Middle Eastern Minorities and the Arab Spring: Identity and Community in the Twenty-First Century 9781463237301

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Middle Eastern Minorities and the Arab Spring

The Modern Muslim World

2 Series Editorial Board

Marcia Hermansen Hina Azam Ussama Makdisi

Martin Nguyen Joas Wagemakers

Advisory Editorial Board

Talal Asad Khaled Abou El Fadl Amira Bennison Islam Dayeh Marwa Elshakry Rana Hisham Issa

Tijana Krstic Ebrahim Moosa Adam Sabra Armando Salvatore Adam Talib

This series will provide a platform for scholarly research on Islamic and Muslim thought, emerging from any geographical area and dated to any period from the 17th century until the present day. 

Middle Eastern Minorities and the Arab Spring

Identity and Community in the Twenty-First Century

Edited by

K. Scott Parker Tony E. Nasrallah

gp 2017

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2017 by Gorgias Press LLC

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. ‫ܛ‬

1

2017

ISBN 978-1-4632-0653-6

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication record is available from the Library of Congress. Printed in the United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ..................................................................................... v Preface ...................................................................................................... vii Contributors ............................................................................................. xi Map ........................................................................................................... xii Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 PART I: ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB SPRING .......................... 15 Chapter 1. Re-Considering Minorities’ Position in the Middle East: The Kurdish Case in Syria.................................................. 17 Eva Savelsberg and Jordi Tejel Chapter 2. The Amazigh in post-Revolution Libya: A Century of Struggle ....................................................................................... 45 Todd M. Thompson and Youcef Bouandel Chapter 3. The Armenian Christian Minority in Greater Syria and the Arab Spring ...................................................................... 79 Darina Saliba Abi Chedid PART II: RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB SPRING .................................................. 99 Chapter 4. Adapting to Shifting Ground: The Alawites of the Northern Levant ..........................................................................101 Leon T. Goldsmith Chapter 5. The Druze and the Arab Spring .....................................129 Lubna Tarabey Chapter 6. Syrian Ismailis and the Arab Spring: Seasons of Death and White Carnations .....................................................147 Otared Haidar Chapter 7. The Christians of Syria and the Arab Spring ................175 Habib C. Malik v

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Chapter 8. The Christians of Lebanon and the Arab Spring.........203 Michael Abi Semaan and Tony E. Nasrallah Chapter 9. The Easy Enemy: The Shia and Sectarianism in the Arab States of the Gulf and Yemen during the Arab Spring.............................................................................................227 Jessie Moritz PART III: OTHER MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB SPRING ........................................................ 259 Chapter 10. Palestinians at Home and in the Diasporas and the Arab Spring...................................................................................261 Bernard Sabella Chapter 11. A Spring Abroad: Exploring the Case of Tunisian Diasporas in Europe ...................................................................277 Claire Demesmay, Sabine Russ-Sattar, Katrin Sold

Conclusion .............................................................................................307 Selected Bibliography ...........................................................................309 Index .......................................................................................................327

PREFACE We would like to express our deepest thanks to the contributors to this volume. They have worked countless hours in field research and in writing their respective chapters. Opinions and scholarly conclusions are their own. Any shortcomings, of course, we as editors accept as our oversight. Regarding the always difficult problem of transliteration, working with an international group of scholars has inevitably led us to the conclusion that each should use the system of transliteration with which they are most experienced. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions in improving this work. We hope the reader will sympathetically keep in mind that the overall purpose of this volume has been to shed insight into the plight of those minorities of the Middle East we have been able to cover in this volume. Events move quickly when conflict is at the heart, and the repercussions of the so-called Arab Spring continue to evolve at a surprising speed. The events covered in this volume focus on the early years of the Arab Spring. What tomorrow holds is still far from settled. For what tomorrow holds we can only hope, and pray. K. S. Parker and T. E. Nasrallah

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CONTRIBUTORS Youcef Bouandel – Qatar University (Qatar)

Claire Demesmay – Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik (Berlin, Germany) Leon T. Goldsmith – Sultan Qaboos University (Oman) Otared Haidar – University of Oxford (United Kingdom)

Habib C. Malik – Lebanese American University (Lebanon)

Jessie Moritz – Australian National University (Australia)

Tony E. Nasrallah – American University of Beirut (Lebanon) K. Scott Parker – Royal Holloway, University of London (United Kingdom)

Sabine Russ-Sattar – Universität Kassel (Germany)

Bernard Sabella – Bethlehem University/Al-Quds University (Palestine)

Eva Savelsberg – European Center for Kurdish Studies (Berlin, Germany)

Michael Abi Semaan – Independent Scholar (Lebanon)

Darina Saliba Abi Chedid – Université Saint-Esprit de Kaslik (Lebanon)

Katrin Sold – Philipps-Univerität Marburg, Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies (Germany) Lubna Tarabey – Lebanese University (Lebanon)

Jordi Tejel – The Graduate Institute Geneva (Switzerland)

Todd M. Thompson – Biola University (USA)

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The Modern Middle East and North Africa

INTRODUCTION K.S. PARKER AND T. E. NASRALLAH

ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON AND AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

I

When frustration and despair led the twenty-six-year-old Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi to set himself ablaze in front of Tunisian government buildings in December 2010, little could he have foreseen the forthcoming protests that coalesced into what is known as the Jasmine Revolution. He could neither have dreamed that the longserving autocrat President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali would before long abdicate and flee to Saudi Arabia, nor that his country would enjoy democratic elections and a non-violent transfer of power. The Tunisian story – which has had its own share of tension, disillusionment, and Islamist militancy – is the closest to success of the widespread phenomenon often called the “Arab Spring” that has swept across much of the Middle East. The discontent and lack of opportunity that motivated Bouazizi was shared by hundreds of thousands across the Arab world, where many countries have been ruled by autocrats for decades if not longer. The gap between the wealthy and privileged and the poor and disenfranchised is vast, and the ensuing protests tapped into a deep-seated resentment against the ruling classes. Crowds gathered to make their voices heard first in Tunisia, and then in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and elsewhere. Arguably the most tragic situation has been the case of Syria, where widespread non-violent protests were met by stiff violence on the part of governmental authorities. Rather than silencing the voices of change, these brutal measures eventually led the peaceful protestors to seek weapons of their own and to 1

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employ violence themselves against the government and its supporters, or perceived supporters. One of the characteristics of the so-called Arab Spring in those countries where regime change has either occurred (Egypt and Libya) or is being attempted (notably Syria) is that the protests initially involved both men and women, young and old, and people across the spectrum of society. This was a democratic protest seeking greater opportunity and equality for the people. It is likely that those involved were naïve and overly optimistic, as evolving events have demonstrated. But in the background were others with less interest or belief in democracy, namely Islamists of a Salafist background or even more radical affiliations, such as al-Qaeda. In Egypt, the largest and most organized group after the government itself was the Muslim Brotherhood. The Arab Spring movement in Egypt began largely with the support of democratically-minded protestors. After it gained momentum, it was the Brotherhood as well as Salafist groups that ultimately were able to take advantage of the democratic vote, albeit to short-term benefit as it would turn out. In Syria and Libya, the result has been even worse, with the rise and growth of often foreign-backed takfiri groups like Islamic State and al-Nusra Front. Usually, this has been at the expense of the more moderate factions, such as the Free Syrian Army, and has even led to the increasingly fundamentalist nature of both Sunni and opposing Shi’ite groups.

II

The historian Albert Hourani concluded some seventy years ago that “majorities and minorities do not fully form communities with one another.” 1 Although the Arab Spring has surely confirmed this statement, those who participated in this movement in its incubation period clearly hoped for something more than the autocracy that they had largely hitherto experienced. Indeed, albeit perhaps naïve, protestors represented a diverse section of Arab societies Albert Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 109. 1

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and looked to a future of democracy and greater freedom and tolerance, albeit not necessarily on the model of Western nations. In the end, these movements to overthrow the yoke of autocratic rulers gave way to Salafists and other extremists, resulting in either thinly-veiled theocracy or instability and even civil war. For the minorities of the Middle East, their prosperity and security had long been linked to general loyalty towards the ruling regimes with the sentiment that the protective hand of the government was better than without. 2 As the Arab Spring has demonstrated, even at the best of times, minorities’ relations with the majority have often proven tenuous. The past decade can surely be included more in “the worst of times” category, and the question continues to be asked: who will protect the minorities and what will become of them in an increasingly intolerant Middle East? Is this only a question of external agency, or do the minorities have some role in their own destiny? Indeed, how do the minorities view themselves and their role in society? What will the future hold? Hourani wrote his classic work in 1947, towards the end of the Mandate period. Concepts of identity and belonging had changed dramatically in the Middle East over the course of the previous half-a-century under European (particularly British and French) rule, although Enlightenment-rooted ideas of society and the nation-state were first introduced from the latter eighteenth century. Whether directly through imperialistic models and institutions or more subtly, ideas of minority status (and, indeed, majority status) evolved along sectarian ideology as groups based on religion, ethnicity, and/or language sought to carve out power and influence within the governmental structures put in place by the European Mandate powers. The understanding of minority status within the construct of the impartial secular state was, of course, built upon the Ottoman millets, particularly within the context of Tanzimat, which was itself brought on by concessions to European On the relationship between minorities and autocratic regimes, see: Ceren Belge and Ekrem Karakoç, “Minorities in the Middle East: Ethnicity, Religion, and Support for Authoritarianism”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 68:1 (2015), pp. 280–92. 2

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pressure. 3 European education provided a platform for minorities to expect equality with the majority, which explains why so many minority members were pioneers in the formation of independence movements as well as communist, socialist, and other such secular parties. Indeed, a key change in the twentieth century in this context is the rise and fall of Pan-Arabism. Originally founded in a show of unity against European colonial hegemony, the Pan-Arab movement proved ineffectual towards the challenges of the modern era – and ran counter to the self-interests of the prevalent autocratic regimes. While non-Muslims and minority Muslims could be part of Pan-Arabism, this was not the case for ethnic and linguistic minorities such as Kurds, Berbers, and Armenians, and Arab regimes often sought to curtail their community identities. Since the 1970s, at least, disillusionment with Pan-Arabism (and abetted by Cold War politics and the Islamic Revolution in Iran) has led to an increased enthusiasm amongst both Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims for a more Islamist approach. 4 Non-Muslim minorities can and have See: Bernard Heyberger, Les chrétiens au Proche-Orient: De la compassion à la comprehension (Paris: Editions Payot & Rivages, 2013); Benjamin Thomas White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman-Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Richard C. Martin, “From Dhimmis to Minorities: Shifting Constructions of the Non-Muslim Other from Early to Modern Islam”, in ed. Maya Shatzmiller, Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), pp. 3–21; cf. Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). On the Ottoman millets specifically, see: Maurits H. van den Boogert, “Millets: Past and Present”, in Anh Nga Longva and Anne Sofie Roald (eds.), Religious Minorities in the Middle East: Domination, SelfEmpowerment, Accommodation (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 27–46. 4 In general, see: C. Ernest Dawn, “The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 20, Issue 1 (1988), pp. 67–91; Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab 3

INTRODUCTION

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been heavily involved in the Pan-Arab movement, but they inherently cannot be involved in majority Islamist movements and still maintain their identity. This has revealed itself most dramatically in the operations of Daesh (also referred to as ISIS, ISIL, or Islamic State) in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere. While European ideas of society and the nation-state may indeed have changed the way that minorities viewed themselves and changed how the majority (Sunni Muslims) viewed them, there can be no denial that minorities in the Middle East have faced sectarian pressure to various degrees since the Arab Conquest in the seventh century and more so from the eighth century. 5 This is not to say that minorities (individuals and communities) have not thrived at various times, but their very status as heterodox or dhimmi necessarily created a distinctive or discriminatory position in society. 6 Peoples (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1991), pp. 401–58; Arthur Goldschmidt, A Concise History of the Middle East, 6th Edition (Oxford: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 316–42. 5 See the discussion in Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw It: A Survey and Evaluation of Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian Writings on Early Islam (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1997), pp. 19–26 and 454ff; cf. Sidney H. Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque: Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 106– 55; John E. Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic Salvation History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). The early development of classical Islamic theology developed in reaction to Christianity and Judaism in the context of inter-religious debates in early Abbassid Baghdad, often by defining what it was not. 6 Arab garrisons – largely, but not exclusively Muslim – were generally kept separate from the subject peoples for most of the first century following the Arab Conquest. Conversion to Islam was initially not permitted by non-Arabs, while monotheistic subject peoples (Christians, Jews, Sabaeans and contextually others) were allowed to keep their faith and traditions so long as they paid the jizya tax and accepted numerous restrictions, enforced to various degrees. These factors re-enforced their separateness and the sectarian milieu. See, for example: Mark R. Cohen, “What was the Pact of ‘Umar? A Literary-Historical Study”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, Vol. 23 (1999), pp. 100–57; Antoine Fattal, Le Statut

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Not dissimilar to Jews in medieval Europe, many of the minorities covered in this volume developed their identities directly in the context of the majority “other” and the often solitary position in society that was available to them, while the restrictions placed upon them effectively entrenched their distinctive features as a minority. The historically tribal nature of many Middle Eastern peoples must also not be discounted, for whom familial kinship is a strong factor in constructing identity along with religion, language, and geography. Some groups – such as Druze and Ismailis – have been minorities from their origins, while others – including Berbers, Kurds, and the various Christian confessions – at least partially owe their minority status to the large-scale immigration of Arab Muslim tribes. 7 Modern European ideas have doubtless influenced concepts of identity and belonging in the Middle East (and, indeed, in most of the world) and thus how minorities and majorities view themselves and each other. Nonetheless, identity as a minority or distinctively as either non-Sunni or non-Muslim or non-Arab (or none of the above) is not in and of itself a product of twentieth century European imperialism. Much akin to the Pan-Arab movement of the twentieth century, the Arab Spring featured the enthusiastic participation of many minorities in the early stages of the movement. This book examines Légal des non-Musulmans en pays d’Islam (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1958), pp. 71–84; and E. Strauss, “The Social Isolation of the Ahl adhDhimma”, in ed. O. Komlos, Etudes Orientales à la Mémoire de Paul Hirschler (Budapest, 1950), pp. 73–94; cf. Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996). In contrast, many Shi’a sects originated in the context of struggle, revolt, or messianic fervour against the ruling Sunni majority. See: Heinz Halm, Shi’ism, trans. Janet Watson, 2nd Edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp. 7–22. 7 Brett, Michael, “The Islamisation of Egypt and North Africa”. The First Annual Levtzion Lecture, delivered 12 January 2005 (Jerusalem, 2006), available at: http://hum.huji.ac.il/upload/(FILE)1228661697.pdf (accessed 15 August 2012). On minority identity in the Middle Ages, see, for example, K.S. Parker, “Coptic Language and Identity in Ayyūbid Egypt”, al-Masāq 25 (2013), pp. 222–39.

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eleven of them and considers their respective participation in and response to the Arab Spring. Its focus is primarily on the early years following the Arab Spring, acknowledging the rapid yet varied changes experienced in each state and area affected by this momentous movement. Each chapter is written by a scholar with experience in the field and deeply versed in their subject. The merits of the Arab Spring seemed obvious initially, involving as it did the overthrow of long-established autocracies. The demerits of the transformation, on the other hand, were initially rather neglected, though scholarship is increasingly tackling this problem. From the perspective of the minorities, this transformation has invariably been negative, we argue, despite their often active participation in this process. The Middle East has historically been a quite diverse society, but this is, indeed, increasingly becoming relegated to the past, as minority groups either leave, assimilate, or are eliminated. The media has but seldom given thorough attention to the precarious situation and experience of Middle Eastern minorities in the course of the Arab Spring, especially on a localised level. It is for reasons such as these that the contributions to this volume are significant. Although many popular and scholarly books on the Arab Spring have recently been published, few have dealt specifically with the various minorities in the region and their role in and hopes and fears deriving from the Arab Spring. For our purposes, the term “minorities” encompasses religious, ethnic, and linguistic minorities, as well as those marginalized in society, enumerated further below.

III

This book revolves around ten basic, underlying points: 1. “Minority” is a numerical notion. The non-literal but conventional meaning of “minority” is not solely a function of numbers, for the question of vulnerability in a society is also included. The non-literal definition includes many Middle Eastern religious and ethnic minorities. The interesting observation is that more often than not, the numerical (literal) minorities and the fragile (conventional) minorities are related.

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2.

The revolt of the Arab Spring against minority regimes risks continuing, with the same momentum, against vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities. The book hopes to answer two main questions: what is the involvement of various minorities in the Arab Spring? And what shall the outcome of the Arab Spring be for minorities? As events continue to unfold, there are good reasons for many minorities to worry about the Arab Spring. In the Arab Spring, there is a pattern whereby a minority in power is attacked or at times sacked by a small group (i.e. a minority). Thus, these “revolutions” start as a minority against a minority. However, in the process the revolting minority metamorphoses into a majority, yet the minority that started the revolution somehow vanishes or is marginalized. For example, it is evident that the demonstrators in Egypt against Mubarak and the army chiefs – of whom many were “liberals” and minorities – were later superseded by the powerful and more radical elements of society. The old regime, as a numerical minority, is either defeated or cornered. Thus the two numerical minorities, of the regime and the igniters of the uprising, are gone or marginalized. Is this trend in itself a danger to vulnerable minorities, such as ethnic and religious minorities? For the past century, societies in the Arab world have overall become increasingly homogeneous. A century ago, nonMuslims alone accounted for at least twenty percent of the overall population in the lands of the former Ottoman Empire, particularly in Anatolia and Greater Syria (Bilad al-Sham). Today, this ranges from one to ten percent, Lebanon and Israel aside. 8 Non-Sunni Muslim minorities were also particular-

3.

4.

5.

Statistics can be tricky, particularly in the Middle East. Courbage and Fargues, using Ottoman census surveys, found that the Christian population had declined in the sixteenth century to only seven percent. Beginning in the eighteenth and continuing into the nineteenth century, Christian demographics recovered to some twenty-five percent in Greater Syria. In Egypt, however, Christian numbers remained low at about eight percent, likely due to continued Mamluk policies. See: Youssef Courbage 8

INTRODUCTION

6.

7.

8.

9

ly numerous in these same areas. Minorities, therefore, are diminishing across the Arab world, for a myriad of reasons. Will the Arab Spring accelerate the process? This is the thread across all the chapters and all the sections. A number of scholars have been invited to contribute to this volume. They are from four different continents, from diverse backgrounds, work in various disciplines relating to the Middle East (anthropology, history, sociology, linguistic studies, and political studies), and are assorted in opinion about the Arab Spring. This volume is, therefore, a spectrum of diverse scholarly views. Although this book is concerned primarily with contemporary events, the contributors understand the historical framework of their particular subjects as well as of the Middle East as a whole, and thus will provide a greater depth of contextualization to this project. More than anything, this book project aims to provide the perspective of the minority groups. Thus, the key question is asked: in the early period of the Arab Spring, were Middle

and Philippe Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), pp. 57–89. Numerically-speaking, Moshe Ma’oz lists non-Sunni Muslims (Shi’a and heterodox) as forming 18 million, Christians 12 million, and Sunni Muslims 98 million for the Middle East region. See: Moshe Ma’oz, Middle Eastern Minorities: Between Integration and Conflict (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1999), p. 109. Of course, calculations of the decline of Christian numbers rapidly increases every year, particularly since 2002 with the invasion of Iraq and subsequent instability, and later after the rapid expansion of ISIS (Da’esh). Todd Johnson of the Center for the Study of Global Christianity at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, has stated recently that Christians formed 13.6% of the population across the entire Middle East in 1910. By 2010, this figure was down to 4.2%, while it is expected to further decline to about 3% in 2025. See: Maria Abi-Habib, “Christians, in an Epochal Shift, Are Leaving the Middle East”, The Wall Street Journal (13 May 2017). Available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/christians-in-an-epochal-shiftare-leaving-the-middle-east-1494597848. Accessed 13 May 2017.

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Eastern minorities convinced that it was a “revolution” – that is, a positive change? 9. Despite the plethora of existing publications in the past few years on the Arab Spring, there has been relatively little comprehensive distinct work on Middle East Minorities and the Arab Spring (MEMAS). This work hopes to fill the gap in the literature. The contributors to MEMAS have utilized a variety of sources, including scholarly works, social media, newspapers, and personal interviews with scholars, journalists, politicians, refugees, and others. 10. The chapters below were largely written in the early years of the Arab Spring, notably prior to the rise in prominence of ISIS (Islamic State or Daesh). The phenomenal success of the latter transformed the narrative of the Arab Spring, in some ways to a third stage following the initial period of hope in regime change and the harsh response of autocrats and more established Islamists. The intentional terror unleashed against Yazidis, Christians, Shi’a, and other minorities (in addition to Sunnis who did not share their views) has led to a greater awareness of the plight of minorities in the Arab world, to include the prominence and relative success of the Kurds in Syria. The growing response against ISIS and the complex array of alliances and feuds both regionally and internationally have, perhaps, led to a new stage. Nonetheless, the situation and future for minorities in the Middle East is nowhere certain.

IV

This volume is divided into three sections, defining minorities along either ethno-linguistic, religious, or other lines. In the first section, Eva Savelsberg and Jordi Tejel discuss the experience of the Syrian Kurds and the Arab Spring. Although their role in the fight against Islamic State has dramatically entered the public eye more recently, the Kurdish community was actually immediately affected and has gained new autonomy while entering into complex relations both within Syria as well as with neighbouring powers in Iraq and Turkey. Todd Thompson and Youcef Bouandel continue the theme of ethno-linguistic minorities in their contribution on the Berbers or Amazigh of Libya. A pre-Islamic people spread across

INTRODUCTION

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much of North Africa, the Berbers played an integral part in the initial revolution against the Gaddafi regime in Libya despite being a minority. As has occurred elsewhere, the chaos following the successful overthrow of the regime has presented immense challenges both to the Berbers and others in Libya. The third chapter, by Darina Saliba Abi Chedid, focuses on the Armenian community in Syria. An important minority since the Middle Ages but more recently since finding refuge in Syria following the First World War and their expulsion from Turkey, the Armenians have felt the brunt of the Syrian Civil War in Aleppo and in their villages in the northeast. The second section – on religious minorities – begins with Leon Goldsmith’s contribution on the Shi’ites of the Levant, most notably the Alawites of Syria and in Lebanon their Iranian-backed allies, Hezbollah. These two groups form the backbone of the Shi’ite fight against the Sunni militants in Syria. That Hezbollah is based in Lebanon has dramatically increased the sectarian tensions in that fragile country. The succeeding chapters discuss Shi’aaffiliated minorities, beginning with Lubna Tarabey’s chapter on the Druze. Although perhaps most visible in Lebanon, Druze communities have featured importantly in Syria, particularly in the south of the country, where they have kinsmen across the border in Israel and Jordan. As the rebellion in Syria has taken on a decidedly Sunni Islamist dominant theme, minorities have grown increasingly fearful. This is also true for the Ismailis, discussed here by Otared Haidar. Although long repressed by the Assad regime and at the forefront of the initially peaceful protests, the Isma’ili community in Syria has overwhelmingly rejected violence as the answer for change in Syria and has subsequently become a target for Islamist factions. This experience has long been one shared by the Christian minorities of Syria, as detailed here by Habib C. Malik. Syria was long a safe haven for Christian minorities from across the Middle East, making up at least ten percent of the population, not including hundreds of thousands of refugees from Iraq. Although they have long called for peace and generally attempted to remain neutral, their lack of military action against the Assad regime has led to their targeting by rebels, even more so under the foreign-backed anti-Christian Islamist factions. The fear of the minorities of hardline takfirism has also been exploited by the Assad regime, which

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portrays itself as the only savior of the minorities. This tense and dangerous atmosphere has inevitably spilled over into neighbouring Lebanon. While Sunni and Shi’ite factions take sides with the warring parties largely along ideological grounds, the Christian communities are again in a precarious environment, as explored by Michael Abi Semaan and Tony Nasrallah. The diversity of Lebanon – where some seventeen religious communities are officially recognised – has long been a defining feature of this small nation, but it suffers gross uncertainty from a dysfunctional government as well as the destabilising tension from the Syrian war and the massive number of refugees. This section concludes with Jessie Moritz’s chapter on the Shi’ites of the Gulf States and Yemen. The experience of the Shi’ite minorities has differed greatly between the Gulf States, particularly Kuwait, Bahrain, and Yemen, depending on the approach of the ruling parties, in particular. Although they have been officially embraced in Kuwait and politically repressed in Bahrain, it is in Yemen where the Shi’ite minority (the Houthis) have turned to violent confrontation. The latter’s recent successes is now undetermined given the new involvement of external Sunni state actors. The third and final section addresses “other” minorities of the Middle and their experience in the Arab Spring. Bernard Sabella examines the position of the Palestinians vis-à-vis the Arab Spring, both internally in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel, but also in the diaspora in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Although those in historic Palestine have largely been disinterested and even unaffected directly, Palestinians dwelling in the long-established refugee camps elsewhere – most dramatically in Syria – have experienced firsthand fighting and the effects of siege warfare. Finally, Claire Demesmay, Sabine Russ-Sattar and Katrin Sold remind us that the Arab Spring has also affected Arabs and others living far from the Middle East. Analyzing the situation of the Tunisian diaspora in Europe, this chapter examines the complex experience and involvement of the expatriate Arab communities with their home countries during the early years of the Arab Spring, considering both internal and external dynamics. This book sheds light in a systematic and almost comprehensive manner on the scattered news of certain minorities in the Middle East in the early years of the Arab Spring. As such, it stands as a unique contribution to the historiography of dramatic and far-

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reaching contemporary events in the Arab World whose conclusion is far from clear. It is, therefore, at once a reference, whilst also acting as a window into the rapidly unfolding events of the contemporary Middle East and the future of her ancient minorities.

PART I: ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB SPRING

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CHAPTER 1 RE-CONSIDERING MINORITIES’ POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE KURDISH CASE IN SYRIA EVA SAVELSBERG AND JORDI TEJEL EUROPEAN CENTER FOR KURDISH STUDIES (BERLIN) AND THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE GENEVA INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the so-called “Arab Spring,” many observers and commentators noted that the popular uprisings of 2010 – 2011 had ushered in a new era in the Middle East. 1 The cooperation between different groups in Tunisia and Egypt – liberals and Islamists, youth and their elders, Christians and Muslims, men and women, and so forth – provoked the fall of Ben Ali, and eventually, of Mubarak’s regime and made claims for a new social contract, and this became the marker of a new era. However, over time reports from the region revealed a gloomier picture: Copts were attacked in Egypt; Islamist parties took over the elections in Tunisia and Egypt whilst secular groups – liberal and leftist alike – were politically marginalised. In Syria, the Sunni Arab opposition failed to meet Kurdish demands for official recognition of a Kurdish national See, for example, Hamid Dabisha, The Arab Spring. The End of Postcolonialism, (London and New York: Zed Books, 2012); Farhad Khosrokhavar, The New Arab Revolutions that Shook the World (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012); Jean-Pierre Filiu, The Arab Revolution. Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising (London: Hurst, 2011). 1

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identity 2 and finally, Shiites were severely repressed by the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain with the support of the neighboring Sunni states. Five years later, the situation has further deteriorated, in particular in Syria where the popular revolt of March 2011 has become a civil war between the regime and an array of rebel groups, including hardline jihadist militias. Against this backdrop, “minorities” 3 in the Middle East have been again depicted as “oppressed groups” or “victims,” caught between authoritarian rulers and Islamist forces. 4 And to this apparent dilemma “minorities” are thought to respond by either tacit submission to the existing order (loyalty) or a slow, yet unchecked process of diasporisation (exit), particularly in the case of religious minorities. 5 The strategy of mobilisation (voice), although not uncommon, is said to be unlikely in most cases due to the risks that minorities would encounter. In that respect, this grid of analysis shows a remarkable degree of continuity with an important bulk of academic publications that highlight the status of “minorities” as endangered groups. 6 The leader of the Syrian National Council, Burhan Ghalioun, clearly stated in several occasions between 2011 and 2012 that Kurds in Syria would not enjoy “collective rights”. They should limit their demands to “democratic rights”, meaning “individual rights”. 3 In this paper we use Brubaker’s definition: “A national minority is not simply a group that is given by the facts of ethnic demography. It is a dynamic political stance, or, more precisely, a family of related yet mutually competing stances, not a static ethno-demographic condition.” Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 60. 4 John Bradley, After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Nonie Darwish, The Devil We Don’t Know: The Dark Side of Revolutions in the Middle East, (New Jersey: Wiley, 2012). 5 Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 6 Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds), Minorities and the State in the Arab World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Habib Malik, Islamism and 2

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A second, albeit less numerous body of literature has analyzed the singular examples of countries such as Syria (1970– ) and Iraq (1969–2003), countries in which individuals from a quantitative “minority” group, Alawis and Sunnis respectively, 7 co-opted and excluded segments of their societies on a regional, ethnic or confessional basis, thus imposing the power of a ruling “minority” at odds with its demographic and social weights. 8 This chapter explores the Kurdish case in Syria as a third configuration with regard to the “minority” issue; namely as an example of a relationship between a “minority” and a state that cannot be studied through the lens of the classic dichotomy of “accommodation vs. resistance” nor as a group from which some of its members have seized power and have favoured their peers on a regional and/or an ethnic/religious basis. Therefore, for the purpose of an initial assessment and in order to better grasp the relations between “majorities” and “minorities” in the Middle East, we argue that researchers should approach this issue from a processual, interactive, and relational approach that encapsulates three key principles. First, majority and minority groups are not always opposed. The use of a long-term perspective allows us to identify periods in which minority members actively participate in the economic and political life of a given society, cothe Future of the Christians of the Middle East (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2010); David MacDowall and Nicholas Van Hear, Minorities in the Middle East (London: Minority Rights Group, 1992); Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, (Jefferson: MacFarland and Company, 2002); Maya Shatzmiller, Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005). 7 Eberhard Kienle, “Entre jama’a et classe: le pouvoir politique en Syrie contemporaine”, Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée, no. 59–60 (1992), pp. 211–239; Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 8 Elizabeth Picard, “Conclusion: Nation-building and minority rights in the Middle East” in eds. Anh Nga Longva and Anne Sofie Raold, Religious Minorities in the Middle East: Domination, Self-Empowermnet, Accommodation (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 330.

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operate with other political forces (both within the government and the opposition), as well as periods of extreme state violence against that very minority. Second, and consequently, the relationship between majorities and minorities is part of a dynamic process in which both continuity and change must be taken into account. Minority populations are constantly negotiating their individual and collective identities – ethnic and religious boundaries, relations in different social spaces – with the state and other social groups. Finally, the relationship between “majorities” and “minorities” within an authoritarian context, which is the case in most of Middle Eastern countries, needs to be reassessed. As Vincent Geisser has pointed out, scholarship has, in general, overlooked authoritarian attitudes enacted by “minorities” or “dissent groups,” while stressing the authoritarian practices of regimes. In so doing, researchers tend to analyse authoritarianism as a substance or an object owned by the state, and not as a “relationship” between different actors, including the “subordinated.” In that sense, a dynamic and interactive perspective moves us away from reifying both actors’ positions and situations; in other words, “minorities” or, more precisely, some segments from a given minority, may change their position and situation over time depending on the political context. Indeed, the historical as well as the short-term perspectives help us to identify periods in which the convergence of interests between regimes and dissenting actors may create favourable conditions for a collective production of authoritarianism. Therefore, social scientists should take into consideration the “authoritarianism of the dominated.” This paper suggests that scholars should be cautious in viewing minority groups solely as passive constituents and/or as victims of authoritarian regimes. On the contrary, they may indeed contribute to the stability of the latter. 9 In that respect, the position of Kurds in Syria is an interesting case in point. On the one hand, as we will demonstrate through a Vincent Geisser, “L’autoritarisme des ‘dominés’: un mode paradoxal de l’autoritarisme politique?”, in eds. Olivier Dabène, Vincent Geisser and Gilles Massardier, Autoritarismes démocratiques et démocraties autoritaires au XXIe siècle: Convergences Nord-Sud (Paris: La Découverte, 2008), pp. 181– 212. 9

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brief historical background, Kurds in post-colonial Syria have not always been victims of state oppression. Moreover, the exclusion of the Kurds from the top circles of power was “compensated” by the Ba‘athist regime with a series of selective measures such as the cooptation of Kurdish political as well as religious elites between the 1970s and 1990s. On the other hand, while analyzing in detail the period from 2011–2016, we will demonstrate that the revolutionary context of the Syrian uprising has offered new opportunities for the most important Kurdish political group – the Democratic Union Party (PYD, Partiya Yekîtîya Demokrat), the Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighting the Turkish state since the 1980s – to return to a place of influence after a decade of strained relations with Damascus and, more importantly, extend its hegemonic position – politically and militarily – over the Kurdish enclaves with the complicity of Bashar al-Asad. Regardless of the geopolitical consequences of this “unwritten alliance” for states such as Turkey or semi-states as Kurdistan/Iraq, it appears that the convergence of interests between the Syrian regime and the PYD has had an important impact on the Syrian crisis and on the relations between social and political actors inside the Kurdish enclaves of Northern Syria. Firstly, whilst local coordination committees and local youth groups attracted many young people at the beginning of the revolt in 2011, the PYD has played a significant role in repressing Kurdish youth activists as well as marches organised by members of the Kurdish National Council, which was established by fifteen political parties in October 2011. Secondly, the PYD has succeeded in keeping the Kurdish enclaves out of the revolutionary process, including the enrollment of Kurds in the Free Syrian Army, in turn preventing Kurds from fighting against the Ba‘athist regime. 10 Finally, since 2012, the PYD has been able to progressively create in the Kurdish enclaves a political as well as military power that is similar in character to the regime’s policies. Around Aleppo, however, dozens of Kurds have established “Kurdish militias” and joined the Free Syrian Army. 10

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A QUICK HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Minority claims were neither the “natural” outcome of a historic conflict between religious and ethnic groups, nor the consequence of imperialist designs in the Middle East. “Minority” and “majority” groups as well as international actors, the colonial powers and the League of Nations, were in a tripartite relationship for more than forty years leading up to the First World War and the collapse of multi-ethnic and multi-religious empires. 11 Thereafter, two diverging constitutional choices shaped state-society relations in the postcolonial Middle East: the choice of government representing the demographic majority or Tocquevillian model (i.e., Syria, Egypt, Israel, Iran, Iraq), or the choice of “consensus democracy” (i.e., Lebanon, and Iraq since 2005). The former came to dominate political engineering in the Middle East whilst the fervour for minority rights diminished in the aftermath of the Second World War, for both the international community (e.g., League of Nations) and indigenous elites. In the so-called Tocquevillian model, the party or the leader who secures the numerical plurality of votes in electoral processes theoretically enjoyed the legitimate right to govern and impose upon state and society its own identity and cultural preferences. However, as Elizabeth Picard notes, in the newly established Middle Eastern states, the rationale for this model was somehow different. In order to strengthen their new and often fragile power, “the rulers held a discourse of unanimity, either in support of a charismatic or traditional leader, or based on a nationalist ideology.” 12 As the diverse projects for “bourgeois democracy” faded away in the postcolonial Middle East, 13 authoritarian leaders “were prone to Vahé Tachjian, La France en Cilicie et en Haute-Mésopotamie. Aux confins de la Turquie, de la Syrie et de l’Irak (1919–1933) (Paris: Karthala, 2004); Benjamin Thomas White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East. The Politics of community in French mandate Syria (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). 12 Elizabeth Picard, “Conclusion: Nation-building and minority rights”, p. 329. 13 Peter Sluglett, “The Mandates: Some reflections on the nature of the British presence in Iraq (1914–1932) and the French presence in Syria 11

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deny cultural pluralism, suppress minority claims, and even eradicate minority movements in the name of a shared national identity.” 14 Yet, as anthropologists and historians remind us, the history of the formation of each modern state is unique. 15 In the same vein, the very notions of “majority” and “minority” obscure the actual diversity within each of these “groups” and do not allow us to grasp the evolution of their relations over time. As Nelida Fuccaro suggests, it was not until the 1930s that notions of national and transnational communities eventually challenged primordial attachments among the Kurds. 16 The result of this process was an increasing conflict of loyalties among Kurdish communities attracted by diverse political projects throughout the 1940s and 1950s: communism, Kurdish nationalism, and Arab nationalism. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Kurds actively participated in the economic, political, and cultural fields in Syria. Kurdish officers and officials held important positions within the state apparatus, whilst Kurdish landowners benefited from the agricultural “miracle” in the Jazirah area. 17 However, by the late 1950s Syria entered into a period of political instability and tensions around the identity –Syrian, Arab or Pan-Arab– of the state. In the (1918–1946)” in eds. Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett, The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 103–127. 14 Elizabeth Picard, “Conclusion: Nation-building and minority rights”, p. 329. 15 C. Krohn-Hansen and K. Nustad, State Formation. Anthropological Perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 2005); A. Sharma and A. Gupta, The Anthropology of the State. A Reader (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). 16 Nelida Fuccaro, “Minorities and ethnic mobilizations; the Kurds in Northern Iraq and Syria” in eds. Nadine Méouchy and Peter Sluglett, The British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 595. 17 After the Second World War, the Syrian Jazira entered into an era of large-scale mechanized grain culture that would soon be dominated by cotton production. Kurdish landowners hired thousands of Kurdish peasants to work in their lands or sold their properties to urbanites of Aleppo, Hama and Damascus.

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end, the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) between Egypt and Syria (1958–1961) and the seizure of power by the Ba’athist party in 1963 propelled Arab nationalism to the center of Syrian political culture. When the Kurdish revolt in Iraq erupted in 1961, the Kurds became one of the major scapegoats of Arab nationalism. Thus, in order to accelerate the process of “Arabisation” of the Kurds, the Syrian government issued a decree (No. 93) authorising a special census of the population in Jazirah. Following its results, 120,000 Kurds, supposedly of foreign stock, were stripped of their Syrian nationality. 18 Under the UAR, recordings of Kurdish music were smashed in cafés, and the publication and even the possession of books written in the Kurdish language became offenses punishable by imprisonment. Arab nationalism was inscribed as an official state principle into the 1973 Syrian constitution, and thus became a compulsory aspect of Syrian civic life. Consequently, the exclusion of Kurdishness became part of the official doctrine of the state. The Syrian regime imposed a ruling minority, the Alawi sect (eleven percent of the nation’s population) that has been at odds with its demographic and social weight from 1970 onwards. However, the Syrian regime, in its dealings with the Kurdish problem, as in other domains, had to tone down its official ideology in order to be socially viable. It was within this framework that Kurdish religious, tribal and political leaders were at times co-opted by the central governments in order to ensure a balance between the different social groups, thereby fostering the regional, ethnic and sectarian lines. Indeed, between 1970 and 1990, the Kurds participated in the Ba’athist system through the engagement of a number of elites from the religious brotherhoods and official shaykhs such as Ahmad Kuftaru, mufti of the Republic (1964–2004). Likewise, after Hafiz al-Assad’s takeover in 1970, membership of the party was See Ismet Chériff Vanly, The Persecution of the Kurdish People by the Bath Dictatorship in Syria, (Amsterdam: Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Kurdish People, 1969); “Stateless Kurds in Syria. Illegal Invaders or Victims of a Nationalistic Policy?,” KurdWatch, Report 5, March 2010, accessed April 19, 2014, http://www.kurdwatch.org/ pdf/kurdwatch_staatenlose_en.pdf. 18

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opened to all Syrians, including non-Arabs such as (Arabised) Kurds, Circasians, and Armenians. The next move was the reintegration of Kurds into the ethno-sectarian system by giving them military positions, not in the ordinary ranks of the Syrian army, but in the elite divisions, notably into the Special Units attached to the Ministry of Defense, and the Defense Brigades. 19 Similarly, Hafiz al-Assad opted for a pragmatic strategy with respect to the Kurds in Iraq 20 and especially in Turkey. 21 Thanks to the cooperation with the al-Assad regime, northern Syria became a breeding ground in the 1980s and 1990s for the PKK, a Kurdish Marxist-Leninist organisation from Turkey. While no figures exist as to the exact number of youths who were active members of the PKK, certain sources estimate that around 10,000 Syrian Kurds died or “disappeared” during clashes with the Turkish army. 22 By 1987, the PKK had offices in Damascus and in several Kurdish cities. 23 By the same token, the PKK’s militants took de Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria. Politics and Society under Asad and the Bath Party, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 18; Ismet Chériff Vanly, “The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon,” in eds. Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, The Kurds. A Contemporary Overview (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 159. 20 Throughout the 1970s, Damascus showed unabashed support for those in political opposition to the Baghdad regime. In particular al-Assad welcomed Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). 21 The conflict between Turkey and Syria was rooted in the transfer of sovereignty of the Sanjak of Alexandretta in 1939 during the French mandate to the benefit of Turkey. Besides this territorial dispute, the Turkish dams on the Euphrates threatened Syria’s water supply. Syria exerted pressure on Turkey by allowing the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to establish bases on its territory, a place from which Kurdish fighters launched military operations against the Turkish army. John Bulloch and Adil Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East (London: Rowland, 1993), p. 60. 22 Harriet Montgomery, The Kurds of Syria: An Existence Denied (Berlin: Europäisches Zentrum für Kurdische Studien, 2005), p. 134 23 David McDowall, The Kurds of Syria (London: KHRP, 1998), p. 65. 19

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facto control over a few small portions of Syrian territory and managed to symbolically replace the state in the minds of some Kurds. Furthermore, six candidates from ‘Afrin overtly declared themselves as representatives of the PKK, and ran for office in the Syrian elections in May 1990. Relations between the PKK and the Syrian government were mutually beneficial, the former having a base in Syria for its activities against the Turkish state while the PKK militants provided Hafiz al-Assad with a shield against its internal (e.g., potential Kurdish challengers) and external opponents. 24 Yet, the Kurds’ role as “minority clients” with Syria acting as a “patron state” turned out to be risky for the PKK. Threatened by the Turkish-Israeli alliance of 1996, isolated internationally and dependent on water supply from the Euphrates, Syria finally succumbed to Turkish pressure to withdraw all support for the PKK. Damascus expelled Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, on October 9, 1998. In January 1999, he began the long journey that took him to Kenya where he was arrested and transferred to Turkey. The repercussions of these developments were deeply felt in Syria; various high-ranking PKK cadres were handed over to Ankara and former PKK fighters returning to Syria were sentenced to prison. In 2003, PKK militants created a new party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to secure an organisational frame for its thousands of members and sympathisers. The al-Qamishli uprising of March 2004 and its aftermath provided the PYD an opportunity to resume its activism in Northern Syria, together with a number of other Kurdish parties. 25 However, given the lack of support from the Arab Syrian opposition Vanly, “The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon,” p. 169. Most media sources reported that on March 12, 2004 during a football match between the local team and Dayr az-Zor in the town of Qamishli, insults between the fans of the two sides escalated into a riot that spilled out into the streets. During the following days, the riots spilled over all Kurdish enclaves and the Kurdish areas of Damascus and Aleppo. By late March, the final count was 43 dead, hundreds wounded, and around 2,500 arrests. For a comprehensive analysis of the Qamishli uprising, see Jordi Tejel, Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 108–132. 24 25

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and state violence, 26 Kurdish parties sought a new balance with the regime by late 2005. Accordingly, the Syrian regime would be more likely to allow a flexible approach with respect to public expressions of Kurdish identity (language, music, cultural festivals, and public events), while the Kurdish movement would not embrace the goal of overturning the government of Bashar al-Assad. Although selective state coercion over some Kurdish political figures as well as on public demonstrations increased from 2008 onwards, the accommodation between the two camps remained unchecked until the “Syrian revolution” of March 2011.

