the cabinet. Consequently, an Israeli spokesman stated that the government was extremely critical of most of the recommendations, but admitted that there were also some positive elements in the Bemadotte plan.45 Shertok did not, however, let his criticism of several of Bemadotte’s proposals keep him from pur­ suing a dialogue with the Arabs, especially with Egypt. In this vein he instructed the Israeli envoy to Paris, Eliahu Sasson, to conduct secret meetings with the Egyptian envoy, Kamal Riad, and present Israel’s suggestions for a separate but comprehensive peace with Egypt in accordance with Shertok’s guide-lines. The draft of the peace treaty that Sasson prepared before these talks and submitted to his Egyptian counterpart contained proposed Israeli guarantees for such a peace as well as for Israel’s non-identification with the Soviet Union, which had been regarded as anathema to the Egyptians. After blaming the war in the Middle East on the British, and admitting that the Arab League had been divided and found it difficult to formulate a unified position on the war and the fate of Palestine (the two Hashemite kingdoms, Iraq and Transjordan, demanded the annexation of the Arab part to Transjordan, and the rest of the member states demanded the establishment of an independent Arab Palestinian state), Riad promised to submit the draft to his government and an early reply.46 During the relative lull in his political activities at the international level, Shertok turned to some controversial internal issues such as the role of religious courts in Israel, the status of the Israeli Arabs, the approaching general elections, and Chaim Weizmann’s nomination as president of the new state. Although his old colleague and former patron had been hostile towards Shertok for some time, on his part, Shertok was still loyal to his ‘dear chief’. Weizmann was expected in Israel towards the end of September 1948, at which time he was to assume the largely ceremonial presidency of the Provisional Council of State. During a working lunch at which the four Mapai ministers—BenGurion, Shertok, Kaplan, and Remez—were discussing Weizmann’s future tasks, it was Shertok who suggested that he should be honoured by being nominated as the first president of Israel. As expected, Ben-Gurion strongly objected to Shertok’s proposal, ‘since Weizmann will be a burden on the government, since life in cabinet is rfot easy even without him, and since before the general elections, I don’t want to create a situation in which such a nomination would open up a new debate’.47 However, during the same meeting of the four, the adamant Shertok persisted until his old colleague and patron was accorded the honour that he felt he amply deserved. In retrospect, it is clear that,

392

Non-Alignment

without his intervention, Weizmann’s nomination as president would not have materialized. This last issue, however, only exacerbated the hostility between Mapai’s two most senior leaders. Hence in September 1948 each was deeply absorbed in his own activities: Ben-Gurion in trying to resume the war; Shertok preparing for his trip to Paris, where he would try to counter the mediator’s plan and promote talks about peace.

NOTES 1. Shertok in Provisional Council of State, 5 July 1948, ISA, FM, 2446/9; Palestine Post, 30 July 1948. 2. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 804. 3. Ibid. 805. 4. Ibid. 807; minutes of provisional government, iv, 2 July 1948, ISA. 5. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 808. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 808-10; minutes of provisional government, iv, 7 July 1948, ISA. 8. Ibid.; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 811. 9. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 812-13. 10. Eban to Shertok, 12 July 1948, Documents, i. 327; Shertok to Eban, 13 July 1948, ibid. 326. 11. Shertok to Eban, 13 July 1948, Documents, i. 329; Shertok to Eban, 14 July 1948, ibid. 330; the quote is from Shertok to Eban, 15 July 1948, ibid. 334; minutes of provisional government, v, 14 July 1948, ISA; Eban, M emoirs, i. 120-1. 12. Shertok to Trygve Lei, 16 July 1948, Documents, i. 330-9; on the Arabs’ pre-conditions for the cease-fire, see Comay to Shertok, 19 July 1948, ibid. 353; on the UN resolution, ibid. 669-70; see Bemadotte’s memorandum, 20 July 1948, ibid. 361-2; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 233-8. 13. See e.g. Shertok to Weizmann, 20 July 1948, Documents, i. 368; Eban to Weizmann, ibid., 10 July 1948, 312-17; Epstein to Shertok, 11 July 1948, ibid. 317-18; Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 24 July 1948, CZA, A245/391. 14. U. Bialer, Sterling Balances and Gaims Negotiations: Britain and Israel, 1947-1992, M iddle Eastern Studies, 28/1 (1992). 15. Shertok to Weizmann, 20 July/22 Aug. 1948, Documents, i. 363-72. 16. Shertok in Mapai Central Committee, 24 July 1948, CZA, A245/391. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. All quotes are from Shertok’s speech in Provisional Council of State, 29 July 1948, as quoted in Sharett, A t the Gates, 264-79. 20. Epstein to Shertok, 22 July 1948, Documents, i. 383-4; Shertok in cabinet, minutes of provisional government, vi, 1 Aug. 1948, ISA. 21. Walter Eytan’s memo submitted to Shertok, 28 July 1948, Documents , i. 423-4; Leo Kohn’s comments on an earlier version of this memo, 27 July 1948, ibid.

Non-Alignment

22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28.

29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43.

393

415-16; and see the protocols of Shertok’s talk with Bemadotte, 5 Aug. 1948, ibid. 465-87. Shlaim, Collusion, 280. Shertok to Shitrit, 8 Aug. 1948, Documents , i. 498. Sasson to Shimoni, 3 Aug. 1948, Documents , i. 453; Shertok to Sasson, 5 Aug. 1948, ibid. 490; Sasson to Shimoni, 8 Aug. 1948, ibid. 499. See e.g. Palestine P ost , 2 Aug. 1948. On the contacts with the Vatican see Shertok to Heinz Graetz, 1 Aug. 1948, Documents , i. 445; on contacts with South Africa and Romania see, Shertok to Epstein, 22 July 1948, ibid. 384; Epstein to Shertok, 22 July 1948, ibid. 383-4; report on Namirovsky’s talks with Pauker, 23 July 1948, ibid. 399-400. For the cabinet’s meeting, see minutes of provisional government, vi, 1 Aug. 1948, ISA; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 247-51. See minutes of provisional government, vi, 1 Aug. 1948, ISA; on the situation on the Egyptian front see Ben-Gurion, War Diary , ii, 2 Aug. 1948; for Shertok’s statement see Palestine P ost , 3 Aug. 1948. On the decision to change the course of the war see, Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 818-19. Shertok to Bemadotte, 6 Aug. 1948, Documents , i. 492; a full summary of Israeli positions in Shertok to Bemadotte, 10 Aug. 1948, ibid. 501-6; for the favourable world reactions to Israel’s positions see e.g. New York Times , 8 Aug. 1948; Shlaim, Collusion , 282-3; and Palestine Post , 8, 10, 15 Aug. 1948. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 6 Aug. 1948; Palestine P ost , 4 and 5 Aug. 1948; minutes of provisional government, vii, 11 Aug. 1948, ISA. Shertok in Ihud Olami Convention, 15 Aug. 1948, CZA; cf. Bar-Zohar, BenGurion, 819-21. Shertok in Ihud Olami Convention, 15 Aug. 1948, CZA. Eban to Shertok, 12 Aug. 1948, Documents , i. 512-14; on these ceremonies see Ben-Gurion, War D iary , ii, 17 Aug. 1948 and 20 Aug. 1948. The opening session of the Zionist Action Committee, 22 Aug. 1948, CZA, S5/323. Shertok to Epstein, 16 Aug. 1948, Documents , i. 525. On the leakage, see e.g. Palestine P ost , 24, 25, 26 Aug. 1948; Shertok to Sasson, 17 Aug. 1948, Documents , i. 533; Shertok to Sasson, 26 Aug. 1948, ibid. 557-8; Shertok to Sasson, 30 Aug. 1948, ibid. 563; Shlaim, Collusion, 282-3. Epstein to Shertok, 24 and 26 Aug. 1948, Documents , i. 549-50; Robinson and Rafael to Shertok, 2 Sept. 1948, ibid. 568-9. See McDonald’s statement during his talk with Shertok, 6 Sept. 1948, Docu­ ments, i. 570-1. On Ben-Gurion’s and Shertok’s exchanges with McDonald see, Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 8 Sept. 1948; but for a more accurate report se$, Shertok to Lourie, 10 Sept. 1948, Documents, i. 587-8. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 8 Sept. 1948. Sharett, A t the Gates, 287-9; and see, Shlaim, Collusion, 286-92. Shertok to members of cabinet, 10 Sept. 1948, Documents, i. 564-89; minutes of provisional government, viii, 12 Sept. 1948, ISA; and see Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 281-5; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 19 and 20 Sept. 1948.

394

Non-Alignment

44. Shertok to Trygve Lie, 17 Sept. 1948, Bunche to Shertok, 17 Sept. 1948, Shertok to Bunche, 19 Sept. 1948, Documents , i. 605-8; Sharett, A t the Gates , 290; Shlaim, Collusion , 292-3. 45. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 22 Sept. 1948, Documents , i. 621-2; and see the statement by the spokesman of the government of Israel, 23 Sept. 1948, ibid. 626-7; minutes of provisional government, x, 26 Sept. 1948, ISA. 46. Sasson to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 Sept. 1948, Documents , i. 632-6; Shlaim, Collusion , 315-16. 47. Ben-Gurion, War Diary , ii, 20 Sept. 1948.

13 A Lament for Generations to Come? Out of political necessity and some mutual respect, Shertok and Ben-Gurion strove to maintain their troubled coalition, but it was inevitable that the two would continue to clash. The next disagreement between the two concerned Ben-Gurion’s dissatisfaction with the cease­ fire and his impatience to resume the war. He asserted then that Israel’s most dangerous enemy was a truce without an end. According to him, it placed a question mark over the existence of the state in the conscience of the world, it meant the presence of UN observers in Israel, and it enabled the Arabs to prepare and choose their own time for an offensive against the Jewish state. Boasting about the immense increase in Israel’s military might during the cease-fire, the prime minister and minister of defence firmly believed that most of Israel’s security problems could, and should, be solved through the application of that force. He was therefore only seeking a pretext to unleash a spectacular military operation. Neither for the first nor the last time, on 24 September 1948 the Arab Legion supplied Ben-Gurion with just what he had been waiting for when it captured an Israeli stronghold in the Latrun area. Although the ID F immediately recaptured the position, Ben-Gurion argued in cabinet that the Transjordanian action demanded a decisive reaction on the part of Israel. And what better action was there to rekindle the war than the capture of Latrun itself, a goal he had been nurturing ever since the rout of the Seventh Brigade there in May 1948. Moreover, Ben-Gurion was fully aware that even a limited operation in the Latrun area might break the cease-fire on all fronts, and this was what he wanted. The ID F’s chief of operations, General Yigael Yadin on the other hand was extremely hesitant to make the attempt since Israel’s main forces on this front were thin and deployed mainly north of the Latrun area.1 Although Yadin had expressed his reservations about the fr>F’s ability to carry out grand military operations, on 26 September 1948 BenGurion raised the question of ‘an attack on Latrun’, and said that Tn case of the outbreak of a war—we can deal a decisive blow to the [Arab] forces in the Triangle, push the eastern border of the central front much further into the West B a n k . . . we can push the [border] in the

396

A Lament fo r Generations to Come?

Jezreel Valley to the south, and reach Nablus; ànd we can extend the corridor to Jerusalem at least to Ramllah . . . ’ Later he would add that the goal should be to extend Israeli operations ‘to Jericho and the Jordan River. The ultimate goal will be to liberate the Hebron and Bethlehem areas in the south, and the entire area between Latrun and north of Ramallah, all the way to Jericho and the Dead Sea.’ Ben-Gurion did not limit his proposal to the West Bank. He also mentioned the possibility of the resumption of the war against Egypt in the Negev.2 The cabinet, Shertok included, was not prepared to endorse such an operation. Among the arguments against this ambitious military plan were the extremely adverse impression that Bemadotte’s assassination had created in the world at large; the stem American, British, and French warnings against the resumption of the war; British military and political and American political support of Trans­ jordan; and the potentially negative implications that such a military move would have on the forthcoming discussions in the UN General Assembly. This time Shertok led the opposition to Ben-Gurion and made his position clear: T am against any military operation that might be construed as a deliberate provocation [leading to the resumption of the war in all parts of the country].’3 At the end of this debate in the cabinet, all seven hioderate ministers, including Shertok, voted against BenGurion’s plan, five supported it, and one abstained. When recalling this cabinet decision later, Ben-Gurion always saw it as a missed opportunity and called it a ‘lament for generations to come’. Later the prime minister did not hide the fact that he firmly believed that the moderates, and first and foremost Shertok, bore the sole responsibility for Israel’s missing that ‘historic opportunity’ to capture the entire West Bank and thereby to terminate the conflict over Palestine. In this context, Ben-Gurion had firmly believed that such a military victory would have crushed all Arab armies in the territory and would have resulted in their readiness to withdraw and in the Arab states’ eventual readiness to sign peace treaties with Israel. There are two versions, not mutually exclusive, regarding Shertok’s personal responsibility for that cabinet decision. One is the testimony of the then cabinet secretary, Zeev Sharef, who much later reminisced that Shertok, who voted through a proxy, told him that if he had known that the majority would vote against Ben-Gurion, he might not have cast his own vote against him, which would have resulted in a tie that in turn could have been ‘untied’ by Ben-Gurion himself with his additional vote as prime minister. The rationale of this explanation was that Shertok,

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who held similar views to those of Ben-Gurion, was not determined to defeat the prime minister on almost all significant votes. Although Sharef s recollections were usually accurate, this is highly questionable. What is more likely is that later realizing the results of that crucial vote, Shertok wanted somehow to placate the ‘old man’, or that Sharef, who was then close to Shertok, wished to ‘protect’ his senior colleague against such accusations. A later version of Shertok’s vote on the issue was offered by Ben-Gurion himself. According to him, Shertok was against a comprehensive operation, but would not have objected to a limited attack focused only on Latrun. While Shertok himself never gave credence to either of these versions, his colleague Kaplan found it difficult to believe that the foreign minister really supported an operation against Latrun.4 Several additional explanations have been offered for both Shertok’s opposition to that operation as well as for Ben-Gurion’s acquiescence with the cabinet’s negative decision during that meeting. The main thrust of all of these explanations seems to focus on the reluctance of both men to do anything that would upset the implicit understanding, or collusion, with Transjordan that eventually Israel would not oppose its annexation of the Arab part of Palestine. Moreover, Ben-Gurion is said to have feared a vehement international reaction against the operation, espe­ cially from Britain. In this context it has been suggested that Ben-Gurion manipulated the cabinet vote against his own proposal in order to maintain the new relations then crystallizing with the USA on the one hand and Transjordan on the other while still retaining his activist image. Ben-Gurion, however, could not resist the temptation to hit out at the cabinet moderates—including his Mapai colleagues Shertok, Remez, and Kaplan, all of whom voted against his proposal—with the vicious, and inaccurate, comment that ‘We’re lucky that [the moderate majority] was not asked to vote on implementation of most of the operations launched during the last year’.5 In other words, Ben-Gurion not only seemed to be expressing his true desire that the plan to capture Latrun should have been undertaken; he was also admitting that military decisions were being taken without the approval of the cabinet. BenGurion’s version provided additional elements to the myth that he and his admirers would later create: that Ben-Gurion had the Vision and ability to take difficult and daring decisions despite the short-sighted objections of his cowardly associates. Ben-Gurion learned a significant political lesson from that disapproval of his plan: instead of raising such issues, as he chose to, in cabinet without prior consultation, especially with the three other ministers of

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his party, he should have endeavoured to forge an a priori majority. This was not always possible because of his colleagues’ moderate views and their own ideas not only about political issues but also about military affairs. As far as Shertok was concerned, there was a direct link between his general strategic position and the cabinet decision, which Ben-Gurion deplored, to refrain from attacking Latrum and the West Bank. He revealed some of his ideas prior to his departure for the UN General Assembly in Paris. Thus, on 27 September 1948 Shertok reported to the Provisional Council of State on what he hoped to accomplish there, saying that although Israel was not yet a member of the world body, its delegation would proudly represent the Jewish state as a free and militarily strong state. He added that his task would be extremely difficult in view of the commitment of the UN, USA, and Britain to ‘Bemadotte’s testament’. He balanced this gloomy forecast by underlin­ ing Bemadotte’s recognition of Israel as a given political factor in the Middle East, and vowed to fight against the less favourable elements of the dead mediator’s report. More importantly, Shertok declared that there was no contradiction between the Biltmore Program and the UN Partition resolution: T h e first was a just demand, and the compromise that came later was also justified.’6 According to him, these were not contradictory plans, rather two stages on the way to the fulfilment of Zionist dreams. Even the résolution concerning partition was not the final stage, and Israel had a legitimate right to demand its modification, especially the plans to cut the Negev from the Jewish state to which he was opposed. Then probably for the first time in front of a venue larger than the cabinet, Shertok discussed in detail the cabinet’s views on the future of the Arab part of Palestine. There were three viable options: to permit King Abdullah to annex this area, or to allow the All-Palestine govern­ ment, about to be established in Gaza, to control it.7 But at that point, Shertok still supported the third option: the establishment of an inde­ pendent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which would be reliant on Israel and would seal Israel off from a possible Iraqi penetration. He added, however, that ‘to say it now is tantamount to our support of the Mufti’s rule in Eretz-Israel’. Therefore he preferred to leave all three options open. This statement of Shertok’s is probably the most accurate explanation for his opposition to the occupation of the West Bank. Ben-Gurion opened his own speech before the Provisional Council of State by stating that Shertok had summarized all relevant points. However, the differences between the two leaders became evident as soon as he began clarifying his own assumptions concerning Israel’s foreign and defence policies. The ‘old man’ began with the widely

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accepted view that Israel was involved in a combined military and political battle which was engaged at both the regional and the inter­ national levels. He asserted that Israel could combat the Arabs without major difficulties; however, the involvement of the superpowers and other large powers in the regional game left Israel enjoying military superiority but political inferiority (implicit in this was an admittance of Israeli military superiority over the all Arab states and the Palestinians). Then he asserted that the superpowers would not tolerate a total Israeli victory over the Arabs. This being the case, ‘We cannot rely only on political action, and on a political solution, even if these were to be favourable to Israel. We must use our military force in the right place and at the right time.’8 By the latter he meant, of course, capturing all the territories that he regarded as essential to Israel’s security. Although they held divergent views on Israel’s immediate needs and moves, Shertok was far from being interested in exacerbating the inherent disagreements between himself and Ben-Gurion. In responding to Ben-Gurion’s contentions regarding his own arguments, Shertok merely stated that, ‘It is conceivable we may be compelled to defy any adverse UN resolution that might damage our vital interests. . . but such a conceivable need does not go contrary to the instructions our delegation to the UN Assembly has received [which had been formulated in accordance with his own position].’ That is to say, the delegation was instructed to pursue a moderate line but also to be prepared to defy unfavourable UN resolutions. Adopting a sober view of the role of diplomacy in general and his own future tasks in Paris, Shertok took pains to clarify that ‘the assembly is not going to discuss any immediate crucial political problems facing Israel. Nor is our delegation going to conquer Latrun or solve the question of the Negev. It is merely going to conduct a verbal fight.’ In the meantime, however, ‘there are many unsolved critical issues that will continue to confront both our govern­ ment and the UN Assembly: to fight or not to fight? And if we do decide to fight, in which framework?’ Then he re-emphasized that, ‘The main danger is in the Negev!’ Thus reaffirming his staunch opposition to a major operation in the West Bank.9 Since a majority of the cabinet, and eventually also Ben-Gurion, agreed with this diagnosis, the prime minister began to disfcuss with the ID F chiefs plans and preparations for major military operations on the Egyptian front. After attaining this consensus, Shertok could leave for Paris. But not surprisingly, when leaving Israel, he was suspicious about Ben-Gurion’s intentions. As if to allay his apprehensions, upon his arrival in Paris Shertok received a telegram from both his and Ben-

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Gurion’s confidant, Reuven Zaslani-Shiloah, stating that, although he was not absolutely convinced of the need to refrain from occupying the West Bank, Ben-Gurion would not torpedo Shertok’s diplomatic mission in Paris by attacking the West Bank.10 In Paris, Shertok initially felt that he was fighting a lost cause concerning the Bernadotte plan. For on 22 September 1948, the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, declared that the USA fully accepted the Bernadotte ideas and concrete proposals. When the British foreign secretary, Earnest Bevin, endorsed Marshall’s stance, Shertok’s conviction that for quite sometime both powers had reached an agree­ ment in this respect was only strengthened. Yet as he learned that many other delegations did not go along with the Anglo-American position, he was encouraged and more determined to exploit the chances to effect a change in the American attitude, which paved the way for an Israeli diplomatic war of attrition against Count Bemadotte’s report. In this he was aided by a delay in the timing of the Palestine debate, which allowed him and his associates time to launch a campaign in the USA and Paris to change the American position. Shertok pinned great hopes on the campaign in the USA which was raging on the eve of the forthcoming presidential election.11 While Shertok was engaged in these hectic diplomatic activities, his assistants Were conducting the planned secret talks about a separate peace agreement with the Egyptians. The prospects for this dialogue seemed somewhat encouraging since Shertok’s interpretation of the Egyptian initial response to his earlier message, that had included his proposal for a peace treaty, was that it implied recognition of Israel. Moreover, it was his opinion that even if it could not sign a full-fledged peace treaty, Egypt might be ready to sign a non-belligerency pact, in which it would undertake to avoid anti-Israeli activities, be willing to evacuate territories that it occupied in Palestine since its invasion in May 1948, and would not demand a massive return of Palestinian refugees to Israel. This was also when Shertok learned that the Egyptians were extremely interested in annexing the Gaza Strip. He was strongly inclined to accede to the Egyptians’ desire for annexation of the Strip because of his opposition to any Israeli control of such a densely populated Arab area whether in the south or in the northern part of the country. On 5 October 1948 he therefore cabled Walter Eytan to do everything in his power to bring the Egyptian proposal before the cabinet immediately.12 But Ben-Gurion suppressed this information and request because the large military operation (Operation Yoav) in the Negev was about to be launched, and he feared that the cabinet might

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delay or even cancel it. Operation Yoav was aimed at ejecting the Egyptians from their positions in the region, positions which might have served as a basis either for a military offensive or for a political demand to cut it off from the rest of Israel. Apprehensive that any further delay would mean giving up the Negev in accordance with a possible UN resolution, Ben-Gurion expedited preparations for the Israeli operation, hurrying also because of the approaching winter and because of his fear that the peace talks with Egypt were gaining momentum. Ben-Gurion had also in mind that IDF chief-of-staff, Yaacov Dori, estimated that it would take only eight days of fighting to crush the Egyptian army in the Negev and the Gaza Strip. Recalling his failure to secure cabinet approval for the operation in the Latrun area and the West Bank, on 5 October 1948, the same day that Shertok cabled Eytan about the favourable Egyptian response, Ben-Gurion convened a large group of Mapai leaders for a preliminary discussion of this new operation against the Egyptian forces; except for two avowed Shertok supporters and members of the moderate camp, Sprinzak and Remez, the majority agreed with the plan. BenGurion summed up that session by stating that, 'There are no miracles, according to all the odds we shall win since the Arabs have not changed . . . the danger in a continued cease-fire is worse, particularly since now we should not expect any immediate [British military] sanctions in the South.’13 The latter evaluation was based on Britain’s deep involvement in the then unfolding crisis over Berlin. Only after consultation with his colleagues in Mapai did Ben-Gurion discuss the plan again with the ID F general staff and commanders of the various fronts on 6 October 1948. During this discussion, Ben-Gurion emphasized that they should engage neither the Transjordanian nor the Iraqi forces in the fighting against the Egyptians. When he and the general staff agreed on the main direction and details of the operation, he presented the plan to the cabinet on the same day (without, it should be recalled, informing them of Shertok’s cable concerning Egypt’s positive response to Israel’s diplomatic feelers). Eight ministers, includ­ ing Remez, voted for the operation, three moderates (Rozen, Shapira, and Levin) were against, and the arch-moderate Eliezer Kaplan ab­ stained. Nevertheless the final decision was in Shertok’s hands, since the cabinet’s pre-condition for the approval of the operation was his consent. If he objected, the cabinet would reconsider; if he agreed, the subcommittee of five would have authority to issue the orders. While still awaiting Shertok’s decision, Ben-Gurion, who now was eager to launch the operation against the Egyptians, called the cabinet’s vote the 'most

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critical government decision since we decided tö proclaim the estab­ lishment of Israel’.14 To torpedo any possibility of an agreement with Egypt, Ben-Gurion informed Shertok that he categorically objected to annexation of the Gaza Strip by Egypt, since ‘It [Egypt] is the greatest kingdom on our borders and its hold over parts of Palestine endangers our existence’. He preferred the barren Sinai desert to separate the two states. Moreover, to stifle any such separate agreement, Ben-Gurion suggested that eventually Egypt and Israel should co-operate in estab­ lishing an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank.15 Shertok did not fail to note that in the past Ben-Gurion had opposed all such ideas. Shertok set about assessing the feasibility of the operation by consider­ ing his talks with George Marshall, John Foster Dulles, who had then been Thomas Dewey’s watch-dog in the American delegation to the UN, Andrei Vyshinsky, and Yakov Malik of the Soviet delegation, and the heads of other delegations, as well as the Israeli ambassador’s talks with Truman’s assistants. Shertok finally reached a paramount decision that, as he had always believed, an operation against Egypt was preferable to one against Transjordan. Thus he approved both the operation as well as the pretext for it: Egypt’s repeated breaches of the cease-fire. Shertok subsequently received full information about the preparations and the timing of the operation.16 It went without saying that the secret peace talks with Ègypt would be terminated, but under the prevailing circum­ stances, Shertok accepted it as the lesser evil. After warning the chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organ­ ization (UNTSO), General William Riley in Jerusalem, early in the morning of 15 October 1948, in accordance with the stipulations of the cease-fire agreements, the ID F launched an attempt to get a convoy through to the besieged Jewish settlements in the Negev. When, as had been hoped and expected, the Egyptians attacked the convoy, the ID F opened its planned operation by bombarding Egyptian positions from the air as well as attacking other targets with land forces. The operation in the Negev was accompanied by two smaller operations aimed at both diverting Arab attention from the main Israeli effort in the Negev and improving Israeli positions south of Jerusalem. Shortly after these three operations began, Henri Vigier and Wilhelm Ivresen of UNTSO, who in fact were Ralph Bunche’s representatives in the territory, called for a new cease-fire and the withdrawal of all troops to previous lines. Since the Egyptians realized the precariousness of their positions, they imme­ diately agreed to a new cease-fire. Shertok—trying to gain additional time for Israel to fully implement its plans—told the acting mediator, Ralph Bunche, in Paris that Israel would only agree if the Egyptians

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permitted the free passage of Israeli convoys to the isolated settlements in the Negev. Partly endorsing Israel’s position, Bunche informed Shertok that he would not ask to convene the Security Council until other means for dealing with the crisis had been exhausted, but sug­ gested a lull in the fighting to allow for the necessary negotiations.17 Since it was clear that Israel was diplomatically stalling until it wiped out the large Egyptian besieged ‘pockets’ in the Negev and occupied Beersheba, and no other formula was found, Bunche reported the cease-fire breaches to the Security Council. On 19 October 1948, the decidedly pro-Arab Security Council adopted a Syrian draft resolution calling for a new cease-fire. Now Shertok urged the cabinet to concur, since Israel had already made substantial military gains and he did not want to push its luck too far. The cabinet accepted his argument, agreeing in principle to a third cease-fire on 20 October 1948, but not before the Israeli army had conquered the main town in the area—Beer­ sheba. Because of its historical and strategic importance, when it was accomplished, this conquest resonated throughout the world. Con­ sequently, the third cease-fire went into effect on 22 October 1948. Nevertheless, since they had expected the disintegration of the Egyptian army in the Negev and were hungry for yet more military and territorial achievements, Ben-Gurion and the cabinet still procrastinated and refrained from stopping the offensive. The main reason for this delay was news about an Egyptian retreat from the Hebron area. Only when their hope to crush the two larger Egyptian pockets in the western Negev did not materialize did Ben-Gurion issue the proper orders to comply with the new cease-fire. Later, after Shertok returned to Israel, he implored the prime minister for his decision to continue the operation and to ignore the UN instructions to stop the fighting.18 Operations ‘Yoav, Yekev, and El Hahar’ constituted a spectacular success for the ID F and Ben-Gurion. It had dealt a severe first blow to the Egyptians, opened the road to the Negev, thereby alleviating the situation of the Jewish settlements in the region, added vast areas to Israel, occupied Beersheba, pushed to the north the Israeli hold in the northern Negev, and ended with the complete encirclement of all Egyptian forces in the Negev. Moreover, it improved Israel’s inter­ national political position and boosted morale at hom e.'In this vein, Ben-Gurion wrote to Shertok that in view of these victorious operations the UN should respect Israel’s military achievements, that this should bolster the government’s position in regard to the annexation of the Negev, that it would expose the disagreements in the Arab camp, and that it would deliver a deadly blow to the Mufti’s All-Palestine govern-

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ment in Gaza. Afterwards, Ben-Gurion approved only one additional naval operation against the Egyptian fleet that resulted in the destruction of the destroyer Farouk.19 Consequently, the third cease-fire would begin on 22 October 1948. Ben-Gurion hinted that his smooth co-operation with Shertok, result­ ing in close political-military co-ordination, had produced impressive and much-needed military results without jeopardizing Israel politically. And as if to further foster their ‘coalition’, Ben-Gurion informed Shertok that he had rejected the commander of the northern front, Moshe Carmel’s, and the military governor of Jerusalem, Moshe Dayan’s requests to launch additional military operations against the Arab Legion in the West Bank and the Iraqi and Syrian units in the north. He nevertheless could not resist mentioning that Qawvqji’s units were still fighting in the north, thus indicating his next target. In the wake of the great victory in the Negev, Shertok indeed witnessed a marked change in the US attitude towards Israel. He argued that not only was that superpower prepared to postpone discussion of the Bemadotte report at the UN, but declarations on Israel during the Dewey-Truman election campaign were also more favourable than before. Shertok took advantage of the new situation by increasing pressure on the USA with regard to Israel’s membership in the UN.20 Aware thàt political and diplomatic moves are often determined on the basis of personal contacts, Shertok used his three weeks in Paris to meet as many foreign ministers, senior officials, and other public figures assembled there as possible. While in Paris he met among others, his adversary George Marshall, France’s Robert Schuman, John Foster Dulles, Andrei Vyshinsky, Herbert Evatt, the Greek foreign minister, Constantine Tsalidaris, the Belgian foreign minister, Henri Spaak, Sweden’s Bo Unden, India’s Mrs Lakshmi Pandit, and Ralph Bunche. In his various talks, he raised the question of Israel’s membership in the UN, which he regarded as an essential element in its political ‘normaliz­ ation’, the fate of the Negev, and the arrangements in Jerusalem. Since the USA had succeeded in postponing the Palestine debate in the Assembly, and since he wanted to demonstrate Israel’s utter indifference to the discussions of the Bernadotte report, Shertok returned to Israel on 24 September 1948, fully satisfied that he had accomplished his mission there.21 Immediately upon Shertok’s arrival in Tel Aviv, an anxious BenGurion interrogated him on the impact of the recent Israeli military operations, about which the ‘old man’ was bursting with pride. Shertok assured him that ‘the victory in the Negev created a tremendous

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impression in Paris’, and that secretly even the British were delighted with it since by weakening the Egyptians, it strengthened their more intimate ally, Abdullah of Transjordan, in Arab politics. Shertok also told the prime minister that the Soviets were so satisfied with the ID F’s conquests that they encouraged Israel to capture the Gulf of Aqaba to frustrate Britain’s desire to annex it to Transjordan and thereby hasten Britain’s ejection from the region.22 The synchronization of political and military moves had been fruitful on this occasion and as noted yielded nice profits, but nobody could predict for how long co-operation between Israel’s two senior politicians would last. Indeed it soon began to crack. The euphoria in activist circles around Ben-Gurion was creating new pressures to continue the war to expand Israeli borders. Shertok, apprehensive of where an unwarranted sense o f victory and demands for expanding the borders might lead, did his utmost to contain the enthusiasm of Ben-Gurion and his aides. Thus in a cabinet meeting held on 26 October, he said that he was still worried about the ‘parliamentary situation at the UN’, which could still turn against Israel. The potentially explosive situation in the cabinet was further intensified by Shertok’s criticism of Ben-Gurion for not immedi­ ately complying with the U N ’s third cease-fire resolution.23 The renewed clashes between Shertok and Ben-Gurion over the continuation of the war meant that future Israeli moves were conducted along two parallel, but not necessarily contradictory paths. In any case, the successful co-ordination between the two leaders and their respective establishments was greatly reduced. Thus while Ben-Gurion and his lieutenants were planning the conquest of central Galilee, Shertok and his associates were involved in attempts to revive peace talks with the Egyptians. In this context, Shertok received messages through Dean Rusk that King Abdullah was interested in resuming his direct talks with Israel, which had come to a halt after the Deir Yassin massacre. The king, who was interested in a continuation of the cease-fire, submitted a six-point plan to the Israelis which bypassed Shertok’s envoy Eliahu Sasson and Transjordan’s Abdul Majid Haidar in Paris. The Americans, who gave their blessing to these new contacts and expressed their willingness to serve as mediators, implored the Israeli government to consider these suggestions seriously, adding that they wbuld consider changing the US position on borders if the Israelis complied with their wishes. However, Shertok still did not change his cool and uncommitted attitude towards Abdullah for having broken his commitment not to invade Palestine in May 1948. His pretext for this hostile stance was Transjordan’s co-operation with the Iraqis. To divert attention from the

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Jordanian initiative, Shertok decided to implicate them in detailed negotiations about various secondary matters, such as the Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus.24 During that period Shertok further elaborated the underlying prin­ ciples for what would become known as Israel’s ‘peripheral policy’, the foundations of which had been laid before the Second World War. Accordingly, he instructed his representatives in Paris to expand contacts with Turkish and Iranian politicians and officials there in a concerted effort to offset Israel’s isolation in the core Middle East. In this context, he considered attempting the establishment of diplomatic relations, including a legation, in Constantinople and extending ‘moral and political support’ to Iran in its conflict with Iraq over the Shat al-Arab in return for establishing a strategic tie with Iran and later purchasing oil from that non-Arab Muslim country. The Iranians’ interest in Shertok’s proposals were the first steps in a long-term Iranian-Israeli connection.25 While Shertok and his officials were busy implementing these political and diplomatic ideas, Ben-Gurion and the military, on the other hand, were planning ‘Operation Hiram’ to eject Fawzi al Qawuqji’s Arab Liberation Army from the Galilee. Since Shertok had softened his previous opposition to such an operation intended to remove actual threats to Israeli settlements, he again co-operated cautiously and conditionally with Ben-Gurion, a move which only enhanced his posi­ tion among the political élite. But his light grew even brighter when a new seven-member Political Committee was elected by Mapai, in which the moderates—Shertok, Berl Locker, Zalman Aharonowich-Aranne, Pinhas Lubianiker-Lavon, and Yosef Sprinzak—constituted a clear majority. Since Ben-Gurion was in an absolute minority in this signi­ ficant committee (the only other activist was Jehudit Shimhoni), he was careful to seek the advanced consent of the moderates on all major military operations. Ben-Gurion was particularly cautious since Shertok had registered another diplomatic success by persuading the White House to overrule the State Department’s acceptance of the Bemadotte plan.26 Soon afterwards, on 25 October 1948, Shertok left again for Paris to attend the UN General Assembly annual debate on Palestine. As luck would have it, the necessary pretext for launching ‘Operation Hiram’ was again supplied by the Arabs themselves: Qawuqji’s units breached the third cease-fire by capturing an Israeli military post in Upper Galilee. Hence while Shertok was trying to build bridges to the Arabs in Paris on the one hand, he also realized that this poorly calculated move on the part of the Arabs facilitated Ben-Gurion’s and

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the ID F ’s action as far as international reactions were concerned. In any event, what would turn into an highly successful military operation from an Israeli point of view was launched on 28 October 1948, had lasted for sixty hours—three days less than the ID F generals had predicted—and resulted in the occupation of the entire Galilee and Israeli forces invading Lebanon for the first time ever. While the UN observers in Palestine tried to reimpose the cease-fire, the Israeli government used delaying tactics, this time with the support of Shertok, who encouraged Ben-Gurion to continue engaging in quiet military operations. Shertok and his representatives in Paris, Ambassador Aubrey Eban and Gideon Rafael, also cabled through Eytan to Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv that, ‘Galilee operation [perfect], no [international] reaction here in view absence publicity and initial impression successful Arab advance threatening our vital positions. Would advise further operations on our part only if clear Arab provocation easily provable, otherwise sanctions movement likely be strengthened. This week especially delicate, no risk worthwhile.’ The operation was completed before any sanctions were imposed:27 In retrospect it seems that ‘Operation Hiram’ established a typical pattern of Israeli behaviour during that period, according to which Israel’s UN delegation became a barometer indicative of when the political climate was right for military operations. Ben-Gurion himself seemed to be accepting Shertok’s argument that, ‘as far as possible we should conceal our military operations until the time is ripe’.28 However, since the prime minister’s appetite for further military operations had been whetted, a new clash with Shertok was inevitable. It occurred when Ben-Gurion revived his ‘Grand Plan’ for attacking the triangle in the northern part of the West Bank, which was anathema to Shertok. Ben-Gurion confided in his chief of staff, Yaacov Dori, and the chief of operations, Yigael Yadin, that, pending a green light from Shertok, they should try again to crush Egyptian pockets in the Negev and increase military pressure on the Transjordanians and Iraqis in the West Bank in order to cause their retreat so that ‘the entire country would be in our hands’. This was the new ‘grand plan’ through which the ‘old man’ intended to compensate Israel for the missejl opportunity to capture Latrun and parts of the West Bank that he had termed the ‘lament for generations to come’. Shertok categorically refused to approve the plan, arguing that Israel’s occupation of the West Bank would exacerbate the demographic balance in Israel, prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in that area, lead to the annexation of whatever areas Israel did not

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occupy in the West Bank to Transjordan, and Would extend Israel’s borders so far beyond the partition lines that it might strengthen the hands of those anti-Israeli powers who maintained that Israel should give up the Negev. Moreover, according to Shertok, it would make the Arab refugee problem untenable.29 All this makes it evident that there was neither implicit nor explicit Israeli collusion with King Abdullah at that point. It also proves that there was no concensus between BenGurion and Shertok on the inadvisability of such collusion. In his renewed efforts to promote the idea of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, Shertok instructed the foreign ministry staff to examine the possibilities of establishing direct contacts with Palestinian leaders in the West Bank towards this end. Indeed, a number of Palestinian leaders in that area were ready to proceed with these ideas. As Shertok should have expected Ben-Gurion, who ‘was sharply sceptical of, almost ridiculing such political plans, and imparting the impression that he wanted to solve most problems by military means, in a fashion that would make any political negotiations and political action worthless’, opposed his initiative, and the ID F was ‘fulfilling its military missions and creating important and surprising political facts, without taking into account the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ political plans, which are in any case becoming defunct’. Therefore, after a careful assessment of the complexities involved in the implementation of such plans and possible adverse ramifications of such a development, Shertok shelved the idea for the time being, summarizing the situation as follows: As far as negotiations [about the fate of the West Bank] are concerned, our official position is that we prefer a separate Arab state. But our conquests, which certainly have not been completed, tend to narrow down the territory [for such a state] and increase its population. These are two reasons which enhance the feasibility of the option of [the West Bank’s] annexation to Transjordan.

Shertok seems to have modified his position on the advisability of an immediate establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank for three reasons: annexation to Transjordan would kill the possibility of a Mufti takeover of the area; there was a lack of any meaningful reaction by the powers to Israeli military operations; and because of his desire to avoid further severe clashes with Ben-Gurion, who had dismissed the idea out of hand.30 Continuing tp shape Israel’s foreign policy through an ongoing process of trial and error, Shertok combined cautious approval of military operations and contacts with Egypt and Transjordan regarding

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observation of the latest cease-fire. One of his operative goals in pursuing this line was to promote direct contacts between Israeli and Arab commanders on the various fronts. Thus he urged the cabinet to initiate such contacts with the Egyptian commanders in the two besieged pockets in the Negev.31 This was a timely initiative since the Egyptians were also interested in resuming peace talks with the Israelis. Indeed, it was such tacit understanding between Israel and its enemies that led to a network of contacts with the Arabs during the latter stages of the War of Independence. In line with his and his officials’ earlier contacts in Paris, Shertok viewed the new Egyptian feelers as an official attempt to resume dialogue with Israel. Thus, after his return from Paris, during a cabinet meeting of 4 November 1948, he proposed direct talks concerning Israel’s borders with the Egyptians. Disagreeing with Ben-Gurion, who had opposed all forms of Egyptian control over the Gaza Strip, Shertok argued that Israel should not only permit it but encourage it, for it would avoid the annexation to Israel of a densely populated Arab area and would facilitate Israel’s demand that Egypt recognize its control of the entire Negev including the Aravah. In this context Shertok urged Ben-Gurion ‘to make every effort to establish Israeli control of locations on the way to Eilat, with the purpose of establishing our hold over it. This is a difficult, but feasible, job, [and] uprooting us will be more difficult than changing or forging a UN resolution.’32 Under the influence of Shertok and several moderate ministers, and in the face of Ben-Gurion’s opposi­ tion, the government adopted a resolution to continue negotiations with the Egyptians, which would focus only on questions pertaining to the Israeli-Egyptian border. According to this cabinet resolution, Israel would also be ready to recognize Egypt’s control over certain parts of the ‘Arab Negev’, that is, Gaza, when all other conflicts between them had been solved and in return for Egyptian recognition of Israel’s control over the rest of the Negev, including Eilat. Finally, the resolution called for the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from the Hebron hills. Shertok kept an open eye on developments not only in the Middle East, but most importantly also in the USA. Thus, at midnight of 3 November 1948 Shertok notified Ben-Gurion that Harry S.Truman had won the US presidential election. Although the two leaders welcomed Truman’s—and the Democrats’—victory, Shertok hastened realistically to remind himself, Ben-Gurion, and the rest of the government that, The USA is still Britain’s partner, and concurs in the latter’s desire for a solid land bridge [between Egypt and Jordan] as a Western basis facing the [the Soviet

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Union]. But if we are ready to withdraw from the southern part of the Negev in order to create an unbroken Arab territory, and in order to leave that area free for the establishment of air bases, which would assist in the protection of Iranian oil, then the US might be ready to strike a compromise with us over Beersheba.33

Assuming that the two Western powers would continue to co-ordinate activities for the foreseeable future, which he regarded as a major political threat, Shertok once again called upon Chaim Weizmann to persuade Truman to approve the Israeli peace initiative on the one hand and continued Israeli occupation of the territories that it had captured on the other. An additional significant request was that the Americans should accord the Jewish state full diplomatic recognition and economic aid. Once again the old lion complied with Shertok’s request. Israeli military and political successes, coupled with Weizmann’s personal communication, seem to have been helpful, for towards the end of November 1948, Truman instructed the American UN delegation in Paris to follow the pro-Israel stipulations of the Democratic platform. But, prior to Truman’s volte-face, and in view of the possibility of UN sanctions against Israel, in early November the cabinet, including Ben-Gurion, decided to forgo the large-scale military operation in the West Bank for one aimed only at capturing the Egyptian pockets in the Negev.34 After recuperating from a severe attack caused by a duodenal ulcer, Shertok once again returned to Paris to lead the Israeli delegation in the UN assembly. From his temporary headquarters there, he warned against any untimely major military operations and bold offensives, advocated great caution and full observation of the cease-fire. Mainly in order to avoid clashes with Truman, who was then reconsidering American policy, and to prevent the alienation of the Security Council members, he demanded that the ongoing operations against the Egyp­ tian pockets in the Negev and the further military advances in Lebanon be halted without delay. In this Shertok again clashed with Ben-Gurion and the activists for whom the question was not whether to continue with military operations but how to avoid sanctions by the UN.35 Aware that he could not disregard Shertok’s views, Ben-Gurion decided that Yigael Yadin, the ID F’s most sophisticated general, should go to Paris to persuade Shertok to change his mind.36 This only added to Shertok’s sense of urgency, for as soon as he had arrived in Paris, he had to jump head first into the political maelstrom brought about by Ralph Bunche’s proposals regarding mediation. Bunche had suggested to continue the cease-fire, and alternatively to institute an armistice, to separate the

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military forces, and to demilitarize the areas evacuated by the two sides. Far from acting in a manner that would support later allegations that he was a devoted believer in demilitarization, Shertok initially responded to Bunche’s suggestion by refusing to accept demilitarization, and by the linking of any Israeli retreat from conquered territories with an imposed peace treaty. Shertok specifically instructed his associates to oppose any suggestion of Israeli withdrawal in the Negev unless this was decided in direct peace negotiations with the Egyptians.37 While Shertok was in Paris, King Abdullah, who still preferred to conduct negotiations through him, dispatched Abdul Majid Haidar and his personal secretary, Abdel Ghani al-Karmi, to meet Shertok and his officials there. Haidar’s formal message from the king began by express­ ing hope that Israelis appreciated his gesture of allowing a convoy to reach the Israeli force in the Mount Scopus enclave. In addition, he proposed free passage for both sides on the main Jaffa-Jerusalem road, a total cease-fire in Jerusalem, cessation of all violent clashes on the entire Israeli-Jordanian front, and expressed his indifference concerning the secret Israeli-Egyptian talks. The only immediate request by the ‘foxy old gentleman’, as Shertok referred to the king, was that Israel should cease the anti-Transjordan propaganda being broadcast on Israel radio. Shertok’s response was to ask the cabinet to agree to free passage to Jerusalem and to establish a cease-fire in the Holy City. When Abdel Ghani al-Karmi arrived in Paris, he repeated Haidar’s suggestions and elaborated on the political constraints imposed on the king by the British. In view of these contacts, Shertok urged the cabinet to accept Abdullah’s proposals. And again Ben-Gurion delayed his reply to Shertok until he had completed Israel’s military designs. When the prime m inister finally did answer Shertok, Ben-Gurion indicated that there was no point in agreeing to free passage on the old road to Jerusalem, since the alternative ‘Burma Road’ was functioning well, but that he was interested in exchanging Latrun for territories occupied by Israel in the West Bank. Ben-Gurion also indicated that a general truce with Transjordan and straightening the lines between the two countries was desirable, and that he would prefer Jordan rather than Egypt to annex the Gaza Strip.38 Shertok’s intense political activities in Paris and his urgent messages to Tel Aviv to stop all military operations prompted Ben-Gurion to hasten Yadin’s departure for Paris. But he gave his chief of operations an additional task: gathering information on the military capability of the powers to circumscribe the outcome of Israel’s own military moves. It appears that Ben-Gurion’s main concern was not (as has been thought

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until now) British reactions, but rather American sanctions. For, as Shertok had postulated, ‘We are threatened with sanctions and desper­ ately anxious not to give enemies cards against us vis-à-vis president USA, utterly gratuitous. Additionally more lasting harm arises from lending weight Israeli expansion argument and antagonizing Christian interests possibly leading to clashes with Maronites.’ At that point both Shertok and Ben-Gurion feared that Marshall and the State Department might support sanctions despite Truman’s instructions to the contrary.39 Shertok, who had long been nurturing Israel’s close relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites, was also worried that Israeli relations with Eastern bloc states might deteriorate, especially with Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The immediate reason for his apprehen­ sion were rumours of a total embargo on Jewish emigration out of Poland and obstruction of the mass emigration from Bulgaria which was then under way. He planned to raise these issues with the Kremlin leaders then in Paris.40 With these unexpected developments demanding his attention, Sher­ tok did not lose sight of the reason why he was in Paris: to launch an offensive on ‘Bemadotte’s testament’. Thus in his speech to the UN Political Committee on 15 November 1948, the experienced Shertok first paid homage to Bemadotte’s memory and pledged that the Israeli government would fight against all forms of political terrorism and do its utmost to capture the LHI members who assassinated the Count. (In fact, the Israeli government was far from doing its utmost to arrest the perpetrators, which drew criticism from the moderates.) He added, however, that he would take issue with the dead mediator’s political plan. He reminded his listeners that Israel had accepted the partition plan only as a compromise on its historical claim for the entire country west of the River Jordan, and that it was the Arabs and not the Jews who had frustrated its implementation. Thus he suggested, Bemadotte’s plan only awarded the Arabs a prize for their aggression and refusal to negotiate with Israel. After reiterating the proposals he had made several times previously at the UN, Shertok concluded his major address by declaring that Israel was whole-heartedly ready for negotiations, and that the proposed UN Conciliation Commission could serve as ‘a mediating device which should aim at bringing the two sides together for direct peace negotiations’. He then went on to repeat his demand that Israel be made a full member of the UN.41 Shertok’s speech and his continuous contacts with the heads of other delegations paved the way for a Canadian proposal to the Security Council that was backed by Belgium and France and welcomed by the

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US representative in the UN, Philip Jessup. The ‘Canadian clause’, which was included in the Security Council resolution adopted on 16 November 1948, called for facilitating the transition from the cease-fire to a permanent peace by establishing a truce on all fronts. Shertok, who supported the resolution, exerted his influence on the Israeli government to accept it. Even Ben-Gurion was forced to admit two days later, albeit reluctantly, that it represented a turning-point that could lead to peace, and announced that the Israeli government accepted the resolution.42 While it was this resolution that paved the way for the 1949 armistice agreements, in Palestine itself the situation looked far from promising. Military clashes were continuing on all fronts, and the precarious cease-fire appeared to be about to collapse. The acting mediator, Ralph Bunche, only exacerbated the situation as far as the suspicious Israelis were concerned by submitting to them on 14 November 1948 a map demarcating the cease-fire lines in the Negev and demanding their immediate retreat to these lines. It is no wonder that the Israeli government, and especially Ben-Gurion, were flabbergasted when they examined the map. For among other things, in accordance with Bemadotte’s testament, Bunche had demanded an Israeli withdrawal from Beersheba, the heart of the Negev, and its internationalization. BenGurion’s reaction was an order to the IDF to begin its planned operation to conquer the disputed areas south of Beersheba all the way to Eilat. Under the new circumstances created by Israel’s recent military achievements, Shertok supported this move, providing it avoided clashes with either the UN or the superpowers. He also suggested that Israel should agree to a token withdrawal to the lines of 14 October 1948, to avoid a total rejection of Bunche’s proposals without giving up Israel’s right to hold on to territories that it had captured. Under the influence of the moderate majority in the cabinet and with Ben-Gurion’s support, it issued a declaration accepting the main elements of the Security Council resolutions of 14 and 16 November, as well as some of Bunche’s proposals.43 Israeli representatives, General Yadin and Shiloah, together with the U N ’s General Riley, who were in Paris, immediately opened discussions on how to implement the resolutions and agreements. These, however, were only the public moves. Realizing tljat a window of opportunity had been created, and hoping that Ben-Gurion would focus on this front instead of the West Bank and Gaza, Shertok secretly urged the prime minister to continue the military operation in the Negev aimed at capturing the rest of the Negev down to Eilat. In this vein, on 17 November 1948, he cabled Ben-Gurion: ‘Cannot urge too strongly occupation Ein Husub [a spot not far from Eilat], other points as far

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south of line 31 as possible, and, if only possible, Aqaba.’ He also objected to any retreat from Beersheba. Ben-Gurion hastened to assure Shertok that the occupation of all points on the road to Eilat would be completed within a few days. Consequently, on 24 and 25 November, the IDF launched ‘Operation Lot’ in which all areas mentioned by Sharett were captured.44 As Shertok expected, the reaction to Israel’s public moderate position was favourable, most significantly that of the USA. Shertok shrewdly used this favourable atmosphere to exploit the differences between the White House and Marshall. He therefore instructed Eliahu Epstein in Washington to request the White House that the USA should use its influence to effect the postponement of a UN resolution on Israel’s borders, that the Americans should avoid agreeing to any exchange of territories without Israel’s explicit consent, and that it would help in promoting Israel’s UN membership. His main reason for attaching importance to the last issue was that he wished to ensure the active participation of Israel in any crucial discussions about the future of Israel and Palestine in the world organization. These initiatives produced positive results. President Truman not only accorded Israel full diplo­ matic recognition and promised to help to achieve Israel’s other de­ mands, but also pledged that the USA would encourage direct negotiations between Israel and its neighbours and reject the internation­ alization of Haifa and Lydda. Attached to the president’s positive promises to Israel, however, was a veiled threat that the USA would recognize the annexation of territories Israel had acquired only as a result of negotiations with the Arab states, and a demand that the Arabs who had fled Palestine be allowed to return to Israel.45 On several occasions while he was in Paris, Shertok had to mitigate the aggressive and adventuristic intentions of Ben-Gurion and the IDF. Thus whenever his liaison contact with the defence establishment, Reuven Shiloah, who was then veering towards the activist pole, nevertheless sensed that untimely moves were being initiated, especially operations that might hinder Israeli-American relations, he would alert Shertok.46 It was in this context that Shertok demanded that the ID F permit a food convoy to get through to the besieged Egyptian pockets in the Negev. When Ben-Gurion refused on the basis that starvation was the best way to expedite the Egyptians’ surrender and collapse, he utilized arguments that underlined the differences between the two leaders. Thus, for example, the ‘old man’ averred that Israel should not trust Bunche’s promises, and since the Egyptians had no right to the Negev, ‘all UN resolutions with regard to Palestine are insignificant, and

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instead of accepting Bunche’s proposals, we should not even ask for UN membership’. Angry, but still coherent, Shertok’s answer to the prime minister was: You should not argue with me about releasing the Egyptian units trapped in the pockets [which he did not], when all I have asked for was to allow food convoys through. The argument that Bunche is biased is irrelevant since there is a Security Council resolution. The matter is connected not only to our member­ ship in the UN, but rather to the results of all discussion throughout the entire Assembly.

Once again, Shertok and the moderates had their way; the cabinet decided to allow the food convoys through.47 Approval of the supply convoys to the Egyptian pockets prevented a political crisis with the Americans. For as Shertok informed BenGurion, Israel’s ‘undue delay in the matter brought it to the brink of a crisis, and only our positive decision prevented it from erupting. The lesson is clear!’ While this incident increased Shertok’s determination to co-ordinate all political and military moves, on the other hand, BenGurion ruminated that ‘It has been said that war is the continuation of politics through other means. This is not always true. From its begin­ ning our war was motivated by the need to defend ourselves against the attempt to annihilate u s . . . Since the first cease-fire, our military action has been a kind of political act.’48 In other words, the concep­ tual gap between Shertok and Ben-Gurion was only continuing to widen. Almost unnoticed by outsiders, whether politicians or officials, and despite the predilections of Ben-Gurion and the IDF chiefs to continue expanding Israel’s borders, after the 16 November 1948 UN resolution, the Israeli government entered negotiations with the Egyptians on a more permanent truce. These were conducted indirectly through General Riley and directly with Egyptian representatives in Paris. Simultan­ eously, Moshe Dayan also began direct talks with Tansjordan’s Abdullah al-Tall over what would become known as a ‘sincere and absolute cease-fire in Jerusalem’. The direct contacts with the Egyptians concerning a longer truce were accompanied by hints that. Egypt would even be ready to negotiate full peace. While Shertok wa^ gratified by these hints, Yadin and Shiloah, who conducted the indirect talks with the Egyptians through General Riley, warned him that, in view of Ben-Gurion’s and the ID F’s rigid attitudes which might lead to the collapse of these talks and a resumption of military operations, he should prepare for a major crisis in the Security Council.49

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Despite the possibility of such a crisis, Shertok now thought that ‘the time has come to harvest the fruits [of Israel’s successes and relative moderation]’, and submitted Israel’s formal application for UN mem­ bership, which he had viewed as a significant step towards the political normalization of the Jewish state’s position in the international arena. His timing of this move was not accidental but symbolic. For he submitted the application on 29 November 1948, exactly one year after the UN resolution on partition. Despite this symbolism, it was neither an emotional act nor a sign of gratitude to the international organization as some of his opponents alleged. Rather it was connected to Shertok’s pragmatic hope that UN membership would allow Israel greater free­ dom in dealing with the challenges created by the U N ’s new Conciliation Commission, which was intended to seek ways and means to implement Bemadotte’s testament.50 However, in spite of Truman’s pledges to Israel, the Americans were still withholding their support. This was the point where Shertok began to feel the negative international reactions to Israel’s continued military operations and the British devious menœuvres for shelving Israel’s request for UN membership until progress was made in discussing Bunche’s proposals. On this occasion the British machina­ tions were successful; Israel’s application was referred to yet another UN committee—the membership committee. At exactly the same time and in connection with the expected negotiations with Transjordan, the delicate issue of transferring the seat of the Israeli government from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was raised by Israeli officials. Since Ben-Gurion knew that Shertok was against such ‘spectacular’ actions, he told his colleagues that they must consult with the minister for foreign affairs in Paris. As expected, Shertok’s response was negative, although he indicated that he would not object to the quiet transfer of a few other state institutions, such as the High Court. For the time being, the cabinet accepted his view in regard to this sensitive matter also, which increased Ben-Gurion’s resentment of his younger partner.51 The decision to postpone the official transfer of the government to Jerusalem tallied with the ongoing negotiations concerning a new modus vivendi along the cease-fire lines with Transjordan, which were progress­ ing slowly. It was clear to Shertok that Abdullah was anxious to stabilize the situation in Jerusalem and move forward to a wider agreement. But, as on so many other occasions, neither Ben-Gurion nor the cabinet was prepared to take any steps that might freeze the issue of borders. Hence, in accordance with Shertok’s recommendation, the talks between Dayan, Sasson, and al-Tall, secretly conducted in Jerusalem, had to be limited

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to the attainment of the ‘sincere and absolute cease-fire in Jerusalem’. The resultant agreements signed on 30 November 1948, included, in addition to the actual cease-fire in the entire Jerusalem area and convoys to the Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus, an agreement to establish between Dayan and al-Tall direct lines of communication intended to solve local troubles.52 From Paris Shertok informed Ben-Gurion about the progress of the secret talks concerning a full peace agreement, conducted with Egypt’s ambassador to the UN, Mahmud Fawzi. Typically, Shertok advised Ben-Gurion that since the Egyptians had been the aggressors when they invaded Palestine in May 1948, Israel should refuse to make any concessions in the Negev including Eilat, but should agree to minor border modifications on the Coastal Plain, except Gaza, in order to provide the Egyptians with a face-saving device. Although Shertok and Ben-Gurion basically agreed that the talks indicated Egypt’s willingness ‘to give up war’, Shertok, however, was indignant when his senior colleague added that ‘it is doubtful whether some controversial issues can be solved without an additional battle’, i.e., the occupation of Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba. Despite his pessimistic view, Ben-Gurion advised continuing talks with senior Egyptians, but insisted that the talks with Transjordan be limited to officers and officials, that is, between Dayan and al-Tall. This last stipulation indicated that there was still no collusion between Israel and Transjordan.53 The negotiations with Egypt seemed to be the only game in town, since the UN Assembly was dragging its feet over the interpretation of Bemadotte’s testament. In an attempt to break the apparent deadlock, Bunche, who had become the main figure in the mediation attempt, began a Middle Eastern shuttle. As could have been expected, it was not long before, to Shertok’s great chagrin, that he and Ben-Gurion again came to blows over the tactics in regard to the talks with Bunche, who showed some signs of shifting his position in regard to Israel’s conquests. Thus while in this connection Shertok was demanding that in return for Israel’s readiness to engage in peace talks with the Arabs, the UN should act on Israel’s membership, since he assumed it was of ‘crucial import­ ance its own sake and as step towards peace in the Middle East’,54 on the other hand, Ben-Gurion felt that, * We entitled admission, [not slightest price payable] for it except membership fees. Consolidation of our real [territorial] position here and prevention unfavor­ able decision UN on final settlement in Palestine more important than ad­ mission. Can wait several years outside UN, provided our positions here assured

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and peace achieved. We must maintain position that Arab armies in Palestine aggressors, invaders and danger our independence and existence. If they unwill­ ing make peace, they are [after] making war and we in self-defence must make war too.55

Shertok, who loathed to give up both his persistent search for peace and adamant pursuit of membership in the UN responded: ‘Fully accept primacy consolidation real position, but feel convinced admission is substantial contribution towards consolidation and peace, re­ peat peace, contrariwise wafting outside may well mean waiting for peace.’56 This exchange demonstrated the further growing gap between Ben-Gurion’s and Shertok’s perceptions about the road to peace. While Ben-Gurion wanted additional territory, which he had deemed would increase Israel’s security, and through Arab acquiescence would lead to peace, Shertok was after admission to the UN, Israeli readiness to offer certain concessions, including border modifications, an agree­ ment with the Arabs, the end of the war, and talks about a permanent peace. On the other side, Bunche mistakenly thought that the Israeli cabinet would release the besieged Egyptian forces in the Negev if Egypt would be willing to negotiate either full peace, or at the least a truce, therefore, he hurriedly secured the Egyptians’ consent for such negotiations.57 As expected, Shertok supported this move, explaining that continuing the siege of the Egyptian pockets was not worth the great loss of inter­ national sympathy and support. Ben-Gurion’s negative position notwithstanding, the cabinet endorsed Shertok’s position and responded favourably to Bunch’s initiative. Despite this progress, Ben-Gurion was openly preparing to ‘totally crush the Egyptians in the Bir Aslouj-Auja al-Hafir area [south of Gaza]’ and ‘to drive those in the rest of the country out as well’.58 And indeed in the mean time, the ID F ’s prepara­ tions for a major military offensive continued during the next few days. The scheduled date for this operation was 17 or 18 December 1948.59 As matters were moving very slowly and Christmas was approaching, the UN delegations were anxious to conclude their endless dealings with the Palestine problem, terminate their deliberations in Paris, and return to their homes. John Foster Dulles, who was then acting head of the American delegation in Paris, therefore proposed to focus on three issues: an attempt to reach a peace arrangement through a conciliation commission, the internationalization of Jerusalem, and repatriation of some Palestinians Arabs to Israel and the settlement of some in Arab

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states. Thus Bemadotte’s recommendations on the Negev as well as on other aspects of the Palestinian quagmire were shelved. On the basis of Dulles’s proposals, on 11 December 1948, the impatient delegations approved the establishment of a rather small Conciliation Commission, comprising the representatives of the USA (basically, as a pro-Israeli power), France (as a British ‘proxy’—Shertok objected this nomination), and Turkey (as a pro-Arab state), whose task it would be to assist in direct or indirect peace negotiations, establish an international regime in Jerusalem, try to protect the holy sites, and to secure an early repatria­ tion of Arab refugees. Since the decision on Israel’s admission to the UN was one of the deferred subjects,60 it is not surprising that Shertok returned to Israel in a pessimistic mood. Yet regardless of the U N ’s resolutions and Ben-Gurion’s preparation for the resumption of the war against Egypt, Shertok was stubbornly pursuing his line. Thus in preparation for direct talks with the Arabs, and especially for renewed talks with Abdullah of Transjordan, he directed Eliahu Sasson to return to Israel from Paris. The instruction for Sasson’s rushed return was linked to the convention of three thousand Palestinians in the second Palestinian Congress held in Jericho on 1 December 1948, where under persistent pressures from King Abdullah it was ceremoniously decided that the West Bank should be annexed to Transjordan and Abdullah acknowledged as king of the united country. It also gave the king the power to solve the Palestine problem to the best of his ability.61 Equipped with Shertok’s instructions, Sasson met with Abdullah al-Tall and transmitted through him the foreign ministry’s proposal for peace. King Abdullah’s response was that he was ready to negotiate a permanent solution pending Israel’s agreement to his annex­ ation of the West Bank. Although Ben-Gurion had raised the question of negotiations with Transjordan on 19 December 1948, when Shertok was still in Paris, and the cabinet moderates regretted their leading spokesman’s absence, since ‘Ben-Gurion did not dwell on the international aspects of this issue’, the truth is that Shertok himself was not persistent enough about the necessity of terminating the war with Transjordan. Aware of Shertok’s tactical indecision, the prime minister hastened to push his own position, saying: ‘For the time being we do not change the status 6f Jerusalem, We shall try to finish the business in the Negev [that is, carry out the operation there]; and we enter into talks with Abdullah. If these talks reach a turning point, the matter would be brought before the cabinet.’ In other words, as Eliahu Sasson correctly assessed, BenGurion was not interested in considering Abdullah’s plan of annexation.

