Migration as a (Geo- )Political Challenge in the Post-Soviet Space: Border Regimes, Policy Choices, Visa Agendas 9783838273389, 3838273389

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“Well-written and well-structured publication on the highly topical issue of migration in the post-Soviet area. Easy to read and extremely useful for multidisciplinary research.” Roman Petrov, Professor of European Law, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

Ivan Timofeev, Program Director, Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow

Mirko Kruppa, Head of Politics, European Union Delegation in Russia, Moscow

“Gulina offers a fresh and truly complete consideration of migration in the post-Soviet space, not only as a key factor in consolidating the ethnic and national identities of the region’s newly independent states but also as an extension of foreign policy and geopolitics as a tool in the hands of governments. Her treatment of the interplay of territorial conflicts in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe with population movements within and out of the post-Soviet region is an especially timely and important contribution. This work draws on a vast trove of primary source material and sets a high bar for objectivity and methodological rigor.” Matthew Rojansky, Director, The Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC

“This book features remarkable research and an outstanding review of developments in the area of migration between former states of the USSR and the regional successor entities and groupings such as NIS, CIS, EAEU, and GUAM. It touches upon migration as a tool for pursuing internal and external political ambitions, sometimes reaching the limits of politics, where frictions and conflicts start.”

Radim Žák, Regional Coordinator, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna

“One of the best documented and systematic records of the history of migration within the post-Soviet space and beyond its borders, written by a Russian living in Europe who deeply understands the mechanisms both of migration from the newly independent states to Russia and from Russia to the West.” Vladislav Inozemtzev, Director, Center for Research on Post-Industrial Societies, Moscow

“This book constitutes a unique resource on migration politics of the former Soviet Republics; it is empirically rich and analytically nuanced. Gulina reveals migration as a geopolitical, demographic, and social challenge for the countries in the region.” Saidasror Saidov, Department Chief, Tajik Ministry of Labor, Migration and Employment, Dushanbe

The author: Dr. Olga R. Gulina is acting director and founder of RUSMPI – the Institute on Migration Policy in Berlin. The author of the foreword: Dr. Nils Muižnieks was the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights in 2012-2018.

ibidem

Vol. 212

Olga R. Gulina

Migration as a (Geo-) Political Challenge in the Post-Soviet Space Border Regimes, Policy Choices,Visa Agendas

ISBN: 978-3-8382-1338-5 Distributed by

SPPS

Edited by Andreas Umland

Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society

Migration as a (Geo-)Political Challenge in the Post-Soviet Space

“An excellent presentation of all relevant aspects of migration from and within Eastern Europe since the 1990s, providing a fresh perspective that is usually missing in the EU‘s current debate on this topical issue. Gulina reminds us of how much national identity and regional political interest determine migration-related legislation on the European continent and how this also connects with political conflicts in the post-Soviet space.”

212

Gulina

“Sobering, critical, and well-cooked research on migration within the Post-Soviet space. A must-read for scholars on Russian and Eurasian studies worldwide.”

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With a foreword by Nils Muižnieks

ibidem

Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (SPPS)

Vol. 212

ISSN 1614-3515 General Editor: Andreas Umland,

Commissioning Editor: Max Jakob Horstmann,

Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kyiv, [email protected]

London, [email protected]

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE* DOMESTIC & COMPARATIVE POLITICS Prof. Ellen Bos, Andrássy University of Budapest Dr. Gergana Dimova, University of Winchester Dr. Andrey Kazantsev, MGIMO (U) MID RF, Moscow Prof. Heiko Pleines, University of Bremen Prof. Richard Sakwa, University of Kent at Canterbury Dr. Sarah Whitmore, Oxford Brookes University Dr. Harald Wydra, University of Cambridge SOCIETY, CLASS & ETHNICITY Col. David Glantz, “Journal of Slavic Military Studies” Dr. Marlène Laruelle, George Washington University Dr. Stephen Shulman, Southern Illinois University Prof. Stefan Troebst, University of Leipzig POLITICAL ECONOMY & PUBLIC POLICY Dr. Andreas Goldthau, Central European University Dr. Robert Kravchuk, University of North Carolina Dr. David Lane, University of Cambridge Dr. Carol Leonard, Higher School of Economics, Moscow Dr. Maria Popova, McGill University, Montreal

FOREIGN POLICY & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Dr. Peter Duncan, University College London Prof. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, University of Bonn Prof. Gerhard Mangott, University of Innsbruck Dr. Diana Schmidt-Pfister, University of Konstanz Dr. Lisbeth Tarlow, Harvard University, Cambridge Dr. Christian Wipperfürth, N-Ost Network, Berlin Dr. William Zimmerman, University of Michigan HISTORY, CULTURE & THOUGHT Dr. Catherine Andreyev, University of Oxford Prof. Mark Bassin, Södertörn University Prof. Karsten Brüggemann, Tallinn University Dr. Alexander Etkind, University of Cambridge Dr. Gasan Gusejnov, Moscow State University Prof. Leonid Luks, Catholic University of Eichstaett Dr. Olga Malinova, Russian Academy of Sciences Dr. Richard Mole, University College London Prof. Andrei Rogatchevski, University of Tromsø Dr. Mark Tauger, West Virginia University

ADVISORY BOARD* Prof. Dominique Arel, University of Ottawa Prof. Jörg Baberowski, Humboldt University of Berlin Prof. Margarita Balmaceda, Seton Hall University Dr. John Barber, University of Cambridge Prof. Timm Beichelt, European University Viadrina Dr. Katrin Boeckh, University of Munich Prof. em. Archie Brown, University of Oxford Dr. Vyacheslav Bryukhovetsky, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Prof. Timothy Colton, Harvard University, Cambridge Prof. Paul D’Anieri, University of Florida Dr. Heike Dörrenbächer, Friedrich Naumann Foundation Dr. John Dunlop, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California Dr. Sabine Fischer, SWP, Berlin Dr. Geir Flikke, NUPI, Oslo Prof. David Galbreath, University of Aberdeen Prof. Alexander Galkin, Russian Academy of Sciences Prof. Frank Golczewski, University of Hamburg Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev, Naval War College, Newport, RI Prof. Mark von Hagen, Arizona State University Dr. Guido Hausmann, University of Munich Prof. Dale Herspring, Kansas State University Dr. Stefani Hoffman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Prof. Mikhail Ilyin, MGIMO (U) MID RF, Moscow Prof. Vladimir Kantor, Higher School of Economics Dr. Ivan Katchanovski, University of Ottawa Prof. em. Andrzej Korbonski, University of California Dr. Iris Kempe, “Caucasus Analytical Digest” Prof. Herbert Küpper, Institut für Ostrecht Regensburg Dr. Rainer Lindner, CEEER, Berlin Dr. Vladimir Malakhov, Russian Academy of Sciences

Dr. Luke March, University of Edinburgh Prof. Michael McFaul, Stanford University, Palo Alto Prof. Birgit Menzel, University of Mainz-Germersheim Prof. Valery Mikhailenko, The Urals State University Prof. Emil Pain, Higher School of Economics, Moscow Dr. Oleg Podvintsev, Russian Academy of Sciences Prof. Olga Popova, St. Petersburg State University Dr. Alex Pravda, University of Oxford Dr. Erik van Ree, University of Amsterdam Dr. Joachim Rogall, Robert Bosch Foundation Stuttgart Prof. Peter Rutland, Wesleyan University, Middletown Prof. Marat Salikov, The Urals State Law Academy Dr. Gwendolyn Sasse, University of Oxford Prof. Jutta Scherrer, EHESS, Paris Prof. Robert Service, University of Oxford Mr. James Sherr, RIIA Chatham House London Dr. Oxana Shevel, Tufts University, Medford Prof. Eberhard Schneider, University of Siegen Prof. Olexander Shnyrkov, Shevchenko University, Kyiv Prof. Hans-Henning Schröder, SWP, Berlin Prof. Yuri Shapoval, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Prof. Viktor Shnirelman, Russian Academy of Sciences Dr. Lisa Sundstrom, University of British Columbia Dr. Philip Walters, “Religion, State and Society”, Oxford Prof. Zenon Wasyliw, Ithaca College, New York State Dr. Lucan Way, University of Toronto Dr. Markus Wehner, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” Dr. Andrew Wilson, University College London Prof. Jan Zielonka, University of Oxford Prof. Andrei Zorin, University of Oxford

* While the Editorial Committee and Advisory Board support the General Editor in the choice and improvement of manuscripts for publication, responsibility for remaining errors and misinterpretations in the series’ volumes lies with the books’ authors.

Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (SPPS) ISSN 1614-3515 Founded in 2004 and refereed since 2007, SPPS makes available affordable English-, German-, and Russian-language studies on the history of the countries of the former Soviet bloc from the late Tsarist period to today. It publishes between 5 and 20 volumes per year and focuses on issues in transitions to and from democracy such as economic crisis, identity formation, civil society development, and constitutional reform in CEE and the NIS. SPPS also aims to highlight so far understudied themes in East European studies such as right-wing radicalism, religious life, higher education, or human rights protection. The authors and titles of all previously published volumes are listed at the end of this book. For a full description of the series and reviews of its books, see www.ibidem-verlag.de/red/spps.

Recent Volumes 205

Ksenia Maksimovtsova Language Conflicts in Contemporary Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine A Comparative Exploration of Discourses in Post-Soviet Russian-Language Digital Media With a foreword by Ammon Cheskin ISBN 978-3-8382-1282-1

206

Michal Vít The EU’s Impact on Identity Formation in EastCentral Europe between 2004 and 2013 Perceptions of the Nation and Europe in Political Parties of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia With a foreword by Andrea Petö ISBN 978-3-8382-1275-3

207

Per A. Rudling Tarnished Heroes The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Memory Politics of Post-Soviet Ukraine ISBN 978-3-8382-0999-9

208

Editorial correspondence & manuscripts should be sent to: Dr. Andreas Umland, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, vul. Volodymyrska 42, off. 21, UA-01030 Kyiv, 209 Ukraine Business correspondence & review copy requests should be sent to: ibidem Press, Leuschnerstr. 40, 30457 Hannover, Germany; tel.: +49 511 2622200; fax: +49 511 2622201; 210 [email protected]. Authors, reviewers, referees, and editors for (as well as all other persons sympathetic to) SPPS are invited to join its networks at www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=52638198614 211 www.linkedin.com/groups?about=&gid=103012 www.xing.com/net/spps-ibidem-verlag/

Peter H. Solomon Jr., Kaja Gadowska (Eds.) Legal Change in Post-Communist States Progress, Reversions, Explanations ISBN 978-3-8382-1312-5

Pawel Kowal, Georges Mink, Iwona Reichardt (Eds.) Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine I Theoretical Aspects and Analyses on Religion, Memory, and Identity ISBN 978-3-8382-1321-7

Pawel Kowal, Georges Mink, Adam Reichardt, Iwona Reichardt (Eds.) Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II An Oral History of the Revolution on Granite, Orange Revolution, and Revolution of Dignity ISBN 978-3-8382-1323-1

Li Bennich-Björkman, Sergiy Kurbatov (Eds.) | When the Future Came: The Collapse of the USSR and the Emergence of National Memory in PostSoviet History Textbooks ISBN 978-3-8382-1335-4

212

Olga R. Gulina Migration as a (Geo-)Political Challenge in the PostSoviet Space Border Regimes, Policy Choices, Visa Agendas With a foreword by Nils Muižnieks ISBN 978-3-8382-1338-5

Olga R. Gulina

MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE Border Regimes, Policy Choices, Visa Agendas With a foreword by Nils Muiznieks

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Cover picture: © copyright 2019 by Mikhail Minakov. Printed with kind permission.

ISBN-13: 978-3-8382-7338-9 © ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart 2019 Alle Rechte vorbehalten Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und elektronische Speicherformen sowie die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronical, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

To Tamara, Rifmir, Rüdiger, Alexander, Timur, Ursula and Helmut.

       

The history of this book began in 1984, when a little girl received a 96-page book with a bright yellow cover, titled 15 Republics’ Sisters, from her parents for her achievements at preschool. This children’s book tells stories about traditions, culture and daily life in 15 former Soviet republics. It is this book that has always been and remains a small engine, pushing the author into the distant roads through the newly independent states of the former USSR. This children’s book and the book in your hands are the author’s personal proof that long roads begin in children’s dreams, and can be inspired by the gift of a good book from beloved people.

 

Table of Contents Abbreviations ...................................................................................... 11 Foreword .............................................................................................. 13 Introduction ......................................................................................... 17 Chapter 1: Legal Framework of Migration Management in Post-Soviet States ............................................................................... 19 Regulation of Migration in the 1990s ........................................ 19 Regulation of Migration in the 2000s ........................................ 23 Regulation of Migration 2010-2018 ........................................... 25 Chapter 2: Migration Management as a Geopolitical Tool in the Post-Soviet Space .................................................................... 29 Russia and Georgia: Neither Friends nor Enemies ................. 30 Russia and Ukraine: Between Confrontation and Cooperation .................................................................................. 33 Russia and Belarus: The Union State divided by Straight Lines................................................................................ 35 Chapter 3: Migration as a Geopolitical Challenge for Russia .... 37 Migration as a Demographic Challenge ................................... 38 Political Challenge of Migration in Russia ............................... 43 Migration as a Social Challenge................................................. 47 Chapter 4: Migration as a Geopolitical Challenge for Ukraine . 51 Going to the West ........................................................................ 52 Going to Russia ............................................................................ 56 Chapter 5: Ukrainian Nationals Searching for Shelter and Asylum in Russia, Belarus and within Ukraine ........................... 61 The Statistical Overview ............................................................. 62 Situation in Russia ....................................................................... 64 Work Patent (Labor License) ...................................................... 64 9

  Refugee Status .............................................................................. 67 Temporary Asylum ..................................................................... 69 Situation in Belarus ..................................................................... 71 Situation in Ukraine .................................................................... 73 Legal Misinterpretation in Russia and Ukraine ...................... 78 The Potential Impact of the Conflict on Migration in other post-Soviet countries ................................................................... 82 Re-drawing the Migration Landscape ...................................... 83 Chapter 6: Migrants from the FSU-Countries in the European Union: Safe Countries of Origin?.................................. 85 Countries of the Former Soviet Union as the SCOs ................ 87 Humanitarian Migrants from Georgia, Ukraine and Russia in the EU Member States ............................................................ 91 Ukraine – Europe’s Forgotten Refugees? ................................. 93 Russians Seeking Asylum in the EU ......................................... 95 EU Visa Liberalization policy in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine .......................................................................................... 98 Where is this “Europe Without Visas and Borders?” ............. 99 Melting the Frozen Conflicts .................................................... 101 Chapter 7: Post-Soviet Migration, Diaspora and Beyond ......... 103 Understanding Diaspora Issues............................................... 103 Institutionalization of Diaspora Politics ................................. 105 Migration and Repatriation in Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan ................................................................................. 110 The Russian Case ....................................................................... 111 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Repatriation Programs ........... 114 Chapter 8: Conclusion...................................................................... 119 Annexes .............................................................................................. 123

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Abbreviations BAMF BKA CIS DNR EAEU EU EurAsEC FMS FOM FSB FSU IDP IHLs ISIS KR LNR NIS RF RK Rosstat SCO TAF Ukrstat USSR VCIOM

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees of Germany German Federal Criminal Police Commonwealth of Independent States Donetsk People's Republic Eurasian Economic Union European Union Eurasian Economic Community Federal Migration Service of Russia Public Opinion Foundation in Russia Federal Security Service Former Soviet Union States Internally Displaced People Institutions of Higher Learning Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Kyrgyz Republic Luhansk People's Republic Newly Independent States Russian Federation Republic of Kazakhstan Federal State Statistics Service of Russia Safe Country of Origin Temporary Accommodation Facilities State Statistics Service of Ukraine Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Russian Public Opinion Research Center

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Foreword It is difficult to think of a more important issue facing broader Europe than the challenge of managing migration. In 2015 and 2016 and thereafter, the world witnessed a Europe mired in a migration policy crisis, wherein human rights obligations were often ignored. Thus, Europe saw: many deaths at sea; pushbacks of desperate people to places where they faced the risk of torture; abuse by border guards and vigilante citizen groups at national frontiers; the construction of a network of razor wire border fences; and a race to the bottom to make life “unattractive” for new arrivals. Migration is not only a human rights challenge, but a political one as well, as populist demagogues have mobilized fear of newcomers and upended party systems across Europe. This fear of Other(s) prevents rational discussion of the role of migration in addressing Europe’s demographic crises and labor market needs. This fear has also prompted many European leaders to take steps undermining European integration. The fences and “temporary” border checks within the European Union risk unravelling the Schengen treaty, one of the signal achievements of the EU. European cooperation has been strained by the manifest lack of solidarity and the adoption by many countries of “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies, seeking to divert migratory flows towards other states. The issue has not only poisoned relations within Europe, but sometimes generated further acrimony and suspicion between the EU and Russia. Disagreements over the Syrian crisis prompted some to claim that Russia was “weaponizing” migration. The focus of most analysis of migration on the continent has been on EU member states and the Mediterranean migration route. But, as Olga Gulina demonstrates in this compact volume, there have been hugely consequential migration developments in the post-Soviet space that have been largely ignored by Western observers and policy-makers. Indeed, what little work that has been conducted on migration in this part of Europe has framed the issue largely in terms of Russia’s influence on its neighbors, particularly 13

  those prioritized by the EU, such as Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Olga Gulina’s analysis provides a more nuanced view of migration developments, examining not only Russia’s policies, but also that of other countries in the post-Soviet space. She stresses not only the geopolitics of migration, but its demographic and social aspects as well. She traces the longer trends in migration policy development since Soviet disintegration from post-Soviet “chaos” to the current “dysfunctional migration management.” A key turning point took place from 2014 to 2016, when the Russia-Ukraine conflict transformed the migration landscape of the whole region. For the first time in recent years, Ukrainian migrants to Russia outnumbered those from Central Asia. Moreover, the conflict prompted many Ukrainians to move West, not only to study and work, but also to avoid conscription. While Poland has obdurately refused to participate in the EU program of refugee relocation from Greece and Italy, it has opened its arms to large numbers of Ukrainians. The analysis also undermines the common stereotype that Russia, as a magnet for migrants from the post-Soviet countries, is always a policy-maker, not a policy “taker.” Other interesting details include the suggestion that Georgia, through selective visa liberalization, intentionally risked destabilizing Russia’s North Caucasus. An important consequence of the recent slowdown of Russia’s economy and the arrival of many Ukrainians fleeing conflict was a decrease in Russia’s need for Central Asian migrant labor. The return of Central Asians from Russia to their countries of origin may have a huge impact, as a lack of employment opportunities in the region could stoke social tensions. As Central Asia has supplied a significant number of the foreign fighters for ISIS, one worries about the security risks inherent in the social exclusion of “returnees” from Russia. On the other hand, when one reads that remittances constitute up to 45 percent of Tajikistan’s GDP, one begins to understand the salient role of migrants for wellbeing in this and other countries of the region. 14

The analysis also yields intriguing details about the role of smaller post-Soviet countries in the European migration landscape. While the plight of and problems surrounding Chechen asylumseekers in Western Europe are well known, few have taken note of the significant number of asylum-seekers from Georgia, who recently constituted as much as 18 percent of all asylum-seekers in Spain. This begs the question of why so many persons are claiming persecution from a country that has regularly been seen as a champion of reform, and frontrunner among candidates for closer European integration. Olga Gulina’s work is rich in statistics and comprehensive in its analysis of legislative developments. This research is an important contribution towards enhancing understanding of a neglected topic. I eagerly anticipate reading more. Nils Muižnieks Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012-2018

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Introduction It has been 27 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Newly independent states formed on the ruins of the Soviet empire were involved in migration processes at local, national and global levels, both as migrant-supplying countries (Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and as migrant-destination countries (Russia, Kazakhstan). The USSR became defunct in 1991, and in the period that followed, the new ruling elites could not get migration under their control. This political earthquake and subsequently changed landscape have left marks on every Soviet citizen. For 70 years the Soviet empire carried out the regular mobilization of its population from Kaliningrad to the Far East, from Moscow to the borders, and from the southern mountains to the northern sea, in order to increase the country’s workforce potential and enhance its industrialization. After the breakup of the USSR, the geopolitical consequences of the disintegration were felt as individual tragedies of the country’s inhabitants. Overnight, millions became citizens of newly independent states, separated by borders, visas and passport requirements, with enormous implications. These consequences arose because the vectors of the post-Soviet nations’ migration policies have been informed not by considerations of cultural, historical and economic advantages of the countries and their populations, but by new geopolitical rivalries guided by the sentiment that there is no middle ground; countries were only allowed to be allies or rivals in this brave new world. At the turn of the millennium, the post-Soviet migration chaos began to transform, turning into a dysfunctional migration management swayed by agendas pursued by the ruling elites. Political and geopolitical games around migration issues have been and remain an efficient mechanism of influence; they are good for destabilizing the situation across many states in the former USSR, slowing down the reforms and challenging policies. What is

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common between Uzbekistan and Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Belarus, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan? These newly independent states, built on the ruins of the USSR, have their own self-determining present. They are independently planning their economic and political futures, but all of them are still interconnected by their common Soviet past. This book is dedicated to the reflections and evaluation of migration policies; in examining their impact on legal, social, and economic dynamics, we can advance our understanding about political challenges ahead in the independent countries of the former USSR.

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Chapter 1: Legal Framework of Migration Management in Post-Soviet States Regulation of Migration in the 1990s On May 20, 1991―seven months prior the official disappearance of the USSR from the world map―the first and last President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev signed the law “On the Procedure for Leaving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Entering the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Citizens of the USSR.” This 1991 law was a breath of fresh air and a harbinger of the forthcoming changes. The law was quite liberal, compared to the regime before. First of all, the law allowed all Soviet citizens to travel outside the USSR at the invitation of state, public and religious organizations, at the request of enterprises or individuals, as well as at the personal request of Soviet citizens. This was not the case previously. Secondly, the law set clear time limits on the procedure of issuing documents, which were: three months for leaving the USSR for permanent residence abroad; one month for a temporary stay abroad; less than three days in case of emergency caused by the illness, death or other personal circumstances of the applicants requiring immediate presence outside the USSR. Thirdly, for the first time, citizens who left the USSR for permanent residence in other countries were allowed to export their property, foreign currency, and also to preserve the right to own property in the territory of the USSR. This included the right to have cash, securities and other valuables kept in the USSR Soviet banks. The articles of the Soviet law of 1991 regulated the mobility of the post-Soviet population until the adoption of Constitutions and special Laws of the newly independent states (NIS) in 1994-1996 (see Table 1). Thus, in Ukraine, the norms of the USSR law were no

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longer in effect only after adopting the law of Ukraine dated January 21, 1994 (No. 3857-XII “On the Procedure for Leaving Ukraine and Entering Ukraine for Citizens of Ukraine.” In Russia the changes entered into force on August 15, 1996 with the passing of Law No. 114 – FL, “On the Procedure for Leaving the Russian Federation and Entering the Russian Federation.” Table 1. Country

Basic laws regulated the mobility of population in post-Soviet countries

Armenia

The Day Constitution / Basic Law was adopted 5 July 1995

Azerbaijan

12 November 1995

Belarus Georgia

15 March 1994 24 August 1995

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia

28 January 1993 *revoked* 30 August 1995 5 May 1993 12 December 1993

Tajikistan Ukraine

6 November 1994 28 June 1996

Uzbekistan

8 December 1992

Right to free movement is reserved for: Everyone who legally resides in the territory, Art. 25 Everyone who legally resides in the territory, Art. 28-3 Only citizens, Art. 30 Everyone who legally resides in the territory, Art. 22 Everyone who legally resides in the territory, Art. 21 Everyone, Art. 25 Everyone who legally resides in the territory, Art. 27 Only citizens, Art. 24 Everyone who legally resides in the territory, Art. 33 Only citizens, Art 28

In Belarus, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the right to freedom of movement belongs only to citizens of these states. In other post-Soviet countries―Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan―the right to freedom of movement and choice of place of residence is reserved for everyone who legally resides in the territory of these states. Such a formulation suggests that people who violate the country's immigration rules and stay on its territory unauthorized cannot move freely, choose their place of residence, or even leave the country. From a legal point of view, the most liberal norm is Article 25 of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which guarantees everyone the right to freedom of movement, choice of a place of stay and residence in the Kyrgyz Republic (Article 25, Part 1); it also

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

21

guarantees the right to free travel outside the Kyrgyz Republic (Article 25, Part 2). An outbreak of legislative activity in the field of migration regulation in independent states happened in the second half of the first decade after the collapse of the USSR, 1995-1999, when, starting to recover from the changes, the legislators of independent states began to shape documents regulating internal, external and humanitarian migration (see Table 2). The first refugees in post-Soviet countries were: those who fled from the riots of Armenians in Sumgait and Baku in 1988-1990; Meskhetian Turks from Fergana in 1989; victims of the civil war in Tajikistanin 1992-1997, and others. Complicated ethnic conflicts in the era of state-formation of independent states led to an urgent need for legal regulation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The 1993 Agreement on Assistance to Refugees and Forced Migrants of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)1 countries was declarative rather than prescriptive, and could not fully regulate the problems arising between independent states after to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The post-Soviet countries that faced these challenges of humanitarian crisis—Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan—were among the first to create national legislation in this field.

 

                                                             1

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional intergovernmental organization focused on cooperation on political, economic, environmental, humanitarian, cultural and other levels between former Soviet Republics. It was founded in 1991 after the dissolution of the USSR and included 12 member states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Georgia left the CIS in August 2008, and by February 2019 Ukraine had left.

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Table 2.

Legal documents regulating humanitarian migration in former Soviet states, 1990-1999.

Country

Laws

Armenia

On Refugees, 27 March 1999 On Political Asylum, 26 September 2001. On Refugees and Asylum, 24 January 2009

Azerbaijan

On the Status of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 29 November 1992. On the Status of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 21 May 1999

Belarus

On Refugees, 22 February 1995. On Refugees, 4 January 2003 On Granting of Refugee Status, Complementary Protection, Asylum and Temporary Protection to Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Republic of Belaru, 23 June 2008

Georgia

On Refugees, 18 February 1998 On Refugee and Humanitarian Status, 6 December 2011

Kazakhstan

On Refugees, 4 December 2009

Kyrgyzstan

On Refugees, 25 March 2002

Russia

On Refugees, 19 February 1993 On Internally Displaced Persons, 20 December 1995

Tajikistan

On Refugees, 20 July 1994

Ukraine

On Refugees, 24 December 1993 On Refugees and Persons in Need of Additional or Temporary Protection, 8 July 2011 On Legal Status of Persons Forced to Leave the Residence as a Result of Temporary Occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol and Circumstances of Anti-terroristic Operations on the Territory of Ukraine, 19 June 2014.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has not acceded to the UN Convention on Refugees and has no special law in this area. The granting of asylum is regulated by Presidential Decree No. UP-5060, 29 May 2017

In the first decade after the collapse of the USSR, the post-Soviet countries started looking for ways of joint regulation of migration processes with different levels of interest and activity.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

23

On November 13, 1992, they established the Consultative Council of the CIS on Labor, Migration and Social Protection of the Population of the CIS States Parties. In April 1994, they adopted an agreement on cooperation in the field of labor migration and social protection of migrant workers in the CIS countries. In February 1995, the CIS regulations were approved and an interstate fund for assistance to refugees and IDPs was created. On March 6, 1998, the Agreement on Cooperation of the CIS States Parties in Combating Illegal Migration was signed; two years later, on January 25, 2000, they approved a regulation on a common database of unauthorized migrants and persons whose entry into the CIS countries was restricted in accordance with their national legislation, and procedures for exchanging information concerning illegal migration. The post-Soviet countries worked on concluding bi-lateral and multilateral agreements in the field of migration management; however these did not keep pace with the political, social and economic changes taking place within the countries. The dynamism and abruptness of the collapse of the Soviet Union led to stagnation in many legal areas. As a result, the legal formalization of the mass movement of people in the era of the state-formation of independent states was carried out by means of by-laws. These were orders, resolutions or instructions of various state bodies, or the use of previous laws of the bygone Soviet Union.

Regulation of Migration in the 2000s The legalization of this stage of migration regulation in post-Soviet countries was closely related to the matter of ensuring security in independent states, combating illegal migration and managing migration for internal demographic purposes. Following the stated guidelines, in 2004, the Council of CIS Heads of Governments―Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan―created a joint commission on collaboration in combating illegal migration and approved the Concept of Cooperation in confronting illegal migration. In October 2007, the Declaration on the Coordinated Migration Policy of the CIS States was adopted, the purpose being to

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create and maintain a single migration framework for free movement and the functioning of a common workforce. In 2008, they adopted the Economic Development Strategy of the CIS countries for the period up to 2020, which declared the following main lines of cooperation among the CIS countries in the field of migration: the implementation of a coherent migration policy; regulation of labor migration which takes into account the interests of both migrant-receiving and migrant-supplying countries; the formation of a common labor market; free movement of labor; and combating illegal migration. Integration processes following the collapse of the USSR took on different forms. On January 26, 2000, the Agreement on the Establishment of the Union State of Russia and Belarus was ratified by the parliaments of Russia and Belarus, proclaiming a coherent policy of these countries on employment, migration, working conditions and their protection (Article 18 of the Treaty). It also declared de jure free movement of citizens of the Union States within these territories. In October 2000 the heads of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan signed a Treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Community. This was the first treaty to declare freedom of movement of goods, works and services among independent states, and became the basis of the Eurasian Economic Union. This treaty had a great impact on the dynamics of migration processes in the whole subsequent decade. The years of 2000-2010 are also characterized by the elites in the independent states having a growing interest in their national diasporas living abroad. This included trying to understand, and to some extent control, migration by different ethnic groups, and the returning of representatives of the indigenous ethnic groups, or compatriots 2.

                                                             2

The term “compatriot” was introduced by the Russia’s Federal Law of 1999 “On the State Policy of Russia Concerning Compatriots Abroad.” It includes four groups of people: citizens of the Russian Federation residing abroad; individuals that used to have Soviet citizenship; individuals and their descendants who emigrated from the USSR or Russian Federation; those, who educated in the traditions of Russian culture and the possession of the Russian language.

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Among the 15 former Soviet states, seven of them―Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine―have special programs for the diaspora or compatriots living abroad. The hierarchy of government bodies responsible for the implementation of these initiatives, and the level of financial and institutional support for repatriates, are different.