KURDISH PARTICIPATION IN THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION

When the 2011 uprising began, many observers believed that the Syrian Kurds would play a major role in overturning the regime. Even though they were divided into more than a dozen different political parties, they were still the best-organised Syrian opposition bloc, and the regime still had memories of the mass protests in 2004. Thus in June 2011, after demonstrations had already placed significant pressure on the Syrian government, the leaders of the Kurdish political parties were invited to Damascus as party representatives for the first time since Bashar al-Assad came to power. The invitation, which was ultimately declined, was part of a host of “pro-Kurdish” measures that the Syrian government had embraced since the beginning of the revolution. These measures also included the naturalisation of registered stateless people (ajanib or foreigners) on April 7, 2011, and the effective repeal of Decree 49 on March 26, 2011, measures that satisfied two of the main programmatic demands of the Kurdish parties and the Kurdish street activists. 27 Although on March 13, 2004 Christians and Arabs of Qamishli joined protestors, the movement took a sudden “Kurdish” turn in the following days. As the Syrian regime asked people from Qamishli to not be exploited by “foreign forces”, Christians and Arabs stepped down from the dissent movement. More importantly, the Syrian opposition did not react to regime’s repression in the Kurdish areas. 27 There is a second category of stateless Kurds, who are not registered at all and who are known as the maktumiin (concealed or unregistered people). 26

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These concessions, however, were not the result of successful negotiations by the Kurdish parties, but rather seem to have occurred as a preventative measure in order to hinder or at least minimise Kurdish participation in the revolution. And indeed, as during the al-Qamishli uprising in 2004, it was not the political parties, but predominantly young people who supported the protests in the spring of 2011. Only the Kurdish Future Movement in Syria (Şepêla Pêşrojê ya Kurdî li Sûriyê) publicly positioned itself on the side of the protestors from the very beginning of the revolution. 28 A split subsequently arose between the Future Movement and the other Kurdish Parties. Only in June 2015, the Future Movement joined the Kurdish National Council in Syria during its third conference. 29 There is no sound evidence of organisational ties between the young people who were active in 2004 and those who began organIn addition, some of the early youth activists were members of the Kurdish Union Party in Syria (Partiya Yekîtî ya Kurdî li Sûriyê). 29 See “Al-Qamishli: Kurdish National Council holds its third conference”, KurdWatch, June 27, 2015, . Currently, the following parties are member parties of the Kurdish National Council: 1. the Kurdish Union Party in Syria (Yekîtî) (chairman: Ibrahim Biro); 2. the Kurdistan Democratic Party – Syria (PDK-S) (chairman: Siʿud Mala); 3. the Kurdish Reform Movement – Syria (chairman: Faysal Yusuf); 4. the Kurdish Democratic Equality Party in Syria (chairman: Niʿmat Dawud; 5. the Kurdish Democratic Patriotic Party in Syria (chairman: Tahir Saʿdun Sifuk); 6. the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (el-Partî) (chair: vacant); 7. the Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria (Democratic Yekîtî) (chairman: Kamiran Haj ʿAbdu); 8. the Kurdish Democratic Left Party in Syria (chairman: Shalal Gado); 9. the Kurdistan Left Party – Syria (chairman: Mahmud Mala); 10. the Kurdish Future Movement in Syria (chairman: Siamand Hajo); 11. the Kurdish Future Movement in Syria (head of the communication office: Narin Matini) 28

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ising demonstrations in Spring 2011. In fact, local coordination committees in the Arab parts of the country were the model for the development of similar groups in the Kurdish regions. 30 Initially, these Kurdish committees discussed and shared the weekly demonstration slogans with their Arab allies. 31 At the end of March 2012, however, Kurdish activists began using their own slogans, ones that often made reference to specific Kurdish issues and had not previously been accepted as general slogans. 32 Aside from the question of providing for specific Kurdish issues in the slogans, the use of religious mottos also became a point of contention. 33 In addition to the difficulties with the Arab opposition around the national issue, the Kurdish parties played a significant role in the “Kurdification” of protest discourse, as reflected in the progressive disappearance of the Syrian independence flag of 1948, the symbol of the Syrian revolution, at demonstrations in cities such as al-Qamishli. From the very beginning, most party representatives were not really interested in the protests and distanced themselves from the Arab opposition, especially from the part that advocated for an overthrow of the regime. For example, party members were critical that “the Arabs” had abandoned the Kurds in their fight against the Syrian regime in 2004, and thus they saw no reason to support an “Arab revolution” now. Initially, local coordinating committees and youth groups were very attractive to young people, but over the years, their influence has diminished. One reason for this is the difficulty to continually develop activities given the scarcity of resources, limited support Interview with ‘Abdussalam ‘Uthman, politician and activist, January 10, 2013. 31 “Jan Qamishloki, Kurdish activist: ‘Most demonstrators do not pray’,” KurdWatch, June 29, 2011, http://www.kurdwatch.org/html/ en/interview1.html. 32 “Al-Qamishli: For the first time, Kurdish activists demonstrate under their own slogan,” KurdWatch, April 7, 2012, http://www.kurd watch.org/index.php?aid=2497&z=en&cure=245. 33 “Al-Qamishli: Demonstrators criticize Islamic slogans,” KurdWatch, May 16, 2012, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=2533 &z=en&cure=245>. 30

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from the outside, and scant organisational skills. Another aspect, however, is that many youth groups began to act like the Kurdish political parties; they disbanded, split or merged together only to split again shortly thereafter. Currently, most youth groups have close ties to one of the Kurdish parties and/or are members of the Kurdish National Council. 34 Although the Kurdish National Council has thus managed to co-opt the youth groups, this has not led to an increase in its popularity or legitimacy, but instead to the neutralisation of potential rivals. Moreover, programmatically, the Kurdish National Council had hardly anything new to offer, at least until recently. For a long time, its ideas for the political future of the Kurds in a Syria postal-Assad were just buzzwords, substantial concepts were missing. Only in July 2015, the KNC published a paper discussing federalism as an option for a future Syrian state, giving some details about its ideas regarding power sharing between the central, regional and local level. 35 However, this development of positions is still workin-progress. The KNC is still struggling for mutual positions in many political fields – given the fact that the KNC is an umbrella organization of numerous political parties as well as independent personalities, few of them having much experience in politics, this is not so much of a surprise. For a long time, there were even two factions in the Kurdish National Council with regard to its stance toward the Syrian revolution and the potential overthrow of the regime. One wished to support the revolution in a much more assertive manner, 36 while the other rejected closer cooperation with When the policymakers within these parties realized that the youth groups were gaining more and more supporters, they founded their own youth organizations; see also Adib ‘Abdulmajid, “Kurdish youth forces in Syria accuse parties of squeezing them out”, Rûdaw, January 14, 2013, http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/syria/5656.html. 35 The paper was published on the website of the Geneva Office of the Kurdish National Cuncil, see http://knc-geneva.org/?p=601&la ng=en. 36 The most important representatives of this faction were the Kurdish Union Party in Syria (Yekîtî) [Partiya Yekîtî ya Demokrat a Kurdî li Sûriyê, Yekîtî], both factions of the Kurdish Freedom Party in Syria (Aza34

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those parts of the Syrian opposition that advocated an overthrow of the regime. 37 This internal discord contributed significantly to keeping the Kurdish National Council out of the Syrian National Council. Only in September 2013, the Kurdish National Council joined what at this time was the most important oppositional union, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, founded on November 11, 2012. This move was probably motivated by the consideration that a possible U.S. military strike would have given the Syrian opposition, and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) specifically, the upper hand. In this case it would have been a mistake not to be part of the opposition. However, when the military strike was not carried out, the Kurdish National Council’s enthusiasm to work with the Syrian opposition declined. In the peace negotiations in Geneva in January and February 2014, the Kurdish National Council as well as the PYD requested to be represented with an independent Kurdish delegation, as “third party” in addition to the National Coalition and the Syrian government – even though the Kurdish National Council was a member of the National Coalition. Since the request was turned down, a representative of the Kurdish National Council participated in the Geneva conference as part of the opposition,

dî) [Partiya Azadî ya Kurdî li Sûriyê, Azadî], and ʿAbdulhakim Bashar’s Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (el-Partî) [Partiya Demokrat a Kurdî li Sûriyê (el-Partî)]. These parties have close ties to Mas‘ud Barzani’s IraqiKurdish Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP-Iraq supports – if only cautiously – the Syrian revolution. 37 The second faction consisted primarily of ‘Abdulhamid Hajji Darwish’s Kurdish Progressivet Party in Syria (Partiya Demokrat a Pêşverû ya Kurdî li Sûriyê) and Muhiyuddin Schaykh Ali’s Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria (Yekîtî) [Partiya Yekîtî ya Demokrat a Kurdî li Sûriyê (Yekîtî)]. The Progressive Party maintains close ties to Jalal Talabani’s Iraqi-Kurdish Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK), which has been hesitant about the Syrian revolution thus far. For its part, the Democratic Yekîtî, which is largely strong in ʿAfrin, traditionally has good relations with the PYD and its mother party, the PKK.

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whereas the PYD was excluded. 38 Currently, the Kurdish National Council is part of the High Negotiations Committee (HNC), the political coalition taking part in the Geneva Peace Talks on behalf of the Syrian opposition. However, internal quarrels over the presence of the KNC within the HNC pop up every few months. On the one hand, the KNC sees its membership as a chance to voice its position and make it known to a wider political audience. On the other hand, its leadership is well aware that its position – e.g. regarding federalism or secularism – is marginal within the HNC, a fact that is criticized by many of its sympathisers. At the same time, there is periodic public pressure to leave the HNC and support for the old idea to form a third Kurdish delegation to the peace talks alongside the PYD. 39 Eventually, the KNC voted against this option – arguing that cooperating with a group that commits severe human rights violations, including against KNC members, and still works with the Syrian regime, was out of question. 40

“DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNING”

The PYD and its militia, the People’s Defense Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) are currently the most important actors in the Kurdish regions. Until the beginning of the protests in 2011, the “Syrian Kurds feel left out of Geneva”, January 18, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/geneva-ii-kurdishinternational-community.html. 39 “ʿAfrin: Democratic Yekîtî demands a unified Kurdish negotiation delegation”, KurdWatch, April 17, 2016, http://www.kurdwatch.org/ ?e3800. 40 Those, very limited, military skirmishes between regime troops and YPG rather seem to have their origins in misunderstandings, quarrels and isolated imperatives on the ground than in a central decision to break with the regime. Indeed, the regime itself occasionally stresses the cooperation between YPG and government. The fact that the YPG/PKK is willing to exclusively fight the IS and not the regime of Bashar al-Assad – a concession Arab groups linked to the opposition were not ready to make – is one of the main reasons for its position as the most important ally of the US. Additionally, the PKK provided a military structure, e.g. well-trained cadres and experienced fighters, other groups could not offer. 38

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PYD was not only the party with the most sympathisers in Syrian prisons, its members were also, as a rule, sentenced to longer prison terms than the members of other parties and were systematically subjected to torture. Since then, however, the balance of power has shifted in favour of this party. At the beginning of the protest wave, the PYD suppressed dissident demonstrations in the Kurdish regions so that the Syrian army did not have to open a “second front” and could stay focused on other areas. In return for its role in suppressing dissent, the Baʿth regime gradually pulled its army and its secret services out of the predominantly Kurdish regions ‘Afrin, ‘Ayn al-‘Arab (Kobanî) and Jazirah 41 and transferred control to the PYD. The fact that all these regions were taken over by the PYD without notable armed conflicts, points to agreements, whether official or unofficial, between the PYD/PKK and the Syrian regime. 42 The PYD propaganda describes its government as “democratic self-governing,” as collective self-administration from below, based on the organisation of the people in civil institutions. 43 However, the “social contract” the PYD often referred to when asked to explain the concept of democratic self-ruling has never been officially published. 44 Comparably nebulous is the question of who participated in the establishment of a local administration in the 41 An

exception is al-Qamishli, where the Syrian army and its security service still have a base. 42 See, for example, “‘Amudah/ad-Darbasiyah: Syrian regime cedes additional cities to the PYD,” KurdWatch, December 1, 2012, accessed April 19, 2014, http://kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=2702&z=en&cure =245. 43 “Interview with Mr Salih Muslim Mohamed the leader of Democratic Union Party PYD,” undated, http://www.pydrojava.net/ en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=79:interview-withmr-saleh-muslim-mohamed-the-leader-of-democratic-union-party-pyd& catid=34:news&Itemid=53. 44 On July 18, 2013, the website Rihab News published the draft of a constitution formulated by the PYD, the “Social Contract for Western Kurdistan”. However, the document was soon removed.

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Jazirah, ‘Afrin and ‘Ayn al-‘Arab on November 12, 2013. 45 No comprehensive list of signatories has ever been published. Moreover, the participants known are either affiliated with the PYD, like the PYD’s women’s organization Yekîtîya Star, or are entirely unknown, such as the Liberal Kurdish Union (Yekîtiya Lîberalî ya Kurdistanî), the Kurdish Democratic Peace Party in Syria (Partiya Aştî ya Demokrata Kurdî li Sûriyê) or the Communist Kurdistanian Party (Partiya Komonîst ya Kurdistanî). The Kurdish National Council as an umbrella organisation did not participate, nor did any of the senior political parties. 46 This lack of transparency and accountability is intentional; the PYD alone promoted the declaration of a local administration, followed by the appointment of three governments in the “cantons” of Jazirah, Kobanî and ‘Afrin on January 21, 27 and 29, 2014. Moreover, it was representatives of PYD-affiliated organizations who met, on March 17, 2016, in Rumaylan, to decide upon a federal administrative system for the area in northern Syria under PYD control, 47 not, as suggested by the PYD, different social groups representing the population of that region. Thus, the YPG/PYD/PKK’s understanding of democracy does obviously not refer to Western standards. In theory, in the proposed system of “democratic autonomy” and “democratic confederalism”, the former refers to a re-grounding of the political status of people, on the basis of self-government rather than on “Al-Qamishli: PYD forms local administration”, KurdWatch, November 25, 2014, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=2968&z= en&cure=1009. 46 Those political parties, as for example the Left Party of Salih Gado’s Kurdish Democratic Left Party in Syria (not to be confused with the identically named party of Shalal Gado), which left the Kurdish National Council in order to work with the PYD’s administration, do not have any political weight. Their positions can well be compared to that of the bloc parties the Assad regime used to tolerate. 47 In addition to PYD representatives, delegates from the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), the People’s Defense Units (YPG), from the PYD-appointed Democratic Autonomous Administration as well as from the PYD-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces of Syria also attended the meeting. 45

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peoples’ relations with the state. “Democratic confederalism” aims at the strengthening of local administrative capacities organised in the form of councils at the very local level, of streets and then neighbourhoods, through district/village and town/city to region. Thus, “democratic confederalism” may be regarded as the form of self-administration in which autonomy is organised. The leader of the movement, Abdullah Öcalan, considers this as a necessary and decisive break from centralised and representative systems, which turn politics from collective decision-making to individual choice and are based not on social relations among people but on individual relations of people with the state, turning politics into a private activity. Reality however is different. “Democratic autonomy” has turned into something else in “Rojava”; a system that is reminiscent of the older and well-known model of “people’s democracy”, a political concept familiar in former socialist countries. There is one ruling party, and all other groups must subordinate themselves to the main party. Competing parties are not allowed to participate in the political process. The consequence of this ideological position is severely felt in the PYD-ruled regions: the number of unlawful arrests or kidnappings in order to intimidate representatives of other political parties has significantly risen since the PYD gained control. 48 As recently as August 2016, numerous politicians of the PDK-S and the Yekîtî, both member parties of the KNC, were abducted and imprisoned. 49 Apart from politicians, journalists and independent activists have also frequently become victims of the PYD. 50 Journalists working for media outlets criticizing the PYD, For the period since August 2011, KurdWatch has the names and cases of about three hundred victims. Approximately two hundred additional cases are all but certain, but since sufficient personal data on these cases is missing, they are not mentioned on the KurdWatch website. 49 “Al-Qamishli: PYD abduct Kurdish National Council politicians”, KurdWatch, August 26, 2016, http://www.kurdwatch.org/?e3932. 50 “Al-Qamishli: PYD abducts journalists to Iraqi-Kurdistan”, KurdWatch, April 27, 2014, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid= 3077&z=en&cure=1016; “Ad-Darbasiyah: Journalist kidnapped by 48

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such as Rudaw and Orient-TV, are not allowed to work in the Jazirah. 51 The unwillingness of the PYD to engage in power sharing is well illustrated by the following episode that took place during the negotiations between the Kurdish National Council and the PYD in Duhok in October 2014. In order to facilitate a mutual administration of the region, the KNC had requested, among other things, 50 percent of the income generated by the YPG by taxes, border fees, oil sales 52 and other sources 53. The PYD thus explained that this would be impossible, as 40 percent of the income was to be transferred to the PKK, 30 percent to the Syrian regime, and 20 percent to the PYD's administration. The Kurdish National Council was offered a share of 5 percent. 54 Not only those criticising the PYD and its politics are persecuted, but independent (civic) engagement is also deemed suspicious. In early December 2013, for example, the PYD-affiliated Union of Kurdish Teachers in Western Kurdistan decided to close all private schools in ‘Ayn al-‘Arab. School tutoring courses were affected, as were Kurdish language courses. 55 However, after several hundred pupils and representatives of the institutions took to the PYD”, KurdWatch, April 30, 2014, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index. php?aid=3081&z=en&cure=1016”. 51 “ʿAyn al-ʿArab: PYD prohibits TV station”, KurdWatch, March 6, 2016, http://www.kurdwatch.org/?e3763. 52 Negotiations between the PKK and representatives of the regime, including the head of the Political Security Directorate in al-Hasakah, preceded the takeover of the oil field; see “Rumailan: PKK and Syrian regime cooperate in Rumailan,” KurdWatch, June 8, 2013, http://kurdwatch. org/index.php?aid=2849&z=en&cure=1009. 53 “Ad-Darbasiyah: PYD demands building licenses,” KurdWatch, Februay 20, 2014, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3029&z= en&cure=1016. 54 Conversation with a member of the Kurdish National Council in Syria participating in the Duhok negotiations in October 2014, July 2016. 55 “‘Ayn al-‘Arab: PYD closes private schools,” KurdWatch, December 12, 2013, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=2981&z= en&cure=1009.

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streets in protest against this decision, it was finally revoked. Thus, the most effective protection against repressions is popular support. As a rule, the PYD tries to avoid conflicts that may cause too much public criticism and also become internationally known. One of the reasons why protest against repressive PYD practices in the Kurdish regions is quite limited so far is that the PYD is neatly using the Islamist threat to gain support among the Kurdish population.

KURDS VERSUS ISLAMISTS – SHIFTING OBJECTIVES

In 2011, the Syrian revolution started as a secular movement. This holds good for the majority of protesters as well as for the Free Syrian Army (FSA), founded in the summer of 2011 with the goal of protecting peaceful demonstrations and initially comprised of small units of deserted soldiers who were joined by civilians and a few foreign fighters. Over the course of the civil war, however, radical Sunni groups within the FSA have gained strength, supported primarily by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, but also by Turkey. Many of these groups have been fighting for the FSA against the regime, without formally submitting to its command structure. In the Kurdish regions, the Jabhat an-Nusrah is especially noteworthy. Numerous Islamists fight in this armed unit, founded in early 2012, who had previously fought against the Americans in Iraq with support from the Syrian Ba’athist regime. Besides these groups that are linked, albeit loosely, to the FSA, there are radical Islamist organisations such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, that are declared opponents of the FSA. Such groups have become increasingly powerful in the course of the revolution. However, until 2014 the Kurdish regions were not their focus of interest, instead they concentrated on fighting against regime troops. The relationship between the PYD, or rather the YPG, and Islamist groups has evolved over time as well. At first, the YPG attacked Islamist fighters mainly for “propagandistic” reasons. At the end of December 2013, for example, units of the YPG and the Syrian Army started a joint offensive against Islamist units near Tall

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Hamis and Tall Brak. Both cities are situated outside the Kurdish areas which the PYD claims to protect against Islamists. In the end, the YPG had to withdraw after major losses. 56 It is reasonable to argue that such “offensives” provoked counter attacks by Islamists rather than weaken them, and that the reason behind the YPG joining the offensive was loyalty towards the regime rather than responsibility for the safety of the Kurds. Loyalty towards the regime, however, was only one reason for the YPG to engage in clashes with Islamists. Another was to distract people’s attention from human rights violations committed by the PYD and its militia. For example, in mid-June 2013, the YPG drove the Jabhat an-Nusrah out of Ras al-‘Ayn, after its chairman Salih Muslim Muhammad had already claimed in late March 2013 that they were no longer active there. 57 There is much to suggest that the fighting flared up again not because of pressing problems, but rather because the YPG had intentionally chosen this moment to distract people from their attack on activists in ‘Amudah and thus win back the sympathy of the Kurdish population by fighting against the Islamists. 58 However, by spring 2014, the situation was different. The reservation of Islamist groups to fight against the Kurds gave way to “Tall Hamis/Tall Brak: PYD and Syrian regime start joint offensive,” KurdWatch, January 7, 2014, accessed April 19, 2014, http://www.kurdwatch.org/?aid=3000&z=en&cure=1016; “Tall Hamis/ Tall Brak: PYD withdraws after major losses,” KurdWatch, January 11, 2014, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3004&z=en&cure= 1016. 57 “Ra’s al-‘Ayn: YPG expels Islamic units from the city”, KurdWatch, July 23, 2013, a http://kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=2887&z= en&cure=1009. 58 Finally, there were eyewitness reports that by summer 2013 Islamist fighters near al-Ma’bada and al-Qahtaniyah (Tirpesipî) withdraw when attacked by the YPG rather than fighting back. “Al-Ma’bada/alQahtaniyah: Fighting between Islamic units and YPG”, KurdWatch, August 6, 2013, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=2897&z= en&cure=1009. 56

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serious clashes between both sides. 59 On September 19, the IS attacked Kurdish populated territory; its fighters marched towards the city of Kobanî. Within twenty-four hours, approximately three hundred seventy villages were captured while ten thousands of refugees fled to neighboring Turkey. Initially, it was the YPG fighting the IS, but when IS forces reached the city of Kobanî, they were replaced by PKK fighters from Turkey. Around October 10, about 400 PKK fighters crossed into Syria from Turkey, and others followed. According to PKK sources, 400 of their fighters were killed. However, independent activists estimate their number to be around 1,500. 60 After a long siege, the PKK was eventually supported by air strikes of the US Air Force; moreover, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) sent Peshmerga to Kobanî. 61 Between January 27 and February 10, 2015, the IS was expelled from all the territories in the vicinity of Kobanî that were under PYD control prior to their IS capture. 62 After such success, large segments of the Western press celebrated the YPG/PKK as the only democratic force in Syria capable of facing IS’ threat military. Internally, the liberation of Kobanî served to reinforce the party’s propaganda of the YPG as the sole rampart against Islamist militias as well. Both narratives, however, conceal that the YPG, in the beginning of the revolution, squashed all attempts of other Kurdish political parties to build up armed units to defend the Kurdish regions. Moreover, the YPG is still denying entry to Syria to the Roj Peshmerga, a force of Syrian Kurds trained by the KDP-Iraq. The Roj Peshmerga are currently fighting the IS in the neighboring country, but the Kurdish Nation“Tall Abyad: Fighting between YPG und Islamists,” KurdWatch, April 10, 2014, http://www.kurdwatch.org/?aid=3065&z=en&cure =1016. 60 Interview with an activist from Kobanî, June 22, 2015. 61 “ʿAyn al-ʿArab: Peshmerga withdraw completely”, KurdWatch, May 1, 2015, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3357&z=en& cure=1029. 62 “ʿAyn al-ʿArab: IS expelled from additional territories”, KurdWatch, February 18, 2015, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid= 3357&z=en&cure=1029. 59

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al Council wants them to return to Syria in order to secure the Kurdish regions. 63 The PKK, thus, has clearly enhanced its positions through the Syrian civil war. However, one should be careful to overestimate its strength as well as its popularity. According to their own statistics, more than 50 percent of their fighters in Syria originate from Turkey. 64 And those Syrian Kurds fighting in the ranks of the YPG do not necessarily do so voluntarily: the fact that the YPG engages in forced recruitment in Syria proves their limited support among important sectors of the Syrian-Kurdish population. 65 Indeed, forced recruitment is one of the most important reasons for young Kurds to flee from the Kurdish regions. 66

CONCLUSION

We have argued elsewhere that the terms “Arab Spring,” as coined in the title of some articles and books on the so-called “Kurdish Spring,” suggest an “awakening” after a period of “passivity” or a For the debate about the Roj peshmerga see for example “AlQamishli: Ibrahim Biro is the new chairman of the Kurdish National Council”, KurdWatch, July 11, 2015, http://www.kurdwatch.org/ ?aid=3488&z=en. 64 On its official website the YPG stated that between November 2, 2015 and January 3, 2016 a total of seventy-six of its fighters had been killed during armed conflicts in ʿAyn al-ʿArab (Kobanî), ʿAfrin, Tall Abyad and al-Hassakah. The birthplace of forty-three of the dead was in Turkey, the birthplace of thirty-two in Syria, and one person had been born in Iraq. Thus, fifty-six per cent of the dead originated from Turkey. See “Syria: YPG deploys primarily Kurds from Turkey as fighters”, KurdWatch, January 7, 2016, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index. php?e3721. 65 For more information on forced recruitment see “Forcible recruitments and the deployment of child soldiers by the Democratic Union Party in Syria”, KurdWatch, May 2015, http://www.kurdwatch. org/pdf/KurdWatch_A010_en_Zwangsrekrutierung.pdf. 66 “Jazirah: Almost two-thirds of the village population has fled”, KurdWatch, December 11, 2015, http://www.kurdwatch.org/index. php?e3692. 63

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winter slumber. 67 As with the Kurdish case, this view is problematic, as we have shown in the first part of this paper. A closer observation of the Kurdish areas in the first decade of the twenty-first century demonstrates that a wide range of Kurdish political actors were mobilised long before the 2011 popular revolts. Although young Kurdish activists in 2011 belonged to a new cohort, the 2004–2005 events in the Kurdish enclaves had highly politicised the Kurdish arena and the memories of the al-Qamishli uprising were still present in the minds of the regime and the Kurdish population in Northern Syria when the 2011 revolt started in Dara‘a. Similarly, an important bulk of expert reports as well as scholarly books and journal articles have argued that the Arab revolts initially offered new opportunities for “minorities” to overcome their traditionally subordinate position. The “democratic uprisings” of 2010–2011, led by increasingly secularised Arab youths, had indeed revealed the irrelevance of the “Islamic” factor for a new generation of politicised actors and “demo-movements.” 68 Rapidly, however, some views were less optimistic and expressed renewed concerns about the Islamist grip in the region despite, or thanks to, the so-called “Arab Spring,” which to some observers and scholars was, in fact, an “Islamist Spring.” Hence, “minorities,” in particular Christians, found themselves once more in a difficult position; they were caught between authoritarian regimes and Islamist groups. In that sense, “minorities” suffered from these dynamics with no other choice that remaining loyal to authoritarian, yet “secular” regimes, or leaving their respective homelands. The reality is, however, much more complex than these accounts suggest. The Kurdish case in Syria reveals how some portions of a given minority may take advantage from a fluid political situation (e.g., popular uprisEva Savelsberg and Jordi Tejel, “The Syrian Kurds in Transition to Somewhere”, in eds. Mohammed M.A. Ahmed and Michael Gunter, The Kurdish Spring: Geopolitical Changes and the Kurds (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2013), pp. 189–217. 68 To Farhad Khosrokhavar, for example, the “demo-movements” are marked by their lack of formal leadership, their democratic mindset, and their search for social justice. Farhad Khosrokhavar, The New Arab Revolutions that Shook the World, op. cit, p. 10. 67

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ing) to seize political and military power in some regions and to renegotiate its position with regard to both regimes and other opposition groups. Finally, we have demonstrated through the analysis of the Kurdish case in Syria that research should approach the topic of political authoritarianism from a different perspective. In the aftermath of the “Arab Spring,” political scientists opened an interesting debate about possible transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in the Arab world. Whilst some scholars (“democracyspotting” trend) argued that the “transition” to democracy had already started in several countries of the MENA region, others highlighted that authoritarian regimes proved their capacity to survive as well as to implement cosmetic reforms that did not seriously challenge the political system. Finally, scholars such as Morten Valbjorn have pledged for a “third way” approach to this issue, since it was clear that Arab countries were certainly in transition to “somewhere” but at that point we didn’t know what this “somewhere” would eventually look like. 69 Yet, much of these debates had focused almost entirely on regimes and viewed authoritarianism as an object, a tool in the hands of governments. We have argued, in line with Vincent Geisser’s viewpoint, that we should analyse authoritarianism as a “relationship” between different actors, including the “subordinated.” In that sense, a dynamic and interactive perspective moves away from reifying both actors’ positions and situations; in other words, “minorities” or, more precisely, some segments from a given minority, may change their position and situation over time depending on the political context. In that sense, the role the different Kurdish groups played during the revolution has been neither limited to that of victims of the ruling government or Islamist forces, nor have all groups immediately and wholeheartedly embraced the idea of toppling the regime. Instead, diverse Kurdish political groups have followed different political strategies, strategies that shift over time and are Morten Valbjorn, “Upgrading Post-democratization Studies: Examining a Re-Politicized Arab World in a Transition to Somewhere,” Middle East Critique 21 (2012), pp. 25–35. 69

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still shifting with regard to their position in the revolution and in particular their relationship to the Ba’athist regime. Moreover, there is strong evidence to argue that, with the exception of Kobanî in 2014, since 2012 Kurds in the mainly Kurdish regions have been victims of the PYD, its militia and its security forces, and not of government troops. However, this may change again. The convergence of interests between the PYD and the Syrian regime led to a common understanding of the challenges they were facing and a shared construction of authoritarian rule in the Kurdish enclaves. The evolution of the conflict (e.g., new alliances at both the national, regional and international level) may lead to the end of that very convergence of interests thereby paving the way for unforeseen consequences for the Syrian Kurds.

CHAPTER 2 THE AMAZIGH IN POST-REVOLUTION LIBYA: A CENTURY OF STRUGGLE TODD M. THOMPSON AND YOUCEF BOUANDEL BIOLA UNIVERSITY AND QATAR UNIVERSITY

Since the Arab conquests of the Middle East and North Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries, the Islamic west, or Maghreb, and the Islamic east, or Mashriq, have enjoyed a common historical and religious bond, while remaining distinct. This difference can be attributed to the lingering cultural, linguistic, religious and political influence of the native Berber or Amazigh peoples of North Africa. While Arabs have enjoyed unquestioned predominance in the history of the Mashriq, the interplay of Amazigh and Arab cultures has been a key influence on the unique history of the Maghreb. 1 In contemporary North Africa, it is estimated that Imazighen make up about 1 percent of Tunisia’s populace, 8–9 percent of Libya’s, 20–25 percent of Algeria’s and 40–45 percent of Morocco’s. Today, Amazigh activism is a major factor in the turbulent politics of the region. They reject the term Berber as pejorative, preferring Amazigh instead, and they dislike the term Maghreb as a name for the region, calling it Tamazgha to emphasize its Berber roots. They wish to see their language achieve official state recognition alongside Arabic and they often support democratic, pluralist Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States (Austin, TX, 2011), p. 1. 1

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political policies in opposition to Islamist or secular Arab nationalist agendas. 2 In light of these developments, since the 1990s, ‘Berber identity’ movements in Algeria and Morocco have attracted increasing attention from scholars. 3 In comparison, much less is known about the Amazigh in Libya, despite their central role in the 2011 uprising against Qaddafi. 4 This article will analyze recent Amazigh experience after the fall of Qaddafi placing it in the context of Amazigh involvement in Libyan politics in the long twentieth-century, which saw the diffusion of pan-Islamic and Arab nationalist ideologies in the Maghreb and the emergence of Libya as an independent state. In the early twentieth century, Amazigh activists drew upon the idea of pan-Islamic solidarity to combat European colonialism and attempt to achieve local autonomy for the region of Tripolitania. Around World War II, many Amazigh activists from Tripolitania partnered with the forces of Arab nationalism in order to secure freedom, once and for all, from the threat of Italian colonization. Ibid., pp. 1–4, 7–8, and 17. For examples of a few such studies see Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities: Berbers, ‘Berberism’ and the State in North Africa”, Journal of North African Studies, 6, 3 (2001), pp. 23–47, Jane E. Goodman, Berber Culture on the World Stage: From Village to Video (Bloomington, IN, 2005), Cynthia J. Becker, Amazigh Arts in Morocco: Women Shaping Berber Identity (Austin, TX, 2006), Michael J. Willis, “The Politics of Berber (Amazigh) Identity: Algeria and Morocco Compared”, in Yahia H. Zoubir and Halzam Amirah-Fernandez, eds., North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation (New York, 2008), pp. 227–42, Susan Gilson Miller and Katherine E. Hoffman, eds., Berbers and Others: Beyond Tribe and Nation in the Maghrib (Bloomington, IN, 2010). 4 While the following works do not focus exclusively on Libyan Berbers after the “Arab Spring”, they have a good deal of relevant and illuminating analysis. See Youssef Sawani and Jason Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Qadhafi: The Islamist, Regionalist, and Amazigh Challenges”, Journal of North African Studies, 18, 4 (2013), pp. 523–43 and George Joffe, “Minorities in the New Libya”, in Moha Ennaji, ed., Multiculturalism and Democracy in North Africa: Aftermath of the Arab Spring (New York, 2014), pp. 293–309. 2 3

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However, the rule of Mu’ammar Qaddafi, who actively oppressed those who did not agree with his homogenous concept of Libya’s Arab identity, drove Amazigh activists away from their erstwhile rapprochement with Arab nationalism. As a result, Amazigh activists in Libya have sided with the forces of revolution and actively opposed movements that might be deemed counter-revolutionary, even to the extent of fighting alongside Islamists. Over the last hundred years, Libya’s Amazigh have moved from staunch proponents of local self-determination, to active supporters of national self-determination conceived in Arab nationalist terms, to active opponents of Arab nationalist authoritarianism. In the current fractured and fluid political landscape, the Libyan Amazigh, like their early-twentieth century predecessors, have become increasingly attracted to the idea of regional autonomy and self-rule as a viable option to secure their rights as a community.

THE AMAZIGH AND ITALIAN COLONIZATION

The distinctiveness of the Libyan Amazigh experience can be discerned best in comparison with other contexts in North Africa. This section will concentrate chiefly on the political experience of notables in the early twentieth century. 5 Contrasting styles of European colonialism made for different responses to Arab nationalism amongst the Amazigh in Libya and Algeria. Michael Willis has identified several significant features of French colonialism that shaped the evolution of Algerian Amazigh politics. Willis attributes the origins of the Algerian Imazighen identity movement in the 1960s and 1970s to two distinctive features of the Kabyle experience of French colonialism. Firstly, the French favored incorporation of Kabyles rather than Arabs into their system of colonial rule. Our use of the term “notables” is indebted to Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables”, in Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury and Mary C. Wilson, ed., The Modern Middle East (London, 2004), pp. 83–109. We believe the concept has value though we recognize its limitations when tied exclusively to a structural-functional explanatory model for social-political relationships in the Middle East and North Africa. See James L. Gelvin, “The ‘Politics of Notables’ Forty Years After”, Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 40, 1 (2006), pp. 19–29. 5

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Secondly, given their special place in the French colonial regime, Kabyles enjoyed privileged access to French educational institutions. As a result, Kabyles spoke Tamazight and French, but not Arabic, and enjoyed a special relationship with the French intellectual elite who cultivated an interest in Kabyle culture even after Algerian independence in 1962. 6 All this mitigated their identification with Arab nationalism. By contrast to French colonialism in Algeria, Italian colonialism never established deep cultural and linguistic roots in Libyan society. Libyan Amazigh notables preferred speaking Tamazight and Arabic to Italian and became fairly well integrated into their territory’s struggle for independence from Italy, which was influenced considerably by both pan-Islamic and Arab nationalist ideologies. Although Amazigh notables involved in the resistance against Italy in the early twentieth-century paired fidelity to Amazigh self-determination with appeals to pan-Islamic solidarity, their successors tended to subsume Amazigh concerns for ethnic and religious freedom under a broader commitment to Arab selfdetermination. On the eve of the Italian colonial conquest, the Ottomans ruled over the Vilayet of Tripolitania located between Tunis and Egypt, which encompassed the territories that would become known as Tripolitania and Cyrenaica under the Italians. 7 The Amazigh were most prevalent in the Jabal Nafusa region of Tripolitania. Undoubtedly, Sulayman al-Baruni was the leading Tripolitanian Amazigh notable of the early twentieth century. He was a man of immense religious learning who evolved into a significant military commander and formidable political force. His career illustrates the intersection of pan-Islamism, Amazigh nationalism and Arab nationalism as ideologies of resistance to European en-

Willis, “Politics of Berber (Amazigh) Identity”, p. 230. Emine Evered, Empire and Education Under the Ottomans: Politics, Reform and Resistance from the Tanzimat to the Young Turks (London, 2012), pp. 176–195. 6 7

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croachment in North Africa, ideologies that would later come to be seen as more antagonistic to each other. 8 By contrast to Arabs in the east who sought to free themselves from the Ottomans with European aid, initially al-Baruni attempted to enlist Ottoman support to fight against the Europeans. Born in 1870, al-Baruni, whose father was a teacher at an Ibadi Zawiya, studied traditional Islamic subjects at al-Zaytuna in Tunis and at al-Azhar in Cairo. He harbored ambitions for the creation of an independent Amazigh Imamate in Tripolitania from the outset of his public career. While Sultan Abdul-Hamid II accused him of plotting against the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks sought to collaborate with him when they rose to power. In 1908, he was elected to serve as representative of the Jabal Gharbi district of Tripolitania in the Ottoman Parliament. After receiving military training from the Ottomans, al-Baruni left Istanbul in 1911 to join the resistance against the Italians in Tripolitania. During this time the Ottomans actively sought to emphasize the pan-Islamic dimensions of their empire to create the sense of a global umma fighting against European imperialism and to unite the disparate tribal notables of Tripolitania. Soon after his return, al-Baruni emerged as the leading resistance fighter. 9 In October, 1912, after the Ottomans signed a peace treaty with Italy, al-Baruni convinced a significant number of Tripolitanian Amazigh and Arab notables at a gathering in al-‘Aziziya to continue their efforts to fight Italy. Abandoned by the Ottomans, alBaruni also attempted to enter into negotiations with the Italians to secure the establishment of an independent Ibadi province. 10 Sus-

J. E. Peterson, “Arab Nationalism and the Idealist Politician: The Career of Sulayman al-Baruni”, in James Piscatori and George S. Harris, eds., Law, Personalities and Politics of the Middle East (Boulder, CO, 1987), pp. 124–128. 9 Peterson, “Arab Nationalism”, pp. 127–128 and Anna Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation: Colonial Legacy, Exile and the Emergence of a New Nation-State (New York, 2009), pp. 39, 56–57. 10 Baldinetti, Origins of the Libyan Nation, p. 57. 8

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picious of his motives, some Arab notables chose to break with alBaruni’s leadership. 11 When the resistance stalled in 1913, al-Baruni escaped to Tunisia, returning briefly to Istanbul where the Sultan appointed him to the position of Senator and granted him the title of Pasha. Following the outbreak of World War I, the Ottomans named alBaruni Governor of Tripolitania, Tunisia and Algeria and sent him back to the region in 1916 to once again stir up resistance to the Italians with the hope of regaining the territory. During this time he sought reconciliation with several important Arab notables in the region. However, in 1917, the Italians defeated al-Baruni decisively in battle. Throughout this time, because of his military exploits and Ottoman connections, al-Baruni became known as a formidable leader in Tripolitania though some of his Arab rivals continued to question his motives. 12 As a result of al-Baruni’s prestige and influence in western Tripolitania, a convention of Tripolitanian notables elected him to serve as a member of the ruling council of four, which also included three Arab notables, for the newly established Tripolitanian Republic. In 1919, the Italians recognized the legitimacy of the Republic through a special statute, but in reality they sought to curtail its influence and establish secure control of the region. Despite his new position, al-Baruni sought constructive engagement with Italy once again to secure an autonomous Amazigh region within the territory of the Tripolitanian Republic. However, Italy suspected alBaruni of wishing to establish an independent Imamate and banished him from Tripolitania. He would spend the next two decades in exile following developments in Tripolitania from abroad until his death in 1940. 13 Even though al-Baruni had cooperated with Arab notables throughout his career, commitment to pan-Islamic solidarity as well as Tripolitanian and Amazigh self-determination Angelo Del Boca, Mohamed Fekini and the Fight to Free Libya (London, 2010), pp. 33–34. 12 Peterson, “Arab Nationalism”, p. 129, Baldinetti, Origins of the Libyan Nation, pp. 43, 57–58 and Del Boca, Mohamed Fekini, pp. 62–63. 13 Peterson, “Arab Nationalism”, pp. 129–130, 132, 135. 11

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shaped his political goals much more significantly than Arab nationalism. In exile, al-Baruni remained hostile to the Italian colonial regime and praised efforts to encourage international solidarity amongst Muslim and Arab peoples when he thought it would benefit the Tripolitanian resistance. 14 By contrast, within Tripolitania, the Italians had successfully exploited tribal and religious divisions amongst Imazighen and Arabs to break up the resistance movement. Several Amazigh notables had even come to support the Italian colonial regime. One prominent example was Yusuf Cherbisc. During World War I, Cherbisc along with several other Amazigh leaders had accepted arms and provision from Italy to fight against Arab supporters of the Ottoman resistance. After the war, Cherbisc and his followers helped the Italians to crush the resistance movement and pacify Tripolitania. When Mussolini visited Libya in 1937, Cherbisc handed him the ‘sword of Islam’ and pledged the loyalty of Libya’s Muslims to Fascist Italy. When news of this event reached Tripolitanian Arab exiles, it confirmed in their eyes the treachery of the Imazighen in selling out their resistance movement. 15 Thus, despite the efforts of al-Baruni, Arabs would come to regard Amazigh contributions to the Tripolitanian resistance as mixed at best.

