Mind and Politics: An Approach to the Meaning of Liberal and Socialist Individualism 9780520020290, 0520020294

Citation preview

Mind and politics An approach to the meaning o f liberal and socialist individualism

by Ellen Meiksins Wood

U niversity of California Press Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: 1972

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University o f California Press, L td . L ondon, England C opyright © 1972 by T h e Regents of the University o f California ISB N : 0-520-02029-4 Library of Congress Catalog Card N um ber: 74-153556 Designed by Theo J u n g P rinted in the U nited States of America

To my mother, Mischa, and Neal

Acknowledgments

I have tried my thoughts out on many people, notably my hus­ band, Neal, who as always has been very patient and very help­ ful, and my students, to whom I must render thanks and, no d o u b t, apologies. My particular gratitude goes to Professor R ichard Ashcraft of the D epartm ent of Political Science, U ni­ versity of California, Los Angeles, whose advice has been in­ valuable and many of whose insights, particularly in relation to J o h n Locke, I have quite shamelessly appropriated. Finally, I can n o t om it giving thanks to the typing pool at York U niver­ sity, T oronto, and to Mrs. R uth Griffin, of Glendon College, w ho performed miracles in helping me to meet various and su n d ry deadlines.

Contents

Introduction 1 1 The epistemological dimension: subject and object 19 T h e K antian revolution: the active m ind and dialectical empiricism T h e self-active subject becomes the free man 2 The psychological dim ension: self and other 47 Consciousness and the self Individuality and the ego 3 T h e anthropological dimension: man and society 74 T h e passage from nature to culture T h e nature of hum an sociality 4 T h e political dim ension: individual and polity 126 T he problem of "individualism ” “Civil society” and “hum an society” Conclusion 174 Index 187

M an is in die most literal sense of the word a zoon p o litiko n , not only a social anim al, b u t an anim al which can develop into an individual only in society. Karl

M arx

A C ontribution to the C ritique o f Political Econom y

An artificially induced uniform ity of thought and sentim ent is a symptom o f an in n er void . . . T h e “jo in in g ” h a b it of the average A m erican, and his excessive sociability, may well have an explanation like that of co n fo rm ity .. . . W e should n o t be so averse to solitude if we had, w hen we were alone, the com panionship of com m unal thought b u ilt into o u r m ental habits. In the absence of this com m union, there is th e need for reinforcem ent by external contact. O u r sociability ¡s') largely an effort to find substitutes for th at norm al conscious­ ness of connection and unio n th a t proceeds from being a sustained and sustaining m em ber of a social whole. T h e h ab it of opposing the corporate and collective to the individual tends to the persistent co ntinuation of the con­ fusion and uncertainty. I t distracts atten tio n from the crucial issue: How shall the individual refind him self in an unprecedentedly new social situation, an d w hat qualities will th e new individualism exhibit? I am not anxious to depict the form which this em ergent individualism w ill assume. Indeed I do n o t see how it can be described u n til m ore progress has been m ade in its produc­ tion. But such progress will n o t be in itiated u n til we cease opposing the socially corporate to the individual. . . . T h e greatest obstacle to th a t vision is, I repeat, the p erp etu atio n of the older individualism now reduced, as I have said, to . . . private pecuniary gain. J ohn

D ewey

Individualism O ld and N ew

Introduction

M an ’s speculations about the world began, it is often said, w ith an interpretation of nature in terms of society, and his earliest attem pts to com prehend the world philosophically may have been based on principles derived from social and political order. T here have also been suggestions that one sign of a cul­ tu re ’s intellectual m aturity is its conceptual separation of the n atu ral and social realms; and yet, it is tem pting to see, even in th e most refined philosophical systems, traces of their political parentage. Certainly, it can be m aintained that W estern phi­ losophy was born in the political experience of ancient Greece; a n d the three philosophers w ith whom the blossoming of the W estern tradition is most often associated—Socrates, Plato, and A ristotle—were, if not always politically motivated, at least always profoundly conscious of the political m eaning inherent in every aspect of their thought—not simply their explicitly political or ethical doctrines, b u t their theories on the nature of the cosmos, or on the nature of hum an knowledge. T he con­ nection between the structure of the cosmos and the organiza­ tio n of the political order in the ideas of both Plato and Aris­ totle seems clear enough;1 and in the disputes of Socrates and P lato w ith the Sophists about the nature of tru th and know l­ edge, one cannot fail to recognize a hierarchical conception of i O ne commentator has w ritten, for example: “Aristotle wants to show that th e Greek city, oligarchical and solidly structured along hierarchical lines, is just because it is constructed in the image of nature. Obviously, this im ­ plies that he must have begun to construct nature in the image of the city, . . . and it is by no means easy to distinguish historically what in the politics stems from the science and w hat in the science stems from the politics/' R. Lenoble, “Origine« de la pensée scientifìque moderne/* in Histoire de la science (Paris, 1957), p. 391, quoted in Paolo Rossi, Philosophy, Technology and the Arts in the Early Modern Era (New York: H arper & Row, 1970), p. 14.

1

2

Introduction

society doing battle with the heritage of Periclean democracy. It is beyond the scope of this essay to prove that similarly political m otivations have affected the course of W estern phi­ losophy in more recent times, or to determ ine—if it is even pos­ sible to do so—w hat came first in any philosophical system. T h e task here is simply to indicate some affinities, specifically be­ tween certain theories of cognition and certain social and politi­ cal doctrines; and for the sake of simplicity, w ithout asking if the order of presentation reflects or reverses the actual progress of thought in the philosophical systems being examined, the discussion will begin w ith the cognitive theories and build upon them to the political doctrines. Nevertheless, it may be worth keeping in m ind the possibility that sometimes affinities between these different aspects of philosophy may exist precisely because of a tendency—particularly on the part of a supremely political anim al like, say, Jo h n Locke—to read political life into all ex­ perience.2 In any case, w ithout pursuing these suggestions any further or making too many claims for the political m eaning of all phi­ losophy, it can certainly be said that whatever its source or m otivation every conception of m an’s nature, w hether scientific, philosophical, or simply grounded in common sense, has at least potential practical, moral, or even political significance. C on­ cepts of hum an nature may serve to m ark the prudential bound»

2 At any rate, one is tem pted to suggest that epistemological disputes some­ times revolve around propositions that seem unintelligible, or a t best for­ malistic and scholastic, u n til they are understood to have some other m ean­ ing or intention, w hether political or otherwise—that is, until they are read as something more than propositions about the nature of cognition. W hat, for example, does it mean to say that experience is in principle not neces­ sary in the formation of ideas, that experience is simply the “occasion” not the cause of ideas? Such a proposition in the case of Descartes (to use an obvious example) m ight be as much theological as epistemological. It is by form ulating his theory of the origin of ideas in a particular way that Des­ cartes is able to make certain statements about the existence of God, who, in the absence of a direct relationship between ideas and the world of experience, becomes the cause of the correspondence between ideas and external reality.

Introduction

3

aries of hum an action. Sometimes they may be used as negative standards, dismal portraits of w hat must be overcome to achieve the morally good life; or they may represent positive moral norms in conjunction w ith the principle that what is “n a tu ra l” is “good.” Certainly, a conscious or unconscious conception of hum an nature underlies every choice of social or political val­ ues; and there is a common tendency to justify political, social, or economic systems in terms of their supposed conformity to h u ­ man nature, or to condem n others because of their alleged vio­ lations of hum an nature, their “alienation of m an from him ­ self.” Moreover, social and political systems tend to institution­ alize certain conceptions of m an by favoring, rewarding, or placing a prem ium on certain exemplary hum an types. Indeed, images of man can be self-fulfilling prophecies. T here is nothing unusual, or even particularly controversial, about the observa­ tion that people often tend to behave in accordance w ith the perceptions others have of them. Psychologists, for example, are not infrequently confronted with an inclination on the p art of their subjects to adjust their behavior to patterns called for by clinical symptomatology. It may not be so farfetched to imagine, then, that such adjustm ents take place on a higher, historical plane and that “hum an n atu re” may obligingly accommodate itself to the diagnoses of a society’s most influential thinkers. In any case, there comes a point at which analysis of a concep­ tion of man ceases to be an em pirical problem, a question of the scientific accuracy o r viability of that conception, and be­ comes a practical or even political question. In a sense, it can be argued that ultim ately no theory of hum an nature is empirically verifiable. In the final analysis, w hether we approach the prob­ lem from the point of view of scientific psychology or philo­ sophical anthropology, we are left with our own perceptions, o u r own introspection, o u r own experience of ourselves through w hich we must interpret our data. Any theory of hum an nature m ust in the end be broken down to an irreducible and unverifiable elem ent of self-experience. Sometimes the demands of sci­

4

Introduction

entific or linguistic rigor may seem to force us to describe man in a way which ru n s counter to our subjective experience of ourselves. But it can be argued that such descriptions rem ain unintelligible until a m eaning derived lrom self-experience is reintroduced. A t any rate, provided there is sufficient “objec­ tive” evidence to support the possibility of various conceptions of man, there is, in the end, little basis for choosing among them. Aside from empirical verifiability, we have no criterion but our own self-experience or—and this is the crucial point here—the practical and moral consequences of adherence to a particular concept of m an. From this point of view, then, we may, after exhausting all “scientific” evidence available to us at any given time, find it appropriate to judge theories of m an practically and morally. In other words, it may be useful to ask not only “W hat em pirical evidence is there for this theory of m an?” but also “W hat m ight it m ean to act on this image of man?” T his practical dim ension is perhaps more apparent in whai we may call the conative aspects of conceptions of m an—those which concern hum an will, desires, passions—than it is in the cognitive aspects—those which embrace epistemology and con­ ceptions of the mind. Nevertheless, it is the fundam ental premise of this study that m oral and even political im plications can be draw n from epistemological theories and their underlying con­ ceptions of the m ind; that sometimes, in fact, the ultim ate m eaning of a theory of m ind may be seen as a moral or political one; and that sometimes epistemology may, so to speak, be read as political theory. Again, sometimes theories of epistemology and conceptions of the m ind may seem to establish the ground­ work for m oral and political doctrines; at times, theories of mind and epistemology seem instead to be derived from moral or political doctrines. But whichever comes first, the affinities between theories of m ind and political doctrines are often strik­ ing, and an exam ination of those affinities between two perhaps seemingly unrelated kinds of theory may shed light on the meaning of both.

Introduction

5

O u r concern here will be with some social and political im pli­ cations of the K antian theory of m ind, according to which the subject plays a positive, in a sense self-active and spontaneously creative, role in the constitution of experience; and the opposi­ tion of this theory to Lockean empiricism, in which the subject is seen as essentially receptive, reflexive, and responsive—passive in the sense that it does not play an active role in the constitution of experience. T he link between these theories and political doctrine will be sought particularly in their common concern w ith the problem of hum an individuality. Perhaps the most basic questions which m ust be confronted by social and political thinkers in some way concern the nature of m an’s individuality and his sociality, and the relationship between the two. I t is strange, therefore, th at analyses of social and political thought generally confine themselves to the conative aspects of hum an n atu re as they bear upon the questions of individuality and sociality, virtually ignoring the im portance that a theorist’s view of cognition and the cognitive dim ension of the self and indi­ viduality may have for social doctrine. We have begun, then, by opposing the “K antian” approach to empiricism; nevertheless, such an opposition may be mislead­ ing. Kant certainly did not see his doctrine as diam etrically opposed to philosophical empiricism. If anything, he considered him self an heir to the empiricists, proceeding from their legacy in an attem pt to correct its deficiencies. It is true that in certain respects Kant may be said to have sought a synthesis of rational­ ism and empiricism, b u t it is perhaps more accurate to say that K a n t’s epistemology was m eant as a correction of empiricism— a correction that preserved many of the latter’s fundam ental principles.8 In other words, the opposition between the episte3 Notably, the principle th at there are no ideas where there is no sense experience, and that experience is the cause and the subject m atter of ideas, n o t simply the occasion—if anything—of ideas, as it is in a sense for the rationalists. Also, see below, pp. 19-20, for Hegel's account of what Kant shares with the Lockean empiricists.

