Migration, EU Integration and the Balkan Route (Southeast European Studies) [1 ed.] 9780367423063, 9781032590547, 9780367823405, 0367423065

Citation preview

Migration, EU Integration and the Balkan Route

Contributing to our understanding of the impact of the 2015 migrant “crisis” on the future of EU integration, this book views the “crisis” as an accelerant to existing problems, namely Brexit, the growing popularity of anti-immigrant far right parties and the rise of xenophobic and antiliberal governments from the Baltics to the Balkans. Providing analysis at the national, regional and EU level, this book shows how the countries on the migrant route have been affected according to their degree of integration with the EU and the specific socio-political and economic conditions of each country. The volume will be of interest to scholars of international relations, security studies, border studies, EU policies, migration studies and Southeast European studies. Marko Kmezić is a Senior Scientist and Lecturer at the Centre for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz, Austria. Alexandra Prodromidou is an Assistant Professor at the Business Administration and Economics Department of CITY College, University of York, Europe Campus and a Research Associate at the Southeast European Research Centre (SEERC) in Thessaloniki, Greece. Pavlos Gkasis is the Associate Dean of the Bachelor of Business Administration in Project Management program at Yorkville University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

Southeast European Studies Series Editor: Florian Bieber

The Balkans are a region of Europe widely associated over the past decades with violence and war. Beyond this violence, the region has experienced rapid change in recent times though, including democratization, economic and social transformation. New scholarship is emerging which seeks to move away from the focus on violence alone to an understanding of the region in a broader context drawing on new empirical research. The Southeast European Studies Series seeks to provide a forum for this new scholarship. Publishing cutting-edge, original research and contributing to a more profound understanding of Southeastern Europe while focusing on contemporary perspectives the series aims to explain the past and seeks to examine how it shapes the present. Focusing on original empirical research and innovative theoretical perspectives on the region the series includes original monographs and edited collections. It is interdisciplinary in scope, publishing high-level research in political science, history, anthropology, sociology, law and economics and accessible to readers interested in Southeast Europe and beyond. The Media as a Tool of International Intervention House of Cards Nidžara Ahmetašević The Balkan Route Hope, Migration and Europeanisation in Liminal Spaces Robert Rydzewski Decolonial Politics in European Peripheries Redefining Progressiveness, Coloniality and Transition Efforts Edited by Sanja S. Petkovska

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/Southeast-European-Studies/book-series/ASHSER1390

Migration, EU Integration and the Balkan Route

Edited by Marko Kmezić, Alexandra Prodromidou and Pavlos Gkasis

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Marko Kmezić, Alexandra Prodromidou and Pavlos Gkasis; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Marko Kmezić, Alexandra Prodromidou and Pavlos Gkasis to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-0-367-42306-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-59054-7 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-82340-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405 Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

Contents

About the contributors   1 Contextualizing refugee ‘crisis’ and EU integration: interrelatedness and mutual reciprocity

vii

1

PAVLOS GKASIS AND MARKO KMEZIĆ

  2 The EU integration project through the lens of the Balkan-route ‘migrant crisis’

12

IRYNA KUSHNIR, MAJELLA KILKEY AND FRANCESCA STRUMIA

  3 EU-Turkey relations and the migration issue: transactionalism in action

34

DIMITRIS TSAROUHAS

  4 The migration/refugee crisis and the (un/re)making of Europe: risks and challenges for Greece

50

DIMITRIS KERIDIS

  5 The Balkan human corridor and the case of North Macedonia

63

ZORAN ILIEVSKI AND HRISTINA RUNCHEVA TASEV

  6 The impact of the “refugee crisis” on European integration in the field of asylum and migration: a Serbian perspective

80

STEFAN SURLIĆ

  7 Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route? ARMINA GALIJAŠ

93

vi  Contents   8 Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary: from discourse to practice

113

ANDRÁS SZALAI

  9 Germany after “2015”: still a country of immigration and asylum?

130

MARCUS ENGLER

10 Conclusions: the crisis of migrants as opposed to the migrant ‘crisis’ and the crisis of European solidarity

148

MARKO KMEZIĆ

Index

157

About the contributors

Marcus Engler Dr. Marcus Engler is a migration researcher and political consultant. He currently works at the German Centre for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIMInstitute) in Berlin. He is intensively studying refugee and migration movements as well as German, European and global refugee and migration policy. Engler studied Social Sciences and Economics at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po) in Paris. He then completed his doctorate in Sociology at Humboldt University and at the Franco-German research Centre Marc Bloch. In recent years, Engler has held various positions in migration research and policy advice. Among others, he worked at the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR), for the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Humboldt University of Berlin and the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) at the University of Osnabrück. He is a board member of the German Network for Forced Migration Studies. Armina Galijaš Dr. Armina Galijaš, M.A., is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz since 2011. She studied Eastern and Southeastern European History, Modern History and Economics at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. After graduating she worked at the same University from 2003 to 2005. From 2005 to 2011, she was a researcher and lecturer at the Department of East European History at the University of Vienna where she also obtained her Ph.D. in History. Her research interests and academic teaching focus on modern Southeast European history. She is Editor-in-Chief of Contemporary Southeastern Europe. Pavlos Gkasis Dr. Pavlos Gkasis is the Associate Dean of the Bachelor of Business Administration in Project Management program at Yorkville University, Toronto, Ontario,

viii  About the contributors Canada. He has worked as a professor and economist with 17 years of combined academic and professional experience. As an academic leader and professor, he has achieved excellence in administration, research, scholarly activity and research-led teaching. He has authored and co-authored multiple successful funded research projects. His research interests include international business, technological diffusion, knowledge spillovers, multinational enterprises, foreign direct investment, macroeconomic analysis, financial economics, international economics and trade, political economy and migration. Zoran Ilievski Professor Zoran Ilievski, Ph.D. (Skopje), M.E.S. (Graz), is a tenured Professor of Political Science and Head of the Center for Policy Research and Analysis of the Faculty of Law at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. He is also heading the SEE Office of the Global Council for Tolerance and Peace. Ilievski has worked on research and policy advisory projects with Columbia University in New York City, the University of Graz, LSE, European Academy of Bolzano/Bozen, SEERC Thessaloniki and the University of Zurich. His research interests include international relations, regulation and accommodation of ethnic conflicts, power-sharing arrangements and European Integration. Dimitris Keridis Professor Dimitris Keridis is a member of the Greek Parliament, representing Athens-North for the centre-right party of New Democracy. He is a Professor of International Politics at Panteion University of Athens and the Founding Director of the Navarino Network in Thessaloniki and the Olympia Summer Academy. He has taught at many universities in Greece and abroad and is a regular TV political commentator. He has published extensively on international politics, including books on nationalism and ethnic conflict, US foreign policy and Greek-Turkish relations. Majella Kilkey Majella Kilkey is a Professor of Social Policy at the University of Sheffield, UK. Her work is in the field of migration studies, with particular focus on the intersections between migration and families/care/gender/ageing/geopolitical transformations. She is Principal Investigator on the project Storying Life Courses for Intersectional Inclusion: Ethnicity and Wellbeing Across Time and Place (2022–2025), funded under the ESRC’s Inclusive Ageing programme; and Co-Investigator in the ESRC’s Centre for Care (2021–2026), leading a programme of work on borders and care. She also currently holds a number of externally funded international research grants. These include two EU H2020-funded projects on which she is University of Sheffield Principal Investigator: Empowerment through Liquid Integration of Migrant Youth in Vulnerable Conditions [MIMY] (2020–2023) and Migration,

About the contributors  ix Integration and Governance Research Centre [MIGREC] (2019-2023). She is a member of the Management Committee of the COST Action Transnational Family Dynamics in Europe (2022–2026). Marko Kmezić Dr. Marko Kmezić is a lawyer and political scientist working at the Centre for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz. He is the author of several scientific monographs including EU Rule of Law Promotion: Judiciary Reform in the Western Balkans” (2016), and co-editor of “Stagnation and Drift in the Western Balkans” (2013) and Europeanization of the Western Balkans: The Failure of Conditionality? (2019). His work includes expert advice on rule of law for the EC, the OSCE and the CoE, and to governments and international organizations in the Balkans. Iryna Kushnir Dr. Iryna Kushnir is currently a Senior Lecturer in Education Studies at Nottingham Trent University. Her interdisciplinary research combines the following main areas: higher education policy and sociology, European integration and social justice. She is particularly interested in the higher education policy and politics of the European Higher Education Area. Her interdisciplinary approach has led to empirical and theoretical contributions, which reveal how education policy on one hand and Europeanization processes and post-Soviet transition on the other hand are interrelated and mutually shape one another. A wider societal impact of Kushnir’s work is in co-establishing and co-developing the Ukrainian Education Research Association which has become the biggest national research association in Ukraine and a hub for education research and quality. Alexandra Prodromidou Dr. Alexandra Prodromidou is an Assistant Professor at the Business Administration and Economics Department of CITY College, University of York, Europe Campus and a Research Associate at the Southeast European Research Centre (SEERC) in Thessaloniki, Greece. She is also a Research Associate at the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI) of the University of Sheffield, UK. In the field of migration her research interests include the post-2015 migrant “crisis” and migrant integration in Southeast Europe. She has extensive experience in EU-funded Jean Monnet Networks Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 project management on the topic of migration. She has published with Routledge, Palgrave and SAGE. Hristina Runcheva Tasev Dr. Hristina Runcheva Tasev is an Associate Professor at the Political Science Department of the Law Faculty “Iustinianus Primus”, Ss. Cyril and Methodius

x  About the contributors University in Skopje. Her primary teaching and research interests focus on public policy, political system of the EU, regulation and accommodation of ethnic conflicts. She is an author of numerous scientific articles and has participated in many domestic and international projects. She has been a Member of Parliament for two terms and has also served as a foreign policy associate in the Cabinet of the Speaker of the Parliament. She is a founder and Vice President of the International Academic Institute. Francesca Strumia Francesca Strumia is a Professor of Law at City, University of London, where she teaches in the areas of Immigration, EU and Public Law. Her research focuses on the relation between the status of citizenship and rights of international mobility, on the cosmopolitan role of the sovereign state, and on skilled migration law and policy. Prior to joining City, Francesca was a Lecturer and Senior Lecturer at the University of Sheffield School of Law. She has taught and held research fellowships at the University of Torino, at the Collegio Carlo Alberto in Torino, at Harvard Law School and at New England School of Law in Boston. She is admitted to the Bar in Italy and in New York State and has practised law in leading international law firms in London and Milan. Stefan Surlić Stefan Surlić is an Assistant Professor at the University of Belgrade’s Faculty of Political Science. His academic interests include comparative analysis of political institutions, ethnically divided societies and democratization and constitutional design in post-conflict societies. Since 2013, he has been an Associate Researcher at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Balkans (CISBalk). Surlić is actively involved in activities related to Belgrade-Pristina relations and potential modalities towards normalization. He initiated the first academic cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina and served as the editor of the publication Perspectives of a Multiethnic Society in Kosovo. In the field of migration, his scientific and research interests lie within the nexus between migration and post-conflict management and societal integration policies for migrants in power-sharing models. He is currently focused on Serbia’s role in overcoming the challenges of the 2015 refugee crisis, the possible acceptance of refugee quotas and the dissemination of institutional capacities to integrate asylum seekers. András Szalai Dr. András Szalai is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies of Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) and a Research Associate at the Democracy Institute of Central European University, Budapest. His current research deals with the symbolic use of borders in mitigating ontological insecurities, and the securitization of migration as a societal control mechanism.

About the contributors  xi Szalai’s work has appeared in outlets such as International Relations, Millennium and European Review of International Studies. Dimitris Tsarouhas Dr. Dimitris Tsarouhas is a Visiting Professor of Political Science, Virginia Tech, and Associate Director of Research at the Center for European Union and Transatlantic Studies (CEUTTSS). He is a Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and a Scientific Council Member of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS). Tsarouhas is the co-editor (with Owen Parker) of Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery: The Political Economies of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland (2018), author of Social Democracy in Sweden: The Threat from a Globalized World (2008) and co-editor of Bridging the Real Divide: Social and Regional Policy in Turkey’s EU Accession Process (2007). His research has been published in numerous book volumes and journals such as Regulation & Governance, New Political Economy, Journal of European Integration, Public Administration, Comparative European Politics, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Social Politics, Social Policy & Administration, Political Studies Review, Armed Forces & Society, European Journal of Industrial Relations and Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.

1

Contextualizing refugee ‘crisis’ and EU integration Interrelatedness and mutual reciprocity Pavlos Gkasis and Marko Kmezić

1 Migrant ‘crisis’ and the Western Balkan route The world is currently facing the biggest wave of mass migration since the Second World War. The most obvious example of this phenomenon is occurring in the European periphery, in the wider basin of the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East. From 2014 until 2021, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR 2023) believes that more than nine million refugees and migrants have entered Europe. The scale of movement peaked in 2015 with over four million refugees and migrants arriving from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries fraught with by armed conflict and persecution. In subsequent years, the number of refugees arriving to Europe has gradually decreased, mostly due to measures imposed to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus, such as border closures, and negative impact of the coronavirus on global economy. Nevertheless, since 2021, amid deteriorating global security, new and/or renewed conflicts, and worsening climatic factors, flows have once again started to increase, with predictions suggesting an upward trend (see Grieveson, Landesmann and Mara 2021). In 2022, around 330,000 irregular crossings were detected at EU’s external border, according to preliminary European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) calculations (2023). This is the highest refugee influx since 2016, marking an increase of 64% from the previous year. Not included in these figures are almost 13 million Ukrainian refugees who crossed the EU’s external land borders from Ukraine and Moldova from February 24, 2022 onwards fleeing the Russian invasion. As unprecedented numbers of people continue being pushed towards Europe, it is becoming increasingly clear that there is no end in sight to mass migration of individuals in pursuit of better and more stable life. Migration to Europe is by no means a new phenomenon (see Fauri 2015). However, never before have individuals been coming to Europe in such unprecedently high numbers. The migration wave erupted in 2014 with some 170,000 refugees, mainly Syrians and sub-Saharan Africans, reaching Italy by small inflatable boats from Libya and Egypt. But the situation took a dramatic turn when in 2015 as Greece overtook Italy as the most popular gateway to Europe in the light of the war in Libya and visa restrictions for Syrian refugees imposed by Egypt. Alongside thousands of citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq fleeing instable situations in their DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405-1

2  Pavlos Gkasis and Marko Kmezić home countries, seemingly overnight hundreds of thousands of Syrians started departing from Turkey to the Greek islands, thus shifting the formerly generally Western European challenge of accommodating large number of migrants into a problem for southeastern Europe as well. Since 2014, almost one million irregular migrants pushed their way north-­ westward from Greece in the hope of reaching the stability and prosperity of the Western Europe. On their march, migrants who arrived to Greek mainland initially tried to make their way via North Macedonia, Serbia, and into Hungary and Croatia and then further towards Western Europe. Paradoxically, this meant that migrants who already entered the EU in Greece would now have to re-enter EU’s border through Hungary or Croatia. In 2015, these transit countries came to be called the ‘Western Balkan route’. The Western Balkan route refers to the corridor used for irregular arrivals in the EU through Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. The route was officially declared closed in March 2016 with the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement, which mandated that all migrants and asylum seekers who irregularly arrived in the EU should return to Turkey (European Council 2016). According to the deal, Turkey was promised six billion Euros in exchange for taking back huge numbers of migrants (Baracani and Sarotto 2023). However, despite of the agreed externalization of border management to third countries (Lazaridis and Wadia 2015), facts have shown that this route has not been completely closed, rather it has become even more dangerous for migrants trying to reach Europe. Since 2015, the Western Balkan route became (see Beznec, Speer and Stojić Mitrović 2016) and has remained at the time of writing this book one of the main migratory paths into Europe (Halla 2022). As the migrants’ real drama unfolded on the European periphery (See Ballinger 2017), the unprecedented influx of migrants had caused colossal disagreements across the European Union (Lukšič Hacin, Kogovšeg Šalamon and Žagar 2019). In 2015, facing severe pressure as regards their national capacities to process, accommodate, and care for incoming irregular migrants, Italy and Greece attempted convincing other EU member states to share the burden of the crisis by providing for better-coordinated assistance to the frontline Member states dealing with the increase in irregular migration and to provide greater uniformity in immigration procedures across all Member states (Zoppi and Puleri 2022). As of late summer 2015, the EU has seen heated debates and an East-West divide over the reception of migrants and their re-distribution within Europe as immerged (see Balkan and Kutlu Tonak 2022; Funk 2016; Gruber 2017; Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2016; Tawat 2017). Barbed wire fences were constructed along five borders, outside of and within the Schengen area (Cocco 2017). Internal border controls within the EU member countries were ‘temporarily’ reintroduced (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017). This marked the first time in 20 years that the EU’s open border regime was de facto cancelled. On the national level, several EU Member states initiated amendments to their asylum legislation, in most cases aimed at tightening restrictions on the rights of asylum seekers (Ripoll Servent 2019). Across the Union, public debate about migration took a rather nationalistic turn (see Brubaker 2017; Funk et al. 2017; Grace and Heins 2021; Ruzza 2019),

Contextualizing refugee ‘crisis’ and EU integration  3 especially following a terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015, despite of the lack of clear link between the event and the surge of refuges to the EU (Krzyzanowski, Trianafyllidou and Wodak 2018). In such a context, one of the EU’s fundamental principles, solidarity among Member states, seemed to have completely disappeared (Dinan, Nugent and Paterson 2017). The so-called migrant ‘crisis,’ as it has become widely known as since the summer of 2015, has became one of the biggest threats to the cohesion of the European Union in the organization’s history (Youngs 2017). But how should one understand the concept of the migrant ‘crisis’? Surely, a crisis was unfolding, but it was mostly caused by European politicians who failed to effectively handle the influx of irregular migrants and not by the migrants themselves. As Mandić (2023) has already pointed out, the true crisis was one of European negligence, chauvinism, and lack of solidarity. Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017) hence critically analysed the implications of the migrant ‘crisis’ for the EU’s existence in general, while several authors had juxtaposed the connection between the migrant ‘crisis’ and a plethora of complementary European crises, such as the crisis of the Eurozone (Falkner 2016) and the security crisis (see Balkan 2016, Bello 2022). Taggart and Szczerbiak (2018) convincingly demonstrated how the migrant ‘crisis’ was misused in order to strengthen Euroscepticism in the EU. In contrast to this segmented framing of the multiplicity of the ongoing crisis, we suggest that these are rather interlinked through a larger crisis the EU is currently facing. In this volume, we will argue that all these various crises, foremost must be seen as a crisis of liberal democracy and of compromise-based decision-making and cooperation at the European level, which we will in turn link to deep and lasting consequences for the future of EU integration. 2 Perplexing narratives This work sets itself apart as it strives to observe the 2015 migrant ‘crisis’ as an accelerant for already existing crises affecting the EU integration project. Conceptually, therefore, we do not perceive the crisis as a result of a series of individual developments and events, such as the so-called migrant ‘crisis’, but also the Brexit vote in the UK, the increase in popularity of anti-immigrant far right parties in Europe, or the rise of xenophobic and anti-liberal governments from the Baltics to the Balkans, but rather as a part of a larger pattern. Namely, the ongoing migrant ‘crisis’ coincides with the biggest challenge to liberal democracy the EU has seen since the end of World War Two. Since 2008, the EU has lost much of its economic appeal as some countries in the EU have struggled with the economic crisis, high-debt, and impoverishment. Shortly after, starting in 2010, the rise of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán revealed that the EU could no longer credibly claim that membership can safeguard democratic institutions. Finally, since 2015, the badly prepared response of EU members to the influx of irregular migrants, the rise of both anti-immigrant sentiment and the number of terrorist attacks by ISIS-inspired or -supported individuals or groups, the sense of stability and certainty that EU membership once projected has declined. The aforementioned contextual setting means that Europe has faced the wave of irregular migrants unprepared, divided, and weak.

4  Pavlos Gkasis and Marko Kmezić The conflicting proposals by different EU member states on how to cope with the ongoing migrant ‘crisis’ raised awareness around the current state of the EU and its institutions giving the impression that national leaders were unable to design a coherent strategy (Bröning and Mohr 2018). Meanwhile, political actors opposing the project of European integration as well as populist parties close to the EU took the occasion to set an agenda reducing EU responsibilities with the desired to reempower the nation-states (Gruber and Rosenbergeg 2023). These efforts found their success in the outcome of the Brexit referendum in June 2016. Furthermore, growing Eurosceptic narrative has been embraced by authoritarian political leaders within the EU, such as Viktor Orban in Hungary, who exploited the situation to deepen the societal capture and further undermine crumbling EU fundamental values as defined in the Treaty on EU (Grimmel 2017). Finally, dissonant voices from the EU on how to handle the migrant ‘crisis’ along the Balkan route had negative repercussions for Western Balkan EU membership candidate countries (Webb 2022). The badly prepared EU response to the challenges of managing the Western Balkan migrant route created opportunity for a more hands on approach to the problem by neighbouring EU member states, such as Hungary or Austria. This has ultimately allowed for the deepening of the symbiotic relationship between Balkan authoritarian strongmen and Eurosceptics within the EU, whereby EU politicians would regularly turn a blind eye to domestic undemocratic practices as long as the Western Balkan regimes continued to providing a sense of external stability by means of cooperatively managing the Western Balkan migrant route. This led to the consolidation of political systems which Bieber and Kmezić describe as stabilitocracies, known to combine semi-authoritarian features, while claiming to be reforming democracies receiving external support, in particular from EU member states, for the sake of the (false) promise of stability (Kmezić and Bieber 2017). Based on these conceptual insights, this volume aims to contribute a better understanding of the impact of the so-called 2015 migrant ‘crisis’ on the future of EU integration with a particular focus on the region of southeast Europe by observing the interrelatedness and mutual reciprocity of these processes. We also introduce some theoretical innovations that are needed in order to address the effects of migration on EU integration, stemming from the actions of the states lying on migrant transit routes to those that are seen as the arrival countries for migrants. The empirical focus rests on the interplay of political dynamics that has unfolded in both direct and indirect relation to the migrant ‘crisis’, and EU integration policies towards the Western Balkans, starting with the so-called long summer of migration of 2015. Eventually in 2018 EU policy innovations, which will be described in detail, managed to seemingly bring the spiralling situation back under control. This book traces the route followed by migrants, from the first point of arrival to Europe, through transit countries, and finally to their end destination. Through qualitative and quantitative data, we follow, within a cross-national comparative perspective, the wide set of political actions and initiatives that continue to shape the journey of the migrants along the Balkan route on their path to the European Union where they seek asylum. Furthermore, we address these political actions and initiatives’ important role on the processes of EU integration, which for the needs

Contextualizing refugee ‘crisis’ and EU integration  5 of this volume we understand broadly as both structuring and strengthening the relationships among the existing and exiting Member states, as well as enlarging to include new Member states. Through the prism of EU integration, this book illuminates a broader perspective of the migrant ‘crisis’, particularly its political and societal repercussions. To this end, we compile a wide variety of case studies from those European countries that find themselves situated along the Western Balkan migrant route, or in their position as popular destination countries. The countries on the corridor have been affected according to the degree of their integration with the EU and the specific socio-political and economic conditions of each country. Analysis is done in three different levels: at the national level, where the impact of the migrant crisis is investigated in the various countries; at the Balkan regional level, where the impact and value of Western Balkan EU integration is investigated; and at the EU level, where the impact of the crisis is investigated through EU mobility policies. Despite this diverse approach, we aim to provide a coherent picture, as all cases are structured through a number of common questions concerning the country’s discourse on the unique interdependence between the migrant ‘crisis’ and European integration. The conducted research covers the period immediately before, during, and after the migrant crisis and follows a qualitative approach, which includes semi-­structured interviews, elite interviews, desk research, and descriptive statistical analysis. 3 Book structure This edited volume is structured around a mental map of the Western Balkan route. Central ideas of the book are to examine the peculiarity of the route comprised of diverse countries with different set of contractual relations to the EU, i.e. EU member states (Germany, Greece, and Hungary), former EU member state (UK), and EU candidate countries (Turkey, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia), to critically question the impact of EU decisions related to managing the migrant ‘crisis’ on these countries, as well as to assess the interrelatedness of migration politics with the process of EU integration. Already existing crises and political tendencies in each specific country will not be neglected or left out of the analysis. The order of book chapters follows footsteps of migrants entering Europe through Turkey and progressing through the Balkans on their path to Western Europe. In Chapter 2, Iryna Kushnir, Majella Kilkey, and Francesca Strumia examine the impact on the EU integration project of the European migrant ‘crisis’ along the Balkan corridor. Understanding EU integration as encompassing both deepening and widening of the Union, the authors hypothesize uneven and differentiated impact of EU policies according to specific countries’ positioning in relation to the EU project and in relation to the ‘migrant crisis’. In order to test this assumption, Kushnir, Kilkey, and Strumia distinguish between not only candidate countries, existing EU member states, and exiting Member states, i.e. the UK, but also between frontline reception countries, transit countries, and countries of preferred destination. Drawing on data from a mixed methods study, which consisted of popular

6  Pavlos Gkasis and Marko Kmezić discourse analysis, policy analysis, and elite interviews with policy-makers at the EU level and selected national levels, their main finding is that the ‘migrant crisis’ exposed pre-existing weaknesses and tensions in the institutional architecture of the EU and in the understanding of the integration project on the part of different actors especially on the national level. This has resulted in: (1) the slowing down and questioning of the ultimate desirability of further enlargement; (2) the reinforcing of the aspiration for the creation of a ‘two tier’ EU; (3) the contribution to EU disintegration in the case of the UK by generating confusion over the categories of migrants, and thus, reinforcing pro-Brexit sentiments. The rich and diverse insights in Chapter 2 may in due course contribute to a new understanding and conceptualization of emerging studies of EU disintegration. In Chapter 3, Dimitris Tsarouhas study on Turkey and the European migration crisis, which the author dubs an ‘apprehensive cooperation’, fills a gap in the EU – Turkey relations studies in its attempt to empirically quantify most significant explanatory factors that account for the negative outcome of Turkey’s EU enlargement. Deriving hypothesis from the key approaches in academic literature on the transactional character of EU-Turkey relations leads the author to examine the migration and migrant ‘crisis’, as well as its aftermath, in light of stagnated EU– Turkey relations. The study rightly highlights the relative success story of the EU – Turkey 2016 agreement which effectively halted unprecedently high waves of irregular migration to the EU by means of externalizing control over EU borders to a third country in exchange for promised financial support. However, Tsarouhas proceeds with his analysis to the field of Europeanization studies, where he provides critical comment related to the third action point of the EU – Turkey agreement, namely the ‘re-energizing the enlargement process’. The author provides an analytical reflection of skewed power leverage based on the EU’s reliance on Turkey to protect EU’s border frontiers, which in turn de facto deprives the Union from using conditionality in order to impact democratic and socio-economic convergence of Turkey, thus leaving it in EU’s waiting room without no foreseeable accession date in sight. The author concludes with a note of concern that although Turkey has become a valuable partner for the Union on issues of joint interest, but it has been gradually removed from the circle of EU membership candidate countries and downgraded to the level of EU ‘partner’ on an ad hoc basis. The fourth chapter, prepared by Dimitris Keridis, shifts its focus across the Aegean Sea to Greece, the first point of entry into the EU for migrants traveling the Western Balkan route. The study, which pragmatically investigates the main repercussions the crisis had for Greece regarding both its internal and external affairs, not only provides a means of analysing and assessing the place of the migrant ‘crisis’ in light of the Greek government-debt crisis – it also considers the nature of the horizontal EU integration amid the interrelated and multiple crisis’s Greece had been simultaneously exposed to. The authors are structuring their study in two main parts, whereas the first part describes the immigration and migrant ‘crisis’ itself, from a global, European, and national-Greek perspective. The second part provides empirically rich explanatory analysis of different policy responses implemented by the Greek government and clarify how these resonate with the

Contextualizing refugee ‘crisis’ and EU integration  7 cacophony of policy choices proposed by various EU member states, especially by Germany under the Chancellor Angela Merkel. The authors conclude that not only the several concurrent crises but also geostrategic considerations of Turkey and EU relations decisively predisposed the Greek answer to the problem of the Western Balkan corridor. Thus, it constitutes another critical case study with findings potentially extending far beyond the question of migrant ‘crisis’ and also beyond the borders of Greece. The next chapter, ‘The Balkan Human Corridor and the case of North Macedonia’ by Zoran Ilievski and Hristina Runcheva Tasev, comes from a rather different point of view. It is informed by legal research of relevant laws and norms that have been adopted in the course of managing the Western Balkans migrant route. Its exploration of migrant ‘crisis’ and EU integration resonates well with the preceding chapter. It sheds light on the political, economic, and social consequences of the mixed migration flows moving through North Macedonia by taking a snap shot of tension between the securitized and de-securitized discourse which is analysed from the perspective of the domestic political divide. The ‘old versus new Europe’ paradigm especially in the light of the terror attacks in European capitals is also taken into consideration. It raises interesting questions about the observed nexus between the EU, EU Members states, and North Macedonia’s policies during the European migrant crisis. The study concludes with an assessment of the effects that EU enlargement with the Western Balkan countries could have on offering viable solutions to the migration flows in the decades to come. Stefan Surlić’s contribution considers the question of the impact of the migrant ‘crisis’ on Serbia’s EU integration prospects in the context of institutional and normative harmonization of migration and asylum policies. Through the perspective the dynamics between Serbia, a candidate country for EU membership, and EU policies for the initial deterrence and later management of the 2015 migrant ‘crisis’ this chapter looks into the degree of policy adaptation of Serbia to the EU’s response to the influx of migrants inside the framework of its potential EU membership. Although the EU has placed migration policy at the centre of the relations with the aspiring Member states, the Western Balkan countries, including Serbia, have adopted the system due to the experience of a rapid influx of migrants during 2015. The author, on the one hand, points out that the new legal framework on asylum and temporary protection improves the status of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers who have found themselves in the territory of Serbia, but, on the other hand, he identifies that there are objective reasons for Serbia’s limited capacity for migrant integration. Surlić concludes that despite inclusive legislation, the absence of a credible EU membership path possibly implies negative consequences for the integration of migrants and refugees into Serbian society. Andras Szalai’s chapter explores the Hungarian anti-migration campaign through the context of securitization theory. It departs from the observation that the current Hungarian discourse on migration bears striking resemblance to Western European discursive structures of the 1990s and early 2000s, despite the liberal borrowing of tried and tested frames, the author argues that the securitization

8  Pavlos Gkasis and Marko Kmezić campaign in Hungary is unique due the conditions underlying its inception and its evolution. To highlight this, crucial gap between discourse and context, this chapter relies on a refined version of securitization theory – one popularized by Thierry Balzacq – that moves beyond the narrow speech act focus of the Copenhagen School, and expands on it to include practices and processes of securitization. Szalai sees securitization as a pragmatic act and tests three assumptions, namely that effective securitization is audience-centred, context-dependent, and power-laden. He highlights how, despite discursive similarities, various European societies are receptive to different constructions of security, which also include non-discursive elements. The chapter concludes by drawing attention to the role non-traditional de-securitization actors can play, and to the role of non-policies as securitization tools, i.e. the elite’s deliberate neglect of an issue for the purposes of securitization. The chapter by Armina Galijaš examines the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a new hotspot on the officially closed Balkan route with a particular focus on the impact of closed borders on the already weak Bosnian state. The chapter reflects on the Balkan route after its formal closure and the interaction of weak statehood, restrictive external EU borders, and their impact on migrants and their position in a post-conflict environment. Galijaš’s empirically rich analysis emphasizes the reactions of civil society and media, especially in the peripheral Krajina region in north-western Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as that of the state authorities. The chapter provides fascinating findings on the institutional response in terms of legal measures and the infrastructural facilities meant to accommodate migrants in the context of EU standards. It concludes that the response of the Bosnian state to the migrants’ situation was a patchwork of ad hoc solutions, which if compared to the context of neighbouring transit countries is quite unique. Galijaš ends her study with a critical discourse towards Bosnia and Herzegovina’s policy makers amid the noted lack of strategic choices and absence of collaboration with relevant civil society representatives. Last but not least we turn to Markus Engler’s work on the European implications of the migrant ‘crisis’ from a German point of view. This is a welcome contribution to this book, which would have been incomplete without a consideration of the perspective of Germany, one of the most influential EU member states, whose role has been crucial in responding to the challenges of the Balkan route. As the author eloquently notes, a number of actors in German and European political arenas are claiming that the high influx of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016 was mainly the result of an intentional invitation or open-door policy by the German government. Nevertheless, Engler’s main finding overrides this assumption by convincingly demonstrating that the influx of migrants is to be understood as a combination of factors, all of which laid beyond the scope of governmental influence. According to the author, they consisted of a high number of forcibly displaced people in the European periphery, the failure of international community to offer durable solutions in the conflict region, a lack of cooperation at the EU level, previously existing ties to Germany, and the relative economic attractiveness of Germany. This chapter goes on to discuss the impact of the migrant ‘crisis’ on German policy-making, its

Contextualizing refugee ‘crisis’ and EU integration  9 political system, civil society, economy, as well as the broader EU-level implications of the migrant ‘crisis’ from a German point of view with regard to the further integration of asylum policies and more generally to EU integration. To conclude, we would like to thank to all those who have supported the development of this edited volume from its inception to competition. Mostly to the European Commission’s Erasmus+ Jean Monnet Actions programme whose generous funding enabled establishing of a MIGRATE network for the period between 2016 and 2019. The partners comprising the consortium that participated in the production of the book are the Southeast European Research Centre (Greece), Bilkent University (Turkey), the Navarino Network (Greece), the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University (Skopje, North Macedonia), the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Belgrade (Serbia), the Central European University (Hungary), the Centre for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz (Austria), the Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung (Berlin, Germany), and the University of Sheffield, (UK). MIGRATE aimed to create a trans-European forum for debate and dialogue and build a network of researchers, with expertise on EU Integration, Western Balkan Integration, Migration, Political Economy, Sociology, Law, Politics, and Economics. The project focused on EU integration processes through investigating the impact of the ongoing post-2014 migrant crisis as a trigger event of instability and transformation in Europe. Finally, we would like to thank to all the authors of individual chapters in this edited volume for their valuable and innovative input that shed new light on the topic of migration and EU integration. We hope that readers who are new to these topics as well as experts in various fields will enjoy reading these collected works. Bibliography Balkan, Erol and Kutlu Tonak, Zümray. 2022. Refugees on the Move: Crisis and Response in Turkey and Europe, Berghahn. Balkan, Osman. 2016. ‘Disorder at the Border: Europe’s “Migrant Crisis” in Comparative Perspective,’ Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 16 (1), 116–120. Ballinger, Pamela. 2017. ‘Whatever Happened to Eastern Europe? Revisiting Europe’s Eastern Peripheries,’ East European Politics and Societies, 31 (1), 44–67. Baracani, Elena and Sarotto, Virginia. 2023. ‘The European Commission’s Role in EU–­ Turkey Migration: Political Leadership through Strategic Framing,’ West European Politics, 46 (3), 573–599. Bello, Valeria. 2022. ‘The Spiralling of the Securitisation of Migration in the EU: From the Management of a “Crisis” to a Governance of Human Mobility?,’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48 (6), 1327–1344. Beznec, Barbara, Speer, Marc and Stojić Mitrović, Marta. 2016. ‘Governing the Balkan Route: Macedonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime’, Research Paper Series of Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe, 5. Bröning, Michael and Mohr, Christoph P. (Eds.). 2018. The Politics of Migration and the Future of the European Left, Verlag J.H.W. Dietz. Brubaker, Robert. 2017. ‘Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40 (8), 1191–1226.

10  Pavlos Gkasis and Marko Kmezić Cocco, Emilio. 2017. ‘Where is the European Frontier? The Balkan Migration Crisis and Its Impact on Relations between the EU and the Western Balkans’, European View, 16, 293–302. Czymara, Christian S. and Schmidt-Catran, Alexander. 2017. ‘Refugees Unwelcome? Changes in the Public Acceptance of Immigrants and Refugees in Germany in the Course of Europe’s “Immigration Crisis”,’ European Sociological Review, 33, 735–751. Della Porta, Daniela. 2018. Solidarity Mobilizations in the ‘Refugee Crisis’: Contentious Moves, Palgrave MacMillan. Dinan, Desmond, Nugent, Neill, and Paterson, William E. (Eds.). 2017. The European Union in Crisis, Palgrave. European Council, ‘EU-Turkey Statement,’ March 18, 2016. Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ Falkner, Gerda. 2016. ‘The EU’s current crisis and its policy effects: research design and comparative finding,’ Journal of European Integration, 38 (3), 219–235. Fauri, Francesca (Ed.). 2015. The History of Migration in Europe Perspectives from Economics, Politics and Sociology, Routledge. FRONTEX, ‘EU’s External Borders in 2022: Number of Irregular Border Crossings Highest Since 2016,’ January 13, 2023. Available at https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/ news/news-release/eu-s-external-borders-in-2022-number-of-irregular-border-crossingshighest-since-2016-YsAZ29 Funk, Nanette. 2016. ‘A Spectre in Germany: Refugees, a “Welcome Culture” and an “Integration Politics”,’ Journal of Global Ethics, 12 (3), 289–299. Funk, Marco, Giusto, Hedwig, Rinke, Timo and Bruns, Olaf (Eds.). 2017. European Public Opinion and Migration. Achieving Common Progressive Narratives, Foundation of European Progressive Studies. Greussing, Esther and Boomgaarden, Hajo. 2017. ‘Shifting the Refugee Narrative? An Automated Frame Analysis of Europe’s 2015 Refugee Crisis,’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43 (11), 1749–1774. Grieveson, Richard, Landesmann, Michael and Mara, Isilda. 2021. Future Migration Flows to the EU: Adapting Policy to the New Reality in a Managed and Sustainable Way. Policy Notes and Reports 49. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies. Grimmel, Andreas (Ed.). 2017. The Crisis of the European Union: Challenges, Analyses, Solutions, Routledge. Gruber, Oliver. 2017. ‘“Refugees (No Longer) Welcome”. Asylum Discourse and Policy in Austria in the Wake of the 2015 Refugee Crisis’, in Barlai, Melani, Fähnrich, Birte, Griessler Christina, and Rhomberg, Markus (eds), The Migrant Crisis: European Perspectives and National Discourses, LIT, 39–57. Gruber, Oliver and Rosenberger, Sieglinde. 2023. ‘Between Opportunities and Constraints: Right-Wing Populists as Designers of Migrant Integration Policy,’ Policy Studies, 44 (2), 155–173. Halla, Barbara. 2022. ‘Western Balkan Migrant Route Most Used in 2022,’ EURACTIV, Jun 14. Available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/western-balkanmigrant-route-most-used-in-2022/ Jeandesboz, Julien and Pallister-Wilkins, Polly. 2016. ‘Crisis, Routine, Consolidation: The Politics of the Mediterranean Migration Crisis’, Mediterranean Politics, 21 (2), 316–320. Kmezić, Marko and Bieber, Florian. 2017. The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. An Anatomy of Stabilitocracy and the Limits of EU Democracy Promotion, Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group.

Contextualizing refugee ‘crisis’ and EU integration  11 Krzyżanowski, Michał, Triandafyllidou, Anna and Wodak, Ruth. 2018. ‘The Mediatization and the Politicization of the “Refugee Crisis” in Europe,’ Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 16 (1–2), 1–14. Lazaridis, Gabriella and Wadia, Khursheed (Eds.). 2015. The Securitization of Migration in the EU, Palgrave Macmillan. Leigh Grace, Breanne and Heins, Katie. 2021. ‘Redefining Refugee: White Christian Nationalism in State Politics and Beyond’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 44 (4), 555–575. Lukšič Hacin, Marina, Kogovšek Šalamon, Neža, and Žagar, Igor. 2019. The Disaster of European Refugee Policy, Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Mandić, Danilo. 2023. The Syrian Refugee Crisis: How Democracies and Autocracies Perpetrated Mass Displacement, Routledge. Ripoll Servent, Ariadna. 2019. ‘The EU’s Refugee “Crisis”: Framing Policy Failure as an Opportunity for Success’, Dans Politique européenne, 65 (3), 178–210. Ruzza, Carlo. 2019. ‘Populism, EU Institutions and Civil Society’, in Ruzza, Carlo, Berti, Carlo and Cossarini, Paolo (eds), Highs and Lows of European Integration, Springer, 121–142. Taggart, Paul and Szczerbiak, Alex. 2018. ‘Putting Brexit into Perspective: The Effect of the Eurozone and Migration Crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European States,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 25 (8), 1194–1214. Tawat, Mahama. 2017. ‘Towards an Ever “Closer” Union? Refugee Policy and Social Cohesion in Eastern EU Member States,’ East European Politics, 32 (2), 277–284. The United Nations Refugee Agency. ‘Refugee Crisis in Europe,’ 2023. Available at https:// www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/refugee-crisis-in-europe/ Webb, Jonathan. 2022. ‘The “Refugee Crisis” and its Transformative Impact on EU-Western Balkans Relations,’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48 (6): 1363–1380. Youngs, Richard. 2017. Europe’s Eastern Crisis: The Geopolitics of Asymmetry, Cambridge University Press. Zoppi, Marco and Puleri, Marco. 2022. ‘The Balkan Route (and Its Afterlife): The New Normal in the European Politics of Migration,’ Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 24 (3), 576–593.

2

The EU integration project through the lens of the Balkan-route ‘migrant crisis’ Iryna Kushnir, Majella Kilkey and Francesca Strumia

1 Introduction This chapter examines the impact of the European ‘migrant crisis’ of 2014–2016 along the Balkan corridor on the EU integration project. We understand EU integration as both enlargement and deepening. We draw on data from a mixed methods study, which consisted of popular discourse analysis, policy analysis and elite interviews with EU-level decision-makers and national-level decision-makers in Germany and the UK. The first round of popular discourse analysis was conducted in July–August, 2017, covering the time span January 2014 to August 2017, with the aim of informing the compilation of the interview topic guides. There were two subsequent rounds in November and December 2017, which update the themes generated in the first round. The popular discourse analysis was guided by search terms around the topics: post-2014 ‘migrant crisis’ along the Balkan corridor – significant moments of contestation of EU integration project – both deepening and widening; Brexit and intersection with ‘migrant crisis’; and Brexit and implications for Free Movement in EU. In total, 59 media outlets were considered from different countries and regions: 35 from six (then) EU countries (the UK, the Netherlands, Ireland, Greece, Germany and Belgium); nine from the EU level; three from two counties on the Balkan route (Serbia and Turkey); one representing the Balkan region; one from a key refugee producing country (Afghanistan); nine from other countries (the USA, Australia, Russia and Qatar); and finally one without any anchoring in a particular country or region. All the media outlets appear oriented towards an international audience as they are available in English and the majority is explicitly described as international. Both right- and left-wing leaning sources were included (e.g., Occupy.com (world-wide liberal), Daily Sabah (Turkish pro-governmental)). The articles within these sources were thematically analysed. A number of representative quotations from the discourse analysis are used in this chapter to supplement the findings from the elite interviews – the main data source drawn upon. Twenty-four semi-structured elite interviews were conducted: 16 in Brussels, Belgium; 7 in Berlin, Germany; and 1 in Sheffield, UK. The purpose of elite interviewing is to shed light on what people think, how they interpret events or processes, what they have done or are planning to do, what their ‘attitudes, values and DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405-2

The EU integration project  13 beliefs’ are (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Tansey 2007). It enables researchers to move beyond formal documentation, confirming and elaborating interpretations, while establishing rich historical detail on the thoughts of and actions of key participants (Tansey 2007). When exploring the evolution of a policy field, there is arguably no substitute for talking directly to those involved. Most of the interviewees were representatives of decision-making bodies either on the EU level or national levels of Germany and the UK, with the remaining being researchers or policy analysts working for NGOs or think tanks. The sample was purposeful, designed to capture expertise in areas of work linked to migration, both internal and external – EU Freedom of Movement and third country nationals (refugees and ‘economic migrants’) – as well as EU integration, Brexit and issues linked to security and border control. There was also an element of snowballing in constructing the sample. Interviewees who could comment on all the targeted areas were recruited. Despite our efforts, we did not secure participants from DG NEAR at the European Commission, which is the department that deals specifically with enlargement. However, other people were competent enough to discuss this matter due to their prior work at that department, or current work with the EU candidate countries. All the interviews were conducted face-to-face, except for three that took place over Skype and one that happened in the form of e-mail correspondence. The interviews were undertaken between September and November 2017. The same topic guide was used for all the interviews, and the topic guide for the interviews in Berlin and Sheffield had additional questions that aimed to further clarify the German and UK stance, respectively. The face-to-face and Skype interviews were voice-recorded, transcribed manually using edited transcript type, and analysed thematically along with the interview that took place over e-mail. Thematic analysis is recorded in a Word document on 51 pages which includes the list of themes and their subthemes and quotes that illustrate them. The confidentiality of responses and anonymity of interviewees was ensured by omitting the names of all the respondents and assigning a code to each interview (Brussels: 1–16, Berlin: 17–23, Sheffield: 24). The affiliation of most of the respondents was omitted except for a couple of those who did not mind to reveal it, although their position in the organization was not revealed. This chapter makes direct references to 17 out of the 24 interviews; however, the original codes assigned to each interview are retained. The interview data, informed by popular discourse analysis, were supplemented by policy document analysis, which aimed to uncover more details about the ideas raised by the interviewees. Most of the policy documents were collected before the interviews to generate a timeline of the EU policy actions taken to support refugees prior to the ‘migrant crisis’, and later the policies that were produced to manage the ‘migrant crisis’. Further documents were collected after the interviews in response to particular points raised by the interviewees. This chapter makes references to a few of those documents to support the analysis. In this chapter, we consider what the ‘migrant crisis’ revealed about the state of affairs in the EU prior to and during the ‘migrant crisis’, and how this understanding informs the future vision of EU integration. This framework was inspired by

14  Iryna Kushnir et al. some of the key findings from the interviews. One was a recurrent definition of the ‘migrant crisis’ by interviewees as the crisis of solidarity in the EU rather than merely a crisis of big numbers of migrants. Other related findings are that the ‘migrant crisis’ exposed pre-existing weaknesses and tensions in the institutional architecture of the EU. There were also questions raised about the future of the EU in light of the experience with managing the ‘migrant crisis’. The rest of this chapter discusses how the European ‘migrant crisis’ has informed our understanding of the EU integration project in the three periods. The separation of the three periods is an organizational tool only, and it is important to note that the reality is more complex, with overlaps among the three periods. 2 What pre-existing weaknesses in the EU the ‘migrant crisis’ revealed The ‘migrant crisis’ has shed light on a number of latent weaknesses in the EU, including: political divisions among the EU countries, the lack of the EU’s preparedness to deal with such a crisis, a transparency deficit in the work of the EU institutions and questions around whether a common European identity existed. 2.1 Pre-existing divisions in the EU

The data suggest that the greatest controversies have been revolving around two regions: the Visegrad group (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) and the UK. A number of scholars discuss the idea that the Visegrad-group countries, or the V4, play a specific role in the EU integration project and stay on the margins of the integration promoted by the ‘Mitteleuropa’ – one of the German terms for Central Europe. In particular, Pakulski (2016) maintains that recent illiberal transformations in the V4 countries, sparked by the ‘migrant crisis’, question the benefits of the V4 for the deepening of the EU. The author also questions the survival of the V4 itself because of the recent controversies among the four members. According to Pakulski, this is despite the fact that the group was originally founded ‘with the aim of coordinating the process of post-communist transformation often described as “a joint return to Europe”’ (p. 7). Similarly, Nagy (2017) discusses the ‘drifting away’ of the V4 countries from the rest of the continental EU particularly because of the reluctance of the V4 to take in refugees (p. 2). Apart from these debates, there is also a body of literature that discusses the integration of the V4 in the aftermath of its accession. Dangerfield (2008) highlights their underestimated success in integration. The idea that there was a general expectation that the region would integrate to a lesser extent implies that the region had its strong common interests linked to post-Soviet transformations, which differed from the processes other European countries were going through. Gotz (2006) is more explicit about the V4 group’s separate interests, talking about nonconvergence tendencies in the EU after the V4 group’s accession, and a resulting ‘clustered Europeanisation’ (p. 109). Our data from the interviews with EU-level

The EU integration project  15 decision-makers develop these ideas, highlighting a widespread acknowledgement that the V4 response to the ‘migrant crisis’ could have been predicted because of the pre-existing divisions between this group and the rest of the EU. The following quote from an interview with a policy officer at the European Council on Refugees and Exiles in Brussels illustrates this idea: The ‘migrant crisis’ has been a testing ground for a number of political trends that had been developing over the last years. This was a perfect issue to have those trends crystallised and come forward. If we look at this Visegrad group and other MSs – this hasn’t been created by the ‘migrant crisis’. The issues had been there and the ‘migrant crisis’ made them visible. (Interviewee 1) The issue with the V4 group is not the only example of pre-existing divisions; another is the UK. It had often been seen as a ‘reluctant member’ even before the ‘migrant crisis’ and its decision to leave the EU: They [the UK] were always out of this Europe. They always opted out from things. (EU official, Interviewee 9) Similar sentiments are present in popular discourse. The American Brookings blog refers to ‘U.K. Prime Minister’s David Cameron[‘s] usual awkward relationship with the rest of Europe’ (October 5, 2015). Obviously, this ‘awkward relationship’ was the case even before the ‘migrant crisis’ since Mr Cameron became Prime Minister four years before the beginning of the ‘migrant crisis’ in 2014. While some interviewees further explain that the UK has not been bound by all the actions of EU legislation, it is the opt-out that the UK had from Schengen that seems to have been at the core of these debates. Below is an extract from quite an emotional recollection of an EU official about the UK-EU discussions of Schengen: I remember that in the early days of the development of the EU integration policy, the-then Home Secretary Jack Straw became ballistic during one of the Council meetings because the UK was mildly criticised for lacking the focus on EU integration in its home policy, and because he told his interlocutor ‘who are you to give us lessons about integration policy’… Well, the UK always wanted to be an island in the sense it didn’t want to be part of Schengen. (Interviewee 2) Such oppositional rhetoric from the UK was, of course, present before the ‘migrant crisis’, and has long been a topic in the EU integration scholarship. For instance, Fletcher (2009) discusses the “balancing of the United Kingdom’s ‘Ins’ and ‘Outs’” in the EU (p. 71). Although this rhetoric had not been significant enough to lead

16  Iryna Kushnir et al. to a Brexit referendum and a leave vote prior to the ‘migrant crisis’, the anti-EU discourse in the UK seems to have moved to the forefront of the recent scholarly, policy and media debates. 2.2 Policy weaknesses

Another latent weakness of the EU exposed by the ‘migrant crisis’ relates to migration and refugee policy, and specifically to gaps in the Common Asylum System (CAS), which includes, but is not limited to, the Geneva Convention (1951), the Dublin Convention (1997), Dublin II Regulation (2003) and Dublin III Regulation (2013): It [the ‘migrant crisis’] has revealed some cracks and it has revealed that Dublin is not efficient. It doesn’t work in some cases. (a representative from the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS), an NGO for promoting open and inclusive decision-making, Interviewee 15) Immigration into the EU, including through the refugee route, pre-existed the ‘migrant crisis’. Despite some controversies over the Dublin Regulations (Kugiel 2016), the established system had been adequate because the numbers had not been high prior to 2014 (Pastore and Henry 2016). A researcher from a think tank in Berlin states: We had CAS on paper but there was never any consensus. No one cared because the system was not challenged. This system was put together over a period of about 15 years but it was finalised in mid and late 2000s when the inflow was very low, both in Germany and other member states. (Interviewee 20) The interviewee refers to the Dublin Convention of 1997. However, the refugee policy in Europe dates back to the Geneva Convention of 1951, which is also acknowledged in popular discourse: The [Geneva] convention’s relatively generous rules for accepting refugees were designed in 1951, when refugee numbers were lower and people-­ smuggling was not a big business. (UK newspaper ‘The Economist’, March 25, 2017) Asylum policies in Europe prior to 2014 had not been criticized in the literature as strongly as they have been since, when the ‘migrant crisis’ exposed their weaknesses in managing the inflow of the refugees. One of the aspects of the asylum policies that had been criticized pre-2014 was poor reception conditions for refugees in Greece (Lenart 2012). Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights had ruled in 2011 that Greece’s degrading treatment of migrant detainees, along with deficiencies in its asylum system, meant it was not safe to return asylum seekers

The EU integration project  17 there under the Dublin Regulation. The EU’s own Court of Justice had also ruled against transfers (European Commission Fact Sheet 2016). Hurwitz (1999) meanwhile had criticized the Dublin Convention by stating that [T]he scope of the Convention does not include applications for humanitarian protection, the conditions for family reunification are too strictly defined, and most importantly the difficulty of providing strong evidence of illegal entry into one of the Member States renders the Convention useless in many cases. (p. 646) Apparently, the focus of the criticism of the asylum-seeking policies in Europe had been different before the ‘migrant crisis’. It had been about the deprived rights of refugees and their limited opportunities for integration into the European society. The focus of criticism shifted somewhat subsequent to the onset of the ‘crisis’ from refugees to the EU itself, and how the EU could protect itself from the refugees and ensure that no member state was overburdened. 2.3 Problem with the EU institutions

The inadequate policy basis discussed above had been integral to a wider problem with the EU institutions. An EU official states that: There is a strong weakness related to democracy [in the EU institutions]. A lot of people have the impression that there is something above them that they don’t have the influence on. (Interviewee 17) Although this official talks about this problem in the present tense, it had clearly existed before the ‘migrant crisis’ since it is related to the nature of decision-making and institutional structure: The transparency of the EU institutions is needed, especially the EC. Most of people see Brussels and the EC as democratic institutions but it isn’t, basically. People in Germany see the EU as a whole as a democratic institution but not the EC. Those people are nominated and not elected. Another big debate here was the transatlantic trade deal. It was negotiated behind closed doors and people were given very limited access to the trade agreement ahead of the time… This leads to the disenchantment of the EU. (Representative from an NGO in Berlin, Interviewee 23) Even though a perceived lack of transparency in the EU institutions existed before the ‘migrant crisis’, it was not so salient a sentiment. Literature written before then reflects this tendency. It can be exemplified by Zurn’s (2000) work about the EU as a case of democratic governance beyond the nation-state. In addition, literature which looked into a democratic deficit in the EU existed (e.g., Follesdal and Hix 2006); however, it was not as common as it is now.