THE AMAZIGH, WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH

Shortly after World War II broke out, Sulayman al-Baruni declared his opposition to Italy and offered his aid to France. He would die before France made an official reply in the form of an invitation to attend a meeting of the main leaders of the Tripolitanian exile community in Algiers. 16 However, other members of the al-Baruni family would soon show up on the margins of the Allied war effort. Isa al-Baruni was the nephew of Sulayman al-Baruni. He had gone into exile with his uncle after the latter’s struggle against Italian Baldinetti, Origins of the Libyan Nation, pp. 94, 96–97, 102. Del Boca, Mohamed Fekini, pp. 57–58, 68, 114–116, 118–119, 150. 16 Peterson, “Arab Nationalism”, p. 134 and Baldinetti, Origins of the Libyan Nation, p. 109. 14 15

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colonization failed. While in exile, Isa al-Baruni had secured amnesty from the Italians and returned to Tripolitania. Upon his return, the Italians conscripted him into their army where he fought until his capture by the British at Sidi Barrani in December 1940. After his capture, he provided intelligence to British forces and volunteered his services to British intelligence organizations such as the Inter-Services Liaison Department (ISLD, the cover name for MI6 in the Middle East) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE, which often went under the cover name MO4 in the Middle East), which were engaged in subversive activities in Tripolitania. 17 In Spring 1942, SOE organized the Tripolitanian Committee with the idea that it could facilitate contacts with influential sheikhs in Tripolitania and encourage their support for the British war effort behind enemy lines to the benefit of ISLD as well as other secret organizations. 18 SOE provided the members, including Isa alBaruni, with a stipend and a villa. The Tripolitanian Committee remained active until the Spring of 1943, when Britain occupied Tripolitania. 19 On the eve of Britain’s occupation, members of the Committee attempted to forge a rapprochement with Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi, the leader of the Sanusi Order, the most notable Cyrenaican exile in Egypt and the future King of Libya, who had been in cooperation with the British since the beginning of the war. In 1940, when Idris had attempted to raise a guerilla force of Libyan exiles to support the British war effort, members of the committee had refused to support him, but in late 1942 they hoped to secure his support for a united independent Libya that would bring both WO 230/161, 38, Lt. Colonel J. N. D. Anderson to Commissioner of Police, Tripolitania, 21st March, 1943. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 18 WO 230/137, 4, ---- to J. N. D. Anderson, 10th April, 1942. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. WO 230/147, 5, J. N. D. Anderson to ------, I.S.L.D., 11th April, 1942. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 19 WO 230/161, 39, Lt. Colonel J. N. D. Anderson to CCAO, 20th March 1943. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. WO 230/161, 40, Lt. Colonel J. N. D. Anderson to VCFA, 23rd March 1943. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 17

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Cyrenaica and Tripolitania under his leadership. While Britain had pledged that Cyrenaica would not return to Italy, they had made no such promises about Tripolitania. In response to the Committee’s overture, Idris attempted both to placate the Committee and avoid further entanglement with them. He suggested that he already enjoyed some level of official recognition from Tripolitanians and that the most appropriate way for the Committee to express their grievances was to approach the British Administration themselves. 20 When the Tripolitanian Committee disbanded in 1943, the members attempted to leverage their influence with the British for various personal and political causes. Isa al-Baruni received permission to return to Tripolitania and obtained a job in the British Military Administration. 21 The other non-Amazigh members who remained in Egypt sought to lobby the British Administration to support Tripolitanian aspirations to self-determination with the patronage of the Egyptian Senator from the Wafd Party, Lamlum Pasha, who had enjoyed a long-term connection with the Libyan exiles. 22 Sensing they were making no progress with Idris or Britain, the rump of the Committee went on several months later accompanied by Lamlum Pasha to meet with Nahas Pasha, the Prime Minister of Egypt, and request that Tripolitania be included in post-war discussions about Arab unity. 23 This positive orientation towards Arab self-determination and Pan-Arabism would soon emerge as a key characteristic in the political thought of Tripolitanian exiles in Egypt, whether Amazigh or Arab. FO 141/869, 179/1/43, JND Anderson, Minute to CPO, 2nd January 1943. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 21 WO 230/161, 38, J. N. D. Anderson to Commissioner of Police Tripolitania, 21st March, 1943. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. WO 230/161, 286, D. L. Stephens, Minute, September 8, 1944. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 22 FO 141/869, 179/14/43, J. N. D. Anderson to I. N. Clayton, 11th October 1943. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. For Lamlum Pasha see Baldinetti, Origins of the Libyan Nation, pp. 65, 74. 23 FO 141/866/149/159/43, J. N. D. Anderson to Burrows, 10th November 1943. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 20

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The Tripolitanian exiles in Egypt along with the rump of the disbanded Tripolitanian Committee stayed relatively quiet during 1944, but reemerged in the Spring of 1945 under the name of the Tripoli-Cyrenaica Defence Committee with another member of the prominent al-Baruni family, ‘Abd al-Qasem al-Baruni, taking part. The revamped organization featured a notable Cyrenaican supporter of Sayyid Idris, Ali Pasha al-Obeidi, as President and Lamlum Pasha as honorary President. The initial platform of the group was fairly general, but decidedly anti-Italian and Pan-Arab. It called for the independence of Tripoli-Cyrenaica, the incorporation of the new state into any future Arab Federation and the solicitation of economic aid from Egypt. The group proposed to hold regular meetings and did have a degree of success in getting its cause as a non-member state on the agenda of the nascent Arab League. When the League held its inaugural meeting on March 22, 1945, it promised diplomatic support for Tripolitanian and Cyrenaican political aspirations. 24 By the Spring of 1946, a split seems to have occurred in the Tripolitanian-Cyrenaican coalition with a breakaway group of Tripolitanian exiles including ‘Abd al-Qasem al-Baruni calling themselves the Tripolitanian Defence Committee. This splinter group issued a series of memorandums outlining their own vision in March 1946. The group remained Arab nationalist in orientation and differed little from the previous committee in its official platform: full independence of Tripoli-Cyrenaica between the borders of Egypt and Tunis and membership in the Arab League. However, there was more focus on the particular Tripolitanian struggle for independence against Italian colonialism with an attempt to portray it as the quintessential Arab struggle. In one memo, the group characterized the early native governments of Tripolitanian from 1911 to 1922, including the Tripolitanian Republic, anachronistically as “Arab National bodies”. 25 A further statement from the group FO 371/50792, U6517/51/70, 27, 47, The Senussi and Tripolitania, 23rd August, 1945. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 25 WO 230/199, 93–97, Memorandum on the Subject of the Question of Tripolitania, Tripolitanian Defence Committee [in Egypt], ca. March 1946. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 24

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hailed the Tripolitanian struggle for independence as “the most outstanding carried out by an Arab Nation during the twentieth century” and called on Tripolitanians to “remember that you are above all things Arabs”. 26 Although ‘Abd al-Qasem al-Baruni was an Amazigh notable, his political views reflected the current popularity of Arab nationalist ideology amongst Tripolitanian exiles living in Egypt. In early October 1946, Lamlum Pasha attempted to reform the Tripoli-Cyrenaica Defence Committee under his own direct leadership and invited ‘Abd al-Qasem al-Baruni amongst others to a special meeting in Cairo. While the Amazigh notable attended, he and several other Tripolitanian colleagues were not impressed by the political direction Lamlum Pasha proposed. The major sticking point was Lamlum Pasha’s insistence that a united, independent Libya would inevitably take the form of an Amirate under the leadership of Sayyid Idris. Al-Baruni and his fellow Tripolitanian exiles did not agree with this view and made a decisive break with Lamlum Pasha after the meeting. They rejected Idris’ fitness to rule over a united Libya and called for a revival of the Tripolitanian Republic as an alternative system of rule. 27 By September 1946 they had formed a group of their own, which they called the Libyan Committee, and began circulating their views. They called the British Military Administration “tyrannical”, highlighted republican government as the most suitable for a united Libya, and proposed Arab League Trusteeship over the territory as an interim measure. 28 They were clearly skeptical about Britain’s partnership with Sayyid Idris and feared that Cyrenaican independence under Idris would mean the return of Tripolitanian subjugation to Italy. WO 230/199, 99–101, A Statement by the Tripolitanian Committee in Egypt, ca. March 1946. 27 WO 230/199, 146–149, A Report on the Re-Forming of the Cyrenaican-Tripolitanian Defence Committee, C. E. Greatorex, 24th October, 1946. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 28 WO 230/199, 154–159, Report Submitted by the Libyan Committee in Cairo to the Arab League and Moslem Circles with Regard to the Libyan Case and British Actions in Libya, September 1946. National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 26

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In Tripolitania itself, other Amazigh notables were more willing to consider Libyan independence under the leadership of Idris. Ibrahim Sha‘aban came from a prominent Amazigh family and became involved in a coalition of Arabs, Imazighen and Jews known as the Tripolitania Defence Committee in the Spring of 1946. 29 In response to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s apparent abandonment of his commitment to independence for a united Libya at the Council of Foreign Minister’s Conference, the Defence Committee issued a telegram to be communicated directly to Bevin. The Defence Committee claimed to be composed of Tripolitanians of “all parties” and “factions” and urged Bevin not to renege on his past promise of independence to Libyans. 30 Shortly after issuing the telegram, the Defence Committee morphed into the United National Front and attracted support from members of the Nationalist Party in Tripolitania. It sought British support to secure the unification of an independent territory comprising both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica under the leadership of Idris and Sha‘aban became one of its leading figures. It drew its appeal largely from Tripolitanian notables, tribal sheikhs and influential traders. This widespread appeal was short-lived. Soon after its birth the United National Front lost the support of the Nationalist Party because of a disagreement over leadership. 31 However, it remained engaged in political debate. In January 1947, Sha‘aban accompanied a United National Front party delegation to Benghazi to meet with the members of the Cyrenaican Front to discuss grounds of cooperation. As a matter of priority, the Tripolitanians requested that the Cyrenaicans reject any settlement of their territory that did not include Tripolitania, but the Cyrenaicans refused and negotiations stalled. 32 In May 1948, the United National Front Baldinetti, Origins of the Libyan Nation, p. 118. Sha‘aban’s group is not to be confused with the multiple iterations of the Tripolitanian Committee discussed above which was based in Egypt. 30 FO 371/57180, U5618/106/70, Telegram for Mr. Bevin, [May 1946], National Archives, Kew Gardens, Britain. 31 Baldinetti, Origins of the Libyan Nation, pp. 118–119. 32 Baldinetti, Origins of the Libyan Nation, pp. 123, 187. 29

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experienced internal conflict ejecting several of its leading members including Sha‘aban for harboring overly pro-Italian sympathies. 33 However, Sha‘aban would survive the purge and reemerge shortly thereafter as one of the leading independent Amazigh notables engaged in Libyan politics. On November 21st, 1949, the United Nations took responsibility for steering Libya towards independence after a General Assembly resolution passed with British support. 34 One of the first tasks for the UN Commissioner and his international cadre of advisers was to establish a committee of twenty-one Libyan representatives from Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan to advise him. This committee would lay the groundwork for the establishment of the first Libyan National Assembly, which would deliberate on the country’s constitution. Ultimately, two Imazighen made it onto the committee, Ibrahim Sha‘aban who had been recommended by the British Military Administration and Sheikh Abu-Rabi‘ al-Baruni, a member of the National Congress of Tripolitania and Judge of the Shari‘a Court of Appeal in Tripoli, who had received the unanimous support of the five main political parties in Tripolitania. 35 Subsequently, Sha‘aban became a representative for Tripolitania in the country’s first National Assembly and also Minister of Communications in Libya’s first provisional national government under the monarchy of Idris in 1951. 36 One observer noted during this time that with independence came a distinct emphasis “on the Arabic character of Libya”. 37 Although Libya’s federal structure Ibid., pp. 130–132, 189. William Roger Louis, “Libyan Independence, 1951: The Creation of a Client State”, in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, eds., Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfer of Power, 1960–1980 (New Haven, CT, 1988), pp. 170–171. 35 The National Congress Party favored a united, independent Libya under the leadership of Idris. Adrian Pelt, Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization (New Haven, CT, 1970), pp. 180, 276–280, 282. 36 Ibid., pp. 300 and 734. 37 Majid Khadduri, Modern Libya: A Study in Political Development (Baltimore, 1963), p. 6. 33 34

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was an anomaly in the region, other aspects of the state were heavily indebted to Arab nationalist ideals forged in the eastern portion of the Arab world. Even though Libya under Idris remained wary of Egyptian influence and schemes for pan-Arab unity, which simply seemed to portend subordination to Egypt, its cultural identification with the Mashriq set a precedent for other North African countries such as Algeria and Morocco that also possessed significant Amazigh minorities and had yet to attain formal independence. Libya’s first constitution, which Sha‘aban helped to mold, defined the Libyan state explicitly in Arab and Islamic terms. The constitution declared Islam to be the official religion of the state and Arabic the official language. While citizens were free to use other languages in private transactions or religious or cultural ventures, Arabic would remain the sole recognized language of the new state. 38 In the 1940s and 1950s, the Imazighen most active at the highest echelons of Libyan politics adapted to the dominant Arab nationalist rhetoric of the period by adopting it as their own. This marked a genuine contrast with Sulayman al-Baruni’s earlier prioritization of Tripolitanian patriotism, Amazigh nationalism and pan-Islamism. However, some elements of Sulayman al-Baruni’s politics remained amongst the Amazigh elite. Sha‘aban may have supported the Arabization of the state, but he also worked to protect Tripolitania’s regional prerogatives within Libya’s federal structure. During Mustafa Bin Halim’s tenure as Prime Minister from 1954 to 1957, Sha‘aban served both as Minister of Education and Defense. In exchange for a pledge of support for King Idris’s plan to renew a lucrative lease of land to the American Air Force, an initiative backed by Prime Minister Bin Halim, Sha‘aban and three other Tripolitanian cabinet members insisted on the transferal of Libya’s government from Benghazi to Tripoli. Ultimately, Bin Halim followed through with his Tripolitanian cabinet member’s request taking the issue to the King. 39 Ismail Khalidi, Constitutional Development in Libya (Beirut, 1956), pp. 7, 73, 76–78, 98–99. 39 Khadduri, Modern Libya, pp. 246, 256, 287. 38

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According to outside observers, during the early decades of Libyan independence, the Imazighen seemed to be growing in influence, but also losing some distinctive aspects of their linguistic and cultural traditions in the process. The American anthropologist Louis Duprée, who would later make his name as an expert on Afghanistan, visited Libya in the 1950s and conducted a study of the Amazigh community. He suggested that the Amazigh had grown in political power and influence because of their contributions to Tripolitania’s fight for independence over the course of many years. He also noted their recent success in buying land from their Arab neighbors, which he predicted would increase their economic clout considerably. By his count there were approximately 40,000 Imazighen in the Jabal Nafusa who still spoke primarily in the Tamazight dialect, though many were fluent in both Tamazight and Arabic. 40 While this was not necessarily a sign of Amazigh assimilation or even integration, it was certainly an indication of Amazigh engagement with Libya’s Arab orientation. A little over a decade after Duprée’s visit to Libya, American Foreign Service officer and expert in North African affairs, Frank Golino, made similar observations about the Libyan Amazigh community. He noted that while the Imazighen tended to speak their own dialect “in their homes and among themselves,” they spoke exclusively in Arabic with nonImazighen. 41 As a result, he found that Libyan Imazighen had lost facility in their own alphabet relying instead on the Arabic script when writing. 42

THE AMAZIGH UNDER QADDAFI (1969–2011)

Despite vast changes in other respects, the Arabizing tendency of Libya’s rulers continued even after the abolition of the monarchy further marginalizing Amazigh language and culture. In September 1969, an upstart Tripolitanian military officer, Mu’ammar Qaddafi, Louis Duprée, “Non-Arab Ethnic Groups of Libya”, Middle East Journal, 12 (1958), pp. 33–44. 41 Frank Ralph Golino, “Patterns of Libyan National Identity”, Middle East Journal, 24, 3 (1970), p. 344. 42 Ibid., p. 344. 40

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overthrew the lethargic regime of King Idris with the help of fellow servicemen. Like many of Qaddafi’s positions towards domestic, regional and international issues, Qaddafi’s treatment of Amazigh in Libya was highly erratic. On the one hand, there was a complete denial of their own existence; as far as Qaddafi was concerned they were Arabs and Libya was composed only of Arab people. On the other hand, there were a few attempts to promote Amazigh folklore in the country. Just a few years before the launch of the Libyan Revolution of 17 February 2011 that overthrew the Qaddafi’s regime, the government proceeded to restore a number of Amazigh as well as Roman architectural sites, an action mainly directed at the foreign tourists who were starting to visit the country. Nonetheless, such actions could be perceived as a form of official recognition of non-Arabs within the state. Qaddafi’s model at the early stages of his political career was Gamal Abdul Nasser, the Arab nationalist icon who had himself led a military coup to overthrow Egypt’s monarchy decades earlier in 1952. 43 Following Nasser’s inspiration, Qaddafi drew on PanArab ideology as he attempted not just to emphasize Libya’s Arab identity as Idris had done, but also to forge closer political links between Libya and the Arab east in the 1970s. 44 For almost four decades of Qaddafi’s rule, the Amazigh, as a group, were denied their basic political rights and civil liberties. The Qaddafi regime engaged in a forced program of Arabization to ensure that Libya was monolithic with no place for either ethnic or religious cleavages. Arabic, as far as the Libyan leader was concerned, was the language spoken in Libya, while Tamazight, when acknowledged, was described as a dialect only. Furthermore, given Qaddafi’s hostility towards everything that either challenged his ideology or threatened his grip on power, he tried to enforce the idea that the Amazigh were originally Arabs. According to Qaddafi, the Berber

43

79–81.

Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya (Cambridge, 2006), pp.

Marius K. Deeb and Mary-Jane Deeb, Libya Since the Revolution: Aspects of Social and Political Development (Westport, CT, 1982), pp. 126–138. 44

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were those people who come to Libya by land (Barr). 45 Therefore, the Berber were those people who originally came from today’s Saudi Arabia to bring Islam to North Africa, including Libya. Hence, Qaddafi saw the Amazigh question as simply a product of Western imperialism whose goal was to create instability and divide the country. Accordingly, he conceived of Libyans in strict terms as Sunni Muslim Arabs following the Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence. The emphasis on the Arab nature of the state can be clearly seen from two very important documents that characterized Qaddafi’s years in power. The first is the Constitutional Declaration proclaimed in September 1969 soon after Qaddafi succeeded in overthrowing King Idris. The document clearly stipulated that Libya was an “Arab” country and that “Arabic” was the official language of the country. The Amazigh minority criticised these stipulations, seeing them as a form of discrimination against their community. 46 Similarly, The Declaration of the Establishment of the Authority of the People, of March 2, 1977, which replaced the Constitutional Declaration, placed emphasis on “Arab” as the main and defining feature of Libya. Indeed, the new name adopted for the country, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, sent an unmistakable message that Libya was Arab. While it is true that the Qaddafi regime was instrumental in ensuring that Libya was an Arab country, identification with PanArab unity movements existed in Libya well before Qaddafi took over power in Tripoli. In an interview with Youcef Bouandel, a member of the Free Officer Movement that led the coup d’état against the monarchy stressed that the 1967 Arab defeat against Barr is Arabic for land and Bahr is the Arabic word for sea. Thanks to Youcef Bouandel’s former Ph.D. student, Ali Harhour, for bringing this point to our attention. 46 Focus group discussion conducted by Youcef Bouandel with several postgraduate Libyan students at Lincoln University, England, June 2005. The word that some students used was “exclusion”. With the Libya portraying itself as an Arab country and identifying its language as Arabic, the Imazighen who did not saw themselves as Arab felt excluded from Libyan society. 45

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Israel was the catalyst for their “revolution”. He stated that they “decided to overthrow the monarchy to achieve two main objectives. The first was Arab unity and the second was the liberation of Palestine from Zionist occupation”. 47 Thus, Arab identity had been a prominent feature not only in the new Libyan leadership’s thinking, but in that of several regimes that came to power in other countries in the Arab world, such as the Baath party in both Damascus and Baghdad. The new Libyan leadership’s thinking was very much influenced by the late Egyptian leader Nasser, one of the biggest advocates of Pan-Arabism. Qaddafi not only saw him as his role model, but saw himself as Nasser’s rightful heir. Hence for the first two decades of his rule, Qaddafi was one the staunchest supporters of Arab unity and tried to enter into bilateral unions with every single country in North Africa, from Egypt in the East to Morocco in the West. 48 This period saw a Pan-Arab euphoria that spanned from Baghdad to Algiers. Therefore, it was no coincidence that Libya, in trying to rebuild its educational system after colonial rule, relied heavily on Arabic-language books and Arab teachers, particularly from Egypt, who played a pivotal role in shaping Libyans’ thinking by emphasising the Arab character of the country. 49 Youcef Bouandel interview with a member of the Free Officers Movement, Tripoli, Libya, May 2005. 48 Since coming to power in 1969, Qaddafi proposed union with Egypt, entered into a union with Tunisia in 1974, proposed unions with Algeria and entered into a union with Morocco in 1984. Abdelhamid Brahimi, former Prime Minister of Algeria 1984–1988, assured Youcef Bouandel that during a high level meeting in 1984 with Qaddafi, the latter proposed a union with Algeria and stressed that the then Algerian president Bendjedid would be president of this newly created entity and that Brahimi would keep his post as Prime Minister. 49 Focus group discussion conducted by Youcef Bouandel with several postgraduate Libyan students at Lincoln University, England, June 2005. Given Libya’s proximity to Egypt and its relative dependence on Egyptian expertise in several areas, including education, the Libyan curriculum was modelled on the Egyptian curriculum and Egyptian teachers emphasized the Arabness of Libya in their class-room. 47

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Qaddafi’s relentless effort to ensure that Libya was Arab was further enhanced by the introduction of the Al Thawra Al Thaqafiya (the Cultural Revolution) in the late 1970s, which portrayed Libya’s Arab and Islamic heritage as the foundation of Libyan society. It was during this period that any books as well as any publications that were deemed reactionary were simply burnt. Furthermore, in the mid-1980s, Western musical instruments were burnt because, according to the Libyan Official news agency, JANA, they contributed to “the distortion of our genuine Arab culture and heritage”. 50 Attacks on Amazigh activists, especially Libya’s first Amazigh Association founded in the early 1970s (Rabitat Shamal Afriqiyia) were increased and its members persecuted because they were deemed to have created a political party. Qaddafi was extraordinarily skeptical about the value of political institutions mediating relations between the state and the people. In his Green Book, Qaddafi not only banned political parties but went as far as stating men tahazab khan (who ever joined a political party was a traitor). In his thinking, parties were a threat to national unity and anybody who did not adhere to the teaching of the Green Book and did not share the leader’s vision was engaged in treason. While the Green Book gave lip service to the idea of minority rights, on balance, it placed much more emphasis on the integration of society into a unified and undifferentiated whole. Aisha Al-Rumi, a pseudonym of a UKbased scholar whose research focus on Libya’s contemporary history stated that “until 2007, a controversial law banned Berbers from giving newborns Berber names and forced children with Amazigh names to adopt traditional Arabic names to register for schools”. 51 Associated Press, “Burn Western Musical Instruments that Distort Culture”, Associated Press, June 2 1985, accessed February 11, 2015, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1985/Burn-Western-Musical-Instrum ents-That-Distort-Culture/id-81d834722e5c10f0e62eea52929b4b4e. 51 Aisha Al-Rumi, “Libyan Berbers struggle to assert their identity online”, Arab Media and Society, 8 (Spring 2009), p. 4, accessed August 5, 2016, http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=713. It should be pointed out that there was a similar practice in Algeria where the government made a list of names available in every town hall in 50

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It is clear Qaddafi viewed Libya’s social or national identity in primarily Arab terms. 52 The “Berber Spring” of 1980 in Algeria sparked a new period of global Amazigh activism, but because of Qaddafi’s repressive policies, Libyan Imazighen were relatively slow to mobilize. 53 While Libyan delegates did manage to attend the first Amazigh World Congress in the Canary Islands in 1997, they risked incurring sanctions on return to their home country. 54 These delegates also seemed to convey a sense of isolation in their activities. An observer to the conference noted that “contrary to the situation in Algeria and Morocco, it is not possible to discern an Amazigh movement in the other Maghreb states and nations. There, the preservation of the Amazigh language and culture is rather a matter of individual commitment”. 55 In fact, Qaddafi used multiple tactics, including assassination, to silence his critics and opponents. Hence, when security agents arrested at least 50 Amazigh activists in the Jabal Nafusa in April 1980 for allegedly forming a secret Amazigh organization, called Nadi El Barouni (El Barouni’s Club), the Imazighen community was quick to point the finger of blame towards Qaddafi for specifically targeting members of their community. 56 However, Qaddafi did not single-out the Amazigh community for such treatment. He neither differentiated between Amazigh and Arab nor between moderate and radical Muslim. What mattered to Qaddafi was not strictly ethnic or religious affiliation, but loyalty. Those who were persecuted received this treatment simply because they dared to oppose his system and question his ideology. The basis of the country. Parents are allowed to register their newborns from the names on that list. 52 Deeb and Deeb, Libya Since the Revolution, pp. 126–138. 53 Willis, “The Politics of Berber (Amazigh) Identity”, p. 231. 54 Gabi Kratochwil, “Some Observations on the First Amazigh World Congress (August 27–30, 1997, Tafira, Canary Islands)”, Die Welt des Islams, 39, 2 (1999), p. 155. 55 Ibid., p. 155. 56 Youcef Baoundel interview with Raki El Shaheibi, Lincoln, England, March 2008.

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their opposition to his rule, whether Amazigh or Arab, secular or Islamic, was of little, if any, relevance. In 2000, Libyan Amazigh exiles took bold steps to reenergize and equip Amazigh activists within Libya. They established the Libyan Tamazight Congress in London, made resources concerning Tamazight language and culture more widely available on the internet and began to demand constitutional recognition of Tamazight as an official state language. In the wake of these initiatives, the Amazigh issue finally came to a head in 2004. Following Qaddafi’s declaration to the United Nations (UN) that Libya was a homogenous Arab country, Amazigh activists in Europe provided the UN’s Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) with a formal alternative account. This alternative report prompted the UN to press Qaddafi’s regime to formally acknowledge the presence of the Amazigh within the state. 57 While many of Qaddafi’s fundamental convictions about national identity remained the same as they had been in the 1970s, he surprisingly showed a willingness to rethink his approach to the Amazigh component of Libyan identity for a time. 58 He met with a number of international Amazigh activists in 2005 and 2006 and, with the backing of his increasingly influential son, Saif al-Islam, lifted the long-term ban on the use of Amazigh names. However, he soon back-pedaled in 2007 and made comments insisting that European colonialists had invented the notion of Amazigh identity to suppress Arab attempts at self-determination. Once again, Qaddafi’s inflammatory claims served to stimulate international mobilization amongst Amazigh activists who used the opportunity to draw attention to the poor treatment of the Imazighen in Libya. In response, Qaddafi relented once more giving official sanction to an Amazigh conference in Tripoli and approving development projects for the Jabal Nafusa. Still, despite some apparent progress at the national level, Amazigh activists in Libya remained subject to threats of violence from Qaddafi supporters for their activities. 59 Maddy-Weitzman, Berber Identity Movement, pp. 139–140. Qadhafi in Muammar Gaddafi [sic] and Edmond Jouve, My Vision (London, 2005), pp. 47–48. 59 Maddy-Weitzman, Berber Identity Movement, pp. 140–143. 57 58

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THE AMAZIGH AFTER QADDAFI (2011–PRESENT)

Given the treatment that the Imazighen have been subjected to for over forty years of Qaddafi’s rule, it is not surprising that they not only joined the 17 February Revolution, but also played a very important role in his downfall. In fact, Amazigh activists considered support of the Revolution a duty. 60 The Revolution offered the Amazigh a golden opportunity not only to get rid of Qaddafi and his regime, but also to establish their long and cherished aspirations. They believed that once Qaddafi was no longer in power, their distinctive identity as “Berbers” would be recognized and they would become an important element in the fabric of the new Libyan society. At the least, they anticipated making similar gains to those of their compatriots in neighbouring countries such as Algeria and Morocco, where the “Berbers” enjoyed more rights. In the 1989 Algerian Constitution, the Algerian society for instance, is defined as reposing on three pillars, Arabness, Berberness and Islam. This prospect of progress gave Amazigh activists in Libya a decisive impetus in the fight against the Qaddafi regime and it became quickly apparent that their role in the Revolution was vital to its overall success. 61 However, once Qaddafi was killed in October 2011 and the revolutionary forces proclaimed success, the solidarity that united the diverse revolutionary forces in the country swiftly broke down leading to a troubled transitional period. The Libyan political scene deteriorated drastically by the middle of 2014 after retired General Khalifa Haftar declared war on Islamist groups, rapidly pushing the country into a civil war. Consequently, Libya ended up with two rival governments, two parliaments, two armies and numerous militia groups with no identified political allegiance. In light of this brief overview, this section aims to highlight the role of the Libyan Amazigh in their country’s political development since the start of the Revolution in early 2011 until the present day, with particular emphasis on the extent to which they have been successful in achieving the full satisfaction of their demands. Youcef Bouandel interview, Doha, November, 2014. Jeremy Bowen, The Arab Uprisings: The People Want the Fall of the Regime (London, 2012), pp. 147–148. 60 61

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As the Libyan Revolution built momentum by winning increasing support across the country and attracting heavy international attention, Qaddafi’s regime resorted to ruthless violence as it launched a battle to the death against the rebels. The Berbers were critical players in this battle, fighting rigorously for months without break. The Jabal Nafusa region became an enduring witness to the considerable price the Amazigh willingly paid to topple Qaddafi. The Nafusa region, a historic enclave for the Amazigh, formed “the third front in a three-pronged resistance movement against the rule of Muammar Gaddafi”. 62 The fierce battles began between the regime’s forces and the Berbers following the spread of bilingual online videos – in Arabic and Tamazight (the Berbers’ language) – where Amazigh anti-regime fighters “pledged allegiance to rebel leaders in the eastern city of Benghazi”. 63 In response, Colonel Qaddafi sent troops to the Nafusa Mountains to curb the revolt in the region and force rebellious towns into submission. For weeks these towns came under continuous heavy bombardment with Grad rockets fired by the regime into residential areas. 64 However, the Amazigh showed no sign of giving in as they set their eyes on a Libya without Qaddafi; a Libya where their culture would be restored and their language would acquire similar status to Arabic in a new constitution. 65 The Amazigh rebellion against Qaddafi’s regime was part of a larger cultural and linguistic Amazigh awakening, which coalesced in the northwestern part of Libya, particularly in the town of Moez Zeiton, “In liberated Libya in the year 2961”, The Guardian, August 6, 2011, accessed October 8, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2011/aug/06/libya-berber-amazagh. 63 John Thorne, “Libya’s Berbers seek their revenge on Qaddafi”, The National, May 30, 2011, accessed August 13, 2013, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa/libyas-berbers-seek-theirrevenge-on-qaddafi#ixzz2buVyyFtf. 64 Ibid. 65 Matt Robinson, “Libya’s mountain Berber see opportunity in war”, Reuters, May 26, 2011, accessed September 28, 2013, http:// http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/26/libya-berber-idUKLDE74O 19G20110526. 62

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Yafran, and quickly spread across the country and beyond. Once the Revolution erupted and rebel groups joined forces in different areas, Amazigh leaders made their aspirations to become active contributors to the formation of a more culturally and politically inclusive Libya clear. They framed their vision in “a set of public demands for a post-conflict Libya”. 66 Politically speaking, the Imazighen sought “a parliamentary democracy based on a constitution grounded in tolerance and respect for human rights”. 67 The National Amazigh Libyan Conference (NALC), which gathered all local councils of the Imazighen of Libya, launched a “public campaign to get Amazigh rights and language enshrined in Libya's new constitution”. 68 In the meantime, the Imazighen worked on strengthening their social presence by reviving their cultural heritage and their language. For example, broadcasting from the state of Qatar – a strong supporter of the Libyan rebels – the Revolution’s Libyan television channel carried news broadcasts in Tamazight to reach out to the Amazigh community domestically and abroad, while the Imazighen of Jadu planned to start up a radio station in Tamazight. 69 The launch of Amazigh-oriented media with a prime focus on achieving public recognition and the reestablishment of Amazigh culture and language significantly strengthened the cultural and C. J. Chivers, “Amid a Berber Reawakening in Libya, Fears of Revenge”, New York Times, August 8, 2011, accessed September 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/world/africa/09berbers.html?_r=0. 67 Ibid. 68 M. S. Tahi, “Statement by the Libyan National Amazigh Congress”, Tamazgha, November 26, 2011, accessed December 28, 2014, http://tamazgha.fr/Libya-CNAL-statment.html and Sarah A. Topol, “Berber Revival’s First Big Sell: Convince Libyans They’re All Berbers”, The Atlantic, November 3, 2011, accessed August 13, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/berberrevivals-first-big-sell-convince-libyans-theyre-all-berbers/249100/. 69 Matt Robinson, “Libya’s mountain Berber see opportunity in war”, Reuters, May 26, 2011, accessed September 28, 2013, http:// http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/26/libya-berber-idUKLDE74O1 9G20110526. 66

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linguistic awakening amongst Libyan Imazighen after the fall of Qaddafi. 70 The Imazighen of the Jabal Nafusa for instance produced “several publications in Tamazight, such as the Yafran Times and Tagrmas”. 71 Simultaneously, some Imazighen have openly challenged the “accepted” Arab nationalist conception of Libyan identity as “an Arab-majority-nation”, claiming that “most Libyans are actually Berber, but have forgotten their original language and culture”. 72 These strong statements reflected not only the pain that the Imazighen felt under Qaddafi’s regime as well as their disenchantment with Arab nationalist ideology, but also their desire to ensure that their heritage be officially recognised in the new Libya. Yet, despite Amazigh contributions to the revolution, these statements did not find universal acceptance. Some Libyans believed that the Imazighen were puppets in the hands of sinister foreign agents trying to take Libya away from its proper place within the Arab world and/or attempting to divide Libya into a number of smaller entities. 73 In any case, the Imazighen engaged in a number of activities carried out by different groups whose aim was to achieve the revival and restoration of the Amazigh cultural heritage. Hence, the Tira Association for Tamazight Culture and Language took “the first step to teach Libyans about their Amazigh heritage by sending blanket text messages to Libya cell phone networks with Tamazight phrases”. 74 Likewise, the Freedom Mountain group began “restoring old Amazigh houses in Yafran’s historic quarter in Anja Wollenberg and Jason Pack, “Rebels with a pen: observations on the newly emerging media landscape in Libya”, The Journal of North African Studies, 18, 2 (February 2013), pp. 191–210, accessed December 29, 2014, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1362 9387.2013.767197#preview. 71 Ibid. 72 Sarah A. Topol, “For Long-Suppressed Libyan Minority, New Freedom Brings an Identity Crisis”, The Atlantic, 2 December 2, 2011, accessed August 13, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2011/12/for-long-suppressed-libyan-minority-new-freedombrings-an-identity-crisis/249101/. 73 Bouandel interview, Doha, December 2014. 74 Topol, “Berber Revival”. 70

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order to preserve their way of life”. 75 The Imazighen were waging battles for their rights on military, political and cultural fronts concurrently. Broadly speaking, the future for the Imazighen of Libya, especially during the last stages of Qaddafi’s rule, looked promising. The then Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC) – increasingly recognized as the country’s legitimate government amongst the international community – included Amazigh representatives. Furthermore, Libya’s “draft constitutional charter for post-Gaddafi Libya” overtly acknowledged “the country’s diversity, including its Amazigh component”. 76 However, Amazigh optimism after the revolution was short-lived and soon after Qaddafi was killed and Libya declared free, the Imazighen found their aspirations and demands swiftly fading from prominence amidst a volatile and frequently violent transitional phase towards a new Libyan state. The tensions gravely intensified in November 2011 when the 26 appointed ministerial posts, which formed the cabinet of Libya’s new interim Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib, were made public. None of the positions went to a member of the Amazigh community. 77 As a result, hundreds of Imazighen “marched into the courtyard of the Libyan prime minister’s office” to demand better representation and to vent their frustration toward what they perceived to be a complete disregard not only for their invaluable contribution to the revolution but also their status as a significant minority group within the country. 78 In the meantime, “Berber tribesmen reportedly began evicting ‘pro-[Qaddafi]’ Arabs from tracts of land in the Jabal Nafusa on which they had been settled by Ibid. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Libya’s Berbers: The New Factor in Post-Gaddafi Politics”, PJ Media, August 26, 2011, accessed September 28, 2013, http://pjmedia.com/blog/libyas-berbers-the-new-factor-inpost-gaddafi-politics/. 77 Francois Murphy, “Libyan Berbers vent rage over cabinet exclusion”, Reuters, November 27, 2011, accessed October 8, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/27/us-libya-amazigh-protestsidUSTRE7AQ0J420111127. 78 Murphy, “Libyan Berbers”. 75 76

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[Gaddafi]”. 79 The situation deteriorated further at the end of 2011, especially after NTC’s President Mustafa Abdul-Jalil stated on Libya’s al-Ahrar TV that while all Libyans respected Amazigh culture and language, the latter ought to ‘“integrate” into the Libyan society and avoid “exclusion”’. 80 Additionally, clashes frequently erupted between Arab and Amazigh militias who took opposite sides during the 2011 Revolution. 81 Being both heavily armed, with tanks and artillery commonly recovered from defeated Qaddafi troops, the violent clashes often left scores dead and many injured. 82 The political process proved equally frustrating. In early 2012, the Constitutional Rights Forum for the Amazigh of Libya was organized at the Libyan Congress building and attended by key political figures, including the General National Congress (GNC) president Mohamed Magarief. The latter voiced his support for acknowledging Tamazight as an official state language – a critical aim of the forum alongside the “establishment of state-funded institutions to safeguard Amazigh culture and equal rights for all Libya’s ethnic groups”. 83 Nevertheless, Amazigh efforts to include Tamazight as an official Libyan language in the new constitution fell short of expectations. Indeed, whilst Libya’s interim constitutional declaration stated that Tamazight, alongside Libya’s other Sawani and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality”, p. 538. Ibid., p. 538. 81 Associated Press, “Battle Between Rival Libyan Militias Kills at Least 22”, New York Times, April 3, 2012, accessed October 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/world/africa/clash-of-libyanmilitias-kills-at-least-22.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=Berber%20militias&st =cse&. 82 Yahia H. Zoubir and Erzsébet N. Rózsa, “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition”, Third World Quarterly, 33, 7 (July 2012), pp. 1267–1283, accessed December 29, 2014, http://www.tandf online.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2012.691830#preview and Associated Press, “Rival Libyan Militias”. 83 Michel Cousins, “Make Amazigh language official says Magarie”, Libya Herald, January 12, 2013, accessed October 5, 2013, http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/01/12/make-amazigh-languageofficial-says-magarief/#ixzz2gpNZuNfZ. 79 80

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languages, “shall be deemed national ones”, the draft constitution recognized the Arabic language as the sole official language of the country and the Shari‘a as the prime source of legislation. 84 Nonetheless, Libya’s interim parliament “authorized schools to teach [Libya’s minorities’ languages] as optional subjects”. 85 Still, this represented a small concession given broader Amazigh aims. The situation improved temporarily for the Amazigh community when Nouri Abusahmen, a man of Amazigh origin, was elected in June 2013 as head of the General National Congress, thus becoming Libya’s interim leader. 86 However, the optimism that followed was, once again, short-lived and gave way to dissatisfaction and protest. In July 2013, “the law setting up the 60–member commission to draft the country’s new constitution” gave only two seats to Amazigh representatives. 87 The Supreme Amazigh Council quickly rejected the law arguing that two seats “did not guarantee the Berbers’ participation in the drafting of the constitution”. 88 The following month, August 2013, hundreds of Berbers held demonstrations in Tripoli outside the Congress building claiming that the Congress was intentionally “marginalizing Libya’s linguistic minoriTim Hume, “A rebirth of Berber culture in post-Gadhafi Libya”, CNN, September 3, 2012, accessed December 9, 2014, http://edition. cnn.com/2012/09/03/world/meast/libya-berber-amazigh-renaissance/ and Maddy-Weitzman, “Libya’s Berbers”. 85 John Thorne, “Libyan Berbers pipe up after decades of forced silence”, Christian Science Monitor, March 23, 2014, accessed December 20, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0323/Lib yan-Berbers-pipe-up-after-decades-of-forced-silence. 86 BBC, “Libya assembly elects Berber Nouri Abusahmen as head”, BBC World, June 25 2013, accessed August 4, 2016, http://www.bbc. com/news/world-africa-23054267. 87 Ines Kohl, “Libya’s ‘Major Minorities’. Berber, Tuareg and Tebu: Multiple Narratives of Citizenship, Language and Border Control”, Middle East Critique 23, 4 (November 2014), p. 423, accessed December 17, 2014, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19436149.2014.970384?j ournalCode=ccri20#preview. 88 Ibid., p. 423 84

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ties”. 89 The protestors demanded, among other things, that the government ensure “more job opportunities for Amazigh youth in Sebha, Murzuk, Ghat, and Obari”, and “complete[s] the registration procedures of Amazigh enabling them to obtain their National Identity Number so as to be able to vote like other Libyans”. 90 The situation was similar, if not more distressing, in western Libya after Amazigh activists cut a gas pipeline that supplied several power stations in late September to demand constitutional rights. 91 Furthermore, by early November, the Imazighen residing in the Jabal Nafusa began staging protests for self-rule following “the heels of the declaration of self-government made by ethnic groups in east Libya”. 92 In general, seeing their seemingly certain marginalization in a normal democracy, Amazigh activists diverted toward different political alternatives. Some activists called for “a consensus based system with a veto right”, while others opposed the existing government altogether “favoring a federal system that devolves regional powers”. 93 These declarations only served to fuel the already volatile situation and confirm the suspicions held by some Libyans that the Amazigh question was a first step on the slippery slope towards national disintegration. 94 Ibid., p. 423. Ahmed Elumami, “Amazighs demand language, cultural and voting rights”, Libya Herald, June 26, 2013, accessed October 5, 2013, http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/06/26/amazighs-demand-languagecultural-and-voting-rights/#ixzz2gpMv5e17. 91 Middle East Online, “Berbers keep pressure on Libya government”, Middle East Online, October 1, 2013, accessed August 4, 2016, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=61705. 92 Karlos Zurutuza, “Benghazi ‘self-rule’ resonates with Berbers”, Al-Jazeera, November 6, 2013, accessed November 9, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/benghazi-self-ruleresonates-with-berbers-2013115122219533260.html. 93 Zurutuza, “Benghazi ‘self-rule’” and Ulf Laessing, “In Libya's west, Berber anger spills into gasfields”, Reuters, November 8, 2013, accessed November 9, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/ 08/us-libya-protest-berbers-idUSBRE9A70PM20131108. 94 Bouandel interview, Doha, December 2014. 89 90

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Halfway through the third year (2014) of the volatile transitional period, the Libyan scene took a drastic turn when retired General Khalifa Haftar launched “Operation Dignity” – an antiIslamist military campaign that invoked neo-Nasserite Arab nationalist rhetoric and sought support from Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s secular authoritarian “counter-revolutionary” regime in Egypt. Haftar’s campaign, which began in May 2014, sparked large-scale countermobilization in Tripoli, and beyond, in a coalition of diverse groups including Amazigh factions. 95 This coalition – self-labeled Operation Dawn – carried out several attacks including one on Tripoli International Airport, which was under the control of Zintani militias allied with Haftar. 96 Facing the growing threat of a materializing counter-revolution, the political activism of Libya’s Amazigh, which led to frequent violent acts in demand of their constitutional rights, amid other things, seemed to be temporarily sidelined as the Imazighen once again joined forces with various rebel groups to fight Haftar and his allies. Throughout the remainder of 2014 and a good deal of 2015, Libya remained subject to a violent contest in which the Amazigh, in a manner similar to 2011, played a significant role. Each of the two factions shaping the armed struggle was diverse and heavily armed. On the one hand, Haftar’s camp claimed to protect the country from Islamist extremists. It included former Qaddafi military men, some “tribal groups and the western mountain city of Zintan”. 97 On the other hand, the opposite camp, in which the Imazighen were key players, portrayed itself as opposing a form of counter-revolution. 98 This latter coalition gathered “extremist and more moderate Islamists, members of the ethnic Berber minority, Frederic Wehrey, “Is Libya a proxy war?” Washington Post, October 24, 2014, accessed December 15, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost. com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/24/is-libya-a-proxy-war/. 96 Ibid. 97 Suliman Ali Zway and David D. Kirkpatrick, “General Escalates Libya Attack”, New York Times, October 15, 2014, accessed December 31, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/world/middleeast/generalescalates-libya-attack-.html. 98 Ibid. 95

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other local or tribal groups, and the major coastal city of Misurata”. 99 Although it may seem strange that the Amazigh allied with Islamists, their motivation to do so stemmed from Haftar and Zintan’s current opposition to “making Tamazight an official language for Libya” as well as Haftar’s past affiliation with Qaddafi. 100 Despite their opposition to Haftar, many Imazighen felt uneasy about their alliance with Dawn forces. They feared that, given Amazigh affiliation with the Ibadi sect of Islam, a sect not recognized as orthodox by the Sunni Muslim majority of Libya, they might ultimately end up fighting Dawn forces if the Dawn coalition defeated Haftar. The rise of ISIS in Sirte also proved a foreboding development. Away from the frontlines of the military conflict, Libyan Imazighen built Ibadi Mosques and schools in the Jabal Nefusa and the Amazigh community of Libya developed its own political institutions. Libyan Imazighen elected their first representatives to the new Amazigh Supreme Council in September 2015. The Council, half of whose representatives were women, aimed to represent Amazigh interests in the chaotic Libyan political scene, which had increasingly marginalized them. By the beginning of 2016, the Amazigh had become increasingly isolated. They remained opposed to counter-revolutionary forces, but also wary of Islamist parties and critical of the new UNbacked Government of National Accord (GNA) operating out of Tripoli. 101 While the GNA has sought to reconcile Haftar’s coalition, which has its political base in Tobruk, with the Islamist coalition, which has its political base in Tripoli, such efforts (as of August 2016), have met with limited success. 102 Moreover, the Zway and Kirkpatrick, “General Escalates”. Andrew Engel, “Libya as a Failed State: Causes, Consequences, Options”, Research Notes: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 24 (2014), p. 15. 101 Karlos Zurutuza, “Libya’s Ibadi Muslims Survived Qaddafi but Now Face the New Threat of Islamic State”, Vice News, March 22, 2016, accessed August 5, 2016, https://news.vice.com/article/libyas-ibadimuslims-survived-qaddafi-but-now-face-the-new-threat-of-islamic-state. 102 John Pearson, “Protests erupt in Libya as UN government rolls out red carpet”, The National, July 14, 2016, accessed August 3, 2016, 99

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Amazigh claim the UN-backed government has ignored their community. 103 In this context, the Kurdish declaration of self-rule in Syria on March 17th, 2016, has proved inspirational to some Libyan Amazigh activists who have begun to make the case for regional autonomy as the only way to foster the development of a “democratic, post-revolutionary Libya”. 104 They claim Amazigh self-rule and regional autonomy in Libya would not only foster stable and just governance, but also provide the West with a new ally in the global fight against terrorism in the country. 105

CONCLUSION

Although the transitional phase following Qaddafi’s fall was tense and largely unsatisfactory, the potential return of the old regime or the triumph of Islamist forces have both carried the prospect of a dark future for the Imazighen – restored oppression and almost certain denial of any rights they might have gained in the last couple of years, not to mention any other rights they were struggling to claim. Disorder and conflict in Libya, has also, to some extent, worked to the advantage of the Amazigh, granting them a degree of local autonomy, which they did not enjoy under Qaddafi. “Over the past three years, marginalized minorities like the Amazigh in the northwest, and Tuareg and Tebu in the south, have gained significant freedoms arising from de facto self-rule, which they zealously guard along with their territory”. 106 While Islamists have ofhttp://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/protests-erupt-in-libya-asun-government-rolls-out-red-carpet. 103 Karlos Zurutuza, “What happened to the “other” Libyans?” New Internationalist, February 17, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016, https://newint. org/features/web-exclusive/2016/02/17/what-happened-to-the-otherlibyans/ 104 Eden Almasude and Mazigh Buzakhar, “From failed state to regional autonomy: Amazigh self-determination in Libya”, Nationalia, April 14, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016, http://www.nationalia.info/opinion/ 10760/from-failed-state-to-regional-autonomy-amazigh-selfdetermination-in-libya. 105 Ibid. 106 Engel, “Libya as a Failed State”, p. 9.