6

Introduction

mology of K ant and, for example, that of Locke is perhaps an opposition between two kinds of empiricism. T h e essential char­ acter of K antian “em piricism ” and its opposition to Lockean epistemology will be discussed particularly in chapter 1 of this essay, and the im plications of these epistemological differences will be developed in subsequent chapters. T h e significant p o in t here is that the distinction between these two "empiricism s” can be carried into the realm of social and political thought. Specifically, this distinction has a bearing on the notion of individualism , which will be our prim ary con­ cern in this study. O ne cannot help being struck, for example, by the coincidence th at the British intellectual tradition that contributed so m uch to the so-called philosophy of individual­ ism should also have fostered the philosophy of empiricism, or by the fact that Jo h n Locke, the high priest of empiricism, should also be regarded as a founding father of liberal individ­ ualism. Moreover, it is being suggested that, if we can speak of two opposing varieties of empiricism, one exemplified by Locke and his philosophical approach and the other by the K antian “revolution,” an analogous opposition can be found between two modes of individualism ; in other words, there is one mode of individualism related to the K antian approach and another related to the Lockean position. T here is a tendency to apply the term “individualism ” rather narrowly to the social doctrine associated w ith liberal demo­ cratic philosophy. In common usage, w hat purports to be a purely formal objective definition of the term nevertheless se­ cretes certain doctrinal assumptions about the nature of man and society. A num ber of assumptions are compactly packaged, for example, in the dictionary’s opposition of “individualism ” to “collectivism,” “socialism,” etc. Such a definitional antagonism is not justified unless one proceeds from certain liberal prem ­ ises. If individualism as a social doctrine involves a com m itm ent to the moral primacy of the individual in society and the right of the individual to freedom and self-realization, a host of addi­

Introduction

7

tional assumptions m ust be made about man and his relation­ ship to society before “individualism ,” individual freedom, and self-realization can be m ade by definition to exclude “social­ ism” and “collectivism.” In short, the m eaning of “individual­ ism ” depends on one’s conception of the nature of individuality. We have suggested, then, that there are doctrines of individu­ alism which are opposed to Lockean individualism in much the same way that K antian epistemology is opposed to Lockean empiricism. If this analogy is pursued, insofar as the nonLockean individualism may encompass “socialism,” it can be said that socialism is not the diam etric opposite of individualism any more than K antian epistemology is the opposite of em piri­ cism. T h e suggestion th at K antian epistemology and the “new ” individualism are related is not simply derived by analogy from the relationship between Lockean empiricism and liberal indi­ vidualism .4 T h e connection between the K antian epistemology and socialist individualism may not be as im mediate as th at be­ tween empiricism and liberal individualism ; or at any rate, in the form er the union is n o t so clearly represented in the person of one thinker, as it is in the case of Locke. Nevertheless, it can be argued that socialist individualism , particularly as it is elabo­ rated by Marx, is in a very fundam ental sense grounded in or supported by the K antian philosophical revolution and that M arx derives certain im portant aspects of his critique of liberal­ ism from principles traceable to the K antian critique of em piric cal epistemology. These connections between theories of m ind and social doc­ trines have a num ber of aspects, which will be discussed in w hat 4 If Lockean empiricism can, in a sense, be regarded as an "individualistic" epistemology—because of its subjectivism, for example—Kantian episte­ mology can perhaps be regarded as the ultim ate in individualism in a somewhat different sense. See, for example, Georg Simmel’s observation that in K ant’s philosophy . . the ego has wrested its absolute sovereignty. . . , It stands so much on itself alone that even its world, tlte world, can stand on i t ”: T he Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans. and ed. Kurt Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 70.

8

Introduction

follows. We can, however, establish a general conceptual frame­ work at the outset by referring to w hat m ight be called the structural connections between the theories being discussed. One m ight begin by saying that, in the two cases under scrutiny, each epistemological theory is united to a social theory, not simply by inference, by analogy, or by a concept of man, but by funda­ m ental formal or structural similarities. In other words, they are united by a comm on mode of thought. T he K antian and Lockean philosophical approaches may be looked upon as rep­ resenting different modes of thought—or what m ight be called systems or structures of thought—which have im plications for, and manifestations in, a variety of problems which may on the surface seem otherwise unrelated. T here are often cases in which a particular mode of thought, a certain form, a system of logic, can be seen as a distinctively characteristic common denom ina­ tor between, for example, certain scientific theories, on the one hand, and certain philosophical systems, on the other; and this common denom inator, this structural similarity, allows one to classify the theories together as representing a single “approach” o r “pattern.” And for our system of classification perhaps we \ can adopt in a rather simplified form the Marxist distinction, ’ derived from Hegel, between “metaphysical” and “dialectical” modes of thought.5 For our present purpose, we may use Friedrich Engels’ charac­ terization of the two modes of thought, w ith the admission that his presentation of the dialectic is rather superficial and fails to do justice to the philosophical m eaning which the concept has for Hegel and even for Marx. If Engels’ account is simplistic, it is nonetheless useful here where our intention is simply to out­ line certain obvious differences in typical patterns of thinking: 5 Hegel distinguishes—for example in the introduction to his Logic—be­ tween the dialectic and the “older metaphysic.” T h e Marxists—M arx and Engels, later Plekhanov, etc.—refer to the non-dialectical mode of thought simply as the metaphysical mode. For the sake of convenience, the latter designation is being adopted here. T he special use of the term “m etaphysi­ cal” will not, I hope, create confusion.

Introduction

9

T o the m etaphysician, things and their m ental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one alter the o th er and ap art from each odier, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. H e thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. “H is com m unica­ tio n is ‘yea, yea; nay, nay’; for whatsoever is m ore than these cometli o f evil." For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can­ n o t at the same time be itself and som ething else. Positive and nega­ tive absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in rigid antithesis one to the other. . . . A nd the m etaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and neces­ sary as it is in a n u m b er of dom ains . . . sooner or later reaches a lim it, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contem plation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them ; in the contem plation of th e ir existence it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of th e ir repose, it forgets th e ir m otion. It cannot see the wood for die trees. . . . [But] every organic being is every m om ent the same a n d not th e same . . . every organic being is always itself, and yet som ething o th e r than itself. F urther, we find upon closer investigation th at the two poles of an antithesis, positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and th a t despite all their opposition, they m utually in te r­ pen etrate. . . . N one of these processes and modes of thought enters in to the fram ework of m etaphysical reasoning. Dialectics, on the o th er h an d , com prehends things an d their representations, ideas, in th eir es­ sential connection, concatenation, m otion, origin, and ending.6

Engels associates the metaphysical mode of thought with the grow th of em pirical science, and then, significantly, argues that “ this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philisophy.”7 Moreover, he goes on to suggest that, at least as far as natural science is concerned, K an t’s theory of the solar system marks a crucial breakthrough in the developm ent of dialectics.8 It can even be argued, as we 6 Friedrich Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works (Moscow: Foreign language Publishing House, 1962), pp. 130-131. 7 Ibid., p. 130. 8 See, e.g., Ibid., p. 132.

10

Introduction

shall see, that it is not simply K ant’s scientific thought but his philosophical system as a whole, notably his epistemology, that introduces the dialectic into the “new G erm an philosophy.” In fact, it may be suggested that the opposition between the “K ant­ ian ” and the “Lockean” approaches corresponds essentially to the Hegelian and M arxist distinction. T his would m ean that we can speak of Lockean empiricism as “m etaphysical” em piri­ cism (remembering that the term “metaphysical” is being used in a special sense), while the K antian brand of empiricism might be called “dialectical.” And, in accordance w ith our fun­ dam ental premise th at there is a connection between these epistemological theories and certain social doctrines, perhaps we can also speak of metaphysical and dialectical individualisms. T hus, for example, if the fundam ental characteristics of the dialectical mode of thought are its tendency to reunite rather than simply to separate, to see things in dynamic interaction, to synthesize rather th an simply to compare, particularly to unite and synthesize opposites, and, finally, to see things in process rather than static rigidity, we shall see how these qualities are reflected in K antian epistemology, in its attem pt dialectically to unite subject and object. Moreover, it is not difficult to foresee what a dialectical theory of individualism m ight be. It m ight, to begin with, take a characteristic view of the relationship be­ tween those “antithetical” opposites, individual and society. As we shall see, for example, the dialectical approach, unlike the metaphysical, emphasizes the dynamic unity, the reciprocity, of individual and society, the ways in which individuality and sociality are m utually reinforcing rather than antagonistic. It also conceives of individuality and sociality as evolving through a dialectical interaction in which the nature of self-consciousness and the sense of com m unity develop and m utually change each other in a dynamic process. In any case, the discussion that fol­ lows will attem pt to show how dialectical individualism reflects both the union of opposites and the dynamic characteristics of the dialectical mode of thought, while metaphysical individual­

Introduction

11

ism, in the form of liberalism, m aintains the antagonism of opposites and their static rigidity. Given this general “structural” framework, we can now p ro ­ ceed to a more specific outline of the argum ent being presented in this essay. 1. T h e controversy between K ant and the empiricists revolves around the role of the subject in experience—i.e. around the subject-object relation and the question of the inde­ pendence or “concreteness” of thought and reason. 2. Conceptions of the role of the subject and of the subjectobject relation have im plications for conceptions of the nature of consciousness and the self, and the relation of self to other—to the external world and other men. 3. T hese conceptions of the self have a two fold significance for the present argum ent: i) In their ideas on the relation between the self and the external world in general, they suggest som ething about the n atu re of individuality and the freedom of the individual. ii) In their ideas on the relation between the self and other men specifically, they suggest something about the rela­ tion between the individual and society, individuality and sociality, som ething about community. 4. Needless to say, ideas on the nature of individuality and sociality, liberty and community, will be reflected in con­ ceptions of m an’s relation to objective social conditions, and, in particular, the individual’s relation to specific social institutions: governm ent, property, etc. I n short, two of the most fundam ental political concepts— lib e r ty and com m unity—can be regarded as two aspects of the self’s relation to other. In other words, a conception of the self ( a n d hence, ultim ately, a theory of mind) is an im plicit unifying f a c to r in political theory—uniting two of its most essential ques­ tio n s ; an d liberty and com m unity are two sides of the same coin.

12

Introduction

I would argue, then, that certain theories of m ind and the con­ ceptions of the self they imply tend to encourage or support cer­ tain social and political ideas. T o emphasize the connections being suggested here, it may be worth m entioning, in a rather lengthy digression, that the logical associations are at least sufficiently strong actually to have caused a good deal of intellectual uneasiness in the minds of certain thinkers who found themselves holding certain views on the nature of m ind and the self, on the one hand, and appar­ ently conflicting social ideas, on the other. David H um e and J. S. Mill are two striking examples. T he problem of the self was an insoluble one for both H um e and Mill, and one which attacked the very foundations of their philosophies. In both instances, the problem is one of reconcil­ ing a conception of the m ind and the self as simply a “series of feelings, or possibilities of them ,” w ith the more definite, inde­ pendent conception of the self dem anded by some of their ap­ parently most cherished principles. H um e in effect adm its that his conception of the self cannot sustain his conception of sym­ pathy, the source of community; Mill, that his idea of the self cannot sustain his ideas of individuality and liberty. T hese ideas of liberty and comm unity seem to be a fundam ental source of friction, both w ithin these philosophers’ own systems, and often between them and the ideas of their liberal colleagues and predecessors. T h e discussion of H um e that appears in chapter 2, for ex­ ample, cites his attack on Hobbes and Locke for their concep­ tions of sociality. H um e begins by following Locke’s conception of the self to its logical conclusion, b u t soon finds th at it con­ flicts with his own conception of sympathy. Finally, unable to find a more satisfactory explanation of the self consistent with his philosophical principles, b u t still unw illing to sacrifice his idea of sympathy, he simply adm its his confusion and throws up his hands.

Introduction

13

T he case w ith Mill, which is also discussed in w hat follows, is strikingly similar. It is precisely his conception of individuality and liberty—considered to be his prim ary innovative contribu­ tion to liberalism—th at comes into conflict w ith the rest of his own philosophical system, in which he remains more true to his predecessors. T o quote from R. Anschutz’s respected work on Mill, in which he discusses M ill’s consternation over the difficul­ ties posed by the only theory of M ind and Ego that is com patible w ith his basic philosophical position: In o th er words, M ill is unable to make anything of the notion of a know ing subject in associationist terms and he is unw illing to try and make anything of it in any o ther terms. It is hard to im agine a more candid confession o f intellectual bankruptcy; and die conscquences of M ill’s failure in this case are fully as serious as they were in the previous case [i.e., in the case of M ill’s account of the objec­ tive world. E.W.] For w hen we tu rn from speculation to practise, the problem of reconciling flux and perm anence in the know ing subject re-emerges as the problem of reconciling determ inism and free will in the m oral agent; and this is a problem , as M ill h a d al­ ready discovered, which is capable of preying on the m ind.9

In any case, we may think in terms of two model social theo­ ries or two traditions, each characterized prim arily by a particu­ lar conception of the self-other relationship in both its aspects— that is, particular conceptions of liberty and com m unity. T h e model of liberalism is characterized by a conception of liberty in which hum an freedom is not incom patible with subjection even to objective forces external to the individual; and a con­ ception of com m unity as externalized, perhaps enforced co­ existence, assuming atomistic relationships among individuals and, insofar as individuality tends to be equated with atomism and privatization, an essential antagonism between individu­ ality and sociality. T h e contrasting “K antian” model is charac­ terized by a conception of freedom as self-activity, autonom y, 9 R. Anschutz, The Philosophy of J. S. M ill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), pp. 179-180.