Regulation of Migration 2010-2018 The years 2010-2018 mark the third stage of the legal regulation of migration processes in independent states. This reflects the turbulence of new economic and political transformations in the region. The countries receiving migrants―Russia, Kazakhstan and, in recent years, Kyrgyzstan, accepting Tajik migrants in their frontier areas―are interested in receiving economic benefits from migration while simultaneously tightening immigration rules. On May 20, 2010, the Russian authorities introduced migration patents guaranteeing the right to work in the territory of Russia to citizens of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan after they have paid monthly taxes and gone through a fingerprinting procedure. A new mechanism of legal regulation has allowed many migrants to be taken out of the “grey” zone; they can now legalize their status, but this takes higher fees, which have added substantial sums to the budget of the Russian Federation. In 2012, Kazakhstan, following the example of the Russian Federation, introduced a similar mechanism for regulating the employment of visa-free citizens from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and others in the households of Kazakhstan. Having made preliminary tax payments, each visa-free migrant receives a work patent. Similar to Russia, the simplification of migration management in Kazakhstan contributed to reducing the potential of corruption in this area of public administration, decreased the number of irregular migrants in the country, and increased revenues to the budget by means of income taxes paid by working migrants. The introduction of this patent mechanism made migration management in both countries more transparent, because it became much easier to buy and register a patent than to bribe. Combating illegal

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migration led to harsher penalties for violations of immigration laws, and increased penalties for unauthorized labor activities of migrants. In 2013, Articles 322.2-322.3 appeared in the Russian Criminal Code, entailing criminal liability for acts of fictitious registration of a citizen of the Russian Federation and/or a foreign citizen; the law also made it illegal to perform fictitious registrations of foreign citizens. In 2014 Kazakhstan followed this innovation. The criminal code of the country was updated with Article 394 to manage illegal migration, where the legislators recognized the abuse of official positions in order to facilitate illegal entry, exit and movement within the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Similar responsibility for facilitating and organizing illegal migration is also established in: Article 322.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation; Article 318.1 of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan; Article 335.1 Criminal Code of Tajikistan; Article 332 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine; Article 362 of the Criminal Code of Moldova; and Article 371.1 of the Criminal Code of Belarus. The potential for profit is huge from exploiting the labor of irregular migrants’ working in terrible and often dangerous conditions, paying only subsistence wages with no time off, and with none of the legal and social protections. However, only the legislators of Belarus and Ukraine consider the confiscation of property as appropriate punishment for those responsible. More severe punishments for violation of immigration rules for entry and exit are set by Russia and Kazakhstan in cases when these acts are committed in collusion with or by a criminal group―up to seven years in prison. Belarus is the only country that considers harsher sentences when those found to be organizing illegal migration commit inhuman, violent or humiliating treatment of migrants. Unauthorized and undocumented migrants, and other people violating immigration rules, prove to be a headache to the government officials in countries receiving migrants. That is why cooperation on concluding agreements on readmission (the voluntary return to the country of origin of migrants who violated the laws of the receiving country) becomes a priority issue in the migration management of post-Soviet states. Agreements on readmission were signed by: the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan in July 2007

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(although at the time of writing this agreement was no longer in operation); Russia and Armenia in August 2010; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine in 2012; and the Russian Federation and Belarus in November 2013. In 2012, Kazakhstan signed readmission agreements with Uzbekistan, and in 2018 it was agreed between Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. In October 2018, a readmission agreement was signed by the Heads of States of Ukraine and Belarus. In recent years, further negotiations on signing the readmission agreement were held by Russia and Tajikistan, Armenia and Belarus, and Armenia and Kazakhstan. In summary, three decades have passed since the collapse of the USSR, during which independent states have done a significant job in managing migration. The time between 1991 and 2019 can be divided into three periods marked by different stages of the formation of independent post-Soviet states and the migration of their populations. The first stage, from 1991 to 2000, is the era of new independence and migration chaos in the wake of the Soviet Union. The second stage, from 2001 to 2010, is the period of strengthening statehood and the streamlining of migration management. The third stage, from 2011 and up to the time of writing (2019), has become an era of turbulent change and a capitalistic approach to the matter of migration. The ruling elites of the newly independent states have started to monetize migration and its social capital. Migration management became an array of tools for staking out their zones of influence, as well as serving as winning slogans for election campaigns. Migration legislation also exerts significant control over parts of the population at home and abroad. These instruments are widely used in all states created from the ruins of the USSR. Since the signing of the Treaty on the Creation of the CIS and the elimination of the USSR, post-Soviet states have undergone profound transformations: emigration, immigration and mobility within the post-Soviet countries have changed the demographic and socio-cultural landscape significantly. The next chapters below analyze those changes in detail.

Chapter 2: Migration Management as a Geopolitical Tool in the Post-Soviet Space The ruling elites of the newly independent states rose from the ashes of the Soviet empire. They continued to exploit, with varying degrees of success, the institutions and mechanisms of migration law with different activities. For example, the granting of citizenship, asylum, work permits, temporary and permanent residence authorization all can be manipulated in the pursuit of foreign and domestic policy objectives. It comes as no surprise that when visiting the Central Asian nations in March 20173, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rahmon, President of Tajikistan, reached an agreement about amnesty for labor migrants from Tajikistan; this caused a subsequent flare of enthusiasm among the Tajiks towards their ruling elites and Rahmon’s presidency. The dual citizenship agreement between Russia and Moldova, and the legalization of four million Moldovan migrants who had previously violated Russia’s migration laws, were the main slogans of the party led by Moldova’s president Igor Dodon at the parliamentary election in 2018. In January 2017, Armenia and Russia agreed a visa-free travel agreement, whereby Russians may enter and exit Armenia using their internal passports; it was not surprising that this coincided with the completion of a new round of difficult talks about the EUArmenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement at the same time. In contrast to the announced liberalization of the Russian-Armenian arrangements, the abolishment of the visa waivers program

                                                             3

In the context of this book, Central Asia consists of former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan which became newly independent states in 1991.

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between Russia and other Central Asian nations is bound to remain unresolved for a long time to come. This is because the introduction of visas for citizens of the post-Soviet Central Asian countries, while being an important instrument for focusing the Russian voters’ attention, remains at odds with some of Russia’s foreign policy interests. The Eurasian Union, built on the example of the European Union, presupposes a free movement of goods, services, and free circulation of labor. Established in January 2015, the Eurasian Union prioritizes the trade and economic integration of Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in a single customs territory. Inside this customs union there are no customs duties or restrictions of an economic nature, with the exception of special protective, anti-dumping and countervailing measures. Declaring the importance of this task at the highest state level, Russian has no interest in introducing a visa regime with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, or the other countries of Central Asia. Nowadays, any changes in migration management in post-Soviet countries are both a cause and a consequence of political changes. The rules governing the issuance of visas or work permits, legalization of undocumented migrants, the granting of citizenship and / or asylum are the subject of political bargaining; as such they are used as instruments for leverage in both foreign and domestic policy making.

Russia and Georgia: Neither Friends nor Enemies Five days in August 2008 changed Russian-Georgian relations forever. Both countries blame each other for military actions on the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia―two regions of Georgia which declared their independence from Georgia in 1990 (South Ossetia) and 1992 (Abkhazia). The diplomatic break between Georgia and Russia in the wake of the armed conflict between them produced an instant effect on migration management in both countries. Long before 2018, visa restrictions were closely linked to tension between the countries. The visa regime had been introduced be-

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tween Russia and Georgia in 2000; immediately after the recognition of Abkhazia4 and South Ossetia5 by Russia in 2008, the visa issuance rules were changed. In 2010, driven by the desire to somehow hurt Russia and under the slogans of unification of the peoples of the South and North Caucasus regions, Georgia unilaterally relaxed its visa requirements for certain categories of Russian citizens. These were residents of the North Caucasus regions: Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Adygea. The North Caucasus republics of Russia and their population are of special attention to the government due to their geography and the potential for conflict. This regional destabilization of Russia’s problem-plagued regions generated a strong reaction among Russia’s politicians and produced serious undesirable effects in real life. Georgia’s citizens living outside Russia began to experience harsh difficulties trying to obtain Russian visas; the bureaucratic procedures became ever more complicated, and the number of rejected applications for any type of the Russian visas grew dramatically. Even a decade later, at the time of writing Georgian citizens still have only one outlet for submitting their applications for the Russian visa: the Russian Federation Interests Section at the Embassy of Switzerland in Georgia. In 2012, Georgia unilaterally eliminated the visa requirements for all Russian citizens, irrespective of their region of residence in Russia. However, so far Russia has yet to reciprocate Georgia’s move by eliminating its visa requirements for Georgian citizens. And only by the end of 2015, after lengthy negotiations, and great expectations on the part of Georgia, Russia relaxed its visa requirements for Georgian citizens, allowing them to obtain business,

                                                             4

5

 

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 26.08.2008. No. 1260. On Recognition of the Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia. http://kremlin. ru/acts/bank/27957 (accessed on July 11, 2019) Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 26.08.2008. No. 1260. On Recognition of the Independence of the Republic of South Ossetia. http://krem lin.ru/acts/bank/27958 (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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work, student and humanitarian visas for any number of entries. They also were allowed visas on the basis of private invitations, irrespective of kinship ties between the invited and the inviting individuals. It was an appreciable relaxation of Russia’s visa policy and produced a positive effect on the migration flows between Russia and Georgia. In 2017, over 79,000 Georgian citizens came to Russia as tourists, as opposed to 47,216 in 2015 and 46,341 in 2016.6 It is expected that the return to visa-free travel arrangements between the countries would be a step towards restoring diplomatic relations between Russian and Georgia, and a harbinger of positive change. The tensions in Russian-Georgian relations are not going to disappear in a hurry, not the least because of the current visa rules and border controls in the self-proclaimed statelets Abkhazia and South Ossetia, recognized by Russia, but unrecognized by most member states of the United Nations. Both self-proclaimed statelets, which in the Soviet times were parts of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, introduced visa requirements for Georgian citizens, while retaining visa-free travel arrangements for Russian citizens. On April 1, 2016, Abkhazia introduced the visa requirements for citizens of all foreign countries except Russia, Transnistria (the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic), and South Ossetia. The law “On Arriving to and Leaving the Republic of Abkhazia” of April 2016 also sets somewhat lax visa rules for citizens of Kazakhstan and Belarus who arrive in Abkhazia and stay no longer than two weeks for the purposes of travel or business. Citizens of other countries must obtain the visa; its price varies from $10 US for a 10-day visa, or $60 US for a multi-entry visa valid for up to one year. The relations between Georgia and South Ossetia are complicated because South Ossetia presumes it is separated from Georgia

                                                             6

Russia’s Touristic Agency (2015-2017). Official statistic of foreign nationals entered Russia in 2015-2017. http://www.russiatourism.ru/contents/statistika/ statisticheskie-pokazateli-vzaimnykh-poezdok-grazhdan-rossiyskoy-federatsi i-i-grazhdan-inostrannykh-gosudarstv/vyborochnaya-statisticheskaya-inform atsiya-rasschitannaya-v-sootvetstvii-s-ofitsialnoy-statisticheskoy-metodologie y-otsenki-chisla-vezdnykh-i-vyezdnykh-turistskikh-poezdok/ (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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by a state border, while Georgia does not recognize the border as it does not recognize South Ossetia’s statehood. As a result, foreign citizens can enter South Ossetia only from Russian territory, provided the visitor has a double- or multiple-entry visa issued by Russia, or the right to visit Russia without the visa. Today, residents of Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are held hostage by these new border regimes, which are driving states further and further apart. The Russian-Georgian conflict is one of the many “frozen” conflicts in the independent states, with no prospect of a definitive solution in sight.

Russia and Ukraine: Between Confrontation and Cooperation The Russian-Ukrainian conflict broke out in 2014 and turned upside down the migration management in the region. Up until the time of writing, this conflict has caused dramatic losses in terms of economic cost, political tension, cultural stresses, and strained relationships between people in both countries. In April 2014 and in November 20187, for the purpose of “preventing acts of terror” and further “disturbances in the country,” Ukraine’s border control service introduced restrictions for Russian men aged 16-60 coming into Ukraine. The restriction did not apply to Russian men with family or children. Ukraine also introduced entry restrictions for men aged 16-60, and women aged 20-35 whose official region of residence was the Republic of Crimea or the town of Sevastopol.8 These categories of citizens could enter Ukraine only after a decision of the head of the border control unit on duty at the time, or an official screening.

                                                             7

8

 

Official webpage of the President of Ukraine (2018). “The Ukrainian President ordered the national border agency to reinforce border control towards Russian nationals”. https://www.president.gov.ua/news/prezident-doruchiv-prikordonnikam-posiliti-vimogi-do-reyestr-51534 (accessed on November 28, 2018) Official Statement of Aeroflot About Restrictions Imposed by Ukraine’s border authorities on the entry into Ukraine. http://www.aeroflot.ru/ru-ru/new/39753 (accessed on November 15, 2017)

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In 2014 Russia launched a campaign to loosen the rules regulating sojourn of Ukrainian citizens, many of whom who were attempting to come to Russia. A year later, in November 2015, all Ukrainian citizens except those who lived in eastern Ukraine lost this privilege; since then they have been obliged to follow the migration rules established for citizens of non-Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) countries. Meanwhile, decree No. 74, issued by the Russian President on February 18, 20179 demonstrated Russia’s special treatment of residents of eastern Ukraine. The decree officially allows holders of identification documents issued by self-proclaimed entities in Ukraine’s Lugansk and Donetsk regions, such as passports, driver’s licenses, birth and death certificates, proof of a name change, and marriage or divorce certificates, to freely move in Russia. They can buy flights, railroad and bus tickets, enroll in educational establishments in Russia, and so on. The style and content of this decree are quite inconsistent. On the one hand, its wording is unambiguous. It mentioned the “separate areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine,” with no mention whatsoever of the People’s Republic of Lugansk or the People’s Republic of Donetsk; on the other hand, this move to recognize the documents is similar to what has been practiced for nearly 25 years in relation to documents issued in Transnistria, yet another postSoviet de-facto statelet that lacks recognition by any other UN member state. There is every reason to believe that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is bound to affect the migration management and its regulatory environment in both countries for many years to come.

                                                             9

 

Executive Order on recognising documents issued to Ukrainian citizens and stateless persons living in certain districts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk regions. http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/53895 (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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Russia and Belarus: The Union State divided by Straight Lines Over decades, Russia and Belarus proclaimed themselves as brother nations, where brotherhood is rooted in supranational union. The Union State of Russia and Belarus was established in 1996 and aimed to ensure the tight cooperation of both states at all levels.10 However, tensions between Russia and Belarus arose in 2014, because Belarus did not recognize the “reunification of Russia with Crimea.” Belarus also rejects the construction of a Russian military base on its territory, and introduced a visa waivers program for West countries. A further deterioration of Russian-Belarussian relations in January 2017 resulted in the creation of a new border security zone in the Bryansk,11 Pskov,12 and Smolensk13 regions in Russia. In violation of the 2006 Russian-Belarussian agreement on the freedom of movement and choice of place of temporary or permanent residence, border controls have been resumed at the Russian-Belarussian border, at the order of the head of Russia’s Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov. There is no doubt that the Russian reinstatement of formal border controls is a response to the Belarussian President’s decision of January 2017 to allow visa-free five-day visits to the country for citizens of 80 states, including the EU member states, USA, Canada, and Japan.14

                                                             10 11

12

13

14

Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus. http://www.soy uz.by/about/docs/dogovor5/ (accessed on July 11, 2019) Order of the Federal Security Service of Russia On the Limits of The Border Zone on the Territory of The Bryansk Region of 29.12.2016. http://www.consul tant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_211902/ (accessed on July 11, 2019) Order of the Federal Security Service of Russia On the Limits of The Border Zone on the Territory of the Pskov Region of December 29, 2016. http://www.c onsultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_211909/ (accessed on July 11, 2019) Order of the Federal Security Service of Russia On the Limits of The Border Zone on the Territory of the Smolensk Region of December 29, 2016. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_211860/ (accessed on July 11, 2019) Belarus has introduced a five-day visa-free regime for citizens of 80 countries. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/belarus-vvodit-pjatidnevnyj-bez vizovyj-rezhim-dlja-grazhdan-80-stran-15342/ (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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The position of Belarus vis-à-vis Russia is an interesting one, and preoccupies observers of the changing dynamics of the region. In last three decades after collapse of USSR, Belarus was and remains Russia’s post-Soviet stronghold and Russia’s closest ally. As such, the Belarussian factor is very important across the entire postSoviet space. A lot depends on the question of whether Belarus has plans to break free from Russia, and if so, when. On the one hand, Belarus hosted the negotiations of the Normandy Four seeking a solution for the Ukrainian crisis and received, in 2016, seven million euro from the EU for “improving migration management and regulating the flow of undocumented migrants” at Belarus’ borders with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. On the other hand, Belarus is a champion of all Eurasian integration initiatives and a member of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. This dichotomy in Belarus’ international agenda already generates tensions in Russian-Belarussian relations; sooner or later it is certain to affect the migration regulations existing between these two countries. In summary, the institutions of migration law in Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia are designed to serve foreign policy objectives and priorities. When situations change, then the migration laws and orders change to suit. There is a danger with the current geopolitical games in migration, with building new borders, introducing restrictive migration policies, and tightening visa regulation; the danger lies in the continuing uncertainty. Borders in people’s minds are much more difficult to eliminate than real-life borders between states. Political manipulation of migration policies can become a heavy and unmanageable burden, with an impact on societies of newly independent states today and for generations to come.

Chapter 3: Migration as a Geopolitical Challenge for Russia15 Russia’s annual immigration levels are among the highest in the world, consistently in the top three alongside the U.S. and Germany.16 The major change in Russia’s migration dynamics over the last few years has come from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which has had a dramatic effect on the volumes and composition of migration flows. Over the course of 2014 to 2016, migration flows from Ukraine outpaced those from Central Asia, traditionally the largest source of migration to Russia. There are now 2.5 million citizens of Ukraine residing within the territory of the Russian Federation, the largest grouping of foreign citizens in Russia.17 In general, migrants heading for Russia both from Central Asian states and Ukraine do not perceive Russia as their new homeland, but mainly as a source of income and/or employment. In most cases, they are not humanitarian migrants, either—refugees or asylum-seekers—not least because Russia rarely grants asylum; it is granted only in numbers magnitudes smaller than other countries.18

                                                             15

16 17

18

This chapter is an updated version of Olga Gulina's chapter in Olga Irisova, Anton Barbashin, Fabian Burkhardt, Ernest Wyciszkiewicz (ed.) (2017). A Successful Failure: Russia after Crime(a). Warsaw: Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding. The text was translated by Natalia Mamul. United Nations (2015). Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, International Migration Report. Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/375). According to Olga Kirillova, Chief of the General Administration for Migration. Vashchenko, V. (2016). Interview of Olga Kirillova, Chief of the General Administration for Migration Issues of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Russian Federation. www.gazeta.ru/social/2016/06/30/8348279.shtml (accessed on July 11, 2019) In Russia, refugee status was granted to 239,359 individuals in 1996; to 79,727 individuals in 1999; to 26,065 individuals in 2000; to 458 individuals in 2005; to 785 individuals in 2010; to 763 individuals in 2012; to 632 individuals in 2013;

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This chapter reveals the specific nature of migration flows in Russia from 2014–2016 and answers the question: Why does migration remain a demographic, political and social challenge for Russia?

Migration as a Demographic Challenge Two factors should be addressed here: the lack of stable, positive population growth, and Russians’ unfaltering emigration aspirations. The growth or preservation of the population’s size is a priority in today’s Russia, because the country faced a danger of the population decline. In 2018, the population of Russia was officially 146.7 million inhabitants (including the population of Crimea) and 144.4 million inhabitants without Crimea; this compares to 148.6 million residents in 1993. The high mortality rate (12.0 deaths/1,000 population) and a low birth rate (12.05 births/1,000 population)19 make population decline one of the biggest challenges for Russia. The Federal State Statistics Service has published estimates that outline three scenarios for Russia’s demographic prospects up to 2050. All are strongly linked to new waves of immigration: 





In a low/inertia scenario, a fall in the Russian population by 36.9 million residents will be partially compensated by the arrival of 7.7 million new migrants. In a medium/realistic scenario, the decrease in Russian population by 16.1 million people will be compensated by the arrival of 13.6 million new migrants. In a high/futuristic scenario, the population growth with an increase of 3.1 million people in Russia will be due to mainly an inflow of 19 million new migrants.20

                                                             19

20

to 808 individuals in 2014; to 227 individuals in 2015; and to 770 individuals in 2016. Russian Federation Federal State Statistical Services (2019). Main socio-economic indicators of living standard of population. http://www.gks.ru/wps /wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/main/ (accessed on July 11, 2019) Rosstat (2015). Russian Demographic Yearbook. www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc _2015/demo15.pdf (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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Any of the three scenarios would have a significant impact on the political, legal and socio-economic landscape of Russia. Population growth in 2014–2016—self-proclaimed by Russian authorities— was achieved through the annexation of two new entities— the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol (to be noted, Ukraine declares these territories are under temporary occupation). This bucked a trend: Russia’s population growth—and in particular its labor market—has been dependent on migrants for years. However, this could be changing. According to various estimates, the country’s labor resources will have fallen by 18-19 million by 2025. The ratio of able-bodied to unemployable residents is heading towards a critical point: 2:1 by 2022 and 1.6:1 by 2045.21 To put that in perspective, the ratio of able-bodied to unemployable residents in 2015–2016 was 2.5:1. Demographic data also show a worsening geographical imbalance. The majority of the Russian population—79 percent—lives in the European part of the country, from Kaliningrad to the Ural mountains, while the Eurasian territories of Western Siberia and Russia’s Far East are scarcely populated. Just 19.3 million people live in the Siberian Federal District, while 6.2 million people reside in the Far Eastern Federal District today. Across the border in China, three neighboring provinces—Heilongjiang, Jilin and Inner Mongolia—are populated by more than 100 million residents. Russia’s overall population density is 8.4 people per sq. km, which is 18 times lower than that of China, and 14 times lower than that of the European Union. It is six times lower than the world’s average.22

                                                             21

22

 

Aleksashenko, S. (2015). Kak vymirayet Rossiya: vyvody iz novogo demographicheskogo prognoza [How Russia is disappearing: a few conclusions from demographical prognose]. RBK, January 30, 2015. Gulina, O. (2016): Zatrat na rubl’, dokhod—na dva. [Because regardless of the merits of this case, it's worth our time]. Gazeta.ru., September 26, 2016. https://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2016/09/23_a_10211915.shtml (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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Russian population growth at current rates is very low. Since 1992, contemporary Russia has consistently experienced population decline. As underlined in 2004 by Professor Anatoly Vishnevsky from the High School of Economics: “simply replacing generations was already impossible back in 1964 in the USSR … [at the moment] the population growth rate in the RF is negative.”23 Another concern for the authorities is the willingness of certain Russians, particularly young ones, to emigrate. According to research carried out by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) in 2016, the majority of respondents (86 percent) had no plans to leave Russia entirely, and believed that their children and grandchildren would be better off living in the country rather than abroad (75 percent). However, 11 percent of respondents harbored opposing views and would like to emigrate. That is a marginal improvement, from the point of view desiring population growth: there were 16 percent wanting to emigrate in 1991, and 13 percent in 2011; 11 percent in 2012 and 13 percent in 2015.24 A substantial amount of these 11 percent willing to emigrate are young people aged 18–24. A report by the Committee for Civic Initiatives25 notes that data from polls conducted by the VCIOM, Levada Center and Public Opinion Foundation showing fairly consistent results. Eurostat statistics also confirm this tendency: Russians aged 18-40 are high on the list for number of applicants to the European Union for permanent or temporary residence, and they make up a sizeable group of naturalized citizens in the EU. An increasing number of Russians who have left their home country are striving

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25

Vishnevsky, A.G. (2004). Al’ternativy migratsyonnoy strategii [Migration strategy and its alternative ways]. Russia in Global Affairs (6)2004. VCIOM (2016): Migration Aspirations Among Russians, in Russian. No. 3229, October 26, 2016. https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236& uid=115921 (accessed on July 11, 2019) Vorobyova, O., Grebenyuk, A. (2016). Doklad Emigratsya iz Rossii v kontse XX nachale XXI veka [Emigration from Russia at the end of XIX century and at the beginning of XX centuries]. Moscow: The Committee for Civic Initiatives, 31– 39.

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to obtain citizenship and/or a residency permit in EU member states—the main countries of destination of Russian migrants (see Annex 1 and 2). There is a significant demographic surplus of Russians in other states, whereas inside Russia, there is a demographic deficit. Four and a half million Russians left the country between 1990– 2014. Another 308,475 citizens left Russia in 2014; 257,324 of whom emigrated to CIS countries, while 51,151 of them went to non-CIS countries.26 Russian statistics, it should be noted, do not determine the nature or purpose of the emigration dynamics, since the purpose of entry/exit is not identified. It would, therefore, be more accurate to use statistical data from destination countries when looking at Russians’ emigration sentiments and the dynamics of outflows from Russia. Experts from the Committee for Civic Initiatives note that four waves of emigration of citizens of post-Soviet Russia can clearly be identified after the collapse of the USSR. The first wave of emigration (1990–1994) comprised of refugees, migrant workers, scientists and ethnic emigrants returning to historic homelands (for the most part, Germany and Israel, but also other countries).27 The second wave of emigration, from 1995 to 2000, had a similar makeup of refugees, migrant workers, ethnic emigrants, scientists and highly qualified specialists, as well as students and entrepreneurs. The composition of those willing to leave their homeland started to change with the third wave of emigration, from 2001 to 2005: the number of young, able-bodied Russians choosing to emigrate increased, not necessarily in the categories mentioned above. A similar tendency persisted among emigrants during the fourth wave of emigration, from 2006 to 2010.

                                                             26 27

 

General results of migration of the population in the RF. www.gks.ru/ bgd/regl/b15_107/Main.htm (accessed on March 7, 2016) Vorobyova, O., Grebenyuk, A. (2016). Doklad Emigratsya iz Rossii v kontse XX nachale XXI veka [Emigration from Russia at the end of XIX and at the beginning of XX centuries]. Moscow: The Committee for Civic Initiatives, 31–39.

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However, it seems that the experts from the Committee for Civic Initiatives overlooked one more wave of emigration: Russians seeking asylum in the West. In the fiscal year of 2016 which ended on 30 September 2016, there were 1,912 Russians applying for asylum in the United States. That was an increase of 31 percent year on year—and up 164 percent compared to the same period in 2012.28 In the EU, 7,510 citizens of Russia applied for asylum during the first ten months of 2016— up 31 percent compared to the same period of 2015.29 Within the EU, the most popular destination countries for asylum-seekers from Russia were: Germany, which registered 4,435 asylum applications (59 percent of all asylum applications submitted by citizens of the RF in the EU); Poland, with 1,860 asylum applications (25 percent), and France with 395 applications (5 percent)30 (see Annex 3). The population decline in Russia itself, combined with the emigration of working-age people from the country, may lead to a situation where scarcely populated areas of the Russian Federation (with its average population density of 8.4 people per square km) become the targets of geopolitical interest from Russia’s neighbors. To the East, there is China (population density: 139 people per square km) and Japan (336 people per square km). Russia’s future peace and prosperity, therefore, may rest on managing a new surge of migration, since only new immigrants can replace an emigrating

                                                             28

29

30

 

Schenk, C. (2016). Russian Applications For U.S. Asylum Surge Again In 2016. www.rferl.org/a/russia-increase-seeking-us-asylum-in-2016/28159435.html (accessed on July 11, 2019) Eurostat (2016). First-time asylum applicants in the EU-28 by citizenship, Q3 2015 – Q3 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ File:First_time_asylum_applicants_in_the_EU-28_by_citizenship,_Q3_2015_% E2%80%93_Q3_2016.png (accessed on July 11, 2019) Eurostat (2016a). Thirty main citizenships of first-time asylum applicants by destination country in the EU 28, 3rd quarter 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/eurost at/statistics-explained/images/6/6a/Thirty_main_citizenships_of_first_time _asylum_applicants_by_destination_country_in_the_EU_28%2C_3rd_quarter _2016.png (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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workforce, if the native population is aging and not experiencing natural population growth.

Political Challenge of Migration in Russia The political challenges posed by migration plays out in many ways in both domestic and foreign policy. The migration flow between Russia and independent states which emerged from the rubble of the USSR has always been one-directional.31 Russia has always been, and still is, a magnet for migrants from the countries of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The dynamics of these migration flows has recently been influenced by the events and circumstances both in the countries of origin and in Russia itself. These include: military conflicts in South Ossetia and the introduction of two-way entry visas between Russia and Georgia; the 2008 financial crisis; the devaluation of the Russian ruble and stagnation of Russian economy during 2014–2015. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict stands out as a political event that has dramatically affected migration flows in post-Soviet continent. From 2014–2016, migration from Ukraine surpassed immigration flows from Central Asian states to Russia, changing a 10-year pattern. Economic recession in Russia, the imposition of EU and U.S. sanctions over the conflict, devaluation of the Russian currency, and a tightening of migration legislation diminished the opportunities and demand for the labor from Central Asian countries; this was at the same time when migrants from Ukraine flooded into Russia. According to Rosstat, the migration balance (the difference between the number of immigrants and emigrants looked in postSoviet continent is illustrated below in Table 3.

                                                             31

Kazakhstan is the only exception. In the 2000s, Kazakhstan also became a recipient country and is still receiving migrants from other Central Asian countries, although far fewer than Russia.

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Table 3.

The migration balance between Russia and Ukraine, Russia-Uzbekistan and Russia-Tajikistan in 20132016, in thousand people 32 2013

2014

2015

2016

Russia-Ukraine

36.4

84.9

146.1

93.6

Russia-Uzbekistan

67.3

36.7

-20.6 (negative)

14.2

Russia-Tajikistan

33.7

19.3

11.3

19.4

After Russian-Ukrainian conflict broke out, Ukrainians became a visibly dominant group in Russia’s migratory landscape. As of 1 October 2016, the statistics were as follows: In Russia there were officially 531,471 citizens of Azerbaijan; 523,124 citizens of Armenia; 741,453 citizens of Belarus; 613,067 citizens of Kazakhstan; 582,863 citizens of Kyrgyzstan; 490,844 citizens of Moldova; 999,035 citizens of Tajikistan; 1,779,002 citizens of Uzbekistan and 2,581,380 citizens of Ukraine registered in the RF.33 Such a transformation of migration flows has served Russian interests, because of the cultural affinity and linguistic unity of Ukrainians and Russians, and skills and knowledge of Ukrainian migrants. However, according to the majority of experts, Ukrainian migration to Russia has become a burden rather than a blessing due to complex migratory regulations and bureaucratic procedures34. These have prevented Russia from leveraging the full potential of well-qualified and highly-educated Ukrainian migrants. In 20152018, Russian authorities registered a steady decline in labor migration from Ukraine due to a visa liberalization agreement between Ukraine and the EU. This caused a new reorientation of migration flows from Ukraine to the EU member states, primarily to Poland. It was a huge loss of Russia’s migratory system, which had been struggling to cope with levels of Central Asian migrants without

                                                             32 33

34

Official data by Rosstat from 2013–2016. www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/ros stat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/ (accessed on October 25, 2017) Stay of citizens of the CIS in the RF as of 1 October 2016. Statistical data of the Migration Department of the Ministry of the Interior, the Central Database of the Registration of Foreigners. Ryazantsev, S., Skorobogatova, V. (2016). “Ukrainian Migration and Russia's Development Priorities.” The International Processes 1(44): 38-51.

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qualifications and low levels of education residing in Russia for years. Migration into Russia, on the whole, does not contribute sufficiently to dealing with the current shortage of professional staff. Nearly 90 percent of migrants entering Russia arrive from countries with a lower average level of employee skills.35 Every second citizen of Tajikistan immigrating to Russia (53 percent), and every third citizen of Kyrgyzstan (38 percent) focus on migration in search of work, education and/or new place of residence. At the same time, the level of education of the majority of migrants from Central Asian countries is far lower than that of Russian citizens. In 2010, as few as 14.3 percent of migrants residing within the territory of the RF could boast of having completed higher education whereas 23.1 percent had completed vocational training. In contrast to 95% of Russian nationals, only 63 percent of migrants arriving in Russia only have a school certificate.36 On the one hand, this creates conditions for the expansion of a shadow labor market while, on the other, it increases tension in the legal sector of the labor market. Russian migration experts estimated that over 10 million foreign citizens are residing and working in Russia.37 But in 2015, Russian authorities issued labor patents only for 1,887,034 foreign citizens, among them: 899,864 labor patents for Uzbek nationals; 445,652 for Tajiks; 209,840 for Ukrainians; and 99,835 for Moldovans. The largest groups of other legalized workers were 51,701 Chinese, 30,757 North Koreans, 20,414 Turkish, and 12,522 Vietnamese.38 These figures make visible the share

                                                             35

36 37

38

 

World Bank (2016). The Russian Federation. Systemic country diagnostic, 119; see also World Bank (2015). Developing skills for innovative growth in Russia. Moscow, 12. Zayonchkovskaya, Z. (2013). Migration in Modern Russia, vol. 1. Russian International Affairs Council, Moskva. UN (2017). International Migration Report. https://www.un.org/en/develop ment/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/Migr ationReport2017_Highlights.pdf (accessed on July 11, 2019) MIA of RF (2016). Statistics and Analytics. https://xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/Delja telnost/statistics/migracionnaya (accessed on November 8, 2018)

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of migrants unauthorized employment in Russia, almost in every sector of national economy. According to Russian specialists, the problems of legalizing employment and the influx of unauthorized migrant workers from CIS countries became even more acute in 2016, since the number of migrant work permits issued in the RF bears no resemblance to the real number of migrants who enter the country with the intention of gaining employment.39 The opposite side of the process which creates serious tensions in the Russian migration field are the demands to introduce a visa regime for Central Asian states. Some of the political upper class perceive migrants from Central Asia as magna bestia, encroaching on the interests of Russians. A Senator, the First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security Frants Klintsevich (from the United Russia Party), Valery Rashkin (from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation—the CPRF), Sergey Mironov (Just Russia Party) and many others are convinced that “a visa regime with Central Asian countries should be re-introduced … fingerprints definitely have to be taken from everyone who enters our country and leaves it without a visa.”40 Leaders of opposition parties compete with representatives of pro-government factions when it comes to proposals for limiting the number of immigrants entering Russia. In his election manifesto “Navalny 2018,” Alexey Navalny stated that it was not only necessary to introduce a visa regime for Central Asian countries but also for Transcaucasian states.41

                                                             39

40

41

Florinskaya, Y., Mkrchyan, N. (2016). Migratsya v Rossii. Starye trendy, novye problemy, Monitoring ekonomicheskoy situatsii v Rossii. Tendentsii i vyzovy sotsyalno-ekonomicheskogo razvitya [Migration in Russia: Old Trends and New Problems. Monitoring of the economic situation in Russia, Trends and challenges of the country’s socio-economic development]. The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, No. 19 (37). First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security Frants Klintsevich suggested to introduce a visa regime with Central Asian countries. RIA News Agency. August 31, 2017. https://ria.ru/201708 31/1501495178.html (accessed on September 14, 2017) The key issues of Alexey Navalny’s election manifesto for 2018 presidential election campaign. https://2018.navalny.com/platform.