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ten seen the Imazighen as following a heretical offshoot of orthodox Islam and speaking an inferior language, the clear opposition of Arab nationalists to the cultural and political demands of the Imazighen has forestalled any potential reconciliation between the two. For the Imazighen community, the break-up of the country into opposing military factions with separate governments in Tripoli and Tobruk has created a fluid situation that recalls the early twentieth century. Like Sulayman al-Baruni, initially the Amazigh sought an alliance with trans-national Muslim forces in a quest to defend their local autonomy and perhaps achieve something more. However, instead of opposing Italian colonization like al-Baruni, contemporary Imazighen have sought to oppose “counterrevolutionary” Arab nationalist forces, whose leadership has recalled the dark days of the Qaddafi regime. Now, should Islamists win outright or gain a decisive influence within the UN-backed government, they worry that they too, like al-Baruni before them, may never achieve the political and legal recognition they have fought so long to secure. Under such conditions, the prospect of regional autonomy and self-rule has proven increasingly attractive.

CHAPTER 3 THE ARMENIAN CHRISTIAN MINORITY IN GREATER SYRIA AND THE ARAB SPRING DARINA SALIBA ABI CHEDID UNIVERSITÉ SAINT-ESPRIT DE KASLIK, LEBANON INTRODUCTION

Even before the start of the Arab Spring and the drastic changes in some of the region’s regimes, the fundamental question was set on the Christians regarding their status, their role and rights in each country, their loyalty or conversely their protection and security. Would they be part of the ruling system despite its deficiencies or would they share the dreams of the opposition? We witnessed several talks and debates during and after the uprisings, some of whom claim that strong regulations alone would guarantee security and freedom of worship to Christian minorities, while others think that democracy and revolutions constitute the hope for Christian minorities, and should even be the product of their thought and awakening. Where is the truth? What is the role of Christian minorities? What would be their vocation and fate? Recently, different scholars and researchers, e.g. Aldo Ferrari (2000), 1 Razmik Panossian (2007), 2 Nicoloa Migliorino (2008), 3 Aldo Ferrari, Alla frontier dell’impero. Gli armeni in Russia (1801–1917) (Milan, 2000), pp. 11–19. 2 Razmik Panossian, The Armenians. From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (London: Armenian Studies Ser., 2007), pp. 5–31. 1

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Nikolaos Van Dam (2011) 4 and Nicolas Heras (2013), 5 have discussed the Armenian identity and nation formation, have presented stimulating claims about the Armenian Syrian community, and have variously explored the roots of the Syrian civil war providing insights about the position of Syria’s Christians especially in Aleppo and Homs, stressing also the vulnerability of this community that is concentrated in strategic areas. Betty Jane and J. Martin Bailey (2003), Nicoloa Migliorino (2008) and Andrea Zaki Stephanous (2010) have also examined the struggle of Armenians to prevent the dissolution of their identity in past years mainly by strengthening their existence in Syrian society through non-profit Armenian organizations, which provided vital economic and financial support to Armenian families. 6 There have been a number of broadly comparative studies, e.g. Riad Jarjour (2008), who argued that the Armenian community is facing in Syria the most critical situation it has ever experienced since the 1915 Genocide. Moreover, Heras and Tozman (2012) as well as J. Reisian (2009) have addressed important issues concerning the threat facing the Christian communities of becoming deliberately targeted by Islamist groups and suffering disproportionately from violence and insecurity, although Nicoloa Migliorino, Reconstructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp. 160–170. 4 Nikolas van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria. Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba`th Party (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 121–134. 5 Nicholas A. Heras is an analyst in the field of international relations with particular regional expertise on the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahara regions. See his article published in August 2013 entitled “Military Intervention in Syria: The End is Not Nigh” available online at the Fair Observer website: http://www.fairobserver.com/region/ middle_east_north_africa/military-intervention-syria-less-than-mortalblow-assad/ 6 Examples include the Armenian Charitable Association “Sourp Oknoutian Khatch” of Aleppo and the Howard Karagheusian Commemorative Corporation (HKCC), which supply medical centers and dispensaries and provide non-profit services to thousands of Armenian families. See Migliorino, Reconstructing Armenia. 3

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they have noticed that Armenians in Syria enjoyed a better situation than other ethnic minorities, most notably the Kurds. The situation of the Christians in Syria is a paradox. Their story is one of constant adaptation to situations over which they have no power. The weight of the Christians of Syria is so weak that revolutions seem to be never to their advantage. While there is no ethnic issue committed against Armenians, nevertheless, the global insecurity and instability in the country has certainly also had an impact on the Armenian community. 7 Today, the challenging dilemma as regards minorities in the Middle East, including the Armenian Christian minority in Syria, constitutes at this level a real problem: Would defying the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria open a period of political instability in which minorities will have no choice but to go into exile or to regroup into a reduced protective minority? And ultimately, will the new regime be interested in their safety and equality with other citizens? This chapter examines the position of the Armenian Christian minority in Syria, with a particular emphasis on their imminent role. It investigates the prospect for this minorities to participate actively in building the region in light of the revolutionary Arab Spring. This study also suggests that, although there is no ethnic issue directed against Armenians themselves, with the collapse of the Assad regime and the overall instability of the country, minorities risk becoming victims of an imminent crackdown which naturally affects the Armenian community.

CHRISTIANS IN SYRIA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Arab States of the Middle East were born from the partition of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 by France and Great Britain. The borders of the Middle East do not match the national constructions established over the centuries, but reflect the brutal passage of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire “Nation-States” in borders delimited on the basis of outside colonial interests. The colonial logic of France and Great Britain in the new States in 7

G. Abrahamyan, idem.

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which they acquired a mandate from the League of Nations was to divide and conquer and rely on minorities. The Arab nationalist movement in Syria and Iraq fought this policy and, once independence was acquired, it strove to eliminate differences between citizens, with the aim of theoretically unifying the country. The minority aspect was therefore denied for decades on behalf of national unity. Lebanon constitutes an exception since each faith community is a minority and communitarianism is institutionalized by the Constitution. Each community has had, since the creation of the Parliament under the French mandate (1920–1946), a quota of Deputies. The confessional distribution of the major posts in the State was formalized in the Tā’ef agreements in 1989, which brought an end to the Lebanese civil war: the president is Maronite, the prime minister is Sunni, and the head of the Parliament a Shi'ite. After independence in Syria and Iraq, institutionalized multiculturalism was abolished, but this did not preclude minorities from expressing themselves and having some claims. This is particularly true for the ethnic minorities who were the first victims of Arab nationalism, while confessional differences were mitigated by the secular nature of regimes. Inside the regimes proclaiming high and strong their secularism and national unity, political struggles for power eventually opposed community clans against each other. In Syria, it was the victory of the ‘Alawite clan of Ḥāfez al-Assad, and in Iraq the Tikriti Sunni clan of Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr and Saddām Ḥusseīn. In the Ottoman Empire, no differences existed between Muslims, whether Turkish, Arab or Kurdish. This refers to a ḥadīth of Muḥammad which states: “there is difference between the nonArab and Arabic by religion. The noblest of you are the most devout”. In fact, this ḥadīth was contesting an Arab ethnicity tendency of considering themselves superior to the conquered countries’ populations, even when they converted to Islam. The Ottoman Empire, whose cohesion was threatened by a similar Turkish racism vis-à-vis other peoples, pursued the fight and gave greater freedom to non-Muslims in order to prevent revolts. According to the historian Albert H. Ḥouranī, “[the Ottoman Empire] was composed of a large number of groups, local tribal, linguistic and religious. On the whole, these groups formed closed communities. Each was a “world”, sufficient to its members and exacting their ultimate loyalty. The worlds touched but did not mingle with each

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other; each looked at the rest with suspicion and even hatred.” 8 The system of “Millet”, which can be transliterated as “nation” or “nationality” was thus based exclusively on religion. It provided protection and autonomy to the religious communities. Jewish and Christian communities had their own administrative and religious organization. They were protected subjects, the dhimmis, 9 and therefore had to pay a special tax. Christians and Jews were known in Islam as Ahl al-Kitāb (“People of the Book”), meaning the people who had obtained divine revelations through prophets preceding Muḥammad, and had been assigned formerly revealed books and scriptures. The status of Ahl al-Kitāb permitted to Christians and Jews to maintain their religious organization, their personal status, places of worship and religious convictions. This protected status was more institutionalized under the Ottoman Empire when their communities were formally accepted as millets or (religious) “nations”. 10 On the other hand, there was a single Muslim “nation”, dominated by Sunnis, and to which the Shi‘ites were forced to belong in complete obedience, except some heterodox branches such as the Druze and ‘Alawis, who were completely ostracized. In the Ottoman millet system, the Armenians became essentially a religious community and were renowned as such by the outside world. 11 The millet system became in the nineteenth century dangerous for the cohesion of the Empire, as the protection of “national” identity, through religion, could evolve into a nationalist claim among Christians who, according to the so-called Code of A. H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 22. 9 A ḏimmī means in Arabic ‫ذﻣﻲ‬, and collectively ‫ أھﻞ اﻟﺬﻣﺔ‬ahl alḏimmah/dhimmah “the people of the dhimma”. It’s a historical term that refers to non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic state. See Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam. From Jihad to Dhimmitude: 7th to 29th Century (Teaneck, N.J: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996), pp. 8– 12. 10 Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, p. 3. 11 Razmik Panossian, Op.cit. pp. 5–31. 8

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Omar, were considered as second-class citizens. In the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman reforms (Tanẓīmāt) abolished the millet system and the Code of ‘Omar, affirming the principle of equality between subjects. The purpose was to take away from the European powers all pretexts for intervention, because communities had adopted a separatist position. The independence of Greece in 1827, supported by the European powers, encouraged the Sulṭān to launch reforms and, in particular, recognize the equality of rights between those of a different religion. But during the reign of ‘Abdul Ḥamīd II (1876–1909), Christians were often persecuted, because the loss of the Balkans had strengthened the Muslim character of the Empire. Arab nationalism, as a reaction to colonialism, is the successor of this assimilation process launched without success at the end of the Ottoman Empire. However, if Arab nationalism passed over religious divisions, it re-enabled the divide between Arab and non-Arab. It is crucial to note that Armenians have willingly migrated since the formation of an Armenian entity in ancient times. The ancestors of those living today in the Middle East migrated from Armenia either voluntarily or because of expulsion from their homeland. The latter were expelled toward the end of the eleventh century following the breakdown of the Bagratid kingdom 12 and settled in what is today Turkey. The Armenian diaspora moved to different Middle Eastern host countries after the second and third migrations (including Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine), constituting a small minority, acquainting to domestic conditions, and finally acquiring citizenship in the nineteenth century. 13 Syria, which counted for 21.5 million in 2010 14 has always been an important place of religious, linguistic and ethnic amalgam, and its population is characterized by strong religious and ethnic diversity. Although official statistics don’t exist about the exact number of ethnic and religious groups, Christians count for about twelve percent split into a minimum of fourteen sects, the Greek The medieval Kingdom of Armenia. Gabriel Sheffer, Idem, pp. 205–206. 14 Number estimated by the United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. Available on: http://esa.un.org/ 12 13

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Orthodox being the biggest. 15 Religious minorities in Syria consist mainly of ‘Alawites, Drūzes, Isma‘īlis, Jews 16 and Christians, both ethnically Arab 17 and non-Arab, such as Armenians. The latter constitutes less than half of all Christians in Syria. In his book entitled Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East, the Challenge of the Future (published in 1998), Andrea Pacini gave some numbers as regards the size of the different Christian communities in Syria: 503,000 Greek Orthodox, 112,000 Armenian Orthodox, 111,000 Melkites, 89,000 Syrian Orthodox, 28,000 Maronites, 25,000 Armenian Catholics, 23,000 Syrian Catholics, 17,000 Assyrians, 11,000 Roman Catholics, 7,000 Chaldeans, and 2,000 Protestants. On the other hand, Youssef Courbage in 2007 18 calculates significantly smaller number of Christians. This concern with numbers reflects the perplexed use of the terms majority and minority in Syria. Christians, who were present in the region centuries before the arrival of Islam, have a very strong sense of belonging to the Syrian nation. And, unlike the social discrimination suffered by the ‘Alawites, Christians have neither been subject to discrimination nor enjoyed special privileges. The major ethnic minorities in Syria are the Armenians, Kurds, Turkmen and Circassians. The last three minorities are essentially solely Sunni Muslims, and hence represent a majority of the population. The Armenians, on the other hand, are Christians and thus form both an ethnic and religious minority. Actually, Syrian Armenians recognize themselves as an ethno-national group, a micro identity, similarly to the Kurds. Armenians in Syria are the exceptional case of an ethnic minority favored only for political reasons. They were given a place in Anh Nga Longva & Anne Sofie Roald, Religious Minorities in the Middle East: Domination, Self-Empowerment, Accommodation (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p.124. 16 Noting that nearly all of Syrian Jews emigrated in the 1990s. 17 Since most Christians in Syria consider themselves as “Arab”, contrary to Armenians. 18 Youssef Courbage, “La population de la Syrie”, in eds. Baudoin Dupret, Zouhair Ghazzal, Youssef Courbage, and Mohammed al-Dbiyat, La Syrie au présent. Reflets d’une société (Paris: Sindbad, 2007), pp. 177–213. 15

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the Syrian parliament through their own elected representatives, and are the only community in the country to have the right to set up their own private schools and to teach their language, while the Kurdish and Turkish languages are prohibited. Mr. Jirair Reisian, former director of al-Salām School, clarifies that “this right was given to the Armenians in Syria because the Armenian Church is a national Church and the prayers are in Armenian language. That is why they have to learn the language of the Church just like the Assyrian Church.” 19 Muslim Aleppians agree that Armenian Christians are well and better educated. Nevertheless, they are described by others, especially in Aleppo, as “clannish” since they hardly ever marry with other Christians. 20 Armenians have no irredentist claim and are considered a guest in the Syrian Arab Republic, which is not the case of the Kurds and Turkmen suspected of pursuing secession in the border areas where they live. One can deduce that there was relatively a kind of tolerance towards religious and ethnic minorities, in particular Christians, on the part of Islam, specifically regarding modern or Baathist Syria. They were particularly treated well and felt safe under the Assads’ leadership (father and son), and there is no doubt that in the event of power turnover, perilous consequences might ensue. Christian traders and industrialists have gained advantages with the shift to open door policies of the 1980s and the 1990s and from acquaintances with the political elite. 21 Christians were protected in such a way that they were able to preserve their own identities to this day. Hence, they have had the benefit of a considerable extent of social and religious freedom under the present regime, and it is a freedom they are afraid to lose within a short period. According to Arax Pashamyan, senior specialist of Arab studies at J. Reyisian. Interview by Kevork Elmassian on Syrian Armenians in Aleppo. Retrieved from an article published in September 15, 2013 by Kevork Elmassian and entitled: “Reconstructing Hegemony and Identity in Syria; Kurds, Alawites and Armenians”, available at: http://neweastern politics.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/reconstructing-hegemony-andidentity-in-syria-kurds-alawites-and-armenians-by-kevork-elmassian/ 20 Anh Nga Longva & Anne Sofie Roald, op.cit. p. 128. 21 Anh Nga Longva & Anne Sofie Roald, op.cit. p. 129. 19

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the National Academy of Sciences, “it is natural that the majority of Armenians would support Bashār al-Assad, since they led safe and prosperous lives under his leadership, ethnic rights were fully protected, they have schools, churches, and it is under that regime Armenians see the chance for ethnic survival.” 22 As a result of historical disastrous experiences, Armenians constantly felt that their ethno-cultural existence was vulnerable and even threatened by “others”. That’s why, the Armenian associations played a significant role in preserving the Armenian community, maintaining the Armenian identity and promoting Armenian culture. 23 A few decades ago, Christians, especially Armenians, used to control the huge gold market in the central bazaar of Aleppo. 24 But with the decline of the percentage of Christians in comparison to Muslims, traders from all sects in the old central bazaar have vanished. Today, Sunni Arab Muslims control this market. The ruling class has constantly increased in power by allying itself with the evolving bourgeoisie, mainly the Sunni merchants of Damascus and Aleppo. Furthermore, there is a marital relationship between the ruling class and the army officials. In the current situation, some of the Armenian minorities are part of the silent block which refuses to intervene in the conflict, others have joined the Free Syrian Army. Nevertheless, all fear to be victims of a crackdown with the fall of the Assad regime. Many of the Syrian Armenians have left Syria for the Republic of Armenia in the Caucasus, and are struggling to afford the higher cost of living there. In these defenseless circumstances, the Armenian Diaspora Ministry spokesman Tevos G. Abrahamyan, Exit plan: Armenians of Syria may need escape if Assad regime collapses. February 13, 2012. Retrieved in March 14 ,2014 from: http://www.armenianow.com/social/human_rights/35541/armenia_syri a_community_civil_strife_assad 23 For example, the Armenians organize on a yearly basis “The Armenian cultural week” in the University of Aleppo, where they celebrate Armenian culture, music, dance, and poetry, etc. (See Migliorino, Reconstructing Armenia). 24 Anh Nga Longva & Anne Sofie Roald, Ibidem. 22

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Nersisyan asserted in an Armenian newspaper that hundreds of Armenian families have already migrated to Armenia from Syria, 25 which elucidates the rising anxiety among Syrian Armenian families and their aspiration to look for safety if more histrionic developments follow in Syria.

ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY OF THE ARMENIAN CHRISTIAN MINORITY IN SYRIA

Ethnicity and religion are two concepts often used concurrently in debates about group identity, but they don’t merely explain each other. The ethnicity of a group may be described as the effect of religious belief and practices, but religion may also be explained as a result of ethnicity. 26 Scholars have focused on the importance of what they call “primordial attachments”, 27 assumed to emanate from the “givens” or assumed “givens” of social existence. These include “kin connection, religion, language, and social practices”, that seem to stem from a natural or spiritual kinship rather than from social interaction. 28 In the case of Middle Eastern Armenian minorities, and during the centuries of dispersion, they decided to maintain their ethno-national identity and integrated in their host countries out of emotional, cultural and religious concerns. They have revealed great solidarity and formed well-organized Diaspora communities through trans-state networks, engaging in a range of cultural, reliS. Gevorgyan, Syria crisis: More Armenians flee as Middle East violence rages on. Retrieved on 6 June 2012 from http://armenianow.com/ society/38537/syria_armenians_refugees 26 Willem Hoffstee, “Religious Origins of Nations? The Christian Communities of the Middle East”, in Bas ter Haar Romeny (ed.), Community, Ethnicity, and Multiculturalism (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 59. 27 There are three main views on ethnicity: primordial, circumstantial, and constructivist. In the first one, ethnicity has an ahistorical quality. 28 C. Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States”, in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (London, 1973; repr. 1993), pp. 255–310. 25

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gious, social, political and economic activities and interactions with their host societies and homeland. 29 The multi-ethnic structure of Syria is a major factor contributing to the development of the current crisis. With around 22.5 million inhabitants, Syria has been ruled by the Ba‘athist regime since 1963. In its Constitution, Syria is a parliamentary republic and governed autocratically by the Ba‘ath party and more specifically, al-Assad family. The family in power is ‘Alawite deriving from Shi‘īsm, and constitutes a minority in a society in which the majority is Sunni. This fact enhanced the conflict between the ruling ‘Alawites and the Sunni majority. 30 Middle Eastern Christians have a more extensive familiarity with Islam than do Christians in any other part of the world. Islam’s genesis started in Arabia, and it was amid the formerly Christian regions of Syria, Iraq, and Egypt that Islam experienced its determinative expansion. That Islam has become the principal and largest religion throughout the region has amply affected its political, social, and cultural nature. Arab Christians and Muslims share Arabic culture, history, language, and fate. 31 Armenian identity formation took place during the first millennium C.E. and was embedded in religious, that is, Christian thoughts. 32 More recently, beginning about 1915, vast numbers of Armenian Christians fled to Syria from massacres in Turkey after the Ottoman Turkish genocide. Afterwards, they started to create a new life there, establishing schools, businesses and churches. According to Bishop Armash Nalbandian, Syrian Armenian Christians Gabriel Sheffer, “Middle Eastern Diasporas: An Overview” in Moshe Ma’oz and Gabriel Sheffer, Middle Eastern Minorities and Diasporas (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), p. 206. 30 Background Note Syria, U.S. Department of State, January 2012. 31 David A. Kerr, A Western Christian Appreciation of Eastern Christianity, in Betty Jane and J. Martin Bailey, Who are the Christians in the Middle East? (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003), p. 11. 32 Theo Maarten van Lint, “The Formation of Armenian Identity in the First Millenium” in ed. Bas ter Haar Romeny, Religious Origins of Nations? The Christians Communities of the Middle East (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 29

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are now suffering again after ninety-five years. Also, Father Simon Faddūl, director of the Catholic charity Caritas in Lebanon considers that Christians in Syria in general are being persecuted because of their pro-government political views, since some of those who fled to Lebanon as refugees were Syrian government employees, and others are linked to Syrian soldiers or affiliates to the intelligence services. 33 In the 16th century, Armenian Christians together with the Greek Orthodox and Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite) communities were acknowledged by the Ottoman sultan as nations having their own courts and laws. At that time, the small Armenian community received permission from the Sublime Porte to construct a church called Saint Sarkis, in the Christian quarter of Damascus. After the genocide of 1915–1918, 20,000 Armenian survivors became refugees in Syria which turned into a French protectorate. The Armenian community, predominantly Gregorian or Oriental Orthodox with Catholic and Protestant minorities, was founded by Saint Gregory the Illuminator who evangelized Armenia 34 in the third century. Nina G. Garsoïan writes about the conversion of Armenia to Christianity: “The conversion of Armenia to Christianity was probably the most crucial step in its history. It turned Armenia sharply away from its Iranian past and stamped it for centuries with an intrinsic character as clear to the native population as to those outside its borders, who identified Armenia almost at once as the first state to adopt Christianity.” 35 The Turks’ forced expulsion to Aleppo in the First World War and the exodus of ArmeniReese Erlich, Syria’s Minority Christians Under Threat From Extremist Muslim Rebels, Persecution Organization, International Christian Concern online publications, December 25, 2013. Available at: http://www.persec ution.org/2013/12/26/syrias-minority-christians-under-threat-fromextremist-muslim-rebels/ 34 Armenia is the land that is known in ancient history as “Nayiry”, in which the Armenian identity was constituted. 35 Nina Garsoïan, “The Aršakuni Dynasty”, in Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004), pp. 63–94; hereafter Garsoïan, “Dynasty”, p. 75. 33

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ans from Cilicia and Alexandretta enlarged significantly the community in Syria. The Armenian Catholic Patriarch of Cilicia and the Armenian Gregorian Catholicos of Sis live in Lebanon. Before the start of the current Syrian war, 150,000 Armenian-Syrian Gregorians and 20,000 Catholics were living mostly in Aleppo, Jazīra and Ladhqīia. We count two Armenian Catholic Dioceses. 36 In point of fact, Aleppo has a long history of religious, linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity. Five hundred years ago, it maintained a vast trade network known for its good reputation and wealth. During the last decades, it has become increasingly insular and homogenous. Although Sunni Muslim Arab Syrians constitute the majority in the city, minorities still openly display their different identities in their own metropolitan quarters. There are also nostalgic memories of “before”, when everyday-life was more “open and carefree”. 37 The Christian minorities in Syria exhibit their religious imagery in Christian quarters during Christian feasts such as Christmas and Easter, exposing for instance their Christmas trees and Santa Claus in Christmas time. All Christians in Syria celebrate Christmas on the same date (December 25th) except the Armenians who commemorate it on January 6th using the Julian calendar. What is remarkable here is that during Christian feasts, church ceremonies are publicly broadcast, and the Syrian President visits or receives major Christian patriarchs and bishops. However, the Kurdish New Year celebration (called the nauroz) is meticulously disregarded and receives no official recognition despite its importance for the Kurdish population. It is even diligently controlled and sometimes repressed. 38 Since the Syrian declaration of independence in 1920, Syria has shown respect to all religions. Until recently, the country has Overview of Religious History of Syria, L’Osservatore Romano, 9 May 2001, p. 16. 37 Annika Rabo, “Conviviality and Conflict in Contemporary Aleppo”, in Anh Nga Longva and Anne Sofie Roald, Religious Minorities in the Middle East: Domination, Self-Empowerment, Accommodation (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 123. 38 Anh Nga Longva & Anne Sofie Roald, Idem, pp. 130–132. 36

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been dominated by a certain system, where the Head of State should be a Muslim. Christian communities, with the help of the State, were free to buy land, build churches, practice their faith, and were given the opportunity for self-development. 39 Until 1963, the Armenians of Alep published four newspapers. In 2003, about 80,000 Armenians lived in Syria. The Armenian elite had strong positions in the economy of the country such as the Jakoubian family who controlled thirty companies in the country, including Samsung, Nokia, Alcatel, Kodak, Michelin, etc.

SYRIAN CHRISTIAN ARMENIANS AMID THE CURRENT UNREST

The questioning of authoritarianism, with the “Arab Spring” of 2011, opens a period of instability which is proving extremely dangerous for minorities throughout the region. Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 until the 2011 Syrian revolt, passing by the 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, eight years have elapsed during which net trends of internal fragmentation have been drawn. There is no single Arab regime that actually gives Christian minorities full rights as partners in governance, as nations having their own languages, and there is no real recognition of diversity and pluralism. All what we have is a one-party ruling system, one nation and one leader. It is more likely to deal with Christian minorities through their communities and faith rather than political parties. Moreover, there is no opposition party, religious or nationalist or leftist that has a positive and clear position towards the rights of Christians and their existence. There are, rather, occasional bombastic discourses about coexistence and unity or some specific religious texts calling for respecting Christians, and herein resides the core of the problem of revolutions and uprisings. For instance in Iraq, even after the end of one-man-rule, and after returning the Kurdish territories, Christians are still denied similar rights geographically speaking and nation-wise: they are not given “Church and State in the Middle East: Syria”, in Betty Jane & J. Martin Bailey, Who are the Christians in the Middle East? (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2003), Part III, p. 193. 39

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what they are entitled to in terms of the number of representative members of parliament, ministries or departments that the system is supposed to do if it was to support them. Furthermore, the West – Americans and Europeans – have no agenda or cause for Eastern Christianity. All what truly interests them is securing oil, and protecting Israel which breaches international law rather than finding an honorable solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Christians are a minority in the Arab world. In the Middle East, the word “minority” should be used with caution since it can mean “separate, alien, displaced, lower in status and powerless”. 40 Christians in the Middle East usually do not accept the designation of “minority”. Maronites in Lebanon, for instance, view themselves as the forefathers of greater Lebanon and the ruling group. Therefore, in this context, the term “minority” denotes groups that diverge from the majority in one variable or more, such as religion, language, culture, etc. For example, Armenian Christians in the Middle East are different from the Sunni majority in the variables of religion, language and culture, while the Copts of Egypt differ in religion only. The minority issue in the Middle Eastern context is complex, because it entails ethnic, linguistic, and/or religious criteria closely felt in the concerned country. In Syria, Circassians do not have the impression of being a minority: fully Arabized and Muslim Sunni, they belong to the majority community. In Jordan, they form a well identified group from which the King recruited his presidential guard. Their loyalty to the monarchy provided them with certain privileges, including that of having two seats in Parliament. The Jordanian Circassians are the exceptional case of an ethnic minority for political reasons. It is also the case of Armenians in Syria, who are the only community in the country to keep their language as a means of education from kindergarten to high school, while Kurdish and Turkish are outlawed. The Syrian Ba‘athist regime has not committed violent ethnic cleansing against these two minorities, as has done Saddām Ḥusseīn in Iraq. However the Kurdish and Andrea Zaki Stephanous, Political Islam, Citizenship, and Minorities: The future of Arab Christians in the Islamic Middle East (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2010), p. 9. 40

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Turkmen regions are left in a state of underdevelopment. This explains their classification as second-class citizens for those who had the chance to possess Syrian nationality, and the desire of the regime to move these “alien” populations to major urban centers where they could “Arabize” 41 more than if they had remained in their in their native areas. The dynamics are now reversed in Iraq since 1991 when Iraqi Kurdistan acquired autonomy from the Baghdadi government. This example worries neighboring countries who fear a similar development for their own Kurdish minorities. On the religious level, Sunni Islam is the religion of 95% of Arabs. Sunnis dominated demographically in Syria and Jordan, but they constitute a minority in Lebanon and Iraq. With the current political problems and instability, Christians in Syria and Lebanon fear to become the first victims of violence and to be obliged to leave the region, as three quarters of Christians did in Iraq since 2003. Today, minorities are facing a real dilemma in Syria: Will the challenge to the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria open a period of political instability in which minorities will have the choice of either going into exile or regrouping in reduced defensive positions? Or will the new regime succeed in guaranteeing their safety and equality with other citizens? The Constitution of Syria advocates equality among citizens. Religious and ethnic affiliation is not formally documented in Syria and therefore does not show on identity-cards, passports or in demographic statistics. The centralized Baathist State has claimed to be the best guarantor of minorities’ rights with the rise of Islamism that would benefit the Sunni community. However, in return for this protection, religious minorities are effectively being taken hostages by al-Assad regime, a position which will actually rebound against them if the regime falls. Ba‘athist Syria is similar to Saddām Ḥusseīn's Iraq since there is a minority in power, but it is a Shi‘ite minority who is dominating the Sunni Arab majority. However, in the regime of Bashār alAssad, the ‘Alawite minority is one of the regime’s central pillars. The “Arabization” of Syria had an impact on its history for centuries and later naturally affected a number of its modern political movements, one of which was the Baath Party. 41

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Certainly, the ‘Alawite community, disdained and ostracized for centuries by Sunni Muslims, are now full-fledged citizens and the average standard of living of this community has significantly increased since the arrival in power of the Ba‘ath party. Children of illiterate peasants of the coastal mountains are now often officers in the army, members of the security and government apparatus, or part of academia. This social promotion would not have been possible without the need for the ‘asabīyyah of Ḥāfez al-Assad to rely on a minority to avoid being overthrown by the Sunni majority. Ḥāfez al-Assad, who was an ‘Alawite from a mountain village where the tribal structure is very powerful, was inspired by the local organization to build his system of power. His genius was to use the mode of community-based organization in his favor, unifying the ‘Alawite community around him and dividing the Sunni majority, using ethnic, territorial, tribal and social divisions. The ‘Alawites are the backbone of the regime by their integration in the repressive forces and the Syrian administration. Elite troops, such as the Army’s Fourth Division currently controlled by the brother of Bashār al-Assad, Māher al-Assad, are exclusively composed of ‘Alawites. However, the ‘Alawites do not monopolize all positions in the first plan. Sunnis are the majority in the government, but they are being monitored by ‘Alawite deputies, who are the real decision makers. Ḥāfez al-Assad knew that the ‘Alawites should not take ownership of all leading positions, because this would humiliate the Sunni majority. It would be sufficient to get them monitored by ‘Alawite assistants or orderlies, who also came from the ‘Alawite mountain region, and who are everywhere in Syria the eyes and ears of the intelligence services. The Mukhābarāt became from the 1970s the most powerful body of the regime, at the expense of the Ba‘ath party and army. 42 At the religious level, the Armenian community is divided into four. Some depend on the (Patriarchate) Catholicos of Echmiadzin in Armenia, others on the Catholicos of Antelias in Lebanon, the Etudes Interculturelles, Dossier, “Les minorités et la question ethnique”, Actes du Colloque international, Lyon, 14 & 15 octobre 2011. Revue d’analyse publiée par la Chaire Unesco de l’Université catholique de Lyon, 5/2012, Tome 1, pp. 19–29. 42

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third on the Armenian Catholic Church of Syria, linked to the Vatican, as well as a handful of Protestants. But since 2003, an important migratory movement took place towards the United States, Canada and Europe. Following this decline in population, the number of seats of Armenian deputies (in proportion to the population) decreased from two in 1974 to one in 2003 while the Kurds and the Assyrians had more members. In 2003, between 45,000 and 60,000 Armenians were living in Aleppo, the economic capital of the country and the surrounding area, constituting the largest ten Christian communities out of all of the others in the city and one of the largest Armenian communities in the Middle East. Armenians controlled carpet and textile mills and employed hundreds of people. Around fifty factories of the city were under Armenian leadership. 43 Syria’s Christians are in a very vulnerable and threatened situation in the Syrian crisis mainly because most of the areas where Christians are concentrated are conflict areas. In addition, Christians in Syria generally do not defend themselves militarily or politically. Some of them stand beside the regime and others work with the opposition. Yet the majority of Christians prefer to preserve their security by remaining silent, neutral and not joining any of the parties. Dr. Ani Kalayjian has launched an urgent call to the international community through the website of the Armenian Weekly News accusing the opposition of targeting in particular Armenian Christian minorities in Syria, alleging that the opposition has “systematically destroyed Armenian churches, Armenian schools, nursing homes, and Armenian neighborhoods”. He adds that “he could hear the bombs blasting at any hour of the day and night. The opposition is waging war against the Assad government, but Armenians have nothing to do with this war.” 44 Christophe Chiclet, Les Arméniens de Syrie dans le piège, publié le 10 décembre 2012. Available at: http://www.confluences-mediterranee.com/ Les-Armeniens-de-Syrie-dans-la 44 Ani Kalayjian, Christian Armenian Minority in Syria Targeted by Syrian Opposition (2012). Available at: http://www.armweeklynews.am/awn/e12/ en_1189.htm 43

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The regime knows that the question of Christians and the defense of secularism is a sensitive issue for international public opinion. The confessionalization of the crisis is explained as a cynical plan. It was meant to transfer to the military field the sectarian and security-based war that they knew was lost in the political field. From the beginning of the dispute, in March 2011, the regime attempted to frighten the Christians at the risk posed by the Sunni majority (70% of the population) in case the clan in power fell. Christians, like other minorities, have always been reticent against the demographic majority that represents the Sunnis. And the regime, using great propaganda and often manipulations, has been able to consolidate and quite skillfully exploit these fears. Damascus also relied on the Iraqi experience where Christians, victims of abuses under the accusation of submission to the Western invader, fled in droves these past ten years. The Christian community in Aleppo is under enormous pressure and many claim that it does not exist anymore. Many of the wealthier Armenians inhabitants of the city have already departed from the city and the country. 45 But Christians have not been the only victims of the violence fuelled by the Iraq war; the killings between Shiites and Sunnis were also (and still are) terrible in Iraq. 46

CONCLUSION

We have perceived in this study that the majority of Syrian Armenians belong to the middle class and enjoy somewhat comfortable financial conditions in comparison to other parts of Syrian society. Although Syrian Armenians enjoyed relatively safe and affluent lives under the Assad regime and succeeded in preserving their ethnic survival, many argue that not all Armenians are faithful to the regime despite this prosperity. Lots of Armenians sympathize

Dennis Pastoor (coord.). Report coordinated by the World Watch Unit of Open Doors International, Vulnerability Assessment of Syria’s Christians (June 2013), p. 75. 46 Catherine Gouëset, Syrie: Les chrétiens, enjeu de la crise. Article published on L’Express website in 01/08/2012. Available at: http://www.lex press.fr/actualite/monde/proche-orient/syrie-les-chretiens-enjeu-de-lacrise_1145270.html#7KYodAbPLl5SCibe.99 45

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with the uprising and do not fear the statements saying that Islamists will massacre Christians when the regime falls. Undoubtedly, there are sincere concerns that force many Armenians to stand with the regime. Nonetheless, the central issue remains the mysterious future of Syria since all depends on who will succeed the regime and the nature of governance. It is not really clear what will happen in the Syrian postconflict period. “Either an al-Assad government or an opposition victory in the civil war raises significant important questions about the future of the country and the preservation of its civic peace”, says Nicholas A. Heras, an analyst in the field of international relations. 47 In the end, it would be remarkable to reaffirm the belief of Dr. Riad Jarjour, 48 ex-General Secretary of the Middle East Council of Churches, who has raised the question about the future of Christians in the Arab World and tried to give a description of the reality that those Christians face today. He believes that despite all challenges, “Christians cannot be saved alone; either Christians and Muslims will be saved together, or both will be destroyed. Then and only then will Christians in the Arab world have the right to demand equality (…) of belonging to a homeland, and equality as citizens. Then Christians will not be anxious about their destiny within the Arab world.” 49

Dennis Pastoor (coord.), ibidem. Dr. Riad Jarjour since 1995 has served as General Secretary of the Middle East Council of Churches. 49 Riad Jarjour, “The Future of Christians in the Arab World”, in Betty Jane & J. Martin Bailey, Who are the Christians in the Middle East? (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2003), p. 21. 47 48

PART II: RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB SPRING

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CHAPTER 4 ADAPTING TO SHIFTING GROUND: THE ALAWITES OF THE NORTHERN LEVANT LEON T. GOLDSMITH SULTAN QABOOS UNIVERSITY, OMAN INTRODUCTION

