Modality in Germanic Languages: Historical and Comparative Perspectives 9783110889932, 9783110143348

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Modality in Germanic Languages

W G DE

Trends in Linguistics Studies and Monographs 99

Editor

Werner Winter

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Modality in Germanic Languages Historical and Comparative Perspectives

edited by

Toril Swan Olaf Jansen Westvik

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

1997

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin.

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress

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Swan, Toril. Modality in Germanic languages. p. cm. - (Trends in linguistics. Studies and monographs ; 99) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 3-11-014334-8 (alk. paper) 1. Germanic languages—Modality. I. Westvik, Olaf Jansen, 1945-, II. Title. III. Series. PD271.S9 1996 430'.045-dc21 96-36896 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek -

Cataloging-in-Publication-Data

Modality in Germanic languages : historical and comparative perspectives / ed. by Toril Swan ; Olaf Jansen Westvik. - Berlin ; New York : Mouton de Gruyter, 1997 (Trends in linguistics : Studies and monographs ; 99) ISBN 3-11-014334-8 NE: Swan, Toril [Hrsg.]; Trends in linguistics / Studies and monographs

© Copyright 1996 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Typesetting and printing: Arthur Collignon GmbH, Berlin. Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer, Berlin. Printed in Germany.

Preface

The present volume contains papers from the Xth International Tromso Symposium on Linguistics, which took place on August 21st-August 25th 1993. The Xth symposium was the second in this series to be devoted exclusively to questions of Germanic linguistics, the first being the Vllth International Tromso Symposium on Linguistics, which was held in 1991.1 The organizers chose the topic of the conference - Modality in Germanic Languages: Historical and Comparative Perspectives — mainly for the reason that this area of grammar would lend itself particularly well to comparative study both synchronically and diachronically. Central elements of the modal systems of the different Germanic languages are historically identical and in the various developments that have taken place over the centuries there are both characteristic difference and similarities. On the other hand it is also true that in spite of the extensive similarities of the modal systems of the Germanic languages, work in this area more often than not is carried out on an exclusively one-language basis, in our opinion much to the detriment both of theory and description. Modality has become a much-discussed concept in recent years; indeed, the very notion of modality has been expanded and is now used with a wide and inclusive meaning as well as more restrictedly, i.e. to include discourse modality, subjectivity and all types of speaker-orientation, etc. — or — as earlier — referring only to modal verb/auxiliary meaning. Whether the term is used in a narrow or in a wider sense, however, modality is a concept which necessarily involves both syntax and semantics; it "faces both ways - Janus-like", as Jespersen suggested in his Philosophy of Grammar. Indeed, in recent years the pragmatics aspects of modality have also been investigated and have proved important. Given the relative paucity of comparative work in the area of modality it was not thought advisable that those who were invited to read a paper should be obliged to discuss their problems from an explicitly comparative angle. Rather, the conference was intended to provide a forum in which it would be possible for the participants to acquaint themselves with work carried out in areas adjacent to their own. It was thought that this might contribute to developing an awareness of and fostering an interest in problems of an historical and comparative nature. Not all of

vi

Preface

those who participated in the symposium read a paper, and of those who did, not all were later able to submit a written version for publication. On the other hand, one of the participants has submitted a paper which was not read at the conference, but which has been included in the present book. The papers presented at the symposium thus throw light on a great many aspects of the state and development of modality and subjectivity in one or more Germanic languages; as will be seen, they represent a wide interpretation of the term modality (indeed, the modal auxiliaries are not the main topie at all). While the German language, and to some extent English, seems to have received the lion's share of attention, many of the other Germanic languages are represented as well. Thus Traugott and Aijmer analyze English verbs that have or are developing subjective meanings or functions. Rosengren, Ormelius, and Onnerfors deal mainly with German - Rosengren with exclamations. Ormelius with the modal particle schon, and Önnerfors with the modal use of VI clauses. Vasko and Fretheim investigate the Norwegian modal particles altsä and nemlig. Finally, Palmer's and Leirbukt's papers include data from Scandinavian as well as from English and German. The editors would like to express their gratitude to the symposium participants, who made the conference memorable, and whose contributions have become the present volume. We also are grateful for the contribution made by N F R (the Norwegian Research Council) whose grants helped finance the symposium and helped make possible the publication of this volume. Toril Swan

Olaf J. Westvik

Note 1

Papers from this symposium were published by Mouton de Guyter in 1994 as T. S w a n E. Morck—O. Westvik (eds.) Language change and language structure. Older Germanic languages in a comparative perspective.

Contents

Preface Toril Swan —Olaf J. Westvik I think - an English modal particle Karin Aijmer

1

Dimensions of epistemicity in English, German, and Norwegian conditionals Oddleif Leirbukt

49

The modal particle schon: Its syntax, semantics, and pragmatics Elisabet Ormelius-Sandblom

75

Negation and modality in the Germanic languages Frank R. Palmer

133

Expressive sentence types — a contradiction in terms. The case of exclamation Inger Rosengren

151

Subjectification and the development of epistemic meaning: The case of promise and threaten Elizabeth Closs Traugott

185

On the Ulvestad use of brauchen versus müssen Bjarne

211

Some central pragmatic functions of the Norwegian particles altsä and nemlig Ildiko Vasko— Thorstein Fretheim

233

On narrative declarative VI-sentences in German Olaf Önnersfors

293

I think — an English modal particle 1 Karin

Aijmer

1. Introduction In 1983, Perkins described research on modality as "very similar to trying to move in an overcrowded room without treading on anyone else's feet" (1983: 4). It may, however, still be possible to find new avenues for studying modality. Contrasting modal devices in two languages may, for example, serve as a "window" on modality, providing insights which are difficult to get by other means. While it would no doubt be interesting to study all the ways in which epistemic modality can be expressed in two or more languages (cf. Stubbs 1986), this would be impractical since it would presuppose that the functional domains of epistemic modality have already been described. An alternative approach is to shift the comparison to a single modal element. What kindled my interest in I think2 was that the phrase seemed to function in the same way as modal particles in languages like German or Swedish (cf. Fillmore 1984, Doherty 1978: 176). In the text-based contrastive project which had recently started at Lund where my task was to study epistemic modality, the contrastive analysis of translation texts gave ample evidence of such a connection. Spoken language is rich in recurrent phrases such as I think which are sensitive to speakers' communicative needs. I argue that I think has "gone one step further" and developed into a discourse marker or modal particle which is syntactically a speech-act adverbial. In order to explain such an incomplete discourse marker it will be shown that we need a scale of pragmaticalization where one of the end-points is a pragmatic element or "modal particle". The present work consists of two studies dealing with I think which are closely related. In the first study I analyse the subtypes of I think on a scale of pragmaticalization and discuss their syntactic, semantic, prosodic, and functional properties. The material for this study comes from the LondonLund Corpus of Spoken English (cf. Greenbaum-Svartvik 1990).3 The second study is a follow-up investigation testing the hypotheses in the first part by establishing correspondences between I think and related epistemic modal elements in English, on the one hand, and modal particles in Swedish, on the other, in a corpus of authentic translations.

2

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2. Modality, grammaticalization, and pragmaticalization Historically, modal auxiliaries are derived from lexical (preterite-present) verbs by means of a process of grammaticalization, which involves syntactic changes but has semantic-pragmatic correlates (cf. Hopper-Traugott 1993). According to Thompson-Mulac (1991), grammaticalization can also cause a change of I think from a main clause construction into an epistemic adverb. Thompson—Mulac's study has opened up a new area of research in which combinations of words not only become lexicalized but can go "all the way" to grammar. The framework of analysis in this work is different mainly in that I find it fruitful to make a distinction between grammaticalization and pragmaticalization 4 (see Figure 1.). Grammatical construction

... . „ Grammaticalization

Lexical form Pragmatic expression

"Pragmaticalization"

Figure 1: Grammaticalization and pragmaticalization

Grammaticalization is concerned with the derivation of grammatical forms and constructions (mood, aspect, tense, etc.) from words and lexicalized structures. An example is (be) going to as a marker of future tense, English let's, and agreement markers in French (Hopper-Traugott 1993). Discourse markers such as you know, you see, etc., are typically "pragmaticalized" since they involve the speaker's attitude to the hearer. I shall argue that strings such as I think which can be loosely attached to the sentence as in Bill is at home I think, are other good examples of pragmaticalization or of emergent pragmatic constructions (cf. Hopper 1991: 19 and Section 2.1). Pragmaticalization can be described pragmatically, syntactically, semantically, and prosodically. Pragmaticalization of meaning has in the past been associated with "bleaching" or loss of meaning. In recent work (Hopper—Traugott 1993: 87-88, Romaine - Lange 1991: 266), it has however been claimed that the beginning of grammaticalization is associated with the development of new pragmatic meanings, strengthening of conversational implicatures, etc. This is in line with the hypotheses in this work where I am interested in comparing the pragmatic processes involved in the development of I think as a modal particle and the pragmaticalization of the new meanings of modal particles in Swedish.

I think - an English modal particle

3

I think permits, for example, extensions of meaning involving the speaker's attitudes to the hearer or to the message. With the modal particles in Swedish, the conventionalization of pragmatic meanings is even more clear. The modal particles in Swedish are short deaccented words with modal meanings (e. g., väl, nog, visst). They are not usually discussed in connection with grammaticalization, probably because the development from a lexical item to a pragmatical expression is so difficult to trace. (The main part of the discussion of particles and other modal elements in Swedish takes place in Section 4.) Pragmaticalized elements can also be characterized semantically. If we differentiate between semantics and pragmatics in truth-conditional terms, as is common, we can stipulate that elements which cannot be analysed in terms of truth are pragmatic or pragmaticalized. A com : parison can be made between the «/-clauses in the following paired sentences: (1)

If it rains, I will take my umbrella.

(2)

He is not very nice if I may say so.

In (1) the «/-clause expresses a condition which must be fulfilled in order for the proposition expressed in the main clause to be true and the meaning of the whole construction must be described in truth-conditional terms. On the other hand, if I may say so in (2) is a pragmatic element expressing the speaker's reservation. The truth-conditional criterion is of overriding importance for distinguishing between grammatical(ized) and pragmatic(alized) elements. Other criteria are non-sufficient since they either pick out a sub-group of pragmatic(alized) expressions or characterize a too large class of adverbials. For example, pragmatic elements tend to be optional in the sentence while grammaticalization results in forms which are an obligatory part of the grammatical "core" such as tense and mood. There are, however, borderline cases such as intensifiers like very which are optional but have a grammatical rather than a pragmatic function. A difficult question is how pragmatic(alized) elements should be described grammatically. One suggestion is that they are "speech-act adverbials" (Andersson 1976: 43), a category which is defined pragmatically and syntactically. Syntactically, speech-act adverbials are "Chomsky-adjoined" to the right (or the left) of the utterance (see Figure 2.):

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Karin Aijmer

Sl S2

NP

S3 speech act adverbial

VP

Figure 2: The constituent structure (adapted from Andersson 1976: 29)

of sentences

containing

"speech-act

adverbials"

Elements which can be placed in the extra speech-act adverbial slot in Figure 2 are expletives and epithets (you bastard, oh God) and a variety of adverbial expressions {frankly speaking, you know, I think, to tell you the truth, if I may say so, etc.)· A major class of speech-act adverbials consists of short modal particles in Swedish (e. g., väl Ί suppose', va 'isn't he'), which are however sentence-internal (cf. Section 4). Syntactic detachability and mobility are a characteristic feature of a larger class of adverbials. Yet another formal test is whether the adverbial can be the focus of a cleft or pseudo-cleft construction or of an alternative or-question or a negative sentence. Some adverbials are easily clefted (It was on Thursday that he came) and are found in alternative questions (Did he come on Thursday or Friday?). On the other hand, there are adverbials which are ungrammatical as the focus of a cleft construction (*It is frankly speaking that he is an idiot) (cf. Quirk et al. 1985, Andersson 1976). Again, this criterion only tells us that speech-act adverbials are sentence adverbials. A test which however seems to distinguish grammatically between speech-act adverbials and other adverbials involves word-order rules in Swedish and Norwegian (Swan 1991). Since these languages are verbsecond languages, an initial sentence adverbial should cause subject-verb inversion. Now this rule is only optional for initial speech-act adverbials as in (3) although it is obligatory for other sentence adverbials (cf. 4). Compare the a and b sentences in (3) and (4): (3)

a. Ärligt talat, han är inte vidare trevlig. frankly spoken he is not very nice b. Ärligt talat är han inte vidare trevlig frankly spoken is he not very nice 'Frankly, he is not very nice'

I think — an English modal particle

(4)

5

a. *Förmodligen han är inte vidare trevlig. probably he is not very nice b. Förmodligen är han inte vidare trevlig. probably is he not very nice 'Probably he is not very nice'

(5)

a. Om jag sä far sega, han är inte vidare trevlig. if I so may say he is not very nice b. Om jag sä far sega är han inte vidare trevlig. if I so may say is he not very nice 'If I may say so he is not very nice'

(6)

a. *Om det regnar, jag tar mitt paraply. if it rains I take my umbrella b. Om det regnar tar jag mitt paraply. if it rains take I my umbrella 'If it rains I'll take my umbrella'

Interestingly, there is some proof that speech-act adverbials can be characterized prosodically. To begin with, they typically occupy a separate tone unit after the main message (the "afterthought function", cf. Chafe 1988): (7)

C [\m]# it's bound to come Vout though#. I thlink# a do you think so C [\m]#. (2.7 162-166)

An adverbial may fall into different adverbial classes depending on its prosody. According to Allerton - Cruttenden (1974: 21), truthfully can occur as in (8 a) with a fall tone to assert the seriousness or truthfulness of what John did. If, however, the adverbial expresses the speaker's attitude to the proposition, it has a fall-rise tone, and truthfully occupies a separate tone unit. In the synonymous phrase to tell you the truth (example 8 b), only a fall-rise tone is found according to Allerton - Cruttenden: (8)

a. tr\uthfully he did it b. to tell you the tr\iuth# only Bill was at home

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Aijmer

Grammaticalization is a broad and fuzzy concept which enables us to describe any kind of syntactic or semantic/pragmatic change or variation. By distinguishing between grammaticalization and pragmaticalization as I have done here, it is, however, possible to ask to what extent the principles and processes giving rise to grammatical markers such as conjunctions, morphological markers of tense, aspect, etc., are the same as those giving rise to pragmatic discourse markers such as I think. There are many similarities between the processes involved in pragmaticalization and grammaticalization. I shall discuss four processes which are typically involved in both grammaticalization and pragmaticalization: specialization, layering, divergence, and renewal (cf. Hopper - Traugott 1993: 113). Specialization refers to the fact that lexical forms or structures become more frequent or the only choice in some text type or in the whole of language. Several examples are given in Palander-Collin's forthcoming study of how methinks develops into an epistemic qualifier in Middle English. She shows, for example, that in Old English the impersonal think shifts from an all-around opinion verb occurring with different kinds of subjects to a first person singular verb when one compares the periods 1350-1420 and 1420-1500. We speak of layering when new devices or techniques emerge to serve a function, but old ones are not discarded. Ail obvious case is when I think coexists with modal adverbs (in my opinion, probably) and auxiliaries (must) in the functional domain of epistemic modality. Divergence indicates that when a lexical form undergoes grammaticalization, the original lexical form may remain as an autonomous lexical item (Hopper - Traugott 1993: 116). The fact that think is used both in I think as a pragmatic expression and as a normal verb with other subjects, e. g., John thinks (that) is an example. By renewal, new forms are created with the same meaning as the grammaticalized or pragmaticalized form. There is, for example, an almost infinite number of modal elements with the meaning Ί believe' emerging as a response to the speaker's expressive needs. The syntactic structure is the same as in I think but the predicate is different (cf. I think, I guess, it is obvious that, etc.). 2.1. The cline of pragmaticalization of I think In my discussion, I have so far focussed on pragmaticalized expressions and "speech-act adverbials". However, I think is not a pure "pragmatic

I think - an English modal particle

7

expression" (Erman 1987) or a "D-item" (Stenström 1990) like you know or you see. The reason is the structural and formal flexibility of I think which causes it to straddle grammar and discourse. I think can occur in different positions in the utterance (cf. I think that Bill is at home and Bill is at home, I think). In comparison with you know, the phrase is flexible with regard to tense, aspect, and modality (cf. I thought, I was thinking, I would think, I would have thought /that Bill was at hornet). Finally, I think can be negated (/ don't think) and questioned (do you think). The model of analysis I want to propose accounts for the structural flexibility of I think on a cline of pragmaticalization (see Figure 3.): Stage 1 I think that Bill is at home

Stage 2 I think Bill is at home

Stage 3 Bill is at home I think

Figure 3: The cline of pragmaticalization of I think

The description of the syntactic and semantic properties of non-factive verbs like think, believe, guess, suppose, etc., which undergo the development in Figure 3., has a long history where the article "Fact" by Paul und Carol Kiparsky (1970) provides a milestone. The thrust of the Kiparskys' article was that the semantic distinction between factive ("presuppositional") and non-factive predicates had a number of repercussions in grammar. Only non-factive predicates in the first person can, for example, be used parenthetically (cf. Urmson 1963). However, neither the Kiparskys nor Urmson looked for a deeper explanation for why non-factive verbs could be used parenthetically. According to Plank (1981), the process is an example of syntacticpragmatic reduction also illustrated by the raising of the subject of the subordinate clause with seem (e. g., It seems that Bill is at home —• Bill seems to be at home), adverbialization (e. g., It is apparent that he is at home —*• Apparently he is at home), amalgamation of a superordinate with a subordinate clause (e.g., he gave this I prefer not to know how awful paper)} The functional precondition for the change is that the verb does not belong to the main part of the message, but expresses in a general way the speaker's attitude to the utterance. That I think at Stage 1 is not only a weakened form of the verb but has lost its status as a main clause can be seen from the occurrence of "main-clause phenomena" in the complement clause after I think

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(Hooper — Thompson 1973, Green 1976, Halliday 1985). The tag question in I think Ithatl Bill is at home isn't he is, for example, acceptable, but hardly I think Bill is at home don't I. Plank does not discuss the pragmatic correlates of "parentheticalization". As I see it, the simplest and most straightforward way of explaining the development of I think to a mobile discourse marker in pragmatic terms is to say that it is the result of conversational implicature and principles such as the Gricean maxim of quality ( " D o not say what you believe to be false") (Grice 1975). Since the sincerity condition associated with the act of asserting or stating is that the speaker believes that the proposition is true, the hearer is allowed to make an inference about the truth of the proposition from the speaker's statement I believe that (I think that) p. Grammaticalization has also been treated as a fairly mechanical process, which can be explained in terms of frequency and that-deletion. In the recent analysis of I think by Thompson - Mulac (1991), the frequency of I think without that is evidence for "grammaticalization". In other words, the evidence suggests that the most frequent subjects and verbs occurring with what syntacticians have considered to be 'that-less' 'complements', ... have in fact been reanalyzed by speakers as epistemic phrases, which have a degree of freedom not possible for subject-verb combinations; in particular they are 'free' to occur in other positions, just as other epistemic phrases, such as epistemic adverbs, do in English. (1991: 317)

Even if Thompson — Mulac's proposal looks neat, it is not very likely for the following reasons. First, such a development is not confirmed by what we know about the history of think. As Rissanen points out (1991: 283), there is no reason to regard I think without that as a result of a historical process of grammaticalization since "zero may have been the unmarked link in speech throughout the Old and Early Middle English period". Secondly, it is difficult to explain other examples of zero replacing that in the same way. It would, for example, be strange to say that John said in John said Bill was fat with zero has been reanalysed as an adverb. Both diachronically and synchronically that-deletion may have other explanations. Diachronically, there is evidence for a gradual change in the frequency of zero after think and related verbs. In Rissanen's data (1991) from Early Modern English, zero was, for example, by far the most frequent variant after think (23/2 examples during the period 1500-1570 and 34/3 at a later stage (1640-1710). 6 According to Rissa-

I think - an English modal particle

9

nen, one of the reasons for this development may be a stylistic shift towards less formality although many other factors are involved. Also in a synchronic context, zero is associated with text type and style. Thus it can be shown on the basis of the distribution of that and zero in the L o n d o n - L u n d Corpus that zero is frequent above all in certain text types. In all there were 1757 examples of I think in the London-Lund Corpus distributed over different genres as shown in Table 1.: Table 1: The distribution of I think (with or without that) over different text-types in LLC Number

Type of discourse

ra

Informal face-to-face conversation

879

51

Non-surreptitious conversation, discussion, interviews Public speaking, sports commentaries, etc. Prepared speech, radio broadcasts, etc. Telephone calls, messages on the answering machine, etc.

496

26

176

29

62

17

144

28

Total

1757

a. Since the texts differ in size, the absolute frequencies have been supplemented with relative frequencies ( = r) indicating the number of frequencies per 10,000 words.

In all, 1,644 (93%) examples were followed by zero. Thompson and Mulac (1991) found that think and guess were much more frequent without that than other verbs such as believe or suggest. In Table 2, the frequencies of that and zero after I think in the London-Lund Corpus are compared with Thompson and Mulac's American data: Table 2\ The distribution of that and zero after I think in LLC and in Thompson and Mulac (1991) Type of c o m p l e m e n t e r

LLC

Thompson and Mulac

I think that I think 0

122 (7%) 1644 (93%)

54 (8%) 599 (92%,)

Total

1766 ( = 100%)

653 ( = 100%)

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If one compares the distribution of that or zero over different text types, it appears that zero dominated in informal conversation (842 examples or 94% of all the zero examples). That was above all used in discussion (48% of the examples). In more formal conversation or public speech, both genres characterized by little involvement and interaction, the percentages were lower (14% and 7% respectively). These results are compatible with Biber's who investigated primarily the difference between speech and writing. According to Biber (1988),7 the text type "informal conversation" in the L o n d o n - L u n d Corpus had the highest score of "private verbs" (e.g. think), first person subjects, and //zai-deletion, features which are characteristic of Involvement on the dimension Involved versus Informational production. On the other hand, prepared speech had the highest mean score for that according to Biber. Biber was concerned with the analysis of text types in terms of linguistic criteria. I think has also been analysed in terms of the role of the speaker. Briefly, what has been suggested by several writers (Benveniste 1966, Banfield 1973, Maynard 1993) is that there is an epistemological distinction between two functions of language: indicating facts and expressing the state of the speaker. When I think is expressive, its function is to express the speaker's emotions. In the fact-indicating or objective style, the speaker refers to himself and to his beliefs as if he referred to a third person. How I think is used is probably the speaker's own choice but linguistic indicators like that may indicate what style is used. Thus when that is used, I think is more likely to express an objective and informative statement about the speaker's beliefs: (9)

A */ mean* I think that every single qu\estion# that I dl\id#. I could n\!ot have done b\etter# - (2.9 450-452)

2.2. The semantic structure of think Think can have a number of different meanings such as 'believe', 'cogitate', and 'intend'. Preisler (1986) is the only writer I know who distinguishes between think 'find' expressing a subjective attitude and think 'believe'. Some indirect proof for the different meanings of think and their relations comes from the history of the verb. To get a better idea of what

I think — an English modal particle

11

think means we can also analyse its functional equivalents and crosslinguistic correspondences in other languages. We know from various sources (cf. Persson 1993; Palander-Collin, forthcoming) that there were two different verbs in Old English (OE pencan and OE pyncan) representing different types of gradation of the same Indo-European root. Compare the following sentence pair (from Persson 1993: 9): (10)

A pyncan (past tense puhte) ('seem') pa Finnas, him f?uhte, ondpä Beormas sprcecon neah än gepeöde. 'The Finns it seemed to him and the Permians spoke almost one language' (Ohthere's Voyage 1.34)

(11)

Β pencan (past tense pohte) ('be of the opinion that'; to think, cogitate) da ööhte he pcet he wolde gesecan helle godu, ... 'Then thought he that he wanted to visit the gods of hell' (King Alfred, Orpheus and Eurydice 1.18)

The meaning of pyncan can be paraphrased by 'seem' (me puhte 'it seemed to me') in present-day English while pencan expresses opinion (= 'believe'). The difference between the verbs is also syntactic since pyncan is impersonal with a dependent dative object functioning as the cause or the source of an experience while pencan has a personal subject. The verbs became indistinguishable as a result of phonological coalescence 8 and, in particular, the change from impersonal to personal subject starting in Middle English affecting pyncan (Persson 1993). We are lucky to have a detailed analysis of the historical development of the meanings of think by Palander-Collin 9 . Unfortunately, however, Palander-Collin does not distinguish between the two senses 'belief' and 'attitude' in the later development of think. Still it is clear that they can and must be distinguished in present-day English. Moreover, from the perspective of pragmaticalization it is desirable to assume that think is polysemous, and that categories can be organized as prototypes if they have several meanings. Compare Hopper - Traugott: "In general, from the perspective of grammaticalization it is methodologically essential to assume polysemy if there is a plausible semantic relationship, whether or not the forms belong to the same syntactic category, because otherwise relationships between more or less grammaticalized

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variants of the same form cannot be established, either diachronically or synchronically" (1993: 71). Polysemy has generally been treated as a stepchild in formal theories of semantics, probably because it is difficult to give a principled account of how meanings are related without considering both synchronic variation and diachronic change. In the light of present-day semantic theory we could claim that think is organized as a prototype with COGITATION (= Swedish tänka; German denken) as a focus. This is a general concept which can easily be extended to belief, opinion and intention by inferencing. Schematically the different senses can be illustrated as in Figure 4. COGITATION

BELIEF

OPINION

INTENTION

Figure 4: The polysemic structure of think

COGITATION describes the meaning of the dynamic verb think (cf. think of, I am thinking). Think has affinities to see, another polysemous verb, because of its general nature and its grounding in the physical world. Unlike think, see has been much discussed as a source of metaphor and pragmatic extensions (cf. Alm-Arvius 1993; Sweetser 1990). Thus a well-known metaphoric relationship involving a relationship from concrete to abstract is that of seeing (cf. Latin sequor 'follow /with the eyes/') and understanding (/ see what you mean) (cf. Sweetser 1990). A similar link can be established between thinking, i.e., a physical and concrete activity and opinion, a mental activity in order to explain the development COGITATION -» BELIEF. The extension involves metaphoric strategies, i. e., speakers view the formation of an opinion or belief in terms of thinking and borrow the verb think to express the new meanings. Evidence for this analysis is that the senses may "overlap" as in some dialects of Swedish where no distinction is made between tänka ('think') and tro ('believe') (Han kommer nog snart tänker jag 'He comes probably soon I think'). The transition from thinking to INTENTION shows that the same processes and principles are involved. The change is most clear in Swedish where tänka ('cogitate') is used both about thinking and as a 'purposive' future.

I think — an English modal particle

(12)

13

Jag tänker göra det. I think do it Ί am thinking of doing it'; Ί intend to do it.' 10

What takes place here is that the concept thinking is borrowed as a metaphor from the physical world to the world of intentions and planning (Sweetser 1990). In English we get a link between thinking and intending mainly in the past tense (OED, II.8): (13)

I thought that I should leave tomorrow.

2.2.1. Functional and cross-linguistic equivalents of think The diachronic analysis tells us little about the meanings of think in present-day English since the original semantic and syntactic distinctions are obscured by subsequent developments. By comparing think with its functional equivalents in English we can, however, sharpen the description of what think means. How are, for example, the following sentences related? (14)

Bill seems to be at home.

(15)

I think that Bill is at home.

Semantically, (14) and (15) have a different analysis. When the impersonal seem is used, the subject functions as the cause of a cognitive experience, and the experiencer (to me) is optional. Think of course requires a personal subject sometimes called the recipient subject (cf. PalanderCollin, forthcoming). Sentences (14) and (15) are close in meaning. Chafe (1986), however, analyses seem as having the meaning induction (cf. Section 3) and thus as different from think or believe. Seem also refers to general belief or opinion (in which case it is related to I hear rather than to believe).11 Finally, in It seems to me that Bill is a fool, we are obliged to analyse seem as expressing a subjective attitude rather than opinion and as related to find (/ find Bill a fool). The meanings of think can be further elucidated by a cross-linguistic comparison. Swedish has, for example, three verbs tänka, tycka, and tro corresponding to 'cogitate', 'find', and 'believe' respectively. Other languages make the same distinction: German {denken-glauben—

14

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finden—meinen) and French (penser—croire— trouver) while, for example, Modern Greek (Viberg 1980) is like English in using the same verb for both the meaning 'believe' and 'find'. The relationship between the verbs in four different languages (English, Swedish, German, French) can be represented as the criss-cross pattern of contrastive links shown in Figure 5.: English

Swedish

German

French

Figure 5: Cross-linguistic equivalents of think and related verbs in English, Swedish, German, and French.

The cross-linguistic investigation helps us to establish under what conditions think does not mean 'believe'. When future time is referred to, think must, for example, be translated by tro 'believe': (16)

Jag tror att det blir regn. I believe that it becomes rain Ί believe it's going to rain.'

In some examples think is translated by tycka. The "the rule of thumb" is that think can be translated into Swedish tycka when it does not mean 'believe'. (17) illustrates an example where tycka must be used in Swedish, and think therefore does not mean 'believe' but can be paraphrased by 'find': (17)

Jag tycker hon är söt. I think she is pretty *Jag tror hon är söt. I believe she is pretty Ί think she is pretty.'

The conditions of use for tycka in Swedish are, however, complicated. The main rule seems to be that tycka must be used if the proposition

I think — an English modal particle

15

contains a degree adjective. The idea is that "she is pretty" is purely subjective, i.e., there is no simple way in which the hearer can bring in objective evidence which could cause the speaker to change his mind. I believe she is pretty or jag tror hon är söt in Swedish would sound strange because the English sentence and its translation into Swedish would imply that the speaker has objective evidence rather than that he bases himself on personal opinion, impression, previous experience, etc. It would, however, be possible for the speaker to utter I believe Bill's wife is pretty implying, for example, that although he has not met Bill's wife he has reliable hearsay information that what is asserted in the proposition is true. In other examples, the choice of tycka 'find' or tro 'believe' conveys a meaning difference: (18)

Jag tycker jag ser ett spöke. Ί think I see a ghost.'

In (18), the speaker reports directly what he sees (cf. Persson's (1993) "impression" sense and Chafe's (1986) "evidence" based on sense impressions). Compare: (19)

Jag tror jag ser ett spöke. Ί believe I see a ghost.'

(19) is appropriate when the speaker claims to have some evidence for what he sees. It can be argued that in (20), tro ('believe') does not express epistemic modality, i.e., a commitment to the truth of the proposition, since what is expressed is a subjective opinion for which no evidence is available: (20)

Jag tror att det vore bra om du kunde komma. I believe that it were good if you could come Ί believe it would be a good idea if you could come.'

Compare: (21)

Jag tycker att det vore bra om du kunde komma. I think that it were good if you could come Ί find it would be a good idea if you could come.'

It is clear however that (20) and (21) are used in different situations. In (20) the speaker uses his authority and refers to evidence (in his mind), while the proposition introduced by tycka is purely subjective.

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Thus Swedish is a good example that 'thinking/believing' and 'thinking/finding' are different meanings although the distinction between the two meanings and their relation to epistemic modality is unclear. A direct argument for distinguishing between the meanings 'find' and 'believe' is finally that the distinction can be expressed linguistically. The example I have in mind is I would think, which must have the meaning 'believe' as indicated by its functional equivalents in English ('believe') and by its cross-linguistic correspondences in Swedish: (22)

I would think that he is at home. 'Jag skulle tro att han är hemma.' Ί would believe that he is at home.' *'Jag skulle tycka att han är hemma.' *'I would find that he is at home.'

(23)

?

/ would think she is pretty. 'Jag skulle tro hon är söt.' ? 'I would believe that she is pretty.' * 'Jag skulle tycka att hon är söt.' Ί would find her pretty.' ?

3. Defining epistemic modality I think as a pragmatic element expresses epistemic modality. Modal logic 12 is, however, not an appropriate model for analysing pragmatic aspects of epistemic modality. We need a theory capable of accounting for the functions of a large number of morphologically different elements, including modal auxiliaries, modal particles, modal adverbs, verbs, morphologized moods, in terms of a number of pragmatic parameters. As Maynard (1993: 37) puts it: Obviously any departure from modal logic as a primary source of analysis creates the possibility for opening up modality research and making it perhaps even chaotic. The neatness and comfortable order imposed by traditional analysis of modal logic is replaced by often muddled and sometimes confusing explanations. Here we must remind ourselves that one must not celebrate a neat and tidy analysis merely because of its neatness. For, when faced with the untidiness of real-life use of language, we are compelled to acknowledge the limitations of a cleanly definable modal logic. Resurrecting the speaking self and recognising language as a self-expression negoti-

I think — an English modal particle

17

ated in intricately c o m p l e x multilevel actual h u m a n interaction leads us toward a pragmatics-oriented concept o f modality.

I think belongs to a system of epistemic modality which is closely related to evidentiality, i.e., the domain of linguistic elements expressing various attitudes to knowledge (Chafe 1986: 262). For example, if the speaker says It's probably a spider, the knowledge would be the idea that it is a spider, and probably indicates something about the degree of reliability of that knowledge (Chafe 1986: 263). In Chafe's model, the epistemology of "evidentials" in different languages is described with the help of the source of knowledge, the "mode" of knowing and the reliability of the knowledge (see Table 3). In addition, knowledge may be matched against expectations {of course), against verbal resources or categories (sort of) or what is normally the case (/basically, essentially, normally). Table 3: Taxonomy of evidentials according to source of knowledge, mode of knowing, and reliability of knowledge (based on Chafe 1986) Source of knowledge

Mode of knowing

Reliability

??? hypothesis evidence language

belief deduction induction hearsay

high

low

Belief as the mode of knowing is difficult to analyse. A statement of belief is close to the expression of emotion: "7 believe throws light on my state. Conclusions about my conduct can be drawn from this expression so there is a similarity here to expressions of emotion, of mood, etc." (Wittgenstein 1974: 191). However, I believe does not only express a subjective attitude. It also conveys that the speaker has some evidence for what he says. A closer analysis of belief suggests that the evidence is incomplete or non-specific (marked by ? in Table 3): "There may be evidence to support a belief, evidence which a believer may cite if pressed for it by a nonbeliever, but belief is always based on something other than evidence alone" (Chafe 1986: 266). Deduction accounts not only for clear examples of deduction such as that would be consistent with the obtained results but also for some uses of can (coke bottles can be difficult to open). Induction is exemplified by epistemic modal auxiliaries (that must be a mistake·, that will be the milkman) and by impersonal verbs {seem). The

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category can be further subclassified depending on the type of evidence. Within the evidential type "hearsay", a distinction can be made between according to X (reference to authority) and it is said that (unreliable knowledge). The parameter "reliability of knowledge" is needed to analyse auxiliaries and adverbs {probably, perhaps, may, might, could). Reliability of knowledge must also be an independent dimension along which each mode of knowledge can move (Figure 6): ligh degree of reliability I am sure I believe I think I suppose I guess low degree of reliability Figure 6\ The scale of high and low degree of reliability (exemplified for the mode of knowledge "belief')

On this scale, I am sure expresses a stronger degree of commitment to the truth of the proposition than I guess. It is also possible to compare epistemic qualifiers expressing the same degree of reliability but belonging to different modes of knowledge, e. g., seem, I think, must. For the purpose of analysing expressions of epistemic modality or evidentiality I shall use Caton's term "epistemic qualifier" (1969).13 Typical epistemic qualifiers are modal auxiliaries {may, must), adjectives {it is certain), adverbs {perhaps), nouns {there is a possibility), and "epistemic parentheticals" {I think, I believe, I guess). In a cross-linguistic perspective one must take into account epistemic qualifiers which have been morphologized or are realized by modal particles. B. L. Whorf (1956) gives examples of a number of so-called modalizers or mood elements in Hopi with meanings such as "quotative" {they say, according to the story), "indeterminate" {perhaps, possibly, maybe), "concessive" {it seems that, evidently, apparently), etc. (see also Aijmer 1980). The area of epistemic modality is, however, fuzzy. Epistemic qualifiers may, for example, slide across one of the types within the functional domain (Chafe 1986: 262). As a result, it seems can, for example, also belong to the category hearsay {it seems that he has been abroad). (I) think represents even greater problems since it has meanings which are not epistemic, and it slides easily across the boundary to different subcat-

I think - an English modal particle

19

egories. It is, for example, not clear whether it should be analysed as induction (like seem) or as belief (like believe)}4 The main point about epistemic qualifiers seems to be that they either soften or reinforce illocutionary force. The following conversational text from the London-Lund Corpus illustrates the interactive use of some epistemic qualifiers: [Informal conversation between female academics about the choice of pictures for the staff room and about personal matters.] (24)

A there are c/ups# nVescafe# Β shall we have a cup of c/offee#. A yes c\ertainly# yes !c\ertainly#. y\es# Β VI see# they're all (6 seconds untranscribable) - A s\ome of them are rather l/arge#. Β [/m]#. A some of them are rather l\arge# Β ((4 to 5 sylls)) — A, Β (10 seconds untranscribable) A y=es# Β ((p\art)) o f t h a t r=eally#. A [/mhm]#. th=ink so#— Β ((6 sylls -- 1 syll)). A p/ardon# Β y\es# -stick a !l\abel# on them if !n\ecessary# ((5 to 6 sylls)) when you l\eave# — A it's all !m\y f/ault ((you see))# you know he he !rang bef\ore# and I said well look here Β *Aoh#* (A I've *got* to !run !n\ow# =and [a]# I said give !Br\enda pri/ority# I said I can't be back till ten pVast# —

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Β A Β A

Β A Β A Β A

Β

A

Β A Β

Aijmer

I've got a feeling I know this !f\ace Brenda#. [\mhm]# I think one !d\oes 'know it# — ((got a)) !t\emperature# — I don't think I've \ o h # there \is milk# ((3 to 4 sylls - 3 to 4 sylls)) well I'll tr\y it [3]#. without *[a] the first* *y\es# ο/κ#* [am] - ((2 sylls)) thank you very m\uch# ~ ((s\een))# — want any s/ugar#. yVes please Brenda# /one#. that's about r\ight# yes Ithat's en/ough thank you# — not y/ours is it *((2 sylls))#* *scr\ipts\oh n o # * those are my scr\ipt# I just saw the n\ote# ((and I know that's all r/ight))# -((just)) put my gl\asses o n # I can't see a IthAing ((without them))# — ((well after all)) they're too dark to be in!sp\iriting# Xaren't they#. I don't w\ant one# I'm afr/aid# I think I(('d 'rather *substit/ute))#* *y/es# (S 1.8 2 - 6 0 )

Epistemic qualifiers are used to avoid disagreement, to soften speech acts, or to express involvement. Using a term from Crystal - Davy (1975), we can refer to I think as a "softener" or "softening connective". I think may, for example, be used to soften a blunt assertion. (25)

I think one IdSoes know i t # —

Like the simple / think, I don't think can be used to avoid bluntness.