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Ben-Gurion had only agreed to talk with Abdullah in order to gain time and divert the powers’ attention from the planned operation in the Negev.62 When the Egyptians had announced categorically that they refused to comply with all aspects of the Security Council resolution of 14 Novem­ ber 1948, calling them to conduct negotiations with Israel, the Israeli government, including Shertok, voted to launch the planned military operation. Moreover, Shertok agreed to remain in Paris to monitor international reactions. Consequently, on 22 December 1948 the Opera­ tion Horev, aimed to drive the Egyptians out of the Negev, opened with a massive bombardment of Egyptian positions. The first targets were in the Bir Aslouj—Auja al-Hafir area and Gaza. Since by then militarily the Egyptian army was already devastated and demoralized, the ID F could make rapid advances including an invasion into northern Sinai not far from al-Arish. Even at that point Shertok advised the cabinet that world reaction was not damaging Israel politically and that it could stall despite the 29 December 1948 Security Council resolution calling for a new cease-fire. Only then did he leave his headquarters in Paris for a short vacation in the countryside.63 Not only was the military operation going extremely well and the ID F did not meet any substantial opposition, but the political and diplomatic moves in Pàris by Shertok and his aides had also led to the indefinite shelving of Bemadotte’s testament. By the same token, nor was the 1947 partition resolution changed in any respect. In addition, it appeared that Israel’s membership in the UN would not be held up for long. It appeared as if Shertok had convinced the Americans and the French representatives that it would help Mapai’s national electoral campaign for the first Knesset, and keep extremist elements from gaining a majority, if Israel were admitted to the world body before these forthcoming general elections. Finally, Shertok and his officials in Paris succeeded in winning the sympathy and political support of many other delegations for their young state.64 At the end of that historic year, Shertok could have been justifiably satisfied. He had contributed significantly to Israel’s establishment, and his position in the small political élite of his party and in the government had been consolidated to the point where he was second on the Mapai list for the general elections to be held in early 1949. This position on the list accurately reflected his actual political status in Israel as second only to Ben-Gurion. He also was aware that world leaders, whom he had met, considered him as a very persuasive diplomat and as having the personal traits of a prominent statesman.65

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NOTES 1. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 24 Sept. 1948; E. Oren, ‘A De fa cto Deal? Policy and Operations on the Central Front During Fall 1948’ (Heb.) Maarachot, 311 (Mar. 1988), 39-44; cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 821-2. 2. Minutes of provisional government, 26 Sept. 1948, x, ISA; on that cabinet meeting see Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 26 Sept. 1948; and cf. Ben-Gurion, Restored S tate o f Israel, i. 288. 3. Ibid. 4. Minutes of provisional government, xi, 6 Oct. 1948, ISA; and Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 297; cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 821-6; Shlaim, Collusion, 303-11. 5. Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 294. 6. Shertok’s speech to Provisional Council of State, 27 Sept. 1948, ISA; Sharett, A t the Gates, 298-309; Shlaim, Collusion, 296-303. 7. Shlaim, Collusion, 296-303. 8. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 27 Sept. 1948; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 290-4. 9. Ibid.; and see also Ben-Gurion in cabinet, minutes of provisional government, 26 Sept. 1948, x, ISA. 10. Shiloah to Shertok, 30 Sept. 1948, Documents, i. 658. 11. Eban to Lourie, 29 Sept. 1948, Documents, i. 653; Epstein to Shertok, 2 Oct. 1948, Documents, ii. 4-5. 12. Shertok to Eytan, 5 Oct. 1948, Documents, ii. 21-9; Y. Nimrod, ‘An Egyptian Peace Proposal on the Eve of the Negev Conquest during the War of Inde­ pendence’, H otam , (Heb.) 17 (23 Apr. 1982). 13. Ibid. 14. Minutes of provisional government, 6 Oct. 1948, xi, ISA; Ben-Gurion, War D iary, iii, 5, 6, and 7 Oct. 1948. 15. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 8 Oct. 1948, Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 9 Oct. 1948, Documents, ii. 44; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 8 Oct. 1948. 16. Elath to Silver, 8 Oct. 1948, Documents, ii. 42-3; Shertok’s assessment of the situation, 11 Oct. 1948, ibid. 47-52; Shiloah to Shertok, 14 Oct. 1948, ibid. 55; BenGurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 294-8; cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 823-30. 17. Shertok to Eytan, 17 Oct. 1948, Shiloah to Shertok, 18 Oct. 1948, Documents, ii. 70-1; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 16, 17, 18 Oct. 1948; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 299-301. 18. See Documents, ii. 72; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 20 Oct. 1948, ibid. 76; Eytan to Mohn, 21 Oct. 1948, ibid. 77; minutes of provisional government, 26 Oct. 1948, xi, ISA; on disagreements in the Arab camp concerning the cease^e, see Shlaim, Collusion, 321-32. 19. Shiloah to Shertok, 24 Oct. 1948, Documents, ii. 87. 20. Elath to Eytan, 21 Oct. 1948, Eban to Eytan, 22 Oct. 1948, Documents, ii. 83; Shiloah to Shertok, 23 Oct. 1948, ibid. 85, Eban to Elath, 25 Oct. 1948, Eban to Shertok, 25 Oct. 1948, ibid. 89-90; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 23 Oct. 1948; cf. Shlaim, Collusion, 332.

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21. Rafael to Meyerson, 25 Oct. 1948, Documents, ii. 89. ' 22. Ben-Gurion, War D iary, iii, 25 Oct. 1948. 23. Minutes of provisional government, 26 Oct. 1948, xi, ISA; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 301-4. 24. Eban to Shertok, 26 Oct. 1948, Documents , ii. 103; Eytan to Eban, 29 Oct. 1948, ibid., 113; Shlaim, Collusion , 333-6; Uri Bialer, ‘The Iranian Connection in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 1948-1951’, Middle East Journal, 39/2 (1985). 25. Shimoni to Eban, 27 Oct. 1948, Documents , ii, 104-5; Bialer, ‘The Iranian Connection’; A. Nahmani, ‘Middle East Listening Post: Eliyahu Sasson and the Israeli Legation in Turkey, 1949-1952’, Studies in Zionism , 6/2 (1985), 263-85. 26. See Mapai Leadership Bureau of Mapai, 1 Nov. 1948, Mapai Archive, 25/48; Elath to Shertok, 29 Oct. 1948, Documents, ii. I ll; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 29 Oct. 1948. 27. Eban and Rafael to Eytan, 1 Nov. 1948, Documents, ii. 118. 28. Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 29 Oct. 1948. 29. See Shertok’s reactions to Ben-Gurion’s plan, ISA, FO, 2451/1; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 30 Oct. 1948, 1 Nov. 1948. 30. Shimoni to Sasson, 2 Nov. 1948, Documents, ii. 126-7; the quote is from Shertok to Meyerson, 5 Nov. 1948, ibid. 141-3; Shlaim, Collusion, 344-6; I. Pappe, ‘Moshe Sharett, David Ben-Gurion and the “Palestinian Option” 1948-1956’, Studies in Zionism, l l \ (1987), 77-96; Elpeleg, ‘Why Was “Independent Palestine” Never Created in 1948’; A. Sela, ‘Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War: Myth, Historiography and Reality’, Middle Eastern Studies, 28/4, (1992), 623-8; A. Sela, From Contacts to Negotiations: The Relations o f the Jewish Agency and the State o f Israel with King Abdullah, 1946-1950 (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Shiloah Institute, 1985). 31. Sasson to Shertok, 2 Nov. 1948, Documents, ii. 125; Epstein-Elath to Eban, 3

Nov. 1948, ibid. 129. 32. Shertok to Meyerson, 5 Nov. 1948, Documents, ii. 141-3; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 312-16. 33. Shertok to Meyerson, 5 Nov. 1948, Documents, ii. 141-3. 34. Weizmann to Truman, 5 Nov. 1948, Documents, ii. 143-6; Epstein to Shertok, 9 Nov. 1948, ibid. 154; Shertok to Eytan, 9 Nov. 1948, ibid. 155; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 5 Nov. 1948; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 319-24. 35. Shertok to Eytan, 10 Nov. 1948, Documents, ii. 158; Shertok to Eytan for Ben-Gurion, 11 Nov. 1948, ibid. 164; Meeting of Israeli Delegation to the UN General Assembly, Paris, 14 Nov. 1948, ibid. 173. 36. Shiloah to Eytan, 10 Nov. 1948, Documents, ii. 157; Shertok to Eytan, two cables, 14 Nov. 1948, ibid. 157, 158; Shertok to Eytan, 14 Nov. 1948, ibid. 170; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 10 Nov. 1948. 37. For Bunche’s proposal see Documents, ii. 151; Eban to Jessup, 10 Nov. 1948, ibid. 158-60; Shertok to Epstein, 10 Nov. 1948, ibid. 160-1. 38. Shertok to Eytan, 9 Nov. 1948, Documents, ii. 155; Sasson to Shimoni, 10 Nov. 1948, ibid. 161-3; Shiloah to Shertok, 20 Nov. 1948, ibid. 209-10. 39. Shertok to Eytan, 11 Nov. 1948, Documents, ii. 164-5; Comay’s and Epstein’s report on their talk with Lovett, 11 Nov. 1948, ibid. 165-7; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 10 Nov. 1948.

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40. Avriel to Meyerson, 11 Nov. 1948, Documents , ii. 168; Shertok to Eytan, 11 Nov. 1948, ibid. 169. 41. Sharett, A t the Gates, 313-33. 42. Eban to Eytan, 15 Nov. 1948, Documents , ii. 179; and see editor’s note, ibid. 179-80; Shertok to Eytan, 16 Nov. 1948, ibid. 186-7; Sharett, A t the Gates, 334-5; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 323-4. 43. Bunche’s proposals were specified in Mohn to Eytan, 14 Nov. 1948, Documents , ii. 174-7; Shertok to Eytan, 15 Nov. 1948, ibid. 184; Shertok to Eytan, two cables, 16 Nov. 1948, ibid. 186-8; on the discussions of Israeli delegation to the UN, 17 Nov. 1948, ibid. 191-4; Shertok to Eytan, 18 Nov. 1948, ibid. 195-6 and esp. n. 1; Shertok to Epstein, 18 Nov. 1948, ibid. 197; the government response is in Eytan to Mohn, 18 Nov. 1948, ibid. 198-201; minutes of provisional government, 17 Nov. 1948, ISA; Ben-Gurion, War Diary , iii. 14, 17, 18, and 20 Nov. 1948; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 325-7, 329-30. 44. Bunche to Shertok, 17 Nov. 1948, Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 17 Nov. 1948, Documents , ii. 188-9; Shiloah to Shertok, 20 Nov. 1948, ibid. 210; Ben-Gurion, War D iaryy iii, 17 Nov. 1948; minutes of provisional government, 17 Nov. 1948, ISA. 45. Eban to Eytan, 19 Nov. 1948, Documents , ii. 205; Shertok to Epstein, 19 Nov. 1948, ibid. 204; Shertok to Eytan, 20 Nov. 1948, ibid. 209; Ben-Gurion, War D iary, ii, 20 Nov. 1948. 46. See Hagai Eshed, A M ossad o f One M an , 118-9. 47. Shiloah to Shertok, 20 Nov. 1948, Documents , ii. 211; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 23 Nov. 1948, ibid. 215-16; Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 24 Nov. 1948, ibid. 221; Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 25 Nov. 1948, ibid. 231, Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 26 Nov. 1948, Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 26 Nov. 1948, ibid. 263; Ben-Gurion, War D iary y iii, 22, 24, and 26 Nov. 1948. 48. Ben-Gurion, War Diary y iii, 27 Nov. 1948. 49. Shertok to Eytan, 23 Nov. 1948, Documents , ii. 216; Shiloah to Shertok, 24 Nov. 1948, ibid. 220. 50. A meeting of the Israeli delegation to the UN, 28 Nov. 1948, DocumentSy ii. 239-41; Shertok to Epstein, 28 Nov. 1948, ibid. 238; Shertok to Trygve Lie, 29 Nov. 1948, ibid. 245-6; A meeting of the Israeli delegation, 1 Dec. 1948, ibid. 253-4. 51. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 29 Nov. 1948, Documents , ii. 246; Shertok to Eytan, 1 Dec. 1948, ISA, FM. 82/7; and for Governor of Jerusalem Bernard Joseph’s demand for the transfer of the seat of government to the capital, see Ben-Gurion, War Diary , iii, 5 Dec. 1948. 52. Shiloah to Shertok, 30 Nov. 1948, DocumentSy ii. 250; for the agreements see, ibid. 631-2; on the attempts to reach additional agreements ^see Shiloah to Shertok, ibid. 5 Dec. 1948; Ben-Gurion, War Diary y iii, 29 Nov. 1948, 5 Dec. 1948; Moshe Dayan, The Story o f m y Life, (A vnei Derech) (Heb.) (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1976), 79-82; Shlaim, Collusion 354-8. 53. Shertok to Eytan, 30 Nov. 1948, DocumentSy ii, 248-9; Shiloah (actually from Ben-Gurion) to Shertok, 2 Dec. 1948, ibid. 254-5. 54. Shertok to Eytan, three cables, 6 Dec. 1948, DocumentSy ii. 267-9.

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55. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 7 Dec. 1948, Documents, ii. 276-7. 56. Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 10 Dec. 1948, Documents, ii. 283; and see Ben-Gurion, War D iary , iii, 6 Dec. 1948. 57. On Ben-Gurion’s talk with Bunche held on 6 Dec. 1948, see Ben-Gurion, War Diary , iii, 6 Dec. 1948. 58. Ibid. 59. Eytan to Shertok, 6 Dec. 1948, Documents, ii. 270; Eytan to Bunche, 6 Dec. 1948, ibid. 271; Mohn to Ben- Gurion, Shertok to Eytan, Eban to Eytan, Eytan to Mohn, 9 Dec. ibid. 278-80. 60. Shertok to Eytan, 10 Dec. 1948, Documents, ii. 283-4; the UN resolution about the Conciliation Commission,, ibid. 639-41; Sharett, A t the Gates, 335-6. 61. Shlaim, Collusion, 359-60. 62. The quotes are from Ben-Gurion, War D iary, iii, 19 Dec. 1948, and also see, ibid. 12,16, and 18 Dec. 1948; Sasson to Shertok, 19 Dec. 1948, Documents, ii. 306-7; and see, Shertok to Eytan, 23 Dec. 1948, ISA, FM. 182/7; and on the talks with Transjordan see, Shlaim, Collusion, 358-65. 63. Eytan to Riley, 22 Dec. 1948, Documents, ii. 313-14; Shertok to Eytan, 24 Dec. 1948, ibid. 314; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 22 Dec. 1948, and on the goals of the operation see ibid. 23 Dec. 1948. 64. McDonald’s report which is quoted in Ben-Gurion, War Diary, ii, 13 Dec. 1948; and Eban’s report, ibid. 24 Dec. 1948. 65. Elath to Shertok, 13 Dec. 1948, Documents, ii. 293; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 28 Dec. 1948.

14 ‘Truce, Yes; Peace, No!’ The Israeli military operation (Operation Horev) against the Egyptians, which seemed to be condoned by world opinion, nevertheless caused a new political crisis. This crisis was precipitated by the Israeli habit of stalling as long as possible before implementing UN resolutions. On this occasion the stalling was aimed at buying enough time to complete the operation before complying with no other than a British draft resolution, submitted to the Security Council on 29 December 1948, calling on Israel to respect the cease-fire and withdraw from the southern Negev by 6 January 1949.1While on the surface this anti-Israel draft resolution was a British initiative, Shertok soon discovered that the main source for major pressure on Israel emanated rather from the USA. Although Ben-Gurion instructed the commander of the southern front, General Yigal Allon, who had pressed for the continuation of the battle over the Sinai, to stop all military activities if and when the British sent in units to enforce the cease-fire, and in any case to change the direction of the offensive from the Sinai towards Gaza, he too was less worried about possible British reprisals than about American political and economic reactions. Thus neither Shertok nor Ben-Gurion were particularly wor­ ried about British retaliation. It transpired that these two leaders had been informed that London was relying on the Americans to put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai.2 Indeed, during a planning session with ID F generals, Ben-Gurion stated that a British attack was highly unlikely.3 Despite his frequent utterances about the British threat, Ben-Gurion knew that British reprisals were not in the offing and had used it only as a bogey to stave off pressure by the IDF generals to continue with military operations against Egypt. In fact, Israeli moves indicated that the decision to withdraw from the Sinai and alter the direction of the attack towards the Egyptian pockets in the Western Negev was taken when, immediately after the Security Council resolution on resumption of the cease-fire, Yadin instructed Allon to retreat from the Sinai. That the main source of pressure on Israel was the USA, and not the rather dubious British ‘ultimatum’, had become even clearer on 31 December 1948. On that day the US ambassador to Israel, James

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McDonald, officially called upon the government to withdraw from all Egyptian territories. Although McDonald indicated that the USA was serving as an additional mouthpiece for the British, who might have to stand behind their mutual defence agreement with Egypt, but he had also to admit that Britain would not be dragged into a major military confrontation with the Israelis. What the American ambassador did, however, point out was that his own government might impose sanctions if Israel did not withdraw. Implicitly, McDonald threatened that the USA would desist from granting Israel full diplomatic recognition and withdraw its support for Israeli membership in the UN. In reality, the main reason for American pressure on Israel was connected not just with Israeli-Egyptian or Israeli-British relations, but also with Israeli-Transjordanian talks; for the Americans had learned that Israel was ready to enter negotiations only about a permanent peace treaty with Transjor­ dan but not about a prolonged truce.4 By applying pressure on Israel the US administration hoped to facilitate talks about both short- and long-term solutions. Shertok, who was serving as acting prime minister during BenGurion’s extended vacation in Tiberias, was left to deal with this mounting crisis. After consulting the IDF chief of staff, Yaacov Dori, and chief of operations, Yigael Yadin, he was convinced that the ID F could retreât from Sinai without harming the rest of the operation in the southern Negev, which Shertok endorsed. The ailing Ben-Gurion con­ curred, only adding that the IDF should increase its efforts against the Egyptian pockets and the Gaza Strip. After his communication with the prime minister, Shertok informed McDonald that Israel would retreat from the Sinai, and also that the government was ready to negotiate with Transjordan on a truce—one of the reasons behind American pressure.5 The harsh American reactions and British threats in view of Israeli reluctance to comply with UN resolutions were based on apprehensions over Israel’s expansionist intentions, which in turn were related to the shroud of heavy secrecy under which the entire Operation Horev was being conducted. Shertok was convinced that vital Israeli political and economic interests would be jeopardized if American-Israeli relations were damaged. To allay these deep American apprehensions about Israeli expansionist intentions, Shertok and other Israeli politicians, including Chaim Weizmann, who was still involved in the implementa­ tion of Israel’s fpreign policy, made it clear to President Truman and the administration that Israel had no further intentions for either expansion or aggression against its Arab neighbours.6

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However, the euphoric Israeli generals, especially the activist comman­ der of the southern front, Yigal Allon, had difficulty in accepting their civilian bosses’ decision to retreat from the Sinai. Despite the explicit orders that had been given to him by the chief of operations, Yadin, on behalf of the acting prime minister, Shertok, Allon flew to Tel Aviv to meet with Shertok to persuade him to alter the decision. In order to placate Allon—and to inflict some more damage on the Egyptian army—Shertok allowed just one more day of fighting, after which Allon was forced to withdraw his troops from Sinai and redirect them, as Ben-Gurion and Shertok had agreed, towards the northern Negev and the destruction of the Egyptian pockets. In view of the continuous mounting American pressure on Israel, and the apprehension that much-needed American aid might be withdrawn, Ben-Gurion henceforth consulted Shertok on all significant military decisions, including tactical moves. Shertok and Ben-Gurion acted in concert during this crisis since they concurred in the view that American sanctions on Israel would have disastrous consequences for the young state’s economy and society. Nevertheless, the unwarranted fact that the ID F was not successful in capturing Gaza or in wiping out the Egyptian pockets once American fears had been allayed and the IDF had been given the go-ahead to continue the operation in this direction,7 left Ben-Gurion and some of the generals bitter over the need to withdraw the ID F from the Sinai and redirect its operation without the capturing of Gaza. Yet, it is important to note that Yigal Allon used to tell his acquaintances that when he had protested against that withdrawal, Ben-Gurion promised him, ‘you will get Gaza!’ In view of what Ben-Gurion and his lieutenants considered äs a new military failure, they began nurturing thoughts of capturing these areas. These ideas would serve as the background to many future battles between Ben-Gurion and Shertok, who would be identified as the politician who had been most attuned to American, British, and UN threats that purportedly caused the end of the 1948 war. For BenGurion, on top of the ‘lament for generations to come’, this was just another proof of Shertok’s soft mettle, and added to his growing hostility towards his colleague. As the date set for the new cease-fire, 6 January 1949/approached, Shertok explained that the Israeli official decision to adhere to it was based on Egypt’s readiness to negotiate with Israel.8 Indeed, after the internationally sensational incident of 7 January 1949, when five British planes were shot down in the Negev by Israeli pilots, for a few days calm was maintained on all fronts. However, the fact that the Israeli govern-

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ment was more apprehensive about American pressure than by a British threat was borne out by Ben-Gurion’s next moves—despite new British warnings that they would use force and land armoured units in Aqaba, Ben-Gurion instructed Yigal Allon to continue with the operation intended to capture Eilat. Nevertheless, he warned Allon to avoid clashes with British forces. Shertok supported this decision because of his long-held wish to hold on to the entire Negev all the way to Aqaba. There is ample evidence that there was no collusion between Israel and Transjordan prior to 1949. Thus for example, as noted, in the wake of his talks with al-Tall in December 1948,9 the head of the foreign ministry’s Middle Eastern Department, Eliahu Sasson, tried to persuade Shertok and Ben-Gurion to open the process of conciliation with the Arab states by agreeing to Transjordan’s annexation of the West Bank and the beginning of talks with the Syrians. Ben-Gurion said the first issue was T o persuade ourself to agree to annexation of the West Bank to Jordan’. As for the tactics concerning the negotiations, he said that ‘for us it is more beneficial to drag the matter [talks with the Arabs] until we finish our business in the Negev, thus as long as the battle in the Negev continues, we will proceed with talks even if they are not effective’.10 After consultations with Shertok, Ben-Gurion instructed Sasson that, ‘We should not commit ourself to the annexation [of the West Bank'to Transjordan] now, but also we should not show resistance, but explain . . . that our government has not yet come to a decision on it.’11 This purposeful indecision on the parts of Shertok, Ben-Gurion, and the cabinet also guided the negotiations that Shiloah and Dayan were conducting with al-Tall at the beginning of January 1949.12 However, the Israeli leaders had realized as early as December 1948, and even more so in January 1949, that the war was about to end.13 Since Ben-Gurion and Shertok sensed that they were facing the beginning of a new stage in the development of Israel’s foreign and defence posture, they met frequently to evaluate the situation and plan future moves. When it came to the negotiations with Transjordan, so dear to the hearts of the Americans, as well as talks with the Egyptians, so dear to the heart of Shertok, Ben-Gurion refused to clarify the government’s ambiguous goals, explaining it by his intention to prevent further internal clashes, especially between moderates and activists, before the approaching general elections for the first Knesset. Usually sensitive to such domestic political considerations, Shertok did not agree with the prime minister since he suspected that Ben-Gurion’s true purpose was to continue the war against Egypt. When Shertok asked the ‘old man’ why Israel should fight with the Egyptians over Abdullah’s rule in Gaza and

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give him a road through the Negev connecting the Hebron area with Gaza, Ben-Gurion had to concede that ultimately it would be better to have Gaza annexed to Egypt rather than to Transjordan. But in the mean time, the two leaders continued to bicker over allowing supplies to the besieged troops in the Egyptian pockets in the Negev, with Shertok opting for reducing unnecessary tension with the Arabs and Ben-Gurion maintaining a rigid negative stance also in this respect. In January 1949 Shertok knew beyond any doubt that Israel reached a historical turning-point; it had just completed a remarkable military campaign that had secured most of the Negev for the Jewish state, hence, according to him, the quintessential question now facing the leadership was ‘whether today, as a result of our own initiative, I repeat and underline, we ourself wish to continue [the war], or whether we can stop here and seriously try to conduct negotiations with our neighbours about stabilizing borders and peace relations’.14 While Shertok used polished diplomatic formulations in public, he was honest and open in internal consultations. Thus in the Provisional Council of State and especially in the Mapai Council, he said that there was an urgent need to end the war and to move slowly towards peace if Israel wished to retain the territories it had already captured—which by far exceeded the borders stipulated in the UN 1947 partition resolution. He also stated that there was an overriding need to allocate more resources to the absorption of immigrants, resources which might go down the drain without assured territorial returns if they were spent on continuing the war. At the same meeting of the Provisional Council of State, Shertok elaborated what would become one of Israel’s most fundamental prin­ ciples for more than a generation to come: the preference for direct bilateral negotiations with each Arab state, rather then multilateral discussions with all the Arab states, pointing out that Israel had already been following this principle in secret talks with Egypt, Transjordan, and Lebanon. But he also divulged that the talks with Transjordan were stifled by British intervention, and that the talks with Lebanon by its leaders’ pre-conditions about the evacuation of Israeli forces from the villages that it had occupied during the Operation Hiram. He then revealed that ‘the most serious change in regard to peace talks, that only now is being shaped, has been initiated by the Egyptian government’, for Egypt was ready to negotiate seriously with Israel. Outlining the reasons why Israel should end the war out of its own volition, contrary to all future allegations about his attitude, Shertok said that it was important ‘not only because of the political principles underlying our position towards the UN, for this aspect is serious but not critical, although we

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have been careful not to cross the line of defiance. . . to the point of total blind disobedience’.15 The main reason for Israel’s agreement to negotiate with the Arabs was, however, not the possibility of causing a pretext for British military intervention, but rather a need for ‘normalization’ and a vivid and persistent fear of American political interference, for not only was the USA concerned about Egypt’s and Transjordan’s fate, and the possibility that the conflict would spread to other parts of the region, the Americans also wanted to avoid a situation in which it would face the dilemma of either supplying military aid to Israel or abandoning it. Shertok therefore proposed that Israel should demand formal termination of war with Egypt and Egypt’s withdrawal from the Negev and the Gaza Strip—but only after Israel had occupied Eilat. Here he disclosed to his colleagues that on this policy there was agreement between himself and Ben-Gurion, including the occupation of the Eilat area, the only pre-condition that he insisted upon and which was accepted by Ben-Gurion, was that it should be launched at a politically appropriate moment. After a substantial majority of the Provisional Council of State—including Ben-Gurion— had approved Shertok’s proposal, he instructed Israel’s negotiating team with the Egyptians to act in accordance with these principles. Although Shertok had convinced Ben-Gurion that negotiations with Egypt would diminish British influence in the region and lead to an atmosphere conducive to peace, and persisted in secretly trying to secure Britain’s de facto recognition of the Jewish state, it did not prevent him from launching fierce diplomatic attacks on the British government at the UN. Thus, for example, he instructed his envoys to lodge a complaint with the Security Council about alleged British military moves in the Gulf of Aqaba. But out of American considerations, prompted by British requirements, the Council was never convened to discuss this Israeli complaint.16 The sophisticated and flexible foreign policy that Shertok conducted with Ben-Gurion’s consent, in which great attention was paid to Amer­ ican demands, again had positive consequences. The USA recommended that Britain should agree to withdraw its complaint over Israel’s inter­ ception of the five British RAF reconnaissance aircraft, to avoid inter­ fering in the Israeli-Egyptian talks, and to try to calm down the region by persuading their Arab friends to negotiate with Israel. In this context, and with the Americans primarily in mind, Shertok withdrew Israel’s complaint to the Security Council about the alleged British manœuvres in the Gulf of Aqaba, despite opposition by Ben-Gurion, who had not relinquished his obsessive suspicion of Britain.17

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Egypt’s military exhaustion and Israeli conciliatory steps yielded far-reaching positive results. Thus in the wake of further diplomatic exchanges concerning observation of the cease-fire, the Israeli forces’ withdrawal from Egyptian territory, and bickering about the level of the delegations and the venue of meetings (Ben-Gurion had insisted that the talks should be conducted somewhere in Palestine), on 13 January 1949 secret proximity talks about a truce between Israel and Egypt began in Rhodes under the mediation of Ralph Bunche. Shertok had been prepared personally to head the Israeli delegation to Rhodes, but since the Egyptians dispatched only junior representatives, the Israeli delega­ tion was on a similar level. It was headed by Shertok’s confidant and director general of his ministry, Walter Eytan, and included Yigael Yadin and Yehoshafat Harkabi of the IDF, as well as Eliahu Sasson, Reuven Shiloah, Shabtai Rosenne, and Eliezer Simon—all of whom were hand-picked by Shertok and more or less loyal to him and to his line. In no time the two delegations agreed on a comprehensive agenda for their negotiations that would include: guarantees of non-belligerency and avoidance of threats to national security; the implementation of all Security Council resolutions on the besieged Egyptian pockets in Negev; the demarcation of borders; the separation of forces; and military forces limitations in the Negev and Sinai.18 Thus in an unobtrusive fashion, the first round of talks with an Arab government had begun. Shertok played an extremely significant role in these and all other talks on truce and armistice. Shertok was well aware of the tremendous risks and potential advant­ ages involved in these proximity talks in the calm atmosphere in Rhodes. He also knew that patience and prudence were needed in conducting these negotiations if he and his colleagues were not to miss an agreement and wreck Mapai’s chances of maintaining its hegemony in the ap­ proaching elections, which were the first to be conducted in the inde­ pendent Jewish state. He and Ben-Gurion therefore were careful to balance domestic and international considerations. This caution was not exaggerated, for the talks with Egypt brought forth vicious attacks by Mapam through its leader, Meir Yaari, on the left, and Herut, through its leader, Menachem Begin, on the right. In addition, Shertok had to manœuvre carefully to accommodate his tactical flexibility with the strategic rigidity of Ben-Gurion and the IDF generals. (Thus, for example, he was not opposed to the evacuation of wounded Egyptian soldiers from the Faluja pocket, while Ben-Gurion and the IDF generals viewed even such a humanitarian gesture as superfluous and regarded the wounded merely as a further bargaining chip.) However, he was able

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to achieve most of his goals through his patience and readiness to compromise with Ben-Gurion.19 Yet since he accurately assumed that the other Arab states were waiting to see how the negotiations with Egypt progressed, Shertok laboured mightily to expedite them. To minimize the intervention and influence of Ben-Gurion and the IDF, Shertok tried to separate purely military from political issues and their considerations. In this he was assisted by his officials. Thus, in this vein, in one of his dispatches from the talks, Walter Eytan wrote: I hope that traditional military considerations will not be allowed to carry too much weight; one more M ish la t [strong point] here, another road-junction there, etc. All our talking is on the basic presumption that the war is in the process of liquidation, in which case these military considerations lose much if not all of their force.

This was the case since, despite all of Shertok’s efforts to prevent it, Ben-Gurion and the generals were still creating recurring crises over such marginal issues as the evacuation of wounded Egyptians, supply of food and medicine to their besieged pockets in the Negev, and control over strongholds. It was therefore no surprise that Eytan requested a greater deal of authority and autonomy for the civilians in the delegation. Since Shertok’s position in the government was strong enough, together with his moderate colleagues, he succeeded in persuading the government to grant Eytan and Shiloah greater freedom of action, much to BenGurion’s indignation.20 In accordance with the strategy Shertok and Ben-Gurion had finally agreed to, and concurrently with the Rhodes talks with the Egyptians, Sasson and Dayan continued their talks with the representatives of Transjordan, including secret talks between the two and King Abdullah in his palace in Shuneh. To Shertok’s personal satisfaction, in his meeting with the Israeli negotiators on 17 January 1949, Abdullah blamed the failure to reach an agreement on the eve of the war on Golda Meyerson’s rigidity. Also to Shertok’s satisfaction, striking a more positive note, during that same meeting the king expressed his intention to distance himself from the Arab League’s policy as well as his dissatisfaction with British attitudes, which, he said, were causing him great political and diplomatic inconvenience, for example, by deploying their military forces in the Gulf of Aqaba. But at the same time, he implored Sasson and Dayan not to provoke the British who were still capable of further complicating matters, and to continue talks with the Egyptians but to refuse to hand Gaza over to them, and to keep Israel

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from any operation aimed at occupying Aqaba, where he was ready to grant Israel certain rights and concessions. In return, he was prepared to expedite the negotiations with Israel if the talks with the Egyptians were successful. In an additional meeting with the king held two weeks later, Abdullah stated that he would be ready to negotiate peace after attaining an armistice, that he had obtained a British endorsement of his moves, and emphasized that Israel should refrain from any attack on Aqaba. Shertok, who knew and understood the king better than anyone else in the Israeli political élite, regarded the king’s promises as a mere public relations gimmick. And since Ben-Gurion was also suspicious of Abdul­ lah and his British patrons, the initial talks with Transjordan dragged on without making much progress.21 There is no success like success, and success in one sphere fosters success in others. In the light of the initial promising progress in Israel’s bilateral negotiations with Egypt, the Americans increased their pressure on Whitehall gradually to alter its hostile policy towards Israel. At that point there was, however, no need for undue pressure or prodding on London, for the British were ready to improve their relations with Israel for their own strategic reasons. Hence, towards the end of January 1949, as a token of its change of intentions, Britain granted Israel de facto recognition and released the Jewish refugees still detained in the British camps in Cyprus. Although this move was balanced by Britain’s simul­ taneous effort to promote international recognition of Transjordan, Shertok rightly felt that this diplomatic achievement of his and his loyal officials represented a first step towards the solution of such disputes with Britain as freeing Israeli Sterling réserves frozen in London, and the reactivation of the Haifa refineries. Shertok was particularly satisfied to learn that Bevin himself was interested in a fresh start with Israel, and that the British leader was ready to discuss all pending issues with Shertok rather than Ben-Gurion, who continued to show explicit hos­ tility towards Britain and its Labour government.22 Furthermore, when Eliahu Epstein informed Shertok that the Americans were expressing grave doubts about the necessity of co-ordinating their Middle Eastern policies with the British, and that they were pursuing their own interests in the region, he expressed his great relief. As Shertok had ex­ pected, in the new relaxed atmosphere of Israeli-American relations, the Export-Import Bank agreed to grant Israel a loan of one hun­ dred million dollars, to provide urgently needed financial aid to the impoverished Jewish state. Members of the Israeli cabinet knew that all these accomplishments, with both the British and the Americans, were a tribute to the foreign and finance ministeries, both of which were

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headed by the two moderate members in the leading trio, Shertok and Kaplan. Israel’s political success with the Western powers was not, however, immediately extended to the negotiations with the Egyptians. The lack of rapid progress in this sphere was partly due to Israeli and Egyptian inexperience with the intricacies of such complex negotiations, and partly to attempts by both sides to extract maximum political and territorial gains. None the less, the way in which the Egyptians con­ ducted the negotiations showed their interest to reach an agreement, partly because they realized that the Israelis held better strategic cards. Under Shertok’s watchful eye and influence, Israel also showed a certain degree of flexibility and readiness to make minor concessions. One of the most significant reasons for the delay in the talks was, however, the fierce internal controversy between activist ‘soldiers’ and moderate ‘diplomats’ in the Israeli delegation to Rhodes. Since he was attuned to the Americans and British on the one hand, and to the Arabs on the other, Shertok preached moderation and flexibility to all members of the Israeli delegation to the Rhodes talks. For he knew that the alternative to these negotiations would be the greater involvement of the UN Conciliation Commission, which was composed of a reluctant American repre­ sentative, a French diplomat whose government’s policy in this respect was unclear, and a Turk whose own government was still pro-Arab despite Shertok’s efforts to improve relations with it. In view of Israeli stalling, the USA had reactivated its carrot-and-stick policy towards Israel. Hence the choice before the Israeli government was between American economic aid and the loss of America’s de jure recognition and withdrawal of its support for Israel’s membership of the UN.23 It was therefore up to Ben-Gurion and Shertok to solve the controversies between the ‘soldiers’ and the ‘diplomats’ in the Israeli delegation to Rhodes. This meant compromise over the lines of separ­ ation of forces and especially over the delineation of borders, which was the quintessential bone of contention between the two camps. As a result of further internal consultations, both sides agreed to stick to the familiar demand for the international borders of Palestine. This com­ promise allowed the Israeli delegation to deal with the Egyptian demand that Israel withdraw to the pre-Operation Horev lines. Since the Israelis had the upper hand militarily, they refused to budge over any further demands. The Egyptians had no other way but to give in on this point. Consequently, ]by the end of January 1949, the main outline of an Egyptian-Israeli non-aggression agreement had been hammered out. As far as the future borders of the two states were concerned, this outline

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of a non-belligerency agreement called for an Egyptian retreat from the Gaza Strip, demilitarized zones along the border, and arrangements concerning the separation of military forces. Effectively, towards the end of January 1949, Auja al-Hafir was the only area being disputed by the Israelis and Egyptians. Additionally, the Egyptians still retained their claim, if only in principle, to Beersheba and the southern Negev.24 Shertok’s optimistic assessment was that the agreement’s "political significance is clear: it practically means an Egyptian recognition of Israel, and the end of war with Egypt. It will also have a positive influence on other Arab states, will serve as an opening to general peace, and to the removal of obstacles created by third parties [like Britain and the US].’ He therefore instructed the delegation in Rhodes that ‘even if the worst comes, do not sever the negotiations without asking us first’.25 Consequently, after removing some further obstacles, the first agree­ ment with Egypt was openly and directly signed by the two sides on 24 January 1949. This agreement dealt with the continuation of the de facto cease-fire. It was soon followed by a second agreement dealing with the release of the Egyptian pockets in the western Negev. Since Israeli moderates felt a sense of urgency to conclude negotiations with Egypt, Shertok, who was apprehensive of undue complications, refused Ralph Bunche’s suggestion that the other Arab delegations be summoned to Rhodes until talks with the Egyptians on open questions had successfully been completed. Bunche accepted this Israeli position, and he did set the date for convening the other Arab delegations only towards the end of February 1949.26 Simultaneously with his deep involvement in the Rhodes negotiations and of course in all other facets of Israel’s foreign affairs, on which he had virtually total autonomous control, because of his popularity at home, Shertok was also busy in Mapai’s elections campaign. Like his colleagues, he viewed these elections as having immense practical and symbolic meaning, since they constituted the first manifestation of full Israeli sovereignty, a test for Mapai’s position in Israeli public opinion as well as a test of the political inclinations of the hundreds of thousands of new immigrants, who still were an unknown political quantity. Like everybody else in Israel, he knew that the elections would also determine whether Mapai could maintain its long-held political hegemony. The party’s social democratic platform, which he had helped draft as in previous elections in pre-state Yishuv, bore his clear moderate imprint. Moreover, he behaved characteristically as a highly disciplined political soldier and lectured and campaigned wherever he was requested throughout the country. Next to Ben-Gurion, Shertok was the most

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popular Mapai speaker, and indeed large crowds Were present at all of his public appearances during which he combined an analysis of Israel’s political position with advocacy of his party’s positions. He was greatly respected especially by veteran Israelis, who vividly remembered his achievements during the Second World War and the diplomatic cam­ paign that he had led in attaining the 1947 UN resolution on partition. After a stormy campaign, which entailed acerbic clashes with Menachem Begin and his new Herut party on the one hand, and with Mapam on the other, the elections to the Constitutional Assembly, which shortly became the Israeli Knesset were held on 25 January 1949. Despite the Mapai leaders’ grave anxieties about the results, the party won 46 of the 120 seats (36 per cent), its main rival on the left, Mapam capturing only 19 seats (15 per cent), the United Religious Front won 16 seats (12 per cent), Herut received 14 seats (11 per cent), the General Zionists obtained 7 seats (5 per cent), the Progressives won 5 seats (4 per cent), with the other 13 seats divided among smaller factions, such as the Communists and Sephardim. As no single party had won an absolute majority, efforts to establish a coalition began immediately after the results were in. But as the Mapai leaders (and almost all subsequent coalition-makers) would soon rediscover, forming a coalition was no easy matter in the more deeply segmented Israeli polity. Although there was broad consensus in Mapai that the coalition should include all parties left of Herut and right of the Communists, there were a number of pre-conditions for inclusion: prospective coalition partners had to agree to collective responsibility of their representatives in the cabinet; a majority of the portfolios would go to the Labour camp; and the government’s foreign policy should be aimed at Jewish-Arab peace agreement, friendship with both the USA and the Soviet Union, support of the UN, and non-identification with opposing global blocs.27 Shertok’s influence in drafting these latter demands was clear. Since Israel had proven that it was capable of conducting orderly general elections, which was one of the American pre-conditions for full recognition, the administration could no longer stall in fulfilling Tru­ man’s promise to accord Israel such recognition, which indeed it did in early February 1949. At the time even this recognition was regarded by every Israeli, including Ben-Gurion, as a major coup, especially since twenty-four states followed the USA in granting the Jewish state de jure recognition. Formal recognition did not mean that the USA eased its pressure on Israel to facilitate progress in Rhodes and refrain from military oper­ ations aimed at further territorial expansion. Moreover, even then the

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USA did not hesitate to express its critical views on Israel’s domestic as well as defence and foreign positions. Thus the Americans had made it clear that their recognition was conditional on Mapai’s excluding both Communists and Begin’s Herut party from the coalition and of course from the new government. On the other hand, as Shertok and Mapai leaders were well aware, the Soviets would not tolerate a coalition which altered Israel’s non-aligned position.28 Although Mapai leaders took the superpowers’ positions into consideration in their negotiations, it had in any event been inclined to form ‘a narrow coalition’ in conjunction with the United Religious Front, the Progressive party and a few other tiny splinter groups. In such a coalition, Mapai’s ‘three big men’—BenGurion, Shertok, and Kaplan—retained their leading positions and Shertok remained second only to Ben-Gurion in seniority. The prospective composition of the coalition and of the Mapai contingent in the cabinet also meant that the moderates would continue to have a clear edge in the Israeli government, and that Shertok would continue to wield significant influence over Israel’s foreign and defence affairs. While the elections in Israel had caused a delay in negotiations with Egypt, when talks between the two countries resumed, the fate of the Negev had to be tackled. In his capacity as acting mediator, on 31 January 1949 Ralph Bunche submitted a draft of a general armistice agreement that was found wanting by the ‘soldiers’ in the Israeli delegation, for it called not only for an Israeli retreat from the Negev and the Gaza area, but also the demilitarization of the Auja al-Hafir area. Yet both Ben-Gurion and Shertok ‘agreed that Israel should attain an agreement and were ready to withdraw from and demilitarize Auja al-Hafir on the condition that it serve as the site for the UN regional committee charged with supervising the armistice agreements’.29 The accord between the two senior leaders about these concessions reflected a volte-face in Ben-Gurion’s thinking that had been encouraged by both Shertok’s thorough persuasion and hints to activate the moder­ ate majority in the cabinet, and in the context of the progress made in the Rhodes talks—which were conducted directly between the two delegations from 4 February 1949. But, ‘the cabinet decision to make concessions on the issue of Auja al-H afir. . . if this will affect an agreement with the Egyptians, was predicated on [Israel’s] freedom of action in the southernmost triangle all the way down to Eilat’. In communications to Eytan in Rhodes, Shertok stated: You are mistaken in thinking that first, the difficulty lies with the government and second, that in my discussions with Ben-Gurion military calculations

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predominated. There are also political considerations against certain agreements [that is, concessions]. Ben-Gurion is also well aware of the need to reach an agreement. He tends to disregard the Security Council, and in this I disagree. But he is close to my own position as to the importance of reaching an agreement.30

Once Ben-Gurion and Shertok reached their accord, the cabinet followed suit and reached a compromise position on the fate of the Auja al-Hafir area: Israel would agree to limited demilitarized strips in its own territory in return for the demilitarization of comparable Egyptian territory, but objected to UN supervision of both zones. When passing this information on to Israel’s negotiators in Rhodes, Shertok explained that this was not the cabinet’s final position but rather guide-lines for additional negotiations, and that these had been approved by a nine-toone majority of the ministers present in the cabinet’s meeting. In other words, Shertok was hinting that the ‘diplomats’ in the delegation could offer to make some further concessions.31 As the end of the war seemed to be approaching and while Israel demonstrated its readiness to make concessions and a degree of eager­ ness to create a new modus vivendi, in February 1949, the almost forgotten UN Conciliation Commission resumed its meddling in Middle Eastern and Palestine affairs. During a very long meeting with its members, who had arrived in Israel after a shuttle to Arab capitals, on 9 February 1949 Shertok learned that the commission intended to take up the question of Jerusalem before Israel had a chance to establish new ‘facts’ there. Far from being willing to ‘sacrifice’ Jerusalem as he would later be accused of, Shertok unhesitatingly told the Commission’s members that Israel intended to annex the Jewish part of the Holy City, and allow the Arab part to be internationalized. His only concessionary note was that these arrangements could be introduced as a result of negotiations and explicit agreement between Israel and Transjordan. At the same meeting, he reiterated Israel’s pre-conditions to peace with the Arabs: direct negotiations; no return of refugees before the signing of a peace treaty; the settlement of refugees in Arab states; and a cabinet and his own preference for an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank. This latter stipulation was modified by the addendum that Israel would not object to Transjordan’s annexation of the West Bank in exchange for substantial border modifications on various fronts with this state, especially,in the Wadi Ara. region.32 Despite his outspoken state­ ments in favour of concessions and agreement, Shertok knew that the Americans had a point in unleashing the Conciliation Commission.

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Knowledge of the Commission’s shuttle also forced Ben-Gurion and himself, as well as the moderate chief of staff, Dori, to be more accommodating in the talks in Rhodes. Therefore General Yadin, who had returned to persuade the three to reject the Egyptian demands with regard to Auja al-Hafir, arguing that since Israel was militarily stronger it should not make any further concessions, came out of his meeting with the three empty-handed. Even his modified suggestion to ‘drag the issue [the negotiations] without resolution for a long duration’ was immedi­ ately rejected by the three. Later Eytan and Yadin would admit that only after this decision could the negotiations have been brought to a conclusion.33 At this point, the Rhodes negotiations had been focusing on Egypt’s pro forma demand that Israel withdraw from Beersheba and the southern Negev. However, since it was clear that this was not a viable demand, the drafting of the final agreements had gone on. By 20 February 1949 the decisive draft of the agreement was ready for the perusal of the respective governments. Then all that was left to do was for the Egyptian delegation to obtain Cairo’s green light to make the concessions in the Negev. When this authorization was given, a delighted Shertok cabled the delegation that Tom orrow [24 February, the date of the signing of the agreement] will mark a new phase in the firm establishment of Israel, in the development of its relations with its neighbours, as well as in the life of the entire Middle East’.34 Carried away by his own emotions, Ben-Gurion was no less enthusiastic; in this mood he wrote in his war diary that, ‘Second to the establishment of the state and to our victories on the battlefield, this is the greatest event in a year of tremendous achievements!’35 But very soon, he would pro­ foundly alter his attitude. The Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement, signed in an austere cere­ mony on 24 February 1949 in Rhodes was received by the majority of the Israeli public with mixed feelings and enthusiastically by only a minority. While the moderates regarded it as a timely and most wel­ comed relief, the majority of the population was sceptical about its ramifications. In other words, although the moderates dominated the cabinet and thus the political scene, this did not reflect the attitudes of the population as a whole. But, what was most important?, Ben-Gurion had co-operated with Shertok in creating what would become known as the ‘Armistice Regime’. In the course of the existence of this ‘regime’, however, relations between the two leaders deteriorated as the differ­ ences between Shertok and his older colleague were too deep to be bridged even by such an important agreement.

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A seed for further controversies between the two leaders was con­ nected with a hypothesis held by Shertok and his associates, especially his most experienced adviser on Arab affairs, Eliahu Sasson. According to this school of thought ‘multiple linkages’ characterized Middle East politics in general and the Arab^-Israeli conflict in particular; i.e., there were strong multiple connections between global developments, the policies of the superpowers and international organizations, and the deeply penetrated Middle Eastern politics. In the context of the ‘multiple linkages’ hypothesis, Shertok and his followers viewed Egypt’s decision to make concessions in regard to the Negev as a result of US influence in that an Israel-Egypt non-belligerency pact was only the very first step in a series of Israeli negotiations and ultimately agreements with other Arab states. Israeli moves during these negotiations were therefore extremely significant. Egyptian indecision concerning the fate of the West Bank, as well as its unclear attitude towards Gaza and the return, or resettlement of the Arab refugees, were also taken as indicators that Egypt itself was prepared to conduct further negotiations with Israel. Shertok and Sasson surmised that ultimately the Egyptians would evacuate Gaza, oppose the annexation of the West Bank to Transjordan, and demand a partial return of the refugees, and would oppose the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs there­ fore chose to maintain and even upgrade its secret direct contacts with the Egyptians, especially in Paris, which would remain the main venue for secret contacts.36 This strategic approach to the negotiations with the Egyptians, as well as most of the other elements of the Shertok line, became anathema to Ben-Gurion and the IDF, who gradually came to believe that in a longer historical perspective, Israel’s War of Independence was far from over. Instead they thought Israel should be preparing for a next round to ‘rectify’ what had not already been achieved or ‘given’ back to the Egyptians. In the light of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement, the cabinet had approved seemingly two contradictory moves, which reflected the two prevailing trends in Israeli politics and the resultant compromises: to open negotiations with Transjordan and to prepare for a major military operation in the Eastern part of the southern Negev, on which there had been an a priori agreement between Shertok and Ben-Gurion and their respective ministries.37 In his preliminary preparatory talks with Israel’s delegation to the negotiations with Transjordan in Rhodes, Shertok stated that there was no contradiction between these moves, that the planned military operation, on which he had agreed with Ben-

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Gurion, would be closely co-ordinated with political moves, and that therefore Israeli demands should not be exaggerated but rather realistic. The first genuine step towards serious Israel-Transjordan negotiations was, however, taken not in Rhodes but in Jerusalem on 13 February 1949, during a meeting between the Arab affairs expert of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yaacov Shimoni, and the ID F’s Moshe Dayan, with al-Tall and King Abdullah’s personal physician and adviser, Doctor Shawkat Aziz al-Saty. The king’s proposals for agreement with Israel included a prolonged in situ armistice rather than a peace treaty, Iraqi forces to remain in Transjordan but under Transjordanian control, Lydda and Ramie to be evacuated by Israel and annexed to the West Bank (which was a ritualistic demand reminiscent of Egypt’s claim for an Israeli withdrawal from Beersheba), Israeli access to the Dead Sea concessions, the exclusion from the talks of Israeli access to Aqaba and Transjordian access to Haifa, and the partition of Jerusalem. There was thus still no collusion between Israel and Transjordan although Abdullah’s wish to create it was indicated by an invitation he extended to Sasson to return to Transjordan for secret preliminary talks. Well aware of Sasson’s eagerness to reach agreement with Arab rulers and that such talks might increase the king’s appetite for Israeli concessions, Shertok rejected the king’s request. Shertok stipulated that Sasson would go to Transjordan only if there was a crisis in the negotiations; in the mean time, he would return to Paris to resume equally secret contacts with Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese diplomats. After some further bickering with al-Tall on agenda and procedures, the formal Israel-Transjordan talks opened in Rhodes on 4 March 1949, that is, eight days after the agreement with Egypt had been signed. As the negotiations with Transjordan involved highly complex and sensitive issues, such as the partition of Jerusalem, Shertok assumed direct responsibility for continuously guiding and supervising them. And since the cabinet had not ruled out an additional military operation against the Iraqi forces still deployed north of Jerusalem, Shertok instructed the delegation to conduct negotiations over a truce only with the Arab Legion, but not including the Iraqis. In his preliminary guide-lines to the Israeli delegation to Rhodes, Shertok instructed them to demand that the boundary in Wadi Ara be moved to thé eastern hills of this wide Wadi so that the strategic road connecting the Coastal Plain with the Jezreel Valley would be included in Israel. (These instructions by Shertok show that it was not entirely due to Dayan’s ingenuity that this element was ultimately included in the agreement, as Dayan’s admirers would argue later.) He also guided the Israeli delegation to

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demand Transjordan’s evacuation of the ‘Small 'Triangle’ (a heavily populated Arab area East of Tel Aviv), Latrun, and the area surround­ ing the Jerusalem-Jaffa railway, couching both demands in strategicmilitary rather than territorial terms. As to southern Israel, all the way down to Eilat, he instructed that the international border become the permanent line, and that Israel must have free access to the Gulf of Aqaba. With regard to Jerusalem, his sine qua non was free access to Mount Scopus and to the Dead Sea. Finally, the Transjordanian-British mutual defence pact was not to be applied during the life of the armistice agreement; nor was Transjordan to annex the West Bank while the talks were still in progress. These clear demands, which had been formulated by Shertok’s minis­ try, were approved by the cabinet on 27 February 1949, with BenGurion fully concurring. The Israeli delegation to the Rhodes talks followed them albeit without hurrying to complete the negotiations in order to give Israel ample time to launch Operation Uvda [fact], aimed at capturing the southernmost part of the Negev, including Eilat. Operation Uvda, intended for the occupation of a vast but almost vacant area, was set in motion with Shertok’s full consent and even blessing. In accordance with his suggestion, however, the cabinet’s strict instruction to the generals was that during this planned operation they must avoid any clash with British forces, which were stationed in Transjordan and in the Gulf of Aqaba region.38 While Israeli-American relations gradually improved during the early part of 1949, those with the Soviet Union and some of its satellites were becoming more problematic. Shertok, who was the chief architect of cordial relations with the Eastern bloc and non-identification with either East or West, had to deal with this unfavourable development. Most difficult was the situation with Romania, where the new Communist government soon began to curb Zionist activities and detain Jewish activists. The Romanian government’s new measures were triggered by demonstrations held outside the Israeli consulate in Bucharest on the part of thousands of Jews who wished to emigrate or who resented being harried by the Romanian government’s secret agents. Shertok’s appre­ hensions grew further since the Polish government was also applying pressure on Jews who had expressed a wish to emigrate to Israel. In view of mounting difficulties in these two countries, Shertok was relieved that the situation in other Eastern bloc states was somewhat better; the Bulgarian government followed the positive attitude it had held towards Jews during the Second World War by permitting those who wished to emigrate to do so with almost no restrictions; the Czech government was

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considering allowing the emigration of twenty thousand Jews, the sale of additional weapons to Israel, as well as assistance to Israeli military industries; Yugoslavia was permitting its Jews to leave; and, finally, Shertok had received encouraging news regarding the possibility of Jewish emigration from Hungary. What bothered Shertok was the extent to which the Soviet Union was influencing the policies of its satellites and the extent to which the satellites were co-ordinating their policies with each other. Unlike Shertok, Golda Meyerson, who, from late 1948 to March 1949, was the first head of the Israeli legation in Moscow, was sceptical that the Soviets did influence the Eastern bloc. She also doubted Israel’s ability to influence Moscow, especially in view of the severe limitations the Kremlin had imposed on the Israeli legation’s activities when she served there.39 Shertok, however, continued to operate on the assumption that he could conduct an effective dialogue with the Soviets, and even considered making a trip to Moscow to try to persuade the Kremlin leaders to alter their attitudes and policy. Although the trip was shelved, thanks to his plans to visit the USA, he and his staff continued to wrestle with the Soviet Union and its satellites over emigration permits and Israeli exports, the latter being deemed necessary to balance the ‘ransom payments’ being demanded by those Eastern bloc countries who did allow Jews to leave, and paid by Israel and Jewish organiza­ tions. While the Rhodes talks with the Jordanians were going on at a slow pace, and Shertok was closely monitoring the preparations for Operation Uvda and relations with the Eastern bloc, he was also involved in the endless talks with the various parties ‘right of the Communists’ and ‘left of H erat’ in the protracted coalitional negotiations that had began immediately after the January 1949 elections. For almost a month after the elections, Mapai was still unable to form a coalition and thus also a new cabinet. In this context, always a staunch supporter of political efficiency, in view of the enormous social and economic tasks facing Israel, Shertok advocated a compact government capable of influencing the national agenda, of formulating clear policies, and of implementing them. In the emerging Israeli political system this was an almost impossible mission. For it meant forming the broadest possible coalition within ‘legitimate’ political boundaries (i.e., without Begin’s Herat and the Communists), and yet persuading the prospective partners in this coalition to curb their demands for pursuing their separate political agendas and appetite for cabinet portfolios. Considering Mapai’s posi­ tion during these negotiations, the pro-Soviet socialist party, Mapam,

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refused to join the coalition and cabinet due to Mapai’s centrist stand on domestic social and economic issues, such as planned economy and the status of the Israeli co-operative movement, and no less on the policy of non-alignment in international affairs. Hence the coalition that Mapai finally succeeded in forming constituted ‘only’ 73 of the 120 seats, including 48 from Mapai, 16 from the still moderate United Religious Front, 5 Progressives and 4 Sephardim.40 As noted, Shertok also strove for a small cabinet, and was satisfied when the portfolios were limited to a dozen, of which the vast majority were again moderates. The new cabinet was introduced to the Knesset on 18 March 1949, and was ratified two days later.41 Shertok was not, however, successful in his persistent campaign to influence Ben-Gurion and his colleagues in Mapai and the other centrist parties to draft a written constitution for the young state, which he strongly supported from his deep belief in civil liberties and from his undaunted search for genuine political efficiency. Symbolically, on the eve of the formation of Israel’s first elected government, and of his next trip to the USA, Shertok decided to change his last name to a Hebrew one following the custom in those early days of Israel among many public personages. Completely in accordance with the commitments that he had made as a young student at the Herzliyah high school in small Tel Aviv some thirty years earlier, and in line with his contributions to the Jewish nation, state, and his party, he chose the name Sharett, which means ‘to serve’. At the beginning of 1949, he was well positioned to serve and thus to influence the development of all three. By then Moshe Sharett had established his position as a founding father of the Jewish state and thus as a very senior member of its ‘service aristocracy’.

NOTES 1. Eytan to Fischer, 24 Dec. 1948, D ocum ents, ii. 314; Fischer to Epstein, 28 Dec. 1948, ibid. 318. 2. On the British position, see Heyd to Shertok, 30 Dec. 1948, D ocum ents, ii. 319; on the change in Bevin’s position, see Linton to Shertok, 1 Jan. 1949, ibid. 334; on Israeli-British relations then see N. Lorch, ‘Big Power vs. Small Power’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1985), 1-161, and esp. 65-72; Ben-Gurion, R estored S ta te o f Israel., i. 335-6; Cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-G urion , 858-61. 3. Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 30 Dec. 1948. 4. McDonald to Shertok, 31 Dec. 1948, D ocum ents, ii. 331-2. 5. Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , ii, 31 Dec. 1948; Cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-G urion , 858-60.

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6. Ginsburg to Shertok, 3 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 339-40; Weizmann to Truman, 3 Jan. 1949, ibid. 337-8; and see Shertok in Provisional Council of State, ISA. 7. Shertok to McDonald, 3 Jan. 1948, D ocum ents, ii. 335-7; McDonald to Shertok, 4 Jan. 1948, ibid. 340-1; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 31 Dec. 1948, 2, 3, and 4 Jan. 1948; Bar-Zohar, Ben-G urion, 860-1. 8. Ben-Gurion, R estored S ta te o f Israel, i. 336; Shertok in Provisional Council of State, 11 Jan. 1949, ISA, FM. 2446/9; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary, iii, 930; Shertok to Lourie, 6 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 5. 9. On the negotiations with al-Tall see Shiloah to Ben-Gurion and Shertok, 26 Dec. 1948, D ocum ents, ii. 334-6; on talks with al-Tall on 30 Dec. 1948, ibid. 336-9; and on talks with him on 5 Jan. 1948, ibid. 340-2. 10. Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary, iii, 30 Dec. 1948; A Political Consultation, 30 Dec. 1948, D ocum ents, ii. 320-31. 11. For a report on these consultations on 30 Dec. 1948, see D ocum ents, ii. 320-31. 12. On the consultations in the foreign ministry, 4 Jan. 1949, and on Ben-Gurion’s evaluation of the situation, W ar D iary, iii, 8 Jan. 1949. 13. Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary, iii, 7 and 8 Jan. 1949. 14. Shertok in Provisional Council of State, 11 Jan. 1948; and see his similar speech in thirty-seventh Mapai Council, 12 Jan. 1948, Mapai Archive, 22/37. 15. Ibid. 16. On the British positions see Linton’s reports on his talks with Hector McNeil, 30 Dec. 1948 and 4 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 342-4; Epstein to Shertok, 5 Jan. 1949, ibid. 345; Epstein to Shertok, 6 Jan. 1949; and Epstein to Shertok, 6 Jan. 1949, ibid. ii. 347; Shertok to Eban, 9 Jan. 1949, ibid. 352; Eban to Shertok, 10 Jan. 1949, ibid. 353; Eban to Shertok, 11 Jan. 1949, ibid. 355; Eban to the president of the Security Council, 11 Jan. 1949, ibid. 355-8; for a summary of the American position then see McDonald to Shertok, 31 Jan. 1949, ibid. 368-9; Gass to Kaplan, 13 Jan. 1949, ibid. 378; Epstein to Shertok, 14 Jan. 1949, ibid. 373; Eban to Linton, 14 Jan. 1949, ibid. 374; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary, iii, 9 Jan. 1949. 17. Linton to Shertok, 11 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 358; Shertok to Eban, 12 Jan. 1949, ibid. 363; on Ben-Gurion’s apprehensions of British threats see BenGurion, W ar D iary, iii, 11 Jan. 1949, 12 Jan. 1949. 18. On the initial stages of these talks, see Eytan’s report, 7 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 5-7; on further developments see Eytan to Shertok, 13 Jan. 1949, ibid. 18. 19. On the link between the talks and the general elections see e.g. Shertok in the thirty-seventh session of Mapai Council, 12/13 Jan. 1949, Mapai Archive, 22/37; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary, iii, 15, 16 Jan. 1949; Eytan and Shiloah to Shertok and Ben-Gurion, 16 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 29; Shertok to Eytan and Shiloah, 17 Jan. 1949, ibid. 30; Shertok to Eytan, 17 Jan. 1949, ibid. 32. * 20. Eytan to Shertok, 16 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 26-8; Shertok to Eytan, 18 Jan. 1949, ibid. 36; Eytan to Shertok, 19 Jan. 1949, ibid. 39-41; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary, iii, 18, 19 Jan. 1949. 21. On these parallel moves see Shlaim, Collusion, 371-9; Shertok to Epstein, 18 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 343-4; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary, iii, 17 Jan. 1949.