The Alawites of the Northern Levant are commonly defined as a Shi‘a-derived heterodox minority. But for the last century, this community has been trying to shed this minority label. Following a millennium of impoverished marginalisation in the coastal and mountain regions of the northern Levant from the late eleventh century, the Alawites joined the dynamic struggles among the diverse populations of the northern Levant seeking to achieve secure coexistence in the modern Syrian and Lebanese states. Arab nationalism, the re-emergence of Shi‘a Islam as a political force, and the ethos of ‘resistance’ to western and Israeli incursions were all important political movements, which held promise for overcoming Alawite minority status. The rise of Alawite individuals to power in Syria and the emergence of Hizballah as a dominant force in Lebanese politics marked a resurgence of Shi‘a influence in the Levant. When the Arab Spring impacted Syria in March 2011, many Alawites and members of other religious minorities feared that they would suffer a return to social and political marginalisation, second-class citizenship, or violent retribution at the hands of a revanchist Sunni Muslim community – a seventy-five per cent majority in Syria – if the Ba’athist regime fell. The Alawites form a 10–15 per cent minority in Syria, but have been disproportionately represented in the public sector and the state security apparatus in Syria since the rise of the Ba’ath par101

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ty to power in 1963, and the ascent of Alawite Air Force officer Hafiz al-Asad to the presidency in 1971. Up to 90 per cent of military officers in Syria are Alawite and the Syrian intelligence branches are all dominated by Alawites. 1 Alawite uncertainty about the nature and consequences of the uprising meant that most Alawites remained either strongly, or at least tacitly, loyal to the regime and continued to form the regime’s key support base. The Syrian crisis consequently assumed an increasingly ethno-religious nature, as socially mixed peaceful protests evolved into a predominantly Sunni Muslim armed revolt, confronting a regime heavily reliant on the support of religious minorities, including Alawites, Christians, Druze, Ismailis and a core of loyal Sunnis. From mid-2013, the conflict assumed transnational characteristics when Hizballah openly intervened in Syria to help secure strategic locations in AlQusayr and the Qalamoun Mountains adjacent to the Lebanese border. 2 On the opposition side, fragmented forces under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who fought for a secular civil state in Syria, increasingly lost ground to Sunni Islamist groups who garnered private and state sponsorship from the Gulf and Turkey. As the conflict intensified and centralised state authority disappeared from parts of the country, new trans-state actors with radical agendas of establishing an Islamic state in the heart of the Arab world became influential inside Syria, including Al-Qaeda affiliated groups, Jabhat al-Nusra (later rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al Sham) and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Such groups often refer to the Shi‘a, and especially the Alawites (they use the term

See Radwan Ziadeh, Power and Policy in Syria: The Intelligence Services, Foreign Relations and Democracy in the Modern Middle East (London: I.B. Taurus, 2011); Shmuel Bar, “Bashar’s Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 25 (2006), pp. 353–445; Hanna Batatu, “Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria’s Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Summer, 1981), pp. 331–344. 2 Isabel Nassief, “The Campaign for Homs and Aleppo.” Middle East Security Report, Institute for the Study of War. No. 17 (2014), pp. 13–18. 1

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Nusayris), as antithetical to Islam. 3 These radical Islamist elements certainly pose a threat to religious minorities’ security in the northern Levant; although their influence in any post-war Syrian entity should not be overstated, as the majority of Syrian, Lebanese and southern Turkish populations remain strongly opposed to the extreme ideology of such radical groups. In general, the Alawites found themselves caught in the middle of a vicious and complex conflict involving an increasingly sectarian opposition, a Syrian regime which consistently raised the stakes of retribution against its supporters with mass state violence against its own citizens, and wider geopolitical power struggles among regional and global powers, including Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and the United States. By 2014, the conflict had claimed at least 150,000 lives including more than 11,000 Alawites, 4 displaced around a third of the Syrian population 5 internally or externally- and decimated the country’s current and future economic potential. 6 Putting the magnitude of the crisis in perspective, António Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees suggested that “Syria as a civilization is unravelling.” 7 An increasing emphasis on religious identity obscures the nature and aspirations of the initial protest movement in Syria, which consistently tried to mobilise a broad social coalition seeking to overthrow Syria’s rigid authoritarian political system and replace it with a pluralist system based on democratic rights and equal citiSee for example, Dawla Islamiya, YouTube, http://www.you tube.com/watch?v=xrZ7E9bEhT8 (uploaded 9 June 2014). 4 Jomana Qaddour, “Unlocking the Alawite Conundrum in Syria,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 2013), p. 67. 5 UNHCR country operations profile – Syrian Arab Republic, 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486a76.html; see also UNHCR Regional Response, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 6 Mona Alami, “Losing Syria’s Economic Future,” Sada, November 19, 2013, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/11/19/losingsyria-s-economic-future/gu5h 1/4 7 Omar S. Dahi, “Syria in Fragments: The Politics of the Refugee Crisis,” Dissent, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2014, p. 45. 3

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zenship. This in fact contained a significant opportunity for Levant minorities to enhance their social status and long term security. The Alawites essentially stood at a crossroads in their struggle to avoid marginalisation in Syria and the wider Arab-Islamic world. Previously, the sect had managed to mitigate the impact of their minority status and enhance their community’s general situation and security by adapting to change and highlighting their Arab ethnicity, Shi‘a religious identity or by presenting an ambiguous, changeable identity. From the perspective of the Alawite community’s ability to adapt to major socio-political shifts in the Levant, this chapter assesses the dichotomy of threat and opportunity to minorities from the Arab Spring Alawites are most commonly categorised as a minority due to their religious identity which places them outside of mainstream Islam. Alongside pre-Islamic Gnostic beliefs, such as cosmological and cosmogonical ‘salvation dramas,’ and metempsychosis (or reincarnation of the soul), their beliefs include the elevation of the fourth Islamic caliph and first Shi‘a Imam ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib to near divine status. 8 The elevation of ‘Ali is considered to be an exaggeration by most Shi‘a Muslims and unacceptable by many Sunni Muslims. 9 According to this unique religious identity, the Alawites form a numerical minority in all three states where they are found in significant numbers. The former belief was made clear to this author by an anonymous Alawite religious leader, who explained that when an old man dies a child containing the soul of the deceased is born; he then presented an illustration depicting a man entering a door and a child exiting on the opposite side. 9 On Alawite beliefs see Meir M Bar-Asher and Aryeh Kofksy, The Nusayri-‘Alawī Religion: An Enquiry into its Theology and Liturgy, (Leiden: Brill, 2002); Yaron Friedman, The Nusayrī –‘Alawīs: An Introduction to the Religion, History and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria, (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Tord Olsson, “The Gnosis of Mountaineers and Townspeople: The Religion of the Syrian Alawites, or the Nusairis,” in T. Olsson, et al. (eds.), Alevi Identity, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1998), p. 178; Matti Moosa, Extremist Shiites, The Ghulat Sects, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988), p. 339. 8

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Accurate figures are unavailable for any of the major Alawite populations, but in Lebanon they are estimated at less than 3 per cent of the Lebanese population, 10 10–15 per cent of Syria’s population, 11 and, less than 1 per cent in Turkey. 12 There is also a small community of around 2200 Alawites in the Golan Heights village of Ghajar, who presently fall under Israeli control. 13 Overall, the Alawites possibly number around 3–4 million concentrated in the north-eastern Mediterranean littoral, extending from northern Lebanon through coastal Syria and into Turkey’s Hatay, Mersin and Adana provinces. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the Alawites contradicted common descriptions of tenuous religious minorities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), who, lacking in political and numerical power, persist only at the toleration of religious Raphael Lefevre, “Power Struggles Among the Alawites in Lebanon,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 January, 2014, www.carnegie endowment.org, (accessed 14 April, 2014). 11 There has not been a Syrian census containing sectarian information since 1960. Demographer Onn Winckler argues, however, that the Syrian Alawite population is possibly much higher than the usual estimate of 12 per cent; see: Onn Winckler, Arab Political Demography: Population Growth, Labor Migration and Natalist Policies, 2nd ed. (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), p. 34; see also, Yahya Sadowski, “The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria,” in S. Telhamy & M. Barnett, (eds.), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, (London: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 144. 12 The Alawite populations of the Turkish provinces of Adana and Mersin were estimated at between 247,000 and 329,000 in 2000 by Prochazka-Eisl, G. and Prozchazka, S. The Plain of Saints and Prophets, The Nusayri-Alawi Community of Cilicia (Southern Turkey) and its Sacred Places, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010), p. 59; In 2011 Alawite informants in Antakya estimated the population of their community as approximately 500,000 out of a total population of 1,500,000 in the Hatay region, Turkish Statistical Institute, www.turkstat.gov.tr (accessed 14 April, 2014). 13 Asher Kaufman, “Let Sleeping Dogs Lie,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 63. No. 4, (Autumn 2009), p. 541. 10

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or ethnic majorities – in most cases Arab or Sunni Islamic. 14 Alawites are Arabs and therefore can be placed within the ethnic majority in the northern Levant, which is at least 90 per cent Arab. 15 Also, while Alawites are a minority by virtue of their religious identity in three main states where they are found, in the geographical area where they are concentrated, they are perhaps a 60–70 per cent majority 16 – although this proportion has possibly reduced due to Sunni migrants arriving from the conflict areas of the Syrian interior since 2011. In the city of Latakia, Alawites are a 55–60 per cent majority in a population approaching 1 million, resulting in the largest metropolitan centre in the Arab world without an orthodox Sunni and/or Twelver Shi‘a Islamic majority. 17 Moreover, rather than a politically disempowered minority, the Alawites have frequently been defined as politically dominant since the rise to power of the Arab socialist Ba‘ath Party in Syria in 1963, and the subsequent political ascendency of Alawite individuals, including Alawite strongman Salah Jadid in 1966–1970, former president Hafiz alAsad in 1970–2000, and the current president, Bashar al-Asad, from 2000 to the present. 18 Despite the sect’s non-typical status as Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd ed. (Jefferson: McFarland, 2002), p. 13. 15 CIA World Factbook, Syrian Arab Republic, https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate _sy.html; CIA World Fact Book, Lebanon, https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html, (accessed 17 June 2014). 16 French data from 1936 put the Alawites as 69, the Sunnis 17, and the Christians 14 per cent of the Alawite state, Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 207, n. 1. 17 The only possible exception is the city of Muscat in Oman. The Alawite population grew from 29 per cent of the population of Latakia in 1947 to an estimated 55 per cent majority in 1994. Fabrice Balanche, “Le cadre alaouite I, Alaouites: une secte au pouvoir,” Outre Terre Vol. 2, No. 14 (2006), 79; Sadowski 2002, p. 144. 18 See for example: Mahmud Faksh, “The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.20, No.2 (April 1984), pp. 133–153; Daniel Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of Power in 14

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a minority and the domination of Alawite individuals in Syrian politics from the 1960s, four years after the start of the Arab Spring, the Alawites were possibly one of the most at risk minorities in the Middle East.

CONCEPTUALISING ‘MINORITY’ IN THE LEVANT

The term “minority” is problematic in terms of providing a concrete categorisation of groups in the Levant. The minority concept generally implies more than simple numerical relativity between small and large groups in a given polity. It has rather been considered as a euphemism for inferior groups “possessing cultural or physical qualities not approved or preferred by the larger – more dominant – population.” 19 Minorities are, therefore, often related with other negative concepts like “victimisation,” “exploitation,” “injustice” and political instability. 20 In 1946 the veteran Syrian nationalist, Jamil Mardam Bey, showed his deep concern around the ‘problem of minorities,’ which he saw as a “grave threat” to the new Syrian state. 21 This revealed an exclusionary view of certain groups who did not match the numerically and socially dominant identity, which in the modern Syrian state meant Sunni Muslim Arabs (who comprised at least sixty per cent of the new state, excluding the predominantly Sunni Kurds). 22 In light of Syria’s twenty-first century turmoil it would seem that the challenge of politically and ideologically reconciling Syria’s diverse demography was never successfully resolved, which warrants a close re-examination Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp. 429–450; E. Zisser, “The ‘Alawis, Lords of Syria: From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect”, in Ofra Bengio & G. Ben-Dor, eds., Minorities and the State in the Arab World, (Boulder & London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1999). 19 Doris Wilkinson, “Rethinking the Concept of ‘Minority’: A Task for Social Scientists and Practitioners,” Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 2000), p. 116. 20 David Nibert, “Minority Group as Sociological Euphemism,” Race, Gender & Class, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1996), pp. 129–36, at 131. 21 Salma Mardam-Bey, Syria’s Quest for Independence 1939–1945 (Beirut: Ithaca Press, 1994), p. xxiv. 22 Onn Winckler, 2009, p. 34.

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of the role and situation of minorities. On the other hand, in Syria today the on-going emphasis on primordial identities and the welfare of minorities, particularly by Western audiences, raises the ire of many Syrians. A common black joke in Syria is that if the regime kills enough Sunnis they will become a “minority” and the world will take action. Thus, according to this view, a disproportionate emphasis on minorities diverts attention from important universal concepts like political legitimacy, accountability, justice, and dignity. The question of how to consider the idea of minorities is therefore important to understanding the situation of sub-state Levant groups like the Alawites. Even in states and regions with a stable, relatively uncontested political culture, it is not a simple task to clearly define the outlines of minority groups. In the northern Levant region, including Syria and Lebanon, the task is even more difficult as the dominant political culture remains a question of intense contestation. The Levant contains a rich palimpsest of overlaying religious, ethnic and social groups who have coexisted for centuries through many periods of political and social change. How the minorities of this region adapt and assimilate their identities and political behaviour to major political shifts is an important factor in their on-going security. As Albert Hourani put it, Levant minorities are adept in “rapid and superficial assimilation” and “preserving, beneath new modes of behaviour and in new forms, their old ways of living.” 23 These “chameleon-like” characteristics are often based on pragmatic objectives of achieving security for minority groups against a dominant majority. At other times they are emotional reactions to perceived threats based on fear and insecurity. Group behaviour can also reflect the cumulative results of individuals falling back on primordial identities in periods of intense political flux and insecurity. Most of all, Levant minorities seek to shed their “minority” status by looking to engender and exploit changes to dominant political cultures that label them as outside the “mainstream” majority. Accurately reading the direction of shifting political ground is vital for minorities’ decision making processes. In this sense, LeAlbert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London: Oxford University Press, 1946). 23

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vant minorities have often displayed tremendous pragmatism in their political alignments. The leader of the Druze community in Lebanon, Walid Jumblatt, has been described as the “weather vane” of Levant politics for his ability to keep his community’s interests safely aligned with trends in regional politics by regularly switching between opposing political camps. 24 The Alawites also exercised pragmatism in periods of political transformation; this approach helped guide the community through a turbulent period of political change in the first half of the twentieth century, as power in the northern Levant passed from the Ottomans to the French to the independent Syrian state. Each political change necessitated an accommodation with new hegemonic identities: from Sunni Islam and Ottoman identity, to the Levantine sub-national identities promoted by the French in the 1920s and 1930s, and finally to Syrian and Arab identities in the 1950s and 1960s. 25 Most of all, it is important to stress that minority status in the Levant is not fixed. Major political and social shifts in the region have often pushed groups into minority status and brought others into the mainstream majority. The Arab Spring represents another major shift in Levant politics, although it remains unclear what the new hegemonic identity will be in Syria following the current conflict and which groups will be marginalised or enfranchised. Overall, the minorities in the Levant are not passive actors or victims of the course of history and they are constantly manoeuvering and competing in the arena of ideology and politics to move from minority status toward the security of the mainstream majority. Successfully interpreting the nature of change can assist minorities to pragmatically adapt their identity and behaviour to preserve their security or even allow them to take advantage of openings in the political status quo to reduce their minority status and achieve more sustainable long term socio-political integration. Mara E. Karlin, “The Druze Factor,” Foreign Affairs, 16 February, 2011. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67454/mara-e-karlin/thedruze-factor 25 Goldsmith, Leon. “‘God Wanted Diversity’ Alawite Pluralist Ideals and their Integration into Syrian Society, 1832–1973.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2013): pp. 392–409. 24

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THE ALAWITES AS ARABS

The populations of northwestern Syria began to be arabised from the time of the seventh-century Muslim conquests. The original Alawite missionaries to the coastal regions of Syria were descended from Arab tribes in Iraq. For the Alawites and some Shi’ites, the twentieth-century rise of Arab nationalism finally provided an opportunity to emphasise their ethnic identity as Arabs and become more firmly attached to the mainstream majority in Syria and the wider Arab world. The idea of using ethnic Arab identity as a means of political mobilisation has its roots in the late nineteenthcentury Levant. Leading Shi‘a writer Muhammad Jabir Al Safa claimed that the Shi‘a had been involved in the Arab nationalist movement since 1877. 26 However, it was the Alawites in Syria who more strongly emphasised their Arab identity. The first opportunity Alawites had to benefit from the growing impulse of Arab nationalism came in July 1936, when the Arab nationalist Mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni (1895–1974), issued a fatwa which, astonishingly for a Sunni religious authority, strongly vouched for the Islamic credentials of the Alawites. 27 This was a significant moment for the Alawites that greatly reduced the sect’s minority status as both Arabs and Muslims and came only two months after the Alawite elite, following a historic meeting in Tartous, had decided not to resist the coastal region’s incorporation into the larger Sunni dominated Syrian state. 28 It was not until the 1950s that Arabs fully awoke to the idea of Arab nationalism and it became a dominant force in the Middle East. Driven by the mass appeal of Egypt’s revolutionary president Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the growing Ba’athist political moveYitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 39. 27 R. D. “Une fatwa du Grand Mufti de Jérusalem sur les Alawîtes,” Syria, T. 22, Fasc. 3/4 (1941), p. 299, Institut Francais du Proche-Orient; Yvette Talhamy, “The Fatwas and the Nusayri/Alawis of Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies, 46: 2, 2010, pp. 185–186 28 Gitta Yaffe-Schatzmann, “Alawi Separatists and Unionists: The Events of 25 February 1936,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 35–36. 26

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ments in Syria and Iraq, Arab nationalism surpassed alternative political ideologies founded on Islamic, conservative, socialist or liberal philosophies. This marked a major shift in the Arab world, where Sunni Islam had previously provided the central basis for political legitimacy. At first, many Alawites supported a narrower Syrian nationalism, which would place the sect as one part of a diverse but fundamentally Syrian identity. 29 This idea was promoted by Lebanese Greek Orthodox intellectual Antun Sa‘adeh and the political movement, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). 30 A dominant Syrian identity was attractive for non-Arab communities, which explains why many Kurds favoured the SSNP. 31 Struggles between the SSNP, the Ba’athists and communist movements in Syria resulted in the defeat of Syrian nationalism as a political force in 1955, which was disastrous for the minority status of the Kurds. 32 Alawites, however, pragmatically embraced Arab nationalism and, in coalition with rural Sunnis, played an important part in the vanguard of the Arab socialist Ba’athist movement in Syria, which eventually captured power in Syria in a military coup by Ba’athist military officers in 1963. 33 Key figures in the political transition were the Alawite officers Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad who were dominant figures behind the scenes of Syrian politics throughout the remainder of the 1960s. 34 Michael, H. Van Dusen, “Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 26, No. 2, (Spring 1972), p. 132. 30 Daniel Pipes, “Radical Politics and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Aug., 1988), pp. 303–324. 31 Jordi Tejel, Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics and Society (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 46–49. 32 Pipes, 1988, pp. 303–324. 33 See Raymond Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba’athist Syria: Army, Party, and Peasant (Boulder: Westview, 1990). 34 Malcolm Kerr, “Hafiz Asad and the Changing Patterns of Syrian Politics,” International Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer 1973), 694; Martin Seymour, “The Dynamics of Power in Syria since the Break with Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan., 1970), p. 37. 29

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The calamitous defeat of the Arab states by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War marked a turning point for Arab nationalism as a dominant ideology in the Arab world, and subsequently Islamic identity steadily re-emerged as a political force. 35 Between 1976 and 1982 the resilience of rural-based Arab socialism as the hegemonic political culture in Syria was tested by a determined revolt against the Ba’ath regime by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group with roots in the conservative Sunni, urban merchant class. 36 After a long, often vicious, struggle the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, who were portrayed as extremist terrorists by the Syrian regime, 37 was finally defeated with devastating effect in the central Syrian city of Hama in February 1982. 38 As many as 20,000 occupants of the city were killed in two weeks of intense fighting. 39 While the Ba‘ath regime’s position was secured by its victory over the Muslim Brotherhood, its legitimacy and ideology of Arab socialism was permanently tainted by the massacre. At the same time, Egypt, under Anwar Sadat, had signed a peace accord with Israel in 1979 and shifted away from Arab nationalism to look inwards to its own interests and national identity. For the Alawites, the decline of Arab nationalism threatened to restore their minority status, therefore, they turned to alternative aspects of their identity to try and mitigate their minority status and consolidate their security. The revival of Islam as a political force Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 252. 36 Itzchak Weismann, “Sa’id Hawwa: The Making of a Radical Muslim Thinker in Modern Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Oct., 1993), pp. 601–623 37 Marvine Howe, “Moslem Extremists in Syria trying to Destabilise Government with Terrorist Attacks,” New York Times, August 20, 1979. 38 Omar Ilsley, “Syria: Hama Massacre,” in ed. Heribert Adam, Hushed Voices, Unacknowledged Atrocities of the 20th Century (Berkshire: Berkshire Academic Press, 2011). 39 This estimate is based on population estimates of the city before and after the conflict. See UN Demographic Yearbooks, 1981, p. 279, and 1984, p. 272. 35

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following the 1979 Iranian Revolution provided an opportunity to reassert their Shi‘a Islamic identity. Syria continued to present itself as the “beating heart” of Ba‘athism and Arab nationalism, however; especially following the defeat of the Iraqi Ba‘ath regime by the United States in 2003. Although Ba‘athism increasingly became a façade, into 2014 it continued to be the official ideology of the Syrian state and an important source of rhetoric for the regime against the opposition movements, which it presented as extremists and terrorists. 40

THE ALAWITES AS MUSLIMS

A major change in Levant politics was the re-emergence of Islamic identity as an important political force following Iran’s 1979 revolution. 41 This created incentives for Alawites to assert a Shi‘a Islamic identity and find common interests with Lebanon’s Twelver Shi‘a community as a way of mitigating their minority status. The origins of the Alawites’ deviation from orthodox Shi‘a Islam can be placed around the time of the minor occultation of the twelfth and last Shi‘a Imam, Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Mahdī, in 874CE. A charismatic individual by the name of Muhammad ibn Nusayr, who was a companion of the eleventh Imam, Hasan al-Askari, and a member of the Shi‘a Banū Numayr tribe in Iraq, claimed that he was the bab (door) to the Imams (descendants of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib). 42 Ibn Nusayr’s claim was unacceptable to the Shi‘a establishment and he was discredited. Alawites regard the poor treatment of their founder as unjustified as an Alawite shaykh explained in 2011, “there [was] a group of people who attacked the Lord Muhammad Ibn Nusayr. They attacked him to lower him, to lower him and to lowArticles promoting this discourse are published daily in Syrian state newspapers. See for example, “Army inflicts heavy losses upon terrorists in several areas”, Syrian Arab News Agency, 17 June, 2014, http://sana.sy/eng/337/2014/06/17/550630.htm (accessed 18 June, 2014). 41 N. Al-Rodhan, G. Herd & L. Watanabe, Critical Turning Points in the Middle East 1915–2015 (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011), pp. 116– 128. 42 Friedman, 2010, pp. 6–7. 40

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er the future that was reserved for him. They accused him without any foundation – lies.” 43 The casting out of Ibn Nusayr from the mainstream of Shi‘a Islam essentially began the Alawites’ history as a minority according to religious identity. The sect’s early followers migrated from Iraq to Syria in the tenth century and were relatively secure until the Sunni Seljuk Turks swept into Syria after their historic defeat of the Byzantines at Manzikert in 1071, and asserted a new Sunni ascendency, intolerant of heterodox sects like the Alawites. 44 The sect’s missionaries and followers migrated to the coastal mountains of the northern Levant where they proselytised among the rural Shi‘a and heterodox Christians. 45 In the early fourteenth century three fatwas by the conservative Sunni cleric, Ahmed Ibn Taymiyya, officially determined the Alawites as heretical enemies of Islam and justified their persecution by the Sunni Mamluk state. 46 Thereafter, the Alawites were forced to endure varying degrees of marginalisation and discrimination under Mamluk and then Ottoman imperial rule from the late thirteenth century up to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. Alawites remain hostile and deeply suspicious of the conservative Wahhabi and Salafist strains of Sunni Islam that Taymiyya helped to inspire. 47 During this period the Alawites had limited options for mitigating their minority status, therefore, they relied on a tactic of maintaining ambiguity around their identity and re-

Anonymous (Alawite shaykh), interview by Leon Goldsmith, Antakya, Turkey, March 2011. 44 Xavier de Planhol, Minorités En Islam, Géographie Politique et Sociale, Paris: Flammarion, 2007, p. 85. 45 Friedman, 2010, p. 37. 46 Yvette Talhamy, 2010, pp. 178–179; Yaron Friedman, “Ibn Taymiyya’s Fatwa against the Nusayri-Alawi Sect,” Der Islam, Vol.82, No.2, (2005), p. 350. 47 Anonymous (Alawite shaykh), interview by Leon Goldsmith, Antakya, Turkey, March 2011. 43

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taining as much autonomy as possible in the inhospitable coastal mountains of north-western Syria. 48 Despite a longstanding alliance between Hizballah and the Syrian regime, in the contemporary Levant it would be too simplistic to place the Shi‘a of Lebanon, who comprise around a third of the Lebanese population, 49 and the Arab Alawites of Syria and southern Turkey into one broad grouping as there are significant differences in the historical development and religious beliefs of both groups. Twelver Shi‘ites have roots in the Lebanon stretching back to the seventh century, 50 whereas the Alawites (or more accurately, Nusayris) did not appear in the northern Levant until the tenth century. The Lebanese Shi‘a belong to the main branch of Twelver Shi‘a Islam and reject Alawite beliefs around the divine qualities of Ali ibn Abi Talib and Muhammad Ibn Nusayr’s claim to be the bab (door) to the hidden Imams. Twelver Shi‘a Islam certainly does not contain any of the Gnostic beliefs attributed to Alawites. 51 Although there remain question marks around the Alawites’ Shi‘a connections, in recent decades Alawite and Shi‘a authorities outwardly professed a basic level of doctrinal unity. Alawite efforts to emphasise their Shi‘a Islamic identity intensified throughout the 1970s following the rise to power of Hafiz al-Asad, and the subsequent challenge to his rule by the Muslim Brotherhood. Notable Shi‘a authorities who tried to bolster Alawite acceptance in the Islamic world as Shi‘a Muslims included the Ayatollah Hasan Mahdi al-Shirazi 52 and Musa Al-Sadr in 1972 and 1973. 53 The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, and the growing assertiveness of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, marked a shift See, Henry Maundrell, A Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem in 1697 (Beirut: Kyats, 1963), pp. 16–17. 49 CIA World Fact Book, Lebanon, https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html 50 Yitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 29. 51 Ibid. 52 Talhamy, 2010, p. 188. 53 Talhamy, 2010, p. 190. 48

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towards the re-emergence of religious identity as a politically influential force in the Middle East. Alawites, therefore, sought to more closely align their interests and identity with revolutionary Iran and the Lebanese Shi‘a. This effort continued in the 1990s, when numerous scholarly publications appeared, arguing the close linkage of the Alawite religion to the Jafa‘ari school of Shi‘a Islam. 54 And in early 2011 a leading Alawite shaykh (religious and community leader) described the identity and beliefs of the Alawites as closely aligned with the wider Shi‘a community: The Alawites are in reality Shi‘a because the Shi‘a are those that are linked to ‘Ali and who love ‘Ali. And they follow ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib because there are two schools: the Ahl al-Bayt and the school of the Sunnah. So the doctrine of the Ahl al-Bayt is expressed by the Alawites, the Shi‘a, Jafaari and the Husayneen. And all these schools are linked to ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. So we consider that the Imam and the Wali (government) are [based in] the 12th Imam and not in the caliph, because the caliphs did not come from the will of God but from politics. 55

Declarations of Alawi-Shi‘a unity were partially based on the political interests of the elites of the two communities; however, the key point is that Alawites sought to reduce their minority status in the wider Levant and Middle East by affirming their religious identity as Shi‘a Muslims. Political and strategic support between Alawites and the Shi‘a has subsequently been a feature of the modern politics of the Middle East, as the seemingly mismatched Syrian Ba‘ath regime and the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with the Lebanese Shi‘a, under the Amal and Hizballah political movements, developed a thoroughly durable regional alliance. 56 The strength of the See for example, Muneer Al Shareef, Muslims and Alawites: Who Are They And Where Are They, (Beirut: Muasasat al Balagh, 1994), p. 8; Shaykh Ali Aziz al-Ibrahim, The Alawites and the Shi’a (Beirut: 1992). See also, Ulrike Freitag, “In search of ‘Historical Correctness’: The Ba’th Party in Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 12–13. 55 Alawite shaykh, (Anonymous), interview by Leon Goldsmith, Antakya, Turkey, March 2011. 56 Goodarzi, 2006, p. 271. 54

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partnership was first shown in the Iran-Iraq war, where Syria sided with Iran against its fellow Arab Ba‘athists in Iraq, and continues to be demonstrated in Iran and Hizballah’s interventions on behalf of the Syrian regime with military and political support throughout the post-2011 uprising. There is of course an important geopolitical dimension to the alliance as Syria remains Iran’s main geographic conduit into the Arab world and the Shi‘a community of southern Lebanon, which forms the front line of resistance to Israel. 57 However, as was explained by an Alawite religious leader in 2011, from Alawite perspectives the relationship is “important in both religion and politics”: […], the Shi‘a and the Alawites are one community, which unites them to the Ahl al-Bayt. During the Iran-Iraq war or the Iraq-US war, Syria was on the side of Iran. Why? Because Iran was the one that was oppressed, so Iran will be on the side of Syria if there is a political, economic or religious problem. 58

The Syrian regime’s strong relations with Iran and Hizballah appeared to pay dividends for the Alawites’ minority status as this alliance, which called itself the “resistance front,” gathered significant moral and ideological momentum in the Arab-Islamic world in the twenty-first century. 59 By confronting Israel with strong rhetoric and military engagements, first, in the 2006 Lebanon-Israel war and, then, in the 2008–2009 Gaza war, the resistance front increasingly gained influence in terms of ideological soft power with the Middle Eastern public, compared to other regional powers, who had reached accommodations with the Israeli state. Similarly to how Arab nationalism cut across religious and sectarian identities, the resistance front also promised to reduce Alawite minority status, as public support for the resistance grew in the wider ArabIslamic street generally, but also through direct cross-sectarian alliBassel F. Salloukh, “The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East,” The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2013), p. 38. 58 Alawite shaykh, March 2011. 59 See Larbi Sadiki, “Reframing resistance and democracy: narratives from Hamas and Hizbullah,” Democratization, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 350–376. 57

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ances with the Sunni Islamist Palestinian movement, Hamas, as well as parts of the Christian community in Lebanon. 60 One of the first casualties of the 2011 Syrian uprising would be the alliance between the Syrian regime and Hamas, whose leadership quickly distanced itself from the Syrian regime. 61 However, in the years before the Syrian crisis, the Syrian president was highly popular; in 2009 the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo, estimated him to be the “the most popular leader” in the Middle East. 62 These positive signs for Alawite acceptance in wider ArabIslamic society, were, however, interrupted by the next major shift in the Arab world, the Arab Spring.

[MIS]READING THE ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA

There have been many different assessments of the nature and evolution of the Syrian uprising. It was possibly a genuinely democratic emancipatory movement, a socio-economic reaction to neoliberal economic reforms of the previous decade, 63 and the effects of severe drought in 2006–2009. Some argued the case of foreign intervention and regional geopolitics, 64 while others explain the uprising in Syria in religious and sectarian terms, as a Sunni Islamic movement seeking to throw off the minority rule of the Alawites and the secular Ba‘ath regime. 65 The uprising most likely contained many of “Aoun from Syria: Time to Return to Our Roots, Get Out of Isolation,” Naharnet, 9 February, 2011, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/ en/2885–aoun-from-syria-time-to-return-to-our-roots-get-out-ofisolation. 61 Erik Mohns and André Bank, “Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of the Resistance axis?” Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2012. 62 “Assad no longer stands in his father’s shadow,” Ha’aretz, Israel, June 21, 2009. 63 Lisa Wedeen, “Ideology and Humor in Dark Times: Notes from Syria,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Summer 2013), pp. 841–873. 64 Khaldoun Khashanah (2014) “The Syrian Crisis: a systemic framework,” Contemporary Arab Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 1–21. 65 Ted Galen Carpenter, “Tangled Web: The Syrian Civil War and Its Implications,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Volume 24, Number 1, Winter 2013, pp. 1–11 60

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these elements; however, it was at base a fundamentally spontaneous social movement with no discernible leadership or specific objective other than demands for a change from the status quo. In September 2011, an ordinary citizen stood in the midst of a peaceful protest march in the mixed Sunni, Alawite and Christian coastal city of Banyas in September 2011 and tried to explain clearly what was changing in Syria. In these days we make demonstrations to claim our rights, our justice, and our freedom. [But] they say we are Salafi, we are Al-Qaeda, we are terrorists and we want to make an Islamic state here. I say it’s a big lie…They say we want to [incite] sectarianism. No! In Banyas, in all of Syria ... Christian and Muslim are brothers. In the street you can see the mosque and the church. Sunni, Alawi, Shi‘a, Kurdi, Druze, we are all brothers, we are all friends, we are all neighbours ...Why do they [the Syrian regime] kill us? Why [do] they kill people in Dera’a? ... [look at this] demonstration in Banyas... hundreds of people say that they want freedom, they want their rights, they want justice in Syria. We want to make real Syria, true Syria. 66

This common narrative of the protest movement rejected sectarian, religious and interventionist theories about the nature of the uprising in Syria. Moreover, the vision that is portrayed for a “real”, “true” Syria, involving all the different ethnic and religious groups, reflects the political and social reality of the diverse Levantine palimpsest, and invokes a diverse civic nationalism that transcends religious and ethnic identities in a way that Arab or Islamic nationalism could not. The common protest chant in 2011, “wahid, wahid, al sha‘ab al Surī wahid,” (one, one, one, the Syrian people are one) also invoked a diverse unity and sought to counter the centrifugal forces of ethno-religious insecurity. 67 If this was the real nature of the political shift in Syria it marked a historic opportunity for the Alawites to achieve genuine social integration and sustainable secuSham Network, SNN, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=CDuc76Lk9XY (uploaded 13 September, 2011). 67 Christa Salamandra, “Sectarianism in Syria: Anthropological Reflections,” Middle East Critique, Vol. 22, No. 3, p. 303. 66

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rity in Syria as part of the majority, based on citizenship rather than ethnicity or religion. Numerous Alawites participated in the early peaceful demonstrations in Homs’ Clock Square and in protests in Damascus. 68 Organised Alawite opposition was demonstrated by the Party of Modernity and Democracy, which represented Alawites from the Hama district at an opposition conference in Antalya, Turkey on 1 June 2011. 69 The party claimed that the regime was manipulating Alawite insecurities and that the sect’s best prospects lay in embracing a path towards a liberated, democratic Syria. 70 Alawite religious shaykhs from Homs, reportedly tried to distance the sect from the regime in September 2011, after government crackdowns on the protest movement intensified. 71 And in late-March 2013, 150 Alawite notables held a conference in Cairo to voice opposition to the regime and show support for a pluralist state beneficial to the security of minorities. One delegate at the conference, Alawite lawyer, Issam Ibrahim, worried that if a real change to a democratic system could not be achieved the impetus for change would transform into religious fundamentalism. 72 For many Alawites the decision whether to abandon the regime came down to pragmatic considerations. Through the first year-and-a half of the uprising supporting Bashar al-Assad seemed a pragmatic choice. The internal and external opposition was fragmented, the international community was not intervening in the crisis, and Aleppo and Damascus remained quiet. Thus it seemed Sunda Suleiman, (Representative of the Syrian Arab Alawite Society), interview by V. Ayhan & O. Orhan, Antalya, Turkey, “An Interview with Sunda Suleiman,” ORSAM, June 1, 2011, March 14, 2014, http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showOrsamGuest.aspx?ID=182; Q&A: Nir Rosen on Syrian sectarianism, Al Jazeera, 18 February, 2012. 69 Ibid. 70 Sunda Suleiman, interview, Orsam, Antalya, Turkey, 1 June, 2011 71 “Prominent Alawite clerics denounce Assad regime’s ‘atrocities’.” Al Arabiya, September 12, 2011. http://english.alarabiya.net/ articles/2011/09/12/166498.html (accessed March 14, 2014). 72 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Fearing stark future, Syrian Alawites meet in Cairo,” Reuters, 23 March, 2013. 68

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the uprising would eventually be brought under control. A potential turning point for Alawites came in mid-2012 when the regime suffered severe setbacks, with large scale rebel assaults on Damascus and Aleppo and the successful assassination of four top regime figures in central Damascus on July 18. 73 Rare Alawite defections also began to increase in the Syrian Arab Army, 74 as the regime struggled to simultaneously control its borders, large parts of the countryside and the two major cities. Some Alawites came to a decision that supporting the regime was a lost cause, as one Alawite explained, “It doesn’t seem to be in our interest, the regime is losing.” 75 In general, however, the majority of the sect remained, at least tacitly, supportive of the regime throughout the crisis. There are several key factors which negatively influenced Alawite perceptions of the uprising and kept them from joining the opposition movement in significant numbers. First, collective memories of the sect’s long history as a rural peasantry, subject to Sunni Muslim dominance, raised concerns among Alawites about a return to second class status. As anthropologist Christa Salamandra has pointed out, the term ‘Alawi often carries connotations of both class and religious identity in Syria. 76 Alawites are therefore sensitive to references to their rural origins. Many Alawites in Latakia were reportedly outraged to hear an anti-regime protest chant, which suggested Syrian president Bashar al-Asad should “go back to the farm.” 77 Second, since the 1960s Alawites have been disproportionately recruited in the public sector, including the military and security serLeon Goldsmith, “Is Alawite Solidarity Finally Breaking?” Hurst Blog, 25 Aug. 2015, http://www.hurstpublishers.com/is-alawite-solid arity-finally-breaking/ 74 Oren Kessler, “Alawite defections from Syrian army may be on rise,” Jerusalem Post, 8 March 2012. 75 “Damascus chaos strikes fear in Assad’s Alawite bastion,” Reuters, 22 July, 2012 76 Christa Salamandra, “Sectarianism in Syria,” 2013. 77 Nir Rosen, “Assad’s Alawites: The Guardians of the throne,” Al Jazeera, 10 October, 2011. 73

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vices as well as in the extensive bureaucracy of the socialist state. 78 Many Alawites are therefore heavy reliant on the state for their livelihoods, which provided strong disincentives to join the opposition. Thirdly, a general fear of sectarianism hung over the Alawite community as the uprising unfolded. This security dilemma turned to somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy as the security situation deteriorated in contested parts of the country. Sectarian kidnappings and murders escalated in Homs in mid-2012, with both proregime and opposition sides blaming the other for attempting to incite sectarianism. 79 Many were convinced that the uprising was an attempt to create an Islamic state in Syria, and suspected the involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in the uprising, seeking revenge for the Syrian government’s massacre in Hama in 1982. 80 In parallel to rising Alawite insecurity and sectarianism, anti-Alawite and Shi‘a sentiments began to rise among Sunnis, many of whom had previously admired their government and Hizballah’s strong resistance against the West and Israel, but felt betrayed by Asad and Hizballah’s stances in support of the Syrian regime against their revolutionary movement. 81 Alawite insecurities about a social reversal, income security, and sectarianism made them easy targets for political manipulation. From the very earliest days of the uprising the regime stood accused of exploiting Alawite insecurities. Veteran political dissident Aref Dalila claimed the regime played the “sectarian card” in its response to anti-regime protests in Latakia in late-March 2011. 82 There was evidence to support this view as intelligence officers actively funnelled groups of Alawite youths towards the protests in central Latakia to incite sectarian violence, while unidentified snipBatatu, 1981, p. 332. Michael Weiss, “Sectarianism or a Trap by Assad?” The Weekly Standard, 22 July, 2012. 80 Ibid., pp. 7 and 13. 81 Q & A: Nir Rosen on Syrian Sectarianism, Al Jazeera, 18 February, 2012. 82 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Notables calm sectarian tensions in Syrian city,” Reuters, 28 March, 2011. 78 79

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ers fired arbitrarily into the crowd from rooftop positions. 83 Key instruments for the regime were irregular units known as Shabiha, which were predominantly, but not exclusively, Alawites. These groups originated out of the organised criminal gangs who operated with a high level of impunity in the 1980s in and around Latakia. 84 The Shabiha groups were used as shock troops to break up protests with lethal force and to generally spread terror in an attempt stem the tide of open dissent sweeping the country. Atrocities perpetrated by the Shabiha against civilians, such as in the village of Houla in May 2012, and in Bayda and Banyas in May 2013, indirectly implicated the wider Alawite sect in their crimes and raised the stakes of a regime collapse. Escalating the overtly sectarian mobilisation of Alawites, between November and January 2013, the Asad regime organised the various Alawite militias into loyalist units called the “National Defence Forces (NDF).” 85 Mirroring Iran’s support to the Shi‘a militias of southern Lebanon in the 1980s, the NDF is trained and overseen by Hizballah and the Iranian Quds Force, entrenching Alawite dependence on its Shi‘a allies. 86 After the potential turning point in mid-2012 passed without any significant increase in Alawite defections, the general trajectory was toward a protracted and bloody conflict, which was officially declared a civil war (or non-international armed conflict) in June 2012. 87 The declaration of civil war lessened the chance of international intervention on humanitarian grounds and essentially equalised the parties to the conflict as far as the international community was concerned. It became clear that the United States or NATO Author’s observations, Latakia, 25 March, 2011 Yassin al-Haj Salih, “The Syrian Shabiha and Their State,” Heinrich Boll Stuftung, April 2012, p. 14. 85 Isabel Nassief, 2014, 13; Jonathan Spyer, “Fragmented Syria,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 2013), p. 11. 86 Charles Lister, “Dynamic stalemate: Surveying Syria’s Military Landscape,” Brookings Doha Center, May 2014, p. 3. 87 Louis Charbonneau, “Syria conflict now a civil war, U.N. peacekeeping chief says,” Reuters, 12 June, 2012, http://uk.mobile.reuters.com/ article/topNews/idUKBRE85B1FM20120612 83 84

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was not going to intervene militarily. This fact was underlined when the “red line” threshold for intervention in Syria, set by U.S. President Barack Obama regarding the use of chemical weapons, passed without any action – despite the suspected use of chemical weapons against the Damascus suburb of Ghouta in August 2013. The Syrian regime denied the attack, which killed around 1,400 people, including women and children, but rapidly agreed to dispose of its chemical weapons stockpile in a last minute deal mediated by Russia to forestall U.S. military strikes. 88 The U.S. withdrawal from its commitment to intervene in Syria was a significant moment for the Alawites, due to the effect it had on the character of the opposition. Secular, western supported, moderate opposition groups (such as the FSA) lost credibility and support among the broader opposition movement. Hence, from mid-2013 Sunni Islamist groups increasingly assumed the lead role in fighting the regime. A new opposition structure, the Islamic Front, was formed combining a number of smaller Islamist groups – including some formerly aligned with the FSA – into an armed force of approximately 50,000–60,000 fighters. 89 The conflict consequently took on a more explicitly sectarian nature and limited the scope for dialogue between Alawites and the opposition regarding the shape of a post-war Syrian state. Regardless of the ideology of the opposition groups, a common red line for the disparate opposition was the insistence that Bashar al-Asad step down as president. Hence, to a significant degree, Alawite support to Asad effectively undermined their ability to negotiate over the nature of the political shift in Syria, which could allow for the sect’s on-going security after the conflict. Glimpses of Alawite adaptation to changing circumstances and rising security challenges have emerged. In early April 2016 several major European news agencies were approached by a small group of Syrians calling themselves the Alawite Initiative Forum, a group which claimed to represent the interests of approximately forty per cent of the Alawite sect. They publicized a document Mark Fitzpatrick (2013) “Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 107–114 89 Charles Lister, May 2014, p. 2. 88

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supposedly attributed to influential tribal and religious Alawite sheikhs inside Syria, called “Declaration of an Identity Reform”. 90 Politically this document is vague but fascinatingly appears to distance the Alawite sect from the regime, without necessarily indicating any substantive move towards the opposition, which it nonetheless describes as “an initiative of noble anger”. 91 Without naming the regime directly, the declaration implicitly proposes a political transition away from “totalitarian rule” to a new era of “democratic… national integration”. 92 The declaration does not explicitly endorse a political or military reorientation but rather seems to be an aspirational statement that the Alawites, as a separate branch of Islam, require a kind of “mental revolution” in order to transcend their “persecuted-minority” mentality if they are to achieve any future security in Syrian lands. Most astonishingly, the declaration tries to separate Alawism from orthodox Twelver Shi‘ism, saying that “we hereby decline any fatwa that seeks to appropriate the Alawites and considers Alawism an integral part of Shiism…” 93 This marks a dramatic turnaround from Alawite, Syrianregime and Iranian efforts to cultivate such an association since the 1970s. Hence, many Syrians and Syria observers are skeptical about the validity of the declaration, sensing regime subterfuge or opposition misinformation. Indeed, it seems incredible that these Alawite shaykhs could have managed to circulate this document among influential Alawites inside the regime stronghold of North-West Syria, exit the country in order to present it to an international audience, and then slip safely back into Syria. The deep penetration of the security apparatus into all parts of the Alawite community renders it unlikely that a wide-based and independent Alawite movement could coalesce without drawing the attention of the ubiquitous mukhabarat. There is nonetheless historical precedent for these The Alawite Initiative Forum, “Declaration of an Identity Reform,” trans. & abridged, 2016. English text available at http://www.welt.de/ pdf/1085/Declaration.pdf 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Declaration of an Identity Reform, 2016. 90

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types of declarations by Alawite religious scholars when the security of the sect is under serious threat. For example, the 1936 declaration that defined Alawite identity as “Muslim” and pushed the sect to accept the unity option of joining with the Sunni dominated Syrian interior instead of separation under French protection. For these reasons, the origins, significance and implications of the declaration requires further careful examination by scholars.