I think — an English modal particle

(26)

21

Β / don7 think Pve \ o h # there \is milk#

Thus Tottie (1991) claims that "... it is certainly no accident that mental verbs collocate with negation, which adds to the emotional character of what is said, and which contributes to avoidance of bluntness, and to the achievement of what Fraser (1980) calls conversational mitigation" (1991: 43). Certainly does not in the first place have epistemic meaning but expresses agreement: (27)

A yes c\ertainly# yes !c\ertainly# y\es#

With really knowledge is matched against what is really or in fact the case (the evidential meaning) but it also contributes to the involvement expressed by the text: (28)

((p\art)) of that

r=eally#.

3.1. The deliberative and tentative function of I think Paradoxically, I think may express either uncertainty or certainty. Holmes (1990:199), for example, recognizes "two distinct and contrastive functions of I think", depending on whether I think is prosodically and lexically more or less prominent. On the one hand, I think signals "careful deliberation, objectivity and perhaps authority" (Preisler 1986). On the other hand, I think may have tentative function and express uncertainty. In a corpus study, the criteria for classification have to be made explicit. The criteria I have used to distinguish between the deliberative and tentative function are prosodic, grammatical, and positional. I think has been classified as "deliberative" if it has the nuclear tone or a prosodic booster (marked by ! in the transcription) upgrading the prosodic prominence of the verb and occurs first in the utterance. Moreover, all examples where / think is followed by the //^-complementizer have been regarded as deliberative since they carry some prominence. The other examples have been classified as tentative. Cases of I think in medial and final position have been classified as tentative even if they are prosodically prominent. The tentative I think expresses uncertainty (epistemic modality) or softens an assertion which may be too blunt (interactive meaning).

22

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Β but he also sold th\at business {s\ince#}# he sold thVat business# I think that was sold for anAother quarter of a m/illion# ((w\asn"t it# (1.13: 774-777)

In the deliberative function I think adds weight to the assertion or expresses reassurance (Holmes 1990). (30)

D y\es#+y\es# -((4 sylls)) + Β +1 th\ink {th\at [a:]#}# the bVoys# had all+ h\ad {an adv\antage#}# (1.12: 187-192)

The effects of the deliberative and tentative I think are quite different even though both have to do with politeness. The deliberative I think expresses positive politeness and "rapport", while the tentative I think is associated with social distancing and with negative politeness (Brown Levinson 1978). In (31) and (32), I think is mildly authoritative and can be paraphrased as Ί am almost sure that': (31)

a the C V C \ P # I {th\ink is} t\aking [öi:]. {l\ine#}# that Pve !just - [i]:nn\ounced#. (5.13: 225-227)

(32)

f and IChris Ll\oyd# came to the n\et then# I th\ink for the f/irst time in the m\atch# 1010-1012)

-- (10.10:

If the nucleus is moved from the verb to the subject, more reinforcement and reassurance are expressed: (33)

Β [a:m] -- VI think that could be done# by negoti\ation# with with whoever one was teaching it w\ith# (3.6: 224-226)

I think — an English modal particle

23

Table 4 demonstrates that the tentative function was by far the most frequent one (85%) in the L o n d o n - L u n d Corpus: Table 4: Distribution of the tentative and deliberative I think in LLC 1 5 Type of I think

Number

tentative deliberative

1497 (85%) 260 (15%)

Total

1757

There was little evidence in the London —Lund Corpus that the deliberative or tentative use of I think was sex-specific although one can expect pragmatic variants to be sensitive to such distinctions (see Preisler 1986; Holmes 1990). Holmes (1990) found, for example, that women used / think more frequently than men in the deliberative function. The data from the London —Lund Corpus are shown in Table 5. Table 5: Distribution of the function of I think on the basis of sex of speaker Type of I think

Female

tentative deliberative

438 (83%) 89 (17%) 527 (100%)

Total

Male 878 (85%) 146 (15%) 1024 (100%)

The table shows that the overall frequency of I think is higher among male speakers, but that there is hardly any difference with regard to function. 3.2. I think in mid and end position The distribution of I think in different positions in the utterance is shown in Table 6: Table 6: Distribution of I think in different positions in the utterance Position

Number

Front Mid End

1377 159 221

Total

1757

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Position seems to be important for the function of I think. In the first occurrence of I think in (34), the tone is falling and the function reinforcing ('deliberative'). When I think is placed at the end of the utterance, less certainty is signalled. (34)

a in I !th\ink# nineteen sixty-!six sixty-!s\even# sixty-seven I t h / i n k # - (11.2: 2 9 0 - 2 9 2 )

Whether I think appears in medial or final position seems to be an effect of the speaker's planning. I think is inserted where it is natural for the speaker to stop to plan, for example after a nominal head as subject. (35)

tl Diana !D\ors I t h / i n k # would be m\y choice# (5.1: 6 1 8 - 6 1 9 )

The characteristic intonation pattern is a rising tone on I think and a fall tone on the immediately preceding word. I think can also be placed between elements in the verb phrase with only a slightly different semantic effect: (36)

b as . Dennis Danby and VI#. may be !s\aid I t h / i n k # to . represent . the . established pr/actice# I suggest that we ask Mr !MVoore#. (5.6: 14—17)

(37)

c it is l\udicrous I t h / i n k # that we sh\ould {ins\ist#}# in the Civil Service and \elsewhere# - (5.5: 281—283)

I think was usually found before or after tone unit boundaries indicating that it cooccurs with the speaker's planning. A minority of examples (17 examples) did not carry the nucleus in mid position: (38)

Β and of course the loc\ations# . are . I think absolutely es!s\ential# to make the thing - !y\ou k n o w # . practically \useful# . (2.1: 6 9 4 - 6 9 7 )

The speaker has several alternative ways of presenting the information. The parenthetical I think can, for example, form a separate intonation

I think - an English modal particle

25

group. I think functions as "an afterthought" qualifying some information which has been given in the preceding part of the utterance. The tone was usually rising. For example: (39)

A who [sei] they've !now got a !fl\at# in ICrouch !!AEnd# I th/ink# (1.6: 84-86)

(40)

C [\m]# it's bound to come Vout though#. I th/ink# a do you think so C [\m]#. (2.7: 162-166)

Secondly, I think can be presented as a post-nuclear "tail" pronounced on a low pitch (Altenberg 1987: 30) as in example (41) or carry the nucleus in a larger tone unit pattern (e. g., examples 36 and 37 above): (41)

Β that he I mean he's a very !{\interesting} candidate H/erman I think# although he h\e's becoming /old# (2.6: 757-758)

It is unlikely that I think in (41) serves a different function when it is prosodically less prominent. The choice between the variants in which / think has mid or end position depends on extralinguistic factors such as the speed of delivery and planning and is ultimately the speaker's own choice (cf. Altenberg 1987). The clitic I think (followed by a tone-unit boundary) is also a polite way of softening or downtoning a previous "head". (42)

c if s mVainly# cos a lVot of them I think# come from Catholic families and *((theyvre +never even)) !m\entioned#. (4.7: 879-881)

A comparison can be made with the conjunct however which can follow a noun phrase head as a "clitic" (The judge, however, took a different view) besides having initial position (However; the judge took a different view) without any noticeable difference in function. (Hopper - Traugott 1993: 133).

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We may summarize the behaviour of I think in mid and end position by giving some rough statistics. In 134 examples it was an afterthought, i.e., it was a separate tone unit; in 32 examples it was a prosodic "tail" and in 114 examples it was part of a larger prosodic pattern. 3.3 Modal clustering and discourse function At the opening of the speaker's turn before the actual message one finds clusters of textual, modal and interpersonal expressions with internal structure (cf. Halliday 1985: 53-54). The most frequent recurrent word combinations containing I think in the L o n d o n - L u n d Corpus are given in Table 7: Table 7: Clusters containing I think in turn-initial position Type of cluster well I think I mean I think you know I think I think you know I think probably I think perhaps really I think yes well I think I think really I think you see well I think probably I think possibly I think I think Total

Number 23 17 13 9 8 8 7 4 4 3 3 3 2 104

Well I think was the most frequent pattern: (43)

A well I think I paint with you know sort of complete abs\orption#. (1.8: 811)

By starting a new turn with well I think the speaker marks hesitation, that he wants to be informal, etc. Clusters of modal and interpersonal elements occur frequently if the topic is embarrassing or if the speaker says something unfavourable about another person:

I think — an English modal particle

(44)

27

Β well - I don't know whether he's ridViculous# Pm sure I [η] I think probably he's only a A *(. coughs)* (B *sort of* mVouthpiece# (2.3: 1008-1009)

In spoken interaction, there is no clear division between planning and executing the message, but the speaker plans on-line on the basis of a "blueprint" of the message (cf. Clark - Clark 1977: 248). Since most of the planning takes place at the beginning of the turn, modal and interpersonal elements cooccur with hesitation noises, word-search, repetition, and self-corrections. In (45), the repetition of I think reflects the speaker's difficulties in finding the right word: (45)

a I I think I think that that's I think that's the best thing r/eally# (5.11: 1010)

In (46) and (47), the combination I think I mean reflects the hesitation and confusion before the speaker comes to grips with the message: (46)

d and I think that [s: öa:] I mean I think it's v\ery important# (5.7: 713)

(47)

A for an\other five years# yVou know# I mean there"s a I think there's a !l\imit# to how much a [m] . a man can t/ake# •(laughs --)* (2.9: 587-591)

Another position for clusters of modal and interpersonal elements is at the end of the speaker turn. The clusters found here serve to assure the hearer that the relationship will continue: (48)

A I mean it's nVearly finished# I've got some !b\its of it# but that would be the best — !w\ay / th!ink# you *kn/ow#* (1.9: 898-901)

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Not unexpectedly we also find utterances in informal conversation which consist nearly exclusively of modal and interpersonal "padding": (49)

A I think it's yVou 'know# I think it !\is good you kn/ow# (1.8: 212-13)

4. Epistemic qualifiers in Swedish Both in English and in Swedish there are epistemic modal constructions such as I think which are structurally mobile, modal auxiliaries, adverbs, adjectives, nouns, etc. A difference between English and Swedish is that Swedish has modal particles as seen from the descriptive sketch in Table 8: Table 8: Epistemic qualifiers in Swedish Grammatical realisation

Examples

epistemic verbs in the present tense with a first person subject; epistemic verbs in the passive

jag tror Ί think', jag antar Ί suppose', jag förmodar Ί suppose'; tycks 'seem', anses 'seem', pastas 'it is said'

modal auxiliaries modal adverbs modal particles modal adjectives modal nouns

kan 'can', kunde 'could', mäste 'must', matte 'may', torde 'will', lär 'be supposed to, they say', skall 'be said to' kanske 'perhaps', möjligen 'possibly', troligen 'probably', förmodligen 'probably', antagligen 'probably', säkert 'probably' väl Ί suppose', nog 'probably', visst 'certainly', va, 'isn't he', vetja 'of course' säker 'sure' det är min äsikt att 'it is my opinion that'

Modal particles are distinguished by their fixed position in relation to the verb and to adverbs: (50)

Han har väl förmodligen alltid bott i Finland. 'He has I suppose probably always lived in Finland.' (Andersson 1976: 31)

Väl is placed immediately after the verbal operator but before other adverbs. We can also note that, as a rule, modal particles do not form single tone units, and they belong to larger nuclear patterns.

I {hink - an English modal particle

29

Since modal particles also occur together with other epistemic qualifiers we must consider combinations: (a) modal particles and adverb (nog säkert, förmodligen)

väl kanske,

väl

(b) modal particles and modal auxiliaries (kan väl, mäste väl) (c) two modal particles (nog visst, nog väl) (d) modal particle and epistemic verb (väl ... antar jag) In Swedish, modal particles 16 need to be analysed also with regard to other parameters than the type of evidence or mode of knowledge. In Aijmer (1977), I argued that väl is associated with an appeal to the hearer to confirm something or to agree in addition to the epistemic meaning of expressing some reservation with regard to the truth of the proposition. (51)

jo men det kan vi väl göra. yes but that can we I-suppose do 'Yes but we can do that, can't we' (Swedish database: Text 504)

(52)

hm ja det är nog svärt att säja. 'mhm yes it is probably difficult to say' (Swedish database: Text 504)

(53)

Andreas Andreas 'Andreas (Swedish

sa visst det att Olle hade sagt det... said certainly it that Olle had said it certainly said that Olle had said so' database: Text 553)

5. The contrastive analysis 5.1. The contrastive analysis of epistemic qualifiers The aim of contrastive pragmatic analysis is to pinpoint similarities and differences in use in two or more languages which can be given an explanation in terms of culture, sociolinguistic analysis, grammaticalization, pragmaticalization, etc.

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On the basis of the analysis of epistemic modality in the first part, I have picked out a set of linguistic devices which can be compared with their translation equivalents in Swedish. The material I have used is mainly The Swedish—English Parallel Corpus /SEPC/) which is being compiled in Lund (Aijmer-Altenberg 1996). The corpus will contain two types of text: first, translations from English into Swedish and from Swedish into English and, second parallel texts, i. e., texts which are comparable without being translations. Translations

Swedish-English Parallel Corpus (SEPC)

Parallel texts Figure 7: The Swedish-English Parallel Corpus

The epistemic qualifiers which have been investigated in translations indicate a "high degree of reliability of knowledge" (see Table 9): Table 9: Frequencies of a sample of epistemic qualifiers (EQs) in the English originals of SEPC (about 40,000 words) Type of EQ

Number

I suppose17 tag questions must I think surely probably I don't think I expect presumably I reckon I don't expect I imagine will I presume I should have thought I should think my guess is

26 20 19 15 11 10 6 5 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1

Total

129

I think - an English modal particle

31

In a few examples such as (54) we find correpondences between elements belonging to the same modal subdomain which also have the the same grammatical form. Presumably was, for example, translated by the Swedish adverb förmodligen in all but one example: (54)

Presumably the poor little devil is getting a kick out of her gesture and it isn't hurting me. (James, English original (EO) 40).

(55)

Förmodligen far den stackars kraken en kick av det här pähittet och mig skadar det inte. (James, ST 41)

One of the clearest correspondences was between must and the cognate modal auxiliary in Swedish. Säkert, which was found as the translation in one example also belongs to the epistemic subtype induction: (56)

It must be something to do with my relationship with my father. (Weldon, EO 24)

(57)

Säkert har det med mitt förhällande till pappa att göra. Surely has it with my relationship to Daddy to do (Weldon, ST 27)

The correspondences of surely are represented in Table 10: Table 10: Translation equivalents of surely in SEPC Equivalents

Number

väl visst säkert mäste

6 1 1 1

Total

9

The strongest link is between surely and väl. For example: (58)

The children are no different, surely, than any others ... (James, EO 7)

(59)

De här barnen skiljer sig väl inte ... these children differ I-suppose not (James, ST 7)

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The analysis of authentic translations also gives examples of links which are less frequent or prototypical. These are of particular interest since they are difficult to establish without quantitative data. The examples must be analysed with care since the less frequent translations may be due to the translator's idiosyncracies. The adverb surely corresponds to the modal particle väl but we should also account for the correspondence between surely and the modal auxiliary mäste ('must') or with säkert ('surely'). When surely is translated by an adverb ('säkert'), no appeal is made to the hearer: (60)

Then surely everything would be all right. (Weldon, EO 24)

(61)

Da skulle säkert allting ordna sig. (Weldon, ST 26)

As Gellerstam (1989: 112) has pointed out, the syntactic pattern represented by I think, I suppose, etc., tends to be retained in translations into Swedish and used rather than a more idiomatic modality particle (nog, väl, visst). This phenomenon can be described as "translationese", a special kind of "interlanguage" which is partly different both from the source and the target language. I think was translated by jag tror ( Ί believe') and corresponded to a modal particle in only two examples (nog). I suppose was, however, frequently rendered by the modal particle väl: Table 77: Translation equivalents of I suppose in SEPC Translation equivalent

Number

jag antar väl väl ... antar jag förstäs kanske

4 5 1 1

Total

19

8

I suppose corresponds to väl or to jag antar. An interesting variant is illustrated by väl and antar jag in the same utterance: (62)

One oughtn't to think about that I suppose (James, EO 57)

/ think — an English modal particle

(63)

33

Man borde väl inte tänka sä antar jag one ought I-suppose not think like that suppose I (James, ST 58)

We also need to find out what väl corresponds to in Swedish originals and whether there are examples where väl must not be translated by / suppose. In order to do this, the directional contrastive approach needs to be supplemented by the "bidirectional" one which implies going both from English into Swedish and from Swedish into English (cf. Krzeszowski 1990). This is a relatively unexplored innovation in contrastive analysis. By this method we can gain some insights into genuine equivalents and keep a check on "translationese". The investigation of the translations of väl gave, for example, the following results: Table 12: Translation equivalents of ra/.18 Translation equivalent

Number

I suppose tag question question must surely I expect probably of course I guess certainly present tense- > p a s t tense

10 1019 9 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1

most likely Total

1 44

There are several possibilities of translating väl into English which all express an appeal to the hearer. The comparison serves to strengthen some of the links provided by the analysis from English into Swedish, for example between väl and a modal adverb {surely) or with I suppose. The correspondence between väl and I suppose is illustrated in (64) and (65): (64)

Snickarungarna var väl inte sä aktsamma. (Lindgren, SO 31)

(65)

I suppose the carpenter's children could not always have been so very good. (Lindgren, ET 29)

34

Karin

Aijmer

The change from present to past tense to render väl is illustrated by: (66)

Det kan väl vara kul om det är du som drömmer ... 'It can I suppose be fun if it is you who dream' (Gripe, SO 9)

(67)

But it could be fun if you're the dreamer ... (Gripe, ET 9)

The correspondences are sometimes difficult to analyse. This is illustrated by the following examples: (68)

Och förresten var det väl en konstig fräga frän en militär?20

(69)

Isn't that a strange question from a military man?

It is not easy to say what väl corresponds to in example (68) and the contrastive analysis needs to be supplemented by testing. Should, for example, väl be identified with interrogative form, with negative polarity or with the negative question form. The fact that we also find affirmative questions corresponding to väl suggests that väl can be equivalent to a question: (70)

Jag har väl talat om att jag inte var ensam i mitt rum? Ί have I suppose told you that I wasn't alone in my room?' (Gripe, SO 18)

(71)

Have I mentioned that I wasn't the only occupant of my room(Gripe, ET 16)

(72)

Du fryser väl inte. (Gripe, SO 67)

(73)

Are you cold? (Gripe, ET 60)

By looking at the uses of väl in the Swedish translations of the English originals we can also check if there are examples which are not accounted for by the bidirectional analysis of the English originals and the Swedish originals. The following example of väl illustrates that väl can be stressed,

I think - an English modal particle

35

i.e., it expresses reinforcement or persuasion rather than tentativeness and softening: (74)

Ni kan väl vara tysta. (Weldon, ST 18)

(75)

Do be quiet. (Weldon, EO 15)

Another example of the reinforcing väl is illustrated in (76): (76)

Smä barn far inte vara pä bryggan, det vet du väl? (Lindgren, SO p. 125)

(77)

Children aren't out allowed on jetties, surely you know that (Lindgren, ET, p. 118)

Nog corresponded in most cases to probably or must: Table 13: Translation equivalents of nog Translation equivalent probably must I think will I guess certainly I suppose no doubt Total

Number 6 5 3 3 2 1 1 1 22

Good correspondences can be established between nog and probably or must. Probably straddles the line between "belief' and "induction" in Chafe's framework, but must is clearly inferential: (78)

Hade han nägra syskon. Det hade han nog. had he any siblings that had he probably (Gripe, SO 58)

(79)

Did he have any sisters or brothers? Probably. (Gripe, ET 52)

36

Karin Aijmer

Nog corresponds to belief in the following pair as shown by the translation with I think (80)

...fast jag ska be honom skriva den själv jag kan ... although I shall ask him write it himself I can nog inte. probably not (Gripe, SO 128)

(81)

... and I'm going to ask him to write it down, because I don't think I could. (Gripe, ET 114)

The reinforcing nog is signalled by stress and front position: (82)

Ja, nog var det bra att hon inte skulle ro sä yes certainly was it good that she not would row so längt. far (Lindgren, EO 118)

(83)

Yes, it certainly was a good thing that they did not have far to row. (Lindgren, ET 111)

Visst was the least frequent of the modal particles. The particle is ambiguous between the meanings seem and of course, but several correspondences are found: Table 14: Translation equivalents of visst Equivalent of visst

Number

seem of course I'm sure emphatic stress don't you certainly apparently as a matter of fact I think

5 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Total

16

I think — an English modal particle

37

The tentative visst is unstressed and is translated by seem or occasionally by other epistemic qualifiers with the meaning induction: (84)

Du är visst inget vidare barnkär du! you are certainly not very fond-of-children you (Lindgren, SO 88)

(85)

You don't seem to like children particularly! (Lindgren, ET 84)

Apparently corresponds to visst in the following example: (86)

Det är visst inte alltid som uppfostran lyckas, it is certainly not always that upbringing succeeds sa jag. said I (Gripe, SO 120)

(87)

Apparently your efforts at self-discipline don't always work, I said. (Gripe, ET 107)

In (88), where visst is stressed and placed in front position the correspondence in English is of course: (88)

... och jag sa att visst künde vi göra det. ... and I said that certainly could we do that (Gripe, SO 115)

(89)

... and I said of course we could do this. (Gripe, ET 103)

5.1. Parallel texts In this section the contrastive analysis will be extended to epistemic qualifiers in texts representing authentic speech. Analysis on the basis of parallel texts from several languages makes it possible to investigate modality in interaction (cf. Biber - Finegan 1989 "interactive evidentiality") and thus provides a new step in contrastive studies. The problem is to find texts which are roughly comparable. For speech, this is extra difficult because of the scantiness of ready-made corpora. We are lucky to be able to use the Swedish database 'Sociolinguistic studies in a database of spoken Swedish21 for the analysis of Swedish.

38

Karin Aijmer

Five informal conversations have been selected and compared with informal conversations from the L o n d o n - L u n d Corpus. The comparison is facilitated by the fact that the conversations in English and Swedish are roughly of the same size. The speakers are close friends or belong to the same family, and they speak on a variety of topics. A problem for the comparison is, however, that the speakers in the London-Lund Corpus are academics, while the Swedish speakers have a variety of different occupations. Only epistemic qualifiers expressing a moderate degree of certainty have been analysed. The results of the inventory are presented in Tables 15 and 16:

Table 15: The distribution of epistemic qualifiers (EQs) expressing a moderate degree of certainty in LLC (texts S. 1.4-1.6, S 1.8, S 1.10) Type of EQ

Realisation

Number

Epistemic verbs

I think I don't think I should think I should have thought I shouldn't think I believe I gather I imagine I expect I suppose I don't suppose it seems it doesn't seem it sounds as if Adjectives and participles (be) likely (be) supposed to Adverbs probably presumably must Auxiliaries

136 22 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 29 3 13 1 1 1 7 32 4 17

Total

277

It is seen from a comparison of the two tables that in English, the modal scene is created mainly by I think and I suppose. Also the adverb probably is frequent. The Swedish texts, on the other hand, are characterized by the high number of modal particles, especially väl and nog.

I think - an English modal particle

39

Table 16: The distribution of epistemic qualifiers (EQs) expressing a moderate degree of certainty in the Swedish database (Conversations 404, 553, 557, 558, 559) Type of EQ

Realisation

Epistemic verbs

jag tror, tror jag Ί believe' skulle jag tro Ί would believe' skulle jag kunna tänka mig Ί could think to myself' jag föreställer mig ait Ί imagine' jag gissar att Ί guess that' jag tror inte Ί don't think' antar jag Ί suppose' förmodar jag Ί suppose' verkar som 'seems as i f antagligen 'probably' förmodligen 'probably' mäste (vät) 'must /1 suppose' lär (visst) 'is said to /certainly' väl nog visst

Adverbs Auxiliaries Particles

Total

Number 23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 4 97 22 2 180

6. Conclusion Contrastive linguistic studies have come of age. One reason is that crosslinguistic data can throw light on processes of grammaticalization and pragmaticalization. Cross-linguistic studies of subject and topic have, for example, revealed a relationship between these categories by analysing them in the context of grammaticalization both diachronically and synchronically (Li - Thompson 1976; referred to in Hopper - Traugott 1993: 28). Secondly, a contrastive perspective provides a window on cultural differences between languages. It was noted by Wierzbicka (1991: 41) that in Polish, opinions are not usually distinguished linguistically from statements of fact, and Drazdauskiene (1981: 57) claims that qualifying expressions such as I think or I don't think are used less often in Lithuanian than in English. I have argued that a grammaticalization perspective also throws light on the meanings of I think and of modal particles in Swedish. Exactly which new meanings have become grammaticalized or pragmaticalized

40

Karin

Aijmer

when we use I think (/ suppose, etc.) in English or a modal particle in Swedish can be shown by a contrastive analysis. A hearer-perspective is, for example, characteristic of I suppose or of surely in English and of väl in Swedish. Modal particles like visst in Swedish are ambiguous between uncertainty and certainty signalled by stress and positional prominence. It can be suggested that the same processes are involved when I think is analysed as deliberative or tentative. Grammaticalization and its complement pragmaticalization are, however, complicated processes. Several years ago (Aijmer 1985) I studied the semantic and pragmatic aspects of the grammaticalization of the modal auxiliaries within prototype theory. This model still seems to me to give a good picture of what goes on in grammaticalization and pragmaticalization. With regard to I think, it is, for example, clear that the meanings and functions of the construction can be described as a focus and extensions f r o m it. The picture is, however, complex since the polysemy of think involves both metaphoric strategies and extensions due to conversational rules and implicatures. In my view of language, it is a dynamic and fluctuating phenomenon. Lexical items can change into idioms; they can become grammatical categories, pragmatic expressions linked with particular functions and situations or be morphologized as affixes or clitics. Changes are not necessarily completed as Hopper and Traugott point out: Changes do not have to occur. They do not have to go to completion, in other words, they do not have to move all the way along a cline. A particular grammaticalization process may be, and often is, arrested before it is fully 'implemented' and the 'outcome' of grammaticalization is quite often a ragged and incomplete subsystem that is not evidently moving in some identifiable direction. (1993: 95)

The outcome of the pragmaticalization of I think can be taken to be such an incomplete subsystem since I think continues to be a main verb followed by a complement clause. The process has, for example, made pervasive inroads into some text types, while more formal genres have preserved the forms representing older stages. In conversation I think has, however, developed a number of new functions as a response to the demands of planning and interaction with the hearer which may in their turn become conventionalized. Appendix Key to prosodic information in the L o n d o n - L u n d Corpus (simplified transcription) # tone unit boundary

I think — an English modal particle -

a(rn) \

/ V Λ =

*

*

41

unit pause brief pause voiced pause falling tone rise tone fall-rise rise-fall level tone overlapping speech

+ +

[?] (()) {} !

glottal stop subaudible words subordinate tone unit booster

Notes 1. I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences for their support of the project "Textbased contrastive studies in English". I also wish to thank the members of the contrastive project group and Ludmila Urbanova for fruitful discussions. I am especially indebted to Bengt Abenberg and Göran Kjellmer who provided helpful comments on an earlier version of the article. 2. It is noteworthy that works on modality with a contrastive orientation generally focus on the modal auxiliaries (see, e.g., Davidsen-Nielsen 1990). 3. For a key to the prosodic transcription, see Appendix. 4. Cf. also Erman - Kotsinas 1994. 5. Cf. C. Lehmann (1985) "interlacing": the interweaving of originally separate clauses into the surface structure of the matrix (cf. Hopper - Traugott 1993: 170). 6. Unfortunately Rissanen does not give statistics for the use of zeroIthat after think with a first person subject. 7. Cf. also Meurman-Solin (1993: 285) on the connection between private verbs and first person pronouns and its diagnostic value for analysing speaker/author involvement in different text types synchronically and diachronically. 8. According to Palander-Collin (forthcoming), the merger of forms did not, however, lead to the confluence of syntactic usages or meanings of the verbs. 9. In fact 161 examples of methinks are still found in the Shakespeare concordance which, as far as I can judge, have the subjective meaning O P I N I O N . 10. Fleischman (1982: 148 f.) in fact notes the same development for French and some varieties of Spanish. 11. Cf. Swedish tycks, as in (i) (i) Han tycks vara hemma. he seems be home 'He seems to be at home' 12. See, e.g., Hintikka (1962) on the logic of belief and Perkins (1983) for a more general overview of modality in logic. 13. Lyons refers to (subjective) epistemic modality as "the speaker's opinion or attitude towards the proposition that the sentence expresses or the situation that the proposition

42

14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19.

20. 21.

Karin Aijmer describes" (Lyons 1977: 452). This definition seems to pick out roughly the same elements as Chafe's but is less specific. Cf. Section 2.2.1. Examples which have not been prosodically transcribed have not been included. The particle ju ('as you know') has not been dealt with since it presupposes that the speaker and hearer share some background knowledge. It is, however, by far the most frequent discourse particle in Swedish reflecting the fact that it is primarily used as a marker of rapport or solidarity. Two examples were negated. The reason for the small number of equivalents is that modal particles most of the time are not translated. Some examples have been excluded because the translation is idiosyncratic and difficult to interpret. Tag questions in the English originals were rendered by väl in five examples, but a variety of tag-like constructions and other particles were also found in the Swedish translations (visst, eller hur, να). The construction clearly needs to be analysed in more detail. Example from my own reading. The Swedish database compiled by J. Löfström, Göteborg, consists of transcriptions of Swedish conversations. Prosody has not been marked. The recordings have usually taken place in one of the informants' homes and can be taken to represent fairly natural speech. The number of words in each conversation is about 4,800 words which makes each conversation roughly comparable in length to the texts from the London—Lund Corpus. The whole database is about the same size as the L o n d o n - L u n d Corpus, viz., ca. 500,000 words.

References 1. Primary literature A. Texts translated from English into Swedish: le Carre, John 1991 The secret pilgrim. London: David Cornwell. 1992 I sanningens tjänst. Translated by Sam L. Lundwall. Stockholm: Bonnier. James, P. D. 1962 Cover her face, 5 - 6 9 . London: Sphere Book. 1992 Slut henries ögon. Translated by Inger Fahlander. Stockholm: Wahlström and Widstrand. Lodge, David 1988 Nice work, 13—69. London: Seeker and Warburg. 1988 Snyggt jobbat. Translated by Annica Preis. Stockholm: Alba. Weldon, Fay 1987 The heart of the country, 1 - 5 4 . London: Arrow Books. 1988 Landets hjärta. Translated by Rose-Marie Nielsen. Höganäs: Bokförlaget Bra Böcker.

I think — an English modal particle

43

B. Texts translated from Swedish into English: Gripe, Maria 1968 Nattpappan. Stockholms: Bonniers. 1971 The night daddy. Translated by Gerry Bothmer. London: Dell Publishing Co., Inc. Jansson, Tove 1958 Trollvinter. Stockholm: Gebers. 1958 Moominland midwinter. Translated by Thomas Warburton. London: Ernest Benn Limited. Lindgren, Astrid 1964 Vipä saltkräkan, 5-125. Stockholm: Raben and Sjögren. 1968 Seacrow island. Translated by Evelyn Ramsden. London: Oliver and Boyd. Sjöwall, Maj - Per Wahlöö 1967 Den vedervärdige mannen frän Säfße, 5—65. Stockholm: Norstedts. 1980 The abominable man. Translated by Thomas Teal. New York: Vintage Books.

2. Secondary literature Aijmer, Karin 1977 "Partiklarna ju och νάΓ. Nysvenska studier 57: 205-216. 1980 Evidence and the declarative sentence. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. 1985 "The semantic development of wilF', in: Jacek Fisiak (ed.), 11-21. Aijmer, Karin — Bengt Altenberg - Mats Johansson 1996 "Text-based contrastive studies in English. Presentation of a project", in: Karin Aijmer — Bengt Altenberg — Mats Johansson (eds.), 73—86. Aijmer, Karin — Bengt Altenberg (eds.) 1991 English corpus linguistics. Studies in honour of Jan Svartvik. London: Longman. Aijmer, Karin - Bengt Altenberg - Mats Johansson (eds.) 1996 Languages in contrast. Papers from a Symposium on Text-based Cross-Linguistic Studies Lund 4—5 March 1994. Lund: Lund University Press. Allen, Sture — Martin Gellerstam — Sven-Göran Malmgren (eds.) 1989 Orden speglar samhället. [Words reflect society] Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget. Allerton, D. J. - A. Cruttenden 1974 "English sentence adverbials: Their syntax and their intonation in British English", Lingua 34: 1 - 3 0 . Alm-Arvius, Christina 1993 The English verb see: A study of multiple meaning. Gothenburg Studies in English 64. Göteborg: Acta Universalis Gothoburgensis. Altenberg, Bengt 1987 Prosodic patterns in spoken English: studies in the correlation between prosody and grammar for text-to-speech conversion. Lund: Lund University Press. Anderson, John M. - Charles Jones (eds.) 1974 Historical linguistics: Syntax, morphology, internal and comparative reconstruction. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Andersson, Lars Gunnar 1976 "Talaktsadverbial". Nysvenska studier 55-56: 2 5 - 4 7 . [Speech-act adverbials].