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22. Linton to Shertok, 18 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 383; Epstein to Shertok, 19 Jan. 1949, ibid. 384; report on Linton’s meeting with Bevin, conducted on 29 Jan. 1949, dated 1 Feb. 1949, ibid. 410-12; and see, K. Pattison, ‘The Delayed British Recognition of Israel*, M iddle E ast Journal, 27/2 (19??), 412-18; Bialer, ‘Sterling Balances and Claims Negotiations’. 23. On the American government’s attitudes see Epstein to Shertok, 23 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 63; on the arrival of the advance staff of the Conciliation Commission, see Golan to Shertok, 26, Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 397-9; Dov Yosef to Shertok, 1 Feb. 1949, ibid. 408-9; on American pressures during that period, Eban to Shertok, 28 Feb. 1949, ibid. 401; on the new problems concerning the American de ju re recognition see Epstein to Shertok, 31 Jan. 1949, ibid. 402-3. 24. Eytan to Shertok, 20 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 48-50; Shertok to Epstein, 26 Jan. 1949, ibid. 74; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 21 Jan. 1949, and 29 Jan. 1949. 25. Shertok to Eytan, 24 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 68; Eytan to Shertok, 28 Jan. 1949, ibid. 79; Shertok to Eytan, 28 Jan. 1949, ibid. 81. 26. Bunche to Eytan, 30 Jan. 1949, ibid. 93. 27. Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 26 Jan. 1949; and see Shertok’s analysis of the results of the elections, Mapai Central Committee, 27 Jan. 1949, Mapai Archive, 23/49. 28. Epstein to Shertok, 24 Jan. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 395; Epstein to Shertok, 9 Feb. 1949, ibid. 424-5. 29. Shertok to Eytan, 1 Feb. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 142; for Bunche’s draft agreement see Bunche to Eytan, 31 Jan. 1949, ibid. 96-110; the protocol of the Israeli delegationsmeeting with Bunche held on 31 Jan. 1949, ibid. 111-26, and the protocol of a meeting on 1 Feb. 1949, ibid. 131-9. 30. Shertok to Eytan, 1 Feb. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 142; Shertok to Eytan, 9 Feb. 1949, ibid. 221; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 9 Feb. 1949. 31. Shertok to Eytan, 9 Feb. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 221; and cf. Y. Rosenthal, ‘David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett and Criticical Decisions in Israeli Foreign Policy, 1949’, Skira H odshit, 35/ 11, (1988), 15-22. 32. On Shertok’s meeting with the Commission, see Shertok to Elath, 9 Feb. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 423-4. 33. Yadin to Eytan, 12 Feb. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 240-1; Eytan to Shertok, 14 Feb. 1949, ibid. 245-50; Eytan to Shertok, 16 Feb. 1949, ibid. 252-4. 34. Shertok to Eytan, 23 Feb. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 270. 35. Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 24, Feb. 1949; and see Ben-Gurion, R estored S ta te o f Israel, i. 338. 36. Sasson to Shertok, 24 Feb. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 271-3; Elath to Shertok, 25 Feb. 1949, ibid. 275; Eban to Eytan, 3 Mar. 1949, ibid. 275-8. 37. Shertok to Eytan and Sasson in Rhodes, 15 Feb. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 353-4; Eytan to Shertok, 16 Feb. 1949, ibid. 356; Cf. Shlaim, Collusion,, 399. 38. See the instructions to the Israeli delegation to the Israel-Jordianian talks in Rhodes, 28 Feb. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 358-60; Shiloah to Shertok, 3 Mar. 1949, ibid. 361-2; Shehok to Shiloah, 4 Mar. 1949, ibid. 364; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 3 Mar. 1949.

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39. The correspondence on this issue is voluminous, see e.g. Friedman to Namirovsky, 22 Feb. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 437-40; Friedman to Avriel, 23 Feb. 1949, ibid. 440-1; on the worsening situation in Romania see e.g., Rubin to Shertok, 27 Feb. 1949, ibid. 461-2. 40. See Shertok in a joint session of Mapai Leadership Bureau and the party’s members of Knesset and cabinet, 21 Feb. 1949, Mapai Archive, 25/49. 41. On the process of establishing the first coalition, see e.g. Ben-Gurion, R estored S ta te o f Israel, i. 358-78.

15 Membership in the ‘Family of Nations’ The dream and the ultimate operative goal of Israel’s Labour leaders was the ‘normalization’ of the Jewish people through the creation of a ‘normal’ state. For Moshe Sharett, such normalization meant, among other things, that Israel would become a recognized member of the ‘family of nations’, which would involve Israel’s membership of the UN, friendly relations with the powers, and especially with its neighbours. By early March 1949 it looked as if Sharett’s long-term campaign towards the first end was approaching its successful conclusion. When Israel’s renewed request for UN membership was brought before the Security Council, the Israeli delegation as well as the embassy in Washington had waged an immense diplomatic campaign intended to secure the ad­ mission. As Sharett did not fail to note, the USA had no compunction in using this issue to influence Israel’s behaviour with regard to a number of issues pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially the question of the borders and the status of Jerusalem. Moreover, although there had been marked improvement in Israeli-British relations, the British UN delegation still tried to sabotage the Israeli request for member­ ship. Nevertheless, Sharett believed that the British were fighting this rearguard action mainly to demonstrate their loyalty to their Arab allies. The dedicated Israeli campaign outweighed the half-hearted British one, and the ineffective American endeavours to postpone the vote. On 4 March 1949 the Security Council approved Israel’s request for mem­ bership and passed it to the various committees of the General Assem­ bly.1 As soon as this chapter in the political and diplomatic history of Sharett and his ministry seemed to be nearing its successful end, and while the Israeli delegation was still stubbornly dragging its feet in negotiations with the Transjordanians, the ID F was finally ready to start its long-planned Operation Uvda, which was designed to occupy the southern Negev and Eilat, as Well as Operation Yizuv (Stabilization), aimed at capturing the western bank of the Dead Sea, between Sodom and Ein-Gedi.2 Ben-Gurion and Sharett, who was involved not only in granting the moderates’ approval for these operations but also in determining their scope, employed a sophisticated diversionary tactic:

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simultaneously to the final preparations for the military operation, the Israeli government dispatched messages to King Abdullah including indications of Israel’s readiness to compromise on various issues dis­ puted in the negotiations.3 Even if Abdullah was not really taken in by Sharett’s and the Israeli government’s diplomatic manœuvres, they did unsettle him. In a direct communication to Sharett, the king complained: I am very sorry about recent events in the Negev area, in Wadi Arava and around Aqaba [i.e., the Israeli military operations] and concerned about future events. We have sent our delegation to Rhodes out of a wish to find a similar favourable spirit among you. Repetition of such events hamper the efforts of those who wish to settle the conflict by maintaining their clear rights, and then nobody should expect good results.4

Since Abdullah, Glubb Pasha, and their generals had realized the true nature of the Israeli movements, Sharett was anxious to allay the king’s fears. In a direct message to Abdullah, Sharett assured him that Israel’s military movements were, and would strictly be confined to areas within the international borders of mandatory Palestine, and were not ag­ gressive vis-à-vis Transjordan.5 Appropriately at the same time, he sternly warned the IDF to act cautiously even though he (and, for that matter, also Ben-Gurion) were more apprehensive of American reactions than of possible Transjordanian or British reactions. To this end, Sharett instructed his envoys in Washington and New York to reassure the Americans that Israel had no aggressive intentions towards Transjordan, but also to monitor American reactions. The carefully calculated political and military gamble of Ben-Gurion and Sharett paid off. The operation was launched on 5 March 1949, and as if to facilitate its successful conclusion, on 10 March 1949 the small Arab Legion unit deployed in Eilat left the area in view of the information about the advancing Israeli forces, and the Israeli forces were able to hoist the Israeli flag next to one of the few huts that then constituted the ‘town’ of Eilat, without any opposition. Sharett was extremely pleased with this development, for in the first place this fulfilled his, Ben-Gurion’s, and their other colleagues’, long-held dreams to control the head of the Gulf of Aqaba and, secondly, this successful military move clearly demonstrated that Israel could benefit, and inter­ nal conflicts be avoided, when its political and military moves were closely co-ordinated. He was also gratified that the Americans, British, and Transjordanians had swallowed the bitter medicine administered to them by the latest Israeli conquest. Moreover the negotiations in Rhodes

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had continued unhampered despite considerable American, British, and Transjordanian diplomatic opposition to Operation Uvda. Hence it was not ironical that only one day after the occupation of Eilat, Israel and Transjordan signed a general cease-fire agreement in connection with the expected armistice.6 Not only Sharett, but also Ben-Gurion was impressed by this achieve­ ment. The latter was so elated that he confided to his diary: ‘This is probably the greatest event of the last few months, if not in the entire war of liberation and occupation [mc!]. And not a single drop of blood was shed!’7 But the ‘old man’ was still not ready to make any commit­ ment as to Israel’s future moves. Apparently his wish for further expansion had not yet subsided. For Sharett, however, Operations Uvda and Yizuv meant the abso­ lute end of Israeli expansion beyond the 1947 borders allotted to it in the UN partition plan. Contemplating the results of the war to date, which, unlike Ben-Gurion, he regarded as a ‘war of independence and occupation’, Sharett marvelled that Israel had succeeded in occupying about 80 per cent of Palestine West of the Jordan River instead of the 55 percent allotted to the Jewish state in the partition resolution.8 According to Sharett, this afforded enough security on the borders to allow Israel to return more seriously to the negotiations with Lebanon that had began a few days before Operation Uvda, as well as to accelerate negotiations with Transjordan concerning the permanent armistice. None the less, in view of Ben-Gurion’s and his spectacular political and military success in regard to the southernmost Negev, Sharett did not completely rule out a limited military operation to eject the Iraqis from the northern part of the West Bank but not to annex any additional territory. A military operation against the Iraqi forces, who were still in control of Samaria, was consequently being weighed painstakingly by the Israeli leaders. For they had to take into consideration the information ob­ tained by their intelligence agencies that these forces were about to be evacuated, as well as clear warnings that neither the British nor the Americans would tolerate yet another large-scale operation directed at one of their allies in the Middle East and at further expanding Israel’s borders. The Americans also warned the Israelis that this might damage their request for UN membership. To Sharett’s relief, in the light of these considerations, Ben-Gurion did not push too hard for such an operation. Apparently, the ‘old man’ believed that Israel could obtain additional territories, especially in the Wadi Ara area, not through a new military offensive but solely as a result of political pressure on Transjordan,

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followed by tough negotiations.9 The expectation that Transjordan might be more forthcoming in regard to territorial concessions in that area also facilitated the decision to continue the negotiations with Lebanon, which looked relatively easy, instead of launching an operation in the north. Signing the agreement with Lebanon depended mainly on evacuating Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. The IDF, however, objected ‘on professional grounds’ to such a move at that stage because of instability in the region and the fear of renewed attacks on Israeli settlements along the international border with this small albeit weak Arab statè. Heavy American pressure led the Israeli government to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, which eventually paved the way for the second armistice agreement with an Arab state on 23 March 1949.10 Once again Sharett was behind this move, for he had forcefully and continuously advocated that Israel should conclude that agreement before any further progress was made with either the Syrians or the Transjordanians. In the wake of the agreement with Lebanon, it looked as if the road towards an interim political settlement between Israel and all the other Arab countries was in the offing, and that a lull in the fighting would follow. This lull made it possible for Sharett to leave for the USA to raise funds for the young state and to continue its campaign for UN membership. Also to be reconsidered and discussed during his visit to America was Israel’s general political orientation in international affairs, and as he used to describe it, ‘Israeli behaviour as a member of the family of nations’. As expected by Sharett and his envoys in the USA, Israel’s policy of non-alignment or non-identification in foreign affairs was indeed raised and thoroughly discussed during his first friendly talk with the then secretary of state, Dean Acheson. Sharett frankly ex­ plained that this orientation was indispensable not only because of inter-bloc and Jewish national considerations, but also by internal Israeli politics. As he told Acheson, one of the major reasons for Israel’s stance was Mapai’s need and wish to prevent further alienation with the pro-Soviet Mapam and its supporters among the Israeli citizens. But it was also inevitable that, notwithstanding his commitment to nonalignment, Sharett raised the question of American military aid for Israel at the same meeting. As could have been expected, Acheson was non-committal precisely because of Israel’s non-alignment* and Amer­ ica’s staunch decision to maintain political and economic evenhandedness vis-à-vis Israel and the Arab states.11 However, Sharett’s initial talk with Acheson in March 1949 on American military aid to Israel was only the first of a long series on the same subject that he would conduct with the US government throughout the rest of his political career.

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Since behind the scenes Sharett remained a staunch supporter of Israel’s search for political agreements with the Arabs, during this same visit to the USA he closely monitored both the Rhodes talks under UN auspices as well as the talks being held directly with Abdullah and his minions. Since the majority in the Israeli cabinet was interested in the successful outcome of these negotiations, the cabinet decided to avoid any additional major military operations but to utilize an Israeli vari­ ation of gunboat diplomacy to induce Transjordan to sign an agreement. And indeed the deployment of three Israeli brigades along the cease-fire line with that Arab state helped to remove some of the psychological and political obstacles on the way to signing an agreement. The remaining political obstacles were removed during a meeting between Dayan and Harkabi and Abdullah in the king’s palace in Shuneh on 18 March 1949. The King and his two Israeli interlocutors agreed that in return for Israel’s consent to Transjordan maintaining certain areas in the northern part of Samaria that Iraq would eventually evacuate, Israel would obtain additional chunks of Wadi Ara, excluding the two large Arab villages, Tulkarem and Qalqilya, and the first range of hills along the Coastal Plain. Although Dayan had conceived neither the strategy behind this Israeli position nor its tactical goals, it was regarded as his first major diplomatic achievement, and established his reputation not only as a soldier but àlso as a politician and diplomat. This was not the last time that another politician would snatch the laurels of political and diplo­ matic victory from Sharett or his envoys. Nevertheless, though this pattern would cost him dearly, as usual Sharett would behave chival­ rously in this respect. In any event, the Israeli-Transjordanian understanding constituted a breakthrough in the highly complex negotiations with that Arab state. It was followed by two of what Walter Eytan called ‘three nights at Shuneh’. Upon the king’s explicit invitation an Israeli delegation consist­ ing of Eytan, Yadin, Dayan, and Harkabi left on the night of 22 March 1948 for the king’s palace at Shuneh to finalize the agreement. On that night Yadin, who had prepared three alternative proposals, submitted Israel’s maximal demands, almost in the form of an ultimatum, which were accepted by Abdullah after long consultations with his ministers and generals. This secret agreement was signed on the next night, that is, 23 March 1949. When the Israeli delegation departed, Abdullah said ‘Tonight we have ended the war and brought the peace’. Even BenGurion, who had always been extremely suspicious of the ‘foxy’ king and his British patrons, agreed to the formula. The ‘Shuneh under­ standing’ of 23 M arai 1949 provided the basis for an Israeli—Transj or-

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danian agreement in principle on the first preliminary armistice arrange­ ments between the two states.12 Although the king’s statement about the end of the war was somewhat premature, nevertheless, the Israelis could have been happy with the results, for most of their requirements had already been met. Conse­ quently Ralph Bunche was duly notified about the Israel-Transjordan agreement in principle, which in turn served as the basis for the formal public agreement. Once Abdullah had overcome further internal objec­ tions, the understanding was formally sealed on 30 March 1949 in Rhodes. This agreement included the border between Israel and Trans­ jordan from the southern Dead Sea south to Eilat which was based on the old non-demarcated international border. It dealt also with the border skirting the Hebron mountain, with the line connecting this area with the Dead Sea and the boundaries of the northern part of the West Bank. The borders agreed upon would become known as ‘the Green Line’, and be maintained until 1967. Like the armistice agreement with Egypt, this accord dealt with limitations on the size of the forces each side was permitted to maintain along the borders, as well as with demilitarized zones. These arrangements would constitute the shaky and problematic Armistice Regime with Jordan that also lasted until 1967.13 Since, as was the case with the Israeli-Egyptian agreement, the two sides had been enticed into signing the agreement by the USA, not all pending problems had been properly addressed, and therefore would continue to provide many occasions for tensions between the signatories although they had been assigned to Mixed Armistice Commissions. Moreover, the tensions created as a result of these shaky arrangements would provide the USA with many pretexts and real opportunities for intervening in the lingering Arab-Israeli conflict. Sharett had experienced some of the new American positions in this respect during his visit to the USA. Thus State Department officials were constantly enquiring about the progress in the Israeli-Transjordanian negotiations and later prodding him to ensure Israel’s adherence to all the stipulations in the agreements. Moreover, in line with America’s overarching goal of attaining and maintaining stability in the entire region and preventing unwarranted violent eruptions there, US officials also expressed much interest in wider issues, such as the* work of the Conciliation Commission, the Palestinian refugees, and Jerusalem. Therefore Sharett had been correct in surmising that Acheson would link the Israeli request for membership in the UN with its positive decisions on these sensitive issues. Although his personal positions were far more flexible, in presenting Israel’s position Sharett adamantly followed the

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cabinet’s decisions and protected its interests, informing Acheson that Israel preferred security over immediate UN membership. But, as usual, he also simultaneously instructed his staff in Israel to facilitate the work of the Conciliation Commission wherever possible. Notwithstanding his seemingly nonchalant rejection of Acheson’s pressures, the pragmatic foreign minister had hoped to finalize Israel’s membership in the world body during that trip. His motivation was in no way connected to adherence to abstract principles, or to gratitude for the U N ’s favourable resolutions concerning the establishment of Israel, but rather to the desire that Israel’s sovereignty be formally recognized by the ‘family of nations’. For Sharett viewed UN membership as an essential step if Israel were not to be relegated to the status of a pariah state. Finally he felt that such membership would enhance contacts with international organizations and agencies, and most immediately with the Conciliation Commission. Hence again, contrary to the image of Sharett propounded by Ben-Gurion’s adherents, he was far from being a naive believer in either the actual power or the moral authority of the UN. He laboured to ensure Israel’s membership solely on the basis of the political advantages that such membership would secure for his country. The other side of the same coin had been Sharett’s pressures on his cabinet colleagues to sign all agreements with Transjordan at the earliest possible date. On this occasion Ben-Gurion and Sharett had reactivated their ‘coali­ tion’, for both men were anxious to conclude the agreement with Transjordan in order to free state resources for the solution of the mounting social, economic, and political problems within Israel’s bor­ ders. In accordance with the understanding between the two, the cabinet rejected expansionist demands forwarded by the ‘soldiers’ in the Israeli delegation in Rhodes. It was in consequence of their concerted stand, and in accordance with their instructions, that the Israeli delegation had reached agreement with Transjordan on all pending issues, leading to the signing of the final general Armistice Agreement on 3 April 1949.14 It should, however, be pointed out here that the successful last-stage negotiations were achieved not as a result of Israeli but of Transjorda­ nian flexibility. If there was any collusion between Israel and Transjordan, it was established only at that stage; and its emergence was imminently connected to new developments in the Middle East that had prompted Sharett and Ben-Gurion to insist on finalizing the agreement with this Arab country in the first place. In addition to the complex calculations that motivated the two leaders, such as American pressure, the wish to

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secure Israel’s membership in the UN, the desire to direct Israel’s limited resources to the absorption of immigrants, they were influenced by a new bloodless revolution in Syria, carried out on 30 March 1949. Both Sharett and Ben-Gurion believed that the pro-British and pro-American Husni al-Zaim revolution had been conceived and assisted by the British and the Hashemites, and in this mood Ben-Gurion, who was still obsessed by Britain’s and Bevin’s alleged influence in the region, wrote: ‘Let’s see: Nuri al-Said is in Iraq; Abdullah in Transjordan; and now Zaim in Syria. [This means that] Bevin controls the Middle E a st. . . ’. Hence, so Ben-Gurion and Sharett had agreed, Israel’s only feasible and profitable step at this juncture was to sign the agreement with Abdullah, the ‘devil’ that they had known and with whom they had been having direct and indirect talks for over a decade.15 Sharett and Ben-Gurion were right only in part of their assessments. For as the signing of the Israeli-Transjordanian Armistice Agreement approached, the pro-Western new Syrian ruler was also swayed to begin negotiating with Israel. Initially, al-Zaim intended to limit the talks to problems related to the cease-fire; but, under heavy pressure from the USA, Britain, the UN, and indirectly from Israel, he agreed to include wider issues in the negotiations. Officially, these negotiations opened on 5 April 1949, in the Bnot Yaacov bridge, north of the Sea of Galilee. Although the Israelis realized from the outset that these talks would be tougher and more protracted than those with either Transjordan or Egypt, Sharett—who was still in the USA—insisted on the complete fulfilment of all Israel’s commitments to keep the cease-fire, even in the face of what his director general, Walter Eytan, called ‘storms in a tea cup [which were initiated by the Syrians]’. Shertok’s recurring objections to any ‘harmful tactical [military] moves’ on Israel’s part prevented most of the ‘mischievous behaviour’ on the part of the ID F and the Ministry of Defence.16 Like other prominent politicians and great foreign ministers, Sharett had to think about and address both the minutiae of diplomatic negotia­ tions with the Arab rulers and major world affairs. Thus, when he was asked to express his views on the latter issues, he chose nothing less than ‘How to Ensure World Peace?’ as the main theme of a talk, he delivered at a meeting organized by his friends on the editorial borfrd of Nation magazine. In the most important and most relevant part of this talk, on the Middle Eastern situation, Sharett—again unlike the pathetic image that his opponents later pinned on him—evaluated the U N ’s role in the area most realistically. Far from adopting a simplistic and parochial attitude of pure gratitude to that organization, he asserted that, while

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the UN might be of help in finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, ‘the organization’s lack of persistence and efficiency in regard to the implementation of its own resolutions has not tallied well with the noble intentions that motivated it when {the establishment of Israel] was conceived’. N ot mincing words, Sharett added that, ‘When the decisive hour in Palestine had come, the ID F and not the Security Council acted to save Israel and the moral authority of the UN from a total collapse’. At best, the UN excelled in limiting the spread of the conflict. He went on to justify Israel’s non-alignment by crediting the greater stability in the area of conflict to the tacit and explicit understandings between the two emerging superpowers. However, since such co-operation was unique and fragile, he doubted that it could last indefinitely and be repeated. In this, he both explained and rationalized his unyielding support for non-alignment. Most important, Sharett firmly believed that the essential factor for reaching and maintaining peace was the closing of the ‘softer’ (in comparison with the ‘harder’ economic or territorial factors contributing to the continuation of the conflict) psychological, cultural, social, and political gaps between warring communities and states.17 Although Sharett and Ben-Gurion concurred on tactical matters, there was little agreement between them regarding the UN or regarding the question of ‘how to ensure world peace?’ or for that matter, peace in the troubled Middle East. While Sharett was willing to concede that the UN had a certain role, albeit a limited one, in reaching the Armistice agreements, Ben-Gurion refused to accord it (or, in fact, the USA or the USSR) any credit for these achievements. According to the ‘old man’, the Armistice agreements were the result of nothing more than the sheer military might of Israel, which had coaxed the Arab states to stop the war and accept a more permanent truce.18 It was therefore not surprising that primarily due to Sharett’s insist­ ence the cabinet was prepared to continue talks with the Conciliation Commission whose American, Turkish, and French members were shuttling endlessly between Middle East capitals in a thankless effort to prompt agreement on the various thorny issues that were on their agenda. At the tactical level, the Israeli government preferred future negotiations with the Arabs to take place on neutral ground rather than in one of the capitals of the members of the Commission. Strategically, with regard to the two main topics that the Commission was concerned with—the Palestinian Arab refugees and Jerusalem—the Israeli cabinet maintained its traditional position that it would be ready to discuss the refugees only in the context of comprehensive peace talks, and that it

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would not move government offices to the Holy City until further discussions on the matter at the UN. Encouraged by Israel’s more forthcoming responses, the Commission members, who directed their main efforts at the Israeli government, went on to demand Israel’s full co-operation in solving the refugee problem. In this context, the Com­ mission endeavoured to obtain Israel’s readiness to respect the rights of the Arab minority in Israel; to pay restitution to Palestinian Arabs for their land and other lost properties; to refrain from confiscating their deposits in Israeli banks; and to permit their employment within its boundaries.19 Despite the immense pressures on the Israeli policy-making ma­ chinery, and contrary to the contemporary image that Israel’s policies were formulated haphazardly, the senior leaders, especially Sharett, insisted that major moves be made only after careful deliberations and planning. In this vein, the proposals set forth by the Conciliation Commission prompted penetrating deliberations of the two issues at stake. During a significant consultation in which these proposals were examined, Ben-Gurion stated that Israel’s policy must be determined by its main current interest which was no longer concerned primarily with defence or with obtaining better borders, but with the absorption of immigrants: This is the most important issue, which precedes everything else. If there is or will be any contradiction or conflict between this and other interests—immigra­ tion precedes everything. This should determine our economic plan, politics, and the ID F ’s policy, both from the point of view of its internal structure and activities. This issue must determine the policy of our negotiations with the Arabs.20

This sweeping statement, which reflected his current general attitude in regard to the national agenda, indicated his readiness in principle to reduce military spending and channel the money saved to the absorption of immigrants, which in turn necessitated stability in the Arab-Israeli conflict system. Ipso facto it meant attempts to reach further agreements with the Arab countries. Such stability would have yet another function: to reduce intervention on the part of the superpowers. The corollary to this last goal was, among other things, Ben-Gurion’s agreement to Sharett’s policy of non-alignment.21 In any case, Ben-Gurion postponed the conclusion of the discussion on the issues pertaining to the work of the Conciliation Commission, and especially of the new idea that the Commission nurtured—an international conference to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, to be held in

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Lausanne—until Sharett returned to Israel. The latter, impatiently awaiting the results of UN discussions on Israel’s admission, once again became almost totally immersed in the diplomatic game. He and his assistants soon discovered that the main obstacle to membership was that of Jerusalem, and not of the Palestinian Arab refugees. Sharett also found out that the Americans were linking Israel’s membership in the UN with the results of the anticipated Israeli-Arab conference in Lausanne.22 In his pragmatic fashion Sharett tried to cut the new Gordian knot and separate the question of Israel’s membership in the U N and its participation in the Lausanne Conference, but to no avail. The Amer­ icans persisted in lumping the two issues together. Because of their rigid position, accompanied by an implicit threat of possible economic sanc­ tions, or at the very least a reduced level of aid to the Jewish state, Sharett had no other choice but to join in this game of threats and promises that the USA had initiated. This, rather than his deep respect for the UN, explains his ensuing great sensitivity to the work of the Conciliation Commission and to its planned international conference. Though he was under less pressure in mid-1949 than he had been in 1947 or 1948, he was again frustrated by the delaying tactics being employed by the members of the UN Security Council as well as by America’s carrot-and-àtick policy vis-à-vis Israel. For while the USA had shown sympathy towards Israel and its foreign minister, it threatened Israel with economic sanctions and a further delay in Israel’s acceptance to the UN. This delay, as well as the need to participate in the planning for Lausanne then under way in Israel, prompted Sharett to return home before the conclusion of the debates in New York about admission.23 In the spring of 1949 Sharett’s position in the Israeli political élite was stronger than ever, therefore his colleagues, including Ben-Gurion, were awaiting his return from New York to resume their discussions about the future of Israeli international and regional orientation. As soon as he arrived in Tel Aviv, the foreign policy-making élite met to resume its deliberations on the Israeli position in general and particularly as regards Lausanne.24 One of the key issues in these deliberations was that of the future of the West Bank. Since the two polar alternatives of formal agreement to its annexation by Abdullah and an Israeli occupa­ tion were not appealing, a consensus was reached concerning a de facto recognition of the annexation to Transjordan and extracting the highest possible price for such a position from Abdullah, Britain, and the USA. In connection with this issue, Sharett focused on what he regarded as the second crucial issue—Jerusalem. While the ID F’s position, as presented

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by Dayan, was to leave the question of the border in Jerusalem open so that Israel would eventually be able to capture all of it, Sharett proposed that Israel enter negotiations with Transjordan on the formal partition of the city, fully aware that the Americans would support such negotia­ tions and eventually also such an Israeli proposal. Since the cabinet moderates and Ben-Gurion supported him, this line was adopted as Israel’s main policy. As to further negotiations with the Arabs, however, while Ben-Gurion and his camp were inclined to negotiate only with Transjordan and Egypt, in view of Zaim’s position, Sharett and his followers felt that in Lausanne Israel should confer with the Syrians as well, notwithstanding current difficulties in the armistice talks between the two countries. Once again the cabinet approved Sharett’s position. The two camps were even further apart on the issue of the Gaza Strip. For there was no change in Ben-Gurion’s wish to annex the area, and in Sharett’s adamant objection to it.25 From his profound knowledge of the Arab question and Israeli politics, Sharett stated that, Since the establishment o f Israel there has occurred a profound change [in Israeli leadership attitudes] towards the issues of territory and population. The focus shifted from a deep interest in the people to an exclusive interest in territory. We are intoxicated by our territorial conquests. However, I must analyse the problems facing us not only in terms of territory but also of population. As long as we are not ready to swallow a hundred and fifty thousands Arabs, I am totally opposed [even] to the idea of a condominion over the Gaza Strip. Moreover, I am not ready to do it [annex Gaza] today since there is still a possibility that the Gazans would be dispersed in the neighbouring Arab countries. If we undertake partnership in a condominion we burden ourself with at the least half of the responsibility for these people.

In this statement Sharett linked his position on annexation of further territories to the much wider ‘demographic issue’, that is, to the questions of the Jewishness of the Jewish state and of Arab refugees. The two principles guiding him in this respect were that, ‘If we talk at all about the [annexation o f] territories, we should first know who is living there. We must take into consideration the population. .We are not interested in the settlement of Arabs in territories where* they do not settle now.’ More specifically, he bluntly asserted that because of the density of Arab population there, for ‘Egypt [as well as for Israel] Gaza is not an asset, it is a burden’.26 From that time until the Sinai Campaign of 1956, Gaza would constantly remain on the Israeli politicians’ agenda and would exacer-

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bate the controversies between activists and moderates, and especially between Sharett and Ben-Gurion. In fact, it immediately resurfaced during cabinet discussions regarding preparations for the Lausanne Conference. And when the American representative on the Conciliation Commission, Mark Ethridge, suggested at the beginning of May 1949 that Israel should annex the Strip, Sharett rejected the proposal in the cabinet, again referring to the ‘demographic issue’ and adding that, ‘We are not mature enough to absorb three hundred thousand Arabs’. To buttress his position on the matter, Sharett intimated that Egypt and Transjordan might agree between themselves that Gaza be given to the latter. But while at that stage Sharett intended to torpedo this proposal by opposition to grant Transjordan a connecting road through the Negev, he indicated that rather than annexing the Strip to Israel, he would even support the annexation of the Gaza Strip to Transjordan. Ben-Gurion, on the other hand, was excited by the new American proposal that Gaza be annexed to Israel. Emphasizing the geopolitical advantages involved, he noted that if such annexation did materialize, it would considerably diminish the pressure on Israel to deal with the general refugee issue. There is no doubt that Ben-Gurion was more interested in annexing the territory than in solving the refugee problem. For he still wished to amend the results of the 1948 war and to fulfil his ‘promise’ tb Yigal Allon that Gaza and parts of northern Sinai would be captured. Surprisingly, despite the crucial nature of the issues on the cabinet’s agenda, on that occasion Sharett was defeated in cabinet. The ‘intoxi­ cated’ majority, including most of the moderates, opted for the annexa­ tion of additional territory and supported Ben-Gurion on the Gaza issue. Thus with Sharett’s unabating objection, the government decided that, ‘If the annexation to Israel of the Gaza Strip, including all its citizens, is proposed, our response will be positive’.27 These preliminary discussions with the experts and in cabinet shed further light on Sharett’s complex political considerations, especially on non-belligerency, refugees, and annexation. The records show that he was clear as to the immediate pragmatic and realistic goals of Israeli peace policy and the best way to achieve them: We don’t have to commit ourselves to permanent and definite arrangements, only to more definite periods. The first goal, that we wish to achieve as soon as possible, is that territorial arrangements pertaining to Palestine are not subject to discussions in the UN but rather a matter between independent neighbouring states and the UN is allowed to intervene only during explicit conflicts, like its intervention in conflicts between sovereign states in other parts o f the world.

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neither because we are a UN offspring nor because it inherited the mandate over Palestine, etc.

Then he added, It is imperative [now that Israel had occupied all those additional territories] to stop the debates in the UN on the Palestine problem and somehow bury it. We should not lend a hand to any attempt to drag it any further even if we have to pay a certain price for it. For as long as the subject is on the agenda the UN member states have opportunities to squeeze from us concessions because we depend on them. During this period we must solve the problem of the Arab refugees. We must reach a situation in which the issue is not a burden on us. We must solve the problems of the absorption of our immigrants and of reducing the ID F ’s budget.

Moreover, Sharett went on to emphasize that the cabinet ‘should not regard the arrangements that we make now as permanent for gener­ ations, but as interim solutions’. Therefore he did not view the Lausanne negotiations as a peace conference, but rather as an excellent oppor­ tunity to conduct direct or proximity talks with the Arab countries about non-belligerency and interim arrangements. He also wished to dissociate Israel from continuous UN intervention caused by the very processes that had led to its establishment. On the other hand, as usual, he preached the avoidance of possible clashes with the UN since economic and financial considerations were then affecting most of the govern­ ment’s moves, including those in regard to their Arab neighbours, and Sharett made it abundantly clear to the Knesset Foreign Affairs Com­ mittee that he and the cabinet would be ready partners to plans to improve the economic lot of the Palestinian Arab refugees as part of any comprehensive plan to improve the economic situation in the entire area. These latter observations were based on intelligence at his disposal about American and British plans for economic development of the region.28 In view of the tightening of global bipolar arrangements, and under the new regional circumstances, Sharett had to synchronize Israel’s political activities in Lausanne and New York, as well as the ongoing negotiations with the Syrians. In the meantime, despite Israel’s attempts to cancel or to postpone it, the Lausanne Conference, sponsored by the UN Conciliation Commission, opened on 27 April 1949;* these were intended as proximity talks, similar to some of the talks that had been conducted in Rhodes, especially the initial negotiations with the Egyp­ tians. As soon as the conference was opened, Sharett and other Israeli representatives there began their presentations by reiterating the cabinet’s traditional positions concerning the three most important

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issues on the agenda: refugees, Jerusalem, and borders. They expressed Israel’s unwillingness to begin full-fledged peace talks with the Syrians before the conclusion of the Ungering Armistice talks; and they advo­ cated the separation of Israel’s admission to the UN from talks on the solution or management of the Middle East conflict.29 The fact is, however, that within certain limits concerning the end goals set by the cabinet, Sharett had a relatively free hand in formulating the Israeli position and tactics in Lausanne. Thus he preferred direct bilateral negotiations with the Arabs to a multilateral round table with all of them, and that Israel’s goal was ‘peace and security’ and not only ‘peace’. His strategy was to engage in casual rather than formal meet­ ings, and to try to uncouple the agendas of the talks with the various delegations—a new version of the old principle ‘divide and rule’. In accordance with Sharett’s instructions, which had been formulated mainly in response to American pressure, Sasson was trying to promote talks with the Syrians, who had firmly rejected Israel’s demand to withdraw to the international border. To facilitate the attainment of these demands, Sharett insisted that Israel put all military operations against the Syrians on hold. Moreover, while Ben-Gurion refused, he agreed to a personal meeting with the Syrian leader Husni al-Zaim.30 However, the talks with Syria were not progressing well and those with Transjordaii within the framework of the Special Committee, that had been established in accordance of the Armistice agreement, were being held up by urgent pending issues which became known as the ‘Clause 8 problems’. The latter included: territorial exchanges in the Latrun area; control over the road to Bethlehem and the Jerusalem-Jaffa railway as well as over Government House, the High Commissioner’s residence during the Mandatory period and in 1949 the UN headquarters; free access to the Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus; the status of the Old City of Jerusalem; the status of the Dead Sea concessions; Jordan’s claim to Gaza, and its alliance with Britain. In trying to deal with all these complex issues, Sharett endeavoured to remove obstacles that in turn were frustrating negotiations with other Arab governments also and to facilitate Israel’s UN membership; but, first and foremost, during that period his chief goal was to improve relations with the USA. As Sharett delved more deeply into the issues at hand, he found that obstacles were being created not only by the Transjordanians, but also by his Israeli colleagues, more accurately by the IDF, led by General Yadin. Consequently, when considering the immense complexity of the issues at hand, he used to say then that while Israel should have tried to reach full peace with Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, in the case of

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Transjordan it would be preferable ‘to postpone recognition of the annexation of any part of the country and part of Jerusalem to Jordan’.31 Namely, while Sharett was interested in continuing negotiations with Abdullah, he preached caution about the substantive nature of the agreement with this country. In view of protracted American pressure and ID F’s tricks, Sharett decided that the time had come for a dramatic, albeit not a public, move. Thus on 9 May 1949, he secretly travelled to meet with King Abdullah at his winter palace in Shuneh, the venue of many other private and still undisclosed meetings between the two countries. In this trip he was accompanied by two ‘soldiers’, or watch-dogs, Dayan and Harkabi. The meeting between the two old acquaintances was for the most part warm and courteous. None the less, Sharett, who knew the king quite well and spoke excellent Arabic, conducted his talks with Abdullah in a somewhat paternalistic fashion; but this in no way harmed the talks, as Dayan would later claim. Rather, it was the ID F’s subsequent actions during the following days and weeks that would provide greater obstruction to the successful conclusion of these talks. In any case, during their intensive talks in the cosy oriental atmo­ sphere of the king’s winter palace, Sharett told Abdullah that, although Israel was most certainly interested in full peace with Jordan, it could be achieved only gradually. He added that the peace that both sides coveted could be likened to a solid house built by the two sides. In accordance with this metaphor, the Armistice agreements constituted the founda­ tions of that entire building, and now it was up to them to erect the walls by solving the pending problems before covering the edifice with a roof—the peace agreement itself. In the midst of these talks, Sharett clashed with Transjordan’s prime minister, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, who never supported the agreements with Israel, over the latter’s argument that the foundation to all further talks should be the 1947 UN partition plan—which Israeli leaders, including Sharett, felt had been rendered null and void when the Arabs invaded Israel. Somewhat conde­ scendingly, Sharett answered that in the first place the Arabs never accepted that resolution and in any case, the resolution was not relevant any more because of the developments which had been imposed on Israel. Despite the clashes and harsh exchanges with AÖu al-Huda, Abdullah and Sharett were able to conclude that the two sides should pursue the possibilities for solving the pending problems on the basis of reciprocity. Hence the Israeli minister left the palace quite satisfied.32 Except for a somewhat improved atmosphere and a general agreement to pursue the talks in the Special Committee, Sharett’s trip to Shuneh

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yielded no immediate results, yet it did motivate Sharett to instruct the ‘soldiers’—Dayan and Harkabi—who continued with the negotiations with Transjordan, to moderate their territorial demands with regard to the Little Triangle east of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, which was the next item on Israel’s agenda during the bilateral talks with Transjordan. In this case the conciliatory mood and moderation in demands led to success. For, when Dayan subsequently showed restraint in the Israeli territorial demands, the Transjordanian representatives agreed to with­ draw from a portion of the region under dispute, adding territory to Israel without a shot being fired. Transjordan’s withdrawal from the Little Triangle area was completed on 9 May 1949, paving the way for further negotiations. However, Abdullah was compelled to introduce changes in his government at that time, and his negotiators were busy in Lausanne. This governmental reshuffle meant that direct talks aimed at further reducing the level of conflict between the two states were temporarily frozen. When they were resumed, the new government in Amman presented tougher demands concerning the annexation of the West Bank, thereby prolonging the impasse that was created after the previous successful round.33 In the mean time, Sharett received clear indications that there was mounting debate within the Arab camp over Transjordan’s claim to the West Bank, with most Arab states opposed its annexation to the Hashemite kingdom. The situation was further complicated by the intervention of external powers. The Israelis were also annoyed to find out that there existed disagreement on this matter on the part of two of the three members of the Conciliation Commission: on the one hand, France supported establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, and on the other, the USA preferred its annexation to Transjordan and that of the Gaza Strip to Israel. Moreover, the head of Israel’s delegation in Lausanne, Walter Eytan, informed Sharett that the Palestinian Arab leader, Nimer al-Hawari, who was heading a delegation of Arabs who had fled the territory, was prepared to negotiate with Israel about the establishment of an independent political Palestinian Arab entity connected to Israel.34 After prolonged deliberations with his officials and members of cabinet, Sharett rejected al-Hawari’s proposal, not in principle, but mainly because he felt that Hawaii did not wield enough power to deliver the goods.35 He also warned Israeli representatives in Lausanne to refrain from /dangerous speculations’ regarding Arab sentiments if Israel failed to promote their aspirations, as well as from engaging in tactical manœuvres to pit one Arab state against the other to ‘score

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points or promote short-term solutions’. What he did expect from the Israeli delegation were increased efforts to establish contacts with ‘more serious’ Palestinian leaders, who would be capable of working towards an independent Palestinian Arab entity in the West Bank, which he had supported.36 Sensing that the Lausanne conference was drifting with no clear sense of direction, Sharett agreed that Israel should sign the Lausanne Proto­ col, stipulating among other things that the 1947 UN resolution concern­ ing partition and the creation of Israel was the basis for continued talks between the sides, only after the Arabs had agreed to sign it too—and when it became clear that the UN was about ready to accept Israel as a full member. In the same context, and under continuous pressure from the Americans, Sharett also urged the cabinet to issue a moderate statement reiterating Israel’s willingness to pay restitution to Arabs who had left Palestine as well as to guarantee and protect the rights of those who had remained within Israel’s borders, and calling for the resettle­ ment of most of the refugees in the Arab states.37 There is no doubt that this statement, issued solely as a result of Sharett’s insistence, facilitated the government’s next move towards UN membership. The one remain­ ing obstacle was an Arab draft resolution calling for postponement of Israel’s admission until the entire Arab-Israeli conflict was re-examined. But Sharett’s firm guidance of the Israeli UN delegation, then headed by the gifted young Abba Eban (whom, it would be recalled, he had hand-picked for the task), and the moderate positions adopted by the government during those days under Sharett’s influence, helped secure the necessary absolute majority in the General Assembly.38 Finally Sharett’s hopes in this respect were fulfilled. On 11 May 1949, the UN General Assembly received the recommendation of its special Ad Hoc Committee to allow Israel membership of the world body. Thirty-seven states—including the USA—supported the recommenda­ tion, twelve voted against, and nine—including Britain, Turkey, Greece, and Belgium—abstained. Always playing the role of the irreproachable gentleman politician, Sharett was probably inclined to relinquish participation in the cere­ monies connected to Israel’s acceptance to the ambassador, Eban, who had carried the main burden of Israel’s final effort. Either from his intuitive understanding of the rituals of Israeli politics, or because he knew of Sharett’s vanity—or out of gratitude to the man who was responsible for his meteoric rise, Abba Eban urged Sharett to come to New York to deliver the acceptance speech and hoist the Israeli flag in front of the UN building.39

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Gratified by Eban’s invitation, Sharett was more than merely willing to travel to the USA to participate in the event that he had been waiting for. He left Israel for New York on 10 May 1949 and arrived in time for the voting in the Assembly. Sharett’s speech in the Assembly, which was attended by many dedicated American Jews, constituted a philosophical, ideological, and historical analysis of ‘Israel’s position in the family of world nations’. In this exposé Sharett declared that, Israel’s admission to the UN, marks the end of the process of transition from . . . a nation lacking political identity to a nation having a very clear and specific identity. It also marks the transition from inferiority to equality, from a posture of protest to active participation, and from the status of an outcast to full membership in the family of nations.

On that moving occasion, Sharett also focused on Diaspora Jewry. Although Israel felt a special responsibility towards these Jews, who had contributed so much to the establishment of the state, he made it clear that ‘Israel will not impose any burden of obedience on any Jew [but its citizens]. As a sovereign entity, Israel relies only on the loyalty of its citizens . . . But its most sacred mission will be to keep its gates open to every Jew who is in need of a homeland.’ On the next day, in front of a large and enthusiastic, mainly Jewish crowd, the Israeli flag was hoisted outside the,UN building in Flushing Meadows. On this occasion, Sharett delivered his second ‘flag speech’. In this extemporaneous and highly emotional speech, Sharett dramatically pointed to the blue and white flag which he had just hoisted, saying that, ‘This flag, which rallied all segments and groups of the Jewish nation who had long been fighting for the redemption and revival of our forefathers’ homeland, this flag, which is hoisted here as the fifty-ninth flag in this huge circle, which in turn symbolizes the unity and most noble desires of the entire human race, expresses our full independence’.40 Sharett’s image and a repres­ entation of the ceremony have been depicted on an Israeli bill circulated during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although it is easy to understand why many Palestinian Arabs resented having to use this particular bill, it is ironic that only very few of them are aware that no Israeli leader at the time sympathized with their plight more than the man depicted on it.

NOTES 1. See D ocum ents, ii, editor’s note, 466; Eban to Eytan, 7 Mar. 1949, ibid. 471-4. 2. Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary, iii, 3 Mar. 1949, 7 Mar. 1949, 11 Mar. 1949.

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3. Sasson to Sharett, 7 Mar. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 371-2; Sharett to Shiloah, 9 Mar. 1949, ibid. 376-7. 4. King Abdullah to Sharett, 10 Mar. 1949, ibid. iii. 380. 5. Sharett to Abdullah, 11 Mar. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 384-5; Shlaim, Collusion , 401-4. 6. See the first agreement signed on 11 Mar. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 382-3. 7. On Ben-Gurion’s response to the easy capture of Eilat, see Ben-Gurion, R estored S ta te o f Israel, i. 338-40; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 3 Mar. 1949, 7 Mar. 1949, 11 Mar. 1949. 8. On Sharett’s response, see Sharett, A t the G ates, 351. 9. Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 14 Mar. 1949, and 19 Mar. 1949; Eytan to Eban, 14 Mar. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 497; Eban to Eytan, two cables, 14 Mar. 1949, ibid. 498; Eban to Eytan, 15 Mar. 1949, ibid. 500-1; Elath to Eban, 15 Mar. 1949, ibid. 501-2; the decisions of the Israeli cabinet, 10 Mar. 1949, ISA. 10. Yadin to Eytan, 11 Mar. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 309; Shiloah to Eban, 16 Mar. 1949, ibid. 314-15; Eytan to Makleff, 18 Mar. 1949, ibid. 316-17; Rosenne to Sharett, 21 Mar. 1949, ibid. 320-2; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 16 Mar. 1949. 11. Elath to Eytan, 25 Mar. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 523; on Sharett’s departure for the USA see Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 14 Mar. 1949. 12. Eytan to Sharett, 23/4 Mar. 1949 (this letter includes the draft agreement), D ocum ents, iii. 468-74; Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 22, 23, and 24 Mar. 1949; Dayan, S to ry o f m y L ife , 88. 13. Eytan to Shiloah, two cables, 20 Mar. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 460-1; Shiloah to Eytan, 24 Mar. 1949, Dayan to Yadin, 26 Mar. 1949, ibid. 486-8; on the later stages of the negotiations see ibid. 496-7; the Israeli cabinet decisions, 16 Mar. 1949, 27 Mar. 1949, and 29 Mar. 1949, ISA; Ben-Gurion, War Diary, iii, 20 Mar. 1949. 14. Sharett to Eytan, 2 Apr. 1949, Documents.; ii, 541-2; the protocols of the third joint meeting of the Israeli and Transjordanian delegations to Rhodes, 3 Apr. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 502-5; Shlaim, Collusion , 406-28. 15. Ben-Gurion, W ar D iary , iii, 3 Apr. 1949; Sasson to Sharett, 4 Apr. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 547-50. 16. On the initial stages of the negotiations with the Syrians see Shiloah to Eytan, 20 Mar. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 509; Shimoni to Eytan, 30 Mar. 1949, ibid. 509-10; Rosenne to Eytan, 31 Mar. 1949, ibid. 511-12; on the actual beginning of the talks, ibid. 519-20; Eytan to Eban, 6 Apr. 1949, ibid. 521; Sharett to Eytan, 6 Apr. 1949, ibid. 522; Rosenne to Sasson, 10 Apr. 1949, ibid. 524-5. 17. All quotes are from Sharett’s speech at the Waldorf Astoria, 7 Apr. 1949, CZA, A245/77. 18. Ben-Gurion in the Knesset, 4 Apr. 1949, D ivrei H aK nesset, i. 28^-310. 19. See a report of the meetings of the members of the Conciliation Commission with Ben-Gurion and foreign ministry officials, 7 Apr. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 555-62; Eytan to Sharett, 7 Apr. 1949, ibid. 562; see the Commission’s proposals, 11 Apr. 1949, ibid. 567; the cabinet discussions on contacts with the Commission, 11 Apr. 1949, ISA.

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20. For Ben-Gurion’s position as expressed in a Political Consultation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held on 12 Apr. 1949, see, D ocum ents, ii. 570-2. 21. See the report on the internal consultations in the foreign ministry, 12 Apr. 1949, ISA, FO. 2447/3. 22. N. Caplan, The Lausanne Conference, 1949 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1993), 19-31; Z. Shalom, ‘The Lausanne Conference—Anatomy of a Failure Known in Advance’, Studies in Z ionism , the Yishuv and the S ta te o f Israel (Heb.) (Beersheba: The Ben-Gurion University, 1993), 3, 562-70. 23. Eban to Eytan, 13 Apr. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 573-4; Eban to Eytan, 15 Apr. 1949, ibid. 574; Sharett to Eytan, 16 Apr. 1949, ibid. 526, and esp. nn. 2 and 3 there; on the need to separate Israel’s membership in the UN from the Lausanne Conference see also Eban to Eytan, 19 Apr. 1949, ibid. 581; Eban to Sharett, 27 Apr. 1949, ibid. 595; on American pressures, Eban and Elath to Sharett, 26 Apr. 1949, ibid. 593-4; the cabinet’s discussion on 21 Apr. 1949, ISA. 24. Protocol of the consultation held on 22 Apr. 1949, ISA, FM. 2447/3; the cabinet’s discussion on 26 Apr. 1949, ISA. 25. D ocum ents, iv. 10. 26. See Sharett in Knesset Committee on Foreign and Defence Affairs, 2 May 1949, ISA, FM, 2451/9. 27. Cabinet decision of 3 May 1949, ISA. 28. Sharett in a consultation held on 22 Apr. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 585-8; Sharett in the Foreign Affairs committee of the Knesset, 2 May 1949. 29. Avner to Sharett, 27 Apr. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 598; Sharett’s reply to this letter is in Sharett to Eytan, 28 Apr. 1949, ibid. 602; Avner to Sharett, 1 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 3-6. 30. Rosenne to Sasson, 28 Apr. 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 540-1; Sasson to Sharett, 29 Apr. 1949, D ocum ents, ii. 603; Rosenne to the Israeli delegation in Lausanne, 1 May 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 544-5. 31. Sharett in the foreign affairs committee of the Knesset, 2 May 1949, ISA, FM, 2451/9. 32. The report about the meeting in Shuneh, held on 9 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 33-7; Shlaim, Collusion , 447-53. 33. On the stalemate in this process see Shlaim, Collusion , 453-60. 34. Eytan to Sharett, 3 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 10-14. 35. Sasson to Sharett, 8 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 20-9, and esp. n. 2. 36. Sharett to Sasson, 10 May 1949, ISA, FM, 2451/13; Eytan to Sharett, 9 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 29-32; and see ibid. 50-2. 37. The Israeli statement is included in Eytan to Ethridge, 4 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 14-16; on a last-minute attempt to further soften the Israeli government position on the refugees see Elath to Sharett, 9 May 1949, ibid. 33; Elath to Jerusalem, 11 May 1949, ibid. 41-2. 38. See A. Eban, M em oirs , 132-7. 39. Ibid. 136-7. 40. His speeches in the UN General Assembly and the ‘flag speech’, are in Sharett, A t the G ates, 353-9.

16 American Pressures As Sharett soon learned, ‘joining the family of nations’, which according to him was an essential element in the normalization of Israel, only meant a further increase in the need to make constant critical decisions, many of which would now have significant international as well as domestic ramifications. Thus Israel’s and his own first diplomatic test after joining the UN came in regard to harsh pressure emanating from various Latin American delegations, which had been extremely helpful to and supportive of Israel, especially in its previous major struggles in the UN—attaining the partition resolution and UN membership, that the Jewish state abstain instead of opposing Spain’s membership of the world body. As a man of principle, however, Sharett could not help but follow his moral and political instincts and vote with the liberal bloc of states that objected to the resumption of political relations with the oppressive Franco regime and to its admission to the UN. When ex post facto this Israeli decision was condoned by most Latin American states,1 the stage was set for the Israeli government, under Sharett’s unmistak­ able guidance, to continue taking moral rather than pragmatic decisions in certain spheres of its foreign relations. Sharett was shortly thereafter required to make further delicate decisions regarding his position on the future of Italy’s colonies in Africa and British controlled territories there (Britain and Italy sought trustee­ ships over Libya, Eritrea, and Somaliland), in fact to support a prelim­ inary agreement reached by Britain’s Bevin and Italy’s Count Carlo Sforza. Although Sharett was favourably inclined to support Italy, which had protected its Jews during most of the Second World War, and had helped the Yishuv during its War of Independence—and which he hoped might serve as mediator between Israel and the cardinally hostile Vatican and the Arab states—he was inclined to forgo his country’s immediate interests for wider moral and political considerations. He therefore decided to join the Eastern bloc and the Arab states in instructing Israel’s UN delegation to vote against granting trusteeship to the colonial powers, a move that received favourable reactions from most Eastern bloc as well from some non-aligned countries.2 Moreover, Sharett’s stipulation that the Israeli delegation should elaborate the

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reasons for its vote gained him and Israel considerable respect among other members of the UN, thereby reducing undue pressure on the Jewish state. Consequently it seemed to many observers as if Israel had joined the non-aligned states and would continue to vote on its con­ science. Sharett’s appointment as Israel’s minister of foreign affairs and the exposure he had gained as a result of his activities at the UN, the USA, and in other international arenas, made it difficult for him to travel unnoted or undertake secret missions. Nevertheless, on his way back from New York, he first stopped in Lausanne to review developments there and find out whether there was a need for new instructions. Finding the work of the Israeli delegation to the Lausanne talks satisfactory he did not change the general guide-lines. Then he continued on a secret mission to Prague, where he and his confidant Shiloah met secretly with the Czech foreign minister, Vladimir dem entis, on 19 and 20 May 1949. The main topics that Sharett and Shiloah discussed with dem entis and his officials were Jewish immigration, the purchase of weapons, and the possibility of licensing the production of weapons in Israel. This trip had been deemed indispensable by the cabinet and by Sharett in the light of apprehensions that under orders from the Kremlin, Czech arms to Israel might dwindle before the plan to establish a joint weapons and munitions industry were finalized.3 Although evidence about this trip is still inadequate, it turns out that it was successful—weapons and munitions supplies to Israel continued unham­ pered at least until 1954. Sharett belonged to the small group of foreign ministers who left great and lasting imprints on their state’s foreign policy machinery. For better or worse, he shaped Israel’s foreign policies as well as the political and administrative mechanisms for their formulation and implementation. In addition to his ongoing involvement in the actual formulation and implementation of these policies—which were highly centralized due to his firm control over his ministry and his exceptional memory and capacity for extended work—he nurtured the ministry staff, most of whom he knew on a first-name basis. Some of the standard operation procedures and patterns that he shaped and institutionalized during 1948 and 1949 remained almost intact until the 1980s. In 1949 Sharett’s main concern was to bolster Israeli embassies and legations abroad. In this sphere, he felt that Israel’s small size, precarious security situation, and that it had been established by a ‘UN decree’ made it particularly vulnerable to pressure from the UN and the powers. In referring to Ben-Gurion’s claim that ‘some may try to prove that even

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without the UN Israel would have been established, but this does not change that fact’, he added that also because of its being the ‘state of the entire Jewish nation’,4 it was imperative to establish as many legations as the budget would permit throughout the world. In the same vein, he instructed Israel’s envoys abroad to engage in what he saw as their two equally paramount tasks: representing Israel in the host countries, as well as the Jewish communities in those countries. The historical and philosophical viewpoints which attached equal weight to these intert­ wined missions meant that unlike Ben-Gurion, he was gradually shed­ ding his Palestinocentric orientation and adopting a stance which was based on a more favourable appreciation of the Jewish Diaspora and its major role in maintaining the entire Jewish people. Simultaneously, he insisted that Israel’s envoys should avoid implicating local Jewish communities in contacts with their host governments on behalf of the Jewish state. This instruction was in line with ideas he expressed in the speech he had delivered at the UN, declaring that although Israel was committed to fight for the well-being of Diaspora Jewry, these Jews were not responsible for either Israel’s attainments or mistakes. Moreover, in view of the overriding need to help Jews in distress and therefore to open as many Israeli missions as possible, in that speech as well as on other occasions, Sharett did not insist on reciprocity in establishing foreign legations in Israel. By the same logic, he made certain that there were substantial numbers of cultural, scientific, and labour attachés, among other things, to help local Jewish communities. Consequently even Israel’s military and commercial attachés were assigned significant tasks vis-à-vis these Jewish communities. Not surprisingly some of the Israeli military attachés proved to be effective in enhancing relations with local communities because of the admiration and love accorded to them by proud Diaspora Jews. In mid-1949 Sharett could have rested on his laurels. He was among the most respected founding fathers of the Jewish state, the list of his achievements was long and impressive, his position in the cabinet and in Mapai was fortified to the point where he was second only to BenGurion, and he had attained wide international recognition and respect. Moreover, he could have been satisfied with his pivotal position in the policy-making machinery. For the Ben-Gurion-Sharett-Kafclan trio had established a powerful working coalition in which each was in almost complete control of his fiefdom, and together they dominated their party. The trio led Mapai, and through it the entire state, from their secure positions in all important party committees and the four essential posts of prime minister and defence (Ben-Gurion), treasury (Kaplan),

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and foreign affairs (Sharett). Thus the party elected the three as the only members in its powerful ‘nomination committee’ and relegated to them the authority to recruit new members of the élite, to search out those meriting promotion as well as to determine Mapai’s lists of candidates for the various elections.5 Both separately and together these three leaders wielded unprecedented power in the Israeli political system. Their effective working coalition notwithstanding, the three represented three different historical factions in the Labour movement: Ben-Gurion, the historical activist Ahdut Haavodah; Kaplan, the historical Hapoel Hatzair; and Sharett the moderate social democrats who over the years either joined Mapai or modified their socialist views. It was these different backgrounds and attitudes to Israel’s foreign and defence policies that also led to recurrent acerbic conflicts and controversies. The next clash between the moderates Sharett and Kaplan on the one hand, and Ben-Gurion on the other, occurred against the backdrop of the faltering armistice talks with Syria. It occurred as a result of Syria’s refusal to withdraw its forces to the international borderline. On the other side, the Israeli cabinet still objected to the establishment of a no man’s land, which it had deemed acceptable only as an ultimate fail-back position in the event of its more intractable demands being rejected. It was during Sharett’s absence from Israel that Ben-Gurion, who was then acting minister of foreign affairs, had instructed the Israeli delegation to abandon the armistice talks with the Syrians if the latter refused to retreat from their initial demands. Under the then prevailing circumstan­ ces the implication of such an Israeli move was clear: a possible further military operation against Syria. The IDF was, indeed, preparing for such an eventuality. Typically of the pattern of his behaviour, when Sharett was alerted to these Israeli military plans, he considered the wider international impli­ cations of a new operation. Reaching the conclusion that these might be harmful to Israel, he demanded the postponement of all planned military actions, and instructed Eban to act through members of the Security Council, especially the USA, to move the Syrians with the hope that their accommodating reaction would be sufficient to resume the talks and thus prevent the planned Israeli operation.6 The chief of staff of UN observers in Palestine, General William Riley, who in fact was Bunche’s personal representative in Israeli-Syrian negotiations and a man not known for his sympathy towards Israel, also issued a grim warning to Israel to refrain,from using its military forces against Syria as it might result in threats to the cease-fire as well as to the pro-Western Husni al-Zaim regime. Although Ben-Gurion himself refused to meet with the

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Syrian ruler, who had expressed willingness to negotiate with the Israelis, he was compelled by his colleagues to wait until Sharett returned before embarking on any further military action. Upon his return to Israel, Sharett was ready to cut the Gordian knot with Syria. Unlike the ‘old man’, he was willing to meet with al-Zaim to take up various Syrian proposals, including the suggestion that three hundred thousand Pales­ tinian refugees be settled in that country as part of a comprehensive solution of the conflict with Syria and the Palestinians. But al-Zaim, who had been deeply insulted by Ben-Gurion’s refusal to meet with him, now refused to meet the Israeli foreign minister, suggesting that Sharett meet Aadel Arslan, Syria’s foreign minister. Although the Syrians did not adhere to their own new proposal, despite Sharett’s agreement to forgo a meeting with the leader himself and instead meet with Arslan, nevertheless, with Kaplan’s support, he had succeeded in preventing an Israeli military campaign against the Syrians.7 The time that Sharett’s manœuvre had bought for further negotiations was limited, as there were mounting pressures coming from the defence establishment to launch a military operation in the face of Syrian stalling. He therefore instructed his ministry to approach Bunche with an explicit demand that the UN make the next move. In view of this chain of events, on 8 June 1949 Bunche submitted a proposal for the resumption of the negotiations, which included provisos allowing the cease-fire lines to serve as armistice lines wherever they corresponded to the old international border, and otherwise drawing the line between Israeli and Syrian positions, and then demilitarizing the area created between the new line on both sides and the old international border. Even then Sharett had to fight inside the Israeli cabinet to shelve the plan for a pre-emptive strike against Syria and to allow the UN to solve the issue. Once again, the moderate group in the cabinet supported Sharett’s position, agreeing to the foreign minister’s intention to put the issue before the Security Council before invoking Israeli military power. This time the Syrians understood the stern message coming from Israel, and indicated to both Bunche and to the Israeli government that they were considering Bunche’s new proposals. This was the turning-point in these negotiations. Once the deadlock had been broken, talks were renewed in mid-June 1949. In this new round, Syria responded to Isràel’s demand for clarification of their conception of the status of the demilitarized and no man’s land zones, as well as of the role and functions of the civilian administration there. This constituted a clear Syrian signal, assuring Israel that they intended to accept in full the mediator’s proposals. Subsequently, on 1 July 1949 Sharett instructed the head of the Israeli

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delegation, Mordechai Makleff, to accept the mediator’s proposals and conclude the negotiations over the armistice agreement in regard to Israel’s northern front. After additional convoluted negotiations, the armistice agreement with Syria was signed on 20 July 1949.8 This was an additional essential foundation for the problematic but relatively endur­ ing Armistice Regime. The stamina and stubbornness of Sharett and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs had overcome Ben-Gurion’s and the ID F’s itch for further military operations against Syria and begun the final stride towards the effective end of what the Israelis have come to regard and term as their War of Independence. A profound economic vulnerability, which was caused by the cumula­ tive need for a huge military budget, almost infinite resources for facilitating the immigration of Jews from their host countries, and the absorption of these immigrants, and insatiable financial requirements for state-building, began to be reflected in Israel’s foreign policy. This, for example, was one of Israel’s most compelling reasons for concluding the agreement with Syria. This immense weakness, which had continuously underlined the Israeli government’s decision-making, meant that foreign support was indispensable. This economic crunch, almost always coupled by anticipation of negative American reactions (the senior Israeli politicians were aware that the USA was their main source of such support), became permanent features of Sharett’s thinking and worry about Israeli foreign policy. Such considerations were prevalent not only during Israel’s negotia­ tions with Syria over the armistice agreement, but in its contacts with other Arab states. Bearing these factors in mind, but also realizing that some of the remaining problems with the Arab states were almost insoluble, Sharett was always inclined to reduce the level of tension with the Arab states, by moving forward gradually and cautiously. Thus in May 1949, when Bunche informed Israel of new Syrian and other Arab states’ ideas on the Palestinian refugees, the dilemma facing Sharett was not simple: while he was well aware that on the one hand some might have argued that ‘formal peace with the Arab states is not an absolute necessity for us’,9 he also knew that, economically and socially, it was essential to reduce the level of tension with the Arab states. Also uppermost in his mind was the imperative need to keep improving relations with the USA, which considered the Arab refugee problem urgent. Therefore he argued that ‘if Israel wants a new initiative [with regard to the refugees] it should move to a new track. But if it wants to drag out [the solution to the problem], it should concentrate its efforts in Lausanne.’10

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Sensing that the time was ripe for a new dramatic Israeli move on the general refugee problem, as well as for a more specific initiative in regard to a further agreement with Lebanon, Sharett recom­ mended that a permanent agreement with Transjordan should be post­ poned until Israel completed its negotiations with ‘all other’ Arab states, and approved Sasson’s plan to broaden the scope of the discus­ sions with the Lebanese delegation in Lausanne and shift them from merely talks on the existing armistice agreement to those on a full-blown peace treaty. Paradoxically, however, this initiative, and the secret direct talks with the Lebanese, which were conducted in Paris rather than in Lausanne in late May 1949, increased rather than reduced tension with the USA, which felt that Israel might be pursuing an independent policy behind its back. Although these preliminary negotia­ tions failed since Lebanon ‘closed ranks with the other Arab states’, Sharett and Sasson were determined to continue with the effort to reduce the level of tension with the Arabs and reach more permanent agree­ ments.11 Unperturbed by the new obstacles, Sharett continued to seek a major political breakthrough for the next several months. In so doing he gambled by trying to break self-imposed Israeli and Arab barriers in regard to the refugees and the possibility of their return to Israel. Although he did not agree with all of Sasson’s radical ideas, he kept sanctioning his aide’s attempts to break the impasse. But to no avail. The Arabs were adamant in their demands and the Israeli defence estab­ lishment in its opposition to such demands.12 Aware of the internal constellation of the American administration, especially of Truman’s respect for his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, and his assistant secretary of state, Dean Rusk, Sharett and his aides were not surprised when the president’s special message of 29 May 1949 expressed deep disappointment over Israel’s rigid position in regard to a permanent solution of the problems of Jerusalem, the borders, and the refugees. Ben-Gurion’s reaction to Truman’s message, particularly to the stiff warning that the USA might reconsider its policies vis-à-vis the Jewish state, was blind rage.13 The prime minister accused the State Department of overlooking the fact that Israel had been established as a result of Israeli military victories, without any substantive American or UN aid, and that the return of the Palestinian Arab refugees would constitute a concrete not imaginary threat to Israel. Yet a calmer and self-restrained Sharett undertook the task of preventing a greater clash with the USA by answering the Americans in a more accommodating manner. His response did not promise any major strategic changes in

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Israel’s position, yet indicated that Israel might consider some modifica­ tions in its rigid position.14 Under American pressure and Sharett’s influence, the Israeli cabinet began reformulating some of its positions vis-à-vis the main issues on the Lausanne Conference agenda. It became more open to consider more permanent arrangements that might lead to full-fledged peace treaties and to let all borders, except for those with Transjordan, which had already been agreed upon in the armistice agreement, correspond with the old international lines. But once again, to Sharett’s great disappoint­ ment, the cabinet overruled him on the matter of the Gaza Strip. The cabinet reconfirmed Ben-Gurion’s stance that Israel’s contribution to solving the Arab refugee problem was to annex the strip and its Arab inhabitants, thereby leaving more than half a million refugees to be resettled in Arab states, and family reunification to be allowed only after the signing of full peace treaties with the Arab states. As to Jerusalem, the formal position was still to create an international regime in the old city and divide the other quarters between Transjordan and Israel.15 Since some of these official positions of the cabinet were still rigid, Sharett and his aides, who preferred to move onward in a gradual manner, awaited the right time to modify them. The ‘Palestinian problem’ was constantly on Sharett’s and his assis­ tants’ minds.16 This was not only because of his official responsibilities as chief negotiator with the powers and the Arabs as well as a senior partner in shaping Israeli policy towards the Israeli Arabs, but also out of a genuine moral and historical concern for the future of both the Jewish state and the Palestinian community. He was therefore profound­ ly dissatisfied with some of the convenient mythologies on the issue that were used by more hawkish Israeli politicians to explain uncompromi­ sing positions towards that ethnic community. He was opposed to arguments that the Arabs were totally responsible for the impasse at Lausanne; that the Arab governments would only sign peace treaties within the boundaries of the 1947 partition resolution; and that actually they did not care about the refugees and cynically used it to embarrass Israel. As could have been expected, he also strongly objected to the idea that Israel should leave the Lausanne talks as soon as the Arabs expressed their intransigent positions. Sharett and the more moderate Israeli political leaders did feel that then there were plenty of indications that the deadlock in Israeli-Arab relations could be broken. Among the options they again examined were contacts between Israel and ‘serious’ Palestinian leaders on the possible establishment of an independent Palestinian entity in the West Bank.