14

Introduction

and transcendence of objective determ ination;10 and a concep­ tion of com m unity as an integral part of the hum an psyche, united in consciousness w ith individuality, so that sociality and individuality—which here does not simply mean atomism or pri­ vatization, but the impulse toward self-activity, creativity, and self-development—are not antagonistic but m utually sup­ portive.11 Needless to say, each model will be exemplified by a variety of thinkers whose systems of ideas are not identical to one an­ other. For example, the liberal model or tradition, anticipated by Hobbes, includes Locke, Madison, Bentham, and J. S. Mill. T h e other group, which is anticipated by Rousseau and in­ cludes Kant, Hegel, and Marx, is even more com plicated.12 Since the pivotal point of this essay is the K antian revolution, we must concern ourselves w ith the “ K antian” model less as the repre­ sentation of a unified and complete school than as a unified abstraction from a revolutionary process, in reaction to the lib­ eral tradition—a process that, in an im portant sense, begins with K ant’s epistemology and culm inates in M arx's social theory, proceeding by means of successive adjustm ents to an initial rev­ olutionary break.18 10 T he difference between these two conceptions of freedom is perhaps the difference between naturalistic conceptions of man and the conception of man reflected, for example, in Sartre’s observation, “W hat we call freedom is the irreducibility of the cultural order to the natural order”: Search for a M ethod, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 152. 11 T his distinction between a conception of community as enforced co-existence and a more "integrative” conception of community is reflected in the liberal fascination with punishm ent and with law and order, in con­ trast to an opposing view which places less emphasis on violence than on “creative space.” 12 Others have sometimes been included, although rather tangentially, for purposes of illustration. Jean Piaget, for example, while he certainly has an elaborate theory of m ind, does not explicitly develop a political theory. Nevertheless, his explicit conviction that the natural tendency of the healthy individual, if allowed to m ature and develop fully, is toward a desire for equality, autonomy, cooperation, and solidarity with his fellow-men, rather than inequality, heteronomy, competition, and egoism, has some tantalizing implications for political theory, if followed to its logical conclusion. 13 T o be perfectly accurate, the object here is not so much to trace the in-

Introduction

15

At any rate, as diverse as the thinkers in each group may be, to class them together in this instance seems no less legitimate than in any other instance where thinkers are “lum ped together” in either a “school” or a “tradition.” T o the extent that any school or tradition includes more than one creative thinker, it cannot, of course, be m onolithic. T h e m ark of a tradition is surely not identity am ong its members. Instead, aside from the kinds of “structural” similarities discussed earlier, we tend to bind thinkers together on the basis of a few essential shared assumptions which are so central that the similarities among the thinkers may be regarded as more fundam ental than the dif­ ferences. For example, as has been suggested, the frame of refer­ ence in the present discussion is the view that the most salient and far-reaching characteristic of liberalism is its conception of liberty and community; and that all the thinkers here designated as liberals, whatever their specific differences, share these funda­ m ental assumptions about the nature of liberty and community, a fact that places very definite lim itations on their specific dif­ ferences as well. By the same token, the K antian tradition is united by its opposition to the fundam ental assumptions upon which these liberal principles are based. A more difficult problem is posed by the fact that our “m od­ els” unite theories of m ind w ith social and political theories. T his means that the models dem and a congruity, perhaps even a logical connection, between sets of ideas that are often at best only unconsciously connected in the m ind of a given thinker. Perhaps, therefore, it would be useful to emphasize th at this essay is seeking to construct something like “ideal types” or

fluence of Kant himself as to discuss the significance of a particular theory of mind which is most commonly associated with him. T h at theory of mind may have been held, and may still be held, by people not influenced by Kant himself, but he is certainly the thinker who is credited with its first system­ atic elaboration. It seems no less meaningful, then, to designate a certain development in theories of m ind as “ Kantian” than it is to refer to certain scientific theories as “Newtonian,” despite the fact that there may have been scientists who arrived at "Newtonian” insights independently of Newton.

16

Introduction

“typological simplifications,” which, for purposes of analysis, abstract an integrated, coherent order from the ideas of a num ­ ber of thinkers who may not themselves have been conscious of such integration, or may not have clearly form ulated the im pli­ cations of their ideas in such a way as to unite them into a co­ herent system. I t is assumed that the construction of such ana­ lytical devices is justified, first of all, on the simple grounds that comprehension alm ost invariably demands an assumption of understandable order. It is in itself significant and illum inating th at the m aterial lends itself to the im position of coherent order by an external observer. I t is obviously more significant if there is some indication th at the order is not simply a subjective con­ struct imposed by the observer, th at the compulsion toward unity and coherence among sets of ideas about different prob­ lems is operative w ithin the presumed “tradition” itself. In other words, the use of such typological constructs is particularly useful if the deviations from the model which actually occur in concrete cases are, in some sense, “objectively” m eaningful. In the present instance, the construction of types seems especially justified, since in those cases where a particular thinker deviates significantly from an ascribed pattern the deviation is objec­ tively meaningful, either in the sense that the thinker himself seems to have felt an imbalance in his system, or in the sense th at the deviation is of such a nature that it has triggered a revolution in thought, a “paradigm change,” carrying in its wake a series of profound readjustm ents among various sets of ideas. In other words, in the latter case, a deviation in one elem ent of our pat­ tern seems to have called for, in the minds of im mediately suc­ ceeding thinkers, a change in the total pattern to restore the bal­ ance. If such a relationship, such a compulsion toward balance, consistency, or coherence, seems to exist among sets of ideas about different kinds of problems—for example, between theo­ ries of m ind and social theories—it seems helpful to think of them as united into a thought pattern or type, w hether or not any given thinker reflects the pattern perfectly and consciously.

Introduction

17

Here, then, is how the discussion proceeds chapter by chapter. T h e first chapter begins with a brief discussion of the K antian “revolution” and its im plications for the concept of mind. T h e central point here is K ant’s attribution of a positive, as it were self-active or original, role to the subject in the constitution of exj>erience and the im plications this has for the subject-object relation, the dialectical mode of thought, and the concept of freedom. In chapter 2, the subject-object problem becomes the selfother problem. In other words, the theory of m ind and the subject-object dichotomy is pursued to its im plications for the idea of consciousness and the self, the process of individuation, the nature of individuality and its relationship to sociality in the developm ent of individual men. Again throughout the dis­ cussion an attem pt is m ade to contrast the “K antian” approach to these problems with the Lockean-empiricist approach. C hapter 3 proceeds from this exam ination of the growth of individuality in individual men to an exam ination of an analogous developm ent in the history of m ankind as a whole. In other words, just as chapter 2 deals with the psychological dim ension of individuality, chapter 3 discusses the an th ro ­ pological dim ension—the process of individuation in the passage from nature to culture. T h is discussion then is followed by an analysis of the nature of hum an sociality and its relationship to individuality and freedom as seen by certain thinkers who re­ flect the approaches being contrasted. C hapter 4, on the political dim ension of the problem, be­ gins w ith a few general remarks on the meaning of “individ­ ualism ” in terms of the different psychological and anthropo­ logical conceptions of individuality previously outlined. Finally, an attem pt is made to relate these contrasting concep­ tions of individuality and individualism to Karl M arx’s distinc­ tion—again inspired by Hegel—between "civil society” and “hum an society.” T his distinction, it is held, provides a useful conceptual framework for exemplifying the contrasting princi-

18

Introduction

pies of society th at m ight be based respectively on the two con­ trasting individualisms. In other words, “civil society” m ight be the society of metaphysical individualism; “hum an society,” that of dialectical individualism. A few concluding remarks will be devoted to the suggestion that modern behavioral political science in many fundam ental ways follows in the tradition of the “metaphysical” approach as here outlined. In a sense, this suggestion constitutes a plea for the elaboration in m odern political theory of a new “antimetaphysical” approach, as in some ways is already true in other social sciences. One final introductory word. It has already been pointed out that the two “traditions” under discussion are not diam etrically opposed, indeed are in many ways less two traditions than two aspects of a single one. T hey are both, after all, “individual­ isms.” T h e “socialist” mode owes a great deal to the “liberal” and shares many of its commitments. Only if one forgets this is it possible to regard a critique of liberalism, such as the one im ­ plicit in the present essay, as a betrayal of all the respect for free­ dom and individuality that liberalism is said to represent. T h e present critique is not m eant as a betrayal of these “liberal” values or of the adm irable political and legal tradition they re­ flect, but, on the contrary, simply as a rem inder that it is possible at least to conceive of an “individualism ”—perhaps one m ight even call it a “liberalism ” in a broader sense—that is somewhat more true to its commitments.

1. The Epistemological Dimension Subject and Object T h e true dialectic is n o t a m onologue of a solitary th in k er with himself; it is a dialogue between I and thou. L udwig

F euerbach

Principles of the Philosophy of the Future

T h e K antian R evolution: T he Active M ind and Dialectical Empiricism T h a t Kant marks a revolution in the history of philosophy seems to be generally recognized, but in w hat that revolution consists is often not so clear. It is well known th at K ant began w ith an attem pt to solve the problem bequeathed to him by H um e—the problem of the origin of our concept of cause and effect, given that it cannot be deduced from experience—and ended by concluding th a t this concept and, moreover, many other categories which are indispensable to thought “were not deduced from experience, as H um e had apprehended, b u t sprang from the pure understanding.”1 W hat, however, is the significance of this conclusion that the fundam ental categories of thought are supplied by the m ind a priori to experience? One of the most explicit interpretations of K ant’s contribution to the “new philosophy” comes from the greatest philosopher of the new tradition, Hegel. In his Lectures on the History of P hi­ losophy, Hegel summarizes the K antian breakthrough by point­ ing out that, although K ant proceeds from the empiricist tradi­ tion, in a sense sharing w ith philosophers like Locke and H um e the denial of universality and necessity in perception, he works a fundam ental change in that empiricist principle. W hile the 1 Im m anuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Paul Carus (La Salle, 111.: T h e Open Court Publishing Company, 1955), Kant’s In tro ­ duction, p. 7.

19

20

T he epistemological dimension

empiricists attack the universality and necessity of the categories in general, K ant merely argues against th eir objectivity in so far as they are present in external things themselves, while m ain tain in g them to be objective in the sense of holding good as universal and necessary, as they do for instance in m athem atics and n atu ral science. . . . But if universality and necessity do not exist in external things, the ques­ tion arises “W here are they to be found?” T o this K ant, as against Hum e, m aintains th a t they m ust be a priori, i.e., that they m ust rest on reason itself, a n d on thought as self-conscious reason: th e ir source is the subject, " I” in my self-consciousness. T his, simply expressed, is the m ain p oint in the K antian philosophy.2

T he K antian revolution has a num ber of profound im plica­ tions which may not be apparent at first glance. T h e most obvi­ ous, as im portant as it may be, is perhaps not the most signifi­ cant, as Hegel’s subsequent discussion reveals. It is undoubtedly significant that Kant, while retaining the empiricist emphasis on the subject, the self, the individual, replaces the solipsism— the radical individualism , if you will—that he seems to feel is inherent in em piricist epistemology, w ith a kind of universifiable, “objective” subjectivity. But the subject undergoes other and even more fundam ental transformations. T he fact that the subject in effect constitutes, creates, “legislates,” objectivity not only implies a different meaning for subjectivity and objectivity; it also reflects a different conception of the role of the subject in experience. K ant’s subject no longer has simply the passive, re­ sponsive, reflexive role inherent in the empiricist concept of mind. T h e m ind is conceived by Kant as self-active, in a sense autonom ous; the subject is a positive, creative participant in the construction of experience. Passive reflections and associations are replaced by active synthesis. As Hegel says; Kant considers thought as in great m easure a synthetic activity. . . . Since K ant shows that thought has synthetic judgm ents a priori - G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), III, 427-428.

T h e epistemological dimension

21

which are not derived from perception he shows th a t thought is so to speak concrete in itself.3

T his distinction between the “active” m ind of K ant’s doctrine and the “passive” m ind of classical empiricism must be clarified, especially since the terms “active” and “passive” are often used somewhat indiscrim inately and not very consistently by the thinkers themselves in their own accounts of the m ind’s role in knowledge. In any case, some kind of “activity” at some stage in the process of knowing can be attributed to the m ind in any theory of knowledge. In this essay, however, the terms are being used in a rather specific sense. T h e reference here is to the na­ ture of experience itself and to the role of the subject in experi­ ence, not simply to w hat subsequently happens to the data of experience. In other words, the m ind is called active or passive according to its original role in the creation of the basic con­ stituents of knowledge. T h e point of empiricism is precisely that experience is, so to speak, given. Experience is the receiving of impressions involv­ ing the direct action of object on subject. T h e m ind may subse­ quently be “active” in comparing, combining, etc., the data of experience, but in its original relation to the m aterial of knowl­ edge, the subject is passive and receptive. Moreover, even the subsequent m ental activity whereby more complex ideas are formed from experience in a sense simply involves drawing out w hat is already given in the object (e.g. deriving ideas of space and time from a particular objective association or conjunction of certain sense impressions). T o quote Hegel on Locke: Locke, however, places the reality of the understanding only in the form al activity of constituting new determ inations from the sim ple conceptions received by means of perception, through th eir com parison and com bination of several into one; it is the ap p re­ hension of the abstract sensations w hidi are contained in the objects.4

3 Ibid., p. 4SO. * Ibid.

22

T he epistemological dimension

According to Locke, for example, the ideas of time and space are themselves derived from perception; they are, in essence, externally given and received as experience: I have showed above, chapter four, th at we get the idea of space, both by our sight and touch; which, I think, is so evident th at it w ould be as needless to go to prove th a t m en perceive, by th eir sight, a distance betw een bodies of different colours, or betw een the parts of the same body, as th a t they see colours themselves.5

In effect, the m ind derives general ideas of time and space from perceptions of particular time sequences or spatial rela­ tions. Hegel even argues that Locke’s form ulation is an empty tautology: “Since distance itself is really space, m ind thus deter­ mines space from space.”6 T h e K antian position is opposed to classical empiricism not because of the im portance the latter attaches to experience, b u t because of its conception of the nature of experience itself and the role of the subject in experience. In brief, the K antian argu­ m ent is that the subject is active in the constitution of experi­ ence itself. T he subject does not simply receive experience; it creates and constructs it. T h e “object” is not simply som ething that is independently given, a “prim ary datum ,” to be imposed on the subject as is; instead, "objectivity” is the product of the subject’s activity. K ant’s doctrine of the “active” m ind is reflected in his distinc­ tion between perception and experience. T h e form er involves simply passive reception by the senses; the latter, the objectifica­ 5 John Locke, An Essay Concerning H um an Understanding, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), I, 219 (Bk. II, chap. xiii, art. 2). H ereafter referred to as Essay. Hegel, op. cit., p. 306. Kant's conception is, of course, well known. T h e principles of time and space are not simply derived from experience. On the contrary, they are a priori contributions of the mind to experience. T h e mind constructs experience by applying a priori synthetic judgm ents to sense data. T o quote Hegel again: "Since Kant shows that thought has syn­ thetic judgments a priori which are not derived from perception, he shows that thought is so to speak concrete in itself” (ibid., p. 430). T h e synthetic activity of mind occurs, in other words, at the most elementary level of ex­ perience.