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Banfield, Ann 1973 "Narrative style and the grammar of direct and indirect speech", Foundations of Language 10: 1 39. Benveniste, Emile 1966 Problemes de linguistique generale. Paris: Gallimard. Biber, Douglas 1988 Variation across speech and writing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Biber, Douglas - Edward Finegan 1989 "Styles of stance in English: Lexical and grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect", Text 9(1): 9 3 - 1 2 4 . Bierwisch, Manfred - Karl Erich Heidolph (eds.) 1970 Progress in linguistics. The Hague: Mouton. Brown, Penelope - Stephen Levinson 1978 "Universale in language usage: Politeness phenomena", in: Esther N. Goody (ed.), 5 6 - 2 8 9 . Caton, Charles E. 1969 "On the general structure of the epistemic qualification of things said in English", Foundations of Language 2: 37—66. Caton, Charles E. (ed.) 1963 Philosophy and ordinary language. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Chafe, Wallace 1986 "Evidentiality in English conversation and academic sriting", in: Wallace Chafe - Johanna Nichols (eds.), 2 6 1 - 2 7 3 . 1988 "Linking intonation units in spoken English", in: John Haiman — Sandra A. Thompson (eds.), 1 - 2 9 . Chafe, Wallace - Johanna Nichols (eds.) 1986 Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology. Norwood, N. J.: Ablex. Clark, Herbert H. - Eve V. Clark 1977 Psychology and language. An introduction to psycholinguistics. New York, etc.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1975 Syntax and semantics 3: Speech acts. New York: Academic Press. Coulmas, Florian (ed.) 1981 Conversational routine. Explorations in standardized communication situations and prepatterned speech. The Hague: Mouton. Crystal, David - Derek Davy 1975 Advanced conversational English. London: Longman. Davidsen-Nielsen, Niels 1990 Tense and mood in English. A comparison with Danish. Berlin — New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Doherty, Monika 1978 "Die Übersetzung von deutschen Modalpartikeln ins Englische", in: Albrecht Neubert (ed.), 156-176. Drazdauskiene, Maria-Liudvika 1981 "On stereotypes in conversation, their meaning and significance", in: Florian Coulmas (ed.), 5 5 - 6 8 . Erman, Britt 1987 Pragmatic expressions in English: A study of'you know', 'you see' and I mean' in face-to-face conversation. Stockholm: Almqvist — Wiksell.

I think — an English modal particle

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Erman, Britt - Ulla-Britt Kotsinas 1993 "Pragmaticalization: the case of ba' and you know", Studier i modern sprakvetenskap: 5 3 - 7 3 . Stockholm: Almqvist - Wiksell. Fillmore, Charles J. 1984 "Remarks on contrastive pragmatics". In Jacek Fisiak (ed.), 119-141. Fisiak, Jacek 1985 Historical semantics. Historical word-formation. Berlin - New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Fisiak, Jacek (ed.) 1984 Contrastive linguistics, Prospects and problems. Berlin - New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Fleischman, Suzanne 1982 The future in thought and language: Diachronic evidence from Romance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fraser, Bruce 1980 "Conversational mitigation", Journal of Pragmatics 4: 341 - 3 5 0 . Gellerstam, Martin 1989 "Om svenskan i översättningar frän engelskan", [Swedish in translations from English], in: Sture Allen - Martin Gellerstam - Sven-Göran Malmgren (eds.), 103-119. Goody, Esther N. 1978 Questions and politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Green, Georgia M. 1976 "Main clause phenomena in subordinate clauses", Language 52: 3 8 2 - 9 7 . Greenbaum, Sidney — Jan Svartvik 1990 "The L o n d o n - L u n d Corpus of Spoken English", in: Jan Svartvik (ed.), 11-59. Grice, H. Paul 1975 "Logic and conversation", in: Peter Cole - Jerry Morgan (eds.), 4 1 - 5 8 . Haiman, John - Sandra A. Thompson (eds.) 1988 Clause combining in grammar and discourse. Amsterdam - Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Halliday, Michael A. K. 1985 Introduction to functional grammar. London: Edward Arnold. Hintikka, Jaako 1962 Knowledge and belief. An introduction to the logic of the two notions. Ithaca — London: Cornell University Press. Holmes, Janet 1990 "Hedges and boosters in women's and men's speech", Language and Communication 10: 185—205. Hooper, Joan B. - Sandra A. Thompson 1973 "On the applicability of root transformations", Linguistic Inquiry 4: 4 6 5 - 4 9 8 . Hopper, Paul 1991 "On some principles of grammaticization", in: Elisabeth Closs Traugott — Bernd Heine (eds.), 1 7 - 3 5 . Hopper, Paul - Elizabeth C. Traugott 1993 Grammaticalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Kastovsky, Dieter (ed.) 1991 Historical English syntax, Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Kiparsky, Paul - Carol Kiparsky 1970 "Fact", in: Manfred Bierwisch - Karl Erich Heidolph (eds.), 143-173. Krzeszowski, Tomasz P. 1990 Contrasting languages. The scope of contrastive linguistics. Berlin - New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Lehmann, Christian 1985 "Grammaticalization: Synchronic variation and diachronic change", Lingua e stile 20: 303-318. Li, Charles N. - Sandra A. Thompson 1974 "Historical change of word order: A case study of Chinese and its implications", in: John M. Anderson - Charles Jones (eds.), 200-217. Lyons, John 1977 Semantics. (2 vols.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maynard, Senko K. 1993 Discourse modality. Subjectivity, emotion and voice in the Japanese language. Amsterdam - Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Meurman-Solin, Anneli 1993 Variation and change in early Scottish prose. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia. Neubert, Albrecht (ed.) 1978 Zur lexikalischen Semantik des Englischen. Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, Zentralinstitut für Sprachwissenschaft. Oxford English Dictionary 1933 Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pallander-Collin, Minna in press "A medieval case of grammaticalization - methinks", in: Matti Rissanen Merja Kytö - Kirsti Heikkonen (eds.) Perkins, Michael R. 1983 Modal expressions in English. London: Frances Pinter. Persson, Gunnar 1993 "Think in a panchronic perspective", Studia Neophilologica 65: 3 - 1 8 . Plank, Frans 1981 "Modalitätsausdruck zwischen Autonomie und Auxiliarität. Sprache und Pragmatik", in: Inger Rosengren (ed.), 57-71. Preisler, Bent 1986 Linguistic sex roles in conversation. Social variation in the expression of tentativeness in conversation: Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Quirk, Randolph - Sidney Greenbaum - Geoffrey Leech - Jan Svartvik 1985 A comprehensive grammar of the English language. London: Longman. Rissanen, Matti 1991 "On the history of that/zero in object clause links in English", in: Karin Aijmer-Bengt Altenberg (eds.), 272-289. Rissanen, Matti — Merja Kytö - Kirsti Heikkonen (eds.) in press Long-term processes in grammaticalization: Corpus-based studies in the history of English. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

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Romaine, Suzanne - Deborah Lange 1991 "The use of like as a marker of reported speech and thought: A case of grammaticalization in progress", American Speech 66: 227-279. Rosengren, Inger (ed.) 1981 Sprache und Pragmatik. Lunder Symposium 1980. Lund: CWK Gleerup. Stenström, Anna-Brita 1990 "Lexical items peculiar to spoken discourse", in: Jan Svartvik (ed.), 137-177. Stubbs, Michael 1986 "A matter of prolonged fieldwork: towards a modal grammar of English". Applied Linguistics 17: 1—25. Svartvik, Jan (ed.) 1990 The London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English: description and research. Lund: Lund University Press. Swan, Toril 1991 "Adverbial shifts: Evidence from Norwegian and English", in: Dieter Kastovsky (ed.), 409-438. Sweetser, Eve 1990 From etymology to pragmatics. Metaphorical and cultural aspects of semantic structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thompson, Sandra A. — Anthony Mulac 1991 "A quantitative perspective on the grammaticization of epistemic parentheticals in English", in: Elizabeth C. Traugott - Bernd Heine (eds.), 313-331. Tottie, Gunnel 1991 Negation in English speech and writing. A study in variation. San Diego, etc.: Academic Press. Traugott, Elizabeth C. - Bernd Heine (eds.) 1991 Approaches to grammaticalization. (2 vols.). Amsterdam - Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishers. Urmson, James O. 1963 "Parenthetical verbs", in: Charles Caton (ed.), 220-240. Viberg, Ake 1980 "Om semantiska fait i svenskan och nägra andra spräk". [The semantic field in Swedish and some other languages], Stockholm: Stockholms universitet. Institutionen för lingvistik. Whorf, Benjamin Lee 1956 Language, thought and reality. Edited and with an introduction by J. B. Carroll. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Wierzbicka, Anna 1991 Cross-cultural pragmatics, The semantics of human interaction. Berlin — New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1974 Philosophical investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.

Dimensions of epistemicity in English, German and Norwegian conditionals Oddleif Leirbukt

1. Introduction Although pragmatic aspects have been a major concern of recent research on conditionals (cf., for example, Athanasiadou — Dirven 1996: 609), there exist relatively few empirical investigations of particular domains, for example, of the epistemic properties of these constructions. The present contribution deals with some crosslinguistically interesting features of conditionals in the Germanic languages, focussing on English and German. Norwegian data will be touched upon for comparative purposes. The general logico-semantic structure of conditionals can be characterized in terms of non-factuality, i. e., neither the protasis nor the apodosis "indicates that an event has occurred (or is occurring or will occur); the sentence merely indicates the dependence of the truth of one proposition upon the truth of another" (Palmer 1986: 189). This holds for socalled real as well as counterfactual conditionals. Conditional constructions can apparently be distinguished from concessive-conditional ones along the lines suggested by König (1986).1 The main claim of this paper is that there are, in principle, two separate dimensions of epistemicity in conditionals, namely (a) the evaluation of protasis and apodosis with respect to their probability as seen from the speaker's point of view (involving a continuum that comprises different degrees of hypotheticality in the sense of Comrie 1986) vs. (b) the degree of certainty or confidence with which the conditional sentence is uttered. In the literature on conditionals, the two epistemic domains are, as far as I know, not treated as being systematically distinct. I will, however, attempt to show that this is, indeed, the case. These two dimensions, for which I will use the terms "probability scale" and "confidence scale", respectively, are probably of a fairly general nature, but I do not want to go into the question whether they are language universals or not. My assumption concerning the different systematic statuses of the two epistemic domains can be based on the general distribution and formal

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structure of probability-scale and confidence-scale markers in conditional constructions. An important aspect is the fact that, in the languages under consideration, the encoding of confidence-scale differences, for instance through adverbial expressions like perhaps or surely, is confined to the apodosis (see below). Furthermore, the repertoire of probability-scale markers shows more formal variation in the protasis, which can be regarded as another indication of functional specialization. This variation involves special possibilities of differentiation in the domain of probability by means of specific verb forms or verbal syntagms, e. g., in areas traditionally known as "potentialis" vs. "irrealis". The latter phenomena tie in with the fact that certain conditional conjunctions (which, of course, occur only in the protasis) in addition to certain verb forms or verbal syntagms indicate the status of a given proposition with regard to the probability-scale. A well-known example is the probability-scale differentiation involved in the use of, for instance, in the event, providing or provided vs. if{cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 1093). Without special reference to conditionals, Lyons (1977: 796-797) points out that certain modal verbs, modal adverbs, and modal adjectives indicate the speaker's qualification of his commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence he utters, as shown in the following examples: (1)

He may have gone to Paris.

(2)

Perhaps he went to Paris.

(3)

It's possible that he went to Paris.

According to Lyons, straightforward statements of fact (i. e., categorical assertions like He went to Paris) may be described as epistemically nonmodal. 2 Alternatively, one may regard sentences without qualifying expressions of the types just exemplified as representing a special degree of commitment to the truth of what is being said, thus operating with a somewhat extended concept of epistemic modality. (For different options see for example, Dietrich 1992.) This position is adopted in the present paper. The confidence-scale dimension of conditionals is dealt with by Palmer (1986: 198), who in his discussion of epistemic modals in cases like (4 a) and (5 a) points out that "the epistemic judgment concerns the whole sentence, protasis as well as apodosis" (cf. also Palmer 1990: 183-184). His analysis is illustrated by paraphrases with ^«/-clauses like (4 b),

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which serves to demonstrate that the use of epistemic might involves a comparatively low degree of subjective confidence about what is being said. Note that in the corresponding paraphrase of the sentence containing epistemic must (Palmer 1986: 198), cited as (5 b), the same that-clause indicates what the speaker is sure about. In other words, pertaining directly to the confidence-scale, the formal difference (i.e., the choice of must vs. might) does not affect the probability-related evaluation of protasis or apodosis. The mutual independence of the two epistemic dimensions becomes especially clear by the overt coding of confidence-scale differences in counterfactual conditionals referring to past time as illustrated in examples (4) and (5): (4)

a. If he had stayed in the army, he might have become a colonel. b. It is possible that if he had stayed in the army, he would have become a colonel.

(5)

a. If he had stayed in the army, he must have become a colonel. b. It is necessary (necessarily the case) that if he had stayed in the army, he would have become a colonel.

With reference to epistemic may in (6), Palmer (1990: 183) remarks that, under this interpretation, the construction is to be paraphrased as 'It is possible that Mary will leave, if John comes', rather than 'If John comes, it is possible that Mary will leave' (I am disregarding the deontic reading): (6)

If John comes, Mary may leave.

Palmer's remarks on epistemic modals can, in my opinion, be generalized. In what follows, all conditional constructions will be taken to express, in some way or another, the degree of confidence with which the sentence is uttered - over and above the probability-related evaluation of protasis and apodosis as propositions. From this point of view, examples (7 a) and (8 a) can be regarded as unqualified cases (comparable to He went to Paris), and they can be contrasted with (7 b), (8 b) and (9), which illustrate overt confidence-scale encoding. (For various types of marker, see Palmer 1986: 63-64.) (7)

a. If Mary comes tomorrow, she will visit Tom. b. If Mary comes tomorrow, she will perhaps/probably/certainly visit Tom.

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(8)

a. If Mary came tomorrow, she would visit Tom. b. If Mary came tomorrow, she would perhaps/probably Icertainly visit Tom.

(9)

If Mary had been here last week, she would probably!certainly have attended his lecture. Unfortunately, she had to stay in London.

Confidence-scale markers in the apodosis can be combined with corresponding means of expression outside the conditional. According to Palmer (1990: 148-149), be going to is chosen in the following example "because it is assumed that the events will, in fact, take place". Here the meaning of this semi-modal is, perhaps, not purely epistemic; nevertheless, its confidence aspect ties in with the assurance expressed in the preceding sequence: (10)

But I said: "Don't have any doubt about this, dear friends, that if you are going ahead with doing that, you are going to be dealing with me!"

The empirical arguments for treating the probability scale and the confidence scale as separate dimensions of epistemicity in conditionals include the fact that the same confidence-scale markers, as illustrated above, often occur in conditionals whose propositions receive different evaluation with regard to their probability as well as the fact that modals and semi-modals in epistemic use are confined to the apodosis (cf. Palmer 1990: 162). An exception is mentioned by Palmer (1990: 182), who points out that an epistemic modal can occur in protases if it echoes what has already been said. His example is to be paraphrased as 'If you say he may come tomorrow' (also under a deontic interpretation): (11)

If he may come tomorrow ...

According to Palmer (1990: 182—183), the non-occurrence of epistemically used modals in the protasis has to do with their performative nature: "the speaker can express a judgment [...], but he cannot (performatively) make it conditional". The distributional properties of epistemic modals (and semi-modals) are also found with adverbs like certainly or perhaps: (12)

a. * If Mary certainly comes tomorrow, she will visit Tom. b. *If they perhaps come across the letters, they will inform us.

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To Palmer's pragmatically-oriented explanation one could add a more syntactic aspect (also touched upon by him), namely that of scope: the speaker's indication of the degree of confidence with which the sentence is uttered concerns the whole construction. Therefore, this epistemic dimension cannot, at least in the languages under consideration, be adequately expressed in the protasis, this part of the conditional being typically a subordinate clause (i.e., a syntactically peripheral member of the sentence). But there is a further aspect to be considered: protasis and apodosis (as correlatives within the conditional) are linked in a relatively tight manner, which makes the construction a whole; this special degree of coherence is probably at the bottom of the distributional limitations on confidence-scale markers like perhaps or probably.3 The close connexion between the confidence scale on the one hand and modals or semi-modals, employed in an epistemic sense, on the other, does not, however, preclude their use as markers for probabilityscale differentiation as well. There are, in fact, cases where it is difficult to decide clearly which epistemic dimension they relate to. As will be shown below, certain means of expression occurring in the apodosis may be taken to function as portmanteaus.

2. Some epistemic properties of English conditionals We can now have a closer look at English constructions. 2.1. Probability-scale aspects Comrie (1986: 89) has put forward the claim that conditionals are incapable of expressing the counterfactuality of a proposition. In making the proviso that further resarch may lead to weakening of this claim and citing a sentence (to be analyzed below) with backshifted pluperfect in the protasis (1986: 98), he has provided an interesting background for further discussion. In what follows, I will first try to demonstrate that the counterfactuality of a certain type of non-past conditional is accompanied by the use of specific markers. Then I will discuss formal distinctions within the protasis that may be interpreted as indications of a systematic ordering relating to distinguishable parts of the probability continuum. A similar approach is found in a recent corpus-based investigation of if-clauses made by Athanasiadou - Dirven (1996). In "hypothetical conditionals", which are treated as a subclass of constructions with

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if-clauses, the authors posit, in general, four "degrees of likelihood" associated with specific verb forms and similar means of expression, for example, should + infinitive in the protasis. The use of backshifted pluperfect and conditional perfect in conditionals referring to present or future time (see below) is, however, left out of consideration. On the basis of the delimitation of the concept of conditional adopted in this paper (cf. section 1), which covers a good deal more than the hypothetical conditional of the two authors just mentioned, I will discuss the function of verb forms and certain combinations of verb + infinitive (for example, the above type with should) as probability-scale markers, paying special attention to non-past constructions. Some infinitival syntagms that are not regarded as belonging to the paradigm of a given verb fulfil epistemic functions comparable to those of the verb forms and should therefore be taken into consideration. Both types of verbal element will henceforth be referred to as "verbal inventory". Giving the following example, Jespersen (1924: 266) notes that the pluperfect ("ante-preterit") is sometimes used "not only of the past, but also of the present time, simply to intensify the unreality irrespective of time": (13)

If I had had money enough (at the present moment), I would have paid you.

This usage is, as attested in Leirbukt (1991: 190), also found in constructions referring to future events: (14)

It is a shame you are leaving tomorrow. If you had stayed here until next week, we would have been able to take a wonderful trip to the coast together.

(15)

If you had come next Wednesday, you would have met Grannie.

Citing (15) as an instance of "double backshifting (pluperfect in the protasis, conditional perfect in the apodosis)", Comrie (1986: 98) points out that the verb forms of this sentence are more appropriate than those in If you came ... you would meet... "if the addressee has already indicated inability to come on Wednesday". What happens here is that the pluperfect and the conditional perfect (the complex infinitive of which is a marker for past) are used in nonpast contexts, thus contracting a relation of contrast to preterite and

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would + infinitive (for example, meet). The functional exploitation of this opposition involves distinctions that are, up to a point, comparable to the notions of "irrealis" and "potentialis" in classical Latin; for crosslinguistic aspects of the English device of temporal reinterpretation of certain complex forms, see Leirbukt (1991). The counterfactuality of constructions like (14) and (15) is apparently connected with an identifiable context factor that affects the truth value of the protasis. In (15), for instance, the addressee's statement concerning his inability to come seems to imply for the speaker that the addressee is not coming, which, of course, entails falsity of the proposition in the //-clause. This seems to be a fairly general contextual rule underlying the occurrence of temporally reinterpreted (and ipso facto marked) verb forms as expressions of counterfactuality. A similar rule holds for German (see section 3). In so far as the opposition between backshifted pluperfect and conditional perfect on the one hand and backshifted preterite and would + (simple) infinitive on the other is dependent on time reference, the latter forms being unavailable in past-time conditionals, it may be justified to regard the expression of counterfactuality in non-past conditionals containing the marked forms as being attributable to temporal distinctions. In addition, there is the context factor regularly accompanying the epistemic interpretation of such constructions. The problem of identifying (and assessing the relative importance of) the factors that determine the counterfactual reading of non-past conditionals with backshifted pluperfect and conditional perfect is probably only to be solved by examining various construction types (including those referring to past time). Such an investigation will have to address the complex interplay of linguistic context and situation (including beliefs, general attitudes of the interlocutors and the like), and it is obviously beyond the scope of the present article. What can be recorded here is the fact that the use of backshifted pluperfect and conditional perfect in conditionals constitutes an important device for expressing counterfactuality in English, no matter how this is eventually to be explained. Before discussing various means of expression relating to lower degrees of hypotheticality than that associated with the pluperfect, I would like to draw attention to the greater variation of the verbal inventory found in the protasis as an indication of functional specialization. In addition to the the preterite, one finds here not only such syntagms as should + infinitive and were/was to + infinitive (discussed below), but also do + infinitive. An interesting example with the present tense of this verb + epistemic might in the apodosis is — without any comment on the verb form of the protasis — provided by Werth (1993: 77):

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But if such a beast does indeed exist, it might be unwise to stand just there.

On a scale proposed by Athanasiadou-Dirven (1996: 634-635) for the preterite of if-clauses in so-called "non-neutral hypothetical conditionals" (i.e., in a subclass of conditionals), the form did in the example cited below is taken to express a likelihood degree of its own among five possibilities ranging from 'close to neutral' to 'unreal'. It is, however, difficult to provide reliable evidence for such nice distinctions, and I therefore do not want to posit a separate degree associated with the didform. What is important from my point of view, is the fact that such a form makes for additional probability scale differentiation, and that it occurs in the protasis): (17)

If the slick did get too big, it would screw us up for the next day.

According to Comrie (1986: 98), cases like (15) suggest that English has more than two degrees of hypotheticality for non-past conditionals. He does not elaborate the point because the distinction focussed on in his discussion of the situation in English is that between "lower hypotheticality" and "greater hypotheticality" as expressed by the present tense vs. backshifted preterite in the protasis (and will vs. would + infinitive in the apodosis): (18)

If you come tomorrow, you'll be able to join us on a picnic.

(19)

If you came tomorrow, you'd be able to join us on a picnic.

Comrie's brief remark on a conceivable tripartite division is worth further discussion. In my opinion, one may even posit a fourth general degree of hypotheticality for non-past conditionals, namely that associated with such expressions as were/was to + infinitive and should + infinitive {should in the apodosis is of a different epistemic nature, see below). Quirk et al. (1985: 1093) cite (20) and (21) as examples of "future hypothetical conditions" with "overtones of tentativeness". In this connexion, Comrie's (1986: 93) translation of the Latin sentence Hanc viam si asperam esse negem, mentiar ("subjunctive without shift to past tense"), which is quoted in (22), is of considerable interest.

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(20)

If it was!were to rain, the ropes would snap. They're far too tight.

(21)

If a serious crisis should arise, the public would have to be informed of its full implications.

(22)

If I were to deny that this road is rough, I should lie.

According to Palmer (1990: 177), should come in a case like (23) indicates a little more doubt about John's coming than the simple form comes, while were to in (24) "expresses rather greater doubt than the more usual type of unreal future conditional" (i. e., that with the preterite): (23)

If John should come, Mary would leave.

(24)

If John were to come, Mary would leave.

Pace Palmer, one can interpret both should and was/were to as markers for a degree of hypotheticality which lies between that indicated by the more or less unmarked present tense on the one hand and that expressed by the preterite on the other. This kind of systematic ordering seems to be suggested by certain incompatibilities in constructions expressing requests. Here an //-clause picturing a future situation in which the request can be complied with is often followed by an imperative, in which case should and were to (in addition to the present tense) can occur in the //-clause, in contrast to the preterite. (25)

a. If you should meet her, please give her my best regards. b. If you were to meet her, please give her my best regards. c. * If you met her, please give her my best regards.

The non-availability of the preterite in cases like (25 c) would seem to indicate that the degree of hypotheticality it expresses is so remote from reality (as posited by the speaker) that it is incompatible with the request, which, of course, presupposes a fairly high degree of probability of the future situation. In the case of should and were to there is no such pragmatic conflict. Summing up, one may say that there is some empirical evidence for positing four degrees of hypotheticality in English conditionals referring to non-past events, and that this variation is to a considerable extent

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associated with differences of form. Following Comrie's (1986: 88) special emphasis on the protasis and taking the verbal inventory used in this part of the construction as a starting point, one may perhaps arrange the structures in question in order of increasing hypotheticality: 1) present tense, 2) was/were to and should + infinitive, 3) backshifted preterite and 4) backshifted pluperfect. Here, however, a proviso seems to be necessary: there probably exist no clear-cut divisions, apart from the counterfactuality associated with backshifted pluperfect as against the lower degree of hypotheticality expressed by backshifted preterite. As regards the structure of the verbal inventory, the general point to be emphasized is that the protasis in respect of such probability-scale markers shows a greater variation than the apodosis does, thus corroborating the claim that the protasis is functionally specialized in terms of a more precise encoding of probability-scale differences. This claim is hardly invalidated by the fact that we do not know exactly how the various parts of the verbal inventory (including those of the apodosis) are used (cf. Palmer 1986: 188).

2.2. Confidence-scale aspects With regard to the encoding of the confidence scale in English, the main points have already been noted in section 1; hence a few additional remarks will be sufficient. As is well known, the apodosis can, besides must, may, and might, contain such confidence-scale markers as can, ought to, and should. The group of semi-modals available in this part of the construction includes epistemic be going to (already touched upon in section 1), be bound to, and have got to. The first three of the following examples are taken from Athanasiadou—Dirven (1996: 620, 621, 624), the last two from Palmer (1990: 56), who also comments on the epistemic sense of the semi-modals in question. (26)

If the share of the poorest in the total national income declines faster than the total is growing, then the poor can get poorer at the same time as the country as a whole seems to be getting richer.

(27)

If these reports are as good as they look, your chaps should be getting a little more rest before long.

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(28)

If there are distance problems, when engaged in conversation, then there are clearly going to be even bigger difficulties where people must work privately in a shared space.

(29)

If they started at ten, they ought to be in Oslo by now.

(30)

If the Government deals with the situation realistically the cost is bound to be great.

(31)

If you've seen all the old Frankensteins you've got to know all the jokes.

As noted in section 1, a general way of indicating confidence-scale differences is to add to the conditional construction some such comment as I'm pretty sure about that, you can be sure that if..., I suspect that if or I venture to say that i f . . . This does not, however, shed any light on the question of specialization between protasis and apodosis with regard to the two dimensions of epistemicity (confidence scale and probability scale) and will, therefore, receive no further consideration. In some cases, confidence scale markers can also indicate probability scale values, as, for example, in (26) and (28). Such portmanteau phenomena reflect, of course, a well-known general principle of linguistic economy, and are not counterexamples to the claim that the confidence scale is encoded in the apodosis, not in the protasis. As will be shown below, similar observations can be made for German and Norwegian.

3. Some epistemic properties of German conditionals As far as the probability scale and the confidence scale are concerned, the main tendencies found in English conditionals may be said to obtain in their German counterparts as well. For probability scale-differentiation in non-past protases, for instance, German uses verbal means of expression that are closely related to the English ones. This generalization is sustainable even if the German subjunctive forms are taken into consideration. As for confidence-scale encoding, both adverbial expressions and modals in epistemic use are of importance. 3.1. Probability-scale aspects With regard to probability-scale variation, I shall only be concerned with non-past protases. Here German seems to distinguish four degrees of

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hypotheticality parallel to the English ones, each of them being connected with different parts of the verbal inventory. They may be arranged in order of increasing hypotheticality. For kommen 'come', for example, this would be as follows (all examples given for 3rd person sg.): 1) present indicative: kommt; 2) preterite subjunctive of sollen (sollte, cf. should) and preterite subjunctive of wollen (wollte) + infinitive: sollte kommen, wollte kommen (the latter syntagm type conveying an additional nuance of volition attributable to wollen); 3) preterite subjunctive: käme and the socalled conditional I with würde + infinitive: würde kommen·, 4) pluperfect subjunctive: wäre gekommen. In the following examples, possible variation of forms in the apodosis is not illustrated: (32)

Wenn Mary morgen kommen sollte, würde sie Tom if Mary tomorrow come should would she Tom besuchen. visit 'If Mary should come tomorrow, she would visit Tom.'

(33)

Wenn sie auch auf diese Einzelheiten eingehen wollte, if she also on these details into-go would 4 käme sie in Schwierigkeiten. came she into difficulties 'If she were to go into these details, too, she would encounter difficulties.'

(34)

Wenn Mary morgen käme (kommen würde), würde sie if Mary tomorrow came (come would) would she Tom besuchen. Tom visit (both würde forms conditional I) 'If Mary came tomorrow, she would visit Tom.'

(35)

Wenn Mary morgen gekommen wäre, hätte sie Tom if Mary tomorrow come were had she Tom besucht. visited (gekommen wäre and hätte besucht pluperfect subjunctive forms) 'If Mary had come tomorrow, she would have visited Tom.'

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The non-availability of backshifted preterite in if-clauses sketching the background of requests expressed by means of the imperative (cf. section 2) is in German paralleled by a fairly clear ungrammaticality of the preterite subjunctive in the corresponding construction with a wennclause. Taken together with the perfectly normal use of the present indicative and sollte + infinitive in the subordinate clause, this is an indication of the higher degree of hypotheticality associated with the preterite subjunctive: (36)

* Wenn Petra zur Sitzung käme, grüße sie bitte if Petra to-the meeting came greet her please schön von mir. fine from me

(37)

Wenn Petra zur Sitzung kommt, grüße sie bitte if Petra to-the meeting comes greet her please schön von mir. fine from me 'If Petra comes to the meeting, please give her my kind regards.'

(38)

Wenn Petra zur Sitzung kommen sollte, grüße sie if Petra to-the meeting come should greet her bitte schön von mir. please fine from me 'If Petra should come to the meeting, please give her my kind regards.'

The use of the pluperfect subjunctive as a marker of counterfactuality in non-past conditionals has not yet been investigated thoroughly enough. This is especially true of its occurrence in constructions expressing present time, which I therefore have to exclude from consideration. For conditionals referring to future time, however, a general rule can be formulated: a precondition for the use of the pluperfect subjunctive is that the context or the situation provides an observed fact - or an event taken to be a fact — which is logically incompatible with the protasis and focussed on by the speaker (cf. Leirbukt 1991). Example (15) above, in which the counterfactuality can be described as a logical collision between the expressly stated inability to come and the imagined event (the addressee's coming on the day in question), can be rendered in German

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as follows {gekommen wärest and hättest getroffen pluperfect subjunctive forms, 2nd person sg.): (39)

Wenn du nächsten Mittwoch gekommen wärest, hättest if you next Wednesday come were had du Oma getroffen. you Grannie met 'If you had come next Wednesday, you would have met Grannie.'

Concerning the degree of hypotheticality indicated by subjunctive wollte and sollte, there is a diachronic point to be made that may be taken to be evidence for the hypothesis that the protasis is the main field for probability-scale differentiation by means of the verbal inventory. As is well known, in early New High German (and a little later) both verb forms could also be used in the apodosis (in much the same way as in English), allowing combination with the simple infinitive as well as the perfect infinitive. In the latter case, a counterfactual interpretation was possible (or perhaps the rule). The following example is taken from G r i m m - G r i m m (1960: s.v. wollen)·, for a corresponding occurrence of sollte forms + perfect infinitive see Leirbukt (1994: section 2). (40)

Ich wollte es ihm gegeben haben..., wenn er mich I would it to-him given have if he me drum angesprochen hätte. there-about asked had {angesprochen hätte pluperfect subjunctive, 3rd person sg.) Ί would have given it to him if he had asked me.'

This use of wollen (+ infinitive) gradually became restricted to the protasis, and the same development is found with sollen, the only difference being that the preterite subjunctive in a few rather marginal cases is still available in the apodosis (cf. Leirbukt 1989: 61): (41)

Es sollte mich nicht wundern, wenn sie die Prüfung it should me not surprise if they the exam bestehen. pass {bestehen present indicative, 3rd person pi.) Ί would not be surprised if they passed their exam.'

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In the course of the process just mentioned, the two subjunctive syntagms (wollte!sollte + infinitive) developed into specific markers for a degree of probability that might be termed "eventuality" (in the case of wollte, there is, as noted above, the additional nuance of volition). Thus the results of this specialization process have been integrated into a relatively clear system of probability scale encoding. 3.2. Confidence-scale aspects For confidence-scale differentiation, German employs to a great extent the same means of expression as English. Before sketching their use in the apodosis, I would like to illustrate the general rule that the German equivalents of confidence-scale markers like possibly, probably etc., namely vielleicht, wahrscheinlich and the like, do not occur in the protasis (taken as a correlative of the apodosis within the construction). 5 Examples (12 a) and (12 b) in section 1 can be paralleled in German as follows: (42)

* Wenn Mary sicherlich morgen kommt, wird sie Tom if Mary certainly tomorrow comes will she Tom besuchen. visit

(43)

* Wenn sie vielleicht die Briefe finden, werden sie uns if they perhaps the letters find will they us informieren. inform

Examples of confidence scale encoding by means of such adverbial expressions are: (44)

Wenn sie damals Geld genug gehabt hätte, hätte if she then money enough had (p.p.) had had sie sicher einen Wagen gekauft. she surely a car bought (gehabt hätte and hätte gekauft pluperfect subjunctive, 3rd person sg.) 'If she had had enough money at that time, she would surely have bought a car.'

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Wenn sie damals Geld genug gehabt hätte, hätte sie wahrscheinlich einen Wagen gekauft. 'If she had had enough money at that time, she would probably have bought a car.'

Epistemic use of modals in the apodosis is found with, for example, dürfen (only in the preterite subjunctive) and können. For a brief account of their meaning, see Palmer (1986: 63). The latter modal allows both present indicative and preterite subjunctive (the subjunctive involving a higher degree of tentativeness): (46)

Wenn wir diese Lösung wählen würden, if we this solution choose would dürfte es mehr Probleme geben. pret. subj. of dürfen it more problems give 'If we chose this solution, there would probably be more problems.'

(47)

Wenn wir diese Lösung wählen würden, könnte es mehr if we this solution choose would could it more Probleme geben. problems give 'If we chose this solution, there could be more problems.'

(48)

Wenn sie an der Sitzung teilnimmt, kann der Chef if she at the meeting part-takes can the boss Probleme bekommen. problems get 'If she attends the meeting, the boss may encounter problems.'

In some cases, for instance in (46) and (47), it is perhaps justified to posit a combination of confidence-scale and probability-scale encoding: as subjunctive forms, dürfte and könnte may be taken to indicate, in conjunction with the subjunctive of the protasis, the status of the respective propositions with regard to the probability scale, and by virtue of their lexical opposition (dürfen vs. können), the two forms in addition encode confidence scale differentiation. The same type of analysis is mutatis mutandis applicable to kann (present indicative) in (48): through its stem it relates to the confidence scale, and as an indicative it contributes to the

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encoding of a comparatively low degree of hypotheticality in the proposition expressed by the infinitival phrase ... Probleme bekommen. In other words, here we have German examples of the use of portmanteaus.