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The renewed interest in this option was stimulated by reports from a self-appointed mediator, the Reverend Garland Hopkins—who could not be suspected of pro-Israeli sentiments and who had just come to Israel from a visit to the West Bank—to the effect that, Tn a referendum, ninety per cent of the Palestinians would vote for Ben-Gurion rather than for Abdullah.’ The Reverend Hopkins further reported that many Palestinian leaders wished to establish an entity in the West Bank Triangle connected to Israel. As on previous occasions, moderate Israeli leaders such as Sharett genuinely welcomed these reports because such a movement might prevent Abdullah’s final annexation of the West Bank, that it best expressed the desires of most Palestinians in the area, and that it would be in Israel’s interest to create a weak buffer in that part of Palestine, and lead to a permanent solution of the Palestinian problem. The activists’ approach was more Machiavellian. They thought that encouraging this Palestinian movement could benefit Israel whether it succeeded or failed. In the event that separatist movements succeeded in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Israel would enjoy a buffer with Transjordan and Egypt, and if they failed Israel would benefit from concessions elicited from Transjordan and Egypt in return for Israeli non-intervention in the solution of such a conflict.17 Sharett’s response to these ideas was, as usual, realistic, sober, and well reasoned. Although in the past he had entertained talks with Palestinian leaders about the establishment of a Palestinian entity in the West Bank, he also knew that King Abdullah was far from being keen to give up the West Bank. Thus, for him, the most pertinent question was who would fight for the Palestinians in order to oust Transjordan from the territory it firmly held. Correctly reading the Israeli activists’ intention, he insisted that Israel should not be involved in such designs. He therefore sup­ ported a referendum in the West Bank to determine the true political leanings of the Palestinians. (It is fascinating to note that this idea would resurface in the 1980s.) With regard to the Gaza Strip, as always he was diametrically opposed to Ben-Gurion and still supported its annexation to Egypt. The final official Israeli position was closer to that of Sharett. Its gist was that Israel expected the Palestinians to decide upon their future themselves. Accordingly, Walter Eytan told the secretary of the Conciliation Commission, D r Pablo Azcarate, that Israel isupported a referendum in the West Bank, and that it was ready to help in its execution. In regard to the Gaza Strip, the cabinet reaffirmed the status quo.18 Unlike other Israeli leaders, and for that matter also unlike Arab leaders, Sharett now expressed the same views on politically sensitive

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issues both at cabinet meetings and in public. Thus when dealing with the Palestinian issue during a Knesset debate in mid-June 1949, he expressed his deep disappointment that the Lausanne Conference had not generated a breakthrough. Then he argued that although Israel genuinely hoped for peace and was ready to meet Arab leaders for serious negotiations, it was not prepared to pay too high a price for it. In response to both rightist and leftist members of Knesset who harshly criticized his views, he stated, ‘Probably the most complex and crucial problem is the fate of the Arab part of Palestine. We have stated on numerous occasions, but I will repeat it here, that if asked about our choice regarding that territory, it is preferable that this part should be a separate entity.’19 When the rightist leader, Menachem Begin, and other Herat members of Knesset shouted counter-arguments from their bench­ es, he answered snappily that while there were many in Israel who hoped to capture the West Bank and thereby prevent its annexation to Transjordan, he had prevented such a military move. To his opponents on the left, especially in Mapam, Sharett recalled Israeli achievements to date during the armistice negotiations and their implementation, and reiterated that if the choice were between annexing the West Bank to Transjordan or an independent Palestinian state, he would prefer the latter, although he would never condone the ID F’s fighting for it. Therefore, he asserted, Israel should be ready to accept the former option. Unlike the conclusions of some historians,20 his was no Machiavellian ploy. Sharett, and to an extent Ben-Gurion too, were ambivalent regarding this issue, and were groping for an optimal solution. Their ambivalence was very frankly expressed by Sharett during a consultation at his ministry: My own view on this matter has undergone many changes. Now I have reached the stage where I realize that we have no choice but to begin serious peace negotiations with Transjordan [in which annexation would be decided]. I have been worrying about American pressures concerning the borders, and thought that this was the best way to satisfy the Americans . . . I was apprehensive that they may force us to withdraw [from territories that Israel had occupied outside the borders of the partition plan] and I have realized that a peace treaty is not a permanent fixture. In the meantime signs of unrest in the West Bank led me to conclude that we must postpone decision.21

In mid-June 1949, however, the Israeli government was confronted not only with a need to decide about its position on annexation of the West Bank to Transjordan, but also on the cessation of the talks in Lausanne.

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Mark Ethridge, head of the American delegation to Lausanne, who was about to leave his post, maintained that there was no use in continuing the talks in view of the unyielding positions of all sides, that is, the Israelis, Arabs, and bystanders. The US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, concurred with Ethridge. Consequently they explained that the intention of the USA and France, which with Turkey were members of the Conciliation Commission, was to continue the talks later in New York. Sharett opposed the postponement and transfer of the talks to the USA, for he accepted the views originating with some of his officials that Israel must continue the behind-the-scenes talks it had been conducting with the Arab and Palestinian delegations in Lausanne and keep the talks away from the USA, to avoid bringing the Palestine issue to the General Assembly and thus exposing Israel to greater American pressure.22 During those weeks, like many moderates at the time and afterwards, Sharett was driven by the fear that the Israeli cabinet, led by Ben-Gurion, would clash head on with President Truman and consequently the USA withhold much-needed economic assistance if Israel did not make tan­ gible concessions on either borders or refugees. It is only fair to add here, however, that the Americans pursued an even-handed policy; they re­ frained from demanding that Israel should agree to major border modifications in favour of a solution to the refugee problem, and said that they expected Israel to allow only a relatively small segment of the refugees to return, with the rest being settled in the Arab states. Although Sharett was inclined to accept the American proposal to play mediator between Israel and Egypt in regard to the refugees and settlement in Arab countries (which ran against the Israeli official position which favoured direct negotiations with the Arab governments), when the Lausanne talks were temporarily shelved towards the end of June 1949, the American offer of mediation was also shelved along with them.23 Persistent American pressure provided the background for Sharett’s next major political step. During a meeting with a small group of his loyal aides on 25 June 1949, he revealed that he had been urging Ben-Gurion and the cabinet to make public the number of refugees it would be ready to accept if there were an agreement with the various Arab countries. In this regard, he disclosed that, although'Ben-Gurion was still loathe to allow too many Palestinians into Israel in spite of American pressure, I [am] anxious turn liability [Israel’s general agreement to allow some refugees to return] already incurred [on the eve of the opening of the Lausanne talks] into

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political asset. I am weighing whether urge government agree should add fifty thousand [to the twenty-five thousand refugees Israel had already agreed to accept] as further final maximum contribution without Gaza to take effect on peace.

However, he was uncertain on some points: ‘will this pacify US, turn scales our favor or mean we gave in and with more pressure will yield more? Jacob Robinson says you [Eban] fear we slide along latter slope—I don’t feel it.’ The truth is that he thought a public statement to this effect was necessary morally. Eban, who in this instance supported Sharett, suggested that the number be increased to one hundred thou­ sand since only this number would satisfy the Americans, while quoting the number seventy-five thousand would only incense them. Indeed, Sharett would use Eban’s figure in forthcoming political discussions, probably also because it had a symbolic value in evoking the memory of the Yishuv’s own demand for the immigration of the one hundred thousand displaced Jews after the Second World War.24 This represented a startling departure from the traditional Israeli position calling for the admittance of refugees only within the frame­ work of family reunification. Nevertheless Sharett did not hesitate to raise the issue in the cabinet on 5 July 1949. As expected, his proposal created a storm with Ben-Gurion leading the activist opposition, and his two staunch supporters Dov Yosef and Rabbi Fishman backing the prime minister. Ben-Gurion repeated that he was not apprehensive about American pressure and a UN discussion of the matter; his main concern was that the return of Palestinians would pose a major security threat to the Jewish state. Although every other minister supported Sharett’s position, in order to prevent a humiliating and resounding defeat of the prime minister on such a crucial matter, Sharett suggested that first Israel should send feelers to Washington to sound out the efficacy of such a statement. The Israeli diplomats in Washington and New York, who supported Sharett’s position, hastened to do as instructed. The American response to these feelers was of course positive, even though the State Department tried to persuade Israel to accept even more refugees. Nevertheless, the State Department suggested that the proposed Israeli statement be made when the Lausanne Conference reconvened in August 1949. In the mean time, when Truman was informed of Israel’s readiness to allow the refugees’ return, he expressed great satisfaction with the new position and hinted that the administra­ tion would pursue more friendly policies vis-à-vis Israel. Only after receiving such encouragements did the Israeli cabinet approve Sharett’s proposal.25

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The principle of non-alignment, which Sharett persistently nurtured and applied, dictated that Israel balance the gesture to the USA concerning the Palestinians with one aimed at the Soviet Union. Hence Sharett proposed that the government should invite the deputy foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, for an official visit to Israel: If he [Gromyko] comes, it will show the US that we are not entirely in their pocket, which should alleviate their pressures on us. From a positive point of view his visit will serve as an opportunity to profoundly discuss open questions before the forthcoming UN general assembly in which he would head the Soviet delegation; we will be able to discuss the problem of immigration [from Eastern bloc countries] in a comprehensive manner that is impossible anywhere else.26

Although Gromyko politely declined the invitation, it improved the atmosphere towards Israel in Moscow. Sharett did not wait long before instructing Mordechai Namir, Israel’s new envoy there, to exploit the more friendly attitude to promote Israel’s interests, especially in the spheres of trade and commerce.27 Sharett’s emphasis on the need to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union was closely connected with Mapai’s complex relations with the more orthodox socialist and pro-Soviet party—Mapam. For al­ though Mapam did not do very well in the 1949 elections, Sharett and his Mapai colleagues still regarded that party as their greatest source either for internal political competition, or for potential co-operation. According to Sharett, the main controversy with Mapam was over the question of ‘whether the Israeli Labour camp could, and should, pave its own [political] road [in world and regional affairs], or whether it is compelled to follow the ways and means determined in other places, [that is, Moscow] out of different needs, and under different circum­ stances .. Z.28 In addition to his hidden warning to Mapam to refrain from subjugating itself to the Kremlin, Sharett made a clear distinction between internal and foreign affairs and tried to prevent undue impact of one facet on the another. Essentially, his policy of non-alignment was directly aimed at achieving greater room for manœuvre inside the Israeli polity (especially vis-à-vis Mapam) as well as in the external arena. Moreover, despite, or probably because he still perceived Mapam as his party’s most dangerous adversary, Sharett persisted in càlling for the reunification of the two parties, which would go a long way towards establishing Labour’s complete political hegemony in the Israeli polity. The forthcoming resumption of the Lausanne Conference again redi­ rected his attention to external affairs. It motivated Sharett to continue to examine Israel’s position and to outline a new strategy, particularly

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with regard to regional affairs. Since the armistice agreement with Syria, signed on 20 July 1949, had improved Israel’s territorial and political position and therefore its security, he asserted that Israel should ‘now rely on more stable reciprocal agreements that bind the other side and are sealed by the U N’. He added, ‘the significance of the armistice regime is that it guarantees that Israel’s borders will retain their present shape’.29 According to Sharett, a stable armistice regime was only a preamble to peace treaties, which were not only morally desirable but also in Israel’s best interest. For, apart from the obvious social, political, and economic benefits that would have been connected to peace with the Arabs, important to him was that progress towards that end would allow Israel to play a larger role in world affairs. Sharett differed from other Israeli political leaders in that he believed that Israel should simultaneously conduct direct bilateral talks with various Arab states and utilize the mediation mechanisms offered by the UN and the USA. He believed that breaking the deadlock at Lausanne and actively co-operating with the Conciliation Commission would warm up the atmosphere between Israel and the USA and prevent a new debate over Palestine in the UN General Assembly, since for both the Americans and the UN, the main difficulty concerning the refugees ‘was not in the moral domain but in the practical sphere’. In other words, it was not a question of the responsibility for the persistence of the conflict, but how to solve it. In all this, however, Sharett never forgot that Israel must benefit fully both in the short and long term from its positive declaration concerning the return of the one hundred thousand Arab refugees. He therefore instructed his envoys at the UN to clarify that the government agreement to admit these refugees was linked to the solution of other pending issues, such as borders and Jerusalem. He summarized his position by saying that ‘without haste or apprehension, Israel should aim at a comprehensive and stable peace’.30 In a simultaneous shrewd political move, Sharett instructed the Israeli delegation to Lausanne to make it known that the government would be ready to consider negotiating with a united Arab delegation, even though it preferred bilateral direct talks. Very reluctantly, he also restated the government’s official position that if in any negotiations with Egypt the issue of the Gaza Strip were to be raised, Israel would claim its annexation; secretly, however, he instructed the delegation to refrain from discussing the fate of the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, he told his representatives to concentrate on an attempt to assess the degree of unrest in the West Bank, advocate the establishment of an autono­ mous Palestinian entity in that part of Palestine, and thus to prevent its

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annexation to Transjordan. He applied a similar approach to the Jerusalem problem; he fervently preferred dividing the city between Israel and a Palestinian entity rather than Transjordan, without deter­ mining the final status of the Old City.31 Although these instructions bore Sharett’s unmistakable imprint, they reflected the usual com­ promise between activists and moderates, and probably also a com­ promise between Sharett’s own contradictory inclinations. These were also designed to ensure a certain amount of freedom to manœuvre in order to reduce the level of the conflict when necessary. In spite of the Israeli readiness to proclaim that concession in regard to the return of the one hundred thousand refugees, it soon became clear that the American endeavour to resuscitate the Lausanne talks would fail. The main reason was a decision by the Arab delegations, adopted towards the end of July 1949, to put the Palestine issue on the agenda of the next General Assembly.32 But even this Arab move did not prevent Sharett and his envoys from missing any opportunity to talk with Arab delegations there or elsewhere, whether directly or indirectly, officially or non-officially. Thus, following information obtained through the president of the Jewish community in Cairo, Salvattore Cicurel, indicating Egyptian interest in improving the Jewish community’s situ­ ation, as well as opening direct negotiations with Israel, in mid-August 1949 Sharett approved further attempts by the tireless Eliahu Sasson to discuss the possibility of a separate peace with the head of the Egyptian delegation to Lausanne, Abd al-Munim Mustafa. Though these pro­ tracted talks did not result in a breakthrough, they were not a total waste. For during these contacts the Egyptians reiterated their firm desire to hold on to the Gaza Strip, strengthening Sharett’s opinion that the official Israeli position on the annexation of the Gaza Strip, which had been adopted under pressure from Ben-Gurion, was impractical and even harmful. None the less, Sharett understood that the fate of the Gaza Strip was not the main bone of contention with the Egyptians, but rather the border south of the Gaza Strip, and because of the precarious internal political situation in Egypt, also the future of Israeli-Egyptian relations in general, this assessment only augmented his pessimism about further progress in these negotiations. Towards the end of August 1949, even the unfailingly optimistic Sasson concluded that ‘The distance between the two sides [Israel and Egypt] is still considerable, and the chances for an additional agreement [to the armistice pact] negligible’.33 Still, although they realized that the internal political situation in Egypt did not permit those who supported an improvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict to

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prevail, Sharett and Sasson pursued contacts with Egyptian politicians and officials to ensure the stability that might lead to a reduction of tension between that country and Israel and eventually to the resump­ tion of the peace talks. Meanwhile, Sharett’s initiative in regard to the return of the one hundred thousands Palestinian refugees created a political storm inside Israel. Fierce debates were conducted within Mapai, at the Knesset, and among the public at large. The debate in Mapai brought with it such explicit extremist anti-Arab statements as the following: T am not ready to accept even one additional Arab. In fact, I want Israel to be completely Jewish. I want to save the nation from the malaise of Arab refugees, whose numbers may grow to the point where they fill the country.’34 Statements such as this included distinct hints of the ‘imposed transfer’ ideology that was espoused by a substantial group within Mapai as well as by many in the rightist parties. Sharett’s answer to these assailants combined practical with moral justification, mentioning the immense suffering of the refugees; the urgent need for family reunification on humanitarian grounds; the clear danger involved in uncontrolled infiltration of Palestinians into Israel as compared with the relative advantage of a planned return of some of the refugees; ‘the two faces of the security dilemma’ in regard to the return, that is, the security risk in the fetum of hostile Palestinians, as against the risk involved in the existence of a hundred thousand refugees in camps along the Israeli borders; the continuous American pressure in this respect; the widely publicized commitment to the solution of the refugee problem;35 the hostile world public opinion; the U N ’s sympathetic position towards the refugees; and the paradoxical situation created by the fact that by its decision to annex the Gaza Strip, the Israeli cabinet had actually decided to accept the principle of the ‘return’ of refugees to Israel. Thanking his few supporters during this highly emotional debate about the annexation of Gaza, he said, The small size of this group [of supporters] does not deter me. I am ready to pay the price of the return of sixty-five thousand refugees [in addition to the 25,000 that the Israeli government had always agreed to admit] to obtain peace and a solution to the issue of borders. People here are afraid that I will agree to the return of refugees and then to concessions in regard to borders as well. But let me remind you that the government has already shown its stamina and power [in this regard]. . . And never before have I been so certain of the justice of this line.36

In the ensuing Knesset debate, responding to those who espoused an imposed transfer, Sharett did not mince words: ‘The question is not

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whether it is better to have no Arabs in Israel. The question is whether it is worthwhile to buy peace and the solution of the entire problem at a certain price, and whether by solving the problem and [thereby] unfreezing the stalemate in Lausanne, we can also improve our relations with the US. If the answer is positive, then we should do it.’37 BenGurion, who spoke after Sharett, implicitly supported the latter’s reason­ ing when he defended the armistice agreements, with which Sharett had become identified more than anyone else.38 It seems that at that point Ben-Gurion altered his traditional view in this respect mainly to alleviate American pressure and to secure their economic support. When the Ben-Gurion-Sharett-Kaplan trio began planning the return and absorption of the Arab refugees, it became clear that, notwithstand­ ing the unrestrained attacks on Sharett, the country’s senior leadership implicitly endorsed his position. It was also the case that to promote this approach even Sharett was ready to engage in some political manipula­ tions. Thus for obvious tactical reasons, Sharett encouraged those who opposed him to voice their criticism openly, intimating to the selected members o f the Mapai Secretariat that he would use their protest to convince the USA to refrain from demanding that the number of refugees be increased, so as to prevent internal instability in Israel. He also instructed his representatives in all foreign capitals to suggest that their host governments should ‘grab’ Israel’s proposal to allow the return of the one hundred thousand before the Israeli government was forced to retract it because of internal public and political opposition.39 Most of the Israeli foreign ministry officials involved in this debate supported both Sharett’s strategy and tactics. Therefore, Reuven Shiloah described Sharett’s plan as ‘the logical conclusion to our basic posi­ tion’.40 And according to Sharett’s instructions, on 3 August 1949, Shiloah presented the new Israeli official position to the Conciliation Commission, which responded by the creation of yet another subcom­ mittee of ‘experts’ to examine the refugee problem. Sharett’s objection to the establishment of this new subcommittee casts a certain shadow on his sincerity as well as on the real intentions of the Israeli government in this proposal. For Sharett himself admitted that his purpose in making the statement about the return of the hundred thousand refugees was to draw the greatest political benefit without going into too ftiany details about the implementation of this startling proposal. Yet even this ‘clarification’ might have been made to placate the hardliners in Mapai and the cabinet. In any case, the Lausanne talks came to yet another standstill. For the Conciliation Commission members and all Middle Eastern delegations

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could not agree about the best venue and forïn for continuing the process, and about the question of the resubmission of the refugee problem to the UN Assembly. The American and Turkish members of the Commission were for the resubmission of the issue to the Assembly, but the French member was for the continuation of the conference in Lausanne. Although on behalf of the cabinet Sharett pressed for the continuation of the talks in Lausanne, the Commission decided to bring it to the General Assembly. ‘The Ben-Gurion school’ of Israeli historiography has argued since then that this phase of the Lausanne Conference was the lowest point in Israeli foreign relations during the first years of the state. Moreover, they have attributed it to Sharett’s line and to his pivotal role in the process. However, the development at the time was quite different. From the minute that the Israeli government had initially decided to follow Sharett’s advice and join the Lausanne Conference, the foreign minister and his envoys navigated them successfully, preventing resolutions which might have harmed Israel more than the possible ramifications of the return of those hundred thousand refugees. Actually the conference failed because of the unbridgeable gap between the positions of the two sides with regard to the borders and the Palestinian refugees—while the Israel government agreed to the return of a hundred thousand refugees, the Arab stàtes and the Palestinians demanded full return of all refugees. That gap was too large to bridge even after Egypt seemed ready to negotiate directly with Israel.41 In August 1949, when the disappointment over Lausanne was simmer­ ing, a new internal political storm was brewing in connection with the sensitive issue of Jerusalem. Once again Sharett and his moderate friends played a major role during this storm. As early as May 1949 Sharett had bravely and openly said that he would be ready to propose that Tel Aviv instead of Jerusalem remain Israel’s capital if Abdullah gave up his plan to turn that city into Transjordan’s seat of government.42 In addition to his concern about the Arab position, one of Sharett’s main reasons for expressing this sacrilegious view was the Vatican’s and other Christian states’ utmost opposition to any change in Jerusalem’s de facto status, much less its becoming solely the capital of the Jewish state. Sharett was strongly supported in this by most of his advisers, most notably by Eban from New York and Shiloah from Lausanne. The two senior officials maintained that Israel should at the very least postpone action in this sphere until the,political and diplomatic scene was more receptive to the idea of Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish state.43 At the same time, at a cabinet discussion on 9 August 1949, the Ben-Gurion supporters

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Rabbi Maimon and Dov Yosef started a fierce activist campaign for the immediate transfer of the centre of government, including the Knesset to Jerusalem. During the highly charged debate on the issue, in a typical move, David Remez, who had long been one of the more noted moderate leaders, joined the activist ‘Jerusalem Lobby’. Since the views of the cabinet ministers were divided, a special cabinet subcommittee was established to investigate the matter further. During the subcommittee’s discussions, Sharett exhorted its members to refrain from a decision to annex West Jerusalem, at least until after the forthcoming General Assembly, writing that, A hasty move on the eve of the general assembly that would be interpreted as a demonstration of a revolt against the UN, would upset even avowed friends, cast a shadow over the entire theatre [Middle East], and rather than serve as a shield against the usurpation of our rights, would instead hasten the internationaliza­ tion of the entire city.44

Not surprisingly, Ben-Gurion joined the cabinet’s ‘Jerusalem Lobby’, as usual calling for Israel to ‘create facts in the city.’ But this time a majority of the ministers, including Kaplan, Shazar, and even Golda Meyerson, supported the Sharett line. None the less, the most that Sharett actually achieved during the cabinet’s meeting on 17 August 1949 was yet another compromise resolution to postpone any immediate move of the government offices to Jerusalem but also to plan and prepare for this eventual transfer.45 These were only the first shots in the internal battle between activists and moderates over the future of Jerusalem. While Sharett still con­ trolled the government policy at that stage, he was not able to keep Ben-Gurion from making emotional public outbursts concerning this controversial issue. Thus, on two occasions—a Knesset speech on 2 August 1949, and in a ceremony on the occasion of Herzl’s reburial in Jerusalem on 16 August 1949—the insistent prime minister stated his position very clearly in: ‘We must move to Jerusalem all that is now in Tel Aviv [i.e. all government ministries].’ As expected, these statements set up reverberations throughout the world, especially in the Vatican and in France, which had undertaken to secure a status quo in Jerusalem at both the Conciliation Commission and the Lausanne Conference. The French representative Claude de Boisanger demanded immediate UN action to block Israel from transferring the government to Jerusalem, and, as Sharett expected, the USA, which had not been very strongly pressing for the internationalization of the city, joined forces with the French.46 Thus it was Ben-Gurion rather than Sharett who caused the

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crisis over Jerusalem. By out-flanking the cabinet and Sharett and appealing to the nation—a well-known tactic of the prime minister—he focused Israeli and world public opinion on this sensitive issue and broadened the crisis to the point where it landed at the General Assembly. Although Ben-Gurion’s blatant outbursts contradicted the cabinet’s decision and frustrated Sharett’s plans for Jerusalem, the foreign minis­ ter did not give up other plans and still actively pursued the possibility of establishing an autonomous Palestinian entity in the West Bank. These moves seemed urgent since formally the Lausanne talks were still lingering on, and the Arabs had reinforced their delegation there by sending Raja al-Husayni and Yussuf Zahayon, members of the Mufti’s All-Palestine government (which had been established in Gaza), as well as another supporter of the Mufti, Rushdi a-Shawwa (who was mayor of Gaza), and Musa al-Surani to frustrate Israel’s attempts to sign separate peace agreements with Arab states or to create a Palestinian entity in the West Bank. The hopes that Sharett and Sasson had pinned on the West Bank delegation led by Nimer al-Hawari were further dashed when King Abdullah, who was still immensely interested in annexing the West Bank, clamped down on the Palestinians by closing the offices of West Bank delegation leader al-Hawari, disbanding his organization, and arresting its members. To make sure that al-Hawari’s support evap­ orated, the king also banned the departure of his organization’s repres­ entatives for Lausanne and prohibited financial transfers to its members. Finally, the Transjordanian government passed a law prohibiting con­ tacts between unauthorized citizens of the kingdom (not to speak of non-citizens) and Israelis. On the other hand, in accordance with Sharett’s instructions, Sasson tried to resuscitate the negotiations with al-Hawari and his colleagues by financing al-Hawari’s activities in Lausanne, encouraging him to meet with Arab and other diplomats on the spot, and preparing a joint plan for the establishment of a Palestinian entity, but to no avail; Hawaii’s supporters were too frightened and disorganized to stage any effective opposition to the king and pursue further their contacts with the Israelis. When Sharett received informa­ tion that the king was travelling to Britain to conduct negotiations with Ernest Bevin over his annexation of the West Bank, he knew that this would soon become the reality in that tortured part of the Holy Land.47 Ben-Gurion’s, unwarranted statements on Jerusalem served as further nails in the coffin of both the Lausanne Conference and several of Sharett’s hopes, for example, to avoid further deterioration in Israel’s

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relations with its neighbours, prevent a debate over Palestine in the General Assembly, and create a channel for regular communication and co-operation with Palestinian leaders who had shown willingness and the courage to work with the Israelis. On 26 August 1949 he indeed learned that the Conciliation Commission had decided in principle to wind up the Lausanne Conference in mid-September and to submit their final report to the General Assembly. As part of their preparation for this move, the Commission asked both sides to respond to a detailed questionnaire on their respective positions. The collective Arab response was comparatively moderate: they would demand the return to Israel of all Arab refugees, but would also permit those who wished to resettle in Transjordan and Syria to do so; while they demanded Israeli withdrawal from all territories not allocated to it by the UN, they were in principle opien to discuss compensation for Arab land occupied by Israel; on the other hand, they also demanded the internationalization of Jerusalem and Jaffa, as well as of a corridor connecting these cities. Under Sharett’s influence, the Israeli response was moderate enough to leave some room for further negotiation. If Sharett and the moderates had hoped that they would be able to use this relatively moderate Arab response to rekindle meaningful talks, they were mistaken. For the Conciliation Commission was setting the next political trap for the Israeli government, and, as it turned out, especially for Sharett. The trap involved the commission’s recommendation to divide Jerusalem into two demilitarized zones, each zone to have administrative autonomy under international supervision—a proposal that was contrary to all Israeli expectations. Only in the accompanying letter did the commission leave any possibility for accommodating Israel: the solution of the Jerusalem question might be deferred until the last stage of the resolution of the entire conflict.48 The Conciliation Commission was not the only body that moved contrary to Israel’s expectations. For at the same time, as part of a general reorientation of their Middle Eastern policy, the Americans increased their involvement in regional affairs by demonstrating a tougher posture towards Israel. In communicating the new American position to the old and ailing Israeli president, Chaim Weizmann, and through him to the Israeli government, President Trumân let it be known that, while he found some of Israel’s proposals helpful, he was unhappy with its position on the major issues of refugees and borders.49 Truman’s somber communication to Weizmann was dispatched against the backdrop of America’s expanding perception that worsening relations with the Soviet Union gave to the Middle East increased

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strategic importance in the event of a world war. Like the British before them, the American strategists felt that their vital interests necessitated aligning the Arab states with the Western sphere of influence through bilateral defence agreements. Hence the new Truman doctrine meant that Israel’s interests could not be allowed to jeopardize the new framework, and that the USA must carefully balance its support of Israel with that of the Arab states. Since Egypt occupied a central position in this new strategic framework, the US inclination was to respond favourably to Egyptian political and other demands. In this context, the Americans warned Israel that they could, and would, mobilize a majority in the UN for new proposals concerning territorial arrangements in the southern Negev and for solving the refugee and Jerusalem issues in a way detrimental to Israeli wishes. N ot content with mere warnings, they also applied sanctions through the Export-Import Bank, which deferred promised development loans to Israel. The official pretext for these subtle sanctions was ‘Israeli intransigence’ regarding borders, and, in particular, finding a solution to the refugee problem.50 Sharett reacted instantaneously. In order to try to frustrate America’s intention to submit new proposals to the UN General Assembly, he instructed the Israeli UN delegation to do everything in its power to prevent the Conciliation Commission from reconvening during the General Assembly session and from prolonging the work of the Com­ mission’s subcommittee of experts re-examining the refugee problem— which had been dispatched to the area contrary to Israel’s wishes. It turned out that on this issue there was tacit collusion with the Egyptian delegation, who for their own reasons preferred further discussions of the Palestine issue to be deferred. The warlike tendencies in the American administration are strengthening. The transition from the Marshall Plan to NATO subjugated American policy to military planning in Western Europe . . . The Americans have reconciled them­ selves to the idea that there is no way out of a war [with the Soviet Union], and if this scenario does materialize, [it is their feeling] that everyone who is not with them is against them.51

This was how Eliahu Elath, Israel’s ambassador to the USA, assessed the winds of war in Washington in a strictly personal report that he submitted to his minister. Elath’s realistic and prophetic strategic con­ clusion, with which Abba Eban concurred, was that Tn a military crisis, the US would try to force us tq change our neutral position and put ourselves totally in their hands’. Therefore, the two perceptive ambassa­ dors argued, if Israel aspired to maintain its policy of non-alignment, it

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had to pursue a moderate and flexible position in its relations with the USA and perforce also with the Arab governments.52 Influenced by the reports of these two senior and influential diplomats, as well as by recurring internal discussions on the question of Mapai’s participation in the Socialist International, Sharett launched one of his periodic re-evaluations of Israel’s non-aligned orientation. Unravelling his thoughts on this complex issue in the Mapai Secretariat, he said: We are anti-Communists in our perception of democracy in general and of democracy within the Labour Movement in particular. But since there are some practical political issues involved [the overriding need for the Soviet Union’s friendship and support], we cannot always draw a direct line connecting our ideological position with a practical political conclusion, especially when the future of immigration [from the Eastern bloc, always an extremely important consideration to him] is in the balance . . . This is an essential consideration since other sources of immigration to Israel are dwindling considerably, thus, we will only be able to have immigration from N orth Africa, and to take the chance of receiving 80 per cent of these immigrants is not a pleasant thought.53

Here it should be noted that in this instance, Sharett was careful in how he dealt with the very sensitive issue of immigration from North Africa, although on earlier and later occasions his acerbic remarks on the poor quality of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa were more blunt. He therefore concluded that, T am ready to continue banging my head against the wall [of the Soviet Union] as long as there is a chance to achieve a breakthrough [concerning immigration from the Soviet Union itself]’.54 The latter statement referred to Sharett’s idea, which was shared by other Israeli leaders of European origin, that it was still possible to convince the Soviet Union to allow its Jews to immigrate to Israel. Towards the end of August 1949, when formulating his ‘policy of small states’, Sharett was also careful to refrain from any formulation that might be interpreted to imply that Israel was ready to forgo non-alignment, even in return for Western guarantees on borders, refugees, or Jerusalem. He was adamant in his conviction that any change in this orientation and the adoption of a pro-American orienta­ tion would trigger a tremendous internal crisis, especially Arhen he was suggesting that Mapam should join the national coalition. Yet the ever-cautious foreign minister instructed his envoys to emphasize that Israel’s avowed non-aligned posture should not be interpreted as joining the Eastern bloc, especially when the West was threatened. Yet he knew very well that in the event of a global war ‘Israel would not remain

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neutral in light of the fateful choice between the freedom of mankind’s spirit and slavery’. This orientation determined most of Israel’s moves in the international arena as well as some of its positions at the General Assembly, for instance, its attitude towards the escalating conflict over Korea, in which the foreign ministry asserted that ‘Israel would avoid giving any opinion regarding the two sides’ responsibility for the present crisis, and would support any practical proposal that will maintain the UN presence in that sensitive part of the world’.55 Also as a result of its professed non-alignment, at that particular juncture, Israel distanced itself from any discussion on nuclear weapons and conventional and nuclear disarmament. Only later would Israel’s policy in regard to these sensitive matters change. In view of the complexity and urgency of the issues at hand, Sharett was completely preoccupied with preparations for the next General Assembly, where he usually met the leaders of world powers. His task, however, was not facilitated by secret cabinet decisions concerning the transfer of some government departments to Jerusalem, or unprovoked Israeli breaches of the armistice agreements.56 In fact, Sharett had to navigate not only between the Scilla and Charybdis of the two emerging superpowers, the various powers who supported and opposed Israel, but also between what he regarded as the irresponsible actions of the Israeli Ministry of Defence, unmitigated by Ben-Gurion’s statements; current crises in the various mixed committees supervising the armistice; and American pressure on Israel to refrain from altering any aspect of the political and territorial status quo. To ensure the Sharett-style non-alignment, the coalition on which the government was founded had to be broadened. Therefore, Sharett fought long and hard to bring the politically moderate Mapam on Mapai’s left and the General Zionists on its right into the coalition. In so doing, he argued (and this casts light on the internal mechanics and procedures of policy-making in Israel at that time) that, although it had been proven that Mapai could form a viable coalition without Mapam and the General Zionists, and that ‘the atmosphere within the cabinet is by far more comfortable than it would be if Mapam rejoins the coalition’, both the General Zionists and Mapam should nevertheless be included in a larger coalition. His goal was quite clear: to fortify the government in view of possible crises, but no less important, to fortify the moderate camp in the cabinet, which would support his own positions. On jthis occasion, Sharett was no less manipulative than Ben-Gurion in formulating doubled-edged policies and statements; for while he argued for Mapam’s inclusion in the coalition, he also con-

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tinued the struggle against that party’s ideological and educational approach, which he perceived as originating in Moscow.57 Despite Sharett’s confidence in his ability to attain these goals, he knew very well that he was facing new ordeals and mounting difficulties both within Israel and in the international arena.

NOTES 1. D ocum ents, iv. 48-9; for an evaluation of this derision see Sharett to Kohn, 13 May 1949, ibid. 49. 2. D ocum ents, iv. 56; Eban to Sharett, ibid., 20 May 1949, 57. 3. D ocum ents, iv. 139; Eshed, A One M an *.M ossad ', 148; U. Bialer, ‘The CzechIsraeli Arms Deal Revisited’, Journal o f Strategic Studies , 8/3 (1985), 309-10, Bialer, Betw een E ast and W est, 160. 4. Protocol of a meeting in the foreign ministry, 8 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 44-8; M. Yegar, ‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. 5. A report, 18 May 1949, Mapai Archive, 32/14/16. 6. Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 13 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 563-4; Harkabi to Eban, 15 May 1949, ibid. 569; for background see, A. Shalev, Co-operation under the Shadow o f C onflict (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1989), 23-4,49-56; the subject was discussed by the cabinet on 18 May 1949, ISA. 7. Rosenne to Ben-Gurion, 18 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 581-4; Shalev, Co-oper­ ation under the Shadow o f C onflict, 56-63. 8. Sharett to Eban, 25 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 589; Lourie to Sharett, 26 May 1949, ibid. 590; Sharett to Eban, 27 May 1949, ibid. 590-1; Sharett to Eban, 30 May 1949, ibid. 591; Sharett to Eban, 8 June, 1949, ibid. 597; Mohn to Sharett, ibid. 598-9; Eban to Sharett, 8 June 1949, ibid. 601; Eban to Sharett, 9 June 1949, ibid. 601-2; report on the meeting between the Israeli and Syrian delegations, 16 June 1949, D ocum ents, iii. 605-13; the mediator’s clarifications are in Bunche to Sharett, 26 June 1949, ibid. 617-19; Sharett’s instructions to conclude the negotiations are in Sharett to Makleff, 1 July 1949, ibid. 622-3; the cabinet discussed the issue on 21 June 1949, 28 June 1949, and 5 July 1949; cf. Shalev, Co-operation under the Shadow o f C onflict, 63-5, 67-74. 9. Sharett’s address at a meeting of the heads of divisions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 66-70. 10. Ibid. 11. Sharett in consultation with the senior staff of foreign ministry, 25 May 1949, ISA, FO, 2447/3; and on the attempt to conduct secret negotiations with Lebanon, see Sasson to Sharett, 31 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 82-3. 12. On the impasse in the negotiations with the Lebanese see Sasson to Sharett, 11 June 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 120. 13. See Elath to Sharett, 27 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 71-2; McDonald to BenGurion, 29 May 1949, ibid. 75-7. 14. Sharett to McDonald, 8 June 1949, ISA, FM. 2456/4/a.

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15. Eytan to Boisanger, 31 May 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 79-80. 16. The correspondence on these issues is abundant, see e.g. Sasson and Liff to Sharett, 1 June 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 86; Sasson to Sharett, 1 June 1949, ibid. 86. 17. Sasson to Sharett, 2 June 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 90; Sasson to Divon, 16 June 1949, ibid. 135-7; Eytan to Sharett, 14 June 1949, ISA, FM 2451/2. 18. Sharett to Eytan, 19 June 1949, ISA, FM, 2451/2; Cf. I. Pappe, ‘Moshe Sharett, David Ben-Gurion, and the “Palestinian Option” ’, 77-96; Shlaim, Collusion, 489-500. 19. See Sharett in the Knesset, 15 June 1949, 20 June 1949, D ivrei H aK nesset, i. 717-38, 741-66. 20. Esp. Shlaim, Collusion, 500-3. 21. See a report on the meeting held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13/14 July 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 222-6; Cf. Shlaim, Collusion, 500-3. 22. Eytan to Eban, 15 June 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 132-3; Eban to Sharett, 15 June 1949, ibid. 133; Eytan to Sharett, 20 June 1949, ibid. 143. 23. For a short analysis of the economic factor in determining Israeli foreign policy, see Bialer, Between E ast and W est, 197-205; Eban to Sharett, 22 June 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 150; Eban, to Sharett, two cables, 23 June 1949, D ocum ents, ibid. 154-6; on the American proposed for mediation see ibid. 172-6; on Sharett’s positive response, ibid. 204. 24. Sharett to Eban, 25 June 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 176; Eban to Sharett, 25 June 1949, ISA, FM, 2181/3; Rosenthal, ‘David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett’. 25. D ocum ents, iv. 206; Sharett to Eban, 6 July 1949, ibid. 207; Eban to Sharett, 8 July 1949', ibid. 210-11; Lourie and Rafael to Sharett, 12 July 1949, ibid. 218-19; on Truman’s positive response, see Lourie to Sharett, 19 July 1949, ibid. 227; Sharett to Elath, 21 July 1949, ibid. 237-8. 26. Sharett to Namir, 27 June 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 181. 27. Namir to Sharett, 30 June 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 189-90; Namir to Sharett, 12 July 1949, ibid. 219; Bialer, Between E ast and W est, 161. 28. Sharett in a meeting with Mapai youth leaders, 1 July 1949, Mapai Archive, 15/49. 29. Guide-lines to Israeli missions, 25 July 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 239-47. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Sasson to Sharett, 26 July 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 248; Avner to Eytan, 26 July 1949, ibid. 248-9. 33. Sasson to Sharett, 27 July 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 256; Sasson to Sharett, 29 July 1949, ibid. 266; Sasson to Sharett, 1 Aug. 1949, ibid. 271-3; Sasson to Sharett, 4 Aug. 1949, ibid. 286-8; Sasson to Sharett, 14 Aug. 1949, ibid. 335; Sasson to Sharett, 16 Aug. 1949, ibid. 357-9; Sasson to Sharett, 21 Aug. 1949, ibid. 380-2; and on the change in the Egyptian position, see Sasson to Sharett, 29 Aug. 1949, ibid. 403-4. 34. The quote is from a statement by Eliahu Hacarmeli in a joint meeting of Mapai’s members of Knesset and the party’s Secretariat, 1 Aug. 1949, Mapai Archive, 11/1/1.

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35. On Truman’s views on this issue, see Elath to Sharett, 28 July 1949, Documents, iv. 261-2; Elath to Eytan, 3 Aug. 1949, ibid. 283-6. 36. See the joint meeting of Mapai’s members of Knesset and Mapai Secretariat, on 28 July 1949 and 1 Aug. 1949, Mapai Archive, 11/1/1. 37. Sharett in the Knesset, 1 Aug. 1949, Divrei HaKnesset, ii. 1195-215. 38. Ben-Gurion in the Knesset, 2 Aug. 1949, ibid. 1216-36. 39. Sharett to Eliash, 3 Aug. 1949, Documents , iv. 282; on Sharett’s own assessment of the storm see, Sharett to Shiloah and Sasson, 7 Aug. 1949, ibid. 298-9. 40. Shiloah to Sharett, 29 July 1949, Documents , iv. 264-6. 41. Sharett to Shiloah, 2 Aug. 1949, ibid. 279-80, esp. n. 2; Shiloah to Sharett, 7 Aug. 1949, ibid. 295-7; Cf. Eshed, A One M an 'M ossad\ 148-51. 42. U. Bialer, ‘The Road to the Capital: The Establishment of Jerusalem as the Official Seat of the Israeli Government in 1949’, Studies in Zionism , 5/2 (1984), 278-86. 43. Eban to Sharett, 8 Aug. 1949, Documents , iv. 301-2. 44. Sharett to Shiloah and Sasson, 9 Aug. 1949, Documents , iv. 304-9. 45. See the cabinet’s decision on 17 Aug. 1949, ISA; Rosenthal, ‘David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett in View of Critical Decisions’; Bialer, ‘The Road to the Capital’. 46. Shiloah.to Sharett, 23 Aug. 1949, Documents , iv. 387; Shiloah to Sharett, 25 Aug. 1949, ibid. 393-5. 47. Sasson to Sharett, 17 Aug. 1949, Documents, iv. 359-61; Eytan to the Israeli delegation in Lausanne, 21 Aug. 1949, ibid. 382; Shlaim, Collusion , 503-6. 48. Sasson to Sharett, 26 Aug. 1949, Documents , iv. 397-8; Sasson to Sharett, 28 Aug. 1949, ibid. 402; Sasson to Sharett, 30 Aug. 1949, ibid. 406-7; Israel’s answers to the questionnaire can be found in Shiloah to Boisanger, 31 Aug. 1949, ibid. 417-20. 49. Truman to Weizmann, 13 Aug. 1949, Documents , iv. 330-3. 50. Shiloah to Sharett, 14 Aug. 1949, Documents , iv. 33; Shiloah to Sharett, 15 Aug. 1949, ibid. 343-7; Gass to Kaplan, 24 Aug. 1949, ibid. 392; Elath to Eytan, 14 Sept. 1949, ibid. 465-8. 51. Elath to Sharett, 30 Aug. 1949, Documents, iv. 408-9. 52. Eban to Sharett, 30 Aug. 1949, Documents, iv. 410-17. 53. Mapai Secretariat, 28 Aug. 1949, Mapai Archive, 24/49; Bialer, Between East and West, 21-5, and esp. 24. 54. Ibid. 55. Eban to Sharett, 30 Aug. 1949, Documents, iv. 410-17; Eliash to Sharett, 2 Sept. 1949, ISA, FM 2488/9; Sharett to Eliash, 11 Sept. 1949, ibid.; Ben-Gurion to Sharett, 15 Sept. 1949, Documents, iv. 471. 56. Elath to Sharett, 9 Sept. 1949, Documents, iv. 450; Eytan to Sharett, 11 Sept. 1949, ibid. 451-2; the cabinet decision, 6 Sept. 1949, ISA. 57. Sharett in Mapai Secretariat, 28 Aug. 1949; a joint meeting of the Secretariat and the members of Knesset, 14 Sept. 1949, Mapai Archive, 11/1/1.

17 ‘If I Forget Thee, Oh Jerusalem!’ Towards the end of 1949, the first year of its independence, the Israeli government was forced to deal with menacing developments on both the international and the internal fronts. On the international plane, the government was primarily worried by the escalating Cold War. This deterioration was created by the growing awareness of the Soviet Union becoming a super power, of its nuclear capability, and its firm control over the Eastern bloc, which in turn caused the Americans to formulate and adhere to the doctrine of containment and to redeploy some of their forces in new bases in what became known as the Northern Tier and in the core Middle East. Consequently the Israelis became aware that escalation in the Cold War might affect Israel’s ability to maintain its policy of non-alignment, and thereby create far-reaching effects on several aspects of its international politics, including weapons supply by and Jewish immigration from the Eastern bloc on the one hand, and American aid on the other. In order to offset some of these perilous developments, during that period Sharett and his associates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were deeply involved in promoting Israel’s peripheral policy, that is, improv­ ing relations with Iran and Turkey. They felt that the chances to establish full diplomatic relations with these states had been increased.1 Closer to home, Sharett was wrestling with the crisis in the Lausanne talks, as well as with the question of Jerusalem’s internationalization, which had become a major external and domestic issue partly because of Israeli unilateral steps to change the status quo in the holy city. Contrary to the later accusation that Sharett and his staff complacent­ ly accepted the Conciliation Commission’s proposals on Jerusalem submitted to Israel and the Arabs in early September 1949 and made public on 13 September 1949, the minister of foreign affairs and his envoys were conducting a dedicated campaign against the Commission’s intentions.2 Thus at a large meeting with Mapai members in Ramat Gan, held in the middle of this campaign on 22 October 1949, Sharett openly stated: ‘We are still in the midst of our battle to obtain a final approval for the facts that we have created in Jerusalem [e.g. the transfer of some ministries from Tel Aviv]. There is still no international recognition and

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approval of the fact that Jerusalem is an inseparable part of Israel. We are still not confronted with the question whether we can establish there our capital.’3 N or were the allegations anywhere near accurate that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was passed over as a full partner in the talks which Yaacov Herzog was conducting with the Vatican and other Christian churches. (Yaakov Herzog would later become a senior official and diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, director general of the prime minister’s office, but then was only the middle rank official in the Ministry of Religious Affairs responsible for contacts with the Christian churches.) In fact, Sharett and his officials were the prime movers in these talks. In any case, Sharett’s harsh public reaction to the Conciliation Commission’s proposals regarding Jerusalem, included these words: ‘This document [dealing with the Commission’s proposals] is not valid. N or does it include any indication that its authors realize the unfeas­ ibility of its recommendations.’4 Like most of his colleagues, Sharett made it clear that the Commission disregarded the fact that West Jerusalem’s status as part of Israel would be compromised by any form of international management of the city. Moreover, he also categorically rejected the demilitarization of the Jewish part of the city without a symmetrical demilitarization of the Arab part. Instead he called for limiting any internationalization or supervision strictly to the city’s holy places. Eventually Sharett’s position would become Israel’s official posture concerning the wicked problem of Jerusalem. In addition to attempts by Israeli diplomats to discuss Jerusalem with officials of various Christian churches, it was Sharett who had instructed Herzog to establish direct contact with the Vatican. Here too his guide-lines were characteristically clear: Before we are forced to begin a struggle [with the Vatican and the Catholic states], we should demonstrate our good will and readiness to reach an agreement. On the assumption that there is a clash between two rival schools in Vatican circles, our approach, and proposals, should indicate that we intend to satisfy the Vatican’s demands with respect to Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem by supporting the moderate school at the Vatican and encouraging compromise with the Pope . . .5 .

The Vatican, however, refused to conduct meaningful negotiations with Israel, preferring that the UN should impose a compromise on both Arabs and Jews.6 Hence, contrary to the allegations which would be made by the activists, the lack of Vatican-Israeli rapport was not due to neglect on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but to the

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Vatican’s refusal to accommodate Israel out of fear that heads of Arab states would make life difficult for their Catholic citizens as well as because of their apprehensions about the effects of Israeli control over the holy places. Sharett’s preoccupation with the Jerusalem question caused the post­ ponement of his trip to New York to participate in the UN General Assembly of September 1949, an event which he always liked to attend partly because of the glamorous social activities connected with it and partly because of the gathering of dozens of heads of state and foreign ministers. Hence the burden of representing Israel at the Assembly’s opening session was laid on the shoulders of the star Israeli diplomat Abba Eban. But the highly centralized system that Sharett had intro­ duced into his ministry kept the young envoy strictly informed as to his minister’s guide-lines and instructions.7 In other words, Sharett did not leave Eban much room for manœuvre. Accordingly Eban reiterated Israel’s familiar positions on the Arab refugees, and proclaimed the government’s decision to contribute to the UN special relief fund for them, a political move that Sharett had initiated and pushed through in accordance with his general attitude towards reducing the tensions in the Arab-Israeli conflict.8 Eban reiterated the Israeli official position on Jerusalem—also adopted under Sharett’s influence—which was based on an assessment that the high financial costs of its internationalization (the estimate was thirty million dollars), would prevent that proposal from being adopted. In view of these instructions, Eban and his assistants continued their tireless campaign to generate support for Israeli posi­ tions, especially with the Catholic states who were under the Vatican’s influence. Though a great deal of attention was focused on the highly sensitive and emotional issue of Jerusalem, Sharett had also prepared Israeli positions on other no less sensitive and controversial international issues that he concluded would be discussed at the General Assembly, and which the cabinet endorsed on 13 September 1949. These were predi­ cated on the basic assumption that ‘Israel was caught between contra­ dictory considerations from both the Middle Eastern and international perspectives’, and that therefore the Israeli delegation must tread a cautious path in regard to the future of the former Italian colonies in Africa; Indonesia; South-West Africa; Greece; Korea; the abrogation of human rights in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria (all of which inciden­ tally were allowing Jewish emigration); and on nuclear proliferation and disarmament. The endorsement of his proposals provided a further indication of his powerful position in the cabinet.