T he epistemological dimension

23

tion of perception through the synthetic, original activity of the understanding: W e m ust consequently analyse experience in o rder to see w hat is contained in this pro d u ct of the senses and of the understanding, and how the judgem ent of experience itself is possible___ Before, therefore, a judgem ent of perception can become a judge­ m ent of experience, it is requisite th at the perception should be subsumed under some such a (a priori) concept of the u n d erstan d ­ ing. . . . [K ant’s note: I add to the perception a concept of the u n ­ derstanding . . . and the synthetical judgem ent becomes of necessity universally valid, viz., objective, an d is converted from a perception into experience.]7

In another work, K ant expresses the same idea: Experience is an em pirical knowledge, th at is, a knowledge which determ ines an object through perceptions. It is a synthesis o f per­ ceptions, n ot contained in perception b u t itself containing in one consciousness the synthetic unity of the m anifold of perceptions. T h is synthetic unity constitutes the essential in any know ledge of objects of the senses, th a t is, in experience as distinguished from mere in tu itio n o r sensation of the senses.8

T hus, again, the object—the objectivity of perception, which is experience—is created by the subject, and not simply given. K ant clearly regards this idea as the crux of his opposition to the empiricists—that is, significantly, to both Locke and H um e. It is im portant to note, too, that, whatever the differences Kant may see between Locke and Hume, these differences do not lie in w hat he considers to be the most fundam ental principles of their conceptions of the m ind: T h e illustrious Locke, failing to take account of these considerations, and m eeting w ith p u re concepts of the understanding in experi­ ences, deduced them also from experience, an d yet proceeded so inconsequently th a t he a ttem p ted w ith th eir aid to obtain knowledge which far transcends all lim its of experience. David H um e recognizes that, in order to be able to do this, it was necessary th at these con­ 7 Kant, op. cit., pp. 57-59. 8 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1965), p. 209.

24

T he epistemological dimension

cepts sh o u ld have an a p rio ri orig in . B u t since h e could n o t ex p lain how it can b e possible th a t th e u n d e rs ta n d in g m u st th in k concepts, w hich are n o t in them selves co n n ected in th e u n d e rsta n d in g , as be­ in g necessarily co n n ected in th e object, a n d since it nev er o ccu rred to h im th a t th e u n d e rs ta n d in g m ig h t itself, p erh ap s, th ro u g h these concepts, be th e a u th o r of th e ex p erien ce in w hich its o bjects are found, h e was co n strain ed to derive th em from ex perience, nam ely, from a subjective necessity (th a t is, from custom ), w hich arises from rep e a te d association in ex perience, a n d w hich comes m istakenly to be reg ard ed as objectiv e.9

In short, the difference between H um e and Locke does not rest, according to Kant, on any fundam ental disagreement con­ cerning the nature of experience, the nature of objectivity, the original activity of m ind, or the role of the subject in the crea* tion of the constituents of knowledge. Instead, the difference is simply a result of Locke’s failure to see the ultim ate im plica­ tions of his own theory of m ind, while H um e confronts these implications. Since, however, H um e tries to deal w ith the im pli­ cations w ithout fundam entally altering the basic conception of mind, he is himself dissatisfied w ith the result. In assessing the significance of K ant’s doctrine and his objec­ tions to empiricism, it is interesting to note, to begin with, that his most influential successors—for example, Hegel and his heirs —have chosen to emphasize that aspect of K ant’s argum ent estab­ lishing the spontaneity, creativity, and freedom of reason, rather than to stress the rigidity and determ inism some may see in the notion of a priori categories.10 In K ant’s defense of the possi­ bility of synthetic a priori judgm ents and his contention that experience, the basic m aterial of knowledge, is not simply given but created, they have seen the “rescue of reason from the em­ pirical onslaught,”11 the restoration of reason as a free, creative force—in fact, an affirmation of hum an freedom and m an’s trans­ cendence. It seems clear, moreover, th at K ant himself believed » Ibid., p. 127. 10 See for example, pp. 45-44, below. 11 H erbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, 2nd ed. (New York: H um ani­ ties Press, 1954), p. 23.

T h e epistemological dimension

25

h e was establishing the spontaneous creativity of the m ind and in so doing affirming the possibility of hum an freedom and gen­ u in e moral choice. For him, understanding was the principle of spontaneity (the “determ inative”), while sensibility was the principle of receptivity the (“determ ined”): “. . . synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determ inative and not, like sense, determ inable merely. . . .” 12 Moreover, this original “ spontaneity” is the basis of all subsequent expressions of such freedom: T h is synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility, and is its first app licatio n —and thereby the gro u n d of all its other applications—to the objects of ou r possible in tu itio n .13

T here is, however, m ore to K ant’s revision of em pirical epistemology and its im plications for the problem of freedom. In his discussion of freedom, K ant makes it quite clear that for him the question is not simply one of transferring causality from a source external to the individual to an internal source, nor is it even simply a m atter of rational causes prevailing over other internal, nonrational impulses. An im m ediate internal cause, w hether rational or instinctual, may still be part of an endless causal chain and still be determ ined by antecedent causes, while freedom dem ands spontaneity, or “causality through freedom ,” the beginning of a causal series. In spite of K ant’s distinction between “practical” and “ transcendental” freedom, and his definition of the form er as the independence of will from sensu­ ous impulse, he emphasizes that ultim ately an act is not free simply because it issues from a rational impulse rather than from blind instinct or from an im mediate response to external stimuli. Indeed, in the final analysis, transcendental freedom or “abso­ lute spontaneity” is the only “proper” freedom, and even practi­ cal freedom has no m eaning except as “transcendental”: In the question of freedom which lies at the foundation of all m oral laws and accountability to them, it is really not at all a question of 12 Kant, Critique, op. cit., p. 165. 13 Ibid.

26

T he epistemological dimension

w hether the causality determ ined by a n a tu ral law is necessary through determ ining grounds lying w ithin o r w ithout the subject, or w hether, if they lie w ithin him, they are in instinct or in grounds of determ ination tho u g h t by reason . . . they also imply n a tu ra l neces­ sity, leaving no room for transcendental freedom. . . . W ithout transcendental freedom , which is its p ro p er m eaning, and which is alone a priori practical, no m oral law and no accountability to it are possible.14

T he im plications for freedom th at Kant attributes to his theory of the active m ind, then, would seem to be more subtle and complex than they appear at first. In light of his argum ent that more is required to meet the criteria of freedom than ra­ tional determ ination alone, K ant’s conception of the active m ind m ight be interpreted as supplying the missing ingredient that makes practical freedom “transcendental.” In other words, one m ight simply take K ant to be saying that rational determ i­ nation is not enough if reason itself is an essentially passive and derivative phenom enon; and that freedom requires not only that a given act have its im mediate source in reason, b u t that reason be in principle a creative and spontaneous force—a force more “free” than the prudence of Hobbesian man, the slave, al­ beit “enlightened,” of the passions, capable only of deferring fulfillment of pleasure. It would seem that K ant’s rejection of this conception of reason m ight by itself distinguish his idea of practical freedom from the “quibbling,” the “wretched subter­ fuge” he attributes to the empiricist doctrine of freedom and its attem pts to reconcile freedom and causality. Kant, however, is not satisfied to rest his argum ent on the simple assertion that the m ind is a "determ inative,” spontane­ ous principle that can “constitute” objects. H aving argued that the only “proper m eaning” of freedom even in its practical sense is transcendental spontaneity, he tries to find a basis in experi­ ence, and not simply in logic, for belief in the possibility of transcendental freedom. T h is experiential basis he finds in the 14 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis W hite Beck (Indianap­ olis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1956), pp. 99-100.

T he epistemological dim ension

27

m oral experience, the feeling of “ought.” T h is experience ulti­ m ate!) depends upon m an’s consciousness of himself through “ pure apperception,” not simply through mom entary sense im ­ pressions, and his consciousness of himself as “thing-in-itself,” transcending the causal order of nature. Man, insofar as he is conscious of himself as a “thing-in-itself,” . . . also views his existence so far as it does n o t stand u n d er tem poral conditions, and him self as determ inable only by laws which he gives to himself through reason. In this existence n o th in g is antecedent to the d eterm ination of his will; every action, and, in general, every changing d eterm ination of his existence according to the in n e r sense, even the entire history of his existence as a sensuous being, is seen in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as only a consequence, n ot as a determ ining g ro u n d of his causality as noum enon.15

In other words, only in the case of his own consciousness of self does man have experiental “evidence” of anything existing, not only as conditioned phenom enon, b u t also as “noum enon” ca­ pable of standing outside, and originating, a causal chain.16 15 Ibid., p. 101. K ant’s remarks to the effect that man as noumenon is free, b u t as phe­ nomenon is part of the casual order of nature, have often caused a great deal of consternation. Even K ant’s admirers often seem to feel that this position requires elaborate and subtle defense. Why this proposition should be so disturbing is not always clear. It is as if Kant were suggesting that m an is in fact part of a rigid causal mechanism, and that whatever “freedom” he has is somehow bogus or illusory, and his ability to “ think” freedom is hardly better than self-deception or, at best, mental gymnastics. If some such in ter­ pretation is at the root of the discomfort that Kant sometimes causes, then it would seem that this discomfort arises out of a failure to keep in m ind the framework within which Kant is always operating in the Critiques. W hat­ ever the ambiguities in Kant's form ulation, one thing is clear enough: Kant does not claim to be w riting about the attributes of the “real” world as such, b u t simply about the nature of m an’s cognition and experience of that world. It is simply not his intention in the Critiques to discourse on the “ laws of nature,” either in general or as they operate on man. It seems hardly necessary to argue that Kant is here interested in the principle of causality, not as an attrib u te of things, but simply as the way in which men experience uniformity and encompass contiguous events in one unified ex­ perience. If he sometimes expresses himself in a m anner that suggests some­ thing more, it is nevertheless clear that everything he says must be under­ stood within the terms of his original frame of reference. Kant himself in ­ dicates that his sometimes confusing use of linguistic conventions—his refer­

28

The epistemological dimension

I t is in this connection that K ant’s theory of m ind and cogni­ tion plays another crucial, if subtle and indirect, role in his doc­ trine of freedom. As we shall see later, K ant in his epistemology has carefully laid the foundation for a new theory of selfconsciousness which, as much as any other aspect of his philoso­ phy, distinguishes him from his empiricist predecessors. T h is theory, which depends upon his conception of the active m ind, tries to account for the sense of self that men experience as a constant, positive them e of the m ind, while the empiricists can describe the self as nothing more than that awareness accom­ panying each fleeting sense impression. K ant's epistemology may not satisfactorily explain or “verify” this experience of the self which is so central to his doctrine of freedom, b u t his theory at least makes it possible to recognize it philosophically, to in­ ences to “laws of causality” or the “nature of things”—is still to be under­ stood as a comment on the nature of cognition and experience. Consider, for example: “T h e proposition that nothing happens through blind chance . . . is therefore an a priori law of nature. So also is the proposition that no necessity in nature is blind, b u t always a conditioned and therefore intel­ ligible necessity. . . . Both are laws through which the play of alterations is rendered subject to a nature of things (that is, of things as appearances), or what amounts to the same thing, to the unity of understanding, in which alone they can belong to one experience, that is, to the synthetic unity of appearances” (Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 248: emphasis in the last sentence added). T h e significant point is that, while in the case of our knowledge of external events we can add nothing to this mode of experience—this knowledge of things under the principle of causality, that is, as phenomena—in the case of our own self-knowledge we are capable of a different mode of experience— the experience of ourselves as spontaneous agents, which has been discussed above. Moreover, the “evidence” supplied by this form of “experience,” if different in its mode of representation, is no less “certain” than empirical evidence. In short, the very least that can be said is that, given K ant’s es­ sential frame of reference, there is nothing in his distinction between man as noumenon and man as phenomenon that suggests that the experience of freedom is any more false o r deceptive than the experience of causality. T here is perhaps more ground for uneasiness in what Kant failed to do than in what he did in elaborating his doctrine of freedom; and it is tem pt­ ing to argue that it is precisely the challenge of completing his conception of freedom that was taken up by thinkers like Marx, who attem pts to give con­ crete expression to K ant’s notion of freedom as self-activity—a point that will be discussed further in what follows.