4. Some epistemic properties of Norwegian conditionals In what follows, only the variety of Norwegian known as "bokmäl" will be dealt with. The variety termed "nynorsk" is excluded from consideration. This is, however, hardly detrimental to our general crosslinguistic discussion because "nynorsk", as regards the form and meaning of conditionals, is very similar to "bokmäl". 4.1. Probability-scale aspects Lacking subjunctive verb forms, Norwegian conditionals are closely related to their English counterparts. There are, however, a couple of differences. A striking one is the deletion of the auxiliary ha ('have') in certain verbal syntagms: ville ha protestert 'would have protested', for instance, is often reduced to ville protestert. This process relates to the probability scale in that it may be said to have a general distancing effect (cf. Hammerich 1960: 65 and Leirbukt 1989: 176-177). In protases with skulle (a cognate of should) + perfect infinitive, the ha deletion yields a complex counterfactuality marker. Furthermore, Norwegian conditionals containing the pluperfect and the conditional perfect differ from their English and German counterparts in being used rather freely with non-past reference. The contextual constraints on these Norwegian forms are, in other words, less heavy than those applying to their English and German parallels. Unfortunately, Norwegian conditionals have not been investigated properly, so no empirically solid comparison with English or German is possible at the moment. As in English, the preterite and the pluperfect found in non-past protases contract an opposition by virtue of which the choice of the complex form regularly involves a greater distancing effect. This does not, however, necessarily imply counterfactuality. The first of the following examples can be construed as counterfactual, but it can, in an appropriate context, also be interpreted as a suggestion or request. In the latter case, the choice of the pluperfect (in conjunction with the conditional perfect of the apodosis) makes, within a non-counterfactual reading, for a more

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polite utterance. This is, of course, a use of distancing structures well known from studies of other languages. Interpreted as a suggestion or request, (49) sounds a little more polite than an alternative containing the preterite (and a ville syntagm corresponding to would + simple infinitive in the apodosis), as illustrated in (50): (49)

Det ville ha νcert fint om du hadde besokt dem. it would have been fine if you had visited them neste uke. next week 1)'It would have been nice if you had visited them next week.' 2) 'It would be nice if you visited them next week.'

(50)

Det ville vcere fint om du besokte dem neste uke. it would be fine if you visited them next week. 'It would be nice if you visited them next week.'

As for the present tense in the protasis, its probability scale value is, as indicated in (51) below, comparable to that of the English present tense and the German present indicative. The verbal inventory of the protasis includes a syntagm consisting of skulle + infinitive. In the majority of cases, it encodes a degree of hypotheticality that lies between the degrees associated with the preterite and the present, thus corresponding to English should + infinitive and German sollte + infinitive. There are, however, examples where the probability-scale value is to be characterized as counterfactuality. 6 The three following conditionals are arranged in order of increasing hypotheticality: (51)

Η vis dette skjer, vil vi fä problemer. if this happens will we get problems 'If this happens, we will have problems.'

(52)

Hvis dette skulle skje, ville vi fä problemer. if this should happen would we get problems 'If this should happen, we would have problems.'

(53)

Hvis dette skjedde, ville vi fä problemer. if this happened would we get problems 'If this happened, we would have problems.'

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67

Interestingly, clauses with should (cf. 2.1.) and sollte (3.1.) sketching the background of requests expressed by the imperative are paralleled by clauses with skulle followed by the imperative. In such cases, skulle (like its English and German cognates in the same construction type) differs in respect of acceptability from the preterite. This would seem to constitute some justification for positing a probability degree higher than the one associated with the latter form. If my analysis is correct, the skulle syntagm is, again, comparable to that with should and sollte. (54)

Η vis han skulle dukke opp, sä hils. if he should turn up then greet 'If he should turn up, then give him my regards.'

(55)

Η vis hart dukker opp, sä hils. if he turns up then greet 'If he turns up, then give him my regards.'

(56)

*Hvis han dukket opp, sä hils. if he turned up then greet

Norwegian protases sometimes contain another modal, namely mätte (a cognate of may). Despite a rather restricted occurrence (cf. Leirbukt 1989: 102-103), it is a clear marker of possibility, and it thus provides further evidence for the hypothesis that Norwegian has a formally encoded degree of probability lying between that expressed by the present and that expressed by the preterite: (57)

Hun ville sikkert tre tilbake om sty ret sä mätte she would surely step back if board-the so should enske. desire 'She would surely resign if the board should so desire.'

The somewhat vacillating nature of the pluperfect with regard to probability-scale value is perhaps part of the background for the occurrence of a more complex syntagm that regularly expresses counterfactuality of the protasis, namely skulle + perfect infinitive (generally allowing ha deletion). In the following example, skulle vcert and ville blitt are reduced forms of skulle ha vcert and ville ha blitt (vcert and blitt being past participles of vcere 'be' and bli 'become', respectively); here, the two verbal syn-

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tagms can only from a purely formal point of view be compared with should have been and would have become: (58)

Dersom Petra skulle ν cert like flittig som Mary, if Petra should been as diligent as Mary ville jeg blitt gal. would I become (p.p.) crazy 'If Petra were as diligent as Mary, I would go mad.'

As regards the probability-scale value of such skulle syntagms in the protasis, a caveat is necessary: our knowledge of their use and occurrence constraints is imperfect. For this reason and in view of the partly unclear use of the pluperfect in Norwegian non-past conditionals, one would hardly be justified in positing a four-way probability scale division as directly related with specific forms as that proposed for English (cf. 2.1.). There are, however, empirical arguments for assuming a similar division of the probability continuum in Norwegian. Besides the occurrence of skulle + perfect infinitive (combined with the possibility of ha deletion) in the protasis, some evidence comes from the following phenomena, taken together: (a) the well-known position of the present tense on the probability continuum, (b) the possibility reading of skulle and mätte noted above and (c) the distancing effect of preterite and pluperfect. On this basis, the various verbal means of expression occurring in non-past protases could perhaps be arranged in order of increasing hypotheticality as follows: 1) present tense, 2) skulle and mätte + infinitive, 3) preterite and pluperfect (the latter form indicating a degree of probability more remote from reality), 4) skulle + perfect infinitive allowing ha deletion. This is, however, a rather tentative result. In order to set up an empirically more solid arrangement of the probability-scale markers, one would have to investigate the Norwegian constructions more closely. 4.2. Confidence-scale

aspects

Norwegian has, of course, adverbial expressions corresponding to perhaps, probably and the like: kanskje, sannsynligvis etc. Being, in principle, used in the same way as their English parallels, they need no detailed account in the present context. Suffice it to say that the general distributional limitations on such confidence scale markers also apply to Norwegian:

Dimensions of epistemicity

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69

* Η vis de kanskje kom i morgen, ville vi fä if they perhaps came tomorrow would we get problemer. problems

More interesting from a general point of view is the opposition between ville and skulle (cognates of would and should) + infinitive in the apodosis. This opposition can only on purely formal grounds be compared with the should/would variation found in British English. In respect of the confidence scale, ville + perfect infinitive in (60) corresponds closely to the English conditional perfect (referring to past time in this case, the Norwegian verb forms are also with regard to the probability scale equivalent to the English ones): (60)

Η vis jeg hadde hatt nok penger i gär, ville jeg if I had had enough money yesterday would I ha kjopt noe annet. have bought something else 'If I had had enough money yesterday, I would have bought something else.'

For the Danish language of his day, Mikkelsen (1911: 455, 457) makes the observation that the use of the skulle variant of the conditional perfect expresses an assurance on the part of the speaker (a usage apparently no longer normal in Danish). In Norwegian, the skulle variant conveys an illocutionary force that might be rendered as Ί assure you that p\ From this point of view, it may be described as a marked variant of the perfect conditional and contrasted with the unmarked ville type. In the following example, an English translation would have to add adverbs like surely or certainly. (61)

Η vis if ha have

jeg hadde hatt nok penger i gär, skulle jeg I had had enough money yesterday should I kjopt noe annet. bought something else

The assurance associated with skulle in the apodosis is also found in conditionals referring to future time. In the following example, the protasis is indicated by the resumptive proform det (here stressed):

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Det er bra de ikke kommer til det der motet. it is good they not come to that there meeting-the Det skulle blitt litt αν en huskestue. That should become (p.p.) a little of a row 'It is a good thing they are not coming to that meeting. There would certainly have been a bit of a row.'

Functionally, the skulle variant of the conditional perfect may also be regarded as a marker for probability-scale value. Here, the perfect infinitive (in conjunction with the ha deletion) seems to be of considerable importance. In view of the combination of probability-scale and confidence-scale aspects, this complex form can be characterized as a portmanteau.

5. Final remarks In this paper, I have tried to show that there is empirical justification for regarding the degree of probability assigned to protasis and apodosis and the degree of certainty or confidence with which the sentence is uttered as constituting two separate dimensions of epistemicity in conditionals. Important evidence comes from systematic differences of encoding: with respect to the former domain, the protasis is the main area of formal variation (offering special possibilities of distinguishing various degrees of remoteness from reality), while the apodosis is reserved for differentiation in the latter domain. We are here concerned with structural regularities common not only to the three languages considered, but to the whole group of Germanic languages spoken today. The occurrence constraints on confidence-scale markers, for instance, hold (as is to be expected) for all of the Scandinavian languages: in, for example, Swedish and Danish, the equivalents of such sentence adverbials as perhaps and probably, namely kanske, sannolikt and mäske, sandsynligvis, respectively, are, in principle, not available in the protasis. There is, by the way, reason to believe that this is a rule of a far more general nature. It applies, for instance, to French adverbs like peut-etre and probablement as well. To conclude these general remarks, I would like to point out that the distributional properties of what I have called confidence-scale markers are paralleled by those of English expressions like by Jove and their equivalents in other Germanic languages, e. g., Norwegian jaggu, jammert or German wahrhaftig and the like. There is probably no clear dividing

Dimensions of epistemicity in conditionals

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line between such "truth intensifies" (Swan 1994: 253, 257) and the confidence-scale markers discussed above, since both types of expressions relate to the process of subjectification in the sense of Traugott (1989). Referring to subjective opinions, attitudes, feelings and the like, they differ considerably from markers for variation in the probability dimension, for example, for truth values, these being to a great extent evaluated on the basis of observed facts and logical reasoning. Such semantic or pragmatic differences within conditionals would seem to be at the bottom of the different formal and distributional properties of the linguistic means used to express confidence-scale variation and subjective judgments or feelings on the one hand and various probability degrees of protasis and apodosis on the other. Notes 1. Interestingly, certain concessive constructions, probably on account of a relatively loose semantic relationship between subordinate and main clauses, permit the use of expressions like probably or perhaps in the latter part of the sentence: Although these words probably derive from Latin, we are justified in assuming that... In this respect, such subordinate clauses differ from protases of true conditionals, as we shall see presently. 2. Without distinguishing between the confidence scale and the probability scale, Lyons (1977: 797), with reference to cases like (1), (2) and (3), uses the term "epistemically modal, or modalized, utterance", which could be related to the confidence scale. In order to capture the viewpoint of probability degrees, one could employ the label "epistemically modal, or modalized, propositions". 3. Recall that such confidence-scale markers can, at least to some extent, be employed in the subordinate clause of a concessive sentence (cf. note 1). This could be attributed to a different type of linking, concessive clauses being, as it were, semantically more autonomous than protases of conditional constructions. 4. In order to illustrate the use of wollte, a protasis with another verb than kommen seems to be appropriate. The occurrence of this probability-scale marker is still largely unexplored. 5. A seeming exception is found in wewn-clauses echoing a previous statement in which a proposition is negated, as in the following example. A.

Peter kommt sicher nicht. Peter comes surely not 'Surely, Peter won't come.'

B:

Und wenn er vielleicht doch kommt, was dann? and if he perhaps nevertheless comes what then? 'But if he comes all the same, what then?'

In such constructions, the scope of the epistemic elements in the wenn-clause is the isolated proposition concerning Peter's coming. This proposition is not a correlative of an apodosis, but a basis for the proform dann, which, in turn, functions as a protasis marker

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in a conditional with was as a very reduced type of apodosis. For a more detailed analysis, see Leirbukt (1994: Section 3). It is worth noting that English probably does not allow the use of perhaps — and the like - in similar cases. Consider the following example. A: There will be no problems. They won't come to the meeting. B: But if they come all the same, what then? Here, perhaps could not be inserted (Peter Trudgill, personal communication). If this reflects a general rule, it may be said that English has even heavier occurrence constraints on adverbials as confidence scale markers in //"-clauses than the two other Germanic languages under consideration. For Norwegian data, see Leirbukt (1994: Section 3). 6. For a more accurate account of constructions with skulle + infinitive, see Leirbukt (1989).

References Athanasiadou, Angeliki — Rene Dirven 1996 "Typology of //-clauses", in: Eugene A. Casad (ed.), 6 0 9 - 6 5 4 . Casad, Eugene A. (ed.) 1996 Cognitive linguistics in the redwoods: The expansion of a new paradigm in linguistics (Cognitive Linguistics Research 6). B e r l i n - N e w York, Mouton de Gruyter. Comrie, Bernard 1986 "Conditionals: A typology", in: Elizabeth Closs Traugott - Alice ter Meulen - Judy Snitzer Reilly - Charles A. Ferguson (eds.), 7 7 - 9 9 . Dietrich, Rainer 1992 Modalität im Deutschen: Zur Theorie der relativen Modalität. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Grimm, Jacob - Wilhelm Grimm 1960 Deutsches Wörterbuch. Bd. 14. Leipzig: Hirzel. Hammerich, Louis L. 1960 "Über die Modalverba der neugermanischen Sprachen", in: Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung 16: 47 — 70. Jäntti, Ahti (ed.) 1989 Probleme der Modalität in der Sprachforschung. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopiston monistuskeskus. Jespersen, Otto 1924 The philosophy of grammar. London: Allen & Unwin. König, Ekkehard 1986 "Conditionals, concessive conditionals and concessives: Areas of contrast, overlap and neutralization", in: Elizabeth Closs Traugott - Alice ter Meulen - Judy Snitzer Reilly - Charles A. Ferguson (eds.), 229-246. Leirbukt, Oddleif 1989 "Zur Kontrastivität Deutsch - Norwegisch im Bereich hypothetischer Bedingungsgefüge: konjunktivische versus indikativische Formenbildung und semantisch-pragmatische Differenzierungen", in: Ahti Jäntti (ed.), 6 0 - 1 0 9 . 1991 "Nächstes Jahr wäre er 200 Jahre alt geworden. Uber den Konjunktiv Plusquamperfekt in hypothetischen Bedingungsgefügen mit Zukunftsbezug", Zeitschrift für germanistische Linguistik 19: 158—193.

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"Betrachtungen zu Dimensionen der Epistemizität im Konditionalgefüge des Deutschen und Norwegischen - mit Streiflichtern auf das Englische", in: Nordlyd: Tromso University Working Papers on Language & Linguistics 22: 102-115.

Lyons, John 1977 Semantics. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mikkelsen, Kristian 1911 Dansk Ordföjningslcere [Danish syntax], Kobenhavn: Lehmann & Stages Forlag. Palmer, Frank R. 1986 Mood and modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990 Modality and the English modals. (2nd edition.) London—New York: Longman. Quirk, Randolph - Sidney Greenbaum - Geoffrey Leech - Jan Svartvik 1985 A comprehensive grammar of the English language. L o n d o n - N e w York: Longman. Swan, Toril 1994 "A note on Old English and Old Norse initial adverbials and word-order with special reference to sentence adverbials", in: Toril Swan - Endre M0rck Olaf Jansen Westvik (eds.), 233-270. Swan, Toril - Endre Merck - Olaf Jansen Westvik (eds.) 1994 Language change and language structure: Older Germanic languages in a comparative perspective (Trends in Linguistics. Studies and Monographs 73). Berlin—New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs 1989 "On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: An example of subjectification in semantic change", Language 65: 3 1 - 5 5 . Traugott, Elizabeth Closs - Alice ter Meulen - Judy Snitzer Reilly - Charles A. Ferguson (eds.) 1986 On conditionals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Werth, Paul 1993 "Accommodation and the myth of presupposition: The view from discourse", Lingua 89: 3 9 - 9 5 .

The modal particle schon: Its syntax, semantics, and pragmatics 1 Elisabet

Ormelius-Sandblom

1. Introduction In this article, I will investigate the German modal particle schon regarding its syntax, semantics and pragmatics. It is an intriguing area for several reasons. Although schon behaves like other modal particles in most respects, it differs from them in some ways. First of all, schon can occur with or without stress ((1) and (2) respectively) unlike many other modal particles: 2 - 3 (1)

(2)

A: und ich kann doch mit η Sommerreifen nich in die and I can doch with the ordinary-tyres not in the Stadt fahren (nich) town go (not?) 'And I can't go to town with ordinary tyres, you know (can I?)' B: in die STADT wohl SCHON (aber nicht auf den in the town wohl schon (but not on the Berg) mountain) 'certainly to town (but not up the mountain)' ("Freiburger Korpus" Steger et al. (eds.), hereafter referred to as FK, 1975: 73, YAH, lines 18-21) Es ist schon gut so. it is schon good so 'It's OK.'

Secondly, it differs from other modal particles with regard to its position relative to sentence adverbials. While other modal particles normally precede the sentence adverbial (3), schon does not (4):

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(3)

da er es ja wirklich nicht hätte machen ..., since he it ja really not would-have do können. can '..., since he really wouldn't have been able to do it, you know.'

(4)

erstmal ist es natürlich schon hart, wenn ein first-of-all is it naturally schon tough, when a Chefarzt... zum Oberarzt gemacht medical director into-an assistant-medical-director made wird is 'first of all it is, naturally, tough when a medical director is made into an assistant medical director' (FK n.d., XAZ, line 309)

Furthermore, there is little agreement as to whether schon has one or several meanings and/or functions. For instance, Helbig (1988) divides the occurrences of the modal particle schon into seven different groups according to function, while Borst (1985) assumes that the meaning of schon varies depending on context. Therefore, one of the questions I will deal with is whether it is possible to explain different occurrences of schon, for example, (5), (6), (7), and (8), in a more uniform manner: (5)

Peter wird es schon schaffen. Peter will it schon make 'Peter will certainly make it.'

(6)

Wer wird das schon tun wollen? who will that schon do want 'Who would want to do such a thing?'

(7)

Na komm schon endlich! oh come schon at-last 'Oh, come on!'

(8)

Wenn ich schon hinfahre, dann mußt du wenigstens die if I schon there-go, then must you at-least the Fahrkarten besorgen. tickets buy 'If I do go there, then you'll at least have to buy the tickets.'

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77

The article will be organized as follows: In Section 2,1 will briefly go through the properties of particles in general and of modal particles in particular in order to give an idea of the behaviour of schon. Section 3 will be dedicated to the position of schon in the sentence structure. I will propose that schon is generated in a special position, where it (normally) remains, and that other constituents move for information-structural reasons. These assumptions help us capture the positional variation of the modal particle in the surface structure. In the subsequent chapter, the topic of investigation will be the relation between schon and the focus-background structure and the themerheme structure respectively. Sections 5 and 6, finally, will concern the lexical meaning and the pragmatic effects of schon and also the functions of utterances containing schon in discourse. I will argue that the lack of consensus in linguistic literature concerning this issue is due to a lack of differentiation between a) lexical meaning, b) pragmatic effect, and c) function in discourse. Instead, I will assume one lexical meaning for the modal particle schon, that can account for the two possible pragmatic effects of schon in varying contexts, that in their turn help determine what functions utterances containing schon may have in discourse. The theoretical framework used here is modular, i.e., grammar and pragmatics are seen as two independent but interacting modules. Furthermore, the analysis of schon draws on the work of Chomsky (1981; 1986 a, b; 1992). Accordingly, I will differentiate between the levels of "overt syntax", phonetic form (PF) and logical form (LF) (cf. Chomsky 1992: 4). However, an additional level of analysis, namely that of semantic form (SF) will be assumed (cf., e. g., Bierwisch 1982, 1987, 1988, 1989; Brandt et al. 1992: 6). The examples used have either been taken from the so-called "Freiburger Korpus" (Steger et al. (eds.)), or they have been constructed. It should be pointed out that the translation of modal particles into English is very difficult. An appropriate translation would often have to include, for instance, intonation, stress, emphasis, etc. (cf. Bublitz 1978: 138). Therefore, only an approximate translation can be given. For example, schon very often has a meaning similar to that of the sentence adverb sicher 'certainly', but they are not equivalents.

2. Properties of particles in general and of modal particles in particular The first question raised when investigating the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of the modal particle schon, concerns the definition of "particle".

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There is a whole range of different definitions in the literature. As a consequence, the size of the group of words regarded as particles varies a great deal (cf. Helbig 1988: 19-21; Hentschel - Weydt 1989: 3 - 7 ) . I will adopt the view of Helbig (1988: 20), according to whom particles are only those indeclinable words that differ from adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions in their syntactic functions and together make up a part of speech. In the following, I will present a short survey of some of the properties that have been attributed to particles in general (2.1) and to modal particles in particular (2.2) in order for the reader to get an idea of the properties of the modal particle schon. 2.1. Particles In the literature, the following properties have been said to be typical of particles: -

Particles are not independent clause elements (cf. Helbig 1988: 21; Brandt et al. 1992: 72; compare also fixation, Lehmann 1985: 308; and isolation, van Baar (unpublished MS.), cited in Davidsen-Nielsen 1993: 19). - They cannot normally occur sentence-initially (cf. Helbig 1988: 22; Brandt et al. 1992: 72; van Baar (unpublished MS.), cited in DavidsenNielsen 1993: 20):4 (9)

* Schon wird er kommen, schon will he come 'Certainly, he will come.'

- They cannot make up well-formed utterances on their own (10) the way adverbs can (11) (cf. Helbig 1988: 22 f.; van Baar (unpublished MS.), cited in Davidsen-Nielsen 1993: 20):5 (10)

A: Wie gut hat er die Prüfung bestanden? how successfully has he the test passed 'How successfully did he pass the test?' B: * Ziemlich. rather 'Rather.'

(11)

A: Hat er die Prüfung gut bestanden? has he the test successfully passed 'Did he pass the test successfully?'

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79

Β: Sicher. certainly 'Certainly.' (from Helbig 1988: 23) - They cannot function as theme (12) or tail (14) in contrast to adverbs (13), (15) (cf. van Baar (unpublished MS.), cited in Davidsen-Nielsen 1993: 20): (12)

* Schon er wird kommen.6 schon, he will come 'Certainly, he will come.'

(13)

Im Vertrauen, er wird kommen. in-the confidence, he will come 'Confidentially speaking, he will come.'

(14)

*Er wird kommen, schon, he will come, schon 'He will come, certainly.'

(15)

Sie ist langsam, arbeitsmäßig, she is slow workwise 'She is slow, when working.'

-

Furthermore, they cannot function as "head of a construction" (16) as opposed to some adverbs (17) (cf. van Baar (unpublished MS.), cited in Davidsen-Nielsen 1993: 20):

(16)

*Er wird sehr schon kommen. he will very schon come 'He will very certainly come.'

(17)

Er wird sehr wahrscheinlich kommen. he will very probably come 'It is very likely that he will come.'

- They also cannot take part in the formation of new words and expressions (cf. van Baar (unpublished MS.), cited in Davidsen-Nielsen 1993: 20):

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*der schon kommende Mann the schon-coming man 'the certainly-coming man'

However, a word that may function both as a particle and as another part of speech can take part in word formation in its function as nonparticle: (19)

die wohlgekleidete Frau the well-dressed woman 'the well-dressed woman'

-

In addition, they "tend to be monosyllabic and unstressed, and they are usually not singled out for focus treatment" (Davidsen-Nielsen 1993: 19) (cf. also Gornik-Gerhardt 1981: 28, 33; Brandt et al. 1989: 20; Andvik 1992: 1 about Norwegian particles; Brandt et al. 1992: 72; Reis 1992: 19). The claim that particles are always unstressed cannot be upheld, though. For instance some of the Geran modal particles, e.g., bloß, denn, ja, schon, may be stressed (cf. Gornik-Gerhardt 1981: 33; Helbig 1988: 25; Ormelius 1993: 160-167) (cf. also Davidsen-Nielsen 1993: 3 about the Danish particle nok Ί dare say' that may also be stressed). - Finally, they are said not to affect the truth value of the clause (cf. Helbig 1988: 23)7 - and yet they modify the utterance semantically and pragmatically. Whether the whole clause or only a part of it gets modified depends on what subclass of particles we are dealing with (cf. Helbig 1988: 24). - However, they seem to have a rather vague semantic content (cf. Brandt et al. 1992: 72; see also below, Section 5.3). 2.2. Modal particles Helbig (1988: 31) suggests a subdivision of the particles into among other groups a class of "Abtönungspartikeln", i. e., particles used to give an utterance another nuance. 8 These are, by the way, much more frequent in German than, for instance, in English, French, or Swedish (cf. Bublitz 1978: 138; Helbig 1988: 11; König 1991: 173). They are also more common in spoken than in written language since they are discourse markers (cf. Davidsen-Nielsen 1993: 3). They have, so to speak, a lubricating effect on communication. Finally, the more relaxed a situation is, the more particles are normally used (cf. Helbig 1988: 12).

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Apart from the properties mentioned above as typical of particles in general there are some properties that are typical only of modal particles: -

-

-

-

-

Most modal particles can only be used in some, not all, clause types (cf. Helbig 1988: 35; Hentschel - Weydt 1989: 14; Nehls 1989: 283; Brandt et al. 1992: 72). Consequently, one can suspect that there is some kind of interaction between modal particles and the so-called "sentence mood" (for more information on "sentence mood", see Brandt et al. 1992: 34-44). I will return to this issue in Section 5.4. The occurrence of the central group of modal particles 9 is restricted to the area after the finite verb in a main clause (concerning the Norwegian and Danish particles respectively, see Andvik 1992: 1; Davidsen-Nielsen 1993: 18) where they may occur adjacent to the finite verb or with other (unstressed) entities preceding them after the finite verb (cf. Gornik-Gerhardt 1981: 35; Helbig 1988: 35). Furthermore, modal particles cannot generally be negated (cf. Brandt et al. 1992: 72; Helbig 1988: 35). Modal particles relate to the whole clause (cf. Helbig 1988: 34; cf. also Palmer 1986: 2, who states that "modality ... relate[s] semantically ... to the whole sentence"). Modal particles are "functionally Janus-headed" (Davidsen-Nielsen 1993: 1) (cf. also, e.g., Hentschel 1986: 3f.; Krivonosov 1989: 35; Nehls 1989: 283; König 1991: 174; Andvik 1992: 1, 4 about Norwegian particles), i.e., the same word may function not only as a modal particle, but as another part of speech as well. Their function, finally, is mainly communicative or pragmatic, e.g., they are said to signal the attitude of the speaker towards the content of the utterance and to fit an utterance into the context (see below, Section 6.1).

Some examples of German modal particles are: (20)

aber, auch, bloß, denn, doch, eben, etwa, eigentlich, halt, ja mal, nun mal, nur, ruhig, schon, vielleicht, wohl

3. The syntactic behaviour of the modal particle schon In Section 3.1, I will touch briefly on the sentence types (structural and semantic) in which the modal particle schon may appear. Furthermore, I will investigate the possible positions of schon in the surface structure of

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a clause (Section 3.2.1) and propose an explanation for these, the hypothesis being that modal particles are generated in a special position relatively high up in the (theoretical) syntactic structure (Section 3.2.2). It will also be suggested that modal particles (normally) remain in this position. 10 3.1. The sentence types in which schon may occur The modal particle schon can be found in many different sentence types: a) verb-second-declaratives (21)

Peter wird es schon schaffen. Peter will it schon make 'Peter will certainly make it.'

b) wh-interrogatives when used as rhetorical questions (22)

Wer wird das schon tun wollen? who will that schon do want 'Who would want to do such a thing?'

(23)

Wer schon wird das tun wollen? who schon will that do want 'Who would want to do such a thing?'

c) imperatives (24)

Na komm schon endlich! oh come schon at-last O h , come on!' (mostly said with some irritation)

d) verb-final-clauses (e.g. es/«o-question deals with the need to specify the proposition concerning its validity. Because of this, the relation between the A- and B-utterances is naturally neither one of contradiction nor one of agreement. It does not seem possible to answer a non-tendentious w/z-question (in its function as a question) with an utterance containing schon (cf. Helbig 1988: 206): (92)

A: In welcher Straße wohnt er? in what street lives he 'In what street does he live?' B: *In der Waldstraße schon, in the Waldstraße schon 'Certainly in the Waldstraße.' (from Helbig 1988: 206)

Exactly why this is so is not quite clear to me, so I will leave this question open for the time being. On the other hand, one can answer a rhetorical question with an utterance containing schon: (93)

Α: Wer will denn bei dieser Hitze heißen Tee trinken? who wants denn in this heat hot tea drink 'Who would want to drink hot tea in this heat?' B: Ich schon. I schon Ί would.' (from Helbig 1988: 206)

Obviously, we are, again, dealing with an objection. It derives from the contradiction present between the indirect assertion of the A-utterance: 'No one would like to drink hot tea in this heat' 42 and the utterance containing schon. Consequently, this case can be subsumed under a). Correspondingly, we can explain the occurrence of schon in rhetorical questions: (94)

A: Mit wem telefoniert sie denn schon wieder so lange? with whom phones she denn already again so long 'Who is she talking with on the phone for such a long time again?'

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Β: Ja, mit wem schon? (Mit Anna natürlich.) yes, with whom schon (With Anna, of-course) 'With whom do you think? (With Anna, of course.)' The affinity of schon to an assertion disambiguates the B-utterance and forces us to interpret it as a rhetorical question. 43 2. Schon also occurs in imperatives in their use as requests: (95)

Na komm schon endlich! oh come schon at-last O h , come on!'

Here we are concerned with a reference to the existence necessary (or possible), under the prevailing circumstances, of a certain state of affairs. Thus, an imperative never allows the conclusion that the state of affairs referred to exists or will exist in the actual world (cf. Rosengren 1993 a: 21-22). In a request, schon does not, of course, weaken the utterance, but emphasizes the aspect of possible factuality and so has a strengthening effect on the request. The strengthening effect comes about in the same way, though, as the above-established weakening effect, namely through interaction between the lexical meaning of schon, the sentence mood and the illocutionary force in question. In the case of imperatives containing schon it is neither a matter of objection nor of agreement, but of emphasizing the necessity of an action. 3. Moreover, schon may occur in conditional clauses: (96)

Wenn ich schon hinfahre, dann mußt du wenigstens die if I schon there-go, then must you at-least the Fahrkarten besorgen. tickets buy 'If I do go there, then you'll at least have to buy the tickets.'

A conditional clause refers to a state of affairs, the existence of which is a prerequisite for another state of affairs. Thus, the state of affairs described in the conditional clause is not presented as existent. On the contrary, two possibilities are open: either the proposition is instantiated or it is not. In this context, schon emphasizes the aspect of possible factual-

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ity. Thus, one of the two options, namely that the proposition is instantiated, is chosen. Helbig (1988: 204) puts it as follows: schon "markiert den im Konditionalsatz ausgedrückten Sachverhalt als präsupponiert (vorausgesetzt), aber als nicht-selbstverständlich" [marks the state of affairs expressed in the conditional clause as presupposed, but as non-self-evident]. The presupposition is possibly due to the fact that the w««-clause lacks illocutionary force, while the fact that the state of affairs is marked as "not self-evident" probably has to do with the conditional meaning of the clause. To sum up, in the above analysis, two different pragmatic effects of schon were established: a weakening one and a strengthening one. Both of them are results of the interaction between the lexical meaning of schon, the sentence mood, and the illocutionary force of the clause. The general function of modal particles guarantees that the weakening or strengthening effect is interpreted relative to the context. However, the status of an utterance containing schon as "objection" or "agreement" is not due to the modal particle, but to the nature of the relation between the utterance containing schon and the preceding utterance (an assertion). Instead, the purpose of using schon is to weaken the objection or to restrict the agreement. In utterances with schon following a ^es//i0-question, though, or in those that are imperative requests or conditionals, it is neither a matter of weakening an objection nor of restricting an agreement, but of emphasizing the aspect of possible factuality, whereby different kinds of goals may be achieved in the different cases, e.g., the emphasizing of the necessity of an action in the case of imperatives.

6.2. The function of utterances containing schon 4 4 I would like to touch briefly on the different functions that utterances with schon may have. They can be both positive and negative. For instance, they can be used: to express the confidence of the speaker (97)

Die Engländer sind schon zu überwinden. the English are schon to defeat 'The English can certainly be defeated.' (FK n.d., XAN, line 152)

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to calm (98)

Es ist schon gut so, it is schon good so 'It's OK.'

to comfort (99)

Sie wird es schon schaffen. she will it schon make 'She'll certainly make it.'

to threaten (100)

Du bist jetzt mit ihm glücklich, aber wart es mal ab! you are now with him happy, but wait it mal out! Der wird dich schon unglücklich machen! that-one will you schon unhappy make 'You're happy with him now, but you wait and see! He'll make you unhappy!

to emphasize (in a condescending manner) that something is self-evident (101)

(102)

Wer wird das schon tun wollen? (Niemand.) who will that schon do want (No one) 'Who would want to do such a thing?' ('No one.') A: Mit wem telefoniert sie denn schon wieder so lange? with whom phones she denn already again so long 'Who is she talking with on the phone for such a long time again?' B: Ja, mit wem schon? (Mit Anna natürlich.) yes, with whom schon (With Anna, of course) 'With whom do you think? (With Anna, of course.)'

to express impatience (103)

Na komm schon endlich! oh come schon at-last 'Oh, come on!'

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7. Summary The many positions possible for the modal particle schon in a clause are explained in this article by assuming that schon is generated in one special position in the (theoretical) syntactic structure, namely as an adjunct to the highest VP and by proposing that other constituents may scramble past schon for information-structural reasons. These reasons have to do with the interaction of the grammatical focus-background structure and the pragmatic theme-rheme structure. Moreover, I have tried to show that by working with a modular theory, in which grammar and pragmatics are assumed to be independent but interacting modules and, accordingly, lexical meaning and pragmatic effects are strictly differentiated, it is possible to establish one lexical meaning οϊ schon, [~FAKT~p], which is compositionally integrated into the meaning of a clause at the level of semantic form. FAKT is assumed to be an operator that is part of a dual group consisting of four semantically related operators. In addition, two pragmatic effects of schon were established on the basis of the meaning of the modal particle in interaction with the sentence mood and the illocutionary force, namely one weakening and one strengthening effect. Finally, the general function of modal particles, i. e., to fit an utterance into the context at a pragmatic level, guarantees that the weakening or strengthening effect is interpreted relative to the context. There still remain several interesting areas in connection with the modal particle schon that I hope to deal with in the future, e. g., the scope relations between sentence adverbials and modal particles, those between different modal particles, the use of schon in discourse from the point of view of conversation analysis, and, of course, the question of whether or not the results presented in this article are applicable to other modal particles. Notes 1. The following article is an extended and somewhat revised version of the 1993 article "Die Modalpartikel schon" in "Satz und Illokution. Band 2." edited by Inger Rosengren. I would like to thank all the people who have helped me through their constructive criticism and their moral support: the participants at the workshop of the project "Satz und Illokution" in 1992 in Tübingen, the participants at the 10th Tromso International Symposium on Language in 1993 and the people working at the German Department,

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Lund University. In particular, I would like to thank Manfred Bierwisch, Margareta Brandt, Wolfgang Koch, Inger Rosengren, and Ilse Zimmermann. 2. There are other modal particles than schon, however, that may occur both with or without stress, e. g., bloß, denn, and ja (cf. Heibig 1988). 3. Capitals indicate that the syllable is stressed. 4. However, there are some modal particles, e.g., schließlich, immerhin, jedenfalls, überhaupt, allerdings, eigentlich, that are in the periphery of the group of modal particles and can occur sentence-initially (cf. Helbig 1988: 25, 36—37): (i)

Ich entschuldige mich nicht, schließlich habe ich den Streit nicht angefangen. I excuse myself not, schließlich have I the fight not begun. Ί won't excuse myself. After all, I didn't begin the fight.' (from Helbig 1988: 200)

5. Admittedly, you could answer the following question with a single schon, but not without at least implicitly adding a clause containing aber: (i)

A: Leihst du mir denn deine Notizen? lend you me denn your notes 'So, will you lend me your notes?' B: Schon, (aber ich muß sie spätestens am Montag zurückhaben), schon (but I must them at-the-latest on Monday get-back) 'Certainly, (but I have to get them back on Monday at the latest.)'

6. However, (12) is acceptable if schon is not regarded as "theme": (i)

A: Ist es sicher, daß er kommen wird? is it certain that he come will 'Is it certain that he will come?' B: Schon, er wird kommen, (aber...) schon, he will come (but...) 'Certainly, he will come (but ...)'