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These calls for increasingly tough immigration regulation reflect a trend where slogans like “Russia for Russians” are often used in attempts to unify segments of the population and generate support for various politicians and stakeholders. Russia’s anti-migration rhetoric includes a conservative values-agenda and xenophobic approach towards newcomers. This national ethno-patriotism maintains keeping uneducated and unqualified aliens far away from Motherland Russia, despite the demographic data testifying that workers are desperately needed for the country’s economic well-being now and in the near future. A visa regime for Central Asian countries would not meet the economic interests of Russia; those in the high echelons of executive power are well aware of this. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and President Vladimir Putin have repeatedly stated that Russia was not going to introduce visas for citizens of Central Asian states, since it would “put off former Soviet Republics.”42 Besides, the only land border between Russia and Central Asian states is with Kazakhstan. So far, the border between Kazakhstan and Russia has not been equipped with special border security measures, which means that considerable financial investment would be needed to organize new passport and visa controls—investment which has not been provided for in the Russian budget. The visa regime for Central Asian states could seriously affect the role of Russia on the Eurasian “chessboard,” and destroy integration dynamics within Eurasian Economic Union.

Migration as a Social Challenge After the collapse of the Soviet Union, new established political parties―such as Rodina, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Russian National Unity (RNE), and others―proclaimed national sentiments as a necessary “social glue” aimed at “holding a

                                                             42

 

RIA.RU (2013). Summary of the 2013 APEC Summit. “Putin in his speech told that a visa regime will only put off partners from the CIS,” Ria.ru. October 8, 2013. https://ria.ru/society/20131008/968476674.html. (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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traumatized and disillusioned Russian society together.”43 These parties found their political niche between subcultural and mainstream cultural activity; they are supported by various groups from imperialists, football fans and far-right activists, as well as ordinary people, who are either unsatisfied with the current politics or with aspects of their own lives.44 One of the most common concerns of the average Russian citizen is related to the change in the ethnic composition of the country’s population—largely due to the arrival of immigrants, mainly from the former Soviet states. Should current trends continue, including population decline and its substitution by migratory influx, migrants and their descendants will make up one-third of Russia’s population by 2050, and will have become the backbone of Russian society by 2100. Thus, growing anti-immigrant sentiments among Russian society is ominous, particularly for the country with 146 national minority groups residing on its territory. Some legislative initiatives concerning immigrants in Russia were inhumane and unjust. The ideas behind these initiatives were to drive migrants out of Russia and get them back to CIS-countries in order to meet certain voter’s expectations ahead of federal or regional elections. For example, one week before the Moscow mayor election in 2010, a tent detention camp for migrants was built in Golyanovo District, one of the largest and most populous districts in Moscow. Sanitation, food, and medical facilities were inadequate for the 600 migrant-detainees (including a number of pregnant women). The police banned lawyers, interpreters, and human rights activists from entering the camp. The mainstream of Russian society and Moscow inhabitants had little interest in these violations of migrant rights. According to a 2013 poll, some 71 percent of Russians were convinced that immigrants were mostly criminals;

                                                             43 44

 

Zakharov, N. (2015). Race and Racism in Russia: Mapping Global Racism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 155. Pain, E. (2016). “The imperial syndrome and its influence on Russian nationalism.” The New Russian Nationalism. Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism. Edited by Kolstø and Blakkisrud. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 4674.

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73 percent supported strong and tough measures by the authorities against immigrants; and 18.7 percent disapproved of migrant’s bad manners and indelicacy.45 According to a 2016 survey by the Levada Center46, the idea of “Russia for the Russians” was accepted by 38 percent of respondents. This is up from 35 percent in 2015. Levada also asked whether this idea was “fully supported,” not just accepted. Fourteen percent responded that it was, only slightly down from 18 percent in 2014. In the same poll, Russians expressed views that it was necessary to limit the number of the following ethnic groups from entering the country (Table 4): Table 4.

Ethnic groups, whose number should be limited within the territory of Russia, in the opinion of Russian nationals, in percentages

Ethnic group People from the Caucasus People from Central Asia Chinese Jews Ukrainians All nationalities except for the Russians

2018 23% 25% 31% 12% 17% 16%

2016 34% 29% 24% 6% 13% 18%

2015 29% 29% 24% 7% 14% 15%

2014 38% 29% 33% 8% 8% 14%

Source: Levada poling results, 2013-2018

Two contrasting trends can be observed in Russia in recent decades. Firstly, a majority of Russians—66 percent of respondents in 2016, 68 percent of respondents in 2015 and 76 percent of respondents in 2014—were in favor of restricting the entry of members of certain ethnic groups into Russia.47 Second of all, the majority of Russians are interested in the return of direct descendants of those who were

                                                             45

46

47

Levada (2013). Otnoshenie k migrantam. [Public attitude towards migrants.]. http://www.levada.ru/2013/07/03/otnoshenie-k-migrantam/ (accessed on July 11, 2019) Levada (2018). Intolerance and xenophobia. The Levada Center press release, August 27, 2018. https://www.levada.ru/2018/08/27/monitoring-ksenofobskih-nastroenij/ (accessed on July 11, 2019) Levada (2014-2017). Otnoshenie k migrantam. [Public attitude towards migrants.]. http://www.levada.ru/tag/migranty/ (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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born in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and who are Russian native speakers and bearers of Russian culture. This contradiction strengthens the politicization of migration legislation, exacerbates the social opposition between “us” and “them,” and turns migration policy mechanisms into issues of interest to foreign policy. Over the years, internal and external migration flows and migration to Russia have been managed on an ad hoc basis, according to the necessity to resolve a given problem. Migration management in today’s Russia focuses on meeting the political needs of the country, which can be at odds with Russia’s demographic, socio-cultural and other interests.

Chapter 4: Migration as a Geopolitical Challenge for Ukraine Ukraine suffered from a prolonged period of poor governance, a rise of the kleptocracy, a decline of living standards and a military conflict across its border with Russia. But there is a hidden destabilization factor for a country’s future: the human exodus. In 2017 Ukraine ranked 9th among displaced populations worldwide. There are 1.58 million internally displaced people in Ukraine, and over 460,000 Ukrainians searching for protection abroad.48 Ukraine’s civilians were forced to flee the occupied and conflict-affected territories and are often called the “forgotten refugees” of Europe.49 Ukraine has also proved to be “a new Mexico”50 and a supplier of cheap labor force for the neighboring countries. However, Ukraine is not a country of emigrants. Immense movement of Ukrainians abroad took place in certain historical periods and were always caused by political, economic or social turbulences and unrest inside the country. Over the years, migration dynamics have changed in numbers, but the migration destinations for Ukrainian nationals remain the same (Table 5). The year 2014 became a transformational point Ukrainian migration corridor West-East. Before 2014, the main migration flows from Ukraine were oriented towards the east, going to Russia (after

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49

50

UNHCR (2017). Ukraine. Operational Update of June, 2017. https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-unhcr-operational-update-1-30-june-2017 (accessed on July 11, 2019) Mitchneck, B., Zavisca, J., and Gerber, T.P. (2016). “Europe’s Forgotten Refugees.” Foreign Affairs. August 24, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-08-24/europes-forgotten-refugees-0 (accessed on July 11, 2019) Düvell, F. (2007). Ukraine – Europe's Mexico? Country report. Oxford: COMPAS. Research Resources Report.

51

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MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE

2014, 57 percent of Ukrainian emigrants went west, primarily to Poland (compared to 43 percent of Ukrainians before 2014). Table 5.

Ukrainian emigrants by country

Final destination Russian Federation Poland Italy Czech Republic Other countries Total

2010 – 1st Half 2012 511,000 168,400 156,000 153,000 193,200 1,181,600

2015-1st Half 2017 342,400 506,500 146,700 122,500 185,200 1,303,300

Source: Ukrstat.org - State Statistics Service of Ukraine

Nowadays, the movement of Ukraine’s human capital reflects the country’s current dilemma, as the population has to choose between migration to the east (meaning Russia) or migration to the west (meaning to the EU member-states). This chapter aims to answer the question: What does migration management imply, and how does it serve interests of the Ukraine?

Going to the West Prior to Euromaidan protests in 2013-2014 following the fundamental geopolitical changes in the country and the wider post-Soviet continent, Ukrainians’ migration strategies were determined mainly by the socio-economic situation in the country. After 2014, there were new reasons added to old ones―political instability and the announced the mobilization of all men aged 25-46.51 In May 2017, Kiev researchers introduced a study entitled “Ukrainian Migration in Times of Crisis,” which aimed to analyze the characteristics of migration flows from Ukraine to the west. For the first time in the long history of Ukrainian migration, the fear of conscription

                                                             51

 

According to a joint mission report on Ukraine by the Office Français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA) and Bundesamt Für Fremdenwesen und Asyl (BFA), individuals aged 25 to 46 could be mobilized. REFWORLD. March 26, 2018. https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b9b6acd4.html (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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into the army became one of the three main motivations for immigration. 52 Other push factors included a search for a job and desire to study abroad. Migration to the west for educational purposes is an increasing trend among young Ukrainians. In 2015/16 more than 68,000 Ukrainians stayed abroad for the purposes of study or skills training, about 9,000 more than in 2014/2015. About 32,000 of them became students in Poland, about 15,700, in Russia, and 8,000 in Germany. The educational migration from Ukraine has a female face. Women dominate among Ukrainians looking for educational options in all countries except Turkey. Two out of every three of Ukrainians study for degrees in humanities in Poland and for degrees in sciences in Germany.53 Search for a job and better wages are other reasons why people leave Ukraine. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), labor migration from Ukraine is predominantly male. Most Ukrainian labor migrants are men with a school-level or university-level education; 40 percent of them are aged 30-44. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the mobilization of the male population strengthened this migration trend among Ukrainian men. Prior to 2013, 67 percent of labor migrants from Ukraine to Poland were women, and 33 percent men. After 2014 it was the other way round: 42 per cent were women, with 58 per cent men. Ukrainians in search of work go to: Poland (14.3 percent of Ukrainian labor migrants); Italy (13.2 percent); the Czech Republic (12.8 per cent); Germany (2.4 percent); Hungary (1.9 percent); and Portugal (1.8 percent). In every country of the EU, Ukrainian labor migrants have a special profile. In general in Poland, Ukrainian citizens work in agriculture, public catering, tourism, and construction. In the Czech Republic, Ukrainians work in the areas of

                                                             52

53

Drbohlav, D., Jaroszewicz, M., (eds.) (2016). Ukrainian Migration in Times of Crisis: Forced and Labour Mobility. Prague: Charles University Faculty of Science. https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/projekty/ukrainian_mig ration_in_time_of_crisis.pdf (accessed on July 11, 2019) CEDOS (2016). Ukrainian Students Abroad. https://cedos.org.ua/uk/osvita/ ukrainski-studenty-za-kordonom-skilky-ta-chomu (accessed on May 24, 2017)

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transport and manufacturing. In Italy and Greece, they are employed in housekeeping, the hotel and service sectors, and public catering. Germany remains a magnet for highly-skilled migrants from Ukraine. The number of Ukrainian citizens issued a blue card―an authorization for highly qualified professionals to work in Germany― is growing annually: 91 people in 2012; 242 people in 2013; 440 people in 2014 and 587 people in 2015. Additionally, approximately 74 percent of all migrants from Ukraine to Germany received permits to stay in Germany for the purposes of running their own business.54 In contrast, in Poland, Ukrainian citizens setting up and working in their own companies account for just 0.3 percent of the total population of Ukrainian migrants in the country.55 The military conflict in eastern Ukraine led to an upsurge in the migration of Jews and ethnic Germans from Ukraine to Germany. For the first time in the last 10 years migration of Jews has increased from 237 applications in 2014 to 378 applications in 2015. Also, emigration of ethnic Germans from Ukraine to Germany showed a positive trend. There were 90 applications of ethnic Germans in 2011, 532 applications in 2014, and over 900 applications in 2015.56 The past, present and future of Ukrainians’ migration to the west in large part is defined by the policies of its western neighbor―Poland. Poland itself is a supplier of migrants to the west, as well as serving as a host country for migrants from the east. It would be correct to say that the migration flows from Ukraine go some way to replace Poland’s moving human capital and labor re-

                                                             54

55

56

BAMF (2016). The 2015 Migration Report. http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/ Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2015.html (accessed on July 11, 2019) Chmielewska, I., Dobroczek, G., and Puzynkiewicz, J. (2017). “A new wave of Ukrainian migration to Poland.” Central European Financial Observer, January 19, 2017. http://www.financialobserver.eu/poland/a-new-wave-of-ukrainian-mi gration-to-poland/ (accessed on July 11, 2019) BAMF (2016). Migrationsbericht 2016/2017. http://www.bamf.de/Shared Docs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-201 6-2017.html (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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sources. Poland uses different mechanisms and programs to organize Ukrainian citizens for short-term or long-term immigration to Poland. One of these programs is Karta Polaka (Pole’s Card) which aims at targeting citizens of post-Soviet nations, primarily Ukraine and Belarus. Karta Polaka is granted to individuals with Polish roots for a period of up to 10 years, after which it can be renewed. The card guarantees its holder a range of rights, anywhere in Poland, including: the right to employment; the right to set up a business and freely engage in entrepreneurial activities on an equal footing with locals; to study free of charge at high schools, vocational schools, and universities; to apply for a stipend or a full or partial reimbursement of a tuition fee for Poland’s educational institutions; to receive a 37 percent discount on railway tickets; to visit the staterun museums for free; to apply for financial assistance from the national or municipal funds, and more. A holder of the Pole’s card who decides to move from his or her country of residence to Poland is entitled to a monthly allowance of approximately US $260 for every adult and US $130 for an accompanied minor for the first 9 months of residence in Poland. In addition, the Polish Government provides assistance for a free-ofcharge intensive Polish language course, and also helps people to find and rent an apartment. As of June 2016, Poland issued about 70,000 cards to Ukrainian citizens, and about 75,000 cards to Belarussian citizens. Unlike Ukraine, the Government of Belarus views this program of provision for Belarusian citizens with Polish descent as a threat rather than an opportunity. The Belarus’s Constitutional Court has ruled in 2011 that this program runs contrary to the Republic of Belarus’ interests, and certain categories of Belarussian citizens―public servants and employees of municipal organs―are banned from using the card.57

                                                             57

 

Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus On the Law of the Republic of Poland “On the Pole’s Card” of 7 April 2011. http://www.kc.g ov.by/main.aspx?guid=23203 (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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Ukrainian citizens also flock to other countries in the west in search of shelter and international protection.58 Ukraine is among the top ten countries whose citizens come to USA in search of protection and shelter. In the period between October 2016 and August 2017, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services reported 2,869 applications from Ukrainians (6.8 percent of the general amount of filings), an increase from 2,543 applications the year before.59 Ukrainian citizens apply for asylum in the EU countries as well. In the EU, more than one-third of Ukrainians’ applications for asylum are filed in Italy. Next on the list are Spain with 430 applications; Germany, with 295; France, with 200; The Netherlands, with 115 applications and 570 applications have been submitted in other EU countries in the third quarter of 201860 (see Annex 3). It is important to mention that humanitarian migration to the west is not a dominant trend in the migration profile of Ukraine; it is a small percentage of the number of Ukrainian citizens who come to European countries and the USA, as they overwhelmingly come in search of educational opportunities or jobs.

Going to Russia Over decades, the Russian Federation had been the primary destination, attracting the majority of Ukrainian migrants. However, the current geopolitical tensions radically changed the figures. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict instigated a quantitative and qualitative transformation of Ukrainian- Russian migration exchange. Historically, western Ukraine was the supplier of migrants to the east and the west, and eastern regions of Ukraine contributed to the migration flow to the east, but insignificantly. Until 2013, 93.7

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Zong, J., Batalova, J. (2017). MPI analysis of State Department WRAPS data. Refugees and Asylees in the United States. MPI. Washington DC. DHS (2017). Immigration Data & Statistics. https://www.dhs.gov/immigrati on-statistics (accessed on December 7, 2018) Eurostat (2018). Asylum Statistics. 3d quarter 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/euros tat/de/news/themes-in-the-spotlight/asylum-q3-2018 (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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percent of Ukrainian migrants originated from western part of Ukraine and only 6.3 percent came from its eastern regions. After 2014, the proportion changed. Among Ukrainians who left the country, residents of its eastern regions accounted for 28.4 percent, and residents of its western regions, for 71.6 percent.61 Because of the historical, cultural and linguistic closeness of Ukraine’s eastern regions to Russia, in a state of heightened migration mobility, many residents of eastern Ukraine have chosen Russia as a country of destination. Russian government policy focused strategic attention on support for immigrants from the Ukraine at this time of conflict. For example, in 2014-2015, 321 temporary accommodation facilities (TAFs) were established in 69 territorial entities of the Russian Federation, housing citizens of Ukraine. Migratory privileges for Ukrainian citizens were revoked on 31 October 2015, and all TAFs had been closed by late 2015. At that moment, citizens of Ukraine were in the same situation as citizens of other independent states of the former USSR; as the countries are not members of the Eurasian Economic Union, they have to apply for a temporary residence permit, work permit, to participate in a State Program to facilitate voluntary resettlement, or apply for Russian citizenship. The main push factors contributing to residence and mobility of Ukrainians within Russia were employment, education, humanitarian protection and resettlement of so called “compatriots.” Temporary labor migration is the main channel of the migration flow between the Ukraine and Russia. In Russia, Ukrainians generally work in: construction (38 percent); the industrial sector (20 percent); commerce (10 percent); agriculture (8 percent); public services (8 percent); transportation (7 percent); and others.62 Not surprisingly, Ukraine used to be one of the largest beneficiaries of migrants’ remittances from Russia. In 2013, the volume of remittances sent by

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62

Chmielewska, I., Dobroczek, G., and Puzynkiewicz, J. (2017). “A new wave of Ukrainian migration to Poland.” Central European Financial Observer, January 19, 2017. http://www.financialobserver.eu/poland/a-new-wave-of-ukrainian-mi gration-to-poland/ (accessed on July 11, 2019) Ryazantsev, S., Skorobogatova, V. (2016). “Ukrainian migration is in Russia's development priorities.” Mezhdunarodnyye protsessy. 14 (1): 38-51.

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private individuals from Russia to Ukraine was USD 3.78 billion, or 1.6 percent of Ukrainian GDP; in in 2016 it was USD 622 million, or 0.6 per cent of Ukrainian GDP. In the last three years the share of money transfers between the countries has been steadily declining: in 2016 private individuals’ remittances accounted for 8.4 percent of all private individuals’ remittances from Russia to Ukraine. In 2014, that figure was 14 percent. The reasons for this include not only the economic situation in both countries and the geopolitical confrontation between them, but also the mutual sanctions restricting the turnover of financial capital. In November 2016, the president of Ukraine issued a directive introducing sanctions against six Russian money transfer systems. As a contra-sanction, the Russian State Duma in 2017 adopted amendments to the Law on the National Payment System, restricting the money transfer by private individuals from Russia to countries that impose restrictions on the operations of Russian money transfer systems. In their explanatory note the authors of the draft law explained in no uncertain terms that the law was introduced in response to the Ukrainian government’s move which curtailed competition on the Russian market of money transfer systems. The mutual sanctions result in a rise in the rates of money transfers between the countries. The mutual sanctions, geopolitical confrontation and socialpolitical tension between countries have a negative effect on the attractiveness for Ukrainians to temporarily engage in the Russian labor market; however they increase the interest in the resettlement program among Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Since 2014, the Russia-sponsored program of resettlement of compatriots to Russia has been focused on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in obtaining placements in the program and all concomitant benefits, including fasttrack procedures for securing temporary and permanent residence permits and employment authorization, or even for obtaining Russian citizenship. According to the data of Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, 100,696 Ukrainian nationals got Russian passports in 2016 (up 49 percent in comparison with 2015). In the same year

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more than 50 percent of applications for Russia’s resettlement program were filed by Ukrainian citizens, 95.3 percent of whom were already present in Russia.63 In May, 2019 the Russian President Putin made the next step and issued a Presidential decree―with immediate effect―simplifying the procedure for granting Russian citizenship to residents of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.64 The Russian announcement to ease naturalization for those in Donetsk and Luhansk regions mirrors Russia’s policies in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Migration to Russia for an educational purposes is also of interest to Russian-speaking Ukrainian nationals. This was, and remains, a result of the Russian state policy. In 2014 the Ministry of Education and Science of RF approved a listing of 17 national institutions of higher learning (IHLs) and 176 vocational colleges eligible to accept students from eastern Ukraine, with a quota for publicly financed placements set at 2500 (prior to 2014, Ukrainian students were limited to a quota of approximately 300). In addition, the Russian President’s Decree of February 2017 simplified the procedure for applying to Russian IHL’s with documents confirming academic degree and professional qualifications, issued to stateless people and Ukrainian citizens permanently residing in Donetsk and Lugansk regions.65 Consequently, Ukraine, with 15,978 of its students studying in Russia, was in third place after Kazakhstan and Belarus in the ranking of countries whose citizens were receiving an education in Russia in 2015/2016.

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64

65

 

MIA of Russia (2016). Monitoring of the State Program to Facilitate Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Living Abroad to the RF. https://xn--b1aew.xn-p1ai/upload/site1/document_file/Monitoring_realizacii_Gosudarstvennoy_ programmy_za_I_kvartal_2016_goda.pdf (accessed on July 11, 2019) Executive Order On Certain Categories of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons Entitled to a Fast-Track Procedure when Applying for Russian Citizenship of May 1, 2019. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60429 (accessed on July 11, 2019) Decree of President of the Russia on the recognition of documents issued to citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons residing in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions of 18 February 2017. http://kremlin.ru/events/presi dent/news/53895 (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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Migration either to the east (meaning Russia) or to the West (meaning to the EU countries) remains a political and social challenge, and a serious test for the economy and stability of the Ukraine. According to the forecast of the country’s population given current birth rate, life expectancy and migration rates, by 2050 Ukraine’s population decline is going to reach dramatic levels. The population could be down nearly ten percent to 32.9 million, compared to the population in 2016. People above the age of 60 are predicted to account for more than 50 percent of its general population.66 Ukraine is losing its human capital both quantitatively and qualitatively. The recent dominant migration flows from Ukraine to the west differ from the former outflows from Ukraine to Russia not only in terms of previous experience of economic-motivated migration, but also in terms of basic demographic characteristics of migrants. Migration either to the west or east could be destabilizing for Ukraine in the near future.

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Gulina, O., Pozniak, O. (2018). “Ukrainian Migration to Russia and Europe: New Trends and its consequences.” The Journal of Social Policy Studies, 16(4): 561576.

Chapter 5: Ukrainian Nationals Searching for Shelter and Asylum in Russia, Belarus and within Ukraine According to the 2013 UN data, there were three dominant migration corridors in the post-Soviet countries: Russia-Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia, and Kazakhstan-Russia.67 According to the head of Russia’s Federal Migration Service, in 2013 Russia was visited by 3.3 million Ukrainian citizens, 2.9 of whom were labor migrants, who earned the equivalent of 30 billion US dollars.68 The migration pattern dramatically changed in 2014. The Maidan revolution and subsequent active conflict in eastern Ukraine forced a displacement of people to neighboring countries. This migration brought dramatic changes. These changes were especially noticeable when they were conducted purposefully by determined lawmakers and politicians. In addition, many of these new policies, procedures and laws brought additional significant changes to the demographic structure of migration flows. The situation in Ukraine seriously modified the area of migration regulation in Russia, Belarus and in Ukraine, which affect the acquisition of citizenship, humanitarian and labor regulation, and legal restrictions on the entry of newcomers in those countries. This chapter illuminates the legal aspects of the regulation of migration movement from Ukraine to Russia and Belarus, as well as official measures introduced by the Russian and Belarussian au-

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UN (2013). International Migration Report. http://www.un.org/en/developm ent/desa/population/publications/migration/migration-report-2013.shtml (accessed on July 11, 2019) Federal Migration Service (2014). The earnings of Ukrainian migrants in Russia can strengthen Ukrainian economy. http://www.vz.ru/news/2014/3/16/67736 8.html (accessed on April 16, 2014)

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thorities in order to support newcomers. It also explains why lawmaking “games” and lack of understanding in the area of migration regulation are bound to cause difficulties in implementation. The discrepancies between the Russian and Ukrainian migration regulations, in particular in citizenship laws, could create a group of persons considered by both Ukraine and Russia to be citizens, without allowances for dual nationality. After the crisis arose, the legislative amendments of migration regulation demonstrate that members of parliament in these two countries do not understand the importance of continuity in migration legislation across borders. As a result, using the institutes of the immigration law as instruments in political “games” can seriously undermine their effectiveness.

The Statistical Overview The crisis in Ukraine affects many aspects of migration regulation within the country and in other countries. In 2014 Russia proposed the urgent creation of a humanitarian mission for southeastern Ukraine made up of members of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and other international organizations.69 Russia, as discussed above, also opened its doors to Russian-speaking Ukrainians from the disputed areas. Other leaders around the world announced their readiness to accept humanitarian migrants from Ukraine. However, nobody in 2014 could provide an exact number of displaced persons forced to leave the conflict zones within and outside of Ukraine. As with many conflicts around the world, it is difficult to have full confidence in the figures about demographic information for people living in these contested areas. According the European Commission’s data of January 15, 2015, over 921,640 people are registered as IDPs within Ukraine, and about 600,000 have fled to neighboring countries. The estimated number of people living in conflict–affected areas was 5.2

                                                             69

 

UN Security Council, 7234th Meeting of August 5, 2014. http://www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2014/sc11508.doc.htm (accessed on November 17, 2017)

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million at the beginning of 2015.70 The IOM’s data of January 2015 identifies 640,637 IDPs in Ukraine.71 The Ukrainian Ministry of Social Policy observes an increase in the numbers of IDPs in Ukraine over the years: from 1,634,487 IDPs in December 2015 to 1,701,571 IDPs in September 2016 (see Annex 4). In 2014, UNCHR estimated that 1.4 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance inside Ukraine. In addition, there were 508,000 internally displaced people from Eastern Ukraine and Crimea registered with UNHCR. The main destinations of IDPs within Ukraine in 2014 were: Kharkiv region (117,976 IDPs); Donetsk region (75,342 IDPs); Zaporozhye (50,427 IDPs); the city of Kiev (46,884 IDPs) and the city of Dnipropetrovsk (39,047 IDPs).72 According to the former Federal Migration Service of Russia, the numbers of Ukrainian nationals coming to Russia were increasing every month of 2014. In 2014 more than 2.6 million Ukrainian nationals stayed in Russia, and 245,510 of these people applied for refugee status and temporary asylum.73 Searching for the right number of displaced persons in the first months of Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a hard task. The main problem is the failure of the Ukrainian authorities to compile adequate statistical data in 2014. Over the early months of the conflict, the main sources of statistics on IDPs within Ukraine and in outside countries came from information collected by UNHCR. In contrast, the statistics issued by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was not comprehensive. Any data on the flow of migrants from Ukraine to Russia ought to be approached with caution, because the statistical

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71

72

73

European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (2018). Ukrainian Fact Sheet. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/ ukraine_en.pdf (accessed on November 19, 2018) IOM (2015). Monthly report on IOM's assistance to IDPs in Ukraine, January 2015. https://twitter.com/rusmpi/status/558592096689725440/photo/1 (accessed on July 11, 2019) Ukraine Situation UNHCR Operational Update - 31 December 2014. http://reli efweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20External%20Upda te%20Ukraine%20Situation%20%23%207.pdf (accessed on November 17, 2017) The video-interview of the FMS chief K. Romodanovsky of December 25, 2014. http://www.fms.gov.ru/press/video/detail.php?ID=8741 (accessed on February 17, 2015)

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information lacks uniformity and varies significantly depending on the region and the agency supplying it. The official data of 20142015 from Belarussian competent authorities also was incomplete.

Situation in Russia Until recently, Russia and Ukraine have always been strategic partners in regulating migration flows. Currently Ukrainian nationals coming to Russia have the following options for legalizing themselves:   

Obtaining a labor license (work patent) for work activities and legalization within Russia; Obtaining the status of refugee; Obtaining temporary asylum on the territory of Russian Federation;

Buying a labor patent and/or obtaining a refugee status do not enjoy popularity among Ukrainians who were forced to leave their country. The most dominant options among the citizen of Ukraine coming into Russia are applying for temporary asylum on the territory of Russian Federation.

Work Patent (Labor License) According the Article 13.3 of Federal Law of Russia Nr. 115-FZ (Amended in November 2014), a work patent or so-called labor license is an official document that gives foreign workers the right to be employed by an employer―either a legal entity or a private person―on the territory of the Russian Federation. Each foreign worker coming to Russia from a non-visa country may be eligible for a work patent. The foreigner should apply personally or via a legally authorized organization to get a work patent at the territorial office of Federal Migration Service in the district where the foreigner has registered his or her migration. The competent migration authorities are obliged to issue a work patent by request within 10 working days after a foreigner has submitted all required documents. Among which are obligatory

SEARCHING FOR SHELTER AND ASYLUM        

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Application form Passport Migration card74 Migration registration75 Medical insurance certificate HIV health certificate General health certificate obtained at the authorized medical center on the territory of the Russian Federation Certificates confirming the completion of a secondary education, or exams that justify knowledge of the Russian language, Russian history, and the Russian legal framework (Art. 13.3. of Federal Law of Russia Nr. 115-FZ).

Additionally, the competent migration authorities also take a fingerprint of a foreigner applying for a work patent.76 Due to the new regulation coming into force on January 1, 2015, each entity of the Russian Federation has the right to determine the cost of the work patent fee. The applicant must pay the requested fee for the period of 1-12 months in the region he/she wants to work. Depending on the region, the patent cost was between RUB 1,568–RUB 8,000 per month (US $24-$122) in 2015 and between RUB 2075-9935 (US $28- $152) in 2019 (see Table 6).77

                                                             74

75

76

77

 

Art. 13.1. of Federal Law of Russia Nr. 115-FZ: The migration card is an identity document that consists of two identical parts and checked up by immigration authorities upon entrance to Russia. Upon entry to Russia each foreigner must within 7 work days register with the territorial office of the Federal Migration Service at the place of sojourn due to the Government Decrees of March 28, 2008 Nr. 220; of December 1, 2008 Nr. 899; of November 10, 2009 Nr. 913; of August 8, 2011 Nr 654. http://www.fms. gov.ru/documentation/862/details/50477/2/ (accessed on January 24, 2015) Federal Law Nr 128-FZ On State Fingerprinting in the Russian Federation of July 25, 1998 with amendments. http://base.garant.ru/179140/ (accessed on November 17, 2017) In 2015, 28 out 85 entities of the Russian Federation there is no established fee for a work patent on its territory. Among them are Republic of Adygeya, Republic of Altai, Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Karelia, Chechen Republic, Komi Republic, Republic of Daghestan, Republic of Mari El, Republic of Buryatia, Republic of North Ossetia - Alania, Republic of

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Table 6.

The work patent fees within Russia in 2015, 201978

Region Chukotka Autonomous Area Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area Amur Region [Oblast] Tumen Region [Oblast] Moscow Republic of Chechnya Chuvash Republic St. Petersburg Yaroslavl Region [Oblast] Republic of Tatarstan Orenburg Region [Oblast] Republic of Crimea79 City of Sevastopol Altai Territory [Krai] Nenets Autonomous Area Penza Region [Oblast] Irkutsk Region [Oblast] Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

2015 RUB 8,000 RUB 6,629 RUB 4270 RUB 3999 RUB 4,000 n.a RUB 3136 RUB 3000 RUB 2823 RUB 2838 RUB 2580 RUB 2500 RUB 2532 RUB 1568 RUB 1568 RUB 1568 RUB 1568 RUB 7052

2019 RUB 5187 RUB 8845 RUB 5650 RUB 5469 RUB 5000 RUB 2075 RUB 4150 RUB 3800 RUB 3942 RUB 3797 RUB 3652 RUB 3307 RUB 4013 RUB 2807 RUB 8060 RUB 3735 RUB 4676 RUB 9335

Buying a labor patent was a less preferable option for Ukrainians who were forced to leave their country, due to a high-fees and a difficult payment scheme in regions of Russia. In 2014-2015, Ukrainians nationals preferred to apply for temporary asylum in the territory of Russia.