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Sharett told the cabinet that usually his instructions were consciously based on a combination of moral considerations and practical calcula­ tions, but this time they were dictated by the need to express gratitude towards some foreign governments and to gamer further support from others. Thus for example, as a token of gratitude to Italy, which had protected its Jews during most of the Second World War, and especially in anticipation of the need for the Italian government support on the Jerusalem question and on relations with the Vatican, he modified Israel’s previous position on Italian Somalia, now instructing his envoys to vote against granting the territory independence. On the more difficult question of how to vote on the Soviet proposal to accept thirteen new members to the UN as a group rather than individually (Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Transjor­ dan, Mongolia, Nepal, Portugal, Korea, and Romania), he decided to abstain and instead support an Australian proposal to hold a separate vote on each country, which would allow Israel to abstain rather than oppose when it came to the membership of Korea and of Transjordan.9 Once again contrary to later allegations, establishing diplomatic rela­ tions with China was high on Sharett’s agenda, especially since it went hand-in-glove with his long-held policy of trying to build up relations with India. Sharett had been busy in building bridges to India since the mid-1930s, when he dispatched a special envoy, Emanuel Olsvanger, to that country in 1936. His continuous interest and contacts with Indian politicians and diplomats blossomed during his long stay in the USA during 1947 and 1948, when he formed friendly relations with many senior Indians, including Mrs Lakshmi Nehru. As to China, it was Sharett who had been eager to promote relations with this country, and who had raised the question of Israeli recognition of her. But, since he was uncertain as to whether it would be better for Israel to initiate such a move or to wait for a Chinese request, in the end he was swayed by cautious Israeli ambassadors who had persuaded him to wait for a Chinese approach, by which time China’s relations with other Western states, particularly of course the USA, might be clarified.10 Further improving the already friendly Israeli-French relations was another major issue on Sharett’s political agenda before leaving for the U N General Assembly in New York. Since in this case hfc assumption was that both countries were in agreement on the indispensable need to prevent the ‘conquest by one country, or by a group of countries, of other countries, [thereby] disturbing the political and military status quo, [as well as any] external influence [particularly that of Britain], and any pan-Islamic influence aimed at stifling all non-Islamic elements’,

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Sharett’s and his associates’ expectations from France included: support for Israel’s positions on both Jerusalem and borders; help in facilitating political and economic relations with Arab countries, including the purchase of oil from the peripheral states, Iraq and Iran; French economic aid; French-Israeli co-operation in nuclear research; and dedicated steps against anti-Semitism in France. In exchange, Sharett was ready to pledge Israel’s support for France’s intention to stage a come-back in the Levant, for France’s wish to maintain its North African colonies, and for the dissemination of the French language and culture in Israel.11 Thus, here too, it was Sharett, assisted by his officials, who laid the foundations for what would become an essential element in Israel’s foreign relations in the 1950s and the early 1960s. These goals formulated by the foreign minister, rather than the Ministry of Defence or the IDF, were implemented by Israel’s first envoy to France, Maurice Fischer, a highly resourceful diplomat with multiple contacts in Paris, who was extremely successful in promoting Israeli interests there. While Sharett endeavoured to promote all these issues, unremitting American pressure compelled him to dedicate a lot of his attention to Jerusalem.12 As Sharett formulated it, here the dilemma was that while, We managed to evade point May 5, September 26, but can we do so indefinitely? Government, including self, feels strongly we cannot historically go on record as offering Old City to Arab domination nor can we appear as having no policy. Government’s decision is attempt get off horns dilemma by indicating what is ideal solution and launching it into mental circulation. Remember all probability economic position Old City present state anyhow untenable long run unless permanent charge international charity.13

He established a link between this solution and the West Bank problems. In this vein he told his colleagues that, Since we will not be able to present the General Assembly with an arrangement between us and Abdullah regarding Jerusalem, under these circumstances, we should leave the field open for any feasible agreement that might be reached later. In the event Jerusalem is discussed during this Assembly, it is desirable that any resolution arrived at should not hamper our chances in future negotiations with Abdullah.14

Again, unlike later allegations against him, there is no indication that Sharett was optimistic about the chances for his proposal for inter­ national supervision over Jerusalem’s holy places instead of internation­ alizing the entirç Old City. In fact, Sharett and the government were quite pessimistic that the UN discussions concerning Jerusalem would not bode well for Israel. The gist of Sharett’s tactics was an attempt to

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postpone the discussion of the Jerusalem issue and avoid awaking sleeping dogs. In fact, he was sceptical even about such a possibility. In a desperate search for a counter to the Conciliation Commission proposal, Sharett and his colleagues entertained even the idea that the Old City be turned into a kind of historical museum supervised by the UN on the basis of an explicit international contract with Israel and the Arabs. Although the majority in the cabinet doubted the wisdom of this diplomatic gimmick, they did not object to its implementation. In this desperate mood he instructed his officials to plan and launch a massive campaign to sway the American government and other UN members’ opinion away from internalization, himself launching an extensive per­ sonal correspondence with numerous foreign ministers on the subject, which only he could have conducted because of his extraordinary stamina and capacity for extended efforts. As he expected, his twin policies in this sphere were endorsed by the cabinet on 18 October, and 15 November 1949.15 While the UN General Assembly was still in session, and Sharett was preparing to leave for New York to lead the Israeli political campaign there, the Soviets launched a vicious and violent attack against Jewish writers and Zionist activists in the USSR. Sharett was particularly appalled by the news of this aggressive action, since he had shaped the grand strategy of non-alignment and cordial relations with the Kremlin not least to help Soviet Jews. Once again in despair, he decided to exploit Israel’s non-aligned posture and the worsening situation between the two superpowers to help alleviate the situation of these Jews. Sharett planned to meet the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Vyshinsky, in New York during the General Assembly session, to discuss the latest anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist campaign together with other mutual interests. Thus in addition to his deliberate intention to point out to Vyshinsky that ‘the best guarantee for Israel’s friendship towards the Soviet Union and for not joining its enemies is that it allows its Jews to maintain lively contacts with Israel’,16 he also intended to register Israel’s earnest opposition to an inter-Arab security pact on the basis that it would be directed against the Soviet Union as well as Israel. Sharett’s primary analysis and general ideas about the Israeli position during the meeting with Vyshinsky were supported by Mordechai Namir, tfho was then Israel’s envoy in Moscow, and were communicated to the Soviet envoy in Tel Aviv.17 Sharett left Israel for the General Assembly’s discussions on what had been Palestine on 18 November 1949, and in the wake of the collapse of the Lausanne talks and the Conciliation Commission report. His flight

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to New York was long and tiring, but new events in the Middle East prevented him from resting before plunging into politics and active diplomacy immediately upon his arrival. The most pressing issue was a new round of talks with King Abdullah on the possibility of concluding a separate peace with Transjordan. This round of discussions with the king began in late October 1949, and were subsequently accelerated after the director of the Palestine Potash Company, Moshe Novomeysky’s, meeting with the king in early November 1949. Consequently Israel was about to open a new series of meetings with Abdullah in late November. Although as previously Sharett was not enthusiastic about these talks, he was prepared to proceed with them in an attempt to forestall new anti-Israeli resolutions at the UN. Therefore, he instructed his officials that recognition of Transjordan and transfer of the Gaza Strip to the Hashemite kingdom, which were still demanded by Abdullah, should be ‘sold’ at the highest possible price. His long fist of pre-conditions for such a ‘sale’ included: abolition of the Transjordanian-British pact; the stipulation that any Transjordanian unity pact with Iraq or Syria would automatically abrogate the peace treaty with Israel; a prohibition against the movement of Transjordanian troops to the Gaza Strip; a territorial link between the Jewish part of Jerusalem and the Western Wall and Mount Scopus; concessions by Transjordan in the contested Latrun area; and Transjordan’s recognition of Israel’s rights in the Dead Sea and the Electric concessions. Less than half-jokingly, Sharett added that he would welcome any further suggestions for similar pre-conditions by Eytan and other officials.18Sharett’s list made it clear that, moderate that he might be, he was not about to trust Abdullah where Israel’s interests were concerned, and would be happy if the king rejected these demands, thus ‘killing’ an agreement. The final instructions to Sasson and Shiloah for the round of negotia­ tions with Transjordan were formulated during a long session held in Tel Aviv with the participation of Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Walter Eytan, Eliahu Sasson, and Reuven Shiloah and these were based on Sharett’s list. Subsequently, equipped with ‘Sharett’s shopping list’, Sasson, who was about to become Israel’s envoy to Turkey as part of Sharett’s attempt to promote Israel’s peripheral policy, and Shiloah held yet another meeting with Abdullah and his advisers in Shuneh on 27 November 1949. Although this meeting showed that the road towards a separate peace with Transjordan would still be very long, it did yield some positiye results,19 which Sharett immediately reported on to a satisfied President Truman, who had wanted to alleviate Abdullah’s precarious position. As usual, Sharett intended to exploit this American

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satisfaction with the Israeli move. While this move was a profitable one, however, a new and more severe storm had been brewing over Jerusalem. As noted, indications of the new political storm had been evident even before Sharett arrived in New York. Thus when Abba Eban notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a revised Australian proposal for the internationalization of Jerusalem on 18 November 1949, nobody was really surprised. Eban had asked that Michael Comay, head of the British Commonwealth Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be instructed to approach Australia’s foreign minister, Herbert Evatt, who during the procedures leading to the 1947 UN partition resolution had been friendly to Israel, with a request to cancel the proposal. However, it took Comay no time to learn that Evatt had initiated the proposal himself, mainly in order to mobilize Catholic support for his failing Labour party in Australia’s impending general elections, and would therefore not retrench his position.20 When an agitated Ben-Gurion relayed to Sharett an urgent message on Australia’s position on 21 November 1949, Sharett replied that the new Australian proposal’s ‘practical effect here confusing, harmful, advantageous to State Department and Palestine Conciliation Com­ mission by making theirs appear middle course [which would have greater chances for acceptance]’.21 In response to a further request from Tel Aviv that he ascertain the Soviet Union’s position, since it controlled a substantial bloc of UN votes, Sharett sadly reported back that his talks with the Soviet UN ambassador, Semen Tsarapkin, made it clear that as part o f its new more pro-Arab posture, the Kremlin would support the Australian draft resolution.22 Faced, in addition, with American moves that to say the least were not very friendly to Israel, especially in the light of American Protestant and Catholic leaders’ demands for the internationalization of the Holy City, Sharett realized that the chances of an Israeli defeat with regard to Jerusalem were increasing. His anxiety was further increased by mount­ ing calls for support of the Australian initiative on the part of Protestant and Catholic organizations, including the Vatican. On the eve of the UN vote, it was Sharett’s assumption that the best Israel could hope for was a postponement of the vote, but also that, ‘We must be prepared for many [unpleasant] surprises’.23 This message conveyed Sharett’s warning to his colleagues to expect a worst-case scenario. The Jerusalem snowball continued to roll and to grow. When a five-member subcommittee of the UN Ad Hoc Political Committee approved the Australian proposal on 1 December 1949, Sharett

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informed Eytan that, ‘Definitely lost battle but only morally and by no means lost war. Negative turn due an Australian freak move and Soviet dogmatism and Arab unscrupulousness.’24 This remark was aimed at taking some comfort from the fact that the Australian draft resolution had helped bury the even worse Conciliation Commission proposals. His morale-boosting message notwithstanding, Sharett was well aware that the situation was grave. Searching for a way to prevent internationaliza­ tion, he urged the cabinet to continue talks with Transjordan in the hope that an agreement with Abdullah—who also opposed internationaliza­ tion—would make an impression on some UN members. As the final vote on Jerusalem approached, Ben-Gurion made a move in the opposite direction. He informed Sharett that he would ask the cabinet to approve the following public statement: ‘Israel will not agree to any form of foreign rule in Jewish Jerusalem, or to its separation from the state. And if we are going to be faced with a choice between leaving Jerusalem or leaving the UN, we would prefer to leave the U N .,2S Sharett, of course, emphatically objected to issuing this statement both because the Australian resolution had not yet been adopted by the General Assembly, and, more importantly, because such an Israeli statement might pave the way to ‘irresponsible military actions’ on the part of the IDF. Reading Ben-Gurion’s intention, he most emphatically demanded 'the omission of the threat to withdraw from the UN. In response to Sharett’s counter-argument, Ben-Gurion encouraged his foreign minister to submit a draft resolution to the General Assembly asserting Israel’s right to control Jerusalem. Rightly sceptical about the chance of success of such a proposal, Sharett again countered with the suggestion that Israel accept a compromise Swedish draft resolution based on the idea of a functional internationalization of Jerusalem, that is to say, territorially dividing the city, but putting its administration in the hands of an international body.26 Despite Sharett’s staunch opposition to a belligerent statement, BenGurion convened the cabinet on 5 December 1949 to discuss his proposed public statement aimed at deterring as many foreign govern­ ments as possible from supporting the Australian draft resolution. However, Sharett’s supporters in the cabinet and in Mapai demanded that his views be heard first. Sharett was then asked to communicate his views in detail, which he did. As could have been predicted, after hearing both views, and as on almost all similar occasions, the cabinet adopted a typical compromise solution: Sharett would vote for the Swedish resolution, but Ben-Gurion would also issue his statement, albeit with the threat that Israel would leave the UN deleted.27 In other words, since

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Sharett’s line was once again supported by a substantial group in the cabinet, Ben-Gurion did not prevail and consequently there was a need for a compromise. But even then, and as Sharett had anticipated and argued, when Ben-Gurion presented his modified statement in the Knesset, it had the opposite effect to the one the ‘old man’ expected. Not only did it not deter any delegation from voting for the Australian resolution, but it alienated a number of Israel’s friends, including the Soviet Union. On 7 December 1949, as the critical UN vote was approaching, a majority of the General Assembly’s Ad Hoc Political Committee, including some of Israel’s friends in the UN, adopted the Australian draft resolution. Sharett attributed the unfavourable and unfortunate vote to a combination of pressure from the Vatican and Ben-Gurion’s statement.28 Although Sharett did not relinquish his concerted efforts to sway key delegations, such as the USA, France, and Burma, when the General Assembly voted on 9 December 1949, thirty-eight states sup­ ported the Australian resolution, fourteen opposed it, and seven ab­ stained. Britain and the USA opposed the resolution, and France voted for it along with the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc, and the Arab states. It is easy to understand why this resolution concerning Jerusalem created an unprecedented storm among both religious and secular Jews in Israel and the Diaspora. Indeed, in regard to Jerusalem there was, and still is, an overwhelming consensus among the Israelis and Jews. Sharett, who had anticipated both the vote and the ensuing storm, tried to calm the flabbergasted Ben-Gurion and his colleagues, suggesting that ‘the question is not what we should do, but what the UN can do [hinting to the world organization’s impotence]’, and he added that Israel must maintain a very low profile while the UN tried to implement the resolution, ‘and, if any stage we find necessary take decisive step can always do so but not now’.29 He also advised that the government should issue a statement to the effect that the resolution would stand no chance of being implemented.30 Ben-Gurion was not ready to postpone a strong reaction to the resolution. In any case, next Sharett monitored American reactions to Israel’s behaviour very attentively, since he knew that the USA hoped that out of its own interest Israel would not do anything to ham per the chances of the ongoing negotiations with Transjordan. And, indeed, immediately after the UN vote, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, approached the Israeli government and urged it to soften its reactions and to avoid aggravating the regional situation. However, because of the prevailing image that the UN and a handful of hostile and apathetic foreign

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governments were ready to deprive the Jews of their utmost sacred places, the public storm in Israel only gathered further momentum. The public reacted furiously to the UN resolution, and the press launched utterly vicious attacks on the government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and especially on Sharett, who was held responsible for the Israeli defeat. These attacks were not confined to an ignorant public, thus during the cabinet meeting of 11 December 1949, Sharett was assaulted by his fellow ministers, especially by the activist Rabbi Maimon. For reasons of party discipline and of fear that the delicate coalition might not withstand the crisis and would collapse, Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir defended Sharett, reminding the other ministers that they had voted for the Sharett line on the issue. However, to show their defiance of both the UN and its resolution, the ministers decided to move the government offices to Jerusalem. In a Machiavellian move, under Ben-Gurion’s guidance, the cabinet decided to postpone the Knesset debate on the issue until Sharett returned to Israel. The purpose of this delay was clear: to point the finger at the minister who was ‘responsible’ for the UN ‘débâcle’ in person. Although moderate colleagues of Sharett’s, like Kaplan and Rozen, did not like this decision, it was adopted by the majority of the cabinet. When Sharett learned of the cabinet vote, in order to minimize the possible damage to himself and his line, he decided to expedite his return to Israel. In the meantime, far from hastening to modify his views in order to ingratiate himself with his colleagues in cabinet and party, he still pleaded for caution, avoidance of blatant acts of defiance, and for the expedition of agreement with Abdullah.31 The loose ‘Sharett camp’ in Mapai, especially Eliezer Kaplan, Yosef Sprinzak, Shlomo Lavie, Ben-Zion Dinur, Pinhas Lavon, and Avraham Harzfeld, courageously defended their absent colleague in the stormy Mapai Knesset caucus, held on the same day as the cabinet meeting. In his opening speech, another Sharett supporter, the secretary-general of Mapai, Zalman Aranne, was apprehensive of the results of the ensuing debate, because ‘there is now a great deal of hatred against Sharett in Israel’, but, he added, T don’t know what the result of the vote in the UN could have been if Sharett’s prognosis about the solution of the Jerusalem problem had been different.’32 In other words, though this pragmatic politician realized that no Israeli could have predicted and prevented the outcome at the UN, yet even he supported Ben-Gurion’s position. When Ben-Gurion spoke for the activist camp, he again pronounced onç of his cryptic double-edged formulations: ‘We have no greater political interest than strengthening the UN. It is in our interest that the UN will be more important and stronger.’ But, he immediately

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added, ‘There is a good chance that Israel and Abdullah can ridicule the U N . . . And in this, we have two good allies: Abdullah and Britain.’ And he concluded, ‘It will not be pleasant to defy the UN, but the world would understand us, and the Vatican would understand us. It is important that we announce our decision [to move the government offices to Jerusalem] before the US has finally made up its mind [on Jerusalem] and before American public opinion has been shaped.’33 In his diary the ‘old man’ commented: T don’t know when I have been confronted with a more difficult decision: to defy the UN, to encounter the Catholics, as well as the Soviet and Arab worlds. But after much deliberation I have decided that we should take the risk and confront the UN, not only with statements, but also with action.’34 It was no wonder at all that on that occasion, the activists in the party secretariat won by a majority of twenty-four to six. Nevertheless, Sharett’s staunch objection to the cabinet statement, together with second thoughts among some coalition partners, led to a further cabinet meeting on 13 December to discuss the issue. At the beginning of this cabinet meeting, Ben-Gurion read Sharett’s message which included his proposal for future action, and which Kaplan and Rozen seconded. Yet the prime minister’s statement was approved again, albeit by a smaller majority. The cabinet also voted to bring to the Knesset the proposal of the dove-like minister of police and minorities, Bechor Shitrit, to proclaim Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. At this point, Ben-Gurion succeeded in postponing the Knesset debate until Sharett’s return, so that Sharett alone would be viewed as the only culprit responsible for the UN vote.35 Now it was Sharett’s turn to surprise the prime minister. Neither immediately nor out of anger and regret, five days after the UN resolution Sharett decided to make a dramatic move of his own: for the first time, he tendered his resignation from the government. According to him, his decision was triggered by the indirect vote of non-confidence in him that the cabinet and his party had made. In a secret and personal message to Ben-Gurion, Sharett explained his unexpected step: First, I did not anticipate the severe international twist that occurred in regard to Jerusalem; secondly, the cabinet and the party have rejected piy line in the wake of the U N vote; and thirdly, I am not sure that I will be able to defend the new line of the government whole-heartedly and effectively in the heavy political battle ahead of us.

Sharett, who was not known for his personal modesty, added: T fully appreciate the damage that my resignation may cause to the government

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and its prestige among our people at home, but I am obliged to return my portfolio to you under the new circumstances.’36 There is no doubt, however, that the two last points in his private letter to Ben-Gurion had weighed more than the first point in his decision to resign. Sharett’s unforeseen step affected his friends, associates, as well as other ministers. Thus his brother-in-law, Shaul Avigur, and two of his closest assistants, Walter Eytan and Reuven Shiloah, immediately cabled him that they were confident the prime minister would reject his voluntary resignation.37 It is difficult now to assess whether Sharett’s resignation actually shocked Ben-Gurion, but it did touch a sensitive nerve. As soon as he received Sharett’s missive, the ‘old man’ cabled the foreign minister, ‘Your resignation cannot be accepted. It is impossible both from my own viewpoint and from the viewpoint of all your other friends. Moreover, those responsible for 14 May [1948—Israel’s Decla­ ration of Independence] should not be separated. In addition to the severe internal and external damage your resignation would bring about, it is unwarranted since nobody could, or should, have foreseen all possibilities, especially in such a complex mat t er . . . and all of us must stand together in this crisis.’38 For the same reasons, Ben-Gurion did not mention Sharett’s resignation in either the cabinet or the party. Except for some close friends and associates of Sharett, his resignation has remained a' secret until recently. Sharett was content with Ben-Gurion’s response, since thus he emerged out of the crisis stronger than before. Not only was his resignation turned down—as he had anticipated—but he also received a written document from Ben-Gurion in which the rationale for their uneasy ‘coalition’ was clearly specified, and gained renewed recognition as well as a mandate to continue with his policies. As the initial storm over the U N ’s resolution on Jerusalem abated somewhat, and Sharett was able to assess the situation more calmly, he concluded rightly that the damage for Israel was not as great as it seemed at first: the resolution was really only a toothless recommenda­ tion, and the USA (which had voted against it) was not about to press too hard for its implementation. In fact, Sharett realized and told his colleagues, that Israel had only exacerbated the situation by overreacting to the vote. He therefore asked senior officials in Jerusalem, Sharef, Shiloah, and Eytan, to calm down Ben-Gurion: For heaven’s sake, protect the honour of the prime minister for his own sake. Make sure that he is tough and calculating, but not hysterical and weird—ad­ mired and respected, but not ridiculed. Statements about ‘our war against the

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entire world’ are unfounded and harmful after the US [moderate] votes in the General Assembly and in the Trusteeship Council. By repeating again and again that we have three enemies [the Soviet Union, the Catholic countries, and the Arab states] he himself widens the gap between us and the Soviets. The latter have already commented that the prime minister’s statement was, to use an understatement, extremely unfortunate and harmful.

Sharett’s concluding sentences also indicated the enormously widening gap between the two leaders: ‘It would be better if he kept quiet for a while. The prime minister’s habit of creating facts in foreign policy by direct and irresponsible statements that contradict my style makes my position intolerable. You should do your utmost to prevent any further worsening of this situation.’39 N ot surprisingly, the Sharett line received significant support from none other than President Truman, who reacted vehemently against Ben-Gurion’s remark that ‘The entire world is against us!’ Thus, the American journalist William Hillman of the Collier's Magazine reported that, in reaction to Ben-Gurion’s pugnacious statement, the offended and resentful president asked him: ‘Isn’t the US part of the “entire world”? And is our continuous support of Israel so minimal and insignificant that it can be overlooked? And on the whole, the Israelis are beginning to boast too much about their power.’40 With regard to the Soviet Union’s reaction to Ben-Gurion’s statement, Sharett justifiably felt that the irresponsible behaviour of the prime minister only hastened the Kremlin’s distancing itself from Israel and drifting towards the Arabs. Not only did Soviet officials let it be known that they interpreted Israel’s positions in the UN and actions in the region as strengthening British power there, but Tsarapkin was reported to have said: Our policy with regard to Palestine is completely consistent and coherent [in the sense that] the 29 November 1947 resolution had three parts: the first part— the establishment of the Jewish state—has been accomplished; the second part— the internationalization of Jerusalem—will be implemented; and the third part—the establishment of an independent Arab state—will be implemented after the two other parts. The Soviet Union will therefore insist that an independent Arab state is established in the Eastern part of Palestine.41 I

The Soviet Union had good reason to worry, since the UN resolution on Jerusalem had contradicted not only Israeli but also basic Transjor­ danian interests, and Soviet diplomats had been informed that in any case Israel and Transjordan were continuing their ‘secret’ negotiations towards a separate peace agreement, which, according to the Soviet

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interpretation, had been intended only to fortify the British hold on that small kingdom and through it their own imperialistic interests. Only then, and mainly as a result of his defeat over Jerusalem at the UN, and the Palestinians’ defeat by Abdullah, did Sharett finally become flexible in his attitude towards Transjordan. Now for the first time he was ready to support open as well as secret Israeli dialogue with Abdullah over the annexation of the West Bank to the Hashemite kingdom. For, according to Sharett, a quantum change had occurred in this sphere when the two countries agreed upon a draft peace treaty (entitled ‘Principles of a Territorial Settlement’) on 13 December 1949, during the fourth meeting between King Abdullah and Samir al-Rifai on the Transjordanian side, and Shiloah and Sasson representing Israel. The principles agreed upon by the Israelis and Transjordanians included: the partition of Jerusalem; Israeli sovereignty in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City; Israeli annexation of the western shore of the Dead Sea up to the Dead Sea Works, a,s well as Israeli access to M ount Scopus; Transjordan’s control over the territory connecting Jerusalem to Bethle­ hem as well as a land corridor connecting Hebron and Gaza; and mutual border modifications and exchanges, especially in the Latrun area. The remaining chief obstacles to finalizing the treaty were Transjordan’s demands for sovereignty in the southern Negev, definition of the Hebron-Gaza corridor’s route size, and demands for certain territories on the Coastal Plain. Although he was not too happy with all the draft agreement’s territorial clauses, Sharett was prepared to accept them if it would facilitate a final agreement, since this would have alleviated many of Israel’s political and diplomatic problems. What both Sharett and Ben-Gurion particularly objected to was the proposed corridor that was to have connected Gaza and the West Bank. But the prime minister— and the entire cabinet—agreed with Sharett that it was worth while to continue the talks with Transjordan, negotiate over the corridor, and to try to conclude a peace treaty.42 Ultimately, however, the talks faltered over the issue of the HebronGaza corridor—Transjordan demanding a wider corridor than Sharett and Ben-Gurion were prepared to allow—and Transjordan’s demand for a free port in the northern part of the Gaza Strip. On their part, the suspicious Israelis viewed the demand for a wide corridor as a Transjor­ danian manœuvre to claim large chunks of the Negev. Sharett was apprehensive that based on such concessions Transjordan meant that, ‘This is attempt reductio ad-absurdum of whole corridor idea view forcing us back to their solution based cession Southern Negev.’43 Ben-Gurion

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agreed with this interpretation, and Sasson and Shiloah were instructed to inform Abdullah that Israel was waiting for new and less demanding proposals. This was enough for prime minister Samir al-Rifai, who had strongly opposed the talks from the outset, to interpret the Israeli response as a dead end and to recommend that Transjordan pull out of the negotiations. Israel and Transjordan shared equally the blame for the failure of these negotiations. The gap between their respective positions was too large to be bridged. And therefore upon his return from New York towards the end of December 1949, Sharett took pains to explain to the British and American ambassadors to Israel exactly why Transjordan’s demands were unacceptable.44 He was particularly careful in his talk with the American ambassador, James McDonald, in the light of continuing American suspicions (despite all evidence) that Israel might be planning to join the Soviet bloc or that it might entertain some new military campaigns against its pro-Western neighbour. He also dealt with the Truman administration’s implicit allegations that during the entire period after the establishment of Israel America’s Jews had demonstrated dual loyalty.45 In desperately trying to assure the Americans that their fears in this respect were unfounded, he pointed out that, in fact, the American Jewish community was America’s best guarantee that Israel would not become a Soviet satellite, and that it was only natural for American Jews to establish close ties with Israel because, The establishment of Israel endowed that community, like all the Jews, with new pride and renewed self confidence. [Moreover,] there is a complete congruence o f interests between US policy aimed at guaranteeing Israel’s international position and the American Jewish community’s inclination to strengthen its own ties with Israel. . .*

In discussing the situation with American Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, Sharett also said that: This congruence should be clarified to the American government and to the Jewish community there. The American government should signal its Jews that it understands their feelings. [Only] the White House has the necessary authority and power in the eyes of American Jews to remove all their doubts about dual loyalty by one word.47

As the year 1949 was coming to a close, the Israeli élite, and particularly Sharett, again conducted a succinct and honest examination of the dramatic events and stormy developments during the first year of

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independence. Sharett chose to do so in a joint Session of the Mapai Secretariat and Knesset members. Since this assessment included a defence of his own positions and actions, Sharett naturally began with the controversial issue of Jerusalem. On this occasion, he attributed the Australian internationalization resolution to the Vatican’s intervention. He told his colleagues that although the Vatican’s unfavourable position was kept secret from the public, It is a wrong and shoddy impression that has become popular here as if this thing [the intervention of the Catholic church] had descended upon us as a complete surprise, as if we have forgotten that the Vatican exists or that there is a Catholic factor [in many states including Australia]. I would like to refute these mean assumptions.4®

That was not all. For Sharett went on to decry, The most terrible, and primarily self-inflicted, sin of Israel, that is, not being wise enough to impose iron discipline on our people in order to prevent the desecration of holy places of other religions [that, according to him, had triggered the Vatican’s opposition to Israeli control over the Old City of Jerusalem].

Mentioning the numerous occasions on which Israeli soldiers and officers had been involved in such barbarous acts, he called it ‘a disgraceful ànd filthy page [in the history of Israel]’. In other words, he was accusing the Israelis themselves of bringing down the Vatican’s wrath on them, ‘for which we paid dearly’ at the General Assembly. Needless to say, Sharett also drew some practical conclusions from this analysis, saying that he had instructed the director general of his ministry to set up a committee to deal with the ‘wrongs that should be corrected, and the means for preventing similar wrongs in the future’.49 The above notwithstanding, Sharett went on, Israel had advised the Vatican ‘to refrain from insisting on internationalization as it would not be implemented in any case, and it would only incite the Israeli government and public to act against the Catholic Church’. He then reviewed the history of Israeli relations with the Vatican and analysed its attempts to reach a satisfactory modus vivendi with the Holy See. He continued by telling his colleagues that Israel’s attitude towards the Vatican had been linked with the policy towards the Palestinian Arabs and the refugee problem, which he considered ‘most severe issues’. He made it absolutely clear that, ‘Until now we have been pursuing an opportunistic policy towards these issues. We have not finalized our positions in order to avoid antagonizing too many sides.’ In this context, he again mentioned the deteriorating relations with the Catholics as a

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result of Israel’s acts in Jerusalem and the desecration of the holy places, and statements, including those of Ben-Gurion, about moving the Israeli government to Jerusalem. ‘If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were a dictator,’ he concluded, Israel would have endeavoured to secure recog­ nition of Jerusalem as part of Israel before proclaiming it as the capital.50 As could have been expected with a statesman of his background and calibre, Sharett’s counter-attack on the activists ended with consider­ ations of a philosophical and historical nature: There was a time when our only option was to fight against our opponents. But we are now in a position where we can fight them by staying put. Why won’t we try this way? W hat weakness would be demonstrated by adopting this way? We are here, and we don’t move, [and I wonder] what are [the world] going to do to us?

As to immediate political steps, he argued that if the government had decided to move its ministries to Jerusalem, which he accepted unwill­ ingly, it should implement this decision as soon as possible and then allow the situation to stabilize again. Nevertheless, from loyalty to his principles as well as from pragmatic considerations, as always, he refused to move his own ministry to Jerusalem and to declare it as Israel’s capital officially, partly because he still expected a major inter­ national storm if the Knesset were to declare it the capital and partly because he knew that foreign diplomats would refuse to conduct official business there.51 As is often the case in politics, a complex issue precipitates a chain reaction which results in additional problems. Thus as a result of his manœuvres in the internal political arena, Sharett, whose personal and collegial political considerations favoured extending the coalition to include Mapam, felt the need to deal with the historical existential ‘demographic problem’ as well as the question of ‘greater Israel’. In regard to these intertwined issues, his position was now very clear: in the debate on whether a ‘greater Israel’ was preferable to postponing independence, ‘probably missing independence for many generations, or forever’, he was prepared to accept ‘giving up now, or for a long duration, the idea of a greater Israel’. Then he added loud and clear that ‘this debate was concluded by our decision to accept partition!’ Concern­ ing a compromise with Mapam, which still preferred a bi-national state in a united Palestine, he was no less clear saying that ‘We have already decided on this issue . . . Israel means only a part of Palestine in which there is a clear Jewish majority, and in which the Israeli government and other State organs can impose the wish of the Jewish majority.’52

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The question of Jerusalem continued, however, to bedevil Israeli politics and of course to need Sharett’s attention. N ot surprisingly, despite his political defeat over this issue, Sharett was consistent in his position. Thus when Roger Garreau, the French chairman of the UN Trusteeship Council, proposed a compromise whereby only the Jewish and Christian quarters, Mount Scopus, the Mount of Olives, and Government House would be internationalized, the control over these enclaves entrusted in the hands of a UN official, the establishment of a council composed of representatives of the three religions, and the entire area of Jerusalem demilitarized, Sharett suggested that the cabinet should reject this new proposal, but in such a way that the door would be left open for a more acceptable compromise. After several discussions on this latest proposal for the solution of the Jerusalem question, on 3 January 1950 the cabinet members rejected it in favour of Sharett’s previous proposal, holding out for UN supervision of the holy places. Anxious to reduce the level of tension that the subject had produced in Israel and world-wide, and despite information that the Vatican might agree to his scheme, Sharett none the less instructed Israel’s ambassadors in Washington, the UN, and Paris to continue negotiations on the French proposal. He confided to his associates that he was prepared to accept a plan that would ensure Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem and the division of the Old City among the three religions. This fight, however, he felt could wait until the negotiations with Abdullah had been concluded.53 His activist opponents’ recurrent claim that Sharett was too ‘soft’, too hesitant, and incapable of making urgent major political decisions was again proven untrue when it came to Israel’s recognition o f Communist China. Despite stem warnings from the Americanophile Israeli ambas­ sador in Washington, Eliahu Elath, that such a move would certainly alienate the White House and other friendly politicians in the USA, he adamantly pushed for recognizing this huge state. And indeed, on 9 January 1950, the cabinet voted to grant such recognition. It was only when the Chinese prime minister, Chou En-Lai, avoided the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel that Sharett instructed Israel’s envoys in Moscow and the UN to put negotiations for direct relations on hold and maintain contacts with the Asian giant only through the Israeli embassy in Moscow.54 Sharett’s attitude towards Japan was more cautious. Though his officials and especially the director of the Asia Department, Yaacov Shimoni, pressed him to explore every possibility of establishing rela­ tions with that country on the basis that its regime had changed

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dramatically since its surrender at the end of the war in the Pacific, the foreign minister was apprehensive, mainly because he still feared that it might serve as a precedent as far as establishing relations with Germany were concerned. (In fact, the utilitarian Sharett was not against talks with the Germans, especially concerning reparations, but he thought that talks about recognition and diplomatic relations would be utterly premature.)55 Therefore while Sharett was indeed a prime mover in Israel’s ‘Asian Orientation’, he also followed his usual pragmatic line in this regard. Despite the enormous tasks it was facing at home and the numerous contradictions in its relations with governments abroad, at the beginning of 1950, Israel’s situation even vis-à-vis some Middle Eastern states, seemed satisfactory and promising. Thus while negotiations with Trans­ jordan were frozen, they had not been totally severed. Somewhat more surprisingly, in the wake of elections to the Egyptian parliament, held early in January 1950, in which the Wafd party and its leader, Mustafa Nahas Pasha, won by a vast majority, that government too was seeking renewed secret contacts with Israel. As part of this effort, the Egyptian government dispatched to Geneva its special envoy, Mustafa Abd al-Munim, who had previously conducted secret talks with the Israelis especially when he led Egypt’s delegation to the Conciliation Com­ mission, for talks with Israeli representatives there. Encouraged by this development, and in an effort to pre-empt any new discussion on Jerusalem by the Conciliation Commission, Sharett was anxious first to resume talks with Transjordan. Although he clashed again with BenGurion on this issue, this time the cabinet went along with the foreign minister’s proposal. Since the talks were to focus on Jerusalem, Israeli representatives Shiloah and Dayan endeavoured to hammer out a more permanent arrangement in the Holy City with their counter parts. But the Transjordanians’ demands for an Israeli withdrawal from former Arab neighbourhoods that had been captured during the war were too substantial even for Sharett and once again the negotiations reached stalemate.56 While talks with the Arabs were deemed essential by Sharett and the moderates, a new outbreak in the periodic deteriorations in AmericanIsraeli relations began to assume greater urgency. This timd the cause of Sharett’s apprehension in this regard was an exchange that Congressman Jacob Javits, who was then a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had with the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in which Acheson justified continued British and American arms sales to the Arabs but the USA’s embargo on such sales to Israel. This, coupled with

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warning given by the American envoy to Israel, James McDonald, that, ‘Israel should not assume it is in the same camp with the US concerning the Jerusalem issue’, was cause for increasing concern, especially since McDonald also made it clear that ‘the US has not, and is not going to abandon the plan for the internationalization of the city, approximately in Une with the Conciliation Commission’s proposal’. What particularly bothered McDonald was his sneaking suspicion that, through Sharett and Eban, the Israeli cabinet was trying to project the image that there existed an explicit American-Israeli consensus in this respect, which was not the case.57 This rift in American-Israeli relations soon became known inter­ nationally and would acquire wider ramifications. Thus, concerned American Jewish leaders, chief among them then president of the United Jewish Appeal, Henry Morgenthau, visited Israel, where they suggested that the government should make an explicit and publicized effort to heal the rupture by renouncing non-alignment, openly trying to establish a regional pact to block Communist penetration into the area. When Morgenthau proposed that Ben-Gurion himself should meet President Truman to announce Israel’s absolute identification with the Western camp, leftist factions, led by Mapam, called for a Knesset debate on this ‘sacrilegious’ proposal. Sharett, the Ministry of Foreign affairs, and in particular the Israeli ambassador to Washington, Eliahu Elath, also entered the fray by disagreeing with both Morgenthau’s analysis and recommendation. According to Elath, the tension between the USA and Israel had been triggered by chronic American suspicion that Israel was preparing for further territorial expansion prior to any serious peace negotiations with Arab countries, especially with Transjordan. He there­ fore strongly advised that Ben-Gurion should not travel to the USA at that particular time, and that when planning any future trip to the USA in the near future the prime minister should clearly dissociate it from any of Morgenthau’s ideas and proposals.58 Although Ben-Gurion stated publicly that he did not agree with Morgenthau’s proposals, he was actually more than ready to adopt the latter’s suggestions, particularly since he had never been enamoured with Israel’s non-aligned posture. Deeply perturbed by the prime minister’s idea of visiting the USA and renouncing non-alignment there, Sharett decided to pre-empt what he regarded as a potential disaster, by advising the White House that Ben-Gurion had been invited to the USA by Jewish organizations and wondered whether a meeting with the president would be desirable during such a visit.59 Thus like most of his colleagues in the small Israeli political élite, Sharett never hesitated to manipulate

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the situation in order to frustrate the designs of his opponents, including the great Ben-Gurion, and to promote his own ideas. This was a significant turning-point in the personal and political relations of the two veteran politicians. From that time on, the gap between the Ben-Gurion and Sharett schools, regarding strategic political and military goals as well as non-alignment, grew increasingly wider. In the mean time, however, though Sharett and his camp still sup­ ported non-alignment, far from being pacifists they of course had no qualms about trying to lift the American embargo on arms sales to Israel. Sharett therefore instructed Blath to do everything in his power to see that the USA supplied Israel with weapons similar to those it was selling to Arab countries. He also instructed Shimon Peres, who then headed Israel’s Ministry of Defence mission in the USA, to submit to the Americans a detailed list of the necessary weapons.60 Back home, he tried to clarify the Israeli position toward the USA by, among other things, convening a high-powered group including Eytan, Eban, Shiloah, Kohn, Goldmann, Aranne, and Teddy Kollek, who was then the head of the US desk in his office, outlining the main issues at stake, and marking the parameters through which bilateral relations with the Americans should be conducted. These included improving relations between the two states without infringing Israeli non-alignment; obtain­ ing arms as well as the economic aid that the Americans had promised but frozen; and recruiting public support for a more pro-Israeli position. Against this backdrop, Sharett was more convinced than ever that an improvement in Israeli-American relations was closely linked to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that this could not be achieved without a solution to the Arab refugee problem, rather than the borders issue—a clear rebuttal of the Ben-Gurion camp’s position. In this respect, Sharett’s view was close to the Americans’. But he did not view the chance of an agreement with Transjordan with much hope, mainly since his colleagues in the cabinet were far from being prepared to concede to Abdullah’s main territorial demands. Under these circumstances, Sharett saw no other alternative but to turn to the American Jewish community for political help. However, since he realized that ‘many Jews all over the world, especially in the USA, are worrying about dual loyalty’,61 Sharett maintained that ‘Israel must first develop a stronger bond with the American Jews’.62 Here, Sharett was among the first Israeli leaders who fully realized that Israel had to reconsider its attitude towards the Jewish Diaspora. And here, too, he clashed with Ben-Gurion, who had a radically different approach towards Diaspora Jews. As it was well known, Ben-Gurion dismissed life

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in the Diaspora as non-productive and almost Servile, and therefore argued that eventually Diaspora Jews, especially those who regarded themselves Zionists, should emigrate to Israel. Despite these divergent views, Sharett was strongly inclined to invest more of his and his office’s energy in promoting healthier and closer relations with Diaspora com­ munities, avoiding, however, the pitfalls entailed in invoking the dual loyalty issue confronting Jews who supported Israel. Despite encouraging Israeli signals, to the disappointment of moderate Israeli leaders, however, the new stalemate in the talks with Transjordan continued. When Transjordan’s intermediaries, such as Abdel Ghani al-Karmi, explained that Transjordan’s hesitation was due to the Pales­ tinian Arab ministers in the cabinet, who stood firm against major concessions to the Israelis, Sharett’s assessment that the refugee problem and Jerusalem constituted the main obstacles to an agreement was strengthened. On the other hand, mounting pressure on Israel by American officials in Washington, New York, and Geneva (the venue of the dying Conciliation Commission) reaffirmed that there was a need for drastic Israeli concessions concerning the partition of Jerusalem and international supervision over the holy sites even though from the point of view of internal Israeli politics the room for manoeuvring in regard to such action was extremely limited.63 But even under the pressures coming from his enVoys in the USA and Geneva to modify Israeli positions, Sharett remained calm and advised them that this process would be long and arduous. When leaders on both sides of the Jordan River, who had been prodded by the Americans, realized that the chances for a breakthrough would remain exceedingly slim if neither side were ready to compromise, they began to search for a pragmatic and more limited way out of the impasse. Nevertheless, the obstacles even on this road were too high. During yet another meeting in Shuneh on 17 February 1950, Abdullah informed Shiloah and Dayan that the current Transjordanian govern­ ment would never support full peace with Israel. Although the leaders on both sides knew that the gap between the two countries’ positions, especially on borders, was substantial, instead of breaking off the talks, Abdullah—as Sharett described it—‘produced deus ex machina—wise new scheme provisional arrangement based non-aggression pact five years, territorial status quo9. The king also suggested the establishment of trade relations and subcommittees to work on solutions to outstand­ ing problems, guarantees that the two states would honour the holy sites, compensation to Arab citizens of Jerusalem for their lost property, and a free zone in Haifa.64 Needing an agreement, on this occasion Ben-

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Gurion and Sharett immediately decided to promote this draft proposal, and brought it to the cabinet on 15 and 22 February 1950, where it was reluctantly endorsed, mainly since the two supported it. Subsequently, in a further meeting in Shuneh on 24 February 1950, the Israelis and their Transjordanian counterparts amended the initial proposals of the two sides and signed a further draft Agreement of Non-Aggression. The draft was further amended in view of Sharett* s reservations particularly concerning the duration of that agreement. This was yet again discussed in Shuneh on 28 February 1950.65 Upon a detailed re-examination of this draft agreement, however, Sharett and Ben-Gurion soon realized that Abdullah stood to be the main beneficiary from this agreement, since it legitimized his annexation of the West Bank. Sharett, nevertheless, again stated in internal discussions conducted in his ministry, that over the time that had elapsed since May 1948, he had changed his position on negotiations with Abdullah, yet, ‘We have always wanted to “sell” our recognition of the king’s annexation of the West Bank at the highest possible price. Therefore, for the time being, it is in our interest that the king should know we have still not recognized the annexation.’66 He also admitted that the main reasons for Israel’s readiness to sign such a pact with Transjordan were continuous American pressure, the chance of reaching an agreement on annexation of the Jewish part of Jerusalem to Israel, and establishing a precedence that could be applied in the negotiations with other Arab countries and especially with Egypt. Concerning negotiations with Egypt, Sharett informed Eban and Rafael, Israel’s representatives on the UN Trusteeship Council and the Conciliation Commission (which had been reconvened in Geneva), that the Israeli government was ready ‘to discuss with Egyptian repres­ entatives the conclusion of a peace settlement between our countries or any interim measure leading to such a settlement’.67 The two envoys therefore met with Abd al-Munim, who had become the Egyptian chief interlocutor with the Israelis, to re-examine the principles of such an agreement.68 However, Munim told them that at this particular moment in the history of the conflict, Egypt was not too eager to conclude a peace treaty with Israel, who, according to the Egyptian view, needed it more urgently. In any case, according to his non-alignmerft approach and wish to gain the goodwill of the USA and the Soviet Union, Sharett notified both superpowers of these otherwise secret negotiations. During this period of hectic contacts with the two Arab states, negotiations were conducted in accordance with Sharett’s basic notion of conflict management rather than to achieve a resolution of the

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lingering Arab-Israeli confrontation. This approach stemmed from his assessment that the prevailing political conditions were not ripe for a full peace treaty with any Arab country. It is therefore appropriate to return to Sharett’s realistic, liberal, and pragmatic political philosophy here. In one of his regular meetings with the younger members of his party, who formed an important part of his constituency within Mapai, Sharett discussed various aspects of his line. Thus he very patiently (many of his colleagues regarded him primarily as a teacher) and in great detail explained to those assembled that Israeli foreign policy emerged out of a combination of ‘planned and ad hoc reactions’ to unfolding problems. This was predicated on the notion that ‘foreign policy does not exist on its own, it is one of the services rendered to the state’. In this context, while it was necessary to distinguish between vision, on which the development of the state depended, and actual policies intended to serve that vision, there was a close connection between the two: according to him, political vision determined the specific goals, and pragmatic policy guided the actions involved in moving from one goal to the next. Thus, ‘Policy is always related to a section of the road in the sense of time; hence it is “short-term” in nature.’ Leaders must constantly check and recheck their policies and adjust them to changing goals and political circumstances. In short, the basic functions of any state—to supply security ahd minimal welfare— its goals, together with global and regional conditions, all direct foreign policy. In this, Israeli foreign policy was not different from that of any other state, and should be made in view of a need for strong linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy. But Sharett also firmly believed that Israel must pursue some unique policies—and in this respect, the ingathering of the Jews constituted Israel’s ultimate goal. This goal had two main inseparable facets: the need to strengthen the state (this was a reminder of his staunch Palestinocentric and Israelocentric view) and the urgent need to rescue Jews in distress (a relatively new conviction that he had adopted during and after the Holocaust). Since it was improbable that Israel could transfer additional Jewish communities in their entirety, as it had done in the cases of the Yemeni and Bulgarian Jews, it must maintain close relations with Jews remaining in the Diaspora. Rational calculations such as these were Sharett’s reason for remaining loyal to his nonalignment policy. For it had facilitated both the immigration of Jews from the Eastern bloc as well as from Middle Eastern and Northern African countries and had simultaneously facilitated intimate relations with the guilt-ridden American Jewish community.

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Generally speaking, Sharett’s philosophy of non-alignment stemmed from his non-conflictual view of world affairs, which substantially differed from the conflictual view of Ben-Gurion. Thus Sharett used to say, T share the belief that there is still a hope that a world order can be created in which different regimes will coexist, and in which each will demonstrate their efficacy or justice in competition over peace.’ He did not, however, apply this principle rigidly, nor did he believe that it should be adopted at any cost, ‘since there is no neutrality in the struggle between democratic and non-democratic regimes’. Still, he rejected the notion that a non-aligned state like Israel must adopt a passive role in international relations. Instead, he believed that Israel should pursue an active role in both regional and global affairs. This meant arming itself in preparation for ‘any doomsday’, but also ‘contributing politically to any process that will lead the Middle East away from war’. Of course, any movement in the latter direction depended on symmetry in Israeli and Arab goals. As long as Israeli and Arab desiderata remained diametrically opposed, he thought that the chances for reaching a permanent modus vivendi were meagre.69 As one of Mapai’s most senior leaders, Sharett was called upon to deal with ‘high international politics’, as well as with domestic affairs. Contrary to the prevailing image of the foci of his interest, he never failed to express his clear views on the domestic front too. Hence he was deeply involved in the search for a solution to the crisis pertaining to the education of immigrants in the absorption camps that Israel had established, a crisis which was tearing Israeli society and politics apart in early 1950. The crisis grew out of the lingering debate about parents’ right to provide religious education for their children. More immedi­ ately, it was connected to the powerful Israeli trade-union movement’s establishment of religious schools in these absorption camps, to which the religious parties, which were Mapai’s traditional coalitional partners, strongly objected. While Sharett, who then began to show interest in religious affairs also, supported the establishment of one general educa­ tional system in the entire country, as long as the law allowed separate religious and secular schools, he supported the claim of the Histadrut as to the right to establish its own religious schools. But his inherent social liberalism led him to support a referendum in the camps themselves on the establishment of further schools and on the more general question of the trade unions’ right to establish religious schools. There was almost full agreement between Sharett and the prime minister, Ben-Gurion, in this area, except that Sharett strove to ensure that the Histadrut won in order to keep Mapam and the General Zionists in the coalition and

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reduce the political power of the religious parties'. He was gratified that the various bodies of Mapai and subsequently the cabinet adopted decisions in accordance with his views.70 Sharett’s attention was soon directed again to foreign policy, in view of a new upheaval in Transjordan. When that country’s anti-Israeli government of Tawfiq Abd al-Huda, who in the past had torpedoed any conciliation with Israel, resigned on 2 March 1950, Sharett interpreted the resignation as a reaction to Huda’s refusal to negotiate the draft agreement with Israel on non-belligerency. Sharett’s prediction was that once he had freed himself from this hostile prime minister, Abdullah would form a new government under the moderate Samir al-Rifai, and then work more persistently towards the ratification of the agreement with Israel. However, al-Rifai failed to form a government, and a new anti-Israeli government was formed by Huda. Although Abdullah presented this new government with a formal ultimatum on acceptance of the draft agreement with Israel, a disappointed Sharett felt that the chances for its ultimate ratification were becoming extremely slim. In view of the upheaval in Transjordan, Shertok was urged to approach America and Britain to put pressure on the king, to which he replied, ‘King needs no persuasion but Ministers. Ready sign and damn the consequences.’ Eventually, however, Sharett was convinced that the true reason for the king’s hesitation was pressure from Arab countries. To alleviate it he approached the USA asking it for moral and economic support for the king and his small state. The Americans were ready to offer only some vague encouragement to Abdullah, which was far from being sufficient to persuade him to continue with the process.71 We shall never know the real reason for the subsequent anticlimax, but whether Abdullah did not want, or was too weak, to impose the agreement on Huda’s government, the outcome was a missed oppor­ tunity for a non-belligerency pact between Israel and Transjordan. Thus, in a further meeting held in Shuneh on 7 March 1950, the king admitted that, while he had hoped to sign the agreement, there were substantial internal and external obstacles on the road to an agreement, and therefore the pace towards peace should be slowed down. The king did not, however, view that stalemate as ‘the end of the road, but only as a delay until after the new elections scheduled for April 1950’. Upon hearing this diatribe, Sharett, who had always been sceptical about negotiations with Abdullah, was somewhat relieved because the Israeli government, and probably also ,he himself, were not put to the actual test of readiness to make substantial concessions to an Arab state. Nevertheless, he told his colleagues in the cabinet that, ‘In view of the

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forces that have opposed the king at home and abroad . . . he pressed his view in a respectable manner’. Summing up this phase in the negotia­ tions, Sharett concluded when writing to Israel’s various legations that, ‘In comparison with the situation at the starting point of this process, we should certainly view this as a positive step on the road to negotia­ tions. Though it is an anti-climax for us, we are far from being disheartened.’72 While Israeli non-aggression negotiations with Transjordan and Egypt were deadlocked, imaginative diplomacy vis-à-vis Iraq resulted in a major human and diplomatic victory for Israel. After protracted and arduous negotiations with the Iraqi government, in a public decree made on 9 February 1950, according to a special law enacted for this purpose, the Iraqi government granted permission to all Jews residing there to leave—on condition that they gave up their Iraqi citizenship and left their property and all other connections with that society behind. Sharett, who from genuine fear for the fate of this community had closely monitored the situation in Iraq since the anti-Jewish incidents there towards the end of 1949 as well as the ensuing negotiations, viewed this as a victory on the part of the Iraqi Jews themselves, as well as an indication of the vast new possibilities for action on behalf of Jews in distress opened up by Israeli sovereignty and power. The great drama of the evacuation of the entire Iraqi Jewish community was also further proof of the prowess of the Israeli Mossad for Jewish immigration which was responsible for facilitating and organizing immigration of Jews in distress, and whose leader was his brother-in-law Shaul Avigur. But, a share of the success of this major achievement must be attributed to Sharett and the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had waged a relentless campaign to persuade foreign governments, including the British and the American, to support this Herculean operation.73 Simultaneously, Sharett and his ministry were also deeply involved in an ongoing attempt to rescue Iranian Jewry, whose immigration would start only later. Despite his joy over Israel’s other successes in this sphere, Sharett was despondent over the Soviet government’s refusal to let its Jews go. Admitting that Israel ‘was totally at a loss and helpless in view of this fateful situation’, he vowed to keep trying to change it since he was genuinely apprehensive about the future of'this Jewish community.74 Psychologically as well as practically, the Israeli government was gradually adjusting to the politics of a regional status quo. It seemed as if in this state of mind the cabinet was also preparing to accept the impasse in the negotiations with Transjordan and Egypt and the failure

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of both the Conciliation Commission and the*Trusteeship Council to find adequate solutions for both the borders and refugee questions. But as all these attempts at reaching peace were quietly fading away, at the end of March 1950 some Israeli diplomats, including Abba Eban, proposed that Israel should initiate a major ‘peace offensive’ intended to ‘actively exploit Arab state’s refusal negotiate peace, try giving public opinion clear picture their intransigence’. As always opting for honest politics, Sharett refused to go along with this insidious ploy on the basis that it might divert attention from the real issue: Israel’s need to conduct serious negotiations with the Arabs.75 During this period, Sharett was busy with yet another crucial process, in which he had been involved since the onset of secret contacts with West Germany: reparations to Israel. The issue of reparations from Germany had been raised by Zionist and Yishuv leaders during thé Second World War; later these leaders focused their efforts on obtaining personal restitution, and when these negotiations gathered momentum, they began to think as well as to talk with their German counterparts about reparations for Jewish property destroyed during the Holocaust. In view of Israel’s pressing economic difficulties, Sharett was one of the earliest advocates of establishing Israeli-German diplomatic relations, which should lead to obtaining reparations from that government. Although in late 1949 the Israeli cabinet had voted to refrain from establishing formal contacts with German officials, it retracted this decision a short while later, in view of Israel’s mounting economic crisis, entrusting the matter of national claims from Germany to the minister of finance, Eliezer Kaplan. However, for personal and political reasons, the latter did not promote the issue energetically enough. Hence it gained impetus only in January 1950, when Ben-Gurion’s economic adviser, Peretz Naftali, met with Sharett, discussed in depth the sensitive complex issues involved in such a process, and suggested that the minister of foreign affairs should initiate a cabinet discussion on direct Israeli-German negotiations regarding ‘first of all, a global settlement of all unclaimed Jewish property’.76 Pragmatist and dedicated executive that he was, Sharett picked up the gauntlet and began to promote the issue with a cabinet that was still extremely reluctant to launch direct and open talks with any German government, preferring to leave such negotiations in the hands of Jewish organizations of the Diaspora. From the earliest stage of the process, it was clear to Sharett that negotiations with West Germany involved parallel contacts with the three Western occupying powers of Germany, and no less important, overcoming the internal emotional and political barriers. The task was

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deemed insurmountable. Yet on 15 February 1950, with the exception of Dov Yosef, the cabinet voted to entrust negotiations over claims and reparations from Germany jointly to Sharett’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Kaplan’s Ministry of Finance, and this in conjunction with the prime minister’s office and the Jewish Agency. At the same time, the cabinet decided Jo launch a massive but gradual and low-key campaign to explain the rationale for such negotiations to a population still affected by the initial shock of the Holocaust and therefore dead set against any direct talks with Germany.77 This decision enhanced Sha­ rett’s already deep involvement in the process. Hence, when the negotia­ tions being conducted on Israel’s behalf by leaders of major world Jewish organizations reached stalemate in March 1950, Sharett ruled that the time had come for tougher official negotiations between the Israeli and the German government; in other words, he indicated that Israel must stop relying on the Jewish organization to do this job. From this point onward, Sharett did every thing he could to promote the very slow process and encouraged and helped the officials directly involved in the negotiations to overcome the immense difficulties confronting them. Early in 1950, along with facilitating the ‘miracles’ of the mass Jewish exodus from Iraq and some East European countries, working hard to save distressed Jews in other countries, dealing with the sensitive question of relations and negotiations with Germany, Sharett also made time to oversee his ministry’s efforts with regard to the establishment of full relations with various Asian countries. He actively encouraged the knowledgeable and industrious Yaacov Shimoni, then the director of the African and Asian desk in his ministry, to promote contacts leading to an exchange of commercial delegations with Indonesia, and he was directly involved in efforts to obtain formal recognition of Israel by Iran, as well as to accord Israeli recognition of China, Burma, and Indonesia. On the other hand, in March 1950 he also wrote, ‘It has been clear to me for quite sometime that we must have greater patience with regard to India’s recognition of Israel, hence we should not prod Nehru too sharply concerning our existence—we would be better off if we sat quietly.’78 He came to hold similar views about the pace of negotiations with other Asian states. Nevertheless, he persisted in instructing Israeli legations in countries such as the USA, Britain, and the Soviet Union to promote such relations indirectly, including, of course, in the corridors of the UN. In his tireless attempts to find channels for establishing or strengthen­ ing relations with Third World and Middle Eastern states, Sharett used the same patient and indirect approach that he was utilizing with India

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and China. One of the occasions on which he used this approach vis-à-vis neighbouring Arab states was in late March and early April of 1950, when the Arab League met in Cairo mainly to prevent King Abdullah from signing a separate non-belligerency treaty with Israel. Since the Arab League had explicitly prohibited its members from negotiating with Israel separately, under an explicit threat of expulsion from the organization, Sharett instructed his ambassador to the USA, Eliahu Elath, to inform the State Department of what was going on in Cairo, which also included Egypt’s attempt to enlist the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem’s active involvement in challenging the king. The point the Israeli envoy was instructed to emphasize to the American officials was that this aspect of Egypt’s policy, as well as its massive weapons imports from Britain, were a threat to regional stability and of course to Israeli security. Though a far cry from the peace initiative suggested by Eban, this did represent an Israeli effort to alert the White House, the State Department, and the American public to adverse developments in the region. This limited low-key campaign proved to be effective. Conse­ quently, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, tried to reassure the Israelis that the League could not afford to expel Transjordan, that this country would soon resume its negotiations with Israel, and that the USA would do its best to restrain Egypt.79 Achesoh’s assurance did not allay Sharett’s fears. Not content with Washington’s reaction, Sharett decided also to approach London for help. He took this step since Israeli relations with the former mandatory government had been improving gradually but constantly. N ot only had Britain been instrumental in helping Israel obtain the release of Iraqi Jews and their transportation to Israel, but it had also signed agreements concerning trade between the two states and the release of Jewish Agency deposits in London that had been frozen in 1948 towards the end of the mandatory period. Moreover, despite the embargo on arms sales to the Middle East and despite its intimate relations with some Arab states, Britain had begun to sell military spare parts to Israel. Therefore, Sharett instructed the embassy in London to request White­ hall to stop supplying weapons to Egypt and to use their leverage in the region to see that Transjordan was not expelled from the Arab League if it signed a separate peace treaty with Israel.80 Sharett was a great believer in reciprocity in international politics. As a token of appreciation of the USA and its Western allies and as an expression of .deep dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union’s refusal to release those of its Jews who wished to leave for Israel, Sharett supported those in Mapai who were arguing that the Histadrut should

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relinquish its membership in the Communist Trade Union’s Interna­ tional, which was dominated by the Soviet Union. This new stance was adopted since after Yugoslavia’s exit from the same organization as part of Marshall Tito’s attempt to gain independence from the Soviet Union, the Histadrut and the Finnish trade-union movement were the last nonCommunist bloc members in the International. As always, Sharett’s explanation of why the Histadrut should leave the Trade Union’s International was both moralistic and pragmatic: Israel was suffocating from having to ‘forge its identity. . . this [continued membership] is a kind of false attitude that our movement cannot endure . . . its price is too high’—and the cooling relations between Israel and the Eastern bloc were in any case leading towards the expulsion of Israel if it did not leave on its own.81 Before suggesting this step, Sharett ascertained that there was no link between the Soviet Union’s emigration policy and the question of Israel’s membership in the Communist controlled International. In the same vein, he indicated that by leaving the International Israel would ‘only be recasting our line of non-alignment not reversing it’. And to emphasize this point he added, ‘It is clear that for the time being we cannot join any other international trade union movement’. Sharett’s clear statement about his carefully balanced position had a significant impact on Mapai’s members of Knesset and its secretariat, who indeed finally decided to leave the Communist International, but to refrain from joining the Western Socialist International. On the other hand, Sharett urged his colleagues that Mapai should renew its membership in COMISCO (the Committee of the International Socialist Conference, which was an organization that replaced an older one in which Mapai had been a member), a British-dominated organization of Western Social Demo­ cratic parties. Sharett felt that Mapai’s continued membership in CO­ MISCO would help Israel in progressive circles in the international arena. His rationale was that, ‘if we are isolated in the world, we are doomed. But if this matter [COMISCO] is alive, and if this brand of Socialism is not bankrupt, and democracy is not rotten, then we must join.’82 Despite Sharett’s warm recommendation for continued Israeli participation, Mapai adopted a wait-and-see posture, postponing further discussion of the issue, thus suspending participation in COMISCO conferences. Paradoxically, it was during this period of relative regional and international calm that there began a slow but marked deterioration in the relations between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. This mounting tension was created by differences in attitude between the two ministries on Israel’s position with regard to the mixed Arab-Israeli

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Commissions that had been set up to supervise the implementation of the armistice agreements. Greatly concerned about this widening gap, Sharett appointed the trusted Reuven Shiloah as a liaison officer between the increasingly estranged establishments. Simultaneous with Shiloah’s appointment to this sensitive task, Sharett requested the ID F chief of staff, General Yigael Yadin, who had replaced the ailing D on, to consult and exchange information with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before taking decisions on ‘any military matter which has a bearing on Israel’s foreign policy, or influence on its position vis-à-vis external factors, including the UN and the neighbouring countries’.83 Sharett was able to elicit only vague promises about future co-operation between the two ministries and the IDF. This was only the beginning of a pattern; more blatant conflicts between the two ministers and their ministries would erupt later. Since the USA had promised Israel that Transjordan would not be drummed out of the Arab League, Sharett and his staff anxiously awaited results of the elections there scheduled for 11 April 1950, before making their next political move in regard to peace talks with this neighbour state. Sharett was monitoring these elections very carefully, since this was the first time that the West Bank Arabs—who had been granted passive political rights similar to those of the Transjordanian citizens to' facilitate annexation of the area—participated in these elec­ tions. When the results were announced, it became known that the West Bankers succeeded in sending a sizeable contingent to the lame Trans­ jordanian parliament. While these elections on the whole strengthened Abdullah’s position, they also resulted in the West Bankers’ capability to express their opposition to a separate agreement with Israel. Sharett and his officials, who pragmatically accepted the expected annexation of the West Bank to Transjordan as a fa it accompli, felt that the new situation would allow Abdullah to resume dialogue with Israel. For, notwithstanding the composition of the parliament, ‘King sticks his word honour restart talks probably after formal annexation, but likely try make us pay heavily for his defiance League in terms Eilat, Jerusalem quarters, even Sharon strip’. However, a few days after the election in Transjordan, the Arab League adopted mitigated resolutions granting a de facto recognition of the annexation of the West Bank to Trans­ jordan, and permitting Arab states to begin negotiations with Israel within the framework of the Israeli-Arab mixed committees for super­ vising the armistice regime only after Israel agreed to the return of all Arab refugees and to adhere to the UN resolution of November 1947.84

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In preparing for forthcoming developments, the Israeli government officially expressed opposition to the annexation, describing it as a breach of the armistice agreement, and stating that unlike the Transjordanians the Israeli government would adhere to this agreement. But, secretly, in a further meeting between Israeli and Transjordanian repres­ entatives, Israel left the door open for further negotiations by hinting to Abdullah’s representative that it might consider annexation as part of a comprehensive peace treaty.85 Hence it was not entirely surprising that on 24 April 1950, the two houses of Transjordan’s parliament adopted a resolution calling for full unity between the Western and Eastern banks of the Jordan River, and their unification into one state, the Hashemite kingdom o f Jordan. This resolution of course was immediately approved by the king, who thus realized a part of his and his ancestors’ dream to create a large Middle Eastern kingdom. In reaction to the stormy debate that followed the annexation of the West Bank and the establishment of Jordan in the Knesset, Sharett said, ‘The genuine excitement expressed in this debate on annexation of the West Bank should be taken seriously by the Arab states.’ Repeating the official Israeli position on annexation and the composition of Jordan, he nevertheless hinted again that the government, including himself, had not been surprised by the new development. This implicit disclosure of what was brewing behind the scenes led to a bitter exchange between Sharett and the leader of the opposition Menachem Begin, who attacked the government for ‘agreeing to the annexation’, and for seeking a peace treaty with a belligerent Jordan. Sharett in turn accused Begin of misrepresenting the government’s position and renewing ‘the hollow and impotent slogan of Israeli sovereignty over both banks of the Jordan, the Mountains of Moab and the Golan’. Begin retorted by repeating the myth about Sharett’s position on the eve of the establishment of the state, saying: ‘there was a time when you yourself had thought about a Jewish state as a hollow slogan’.86 This acerbic exchange notwithstand­ ing, Sharett reiterated the government’s determination to continue its efforts to reach peace with its neighbours. The British now came forward with a courteous gesture that showed Sharett’s wisdom in trying to improve relations with the former colonial power. On the occasion of Jordan’s annexation of the* West Bank, Britain sought to balance its continuous support of that Arab state and patronage of its king by granting de jure recognition to Israel. Although the British emphasized that such recognition was of an Israel within borders that had not yet been finally drawn, and that they were still reserved in their general attitude towards Israel, it was a genuine

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indication of Britain’s goodwill and of its readiness for a further improvement in relations.87 As Sharett had postulated, mainly in his own self-interest, Abdullah did resume talks with Israel on 26 April 1950. At the next meeting between the king and the two Israeli envoys, Shiloah and Dayan, this time in Amman, he looked relaxed and content. Expressing his satisfac­ tion with the election results and the ensuing annexation of the West Bank, which he viewed as a major personal victory, the self-assured Abdullah promised the two Israelis that if talks between the two countries were successful, he would sign a separate peace treaty with Israel, even at the cost of leaving the Arab League. Finally, as a gesture of goodwill, Abdullah made a pledge to appoint his envoys to the formal peace negotiations.88 Even though these talks were not leading to a formal peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, nevertheless, they buttressed at least tempo­ rarily the armistice and related arrangements (as well as contributing to a marked improvement in Israeli relations with the USA, which was highly interested in promoting calm around Israeli borders). Thus, for example, that same meeting in Amman with the king resulted in a secret understanding on the prevention of Palestinians’ infiltration from Jordan. However, Sharett’s hopes for better relations with Britain were dashed when, at the beginning of May 1950, and under heavy British pressure, Abdullah advanced renewed demands for an Israeli retreat from the southern Negev and its eventual annexation to Jordan.89 As this was anathema to the Israeli government, and especially to Ben-Gurion, it seemed that the chances for a more comprehensive settlement with Jordan and an improvement in British-Israeli relations were rapidly evaporating. Hence if during that period there existed any collusion between Israel and Jordan, as some historians have maintained, it was not in regard to the final shape of the border and relations between these two states, but rather to keep the existing borders quiet. Moreover, realizing that an agreement with Abdullah that would include satisfactory arrangements as regards Jerusalem was becoming less and less likely, Sharett and his staff began to outline an Israeli reaction to the possibility that the USA through the U N would try to impose the internationalization of the city. This became particularly urgent in view of the forthcoming General Assembly and renewed discussions on the Palestine problem in the Trusteeship Council.90 Once again the Israelis resorted to secret talks to elicit help from the USA. Accordingly, Ëlath and Eban met George McGhee, Stuart Rockwell, and Benjamin Gerig, three State Department officials who encouraged

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Israel to talk about Jerusalem. During this meeting Eban explained to them that ‘strategy of non-implementation of [the Australian interna­ tionalization resolution], worked out between us in Geneva [during the last phases of the Geneva Conference] of which first stages completed’. Eban and Elath hoped for ‘their help [in] further stages up to and in General Assembly’,91 that is, in supporting Israeli plans for functional internationalization of the holy places.92 The three State Department officials told the Israelis that America would uphold its commitment if American-Israeli contacts on Jerusalem remained confidential. Sharett obtained the cabinet’s approval for action along these lines, as well as for forwarding positive Israeli ideas instead of merely rejecting unfavour­ able proposals by others. The prospects of success in this realm, which had become almost an obsession with Sharett after the Israeli failure in the previous General Assembly, were enhanced when, for reasons which were not immediately clear, the Soviet Union representatives announced the withdrawal of their support for the internationalization of the city in favour of an arrangement that would satisfy all the sides concerned. At first, Sharett interpreted this change either as a voluntary Soviet reconsideration of its traditional policy towards Jerusalem, or as a favourable response to ceaseless Israeli presentations and persuasion. Somewhat later he would adopt the more accurate view that the Soviets had decided to pursue a more pragmatic policy in the region. At the time, however, most important to him was that the change in Soviet policy increased Israel’s chances to turn West Jerusalem into the capital of the Jewish state.93 Now that the Soviets were exhibiting a more pragmatic and evenhanded attitude towards the solution of the Jerusalem problem, Sharett increased his attention to America’s stance on the arms embargo to Middle Eastern states in general, and to Israel in particular. Since American officials had assured his envoys that the embargo had nothing to do with Israel’s non-aligned posture, he increased his efforts with regard to deciphering the ‘mystery’ of the United States’ rigid position on the issue. Ambassador Elath supplied him with a clue to this riddle when he suggested that America’s strict adherence to the embargo was connected to bureaucratic politics resulting in conflicts between the State and Defense Departments, which had become evident during discussions taking place in the National Security Council: while the State Depart­ ment had come to advise adopting a more flexible approach on the question of weapons, the Pentagon was still rejecting all such Israeli requests. Concluding that only improved relations with the Pentagon

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might bring about a change in the US attitude, Sharett and his officials decided to launch a campaign to do exactly this.94 For Sharett, whose ministry was deeply involved in the attempt to obtain American weapons for Israel,. the ultimate goal was not to enhance Israel’s offensive capability, but to create a stronger Israel that might contribute to a marked reduction in regional tensions through deterrence rather than the use of brutal force.

NOTES 1. See e.g. an analysis of the situation, requested by Sharett and prepared by Eliahu Elath in Elath to Sharett, 12 Oct. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 536-7; Eytan to Eban, 30 Oct. 1949, ibid. 584-5; Bialer, ‘The Iranian Connection*, 302-6. 2. Eban to Sharett, 13 Sept. 1949, two cables, D ocum ents, iv. 462-4; Sharett in a meeting with editors of the Israeli newspapers, 16 Sept. 1949, ISA, FM 2446/14; see Herzog’s report, in Herzog to Eban, 29 Sept. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 511-16; Herzog to Eban, 10 Oct. 1949, ibid. 530. 3. Sharett in a meeting with workers, held in Ramat Gan, 22 Oct. 1949, Mapai Archive, 15/4/20; Cf. Bialer, ‘The Road to the Capital*, 282; Bar-Zohar, Ben-G urion , 889. 4. Ibid. , 5. Herzog to Eban, 10 Oct. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 511-16. 6. Ginossar to Sharett, 19 Sept. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 483; Ginossar to Eytan, 11 Oct. 1949, ibid. 533-4; Bialer, ‘The Road to the Capital’, 282-5. 7. Eban to Sharett, 29 Sept. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 505; Elath to Sharett, 28 Sept. 1949, ibid. 504; cf. Bialer, ‘The Road to the Capital’, 288. 8. The cabinet decided to support the fund in its meeting on 26 July 1949, ISA. 9. The cabinet made these decisions on 13 Sept. 1949, ISA; ‘Our Position in the Fourth Session of the Assembly, First Memo from the Minister of Foreign Affairs’, 29 Sept. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 506-10; Eban to Sharett, 2 Oct. 1949, ibid. 521, esp. n. 3. 10. Sharett to Eban, 27 Oct. 1949, ISA, FM, 2329/14; Eban to Sharett, 28 Oct. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 583-4. 11. ‘Outline of the Basis for Talks with France’, 15 Nov. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 626-7; Avner to Fischer, 29 Nov. 1949, ibid. 657-9. 12. e.g. Eytan to Sharett, 10 Oct. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 529-30. 13. Eytan to Eban, 5 Oct. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 525; Eban to Sharett, 10 Oct. 1949, ibid.; Sharett to Eban, 10 Oct. 1949, ibid. 529; quote is from Sharett to Eban, 12 Oct. 1949, ibid. 535; Eban to Sharett, 12 Oct. 1949, ibid. 14. Sharett to Abraham Katznelson, 4 Nov. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 598-9; cf. Bialer, ‘The Road to «the Capital’, 289.