7. It is not quite clear to me, though, if this claim is actually tenable, since for instance the focus particle nur in sentence (ii), as far as I understand, must influence the truth value of the clause. Compare (i) and (ii): (i)

Karl ist hingegangen. Karl is there-gone 'Karl went there.'

(ii)

Nur Karl ist hingegangen. only Karl is there-gone O n l y Karl went there.'

In a context where Karl and Mathias went there, (i) must be true, but (ii) false. 8. Other subclasses are "Gradpartikeln" [focus particles], "Steigerungspartikeln" [intensifying particles], "Antwortpartikeln" [answering particles], "Negationspartikeln" [negation particles], and the "Infinitivpartikel" [infinitive particle] (see Helbig 1988: 31). 9. For some more information about the central group of modal particles, see Helbig 1988: 36.

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10. See example (35), though. 11. For a discussion of the exclamatives, see for instance Fries (1988) and Rosengren (1992). 12. The word order in (i) is possible too, though, but only if schnell is thematic (for a definition of the term "thematic", see Section 4): (i)

Er würde schnell S C H O N fahren, wenn es nur erlaubt wäre. he would fast schon drive, if it only allowed were 'He would certainly drive fast, if it were only allowed.'

Besides, (i) is a very marked sentence. 13. For further discussion of the position of schon relative to sentence adverbials, see Section 5.5. 14. Although the term "movement" is dynamic, I assume that it is only a way of representing relations between structural positions. 15. Lenerz (1993: 119) states, that the "Wackernagel position" cannot be the only position possible for unstressed pronouns. Instead, he tentatively suggests that they must at least be adjuncts to VP, or ideally, move to their respective AGR-positions (see 148). I will not go into this problematic topic any further, but I will temporarily assume a "Wackernagel position". 16. There is a pragmatic focus-background structure as well, though. For a model of the relations between the different submodules of the information structure, i. e., the themerheme structure, the (pragmatic) focus-background structure and the topic-comment structure, see Molnär (1991). 17. The aim of this article is not to investigate the phenomenon of scrambling. Therefore, I will not commit myself to any special view on the status of scrambling, i.e., whether it is Α-movement (cf. Fanselow 1990), A'-movement (cf. Webelhuth 1990) or a case of base generation (cf. Abraham 1992). See also Rosengren (1993 b) for more on this subject. In the following, I will assume, though, that it is some kind of movement. 18. An "information unit" is the basic entity of the information structure. The information structure should not be confused with the illocutionary structure. Rather, the information structure and the illocutionary structure are two separate (pragmatic) aspects of the text structure. The information unit has a focus-background structure of its own and can consist either of an independent proposition or two (seldom more) restrictively conjoined propositions (see Brandt 1990: 108-113). 19. Cf. Gornik-Gerhardt (1981: 33) and Helbig (1988: 25), who point out that the claim that modal particles are always unstressed cannot be upheld. Cf. also one of the Danish particles discussed in Davidsen-Nielsen (1993: 3), nok, that may also be stressed in contrast to the rest of the particles discussed there. 20. For a more detailed description of schon relative to the focus-background structure, see Ormelius (1993: 157-167). The description in Ormelius (1993) is based on the focus theory in Rosengren (1991), but I cannot see that any major problems should arise in adjusting it to Rosengren (1993 b). 21. An unstressed pronoun moves to the so-called Wackernagel position (cf. note 15) and a subject possibly (but not necessarily) to SpecAGRs (cf. Rosengren 1993 b: 259). 22. [ ] = focus domain. 23. Cf. Davidsen-Nielsen (1993: 17-19), who points out that the Danish discourse particles are strongly grammaticalized with respect to at least two of the parameters proposed by Lehmann (1985) as parameters relevant when measuring the degree of grammaticali-

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24. 25. 26.

27. 28.

29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40.

41. 42.

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zation, namely the loss of paradigmatic weight ("obligatorification", Lehmann 1985: 306-308) and the loss of syntagmatic variability ("fixation", Lehmann 1985: 308). According to Hopper - Traugott (1993: 72) processes of grammaticalization seem to draw primarily on Relevance. For the difference between this kind of subjectivity and the expressing of an attitude of the speaker, see p. 26. However, it is difficult to say to what degree the unacceptability of the clause may have something to do with the fact that schon is normally interpreted as a temporal adverb in clauses with the predicate in the perfect. Hentschel (1986) also talks of "Abtönungspartikeln". Cf. Bublitz (1978: 8), however, who analyses modal particles, if I understand it correctly, as expressing emotive modality. This goes for Nehls (1989: 282) as well, who characterizes them as expressions of "emotional attitudes in interpersonal communication". Cf., e.g., Burkhardt (1989: 365), whose "particle paraphrase": "schon bedeutet 'im Gegensatz zu dem, was du den Anschein machst zu tun oder zu denken, gilt p, und ρ ist erwünscht'" [in contrast to that which you seem to do or to think, ρ is true, and ρ is desirable], runs into problems both in the conditional clause (96) (see p. 3 6 - 3 7 ) and in the example (89) (see p. 34) and in the rhetorical question (94) (see p. 36, where the proposed meaning "desirable" can be strongly called in question. INST is a two-place-predicate e (S/N)/S which makes the reference to states of affairs possible. Specifically, it creates a new proposition out of the proposition q and a state of affairs e (for a more detailed description, see Bierwisch 1988: 2 3 - 2 4 . This idea goes back to a suggestion from Manfred Bierwisch. B E D A U E R = be sorry about. Cf. Brauße (1986: 210), though, who states that "Als übergreifendes Bedeutungselement aller Modalpartikeln kann die Bezugnahme auf vorausgehende Annahmen festgehalten werden." [The relating to preceding assumptions can be established as an overall meaning component of modal particles.] It is not quite clear, though, how the semantic integration of the modal particle in the initial field proceeds. I will leave this question open for the time being. Tense has been excluded here. Probably, sentence (84 a) should be marked with a question-mark, too, since schon and wahrscheinlich seem to be compatible only under certain conditions. Another interesting problem regarding scope concerns the combination of schon with other modal particles and in particular the question why most other modal particles precede schon. Note that there is no one-to-one correspondence between sentence mood and illocutionary force (cf. Brandt et al. 1992: 6 0 - 6 1 ) . As far as I can understand, Hentschel is talking about the "Abtönungspartikeln" here. For a discussion of some more examples where the utterance with schon contains more rhematic material, or where it objects to an implicit assumption, see Ormelius (1993: 181-182). Bublitz does not analyse this kind of schon as a modal particle, but rather as a modal word. For more information on rhetorical questions as indirect illocutions, see Meibauer (1986).

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43. Furthermore, we can expect schon to occur in u/z-exclamations if they are analysed as declaratives or as "rhetorically" reinterpreted interrogatives (cf. Rosengren 1992: 291, 296). 44. For an analysis of the effect of stressing the modal particle schon, see Ormelius (1993: 185-188).

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Selkirk, Elisabeth O. 1984 Phonology and syntax. The relation between sound and structure. Cambridge, MA.: M I T Press. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs - Bernd Heine (eds.) 1991 Approaches to grammaticalization. (Typological Studies in Language 19:1.) Amsterdam - Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Thurmair, Maria 1989 Modalpartikeln und ihre Kombinationen. (Linguistische Arbeiten 223.) Tübingen: Niemeyer. Uhmann, Susanne 1988 "Akzenttöne, Grenztöne und Fokussilben. Z u m Aufbau eines phonologischen Intonationssystems für das Deutsche", in: Hans Altmann (ed.), 65 — 88. 1991 Fokusphonologie. Eine Analyse deutscher Intonationskonturen im Rahmen der nicht-linearen Phonologie. (Linguistische Arbeiten 252.) Tübingen: Niemeyer. Van Baar, T. n.d. Particles. [Unpublished MS.] Webelhuth, Gert 1990 "Diagnostics for structure", in: Günther Grewendorf - Wolfgang Sternefeld (eds.), 4 1 - 7 5 . Weydt, Harald - Elke Hentschel 1983 "Kleines Abtönungswörterbuch", in: Harald Weydt (ed.), 3 - 2 4 . Weydt, Harald (ed.) 1983 Partikeln und Interaktion. (Reihe Germanistische Linguistik 44.) Tübingen: Niemeyer. 1989 Sprechen mit Partikeln. Berlin - New York: Walter de Gruyter. Wolski, Werner 1983 "Die Modalpartikel schon in Wörterbüchern und linguistischen Untersuchungen. Ein Beitrag zur praktischen Lexikologie", Germanistische Linguistik 1983: 4 5 3 - 4 8 6 . 1989 "Modalpartikeln als einstellungsregulierende lexikalische Ausdrucksmittel", in: Harald Weydt (ed.), 330-345. Zybatow, Lew 1987 "Modalpartikeln - ein partikularer Fall der zu übersetzenden Einstellungsbedeutung", Linguistische Arbeitsberichte 61: 32—38.

Sources "Freiburger Korpus." Steger, Hugo - Ulrich Engel - Hugo Moser (eds.) 1971 Texte gesprochener deutscher Sprache I. München - Düsseldorf: Max Hueber , Verlag — Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann. 1974 Texte gesprochener deutscher Sprache II. München — Düsseldorf: Max Hueber Verlag - Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann. 1975 Texte gesprochener deutscher Sprache III. München: Max Hueber Verlag, n.d. Unpublished texts from the "Freiburger Korpus."

Negation and modality in the Germanic languages Frank R. Palmer

1. Introduction Just over a year ago, I attended a symposium on mood and modality in Albuquerque and presented a paper entitled "Negation and the modals of possibility and necessity" (Palmer 1992). This was based upon data collected from twenty-four different languages; three of these languages were Germanic - Danish, English, and German. It became apparent that the Germanic languages were, in an important respect, different from most of the others and that they raised particular problems; it is for that reason that I have chosen the topic for this paper. The Germanic languages from which the data have been taken are Danish, Dutch, English (including Scottish English), German (including eight dialects), North Frisian, Icelandic, Norwegian, and Swedish, all the data (for good or ill) being supplied by professional linguists in reply to a questionnaire 1 .1 failed to obtain data on Faroese, and should, perhaps, have considered also Afrikaans and possibly Yiddish. I also looked at some Creole material, but decided that it was too disparate to be included. A word of warning is appropriate. The modal systems of languages are notoriously difficult to establish with any great degree of certainty for two reasons. First, there is no simple and precise way of establishing formal criteria across languages, or perhaps even within single languages, for the definition of a modal verb; in general, I shall simply accept occurrence in the paradigms provided as the criterion, except where it has been specifically suggested to me that a particular form is not a modal verb. Secondly, different speakers have different intuitions about the normal form for the expression of a modal concept, and, therefore, of the appropriateness of any potential modal verb to express such a concept. Indeed, where I had more than one set of replies to my questions, they were never completely identical, though, fortunately, usually very close. Nevertheless, I shall, for the purposes of this paper, take the data that I have been given as typical of the languages discussed, and use expressions such as "the form in Norwegian is ...", while being aware that other scholars may disagree.

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2. Theoretical framework It will be helpful to begin with a brief account of the framework within which I set the problem. (i) There are basically two kinds of modality, epistemic and deontic. Epistemic modality is concerned with judgments of the kind: (1)

a. He may be in his office. b. He must be in his office.

These would be possible replies to a question about someone's whereabouts. Deontic modality is concerned with action, with "directives", whereby the speaker permits, obliges, etc., the addressee to act in some way as in: (2)

a. You may Ican come in now. b. You must come in now.

With (2 a) the speaker gives permission for the act of coming in, while with (2 b) he expresses the obligation to do so. (ii) The notions of possibility and necessity are particularly important with both types of modality. In the sentences above may expresses possibility and must necessity with both kinds of modality. Epistemic modals may be paraphrased with 'possible/necessary that' and deontic modality with 'possible/necessity for' - 'It is possible/necessary (necessarily the case) that he is in his office', 'It is possible/necessary for you to come in now'. There are, in fact, other types of modality, as shown by: (3)

a. He will be in his office. b. You shall come in now.

However, this paper (like the previous paper) is concerned only with the modalities of possibility and necessity, partly because they are comparatively easy to identify across languages, but, more importantly, because, as will be seen shortly, they have special relationships involving negation.

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(iii) A distinction must be made between the modality and the proposition. Thus in the sentences above the modality is concerned with the judgments or directives of possibility/necessity, while the propositions relate to 'he be in his office' and to 'you come in' respectively. This is of great importance for negation, because either the modality or the proposition may be negated. The fact that either may be negated can be seen in the English examples: (4)

a. He may be in his office. b. He can't be in his office. c. He may not be in his office.

(Although a different verb is used for (4 b) than for (4 a) and (4 c), both verbs are typically "possibility" verbs.) Paraphrases for these, which clearly show the scope of the negation, are: (5)

a. It is possible that Bill is in his office. b. It is not possible that Bill is in his office. c. It is possible that Bill is not in his office.

(iv) Possibility and necessity are related logically in terms of negation, and these relations are to some degree mirrored in language. For necessity, paraphrases comparable to those of (5) would be: (6)

a. It is necessary (necessarily the case) that he is in his office. b. It is not necessary (necessarily the case) that he is in his office. c. It is necessary (necessarily the case) that he is not in his office.

However, it would appear that (6 b) and (6 c) (those involving negation) cannot be expressed by a "necessity" modal. For 'necessary that', 'not necessary that', and 'necessary that not' the only forms available are: (7)

a. He must be in his office. b. He may not be in his office. c. He can't be in his office.

This paradigm uses the possibility forms for its negatives, but in the reverse order from that of the paradigm in (4). This can be explained in terms of the logical equivalences Not Possible = Necessary Not and Possible Not = Not Necessary; thus 'It is not necessary (necessarily the case)

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that he is in his office' is expressed by the form more directly associated with 'It is possible that he is not in his office', and 'It is necessary (necessarily the case) that he is not in his office' by 'It is not possible that he is in his office'. In my analysis there are twelve different terms in the basic system of modality. These are, with the relevant English forms: (8)

Epistemic

Deontic

possible not-possible possible-not

may can't may not

necessary not-necessary necessary-not

must (may not) ( can't)

possible not-possible possible-not

can!may can't /may not ( needn't)

necessary not-necessary necessary-not

must needn't mustn't

(The forms in brackets indicate the suppletive forms used in English that are dependent on the necessity-possibility equivalences.) (v) What makes negation and modality interesting is that there is a great deal of irregularity in the sense that there is a simple lack of one-to-one correlation between form and meaning, so that it is not possible to predict for a given form what will be its meaning, or, vice versa, what will be the form to express a particular modal meaning. One kind of such irregularity has already been considered - the use of suppletive possibility forms for the necessity forms. Another is the use of completely different modal verbs, as in English: (9)

a. You must go. b. You mustn't go. c. You needn't go.

Obligation to act and obligation not to act are expressed by forms of must, but for no obligation to act the negative form of another verb, need, is required.

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3. Function of the negative One issue of regularity particularly affects the Germanic languages. The most obvious way of distinguishing between negation of the modality and negation of the proposition is to place the negative marker with either the modal verb or the main verb (the terms "modal verb" and "main verb" are here used for the formal, grammatical, elements, while "modality" and "proposition" are defined in terms of meaning). This can be seen in the Italian: (10)

a. Pud essere nell' ufficio. he can be in the office 'He may be in the office.' b. Pud non essere nell' ufficio. he can not be in the office 'He may not be in the office.' c. Non pud essere nell' ufficio. not he can be in the office 'He can't be in the office.'

Theoretically, the whole paradigm of epistemic/deontic, possibility/necessity modality could express modality in this way, but I have not noted a single example of such a perfectly "regular" paradigm. The nearest noted was that of modern Greek where there is only one missing form. However, modality in modern Greek involves a conjunction and a finite subordinate clause, whereas many languages use an infinitive, generally with no other marker. The nearly complete regularity in Greek is thus not surprising. What is special about the Germanic languages is that none of them uses the device of positioning the negative marker in order to distinguish negation of the modality and the proposition. In none of them are there contrasts of the kind: (11)

a. You may come in. b. * You not may come in. c. You may not come in.

It follows from this that where the distinction is made it has to be made by some other means. Such means include the two already mentioned,

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the use of the logical equivalences and the use of different modal verbs, but there are other devices as well, which will be considered later. It is crucially important, however, to decide whether, in the Germanic languages, the negative marker is to be associated grammatically with the modal or the main verb, and hence, if the form is regular, whether it signals negation of the modality or the proposition. In fact, it is reasonable to argue that it is associated with the modal verb for two reasons. First, this would maximize the regularity since it generally negates the modality. Secondly, the negative normally follows the verbal element that it negates in the Germanic languages (though this is an issue that requires further research). There are problems with this, however, that will be discussed in section 7.

4. Possibility/necessity suppletion As noted earlier, a common device is suppletion in terms of the possibility-necessity equivalences. Two types of suppletion were noted in many of the languages investigated in my previous paper. In one type it is used for both necessity terms, 'not necessary' and 'necessary not', while in the other it is used for the terms with negation of the proposition, 'possible not' and 'necessary not'. Suppletion for the necessity terms has already been seen with epistemic modality in English (example (7), repeated here): (7)

a. Bill must be in his office. b. Bill can't be in his office. c. Bill may not be in his office.

Other languages for which this was noted are Assamese, Italian, and Welsh. However, some dialects of English (including Scottish English) use mustn't instead of can't (though this is an unusual form - see section

7): (12)

Bill mustn't be in his office.

(Standard) English appears to be the only Germanic language with this type of suppletion (suppletion with both necessity terms). Suppletion for the terms with negation of the proposition was noted in the previous paper for all four types (epistemic/deontic χ possibility/

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necessity) in Kikuyu. It is probably also to be found in German (though alternative forms complicate the issue): (13)

Epistemic possibility

kann (mag) kann nicht muss (braucht) sible-not)

nicht (not-necessary for pos-

Epistemic necessity

muss muss (braucht) nicht kann nicht (not-possible for necessary-not)

Deontic possibility

darf (kann) darf (kann) nicht muss (braucht) nicht(l) (not-necessary for possible-not)

Deontic necessity

muss muss (braucht) nicht darf nicht (not-possible for necessary-not)

It is found similarly in both epistemic paradigms of Danish: (14)

a. Det kan vcere sandt. that can be true 'That may be true.' b. Det kan ikke vcere sandt. (not-possible) that can not be true 'That can't be true.' c. Det behover ikke veer sandt. (not-necessary for possible-not) that must not be true 'That may not be true.' d. Det mä vcere sandt. that must be true 'That must be true.' e. Det behever ikke vcere sandt. (not-necessary) that must not be true 'That may not be true.' f. Det kan ikke vcere sandt. (not possible for necessary-not) that can not be true 'That can't be true.'

It may also be true of Danish deontic possibility, if the forms are taken to be (but see below):

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(15)

kan

kan ikke

behover ikke

The data from Dutch and Swedish suggest the same type of suppletion in all paradigms except that of epistemic possibility (where Dutch uses stress (see Section 5) and Swedish has no 'possible not' form) - although there is a complication in that both languages use a different necessity verb, Dutch for all the other paradigms, Swedish for the deontic paradigms only. The Dutch forms are: (16)

Epistemic necessity

moet hoeft niet kan niet (not-possible for necessary-not)

Deontic possibility

mag mag niet hoeft niet (not-necessary for possible-not)

Deontic necessity

moet hoeft niet mag niet (not-possible for necessary-not)

The Swedish forms are: (17)

Epistemic necessity

mäste mäste inte kan inte (not-possible for necessary-not)

Deontic possibility

far (kan) fär (kan) inte behöver inte (not-necessary for possible-not)

Deontic necessity

mäste behöver inte fär inte (not-possible for necessary not)

There is a curious complication in Danish and North Frisian in that the same verb (mä and mötj respectively) is used for epistemic necessity and deontic possibility, though with an alternative in Danish (and the verb is even used as an alternative for deontic necessity in both languages):

Negation and modality

(18)

Danish Epistemic necessity mä behover ikke kan ikke

N. Frisian mötj tort ai mötj ai

Deontic possibility mä (kan) mä (kan) ikke behover ikke

mötj mötj ai tort ai

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There are, however, other verbs available to avoid the ambiguity. There is also a small point with the Icelandic deontic modals. There is suppletion of the forms with negation of the modality if the interpretation is: (19)

Deontic possibility mätt mätt ekki parft ekki (not-necessary for possible-not) Deontic necessity

veröur l>arft ekki mätt ekki (not-possible for necessary-not)

This assumes that frarft is a necessity verb, equivalent to (and translated as) English need, although I have treated the related verb in German darf as a possibility verb. There are, moreover, two problems of interpretation. First, for both Frisian and Icelandic the form offered for epistemic 'possible not' was neither regular nor a suppletive of the type being considered, although there is, in both languages, a regular 'not necessary' form, the forms suggested being, respectively (see Section 6 for discussion): (20)

Dät koon/mai weese, that can/may be 'He may not be in his Padt getur verid ad it can be that 'He may not be in his

dät hi ai önj san dörnsch as. that he not in his room is room.' hann see ekki ά skrifstofunni sinni. he be not in-office his-own office'

One must first of all wonder why the suppletive term was not suggested, so making epistemic possibility follow the same pattern of suppletion as

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the other paradigms. (Is it really the case that the speakers of these languages are not so easily influenced as speakers of the other languages by the possibility—necessity equivalences?) Secondly, there must be some doubt about the suppletion of deontic 'possible not' with 'not necessary' — for this equates permission not to act with no obligation to act. This is relevant not only to the language discussed, but also to English, where the paradigm would be illustrated by: (21)

a. You may lean leave now. b. You may notlcan't leave now. c. lYou needn't leave now.

It is debatable whether saying there is no need (or necessity) to act is the same as giving permission not to.

5. Use of different forms The use of different forms for the negatives is found in most of the Germanic languages, most commonly for deontic 'not necessary', for example: (22)

English Dutch Frisian German Icelandic Norwegian Swedish

must/needn't moet/hoeft niet (also epistemic) schal(mötj)ltort ai muss/braucht nicht (optional) verdurlparft ekki mältrenger ikke mästelbehöver inte

(Norwegian trenger is not, however, considered to be a modal.) Two examples of different forms being used with possibility, in both cases for 'not possible' are those of epistemic modality in English, illustrated in (4), and deontic modality in Norwegian. The Norwegian forms for 'He may/can leave the room' and 'He may not/cannot leave the room' are: (23)

a. Han kan forlate rommet. b. Han fär ikke forlate rommet.

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A slightly different situation is one in which there are two alternative forms for the positive, but these are used contrastively with the negatives. This is found with deontic necessity in Danish and the Deggendorf (Lower Bavaria) dialect of German (with alternatives): (24)

Danish

skal/behover behover ikke (not-necessary) skal ikke (necessary-not)

German (Deggendorf)

muasdlsoisd muasd(braugsd) ned (not-necessary) soisd(deafs) ned (necessary-not)

6. Other devices Two other devices may be noted: First, stress alone was indicated as the distinguishing feature with epistemic modality in Dutch: (25)

a. Hij kan op kantoor zijn. 'He may be in his office.' b. Hij kdn niet op kantoor zijn 'He can't be in his office.' c. Hij kan niet op kantoor zijn. 'He may not be in his office.'

Stress was also indicated in the Greenlandic form of Danish: (26)

a. Du skal (mä) ga. 'You must go.' b. Du skäl ikke ga. 'You needn't go' c. Du skal ikke ga. 'You mustn't go.'

Secondly, a distinction was made in terms of mood, the subjunctive or "conditional" being used for the positive term, but the indicative for 'not possible' with epistemic possibility. The paradigm from Munich German for 'He may be in his office' is:

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a. Er könnte im Büro sein. b. Er kann nicht im Büro sein, (not possible) c. Er könnte nicht im Büro sein, (possible not)

Similar forms were provided for three dialects of Swiss German (though for two a simple modal form was not used for 'possible not', a form with conjunction and finite complement being preferred): (28) Lucerne Basel Bern

possible kchönnt chönnt chönnti

not possible kchann nid cha nöd cha need

possible not (Ikchönnt nid)

Icelandic uses the same kind of device, though again with a finite complement for the 'possible not' term (already noted in (20)): (29)

a. Hann gceti verid ά skrifstofunni sinni. he could be in office his-own 'He may be in his office.' b. Hann getur ekki verid ά skrifstofunni sinni. he can not be in office his-own 'He can't be in his office.' c. Pad getur verid ad hann see ekki ά skrifstofunni it can be that he be not in office sinni. his-own 'He may not be in his office.'

For Austrian German, the negative contrast is made in the same way, but the positive form is in the indicative: (30)

kann (possible) kann nicht (not-possible) könnte nicht (possible-not)

(In this context, mention could be made of the English past tense 'tentative' forms such as might and could and similar forms in, for example, Danish.)

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Another device was the use of a modal with a conjunction and a finite complement clause of the type 'it may be that'. This has already been exemplified in (20) and (29). It was found with the epistemic 'possible not' term in Frisian, German dialects, Icelandic, Norwegian, and Swedish, though in all except two (Icelandic and Norwegian) there was a 'not necessary' form which might have been considered as the appropriate suppletive form (as discussed in section 4). Moreover, no forms for epistemic 'not necessary' or 'necessary not' were offered for Icelandic, while the forms offered for epistemic 'possible not' and 'not necessary' in Norwegian both used adverbs: (31)

a. Han er muligens ikke pä kontoret. he is possibly not in office 'He may not be in his office.' b. Han er ikke nodvendigvis pa kontoret. he is not necessarily in office 'He may not be in his office.'

7. The regularity of 'not possible' The most regular of the terms in the modality system in general were those for 'not possible'. For epistemic 'not possible' the only language that uses a different verb is English - can for may (see (4)), although, as was seen in section 6, in some languages there is a change of mood. For deontic 'not possible' the only exception is Norwegian (see (23)): (32)

English (epistemic possibility) Norwegian (deontic possibility)

may kan

can't für ikke

It is also worth noting that most of the languages use the etymological 'can' form for epistemic 'not possible'. This is even true of (standard) English and Frisian, even though the form for the positive term is different (but only as an alternative in Frisian): (33)

English North Frisian

(may) (mail koon)

can't koon ai

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The only exceptions are (but with an alternative in Fersental German): (34)

Scottish English Icelandic German (Fersental/Trentino)

(might) mustn't (gaeti) getur ikkei (mu! mulkhän net khan)

Similarly, the 'can' form is also regularly used for deontic 'not possible'. The only exception is Norwegian, though there are alternative forms in English, German, and Swedish: (35)

Norwegian English German Swedish

(kan) (can/may) (kann!darf) (kan/fär)

far ikke can't/may not kann!darf nicht kanlfär inte

8. 'Reversal' with 'necessary not' There is one other feature worth noting. In a very large number of languages the form for deontic 'necessary not' is strikingly irregular in that, although the negative is associated grammatically with the modal, not the main verb, it is the proposition, not the modality, that is negated. This can be seen in Italian: (36)

a. Deve venire. you must come 'You must come.' b. Non deve venire. not you must come 'You mustn't come.'

Since the negative marker is grammatically associated with the modal verb, preceding it rather than following it (compare the Italian possibility forms in example (10)), it might be expected that the meaning would be that of 'not necessary' (no obligation, 'You needn't come'), whereas, in fact, it has the meaning of 'necessary not' (obligation not to, 'You mustn't come'). (In fact, with the appropriate stress, it can also have the regular 'no necessity' meaning, but that does not invalidate the point being made.)

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Here, then, there is another type of irregularity, in that the negation would seem to have been misplaced. This misplacement (or what I would call "reversal") of the negation is fairly common with the term for deontic 'necessary not'; other languages exhibiting the same phenomenon are Arabic, Assamese, Farsi, Kinyarwanda, Tamil, and Tigrinya. It is only rarely found (but see below) with other terms in the modal paradigm; the Italian 'not possible' forms, for instance, are quite regular. This reversal seems to be fairly rare in the Germanic languages. There is a striking contrast between the English and the German: (37)

a. You mustn't come in. b. Du mußt nicht hereinkommen. 'You needn't come in'

In English it is the proposition that is negated ('necessary not'), while in German it is the modality ('not necessary'). If, as argued in Section 2, the negative is associated with the modal in the Germanic languages, so suggesting 'not necessary', German is regular and English irregular. Only one other Germanic language has exactly this same kind of reversal — Norwegian, which like English, uses a different verb for 'not necessary': (38) Norwegian mä English must (cf. German muß

not necessary trenger ikke needn't muß (braucht) nicht

necessary not mä ikke mustn't darf nicht)

In some English dialects, including Scottish English, this reversal is found with epistemic as well as deontic necessity: (39)

must

might not

mustn't

This may be true of North Frisian if the relevant verb is taken to be a necessity verb: (40)

schall mötj

tört ai

mötj ai

The complication is, however, as we have seen, that this verb is also the verb of deontic possibility; treated as a possibility verb it would show only the suppletion of 'not possible' for 'necessary not'.

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However, there is also reversal where there are two alternative 'necessity' verbs in the positive, which are distinctive with the negatives. This is the case with Danish and the Deggendorf dialect of German (there are alternative forms which are omitted here): (41) Danish Deggendorf

behoverlskal muasd/soisd

not necessary behover ikke muasd ned

necessary not skal ikke soisd ned

The forms in the second column are regular - negation of the modal signals negation of the modality; those in the third column are irregular - the negative is associated with the modal, but the proposition is negated. There also appears to be reversal with English epistemic 'possible not': (42)

may

can't

may not

However, it may be relevant that may not is never cliticized, which may suggest formal association of the negative with the main verb rather than the modal. With shall too (which is not included in the basic system), there appears to be reversal. If shall signals Ί guarantee that...', shall not signals Ί guarantee that ... not', not Ί do not guarantee that...', for which there is, in fact, no form. It may be significant that the forms with reversal in Danish and the German dialects are etymologically related to shall.

9. The positioning of the negative Finally, it may be asked why the Germanic languages do not use the simple device of positioning the negative to distinguish the two types of negation (see Section 2), although this is commonly (and naturally) found in many other languages. Part of the answer may be simply that it is a grammatical rule that the negative always follows the modal verb. In English it not only always immediately follows but also is cliticized with most verbs. In North Frisian the preferred position varies with the modal, as seen in: (43)

Hi mötj e dörnsch ai ferlätje. he must the room not to leave 'He may not leave the room.'

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Hi tört ai e dörnsch ferlätje he need not the room to leave 'He needn't leave the room.' However, it is also possible to say: (44)

Hi mötj ai e dörnsch ferlätje. he must not the room to leave 'He may not leave the room.'

I am not sure of the precise rules for the position of the negative in all the other languages; this is yet another area that requires further research. What is clear is that the Germanic languages appear to be consistent in lacking the apparently simple device that is found in so many other languages, and that it is this that makes their modal systems so complex and irregular. Note 1. I wish to thank Lars-Gunnar Andersson, Petur Helgason, Georg Hellmayr, Peter Halter, Paul Kerswill, Karen Langgärd, Per Linell, William Lockwood, Jim Miller, Niels Davidsen-Nielsen, Anthony Rowley, Peter Thurlow, Peter Trudgill, Cornelia Tschichold, Alistair Walker, and Herman Wekker for their help in providing me with examples. Any errors will certainly be mine.

References Palmer, Frank R. 1992

"Negation and the modals of possibility and necessity", paper presented at Symposium on Mood and Modality, Albuquerque. [To appear in: Joan Bybee - Suzanne Fleischman (eds.).] Bybee, Joan — Suzanne Fleischman (eds.) in press Mood and modality. Amsterdam - Philadelphia: Benjamins.

Expressive sentence types — a contradiction in terms. The case of exclamation Inger Rosengren

Expressive sentences We are all aware of the existence of certain expressive sentences like: (1)

What a nice guy he is!

(2)

How foolish she is!

(3) (4)

Isn't she beautiful! Sä vacker hon är!

so beautiful she is 'How beautiful she is!'

(5)

(6)

Vad

hon är vacker!

what she is beautiful 'How beautiful she is!' Wie schön

sie

singt!

how beautifully she sings 'How beautifully she sings!' (7)

Wen

der (nicht)

alles

kennt!

whom he (not) all knows 'All the people he knows!' (8)

Ist

die aber

gewachsen!

has she PART grown 'Has she grown!'

(9)

Comme il

fume!

how he smokes 'What a lot he smokes!'

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Rosengren

(10)

Qu'est-ce quelle est belle! what is it that she is beautiful 'How beautiful she is!'

(11)

N'est-elle pas belle! is she not beautiful 'Isn't she beautiful!'

These sentences are usually called exclamatory sentences or "exclamatives". They vary quite a lot in form but seem to have pretty much the same function, namely being exclamations about a state of affairs. In descriptive grammars, they are mostly looked upon as a specific minor sentence type or a set of sentence types on a par with the three basic types, declaratives, interrogatives, and imperatives. However, they do not have a form-type of their own. They look like declaratives or interrogatives. Why is this so, and what determines their specific function? Most grammars do not discuss this question. Some grammars, however, at least point to the fact that exclamatives at the same time inform about a state of affairs - and thereby resemble declaratives - and express an emotion. Variety in form and unity in function is a dilemma for every grammar categorizing form types. This is the reason why grammars tend to be inconsistent in their treatment of exclamatives. Next to declarative, interrogative, and imperative clauses, the exclamative is probably the most prominent candidate for recognition as a sentence type in grammar on a par with the three major types. However, there are other candidates, too. One of them is what Quirk et al. (1985: 11.38) regard as irregular sentences — sentences with optative subjunctive and subject-verb-inversion: (12)

Long live the Republic!

Less archaic are sentences with may: (13)

May the best man win!

These sentences express a wish. The same function may be conveyed by independent constituent clauses (Quirk et al. 1985: 11.41), beginning with if only:

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If only he were not so timid!

Corresponding types may be found in other languages as well. In grammars, they often are treated as a sentence type of their own. In this paper, I will concentrate on exclamatives. In principle, however, the explanation offered applies to other expressive types as well (see Rosengren 1992 and 1993). It is my aim to show that the function of exclamatives is the result of the cooperation between, on one hand, grammar and, on the other, pragmatics. I will argue that the above utterances are (mostly positive^ declaratives or negative interrogatives. They obtain their exclamatory function through an inference process, triggered by the sentence type, the propositional content and emphatic stress, resulting in a generalized implicature. Further, I will try to explain why they cannot constitute a sentence type of their own and at the same time be expressive sentences, in other words, why this would be a contradiction in terms. Finally, I will maintain that exclamations differ from standard illocutions in not being speech acts in the strict sense of the term but instead emotional expressions. The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, I will describe the syntactic structure of exclamatives in the four languages under investigation (English, Swedish, German, and French) and discuss the different proposals as to their explanation. It will be shown that exclamatives exhibit astonishing structural similarities in all the languages. The investigation will support the assumption that exclamatives do not constitute a sentence type of their own but are declaratives and interrogatives. In Section 3, I will discuss how their function may be derived from their grammatical structure, and, finally, in Section 4 I will consider their pragmatic status.

2. The syntactic structure of exclamatives It is a well known fact that, unlike declaratives and interrogatives, exclamatives do not have a syntactic clause structure of their own. Exclamatives may be introduced by w/?-phrases or by complementizers, or they may look just like plain declarative or j^s/no-interrogative clauses. In this section I will review what we know about each of the languages compared with respect to the different shapes of their exclamatives. I will distinguish

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strictly between exclamatives as form types and exclamation as a functional type. Exclamation, thus, is here used as the function of the different exclamative form types.2 2.1. English The following description takes as its point of departure Quirk et al. (1985), since this grammar gives a comprehensive overview of exclamatives in English. I will only discuss independent clauses, however. (t) We find exclamatives introduced with how and what. (15)

What a time we've had today!

(16)

How delightful her manners are!

According to Quirk et al. (11.31-11.32), from whom the examples are borrowed, these types are the only formal types of exclamatives. The authors treat them as a specific sentence type on a par with the standard types: declaratives, interrogatives, and imperatives. This type of exclamative may be elliptic, too (Quirk et al. 11.32): (17)

What a terrible wind!

