Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia 9789812307057

Citation preview

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publications, an established academic press, has issued more than 1,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publications works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world. The Southeast Asia Background Series is a major component of the Public Outreach objective of ISEAS in promoting a better awareness among the general public about trends and developments in Southeast Asia. The books published in the Southeast Asia Background Series are made possible by a generous grant from the K.S. Sandhu Memorial Fund. ii

Southeast Asia Background Series No. 9

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

Terence Chong

111!!'111!!1'1111!

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

llliiilliiilliiil Singapore

First published in Singapore in 2005 by ISEAS Publications Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected]

• Website: bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2005 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters.

ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Chong, Terence. Modernization trends in Southeast Asia. (Southeast Asia background series) 1. Asia, Southeastern—Social conditions—20th century. 2. Indonesia—Politics and government—19453. Education—Asia, Southeastern. 4. Asia, Southeastern—Religion. 5. Middle class—Asia, Southeastern. 6. Consumption (Economics)—Asia, Southeastern. I. Title HN690.8 A8C54 2005 ISBN 981-230-316-2 Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd. Printed in Singapore by Utopia Press Pte Ltd. iviv

Contents vi

List of Tables

viii

About the Author 1

Introduction

1

2

Modernization and Modernity

5

3

Education in Southeast Asia

13

4

Citizenship and Ethnicity in the Age of Globalization

23

5

Religion

35

6

Emergence of the Middle Class

47

7

Mass Consumption

57

8

Conclusion: Towards a Southeast Asian Modernity?

65 71

Selected Bibliography

v

In Focus 1

Population by Country

2

2

Gross Domestic Product per Capita

3

3

Neoliberalism

10

4

The Role of Madrasah in Modernity

18

5

Education and Cultural Capital

20

6

The History of Citizenship

25

7

The Role of “Race” in Colonialism and Neo-colonialism

26

8

Ethnicity and National Culture

29

9

World Religions in Southeast Asia

38

10 Are Southeast Asians Essentially Religious?

42

11 Islam Hadhari and Modernization

45

vi

In Focus

vii

12 Who Are the Middle Class?

48

13 Is the Concept of Class Still Relevant?

54

14 Mass Consumption

58

vii

About the Author Terence Chong is a sociologist and Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. He is editor of the Trends in Southeast Asia series and co-editor of SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia. His research interests are globalization, the Southeast Asian middle class and civil society, and the sociology of culture.

viii

Introduction

1

Chapter 1

Introduction Diversity and change are the only constants in Southeast Asia. In a region of approximately 4.5 million square kilometres in size, over 500 million people, one thousand languages, a religious smorgasbord of Animism, Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity, the sheer diversity of Southeast Asia defies simple categorization. The region has also been host to a variety of political ideologies from monarchism to colonialism, communism, authoritarianism, and different versions of democracy. Given this diversity, a stable and distinct Southeast Asian identity remains elusive. The region’s identity is very much defined in contrast to other regions than by any specific inherent features or characteristics. As a geographical concept, Southeast Asia is a recent invention. The term only gained popular acceptance from World War II, during which the British used “Southeast Asia” to describe the collection of peninsulas and islands to the south of China and east of India as a particular area of military operation against the Japanese. It was only in the 1950s and 1960s with the wave of anti-colonial and nationalist sentiments sweeping across the region that nation-states — itself very much a modern entity — emerged. On 8 August 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in Bangkok. The five original member countries were Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined 1

2

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

Population by Country (Thousands) Country

1990

2000

Indonesia Vietnam Philippines Thailand Myanmar Malaysia Cambodia Laos Singapore Brunei

182,117 66,074 61,104 54,389 40,506 17,845 9,744 4,13 3,016 257

211,559 78,137 75,711 60,925 47,544 23,001 13,147 5,279 4,016 334

Southeast Asia

439,926

520,355

Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 2002.

later, in 1984; Vietnam in 1995; Laos and Myanmar in 1997; and Cambodia in 1999. There is little doubt that Southeast Asia is undergoing modernization, changing not only the way Southeast Asians live but also the way they see themselves. The extent of modernization, however, varies from country to country. It is thus important not to think of modernization as a static concept but as an uneven process that societies undergo. This book seeks to capture the main debates surrounding certain issues that are affected by, and in turn influencing, the modernization processes in Southeast Asia. It is not intended to serve as a comprehensive examination of the complex and multifarious processes of modernization; rather, it offers itself as an introductory, and hopefully critical, approach to selected issues.

Introduction

3

Gross Domestic Product per Capita (US$) Country

1985

1990

1998

Singapore Brunei Malaysia Thailand Philippines Indonesia Vietnam Myanmar Cambodia Laos

14,532 21,152 2,644 1,335 967 603 183 — — —

19,967 18,716 3,164 2,006 1,064 778 206 — 240 —

31,139 18,038 4,251 2,593 1,092 972 331 — 279 421

Source: United Nations, Human Development Report 2001.

IDENTIFYING MODERNIZATION TRENDS Chapter 2 provides an introduction to concepts and ideas of modernization and modernity. It will lay out the intellectual terrain on which subsequent chapters will be discussed. Chapter 3 takes mass education to be both a product and a driving force of the modernization process. Mass education equips citizens with the necessary skills for industrial labour, while higherskilled jobs demand increased levels of education. The chapter looks at the rising levels of education in the region to show how the changing demographics have affected Southeast Asian societies. Chapter 4 seeks to highlight the main challenges faced by citizenship and ethnicity brought about by the reduction of distance and permeation of boundaries in the age of globalization. Two particular issues are addressed here: firstly, the ways in which

4

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

these communities and identities are challenged by globalization; and secondly, how they are responding. Chapter 5 brings religion, a key characteristic of Southeast Asia, into focus. It is neither a study of the development of religion nor a comprehensive account of the religious diversity in Southeast Asia. Instead, the chapter will selectively highlight examples in the region to illustrate various dimensions of the relationship between religion and modernization, and its role in national politics. Chapter 6 delves into the emergence of the middle class. The emergence of middle class is one of the key features of modernization and a modern society. Economic development invariably produces a middle class with specific relations to capitalism and the state. The chapter examines the rise of the middle class in selected Southeast Asian countries and their place in the modernization process. Chapter 7 surveys the phenomenon of mass consumption by looking at the impact of Western consumer goods in Southeast Asian countries. It looks at how the expansion of mass consumerism and consumer culture among the affluent is changing regional lifestyles, cultural identities, and aspirations. Lastly, modernization and modernity have long been associated with the West because scientific breakthroughs, technological advancements, contemporary political systems, and institutions have percolated from Western experience onto the contemporary Southeast Asian landscape. The chapter asks: Can Southeast Asia ever become modern on its own terms?

Modernization and Modernity

5

Chapter 2

Modernization and Modernity When one speaks of modernization, one usually refers to physical change such as the springing up of new buildings, roads, transportation system, and the introduction of machines and new technologies into daily life. In this sense, modernization can be seen as the industrial progress of society, conventionally signifying the material transition of a developing society to a developed one. The modernization of society has European origins. The Industrial Revolution of Britain, usually dated from 1760 to 1850, resulted in numerous technological innovations like the steam engine, the combustion engine, the spinning mule, as well as the expansion of railroads, to increase efficiency in product output and delivery. The modernization of Southeast Asia, a twentieth century phenomenon, has taken place in an era of globalization and global capital, both of which have been key factors that have shaped the development of the region.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA Asia’s economic development in the twentieth century came in three waves. The first regional economic wave began in Japan from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s. This led to the regionalization 5

6

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

of Japanese capital, which helped engender the second wave. The second regional economic wave swept through Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore — collectively known as the “Asian Tigers” — from the mid-1960s to the 1980s. The third regional economic wave took place from the 1980s to the mid-1990s and included Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines — popularly known as the “Asian Dragons”. Cheaper labour, raw goods, and lower business costs offered by Southeast Asian countries were key factors in attracting global capital. For Indonesia and Malaysia, both oil- and gas-producing nations, the oil bonanza helped sustain their early development policies while Singapore leveraged heavily on its electronics industry. Thailand‘s abundance of staple crops and agricultural industry was a major contributor to its growth. Meanwhile, the manufacturing industry played a key role in all Southeast Asian countries. This combination of high-performing industries, complemented by global demand, resulted in the “Asian miracle” that was, in turn, perpetuated by undervalued currencies pegged to the US dollar and became the catalyst for industrialization. Massive construction and real estate projects spewed forth spanking skyscrapers to change the skylines of every city from Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok. Employment figures also grew as factories and sweatshops were established to produce goods for export. At the same time consumer spending exploded as a new middle class flocked to shopping malls to feed its seemingly insatiable appetite for electronics and designer goods. Designer labels like Prada, Gucci, and Armani became ubiquitous in major capitals from Jakarta to Singapore. The “Asian miracle”, however, lost its lustre in the wake of the 1997 Asian crisis. The crisis originated from the Thai economy with a series of speculative attacks on the Thai baht, and the contagion spread rapidly to other regional economies. The

Modernization and Modernity

7

crisis was further exacerbated by the short-term capital mobility which allowed rapid outflow of capital from the region. A host of explanations ranging from the lack of institutional transparency, non-performing loans, wanton financial speculation, excessive spending, to corruption were advanced to explicate the cause of the crisis. Although rocked by the experience, the region’s modernization and industrial development continues, albeit at a slower, more cautious pace. Despite its many benefits, industrialization in Southeast Asia, as with Britain’s Industrial Revolution, has ushered in numerous social problems. Families were uprooted as they migrated from rural areas to cities in search of work. Sweatshops in Indonesia and the Philippines, with long working hours and poor wages, have become synonymous with the negative consequences of globalization and symbols of Third World exploitation. Children, often preferred as factory workers because of their nimble fingers and compliance, have to forgo education in order to supplement family income, thus creating a vicious cycle of poverty. Meanwhile, women are faced with the double burden of factory work followed by domestic chores and childcare. Poor government regulations have also seen the spiral of environmental pollution. Unsupervised “slash and burn” deforestation techniques in Indonesia, for example, contribute to haze that annually affects neighbouring countries such as Singapore and Malaysia.

MODERNITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA If industrialization describes the physical change of society, then modernity describes the intellectual and cultural features of this society. Modernity conventionally denotes the modern age and the ideas and styles associated with this age. In historical terms, modernity refers to the end of the Middle Ages and the

8

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

emergence of the Renaissance which has come to be synonymous with the rediscovery of classical philosophy and the separation of the Church from human scholarship to signify the rebirth of the human spirit. The Age of Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, leading up to the French Revolution, was another major movement of the modern age where critical modes of thinking, philosophies, and social organization championed human reason over superstition and religious dogma. Modernity is thus associated with a strong belief in rationality and the triumph of science over religion as an explanation of the world. From this perspective, such notions of modernity are often criticized for being too Western-centric. Such criticisms have engendered debates over the possibility and definition of an Asian modernity. Modernity also refers to the condition of being a modern individual living in a modern society. Simply put, it differentiates between the living conditions and mental perspectives of an urban city-dweller and a rural farmer, both of whom have diverse experiences of life, work, entertainment, and material consumption. Another way of understanding modernity is the difference in human relationships in premodern and modern societies — or the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft dichotomy. Gemeinschaft, or community, refers to relationships based on kinship, ethnicity, or clans that are characteristic of rural or premodern societies. As society modernizes, human relationships become increasingly based on professional membership, contractual obligations, and civic norms, all of which are highly impersonal and public in nature. These latter types of relationships are referred to as Gesellschaft, or association. Invariably, the nature of our relations with fellow human beings determines how we view the world and ourselves. A Southeast Asian illustration of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft dichotomy could be the transition from the Malay kampung

Modernization and Modernity

9

(village) in Malaysia to its capital, Kuala Lumpur. The Malay kampung is socially organized around kinship and was politically managed by feudal and monarchical rule while Kuala Lumpur, which is modern and cosmopolitan, is open to the forces of globalization and in tune with the world market. The transition from kampung to Kuala Lumpur is thus more than a change in scenery; it also signals a paradigm shift in social relationships, culture, and economic life. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are of course not mutually exclusive. We can see, for example, how Chinese transnational companies in Asia may, on the one hand, conduct business based on professional and contractual obligations (Gesellschaft) while, on the other, continue to rely on ethnic-based networks and kinship (Gemeinschaft) to further their interests.