A FUTURE FOR ALAWITES?

In 2007, a meeting took place in Damascus between Bashar alAsad and United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-Moon. The conversation concerned the establishment of a special court to prosecute the perpetrators of the political assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister and Sunni leader, Rafiq al-Hariri, on 14 February 2005. Asad told the UN head that “if the Tribunal were established under Chapter 7 of the [UN] Charter, this could easily ignite a conflict which would result in civil war and provoke divisions between Sunni and Shi‘a from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea.” 94 In short, Asad suggested that if the political status quo of the northern Levant was challenged the regional repercussions could be catastrophic. In March 2011, an Alawite shaykh in Antakya, Turkey, echoed this perspective and suggested, “if there is danger for the Alawites in Syria, this will not stay in Syria because there are Alawites in Turkey, in Iran and in Lebanon, and this can spread to all the areas.” 95 These predictions of a Sunni-Shi‘a war spanning the borders of the eastern Middle East could prove proUnited Nations, Note of the Secretary-General’s meeting with His Excellency President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Held at the Palace in Damascus on 24 April, 2007; Chapter 7, article 42, of the UN Charter states: “Should the Security Council consider that [non-violent] measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security,” available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml (accessed August 10, 2008). 95 Anonymous (Alawite shaykh), interview by Leon Goldsmith, Antakya, Turkey, March 2011. 94

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phetic, but they also illustrated how Alawites saw their future security as being linked to the wider Shi‘a community, more so than Arab or even Syrian national identity. If, however, there proves to be substance to apparent Alawite efforts to reorientate their identity away from a close association with the Twelver Shi‘a, as disclosed in the declaration of identity reform, then a reassessment of Alawite security strategies will be necessary, which may reveal a reassertion of Levant minority pragmatism. In the midst of the on-going civil war, Bashar al-Asad sought renewed legitimacy by winning a widely criticised presidential election with 88.7 per cent of the vote in regime held areas. 96 Many Syrians labelled them the “blood elections” based on the brutal repression over the preceding three years that had allowed the incumbent president to reach the, seven yearly, referendum still in power. Shortly afterwards, the ultra-extremist Sunni Islamist organisation ISIS, which had been building its strength in the al-Jazeera region between Syria and Iraq, captured the major northern Iraqi city of Mosul, and declared their intention to establish a Sunni Islamist shari‘a state, spanning north-eastern Syria and north-western Iraq. 97 ISIS’ advances as well as strong Kurdish assertions in northeastern Syria constituted a powerful challenges to the geopolitical structures put in place by European powers in the 1916 Sykes-Picot treaty. Most relevantly for the Alawites, the Syria-Iraqi crisis has the potential to escalate into a sectarian war between Shi‘ites and Sunnis from the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia. In the short term the Syrian regime’s stronger military position, following Russia’s intervention in Syria in late 2015, means that the security of the Alawites as a whole, aside from a high casualty rate among young men in the war and periodic bombings in Alawite districts in cities like Homs and Tartous, is relatively secure. Moreover, the ISIS phenomenon, and ongoing turmoil across “Syrian President Bashar al-Assad wins third term,” BBC Middle East, 5 June 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-2770 6471 (accessed 18 June 2014). 97 “Islamists force 500,000 to flee Mosul,” BBC Middle East, 11 June, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27789229 (accessed 18 June 2014). 96

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the Arab world, could side-line thoughts of democratic pluralist change and shore up the authoritarian rule of the Syrian, and other Middle Eastern regimes. In the longer term, the ISIS conquests, short lived as they may be, foreshadow dangerous trends in Islamic extremism with potentially catastrophic consequences for religious minorities. For the Alawites of the northern Levant, an intensification of Sunni-Shi‘a-Alawi identities amid continued regional conflict would see their status as a Levant minority confirmed. As was the case for much of their history, they could be surrounded by Sunni majorities to the north and to the east. Moreover, their geographic separation from Shi‘a Iran would be become more pronounced. When it began, the Arab Spring in Syria essentially constituted a mass demand for change. Maintaining the status quo was not a realistic possibility, therefore, reading the nature of the change was essential for the Alawites. With the demise of Arab nationalism and the failure to maintain a cross-sectarian resistance front, Alawite options were twofold. They could support a change to a pluralist, civic state based on equal citizenship, which would require trusting the intentions of the Sunni majority in Syria. Or they could fall back on sectarian identities and their Lebanese and Iranian Shi‘a allies, and risk extended conflict and a return to marginalisation in the northern Levant. Fear and political manipulation were major factors in the ability of the Alawites to successfully adapt to shifting political ground, and caused a misreading of the opportunities that existed in the Arab Spring. Looking ahead, it is critical for the Alawites, other religious minorities, and the moderate Syrian opposition, to urgently seek common ground against religious extremism and political manipulation of minority insecurities. This could resuscitate the cross-sectarian impetus for political pluralism that is the only logical change for the northern Levant’s palimpsest of diverse, yet intrinsically interconnected communities.

CHAPTER 5 THE DRUZE AND THE ARAB SPRING LUBNA TARABEY LEBANESE UNIVERSITY The Arab World has been undergoing a series of transformations after the onset of what came to be referred to as the first Arab Uprising in Tunis. What was assumed by many to be a mere opposition to social injustice soon escalated to an uprising, some calling it a revolution, which extended to most of Tunisia. The effects of this uprising soon spread beyond national boundaries reaching other Arab states including Egypt and Syria. These uprisings escalated into long bloody confrontations against ruling regimes, and in the case of Syria continue to be extremely violent. Prior to the uprisings, Syria had enjoyed a long period of political stability under the military based regime of Hafiz al-Assad and later his son Bashar. The situation in Syria, although stable, was characterized by social injustice and the rule was based on fear. This injustice was the fuel that ignited the uprising in Syria after lessons from other Arab uprising inspired the Syrian people to overcome their fear and rise into action. The Syrian uprising escalated quickly, spreading from one area to another. Much has been written about the uprising detailing its beginning and the role played by various groups, particularly the Sunni numerical majority. However, the uprising that brought the people into open confrontation with the regime did not equally extend to all groups, especially minorities such as the Druze. The Druze, although sharing feelings of resentment towards the regime with others, did not, as a group, participate in the armed confrontations. The nonparticipation of the Druze in the Syrian uprising, although referred to in some news reports, was not fully researched. There is no research that attempts to explain this immobility, despite the history 129

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of confrontation between the Druze of the Jabbal and the Baath party in year 1966 1. The Druze seem to continue to support, or at least not stand against, the Assad regime. To truly understand this position, one must study the history of the sect and the political situation of the Druze in Syria, with some reflection on their Lebanese counterparts since the sect, although under the political authority of two states, share a common history and, according to members of the sect, a common future. This discussion is further placed within the context of their status as a religious minority in a Sunni dominated majority.

MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Minorities in the Middle East constitute those groups situated in opposition to dominant power holders throughout history, namely the Sunni Arabs. Although there are some states which were or currently are ruled by non-Sunnis, such as Lebanon or Syria, yet the majority of Arab countries are ruled by Sunnis whose religious ideology support their ruling status in the sense that Sunnis consider that they have a right, religiously speaking, to rule. Nisan affirms that “The Sunni Muslim community especially, beyond its overwhelming majority status, is enthralled historically with a feeling of its natural or divine granted right to rule alien population. Mastery and hegemony characterizes its collective conscience toward weaker smaller communities”. 2 Within such a cultural environment, the minorities, who lack the support of an outside force, feel threatThis confrontation led to the death of the Druze general Saleem Htoum in 1967. Hatoum led a rebellion against the early attempts of the Baath Party to rule Syria. He was against the policies of Salah Jdeed and Hafiz al-Assad and, together with a number of Druze generals, tried to overthrow the Baath Party leadership. His attempts failed after Hafiz alAssad sent airplanes to bombard the Druze areas. This led Hatoum to announce that he was leaving Syria to avoid harm to his fellow Druze. He left to Jordan but returned in 1967 only to be arrested and quickly put to death by the regime. See Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self Expression, 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company Inc. Publishers, 2002). 2 Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East, p. 13. 1

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ened and realize that they cannot enjoy independence or freedom except under secular rule. This is the case of the Druze, who although historically enjoyed a certain level of independence in Mount Lebanon and Syria during the Ottoman rule and to a lesser extent under the Mandate, feel after the establishment of independent Lebanon and Syria a threat to their existence which can only be combated through supporting either a secular state or a rule of another minority. The Druze do not threaten the existence of other groups as the sect does not accept new believers and hence does not engage in religious conflicts except when threatened. Nisan concludes that: “As a closed and non-missionary religion the Druze were liberal and pluralistic in their attitude to ideas and people. What they wanted from others was to be left alone.” 3 This desire to be left alone does not mean that the Druze are not willing to take up arms, engage in conflict and fight when and if they feel a threat to their existence. This attitude of leave and be left alone largely shapes the way they interact with other groups and their reactions to changing socio-political conditions in the areas in which they reside.

THE DRUZE RELIGION: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Druze sect, originally called Tawheed, emerged under the rule of the sixth Fatimid Caliphate Al-Hakim Bi Amr Allah in Cairo. 4 According to Druze understanding, he declared the new faith in 1017 after a prophesying period of twelve years during which emissaries were sent to different parts of the world including present day Syria, Lebanon and Palestine 5 where they became known as the Druze in accordance with one of the main emissaries sent to the Ibid., p. 96. Fou’d Khuri, Imamat al-Shahīd w Imamat al-Batal: al-Tan īm al-Dīnī lada al- Ṭawaif w al- Āqa īat fī al- ʿlam al- ʿrabi (Beirut: Markaz Dar al-Jamiʿh, 1988), p. 180. 5 Sami Makarem, “The Druze Faith.” In The Druze: realities and Perceptions, ed. Kamal Salibi, (London: Druze Heritage foundation, 2005), pp. 2– 16. 3 4

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area – Nashtakin al-Darazi. 6 Although al-Darazi was killed by the believers for misguided teachings, ironically, the sect became known by his name – the Druze. 7 The sect faced a setback upon the disappearance 8 of al-Hakim on the night of 12–13 February 1021. Al-Hakim’s successor, Al-Daher ad-Din Allah, persecuted the believers killing many over a period of six and a half years. 9 The heralding process was resumed in 1026 and continued till 1043 when the new faith was closed to new believers. 10 The persecution led believers to hide their beliefs practicing secrecy. This has created a lot of misconceptions around the sect. Many scholars who wrote about the sect fell victim to the secretive nature of the religion and provided wrong ideas about the faith and its believers. 11

Al-Darazi spread the teachings of the new faith in the area but later became misguided and claimed the imamate for himself. He was later killed by Al-Hakim's orders because he refused to comply with al-Hakim's instructions and taught wrong principles of the faith. Sami Makrem, The Druze Faith (New York: Caravan Books, 1974), p. 22. 7 Jamīl Ābou Tourabī, Man Hom al-Mowaḥīdīn al-Durudh: Nashatihom al-Tarīkhahom, tamadudihom al-Joghrafī, ʿ qidatahom al-Dīnīah, ʿ datohom w taqalidhom, niḍalahom al-Watanī w al-Qawmī, Āshhar 'lamaāhom. (Damascus: Dar ʿlā al-Dīn Lilnasher w al-Tawziʿ w al-Tarjamah, 1988), p. 83. 8 Al-Hakim is said to have disappeared after going on one of his usual mediating excursions to Mount Al-Muqatam near Cairo. He did not return on that date and members of the faith believe that he left the believers to test the depth of their belief. Some scholars claim that he was killed by his sister but the members of the faith believe that being an incarnation of God, that is not a possibility. He chose to leave his earthly form but continued to guide believers through his appointed Imam. See Makarem, 1974 9 Zeidan Atashe, Druze and Jews in Israel: a Shared Destiny (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1995), p. 13. 10 After year 1043 no new believer was allowed to join the faith and it was announced that the new faith had fulfilled its purpose of gathering the believers and no new believer was to join since all people were given the chance to accept the true religious. Those who did not were not religiously prepared to do so. 11 One of the few non-Druze scholars to write about the Druze, the late anthropologists Fuad Khuri falls victim to this misconception. In one 6

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SOCIO-POLITICAL PRESENCE OF THE DRUZE

To protect themselves against persecution, the Druze practice taqiya – concealment behind accepted religious forms and adapted much of mainstream Islamic practices. 12 They observe the principle of al-estitar bilma'louf which is “behavior in accordance with the prevailing or conventional codes or outward assimilation to avoid harmful curiosity”. 13 Although persecution diminished over the years, the practice of taqqiya and al-estitar bilma'louf continued. Mukasa asserts that “To these days, they continue to avoid confrontation or contact with the members of dominant religions in the areas”. 14 These social practices coupled with their distinguishing beliefs of reincarnation, freedom and equality 15 have created a of his early books on religions in the Middle East, he claims that the Druze can join the religious stratum at the age of fifty. See Khuri (1988), 288. In fact, the initiation into the religious stratum has nothing to do with age – it is a variable of the ability of the initiate to acquire knowledge and memorize the scriptures, as well as, his/her moral conduct as evaluated by other members of the religious stratum. 12 For example, the Druze pray the Islamic prayer in funerals. They follow same rules of inheritance of Islam but added the freedom of testation. 13 Intisar Azzam, Change for Continuity: the Druze in America, (Beirut: Entreprise Universitare d'Etude et du Publication, 1997), pp. 27–8. 14 Sahar Mukasa, Comprehensive Bibliography of the Druze Religion (New York: The Druze Research and Publication Institute, 2004), p. 101. 15 Reincarnation is a basic belief among the Druze and one that sets them apart from main stream Islamic sects. Reincarnation, according to the Druze, is a reflection of the principle of Tawheed where the physical and the spiritual cannot be separated and experience can only be realized in a human body. Reincarnation allows the spirit enough experiences to acquire knowledge of God and of its own true godly nature (for more see Tarabey (2013), chapter two). Freedom, likewise, is highly valued in the sect since members of the faith freely took up the new religion. The Druze are famous for cherishing their freedom and they refuse any form of outside control. Equality is another principle that guides the Druze way of life. All believers are equal before God and gender equality is highly noted in their religious texts (Makarem, 2006: 19–21)

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community that is distinguished by a very strong solidarity and a rejection of any kind of internal conflict. 16 As a community living in a mountainous terrain, they historically enjoyed a certain level of independence. 17 The Druze were the emirs of Mount Lebanon and ruled for a long period of time during the era of the Tannukhī emirs and later that of the Maʿnī emirs. 18 However, the Druze lost their power to the Shahabīs who allied with European powers after the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. 19 Throughout history, the Druze refused outside rule even under the Ottoman rule. They accepted the rule of their leaders who, sometimes during the course of history, had agreements with rulers but the Druze people's allegiance remained with their leaders and never with the rulers. In all struggles, they emphasized their Arab identity which is a reflection of their constant attempt to assimilate within a larger society that did not accept them. 20 Gorton confirms this aspect emphasizing that “Despite far reaching outward, behavioral conformity, justified by their adherence to the practice of taqqiya or dissimulation, the fact is that they were not officially accepted by any of the Orthodox Islamic state they lived in, either as Muslims or as ahl al-kitab”. 21 After the defeat of the Ottomans, the French and British mandates ruled the areas in which the Druze existed. The Druze stood against the attempts by the Mandate powers to break up the area into smaller countries fighting against the French Mandate in Lebanon and supporting the Arab government of Damascus under Lubna Tarabey, Family Law in Lebanon: Marriage and Divorce Among the Druze (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), pp. 25–8. 17 Kamal Salibi, “The Lebanese Identity.” Journal of Contemporary History, 6:1 (1971), p. 76. 18 The Tanukhīs ruled from 1146 to 1516 when they lost their power to the Maʿnīs – another Druze family Yusri Hazran, “Between Authenticity and Alienation: the Druze and Lebanon’s history.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 72:3 (2009): pp. 464–5. 19 A.J. Abraham, Lebanon in Modern Times, (Maryland: University Press of America, 2008), pp. 40–55. 20 Yehya, Al-Durudh w al-Sraʿ, p. 28. 21 Gorton, Renaissance Emir, p. 23. 16

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Prince Faysal’s rule. 22 In Lebanon, after the division imposed by the Mandate and the Sykes-Picot accord, the Druze lost much of their political strength leaving them as the fifth powerful sect after the Maronites, Sunnis, Orthodox and Shia 23 although the Druze affirm that had played a central role in the independence of Lebanon. Abou Mosleh assert that “The Lebanese independence of year 1943 was possible because of the Druze who protected the free government of Lebanon offering the members of the cabinet protection in the Druze village of Bchamoun where the first Lebanese flag was raised”. 24 The Druze people were against the political division of the country along sectarian lines. Although they enjoy some power as a minority, their politicians realize that their continued existence relies on a secular rule. Hence, the late Kamal Junblatt’s policies focused on eradicating the confessional system. His successor Walid Junblatt realized after the civil war that “changing the Lebanese sectarian system was not a possibility and his attempt centered around the preservation of the Druze status quo.” 25 In Syria, the situation of the Druze is not a powerful one. They are a small minority making up about five percent of the population. 26 Their presence in Syria dates back to the eleventh century where they spread from Lebanon to Soueida and Hawran particularly after the Druze civil war of 1611. 27 Later, in 1861, a large number of the Druze left Lebanon for Syria upon the estab-

Izat Zahr al-Dīn, Al-Mujahīdon al-Durudh fī ʿhd al-Intidab: al-Qadah al-Siyasīoun w al-Majmouʿt al-Moqatilah, (Lebanon: mo'sasat al-Tourath alDirdh ī, 2004), pp. 10–11. 23 Zahr al-Dīn, Al-Mujahīdon, p. 17. 24 Abou Mosliḥ, Tarikh al-Durudh, p. 67. 25 Yusri Hazran, “Re-Confessionalising the Shi’tes and the Druze: the failure of secularism in Lebanon.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 40:2 (2013): pp. 168–173. 26 Marwan Muasher, The Second Arab Awakening: And the Battle for Pluralism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 106. 27 Kamal Deeb, Tarīkh Sourīah al Mouʿṣer: Min al-‘ntidab al-Faransī ‘la Saīf 2011, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 2013), p. 55. 22

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lishment of a Christian ruled mutasarifīah. 28 In Syria, they lived in the shadow of a Sunni majority which they could not fight. It was only under the mandate that minorities, including the Druze, started to acquire some recognition in Sunni dominated Syria. 29 Minorities enjoyed, for a period of time, some form of autonomy, but this ended very soon. Ajami states that “The gift of autonomy that France extended the Alawites – and the Druze – could not last. In 1936, a Franco Syrian treaty brought the autonomy of these two communities to an end.” 30 Left without autonomy, and lacking any other resource such as outside foreign support, they attempted a revolution (1925–27) but failed. 31 Since Hafiz al-Assad came to power, and established an Alawite rule under the camouflage of a secular state, minorities were transformed by state policies into clients of the state and the Druze accepted their status as a minority and accepted the rule of the Assad family.

THE UPRISING AND THE DRUZE POINT OF VIEW

The Syrian state had presented itself as a supporter of minorities, offering them protection and allowing them to preserve their religious particularities within the state. Hence, the regime could rely, if not on the support of minorities against uprisings, at least on the minority’s non-participation in any attack against the regime’s interests and continuity. “… in a country that is seventy five percent Sunni Muslims … The Assads have skillfully played the minority card over the years, particularly guaranteeing for themselves at least a twenty to thirty percent loyal support base in the country by playing on fears of the potential for repressive Sunni Muslim rule and/or instability in which minorities typically pay a high price.” 32 During that period of time the Druze and the Christians were in conflict and this led many Druze to flee Lebanon to Syrian areas. Nisan, Minorities 101. 29 David Lesch, Syria: the Fall of the House of Assad, (London: Yale University Press, 2012), p. 3. 30 Fouad Ajami, The Syrian Revolution, (Stanford-California: Hoover Institution Press, 2012), p. 20. 31 Deeb, Tarīkh Sourīah, p. 57. 32 Lesch, Syria, pp. 51–2. 28

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The Druze accepted the idea that a regime that guaranteed their existence is better than one that would seek to end it – politically or physically. In Lebanon, only through accepting their status as a minority were they able to secure a political representation and when they had tried to fight the Maronites who were supported by the French, they lost. They realized that the same could transpire in Syria. Supporting a minority rule was better than being overwhelmed by a Sunni majority and the regime understood that very well. Gelvin declares that “The regime believes that it can manipulate sectarianism along with kinship to lock the minorities and the regime in a multi supportive embrace”. 33 This had its eminent reflection on the participation of minorities, including Druze, in the recent conflict in Syria. The Syrian uprising started in the town of Deraa, a predominantly Sunni area in southern Syria, as a reaction to the abusive measures taken by the police against children. 34 The popular movement in Deraa later escalated into protest movements that spread to other areas already suffering from the regime’s policies which were behind the rapid escalation of confrontations in Syria. For instance, Zurayk and Gough highlight the biased agricultural policies that fed the uprising. “The demise of the farm sector was accelerated by the accumulation of land, ecological resource and state facilities in the hands of a few beneficiaries of the regimes.” 35 Similarly, policies of economic reform that centered on furthering the interest of those in power and resulting in economic problems was another failure of the regime. 36 The regime had tried to attend to the economic problems facing the country, but failed to reach a workable situation. For example, policies regulating the banking James Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 110. 34 Stephen Starr, Revolt in Syria: Eye Witness to the Uprising, (London: Hurst and Company, 2012), pp. 46–7. 35 Rami Zurayk and Anne Gough, “Bread and Olive Oil: the Agrarian roots of the Arab Uprisings” in The New Middle East: Protests and Revolution in the Arab World, ed. Fawaz A. Gerges, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 107. 36 Lesch, Syria, pp. 63–64. 33

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sector were modified a little to allow for a growth in the investments and uplift the country’s economy. Reform policies were also attempted in other service sectors; however, all these attempts were not capable of addressing the serious economic problems in the country. 37 In addition to the regime's policies, its use of the secret intelligence police service – which was bestowed with a lot of power and could detain citizens for long periods of time without being held accountable – was another factor that created anger against the regime. 38 Trip claims that the “uprisings of 2011 therefore were acts of mass resistance to the appropriation of public resources and public space, as well as protests against the power that had been used to ferociously defend their denigration and exclusion of the public. The systematic brutalities and contempt displayed by the police and security forces as they routinely violated citizen’s rights and dignity were both catalyst and target of the uprising.” 39 Evidently, no single reason in itself is sufficient to explain the causes of the uprisings. Economic, political, and reform policies all played a role and none can be taken independently. “There is no single cause that explains the social eruptions that have shaken the Arab political system to its foundation. In the social sciences, neatly delineated single causes, though appealing, rarely capture society’s nuances and complexities. Analysts focus on either political variables or economic variables as the drives behind the uprising. Focusing on one without the other is simplification of a more complex reality,” Gerges maintains. 40 The Druze, like all other Syrians, had major objections to the Syrian regime’s policies on more than one level, and despite the fact that a large number of citizens did not accept the regime’s polDeeb, Tarīkh Sourīah, pp. 741–773. Lesch, Syria, p. 65. 39 Charles Trip, “The Politics of Resistance and the Arab Uprisings.” in The New Middle East: Protests and Revolution in the Arab World, ed. by Fawaz A. Gerges, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 136. 40 Fawaz Gerges, “Introduction: a rupture.” In The New Middle East: Protests and Revolution in the Arab World, edited by Fawaz A. Gerges, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 9. 37 38

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icies, the uprisings were not happening everywhere in Syria and the Druze did not, as a sect, similar to other religious minorities, join the uprisings. Ajami states that “The other minorities – Druze, Ismailis, Christians, Alawites – had remained on the sidelines or, of course, supported the regime… The protests that had begun in Deraa stopped at the borders of Soueida, the neighboring capital of the Druze”. 41 Some Druze individuals participated in riots against the regime asking for reform but that was it. Any attempt to put the whole sect into the conflict against the regime was not present. Starr notes the Syrian expert Ichael Provence’s view that the Druze as a community did not participate in the uprisings. According to Provence, “I think there is plenty of Druze support for the protest. As a small, historically significant, and committed Arabist minority, we will not see Druze protest, but there are protesters who are Druze, if you see the difference.” 42 Thus, as a sect, the Druze did not plunge into the uprisings. Moreover, the Druze religious leaders of Syria never encouraged the youth to join the conflict. Neutrality, in conformity with their religious principle of taqiyya, was the position they adhered to refusing to offer any position with or against any side. Nevertheless, the Druze are apprehensive of the alternative presenting itself in the form of Al-Nusra or ISIS. The Druze of Syria have recently witnessed, in a number of areas, the atrocities of such Sunni Fundamental groups fighting in Syria. Reports by Firas al-Choufi of alAkhbar newspaper accounted one particular incident that happened in the district of Idlib. He reported that fourteen Druze villages of that area were forced to declare Islam as their religion and to build mosques and carry out public prayers. The Druze people themselves do not comment on that issue claiming that any comment “Does not benefit the Druze but might even cause damage.” 43 The report claims that the fact that some fighters from Soueida who joined the army after Khaldoun Zein Eddine deserted the Syrian army and fought the regime does not mean that the Ajami, The Syrian Revolution, p. 89. Starr, Revolt in Syria, p. 49. 43 Firas al-Choufi “Daeya Saoudi Yahdi Drouz Idlib” al-Akhbar, http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/197684. Date of access: 16/3/20150. 41 42

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Druze of Idlib are with or against the revolution. How can they voice their opinion while they live in small geographically dispersed villages which quickly fell into the hands of the Free Army then ISIS and Jibhat al-Nusra? 44 The state of affair in such villages remain ambiguous but the Druze people say that they have reached an agreement with such group – they would not fight against them and in return they would be left in peace. The Druze of Soueida had similarly remained neutral throughout the conflict, however, only when the Asad regime started drafting Druze youth to the front to fight in non-Druze areas did the Druze openly oppose the regime’s policy, but they never supported the uprisings. The Druze youth, backed up by a group of religious men calling itself “Shoyouk Al-Karamat” (The Sheikhs of Dignity), refused the mandatory service. 45 This group organizes the defense of the Druze areas against any outside attack, be it from the opposition or the regime. The group’s founder, Wahid Al-Balous, was assassinated in September 2015. The Druze Lebanese politician Junblatt accused the regime of the murder claiming that it was an attempt to force the Druze to leave the neutral position they had been taking, but it remained unclear who the real culprit was. 46 The position of the Druze continues to be announced neutrality but they are getting arms and defending their areas against any attack by whatever side. The position of Druze of the occupied Golan Heights is not different. They are apprehensive of ISIS which perceives the Druze are heretics and hence would rather support Assad. 47 The Palestinian Druze share apprehension towards ISIS while voicing their concern for their fellow Druze in Syria. The religious leader in PalesIbid. Amar, Mays, “Dorouz Souria Yatakhaloun an Al-AsaD” in AlArabia, 20 July, 2015 (http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/ syria/2015/07/20) 46 “Al-Druze fi Souria … Hiyad thamanoho al-Dam”, Sky News Arabia, 7/9/2015 http://www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/772843 47 Gostoli, Yehya, “For the Druze in the Golan Heights, ‘Syria’ is just an idea” Al-Jazeera, August 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 2015/07/druze-golan-heights-syria-idea-150721101012597.html 44 45

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tine are scared over the future of the Syrian Druze. They do not support Assad but realize that a fanatical Sunni rule would result in a catastrophe for the Druze. Some have even gone to the extent of asking the Israeli government to provide armaments to the Druze of Syria to protect themselves. 48 Nevertheless, the overwhelming attitude of the Druze remains one of preaching neutrality in the conflict. In Lebanon, the Druze religious leaders have also remained cautious in expressing their resentment towards the Asad regime. The alternative is not appealing and they recognize their weak position as a minority with no one to rely on. One religious sheikh said, “The Druze have no one to rely on. Sunnis have Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries; Shias have the support of Iran; Christians have the support of Europe. We have no one. We have to stick together and not participate in a warfare that is outside of our control.” 49 They constantly preach self-restrain and an avoidance of being dragged into any conflict. This position taken by the religious men of the sect was not adopted by all politicians. The Druze Lebanese politician, Walid Junblatt, encouraged the Druze of Syria to fight the regime, yet the people as a sect did not comply. During the early days of the uprisings, the Lebanese Druze leader had even encouraged the Druze of Syria to leave the army, defect and join the Free Syrian Army. He reportedly called foreign countries to participate through providing arms to the uprisings in the hope of accelerating the downfall of Assad’s regime. Tom Perry reported to Reuters on August 14, 2012 that “Junblatt has urged the Druze community in Syria to join the rebellion and criticized members of Traboulsi, Kareem. “Plight of Syria’s Druze mobilizes communities across the region” The New Arab, 22, 6, 2015. https://www.alaraby. co.uk/english/politics/2015/6/22/plight-of-syrias-druze-mobilisescommunity-across-the-region 49 An interview conducted by the author with a religious Sheikh from Lebanon who has a doctorate in Philosophy and who has relatives in Syria. Whether the Christians actually have the support of the West or not is of no consequence since what matters in how the Druze perceive their situation and to the Druze they are the only group without outside help. Date of the interview (June 2014). 48

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the sect who have helped Assad during the crackdown. He cited at least one example of a Druze officer killed while fighting Assad’s forces, saying this was positive but not sufficient.” 50 It must be noted that not all Lebanese Druze politicians join in Junblat's fervent antagonism to the Syrian regime. Two notable Druze politicians, Talal Arslan, president of the predominantly Druze Lebanese Democratic Party, and Weam Wahhab, president of Tayyar alTawheed al-Arabi, voice their support to the Syrian regime. Talal Arslan is reported to encourage all Lebanese Druze to continue to be true to their Arab origin by supporting Assad. “Like we scrambled in the beginning of the 20th century to defend Syria in Maysaloun, al-Mazraa and Jabal al-Arab, we will defend it in any battle.” 51 Wahhab shares Arslan’s position insisting that the Druze have nothing to fear since Assad’s regime is committed to defending the Druze presence in the Middle East. “President Assad told me during my last visit (2012) that he is committed to all Druze without exception, as he considers that Syria’s interest lies in preserving the Druze,” Wahhab declared. 52 Wahhab’s attitude has not changed and continues to encourage the Druze to support Assad.

WHY THE DRUZE’S NEUTRAL POSITION

The Druze have not so far complied with the calls to join the uprising for a number of reasons. First of all, although the Syrian regime was corrupt and unjust towards its citizens, it maintained a good working relationship with the Druze. This is especially true under the presidency of Bashar al-Assad who made it a habit to visit Druze areas and share their food, a thing that is highly regarded Tom Perry, “Topple Assad to Prevent Syria Breaking up- Jumblatt” in Reuters, Tuesday, August 14, 2012, http://in.reuters.com/article/ 2012/08/14/Syria-crisis-jumblatt-isINDEE87DOBT20120804 date of access: 16/3/2015. 51 “Arslan: from now on we are concerned with defending Syria”. Naharnet, May 5, 2013. www.naharnet.com/stories/en/81986. date of access 20/3/2015 52 “Wahhab: Assad committed to preserving Druze community” The Daily Star/Lebanon. February, 5, 2012. www.dailystar.com.lb/politics/ 2012/Feb-05/162234. date of access: 20/3/2015 50

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among the Druze. 53 He worked hard on maintaining a positive image for himself and his regime among the minorities. Another reason for the Druze hesitancy in their participation is the lack of coordination among the leaders of the uprising and even some conflict among uprising leaders that were starting to take up a sectarian resonance – a thing totally unacceptable by the Druze who perceive a secular regime as the only kind in which they might be able to survive. The dissent within the uprising discouraged the Druze from joining the conflict. Gerges affirms that “The uprisings were not at all united and harmonious. There also existed a struggle of domination inside the public squares within the protests most notable between religious conservative and liberal leaning groups.” 54 Moreover, the Syrian uprising, both inside and outside Syria, lacked a common leadership and was characterized by a lack of coordination. The leaders of the uprising seemed unaware that a united front “was vital in order to offer a real choice to those Syrians who supported the regime simply because there was no legitimate alternative.” 55 This lack of leadership and a common vision creates apprehension within the minorities who do not know the trajectories of events and could not trust the outcomes. “The Damascus regime was a known entity, and better the devil you know than the one you don’t,” Ajami asserts. 56 This brings us to another reason, and a most determinant one. The fact that minorities are scared of the Sunni majority – a reality that the regime strengthened, encouraged, and fed. The fact of the matter is that in other Arab countries where uprisings took place, the Islamists seem to be coming to power, some through the process of elections. Muasher declares that “In every Arab country The Druze highly evaluate the interpersonal relationships among people. They honor their guests and protect them. If they share food with someone, they consider that they are bound by a strong social relationship that cannot be broken easily. Assad realizes the importance of these social relationships among the Druze and constantly works at maintaining and strengthening them. His most recent visit to the Druze was in 2011. 54 Gerges, “Introduction”, p. 7. 55 Lesch, Syria, p. 53. 56 Ajami, The Syrian Revolution, p. 90. 53

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that held free elections in 2011 and 2012, Islamist parties made a strong showing. Their success has raised concerns that the Arab Spring might usher in theocracies rather than democracies.” 57 This is a main concern for minorities such as the Druze of Syria, particularly in light of the fragmented nature of the Syrian opposition. The latter’s members include such groups as the Syrian National Council, local coordinating committees and revolutionary councils, Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Jihad, Jibhat al-Nusra and Ahrar AlSham. 58 Add to all these the most recent power to join the group or emerge out of the group – ISIS ( The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham) which has announced its own Islamic state with a Caliphate rule. The practices of this particular group have been ruthless and intolerant off minorities as the incidents in Iraq have clearly showed. The control of ISIS over a significant area of Syria and Iraq where they have targeted Christian sects further drove the minorities of Syria into the arms of the regime. The Druze came to realize that the alternative to the regime that was being posed was not an alternative to them. If anything, such an alternative might bring about their ruin. The Druze, like other minorities, have in fact not participated actively as a group in the uprisings despite the attempts by the leaders of the uprisings to incorporate elements of the minorities to present an image of complete representation of all factions of the Syrian society. However, as Lesch points out “Often attempts to include minorities in opposition activities were merely cosmetic. As one leading opposition figure commented, “Nowadays they’re (the opposition group) looking for one Christian, two Alawites, three Druze, and then they say they’re representative.” 59 In fact, most minorities did not participate because they are apprehensive of the outcomes of the uprising. In countries where elections were held post uprisings, Islamists had risen to power through the democratic Muasher, The Second Arab, p. 65. Radwan Ziadeh, “Revolution in Syria: the Struggle for Freedom in a Regional Battle.” In The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy, ed. by John Davis, (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), p. 105. 59 Lesch, Syria, p. 107. 57 58

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process of elections not because they have a majority in the countries in which they live but because they are able to secure a majority out of those who actually vote in national and local elections. The people who participate in the elections and actually go to cast their votes constitute a minority in the Arab World. The reason for this is that the Islamists can mobilize their voters so all they need to win in any election is a “majority within the minority who votes.” 60 The way things evolved after the uprisings bringing Islamic groups to power or as happened in Syria where Islamic fundamentalist groups controlled the opposition and forced, by the power of arms, its control over certain areas was a scary development of events. This has even led the Lebanese Druze leader to reconsider his position with regard to the uprising. Walid Junblat was at the beginning of the Syrian uprising adamantly against the regime of Bashar alAssad, asking the Druze in Syria and encouraging the Druze of Lebanon to carry arms against the regime. He still opposes the rule of Bashar but his attempts at mobilizing the Druze of Soueida has become less pronounced. Evidently, the Druze of Syria did not follow Junblat’s biddings because they could perceive up close how the Islamists were approaching the Druze as a people without a religion left with one of two choices – either join Islam or become targets for violent attacks. Thus, the Syrian Druze did not join the uprisings as a group; neither did the Druze of Lebanon provide military support to the opposition. Although many of the Druze in Lebanon supported Junblat in his position and some even participated, as individuals, in the fighting along the opposition, yet as a community, much like their Syrian counterparts, they adopted a neutral position and neither supported the regime nor the opposition. They took refuge in their own religious principle of taqiya and did not take sides. The Druze as a small community are aware that their status as a minority leaves them in a weak position. They cannot afford to jeopardize their stability, otherwise they might pay a heavy price. After the recent events in Lebanon and the attempt by the Islamic fundamentalist group to control the Lebanese Syrian border area of John Bradely, After the Arab Springs: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 13. 60

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Ersal, attacking the Lebanese army and taking hostages, even Junblat's position changed. He warned against the spread of such groups which might, he claimed, lead to the disappearance of minorities in Lebanon – the Christian and the Druze 61. The situation in the Syrian Druze area of Soueida is also undergoing some changes. Reports of ISIS and other Islamic groups aiming to attack the Druze area have caused a stir in the community both in Syria and Lebanon. Although events are still unfolding and reports are not categorically confirmed or reliable, the Druze are preparing themselves for a confrontation and are stacking up arms. The Druze are announcing that although they had taken a neutral position in the uprisings, they will not continue to do so if their areas become targets for the Islamic groups. The next few months might witness a change among the Druze. Rather that joining the uprising against the regime as the opposition had been hoping, we might expect them to fight against the opposition not because they want to fight alongside the regime but because they would be fighting for their self-preservation and continuity.

“Nassrallah la junblat: hal tastatieh himayat alduruz min khatar Daesh” Monday, August 11, 2014. Lebanon 24. www.lebanon24.com/ Exclusive/details/854999. Date of access: 18/3/2015. 61

CHAPTER 6 SYRIAN ISMAILIS AND THE ARAB SPRING: SEASONS OF DEATH AND WHITE CARNATIONS OTARED HAIDAR UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Syrian Ismailis, ethnically and linguistically, are Syrian Arabs who mainly still live in towns and villages situated in the heartland of the region of their ethnic origin. This area stretches between Salamiya, which was the Ismaili headquarters during the foundational underground movement in the eighth century, and the Ismaili castles, most of which are still standing between Salamiya and the Western Coastal Mountain Range, marking the network of mission centers during that early stage. The biggest cluster of Ismaili villages outside Salamiya is the region of “al-Khawabi”, in the western region which is named after its renowned castle. According to the United Nations’ estimates of 2013, the Syrian population numbers about 22.5 million. There are no reliable estimations for the number of Syrian Ismailis today. Dick Douwes estimates the Nizari, Qasimi and Mu’muni, Ismailis together as one percent of the Syrian population. 1 Most internal sources locate them within the range of 0.5% to 1% of the Syrian population, and Dick Douwes, “Modern History of the Nizari Ismailis of Syria”, in A Modern History of the Ismailis: Continuity and Change in a Muslim Community, by Farhad Daftary, ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011) p. 2. 1

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other sources state their number around two hundred thousand people. 2 On the basis of their faith, they are part of the international Ismaili community that is internationally recognized through its spiritual leader, Imam Karim Shah al-Husayni known as Aga Khan IV (1936–), the renowned advocate of peace and Third World development, and the founder of Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), the non-confessional institution that serves equally all. The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) is “a group of development agencies with mandates that include the environment, health, education, architecture, culture, microfinance, rural development, disaster reduction, the promotion of private-sector enterprise, and the revitalisation of historic cities. AKDN agencies conduct their programmes without regard to faith, origin or gender”. 3 Although they constitute a small minority, Syrian Ismailis are a recognized community in Syria. They have a long continuous and well-established tradition of good learning, socio-cultural activism, secularism and high politicization, and they are nationally acclaimed as a liberal, secularized, modernized and cultured community. They peacefully co-existed in their region of ethnic origin along with other communities, including the most influential three groups, the Sunnis, Alawites, and Bedouins. This chapter aspires to provide an internal and comprehensive view of the Ismaili community during the events of the “Arab Spring” that influenced and transformed their lives. It examines closely the life of the Syrian Ismaili community today and its interaction with these events. This study explores the range of views among the members of the community towards “the Syrian Spring” and its challenges and prospects for the country in general and for the Ismailis in particular. The research uses data collected For recent estimates, see: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486 a76.html, Syria Comment http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/syrian-pop ulation-growth-and-unemployment-by-ehsani/ and World Population Review http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population/. 3 For more about AKDN, see http://www.akdn.org/ and about Agha Khan see http://www.akdn.org/about_agakhan.asp, both accessed on 12 March 2015. 2

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during 15 months spent sporadically in different parts of Syria between 2011 and 2014. Hence, it combines empiricism with approaches that are consolidated in several recent studies of social sciences, media, cultural studies and Ismaili history. It also draws on recent studies that expand on Gramscien concepts of civil society, and Foucault and Bourdieu’s approaches of political sociology. The chapter makes use of published material on relevant subjects, and follows closely the daily Syrian news in media, press and on social media for three years. In addition, it is based on interviewing formally and informally several hundreds of Ismailis in different locations in Syria and tens of them in different countries outside Syria. The interviewees span a wide range of male and female Ismailis in terms of age, class, education, political views and religious adherence.