(18)

How encouraging!

What are we told about these exclamatives? They resemble w/j-questions in having a w/z-phrase in the initial position. In contrast to w/?-questions, however, there is generally no inversion. There may be inversion, though, and inversion is preferred with negative rarely. Quirk et al. do not discuss why this is the case. The first question to be answered is this: Could these exclamatives possibly be interrogatives? From the normal lack of inversion we must not necessarily conclude that they could not. They may have the structure of interrogative constituent clauses, but there are other relevant properties which make us believe that they are not interrogatives. Quirk et al. discuss the status of what and how. We are told that these elements are "predeterminer in a noun phrase" and "intensifier of an adjective, adverb, or clause", respectively. Their function in exclamatives is that of indicating an extreme position on a scale. So, what is always followed by

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the indefinite article when it is combined with a singular count noun, what a (see Elliott 1971 and 1974). Correspondingly, what a can never be used in interrogative clauses. The function of how points in the same direction. Elliott (1974) emphasizes that exclamatory /?ow-sentences do not accept any and ever and that, on the other hand, exclamatives accept very, extremely, etc., which are not allowed in questions: (19)

*How very nice is she?

What is more, (15) and (16) do not take a negation with scope over the whole clause. McCawley (1973) underlined this more than 20 years ago. Huddleston (1993) tries to get around this fact by showing that exclamatives sometimes are compatible with a negation: (20)

What a lot of them I didn't have the time to read! (Huddleston 1993: 262)

(21)

How many of them we didn't see! (my example)

As Huddleston himself points out, however, the negation may only be used when it does not have scope over the wh-phrase. This fact, of course, is important. In (20) and (21) the set of things exist independently of my seeing or reading them. Only then may I be astonished that I did not read or see them. This is why we cannot use a negation with wide scope in wh-exclamatives. 3 (I will return to the matter of negation later on when comparing other languages.) So far, we have found no empirical evidence supporting the assumption that how and what a exclamatives are interrogatives. Could they be declaratives? Quirk et al. mention another exclamative type with the same function where there cannot be any doubt that it is a declarative clause: (22)

We've had such a time!

In (22), such fulfills the same function as what a in (15). I will assume that (15) through (18), (20), and (21) are declaratives, too. They usually occur with the word order of constituent clauses but may also, more seldom, occur with the word order of main clauses. The investigation of the other languages will support this assumption.

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(ii) Yet another type of exclamative is the following one (Quirk et al. 1985: 11.22): (23)

Hasn't she grown!

(24)

Wasn't it a marvellous concert!

(25)

Am I hungry!

This type has the same structure as yeslno interrogatives, that is, the verb is in the front position of the clause. Let us call them Vl-exclamatives. Quirk et al. call them exclamatory questions (1985: 11.22), maintaining that they are interrogative in structure but have the illocutionary force of an exclamatory assertion. They usually have emphatic stress and a falling instead of a rising tone. We are not told what an exclamatory assertion is. It is, therefore, still more difficult to understand what the link is between the interrogative sentence and the exclamatory assertion. Interestingly, this type of exclamation does allow a negation, but it must be the clitic n't. Quirk et al. do not comment on this either. I will return to this fact when discussing the German structures. Most importantly, though, the negation does not seem to negate. It behaves as if it were a kind of pleonastic not. Quirk et al. think it is odd that a positive and negative clause should have nearly the same function. However, they point to a certain difference in function between negated and non-negated exclamatives of this type: 4 (26)

Wasn't it a marvellous CONcert! = What a marvellous CONcert it was!

(27)

Has she GROWN! = She HAS grown!

We are told that the negated type has an appeal for the listener's confirmation. This is not the case with the positive type, which instead implies that a positive response is self-evident. This gives rise to the suspicion that at least (25) and (27) are not interrogative clauses, just as McCawley already maintained in 1973. McCawley (1973) does not accept the existence of negative Vl-exclamatives. This is, of course, not correct (cf. (23) and (24) above). In treating positive Vl-exclamatives, she enumerates quite a lot of properties that are not found in positive VI-interrogatives. Some of them are repeated here.

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The positive exclamative VI-type does not allow: (a) (b) (c) (d)

intensifiers like very, extremely, etc.; comparatives or superlatives; indefinite subjects (someone); coordination.

It allows: (e) (f) (g) (h)

only a restricted range of modals (can = 'able'); only a restricted range of quantifiers, not for instance any, the NP-extraposition: Is it awful the price you pay!; Finally, ever in its non-temporal meaning (not allowed in questions).

Note that these properties are all propositional in character and apply to negated Vl-exclamatives as well. I will return to this later on. Huddleston (1993) insists that the VI-type (positive and negative) is an interrogative clause (cf. above). He tries to explain away all the properties mentioned by McCawley as being either not relevant or just possible in interrogative clauses used as questions as well. To him, exclamatives (the above w/z-types included) are interrogatives used as indirect speech acts. As McCawley has already pointed out, however, indirect speech acts do not take their interpretation out of the blue. The exclamatory VI-types, for instance, do not have any propositional content from which the indirectness could be derived pragmatically - as has the example given by Huddleston, Would you mind opening the door?, where the proposition denotes the act wanted by the speaker. Huddleston, therefore, begs the question by explaining all exclamatives as indirect speech acts. It is much more complicated than that. I will argue in more detail below that we have to distinguish between the positive and the negative exclamatives mentioned above, on one hand, and such negative exclamatives in which the negation takes scope over the whole clause, on the other, the former being declaratives, the latter actually interrogatives. It is true that, in order to be able to function as an exclamation, this latter type must first be interpreted in a specific way (for a detailed account, see Section 2.3). This interpretation, however, is only a necessary prerequisite for an inference process to be able to start, resulting in the exclamatory interpretation.

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(iii) Before leaving this section, a few more types should be mentioned. Quirk et al. treat the following type under the title "Subordinate clauses as irregular sentences" (1985: 11.41) without directly comparing it with the above exclamatives: (28)

That he should have left without asking me!

(29)

To think that she could be so ruthless!

We are told that this type (often containing a modal verb) mostly conveys disapproval or regret but that it may convey approval or relief, too. It is interesting because it obviously has the same structure as the constituent that-clause, often with so/such determining an adjective or adverb. It may be negated, too. We are not told what sentence type it belongs to. Certainly it cannot be an interrogative clause. If we want to categorize it, we will have to call it a declarative clause. As we will see later on, other languages have the same structural type with an exclamative function. (iv) Beneath the heading "Nonsentences", Quirk et al. (11.53) register the following type: (30)

The clothes she wears!

This type may be compared with the following ones (cf. Ebert - Rohdenburg 1971, from whom the examples are borrowed, and Elliott 1971 and 1974): (31)

It's amazing the pancake he ate for supper!

(32)

It's dismaying the thing (that) he saw!

(33)

It is dismaying what he saw!

In (31) we have a matrix clause expressing astonishment. The rest is a noun phrase modified by a restrictive relative clause. In analogy with concealed questions, Grimshaw (1977: 143-144) calls the NPs concealed exclamatives. She regards them as base generated NPs. They occur only with predicates that take an NP. The matrix clause is not obligatory (see (30)). Certainly, they cannot be interrogatives. They have something in common with relative clauses (cf. German and French below).

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Compare also the following minor type, mentioned by Quirk et al. (6.34n): (34)

Fool that I was!

with a relative clause initiated by that. (v) Quirk et al. (11.8) remark that declaratives followed by a tag question may function as exclamations as well, although they are not as emphatic as the corresponding negated VI-cases: (35)

It's wonderful wEAther, ISn't it?

(36)

She was ANgry, WASn't she?

They cannot be negated. Compare German, below. (vi) To summarize: English uses quite a lot of different form types to express exclamations. The only type with specific properties is the one with a wh-phrase, how, or what a. We can be fairly certain that this type is not an interrogative clause. Among the other subtypes, the VI-type is the most interesting. It seems necessary to distinguish between positive and negative Vl-exclamatives. There seem to be good reasons not just to regard the positive ones as interrogative clauses as Huddleston (1993) does. Another type is the that-clause, which cannot be interrogative in structure. The same holds for (30) through (34), where there is an obvious relationship to relative clauses. 2.2. Swedish Swedish exclamatives resemble English ones. However, Swedish (with one exception) does not use the same set of wh-phrases in wh-interrogatives and in w/j-exclamatives. The following description is based on Svenska Akademiens Grammatik (The Grammar of the Swedish Academy = SAG, forthcoming). As for English, only independent clauses will be discussed. (i) Exclamatives with an initial w/i-phrase (sä, sädan (sä'n), som, vad, vilken):

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(37)

Sä stor du har blivit! so tall you have become 'How big you have gotten!'

(38)

Ett sädant vackert ansikte (som) han har! a such beautiful face (that) he has 'What a beautiful face he has!'

(39)

Som jag har sökt dig! how I have looked for you 'How I have been looking for you!'

(40)

Vad du är vackerü Vad vacker du är! what you are beautiful/ what beautiful you are 'How beautiful you are!'

(41)

Vilken överraskning det var! (SAG) which surprise it was 'What a surprise it was!'

The exclamatives may be elliptic, too: (42)

Sant vackert väder! such beautiful weather 'What beautiful weather!'

(43)

Sä lovande! so promising 'How promising!'

As for the wh-phrases, they behave much like the English equivalents. SAG regards som as a complementizer. However, I do not think that this is correct. It certainly functions as an adverbial phrase with a scalar meaning and is comparable with English how. Negation is only possible when the negator does not take scope over the wA-phrase: (44)

Sä mänga böcker (som) jag aldrig hinner so many books (that) I never will have the time läsa! to read 'How many books I never will have the time to read!'

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Contrary to English, however, sälsädan(sä'n)lsom are not found in interrogative clauses at all. They express degree and quantity. Vad also expresses degree and quantity. It corresponds to German was and French que with the same function (see below) and (contrary to was in German) it may form a phrase together with an adjective or adverb. In this function it is not found in interrogative clauses. Vilken corresponds to German welch (see below), and it may appear in interrogative clauses as well. Only in exclamatives, however, is its meaning scalar. Moreover, the Swedish exclamatives always show the word order of constituent clauses (cf. English, above, and German below). I will assume that (37) through (44) are declaratives. Marginally, Swedish, too, allows negated w/z-exclamatives, where the negation takes scope over the whole clause. SAG regards them as rhetorically used interrogatives. Two examples are given: (45)

Vilken syn motte oss ickel which sight met us not 'What a sight met us!'

(46)

Hur vacker är hon inte! how beautiful is she not 'How beautiful she is!'

Both are negated and both are somewhat archaic. Compare, however, fn. 3. Since hur is only possible in interrogative clauses, the negation — by now expected - is obligatory when the clause is used exclamatorily: (47)

*Hur vacker hon är/är hon! how beautiful she is/is she

As by now expected, too, the negation does not seem to negate in these interrogatives either. (ii) There is also a Swedish Vl-exclamative, but only negated (at least in the standard, cf. English above): (48)

Är han inte söt! is he not cute 'Isn't he cute!'

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*Är han söt! is he cute

This fact is certainly interesting, considering the above discussion concerning the status of the English Vl-exclamatives. Since, just as English, Swedish has an interrogative VI clause, it is difficult to explain why this cannot be used as an exclamative, given the fact that the English counterpart can. If, on the other hand, the English positive VI-exclamative is not interrogative but declarative in character, the difference between Swedish and English may be easier to explain. It may perhaps be tracked back to differences in the use of VI-declaratives in both languages (cf. Önnerfors, in this volume). I will, therefore, assume, as does SAG, that the Swedish negated VI-exclamative is interrogative in structure. (iii) Exclamatives with att: (50)

Att det kan finnas en sädan människa! that there can exist a such person 'That there is such a person!'

The α/ί-clause corresponds to the English that-clause. It is an independent constituent clause with an initial complementizer. Just as in English, it may be negated. The complementizer may carry emphatic stress. This clause, of course, cannot be an interrogative clause either. (iv) Without commenting on the fact, SAG mentions that it is possible to use a normal declarative as well (note the modal particles): (51)

Hon är minsann vacker! she is PART beautiful 'Isn't she beautiful!'

(52)

Hon har dä tokiga ideer! she has PART silly ideas 'Hasn't she got silly ideas!'

This type cannot be negated. (Cf. German below.) (v) In summary: Swedish distinguishes clearly between non-negated and negated exclamatives with a w/z-phrase, insofar as the non-negated ones

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(with one exception, vilkeri) are introduced by a w/i-phrase not found in interrogatives, and the negated ones are introduced by a w/z-phrase not found in declaratives. This gives us a hint as to where to look for the solution to the above-mentioned dilemma. Like English, Swedish has negated Vl-exclamatives. Contrary to English, however, no positive VIexclamatives are found in the standard. An independent constituent clause, introduced by the complementizer att, is found in Swedish, too. It is even possible to use a plain V2-declarative exclamatorily. 2.3. German In German, just as in English and Swedish, there are two major types of independent exclamative clauses: with and without a w/j-phrase. The following description is based on Rosengren (1992). (i) Exclamatives with wh-phrases: (53)

Wie schön sie ist! wie ist sie schön! how beautiful she is /how is she beautiful 'How beautiful she is!'

(54)

Was der für ein schönes Haus hat! what he for a nice house has 'What a nice house he has!'

(55)

Welch ein schönes Haus/welch schöne Beine die hat! what a beautiful house/what beautiful legs she has 'What a beautiful house/what beautiful legs she has!'

(56)

Was der schön singt! what he beautifully sings 'How beautifully he sings!'

(57)

Wen der alles kennt! whom he all knows 'All the people he knows!'

(58)

Was der nicht alles weiß! what he not all knows 'All the things he knows!'

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Wo war die nicht alles! where was she not all 'All the places she has been to!'

Wie and was für (ein)lwelch (ein) correspond to English how and what (a). (Welch ein cannot appear in interrogatives, neither can uninflected welch.) Just as in English and German, these u>/?-phrases are scalar in meaning, expressing degree or quantity. 5 The exclamative wte-clauses may be V2 or verb-final. In German, wie may be non-adjacent to the adjective or adverb: (60)

Wie ist der groß! how is he big 'How big he is!'

Wie cannot have this position in questions (cf. English above), where it must be adjacent to the adjective or adverb: (61)

Wie groß ist er? how big is he 'How big is he?'

A speaker uttering (61) asks for a certain measure, say 180 cm. In an exclamatory utterance, the speaker tells us that the actual person is very tall, taller than would be expected. This specific meaning of wie and the corresponding how is the reason why these clauses cannot be classified as interrogative clauses. Compare this with Swedish, where the corresponding wh-phrase cannot appear in interrogative clauses at all. Thus far, we may assume that the German exclamatives introduced by wie and was für (ein)/welch (ein) are simply declarative clauses. 6 German also has a was which more or less corresponds to Swedish vad and French que. It cannot appear in this function in interrogative clauses. It differs from wie in not being able to form a phrase with an adjective or adverb: *was schön. This is possible in Swedish and French. The rest of the set of wh-exclamatives are typically German (wer, was, wo). Let us first look at the positive clauses. We do not find them in English and Swedish, and in French they are only marginally used exclamatorily (see below). They are always verb-final clauses and mostly contain alles, expressing the universal quantifier. This alles behaves the same way in exclamatives as it does in wh-interrogative clauses (as for the

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latter, see Reis 1990 and 1992). Alles pro to typically has its basic position directly behind the wh-phrase and may move with the wh-phrase to the initial field. Most probably, it is a clitic and attaches itself to the whphrase. As to its function, however, there are some differences. Because of its quantificational properties, it gives rise to a plurality meaning in interrogatives, and the answer must be exhaustive (all of the set asked about must be identified in the answer). In exclamatives it serves to strengthen the scalar interpretation by virtue of expressing totality. It indicates an extreme position on a quantitative scale (see below, and section 3).7 In Rosengren (1992), it is maintained that the positive clauses with wer, was, wo, etc., are declarative clauses. They resemble relative clauses and may be compared with structures like: (62)

(Unglaublich) das Geld, das er immer ausgibt! (unbelievable) the money that he always spends '(It's unbelievable) the money he always spends!'

Cf. the English counterparts (31) through (33) above. However, even if (62) may be described as a certain type of relative structure used exclamatorily, this is not quite the case with the German example (57) above. The specific wh-phrase in (57) may be described as incorporating a correlate. It is a definite phrase appearing only in exclamatives but without the scalar meaning of how and what. It thus has much the same properties as have the definite determiner and the demonstrative pronoun. However, I will not go further into detail in this matter here. It suffices to underline the specific character of this whphrase. Clauses with wer, was, wo may occur with negation, too, mostly with the same quantifier alles (see (58) and (59)). They are V2 or verb-final clauses. Compare the following minimal pair: (63)

Was hat der alles nicht gemacht! what has he all not done 'All the things he hasn't done!'

(64)

Was hat der nicht alles gemacht! what has he not all done 'All the things he has done!'

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Only in (63) nicht seems to negate, and the exclamation is about what is not the case (cf. the discussion concerning negation in English, above). In (64), where nicht has scope over alles, the clause cannot be used interrogatively and the negation does not seem to negate. We interpret (64) as an assertion about the fact that a specific person, denotated by der, does a lot. This difference between (63) and (64) is essential. Regarding its structure, (63) could be an interrogative clause. However, since the negation is negating, it is better explained as a declarative clause (cf. the discussion above). As for (64), though, where the negation does not seem to negate, it could be an interrogative clause. If so, we must ask why it cannot function as a question. Here we will have to look at the different scope positions of the negator (cf. Rosengren 1992). Since the negation takes scope over alles in (64), the question would be a question about a negatively defined set, not all. Compare the following two dialogues: (65)

a. Er hat alle Häuser nicht angestrichen. he has all houses not painted 'He hasn't painted any houses/he has painted none of the houses.' b. Wieviele sind das? how many are that 'How many are there?'

(66)

a. Er hat nicht alle Häuser angestrichen. he has not all houses painted 'He hasn't painted all houses.' b. * Wieviele sind das? how many are that

The question following the assertion is only possible when the negation does not take scope over the quantifier. The question in (66) would be about a negatively defined set, not all which cannot be enumerated. This is why utterances of the kind exemplified in (64) with nicht alles cannot be used as a question. However, it does not necessarily mean that they could not be used as a rhetorical question. Actually, they may be used in this way (see Meibauer 1986: 203, ex. 114), but normally they are interpreted as exclamatives. As will be argued below, the rhetorical interpretation is what we need as a starting point for the exclamatory interpretation: 8 Was macht der nicht alles? > Der macht nicht alles (existential implicature) > Es ist nicht der Fall, daß der nicht alles macht > Der macht

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alles (rhetorical interpretation). ('What does he not all do?' > 'He does not do everything' > 'It is not the case that he does not do everything' > 'He does everything'.) The clitic alles then has exactly the same function as it has in the positive exclamative: it serves to strengthen the scalar interpretation (extreme position on a quantitative scale) by virtue of expressing totality. Note that this does not mean that the exclamation as such is an indirect speech act. What is an indirect speech act is the rhetorical question (see Meibauer 1986). This allows us to make an assertion. Hence the rhetorical question is a necessary prerequisite for the exclamation, but it is not a sufficient one (see below). (ii) As for the types without a wA-phrase, we find V2- and VI-types, the latter with and without negation. They will be treated together, since in German the positive V2-types and VI-types show some important similarities which distinguish them from the negative VI-types. First to the positive ones: (67)

Die ist aber schön! she is PART beautiful 'Is she beautiful!'

(68)

Die hat vielleicht schöne Beine! she has PART beautiful legs 'Has she got beautiful legs!'

(69)

Ist die aber schön! is she PART beautiful 'Is she beautiful!'

(70)

Hat die vielleicht schöne Beine! has she PART beautiful legs 'Has she got beautiful legs!'

The positive VI-clause allows exactly the same modal particles as does the exclamatory V2-clause {aber and vielleicht). These particles cannot appear in the negated VI-clause. And what is more, they cannot appear with this function in declaratives used as assertions either. If we want to make sure that the utterances are interpreted as exclamations, they are almost obligatory. In exclamatives the particles strengthen the scalar meaning (see Rosengren 1992) and thereby lend a helping hand to an

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exclamatory interpretation. 9 Since the V2-type must be a declarative, and since German possesses a VI-declarative (cf. Önnerfors, in this volume), the VI-clause will certainly be best explained as being a declarative clause, too. The VI-clause, however, also appears with a negation (cf. English and Swedish above): (71)

Ist die nicht schön is she not beautiful! 'Isn't she beautiful!'

(72)

Hat die nicht schöne Beine! has she not beautiful legs 'Hasn't she got beautiful legs!'

Interestingly, these negated VI-clauses, however, do not admit the modal particles found in the non-negated V2- and VI-types. There are also some restrictions as to the predicates occurring in these negative exclamatives. For one thing, only predicates allowing an answer may occur. Thus, it is not possible to make an exclamation in German by using the following clause, since a corresponding question would be peculiar: (73)

*Hab ich nicht Hunger! have I not hunger

However, exactly this clause, when non-negated, is possible as an exclamative: (74)

Hab ich Hunger! have I hunger 'Am I hungry!'

(As for other restrictions, see Rosengren 1992.) In analogy to the account given for the English and Swedish VI-clause, we may therefore assume the negated VI-clauses to be interrogative clauses. There is, however, an important difference between negated questions and negated exclamatives as well. We touched upon it previously, when discussing the English counterparts where only the clitic n't is allowed. First, note that negated questions always are biassed. To ask negatively implies that the speaker thinks he already knows the answer (see Rehbock

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1985 and 1987). Second, in German Vl-exclamatives, the negation cannot amalgamate with the indefinite article the way it can in interrogatives: (75)

* Hat der kein schönes Rad gekauft! has he no beautiful bicycle bought

(76)

Hat der nicht ein schönes Rad gekauft! has he not a beautiful bicycle bought 'Hasn't he bought a beautiful bicycle!'

(75) is only possible when used as a question. In Rosengren (1992) it has therefore been argued that, when amalgamated with ein, the negation does not take scope in the same position as it does in Vl-exclamatives. In the latter case it takes scope over the whole clause. Let us look at the following questions to make this point more explicit: (77)

Hat Peter wieder keinen Aufsatz eingereicht? has Peter PART no essay handed in 'Has Peter not handed in an essay?'

(78)

Hat nicht Peter wieder einen Aufsatz eingereicht? has not Peter PART an essay handed in 'Hasn't Peter handed in an essay?'

As for (77), we expect primarily the answer nein, or we may answer with doch, contradicting the expectation of the speaker. As for (78), however, we primarily expect ja, secondarily nein. I will not go into detail here, but it seems plausible that the position of the negation in (78) triggers the expectation of a positive answer, and also that this in turn is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for a negated VI-interrogative clause to be used as an exclamation. This again seems to be compatible with the fact that English admits only the clitic n't in exclamative VI-types. The negation cliticises with the verb and thereby obtains the correct scope over the whole proposition, the outcome of which is the expectation of a positive answer. Exactly why wide scope results in the expectation of a positive answer and narrow scope in the opposite, we do not know. However, I think we may look for the answer in the cooperation between the sentence mood and the negator, which has been made possible by the wide scope of the negator (for further discussion, see Rosengren 1992).

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(iii) The verb-final clause with the complementizer daß may be compared with the English and Swedish counterparts (28) and (50): (79)

Daß die so schöne Beine hat! that she so beautiful legs has 'That she should have such beautiful legs!'

Note that this type of complementizer clause cannot be used to express assertions. Neither does it allow the previously mentioned modal particles vielleicht and aber. It often contains solsolch, expressing a high degree on a scale compatible with (but not identical in meaning to) wie in the corresponding w/'e-clauses. (iv) German has some minor exclamative types, too. The counterpart of the English relative-clause-like exclamative was mentioned above (62). Like English (34), German allows the following type: (80)

Dummkopf, der du bist! fool that you are 'Fool that you are!'

(v) To summarize: German looks pretty much like English and Swedish. We find the wh-phrases wie, was für (ein) and welch (ein). In addition, German has a specific phrase-type was, wer, wo. Its meaning in positive and truly negated clauses is definite and it seems to be related to the relative pronoun on one hand, and to the determiner and the demonstrative pronoun on the other. Negative wA-clauses where nicht takes scope over alles are rhetorical questions. German also has V2- and VI-clauses. The former certainly must be declarative. This seems to hold for the positive VI-clause, too, while the negative VI-clause seems to be an interrogative clause. From the behaviour of the negation in German VIclauses, we may conclude that it must be placed high in the sentential hierarchy, taking scope over the whole proposition. This triggers the expectation of a positive answer, a prerequisite for the utterance being interpreted as an exclamation. As in other languages, German also has an independent constituent type, introduced by the complementizer daß. 2.4. French Regarding French, I will rely mostly on the description (but not always on the explanation) given in Alter (1993), from whom most of the exam-

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pies are borrowed (cf. also Gerard 1980, Milner 1978, and Radford 1989). French very much resembles the languages already investigated. However, it differs from them as to the vast set of w/2-phrases, the partitive and pseudo-partitive constructions and the possible subject-clitic-inversion. These language-specific properties, though, will only be discussed when relevant for the comparison. Like the other languages investigated here, French possesses exclamatives with and without a wh-phrase. (i)

Wh-phrases:

(81)

Comment tu peux /peux-tu dire une chose pareille! how you can /can you say a thing such 'How can you say such a thing!'

(82)

Combien (de cigarettes) tu fumes I fumes- tu (de how much (of cigarettes) you smoke /smoke you (of cigarettes)! cigarettes) 'What a lot (of cigarettes) you smoke!'

(83)

Comme tu fumes! how you smoke 'What a lot you smoke!'

(84)

Quelle jolie fille tu as Ias-tu accompagnee! what beautiful girl you have /have you accompanied 'What a beautiful girl you accompanied!'

(85)

Que tu fumes! what you smoke 'What a lot you smoke!'

(86)

Ce qu'il fume! it that he smokes 'What a lot he smokes!'

(87)

Qu'est-ce que tu fumes (de cigarettes)! what is it that you smoke (of cigarettes) 'What a lot (of cigarettes) you smoke!'

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As to the linguistic explanation of the w/?-phrases, see Radford (1989) and compare Alter (1993). Comment/comme/combien correspond to English how, German wie; quel to English what a. German welch; que/ce que to how, wie, was. The wß-phrases in exclamatives have a scalar meaning, just as have their counterparts in English, Swedish, and German. In French they differ from the interrogative equivalents by not being able to remain in situ. This fact once more underlines that exclamatives are not interrogatives. Inversion is not as frequent in exclamatives as in interrogatives, either. In French we marginally find negated w/2-exclamatives with a "pleonastic" negation, too: (88)

Combien defois n'ai-jepas dit de ne plus fumer! how many times not have I said not more to smoke 'How many times haven't I told you not to smoke any more!'

(89)

Quelle ne fut pas sa peur! which not was not her fear 'How very afraid she was!'

(90)

Quelles jolies filles tu η'as pas accompagnees! which beautiful girls you not have accompanied 'What girls you accompanied!'

(91)

Que ne fume-t-il pas! what not smokes-he not 'The cigarettes he smokes!'

Here, the negation obviously has scope over the whole clause. As expected, it does not seem to negate. Que in (91) is a direct object. The simplest account will be to assume that (88) through (91) are interrogative clauses and that we interpret them rhetorically, just as in English, Swedish, and German. Marginally, French allows exclamatives of the kind found in German (59) with qui, quoi, oil without negation, too (see Radford 1989): (92)

Et ou, Us sont altes! and where they are gone 'And the places they went to!' (Radford 1989: 260)

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I will maintain that, just as its equivalent in German, (92) is a declarative. (ii) French also allows VI- and V2-exclamatives: (93)

Fume-t-il! smoke he 'Does he smoke!'

(94)

Est-il g0nereux! is he generous 'Is he generous!'

(95)

Tu fumes! you smoke 'You do smoke, don't you!'

Alter (1993) regards these clauses as declaratives. So do I. They are not as frequently used as the w/z-types. The inversion in (93) and (94) will be of the same kind as the one in interrogative clauses. The exact linguistic explanation of it does not matter in this connection. Just as in all the other languages previously described, there exists a negated type, too: (96)

N'est-ce pas jolyl not is it beautiful 'Isn't it beautiful!' (Gerard 1980: 133)

We find once more the negated interrogative clause. The explanation will be the same as given above for German. (iii) The following types will be best explained as being independent constituent clauses (cf. Radford 1989). They do not allow the subject-cliticinversion (which is, of course, not to be expected if they are constituent clauses): (97)

Qu'il fume (des cigarettes)! that he smokes (of cigarettes) 'That he smokes (cigarettes)!'

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Si eile est belle! if she is beautiful 'How beautiful she is!'

When que is the counterpart of English that, the proposition may be negated, just as in the other languages. Then, of course, the negation is negating. As to si, it may be the same word as si = i f . (iv) To summarize: By and large, French shows the same picture as the other languages. It, too, makes use of declarative and interrogative clauses to express exclamations. Furthermore, negation seems to fill the same function as in the other languages.

3. The utterance meaning of exclamatives (i) Until now, the description has concentrated on the syntax of exclamatives. Their function has only been touched upon in passing. In this section, I will try to explain how the exclamatory function is derived from their semantics and stress pattern. So far we have found an astonishing conformity in the languages under investigation. They exhibit almost the same variety of form types, and these form types seem to have almost one and the same exclamatory function. To understand what is going on, we will have to widen the perspective and take a closer look at the relation between grammar and pragmatics. However, let us first look a little more closely at the concept of sentence type, since it obviously plays such a significant role in the discussion concerning the status of exclamatives. There seem to be good reasons for assuming that at least the major sentence types have some syntactic feature in a functional head that defines them as declarative, interrogative, and imperative, respectively, and that the semantic correspondence to this syntactic feature is a sentence-mood operator which defines the sentence type semantically. I will not go into detail here (for detailed discussion, cf. Brandt et al. 1992, Rosengren 1992 and 1993). Simplifying somewhat, however, the sentence mood of the declarative consists of an existential operator binding an event variable (as to this variable, cf. also Davidson 1980, Higginbotham 1985, and Bierwisch 1988). This operator is part of the sentence mood of the interrogative clauses, too. In addition, however, the interrogative clauses have an operator of their own, respon-

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sible for their specific interrogative meaning. As to the main sentence types - declarative, interrogative, and imperative - , it has been argued in Brandt et al. (1992) that the sentence-mood operator determines the illocutionary potential of the sentence type. Thus, in the unmarked case, declaratives are used as assertions; interrogatives, as questions; imperatives, as directives. However, not only the unmarked interpretations, but also the more marked usages may be derived from the semantics of sentence type. Now, turning to exclamatives, we find nearly all the structural types of the sentence types declaratives and interrogatives, but there are no really good structural properties for defining exclamatives as a sentence type of their own. This has been noticed many times before, but it has never been explained. The above discussion gave rise to the proposal that exclamatives are just declaratives and interrogatives, obtaining their specific exclamatory function from other sources than the sentence mood. I will pursue this track further, showing that it will give us the right kind of explanation. (ii) In order to do this, however, we will first have to distinguish between grammatical (short for grammatically determined) meaning and utterance meaning (see Bierwisch 1980). The grammatical meaning of a clause is composed of the meaning of its parts (sentence mood and the meaning of the lexical entities). The utterance meaning is the meaning which the sentence has when uttered. This meaning may be identical with the grammatical meaning, but very often, it is not. Meaning is added, due to inferential processes in context. In Rosengren (1992), the exclamatory function of exclamatives was traced back to the sentence mood and the specific propositional properties of German exclamatives (we will for the moment exclude thatclauses) as well as to their stress pattern. The propositional content was described in the following way: The predicate is an adjective, adverb, or verb that induces a scale of some sort: degree or quantity. 1 0 An individual is beautiful, has beautiful legs, has a fine house, etc.; the manners of somebody are delightful; somebody knows many people, etc. The utterance meaning, however, is: more beautiful, finer, more delightful, more people than expected (cf. Fries 1988). What is expected by the speaker is a certain value on a scale, that is, the actual norm. What the speaker, however, finds and consequently expresses, is a deviation from this norm. This deviation is not expressed literally. The speaker literally only asserts the fact that somebody is (very) beautiful, etc., thereby guaranteeing the

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factual interpretation always found in exclamatives. He does so by using a declarative and negated interrogative clause (yes//Jö-question with an expectation of a positive answer or rhetorically interpreted w/?-question). Clauses initiated by a complementizer (that, att, daß, que) differ somewhat from this pattern. The whole clause denotes a fact. When the speaker utters an exclamatory that-clause, he conveys the meaning that the existence of this fact is a deviation from a certain norm. This is why this type of clause must not have a predicate inducing a scale (but when it has one, it often is preceded by so/such), and also why it is possible to negate these clauses. However, when using an exclamative, the speaker does not only express a deviation from a norm. He also expresses astonishment, distress, joy, etc., with regard to this deviation (see Fries 1988 and Rosengren 1992). This obviously has something to do with the stress pattern of the utterance (only the that-clause does not require this same stress pattern, because of its specific function). This stress pattern has been thoroughly investigated for German (see Batliner 1988, cf. Rosengren 1992).11 I will therefore demonstrate the case by using German examples only. In (99) through (101) we find a specific accent type, called Exklamativakzent 'exclamatory accent': (99)

DIE ist aber schön! she is PART beautiful 'Is she BEAUtiful!'

(100)

Ist DIE aber schön! is she PART beautiful 'Is she BEAUtiful!'

(101)

Wen DER nicht alles kennt! whom he not all knows 'All the PEOPle he knows!'

One, sometimes two, entities of the clause (the argument, being predicated about, and/or the predicate inducing the scale) obtain an accent with a higher value (F 0 ) on the Hertz scale than expected if it were a nuclear accent, and mostly also with a prolonged duration. This accent is interpreted as an emphatic accent (Batliner 1988: 244-245). (iii) In order to understand the relation between the sentence-type/mood, the propositional content and the stress pattern, we will also have to

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specify two systems outside grammar to which the exclamative makes reference when uttered. Let us assume that there exist a conceptual system (see Bierwisch 1988) and an emotive system (see Fries 1991 and 1994) outside grammar. They differ in the way they are linked to reality. The conceptual system contains our representation (knowledge) of the actual world. In cooperation with the propositional content the sentence mood determines the reference of the clause to the conceptual system, that is to our knowledge of the world. The emotive system comprises the emotions that are our emotive evaluation of objects and state of affairs in the actual world. Let us assume that the emotive system has two dimensions, EMint (for intensity) and E M ± (for positive and negative emotions) (see Fries 1991 and 1994). EMint

EM± Figure 1. The emotive system

Emotions differ from concepts in that they may only be expressed in non-propositional form. Note that the emotive system does not define specific emotions. We propositionalize an emotion by talking about it, thereby making reference to the conceptual system. In that case, however, we are not expressing it directly. If exclamations are a specific type of illocutions in that the exclamation is a direct emotive expression concerning a state of affairs, the exclamatory part cannot be realized by a proposition. Hence, there cannot be any exclamative sentence type on the same level and of the same kind as declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives. This would be a contradiction in terms. (iv) After these preliminaries, I will try to describe in some detail the origin of the specific exclamation part of the utterance. The literal assertion made by the speaker by using the declarative and negated interrogative clause is about a fact and refers to the conceptual system. The deviation from the norm, only found in the utterance meaning, is a generalized implicature 12 resulting from an inference process, triggered by the emphatic stress. 13 Since stress itself is a scalar phenomenon, and since the

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actual stress has a higher F 0 -value and a more extended duration compared with the normal nuclear stress, it mirrors the (degree of) emotive involvement of the speaker, for example, it is iconic in nature, thus relating the utterance to the intensity scale of the emotive system (as for iconicity of stress patterns, see Bolinger 1985). Note that the stress itself does not have an emotional meaning; it is only iconically mirroring emotion. Its position on the entities constituting the scale furthermore tells us what the emotion relates to. The emphatic stress, however, cannot tell us whether the emotion is positive or negative, let alone exactly what type of emotion it is. The default case is astonishment. But the context may determine the character of the emotion as joy, sorrow, etc. Thus, summarizing: The exclamatory function cannot be directly derived from the semantics of the uttered clauses (sentence mood and propositional content). It is a generalized implicature, triggered by the emphatic stress (not having any semantic content, but relating the utterance to the emotive system) and operating on the whole grammatical structure. The generalized implicature, in turn, is the reason why we tend to regard this type of sentence as a sentence type of its own, in spite of its having no specific sentence-type properties, the sentences actually being declaratives and interrogatives. It may look as if the w/i-phrases how, what a with their scalar meaning (and their equivalents in the other languages) and for instance German scalar alles in clauses with wer, was, wo contribute to this "grammaticalization" 14 of sentences as exclamatives. But how do we know that it is not the other way round, i. e. the iv/?-phrases and other entities obtain their specific meaning from appearing in exclamations? Taking this perspective, the differences between exclamatives and interrogatives as to the occurrence and meaning of certain other lexical entities, pointed out by McCawley (1973) and others (see above) also fall into place. Moreover, since wh-phrases are not obligatory for the exclamatory interpretation, it also explains why plain declaratives and interrogatives may serve as exclamatives as well. In concluding this section, let me just point to the affinity between exclamatives and interjections (cf. also Fries 1992). Interjections differ from exclamatives in two ways: First, they have no proposition describing the state of affairs the interjection is about, and second, the interjection itself lexically expresses the emotion that is not literally expressed in exclamatives. Still, they are closely related in function and they may cooccur in the same utterance: (102)

Boy, is linguistics easy!