GLOBALIZATION Globalization is now a media and academic buzzword. It refers to the heightened interconnectedness of individuals and places brought about by increased travel and communication which have facilitated the cross-border flow of goods, services, capital, and knowledge. Although globalization is popularly defined as global connectivity and familiarity, the character and consequence of its processes are complex and often unclear, having been described as differently as a “process of modernity”, a phase of “late modernity”, and even a “postmodern” phenomenon. While academics have only begun to seriously talk about the concept of globalization in the last 15 years or so, the processes of globalization have been around for much longer. According to Karl Marx, writing in 1848, the global spread of capitalism was inevitable because “it must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere”. Globalization, however, is not only the global ubiquity of capitalism but also a specific mindset.

10

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

For sociologist Roland Robertson it means “the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole”. This does not mean that the world is becoming the same everywhere. Rather, it implies that there are increasingly similar ways of thinking socially, politically, and culturally of the world at large.

Neo-Liberalism “Globalization” and “neo-liberalism” are often used interchangeably. This is because globalization is popularly conceived as an economic phenomenon. Neo-liberalism is a set of economic policies that have become widespread during the last 25 years or so and is premised on the concepts of deregulation, liberalization, and privatization. Generally speaking, deregulation discourages trade barriers and protective policies put up by countries to preserve their domestic markets and workforce. Liberalization advocates a laissez-faire approach to market principles where “supply” and “demand” are privileged over other considerations, while privatization is the move away from state central planning towards services and operations conducted by private enterprise. These concepts penetrate societies and domestic markets, creating a common bond between countries based on ideas of a free market. As such, the results of the free market — the global consumption of Starbucks coffee and Levis jeans — are seen as evidence of globalization.

POSTCOLONALISM AND ASIAN VALUES Another important aspect of modernity in Southeast Asia is postcolonialism — the formal end of the colonialism and the subsequent transition to sovereign nation-state. For many countries in the region, with the exception of perhaps Thailand, the end of colonialism signals the postcolonial task to replace and redefine colonial administration, institutions, values, and other sociopolitical systems, with those more suited to their contemporary

Modernization and Modernity

11

cultural-political conditions. This nation-building process may lead to the state-authorization of certain local languages, cultures, and ethnic groups, such that they form the dominant national identity or culture at the expense of others. The need to think of one’s self as part of a broader national identity and partaking in a common national culture is very much a modern invention. Such a need assumes that national culture is authentic and stable. Take Balinese culture for example. It has been noted by anthropologists elsewhere that Bali has had a long history of interaction with the West, not only as a Dutch colony but also as a European fantasy of paradise, a theatre of war, and a site for mass tourism. This makes the idea of an authentic and unchanging Balinese culture very problematic. Instead, such representations of local culture tell us more about how Southeast Asians see themselves. Indeed, Southeast Asians have come up with different ways to identify and deal with the processes of modernization and modernity. The discourse of “Asian values” is one such way. Most fervently championed by Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew, Asian values are an attempt to synthesize Asian traditions and Western notions of modernity. Respect for authority, strong savings habit, industriousness and diligence — considered by some to be Asian values — have been put forth as cultural explanations for the Asian miracle and, by extension, assert the need to preserve certain local cultural traditions responsible for economic growth. This has influenced the way Southeast Asians see themselves. For example, the fear that materialism and rising affluence was “Westernizing” society — a popular euphemism for liberalism, individualism, and hedonism — led the Singapore government to expound the importance of Asian values. Asian values suggested that Asians could modernize without being “Westernized”, which was true, but did so by portraying the “West” as an example of social and

12

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

moral decay — which is highly debatable. After all, the “West”, like Southeast Asia, is not a monolithic entity but a diverse and complex collection of cultures and politics. Nonetheless, Asian values had the effect of defining Singaporeans in terms of what the “West” is not.

CONCLUSION There is little doubt that the pace of industrialization in Southeast Asia, though somewhat tempered since the 1997 Asian crisis, has changed the lifestyles and mindsets of many Southeast Asians. The modernization of larger Southeast Asia began in the 1980s and was driven by global capital and the regionalization of production processes. The processes of globalization, largely responsible for the modernization of Southeast Asia, is also undermining the ability of sovereign states to completely control their domestic economic, cultural, social, and political affairs. States are perceived to be less powerful because, in the economic sphere, for example, important decisions affecting employment and development in countries are made elsewhere by investors, bankers, and businessmen in global cities such as London, New York, or Tokyo. Multinational companies are also increasingly powerful as agents of economic development and investment, often able to demand favourable conditions from governments to operate in a country. Southeast Asia, with its many traditions, cultures, and values, is grappling with the influences and demands of modernity. The following chapters attempt to survey just some of the ways modernization and its consequences are affecting life in Southeast Asia.

Education in Southeast Asia

13

Chapter 3

Education in Southeast Asia The modernization of societies depends on their ability to create new institutions, exploit advanced technologies, master their environment, and adapt their patterns of behaviour for common goals. Conventional wisdom has it that education, by improving the capabilities of individuals and institutions, plays a key role in the modernization process. Education serves as a catalyst for economic, social, and political development, all of which contribute to overall national development. Nonetheless, precisely how education, as a causal agent, triggers economic growth continues to be a matter for debate among researchers. On the one hand, numerous studies suggest that education is strongly linked to economic productivity, technological advancement, higher individual income, lowering of poverty levels, gender equality, greater awareness of citizenry responsibilities, and the general elevation of quality of life. Education also breaks cultural barriers by connecting societies to the rest of the world through the common languages of mathematics, science and technology, and ideologies. On the other hand, there are counter-studies that suggest that education may have negative consequences. Uneven access to education, for example, leads to an education system that may 13

14

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

perpetuate and legitimize divisions based on ethnicity, gender, or economic status. If a certain ethnic group or class is found to be over-represented in higher education at the expense of others, it may lead to a polarization of society, with ethnically heterogeneous societies being the most vulnerable. Another popular criticism of education is its heavy reliance on Western information, technologies, pedagogy, and philosophies. This is especially evident in higher education such as colleges or universities, and if left unchecked, will make younger generations more susceptible to Western or global culture and may be responsible for weakening their cultural roots and traditional values. One economic criticism is that poverty-stricken families may begin by borrowing heavily to send their children to universities in the hope of giving them the means to a better life. However, when job scarcity becomes chronic, these families sink deeper into debt, thus creating a downward spiral. Nevertheless, education is generally synonymous with the process of enlightenment, the endowment of skills, the pathway to the achievement of individual aspirations and, in terms of both formal and vocational education, is deemed to equip individuals with the proficiency to exploit economic opportunities. Seen in this light, the benefits and potential of education far outweigh its adverse effects. While explanations for economic growth are multi-factorial — ranging from favourable market conditions, strategic investments, high savings rate, good governance, to transparent institutions — it is generally accepted that education is a key factor and continues to be the priority of Southeast Asian governments. The rest of this chapter looks at the various ways in which education may boost economic development and serve as a catalyst for the modernization process in Southeast Asia.

Education in Southeast Asia

15

DEMOGRAPHIC AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS The greatest obstacles to high-quality mass education facing Southeast Asian governments are demographic and financial conditions. The demographic direction of the region is, generally speaking, a gradual transition from high to lower mortality and fertility rates. Countries with high youth-dependency ratios and limited financial resources will struggle to provide adequate mass education. Conversely, richer countries with a lower youth-dependency — Singapore, for example — are able to invest more per child than poorer countries with higher youth-dependency ratios. Poorer countries also tend to have limited education choices and may suppress female enrolments in favour of male enrolment, thus reducing market opportunities for women in the long run. Furthermore, countries with high youth-dependency ratios face greater demands for early levels of education and this invariably places more constraints on efforts to improve education quality. In other words, while it is universally acknowledged that education is important for national development, the allocation of limited resources, together with varying domestic situations, continues to pose a substantial challenge to policy-making in Southeast Asia.

DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN CAPITAL One link between higher education and economic growth is the development of human capital. Here it is assumed that educated workers are needed to manage technological innovations for greater productivity, efficiency, and higher-quality goods. The benefits of human capital development are most evident in agricultural or labour industries, and can be measured in monetary terms such as higher income. A virtuous circle is said to be created

16

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

where work skills lead to greater product output, opening the way for the introduction of newer technologies which, in turn, creates greater demand for higher skills — thus resulting in the ongoing development of human capital. Take Indonesia for example. Its per capita income grew from US$70 in 1969 to US$1,080 in 1996. This steady increase in income generally mirrors the country’s rising education levels. In 1971, 74 per cent of the Indonesia population had less than primary level education while only 20 per cent completed primary school. In order to tackle these alarming figures the Indonesian government introduced the Presidential Assistance Programme (or Inpres SD) in 1973 to subsidize basic education. By 1994 these figures improved, with 34 per cent without primary education, 37 per cent having completed primary school, and the rest with a junior secondary school or above. Indonesia’s case, as with the broader ASEAN region, suggests that there is a positive correlation between gross domestic product (GDP) per capital and human development, though it is important to note that other factors such as high savings rate, high investment rates, and global demand have also contributed to economic growth. Nevertheless, a 1993 World Bank study entitled The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy concluded that the growth in high-performing Asian countries, before the 1997 Asian crisis, was due to the broad-based development of human capital, especially at primary education level. However, as global economic structures and technological creation moves to favour secondary and higher education, local industries with a predominantly primary-level educated workforce, or one that is slow to upgrade its vocational and technical skills, will find it difficult to evolve into high-value production. This would put such countries at the lower end of the New International Division of Labour (NIDL) hierarchy.