                                                            

78 79

 

Tuva, Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, Republic of Kalmykia, Republic of Karelia, Karachayevo-Circassian Republic, Udmurtian Republic, Astrakhan Region [Oblast], Ivanovo Region [Oblast], Pskov Region [Oblast], Stavropol Region [Oblast], Kurgan Region [Oblast], Sakhalin Region [Oblast], Novosibirsk Region [Oblast], Krasnoyarsk Territory [Krai], Trans-Baikal Territory [Krai], Kamchatka Territory [Krai], Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area - Yugra Data collected from the regional legislation. The Crimean Peninsula was annexed by the Russian Federation in 2014 and administered as two new entitles of Russian Federation—the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. In these territories, a foreigner applying for a work patent is required by the federal government to pay a monthly fee.

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Refugee Status According to Article 1 of the Federal Law “On Refugees”, a refugee is: a person who, owing to well‑founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.80

To receive refugee status, the applicant must submit the relevant application to a local office of the Federal Migration Service (FMS). The applications are reviewed on their merits within 3-6 months of when the applicant receives the confirmation that his or her refugee status application is being reviewed. The refugee status is granted for a period of up to three years, which can be extended if the circumstances haven’t changed. The applicant is issued a refugee identification document. Russian passports are not issued to people who are granted refugee status. A person who has been granted refugee status and their accompanying family members are entitled to: 

  



The provision of interpreter services and the information about the rules for obtaining the refugee status, their rights and obligations and other necessary information; Assistance in transportation of their families and luggage to their place of residence; Food and the use of public services at the temporary accommodation center; Protection of the representatives of the territorial body of the federal executive body for internal affairs at the temporary accommodation to ensure their safety; A one-time allowance for every family member according to the rules and in the amount set by the Russian government, however no less than 100 RUB.;

                                                             80

Law of Russian Federation On Refugees of February 19, 1993 No. 4528-1.

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  

An authorization for placement in the temporary accommodation center for refugees from the local government agency in charge of migration control; Healthcare services and medication; Assistance in placement at a professional training establishment or job search; The right to employment on the territory of Russian Federation without work authorization after the grant of the refugee status.81

Irrespective of the guaranteed rights and freedoms, obtaining a refugee status does not enjoy popularity among Ukrainians due to these very lengthy and bureaucratic procedures. In addition, people are by no means certain to achieve success; granted refugee status is actually quite rare (Table 7). The percentage of successful refugee applications in Russia in 2014 was less than seven percent.

                                                             81

Federal Law Nr 4528-1 On Refugees of 19.02.1993. This is a summary of different regulations contained in the Law on Refugee of 1993.

SEARCHING FOR SHELTER AND ASYLUM Table 7.

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Comparison of the number of citizens of Ukraine, Syria, and Afghanistan granted asylum and temporary asylum in Russia in 2015/2016, 2018/2019

Refugees as of 1 January 2015 Temporary asylum as of 1 January 2015 Refugees as of 1 January 2016 Temporary asylum as of 1 January 2016 Temporary asylum as of 1 October 2016 Refugees as of 1 January 2018 Temporary asylum as of 1 January 2018 Refugees as of 1 January 2019 Temporary asylum as of 1 January 2019

Ukraine 227

Syria 2

Afghanistan 414

234,36

1,924

693

273

2

352

311,134

1,302

572

166

2

305

123,434

1,128

356

140

2

305

75,006

826

484

329,900

Source: Rosstat, 2015-2018, http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/tab-migr4.htm

Temporary Asylum Temporary Asylum on the territory of the Russian Federation is an opportunity for a foreign citizen or a stateless person to stay temporarily on the territory of the Russian federation in accordance of Article 12 of the Law On Refugees. In addition, on August 1, 2014 the Russian Government adopted the Provisional Simplified Rules for Granting Temporary Asylum in Russia to Ukrainian Citizens.82 According to the new rules, the applicant and members of their family submit their applications for temporary asylum to the local office of the FMS. The applicant and the accompanying family members must:

                                                             82

The Decree of Government of Russian Federation № 690 of 22 July 2014. http://government.ru/docs/13927/ (accessed on November 15, 2017)

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Be fingerprinted at a territorial office of the FMS in the area where they are staying; Have a health check at the authorized medical center within 10 days.

Before granting temporary asylum, the territorial office of the FMS: 



Checks the information about the applicant and his or her accompanied family members using the relevant databases of the Federal Migration Service and Ministry of the Internal Affairs, in order to verify the information on the application; Sends to the territorial office of the Federal Security Bureau the information about the applicant and accompanying family members no later than on the working day following the day when the application was received, for record keeping purposes.

The decision on granting temporary asylum is made by the FMS’s territorial office where the application was submitted within three days after the submission of the application. When the decision to grant temporary asylum is made, the FMS territorial office in the local area issues to him or her, within 24 hours, the temporary asylum authorization. According to the Simplified Rules for Granting Temporary Asylum, the temporary asylum authorization can be issued only when the applicant and accompanying family members submit their medical clearance cards. However, it is widely known that the FMS’s territorial office often issued the asylum authorization without the full required medical clearance procedures. Temporary asylum is granted for a period of up to one year, which can be extended for another year an indefinite amount of times, pursuant to the decision of the appropriate local FMS office following the written application (Article 12 Of Law on Refugee). When a Ukrainian citizen is granted temporary asylum, he or she remains a Ukrainian citizen. At any moment they may relinquish the status granted, receive again their national Ukrainian passport, and later re-gain the status of a person with a temporary asylum

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staying in Russia if needed. Although there is one strong disadvantage in relinquishing temporary asylum status―a person without the temporary asylum status may not be employed on the territory of Russia.

Situation in Belarus According to the Belarussian Ministry of the Interior, the Ukrainian nationals who come to the Republic of Belarus sometimes do not have a complete set of necessary documents and, therefore, cannot produce all the information as required; this makes it impossible to have the legal formalities concerning their status fulfilled in accordance with the Belarussian legislation.83 One of the main problems for the Ukrainian migrants leaving war zone in Ukraine is finding legal employment in Belarus. However, the national competent authorities changed the rules governing the hiring of Ukrainian nationals, to speed up procedures. Pursuant to the Belarussian President’s Order No. 42084 of August 30, 2014, Belarussian employers hiring Ukrainian nationals are granted the following exemptions: 



They are exempt from the guest worker fee that employers are normally required to pay, and employers do not have to request for their guest workers the special employment authorization; They may hire Ukrainian nationals without having to validate these individuals’ academic credentials issued by Ukrainian educational and other institutions.

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84

 

The official web-page of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. http://mvd.gov.by/ru/main.aspx?guid=208573 (accessed on November 21, 2017) Presidential Decree On the Residence of Ukrainian Citizens in the Republic of Belarus. No. 420 of 30 August 2014. http://president.gov.by/ru/official_d ocuments_ru/view/ukaz-420-ot-30-avgusta-2014-g-9659/ (accessed on November 17, 2017)

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The Belarussian competent authorities decide on issuing the special employment permits to Ukrainian nationals within five working days, an improvement on the previous 15 days delay from legislation from 2010.85 Unlike in Belarus, Ukrainian nationals in Russia are bound to meet with certain obstacles validating their academic credentials. Despite the flow of humanitarian migrants from Ukraine to Russia, Russia did not introduce simplified rules for validating their degrees and certificates. According to Andrei Kabanov, vice-chairman of the government of the Ivanovskaya Region, Russia, there is a mis-match between the skills of the new arrivals, and what is needed in Russia. In his words, Russia needs narrow specialists – agriculturists, accountants, veterinarians, manufacturing technicians, economists, engineers… Whereas the newcomers lived in mining towns and do not have this sort of professional skills. …there are difficulties because of the lack of conformity between Russian and Ukrainian academic credentials. Thus, a doctor with the Ukrainian degree cannot work in Russia, although there is a shortage of professionals in our healthcare.86

Belarus, meanwhile, offered a simple procedure for validating Ukrainian nationals’ academic degrees. Such individuals have to pay 10 percent of the minimum monthly wage of the Republic of Belarus,They also fill out a special form and submit it, along with their passports and notarized copies of the documents confirming their academic degrees, to a Belarussian educational establishment authorized to validate academic credentials. Besides, Ukrainian citizens coming from the Donetsk and Lugansk Regions seeking employment are exempt from:

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86

 

Law on External Labour Force of 30th December, 2010, Nr. 225-Z. http://pravo. levonevsky.org/bazaby11/republic03/text412.htm (accessed on November 17, 2017) Kabanov, A. (2014). How much does Ukrainian refugee cost? http://www.chastnik.ru/2014/07/17/5334454/ (accessed on August 25, 2014).

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

73

The fee for the issuance of temporary and permanent authorizations to reside in the Republic of Belarus and for the residence permits; Payment for healthcare services provided by public healthcare institutions of the Republic of Belarus, including medical examinations required for new employees, immunization for adults and children, and pregnancy care.87

Due to the simplified employment rules in Belarus, the flow of Ukrainian migrants to the country has grown significantly After the Russian-Ukrainian conflict broke out in 2014, Ukrainians fled to the nearest neighbor country ―Belarus ―and searched for shelter and a new job. Not many Ukrainians applied for refugee status or temporary protection status on the territory of Belarus. According to statistics, in a period of 2014-2017, only four Ukrainian nationals were granted asylum, and 2,178 Ukrainians received temporary protection in Belarus.88 But the Ministry of the Interior Affairs of the Republic of Belarus recorded an increase in special work permits for Ukrainian nationals issued to Belarussian employers. In 2014 Belarus reported that 17,778 Ukrainians gained work permits; in 2015 14,045 permits were granted; in 2016 12,696 permits were granted, and in 2017 4,681 Ukrainian nationals submitted applications and were granted special work permits across all the regions of Belarus.89

Situation in Ukraine The Government of Ukraine also assists residents of eastern Ukraine who were forced to move from the occupied areas and conflict territories. In 2014, the Ukrainian parliament―the Verhovna Rada―passed the Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Internally

                                                             87 88 89

 

Paragraph 1.1 of the President’s Order. Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. https://archive.fo /SrfrF#selection-10839.0-10857.3 (accessed on November 17, 2017) Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. https://archive.fo/mh 7P2#selection-5169.0-5209.5 (accessed on November 17, 2017)

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Displaced Person to protect people displaced by conflict.90 This law gives IDPs a specific set of rights, such as protection against discrimination or forcible return, and assistance in voluntary returns. It also simplifies access to different social and economic services, especially residence registration (which is a requirement for accessing banking services and registering a business), and unemployment benefits. However, all those benefits are available only for those citizens of Ukraine who are temporarily displaced within territory of Ukraine and who could provide an appropriate data of their whereabouts on the territory of Ukraine.91 Furthermore, the IDP Law obliges the Government of Ukraine to start developing a policy for the integration of internally displaced persons, which is expected to lead to better long-term planning for these individuals. Recently, there have been challenges to provide financial support for IDPs. According to Decision No. 637 of the Cabinet of Ministers “On Welfare Payments to People Who Have Moved from Temporarily Occupied Ukrainian Territories and Areas of the Anti-Terror Operation”92, welfare payments are contingent on whether the person has IDP status. This restriction generates huge queues due to the struggling competence of the authorities. In particular, this creates obstacles and further difficulties, particularly for vulnerable people in the displaced population, such as disabled persons or senior citizens incapable of moving independently. According to the Pension Fund and the Government of Ukraine, 823,000 people are currently registered as IDPs, 617,000 of whom have been resettled and provided with a new housing.

                                                             90

91 92

 

Law of Ukraine On the Internally Displayed Persons’ Rights and Freedoms Nr. 1706-VII of 20 October 2014. http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1706-18 (accessed on November 17, 2017) Art. 5 Law Nr. 1706-VII. Decision No. 637 of the Cabinet of Ministers “On Welfare Payments to People Who Have Moved from Temporarily Occupied Ukrainian Territories and Areas of the Anti-Terror Operation of 2014.” http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/637-2014-%D0%BF (accessed on November 17, 2017)

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In 2015, the Government spent UAH 328 million on the assistance to IDPs within the country. Individuals unable to work received UAH 884 per month, and individuals able to work were allocated UAH 442 per month.93 Overall, 30,000 people registered as job seekers. Among them nearly 5,000 were provided with a job, and nearly 20,000 registered as unemployed.94 The total count of pensioner IDPs residing in Donetsk and Luhansk regions is 443,900. These people are also registered and retained their social entitlements from Ukraine.95 The government of Ukraine made a step towards improving the situation of Ukrainian citizens residing in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. The Decision No. 234 issued by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers of July 2, 2014 governs measures for the payment of pensions and provision of social benefits serviced for those nationals. In order to receive his or her pension from Ukraine, Ukrainian citizens residing in these territories are obligated to submit to the competent authorities the following documents: a request for the pension’s transfer; a copy of the Ukrainian passport; the document issued by the competent pension authorities of the Russian Federation that confirms a nonpayment of pension benefits from Russia; and additional information on preferable method of the pension’s transfer.96 One more barrier faced by IDPs was a bank procedure. The National Bank of Ukraine97 categorizes all Ukrainian citizens who

                                                             93 94

95 96 97

 

The average pension was 1523 UAH (approximately US $ 58). http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/ru/publish/article?art_id=247853792 (accessed on March 16, 2016). There is no data for the remaining 5,000 people who did not register as unemployed or successful in finding a job. http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/ru/publish/article?art_id=247876557 (accessed on March 16, 2016) Official web page of the Pension Fund of Ukraine. http://www.pfu.gov.ua /pfu/control/uk/index (accessed on March 16, 2016) The National Bank of Ukraine’s Decision No. 699 “On Application of Certain Norms of the Currency Legislation During the Temporary Occupation in the Free Economic Zone of Crimea. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ v0699500-14 (accessed on March 16, 2016)

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previously lived in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as non-residents of Ukraine. It caused them a lot of difficulties as bank customers. These people were not able to access their bank accounts until national authorities accepted that the address indicated on the IDPs’ papers was considered to be their official address in the territory of Ukraine.98 Over months, daily additional political decisions and programs have been needed in order to ensure important articles of the Law on the Provision of Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons are enforced, such as: 









Collection, analysis and verification of the information on IDPs with due consideration to the Ukrainian Law on Protection of Personal Data (Article 4 part 9 of the Law 1706VII); New registration policy of unemployed IDPs in areas where they actually reside (Article 7 part 1 para. 2 of the Law); Access to education for IDPs outside their regular area of residence, financed by the state or other sources (Article 7 part 9 of Law); Transportation free of charge for IDPs, by railway or by car, to their abandoned domiciles, in such manner as prescribed by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. (Article 11 part 8 para 15 of Law); Measures and mechanisms of refinancing construction costs or interest repayment on credits for those IDPs who, as a result of the occupation or hostilities, armed conflict, incidents of violence, massive violations of human rights, environmental emergencies or natural disasters, were in-

                                                             98

 

Decision of the Ukraine’s National Bank No. 810, issued on December 16 2014, http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=12927653 (accessed on March 16, 2016)

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jured or incapacitated, or remained without the breadwinner, or without proper guardianship and care as minors (Article 17 part 2 of Law).99 Within three months after the Law Nr. 1706-VII came into force, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers introduced final changes to the relevant regulations. At the time of writing, the government of Ukraine extended the deadline for registration of IDPs up to February 1, 2015 instead December 31, 2014, which is an improvement.100 This date applies only to Ukrainian citizens who were eligible for social benefits before October 1, 2014, but who did not register at the regional offices on the territory of Ukraine.101 The main reason for this regulation is a concern around growing “social and pension tourism” among pensioners and other social beneficiaries.102 Responding to the protection needs of IDPs and other individuals in the conflict zones, with due regard to international humanitarian norms and standards, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) also published a 2015 Strategic Response Plan for Ukraine. Key humanitarian issues included: winter

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Solodko, A., Doronuyk, T. (2014). Загальний огляд ситуації з внутрішньо переміщеними особами в Україні [Overview of the situation with internally displaced persons in Ukraine] (November-December 2014). http://www.ce dos.org.ua/en/migration/zahalnyi-ohliad-sytuatsii-z-vnutrishno-peremishch enymy-osobamy-v-ukraini-lystopad-hruden-2014 (accessed on March 23, 2015) 100 Decree of the Government of Ukraine “On welfare benefits for persons moving out of the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine and zone of anti-terror operation.” http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/637-2014-%D0%BF (accessed on March 16, 2016) 101 This rule does not apply for new IDPS moving out of conflict zone and/or occupied territory of Ukraine. 102 Social and pension tourism became a phenomenon in Ukraine. In order to get a pension or other social benefits, people from conflict affected regions register themselves on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government, but without real resettlement on it. They keep their normal residence and drive once or twice per month to their registration address to access their social benefits.

 

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emergency housing; non-food items; protection of the affected population; humanitarian access; and continued displacement.103 OCHA estimated that 900,000 individuals, including 508,000 IDPs from East Ukraine and Crimea, would need support for social, financial and other forms of humanitarian aid in this plan. Special attention was given to the most vulnerable groups, such as disabled and elderly persons, children and women.

Legal Misinterpretation in Russia and Ukraine Since the crisis in Ukraine, the members of parliament in both countries started to use the institutions of citizenship and residency as instruments in political games. In Russia, on April 20, 2014 amendments were introduced to the Law on Citizenship to simplify the rules governing acquisition of the Russian citizenship for “Russian native speakers.”104 These provisions apply to Ukrainian citizens as well. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, under their citizenship law, Ukrainian citizenship can be relinquished only by submitting an application to the President of Ukraine. All other options for relinquishing Ukrainian citizenship are covered by Article 19 of the Law. The only instrument for regulating “the handing out of Russian passports” is Article 19 part 1, under which voluntary acquisition of another nation’s citizenship is a basis for automatic termination of Ukrainian citizenship: The definition of voluntary acquisition of another state’s citizenship applies to all instances when a Ukrainian citizen, in order to acquire another state’s citizenship, had to submit an application or request about such acquisition

                                                             103 UN OCHA (2015). Strategic Response Plan 2015. http://reliefweb.int/sites/rel iefweb.int/files/resources/2015_SRP_Ukraine_20141205_0.pdf (accessed on March 14, 2016) 104 Federal law No. 71-ФЗ “On Introducing Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Citizenship of the Russian Federation’ and Certain Laws of the Russian Federation”, signed on April 20, 2014. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons _doc_LAW_161941/#p23 (accessed on March 16, 2016)

 

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in accordance with the rules established by the national legislation of the state whose citizenship was acquired.105

The question is open to debate, as to whether Ukrainian citizens who used the fast-track path to apply for Russian citizenship automatically relinquish Ukrainian citizenship due to the Ukrainian legislation. Moreover, the official migration service of Ukraine informs that Russia does not have the authority to take any official decision about the termination of the Ukrainian citizenship for inhabitants of Crimea and Sevastopol. Residents are also not required to submit an application for retain the citizenship of Ukraine.106 After the State Duma of Russia rushed through a simplified version of the law about the acquisition of Russian citizenship for native Russian speakers, the deputies of the Ukrainian Rada (Parliament) in March 2014 also registered amendments to the Law on Ukrainian Citizenship. The new Article 9-1 states: for the duration of the temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, Russian citizens who do not recognize the occupation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and relinquish Russian citizenship have the right to acquire Ukrainian citizenship via the simplified procedure.107

The simplified rules for the acquisition of the citizenship do not demand from Russian citizens the knowledge of Ukrainian language or a minimum residency period. Another related point is the ongoing legal residency of both Russian and Ukrainian nationals in those countries. Pursuant to the

                                                             105 Law on Citizenship of Ukraine, published in the Messenger of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2001, No. 13, 65. http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ 2235-14 (last accessed on June 2, 2014) (accessed on May 27, 2015) 106 Official webpage of the migration service of Ukraine (2015): What is about citizenship in the Ukraine/Щодо громадянства України. http://dmsu.gov.ua /informatsiya-dlya-krimchan (accessed on March 25, 2016) 107 Law Draft on Citizenship of the Ukraine [Про громадянство України]. http://search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/JG3IX00I.html (accessed on March 25, 2016)

 

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Agreement Between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Visa-Free Travel of Ukrainian and Russian Citizens, signed on January 16, 1997, and the Rules of Entry of Citizens of the Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States into Ukraine, issued on May 6, 2001, Ukrainian and Russian citizens may stay without visa in the CIS countries for 90 days out of any consecutive 180 days. The 90-day rule is enforced in the territory of the Russian Federation. The Law 376-FZ108, adopted in Russia at the end of 2013, introduced certain restrictions on the entry of migrants from the CIS countries, included the Ukraine. The foreigners from visa-free countries who did not possess a working permit, permit for temporary residence or work patent (labor license) could technically stay only “90 days in and 90 days out” over the 180 days on the territory of the Russian Federation. Previous regulation stated that any person entering Russia from a visa-free country wanting to stay longer after 90 days should leave the territory of the Russian Federation. Since January 1, 2014 the violation of the “90 out of 180 days rule” led to the legal consequences such as a fine with or without deportation or refusal of entry into Russia for three years (Art. 27.1.12 Law 114-FZ109). Because of the crisis in Ukraine, the Ukrainian country’s border agency since April 18, 2014 insisted on new limitations, restricting the entry of men with Russian passports aged between 16 and 60 for the purpose of “preventing terror acts” and further “disturbances in the country.”110 There is no official data for how many Russian citizens were interrogated or detained due to this regulation. In contrast, the citizens of Ukraine may enter the territory of Russian Federation with Ukrainian national passport and may stay in Russia for 270 days within one year. This privilege came in force

                                                             108 Law 376-FZ On Amendments into the Migration Bills. http://www.consultant. ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_156010/ (accessed on March 25, 2016) 109 Law 114-FZ “On the Procedure for Exiting and Entering the Russian Federation.” 110 http://podrobnosti.ua/video/podrobnosti/2014/04/18/971602.html (accessed on June 2, 2014)

 

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in April 2014 due to Federal Migration Service’s order signed by K. Romodanovsky.111 The year 2015 brought serious changes that affected Ukrainian citizens residing in Russia. The head of the FMS announced that: privileges for Ukrainian nationals will disappear in 2015… We were exceptionally liberal in relation to Ukrainians nationals in 2014, but we are likely to get back to the common regulation and deal with Ukrainians compliant with the general rules.112

Welcomed into Russia for humanitarian reasons (and political ones) in 2014, the Ukrainians were then deprived of all their previous “privileges” in 2015. Since 2015, Russia has applied to Ukrainian citizens the general rules of 90 out of 180 days, and other provisions of the Russian migration legislation. In addition, the question of whether Ukrainian citizens can nowadays enter Russia with Ukrainian domestic passports remains unresolved. De jure Ukrainian citizens are not members of the EurAsEC, and, so, since January 1, 2015 they must show their foreign travel passports when they enter the territory of the Russian Federation. In practice, Ukrainian citizens are generally still granted a waiver to cross the Russian border with national internal passports. Summing up, the migration from Ukraine to Russia and Belarus, its statistical flows and legal regulation is like “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”113 Given the lack of clarity and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, we should not expect a decline in the internal migration flows within Ukraine, as well as outbound flows to Russia and Belarus. Although Ukrainian nationals in both

                                                             111 The memo for Ukrainian citizens who were forced to leave the territory of Ukraine. http://www.fms.gov.ru/foreign_national/novisas/index_ukr.php (accessed on March 25, 2016) 112 Federal migration service of Russia (2015). The new immigration regulation. Press-conference of January 12, 2015. http://www.fms.gov.ru/press/news/ news_detail.php?ID=8722 (accessed on March 28, 2015) 113 Winston Churchill used this sentence to describe Russia. BBC Broadcast, January 10, 1939.

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Russia and Belarus are bound to meet with certain obstacles seeking for a job and housing. The tightening of immigration legislation of Russia that came in force in January 2015 could make additional hurdles for Ukrainian nationals residing in Russia. As a result, it could be a push factor for a resettlement back to Ukraine. In case of Russia, the Ukrainian migrants could be seen by Russian migration authorities as “Trojan horses” for the Ukraine. They could not get rid of them due to the “political priority” of their movement on the territory of Russian Federation, but the legal framework related to Ukrainian citizens causes many misunderstandings and much misinterpretation among practitioners and lawmakers.

The Potential Impact of the Conflict on Migration in other post-Soviet countries The Russian-Ukrainian conflict impacts on Central Asia and the Caucasus in the short- and long-term, but not in the way many people expect. With economic decline in Russia due to stagnation and conflict, the decreasing GDP in Russia has strong knock-on effects for other former Soviet Union countries, dependent on migrant remittances. In addition, the horizon is also clouded by the prospect of social conflict in other countries. Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan are not prepared to welcome labor migrants returning from Russia back into the fold. Addressing the returnees’ demands for employment, healthcare and social welfare has become increasingly difficult in states where the private sector is underdeveloped, the economic situation is unstable, and the national balance of payments, debt, central government finance and trade indices steadily continue to deteriorate. Central Asian labor migration and return can be seen as a social cost of post-Soviet transition, affecting a nation’s independent statehood. For a long time, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were the biggest suppliers of labor migrants to Russia. Meanwhile, other CIS countries lagged behind, such as Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. But in 2014, the number of migrants from

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Ukraine to Russia far outstripped Central Asia. Indeed, the statistical data for 2014 shows a decline in migration flows to Russia from all CIS countries, except Belarus (up by 4,455 in 2014) and Ukraine (up by 36,106 in 2014). As a consequence of changing migration patterns, the volume of money transfers from Russia to Central Asian countries and the Caucasus has declined. During the first quarter of 2014, the remittances from Uzbek labor migrants decreased by 9.6 percent, and payments by Tajik labor migrants are estimated to have fallen by 30 percent. Yet, strange though it may seem, payments from Russia to Ukraine have increased. Remittances from Russia to the Ukraine were: US $3.04 billion in 2011; US $3.39 billion in 2013; and more than US $4.1 billion in 2014. The impact is far-reaching. Even before the introduction of the EU sanctions against Russia, it was estimated that inflation in 2015 in Tajikistan alone would be 8-9 percent, and job creation would slow. In the south of Kyrgyzstan, where up to 70 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, big economic changes could potentially lead to social unrest. Up to 35 percent of the population of Armenia live in poverty, and many are compelled to seek jobs abroad, mostly in Russia. Meanwhile, representatives of the Armenian Immigration Service estimated that the seasonal migration to Russia fell by 50 percent since 2014/2015 and, as a result, the population’s living standards are in decline.

Re-drawing the Migration Landscape For a long time, Kazakhstan and Russia were countries that predominantly received immigrants, supporting the economies of other post-Soviet nations through remittance payments. According to data from the World Bank of 2014/2015, the share of money transfers from labor migrants totals 5.5 percent of Ukraine’s GDP, 12 percent of Georgia’s GDP, 21 percent of Armenia’s GDP, 31.5 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, and 45 percent of Tajikistan’s. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict led to remittances declining in Moldova by 2.9 percent, in Kyrgyzstan by 4.9 percent, and in Tajikistan by up to 17.8 percent.

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A similar situation in remittances occurred earlier, in 2009, in connection with the Russian experience of the global economic crisis. The volume of money transfers from Russia to Central Asia fell by more than 30 percent; the drop was roughly the same in Moldova, registering a fall of 29 percent. However, neither the economic crisis itself nor the decline in the volume of remittances seriously affected migration patterns in 2009. The situation was quite different in 2014. The Ukraine crisis has managed to rewrite the migration landscape across the post-Soviet space. Some experts predicted a re-direction of the migration flow partially from Russia to Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, however, has no capacity and no interest to accommodate all of Russia’s unemployed migrants. First of all, Kazakhstan does not require an increase in foreign labor. In 2014, there were roughly 29,000 guest workers in Kazakhstan. In 2015, the guest worker quota is set at 0.7 percent of the nation’s economically active population―in other words, 63,900 persons. One seriously doubts that in 2015 the entire guest worker quota would be used up. Second, in contrast with Russia, Kazakhstan is in a stronger position demographically. Kazakhstan’s population will grow naturally by 400,000 by 2020. Kazakhstan also has a better ratio between employable population and pensioners: 1:12; compared to 1:2.5 in Russia. Thirdly, Kazakhstan has made serious efforts to encourage internal migration through its National Road Map to Employment 2020 program. The crisis in Ukraine has brought about serious changes not only in geopolitics, but external socio-economic relations in postSoviet countries. Both the crisis in Ukraine and the potential scenario of collapsing migration corridors carry risks for economic, political and social stability in the region.

Chapter 6: Migrants from the FSU-Countries in the European Union: Safe Countries of Origin? The concept of a “safe country of origin” (SCO) first appeared in EU Directive 2005/85/EC in 2005. According to the updated Council Directive 2013/32/EC, a safe country of origin implies a country where legal and democratic procedures are in place. In addition, human rights violations, including those related to armed conflicts, are properly investigated and brought before an independent judicial body. In migration law, receiving EU countries may use the concept of a “safe country of origin” as a basis for swift consideration and summary rejection of asylum applications from nationals of such countries, with some exceptions. An asylum application from a national of a designated SCO is examined within 15 days in Belgium (compared to six months as a general rule); the same is considered within 30 days in the Czech Republic (also usually six months), and within 48 hours in Norway. The United Kingdom presumes an asylum application from a country on the SCO list to be unfounded and, therefore it can be rejected without consideration.114 There is an important legal distinction between a “safe country of origin” and a “safe third country.” The latter, in the meaning of Article 38 of Directive 2013/32/EC, are countries in which a person seeking international protection would be safe. Should a safe third country deny the applicant entry to its territory, the EU member state receiving the application must ensure its examination under the general procedure (Article 38, para 4 of the Directive). A

                                                             114 Refugee Council (2018). UK. Safe Country of Origin. http://www.asylumineur ope.org/reports/country/united-kingdom/asylum-procedure/safe-countryconcepts/safe-country-origin (accessed on March 25, 2019)

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safe country of origin is considered to have sufficient legal procedures in place to protect its own nationals, while a safe third country is expected to guarantee safety and proper legal protection to nationals of other countries. The two legal concepts―safe country of origin and safe third country―are interrelated and designed to simplify migration management and asylum procedures within the EU. Making lists of both types of countries lies within the exclusive competence of the EU member states. Most EU member states have integrated the concepts of SCO and safe third countries in their domestic law in one form or another. However, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Cyprus and Slovenia do not have such provisions in their domestic legislation. Sweden, Norway and Finland do not have official lists of safe countries de jure but use summary proceedings in regard of asylum applications from nationals of certain countries. A few member states, such as Estonia, have updated relevant laws but have not yet adopted SCO and safe third country lists. Approved in June 2015, the second package of the European Agenda on Migration proposes setting up a shared SCO list. Yet despite good intentions, the EU member states do not currently have either a shared SCO list or even a shared opinion on the matter. By 2017, only 16 EU countries used SCO lists, in one form or another, to optimize their asylum granting process. These include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, France, Finland, the UK and the Czech Republic. Yet even these member states have different lists of SCOs and different criteria for listing. In 2017 the Netherlands introduced the most impressive list of 32 SCOs, followed by the UK with 24, Malta with 23, and Austria with 20 SCOs. Ireland’s SCO list includes Albania, Serbia, Moldova, Georgia, South Africa and all countries of the former Yugoslavia.115 The UK

                                                             115 International Protection Act 2015 (Safe Countries of Origin) Order 2018. http://ipo.gov.ie/en/IPO/SI%20No%20121%20of%202018.pdf/Files/SI%20 No%20121%20of%202018.pdf (accessed on April 15, 2019)

 

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designates countries as SCOs based on applicant gender: Ecuador, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius and Liberia are considered SCOs for male applicants but unsafe for females within the meaning of the UK’s asylum law. Iceland considers Ukraine a SCO, except its eastern regions and Crimea.116 Some EU member states make exceptions for certain types of asylum seekers from countries otherwise considered SCO, e.g. Norway makes an exception for albinos from Tanzania, and the Netherlands for people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) from Algeria and Morocco.117

Countries of the Former Soviet Union as the SCOs Asylum applications lodged in EU member states by nationals of FSU countries peaked in 2016, with the highest registered number of asylum seekers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Tajikistan. Applications from Uzbekistan peaked in 2006-2008, from Russia in 2013, and from Ukraine in 2015 (see Table 8). Table 8.