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4. The functional status of exclamations Since exclamations are direct emotive expressions, they are not of the same kind as standard illocutions. And they certainly are not indirect speech acts, either. Exclamations seem to be a kind of illocutionary act of their own, much closer to grammar than standard illocutions and indirect speech acts are. What characterizes them is their expressive directness. Of course, they are related to the expressives in Searle's system, too. But they do not propositionalize the emotive meaning in the way expressives do. They have also very much in common with utterances of the following kind (cf. Rosengren 1984 and 1985): (103)

I am distressed about her awful manners.

The difference between (103) and the corresponding exclamations: (104)

Hasn't she awful manners!

(105)

What awful manners she has!

(106)

How awful her manners are!

lies exactly in the propositionalizing of the emotive attitude in (103), which is, not found in (104) through (106), and in the implicature of (104) through (106), which is that the manners are more awful than expected, not found in (103). This latter part of the utterance meaning is represented by the exclamation mark and makes (104) through (106) different from (103). Exclamations, then, are some kind of illocutions not fitting into the standard system defined by Searle. What exactly their relation to this system is, is a difficult question to answer, however, and I will not discuss it further here.

5. Summary I have argued that exclamatives are not, and indeed cannot be, a sentence type of their own. They are declaratives and negated interrogatives with a specific propositional property, and they contain a predicate inducing a scale. The exclamatory effect is triggered by the emphatic stress, which by

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itself iconically mirrors the emotive involvement of the speaker and makesreference to the emotive system. The emphatic stress starts an inference process, which results in a generalized implicature to the effect that the value on the induced scale is deviating from the norm. Being declaratives and interrogatives having a specific function not primarily derived from the sentence mood of these sentence types, they have no natural position in a grammar normally categorizing form types with a default one-to-one relation between form and function. This is why they cannot be consistently treated in such grammars, but will always fall between two stools. I have further argued that they have exactly this paradoxical relation between form and function because they are direct emotional expressions. This makes them a specific expressive illocutionary type.

Notes 1. This paper is to a great extent based on my earlier paper on exclamatives (Rosengren 1992, cf. Rosengren 1993). I am grateful to the participants of the symposium "Modality in Germanic Languages", held in Troms0 in August 1993, and to the participants of the network meeting "Language and pragmatics", held in Rendsburg in September 1993, for their valuable comments on an earlier version of the paper. Still earlier versions were presented at the Goethe Institute in Osaka, the Hitatsubashi University in Tokyo, at the Universities of Tübingen and Göttingen and at the Institute of German Language in Mannheim. I should also like to thank the participants of these meetings. Special thanks are due to Norbert Fries, Marga Reis, and Ilse Zimmermann for their very useful criticism and comments when discussing in some detail parts of the present study. 2. Hence, not all emotive utterances with an exclamation mark are exclamations in the technical sense of the term. 3. Quirk et al. (1985) do not discuss the exclamatory use of rhetorical questions: (i)

How many times haven't I told you not to smoke!

This type - where the negation seems to be pleonastic - is found in all the languages under investigation. As for their explanation, see the discussion in 2.2., 2.3., 2.4. 4. Capitals indicate stress. 5. By the way, all languages seem to be able to use how and its language specific equivalents in exclamatives with manner meaning: (i)

Wie der mich behandelt! how he me treats 'How he treats me!'

However, this usage seems to be more or less restricted to predicates taking obligatory manner adverbials which in turn makes us suspect that we always interpret utterances like (i) as if there were an adjective or adverb, being graduated by how.

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6. When negated, however, they are exclamatorily used rhetorical questions. (i)

Wie oft habe ich dir nicht schon gesagt, daß du nicht rauchen how often have I to-you not already said that you not smoke sollst! should 'How many times haven't I told you not to smoke!'

See note 3 and the discussion of wer, was, wo under (i) in 2.3. 7. Cf. the scalar interpretation of ever in English Vl-exclamatives and the specific meaning of ganz ('entire') in German clauses like: (i)

Er ist GANZ lieb. he is entirely kind 'He is extremely kind.'

8. The explanation given here differs somewhat from the one given in Rosengren (1992). 9. Cf. the marginal use of plain V2-declaratives in English and the corresponding declaratives in Swedish. 10. Sometimes the scale is implicit: (i)

What a beard he has!

He has a beautiful, large, etc., beard, deviating from the expected norm. Cf. also note 5. 11. However, much the same type of stress is found in the other languages under investigation as well. Regarding English, cf. Quirk et al. and (26) and (27) above. For French, see Alter (1993). 12. Since the implicature is derived by an inferential process, it certainly is not conventional. And it is generalized by not being dependent on context. As expected, it should be possible to cancel it in certain linguistic contexts. This is the case, too. Cf. the following example: (i)

Wen DER alles kennt (, weiß ich nicht) whom he all knows know I not Ί don't know all the people he knows.'

When embedded in the matrix clause, the exclamatory interpretation of the wh-clause and its wh-phrase gets an interrogative interpretation. However, the cancelation is made difficult by the specific stress pattern, directly mirroring the emotional involvement of the speaker. 13. It is an interesting fact that most languages prefer exclamatives with constituent clause structure. An exception is German, where VI and V2 declaratives are frequently used as exclamatives. However, in these cases the modal particles aber and vielleicht characterize the clauses as exclamatives. Certainly, the constituent clause structure of exclamatives - by grammatically "looking for" a matrix clause - lends a helping hand to the stress pattern. This does not mean, though, that exclamatives with constituent clause structure are grammatically elliptic in the strict sense of the word. They are independent constituent clauses. 14. I am not using the concept of grammaticalization in the technical sense found in for example Hopper - Traugott 1993 (cf. also Traugott, in this volume).

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"Imperativsatz und 'Wunschsatz' - zu ihrer Grammatik und Pragmatik", in: Inger Rosengren (ed.), 1 - 4 7 . Rosengren, Inger (ed.) 1987 Sprache und Pragmatik. Lunder Symposium 1986. (Lunder germanistische Forschungen 55.) Stockholm: Almqvist and Wikseil. 1992 Satz und Illokution. Volume 1. (Linguistische Arbeiten 278.) Tübingen: Niemeyer. 1993 Satz und Illokution. Volume 2. (Linguistische Arbeiten 279.) Tübingen: Niemeyer. SAG = Svenska Akademiens Grammatik [The G r a m m a r of the Swedish Academy] forthcoming. Searle, John R. - Ferenc Kiefer - Manfred Bierwisch (eds.) 1980 Speech act theory and pragmatics. Dordrecht: Reidel. Stickel, Gerhard (ed.) 1984 Pragmatik in der Grammatik. Düsseldorf: Schwann. Sucharowski, Wolfgang (ed.) 1985 Gesprächsforschung im Vergleich. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Tracy, Rosemarie (ed.) 1992 Who climbs the grammar tree. (Linguistische Arbeiten 281.) Tübingen: Niemeyer. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs [this volume] "Subjectification and the development of epistemic meaning: The case of promise and threaten."

Subjectification and the development of epistemic meaning: The case of promise and threaten Elizabeth Closs Traugott

1. Introduction 1 Subjectification, the historical pragmatic-semantic process whereby meanings become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief state, or attitude toward what is said, has come to be of considerable interest in recent years (see, for example, Traugott 1989, Langacker 1990, Brinton 1990, Company 1995, Smith 1993, and especially Stein and Wright 1995).2 The development of epistemic modality is a prime example. My purpose in this paper is to demonstrate in some detail the development of epistemic meaning in two verbs, promise and threaten. A secondary theme will be presentation of the hypothesis that these verbs may be on the verge of grammaticalizing to quasi-modals. Dowty (1985), Higgins (1990),3 and Verhagen (1995, 1996) distinguish (a) performative and (b) epistemic meanings of promise and threaten, such as occur in utterances like: (1)

a. Martinez promises to focus on the future and predicts he will be reelected easily. (1990 UPI) 4 b. It promises to be a hot and grueling day. (1992 Guardian [HECTOR])

(2)

a. ... a handful of Tory MPs who are threatening to abstain or vote against repatriation of Vietnamese boat people (1992 Independent [HECTOR]) b. Should such developments threaten to materialise, the pressure for an easier monetary policy ... would be steep. (1992 Independent [HECTOR])

In Verhagen's terms, promise in such examples as ( l b ) and threaten in such examples as (2 b) "are construed as evaluation^] (on the part of the conceptualizer) of the applicability of the predicate"; that is, they do not "provide any information about the subject independent of the rest of the

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sentence" (Verhagen 1996). Verhagen is primarily interested in synchronic subjectivity and in the semantics of the verbs as it interacts with word order in the subordinate clause. My focus here will be on the diachronic process of subjectification, with particular reference to the changing lexical semantic and syntactic status of epistemic promise and threaten. Section 2, based on Traugott (1993), outlines the history of the verbs and their development as subject-to-subject raising verbs. 5 Section 3 suggests that they are also showing the beginnings of decategorialization to quasimodals like have to, be going to, be about to. Section 4 suggests some motivations for these changes, most especially subjectification.

2. A brief history of promise and threaten 2.1. Stage I Promise first appears in Middle English, as a borrowing from French. From the beginning it is performative, a verbal commitment to do something, and so the subject must be animate and able to perform an illocutionary act. Threaten occurs from Old English on, and, as in Present Day English, is not necessarily performative or commissive; it means 'signal intention of inflicting something negative', verbally or otherwise, with or without commitment, and so the subject must be sentient and have the ability to intend. In their early stages, both verbs occur with finite as well as non-finite complements (promise!threaten that X will occur), and, of particular interest to us here, with nominal complements. Examples with non-finite complements include: (3)

a. And promysed Kyng Herowde without delay To come ageyn by hym — this is no nay (c. 1500 Digby Plays 97 [DHCE]) b. wyrde... de oft öreatajj da yflan to fate: Dat. ... that often threatens the evil-ones to witnianne punish-INF 'with fate ... that often threatens to punish the evil' (c. 880 Boethius 40 [DHCE])

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Examples with nominal complements include: (4)

a. and there asked hym a gyffte that he promysed her whan she gaff hym the swerde (bef. 1470 Works of Thomas Malory 48 [DHCE]) b. promising him certainty of success in whatever pursuit he adopted, but recommended caution (1974 Str [ARCHER]) c. mid word he J^retne]} muche & lute dep in dede With word he threatens much & little does in deed (1297 R. Glouc. (Rolls) 9383 [DHCE])

At this stage, promise and threaten are (and have remained throughout their history) control verbs that coindex the subjects of the matrix and the lower clause. The optional thematic indirect object is syntactically the object of the matrix and may be passivized: (5)

his pardon was granted him, and a lettar written to him from my counsel, in wich he was promised to be considered and holpen (1550 Edward VI Diary Vol. 2 476 [DHCE])

2.2. Stage II6 In the sixteenth century, both verbs in their transitive uses introducing nominal objects developed the meaning 'portend, presage'. This is a nonintentional, non-commissive, epistemic use. At this stage, the subject still controls the predicate (it is the source of the promise or threat); it can be inanimate as well as animate: (6)

a. " Yf any man all this can gett, shall he haue the greatest felicitie, shall he fynde her [felicity] in these [honor, glory, pleasure] that we haue shewed you, promise more than they giue?" (1593 Queen Elizabeth, translation of Boethius, 57 [DHCE]) b. the Title of this Paper promising some Experiments about the Production of Electricity, I must not omit to recite ... (1675-1676 Boyle, Electricity and Magnetism 20-21 [DHCE]) c. As the morning promised a fair day we set out, but the storm coming up again we were obliged to come to. (1784 Muhl [ARCHER])

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An example in the passive is: (6)

d. The croupous symptoms had appeared early and gone on rapidly so that suffocation was threatened. (1864 Spencer [ARCHER])

This stage appears to have been the intermediary step between Stage I, the control stage, and Stage III, the raising stage permitting, as it did, non-human subjects, and epistemic meanings of the type: 'there is something about the subject that leads to an expectation of the proposition coming into being'. 2.3. Stage III In the eighteenth century, both verbs developed raising uses with nonfinite complements. The meanings are non-intentional and epistemic: the speaker views the proposition as likely, and evaluates it positively or negatively. With promise, early examples suggest give promise of, hold promise for, etc., and complements are limited to inchoative events with the verb be: (7)

a. He promised to be stout when he grew up. (1722 Defoe [OED]) b. The Capitol promised to be a large and handsome building, judging from the part about two thirds already above ground. (1795 Twin [ARCHER])

Note here the subject has some thematic relation to the verb: there is "something about" the baby that suggests he will grow strong, something about the part of the building already built that suggests it will be handsome - in other words, this is not full raising. As Dowty (1985), Higgins (1990), and Langacker (1995) have observed, raising is not a parametric phenomenon, but on a continuum from full control to non-control (from full thematic relation of the subject to non-thematic relation). The inference from the inchoatives is that the end result (being stout, handsome) is likely to occur in the future. By the end of the eighteenth century we find the construction extended to the Stative copula and even activity verbs. In these cases, the thematic relationship of the subject is either demoted or non-existent, and the raising is more canonical:

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a. The Spanish section at the Chicago World's Fair promises to be on a grand scale. (1893 Manl [ARCHER]) b. the Pet Shop Boys' tour promises to be orchestrated with an imagination and attention to detail that makes most of their competitors look positively pedestrian. (1992 Guardian [HECTOR]) c. As thirty something safeness spreads through the high street, her Jigsaw and own label designs promise to delay the moment when the fawn raincoat takes over the world. (1992 Guardian [HECTOR]) d. The route promised to throw a variety of weather at us. (1992 Flying [HECTOR])

It is not clear that epistemic threaten was first limited to inchoative ^-complements, although the early examples do involve change of state verbs: (9)

a. I am sometimes frightened with the dangers that threaten to diminish it [my estate]. (1780 Mirror No. 81 [OED]) b. The French government manifests very considerable uneasiness on account of the prevailing scarcity of corn, an evil that threatens to increase in consequence of the late inclement weather. (1802 Joh2 [ARCHER])

Specific raising verb properties include occurrence with expletive it (though this is very rare in my corpora), see (10 a), 7 and with subject idiom chunks (10 b): (10)

a. It promises to be a hot and grueling day. (1992 Independent [HECTOR]) b. But if push ever did threaten to come to shove, British and French nuclear weapons ... (1992 Economist [HECTOR])

The epistemic meaning of promise and threaten, as in the case of appear and seem, involves the speaker's tentative judgment of likelihood based on appearances as well as expectations and knowledge (note in particular in this connection example (7 b), in which appearance is specifically re-

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ferred to). In this respect promise and threaten share some properties with what Coates calls "inferential" epistemic modals like should, ought to ("from the evidence available I tentatively assume that ..."), as well as with what she calls the "non-inferential" epistemic modals like may, might, could ("I think it is likely"). They therefore cross-cut her two proposed parallel scales based on inferentiality (Coates 1983: 19). Promise and threaten in fact also share semantic properties with be going to.8 For example, referring to Wekker (1976), Coates (1983: 201) points out that be going to has "present orientation" (see also Palmer 1979: 121), i.e., "some indication of the future event (or state) referred to is present at the moment of speaking", as in: (11)

a. I think there is going to be a storm. (implies speaker can already see dark clouds, hear thunder, etc.) b. Everyone looked impressed and Mother said proudly, "Julia's going to be clever" (implies that Julia is already showing signs of cleverness) (Coates 1983: 201)

Promise and threaten likewise have present orientation in this sense, as is made explicit in such examples as: (12)

The wave has already helped to wash away the Congress I party and threatens now to wash away Nehru's vision of a secular homeland for Indians of many races and all faiths. (1992 Independent [HECTOR])

In addition, of course, they also require the lower clause to have future reference - the wave now threatens to wash the vision away in the (near) future. 2.4. Summary of the major changes A summary of the major semantic and syntactic changes discussed is given in Table 1. Note that, as is typical of lexical and many morphosyntactic changes, all the stages continue to coexist, an effect that Hopper (1991) terms "layering". The acquisition of raising properties occurred, not as one might guess, via a direct lexical reanalysis of the earlier commissive with a non-finite clause, but rather via semantic reanalysis of the commissive with a direct

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Table 1: Summary of development of promise and threaten promise I

threaten ± Perf. - E + Cont. +OBJ ±NFC

OE LME

+ Perf. - E +Cont. ±OBJ ±NFC -Perf. + E +OBJ -Perf. + E - C o n t . + N F C

II III

ENE PDE

Key: OE LME ENE PDE Perf.

= Old English (650-1125) = Late Middle English (1400 - 1 4 7 0 ) = Early New English ( 1 4 7 0 - 1710) = Present-Day English (1710 - n o w ) = performative verb

-Perf. + E + OBJ -Perf. + E - Cont. + N F C

Ε Cont. OBJ NFC Comp.

= = = =

epistemic control verb object nominal comp. non-finite comp, clause complement

object as 'pre-indicate, portend' (Stage II). This, together with the development of epistemic meanings for control verbs like insist (that something is the case), suggests that any hypothesis that there is a necessary correspondence between semantic epistemicity and syntactic verb raising (see van Kemenade 1993: 154) is too strong. The epistemic meaning of promise! threaten NP was presumably extended by analogy to constructions with non-finite complements (Stage III). Furthermore, the loss of thematic control was gradual, via inchoative and change of state constructions.

3. Evidence for decategorialization I now turn to evidence for the incipient decategorialization or grammaticalization of promise and threaten from main verb into semi-auxiliaries, specifically quasi-modals. Grammaticalization is the well-known process whereby lexical items and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions, and once grammatical then come to serve even more grammatical functions (Hopper — Traugott 1993; for grammaticalization in progress, see Lehmann 1991, Romaine - Lange 1991, Thompson - Mulac 1991). It seems likely that all raising verbs are undergoing incipient grammaticalization. This would follow from the loss of the verbs' ability to assign a theta-role to their subjects as well as other changes, such as the ability to be used in idiom chunks, that indicate loss of some categorial properties of main verbs.

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Even so, some raising verbs are more like main verbs than others. Verbs like seem are closer to the main verb end of this continuum, modals like may furthest away (assuming they can be classified as verbs at all), with respect to such criteria as access to morphological tense, cooccurrence with non-finite complements as opposed to bare infinitives, and the requirement of do-support. Huddleston (1979) and Quirk et al. (1985: Ch. 3) suggest various gradient classifications of auxiliaries and "catenatives", though in fact they are in essence subclassifications of raising verbs, sharing many features with Postal's (1974) criteria for raising. For example, Quirk et al. (1985: 137) distinguish several subcategories on what could be called a continuum of auxiliation: (13)

Continuum of auxiliation (a) Central modals (b) (c)

Marginal modals Modal idioms

(d)

Semi-auxiliaries

(e)

Catenatives

(f)

Main verb + N F I N

can, could, may, might, shall, should, willl'll, would!'d, must dare, need, ought to, used to had better, would rather!sooner, BE to, HA VE got to, etc. HAVE to, BE about to, BE able to, BE bound to, BE going to, BE obliged to, BE supposed to, BE willing to, etc. APPEAR to, HAPPEN to, SEEM to, GET + ed, KEEP + -ing, etc. HOPE to, BEGIN + -ing, etc.

This continuum is designated as a "one verb phrase < > two verb phrase" continuum. It is synchronic and reflects the outcome of changes from complex to simple constructions. Diachronically, what has happened is that the verbs have developed on a semantically motivated continuum of grammaticalization of the following type: 9 (14)

full thematic predicates > raising predicates > quasi-modals > modal operators

The positions on this continuum are to be thought of as "cluster points", magnets, as it were, where iron filings (in this instance source verbs) coalesce; or, to use more familiar terminology, they represent clusters of prototypical properties. Verbs newly entering the domain of a prototype

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or leaving it will vary depending on their history with respect to their match to the prototype. Crucially, the positions are not syntactic parameters, which leads to uniform changes for all verbs that reach the relevant points on the continuum. Changes leading to membership of the right-most end of the continuum have been of particular interest in recent years. Thus the modal auxiliaries can, could, may, might, must, shall, should, will, would, and auxiliary do have held center stage in recent accounts of the history of English syntax (see, among many others, Closs 1965; Lightfoot 1979, 1991; Plank 1984; Roberts 1985, 1993; Warner 1990; Denison 1993; Kemenade 1993) and semantics (Palmer 1979, 1986; Bybee 1988, 1990; Bybee - Pagliuca 1985;10 Traugott 1989; Kytö 1991). However, the so-called quasi-modals (e. g., be to, be going to, have to, ought to, had better, be aboutlablelbound to), which are in an intermediate position between raising predicates and modal operators, have largely been relegated to the sidelines or been treated as replacements of the true modals after the latter ceased to be inflected for tense; for example, Lightfoot (1979: 112) suggested that be going to, have to, be able to filled a "vacuum" created by the auxiliation of the modals. Plank (1984: 320-322) countered the replacement hypothesis by showing that the three verbs already had quasi-modal properties in Middle English. The story of be going to has subsequently been elaborated (Perez 1990, Danchev - Kytö 1991; Hopper - Traugott 1993, Tabor 1994), as have the stories of have to (Brinton 1991) and be about to (Gabbard 1993), but as a class the quasi-modals have still not received the attention that they deserve. They are troublesome in the generative syntactic paradigm because they do not fit any category neatly (their synchronic gradience has been discussed by Huddleston 1979 and Quirk et al. 1985, among others). They are not modals because they carry tense and supposedly also introduce a to-infinitive. The status of this infinitive is questionable, however, because in certain contexts it shows properties of phonological reduction typical of single constituents (cf. hafta, oughta). They are both like and unlike modals in that under certain circumstances some of them require ί/osupport, but here dialects vary; for example, British and American English differ with regard to: (15)

a. She has to go, doesn't she? (British and American) 11 b. He ought to leave right now, oughtn't he? (British) c. He ought to leave right now, shouldn't he? (British and American)

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The raising uses of promise and threaten similarly show evidence of some distinctly main verb properties, but they also show evidence of some distinctly more auxiliary-like properties that suggest they are becoming quasi-modals. I start with a main verb property. One feature of raising verbs in English is that they tend not to occur with progressives, at least with animate subjects: (16)

a. He is appearing before Congress tomorrow, (control) b. He appears to be appearing before Congress tomorrow. (raising + control) c. She turns out to be turning out a lot of articles these days. (raising + control).

Most speakers seem to have intuitions that progressive promise and threaten are control (i.e., performative) verbs with human subjects, as in (17a), (18a) but raising verbs (i.e., epistemic) in (17b) and (18b, c): (17)

a. She is promising to be a good president. (control only) b. She promises to be a good president. (raising or control)

(18)

a. Her husband was threatening to leave her. (control) b. against the revived materialism which threatens to engulf the world non-Jewish and Jewish alike. (raising) (1951 Brod [ARCHER]) c. The hapless, aggrieved house-husband threatens to become as rigid and unexamined a comic invention as the grotesquely intrusive mother-in-law once was. (raising) (1992 Independent [HECTOR])

Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the progressive is still available with the raising verb uses of promise and threaten, suggesting that in this respect they are located between full thematic predicates and raising verbs on the continuum in (14): (19)

a. Doesn't the provincial sector possess some routes which are promising to become profitable? (text about British Rail 12 )

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b. After the Uganda national movement had been proscribed on the ground that its trade boycott campaign and subsequent intimidation were threatening peace and order here six of its leaders were yesterday arrested on orders made under the deportation ordinance. (1959 Guardian [ARCHER]) c. In California's southern Sierras, a 250-acre fire was threatening to join up with a 60-acre blaze to endanger two small mountain towns. (1990 UPI) It should be noted, however, that in most examples that I have encountered of this kind of construction, the subject is semantically bridged to a human subject (the sector, boycott, and intimidation entail agents) or often treated as a natural agent (fire). On the other hand, promise and threaten show distributional restrictions that suggest some speakers' discomfort with other main verb characteristics 13 available to raising verbs high on the main verb end of the control > raising verb continuum. One of these characteristics is the doconstruction. Compare: (20)

a. Dashiel doesn't seem likely to get tenure. b. !Dashiel doesn't promise to get tenure. c. Dashiel may not get tenure.

Not all speakers accept (20 b), which suggests that they treat epistemic promise (and threaten) more like an auxiliary than a main verb. Among distinguishing characteristics of auxiliaries and quasi-modals like have to is that they allow adverbs such as certainly, often, now14 to follow the verb. However, this is not true of main verbs, whether or not they are raising verbs like appear (Huddleston 1979: distributional table; see also Jackendoff 1972: 48): (21)

a. Electricians had still to learn that the jar required an outer as well as an inner conducting coating. (Kuhn, Structure of Sei Revol [McCawley 1992]) b. There certainly appeared to be a problem. c. * There appeared certainly to be a problem.

For some speakers, promise and threaten behave more like ought to and can in this regard than like seem and appear, as in (22b):15

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a. The conflict certainly threatens to erupt into war. b. The conflict threatens certainly to erupt into war.

and in (12) repeated here as (22 c): (22)

c. The wave has already helped to wash away the Congress I party and threatens now to wash away Nehru's vision of a secular homeland for Indians of many races and all faiths. (1992 Independent [HECTOR])

Note the parallelism between has already helped and threatens now (not has already helped and threatens to wash away now). Perhaps the strongest evidence for incipient grammaticalization comes from cooccurrence patterns with modals. Full lexical epistemic verbs, including insistlsuggest that something is the case and raising verbs seem, appear occur with both deontic and epistemic modal auxiliaries: (23)

a. The dean may suggest that Dashiel cheats i) but that should be her decision. (D(eontic)) ii) and if so I will back her up. (E(pistemic)) b. The confrontation may/must appear to escalate into war i) so that we can persuade Congress to declare war. (D) ii) but it's actually not doing so. (E) c. She might/must appear to be a good attorney i) so that we can expose them, (a Portia-like situation; D) ii) but I don't believe she is one. (E) d. She may/must promise/threaten to be a good attorney i) but that should be her decision. (D) ii) but I don't believe her. (E)

Now consider epistemic promise!threaten. Modal auxiliaries that precede these verbs are usually understood as epistemic only: 16 (24)

a. The conflict may promise to escalate into war i) *so that we can distract the public's attention away from increased taxes. (D) ii) but we have to make sure that it does not do so. (E) b. The house-husband may threaten to become a stereotype i) *but that should be hislyour decision. (D) (not good with the role reading of (18a)) ii) but we'll put an end to that. (E)

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This conforms to the well-known constraint that if a central modal precedes a quasi-modal or (in double modal dialects) another central modal, it must be epistemic (see Shepherd 1981; Montgomery - Nagle 1993, among others). This constraint holds absolutely in some contemporary varieties of English spoken in Scotland, Northern England, the American South, and of Black English Vernacular, at least for double modals of which the first is may, might, will, would, can, could: (25)

a. Can you get your civil rights without getting your head busted? You might (E) will in the long run. (Labov 1972: 58) b. You might (E) ought to tie that tree from the other side. (Butters 1973: 277) c. You might would say that ('It might be that one would say that')· (Butters 1973: 276) d. You might still could keep the cuff [the way it is] and have French cuffs ... You might could keep the cuffs. (Di Paolo 1989: 198)

With respect to (25 b, c), Butters suggests that the might denotes "roughly what might be conveyed in formal Standard English with perhaps, or informally maybe", and goes on to say it carries "the force of uncertainty, reticence, deliberation" with first-person subjects (e.g., / might could move the pawn), or politeness with second-person subjects (e.g., You might ought to (should) pretend you don't care about her any more), while the third person subjects are ambiguous between deliberateness and politeness (e. g., He might could kill the chickens 'He just might kill the chickens' or Ί suggest that he kill the chickens') (1973: 279). With respect to (d) and other double modals beginning with might, Di Paolo says "I assume might has a constant epistemic reading throughout and that it contributes to the hedging, politely suggestive, and non-instructive sense of D[ouble] M[odal]s" (Di Paolo 1989: 198). Double modals have a long history that goes back to Middle English, though whether there was continuity from Middle English on has been questioned on grounds of differences in inventory, especially the frequent use of shall, should as the first modal in Middle English, and lack of evidence of continuity (Nagle 1993, Montgomery - Nagle 1993). In any event, the construction is by no means alien to English (even if regarded as somewhat non-standard) and is not regionally restricted when the second modal is a quasi-modal (see for example might ought to).

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4. Possible motivations for the changes What might motivate such changes? The answer deserves much fuller attention than I can give it here, but a brief sketch is as follows. If we were to take a primarily syntactic or lexical approach, we might claim that Stage II is the result of a change whereby the transitive clause construction simply allowed analogical extension from human subjects to non-human ones, and that the semantic changes followed. But this would leave us with no motivation for the analogy. I suggest that the pragmatic invited inference .of futurity implied by promise and threaten at Stage I came to be semanticized in contexts where no proposition is syntactically expressed, i. e., in contexts with direct objects. This led to Stage II, at which a new epistemic meaning coexisted with the older, performative one. The fact that these two verbs at Stage II often had indefinite objects distinguishes them from other verbs of the commissive class like guarantee, pledge, vow, and vouch for. Although the latter verbs allow direct objects, there are no examples with indefinite objects in the DHCE Corpus that are similar to those in (3 a) and (3 c) repeated here as (26 a, b), where the object is an indefinite NP or indeed an indefinite quantifier (much ): (26)

a. and there asked hym a gyffte that he promysed her whan she gaff hym the swerde (bef. 1470 Works of Thomas Malory 48 [DHCE]) b. Mid word he ]3retnej3 muche & lute dep in dede With word he threatens much & little does in deed (1297 R. Glouc. (Rolls) 9383 [DHCE])

These indefinite objects underspecify the nature of the commitment and they presumably allowed for the demotion of the semantics of commitment. The other commissives, which require more specific objects (mostly of a verbal kind like allegiance), did not acquire epistemic meanings. Stage III, I hypothesize, starts out as a case of analogical extension of epistemic meaning to the non-finite construction, which was already available for promise and threaten, followed by shifts to increasingly raising syntax. The motivation for the development of the raising uses of promise and threaten (Stage III) is part of a general process whereby epistemic meanings gradually shift from more "objective" possibility based in general beliefs and attitudes to a more "subjective" possibility based in the indivi-

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dual speaker's belief or attitude. 1 7 In other words, the assessment of truth becomes "relativized to a speaker" (Frawley 1992: 407). The particular kind of epistemic meaning that has developed is what has variously been called sujet d'enonciation (Benveniste 1966), non-factive (Kiparsky - Kiparsky 1971), psychological (Wierzbicka 1988) or subjective (Lyons 1977; Kiefer 1987; Traugott 1989; Langacker 1990). It is an epistemic meaning that, as we have seen, involves the speaker's tentative judgment of likelihood based on appearances as well as expectations and knowledge. Probably one of the best-known types of subjectification in the epistemic domain is the shift from root/deontic > epistemic meanings in auxiliaries like must and will. In (27) and (28), the (a) examples are historically older than the (b) examples: (27)

a. They must be married (some external force requires them to be married). b. They must be married (It is obvious that they are married, I conclude that they are married).

(28)

a. We won't go (We refuse to go). b. It's seven. They'W be home by now.

The root meanings occur in Old English; epistemic meanings first appear in the fourteenth century. The process of subjectification is of course far more nuanced than this might suggest. A more refined gradience that I have argued for elsewhere (1989, 1995) can be demonstrated in the shift from relatively objective epistemic meanings, i.e., communally agreedupon assessments of the likelihood of a situation, as in (29 a), to more subjective or speaker-based ones, as in (29 b): (29)

a. / wol gladly yelden hire my place (future will). Ί will gladly yield my place to her' (c. 1386 Chaucer CT. CI. Ε 843 [Visser 1969: 1678]) b. This will be your luggage, I suppose (evidential, conclusive will). (1847 Bronte, Jane Eyre XI [Visser 1969: 1701])

Visser cites Sweet's remark as late as 1903 that the kind of use in (29 b) was not well-formed in Standard English, and suggests that the conclusive (strongly epistemic) use of will is a very recent phenomenon. The development of strongly epistemic must is rather earlier. Weakly epistemic

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must appears to have originated in contexts of third-person subjects and an adverb expressing necessity as in (30 a), which is ambiguous between deontic and epistemic. Examples without the adverb as in (30 b) are frequent from the fourteenth century according to Visser (1969: 1810): (30)

a. Ah heo mot nede beien, pe mon pe ibunden but he must necessarily submit, the man who bound bid. is 'But he who is bound ought necessarily to submit/necessarily submits' (c. 1225 (71200) Lay. Brut. 1051 [MED moten 2 c]) b. He most kunne muchel of art, Dat pu He must know much of art (cunning), That you woldest Jeve perof part. would give thereof part 'He must be very cunning for you to be willing to give part of it'. (c. 1300 (71250) Floris (Cmb) 521 [MED moten 4])

The Middle English Dictionary cites (30 b) as 'he must know; we must assume that he knows', and presumably interprets it as a relatively objective epistemic, although the conclusive sense is surely present. The conclusive meaning is found more frequently in later texts, including: (30)

c. The fruit muste be delicious, the tree being so beautiful. (1623 Middleton, Spanish Gipsie I.i. 16 [Visser 1969: 1810])

The claim that subjectification has occurred in the history of the modals in English like may and must has been criticized, e.g., by Householder (1992: 388) on the grounds that "well-documented languages like Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit" had both kinds of meaning in the equivalent modals, and that "the Latin usages early permeated the European vernaculars, including English". But such a criticism is moot unless it can be shown that early stages of the English language clearly also had both meanings in the pre-modals (which they do not). Higgins (1990) expresses a similar concern about whether epistemic (raising) promise was an innovation in English, since such uses also existed in Latin and French. The counter-argument is again the same: if the change occurred in Latin or French and not in English, why does the epistemic meaning

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not appear at the outset? Furthermore, neither Householder nor Higgins take into consideration the vast number of innovations in English in the modal domain involving subjectification. Such subjectification is not limited to or necessarily a function of raising. It is attested throughout the modal system broadly construed, including not only the development of the epistemic modals, and of the quasi-modals like be going to, have to, be about to, mentioned above, but also of epistemic adverbs like probably (Hanson 1987), and connectives like concessive while, still, metalinguistic rather than, and focus and scalar particles such as even, merely. It is further evidenced by degree modifiers like kind of/sort of (Tabor 1993, 1994), and the rise of "hot news" perfects (Schwenter 1994) (for examples of many such developments, see Hopper — Traugott (1993) and Traugott 1995). Adversative connectives (e.g., while, but), focus and scalar particles (e. g., even, merely), stance adverbs (e. g., precisely), are among classes of grammatical words that may be used "to indicate the degree of strength (evidence, confidence, insistence) with which a statement is made or a directive is uttered, ... to identify inconsistencies and ... to select the context in which a new utterance is to be processed" (König 1991: 180). As such they have over their histories acquired modal and strongly epistemic meanings (among their various polysemies). Of particular interest in recent years have been the changes from manner adverbs, e. g., actually, generally, loosely, really, strictly, to stance adverbs encoding "the speaker's normative judgment respecting degree or conditions of truth" and adverbs of modality which may "act preemptively to inform and to persuade a hearer of the nature and importance of the speaker's evaluation" (Powell 1992a: 76). A well-known development in the last hundred years or so has been the rise of what is often called a "metaphorical" meaning of literally. Originally this was an adverb meaning "in the literal sense of the word", as exemplified by: (31)

It is not a crime to make evasive, potentially misleading, but literally true ... unsworn statements to Congress in an effort to influence legislative inquiry. (1991 UPI)

By the mid-nineteenth century it began to be used as well to indicate the speaker's assessment that the proposition is an exaggeration, or unexpected, hence is subject to negative evaluation by either of the interlocutors: 18

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a. Mr. Chamberlain literally bubbled over with gratitude. (1906 Westminster Gazette 15 Nov. 2/1 [OED]) b. Mr. Frank has literally stood by and watched Postal Service executives waste his agency's funds. (1991 UPI)

Another case of subjectification (accompanied by the development of sentence-adverbial characteristics) can be found in the rise of sentenceadverbial hopefully. The most recent known to me is the phrase bottomline is, illustrated by: (33)

"Nobody has tried to shut her up. Bottomline is when she starts to take specific shots at our customers, we have to protect our legitimate business interests," Bass said. (1991 UPI).