Education in Southeast Asia

17

Take, for instance, the area of Information, Communications, and Technology (ICT), a high-value industry that places a premium on higher education and specialized skills. Malaysia’s attempt to develop its ICT industry is epitomized by the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) project launched in 1996. The main aim of the MSC was to enable Malaysia to leapfrog into the Information Age and become a knowledge-base economy by 2020. In order to set up the necessary physical infrastructure, the Malaysian government has, thus far, invested between US$1 billion and US$2 billion in the installation of fibre-optic network. The MSC has, however, seen mixed results for a variety of reasons including the 1997 Asian crisis, the burst of the dot com bubble and, of key concern to us here, the inability to produce local expertise and skills required. This has prompted former Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohammad to urge more Malay university students to take up science and mathematics instead of religious studies. The multiethnic and multireligious complexion of South east Asia may also complicate the education policy-making process. Ethnic groups may desire to preserve their ethnic languages while religious groups may demand for more statesupport for religious schools. Governments will have to design education policies that accommodate such domestic demands without compromising on the economic viability of its human capital. The teaching of English, mathematics, and science are vital for international trade and the transfer of technological expertise. Conversely, subjects like literature, religion, and the arts, are important for a sense of collective identity and cultural awareness. As such, a balanced approach to the development of human capital is not only politically prudent but also necessary in order for society to both enjoy the benefits and confront the side effects of modernization.

18

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

The Role of Madrasah in Modernity The madrasah is a traditional institute of education in the Islamic world. It focuses on the study of the Quran, Islamic tradition, and Arabic literature. Most madrasah are attached to a mosque, where pupils are taught to read, recite, and memorize the Quran. The role of the madrasah has been in the spotlight ever since 11 September 2001. Critics believe that madrasah teach anti-West doctrines and sow seeds of intolerance. Some believe that critical questioning in madrasah is considered blasphemous or heretic, and that these schools tend to reinforce accepted values rather than develop and disseminate new ideas, hence are not able to keep up with modern times. Others counter that madrasah need not be anti-modern or breed intolerance. Instead, madrasah students can excel academically with good teachers and syllabi. Furthermore, madrasah that preach intolerance are deviant forms of Islam, and do not represent the Muslim community as a whole since the religion does not teach hatred or intolerance. Finally, the role of madrasah is to impart ethics and values for living, both of which are necessary for modern times.

INITIATING CHANGE IN SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND TRENDS Education may also impart social attitudes and trends that are favourable to economic activity. Firstly, education can inculcate a variety of social skills needed to adapt to different workplaces. Basic education offers opportunities to socialize as well as to develop interpersonal skills needed for the working environment. Studies have also shown that education plays a role in the adaptability and flexibility of workers, both of which are increasingly crucial as multi-tasking becomes the norm in many industries. Education also promotes gender equality. In most Southeast

Education in Southeast Asia

19

Asian countries, the relationship between men and women is punctuated with glaring inequalities. Moreover, gender-based inequality is evident not only in the lack of opportunities for women to develop skills and talents, but also in more fundamental areas such as nutrition, health, and survival. Two primary causes of gender inequality are patriarchal values and limited economic opportunities. Education has played a crucial role in tackling both causes. Patriarchal values in Vietnam, for example, are pervasive and deeply entrenched. However, the promotion of education since 1949 has substantially changed the picture in Vietnam. Today, there is widespread literacy among rural women resulting in a larger domestic workforce, although patriarchal attitudes still resonate. An example of education broadening economic opportunities for women is Thailand’s Daughters Education Programme (DEP). The DEP provides scholarships for young women to continue their education. These scholarships are important to girls who may otherwise turn to the sex industry. Following the DEP’s footsteps, the Thai government hands out scholarships to young women in northern Thailand, thus offering them an alternative to the sex industry. Education has also helped lower fertility rates. Information and specially designed programmes on family planning have enabled Southeast Asian countries to reduce their fertility rates which, in turn, eases the financial burdens of families. Lower fertility rates may lower unemployment levels but they have also ushered in social and cultural changes. The reduction of family size, for example, has led to changing perceptions of the role of the family and intergenerational relationships. Awareness of health issues has also risen with education. The Philippines ranks fifth in the world in estimated number of tuberculosis cases. Sixty-eight Filipinos die every day from tuberculosis, with the poor even more susceptible to the air-borne disease given their crowded and unsanitary living quarters and poor

20

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

diet. Awareness programmes and educational initiatives, many of which are led by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have resulted in more than 3,000 tuberculosis patients undergoing daily supervised treatment in 49 municipalities and 900 neighbourhood villages. On an ideological level, education has enabled governments to impart national values and nurture civic consciousness. National values and civic consciousness help temper a sense of collective identity for society. Take the case of Indonesia, for instance. Formulated in 1945 as a national ideal, Pancasila became a key feature of the national curriculum in 1975. Children aged six and above learned its five principles — belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and social justice — by rote and were instructed daily to apply the meanings of this key national symbol to their lives.

Education and Cultural Capital In his classical study of the French education system, the late sociologist Pierre Bourdieu discovered that education, instead of promoting social change, had a tendency to reproduce existing social relations and inequalities. A student from a wealthy family can afford to go to an expensive private school furnished with the latest technologies and best teachers. This student has access to tutorial support and enrichment classes. If the student’s parents are well educated, she is likely to do well because the values, knowledge, and experiences transmitted from parents to child are likely to be legitimized in schools. This child is said to have cultural capital that is, in turn, recognized and validated by existing education institutions. In expensive private schools, this student will associate with students of similar backgrounds and, because they share similar cultural capital, are likely to form social ties beyond school life. In other words, the student’s family, having prospered under the dominant system, is likely to perpetuate this system and its values.

Education in Southeast Asia

21

CHALLENGES TO EDUCATION POLICY-MAKING Education policy-making in Southeast Asia faces three broad challenges. Firstly, national policies in developing countries have to address the rural-urban disparity. Across Southeast Asia, there is a notable gap in literacy, enrolment levels, and school completion rates between urban and rural areas. Schools, syllabi, and curriculum in capital cities are of a generally higher quality than in rural regions. This disparity is also closely linked to gender and income inequality. Issues of physical infrastructure, teaching expertise, and the emphasizing of education relevance have to be tackled in order to address this disparity. The second challenge for Southeast Asian countries is the need to address the lower educational levels of ethnic minorities. Though there are academically successful ethnic minorities in the region such as the Chinese minority, in many cases, ethnic minorities tend to be under-represented in terms of enrolment and school completion. They are also less visible in higher education. A variety of factors such as their location in rural areas and specific historical and political conditions may be impediments to their educational progress. Existing school syllabi or curricula may also be incompatible with minority languages or cultural lifestyles. Ethnic minorities are also under-represented in the teaching profession. The third challenge, and perhaps most obvious one, is financial constraint. The task is to look for methods and strategies to maximize cost-effectiveness with limited resources. Though at different stages, Southeast Asian countries have to make the gradual transition from mass primary to mass secondary education, and in some cases towards mass tertiary education. Given that costs rise in tandem with the level of education, governments will have to seek strategic allocations of finances in order to maintain a skills-balanced workforce. Competing for national funds are items

22

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

like teachers’ salaries, building expenses, teaching aids, class size, scholarship programmes, organization, and quality of education. According to the Asian Development Bank, Cambodian teachers are paid so poorly that their official salary is insufficient for one person to live on, let alone an entire family. Likewise, in many developing countries, teachers’ salaries are already too low for governments to make savings from further reduction in this area. The quality of vocational education would also require industrysensitive syllabi, as well as up-to-date machines and workshops.

CONCLUSION Education is generally linked to economic growth, and part of the broader modernization process. The benefits of education, such as personal enlightenment, industry or market skills, increased capacity for technological adaptation, and the imparting of social and cultural trends favourable to economic growth, are well rehearsed in the general literature. Nonetheless, education remains but one of the many catalysts of economic growth. Although education is important to Southeast Asian governments, there are a variety of constraints that these governments have to address. They include demographic conditions that may place severe demands on limited resources, gender inequality, the marginalization of ethnic minorities, the rural-urban divide, and so on. The severity and nature of these constraints vary from country to country. Also important is the strategic emphasis of different types of education for a wellbalanced workforce. Primary, secondary, vocational, and tertiary education must be harmonized to produce a workforce that adequately meets industry and market demands.

Citizenship and Ethnicity in the Age of Globalization

23

Chapter 4

Citizenship and Ethnicity in the Age of Globalization Modernization has had major influences on two sources of identity in Southeast Asia — citizenship and ethnicity. Although ethnic groupings precede citizenship as a source of identity, the birth of the nation-state has linked both of them together with different consequences. This chapter is not a comprehensive discussion of the development and specificities of citizenship and ethnicity but, instead, seeks to highlight the main challenges faced by these two communities brought about by the reduction of distance and permeation of boundaries in the age of globalization. Two particular issues are addressed here: firstly, the ways in which these communities and identities are challenged by globalization, and secondly, how they are responding.

CITIZENSHIP: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND BELONGING Citizenship is fundamentally a European invention and is generally underpinned by two principles. Firstly, citizenship entitles one to

23

24

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

uniform national rights, an idea alien to pre- modern societies where slaves and serfs enjoyed no such privilege. British sociologist T.H. Marshall defined three basic rights of citizenship. “Civil rights” protect the rights of the individual to free speech and faith, ownership of property, and justice. “Political rights” are concerned with the right to direct or indirect political participation, while “social rights” entitle the citizen to economic welfare, security, and acceptable standards of living. This has been described as a liberal individualist notion of citizenship as defined under the welfare state. Secondly, citizenship binds one to a social contract with the state where, in return for the protection of rights, one is expected to fulfil certain duties such as the paying of taxes, obeying the laws of the land, or conscription. This has been described as a civic republican notion of citizenship where the emphasis of citizenship is not on individual rights, but on a shared commitment to a common endeavour for the collective good of society. The emphasis of either principle varies from society to society. However, beyond rights and duties, citizenship has a more substantial meaning. It achieves a sense of national identity and membership among people. National identity is nurtured through mass education, the invention of public ceremonies, public monuments, and the telling of national myths. This allows citizens who have never met to think of each other as sharing the same national identity and culture, or what Benedict Anderson calls “imagined community”. As such, citizenship may be said to be a mixed bag of rights, duties, and sense of belonging.

Citizenship and Ethnicity in the Age of Globalization

25

The History of Citizenship The concept of citizenship was originally meant to denote membership to the city, not country. Greek citizens of Athens were male property owners who were entitled to vote, pay taxes, and give military service. The Romans later adopted the idea of citizenship as a way of differentiating those who lived in Rome from those who came from outside. In AD 212 Emperor Caracalla issued an edict in which citizenship was given to all free people in the empire. This universal bestowal of Roman citizenship is known as the Constitutio Antoniniana. The three key privileges of citizenship were political (the right to vote), legal (marriage rights and various exemptions from punishment such as scourging and crucifixion without trial), and economic benefits (freedom from having to pay tax). Citizenship could come from birth or by being conferred, but it could also be granted to those who had rendered Rome good service, for instance, in warfare. Citizenship could also be granted to freed slaves.