Number of asylum application from FSU countries to the EU in 2008-2017

Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan

2008 4,565 2,045 960 5,018 555 310 960 21,015 90 35 925 1,005

2010 5,525 2,060 910 6,865 805 1,045 1,110 18,595 205 45 848 460

2013 5,234 2,677 943 9,090 935 659 294 41,472 296 161 1054 544

2015 5,243 2,757 956 7,763 627 602 1,841 22,233 1,124 386 22,041 568

2016 8,504 5,734 836 8,318 683 681 3,655 27,603 3,208 228 12,491 559

2017 7,676 4,781 1,097 11,088 847 606 1,603 16,975 1,701 148 10,165 556

                                                             116 List of safe countries: https://utl.is/index.php/en/list-of-safe-countries (accessed on April 15, 2019) 117 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/poli cies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_safe_ countries_of_origin_en.pdf (accessed on April 15, 2019)

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It is interesting to observe the geographical preferences of FSU asylum seekers in Europe. In 2017, applicants from the Caucasus countries of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan sought asylum in the widest geographic range. Specifically, 3,459 Georgian nationals applied for asylum in Germany, 2,102 in France, 1,107 in Greece, 507 in the Netherlands, 454 in Austria and 289 in Iceland. Nationals of Azerbaijan sought asylum mainly in Germany (3,408 applicants), France (472), Sweden (293), Austria (104) and the UK (70). Armenian nationals lodged 3,850 applications in Germany, 2,357 in France, 228 in Austria, 125 in Italy and 116 in Spain. Germany, Poland and Sweden registered the highest number of asylum applications from Central Asia in 2017. Nationals of Turkmenistan filed 121 applications in Germany, seven in Sweden and two each in Poland and France; 284 nationals of Kazakhstan applied for asylum in Sweden, 203 in France and 140 in Germany; nationals of Kyrgyzstan lodged 186 asylum applications in Sweden, 122 in Germany and 34 in France; nationals of Uzbekistan filed 336 applications in Sweden, 60 in Germany, 29 in the UK and 18 in France. Germany and France have been the leading countries of destination for applicants from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. In 2017, Russians filed 6,226 asylum applications in Germany, 2,787 in France, 3,526 in Poland, 1,396 in Austria, 468 in Sweden and 404 in Finland; 365 nationals of Belarus applied for asylum in Germany, 117 in the Netherlands, 59 in France and 40 in Poland; 1,058 Moldovans sought asylum in Germany, 342 in the Netherlands and 45 in Italy; Ukrainian nationals filed 2,277 asylum applications in Italy, 2,265 in Spain, 1,322 in Germany, 687 in France and 668 in Poland.118 Just a quarter of a century after the relatively bloodless collapse of the Soviet Union, military and ethnic conflicts as well as economic and social turmoil in the newly independent states have raised the issue of whether the post-Soviet countries can be considered safe third countries and/or safe countries of origin. National

                                                             118 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do cessed on April 15, 2019)

(ac-

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legislators in EU member states have different perspectives on the matter. Citizens of the Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are EU members and cannot seek asylum in other EU countries. Three other countries―Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine―have been granted visa-free entry in EU member states for 90-180 days, which de jure indicates trust in their democratic institutions and legal procedures, but does not automatically designate them as SCOs for the purposes of EU asylum policies. The opposite is also true: nationals of FSU countries included in SCO lists still have the possibility of applying for asylum and international protection in EU member states, although the prospects of success of such applications are much lower. In 2017, an increase in Georgian nationals seeking asylum in EU member states following visa liberalization triggered debates on whether Georgia could be considered a SCO. In Germany, the Bavarian branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has been lobbying for a bill to recognize Georgia119, alongside Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia120, as a safe country of origin. The law came in force in 2019. The German Parliament voted to classify the African states of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco―along with Georgia―as safe countries of origin for the purposes of German immigration law. Eight other EU members states―Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Iceland, Luxembourg, Bulgaria and Norway―granted Georgia this status much earlier. In January 2019, Iceland’s Directorate of Immigration also added Moldova to the list of safe countries of origin.121

                                                             119 MIA of Georgia (2018). News. http://police.ge/en/shinagan-saqmeta-ministr is-moadgile-germaniis-mtavrobis-delegatsias-shekhvda/11485 (accessed on April 15, 2019) 120 Das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, für Sport und Integration (2016). Liste sicherer Herkunftsstaaten. https://www.stmi.bayern.de/med/aktuell/ archiv/2016/16012ministerrat/ (accessed on April 15, 2019) 121 Moldova on the list of safe countries of origin. https://utl.is/index.php/en/ about-directorate-of-immigration/news/1000-moldova-on-the-list-of-safe-co untries-of-origin (accessed on April 15, 2019)

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Ukraine is a special case, as it is a country whose territorial integrity has been violated and continues to be to this day. Ukraine was recognized a SCO by the UK in 2014, the Netherlands in 2016, and Austria in 2018. Today, most EU member states, including Austria, Bulgaria, the UK, Luxembourg and others, consider the entire Ukrainian territory as a SCO, while some other member states, such as Iceland and the Netherlands, make an exception for Crimea and eastern parts of Ukraine by refusing to designate these places as SCO. Back in 2014, the UNHCR appealed to the EU member states asking them to cancel the designation of Ukraine as a SCO, and thereby open access for Ukrainian nationals to procedures of applying for asylum and international protection. A few European states have responded to that appeal. On 26 March 2014, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless people (OFPRA) cancelled Ukraine’s status as a SCO, and in 2018, France adopted a legal provision for full and comprehensive consideration of all asylum applications. Since the 2015 reform of the Polish immigration law, the concept of SCO is no longer applicable in Poland in the context of asylum procedures and everyone has the right to submit an asylum application. In February 2019, the Polish Ministry of the Interior announced a draft amendment to the law on protection of foreigners, which aimed to introduce the safe country of origin concept and anticipated the adoption of national lists of safe countries of origin and safe third countries (however, this was not yet adopted at the time of writing). It is noteworthy that EU member states’ approaches to Russia in terms of asylum policies have changed over time. Bulgaria, Denmark and, since early 2016, Norway consider Russia a safe country of origin. Serbia, while not a member of the EU, shares this approach: in 2009, it included Russia in its SCO list and has not changed it since (see Annex 5). However, European countries make exceptions from the general rule of considering Russia a SCO for certain categories of asylum seekers, such as civic and political activists, LGBT people, and Russian nationals of Chechen descent.

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Nowadays, eight other FSU countries―Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan―are not specifically mentioned in EU member states’ legislation due to a relatively small number of asylum applications from these countries.

Humanitarian Migrants from Georgia, Ukraine and Russia in the EU Member States In recent years, a large number of citizens from ex-Soviet countries have not just sought employment, education and family reunification within the European Union; there has also been a significant drive to seek asylum. Approval rates for asylum applications for people from FSU countries are low―between 1.5 percent and 4 percent (see Annex 3). But that does not deter asylum seekers from Georgia, Ukraine and Russia in particular from seeking refuge in the EU. In 2016-2017, 19 percent of approvals were granted to citizens of Ukraine, Russian nationals of Chechen origin, representatives of non-governmental organizations and LGBT activists in some EU countries. A surge in the number of asylum seekers from Georgia was seen in the EU in late 2017, a year after the introduction of visa liberalization between Georgia and the bloc. From September to December 2017, citizens of Georgia lodged a high number of asylum applications in: Spain (18 percent of applications in that country); the Czech Republic (13 percent); Ireland (9 percent); Sweden (8 percent); and Denmark, Finland and Sweden (all at 6 percent). Not surprisingly, visa liberalization with the European Union has become a multi-faceted challenge for Georgia. Implementation of the Readmission Agreement, which regulates the return of Georgian nationals who violate any immigration law of an EU member state, was an important prerequisite for the introduction of visafree travel, which had been under negotiation since 2012. Other requirements included a continuous and comprehensive information campaign about the nature of the EU-Georgia visa-free regime and the active involvement of the country’s authorities in the fight against international crime.

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The very idea of expanding the EU visa-free area further east was fraught with fear and doubt in EU member states. They were, frankly, reluctant to do so because of the fear of growing flows of irregular migrants and an influx of individuals with criminal records. As a result, in February 2017 EU legislation was amended to expand the grounds for suspending or waiving a visa-free regime, and to simplify the procedure. Amendments that took force on 28 March 2017 provide for the suspension of visa-free travel between the EU and third countries in the following cases:   



An increase by more than 50 percent of the flow of irregular migrants; When citizens of the third country violate the rules of stay in EU member states; An increase by more than 50 percent of the number of asylum applications while the number of approved asylum requests in EU member states does not exceed 3-4 percent; Whenever this poses a threat to the public order and security of EU member states.

A year after the agreement came into force, Georgia, with its population of 3.7 million people, became one of the top 10 countries of origin for those seeking asylum in the EU. In January 2018, 1,748 Georgian nationals lodged asylum applications in EU member states; 1,650 applications were submitted in February 2018 and 1,613 in March 2018 (as compared to 541 asylum applications in all of 2016, and 753 in 2017). The rate of approvals for Georgian citizens is negligible, less than 2 percent. The influx of people seeking asylum and other form of international protection from Georgia to the EU has become a time bomb for the visa-free agreement. Still, we should not expect it to cause the revocation of the pact. European Council President Donald Tusk assessed very positively “the commitment of the Georgian authorities and politicians to continue working with EU institutions

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[to resolve the problem], which is a prerequisite for maintaining a visa-free regime between the EU and Georgia.”122 The surge of people seeking asylum and other form of international protection has forced Georgian MPs to amend national legislation. From now on, the readmission and return of migrants whose asylum applications had been rejected by EU member states will be carried out at the expense of the Georgian state, with subsequent deductions from the income of the unsuccessful refugee. Moreover, Chapter 7 of the Law on official records of births, deaths and marriages has been amended to prevent re-entry into the Schengen area by people who change their surnames and intend to apply for asylum again. Adult nationals of Georgia cannot change their surnames before five years have passed since their deportation from an EU member state and/or after their return to Georgia under the readmission program.

Ukraine – Europe’s Forgotten Refugees? Ukrainians are not “Europe’s forgotten refugees” simply because they flee to the EU mainly in search of employment and education. The number of asylum applications filed by Ukrainian nationals in Western countries and the number approved are negligible. In 2017, Ukrainian nationals constituted the most numerous group granted asylum in Poland (280 applications, or 50 percent of the total). They were second in the Czech Republic (35 applications, or 22 percent) and Estonia (10 applications, or 9 percent). They came in third in Portugal (45 applications, 9 percent) and Slovakia (10 applications, 13 percent).123

                                                             122 Remarks by President Tusk and President of Georgia Giorgi Margvelashvil. https://video.consilium.europa.eu/en/webcast/008697eb-56ab-450c-8775-68 5012e8f687 (accessed on July 11, 2019) 123 Asylum decisions in the EU. EU Member States granted protection to more than half a million asylum seekers in 2017. Press Release 67/2018 of April 19, 2018. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8817675/3-19042018-APEN.pdf/748e8fae-2cfb-4e75-a388-f06f6ce8ff58 (accessed on July 11, 2019)

 

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A jump in the number of asylum applications filed by Ukrainian nationals in the EU was observed in 2014-2015, as shown in Table 8. In 2014, 14,060 applications were submitted, and 22,040 in 2015 (compared with 1,055 applications in 2013).124 Most applications were rejected due to the availability of protection within the country. The rejection of the majority of applications for humanitarian reasons was due to the listing of Ukraine as a safe country of origin in the majority of EU member states, under Articles 29-31 of the Asylum Procedures Council Directive 2005/85/EC. Ukraine was declared an SCO in the UK in 2014, in Germany and the Netherlands in 2016 and Austria in 2018. The situation of Ukrainian asylum seekers in France and Poland is worth closer analysis. Before the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, French immigration authorities viewed Ukraine as a safe country, but in 2014 the OFPRA (Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides) decided to remove Ukraine from this list and apply a comprehensive procedure in the case of asylum applications from Ukrainian nationals. Reforms of Polish migration law in 2015 resulted in a similar approach, with the very notion of ‘safe country of origin’ removed. Despite the recommendations of the UNHCR to remove Ukraine from the list of ‘safe countries of origin’, the immigration services of Bulgaria, the UK, Luxembourg and other countries still consider Ukraine a safe country. Twelve EU member states―Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and the UK―include the concept of a safe country of origin in their legislation, although the lists differ from country to country. Applications filed by asylum seekers from safe countries are approved or denied based on a single interview by a representative of the immigration authorities. As a rule, decisions to reject applications on safe country grounds can be appealed

                                                             124 The number of Ukrainian asylum seekers in the EU in 2016 has decreased, see Gulina, O. (2018). “Safety in Legal Limbo: Refugees in Georgia, Ukraine and Russia.” Riddle, May 18, 2018. https://www.ridl.io/en/safety-in-legal-limborefugees-from-georgia-ukraine-and-russia/ (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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against and overturned within seven days by the supreme administrative court in an EU member state (e.g. the Federal Administrative Court BvwG in Austria, or the Supreme Administrative Court in the Czech Republic). The number of overturned decisions in the case of asylum seekers from “safe” countries ranges from 0.9 – 2.5 percent.

Russians Seeking Asylum in the EU In 2013, a total of 42,277 asylum applications were filed by citizens of the Russian Federation in EU member states; in 2016, the number of asylum applications was 27,874; in 2017, it was 17,200. Although the figures show a decline in the numbers of people seeking asylum from Russia, the reason for this remains unclear; it is also not agreed across member states what should be done with Russian nationals who are not considered refugees or individuals in need of protection. People of Chechen origin are the most numerous group of Russian asylum seekers in EU member states, and the main country to receive Russian asylum seekers is Poland.125 Before 2009, six percent of Russian asylum applicants of Chechen origin received refugee status in Poland, while that number dropped to four percent in 2016. In the case of Russian nationals, 115 applications were approved by Poland in 2017, or 21 percent of all asylum applications. In the fourth quarter of that year, Russians outnumbered Ukrainian nationals in terms of the number of asylum applications (340 applications, or 70 percent, coming from citizens of Russia, compared to 40 applications, or eight percent from citizens of Ukraine)126. While

                                                             125 Stummer, K. (2016). “Forgotten Refugees: Chechen asylum seekers in Poland.” Krytyka Polityczna & European Alternatives, February 11, 2016. http://politica lcritique.org/cee/poland/2016/forgotten-refugees-chechen-asylum-seekers-i n-poland/ (accessed on July 11, 2019) 126 Gulina, O. (2017). “What happens when Chechens seek asylum in Europe?” Intersection Russia/Europe/World, October 2, 2017. http://intersectionproject.eu /article/russia-europe/what-happens-when-chechens-seek-asylum-europe (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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Ukrainian nationals are called Europe’s forgotten refugees, Russian nationals of Chechen origin can be called Europe’s unrecognized refugees. Before the recent surge of refugees and immigrants from the Middle East and Africa, Poland was a transit country for people seeking asylum and other form of international protection coming from Russia. Once they reached the territory of Poland, they did not stay long; they quickly moved on to Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium and other EU countries. The situation changed in 2014-2016, when EU member states began to send transit Russian humanitarian migrants back to Poland based on the Dublin Regulation, which stipulates that the state where the asylum seeker first entered the EU must be the one to examine any asylum application. The problem of Russian nationals of Chechen origin worsened in Poland, and became the subject of hearings at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. As a result, Polish migration law was revised to allow claims for compensation in accordance with Art. 407 of the Act on Foreigners, for violation of rights due to “wrongful detention or wrongful placement in a guarded center or in a detention center for foreigners.” In April 2018, Poland became the respondent in the case of Bistieva and Others v. Poland.127 Bistieva and her three minor children had been placed in a guarded center for aliens in the town of Kętrzyn; they finally left Poland for the small town of Herne in North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany, after having been refused asylum in Poland. The ECHR ruled that the applicant and her children should be compensated EUR 12,000. In a number of other cases―e.g. M.K. v. Poland (No. 40503/17); M.A. and others v. Poland (No. 42902/17); M.K. and others v. Poland (no. 43643/17); and D.A. and others v. Poland (No. 51246/17)―the ECHR called on Poland to review its practice of examining asylum applications lodged by Russian nationals of Chechen origin who flee to Poland

                                                             127 ECHR Decision of 10 April 2018. Bistieva and others v. Poland (application no. 75157/14). https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre/?i=001-182210 (accessed on July 11, 2019)

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via the Belarusian border, and to bring it into line with EU standards. Chechen migration to Europe is a huge challenge for EU bureaucracy, which faces difficulties in integrating this group of people or returning them to their country of origin. On May 1, 2018, ERIN (the European Reintegration Network) initiated a pilot program on the return of citizens of the Russian Federation of Chechen origin from Germany, France, Sweden and the UK to Russia and/or Chechnya. Funding was earmarked for only six months until October 31, 2018. It is difficult to determine the success of the initiative, due to the fact that at the time of writing the data is considered too sensitive to share openly with the public for analysis.128 In Russia, the coordination and implementation of the reintegration program is carried out by the Moscow and Grozny offices of Caritas, a religious charity organization linked to the Catholic Church. The reintegration program offers various types of assistance to returnees: administrative and/or financial assistance in finding employment and/or starting a business; social and/or legal aid; search for and/or provision of housing and furniture, etc. The amount of financial assistance is limited, and is taxed at a rate of 13 percent in accordance with Russian law. Financial assistance for returnees varies depending on a number of criteria. ERIN finances voluntary returns of Russian nationals of Chechen origin with EUR 2,500 when their vulnerability and violation of their rights are documented; they receive EUR 2,000 for a regular voluntary return, or EUR 1,000 for forced return, including based on a decision of immigration authorities. In the case of the forced return of people detained in an EU member state, based on EU law and a court decision due to a violation of public order, they receive just EUR 750.

                                                             128 BAMF (2018). Pilotprojekt zu Reintegration in Tschetschenien [Pilot project that aims to reintegrate and repatriate Chenchen asylum seekers residing in the EU]. http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/DE/2018/201804026-pilotpr ojekt-erin-reintegration-tschetschenien.html (accessed on July 11, 2019)

 

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Clearly, the waves of migration from post-Soviet countries to the EU are mainly due to the political and socio-economic conditions in Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. Between March 2016 and March 2018, 22,032 Georgian, 19,948 Ukrainian and 35,403 Russian asylum seekers were registered in EU member states.129 Profiles of these groups of asylum seekers vary. Many of them may try to take advantage of the situation and flee to EU countries not because they are running away from persecution or threats, but in search of a better life. These are the ones who undermine the gravity of the institution of asylum, and hinder the procedure of granting humanitarian protection to people who really need it due to a well-founded fear of persecution or conflict. Although EU immigration authorities find it difficult to differentiate among the profiles of migrants, the task should be within their reach.

EU Visa Liberalization policy in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine For Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine―three of the six countries linked to the EU since 2009 through the Eastern Partnership (EaP)130―the lifting of EU travel visa requirements has often been arduous (see Annex 6). Yet all the parties understand that this process brings opportunities and challenges, both economic and political. The example of Moldova, which for over three years has enjoyed visa-free travel to 26 Schengen Area countries plus four other European countries, prompts cautious optimism. On 28 April 2014, Moldova became the first EaP country to meet the conditions for

                                                             129 EASO (2018). Latest asylum trends. https://www.easo.europa.eu/latest-asylum-trends (accessed on April 11, 2018) 130 The Eastern Partnership aims to reinforce the political association and economic integration of six Eastern European and South Caucasus partner countries with the EU: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Russia is not integrated in the Eastern Partnership framework, because Russia had acquired a strategic partnership status in the relationship with the EU. By 2019, the EU no longer classifies Russia as a strategic partnership country.

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the relaxing of EU visa requirements. This followed some 40 domestic reforms, including stricter migration and border management, notably the introduction of international biometric passports. Visa liberalization had little impact on the direction of migration (towards the EU) , but it significantly increased the volume of that travel. In 2015, Moldovans made some 108,000 trips to the Schengen Area, up more than 20,000 compared to 2013. From 2013 to 2015, their main European destinations were Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania. Relaxation of the EU visa requirements for Moldova highlighted the geographical, linguistic and cultural affinity of Moldovans and Romanians. From a total Moldovan population of 3.5 million, one million today have a biometric passport for visits to the EU without a visa. Just over half a million Moldovan nationals also hold a Romanian passport. As Romania is an EU country, this guarantees them free movement and the right to employment across the EU. Georgia’s quest for EU visa-free travel is more politically motivated. Its leaders supported the process through political campaigning, and saw it as a way to distance Georgia from Russia. Visa liberalization started in June 2012, was approved by the European Parliament in February 2017, coming into force a month later. Ukraine started its visa talks back in 2008, waiting seven years for the green light. On 11 June 2017, its citizens became entitled to visa-free travel to the EU. Thousands celebrated in Kiev. Waving a new biometric passport, President Petro Poroshenko declared it symbolized the “fall of a paper curtain” between Ukraine and Europe.131

Where is this “Europe Without Visas and Borders?” Many EU countries doubted the advisability and necessity of extending the visa-free space further east. Their biggest concerns were

                                                             131 Speech of the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko at the ceremony dedicated to a visa-free regime with European Union in the town of Uzhgorod, Ukraine, June 11, 2017.

100 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE an increase in irregular migrants and the influx of criminal elements. In the April 2016 Dutch referendum, 61 percent voted against ratifying the Ukraine-EU Associated Agreement, which included an action plan for lifting visa requirements. One of the EU’s main fears was that visa-free travel would encourage “criminal kingpins” from former USSR countries to set up shop across the bloc. According to the German Federal Criminal Police (BKA) Office, Georgian nationals with a rich criminal past have been coming to Germany via Austria and the Czech Republic for years. They use any legal loophole to qualify for a short or long stay in the EU, such as by filing asylum applications. In 2013, German law enforcers investigated some 4,740 Georgian nationals with a view to halting their criminal activities in the country. Two years later, in the German city of Luneburg, Russian and Georgian nationals were prosecuted for membership of an organized criminal group. Proceedings dragged on for six months, running up huge costs for translators and experts. Through media coverage Germans were familiar with the strange and unsavory world of the criminal kingpin. Public disquiet grew in 2015, after the arrest of crowned criminal kingpin Zviad Darsadze, from Kutaisi in Georgia. His business interests extended across France, Germany and Spain. A year later Europol forces, alongside the Spanish, French and Georgian police, arrested over 100 members of a Georgian organized criminal group in Spain during Operation Aikon. The defendants face charges of robbery, theft and kidnapping in numerous major Spanish cities. The second stumbling block to visa-liberalization talks, especially for Moldova and Ukraine, centered around unauthorized migrants. EU countries worried they would take advantage of visafree travel and, in breach of the bloc’s migration rules, pose a threat to their rule of law. Such fears are unwarranted, according to a 2015 study by the Batory Foundation. It concludes that “if the conditions set by the EU are met, as they were in the case of Moldova, and are also being done in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia, visa liberalisation does

MIGRANTS FROM THE FSU-COUNTRIES 101 not represent a danger to the European Union.”132 So there is unlikely to be a worrying increase in the number of irregular migrants or asylum-seekers. The EU member states and the Eastern partnership countries can in fact benefit from visa-free travel. Moldova is shifting towards modern European governance standards. The EU can then work with a more reliable partner, thanks to Moldovan reforms of everything from migration to anti-corruption and money-laundering. Nonetheless the EU recently decided to shield itself better against any visa-free travel problems. In early 2017, the European Parliament approved a new mechanism for suspending the EU’s visa regime for non-EU countries. This “visa brake” can be triggered by any EU Member State or the European Commission, suspending visa-free travel of specific third-country nationals for 9-18 months. However, this only applies in specific circumstances, among them a major increase in irregular migrants or unfounded asylum requests.

Melting the Frozen Conflicts Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine all face tricky territorial disputes/conflicts that originated in Soviet history and the collapse of the USSR. By chance or design, visa liberalization opens avenues for tackling these “states with limited recognition”―specifically Transnistria in Moldova, the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and the Lugansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. After decades without progress, Moldova is now unifying the country through EU visa liberalization. In the first 12 months, over 27,000 residents of Transnistria applied for citizenship of Moldova. Today around 77,000 of these residents hold a Moldovan biometric passport offering visa-free entry into 30 European countries―com-

                                                             132 Benedyczak, J., Litra, L. and Mrozek, K. (2015). “Moldova’s success story. The visa-free regime with the EU one year on.” Batory Foundation. Warsaw/Kyiv, May 2015.

102 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE prising all EU countries (excluding the UK and Ireland), plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland as non-EU members of Schengen. This Moldovan success story is unlikely to be repeated in Ukraine. Firstly, this is because Ukraine is grappling with institutional challenges and still has fighting forces in the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. By contrast, Moldova’s visa-free regime was introduced a quarter of a century after the active phase of the conflict in Transnistria. Secondly, Moldova has always maintained economic ties with Transnistria. After Moldova signed the EU Association Agreement, Transnistrian businesses were invited to use quotas for exporting products from Transnistria to the EU, but only if the businesses officially re-registered in Moldova. In 2010, the Georgian authorities adopted a similar approach, announcing the “Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation” to cover education, provision of medical services, economic integration, information exchange, the prevention of natural and man-made disasters, and human rights protection. The strategy even extended to supporting and preserving the cultural values of both peoples, such as the Abkhazian language. Georgia also runs a number of citizen-support programs and provides high-quality medical assistance to the residents of Abkhazia and Ossetia. With access to medical care and other services in Georgia, it is no wonder why residents of these two breakaway republics are anxious to remain connected. It is a different story in the Ukraine. Having severed social and economic ties with its occupied territories, including Crimea―annexed by Russia in 2014―Ukrainian authorities may be unable to emulate these peacebuilding and unifying measures. Time is therefore Ukraine’s best ally and greatest enemy, when it comes to reintegration. Ultimately, EU visa liberalization is simply a tool. As shown by the advances and setbacks in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, the extensive process can become a huge help or headache for each party to the agreements.

Chapter 7: Post-Soviet Migration, Diaspora and Beyond The unprecedented phenomenon of human mobility in the 21st Century in the territories across former Soviet borders requires a new understanding of identity and belonging issues. This chapter raises the questions of whether and how far compatriots and diaspora members, through their ties and cultural interactions with home and host countries, have an impact on foreign and domestic agenda in post-Soviet countries. Migration and diaspora policies are very politicized in this region. Over recent decades, diaspora members have become powerful in many ways, such as sending remittances, building up the economy from abroad, keeping cultural and linguistic ties, lobbing for the cause of their former homeland, and serving as unofficial ambassadors for culture and understanding. As a result, those individuals are of political, socio-economic and cultural interest to their former motherland.

Understanding Diaspora Issues Diaspora politics in the FSU-states have switched back and forth and evoked changes in the foreign and domestic agenda on the continent. After the creation of the newly independent states, former Soviet citizens were engaged in negotiating newly established identities. This involved a new understanding of diasporic self-identification and challenges of migrants’ diversity. They also had to accommodate home and host state policies, and served as unofficial peace makers or unwitting peace-wreckers. Some chose to provide strategic, financial or tangible resources in support of armed and non-armed conflicts in the region.

103

104 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE The political, legal and socio-economic nuances in diaspora building process cannot be easily grasped. It requires a broader competence and knowledge across history and now. In Soviet times, the term diaspora had been only rarely used, and the phenomenon of diaspora hadn’t attracted the attention of researchers. The dissolution of the USSR and circumstances that had preceded it―the earthquake in Armenia in 1988, the ArmenianAzerbaijani conflict in 1988, the civil war on the territory of Tajikistan in 1992-1997, etc.―have inspired research interest in the former citizens of Soviet countries, and their destinies across the borders. Russian scholar Valery Tishkov is seen as the ideologist behind diaspora policy in the NIS. In the early 1990s he distinguished two ideological concepts: a “historical homeland” as a region where “the historical and cultural appearance of the diaspora group was formed and where the main culture-closed ethnos is continuing to live;” and a “new homeland,” defined as a region where the diaspora “lives remotely from a special historical primary centre [sic].”133 Tishkov proposed considering the nation state, not an ethnic community, as the key element in the formation of the diaspora. About the diaspora, he wrote the following: diaspora is united and preserved by more than just culture. Culture might disappear while the diaspora will survive. The diaspora is a political project, [which] is fulfilling a special mission of [national state’s] service, resistance, struggle and revenge.134

In Tishkov’s view, the main task of the diaspora-gathering and repatriation policies in the NIS, especially in Russia, consisted, and continues to consist, in: creating and maintaining collective memory, the myth of the ‘historical homeland’ and the nostalgic belief in the ancestral homeland as the ideal

                                                             133 Tishkov, V. (2001). Istoricheskiy fenomen diaspory [Historical phenomenon of the diaspora], in: Polyakov & Tarle (eds.). National diasporas in Russia and abroad in the XIX-XX centuries. Moscow: RAS, 9-44. 134 Tishkov, V. (2003). Rekviyem po etnosu: Issledovaniya po sotsial'no-kul'turnoy antropologii [Requiem for Ethnos. Research in Social and Cultural Anthropology]. Moscow: Nauka.

 

POST-SOVIET MIGRATION 105 home where members of the diaspora [compatriots] or their descendants should return sooner or later.135

Such understanding has made diaspora issues of a special interest to national legislators and politicians in the region.

Institutionalization of Diaspora Politics Diaspora institutionalization policy is a process of building governmental, non-governmental and quasi-governmental bodies for improving and empowering cooperation between diaspora members, home and host states, and other involved actors. Diaspora issues in the NIS are often politicized. For example, the formation and development of Azerbaijani diaspora is seen as a “political project”136 that aims to condense a lobbying model of Armenia’s approach abroad.137 Diaspora issues are also a substantial instrument of the country’s domestic agenda. Since 2002, the draft Law in Armenia on Regulation of Overseas Employment has not been adopted by the Parliament, because national authorities do not want to be perceived as encouraging emigration.138 It is important to note that it was not always this way. After the dissolution of the USSR, no newly independent states had a government agency or other official institution dedicated to the diaspora abroad. Nowadays, governments across the spectrum of NIS outline their own approaches and diverse strategies in order to institutionalize their relations with diasporas. Only a few FSU

                                                             135 Ibid. 136 Rumyansev, S. (2012). Diaspora-Building in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan. CARIMEast Explanatory Note 12/35. Italy, RSCAS: European University Institute. http://www.carim-east.eu/media/exno/Explanatory%20Notes_2012-35.pdf (accessed on July 11, 2019) 137 Makaryan, S. Chobanyan, H. (2014). “Institutionalization of Migration Policy Frameworks in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.” International Migration. № 52(5):52-67. doi:10.1111/imig.12163 138 Bournazian, V., Harutyunyan, K. (2012). “Perspectives on Legal Aspects of Labour Migration: Governance in Armenia.” CARIM-East AS 2012/07. http://www.carim-east.eu/media/CARIM-East-AS2012-07.pdf (accessed on July 11, 2019)

 

106 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE countries, such as Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, fail to officially engage with their populations living and working abroad. Diaspora groupings in the FSU states could be classified on whether they are fully institutionalized, and to what level.139 









At ministerial level like the State Minister's Office on Diaspora Issues of Georgia; the Ministry of Diaspora of the Republic of Armenia, etc. At sub-ministerial level, i.e. agency, committee, departments, like Diaspora Relations Bureau in Moldova; Committee of the Migration Issues in Kazakhstan; Rossotrudnischestvo that operates under the jurisdiction of Russia´s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); The National Commission for Matters Concerning Ukrainians Worldwide under the supervision of the Government of Ukraine. As a quasi-governmental organization, for example the Executive Coordinating Council of Moldovans residing abroad; the Hayastan-All-Armenian Fund in Armenia. At non-governmental level such as the Mekendeschter Forum in Kyrgyzstan; the Tajik Diaspora Forum, supported and administrated by IOM; the Public Advisory Council in Georgia; the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the World Russian Press Foundation. Other form of institutionalization: A working group for diaspora issues under chairmanship of Foreign Ministry Parliamentary Secretary in Latvia; or creation of repatriation programs targeting compatriots and special ethnic groups.