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15. The correspondence about this issue is voluminous; most important are: Sharett to Eban, 5 Oct. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 525; Eban to Sharett, 13 Oct. 1949, ibid. 542-3; Sharett to Eban, 18 Oct. 1949, ibid. 555; Eban to Sharett, 23 Oct. 1949, ibid. 569-70; Katznelson to Sharett, 26 Oct. 1949, ibid. 574-6; for Sharett’s instructions to conduct the campaign see a letter from Eytan to all Israeli missions, 30 Oct. 1949, ibid. 587; an example of a letter sent to all UN legations is Eban to Hood, 3 Nov. 1949, ibid. 597-8; an example of Sharett’s letter to numerous foreign ministers is Sharett to Fraser, New Zealand’s foreign minister, 8 Nov. 1949, ibid. 613-15; on the government’s decision of 15 Nov. 1949, see Eytan to Eban, 17 Nov. 1949, ibid. 632. 16. Sharett to Namir, 15 Oct. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 551. 17. Namir to Sharett, 21 Oct. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 566-7; report on Sharett’s meeting with Yershov, the Soviet envoy to Israel, 15 Nov. 1949, ibid. 625; the issue was discussed in cabinet on 22 Nov. 1949, ISA. 18. Sharett to Eytan, 20 Nov. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 637. 19. See report on this meeting, held on 27 Nov. 1949, and dated 29 Nov. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 659-62; Shlaim, Collusion, 518-22. 20. Eban to Comay, 18 Nov. 1949, ISA, FM, 2202/4; Comay to the legation in the UN, 20 Nov. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 635; on Evatt’s adamant position, see Comay to Eban, 23 Nov. 1949, ibid. 643. 21. Shareti to Eytan 21 Nov. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 639. 22. Eban to Eytan, 21 Nov. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 640-1; on Sharett’s talk with Tsarapkin, see Sharett to Eytan, 1 Dec. 1949, ibid. 671-2. 23. Elath to Eytan, 24 Nov. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 646; Herzog to Sharett, 24 Nov. 1949, ibid. 647-8; Eban to Eytan, 26 Nov. 1949, ibid. 648-9. 24. Sharett to Eytan, 1 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 672; Sharett to Eytan, 3 Dec. 1949, ibid. 674-6. 25. Ben-Gurion to Sharett, 4 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 676. 26. Eytan to Sharett, 4 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 676. 27. D ocum ents, iv. 679-81; Eytan to Sharett, 5 Dec. 1949, ibid. 681. 28. Sharett to Eytan, 7 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 688. 29. Sharett to Eytan for Ben-Gurion, 10 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 694. 30. Sharett to Eytan, 10 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 695; Eytan to Sharett, 11 Dec. 1949, ibid. 697. 31. Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 12 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 702-3; Eytan to Sharett, 13 Dec. 1949, ibid. 710-11. 32. The Mapai’s caucus, 12 Dec. 1949, Mapai Archive, 11/1/1. 33. Ibid. 34. Ben-Gurion’s diary, 14 Dec. 1949, as quoted in D ocum ents, iv. 716-20; cf. Bialer, The R oad to the C apital, also Bar-Zohar, Ben-G urion, 891. 35. See the government’s decision, 13 Dec. 1949, ISA. * 36. Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 14 Dec. 1949, ISA, FM, 2446/11. 37. Shiloah to Sharett, 14 Dec. 1949, CZA, A245/183; Eytan to Sharett, 15 Dec. 1949, ISA, FM, 2446/11. 38. Ben-Gurion to Sharett, 16 Dec. 1949, CZA, A245/183.

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39. The quote is from Sharett to Eytan, 15 Dec. 1949,, CZA, A245/70; Eban to Eytan, 13 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 711-12; Eban to Eytan, 15 Dec. 1949, ibid. 726-7. 40. Rafael to Sharett, 29 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 770-1. 41. See a report on Tsarapkin’s statement, in Rafael to Sharett, 13 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 712-13; the cabinet discussed these matters on 27 Dec. 1949, ISA. 42. Ben-Gurion diary of 24 Dec. 1949, as quoted in D ocum ents, iv. 716; Sharett to Eytan, 14 Dec. 1949, ISA, FM, 2453/2; Shlaim, Collusion, 527-9; and cf. BarZohar, Ben-G urion , 892-3. 43. Sharett to Eban, 29 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 765-6. 44. Sharett to Eban, 29 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 765-6; Sharett to Eban, 1 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, iv. 3; Shlaim, Collusion , 529-33. 45. On American doubts concerning Israel’s positions see e.g. report of a talk with the American ambassador in Tel Aviv, 16 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 730-2. 46. See report on Sharett’s talk with Frankfurter, 15 Dec. 1949, D ocum ents, iv. 728-9. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid.; and see also Sharett to Eytan, 10 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 17-18. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. For the entire analysis, see the protocols of the meeting of Mapai Secretariat and members of Knesset, 31 Dec. 1949, Mapai Archive, 11/1/1; Sharett’s speech in the Knesset on 2 Jan. 1950, D ivrei H aK nesset, iii. 375-96. 52. Sharett in the joint meeting of the Mapai Secretariat and its Knesset contingent, 3 Jan. 1950, Mapai Archive, 11/1/2; and see Sharett in the Knesset, 4 Jan. 1950, D ivrei H aK nesset, iii. 416-44. 53. Sharett to Eban, 4 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 7-8, 14. 54. On the government’s decision concerning the recognition of China on 9 Jan. 1950 see ISA; Eytan to the Israeli embassy in Washington, 10 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 20; on later developments in this respect, see Shimoni to Eytan, 29 Jan. 1950, ibid. 71-2, and on Sharett’s instruction to stall see n. 2. 55. On the relations with Japan, Shimoni to Eytan, 11 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 21- 2 . 56. On the new contacts with the Egyptians see Rafael to Eytan, 15 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 31-2; report on the talks in Shuneh held on 23 Jan. 1950, ibid. 45-6; Shlaim, Collusion , 537-8. 57. Keren to Eytan, 13 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 26; on the Israeli government’s reaction, 25 Jan. 1950, ibid. 51-2. 58. Elath to Sharett, 30 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 78-9; cf. M. Gazit, ‘Ben-Gurion’s Attempts to Foster Military Connections with the USA’, Gesher (Heb.) 32/115 (Winter 1987). 59. Sharett to Elath, 22 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 59-61, and on Sharett’s decision how to handle the situation, see n. 9. 60. The US Division to Elath, 30 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 76-7; Elath to Sharett, 31 Jan. 1950, ibid. 88. 61. Consultation in the foreign ministry, 31 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 82-5.

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62. Ibid. 63. On the new round of talks with the Transjordanians held on 30 Jan. 1950, see, D ocum ents, v. 75, and on 3 Feb. 1950, ibid. 98, and see further, ibid. 99-100; on the American position see Rafael to Sharett, 3 Feb. 1950, ibid. 100-1, and especially n. 2; and see minutes of a talk between Sharett and Eban, 16 Feb. 1950, ibid. 126-7; Shlaim, Collusion, 538-40. 64. Sharett to Eban, 19 Feb. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 135, and see the cabinet decisions made on 15 Feb. 1950 and 22 Feb. 1950, ISA. 65. For the draft, dated 24 Feb. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 140; see the draft for a non-aggression agreement, dated 28 Feb. 1950, ibid. 146-53; Shlaim, C ollusion, 540-5. 66. Minutes of the consultation in the Foreign Ministry, 20 Feb. 1950, ISA, FM, 2451/2. 67. Sharett to Eban and Rafael, 27 Feb. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 143; Sharett to Elath, 27 Feb. 1950, ibid. 144; Elath to the US Division, 27 Feb. 1950, ibid. 145; the quote is from Rafael to Chairman of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 28 Feb. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 154-5. 68. On the talks with Munim, see a report dated 3 Mar. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 170-3; and see Sharett’s clarifications about his positions in this respect, Sharett to Eban and Rafael, 6 Mar. 1950, ibid. 176-7. 69. Sharett'in a meeting with Mapai youth, 12 Feb. 1950, Labour Archive, 104/4 Sharett 4. 70. See the joint session of Mapai’s faction in the Knesset and the party’s secretariat, 19 Feb. 1950, Mapai Archive, 11/1/2; see the cabinet resolution, 22 Feb. 1950, ISA; E. Kafkafi, ‘The Question of Religious Education*, S ta te Government and International R elations (Heb.), 30 (1989). 71. Sharett to Israeli missions, 3 Mar. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 162; quote is from Sharett to Eban, two cables, 5 Mar. 1950, ibid. 174-5; see report on Shiloah and Dayan’s meeting with Abdullah, 7 Mar. 1950, ibid. 178. 72. Sharett to Israeli Missions Abroad, 9 Mar. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 181-2; Cabinet’s decision, 8 Mar. 1950, ISA; Shlaim, Collusion, 547-9. 73. Sharett’s request to the US government for aid for the absorption of Iraqi Jews, Sharett to Elath, 12 Mar. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 183-4; on the entire affair see D. Tsimhoni, ‘Why the Majority of the Jews of Iraq Immigrated to Israel in “Operation Ezra and Nehemya” ’, Studies in Zionism , the Yishuv and the S ta te o f Israel (Heb.), 4 (Sdeh Boker: The Ben-Gurion Research Centre, 1994), 379-404; D. Tsimhoni, ‘The Political Background to the Operation of Iraqi Jews* Immigration, 1950-1951’, Studies in the H istory and C ulture o f Iraqi Jew s (Heb.) (1996). 74. Sharett to Israeli missions, 5 Mar. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 175; Sharett to Namir about the immigration of Russian Jews, 8 Mar. 1950, ibid. 180-1*. 75. Summary of the discussions about Jerusalem in the Trusteeship Council, in Eban to Sharett, 3 Mar. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 163-7; an interim summary of the situation in the Palestine Conciliation Commission, in Rafael to Eytan, 3 Mar. 1950, ibid. 168-9; quote from Eban to Sharett, 13 Mar. 1950, ibid. 184-5; Eban to Sharett, 28 Mar. 1950, ibid. 202; Eban, M em oirs, 141-4.

536 76. 77. 78. 79.

80.

81.

82.

83. 84.

85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

90. 91. 92.

93.

94.

'If I Forget Thee, Oh JerusalemV Peretz Naftali to Sharett, 24 Jan. 1950, D ocum ents, vf 50-1. See the cabinet’s decision of 1 Nov. 1949, 18 Nov. 1949, and 15 Feb. 1950, ISA. Sharett to Elath, 19 Mar. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 192. Sharett to Elath, 30 Mar. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 221; Elath to Sharett on his talk with Acheson, 5 Apr. 1950, ibid. 243-5; on Transjordan relations with Israel during that period see Shlaim, Collusion, 551-5. On the Israeli-British agreement see Horowitz to Sharett and Kaplan, 26 Mar. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 196-8; Sharett’s report about his talk with Knox Helm, 10 Apr. 1950, ibid. 253-5; see the cabinet decision, 12 Apr. 1950, ISA; and on the improvement in Israeli-British relations see Bialer, ‘Sterling Balances and Claims Negotiations’. On the debate concerning the Histadrut’s membership in the International see the protocol of the joint meeting of Mapai’s Secretariat and its Knesset members, 30 Mar. 1950, Mapai Archive, 24/50. On the discussions concerning COMISCO see a further joint meeting of the Secretariat and the members of Knesset, 18 May 1950, ibid.; Bialer, Between E ast and W est, 24-32. Sharett to Yadin, 9 Apr. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 250. Sharett to Eban, 13 Apr. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 262; on the ministry’s evaluations see M. Sasson to E. Sasson, 17 Apr. 1950, ibid. 272-4; on the assessment of the Arab League’s resolutions, see Sharett to Elath, 18 Apr. 1950, ibid. 275; on the results of the elections and their implications, see Shlaim, Collusion , 555-8. See report on Moshe Sasson’s meeting with al-Karmi, 1 May 1950, D ocum ents, v. 305-7. The Knesset meeting 3 May 1950, D ivrei H aK nesset, v. 1280-330. Knox Helm to Sharett, 27 Apr. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 304; Sharett to Knox Helm, 2 May 1950, ibid. 308-9. Report on the talk with Abdullah, 27 Apr. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 300-2. M. Sasson to E. Sasson, 1 May 1950, D ocum ents, v. 305-7; Shlaim, Collusion, 559-60; M. Gazit, ‘The Israel-Jordan Peace Negotiations, 1949-1951’, Journal o f C ontem porary H istory, 23 (1988), 409-24. On the Israeli cabinet’s deliberations held on 16 Apr. 1950, see Sharett to Eban, 16 Apr. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 268. On the meeting with the three American officials, see Elath and Eban to Sharett, 19 Apr. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 277-8. On the discussions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Israeli proposals concerning the functional internationalization, see report of 17 Apr. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 280-1. The Soviet announcement made 17 Apr. 1950 is in D ocum ents, v. 271; Sharett’s assessment in a report on his talk with the British envoy in Tel Aviv, 20 Apr. 1950, ibid. 281-4; see Eban’s report on his talk with Malik, 21 Apr. 1950, ibid. 289. Elath to Sharett, 21 Apr. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 286-7; Elath to Sharett, 21 Apr. 1950, ibid. 288; Elath to the US Division, two cables, 26 Apr. 1950, ibid. 297-9.

18 A Swing towards the West That a moderate, liberal, pragmatic, and libertarian camp, led by Sharett, composed of moderates of Ahdut Haavodah and some veterans of Hapoel Hatzair, existed within Mapai was made clear during the debate on a constitution for Israel. Early in 1950 Sharett felt that, ‘This situation, whereby our Knesset faction has no position on a constitution and every member pursuing his own line, is a grave problem for our party and source of great shame for the Knesset’. Arguing that it was not politically desirable for ‘the predominant group in the Knesset to have no clear policy’ on such a crucial issue, Sharett said: T have made up my mind. My position does not correspond to that of the prime minister; I ardently support a written constitution for Israel.’1 This statement referred to Ben-Gurion’s notion that for the time being there was no need for a formal constitution, as well as to the ensuing cabinet decision of 13 December 1949, that Ben-Gurion had pushed through, that said: ‘Under the present circumstances there is no need for a constitution. There is only a need for relevant basic laws.’2 Although Sharett had wished to avoid yet another open conflict with Ben-Gurion at that time, he did convince the secretary-general of Mapai, Zalman Aranne, to convene the party Secre­ tariat and its Knesset caucus to discuss the issue in camera. After some intentional delay and récurrent debates in the various party bodies, on 5 May 1950 the subcommittee whose task it was to investigate the issue decided to hold a referendum among Mapai’s members of Knesset on what the party’s position should be concerning a constitution. It was on this occasion that Sharett told his colleagues that if the Knesset did not vote for a constitution, he would see it as a major failure and missed historical opportunity which could ‘never be redressed’. As to Ben-Gurion’s formalistic argument that, since passing a constitution required a special majority of the Knesset, it would constrain the Knesset for many decades since it would be difficult to amend it, Sharett countered that, although the prime minister’s ap­ proach seemed ultimately to be leaning in the same direction, his approach would result in fragmented legislation and leave Israel without a cohesive legal instrument to ensure civil liberties. More importantly, Sharett rejected Ben-Gurion’s argument that their generation should not impose its views on future Israelis: ‘We have

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always imposed our will on the nation out of a deep historical sense that we indeed express the wishes of all generations until the end of all generations.’ If Israel’s founding generation had not adopted this posi­ tion, he continued, they could not have succeeded in any of their previous actions intended to establish and develop the state. Moreover, if they failed in imposing their moral values on future generations, these Israelis ‘will be bom into a state that will be like a burglarized home. We must not lose our moral values and ability to shape the state .. .’3 After long deliberations, when Mapai’s secretary-general, Aranne, announced the results of the referendum on the constitution, thirty of the thirty-eight members who participated supported Ben-Gurion and eight supported Sharett. The latter constituted some of the party’s most outspoken moderate leaders, who usually backed Sharett (including Aranne himself, Ben-Zion Dinaburg-Dinur, Pinhas Lubianiker-Lavon, and Yosef Sprinzak). Other moderates like Kaplan were not in Israel at the time; had they been in the country, they too would probably have supported him.4 In retrospective it seems that on that occasion, both the moderates and Israel lost. Subsequently, the Knesset adopted a resolution to the effect that the constitution would be written piecemeal in the form of basic laws. Turning to his own area of responsibility, Sharett demonstrated toughness in his meetings with the British and American ambassadors in Tel Aviv on lifting the arms embargo that had been imposed on Israel.5 The deep dissatisfaction with the embargo which was felt by the Israeli public and the government, and the ongoing debate on Israel’s ‘affilia­ tion’, led to yet another heart-searching review of Israeli-American relations. In this context, Sharett considered the alternatives presented by Elath and Eban, Israel’s ambassadors to the USA and the UN. Whereas Elath averred that ‘Only dynamic, pragmatic approach prob­ lem will enable us preserve desirable level our relations with USA, general public, Jewish community and Government’, and called for a more intensive involvement in the USA and its internal affairs (without, however, changing Israel’s basic posture of non-identification), Eban called for reducing the volume of the anti-embargo campaign in favour of quiet diplomacy aimed at showing the Americans why a stronger Israel would serve as a strategic asset which could promote stability in the entire Middle East.6 Sharett sided with Elath on the basis that, ‘If Jewish and general opinion unmobilized on arms issue might give up altogether method such public support since on no aspect response so eager Israel security’.7 At the sanie time, he made it clear that he did not want to carry the campaign for weapons to the extent where it might

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cause a total breakdown in relations with Washington. Therefore, he concluded that, without any compromise concerning arms sale to Israel, substantial efforts should be invested in gaining American support for a comprehensive peace process in the region. In trying to set this pro­ gramme in motion, Sharett never hesitated to clash with the IDF and its generals, whose hawkish positions he felt were deterring rather than encouraging the Americans to lift the embargo. Thus while he agreed that all documents concerning Israeli requests for weapons should be drafted by the foreign ministry in co-operation with IDF representatives, he informed the chief of staff, Yigael Yadin, that ‘Since our [foreign ministry] intelligence, based on general American public opinion as well as on inside information emanating from the administration, indicates that the State Department and the Pentagon hold ingrained negative attitudes on supplying us with weapons, tactically it would be better for us to put forward modest requests rather than to try and catch as much as we can’.8 In the same context, Sharett did not hesitate to preach his ‘heretical gospel’ about the need for an agreement with the Arabs concerning non-belligerency, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem even to the ID F’s most hawkish generals. Thus, in May 1950 Sharett told a large gathering of officers of the ID F that ‘This generation must be content with that part of Palestine which we have redeemed and liberated. Moreover, I can’t guarantee that even the next generation will liberate the rest of the country, therefore now we do not initiate any offensive moves, and we are maintaining and fortifying the territory that we hold.’ When asked what were the reasons for such restraint, he said, ‘For one decisive reason: enough blood has been shed! Furthermore, it must be said that we are not going to begin any campaign for conquests without Arab provocation, otherwise we will be implicated in a major struggle with the Arab world,’ and above all, ‘It is impossible to absorb the vast immigration arriving in Israel and make a war’.9These notions, together with his veto of all aggressive military moves as well as retaliatory measures, made him both detested and ridiculous in the eyes of the senior ID F officers. But Sharett was firm in his belief that Israel’s policy should be directed towards the reduction of tension with the Arab states rather than initiating any provocation or fanning any tensipn. Thus, for example, he opposed proposals that Israelis should harvest in the Latrun no man’s land area, which had been cultivated by Arabs, in order to ‘establish territorial facts’. Simultaneously, Sharett was probably the first Israeli leader to learn about the major shift in Western attitudes towards the Middle East that

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would eventually be expressed through the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Thus quite early in the process of its formulation, Sharett gathered that America, France, and Great Britain felt that it would be best to guarantee the existing borders in the Middle East, especially those of Turkey and Iran, but also of Israel and its Arab neighbours, and that Middle East states all maintained only enough armaments for selfdefence. In regard to the regional states’ requests for arms, the powers specified that any such weapons supplied must not be used for offensive purposes, that the three powers supported peace efforts, and that, in the event of aggression, they wpuld guarantee the existing borders of all states. In view of the early information about such a declaration, Ambassador Elath proposed that the government should welcome the planned declaration since it implied political guarantees for existing borders and a certain equity between Israel and the Arab states in regard to weapons imports. Sharett accepted this position, and his attitude influenced the restrained formal Israeli reaction to the declaration, which was of general acceptance. Yet this did not prevent Sharett from stating that the existing arsenals in some states in the region were much too large for merely defensive purposes, and that they posed a threat to its stability.10 While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly expressed a degree of satisfactioq with the declaration, internal reactions were more critical. Sharett and his officials knew that the more sober of these remarks were accurate. They had realized that, despite Israel’s theoretical ability to purchase weapons from the USA, the White House had not retreated from its basic refusal to sell any such goods. When reports to the same effect were received from Israeli embassies in Paris and London, it became clear to Sharett that T h e transparent purpose of the Declaration is to ensure that the Middle East remain under Western influence. Moreover, it is clear that the Western powers intend to manipulate the regional states to join the Western bloc by promises of weapons.’ Apprehensive that, among other things, this might result in pressure on Israel to relinquish its non-identification, a policy that Sharett was determined to preserve at almost any cost, the foreign minister made certain that his director general, Walter Eytan, explained to the Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv, Pavel Yershov, that despite welcoming certain aspects of the declaration, such as the guarantees for security and the acceptance of the borders of all regional states, Israel had neither initiated it nor had helped in its preparation, that it ran against some of Israel’s interests, particularly in regard to arms purchase, and that Israel’s basic international orientation, that is, non-alignment, would not

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change. This statement by Sharett’s director general was essential, since Israel was still acquiring large quantities of weapons from the Eastern bloc and especially from Czechoslovakia. However, Sharett’s notion of ‘a mathematical neutrality’ was losing its appeal to the Israeli political élite, more of whom than ever before were calling for Israel to retreat from this form of non-alignment, and to declare openly that it was moving towards full membership in the Western bloc. In this vein, the cabinet therefore approved negotiations aimed at a formal AmericanIsraeli friendship treaty, which was favoured by Ben-Gurion and his activist associates since they hoped that consequently the USA would supply Israel with modem and sophisticated weapons.11 Simultaneously with these passionate internal discussions on the Tripartite Declaration and on its corollary—Israel’s retreat from non­ identification, Sharett and his colleagues in cabinet were also considering the constantly growing American involvement in the question of repar­ ations from Germany. Consequently, on the eve of his departure for a long trip in South Africa in June 1950, Sharett instructed Elath to raise this complex issue with the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, before the Western powers formally recognized West Germany. Sharett, who had known only too well that Israel was on the brink of a major economic crisis, cautioned Elath to avoid any impression that these reparations would lessen Israel’s need for American aid. And since his chief goal in this respect was Washington’s active support for reparations, Sharett instructed Elath to request American pressure on the German govern­ ment in general, and on Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in particular to facilitate an agreement. However, since Elath himself was about to leave his post in Washington to become Israeli ambassador to Britain, he did not pursue this issue. Hence, it was left to his successor, Abba Eban.12 In any case, Sharett’s instructions indicated that now there existed a clear link between Israel’s claim for reparations and a possible change in its policy of non-alignment. Like most of Sharett’s previous and later trips to Diaspora com­ munities, his long and arduous trip in South Africa during most of June 1950 was regarded as an exceptional success. His pleasant personality and impeccable gentlemanly manners, his warm and emphatic approach towards his hosts, excellent command of English, and deep knowledge of local conditions, not to speak of his senior position in Jewish and Israeli politics, helped him capture the minds, hearts—and pockets—of his Jewish and Gentile audiences. Hence, the trip yielded handsome political and financial results. It helped strengthen relations between Israel and South Africa, as well as between Israel and the South African

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Jewish community—and it encouraged the local Jewish Labour move­ ment which had close ties with Mapai. Last but not least from Sharett’s point of view, the funds raised during his trip were far from negligible. When he returned home in late June 1950, Israel’s international situation seemed to be improving considerably. Thus, for example, an over-optimistic Eban reported that ‘we are quite clearly emerging from bad international climate created last December [by the U N resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem]’.13 None the less, soon after his return from his exhausting trip to South Africa, Sharett realized that such evaluations were premature, particularly since the Tripartite Decla­ ration had created grave dilemmas for the Israeli government. First of all, the proponents of greater identification with the United States— including Eban, his brother-in-law Chaim Herzog, then military attaché in Washington, and Moshe Keren of the Israeli Embassy in Washing­ ton—criticized the government’s decision to step up arms purchases from Czechoslovakia,14 on the basis that ‘though we are in the “non­ identification line” and friendship towards the two sides, in view of our global inclinations and relations, conceptually and practically we are moving towards the West’, and the news of such a purchase from the Eastern bloc would destroy efforts to build closer relations with Amer­ ica. Under Sharett’s insistence, Jerusalem’s balanced and cautious re­ sponse to these notions and proposals was that Israel must not panic, and in any event that it would not change its course abruptly.15 The government dilemma vis-à-vis non-identification was further com­ plicated by a Chinese request that Israel should establish a consulate in Beijing. Apparently, this Chinese approach, made on the eve of the Korean War, was intended to pre-empt Israeli support for the West in this conflict. In view of the worsening international situation on the eve of that war in a remote and strange country for most of the Israelis, the government let it be known that the only constraint preventing the establishment of full diplomatic relations with China was financial difficulties confronting Israel in general and hence also the foreign ministry whose budget was cut, but that Israel would continue to maintain contact with Beijing through both countries’ embassies in Moscow.16 Thus the prevailing allegation that Sharett opposed full diplomatic relations with China because of stiff American objection is far from being accurate. Although the Chinese connection was part of a fundamental general dilemma concerning Israeli foreign affairs, Sharett had to turn to some urgent matters closer to home. For the thorny issue of the Palestinians, the Palestinian refugees, and the Israeli Arabs was raised again by the

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Israeli media and public. In this context, during May and early June 1950, in a number of private communications to Ben-Gurion, Sharett both protested against the brutal manner in which the IDF treated the infiltrators and warned the prime minister of the possible internal and international consequences.17 In June 1950, as a result of a marked increase in Arab infiltration from the West Bank into Israel, especially in the Hebron area, the IDF reacted by expelling large groups of Palestinians in the Arava area to Jordan. When these deportees claimed that they had been tortured by Israeli soldiers, an allegation that won immense attention and coverage in the international media, especially in the wake of a front-page report in the Observer by Philip Toynbee, the Israeli leadership was forced to reconsider its position on the matter. As expected, it was Sharett who opened the debate on this issue in a joint meeting of the Mapai Secretariat and members of Knesset, reiter­ ating his view that the actual partition of Palestine and the Arab exodus had been a unique and most surprising phenomenon during the 1948 war, which had dramatically altered Israel’s development. Because of these two. unparalleled historical occurrences, the Jewish state had to cope with the refugees issue and an Arab minority, mainly in the Galilee and the Small Triangle, until the satisfactory solution of the entire Palestinian question. Therefore, he said, Israel must face the matter squarely and not avoid it. In reaction to the simplistic argument that Israeli Arabs constituted a fifth column, thus posing a security threat, that Israel should deal with chiefly out of the same considerations, Sharett posed the state’s moral foundations, Israel’s precarious position among the nations, as well as its responsibility for the Jewish com­ munities all over the world. He strongly emphasized that security considerations should not dictate Israel’s policy towards the Israeli Arabs. Finally, he stated, ‘We don’t live under a dictatorial regime that can formulate a policy and set out to implement it in a calculated and cruel manner without considering possible reactions at home and abroad . . . N ot only do we live in a “transparent palace”, as Arlosoroff used to say, but it is a palace that everyone can enter.’18 Voicing then even more heretical views, he harshly condemned the use of brutal force by either private citizens or ID F soldiers against both Palestinian infiltrators and Israeli Arabs. ‘The war against thb infiltrators is, and should be, conducted only by regular IDF forces, for this is the only way it can be controlled and its efficacy can be measured. I don’t want to appear ridiculously pedantic, but let me also repeat that the IDF has demonstrated excessive force, utter stupidity and lack of sensitivity in this respect.’ He did not desist from his vehement accusations against

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the ID F’s behaviour and quoted the devastating report published by the London Observer about the cruel expulsion of the Palestinians and the atrocities conducted against them: ‘We tend to go too far. Under no circumstances does the war against infiltration necessitate those means that the British and American press have condemned, and which we have denied [although] no one in the world, other than the Jews, believes.’ Among other things, he accused General Moshe Dayan, who was present at the meeting where Sharett launched his attack on Israeli civilians and soldiers, of condoning such behaviour. Again using as his evidence the devastating report in the Observer, he unequivocally de­ manded that Israel pursue its policy against infiltration without giving up its human values in the process. It was no wonder that Ben-Gurion and the ID F’s chiefs were extreme­ ly disturbed by Sharett’s somber accusations. For indeed this issue became a source of painful and consistent confrontation between the two opposing camps in Mapai. Since Ben-Gurion was not present at the meeting, and it was Dayan who had been personally attacked, notwith­ standing the fact that he was wearing his military uniform at a party function, the general replied to Sharett’s allegations. Relegating the responsibility for cruelty to Sephardi Moroccan and Iraqi new immi­ grants serving in the IDF, and hinting at their backwardness and hatred towards thfc Arabs Dayan demanded that the atrocious behaviour be viewed realistically and in perspective, as part and parcel of the given situation whereby Jews and Arabs were locked in that protracted conflict. Dayan harshly criticized ‘the moral yardstick used by Sharett’, since ‘the only method that has been proven efficient, even if not justified or moral, is that of collective punishment’.19 Repeating profound doubts about the Israeli Arabs being at all loyal to the Jewish state, Dayan saw no reason to distinguish between the Arabs who had chosen to remain in Israel and those who had fled. Indeed, he hoped that ‘there will perhaps be another opportunity to transfer these Arabs from Eretz Israel in the near future, and as long as this possibility exists, we must do nothing to foreclose it’. Sharett’s reaction to this hawkish statement was even stronger: full political civic rights must be granted to Israeli Arabs. It is easy to see why this open frontal confrontation exacerbated the already tense relations between the two camps in Mapai and in the government, making coexistence even more problematic. There was a sequel to this discussion. In a further discussion, and against the backdrop of the failure to make progress in negotiations with Jordan,20 Sharett led the moderates and was supported by such Mapai politicians as Reuven Burstein, Zalman Aranne, David Hacohen, Ben-

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Zion Dinaburg, and Nahum Verlinski. On the other side, defending his son’s position, Shmuel Dayan, who was one of the veteran leaders of Mapai, argued that the war with the Arabs had not been concluded, and then in a response to Sharett he also dealt with ‘the moral issue in war’. On this he stated that, ‘Apparently, there is no moral in war. We fought as all other nations do. We occupied and conquered houses in Jaffa and Katamon [a neighbourhood of Jerusalem], and we don’t intend to give all this b a c k .. .’.21 Sharett intervened angrily at this point, demanding that cruelty towards the Arabs be stopped immediately. Sharett made it clear that, while he would not object to any voluntary emigration of Arabs out of Israel, as long as there was an Arab minority in Israel they should be treated ‘with minimum fairness’. He then added that ‘positive elements’ within this community should be approached and encouraged to take steps towards their own economic and social development and growth.22 In line with Mapai tradition and practice, those present in the meeting decided to appoint a committee to discuss Sharett’s and his fellow moderates’ proposals. Some of the moderate camp’s international political intentions were frustrated by events occurring far from the Middle East during the last week of June 1950. It was then that North Korea invaded the south and reached the outskirts of Seoul. At first it seemed that all of South Korea would collapse under the advance of the North. Therefore, on 25 June 1950, the Security Council was convened, and under American influence called for an immediate cease-fire, for the North’s withdrawal to the thirty-eighth parallel, for all UN members’ support of these proposed steps, and for UN supervision of the implementation of these stipula­ tions. In protest, the Soviet Union abstained from all debate in the UN. Two days later, when it became clear that North Korea was not abiding by the UN decision. President Truman made a move that would affect most countries throughout the world, including Israel, to a greater or lesser degree: he ordered the US military to support the South Korean attempt to repulse the North. Alarmed pundits of Israeli identification with the West felt that the time had come for the government openly to express its support for the Western bloc in general, and more specifically for the USA.23 The main pragmatic reason for such a step, they maintained, was that by so doing Israel would increase its chances of successfully concluding ongoing negotiations for oil from Western sources as well as for an additional loan from the US Export-Import Bank. As always, Sharett advocated a double-edged policy whereby Israel would maintain its non-alignment orientation but issue a vague statement supporting the Security Council

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resolution. Sharett’s main reason for endeavouring to maintain a bridge to the Soviet Union had nothing to do with any great love for that regime or with support for its policy in Korea; rather it was based on the need to protect the interests of Israel and the lives of Eastern European Jews, including those in the Soviet Union.24 It should be noted that unlike other senior Israeli leaders, Sharett was ready to pay a price for ensuring the safety of these Jews. Accordingly, in a telegram he instructed the Israeli diplomats abroad to explain that T h e weakness tone, generality terms, and unreality of last sentence [of the Israeli government statement saying “The Israel Government hopes the UN will continue its efforts to unite all great powers in a joint attempt to maintain peace in the world”] indicate complexity our international position mainly view our responsibilities towards East European Jewries, not excluding USSR’.25 The cabinet, and then the Knesset, approved Sharett’s cautious position in early July 1950. Hence notwithstanding substantial American pressure, Sharett had managed to prevent a shift in Israel’s orientation. In the following weeks, Sharett undauntedly made efforts to convince foreign governments, especially that of the Soviet Union, that Israel’s lukewarm support of the UN resolution on Korea did not presage a retreat from its traditional posture of non-alignment. Thus, when UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie urged all those UN members that had supported the resolution to send forces to Korea to help implement that resolution, Sharett argued that Israel could not make such a commit­ ment since it was still under siege itself. This ambiguous position raised hard questions throughout the world among both friend and foe.26 But even these unfavourable reactions did not sway Sharett from his com­ mitment to non-alignment. Increasingly, however, these world events that made it difficult for Sharett to square the circle, warranted yet another re-examination of Israel’s posture. Sharett therefore convened a conference of Israeli ambassadors in Tel Aviv to be held between 17 and 23 July 1950 and whose first item would be ‘Israel between East and West’. Firmly supported by his political ally Zalman Aranne, chairman of the Knesset Defence and Foreign Relations Committee, and by a battery of experts and Eastern bloc ambassadors, including Mordechai Namir, Shmuel Eliashiv, Israel Barzilai, Maurice Fischer, Avraham Katznelson, and Yaacov Shimoni, Sharett summarized Israel’s position: We must not deviate from our present line of non-alignment, but in pursuing this line we should be careful, and refrain from supporting either the Americans

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or Soviets. This would ensure the necessary friendship of the two sides on the one hand, and on the other hand, would compel the two sides to deal with us nicely, in order to prevent our committal to the other side.27 The ambassadors’ conference also dealt with another existential issue— ‘Israel and the Arab World’. During the consultations on this subject, a disillusioned Sharett stated that, ‘A No War—No Peace situation may last for a long period, but it is not a normal situation, and Israel should avoid any illusion that it is, or that all is working for Israel.’ Here Sharett did not hesitate to go against the majority of the participants in the conference to state openly and emotionally that, ‘Israel is missing a peace with the Arab world. The lack of such peace greatly hinders our position.’28 Although political tactics were compelling Israeli leaders to maintain a low profile on this issue, so Sharett intimated, they should do their utmost to achieve it. For, even a ‘cold peace’ was preferable to a ‘No War—No Peace [situation]’. Moreover, according to him, the mere attempt to pursue peace would lead to increased stability and com­ promise among the Arab states and to decreased pressure from the powers. He made certain to clarify that peace negotiations must be ‘based on the existing territorial status quo, but in principle we are ready to compensate the Arabs who fled Palestine’. Although Sharett opposed any idea of imposed transfer, he also made it clear that Israel would not repeat its offer of allowing one hundred thousand Arab refugees to return, since it had been rejected by the Arabs at Lausanne. As expected, Sharett supported separate bilateral negotiations with Arab states, beginning with the Egyptians with whom, he thought, there were no insurmountable pending issues. Although he maintained his resentment of Jordan, he knew that there was no other immediate Arab partner for serious talks except for Abdullah. As far as the Israeli Arabs were concerned, he stated that the government was interested to ‘weaken them as a bloc and a national minority, but to improve their personal status’.29 Realizing that there were many within Israel’s expanding political and military élites anxious radically to ‘amend’ the results of the 1948 war, he felt compelled to repeat that, ‘Israel will avoid any military adventure explicitly aimed at conquering additional area and at expansion’.30 His stiff warnings against any military adventure were predicated on his assessment that the powers would react aggressively, and especially of the ‘demographic factor’, that is, occupation of additional territories would have increased the Arab population inside Israel. Sharett’s blatant opposition to military adventurism was made in reaction to Dayan’s typical activist statement that ‘The first round in the

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establishment of Israel has not been completed yet, since we have not decided whether the territorial shape of the state today is final’. To facilitate the possibility of expansion, Dayan postulated that Israel should prefer a disunited Arab Middle East, for the ‘development of such blocs will open the possibility to amending Israel’s frontiers, and I doubt whether we should miss any such opportunity’. There is no doubt that Dayan reflected the views of his mentor, Ben-Gurion. Sharett responded to these notions at the same conference by saying, ‘We can’t sacrifice Jewish fighters, or for that matter, hurt others arbitrarily merely to satisfy the [activist camp’s] expansionist desires’.31 Sharett’s razor-sharp reply to General Moshe Dayan, prompted BenGurion’s intervention at another meeting of the same conference. Staunchly supporting Dayan, the prime minister called for the use of force rather than persuasion in pursuing Israeli foreign and defence policy. Convinced that the establishment of Israel had failed to solve the problems of borders, refugees, and Jerusalem, Ben-Gurion went on to argue that actions were more decisive then words, even if such actions provoked retaliatory moves on the part of the Arabs or triggered the opposition of the powers. In a more direct response to Sharett, BenGurion categorically stated that foreign policy is secondary, and subser­ vient, to military action, and said that, ‘We are still in the midst of building the state, this has a priority over everything else, and therefore the constant creation of facts could be accompanied by persuasion, but not subject to it, or to its results’. This clear delineation of Mapai’s internal political front was a further source of acrimonious and ultim­ ately tragic clashes between the Ben-Gurion and Sharett camps. The disagreement between the two leaders and their respective camps was extended to Israeli-Diaspora relations. Sharett, who like BenGurion, had held rigid Palestinocentric views until the end of the Second World War, agreed with the ‘old-man’ that Jewish immigration was a significant issue for both Israel and the immigrants themselves. But, ‘since we must assume that the Jewish masses, probably the majority of the Jewish nation, will long remain dispersed throughout the world’, he opposed Ben-Gurion’s ‘false maxim’ that the establishment of the Jewish state meant separation from and clash with the Diaspora. Sharett had already formulated the notions that would serve as the foundation of an Israeli-Diaspora accord regarding the nature of the Diaspora’s commitments to Israel and Israel’s autonomy. Thus while he realized that Israel must assume responsibility for and concern itself with the welfare of all Jews, wherever they lived, he exempted Diaspora Jews for any responsibility for Israeli policies and behaviour. Moreover, his

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sensitivity to the issue of ‘dual loyalty’ led him to propose that instead of requesting the absolute loyalty of Diaspora Jews, Israel and the Diaspora must try to establish a mutual bond and commitment.32 It was this approach that augmented his determination to deal even more intensively with the issue of reparations from Germany. To Sharett’s dismay, this crucial issue was linked by the US govern­ ment with Israel’s non-alignment orientation. As noted, the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs had revived the reparations issue when it evidently seemed that Germany was becoming a major economic force in Europe and that gradually the powers were losing their leverage over it. The government therefore deemed it urgently necessary to forward Israel’s claims for personal restitution and national reparations while the three powers were attempting to pave the way for Germany’s integration into ‘the family of nations’. In this context, when Sharett was informed of the German government’s desire to avoid the issue as far as possible, his sense of urgency only increased. He and his officials then proposed that in view of Israel’s abysmal economic situation, it should leave aside the moral question of whether or not to sully Jewish hands with German money, and focus on action to attain the reparations. Sharett believed that ‘While there can be no forgiveness for murder, even a murderer should pay for part of his crime’. Sharett suggested this distinction in view of the German government’s stubborn refusal to pay national reparations, even though it was already paying personal restitutions. His adamant conclusion was that the Israeli government must deal with this issue directly and secretly. On 8 August 1950 he met with the finance minister, Eliezer Kaplan, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Jewish Agency officials to establish an Israeli legation in Germany which would negotiate with the government there under a heavy veil of secrecy.33 The questions of German reparations, the Jewish Diaspora, and Israeli defence policy were not the only issues on which Sharett and Ben-Gurion differed in the summer of 1950. At that point, the two also clashed over the issue of Israel’s participation in the Korean War, especially in view of mounting American pressure that their allies should openly support the US position.34 Whereas Sharett was still adamantly against active Israeli involvement in that remote war, Ben-Gurion’s activist stance led him to propose that Israel should dispatch military units to Korea. Sharett felt that such a move would be opposed by large segments in Israel, that it would create dissatisfaction within the IDF, that it would further enhance military adventurism, and that it would harm Israel’s relations with the Eastern bloc. The cabinet’s unanimous support of

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Sharett on this issue clearly proved that Sharett was still capable of vetoing those of Ben-Gurion’s activist aims which he viewed as dangerously adventurous. It was on this occasion that Ben-Gurion caustically uttered his famous remark, ‘even the majority has the right to be mistaken’.35 Sharett’s undaunted prominent position in Mapai was again reflected when he was assigned the task of delivering the main programmatic speech at the ceremonious opening session of the party’s fifth conven­ tion, held in mid-August 1950, to celebrate Mapai’s twentieth anniver­ sary. He began his keynote speech by reviewing Mapai’s contribution to the fate of Jewish people during the past fateful twenty years, and by crediting the party’s pivotal position in the polity to the unremittingly acute sense of mission it had inherited from its predecessors, Hapoel Hatzair and Ahdut Haavodah. According to him, the united party was not interested in power and control per se, it asked for ‘the freedom to undertake responsibility to establish the state’, and ‘utilized the moral advantage of majority rule for the sake of the entire society . . . on the basis of equal rights of every individual’.36 Mapai’s greatness was in the ability to transform itself from a party adhering to the gradual approach of Constructive Socialism into ‘a party championing courageous pro­ gramme and bold slogans, a party dedicated to the immediate achievement of the ultimate [Zionist] goal—we are the Jewish state party’. Defending Mapai’s willingness to accept partition in order to achieve the ultimate Zionist goal, he said that ‘the real alternative had been between a catastrophe with a solution, and a disaster without a solution’.37 Mapai, he continued, had opted for the latter possibility and therefore it had been responsible for no less than ‘seven miracles’: his own achievement of the 29 November 1947 UN resolution; Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine; the establishment of the Jewish state; Israel’s military victory over the combined Arab force; the Palestinian exodus; Israel’s accept­ ance as a full member in ‘the family of nations’; and the ingathering of the Jewish exiles. While lamenting that these ‘miracles’ were marred by the split in Mapai that led to the creation of Mapam, he maintained that this split had left Mapai the only zealot guardian of the state, and had allowed it to govern Israel in accordance with the best principles of social democracy. In conclusion Sharett threw out the challenge that Mapai’s initial successes necessitated even greater efforts in the future.38 Sharett also delivered the closing speech at that Mapai convention. This speech was less formal, more emotional, and touched sensitive nerves in those of the leadership and rank and file who were present there. Describing his frequent trips around the country, and especially his meetings with new immigrants, he spoke of one particular neighbour-

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hood in Lod: ‘When I saw the people walking in the streets of Lod [Lydda], playing backgammon in their dirty cafés, and the women putting their children to sleep, I asked myself what is the connection between them and Mapai.’ The dim lights and dark comers of these dives made Sharett further ponder: ‘What might be nesting in that darkness? Who knows what cellars are created in our lives? What sewers? Who knows what bitterness may be accumulating? Who knows what corruption might be accumulating? What dynamite might be piling up? And who knows who may be lurking in their comers with the matches to ignite it?’ Out of his deepest concern for the future of Israeli society, he called upon his colleagues to volunteer to work with this deprived and problematic segment of the Jewish community, which was slipping out of the party’s influence.39 On the eve of the 1950 UN General Assembly, the Conciliation Commission’s discussions had come to an absolute impasse, hence in an attempt to recover some ground, the utterly frustrated members of the commission, who were conducting endless and fruitless trips to the vari­ ous capitals in the region, were desperately trying to reactivate the mixed Israeli-Arab committees in accordance with the armistice agreements. The American and British governments encouraged this line, particularly with regard to the Egyptian-Israeli mixed committee. The Israeli govern­ ment and Sharett welcomed this initiative per se, but in pursuing this line, Sharett also expected to diminish the possibility of a further debate on borders, territories, and Jerusalem at the General Assembly while keeping channels to the Arab states open. But just at that time and unfortunately for Sharett and the moderate camp, and again as a result of a compromise between moderates and activists, towards the end of August 1950 the Israeli cabinet rejected his proposal to accept the commission’s proposals which entailed the unilateral offer of compensa­ tion to the Arab refugees. Actually, as part of this compromise, the government reverted to its traditional position and stated that it was ready to discuss this issue only within the framework of comprehensive peace talks. It did, however, agree to resume the work of the mixed Arab-Israeli committees.40 At this stage of development, Israel’s foreign policy was shaped as a result of close consideration of internal conditions, especially the disas­ trous state of the economy. Sharett, who had studied political economy at the London School of Economics and was far from ignorant in this respect, compared the Israeli economy to a small unsteady boat drifting aimlessly on a stormy sea, ‘somehow manoeuvring through endless combinations, and always submerged by deficits’.41 Prompted by this

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depressing situation and by his friend the minister of finance, Eliezer Kaplan, he, with the help of Eban, initiated a campaign to gain a new loan from the US Export-Import Bank.42 The general design of this ambitious diplomatic campaign resembled that of the campaign that Sharett had waged on the eve of Israel’s establishment. It involved persuasion of and pressures on senior members of the American cabinet, such as Charles Brannan, Oscar Chapman, James McGrath; White House advisers, such as Foster Dulles, Philip Jessup, Averell Harriman; senior Congressmen, Senators, and Governors, such as Herbert Lehman; friendly public figures, such as Bernard Baruch and the ageing Judge Felix Frankfurter; American Jewish leaders, such as Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, who after the establishment of Israel had been pushed aside by Ben-Gurion and Sharett; and the leaders of both parties, such as William Boyle, national chairman of the Democratic party. Sharett supported Eban’s intention to avoid a massive campaign in the written and electronic media, and for that matter also direct appeals to public opinion, which were extensively used on other similar occasions. Although Israel’s special brand of neutrality was regarded as an impediment to achieving such a loan, Sharett still hoped to benefit from non-alignment. Thus he maintained that instead of committing Israel to a decidedly pro-American posture, the government should adhere to its previous ambiguous position in this respect and only gradually ‘reveal our true policy in world affairs, that is anti-communism, only gradually. This should be done along with our genuine position, which is a product of our inherent connection to the Western world, that exceeds our ties to the East.’43 The need for such a gradual change in the Israeli government’s orientation in foreign politics was also strongly linked to the hopes in regard to the much needed reparations from Germany. For by then the Israeli government was in the process of establishing its formal delegation to the planned negotiations with the German government and formulat­ ing its initial demand for a billion and a half DM, to be paid to Israel over a period of several years. This money was to be used particularly to shore up the failing Israeli economy, to pay for the increasing military budget, and to facilitate the absorption of six hundred thousand Jewish immigrants who had arrived in the country after May 1948. Preparing the grounds for Israeli’s demand in this sphere became increasingly urgent as a meeting of Western foreign ministers, intended to end their state of war with Germany, grew nearer.44 In conjunction with this comprehensive campaign, in September 1950 Israel convened the first Jerusalem Conference, at which about one

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hundred distinguished and rich Jewish personalities from Western states and especially from the USA participated. These dignitaries conceived the idea of establishing State of Israel Bonds to finance immigration and the absorption of new immigrants. The stories about Ben-Gurion’s exclusive fatherhood of the Bonds organization, like many other myths about his legendary powers and activities, have been exaggerated. The idea was not conceived by any single individual, rather it was the brainchild of a group of politicians and officials. Indeed, only after extended deliberations by numerous Israeli and Jewish leaders, was the idea elaborated and put into operation. In any event, during that conference both Sharett and Ben-Gurion praised the Jewish leaders of the Diaspora for undertaking to raise a billion dollars within five years through the new organization. However, since at the time the Israeli cabinet greatly doubted that it would be possible to raise such an enormous sum, the assembled leaders were also drafted to use their political clout to promote Israel’s request for American government aid, through the Export-Import Bank. Despite their constant apprehension of being accused of dual loyalties, Sharett’s and Ben-Gurion’s presenta­ tions at the conference were effective in convincing quite a few American-Jewish leaders to support both the establishment of the Bonds and Israel’s request for an additional loan.45 As in every autumn, in early September 1950, Sharett was busy charting Israel’s course in the forthcoming General Assembly. This time he felt that this task was made increasingly difficult by the need to manœuvre between the two superpowers, who were heading at full speed towards the Cold War. Although he was aware that Israel’s dependence on the USA had dramatically been increased, mainly because of its immense economic troubles, Sharett none the less managed to promote decisions geared to demonstrate what he perceived as autonomous Israeli policies. Thus in view of his perpetual search for freedom of political action and in order to promote Israel’s peripheral strategy, Sharett advocated that the government support the election of the Iranian representative to the UN as president of the General Assembly, as well as Turkey’s membership in the Security Council.46 To avoid exacerbating Israel’s position vis-à-vis the superpowers, he suggested that Israel should support the universal admission of all new applicants for UN membership. But because of the powers’ rivalry over Greece, he asserted that Israel should abstain in the vote on Greece. For the same reason, Israel should also abstain in the vote on the violation of human rights in Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. More important, although Israel was still considering its attitude regarding proposals for the

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non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Sharett ruled that the final Israeli decision in this respect would depend on the American position. Sharett also supported Trygve Lie’s attempt to bring about a cease-fire in Korea, as well as the American position on the dispatch of U N forces to Korea, but objected to America’s attempt to impose that country’s reunification. Thus, far from pursuing old routines out of inertia, Sharett and his officials had mapped out a carefully premeditated and highly selective strategy aimed at maintaining Israel’s policy of non-alignment.47 As on previous occasions, his main motivation for maintaining this orientation was connected to the faint hope for vast immigration from the Soviet Union and for the continuation of the supply of East European weapons. Sharett’s instructions to his envoys were far from those of a hesitant politician, as he was characterized by his activist opponents. Instead, they were directed at energetically pursuing vital Israeli inter­ ests. Some of Sharett’s innovative policies were ahead of his time. Thus on the eve of the 1950 General Assembly, he wished and worked hard to appoint an Israeli Arab to Israel’s delegation to the UN, and regretted that it was not then possible to do so, because of the staunch opposition of the defence establishment led by Ben-Gurion. Sharett openly deplored the stormy situation on Israel’s borders, caused by violent clashes on both sides, since these clashes had triggered repercussions not only in Israel-Arab relations, but also within the Israeli political system and in Israel’s relations with the USA and Britain. The most serious incidents were those on the Israel-Jordanian border not far from the Sea of Galilee; with Syria, in the northern demilitarized zone; and especially with Egypt in connection to the deportation of the Azazmeh Bedouin tribe residing on the EgyptianIsraeli border in the demilitarized Auja al-Hafir area, which in turn caused an Egyptian threat to expel all Egypt’s Jews. While Sharett was ready to agree to the Bedouins’ return if Egypt would reciprocate in regard to its complaints to the UN concerning the deployment of Israeli forces in the Eilat area, Ben-Gurion rejected any such package deal.48 But this time Ben-Gurion’s objection did not mean that the issue was closed. The incidents that had centred around the Bedouins’ expulsion brought to the surface tensions that would continue to augment the differences between Israel’s defence and foreign affairs establishments. These profound disagreements fell under the euphemistic title given by the foreign ministry—‘Disagreement concerning the policy towards the armistice regime’. The very incidents that had caused it all, that is, the two expulsions of the Azazmeh Bedouins from both the Auja and

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Ashkelon areas, purportedly for security reasons, resulted in a strong note on the ID F’s behaviour prepared by the chief of the UN observers force, General William Riley, entailing grave damage to Israeli-American relations and an American complaint to the Israeli government. Upon receiving the UN note, Sharett wrote Ben-Gurion: You should know that I am not at all convinced that the ID F reports [on these incidents] are accurate, and must therefore ask you to check into the matter personally . . . Especially you should check whether the action taken against the Bedouins at the beginning of September was not in accordance with regular procedures and was in fact a ‘major operation’ initiated by the ID F without notifying the foreign minister. In this case, I strongly protest, since it was carried out without prior consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, [and] I must regard it as an absolutely stupid act, since it was carried out just before the General Assembly.49

Here in fact, without restraint, Sharett was accusing General Moshe Dayan, then commander of the southern front, and Ben-Gurion’s most favoured protégé, of political insensitivity. Although Ben-Gurion al­ legedly re-examined the incident, and defended his protégé in a tenuous manner, saying that ‘Dayan told the truth as it is known to h im . . . ’, Sharett was not convinced at all that either problem of expulsions or brutal behaviour of the ID F during these ‘operations’ had genuinely been solved, and in accordance with his basic view in regard to the desirability of reducing the levels of friction with the Arab states, he suggested serious negotiations with Egypt on permanent arrangements concerning these Bedouins. On this occasion Sharett’s intervention was successful—the cabinet adopted his position, and instructed Ben-Gurion, and through him the IDF, to desist from evicting these tribes. Sharett also elicited a cabinet decision that limited the ID F’s autumn manœuvres only to the degree permitted in the armistice agreements, and warned the ID F generals to refrain from any provocation that would serve as a pretext for evicting additional Bedouins or other Arabs.50 After dealing with these thorny matters, Sharett travelled to the USA to take part in the discussions of the General Assembly. The first session of the Assembly, held on 19 September 1950, reminded Sharett ‘of a Somerset Maugham play that opens with a pistol shot’. He >yas referring to a procedural novelty which surprised everyone—a political discussion in the Assembly prior to the election of its president. This time, it was a debate on China’s membership, a particularly sensitive issue during the Korean War. On the spur of the moment, Sharett decided to defy the USA by joining India, Pakistan, Burma, and the East European bloc in

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supporting China’s application for membership., He did it in the hope that this would improve Israel’s chances of establishing formal dip­ lomatic relations with these four Asian states—and emphatically re­ emphasize Israel’s policy of non-alignment. In explaining his move, Sharett told the baffled Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who was present at the Assembly, that Israel had voted ‘for a fact, not for fiction’.51 Sharett also contributed to American disappointment with his position in regard to the Korean issue. Instead of supporting US calls for dispatching troops there, as he had agreed before his trip to America, the fluid situation at the UN led him to conclude that the Israeli delegation should make decisions on the spot in response to develop­ ments in New York.52 In this vein, Sharett took the opportunity to examine closely the UN status and potential power to implement its resolutions. Although he knew that the UN decisions were predeter­ mined by its composition, he also felt that ‘this is a house [organization] in which there is a growing genuine awareness of the importance of the issues discussed here, of their actual impact and of their moral and spiritual quality and significance’53—values which he found no less consequential than the brutal force demonstrated by various countries, or for that matter, by activists back home. In line with this autonomous posture—based on his ‘coalitional’ understanding with Ben-Gurion—Sharett informed Jerusalem only that his strategy concerning the Arab refugees would be that of initiating a ‘constructive policy by declaring readiness co-operate in solution prob­ lem by resettlement towards which we contribute payment compensation on understanding this forms first stage overall settlement between us and Arab world’.54 Obviously Sharett was bent on taking advantage of his relative freedom to determine Israel strategy vis-à-vis these issues, in promoting the policy he preferred. During 1950, largely as a result of Sharett’s and his officials’ efforts, there was a further improvement in Israeli-British relations. Conse­ quently, in September, the British Labour government reciprocated to Israel’s diplomatic overtures and dispatched a junior minister, Arthur Henderson, for a first formal visit by a British senior politician to Israel since its establishment in 1948. Since Henderson visited Israel while Sharett was in New York, he met Ben-Gurion, who in Sharett’s absence was acting minister of foreign affairs. The discussions between Hender­ son and Ben-Gurion focused on general strategic matters but mainly revolved around a possible Israel-Jordan agreement, in view of the latest round of clashès and Abdullah’s demands that Israel should diminish its retaliatory operations. Partly since Henderson was the son, namesake,

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and political heir of a noted pro-Zionist Labourite leader and Britain’s foreign minister, whom both Ben-Gurion and Sharett had known early in the 1930s, and partly because of Ben-Gurion’s and the ID F’s great interest in purchasing British weapons, the prime minister demonstrated uncharacteristic self-restraint in his discussions with Henderson, and expressed Israel’s wish to reach an agreement with Jordan through the good offices of its British patron. Encouraged by the results of the talks with Henderson, and typically eager to exploit immediately the positive character of the talks, Ben-Gurion impulsively instructed Eliahu Elath, now ambassador to Britain, to make a blunt request to Britain’s Jewish Secretary of War, Emmanuel Shinwell, to help obtain British military aid. Ben-Gurion’s instruction to Elath, ‘Tell him outspokenly that though in peace we try maintain political independence [non-alignment], in event world war we stand a hundred percent with West’, was anathema to Sharett, who wished to maintain the non-aligned posture as long as possible.55 Thus the attitudinal gap between Ben-Gurion and Sharett was widen­ ing only further. In these endless political encounters with the prime minister, Sharett gained support for his non-aligned approach from American Jewish organizations while he was in the USA, including the leaders of the American Zionist Organization, the American Jewish Committee, B’nai Brith, the Synagogue Council of America, the Amer­ ican Jewish War Veterans, and Jewish Labour Committee. In this context, Eban was glad to report that ‘Nobody suggested our present foreign policy [of non-identification] in any way prejudicial to prospect success [for financial and economic aid] and no demands here for further identification than implied in present course’.56 Equipped with these assurances of the major American Jewish organ­ izations and similar assurances from the foreign ministries of France, Britain, and India, Sharett had been ready to develop the first major Israeli international initiative in the UN, but now he felt that BenGurion’s instructions regarding the talks with Shinwell could have undermined his initiative. Nevertheless he did not give up his intention to persist with the non-alignment policy and with diplomatic initiatives. Drawing on his own philosophy and on Israel’s cumulative experience in regard to cease-fire and armistice, and in a sense defying the USA, Sharett opposed the Soviet Union’s ejection from the UN, and formu­ lated and proposed to the General Assembly a series of major amendments to the American-sponsored draft resolutions on Korea. Sharett’s various amendments emphasized the need for mediation be­ tween the warring sides, and for the establishment of a special UN body

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to supervise any cease-fire or truce that might be achieved. He hoped that Israel would become a member of this body, and thereby increase its international visibility, consequently gaining respect and prestige.57 To his and his supporters’ relief, Sharett’s political and diplomatic initiatives did not harm Israeli-American relations. On the contrary, it paved the way to new open and secret co-operation between the two countries. Thus Israel’s mystery man Reuven Shiloah, who travelled to the USA to help set up the initial contacts between the CIA and the Israeli intelligence community through James Angleton, reported that he was ‘pleasantly surprised by the radical [i.e. positive] change’, that he sensed had occurred in Israel’s relations with the American government. ‘This applies to both controversial issues and the general atmosphere. Whereas they [the Americans] used to address us as if we were guilty, and blamed us for being aggressive, inflexible, and wishing to conquer new territories, their attitude now is one of understanding and friend­ ship.’ Shiloah attributed the change to Israel’s, through Sharett’s, moderate positions in international politics, and no less to the fact that ‘In the basic controversy between Western democracy and Eastern regimes, we are perceived as a loyal [US] partner, possibly the only partner in the Middle East’. And, he continued, Sharett’s proud nonaligned posture had improved rather than hampered Israel’s position. Other Israeli diplomats in the USA, such as Moshe Keren, who had previously been sceptical of where Sharett’s line would lead, now admitted Sharett had been right.58 The administration’s elaborate efforts to improve relations with Israel at that particular point were demonstrated also in the decision to replace the amateurish ambassador in Israel, James McDonald, who was Tru­ man’s political appointment, with the professional diplomat Monnett Davis. Despite McDonald’s great sympathy towards Israel, Sharett did not oppose this move; he hoped that a professional diplomat would help to ‘normalize’ the patron-client relations between the USA and Israel and introduce more efficient channels of communication between the two governments. Evetually, however, Sharett found it difficult to translate the warmer atmosphere into tangible economic attainments. Thus, despite heavy Israeli pressure, the administration had postponed a decision on the loan that Israel desperately needed from the ExportImport Bank until after the November 1950 US elections—although President Truman, his cabinet, including the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, the State Department, and even the Export-Import Bank president, all supported it.59

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Sharett was equally disappointed with the Kremlin’s continued refusal to let Soviet Jews go. But, undaunted, he discussed the matter with the Soviet foreign minister, Vyshinsky, who admitted that many Jews wished to leave the Soviet Union and go to Israel, but reminded him that such emigration contradicted Soviet policy vis-à-vis all ethnic minorities. When Vyshinsky asked if the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs ‘ex­ pected us to permit a million Jews to emigrate’, Sharett’s response was a plea for fifty thousand, or even ten thousand. But even this plea fell on deaf ears. In reaction to a further question, Vyshinsky told Sharett that even his official visit to the Soviet Union would not change the Kremlin’s ideologically determined position in this respect.60 Since also this time the General Assembly debate on the Palestine question was postponed until the end of October 1956, Sharett returned to Israel. In his usual detailed debriefing and re-evaluation of Israel’s position in international politics after such a mission, Sharett asserted that Israel’s position in the international arena was much improved, since the Korean crisis had diverted attention from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and boasted that both he himself and all Israeli diplomats had enhanced their ability to ideal with complex international issues. He explained to his associates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to his colleagues in the cabinet his decision to amend the American draft resolutions on Korea in close collaboration with India, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Sweden, with whose UN delegations he had worked on the amendments. Substantive­ ly, in following this line his main goal was to strengthen Israel’s policy of non-alignment and through it improve relations with other nonaligned countries. He also explained his decision to support the Eastern bloc’s proposal to accept China as a UN member by paraphrasing John Foster Dulles, who said that ‘whenever we face the choice between being right from a legal point of view or to remain alive, we always prefer the second option’, and in this vein Sharett said that ‘this is also the legal logic of the Torah; namely, the Torah was given to us to follow it, but not that it would lead to suicide’. By the same token, he explained, his suggested amendments to the American proposal were made so that Israel would both make the right moral move and prosper rather than commit political suicide. Moreover, in view of his bitter disappointment with the results of the 1949 session of the General Assembly concerning the Jerusalem issue, this time he invested special efforts in developing good relations with the delegations of the four members in the concilia­ tion commission—India, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Turkey—but did not minimize the diplomatic dangers that lay ahead on both the questions of the Arab refugees and Jerusalem. His current apprehensions were based