ETHNICITY: PRIMORDIAL LOYALTIES AND BLOOD TIES There are generally three ways of looking at ethnicity. Firstly, as small self-organizing communities which predate the nation-state; secondly, as a source of identity based on a common culture and traditions such as language, rituals, and food; and thirdly, as a biological group that promotes ideas of “race” and “blood ties” based on physical similarity, such as skin colour, or phenotypes. A deeply ingrained sense of identity, ethnicity is often said to be primordial and instinctive. The power of ethnic belonging and loyalty has grown from a network of small communal relations in pre-modern times to a potent source of mass mobilization today. The spread of mass literacy and mass media has been responsible for the expansion of

26

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

ethnic belonging and loyalty. With mass literacy, greater numbers of people could be reached through the mass media such as newspapers, pamphlets, books, posters, and flyers with messages that emphasized notions of common history, traditions, values, blood, and destiny. People previously separated by geography and distance could now “imagine” themselves as “one” though the mass media. Advancements in the mass media such as satellite broadcasting, the Internet, and digital streaming, have only increased the speed and frequency of global connections, and have rendered geography insignificant. Ethnic awareness may, of course, lead to communal and cultural pride or ethnic violence. Many instances of ethnic violence have been committed under the banner of state legitimacy. The Muslims of Pattani, south Thailand, and the people of Aceh, for instance, have been denied the right to self-determination.

The Role of “Race” in Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism The classification of people into different “races” began in the sixteenth century and became the subject of scientific endeavours from the nineteenth century. The result of such endeavours was a racial hierarchy which was used by colonials to justify imperialism. Inferior races, colonials argued, were tribal and prone to violence, and thus in need of the civilizing influences of the West. The “white race”, on the other hand, was deemed to be rational and enlightened. The inferiority and superiority of certain races hence became one of the ideological discourses of colonialism. Such attitudes are still prevalent, albeit in less overt forms. The 1997 Asian crisis saw some quarters in the West deride Southeast Asia for being incapable of self-regulation. In popular culture too, Caucasians are often depicted, especially in advertisements and movies, as epitomizing beauty and glamour. Meanwhile it is not uncommon to see Asians portrayed as exotic, inept, or undesirable.

Citizenship and Ethnicity in the Age of Globalization

27

One way of understanding why ethnic violence is perpetrated is the idea of “identity as difference”. “Identity as difference” is the phenomenon where one becomes protective of one’s identity when someone else’s identity and values are perceived to be a threat and hindrance. In other words, “identity as difference” is the way some people define their identity in opposition to others. This is becoming an increasingly common phenomenon with globalization as tourists and migrant workers heighten the frequency of cultural contact while global capital continues to economically and psychologically alienate peoples and promotes global rootlessness.

RECONCILING NATIONALITY WITH ETHNICITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Citizenship has been instrumental to the modernization process in Southeast Asia. The wave of anti-colonial sentiments in the 1950s and 1960s was partly expressed in the form of nationalism. Nationalism, however, assumes that different cultural and ethnic groups could envisage themselves as part of a collective and cohesive nation. The role of citizenship was fundamental in binding disparate groups together as countries in the region made the transition from colonial territories to nation-states. Citizenship offered large numbers of populations a new sense of identity that was intertwined with the future of their nation. Citizenship’s attempt at reconciling national identity with disparate ethnic and cultural identities has had mixed results in Southeast Asia. The historical experience of this reconciliation varies from country to country. In Malaysia, for example, upon achieving independence in 1957, ethnic Malays were accorded unconditional citizenship while ethnic Chinese had access to citizenship only upon specific periods of residence and language

28

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

proficiency in Malay. In 1971, under the New Economic Policy, Malaysian citizenship was further differentiated when ethnic Malays were granted certain economic rights. Citizenship is also no guarantee of a cohesive national identity. Take the Sama Muslims in southern Philippines for example. Anthropological research has shown that the Sama Muslims resist the “Filipinization” of their culture in order to safeguard their traditions, ways of life, and religion in the Catholic-dominant nation-state. Their challenge is to preserve their cultural identity and yet retain their rights as Filipino citizens. This challenge has resulted in the Sama Muslims identifying themselves differently, depending on the social context. They see themselves as Sama at a communal level in everyday life, as Filipino on a national level, and as Moro on a transnational level. Paradoxically, modernization processes may also sometimes persuade certain minority ethnic groups that they do not belong as national citizens. Take, for instance, a study of Lao-speaking villages in northeast Thailand and their introduction to the transistor radio. With the transistor radio, the Lao-speaking villagers have become more aware of the cultural and political differences between themselves and the dominant Siamesespeaking people. This awareness has reinforced the Lao-speaking villagers’ cultural and linguistic identity, and strengthened the affinity between themselves and their neighbours across the Mekong River in western Laos. On the other hand, Thailand, free from colonial experience, encouraged ethnic Chinese to become Thai citizens. And by 1970, it was estimated that more than 90 per cent of ethnic Chinese born in Thailand had done so. When diplomatic relations were established with China in the 1970s, ethnic Chinese residing but not born in Thailand were given the option of becoming Thai citizens. Over time, and except for a minority, the

Citizenship and Ethnicity in the Age of Globalization

29

ethnic Chinese have largely assimilated into Thai society through deep socio-cultural integration and Chinese-Thai intermarriages, with many speaking both Thai and Chinese. As we see, cultural and ethnic affinities are often at odds with national citizenship. The particular ethnic and political conditions in Southeast Asia have furthermore made it difficult for states to adhere unwaveringly to the principle of uniform national rights. In Singapore, ethnic Malay citizens, because of their indigenous status, are granted special considerations such as state land to build mosques and education subsidies.

Ethnicity and National Culture According to British political theorist Anthony Smith, five characteristics are needed for the development of national culture and belonging. 1. The existence of social ties in the form of shared beliefs and myths of ancestry; a sense of common history and destiny; shared language and religion; identification with a specific geographical territory, all of which allow societies to form an ethnie. 2. The existence or invention of an array of enemies which serve to inspire society to believe in a common fate. 3. Modern state institutions able to impart a strong sense of civic solidarity amongst its people. 4. An intellectual tradition that is able to propose new ethnies and disseminate political ideals for self-renewal. 5. A well-expressed nationalist ideology that motivates people to achieve the goal of forming their own nation-state. Critical Thought: Smith’s definition of an ethnie is human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories, and cultures. But what about multicultural and multireligious societies in Southeast Asia, many of which have strong migrant histories?

30

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP Given the multicultural complexion of many countries today, as well as the struggle of ethnic minorities to achieve political and cultural equality, the idea of cultural citizenship is growing increasingly popular. The concept of cultural citizenship is closely associated with the multicultural experiences of Europe and Latin America, but has been considered in other situations as well. Advocates argue that national identity and national culture in any country invariably favours the dominant ethnic group, and that conventional notions of citizenship fail to account for the cultural rights of ethnic minorities. As such, unlike conventional citizenships which are defined according to nationality, cultural citizenship puts culture and ethnicity as the central definition of citizenship. According to theorists, cultural citizenship offers ethnic minorities the possibility of legitimizing their demands for equality and respect. To define “cultural citizenship” it may be helpful to contrast it with traditional national citizenship. 1. Unlike national citizenship, where rights and duties are statedefined, those of cultural citizenship are group-defined. 2. Unlike national citizenship, which emphasizes nationality, which critics claim favours the ethnic majority, cultural citizenship emphasizes the everyday practices and traditions of cultural groups. 3. Unlike national citizenship, which seeks to construct a national state under which all ethnic groups are subjected to, cultural citizenship seeks to construct a multicultural state where cultural autonomy and sovereignty is preserved. 4. Unlike national citizenship, whereby political and civil rights are guaranteed by virtue of one’s nationality, the cultural citizen’s claim to political rights is premised on his entitlement to be treated fairly as an ethnic and cultural entity.

Citizenship and Ethnicity in the Age of Globalization

31

The challenges posed by cultural citizenship to conventional forms of national citizenship are clear. Firstly, there will be little possibility of national cohesion if cultural or communal identity is emphasized at the expense of national identity. Secondly, the lack of national cohesion may lead to the inability to mobilize citizens for national causes. Thirdly, the emphasis on cultural rights may come at the expense of fulfilling the duties and obligations of national citizenship.

GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP Another challenge to national citizenship is the idea of cosmopolitan or global citizenship. While national citizenship speaks of membership and belonging on a national level, global citizenship attempts to stretch this membership and belonging on a global level. This idea of human beings as members of a global human society is not a new concept, and has roots in the major world religions, in the principles of the Enlightenment, and in the concept of international socialism. Advocates of global citizenship believe that the nation-state is becoming an increasingly porous perimeter within which to exercise one’s citizenry duties. With growing awareness of the numerous global concerns, national citizens are extending their citizenry obligations to the international stage. More importantly, a universal set of individual rights is extended across the globe. One formalization of such rights is the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes the right to political and religious freedom, to ownership of property, and to justice. Just as an “imagined community” is needed by national citizenship to endure, a universal set of rights allows an “imagined global community” to be envisioned — thus facilitating the ability to think of the world as one — where different people from different

32

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

cultures are believed to share certain values such as respect for life, tolerance of differences, and the importance of justice and non-violence. Advocates point to the modernization and globalization trends that make global citizenship possible. They argue that the growing power of international finance capital and the corresponding lack of power of national governments to influence the welfare of their citizens; the increased integration of national economies; the escalation of international treaties which may affect national sovereignty; and the increase in international migration — all contribute to the need for global citizenship. Thus far, global citizenship has been exercised largely in terms of volunteer work, providing humanitarian aid, offering expertise for community development, and raising environmental awareness on an international level. Indeed, Southeast Asia has benefited from examples of global citizenship. Take, for instance, the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme in Vietnam. In their effort to conserve three of Vietnam’s World Heritage Areas (WHA) — My Son Sanctuary, Hoi An Ancient Town, and the Bay of Ha Long — UN volunteers, both national and international, are collaborating to raise public awareness and design education programmes. The role of international NGOs is a crucial platform for global citizenship. Major calamities such as the Asian tsunami which hit Aceh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Thailand on 26 December 2004, offer opportunities for people to practise global citizenship in the form of donations or volunteerism. Organizations such as Raleigh International, the Red Cross, and World Vision have also contributed to regional communities by building schools, providing humanitarian aid, and setting up children welfare programmes. However, critics argue that the idea of global citizenship is nothing more than personal altruism. They draw attention to the

Citizenship and Ethnicity in the Age of Globalization

33

growth of a new international class of highly skilled professionals who lead globally nomadic lives and only form little or superficial relations with those around them. Indeed, the concept of a global citizenship says little about duties and provides no explanation as to why global citizens would be compelled to discharge such duties. With national citizenship, people contribute to the well-being of their fellow citizens because they experience national belonging; and for those who lack this feeling, there are national laws such as income tax laws and conscription, which make national contribution compulsory. Global citizenship, on the other hand, relies on an altruistic minority because there are no such laws.

CONCLUSION The nation-state’s attempt to reconcile citizenship and ethnic identity is a modern and ongoing process. This reconciliation must take into account the multicultural complexion of the region in the construction of ethnic-based nationality and national culture. When such constructions fail to account for the social, economic, and political rights of ethnic minorities, the legitimacy and validity of their citizenship will also come under scrutiny. This may open the way for advocates of cultural citizenship or cultural rights to demand for political autonomy for ethnic minorities. Such demands will weaken the legitimacy of national citizenship. The idea of a global citizenship is also taking shape, largely in the form of corporate governance, international volunteerism, and global social movements. Increased economic integration and the perceived inability of nation-states to influence domestic conditions are prompting interested individuals to address social, political, and economic inequalities within a globally applicable framework of human rights.