THE SYRIAN ISMAILIS AND SALAMIYA

Historically, several orders (tariqa) existed within Ismailism and several groups are considered off-shoots of the eighth century’s Ismaili movement, most noteworthy of which in the Arab world are the Druze and the Mu’minis (also called Mumin Shahis in nonSyrian sources). The Mu’minis emerged through the latest division of the Nizari Ismailis into Mu’minis and Qasimis (Qasim Shahis in non-Syrian sources) and some of them refer to themselves as Ismaili Mu’minis. However, the term “Ismailis” in today’s academic and official sources, as well as in Syrian vernacular usage, is widely restricted to the international Nizari Qasimi community who recognizes Aga Khan IV as their hereditary 49th Imam and spiritual leader. Estimated at 15 million, they are today the second largest Shi‘a group, and the Syrian Ismailis, to which this chapter is devoted, is part of this international Nizari Qasimi community. 4 Being the earliest existing Ismaili community, and the only Arab Ismaili Qasimis, the Syrian Ismailis occupy a special symbolic Some information in this introduction about the history of the Ismaili community draws and expands on the definitions provided in Farhad Daftary, The Isma‘ilis: Their History and Doctrines, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 4

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position within the international community. They are the only enduring connection with the early underground movement and of the Fatimid era (969–1170 AD), the guardians of the foundational heritage and the continuing context of the Imams’ genealogy. The Syrian Ismailis share a common historical experience and cultural traditions with other minorities in the Levant who are Shi‘a and/or Fatimid sub-groups, most noteworthy being the Twelver Shi‘a, Alawites, Druze and Mu’minis. Today, however, their strongest connections are with the two other largest groups in Salamiya and its countryside. The first is the Mu’mini community who lives in the two neighboring towns of Misiyaf and Qadmus as well as in Salamiya, and the second consists of the descendents of several Ismai‘li families who converted to Sunnism, mainly in the early decades of the twentieth century. 5 The Ismailis strongly and constantly intermixed with these two groups and they consider them as their only living ethnic extension. These two communities maintain solid referential relations to Ismaili traditions and institutions. However, they have major dissimilarities with the Qasimi Ismailis that are demonstrated in their contemporary general political inclinations. Syrian Ismailis share the features that characterize all these communities but they also have their own particularities. The ongoing research about the Arab Spring demonstrates that the complex nature of the Arab societies and their wide range of cultural identities are major challenges to approaching the subject. 6 Similarly, the difficulty faced by many Syrian, regional and international observers in their attempt to understand and analyze the experience of Salamiya and the Ismailis during the Arab Spring stems from lack of in-depth knowledge of the complex demographic structure of Salamiya and the entangled relationship between its various communities. Due to these problems of definiDick Douwes, “Modern History of the Nizari Ismailis of Syria”, in ed. Farhad Daftary, A Modern History of the Ismailis: Continuity and Change in a Muslim Community (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011). 6 Sohrab Ahmari and Nasser Weddady, “Conclusion: Our Dreams Deferred”, in eds. Sohrab Ahmari and Nasser Weddady, Arab Spring Dreams, the Next Generation Speaks out for Freedom and Justice from North Africa to Iran (New York: Palgrave, MacMillan 2012), p. 213. 5

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tions, the term “Ismailis” in this paper refers to all Syrian Qasimi Ismailis across Syria. The words “Salamiya” and “Salamiyans” refer to the interfaith community of the city and its countryside of which the Ismailis constitute a majority. This majority constantly intermixes and intermarries with other denominations, especially the Mu’mini and Sunni Salamiyans. Today, the majority of the Ismailis live in the city of Salamiya and its countryside. The rest are mainly distributed in al-Khawabi, and around the Syrian large cities. The Ismailis who live outside Salamiya frequent the city regularly, and all Ismailis interact and intermix through their referential relationship with the city and its local Ismaili Council. The established particularity of the city contributed to the emergence of the well-defined identity of Salamiya, which is largely considered a synonym of the Ismaili community in Syrian popular culture. Hence, the name of Salamiya which is a focal referential space in the cultural imaginary of the Syrian Ismailis is used in this chapter as a representative ground of the Ismaili culture, social life and politics. Ismailis are known today for maintaining friendly interactive relationships with all other communities. This attitude is based on the cultural patterns of their heritage as well on as their modernized focal concepts of plurality, liberalism and equality which inform their modern religious teaching and cultural norms. Throughout its modern history, the Ismaili Council has been the main intermediary setting for resolving issues of violence and insecurity, and for reconciling hostile disputes in a region that was continuously plagued by ethnic clashes and tribal attacks. This pluralistic culture nurtured a communal ability to adapt and interact with different cultures and to function as mediators between different communities. In the province of Hamah, the Ismaili community developed an interdependence relationship with neighboring communities. They turned Salamiya into the bustling centre for all kinds of trade between the different communities in and around it, and also with large Syrian cities. Since it was rebuilt and re-inhabited in 1848, modern Salamiya became a major trade centre for agricultural products, cattle and stock products of the vast surrounding rural communities including the Bedouins. Nonetheless, as Muhammad al-Shamali has noted,

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Salamiya financially “depends on the income of its employees, intellectuals and scientific cadres”. 7 Furthermore, for all neighboring communities, Salamiya is the main provider of key services, including medical, legal and educational services. The modern interactive nature of the city which echoes similar paradigms of its cultural imaginary inspires the dynamic spirit that characterizes its community and institutions.

THE ISMAILIS IN RECENT HISTORY: GRIEVANCES AND POLITICIZATION

The ongoing research about Syria overlooks the political culture of the minorities and concentrates on examining the tension between religious and political mainstreams which led to the armed conflict during the 1980s and the Arab Spring. In his study “Human Development and the Arab Spring”, 8 Kuhn, who observes that no study to date paid sufficient attention to the human development factors to predict political change, introduces a fresh perspective that should be incorporated in the studies of minorities and the Arab spring. His careful research examines the role of greater human capital in creating greater expectations and greater disappointments when basic needs are not met, which leads to political action. The Syrian Ismailis possess one of the highest percentages of literacy in Syria and comparatively high number of degrees holders and prominent intellectual, literary and artistic figures. Names of Ismaili students from Salamiya and al-Khawabi figure largely in top lists of national and provincial educational achievements. These are direct results of the pioneering Ismaili enlightenment movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which led to the rapid expansion of modern schools and women’s education. The Ismaili Muhammad al-Shamali, “al-Thawra al-Suriyya wa Ta’ifat al-SunIsmayliyin”, “The Syrian revolution and the Sunni-Ismaili community”, alHiwar al-Mutamaddin, Vol. 4238 (7 July 2013), accessed on 12 March 2015 http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=381427. 8 Ranall Kuhn, “On the Role of Human Development in the Arab Spring”, Population and Development Review 36 (4) (Dec. 2012), pp. 649–683. 7

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enlightenment movement was based on classical paradigms of learning and teaching that were kept alive in the doctrine 9, and was promoted and fostered through interaction with the Imamat institution, an early antecedent of AKDN. Salamiya, which carries proudly its rhyming title “the capital of thought, poetry, and poverty”, is associated with good education and active cultural life and its inhabitants are widely believed to be a highly cultivated community. However, these merits failed to give the Ismailis a worthwhile position among other communities in the current Syrian society. Ismailis are drastically underrepresented in top posts in the government and the army, and they are alienated from the elite corps that dominate the economy and politics. Although Ismailis constitute about seventy percent of the population in Salamiya, their share in the unofficial quota for top governmental positions and the representative posts of Salamiya in the government’s departments has always been drastically cut and gone to other communities of the city. The Ismaili presence is even undercut within the management bodies of the Ismaili endowments and heritage sites, and the AKDN offices due to the imposition of the same unofficial data. The many qualified unemployed Ismailis consider these measures as part of corrupt discriminatory policies that involve both the religious and political mainstreams, and they believe they merit more support. This alienation from the privileged circles has had severe political and social repercussions on the Ismailis and the conditions of their localities. Echoing the understanding of the “role for the intellectual” as expressed in the works of major theoreticians, 10 many Syrians argue that educational and cultural excellence is the vital factor that makes the Syrian Ismailis a highly politicized community. However, undoubtedly, the long-standing grievances contributed to the hardcore politics that characterize the SyrHeinz Halm, The Fatimids and their Tradition of Learning, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), pp. 1–2. 10 David L Swatz, “For an intellectual Politics of Symbolic Power”, in Symbolic Power, Politics, and Intellectuals: The Political Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, (Chicago: the University of Chicago, 2013), pp. 145–188. 9

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ian Ismailis, and to the firm association between Salamiya and the Syrian counterculture. The high unemployment rate among Ismailis and lower standards of living in their poverty-stricken towns and villages (which suffer a state of serious underdevelopment) pushed them into large cities. For many, this internal migration intensified their discomfort of living as scattered underpaid and overworked employees and workers. Many Ismailis consider themselves victims of harsh unsympathetic official treatment, and some activists accuse the Syrian authorities of following biased political strategies. They insist that the hardship and inferior economic and political status is a byproduct of a planned and systematic discrimination against the Ismailis. Ismailis were continuously prominent and active in the secular leftist and nationalist parties, both the underground and official ones, since the outset of these parties between the two world wars. For the most part, political activism was an intellectual practice rather than political action, but some prominent members of the community played key roles in the political changes of the 1960s and occupied top governmental posts between 1963 and 1970. Since the 1970s, which witnessed the elimination of many Ismaili leading figures and a tightening of the rope around the neck of the community, Ismaili intellectuals played a leading role in oppositional politics. During the reign of Assad the father, both Ismaili politicians and peaceful oppositional Ismaili intelligentsia were subjected to a harsh treatment ranging from exclusion and marginalization to exile and long-term imprisonment in the notorious Syrian political prisons and detention centers. The repression was revolving like a ruthless vicious circle. The harsher the repression grew, the more radical the community became. The Ismailis were subjected to mass arrests, their rate in political prisons was disproportionately huge, and their tragic experience touched the lives of almost everybody in this small, vulnerable interconnected community. Many lives were shattered and the community was impoverished, terrorized and isolated. The authorities made sure all possibilities for the Ismailis of finding a way out of this impasse were blocked including denying the Aga Khan and AKDN any access to Syria and the community. These three decades were a period of political, economic, social and cultural turmoil that still scars the life of the community. However, the most lasting, devastating aftereffect was

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the state of great confusion concerning the communal character and self-awareness that manifests itself during crises including the ongoing one. Despite all that, many notable Ismailis argue that the period was not comparatively all unsatisfactory if we weigh up all positives. The 1980s witnessed the bloody events which accompanied and followed the Muslim Brotherhood’s revolt, and the Syrian government reacted by following a relatively more supportive policy towards the minorities. Extending on Seal, Raymond Hinnebusch examines the incorporation of wider social forces and minorities during that period as a tool of building solidarity. 11 Evidently, the Ismailis have enjoyed the religious freedom that prevailed throughout Syria and invested in it to enrich their cultural life. Few Ismailis took a leading role in Syrian cultural life, media, art, and literature, but the strict political and economic marginalization continued to impoverish the community and to restrict its progress. The political changes of 2000 brought a new strategy both towards the minorities and secular parties. The official attitude towards the Ismaili community noticeably changed. After a long imposed disruption, the Aga Khan was welcomed in Syria by the new president and the AKDN generously and enthusiastically started to contribute to the development process throughout Syria and laid the foundation for many plans and projects. It looked as if a new life was pumped throughout the veins of Syria and the Syrians, and the country witnessed affluence in cultural life that had been on hold for decades. In Salamiya, dozens of cultural groups, committees, galleries and clubs were set up by the cultural elites, generating around them their independent grounds and networks. Some were set up by poets and artists and the rest were linked to the Ismaili Council or different political parties, but most of them were independent “self-generating and self-supporting” structures that operate along the defining lines of civil society. 12 These independent Raymond Hinnebusch, “Modern Syrian Politics”, History Compass, Vol. 6:1 (2008), pp. 263–285. 12 Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy Fourth Wave: Digital Media and the Arab Spring, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), pp. 4–5. 11

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structures and socio-cultural activities proliferated to represent the right face of the city and establish a strong base for a preliminary form of a civil society network as “a complex of ideologico-cultural relationships”, to use Gramsci’s definition. 13 The new cultural and political reforms brought by the new leadership, especially on travelling, gathering and women rights, eased political restrictions and improved the lives of many Syrians including a considerable number of Ismailis. However for many, especially those who were and still are affected by the widespread poverty in the area, and those who were imprisoned and their families, that was too little too late. The burden of the past was still casting a shadow on their lives, and the aftereffects of their painful experiences eclipsed any prospect of moving forward.

THE EARLY SPRING: A SEASON OF SILENCE AND WHITE CARNATIONS

Since the first demonstration, most of the minorities including Ismailis as well as large segments of the majority seemed to be maintaining a collective stance that placed them on a ground designated and defined as the “silent majority”. However, like all other groups standing on this “silent ground”, the Ismailis were anything but silent. Beyond all doubts and questions, it was very difficult for such a community to depoliticize itself altogether at one stroke and at such a moment. Some members of “the silent majority” interviewed by international media make obvious that people standing on this ground are using their critical thinking based on a rich historical experience and their thoughtful judgment derived from a thorough reading of the changing situations around them. Jonathan Steele argues that these people believe that their stance revolves around reconciliation, peaceful resolution to the conflict, protecting

Chantal Mouffe and Anne Showstack Sasson. “Gramsci in France and Italy: A Review of the Literature”, in ed. Martin James. Antonio Gramsci, Contemporary Applications, Vol. IV of Antonio Gramsci: Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 95. 13

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the state and its institutions and peaceful transition to democracy. 14 These were soon to become the guiding principles of the leading oppositional groups who are not involved in the armed fighting. However, as demonstrated by Ben Hubbard and Steve Negus, these insightful views and inspiring visions were overlooked and the term, “silent majority”, was interpreted by polemicists merely as leaning towards the government against all other groups who support armed struggle for change. 15 Yasin al-Hajj Salih observes that Salamiyan activists had a significant presence in the initial minor peaceful protests and sit-ins that preceded the outbreak of the uprisings of March 2011. 16 Salamiya was the second city, after Dar‘a, to witness protests and it attracted activists from other towns and villages. As reported in several articles in al-Sharq al-Awsat, Salamiya, on 25th March 2011, witnessed the first demonstration which was to be followed by regular ones for months to come. 17 Numerous articles, including these two and another one by Maryam Saleh, emphasize that the first demonstration constituted thirty people, five of whom were women. Interestingly, several hundreds stood at a close distance watching the first demonstration. 18 That night, people were awakened around 3:00 a.m. by the roaring sound of a procession of motorcycles storming through back streets shouting a brief slogan “Allah, Syria, freedom”, followed by similar ones hailing for Allah, Syria and the Syrian president. These two slogans would be the definitive trademark of the two adversaries that would overwhelm the streets in the following Jonathan Steele, “The Diary”, The Guardian, vol. 24, no. 6 (22 March 2012). 15 Ben Hubbard and Steve Negus, “Civil war gives Syrian minorities no clear option”, The Associated Press News, (7 March 2013). 16 Yasin al-Hajj Salih, “When did the revolution break out, and where”, almodon (21 March 2013). 17 Paula Astih, “The city of Salamiya in Hama: most of its population are Ismailis”, al-Sharq al-Awsat (8 April 2012); idem, “Salamiya, the city of poverty and thought”, al-Sharq al-Awsat (9 May 2012). 18 Maryam Saleh, “Against all odds: the women in one Syrian city succeed in keeping their protest movement alive”, Majalla (24 July 2013). 14

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period. That morning, the town was sinking in a heavy atmosphere of tension and mixed expectations. In the shops, you could hear educated people in their daily gatherings around the trays of yerba mate 19 arguing enthusiastically about a major change in view that would either establish civil rights, justice and freedom in new democratic secular Syria or would lead to internal conflicts. Around bigger trays in the houses, larger groups apprehensively discussed the brutal coming civil war which would see atrocious bloodshed. The motorcycles processions continued day and night and the protests continued. The early protests looked like an outlet for channeling enduring economic and political grievances and claiming overdue bills. Salamiya’s “neat demonstrations” or “demonstrations of white carnations” (as they were widely called in the media, including “White Carnations for Salamiya”), 20 distinguished themselves by the tradition of carrying flowers and candles, using poetry verses of Muhammad al-Maghut and secular peaceful slogans that were picked up quickly and popularized throughout Syria, and the heavy presence of intelligentsia, senior citizens and women with their uncovered heads and casual sporty outfits. They were paralleled by “loyalist” demonstrations organized by schools and governmental institutions. Yerba mate plant is a source of a beverage, grown and traditionally consumed in Central and South America. It is very popular among some communities in the Levant and especially in Western Syria, the region which is dominated by the Syrian minorities. It was brought by the SyroLebanese who fled the country during the Ottoman period and settled in South America. Throughout the decades it became a symbol of resilience and survival that connects these communities with their historical experience and lost expatriates. During the recent campaigns of polemics against minorities, mate was turned into a recurrent cultural symbol in art and literature and acquired strong political overtones, especially on social media. 20 “White Carnations for Salamiya”, a documentary by Naji al-Jurf, a young gifted film maker from Salamiya who was assassinated in 2015 in Turkey. It was shown on Orient TV (30 March 2012), available on YouTube at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5QQWQQsU2cs. 19

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The Salamiyan protesters were led by prominent figures in the community, above all senior former political detainees and intellectuals, predominantly educated and very articulate. The animated scene continued for few weeks before turning into frantic clashes between the protesters and the police supported by groups responsible for keeping order. The Ismaili public was trapped in the middle between the two conflicting groups, both of whom claimed to be saviors of the country. During that early stage more people travelled weekly from other towns and villages to join the demonstrations in Salamiya. While protests grew larger, the presence of the “loyalist” groups, and police forces grew wider too and the number of people gathered for Friday prayer in the central Sunni mosque swelled to an unprecedented extent. When clashes started, many locals indicated that the tension was ignited and intensified by radical outsider individuals and organized groups, who traveled every Friday and poured into the central mosque while the Salamiyans were waiting in the adjacent square. As for the “neat” initiators and the carnation holders, they looked and sounded as if they were cut from the scenes of the events which were intensifying and raging around them, proceeding in their own civil revolution which was guided by the old principles of peaceful struggle and intellectual projects. In a couple of months, the flow of internally displaced people into the city started to grow quicker and larger. Far from the scenic euphoria in the central square, the vibrant spirit of the city gradually waned, streets and socialization spaces were deserted in early evening and most families started storing food in anticipation of a long war.

THE ISMAILI COUNCIL AND ACTIVISTS: GROUNDS FOR PEACE, DIALOGUE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The spaces that continued to be busy and filled to capacity in all Ismaili locations, including Salamiya, were the Ismaili masjids. 21 Their libraries and cultural activities – open to people of all faiths – continued to attract people to lectures, seminars, art exhibitions, A masjid is a community center that includes a prayer house, and its vernacular name, jam’a, usually refers to the small ones. 21

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fairs of handcrafts and homemade food products, and educational and vocational training courses. During the last few years, the Ismaili Council organized numerous seminars and training courses on subjects that address the communities’ needs in time of crises and wars. In collaboration with the Red Crescent and the Ministry of Health, they trained and qualified individuals and groups in warrelated subjects including first aid, disaster-response, psychological support, women and children’s health, and dialogue and reconciliation. To put it briefly, the earlier aspirations and ambitious plans of the Ismaili international and national institutions which were vigorously put to work and started to contribute to the development process throughout Syria before 2011, were brought to an abrupt halt and replaced by emergency plans and projects that efficiently respond to the crisis. During evening prayers, the Imam’s statements (farmans) that were read regularly called upon the community to calm internal disputes and to participate with all Syrians in working for peace. They included recommendations and series of guidelines for the community as well as for the Councils’ administrations and boards, encouraging them to contribute to establishing dialogue and reconciliation in Syria. Since the early mobilization, the Aga Khan’s main call of “No to arms! Yes to dialogue” was turned into the guiding motto of the Ismailis across the political spectrum, including prominent figures of the opposition. The community websites and individual pages that rapidly multiplied circulated instantly the Imam’s activities, speeches and interviews which were published regularly in the international media. They echoed his direct recommendations and internal speeches that were read regularly in every masjid and jam‘a around Syria. Intellectual debates in cultural clubs and public conversations in social gatherings echoed these calls for reconciliation and dialogue. In May 2011, following the escalation of clashes between protesters and official forces, the local Ismaili Council organized an inter-faith meeting constituting a group of Salamiyan former political prisoners and protest leaders, and the top governmental officials in Salamiya to discuss the situation in the city and exchange views and suggestions. As reported by both sides, the meeting was concluded successfully with full agreement on maintaining the peacefulness of the protests. It was covered in detail by Nassar alJurf in the official newspaper al-Fida’ and was also greeted in the

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oppositional media, including by Mus’ab al-Jundi in Orient Net, who considered the meeting to be re-affirming and consolidating of the Ismaili Council’s presence in the community as “the civil institution which has the strongest influence on the whole social spectrum”. 22 In fact, the meeting also proved the ability of the protesters to emerge as a main player in the evolving structure and network of the civil society in Salamiya. Additionally, it could be an inspirational experience to the understanding of the State as an institution “including both civil society and political society”. 23 The activity proved to be more than symbolic and a team of senior high profile former prisoners started co-operating with the Ismaili Council’s committees and they significantly contributed to resolving together several critical problems. When events started to take a violent turn and Salamiyan civilians were targeted, members of this team provided dynamic skills and thorough knowledge in social work, dialogue and reconciliation under the Council’s supervision. The team took part in the delegations that met with moderate notables from rebels’ communities and mediated successfully in freeing many Salamiyan kidnapped people, including several kidnapped female teachers during 2012. Some members of the team emphasize that their involvement with many activities of mediating, negotiating, and supervising social work with internally displaced people contributed to keeping away the armed groups – who are lurking in the environs of the city – away from invading it. Since the early weeks of the uprising, as reported by Ayda alMuli, male and female Ismaili volunteers joined the training workshops organized by governmental institutions and international organizations, most notably the two highlighted in the title. 24 The cultural clubs and societies such as al-‘Adiyat and Friends of Salamiya also attracted many volunteers who set up groups for civil Nassar al-Jurf, “Invited by the party department is Salamiya: A public dialogue-meeting with national forces and various activities”, alFida’ (23 May 2011); Mus’ab al-Jundi, “Salamiya, the Mosaics of revolution and disobedience”, Orient Net (18 February 2013). 23 Mouffe and Sasson, “Gramsci in France and Italy”, pp. 92–95. 24 Ayda al-Mouli, “Workshops by the Municipal Administration of Health and the Red Cross”, al-Thawra (26 April 2011). 22

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work ranging from environmental projects to clearing rubble in explosion sites. In addition to their independent activities, these organizations worked collectively in many successful projects and created pioneering models of civil work. In all these grounds, Ismailis participated in social and cultural work that responded actively to the crisis, especially the problem of internally displaced people. Being the only quiet and peaceful spot in the heart of a fierce combat zone, Salamiya became a destination for people fleeing the conflict areas of Homs, Hamah, Talbisa and Rastan. As noted in alSharq al-Awsat, twenty-five thousand people from Hamah alone arrived in the first year, followed within two years by massive flows into Salamiya, estimated as 150,000, coming from the neighboring cities and villages as well as from the remote reaches of Idleb and Aleppo, and the eastern towns on the Euphrates. 25 Many Salamiyan oppositional activists quickly organized themselves and formed humanitarian aid groups. With the rise of Islamization and militarization, the protesting activists responded gradually by shifting their efforts towards dealing with the humanitarian crises resulting from the mutual violence. Their main task was to ease the strain on the besieged areas and to support the internally displaced people. Abdallah al-Sha‘‘ar has remarked that despite the bad economic situation of the population, a donated food pack was provided to every displaced family and tens of new arrivals were accommodated without rent for weeks and months in houses of the activists and their acquaintances until some of them were distributed in shelters. Male and female activists stood in long queues at dawn at bakeries to buy bread packs and send them to besieged areas, especially Hamah. Furthermore, they organized a campaign for blood donation to hospitals in the conflict areas. 26 On a larger scale, the trained volunteers’ committees of the local Ismaili Council played a major role in dealing quickly and effi“The city of Salamiya in Hama: most of its population are Ismailis”, al-Sharq al-Awsat (8 April 2012); Paula Astih, “Salamiya, the city of poverty and thought”, al-Sharq al-Awsat (9 May 2012). 26 Abdallah al-Sha‘ar, “Salamiya and Hamah: the association of the national and the humane”, al-Hayat newspaper, no. 17958 (4 June 2012), p. 12. 25

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ciently with the shocking effects of the crisis on both the local community and the large number of internally displaced people who settled in Salamiya. Under the supervision of the Council, different committees arranged the preparation of shelters and their guarding, the distribution of logistics, and organizing teaching classes for children. The Council’s committees include volunteering women who participated in cooking and housekeeping of sheltering centers, and medics and doctors who provided free healthcare. AKDN is the main provider of aid and logistics, but many expenses are covered by the Council’s internal fund to which the international Ismaili community as well as the Syrian Ismailis contributed. Wealthy Salamiyans as well as those going through financial hardship also donated generously. The Ismaili Council’s committees, the activists groups, the cultural societies and the Red Crescent provided efficiency and outstanding expertise in humanitarian and social work of civil society groups. The volunteers, who predominantly combine hard secularists and observant Ismailis, successfully co-operated and coordinated across the great divide. Although operating under many different umbrella-organizations that facilitated their work, they had a great deal in common and their work progressed similarly. Additionally, all were passionate volunteers who had a high social awareness and cultural sensitivity in dealing with the large groups of internally displaced population from rural areas as well as from the conservative cities and semi-urban areas which were defined as the social environment of the Islamists and their armed fighters. Interestingly, they were able to successfully establish the concept of Civil Society as a principal social actor, and popularize it among all groups and communities. As demonstrated in al-Fida’, during emergencies, the locals and governmental local media used the term “Civil Society” when they unprecedentedly appealed to these volunteering groups seeking their support and help in critical situations such as sudden breakdowns of utilities services that followed

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attacks on the infrastructure and public institutions by armed groups. 27 The Ismaili Council established itself as a civil community ground in reconciling internal disputes and conflicts in the city and the community. On 7 August 2013, an activist who was a busdriver in one of the governmental departments was killed by a bomb while he was secretly taking aid to one of the neighboring besieged areas and his death generated several conflicting stories. The majority of the community believes that he was involved in providing “logistics” to the rebels and blamed him for an attempt to implicate the community and the city in the frenzy circle of violence between the government and the armed groups. As noted by Hubbard and Negus, these incidents added more to the public disapproval of the protests which was growing because “many residents blamed the local activists for bringing the war to what had been a peaceful city”. 28 Others insisted that he was only carrying food to women and children and was punished by secret police, and they commemorated him with a large funeral that was covered by scores of videos on YouTube. This was the one of very few incidents in which an Ismaili was suspected to be directly involved with the armed groups. The community was alarmed with the news and the rift between the activists and the community started to widen. The Ismaili Council held the usual rituals and prayers for the Ismaili activist equally like all other Ismailis killed in the war and the community responded by praying for his soul. This incident triggered some discontent among many individuals but it established the Council’s position as an independent space for all Ismailis irrespective of their political inclinations.

“Thirsty days and sleepless nights: It is time for the concerned officials to solve the old-new crises of drinking water”, al-Fida’ (17 June 2013). 28 Hubbard and Negus, “Civil war gives Syrian minorities no clear option”. 27

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ISLAMIZATION AND MILITARIZATION: SEASONS OF THIRST AND DEATH

Salamiya epitomizes the whole of Syria in which a vast majority of the minorities as well as the mainstream anticipated the rise of radical Islamism and expressed their fear of civil war since the very beginning. 29 During early protests, a common voice across the Ismaili community warned that what looked like a trans-ethnic uprising in Syria would soon be taken over by overwhelming organized Islamic groups that would undermine the Syrian state and would drive the country into a brutal civil war. This war, they argued, is staged and supported by international Islamic organizations and external patrons and allies to destroy the state and the society. They were criticized because their discourse bears clear resemblance to that of the government. Unfortunately, it did not take long for these fears to be realized. In a few months, the clashes across Syria grew more violent. The early signs of Islamization and militarization of the revolt grew stronger with the regular funerals of soldiers returned from the war zone to be buried in their hometowns. In Salamiya, these incidents had a strong effect that was expressed in the low-key comments of people returning from the post-funeral gatherings. The community grieved for these young soldiers emphasizing that they were doing their compulsory military service or were from poor families who took the military jobs as a source of living. More funerals followed coming to Salamiya from big cities for people who were executed by rebels due to suspicions of having connections with secret police, some of which were proved to be unfounded allegations. Many other funerals arrived from other cities for individuals or families killed for refusing to evacuate their houses in areas dominated by armed groups. The community was terrorized by the horrific stories about signs of torture and mutilation on the bodies of some of them, related by their families and friends. In the following period, incidents of shelling and bombings widened steadily and in Joshua Landis, “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Assad regime is likely to survive to 2013”, Middle East Policy Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (Spring 2012). 29

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2013, a series of coordinated wide-scale bombings and shelling of Salamiya and its countryside killed hundreds of people. The first two wide-scope bombing attacks at the beginning of 2013 had sweeping devastating effects on the Ismailis and the whole population of Salamiya. However, they also proved to be particularly consequential for peaceful activists and the Syrian intellectuals who viewed Salamiya as a pioneering exceptional example of non-violent revolution. A larger number of Ismailis considered the attacks as a desperate attempt by the armed opposition to militarize the community and to prove the failure of the state to protect them. In fact, it caused discontent and frustration among the community especially because these incidents were almost ignored by domestic, regional and international media. This frustration was coupled by the apathetic response of the international community and organizations that turned a blind-eye to them, which is unusual for similar incidents. The polemics that accompanied and followed the attacks by the armed opposition, and their supporters who glorified the acts, were shocking and triggered wide criticism. Two illustrative articles by Basileus Zeno and by Hubbard and Negus provide rigorous reading of the situation surrounding these incidents. 30 The two attacks marked a turning point in the course followed by the peaceful opposition in Salamiya and their successful pioneering example of non-armed revolution and dialogue between all sides of the conflict. Hubbard and Negus interviewed a Salamiyan activist and were able to convey his frustration because the armed groups targeted his peaceful town and thus undermined its civil revolution, “instead of joining the armed opposition, he and other activists struck deals with local officials to allow protests as long as they remained peaceful, he said.” That worked well, he said, until 21 January, when a bomb attack on a carpet factory killed 42 people. Two weeks later, a second blast struck a military factory nearBasileus Zeno, “The Syrian City of Salamiya and al-Nusra Front: The issue of Unannounced death”, al-Hayat (13 March 2013); Hubbard and Negus, “Civil war gives Syrian minorities no clear option”. 30

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by, killing some 320 male and female workers, including 103 from Salamiya. 31 Hundreds of members of the Ismaili community living, working in, or travelling through remote or adjacent rebel-controlled areas were directly targeted, kidnapped or killed. Hundreds of Ismaili families fled or were expelled from different areas they inhabited continuously for generations. One of the wide-scale and horrific incidents took place in December 2013, in the Workers’ District of ‘Adra, near Damascus, which is inhibited predominantly by the minorities’ working class families. Hundreds of Ismailis were besieged for weeks, tens of them are still held, and many were killed or kidnapped. Adra’s siege caused a wave of exodus from the district, and the traumatic effects on the families, who settled and built their lives across Syrian towns for decades, forced them to return to Salamiya in fear of a similar destiny. The returnees lost their houses and businesses, but their basic needs are supported by their relatives and the Ismaili Council. It was clear that events are quickly taking a sectarian track. Kidnapping of civilian Salamiyans for killing or for ransom is the most serious ongoing problem. Throughout 2012–2014 there were many kidnappings of busses of employees who commuted to tens of neighboring areas. The biggest of these incidents included large groups of Salamiyan female teachers travelling to al-Jinan, Tulul alHumr and al-Hamra, for school teaching every day. The cultural sensitivity of incidents involving women still represent the main obstacle to obtaining clear information through interviewing the women or having access to official records that handled these incidents. However, some journalists in the local press covered some of these incidents in brief, most notably Muhammad Ahmad Khabbazi, in al-Fida’. 32 Ismaili villages were singled out and targeted by the armed groups who shelled them regularly, and some villages were taken Full details can also be found in: Mus’ab al-Jundi, “Salamiya, the Mosaics of revolution and disobedience”, Orient Net (18 February 2013). 32 Muhammad Ahmad Khabbazi, “To the Education administrator: what about the educational society in Salamiya”, al-Fida’ (4 November 2012). 31

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over by these groups. These invasions were accompanied by killing, kidnapping and robbing civilians, and causing destruction to properties, farms and worshipping houses. Some of the remote villages witnessed clashes between these groups and the governmental forces and paramilitaries. In their attempt to drive out the armed groups who stationed their fighters in the evacuated houses, the governmental forces subjected these villages to airstrikes which caused more deaths and destruction. These incidents forced thousands of Ismailis in the countryside out of their homes and farms and created mass exoduses of internally displaced people who ran for their lives and took refuge in Salamiya or in more safe villages. The graphic images of evacuated ruined villages portray how civil war engulfs all the broad diverse patchwork of different communities, even those who adhere to their peaceful standing in the backlines. Daily incidents of kidnapping, rape and brutal killing targeting members of the Ismaili community indicated that the events have turned into sectarian violence that will continue for some time. The last three years subjected the Ismailis to a great deal of suffering and horror, “unprecedented since the Ottoman period” to use their most repeated cliché. Located at the crossroads between several rebel-controlled areas in the centre of a combat zone, Salamiya is a daily target for offences and atrocities hitting from four directions. One of the last wide-scale offensives was a suicide car bombing near a primary school in the village of al-Kafat on 9 January 2013, killing and wounding dozens of people, mostly children and women, and destroying tens of houses and shops. Daily incidents of threatening, robbing, killing, kidnapping, and shelling became characteristic of the city and its countryside. The constant attacks on buses transporting Salamiyan students, employees and aid workers of the Red Crescent and AKDN paralyzed the city and had a traumatic influence on its main driving forces, turning them into the most vulnerable groups in the community. Since al-Raqqa was taken by Islamist extremists who stationed thousands of fighters in Salamiya’s eastern hills of Bal‘aas, the city and its villages came under constant threats of invasion and genocide sent through different mediums, including social media and streets’ leaflets. Throughout the last three years, Salamiya has been severely affected by attacks on the infrastructure, public institutions and utilities sectors. The repeated destruction blocked the population’s access to their basic needs of food, water, energy, and medicine, and

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denied them their basic rights of work, education and health. One of the most crucial problems was the drastic aggravation of the old problems in several public services, especially the water system. During the last three years the city witnessed longer terms of cutting off water that flows through rebel-held areas. In addition to locking up the water supply and destruction of water pipes, the water was many times, accidentally and intentionally, contaminated which led to the spread of diseases, especially between children, as reported by Hassan Na‘us in al-Fida’. 33 One of the longest terms of water deprivation was in summer 2013 when the water was cut off for about two months in the city after it witnessed a sharp rise in its population, which had more than doubled, reaching 250,000. The panicked public blamed the authorities for not finding a quick way out of this fatal situation and many accused the government of deliberately ignoring it as a collective punishment for the city. Local journalists raised the problem repeatedly in the press, calling on the civil society in Salamiya and the international organizations to help. These reports with their bizarrely long titles sound like an emergency distress call. The water hardship put more strain on families’ finances as they had to pay expensive prices for water from roaming tanks. The ordeal was accompanied by hundreds of health emergency cases that required admission to intensive care due to poisoning. The city was swept by the spread of many epidemics, including one hundred and eighty-three severe cases of liver infection that were diagnosed in early September 2013 alone, as reported in tens of articles. 34 These cases were contained before turning into larger epidemics by co-operation between national healthcare system, UNICEF, the Red Cross and the Ismaili Council.

Hassan Na‘‘us, “A tragic situation of the drinking water crises in Salamiya is a threat of a human catastrophe. Engineer Shahhud: we sent a memorandum to the foreign ministry to coordinate with the Red Cross”, al-Fida (29 August 2013). 34 Including: “183 cases of epidemic liver infection A in Salamiya because of contaminated water”, Tishreen (22 September 2013). 33

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THE ISMAILIS IN THE MEDIA SPRING: RECLAIMING LOST VOICES AND IMAGES

The protests in the minorities’ areas were highlighted in the early stage to contest the accusation that the revolt is assuming gradually an Islamist Salafist nature. The oppositional voices of the minorities were celebrated and appropriated to present a narrative that is especially designated for the consumption of Western people, Western media and Western political circles. This narrative is manufactured in major regional and expatriate media based in the West, and spread around in order to contend the official Syrian narrative about the state- protection of minorities and about the Islamist extremist threat. An article entitled “The city of al-Salamiya in Hamah: revolted early against the regime of Assad so he tightened his grip on it, the majority of its residents belong to the Ismaili community”, 35 is an illustrative example of a myriad of articles published in major Saudi newspapers in London in which the words “Ismailis”, and “Salamiya” are highlighted repeatedly in their long titles. The images of the early well-organized Salamiyan demonstration gave a civil, peaceful, and secularized edge to the overall picture of the mobilization. However in regional media, Salamiya’s exceptional experience was soon edited out completely when the uprising started to consolidate itself as an Islamic uprising that endeavors to establish an Islamic state under Shari‘a law. The more recent articles that covered the protests of Salamiyan women such as “Against all odds: the women in one Syrian city succeed in keeping their protest movement alive”, by Maryam Saleh, 36 carried a picture of women from Aleppo, with the full Islamic dressing, who do not resemble Salamiyan female demonstrators. Some local and international voices tried to blow the whistle and criticized this misrepresentation of minorities. Interviewing a young activist and film-maker, Hubbard and Negus noted that “an activist from the city of Salamiyeh, where most residents belong to the Ismaili branch of Shiite Islam, said he had been organizing and filming 35 36

Al-Sharq al-Awsat (8 April 2012). Majalla (24 July 2013).

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anti-regime protests since early in the uprising but found that rebel websites preferred videos featuring the black flags associated with militant Sunni Islam”. 37 This elimination of the minorities alarmed many intellectuals and civil society activists who criticized this process repeatedly. Criticizing the media of the Gulf States, Basileus Zeno blamed it for igniting the civil war. He explains: “This media works like war-media which only show the picture that suits their ‘Islamic’ project by marginalizing the demonstrations of some nonIslamic areas such as the demonstrations of the city of Salamiya with its Ismaili majority and the demonstration of Suwaida with its Druze majority”. 38 It was clear that intellectuals who were alarmed by this early symbolic eradication understood it as an advance warning to the actual one that was to follow soon. The other serious dilemma behind the scenes seemed an extension of the issue of eliminating the minorities. The young filmmaker interviewed by Hubbard and Negus continues, “Activists from minority sects who support the uprising have found themselves sidelined, sometimes by both the opposition and their own communities”. The glamorous alternative institutions, which rapidly grew under the generous sponsorship of the Gulf States and within their media structure, promised better conditions and freedom of expression. However, they only reproduced a more defective and corrupted version of the old official institutions. The minorities’ cultural elites who passionately joined them were eliminated and their work was subverted or discarded altogether. The growing dissenting tone of their voices is still unheard in the middle of the loud excitement of regional and international media that are diligently continuing their “coherent” discourse. Many observers who closely followed these events remarked that the opposition rigorously masked all early sectarian indications

Hubbard and Negus, “Civil war gives Syrian minorities no clear option”. 38 Basileus Zeno, “The Syrian Revolution: From the National Struggle to the Sectarian Maze”, Al-Akhbar, no. 1579 (6 Oct. 2011). 37

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of the uprising. 39 However, these indications were glaringly visible to observers and minorities. Along with all minorities and other groups who were classified as the silent majority, the peaceful Ismailis were (and still are) targeted by a polemical campaign and were criticized as being passive, self-indulgent and indifferent towards the uprising. This criticism is coupled by threats, and accusations of heresy and betrayal which uses the typical wording that is used in the statements issued against other minorities including the Christians and the Druze and especially the Twelver Shi‘a and Alawites. This association with the latter two that are, wrongly, identified with the government and its closest regional allies, fuels the insecurity of the Ismailis and impacts their current social and political outlook. The medieval polemics resurface again and the new media circulate articles reviving the old offensive discourse and derogatory remarks about the Fatimids, the Assassins, and the Imams. These articles trigger prompt emotional and intellectual responses. The social media and the virtual walls of the young Ismailis are turned into feverish forums in which they discuss their views about modernism, plurality and dialogue, and relate it to the historical experience of their city, their community and their ancestors. The political and socio-cultural output of the Syrian Ismailis represents a strong counter-discourse to the binary of “the political society-the civil society”. It also challenges the binaries and stereotypes that were established by the ongoing civil war, which equates opposition with political Islamism, and equates minorities with being detached, insular and self-absorbed. Salamiya’s experience with the Syrian crisis demonstrates the efforts of its community, which is struggling daily for survival, to turn their city into a mediating site for dealing with internal disputes, and generating what civil society theorists call “sources of social harmony and political comity”. 40 It George Monbiot, “Syria: Sanctions – damned if we do, damned if we don’t”, in ed. Toby Manhire, The Arab Spring: Rebellion, Revolution and a New World Order (London: Guardian Books, 2012), pp. 248–50. 40 Virginia Idogkinson and Michael W. Foley, Introduction to The Civil Society Reader (Tufts: University Press of New England, 2003), pp. xixxxi and 255. 39

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also presents it as a space for engaging in critical reflection and emphasizing the ability of Syrian minorities to negotiate with problematic legacies in the deep-rooted level of Syrian cultural imaginary in order to achieve national reconciliation. Evidently, this emphasizing of cultural identity and particularity is not meant to nurture a feeling of detachment and selfimportance, and not an ideology that pushes towards power and privileges, but rather a conscious attempt to counter the hegemonic Islamic discourse. In the middle of the ongoing brutal civil war and frenzied media war, Salamiya and the Ismailis prove that what seems to be standing silent on the sidelines is an intentional diverging from the standardized patterns of political activism towards establishing a foundation of civil revolution and civil society to which they can be a successful example and a major contributor. Moreover, their classical and modern cultural paradigms can serve as an inspirational source for civic education and national peacebuilding in the post-war period.