T he epistemological dimension

29

corporate it into his system. Again, as we shall see, it is precisely this experience of the self as a constant theme of the m ind that makes both H um e and Mill so uneasy when they try to give an account of the self o n the basis of principles inherited from Locke. They are uneasy because, while they are themselves con­ scious of such an experience, their own theories of m ind seem to render the experience impossible or at least absurd. Both of them simply disown the experience philosophically, while reluc­ tantly adm itting it “privately.” Kant, however, must make this experience of the self an integral part of his system, since it pro­ vides the “proof” of freedom. H e must therefore revise em piri­ cist epistemology precisely at the point where it denies the pos­ sibility of this distinctive sense of self. In effect, then, K ant’s epistemology is the basis of his moral doctrine, since, to establish m an’s “transcendental spontaneity” and the possibility of self-active, conscious rational choice, Kant m ust first show that reason asserts primacy in its most im portant confrontation with the external world—in experience itself—not only because of what this says directly about the “freedom ” of reason, but because of w hat it says more indirectly about the n atu re of the self. His attack on the empiricists, therefore, is not simply an epistemological quibble, but a far-reaching argum ent ab o u t the nature of hum an freedom. A nother point must be emphasized in exam ining the signifi­ cance of K ant’s argum ent, with particluar reference to his dis­ tinction between perception and experience. In terms of the actual psychology of the individual m ind—as distinct from the archetypal epistemology of the model m ind—K ant sees the rela­ tionship between perception and experience as, in part, a devel­ opm ental one. T h e hum an infant first perceives and only subse­ quently experiences. T h e capacity for experience is achieved, the understanding is activated, through increasing confronta­ tions with the external world: T h e fact th a t during this period [of infancy] it [the child] begins to follow shiny objects w ith its eyes marks the crude beginning of the

30

T he epislemological dimension

progress of perceptions (apprehension of the representation of sensa­ tion), expanding them into knowledge of the objects of sense, th at is, experience.17

And further on: R em em brance of o ne’s childhood does not reach back nearly to th at time, however, since it was n o t the tim e of experience, b u t simply of scattered perceptions n ot yet u n ited in the conception of the ob­ ject.18

T he significance of these ideas for K ant’s conception of the self—in a discussion of which the passages just cited actually ap­ pear—will be explored in the next chapter. For the moment, a further point that arises out of the foregoing discussion bears m entioning. It has perhaps already become apparent that a central theme of K ant's doctrine is the reunification of subject and object. For example, his conception of experience in a sense lessens the rigid opposition between subject and object implied by the theory of empiricism. In the latter, the object is an inde­ pendently existing given, standing over and against the subject; while for Kant, the object is itself the product of subjective crea­ tivity and the active interpenetration of the subject and the ex­ ternal w orld.19 Again, K ant’s developm ental conception of the 17 Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, in Gesammelte Schrif­ ten (Berlin: Prussian Academy of Sciences, 1917), VII, 127-128: “Das es in diesem Zeitraum ihm vorgehaltenen glänzenden Gegenständen m it Augen zu folgen anhebt, ist der rohe Anfang des Fortschreitens von W ahrneh­ mungen (Apprehension der Empfindungsvorstellung), um sie zum Erkennt­ nis der Gegenstände der Sinne, d.i. der Erfahrung, zu erw eitern.“ (The original text is included when the translation is my own. E.W.) 18 Ibid., p. 128. “Die Erinnerung seiner Kinderjahre reicht aber bei weitem nicht bis an jene Zeit, weil sie nicht die Zeit der Erfahrungen, sondern bloss zerstreuter, unter den Begriff des Objects noch nicht vereinigter W ahrneh­ mungen war.“ i# It is left in part to Hegel and finally to Marx, whose contribution to this question will be discussed in the next section, to treat the problem of the subject-object relation as a problem of existence and not simply of epistemology, and to find the ultim ate reunification of subject and object in the unification of thought and existence through hum an practice. M arx’s re­ formulation of the problem emphasizes even more strikingly the implica­ tions of the Kantian revolution for conceptions of human freedom and social life*

T h e epistemological dimension

31

relationship between perception and experience emphasizes the dynam ic interaction of the subject and external reality, self and other. For Hegel, this conception of the subject-object relation has a special significance, because he sees in it the principle of the dialectic. T h e dialectic, w ith few exceptions long absent from philosophy, has thus been reintroduced into the “new” G erm an philosophy through K ant’s system of thought: . . . besides the general idea of synthetic judgm ents a priori, a u n i­ versal which has difference in itself, K ant's instinct carried this out in accordance w ith the scheme of triplicity, u n sp iritu al though that was, in the whole system into which for him the en tire universe was divided. T h is he n o t only practised on the three critiques, b u t he also followed it o u t in most o f the subdivisions u n d er the categories, the ideas of Reason, etc. K ant has therefore set forth as a universal scheme the rhythm of knowledge, of scientific m ovem ent; a n d has exhibited on all sides thesis, antithesis and synthesis, modes of m ind by means of which it is m ind, as thus consciously distinguishing itself. T h e first is existence, b u t in the form of O ther-B eing for conscious­ ness; for w hat is only existence is object. T h e second is Being-for-self, genuine actuality; here the reverse relation enters in, for selfconsciousness, as the negative of Being-in-itself, is itself relative. T h e third is the unity of the two: the absolute self-conscious actuality is the sum of true actuality, into which are reabsorbed both the objec­ tive and the independently existent subjective. K ant has thus m ade an historical statem ent o f the m om ents of the whole, and has cor­ rectly determ ined and distinguished them : it is a good in tro d u ctio n to philosophy.20

T he K antian revolution from this point of view is essentially 1 the re-establishment of the dialectic in philosophy by means of a certain conception of the relation between subject and object, self and other. It is not only the dialectical mode of thought that is significant here, but the fact that the basis of the dialectic, the dialectic in its very essence, is a relationship between self and other. I t will be seen th at this form of the dialectic may have profound im plications for conceptions of society. It is not diffi­ cult to see, for example, how epistemology is translated into 20 Hegel, op. cit., pp. 477-478.

32

T he epistemological dimension

social theory when one considers how the epistemological sub­ ject is transformed by M arx into “m an as a hum an and natural subject endowed w ith eyes, ears, etc., and living in society, in the world, and in n atu re.”'-1 T h e activity of m ind becomes practical activity; the relationship between self and other becomes the social relations between m an and m an when Marx, like Feuer­ bach, proceeds from the principle that “the true dialectic is not a monologue of a solitary thinker; it is a dialogue between I and thou.”22 T o sum up the im plications of the discussion so far, then, it can be said that, by affirming the creative self-activity of the sub­ ject and the spontaneous independence of reason, and by re­ establishing the dialectic, particularly with reference to the subject-object relation and the unity of self and other, the K ant­ ian revolution, as we shall see more clearly in w hat follows, lays the groundw ork for a transform ation of the self-other problem in both its aspects: the self-other relation as the problem of lib­ erty and as the problem of community. T h e Self-Active Subject Becomes the Free M an T h e im plications for social theory of the K antian concept of m ind may become more im mediate and striking if one considers what Marx does to this concept, how he transforms it quite con­ sciously and directly into a theory of society and social action. T h a t M arx belongs to the K antian tradition may n o t be im­ mediately apparent. In fact, interpretations of M arxist m aterial­ ism very often suggest precisely the kind of passive empiricism— and that in an extrem e form—to which the K antian theory of m ind is opposed. T h is m aterialism is often understood to imply th at hum an consciousness is simply a passive product, a mere reflection of objective m aterial conditions; and this conception 21 Karl Marx, “C ritique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole," in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. M. Mil­ ligan, ed. Dirk J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 191. 22 Ludwig Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. M. H. Vogel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966), art. 62, p. 72.

T h e epistemological dimension

33

of consciousness is presum ed to lie at the heart of the crude de­ term inism often attrib u ted to Marx. In fact, however, M arx quite explicitly attacks this kind of determ inistic m aterialism ; and it is precisely because he sides w ith idealism in its opposition to the passive determ inism of em­ piricism —which lies at the heart of the eighteenth-century m ate­ rialism he is attacking—th at he is able to translate his epistemology into a theory of society, social action, and revolution. T h e Theses on Feuerbach clearly demonstrates how Marx seeks to elaborate a theory of m ind into a social doctrine./Tn the first place, he expands the idea of m ental activity proposed by ideal­ ism into a concept of practical activity. Moreover, in so doing, he also gives concrete social form to the dialectical relationship between subject and object by m aking it a principle of social relatio n sjln Theses IX and X, he rather mysteriously associates the old materialism w ith a particular principle of society—“civil society”—and suggests th at the new materialism will be the basis of a new social principle, the principle of “hum an society.” He is here quite explicitly connecting certain epistmological theo­ ries w ith certain conceptions of society.23 T h e latter connections will be discussed in greater detail in the final chapter. For the m om ent, while we are still exam ining epistemology, more needs to be said about M arx’s relation to the K antian tradition, par­ ticularly since he is so often misunderstood on this score. Marx begins the Theses on Feuerbach by attacking earlier theories of materialism and opposing to their objective deter­ minism an emphasis on what m ight be called the principle of 23 If we adopt the popular designation of Marxist philosophy as “dialectical m aterialism ,” perhaps we can add another dimension to the meaning of that term. If Kant’s theory of m ind can be called “dialectical empiricism,” as has been suggested, perhaps the Marxist theory can be interpreted as a transformation of this principle into a concrete social theory. “Dialectical materialism ,” then, would involve a concept of society based on the prac­ tically active subject—i.e. creative m an—and the practical reunification of subject and object, self and other, at all levels—for example, the reunification of man with his own previously alienated activity, man with man, the in ­ dividual with his social powers.

34

T he epistemological dimension

subjectivity and the idea of subjective activity introduced by idealism. T h e chief defect of all previous m aterialism (including th a t of Feuer­ bach) is that things (Gegenstand), reality, the sensible world, are con­ ceived only in the form of objects (O b jekt) of observation, b u t n o t as hum an sense activity, n o t as practical activity, n o t subjectively. H ence, in opposition to m aterialism , the active side was developed abstractly by idealism, which of course does not know real sense ac­ tivity as such.24

In a very fundam ental sense, this emphasis on the principle of subjectivity is the essence of M arx’s philosophy. Im plicit in it is his idea of freedom as self-activity, self-creation, and individ­ ual self-realization—the reunification of subject and object by means of m an’s active participation in the world through use of all his faculties. T h e condition for this freedom is m an ’s con­ scious transcendence and practical mastery of objective reality. All previous materialism, w ith its empiricist epistemological base, is a denial of hum an subjectivity and individuality in the sense that it must regard m an simply as an object, as a passive, receptive function of objective conditions. In idealism M arx sees a basis for rejecting the untranscendable determ inism of early m aterialism and for establishing the principle th a t m an as free conscious subject can and must transcend his passive deter­ m ination by objective reality and historical forces. T h is is w hat it means to leave the stage of prehistory and enter the stage of true hum an history. M arx’s social, political, and economic theo­ ries are, as it were, statements of the conditions necessary to achieve “subjectivity”—that is, to achieve mastery over objects and attain self-realization through the practical reunification of subject and object. Marx proceeds, then, from the idealist attem pt to bridge the 24 Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in Karl Marx, Selected W ritings in So­ ciology and Social Philosophy, ed. T . B. Bottomore and M. R ubel (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), Thesis I, p. 82.

T h e epistemological dimension

35

gap between subject and object. However, as he indicates in the statem ent cited above, he is not entirely satisfied w ith the ideal­ ist attem pt, because idealism rem ains in the abstract realm of m ental activity and fails to deal w ith m an as he is in the world, as active participant in life and society. T h e epistemological re­ unification of subject and object can, in fact, be achieved only through m an’s, the subject’s, active participation in objective reality. Only to the degree that m an, having consciously grasped reality, can change reality—and through it, himself—can one really say th at the chasm between subject and object has been closed and that the principle of subjectivity and individuality has prevailed. H aving added this practical dim ension to the old epistemological problem , M arx argues that he renders irrelevant the difficulty that still plagued the idealists, notably K ant, in their attem pts to bridge the gap between subject and object. Kant, for example, still retained the gap insofar as he questioned the accessibility of ultim ate reality to hum an thought and knowledge. For Marx, the “reality” of thought is no longer a problem, if m an himself can change reality—and change it in accordance w ith his conscious goals. T h e ability to change reality in accordance w ith hum an thought is practical proof of the tru th of thought. T h e unity of theory and practice can m ean the unity of subject and object. T h e question w hether h u m an th in k in g can p reten d to objective (gegenständlich) tru th is n o t a theoretical b u t a practical question. M an m ust prove the tru th , i.e., the reality an d power, the “ thissideness” of his th in k in g in practise. T h e dispute over th e reality or non-reality of th in k in g th a t is isolated from practise is purely a scholastic question.25

M arx has thus elaborated on the K antian theory of m ind by proposing revolutionary practice as a new form of consciousness, and the theory of m ind has become a social doctrine. As Shlomo 25 Ibid., Thesis II, p. 82.