Religion

35

Chapter 5

Religion Linking the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia has long been an important passage for trade. Hot on the heels of traders were missionaries and proselytizers. The first of world religions to arrive in the region were Hinduism and Buddhism via trade links with India. Indian merchants not only established trading stations along the region but also brought along their religious and cultural influences. Beyond the spiritual, Hinduism and Buddhism have contributed to the development of a written tradition in Southeast Asia. And while Southeast Asian converts have incorporated local features and cultures into Hinduism and Buddhism for a distinct flavour, aspects of their religious life are still observably Indian. By the twelfth century, peoples in what are known today as Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam were converted to Buddhism. In Bali, part of Muslimdominated Indonesia, approximately 90 per cent of the population practise Hinduism. The year and source of Islamic influence in Southeast Asia is a matter for debate. Some European scholars argue that Islam entered the region upon trade with India, some regional Muslim historians assert that it was imported directly from the Middle East, while other scholars believe that Muslim Chinese introduced it when they traded in the region. Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that Islamic teachers had, by the fifteenth century, established 35

36

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

religious schools largely in the Malay Peninsula as well as in parts of Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, and Mindanao. In the course of time, Islam absorbed many pre-existing Southeast Asian beliefs such as animism. Presently both Malaysia and Indonesia are predominantly Muslim, with the latter the most populous Muslim country in the world. Christianity was, comparatively speaking, a late arrival to Southeast Asia. Christian missionaries only ventured into the region in significant numbers with the spread of colonialism from the eighteenth century. Failing to penetrate China and Japan, many Christian missionaries settled along Southeast Asia. Today, the Philippines (except for its Island of Mindanao) is a predominantly Catholic country with strong Spanish influences. Vietnam, on the other hand, saw Catholic missionaries from France. Other pockets of Christian missionary work can be found in central Java, north Sumatra, including western New Guinea. Along with proselytizing, Christian missionaries, many of whom were well educated, introduced European-styled education to the region. Strictly speaking, Confucianism is less of a religion than an ethical system. Its practice is generally confined to ethnic Chinese who constitute a minority in Southeast Asia and is thus not as widespread as any of the world religions mentioned above. This chapter is neither a study of the development of religion nor a comprehensive account of the religious diversity in Southeast Asia. Instead, this chapter will selectively highlight examples in the region to illustrate various dimensions of the relationship between religion and modernization.

RELIGION AND MODERNITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Several criticisms are generally made of religion’s role in modernity. Firstly, the “other-worldliness” or “fatalism” of religions

Religion

37

like Hinduism, Islam, Taoism, and Buddhism weaken attitudes such as innovation and materialism, which fuel modernization. Secondly, the time, labour, and finances devoted to religious institutions could be better spent on other secular institutions such as schools and hospitals, or on technology. Thirdly, religion is deemed to be a divisive force in society, thus posing a significant obstacle to national solidarity and political stability. Fourthly, religion is often associated with superstitious beliefs and irrational behaviour; and consequently belongs to “traditional” society, not “modern” society. Such criticisms converge largely with Western classical sociological arguments which assert that modernization implies secularism, and that the decreasing importance of religion in public life complements the increasing levels of modernization. Nonetheless, there are no clear signs that increased modernization has brought about a decline in religion in Southeast Asia. Instead, it is noted that the accoutrements of modernization such as materialism, Western values, and mass consumerism may have actually strengthened ideological commitment to religion. To be sure, it is notoriously difficult to determine, with any degree of certainty, the exact manner in which religion or religious beliefs have impacted on modernization processes or vice versa. As such the information offered here is structured according to selective criteria for an impressionistic overview.

The Decline of Animism Animism — the belief in the power of ancestral spirits and spirits of nature — is the ancient and indigenous religion of Southeast Asia. Its exact temporal beginnings are unknown and it probably grew naturally with the development of the early

38

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

World Religions in Southeast Asia A religion can be defined as the belief in a single spiritual being (monotheism) or a variety of beings (polytheism). Strictly speaking, Buddhism and Confucianism do not correspond to conventional definitions of religion which emphasize the worship of gods or spirits. Nonetheless, they are commonly included as “world religions” on the basis of their prominence and size of following. Below are some world religions found in Southeast Asia.

Christianity Christianity is the most followed world religion with an estimated 2 billion believers. It is based on the life and teachings of Jesus Christ. A cornerstone of the Christian faith is the belief that Jesus, crucified for the sins of humankind, rose from the dead (the Resurrection) and ascended to heaven. There are many different Christian variations or “denominations” today. The major divisions are those between the Orthodox Church and Western Christianity, with the latter further sub-divided into Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.

Islam Islam is the world’s second most followed religion. Its origins date back to Mecca AD 610 (or “year zero” in Islamic calendars). Islam is based on the ministry of the Prophet Muhammad who received divine revelations from Allah. It is important to note that Muhammad did not found Islam — which shares etymological origins with the word “peace”. But Muslims consider him as the final messenger through whom Allah revealed the faith to the world. Earlier messengers, according to Muslims, include Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. Islam is now a major world religion with an estimated 1.3 billion adherents and is divided into different branches, namely, the Sunnis (85 to 90 per cent of Muslims), the Shi’ites, and the Sufis (who may be either Sunnis or Shi’ites).

Religion

Buddhism Buddhism, founded in India by Siddhartha Gautama (the “Buddha”; 563–483 BC), is another world religion with an estimated 500 million adherents. Buddha (The Enlightened or Awaken One) attained Nirvana (Enlightenment) through meditation and taught that meditation and compassion provided answers to suffering and permanent release from it. The “spirit” or “essence” of Buddhist teachings is dharma. At about the 100 BC, a major schism resulted in the formation of the Hinayana and Mahayana branches. From the Hinayana branch emerged the Theravada school which is currently found in Sri Lanka and all Southeast Asian countries. The Mahayana branch can be found today in Korea, China, Japan, and Tibet.

Hinduism Hinduism is probably the oldest practised religion in the world today. Its date of origin is still a matter for debate (some scholars put it at 2500 BC) largely because Hinduism is not based on the teachings of one individual but, instead, constitutes a gradual amalgamation of a family of religions and cultures. The word “Hindu” derives from the river Indu, which flows 1,800 miles from Tibet through Kashmir and Pakistan to the sea. There are an estimated 750 million Hindus worldwide, most of them found in India. The generic beliefs of Hindus are the belief in a single Divinity present in everything; belief in other gods who are aspects of this Divinity; and the belief in reincarnation and karma, a force that determines the quality of each life, depending on one’s deeds in his or her past life.

39

40

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

Bronze Age communities. Largely found in rural and agricultural societies, animism is regarded as rural superstition and a sign of ignorance. There appears to be a decline in animism in Southeast Asia. From the perspective of classical Western sociology, factors such as modern medicine, education, industrialization, greater ruralurban migration, and agricultural knowledge would be prime candidates in explaining the decline. After all, the modern society and its defining features such as science and technology would strip superstitions and arcane beliefs of their mystique. This, however, is not quite the case for Southeast Asia. Monotheistic religions and religious teachers have also been responsible for the decline in animism. Take, for example, the Sufi movement in Indonesia. In central Java, the Sufi-led Muhammadiya reformist movement in 1912 was responsible for purifying Islam from indigenous folk elements of Javanese religion, which had earlier incorporated many Hindu-Buddhist beliefs. In rejecting traditional interpretations of Islamic law, the Muhammadiya movement was responsible for de-legitimizing folk rituals and superstitions by advocating a return to the fundamentals of the Koran.

Observance of Rituals Western sociology often attempts to measure the religiosity of a society through its observance of rituals. In such cases the number of churches and the levels of church attendance are assessed. Such forms of measurements are hard to replicate in Southeast Asia because of the general lack of data. Nonetheless, scattered information does indicate that religion and religiosity are not on the decline.

Religion

41

Take Thailand, for instance, where Theravada Buddhism is the official religion with 92 per cent of Thais considering themselves Buddhists. According to government sources the number of monasteries increased from 30,377 in 1997 to 31,111 in 2000. Meanwhile the number of monks fell from 270,540 (1997) to 265,791 (2000). It is argued that this does not represent a decline in faith but the result of changing educational conditions. The number of persons in monasteries fluctuates because of the traditional requirement that each adolescent should spend six months to two years in residence in a monastery. With greater numbers of secular government schools available to the poor, Thai boys have not turned to Buddhist schools, the traditional springboard into a religious life. The decline of enrolment in Buddhist schools and, consequently, declining number of monks must, instead, be seen in the larger context of modernization’s inroads into Thai social life where Buddhism still looms large, and is not taken in isolation as evidence of religion’s decline. Another statistical indication that religion is not on the decline is the rising number of haj (Islamic pilgrimages to Mecca). Studies show that the annual total of haj in Malaysia from 1965 to 1980 had tripled. In Singapore the number of pilgrimages rose from 3,532 trips in 1990 to 4,412 trips in 2000, with an all-time high of 5,216 trips in 1992. Significant increases in religious pilgrimages are also recorded in Muslim-minority countries such as Thailand and the Philippines. Of course, this growth in numbers must also take into account the rising levels of affluence amongst Muslims who previously may not have been able to afford haj. In this sense, it may even be argued that modernization and economic affluence have provided the financial means for people to express their faith.

42

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

Are Southeast Asians Essentially Religious? Religion plays an important role in Southeast Asian life. However, Western commentators have often essentialized Southeast Asians as religious peoples whose intentions and actions are straightforwardly determined by religious beliefs. This essentialism stems from a colonial mindset responsible for classifying the East in contrast to the West. The West/East contrast is supported by other dichotomies such as rational/irrational, scientific/superstitious, and history/myth. Such classifications have provided colonialists with the moral impetus to govern natives who may otherwise be unable to organize themselves. Such essentializing fails to understand how religion may be deployed as a means to mobilize people for different causes. Religion, instead, should be seen as a potent instrument in broader causes such as the struggle against colonialism, the stirring up of nationalist sentiments, or the jostling for political power.