Formal and informal diaspora institutions and their hierarchies reflect diverse interests on both the foreign and domestic levels of newly independent states. For example, the Coordinating Council For Sustaining Moldovans Residing Abroad was established on a voluntary basis by the Governmental Decree in 2000. In

                                                             139 Agunias, D.R., Newland, K. (2012). Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development. A Handbook for policymakers and practitioners in home and host countries. IOM &MPI: 74-90. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/diaspora_handbook_en_for_web_28may2013.pdf (accessed on July 11, 2019)

POST-SOVIET MIGRATION 107 2005, the national government re-founded the Executive Coordinating Council with 13 representatives from government, the Presidential administration and diaspora. Both institutions were overtaken by the Coordinating Council of Peoples Originating From Moldova and Residing Abroad in 2011. In 2012, the Bureau for Diaspora Relations of Moldova was created reporting directly to the Prime Minister. The Bureau deals with developing and coordinating national policies for and with diaspora participation. In 2017, an inter-ministerial committee (CIDMD) was founded, which aims to: coordinate the diaspora policy; formulate its strategic vision; and ensure the implementation of the actions, programs, initiatives in the field of diaspora and migration. 140 The Committee consists of representatives from Ministries and central administrative authorities, and is led by the Secretary General of the Moldovan government. Diaspora institutionalization policy has its own specific design in Ukraine. The National Commission for Matters Concerning Ukrainians Worldwide was created in 2004. It consists of the representatives of: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); the Presidential administration; the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers; the Ministry of Education and Science; the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Culture; the State Migration Service; the State Border Service; the State Committee for Television and Radio broadcasting; the National Academy of Sciences; the Ukrainian World Coordinating Council; the Ukraine-World Society; and the Parliament’s deputies upon their consent. The Commission is authorized to issue a special certificate of Ukrainian living abroad. According the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers № 1531 of November 17, 2004 “On Approving the Procedure of Obtaining the Certificate of Ukrainian Living Abroad,” every Ukrainian living abroad may apply for the certificate, if he or she is older than 16 years old, holds citizenship of a foreign state,

                                                             140 Government Decree № 725 of September 14, 2017 “On the Mechanism of Coordinating the State Policy in the Fields of Diaspora, Migration and Development.”

 

108 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE and has documents attesting his or her Ukrainian descent, or a birth certificate confirming the Ukraine as the place of birth. The US $10 fee is charged by the Commission for issuing the certificate141. Diaspora empowerment is an important task for Azerbaijani authorities. In 2002, Heydar Aliev issued the Decree “On Establishment of State Committee on Diaspora Affairs.” The Committee aims to consolidate national interests, coordinate the activities through and with Azerbaijani diaspora and strengthen national unity among Azerbaijanis living abroad. The Committee has a complicated history, created in 2002 and re-established in November 2008. Nowadays, the State Committee on Diaspora Affairs is an executive body which includes four departments divided by the world regions: Russia, Belarus and Ukraine; the EU countries; Asian and Transcaucasian states; the USA and Canada. The Committee is headed by the Chairman appointed by President of the Republic. Georgia created the Minister's Office on Diaspora Issues of Georgia at the ministerial level. In 2008-2016, the Office was a governmental agency with three departments under the jurisdiction of the Government that maintained contacts with the Georgian diaspora. The Office was abolished and merged with the MFA in 2016. Nowadays, diaspora issues are an area of joint responsibility of the Parliamentary Committee on Diaspora and Caucasus Issues and the Special Department on Diaspora Issues under jurisdiction of the Georgian MFA. Russia’s policy towards its diaspora has a hybrid character with different levels of institutionalization. Russia initially began assisting compatriots from the FSU states by establishing the Government Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad in 1994. However, the Russian government frequently revises and modifies government policy in relation to the diaspora. Recently, in March 2019,

                                                             141 By November 2017, 8515 persons from 72 countries have obtained the legal status of Ukrainians living abroad

 

POST-SOVIET MIGRATION 109 the Russian government announced the development of new programs and initiatives that aim to find and naturalize at least 5-10 million potential new citizens of Russia which are actually living in other countries and have an interest in being resettled to Russia.142 Currently the Foreign Minister is the Chairman of the Commission, which operates under jurisdiction of the Russian MFA. Since 2008, Rossotrudichestvo has operated at the ministerial level as an agency for the CIS Affairs, compatriots abroad, and international humanitarian cooperation. Rossotrudichestvo has its offices in 80 countries around the globe. Russkij Mir Foundation plays a leading role in forming “the Russian World as a global project” and promoting Russian language, culture and traditions worldwide. The foundation was established in June 21, 2007 by the Presidential decree and is a joint project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science. In 2014, the Government Commission founded the NGO World Russian Press Foundation that aims to increase the global awareness of the social, economic, cultural, scientific and other achievements of Russia among the Russian-speaking diaspora abroad. In relation to all the other states of the former Soviet Union, today Russia has the most developed institutions dedicated to diaspora politics, and a significant amount of legislation in that field. The various ways of institutionalizing diaspora policies reflect diverse interests of newly independent states in diaspora empowerment. The main factor of the changing process of policies around diasporas was and remains internal dynamics within the historic homeland country, rather than demands from citizens living outside the country. Compatriots and diaspora members in general aim to avoid increasing bureaucracy or institutionalization of their activities (with Moldova as an exception). Predominantly diaspora abroad are interested in more of an informal relationship with their country of origin.

                                                             142 Soloviev, V. (2019). Russia is searching for 5-10 million new citizens. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3909388 (accessed on July 11, 2019)

110 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE In the upcoming years, no one should expect the re-orientation of the diasporic strategies in the region; this is because national legislators and law enforcers in the newly independent states consider the needs and interests of the state over interests and needs of country(wo)men living abroad.

Migration and Repatriation in Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought drastic changes to the everyday lives of Soviet people, who were displaced without ever physically changing their residence. It is interesting to notice that such changes were perceived quite differently by the population in the FSU-states (Table 9). Table 9.

Gallup poll: whether the breakup of the USSR harmed or benefited your country, in percentage

Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine

Benefit 12 44 26 37 45 16 26 19 27 62 23

Harm 66 31 38 33 25 61 42 55 52 8 56

Neither 10 8 15 9 12 8 10 18 12 9 10

Don’t know 12 18 21 21 19 14 22 8 10 22 10

Source: Gallup. Survey conducted in 2013.143

Many of those people who were divided by newly appeared borders and visa-regimes, were often called as co-ethnic members, peoples from “ours abroad,” “blood brothers,” “far away sisters,” “scattered seeds,” or “people with historic roots.” They were ignored by newly established governments for years. The situation

                                                             143 Esipova, N., Ray, J. (2013). “Former Soviet Countries See More Harm From Breakup.” Gallup, 19. December 2013. https://news.gallup.com/poll/166538/ former-soviet-countries-harm-breakup.aspx (accessed on July 11, 2019)

POST-SOVIET MIGRATION 111 changed in late 2000s, when these people became agents of country’s development by sending significant remittances, and got the right to repatriate to their historical homelands. Among 15 former Soviet Union nations, seven newly independent states―Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova―have established a special repatriation program with initiatives targeting co-ethnics living in other countries. Current repatriation programs differ by target groups, state’s repatriation measures, provisions for immigration and citizenship policies, and reflect varied levels of state engagement. This chapter compares repatriation programs in Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

The Russian Case Russia’s repatriation program targeting the former Soviet citizens was one of the first steps taken in diaspora policy-making process in the region. The main core of the Russia’s repatriation policy is the concept of compatriots. The term “compatriot” was introduced by the Federal Law of 1999 “On the State Policy of Russia concerning compatriots abroad.” It includes four groups of people: citizens of the Russian Federation residing abroad; individuals that used to have Soviet citizenship; individuals and their descendants who emigrated from the USSR or RF; and those, who are educated in the traditions of Russian culture, speak the Russian language, and do not want to lose their relationship with Russia (Art. 1 of Law). Scholars agree that the proposed concept of compatriots aimed at targeting Russian-speaking population of the FSU-states, which “appeared to be beyond the frontiers of their historically native country.”144

                                                             144 Zevelev, I. (2008). “Russia’s Policy Toward Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union.” Russia in Global Affairs, 6 (1): 49-62; Nozhenko, M. (2006). “Motherland is Calling You! Moves Behind and Prospects for the New Russian Policy on Compatriots Abroad.” Lithuanian Foreign Policy, № 18. http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/LFPR-18-Nozhenko.pdf (accessed on July 11, 2019)

112 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE In 2006, the State Program of Support to Voluntary Return to Russia of Compatriots Residing Abroad was announced by the Decree of President № 637 of June 22, 2006, titled “On Measures to Assist the Voluntary Resettlement to the RF of Compatriots Currently Living Abroad.” The state offers compatriots and their family members a free choice of residence in the regions participating in the program, and provides: financial assistance in resettlement; free transportation of their belongings from the previous place of residence to Russia; administrative assistance in the search for new employment opportunities; housing; access to social and medical services; and education and training activities. In addition, the program participants and their family members have the right to get a residence permit without concerns about any annual restrictions, and have the right to work without needing to obtain a labor patent. It also considerably simplifies the process for applying for Russian citizenship. All those advantages serve to attract nationals from other FSUstates. Over the 13 years since the start of the resettlement program in 2006, Russia has made significant progress in achieving its goals. In 2006, only 12 regions of the Russian Federation wished to receive immigrants. By 2017, a total of 61 regions took part in the program, with as many as 68 in October 2018. During the entire period, the support program for voluntary return of compatriots living abroad to the Russian Federation attracted a total of 575,501 people. 525,000 of these people also received Russian citizenship. The number of participants in Russia’s resettlement program has grown year by year (see Table 10). For instance, in 2013, a total of 39,200 applications were approved from a total of 91,400 people. In 2018, 70,900 applications, out of 166,200 people, were admitted to the Program.145

                                                             145 MIA of Russian Federation. https://xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/mvd/structure1/ Glavnie_upravlenija/guvm/compatriots/monitoring/2018 (accessed on July 11, 2019)

POST-SOVIET MIGRATION 113 Table 10. The source countries for the Russian resettlement program, in percentage of the total number of participants Armenia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Tajikistan Ukraine Uzbekistan Others

2013 3.3% 29.4% 6.1% 14.9% 8.1% 9.3% 24.7% 4.2%

2018 8.7% 33.4% 3.0% 10.7% 16.3% 14.8% 8.3% 4.8%

Source: MIA of Russian Federation, 2013, 2018

The success of the Russia’s repatriation policy is rooted in migration outflows from the FSU states. It is interesting and somewhat surprising to think that a success of Russia’s repatriation strategy and such a broad understanding of compatriots did not create many difficulties in Russia’s relations with other former Soviet states. Since the start, the Russian state resettlement program has been the subject of only a few critical debates in the parliaments of the independent countries of the former USSR. In March 2011, Vahan Hovhannisyan, former leader of the Dashnaktsutyun opposition movement, told the Armenian National Assembly that the program of resettlement in Russia, which causes a mass outflow of the Armenian population, contradicts the spirit of Russia’s strategic cooperation with Armenia.146 There are several explanations to justify this rather accepting posture towards the Russian compatriot resettlement program by other former Soviet countries. Most of the independent states of the former Soviet Union conduct their own repatriation programs. Unlike the Russian program, these are based on ethnicity. They only focus on the representatives of the constituent ethnic groups, and as such they are less successful.

                                                             146 Grogoryan, M. (2011). Armenia: Russian Resettlement Program Causes Concern Over Population Outflow. https://russian.eurasianet.org/node/58611 (accessed on July 11, 2019)

114 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Repatriation Programs Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have implemented ethnic-oriented repatriation policies. In Kyrgyzstan, the Program Kairylman (literally: Returnee) was adopted by the Law № 175 of November 2007 “On State Guarantees for Kairylmans - Ethnic Kyrgyzs People Moving to the Kyrgyz Republic” in conjunction with the Kyrgyz Government Ordinance № 26 of April 2016. The program is open to foreign nationals and stateless persons who are of ethic Kyrgyz origin, including descendants. Between 1992-2014, approximately 50,000 returnees resettled to Kyrgyzstan, and 40,000 of these people obtained Kyrgyz citizenship as well.147 According the statistics of the Ombudsman Office, hundreds of thousands of more people are eligible. These include: 300,000 ethnic Kyrgyz people living in Uzbekistan; 200,000 people in China; 82,300 people in Tajikistan; 2,500 people in Turkey; and 2,000 people of ethnic Kyrgyz origin in Afghanistan. All these people are potential participants in the Kairylman resettlement program. In this program, every returnee is eligible for an administrative and financial assistance, as well as social and medical support from the government. The program also includes: compensation for transportation costs; a lump sum allowance for the program participant and his or her family members; housing allowance; vocational trainings and job search assistance. It is interesting to note that Kyrgyz lawmakers used the term “a return of Kairylmans” in 20082014; but after 2015 they operated only with a term “resettlement of Kairylmans. ” 148 Linguistic changes show changing attitudes, but do not imply that all legal difficulties have been resolved. For a long time, this group of newcomers had troubles in obtaining residence permits and citizenship in the Kyrgyz Republic. This happened because

                                                             147 OECD, ILO (2017). How Immigrants Contribute to Kyrgyzstan's Economy. Paris: OECD Publishing. 148 Ministry of Justice of Kyrgyzstan (2016). The Program of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic “Kayrilman” for 2017-2022. Appendix 1. http://cbd.minjust. gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/98654 (accessed January 15, 2018)

POST-SOVIET MIGRATION 115 their resettlement often occurred in an unorganized or chaotic manner. In many cases, Kairylmans moved to the territory of Kyrgyzstan in violation of border procedures, retaining their previous nationality. In order to solve these legal troubles, in 2012 the Kyrgyz parliament simplified the procedure in order for Kairylmans and their descendants to obtain Kyrgyz citizenship without the loss of previous citizenship. Since that time, approximately 17,000 Kairylmans have become nationals of the Kyrgyz Republic.149 Post-Soviet Kazakhstan sought to build a state truly of and for the titular ethnicity, in order to overcome concerns about the “Russification” of its population. The repatriation program was and is one of the main pillars of the state-building strategy of Kazakhstan. Kazakh lawmakers articulated the national repatriation strategy through the Law № 204-1 of December 1997 “On Population Migration.” The Law defines a legal status of an oralman (literally: a repatriated ethic Kazakh, or person who came back) and outlines the state’s measures towards social, cultural, linguistic, political and economic integration of oralmans in the newly independent Kazakhstan (Chapters 1, 3, and 4 of the Law). In 2005, the Kazakhstan’s State Program of Support for Compatriots Living Abroad was adopted by the Presidential Decree of November 2005. The program aims to build social, economic, and legal protection and support for compatriots residing abroad. All these issues are seen as essential components of a united Kazakh nation (Paragraph 4 of the program). According to the Art. 1 of the Law, an oralman is a foreign citizen or a stateless person of Kazakh ethnic origin who was permanently residing abroad at the moment when the Republic of Kazakhstan acquired its sovereignty, but who repatriates to Kazakhstan in order to take up permanent residence in the country.

                                                             149 The Ombudsman of the Kyrgyz Republic (2017). The Special Report Observing a Situation with the Rights of Kairylmans moving to the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. http://www.ombudsman.kg/files/docs/reports/2016/observance-of-t he-rights-of-ethnic-kyrgyz.pdf (accessed on January 15, 2018)

 

116 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE In a period from 1991 to 2015, 60,325 oralman and their families, or 95,5894 ethnic Kazakhs, have participated in the repatriation program. This makes 5.5 percent of the current country’s population. Some experts estimated that as high as 10 percent of the Kazakhstan’s population are returnees (see Table 11).150 Table 11. The main countries of oralmans’ origin, as a percentage of all returnees Country Uzbekistan China Mongolia Turkmenistan Russia Other countries

1991-2015 61.6% 14.2% 9.2% 6.8% 4.6% 3.6%

1st Quarter 2018 43.2% 43.7% 5.7% 3.4% 0.6% 3.4%

1st Quarter 2019 57.6% 21.5% 5.8%, n.a. 1.9% 4.9%

Source: The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://www.enbek.gov.kz/en/node/360467

The majority of returnees―55.6 percent of oralmans―are of the working age. Nearly 40 percent are minors, children under the age of 18, and 4.5 percent are retired. They have a diverse educational background: 8.7 percent of working age oralmans have obtained a high school diploma; 20.6 percent have obtained a professional education; 60.8 percent finished secondary school; less than 10 percent have failed to complete their degree.151 Over the years, oralmans have faced troubles in learning the Kazakh language, receiving pension and benefit payments, getting a job or finding a place to live. In order to improve these issues, the Government of Kazakhstan launched a new Program “Nurly Kosh” (meaning: A Light Comfortable Overnight Stay) through the Government Decision № 1126 of December 2008. The goal of the program was the construction of new houses for oralmans and their

                                                             150 Kalshabayeva, B., Seisenbayeva, A. (2013). “Repatriates in the Kazakhstan: The Problems of Migration and Adaptation to the Historic Homeland.” International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 7, №:6: 1625-1630. 151 The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population of the RK (2017). Information on Ethnic Migration. https://www.enbek.gov.kz/ru/taxonomy /term/521 (accessed on January 15, 2018)

POST-SOVIET MIGRATION 117 family members, and creation of the adaptation centers. By 2017, 14 adaptation centers were built within the country. These centers aim to help oralmans in their daily routine and assist their successful integration. The repatriation policies of Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan differ not only by target groups and state measures, but also by the program purpose. The repatriation strategy of the Russian Federation is designed to counteract a current demographic decline. The repatriation program in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan aim to increase a ratio of a titular nation in line with their idea of building a nation-state.

 

Chapter 8: Conclusion What do Kyrgyzstan and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Moldova and Turkmenistan have in common? Until 1991 these newly independent states were the republics of the Soviet Union, where migration processes were dynamic, multidirectional but also heavily controlled. In the three decades after the collapse of the USSR, newly independent states have done a significant job in managing the mobility of their population. By 2010, the majority of those countries had succeeded in fighting against chaotic and unmanaged migration procedures, and in doing so better organized their bureaucracies and, arguably, strengthened their statehood. However, the turbulent challenges of 2010-2018 required a new approach in collaboration across the newly independent states, and new tactics regarding human movements in the region. By 2014, the FSU-states had to choose whether their national interests were better served by an orientation towards the European Union, towards a Eurasian Union, or somehow in between. Some of the newly independent states, such as Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, have chosen a straight-forward European approach and are shifting away from any common ties and linkages that provided the original rocks of in their foundations as nation-states. In contrast, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan maintained the Eurasian/Russian approach, and continued to follow the main player’s rules. Other FSU countries, such as Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan have had varied success in trying to keep both European and Eurasian approaches, in order to keep the advantages of both. For example, Belarus and Kazakhstan established the visa-waiver programs for the EU nationals, but also benefitted from preferential treatment in relation to Russia due to being a member of the Eurasian Economic Union.

119

120 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan, due to their countries’ specific geopolitical circumstances, have chosen to carve their own paths and have not prioritized either the European or the Eurasian approach. Russia in this classification has a special status of being the main rule setter and has a strong influence across the whole postSoviet continent. The moves and policies coming out of Russia, whether admired or feared, set off actions and reactions in parliaments, ministries and border agencies across the former Soviet Union and beyond. Consequently, the post-Soviet space with newly independent states remains territory controlled and shaped by the political elites, not necessarily in the interest of the populations in these states. Currently, five frozen conflicts―Crimea, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh ―remain the biggest challenges for the post-Soviet continent and their inhabitants. The relatively bloodless disintegration of the Soviet Union has preserved the threads of social, cultural and economic cooperation across international borders. However, these are strained with every new round of tension or conflict between these newly independent states. The term “blizhneye zarubezh'ye”(near-abroad countries) appeared in the 90s, and showed the attitude of newly independent states to each other as truly sovereign states with something in common. However, the term is no longer used. This assumption of closeness and common purpose has become a relic of the past. Nowadays, the newly independent states are becoming more “distant and far abroad” from each other. The growing trends of the politicization, monetization and weaponization of migration issues also do not make people-to-people communications, connections or mobility any easier. There is a danger of current geopolitical games in the field of immigration leading to the fencing off of territories and people from one another. In fact, on-going conflict, introduction of restrictive migration policies, increasingly tight visa regulation, and accelerated repatriation programs across post-Soviet countries serve to alienate many inhabitants of newly independent states away

CONCLUSION 121 from each other. These political games can also exacerbate tensions within these new states, and xenophobia against different ethnic groups. Nowadays, relations among some newly independent nations resembles Thomas Hobbes’ description of states as gladiators glaring at each other, with garrisons and guns along their borders, preparing for battle. But battles must come to the end, albeit while grievances and alienation may remain in human minds and hearts. Borders in people’s minds are much more difficult to eliminate than borders between states. Political manipulations in the area of migration can have lasting and heavy effect. Politicians would be wise to heed the fact that 70 years of coexistence under the USSR led to some levels of shared history, understanding and empathy towards each other. There are risks that in the next 10-15 years the new generations of the newly independent states may know next to nothing about their other fellow nationals and their near neighbours. Despite conflict and political upheaval, it will be important to preserve some of what the peoples of Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Turkmenistan have in common.

 

 

Annexes 1.

Proportion of naturalized Russians among naturalized citizens of EU member states

GEO/TIME Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Germany (until 1990 forEstonia Ireland Greece Spain France Croatia Italy Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Romania Slovenia Slovakia Finland Sweden United Kingdom Iceland Liechtenstein Norway Switzerland

2008 2.599 232 88 72 2.439 149 159 834 281 3.530 49 1.772 190 93 104 10 156 19 436 127 107 259 32 13 26 2.211 759 1.379 38 1 515 378

2010 1.641 79 74 100 4.191 75 253 611 324 304 27 1.881 191 67 37 50 111 38 275 137 215 580 : 6 8 1.925 769 1.701 21 2 672 355

Source: Eurostat

123

2012 1.439 410 183 85 4.211 173 464 201 221 2.203 26 1.351 184 82 55 17 151 69 449 316 244 506 : 13 3 2.477 957 1.861 21 0 648 369

2014 641 146 502 31 4.896 205 319 309 939 3.040 11 1.484 618 109 62 30 170 22 448 431 361 395 10 26 5 2.317 724 1.591 13 0 417 392

2015 950 214 308 147 4.539 133 154 310 518 2.654 32 1.499 1.138 70 56 40 131 261 349 298 250 327 16 8 5 1.728 798 1.536 25 1 442 568

2016 1.029 488 690 232 4.833 244 109 391 711 4.094 36 1.684 1.155 127 57 31 119 493 421 337 236 359 6 11 7 2.028 816 1.649 14 1 457 665

124 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE 2.

The number of temporary and permanent residence permits issued to citizens of the RF by EU member states

GEO/TIME

2008

European Union (current composition) European Union (before the accession of Croatia) Belgium

2010

2012

2014

2015

2016

55.836 40.525 37.761

44.384

48.160 55.766 :

55.836 40.525 37.761

44.348

48.047 55.674 :

1.482

1.353

867

713

680

Bulgaria

460

738

484

680

670

455

666

Czech Republic

3.105

2.453

3.412

4.177

7.365

9.139

5.677

712

2017

619

Denmark

802

654

420

297

362

355

318

Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG) Estonia

6.249

3.246

4.952

6.273

6.986

6.600

7.123

1.044

1.023

894

846

916

986

824

Ireland

226

91

112

200

284

242

288

Greece

969

1.181

1.095

1.378

1.175

1.009

878

Spain

3.664

2.850

4.094

4.544

4.844

4.560

4.642

France

3.400

4.233

4.310

4.740

4.575

4.795

4.894

Croatia

:

:

:

36

113

92

86

Italy

5.305

5.079

2.173

1.833

1.812

1.536

2.515

Cyprus

1.090

302

431

439

562

585

534

Latvia

2.758

475

530

382

328

416

1.036

Lithuania

463

418

804

2.174

978

897

649

Luxembourg

:

59

83

167

192

171

213

Hungary

1.235

279

356

795

731

723

625

Malta

406

41

50

514

688

427

378

Netherlands

39

27

33

1.300

1.537

1.572

1.785

Austria

526

1.937

374

914

1.638

1.127

:

Poland

4.198

559

168

273

413

1.055

929

Portugal

387

249

302

328

281

286

:

Romania

118

49

97

96

106

178

97

Slovenia

69

63

126

255

277

224

303

Slovakia

310

171

160

332

526

521

448

Finland

4.152

2.762

3.440

2.678

2.438

2.740

1.656

Sweden

1.458

1.426

1.475

1.288

999

1.235

1.175

United Kingdom

11.921 8.807

6.519

6.732

6.684

13.128 :

ANNEXES 125 Iceland

28

2

7

9

6

17

:

Liechtenstein

:

:

:

6

12

9

15

Norway

854

747

844

499

566

420

374

Switzerland

:

:

978

1.913

1.133

:

:

Source Eurostat data, 2008-2017.

126 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE 3.

Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by the FSU state’s citizenship in the EU member states

Belarus GEO/TIME

2008

European Union 960 (current composition)

2009

2010

2011

947

910

1.405 1.285 943

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

775

956

836

1.097

Belgium

75

49

55

95

70

67

40

32

31

57

Bulgaria

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Czech Republic

80

55

55

70

55

22

30

19

12

19

Denmark

5

Germany (until 60 1990 former territory of the FRG)

8

5

25

155

53

60

71

45

59

73

60

95

95

112

125

296

293

365

Estonia

5

1

0

5

5

3

5

2

2

6

Ireland

20

10

0

0

5

1

0

1

1

6

Greece

10

5

10

30

5

3

0

1

1

6

Spain

15

4

5

10

15

7

5

5

12

22

France

85

80

75

100

140

81

55

81

42

59

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

0

0

0

0

1

Italy

5

2

5

5

10

6

5

4

11

22

Cyprus

0

3

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

Latvia

0

1

0

0

0

2

0

1

4

5

Lithuania

15

14

15

20

20

21

10

22

12

32

Luxembourg

5

15

20

10

20

27

15

4

14

17

Hungary

5

3

0

0

0

2

0

0

1

0

Malta

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Netherlands

5

39

65

270

65

69

50

49

24

117

Austria

60

73

45

40

40

19

40

33

21

36

Poland

60

38

45

80

70

41

25

24

46

40

Portugal

0

0

0

5

15

2

0

2

4

0

Romania

0

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Slovenia

5

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

Slovakia

0

3

0

0

0

2

0

1

0

0

Finland

65

92

60

80

35

43

25

36

44

29

Sweden

385

357

345

430

445

345

255

251

195

184

19

35

40

30

13

25

19

20

13

United Kingdom :

ANNEXES 127 Iceland

0

0

0

5

5

2

10

14

8

3

Liechtenstein

5

0

5

0

0

2

0

3

3

8

Norway

15

10

30

50

140

51

45

18

9

10

Switzerland

40

76

75

135

160

133

60

54

65

60

Total

1.015

1.033 1.020 1.600 1.585 1.131 895

1.045 921

1.178

2008

2009

2017

Moldova GEO/TIME

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

European Union 960 (current composition)

1.110 735

610

440

294

465

1.841 3.655 1.603

Belgium

15

28

15

10

20

15

20

14

Bulgaria

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Czech Republic

15

20

15

10

10

11

10

21

9

17

Denmark

0

11

5

5

0

3

5

3

2

2

Germany (until 20 1990 former territory of the FRG)

39

45

25

35

72

270

1.567 3.407 1.058

Estonia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Ireland

140

86

55

30

15

3

5

6

3

3

Greece

115

58

40

45

20

22

10

34

46

39

Spain

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

3

21

6

France

180

289

185

240

135

57

30

32

35

17

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

1

0

0

1

0

Italy

20

23

15

15

10

6

20

37

36

45

Cyprus

20

24

10

10

5

3

0

1

4

3

Latvia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

6

6

Lithuania

0

0

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Luxembourg

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

Hungary

20

35

15

10

5

10

5

8

0

1

Malta

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Netherlands

5

4

10

5

10

3

5

9

15

342

Austria

220

217

130

80

55

33

30

27

13

29

Poland

15

6

5

5

5

8

0

1

8

9

Portugal

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

Romania

20

143

110

60

45

13

10

17

16

11

Slovenia

0

2

0

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

128 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE Slovakia

115

74

40

40

30

6

5

5

1

0

Finland

5

11

0

0

0

0

0

17

1

2

Sweden

25

United Kingdom :

13

20

5

25

24

40

37

27

6

22

10

5

5

4

0

1

1

1

Iceland

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

1

Liechtenstein

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Norway

10

10

5

5

5

8

5

5

4

3

Switzerland

20

31

25

40

20

15

10

21

25

13

Total

990

1.152 765

655

465

317

480

1.867 3.687 1.620

2008

2009

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Russia GEO/TIME

2010

2016

2017

European Union 21.015 20.109 18.595 18.325 24.290 41.472 19.820 22.233 27.603 16.975 (current composition) Belgium

2.765

2.874 2.725 2.680 2.655 2.150 1.850 1.322 724

703

Bulgaria

5

12

10

5

10

2

5

4

Czech Republic

80

57

50

45

40

52

40

43

60

57

Denmark

180

335

400

365

510

967

520

184

83

48

9

14

Germany (until 980 1990 former territory of the FRG)

1.192 1.410 1.880 3.415 15.473 5.510 6.200 12.232 6.226

Estonia

5

5

5

5

10

14

20

13

14

17

Ireland

30

33

15

15

10

7

0

7

9

18

Greece

125

96

100

65

35

13

25

41

19

38

Spain

65

55

45

65

35

57

65

87

176

375

France

3.730

3.783 4.695 4.480 6.015 5.143 4.205 3.520 2.572 2.787

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

14

10

5

6

4

Italy

15

26

20

15

25

38

65

40

59

149

Cyprus

30

25

20

10

10

7

10

11

16

11

Latvia

5

3

5

20

10

6

10

12

26

28

Lithuania

400

243

110

110

95

74

55

41

62

90

Luxembourg

10

26

20

45

20

12

5

14

5

28

Hungary

20

27

25

10

5

11

20

17

8

4

Malta

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

1

Netherlands

130

176

240

520

825

303

195

156

143

335

Austria

3.445

3.566 2.330 2.325 3.110 2.851 1.995 1.682 1.633 1.396

ANNEXES 129 Poland

7.760

5.726 4.795 4.305 6.085 12.844 4.000 7.870 8.991 3.536

Portugal

0

2

5

10

5

Romania

15

12

10

5

10

6

10

2

3

0

Slovenia

5

5

10

5

5

13

5

7

6

4

Slovakia

100

72

65

35

20

15

5

9

2

5

Finland

190

587

395

290

225

243

200

153

192

404

Sweden

920

7

5

8

13

31

1.058 975

915

940

1.033 865

653

412

468

United Kingdom :

111

105

100

170

117

120

127

118

208

Iceland

5

0

0

5

5

9

15

2

11

6

Liechtenstein

5

12

30

15

10

9

5

4

0

5

Norway

1.075

867

630

365

370

375

225

127

77

59

Switzerland

210

452

350

245

340

412

170

205

183

155

Total

22.305 21.440 19.600 18.955 25.010 42.277 20.235 22.571 27.874 17.200

Ukraine GEO/TIME

2009

2010

2011

2012

European Union 925 (current composition)

2008

936

845

940

1.095 1.054 14.060 22.041 12.491 10.165

Belgium

65

35

65

75

90

65

570

434

186

154

Bulgaria

0

8

5

0

10

0

40

65

24

15

Czech Republic

320

202

115

150

175

144

515

694

507

435

Denmark

5

7

5

20

15

38

135

97

96

46

Germany (until 45 1990 former territory of the FRG)

85

70

55

135

152

2.705 4.658 2.492 1.327

Estonia

1

0

0

0

0

60

0

2013

2014

2015

93

2016

9

2017

11

Ireland

20

17

5

10

15

9

50

47

20

14

Greece

55

51

50

30

45

22

110

227

122

85

3.347 2.568 2.265

Spain

5

8

5

10

20

14

895

France

75

73

90

100

145

137

1.425 1.646 660

687

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

2

10

2

Italy

15

10

20

20

35

34

2.080 4.663 2.570 2.747

Cyprus

15

25

10

10

5

1

95

70

28

38

Latvia

0

0

0

5

0

0

75

47

8

6

9

5

Lithuania

5

1

0

0

5

5

70

65

30

33

Luxembourg

5

0

5

0

0

2

25

28

35

37

130 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE Hungary

0

9

10

5

0

7

35

28

23

7

Malta

0

0

15

0

0

0

40

71

84

38

Netherlands

20

19

30

50

30

37

265

761

342

178

Austria

140

122

80

65

80

61

455

507

374

490

Poland

40

36

45

65

70

45

2.275 2.295 1.302 668

Portugal

0

5

0

5

5

2

155

Romania

0

9

10

5

0

11

35

37

10

11

Slovenia

0

0

0

5

5

1

15

14

1

2

Slovakia

30

13

20

5

5

14

25

24

25

8

Finland

10

7

10

10

15

5

300

74

64

43

Sweden

55

129

120

190

130

171

1.320 1.413 616

366

142

124

494

United Kingdom :