36

T he epistemological dimension

Avineri puts it, “Revolutionary praxis is an active and social epistemology.”26 We shall see later how M arx develops this theme. At this point it m ust be emphasized that the determ inism that Marx is attacking, and its im plicit conception of freedom as compatible with determ ination even by external objective forces, does not belong simply to the frankly mechanistic, deter­ ministic doctrines of uncom prom ising materialists like Hobbes, but to the more “liberal” systems of his successors as well. More­ over, this conception of freedom is reflected not only indirectly in liberal doctrines of social and political liberty, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters, b u t in the more fundam ental philosophical principles that underlie them. T his point can be illustrated by considering the very thinkers who would seem to pose the most serious challenge to this argum ent: Locke and J. S. Mill. According to Locke, for example, the freedom of the agent lies, to begin with, in the absence of im pedim ents to action de­ term ined by the will—not in the “freedom” of volition itself. So th at liberty is not a n idea belonging to volition, o r preferring; b u t to the person having th e pow er of doing, or forbearing to do, accord­ ing as the m ind shall choose o r direct. O u r idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, a n d no farther. For wherever restraint comes to check th a t power, or com pulsion takes away th a t indifferency of abil­ ity to act, or to forbear acting, there liberty, and o u r n o tio n of it, presently ceases.27 26 Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl M arx (Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 149. Avineri also provides a convincing explanation of M arx’s well-known observation that “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness”—an observation often under­ stood to contradict the interpretation of Marx being presented here. Avineri writes: “ ‘Social being’ includes by definition m an’s relation to the external world, and the worst th at can be said about this much-quoted and littleunderstood sentence is th at it is tautological. If ‘social being’ is purposive action, the shaping of external objects, this action implies a consciousness in relation to these external objects. In any case, Marx never said that ‘being determines consciousness’, but that ‘social being determines consciousness’: these are two entirely different statements” (ibid., pp. 75-76). 27 Locke, Essay, p. 317 (Bk. II, chap. xxi, art. 10).

T h e epistemological dim ension

37

T hus, I think, first, th a t so far as anyone can, by the direction or choice of his m ind, p referring the existence of any action to the n o n ­ existence of th at action, and vice versa, make it to exist or n o t exist, so far he is free.28

U p to this point, it is clear that freedom lies in the absence of im pedim ent to voluntary motion, but that the will itself is quite mechanistically determ ined. T h e opposite of “voluntary” is not “ necessary,” but simply “involuntary.”29 In the first edition of the Essay, Locke leaves it at that. In the second edition, w ithout removing the passages which speak of freedom as absence of restraint of voluntary action, no m atter how mechanistically determ ined volition itself may be, Locke adds another elem ent to his definition of freedom which may seem to suggest th at voluntary action is not entirely mech­ anistically determ ined. T his is the notion that the m ind can “suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires,” 30 and that freedom lies in this power of suspension. T h e “uneasi­ ness” which almost always determines the will to action need not always do so. T h e difficulty, however, is that Locke provides no explanation of this power to suspend volition. T his idea, if taken at face value, is contradicted by everything that goes before it—every­ thing Locke says about desires, volition, the nature of the self, and, more fundam entally, about the m ind and its role in experi­ ence—which provides no basis for a truly independent act of mind. O n the basis of Locke’s own premises, one can only con­ clude that this suspension itself is a determ ined act of volition. As A. C. Fraser puts it in his notes to the Essay: B ut unless in this m an rises above a merely n atu ral causation of mo­ tives, he is no m ore ethically free in suspending voluntary execution of a desire than in any o ther exercise of will. A pow er to suspend volition, necessarily thus dependent, leaves m an still a p art o f the m echanism of nature.

28 Ibid., p. 324 (art. 21).

29 See ibid., p. 318 (art. 11). so Ibid., p. 345 (art. 48).

38

T he epistemological dimension

. . . after all, on his premises, the suspension m ust be the n atu ral issue of uneasiness.31

A particularly forceful attack on Locke’s conception of free­ dom and moral responsibility comes, interestingly enough, from T . H. Green. It is w orth quoting at some length from G reen s remarks, because they illum inate the present argum ent by at­ tributing the difficulties in Locke’s doctrine precisely to em piri­ cism’s denial of the “originativeness of thought” and to its in­ ability to account for the self as anything more than a discontin­ uous series of sensations or the simple awareness th at accompa­ nies individual perceptions.32 Here then is G reen’s argum ent: . . . the “suspense of desire,” th a t he speaks of, can only m ean an in ­ terval, d uring which a com petition of im agined pleasure (one asso­ ciated w ith more, a n o th er w ith less, of sequent or antecedent pain) is still going on, and n o n e has become finally the strongest motive. Of such suspense it is unm eaning to say that a m an has “ the pow er of it,” o r that, when it term inates in an action which does not produce so m uch pleasure as a n o th er m ight have done, it is because the m an “has vitiated his p alate,” an d th a t therefore he m ust be “answ erable to him self” for the consequences. T h is language really im plies th at pleasures, instead of being ultim ate ends, are determ ined to be ends through reference to an object beyond them which the m an himself constitutes; th a t it is only through his conception of self th a t every pleasure—not indeed best pleases him, or is most attractive in imag­ in atio n —b u t becomes his personal good. . . . T h u s when Locke finds the ground of responsibility in m an’s power of suspending his desire 'till he has considered w hether the act, to which it inclines him, is of a kind to make him h ap p y o r no, the value of the exp lan atio n lies in the distinction which it may be taken to imply, b u t which Locke could not consistently adm it, be­ tween the im agination of pleasure and the conception of self as a perm anent subject o f happiness, by reference to which an im agined pleasure becomes a strongest motive. . . . T h is am biguous deliverance about m oral freedom, it must be observed, is the necessary result, on a m ind having too strong a prac31 Ibid., p. 345, nn. ] and 2. 32 See below, pp. 49-51, for a more detailed discussion of the em piricist con­ ception of the self.

T h e epistemological dimension

39

lical hold on life to tam per w ith hum an responsibility, of a doctrine which denies the originativeness of thought, an d in consequence can­ n o t consistently allow any motive to desire, b u t the image of a past pleasure o r p ain .83

A t best, then, desires are suspended in favor of more pressing ones. In fact, the highest m orality itself, presumably the most transcendent ground for suspension of desires, is based on this principle, as Locke suggests in Article 72 of the Essay. Speaking of “morality, established o n its true foundations,” Locke argues: “T h e rewards and punishm ents of the afterlife, which the A l­ mighty has established as the enforcem ent of His law, are weight enough to determ ine the choice . . 34 when they are taken into account (which, apparently, they all too seldom are). T hus, the rewards and punishm ents of the afterlife are simply additions to a series of pleasures and pains the absence or presence of which, actual or anticipated on the basis of past experience, produces “uneasiness.” Indeed, there seems to be no reason to regard Locke’s power to suspend the satisfaction of im m ediate desires as anything very different from Hobbes’ prudence, which is never regarded as incom patible with his mechanistic conception of m an and hum an liberty. It may perhaps be pointed out that, despite the suggested similarities between H obbes and Locke on this point, it is pre­ cisely and explicitly H obbes’ m oral doctrine that Locke is at­ tacking in the Essay. A nd yet it can be argued that the very n ature of Locke’s attack on Hobbes is such that, far from reveal­ ing a truly fundam ental difference between the two thinkers, it serves only to emphasize the fundam ental similarities between their respective conceptions of m an and hum an freedom. T h e only m ention of Hobbes in the Essay appears in Locke’s account of m oral obligation and the differing opinions m en have concerning its foundation. Locke contrasts the H obbesian Thom as Hill Green, H u m e and Locke, intro. Ramon M. Lamos (New York: Thom as Y. Crowell Co., 1968), pp. 315-317. 34 Locke, Essay, p. 364 (art. 72).

40

T he epistemological dimension

notion of obligation (or rather Locke’s own interpretation of that notion) with “the true ground of m orality.” T h e Hobbesian principle is that men must obey certain m oral laws “be­ cause the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not.” 35 T h e “true ground of m orality,” on the other hand, “can only be the will and law of a God, who sees m en in the dark, has in his hand rewards and punishm ents, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender.” 30 T he disagreement, then, seems to be largely over who “has in his hands” the most impressive rewards and punishm ents, and not about the nature of hum an m otivation or the relation between freedom and determ ination by external forces. T h e moral nature of m an—which is the highest expression of w hat­ ever freedom he has—lies not so much in his ability, by virtue of his reason, to transcend determ ination by external stim uli, but simply in the source of the stim uli that act most strongly on him: a m an’s behavior is moral insofar as it is determ ined by rewards and punishm ents anticipated from God, as he is de­ picted in the Bible, rather than from some other source of rewards and punishm ents. Moral “action” is not qualitatively different from any other pleasure-pain-determ ined behavior. Again, at best, m orality for Locke is a prudence very m uch like that of Hobbes’ obedience to the sovereign. Locke’s m oral doc­ trine does not seem in the least incom patible w ith H obbes’ pic­ turesquely mechanistic image of hum an behavior, according to which rewards and punishm ents are the “nerves” of the body politic which are “b u t so many strings . . . by which fastened to the seate of the Soveraignty every member is moved to perform his duty.” 87 T h e case of M ill is rather more complicated, prim arily be­ cause there is an obvious, almost explicit, contradiction, of which Mill himself seems to have been aware, between his fa­ 35 Ibid., p. 69 (Bk I, chap. i, art. 5). 36 ib id ., p. 70 (art. 6). 37 Thom as Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), Hobbes’s Introduction, p. 8.

T h e epistemological dimension

41

m ous doctrine of liberty and individuality and his more general conception of man. T h e problem revolves essentially around M ill’s conception of the self, which he shares with H um e and ultim ately with Locke: the notion of the self as simply a series of sensations or possibilities of response. T he difficulty is clearly that such a conception of the self cannot sustain a principle of individuality based on individual spontaneity, autonomy, and the primacy of the self. In general, M ill’s defense of liberty and the uniqueness and spontaneity of individuality seems almost an aberration in the light of his other doctrines. Both before and after “On Liberty,” for example, he adheres to a naturalistic conception of man, according to which hum an action becomes a reflex of independently existing natural forces: before ‘‘O n Liberty,” in his Logic, which argues for the possibility of a social science precisely on the grounds that social laws can be regarded as natural laws, and that the same laws of causality apply to men as to m atter;38 after, in the essays on religion, where we are told th at “A rt is as much N ature as anything else” in its causal deter­ m ination.39 As for Utilitarianism, the contradictions seem to ex­ ist side by side in a single work. Even if M ill’s doctrine of liberty cannot be dismissed as an aberration, the fact rem ains that the kind of determ inism im plicit in his naturalism , in his concept of a social science, etc., is m ore com patible with his account of the knowing subject and the self as a series of sensations or possibili­ ties of response, than it is w ith a conception of liberty that em ­ phasizes the precedence of the self, the individual, the idea of self-development and spontaneity.40 T h e feeling that M ill’s concept of liberty and individuality is a foreign elem ent in his doctrine is strengthened by a com­ 38 John Stuart Mill, A System o f Logic (London: Longmans, Green and C o .,

1967), p. 227 (Bk. Ill, chap. 5, art. 8, note) and Bk. VI passim. 39 Mill, Three Essays on Religion, quoted in R. Anschutz, The Philosophy of J. S. M ill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 170. 40 it may be worth noting that the relationship between Mill's epistcmology and that of Locke is far from indirect. As Anschutz points out, Mill acknowl­ edges that he derived his basic epistemological principles from Hartley and Priestley, who, in turn, had adopted Locke’s premises. See Anschutz, op. cit., p. 174.

42

T he epistemological dimension

parison w ith the ideas of another advocate of individuality by whom Mill himself was greatly impressed. In "O n Liberty,” Mill singles out the doctrine of W ilhelm von H um boldt as a uniquely im portant statem ent of the philosophy of individual liberty that he himself is now propounding. T h e significant p o in t is that, while for Mill that philosophy represents a departure from his other philosophical principles—notably his conception of m ind and the self—H u m boldt’s doctrine of individuality is firmly and explicitly based o n his own conception of m ind and the self. W hat makes this consideration particularly im portant in the present argum ent is the fact th at the theory of m ind and self upon which H um boldt bases his doctrine of liberty is a funda­ m entally “K antian” one. Particularly in his explanation of lan­ guage, H um boldt develops a theory of m ind according to which language is a creative phenom enon, the prim ary expression of the m ind’s creativity, generated out of principles of order sup­ plied to experience a priori by the mind, the self-active subject. T h is conception of m an’s fundam ental creativity becomes the basis of H um boldt’s conception of freedom and individuality.41 T h e foregoing discussion should already give some indication of the bearing th a t the theories of m ind here being exam ined may have on social and political thought. At this point it may be worth rem em bering the suggestion that not only can a theory 41 It is significant too. that H um boldt develops a theory of sociality as a fact of human consciousness, dialectically united with individuality: "B ut since man is a social animal this being his distinctive character—because he needs others, not for protection, not for help, not for procreation, not for his life of habit (as do several animal species as well) but because he rises to a consciousness of self, and an T without a ‘thou’ is an absurdity to his rea­ son and his senses: therefore, in his own individuality (in his ‘I ’), the in ­ dividuality of his society (his ‘thou’) defines itself simultaneously." W ilhelm von H um boldt, “Betrachtungen über die Weltgeschichte," Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Prussian Academy of Sciences, 1904) 3, 355: “Da aber der Mensch in T h ier der Geselligkeit ist—sein distinctiver C harakter— weil er eines Ändern nicht zum Schutz, zur Hülfe, zur Zeugung, zum Ge­ wohnheitsleben (wie einige T hierarten), sondern deshalb bedarf, weil er sich zum Bewusstseyn des Ichs erhebt, und ich ohne Du vor seinem Verstand und seiner Empfindung ein Undig sind; so reisst sich in seiner Individualität (in seinem Ich) zugleich die seiner Gessellschaft (seines Du) los.”