ROLE OF RELIGION IN NATIONAL POLITICS The intimate relationship between ethnicity and religion has made the latter an important political tool in Southeast Asia. The centrality of religion’s role in national politics is, on the one hand, congruent with modernist notions of national culture whereby the shared customs and cultures of an ethnie are an integral part of nationhood, while on the other, at odds with the notion of the secular state. Free from the colonial legacy that has spurred ethno-religious nationalism in many parts of the region, Thailand’s predominantly Buddhist society has served as an accommodating vehicle for ethnic integration. Ethnic and religious polarization has not been a primary feature in Thai national politics largely because

Religion

43

the general consensus on the centrality of Buddhism in Thai national culture has paved the way for a relatively smooth assimilation process. However, recent events in Pattani, south Thailand, are threatening Thailand’s history of peaceful ethnic integration. The Pattani Malays, once a prosperous kingdom until it was overtaken by Siam, have displayed separatist intentions on ethnic and religious grounds. Such intentions have received little attention in Thai national politics until the government’s overwhelmingly robust response, resulting in hundreds of deaths. In the Philippines there is a constitutional separation of the Church from the state in the Catholic-majority country. This, however, has not prevented religious institutions from commenting on local and national politics. It is not uncommon for priests and bishops to call upon their congregation to vote for particular political candidates. Meanwhile, Muslim separatist politics also plaque the country in the form of the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. And though both rebel groups signed unity agreements in August 2001 with the Philippine government, frequent and violent clashes with these groups have continued. In Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in world, politicization under an Islamic banner was largely discouraged under the Soeharto regime (1968–98). In eschewing a religious state, the national ideology of Pancasila was formulated upon independence. Pancasila’s five principles — belief in one supreme God; humanitarianism; nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; democracy; and social justice — are credited with upholding the pluralist ethos of multiethnic and multireligious Indonesia. Islam, nonetheless, remains the obvious alternative for mass mobilization. Periodic outbursts of Muslim protest have occurred, notably during the 1980s with passing of the 1985 Societies Law requiring all institutions to adopt Pancasila. In late

44

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

1996, religious violence broke out when Muslim crowds attacked Christian churches and Buddhist temples. In May 1998 violence broke out again though this time it was fuelled by a multitude of factors from Indonesia’s growing disparities of wealth, official corruption, the affluence of the ethnic Chinese, and Indonesia’s authoritarian regime. With the exception of a fugacious flirtation with Confucian ethics in the 1980s and early 1990s, religion is largely absent from national politics in the city-state of Singapore. Local political parties are generally multiethnic in membership. To fill the national ideological void, the Singapore government established the Shared Values in 1991, namely, nation before community and society before self; family as the basic unit of society; community support and respect for the individual; consensus, not conflict; and, racial and religious harmony. Certain national issues like the recent debate over the building of a casino to make the city-state more attractive to tourists have, however, prompted different religious organizations to articulate their objection. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that religion will influence policy-making in Singapore. Religion has played a major role in Malaysian politics. Early dakwah (revivalist) movements from the late 1960s and opposition party Pan Islam Malaysia (PAS), together with the establishment of the student-led Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM) placed Islam firmly in the political sphere. In 1979 the Iranian Revolution offered a visionary blueprint for the establishment of an Islamic state. Islam has been a shared platform for ABIM, PAS, and the ruling party United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to express their moral and political legitimacy. Accelerated modernization processes since the early 1990s have not reduced the role of religion in the Malaysian political arena, prompting former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to famously declare the country an “Islamic state” in 2001.

Religion

45

Islam Hadhari and Modernization The Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi introduced the idea of Islam Hadhari in the run-up to the March 2004 general elections. In seeking the people’s mandate, Prime Minister Abdullah presented Islam Hadhari as a progressive brand of Islam for a post–September 11 world. At the 55th UMNO General Assembly in 2004, the Prime Minister further developed Islam Hadhari with ten principles including “a just and trustworthy government”; “mastery of knowledge”; “balanced and comprehensive economic development”; and the “protection of the rights of minority groups and women”. Islam Hadhari (interpreted as “civilizational” Islam) has been said to have two main functions. Firstly, it is believed to be an ideological counter-measure against the more “fundamental” interpretation of Islam as espoused by PAS. Secondly, Islam Hadhari places greater emphasis on economic development and modernization, thus portraying Malaysia as a moderate Muslim society to the rest of the world.

CONCLUSION There is little evidence to suggest that modernization is bringing about a decline in religion in Southeast Asia. And while rural superstitions seem to be fading out with mass education, pockets of religious influences and conflict, when synthesized with the politics of ethnicity and nationalism, continue to characterize the modernization process of Southeast Asia. It is perhaps more helpful to see religions not as an integral and essential character of Southeast Asia, but as ideologies and discourses whose long histories in the region are often mobilized for political purposes. This is not to say that religion does not play a fundamental role in one’s personal life but, rather, its importance

46

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

to so many individuals has made it a useful instrument in broader political struggles such as colonialism, nationalism, and the sociocultural changes which modernity ushers in.

Emergence of the Middle Class

47

Chapter 6

Emergence of the Middle Class According to modernization theory, economic growth paves the way for the development of a middle class from which universalism and democracy will engender. Based on the Western European experience, this theory sees modernization and democracy as two sides of the same coin. Unlike in Western Europe, however, the fledgling Southeast Asian middle classes are largely the result of state-centred capitalist economic development. It is argued that a middle class created under such conditions is generally beholden, even compliant, to the state, lacking the instinctive desire for democratization as historically demonstrated by its European counterpart. To be sure, the emergence of the Southeast Asian middle class is not a uniform one. There were, generally speaking, three waves of regional economic development responsible for its emergence. The first wave of economic development, from the 1950s to the 1970s, occurred in Japan, resulting in a Japanese middle class by the mid-1970s. The second economic wave, from the 1960s to the 1980s, swept Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore (popularly known as the “Asian Tigers”) to the higher ground of middle-class comforts. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and, to a certain degree, the Philippines caught the third wave of economic 47

48

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

development from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (ending abruptly with the 1997 Asian financial crisis); and saw a middle class emergence in their respective countries in the short span of one or two generations. These waves of economic development, enthusiastically encouraged by governments, were the result of economic globalization, increased foreign direct investment (FDI), the region’s cheaper labour and abundance of raw materials, and later, banking and portfolio investment liberalization. All these combined to effectively integrate Southeast Asia deeper into the world economy.

Who Are the Middle Class? Although a convenient and popular term, “middle class” is a problematic concept. In everyday speak it is usually taken to mean the “white collar” class — above the working class and below the upper class. According to Marxist theory, a “class society” is characterized by the conflict, tension, and struggle between groups of people. Each group shares similar means of production and, consequently, a particular “class consciousness”. Framed accordingly, the middle class, as with others, is assumed to be homogeneous whereby people are believed to share the same interests and values just because they are from similar economic backgrounds. This is highly problematic in Southeast Asia where ethnicity, religion, and language play important roles in social groupings. In the Weberian tradition the concept of “stratified society” replaces “class society”. People in a stratified society are divided according to their access to different life-chances. In this sense the middle class is differentiated by its economic status, social positions, close relations to politics, all of which boosts its life-chances. On a more empirical note, the middle class can be characterized by its pattern of material consumption. A middle-class society is one where the majority of citizens have secondary or higher education, enjoy home ownership, and consume goods such as cars and annual holidays.

Emergence of the Middle Class

49

THE MIDDLE CLASS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Thailand The economic boom from 1987 to 1995 resulted in the expansion of the Thai middle class. The size of the Thai middle class — made up of professionals, executives, managers, and high-skill technicians — more than doubled from 310,000 in 1987 to 710,000 in 1994. There are several characteristics of the Thai middle class. Firstly, it is a well-educated class. The number of Thais receiving higher education skyrocketed from 316 for every 100,000 in 1975 to 2,009 in 1985. In 1995 the number of Thais who received higher education was 2,096 for every 100,000. The Thai middle class is, secondly, comparatively young. A study shows that 56.2 per cent of the middle-class working population in Bangkok are between the ages 20 and 34. Thirdly, they are predominantly Sino-Thai. Many of these young middle-class Sino-Thais are from traditional middle-class Chinese parents of the post-war years and who have benefited most from the education boom. Fourthly, and rather understandably, they are generally found in the country’s capital, Bangkok. One study indicates that 50 per cent of white-collar workers and 62 per cent of university students were Bangkokborn, while another study shows that 61 per cent of middle-class professionals earning more than 20,000 baht (US$513) a month were Bangkok-born. Given these characteristics, the Thai middle class is probably the most socially cohesive and culturally dominant in Southeast Asia. This cohesion and dominance has made the Thai middle class the most intellectually influential grouping in national politics.

Malaysia Unlike Thailand, the middle class in Malaysia is ethnically

50

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

fragmented. The Malaysian middle class, especially the Malay middle class, has been nurtured by state-centred economic development. The Chinese Malaysian middle class has benefited from economic globalization in general, and more specifically, the Malaysian government’s active wooing of Japanese and Taiwanese capital and investments. The Malay middle class is a product of Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1971 to 1991, as well as the National Development Policy (NDP), unveiled in 1991. These two national policies, specifically designed to cultivate a Malay middle class, have to some extent, succeeded. While the NEP’s target of attaining 30 per cent of Malay corporate share was not achieved, there has been significant numerical growth in the Malay middle class. The number of Malay executives and managers increased from 5,000 in 1970 to 54,000 in 1990. The number of professionals and technicians in 1980 was 34,000 (or 9.1 per cent of the working population in Kuala Lumpur). This number grew to 59,000 (12.4 per cent) by 1990. The Malay middle class, much more so than the Chinese middle class, has been heavily dependent on state-planned education. Quotas were introduced for Malay enrolment at universities while Malay replaced English as the language medium in secondary and university levels. In 1970, out of the total 7,677 students enrolled at universities, 3,084 were Malays and 3,752 Chinese. By 1985 there were 22,271 Malays (37 per cent of all university students) and 9,142 Chinese (15 per cent) enrolled at local universities, while 6,034 Malays (10 per cent) and 13,406 Chinese (22 per cent) were enrolled in overseas universities. Education, crucial to the formation of the middle class, has been vital in nurturing the Malaysian Malay middle class. This NEPnurtured Malay middle class, armed with high education and cosmopolitan attitudes, has been popularly termed Melayu Baru

Emergence of the Middle Class

51

(New Malay) and has become the ethnically inscribed face of Malaysian economic progress. Nonetheless, even the undoubted expansion of the Malay middle class has not repelled criticisms that only a small number of urban-living Malays have benefited from state patronage. The rural-urban divide within the Malay community remains wide while religion-based politics continue to hold great sway in Malaysia, thus undercutting the political influence of highly educated, urban-living Malay middle class.

Indonesia Like Malaysia, the Indonesian middle class is ethnically divided and state-dependent, though much smaller in size than its Malaysian counterpart. According to surveys, approximately 8.6 per cent of Indonesia’s total working population are professionals, high-skilled technicians, white-collar workers, managers, and executives. Not surprisingly a large portion of these groups are found in the country’s capital, Jakarta, where 25 per cent of the working population fall into the “middle class” category. Previously dominated by ethnic Chinese, larger numbers of Muslim pribumi (indigenous Indonesians) are joining the ranks of the middle class to change its ethnic complexion. However, this has done little to alleviate tensions between the ethnic Chinese minority and the pribumi majority, as well as that between those formerly dependent on Soeharto’s patronage and independentminded professionals. The elevation of Indonesian Muslims into the middle class has also turned Islam into a religion of the middle class. Previously associated with rural poverty, pondokstyled fundamentalism, and anti-West and anti-Chinese attitudes, Islam has become a lifestyle symbol among the Indonesian middle-class Muslims. Scholars have noted that it is used by real estate companies to sell “Islamic real estate” in West Java. Islam

52

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

has also become central to the female fashion industry, been incorporated into the media industry’s celebrity circuit, associated with television chat shows, and used by McDonalds to sell ketupat during Ramadan. The influence of the Indonesian middle class on national politics and issues is negligible. The series of conflicts and confrontations triggered by the 1997 Asian crisis, leading to the overthrow of the Soeharto government, were predominantly student-led and exacerbated by the urban poor and unemployed. And although certain sections of the urban middle class sympathized with some of the student protest rhetoric, it largely abstained from the violence and anarchy that ensued.