18  Iryna Kushnir et al. 2.4 Cracks in the idea of a common European identity

European identity before the ‘migrant crisis’ had not been questioned as much as it has been in the retrospect, post-2014. The idea of diversity had been emphasized, and some cracks in this idea had been implied in the literature published before the ‘migrant crisis’. In particular, Derrida (1992) highlights diversity by stating that the European identity-seeking process is about building commonality together with the unavoidable respect for differences. Some weaknesses of the idea that European identity is about the respect for differences are suggested by Dale and Robertson (2009). The authors argue that a single view of Europe and what it means to be ‘European’ is missing. Both of these statements suggest that European identity never just existed out there, it is something that is always in the making. In light of this, Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) describe European identity both as a project and as a process. The issues analysed in the literature above had not been positioned as a crisis of identity. The discourse that an invisible prequel to the crisis of European identity had existed even before 2014 emerged in the context of the ‘migrant crisis’. It was a tipping point that challenged the collective identity which, in its turn, did not ‘pass the test’. This discourse can be traced in the interview with an EU policy officer whose speculation implies that there had been a lack of collective identity in Europe before the ‘migrant crisis’: We have to think whether we are ready to become multi-religious, multicultural region. (Interviewee 7) There is a recognition in popular discourse that in the context of the ‘migrant crisis’, far-right groups position religious and race diversity in Europe that existed before the ‘migrant crisis’ as the crisis of identity: One of the collateral damages of post-truth politics is that not only the present gets distorted – the past gets rewritten as well. Racist videos online depict fantasies of Europe “before” and “after” migration. “Before” is depicted with orderly scenes of 1950s streets, shops and parks where an all-white population strolls or plays happily. “After” is groups of dark-faced men attacking women, rioting against the police, shouting “Allahu Akbar”. (UK newspaper ‘The Guardian’, October 31, 2016) -------Clearly, the ‘migrant crisis’ has revealed a number of weak dimensions to the EU that seem to have existed before 2014, although most of them were not visible, or at least were not in the centre of political, public and media attention. Key weaknesses back then included: political divisions among the EU countries, the lack of EU’s preparedness to deal with such a crisis, the lack of transparency in the work of the EU institutions and the lack of a common European identity.

The EU integration project  19 3 What problems the ‘migrant crisis’ of 2014–2016 brought about The year of 2014 marked the start of a dramatic increase in the numbers of refugees in Europe, particularly along the Balkan corridor. The EU’s widely perceived inability to deal with the challenges hit on its weak sides and deepened the cracks. Furthermore, the ‘migrant crisis’ contributed to EU disintegration in the case of the UK by generating confusion over the categories of migrants, and thus, reinforcing pro-Brexit sentiments. These also had some ripple effects elsewhere in the EU and its candidate countries in growing right-wing electoral gains. 3.1 More problems around a common European identity

The aggravation of the European identity question became quite prominent. Postelnicescu (2016) claims that ‘Europe is nowadays at a crossroad, divided between the need to remain faithful to its core democratic values and freedoms, maintaining an area of freedom and justice and the need to protect its citizens against the new terrorism and the rise of nationalistic leaders and parties that require less Europe and more power back to the nation states’ (p. 201). This development became correlated with the raise of xenophobia, particularly biases about religion and sometimes ‘race’, in many EU member states. This was expressed in the reactions of certain member states to the EU quotas on the relocation of refugees. The EU attempted to promote burden sharing and help Greece as the country of first entry of refugees along the Balkan route who travel to the EU by suggesting relocation quotas. Council Decision (2015) is an exemplary document where provisional measures were suggested. However, the idea of burden sharing based on solidarity and common European identity met strong opposition in some EU member states: When you’ve got the Commission proposing solidarity between the member states: the relocation of people coming in so that it won’t be one or two states dealing with all of them. That looked like a very logical conclusion to draw. A lot of Home Office ministers agreed with that. Parliament agreed with that. And then it looked like Home Office ministers turned to other ministers in their countries and they said to Home Office ministers, “What were you thinking?”… When Germany hoped that other counties would step in, the opposite happened’’. It raised questions about how united the EU was. These cracks existed before but this made them more visible. (EU policy-making level official, Interviewee 6) The following quote from the UK media outlet The Huffington Post further illustrates this disunity by emphasizing how Islamophobic many member states turned out to be: British, Bulgarian, Czech, Dutch and Hungarian government representatives and politicians have recently made xenophobic comments about migrants. Poland took in some 60 Christian-only families from Syria in July [2016]. The Baltic States are also becoming increasingly anti-Muslim, and

20  Iryna Kushnir et al. in Lithuania there is a discussion about banning the wearing of the burka to prevent Muslim migrants from coming to the country. (September 1, 2016) Such Islamophobia in certain countries in the EU in the context of the ‘migrant crisis’ ultimately questions the idea of a common European identity. It shows that only some member states may be ready to accept and integrate the refugees the majority of whom are Muslim and not white. Such readiness of some states to integrate refugees signals that the identity of the local population in these states is inclusive. Other member states have not appeared as open to such developments. 3.2 Brexit

There is a wide literature which emphasizes that EU Freedom of Movement was the main area of debate leading up to Brexit (Freeden 2017; Goodwin and Heath 2016; Sayer 2017). In particular, Freeden (2017) argues that [A]t the height of the crisis of refugees from Syria, Africa and other middle eastern countries, I pointed to one striking difference between sentiments on migration on the European continent and in the UK. In continental Europe, people were afraid of refugees; in the UK, people were afraid of Europeans. Of course, this needs the kind of fine-tuning that a media soundbite cannot provide. (p. 1) The scholar recognizes that the media has little potential to explain the nuances of the underlying issues. There are also more provocative accounts of the events in the UK Leave Campaign, such as this one: The Leave Campaign, and particularly UKIP, made immigration a wedge issue in the referendum, one of whose most enduring images was of Nigel Farage standing in front of a billboard-size poster showing an endless line of refugees with the caption: “BREAKING POINT: The EU has failed us all. We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders.” So did Britain’s tabloid press, which amplified local horror stories (whether true or false)… Opinion polls repeatedly showed immigration to be a major concern among potential Leave voters. (Sayer 2017: 99) Our research takes these statements further and suggests that the media and rightwing politicians in the UK did not simply fail to convey the distinction between refugee migration into the EU and the movement of EU citizens within the EU under Freedom of Movement provisions, but rather generated confusion over the

The EU integration project  21 categories of migrants. This was a very strong theme in the interviews. An EU official speaks for most of the decision-makers that were interviewed, stating that: It [‘migrant crisis’] gave Farage and his friends some meat on the grill. (Interviewee 4) Another official from the European Commission explains how the confusion was encouraged by politicians and the media: There was a media driven campaign to confuse or equate humanitarian migration with economic migration. Further confusion was created by mixing up intra-EU migration with the migrants coming from the Syria crisis. The former type of migration relates to the EU Treaty rights to reside and have access to social services… In the case of the UK the migrant crisis has been confused and conflated with the issue of net immigration especially from the new Member States leading to a media maelstrom which lent credibility to misinformation and erroneous analysis presented by the Brexit camp. (Interviewee 13) This was in the circumstances when the UK did not actively engage in the redistribution of refugees: British involvement in the management of the ‘migrant crisis’ has been minimal. We’ve seen the UK dragging its heels in the migration policy in Europe, it’s been slow to cooperate except in some negative instances. For instance, they are very happy to avail the Dublin regulation but not so happy to show solidarity to the arrivals in Greece. (Policy analyst on the EU level, Interviewee 16) The interviewees were also asked whether the EU could have done anything to prevent Brexit. A common answer to this was that it, indeed, could – by informing the public in the UK about the work and principles of the EU. However, there is also a justification for why this was not done: …the EU has a reputation of not mingling, not talking because it’s taken as propaganda for the EU. If I refute some of the questionable statements of Farage, it looks like I do propaganda and give Farage even more power. This could have been done by the UK leaders to refute every single line of fanatics and liars. Here is the truth, if you like it you stay, if you don’t like it you leave. (EU official, Interviewee 4)

22  Iryna Kushnir et al. 3.3 Right-wing political gains beyond the UK

The anti-EU sentiments in the UK strengthened significantly during the ‘migrant crisis’ and led to the leave vote in the 2016 referendum in the UK. We can trace a similar right-wing boost beyond the UK, expressed in countries suspending Schengen by re-establishing national borders, and even putting up fences along the borders to restrain the movement of refugees. This resulted in confrontations among the member states. It coincided with the ‘migrant crisis’ and Brexit campaign and the aftermath of the referendum. Thus, this boost can be seen, arguably, as a ripple effect of the relationship between Brexit and the ‘migrant crisis’. The following two quotes from the interviews reflect this link to both phenomena: We can see that more and more right-wing governments are appearing e­ verywhere – last week in Austria, before also in Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, there are movements in other countries. There is a development which is more national, and it weakens the European idea. This is linked to the European ‘migrant crisis’. (Representative of a decision-making body in Berlin, Interviewee 17) AfD which is a new right-wing populist party used similar arguments [to what UKIP used]. I am not sure if they referred to Brexit as a position to follow in Germany. But their position is Euro-sceptic and sometimes Eurohostile. They would vote for border controls, moratorium on Schengen and freedom of movement. (Researcher/think tank representative in Berlin, Interviewee 20) The respondents do acknowledge the rise of the right but they do not see it leading to further disintegration of the EU. On the contrary, the UK media outlet Venitism Wordpress paints a more dramatic picture, which was perhaps a technique to reinforce the support for exiting the EU in the post-Brexit-vote UK: Slovaks want a referendum right now. Nevertheless, Slovexiteers are at the helm of the Council of EU! Frexit, Nexit, Auxit, Dexit, Czexit, Slovexit, Italexit, and Grexit are coming soon. Nobody can stand the diktats of Brussels. (July 2, 2016) The potential for further exits from the EU is acknowledge by Oliver (2017). However, the author positions such a scenario as one of a number of possible directions for EU development, and examines it as a theoretical debate about EU disintegration, rather than a route to be expected in practice in the future. Not only have the right-wing aspirations strengthened in the EU member states. There is a similar tendency in the EU candidate countries as well. Turkey is a telling example. Radicalisation in Turkey questioned the ultimate desirability of Turkey’s potential membership in the EU, despite the success of the EU-Turkey deal:

The EU integration project  23 …everybody [in the EU] is happy with the EU-Turkey deal because there almost 3 million of refugees in Turkey… I know that all political parties are against Turkey’s candidacy after what happened in the past year. The whole political system of Mr Erdogan, the current Turkish government has no support in the European Parliament at all. (EU policy-making level official, Interviewee 3) --------------This section has examined how the pre-existing weaknesses in the EU were aggravated during the 2014–2016 ‘migrant crisis’ and how they served as a fertile ground for more problems to grow with the onset of the ‘migrant crisis’. Examples of this are related to the deepening of the cracks in the idea of a common European identity, the rise of the right in the EU in the cases of Brexit and recent similar confrontations beyond the UK. 4 Way forward for EU integration The problems that the ‘migrant crisis’ brought about challenged the EU as an institution, its established ways of work and its prospects for further survival and integration. However, one of the messages of our research is a strong belief of decision-makers on the EU level and selected national levels that the EU should be able to survive despite the problems it has been facing. At the time when the interviews were conducted, there was a lack of clarity as to the future of integration. Nevertheless, the interviewees expressed some ideas as to how EU integration may unfold in the future. 4.1 The EU is likely to survive

All sorts of divisions in the EU reinforced by the ‘migrant crisis’ sparked a debate in the media about whether the EU would survive at all. Examples include: Professor who predicted Brexit and Trump claims European Union will cease to exist in 2017. (UK newspaper Express, January 4, 2017) Brexit will create new dividing lines within the EU… Brexit will also create new dividing lines within the United Kingdom; Scotland already demands a new independence referendum. I would not be surprised if both negotiating partners – the EU and the UK –fall apart as a result of Brexit. (German newspaper Zeit, March 29, 2017) This concern was also acknowledged by a number of interviewees; however, none of them thought that the collapse of the EU was a realistic possibility. Rather, they were all optimistic about the survival of the EU. Here is an exemplary quote by

24  Iryna Kushnir et al. an official working on Strategy European Migrant Smuggling Centre at Europol, which is an agency of the European Commission: I don’t see the EU disintegrating… I see this crisis as a disintegrating factor but I also see this as an opportunity now for integrating the EU more. (Interviewee 14) Despite the optimism about the EU’s future survival, respondents were much more uncertain about ‘the how’ of achieving it. There is a need for a new vision. There is a job to be done in terms of helping people understand why the EU matters. The post-war peace project is losing ground, so what’s the project now? (EU policy-making level official, Interviewee 6) 4.2 EU integration strategies for the future

The belief that the EU has a future but, at the same time, its unclear vision in the eyes of the decision-makers prompts the need to discuss the prospects of the EU integration after the ‘migration crisis’. Interviews with decision-makers on the EU level and selected national levels suggest that the EU integration in post-‘migrant crisis’ may unfold in the following directions: locating migration in the centre of EU policy-making, questioning the ultimate desirability of further enlargement, finding ways to cooperate with the UK after Brexit and focusing on the deepening of the relationships among the existing member states. 4.2.1 Putting migration at the centre of EU policy-making

Since the Lisbon European Council meeting on March 23–24 in 2000, the main goal of the EU had been to become the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world (European Parliament 2000). This aim has been reinforced through a number of initiatives, such as the Bologna Process, which predominantly relies on facilitating common European identity through integrating European topics in education and harmonizing educational structures in Europe (Kushnir 2016). According to Grek (2008), education had been emerging as a key policy-making mechanism in the EU prior to the ‘migrant crisis’ – ‘…education is slowly moving from the margins of European governance to the very centre of its policy making’ (p. 208). The ‘migrant crisis’, however, has displaced this process somewhat, moving migration more centre stage in EU policy-making. According to a representative of the European Commission who was interviewed in the framework of this research: It’s a very new policy area on the agenda in Europe… Migration concerns were always seen as a side dish way down in the list of priorities… Today, immigration policy is in the centre. (Interviewee 2)

The EU integration project  25 The growing focus on migration can be traced in a number of recent developments. One of them is the work on shaping a Common Asylum Policy in Europe. A number of steps have been taken, such as, for instance, working out an EU List of Safe Countries of Origin (2015), the EU-Turkey Agreement (2016) and proposal for Dublin IV Regulation (2016). Each of these new steps was surrounded by controversy Here is an example of the struggles around a safe list of countries, discussed in the EU-level media outlet Euroactive: 12 member states have compiled “safe lists”, yet there is not one single country that appears on all 12 lists, emphasising the bloc’s failures to coordinate on a common refugee policy. (April 14, 2016) The focus on migration is likely to dominate EU policy-making in the future, too. In particular, there is growing investment in refugee-producing regions in the world in order to stop migration at the point of origin (Kühnhardt 2017). The logic behind this investment is explained by an EU official: It was once said that if you take the world as a global market, if you have capital, money, investment capacity in one part of the world, and you have human capacity in another part of the world, there will be adjustment. Either the bank power comes to where human capacity is, or vice versa. If you don’t want migrants then you share prosperity with the countries that produce refugees. (Interviewee 2) EU decision-makers understand that this investment has potential to reduce migration but it will never completely stop it. Therefore, there is a need for the creation of legal routes of migration to prevent the dangerous ways refugees from the Middle East used to reach the EU during the 2014–2016 ‘migrant crisis’. One of the most significant developments in this respect is opening up to refugees a skilled migration route: Highly skilled refugees can apply through the Blue Card route. Refugees can have skills and be economic migrants. That’s a very new idea. The idea is that we can choose third country economic migrants on the basis of their skills, income, etc. (Representative of a decision-making body in Berlin, Interviewee 18) The Blue Card initiative dates back way before the ‘migrant crisis’ (Blue Card Directive (2009), now replaced by Blue Card Directive (2021)). It is an EU-wide work permit program that allows high-skilled non-EU nationals to work and live in any country within the European Union. This initiative excludes Denmark, Ireland and the UK, as they are not subject to the proposal. The prominence of migration in EU policy-making is echoed in all the debates about the future development of the EU. This pertains to the questions of further

26  Iryna Kushnir et al. EU enlargement, the EU-UK relationship after Brexit, and deepening of the relationships among the remaining member states. 4.2.2 Questioning further enlargement

Questioning the ultimate desirability of EU enlargement to the candidate countries – that at the time of the interviews were Turkey, FYROM, Macedonia, Albania and Serbia – is a very strong theme in the answers. The following quote illustrates this: …the president of the European Commission said that there would be no enlargement during this period. There are many political negotiations but the enlargement to Serbia or FYROM or any other country is not a political reality just now. (EU policy-making level official, Interviewee 3) The official refers to Jean-Claude Juncker’s speech State of the Union Address 2017 on September 13, 2017 (European Commission Press Release Database 2018). Speculations of decision-makers during interviews provide further explanations. One of the explanations of the lack of prospects for enlargement is that it has been difficult to reach consensus around the redistribution of migrants and the idea that re-establishing national borders compromises good relationships among the member states, as the same EU policy-making-level official, mentioned above, claims: …nobody is interested in bringing new actors in this process. The process with 28 MSs is already absolutely complicated because everybody says we have some national specifics, far-right parties… It’s all difficult but still possible. (Interviewee 3) Deepening the relationship among the existing member states is prioritized now over-widening. This preference is also strengthened by the concern of facilitating more intra-EU migration from the new member states if they are accepted, although this concern is not very strong: …potential workers coming from Albania or Kosovo, there will be no one open to that idea. This is one of the biggest problems if we talk about enlargement, such as Albania or Kosovo coming into the European Union… There would be more social tensions than we already have. (EU policy-making level official, Interviewee 3) What is discussed above is a potential fifth wave of the EU enlargement after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 that formally established the EU. There were also waves in 1995 when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined; then in

The EU integration project  27 2004 when Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined; in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania joined, and finally in 2013 when only Croatia joined (European Council 2017). The advantages of EU enlargement for the EU as an institution during each of the prior waves back then were also questioned, for instance, in Sjursen (2006) and Grabbe (2014). However, such strong concern that the interviewees expressed in relation to any further enlargement was not captured in that literature. 4.2.3 Shaping the UK-EU relationship post-Brexit

The question about how the EU-UK relationship should look like after Brexit had yielded, at the time of the interviews, endless public, media and political debates. A dominant voice in the media maintained that despite the agreements made between the two parties, Brexit would mean the end of the privileges the UK had enjoyed as an EU member. This was visible both in the UK and non-UK media. The following quote from the UK media outlet BBC exemplifies that: Free movement of people between the EU and UK will end in March 2019, UK government ministers have said. (July 27, 2017) Despite this seeming readiness of both parties to cut off their ties, the interviews with the decision-makers on the EU level suggested that at least the EU as an institution would favour retaining the close cooperation with the UK as much as possible after Brexit because of security, for instance: The UK is an extremely important player when it comes to the international security of the EU. Since Brexit is happening, we hope that the UK will remain in security agencies such as Europol. It wouldn’t be a good decision to stop participating in such agencies and cooperating with other MSs on the multilateral level in security. It has already been mentioned by the UK authorities that they would remain in Europol at least. (an official working on Strategy European Migrant Smuggling Centre at Europol, interviewee 14) This cooperation was favoured by the EU regardless of its strong stance about cancelling the benefits that the EU membership presupposes for the states that decide to leave, wishing to avoid some disadvantages of being a member: If you want to get out, like the UK, you get out… It depends on what Theresa May wants to do. Europe sticks to its principles. This is Europe… These are the rules of the club… If you are not very receptive and can’t change anything, you have to leave the club. (EU official, Interviewee 4)

28  Iryna Kushnir et al. 4.2.4 Deepening of the relationships among the remaining member states

Deepening has become a necessity in the EU in the context of the growing controversies among the member states about the relocation of refugees and the erecting of country borders, as well as in the aftermath of Brexit and mushrooming right-wing movements throughout the EU. The interviews with the decisionmakers on the EU level suggest that the deepening of the EU integration for a better future is based on the securitisation of the EU, and considering the reformation of the EU into a two-tier region. These two tiers mean the core and peripheral countries that would have different levels of commitment to the common EU principles, and would also benefit unequally from the privileges the EU membership would offer. An EU official in the internal security domain presents the securitisation of the EU as the foundation of EU deepening. This involves working out mechanisms to protect the EU from external terrorism, as well as preventing the radicalisation of the citizens in the EU. This is ensured by security services of the EU through the cooperation among the member states and, more importantly, through the cooperation with the neighbouring countries of the EU: There is cooperation with third countries, counter-terrorism dialogue with countries of origin, countries of passage, countries at the borders of the EU. All of this can play an important role in preventing the movement in the first place… There is cooperation with countries along the route, with Turkey in particular, countries in the Western Balkans… There are countries that are so close to the EU that the effective use of our internal instruments there can help to protect the security of the EU… Security is the foundation. We have already involved the Ministers of Education, of Healthcare, etc. (Interviewee 8) The same EU official in the internal security domain further explains how the promotion of local-level democracy in the EU states facilitates security in the EU overall: The quality of democracy on the local level matters…All of this needs to come together in reality. And reality is the street, the school, the family. That’s the world where security happens or fails to happen… It’s about having trust in oneself, believing that the other one trusts you, trusting the rule of law, the state, the objectivity and the effectiveness of the institutions, trusting that if you do anything illegal, you will be in trouble, that there are boundaries. (EU official in the internal security domain, Interviewee 8) Another direction for EU deepening is linked with the debates around two-tier Europe. These debates started long before the ‘migrant crisis’. For instance, Radosevic (2004) analysed the prospects of two-tier or even a multi-tier Europe ten years earlier, and argued for the multi-tier EU because based on the national innovation capacity there were three groups of countries in the EU, with the Central Eastern

The EU integration project  29 European countries falling into two groups. The concern about various types of divisions in the EU has been heightened following the ‘migrant crisis’: The lack of solidarity in the EU has been noted by Western European countries. There will be an interesting development in this direction… The EU would move on with a two-tier approach… This would be the difference between those countries that want more integration in terms of economical and tax harmonisation, migration, and some countries that want to stay behind. It would be their choice not to move forward. This would have consequences for financial solidarity. At the moment, these are only words, but it may happen. This development has been in the documents for some years but it’s more valid now. (European Commission official, Interviewee 5) It was felt that the chances of implementing multiple tiers in the EU in practice were stronger than ever. Even though the idea behind such a reformation of the EU is to improve solidarity among those member states that desire solidarity, some interviewees have expressed a deep concern about a potential negative impact of this plan on the EU as an institution: I am worried that we will have deepening integration without some member states… It would be the end of the European dream if you have a centre with 15 or so countries in the Eurozone, and all other countries on the outside. There will be bad consequences for many countries… Since we are not able to bring all these countries together, then the EU in today’s form is over. (EU policy-making level official, Interviewee 3) ---------------------The future of the EU is unclear; however, decision-makers on the EU level have identified a number of directions to shape EU integration. These include putting migration at the centre of policy-making in the EU, questioning the ultimate desirability of further enlargement, finding ways to cooperate with the UK after Brexit and focusing on deepening the relationships among the existing member states. 5 Conclusion This chapter has attended to data from a mixed-method study to analyse the impact of the European ‘migrant crisis’ along the Balkan corridor on EU integration. This chapter has considered what the ‘migrant crisis’ revealed about the state of affairs in the EU prior and during the ‘migrant crisis’, and how this understanding informs the future vision of EU integration. The EU had had a number of weak elements prior to the ‘migrant crisis’, although they were not so visible. These included: political divisions among the EU countries, the lack of EU’s preparedness to deal with a crisis like that, the lack of transparency in the work of the EU institutions and the lack of a common

30  Iryna Kushnir et al. European identity. The numbers of refugees and other types of migrants making their way to the EU grew significantly between 2014 and 2016, particularly through the Balkan corridor. The aggravation of the European identity question became quite prominent. Moreover, the ‘migrant crisis’ contributed to EU disintegration by reinforcing pro-Brexit sentiments in the UK. These also echoed in other EU member states. Right-wing parties gained strength in the EU candidate countries too. The problems that the ‘migrant crisis’ brought about challenged the EU as an institution and its prospects for further integration. Although the future of the EU is unclear, decision-makers on the EU level have identified a number of directions to shape EU integration in the post-‘migrant crisis’ context. These include putting migration at the centre of policy-making in the EU, questioning the ultimate desirability of further enlargement, finding ways to cooperate with the UK after Brexit and focusing on deepening the relationships among the existing member states. References Aberbach, Joel D. and Rockman, Bert A. 2002. ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews,’ PS: Political Science & Politics, 35 (4), 673–676. Checkel, Jeffrey and Katzenstein, Peter. 2009. ‘The Politicization of European Identities,’ in Checkel, Jeffrey and Katzenstein, Peter (eds), European Identity, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1–28. Dale, Roger and Robertson, Susan. 2009. Globalisation and Europeanisation in Education, Oxford: Symposium. Dangerfield, Martin. 2008. ‘The Visegrád Group in the Expanded European Union: From Preaccession to Postaccession Cooperation,’ East European Politics and Societies, 22 (3), 630–667. Derrida, Jacques. 1992. The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. European Commission Press Release Database. 2018. ‘Jean-Claude Juncker’s Speech “State of the Union Address 2017”,’ February 1, 2018. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm European Commission Fact Sheet. 2016. ‘Questions & Answers: Recommendation on the Conditions for Resuming Dublin Transfers of Asylum Seekers to Greece,’ February 12, 2018. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4253_en.htm European Council. 2017. ‘EU Enlargement,’ February 1, 2018. Available at http://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ European Parliament. 2000. ‘Presidency Conclusions from the Lisbon European Council in 2000,’ February 2, 2018. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm Fletcher, Maria. 2009. ‘Schengen, the European Court of Justice and Flexibility under the Lisbon Treaty: Balancing the United Kingdom’s ‘Ins’ and ‘Outs’,’ European Constitutional Law Review, 5 (1), 71–98. Follesdal, Andreas and Hix, Simon. 2006. ‘Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 44 (3), 533–562. Freeden, Michael. 2017. ‘After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology,’ Journal of Political Ideologies, 22 (1), 1–11.

The EU integration project  31 Goodwin, Matthew and Heath, Oliver. 2016. ‘The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result,’ The Political Quarterly, 87 (3), 323–332. Gotz, Klaus. 2006. ‘Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization,’ IHS Political Science Series working paper 109, January 31, 2018. Available at http://irihs.ihs. ac.at/1703/1/pw_109.pdf Grabbe, Heather. 2014. ‘Six Lessons of Enlargement Ten Years On: The EU’s Transformative Power in Retrospect and Prospect,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 52 (S1), 40–56. Grek, Sotiria. 2008. ‘From Symbols to Numbers: The Shifting Technologies of Education Governance in Europe,’ European Educational Research Journal, 7 (2), 208–218. Hurwitz, Agnès. 1999. ‘The 1990 Dublin Convention: A Comprehensive Assessment,’ International Journal of Refugee Law, 11 (4), 646–677. Kugiel, Patryk. 2016. ‘The Refugee Crisis in Europe: True Causes, False Solutions,’ The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 4, 41–59. Kuhnhardt, Ludger. 2017. The Global Society and Its Enemies. Global Power Shift (Comparative Analysis and Perspectives), Cham: Springer. Kushnir, Iryna. 2016. ‘The Role of the Bologna Process in Defining Europe,’ European Educational Research Journal, 15 (5), 1–12. Lenart, Joanna. 2012. ‘“Fortress Europe”: Compliance of the Dublin II Regulation with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,’ Merkourios, 28 (75), 4–19. Nagy, Boldizsar. 2017. ‘Sharing the Responsibility or Shifting the Focus? The Responses of the EU and the Visegrad Countries to the Post-2015 Arrival of Migrants and Refugees,’ Global Turkey in Europe working paper 17, January 31, 2018. Available at http://www. nagyboldizsar.hu/uploads/2/6/7/7/26778773/gte_wp_17_published.pdf Oliver, Tim. 2017. ‘The EU Falling Apart? Theoretical Discussions of Brexit, Grexit and Other Exit Scenarios,’ in Grimmel, Andreas and Giang, Sussane (eds), Solidarity in the European Union, Cham: Springer, 131–144. Pakulski, Jan. 2016. ‘Crumbling Elite Consensus and the Illiberal Turn in Poland,’ in Pakulski, Jan (ed), The Visegrad Countries in Crisis, Warsaw: Collegium Civitas, 51–65. Pastore, Ferruccio and Henry, Giulia. 2016. ‘Explaining the Crisis of the European Migration and Asylum Regime,’ The International Spectator, 51 (1), 44–57. Postelnicescu, Claudia. 2016. ‘Europe’s New Identity: The Refugee Crisis and the Rise of Nationalism,’ Europe’s Journal of Psychology, 12 (2), 203–209. Radosevic, Slavo. 2004. ‘A Two-Tier or Multi-Tier Europe? Assessing the Innovation Capacities of Central and East European Countries in the Enlarged EU,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (3), 641–666. Sayer, Derek. 2017. ‘White Riot—Brexit, Trump, and Post-factual Politics,’ Journal of Historical Sociology, 30 (1), 92–106. Sjursen, Helene. 2006. ‘Introduction: Enlargement and the Nature of EU Polity,’ in Sjursen, Helene (ed), Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity, Abington: Routledge, 1–16. Tansey, Oisin. 2007. ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling,’ PS: Political Science & Politics, 40 (4), 765–772. Zurn, Michael. 2000. ‘Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other International Institutions,’ European Journal of International Relations, 6 (2), 183–221.

32  Iryna Kushnir et al. Media outlets cited BBC (UK). Freedom of Movement to End after Brexit (July 27, 2017). Available at http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-40734504 (accessed February 1, 2018). Brookings Blog (USA). Why Europe Ccan’t Handle the Migration Crisis (October 5, 2015). Available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/10/05/why-europecant-handle-the-migration-crisis/ (accessed February 1, 2018). Euroactive (EU region). Refugee Country ‘Safe List’ Complicated by European Disunity (April 14, 2016). Available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/ thursday-refugee-country-safe-lists-complicated-by-european-disunity/ (accessed February 1, 2018). Express (UK). Professor Who Predicted Brexit and Trump Claims European Union Will Cease to Exist in 2017 (January 4, 2017). Available at http://www.express.co.uk/news/ uk/750018/European-Union-Brexit-Trump-predication-collapse (accessed February 1, 2018). The Economist (UK). Most EU Countries Are Happy to Welcome Other Europeans (March 25, 2017). Available at https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21719191-theyare-less-keen-refugees-outside-most-eu-countries-are-happy-welcome-other (accessed February 1, 2018). The Guardian (UK). Refugees Aren’t a Problem. Europe’s Identity Crisis Is (October 31, 2016). Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/31/refugeesproblem-europe-identity-crisis-migration (accessed February 1, 2018). The Huffington Post (UK). What Responses to the Migration Crisis Reveal About Racism and Populism in Europe (September 1, 2016). Available at http://www.huffingtonpost. co.uk/claire-fernandez/migrant-crisis_b_8069834.html (accessed February 7, 2018). Venitism (UK). EU Shaping up or Members Shaping Out (July 2, 2016). Available at https:// venitism.wordpress.com/2016/07/02/eu-shaping-up-or-members-shipping-out/ (accessed February 1, 2018). Zeit (Germany). Yes, You Will Suffer as Well (March 29, 2017). Available at http://www. zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-03/united-kingdom-brexit-article-50-european-union/komplettansicht (accessed February 1, 2018). Policy documents cited An EU List of Safe Countries of Origin (2015). Available at https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf (accessed February 2, 2018). Blue Card Directive (2021). Directive 2021/1883 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2021 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-­country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, and repealing Council Directive 2009/50/EC. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ ALL/?uri=CELEX:32021L1883 (accessed May 2, 2023) Blue Card Directive (2009). Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri= CELEX:32009L0050 (accessed February 2, 2018). Council Decision (2015). Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the

The EU integration project  33 benefit of Italy and Greece.Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri =celex%3A32015D1601 (accessed February 7, 2018). Dublin II Regulation (2003). Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al33153 (accessed February 2, 2018). Dublin III Regulation (2013). Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (Dublin III Regulation), replacing Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (Dublin II Regulation), lays down the criteria and mechanisms for determining which EU country is responsible for examining an asylum application. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:23010503_1 (accessed February 2, 2018). Dublin IV Regulation Proposal (2016). Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast). Available at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-270-EN-F1-1.PDF (accessed February 2, 2018). The Dublin Convention (1997). Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities Dublin Convention 97/C 254/01. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ ALL/?uri=celex%3A41997A0819%2801%29 (accessed February 2, 2018). The EU-Turkey Agreement (2016). Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorization. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:22014A0507%2801%29 (accessed February 2, 2018). The Geneva Convention (1951). Convention relating to the status of refugees. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf (accessed February 2, 2018).

3

EU-Turkey relations and the migration issue Transactionalism in action Dimitris Tsarouhas

1 Introduction Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the migration crisis has dominated European Union (EU) politics from 2015 onwards. For Turkey, however, the issue of how to deal with a large number of refugees had emerged in 2011, following the onset of the Syrian civil war. Turkey has been at the forefront of hosting Syrian refugees in its territory and, along with Jordan and Lebanon, has done more than any other individual state to confront this major issue. Further, at the peak of the European migration crisis, EU-Turkey relations were revived, albeit temporarily, due to the key role played by Turkey in dealing with the issue and the need by Brussels and major member states (not least Germany) to engage in a domestic damage limitation exercise. Paradoxically, precisely at the moment when EU-Turkey relations appeared to be on terminal decline, the EU-Turkey agreements of 2015 and 2016 revived the prospects of wider cooperation. However, and as argued in this chapter, this revival was the result of an agreement that was strictly founded on an interest-based approach, removed from the purpose-driven initiatives of the past that aimed at aligning Turkish policy to EU standards. In a general sense, the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal has therefore reinforced the transactional character of EU-Turkey relations. Moreover, the sheer number of both refugees and migrants now on Turkish territory poses a major challenge for policymakers regarding prospects and options for integration and accommodation in public life. This chapter argues that transactionalism has now replaced principled cooperation between the EU and Turkey, with migrants and refugees often becoming the victims of this new reality. The chapter first discusses the relationship between the two sides prior to the migration crisis, before explaining in more details how the two sides arrived at the EU-Turkey deal, which remains the backbone of their transactional exchange on the issue. The next section takes a step back and elaborates on the ways in which the EU had been able to influence Turkey’s asylum and immigration policy in the recent past. The changes implemented by Ankara had been extensive and wide-reaching. The last section updates the reader with developments since the EU-Turkey deal, while the conclusion summarises the main argument. DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405-3

EU-Turkey relations and the migration issue  35 2 EU-Turkey relations: context and background 2.1 A qualitatively different relationship

Relations between the EU and Turkey are fundamentally different from those between the Union and the western Balkan states discussed elsewhere in this volume. First, the former go deep back into time, in contrast to the more recent relations the Union has established with former communist states. This longevity in EU-Turkey relations is a blessing and a curse: it can help stabilise relations in difficult times, given that long bonds have enhanced mutual benefits. On the other hand, however, the past casts a long shadow in terms of established policy practices and ways of doing things, which cannot be easily undone. Second, EU-Turkey relations are deep, extending to a number of policy areas (the Customs Union, the fight against terrorism) and encompassing a wide array of economic and political objectives. In that sense, the migration and refugee challenge of recent years is rather than a focal point. However, its salience for both the Union and Turkey goes beyond the immediate handling of the crisis and demonstrates the new character that this relationship has acquired—one dominated by transactionalism amidst the waning ‘soft power’ of the EU in its periphery (Öniş and Kutlay 2017) and the accelerating de-Europeanisation of Turkey (Aydin Düzgit and Kaliber 2016; Heraclides and Alioğlu Çakmak 2019). Third, and linked to the previous point, is the fact that Turkey’s sheer size inevitably confronts the Union with near-existential dilemmas of an institutional (European Parliament size and vote allocation to Turkey, Council votes etc.), political (Turkey as a European as well as Asian power), and economic (market size and access, convergence policy, the CAP) nature. 2.2 Cooperation and conflict until Helsinki

Turkey was one of the two signatories (alongside Greece) of an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community only a few years after the latter’s establishment. The pro-western foreign and economic policy orientation of Turkey in the early Cold war era was manifest in its membership to all major western institutions, and the desire to join the EEC was part of the same logic (Tsarouhas 2018). The Ankara Agreement, signed in 1963, was a further step towards closer economic relations, foreseeing a Customs Union (realised nearly three decades later) and a potential accession to the Community, while the Ankara Protocol of 1970 foresaw the concrete steps leading to a Customs Union. Cooperation between the two sides was smooth until the 1970s, not least due to a convergence of mutual economic interests and a desire to forge ahead with close relations (Eralp 2009). Soon thereafter, however, economic turbulence and continued political instability in Turkey derailed relations at the political level. The Ankara protocol was suspended following the 1980 military coup d’etat, and although relations resumed soon afterwards and Turkey formally applied to join the Community in 1987, its application was rebuffed two years later (Erdemli 2003). Until the end of the 1990s and despite the introduction of the Customs Union, relations remained tense. As

36  Dimitris Tsarouhas the EEC became a European Union and as Central and Eastern European countries became candidates, a set of concrete political and economic criteria became symbolic expressions of the Union’s democratic and rule-based credentials. Turkey’s authoritarian turn after the 1980s coup was hardly reconcilable with the conditionality policy emerging on the Continent, not least since Cyprus became a candidate country for EU accession, further complicating relations. 2.3 Turkey’s Europeanization moment

By 1999, however, the political wheels were turning rapidly and towards uncharted territory. Centre-left governments in most EU member states favoured a political and economic interpretation of the Union as opposed to identity-oriented definitions. Turkey benefited from that, as it did from the Kosovo war and its potential implications for stability in a volatile region. The Helsinki Summit awarded Turkey the long-awaited candidate country status, and by 2005, despite great difficulties and Cyprus’s accession to the Union a year earlier, negotiations for membership were launched. By the mid-2000s, Turkey’s economy was getting larger and its politics more stable, currently dominated by the former mayor of Istanbul, now Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). The Europeanization process, which had been credited with the accession of CEE states in the recent past (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Grabbe 2006) and had been heavily influential in Southern Europe’s incorporation to the Community, was now hitting Turkey’s door (Tocci 2005). In both domestic and foreign policy, Turkey implemented a series of far-reaching political, judicial and economic reforms, increasingly giving the impression of a stable and progressively prosperous nation at ease with its neighbours and eager to constructively engage with the Union’s conditionality approach so as to land the ultimate prize of accession. 2.4 Europeanization and its limits

From the start of the accession negotiations, however, problems were obvious to the naked eye. Although accession negotiations began in 2005, they never gathered pace. The immediate cause was Cyprus, and in particular, Turkey’s refusal to extend the Customs Union provisions to the Republic (Eralp 2009). Yet this was a rather convenient pretext for both sides: the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 was never particularly popular among western European public opinion and the prospect of Turkish accession rekindled conservative reflexes in countries such as France and Austria, not least when conservative administrations sought to reanimate the debate as to whether Turkey really ‘belonged’ to ‘Europe’. At the same time, the Turkish government lost little time in adopting a ‘double standards’ thesis, accusing the Union of adopting a culturalist opposition to Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population. In due course, Turkey froze and then reversed EU-aligned legislation on a series of policy areas, further distancing itself from the EU acquis. The limits of Europeanisation (Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit 2011; Tsarouhas 2016) were soon revealed. Moreover, the Eurozone economic crisis tainted the

EU-Turkey relations and the migration issue  37 EU’s image in the country further and the brief Arab Spring facilitated Turkey’s rather incoherent attempts to establish itself as a regional power in the Middle East, an attempt that has met with little success ever since (Öniş 2014). 3 Towards transactionalism 3.1 The EU-Turkey readmission agreement

In late 2013, EU-Turkey relations started improving after a prolonged period of stagnation. In October, a new chapter was opened for negotiations as a result of a change in government in France and the election of Francois Hollande replacing the ‘Turkey-sceptic’ Nicolas Sarkozy. Cooperation between the two sides was affirmed through changes in Turkish legislation. In December of that year, the two sides took a step further, signing a Readmission Agreement. According to the agreement, Turkey would readmit third country nationals that had entered the European Union illegally through Turkey in exchange for assistance in beefing up border security and, more importantly, setting out a roadmap that would eventually lead to visa-free travel for Turkish citizens visiting EU member states1 (Kirişci 2014). The agreement is significant for several reasons: it bolstered the cooperation between the two sides at a time when the migration crisis was intensifying, especially for Turkey. Second, it signalled that the Union was now in search for viable agreements with third countries to enhance its internal cohesion in the face of vociferous opposition against migration-friendly policies, especially by the newly admitted members in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Finally, it symbolised the interdependent nature of the EU-Turkey relationship on migration, despite the fact that the framework of the agreement did not relate to Turkey as a candidate country but was rather placed in a ‘third country’ context and with an eye to limiting migration flows entering EU territory (Kirişçi 2014). This was a clear indication of the transactional nature that EU-Turkey relations were to acquire. 3.2 The Joint Action Plan and EU-Turkey Statement

In November 2015, an EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP) was adopted by the two sides, followed by the EU-Turkey Statement in early 2016. Given the centrality of these two policy instruments in diffusing the crisis, at least from an EU perspective, it is worth examining them in some detail. The JAP resulted from a decision by the European Council in September 2015 to step up cooperation with Turkey on the issue of migration.2 EU leaders sought to use the willingness of Turkey to host migrants and/or refugees in return for concrete benefits. Importantly, the JAP linked cooperation on migration with Turkey’s EU aspirations by promising to open new acquis chapters for negotiation. This was a minimal price to pay for the EU, considering that earlier efforts to lock Turkey closer into the EU policy framework had not been particularly successful, but left it open to accusations of turning a blind eye towards Turkey’s deteriorating democratic record at home. The worsening EU-Turkey relations confirm the argument,

38  Dimitris Tsarouhas to the extent that the EU has become ever more powerless to incentivise change in Turkey’s political approach. Aside from reinvigorating EU-Turkey accession talks, the JAP called for more cooperation between the two sides, including the deployment of FRONTEX personnel to Turkey and extra-financial assistance to cope with Syrian citizens under temporary protection, beyond the funds already committed through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) (European Commission 2015). Three billion Euros were thus earmarked for Turkey under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey scheme; crucially, the money would be disbursed through project implementation through NGOs and international organisations, and Ankara would thus prove unable to be the direct beneficiary.3 EU financial assistance was also foreseen to assist the country in enhancing its capacity to meet the benchmarks identified by the EU regarding negotiating with Turkey for visa-free travel of its citizens to the EU, a major prize for any Turkish government. Visa liberalisation discussions had begun in 2013. During the process, the EU identified 72 benchmarks for Turkey to meet prior to gaining the right for visafree travel. This was in line with a similar framework adopted for other non-EU countries who have since gained the right for their citizens to travel visa-free to EU states. A new anti-terror law alongside appropriate regulation concerning personal data has long been the major obstacle to the successful conclusion of these negotiations. The JAP offered new impetus to the process. Moreover, the JAP reinforced Turkey’s EU aspirations by stressing the ‘negotiating candidate country’ status of Turkey, thus linking the issue of cooperation on migration with Ankara’s aspirations towards full membership. Indeed, Chapter 17 on Economic and Monetary Policy was opened in December 2015 and more were promised in the future. Meanwhile, Turkey was shaken by successive terrorist attacks on its soil, which drew attention to its close geographic proximity to Syria (the two states share a 900km long border) and the resulting vulnerability of the country. The EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 confirmed the progress made since the JAP and the fruitful cooperation between the two sides in their fight against smugglers and the attempt to ease living conditions for Syrians in Turkey. Ankara opened its labour market to Syrian nationals and updated its legislation on visa requirements. Nevertheless, a concrete formula to stem the flow of migrants crossing from Turkey into Greece, and therefore potentially further west deep into EU territory, was necessary. To that end, the Statement set out a ‘one-in, one-out’ formula: for everyone, irregular migrant returned to Turkey from Greece another Syrian in Turkey would be resettled in an EU member state, up to a maximum of 72,000 persons (European Council 2016). To appease critics, the Statement underlined that the process would be governed fully by the relevant international humanitarian standards and that it constituted a ‘temporary and extraordinary measure…necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order’ (ibid.). This did little to assuage fears that the European Union was now becoming complicit in a process that undermined human rights (Haferlach and Kurban 2017). Equally significant was the 72,000 numerical cap that the Statement placed on the potential irregular migrants that member states would be hosting. The number was very low, given the

EU-Turkey relations and the migration issue  39 scale of human movement at the time, and this was soon proven true. The Union claimed that ‘voluntary contributions’ by member states would suffice to deal with the issue. However, the question of reallocation soon split the Union. Visegrad states, joined by Austria, refused to display solidarity to their southern neighbours overwhelmed by large numbers. The Statement further called on Turkey to make sure that all illegal land and sea crossings towards EU territory be blocked for smugglers. It thus turned Turkey into the most important EU ally in the fight against irregular migration. Brussels considered the deal the necessary price to pay and therefore went beyond the JAP in (a) allocating another €3 billion of financial assistance to Turkey, (b) promising the opening of another acquis chapter (number 33 on financial and budgetary provisions), and (c) accelerating the visa liberalization dialogue with a view to implementing the lifting of the visa requirement for Turkish citizens. A long-stalled accession process was now being revived by Brussels. Germany was instrumental in this respect: as Chancellor Merkel faced the largest crisis of her premiership by accepting more than one million migrants into Germany and steadfastly refusing to place a cap on the number of people that Germany would be accommodating (Deutsche Welle 2017). Her stance left her open to right-wing criticism and assisted the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party as a major political force nation-wide. However, it also cemented Merkel’s reputation as a conviction politician and demonstrated a degree of decisiveness in her leadership that had hardly been on display during the Eurozone crisis. Moreover, the stance of the German Chancellor was appreciated in Ankara too, and German-Turkish relations remain cordial and cooperative. At the present time, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon are hosting more than five million refugees, primarily from Syria. Turkey is by far the country that has undertaken the heaviest task: according to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), almost four million Syrian refugees currently reside in Turkey alone (UNHCR 2019). At the peak of the crisis for Europe, back in 2015–2016, Turkey had been hosting more than 3 million people from Syria (Tsarouhas 2019). In terms of population, there is now roughly one refugee or migrant for every 20 Turkish citizens residing in the country, a number that no EU member state have had to deal with in the past. Most Syrian refugees live outside camps, as only 360,000 currently reside in the camps (UNHCR 2019). As the country was faced with an influx of Syrian refugees, primarily from cities such as Aleppo, as early as 2011, Turkey created camps early on. It could, however, not be foreseen that the civil war would escalate quickly over the next few years and that existing camp infrastructure would prove wholly inadequate to accommodate an ever-increasing number of people entering the country. The Turkish government repeatedly argued that closing the door to those seeking refuge would be an inhumane act. It stressed the cultural affinity with the Syrian population, as well as its humanitarian concerns for the plight of people fleeing war to prepare the ground for Turkish citizens to accept the high number of refugees entering the country (Balamir Çoskun and Yildiz Nielsen 2018; Kirişçi, Brandt and Erdogan 2018). A very large number of refugees have sought to settle in Istanbul,

40  Dimitris Tsarouhas not least because of the city’s size and economic potential. As mentioned above, they are now able to obtain work permits. However, the vast majority engage in informal employment which has contributed to growing resentment by the local population. Much of the rest of the refugees live close to the Syrian border which resulted in a rather asymmetrical distribution of the refugee population. On the part of Turkish authorities and a large part of the population, the expectation was that settling close to the border was a welcome development, encouraging the prospects of Syrians returning to their homeland following the end of the conflict. Nevertheless, the extent to which the end of the conflict will mean the return of Syrian refugees is unknown. Crucially, the Turkish government’s welcoming policy towards Syrian refugees was predicated on the foreign policy assumption that the Assad regime would soon collapse and that regime change was all but inevitable (Stein 2014). Thus, the very generous policy that was followed at the beginning of the crisis in terms of welcoming record numbers of refugees was very much based on the assumption that the country would be able to reap the benefits of this generosity in post-Assad Syria, to which it expected to play a protagonist role and consolidate its role as a regional power in the broader Middle East region. The fact that the civil war has followed a very different path, that Russia has become the most active power in the region propping up Assad and that the latter is now increasingly re-legitimised by the international community as the country’s sovereign leader has meant that this policy logic has been undermined. Until the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan was agreed upon, Turkish President Erdoğan asserted that the country had already spent more than $8 billion in seeking to provide for Syrians in the country (Kanter and Arango 2015). The figure rose further and had reached $12.5 billion by the time the agreement with the EU was reached. Support received from abroad was negligible, reaching only a paltry 3% of the total amount spent (EU-Turkey Statement 2015). 4 Turkey’s migration and asylum policy Following the establishment of the Republic, Turkey’s refugee laws were characterised by an extreme degree of restrictiveness. According to the relevant Settlement Law dating back to 1934, those eligible to receive the status of a refugee in the country were solely people ‘of Turkish culture and descent’. Although the country changed greatly ever since, severe restrictions in the legislative framework remained in place for a long period of time. Following the start of accession negotiations with the European Union and as analysed below, Turkey revised the 1934 Settlement Law through a new law but maintained the emphasis on the ethnic background of those who are entitled to settlement and, potentially, citizenship. The fundamental philosophy of the state’s approach thus remained unchanged, as discussed in more detail below (Iskan Kanunu 2006). In 1951, the landmark Geneva Convention consolidated in one definition the understanding of who is a refugee and established the principle of non-refoulment, prohibiting states from returning refugees to states where they could face torture and other forms of prosecution due to their race, ethnicity, nationality or opinion

EU-Turkey relations and the migration issue  41 (UNHCR 2010). In 1967, the additional protocol agreed in 1967 broadened the definition of a refugee and obliged states to comply with the Convention’s provisions without limitations to date (UNHCR 2010). Turkey is a signatory to both of those key documents; however, the country added a geographic limitation in terms of incoming refugees. Simply put, this means that a right to asylum in Turkey could be granted only to those arriving from Europe. The direct consequence of the geographic limitation has been that refugees arriving from elsewhere in the world, as happened both in the aftermath of the Iraq war in the 1990s and more recently due to the Syrian conflict, are legally seen as ‘guests’, with no asylum claim right and therefore expected to depart from the country at some ill-defined point in the future. After the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the first Gulf War, as well as the earlier Iraq-Iran war of 1980–1988, people fleeing conflict in the Middle East (and further East) started arriving in Turkey. The country became a transit spot for those whose destination was further west, while others would attempt to settle in Turkey itself. The legal and regulatory framework of the country was inadequate to deal with the new reality; Turkey had ceased to be a country of emigration to safer and more prosperous western nations. It was therefore imperative that new initiatives be taken to deal with the changing reality. This gathered pace following the Syrian refugee crisis. In 1994, Regulation 69/1994 offered a temporary protection status to refugees. Those whose status was approved then became entitled to resettlement in third countries by use of UNHCR services. This was the first instance in which Turkey defined refugees (stemming from Europe) and asylum-seekers (stemming from elsewhere in the world) by use of national legislation instead of merely relying on international legal commitments (Kaya 2009). However, the big legislative changes to consolidate various instruments occurred in the 2000s as a result of two factors: first, Turkey’s EU accession talks; second, the Syrian crisis and agreements with the European Union discussed above. Turkey’s EU vocation appeared solid after 2005: having obtained a candidate country status in 1999, it began accession negotiations in 2005. Legislative alignment with the EU acquis is a major precondition for accession, and the National Action Plan (NAP) for Asylum and Migration, endorsed by then Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2005, pointed to Turkey’s willingness to proceed with alignment. In 2006 and as accession negotiations were under way, an Implementation Directive further specified the legal status of refugees and asylum-seekers. Nonetheless, the geographical limitation was maintained throughout, resulting in effect in a two-tier asylum and migration system: the first, referring to Europeans, was resulting from Turkey’s proximity to the West during the Cold War. The second, referring to non-Europeans, was a nascent development of events in Turkey’s eastern neighbourhood during the 1980s and early 1990s, such as the influx of Iraqi Kurds after 1988 as well as the first Gulf war of 1990 (Kirişçi 2012). Nevertheless, this did not automatically mean dropping the crucial geographic limitation. The NAP had identified two pre-conditions for lifting that limitation. Turkey wished for (a) EU member states to commit to burden sharing so as not to impede the implementation of such a change, and (b) amendments to be made to existing legislation so as to impede a rapid influx of refugees (National Action Plan 2003).