T h e epistemological dimension

43

of m ind have such implications, b u t the theory may even in a sense have its origins in political philosophy, as seems to be the case w ith Kant. I t is well known that K ant had the greatest ad­ m iration for Rousseau, by whom he was influenced despite the profound differences in th eir tem peram ents and their philo­ sophical concerns and methods. K ant w ent so far as to suggest that Rousseau was the N ewton of the m oral sciences.42 G ener­ ally, interpretations of Rousseau’s influence on K ant refer to the respect for the moral n atu re of m an and for the dignity of the common m an which K ant learned from Rousseau and which, for example, lies at the h eart of K ant’s republicansim ; or refer­ ence is made to the concept of freedom as obedience to selfimposed law, central both to Rousseau’s political theory—for example, to his concept of the general will—and to K ant’s m oral philosophy and his concept of the rational will; or, related to this last point, sim ilarities are seen between Rousseau’s concept of the general will and K ant’s categorical im perative. Moreover, in chapter 3 below, sim ilarities between K ant and Rousseau’s accounts of the beginnings of hum an history will be noted. In any event, the connections most commonly m entioned are specifically between K ant’s m oral and political philosophy and the m oral and political thought of Rousseau. T h e object here, however, will be to suggest a more fundam ental connection between K ant’s philosophy in general, particularly his concept of mind, and the political philosophy of Rousseau. Hegel himself, in fact, notes precisely such a fundam ental connection in his argum ent that Rousseau, together w ith H um e, is the initiator of the transition to the new Germ an philosophy. In Rousseau’s political thought Hegel seems to find the p rin ­ ciple of freedom that is essential to K antian philosophy. Rous­ seau’s theory of the state—presumably his concept of the general will, in particular—according to Hegel brings to consciousness . . . the sense th at m an has liberty in his spirit as the altogether ab42 See Kant, Fragmente, in W erke, ed. E. Cassirer et al. (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag, 1912-1922), V III, 630.

44

T he epistemological dimension

solute, th a t free-will is the notion of m an. Freedom is ju st thought itself; he who casts thought aside and speaks of freedom knows not w hat he is talking of. T h e unity of thought w ith itself is freedom, the free will. T h o u g h t, as volition merely, is the impulse to abrogate o ne’s subjectivity, the relation to present existence, the realizing of oneself, since in th a t I am endeavouring to place myself as existent on an equality w ith myself as thinking. It is only as having the pow­ er to think th at the will is free. T h e principle of freedom emerged in Rousseau, and gave to m an who apprehends himself as infinite, this infinite strength. T h is finishes the transition to the K antian philoso­ phy, which, theoretically considered, m ade this principle its founda­ tion, knowledge aim ed at freedom and at a content which it possesses in consciousness.48

Perhaps we can take the liberty of elaborating on H egel’s sug­ gestion, with the possibility that it will be given a meaning somewhat different from what Hegel intended. Hegel seems to be suggesting that Rousseau’s political theory is based on a con­ ception of freedom as subjectivity, as self-activity in accordance with self-imposed law. Such a conception would be opposed to the determ inism of empiricism, to the particular conceptions of liberty and free will that are im plicit in it, and to the utilitarian concepts of the state, already exemplified by Hobbes and Locke, that can be associated with philosophical empiricism. For the •empiricists, as we shall see, the self is essentially a reflection, a passive function of objective conditions, in the sense that it is nothing b u t a series of sensations or the awareness th at accom­ panies each sensation, rather than a distinct, constant, positive “m otif” of the m ind, an “original activity,” as it were. Activity takes the form of response to stimuli, the kind of self-passivity expressed by the pleasure-pain principle. As we have seen, voli­ tion tends to be thought of as simply reflexive, responsive mo­ tion, so that even action in accordance with individual will is nevertheless externally determ ined. Thus, freedom, which seems to mean simply the absence of external im pedim ents to responsive motion, may still involve mechanistic determ ination and determ ination of the self by objects external to it. ■*3 Hegel, op. cit., p. 402. I

T h e epistemological dimension

45

T h e same ideas are reflected in political theory. A theory o\ the state that is, for example, based on property, the concept of interest, and the interaction of interests reflects this kind of em piricist determinism, because it tends to identify m an and his individuality with, to make him a function of, the external­ ized, objectified conditions of his class, his place in society or the market, the division of labor, and so on.44 Freedom in so­ ciety, then, has to do w ith the free interplay of these objective forces and the proper functioning of the mechanism. Rousseau, like Marx after him, seeks a principle of society th at transcends this mechanistic determ inism by basing his po­ litical theory on the possibility of m an’s conscious and rational transcendence of objective forces. Firstly, by himself becoming the source of the public o r general will, the source of the law, the individual is no longer subjected to a state separable from and against him. For empiricism-liberalism, the state must, in a sense, personify and objectify the law and the public interest and impose them from w ithout upon egoistic individuals in te r­ acting in terms of their conflicting private interests. Because men are essentially “private” and egoistic, the people cannot serve as their own source of the general will. T hey must be repre­ sented.45 Secondly, the social revolution establishing a funda­ m ental equality, which is envisaged by Rousseau as a precondi­ tion to his new political order, is m eant to create a situation wherein man will no longer define his identity in terms of his objective status or function in the social system or the market. In effect, Rousseau’s political society is based on autonomous, self-active individuals acting in accordance with self-imposed laws and a self-generated general will—in a sense, subjects which are themselves the sources of objectivity and universality. Ernst Cassirer elaborates on this aspect of Rousseau’s phi­ losophy in connection w ith the latter’s religious thought. T h e basis of natural religion, according to Rousseau, is m an’s ca­ 44 For a more detailed discussion of these points, see below, pp. 152 ff. 46 For further explanation of this idea, see below, chap. 4, " ‘Civil Society’ and ‘H um an Society.’ ”

46

The epistemological dimension

pacity to transcend by means of the rational will and selfimposed law the com pulsion of external objects. T h e self is the source of religion, the voice of God, precisely insofar as it is capable of som ething more than receptivity, passivity, and re­ sponse to stimulus. How Rousseau develops this idea in his reli­ gious doctrine is not im portant here. W hat is significant is the general principle the idea contains, the concept of the self it opposes to that of determ inistic empiricism. As Cassirer points out: At this p o int R ousseau transcends the lim itations of the sensationalistic psychology. T h e self is n o t a datum of sense an d can never be understood as the m ere product of sense data. I t is an original ac­ tivity, and the only evidence of such activity available to m an. A nd this spontaneity of the self, n o t its receptivity, is the m ark of the D ivine.46

T hus, Rousseau’s moral and political philosophy establishes the principle of freedom as autonom ous self-activity, the prin­ ciple of the self as originally creative and spontaneous rather than simply receptive, and the principle that the self, the sub­ ject, is the source of objectivity, generality, universality. H egel’s analysis, like that of Cassirer,47 seems to suggest th at K ant is attem pting to find a systematic philosophical and epistemologi­ cal basis for the concept of m an and the self—the self as an “original activity” and the source of universality—that is im plicit in Rousseau’s m oral and political thought. 46 Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe, trans. J. G utm an, P. O. Kristeller, J. H. Randall, Jr.; introd. P. Gay (New York: H arper and Row Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 46-47. 47 See, for example, ibid., p. 59.

2. The Psychological Dimension Self and Other B ut since m an is a social an im a l—this b ein g his distin ctiv e ch aracter—because h e needs o thers, n o t for p ro tectio n , n o t for help, n o t fo r p ro c re a tio n , n o t for his life of h a b it (as d o sev­ eral an im al species as well), b u t because he rises to a conscious­ ness of self, a n d a n “ I ” w ith o u t a " th o u ’' is an a b su rd ity to his reason a n d his senses; therefo re, in his ow n in d iv id u ality (in his “ I,”) th e in d iv id u a lity of his society (his “ th o u ”), d e­ fines itself sim u ltan eo u sly .1 W il h e l m v o n H u m b o l d t

Observations on W orld H istory

Consciousness and the Self T h e foregoing brief outline of the K antian theory of m ind, an d the way in which it lays the groundwork for a dialectical union of subject and object, can now be extended to a m ore specific consideration of th at theory’s im plications for the idea of self, the relation between self and other, and the nature of individuality. T h e notion of the self is, of course, inextricably bound up with the problem of consciousness, since whatever else may be m eant by that term, surely part of what it means to be conscious by any definition is to possess a self, to have some kind of awareness of one’s “I ” and its distinctness from “other.” N eed­ less to say, conceptions of the nature of consciousness—and hence, the nature of self-consciousness—will vary according to conceptions of the n atu re of m ind. Moreover, insofar as the self is, as it were, the essence of subjectivity, clearly w hat is said ab­ stractly about the epistemological relation between subject and object has concrete m eaning in terms of psychological concep­ tions of the self and its relation to other—to objects, to its en­ vironm ent, to other selves. i See above, p. 42 n. 41, for original text and citation.

47

48

The psychological dimension

Several im portant points which will emerge in the course of this discussion and in the subsequent chapters should be noted and emphasized at the outset. In the first chapter, it was sug­ gested that in the K antian view the subject is in a sense original and self-active, which would seem to imply that the self or the ego is, so to speak, a priori. Moreover, if this were the case, one might even be inclined to conclude that Kant is positing some kind of im m utable “essence” of m an that would entail a static conception of hum an n a tu re /ln fact, however, it turns out that the view that emphasizes the self-activity of the subject, in keep­ ing with its dialectical approach, tends to encourage a more dynamic conception of hum an nature; and, again dialectically, it issues in a concept of the conscious self, not as a priori, but as an evolving phenom enon, something that must in a sense be achieved. T he self in any meaningful sense is not simply the immediate, passive, perhaps even fleeting awareness accompany­ ing individual sense impressions, which it seems to be for the empiricists. Instead, the self as a distinct and positive “ them e” of the m ind is the end product of the synthetic activity of mind. T he conscious self is achieved through the dialectical interaction of the active m ind and experience, of the perceiving subject and external objects. A nd as the product of a dialectical process, the self is a dynamic phenom enon, which, moreover, is in a very fundam ental sense united with its other. T h e em piricist’s view, according to which the subject passively reflects or simply responds to objective reality, on the other hand, paradoxically seems to conceive of the self—as active ego or even egoism—as the prim ary and unchangeable fact of hum an existence. Since the self here seems to be little more than the simple awareness accompanying sense impressions, or at most a potential for response to objective reality, it may seem absurd to speak of the active ego as a priori. But this is perhaps one of the fundam ental paradoxes of empiricist psychology. On the one hand, the self seems to have no distinct positive reality for the British empiricists; on the other hand, the same empiricists

T he psychological dim ension

49

seem invariably to assume the existence of ego as a constant and active force. Given the em piricist’s notion of the self as a kind of potential for responsive behavior, however, perhaps it can sim­ ply be said that this seemingly empty self takes on a positive content as egoism when th at passivity is translated into activity in the form of passion. Passion is, so to speak, active passivity, responsive, reflexive action; and passion in a sense becomes the essence of the self.2 Paradoxically, then, this passive almost non­ existent selfhood becomes, in the form of passion, active egoism; and egoism becomes the prim ary and unchanging fact of hum an nature. We shall see th at active egoism becomes in effect the im m utable essence of man, the constant factor throughout every stage of hum an developm ent. In fact, it should also become apparent that hum an individuality is virtually equated w ith egoism, a fact that has crucial im plications for the nature of “Lockean” individualism. T o return, then, to an elaboration of these points, we may begin with a brief account of the empiricist conceptions of con­ sciousness and the self and then contrast them with the K antian conceptions. Consciousness for Locke is apparently nothing more than the simple, irreducible, essentially passive awareness that is involved in all perception, “it being impossible for anyone to perceive w ithout perceiving that he does perceive.”3 It is this “conscious­ 2 T h e way in which passivity is translated into activity in the form of pas­ sion is best illustrated by the m etaphor of m atter in motion so popular in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century explanations of hum an behavior. H u ­ man passion, as responsive behavior, operates in much the same way as the physical phenomena of attraction and repulsion. Why passions should be assumed to be essentially egoistic—and even antagonistic—is not entirely clear, but perhaps the same metaphor, especially for example as used by Hobbes, provides a clue. T he assumptions underlying the m etaphor of m at­ ter in motion are atomistic, based on a model of separate and discrete p a rti­ cles whose relationships, such as they are, must ultimately take the form of collision. 3 John Locke, An Essay Concerning H um an Understanding, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), I, 449 (Bk. II, chap. xxvii, art. 11). Hereafter referred to as Essay.