Philippines The Filipino middle class has been around longer than the Thai, Indonesian, and Malaysian middle classes as its industrialization began in the 1950s. Economic growth since then has, however, been weak even though education levels have been relatively high. This has had particular consequences for the Filipino middle class. In 1956, middle-class jobs were held by 9.4 per cent of the working population. This grew to 11.5 per cent in 1965. Middleclass jobs remained proportionately constant at 11.5 per cent in 1995 even though the actual numbers increased from 1,264,000 in 1985 to 2,185,000 in 1997. Meanwhile, education levels in the Philippines were high compared with the rest of the region. The number of Filipino students with higher education grew from 1,808 for every 100,000 of its population in 1975, to 2,760 in 1995. These figures represent relatively high levels of education compared with Malaysia, Thailand, or Indonesia. According to some scholars, the country’s poor economic growth has denied its middle-class domestic opportunities, thus explaining why the

Emergence of the Middle Class

53

Philippines has been a major exporter of labour from professionals and managers to maids and entertainers. Politically speaking, the Filipino middle class is highly visible but generally ineffective. This is because of the high volume middle-class brain-drain to countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia. Furthermore, with the government dominated by the landed gentry, there has been little political incentive to empower or broaden the local middle class. As such, unlike Malaysia and Thailand, the Filipino middle class is less politically and economically dependent on the state. It is also less divided than Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.

Singapore Riding the economic development wave together with Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, Singapore is generally seen as a resolutely middle-class society; one which owes it existence to the Singapore state. In terms of empirical criteria such as occupation, income, and education, Singapore has a middle-class majority. According to surveys, of the total working population, 29.2 per cent are professionals and technicians; 14.3 per cent hold administrative and managerial positions; and 18.8 per cent are in the business and finance sector. The average monthly income is S$3,114 (US$1,899), while the median monthly income is S$2,234 (US$1,362). With regard to education, 39.5 per cent have secondary and upper secondary education, while 11.7 per cent have university education. Studies also indicate that the three main ethnic groups — Chinese, Malay, and Indian — are proportionately represented in the middle-class category at 41 per cent, 42 per cent, and 46 per cent, respectively. Although it has been argued that the Singapore middle class, unlike its Western counterpart, is less inclined towards liberal democracy, surveys indicate that

54

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

younger middle-class citizens (aged 15–29) have a higher propensity for political participation compared to middle-age citizens (aged 45–59), and consequentially demonstrate little signs of political alienation.

Is the Concept of Class Still Relevant? Although the tradition of studying society as a collection of different social and economic classes is long and still very influential, recent studies have questioned the relevance of class as a means of understanding contemporary society. There are two main objections to the use of class. First is the purported trend towards the individualization of society. Simply put, it means that individuals are increasingly less adherent to loosening legal obligations, tradition, or other social ties, and are thus “free” to act on personal choices and develop as they please. Modernization and globalization processes have opened up an array of lifestyle, professional, cultural, and ideological choices for individuals; and with their pursuit of “made-to-order” lives, it is debatable if the concept of class as a social and economic grouping is now adequate to describe and explain the actions and lives of contemporary individuals. Second, culturalist explanations of society are replacing materialist explanations. According to materialists, one’s identity and culture is tied to property, organizational position, or economic status — variables that support the concept of class. In a post-modern society, it is argued that the construction of identity is more closely linked to occupation, along with modes of cultural consumption, which could include the types of television programme one prefers, the type of clothes one wears, the destinations for holidaying, or the car one drives. In other words, the consumption of goods for what they symbolize is another way of asserting social status. It is thus argued that conventional notions of class analysis must now be modified to accommodate cultural consumption analysis.

Emergence of the Middle Class

55

The answer as to whether or not the Singapore middle class is politically engaged depends on one’s definition of political engagement. It is highly unlikely that the middle class will engage the Singapore government in competitive or adversarial politics as surveys indicate generally high levels of public satisfaction with the quality of governance. Furthermore, public surveys also suggest that a strong and good government sits high on the list of respondent priorities. However, the middle class may demonstrate political participation with acts of volunteerism, civil society work, and consensus-building. Such forms of political participation pose little threat to state legitimacy.

CONCLUSION The new middle classes across Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore have emerged from complex historical, political, and economic forces. They are the product of post–World War II American capitalist expansionism and, later, Japanese investments in the region. The countries mentioned began modernization and industrialization at different times, and their middle classes have emerged accordingly. They are, to different degrees, products of the developmental state. The political character of the Asian developmental state stretches across a wide spectrum from the democratic, semi-democratic, soft authoritarian, to the authoritarian, the nature of which contributes to the relationship it shares with its respective middle class. Many of these new middle classes, with their income, social status, and lifestyle choices, share three common features. Firstly, they are shaped by Americanization, Japanization, and more recently, the economic rise of China. This, it is suggested, will ensure that the Southeast Asian middle class remains open to, even dependent on, globalization and regionalization. Secondly,

56

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

the Southeast Asian middle class is an expanding market for multinational companies and mass consumption. Goods, services, and images are increasingly localized according to the tastes of the middle class. Thirdly, it has been proposed that from the dynamism and cultural creativity of the Southeast Asian middle class, a regional or Asian identity will emerge. As a space in which the East and West, local and global collide, the Southeast Asian middle class will develop a recognizable modern Asian culture.

Mass Consumption

57

Chapter 7

Mass Consumption Along with economic development and a broadening middle class come changes in buying and spending patterns — or mass consumption. Greater disposable income and more leisure time, together with the influx of imported products, have created an insatiable demand for consumer goods such as cars, washing machines, refrigerators, personal computers, television sets, mobile phones, and trendy street apparel in many of the capitals in Southeast Asia. The ubiquity of global brands like Nike, SONY, McDonalds, Toshiba, GAP, DKNY, Levis in highly populated urban centres has also made material consumption more conspicuous than ever before. One fundamental trend of modernization is capitalism’s ability to turn a society of diverse cultures and ethnic groups into a society of consumers. Mass consumption not only indicates the rising income levels of a consumer society, but its patterns also provide a vivid picture of the society’s desires, values, and fantasies. In other words, the things people buy, the reason they buy them, and what these things mean to them, tell us about the character of a modern consumer society.

57

58

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

Mass Consumption The study of mass consumption is a relatively new field. It emerged in the mid-1970s as a mode of inquiry that linked materialism with notions of identity and cultural behaviour. The study of consumption rejects classical Marxism, which asserts that capitalists use mass consumption to transform individual workers or proletariats into consumers for their own gains, that is, capital accumulation. This is largely in line with the belief that consumers blindly buy into advertising mantras and have little choice in what they consume. Instead, consumption theorists argue that consumers are capable of endowing personal meaning on impersonal consumer goods, and of using such goods as symbols of identity or lifestyles. Consumers, far from blindly buying into the manufactured dreams put out by advertisers, are using goods in unique ways (or styles) to express themselves.

STATUS SYMBOLS In a capitalist society, material goods are bought as much for their functional as for their symbolic value. Luxury brands like Gucci, Prada, Armani, BMW, Jaguar, while performing the same function as their cheaper counterparts, are status symbols in that they are acquired for the favourable social evaluation they bring from others as well as the enhancement of the owner’s social standing. The power of a status symbol depends on its recognition by others as desirable or prestigious. The more people who recognize a Rolex watch as a desirable or prestigious object, the more powerful it becomes as a status symbol. Status symbols have, for better or worse, become instantaneous socio-economic markers of a person’s position in modern society. Status symbols are used by consumers to indicate wealth and taste — both of which serve as indications of class. The economic

Mass Consumption

59

boom in Southeast Asia during the early to mid-1990s saw the expanding middle class purchase expensive apartments, luxury cars, exotic holidays — purchases that differentiated it from the poor and working class. For example, it has been observed that some Indonesian middle-class families, in order to be seen, would sit for long periods of time at fast-food restaurants like McDonalds or Pizza Hut consuming Coca-Cola and burgers, which are unaffordable to the Indonesian poor. These families would even leave the restaurant with empty paper bags to indicate to others what they had for lunch. Meanwhile in Malaysia, it has been noted that the American motorcycle, Harley Davidson, is now the toy of choice for the new upper middle class, or Malayu Baru (New Malay). The upper middle class uses this highly expensive American import to symbolize an executive lifestyle and high income. This is ironic because the Harley Davidson in America is symbolic of American working-class values, adventure, and rugged masculinity. Taste is also a means of class distinction. For example, the upper middle class in the West may choose to watch opera or foreign art films instead of Hollywood movies and local television. In doing so, they are distinguishing themselves from the less educated or “less cultured” because education and learning are required to understand the cultural references made in operas. The Southeast Asian middle class also attempts to differentiate itself with taste. For instance, it has been observed that a bungalow was the ideal home for the aspiring Malaysian middle-class civil servant in the late 1960s and 1970s. In the 1990s, however, condominiums or apartments, with a range of recreational facilities like gym, swimming pool, and tennis courts, were considered very fashionable and highly sought after by the new middle-class Malays. The type of sports played has also been shown to indicate subtle class distinctions. In a study of Indonesian bureaucrats who

60

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

participated in sporting activities, it was discovered that lowerranked bureaucrats played table tennis and football, middle-ranked ones played volleyball, while upper-ranked bureaucrats indulged in tennis and golf. In Malaysia where, as in most societies, the car is a powerful status symbol, studies show that European brands like Mercedes, BMW, and Volvo carried different meanings for different segments of the upper-middle class. Businessmen traditionally preferred Mercedes, the young and highly educated yuppies often opted for BMW, while civil servants went for Volvo.

YOUTH AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION Perhaps most conspicuous in everyday mass consumption is the youth. Raised in the era of rapid economic growth, many middleclass Southeast Asian youths are avid global consumers. Without major financial commitments like housing and cars, and free from family obligations, many youths and young working adults possess the economic means to express their identities and desires through material consumption in various ways. From the music they listen, to the clothes they wear, and the way they wear them, material consumption has become a means for identity construction. It is common to see middle class and affluent youths in major Southeast Asian cities togged in American street fashion or the latest gangsta rap style. There is little doubt that American popular culture is the most pervasive of popular cultures, and it is through American popular culture that many Southeast Asian youths are articulating local and personal concerns. For example, America, and all things American, is often portrayed by Hollywood movies, pop songs, advertisements, and other forms of popular culture as the “land of the free”, and celebratory of individualism and liberty. In wearing pop culture T-shirts or listening to American rap, Southeast Asian youths are not necessarily aspiring to become

Mass Consumption

61

American, but are more likely appropriating specific messages such as demand for personal respect, individualism, or freedom to make one’s own decisions, in order to address personal concerns such as parental oppression, societal expectations, or peer pressure. For instance, it has been observed that Singaporean teenagers and their parents view American street fashion from opposite ends of the spectrum. Such fashion items are used by Singaporean teenagers to express rebellion and resistance to local repression and discipline, while for parents, they represent the very absence of discipline associated with the liberal West. By consuming American popular culture, many are in fact identifying with the specific ideas and sentiments embedded in consumer goods. In fact, far from being “individualistic” or self-absorbed, as many critics of today’s youth charge, the youths in Southeast Asia have generally been socially responsible and in some cases a moral force in national politics. For example, as noted elsewhere, in Indonesia, youths and students took to the streets in protest against state corruption and mismanagement during the economic crisis, and constituted a moral agitation for political change.