42  Dimitris Tsarouhas The EU accession process had offered fresh impetus for reform in Turkey’s legislation regarding migration and asylum. By the time the Syrian civil war erupted, however, the two-track system identified above had remained in place and those already in the country had limited access to vital services and legal protection. What is more, relations with the European Union had become unstable and unpredictable, as the Cyprus imbroglio slowed down the accession prospects of Turkey and scepticism by large member states, such as France and Germany, slowed down Turkey’s alignment with EU law. By 2011, Turkey’s politics in dealing with the Syrian crisis pointed to generosity and solidarity, its capacity to deliver sustainable protection was limited, and its relations with key EU member states under strain. In 2013, the adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International protection (LFIP) was a major step forward, constituting the first ever integrated national law concerning asylum in the country (Suter 2013). Along with the creation of an integrated new body to deal with the issue of migrants and refugees, the General Directorate for Migration Management (GDMM), it constitutes a major innovation in Turkey’s approach. It is not accidental that the UNHCR, which warmly welcomed the new law, played a considerable role in drafting it as well (Çorabatir 2016: 7). Moreover, the European Union hailed Turkey’s legislative efforts in the context of the Visa Liberalization Roadmap (European Commission 2014). The new law focused on individual asylum request cases and was very much in line with EU legislation and asylum procedures, such as provisions regarding ‘safe third countries’ and ‘first-country-of asylum’ (Çorabatir 2016: 7). It defined several categories of foreigners for the first time and was explicit regarding the term of entry, stay and exit in the country (Soykan 2012). The creation of the GDMM, subject to the Interior Ministry, meant that tasks regarding the management of migration would now fall under the authority of the newly established body instead of the General Directorate for Security. The new law also granted, for the first time, limited access to social services for vulnerable groups such as conditional refugees and asylum-seekers (Yabancilar ve Uluslararasi Koruma Kanunu 2013). The formation of the GDMM has had consequences for other Ministries as well: there is now a more integrated approach by way of incorporating migration-related departments to agencies such as the police or the gendarmerie; previously, such agencies merely had units dealing with the issue (IOM Programme Officer, personal interview, October 14, 2016). Finally, in 2014, a Temporary Protection Regulation was issued, which included the granting of rights to healthcare and education to those under protection status and in line with the provisions of the Geneva Convention (Makovsky 2019). A number of changes were introduced to ease the presence of Syrian nationals in Turkey and despite the high number of unregistered citizens of Syria residing in the country. Aside from the temporary protection status offered to them, Syrian nationals would be issued with biometric ID cards, in line with EU laws and regulations. Furthermore, access to the labour market would now be made possible, as would access to psychological services and counselling. The latter is particularly relevant

EU-Turkey relations and the migration issue  43 for the thousands suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and carry not only the physical but, equally importantly, the psychological scars that the brutal conflict had inflicted upon them. The implementation of the regulation, however, has been far from smooth. Both bureaucratic delays and the reluctance to follow through on what is actually prescribed in the regulation mean that the number of Syrians who have managed to gain access to the biometric ID cards remains very low (IOM Project Development and Implementation Unit, personal interview, October 14, 2016). It is worth stressing that the process of adaptation to international norms on asylum and migration has had a discernible effect on the Turkish authorities’ management of the crisis. Cooperation with international NGOs has expanded greatly, to a great extent because of the latter’s direct involvement in capacity building and project implementation as implementing partners (IOM Project Coordinator, October 13, 2016). Further, organisations such as the UNHCR and the International organization for Migration (IOM), now a UN body, play a key role in managing the process. Non-governmental organisations, municipalities and international agencies set up language courses for Syrians to break the important language barrier. Success has been limited, however, as demand is sky-high and the ability of the country to coordinate a unified programme and respond to the challenge is far from guaranteed (IOM Project Development and Implementation Unit, personal interview, October 14, 2016; IOM Project Coordinator, October 13, 2016; Regional Representative of the Confederation of Progressive Turkish Trade Unions, personal interview, December 8, 2016). Nevertheless, the picture is far from rosy: as most refugees are in the south of Turkey and municipalities are primarily dealing with attempts to ease their living conditions, asymmetries in approach between the central state and municipal authorities often impede their cooperation (Regional Representative of the Confederation of Progressive Turkish Trade Unions, personal interview, December 8, 2016). Coordination problems get to the heart of managing the migration and asylum framework. All of the above demonstrate the cooperation between Turkey and international organisations, including the European Union, at a particularly sensitive time. Nevertheless, important limitations to Turkey’s full alignment with international practice persisted. First, the 2013 Law did not grant equal protection to all groups entering the country, relying instead mostly on a 2001 EU Directive on temporary protection (Çorabatir 2016: 7). Second, the new legislative framework did not include the right to work for Syrian refugees. Instead, the people concerned would need to apply and receive work permits under a cumbersome and heavily bureaucratic process, which drove most in the underground economy (Kirişçi, Brandt and Erdogan 2018). As a consequence, the spirit of the new legislative framework, while greatly expanding on existing arrangements, did not offer a path towards sustainable livelihood for the millions that had entered the country and left the issue of access healthcare and education services to the discretion of the government instead. Finally, the geographic limitation was not lifted. According to Kirişçi (2012:75), the reasons behind this decision emanate primarily from Turkey’s fears about the consequences of lifting the limitation without entering the EU.

44  Dimitris Tsarouhas 5 EU-Turkey relations after 2013 Turkey and Germany, two countries of roughly equal size, deep economic bonds and a love-hate relationship spanning decades became the main protagonists in the ongoing saga. Ankara had every right to be pleased: it was voluntarily undertaking the task that the European Union had refused to implement itself and rightly felt that the lack of solidarity among EU member states provided it with a golden opportunity to make progress in its relations with the Union at a time when its relations with the EU had reached a new low. Crucially for the Turkish government, harmonious cooperation with the EU and the reliance of Brussels on Ankara to deal with the migration crisis suggested that visa-free travel to the Union could become a reality. Not least for electoral purposes, the realisation of this long-cherished goal would be seen as the ultimate triumph of Turkish diplomacy, above and beyond the opening of a few more negotiating chapters. 5.1 Durable agreements, worsening tensions: the post-deal period

Although the criticism against the EU-Turkey migration deal has not fully subsided, its successes cannot be ignored. The number of people attempting to cross illegally into EU territory has dropped considerable, and the networks of smugglers that profited greatly from the absence of such cooperation in the past have lost out. The European Union, by issuing regular updates and data pertaining to the agreement, has stressed the benefits incurred through the implementation of the deal. The second anniversary of the deal saw the Commission claim that arrivals on the Aegean Sea islands from Turkey had dropped by an astonishing 97% in two years; daily, this meant an average of about 80 a day, compared to more than 3000 during 2015 (European Commission 2018; IOM Programme Officer, personal interview, October 14, 2016; IOM Project Development and Implementation Unit, personal interview, October 14, 2016; Regional Representative of the Confederation of Progressive Turkish Trade Unions, personal interview, December 8, 2016; Support to Life Foundation Protection Expert 1, personal interview, December 9, 2016; Support to Life Foundation Protection Expert 2, December, 9, 2016). Further, the Commission underlined that resettlement of Syrian refugees to member states continued apace and that support provided to Greece had allowed the latter to manage the crisis more effectively. Finally, the Commission underscored how its financial aid to Turkey had enabled hundreds of thousands of Syrian kids to attend school in Turkey, 1.2 million people to get access to healthcare and hundreds of new schools to be constructed (European Commission 2018). Despite occasional threats to end the agreement, mostly resulting from the alleged ‘dishonesty’ and ‘non-cooperation’ by the EU (BBC News 2017), Turkey has continued to implement the agreement throughout. It has also partnered with both Greece and NATO to beef up coast guard supervision of the Aegean Sea and to continue disrupting smugglers’ attempts to bypass surveillance and policing at sea. Nevertheless, tensions with the EU have remained throughout the implementation period and domestic instability has fuelled deterioration in relations with Europe.4 In

EU-Turkey relations and the migration issue  45 that context, two events stand out; however, the 15 July 2016 coup attempt against the Turkish government is the most important. The bombing of the Turkish Parliament, tanks on the Bosporus bridge and the attempted assassination of President Erdoğan came as a surprise to most observers. Hundreds of civilians lost their life and thousands got injured as the President called on the people to defend democracy in the country. This extraordinary coup attempt was attributed to a faction of the armed forces linked to the Islamic preacher Fettulah Gülen. The government responded by clamping down on the putschists and then moved quickly to declare a state of emergency to ‘cleanse’ the state of conspirators and accomplices of the alleged masterminds. In the process, hundreds of thousands of civil servants and private sector employees lost their jobs and associated rights. The army, police, media, judiciary as well as academia all saw alleged conspirators imprisoned or accused of cooperation with the putschists. Whilst the Turkish government called for solidarity by Europe amidst its ‘anti-terrorist’ measures and accused the Union of ignoring the trauma of 15 July, the EU condemned the coup attempt but also called for respect for democratic institutions and the quick return to the rule of law (IKV 2016). In recent years, progress has been made by way of the lifting of emergency rule and the return of some civil servants to their post, although arrests continue from time to time. Second, acrimony increased further ahead of the controversial 2017 Turkish referendum to transform the regime to a (sort of) Presidential democracy. As domestic Turkish politics and the associated tensions between different segments threatened to spill over to EU member states with a large Turkish population, Germany and the Netherlands were accused by President Erdoğan of restricting freedom of speech by prohibiting or curtailing campaign events. Turkey’s belligerent rhetoric, characterising German and other officials as ‘Nazis’, heightened already escalating tensions (Pierini 2018). Turkey’s close cooperation with Russia, beginning in 2016, meant that the EU and Turkey were driven further apart—even on how to deal with the Syrian crisis, an issue that had united them until then. To top it all, stringent anti-terror legislation, objected to by the EU, has meant that visa-free travel remains elusive for Turkey, further fuelling existing tensions. Gaining the right to visa-free travel has been a long-cherished goal of every Turkish government since the EU ceased the practice following the 1980s coup (Kirişçi 2014). Heightened political instability in Turkey has been combined with the non-­ resolution of the Syrian crisis and has led to increasing tensions regarding the integration and accommodation of millions of refugees. Turkey is ambivalent as to the extent to which it wishes to integrate the Syrians in the country (IOM Project Development and Implementation Unit, personal interview, October 14, 2016; IOM Programme Officer, personal interview, October 14, 2016). Sections of civil society, such as some trade unions, argue that informal employment by refugees undercuts minimum wage legislation and penalises Turkish workers as a result (Support to Life Foundation Protection Expert 1, personal interview, December 9, 2016). Integration becomes harder still considering that Syrians are a majority in certain cities on the border and form majorities in Istanbul neighbourhoods. The erstwhile welcoming attitude of the Turkish people has turned to increasing disappointment and anger, as it is becoming increasingly clear that most Syrians intend to stay in

46  Dimitris Tsarouhas the country even after a political solution has been reached in Syria (Makovsky 2019). Worryingly, politics has now entered the picture and the issue is no longer a matter of displaying solidarity to those fleeing conflict. When President Erdoğan raised the prospect of granting citizenship to Syrians in 2016, the opposition vociferously opposed such a plan and popular backlash forced Erdoğan to backtrack. Although about 70,000 Syrians had been granted citizenship by early 2019, the government now claims that eventually all refugees will return home, a rather unlikely prospect (Makovsky 2019). Humanitarian organisations in the field allege that the current status of Syrians in Turkey cannot continue as is for a long period of time (Support to Life Foundation Protection Expert 1, personal interview, December 9, 2016; Support to Life Foundation Protection Expert 2, December, 9, 2016; Support to Life Foundation Protection Expert 3, December, 9, 2016), although it is equally clear that awarding full citizenship rights to all of them is not feasible. Meanwhile, incidents of violence between Syrians and locals, sometimes resulting in deaths and widespread urban violence, have been on the increase, especially in the western urban centres where cultural misunderstandings and differences are as ripe as those between Syrians and EU member states (International Crisis Group 2018). At least in the western part of Turkey, polls suggest that locals see the Syrian refugees as neither willing nor able to integrate in Turkish society. 6 Conclusion This chapter has argued that EU-Turkey cooperation over the migration crisis, although real, has been apprehensive. Fraught with challenges and complexities, the EU-Turkey agreement has been indicative of how the Union has dealt with the crisis and has offered it the possibility of diffusing some of the tension associated with the issue. Turkey’s generous and hospitable reaction at the onset of the crisis—a combination of benevolence and political calculation regarding Syria—proved a saving grace for a Union divided and split on how to deal with yet another structural problem, following the Eurozone crisis. Moreover, Turkey has cooperated closely with Europe as well as international organisations and NGOs to upgrade its legislative toolkit and adjust it to the changed realities of the 21st century. Turkey is today much more than a country of emigrants abroad: it is a transit country for migrants and refugees wishing to migrate from East to West as well as a destination country resulting from its improved economic profile (Ozcurumez and Șenses 2011). The modernisation of its laws and regulations on migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers is an attempt to reconcile the multiple identities that the country has now acquired. Although the EU-Turkey agreements have survived periods of instability and tension, major challenges remain. For the EU, immigration continues to top citizens’ concerns in several member states, fuelled by populist short-termism and the desire for electoral gains. Meanwhile, Turkey’s approach has undergone important changes too. The sheer number of refugees now residing in the country has led to inter-ethnic clashes and the consolidation of a schism between Syrians’ and Turks’ expectations as to the way forward. While the latter are openly questioning the desirability of Syrians remaining in the country, most of the former have sought to rebuild their

EU-Turkey relations and the migration issue  47 livelihoods on Turkish soil and are reluctant to contemplate a return to their homeland. For years to come, Turkey will face a massive challenge regarding how to deal with its Syrian population. Whatever solution it comes up with, it will be met with resistance and doubts by segments of the population. Cooperation with the European Union and a sincere willingness to reach mutually acceptable solutions is but one of the many preconditions on which the success of this project depends on. Notes 1 By 2013, the European Union had already securitized its approach regarding irregular migration by adopting measures to combat illegal flows through the utilization of surveillance, border patrols and tackling illegal employment practices (see Ozcurumez and Șenses, 2011: 239). 2 This section draws on Tsarouhas (2019). 3 By October 2019 and amidst a new spike in migrant/refugee arrivals to Turkey, calls (particularly by Greece and Germany) are multiplying to provide further financial assistance to the Turkish authorities. This time, such assistance is likely to go directly to Turkey, however. 4 The prospect of Turkey becoming a full member of the EU was dealt a major blow following the summer of 2013 due to the Gezi protests and the condemnation of the Turkish state’s harsh treatment of protesters by Brussels (Secretary General of Istanbul Development Foundation, personal interview, December, 12, 2016).

References Arango, Tim and Kanter, James. 2015. ‘Turkish Leader says EU should do more about Syria,’ New York Times, October 5. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/ world/europe/turkey-erdogan-syria-european-union-refugees.html Aydin-Düzgit, Senem and Kaliber, Alper. 2016. ‘Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country?,’ South European Society & Politics, 21 (1), 1–14. Aydin-Düzgit, Senem and Noucheva, Gergana. 2011. ‘Lost in Europeanization: The Western Balkans and Turkey,’ West European Politics, 35 (1), 59–78. Balamir Çoskun, Bezen and Yildiz Nielsen, Selin (Eds.). 2018. Encounters in the TurkeySyria Borderland, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. BBC News. 2017. ‘Erdogan Threatens to Scrap EU-Turkey Migration Deal,’ March 16. Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39294776 Çorabatir, Metin (Ed.). 2016. The Evolving Response to Refugee Protection in Turkey: Assessing the Practical and Political Needs, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Deutsche Welle. 2017. ‘Angela Merkel Rules Out Upper Limit on Refugees,’ September 12. Available at https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-rules-out-upper-limit-on-refugees/ a-40459431 Eralp, Atila. 2009. ‘Temporality, Cyprus Problem, and EU-Turkey Relationship’, EDAM Discussion Paper Series 2009/02. Erdemli, Özgül. 2003. ‘Chronology: Turkey’s Relations with the EU,’ Turkish Studies, 4 (1), 4–8. European Commission. 2014. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: On Progress by Turkey in Fulfilling the Requirements of its Visa Liberalization Roadmap, European Commission. European Commission, ‘EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan,’ October 15, 2015. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/MEMO_15_5860

48  Dimitris Tsarouhas European Commission, ‘EU-Turkey Statement: Two Years On,’ April 2018. Available at https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-09/20180314_eu-turkey-two-yearson_en.pdf European Council, ‘EU-Turkey Statement,’ March 18, 2016. Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/# Grabbe, Heather (Ed.). 2006. The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe, London: Palgrave MacMillan. Haferlach, Lisa and Dilek, Kurban. 2017. ‘Lessons Learnt from the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement in Guiding EU Migration Partnerships with Origin and Transit Countries,’ Global Policy, 8 (4), 85–94. Heraclides, Alexis and Alioğlu Çakmak, Gizem (Eds.). 2019. Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation: From Europeanization to de-Europeanization, London: Routledge. IKV. 2016. The Day After: Turkey’s Recovery Following the Failed Coup Attempt, Publication No 287, Economic Development Foundation. International Crisis Group. 2018. Turkey’s Syrian Refugees: Diffusing Metropolitan Tensions, Europe Report No 248, International Crisis Group. Kaya, Ibrahim. 2009. Reform in Turkish Asylum Law: Adopting the EU Acquis?, CARIM Research Reports 2009/16, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/11849/CARIM_RR_2009_16.pdf;jsessionid =77E4437E3332349ABA3BFC18004E4E71?sequence=2 Kirişçi, Kemal. 2012. ‘Turkey’s New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of It?’, in Paçacı, Elitok, Seçil and Straubhaar, Thomas (eds), Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities, Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 63–83. Kirişçi, Kemal. 2014. Will the Readmission Agreement Bring the EU and Turkey Together or Pull them Apart?, CEPS Commentary, February 4. Available at https://www.ceps.eu/ system/files/KK%20EU-Turkey%20readmission%20agreement.pdf Kirişçi, Kemal, Brandt, John and Erdogan, Murat. 2018. ‘Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Beyond the Numbers’, Brookings Institution, June 16. Available at https://www.brookings. edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/06/19/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-beyond-the-numbers/ Makovsky, Alan. 2019. Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma: Tiptoeing towards Integration, Washington, DC: Center for American Progress. Öniş, Ziya. 2014. ‘Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East’, Mediterranean Politics, 19 (2), 203–219. Öniş, Ziya and Kutlay, Mustafa. ‘Global Shifts and the Limits of the EU’s Transformative Power in the European Periphery: Comparative Perspectives from Hungary and Turkey,’ Government & Opposition, 54 (2), 226–253. Ozcurumez, Saime and Șenses, Nazli. 2011. ‘Europeanization and Turkey: Studying Irregular Migration Policy,’ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 13 (2), 233–248. Pierini, Marc. 2018. The 2018 Turkey Regress Report, Bruxelles: Carnegie Europe. Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich . 2004. ‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (4), 661–79. Soykan, Cavidan. 2012. ‘The New Draft Law on Foreigners and International Protection in Turkey,’ Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration, 2 (2), 38–47. Stein, Aaron. 2014. ‘For Turkey, It’s All about Regime Change in Syria,’Al Jazeera, October 8. Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/10/8/for-turkey-its-all-aboutregime-change-in-syria Suter, Brigitte. 2013. ‘Asylum and Migration in Turkey: An Overview of Developments in the Field, 1990–2013,’ MIM Working Paper Series, 13 (3). Available at https://www.

EU-Turkey relations and the migration issue  49 mah.se/upload/Forskningscentrum/MIM/Publications/WPS%2013.3%20Brigitte%20 Suter%20final.pdf Tocci, Natalie. 2005. ‘Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor of Reform?,’ South European Society & Politics, 10 (1), 73–83. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2016. ‘Personal interview with International Organization for Migration (IOM) Project Development and Implementation Unit,’ October 13. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2016. ‘Personal interview with International Organization for Migration (IOM) Programme Officer,’ October 14. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2016. ‘Personal interview with Confederation of Progressive Turkish Trade Unions (DISK) Istanbul Regional Representative,’ December 9. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2016. ‘Personal interview with Support to Life Foundation (Hayata Destek Vakfi) Program Manager,’ December 9. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2016. ‘Personal interview with Support to Life Foundation (Hayata Destek Vakfi) Protection Expert 1,’ December 9. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2016. ‘Personal interview with Support to Life Foundation (Hayata Destek Vakfi) Protection Expert 2,’ December 9. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2016. ‘Personal interview with Support to Life Foundation (Hayata Destek Vakfi) Protection Expert 3,’ December 9. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2016. ‘Personal interview with Istanbul Development Foundation (IKV) Secretary Genera,’ December 12. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2016. ‘Social Policy in the EU and Turkey: The Limits of Europeanization’, in Çigdem, Nas, and Yonca, Özer (eds), Turkey and the European Union: Processes of Europeanization, London: Routledge, 161–179. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2018. ‘Turkey: Identity Politics and Reticent Europeanization’, in Mannin, Michael and Flenley, Paul (eds), The European Union and Its Eastern Neighbourhood: Europeanisation and Its Twenty-First-Century Contradictions, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 126–138. Tsarouhas, Dimitris. 2019. ‘Turkey and the European Migration Crisis: Apprehensive Cooperation’, in Prodromidou, Alexandra and Gkasis, Pavlos (eds), Along the Balkan Route: The Impact of the post-2014 “Migrant Crisis” on the EU’s South East Periphery’, Bonn: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 28–42. Turkish Government, ‘Iskan Kanunu [Settlement Law]. Law No.5543/19,’ September 19, 2009. Available at http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5543.pdf Turkish Government, ‘Yabancilar ve Uluslararasi Koruma Kanunu [Law on Foreigners and International Protection]. No. 28615,’ April 11, 2013. Available at http://www.mevzuat. gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6458.pdf Turkish Government, ‘Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration,’ March 25, 2005. Available at http://www.madde14. org/images/0/03/Uepeng.pdf Turkish Heritage Organization. 2016. ‘Turkey’s Role in the Refugee Crisis,’ THO Factsheet. Available at https://www.turkheritage.org/en/publications/factsheets/humanitarian-aid/ turkeys-role-in-the-refugee-crisis-2493 UNHCR. 1966. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Available at https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 UNHCR, ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response – Total Persons of Concern by Country of Asylum,’ 2019. Available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria

4

The migration/refugee crisis and the (un/re)making of Europe Risks and challenges for Greece1 Dimitris Keridis

1 Introduction In 2015, Greece faced an unprecedented crisis when almost a million people crossed disorderly its borders from Turkey on their way to Europe. The crisis presented Greece with a humanitarian challenge at the peak of its own economic recession, while it threatened to overwhelm the Greek state’s limited administrative capacity, destabilize the regional order by potentially igniting tensions with neighbouring Turkey and North Macedonia, marginalize Greece further within the European Union (EU), both politically and physically, and upend European integration at a time when Greece needed and depended the most on the solidarity of its EU partners. At first, the incoming government of Alexis Tsipras exacerbated the problem by adopting an open-borders policy that reversed some of the border controls that its predecessors had struggled to introduce. Eventually, however, Athens proved flexible and realistic. It supported the emerging EU consensus on enhanced border protection and the controlled and measured flow of refugees into the EU. The Greek government abandoned its leftist proclamations and aligned itself closely with Germany in support of the EU-Turkey deal that drastically reduced the human flows from Turkey into the EU. Furthermore, the Greek government invited NATO naval forces to help monitor the flows in the Eastern Aegean Sea between Turkey and Greece. Finally, the Greek government buried away much of its populist euroscepticism and turned into a champion of furthering integration, especially in the field of immigration and asylum policy that should be dealt with at the EU level rather by each state separately. The crisis, however, weakened the EU as a whole as it seemed to confirm its geopolitical weakness while it strengthened the nationalist, euro-sceptic voices within many EU member states and contributed to the Brexit vote in the British referendum of 2016. In Germany, the EU’s core country, it allowed a xenophobic, right-wing party, named “Alternative for Germany”, to enter the federal parliament, coming third in the September 2017 elections, making the formation of a new governing coalition in Berlin a difficult political and numerical exercise. The Schengen Area did hold together, as its dissolution would have been extremely costly, especially for the very open and inter-dependent economies of northern Europe. But the crisis that followed a period of severe economic DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405-4

The migration/refugee crisis and the (un/re)making of Europe  51 contraction after 2008 has had a deep political impact, turning Europe sharply rightwards. With the exception of France where, thanks to the electoral law and the daring charisma of Emmanuel Macron, a staunchly Europhile president and parliament were elected, the crisis accelerated the decline of Europe’s most distinct political force, that of social democracy, and contributed to the rise of a group of nationalist and occasionally authoritarian leaders in Central Europe that view Brussels with increasing hostility. In fact, the crisis threatened to divide the EU along a Western mainstream and an Eastern alternative (plus an exiting Britain) that has come to resent the influence and the reforms propagated by the EU bureaucracy. Moreover, it seems that there has been no permanent fix to the challenge of managing the influx of migrants and refugees and that a new crisis might occur with devastating consequences for the future cohesion of the European Union. There is still no administrative capacity in Greece to process in a timely manner the influx of people and return significant numbers of illegal immigrants to Turkey. Germany, with its fairly generous asylum policy and with an economy of full employment, continues to act as a gigantic magnet stimulating human flows that can undermine European integration and strengthen further the return to strict national border controls. This paper is structured around two parts: the first part describes the immigration and refugee crisis itself, from a global, European, and national-Greek perspective; the second part analyzes the risks to and policy responses of Greece, and how they relate to the country’s overall geostrategic position at a time when Europe is being redefined as it struggles to respond to a multitude of challenges. 2 The crisis With one person displaced every 3 seconds, there are more displaced people in the world today (circa 65 million) than during World War II (UNHCR 2018a). Still, with armed conflicts becoming more protracted and environmental pressures mounting, the number of refugees is bound to increase. Despite the magnitude and the importance of this phenomenon, general perceptions and policy responses are often incorrect or inadequate, and the gap between public opinion and the opinion of experts is vast and growing. While recent wars in the Middle East and Northern Africa pushed a dramatic wave of asylum-seekers and migrants towards Europe in 2015–2016, 84% of the displaced remain in low- to middle-income countries and 8 out of 10 refugees are living in neighbouring countries. With more than 40% of refugees displaced for more than 10 years and 20% for more than 30, supporting alternative livelihoods and ensuring access to services and legal protection have never been so compelling. The above short exposé provides a concise picture of the refugee challenge from a global perspective. Zooming into Europe, before dealing with the specifics of the 2015 crisis, it is useful to bear the following facts in mind. The international regime protecting the refugees was put in place in the aftermath of World War II. The provisions of the regime are generous and mandate the full protection of refugees.

52  Dimitris Keridis The regime was meant for the protection of the few political refugees escaping communism or military dictatorships during the Cold War. In other words, it was meant for the protection of people coming from the First or the Second World, sharing the colour, religion, and cultural outlook of Europeans and not for people from the impoverished and culturally alien global South. Indeed, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1950 and came of age with the 1956 refugee crisis caused by the failure of the Hungarian revolution and the invasion of Hungary by the Soviet army when, as a result, 200,000 Hungarians fled to the West (UNHCR 2018b). Moreover, some Western countries, including Germany and Greece, went further and introduced specific refugee-protection clauses into their constitution. The Greek constitution of 1975 provides a good example of that when it states that “the expulsion of an alien under persecution for his defence of liberty is forbidden” (article 5, paragraph 2). However, things evolved differently. There has been an interesting but much understudied chain of developments during the post-war era. War between states became rare and war among great powers became obsolete, in part thanks to nuclear weapons. War has not disappeared but it has been “domesticated”. The vast majority of wars in the post-war era have been civil wars (Christia 2012). Civil wars are very much associated with poverty and they occur, almost exclusively, in the global periphery or what used to be the Third World (Collier 2009). As a result, contrary to the experience of World War II, which gave birth to the current international regime for the protection of refugees, the vast majority of refugees and internally displaced people today come from poor, third-world nations engulfed in civil war. As already mentioned above, traditionally, most of these people have remained either within their country of origin or in neighbouring countries. This has been the case with the millions of Palestinians festering in various Arab states, the millions of African refugees, as a result of the recurring sub-Saharan civil wars, surviving in the various African refugee camps or the millions of Afghans in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. As long as these people remained far and away from the West, little attention was paid to them. They were a concern for the hosting countries and the international humanitarian agencies dedicated to dealing with these issues, but they were not a concern for the leaders or the public opinion of the powerful nations of the world. An exception in this 70-year-long history was the forced displacement caused by the Yugoslav wars of succession in the 1990s. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia produced an intra-European wave of refugees not seen since World War II. However, the sympathy towards the victims and the relatively small numbers involved did not produce an anti-refugee backlash among the Western publics. After all, most of the forcefully displaced people remained within the borders of former Yugoslavia, with Serbia receiving the vast majority of them, some 800,000 Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia. When war came to Kosovo in 1999, it was neighbouring North Macedonia that hosted the hundreds of thousands of Albanian refugees escaping Slobodan Milosevic’s terror. In short, the Yugoslav tragedy was a European

The migration/refugee crisis and the (un/re)making of Europe  53 war fought by Europeans. Europe and the West, after some hesitation, were both able and willing to deal with it. It took place in the midst of the euphoria brought about by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of East European communism, and the end of the Cold War. As a result, NATO intervened militarily twice, first in Bosnia in 1995 and then in Kosovo in 1999. The United States, together with its major European allies, imposed a peace settlement first at Dayton over Bosnia and then, with the Security Council Resolution 1244 over Kosovo, that opened the way for the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. Things changed dramatically two decades later with the refugee crisis of 2015. With the advent of the crisis, Europe and Germany, in particular, were flooded by non-European, non-Christian, and culturally alien refugees and immigrants at a time of increasing Islamophobia and social anxiety. For the first time since the introduction of the refugee-protection international regime, Europe was asked to walk the humanitarian talk it had been preaching for seven decades. At first, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, welcomed the newcomers, and in a famous proclamation that has haunted her ever since, she welcomed the challenge and reconfirmed post-war Germany’s commitment to the full protection of refugees wherever they come from. However, as the crisis deepened, her allies started to abandon her. First, it was Austria and then the sister party of her Christian Democrats, the staunchly conservative Bavaria-based Christian Social Union. Eventually, she was forced to change course, accepted the closing of the Balkan corridor, through which most of the influx took place, with the erection of heavily guarded border fences, and sponsored an EU repatriation agreement with Turkey that decreased the flow by 97%. Meanwhile, as a result of the crisis, many in Europe started calling for the tightening or even the abandonment of the international regime for the protection of refugees altogether. These include not only the Visegrad extremists of the likes of Viktor Orban (Buckley and Byrne 2018), who has equated the refugees with terrorists, but many conservatives on the centre-right as well. The overall European consensus has moved towards the better management of borders (Tardy 2017), the speedy review of asylum claims, the repatriation of those whose claims have been rejected, and the granting of economic aid to the poor and distressed countries where most immigrants come from, provided they do a much better job in controlling their borders effectively (Batsaikhan 2018). As the French President Emmanuel Macron put it in his speech at the Sorbonne in September 2017, “only with Europe can we effectively protect our borders, take in those eligible for asylum decently, truly integrate them, and at the same time quickly return those not eligible for such protection. So long as we leave some of our partners submerged under massive arrivals, without helping them manage their borders; so long as our asylum procedures remain slow and disparate; so long as we are incapable of collectively organizing the return of migrants not eligible for asylum, we will lack both effectiveness and humanity… we need to do that without leaving the burden to the few, be they countries of first entry or final host countries, by building the terms for genuine, chosen, organized and concerted solidarity” (French Ministry for European and Foreign Affairs 2017).

54  Dimitris Keridis Nevertheless, the feeling remains that the problem of immigration and refugees is here to stay, that the income inequality among the world’s regions has increased, that globalization has facilitated immigration, and that Europe will be facing similar or worse crises repeatedly in the future (Darvas 2017). Interestingly, the 2015 crisis proved that even small numbers can have huge political consequences. There were no refugees going to Great Britain, and yet, the images of disorder and chaos emanating from the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean played a major role in the voters’ turn against Europe in the British referendum. There are no refugees in Hungary today, and moreover, there are no refugees who want to go to Hungary anyway. This did not stop Orban from turning the refugee crisis into a major public concern and from proclaiming a crusade against the refugees and the cosmopolitan elites of Brussels who supposedly supported them. Even the number of approximately two million people who came into Europe in 2015, although much higher than in previous years, is, comparatively speaking, manageable, one might argue, for a European Union of 510 million with vast economic resources at its disposal. With this background in mind, let’s now turn to the crisis itself and its impact on Greece. The numbers paint a dramatic increase in the amount of illegal crossings into the European Union during 2015. While there were 72,500 crossings in 2012 and 283,500 thousand in 2014, the number exploded to 1.8 million crossings in 2015, reports Frontex Risk Analysis Network (Kotzamanis and Karkouli 2016). According to UNHCR, the majority of these crossings, around one million, took place through the Mediterranean Sea routes, and, more specifically, from Turkey into Greece, through the eastern Aegean Sea (Kotzamanis and Karkouli 2016). The total number of arrivals in Greece increased from 77,000 in 2014 to 911,000 in 2015. Whereas, prior to 2014, most arrivals involved land crossings, mainly over the river border between Greece and Turkey in Thrace; in 2015 more than 90% of arrivals were by sea, with the Greek island of Lesbos being the primary destination followed by the islands of Chios and Samos. From these and the other Greek islands across from the Turkish coast, refugees and migrants were transferred to the northern border at Idomeni, on their way to Central Europe, in what became known as the Balkan corridor. According to UNHCR, the number of sea crossings increased between 2014 and 2015, from 41,038 to 856,723, mainly from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan (UNHCR 2018c). Among the Syrians were many women, children, and older people. However, incoming Afghanis were mostly young men. The crisis peaked in October 2015 with 218,000 sea crossings into Greece but the number remained substantial until March 2016, when, following the signing of the EU-Turkey agreement, the influx started receding. However, according to the Financial Times, “…some worry the problem is merely being moved elsewhere”. In April, the numbers of migrants reaching Italy exceeded the total of Greece for the first time since June 2015, according to Frontex, the EU border agency. Some 8,300 migrants were detected on the central Mediterranean route compared with 2,700 on the Turkey-Greece crossing” (Hope 2016).

The migration/refugee crisis and the (un/re)making of Europe  55 According to UNHCR, there are around 15 million refugees in the world today, excluding the internally displaced people and the 5.1 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA since 1949. Syrians constitute the largest group, followed by Afghanis and Somalis. Due to the Syrian civil war, Turkey became the largest refugee-hosting country worldwide in total numbers for the first time ever, but Lebanon remained the country with the highest concentration of refugees in per capita terms (European Stability Initiative 2015). Today, it is estimated that some 3.1 million Syrians are in Turkey alone (European Commission-Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 2016), with only 10% in refugee camps and the rest in various Turkish cities, according to a Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations’ report (Erdogan and Ünver 2015). It is important to keep this broader picture in mind because while the increase in refugees and illegal migrants heading to Europe in 2015 was dramatic, the actual number reaching the European Union, which comprises 28 member states, remained relatively small, especially when compared with the number of refugees reaching some smaller and much poorer countries outside Europe. Why the surge? The answer to this question is not so straightforward. There is the obvious reason of the Syrian civil war. Indeed, while violence in Syria erupted in 2011 and intensified after 2012, the summer of 2015 was a turning point. The reversal of Assad’s fortunes, with the help of Russia, meant the prolongation of the war and persuaded many Syrians to leave and seek permanent resettlement elsewhere, preferably in Europe. The Islamic State’s reach from Syria’s eastern wastelands into its Kurdish and Arabic heartland, in the north and the west, and into Iraq, with the fall of Mosul, the country’s second largest city, together with the intensification of the fight around Syria’s main city, Aleppo, further contributed to the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Syrians and Iraqis. However, there is no consensus that the objective realities on the ground in Syria and Iraq alone caused the surge. Far from it, the cause of the surge is hotly debated in Europe, as the refugee crisis became highly politicized and polarized between two opposite visions. One is best represented by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the other by Hungary’s Prime Minister Victor Orban. For Orban, there was no influx of refugees but an “invasion” of illegal immigrants, as even Syrians came to Europe not directly from war-torn Syria but through safe Turkey. Furthermore, the flow included many non-Syrians coming from poor third-world nations. According to Orban, this “invasion” took place because of the misguided perceptions and the policy mistakes of the passive liberal elites of Europe who espouse multi-culturalism at the expense of Europe’s Christian identity. Critics of Merkel, both inside and outside Germany, pointed to her statements, welcoming the Syrian refugees stranded in Hungary in September 2015, as a main reason why the refugee wave turned into a tsunami (Hoffmann 2016). Similarly, the newly elected Greek government of Alexis Tsipras, initially a radical leftist, was accused of foolishly abolishing all border controls and doing away with the detention of all illegal entrants, as applied by the previous Greek administration, led by Antonis Samaras, a conservative.

56  Dimitris Keridis Critics claim that when it comes to influxes of such magnitude, being “humane” has the unintended consequence of acting as a magnet, attracting more people and complicating, rather than resolving, the refugee problem. They point to the fact that whereas, in the past, Italy was the preferred gate of entry into Europe, after the election of Tsipras to the Greek premiership in January 2015, Greece became, by far, the most heavily trafficked entrance into Europe. Furthermore, the influx receded when the “inhumane” closing of the land border took place, effectively blocking the Balkan corridor. It is true that the Greek government included many activists and supporters of migrant and refugee rights. But even Greeks who did not belong to the Left showed a certain understanding for the government’s argument. Faced with Turkey’s intransigence, boats entering the Greek territorial waters could only be escorted to the nearest Greek port and not be pushed back towards Turkish waters, since this could easily have caused their sinking and the loss of human lives. However, when the pressure from Europe to do something and start controlling the flows mounted, Tsipras, quite realistically, subscribed to Merkel’s plans for a deal with Turkey that involved the return to Turkey of all people coming to Greece after March 20, 2016, and the detention of all entrants in the Greek islands away from the Greek mainland. Apart from the “pushing” and “pulling” factors described above that directly contributed to the surge, there has been a third set of indirect factors. These factors concern the policies of other countries in Europe’s borderlands. Italy, under the leadership of Matteo Renzi, abandoned the policy of “mare nostrum” and intensified the patrolling of its sea borders during 2015. Morocco successfully cooperated with Spanish authorities to effectively control the land and sea border between the two countries. On the contrary, Turkey, faced with a humanitarian crisis within its borders, a failed policy in Syria and Europe’s indifference, did not do much to stop or even limit the smuggling of hundreds of thousands of people from its coasts. The refugee crisis afflicting Europe in 2015 was the result of many factors, with each factor pointing to a different culprit and requiring a course for future action (Parkes 2017). While there has been a certain rise in the “demand” for crossing illegally into Europe, the incoherent and ineffective border-controlling and refugee/ immigration policy on the part of the EU as a whole exacerbated the problem. The increased “supply” of illegal, uncontrolled, undocumented, and, often, chaotic crossings further stimulated the demand to migrate in the first place. As a consequence, during 2015, there was a continuing shift in the flows of people coming out of Syria from Lebanon and Jordan towards Turkey, as the easiest conduit into Europe. Similarly, Turkey attracted many economic immigrants from Africa and Asia who wanted to cross into Europe. It has been little noticed and not much discussed in Europe, but this accelerating shift threatened to destabilize Turkey and provided the main impetus for agreeing to the March 2016 deal with the EU. In sum, all these events affirmed Europe’s need for both an effective and unified border-control mechanism and a legal and organized way for immigration, grounded in the protection of refugees according to international law, a via media as proclaimed by President Macron.