64

55

50

60

75

285

261

148

200

Iceland

0

0

0

0

0

15

8

11

10

0

Liechtenstein

0

5

0

0

10

1

5

17

12

8

Norway

20

27

10

15

30

25

130

94

26

33

Switzerland

30

29

15

25

30

41

210

243

96

76

Total

975

997

870

980

1.165 1.121 14.415 22.403 12.636 10.292

2008

Kazakhstan GEO/TIME

2009

2010

2011

2012

2014

2015

2016

2017

European Union 555 (current composition)

717

805

790

1.180 935

760

627

683

847

Belgium

20

70

105

200

225

133

70

22

13

40

Bulgaria

0

3

0

5

0

0

0

0

0

4

Czech Republic

75

183

45

20

25

22

5

18

18

38

Denmark

5

4

5

0

5

8

5

4

9

4

Germany (until 10 1990 former territory of the FRG)

11

25

30

65

140

145

124

122

140

Estonia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2013

Ireland

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Greece

5

4

5

5

5

4

0

0

3

3

Spain

0

9

0

0

5

6

5

6

9

11

France

85

153

165

150

210

153

150

86

121

203

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

0

0

0

0

0

Italy

0

0

0

0

0

2

5

0

3

10

ANNEXES 131 Cyprus

0

4

5

0

5

0

0

0

0

1

Latvia

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

4

1

13

Lithuania

0

2

0

0

0

2

0

2

3

1

Luxembourg

0

0

0

0

0

6

0

1

2

0

Hungary

0

0

5

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

Malta

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Netherlands

20

21

20

20

35

25

20

21

23

15

Austria

25

45

20

30

30

72

40

38

52

42

Poland

15

5

10

25

120

95

85

31

46

7

Portugal

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Romania

0

0

0

0

0

3

0

1

0

0

Slovenia

0

0

0

5

0

1

0

7

0

0

Slovakia

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Finland

5

10

10

5

5

4

0

1

3

1

Sweden

280

189

365

290

435

247

210

259

245

284

United Kingdom :

3

5

0

5

11

5

2

9

29

Iceland

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

7

6

0

Liechtenstein

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

Norway

10

29

25

10

20

14

15

7

4

7

Switzerland

5

15

10

15

5

18

30

9

5

16

Total

565

761

835

815

1.200 967

805

647

700

876

2008

2011

Kyrgyzstan GEO/TIME

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

European Union 310 (current composition)

321

1.045 935

680

659

595

602

681

606

Belgium

20

34

160

130

80

86

55

62

28

33

Bulgaria

0

2

5

5

0

0

0

0

5

0

Czech Republic

35

23

35

30

15

12

15

14

11

10

Denmark

5

0

5

5

5

6

5

2

0

5

Germany (until 15 1990 former territory of the FRG)

19

65

85

50

108

135

96

198

122

Estonia

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

Ireland

0

0

5

5

0

1

0

0

9

0

Greece

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

132 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE Spain

0

0

15

0

0

0

0

1

1

10

France

25

29

90

120

100

66

65

42

43

34

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

0

0

0

0

0

Italy

5

0

10

10

0

3

0

6

14

95

Cyprus

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Latvia

0

0

5

0

5

0

0

2

2

6

Lithuania

0

0

5

30

10

0

0

8

7

7

Luxembourg

0

0

5

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Hungary

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

2

5

0

Malta

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Netherlands

5

8

10

20

10

4

10

9

10

11

Austria

70

31

100

70

65

50

20

38

37

24

Poland

5

13

35

45

40

67

120

147

72

50

Portugal

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

1

0

Romania

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

Slovenia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Slovakia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Finland

0

1

10

5

10

2

5

1

2

2

Sweden

110

152

455

355

280

245

155

156

226

186

United Kingdom :

9

25

10

10

7

5

13

9

10

Iceland

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

Liechtenstein

0

3

0

5

0

5

5

4

0

0

Norway

10

23

60

45

35

34

10

11

5

3

Switzerland

0

6

20

5

30

2

10

11

2

2

Total

325

353

1.125 990

740

700

620

628

688

613

2008

2016

2017

Tajikistan GEO/TIME

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

European Union 90 (current composition)

144

205

210

210

296

590

1.124 3.208 1.701

Belgium

0

5

5

10

10

2

10

20

10

Bulgaria

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Czech Republic

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Denmark

0

3

5

0

5

3

0

2

0

0

8

ANNEXES 133 Germany (until 20 1990 former territory of the FRG)

48

65

95

50

160

360

299

2.011 1.245

Estonia

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Ireland

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Greece

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Spain

5

0

0

0

0

3

0

3

0

1

France

5

14

15

5

10

13

10

13

12

17

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

0

0

0

0

0

Italy

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

3

7

Cyprus

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Latvia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

14

13

Lithuania

0

2

5

5

0

1

5

8

19

52

Luxembourg

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

5

Hungary

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

6

62

0

Malta

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Netherlands

15

10

25

15

20

6

10

33

22

63

Austria

5

25

25

45

55

51

45

101

121

56

Poland

0

2

0

0

10

5

105

538

881

154

Portugal

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Romania

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Slovenia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Slovakia

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

Finland

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

4

4

4

Sweden

30

35

55

35

45

47

35

90

39

72

United Kingdom :

0

0

5

0

1

0

1

8

0

Iceland

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

Liechtenstein

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Norway

5

26

30

5

15

14

10

31

10

4

Switzerland

0

2

10

0

10

0

5

3

10

12

Total

95

172

240

220

235

310

605

1.159 3.228 1.719

134 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE Turkmenistan GEO/TIME

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

European Union 35 (current composition)

44

45

45

60

161

385

386

228

148

Belgium

5

5

5

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

Bulgaria

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

Czech Republic

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

0

Denmark

0

Germany (until 10 1990 former territory of the FRG)

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

6

10

10

25

130

350

361

189

121

Estonia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Ireland

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Greece

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

Spain

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

France

0

5

0

0

0

7

5

3

8

2

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

0

0

0

0

0

Italy

0

0

0

5

0

1

0

0

0

1

Cyprus

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Latvia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Lithuania

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Luxembourg

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Hungary

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Malta

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

Netherlands

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

3

Austria

0

2

0

0

0

4

0

1

2

2

Poland

0

0

0

5

5

4

15

1

10

2

Portugal

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Romania

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

Slovenia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Slovakia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Finland

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Sweden

20

16

15

10

15

8

5

11

2

7

United Kingdom :

7

5

5

5

3

10

4

9

4

Iceland

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Liechtenstein

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

ANNEXES 135 Norway

0

5

0

0

5

3

0

2

2

1

Switzerland

0

1

0

5

0

1

0

0

1

0

Total

35

51

45

50

65

165

385

388

231

149

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

European Union 1.005 (current composition)

549

460

635

635

544

520

568

559

556

Belgium

15

24

30

40

15

16

5

11

1

6

Bulgaria

0

1

0

5

0

1

0

0

0

0

Czech Republic

15

16

15

25

10

6

5

5

18

9

Denmark

5

Uzbekistan GEO/TIME

7

15

5

15

4

10

6

3

2

Germany (until 20 1990 former territory of the FRG)

17

20

30

35

22

25

23

91

60

Estonia

0

0

5

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

Ireland

5

0

0

0

0

4

0

1

2

1

Greece

5

6

10

5

5

2

0

9

2

3

Spain

5

2

0

0

5

11

0

0

7

2

France

20

29

25

30

65

18

20

34

20

18

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

0

0

0

0

0

Italy

0

3

0

0

5

0

0

1

7

2

Cyprus

55

14

0

5

0

1

0

0

2

1

Latvia

0

11

0

5

0

3

0

1

2

5

Lithuania

10

10

5

10

5

2

0

1

1

1

Luxembourg

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

Hungary

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

10

1

0

Malta

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

Netherlands

15

16

15

20

15

14

10

6

11

10

Austria

25

45

15

25

20

38

45

39

45

33

Poland

25

19

15

5

20

16

15

34

22

5

Portugal

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Romania

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Slovenia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Slovakia

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

Finland

0

5

5

0

0

2

10

2

4

2

136 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE Sweden

308

275

385

395

363

340

350

299

366

United Kingdom :

770

14

15

35

20

21

25

30

19

29

Iceland

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

0

0

Liechtenstein

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Norway

145

145

110

115

130

139

85

51

22

15

Switzerland

10

15

15

10

10

11

10

14

2

9

Total

1.160

709

585

760

775

694

615

638

583

580

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Armenia GEO/TIME

European Union 4.565 (current composition)

6.855 5.525 7.115 5.520 5.234 5.700 5.243 8.504 7.676

Belgium

595

1.475 1.305 910

605

425

280

277

226

179

Bulgaria

70

39

60

35

20

10

10

17

2

0

Czech Republic

30

19

15

10

20

42

30

44

60

129

Denmark

10

16

30

40

60

108

100

42

21

27

Germany (until 255 1990 former territory of the FRG)

341

390

400

670

1.296 2.240 2.160 5.405 3.850

Estonia

1

0

5

5

0

0

0

8

6

2

Ireland

5

10

10

10

0

0

0

0

1

7

Greece

115

73

70

50

35

49

30

29

74

72

Spain

35

17

35

30

10

22

15

35

87

116

France

2.440

3.606 2.160 4.195 2.640 2.056 1.920 1.635 1.455 2.357

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

0

0

0

0

0

Italy

30

10

55

35

75

101

65

39

74

125

Cyprus

5

14

5

10

0

5

5

3

8

2

Latvia

0

0

0

5

0

0

10

0

8

7

Lithuania

0

3

20

30

5

8

0

3

15

27

Luxembourg

0

2

5

5

0

9

0

1

0

5

Hungary

10

12

10

10

0

3

5

3

44

0

Malta

0

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

Netherlands

240

371

650

580

310

264

205

116

94

191

Austria

360

445

270

215

340

285

330

303

332

228

Poland

50

148

105

215

415

206

135

195

340

84

Portugal

0

0

0

0

0

3

0

0

0

2

ANNEXES 137 Romania

0

0

0

20

0

4

5

0

2

0

Slovenia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Slovakia

20

17

10

10

35

26

0

3

3

0

Finland

15

11

10

10

10

1

5

3

2

1

Sweden

275

215

275

270

250

292

290

297

206

217

United Kingdom :

6

25

15

15

19

20

30

39

42

Iceland

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

3

2

Liechtenstein

0

0

0

0

5

4

5

1

1

0

Norway

15

30

15

15

25

15

25

19

2

9

Switzerland

60

90

105

105

110

153

90

52

54

72

Total

4.640

6.975 5.645 7.235 5.665 5.406 5.825 5.317 8.564 7.759

2008

2009

Azerbaijan GEO/TIME

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

European Union 2.045 (current composition)

2.586 2.060 2.490 2.275 2.677 2.905 2.757 5.734 4.781

Belgium

70

83

80

170

145

139

90

55

70

54

Bulgaria

0

0

0

0

0

0

10

1

0

1

Czech Republic

5

1

5

0

10

6

5

6

52

127

Denmark

25

10

15

35

20

16

20

19

21

27

Germany (until 535 1990 former territory of the FRG)

750

535

725

620

1.029 1.295 1.497 4.744 3.408

Estonia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Ireland

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

Greece

5

4

0

0

5

0

0

3

1

0

Spain

25

4

10

5

0

1

5

3

18

27

France

745

880

880

845

915

906

845

489

346

472

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

0

0

5

1

0

Italy

0

19

15

10

20

1

5

11

7

9

Cyprus

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

Latvia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

4

7

Lithuania

0

0

5

0

5

4

20

16

7

6

Luxembourg

0

11

0

15

10

1

5

3

13

8

Hungary

0

1

5

0

0

0

5

5

1

4

Malta

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

138 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE Netherlands

110

138

105

145

100

96

80

66

79

134

Austria

120

128

90

95

110

98

130

57

71

104

Poland

5

10

10

0

5

3

0

17

22

25

Portugal

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Romania

0

0

0

5

0

1

0

0

0

0

Slovenia

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Slovakia

5

9

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Finland

0

9

10

10

10

5

10

29

11

4

Sweden

400

293

483

275

400

285

341

380

441

234

United Kingdom :

45

15

25

25

29

10

28

30

70

Iceland

0

0

0

0

3

0

0

3

5

0

Liechtenstein

0

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

Norway

40

60

45

55

45

50

15

37

18

11

Switzerland

30

19

35

30

15

30

40

35

28

68

Total

2.120

2.669 2.145 2.575 2.335 2.760 2.960 2.829 5.785 4.867

2008

2009

Georgia GEO/TIME

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

European Union 5.015 (current composition)

10.501 6.865 7.060 10.830 9.090 8.560 7.763 8.318 11.088

Belgium

275

386

365

400

505

371

430

299

242

468

Bulgaria

5

16

15

5

5

5

0

5

0

0

Czech Republic

40

33

10

15

10

15

20

20

49

129

Denmark

25

17

15

15

75

66

105

100

73

74

Germany (until 285 1990 former territory of the FRG)

638

750

525

1.430 2.485 3.180 3.196 3.770 3.459

Estonia

6

0

5

35

9

5

12

3

13

55

15

20

0

Ireland

180

88

15

20

39

75

304

Greece

2.240

2.170 1.160 1.120 895

533

350

386

689

1.107

Spain

60

36

50

9

20

57

72

304

France

460

542

1.435 1.740 2.680 2.694 1.610 1.326 1.165 2.102

Croatia

:

:

:

:

:

0

0

1

0

0

Italy

65

85

80

30

65

107

90

133

194

539

Cyprus

120

73

40

15

10

1

10

17

18

87

Latvia

15

2

0

175

105

146

175

30

4

8

10

10

ANNEXES 139 Lithuania

10

76

250

230

310

119

115

48

7

10

Luxembourg

0

2

5

15

5

19

10

23

64

138

Hungary

160

116

70

20

10

41

40

30

13

6

Malta

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

9

Netherlands

75

427

610

235

250

215

335

263

597

507

Austria

510

975

370

260

300

253

415

405

350

454

Poland

70

4.182 1.085 1.735 3.235 1.242 720

390

124

69

Portugal

5

2

5

5

5

0

1

1

2

Romania

55

39

10

25

0

26

5

11

0

1

Slovenia

0

1

5

0

0

0

0

3

0

0

Slovakia

120

98

65

65

55

33

15

6

1

0

Finland

10

22

55

70

30

15

40

18

20

122

Sweden

225

369

290

280

750

620

805

891

721

1.102

0

United Kingdom :

100

85

45

30

51

55

53

64

74

Iceland

0

0

5

10

3

5

1

42

289

5

Liechtenstein

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

4

Norway

20

47

85

50

110

67

35

35

8

37

Switzerland

480

638

640

400

725

653

465

404

465

670

Total

5.520

11.186 7.595 7.515 11.675 9.813 9.070 8.203 8.836 12.088

140 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE 4.

Distribution of the registered internally displaced persons by regions within Ukraine in 2015-2017

Region/ Oblast’

28.12.2015

22.09.2016

08.06.2017

02.11.2017

Vinnitskaya

12 866

14 014

14 622

14 819

Volynskaya

4 008

4 565

4 971

2 824

Dnepropetrovskaya

77 001

75 551

75 195

73 576

Donetskaya

630 717

621 076

529 483

529 130

Zhitomirskaya

10 257

11 651

12 597

7 270

Zakarpatskaya

3 450

3 447

3 532

3 467

Zaporozhskaya

112 179

107 016

53 767

54 564

Ivano-Frankovskaya

4 036

4 580

5 293

3 397

Kiyevskaya

46 894

54 306

60 325

59 926

Kirovogradskaya

11 535

14 487

9 238

7 801

Luganskaya

242 281

288 819

293 604

299 134

L'vovskaya

11 028

11 942

12 291

12 050

Nikolayevskaya

8 712

8 452

8 080

8 255

Odesskaya

34 899

40 415

45 008

38 095

Poltavskaya

30 233

29 427

28 538

27 502

Rovenskaya

3 146

3 208

3 181

3 256

Sumskaya

15 062

15 997

14 788

14 299

Ternopol'skaya

2 700

2 478

2 497

2 499

Khar'kovskaya

205 627

192 989

197 666

160 616

Khersonskaya

13 568

16 001

17 158

13 441

Khmel'nitskaya

7 152

6 715

6 509

6 947

Cherkasskaya

14 156

14 213

13 244

12 964

Chernovitskaya

3 110

3 323

3 600

2 263

Chernigovskaya

9 862

9 454

8 908

8 614

Kiev

120 008

147 445

169 371

154 993

Total, within Ukraine

1 634 487

1 701 571

1 593 466

1 521 702

* Source: The Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine (Ukrainian: Міністерство соціальної політики України)

ANNEXES 141

Iceland

France

Norway

Czech Republic

Austria

United Kingdom

X

Luxemburg

*

Armenia

Belgium

The Netherlands Bulgaria

FSU countries designated and non-designated as SCOs by EU member states, Norway, Iceland and Serbia Germany

5.

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Belarus Georgia

X

X

X

X

X

Moldova

X

Ukraine

*

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X ***

Russia

X

*Moldova and Ukraine are not formally designated as SCOs but draft legislation was discussed by German Parliament in 2018. **Except eastern territories of Ukraine ***Except Luhansk and Donetsk regions and Crimea

6.

Migration to the EU MS from Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine

a.

First-time and subsequent asylum applications to the EU MS from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in 2007-2018 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

2013

2014

2015

Moldova

33

20

39

45

25

72

270

1,567 3,407 1,058

Georgia

231

285

638

750

525

1,430 2,485 3,180 3,196 3,770 3,459

Ukraine

80

45

85

70

55

135

Total

344

350

762

865

605

1,600 2,709 6,155 9,421 9,669 5,844

35

152

2016

2017

2,705 4,658 2,492 1,327

*Eurostat

b.

Schengen visas issued by diplomatic missions or consular posts in Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine in 2007-2017

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Moldova 6,916

6,229

6,248

6,425

6,654

6,517

6,833

1,996

379

280

210

Georgia 20,879 16,927 17,892 15,460 17,368 16,595 15,601 15,796 16,674 16,042 4,073 Ukraine 111,525 112,061 95,159 97,02 Total

99,234 100,455 104,819 96,862 92,078 98,833 52,986

139,32 135,217 119,299 118,905 123,256 123,567 127,253 114,654 487,752 394,875 267,059

*Eurostat

142 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE c.

2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017

Number of decisions and overall protection rates for applicants from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in 2007-2017 Moldova 0 26 5,3 19 0 65 4,5 22 0 251 6,2 32 11,8 34 6,8 44 0,5 4,797 2 1,360

Protection quota Decisions Protection quota Decisions Protection quota Decisions Protection quota Decisions Protection quota Decisions Protection quota Decisions Protection quota Decisions Protection quota Decisions Protection quota Decisions Protection quota Decisions

Georgia 2,1 194 2,6 428 1,2 948 2,1 430 1,1 663 0,4 1,573 0,5 2,510 0,3 2,360 1,8 4,057 2,1 6,340

Ukraine 12,5 48 7,1 56 6,6 61 21,1 71 4,5 44 5,3 57 5,5 345 5,4 1,008 1,5 4,04 5,2 5,792

* BAMF - German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees

d.

Moldova Georgia Ukraine Total *Eurostat

 

Third country nationals of Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine found to be irregularly present on the territory of the EU MS in 2008-2017 2008 335 460 1,325 2,120

2009 325 605 1,155 2,085

2010 275 710 1,070 2,055

2011 325 585 1,095 2,005

2012 265 1,085 1,280 2,630

2013 260 1,380 1,265 2,905

2014 205 1,580 1,455 3,240

2015 285 1,495 2,550 4,330

2016 2.050 1,810 2,270 6,130

2017 2.235 2,030 2,405 6,670

ANNEXES 143 7.

Institutionalization of diaspora politics in the FSU-countries Formation

Legal status

Ministry of Diaspora of the Republic of Armenia

2008

a part of the Armenian government. Minister appointed by the decree of President of the RA

Office of state minister of Georgia for diaspora issues

2008 (2016 re-established)

a governmental agency within the Georgian government.

Public Advisory Council

2014

The civic advisory board. Its task is to improve relations with diaspora organizations; facilitate preparation of recommendations to State Minister on the current issues in education, science, culture, economy and investment, sports, youth and other fields of Georgian Diaspora activities.

Diaspora Relations Bureau (BRD)

2012

a subdivision of the State Chancellery, under the direct subordination of the Prime Minister

Moldova

Georgia

Armenia

Country

144 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE Country

The inter-ministerial committee (CIDMD)

Azerbaijan

the Executive Coordinating Council of Moldovans residing abroad/ Coordinating Council of peoples from Moldova residing abroad

Formation

Legal status

2017

an inter-ministerial committee in the sectors of Diaspora, migration and development (CIDMD)

2000

as an advisory body for coordinating links between Moldovan diaspora associations and the authorities of the Republic of Moldova

State Committee on Work with Azerbai- 2002 / 2008 janis Living Abroad

is a governmental chair within the Azerbaijan’s Government

ANNEXES 145

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Ukraine

Country

Formation

Legal status

National Commission for Matters 2004 Concerning Ukrainians Worldwide

National Commission functions under the supervision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

Mekendeshter Forum

Forum has been initiated by former President Rosa Otunbaeva

2012

Kairalman Program 2007

Kyrgyzstan’s repatriation program is under supervision of Kyrgyz MFA

Committee of the Migration Issues

2004

A part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Oralman Program

2007

Kazakh repatriation program is under supervision of Kazakh MFA

146 MIGRATION AS A (GEO-)POLITICAL CHALLENGE Country

Government Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad

Formation

Legal status

1994

Russia’s repatriation program is under the jurisdiction of the MFA of Russian Federation

NGO

2007

Russia

Russkij mir Foundation

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation are founders

Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation Rossotrudichestvo

2008 operates under the jurisdiction of the Russian MFA

    

  

..

SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY

.

Edited by Dr. Andreas Umland |ISSN 1614-3515 1

Андреас Умланд (ред.) | Воплощение Европейской конвенции по правам человека в России. Философские, юридические и эмпирические исследования | ISBN 3-89821-387-0

2

Christian Wipperfürth | Russland – ein vertrauenswürdiger Partner? Grundlagen, Hintergründe und Praxis gegenwärtiger russischer Außenpolitik | Mit einem Vorwort von Heinz Timmermann | ISBN 3-89821-401-X

3

Manja Hussner | Die Übernahme internationalen Rechts in die russische und deutsche Rechtsordnung. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit der Verfassungen der Russländischen Föderation und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland | Mit einem Vorwort von Rainer Arnold | ISBN 3-89821-438-9

4 5

Matthew Tejada | Bulgaria's Democratic Consolidation and the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). The Unattainability of Closure | With a foreword by Richard J. Crampton | ISBN 3-89821-439-7 Марк Григорьевич Меерович | Квадратные метры, определяющие сознание. Государственная жилищная политика в СССР. 1921 – 1941 гг | ISBN 3-89821-474-5

6

Andrei P. Tsygankov, Pavel A.Tsygankov (Eds.) | New Directions in Russian International Studies | ISBN 3-89821-422-2

7

Марк Григорьевич Меерович | Как власть народ к труду приучала. Жилище в СССР – средство управления людьми. 1917 – 1941 гг. | С предисловием Елены Осокиной | ISBN 3-89821-495-8

8

David J. Galbreath | Nation-Building and Minority Politics in Post-Socialist States. Interests, Influence and Identities in Estonia and Latvia | With a foreword by David J. Smith | ISBN 3-89821-467-2

9

Алексей Юрьевич Безугольный | Народы Кавказа в Вооруженных силах СССР в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг. | С предисловием Николая Бугая | ISBN 3-89821-475-3

10 Вячеслав Лихачев и Владимир Прибыловский (ред.) | Русское Национальное Единство, 1990-2000. В 2-х томах | ISBN 3-89821-523-7 11 Николай Бугай (ред.) | Народы стран Балтии в условиях сталинизма (1940-е – 1950-e годы). Документированная история | ISBN 3-89821-525-3 12 Ingmar Bredies (Hrsg.) | Zur Anatomie der Orange Revolution in der Ukraine. Wechsel des Elitenregimes oder Triumph des Parlamentarismus?| ISBN 3-89821-524-5

13 Anastasia V. Mitrofanova | The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy. Actors and Ideas | With a foreword by William C. Gay | ISBN 3-89821-481-8

14 Nathan D. Larson | Alexander Solzhenitsyn and the Russo-Jewish Question | ISBN 3-89821-483-4 15 Guido Houben | Kulturpolitik und Ethnizität. Staatliche Kunstförderung im Russland der neunziger Jahre | Mit einem Vorwort von Gert Weisskirchen | ISBN 3-89821-542-3

16 Leonid Luks | Der russische „Sonderweg“? Aufsätze zur neuesten Geschichte Russlands im europäischen Kontext | ISBN 3-89821-496-6

17 Евгений Мороз | История «Мёртвой воды» – от страшной сказки к большой политике. Политическое неоязычество в постсоветской России | ISBN 3-89821-551-2

18 Александр Верховский и Галина Кожевникова (peд.) | Этническая и религиозная интолерантность в российских СМИ. Результаты мониторинга 2001-2004 гг. | ISBN 3-89821-569-5 19 Christian Ganzer | Sowjetisches Erbe und ukrainische Nation. Das Museum der Geschichte des Zaporoger Kosakentums auf der Insel Chortycja | Mit einem Vorwort von Frank Golczewski | ISBN 3-89821-504-0

20 Эльза-Баир Гучинова | Помнить нельзя забыть. Антропология депортационной травмы калмыков | С предисловием Кэролайн Хамфри | ISBN 3-89821-506-7

21 Юлия Лидерман | Мотивы «проверки» и «испытания» в постсоветской культуре. Советское прошлое в российском кинематографе 1990-х годов | С предисловием Евгения Марголита | ISBN 3-89821-511-3

22 Tanya Lokshina, Ray Thomas, Mary Mayer (Eds.) | The Imposition of a Fake Political Settlement in the Northern Caucasus. The 2003 Chechen Presidential Election | ISBN 3-89821-436-2 23 Timothy McCajor Hall, Rosie Read (Eds.) | Changes in the Heart of Europe. Recent Ethnographies of Czechs, Slovaks, Roma, and Sorbs | With an afterword by Zdeněk Salzmann | ISBN 3-89821-606-3

24 Christian Autengruber | Die politischen Parteien in Bulgarien und Rumänien. Eine vergleichende Analyse seit Beginn der 90er Jahre | Mit einem Vorwort von Dorothée de Nève | ISBN 3-89821-476-1

25 Annette Freyberg-Inan with Radu Cristescu | The Ghosts in Our Classrooms, or: John Dewey Meets Ceauşescu. The Promise and the Failures of Civic Education in Romania | ISBN 3-89821-416-8 26 John B. Dunlop | The 2002 Dubrovka and 2004 Beslan Hostage Crises. A Critique of Russian CounterTerrorism | With a foreword by Donald N. Jensen | ISBN 3-89821-608-X

27 Peter Koller | Das touristische Potenzial von Kam’’janec’–Podil’s’kyj. Eine fremdenverkehrsgeographische Untersuchung der Zukunftsperspektiven und Maßnahmenplanung zur Destinationsentwicklung des „ukrainischen Rothenburg“ | Mit einem Vorwort von Kristiane Klemm | ISBN 3-89821-640-3

28 Françoise Daucé, Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (Eds.) | Dedovshchina in the Post-Soviet Military. Hazing of Russian Army Conscripts in a Comparative Perspective | With a foreword by Dale Herspring | ISBN 3-89821-616-0

29 Florian Strasser | Zivilgesellschaftliche Einflüsse auf die Orange Revolution. Die gewaltlose Massenbewegung und die ukrainische Wahlkrise 2004 | Mit einem Vorwort von Egbert Jahn | ISBN 3-89821-648-9

30 Rebecca S. Katz | The Georgian Regime Crisis of 2003-2004. A Case Study in Post-Soviet Media Representation of Politics, Crime and Corruption | ISBN 3-89821-413-3

31 Vladimir Kantor | Willkür oder Freiheit. Beiträge zur russischen Geschichtsphilosophie | Ediert von Dagmar Herrmann sowie mit einem Vorwort versehen von Leonid Luks | ISBN 3-89821-589-X

32 Laura A. Victoir | The Russian Land Estate Today. A Case Study of Cultural Politics in Post-Soviet Russia | With a foreword by Priscilla Roosevelt | ISBN 3-89821-426-5

33 Ivan Katchanovski | Cleft Countries. Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova| With a foreword by Francis Fukuyama | ISBN 3-89821-558-X

34 Florian Mühlfried | Postsowjetische Feiern. Das Georgische Bankett im Wandel | Mit einem Vorwort von Kevin Tuite | ISBN 3-89821-601-2

35 Roger Griffin, Werner Loh, Andreas Umland (Eds.) | Fascism Past and Present, West and East. An International Debate on Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right | With an afterword by Walter Laqueur | ISBN 3-89821-674-8

36 Sebastian Schlegel | Der „Weiße Archipel“. Sowjetische Atomstädte 1945-1991 | Mit einem Geleitwort von Thomas Bohn | ISBN 3-89821-679-9

37 Vyacheslav Likhachev | Political Anti-Semitism in Post-Soviet Russia. Actors and Ideas in 1991-2003 | Edited and translated from Russian by Eugene Veklerov | ISBN 3-89821-529-6

38 Josette Baer (Ed.) | Preparing Liberty in Central Europe. Political Texts from the Spring of Nations 1848 to the Spring of Prague 1968 | With a foreword by Zdeněk V. David | ISBN 3-89821-546-6

39 Михаил Лукьянов | Российский консерватизм и реформа, 1907-1914 | С предисловием Марка Д. Стейнберга | ISBN 3-89821-503-2

40 Nicola Melloni | Market Without Economy. The 1998 Russian Financial Crisis | With a foreword by Eiji Furukawa | ISBN 3-89821-407-9

41 Dmitrij Chmelnizki | Die Architektur Stalins | Bd. 1: Studien zu Ideologie und Stil | Bd. 2: Bilddokumentation | Mit einem Vorwort von Bruno Flierl | ISBN 3-89821-515-6

42 Katja Yafimava | Post-Soviet Russian-Belarussian Relationships. The Role of Gas Transit Pipelines | With a foreword by Jonathan P. Stern | ISBN 3-89821-655-1

43 Boris Chavkin | Verflechtungen der deutschen und russischen Zeitgeschichte. Aufsätze und Archivfunde zu den Beziehungen Deutschlands und der Sowjetunion von 1917 bis 1991 | Ediert von Markus Edlinger sowie mit einem Vorwort versehen von Leonid Luks | ISBN 3-89821-756-6

44 Anastasija Grynenko in Zusammenarbeit mit Claudia Dathe | Die Terminologie des Gerichtswesens der Ukraine und Deutschlands im Vergleich. Eine übersetzungswissenschaftliche Analyse juristischer Fachbegriffe im Deutschen, Ukrainischen und Russischen | Mit einem Vorwort von Ulrich Hartmann | ISBN 3-89821-691-8

45 Anton Burkov | The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Russian Law. Legislation and Application in 1996-2006 | With a foreword by Françoise Hampson | ISBN 978-3-89821-639-5

46 Stina Torjesen, Indra Overland (Eds.) | International Election Observers in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Geopolitical Pawns or Agents of Change? | ISBN 978-3-89821-743-9 47 Taras Kuzio | Ukraine – Crimea – Russia. Triangle of Conflict | ISBN 978-3-89821-761-3 48 Claudia Šabić | "Ich erinnere mich nicht, aber L'viv!" Zur Funktion kultureller Faktoren für die Institutionalisierung und Entwicklung einer ukrainischen Region | Mit einem Vorwort von Melanie Tatur | ISBN 978-3-89821-752-1

49 Marlies Bilz | Tatarstan in der Transformation. Nationaler Diskurs und Politische Praxis 1988-1994 | Mit einem Vorwort von Frank Golczewski | ISBN 978-3-89821-722-4

50 Марлен Ларюэль (ред.) | Современные интерпретации русского национализма | ISBN 978-3-89821-795-8

51 Sonja Schüler | Die ethnische Dimension der Armut. Roma im postsozialistischen Rumänien | Mit einem Vorwort von Anton Sterbling | ISBN 978-3-89821-776-7

52 Галина Кожевникова | Радикальный национализм в России и противодействие ему. Сборник докладов Центра «Сова» за 2004-2007 гг. | С предисловием Александра Верховского | ISBN 978-3-89821-721-7

53 Галина Кожевникова и Владимир Прибыловский | Российская власть в биографиях I. Высшие должностные лица РФ в 2004 г. | ISBN 978-3-89821-796-5

54 Галина Кожевникова и Владимир Прибыловский | Российская власть в биографиях II. Члены Правительства РФ в 2004 г. | ISBN 978-3-89821-797-2