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on the first report by UNRWA, which had been established in May 1950, which pointed to the hardships that the Palestinian refugees had encountered and the need for urgent action to alleviate their plight.61 In the mean time, the destitute Conciliation Commission submitted its annual report. Abba Eban could tell Sharett that this report was favourable to Israel in that it marked a change in the commission’s tendency to rely on previous UN resolutions and to blame Israel for refusing to abide by them. Thus, he wrote, the commission ‘accepted our view on necessity direct talks [between Israel and the Arab states] with refugees as item one’. Eban also thought that Israel stood a good chance of achieving its goals in Jerusalem if it were able to conclude a separate agreement with Jordan.62 The Dutch-Swedish draft resolution that followed the Conciliation Commission’s report also demonstrated a new approach to Israel, since it did not oppose the public proclamation of Jerusalem as its capital. To cap it all, there were rumours that the Vatican might support this resolution. On the basis of these cautiously optimistic evaluations, Sharett gained a meaningful victory in the cabinet: it endorsed his proposal to issue a positive unilateral declaration on the resettlement of Palestinian refugees, the establishment of a fund to aid such resettlement, and Israel’s willingness to transfer its compen­ sations to this fund.63 Once again, however, a perceived improvement in foreign affairs went hand in hand with worsening internal conditions. The chronic lack of foreign exchange and failure of restrictive economic policies and ration­ ing had contributed to the emergence of a pervasive black market and zero economic growth in Israel. When the government’s efforts to resuscitate the faltering economy, by abolishing the restrictions and rationing, and introducing a ‘new economic policy’, aimed at encour­ aging growth, did not yield the expected results, Ben-Gurion resigned on 15 October 1950. This meant that the entire government also resigned and that the coalition might collapse. The main reason for this looming coalitional crisis was that not for the last time, the formation of a new coalition was entangled by a mounting controversy between Mapai and the religious parties over a host of issues, including the new economic policy, religious education, and the religious parties’ share of cabinet portfolios. Since Ben-Gurion was unable to solve this severe crisis and form a new coalition and government, Sharett was called in to help, in the hope that his friendly relations with the moderate leaders of Mapai’s partners would facilitate an early resolution to the unfolding crisis.64 While Sharett’s intensive intervention in the crisis eased the conflict between

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Mapai and the religious parties, it led to the withdrawal of Mapam and the General Zionists from the coalition, but not on foreign policy issues. Still, in his own party Sharett gained additional prestige as an astute political problem-solver. The new coalition that was established sub­ sequently to Sharett’s intervention was smaller but more coherent. Although foreign policy was not the main issue leading to Mapam’s withdrawal from the government, it entailed the resignation of many Mapam officials, including a number of ambassadors mainly to East European states. Though it created a furore, this wave of resignations did not cause any major disruption in the relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Sharett did his utmost to revert to business as usual. As soon as the coalitional crisis was over, a more popular and self-confident Sharett returned to New York to attend the General Assembly and to supervise the delicate process leading to the estab­ lishment of the Israeli Bonds organization. He had been required to deal with this intricate issue personally, since the American government linked its approval of this enterprise to the Israeli stance on Korea as well as to its own need to sell US Government bonds to finance the war in Korea. As usual, Sharett began by studying the issue in depth and subsequently designed the strategy for its solution. The energy invested in each of these tactical moves was tremendous. Part of it was invested in a continuous struggle with the defence ministry which had been conducting a war of attrition against the foreign ministry. Many in the foreign ministry felt that since the establishment of the state, Israel had been engaged in activities that certainly did not promote peace with Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, that could not but enrage their governments, and created in the West an image of Israeli aggress­ iveness. Sharett and his ministry tried to prevent and limit Israeli retaliatory operations and aggressive behaviour, but their efforts were not always crowned with success. One of these failed efforts occurred during Sharett’s stay in New York. Although BenGurion consulted him about an operation aimed to open the road to Eilat, blocked by the Jordanians, and which Sharett had opposed, such an operation was carried out at Wadi Aravah and enhanced tension with Jordan.65 To facilitate stability and tranquillity in the conflict system, onç of Sharett’s most important tasks at the 1950 UN Assembly was to shepherd the Swedish-Dutch proposal on Jerusalem through, despite vehement Vati­ can opposition and in view of Jordan’s refusal to sign a separate agreement with Israel.66 This highly complex international situation explains why Sharett exerted all possible influence from New York in

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preventing any escalation on Israel’s border with, Jordan, and in having Israeli forces removed from disputed areas on the Israeli-Egyptian border in the Negev. Overwhelmed by the sheer volume of his numerous political and diplomatic duties and missions in New York, Sharett barely finished preparing for the final Assembly sessions and the debate on the Palestine question in December 1950. However, on 2 December 1950 the General Assembly approved the uninterrupted financing of UNRWA as well as the establishment of a special separate fund for resettling Arab refugees. In accordance with Sharett’s position and recommendations, Israel abstained rather than opposed this resolution. Moreover, on 14 Decem­ ber 1950 the Assembly approved a resolution based on the annual report of the Conciliation Commission calling on Israel and the Arabs to begin peace talks. Under Sharett’s guidance, Israel also abstained in this vote rather than opposed it. In regard to Jerusalem, an American-Belgian draft resolution, based on the Swedish-Dutch draft, did not gain the required majority and—to Sharett’s relief—the final debate on this sensitive issue was postponed to the General Assembly of 1951.67 Sharett, however, did not regret the great efforts that he and his associates had invested during that General Assembly, since they succeeded in amend­ ing all draft resolutions on Jerusalem in a fashion that was commensur­ ate with Israeli desiderata. These satisfactory outcomes of the discussions in the General Assem­ bly notwithstanding, the winter of 1950 marked a dramatic change in the Korean War, which increased apprehensions, including in Israel, of a major global war. Towards the end of November 1950, UN forces had launched a major offensive aimed at defeating the Soviet and Chinesebacked North Koreans. As is well known, this major offensive failed, since reinforced by Chinese forces, the North Koreans repulsed UN (i.e. mainly American) forces to the thirty-eighth parallel. These dramatic developments enhanced criticism of President Truman’s ‘softness’ and led to a hasty visit of the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, in Washington at the beginning of December 1950. This visit produced a stiff American-British warning to the effect that neither of these powers would entertain the appeasement of the Koreans or of their Chinese patrons, and that UN forces would continue to fight in Korea. These developments affected many states and Israel among them. Thus soon after Attlee’s visit, Sharett learned that as part of the division of labour between the USA and Britain, in the event of a global war it would be Britain’s responsibility to protect the Middle East. Instead of panicking or withdrawing from what had been regarded as a perilous international

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game, these alarming events prompted Sharett to propose a major new diplomatic initiative, openly calling for the establishment of a large bloc in the UN which would pursue a conciliatory line with regard to ending the Korean War.68 Simultaneously, at the beginning of December 1950, Sharett consulted Ben-Gurion from New York, regarding American stockpiling of vital strategic food and raw materials in Israel ‘for use during any emergency period’.69 In this context, Sharett’s idea was that Israel would have the option to purchase parts of these stocks in the event, of war breaking out between it and its neighbours. With Ben-Gurion’s active backing, Sharett met the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense, George Marshall, Secretary of Agriculture, George Brannan, and presidential adviser, Averell Harriman, to discuss the idea. As a result of these talks, Sharett hoped that America would agree to stockpile at least grains in Israel, as this would not require congressional approval. In preparation for his meeting with the Defense Secretary, Marshall, Sharett acted on the two assumptions that 'The Middle East is a vital area for the democracies to protect. Israel is anxious to be in a position to contribute as effectively as possible to the security of the region.’ He also emphasized that 'the establishment of these stockpiles in advance of an emergency would both serve the interest of Israel’s security and powerfully increase the defensive resources of democracy in the Near East’. The rationale for such deposits, according to Sharett, was that ‘Israel’s supply position is directly connected to its defensive capacity. Israel has declared its determination to fight, if necessary, in defence of its democracy. The importance of this pledge is reinforced by the fact that Israel has a manpower potential for combat duty in the neighbour­ hood of two hundred thousand.’70 Although the Secretary of State and his lieutenants were impressed with what they perceived as a change in Israel’s non-aligned position as it had been presented by Sharett, Marshall was vague on the possibility of depositing food and raw materials, suggesting to Sharett, and later to the then Israeli Consul General in Washington, Teddy Kollek, to discuss the plan with the British, who would be directly responsible for the defence of the region according to the American-British agreement of December. Hence Sharett considered stopping in London on the way back to Israel, but since consultations on such a level with the British would have meant a major departure from Israel’s previous reserved policy vis-à-vis its former colonial power, after a brief exchange of views with Ben-Gurion, he decided to postpone such a visit until further improvement in

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Israeli-British relations and after further deliberations in Israel on the entire matter.71 Although Harriman and his assistants in the State Department resisted Sharett’s proposal for depositing American food and raw materials in Israel, they left the ultimate decision to Marshall, since it would involve a major change in American attitude and strategy towards Israel. This group of officials suggested, however, that Sharett should submit a detailed proposal to Marshall. Thus in an urgent memo to Marshall before he returned home, laying the foundations for Israel’s 'special strategic relations’ with the USA this time in concert with Ben-Gurion,72 Sharett specified its various supply and military needs. Marshall’s reply to the memo was still that the State Department must be consulted. This meant that Sharett would have to deal with that department’s coupling of any Israeli request to concessions towards Jordan, Egypt, and Syria.73 Though Sharett’s line in regard to requests from the USA and their justification would be followed later, it is a mistake to infer that his political manœuvre led to an immediate major shift in Israel’s nonalignment policy. Essentially it was an additional step along the road to transforming American-Israeli relations. As if to substantiate this pro­ cess, towards the end of December 1950, a State Department evaluation maintained, that Israel was graudally departing from non-alignment, and would be willing to render America access to its ports and airports during a severe global crisis. A similar assessment prepared in London led Whitehall to state that it might re-examine the defence of the Middle East and Israel’s role in it. And it was in this connection that the British ambassador to Israel, Knox Helm, informed Walter Eytan that General Brian Robertson, commander-in-chief of Britain’s forces in the region, was inclined to visit Israel, and that the visit would be more than merely ceremonial.74 As part of his attempt to effect only a gradual controlled change in Israel’s general political orientation, Sharett forced the cabinet to face some critical decisions concerning relations with West Germany. In view of evident progress in the Anglo-French-American discussions on a formal ending of the state of war with Germany, and their request for the reaction of various other governments to such a move, Israel had three options: to disregard the call, to declare that its position of non-recognition of Germany would not change, or to recognize Ger­ many and then submit a formal demand for reparations. The pragmatist Sharett supported the third option and brought it to the cabinet along with the ‘heretical’ notion of the urgent need for establishing formal

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diplomatic relations with Germany in order to facilitate obtaining reparations. Consequently, in early January 1951 the cabinet rejected Ben-Gurion’s fantastic suggestion that Israel would threaten to declare war on Germany unless that country undertook to pay Israel for Jewish property destroyed during the war. Instead, in accordance with Sharett’s sober proposal, the cabinet voted to approach the allied powers regard­ ing reparations, and to establish a special government corporation to deal with Israel’s demands.75 With that vote, which he initiated, Sharett became the prime mover in cabinet in the lengthy negotiations with both the powers and the German government in regard to reparations. He was bent on relieving Israel’s debilitating economic crisis, which—next to Israel’s security— was his most urgent goal at that time.

NOTES 1. Sharett to Aharonowitz, 21 Feb. 1950, Labour Archive, 32-14-1. 2. See the cabinet’s decision, 13 Dec. 1949, ISA. 3. ‘A joint meeting of the Secretariat and the party’s faction in the Knesset for an interim summation of the position on a constitution’, 7 May 1950, Mapai Archive, 11/1/2. 4. ‘A joint meeting of the Secretariat and the party’s faction in the Knesset’, 14 May 1950, 28 May 1950, ibid. 5. On Sharett’s relations with the British ambassador, Sir Alexander Knox Helm, see e.g. Sharett to Knox Helm, 2 May 1950, D ocum ents, v. 308-9; and see a report on a particularly stormy meeting between the two, in Comay to Kidron, 3 May 1950, ibid. 311-12. 6. Elath to the US Division, 4 May 1950, D ocum ents, v. 312-13; Eban and Rafael to Sharett, 10 May 1950, ibid. 321-2; Elath’s reaction to Eban and Rafael, in Elath to Sharett, 11 May 1950, ibid. 324. 7. For Sharett’s reaction, see Sharett to Eban, 16 May 1950, D ocum ents, v. 330: Bialer, Betw een E ast and W est, 215-18. 8. Sharett to Yadin, 12 May 1950, D ocum ents, v. 315. 9. See Sharett’s speech to IDF officers, 15 May 1950, ISA, FM, 2454/21/A. 10. Elath to Sharett, 17 May 1950, D ocum ents, v. 335-6; US Embassy in Israel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 May 1950, ibid. 342; circular letter to Israeli missions, 25 May 1950, ibid. 343-4; Elath to the foreign ministry, two cables, 25 May 1950, ibid. 345-6; Kidron to Comay, 25 May 1950, ibid/350; Najar to Eytan, 31 May 1950, ibid. 372-3. 11. See the cabinet decision, 17 May 1950, ISA; Eytan to Israeli missions, two cables, 26 May 1950, D ocum ents, v. 347-8; on suggestions for a shift in Israeli non-alignment see e.g. Keren to Eytan, 31 May 1950, ibid. 368-9; and see Pinhas Lubianiker-Lavon in Mapai Secretariat, 25 May 1950, Lavon Archive, 2/205/C;

566

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

A Swing towards the West on the arms deals with Eastern Europe, Bialer, ‘The Czech-Israeli Arms Deal Revisited’, 310-11. Sharett to Elath, 21 May 1950, D ocum ents, v. 339-40; Elath to Sharett, 25 May 1950, ISA, FM, 2308/18. Eban to Eytan, 1 June 1950, D ocum ents, v. 373; Keren to Sharett, 13 June 1950, ibid. 389-90. See cabinet decision on this issue, 31 May 1950, ISA. Eytan to Keren, 25 June 1950, D ocum ents, v. 403; Bialer, Betw een E ast and W est, 177-8. Levavi to Eytan, 21 June 1950, D ocum ents, v. 398-9; notes on a meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 June 1950, ibid. 404. Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 21 June 1949, ISA, FM 2402/12; Eytan to Yadin, 7 Dec. 1949, ISA, FM, 2431/6. See the joint meeting of the Mapai faction in Knesset and the Secretariat, 18 June 1950, Mapai Archive, 11-1-3; B. Morris, Isra e ls Border W ars, 1949-1956 , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 157-66. Protocol of the Joint Meeting, 9 July 1950, Mapai Archive, 11/1/3. On the failure of the negotiations with Jordan, see M. Sasson to E. Sasson, 27 June 1950, D ocum ents, v. 408-9. Protocol of the joint meeting, 9 July 1950, Mapai Archive, 11/1/3. Ibid. Rafael and Lourie to Sharett, 28 June 1950, D ocum ents, v. 410-11; Eban to Lourie, 29 June 1950, ibid. 412; Lourie to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 1950, ibid. 416. Sharett to Israeli Missions Abroad, 30 June 1950, D ocum ents, v. 414; Keren to Sharett, 1 July 1950, ibid. 417-19; Sharett to Keren, 2 July 1950, ibid. 420; Sharett to the Israeli Missions Abroad, 3 July 1950, ibid. 420-1; cf. Bialer, Between E ast and W est, 218-20. Sharett to Keren, 2 July 1950, D ocum ents, v. 420. On the powers’ general reactions to Israel’s posture, see Keren to the US department, 3 July 1950, D ocum ents, v. 421-2; Namir to Sharett, 6 July 1950, ibid. 427; on the reactions to Sharett’s statement, see e.g. Lourie to Sharett, 24 July 1950, ibid. 443-5; for Sharett’s statement see, D avar, 24 July 1950. For a report on this conference see ISA, FM, 2458/4; Bialer, Betw een E ast and W est, 220-4. See the report on the ambassadors’ conference, ISA, FM, 2458/4. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. See report on this meeting, 1 Aug. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 452-3. See Lourie and Rafael to Sharett, 2 Aug. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 456. See D ocum ents, v. 457; Sharett to Trygve Lie, 3 Aug. 1950, ibid. 458; and see the cabinet decision, 3 Aug. 1950, ISA. M. Sharett, A fa p a ls Tw enty Years (Tel Aviv: Mapai, 1950). Ibid.

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38. Ibid. 39. The Seventh Convention of Mapai, 15-17 Aug. 1950, Mapai Archive, 21/7. 40. Biran to Sharett, 21 Aug. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 484-6; Sharett to Eytan, 22 Aug. 1950, ibid. 486-7; on the USA and Britain’s positions see the US Division to the Embassy in Washington, 23 Aug. 1950, ibid. 490; Eytan to Sharett, 24 Aug. 1950, ibid. 491-2; Sharett to Eban, 27 Aug. 1950, ibid. 502; Eban to Sharett, 31 Aug. 1950, ibid. 513; on the mixed commissions see Shalev, Co-operation under the Shadow o f C onflict, 91-103, 107-21. 41. Sharett in Mapai Central Committee, 10 Sept. 1950, Mapai Archive, 23/50. 42. Eban to Sharett, two cables, 25 Aug. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 499-501; Eban to Sharett, 30 Aug. 1950, ibid. 506-7; Eban to Teddy Kollek, 31 Aug. 1950, ibid. 509-10. 43. Mapai Central Committee, 10 Sept. 1950, Mapai Archive; Bialer, Between E ast and W est, 224-8. 44. Peretz Naftali to Sharett and Kaplan, 1 Sept. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 514-16; Eban to Sharett, 8 Sept. 1950, ibid. 529. 45. See Sharett’s report to Mapai Central Committee, 10 Sept. 1950, Mapai Archive, for Ben-Gurion’s claim for fatherhood of the Bonds see, Ben-Gurion, R estored S ta te o f Israel9 i. 419-20; for the government decisions on 14 Sept. 1950 to implement the decisions of the Jerusalem conference, see ISA. 46. Sharett in Mapai Central Committee, 10 Sept. 1950, Mapai Archive; and see the cabinet’s decision, 7 Sept. 1950, ISA. 47. The conclusions of a meeting in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 Sept. 1950, DocumentSi v. 530-3; Sharett to Eytan, 2 Oct. 1950, ibid. 567. 48. On the clashes on the Israeli-Jordanian frontier, see Sharett’s office to the embassy in Washington, 14 Sept. 1950, D ocum entsy v. 533-5; report on Comay’s talk with Chadwick, 14 Sept. 1950, ibid. 536-9; Eban to Trygve Lie, 15 Sept. 1950, ibid. 539-41; on the clash on the Israeli-Syrian borders, see Eytan to Sharett, 19 Sept. 1950, ibid. 545; on the clash with the Egyptians, see Sharett to Eytan, 19 Sept. 1950, ibid. 545-6; and on the deterioration on all Israel’s borders, see Shalev, Co-operation under the Shadow o f C onflict, 89-92. 49. Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 19 Sept. 1950, Ben-Gurion Archive. 50. Ben-Gurion to Sharett, 23 Sept. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 553; Eytan to Sharett, 24 Sept. 1950, ibid. 554-5; Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 28 Sept. 1950, ibid. 561. 51. Sharett to Eytan, 20 Sept. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 550-1; Sharett to Eytan, 28 Sept. 1950, ibid. 568. 52. Sharett to Eytan, 28 Sept. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 556-9. Bialer, Between E ast and W est, 228-9. 53. Sharett to Eytan, 28 Sept. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 556-9. 54. Sharett to Eytan, 2 Oct. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 567. 55. A report on Ben-Gurion’s talks with Henderson, 1 Oct. 1950, D ocum ents, 562-5; on the negotiations with Transjordan, see Eytan’s report on his meeting with Abdullah on 2 Oct. 1950, ibid. 565-6; Comay to Sharett, 6 Oct. 1950, ibid. 571; Elath to Comay, 6 Oct. 1950, ibid. 572, Eytan to Elath, 9 Oct. 1950, ibid. 574; cf. Gazit, Ben-G urion’s A ttem pt', Bialer, Between E ast and W est, 228-9. 56. Eban to Eytan, 10 Oct. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 579.

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57. Sharett to Eytan, 11 Oct. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 580-1.. 58. Shiloah to Eytan, 12 Oct. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 584-6; Kollek’s report on his talks with Berton Berry, 13 Oct. 1950, ibid. 586-8; Eshed, One M an ‘M ossad’, 160-3. 59. Gass to Kaplan, 16 Oct. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 592. 60. Levavi to Namir, 3 Nov. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 626. 61. Eban to Sharett, two cables, 25 Oct. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 604-7; A report on a meeting of Sharett and the heads of the various departments in his ministry, 26 Oct. 1950, ISA, FM, 2409/9; and see cabinet decisions of 24 Oct. 1950, and 25 Oct. 1950, ISA. 62. See the above-mentioned two cables from Eban to Sharett, n. 44. 63. Eytan to Israeli Missions Abroad, 29 Oct. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 608-9; Eytan to the Israeli Missions Abroad, 31 Oct. 1950, ibid. 611, 7 Nov. 1950, 632-3. 64. Mapai Political Committee, 29 Oct. 1950, Mapai Archive, 26/50. 65. Avner to Sasson, 23 Nov. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 670-2; Eytan to Sharett, 30 Nov. 1950, ibid. 682-3; Eytan to Sharett, 2 Dec. 1958, ibid. 685-6; the issue was discussed in the cabinet on 2 Dec. 1950 and 4 Dec. 1950, ISA; Shlaim, Collusion, 578-9. 66. Sharett to Eytan, 22 Nov. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 662; Sharett to Israel missions abroad, 24 Nov. 1950, ibid. 672-3. 67. Sharett to Eytan, 7 Dec. 1950 D ocum ents, v. 690-1; Sharett to Eytan, 12 Dec. 1950, ibid. 698-9; Sharett to Eytan, 13 Dec. 1950, ibid. 700. 68. Eban to Eytan, 9 Dec. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 696-7. 69. On this initiative by Sharett see Eban to Eytan, 13 Dec. 1950, ibid. 699. 70. Eban to the foreign ministry’s USA Division, 7 Dec. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 694. 71. Sharett to Elath, 8 Dec. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 694-5; Sharett to his office, three cables, 18 Dec. 1950, ibid. 711-12; cf. Gazit, ‘Ben-Gurion’s Efforts’; Bialer, Between E ast and W est, 231-4. 72. Sharett to Marshall, 23 Dec. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 718-22. 73. Keren to the US division, 27 Dec. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 723. 74. Report on this talk, 28 Dec. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 729-30. 75. Eytan and Rosenne to Sharett, 8 Dec. 1950, D ocum ents, v. 695; Eytan to the cabinet’s secretary, 17 Dec. 1950, ibid. 707-9; Eytan to Rosenne, 28 Dec. 1950, ibid. 731; the legal adviser to Eytan, 2 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2413/2; on the cabinet’s decision on 3 Jan. 1951 see, Sharef to Eytan, 4 Jan. 1951; ISA, FM, 2417/1; the Israeli cabinet’s letter to the powers’, 9 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2445/6; and see the cabinet’s decision, 27 Dec. 1950, ISA.

19 A Year of Troubles T he ability of small states to maintain a respectable existence depends on a delicate balance between their power and prestige in the interna­ tional sphere and their internal social and economic stability. At the beginning of 1951 Sharett knew only too well that there existed a tremendous gap between Israel’s position in these two areas. While Israel’s international position and status had significantly improved, it was in the midst of a protracted social and economic crisis. First, the government was facing explicit difficulties in honouring its internal social and economic commitments, a situation which was a direct result of its immense military expenditure, the substantial investments in nation­ building and—most important—the enormous expenses connected with the absorption of immigrants. In retrospect it is clear that every Israeli policy during that period was influenced by this overriding economic predicament. ‘The situation in regard to grain and wheat is desperate. By the end of January 1951 there will be no grain; and by the end of February 1951 there will be no bread. There is an overriding need to obtain and dispatch at least fifty thousand tons of grain.’ This was the kind of SOS message that Ben-Gurion sent to Eban at the beginning of 1951.1 Eban informed the prime minister that Israel’s embassy in Washington could purchase no more than twenty-thousand tons of grain because of the lack of available funds.2 The Israeli government emerged from this financial crisis only later in 1951, partly as a result of the Export-Import Bank loan of thirty-five million dollars that was finally approved and the contract signed on 4 January 1951. The loan, however, augmented Israel’s dependence on the USA and made it more vulnerable than ever to American pressure. But Sharett and the government still maintained Israel’s previous posture. Although Sharett said that ‘thçre is peace neither in the small world of the nations in the Middle East, die region to which we particularly belong, nor in the larger world of nations in which we also belong as an independent and equal state’,3 he was able to persuade the political élite to maintain Israel’s policy of non-alignment, on the basis that this posture had significandy improved Israel’s position in the international arena and would yield more in the future. Sharett

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could take credit for Israel’s acceptance by almost every country, except the Arab states, as an independent viable political entity, for the marked improvement in Israeli relations with such former adversaries as Britain, India (which in late 1950 recognized Israel), as well as other Third World countries, and for its ability to adopt a middle-of-the-road policy between the USA and the USSR. Many moderate Israeli politicians and diplomats, such as Zalman Aranne and Abba Eban, openly praised Sharett for the positive results of non-alignment.4 But among the disappointing developments facing Sharett at that time were the consequences of the Conciliation Commission’s failure to promote peace talks. For this failure increased American pressure on both Israel and the Arab states, particularly in regard to a solution of the Arab refugees and borders. To demonstrate Israel’s goodwill, and especially to placate the US government, Sharett announced on 23 January 1951 that Israel would not wait for comprehensive peace negotiations to begin before paying collective compensation to the refugees through UNRWA. Paradoxically, however, this supposedly conciliatory announcement obstructed rather than facilitated the peace talks with Jordan. For the wealthy Palestinian landowners, who had fled to Jordan and gained substantial political power there, were hoping for direct personal restitution or to regain control over the property left behind.5 Sharett was equally perturbed by the Soviet Union’s attitude towards Israel. For now the Soviets were openly courting the Arab states, especially Egypt, which was then deep into negotiations with Britain regarding future control of the Suez Canal.6 As noted, Israel’s desperate economic situation overshadowed all its other problems. However, while the USA was still dragging its feet in regard to economic and military aid, the British were exhibiting clearer signs of goodwill towards the Jewish state. In Sharett’s absence, but with his full blessing, Ben-Gurion and Eliezer Kaplan approached the British in an attempt to launch ‘discreet efforts interest UK, Dominions, in relieving our urgent needs foodstuffs, raw materials and even stockpiling here on strategic grounds ensuring valuable local industrial potential on much bigger scale than last War [1948]’.7 The Israeli leaders considered that ‘this would be farsighted for them in spite our existing non-ad­ herence and in view of political climate in Egypt [which was creating difficulties in regard to the Egyptian-British pact], other Arab states, complete lack industrial facilities, Jordan etc’.8 These overtures towards London unleashed a wave of rumours which in turn created an uproar among both rightist and leftist Israeli politicians, who were still nurtur­ ing enmity towards the former mandatory power, the Middle Eastern

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states, and foreign diplomats. In order to curb these rumours and prevent undesirable political ramifications, the government declared that, ‘All rumours notwithstanding, nobody has approached us, and we have not approached anybody about bases, transfer of military units from Egypt, etc.’.9 Gradually withdrawing from non-identification, and persuading the USA to include Israel in American strategic designs in the Middle East, was a tremendous task for both Sharett and Ben-Gurion—albeit for different reasons. When Ben-Gurion, who himself had preached a more rapid process of departure from non-alignment and pledging unequi­ vocal allegiance to the USA, learned about Sharett’s memo to Marshall, which included faint hints in this vein—particularly his suggestion that Israel’s military industries be taken into account in Western emergency plans—he was furious. Warning the cabinet against any change in its policy, he none the less awaited Sharett’s return from vacation in France on his way back from the UN General Assembly, to discuss his contested statement and the future of this orientation with him.10 After this discussion, which was held upon Sharett’s return, Sharett was compelled to instruct Eban that his memo to Marshall should be kept secret because it was premature, and that they should prevent any impression that they had made a unilateral proposal that failed to take into account what the American government were ready to give in return.11 Beyond their controversy about how much information Israel should disclose to the USA, both Sharett and Ben-Gurion had been convinced that the time had come to reconsider Israel’s orientation, since, ‘the only chance for the success of our request for a grant [from the USA] depends on the assumption that a strong Israel is a strategic asset to the Western states in the event they are forced to deal with aggression in the Middle East’.12 Ben-Gurion was first to reassess Israel’s policy vis-à-vis the USA. When re-evaluating his own position, Ben-Gurion also revealed the degree of differences between his and Sharett’s views: ‘About our relations with the US’ he wrote to Teddy Kollek, ‘probably I am more flexible than Sharett. I have not believed in the non-identification formula because I don’t believe in a negative policy. Therefore, I have never supported non-identification.’ On the other hand, JBen-Gurion asserted that, although Israel had never been neutral in the ideological struggle between East and West, he did not want to turn Israel into a Western puppet. This is why he considered Sharett’s and Eban’s pro­ posals regarding Israel’s military industry as ‘a catastrophic mistake. I don’t see how it can be amended, although Moshe [Sharett] says that we

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can withdraw it.’ Yet, he was also confident that it was in Israel’s best interest to continue ‘the efforts to include the USA in the defence of the Middle East, and this regardless of the prevailing policy in Washing­ ton’.13 As far as Britain was concerned, the unforgiving Ben-Gurion ‘did not see any benefit in an initiative for a talk with Bevin in this respect. Though, if he approaches us, we will listen to what he has to say. As long as he refrains from approaching us, it means that no change has occurred [in Bevin’s negative posture vis-à-vis Israel], and that our initiative can only create harm.’14 Thus Ben-Gurion was not trying to block an improvement in Israeli-British relations; out of vanity and vengeance he merely wished to create a situation in which Israel’s former adversary would take the first step in the courting minuet. These were the prime minister’s reactions to talks between Sir William Strang, the permanent under-secretary of state at the British Foreign Office and the Israeli ambassador to Britain, Eliahu Elath. Nevertheless, these London talks of mid-January 1951 raised great expectations. Initially intended merely to plan for General Brian Robert­ son’s visit to Israel—a visit that both Ben-Gurion and Sharett had agreed on, nevertheless, Strang took a surprising leap forward when he informed Elath that Whitehall was now expounding regional rather than state defence for the Middle East, and, according to this plan, Israel would be an important piece in Britain’s new regional strategy. If the Marshall-Sharett talks represented progress in American-Israeli rela­ tions, Strang’s remarks to Elath, together with the information that Bevin had blessed their meeting, revealed unforeseen possibilities for Israeli-British co-operation. According to Strang, Britain was seeking a regional defence pact, the establishment of a British base in Gaza that would be connected to Jordan by a corridor, and one or even a few bases in Israel proper. Aware of Israel’s needs and sensitive spots, Strang was not talking only about strategic military co-operation; he mentioned scientific, technological, and economic co-operation as well. Elath cor­ rectly surmised that there was a connection between what Strang and he were discussing and difficulties in the British-Egyptian negotiations. After detailed consultations with his superiors, the Israeli ambassador informed Strang that the Israeli government was indeed interested in pursuing talks along these lines. He also conveyed the government’s blessing on the Robertson mission.15 Now the anxious Israeli politicians and diplomats were waiting for the next British move. Sharett, who was still apprehensive of an uncontrolled and too-hasty shift in orientation, did his best to prevent Israel’s abrupt and total

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withdrawal from non-alignment, especially in order to promote relations with India, China, and other Third World countries—whose support he felt was indispensable to Israel, at the very least as a counterbalance for its increasing reliance on the West. He fought Ben-Gurion in the cabinet over fully supporting the US position on China, and he won. Eban was subsequently instructed to support China’s membership in the UN and the expulsion of Taiwan from this organization, as well as to oppose sanctions against China. Sharett explained this position by saying that ‘We cannot widen the gap with the USA any further than this position. This is due both to our connections to Washington, which are being extended by the intensifying global crisis, and due to the Korean imbroglio itself, which can only be escaped by bridging the differences between the USA and the other side, not by defeating the USA, which has no chance.’16 Sharett stubbornly refused to succumb to Ben-Gurion’s and Eban’s pressure and persuasion aimed at expediting Israel’s moves towards more intimate relations with the USA. He countered their argument that such a move was needed to ensure Israel’s independent existence in the event of a third world war with a ‘triple formula’. Recognizing the need for a close link between the two countries, he said that Israel should ‘aim for maximum support from the USA while avoiding any a priori commitments. In avoiding far-reaching explicit commitments, we also should avoid any statement that negates our commitment to the West. This is possible since, in fact, we are not required to make any such statement.’ He then succinctly summarized his view on the ultimate principle that should guide Israel’s behaviour in international politics as follows: ‘As far as we can, we should continue as far as possible without commitments, always maintaining our freedom of manœuvre.’17 While Sharett emphasized flexibility and freedom of political action, BenGurion clearly stated his belief that ‘in the final analysis, the military factor is most decisive’. Hence, while Sharett relied on political and diplomatic flexible policy, preferably based on non-alignment, BenGurion believed that only military force and strategic alliances would save Israel, and that therefore Israel must align itself to the West. The distance between the positions of these two politicians was, indeed, striking. * As in any coalitional regime, the Israeli government’s policy was emerging slowly, largely as a result of protracted discussions between Ben-Gurion and Sharett aimed at finding a compromise, and then as a result of a few rounds of discussions in Mapai, and finally with Mapai’s coalitional partners. Since they both believed that it was still too early

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clearly and fully to commit Israel to the West, but realized Israel’s need for close relations with the USA and even Britain, they also intimated that ‘we likewise feel that it should be in the direct interest of the Western powers to solidify Israel’s economic position and to augment from now on its military and industrial potential’, as well as to continue promoting secret connections between the respective intelligence com­ munities. This definition of Israel’s immediate goals meant showing coolness towards Strang’s ideas regarding bases, since in addition to the expected immense internal difficulties, especially with Mapam and other leftist elements, Israel’s agreement to establish foreign bases on its soil ‘would so seriously embroil Israel’s relations with the Soviet Union as to stop immediately any further emigration to Israel from the satellite countries’.18 When Elath finally delivered this message to the British, he reported back that Israel’s readiness to improve the bilateral relations satisfied the British, but that the British poured some cold water in stating that they maintained that Robertson’s visit to Israel was intended to deal only with military issues.19 Hence the elaborate internal discus­ sions about foreign bases were premature, and only caused unnecessary internal friction and heat. Sharett’s stubborn effort to maintain non-alignment in order to maintain cordial relations with the Eastern bloc and to improve relations with Asia,' proved well founded. For in addition to the Kremlin’s attempts to enhance its ties with the Arab states, there was a marked increase in government-initiated anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe as well as restrictions on military and trade relations with Israel, thus, for example, the Czechs had just rejected a new Israeli request for additional weapons. Here the Israeli claim that their request for weapons was aimed at maintaining autonomy in the international arena did not work; Czech diplomats explained, in private, that their country’s refusal was linked with increasing Soviet control over its satellites.20 Consequently, the Israelis, and especially Sharett, could not help but note that their relations with Eastern Europe were cooling off. However, they still hoped that they would be able to mend fences with these countries and save their relations with them. At the same time, Sharett made another determined decision. Relying on his intimate knowledge of the situation in Lebanon as well as in the entire region, Sharett was careful to reject the Maronite Christian Phalanges’ request for massive Israeli support. His assessment was that Phalanges constituted a small, disorganized, and adventurous movement that would be defeated in the forthcoming elections in that small Arab state, and, most important, that ‘Jewish-Christian co-operation [in

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Lebanon] is not realistic. Past experience teaches that it is totally impossible to rely on this organization.’ Nevertheless, to keep a line open to that Arab state, he did approve token aid for the Maronites—al­ though even then he was insistent that Israel must maintain a great deal of caution in this sphere.21 Internally, Sharett and his officials opened a Pandora’s box that caused a furore in the defence establishment. In a conference of Israeli military attachés, Sharett openly called for the supremacy of political over military considerations. Sharett and his officials also advocated closer co-ordination between the Ministry of Defence and the IDF on the one hand, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the other.22 Chief of Staff Yigael Yadin immediately launched a ‘counter-attack’ on behalf of the defence establishment. He accused the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of irresponsibly passing classified information to foreign attachés in Israel, and of spreading rumours that by its retaliation to Arab attacks the IDF had been sabotaging government policy in general and foreign ministry manœuvres in particular. Sharett responded that in his reaction Yadin had demonstrated the defence establishment’s narrow-minded approach to security issues, and asserted that security ‘is not confined to military aspects, but transcends it, and has tremendous ramifications on the national economy, social organization, foreign relations’. Relatively speaking, this was only a moderate clash in the ever-escalating conflict between the foreign affairs and defence establishments. Quite surprising­ ly, however, Ben-Gurion supported Sharett rather than the chief of staff in regard to this crucial aspect of American-Israeli relations, instructing Yadin to step up ID F co-operation with the foreign ministry, especially in their efforts to promote better American-Israeli understanding. Israel’s slow but steady change of international orientation did not affect its relations with the Arab states one way or the other. In this context, both Sharett and Ben-Gurion were re-evaluating the desirability as well as the possibility of an agreement with the internally troubled Jordan. On the one hand, they deemed Jordan an ‘artificial’ entity that was experiencing marked political instability. According to them, Jor­ dan’s existence was dependent on one person—the king, who in turn was highly dependent on Britain. Hence an agreement with it would only enhance British positions in the region, which Ben-Gurion ^bhored. On the other hand, such an agreement might postpone an understanding with Egypt, which Ben-Gurion considered the most important Arab state in the region, which unlike Jordan enjoyed relative stability. In addition, it was the prime minister’s opinion that an Israeli-Egyptian arrangement was likely to alleviate Israel’s position in the region, while

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an agreement with Jordan would have no effect on Other Arab countries’ siege of Israel. In this context, once again it became apparent that the major bone of contention between the two Israeli politicians was Ben-Gurion’s longheld desire to amend the results of the War of Independence by expanding what he termed as Israel’s ‘ridiculous borders’.23 While Sharett—and Ben-Gurion to a lesser extent—were absorbed in debating these crucial issues, a deep coalitional crisis erupted which would lead to early elections. This crisis, which first emerged in the middle of December 1951, was again caused by the religious parties’ insistence on predominance in educating the immigrants still in the absorption camps. Despite endless discussions and negotiations on the subject in the cabinet, this time Mapai failed in its attempt to persuade the religious parties to accept that the Labour camp could establish its own religious schools in the camps. Even Ben-Gurion’s threat to dissolve the government in which the religious parties participated, if Mapai’s position was not approved, did not have the desired effect. In the Knesset vote on this issue, the opposition, led by the General Zionists and the religious parties, defeated the coalition which supported Mapai’s position by a small margin. After additional abortive attempts to solve the crisis, Ben-Gurion handed in his resignation early in March 1951, which on this occasion meant early general elections.24 The internal crisis called for a comprehensive political re-evaluation by Mapai, which the party intended to carry out at a special convention in mid-February 1951. In his speech on this occasion, Sharett, who was one of the two keynote speakers, posed the ‘heretical’ question: ‘Are we, the Jewish nation, made of a fibre capable of building and maintaining a sovereign state?’ Continuing with this highly sensitive philosophical as well as practical issue, he suggested that, based on Israel’s meagre experience, he was not yet able to answer this question with a resounding ‘Yes’. Since a decisive answer to this question depended on curing some of Israel’s basic malaise, and since Mapai was crucial to any solution of Israel’s main problems, Sharett called for a thorough shake-up of the party. Otherwise, he said, Mapai’s standing in the forthcoming elections was extremely chancy, since it was unlikely to repeat its overwhelming achievements during the 1948 war and the armistice talks of 1949. The revitalization of the party that the social democrat Sharett had in mind included the democratization of the internal elections in the party, strictly following democratic procedures in all the party activities, more frequent meetings of the party’s elected organs, and intensive work among new immigrants, who were drifting away from the party. More-

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over, he hoped that as part of its revival the party would be able to implement the following strategy in the election campaign that it was facing: ‘[a campaign] by an army of foot-soldiers [active party members] who will visit every home, talk with every family, establish personal contact with everyone’. He, very much like Ben-Gurion, strongly sup­ ported a reform in the Israeli electoral system intended to replace the existing system of Proportional Representation by a majoritarian ar­ rangement.25 This passionate call for a sweeping change in Mapai and through it in the country reflected Sharett’s own style of politics. The preparations for the 1951 elections also raised the issue of whether the time had not come to grant full political rights to all Israeli Arabs, regardless of their participation in the general census conducted in 1948, that is, including all Arabs who had illegally returned after that war. Sharett, of course, out of ethical, political, and Israeli self-interest, was in favour o f extending the right to vote to all, and especially to the Arabs who had returned to the Israeli Little Triangle east of Tel Aviv. As expected, Ben-Gurion ridiculed Sharett’s humane position. In the en­ suing exchange which was extended to issues beyond the immediate question of the Arabs’ right to vote, Sharett reproached Ben-Gurion for allowing 'shocking things to happen in Israel. . . Jews will understand that the Arabs are human beings and not dogs [mc!] only when a Jew is hanged for murdering in cold blood an innocent Arab. There is an awful malaise here!’ On the question of the right to vote, Ben-Gurion was defeated in the Mapai Central Committee, Sharett’s proposal being adopted by a majority of nineteen moderates against fourteen hard­ liners.26 Rapprochement between a colonial power and its previous colony, which obtained independence through a military struggle, is usually slow and gradual. This was also true of Israel’s relations with Great Britain. After elaborate preparations, General Brian Robertson, British commander-in-chief for the Middle East, arrived in Israel on 19 February 1951. Upon the general’s arrival in Tel Aviv, the Israeli left organized stormy mass demonstrations against both Britain and the general, and accused the Israeli government of promoting British colonialist interests by hosting him. Partly out of his deeper convictions, partly to calm the political storm, and partly in order to facilitate the visit, Sharett unhesitatingly countered that ‘Israel has become a factor in this part of the world: we are a political and military factor. Moreover, we are facing a global crisis that may open various possibilities [including, of course, those issues that Ben-Gurion and himself intended to raise in their talks with Robertson], and we must explore all options.’27

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In talks with Ben-Gurion, Sharett, and ID F generals, Robertson presented the Western powers’ new approach to the defence of the Middle East: instead of relying on bilateral relations with each of the states in the region, the USA and Britain wished to agree on a multilateral pact or set up a collective regional defence organization against Soviet Union aggression in general and its possible penetration into the region in particular. But, Robertson immediately added, the Arab states had not agreed to Israeli participation in such an organiza­ tion even in the event of a third world war breaking out. While he did not repeat Strang’s suggestions that British bases be established in Israel and other countries of the region, he did emphasize the need to protect the strategic roads in Israel and the air routes through it in order to maintain regional communications. These were essential if the West was to defend the Middle Eastern Northern Tier, that is Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. On his part, Ben-Gurion explained to the British general that Israel’s main concern was to survive during a major global crisis, and survival was impossible without good relations with, and support of the West. Ben-Gurion added a twist which attracted the British general’s attention: that if a third world war did break out, Israel’s historical and cultural connection with Britain should gain it treatment as a member of the British Commonwealth.28 In his sutnmary of the talks with Robertson, Sharett shed an interes­ ting light on the Israeli government’s position in regard to the defence of the Middle East, as well as on a number of related aspects, such as the Israeli élite’s attitudes towards the British. In a kind of personal simulation, he outlined the way in which he felt that Robertson should have perceived his hosts and their positions. First of all, it should have been clear to Robertson that Ben-Gurion and himself together repres­ ented the Israeli consensus based on a 'strong opposition to Soviet ascendance and ipso facto, a preference for American and British friendship’. The general should also have understood that, although the Israeli activists and the ID F maintained a strong suspicion towards Britain, ‘they would not hesitate to fight against the Soviets if necessary, and that there is no doubt in the government’s absolute control over the IDF and its compliance with the government’s orders’. Next Sharett observed that the British must be aware that it would be difficult to reach an agreement with Israel on military co-operation, ‘since its internal and external relations are more complex than can be presumed from a distance’. He aljso commented that while there had been a noted change in the government’s position vis-à-vis Britain, this had not spread to the general Israeli population. At this point in his analysis, Sharett drew a

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cynical and ridiculing profile of Ben-Gurion: ‘He is a great man moved by a vision. His ability to raise the talks to an abstract plane helps him to avoid more immediate issues and justifies his disregard of his counterpart’s positions.’ In this Sharett was referring to a number of issues that were disregarded by Ben-Gurion, including Robertson’s proposals for arranging free flights over Israel and the passage of land forces during a war, ‘Although he [General Robertson] has not achieved his goals [in regard to rights of transportation through Israeli territory] . . . nevertheless, the results of the visit should not be viewed negatively, [since] there is no doubt that it was an important visit that will serve as one link in a chain’. Moreover, Sharett felt that his own public comment on the educational importance of Robertson’s visit, as far as Israeli public opinion was concerned, ‘should be taken as sincere’. In this vein, it should be mentioned here that Israel’s contacts with Britain, which culminated in Robertson’s visit, were initiated by Sharett in his memo­ randum of late 1950 to Marshall.29 In the wake of Robertson’s visit, Sharett tried to cash in on the British general’s declarations of friendship made during his visit to the Holy Land. Thus when he noted that the Egyptian government was hardening its position towards Israel by, among other things, tightening its block­ ade of Israel in the southern sea passages and deploying two huge sea canons in the Straits of Tiran, he asked Britain to intervene. As far as Sharett was concerned, Whitehall’s favourable response—that it viewed Egypt’s steps as an abrogation of the armistice agreements—was proof that Robertson’s visit had paid off. But Sharett also correctly realized that, notwithstanding the British political gesture, the chances for a regional defence agreement with Britain and the USA were negligible, mainly because of Arab opposition. Then an aura of sadness and pessimism concerning the possibility of signing peace agreements with both Egypt and Jordan was descending also on Sharett. But still, despite Israel’s military and defence experts’ conviction about the inevitability of ‘a second round’ in Israel’s war against Egypt, the unrelenting Sharett and his Ministry of Foreign Affairs came up with fresh peace initiatives, vis-à-vis Egypt. In initiating this new campaign their intention was to ‘refute the accepted view that Israel is Abdullah’s ally [later termed “collusion”], that this alliance is directed against Egypt, and that Israel’s Arab policy is incongruent with the efforts toward peace’.30 Courting Britain could not hide Sharett’s main intention: to move closer to the USA without giving up non-alignment. To this end, Sharett instructed Israel’s representatives in Washington and New York to

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emphasize its strategic importance in a volatile Middle East. From this point of view, Israel could take great satisfaction with the Point Four agreement it had signed on 26 February 1951 with the USA for technological assistance and co-operation. This agreement was viewed as yet another step in the direction of close strategic co-operation with that superpower.31 But Sharett realized that the road towards attaining intimate strategic co-operation with the USA was still blocked by such disagreements and controversies as Israel’s continued non-identification, the ideological objection to friendly American relations with West Germany as well as with the Arab states and the Arab League, opposition to the Syngman Rhee government in South Korea on the one hand, and American dissatisfaction with Israel’s support for China’s UN membership, for Soviet policy vis-à-vis new members of that organiza­ tion as well as for a compromise solution in Korea on the other. The two countries also differed on the need for the condemnation of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria for human rights violations, a boycott on Spain, and most significantly, Israel’s refusal to support the US proposal for ‘Peace through Deeds’, which also involved an American plea for nuclear non-proliferation.32 The Sharett camp’s adherence to non-alignment was deemed a draw­ back to closer American-Israeli relations. But Sharett clung to this position in the belief that ‘Independence and non-identification are two sides of the same co in . . . Independence is the positive definition of non-identification. This approach always avoids involvement with either side. It is a method to abstain rather than to be implicated [in undesir­ able conflicts].’ Despite American discontent, as long as the world was just on the brink of a third world war, Sharett did not see any reason to change Israel’s basic orientation.33 Therefore, he had no qualms in submitting Israel’s claims for reparations from Germany, which were jointly drafted by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance to the USA, Britain, and France, as well as a request of a one hundred and fifty million dollars grant [the term that was used at the time was ‘gift’] from the USA.34 Since Israel’s domestic affairs have always strongly affected its foreign policy, it is not surprising that two major foreign policy issues became entwined with the 1951 election campaign. The first issue was connected with the American ‘gift’; when Sharett learned that Washington was planning to postpone a decision on the grant because of Mapai’s and consequently of the Israeli government’s shaky political position, he secretly informed the Americans that any further postponement would only harm Mapai’s chances of winning the elections. Reacting to

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Sharett’s anxious communication, Eban assured the foreign minister far from convincingly that the American delay was not connected with the elections. The second issue centred on the proposal gradually to move the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offices from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Although Abba Eban and Teddy Kollek, who initiated the proposal, felt that in addition to improving Israel-American relations, ‘There are not many issues that will improve the government’s, and the party’s prestige more than moving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem’.35While Eban and Kollek argued that by moving the offices to Jerusalem Israel could ‘kill’ all American and UN plans for the internationalization of Jerusalem, Sharett continued to veto the move in order to refrain from further offending the Americans and the Western powers. The response to Israel’s official representations to the three Western powers regarding reparations from Germany was prompt and striking.36 The German government quickly discussed the matter, accepted the principle of reparations, and agreed in principle to pay more than a billion dollars to Israel, indicating that Chancellor Adenauer himself would meet Israeli officials to iron out the details of such an agreement. In view of this somewhat unexpected but very positive German response, Sharett further expedited Israeli reaction; but he was soon disappointed by the American behaviour. While in principle the USA was willing to assist Israel in promoting its historic claim for reparations, American officials such as Henry Byroade, who was then in charge of US policy towards Germany, linked the reparations to the Israeli government’s change in its non-identification orientation and to Germany’s still precarious economic situation. Thus, relations between Israel and the USA were, as they would continue to be, more complicated than observers might have thought.37 The rapid developments surrounding ‘Operation Shilumim [Repar­ ations]’ stunned the few Israeli politicians and officials who had been privy to the negotiations. Sharett’s insistence, staunchly supported by the powerful director general of the finance ministry, David Horowitz, on further expediting the process, drew heavy criticism on moral and practical grounds from both the right and the left of the political spectrum. The Minister of Foreign Affairs responded to such criticisms by firmly asserting that the history of the Yishuv and of Israel should have demonstrated that only daring claims were adequately rewarded. At the same time, he also pointed out that the financial claim for reparations was relatively minor in comparison to the Yishuv’s patient struggle to establish the Jewish Brigade during the Second World War, to initiate the Biltmore Program—and, of course, the right to establish

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the State of Israel itself, all great events in the attainment of which he was very active. In the midst of the recurrent imbroglios caused by these crucial issues in the sphere of Israel’s foreign affairs, new severe problems arose in connection with Israel’s work on its huge water project, intended to divert the Jordan River in the northern demilitarized zone. As soon as the Israelis had begun the works on their side of the demilitarized zone in early January 1951, the Syrians lodged a complaint with the IsraeliSyrian mixed commission for the supervision of the armistice agree­ ments. In early March, General William Riley, chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) and chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commissions, rendered his verdict in regard to the complaint: he rejected the Syrian claim that by its works Israel had abrogated the military balance in the region, but also ruled that Israel should not confiscate any Arab land in the demilitarized zone and that it should stop the works until the resolution of the disagreements between the two protagonists. Disregarding these guide-lines, Israel resumed the works in the Huleh on 25 March 1951. Sharett had been bedridden on 30 March 1951, when Ben-Gurion conducted a consult­ ation on the issue, which resulted in the decision to continue working on the project despite continued Syrian opposition and military escalation.38 While unnecessary provocations were to be avoided, the ID F forces in the area were instructed to retaliate if the Syrians began shooting. Reflecting Sharett’s view, the prevailing perception among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives who participated in this consultation was that the military had once again 'adopted and demonstrated an independent approach to issues pertaining to Israel’s external relations, an approach which is based on a unilateral and superficial interpretation of the term “security”. This interpretation does not recognize any other reality than the ID F’s wishes.’39 The climax in the escalation on the Syrian border, which had begun in late March and continued in early April 1951, was a massive Israeli retaliatory operation launched on 4 April 1951, after seven ID F soldiers had been killed near A1 Hamma when they were patrolling in the demilitarized zone. Not for the first time, Sharett rejected the ID F ’s version of the tragic event in favour of that of the UN and the USA. According to Sharett, the IDF had committed two blunders: sending the seven Israeli soldiers to patrol in the DMZ in the first place, and then shelling the Syrian military positions. Although he raised the matter in cabinet, suggested an extremely limited operation, and urged BenGurion to restrain the IDF, this time Sharett was defeated; not only did

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the cabinet approve further massive retaliatory land operation against Syrian strongholds, but it also approved the use of the air force in this operation.40 As Shaiett predicted, America immediately linked the new border incidents to Israel’s request for a grant-in-aid, and, in an aide-mémoire communicated to the Israeli cabinet, warned Israel to refrain from further action in the northern DMZ. This American reprimand, coupled with cautionary communications from the Israeli embassy in Washington, prompted Sharett to confront Ben-Gurion: ‘A great leader*, he told his elder colleague, 'should admit his mistakes [i.e. sending the patrol and bombing the Syrians positions], and such an acknowledgement would only enhance his reputation.’41 Then Sharett proposed that Israel should publicly admit the mistakes it had committed in this regard. While pointing out that this was not the first time the IDF had extended the scope of retaliatory operations, he submitted to the prime minister a series of ‘proposals’ (actually, these were demands) to tighten civilian control over the IDF operations and to augment the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in. the implementation of the armistice agreements. Whether as a result of Sharett’s persuasion, or his pressure, Ben-Gurion did event­ ually make such public admission and instructed the IDF to limit its reactions. While this led to a lull in the political and diplomatic attacks against Israel, the USA was no more forthcoming with regard to the grant.42 In the light of its persisting tremendous economic needs, the Israeli government, led by Sharett, again resorted to an often used ‘secret weapon’: its supporters among the American Jewish community. Thus Abba Eban approached friends of Truman such as Abraham Feinberg and the president of the American Jewish Committee, Jacob Blaustein, to persuade the president to intervene on Israel’s behalf in this respect. Depressed by the worsening global situation, the president told these Jewish dignitaries that he felt the time had not yet arrived for this move. Instead, he told Blaustein that he would appreciate a ‘cease-fire’ with the American Jewish community and a relaxation in its constant pressures on the White House. The Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, expressed the same view, but to placate the Jews he added, however, that the Pentagon was planning to include Israel in its strategic plans for the defence of the region.43 Not heeding the Americans’ requests, after consultations with Abba Eban, Sharett instructed Israel’s envoys in the USA to maintain their pressure on the administration and encouraged Israel’s ageing president, Weizmann, and other Jewish leaders, to send letters to Truman urging him to expedite the grant-in-aid.

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During that same period, Sharett and his envoys were constantly searching for ways to improve Israel’s position in the international arena. By the spring of 1951 they had already detected the rapid deterioration of France’s position in North Africa and viewed it as providing an opportunity to approach this fading colonial power. In this vein, in April, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the French were finally digesting the dangers that the Arab League and Egypt were creating for their interests in the Maghreb, and suggesting that Israel exploit the situation to intensify relations with France.44 On the basis of conclusions arrived at even earlier, that Israel and France had ‘parallel interests’ in curtailing the Arab League and pan-Islamic trends, as well as the Arab states’ inclination to create large anti-Israeli and anti-French blocs, Israel had indeed succeeded in obtaining a large loan and military aid from France, which was ‘for the time being more serious than that from the US or Britain’,45 as well as behind-the-scenes political support. But the French-Syrian connection and the pre-De Gaulle era of French-American close political co-operation were still preventing intimate Israeli-French relations that Sharett was determined to pursue. Thus Sharett and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the defence ministry, were immersed in promoting better relations between these two countries, who in their turn were discovering the potential mutual benefits of such a friendship. That same month, April 1951, Ernest Bevin, one of the great post-war leaders, died. Although Sharett was more generous than Ben-Gurion in tending Israel’s condolences on the foreign secretary’s demise, he did not shed too many tears (Sharett instructed his officials to ‘formally offer to the Foreign Office our condolences, without mentioning Palestine [dur­ ing the Mandatory period])’ since it was his view that Bevin’s successor, Herbert Morrison, was more sympathetic towards Israel. Once again Sharett had been correct in this political evaluation. For as soon as he settled in the Foreign Office, in May 1951 Morrison dispatched a detailed message to the Israeli government in which he expressed his positive attitude towards the Jewish state and said—in reaction to Ben-Gurion’s quip to General Robertson—that Britain should consider treating Israel as if it were a Commonwealth member in the event of a third world war. But, as Sharett expected, Morrison explained that Britain’s movement towards Israel would be gradual, and should begin with the military co-operation requested by General Robertson, as well as clear indications of progress towards peace treaties between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Deeply disappointed by Morrison’s restraint and qualified expressions of friendship with Israel, Ben-Gurion renewed his

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suspicious, almost hostile, attitude towards Britain and Morrison. Al­ though Sharett did not share Ben-Gurion’s pessimism and suspicion, he and the ‘old man* collaborated on preparing Israel’s response, delivered through Britain’s ambassador in Tel Aviv, Knox Helm, that the govern­ ment was not interested in discussing wider military co-operation with Britain or the USA before the forthcoming elections.46 Thus under Sharett’s influence, Ben-Gurion avoided yet another of his hasty and harmful actions and statements. On 2 May 1951, the ‘old man’ left Israel for a ‘private visit’ to the USA, during which he ‘unofficially’ met President Truman and numerous American politicians. During Ben-Gurion’s absence, Sharett served as acting prime minister. While the Israeli government was eager to reduce tension and thus stabilize the situation on the northern front, the Syrian chief of staff, Adib Shishakli, who soon would become Syria’s leader, was interested in intensifying the clashes along that border. On the other side of the border, Sharett was struggling to implement a policy of ‘extreme restraint’ while Ben-Gurion was on his mission to the USA. In this he was forced to fight great pressure from the IDF to react to recurrent Syrian provocation. The tension reached a new climax when Syrian soldiers intruded into the DMZ not far from Tel al-Mutilla and captured some military positions, The two sides exchanged heavy artillery fire and on 6 May, the ID F repulsed the Syrian force from the DMZ. In these violent exchanges and the operation for repulsing the Syrians some forty Israeli soldiers were killed. The premeditated and well-calculated re­ straint in view of the Syrian attack facilitated Ben-Gurion’s talks in the USA and also elicited sympathy from the leaders of France and Britain who staunchly supported the pro-Western Shishakli.47 This restraining policy, which was based on ‘military courage and political wisdom’, also resulted in a Security Council resolution condemning the Syrians for penetrating into the DMZ—although the resolution stopped short of a clear order for a Syrian withdrawal no small achievement during those tense months. None the less, Sharett interpreted it as recognition of Israel’s right to continue its work in the demilitarized zone. In the absence of his great rival, Sharett was once again able to demonstrate his ability to deal with the complex political and military situation facing Israel.48 Even Ben-Gurion’s activist assistants were forced to report to the ‘old man’ that Sharett ‘has been doing his utmost during the crisis [on the northern front]. His relations with the chief of staff [Yadin], and [chief of military operations] Makleff are cordial, and the military and political operations are extraordinarily well co­ ordinated. Why should not Ben-Gurion cable a few lines to Sharett

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expressing his appreciation?’49 As always, Ben-Gurion was stingy in complimenting Sharett. While during his long visit to the USA Ben-Gurion was conducting talks with the Secretary of Defense, Marshall, and the Secretary of State, Acheson, regarding Israel’s position in the event of yet another global war as well as the American grant-in-aid to Israel, Sharett was still doing his best to maintain Israel’s posture of non-identification.50 To this end, he met again the Soviet ambassador to Israel, Yershov, to assure him that the prime minister’s visit to the USA was mainly intended to strengthen Israel’s relations with the American Jewish community and launch Israeli Bonds, rather than to forge closer ties with the West.51 But circumstances beyond Israel’s control were making it more difficult than ever to maintain that Israeli international orientation. The first painful step in the clear Israeli retreat from non-alignment came in response to the explicit American demand that all its allies vote in favour of an embargo on weapons and other military materials to China. The American pressure in this instance was linked to internal American and Israeli problems: it was then that General Douglas MacArthur and his numerous supporters had harshly attacked the Truman administration for avoiding a more stringent policy towards the Chinese and a more aggressive conduct of the war in Korea. And it should be remembered that it had "occurred simultaneously with Ben-Gurion’s month-long visit to the USA, while he was desperately asking for generous American military and economic aid, support regarding the German reparations, and against the backdrop of the lingering crisis on Israel’s northern border, which had just been further exacerbated by the dispatch of Iraqi troops to Syria. Hence in spite of his profound hesitations, Sharett had no option but to approve Israel’s pro-embargo vote in the UN. Indeed, as the more astute political observers noted at the time, this was a major indication that finally Israel was altering its policy of non-alignment; ipso facto it also presaged worsening relations with China, which Sharett had laboured so hard to foster.52 Simultaneously, the reparations negotiations were progressing even more quickly and satisfactorily than Sharett had dared to hope. In mid-April 1951, in Paris, and in total secrecy imposed by Israel because of the moral and political sensitivity of the issue, and on his own initiative, Chancellor Adenauer met David Horowitz, director general of the Israeli Ministry of Finance, and Israeli ambassador to France, Maurice Fischer, and told the two Israelis that he favoured the early conclusion of the reparations agreement. As instructed by Sharett, the Israeli officials were forthright in specifying Israel’s pre-conditions for

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such an agreement: a formal German admission of its crimes against the Jews and a request for the forgiveness of the Jewish people, as well as full acceptance of all Israeli financial demands including the total amount that Israel had demanded. As soon as Adenauer responded positively to these points, still apprehensive about unforeseen obstacles, Sharett instructed Eban to communicate the gist of this talk to Dean Acheson, and to request continued American support for the Israeli demands and for Israel’s attempt to normalize relations with Germany.53 These indirect trilateral negotiations were kept secret in view of the approaching elections in Israel and the harm they might have caused Mapai, but also in view of Adenauer’s own apprehensions about reactions in Germany. Sharett’s success in promoting and guiding the negotiations about reparations from Germany—which was kept utterly secret from the Israeli public and everybody else not connected with the actual conduct of the negotiations—was followed by a public failure that could have caused Mapai and himself great political damage: on 14 May 1951 the American, French, British, and Turkish representatives in the Security Council submitted a draft resolution calling on Israel to stop the Huleh works for the diversion of the Jordan River water. Although from the USA Ben-Gurion urged his colleagues in Israel not to yield to this demand, as he would try to persuade Truman into explicitly and openly stating that the USA would veto the draft resolution, under pressure from the State Department the president seemed to be unmoved. Extremely worried about possible adverse ramifications of a defiant Israeli posture particularly as far as American-Israeli relations were concerned, Sharett proposed a symbolic temporary stoppage of the works, to which Ben-Gurion agreed since he knew that on this issue he would be defeated in the cabinet while he was away from Jerusalem and in view of the moderates’ majority. On 18 May 1951 the Security Council adopted an essentially anti-Israeli resolution. Sharett’s analysis of the origins of this resolution was that it had been due entirely to US initiative and pressure, which other powers, especially Britain and France, had been unable to withstand. According to his assessment, the reasons for the rigid American position were: a heaven-sent opportunity to prove to the Arabs that America was their friend; accumulated imtationrin the State Department against Israel over its success securing the grant-in-aid despite the department’s opposition; Ben-Gurion’s defiant statements directed at the UN and ipso facto the USA; the bombing from the air at A1 Hamma; and the inadequacy of Israeli support concerning the war in Korea.