50

T he psychological dimension

ness always accompanying thinking [here synonymous w ith per­ ceiving. E. W .]. . . which makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things [and] in this alone consists personal identity. . . . ” 4 T hus, con­ sciousness of self is involved in any sense perception and repre­ sents no distinctive act of m ind; in this sense, even an infant— perhaps even a child in the womb5—insofar as it can feel hunger and warmth, for example, has a consciousness of self. Locke, therefore, simply equates consciousness w ith sensation and feel­ ing and the kind of awareness they imply. It is not very far from this conception of the self as simply the “consciousness always accompanying thinking” or perceiving to H um e’s explicit denial of any distinctive consciousness of self: But self or person is not any one impression, b u t th at to which o u r several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, th at im pression must continue invariably the same, th ro ’ the whole course of o u r lives; since self is suppos’d to exist after th at m anner. B ut there is no im­ pression constant a n d invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, an d never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, th a t the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea.®

H um e’s doubts are shared by J. S. Mill, who finds himself unable to construct a more satisfactory conception of the self on the basis of the theory of m ind he has inherited from Locke: T h e belief I e n tertain th a t my m ind exists when it is n o t feeling, nor thinking, nor conscious of its own existence resolves itself into the belief of a P erm anent Possibility of these states. . . . [H ence we may regard m ind] as n o th in g b u t a series of o u r sensations (to which m ust 4 Ibid. 5 See Ibid., p. 184 (Bk. II, chap. ix, art. 4), on the existence of ideas in the unborn child. « David Hume, A Treatise of H um an Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ox­ ford: Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 251-252 (Bk. I, chap. ix, sec. vi). H ere­ after referred to as Treatise.

T h e psychological dim ension

51

now be added ou r in te rn a l feelings) as they actually occur, w ith the addition of infinite possibilities of feeling requiring for th eir actual realization conditions which may o r may n o t take place.7

In the face of such a conception of m ind and self, M ill can only resign himself to the difficulty posed by the fact that we are also aware of ourselves as such a series of sensations: . . . we are reduced to the alternative of believing th a t the m ind, or ego, is som ething different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them , or of accepting th e paradox th at som ething which ex hypothesi is b u t a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as series. . . . I th in k by far the wisest th in g we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, w ithout any theory as to how it takes place; and when we are obliged to speak of it in term s which assume a theory, to use them w ith a reservation as to th e ir m eaning.8

It cannot be emphasized enough that the most serious difficul­ ties encountered by H um e and Mill in their analyses of the self revolve around the very themes th at are central to this essay. In M ill’s case, as we have already seen, the empiricist conception of self endangers his conceptions of liberty and individuality. In H um e’s case, which will be discussed more fully later, that con­ ception of the self becomes the source of his gravest philosophi­ cal doubts precisely because it cannot support his conception of sympathy, the basis of comm unity. T o sustain their most cher­ ished doctrines, both H um e and Mill feel the need for a more positive conception of the self than their theories of m ind will allow. It is precisely this kind of conception of the self that K ant tries to develop on the basis of his new theory of mind. In the previous chapter, the m eaning of K ant’s epistemology and of his opposition to classical empiricism was illustrated by a discussion of his distinction between perception and experi­ ence. From his conception of that distinction, it should be clear 7 John Stuart Mill, Exam ination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, quoted in R. Anschutz, T he Philosophy of J. S. M ill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 179. 8 Ib id .

52

The psychological dimension

that Kant differentiates between the kind of awareness im plicit in perception and a distinctive, more active, in a sense inde­ pendent, form of consciousness corresponding to experience. By the same token, there is a difference between the “ self” that simply “accompanies” each perception, and the distinct, posi­ tive, and continuous experience of the self involved in true selfconsciousness: T h is thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a m anifold which is given in in tu itio n contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis. For the em pirical consciousness, which accompanies different representa­ tions, is in itself diverse a n d w ithout relation to the id en tity of the subject. T h a t relatio n comes about, not simply through my accom­ panying each representation w ith consciousness, b u t only in so far as I conjoin one representation w ith another, an d am conscious of the synthesis of them . O nly in so far, therefore, as I can unite a m anifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in (i.e. through­ out) these representations.. .. . . . In o ther words, only in so far as I can grasp the m anifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine. For otherw ise I should have as many-coloured a n d diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself.9

Moreover, just as the relationship between perception and experience is developm ental in the growth of the individual psyche, so the consciousness of self is the product of th a t evolu­ tion from perception to the capacity for experience, an evolu­ tion that K ant regards as the child’s “developm ent in to hum an­ ity” (Entw icklung zur M enschheit)}0 In the period of “scattered perceptions” prior to the “time of experience,” the child “merely felt itself; now it thinks itself.” 11 And, again, as might be concluded from our discussion of the evolution from percep» Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. M artin's Press, 1965), pp. 155-154. 10 Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, in Gesammelte Schrif­ ten (Berlin: Prussian Academy of Sciences, 1917), VII, 128. 11 Ibid., p. 127: “V orher fühlte es bloss sich selbst, jetzt denkt es sich selbst/’

T h e psychological dimension

53

tion to experience, the attainm ent of selfhood, the progress from the self as simply the awareness accompanying all perception to the self as true self-consciousness, is accomplished through a process of confrontation w ith the external world. In other words, the consciousness of self is not simply given but must, in a sense, be achieved. An infant can feel, but it is not yet con­ scious of itself in the complex, active sense im plied by its later use of the pronoun “I.” T h e active, conscious, and progressive process of delim iting subjectivity from objectivity, “I ” from “not-I,” has not yet taken place, since there is only direct, simple awareness of sensation and feeling unm ediated by true con­ sciousness. T h e ‘I ” is not yet an object for consciousness. T h e final, distinctly conscious “1” is a product of various processes of delineation, requiring a variety of confrontations w ith “other­ ness” for the m ind to work with. In short, Kant, unlike Locke, distinguishes among the various levels of “selfhood,” particularly between, on the one hand, the simple basic, immediate, and essentially passive and unconscious “self” which is involved in sensation and, of course, underlies all experience; and on the other hand, the truly conscious self which is the end, rather than the beginning, of a m ental process, the self that becomes possible only when the “1” can become an object for consciousness. T h e original sensate “self”—if it can, in fact, be isolated and identified—is, of course, necessary to make experience possible; but the true, conscious self is a result of experience, a product of differentiation and com bination. T h e constitution of the self in the latter sense involves a synthesis of the discrete and passive sensations of the rudim entary "self” into a unity; and it is precisely the consciousness of this power of com bination, this “act of spontaneity,” that produces m an’s ex­ perience of himself as intelligence, as a free and spontaneous being—an experience that, as we have seen, is so central to K ant’s doctrine of freedom. Moreover, the process is one that arises out of a dialectical union of self and other, both in the sense th at it is a product of the interaction of subject and object, the activity

54

T he psychological dimension

of m ind and external objects, and in the sense that the self can arise only out of a prior unity w ith its environm ent, objects and other selves. T h e “I ” defines itself only through relationships with its “other,” particularly its “thou.” T h e Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer elaborates these points in such a way as to make them even more strikingly pertinent to the present discussion. In the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer suggests th at this inseparability of subject and object, self and other, has its social counterpart in the inseparability of individual and community. T he mythical form of consciousness that characterizes prim itive m an at first unites the self w ith the community and only progressively makes way for individuation. In this sense, as in others that will be discussed in the course of this study, the “ K antian” approach dialectically unites individu­ ality and community: T h e opposition of subject and object, the differentiation of the I from all given, determ inate things, is n o t the only form in which progress is m ade from a general, still undifferentiated life feeling to the consciousness o f the self. In the sphere of pure knowledge, it is true, progress consists above all in the differentiation of the principle of knowledge from its content, of the know er from the know n; b u t m ythical consciousness and religious feeling embrace a still more fundam ental contrast. H ere the I is oriented n o t im m ediately to­ w ard the outside w orld b u t ra th e r tow ard a personal existence and life sim ilar to it in kind. Subjectivity has as its correlate n o t some outw ard thing b u t ra th e r a “th o u ” o r “he," from which on the one

hand it distinguishes itself, but with which on the other hand it groups itself. T h is thou or he forms the true antithesis which the I requires in o rd e r to find and define itself. For here again the individual feeling an d consciousness of self stand n o t at the begin­ ning b u t at the e n d of the process of developm ent. In th e earliest stages to which we can trace back this developm ent we find the feeling of self im m ediately fused with a definite mythical-religious feeling of community. T h e I feels and knows itself only insofar as it takes itself as a m em ber of a com m unity, insofar as it sees itself grouped w ith others into the unity of a family, a tribe, a social organism. O nly in and through this social organism does it possess itself; every manifestation of its own personal existence an d life is

T h e psychological dim ension

55

linked, as though by invisible magic ties, w ith the life of the totality around it.12

Individuality and the Ego U p to now, our discussion has dealt more w ith the problem of freedom than w ith com m unity. Needless to say, the relation be­ tween self and other is significant for the problem of community largely insofar as “other” means not only inanim ate “objective” reality or external things but, above all, other men. Here, the relevance of the previously discussed subject-object problem rests largely on the degree to which other men must be regarded as the partners in the dialectical unity required for the process of individuation and the developm ent of ego—the degree to which, in other words, com m unity must be regarded as the con­ dition for individuality, and vice versa. T h e passage from Cas­ sirer cited above indicates how the subject-object relationship finds its social reflection in an individual-com m unity relation­ ship, and how the relationship between individuality and com­ m unity is reciprocal. T h e im plication of this dialectical view is that individualism is n o t synonymous with egoism. Far from seeing egoistic individualism as the natural, even logical, con­ sequence of m an’s unique capacity to be conscious of himself, this view regards self-consciousness and ego as both derived from and conducive to sociality. One aspect of this argum ent that is particularly worthy of elaboration concerns the im plications of the chronology of selfconsciousness and ego-development suggested by K antian psy­ chology. T h e im portance of the argum ent th at consciousness of self is not prim ary is obvious enough in its im plications for the relationship between the individual and other men. T h e argu­ ment becomes even more significant when transposed from the history of individual consciousness to the history of m ankind and the transition from nature to culture. All forms of the argu­ 12 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Sytnbolic Forms (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), Vol. II, “Myth," p. 175. Emphasis added.

56

The psychological dimension

ment appear in Kant, who discusses the derivative nature of self-consciousness in his Critique of Pure Reason, the lateness of the child’s ego-consciousness in his Anthropology, and the tran­ sition from an undifferentiated preconscious “life feeling” to a self-aware social consciousness in his “Conjectural Beginning of H um an History.” U nfortunately, however, K ant himself never elaborates the im plications of these views in any great detail; nor do his im m ediate successors concern themselves specifically with such psychological questions as the process of ego develop­ m ent and individuation. Nevertheless, we may perhaps allow ourselves the liberty of, in a sense, reconstructing a “ K antian” theory of child psychology by exam ining the view of a psycholo­ gist whose assumptions are strikingly K antian, not only with respect to the specific problem of individuality, b u t even with respect to the underlying theory of mind. A most detailed and explicit illustration of the im plications that certain K antian principles may have for these questions is provided by a m odem psychologist, Jean Piaget. T o justify the use of his example, however, a few words m ust be said first about Piaget’s theory of m ind and the sense in which it m ight be called K antian.18 It may be that Piaget’s form ulation will even serve to clarify to some extent K ant’s own theory of m ind. T o begin with, Piaget, like Kant, opposes his theory to tradi­ tional empiricism and its m odern heirs; and he does so not be­ cause of the im portance empiricism attaches to experience, but on the grounds that it assigns a purely passive, receptive role to the subject in experience. Here is how Piaget describes the doc­ trine he opposes: . . . In short, at every level, experience is necessary to the develop­ m ent of intelligence. T h a t is the fu n d am en tal fact on which em­ pirical hypotheses are based and which they have the m erit o f calling 18 Piaget himself acknowledges the affinities between his theory of m ind and that of Kant. See, for example, his T he Origin of Intelligence in Children, trans. M argaret Cook (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1963), pp. 376 ff. It must be said, however, th at Piaget does not seem to give Kant his due. As the subsequent quotations from Piaget will show, the affinities are more

profound than he admits.

T he psychological dimension

57

to attention. O n this question o u r analyses of the origin of the child’s intelligence confirm that p o in t of view. B ut there is m ore to em piricism than just an affirmation of the role of experience: E m ­ piricism is prim arily a certain conception of experience an d its action. O n the one hand, it tends to consider experience as im posing itself w ithout the subject’s having to organize it, th at is to say, as impressing itself directly on the organism w ithout activity of the subject being necessary to constitute it. O n the o th er hand, a n d as a result, em piricism regards experience as existing by itself and eith er ow ing its value to a system of external ready-made “things” and of given relations betw een those things (metaphysical em p iri­ cism) or consisting in a system of self-sufficient habits an d associa­ tions (phenom enalism ). T h is dual belief in the existence of an experience in itself and in its direct pressure on the subject's m ind explains, in the last analysis, why empiricism is necessarily associationist. Every m ethod of recording experience o th er than association in its different forms (conditioned reflex, “associative transfer," association of images, etc.) presupposes an intellectual activity p a r­ taking of the construction of the external reality perceived by the subject.14

T o this view according to which the subject is simply recep­ tive and the object is som ething that is given rather than consti­ tuted by the subject, Piaget opposes a conception of the active subject that, so to speak, participates in the creation of the ob­ ject—that is, objectifies experience by means of the synthetic activity of m ind. I t will be recalled that this notion that the object is not simply given but is rather the end product of m en­ tal synthesis plays an essential role in the K antian idea of self. It will be seen that this notion plays a similarly crucial role in Piaget’s account of the process of individuation, the differentia­ tion of “I ” from “not-I.” Like Kant, Piaget clearly distinguishes between simple sensation and a higher level of consciousness in which, through a process of m ental synthesis, experience is “ob­ jectified,” or, to p u t it another way, the self and objects of expe­ rience are differentiated from each other: T h e m ind, then, proceeds from pure phenom enalism whose re p re ­ sentations rem ain half-way betw een the body and the external en ­ H ibid., p. 562.

5