Here bottomline is means something like basically.

5. Envoi The present study of the history of promise and threaten is intended as a contribution to the growing body of evidence that the development of epistemic forms via raising is a gradient phenomenon, and furthermore is semantically motivated. The gradient approach to changes proposed here, which claims that as decategorialization occurs, recategorialization (in this case to a categorial raising verb) is not instantaneous, necessary, or even expected, goes against the grain of most restrictive theories of grammar (e. g., Roberts 1985, 1993; Lightfoot 1991). However, the fact of language is that despite significant regularities that might be captured in a theory of core grammar, there are also vast areas where these regularities do not hold. The large (and growing) set of quasi-modals cannot be relegated to some periphery of epiphenomenal oddities (see Baker 1991 for some concerns regarding the coreperiphery distinction). For those of us who study language change, the central challenge for a restrictive theory of grammar that seeks to identify discrete parametric changes is precisely that various constructions can exist for hundreds of years without being reanalyzed or analogized into some positive parameter. Instead, they may thrive in an in-between state, like the quasi-modals, sharing some properties of full raising verbs and some of full auxiliaries, without resolution of their gradient status.

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In a stimulating but brief comment, Roberts (1993: 325) cites claims that in most languages "epistemic modals strongly favour appearing in tensed contexts". However, reminding us that Early Modern English full lexical verbs do not move to Tense (in a Government and Binding model) whereas core modals like must can, he claims that "items that instantiate epistemic modality cannot be verbs" in Modern English (he analyzes them as operators instead). I hope to have shown that some verbs, specifically promise and threaten, have indeed been able to instantiate epistemic modality in Modern English, and furthermore, that whatever principles are leading to the association of these verbs with Tense are gradual, rather than abrupt. For some linguists the challenge of gradience raises the anxiety: Are we once again facing a linguistics in which each word has its own history, in other words, is linguistics going to cease to be predictive? All the evidence shows that indeed each word does have its own history. But we can be predictive, because these individual micro-histories are constrained by perception and production strategies that constrain minimal steps of change (cf. Lichtenberk 1991, among many others) and lead to unidirectionality. In the case of promise and threaten, the unidirectionalities are specifically the shift to increasingly raising verb status, decategorialization from main to auxiliary or light verb status in the process of grammaticalization, and most especially subjectification. This subjectification arises out of the process of negotiating interactional identities and establishing shared contexts in which meanings are created and understood. Above all, it derives from the expressive function of language that allows us to display various "feelings, orientations and statuses" (Schiflfrin 1987: 12).

Notes 1. Especial thanks to Niels Davidsen-Nielsen, David Denison, Stephen Nagle, Elisabet Ormelius, Inger Rosengren, and Toril Swan for comments on this paper or insights that have contributed directly to it; also to Paul Kiparsky, Peter Sells, Whitney Tabor, and Nigel Vincent for comments on earlier versions. Some of this material was presented at the Nineteenth Berkeley Linguistics Society Meeting (see Traugott 1993), and at the Eleventh International Conference on Historical Linguistics, U C L A 1993. 2. The study of subjectification builds on synchronic analyses of subjectivity by Benveniste (1966) and Lyons (1977). 3. Higgins (1990), an unpublished fuller account of the development of promise, with particular attention to issues pertaining to the development of raising, came to my attention as I was preparing my final draft. Higgins' findings in general support the historical account given here, though he would no doubt disagree on some particulars.

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4. The corpora used are as follows: a) For the earlier periods (750-1710) from Matti Rissanen, Merja Kytö et al., Diachronie Part of the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts (DHCE). b) For the later periods (1650-1990) A Representative Corpus of Historical English Registers ( A R C H E R ) , courtesy of Douglas Biber and Edward Finegan. c) For contemporary English from the H E C T O R Corpus, part of the Oxford Corpus of British English, courtesy of Susan Atkins, and from a corpus of 1990-1992 United Press International (UPI) press releases, courtesy of Academic Text Service at Stanford University. 5. The change is not limited to English. Postal (1974: 1992) mentions that French menacer and promettre have undergone similar changes; Verhagen (1995, 1996) cites Dutch beloven and dreigen. 6. In the later part of the fifteenth century promise came to be used as an epistemic parenthetical as in: (i)

7. 8.

9. 10.

11. 12. 13.

Out on it, says the king, that is the foulest, for hee is durty up to the elbows. I, sayes Will; but then he washes him cleane againe, and eats his meate cleanly enough, I promise thee. (1608 Robert Armin, Nest of Ninnies: 45 [DHCE])

Note this meaning parallels the metalinguistic epistemicity that applies to the content of what is discussed in Sweetser (1990). For purposes of the present paper, I ignore this particular development since it does not introduce a nominal or infinitival complement, has no parallel in threaten, and does not appear to be directly related to the epistemic meaning under discussion here. The earliest examples cited by the O E D and Higgins (1990) are mid-nineteenth century. Be going to also cross-cuts Coates' scales, although she does not mention this fact. A question for future research is the extent to which the whole class of quasi-modals may cross-cut the inferential-non-inferential scales proposed in Coates (1983). For a somewhat similar continuum, see Goossens (1987). See also Bybee - Perkins - Pagliuca, (in press), a cross-linguistic, and largely synchronic, study of tense, aspect, and modality that focusses on these types of modals, including issues in their history in English. Quirk et al. (1985: 146) claim that 85% of the have to constructions in their British English data have do rather than have in negative and interrogative sentences. I owe this example from contemporary British English to Susan Atkins. A matter for further study is a split between promise and threaten as suggested by the 1990-1992 UPI data. This data base shows no examples of progressive promise with any type of subject (promising is restricted to adjectival and gerund constructions), while progressive threaten occurs in control as well as raising senses; an example of the former is: (i)

She believed he was threatening her and she reacted in the way she thought best — by shooting him four times. (1992 UPI)

14. Not is not included here, since it does not distinguish auxiliaries from raising main verbs, cf. She may not go, She ought not to go, She appears not to have seen him. 15. Note that probably does not cooccur with these verbs. The reason here is presumably pragmatic: probability is a logical modality while promise and threaten are psychological

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ones (see Wierzbicka 1988 for this distinction). Possibly also does not cooccur with them, presumably because it is modally weaker than they are on a scale of possibility and would clash with the principle of inference to the stronger interpretation ("if likely, then not merely possible"). See Horn (1984) on the role in the development of central modals out of main verbs of what he calls the "R-principle": "Make your contribution necessary, say no more than you must", which puts lower bounds on implicata and invites hearers to infer more than they hear. See Traugott - König (1991) on the suggestion that grammaticalization typically involves strengthening of implicatures. 16. Denison (p.c.) suggests that the constraint may be apparent only: perhaps to avoid processing difficulties that might arise if the deontic were used, since the deontic requires an agentive subject. Even if this is the motivation for the constraint, in so far as the constraint holds, it is further evidence for distinctions from other raising verbs with more main verb-like properties. 17. For a discussion of the relationship between raising and subjectification, with particular reference to promise and threaten, and to epistemic modality, see Langacker (1995). 18. Powell (1992b) provides a detailed synchronic account of the polysemies of literally.

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On the use of brauchen versus müssen Bjarne

Ulvestad

As Erben rightly observes, the use of the verb brauchen is in need of more extensive research. This verb, together with a few other so-called modality verbs, brings "... in einer sehr differenzierten Weise, die mitsamt den entsprechenden Regularitäten noch nicht zureichend beschrieben ist, eine Beziehung der Subjektgröße (des Agens) zu einer infinitivisch genannten Handlung/Verhaltensweise zum Ausdruck" (1984: 55). One of the main difficulties involved in the usage descriptions with respect to this verb as well as to the modal auxiliaries in general, pertains to the deplorable fact that in modern linguistics, in Jäntti's well-chosen words, "... sind viele, auch zentrale Termini und Begriffe manchmal diffus, unscharf, ambig, schwer definierbar oder überhaupt nicht definiert. Dies gilt für den Terminus "Modalität" mehr als für andere Termini in der Sprachforschung" (1989: 11). An indication of the predicament in which investigators of modalverb usage find themselves at present is the surprisingly large number of terminological pairs like subjective vs. objective, epistemic vs. deontic, predictive vs. pragmatic, and inferential vs. noninferential, just to name a few. Nine of the current term pairs are listed by Buscha, whose optimistic comment runs as follows: "Mit den verschiedenen Termini werden nicht verschiedene Merkmale der Opposition bezeichnet, sondern die einzelnen Begriffspaare drücken die gleiche Grundunterscheidung aus, ..." (1984: 214). Buscha is indubitably right as far as classical, often-cited examples are concerned, such as Hans muß es tun, der kann es am besten (objective), Hans muß krank sein, sein Gesicht ist kreideweiß (subjective). Sentences like these are found in scores of grammars and articles on the German modals. As to the plethora of alternative terms proposed, we are in most cases confronted with innovative renaming — the number of terminological pairs suggested so far is approaching thirty. However, the numerous terms create interesting as well as annoying difficulties when less familiar or hitherto rarely discussed types of sentences catch the attention of the grammarians. In such cases, the terms almost invariably change from a labelling function to a basically criterial function, in which the normal denotation of the terms used, whether they

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are based on Greek, Latin, or everyday West-European words, may play a significant role in generating pedagogical confusion and scholarly disagreement. A good example is provided by Fichtner in his description of what is traditionally called subjective and objective usage: "Those sentences in which modal and lexical verb apply simultaneously reflect the 'concurrent modal conjugation,' because the two verbs 'run together,' as it were; and those where the force of the modal is felt before that of the lexical verb begins [,] represent the 'prospicient modal conjugation,' because the subject, while in the situation described by the modal, 'looks ahead' to the action of the lexical verb" (1979: 130-131). Examples supplied by the author for the concurrent and the prospicient modal conjugations, which evidently replace the traditional terms subjective and objective usage, respectively, are: (1)

Er muß heute arbeiten. 'He must already be at work (around here somewhere) today.'

(2)

Er muß heute arbeiten. 'He has to go to work today'

Trouble will necessarily arise if one tries to analyse and describe, for example, the following sentences in such terms: (3)

Ich muß viel leiden und oft weinen.

(4)

Warte einen Augenblick, Peter muß gleich kommen.

Fichtner's time-referential terms would compel one to call the objective use of muß in (3) concurrent, as in (1), and to refer to the subjective use in (4) as prospicient, as in (2). Thus, the terms concurrent and prospicient cannot reasonably be used to replace the traditional terms subjective and objective. But even the latter terms are, for reasons of deviant usage, occasionally "irreführend", to quote Vater (1975: 139). Probably the most confusing and accordingly least usable of all is the term pragmatic. Fillmore employs it as opposed to epistemic (1969: 113); Gerstenkorn operates with the terms "pragmatisch" and "nichtpragmatisch", of which the first stands for the most usual meaning of subjective or epistemic (1976: 289).

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The main reason for current terminological bewilderment (and I have given only a few examples out of a large number) is probably the failure on the part of the innovators to try out their terms on sentences that occur outside the narrow range of standard examples in textbooks and grammars. This is the background against which the various present usage descriptions of müssen contra brauchen must be viewed. In reading the many accounts as to how brauchen is used, one observes that no worthwhile rules have been given so far. By worthwhile rules, I mean rules that are capable of improving the performance of teachers and learners of German as a foreign language. Apart from the virtual absence of rules, there are considerable differences of opinion to be noted with regard to statements of occurrential frequency. Thus, Kürschner writes about the relationship between the modals brauchen and müssen: "Es gibt ... Inhaltstypen, bei denen in negativer Umgebung müssen und brauchen nicht frei miteinander alternieren, doch sollen sie uns hier nicht weiter interessieren. Wichtig ist, dass brauchen stets durch müssen ersetzt werden kann ..." (1983: 192). Compare this statement with one made by Brünner five years earlier: "In praktisch allen Belegen lässt sich 'nichtbrauchen' durch 'es ist überflüssig!unnötig' paraphrasieren, eine Paraphrase, die bei 'nicht-müssen' fast nie möglich ist" (1979: 89). Since brauchen-sentences can hardly be replaced by müssen always as well as almost never, it seems obvious that at least one of the two frequency statements must be wrong; in fact, both are. There are in reality several rules of usage according to which only brauchen appears possible. For instance, in my fairly large material (see below) only brauchen is found in sentences like: (5)

Wenn du das, was du ... angerichtet hast, nicht in Ordnung bringst, brauchst du nicht wiederzukommen. (Benz 1973: 323)

(6)

Wenn Sie nichts Besseres wissen, brauchen Sie nicht mehr zu mir zu kommen. (Gaiser 1970: 110)

For this very special rule (a subrule for the construction wenn-clause + nicht brauchen-clause), I have found no exceptions. I mention in passing that there are more than a dozen equally strong rules, admittedly with comparably infrequent application, to be extracted from my texts. None of them has been proposed thus far in the literature on German grammar. Instead of giving rules for keeping nicht/nur brauchen out of the domain of nicht/nur müssen and vice versa, most grammars, even the most

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advanced, merely inform their readers that brauchen occurs more often than müssen. This is true {müssen has a frequency of 37% and brauchen a frequency of 63% in sentences that permit the occurrence of either), but such information can only be truly serviceable if one knows in what types of sentences the two modals do not alternate facultatively. The description of such rules will be the subject of another paper; here, I shall just succinctly discuss a couple of additional examples. In his large grammar, Engel writes: Meist wird müssen allerdings bei negiertem und ebenso bei restriktivem Gebrauch durch brauchen ersetzt (dies ist der wesentliche Verwendungsbereich des Modalverbs brauchen): ... Sie brauchen nur den Deckel kräftig hochzuziehen. Sie müssen nur den Deckel kräftig hochziehen, (seltener)

(1988: 467) In constructions like this, it is actually müssen that is (by far) most frequently found, in this case because of the word kräftig; without this adverb, Engel's frequency indication would be correct. Another example following the appropriate rule is: (7)

Es wird vorbeigehen ...du mußt es dir nur ganz richtig klarmachen. (Remarque 1971: 90)

The corresponding high-frequency rule may be provisionally stated as follows: In «wr-sentences (like the preceding ones) with (a.) communicationally important adverbs denoting cautiousness and mental or physical exertion or perseverance, or with (b.) verb phrases with related meaning, müssen and not brauchen should be used. Examples of typical adverbs of this kind are, apart from kräftig and richtig (the latter is the adverb most often registered in my material): stark, fest, energisch, adäquat, beharrlich, rasch, schnell, sofort, vorsichtig. The rule is clearly operative also in the first pair of rhyming lines in a recent Bavarian hit song: (8)

Ich mächt' mit dir ein Luftschloß bau'n ...Du ganz fest vertrau n.

mußt mir nur

It would be very surprising to find brauchst in the second line, although this form would be perfectly acceptable rhythmically in the Bavarian language (which only exceptionally uses the zw-infinitive with this verb).

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Examples of the verb phrase (b.) subrule are: (9)

Du mußt nur Geduld haben, Jens ... (Konsalik 1977: 81)

and (10)

Man muß nur das Auge haben für Fälle, die ... (H. Mann 1971: 316)

As examples of typical verb phrases in sentences governed by this subrule, one may note the following: den Nacken steif halten, die Stirn haben, sehr vorsichtig sein, lange genug suchen, eindeutig genug darlegen. It seems that all m/r-sentences that include words like genug, genügend, Geduld, Ausdauer and so forth permit only müssen. For reasons of space I can mention only these relevant words here. No subdivision of modal syntax and semantics presents more vexing problems than the one dealing with subjective/epistemic as against objective/nonepistemic usage (these are the terms most often met with; I use both without referential difference), and the problem regarding constructions with nicht brauchen and nicht müssen (hereafter nb and nm respectively) has revealed itself as particularly intractable. To judge by a statement in the most recent monograph on German modals, Öhlschläger's Zur Syntax und Semantik der Modalverben des Deutschen (1989), there appears to be general scholarly consensus that the /^-sentences cannot be used epistemically. The author explains his exclusion of the modal brauchen as follows: "... (nicht) brauchen weist nur einen Teil der Verwendungsmöglichkeiten der klassischen Modalverben auf - nicht-epistemische ..." (1989: 8). A footnote to this reads: "Vgl. aber Takahashi (1984)." But even in the minute (three pages) article by the Japanese Germanist one finds reference to five publications that treat of the "epistemic" use of nb (Takahashi 1984: 3), the first one appearing as early as 1972 (see below). Interestingly enough, there has been no public controversy regarding the very complex problems involved. Only Öhlschläger and Takahashi allude to other opinions, and only the latter mentions in this connection the important article by the American Germanist Folsom in Muttersprache 78 (1968), to my knowledge the first one to state that nb cannot be used subjectively (1968: 323). The Japanese scholar does not give any reason for his considering Folsom's view incorrect, he just says it is. His main interest is in having the subjective use of nb described in the diction-

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aries. He seems unaware of the fact that such usage is not recorded in the dictionaries for nm either. As far as I can see, there are today more than twenty Germanists who, in grammars and research articles, accept epistemic usage of nb, and only Folsom, Öhlschläger, and Kürschner (1983) seem to dissent from this view. The problem and its causes, which are not necessarily merely terminological, undoubtedly require further discussion. With regard to the relative text-occurrential frequency of subjective nb, Takahashi quotes the two linguistic advisers of Bibliographisches Institut Mannheim in the early eighties: "Der subjektive Gebrauch von 'brauchen' ist ... zwar durchaus üblich, aber nicht so häufig bzw. auffallig und deshalb von den Grammatikern und Wörterbuchverfassern bisher anscheinend übersehen worden" (1984: 21). He then lists eight ^-sentences, two of which he has found in Folsom's article (where they are referred to as non-subjective), and on the basis of these examples he concludes "... dass der subjektive Gebrauch von nicht brauchen nicht so selten ist" (1984: 22). Against grammarians who hold that nb- and «ra-sentences differ in meaning, he maintains, to my knowledge the first to note it, that they are semantically equivalent. On the other hand, Öhlschläger is evidently one of those who consider the two construction types to be fundamentally nonequivalent, since he presents the «w-sentence Der Angeklagte muß nicht der Mörder sein as an example of epistemic usage (1989: 207), but rejects a similar use of nb. The following problems, the solution or part-solution of which may bring us closer to an ultimately acceptable usage description, will be taken up in the following: (i) The relative text-occurrential frequency of what are claimed to be instances of subjective use of nb and nm. (ii) The question as to whether the two types of usage are or are not semantically and pragmatically equivalent. In either case, one is faced with the problem concerning the pragmatic significance of the two construction types. (iii) Ultimately, the multiple definitions of subjective as against objective usage may need revision. In my opinion, this kind of problems can only be solved, if at all, on the basis of a sufficiently large corpus of pertinent sentences in their

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contextual setting, preferably as found in prose works that contain numerous sentences represented as direct speech (e.g., between quotation marks). The "subjective" nm/nb-constructions are relatively seldom met with in expository prose. For the purpose of the investigation at hand, I have excerpted all the germane sentences found in 407 novels, most of them of a recent date, only a few of which are translations (from English). The material comprises 138,520 text pages, but since pages vary considerably in textual density (between 250 and 500 words per page), I have made an admittedly rough count-and-multiply estimate of the number of words. The corpus contains about 48,543,000 words, or, according to Bausch's appraisal, the equivalence of 5,394 hours of speaking (9,000 words per hour (1979: 143)). The average number of words per novel, 120,155, may seem rather large, but I have excerpted maximally "thick" novels, in order to keep the bibliographical register as short as possible (average number of pages per book: 342). "Thick" novels are for instance Musil's Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, 400,000 words, and Th. Mann's Der Zauberberg, 305,000 words. The outcome of my study definitely corroborates the opinion of Takahashi's linguistic advisers in Mannheim. Merely 48 instances of "epistemic" nb, and 207 of "epistemic" nm. One would, assuming that my corpus is representative, have to read eight and a half large novels in order to find one example of nb, and two novels to obtain one instance of nm. This is surely the explanation why Raynaud in her large monograph on the use of the German modals (1974), in my opinion the best study so far, did not find a single example of "epistemic" nb in her corpus (278,070) words, corresponding to 2.3 average-sized books in my material: 1974: 673). Altogether, my corpus contains 9,348 examples of nichtInurIbloß, etc., brauchen and 5,477 examples of müssen in "non-epistemic" use. A number of pertinent construction types that have not been recorded or discussed up till now will be described in another paper. The relatively high frequency of "epistemic" «m-sentences should enable one to answer conclusively the question of possible isosemanticity on the part of the two constructions. A few examples may be adduced to illustrate my matching procedure: (11)

Es brauchte nichts zu bedeuten. (Burk 1990: 232)

(12)

Das muß nichts bedeuten, ... (Kirst 1974: 487)

(13)

Aber das brauchte nichts zu besagen. (Stemmle 1962: 117)

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(14)

Das muß nichts besagen ... (Cotton 1987: 68)

(15)

Daß sie nicht ans Telefon gegangen war, brauchte nichts unbedingt Übles zu bedeuten; ... (Heinrich 1989: 345)

(16)

Das mußte nichts Schlimmes bedeuten. (Fallada 1978: 461)

It must be admitted that this type of sentence, involving interpretation and evaluation of actions and happenings and situations, and recorded outside of context, makes it seem not completely inconceivable that we have to do with "epistemic" sentences; they are for instance "sprecherbezogen", a feature that for many Germanists (for example, Engel) serves as a criterion for that which others call subjective, etc. As examples of «6-sentences roughly corresponding to Der Angeklagte muß nicht der Täter sein, one may adduce: (17)

Weil er Waffenhändler ist und in Hongkong lebt, braucht er noch lange kein Spion oder gar Leiter einer Spionzentrale zu sein ... (Bergius 1989: 9)

(18)

Der andere jedoch braucht nicht gerade ein Lagerkommandant gewesen zu sein, ... (Nossack 1971: 172)

There is, in my opinion, no reason for concluding that the two kinds of "epistemic"-sentences differ semantically or pragmatically. If we accept "epistemic" nm, we also have to accept "epistemic" nb. It is noteworthy that the very few grammarians that actually treat of the meaning of such "epistemic" phrases as these, seem to have considerable difficulty in giving a half-way lucid and convincing explanation. Ehlich and Rehbein, the first ones to mention "epistemic" «ό-sentences, adequately exemplify and explain the meaning of positive epistemic müssensentences, but regarding "epistemic" «^-phrases, they merely state that on this point "... liegt die Sache schwieriger ... Udo braucht keine Champignons gefunden (zu) haben ist ... möglich. Doch wird [dieser Satz] hier nicht mehr diskutiert" (Ehlich - Rehbein 1972: 340). The other writers on this theme do attempt to be more explicit in their explanations. Before discussing their opinions, I cite for the sake of expository convenience part of a dialogue between a young woman and her very sick brother (he is the first speaker):

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"[Ich] Hab Schatten auf beiden Lungen."... "Wer sagt das?" "Mein Röntgenologe" ... "Geh zu meinem. Der ist besser."... "Ich hab Schatten auf der Lunge ..." "Hör auf Es muß nicht stimmen" (Knef 1985: 221)

The wider context shows clearly that negation here is of the modal auxiliary, not of the infinitive phrase. The sister could just as well have used brauchen in the last utterance, compare the following sequence: (20)

Ich glaube, ich habe so was gelesen ... Aber es braucht nicht zu stimmen (Fallada 1970: 369)

With these examples in mind, the statements of the various grammarians will be examined. Raynaud writes: "Über nicht brauchen läßt sich streiten ... in der Schriftsprache tritt es als [Modalisator] bisher kaum auf. Aber ein Satz wie Die Nachricht braucht nicht falsch zu sein im Sinne von ... Es scheint mir möglich, daß die Nachricht richtig ist, ist durchaus denkbar" (1977: 22). The problem is whether the paraphrase is fully acceptable, which I doubt. Corresponding paraphrasing would not give exactly the meaning that is contained in the two dialogue sentences above. Shortening Raynaud's epistemic paraphrase, in the well-known traditional way, to: Die Nachricht kann richtig (— nicht-falsch) sein, we would find the two speakers quoted above in (19) and (20) saying: Es kann unrichtig sein. Somehow, this paraphrase does not seem right. To be sure, both sentences display the pragmatic component of consolation in the sister's utterance and an implication of friendly reassurance in that of the other, but it seems, and I hope to show more clearly later on that one is faced with disparate presuppositions. At this point, I only claim that the clause Es kann unrichtig sein is not to be regarded as isosemantic and isopragmatic with the clause Es braucht nicht zu stimmen. One can also, again very provisionally, say that the first phrase functions as a genuine statement of a possiblity which may eventually turn out to be right or wrong (cf. Raynaud's paraphrase), the second phrase does not. Also, Takahashi paraphrases instead of giving a more formal semantic description: "Ichlman brauche/t nicht an(zu)nehmen, daß ..." (1984: 20). Applying this to the above phrases, one gets: Ich brauche nicht anzunehmenlmuß nicht annehmen, daß es stimmt. However, the main clause does

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not have the right meaning for such a paraphrase, which would ordinarily mean: Ί don't have to assume that p, because I know that p\ or, with suitable intonation: Ί don't have to assume that p, because I know that not-/?', cf.: (21)

Ich bin ... in New York so gut wie zu Hause, und wenn jemand Brooklyn-Slang spricht, nachdem hier geschossen war, brauchte [sie] ich nicht anzunehmen, dass der Bursche vor mir ein verirrter Kamerad aus der Heilsarmee sei (Cotton 1986: 86)

One could add: "... because I know for sure that he is not." In the first of the eight examples cited by Takahashi, a professor gives as the result of his research a new translation of a recalcitrant Old High German word sequence: (22)

Demnach wäre fatereres mines mit 'meines Vaterlandes' zu übersetzen, was nicht ganz abwegig zu sein braucht (1984: 21)

But the professor, who of course knows his critical colleagues, would hardly choose to express himself in the supercilious manner that the suggested paraphrase would entail. A new reading of an old text is a precarious enterprise, and the writer has every reason to expect criticism. One may note that the German sentence Ich brauche nicht anzunehmen translates as Ί have no reason to assume t h a t . . . ' , which makes it unfit for a paraphrase like Takahashi's. The professor's choice of words undoubtedly indicates that he is indeed anticipating a measure of skepticism regarding his novel translation (cf. the submissive phrase nicht ganz abwegig). Engel's description, which appears in the chapter on "Sprecherbezogener Gebrauch der Modalverben", is even more difficult to understand than the two just discussed. According to his view, the nm- and nbphrases cause an assumption ("Vermutung") to be cancelled ("aufgehoben") (1988: 472). Thus the sentence Es muß nicht stimmen presumably entails the revocation of an assumption held by the speaker. Interestingly enough, he says the same thing about the negated modal können: "Die Negation ... hebt damit die Vermutung des Sprechers auf; ..." (1988: 471). This statement describes but one particular usage. It applies, for instance, to the following example: (23)

In Shanghai dachte ich, daß Knut mit seiner Frau kreuzunglücklich wäre. Das kann aber nicht der Fall gewesen sein (Ekert-Rotholz 1975: 82)

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The wording of the description may lead unwary readers to look at nkand nm/nb-clauses as being equivalent, which they of course are not. The often substitutable denotative equivalent of nk is m + negated infinitive. Below, I shall attempt to demonstrate that no cancellation of an assumption is involved in the «^//^-construction, but one will see that it does indicate a moderately oppositional reaction to a hypothesis or belief, be it explicit or imagined by the speaker to be implicit. Finally, Ohlschläger's description will be considered. As we have seen, he does not regard the «^-construction as occurring epistemically. He terms the «m-phrase under discussion objective epistemic, and his definition of the positive objective-epistemic nm-meaning runs as follows: "eine mit einem Satz der Form e muß IP [= infinitive phrase] ausgedrückte Proposition ist dann und genau dann wahr, wenn aus der jeweiligen Evidenz Ε logisch folgt, daß der mit der IP bezeichnete Sachverhalt besteht" (1989: 249). It is not quite clear how "logisch folgt" is to be understood. The following information supplied by the author indeed seems rather problematic: Wenn die Evidenz, wenn die Umstände von der Art sind, daß sie ... zur Annahme der Wahrheit der Konklusion zwingen, ist nicht nur der Sprecher, sondern jeder, genauer: jede sich rational verhaltende Person im Hinblick auf diese Evidenz gezwungen, die Wahrheit dieser Proposition anzuerkennen. Und daß der Sprecher — wie andere auch — dazu gezwungen ist, heißt noch nicht automatisch ..., daß der Sprecher im entsprechenden Grad sicher ist, daß diese Proposition wahr ist. (1989: 237)

It is the last sentence that makes this description difficult to accept. It sounds strange that the speaker's objective-epistemic conclusion forces himself as well as his partner(s) to acknowledge the truth of its proposition {p), though he isn't necessarily certain as to its truth. One can hardly accept a proposition as necessarily true and as possibly not true at the same time. For the «ra-sentences, the usage description includes this passage: "... objektiv-epistemisch verstanden bezeichnet [müssen] immer die logische Folgeziehung [,] und dementsprechend werden negierte Sätze immer so verstanden, daß das Bestehen einer logischen Folgebeziehung negiert wird" (1989: 205). If one tries this out on our test constructions, one finds that Es muß nicht stimmen is sort of a paraphrase of Es folgt nicht logisch, daß es stimmt. That appears to be a somewhat artificial way of speaking, and I doubt that normal speakers using the «ra-construction think of logical (non)necessity at all. Anyway, this description and explanation as to objective epistemic nm-usage seems to be a bit lacking in intelligibility.

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In order to demonstrate the kind of difficulty one may encounter in trying to analyse and classify nm- and «^-sentences in accordance with Öhlschläger's description, I cite a pertinent example: in his novel Faustrecht, Kirst describes an episode in which the soldier Faust has disappeared from the military camp. In spite of incessant searching he has not been found, and everybody wonders where he can be. Eventually, the following dialogue develops between the camp's captain and its major: (24)

"Sir — wenn dieser Faust nicht im Lager aufzufinden sein sollte, dann muß er eben anderwärts sein!" "Das muß er nicht sein!", behauptete der Major ... Wenn dieser Bastard nicht in unserem Lager ist — dann kann er unter demselben sein! Also etwa in der Erde — oder in irgendeiner Scheißhausgrube" (1972: 13)

Both dialogue partners draw equally acceptable conclusions, given the situation, and both statements follow logically from the evidence available, in the way such reasoning is usually performed in this world. The captain certainly must consider the evidence for his conclusion as being unavoidable, as having a compulsive force; yet his partner is not willing to acknowledge the truth of that conclusion. He is, in other words, not forced ("gezwungen") to accept the proposition involved as true. This evidently militates against Öhlschläger's dictum. The mw^e«-proposition is true from the point of view of the captain, and the major obviously neither denies nor accepts it as true. But it would have been unnatural for the latter to meet the captain's conclusion with a statement like: Das folgt nicht logisch! It does follow logically. According to Öhlschläger, the term objective epistemic, indicating a compulsive conclusion, is appropriate also for sentences like Sie muß dumm sein (1989: 207), allegedly due to the emphasis placed on the modal. It is hard to understand that in this case the utterance, whatever the underlying evidence, forces speaker and listener to acknowledge the truth of the infinitival proposition, or that the truth follows logically in a more decisive sense than in that of the captain's conclusion. What the major does, is propose another (logically derived) possibility as to the whereabouts of the missing soldier. At this point I think it advisable to conclude that the phrase Das muß nicht/braucht nicht stimmen is not properly translatable as: 'That doesn't follow logically,' but rather as: 'That isn't necessarily so.' Many examples of this meaning correspondence are to be found in German translations of American texts. The two English utterances just cited are indubitably

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pragmatically different. The former is usually heard (read) only in scientific argumentation, the latter represents normal conversation. The dialogue just recorded evinces one of the two principal modes of nm and nb usage, one may speak of duophrastic ( = involving two speakers), as in the case just cited, and monophrastic use, as in the example: (25)

Das kann Zufall sein, muß aber nicht! (Braunburg 1982: 91)

The first part of the duophrastic type may consist of any kind of modalized statements, assertive as well as hypothetic, in our Kirst example modalized by müssen·, One may formalize: m : nm (the colon marks the border between first and second dialogue participant). The monophrastic type, on the other hand, only very rarely deviates from the formula kfönnen], nm/nb, e.g.: (26)

Herr von Studmann murmelt etwas, es kann eine Antwort sein, es braucht aber keine zu sein (Fallada 1970: 417)

Both formulas may be said to underlie more extended patterns like: (trigger-phrase +/- modal :) k, nm/nb, k (the final k serves to emphasize the possibility): (27)

... und hinter jeder Fensterscheibe konnte ein Vorgesetzter stehen — es mußte nicht sein, aber es konnte doch sein! (Kirst 1970: 20)

and (trigger-phrase +/— modal :) nmlnb, k, nm/nb: (28)

Die beiden Vasen sind bestes Delft ... der Breugel muß nicht unbedingt ein Original sein — kann - aber muß nicht ... (Arnau 1961: 44)

Textlinguistically, the nw/«6-patterns are regularly nonfirst structures, and from that point of view one could well hold that their classification as mono- and duophrastic constructions is artificial. There always has to be something that triggers an nm/nb-phrase. This textual restriction stands in contradistinction to sentences like Emil muß krank gewesen sein, which may, and often do, appear at the very beginning of a text or a paragraph. The nm/nb-phrases in all cases observed entail reaction to a previous assumption or conclusion by the speaker, or to something said

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by his partner, or assumed by the speaker to be in the mind of the latter. And the thing reacted to is, to the speaker, of a basically nonconclusive or hypothetical nature. In a novel by Döblin a good example of the monophrastic pattern is found: A person sees a man with a very red and swollen nose and, naturally, he draws the conclusion that the man must be a drunkard. But he quickly realizes that another thing could just as well be the cause. His thoughts are: (29)

... sone dicke, rote Neese, das braucht aber nicht vom Schnaps zu sein, das ist kalt heute; ... (Döblin 1974: 140)

One may construct sort of an explicit, logically structured sequence of underlying thoughts: Der hat aber eine dicke, rote Nase; er muß viel Schnaps getrunken haben. Er kann, aber muß nicht. Es kann sein, daß die Kälte die Ursache ist für die geschwollene dicke Nase. One may formalize this monophrastic sequence in this way: m, k, nm, k. A basically duophrastic sequence may so to speak drop the firstphrase modal and change into a monophrastic one, thus, e.g., m : (k), nm, (k) —