The migration/refugee crisis and the (un/re)making of Europe  57 3 Greece’s geostrategic position in and after the crisis While the crisis initially threatened Greece’s international standing, at the end it was somehow and, at least momentarily, resolved thanks, in part, to its privileged geostrategic position. What were the primary risks involved? To begin with, the risks were many and serious. The first and most immediate of them all was to have Greece cut off from the Schengen area where it belongs and turned into a panEuropean hotspot and detention center for immigrants and refugees alike. The prospect seemed real when North Macedonia built a fence along the border with Greece and policed it with the help of some of Greece’s EU partners. The then foreign minister of Austria, Sebastian Kurz, and the country’s newly elected chancellor organized meetings with his counterparts from the countries lying along the Balkan corridor excluding Greece. Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency) dispatched a mission on North Macedonia’s border with Greece. There was a lot of noise for suspending Greece’s membership in the Schengen area. Finally, on November 12, 2016, Germany temporarily reintroduced border controls for the flights from Greece, citing concerns for the security situation and the threats resulting from the continuous and significant secondary movements. Since Greece shares no land border with any other member state of the Schengen area, borderfree travel from Greece is only possible through air and through the sea lane to Italy. Another risk had to do with the security of Greece as a hosting nation, in the broader sense of the term. There is no doubt that the human wave of 2015 coming into Greece from Turkey included a small percentage of criminals, terrorists, and would-be jihadists. A gunman killed during the terrorist attack against the Stade de France in Paris in November 2015 carried a passport that belonged to a Syrian refugee who had passed through Greece the month before. There have been several stories of smuggled guns, forged passports, and jihadist networks reported in the press. There was also a concern about public health and a fear of epidemics which did not materialize. Another risk arose unexpectedly from the work of NGOs and international agencies. As the crisis gathered pace, Greece was flooded by a plethora of NGOs, pro-refugee activists, and the media. UNHCR established a mission in Greece to deal with the emergency. While most of their efforts were commendable and they efficiently filled a gap in the management of the human flows crossing the waters in the Aegean Sea, their priorities and interests occasionally clashed with those of the Greek state. To begin with, these groups and agencies did not recognize the distinction between a refugee and an economic immigrant and thought of every incomer as deserving a free passage and asylum if he/she chose to apply for one. There were many incidents when activists attempted to mobilize and organize demonstrations and various forms of civil disobedience against the Greek authorities. The UNHCR itself is not accustomed to operating within a European environment as most of its past experience had to do with situations where state authority was non-existent or very weak. Many of these organizations had a lot of funding from various sources, including the EU, a significant administrative capacity, a long experience dealing with crises, and a very good access to world

58  Dimitris Keridis media. As a result of this mostly complementary but sometimes antagonistic symbiosis between the Greek state and the NGOs/UNHCR, a peculiar relationship developed, punctured by the occasional flare-ups of accusations of corruption from each side against the other. In a more traditional sense, the crisis threatened to cause deterioration in Greece’s relations with Turkey. At a minimum “search and rescue”, operations in the Eastern Aegean are complicated affairs. The proximity of the Greek islands to the Turkish mainland makes the crossings easy during most of the year and limits the time for the coast guard to respond to just a few minutes. When NATO was invited to monitor the situation and assist the two states and Frontex, the GreekTurkish rivalry complicated its mission. Alarmed by the crisis, NATO’s defense ministers decided to dispatch NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 2 to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance in the territorial waters of Greece, Turkey, as well as in international waters. But NATO’s mission included only the northern and not the southern Aegean and cooperation with Frontex was rocky. In both cases, it was Turkey who objected to the expansion of NATO’s mission into the Greek Dodecanese and to working closely with an EU institution, since Turkey wants no NATO operations in the demilitarized Dodecanese islands and is not part of the EU. In addition, the flow threatened the stability of all the countries lying along the Balkan corridor, most of which are poor and fragile to begin with (Philips 2016). The building of a fence by the authorities of North Macedonia along the border with Greece was received as a particular afront to Greek pride. More ominously, the crisis seemed to afford Turkey and Russia an opportunity to undermine Europe’s liberal consensus, which they have both come to detest in recent years. Ultimately, the crisis threatened to lead to the fragmentation of the EU with the nationalization of refugee policies and the adoption of a beggar-my-neighbour attitude towards the problem. In certain quarters, Greece was vilified for its inability to control its borders, process the influx in an orderly fashion, and provide its EU partners with reliable security data. The crisis reconfirmed Greece’s image as the sick man of Europe, the weakest of the weak links, a perennial problem that needed constant supervision if not amputation. Greece, however, found two unexpected “allies” in its efforts at climbing back to some international respectability. The first was Victor Orban, his rhetoric as well as his policies. The other was Tayip Erdogan who agreed to the EU-Turkey deal. Orban’s policies of fence building trickled down to Hungary’s southern neighbours who got scared that they might get stuck with thousands of unwanted refugees. This forced others to build their own fences effectively sealing off the Balkan corridor. In the age of social media, news travel fast. Prospective travellers in Turkey soon learned that crossing into Greece would probably mean their confinement in a hotspot on a Greek island where living conditions were bad. However, it should be noted that fences can only work if and for as long as they are heavily patrolled; otherwise, loopholes are soon found and the flow trickles in as is currently the case. Furthermore, Orban’s aggressive rhetoric, specifically targeted towards a resentful domestic audience, frustrated by the ever-elusive convergence of its standards

The migration/refugee crisis and the (un/re)making of Europe  59 of living with Western Europe after 30 years of reform, highlighted the perils of anti-European populism for the European elites. In juxtaposition, the Greek stand appeared less frightening and more liberal, rational, serious, and pro-European. While the euro crisis had divided Europe between North and South, the refugee crisis divided Europe between East and West, reopened the wounds of the Cold War division but put, at least for a moment, Greece on the right side of history, together with Germany and its other old west European allies. However, the main reason for Greece’s come back, away from the grave risks the crisis initially posed, had to do with Turkey. The big question here is why did Erdogan offer his help and agreed to a deal with the EU? Some reasons are obvious: money and some rewards for Turkish citizens. Turkey was promised more than three billion of euros in aid for its refugee problem and an acceleration of the visa-free travel into Schengen for its people (European Stability Initiative 2016). Currently, Turks are the only people west of Russia, together with the Kosovars, who need a visa to enter Schengen. Two other reasons have not received a lot of attention but they did play a role. The one had to do with the declining desire of refugees to leave Turkey in the first place, as they preferred to remain close to Syria, where things started to get a bit more stable in 2016, and the Balkan route was closed. The other had to do with Erdogan’s ambition to be recognized as a powerful player on a par with Merkel, who together can shape Europe’s future. The EU-Turkey deal reaffirmed this belief and created some space for the rapprochement of the two on an equal footing. Rather than pushing for EU accession from a position of weakness, Erdogan struck a deal with Germany from a position of strength. However, the most important reason for Turkey not only agreeing to but, actually, championing the deal had to do with Turkey’s own growing sense of destabilization caused by being turned into a global magnet attracting hundreds of thousands of people wishing to cross illegally into Europe. The more people boarded the boats heading towards the Greek islands the more people arrived in Turkey or planned to make the trip to Turkey. By the fall of 2015, the situation in Turkey was getting out of hand and Ankara understood this simple dynamic that escaped most liberal media reporting on the crisis. The deal itself has pulled Greece out of the refugee conundrum, allowed for some EU aid (monetary as well as in personnel and technical advice) to flow to Greece as an EU frontline state while it drastically reduced the human flows that had threatened to overwhelm the Aegean islands. Moreover, the deal has provided the breathing space for the rethinking of Europe’s asylum and immigration policy. However, the EU leaders remain short-sighted. Relieved at managing to control the immediate crisis, they currently seem uninterested in dealing with its underlying causes, and thus, they make sure that the crisis, in one form or another, will return. One statistic is particularly disheartening: the total number of people returned from Greece to Turkey after the signing of the deal is only a few hundreds and it remains smaller than the corresponding number before the signing of the deal. In other words, although repatriation is at the core of the EU-Turkey deal, it is not working due to the inability of processing the asylum cases currently piled up in

60  Dimitris Keridis Greece. While asylum cases in the Netherlands are decided within two months, in Greece, and elsewhere, it might take years, cancelling both premises of Macron’s vision for effectiveness and humanity (European Stability Initiative 2018). Schengen has exhibited some of the same flaws found in the monetary union and the euro. It was designed as a technical solution to facilitate travel and trade among the core European countries without much consideration of the politics involved. It worked as long as there was no crisis. When the crisis erupted, its political weakness came to the fore and threatened to unravel it. And, just as was the case with the crisis of the euro, the refugee crisis has led to strengthening its provisions and to increasing coordination among its member states but not to the resolution of its genetic flaws. In the case of the euro, the main flaw has to do with the asymmetry between the surpluses of the north and the deficits of the south. In the case of the Schengen, the main flaw has to do with the attraction of Germany as an immigration destination and the asymmetry in the administrative capacity of the EU member states in dealing with the resulting flow in an efficient and humane way. For all the difficulties involved, the stakes have been raised and failure is not an easy option. The unravelling of Schengen would have had dramatic consequences for inter-European trade and traveling. Most European economies are extremely open and inter-linked with their neighbors. Reintroducing border controls would have deducted billions of euros from Europe’s GDP. For all the appeals of the populist argument against immigration and in favour of renationalizing immigration policy, it is this inescapable economic logic that has proved integration’s most important ally. The irony in all this is the fact that Greece is the country that benefits the least from Schengen and, consequently, would have lost the least from its dismantling. The reason is that the Greek economy is fairly closed; the value and volume of goods traded with the Schengen area is a miniscule fraction of the total interSchengen trade, and Greece shares no land border with any other Schengen member state. So, for Greece, Schengen is only about air travel which mostly concerns the tourist industry and not the trading of goods. And air travel is already fairly controlled due to heightened security checks before boarding a plane. Inescapably, for Greece, the political effects of the 2015 refugee crisis were cumulative as it occurred on the footstep of an economic depression. Despite some initial hesitation, Greece reaffirmed its devotion to Europe, as an unshakeable national strategic priority and put its trust on a European solution to the problem. The defeat of the anti-European option is to be welcomed to the extent that a Grexit (from the eurozone, the Schengen or the EU itself) could have exposed Greece to unmitigated geostrategic disasters. But it has to be admitted that the victory of the European option had more to do with the Greeks’ lack of confidence in their own power rather than the strength of the EU. The EU reality remains deeply problematic as it involves forces and dynamics that, left unchecked, might further contribute to Greece’s marginalization into an unfavourable European periphery. It is high time for the Greek elites to realize the dangers involved in their unquestionable Europhilia that often leads to a policy

The migration/refugee crisis and the (un/re)making of Europe  61 inertia or policy dependency on Brussels. They must find the courage, imagination and competency to work for the reform of the EU architecture, while understanding that EU membership is not a panacea but, on the contrary, it can, depending on national choices, accentuate problems and pathologies. In that regard, a good start for Athens would be to work together with other frontline states, such as Italy, for a new robust EU immigration and refugee policy. This policy will not only strengthen EU integration but it will also rebalance the costs of this integration in favor of southern Europe, that, without discounting its own responsibility, has paid the heaviest price for the flaws of the euro and the Schengen in recent years. Note 1 Parts of this chapter were published in the Uluslararası İlişkiler/International Relations Journal, Vol. 15, No. 58, 2018, pp. 69–80. Bibliography Batsaikhan, Uuriintuya, Darvas, Zsolt and Goncalves Raposo, Ines. 2018. ‘People on the Move: Migration and Mobility in the European Union’, Blueprint Series 28, Bruegel, Brussels, 22 January. Available at https://www.bruegel.org/2018/01/people-on-the-movemigration-and-mobility-in-the-european-union/ Buckley, Neil and Byrne, Andrew. 2018. ‘The Rise and Rise of Viktor Orban’, Financial Times, January 25. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/dda50a3e-0095-11e8-96509c0ad2d7c5b5 Christia Fotini. 2012. Alliance Formation in Civil Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Collier, Paul. 2009. Wars, Guns and Votes, New York: Harper-Collins. Darvas, Zsolt. 2017. ‘How the EU Has Become an Immigration Area’, Bruegel, December 6. Available at https://www.bruegel.org/2017/12/how-the-eu-has-become-animmigration-area/ Erdogan, Murat and Ünver, Can. 2015. Perspectives, Expectations and Suggestions of the Turkish Business Sector on Syrians in Turkey, Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations. Available at https://www.tisk.org.tr/yayin/1262903466-perspectives-­expectationsand-suggestions-of-the-turkish-business-sector-on-syrians-in-turkey---2010.pdf European Commission-Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection. 2016. ‘Turkey: Refugee Crisis’, ECHO Factsheet, March 03. Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ files/resources/turkey_syrian_crisis_en_0.pdf European Stability Initiative. 2015. ‘The 2015 Refugee Crisis through Statistics’, October 17. Available at https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-%20Refugee%20Statistics%20 Compilation%20-%2017%20Oct%202015.pdf European Stability Initiative. 2016. ‘On Solid Ground? Twelve Facts about the EU-Turkey Agreement in 2016’, Report, January. Available at https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20%20Twelve%20Facts%20about%20the%20EU-Turkey%20agreement%20in%202016. pdf European Stability Initiative. 2018. ‘Amsterdam in the Mediterranean: How a Dutch-Style Asylum System Can Help’, Report, January. Available at https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ ESI%20-%20101%20on%20the%20Dutch%20Asylum%20System%20-%2026%20 January%202018.pdf

62  Dimitris Keridis French Ministry for European and Foreign Affairs. 2017. ‘President Macron’s Initiative for Europe: A Sovereign, United, Democratic Europe’, September 26. Available at https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/europe/president-macron-sinitiative-for-europe-a-sovereign-united-democratic-europe/ Hoffmann, Christiane. 2016. ‘Merkel’s Humane Refugee Policies Have Failed’, Der Spiegel, February 26. Available at https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-limitsof-humanity-merkel-refugee-policies-have-failed-a-1079455.html Hope, Kerin. 2016. ‘Migrant Numbers Returned to Turkey Fall Short’, The Financial Times, May 15. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/491d2bf6-1aa7-11e6-a7bc-ee846770ec15 Kotzamanis, Βyron and Karkouli, Alexandra. 2016. ‘Migration Flows into Greece Over the Last Decade: Intensity and Basic Characteristics of Illegal Entrants and Asylum Seekers’ (in Greek: Οι μεταναστευτικές εισροές στην Ελλάδα την τελευταία δεκαετία: ένταση και βασικά χαρακτηριστικά των παρατύπως εισερχομένων ως και των αιτούντων άσυλο), Demographic News no 26. Available at http://www.demography-lab.prd.uth.gr/DemoNews/ DEMONEWS_26.pdf Parkes, Roderick. 2017. ‘Nobody Move! Myths of the EU migration crisis’, Chaillot Papers, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December. Available at https://www.iss. europa.eu/content/nobody-move-myths-eu-migration-crisis Philips, L. David. (Ed.). 2016. Balkan Human Corridor, Essays on the Refugee and Migrant Crisis from Scholars and Opinion Leaders in Southeast Europe, The Institute for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia University. Available at http://navarinonetwork.org/ wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Balkan_Human_Corridor_e-book.pdf Tardy, Thierry. 2017. ‘Operation Sophia’s World: Changes and Challenges’, EU Institute for Security Studies Brief Issue, November. Available at https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/ operation-sophias-world-%E2%80%93-changes-and-challenges UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2018a. Figures at a Glance. Available at https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2018b. History of UNHCR. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from http://www.unhcr.org/historyof-unhcr.html UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2018c. Operational Portal Refugee Situations, Greece. Available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/ location/5179

5

The Balkan human corridor and the case of North Macedonia Zoran Ilievski and Hristina Runcheva Tasev

1 Introduction The years between 2015 and 2016 were marked by a wave of over a million refugees and migrants arriving in the European Union (EU) through the Balkan corridor. Although the old continent has always been an attractive destination for refugees and economic migrants, this last human influx has created unprecedented fears of serious long-term consequences, inspiring populist political forces to claim that it will change the demographic map of Europe, especially since these people came outside of Europe, the vast majority of them being Muslim. The bulk of this large number of migrants made their journey across the Mediterranean, crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as a result of the aftershocks of the war that affected the entire region. These people were joined within Greece by migrants and asylum seekers who were previously settled there, mostly unregistered people, outside the official temporary protection and other asylum procedures. Therefore, hundreds of thousands of Afghanis, Iraqi, Pakistani, Sudanese, Eritrean, and other economic migrants and refugees joined a massive mixed migration flow towards Western Europe. The Balkan corridor extended from the Eastern Mediterranean route going from Turkey through Greece, the countries of former Yugoslavia and continuing through Hungary in the North and Austria in the West. This route was previously used by displaced persons originating from the Middle East, as well as a substantial number of refugees and migrants originating from North Africa, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It became more intensively used after the EU visa liberalization for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and North Macedonia came into effect in 2009–2010, with numbers of people peaking between 2014 and 2016. The authors of this chapter examine migrants and refugees in two groups that enjoy a different level of assistance and protection under international law. Making a distinction between them is not always a clear-cut process. A refugee is an asylum seeker1 whose claim has been approved. However, the UN considers people fleeing war or persecution to be refugees even before they officially receive asylum. The “umbrella term” migrant can refer to refugees, economic migrants2 and asylum seekers. These groups of migrants can overlap, as in the case of this crisis where

DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405-5

64  Zoran Ilievski and Hristina Runcheva Tasev mixed-migration flows were formed: asylum seekers and economic migrants making their way to Western Europe together. We place our research focus on the refugee and migrant crisis along the Balkan human corridor in the period between September 2015 and March 2016, when the Balkan corridor was effectively closed upon the unanimous decision of the EU Council after North Macedonia sealed its designated entry point for these people at its border with Greece. The analysis offered will uncover the implications of the migrant crisis on domestic politics in North Macedonia, within the wider context of the Balkan Corridor. We analyze the salience of the country’s role as “borderkeeper” in this context, at a time when the EU itself was at a crossroad, torn between its core democratic values and the need to counterbalance state-centric tendencies among EU member states using this momentum to promote nationalistic policies, rallying for the “defense of the nation” (Mendelsohn 2017: 152). 2 The legal framework and initial policy responses The registration process of the people arriving at the improvised southern border crossing to Greece started as late as June 2015. Previously, waves of people had been allowed to enter and leave the country unregistered, on top of the illegal crossings through other entry points in the country. Therefore, the actual number of migrants entering Europe between 2014 and 2015 is much higher than the official numbers suggest, amounting to an estimated figure of over one million people.3 On 19 August 2015, the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia declared a “state of crisis” on the southern and northern borders of the country, based on the Law on Crisis Management (“Official Gazette of Republic of Macedonia” No.29/2005) due to the influx of migrants in the country. With the Parliament’s decision, the crisis was extended until June 2016 and was further extended until the end of 2016 at a session shortly before the unconstitutional dissolution of Parliament. In October 2016, the Government once again decided to extend the declared “state of crisis” until the end of June 2017. The country is a party of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967. It is also a state party of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1997 European Convention on Nationality. The basis of the national legal framework for the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers during the period under scrutiny was the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, which was adopted in 2003, and amended in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2015, and 2016 to fully meet high international standards, in line with the EU. The Law governs the conditions and procedure for the granting and cessation of the right of asylum to an alien or a stateless person seeking recognition of the right to asylum, as well as the rights and duties of the asylum seekers and persons who have been recognized the right of asylum (Article 1, Paragraph 1). It also governs the conditions under which the Republic can grant temporary protection as well as the rights and duties of persons under temporary protection (Article 1, Paragraph 2). Furthermore, other laws on the various aspects of the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers include the

The Balkan human corridor and the case of North Macedonia  65 Law on Social Protection, Law on Foreigners and the Law on Health Insurance from 2010 which regulates the healthcare rights of the persons recognized as refugees and others. The Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection defines an asylum seeker as “an alien who seeks protection in the Republic of Macedonia and has submitted an application for recognition of the right to asylum, in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken in the procedure for recognition of the right to asylum” (Article 3, Paragraph 1). It further recognizes a refugee as “an alien who, after examination of his claim, has been found to fulfil the requirements set out in the Convention of Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the law, that is, a person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or his political opinion, is outside the state of his nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that state, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the state in which he had a habitual place of residence, is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (Article 4, Paragraph 1). Persons under Subsidiary Protection are defined in Article 4-a of the Law as “an alien who does not qualify as a recognized refugee but to whom the Republic of Macedonia shall recognize the right of asylum and shall allow to remain within its territory because substantial grounds exist for believing that if s/he returns to the state of his/her nationality, or if he is a stateless person, to the state of his previous habitual residence, he would face a real risk of suffering serious harms”. The main amendments to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, made in 2015 and 2016, were aimed at approximating the EU asylum law by legislating improvements in the areas of access to territory and asylum procedures, as well as the conditions under which people seeking international protection are detained. Amendments include a procedure for the registration of the intention to submit an asylum application at the border, which protects asylum seekers from the risk of refoulment and allows them to enter and remain in the country legally for a short timeframe of 72 hours before formally registering their asylum application (Koshevaliska, Tushevska Gavrilovikj and Nikodinovska Krstevska 2016). Therefore, migrants were no longer treated as “illegal” and thus could transit through the country within the 72-hour time frame legally, safely and in an organized fashion. Ensuring the rights of asylum seekers and persons who have been granted the right of asylum is a responsibility of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (Article 48 of the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection). In this regard, in 2008, North Macedonia adopted an Integration Strategy for Refugees and Foreigners for the period 2008–2015 (Government of the Republic of North Macedonia 2008) and a corresponding National Action Plan (NAP) (Government of the Republic of North Macedonia 2015). In this context, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), established the Center for Integration of Refugees and Foreigners responsible for the facilitation of main activities outlined within the NAP. During the crisis, two transit centres were in operation (Vinojug near Gevgelija on the border with Greece and Tabanovce near Kumanovo on the border with Serbia) in addition

66  Zoran Ilievski and Hristina Runcheva Tasev to the older, already operational reception centres located in Vizbegovo and Gazi Baba in the capital, Skopje. It is noteworthy to mention that the 2008–2015 Strategy was primarily aimed at facilitating the local integration of Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians (RAE) from the regions bordering North Macedonia, who were granted international protection, without special consideration for refugees from outside the region (Gerovska Mitev 2016). The Law on International and Temporary Protection was adopted in April 2018. The Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection which applied in the relevant period ceased to have effect on the day this Law entered into force. This new Law regulates the conditions and the procedure for acquiring the right to international protection, as well as the termination and revocation of the right to asylum to a foreigner or stateless person. It further outlines the rights and obligations of asylum seekers and persons granted asylum in the Republic of North Macedonia. An interesting novelty of the Law is the adoption of a List of safe countries of origin (Article 14, paragraph 4). The list of safe countries consists of all EU Member States, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, and Nepal (Kamberi 2020). In July 2016, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy published a Strategy for Integration of Refugees and Foreigners 2017–2027 and the National Action Plan for Integration of Refugees 2017–2027. Nonetheless, despite all the amendments in its legal framework, a number of bodies of domestic and international character, including the UNHCR, believe that “the country does not as yet meet international standards for the protection of refugees and does not qualify as a safe third country”, and even advises “that other states should refrain from returning or sending asylum seekers to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia until further improvements to address these gaps have been made, in accordance with international standards” (UNHCR 2015). While the North Macedonian administration attempted to keep out people trying to cross its border with Greece, “ordinary citizens mobilized to help the refugees by donating food, clothes and medicines. In the absence of adequate aid or coordinated government support, donations from NGOs and individual volunteers proved life-saving for refugees waiting at the borders” (Tuneva 2017: 6). Legis, for example, is one of the few civil society organizations working with migrants and refugees in North Macedonia, having also published a Public Policy Document on Improvement of Access to Rights and Protection of Refugees and Migrants with Focus on Vulnerable Groups. 3 The impact of the “migrant crisis” on national politics Due to the dramatic internal political crisis, the migrant issue had only a secondary role in the North Macedonian political scene between 2015 and 2016. North Macedonian politics lacked a substantial public debate during the peak of this crisis because of three main reasons: the domestic context, the cacophony of opposing positions of the two “blocs” of EU member states in addition to the positions of EU supranational institutions and finally the domestic public opinion.

The Balkan human corridor and the case of North Macedonia  67 The last North Macedonian political crisis started at the beginning of 2015 with a wiretapping scandal when the opposition leader of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and later Prime Minister Zoran Zaev publicly released a large number of secretly recorded phone conversations within the Ministry of Interior, which involved the highest-ranking government officials, including the former Prime Minister and leader of VMRO-DPMNE, Nikola Gruevski. Following an array of lawsuits, large protests and political struggle, the so-called Przino Agreement was reached with the assistance of the US and the EU. Nevertheless, the internal turmoil continued reaching its peak on 27 April 2017 when the North Macedonian Parliament was violently stormed by angry protestors, and many members of Parliament from the opposition were physically attacked, while the police failed to intervene for several hours. Therefore, the country was in a state of severe political crisis from the end of 2014 until June 2017 when a new Government was formed with Zoran Zaev as Prime Minister, steering attention away from the migrant crisis. Certainly, political opponents used the migrant crisis as an opportunity to attack each other but only as attempts to gain public attention rather than as opportunities to highlight any real conceptual or ideological differences in their approach to it. The main reason why the theoretically leftist opposition was simply feigning an interest in the migrant crisis rather than actively opposing the government’s and the President’s decisions was the strong support the so-called “protective measures” taken by the state had gained in the public eye. These involved, in the first instance, the facilitation of these people’s fast transit through the country, and, in later stages, the reduction of the inflows of people through quotas coordinated with countries to the North along the route, and finally, the closure of the Balkan Route with a cascade of border shutdowns. Within the country, certain actions were rejected by the opposition simply because the governing party suggested them. The main opposition party at that time criticized the amending of the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, claiming it would not solve the problem of abysmal conditions in the refugee centres. However, they did not do more to stop or delay the parliamentary legislative process on this issue. Furthermore, the opposition criticized the decision to build a border fence in November–December 2015, arguing that it will not solve the problem, but they did not protest against the building of the fence once construction started nor did they go against the decision to build another parallel fence in February 2016. When several NGOs were signing a petition demanding that the fence be removed in March 2016, the conservative media accused Zoran Zaev’s SDSM of being behind that initiative, a thesis that seems very far-fetched, as the opposition focused its energy on issues that would bring them more votes rather than possibly inflicting political damage to itself. Ironically, the largest political disturbance related to the migrant and refugee crisis occurred well after the peak of 2015–2016. Namely, the new North Macedonian Government led by SDSM, and, more specifically, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy drafted the Strategy for Integration of Refugees and Foreigners 2017–2027 and the National Action Plan for Integration of Refugees 2017–2027, which were presented to the general public for comments before the final version

68  Zoran Ilievski and Hristina Runcheva Tasev was approved by the Assembly. According to the Ministry, the Strategy was drafted in coordination with UNHCR and other relevant institutions. It was aimed at dealing with four significant areas relevant to asylum seekers – housing, education, employment, and integration – all the while revising shortcomings of the previous strategy and improving the integration process. The draft Strategy and Action Plan were met with severe antagonism from VMRO-DPMNE, the leading opposition party. It accused the ruling SDSM of threatening the overall security, the economy, and the health system of the country with the permanent settlement of 150,000 to 200,000 migrants on its territory. These strategic documents will mean enormous costs totalling billions of Euros in the next ten years for accommodation and construction of buildings and settlements for migrants. That means enormous costs in the field of employment, social programmes, and funds that Macedonia does not have any resources for, (Press 24 2017) stressed VMRO-DPMNE MP Vlatko Gjorcev, adding that country would be transformed from a transit country into a final destination for refugees. Furthermore, the VMRO-DPMNE pointed out that granting citizenship to tens of thousands of migrants and their permanent settlement would cause serious distortion of the labour market and significantly worsen the already difficult situation regarding the high unemployment, which has forced many North Macedonian citizens to move to other countries in order to secure work and livelihood. The Government categorically disputed these accusations, claiming that VMRO-DPMNE was trying to halt reforms through unfounded accusations and false news. According to SDSM, the Strategy was based on international standards and the Convention on the Rights of Refugees, which North Macedonia has ratified. The party said it had a document that served as a roadmap and which contained no binding acts concerning any ministry or institution. According to SDSM, “the draft Strategy, which VMRO-DPMNE is abusing in its attempt to fuel fear and scare the citizens, is just a continuation of the same strategy for the period 2009– 2015, adopted by the former government led by VMRO-DPMNE” (King 2017a). Furthermore, SDSM pointed out that the number of migrants interested in permanently settling on the territory of the Republic of North Macedonia was negligible. Official statistics support this stance. Namely, the Helsinki Committee recently published a report stating that, in the Republic of [North] Macedonia, in the period from 2015 to June 2017, a total of 2.243 requests for granting the right to asylum had been submitted by 2.717 persons, only five of which had been granted official refugee status, and only 11 subsidiary protection (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia 2017). This shows that North Macedonia is merely a transit country for refugees and hardly a country of final destination. The public debate regarding the Strategy and the Action Plan instigated numerous instances of xenophobic hate speech towards refugees, and several civic initiatives organizing citizens’ petitions against migrants were set into motion. These

The Balkan human corridor and the case of North Macedonia  69 civic groups were inspired and instrumentalized by political forces in their populist hunt for votes. Furthermore, following the deadline for submitting comments on the Strategy and the Action Plan, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy reported that it had received identical comments from several VMRO-DPMNE-led municipalities, stating that accepting refugees and foreigners in North Macedonia “will destabiliz the region and the country as a whole” (King 2017b). The opposition’s disapproval of the Strategy culminated when VMRO-DPMNE filed an interpellation motion against Minister of Labour and Social Policy Mila Carovska, who, according to VMRO-DPMNE, had consulted neither citizens nor municipalities when drafting the strategic documents. The interpellation did not pass in the Assembly. As the local elections scheduled for 15 October 2017 were approaching, 12 VMRO-DPMNE-led municipalities announced their decisions to call for a referendum for the citizens to voice their opinion regarding a permanent settlement of migrants in their respective municipalities. The decisions of the municipalities to hold referendums were annulled by the State Inspectorate for Local Self-Government Units. It is noteworthy to mention that, even though the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy initially planned for the Strategy for Integration of Refugees and Foreigners 2017–2027 and the National Action Plan for Integration of Refugees 2017–2027 to be adopted by the end of 2017, they have not been approved by the Assembly to this day. 3.1 Public opinion and media

At the peak of the crisis, in October 2015, a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute and the Centre for Insights in Survey Research-Skopje, showed that the majority of respondents (66.2%) supported building a fence on the southern border (Centre for Insights in Survey Research-Skopje 2015). Additionally, citizens of North Macedonia evaluated EU’s handling of this crisis as highly negative, as reported by the public opinion poll of the International Republican Institute from January 2016, when 59% of the respondents answered that the effects of EU’s handling of the crisis on North Macedonia are negative. That same poll also showed that 28% of the respondents thought that the government is providing “too much support to refugees”, while another 37% responded that the government support is “sufficient” (International Republican Institute 2016). According to Balkan Barometer 2017:Public Opinion Survey, only 7% of the North Macedonians viewed refugees as the most important problem that Southeast Europe was facing at that moment (Regional Cooperation Council 2017). This is a significant drop compared to the Balkan Barometer 2016:Public Opinion Survey, according to which 18% of the North Macedonians believed that refugees were the most important problem, which was more than four times more than the regional average of 4% (Regional Cooperation Council 2016). In general, the 2017 survey concludes that attitudes towards refugees are less hostile than before. The regional average in 2017 shows that the proportion of the population with a negative (40%) and a neutral (41%) attitude towards refugees is equal. Compared

70  Zoran Ilievski and Hristina Runcheva Tasev with 2015, when the problem of refugees was significantly more relevant, there has been a change in attitude towards them: the number of those who regard them as a threat to their economy has decreased (from 47% to 40%). Nevertheless, according to the 2017 survey, North Macedonia was the only country where most respondents found that refugees had a negative impact on the economy. In North Macedonia, 57% of the population gave negative responses to the question “What do you think about refugees coming to live and work in your city? Is it good or bad for your economy?”, compared to Albania with 29%, Kosovo with 17%, Bosnia and Herzegovina with 44%, Montenegro with 37%, Croatia with 43%, and Serbia with 47%. Only 8% believed that refugees are good for the economy, whereas 29% were neutral. In 2015, 66% had considered the arrival of migrants to be bad for the economy. Furthermore, the survey established respondents from North Macedonia as the least supportive of affirmative government action in favour of displaced persons and refugees. Only 47% of the respondents from North Macedonia agreed that the government should provide affirmative measures to promote opportunities for equal access of displaced persons and refugees, whereas this number was 74% in Albania, 89% in Kosovo, 82% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 75% in Montenegro, 67% in Croatia, and 71% in Serbia. Similarly, only 43% supported affirmative measures for displaced persons and refugees when applying for a public sector job, compared to Albania with 68%, Kosovo with 79%, Bosnia and Herzegovina with 81%, Montenegro with 71%, Croatia with 54%, and Serbia with 64%. Furthermore, North Macedonia had the lowest support for better housing conditions for displaced persons and refugees compared to the other countries of the region. Only 51% believed that the Government should do more in order to ensure better housing conditions, compared to Albania with 77%, Kosovo with 90%, Bosnia and Herzegovina with 84%, Montenegro with 72%, Croatia with 61%, and Serbia with 65%. Such negative public perceptions of migrants and refugees are tied to the country’s political culture and thus are highly resistant to quick changes. Luckily, North Macedonia does not have a significant far-right populist movement which would actively work on spreading anti-migrant sentiments and propaganda. As Marina Tuneva notes, during this crisis, the media poorly fulfilled its role to publish and broadcast relevant, topical news while also reflecting on the actions of government: Media covered and interpreted the events in ways that revealed deep political divides within their ranks. Reports by outlets on one side of the divide could be seen as legitimizing government policies and helping spread the message that refugees did not belong in the country […] On the other side, several media outlets voiced criticism of the government’s policies towards refugees, while presenting the main problem in the frame of humanitarian crisis and the suffering of the refugees. Human-interest stories in these outlets in effect called for vulnerable groups to be helped. These media to some extent presented the views of civil society, unlike the pro-government media which

The Balkan human corridor and the case of North Macedonia  71 portrayed NGOs mostly as groups that opposed the government’s efforts to deal with the crisis and contributed to the endangerment of national security. Media in both groups, however, often ran news articles that lacked information needed for a good understanding of the context. (Tuneva 2017: 21)

4 The EU institutions and the crisis Different groups of actors – the European Commission (EC), Germany’s policies (supported by Greece), and the Visegrad group – conveyed messages which were conflicting at worst and dissonant at best. This revealed a striking lack of capacity, cooperation, and solidarity, as well as necessary communication between the countries along the route (European Commission 2015). The EC adopted a plan of action for immediate implementation on how to cooperate and what to achieve collectively to better manage the flows of migrants and refugees, especially regarding quotas for receiving asylum applicants, reception capacities, and border management. However, there was serious pushbacks by the Visegrad group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), supported by Austria, Slovenia, and Croatia. The migrants did not consider the countries along the Western Balkan route as their final destination. However, even as transit points, Western Balkan countries were trying to limit the number of incoming persons on the request of some recipient countries at the end of the corridor. As the number of people coming through the corridor increased, pressure from the latter group of countries increased, ultimately leading to a domino effect of border closures and increasing restrictions on movement (Greider 2017). These countries refused to participate in any proposed mechanism for influx management which made a mutually acceptable solution for migrant management by the EU an even more distant prospect. Thus, this crisis created two “ideological” blocks. Some EU member states supported managed migration, which was a German proposal. The other group stood in support of the Visegrad Four that proposed closing borders along the Western Balkan route. Hungary at the beginning of September 2015 saw thousands of people blocked at Keleti train station in Budapest for several days. The Hungarian right-wing government led by Viktor Orban made many attempts to contain and restrain migrants in camps once they entered Hungary. However, the migrants decided to move towards the Austrian border, following the so-called “March of Hope”, as people reclaimed their mobility and filled a two-lane motorway marching westward. In the course of one weekend, at least 10,000 people arrived in Germany as the events in Hungary pushed the German government to declare, on 5 September 2015, that it would not close its borders to those wishing to seek asylum. Subsequently, buses were organized to shuttle people from Hungary, across Austria, to Germany (Santer and Wriedt 2017). Hungary closed the border to Serbia immediately afterwards, and the migrants were prevented from crossing by a massive fence and an enormous

72  Zoran Ilievski and Hristina Runcheva Tasev number of security forces. The Hungarian decision to reintroduce border controls forced refugees coming up from Serbia to steer through Croatia which created a politically manufactured humanitarian crisis at the Bapska-Berkasovo crossing on the Serbo-Croatian border in the second half of September 2015. The state of crisis in the summer of 2015 in North Macedonia resulted in measures undertaken by the army that was deployed and which in November 2015 began to erect a fence along the border with Greece for the limitation of the migrant influx. The bilateral tensions between Greek-Macedonian relations were a reflection of the divisions between the so-called “Merkel vs Orban” positions. They were also reflected at other points of bilateral conflicts along the Western Balkan corridor, such as the Serbian-Croatian tensions. At the beginning of 2016, the Schengen area was under intense pressure and some border controls, albeit partially, were restored. Austria and Slovenia supported the block which advocated for the closure of borders along the Western Balkan route, receiving support by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk. Western Balkan countries increasingly coordinated migrant policy and action, both logistically and politically. In November 2015, Croatia, North Macedonia, and Serbia took their first joint restrictive measure; they began to allow transit only to migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This was a result of Slovenia’s request to redirect migrants from non-war-torn countries back to Croatia (Šelo Šabić and Borić 2016: 4). Restricting the number of migrants became a trend at the beginning of 2016 in many countries throughout the EU. Slovenia and Croatia adjusted their policies and introduced restrictions on migrants by limiting entry only to those who intend to seek asylum in Austria and Germany. Austria put a cap on the number of refugees it would take in: it limited the number of asylum claims to 37,500 in 2016 and to a total of 127,500 up to 2019. The latter number represents 1.5% of Austria’s population of 8.5 million. Afterwards, Austria decided to limit the number of new arrivals, created a plan for repatriating over 50,000 asylum seekers over the course of three years and for constructing new fences along its border with Slovenia. Finally, in February 2016, Austria introduced new measures for limiting the number of asylum applications to 80 per day, and the number of transits to Germany to 3,200 per day. This measure followed the meeting between the heads of police services of Austria, Croatia, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia in Zagreb, whereby collaboration was reached to significantly reduce migration flows to the greatest possible extent.4 This served as the prelude to the closure of the Western Balkans route. Following these decisions, North Macedonia passed new controls that restricted Afghan refugees from crossing its border. Moreover, Iraqis and Syrians would now be subject to further regulations, which included language tests to try to determine the persons’ city, region, and country of origin. North Macedonia explained these heightened measures as a response to the decisions taken by countries further along the route (Šelo Šabić and Borić 2016: 4).

The Balkan human corridor and the case of North Macedonia  73 North Macedonia decided to construct a second fence along the border on 8 February 2016. It was positively accepted by the countries of the Visegrad Group that offered their support for the country and sent police forces in late 2015 to the border with Greece, culminating in the paradoxical scenario of policemen from several EU states protecting a border crossing from the side of a non-EU state from people coming from an EU and Schengen zone state. Austria hosted a summit in Vienna at the end of February 2016 for the ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of interior of Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, and the Western Balkan countries. Greece was not invited, and in a clear sign of diplomatic protest, it called its Ambassador back to Athens on consultations. Officials in Athens also added that this meeting was “non-friendly and anti-European” (Deutsche Welle 2016). The EC also criticized the restrictions along the Balkan route as unlawful and contrary to an EU-wide approach. Austria’s foreign minister, on the other hand, heavily criticized Germany’s refugee policy, calling it contradictory. “Last year, Austria accepted per capita twice as many asylum applications as Germany”, Austrian Foreign Minister Kurz said, adding that “it won’t happen a second time” (Ibid.). That dramatic period was also marked by a meeting of EU interior ministers in Brussels to discuss the crisis, at which point the EU Commissioner for Migration warned that, “the EU has ten more days to reduce the number of migrants or else there is a risk the whole system will completely break down” (Reuters 2016). The following days Slovenia capped the number of migrants allowed to enter the country at 580, a step followed by Croatia and Serbia. In the last days of February 2016, there were approximately 500 new arrivals in North Macedonia. The Macedonian-Greek crossing drew international attention again when the migrants confronted the border guards at Idomeni, sparking a bilateral diplomatic dispute. Greek President Prokopis Pavlopoulos accused the North Macedonian authorities of ill treatment of migrants while they were attempting to cut the fence and cross over through the crossing near Idomeni from the Greek side (Harris 2016). North Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov accused Greece of irresponsibly channelling more than a million people, including as Greek Defence Minister Panos Kammenos stated: possible “jihadists” to Western and Northern Europe (Biskup, Diekmann and Ronzheimer 2016). The new entry restrictions quickly aggravated the already tense situation at the Greek-Macedonian border, which culminated in protests on 29 February 2016. Migrants stranded on the Greek side of the border broke the barricade and were quickly barraged with teargas by the Macedonian police (Avramidis and Karagiannopoulos 2016). During the following days, the border was entirely closed, giving impetus to the EU-Turkey summit and the official shutdown of the Balkan route, with a unanimous vote of the EU Council. The role of the EU in North Macedonia was visible through the activities of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU, whose mandate was expanded in 2016 when it became the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, commonly referred to as the Frontex. Pursuant to Article 14, Reg. 2007/2004; MB Decision,

74  Zoran Ilievski and Hristina Runcheva Tasev 22 February 2007, on 19 January 2009, a Working Arrangement between Frontex and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) of the Republic of North Macedonia was agreed, which entered into force the next day. The objective of this agreement was countering illegal/irregular migration and related cross-border crime through information exchange and risk analysis, common training and research and development projects, joint operational measures and participation in pilot projects on a case-bycase basis, under decisions by the Executive Director of Frontex. In July 2018, Frontex initiated signing a status agreement that would enable teams from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency to be deployed in North Macedonia. A status agreement defines the procedures, scope, civil and criminal liability, tasks and powers of the actions to be taken, which can be a joint operation, a rapid border intervention or a return operation. The Agreement would allow this Agency to conduct joint operations within and with North Macedonia in case of urgent or sudden migratory challenges. The draft version of the Agreement envisages that a Member State team from the Agency would perform tasks and execute the Agency mandate on the territory of the Republic of North Macedonia under instructions from and in the presence of national border guards or other relevant staff. Currently, Bulgaria is the only country blocking the signing of a border management agreement between North Macedonia and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency – Frontex and it has not yet entered into force. After the closure of the Western Balkan route, inflows were significantly reduced. The International Organization for Immigration reported that 172,000 migrants reached Europe by sea in 2017 compared to 363,000 in 2016. The EU Council’s request for the closure of the Macedonian-Greek designated crossing point gave the domestic managers of the processes a solid political and societal legitimacy, that they have done an efficient job in implementing an important requirement of the EU, much to the distaste of liberal political and academic circles throughout Europe. 5 Conclusions The migrant crisis of 2015–2016 has created numerous internal and external divisions in countries along the corridor, from its starting point, up to the receiving end in Europe. These divisions have been manipulated with a view to strengthening the populist forces that are threatening the core values of the EU. The clear divisions among member states of the Union on this issue point to deeper cleavages in political cultures, with strategic consequences, and a continuing cacophony about which political values take precedence, highlighting competing visions for the future of the EU. These anti-immigration sentiments lent credence to nationalists in the EU, sending along signals to their Western Balkan counterparts to follow suite. The phenomenon of migration was presented as a threat to national identity, interests and ideals, cultural attitudes, social structures, and way of life. Such sentiments and policies, in general, have stronger standing in post-communist countries compared

The Balkan human corridor and the case of North Macedonia  75 to Western EU member states. This was clearly visible when leaders of Eastern European states like Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic all expressed a distaste for receiving these people, whereas concerning the consistency of the populations they would agree to host, a strong preference for non-Muslim migrants was openly displayed. The North Macedonian political scene witnessed the migration crisis (2015– 2016) as a horizontal political issue: the government faced no substantial political obstacles across the party spectrum in managing the transit of migrants along the short corridor. Ironically, the largest political disturbance related to the migrant and refugee crisis occurred well after the peak of the crisis, and it was used by the new opposition mainly as a short-term proxy issue to spur anti-government sentiment, rather than a substantial policy standpoint. Public opinion which is a reflection of the country’s political culture, influenced by media, maintains a frightened and uninformed view on incoming migration, a topic which all political and societal stakeholders need to address with an honest, analytical, and objective approach, challenging harmful stereotypes, prejudice, and daily propaganda. Notes 1 An asylum seeker is defined as a person fleeing persecution or conflict and therefore seeking international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention on the Status of Refugees. In the global context, it is a person who seeks protection from persecution or serious harm in a country other than their own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. 2 According to UNHCR Master Glossary of terms, economic migrants are persons who leave their countries of origin purely for economic reasons not in any way related to the refugee definition or in order to seek material improvements in their livelihood. Economic migrants do not meet the criteria for refugee status and are therefore not entitled to benefit from international protection as refugees. 3 Personal interviews with officials from the Ministry of Interior, the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia and with international organizations working on the issue (September 2016–April 2017). 4 Joint Statement of the Heads of Police Services from the Meeting held in Zagreb, Croatia, on 18 February 2016. Available at https://www.mup.hr/UserDocsImages/topvijesti/2016/ veljaca/migranti_sastanak/joint_statement.pdf.

Bibliography Al Jazeera America. 2015. Amid Refugee Crisis, Hungary Prime Minister Says Muslims not Welcome, March 9. Available at http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/3/hungaryprime-minister-says-muslims-not-welcome-amid-refugee-crisis.html# Avramidis, Alexandros and Karagiannopoulos, Lefteris. 2016. ‘Macedonia Police Fire Teargas at Migrants While Europe Bickers,’ Reuters, February 29. Available at https://www. reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece-macedonia-idUSKCN0W2188 Beck, Luisa and McAuley, James. 2018. ‘Germany’s Angela Merkel Prevents the Breakup of Her Government with Immigration Deal,’ The Washington Post, July 2. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germanys-angela-merkel-may-have-

76  Zoran Ilievski and Hristina Runcheva Tasev won-fight-over-migration-but-her-coalition-is-in-doubt/2018/07/02/d4e02b60-7da211e8-a63f-7b5d2aba7ac5_story.html Biskup, Daniel, Diekmann, Kai, and Ronzheimer, Paul. 2016. ‘Macedonian President Settles a Score Here,’ Bild, March 11. Centre for Insights in Survey Research, Survey of Public Opinion in Macedonia, September 29-October 5, 2015. Available at https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015-11-19_survey_of_citizens_of_macedonia_september_29-october_5_ 2015_0.pdf Deutsche Welle. 2016. ‘Austria Hosts Balkan Refugee Conference without Greece,’ February 24. Deutsche Welle. 2018. ‘Germany’s List of ‘Safe Countries of Origin’ and what It Means,’ November 13. EURACTIV. 2016. ‘Balkan Route ‘Closed’ after Cascade of Border Shutdowns,’ March 9. Available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/balkan-route-closedafter-cascade-of-border-shutdowns/ European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Follow-Up to the Leaders’ Meeting on Refugee Flows Along the Western Balkans Route,’ December 15, 2015. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0676&from=EN European Commission, ‘Statement by Commissioner Hahn and MEPs Vajgl, Howitt and Kukan: Agreement in Skopje to Overcome Political Crisis,’ July 15, 2015. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5372_en.htm European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ‘Western Balkans News Brief,’ February 16–29, 2016. Available at http://us1.campaign-ar- chive2.com/?u=8e3ebd297b1510becc6d6d69 0&id=8fac50c411 European Western Balkans. 2020. ‘Bulgaria Blocks North Macedonia Frontex agreement,’ October 22. Available at https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/10/22/bulgaria-blocksnorth-macedonia-frontex-agreement/ Financial Times. 2015. ‘Poland Favors Christian Refugees from Syria,’ August 2015. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/6edfdd30-472a-11e5-b3b2-1672f710807b# axzz3ktymzs8n FRONTEX. 2009. Working Arrangement with the FYR of Macedonia Concluded, February 3. Available at https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/working-a rrangement-with-the-fyr-of-macedonia-concluded-10iaEG FRONTEX. 2010. Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2010. Available at https://frontex. europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/ WB_ARA_2010.pdf Geopolitical Futures. 2018. ‘In Europe, as Migration Falls, Nationalism Rises, Geopolitical Futures,’ May 17. Available at https://geopoliticalfutures.com/europe-migration-fallsnationalism-rises/ Gerovska Mitev, Maja. 2016. Providing Adequate Social Services for Refugees: A Challenge in FYR Macedonia, European Social Policy Network Flash Report 2016/36. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=16000&langId=en Government of the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of the Interior. ‘Joint Statement of the Heads of Police Services from the Meeting held in Zagreb, Croatia,’ February 18, 2016. Available at https://www.mup.hr/UserDocsImages/topvijesti/2016/veljaca/migranti_sastanak/joint_statement.pdf Government of the Republic of North Macedonia, Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. ‘Integration Strategy for Refugees and Foreigners for the period 2008–2015,’ December 28, 2008. Available at http://mtsp.gov.mk/WBStorage/Files/strategija_begalci.pdf

The Balkan human corridor and the case of North Macedonia  77 Greider, Alice (Ed.). 2017. Outsourcing Migration Management: The Role of the Western Balkans in the European Refugee Crisis, Migration Policy Institute. Available at https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Outsourcing%20Migration%20Management_%20The%20Role%20of%20the%20Western%20Balkans%20in%20the%20 European%20Refugee%20Crisis%20_%20migrationpolicy.pdf Harris, Mary. 2016. ‘President Pavlopoulos: Greek Veto on FYROM’s EU-NATO Bid is Non-Negotiable,’ Greek Reporter, August 5. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia. 2017. ‘Refugees Rights: National and International Standards vis-a-vis the Situation on the Ground’. Available at http://www.mhc.org.mk/analysis/518?locale=en#.WtS5HPluapp Institute for Political Research Skopje, ‘The Perceptions on the Migrant Crisis Unpublished Public Opinion Poll,’ November 2015. Available at http://ipis.org.mk/ International Organization for Migration, ‘Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One Million in 2015: IOM,’ December 22, 2015. Available at https://www.iom.int/ news/irregular-migrant-refugee-arrivals-europe-top-one-million-2015-iom International Republican Institute. 2016. Survey of Macedonian Public Opinion. Available at https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/iri.org/wysiwyg/iri_macedonia_survey_ april_2016_0.pdf Jones, Chris (Ed.). 2019. State watch briefing – Frontex: Cooperation with Non-EU States, Statewatch. Available at https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/analyses/no309-frontex-third-countries-agreements.pdf Kamberi, Ismail (Ed.). 2020. Tackling the Migrant Crisis in the Republic of North Macedonia: Overview of the Country’s Efforts and of the Cooperation with Frontex and EU Member States in Countering Illegal Migration, European Policy Institute. Karnitschnig, Matthew. 2016. ‘Austria Does Angela Merkel’s Dirty Work,’ Politico, January 21. Available at https://www.politico.eu/article/austria-refugees-germanyangela-merkel-asylum-migration/ Kasparek, Bernd and Speer, Marc. 2015. ‘Of Hope. Hungary and the Long Summer of Migration,’ Bordermonitoring, September 9. King, Vanesa, 2017a. ‘SDSM: The Refugee Strategy Is a Continuation of the One that Was Adopted in 2008,’ META News Agency, August 7. King, Vanesa. 2017b. ‘Xenophobia and Calls for a Referendum from the Municipalities on the Strategy for Refugees,’ META News Agency, August 9. Koshevaliska, Olga, Tushevska Gavrilovikj, Borka and Nikodinovska Krstevska, Ana. 2016. ‘Migration Crisis: Macedonia on Crossroads’, in Nikodinovska Krstevska, Ana and Gavrilovik Tushevska, Borka (eds), Migration at Sea: International Law Perspectives and Regional Approaches, Skopje: Gianni Editore, 61–76. Krastev, Ivan. 2015. ‘Eastern Europe’s Compassion Deficit,’ The New York Times, September 8. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/09/opinion/eastern-europes-­ compassion-deficit-refugees-migrants.html Krastev, Ivan. 2016. ‘Refugee Crisis: ‘Not the Same Values in East and West,’ Deutsche Welle, March 8. Available at https://www.dw.com/en/refugee-crisis-not-the-samevalues-in-east-and-west/a-19102868 Legis. 2017. Public Policy Document on Improvement of Access to Rights and Protection of Refugees and Migrants with Focus on Vulnerable Groups, November 2017. Availabe at http://www.legis.mk/uploads/Legis_Istrazuvanje_Finalna%20verzija%20EN%20-%20 Copy%201.pdf Mail Foreign Service. 2016. ‘Europe Builds Another Wall: Macedonia Erects Second Barrier of Razor Wire to Stem the Human Tide from Greece,’ Daily Mail, February 8.