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A few days later the cabinet approved Sharett’s ‘method concerning the impasse into which we have been led’. Accordingly he then proposed to the head of the UN force, General Riley, that Israel would agree to stop all works on Arab soil and carry, it out only on Israeli soil until payments to evicted Arabs could be arranged. His prolonged negotia­ tions with Riley were aimed at allowing the ‘continuation of the work without being regarded as abrogating the UN resolution’, a policy that the cabinet approved on 23 May 1951.54 Sharett’s deep involvement in the temporary stoppage of the works elicited a sullen response from the ID F ’s chief of staff, General Yadin, who viewed this as an inadmissable breach of the established rules of the game concerning the predominance of the defence establishment in determining policy in this sphere, and who wrote to Sharett that ‘if there is any need for concessions [which he did not admit], these should only be made in the presence of [that is, in consultation with] the military, in order to ensure that its prestige maintained’. Sharett, who in BenGurion’s absence tried to transfer the locus of ultimate decision-making in this sphere to his ministry, replied that he himself and his officials were capable of dealing with all matters pertaining to the armistice regime and that additional consultation with the IDF would not give him any better information that would cause him to change his mind regarding the need for complying with the Security Council resolutions. He did, however, reiterate his reasons for the concessions: it was intended to create a better atmosphere prior to any further Security Council meeting on the works in the north, and to improve Israel’s chances of continuing the work. Typically he concluded by writing: ‘You understand very well that I approved very strong military measures when we were facing direct Syrian military threats. But when we face clear political problems, we must have great patience and demonstrate flexibility. I don’t want Israel to be perceived as an aggressive and spiteful state.’55 This represented the Sharett line and style at their clearest. The exchange between Sharett and Yadin marked the beginning of renewed and more intensive clashes between the defence and foreign affairs establishments. Raising the issue again upon Ben-Gurion’s return to Israel, the upset and hawkish Yadin (he would change his view in the 1960s and 1970s) impressed on the prime minister his conviction that relations between the ID F and the Foreign Ministry had become intolerable. He therefore insisted that either the army be relieved of its responsibility for shielding the works in the north as well as for its duties related to Arab-Israeli mixed commissions supervising the armistice agreements, or be given total responsibility in this sphere.56 There is no

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doubt that Yadin’s and the ID F’s purpose was to cause a crisis with Sharett, leading to a decision that all these matters should be dealt with by the IDF and the Ministry of Defence. Sharett vehemently rejected Yadin’s allegations about the ineffectiveness of his ministry in dealing with these matters, he denied that there had been any agreement on division of labour in this sphere and made it clear that his ministry would continue to monitor the ID F’s behaviour vis-à-vis maintaining the armi­ stice agreement as this was far more than a purely military matter.57 Siding as usual with the IDF, Ben-Gurion unequivocally told his colleagues that he was for maintaining the army’s predominant role in administering the armistice regime as a whole and the Mixed Armistice Commissions in particular.58 He rejected Sharett’s proposal for a com­ promise (that is, to establish an interdepartmental committee for dealing with this issue), but in view of Sharett’s persistent pressure,59 Ben-Gurion was ultimately compelled to order the ID F to conduct detailed consult­ ations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about all matters connected with the armistice regime. This internal arrangement was kept intact until Sharett’s appointment as prime minister in 1953. In any event, these clashes created additional layers of ill will between the two leaders and their respective ministries and staffs. Sharett and Ben-Gurion also continued to clash over policy towards the USA. On the one hand, Sharett believed that there were no longer inherent anti-Israeli sentiments in the US administration, and that its desiderata were to prevent undue political upheavals in the Middle East and instead to introduce a measure of stability and accord, which would also contribute to the prevention of Soviet penetration. Strictly inter­ nally, Sharett claimed that the USA had a point—Israel had augmented regional instability by cumulative aggressive actions such as establishing military outposts in no man’s land near Eilat, clashing with the Arab Legion on the road to Eilat, bombing Syrian positions and outposts, conducting vicious retaliatory operations against Syrian land forces, evicting the Azazmeh Bedouins from the Auja area as well as Arabs from the northern DMZ where the Jordan waterworks were being carried out. But, while Israel was ‘the main destabilizing force in the area, since we change ancient arrangements her e. . . As much as this now makes us a target for ploy and pressure, it also guarantees our future victory.’ But this victory would be achieved only ‘by an adequate mix of patience, prudence, flexibility and stamina in our attempt to reach peace, as well as firmness and perserverence in our decisions’.60 Sharett was aware that the tension with the USA was also a result of Israel’s internal political problems. Hence, during the crisis with the

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Syrians, for domestic reasons Sharett rejected ‘far-reaching concessions to the State Department’, as ‘deficient, since they are completely devoid of sensitivity to the changing situation inside Israel, as well as unduly complacent regarding the potential dangers inherent in any major storm that might be unleashed by internal forces during that extremely nervous and sensitive period. This would have an adverse affect on the fateful struggle [general elections] now facing us.’61 In the highly charged debate in the Knesset in the wake of the Security Council anti-Israeli resolution, Sharett repulsed the criticisms directed at him from the right and left saying, The government regards the northern DM Z as an integral part of Israel’s sovereign rule, and it views the right to implement the Jordan works as basic and definite and it is determined to bring it to a successful ending despite all difficulties and obstacles. But, in the process of the implementation of this national project, Israel is also interested in avoiding unnecessary crises, and in taking care that whatever complications might occur should not hurt the armistice regime.62

Although Israel’s concessions concerning the temporary postponement of further work on the Jordan project in certain parts of the DM Z and the Security Council resolution were presented by activists on the right and left as >a failure of the Sharett line, the foreign minister still insisted that Israel had to increase its efforts to show prudence in its actions. He also explained that Israel’s representatives abroad were not and could not be expected to consider the decisive role that internal politics had played in the cabinet decisions.63 While the situation in the northern part of Israel was precarious and caused considerable tension in Israel, and while American-Israeli rela­ tions were not proceeding along satisfactory lines, Sharett could take comfort in the development of the French-Israeli ties. On the basis of further negotiations between the two governments, the French decided secretly to sell Israel twenty-five Mosquito fighters, clarifying that Israel’s adversarial relations towards Syria did not prevent France from remaining foremost among Israel’s friends.64 Fully aware of this FrenchIsraeli deal, the Americans did not torpedo it, and in fact tacitly even blessed it.65 As far as the reparations from Germany were concerned, Sharett was convinced that the timing for the submission of the Israeli claims was optimal and therefore he was strongly inclined to promote it further. This was not only because the German ‘economic miracle’ was beginning to take off, thus facilitating actual German payments, but also because

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Israel’s initial success with its Bonds sale in the USA had somewhat reduced its instantaneous need for the German money and thereby increased its bargaining power vis-à-vis Bonn. Yet in July 1951, Sharett was apprehensive about the US attitude, especially when the Americans informed Israel that they would not play any role in these negotiations. But Sharett had already stepped up efforts in this sphere, appointing Felix Shinnar—who would become a central figure in the reparations negotiations with Germany—as his adviser in late June 1951, that is when Henry Byroade had hinted that despite Acheson’s vague promises given to Sharett during his last visit to the USA, the Americans were reluctant to support Israel’s claim as well as its specific demands. Consequently, in early July 1951 the USA presented its formal position, explaining that since its hands were bound by its agreements with France arid Britain, it would not be able to act on behalf of Israel, and suggested that Israel should act on its own and approach the German government. This answer only increased Sharett’s and Shinar’s determination to pursue their goal, thus becoming the key actors in this arena. Accord­ ingly, the Israeli cabinet authorized the minister for foreign affairs to plan, approve, and supervise every step taken in this sphere on behalf or in connection with the Jewish state. Subsequently, Nahum Goldmann, then chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency Executive and Chairman of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany, had to co-ordinate all his activities regarding reparations with Sharett, as the most senior Israeli politician continually involved in this issue.66 Sharett’s pivotal position in Mapai became even more evident on the eve of the 1951 elections to the Second Knesset. In Ben-Gurion’s absence (the prime minister was still visiting the USA), Sharett not only led the entire election campaign, but served as head of Mapai’s powerful selection committee of candidates for the Knesset and local munici­ palities. In this he was joined by a rising star in Mapai, the still dovish Pinhas Lubianiker-Lavon. In setting forth the rationale for the selection of candidates for the Knesset and the logic of their order on the list, Sharett typically emphasized that they had been based on the ethical standing of the candidates, of their full commitment to the duties of a Knesset member rather than holding other positions, and to their seniority in the party. He added that there was also the need to encourage young men and women, and—above all—to field a list that would appeal to the voters. The list Sharett eventually presented placed him third, after Ben-Gurion and Yosef Sprinzak, the Knesset speaker and former leader of Hapoel Hatzair. Sharett’s close associate, Eliezer

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Kaplan, was fourth. It meant that three out of the four uppermost on the list—Sprinzak, Sharett, and Kaplan—were moderates. This was not accidental; it indicated the centrality and influence of the moderates in the party’s leadership.67 Moreover, in drafting the party’s platform, which would serve as its most basic symbolic and operational declara­ tion of goals and means in the elections, Sharett also made sure that the moderate Kaplan worked on the social and economic sections, while he himself drafted those sections concerning security, defence, and foreign policy. He was therefore able to ensure that in this sphere the party’s platform advocated the continuation of the non-alignment orientation and thus that nothing would be included which indicated the possibility of any major rift with the Soviet Union. To this end, he did everthing in his power to include the following passage: Mapai believes in a global regime based on agreement and compromise between all states, even with those who hold divergent ideologies, provided that these states are ready to participate in and abide by resolutions of the UN, as the [main] vehicle for securing peace in the world. Enhancing peace in the world is impossible without the reconciliation of diverse, and even totally different regimes.68

In addressing the situation in the Middle East and Israel’s position in that region, uppermost in Sharett’s considerations was the elusive peace with Israel’s Arab neighbours. Analysing the general rules governing the patterns of the evolution of Israeli-Arab relations, he maintained; It seems that usually we don’t pay enough attention to the tremendous shock that the establishment of Israel created in the Arab countries, and the immense dimensions of the psychological and political difficulties that these countries encounter when they have to accept such a fateful verdict, and adjust to this new and revolutionary phenomenon. Also it seems that we don’t grasp the full scope and intensity of the hatred towards Israel as well as the burning wish for revenge vibrating in every comer of the Middle East. We don’t appreciate how in the long term these feelings determine the atmosphere of Israeli-Arab relations and the motivations behind Arab governments’ policies.69

In this context he also did not hide the fact that through its mistaken decisions Israel had contributed to the mounting tension in the region, yet he also firmly believed that despite the intransigent Israeli defence establishment, there were enough Israeli leaders who were ready to welcome peace, provided that such peace ‘is based on the existing territorial arrangements’.70

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For him it was essential that the world at large and the Arabs in particular be made to see that Israel wanted peace and that it was the Arabs who were rejecting it. In this context he said, It is one thing if the powers would attribute our reluctance in this regard to the pre-conditions that we present—in fact, only one condition: [territorial] status quo—but we must not create a situation whereby the powers attribute such reluctance to a lack of desire for peace on our part, or even worse, if the powers attribute it to our attempt to postpone peace.

Despite a faint attempt to justify some of Ben-Gurion’s ambiguous statements about a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Sharett knew very well that one of the major stumbling-blocks towards achieving this end was Ben-Gurion’s inclination ‘to postpone peace talks until we double our population again and he is content with the ambiguous status quo and its various implications, especially if making peace now involves concessions that we are not ready to make [particularly regarding land, borders, Arab refugees and Jerusalem]’.71 In the same context, Sharett argued that, ‘immense political signific­ ance should be attached to the problem of Palestinian refugees, espe­ cially if we don’t want a formal peace treaty now’. This was the case since ‘the resettlement of refugees can occupy the minds of the Arab states during the critical years in which we will double our population’. And, most important, ‘if we can find even a partial solution to the problem of the refugees and of their property, this will constitute great progress towards the reduction of psychic bitterness of hundred of thousands of Arabs who reside not far from our borders’. Thus in principle Sharett supported Israeli initiatives with regard to talks about a comprehensive peace with the Arab states on the basis of territorial status quo, and at least conscious attempts aimed at reducing the levels of tension on Israel’s borders. King Abdullah of Jordan was murdered on Temple Mount in Jeru­ salem on 20 July 1951, after Friday prayers. It is well known that when this traumatic event occurred, Abdullah’s grandson, who would become King Hussein, was standing right next to his grandfather. As King Hussein would later attest, this was one of the most significant events that shaped his personality and politics. The initial reactions to the king’s assassination were quite emotional among many Israeli politi­ cians, including Sharett. Almost all these politicians were apprehensive that the sudden demise of the king would result in total chaos not only in the Hashemite kingdom but also in the entire region. After a calmer consideration of the situation, characteristically, Sharett instructed his

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officials ‘to be ready to face all far-reaching complications that may stem from this murder, but also to utilize all windows of opportunity that may be opened, to speak up in favour of maintaining the status quo to ensure stability and peace in the Middle East, as well as to ensure that everyone understands that we will not sit by idly if anybody tries to disturb it’.72 In view of the great uncertainty created by the assassination of the Jordanian king, even the dovish Sharett recommended that the IDF should call a military alert and that the government should maintain constant communications with Britain and the USA, as well as with the Arabs in the West Bank, in case the latter were contemplating any action against their enemy, the Grand Mufti—who was alleged to have been responsible for the king’s assassination.73 This indicated that Sharett had still not entirely relinquished his view that from an Israeli point of view an independent Palestinian entity might be both acceptable and useful. Ben-Gurion, on the other hand, adopted a diametrically opposed position. His immediate reaction was that Israel should exploit the situation by contemplating occupation of the West Bank, especially in the event that Iraq should capitalize on the unrest in Jordan to invade that country, now ruled by the murdered king’s son, Talal. The ID F chiefs assured the prime minister that the army was prepared to launch such an operation. By coincidence, at the same time Ben-Gurion conferred with the hawkish Hebrew University professor of Political Science, Benjamin Akzin, who had been Jabotinsky’s personal secretary. Quite expectedly, Akzin encouraged Ben-Gurion to implement an even more ambitious and daring plan: to approach the British and suggest that Israel and Britain should eject the Egyptians from Sinai and create a huge British base there in exchange for allowing Israel to control the entire West Bank. During one of their frequent meetings, Ben-Gurion repeated these views in Sharett’s presence. In responding to BenGurion, Sharett insisted on maintaining the status quo, but Ben-Gurion countered that the assassination had already broken it. He therefore contacted the distinguished Oxonian historian and political philosopher, Isaiah Berlin, who had been very close to Weizmann on the one hand, and to many senior British politicians on the other, to broach the idea with Churchill. When the distinguished scholar declined, the ‘old man’ dispatched Reuven Shiloah, then the head of the Israeli Mossad, to sell his idea to the British government. Shiloah went to London and conducted a few talks with British officials, but the British repulsed both the man and his message. Not surprisingly, Ben-Gurion directed his anger at this failure towards the Israeli minister of foreign affairs and his

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officials, who had opposed the adventure from the start. On this occasion he denigrated Sharett and his officials by saying: ‘When will they learn to stop saying No, because o f . . . [sic]9 but also Yes.’74 While Ben-Gurion continued to harbour such ideas of expanding the Israeli borders to redress the outcomes of the 1948 war, Sharett blocked these adventures. As soon as things settled down in Jordan, Sharett reassessed the situation. The gist of his evaluation was that ‘with the unrealistic exception of a full British occupation and control of Jordan, the death of Abdullah has eliminated the possibility of a separate Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement’. Therefore, Israel should ‘aim at peace while being prepared for war’. However, he cautioned, Israel must ‘at every stage, take into consideration the impact that our own actions against the Arabs might have on our position towards the powers’.75 To ensure a prudent Israeli policy, he called for greater control over the IDF, establishing a special division in his ministry to co-ordinate all political and military activities concerned with Israel’s Arab neighbours. Con­ firmation pf Sharett’s assessment came from an unexpected source. In his public statements during that stormy period, the Jordanian prime minister Tawfiq Abul Huda stated that Jordan would resist any Iraqi attempt to annex the kingdom, would seek closer co-operation with the Arab League, and co-ordinate its Israeli policy with that body. While Jordan would not sign a separate peace with Israel, it would refrain from pursuing an aggressive policy vis-à-vis all its neighbours, including Israel.76 Meanwhile, tension was also high on Israel’s southern border. On this front, probably the most significant question in dispute was that of Egypt’s interference with the passage of goods for Israel through the Suez Canal. For some time the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been planning to submit the issue to the UN Security Council.77 Armed with General Riley’s statement of 12 July 1951, that the Egyptian blockade of Israel was harming the efficient functioning of the armistice agreements, the Israeli government publicly refused to continue peace negotiations with Egypt, or to co-operate with the president of the American Jewish Committee, Jacob Blaustein’s, efforts at mediation between Israel and Egypt.78 This did not, however, mean cutting off the ongoing secret meetings between Israeli diplomat Zalman* Divon and such leading Egyptian personalities as Muhammad Sarraj al-Din, Yassin Sarraj al-Din, and Ahmad Abudd. As noted, publicly, however, the Israeli government pursued a tough stance vis-à-vis ‘Egyptian proposals intended to divert attention from the issue of passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran’. This was to prevent the Americans from

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adopting ambiguous Egyptian proposals for the continuation of peace talks and neglecting the issue of the freedom of navigation.79 The heavy burden of foreign affairs during that period of tension on the Syrian, Egyptian, and Jordanian fronts did not impede Sharett from maintaining an active role in the long and aggressive election campaign which was launched by Mapai. During this campaign, he travelled throughout the country, meeting with many thousands of Jews as well as Israeli Arabs, vehemently attacking Mapai’s two major opponents during those elections—Mapam on the left and the General Zionists on the right. During this campaign, in dozens of speeches in both beautiful Hebrew and fluent and flowery Arabic, Sharett’s main message was to warn against great dangers stemming from the tense situation on Israel’s borders, but also to point to the great opportunities created by the ingathering of Jewish refugees, whom Israel must make every effort to integrate into the social and economic life of the country and its politics. In all these speeches he did not forget to mention the need to improve the lot of Israeli Arabs. Immediately after the elections—in which Mapai maintained its pivotal position in the political arena—Sharett continued to deal with these issues, emphasizing that he intended to visit again some of those places where he made speeches on the eve of the elections to refute the image that the Mapai leaders only storm the public and visit all comers p f the country before elections. In the same spirit, he urged his colleagues to put the Mapai platform into practice to show their voters that their promises had not been mere electoral rhetoric. Although Mapai maintained its predominant position in Israeli poli­ tics, the fact that it had gained only forty-five seats in the Knesset (its two main political competitors, the General Zionists on the one hand and Mapam on the other, had won twenty and fifteen seats respectively), compelled it to form a new coalition government, as yet again it had not attained the sixty-one seats necessary to form a government on its own. During the many weeks of negotiations that followed, Sharett, who always was ambivalent about Mapam, expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of including this pro-Soviet party in the coalition, suggesting instead that Mapai join with its ‘historical partners’, the General Zionists and the religious Zionist parties. While this would mean a larger coalition than absolutely necessary to sustain a stable government, he feared that a smaller coalition would find it difficult to pursue vital national interests.80 The Mapai victory in the 1951 general elections, which was welcomed by the Americafi administration, and the Israeli government’s readiness to moderate its positions on the waterworks in the north, which now was

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the principal source of disagreement between the two governments, helped to ease relations with the USA. Once it became clear to the Americans that Sharett’s intention to compensate the Arabs evicted from the DMZ, to withdraw Israeli forces from that zone, and to permit UN observers to patrol the area without interference, was still intact, the Americans agreed to sell Israel spare parts and other military systems and components.81 Sharett and his talented associates, Eban, Elath, and Rafael, were also not entirely surprised when, in September 1951, the USA proposed another international conference to attempt a solution of the ArabIsraeli conflict. The Americans planned to revive the Conciliation Com­ mission as the main tool for breaking the diplomatic stalemate and for strengthening the armistice regime, which was falling apart. Since the USA viewed the precarious conditions on Israel’s southern and northern borders as a grave threat to regional stability, and since Israel was in desperate need of economic and military aid, Sharett and other moderate ministers saw no way out of accepting the American call. They also knew that if this new attempt failed, the conciliation idea would be shelved for many years, and considered such a scenario potentially beneficial for Israel. But they did set strict pre-conditions: that the conference should not replace bilateral negotiations, that is, would allow direct talks between Israeli and Arab representatives; that it must not focus only on the refugee issue; and that it would not impose a solution.82 For many years to come, these would remain some of Israel’s main pre-conditions for participation in any international conference for the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus also in this respect Sharett has laid the foundations of Israel’s foreign policy. ‘The pessimist laments what he has not received, and the optimist is happy with what he has attained,’ was Sharett’s comment when the US Senate voted to increase the ‘gift’ [grant-in-aid] to Israel for the fiscal year 1951/2 to seventy-five million dollars—though that was only half of what Israel had requested. Sharett of course regarded himself as belong­ ing to the latter category. But even with the additional ten million dollars’ grant for military purchases, the American money was far from being enough to shore up Israel’s precarious financial situation, which had become the most pressing matter on Sharett’s agenda. Accordingly Sharett told his ambassadors in Britain and France that ‘The Govern­ ment’s financial situation is getting worse, therefore, foreign aid is a matter of life and death’, and instructed them to do all in their power to obtain ‘investments, credits, loans or direct grants’ from these countries. In an effort to help to alleviate the situation, he himself agreed to

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participate in the annual Israel Bonds convention in the USA.83 As for the American military grant, Sharett urged Ben-Gurion to present a list of required items to the Americans as soon as possible. But neither Ben-Gurion nor the IDF were willing to meet the American pre­ condition: divulging detailed information on Israeli military industries.84 Sharett was also busy preparing for the Paris Conference convened by the Conciliation Commission, which as always he and his officials regarded as a serious event and at which he had decided to present one of his own double-edged formulas. His analysis of the forces behind this conference was gloomy: he assumed that the State Department was the main moving force and that it had two goals—first of all to demonstrate its sympathy towards the Arab states, thus restoring their previous even-handed policy, and secondly to promote their plan to stabilize the region and prevent Soviet penetration. As far as Israel was concerned this would mean one thing: ‘Renewed pressures on Israel in order to elicit concessions for the Arab states’. In this regard he did not mince words: In view of this gloomy forecast, we must plan our strategy very carefully, and it must be double-edged. First, we must pre-empt the planned attack against us by a premeditated attack on the other side. Second, despite the need to defeat the State Department’s ploys, the implementation of which was assigned to the Conciliation Commission, we must do whatever possible to present a united front with the Conciliation Commission, that is, with the UN.

Hence on the one hand he instructed Israel’s delegates to the Paris Conference to co-operate publicly with the UN, and also to launch a diplomatic attack on the Arab states. Practically, this meant that, while Sharett’s aides had to condemn the Arab refusal to conduct direct negotiations with Israel, their negation of peace with Israel and the continuation of violence, Israel also had to be seen to offer some positive proposals. It was in this connection that Sharett intended to propose a detailed plan for a comprehensive peace process leading to a permanent solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Sharett urged that at the very least Israel must agree to pay reparations to the Arab refugees, ‘since this is a matter of personal rights and personal sufferings, there is here a severe and tremendous human problem which creates an immense burden on the UN that we ourselves are interested to solve’. But for internal consump­ tion he also stressed that, *

Our contribution to the permanent solution of the refugee problem should not be viewed as a unilateral concession on our part without any benefits for us. We

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must remember that, as a result of the 1948 War, we made two enormous gains first, the vast lands that we have possessed in no time, and second, the evacuation of the lands of the state of the vast majority of its Arab inhabitants.85 On the eve of the Paris Conference, which opened in mid-September 1951, Sharett arrived there to guide personally the Israeli ambassador, Maurice Fischer, who led the Israeli delegation, on the positions that the cabinet had agreed upon: a strong emphasis on talks leading to peace agreements, rather than to non-belligerency; direct negotiations with the Arab governments; and readiness to compensate Arab refugees. The cabinet had also approved the implementation of Sharett’s tactical formula. He did not remain in Paris, however, especially after Ambassa­ dor Fischer and other Israeli officials reported to him that the Arabs intended to concentrate mainly on the refugee problem rather than on the question of a comprehensive peace, and to try to drag the conference out as much as possible.86 Since he felt that he could do little to alter the situation there, he continued on to New York, as planned, to attend the UN General Assembly and participate in the opening of the annual Bonds campaign, knowing that the centre of activities was in any case in the USA. The Paris Conference began on 13 September 1951, with Ely Palmer, the American chairman of the Conference delivering the opening decla­ ration of its purposes: to solve through mediation the problems of individuals—mainly those of the Arab refugees—and of states—borders, demilitarized zones, water, freedom of navigation, etc. In the mean time, and in the absence of Sharett, the Israeli government discussed its attitude towards the conference. Once again the disagreements between activists and moderates surfaced: while Ben-Gurion, Golda Meyerson, Dov Yosef, and Rabbi Maimon harshly criticized the Conciliation Commission and its conference, the moderates, Pinhas Rozen, Eliezer Kaplan, and Moshe Shapira supported the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ recommendations.87 Back in Paris, after some diplomatic haggling, the specific agenda was approved by all participants, including Israel: the participants agreed that the conference would not address issues pertain­ ing to the fate of either individuals or states until both sides had signed a non-aggression pact. Hence, discussions over the refugees were post­ poned and signing a non-aggression treaty became the main concern of the Conference. The Israeli representatives stated that Israel would sign such a treaty only on condition that the signing was immediately followed by direct negotiations about a comprehensive peace in accord­ ance with an agreed agenda, but the Arab governments’ response was

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that there was no need for such a treaty since they, had been adhering to the armistice agreements and that on all occasions Israel had been the aggressor who abrogated them. Following closely the developments in Paris, Sharett concluded that Walter Eytan in Tel Aviv, and Maurice Fischer on the spot, had been correct in both their assessment that ‘nobody has been expecting a successful Conference5 and in guiding the daily negotiations and contacts. Sharett was also pleased that the American chairman of the conference rejected the Arab position on the lack of need to discuss a non-aggression pact, and regretted that he did not accept the Israeli position concerning direct peace talks. In view of the initial sceptical Israeli position and on the basis of current reports about the difficulties that emerged during the conference, Sharett was not surprised that the conference reverted to a discussion of such a non-aggression treaty.88 Consequently, both Israel and the Arab states began to stall and slow down the discussions about non-aggression. By mid-October 1951, growingly realizing the tactics that both Israel and the Arabs were pursuing, the Americans, who had initiated the con­ ference, became disillusioned and began to search for clear evidence that it had come to an impasse before they could break it up and disregard the Conciliation Commission. As on so many occasions during that period, Sharett and Ben-Gurion disagreed on the question of Israel’s reaction. While Ben-Gurion insisted that Israel should withdraw from any further talks, Sharett argued for exhausting the process in an attempt to get as much mileage as possible even from its failure. Sharett had the upper hand on this occasion, especially since the USA pressed Israel, which desperately needed American economic aid, to continue negotiations towards a non-aggression treaty.89 There was no impasse, however, on the issue of reparations from Germany. While Sharett was busy in Paris and the USA, Bundestag member Jakob Altmaier made a secret trip to Paris with the draft declaration that Chancellor Adenauer intended to make in this regard. The German emissary had been charged with assessing Israel’s and the Jewish organizations’ reactions to this draft. During his meetings with Fischer and Goldmann, the two indicated that the Israeli government and Jewish organizations would be ready to issue a welcoming statement about the German readiness to pay the reparations, but also told him that the implementation rather than the wording of the declaration was what counted. Nevertheless, the two representatives of Israel and the Jewish organizations conveyed to the Germans some amendments to the declaration that'Adenauer intended to deliver in the Bundestag on 27 September 1951. As a chief participant in the process of acquiring the

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reparations Sharett had been constantly consulted and influenced the emerging Israeli position. Hence he had no difficulty in supporting the Israeli cabinet’s decision, made on 26 September, merely a day before the planned statement in the Bundestag, to accept Adenauer’s declara­ tion. After the declaration, Sharett continued to guide the ensuing complex technical negotiations with Bonn. As usual his knowledge and understanding of both the wider meaning and details of this agreement were profound. In any case, at that point, his first task was to instruct his officials as to Israel’s position on a formal meeting between German and Israeli representatives, on neutral ground. All further cabinet discussions on the reparations were postponed until Sharett’s return from the USA.90 On 22 September 1951, when he was still far from Tel Aviv, where the ‘Shertok-Sharett tribe’ thrived, Sharett’s beloved mother Fannie died. Even on this occasion, the dedicated Sharett, who was himself ill then, stopped his work for only a very brief period to mourn the warm­ hearted and supportive ‘Mama’ Shertok. Although he shortly resumed his functions and activities on behalf of Israel, his pain over Fannie Shertok’s death was genuine and deep. In his great sorrow, he was glad when he heard that the Mapai Central Committee held a special memorial meeting after her funeral. This was a demonstration of respect not only towards Sharett, but also towards a vanishing generation of the pioneers that had built the Yishuv and Israel.91 Mama’s death had brought yet another chapter in Moshe Sharett’s life to a close. A new government was not formed in Israel until the beginning of October 1951. Even then, to their great dissatisfaction, Ben-Gurion, Sharett, and other Mapai leaders had not been able to expand the coalition base to include either Mapam or the General Zionists. Rather, it was limited to Mapai, its small satellite parties, and the religious front that had caused the crisis that led to the 1951 elections. The size of the cabinet remained thirteen, and its composition was almost identical to the previous cabinet. Naturally, Sharett was immensely disappointed that two of his most ardent supporters—Pinhas Lavon of Mapai, and Pinhas Rozen of the Progressives, were not included this time. On the other hand, he did not regret the departure of the Ben-Gurion supporter and traditional Sharett opponent, Rabbi Yehuda Leib Màimon. Sha­ rett’s own position in the cabinet was secure. There was no doubt that he was second only to Ben-Gurion. Just as the new government was seated, it was disturbed by the news that in the NATO members conference in Ottawa, held on 15-20 September 1951, and in which Greece and Turkey were admitted as

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members, Britain and the USA had almost completed their plans for the long-desired Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO), which later would become known as the Supreme Allied Command Middle East (SACME), a unified command that was to include all states in the region. Immediately after his return from Ottawa, the pro-Israeli British Secretary of War, Emmanuel Shinwell, who had become a most emphatic and valuable mediator between the two governments, told Israeli diplo­ mats in London that the British government and its military chiefs were most friendly disposed towards Israel’s incorporation in the proposed regional organization despite, expected Arab opposition. Most Israeli politicians, and Ben-Gurion chief among them, were concerned about this rapid development against a new Middle Eastern backdrop which included the anti-Israeli leader Muhammad Musaddeq’s seizure of power in Iran, Egypt’s continued maritime blockade of Israel, Turkish membership in NATO, American aid to the Arab states, and the paucity of its aid to Israel. These apprehensions were fully communicated to Sharett in New York with the suggestion to hold a meeting of all Israeli policy-makers, IDF chiefs, and Israeli ambassadors immediately upon his return to Israel.92 Such a high-powered consultation indeed took place upon Sharett’s return to Tel Aviv from his visit to the USA, which was especially successful as far as finalizing the American grant-in-aid and fund-raising for Israel were concerned. In this consultation most senior civilian and military policy-makers participated, and these included Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Yadin, Makleff, Benyamin Gibli (then the head of military intelligence), Shiloah (head of the Mossad), Elath, Eliahu Sasson, Eytan, Herzog (representing ambassador Eban, who had to stay in the USA because of urgent state business), and a group of senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Comay, Moshe Sasson, Avner, Shay, Salmon, Linton, and Avriel. According to Sharett’s summing-up state­ ment towards the end of this consultation, Israel’s position was based on two assumptions: there was still an imminent danger of an outbreak of a third world war that might threaten the state’s existence, and the West was preparing for such a contingency. Therefore, joining the planned regional command would enhance Israel’s security in the event of a world war, would increase the need for both American civilian and military aid, and would require guarantees against Arab threats to Israel’s continued existence in a regional war. His further assumptions were that Israeli participation in such an American sponsored organiza­ tion would foster the American Jewish community’s relations with the homeland (this assessment was based on the assumption that the

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American Jewish community would follow the administration’s lead), but on the other hand it would involve the danger of leaking information on Israel’s defence systems to the Arab states, increase the uncertainty about Western intentions, particularly towards a preventive war on the one side, and the use of the Middle East as a springboard for attacks against Russia’s ‘soft belly’ on the other, pose a threat to Soviet and East European Jewry and increase internal political rifts in Israel stemming from these uncertainties.93 Typically, Sharett concluded—and Ben-Gurion concurred—that Israel should be willing to discuss the issues involved with the USA and Britain, and would agree only to practical arrangements that did not involve signing any formal collective pacts. It was important that Israel should not simply wait passively for an offer by the powers, but should ensure that it found out first whether the contemplated offer might be beneficial. Ben-Gurion summed up the meeting by telling those assem­ bled that in view of the existing multiple ambiguities, Israel could not be expected to adopt a clear position towards the uncertain intention to establish SACME, but that Israel should not wait for a formal invitation to join such a Command if it were established, therefore it should request economic aid to boost its civilian industrialization and for military-strategic purposes, the positioning of food and oil reserves in its territory, the improvement of its transportation infrastructure, these in accordance with their understanding with General Robertson. Great attention was given by Sharett during these consultations to Israeli-British relations, especially in view of British Labour’s electoral failure and the establishment of a Conservative government headed again by Churchill and Eden. In this connection Sharett implied criticism of Ben-Gurion’s great suspicion towards Britain when he said that Israel must adjust itself to regard Britain as an ally rather than an enemy, and that Israeli leaders should therefore think twice before attacking the former mandatory power. Eventually, Ben-Gurion agreed with Sharett’s position that Israel should explore the possibilities of strategic co­ operation with Britain, and particularly in reaction to recurrent British feelers.94 Simultaneously, however, Sharett explained that with certain reserva­ tions Israel still adhered to the principle of non-identificatjpn. Thus, he publicly told the Knesset: The government will strive to maintain friendly relations with every peace-loving state that is well-disposed towards Israel. However, our vital interests dictate that, above all, we must maintain close relations with those countries who allow

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A Year o f Troubles

their Jews to fulfil Israel’s historical mission [that is, to freely immigrate to the Jewish state], and whose governments render the practical assistance that enables us to surmount the trials of today as well as those that lie in wait for us.

In a private note, he added that, ‘In principle Israel is prepared to co-operate with the West in the defence of the Middle East, although it reserves for itself the right to present conditions if invited to participate in a fixed organizational framework for this defence—a programme that has not yet arisen.’95 As was usual in those years, Arab behaviour spared the Israelis from having to deal with the scenario outlined in Sharett’s private note. For, the Egyptian government rejected the proposed Supreme Allied Com­ mand Middle East. When the powers that had initiated the idea, the USA, Britain, France, and Turkey, then approached other Middle Eastern states, including Israel, with the same idea for strategic co­ operation, insisting that there would not be any change in any other practical arrangements in the region, such as the 1950 Tripartite Decla­ ration, the Israeli response was the same as that adopted during the previous consultation of the foreign policy élite. During a meeting with the American ambassador to Tel Aviv, Monnett Davis, Ben-Gurion repeated these conditions, adding a major new proviso: American weapons aqd training for the IDF. Ambassador Davis reflected current feeling in Washington when he replied that such a possibility was dim in view of the Israeli generals’ leftist inclinations and Israel’s refusal to share information on the IDF and its military industries with the USA. Ben-Gurion retorted that the IDF was under the Wrm control of the cabinet, and that Israel’s generals were far from belonging to the far left. After Davis passed on Israel’s conditions for participating in SACME to Washington, he reported back to Ben-Gurion and Sharett that in any event his government regarded such a plan only as a matter for the future.96 By then, Sharett was closely and attentively monitoring all statements and actions of Ben-Gurion and the IDF, since the ‘old man’ and the general staff exhibited signs that they were preparing for a major military operation against Egypt. Sharett and his officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it clear that, ‘we should rid ourselves of any thought of launching a military adventure against any Arab state, including Egypt, since the West will not tolerate any such military initiative, even against Egypt [which was resisting an agreement about control over the Suez Canal]’.97 In this connection, Sharett was particu­ larly annoyed because the ID F’s plans were accompanied by an escala­ tion of complaints against what the defence establishment labelled ‘those

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civilians who are always cautious and always holding back’.98 The rumours about these preparations for major military operations reached the Egyptians. Thus during Rafael’s and Divon’s ongoing secret meet­ ings with Mahmud Azmi in Paris, the two Israeli diplomats were taken aback to learn that the Egyptians were preparing for an Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip, and also that the Egyptian government would not be totally opposed to a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, since in any case it had been contemplating to transfer the control this territory to Jordan. Sharett hastened to approach Ben-Gurion and pointed out that at that particular perilous moment a state of military alert had its advantages in deterring the Egyptians from launching an attack on Israel, nevertheless the ID F should be warned to avoid any hasty offensive operation on Egypt. He implored Ben-Gurion to make clear to the IDF general staff that such alert ‘is just a political manœuvre and by no means a real intention to launch a military operation’.99 In mid-October 1951, Israel, like all other UN members, was ap­ proached by the USA to send troops (the request was for an IDF brigade) to Korea, despite the ongoing talks about a cease-fire in that country. While most Israeli leaders were opposed to dispatching a military unit, they wondered how they could refuse to comply with this persistent request without offending their benefactor during a period in which Israel was still in great need of American economic and military help. The best that they could do was to stall in the hope that a cease-fire would be introduced before they were put to the test.100Nevertheless, the fact that the economic crisis in Israel was as acute as ever made this extremely tricky. Surprised and alarmed by this news, Sharett, who was then still in the USA, and was extremely bewildered by the new financial crisis facing Israel, undertook the delicate task of requesting additional aid from the USA without increasing American intervention in Israeli affairs. But he soon discovered that before the Americans would con­ sider any request, they repeated their old demand for full information about the Israeli economy, including its civilian and military outlays. Kaplan had to supply this information, and to explain that the new economic crisis had been caused by the drought of that year, the huge immigration from Iraq, and reduced income from both the UJA and Israel Bonds. Sharett submitted these materials to the Americans and was waiting for their response concerning aid. In his major Knesset speech during the debate over the political situation, held on 4 November 1951, Sharett explained that the major issues facing Israel were obtaining American economic aid (here he elaborated on the developments leading to the approval of the sixty-four

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million dollars grant-in-aid); eliciting German reparations; the Paris Conference (here he stated that the Conference had failed in its attempt to ‘create a breakthrough in the process leading to peace’ and publicly announced that Israel was ready to pay compensation to the Palestinian refugees); and dealing with issues pertaining to the planned SACME.101 In retrospect it is clear that Israel’s critical and constant need for American economic and military aid overshadowed all other issues and tremendously influenced Sharett’s strategic thinking and political beha­ viour during that period. In view of the mounting tensions in the Middle East and Israel’s grave economic problems, Sharett set out yet on another trip to Paris. Officially, he travelled there to participate in the UN General Assembly. But Paris was also a convenient venue for conducting the endless haggling with the Americans over aid and with the German government over the reparations. In this connection, he requested Goldmann to arrange a meeting with Adenauer. When the German Chancellor agreed to meet Goldmann, Sharett urged the cabinet to approve the meeting in the light of Israel’s urgent need to expedite an agreement whose implementation would help shore up the economy. Ben-Gurion approved the meeting, provided that Goldmann said that the Israeli cabinet, and for that matter Ben-Gurion, had only been informed about this meeting but had not had a hand in initiating it.102 As planned, Sharett himself met Dean Acheson and Anthony Eden in Paris. Typically, Sharett opened his friendly meeting with Acheson, which was held on 19 November 1951, by complimenting the Secretary of State on his performance at the First Committee of the Assembly that same morning, for Sharett ‘thought that his address represented exactly that combination of firmness in substance and of moderation in tone which was so eminently called for’, as well as for the fact that, ‘He [Acheson] had succeeded in taking quite a few trump cards out of the hands of the other side and driving them into a comer’. Since he usually adopted a similar approach, Sharett could openly admit that for him Acheson’s performance had been a most instructive experience. Moving to discuss with the Secretary of State matters of substance, he mentioned the reasons for Israel’s need of particular strategic arrange­ ments with the USA rather than official participation in SACME, which included: the national and personal traumatic memories of the Second World War, especially memories of the great anxiety in face of the possibility of a Nazi German invasion into Palestine, that necessitated special security arrangements to allay Israeli phobias; the fingering Arab-Israeli conflict; and the need for massive Jewish immigration from

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the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc (Sharett mentioned one and three-quarter million from the Soviet Union, two hundred and fifty thousand from Romania, a hundred and fifty thousand from Hungary, and fifty thousand each from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria). Acheson agreed with Sharett’s analysis, but indicated that closer special strategic co-operation between Israel and the USA would be feasible only in the eventuality of a third world war. Even though Acheson responded positively to Sharett’s remark that Israel could not wait for such a development and hoped for immediate improvement of its relations with the Democratic administration, Sharett nevertheless pointed out that Israel would still maintain non-identification, motivated in part by a stern warning from Gromyko that Israel should refrain from ‘going American’. As Sharett told Acheson: ‘We fear that they would avenge themselves on “their” Jews.’103 Encouraged by Acheson’s assur­ ance that the Eisenhower administration understood Israel’s position towards the Soviet Union, Sharett requested an increase in America’s grant-in-aid to Israel for the year 1952/3, and was relieved to learn that this was the administration’s intention. Only then did the Israeli minister of foreign affairs raise the issue of reparations; and here, too, he was gratified to hear that Acheson was receptive to Israel’s position. Sharett concluded his report about this meeting by writing, ‘The Secretary closed the proceedings with his usual cliché that it was always a pleasure for him to see me. This time I thought he said these trite words a wee bit more feelingly.’ Sharett came away from his meeting with Eden with similar positive feelings.104 Sharett hastened to report the ‘good news concerning reparations’ to Ben-Gurion and Kaplan in view of the results of the meeting in London between Goldmann and Adenauer of 16 December 1951, that had been approved by the cabinet. For towards the end of this meeting, the chancellor had handed Goldmann a note saying that the time had come for open formal Israeli-German negotiations since Germany had ac­ cepted the pre-conditions set forth in Sharett’s memorandum to him of March 1951. In reporting to his two senior colleagues in Jerusalem, Sharett left no doubt about his own order of priorities: that he return to Israel immediately to participate in the cabinet’s consideration of reparations and in the ensuing debate in the Knesset. Ben-Gurion had hoped to keep Sharett’s achievement over the reparations secret until Sharett returned home; but since Goldmann arrived in Israel first, and there was more than a chance that he would divulge the secret about the London meeting with Adenauer and the intention to begin open negotiations

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with the German government, the prime minister.decided to go public on the issue. Thus, Sharett was deprived of witnessing the triumphant results of his political acumen and determination.105 Once again, he would remain in the giant shadow of Ben-Gurion. Sharett returned to Israel immediately after the 1951 General Assem­ bly. His activities during 1951 were crowned with his success in eliciting a cabinet resolution on the Israeli request for American military aid, which he had been promoting for many months. This decision, which necessitated a change in the ID F’s attitude towards co-operation with the Americans that would occur only later, marked the beginning of the end of Israel’s policy of non-identification. Although withdrawal from this policy was intended to be gradual, it was expedited by Israel’s worsening relations with the Soviet Union, in view of the depressing news about the Prague trials.106 Yet Sharett was ambivalent about this development: while he grieved for the Jews in the Eastern bloc, he was also happy to have finally unblocked the path towards closer relations with the USA. The father of non-alignment was convinced that this policy had been exhausted and was now determined to pursue its alternative: intimate ties with the West, but as always only in a gradual fashion.

NOTES 1. Ben-Gurion to Eban, 2 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2308/15. 2. Eban to Ben-Gurion, 3 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2308/20; Israel embassy in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 Jan. 1951, ibid. 3. Avner to the Israeli missions in Western Europe, 17 Jan. 1950, ISA, FM, 2515/1. 4. Eban, M emoirs , i. 144, 146-9. 5. Sharett’s report to cabinet, 18 Jan. 1951, ISA; Sharett in Knesset, 23 Jan. 1951, Divrei HaKnesset , viii. 848-69; on the talks with Jordan see Sasson’s report, 27 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2408/3; Shlaim, Collusion , 582-9. 6. Avner to Israeli Missions Abroad, 3 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2515/1. 7. Comay to Elath, 5 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2318/7. 8. Avner to Israeli Missions Abroad, 9 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2515/1. 9. Eytan to Rafael, 10 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2318/7; Cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 900-2. 10. Ben-Gurion to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, 11 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2308/15. 11. Sharett to Eban, 16 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2308/15; Eban to Sharett, 16 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2308/20. 12. Ibid. 13. Ben-Gurion to Kollek, 17 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 532/73. 14. Ibid.

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15. Elath’s report on his talk with Strang, 15 Jan. 1951, and Elath to Comay, 15 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 37/10; Avner to Israeli Missions Abroad, 23 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2515/1; Cf. Bar- Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 903-4; Bialer, Between East and West, 235-7. 16. Eban to Sharett, 18 Jan. 1951, Sharett to Eban, 20 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2329/11; Avner to Israeli Missions Abroad, 23 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2515/1; Eytan to Israeli Missions in Eastern Europe, 25 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2377/1; Sharett to Eban, 25 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2338/14; the discussion in the cabinet, 25 Jan. 1951, ISA; Eytan to the Israeli delegation in the UN, 26 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2338/4; Eban’s statement in UN Political Committee, ISA, FM, 3073/4; Sharett to Eliashiv, 28 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2342/14; Sharett to Eban, 29 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2388/14; Ben-Horin to Israeli Missions in Western Europe, 31 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2515/1. 17. See the protocol of the second session of the meeting of the Israeli military attachés, which dealt with ‘Israel and the global strategic conception about the Middle East’, 2 Feb. 1951, ISA, FM, 2458/4; Ben-Dor to the US Division, 5 Feb. 1951, ISA, FM, 2461/10. 18. Working Paper, ‘Outline of Elath’s Reply to Sir William Strang’, 2 Feb. 1951, ISA, FM, 2595/3. 19. Elath to Comay, 9 Feb. 1951, ISA, FM, 2318/8. 20. Eliashiv to the Eastern European Division, 2 Feb. 1951, ISA, FM, 2342/4; and see Eliashiv to Levavi, 4 Feb. 1951, FM, 2493/4; U. Bialer, ‘The Czech-Israeli Arms Deal Revisited’, Journal o f Strategic Studies, 8/3 (Sept. 1985), 307-14; Bialer, Between East and West, 177-80. 21. The Research Department’s memo, 25 Jan. 1951, ISA, FM, 2408/16. 22. Ben-Dor to Eban, 11 Feb. 1951, ISA, FM, 338/15; Sharett to Yadin, 12 Feb. 1951, ISA, FM, 338/16; Ben-Gurion to Yadin, 8 Feb. 1951, Ben-Gurion Archive. 23. Ben-Gurion*s Diary, 7 Feb. 1951, 13 Feb. 1951; on Egypt’s position see Ben-Dor to the embassy in Washington, 19 Feb. 1951, ISA, FM, 3055/4; Shlaim, Collusion , 590-1; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 895. 24. The cabinet discussed the issue on 13 Dec. 1950, 3 Jan. 1951, 18 Jan. 1951, 23 Jan. 1951,1 Feb. 1951, ISA; Ben-Gurion, Restored State o f Israel, i. 405-9; Eyal Kafkafi, ‘The Religious Education Problem’, State, Government and Interna­ tional Relations (Heb.), 30 (1993). 25. Sharett in the special gathering, 16/17 Feb. 1951, Mapai Archive, 15/2/51. 26. A joint meeting of Mapai Central Committee and Mapai members of Knesset, 20 Feb. 1951, Mapai Archive, 11/1/51. 27. Sharett in the Knesset, 21 Feb. 1951, Divrei HaKnesset, viii. 28. See the protocols of the talks with Robertson, ISA, FM, 2603/7, and especially the talk held on 21 Feb. 1951; Comay to Elath, 24 June 1951, ISA, FM, 30/16; see, Documents, vi. 115-35; Cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 904-5; Bialer, Between E ast and West, 237-9. 29. Sharett to Elath, 28 Feb. 1951, ISA, FM, 36/14; Comay to Elath, 28 Feb. 1951, ibid.; Elath to Comay, 7 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2318/7. 30. See report on the visit to Israel of Louis Jones, the head of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs of the State Department, 11-14 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2479/9; on

610

31.

32. 33. 34.

35.

36. 37.

38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

43.

44. 45.

A Year o f Troubles the negotiations, Sasson to Shiloah, 13 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2431/8; Evron to Rafael, 20 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 3043/13; Divon to Shiloah, 29 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2582/4; Shlaim, Collusion, 592. Keren to USA Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 Feb. 1951, ISA, FM, 2479/9; the agreement is in ISA, FM, 342/25; the cabinet discussed it on 18 Jan. 1951, ISA; and see Rafael to Sharett, 12 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2384/21. Rafael to Sharett, 12 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2384/21. Sharett in a secret meeting of Mapai Secretariat and its members of Knesset, 3 Mar. 1951, Mapai Archive, 23/51. Sharett to Eban, 8 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2308/15; Eytan to Israeli Missions, 12 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2377/1; Note from the Government of Israel to the Government of the United Kingdom, 12 Mar. 1951, Documents, vi. 163-9; the renewal of the government’s claim for reparations was discussed by the cabinet on 8 Feb. 1951; for Israel’s request for the grant, see Note from the Government of Israel to the Government of the US, Documents, vi. 169-76. On the first issue, Sharett to Eban, 5 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2308/15, Eban to Sharett, 7 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2308/20; and on the second issue, Eban to Eytan, 6 Mar. 1951, the quotes are from Kollek to Sharett, 7 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2408/13. Sharett to Horowitz, 8 Apr. 1951, Documents, vi. 231-2; Sharett’s guide-lines circulated to all Israeli missions, 17 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 3144/15. Livne to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2543/2; Eytan to Eban 20 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2377/1; Keren to US Division, 21 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/1; Sharett to David Horowitz, 28 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2338/4. See the summary of the meeting held by Ben-Gurion, 30 Mar. 1951, ISA, FM, 2433/5; the cabinet discussed the Jordan works on 25 Mar. 1951 and 5 Apr. 1951, ISA. Avner to Ben-Horin, 12 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2394/4; Sharett to Ben-Gurion, IDF Archive, 128.81/47; Kollek to Sharett, 21 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2467/3. For background and development of these incidents and the Israeli retaliation see, Shalev, Co-operation under the Shadow o f Conflict, 147-9. Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 16 Apr. 1951, Documents, vi. 249-50. Eban to Sharett, 7 Apr. 1951, Documents, vi. 227-8; report on a meeting with the American ambassador, Monnett Davis, in Tel Aviv, 8 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 84/21; Eytan to Israeli Missions Abroad, 9 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2318/7; Eban to Sharett, 10 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/1; Ben-Horin to Avner, 12 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2394/4; Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 25 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2433/7; Eban to Sharett, 25 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM. 2330/5. Feinberg’s reports on his meetings with Truman on 4 Apr. 1951, and with Acheson on 5 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2464/4/A; Keren to US Division, 5 Apr. 1951, Documents, vi. 213-14; Eban to Sharett, 5 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/1; on Blaustein’s meeting with Truman, Eban to Sharett, 17 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/1; Weizmann to Truman, 30 Apr. 1951, ibid. Amir to Avner, 11 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2539/14; Avner to Amir, 30 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/1. Ibid.

A Year o f Troubles

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46. Avner to Israeli Missions Abroad, 18 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2515/1; Morrison’s dispatch, 23 Apr. 1951, ISA, FM, 2449/1; for a report of Ben-Gurion’s and Sharett’s meeting with Knox Helm held on 9 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2457/5; cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 905-6. 47. Sharett to Eban, 4 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2207/17; Sharett to De Ridder, 6 May 1951, Documents , vi. 287-8; Sharett to Eban, 6 May 1951, ibid. 286-7; Sharett to the President of the Security Council, 7 May 1951, ibid. 289-93; Avner to Israeli Missions Abroad, 7 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2515/1; Eytan to Israeli embassies, 8 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2377/1. 48. Eban to Sharett, 8 May 1951, 9 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2330/5; Sharett to Eban, 10 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2330/1. 49. Evron to Argov, 13 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2203/18. 50. On Ben-Gurion’s talk with Marshall, Herzog to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 May 1951, ISA, FM, 337/4; on Ben-Gurion’s talk with Acheson, Eban to Sharett, 12 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2203/7. 51. Report on Sharett’s talk with Yershov, 8 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2203/7. 52. Avner to the Israeli Missions Abroad, 14 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2515/1; Eytan to Eban, 16 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2330/1. 53. Sharett to Eban 13 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2308/21. 54. On the draft resolution, Eban to Sharett, 15 May 1951, 16 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/1; on the pressures on Truman see Keren to Tel Aviv, 16 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2207; Ben-Gurion to Sharett, 17 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/1; Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 18 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2203/7; on the UN resolution see Lourie to Sharett, ISA, FM, 2433/8; Keren to Sharett, 18 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/1; on Truman’s unyielding position, Embassy to Sharett, 18 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/1; on Ben-Gurion’s approval of Sharett’s position, Lourie to Sharett, 19 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2330/1; Eban to Sharett, 21 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2207/7; on Sharett’s meeting with Riley see Eytan to the embassy in Washington, 21 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2207/17; on the cabinet’s decision to stop the works, Sharett to Riley, 21 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2433/8; Eytan to the embassy in Washington, 25 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2339/1. 55. Yadin to Sharett and Lavon, who was the acting minister of defence, 7 June 1951, Sharett to Yadin, 11 June 1951, ISA, DM/1502; Eban to Shiloah, 22 June 1951, all in ISA, FM, 2564/24. 56. Yadin to Ben-Gurion, 13 Aug. 1951, ISA, DM/1502. 57. Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 19 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2428/1. 58. Ramati to Dafni, 11 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2428/1. 59. Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 12 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2428/1. 60. Sharett to Eban, 3 July 1951, ISA, FM, 339/5. 61. Sharett’s memorandum on the crisis in the north, 17 June 1951, ISA, FM, 3008/5. * 62. Sharett in the Knesset, 4 June 1951, Divrei H a Knesset, ix. 1893-910. 63. See Cabinet’s decision of 3 June 1951, ISA; Sharett’s memo on the works in the north, 17 June 1951, ISA, FM, 3008/5. 64. Fischer to Avner, 1 June 1951, ISA, FM, 2539/14; Avner to Israel Missions Abroad, 18 May 1951, ISA, FM, 2515/1.

612

A Year o f Troubles

65. Fischer to Avner, 1 June 1951, Documents, vi. 354-5., 66. The summary of a meeting at Sharett’s home, 9 June 1951, ISA, FM, 344/15; Keren to the ministry, 29 June 1951, ibid.; Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the embassy in Washington, 5 July 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/2; the American message of 5 July 1951 is in ISA, FM, 344/21; the summary of a meeting between Sharett, Nahum Goldmann, David Horowitz, and Pinhas Shinar, 5 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 344/15. 67. See the discussions of the Central Committee, 4 July 1951, 8 July 1951, Mapai Archive, 23/51. 68. Ibid. 69. Information to Israeli Missions Abroad, 3 July 1951, Documents , vi. 428-31. 70. Sharett to Rosenne, 30 June 1951, ISA, FM, 338/39. 71. Ibid. 72. Sharett to Rafael, 21 July 1951, ISA, FM, 2330/6; Sharett to Israeli Missions Abroad, 24 July 1951, Documents , vi. 495. 73. Protocol of a meeting held after the assassination, 23 July 1951, ISA, FM, 3043/13; Sharett to Eban and Elath, 29 July 1951, Documents , vi. 505. 74. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 907-8; Shlaim, Collusion , 610-12. 75. On the British position, see Elath to Comay, 27 July 1951, ISA, FM, 2319/1; the quotes are from Sharett to Israeli Missions Abroad, 24 July 1951, Documents, vi. 495. 76. Sharett’s comments on the eve of the consultation about the situation in the Middle East, 24 July 1951, ISA, FM, 2578/7; Sharett to Elath, 1 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2319/1; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Israeli embassy in Paris, 8 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/9. 77. Eytan to, the Israeli embassy in Washington, 19 July 1951, Documents, vi. 487. 78. Riley’s statement, 12 July 1951, in FM, 2418/18; Eban to Blaustein, 24 July 1951, ISA, FM, 2464/4/A; Eytan to Israeli Missions Abroad, 26 July 1951, ISA, FM, 2377/1. 79. Divon to Eytan, 6 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/18; Divon to Eytan, 14 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2410/1; Divon to Eytan, 14 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2457/12. 80. Sharett speeches, CZA, A245/78; Sharett’s speech in Mapai Political Committee, 5 Aug. 1951, Mapai Archive, 26/51; Sharett’s speech in Mapai Central Commit­ tee, 13 Aug. 1951, Mapai Archive, 23/51; Sharett’s speech in Mapai Political Committee, 10 Sept. 1951, Mapai Archive, 26/51. 81. On the improvement of the relations, see McGhee to Eban, 10 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 338/23; Eban to Sharett, 15 Aug. 1951, Documents, vi. 552; Eban to Sharett, 16 Aug. 1951, Documents, vi. 556-7; Herzog to the Ministry, 16 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2487/4; Meeting: Sharett-Davis (held on 23 Aug. 1951), 2 Sept. 1951, Documents, vi. 594-6. 82. Palmer to Sharett, 10 Aug. 1951, Documents, vi. 541-2; Najar to Eytan, 12 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/8; Sharett to Palmer, 13 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 3055/14; Sharett to Eban, 13 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2207/20; Ministry to Israeli Missions Abroad, 20 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2515/1. 83. Sharett to Elath, 3 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 37/1; report on Sharett’s talk with Davis, 6 Sept.» 1951, ISA, FM, 33-8/10; the cabinet had approved Sharett’s trip to the USA on 22 Aug. 1951, ISA.

A Year o f Troubles

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84. On the use of the military grant, Sharett to Eban, 28 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 2207/21; Eban to Sharett, 2 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2207/21; Sharett to BenGurion, 6 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2488/3; on the possibility of arms purchase from Britain, Comay to Elath, 7 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2587/9. 85. All quotes are from Sharett’s instructions prior to the Paris Conference, 12 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 3055/14. 86. Fischer to Eytan, 14 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/8; Eytan to Israeli Legation in Paris, 16 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/9; Fischer to Eytan, 18 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2441/4; Eytan to Sharett, 19 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2330/2; see the cabinet’s discussion on 19 Sept. 1951, ISA. 87. Eytan to Sharett, 19 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2330/2. 88. A summary of the developments in the Paris Conference until October 1951, in ISA, FM, 3055/14. 89. Eytan to Fischer, 14 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/9; Eytan to Israeli Missions in New York and Paris, 16 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2447/1; Sharett to Eytan, 16 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2338/7; Fischer to Sharett, 17 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/8; Eytan to Fischer, 18 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/9; Fischer to Eytan, 19 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/8; Eytan to Israeli Legation in Paris, 21 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/9; Eban to Sharett, 23 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/2; Fischer to Eytan, 26 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/8; Eytan to Israeli Missions in New York and Paris, 26 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2377/1. 90. For background, Avner to Herlitz, 15 Aug. 1951, ISA, FM, 344/15; Avner to Herlitz, 11 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 344/15; Goldmann and Fischer to Eytan, 21 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/8; on the cabinet’s decision of 26 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2539/2; Sharett to Eytan, 26 Sept. 1951, and a cable to all Missions, 26 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 1808/8; Statement by the Spokesman of the Government of Israel, 27 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 344/22; Eytan to Sharett, 30 Sept. 1951, ISA, FM, 2330/7; Eytan to Sharett, 12 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2330/3; the Acheson Statement is in Documents , vi. 665-6. 91. The special meeting of Mapai Central Committee, 22 Sept. 1951, Mapai Archive, 23/51. 92. Elath to Comay, 4 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2319/1; Herzog to Ministry, 5 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2309/3; Eytan to Sharett, 13 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2330/3; Eytan to Israeli Missions Abroad, ISA, FM, 2377/1; cf. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 908-9; Bialer, Between East and West, 245. 93. Comay to Eban, 5 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 2457/5. 94. Comay to Eban, 11 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 2595/3; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion , 909-10; Bialer, Between East and W est , 245-8. 95. Divrei HaKnesset , x, 4 Nov. 1951; information to Israeli Missions Abroad, ISA, FM, 3063/12; for the private communication, CZA, A245/82. 96. Memo 9 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 2445/12; report on Ben-Gurion’s taÂk with Davis held on 10 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 2455/1; Davis’ reply, 17 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 2445/12. 97. Avner to Amir, 31 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2517/1. 98. Ibid.

614

A Year o f Troubles

99. Divon to Eytan, 8 Nov. 1951, IDF Archive, 695; Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 8 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 183/3. 100. Comay to Sharett, 11 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2344/9; Davis to Ben-Gurion, 6 Dec. 1951, ISA, FM, 2458/17; Eban to Ben-Gurion, 10 Dec. 1951, ISA, FM, 182/10. 101. Sharett in the Knesset, 4 Nov. 1951, Divrei HaKnesset, x. 278-80: Sharett to Ben-Gurion and Kaplan, 13 Oct. 1951, ISA, FM, 2207/22; on Kaplan’s talks with Davis concerning American aid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Israeli Missions Abroad, ISA, FM, 2515/1. 102. Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 13 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 183/3; Ben-Gurion to Sharett, 16 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 182/10. 103. A report on Sharett’s talk with Acheson, 19 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 341/15; on Gromyko’s warning, the Israeli embassy in Moscow to the Ministry, 22 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 2551/8. 104. Report on Sharett’s talk with Eden, 23 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 2457/1. 105. Sharett to Eytan, 20 Nov. 1951, ISA, FM, 183/3; Adenauer to Goldmann, 6 Dec. 1951, ISA, FM, 344/19; Elath to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 Dec. 1951, ISA, FM, 2319/1; Sharett to Eban, 7 Dec. 1951, ISA, FM, 2207/24; Sharett to Ben-Gurion, 7 Dec. 1951, IDF Archive, 695; Sharett to Eytan, 11 Dec. 1951, ISA, FM, 183/3; Eytan to Sharett, 16, 17 Dec. 1951, ISA, FM, 182/10. 106. Kollek to Eban, 28 Dec. 1951, ISA, FM, 2308/22; Bialer, Between E ast and West, 250-1.

20 ‘A People that Does not Dwell Alone’ D eterioration of security on Israeli borders, reparations from Ger­ many and the retreat from non-alignment were the three major issues confronting Sharett and his colleagues at the beginning of 1952. Sharett’s primary readiness and justification for gradually abandoning the nonaligned orientation, which he had shaped and defended so far, was the urgent need for American economic and military aid, for he was convinced that the USA would not otherwise extend that aid in view of its two current afflictions: ‘a psychological malaise—hatred of Commun­ ism—one can say, a physical one—arming itself and practically prepar­ ing itself for war’.1 Nevertheless, Sharett still insisted that Israel must steer a cautious path between the avoidance of any commitment and a too evident pledge to either the Eastern or the Western bloc. As usual, his goal was that the Israeli government should adopt one of the ambiguous formulas that he and other Israeli leaders were so accus­ tomed to and inclined to adopt: ‘achieving maximum aid with minimum commitment’. In this connection, he could take satisfaction for having prevented Israel from committing itself to send troops to Korea, and simultaneously obtaining an increased grant-in-aid from the USA. But, as he kept warning both his colleagues and himself, ‘[the war in] Korea is not over, and there might be new Koreas to produce new political tests’.2 During the first weeks of 1952, Sharett tenaciously prodded the Ministry of Defence and the ID F to submit their requests for the weapons that the USA had promised in accordance with the Mutual Security Act. As mentioned previously, Sharett had to fight Ben-Gurion and the defence establishment’s obvious reluctance to supply the Amer­ icans with the information they demanded as a pre-condition for supplying the weapons. It was not until mid-January 1952 that Israel sent faint preliminary feelers about the weapons it wished t