55 Галина Кожевникова и Владимир Прибыловский | Российская власть в биографиях III. Руководители федеральных служб и агентств РФ в 2004 г.| ISBN 978-3-89821-798-9

56 Ileana Petroniu | Privatisierung in Transformationsökonomien. Determinanten der Restrukturierungs-Bereitschaft am Beispiel Polens, Rumäniens und der Ukraine | Mit einem Vorwort von Rainer W. Schäfer | ISBN 978-3-89821-790-3

57 Christian Wipperfürth | Russland und seine GUS-Nachbarn. Hintergründe, aktuelle Entwicklungen und Konflikte in einer ressourcenreichen Region| ISBN 978-3-89821-801-6

58 Togzhan Kassenova | From Antagonism to Partnership. The Uneasy Path of the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction | With a foreword by Christoph Bluth | ISBN 978-3-89821-707-1

59 Alexander Höllwerth | Das sakrale eurasische Imperium des Aleksandr Dugin. Eine Diskursanalyse zum postsowjetischen russischen Rechtsextremismus | Mit einem Vorwort von Dirk Uffelmann | ISBN 978-3-89821-813-9

60 Олег Рябов | «Россия-Матушка». Национализм, гендер и война в России XX века | С предисловием Елены Гощило | ISBN 978-3-89821-487-2

61 Ivan Maistrenko | Borot'bism. A Chapter in the History of the Ukrainian Revolution | With a new Introduction by Chris Ford | Translated by George S. N. Luckyj with the assistance of Ivan L. Rudnytsky | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition ISBN 978-3-8382-1107-7

62 Maryna Romanets | Anamorphosic Texts and Reconfigured Visions. Improvised Traditions in Contemporary Ukrainian and Irish Literature | ISBN 978-3-89821-576-3

63 Paul D'Anieri and Taras Kuzio (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution I. Democratization and Elections in Post-Communist Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-89821-698-2

64 Bohdan Harasymiw in collaboration with Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution II. Information and Manipulation Strategies in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-699-9 65 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution III. The Context and Dynamics of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-803-0 66 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution IV. Foreign Assistance and Civic Action in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-808-5 67 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution V. Institutional Observation Reports on the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-809-2 68 Taras Kuzio (Ed.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution VI. Post-Communist Democratic Revolutions in Comparative Perspective | ISBN 978-3-89821-820-7

69 Tim Bohse | Autoritarismus statt Selbstverwaltung. Die Transformation der kommunalen Politik in der Stadt Kaliningrad 1990-2005 | Mit einem Geleitwort von Stefan Troebst | ISBN 978-3-89821-782-8

70 David Rupp | Die Rußländische Föderation und die russischsprachige Minderheit in Lettland. Eine Fallstudie zur Anwaltspolitik Moskaus gegenüber den russophonen Minderheiten im „Nahen Ausland“ von 1991 bis 2002 | Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Wagner | ISBN 978-3-89821-778-1

71 Taras Kuzio | Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism. New Directions in Cross-Cultural and Post-Communist Studies | With a foreword by Paul Robert Magocsi | ISBN 978-3-89821-815-3

72 Christine Teichmann | Die Hochschultransformation im heutigen Osteuropa. Kontinuität und Wandel bei der Entwicklung des postkommunistischen Universitätswesens | Mit einem Vorwort von Oskar Anweiler | ISBN 978-3-89821-842-9

73 Julia Kusznir | Der politische Einfluss von Wirtschaftseliten in russischen Regionen. Eine Analyse am Beispiel der Erdöl- und Erdgasindustrie, 1992-2005 | Mit einem Vorwort von Wolfgang Eichwede | ISBN 978-3-89821-821-4

74 Alena Vysotskaya | Russland, Belarus und die EU-Osterweiterung. Zur Minderheitenfrage und zum Problem der Freizügigkeit des Personenverkehrs | Mit einem Vorwort von Katlijn Malfliet | ISBN 978-3-89821-822-1

75 Heiko Pleines (Hrsg.) | Corporate Governance in post-sozialistischen Volkswirtschaften | ISBN 978-3-89821-766-8

76 Stefan Ihrig | Wer sind die Moldawier? Rumänismus versus Moldowanismus in Historiographie und Schulbüchern der Republik Moldova, 1991-2006 | Mit einem Vorwort von Holm Sundhaussen | ISBN 978-3-89821-466-7

77 Galina Kozhevnikova in collaboration with Alexander Verkhovsky and Eugene Veklerov | UltraNationalism and Hate Crimes in Contemporary Russia. The 2004-2006 Annual Reports of Moscow’s SOVA Center | With a foreword by Stephen D. Shenfield | ISBN 978-3-89821-868-9

78 Florian Küchler | The Role of the European Union in Moldova’s Transnistria Conflict | With a foreword by Christopher Hill | ISBN 978-3-89821-850-4

79 Bernd Rechel | The Long Way Back to Europe. Minority Protection in Bulgaria | With a foreword by Richard Crampton | ISBN 978-3-89821-863-4

80 Peter W. Rodgers | Nation, Region and History in Post-Communist Transitions. Identity Politics in Ukraine, 1991-2006 | With a foreword by Vera Tolz | ISBN 978-3-89821-903-7

81 Stephanie Solywoda | The Life and Work of Semen L. Frank. A Study of Russian Religious Philosophy | With a foreword by Philip Walters | ISBN 978-3-89821-457-5

82 Vera Sokolova | Cultural Politics of Ethnicity. Discourses on Roma in Communist Czechoslovakia | ISBN 978-3-89821-864-1

83 Natalya Shevchik Ketenci | Kazakhstani Enterprises in Transition. The Role of Historical Regional Development in Kazakhstan’s Post-Soviet Economic Transformation | ISBN 978-3-89821-831-3

84 Martin Malek, Anna Schor-Tschudnowskaja (Hgg.) | Europa im Tschetschenienkrieg. Zwischen politischer Ohnmacht und Gleichgültigkeit | Mit einem Vorwort von Lipchan Basajewa | ISBN 978-3-89821-676-0

85 Stefan Meister | Das postsowjetische Universitätswesen zwischen nationalem und internationalem Wandel. Die Entwicklung der regionalen Hochschule in Russland als Gradmesser der Systemtransformation | Mit einem Vorwort von Joan DeBardeleben | ISBN 978-3-89821-891-7

86 Konstantin Sheiko in collaboration with Stephen Brown | Nationalist Imaginings of the Russian Past. Anatolii Fomenko and the Rise of Alternative History in Post-Communist Russia | With a foreword by Donald Ostrowski | ISBN 978-3-89821-915-0

87 Sabine Jenni | Wie stark ist das „Einige Russland“? Zur Parteibindung der Eliten und zum Wahlerfolg der Machtpartei im Dezember 2007 | Mit einem Vorwort von Klaus Armingeon | ISBN 978-3-89821-961-7

88 Thomas Borén | Meeting-Places of Transformation. Urban Identity, Spatial Representations and Local Politics in Post-Soviet St Petersburg | ISBN 978-3-89821-739-2

89 Aygul Ashirova | Stalinismus und Stalin-Kult in Zentralasien. Turkmenistan 1924-1953 | Mit einem Vorwort von Leonid Luks | ISBN 978-3-89821-987-7 90 Leonid Luks | Freiheit oder imperiale Größe? Essays zu einem russischen Dilemma | ISBN 978-3-8382-0011-8 91 Christopher Gilley | The ‘Change of Signposts’ in the Ukrainian Emigration. A Contribution to the History of Sovietophilism in the 1920s | With a foreword by Frank Golczewski | ISBN 978-3-89821-965-5

92 Philipp Casula, Jeronim Perovic (Eds.) | Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency. The Discursive Foundations of Russia's Stability | With a foreword by Heiko Haumann | ISBN 978-3-8382-0015-6

93 Marcel Viëtor | Europa und die Frage nach seinen Grenzen im Osten. Zur Konstruktion ‚europäischer Identität’ in Geschichte und Gegenwart | Mit einem Vorwort von Albrecht Lehmann | ISBN 978-3-8382-0045-3

94 Ben Hellman, Andrei Rogachevskii | Filming the Unfilmable. Casper Wrede's 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich' | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0594-6

95 Eva Fuchslocher | Vaterland, Sprache, Glaube. Orthodoxie und Nationenbildung am Beispiel Georgiens | Mit einem Vorwort von Christina von Braun | ISBN 978-3-89821-884-9

96 Vladimir Kantor | Das Westlertum und der Weg Russlands. Zur Entwicklung der russischen Literatur und Philosophie | Ediert von Dagmar Herrmann | Mit einem Beitrag von Nikolaus Lobkowicz | ISBN 978-3-8382-0102-3

97 Kamran Musayev | Die postsowjetische Transformation im Baltikum und Südkaukasus. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der politischen Entwicklung Lettlands und Aserbaidschans 1985-2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Leonid Luks | Ediert von Sandro Henschel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0103-0

98 Tatiana Zhurzhenko | Borderlands into Bordered Lands. Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine | With a foreword by Dieter Segert | ISBN 978-3-8382-0042-2

99 Кирилл Галушко, Лидия Смола (ред.) | Пределы падения – варианты украинского будущего. Аналитико-прогностические исследования | ISBN 978-3-8382-0148-1 100 Michael Minkenberg (Ed.) | Historical Legacies and the Radical Right in Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe | With an afterword by Sabrina P. Ramet | ISBN 978-3-8382-0124-5 101 David-Emil Wickström | Rocking St. Petersburg. Transcultural Flows and Identity Politics in the St. Petersburg Popular Music Scene | With a foreword by Yngvar B. Steinholt | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0600-4

102 Eva Zabka | Eine neue „Zeit der Wirren“? Der spät- und postsowjetische Systemwandel 1985-2000 im Spiegel russischer gesellschaftspolitischer Diskurse | Mit einem Vorwort von Margareta Mommsen | ISBN 978-3-8382-0161-0

103 Ulrike Ziemer | Ethnic Belonging, Gender and Cultural Practices. Youth Identitites in Contemporary Russia | With a foreword by Anoop Nayak | ISBN 978-3-8382-0152-8

104 Ksenia Chepikova | ‚Einiges Russland’ - eine zweite KPdSU? Aspekte der Identitätskonstruktion einer postsowjetischen „Partei der Macht“ | Mit einem Vorwort von Torsten Oppelland | ISBN 978-3-8382-0311-9

105 Леонид Люкс | Западничество или евразийство? Демократия или идеократия? Сборник статей об исторических дилеммах России | С предисловием Владимира Кантора | ISBN 978-3-8382-0211-2

106 Anna Dost | Das russische Verfassungsrecht auf dem Weg zum Föderalismus und zurück. Zum Konflikt von Rechtsnormen und -wirklichkeit in der Russländischen Föderation von 1991 bis 2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Alexander Blankenagel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0292-1

107 Philipp Herzog | Sozialistische Völkerfreundschaft, nationaler Widerstand oder harmloser Zeitvertreib? Zur politischen Funktion der Volkskunst im sowjetischen Estland | Mit einem Vorwort von Andreas Kappeler | ISBN 978-3-8382-0216-7

108 Marlène Laruelle (Ed.) | Russian Nationalism, Foreign Policy, and Identity Debates in Putin's Russia. New Ideological Patterns after the Orange Revolution | ISBN 978-3-8382-0325-6 109 Michail Logvinov | Russlands Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme des Bekämpfungsansatzes | Mit einem Geleitwort von Hans-Henning Schröder und einem Vorwort von Eckhard Jesse | ISBN 978-3-8382-0329-4

110 John B. Dunlop | The Moscow Bombings of September 1999. Examinations of Russian Terrorist Attacks at the Onset of Vladimir Putin's Rule | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0608-0

111 Андрей А. Ковалёв | Свидетельство из-за кулис российской политики I. Можно ли делать добрo из зла? (Воспоминания и размышления о последних советских и первых послесоветских годах) | With a foreword by Peter Reddaway | ISBN 978-3-8382-0302-7

112 Андрей А. Ковалёв | Свидетельство из-за кулис российской политики II. Угроза для себя и окружающих (Наблюдения и предостережения относительно происходящего после 2000 г.) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0303-4 113 Bernd Kappenberg | Zeichen setzen für Europa. Der Gebrauch europäischer lateinischer Sonderzeichen in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit | Mit einem Vorwort von Peter Schlobinski | ISBN 978-3-89821-749-1

114 Ivo Mijnssen | The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia I. Back to Our Future! History, Modernity, and Patriotism according to Nashi, 2005-2013 | With a foreword by Jeronim Perović | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0578-6

115 Jussi Lassila | The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia II. The Search for Distinctive Conformism in the Political Communication of Nashi, 2005-2009 | With a foreword by Kirill Postoutenko | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0585-4

116 Valerio Trabandt | Neue Nachbarn, gute Nachbarschaft? Die EU als internationaler Akteur am Beispiel ihrer Demokratieförderung in Belarus und der Ukraine 2004-2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Jutta Joachim | ISBN 978-3-8382-0437-6

117 Fabian Pfeiffer | Estlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik I. Der estnische Atlantizismus nach der wiedererlangten Unabhängigkeit 1991-2004 | Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Hubel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0127-6

118 Jana Podßuweit | Estlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik II. Handlungsoptionen eines Kleinstaates im Rahmen seiner EU-Mitgliedschaft (2004-2008) | Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Hubel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0440-6

119 Karin Pointner | Estlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik III. Eine gedächtnispolitische Analyse estnischer Entwicklungskooperation 2006-2010 | Mit einem Vorwort von Karin Liebhart | ISBN 978-3-8382-0435-2

120 Ruslana Vovk | Die Offenheit der ukrainischen Verfassung für das Völkerrecht und die europäische Integration | Mit einem Vorwort von Alexander Blankenagel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0481-9

121 Mykhaylo Banakh | Die Relevanz der Zivilgesellschaft bei den postkommunistischen Transformationsprozessen in mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern. Das Beispiel der spät- und postsowjetischen Ukraine 1986-2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Gerhard Simon | ISBN 978-3-8382-0499-4

122 Michael Moser | Language Policy and the Discourse on Languages in Ukraine under President Viktor Yanukovych (25 February 2010–28 October 2012) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0497-0 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0507-6 (Hardcover edition)

123 Nicole Krome | Russischer Netzwerkkapitalismus Restrukturierungsprozesse in der Russischen Föderation am Beispiel des Luftfahrtunternehmens "Aviastar" | Mit einem Vorwort von Petra Stykow | ISBN 978-3-8382-0534-2

124 David R. Marples | 'Our Glorious Past'. Lukashenka‘s Belarus and the Great Patriotic War | ISBN 978-3-8382-0674-5 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0675-2 (Hardcover edition)

125 Ulf Walther | Russlands "neuer Adel". Die Macht des Geheimdienstes von Gorbatschow bis Putin | Mit einem Vorwort von Hans-Georg Wieck | ISBN 978-3-8382-0584-7

126 Simon Geissbühler (Hrsg.) | Kiew – Revolution 3.0. Der Euromaidan 2013/14 und die Zukunftsperspektiven der Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-8382-0581-6 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0681-3 (Hardcover edition)

127 Andrey Makarychev | Russia and the EU in a Multipolar World. Discourses, Identities, Norms | With a foreword by Klaus Segbers | ISBN 978-3-8382-0529-8

128 Roland Scharff | Kasachstan als postsowjetischer Wohlfahrtsstaat. Die Transformation des sozialen Schutzsystems | Mit einem Vorwort von Joachim Ahrens | ISBN 978-3-8382-0622-6

129 Katja Grupp | Bild Lücke Deutschland. Kaliningrader Studierende sprechen über Deutschland | Mit einem Vorwort von Martin Schulz | ISBN 978-3-8382-0552-6

130 Konstantin Sheiko, Stephen Brown | History as Therapy. Alternative History and Nationalist Imaginings in Russia, 1991-2014 | ISBN 978-3-8382-0565-6

131 Elisa Kriza | Alexander Solzhenitsyn: Cold War Icon, Gulag Author, Russian Nationalist? A Study of the Western Reception of his Literary Writings, Historical Interpretations, and Political Ideas | With a foreword by Andrei Rogatchevski | ISBN 978-3-8382-0689-9 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0690-5 (Hardcover edition)

132 Serghei Golunov | The Elephant in the Room. Corruption and Cheating in Russian Universities | ISBN 978-3-8382-0670-7

133 Manja Hussner, Rainer Arnold (Hgg.) | Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Zentralasien I. Sammlung von Verfassungstexten | ISBN 978-3-8382-0595-3

134 Nikolay Mitrokhin | Die "Russische Partei". Die Bewegung der russischen Nationalisten in der UdSSR 1953-1985 | Aus dem Russischen übertragen von einem Übersetzerteam unter der Leitung von Larisa Schippel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0024-8

135 Manja Hussner, Rainer Arnold (Hgg.) | Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Zentralasien II. Sammlung von Verfassungstexten | ISBN 978-3-8382-0597-7

136 Manfred Zeller | Das sowjetische Fieber. Fußballfans im poststalinistischen Vielvölkerreich | Mit einem Vorwort von Nikolaus Katzer | ISBN 978-3-8382-0757-5

137 Kristin Schreiter | Stellung und Entwicklungspotential zivilgesellschaftlicher Gruppen in Russland. Menschenrechtsorganisationen im Vergleich | ISBN 978-3-8382-0673-8 138 David R. Marples, Frederick V. Mills (Eds.) | Ukraine’s Euromaidan. Analyses of a Civil Revolution | ISBN 978-3-8382-0700-1 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0740-7 (Hardcover edition)

139 Bernd Kappenberg | Setting Signs for Europe. Why Diacritics Matter for European Integration | With a foreword by Peter Schlobinski | ISBN 978-3-8382-0703-2

140 René Lenz | Internationalisierung, Kooperation und Transfer. Externe bildungspolitische Akteure in der Russischen Föderation | Mit einem Vorwort von Frank Ettrich | ISBN 978-3-8382-0751-3

141 Juri Plusnin, Yana Zausaeva, Natalia Zhidkevich, Artemy Pozanenko | Wandering Workers. Mores, Behavior, Way of Life, and Political Status of Domestic Russian Labor Migrants | Translated by Julia Kazantseva | ISBN 978-3-8382-0713-1

142 David J. Smith (Eds.) | Latvia – A Work in Progress? 100 Years of State- and Nation-Building | ISBN 978-3-8382-0718-6

143 Инна Чувычкина (ред.) | Экспортные нефте- и газопроводы на постсоветском пространстве. Aнализ трубопроводной политики в свете теории международных отношений | ISBN 978-3-8382-0822-0

144 Johann Zajaczkowski | Russland – eine pragmatische Großmacht? Eine rollentheoretische Untersuchung russischer Außenpolitik am Beispiel der Zusammenarbeit mit den USA nach 9/11 und des Georgienkrieges von 2008 | Mit einem Vorwort von Siegfried Schieder | ISBN 978-3-8382-0837-4

145 Boris Popivanov | Changing Images of the Left in Bulgaria. The Challenge of Post-Communism in the Early 21st Century | ISBN 978-3-8382-0717-9

146 Lenka Krátká | A History of the Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping Company 1948-1989. How a Small, Landlocked Country Ran Maritime Business During the Cold War | ISBN 978-3-8382-0716-2

147 Alexander Sergunin | Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behavior. Theory and Practice | ISBN 978-3-8382-0782-7

148 Darya Malyutina | Migrant Friendships in a Super-Diverse City. Russian-Speakers and their Social Relationships in London in the 21st Century | With a foreword by Claire Dwyer | ISBN 978-3-8382-0702-5

149 Alexander Sergunin, Valery Konyshev | Russia in the Arctic. Hard or Soft Power? | ISBN 978-3-8382-0783-4 150 John J. Maresca | Helsinki Revisited. A Key U.S. Negotiator’s Memoirs on the Development of the CSCE into the OSCE | With a foreword by Hafiz Pashayev | ISBN 978-3-8382-0872-5

151 Jardar Østbø | The New Third Rome. Readings of a Russian Nationalist Myth | With a foreword by Pål Kolstø | ISBN 978-3-8382-0900-5

152 Simon Kordonsky | Socio-Economic Foundations of the Russian Post-Soviet Regime. The Resource-Based Economy and Estate-Based Social Structure of Contemporary Russia | With a foreword by Svetlana Barsukova | ISBN 978-3-8382-0875-6

153 Duncan Leitch | Assisting Reform in Post-Communist Ukraine 2000–2012. The Illusions of Donors and the Disillusion of Beneficiaries | With a foreword by Kataryna Wolczuk | ISBN 978-3-8382-0874-9

154 Abel Polese | Limits of a Post-Soviet State. How Informality Replaces, Renegotiates, and Reshapes Governance in Contemporary Ukraine | With a foreword by Colin Williams | ISBN 978-3-8382-0885-5

155 Mikhail Suslov (Ed.) | Digital Orthodoxy in the Post-Soviet World. The Russian Orthodox Church and Web 2.0 | With a foreword by Father Cyril Hovorun | ISBN 978-3-8382-0881-7

156 Leonid Luks | Zwei „Sonderwege“? Russisch-deutsche Parallelen und Kontraste (1917-2014). Vergleichende Essays | ISBN 978-3-8382-0823-7

157 Vladimir V. Karacharovskiy, Ovsey I. Shkaratan, Gordey A. Yastrebov | Towards a New Russian Work Culture. Can Western Companies and Expatriates Change Russian Society? | With a foreword by Elena N. Danilova | Translated by Julia Kazantseva | ISBN 978-3-8382-0962-3

158 Edmund Griffiths | Aleksandr Prokhanov and Post-Soviet Esotericism | ISBN 978-3-8382-0963-0 159 Timm Beichelt, Susann Worschech (Eds.) | Transnational Ukraine? Networks and Ties that Influence(d) Contemporary Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-8382-0964-7

160 Mieste Hotopp-Riecke | Die Tataren der Krim zwischen Assimilation und Selbstbehauptung. Der Aufbau des krimtatarischen Bildungswesens nach Deportation und Heimkehr (1990-2005) | Mit einem Vorwort von Swetlana Czerwonnaja | ISBN 978-3-89821-940-2

161 Olga Bertelsen (Ed.) | Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine. The Challenge of Change | ISBN 978-3-8382-1056-8

162 Natalya Ryabinska | Ukraine's Post-Communist Mass Media. Between Capture and Commercialization | With a foreword by Marta Dyczok | ISBN 978-3-8382-1051-3

163 Alexandra Cotofana, James M. Nyce (Eds.) | Religion and Magic in Socialist and Post-Socialist Contexts. Historic and Ethnographic Case Studies of Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy, and Alternative Spirituality | With a foreword by Patrick L. Michelson | ISBN 978-3-8382-1039-1

164 Nozima Akhrarkhodjaeva | The Instrumentalisation of Mass Media in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes. Evidence from Russia’s Presidential Election Campaigns of 2000 and 2008 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1043-8 165 Yulia Krasheninnikova | Informal Healthcare in Contemporary Russia. Sociographic Essays on the PostSoviet Infrastructure for Alternative Healing Practices | ISBN 978-3-8382-1030-8

166 Peter Kaiser | Das Schachbrett der Macht. Die Handlungsspielräume eines sowjetischen Funktionärs unter Stalin am Beispiel des Generalsekretärs des Komsomol Aleksandr Kosarev (1929-1938) | Mit einem Vorwort von Dietmar Neutatz | ISBN 978-3-8382-1052-0

167 Oksana Kim | The Effects and Implications of Kazakhstan’s Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. A Resource Dependence Perspective | With a foreword by Svetlana Vlady | ISBN 978-3-8382-1037-7

168 Anna Sanina | Patriotic Education in Contemporary Russia. Sociological Studies in the Making of the PostSoviet Citizen | With a foreword by Anna Oldfield | ISBN 978-3-8382-1033-9

169 Rudolf Wolters | Spezialist in Sibirien Faksimile der 1933 erschienenen ersten Ausgabe | Mit einem Vorwort von Dmitrij Chmelnizki | ISBN 978-3-8382-0515-1

170 Michal Vít, Magdalena M. Baran (Eds.) | Transregional versus National Perspectives on Contemporary Central European History. Studies on the Building of Nation-States and Their Cooperation in the 20th and 21st Century | With a foreword by Petr Vágner | ISBN 978-3-8382-1115-2

171 Philip Gamaghelyan | Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm. Evolving Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria | With a foreword by Susan Allen | ISBN 978-3-8382-1117-6

172 Maria Shagina | Joining a Prestigious Club. Cooperation with Europarties and Its Impact on Party Development in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine 2004–2015 | With a foreword by Kataryna Wolczuk | ISBN 978-3-8382-1104-6

173 Alexandra Cotofana, James M. Nyce (Eds.) | Religion and Magic in Socialist and Post-Socialist Contexts II. Baltic, Eastern European, and Post-USSR Case Studies | With a foreword by Anita Stasulane | ISBN 978-3-8382-1090-2

174 Barbara Kunz | Kind Words, Cruise Missiles, and Everything in Between. The Use of Power Resources in U.S. Policies towards Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus 1989–2008 | With a foreword by William Hill | ISBN 978-3-8382-1085-8

175 Eduard Klein | Bildungskorruption in Russland und der Ukraine. Eine komparative Analyse der Performanz staatlicher Antikorruptionsmaßnahmen im Hochschulsektor am Beispiel universitärer Aufnahmeprüfungen | Mit einem Vorwort von Heiko Pleines | ISBN 978-3-8382-0995-1

176 Markus Soldner | Politischer Kapitalismus im postsowjetischen Russland. Die politische, wirtschaftliche und mediale Transformation in den 1990er Jahren | Mit einem Vorwort von Wolfgang Ismayr | ISBN 978-3-8382-1222-7

177 Anton Oleinik | Building Ukraine from Within. A Sociological, Institutional, and Economic Analysis of a NationState in the Making | ISBN 978-3-8382-1150-3

178 Peter Rollberg, Marlene Laruelle (Eds.) | Mass Media in the Post-Soviet World. Market Forces, State Actors, and Political Manipulation in the Informational Environment after Communism | ISBN 978-3-8382-1116-9

179 Mikhail Minakov | Development and Dystopia Studies in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Eastern Europe | With a foreword by Alexander Etkind | ISBN 978-3-8382-1112-1 180 Aijan Sharshenova | The European Union’s Democracy Promotion in Central Asia A Study of Political Interests, Influence, and Development in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2007–2013 | With a foreword by Gordon Crawford | ISBN 978-3-8382-1151-0

181 Andrey Makarychev, Alexandra Yatsyk (Eds.) | Boris Nemtsov and Russian Politics. Power and Resistance | With a foreword by Zhanna Nemtsova | ISBN 978-3-8382-1122-0

182 Sophie Falsini | The Euromaidan’s Effect on Civil Society. Why and How Ukrainian Social Capital Increased after the Revolution of Dignity | With a foreword by Susann Worschech | ISBN 978-3-8382-1131-2

183 Andreas Umland (Ed.) | Ukraine’s Decentralization. Challenges and Implications of the Local Governance Reform after the Euromaidan Revolution | ISBN 978-3-8382-1162-6

184 Leonid Luks | A Fateful Triangle. Essays on Contemporary Russian, German and Polish History | ISBN 978-3-8382-1143-5

185 John B. Dunlop | The February 2015 Assassination of Boris Nemtsov and the Flawed Trial of his Alleged Killers. An Exploration of Russia’s “Crime of the 21st Century” | ISBN 978-3-8382-1188-6 186 Vasile Rotaru | Russia, the EU, and the Eastern Partnership. Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? | ISBN 978-3-8382-1134-3

187 Marina Lebedeva | Russian Studies of International Relations. From the Soviet Past to the Post-Cold-War Present | With a foreword by Andrei P. Tsygankov | ISBN 978-3-8382-0851-0

188 Tomasz Stępniewski, George Soroka (Eds.) | Ukraine after Maidan. Revisiting Domestic and Regional Security | ISBN 978-3-8382-1075-9

189 Petar Cholakov | Ethnic Entrepreneurs Unmasked. Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflicts in Contemporary Bulgaria | ISBN 978-3-8382-1189-3

190 A. Salem, G. Hazeldine, D. Morgan (Eds.) | Higher Education in Post-Communist States. Comparative and Sociological Perspectives | ISBN 978-3-8382-1183-1

191 Igor Torbakov | After Empire. Nationalist Imagination and Symbolic Politics in Russia and Eurasia in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Century | With a foreword by Serhii Plokhy | ISBN 978-3-8382-1217-3

192 Aleksandr Burakovskiy | Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Late and Post-Soviet Ukraine. Articles, Lectures and Essays from 1986 to 2016 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1210-4

193 Natalia Shapovalova, Olga Burlyuk (Eds.) | Civil Society in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine. From Revolution to Consolidation | With a foreword by Richard Youngs | ISBN 978-3-8382-1216-6

194 Franz Preissler | Positionsverteidigung, Imperialismus oder Irredentismus? Russland und die „Russischsprachigen“, 1991–2015 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1262-3

195 Marian Madeła | Der Reformprozess in der Ukraine 2014-2017. Eine Fallstudie zur Reform der öffentlichen Verwaltung | Mit einem Vorwort von Martin Malek | ISBN 978-3-8382-1266-1

196 Anke Giesen | „Wie kann denn der Sieger ein Verbrecher sein?“ Eine diskursanalytische Untersuchung der russlandweiten Debatte über Konzept und Verstaatlichungsprozess der Lagergedenkstätte „Perm’-36“ im Ural | ISBN 978-3-8382-1284-5

197 Alla Leukavets | The Integration Policies of Belarus and Ukraine vis-à-vis the EU and Russia. A Comparative Case Study Through the Prism of a Two-Level Game Approach | ISBN 978-3-8382-1247-0

198 Oksana Kim | The Development and Challenges of Russian Corporate Governance I. The Roles and Functions of Boards of Directors | With a foreword by Sheila M. Puffer | ISBN 978-3-8382-1287-6

199 Thomas D. Grant | International Law and the Post-Soviet Space I. Essays on Chechnya and the Baltic States | With a foreword by Stephen M. Schwebel | ISBN 978-3-8382-1279-1

200 Thomas D. Grant | International Law and the Post-Soviet Space II. Essays on Ukraine, Intervention, and Non-Proliferation | ISBN 978-3-8382-1280-7

201 Slavomír Michálek, Michal Štefansky | The Age of Fear. The Cold War and Its Influence on Czechoslovakia 1945–1968 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1285-2

202 Iulia-Sabina Joja | Romania’s Strategic Culture 1990–2014. Continuity and Change in a Post-Communist Country’s Evolution of National Interests and Security Policies | With a foreword by Heiko Biehl | ISBN 978-3-8382-1286-9

203 Andrei Rogatchevski, Yngvar B. Steinholt, Arve Hansen, David-Emil Wickström | War of Songs. Popular Music and Recent Russia-Ukraine Relations | With a foreword by Artemy Troitsky | ISBN 978-3-8382-1173-2

204 Maria Lipman (ed.) | Russian Voices on Post-Crimea Russia. An Almanac of Counterpoint Essays from 2015–2018 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1251-7

205 Ksenia Maksimovtsova | Language Conflicts in Contemporary Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. A

Comparative Exploration of Discourses in Post-Soviet Russian-Language Digital Media | With a foreword by Ammon Cheskin | ISBN 978-3-8382-1282-1

206 Michal Vít | The EU’s Impact on Identity Formation in East-Central Europe between 2004 and 2013. Perceptions of the Nation and Europe in Political Parties of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia | With a foreword by Andrea Petö | ISBN 978-3-8382-1275-3

207 Per A. Rudling | Tarnished Heroes. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Memory Politics of Post-Soviet Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-8382-0999-9

208 Peter H. Solomon Jr., Kaja Gadowska (Eds.) | Legal Change in Post-Communist States. Progress, Reversions, Explanations | ISBN 978-3-8382-1312-5

209 Pawel Kowal, Georges Mink, Iwona Reichardt (Eds.) | Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine I. Theoretical Aspects and Analyses on Religion, Memory, and Identity | ISBN 9783-8382-1321-7

210 Pawel Kowal, Georges Mink, Adam Reichardt, Iwona Reichardt (Eds.) | Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II. An Oral History of the Revolution on Granite, Orange Revolution, and Revolution of Dignity | ISBN 978-3-8382-1323-1

211 Li Bennich-Björkman, Sergiy Kurbatov (Eds.) | When the Future Came: The Collapse of the USSR and the Emergence of National Memory in Post-Soviet History Textbooks | ISBN 978-3-83821335-4

212 Olga R. Gulina | Migration as a (Geo-)Political Challenge in the Post-Soviet Space. Border Regimes, Policy Choices, Visa Agendas | With a foreword by Nils Muižnieks | ISBN 978-3-8382-1338-5

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