78  Zoran Ilievski and Hristina Runcheva Tasev Available at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3437717/A-second-wall-razorwire-stem-human-tide-Macedonia-builds-fence-border-Greece-send-message-migrantsattempts-cross-illegally.html Mendelsohn, Rebecca. 2017. ‘The European Refugee Crisis: Nationalist Backlashes within the European Union,’ Midwest Journal of Undergraduate Research, 7, 150–176. Nechev, Zoran and Trauner, Florian (Eds.). 2019. Status Agreements: Frontex Novel Cooperation with the Western Balkans Policy Brief 5/2019, Institute for Democracy. Available at https://idscs.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/A5_FrontexENG.pdf Official Journal of the European Union, ‘Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council,’ September 14, 2016. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R1624 O’Grady, Siobhán. 2015. ‘Slovakia to EU: We’ll Take Migrants — If They’re Christians,’ Foreign Policy, August 19. Available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/19/ slovakia-to-eu-well-take-migrants-if-theyre-christians/ Park, Jeanne. 2015. ‘Europe’s Migration Crisis,’ Council on Foreign Relations, September 23. Available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/europes-migration-crisis Petzinger, Jill. 2018. ‘Merkel Insists Islam Is Part of Germany in the First Speech of Her New Term,’ Quartz, March 21. Available at https://qz.com/1234662/angela-merkel-saysislam-is-part-of-germany-in-her-first-major-speech-of-her-new-term/ Regional Cooperation Council. 2016. Balkan Barometer 2016 Public Opinion Survey. Available at https://www.rcc.int/seeds/files/RCC_BalkanBarometer_PublicOpinion_2016.pdf Regional Cooperation Council. 2017. Balkan Barometer 2017: Public Opinion Survey. https://www.rcc.int/seeds/files/RCC_BalkanBarometer_PublicOpinion_2017.pdf Rettman, Andrew. 2015. ‘EU states Favor Christian Migrants from Middle East,’ EU Observer, August 21. Available at https://euobserver.com/justice/129938 Reuters. 2016a. ‘[North] Macedonia Police Fire Teargas at Migrants while Europe Bickers,’ Reuters, February 29. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-europe-migrants-greece-macedonia-idUSKCN0W2188 Reuters. 2016b. ‘EU Has 10 days to see Progress on Migrant Crisis or Schengen Unravels: EU Commissioner,’ February 25. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-europe-migrants-avramopoulos-idUSKCN0VY22T Rolandi, Francesca. 2015. ‘Interview with Mersiha Smailovikj,’ Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa, September 23. Available at https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/ Areas/North-Macedonia/Macedonia-the-Refugee-Emergency-164182 Santer, Kiri and Wriedt, Vera. 2017. ‘(De-) Constructing Borders: Contestations in and around the Balkan Corridor in 2015/16,’ Movements, 3 (1), 141–150. Available at https://movements-journal.org/issues/04.bewegungen/10.santer,wriedt--de-constructing-­ borders.pdf Šelo Šabić, Senada and Borić, Sonja (Eds.). 2016. At the Gate of Europe: A Report on Refugees on the Western Balkan Route, Zagreb: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Publications. Squires, Nick. 2018. ‘Silvio Berlusconi Says Illegal Migrants Are ‘Social Time Bomb’ as Race Dominates Italian Election Campaign,’ The Telegraph, February 5. Available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/02/05/silvio-berlusconi-says-illegalmigrants-social-time-bomb-race/ The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 2003. Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection. Available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/53072d144.html The Guardian. 2016. ‘Balkan States Attempt to Limit Numbers of Refugees Claiming Asylum,’ The Guardian, January 20. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ jan/20/balkan-states-attempt-to-limit-numbers-of-refugees-claiming-asylum

The Balkan human corridor and the case of North Macedonia  79 The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia. 2018. Annual Report for 2018: The Rights of Refugees, Migrants and Asylum Seekers in the Republic of Macedonia. Available at http://mhc.org.mk/system/uploads/redactor_assets/documents/3292/Help_On_Route_-_ANG_2018_final.pdf The Slovenian Times. 2016. ‘Slovenia Limiting Refugee Flow,’ January 22. Available at http://www.sloveniatimes.com/slovenia-limiting-refugee-flow Tuneva, Marina. 2017. Media Coverage of the Refugee Crisis in Macedonia, South East European Network for Professionalization of Media. Available at https://seenpm.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/Crisis-reporting-Macedonia_Final.pdf UNHCR, ‘Observations on the Situation of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,’ August 2015. Available at http://www.refworld.org/ pdfid/55c9c70e4.pdf

6

The impact of the “refugee crisis” on European integration in the field of asylum and migration A Serbian perspective Stefan Surlić

1 Introduction The migrant crisis, which peaked in 2015, posed a major challenge for both the economically developed countries of the European Union (EU) as migrants’ desired destinations, and the countries of the Balkans, which primarily served as transit countries. However, with the closure of the Balkan Route and the EU-Turkey agreement signed in 2016, the context of migration has changed with the influx of migrants having been reduced. Nonetheless, Serbia has faced the possibility of receiving refugees on a permanent basis as well as the need to adjust its normative framework for migrants and asylum seekers. After more than 700,000 refugees and migrants traversed its territory during 2015, Serbia experienced a temporary change in its status turning into a host country for people forced to leave their places of residence. Although there are relatively few persons who have expressed their intention to seek asylum or have formally filed an asylum application in Serbia, it is noticeable that there have been significant changes in the legislative area that have facilitated procedures, from initial registration to institutional asylum certification. Therefore, the basic question I begin this chapter with is articulated as follows: How has Serbia adapted its institutional and normative framework in order to harmonize its asylum policy with EU requirements and to facilitate the integration of accepted migrants? The waves of refugees have called into question the functionality of a single EU migration system and asylum policy and the intention of member states to share the burden jointly in solidarity, but also have brought into focus the state of its own borders since the Balkan route entailed double entry of migrants into the EU via North Macedonia and Serbia as non-member countries. Still, seeking to make progress in the EU integration process, the authorities in Serbia seized the opportunity to prove themselves as a constructive partner, offering to share in the burden. At the same time, after the rapid influx of migrants in 2015, normative reforms have been implemented in order to achieve legislative standards of care, regulating migrants’ status and providing conditions for the integration of asylum seekers. The new legislative framework is the outcome of the harmonization of Serbian legislation with the Acquis Communautaire, as well as efforts to overcome problems and deficiencies that have arisen during the migrant crisis due to insufficiently DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405-6

The impact of the “refugee crisis” on EU integration  81 precise and incomplete existing legal solutions in Serbia. Although changes to the old laws and the adoption of new ones provide for a more efficient and simplified asylum procedure and brand-new stipulations and procedures, there are still aggravating factors in integration due to institutional indifference, limited infrastructure capacity and the overall economic situation in the country. A particularly aggravating factor is the significant number of refugees and displaced persons resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Despite facilitated naturalization encouraged by state institutions, there are still 26,502 registered refugees and 199,584 internally displaced persons from ex-Yugoslavia, who have long-standing problems with housing, finding work and achieving basic living conditions (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration 2019). Therefore, there is reasonable doubt about Serbia’s capacity to integrate refugees who arrived after 2015, when not even the basic needs for many who came during the 1990s have been met. In the following lines, apart from addressing the normative framework, I will point out the connection between EU integration of Serbia and asylum policy, the views of civil society representatives on the impact of migrant flows on Serbia’s negotiating position with Brussels, as well as the recorded anti-migrant voices that have the potential to rise should financial support be lacking along with a credible perspective of EU membership. 2 Serbia’s legislative framework and accession negotiations for EU membership Serbia’s determination to join the EU has defined a long-standing process of aligning domestic legislation with EU requirements including standards in the field of migration and asylum. The first Asylum Act, which was largely aligned with EU law, was adopted in 2007 as part of the “Visa Liberalization Roadmap” following the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (Velimirović 2018: 4). In addition to complying with EU norms, Serbia’s Constitution guarantees the right to asylum and it is a signatory of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees (United Nations 1951). Serbia has ratified many international treaties related to asylum rights and within the framework of national legislation has adopted a number of laws and by-laws affecting migration regulation, such as the Law on Foreigners (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 2018c) providing for three types of visas as well as several grounds for granting temporary residence in the territory of Serbia and the Law on Border Control (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 2018b), which defines more clearly the place and function of police powers in border control in order to prevent irregular migration. The area of migration is also regulated by the Law on Employment of Foreigners (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 2014), which regulates, among other things, the right of persons with refugee status to a work permit and the Law on Migration Management (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 2012), which defines the competences of the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, establishes the Migration Council and further specifies the procedures for readmission and accommodation of persons with a recognized right to refuge and subsidiary protection.

82  Stefan Surlić In the second phase of harmonization of the legislation in the field of legal and irregular migration that will materialize through amendments to the Foreigners Act by the end of 2020, it has been planned to align with the EU directives concerning the employment of highly qualified workers – the “blue card” – strengthening the penal framework for employers who employ irregular migrants, and additional guarantees for the free movement of workers (Draft Action Plan for Chapter 24 2019). The EU has insisted on harmonizing regulations ever since the opening of the membership perspective. It pursued a policy of conditionality on topics of particular concern to the Union, and in the field of migration, it designed a strategy “where the reinforcement of the region’s migration management capacity is indissociable from regional cooperation, migrant and refugee rights, and a clear path towards EU accession” (Pastore 2019: 22). Serbia has developed the National Program for the Acquisition of the European Union Acquis (NPAA) from 2014 to 2018, which is a plan of activities for harmonizing legislation and identifying the human and budgetary needs necessary for implementation (Grupković, Jelačić Kojić and Petronijević 2016: 13). In the course of membership negotiations with Brussels, Serbia opened Chapter 24 – Justice, Freedom and Security – in 2016 and undertook to further align with EU law in the Action Plan, as well as to reform migration and asylum policies. The text of the adopted Action Plan for Chapter 24 clearly states: Chapter 24 of the Action Plan will take priority over existing strategies and action plans in the relevant areas covered by Chapter 24. If necessary, they will be modified to align with the obligations of this Action Plan. (Action Plan for Chapter 24 2016: 13) Based on the recommendations in the Action Plan, and the direct experience of regulating the large influx of migrants into the country, in 2018, after a lengthy discussion on the draft involving civil society representatives, Serbia adopted a systematic Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 2018a).The legislative framework on migration and the right to asylum also includes the adopted Foreigners Act and the Border Control Act. Chapter 24 otherwise covers ten sub-policies: Migration, Asylum, External Border Control and Schengen Agreement, Visa Policy, Judicial Cooperation, Police Cooperation and Combating Organized Crime, Cooperation in Combating Terrorism, Drug Cooperation, Customs Cooperation and Counterfeiting of the Euro. The importance of this chapter in the accession process is reflected in the possibility of suspending negotiations under other chapters if progress in the rule of law is not considered satisfactory. Furthermore, in order to monitor performance more effectively, the European Commission has introduced interim benchmarks and closing benchmarks (National Convention on the European Union 2018: 186). Within the policies of Migration and Asylum, in addition to adopting new laws, the EU insisted on the feasibility of solutions in practice through continuous institutional and personnel changes. Therefore, Serbia was required to analyse the technical and training needs in the area of legal and irregular migration and introduce

The impact of the “refugee crisis” on EU integration  83 modern operational procedures for profiling, screening and registering migrants, ensuring adequate accommodation, increasing the capacity of reception centres in accordance with the new regulatory framework, and assisting with the voluntary return of migrants to their countries of origin (in 2018 alone, 278 migrants were returned through the Assisted Voluntary Return Program) (Draft Action Plan for Chapter 24 2019). Although, in order to meet the requirements for establishing a visa-free regime for Serbian citizens, harmonization with EU law (Acquis Communautaire) and subsequent adoption of the Asylum Act were required, it turned out that the established national asylum system has several key weaknesses. The Asylum Act 2007 was in line with the Geneva Convention, the additional protocols and partly in line with the EU Directives in force at the time (Joksić 2018: 13), but the 2015 crisis showed that many provisions were not clearly defined, which has led to the absurd situation of securing freedom of transit and the institutional treatment that did not have a foothold in the applicable regulations (Volarević 2017: 3). The Ministry of the Interior and the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration were recognized by this law as key institutions for exercising the rights of asylum seekers by having the Ministry in charge of conducting the procedure and determining status, and the Commissariat of providing accommodation, basic living conditions for asylum seekers and of the integration of persons who had been granted the status. The main drawback of the procedure envisaged is the difference between the large number of expressed intentions to seek asylum and the actual number of applications submitted. The reason is that it was solely through their expressed intention to seek asylum that the migrants were able to secure a legal stay in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, until the opportunity arose for them to continue their journey and reach the country of final destination. Also, the recording procedure was not precisely defined, nor were the rights and obligations of foreigners. Similarly, there was no precise sanction defined for persons in proceedings who acted contrary to the provisions of the law (Joksić 2018: 14). Due to the rapid influx of migrants in 2015, the institutions in charge of recording and determining status could not fully respond to the task because of the legal framework that provided for the complicated procedure. Representatives of the civil sector and legal advisers on asylum were in favour of a tolerated status, existing in some EU countries, to justify the unlawful stay of a person in a certain territory, or to define the reason why a person cannot be forced or voluntarily removed from the country. Although the state authorities also launched such an initiative for people who de facto resided illegally in the territory of Serbia, in the then-legal regulations, no proper basis could be found (Volarević 2017: 4). Therefore, it can be concluded that, in addition to the requirement for harmonization of norms with EU standards, the main reason for adopting the new legal framework was that most of the institutions and solutions needed to overcome the refugee crisis were not specified or clearly defined. The new law initially defines terms such as asylum, asylum proceedings, foreigner, asylum seeker, refugee, asylum, subsidiary protection, country of origin, as well as unaccompanied minors or minors separated from their parents, emphasizing

84  Stefan Surlić rights arising from these statuses, as well as the conditions for their attainment (Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection 2018: Article 2). Asylum is defined as “the right to reside and to protection held by a foreigner who, by a decision of a competent authority, has been granted the right of refuge or subsidiary protection” (ibid.). The law makes a clear distinction between the two concepts of protection, refuge being provided to a refugee “who is found by a competent authority to reasonably fear persecution in the country of origin or country of habitual residence,” as well as subsidiary protection granted to a person who has not suffered direct persecution but who in the event of his return to the country of origin or the country of habitual residence, would be exposed to serious injustice and who cannot or who does not wish to be placed under the protection of that state because of such danger. (ibid.) Of particular importance is the institution of temporary protection that the government may grant in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons (Article 2), as well as the possibility that the government of the Republic of Serbia may make a decision, in the case of a mass influx of persons who express their intention to seek asylum, to engage officers of other organizational units or other state bodies in the process of conducting hearings in order to increase the efficiency of the asylum procedure (Article 37). This ensures that the state acts in a timely manner in the event of a repetition of the events of 2015 and provides a more humane approach to people who have been spontaneously displaced. The new law addresses key shortcomings of the earlier legislative framework regarding the registration procedure and formal asylum applications, as follows: A foreigner shall not be punished for unlawful entry or stay in the Republic of Serbia if he/she expresses without delay his/her intention to apply for asylum and provides a valid justification for his/her illegal entry or stay. (Article 8) In this way, as Joksić points out, the legal vacuum between the moment of expressing the intention and the formal filing of an application is avoided, since an asylum application can be submitted only after the foreigner is accommodated in one of the asylum centres (ibid.: 17). Also, the procedure was simplified by merging the recording and registration phases, which had been separated so far and which in practice meant taking biometric data twice but in accordance with different legal bases (Joksić 2018: 17). The law stipulates that the asylum procedure begins by submitting a formal asylum application to an authorized officer of the Asylum Office in the prescribed form no later than 15 days from the date of registration (Article 36). Furthermore, the applicant is legally protected, because if the authorized officer of the Office does not allow him/her to submit the application, the applicant may do so within

The impact of the “refugee crisis” on EU integration  85 eight days from the expiration of the original deadline (ibid.). Also, the asylum procedure is considered to have been initiated by the submission of an asylum application form to the Asylum Office (ibid.). For the first time, new stipulations have been introduced into the legislative framework for asylum seekers, such as the sur place principle, which establishes “a justified fear of persecution or a real risk of suffering serious injustice” (Article 27), emphasizing the concept of a safe country of origin, where the list identifies and revises data from relevant institutions such as EASO, UNHCR and the Council of Europe (Article 44), as well as explains in more detail the concept of safe third country. The possibility of voluntary return to the country of origin for which the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration is responsible has also been identified (Article 85). In accordance with the provisions of EU directives and due to the frequent occurrence of minors, with or without escort on the Balkan route, the principle of “protection of the minor’s best interests” is laid down, which describes the protection and treatment of this category of migrants. Also, horizontal alignment of the Foreigners Act and the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection is established by incorporating the provision on foreigners who expressed their intention to apply for asylum in the category of foreigners, providing the competent misdemeanour courts the grounds for punishing foreigners who failed to act in accordance with obligations arising from the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection (Joksić 2018: 17). UNHCR assessed that the adopted Law on Asylum and Temporary protection presents considerable progress as compared to earlier legal solutions, especially regarding the introduction of provisions ensuring gender sensitive asylum procedures, the introduction of gender, gender identity and gender-based violence in the definition of refugees, as well as the institutional recognition of children-­asylum seekers and the provision of the definition of unaccompanied children (RTV 2018). However, in spite of remarkable progress, an important opportunity has been missed for complete harmonization with the Action Plan and civil society recommendations regarding the right to citizenship. According to the Action Plan for Chapter 24, in the second phase of harmonization of the legal framework, Serbia took on the obligation to implement activities aimed at establishing the EURODAC system for comparing fingerprints (2016: 39). Also, the institutions of Serbia have the obligation to conform to the Dublin Regulation, which determines the actions of an EU member state in situations when a third-country citizen or a person with no citizenship submits a request for international protection (ibid.). According to the Convention on the Status of Refugees, Serbia has the obligation to grant citizenship to persons who have been granted the status of refugees through naturalization. However, although refugees have been granted shelter through the right of residence and protection, it has not been defined whether this right refers to permanent residence. According to the existing legal framework, the right of residence for persons with the status of refugees is defined as the right to temporary residence, which is not calculated into the time necessary to obtain

86  Stefan Surlić permanent residence. On the other hand, it is possible to obtain the right to citizenship exclusively upon permission for permanent residence, which in practice means that persons with the status of refugees who have been granted asylum cannot become citizens of Serbia in the future and achieve naturalization in that way (Jelačić Kojić 2018). In the first half of 2019, 6,156 persons expressed their intention to seek asylum in the Republic of Serbia, 107 of whom have submitted a formal request to date. Compared to the data for the same period from January to June 2018, no important change has been noted in the number of decisions on granted refugee status. The right to asylum was granted to 13 persons, compared to 11 in the previous year. Still, subsidiary protection was granted in 14 cases throughout 2018, a figure that in 2019 was achieved as early as June (UNHCR 2019). As of 2008 and the establishment of the national asylum system until November 30, 2018, the Office for Refugees granted 54 shelters and 74 subsidiary protections (Trkulja 2018). It is clear, especially after the migrant crisis, that there is a clear discrepancy between the number of persons who have expressed their intention to seek asylum and those who have submitted a formal request and have been granted asylum and subsidiary protection in the Republic of Serbia. The reason for such an outcome is not a restrictive asylum policy, but the migrants’ genuine intention that the asylum centres be merely a stopover on the way to their desired destination in Western Europe. 3 The policy of integration between national capacities and the pursuit of full EU membership Adapting Serbia’s asylum and immigration policies to EU standards, in addition to the normative framework, requires building capacities for a permanent integration of the persons who have expressed their intention to remain in this area. However, the success of the integration process in the Western Balkan countries is directly related to the possibility of participating in the creation of a common strategy with the EU countries, as well as to a credible prospect of EU membership. In the first instance, despite significant financial assistance through the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (MADAD) funds allocated primarily for the accommodation, healthcare and social protection of the refugees (Velimirović 2018: 8) the EU position was already quite clear, “more in the form of a burden-shifting policy than cooperation to solve the problem” (Peshkopia 2005: 218). An additional aggravating factor is the fact that integration policies at EU level are considered at the intergovernmental level, so the concept differs significantly among member states, although the measures in many countries are very similar. There are supranational documents that mention integration mechanisms, such as the Action Plan for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (2016), which was conceived as a framework of support to national institutions, although control mechanisms and possible sanctions for unsuccessful outcomes have failed to be identified. Also, since 2011, there has been a marked securitization of migration in

The impact of the “refugee crisis” on EU integration  87 EU documents that mirror the public discourse of many member states (Božić and Kuti 2018). Secondly, given the stagnation of the EU accession process for Serbia, the EU’s carrot-and-stick policies only retain the stick, which can create a negative narrative about inclusive access to refugees and asylum seekers. Alternatives to full-fledged membership, such as a strategic partnership, cannot meet the citizens’ expectations and can very easily turn dominantly positive migration attitudes into outbursts of xenophobia. Positive normative changes are supported by expectations that they will lead to a better position for Serbia in the EU accession process, and that despite various voices within the EU, Serbia is part of a broader European solidarity response to the emerging crisis. Therefore, halting the process of EU integration in the context of migration would have two concrete consequences: firstly, strengthening the currently nondominant and conspiratorial attitude that the EU intends to keep refugees outside its border, i.e. in the Western Balkans, which would change the map of Serbia demographically and culturally due to the large number of migrants, and, secondly, increasing fear among citizens of the possibility of Brussels stopping funds and shifting the burden of caring for refugees onto the Serbian state. The strengthening of anti-immigrant voices in the form of movements and parties across the EU, coupled with the fact that candidate countries have strengthened their integration capacities despite economic underdevelopment, creates an image of a “more European” Balkans compared to many EU countries. Dealing with the rapid influx of refugees has led to a clear divide within the EU between countries where right-wing, isolationist tendencies have prevailed – mostly in Central ­Europe – and those in which pro-EU attitudes are still prevalent (Makarychev 2018: 750). The paradox was observed at the beginning of the refugee crisis, when “the Balkan countries facilitated transit along the route with the support of international humanitarian organizations while the EU member states pushed them to stop the incoming flow” (Cocco 2017: 297). The agreement reached with Turkey, or possibly a future agreement with Serbia and other Western Balkan countries, would only further confirm the thesis that extensive financial assistance is merely a compensation for the failure of a coherent EU migration policy and the lack of solidarity in the care of refugees. On the other hand, despite limited economic and infrastructural capacities, this raises the question of Serbia’s sincere willingness to replace its dominant transit country status with a status as a receiving country. In the normative sense, the government of Serbia adopted the Regulation on Integration, which comprises full and timely information on rights, opportunities and obligations, language learning and familiarization with the Serbian history, culture and constitutional order, access to the education system, exercise of the right to health and social care, as well and assistance with integration into the labour market (2016). Sonja Tošković from the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, who is a strategic partner of UNHCR, emphasizes that “the migrant crisis and the consequent adjustment of the legislative framework is a lengthy process in which representatives of state institutions are still learning what they are responsible for” (2017).

88  Stefan Surlić Although the adopted laws have significantly accelerated integration mechanisms, the small number of people who opted for Serbia as a destination country does not encourage institutions to view migration as a matter of national priority. Therefore, the EU integration process is the only framework in which it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of institutions in the implementation of adopted laws, as well as to strengthen Serbia’s capacity to exercise asylum seekers’ rights. Serbia’s political representatives emphasized the humane side of the institutional response to the 2015 refugee crisis, and then Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić even offered to participate in burden-sharing through the quota system (Surlić 2019). However, in addition to the notion of Serbia as a candidate country that shares European values, which is a positive exception among growing xenophobia, it should be borne in mind that no pressure was exerted upon politicians from the domestic public to address refugee issues. In the general belief that refugees were not going to remain in Serbia, it was possible to take a stand and support the integration of future asylum seekers without bearing political consequences. One of the main reasons behind the lack of integration is the high unemployment rate and consequently the inability of the refugees to achieve a normal existence. However, migration analyses that emphasize the need for Serbian institutions to prepare integration policies cannot be overlooked. Presenting the demographic analysis for 2018, the President of Serbia emphasized the positive aspects of the anticipated new waves of migration, according to which Serbia will have zero net migration between 2028 and 2030, i.e. an equal number of emigrants and immigrants, as the sudden influx of foreigners will have alleviated the brain drain problem (Serbia Today 2018). Also, Bobić, observing the activities of refugees from the region during the wars of the 1990s, points out that the problem with the labour market in underdeveloped countries such as Serbia may be relative, noting that new residents have shown readiness to unconditionally adapt to the labour market, “in terms of willingness to take part in activities beyond the usual working hours, without a contract, or in the private sector”, as well as being “willing to perform any paid job regardless of their educational level as well as to moonlight” (2010: 104). However, there are criticisms that despite the fact that integration would entail primarily adjusting the labour market in the near future, a more serious approach by institutions, which would prove crucial, has not been adopted: Serbia should develop a long-term strategy, because migration is an issue that concerns not one, but several generations. However, we have witnessed a lack of deeper institutional contemplation. How many migrants have passed who speak Arabic and Farsi? Did the state offer one of them a job? And people with the knowledge of those languages will be indispensable to us. (Jelinčić 2017) Another dominant problem in future integration pertains to the issue of culture, particularly in view of the highly conflicting past of the former Yugoslavia. Due to

The impact of the “refugee crisis” on EU integration  89 the fact that migrants come from a completely different cultural space, “it is questionable how these people will be accepted, considering the strong nationalism in the Western Balkans” (Stančetić 2018: 270). Analysing the anti-immigrant sentiment of right-wing parties and movements, Rečević recognizes that despite the expression of extreme views, there was no organized prevalent or ongoing anti-immigration campaign. The most vocal was the “SNP Naši” movement, which protested “against the EU plan to settle 400,000 migrants in Serbia” and urged people in Serbia to stand up against the (in fact nonexistent) EU plan to build a collective centre for thousands of people that would bring about an overall change to the people’s lifestyle (2019: 303). However, as Antonijević points out: It is positive that the migrant crisis has not been exploited for the sake of political campaigns. Certain voices were heard featuring refugees as a threat to security and the traditional way of life in Serbia, but fortunately, they have remained isolated (2017) However, although without an organized anti-immigration campaign, the parliamentary nationalist party Dveri made it clear that they were against the settling of the refugees in the territory of Serbia, believing that their integration would significantly change the ethnic structure of the population, strongly opposing on several occasions the opening of new reception centres and the adoption of local action plans to improve the status of migrants (Rečević 2019: 307). Integration prescribes the migrant’s familiarization with domestic social culture through learning the official language, since the new Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection stipulates the obligation for persons who have been granted the right to asylum to attend Serbian language classes, along with courses on history, culture and politics, while unjustified absences may lead to loss of entitlement to financial assistance (Jelačić Kojić 2018: 4). Although access to education is geographically limited to places of reception and asylum centres, it has been observed that the inclusion of children in primary education has had the most positive effects on building relationships between migrants and the local population (Stojić Mitrović 2019). Also, Serbia could not take on the obligation to find employment for new residents, but the Commissariat for Refugees and Migrants has an obligation to assist in the integration of asylum seekers into the labour market with a variety of tasks ranging from assisting in the recognition of foreign school diplomas to obtaining the documents required for applying to the National Employment Service (Jelačić Kojić 2018: 5). However, despite inclusive legislation and positive examples of integration processes, explaining the hot potato system of migration, Mandić (2018) argues that “urban integration of Syrians themselves never existed as a practical possibility,” and that camps have “simply diverted migration away from cities, bypassed populated centres, and thwarted or penalized any longer-term stays outside government jurisdiction” (9).

90  Stefan Surlić 4 Conclusion Serbia’s asylum and migration policies cannot be taken out of the context of EU integration. Although Serbia is recognized as a transit country, with a small number of persons having acquired the right to asylum, the new legal framework that guarantees a more efficient and more humane approach to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers has emerged from the goals defined in the pre-accession negotiations with the EU and from the shared experience of coping with the 2015 refugee crisis. At the same time, various EU funds made it impossible for the Serbian society to feel the financial burden of dealing with a significant influx of people, while the prospect of EU membership awakened the desire of political leaders to portray Serbia as a country ready for the solidarity lacking in Europe. The common denominator that emerged from 17 interviews conducted with representatives of civil society organizations dealing with refugees and migrants in Serbia is that the EU is the only framework in which adequate responses can be provided to challenges and crises. Despite the lack of a coherent migrant integration policy at the supranational level, EU institutions anticipate positive outcomes from Serbia’s integration policy, as well as the promised enlargement policy. As part of the EU accession process, Serbia has undertaken and normatively defined an integration system for persons enjoying asylum seeker status or those who have already acquired this status. However, one of the main institutional priorities for the future is to recognize foreigners who have decided to remain permanently in Serbia and those who use the integration procedure until the opportune moment arises to continue their journey to their desired destination. Such an approach would require additional infrastructural and administrative capacities, especially given that even persons who have not expressed their intention to apply for asylum in Serbia are still residing in asylum centres and other facilities intended to accommodate asylum seekers (Trkulja 2018: 65). The asylum system in Serbia, as in most other European countries, is “founded on the paradigm of the asylum seeker as an individual seeking to enforce his or her rights rather than providing a priori protection for larger groups” (Kilibarda 2017: 227), and despite positive examples of integration, it still does not recognize socially and institutionally that it is a two-way adjustment. Taking into account the predictions on migration trends, Serbia faces the great challenge of implementing inclusive legislation for refugees and asylum seekers in the future through the real integration of persons who have decided to remain and become full members of society. References Antonijević, Milan. 2017. ‘The Impact of the ‘Refugee Crisis’ on European Integration in the Field of Asylum and Migration from a Serbian Perspective, Interview by Stefan Surlić,’ Migrate Jean Monnet Project, September 6. Bobić, Mirjana. 2010. ‘Forced Migrants in Serbia: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons-­ Facts and Figures, Coping Strategies, Future,’ Refuge, 26 (1), 101–110.

The impact of the “refugee crisis” on EU integration  91 Božić, Saša, and Kuti, Simona. 2018. ‘European Migrant Integration Policy: From Standardising Measures for European Union Countries to Integration Service Based on Social Scientific Knowledge,’ Revija za sociologiju, 48 (1), 49–75. Cocco, Emilio. 2017. ‘Where Is the European Frontier? The Balkan Migration Crisis and Its Impact on Relations between the EU and the Western Balkans,’ European View, 16 (2), 293–302. Commissariat for Refugees and Migration. 2019. Office Statistics – July 2018. Available at http://www.kirs.gov.rs/media/uploads/Dokumenti-i-publikacije/Statistike/izbirl2018.pdf European Commission. 2016. Action Plan for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, Publications Office of the European Union. Grupković, Brankica, Jelačić Kojić, Miroslava and Petronijević, Vladimir. 2016. Serbia on the Refugee Route – Humanitarian Response and Legal Adjustments, Spoljnopolitičke sveske. Available at https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/belgrad/12942.pdf Jelačić Kojić, Miroslava. 2018. Challenges to the Integration of Asylum-Recognized Persons, Belgrade: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Jelinčić, Jadranka. 2017. ‘The Impact of the ‘Refugee Crisis’ on European Integration in the Field of Asylum and Migration from a Serbian Perspective. Interview by Stefan Surlić,’ Migrate Jean Monnet Project, September 15. Joksić, Emilija. 2018. ‘Asylum System of the Republic of Serbia’, in Milenković, Dejan (ed), Evropske sveske, European Movement in Serbia, 12–20. Kilibarda, Pavle. 2017. ‘Obligations of Transit Countries under Refugee Law: A Western Balkans Case Study,’ International Review of the Red Cross, 99 (904), 211–239. Makarychev, Andrey. 2018. ‘Bordering and Identity-Making in Europe after the 2015 Refugee Crisis,’ Geopolitics, 23 (4), 747–753. Mandić, Danilo. 2018. ‘A Migrant “Hot Potato” System: The Transit Camp and Urban Integration in a Bridge Society,’ Journal of Urban Affairs, 43 (3), 1–17. National Convention on the European Union. 2018. The Book of Conclusions and Recommendations. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia. 2012. Law on Migration Management, no. 107/2012. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia. 2014. Law on Employment of Foreigners, no. 128/2014. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia. 2018a. Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, Foreigners and Border Control, no. 24/2018. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia. 2018b. Law on Border Control, no. 24/2018. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia. 2018c. Law on Foreigners, no. 24/2018. Pastore, Ferruccio. 2019. ‘From Source to Corridor: Changing Geopolitical Narratives about Migration and EU-Western Balkans Relations,’ Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 21 (1), 11–26. Peshkopia, Ridvan. 2005. ‘Asylum in the Balkans: European Union and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Assistance to Balkan Countries for Establishing Asylum Systems,’ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 5 (2), 213–241. Rečević, Tijana. 2019. ‘Violent Extremism and Radicalization in the Context of the Migrant Crisis: Evidence from Serbia’, in Perry, Valery (Ed), Extremism and Violent Extremism in Serbia: 21st Century Manifestations of an Historical Challenge, Stuttgart: Ibidem Press, 281–317. Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Interior. 2016. Action Plan for Chapter 24 – Justice, Freedom, Security.

92  Stefan Surlić Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Interior. 2019. Draft Action Plan for Chapter 24 – Justice, Freedom, Security. RTV. 2018. ‘Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, Foreigners and Border Control: UNHCR Praises New Laws,’ April 3. Available at http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/unhcrhvali-nas-nove-zakone-o-azilu-i-strancima_906639.html Serbia Today. 2018. ‘Young People Leaving Serbia Will Be Replaced by Migrants,’ March 18. Available at https://www.srbijadanas.net/vucic-mlade-koji-odlaze-iz-srbijece-zameni-migranti-video/ Stančetić, Veran. 2018. ‘Guidelines for the Design of a Refugee Policy in the Western Balkans,’ Croatian and Comparative Public Administration, 18 (2), 269–285. Stojić Mitrović, Marta. 2019. ‘The Reception of Migrants in Serbia: Policies, Practices, and Concepts,’ Journal of Human Rights and Social Work, 4 (1), 17–27. Surlić, Stefan. 2019. ‘Who Said Quotas? The Role of Serbia in Burden Sharing of the “Migrant Crisis”,’ in Gkasis, Pavlos and Prodromidou, Alexandra (eds), Along the Balkan Route: The Impact of the Post-2014 ‘Migrant Crisis’ on the EU’s South East Periphery, Belgrade: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 118–129. Tošković, Sonja. 2017. ‘The Impact of the ‘Refugee Crisis’ on European Integration in the Field of Asylum and Migration from a Serbian Perspective. Interview by Stefan Surlić,’ Migrate Jean Monnet Project, September 11. Trkulja, Ana. 2018. Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia 2018, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. United Nations. 1951. Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. UNHCR. 2019. Asylum Office Statistics – July 2019. Available at http://www.unhcr.rs/dokumenti/statisktike/azil.html Velimirović, Svetlana. 2018. ‘The European Union and the Migrant Crisis in Serbia’, in Milenković, Dejan (ed), Evropske Sveske, Belgrade: European Movement in Serbia, 12–20. Volarević, Siniša. 2017. The Western Balkan Migrant Route in the ‘Beyond the Crisis’ Period; Situation in the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

7

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route? Armina Galijaš

1 Introduction Although most migrants hoped for a quick transit through Bosnia in 2018, many of them have spent more time in this country than they expected or thought they would. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the average length of stay in various reception centers in Una-Sana Canton (USC) in North-Western Bosnia, the focus of this paper, was between 54 and 159 days as of August 2019 (IOM employees, August 25, 2019). The migrants cannot easily travel further, and many are trapped or stuck in Bosnia, as well as in Serbia. The public, as well as the state institutions in Bosnia, perceive these people exclusively as migrants in transit and the situation as temporary. Migrants are perceived only as persons who are passing through, and once they have passed through, the issue will be resolved. The fact is that a lot of these people are leaving the country but new ones are still coming and nobody can make forecasts or say with certainty for how long this migration route will be used to the same or a similar extent. Most problems will therefore continue to be addressed on an ad hoc basis and, if possible, resolved as such. Although it is a fact that the number of illegal migrants who have entered the EU in the past year is equal to the average number of tourists who visit Athens in a single day in August (Krastev 2019), the situation for migrants in Bosnia is no easier. On average, there are 7,500–8,500 migrants in Bosnia at any given time (UNHCR 2019b), but even with this relatively small number, the Bosnian state is not willing or able to cope. This inefficiency of the Bosnian state became very evident during several civil protests in Bihać, when migrants from the Sarajevo Canton were redirected to the USC and the city of Bihać. The city was unprepared for this number of migrants, lacking the necessary infrastructure. On one of these occasions, on 17 November 2018, the citizens of Bihać appealed to the Ministry of Security and all other state institutions “to protect the state border, in order to bring the situation with migrants and refugees in the Una-Sana Canton under control” (N1 2018c). In the same statement, they gave their support to the cantonal government and police to continue to “prevent the inflow of new migrants into the Una-Sana Canton area” (N1 2018c). In addition, they urged the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina railway DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405-7

94  Armina Galijaš and bus operators to stop bringing unregistered people without any documents to Bihać. The citizens’ representative added that the inhabitants of Bihać are also extremely dissatisfied with the work of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and a citizen representative stressed that “[they] do not want inefficiency and non-transparency from them, but help in accordance with the laws of the European Union” (N1 2018c). According to the news, the citizens were trying to communicate their problems to different entities and across different levels of government. Although latent xenophobia emerged during the protests, the citizens’ representatives emphasize that everyone must know that they are not protesting against these people, but against Bosnian political leaders who have been ignoring the problems and have left the citizens to solve them on their own (N1 2018c). They also point out that, in their opinion, the organizations with the most money, like IOM and UNHCR, do not act in accordance with the standards set by their EU donors. This short news report from N1 TV shows the complexity of the responsibilities and how many independent actors are involved in the issue. The demands of the citizens of Bihać are not only aimed at local actors, but at larger institutions. Citizens demand control over the borders, the relocation of the migrants’ accommodations and the controlled transfer of migrants to USC; as if they are trying, through their requirements, to coordinate the whole situation. On 17 November 2018, citizen representative Ramić stressed that the state needs to solve this problem (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2018b). “The migrants have only shown us that we do not have a state” (USKinfo 2018), added Ramić. To what extent does the dysfunctionality of the state influence the migrant situation in Bosnia? Are migrants accepted in this country? To what extent is their (lack of) acceptance influenced by the media, and what are the differences and similarities compared to Serbia? Is there any option for migrants to stay in Bosnia, or any legal solution for them to continue their journey? Could Bosnia become a new hotspot along the closed Balkan route? The questions above will be explored on the basis of a series of semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders, representatives and employees of IOM, employees of the Service for Foreigner’s Affairs (SFA), a high-ranked representative of the USC Ministry of the Interior, and seven citizens of Bihać. All these people wanted to talk about the migrant situation in USC, but at the same time demanded anonymity, which highlights the controversial nature of the topic. Further analysis is based on selected documents and reports, produced primarily by IOM, UNHCR, various professionals and NGOs, as well as on media samples (IOM n.d.-b). While the migrants have been crossing through the whole of Bosnia, this paper focuses on Bihać and USC, due to the high numbers of migrants concentrated in this location. Before answering the question above, I first attempt to provide an accurate picture of the size of this migrant population, and to shed light on their composition in terms of nationality, gender and age. I illustrate who has tried to shelter, nurture and help these people and how. I also consider the role of the numerous NGOs working within this policy process and social field.

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route?  95 2 Under what conditions do migrants stay and live in Bosnia? After the closure of the EU borders in March 2016 and the implementation of increased control of the borders between Serbia and the EU, it was just a matter of time until the migrants were “redirected” to Bosnia. Due to the long land border between Bosnia and Croatia (932 km), this seems to be the last option for migrants seeking to reach Western Europe by land. In March 2016, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia adopted the migration and asylum strategy and action plan for 2016–2020 (Ministry of Security BIH 2016), but two years later, in 2018, thousands of people were living in the streets, fields, forests, or makeshift camps all over the country, and Bosnia still does not seem prepared for this situation (Ahmetašević and Mlinarević 2019). Since the beginning of 2018, the country has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of migrants and refugees entering the country. Compared to 2017, the number of migrants increased in a few months by more than a hundredfold. According to the UNHCR fact sheet for June 2019, the estimated number of refugees and migrants at this point was 7,000–8,000 and the maximum available accommodation as of 30 June was 4,145 places (UNHCR 2018). The number of detected refugee and migrant arrivals for the period from January 2018 to June 30, 2019 was about 35,000. The majority of them (32,340) expressed a supposed “intention to seek asylum,” which means they are registered migrants. The migrants theoretically have the opportunity to express this intention orally or in writing to any police officer or competent official of the Ministry of the Interior at a border checkpoint or within Bosnian territory, and to receive a “certificate of the expressed intention to seek asylum” (Ahmetašević 2019). The migrants do not apply automatically for asylum and have to wait for the Sector for Asylum (SA) to invite them for an asylum registration interview. Due to lack of staff and complicated bureaucracy, this procedure can take a long time and is quite confusing (Ahmetašević 2019). Those with no registered address cannot schedule an interview. By June 2019, 1,767 persons, or 5% of all registered migrants, had formally been able and willing to lodge their asylum claim with the SA (UNHCR 2018). In 2018, asylum requests were filed by people from 27 countries, and only 2 persons received a positive response and subsidiary protection. Although it is not possible to speak of completely distinct categories when it comes to reasons for leaving the country of origin, most respondents cited poor living standards (33%), a feeling of insecurity (21%), or a state of war or armed conflict (10%) as reasons for leaving. Only 9% of respondents left their country of origin for political reasons, 7% due to personal conflict with another person, that is, religious reasons, and 5% for family reunification. Only 2% had reasons related to health problems (Turčalo 2019). The majority of migrants between January 2018 and June 2019 were from Pakistan (34%), followed by migrants from Iran (12%). The third largest groups of migrants were from Syria and Afghanistan (11% each), followed by Iraqis (9%) (UNHCR 2019c). The relatively high number of Iranians is directly linked to the Serbian abolition of the visa regime for Iran in August 2017 (Galijaš 2019: 105– 108). Thus, Serbia became the first and only country in mainland Europe to offer

96  Armina Galijaš Iranians visa-free travel. Although the Serbian government cites economic reasons as an explanation for this policy (Danas 2017), many doubt this and see it as a reward for Iran’s support in the case of Kosovo. Specifically, Iran does not recognize Kosovo and thereby supports Serbian foreign policy and its political goals (B92 2018; Blic 2018b; Gedošević 2018). The number of Iranian migrants that entered Bosnia by September 2018 is more than 100 times higher than the year before. According to data from Bosnia’s Foreigners’ Affairs Service, 16 Iranians expressed an intention to seek asylum in the country in 2017, but by September 2018, this number already stood at 1,647 (N1 2018b). The “fake Iranian tourists” issue was also raised by the Chairman of Bosnia’s Council of Ministers, Denis Zvizdić, who stated that “the fact is that they come to Serbia as tourists, and emerge in Bosnia without any identification documents (N1 2018b).” Until they reach Serbia they are tourists, but, after they leave Serbia, they become migrants. Serbia was criticized for this incident by the European Union, and the European Council demanded that it respect EU visa policies. On October 8, 2018, the Serbian government gave in to this pressure and on October 16 it reintroduced its visa requirement for Iranians (Schengen Visa Info 2018; cf. Blic 2018a). The Serbian minister of the interior, Nebojša Stefanović, said in parliament that Iranians had “abused the abolition of visas” (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2018a; RS Official Gazette 2018). By June 2019, people from Iran were not among the top asylum seeker and migrant arrivals to Bosnia, and they ceased to appear in the statistics as a separate group. The majority of migrants arrive overland and enter Bosnia in an irregular manner, meaning through non-official border crossings. They use two main routes. While the largest population continues to arrive from Serbia, the others come from Montenegro (UNHCR 2018: 2). The majority come to Bosnia and Herzegovina from Serbia (87%). For some migrants, the journey from Serbia to Bosnia begins in the so-called Afghan Park in Belgrade, in which smugglers, mostly of Pakistani or Afghan origin in cooperation with domestic smugglers, transfer people by land or water (via the river Drina) to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Turčalo 2019). Some of them remained in Serbia after the closure of the so-called Balkan route in March 2015 and are now trying to continue their journey, while others are just passing through Serbia and entering Bosnia. The other main route starts in Greece and runs through Albania and Montenegro into Bosnia (OSCE 2018). According to activists and volunteers in the field, some migrants are on the move for several years. They spent years in Turkey or Greece. Some others started their journeys several months before reaching Bosnia, but very often they all say the same thing: “We need to begin life, waiting around does not mean having a life” (Ahmetašević and Mlinarević 2019). In fact, all these people had already reached the EU, as they had to cross either Bulgaria or Greece on their way to Bosnia and they are now trying again to enter the EU and the Schengen area via Croatia. During the first months of 2018, migrants quickly moved from border areas toward Sarajevo, but since then a new trend has been observed in which migrants and refugees increasingly avoid Sarajevo and head directly to Una-Sana Canton (USC) in North-Western Bosnia. The USC location is linked to attempts to enter the EU and the Schengen zone. The majority of the migrants in Bosnia in 2018 were in

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route?  97 USC, in the cities of Bihać and Velika Kladuša, the shortest distance from Slovenia, which is a part of the Schengen area. The Schengen area is the beginning of the final destination for migrants, which is often Germany, France or Italy. Croatia is 70 km wide on the route from Bihać to Slovenia, and if everything goes well for migrants, this is the fastest way to cross it. If we compere the numbers of all registered migrants in the period between January 2018 and June 2019 (ca. 35,000) against the number of migrants currently (June 2019) staying in Bosnia (7,000–8,000), it is clear that the route is effective. It must be emphasized that migrants continue to arrive in Bosnia, with, e.g., 2,603 detected arrivals in May 2019 (UNHCR 2019b), and that people still move on despite the difficult circumstances. This influx has challenged the human and financial resources of the responsible institutions. Similar to Serbia, the EU has decided to give support for the migrants in these countries. From the beginning of the refugee crisis in Serbia until July 2018, the EU has allocated more than €25 million in humanitarian aid to assist refugees and migrants. Furthermore, “approximately €80 million have been allocated by the European Commission and EU Member States to assist Serbia in effectively managing the migration flow. EU funds are used for better border management, running costs of the centers and also for improving reception conditions and provisions of services in the education and the health sector” (ECHO 2019). The assistance also includes the provision of informal education. But, in contrast to Serbia, the EU has decided to direct its entire donation for migrants in Bosnia, in the total amount of €9.2 million, toward IOM, UNHCR and UNICEF, instead of the local government, with the aim of preventing major humanitarian and security issues. The EU has probably tried to avoid allegedly corrupt Bosnian politicians by distributing funds directly to the international organizations, but stripping the state authorities of any responsibility, and taking over their role, could be dangerous. It allows for a situation in which it is always possible to push the blame back and forth between actors, as “(o)rganizations that became responsible for distribution of money are stating that the government has been responsible for the provision of the accommodation, while the government has stated that it is the UN agencies and their related organizations that received the money for that purpose” (Ahmetašević and Mlinarević 2019: 8). To manage the migrant situation, the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Security of Bosnia has appointed the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as the leading organization that will direct its activities toward establishing the Temporary Reception Centers for migrants in Una-Sana Canton. As leading organization, IOM has received € 7,342,168. Most funds were spent on shelter, containers and equipment (41%), 27% on food and 11% on clothing, footwear and hygienic items (IOM 2019a). All migrants are permanently in need of humanitarian assistance. According to representatives of the IOM, cooperation with national representatives in some areas is not always easy. In particular, accommodation is problematic. Many migrants and refugees are housed in accommodation that is not owned by the state but by private persons, such as the hotel Sedra, which makes potential maintenance repairs difficult. IOM is not ready to cover repair costs (e.g., roofs) for private accommodation, although this

98  Armina Galijaš would be necessary for migrants. Here it becomes obvious how difficult cooperation sometimes is and how it can stumble on basic issues. The reasons are often the high number of government officials involved in making the decisions (Two IOM representatives, personal communication, August 25, 2019). In June 2019, more than 4,000 spaces were available across eight locations in Bosnia, not including the few safe houses made available to a limited number of particularly vulnerable cases. More than 1,200 asylum seekers and migrants were accommodated in Bira TRC in Bihać, ca. 550 in Miral facility in Velika Kladuša, up to 580 in Borići Dormitory in Bihać, ca. 400 in Sedra TRC in Cazin, ca. 400 in Ušivak TRC in Hadžići near Sarajevo, ca. 150 in AC Trnovo near Sarajevo, 250 in RRC Salakovac near Mostar, and between 70 and 100 people were accommodated in an additional location in Sarajevo called House of All (HoA). One of the problems in these accommodations is security. There is not enough staff to guarantee security, especially in Miral and Bira, where there is a problem of unauthorized and undetected entry into the facility. In Bira, where 1,000–1,500 people per day are present, the coordinator of the center has only nine persons at his disposal who are responsible for the entire security infrastructure (Hadžimehmedović 2019). In addition to physical security issues, this can also be a problem for the health of others, as undetected persons have not undergone medical examinations. Unauthorized entries take place through jumping over the fence or using someone else’s identification card (Turčalo 2019). An unidentified number of migrants are privately accommodated or squatting in Sarajevo and USC, and some of them are sleeping rough in other locations. According to the report “People on the Move in Bosnia,” the accommodation solutions provided at the end of 2018 in the majority of cases do not meet the standards needed for dignified human life (Ahmetašević and Mlinarević 2019). In summer 2019, many migrants in Bihać were residing outside of the four official reception centers, squatting in public spaces and empty houses. Because the numbers of migrants largely exceed the capacity of the four official migration accommodation centers in the USC, and because of the supposedly tense situation in the city of Bihać between locals and migrants, the controversial camp Vučjak was opened in summer 2019. The camp is located directly on the site of an old landfill and is surrounded by minefields from the Bosnian war (1992–1995). In this camp, with no permanent water supply or toilets installed, people have even been forced to defecate out in the open (Davies, Wochnik-Obradovic and Isakjee 2019). The United Nations described this camp as “entirely inadequate for the purpose of accommodating people” (IOM 2019b). Due to the tense situation between migrants and the native population in the city of Bihać, primarily caused by the excessive number of migrants in relation to the inhabitants of the city, Bosnian police detain migrants every afternoon in the city center and transport them back to the camp. In this camp, there are also recorded individual cases of tuberculosis, hepatitis B and at least 20 instances of scabies (Davies, Wochnik-Obradovic and Isakjee 2019). Setting up this camp shows how difficult the situation is for the migrants in USC, but also for the Municipality of Bihać, which has neither the financial nor the logistical means to offer an effective solution. “With this number of migrants in the city, we were no longer able to provide security. Vučjak was not well selected, but we had no choice,” stated a representative of the Cantonal Ministry of Interior

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route?  99 (personal communication, August 23, 2019). The Bosnian state does not intervene properly or provide any well-designed strategic long-term solutions, nor does it provide sufficient financial support. If we compare the financial situation between Serbia and Bosnia, as well the controlled distribution of resources, Serbia’s advantage is obvious. On the one hand, Serbia has been faced with the problem for a longer time, since 2015, but, on the other hand, Bosnia has had enough time to prepare for the foreseeable influx of migrants and did not take or did not want to take advantage of that. 3 What determines the acceptance of migrants in Bosnia? These migrants are not the first people from the Middle East to have come to Bosnia in larger numbers in recent years. Small countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina have seen large percentage increases in tourist arrivals after the Arab Spring (Groizard, Ismael and Santana Gallego 2016: 6–7). After this revolution, which destabilized many Arabic traditional holiday destinations such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, the Arabs discovered Bosnia (Arslanagić 2016). Bosnia, where around half the population is Muslim, has become increasingly popular with Arab tourists in recent years, capitalizing on its lush natural beauty and relatively low costs (MacDowall 2017). The tourists come to Bosnia to escape the summer heat at home and to discover and enjoy mountainous, rivers and lakes (Adrović 2017). Since Arab tourists, but also investors, began to visit Bosnia in significant numbers prejudice against them as well as fear have surfaced and have even led to the open expression of hate speech. A trend of offensive, xenophobic and stereotypical comments about them has spread. The users of social media complain about their alleged arrogance on resorts nationwide, as well as their behavior in restaurants and on the streets. In Bosnia, where people wear European-style clothing, the sight of burqas and traditional Arab robes is also worrying for some. The women in burqas are often called “ninjas,” and the Arabs are often described as backward. “We don’t want to have them in our restaurant, because they leave a mess and they are very noisy,” said a woman at the reception in a hip Sarajevo restaurant. Although many Bosnians share a religion with the majority of Arabs, and they very often have Arabic names, they do not know any more about them than the average European citizen. Life in Arabic countries is much more differentiated than the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina presents. There is very little exposure to Arabic culture, cinema, music or literature, but recently there have been a lot of newspaper articles and TV debates about Islamic/Arabic radicalism and especially the abuse of women and girls. All Arabs are equated in these articles, and there is hardly any distinction made among Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Brunei, Oman, Tunisia or the Emirates, and, ultimately, also ISIS, although the Arab World in fact consists of 22 countries. According to the Bosnian media, they are virtually all the same: bad Arab men and oppressed Arab women (Žuna 2017). Although investment and tourists are much needed in this country, and economic analysts and Arabic partners emphasize and welcome all these investments in Bosnia (Adrović 2017; Al Jazeera 2019; Mešić 2017), the population exhibit resistance and fear. Negative comments and xenophobic reactions against Arabs