WESTERNIZATION AND ASIAN VALUES Because the youth and young adults are the most visible consumers, they are often criticized for blindly mimicking American fashion and for losing their identity as “Asians”. Such criticisms are based on the assumption that the consumption of imported material goods will change a person’s values and identity. A broader but parallel argument is that globalization is “westernizing” or “Americanizing” different societies around the world. Such fears are profound and are considered serious enough for governments to act on. The Singapore government, for example, concerned with the link between material nimiety and individualism, began to

62

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

emphasize ethnic languages and “Asian values” in the effort to halt the “westernization” of Singaporean society in the late 1970s. This fear of “westernization” as result of excessive mass consumption, it is argued elsewhere, is an illogical one. Singapore imports and consumes both American as well as Japanese consumer goods. Both American and Japanese brands and culture like GAP, Hitachi, Levis, Muji, rap music and J-pop, American fast food, and sushi restaurants are found everywhere in Singapore. Yet, only the consumption of American consumer goods elicits fears of “westernization” while Japanese consumer goods do not hold worries of “Japanization”. This is largely because critics of “westernization” (predominantly the older generation) see mass consumerism as the direct result of the penetration of American culture, ideology, and practices into local cultures. American ideology and culture, closely associated with individualism, liberalism, and hedonism, is deemed antithetical to what the older generations stand for, that is, fiscal prudence, strong savings habit, modest material consumption, and delayed gratification. Japanese culture, on the other hand, is associated with respect for authority, social discipline, and hard work. Hence, instead of criticizing mass consumption — an essentially necessary feature of capitalist society — the fear of “westernization” is used to monitor its “ill effects” like individualism and hedonism. The Asian values discourse is one of the ways to counter “westernization”. As a set of cultural principles or ethics such as respect for authority, diligence, and the prioritizing of communal needs over individual desires, Asian values are used to minimize political and cultural influences from the “West”. One example of this is the then Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s 1994 National Day Rally speech. Citing an advertisement in the local media for a health beverage where a young boy tells his father, “Come on Dad, if you can play golf five times a week, I can have

Mass Consumption

63

Sustagen once a day”, the Prime Minister opined that the boy’s insolence ran counter to Asian values. The Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts later stated that local advertisers should be discouraged from showing Singaporeans behaving like Westerners. It is thus clear that Asian values are used to preserve or inculcate some definition or idea of an Asian way of life. It has also been argued that the proponents of the Asian values discourse are most vocal in economically successful countries. The argument is that the more economically successful an Asian country is, the greater its scrutiny and criticism from the West. As such these Asian countries have to find an inviolable philosophical or cultural underpinning for their preferred mode of governance. In short, the Asian values discourse is said to be designed to counter ideological imperialism and biased policies from the West.

CONCLUSION The rapid economic expansion of Southeast Asia in the last decade has engendered clear evidence of mass consumption. Before the 1997 Asian crisis the demand, import, and purchase of global consumer goods were symptomatic of a vibrant economy while the uneven distribution of consumer goods and brands reflects the class stratification inherent in all capitalist societies. Consumer goods are prized for more than their functional value but also for their symbolic value. Luxury goods and brand names have become status symbols which distinguish one class from another while taste is also a way to define class and cultural knowledge of consumers. This consumer culture, made up of a constellation of advertisers, consumers, distributors, brands, images, and meanings, has been fecund ground on which to study the way in which people construct their identity and articulate their desires. Conspicuous

64

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

material consumption has resulted in fears of “westernization” and the subsequent emergence of the Asian values discourse as critique of consumer culture. Such fears usually stem from straightforward associations of American culture with individualism, liberalism, or hedonism while the discourse seeks to chart a path towards an Asian-style modernity

Conclusion: Towards a Southeast Asian Modernity?

65

Chapter 8

Conclusion: Towards a Southeast Asian Modernity? Flipping through a popular news magazine recently, I came across two glossy images of Southeast Asia. The first was a beautifully composed photograph of weather-beaten Thai farmers in oversized straw hats bending over terraced rice fields. The second image was a close-up snapshot, washed in a fashionable blue tint, of an urban Chinese professional in a sharp business suit barking into his mobile phone as he navigated the metropolitan city. While close to caricature, these two contrasting images capture several truths about the region. Firstly, the region’s history of uneven economic development has resulted in extremes. In the city the rich are never too far from the poor while throbbing cities are never too far from half-empty dusty villages. Secondly, from Philippines to Indonesia to Thailand to Singapore the experience of modernization is a subjective one. Southeast Asia’s modernization experience has been informed by the cultural, religious, and political facets of its many national constituents. Islam, semi-democratic, and authoritarian states, ethnic interests, and cultural values all influence the way modernization is conceived as well as the perception of promises 65

66

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

and threats it holds for society at large. Thirdly, the two images underline not only the close geographical but also psychological and normative proximity between the old and the new, between the rural and the urban, between tradition and modernity in Southeast Asia. The lifestyles and values of many Southeast Asians are neither anchored completely in the rural or the traditional nor do they unfold exclusively in the urban or modern. The Southeast Asian must learn to negotiate different conceptual worlds from the religious, the ethnic, and the cultural to the professional, the cosmopolitan, and the global. Given these unique political, social, and cultural conditions, will a Southeast Asian modernity emerge?

A SOUTHEAST ASIAN MODERNITY? One major question concerning many Southeast Asian intellectuals and thinkers is: can Southeast Asia ever become modern on its own terms? Modernization and modernity have long been associated with the West because scientific breakthroughs, technological advancements, contemporary political systems and institutions have percolated from Western experience onto the contemporary Southeast Asian landscape. More than an esoteric philosophical musing, the question of a Southeast Asian modernity goes to the core of Asian ideals and values from which political systems, social structures, economic practices can be developed to negotiate modern life. A Southeast Asian modernity would be informed by the region’s historical trajectory, social, and political formations, as well as conflicts, divergences, and convergences. There are several factors that may influence the character of a Southeast Asian modernity. Firstly, the region’s globally oriented economic outlook will shape its identity. Southeast Asia is one of the most outward-looking regions in the world, often defining itself

Conclusion: Towards a Southeast Asian Modernity?

67

in relation to the outside world, thus imbuing it with a singularly diverse identity. As noted elsewhere, for Indian scholars who wanted to spread the virtues of Hindu civilization, the region was seen as “Further India”. For the Chinese migrants escaping poverty, Southeast Asia was known as “Nangyang”. Ancient Southeast Asian civilizations too exhibited this economic openness. The kingdom of Srivijaya, for example, laid out a transportation and logistical system that gathered forest products from the jungles of Sumatra and transferred them to China. Melaka, through smaller agencies throughout the Straits region, extracted sea and land produce to contribute to the China trade route. In values, as in commerce, Southeast Asia exhibits the same openness. The region attracted world religions and infused them with local practices and sensitivities. Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity have been personalized by everyday practice. Cultural exchange has also shaped the region’s identity. The influx of migrants and settlers has resulted in intermarriages and numerous cultural hybrids and assimilations. The Peranakans (or Straits Chinese) are ethnic Chinese who settled in the Straits Settlement and adopted Malay culture; the Thai Chinese have assimilated into Thai culture; Indonesian Chinese into Indonesian national culture, and so on. Economic openness, geographical ambiguity, and cultural exchange may shape an outward-looking and culturally dynamic Southeast Asian modernity. Secondly, nationalism and national cultures will inform the Southeast Asian modernity. Issues of national sovereignty, national identity, and nation-building will continue to reverberate for two reasons. Many of the region’s countries are relatively young nations of approximately 50 to 60 years old. Nationalism is also a convenient mobilizing force both for national interests and self-identity. The importance of national sensitivities and sovereignty issues have been acknowledged by the region and

68

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

formalized as protocol by ASEAN in the form of its policy of “non-interference”. As such, the Southeast Asian modernity will have strong national elements for the near future. Thirdly, a Southeast Asian modernity will be informed by a strong consumerist culture. As long as economic and material development continues at a steady rate, with global capital and consumer products flowing into the region, a strong consumerist ethos, fuelled by Western, predominantly American, and Japanese popular culture, will offer avenues for self-expression and class distinction. It is unlikely that this consumerist ethos will result in Western or global culture homogenizing Southeast Asian cultures. For though foreign goods will be consumed for their prestige, it is just as likely that these goods and products will be infused with local values and meanings, utilized as vehicles to express local concerns and interests. Fourthly, in terms of political ideology, Southeast Asia remains an eclectic mix of democracy, semi-democracy, monarchy, and military rule. As such, unlike Europe or America, Southeast Asia does not champion a specific brand of democracy or human rights, and thus de-links any political ideology from ideas of modernity. A Southeast Asian modernity will have little to say about liberal democracy and human rights. Instead, the strong state will be deemed more important by the ruling class and the majority of the middle and working classes. It is this site, the political, in which the struggle to define an Asian modernity will be most visible. Many in the West believe that economic development will be accompanied by the political evolution towards a liberal democracy. The refusal of many Southeast Asian states to fulfil these Western expectations will either undermine or characterize the notion of a Southeast Asian modernity. These factors have outlined the contours of what a modern Southeast Asia will look like. The concluding section

Conclusion: Towards a Southeast Asian Modernity?

69

below identifies some possible threats to the modernization process.

POSSIBLE THREATS TO MODERNIZATION PROCESS Economic growth is the primary engine of the modernization process. For the moment the economic prospects for Southeast Asia are bright as economic rebounds in the United States, Japan, and Europe are contributing to the region’s development. Nonetheless, there are several factors that may disrupt growth. Firstly, terrorism remains the region’s primary concern. Indonesia’s third suicide bombing in September 2004, together with various religion-based violent struggles in south Thailand and south Philippines, may derail economic development, depending on whether or not governments can isolate such cases of violence. Secondly, cheaper and increased intra-region travel has made it easier for diseases and viruses to spread. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) of 2003 and the more recent Avian flu are pan-region health threats which may debilitate the region’s workforce and erode investor and tourism confidence. Thirdly, there is a need to tackle the problems of corruption and the lack of government transparency. These problems, often deeply embedded, may hinder the implementation of new initiatives, systems, and values which are needed to keep up the modernization process. This book has sought to identify various aspects of modernization in the region. It is not meant to be a comprehensive examination of Southeast Asian modernization but a selective discussion of trends in the region. Education, ethnicity and citizenship, religion, the middle class, and mass consumption were discussed though many other issues such as health, population growth, migration, crime, security, and the development of party politics all deserve equal attention but for the lack of space.

Selected Bibliography

71

Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 1983. Asian Development Bank. Education and National Development in Asia: Trends, Issues, Policies and Strategies. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2001. Beeson, Mark, ed. Contemporary Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics, National Differences. New York: Macmillan, 2004. Birch, David, Tony Schirato, and Sanjay Srivastave. Asia: Cultural Politics in the Global Age. New South Wales, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2001. Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique on the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge, 1989. Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999. Oommen, T.K. Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997. Pinches, Michael, ed. Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia. London: Routledge, 1999. Reid, Anthony. “Islamisation and Christianisation in Southeast Asia: The Critical Phase, 1550–1650”. In Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief, edited by Anthony Reid. New York: Cornell University Press, 1993.

71

72

Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia

Tan Ern Ser. Does Class Matter? Social Stratification and Orientations in Singapore. Singapore: World Scientific, 2004. Von de Mehden, Fred R. Religion and Modernisation in Southeast Asia. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986. World Bank. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.