100  Armina Galijaš are widespread in Bosnia’s newspapers, social media and internet portals. The reactions seem to be inspired by some kind of cultural racism, based on prejudices and the idea that these two cultures are fundamentally incompatible and cannot co-exist in the same society. Some Bosnians complain about a culture clash with visitors and are concerned about creeping conservatism. The predominantly Muslim inhabitants of Sarajevo are restrained or openly opposed to the newcomers. Middle-aged Bosnian women say “they are welcome to visit us, but please let them go back where they came from” (RTRS 2016). Many intellectuals in the media are also against Arab investments in Bosnia. Usually they start discussions with the words “We don’t have anything against Arabs or Arab and other foreign inventions, but...” (FTV 2016). In summer 2016, a member of the Bosnian Academy of Sciences and professor of Arabic studies at the University of Sarajevo, Esad Duraković, defined the selling of Bosnian property to Arabs as an “Arab invasion” and “Arab conquest of this country,” stating that this is only the beginning of the occupation (N1 2016). He also said, at the end of an interview in a very popular TV show, “I’m worried about the future of my children and my descendants” (N1 2016). His colleague, professor Rešid Hafizović, has made similar arguments (FTV 2016). These discussions about Arabs took place in Bosnia during the refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016, when hundreds of thousands of Arabs, among other people from the Middle East and Afghanistan, went on the Balkan route to the EU, but bypassed Bosnia. But in 2018 and 2019, a lot of migrants, mostly also from the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, tried to reach Western Europe by passing through Bosnia. Unlike investors and tourists, these people flee from their homes and need protection. Have these facts influenced the acceptance of this population? At the beginning of 2018, the population in Bosnia was empathetic and helpful, and the media also adopted this attitude in large measure. The Bosnians could recall their wartime experiences (1992–1995), and they shared their compassion with the migrants (N1 2018a; DW 2018), but the initial sympathy and kindness of the local population toward migrants declined over time. There are three main reasons for this: mismanagement of the state, various interest groups in power, and media coverage. In May 2018, a citizen of Sarajevo expressed distrust toward the state, stating that “citizens help as best they can and the government is nowhere to be seen. In this case, both the citizens and the refugees rely on themselves.” The migrants initially needed the help of various NGOs, as well as the help of the population. When the state did not take over this role, the situation changed. Confusing situations and conditions, the absence of systematic and organized state-run support, insufficient humanitarian aid, as well as the shifting of responsibility between different levels of government and humanitarian organizations contributed to the change of opinion. For example, since 2019, the police of USC have taken migrants off the train in Bosanska Otoka (50 km from Bihać) and, in so doing, tried to prevent their arrival to Bihać. Then, they drive the migrants to the entity border with Republika Srpska, where they leave them there without water, food or medical help. The police of Republika Srpska send the migrants back to USC canton, which the local USC police will not allow (DW 2019). This is a clear example of the transferring of responsibility between different levels of government in Bosnia. Yet, this shift of

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route?  101 responsibility does not stop migrants in the end. As an IOM employee put it in a nutshell, “they have crossed Iran by foot; they can also make the 50 km to Bihać if they want” (IOM employee, personal communication, August 25, 2019). Examples such as these actions in Otoka, or establishing the completely unsuitable camp Vučjak, further show the miscommunication between different levels of government and reveals the complete absence of the state, as many claim. However, the fact that state institutions can still coordinate, even under difficult circumstances, is shown by the example of the fire at the migrants shelter Miral (N1 2019a). After the fire was reported, the fire brigades were there in three minutes; in five minutes, the police and first aid arrived. The fire was extinguished; all the injured were quickly transferred to two different hospitals, depending on the type of injury. An IOM employee says that without this quick intervention, IOM would only have been able to count the corpses (IOM employee, personal communication, August 25, 2019). Although some structure and action are to be noted at the cantonal level, general state action on this issue is lacking. The cantonal institutions, but above all the citizens in Bihać, feel left and forgotten, as they say, “by Sarajevo” (A.T., K.T. and S.D., citizens of Bihać, personal communication, August 25, 2019; representative of Department of the Interior of USK, personal communication, August 23, 2019). This condition of “feeling abandoned by the state” was also reinforced by media coverage. In May 2018, the media reporting was getting worse, and also influenced the acceptance of migrants by the local population. Since spring 2018, the migrants have been described as thieves, rapists, terrorists, addicts and a threat to the population (Mediacentar Sarajevo 2019). Especially the “click-oriented” media have begun to dominate with sensationalist titles, but the traditional ones are also involved. The covers of the most widely read newspapers in Bosnia appear with titles such as “Migrant tried to rape the mother of two children” (Dnevni avaz 2018c), “15,000 euros, opium and speed [methamphetamine A.G.] found in the possession of migrants” (Dnevni avaz 2018b) and “Drama in the center of Sarajevo: Migrants beat and rob” (Dnevni avaz 2018a). There is certainly crime among migrants, but no more so than among the local population. Most studies and experiences in Europe and neighboring Serbia, through which more than a million refugees have passed, show that migrants are not responsible for the increase in crime (Veselinović 2017). Most crimes by migrants are trivial, the most frequent being the theft of clothes, backpacks, telephones, or food (Turčalo 2019), and injuries mostly occur in fights between migrants themselves. Violence directed toward non-migrants is very rare (AbrašMedia 2018). These facts are drowned out by media coverage. The real problem with crime that the police in Bihać find difficult to solve is that the detained criminals are often released without consequences. Often, the police do not have interpreters for many languages or are not able to pay for a translator. The other problem is inaccessibility. Even if charges are brought, the likelihood that the defendants will be in Bosnia when the case comes to court is extremely unlikely (representative of Department of the Interior of USK, personal communication, August 23, 2019). If we compare this situation with that in Serbia at the beginning of the crisis, we can see important differences right away. The Serbian state authorities acted strategically and played an important role in deflecting potential protests among the population, which led to the relatively wide acceptance of migrants (Galijaš 2019). Former prime minister and current president Aleksandar Vučić publicly denounced

102  Armina Galijaš any protests that occurred and kept a firm grip through his substantially authoritarian rule (Blic 2015; CNN 2015; Milenkovski 2018; RTRS 2015). There is hardly any opposition in Serbia left, as all voices against Vučić’s rule have been silenced. The Serbian media, closely bound to official politics, has offered its backing, comparing a praiseworthy Serbia with its recalcitrant neighbors: “Images of migrants in Belgrade’s parks and smiling policemen holding migrant children were juxtaposed in the media with cages in which migrants were being held in Hungary, or angry Macedonian officers beating migrants on the border” (Beznec, Speer and Mitrović 2016; cf. Jevtović and Bajić 2018). During 2015 and in the first six months of 2016, such slanted news was widely disseminated. It condemned Hungary and Croatia as self-styled “guardians of the gates to Europe,” and also Bulgaria (Jevtović and Bajić 2018: 102; Kostić 2018). Serbia was different. Vučić proclaimed that his country would “never erect walls” or restrict the movement of people seeking protection. He had a decisive influence on public opinion (Avramović and Jovanović 2015; Telegraf 2015). The media emphasized the humanitarian side of migration, together with the humanity of Serbian citizens, effectively triggering empathetic attitudes. Many people became directly engaged in helping the refugees. Vučić’s approach at the time was in line with the politics of the German chancellor, Angela Merkel. He was calculating his politics carefully with an eye to entering the EU, and he capitalized on the refugee crisis (El-Shaarawi and Razsa 2019, 97; cf. Milan and Pirro 2018). Accession to the European Union remains a strategic goal for the Republic of Serbia, but it involves compliance with European values and standards, and not least respect for human rights. A strategic legislatively and institutionally sound migration policy seemed particularly important for furthering the accession process. The benchmarks had been set by the EU. In the midst of the crisis, in July 2016, Serbia formally implemented Chapters 23 and 24, which deal with issues of human rights and anti-discrimination. The Serbian Ministry of the Interior has been negotiating Chapter 24 with the EU, and the action plan for its implementation covers topics such as migration, asylum, visa policy, external borders, and the Schengen regime (in which border controls are dropped). Bosnia, unlike Serbia, does not have a similar motivation and a reasonably concrete strategic goal of obtaining EU membership, and Bosnian treatment of migrants and refugees has not been influenced by EU conditionality. In this particular “migrants’ case,” it becomes apparent that the political actors do not pursue a long-term plan or policy. This corresponds to the general picture of politics in this country. We cannot say that Bosnia is a more or less democratic state than authoritarian Serbia, but Bosnia has certainly more interest groups in power then Serbia. All these different groups/political parties have control over certain media (European Parliament 2018) and use this media to stir up the political conflicts in the framework of public discourse. While in Serbia a humanitarian approach is being enforced by autocratic means, in Bosnia any clear approach is missing. On the other hand, if the EU loses interest in Serbia, Serbia’s pragmatic approach might also very well change (Galijaš 2019, 105). In the case of Serbia, we can see how an ideological persistence on behalf of the EU – which can also be seen partially as authoritarian – has a positive effect on an authoritative society, and how that can quickly change.

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route?  103 There is one more important difference between Serbia and Bosnia, and between Belgrade and Bihać, the cities where most of the migrants are or have stayed. When we compare these two cases, we should not disregard the proportion between migrants and the native population. In its urban core, Bihać has 35,000 inhabitants and, at any given moment, between 7,000 and 9,000 migrants. That would be the same as if 200,000 migrants arrived in Belgrade at once. On the other hand, in Belgrade a maximum of 3,000–4,000 migrants stayed for a longer period (N1 2019b). 4 How to stay in or how to leave Bosnia According to journalist and activist Nidžara Ahmetašević, some migrants are tired of the journey and are willing to stay in Bosnia, but, as she highlights, it is almost impossible to get an overview of the complicated bureaucracy in this respect and to complete an asylum application (Ahmetašević 2019). Flyers made for the migrants with the aim of explaining their rights and further steps confirm Ahmetašević’s statement. The concrete steps, rights and possibilities are explained imprecisely, and after repeated and thorough reading, they remain unclear. There are several factors which hinder fair and efficient access to asylum, such as the following: a number of circumstances under which the Service for Foreigners’ Affairs (SFA) do not reissue attestations on intention to seek asylum; migrants with no registered address cannot schedule an interview with the SFA; the SFA has limited capacity to register and process asylum claims and has been slow to schedule registration procedures; the need to pay an administrative fee of 1,000 km to the SFA for them to issue Certificates of Residence; a lack of interpretation, translation and explanation services (UNHCR 2018). All these reasons are again directly or indirectly connected to Bosnia’s dysfunctionality and the large number of involved actors. As presented in the “Bihać case,” responsibility is often pushed back and forth from one government unit or level to another. There is also a discrepancy between praxis and law. The limited access as well as delay in issuing asylum seeker cards prevent access to the rights provided by the Law on Asylum. Some migrants wait for hours to express their intention to seek asylum (Al Jazeera 2018a). Sometimes previously issued cards expire, despite timely requests for their extension. A further problem is that a lot of the main actors do not possess basic information on how to deal with the new situation. For example, the Service for Foreigners’ Affairs in Bosnia stated that they have not received uniform guidelines for handling migrants and refugees in vulnerable situations (OSCE 2018). Health and social care is unevenly provided and depends on the location and the type of assistance needed, as well as on human and financial capacities, which are very often insufficient. The current response is comprised of a patchwork of more systematic and ad hoc healthcare provision solutions (UNHCR 2018, 9). There is also a lack of clear protocols or standard operating procedures that would define thee roles and responsibilities of each responsible body, as well as coordination between different levels of government, and between government agencies and organizations (OSCE 2018). As was the case in Serbia, the role of numerous NGOs and CSOs is now very important in Bosnia. These organizations are the main support during the crisis and an

104  Armina Galijaš important partner in migration issues (Galijaš 2019). NGOs in Bosnia are currently some of the central providers of direct humanitarian assistance to migrants. This is recognized by stakeholders such as the SFA, police bodies and international organizations, which consistently refer migrants to NGOs. NGOs, CSOs, associations and organizations such as IOM, UNHCR, Crveni križ/krst (Red Cross), DRC, UNICEF, Vaša prava, Žene sa Une, Save the Children, pomozi.ba, Are You Syrious?, among others, are engaged countrywide, in reception centers as well as in those locations with the highest number of migrants (OSCE 2018: 7). Small, local organizations like Solidarnost or Žene sa Une were also the first to respond in Bihać. They provided basic help, food and NFI (Non-food items) (Ahmetašević and Mlinarević 2019: 23). The mayor of Bihać Šuhret Fazlić stressed: “Without NGOs and IOM we would be completely alone in solving all the problems related to the migrant population” (Al Jazeera 2018b). He also spends most of his time working on migrant issues. It is also certain that none of the migrants would ever have been able to access the asylum system alone without the support of NGOs or volunteers. It must also be emphasized that the situation in Bosnia, when it comes to first humanitarian aid has been improved in comparison to the previous year (2018), but only for the migrants staying in the centers. These migrants and refugees have access to better healthcare, adequate water, sanitation and hygiene, higher quality food and enough NFIs. The migrants who are not registered, or have no place in one of the official centers, face enormous problems. Those who sleep rough are dependent on the help of volunteers. Without space in one of the centers, they also receive no medical protection, which is a problem not only for those affected, but for the entire community. Most of these people are exhausted, malnourished and more susceptible to disease and illness. Impurity of water and food, poor hygienic conditions and generally poor living conditions further affect their health (Kamber 2019). What is urgently needed is more official accommodation, especially before the beginning of winter. For the children in the official centers, education has improved. In the five primary schools in the USC, about 200 refugee and migrant children will go to school in 2019/2020. According to some current estimates, about 60 children will be able to be immediately admitted to schools, while others will attend HEART (a special socialization program, in which migrant children attend workshops and learn the local language). Apart from these, children from migrant families have been gradually incorporated into the education system of USC since February 2019. These children will be provided with all the necessary equipment, such as backpacks and stationery, clothing and footwear for the beginning of the school year, and the schools will further provide them as well as children from the local communities with textbooks (Duraković 2019). The Bosnian Foreigners Service is now also present and has taken a leading role in two centers in USC, in Borići and Sedra. The goal is to extend this program to the other centers. Although the highest level of government works slowly and often insufficiently, one can see that constant improvement can be observed at cantonal and local level. With the support of the state, the situation could be improved for all involved. The state alone does not offer any serious perspective or possibility for the migrants to stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although some families have managed to obtain asylum in Bosnia, they are an exception that confirms the rule.

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route?  105 Onward travel through Croatia is also becoming more and more difficult. Migrants have frequently been stopped at the state borders and forcibly turned back, very often with excessive use of force, and often violence and serious injury. Migrants have reported that they have been hit, deprived of their belongings and threatened with guns. Swiss television has managed to fully document these illegal violent pushbacks at the EU’s external border (SRF 2019). The migrants report that the police smashed their phones, stole their money, burnt their clothes and assaulted them. As one migrant reports, “they beat us with electric shock sticks.” Similarly, another man reports: “all of my things were put into the fire and everything was turned to ash” (Davies, Wochnik-Obradovic and Isakjee 2019). They have also been denied access to asylum procedures after crossing the border (ECRE 2018; cf. CMS 2018; Davies, Wochnik-Obradovic and Isakjee 2019; Fokus 2018; Jakob 2018; Walker 2018). One Croatian police officer, who wanted to remain anonymous, told the BBC he had taken part in three “pushback” operations (BBC 2019). In mid-July, the Croatian prosecutor Lora Vidović published an anonymous complaint by a group of Croatian police officers. In it, they suggest that, according to the instructions of their superiors, they must return the illegal overflows to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Lukić 2019). One police officer said, if the police opposed the pushback, they would get fired, which would have an impact on their families (Novosti 2019). In August 2019, there was also a suspicion that the Croatian police illegally crossed the border into Bosnia while forcing 18 injured migrants back (Klix 2019a; Radio Free Europe 2019). Through these illegal actions, Croatia is looking to join the Schengen zone and has been keen to present itself as a dependable guardian of the EU’s external border. Nevertheless, many migrants manage to cross Croatia. The volunteers say that there are days when everyone comes through, as if there is an unofficial agreement that they let through a certain number of people (Ahmetašević 2019). The migrants are prevented from traveling by the force of the Croatian border police, but on the other hand, they are told that, somehow, it is still possible to get through. It is obvious that the route, although in very difficult circumstances, is still open. This is also confirmed by the numbers of migrants who go in and out of Bosnia. From 35,000 registered migrants in 2018 and the first half of 2019, at the moment there are 7,000– 9,000 in Bosnia, and new ones are still coming in. Since refugees and other migrants cannot legally get to Western Europe, they have also been increasingly dependent on traffickers. Transit migration has been recriminalized, and refugees and migrants are in a state of extreme vulnerability. Yet, even though it has decreased, and even though transit has become more dangerous and financially more costly, the flow of migrants has not stopped. The smugglers’ prices are enormous, and according to some journalists’ reports the price to cross the Balkan route is up to €10,000 (von der Brelie and Salfiti 2018). According to “People on the Move,” smugglers were asking for €4,500 to smuggle migrants from Sarajevo to Trieste (Ahmetašević and Mlinarević 2019: 25). Many of the migrants have become victims of trafficking on their journeys, or are potential victims of slavery, because it is unimaginable that all of them can afford the smugglers’ prices (Ahmetašević and Mlinarević 2019: 25). Also “unaccompanied minors are recruited as “agents” for smugglers with the task to find “customers,” and in return, they get free rides to the EU after a certain number of customers, and up to 200 euros per person they bring to their bosses”

106  Armina Galijaš (Ahmetašević and Mlinarević 2019: 25). A significant number of people from criminal structures in Bosnia have turned to smuggling migrants. The majority of these people were previously engaged in arms, drug or human trafficking. As Turčalo reports, “with the arrival of migrants, they reoriented themselves to an easier and more lucrative business. Compared to drug smuggling, the risk of failure in smuggling of migrants is insignificant. A “bust” of a drug shipment is expensive” (2019). So far, according to some estimates, 20–40 migrants and refugees in Bosnia have lost their lives. As reported by Ale Šiljdedić, a spokesman for the USK Ministry of Interior, a 17-year-old Pakistani man drowned in August in the Una River when he tried to take a bath. This is the 19th migrant death since the beginning of 2019 and the sixth drowning. Five migrants drowned in Una and one in the Korana. The underaged Pakistani dived and disappeared below the surface (Klix 2019b). A lot of migrants come to Una to take a bath, without knowing how dangerous this river is, even for experienced swimmers. There is also an increase in the number of migrants interested in returning to their countries of origin through IOM’s Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration programs. Until the end of November 2018, IOM had assisted the return of 389 persons. Responding to the growing demand, IOM appointed two AVRR focal points in Sarajevo Canton and an additional three in USC (UNHCR 2018: 15). But still, the majority of the interviewed migrants in Bosnia (87%) stated that they would not return to their country of origin (Turčalo 2019). 5 Conclusion After the closure of the EU borders in March 2016 and the increased control of the borders between Serbia and the EU, the migrants were “redirected” to Bosnia. Compared to the year 2017, the number of migrants has increased in some months by more than a hundredfold. While the largest population continues to arrive from Serbia, the others come via Montenegro. They are heading mostly toward the USC in North-Western Bosnia, from where the distance to Slovenia and the Schengen zone is the shortest. Originally, the migrants were perceived as a temporary issue - once they pass by, the issue will be solved. The fact is that a lot of these people are indeed going through, but new ones are coming and nobody knows how long this route will be used to this extent. On average, there are 7,000–9,000 migrants staying in Bosnia. Migrants flee their countries for many reasons: war, totalitarian regimes, poverty, violence or climate change. At the moment, economic migrants make up the majority in Bosnia, but there are others who were forced to leave on the grounds of political persecution or conflicts. At the beginning of 2018, the population in Bosnia was empathetic and helpful, and the media attitude corresponded to this sentiment. But the initial sympathy and kindness of the local population declined over time. The three main reasons for this are: mismanagement of the problem by the state, the policies of various interest groups and the changing media coverage. The response of the Bosnian state to the migrants’ situation is a patchwork of ad hoc solutions. If we compare this with the situation in Serbia, we note important differences. The Serbian state authorities acted strategically and played an important role in deflecting potential protests among the population. The Serbian media,

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route?  107 closely bound to official politics, emphasized the humanitarian side of migration, applauded the “openness and humanity of Serbian citizens,” effectively enforcing empathetic attitudes. Serbian President Vučić’s approach at the time was in line with the strategies of the German chancellor, Angela Merkel. He was calculating his politics carefully with an eye to EU accession, and he capitalized on the refugee crisis. Accession to the European Union remains a strategic goal for the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, Bosnia does not have a similar perspective and motivation – hence its policy hasn’t been influenced by EU conditionality. It is obvious that there is no such thing as a long-term strategy for migration. We cannot say that Bosnia is less democratic than Serbia, but Bosnia has certainly more competing interest groups than its neighbor. All these different groups control certain media and use them as platforms for their daily political conflicts. In May 2018, the media reporting about migrants became more negative and influenced their acceptance by the wider population. While in Serbia a humanitarian approach is being enforced by autocratic means, any clear approach is missing in Bosnia. The migrants’ facilities in Bosnia are still below EU standards and health care and protection are insufficient. Nevertheless, there are improvements on the cantonal and local level in infrastructure and accommodation, especially since 2019. But Bosnia’s deficient asylum system and the limited institutional and infrastructural capacities do not provide sufficient security for the migrants. It is difficult to say whether this is part of a political strategy to keep migrants away, or whether it is a result of institutional inefficiency—or both. The increased number of migrants wanting to return home indicates how difficult it is to stay in Bosnia and to continue the journey toward Western Europe. According to the testimonies of migrants and monitoring groups, the Croatian police force has engaged since 2018 in a systematic campaign of violence against and theft of migrants’ property. In an effort of the Croatian government to prove its capability to join the Schengen zone, the country is doing everything to protect the EU border. Although migrants continue to use this route, the journey has become more and more difficult, dangerous and expensive. Bosnian police estimate that some 15,000 migrants have already managed to continue onwards this year (August 2019), despite the intensified police presence on the Croatian side of the border. There are no indicators suggesting that Bosnia could become a new hot spot for migrants, but there are more than a few indicators showing that this migration flow will not stop any time soon, especially, as long as the asylum procedure and protection in Turkey and Greece are not solved. References AbrašMedia. 2018. ‘Više od 3.000 migranata odgovorno za devet krivičnih djela u BiH,’ Abras Media, May 11. Availble at http://abrasmedia.info/vise-od-3-000-migranataodgovorno-za-devet-krivicnih-djela-u-bih/ Adrović, Deniz. 26 April 2017. Personal interview. Ahmetašević, Nidžara. 15 February 2019. Personal interview. Ahmetašević, Nidžara, and Mlinarević, Gorana. 2019. People on the Move in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2018: Stuck in the Corridors of the EU, Berlin: Heinrich Boll Stiftung.

108  Armina Galijaš Al Jazeera Balkans. 2018a. ’Migranti u Bihaću smješteni u zgradu bez prozora i vrata,’ April 28. Available at http://balkans.aljazeera.net/video/migranti-u-bihacu-smjesteniu-nedovrsenu-zgradu Al Jazeera Balkans. 2018b. ‘Uprkos problemima, mnoge izbjeglice žele ostati u BiH,’ April 14. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fx6D5G4vk7E Al Jazeera Balkans. 2019. ‘Arapi kupuju nekretnine u BiH,’ July 23. Available at https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNptAf_Td6E Arslanagić, Maja. 2016. ’Čime se bave arapske firme na Ilidži: Kupuju zemlju i nude svoje turističke aranžmane,’ Faktor, January 15. Available at http://www.faktor.ba/vijest/ cime-se-bave-arapske-firme-na-ilidzi-kupuju-zemlju-i-nude-svoje-turisticke-aranzmanefoto-203244 Avramović, Filip and Jovanović, Igor. 2015. ‘Serbia Will Take in Some Migrants, Vucic Says,’ Balkan Insight, September 2. Available at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/ article/serbia-to-receive-certain-number-of-migrants-pm-says-09-01-2015 B92. 2018. ‘Iran mora da ulaže u srpsku privredu, a njima fale auto-delovi,’ February 27. Available at https://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2018&mm=02 &dd=27&nav_id=1363472 BBC. 2019. ‘“Beaten and robbed”: How Croatia is policing its borders,’ July 29. Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-49132735/beaten-and-robbed-howcroatia-is-policing-its-borders Beznec, Barbara, Speer, Marc and Mitrović, Marta S. 2016. Governing the Balkan Route: Macedonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime, Research Paper No. 5, Rosa-­ Luxemburg-Stiftung Southeast Europe. Available at https:// bordermonitoring.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/5-Governing-the-Balkan-Route-web.pdf Blic. 2015. ‘Vučić migrantima: Ovde ste uvek dobrodošli, osećajte se sigurno,’ August 19. Available at https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/vucic-migrantima-ovde-ste-uvek-dobrodosliosecajte-se-sigurno/ncwns15 Blic. 2018a. ‘Posle kritika iz EU Srbija ukinula bezvizni režim sa Iranom,’ October 10. Available at https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/posle-kritika-iz-eu-srbija-ukinula-bezvizni-rezimsa-iranom/c8yz115 Blic. 2018b. ‘Veliki poslovni forum Srbija - Iran šansa za naše građevinarstvo, tekstilce, drvnu industriju,’June 21.Available at https://www.blic.rs/biznis/veliki-poslovni-forum-srbija-iransansa-za-nase-gradevinarstvo-tekstilce-drvnu/kcv6k9q CMS. 2018. ‘Izvještaj o nezakonitim i nasilnim protjerivanjima izbjeglica iz Republike Hrvatske,’ February 28. Available at https://www.cms.hr/system/article_document/doc/501/ IZVJE_TAJ_O_NEZAKONITIM_I_NASILNIM_PROTJERIVANJIMA_IZBJEGLICA_IZ_REPUBLIKE_HRVATSKE.pdf CNN. 2015. ‘Serbian PM: We Acted in European Way, Neighbors Didn’t,’ September 16. Available at https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/09/16/amanpour-serbia-refugeecrisis-aleksandar-vucic-intv.cnn Danas. 2017. ‘Srbija ukida vize za državljane Indije i Irana,’ August 22. Available at https:// www.danas.rs/drustvo/srbija-ukida-vize-za-drzavljane-indije-i-irana/ Davies, Thom, Wochnik-Obradovic, Jelena and Isakjee, Arshad. 2019. ‘Voices on the edge of Europe: The violence and filth of a camp in Bosnia defines the EU’s legacy on refugees,’ The Independent, August 2. Available at https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/ eu-refugee-camp-croatia-bosnia-schengen-germany-asylum-immigration-a9033081.html Dnevni avaz. 2018a. ‘Dramatično u centru Sarajeva: Migranti tuku i pljačkaju,’ May 6. Available at https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/375453/dramaticno-u-centru-sarajeva-migranti-tuku-ipljackaju

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route?  109 Dnevni avaz. 2018b. ‘Kod migranata pronađeni 15.000 eura, opijum, spid,’ May 8. Dnevni avaz. 2018c. ‘Migrant pokušao da siluje majku 2 djece,’ July 17. Available at https:// avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/397563/danas-u-dnevnom-avazu-citajte-migrant-pokusao-da-silujemajku-2-djece Duraković, Dženita. 2019. ‘Djeca migranti polaze u školu u BiH,’ RFU, September 2. Available at https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/deca-migranti-unsko-sanski-kanton/30137923. html ECHO. 2019. ‘European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations,’ European Commission. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/echo/printpdf/where/europe-and-central-asia/ serbia_en El-Shaarawi, Nadia, and Razsa, Maple. 2019. ‘Movements upon Movements: Refugee and Activist Struggles to Open the Balkan Route to Europe,’ History and Anthropology, 30 (1), 91–112. European Council on Refugees and Exiles. 2018. ‘Push Backs and Police Violence on the Rise at Croatian Border, Report Finds,’ March 9. Available at https://ecre.org/ push-backs-and-police-violence-on-the-rise-at-croatian-border-report-finds/ European Parliament, ‘Media Freedom in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ November 14, 2018. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-005784_EN.html Fokus. 2018. ‘Alarmantno u Krajini. Ljudi se boje, nema dovoljno hrane,’ July 27. Available at https://www.fokus.ba/vijesti/bih/alarmantno-u-krajini-ljudi-se-boje-nemadovoljno-hrane-foto/1178674/ FTV (Federalna televizija). 2016. ‘Politički magazin Pošteno,’ October 24. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UnFWuL5jjv4 Galijaš, Armina. 2019. ‘Permanently in Transit: Middle Eastern Migrants and Refugees in Serbia,’ Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society, 67 (1), 75–109. Gedošević, Lana. 2018. ‘Srbija je ukinula vize građanima Ukrajine, Irana, Bahama, Mauricijusa, Barbadosa, Jamajke, a zbog jedne su nama pretili VRAĆANJEM VIZA,’ Blic, July 4. Available at https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/srbija-je-ukinula-vize-gradanima-ukrajineirana-bahama-mauricijusa-barbadosa-jamajke/wwhp4zt Groizard, José L., Mohanad, Ismael and Santana Gallego María. 2016. The Economic Consequences of Political Upheavals: The Case of the Arab Spring and International Tourism, Working Paper. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/ profile/Mohanad_Ismael/publication/301889240_The_economic_consequences_of_ political_upheavals_the_case_of_the_Arab_Spring_and_international_tourism/ links/572b1f9408ae2efbfdbdbe84.pdf Hadžimehmedović, Amira. 2019. Interview by A. Galijaš. August 25. Center Coordinator. Interview 1. 2019. Interview by A. Galijaš. August 25. Bihać. Interview with IOM Employee. Interview 2. 2019. Interview by A. Galijaš. August 25. Sedra, Bira, Borići. IOM Employees, 25 August 2019 in Centers Sedra, Bira and Borići. Interview 3. 2019. Interview by A. Galijaš. August 25. Bihać. Interviews with two IOM Representatives. Interview 4. 2019. Interview by A. Galijaš. August 25. Bihać. Interviews with Citizens of Bihać A.T., K.T. and S.D. Interview 5. 2019. Interview by A. Galijaš. August 23. Bihać. Interview with a Representative of Department of the Interior of USK. IOM, UN Migration. n.d.-a. Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration. Available at https://www.iom.int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration IOM, UN Migration. n.d.-b. IOM in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH). Available at https://bih. iom.int/

110  Armina Galijaš IOM, UN Migration. 2019a. Financial Overview of the Response to the Migrant Situation in Una-Sana Canton with the Support from the European Union, February 8. Available at https://bih.iom.int/pbn/financial-overview-response-migrant-situationuna-sana-canton-support-european-union IOM, UN Migration. 2019b. UN Country Team in BiH: Joint Statement on Relocation of Migrants and Refugees to a Location near Bihać, June 14. Available at https://bosniaherzegovina.un.org/bhs/node/23902 Jakob, Christian. 2018. ‘Kroatien ist so rabiat wie Ungarn,’ die Tageszeitung, August 8. Available at http://www.taz.de/!5521293/ Jevtović, Zoran, and Bajić, Predrag. 2018. ‘Slika o migrantima u diskursu dnevne štampe Srbije’, in Lutovac, Zoran (ed), Savremene Migracije I Drustveni Razvoj: Interdisciplinarna Perspektiva, Belgrade: Srpsko sociološko društvo, 97–110. Kamber, Ajdin. 2019. ‘Izbjeglice između nade i bolesti,’ Deutsche Welle, May 31. Available at https://www.dw.com/hr/izbjeglice-izme%C4%91u-nade-i-bolesti/a-48977323 Klix. 2019a. ‘Policija Hrvatske upala na teritoriju BiH i prebacila 18 povrijeđenih migranata,’ August 8. Available at https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/policija-hrvatske-upala-nateritoriju-bih-i-prebacila-18-povrijedjenih-migranata/190807077 Klix. 2019b. ‘Migrant se utopio u rijeci Uni: Zaronio i nestao ispod površine,’August 27. Available at https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/crna-hronika/migrant-se-utopio-u-rijeci-uni-zaronio-inestao-ispod-povrsine/190827114 Kostić, Dejana J. 2018. ‘Policing the Border, Producing the State. A Critical Discourse Analysis of Press Representation of Conflict on the Serbian-Hungarian Border during “Refugee Crisis”,’ in Lutovac, Zoran (ed), Savremene Migracije I Drustveni Razvoj: Interdisciplinarna Perspektiva, Belgrade: Srpsko sociološko društvo, 111–21. Krastev, Ivan. 2019. ‘Viktor Orbán and His Allies Won’t Win the EU Elections,’ The Guardian, March 20. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/20/ viktor-orban-eu-elections-rightwing-populists-immigration?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other Lukić, Slavica. 2019. ‘Pučka pravobraniteljica u velikom intervju za Juranji ‘Stat ću iza svakog policajca koji odluči progovoriti o nasilju nad migrantima,’ Jutarnji list, July 24. Available at https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/pucka-pravobraniteljica-u-velikomintervjuu-za-jutarnji-stat-cu-iza-svakog-policajca-koji-odluci-progovoriti-o-nasilju-nadmigrantima/9157892/ MacDowall, Andrew. 2017. ‘Middle Eastern Property Investments Draw Mixed Reaction, Gulf Interest Has Raised Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe,’ Financial Times, April 26. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/092698d2-13aa-11e7-b0c1-37e417ee6c76 Mediacentar Sarajevo. 2019. ‘Patka - dokumentarni film o medijskom izvještavanju o migrantima u BiH’. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kpR1EVBfcVY Mešić, Hana. 25 April 2017. Personal Interview. Sarajevo. Milan, Chiara and Pirro, Andrea L. P. 2018. ‘Interwoven Destinies in the “Long Migration Summer”: Solidarity Movements along the Western Balkan Route’, in Della Porta, Donatella (ed), Solidarity Mobilizations in the ‘Refugee Crisis’: Contentious Moves, London: Palgrave Macmillan, Vol. 16, 125–153. Milenkovski, Mirjana. 16 March 2018. Personal Interview. Belgrade. Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. n.d. Rulebook on Asylum in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at http://msb.gov.ba/Zakoni/akti/default.aspx?id=1741 &langTag=en-US Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2016. Strategy in the Area of Migrations and Asylum and Action Plan for the Period 2016–2020. Available at http://www.msb.gov. ba/PDF/Strategija_ENG_2016.pdf

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a new hotspot on the Balkan route?  111 Mitrović, Marta S. 2014. ‘Serbian Migration Policy Concerning Irregular Migration and Asylum in the Context of the EU Integration Process,’ Issues in Ethnology and Anthropology, 9 (4), 1106–1120. N1. 2016. ‘Pressing: Esad Duraković,’ November 30. Available at https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=sCSHgDta8qo N1. 2018a. ‘Iranians Tourists in Serbia End Up as Migrants in Bosnia,’ September 7. Available at http://ba.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a283505/Iranians-tourists-in-Serbia-end-upas-migrants-in-Bosnia.html N1. 2018b. ‘Latić već četiri mjeseca hrani dnevno 600 migranata,’ May 28. Available at http://ba.n1info.com/Vijesti/a263059/Hrani-migrante-u-restoranu-u-Kladusi.html N1. 2018c. ‘Novi protest u Bihaću: Nismo protiv migranata, već lidera,’ November 17. Available at http://rs.n1info.com/Region/a436708/Novi-protest-u-Bihacu-Nismo-protivmigranata.html N1. 2019a. ‘Crvena linija: Gde su danas migrant u region,’ July 26. Available at https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=pSofmpM2h2o&feature=youtu.be N1. 2019b. ‘Električni rešo izazvao požar u “Miralu”: Povrijeđena 32 migranta,’ June 1. Available at http://ba.n1info.com/Vijesti/a347929/Elektricni-reso-izazvao-pozar-u-­ Miralu-Povrijedjena-32-migranta.html Novosti. 2019. ‘Izbjeglice iz Sirije: Policija s nama postupa kao da smo zvijeri,’ August 8. Available at https://www.portalnovosti.com/izbjeglice-iz-sirije-policija-s-nama-postupakao-da-smo-zvijeri Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia. 2018. ‘Odluka o prestanku važenja Odluke o ukidanju viza za ulazak u Republiku Srbiju za državljane Islamske Republike Iran,’ No. 75. OSCE. 2018. Assessment: Migrant and refugee Situation in Bosna and Herzegovina. Overview of the Intervention of Key Actors in the Field, September 25. Available at https:// www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/397319 Radio Free Europe. 2019. ‘Bosnia to Start Tracking Migrant Injuries after Alleged Beatings by Croatian Police,’ August 8. Available at https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-trackingmigrant-injuries-alleged-beatings-croatian-police/30100316.html Radio Sarajevo. 2016. ‘Woman Was Beheaded Because She Went on to the Market without Her Husband,’ December 29. Available at https://www.radiosarajevo.ba/vijesti/svijet/ zeni-odrubili-glavu-jer-je-otisla-na-pijacu-bez-muza/249219 Radio Slobodna Evropa. 2016. ‘Repeatedly Raped,’ March 20. Available at https://www. slobodnaevropa.org/a/idil-uz-kontracepciju-zrtve-siluje-bez-prestanka/27622074.html Radio Slobodna Evropa. 2018a. ‘Protest i peticija za izmještanje migranata iz Bihaća,’ November 17. Available at https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/bihac-protest-­migranti/29606192.html Radio Slobodna Evropa. 2018b. ‘Vlada Srbije ukinula bezvizni režim za građane Irana,’ October 10. Available at https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/29536566.html Radio Televizija Republike Srpske. 2015. ‘Vučić: Neevropsko ponašanje mora da se zaustavi,’ September 16. Available at http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/2040446/vucic-neevropsko-ponasanje-mora-da-se-zaustavi.html Radio Televizija Republike Srpske. 2016. ‘Oko 600 Arapa prijavilo prebivalište u BiH,’ September 6. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oHuTQJ1CnQU Republic of Serbia, ‘Akcioni Plan, Pregovaračka grupa za poglavlje 23, Akcioni plan za poglavlje 23,’ April 2016. Available at http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/akcioni_plan_23.pdf Republic of Serbia, ‘Pregovaračka grupa za poglavlje 24, Akcioni plan za poglavlje 24. Pravda, sloboda, bezbednost,’ March 1, 2016. Available at http://www.bezbednost.org/ upload/document/akcioni_plan_pg_24.pdf

112  Armina Galijaš Schengen Visa Info. 2018. ‘EU Forces Serbia to Return Visa Regime for Iranian Passport Holders,’ October 11. Available at https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/ eu-forces-serbia-to-return-visa-regime-for-iranian-passport-holders/ Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen. 2019. ‘Prügel an der EU-Grenze: Wie Kroatien Migranten abschiebt, Rundschau,’ May 15. Available at https://www.srf.ch/play/tv/rundschau/video/ pruegel-an-der-eu-grenze-wie-kroatien-migranten-abschiebt?id=972c5996-ec49-40798b94-4c9ec33b8849 Telegraf. 2015. ‘Vučić: Srbija neće podizati zid, makar ćUSCije padale s neba!,’ October 25. Available at https://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/1819811-vucic-srbija-necepodizati-zid-makar-cUSCije-padale-s-neba Turčalo, Sead. 2019. Istraživanje sigurnosnih rizika od nezakonitih migracija u BiH, unpublished. UNHCR. 2018. Refugee and Migrant Situation Report, Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 1–30. Available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68459 UNHCR. 2019a. Inter Agency Operational Update: Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 01–31. Available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70020 UNHCR. 2019b. Inter Agency Operational Update: Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 01–30. Available at https://www.undp.org/content/dam/unct/bih/PDFs/UNCTBiHSitReps/Interagency%20refugee%20and%20migrant%20operational%20update-%20June%202019. pdf. UNHCR. 2019c. UNHCR Snapshot for Serbia July 2019. Available at https://data2.unhcr. org/en/documents/download/70672 USKinfo. 2018. ‘Državni vrh nas doživljava kao turiste, a talgo je otvoren da bi se Krajini poslali migrant,’ November 15. Available at http://www.uscinfo.ba/vijest/intervju-sejramic-drzavni-vrh-nas-dozivljava-kao-turiste-a-talgo-je-otvoren-da-bi-se-krajini-poslalimigranti/45520 Vaša Prava. 2010. Azil brošura. Available at https://www.vasaprava.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/04/Azil-brosura-eng-2010.pdf Veselinović, Stefan. 2017. ‘VICE Srbija istražuje: Koliko je izbeglička kriza uticala na criminal,’ VICE, November 2. Available at https://www.vice.com/sr/article/xway5z/ vice-istrazuje-koliko-je-izbeglicka-kriza-uticala-na-stopu-kriminala Von der Brelie, Hans and Salfiti, Jad. 2018. ‘“Western Balkan Route” for Migrants, Refugees Stuck at Borders,’ Euronews, November 30. Available at https://www.euronews. com/2018/11/30/western-balkan-route-for-migrants-refugees-stuck-at-borders Walker, Shaun. 2018. ‘Refugees Crossing from Bosnia “Beaten and Robbed by Croatian Police”,’ The Guardian, August 15. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/ aug/15/refugees-crossing-from-bosnia-beaten-and-robbed-by-croatian-police Žuna, Emina. 2017. ‘Arapi u raljama zapadnih medija: Silovanja, pedofilia i javna pogubljenja,’ Analiziraj, January 13. Available at https://analiziraj.ba/2017/01/13/ arapi-u-raljama-zapadnih-medija-silovanja-pedofilija-i-javna-pogubljenja/

8

Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary From discourse to practice András Szalai

1 Introduction The migration crisis in the European Union (EU) serves as a meta-issue which links various policy problems, from fear of terrorism to economic welfare, border control, matters of identity, and a general European responsibility for refugees. This multifaceted issue affects different member countries in various ways, and responses also vary considerably. Out of the most affected countries, Hungary has received increased media attention internationally and was often accused of misconduct with regard to the treatment of migrants/refugees. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán first mentioned his plans of regulating migration into Hungary in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, after which the government launched a coordinated, well-funded media campaign that has demonized migrants as a threat to national security, irrespective of the latter’s personal motivations. The Hungarian government’s strong anti-immigration rhetoric and policies that have followed—most importantly, the construction of a border fence in the South of the country—have shocked many observes, begging the question of what made such a swift shift possible and how it came about. Xenophobic tendencies in Hungary have been steadily growing since the introduction of the campaign, and the discourse is by now clearly dominated by the security frame. Though the precise mechanisms of persuasion and their effectiveness are still under investigation, this chapter is based on the assumption that the increase in hostility toward migrants in Hungary can be linked to the government’s ongoing securitization campaign. The success of the campaign is puzzling as its launch predates the summer 2015 wave of refugees, meaning that at the time of its launch, the everyday Hungarian had no real experience with mass migration. Thus, the rapid securitization of migration and the resulting increase in xenophobia cannot simply be attributed to societal shock and feelings of insecurity at the sight of massive migrant waves (cf. Karyotis 2012). This chapter renarrates the story of this anti-migration campaign as a case of securitization. Securitization is a frequently analyzed process within security studies that explains how security issues emerge, as the political elite elevates various aspects of normal politics into the realm of emergencies, invoking fears of threats to national security and thereby enabling control over the issue. Migration has been assessed DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405-8

114  András Szalai through the lens of securitization many times, with excellent in-depth case studies from Canada/Australia to Western Europe and Greece (Huysmans 2000; Karyotis 2007; Wæver et al. 1993; Watson 2009). So what makes the Hungarian case special, other than its topicality and its locality? Indeed, the current Hungarian discourse on migration-as-a-security-threat bears some striking resemblance to some of the Western European discursive structures of the 1990s and early 2000s that depict migration as a multifaceted source of danger, threatening national job markets, identities, and lives in the form of terrorism. Nevertheless, this chapter argues that, despite the liberal borrowing of tried and tested frames, the Hungarian securitization campaign is unique due to the context of its inception and its rapid evolution. In order to highlight this crucial gap between discourse and underlying conditions, the chapter relies on a refined version of securitization theory—one popularized by Thierry Balzacq (2005, 2011)—that moves beyond the narrow speech act focus of the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; Waever 1995) and expands it to include practices and processes of securitization. Securitization, seen as a pragmatic act, then invites three assumptions: effective securitization is audience-centered, context-dependent, and power-laden. For the purposes of this chapter, the approach is used to highlight that, despite similarities in discursive structures, various European societies are receptive to different constructions of security. Therefore, this chapter will draw focus, on the one hand, on structural aspects, such as prevailing xenophobic tendencies among the population (i.e. the audience), and the state of the political-institutional environment in contemporary Hungary. On the other hand, the chapter will also seek to highlight agential aspects of the context— drawing on the concept of power used by Balzacq—and deconstruct the government campaign. Crucially, the latter does not only focus on discourse but also includes an investigation of non-discursive components (securitization tools and instruments). Finally, in an attempt to improve on Balzacq’s framework, this chapter draws attention to the role non-traditional desecuritization actors—most importantly, civil society—can play, as well as to the role of non-policies as securitization tools, i.e. the elite’s deliberate neglect of an issue in order to demonize the subject of security. The chapter proceeds with a short introduction of the practice approach to securitization. It then offers a brief overview of European securitizing discourses with regard to migration, identifying key rhetorical structures. Arguing on the basis of similarity, it then presents the Hungarian securitizing campaign as a case study. By highlighting its core elements, I suggest that the core of the Hungarian discourse is an adaptation of pre-existing European discourses that adds little to how migration has generally been securitized in terms of the frames used. Building on Balzacq’s theory, the chapter identifies the specificities of the Hungarian case in terms of its socio-political context, which in turn leads me to a set of preliminary conclusions about the future of the Hungarian situation, as well as its implications for a joint European migration policy framework. 2 Speech acts and practices In its original formulation by the Copenhagen School (CS), securitization is the process by which a securitizing actor uses the rhetoric of an existential threat on

Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary  115 an issue, and thereby takes it out of the realm of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where any appropriate measure can be taken to curb the threat. This definition has since been applied to countless cases but has also come under theoretical criticism due to its exclusive focus on securitization as a selfreflexive speech act, its under-theorizing of appropriate audiences, and its strict separation between normal and emergency politics. Put simply, its underlying assumption is that the word “security” has a performative character, but there is disagreement on whether this act is independent of an audience (self-reference) or only acquires its performativity when used by particular actors in specific contexts (inter-­subjectivity) (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). Another definition, one that this chapter adopts, draws less of a strict distinction between the world of normalcy and the world of emergency politics. Its major proponent, Thierry Balzacq, defines securitization as an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts and institutions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be immediately undertaken to block it. (quoted in Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka 2015: 495, emphasis added) In standard securitization, the utterance of the word security on its own creates a new social order wherein normal politics are bracketed and emergency measures can be taken to counteract a threat. But, as Balzacq (2005: 172) notes, the discursive action of security thereby holds a high degree of formality, so securitization lends itself to the interpretation that it has a fixed code of practice (a conventional procedure). He argues that securitization should be rather understood as a strategic practice that “occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction” (Balzacq 2005: 172). The practice-oriented version of securitization combines processes of threat construction/design with that of threat management, and this sequential and differentiated conceptualization draws attention to a number of issues, specifically non-discursive securitization instruments (see Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka 2015: 517), the role of the audience(s) and veto powers, as well as the inter-subjective context within which securitization as an exercise in persuasion occurs, including power relations among securitizing actor and audiences. Its key components are, therefore, the securitizing actor, the referent subject (that which is threatening), the audience, the context, and the adoption of distinct policies. For practice-oriented securitization theory, the differences in securitization outcomes can be best accounted for by reference to their context. This context can mean a number of things, ranging from the political regime within which the

116  András Szalai securitization attempt unfolds to inter-subjective meanings that govern threat perceptions, or the institutional structures that define relevant audiences. Due to the wide variety of possible contexts, there is therefore no universal “logic of security” (cf. Waever 1995), only different, context-dependent articulations. Thus, in the case of migration, the specific frame used to classify the phenomenon as a security threat largely depends on the national identity of the receiving—or in Hungary’s case, transit—state as elites draw on established national symbols and other tools to shape the discourse, achieve the issue’s securitization, and enable/limit policy options. The aforementioned institutional structures and discursive practices that produce relevant audiences within the context of securitization merit special attention; they necessitate the analysis of actors beyond the government and the agencies to which it delegates authority in threat identification. Three such actors that are key to securitization stand out: the political opposition, the judiciary, and the media. These three institutions represent veto powers in democratic states that are able to question the securitization claims of the governing elite and check the legitimacy of the policies they introduce. Once we move away from the CS’s understanding of securitization, the securitizing actor cannot simply rely on the performativity of the speech act, but must engage various audiences and “functional actors” (Buzan et al. 1998), among which these institutional players who can challenge the securitizing act. Since there is a need to argue one’s position in often very diverse settings, rhetoric and persuasion need to form part of security analysis, highlighting differences across issues, but also states as they present differing answers to similar issues. When it comes to migration, the media has been frequently highlighted as a key institution (Bourbeau 2011; Vultee 2011; Williams 2003). The media namely has an important role in reproducing society and in maintaining dominant constructions of the Self and the Other, so it also plays an instrumental role in securitization by constructing the “Us” and the “Them”, by explaining what the conflict is about and what can be done to stop it (Watson 2009: 21). This instrumental role does not necessarily mean autonomy: though the media can sabotage securitization attempts by presenting counterframes—either their own or more frequently borrowed from desecuritizing actors—in most cases, it merely serves as a forum through which the securitizing actors communicate their own frame. In the case of migration, the media’s coverage has indeed been mostly reflecting the claims of the governing elites (Statham and Geddes 2006). Since the media rarely generates its own frames, but selects from those available, the power relations among securitizing actors and those that present counterframes influence the media image. In addition, it has to be noted that the media often focuses on the dramatic and the sensational, so selective reporting and the selective use of frame elements may lead to a distorted image of the issue at hand, which in turn partly explains why security frames take precedence. For these reasons, the analysis of media coverage is essential to any understanding of the securitization of migration. Apart from seeing securitization as more than a speech act, the practical understanding of security also moves beyond discursive means when explaining threat construction. In a 2008 article, Balzacq (2008: 76) drew attention to processes

Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary  117 “above and beneath” the level of discourse, that is, the “empirical referents of policy” (policy tools or instruments) used to alleviate problems that have been defined as a threat (for applications in the EU context, see Léonard 2011). Discourse predates or otherwise limits the choice of policy tools, and the choice of policy instruments, Balzacq (2008: 78) maintains, is the realm of intense power games. Despite their different logics and mechanism, however, discourse and policy instruments mutually reinforce each other in the policy process. A crucial distinction has to be made: not all instruments of securitization are securitizing tools. Instruments of securitization post-date a successful securitization. In other words, they do not construct a threat per se but are built to curb an already securitized threat. They may or may not become securitizing tools. A securitizing tool in turn is “an instrument which, by its very nature or by its very functioning, transforms the entity (i.e. subject or object) it processes into a threat” and can therefore be a substitute for the discursive logic of securitization (Balzacq 2008: 79–80). Policy instruments are never purely technical solutions to a problem: they are both political and symbolic. Their selection, use, and effect depend on political factors and require political mobilization. On the other hand, they are symbolic in the sense that they tell the population what the securitizing actor is thinking and what its collective perception of a problem is (Peters and van Nispen 1998, quoted in Balzacq 2008: 81). Within this chapter, I discuss the barbed wire fence constructed on the Serbian-Hungarian border as an instrument of securitization that also acts as a highly symbolic securitization tool. In addition, I seek to introduce the concept of non-policy as a securitization tool: by only offering limited solutions to a problem, the securitizing actor can present both their willingness to curb the constructed threat but also let it become more visible/acute for the audience in order to justify further, stricter policies. Non-policies, from this perspective, do not represent policy failures but a conscious non-discursive move that underlines the rhetoric of the security frame and provokes a sense of insecurity in the audience. The following section presents the securitization of migration through examples from Western Europe. The goal of the section is to highlight common elements across discourses and to show how securitization dynamics usually unfold within this particular policy area. 3 Securitizing migration in Europe Western European societies have had extensive experience with migration but with very different overtones across time. After the end of World War II, migrants and refugees were welcomed as a useful labor force that could contribute to recovery in Europe. Moreover, under the shadow of the Cold War ideological conflict, refugees from Communist states were seen as a sign of victory over the East and were also welcomed with open arms. These same societies after the end of the bipolar conflict have experienced an increase in migration flows from outside of Europe. With this new wave came the emergence of a discourse about danger with reference to chaos, disorder, and a “clash of civilizations”, where fear is primarily about “the different, the alien, the undocumented migrant, the refugee, the Muslim,

118  András Szalai the ‘non-European,’”, essentialized into the figure of the migrant (Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002: 22). These public fears were arguably only exacerbated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Guild 2003; Huysmans and Buonfino 2008; Karyotis 2007). The discourse around the supposed negative effects of migration has since been a way of summarizing and explaining away some of Western Europe’s problems by moving the issue of migration away from economics and socio-cultural analyses into the realm of security under the umbrella concept of “new security challenges”. This process of shifting the discourse on migration toward that of objective security threats is an instance of the logic of securitization and has been addressed by a number of authors both in its European and global context (Huysmans 2000; Léonard 2011; Mistri and Orcalli 2014; Wæver et al. 1993; Wunderlich 2012). The current wave of refugees and migrants hoping for a better life has also been fitted into this master frame of the threat of the non-European migrant that is both harder to assimilate due to cultural differences and also holds a lower skill-set than, for instance, intra-EU migrants, which in turn diminishes their economic value for the host society. The securitization of migration is achieved through the use of multiple and overlapping discourses: migrants were presented as a threat along a cultural/identity axis (Islamophobia), the aforementioned economic axis (job loss and benefitseeking), and a security axis (terrorism and crime) (Huysmans 2000). In addition, this securitizing discourse also overlaps with the discourse on the crisis of multiculturalism in Western European societies (Triadafilopoulos 2011) as well as the post-9/11 discourse on Islamist terrorism, which further underline the identity and security axes, lending them both racial overtones (see, e.g. Ibrahim 2005; Wæver et al. 1993). This crucial question of identity and social order is characteristic of the European discourse on migration. The perpetuity of the anti-migration discourse of the 1990s is linked to the absolute politicization of migration in these states. In Western Europe, multiculturalism, Islamophobia, and migration have been central election issues for decades, used to mobilize voters on both sides. Now, with hard security concerns looming in the background, the discourse becomes one about a “clash of civilizations” where European culture and identity are threatened. Mainly, relying on myths and consciously concealing potential benefits, this identity discourse has so far led to inefficient control measures because of a fear of political costs, and it has also justified a more radical and racialized perception of migration along the extremes of the political spectrum (see, e.g. Dover 2008; Mistri and Orcalli 2014). A cursory look at the domestic discourse on migration in Hungary but also in other Central and Eastern European states—most notably Slovakia and the Czech Republic—reveals clear similarities with Western European discourses of the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. These states are therefore not pioneers of securitization when it comes to the rhetoric of migration but rather adopters of a preexisting West European discourse about both the dangers of migration writ large and assimilation/integration policies referred to as multi-culturalism. Though these societies have practically no first-hand experience with migration—save for the

Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary  119 limited influx of refugees from the Balkans in the 1990s—they show high levels of xenophobia (understood as a fear of the unknown) and elite attempts at securitizing the current migration wave have been very effective, and nowhere more so than in Hungary. With similarities in the discourse, but also in terms of policy choices, the discourse on migration in contemporary Hungary constitutes a clear case of securitization. Hungary is not an innovative new player in the European discourse but more of an implementer and adapter of preexisting discursive structures. Differences lie more in local institutions, policy practices, and the inter-subjective context wherein securitization unfolds, which all make particular audiences sensitive to specific threat constructs. In the following sections, I will present and analyze the securitization dynamics underlying the current discourse on migration in Hungary by relying on Balzacq’s framework. I will devote special attention to the political context that spurred the securitization move, the presence of both discursive and non-discursive elements, the use of non-policies, and the non-traditional role of desecuritizing actors. 4 Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary The rapid successful securitization of migration and the striking increase in xenophobia in Hungary are puzzling when one takes a look at the sequence of events that led to the erection of a barbed wire fence on the Serbian-Hungarian border. On the one hand, the securitizing campaign of the government was launched months ahead of the summer migration wave. On the other hand, migrants were constructed as both an economic and a cultural threat, despite it being clear that they were merely passing through the country. Following the guidelines of the practice-based approach to security, in order to better understand the Hungarian government’s motivations behind the securitization of migration, as well as the reasons why a large portion of the population so readily accepted the securitizing move, we need to have a closer look at the context. As with any political decision, cost–benefit calculations are key to understanding the actions of the elite. When an actor engages in securitization, they seek to elevate an issue into the realm of security, thereby limiting possible policy options. Such actions are always running the risk of not being successful, either because they fail to persuade key audiences or a successful desecuritization act negates their effect. Unsuccessful securitization acts, then, may bring a loss of political capital. Though the final goal of securitization is placing an issue on the agenda and then taking control over it, motivations differ among elites and individuals. Actual fears of a phenomenon may propel elites to securitize an issue, like environmentalist groups do with climate change (Hayes and Knox-Hayes 2014; Mason 2013). Nevertheless, highly dramatized national security crises also garner public attention and support, and, through securitizing certain issues, the elite can divert public attention from other fields, like a struggling economy. In turn, the successful mitigation of the newly constructed threat can provide a government with political capital and can be used to discredit the opposition. The easier an issue is to mitigate, the more likely such a shift in support becomes. This latter kind of

120  András Szalai cost–benefit calculation was the primary motivation behind the Hungarian government’s initial securitization attempts in early 2015. Following its landslide victory in the 2010 elections, the governing party,1 FIDESZ, used its constitutional majority to redraw the political-institutional map of Hungary. Claiming to speak on behalf of the whole population, the party and its Prime Minister capitalized on disillusionment with the first two decades of democratic change, as well as EU membership. Instead of offering wide-ranging reforms, however, the government sought to monopolize political space and solidify its hold over the country—all under a strong nationalist rhetoric that offered a sense of exceptionalism to voters (Scheppele 2014). The resulting institutional changes, coupled with near-total control over the media define Hungary’s illiberal democracy, famously popularized in Prime Minister Orbán’s 2014 speech in Băile Tuşnad, Romania (Orbán 2016). These changes were only met with limited opposition, while organized opposition movements could only be mounted before the 2014 elections and around topical issues, like the proposed “internet tax” in the fall of 2014 (BBC 2014). Nevertheless, by late 2014, FIDESZ’s public support was crackling under a series of corruption scandals, an underperforming economy, high unemployment, and the general feeling of fatigue with the aggressive politics of the government. This loss in support necessitated new action to mobilize the core electorate and draw back lost voters. Meanwhile, FIDESZ’s extreme right wing opposition, Jobbik, became the second strongest political force in Hungary, overtaking the democratic opposition as the main challenger of the governing party (a fact reflected in the 2014 national election results). In an attempt to stop disillusioned voters gravitating toward Jobbik, FIDESZ had been taking over some of most symbolic program points from the extremist party’s agenda since 2010. The government rarely condemned anti-Roma or anti-European remarks coming from Jobbik, and even co-opted the party in parliamentary debates, including the one that made the 15 September laws on migration possible. Beyond mobilizing FIDESZ’s core electorate, catering to Jobbik sympathizers and drawing them closer to the governing party is the other motivation explaining the government’s initial approach to migration. Since migration during the first few months of 2015 was limited when compared to current numbers and not directed toward Hungary as a destination, migrants represented an “easy target” for securitization—i.e. defining them as the next threat to Hungarians that only a strong government could repel. The pre-existing institutional structures could then be used to take over public discourse with the government’s frame and crowd out alternative views, eventually forcing desecuritizing agents to adopt novel approaches to depolitizing migration. In this sense, power relations underlying the context of securitization of migration in Hungary are so skewed that they can be excluded from the analysis. Namely, FIDESZ’s monopoly over Hungarian politics effectively negates the veto power of the judiciary, the parliamentary opposition, as well as the media, leaving NGOs and non-institutionalized civilian movements as the promoters of a desecuritization frame. The turn toward migration as a security challenge, which forms part of the political spectacle of FIDESZ’s governing style—to be discussed further in this

Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary  121 chapter—has once again mobilized supporters, drawn in extremist voters due to its hard stance on aliens, divided up the population along familiar lines, and crucially avoided political costs traditionally associated with securitizing migration in Western Europe. This latter point merits further attention. When securitizing migration, the elite runs the risk of engaging two different groups: a softer stance might alienate extremists (see the French case in Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002, 30), while a more radical stance on migration might alienate pre-existing migrants and moderate voters. Given that Hungary has had no prior experience with migration and multiculturalism and that the current wave only passes the country, FIDESZ’s securitization attempt offered higher benefits than costs. Moreover, a crisis script applied on migration evokes feelings of danger and insecurity, which are by default high on the public agenda. As such, securitizing migration was yet another way for the government to detract both public and media attention from high profile scandals that wrecked support. A steady increase in FIDESZ’s support is clearly visible ever since the launch of the billboard campaign. But every campaign needs an audience, and the Hungarian population was already predisposed toward a more radical stance on migration. Polls conducted by polling company TÁRKI since the 1990s show high levels of xenophobia even in regional terms, and respondents even reject fictional ethnicities that are used in the polls. This xenophobia, however, differs from its Western counterpart, as without real life experience in coexistence, Hungarians’ xenophobia is more a fear of the unknown, than a fear of the different (Szalai and Gőbl 2015). 4.1 Discursive elements of the security frame

The current politicization of migration in Hungary is part of a wider political ­spectacle—the creation and circulation of symbols in the political process (­Edelman 1988)—wherein the conditions of belonging are contested. Within such spectacles, politics emerges as a drama where meaning is conferred through evoking crisis situations and political myths. Drama legitimates political decisions through invoking threats and dangers and also governs role-taking by the actors. Within this spectacle, one of the key issues is cultural identity, which in turn enables the politicization of migration (Huysmans 2000). This dramatic interpretation of politics on behalf of the governing party is traced back to the 2002 general elections which FIDESZ surprisingly lost against most polls, despite a sound economy and the promise of an unproblematic EU accession. Despite getting the majority of votes (48.7%), the governing party had to hand over power to a Liberal-Socialist coalition that held about 51% of the votes, securing it a shaky majority in parliament. Shocked by these results, FIDESZ supporters called the elections a fraud, and Orbán gave a series of speeches calling for unity on the Right, with the slogan being “the Fatherland cannot be in opposition” (“A haza nem lehet ellenzékben”). This image of a government-in-exile effectively divided Hungarians into true Hungarians (FIDESZ voters) and traitors/communists/liberals (supporters of the government) and lent FIDESZ’ time in opposition a war-like tone, wherein “retreat was impossible” (Orbán 2006). This rhetoric followed the party throughout the 2000s.

122  András Szalai With FIDESZ’ landslide victory over the scandal-ridden Socialists in 2010, the rhetoric did not change: the party had to look for new “enemies” to fight. This trope of Hungarians under attack, with only the government—more specifically, the PM—there to save them has been applied to a strikingly varied mix of issues, ranging from the “war on unemployment”, the “war on national debt” all the way to 2014’s “war on utility costs” (rezsiharc). This war-rhetoric has also been consistently used to delegitimize FIDESZ’s critics, Hungarians and not the government serving once again as the referent object of the “attacks”. Again, the group of foes is very diverse, ranging from the EU on various occasions (Euractiv 2011), through foreign multinational corporations, the Western press (“a liberal conspiracy against Hungarians”), Western liberals to Hungarian watchdog NGOs (Nielsen 2014), and his domestic opposition (“the fight against Communism”). This constant rhetoric of war forces the government into a role of the tough warrior, justifying restrictive domestic policies and the refusal to compromise on even the most minor of issues. Though the PM himself seems to relish confrontation and acting as a savior to his most loyal voters, these securitization-like rhetorical maneuvers have had mixed results. Some were highly successful in mobilizing support (esp., the massively populist war on utility costs). Clearly, the politicization of migration falls into this category; the discursive tools used are similar, with slight alterations. The analysis of the official discourse from January 2015 onward reveals a strong, hostile language toward migrants, which served as the major legitimizing factor in introducing restrictive policies like the border fence, or stricter penal code for “illegal” border crossing published on 15 September 2015. Security considerations with clear racist and Islamophobic overtones have dominated public discussions and have led to a shift in public opinion towards xenophobia. The official discourse—including the above collection of regulations, similar to Greece’s “Law for Aliens” of 1991 (see Karyotis 2012: 395)—does not differentiate between asylum seekers and economic migrants, nor does it distinguish irregular from regular migration. Instead, all these categories are subsumed under the term “bevándorló” (migrant). This term in Hungarian has an additional layer: it suggests an inward direction of movement, meaning that it refers to migrants coming into Hungary. This term is often married with the “illegal” or “megélhetési” (economic/rent seeking) qualifier and has been constantly repeated in official communication, including press reports of the state television. With relatively low migrant numbers at the beginning of 2015, official discourse mainly warned of economic migration as a potential threat, disregarding relevant research on its benefit, as well as the massive outflow of Hungarians toward Western Europe that could have justified a government shift toward controlled migration. Elevated domestic and international media attention was directed toward the question of migration after the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, when Orbán put the blame squarely on Western integration policies, making no distinction between economic migrants and extremists as he claimed that “economic migration is a bad thing for Europe. One should not think of it as a beneficial thing, it only brings problems and dangers into the life of European people. Therefore it must be stopped. This is the Hungarian position” (Quest 2015). The rhetoric of the

Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary  123 Hungarian government from the beginning of the concerted anti-migration campaign in late March 2015 matured as the security and identity axes supplanted the economic axis. Ever since, the rhetoric has been very consistent and mirrors those of the European receiving states (see Bourbeau 2011; Huysmans 2000; Karyotis 2012 and others). It has identified migration as a threat to the Hungarian state (terrorism) and, due to assumed cultural and religious differences, has dubbed migration as the main threat to ethnic homogeneity (influx and higher birth rates) as well as the national tradition (Islam). As in many other cases, it has been reified as a threat to the survival of, firstly, the national community and, more recently, European civilization, defined as exclusively Christian. Not only has this discourse excluded the migrant from society but has also framed them as dangers to said society: they are uncivilized, unclean, and unorderly; they do not respect our laws and they are prone to committing crimes. Other adjectives commonly used by government officials include terrorist, disrespectful, shifty, parasitic, deviant, Muslim, violent, anti-women, lying, and ungrateful. Migration in turn has been defined in terms of an invasion/flood metaphor, which further helped to translate feelings of social anxiety due to economic uncertainty into opposition against migrants (Huysmans 2000). The “criminal migrant” is yet another familiar trope from Western European discourses, one that relies on dubious statistical data, commonsensical arguments, mandated ‘expert’ testimonies, and misrepresentative media reports (Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002: 25). This image transforms all migrant, irrespective of individual motivations, into threats to any receiving or transit country. Even if one accepts that migrants are passing Hungary on their way to Germany and other, more prosperous European states, as long as they are in Hungary, they represent a clear and present threat. One of the consequences of the criminalization of migration is the elimination of the distinction between migrants and asylum seekers/refugees. This, as in other EU countries with similar discourses, can be seen in the reduced number of asylum seekers granted refugee status. With migrants criminalized, all of them become subject to suspicion by the host population. Criminalization eventually shifts the public discourse on economic migration and the moral obligations to help refugees towards separating “real” refugees from “impostors”, i.e. benefit-seeking economic migrants or terrorists in disguise. It is then hardly surprising that the majority of the population considers most asylum seekers “fake”. As mentioned, migration was initially securitized primarily as an economic threat. Following the exponentially increasing pressure of growing migrant waves, the “job loss” frame was dropped for an identity-based threat frame, wherein the economic threat only manifested in the costs Hungarians would have to bear while hosting migrants. Migrants, therefore, now threaten Hungarian culture but also European civilization at large. Underlying this “Us versus Them” opposition is the strong national myth that the Hungarian society had been a homogeneous one, and a loss of cultural and ethnic homogeneity would threaten social order. Within this frame, the future of the community is a choice for or against migration, leaving no middle road open for a more nuanced treatment of a complex issue, especially the state’s obligation to protect refugees (Watson 2009; see Huysmans 1995). Here,

124  András Szalai the role of Hungarians is that of the crusaders, the last defenders of Europe from a Muslim threat: “It is not for fun that we are doing what we are doing; no one likes serving in a border fortress”, Orbán stated in September 2015, “but this historic role of protecting the external borders has now fallen to Hungary” (Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office 2015). In recent interviews, this notion of “historic role” here alludes to the now commonly used analogy drawn between current migration influx and the medieval Turkish invasion of Hungary. This analogy consequently assigns the role of defenders of Europe to Hungarians, playing on their sense of exceptionalism. In turn, any European criticism and the proposed quota system that would have migrants move back to Hungary can be seen as betrayal. 4.2 Non-discursive elements of the security frame

As the practice-based interpretation of securitization highlights, securitization dynamics are active beyond the level of discourse: securitization acts are more than speech acts, they involve non-discursive instruments. In the Hungarian case, the highly symbolic border fence is an obvious candidate for policy tools. It sends clear signals about government intentions and reflects the promoted frame of danger from an impeding invasion by a hostile/alien out-group. This physical border serves as an excellent securitization tool, yet its function as a securitizing instrument is questionable at best: it diverted migration flows toward Croatia, but migrants still travel through Hungary. Nevertheless, as a symbolic tool, the fence garnered wide support. The other non-discursive element, which I term “non-policy”, on the other hand, lies outside the framework promoted by Balzacq: the conscious neglect of a policy issue for short-term benefits in terms of securitization. Balzacq and his colleagues seek to shift attention toward the practical aspects of securitization and non-policies do fit the non-discursive label, yet they are chiefly about failure. As the media have frequently reported, the Hungarian state showed striking ineptitude when dealing with mass migration, an ineptitude that culminated in the failed management of the so-called transit zones in Budapest. Not only did the government fail to offer effective policy instruments, but it also gave way to a new actor, civil society, thereby shifting the burden of governance. This failure becomes even more puzzling when we consider the fact that the government received ample warning from FRONTEX about the size and composition of each wave (Rácz 2015). For months after the first large wave of Syrian refugees arrived to Hungary, government policy was limited to taking refugees who were apprehended while crossing the border to registration stations (where their fingerprints were taken), in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation, the EU’s legal framework for processing asylum claims. Following their registration, they received a document about their registration (in Hungarian), a temporary railway/bus ticket, and had 36/48 hours to get to their assigned refugee camp, but they were only given a blank map of Hungary with the capital, the camp, and their entry point highlighted. Refugees were instructed to go to railway stations but they were given no official help about which trains to board—a task that was fulfilled by civilian organizations. Once in Budapest, refugees sought to continue their journey either to the West or to their assigned

Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary  125 camp but again received no information about schedules nor did they receive access to local public transportation in order to move between railway stations. Finally, refugees received no information about their rights, obligations, or travel routes. The lack of government policy solutions (securitizing instruments) is surprising at a first glance, given that, as mentioned, there was ample information on both the changing composition of migration as well as increases in volume. Not only were no real domestic answers presented, but help from the EU was not sought either. This spectacular failure of the Hungarian government and the poor setup of transit zones arguably represent a particular form of securitization tools, which we call non-policies. As reports of FIDESZ’s mid-September 2015 party meeting suggest, PM Orbán clearly did not seek real solutions but wanted to use migration to divert attention from problematic domestic issues. By forcing migrants entering at the Serbian border into busy transportation hubs in Budapest, supplying them with little information and thereby prompting them to stay in transit zones without basic amenities, the government could create a now visible image of the migrant as a dirty, unkempt, and potentially dangerous alien. Apart from impelling migrantcitizen interaction under unfavorable circumstances, the chaotic images of these zones also presented ammunition for the ongoing media campaign. For instance, media coverage on state television usually showed government officials wearing medical masks when interacting with migrants. Thus, instead of provoking citizen opposition due to government neglect, transit zones overcrowded with refugees offered a non-discursive tool for the government securitization campaign in the form of a stage on which the pre-established image of migrants could be reinforced, and blame could be shifted onto them for the situation in said areas. However, at this point, non-policies remain under-theorized and under-researched. Therefore, they will have to be a key focus of future research. 4.3 Desecuritizing migration

The logic of securitization envisions the elite engaging in discursive contestation about the motivation and identity of migrants, with reference to their relationship to the receiving state. This contestation is often also supported by non-discursive securitizing tools and is frequently resisted by other actors aiming to desecuritize the issue. According to Michael C. Williams (2003: 514), the success of a securitization act is influenced by “the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats”. So, political elites are not always able to rely on securitization to claim control over an issue. This ability is contextual and is conditioned by power relations between the securitizing actor and various audiences/veto powers. In the Hungarian case, however, political power relations are extremely asymmetrical. Due to FIDESZ’s dominance in the media, competing frames offered by the opposition and local NGOs received little to no visibility. As both the judiciary and parliament have been filled with party loyalists, other, traditional veto powers also lacked the necessary political power to mount a desecuritization campaign. These asymmetrical power relations forced desecuritization agents to adopt new approaches. The centerpiece of these efforts were the counter-offensive mounted

126  András Szalai against the government’s anti-migration billboard campaign and the previously unprecedented grassroots campaign of activists in Budapest and major cities to help refugees into and out of transit zones. Both efforts were highly symbolic, therefore they caught the attention of the Western media, offering further visibility to the desecuritization frame. Within this frame, Hungarians were depicted as a solidaristic peoples with a xenophobic government, a peoples that is willing to help refugees in need. The purpose of the early June poster campaign was to boost awareness of the April 2015 government pseudo-poll “National Consultation on Migration and Terrorism”. National consultations are a key element of illiberal democracy in Hungary; they have been used to supplant referenda, offering an illusion of influence to supporters of the government. These questionnaires are little more than propaganda pieces with questionable methodology, biased and suggestive questions. They serve the purpose of communication between the government and its supporters, issued by the former, and usually tied to a populistic campaign. They provide tropes for supporters to shape public discourse, raise awareness about the government-­ preferred voting option, and are frequently used to demonstrate both the presence of democratic institutions and wide support for government policy against critics. The language used in the migration-related consultation is symptomatic of the securitization frame constructed by FIDESZ: it labels migrants as terrorists, and as a source of economic and cultural threat. The billboard ­campaign—which could also draw on Western examples—is equally hostile and reflects the image of the criminal/alien, with slogans like “if you come to Hungary, you need to abide by our laws/respect our culture” and “you cannot take away the jobs of Hungarians”. The billboards were clearly not targeting migrants, but the general population, as they were all in Hungarian. The third element of the desecuritization campaign came from the NGOs and civilian activists working with refugees in transit stations, refugee camps, and border towns. NGOs, such as the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, the Association of Pediatric Practitioners, Menedék Alapítvány (Refuge Foundation), Menhely Alapítvány (Shelter Foundation), and Oltalom (Sanctuary) Charity Society worked together with ad hoc, non-institutionalized activist groups like Segítsünk Együtt a Menekülteknek (Let’s Help Refugees in Hungary), Migration Aid, and the Migrant Solidarity Group of Hungary (Migszol). These latter non-institutionalized organizations merit special attention. Relying mainly on social media, they managed to attract media and public attention, as well as company and personal contributions in terms of know-how, skills and time (activists, interpreters, drivers, cooks etc.), in-kind contributions (food, clothes, medicine). These contributions were all used transparently to assist migrants to reach transit zones, spend the minimum necessary time there, and then move on to either a refugee camp or a train heading toward Western Europe. As their names suggests, these organizations sought to offer solidarity to migrants, irrespective of the latter’s personal motivations. With a strong presence in the social media and active links to non-state and active media, they not only promoted solidarity for migrants but also an image of Hungarians as

Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary  127 a solidaristic people with bad leadership. By organizing the daily life of migrants at transit stations, these civilian organizations effectively took over the responsibilities of the state, from providing information, food and shelter to providing legal counsel about migration policies. Their continued efforts form the backbone of the desecuritization campaign as they continuously promote a counterframe that depicts migration as a humanitarian issue, not a question of security. Though unable to revert the government securitization efforts, these organizations helped to create an alternative frame that has received wide visibility in the capital and in the foreign press but less so in the countryside. I suggest that the presence of an alternative frame can provide the basis of further desecuritization attempts. However, our initial research still suggests that NGOs and activist groups indeed lack the political power to mount a full desecuritization campaign on their own, without the assistance of traditional veto powers (judiciary, parliamentary opposition, media). 5 Conclusion Countries of the Visegrad region have been converging on their hostile stance on migration since the second half of 2015. This change alone would render the Hungarian case less unique than this chapter suggested. However, once we look closer into the country-specific context of securitization dynamics, Hungary once again becomes a sort of an outlier—a pure case where securitization discourses are largely unchallenged. The empirical fact that the campaign at the core of government reactions was launched prior to the crisis further draws critical attention to the specificities of the context, despite obvious parallels with neighboring states both in terms of discourse and policies. Using Thierry Balzacq’s critique of securitization theory, this chapter highlighted a number of elements of the Hungarian case that explain recent trends. First, securitization is audience-dependent, and Hungarian voters show consistently high levels of xenophobia and have also been conditioned by government rhetoric to think in terms of emergencies and clear and present dangers. Second, securitization is power-laden. In the case of Hungary, power relations are extremely skewed with the government holding control over the media, the opposition, and the judiciary. Therefore, desecuritization attempts have been restricted to civil society actors—among them issue-specific, nontraditional grassroots—which have been using nonconventional techniques to counteract the government master frame. However, without the aforementioned veto powers present, these desecuritization attempts have only received limited visibility. To these two elements, the chapter added non-discursive tools termed non-policies. These, within the practicebased approach of Balzacq, demonstrate that a focus on discourse is insufficient for understanding securitization. As its own contribution to this revision, this chapter suggested that non-policies are important precisely because they appear to be products of chance and circumstance, so they usually fall outside the analysis of practices targeted at securitizing certain issues, such as migration. With this more nuanced understanding of securitization dynamics in Hungary, cross-country variance within the European Union can hopefully be better understood.

128  András Szalai Note 1 Though officially FIDESZ governs in coalition with the micro-party KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party), the latter have never ran independently in elections since 2005. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, it is treated as a faction within FIDESZ and “governing party” and FIDESZ will be used interchangeably.

References Balzacq, Thierry. 2005. ‘The Three Faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and Context,’ European Journal of International Relations, 11 (22), 171–201. Balzacq, Thierry. 2008. ‘The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 46 (1), 75–100. Balzacq, Thierry. 2011. ‘A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants,’ in Balzacq, Thierry (ed), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, Abingdon: Routledge, 1–30. Balzacq, Thierry, Leonard, Sarah and Ruzicka, Jan. 2015. ‘“Securitization” Revisited: Theory and Cases,’ International Relations, 30 (4): 494–531. BBC. 2014. ‘Hungary Internet Tax Cancelled after Mass Protests – BBC News,’ October 31. Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29846285 Bourbeau, Philippe (Ed.). 2011. The Securitization of Migration. A Study of Movement and Order, Abingdon: Routledge. Buzan, Barry, Ole, Wæver, and de Wilde, Jaap (Eds.). 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Ceyhan, Ayse and Tsoukala, Anastassia (Eds.). 2002. ‘The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies,’ Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27 (1), S21. Dover, Robert. 2008. ‘Towards a Common EU Immigration Policy: A Securitization Too Far,’ European Integration, 30 (1), 113–130. Edelman, Murray (Ed.). 1988. Constructing the Political Spectacle, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Euractiv. 2011. ‘Hungarian EU Presidency Slithers through Last Debate,’ July 16. Available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/hungarian-eu-presidencyslithers-through-last-debate/ Guild, Elspeth. 2003. ‘International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and Borders Policy: The Unexpected Victims of 11 September 2001,’ European Foreign Affairs Review, 8 (3), 331–46. Hayes, Jarrod, and Knox-Hayes, Janelle. 2014. ‘Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between US and EU Approaches to Policy,’ Global Environmental Politics, 14 (2), 82–101. Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office. 2015. ‘Today Bavaria’s Borders Are Being Defended by Hungary,’September 23.Available at https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/ news/today-bavaria-s-borders-are-being-defended-by-hungary Huysmans, Jef. 1995. ‘Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of “Securitizing” Societal Issues’, in Miles, Robert and Thranhardt, Dietrich (eds), Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, London: Pinter, 53–72. Huysmans, Jef. 2000. ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,’ JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (5), 751–77. Huysmans, Jef, and Buonfino, Alessandra. 2008. ‘Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK,’ Political Studies, 56 (4), 766–788.

Securitizing migration in contemporary Hungary  129 Ibrahim, Maggie. 2005. ‘The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse1,’ International Migration, 43 (5), 163–187. Karyotis, Georgios. 2007. ‘European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11: The Security–Migration Nexus,’ Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 20 (1), 1–17. Karyotis, Georgios. 2012. ‘Securitization of Migration in Greece: Process, Motives, and Implications,’ International Political Sociology, 6 (4), 390–408. Léonard, Sarah. 2011. ‘EU Border Security and Migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and Securitisation through Practices,’ European Security, 19 (2), 231–254. Mason, Michael. 2013. ‘Climate Change, Securitisation and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,’ The Geographical Journal, 179 (10), 298–308. Mistri, Maurizio, and Orcalli, Gabriele. 2014. ‘The European Union’s Immigration Policy: A Stalled Form of the Strategy of Conflict?,’ International Economics and Economic Policy, 12 (2), 239–256. Nielsen, Nikolaj. 2014. ‘Hungary Raids Norway-Backed NGOs,’ EU Observer, March 27. Available at https://euobserver.com/political/125537 Orbán, Viktor. 2006. ‘Orbán Viktor Várbeli Beszéde [Viktor Orbán’s Speech in Buda Castle],’ 24.Hu, April 11. Available at https://24.hu/belfold/2006/04/11/orban_viktor_ varbeli_beszede/ Orbán, Viktor. 2016. ‘Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp,’ 1–5. Quest, Richard. 2015. ‘Quest Means Business,’ CNN. Available at http://transcripts.cnn. com/TRANSCRIPTS/1501/12/qmb.01.html Rácz, András. 2015. ‘A Calculated Non-Action Miscalculated: Hungary´s Migration Crisis,’ Visegrad Revue. Available at http://visegradrevue.eu/a-calculated-non-actionmiscalculated-hungarys-migration-crisis/ Scheppele, Kim Lane. 2014. ‘Hungary and the End of Politics,’ The Nation, May 6. Available athttps://www.thenation.com/article/archive/hungary-and-end-politics/ Statham, Paul, and Geddes, Andrew. 2006. ‘Elites and the “Organised Public”: Who Drives British Immigration Politics and in Which Direction?,’ West European Politics, 29 (2), 248–269. Szalai, András, and Gőbl, Gabriella. 2015. Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary, CENS Working Papers, Budapest. Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos. 2011. ‘Illiberal Means to Liberal Ends? Understanding Recent Immigrant Integration Policies in Europe,’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37 (6), 861–880. Vultee, Fred. 2011. ‘Securitization as a Media Frame’, in Balzacq, Thierry (ed), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, Abingdon: Routledge, 77–93. Waever, Ole. 1995. ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Lipschutz, Ronny D. (ed), On Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 46–87. Wæver, Ole, Buzan, Barry, Kelstrup, Morten and Lemaitre, Pierre (Eds.). 1993. Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter. Watson, Scott D. (Ed.). 2009. The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking Boats, Abingdon: Routledge. Williams, Michael C. 2003. ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,’ International Studies Quarterly, 47 (4), 511–531. Wunderlich, Daniel. 2012. ‘Implementing EU External Migration Policy: Security-Driven by Default?,’ Comparative European Politics, 11 (4), 406–427.

9

Germany after “2015” Still a country of immigration and asylum? Marcus Engler

1 Introduction From summer 2015 until the so-called closure of the Balkan-Route and the coming into force of the EU-Turkey-Statement in February and March 2016, around 1 million migrants and refugees entered the European Union in a spontaneous and irregular manner (IOM 2017). A large number of those persons entered Germany and requested asylum. In 2015, a record number of people seeking sanctuary arrived in Germany with 476,649 requests being lodged (441,899 first-time applications; see Figure 9.1). In 2016, the number of applications further increased to 745,545 (722,370 first-time applications) of which around 280,000 had already arrived in 2016 (Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat 2017). The number of arrivals in the European Union and in Germany quickly and significantly decreased at the end of March 2016 after the closure of the Balkan Route and the EU-Turkey deal. In 2017 (198,317 first-time applications), 2018 (161,931) and 2019 (January– August: 98,428), the numbers decreased further. The immigration of asylum-seekers has to be seen in the context of the overall immigration to Germany. In the five-year period 2014–2018, around 8.6 million arrivals were recorded (with repeated arrivals also being counted twice; see Figure 9.1). This was countered by around 5.6 million people moving away and resulted in a net immigration of three million people in only three years. In 2015 and 2016, it was mainly refugees who entered Germany, including many Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis. The so-called protection rates were exceptionally high compared to historical averages. In 2015, the so-called overall protection rate, which includes all forms of protection (i.e. eligibility for asylum, refugees under the Geneva Convention and subsidiary protection) stood at 50%. In 2016, this figure rose to 63% and then decreased during 2017. These figures are even higher if second instance decisions by administrative courts are taken into account. The high percentages imply that a very large number of humanitarian migrants will very likely remain for a longer period of time or even permanently in Germany. Finally, in the years prior to 2015 and since 2017, most migrants came from other—mainly Eastern and Southern European—EU states. Despite demographic ageing and contrary to many forecasts, the population of the Federal Republic of Germany has hence grown significantly from 81.2 million at the end of 2014 to around 83 million at the end DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405-9

Germany after “2015”  131 Overall Immigration and Emigration, Net Migration and Asylum Applications 25,00,000 20,00,000 15,00,000

10,00,000 5,00,000 0

1973

1978

1983

1988

Asylum applications

1993

1998 All Arrivals

2003

2008

2013

2018

All Departures

Figure 9.1  Immigration and Asylum Applications in Germany 1973–2019. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2019a, 2019b/BAMF 2019, chart by the author.

of 2018, and the number of foreigners has risen from 7.5 million to 10.9 million in this period. The arrival of record numbers of asylum-seekers brought the topic of asylum and migration to the forefront of the public sphere and triggered controversial debates on the causes of the influx as well as on appropriate political solutions in Germany and at the European level. The grand coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD reacted with political hyperactivity and adopted many laws, often not only dealing with actual problems but also symbolically demonstrating the ability to act. Most of the domestic measures adopted after 2015 follow a rationale of differentiation which offers more support for people with good prospects for asylum rights and for skilled immigrants. At the same time, restrictive measures have been adopted for asylum-seekers with less good chances of being recognised. This chapter starts by offering a short overview of asylum trends and policies prior to 2015 to outline the longer-term perspective which is necessary to fully understand more recent developments. It then analyses the events and dynamics of 2015 and discusses debates, conflicts and reactions to the “refugee crisis” in Germany as well as the German position with regard to international cooperation. It concludes by summarising and discussing the main findings. 2 German asylum policies: from national interest to European cooperation? The reactions to the 2015/2016 “refugee crisis” can only be adequately understood if the historical background and more recent developments of asylum and migration policies in Germany are taken into account. Therefore, the main developments in this field are briefly outlined in the following paragraphs. The underlying dynamics and causalities are certainly complex and cannot be discussed here in detail.

132  Marcus Engler However, it can be stated that asylum policies tend to be more restrictive when numbers of arriving asylum-seekers are on the rise. On the other hand, lower numbers of asylum-seekers can lead to more liberal policies. 2.1 Permissive approach after WWII

Parallel to the development of an international legal framework regarding refugee protection, a comparatively liberal law regulating the right to asylum was conceived in West Germany immediately after the Second World War. By adopting this permissive approach to the right to asylum, the Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer Rat) wanted to make a deliberate break with the National Socialist past, which had produced millions of deaths, refugees and displaced persons (Herbert 2014; Münz et al. 1999). In 1949, the right to asylum was laid down in the Constitution, while until 1993, Article 16 of the Constitution (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of Germany stated, without any further qualification, that “persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum.” From the late 1950s until the early 1970s, West Germany recruited several million labour migrants (Gastarbeiter), the majority being guest workers from Turkey, Southern Europe and North Africa. Most of them only stayed temporarily and no integration measures were implemented. Despite their presence, Germany did not perceive itself as a country of immigration. As a reaction to the 1973 economic crisis, the labour migration program was officially halted. Yet, this did not lead to an end of immigration, as the migrants that managed to remain brought their families along. Until the end of the 1970s, the number of asylum-seekers remained relatively low, while most were political refugees from states of the Eastern bloc, the majority of whom were granted protection. 2.2 Increase in numbers leads to restrictive policies

The number of asylum seekers reached a first peak in the years 1979–1981, when a total of 200,000 asylum applications were lodged (see Figure 9.1) (Münz et al. 1999). In an attempt to curb the number of asylum claims, federal and state governments introduced a number of restrictive measures: appealing against negative decisions on asylum was made more difficult; a visa requirement was introduced for some countries of origin; applicants were no longer allowed to work during the first 12 months of the asylum procedure; social benefits were cut; and residency restrictions were introduced. Despite all these measures, the number of asylum claims rose significantly from 1988 onward, with 103,100 applications filed in that year alone. The recognition rate sank to under 10%, partially due to a more restrictive interpretation of existing laws. Yet, many rejected asylum-seekers remained in the country, their deportation being impossible. This discrepancy further fuelled political controversy (Herbert 2017; Münch 2014). After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the number of asylum claims reached a new peak in 1992, when 438,200 applications were filed. At the time, approximately, three quarters of all asylum applications registered in the EU were lodged in

Germany after “2015”  133 Germany. From the dismantled Yugoslavia alone, about 350,000 civil war refugees fled to Germany, not least because of existing networks with migrants who had come to Germany as labour migrants earlier (Bade and Oltmer 2004). The parallel large-scale immigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, called Aussiedler, further fuelled the increasingly fierce immigration debate. The early 1990s saw a rising number of violent racist attacks with numerous casualties. Against this backdrop, the Social Democrats (SPD), the Free Democrats (FDP) and the Christian Democratic parties (CDU/CSU) agreed on a radical and restrictive reform of the German asylum law, known as the “asylum compromise” (Poutrus 2019). In particular, the introduction of the concepts of “safe third countries” and “safe countries of origin” made it much more difficult to claim asylum in Germany. The asylum compromise also introduced the so-called airport procedure; an expedited mechanism allowing for asylum claims to be processed in the transit area of airports. Furthermore, the adoption of the Asylum-Seekers’ Benefits Act created a separate social security scheme, with a significantly lower level of benefits. As part of the compromise, the immigration rules for ethnic Germans were also made more restrictive. On 1 July 1993, the restrictions came into effect and the number of new asylum applications dropped significantly, with other European states hosting many more asylum-seekers (Schimany 2014). At the same time, the German government succeeded in incorporating some of the main components of the restrictive German asylum law into European Community law (Engler and Schneider 2015). The cornerstone of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is the so-called Dublin System, which assigns responsibility for asylum seekers to member States (Fratzke 2015). Since the 2004 Eastern enlargement of the EU, Germany is surrounded by other member states. Following the Dublin rules, in most cases, the first EU country of arrival is responsible for an asylum-seeker; therefore, Germany would only be responsible for a very limited number of cases. Despite the fact that the Dublin rules were never entirely applied, asylum applications in Germany decreased during the second half of the 1990s and remained relatively low until 2012 (Figure 9.1). 2.3 Liberalisation process in society and politics

In parallel, the migration, asylum and integration policies in Germany have been gradually liberalised. This process started under the coalition of Social Democrats and Greens (1998–2005) and was continued under the following coalition of SPD and CDU/CSU. It has been facilitated by moderate levels of overall immigration, a positive development of the labour market and a growing awareness of accelerating demographic ageing. Moreover, Germany did not want to lag behind in the competition for the most talented people, and at the same time, policymakers wanted to avoid the mistakes of the past, when the failed integration of “Gastarbeiter” led to social problems (SVR 2014, 2015). A number of laws and measures were introduced which aimed at improving integration and making Germany more attractive for skilled economic migrants.

134  Marcus Engler Immigration requirements for highly skilled workers were eased and procedures for the recognition of professional competencies acquired abroad were ameliorated. Also, at different political levels, numerous measures were implemented to facilitate integration, avoid discrimination, and develop intercultural competencies in public administration. These go along with an altered self-perception of Germany as a country of immigration. This liberalisation process also spilled over to humanitarian migration. As a result of the Europeanisation of the asylum rules, the legal situation improved for certain categories of asylum-seekers, e.g. those with subsidiary protection. In September 2014, the parliament passed a legislative package which reversed many of the restrictive measures. The ban on work for asylum-seekers was shortened to three months, residence requirements were made less restrictive, and access to language and integration courses was improved (SVR 2014). A more humanitarian refugee policy also included an increase in organised admission schemes, like resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes, through which refugees can enter Germany in a safe and legal manner (Engler 2015b). 2.4 Rising numbers and new controversies

The process of liberalisation though was neither linear nor without conflict. The rise in the number of asylum claims since 2010 and of citizens from other EU countries had reignited debates on asylum and immigration long before the summer of 2015. Already in 2014, municipalities in Germany reported huge challenges regarding the accommodation of refugees. At the same time, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) did not have sufficient staff to process the asylum applications, so the backlog and processing times grew. In particular, the growing numbers of asylum applications filed by citizens of Western Balkan countries fuelled a new debate on “asylum abuse” in 2014 in light of the low recognition rates. Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were added to the so-called list of safe countries of origin in November 2014. In a similar vein, the immigration of ten thousands of Romanians and Bulgarians led to a debate on how to prevent “poverty migration.” In many places, the population showed solidarity and provided support for refugees. Elsewhere, though, citizens’ movements reacted to the establishment of new refugee accommodation in a sceptical or even hostile manner. In this context, numerous protests against the reception of asylum-seekers have been initiated or exploited by radical right-wing actors. 2.5 Increasingly in favour of EU-cooperation

When it comes to cooperation at the EU level, the German position was traditionally in favor of a strict implementation of the Dublin-system and against a greater sharing of responsibility. However, in reaction to the crisis in Syria, the German government took a different stance. Germany was in favor of a coordinated EUwide approach with regard to the organised admission of Syrian refugees to the

Germany after “2015”  135 European countries. Starting in the second half of 2012, the federal government, in cooperation with UNHCR and the European Commission, was lobbying for a European humanitarian admission program for Syrian refugees. As a consensus could not be reached at the European level, Germany set up its own national admission program in spring 2013, hoping that other countries would later join or follow its example, which happened only to a very limited extent. Between May 2013 and June 2014, the federal government and the states decided to create a total of 20,000 places for refugees from Syria. Moreover, 15 out of 16 states made it possible for Syrians living in Germany to bring their family members, provided that they committed themselves to cover the cost of their accommodation and living. By mid2018, more than 23,000 people were received in this way. Germany was ready to do its part, but the German government expected other European countries to do the same, which led to increasing conflicts at the EU level (Engler 2015a). Germany supported the ad hoc relocation schemes proposed by the EU-commission in June and September 2015. Moreover, the German government gradually changed its position on the Dublin system and was in favor of a permanent and mandatory distribution mechanism for all asylum-seekers. As this change of position happened before the exceptional increase of asylum-applications in 2015, this policy shift cannot be explained by national interests only. It was at least partially driven by the insight—well documented by many scientific studies and NGO reports—that the Dublin system in its current state is strongly unfair and dysfunctional in many regards (Fratzke 2015). 2.6 Causes and dynamics of the 2015 “refugee crisis”

The discussions around the causes behind the refugee influx of 2015/2016 are highly controversial. Many have held the German government responsible. According to this interpretation, Chancellor Angela Merkel would have opened the borders and invited or encouraged migrants and refugees to come to Germany and Europe (Betts and Collier 2017). While Merkel and the German government certainly played an important role, the circumstances and causes behind the movement are far more complex as shall be outlined in the next paragraph. First of all, it needs to be underlined that the number of people in search of protection did increase significantly over the last few years. According to the data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at the end of 2014, 59.5 million people were fleeing from persecution, violence and human rights violations, the highest figure since such statistics were first published in 1989. The number further increased in the following years and surpassed that of 70 million forcibly displaced persons (UNHCR 2019). What should be particularly stressed is the civil war in Syria, which has been ongoing since 2011 and has caused a huge displacement crisis, involving several million people, both within the country and into neighbouring countries. In the states of first arrival—mainly Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan—several million refugees were and still are confronted with extremely difficult livelihood situations and a lack of perspective. Moreover, the cost of living is high and the resources they brought from their home countries were being

136  Marcus Engler used up over time. Insufficient humanitarian support—food rations were even cut in 2015—in the region and the fact that industrialised countries launched very few legal admission schemes resulted in a growing number of refugees setting off at their own risk (IOM 2017; UNHCR 2015). In the public debate, the question is often posed as to why asylum-seekers look for protection in Germany (and a few other countries like Sweden). Research has shown that in this case too, numerous factors come together, the most important being structural aspects and circumstances that short-term political decisions have no influence upon, such as the level of prosperity, the support for human rights and, above all, migrants’ pre-existing social networks (Brücker et al. 2016; Neumayer 2005; Scholz 2013). During 2015, a growing number of asylum-seekers entered the European Union via the Aegean Sea and Greece. Many arrived in Hungary, which was formally the country of first entrance under the Dublin regulation, since Greece was not taking part starting at 2011, as a result of court rulings which classified the Greek asylum system as being in a state of systemic failure. Those high numbers of asylumseekers were unprecedented in Hungary and led to increasingly difficult conditions in the country (UNHCR 2015). Contrary to the Dublin rules, the vast majority of asylum-seekers wanted to move on to other countries, in particular to Germany and Sweden. At the end of August, the German government announced that it de facto suspended the Dublin procedure for Syrian asylum-seekers (Zeit Online 2015). From a legal point of view, this is possible based on the sovereignty clause in the DublinIII-regulation which was confirmed by the European Court of Justice in July 2017 (Thym 2018). However, the communication of the suspension to the outside happened by accident, when an internal document was published. The news spread quickly and created an additional incentive for Syrians to move on to Germany and to apply for asylum there (the protection rate being close to 100%) (Engler 2016). At the end of August and the beginning of September, two tragic events which were widely covered by the media were again shaking European public spheres. On August 28th, a lorry with 71 bodies was found on an Austrian freeway. The lorry was used and abandoned by smugglers who were transporting refugees from Hungary to Western Europe. Only a few days later, on 2 September, 2015, the pictures of the body of Alan Kurdi—a three-year-old boy from Syria who drowned in the Aegean Sea—were published on the front pages of many European newspapers (Vis and Goriunova 2015). Those tragedies generated shock and outrage in media and society and further increased pressure on political leaders to prevent similar events in the future. In the beginning of September 2015, several thousand refugees were gathering at the Budapest Keleti train station from where they wanted to travel to other European countries. Their numbers began to grow as Hungarian police forces no longer let them board trains heading west. The situation further escalated as police forces stopped a train with 300 refugees and tried to bring them by force to a reception centre, which the refugees opposed. On 4 September, several hundred refugees started to walk via the freeway towards Austria and Germany. It was in

Germany after “2015”  137 direct reaction to this situation that the governments of Germany, Austria and Hungary agreed on 4 September 2015 to let refugees from Hungary enter Austria and Germany. It was hence not a unilateral decision of the German government, as it is often stated. The governments of Germany and Austria argued that the decision was limited to a few thousand individuals and for a limited time span only. Nevertheless, several hundred thousand people arrived in Western Europe (transiting via the Balkan route) between September 2015 and March 2016. Against this backdrop, the decision of 4 September 2015 cannot be understood as an intentional and encouraging policy of the German government but rather as a last-minute reaction to a humanitarian emergency. At that moment, the German government did not really have other options any more. Without that decision, the situation would have further escalated in Hungary with unpredictable consequences, an assessment which is shared by many observers. Yet, the decision was understood differently by many refugees. It is difficult to quantify the impact of political decisions and symbols on migratory movements. The decisions taken by the federal government are likely to have strengthened people in their decisions to come to Germany and Europe. They cannot serve as the only explanation for the unprecedented scale of the surge of refugees from outside Europe. Merkel’s famous statement “Wir schaffen das,” as well as the “selfies” with asylum-seekers, have to be put into the context of German domestic politics. Those statements were not meant as an invitation for refugees to come but rather as a message to the German population which was increasingly divided over the admission of refugees. Merkel made those statements in reaction to a growing number of xenophobic events and attacks and increasing support for far right political forces in Germany. 3 Regaining control and facilitating integration: debates, policies and conflicts The growing numbers of asylum-seekers and migrants led to huge challenges and conflicts in society and the political arena in Germany and at the EU level. The main reactions, political developments and challenges at the national level are described in the following paragraphs. The German position concerning the closure of the Balkan Route and the EU-Turkey deal is also discussed. 3.1 Logistic and humanitarian challenges

An immediate challenge concerned the accommodation of several hundred thousand asylum-seekers within a few months. Across the country, emergency accommodations were opened, including in barracks, containers, tents and school sports halls (Deutscher Bundestag 2016). This meant, on the one hand, that these asylumseekers could enjoy hardly any privacy and were subject to continuous stress for months and often years. On the other hand, the opening of temporary shelters on a very short notice and, in many cases, without proper consultation of the local population has regularly led to conflicts with local residents. However, despite

138  Marcus Engler the unprecedented numbers of arriving asylum-seekers, nobody was left without accommodation. Despite significant staff increases, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), which is responsible for the examination of asylum applications, did not have sufficient capacity. This increased the backlog of cases and extended processing times. At the beginning of 2016, BAMF had up to 700,000 pending asylum applications (Spiegel Politics Online 2016a). These backlog cases could only be reduced in 2017, after the number of newly arriving asylum-seekers decreased and several reforms of the organisation of the asylum-processing were implemented.1 But the processing of applications with newly recruited staff and new procedures also led to numerous wrong decisions. As a result, a huge backlog was created at the administrative courts, which are responsible for reviewing first instance decisions.2 However, not only was the accommodation issue difficult and the asylum administration overburdened, but other governmental and non-governmental ­institutions—such as social authorities, schools or language course providers— also experienced considerable bottlenecks. This led to frustration for many refugees and their supporters and delayed the process of societal integration. 3.2 Divided population: reactions and surveys

In opinion polls, the topic of migration and integration has been by far the most important since the beginning of 2015 and remained so in 2019 despite a continuous decline in importance since mid-2016 (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2019). Multiple surveys showed a divided population concerning the refugee issue. This division was also reflected in diverging actions. On the one hand, spontaneous support for asylum-seekers by the local population reached an unprecedented level. Citizens were offering any kind of support, like donation of food and clothes, German lessons, etc. (Ahrens 2017; Karakayali and Kleist 2016). According to estimations, almost 10% of the German population actively participated in activities which supported the arrival of refugees. At the same time, xenophobic assaults on asylum-seekers and refugee shelters reached record levels (Spiegel Politics Online 2016b), while xenophobic movements (PEGIDA) were gaining support. Moreover, the newly established rightwing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) succeeded in entering all 16 regional parliaments, obtaining more than 20% of the votes in some federal states and also entered the German Bundestag in the September 2017 general election with a share of 12.6% of the votes. Whereas most of the violence since 2015 was directed against refugees and migrants, it should also be mentioned that there were attacks and violence by migrants, including several (attempted) terrorist attacks. The marked decline in immigration and the intensity of public debate on this issue has also led to a decrease in violence against refugees. In 2018 and 2019, the AfD was also successful in regional elections. On the one hand, this shows that their success cannot only be explained one-dimensionally by the arrival of the refugees but that other issues and factors are also important. On the other hand, it indicates that the AfD has established itself structurally in the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Germany after “2015”  139 Meanwhile, the restrictive political measures in Germany and at the EU level have also led to mass protests, for example calling for the reception of refugees and migrants rescued from distress at sea or demonstrating for an open society in general. The Seebrücke Alliance of almost 100 municipalities also criticised national and European politics. In a development often referred to as the local turn of migration policy, these municipalities also agreed to accept additional refugees. 3.3 Permanent conflict within the government

The events also triggered a fierce and long-lasting conflict within the national government and mainly between the two conservative “sister parties” CDU and CSU about the appropriate measures. With thousands of people arriving at the German borders every day at the end of August and beginning of September, the question of a possible closure of the border was discussed intensively. Parts of the c­ oalition—mainly from the CSU—were in favour of a closure and the border police was already preparing respective measures.3 The Merkel-led government finally discarded this option because it feared a further worsening of the already tense humanitarian situation and a destabilisation of the countries of the Balkan route. The strategy adopted by Merkel and the government was to pursue an agreement with Turkey, which took significant time to negotiate. The CSU was then in favor of the introduction of transit zones at the borders as well as a binding annual upper limit of 200,000 asylum-seekers. Once the ceiling was reached, all further asylum-seekers would be turned back at the border. This proposal was also rejected by the CDU and most other parties and experts. Against this backdrop, the government opted for a softer approach and on 13 September 2015 decided to temporarily reintroduce checks at German borders, particularly at the border with Austria. Other states have adopted similar measures (including Sweden, Denmark and France), which significantly impacted on the idea of borderless traveling within the Schengen zone. The border controls have been extended several times and were still in place at the end of 2019. In the treaty of the grand coalition, which was updated again in 2017, it was agreed that the influx of refugees would not exceed the range of 180,000–220,000 per year. Nonetheless, the legal nature of this agreement is unclear. In 2018 and 2019, this figure was undercut. Since summer 2015, the government has passed almost 20 laws and implemented numerous measures, which were aiming at a better control and reduction of flows of asylum-seekers and other migrants. Regularly, an accelerated parliamentary procedure was applied so that civil society hardly had any time for criticism and proposals for change. Quickly after the events of the summer of 2015, the federal government reacted with the so-called Asylum Package I, which came into force on 24 October 2015. The package already contains the approach of a differentiated treatment of asylumseekers, which became the dominant course of action. On the one hand, access to integration measures was accelerated for those refugees that are likely to remain in Germany (with a protection rate above 50%). Those refugees were given the opportunity to attend an integration course as early as during the asylum procedure.

140  Marcus Engler On the other hand, asylum seekers that are unlikely to stay in the country are supposed to leave Germany more quickly. In the package, the federal government also provided for a greater participation in the financing of refugee accommodation and introduced a number of measures aiming at accelerating the asylum procedure. Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro were also added to the safe countries of origin list. In return, access to the labour market for citizens of the Western Balkans countries was facilitated. In the face of the continuing arrival of high numbers of refugees, these measures seemed to be insufficient from the perspective of the German government. Already at the beginning of November 2015, the coalition leaders agreed upon the Asylum Package II, which entered into force in mid-March 2016. The package contained a number of additional measures aiming at better controlling asylum flows. It provided for the creation of more “special reception centers” for asylum-seekers from safe countries of origin, who are subject to re-entry restrictions, lodge subsequent applications or are unwilling to cooperate. In these centres, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees should in the future make decisions on asylum applications within one week. Rejected applicants should return to their own countries or be deported directly from these centres. The package includes additional measures which aim at limiting family reunification for certain refugees and simplifying deportation. In a controversial measure, family reunification was suspended for a period of two years for those beneficiaries of subsidiary protection who have been granted a residence permit based on this status after 17 March 2016 (Kalkman 2017). This measure has been sharply criticised by human rights organisations and political opposition who argued that integration was made impossible if refugees in Germany could not reunite with their close relatives being still in the crisis regions. Also, it encourages family members to engage on irregular and dangerous routes to join their relatives in Germany. Since August 2018, up to 1,000 family members can join their relatives every month. Over time, the debate shifted from admission and integration to the return of asylum-seekers and other migrants. For one thing, the forced return of migrants without a regular residence permit was declared a priority. Additionally, programs supporting the voluntary return of refugees and migrants were financially extended and more systematically communicated. As a consequence, the numbers of forced and voluntary returns increased. This policy also led to vast protest campaigns which focused on the return of rejected Afghani asylum-seekers. Further laws were passed in 2017, 2018 and 2019. They also followed the logic of differentiation. As a result, integration was facilitated and accelerated, while migration movements were controlled and repatriation was facilitated (Grote 2018; SVR 2019). Particularly noteworthy is a comprehensive migration package adopted in July 2019 in which key ideas from the coalition agreement were implemented. Gradually, other groups also gained access to integration services, training support and the labour market. In particular, regulations were created for rejected asylum-­seekers who continue to reside in Germany because it is not possible to leave the country. Under certain conditions, they can take language courses, start and complete vocational training and find work. This can also lead to them receiving

Germany after “2015”  141 a secure residence permit. On the flipside, numerous persons are excluded from these regulations, including those who are believed to intentionally conceal their identity. The so-called residence requirement which was first introduced in 2016 has now been delimited. According to law, recognised refugees may not freely choose their place of residence for three years but must live in a certain federal state or municipality. Another part of the package is a law designed to facilitate the return and repatriation of rejected asylum-seekers and other migrants. This includes measures that make integration considerably more difficult. Among other things, all asylum-seekers will in future have to stay in collective reception facilities until the end of their asylum procedure—up to a maximum duration of 18 months. Moreover, the possibilities for detention in the run-up to possible deportations have been extended. Finally, another part of the overall package is the Skilled Immigration Law (Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz), which further facilitates the possibility of entry to Germany for qualified skilled workers—even those without an academic degree. 3.4 Integration: progress in language learning and labour market participation

The integration of a large number of people in a relatively short period of time poses enormous challenges to every country. Yet, Germany was relatively well prepared with considerable resources, a good infrastructure and a favourable situation on the labour market. Integration is a multi-dimensional process and includes social, cultural, political and economic aspects. Only a very small proportion of the refugees already had German language skills on arrival. In the meantime, a continuous improvement in the language skills of many refugees can be observed. At the end of 2017, half of the refugees who moved in from 2013 to 2016 had taken part in an integration course and around one-third had good or very good German language skills (IAB 2019). These figures are likely to have risen further in the meantime. The integration of asylum-seekers and refugees into the labour market plays a central role in the discussion. In the past, this took longer in Germany—as in many European countries—than in the case of other migrants. Among other things, this has to do with the characteristics of refugees, the special migration process and the legal framework. Even among those who have recently moved in, most do not have any vocational qualifications, which are very important in Germany. At the same time, it should be noted that those refugees who have successfully embarked on the dangerous journey to Germany are younger and have a better school education compared to the average of the population in the countries of origin. The positive labour market situation, easier legal access to the labour market and better and earlier support in language acquisition have contributed to faster integration into the labour market than in the past. The labour market participation of refugees who have moved in since 2015 has continuously improved; in October 2018, 35% of this group was already in employment (IAB 2019).

142  Marcus Engler However, there are still major challenges. The labour market opportunities are very unevenly distributed regionally. The recognition of professional qualifications as well as post-qualification and training will continue to take time. 3.5 Cooperation at the European level and global commitment

Since 2013, the German federal government has advocated for a European solution to the Syrian refugee crisis. This solution was based on the organised admission of some refugees and more even distribution of asylum-seekers across the EU member states. Still, such a solution turned out to be difficult to implement, as only a few countries were ready to participate to a significant extent (Engler 2015a). The arrival of about a million of asylum-seekers in Europe in 2015 and 2016 further aggravated the political climate at the EU-level and led to intense and long-lasting political conflict over the refugee issue. Many governments made it clear that they were not ready to accept a substantial redistribution of asylum-seekers. Meanwhile, a consensus quickly emerged among European political leaders that the number of arriving refugees needed to be significantly reduced. Between the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, different views were expressed about how to achieve this intent. Two options were on the table: the closure of the Balkan Route and an agreement with Turkey. The German government was critical towards a closure of the Balkan Route. The concern was that a closure would put Greece in a difficult situation and would not offer a sustainable humanitarian response for those seeking protection (Bundesregierung 2016). Under these circumstances, Germany was not directly involved in the closure of the Balkan Route, which was mainly organised by the Austrian government in cooperation with the Balkan states. In order to reduce the number of refugees in a sustainable manner, the German government preferred a solution based on a prospective cooperation with Turkey. In March 2016, after several months of negotiations, the European Union and Turkey adopted the EU-Turkey statement behind which Germany was a major political driving force (Collett 2016; König and Walter-Franke 2017). The German government strongly supports the strengthening of the protection of the EU external borders and repeatedly campaigned for migration agreements with North African countries, following the example of the EU-Turkey Deal. Also, the German government strongly supports the cooperation with Libya, concluded in the so-called Malta declaration (Bauloz 2017; Engler 2017). At the same time, Germany is still advocating for a profound reform of the Dublin regulation and fair distribution of asylum-seekers in Europe. In the context of the fierce conflict over the relocation scheme, the government no longer seems to insist on a binding and quota-based distribution for all EU member states and is more open to softer and non-binding forms of solidarity. With regard to the admission of asylum-seekers and refugees over legal programs, the German government is in principle still in favour of resettlement. The implementation of the European relocation schemes was—like in most other countries—rather slow. Faced with several hundred thousand spontaneously arriving asylum-seekers, Germany did not renew its federal humanitarian admission

Germany after “2015”  143 program for Syrians, as did most federal states (Länder). However, Germany is still committed to resettlement and offered 10,200 places in the period 2017– 2019. Most of the places were allocated to Syrians under the framework of the EU-Turkey Statement. Also, Germany regularly participated in the admission of migrants and refugees rescued in the central Mediterranean and committed to accept 25% of all rescued individuals in this area in the framework of a Coalition of the Willing in autumn 2019. Moreover, the German government strongly supports both Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees and has significantly increased its funding for humanitarian assistance and refugee protection in the countries of first asylum. 4 Conclusions and outlook The German case illustrates that the possibility to regulate large flows of people in search of protection while, at the same time, respecting human rights standards are limited for individual national governments, at least in the short term. The German government did not intentionally invite or encourage asylum-seekers to immigrate to Germany or Europe. It rather decided not to close the borders when several hundred thousand asylum-seekers arrived in 2015 in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe and political destabilisation in transit countries. The explanatory factors behind the movement of 2015 are complex. Lack of cooperation at the European and international level, which led to a totally insufficient humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis, is among the main factors. Taking these facts into consideration, attempts to explain the events of 2015 by focusing on an intentional open-door policy of the German government are not only analytically one-dimensional but seem to serve the political purpose of shifting responsibility to others. The historically high immigration of refugees and migrants to Germany led to huge logistical and humanitarian challenges for the German authorities and society. It also triggered a deep conflict in the public sphere and politics and fuelled the establishment of the right-wing AfD. Four years after the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees in Germany, the political and social debate has calmed down somewhat. Structural progress can be observed in the integration of a very large number of new immigrants, for example in language acquisition or in the labour market. However, given the huge numbers and the still recent arrivals of many of the refugees and migrants, the country still faces major challenges in terms of integration. The rise of the AfD has lastingly changed the political landscape of the Federal Republic of Germany. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the events of 2015 did not call into question the overall acceptance of immigration. In principle, the population and political elites are still willing to accept refugees, albeit at smaller numbers. The immigration of qualified workers, on the other hand, is to be significantly expanded. The German government took a more and more restrictive approach towards asylum-seekers and irregular migrants while at the same time facilitating integration

144  Marcus Engler for some refugees and skilled migrants. In principle, the German government and the majority of the population are still ready to accept refugees and very much in favour of a further European integration and global cooperation in this and more general policy areas. The drastic decrease of new arrivals since April 2016 and the decreases in the backlog of pending asylum cases, the easing of accommodation capacities and a relaxing public opinion are collectively increasing the room for manoeuvre for a more humanitarian refugee policy. The development of German asylum and migration policy will continue to be closely linked to European politics. On the one hand, the federal government supports policies which aim at increasingly controlling and reducing irregular flight and migratory movements to Europe. At the same time, it advocates the humanitarian admission of persons seeking protection. How large the humanitarian scope will be depends to a large extent on the willingness of other EU states to participate and receive refugees. In light of the ongoing diverging political approaches to immigration and asylum policies within the European Union, a comprehensive reform in this policy field which would include a proactive and humanitarian approach and would go beyond symbolic politics seems out of sight. Notes 1 Interview conducted by the author with a representative of BAMF, 18.09.2017. 2 Interview conducted by the author with a project member of Amadeu Antonio Foundation, 20.11.2017; interview conducted by the author with staff member of the Federal Criminal Police (BKA), 12.12.2017 (by email). 3 Interview conducted by the author with a responsible person in charge of the Federal Police, 29.11.2017.

References Ahrens, Petra-Angela. 2017. Skepsis und Zuversicht. Wie blickt Deutschland auf Flüchtlinge. Studie des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der EKD, Creo-media. Available at https:// www.siekd.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Skepsis_und_Zuversicht.pdf Bade, Klaus and Oltmer, Jochen (Eds.). 2004. Normalfall Migration, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Bauloz, Céline. 2017. ‘The EU Migration Partnership Framework: an External Solution to the Crisis? EU Migration Law Blog,’ January 31. Available at http://eumigrationlawblog. eu/the-eu-migration-partnership-framework-an-external-solution-to-the-crisis/ Betts, Alexander and Collier, Paul. 2017. Refuge, Transforming a Broken System, London: Allen Lane. Brücker, Herbert, Kunert, Astrid, Mangold, Ulrike, Kalusche, Barbara, Siegert, Manuel and Jürgen Schupp (Eds.). 2016. Geflüchtete Menschen in Deutschland – eine qualitative Befragung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung. Available at https://doku.iab.de/ forschungsbericht/2016/fb0916.pdf Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat, ‘280.000 Asylsuchende im Jahr 2016,’ January 11, 2017. Available at http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/ DE/2017/01/asylantraege-2016.html

Germany after “2015”  145 Collett, Elizabeth. 2016. ‘Commentary: The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal,’ MPI Policy Institute, March. Available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-euturkey-refugee-deal Deutscher Bundestag. 2016. Aktuelle Meldung, March 17. Available at https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/201603/-/415614) Die Bundesregierung. 2016. Merkel: Müssen gemeinsame Antwort finden, March 11. Available at https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2016/03/2016-03-10merkel-­interview-fluechtlingskrise.html Engler, Marcus. 2015a. ‘Europäische Flüchtlingspolitik: Und sie bewegt sich doch,’ Netzwerk Fluchtforschung, September 2. Available at https://fluchtforschung.net/blog beitraege/europaische-fluchtlingspolitik-und-sie-bewegt-sich-doch/ Engler, Marcus. 2015b. Sicherer Zugang. Die humanitären Aufnahmeprogramme für syrische Flüchtlinge in Deutschland, Policy Brief, Forschungsbereich beim Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen. Available at https://www.svr-migration.de/ wp-content/uploads/2023/01/SVR-FB_Sicherer_Zugang_Humanitaere_Aufnahmeprogramme-8.pdf Engler, Marcus. 2016. ‘Auf Einladung der Kanzlerin?,’ Netzwerk Fluchtforschung, August 15. Available at https://fluchtforschung.net/blogbeitraege/auf-einladung-der-kanzlerin/ Engler, Marcus. 2017. ‘Libyen – ein schwieriger Partner der europäischen Migrationspolitik,’ Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, June 28. Available at http://www.bpb. de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/250481/libyen Engler, Marcus and Schneider, Jan. 2015. German Asylum Policy and EU Refugee Protection: The Prospects of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), Focus Migration Policy Brief, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Available at https://www. bpb.de/system/files/dokument_pdf/Policy%20Brief_German%20Asylum%20Policy%20 and%20EU%20Refugee%20Protection_2015.pdf Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. 2019. ‘Wichtige Probleme in Deutschland,’ September 27. Available at https://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Langzeitent wicklung_-_Themen_im_Ueberblick/Politik_II/. Fratzke, Susan (Ed.). 2015. Not Adding up. The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System, Bruxelles: Migration Policy Institute Europe. Grote, Janne (Ed.). 2018. The Changing Influx of Asylum Seekers in 2014–2016: Responses in Germany, Focussed Study by the German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network (EMN), Nürnberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Herbert, Ulrich. 2014. ‘Asylpolitik im Rauch der Brandsätze – der zeitgeschichtliche Kontext’, in Luft, Stefan and Schimany, Peter (eds), 20 Jahre Asylkompromiss. Bilanz und Perspektiven, Bielefeld: Transcript, 87–104. Herbert, Ulrich (Ed). 2017. Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge, Nördlingen: C.H. Beck. Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB). 2019. Flüchtlingsmonitoring: Endbericht, Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, Forschungsbericht 528. Available at https://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/Forschungsberichte/ fb528-fluechtlingsmonitoring-endbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 IOM. 2017. Missing Migrants Project. Available at http://missingmigrants.iom.int/ mediterranean Kalkman, Michael. 2017. Country Report: Germany (2016 Update), Aida – Asylum Information Database. Available at https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ report-download_aida_de_2016update.pdf

146  Marcus Engler Karakayali, Serhat, and Kleist, Olaf. J. 2016. Strukturen und Motive der ehrenamtlichen Flüchtlingsarbeit (EFA) in Deutschland, Berlin: Humboldt-Universität. Koenig, Nicole, and Walter-Franke, Marie. 2017. ‘One Year on: What Lessons from the EU-Turkey “Deal”?,’ Jacques Delors Institut, March 17. Available at https://www.hertieschool.org/fileadmin/user_upload/20170317_EU-Turkey-deal-one-year-on-NK-MW.pdf Münch, Ursula. 2014. ‘Asylpolitik in Deutschland – Akteure, Interessen, Strategien’, in Luft, Stefan and Schimany, Peter (eds), 20 Jahre Asylkompromiss. Bilanz und Perspektiven, Bielefeld: Transcript, 9–86. Münz, Rainer, Seifert, Wolfgang and Ulrich, Ralf (Eds.). 1999. Zuwanderung nach Deutschland – Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. Neumayer, Eric. 2005. ‘Asylum Recognition Rates in Western Europe: Their Determinants, Variation, and Lack of Convergence,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (1), 43–66. Poutrus, Patrice. 2019. Umkämpftes Asyl, Vom Nachkriegsdeutschland bis in die Gegenwart, Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag. Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration. 2014. Deutschlands Wandel zum modernen Einwanderungsland, Jahresgutachten 2014 mit Integrationsbarometer, Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration. Available at https://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/SVR_Jahresgutachten_2014-8.pdf Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration. 2015. Unter Einwanderungsländern: Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich. Jahresgutachten 2015, Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration. Available at https://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/SVR_JG_2015_WEB-8.pdf Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration. 2019. Bewegte Zeiten: Rückblick auf die Integrations- und Migrationspolitik der letzten Jahre, Jahresgutachten 2019, Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration. Available at https://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/SVR_Jahresgutachten_2019-8.pdf Schimany, Peter. 2014. ‘Asylmigration nach Deutschland’, in Luft, Stefan and Schimany, Peter (eds), 20 Jahre Asylkompromiss. Bilanz und Perspektiven, Bielefeld: Transcript, 33–66. Scholz, Antonia. 2013. Warum Deutschland?: Einflussfaktoren bei der Zielstaatssuche von Asylbewerbern: Ergebnisse einer Expertenbefragung, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. Available at https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/ Forschungsberichte/fb19-warum-deutschland.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=14 Spiegel Politics Online. 2016a. ‘Asylanträge beim Bamf: 280.000 Fälle entschieden, mehr als 670.000 offen,’ May 2. Available at https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ fluechtlinge-­frank-juergen-weise-kuendigt-beim-bamf-verbesserungen-an-a-1075806. html Spiegel Politics Online. 2016b. ‘Hohe Zahl von Anschläge auf Flüchtlingsheime,’ December 28. Available at https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/rechtsextremismus-zahlder-anschlaege-auf-fluechtlingsheime-bleibt-hoch-a-1127814.html Statistisches Bundesamt. 2019a. Wanderungen zwischen Deutschland und dem Ausland im Jahr 2019, (Stand: Januar bis Juni), Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. Statistisches Bundesamt. 2019b. GENESIS-Online, Central Database of the Federal Statistical Office. Available at https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online.

Germany after “2015”  147 Thym, Daniel. 2018. ‘Die Flüchtlingskrise vor Gericht. Zum Umgang des EuGH mit der Dublin III-Verordnung,’ Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, 133 (5), 276–284. UNHCR. 2015. Seven factors behind movement of Syrian refugees to Europe, September 25. Available at https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2015/9/560523f26/seven-factorsbehind-movement-syrian-refugees-europe.html UNHCR. 2019. Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2018. Available at https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/#:~:text=The%20world%20now%20has%20a,2018%2C%20 reaching%20a%20record%20high Vis, Farida, and Goriunova, Olga (Eds.). 2015. The Iconic Image on Social Media: A Rapid Research Response to the Death of Aylan Kurdi, Visual Social Media Lab. Available at https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/14624/1/KURDI%20REPORT.pdf Zeit Online. 2015. ‘Deutschland setzt Dublin-Verfahren für Syrer aus,’ August 25. Available at https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-08/fluechtlinge-dublin-eu-asyl

10 Conclusions The crisis of migrants as opposed to the migrant ‘crisis’ and the crisis of European solidarity Marko Kmezić 1 The multiple EU crises conundrum The unprecedented influx of irregular migrants that culminated in the summer of 2015, and later became widely known as the so-called migrant ‘crisis,’ has become one of the biggest challenges to the cohesion of the EU in the organization’s history. As we have demonstrated in this volume, the migrant ‘crisis’ unraveled both EU deepening and widening processes and laid bare a lack of solidarity, the latter of which is one of the main threats for the survival of the EU. As the introduction chapter of this volume points out, there are several reasons for these developments. First, the migrant ‘crisis’ is understood in this book as an accelerant for already existing crises affecting the EU integration project. Concretely, the EU saw the peak of the influx of migrants in the aftermath of the Eurozone’s 2009 economic and financial crisis. The monetary union as conceived by the Maastricht Treaty has proven to be a half-finished project, lacking adequate safeguards and mechanisms for financial solidarity among Member states in cases of emergencies (VaughanWhitehead 2015). The failure to respond quickly to the 2008 financial crisis in the US is one of the most glaring examples of the shortcomings of the Maastricht Treaty. As the EU financial system collapsed, it became obvious that southern Eurozone Member states would fall into much deeper recessions than the more developed economies from the European north. Consequently, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and particularly Greece implemented harsh austerity policies imposed by the EU as the condition for the bailouts they received. The resulting anger of effected Member states opened up a crack between Northern and Southern Europe that impeded EU decision-making for several years. The migrant ‘crisis’ has only deepened these already existing divisions between EU Member states. Second, almost equally important, the EU was faced with the Brexit vote in the UK, the increase in popularity of anti-immigrant far-right parties in Europe, the rise of xenophobic and antiliberal governments from the Baltics to the Balkans, the coronavirus pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the resulting energy crisis. Answers of individual EU Member states to some of these challenges have differed significantly as can be observed in cases of Greece, Hungary, and Germany (see Chapters 4, 8, and 9, Keridis, Szalai, and Engler). At this time, it is safe to predict two points: first, that this era of crises will continue for a number of DOI: 10.4324/9780367823405-10

Conclusions  149 years, and second, that there is no end in sight to mass migration of individuals to Europe in pursuit of better and more stable lives. Third, the migrant ‘crisis’ put the Western Balkans back on the political map by underlining the strategic importance of the region for the EU’s stability and security. However, as described by Ilievski and Runcheva Tasev, Surlić, and Galijaš, in Chapters 5–7, this brief moment of renewed attention in light of the migrant ‘crisis’ has done little to foster more strategic thinking on how to promote lasting stability in the countries of the region, ensure their sustainable democratic transformation, and assist their economic development. Quite to the contrary, as argued by Surlić in Chapter 6, the EU’s horse trading of fundamental European values for geopolitical interests and stability has completely eroded the EU’s credibility as a normative power. Instead, in a need of finding credible partners in countries located along the Balkan migrant route, the EU has been all too ready to overlook democratic backsliding among the candidate countries and to support the local autocratic leaders. 2 The larger crisis of the EU In this book, we have observed these three interlinked points by establishing a contextual narrative of a larger crisis that the EU is currently facing. Namely, we argued that all of these diverse crises should not be observed as a result of a series of individual developments and events, but foremost as a crisis of liberal democracy, compromise-based decision-making, and a lack of solidarity at the European level. In turn, this crisis is producing deep and lasting consequences for the future of EU integration, understood in this volume both as the process of deepening and widening. We grasp EU deepening as a process of increasing the Union’s responsibilities in accordance with the integration strategy, i.e., from economic and legal areas to those in political and social areas. Deepening of the EU implies increased supply of Union-wide democratic legitimacy and solidarity among its Member states. The process of widening presupposes the process of the gradual inclusion of all European states by a process that in essence repeats that of deepening. Along these lines, we followed, within a cross-national comparative perspective, the wide set of political actions and initiatives that continue to shape the journey of the migrants along the Balkan route on their path to the European Union, aiming to test the extent and ways in which the ongoing migrant ‘crisis’ had impact on the nexus between the Balkan migrant route countries and EU (dis)integration processes. 2.1 Internal repercussions of the EU response to a migration issue framed as a crisis

This volume has in some respects a more preliminary task, namely, to gain a better understanding of EU’s response to the migrant ‘crisis.’ Politics, policies, geography, and different historical experiences of EU Member states have shaped sharply contrasting attitudes toward migration. Countries like Germany (see Chapter 9, Engler), and some others that already experienced high levels of immigration,

150  Marko Kmezić initially took a welcoming stance exemplified most vividly by German Chancellor Merkel’s open-door policy, a major pull factor to migrants and refugees. However, Central and Eastern European countries, which for decades had existed in relative detachment or had been countries with a history of emigration, aimed to prevent people from entering their territory (see Chapter 8, Szalai). As described by Keridis (Chapter 4), the frontline states in Southern Europe, where the bulk of the migrants arrived, complained about a lack of solidarity, while Northern European countries, where a large share of the migrants wanted to go, criticized the Southern European governments for not living up to their obligation to process the asylum requests, as required by the Dublin Regulation (Lehne 2022). The various chapters have therefore compared the goals, strategies, policies, and instruments of the EU in an effort to support its ambitious integration project, namely the Schengen passport-free travel zone. The authors look both at the general picture (see Chapter 2, by Kushnir, Kilkey, and Strumia), individual EU Member states responses to the migrant ‘crisis’ (see Chapters, 4, by Keridis, and 9, by Engler), and at EU policies toward individual countries in Southeastern Europe (See Chapters 3, by Tsarouhas; 5, by Ilievski and Runcheva Tasev; 6, Surlić; and 7, by Galijaš). Our bottom line can be summarized as follows: Practically, the responses to the migration ‘crisis’ adopted by the EU entailed a variety of measures in pursuit of different objectives, including enhanced humanitarian action to save lives in the Mediterranean sea; measures to safeguard Europe’s security and reinforce the EU’s external borders to contain cross-border threats; intra-EU security cooperation and exchange of information in countering human trafficking and migrant smuggling; increased development assistance, particularly in Africa, to tackle the root causes of migration; the review of EU asylum policies with the objective of alleviating pressure on national asylum systems in frontline Member states facing the high volume of arrivals; and exploring the Union’s enlargement and external policies by means of far-reaching agreements with neighboring Balkan, African, Asian, and Middle Eastern states to curb irregular immigration, including most notably the March 2016 EU-Turkey Agreement. However, later research noted that some of these measures have often been implemented inadequately, if at all (Coggio 2021; Mac Ginty, Pogodda and Richmond 2021; Raineri and Strazzari 2021). Beyond the realm of discourses, the analysis of how EU migration and enlargement policies have been implemented in practice (see Chapters 2, by Kushnir, Kilkey, and Strumia; 3, Tsarouhas; 4, Keridis; and 9, by Engler) sheds fresh light on the inherent tensions of the EU response to a migration issue and its framing as a crisis. First, restrictive national migration policies, adopted by Member states in haste, often ignored aspects of EU law, for example, with regard to the freedom of movement within the Schengen Area. Second, initial EU policy choices, both internally and in cooperation with third countries, prioritized security-driven and military concerns and interests of the EU and its Member states, where the focus on border controls and fighting against smuggling have by and large prevailed, instead of first ensuring full compliance with fundamental EU values and principles (Carrera et al. 2015).

Conclusions  151 Concretely, as concluded in this volume, these steps did not outweigh the migrant ‘crisis’ negative impact on the cohesion and solidarity within the EU. This remains evident even at the time of publishing this book, as continuous attempts by the European Commission to establish quotas for asylum seekers, and efforts at reaching a more equitable distribution of the migration burden among Member states that would replace the outdated Dublin Regulation, have failed. After years of erratic and uncoordinated actions, the European Commission revealed in September 2020 the long-awaited New Pact on Migration and Asylum to propose a “fresh start” (European Commission 2020) on this highly politicized policy priority. In a nutshell, in the future, the EU should prioritize stopping irregular migration flows at their source, before they reach Europe’s borders. Naturally, policy priorities announced by the European Commission have yet to be endorsed univocally by the European Council Heads of State. However, Hungary (see Chapter 8, Szalai), Poland, and the Czech Republic have on numerous occasions already expressed opposition and denied the obligation to come to a mutual agreement on EU migrant and asylum regulations. The migration ‘crisis’ has thus reinforced preexisting centripetal forces unleashed by the conundrum of previous EU crises, which positioned the migration issue as a colossal challenge to European integration. The ongoing debate on how the EU can strike the right balance between responsibility and solidarity, on the one hand, and opposed national interests and priorities, on the other hand, had proven a very fertile ground for the populist and nationalist Eurosceptic parties that were successful in exploiting growing antimigration sentiments and gained ground in several Member states. Political actors opposing the project of European integration used the situation to set an agenda reducing EU responsibilities with the desire to re-empower the individual nationstates. These efforts found their success in the outcome of the Brexit referendum in June 2016 (see Chapter 2, this volume, by Kushnir, Kilkey, and Strumia) and allowed authoritarian political leaders within the EU, such as Viktor Orban in Hungary (Chapter 8, this volume, Szalai) who exploited the situation to deepen societal capture and further undermine crumbling EU fundamental values as defined in the Treaty on EU. 2.2 The crisis of the EU enlargement

The EU’s political response to the migrant ‘crisis’ in the Balkans initially mostly addressed containment and deterrence. In the absence of more strategic and farreaching comprehensive policy options, the initial EU reaction relied on its already existing Balkan policy, namely the policy of enlargement. The credibility and underlying EU values that supposedly drive the enlargement process were completely sacrificed for the purpose of securitization interests of several Eurosceptic Member states. Worse yet, there have been signs of backroom deals compromising EU support and promotion of more robust democratic societies for stability through propping up strong leaders who are able to tackle the migrant ‘crisis.’ Viewing the migrant ‘crisis’ through the broader framework of the EU’s enlargement policy (see Chapters 3, by Tsarouhas; 5, by Ilievski and Runcheva Tasev; 6, Surlić; and 7, by

152  Marko Kmezić Galijaš), this volume took stock of arrival of migrants and analyzed consequences it had for the EU’s engagement vis-à-vis the Western Balkan candidate states. The EU relationship with the Western Balkans is primarily based on the principle of enlargement as a mechanism for sociopolitical transformation (for an overview, see Džankić, Keil and Kmezić, 2020). The EU’s comprehensive strategy to promote sociopolitical reforms is exercised through the Stabilization and Association Process in the Western Balkans. It consists of the progressive development of contractual relations and institutional ties based on an enhanced political dialogue and monitoring process, supported by financial assistance and technical aid. At the core of these processes is the demand from aspiring Member states to comply with a set of political conditions. In the course of this process, the candidates adopt not only the EU law, but also principles and rules in areas, such as democracy and the rule of law. In a nutshell, the EU relies on the obviously asymmetric relationship with candidate countries to set the rules that shape their public policymaking through the process of accession. The EU pays the reward to governments that comply with their demands and, alternatively, withholds the reward from those that do not. Studies in the Europeanization research area (see Schimmelfenning 2010, 2012, 2015; Sedelmeier 2006, 2011, 2015) have focused on analyzing the conditions under which EU accession conditionality has been effective in inducing rule adoption in EU candidate countries. The main set of findings informs us that the external incentives model hypothesizes that the impact of EU conditionality depends on four factors: (1) the determinacy of EU conditions, (2) the credibility of the membership perspective, (3) the capacity of candidate states, and (4) the adoption costs that they face when transferring the EU conditions into national law and practice. This volume contributes to the specific field of Europeanization studies which considers the EU’s impact beyond the Member states by means of establishing a clear link between the badly prepared EU response to the challenges of managing the Western Balkan migrant route and the factors advancing the impact of EU conditionality, namely the credibility of the enlargement process. This volume shows how the need for stable partners in tackling the consequences of the migrant ‘crisis’ resulted in the EU being all too ready to overlook democratic backsliding among the candidate countries. The credibility of EU enlargement depends on a reliable, merit-based application of conditionality by the EU. The EU’s tendency to turn a blind eye to worrying authoritarian tendencies, as well as the more handson approaches to the problem of migration by certain EU Member states, such as Hungary or Austria, has profoundly diminished the credibility of the enlargement process and even backslid achieved positive effects of enlargement negotiations. This has been particularly apparent in the cases of Macedonia (see Chapter 5, by Ilievski and Runcheva Tasev) and Serbia (see Chapter 6, Surlić). Ultimately, this allowed for the deepening of the symbiotic relationship between Balkan authoritarian strongmen and Eurosceptics within the EU, as best can be observed in case of former North Macedonian Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski. Gruevski, who fled North Macedonia rather than reporting to jail to serve a seven-year sentence for corruption, succeeded in receiving a political asylum in Hungary, a country whose

Conclusions  153 prime minister, Viktor Orban, has prided himself on making his country one of the hardest places in Europe in which to claim asylum, for years centering his political program around xenophobia. 3 Conclusions This volume dealt with the impact of the post-2015 migrant ‘crisis’ on EU integration. The migrant ‘crisis’ was taken to be a culmination of dilemmas, setbacks, as well as concurrences in policy, which were connected to the internal and external EU integration project. This is done not only among EU Member states but also among EU and non-EU Member states. The volume positions the migrant ‘crisis’ inside a framework of recurring crises, from the Eurozone crisis in 2010, followed by a crisis of liberal democracy, and finally the migrant ‘crisis,’ all interrelated and mutually reciprocal, instigating populism and securitization of policies as well as questioning the viability of the EU project per se. We have asserted in this book that in both internal and external dimensions of the migration ‘crisis,’ the EU’s response has centered on fighting the symptoms, rather than on developing more long-term solutions. Concretely, as demonstrated in chapters analyzing effects of the migrant ‘crisis’ in EU Member states, a sudden emergency caused by unprecedented inflow of migrants initially triggered a nation-first reflex which has led to strengthening and subsequently consolidation of Eurosceptic and populist voices. The migration ‘crisis’ led us to understand how conflicting interests of individual EU Member states, combined with ideological diversity, can hinder efforts at collaborative action. At the same time, this should not and is not taken as the EU’s fait accompli; quite the contrary, there are important lessons to be learned from the subsequent crises the EU faced, namely the pandemic crisis and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In both cases, the governments of EU members have responded with remarkable unity and determination, thus leaving room for cautious optimism that the Union will be able to solve difficult problems in the future. Another important take, from the pandemic crisis in particular, is the pivotal role which the European Commission has assumed in preparing the common strategy for all Member states. Although we acknowledge that it is still the Member states who are in the driver’s seat, the technical expertise and operational capacity of the supranational EU institution – the Commission – had proven to be capable to stir and move the EU to act in the time of crisis. The chapters dealing with the non-EU Member states highlighted the importance and urgency of the Western Balkans’ EU enlargement, as it was clearly demonstrated by the region’s central role during the migrant ‘crisis,’ despite the fact that it is still not part of the EU. However, the limited ability of the Union to respond effectively to the migration ‘crises,’ and also to the accompanying challenges to democracy in some Member states, has undermined its appeal as a robust and cohesive group of countries working together to further economic prosperity and democracy. Confronted with so many simultaneous internal and external crises over the past decade, the Union has become more self-absorbed and less concerned with its expansion toward the Balkans. If anything, enlargement has started to lend itself more easily to politicization

154  Marko Kmezić in the national arenas of some Member states, where mainstream or marginal parties with anti-immigration, populist, and Eurosceptic programs exploited popular discontent in a crisis-ridden climate to reinforce EU citizens’ unease about the potential negative implications of further EU widening. Agreeing on these realities should be the first step toward devising a new, fresh, and pragmatic approach toward the Western Balkans. The current EU approach to the region simply contributes to the fading of the EU’s normative and transformative potential, as well as of its image as a reliable promoter of the demands of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. Therefore, instead of relying on strong Balkan leaders to contain the migrant ‘crisis,’ in the future the EU should use the leverage it has in the region, and the tools of EU enlargement policy, to tackle both the internal and the external dimensions of the crisis more forcefully. The first step to rectifying this current reality would be no longer turning a blind eye toward state-capturing Balkan leaders who are undermining the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and media freedom in their countries. By supporting authoritarian tendencies in return for security guarantees, the EU has essentially allowed the deepening of state capture and democratic backsliding in the region and ultimately sidelined the process of EU integration. As seen in this book, crises can also be observed as an open decision-making situation. These crises can serve as a needed stimulant that may trigger reform activities leading to renewed European integration. The EU’s track record of migrant ‘crisis’ management offers lessons that can be applied to current and future challenges the Union is facing. The key question is how the EU can foster the necessary solidarity and democratic decision-making to survive in an increasingly contested world. In the words of Jean Monnet, one of the EU’s institutional architects, “Europe would be built through crises, and that it would be the sum of their solutions” (Monnet, 1978: 147). The past couple of decades, during which the EU has encountered one major crisis after another, have confirmed the wisdom of this well-known quote from Monnet’s memoirs. This book attests that even strong internal pressure combined with severe crisis is not enough to push the EU and its institutions to act boldly and decisively. Therefore, the pressing task for political theorists aiming to articulate normative standards for the EU in the sphere of policymaking is how to ensure the solidarity as the fundamental value underpinning the project of internal and external European integration. Bibliography Carrera, Sergio, Blockmans, Steven, Gros, Daniel and Guild, Elspeth. 2015. ‘The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis. Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities,’ CEPS Essay No. 20/16. Coggio, Tessa. 2021. Europe’s Tackling of ‘Root Causes’ of African Migration Has a Mixed Record, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Džankić, Jelena, Keil, Soeren and Kmezić, Marko (Eds.). 2020. The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans – A Failure of EU Conditionality?, London: Palgrave. European Commission. 2020. ‘Communication from the Commission on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum,’ COM(2020) 609 final, September 23. Available at https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0609.

Conclusions  155 Lehne, Stefan. 2022. The EU and the Creative and Destructive Impact of Crises, Carnegie Europe, October 18. Mac Ginty, Roger, Pogodda, Sandra and Richmond, Oliver P. (Eds.). 2021. The EU and Crisis Response, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Monnet, Jean. 1978. Memoirs, Glasgow: Collins Publishing. Raineri, Luca and Strazzari, Francesco. 2021. ‘Dissecting the EU Response to the “Migration Crisis”,’ in Mac Ginty, Roger, Pogodda, Sandra and Richmond, Oliver P. (eds), The EU and Crisis Response, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 26–59. Schimmelfenning, Frank. 2010. ‘Europeanisation Beyond the Member States,’ Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften, 8 (3), 319–339. Schimmelfenning, Frank. 2012. ‘Europeanization beyond Europe,’ Living Reviews in European Governance 7 (1). Schimmelfenning, Frank. 2015 ‘EU Enlargement’, in Richardson, J. and Mazey, S. (eds), European Union: Power and Policy-Making, London: Routledge, 261–282. Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2006. ‘Europeanization in New Member and Candidate States,’ Living Reviews in European Governance, 1 (3). Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2011. ‘Europeanization in New Member and Candidate States,’ Living Reviews in European Governance 6 (1). Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2015. ‘Enlargement: Constituent Policy and Tool for External Governance”, in Wallace, H., Pollack, M. and Young, A. (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 407–435. Vaughan-Whitehead, Daniel (Ed.). 2015. The European Social Model in Crisis. Is Europe Losing Its Soul?, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Index

Acquis 36–27, 39, 41, 80, 81–83, 141, 143 Aegean Sea 44, 50, 54 Afghanistan 1, 12, 54, 72, 95, 100 Africa 20, 51, 56, 63, 132, 150 Albania 2, 26, 52, 63, 66, 70, 96, 140 Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 22, 39, 138, 143 anti-migration campaign 7, 113, 123 asylum 2, 4, 7–8, 16–17, 25, 34, 40, 43–46, 50–53, 57, 59–60, 63–69, 71–75, 80–91, 95–96, 98, 102–105, 107, 122–124, 130–144, 150–153 Austria 4, 9, 22, 27, 36, 39, 53, 57, 63, 71–73, 136–137, 139, 152 authoritarian 4, 36, 51, 102, 151 Balkan corridor 5, 7, 12, 19, 29–30, 53–54, 56–58, 64, 72 Blue card 25, 82 border controls 2, 22, 50–52, 55, 57, 60, 72, 102, 139, 150 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2, 5, 8, 64, 66, 70, 93, 95, 99, 104–105, 134 Brexit 3–4, 6, 12–13, 16, 19–24, 26–28, 30, 50, 148, 151 Brussels 12–13, 15, 17, 22, 34, 39, 44, 47, 51, 54, 61, 73, 81, 83, 87 Budapest 71, 124–126, 136 Bulgaria 27, 74, 96, 102 citizenship 40, 46, 68, 85–86 civil society 8–9, 45, 66, 70, 81–82, 85, 90, 114, 124, 127, 139 climate change 106, 119 Common Asylum Policy in Europe 25 conditionality 6, 36, 82, 102, 107, 152 Copenhagen 8, 114 countries of preferred destination 5 COVID-19 1, 34

Croatia 2, 27, 52, 70–73, 75, 95–97, 102, 105, 124 Cyprus 27, 36, 42 democracy 3, 17, 28, 45, 51, 120, 126, 149, 152–154 diversity 18, 153 Dublin Convention 16–17 education 24, 28, 42–43, 68, 87, 89, 97, 104, 142 Egypt 1, 66, 99 enlargement 6–7, 12–13, 24–26, 29–30, 37, 90, 133, 150, 152–154 Erdoğan, Tayyip 23, 36, 39–41, 43, 45–46, 55, 58–59 EU – Turkey agreement 3 EU funds 90, 97 European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) 1, 38, 54, 57–58, 73–74, 124 European Commission 13, 17, 21, 24, 26, 29, 38, 42, 44, 55, 71, 82, 97, 135, 151, 153 European identity 14, 18–21, 23–24, 30 European integration 4–5, 50–51, 80, 144, 151, 154 European Parliament 23–24, 35, 102 European periphery 1–2, 8, 60 European relocation schemes 142 Europeanisation 14, 35, 37, 134 Eurosceptic 4, 151, 153–154 Eurozone crisis 39, 46, 153 external borders 73, 102, 124, 142, 150 externalization 2 fences 2, 22, 53, 58, 72 France 36–37, 42, 51, 57, 97, 139 Free movement 12, 27, 82

158  Index Geneva Convention 16, 40, 42, 81, 83, 130 Germany 5, 7–9, 12–13, 16–19, 22, 35, 39, 42, 44–46, 51–57, 59–60, 71–73, 97, 123, 131–144, 148–149 Greece 1–2, 5–7, 9, 12, 16, 19, 21, 35, 38, 44, 47, 50–61, 63–66, 71–73, 96, 107, 114, 136, 142, 148 Greek government-debt crisis 6 hate speech 68, 99 health 57, 65, 68, 87, 95, 97–98, 103–104, 107 human rights 17, 38, 68, 87, 102, 135–136, 140, 143 humanitarian organisations 46 Hungary 2, 4–5, 8–9, 14, 22, 27, 52, 54, 64, 71, 75, 102, 113–115, 117–124, 126–127, 136–137, 151 illiberal democracy 120, 126 immigration policy 24, 34, 56, 59–60 International organization for Migration (IOM) 43–44, 93–94, 97–98, 101, 104, 106, 130, 136 IPA 38 Iraq 1, 41, 54–55, 72 irregular (migration) 2, 6, 39, 47, 74, 81– 82, 151; (arrivals) 2 ISIS 3, 99 Islamophobia 2, 20, 53, 118 Italy 1–2, 54, 56–57, 61, 97, 148 journey 4, 63, 83, 90, 94, 96, 103, 107, 141, 149 judiciary 45, 116, 120, 125, 127 Kosovo 2, 26, 36, 52–53, 66, 70, 96, 140 language learning 87, 141 Libya 1, 99, 142 Macron, Emmanuel 51, 53, 56 Mediterranean Sea 1, 54, 150 Merkel, Angela 7, 39, 53, 55, 59, 72, 102, 107, 135, 137, 139 Middle East 1, 25, 37, 40–41, 51, 63, 99–100 Moldova 1 Monnet, Jean 9, 154 NATO 44, 50, 53, 58 Netherlands 12, 45, 60 North Macedonia 2, 5, 7, 9, 50, 52, 57–58, 63–74, 80, 134, 152

Orban, Viktor 3–4, 53–54, 58, 71–72, 113, 120–125, 151, 153 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 96, 103–104 Poland 70, 75, 151, 14, 19, 22, 27 police cooperation 82 populism/populist 4, 22, 59, 63, 69–70, 74, 122, 151, 153–154 Readmission Agreement 37 reception countries 5 redistribution of refugees 21 relocation quotas 19 right-wing 19–20, 22, 28, 30, 39, 50, 71, 87, 89, 134, 138, 143 rule of law 28, 45, 82, 152, 154 Russia 12, 40, 45, 55, 58–59 Safe Countries of Origin 25, 66, 133–134, 140 Schengen 2, 15, 22, 50, 57, 59–61, 72–73, 82, 96–97, 102, 105–107, 139, 150 securitizing migration 113, 115, 119, 121 security 1, 3, 8, 13, 27–28, 37, 42, 53, 57, 61, 68, 71, 82, 89, 94–95, 97–99, 107, 113–124, 127, 133, 149–150, 154 Serbia 2, 5, 7, 9, 13, 26, 52–53, 63–66, 70–73, 81–90, 93–97, 99, 101–103, 106, 107, 134, 152 Slovenia 27, 71–73, 97, 106 social media 58, 99–100, 126 solidarity 3, 14, 19, 21, 29, 39, 42, 44–46, 50, 53, 71, 80, 87, 90, 126, 134, 142, 148–151, 154 stabilitocracy 4 state-capture 152 statehood 8 sub-Saharan 1, 52 Syria 1–2, 19–22, 34, 38–47, 54–57, 60, 72, 86, 89, 95, 124, 131–136, 142–143 transit country 46, 68, 87, 90, 123 Tsipras, Alexis 50, 55–56 Turkey 2, 5–7, 9, 12, 22–23, 25–26, 28, 34–47, 50–51, 53–59, 63, 66, 73, 81, 87, 96, 107, 130, 132, 135, 137, 139, 142–143, 150 UK 3, 5–6, 9, 12–16, 18–27, 30, 148 Ukraine 1, 148, 153

Index  159 UNHCR 1, 39, 41–43, 51–52, 54–55, 57– 58, 65–66, 68, 75, 85–87, 93–97, 103–104, 106, 135–136 United Nations (UN) 1, 39, 43, 52, 63, 65, 81, 97–98, 136 United States (US) 53, 67, 148, 152 veto powers 115–116, 125, 127 violence 46, 55, 85, 101, 105–108, 135, 138 visa-free travel 37–38, 44–45, 59, 83, 96 visegrad-group countries 14–15, 30, 39, 53, 71, 73, 127 Vučić, Aleksandar 88, 101–102

war 1, 3, 24, 34–36, 39–42, 51–53, 55, 59, 63, 72, 95, 98, 106, 117, 121–122, 132–133, 135 Western Balkan route 1–2, 5–6, 71–72, 74 Western Europe 2, 5, 59, 63–64, 86, 95, 100, 105, 107, 114, 117–118, 121– 122, 126, 136–137 World War II 1, 51–52, 117 xenophobic 3, 19, 50, 68, 99–100, 113, 126, 137–138, 148; (xenophobia) 19, 87–88, 94, 113, 119, 121–122, 127, 153 Yugoslavia 52, 63, 81, 88, 133