CHAPTER 7 THE CHRISTIANS OF SYRIA AND THE ARAB SPRING HABIB C. MALIK LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY – BYBLOS For most of its history the land known today as Syria was not a coherent polity under that name but rather a geographic designation primarily, like that of North America, encompassing presentday Syria and extending at times to include parts of neighboring states like Lebanon, Jordan, southern Turkey, and historic Palestine (“Greater Syria” also known as bilad esh-Sham), or it was a part of larger imperial territories such as the Umayyad and Ottoman Empires. Since the dawn of Christianity this geographic Syria has harbored some of the oldest Christian communities in existence. Saul became St. Paul on the road to Damascus in a dramatic conversion episode chronicled in the New Testament. 1 News of Jesus’s miraculous healings spread to Syria and people brought him their sick to be cured. 2 Antioch in northern Syria (inside today’s Turkey) was the place where the followers of Jesus were first given the name “Christians.” 3 Antioch also became the seat of one of the two principal theological schools of Christian doctrine alongside the other, Alexandria. Evangelization northwards to Georgia and eastwards as far as India was first launched from Antioch and Syria. The tradiThe Acts of the Apostles, chapter 9. Matthew 4: 24. 3 The Acts of the Apostles, 11:26. 1 2

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tion of Syrian asceticism that first came to the Levant from Egypt’s great Desert Fathers soon developed its own brand of individual eremitism, as with the Stylites like Simeon who lived on top of a pillar for years, and their extraordinary feats of self-sacrifice became legendary in the West. A number of popes hailed from Syria starting with the eleventh Pope Anicetus (c. 155–166 AD). Certain Christian heresies also sprouted in Syria such as Apollinarianism, while Nestorius, originator of another heresy, was born in northern Syria (in Turkey, today) then moved to Antioch. Both these heresies occasioned fierce Christological controversies during the early Christian centuries. Saint Maroun came from northern Syria and his followers, the Maronites, eventually moved south and established themselves in Lebanon’s rugged mountains. 4 Much more can be said of Syria’s centrality in early Christian history, thus what is clear is that Christianity has existed in geographic Syria in unbroken continuity since the time of Jesus. Prior to winter 2011 when peaceful protests against the regime of President Bashar Assad broke out in Der’aa, located at the southern tip of the contemporary state of Syria, quickly spreading to other areas only to be met with bloody force, the native Christians of Syria numbered around 2.3 million of a total of roughly 23 million people, namely 10 percent of the overall Syrian population. Although most of these Syrian Christians are ethnic Arabs who are largely Greek Orthodox and some Greek (Melkite) Catholics, a For a comprehensive overview of Christianity in Syria see Pierre Canivet, “Christianity in the 1st Century in the Context of the Mediterranean Civilizations: Judaic, Greek, Roman and Asian,” in Christianity: A History in the Middle East, Rev. Habib Badr chief editor, Suad Abou el-Rous Slim and Joseph Abou Nohra assistant editors (Beirut: Middle East Council of Churches Studies & Research Program, 2005), pp. 47–66; on the early Christian heresies mentioned and others see Metropolitan (Anba) Bishoy of Egypt, “The Shaping of Christian Thought II: The Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, the Christological Controversies of the 4th and 5th Centuries,” in same source, pp. 191–217; and on early ascetic life in Syria including the Stylites see Father Shafiq Abou Zayd, “Ascetic movement in the East: Origins, Development and Dissemination II: In Syria, Iraq and Palestine,” in same source, pp. 385–411. 4

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considerable number of them are ethnic Armenians that moved south from eastern Turkey after the massacres of 1915, and others are ethnic Assyrians either of the eastern Orthodox, or Chaldean Catholic, denominations. In addition there are Syriac Orthodox and Syriac Catholics as well as Maronite Catholics. Syria’s Christian communities have tended to dwell mainly in and around the larger cities of Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. Smaller concentrations can also be found in Tartus, Latakia, Hama, Suweida, Kassab, and other towns and cities, in particular in the region known as Wadi alNasara, or “Valley of the Nazareans,” (meaning Christians), stretching from Homs northwest to Tartus. Following the outbreak of civil war in 2011 the numbers of Christians in Syria have fallen to around 1.9 million in 2012, and to 1.7 million in 2013 along with further mass depletions since. Patrick Sookhdeo, founder of the charity Barnabus Fund, declared in September 2015 that he believed there were no more than 250,000 Christians living in Syria. 5 Emigration usually due to forced displacement has been the principal reason for this sudden and dramatic demographic decline. 6 See Caroline Wheeler, “Genocide of the Christian Martyrs laid bare: Sick ISIS Butchers Crucify Thousands in Syria,” in Sunday Express, 29 September 2015. Mr. Sookhdeo is reported as saying: “In Aleppo, to give you one illustration, there used to be 400,000 Christians four years ago. Today there may be between 45,000 and 65,000.” http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/608224/christian-martyrsGeorge-Weidenfeld-Patrick-Sookhdeo-Syria-Barnabus-Fund-relocatecharity. 6 The early statistics on Syria’s Christians are taken from Nicolas Heras, “Profile of Syria’s Christian Community,” in Vulnerability Assessment of Syria’s Christians published by Open Doors International (serving persecuted Christians worldwide), Dennis Pastoor, Coordinator, World Watch Unit, June 2013, p. 29. For more statistics see “Syria: The situation of Christians, including whether Christians are perceived to be loyal to President Assad; treatment of Christians by the regime and the opposition forces, including incidents of violence against them; state protection (2013–July 2015),” published by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), 6 August 2015 http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 55deba764.html. 5

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The minorities’ problem in the Middle East including that of the region’s indigenous Christians has come to prominence of late as a function of the meteoric rise of Salafism. Whether one calls it Salafism, or Jihadism, or Takfirism, 7 in the end it all boils down to versions of militant fanatic Sunni Islamism that rejects the other including moderate Sunnis and condones violent attacks on anyone or any group that does not espouse its extremist intolerant ideology. Two distinctly divergent narratives have defined the historical courses followed by native Arab Christian communities when they were faced with the prospects of Sunni rule: a dhimmi narrative and a free one. 8 Over ninety-percent of Arab Christians – certainly those in Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, and southern Sudan – succumbed at some point during the past 1300 years of Islamic rule to being relegated to the humiliating subordination of second-class, or dhimmi, status. The remaining Christians, mainly those of Lebanon (Maronites and the members of other denominations who Salafism refers to “the good Salaf” namely to the contemporaries and immediate followers of the prophet Mohammad regarded as having been the purest representatives of Islam and the authentic Muslim lifestyle including dress and mannerisms to be emulated in all succeeding ages by devout Muslims. Jihadism means those driven by the Qur’anic command to wage holy war (jihad) against infidels and all the enemies of Allah. Takfirism is the act of openly accusing of kufr, or heresy, all those who do not follow the strict precepts of Islamic shari’a (law) as understood and practiced by the Salafis and Jihadis and Takfiris, a grave crime that is punishable by death. All three of these designations become interchangeable when applied to the phenomenon of violent and fanatical militant Sunni Islamism. 8 George Sabra has referred to them as the two ways of being a Christian in a Middle Eastern Islamic context: the “Arab Christian” and the “Eastern Christian.” See George Sabra, “Two Ways of being a Christian in the Muslim Context of the Middle East,” in Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations, edited by University of Birmingham, UK, and Monash University, Australia, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group (Vol. 17, No. 1), January 2006, pp. 43–53. Sabra makes the salient point about the at times interpenetration of these two types within individual persons and communities of Middle Eastern Christians (p. 50). 7

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threw in their lot with the Maronites), fought hard throughout their embattled history incurring great costs in terms of blood and property to elude dhimmitude and retain a degree of free existence that set them apart from the rest of Middle Eastern Christianity. The Christians of Syria largely belong to the first dhimmi narrative and this certainly after the days of their last great theological warrior, St. John of Damascus (676–749 AD). The roots of the distasteful dhimmi system go back to triumphalist and cruel conditions laid down under the guise of mercy towards the vanquished by the second Islamic Caliph Omar (‘Umar bin al-Khattab, 579–644 AD) regulating how Muslims should treat the “People of the Book,” namely Jews and Christians as the Qur’an refers to them 9, living in their midst. Taken collectively, these Conditions of Omar and their dhimmi restrictions over time amounted to a dehumanizing recipe for the gradual liquidation of the subjugated communities instead of being the much-touted system of tolerance for non-Muslims living under Islamic rule that many shallow scholars writing romanticized historical accounts have insisted it was. 10 Since the majority of Muslims has always Some Qur’anic references to “People of the Book” include: Surat al-‘Imran 64, 72–80, 98–101, 113–115, and 199; Surat al Baqara 62, and 213–214; Surat al-Ma’ida 15–19, 69, and 82; Surat al-Nisaa’ 171; and Surat al-Ankabut 46. 10 One such example is the prominent Western scholar of Islam, William Montgomery Watt, who writes in his Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1987): “In the early days of Islamic empire the Christian inhabitants of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent were probably better off as dhimmis under Muslim Arab rulers than they had been under Byzantine Greeks…On the whole there was more genuine toleration of non-Muslims under Islam than there was of non-Christians in medieval Christian states.” (p. 51). Elsewhere, in an earlier book entitled The Majesty that Was Islam: The Islamic World, 661–1100 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Great Civilizations Series, 1974), the same author says about the disappearance of Christianity from the countries conquered by Islam: “There was nothing dramatic about what happened; it was a gentle death, a phasing out.” (p. 257). The pioneering scholar of dhimmitude, Bat Ye’or, begs to differ. In an address Ye’or gave at a seminar in the 9

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been the Sunnis, and since Sunnis have been the Muslims usually in power much of the time throughout most of the Islamic world for the past thirteen centuries, it becomes clear why Sunnis should insist on what amounts in their eyes to their birthright to rule over others. And many among them are genuinely convinced that dhimmitude was a tolerant and benevolent system offering protection to vulnerable Jewish and Christian minorities who did not wish to convert to Islam or leave their ancestral homelands. Damascus in present-day Syria was the seat of the Umayyad Empire (c. 660–750 AD), and Baghdad in present-day Iraq the capital of the Abbasid Empire (c. 750–1258 AD) – both representing the high points of Arab Sunni political and religious ascendancy in the world of Islam. Later, Constantinople, conquered from the Byzantines by the Ottomans in 1453 and renamed Istanbul, became the center of Sunni power and domination for over 400 years. Within this Sunni ocean that stretches from Morocco to Indonesia and beyond, the Safavid Empire, precursor to today’s Shiite-ruled Iran, was a small island of Shiism and therefore just another wayward minority in the eyes of the ruling majority permanently ripe for subjugation under Sunni rule. One way to understand the differences between dhimmi and non-dhimmi Christian communities in the region is to look at both sides of the Lebanese–Syrian border. On the Syrian side the fortunes of the Christians for the most part historically have depended on the temperamental whim of the ruler – at times deciding for French Senate on June 6, 2004, she said Montgomery Watt was wrong adding: “in fact, the long death-throes of Christianity under Islam were extremely painful and tragic, as can be seen even in the 20th century, with the genocide of the Armenians, and the Lebanese Christians’ resistance in the 1970s-1980s, and for the last decades the genocide in the Sudan,…” On the nefarious nature of dhimmitude see Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam (Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985); and her The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude (Teaneck, N.J: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996). See also Mark Durie, The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude and Freedom (Deror Books in Australia and USA, 2010), with a Forward by Bat Ye’or.

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purposes of expediency to ease up on them slightly, while at others, or under a different ruler, tightening control and increasing the pressures on the hapless community. For this reason one can appreciate why under the rule of the Assads, both father and son, for example, many Syrian Christians have displayed the pictures of the president in their homes and harbored sentiments of support for him as contrasted with more severe historical precedents or possible nastier alternatives. For their part and out of pure cynical calculation, the Assads during their long periods of successive rule have seen fit to lighten the stresses on Syria’s Christians even to the extent of appointing some of them to high-ranking posts in the state administration and the army. 11 And because for the past 1300 years of mainly Sunni rule these Syrian Christians never really knew a truly free existence and lived mainly as dhimmis, any slight lifting of the strains of dhimmitude, no matter how modest, has been celebrated by the community as a significant triumph and qualitative improvement in their lives. Move to the other side of the same border in Lebanon and you witness the precise opposite of this phenomenon. There the Christians historically have fought hard to preserve their freedoms and ward off the specter of dhimmitude, and they often paid dearly for this with their blood and possessions. In the pre-technological era they were aided by the ruggedness and inaccessibility of the Lebanese mountains as well as by the tenacious tradition of Maronite monasticism entrenched in those same mountains. Despite Lebanon’s fragility and multiple problems in recent years its civil society has been more robust generally than its weak state mainly because the levels of its individual as well as group freedoms have remained high and continue to exceed those found in any of the surrounding Arab societies. This is why the erosion of some of those freedoms as a result of the 1975–90 war in Lebanon, and the 29–year Syrian occupation that gripped the country beginning in 1976, was regarded by the Christians as a huge loss and a tragedy of major proportions. Saddam Hussein, leader of the rival secular Baath party in neighboring Iraq, did roughly the same for the Christians in that country. 11

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On one side of that curious border therefore even a flimsy, sporadic, and unguaranteed improvement on the freedom index is celebrated by dhimmi Christians as a qualitative leap forward, while on the other side of the same political divide the least diminishing of established and hard-won freedoms is treated by the non-dhimmi Christians as nothing short of a national and historic calamity. This simple yet telling litmus-paper comparison underscores the centrality of freedom as the defining personal and collective existential ingredient in the lives and destinies of these two respective Christian communities, the Syrian and the Lebanese. It also reveals how deeply significant and real that border is despite its expedient inception under French mandate rule in 1920 when Grand Liban (Greater Lebanon) was created. Ever since the challenge to Bashar Assad’s rule turned bloody in 2011 marking the start of a vicious civil war that has engulfed the entire nation Syria’s Christians have been repeatedly branded as diehard supporters of the regime, and many have paid a heavy price for this perception. 12 In murky situations such as one encounters in a place like Syria where available alternatives and choices all seem repulsive in varying degrees those insisting on ideal or utopian solutions will emerge the most frustrated, and therefore the most detached from reality. Moral clarity in times of conflict is not always guaranteed or self-evident, so choices are often not those between what is recognizably good and what is undeniably bad; in the real world choices usually tend to be among various shades of bad and worse. This in fact has been precisely the sad predicament of Syria’s Christian communities ever since the start of the Syrian uprising. One analyst has stated it in 2013 as follows: “For its part, the Assad regime has consistently claimed that it is the only hope of protection for religious minorities in Syria – not only for Alawites, but also for Christians, Druze, and others. In view of how the SyriBoth Bashar and his father Hafez before him have ruled Syria with an iron fist for nearly half a century. They belong to the Alawite minority community (about 12 percent of the Syrian population), an offshoot of Shiite Islam, and have espoused a secular Pan-Arabist ideology, the Baath, that borrowed from European socialism and allied itself with the antiWestern forces of the 20 century’s global left. 12

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an civil war has developed, more Christians have come to accept this claim. The opposition is increasingly controlled by Islamists, who view the rebellion as a religious struggle and are not interested in interreligious dialogue.” 13 These unenviable Christians, however, have received little by way of understanding or sympathy from outsiders in the face of the difficult choices they have uneasily had to make. Instead, they have been consistently accused of willfully siding with the Assad regime, of condoning dictatorial brutality, of serving as a thorn in the side of the anti-regime opposition, and of betraying the noble aims of the Syrian uprising. 14 From the beginning of this uprising Syria’s Christians assumed a cautious attitude that soon turned into deepening skepticism with respect to both the abilities and the underlying intentions of the Syrian opposition. Confidence was quickly eroded in the strength or durability of the moderate Sunni factions within the opposition to hold on to the initial liberal revolutionary impulse and overcome growing, and eventually successful, attempts by the radical Islamists to hijack the uprising and steer it in a different direction according to their increasingly militant agendas. The Christians felt that their choices had been tragically reduced to either sitting on the sidelines of the emerging conflict thus risking being accused of treason by Gabriel Said Reynolds, “The Devil They Know: Why Most Syrian Christians Support Bashar al-Assad,” in Commonweal (August 27, 2013); retrieved from the September 2, 2013 version at www.common wealmagazine.org/devil-they-know. 14 In reality part of what has been happening can be summed up as follows: “The threat of the stark choice between extinction and exile might explain why many of Syria’s Christians support the Assad regime….It is likely that most Sunni Muslim opposition fighters now perceive Christians and Alawites as principal pillars of domestic support for the Assad dictatorship.” Quoted from “The Choices for Syria’s Christians” by Lawrence A. Franklin (April 4, 2013); see www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4243/syria-christians. In the CatholicHerald.co.uk on 20 June 2013 Father Alexander Lucie-Smith posted a piece with the telling title: “Assad’s regime is appalling, but I can’t blame my Christian friends in Syria for praying that he wins. There are no good guys in the Syrian conflict; people can only choose the lesser of evils.” 13

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both parties, or figuratively holding their noses and casting their lot reluctantly and at times with unmistakable consternation on the side that they perceived as the lesser of the two evils. And when greater clarity began to define these two evils it quickly became apparent that nasty as the regime of Bashar Assad was, it simply looked to be the less calamitous choice when compared with the Salafists and Jihadists and Takfiris that by then had all but seized the reins of the Syrian revolution. It was a classic example of the “damned if you do and damned if you don’t” dilemma. Here is an overview of the descent into mayhem and destruction that have been the lot of Syria’s Christians since the launching of the bloody uprising. At the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011 Christians did take part in a few of the anti-regime marches out of their genuine desire to see liberal reforms introduced into the prevailing system. They did so apprehensively, however, with the still-fresh bitter backdrop of the ravages endured by the neighboring Christians in Iraq a few years earlier at the toppling of Saddam Hussein. But soon they began to hear slogans chanted at Syrian opposition rallies that were quite disturbing to them: “Christians to Beirut; Alawites to the coffin!” Clearly, Sunni supremacist sentiments had crept into play here and were increasingly asserting themselves in the public psyche of the protestors. 15 With time this hostile attitude to the Christians and other minority communities only deepened, and more inflammatory slogans began to circulate. 16 Then the dreaded scenario started to unfold: systematic targeting of Christian individuals, neighborhoods, and whole villages. This abuse on a heightening scale evenJohn Eibner, CEO of Christian Solidarity International, writing in The Washington Times, August 3, 2012. 16 “On Saturday we kill the Jews; on Sunday we kill the Christians” was a familiar refrain in radical Islamist circles, and a variation of it: “First the Saturday people, then the Sunday people” meant that with the departure of the last remaining members of the small Jewish community from Syria in the opening years of the 21st century the time had now arrived to act against “the Sunday people.” See Lela Gilbert, Saturday People, Sunday People: Israel through the Eyes of a Christian Sojourner (New York: Encounter Books, 2012). 15

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tually led to the mass displacements of Christian populations both internally inside Syria as well as abroad. 17 Initially, the few abuses that got reported in the media were ascribed by leaders of the opposition to “individual mistakes” thereby absolving the revolution as a whole of any culpability. Early in 2012 an organized attack on Christians in the Hasaka region came under the ominous slogan of “land for peace” meaning that Christians will be left in peace if they give up their agricultural lands. The widespread fears among the Christians sparked by this attack led to the establishment of the Council of Churches and Christian Relations that pleaded with the Syrian government to put a stop to such maltreatments of the community. June 2012 marked a painful watershed in the suffering of Syria’s Christians when the commander of the Free Syrian Army in the town of Qusayr, a branch of the spearhead of the armed opposition to the regime, issued an ultimatum to the Christian inhabitants of the town to leave immediately because of their “open support” for the Assad regime. Over ten-thousand Christians left the town as a result and the Vatican issued the first of its condemnations of this deliberate harassing of Syria’s Christians. Warnings turned to prolonged sieges of towns like Rableh in the Homs district home to 12,000 Christians who were deprived of food, water, and electricity for two weeks until the siege was finally broken by the Assad forces. Then came the turn of Yabroud where for the first time in this conflict the Christians living there were compelled to pay the special jizya or poll tax levied from subjugated dhimmis. 18 In October of 2013 the The skeleton of this timeline of attacks on Syria’s Christians is based on the seminal account by Abdullah Suleiman Ali entitled “Masihiyu Suriya: al-Hijra aw Hadd al-Sayf!” [Syria’s Christians: Emigration or the Sharp Edge of the Sword!] published in as-Safir, July 25, 2014. 18 Basing himself accurately on what is stated in Qur’an Surat alTawba 29, Mark Durie poignantly describes the jizya as a virtual beheading: “For the dhimmi, the annual jizya payment was a powerful and public symbolic expression of the jihad-dhimmitude nexus, which fixed the horizon of the dhimmi ’s world. Although the ritual varied in its specific features, its essential character was an enactment of a beheading, in which one of the recurrent features was a blow to the neck of the dhimmi, at the 17

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city witnessed a massive exodus of its Christians after Jabhat alNusra, one of the ascendant Jihadist paramilitary factions within the increasingly Islamized Syrian opposition and having solid ties to Al-Qaeda, blew up two ancient churches. Further outrages aimed at Christians plagued the year 2013 throughout Syria. By now it had become evident that the dominant faces of the Syrian opposition were the Jihadi and Takfiri groups. Lootings, kidnappings, extortion, torture, savage rape, beheadings, destruction of holy sites including churches and monasteries, public crucifixions, and wholesale evictions of Christian residents from their homes and villages – these had become the daily hallmarks of this now full-fledged Islamist-driven religious cleansing and programmed violence under the cloak of regime opposition. 19 Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city in the north of the country, received its share of destruction and displacement when the Islamist “Unity Brigade” (Liwa’ al-Tawhid) swept through major portions of the city terrorizing the civilian inhabitants, in particular the Christians. More than half the 150,000 Christians of Aleppo decided to flee their homes after these Jihadists took over their neighborhoods. Many of them went to relatively safer parts of Syria, while others relocated to neighboring countries like Turkey, Greece, and Armenia. 20 very point when he makes his payment.” See Durie, The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude, and Freedom, p. 131. 19 Nina Shea, director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom in Washington DC, called it “The shadow war against Syria’s Christians.” In a testimony before Congress in June 2013 Shea said:” Though no religious community has been spared egregious suffering, Syria’s ancient Christian minority has cause to believe that it confronts an ‘existential threat’”. See National Review Online, July 1 & 2, 2013, “The Shadow War against Syria’s Christians” by Nina Shea www.nationalreview.com/corner/352494/shadow-war-against-syriaschristians-nina-shea. See also John L. Allen Jr., “’Shadow war’ Targets Christians in Syria,” National Catholic Reporter (July 15, 2013) http://ncronline.org/news/global/shadow-war-targets-christians-syria. 20 It is an example of cruel irony when thousands of Armenians, whose parents and grandparents fled to places like Aleppo in Syria follow-

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Perhaps the one incident that has instilled the most shock in, and deeply damaged the morale of, the remaining Christians in and around Aleppo and of ecclesiastical officials and Christians throughout Syria and beyond has been the kidnapping on 22 April 2013 of the two bishops Boulos Yazigi and Yuhanna Ibrahim by armed Islamist militants belonging to ISIS. 21 As of this writing nothing has surfaced regarding the whereabouts or the condition of the two abductees. In June 2014 a Russian website reported that they were being held in the northern Syrian city of Raqqa, which is under the control of ISIS, but no independent and credible confirmation of this has emerged. 22 Raqqa is also a city where ISIS has ing the massacres their people had suffered under the Ottomans in 1915, now find themselves desperately escaping Syria back to their ancestral homeland of Armenia. See Damien McGuinness, “Armenians flee Syria for their Ancestral Homeland,” BBC News Europe, March 22, 2013 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21844351. The same expulsion occurred in March 2014 in the Syrian town of Kassab where some 2500 Armenians living there for generations were suddenly forced by attacking Jabhat al-Nusra and Chechen terrorists to run for their lives. See Lela Gilbert, “The Stuff of Nightmares: Christians Forced from Homes in Syria’s Kassab,” Zenit.org, April 14, 2014 http://www.zenit.org/en/ articles/the-stuff-of-nightmares-christians-forced-from-homes-in-syria-skassab. 21 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also referred to sometimes as ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), or by the Arabic acronym Daesh, is the name of the extremist Takfiri group that employs terror and murder on a wide and systematic scale, often resorting to subbestial savagery, against all who do not adopt its militant interpretation of Islam. This includes other Sunnis as well as Shiites, Alawites, Kurds, Turcomen, Christians, Yazidis, and all other minority communities native to the regions under ISIS control (since June 2014 portions of eastern Syria and western Iraq). The two abducted prelates are Boulous Yazigi, Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Aleppo and brother of John X, Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch and All the East, and Syriac Orthodox bishop Yuhanna Ibrahim of Aleppo. 22 “Two Bishops Kidnapped in Syria held Captive by ISIL, in ‘Good Health’,” June 8, 2014. See http://www.pravoslavie.ru/english/ 71377.htm.

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imposed the jizya, or poll tax, on Christians there now treated as dhimmis. 23 Much talk has circulated since their kidnap about possible behind-the-scenes deals to exchange the two prelates for Islamist prisoners held in Lebanon and Syria, but this too has not been substantiated. In fact speculation continues as to whether they are dead or alive. Their disappearance has not been an isolated incident but only a high-profile example of a widespread phenomenon: kidnap for money or exchange of people or the sheer instilling of terror. Invariably, the victims are members of the vulnerable minority communities targeted for ethno-religious cleansing such as Syria’s Christians. A few months after the direct Russian military entry in September 2015 into the Syrian conflict a historic encounter took place on 12 February 2016 at the Havana Airport in Cuba between Pope Francis and Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill. In their 30– point Joint Declaration 24 issued that same day five of the points (numbers 8–12) dealt directly with the sufferings of Christians throughout the Middle East, particularly in Syria and Iraq. The two abducted and still-missing Syrian Christian prelates are mentioned by name in point number 10, and a call for Christian unity and prayers for the fallen martyrs are urged. In fact, the plight of Middle Eastern Christians – specifically those facing the devastations of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq – constituted the catalyzing backdrop to this unprecedented meeting between the heads of the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches. This telling focus reveals the genuine and deep concern felt by both Churches for Christians native to the Middle East and the extreme hardships they continue to endure. See “Syria Crisis: ISIS imposes Rules on Christians in Raqqa,” BBC News Middle East, February 27, 2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-26366197. 24 See “Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia,” the official English translation put out by Vatican Radio on 12 February 2016 at http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/ 2016/02/12/joint_declaration_of_pope_francis_and_patriarch_kirill/120 8117. 23

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In October 2013 a horrific massacre of Christians took place in the Syrian towns of Sadad and Muheen resulting in the expulsion of hundreds of terrified Christians from the area. Sadad is an ancient Syriac Orthodox Christian habitation, so old as to be mentioned in the Old Testament. 25 It lies in a remote barren region between Homs and Damascus and its Christian population is generally poor. Jihadists attacked out of the blue one autumn day and filmed their dastardly deeds of torture and mass murder of men, women, and children and the destruction of 14 churches and property. A week later Assad’s forces retook the town, but this came too late for the victims and the unique churches some dating back to the early Christian era. Other Christian villages in the Qalamun region also simultaneously attacked included Qarrah, Nabak, Deir Attiyah, and Yabroud. These instances of deliberate and bloody religious cleansing have received scant coverage in Western media. If the attacks on Sadad and its environs were appalling, a month earlier in September the ancient historic town of Maaloula – where Aramaic is still the spoken language as it was in the time of Jesus – was ransacked by armed Jihadists belonging to Jabhat alNusra supported by elements of the supposedly moderate Free Syrian Army. This was the first of two devastating attacks on the picturesque Greek (Melkite) Catholic and Greek Orthodox town nestled among the cliffs of a mountain some sixty kilometers north of Damascus. A designated world-heritage site by UNESCO, Maaloula was all but destroyed by the marauding Islamist fanatics and its Christian residents forcefully displaced after some were brutally murdered rendering it a ghost town and the subsequent scene of fierce fighting between the entrenched Jihadists and the Syrian army loyal to Assad. Methodic desecrations of churches and monasteries were undertaken by the Islamists who smashed religious

Sadad in Biblical Hebrew is Zedad. See Numbers 34:8 and Ezekiel 47:15. See also Raymond Ibrahim, “Largest Massacre of Christians in Syria, Ignored in the West” posted at http://www.raymondibrahim.com/ islam/largest-massacre-of-christians-in-syria-ignored/. 25

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statues and burned precious icons and manuscripts as they destroyed virtually everything else in their path. 26 Three months later in December Maaloula was once again viciously attacked by Jihadists who this time stole or destroyed any of the few surviving religious artifacts from the first attack and then kidnapped thirteen Syrian and Lebanese Orthodox nuns from the Monastery of Mar Thekla leading them to the Islamist-seized town of Yabroud 20 kilometers away where they were held for another three months before being finally released on 9 March 2014 as the Assad forces were poised to retake Yabroud. Their release apparently came on the heels of intensive negotiations between the kidnappers and a number of Syrian, Lebanese, and Qatari intelligence chiefs that resulted in a swap of the nuns for 138 Islamist women held in Syrian prisons. 27 Syria’s Christians have alternately been caught in the crossfire of a war they never wanted to be a part of, have been purposely targeted and brutalized out of pure Islamist hatred, or have been used as convenient pawns in the ongoing showdown between regime forces and an increasingly radicalized Sunni rebel opposition. At the end of January 2014, in a statement by a delegation of Syrian Christian clerics visiting Washington D.C., it was asserted that forty churches had been burned throughout Syria and that half a million Christians had been driven from their homes with another 300,000 having fled Syria altogether. 28 Another set of figures from July 2014 gives a smaller number of about 450,000 Christians that includes both the internally displaced and those that have left Syria. HowevOn the tragedy of Maaloula see Ruth Sherlock and Magdy Samaan, “Syria Crisis: al-Qaeda seizes Village that still speaks the Ancient Language of Christ,” in The Daily Telegraph, September 5, 2013. See also the report in Asia News entitled “Maaloula: Rebels break into the Village Homes, kill Three Young Christians” http://www.asianews.it/newsen/Maaloula:-rebels-break-into-the-village-homes,-kill-three-youngChristians-28958.html. 27 See the report in Russia Today “Nuns kidnapped in Syria’s Maaloula set free,” (March 9, 2014) http://rt.com/news/syria-nuns-releasemaaloula-782/. 28 See Lawrence A. Franklin, “The Choices for Syria’s Christians”. 26

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er, the same source also speaks of 1200 Christians killed (some quite brutally), 60 churches destroyed or damaged, and 24 Christian towns and villages emptied of their inhabitants. 29 At the end of June 2014, and after sweeping through large parts of eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq across a virtually nonexistent border, ISIS declared the creation of a Sunni caliphate and changed its own name to the “Islamic State,” or IS. 30 This was one of the abominable offspring of the ill-fated and misnamed Arab Spring: a militant Takfiri state that has since perpetrated untold misery on everyone within its reach from other Sunnis to Shiites to Christians in Mosul and Yazidis in Sinjar to all groups with a different creed or worldview. The choices IS offered its wretched Iraqi victims – the same as those imposed on Christians by ISIS in Raqqa – are chilling yet classic as far as Islamic conquests have proceeded in history: Convert to their brand of Islam; live in humiliation as subjugated dhimmis (for People of the Book); or die by the sword. Those who could escape did flee under very difficult conditions; others who risked staying put were summarily executed often in inhuman ways; very few actually gave in and “converted” under pressure to avoid death – no Christians that we know of in Mosul, but some Yazidis from Sinjar did. 31 Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict on the regime’s side starting in September 2015 brought much needed relief to the sagging battlefield fortunes of Assad’s exhausted army. There were some beneficial byproducts of this for Syria’s Christians. One tan29

Sayf!”

See Abdullah Suleiman Ali, “Masihiyu Suriya: al-Hijra aw Hadd al-

“ISIS Militants declare Islamic ‘Caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria,” France 24 with AFP and Reuters, June 30, 2014 http://www.france24. com/en/20140629–jihadist-group-isis-declares-islamic-caliphate-iraqsyria/. 31 Liz Sly, “Islamic State Video shows Scores of Yazidis converting to Islam,” The Washington Post, August 21, 2014. In the case of the Yazidis there have been several statements along with poignant evidence on the ground to indicate that the Islamic State is bent on genocide. See Lydia Tomkiw, “Iraq’s Jihadis have vowed to wipe out the Yazidis. Who are they?” The Christian Science Monitor, August 5, 2014. 30

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gible example is the start of the return on 9 December 2015 of displaced Christians to battered neighborhoods in Homs previously under rebel control but now deemed safe after the rebels were expelled. The Cyprus-based SAT-7 Christian television station broadcast a program about this development. 32 Although Aleppo in the following months of 2016 went on to experience harsh fighting between entrenched rebels and regime forces supported by Russian air cover, with resulting massive wholesale devastation of entire districts in the large city, some Christian quarters on the west side of Aleppo remained fairly intact and secure from the immediate ferocity of the clashes and bombardments. The same has not been the case for thousands of Christians trapped on the eastern side of the beleaguered city that has been under rebel control. Fierce Russian and regime aerial bombings and a prolonged siege of those portions of the city have cut off vital supplies endangering thousands of Christians and other civilians living there. 33 The siege was finally broken in August 2016 and humanitarian relief brought in, but the war for Aleppo has raged on. Questions have continued to swirl around the role Assad played in facilitating the emergence of ISIS in Syria with the alleged aim of offering a stark reminder principally to his regime’s foreign detractors but also to his Russian allies that what awaits Syria and the region should the regime fall is a worse fate than anything the brutal Baath secular dictatorship he runs has perpetrated. Anecdotal evidence suggests that on more than one occasion since the start of the uprising in 2011 the Assad forces have deliberately released from state prisons hundreds of hardened radical Islamists who then directly proceeded to join the fight against the regime thereby painting the anti-regime rebellion as a militant Islamist Jihad. 34 See “Faith rises from the Rubble of Old Homs, Syria,” a SAT-7 Christmas 2015 broadcast https://www.sat7uk.org/faith-rises-from-therubble-of-old-homs-syria-in-sat-7–christmas-broadcast/. 33 See “Syria’s Christians under Siege in Aleppo,” by Bradley Eli, July 21, 2016, in ChurchMilitant.com http://www.churchmilitant.com/news/ article/syrias-christians-under-siege-in-aleppo. 34 As an example see Phil Sands, Justin Vela, and Suha Maayeh, “Assad Regime set free Extremists from Prison to fire up Trouble during 32

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When these terrorists then go around killing members of exposed minority communities such as the Christians this plays into the regime narrative that it has in fact been the true protector of these vulnerable groups. Until late August 2014, after the United States commenced earnest airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and hinted at doing the same in Syria, Assad’s forces had hardly struck at ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra or any of the other Jihadist organizations operating inside Syria but reserved instead their heaviest assaults for the Free Syrian Army and the more moderate elements in the Syrian opposition. Regardless of the extent to which Assad has been culpable in the genesis of ISIS the fact remains that this unleashed Frankenstein has proven itself to be objectively worse than the unsavory regime that may or may not have had a hand in creating it. Another taint haunts the Christians in Syria alongside that of direct regime support: the strong association many of their coreligionists across the border in Lebanon have with the militant Iranbacked Shiite militia Hezbollah. 35 Since Hezbollah became directly and unabashedly involved in the military campaigns inside Syria on the side of Assad in his conflict with the mainly Sunni rebels the mistaken notion has been reinforced that Syria’s Christians must be siding with the Shiite militia in its battles against Syria’s Sunnis given that Hezbollah enjoys good relations with a sizeable portion of Lebanon’s Christians. Hezbollah’s entanglement in the Syrian civil war has created many security complications for Lebanon by exacerbating sectarian tensions there between Sunnis and Shiites and by radicalizing segments of the huge numbers of Syrian (mainly Sunni) refugees flooding the country. Tragically, the Christians in Lebanon, and by extension those in Syria as well, once again risk bePeaceful Uprising,” The National, January 21, 2014 http://www.thenational.ae/world/syria/assad-regime-set-free-extremistsfrom-prison-to-fire-up-trouble-during-peaceful-uprising. 35 The Free Patriotic Movement led by former Lebanese army general Michel Aoun, the largest and strongest Christian political party in Lebanon, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah back on 6 February 2006 that has evolved into a significant political alliance on the Lebanese political scene.

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coming collateral damage in any proliferating Sunni versus Shiite/Alawite showdown in which they have sought to play no part. Returning to the significance of that border separating Syria and Lebanon as a demarcation line between dhimmitude and freedom, it becomes clear that in times when dhimmi communities are subjected to severe and overt persecution like what has happened in Syria and Iraq such distinctions become blurred and even tend to vanish entirely as the freer Christians mobilize to help their afflicted brethren in the faith and to speak out forcefully on their behalf. As the historian Charles Frazee has stated it: Due to the precarious state of Christianity in the eastern Mediterranean, a new spirit of cooperation among all the Syrian churches is evident. Patriarchs regularly visit each other and discuss common initiatives, especially ways to slow the emigration of so many of their members to Europe and the Americas. 36

Frazee points to the Balamand Declaration of 1993 as embodying this new spirit of cooperation among the Middle Eastern churches, both Orthodox and Catholic, thereby inaugurating a new era of reconciliation for these “sister churches.” 37

Many Christians from Syria have found refuge in Lebanon since the outbreak in 2011 of the Syrian rebellion. The various patriarchates of the eastern churches located in Lebanon including the Greek Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Maronite, and others have taken in entire families in their monasteries and schools and have provided for their basic needs. Relatives, friends, and private connections across the border have also stepped in to bring relief to these distressed Christians displaced from Syria. Non-governmental organizations like the Catholic relief service Caritas have offered their share of help as well. Some of the displaced Christians stayed for a Charles Frazee, Christian Churches of the Eastern Mediterranean (Placentia, California: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2011), p. 195. 37 Ibid. 36

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short while in Lebanon only to move on to other destinations in the West, but many did remain in Lebanon hoping to be able at some point to return to the shattered homes and villages they left behind in Syria. Archbishop Issam John Darwish of the Melkite Greek Catholic Archbishopric of Zahle and Fourzol in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley – himself originally a native of Syria – summed up the plight of the Christian refugees when he declared to the charity Aid to the Church in Need: They live in rented homes, sometimes with multiple families in a single home or a set of rooms… most of these Christian families, however, are in need of the very basics of daily life – food, educational opportunities for their children, medical care… Many of them are in bad shape, emotionally and materially – they left everything behind and came here with literally nothing. Jihadist rebels came to them at night and forced them to leave immediately – they are traumatized, because they were unable to mourn and pray for their dead. We try to support them emotionally and financially. 38

The Archbishop added that they were helping some of these Christians pay their rent and find temporary employment in Lebanon. He expressed a widespread skepticism among Christians regarding swift prospects for democracy, freedom, and human rights in the Middle East: “There is no Arab spring; there is no push for democracy – it is a push for theocracy,” he grieved. Paradoxically, and like many other church officials and lay Christians, Archbishop Darwish also echoed the familiar optimistic refrain about the important role Christians have to play in the region in collaboration with moderate Muslims. Surveying the swath of human and material wreckage brought on by Takfiri Islam that has stretched from Iraq through the Levant to Libya, and south to parts of Arabia, the question immediately arises: Where are the moderate Muslims, in particular the moderate Sunnis? As a shopkeeper in the predominantly Christian neighborhood of SulaimaReported by the Catholic News Agency, January 7, 2014 http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/lebanese-bishop-appeals-forchristian-syrian-refugees/. 38

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niyah in Aleppo asked a Western reporter tellingly in August 2014: “Why aren’t the moderate Muslims doing more to stop the extremists in their midst? Do they agree with their ideology and extremism? We saw hundreds of thousands of protesters on the streets against the abuses of the regime, so why are we not now seeing those thousands of protesters against what [the Islamic State] is doing?” 39 In fact these poignant questions hit the nail squarely on the head by revealing a pervasive loss of faith among Syrian Christians in both the strength and durability, not to mention the very existence, of Muslim and specifically Sunni moderation to stand up to, and eventually reverse, the swelling toxic tide of extremism brought on by this Salafi-Jihadi-Takfiri surge. A great many of the failures of the so-called Arab Spring can be ascribed to the endemic weakness of Sunni moderation with its tendency to be easily intimidated and cowed into silence and inaction by the determined and violent militant fanatics. For Archbishop Darwish’s noble aspiration of a transformative role played by Christians native to the region in collaboration with moderate Muslims to actually materialize two ingredients need to be present: the Christians in question must be free Christians, not dhimmis, and the moderates will have to be courageous and authoritative Sunnis with staying power and the will to partner with free Christians to proactively confront and stifle with determination all forms of murderous extremism motivated by religious hatred. If Sunni moderation proves unable to shoulder its fateful historic responsibilities in quelling the barbarous radicals from within the Islamic fold, the Middle Eastern region is doomed to open-ended chaos and misery and bloodshed. There are differences of temperament and vision between members of the Syrian opposition still residing inside Syria and those who have relocated abroad. This is certainly true of the few Christians among them. Someone like the journalist and outspoken critic of the Baath, Michel Kilo, who lives in exile in Paris, has stressed the relatively good treatment minority communities including Christians experienced in Syria before the Baath took over Edward Dark, “Aleppo’s Forgotten Christians,” Al-Monitor, August 11, 2014 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/ aleppo-christians-syria-war-iraq-mosul-isis-islamic-state.html. 39

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power in 1963 through a coup. He has argued that oppression of vulnerable groups like the Kurds, pious Sunni Muslims, and the intellectual class featuring many Christians in its ranks began with the coming of Baath rule and accelerated under the Assads. 40 Kilo’s courage is not to be disputed, and his insights merit careful consideration. However, if Kilo represents the best product of Syria’s Christian intellectual elite, much is left to be desired. Where are the luminous intellectual, philosophical, and artistic representatives of the Syrian Christian communities, those who have made a substantial contribution to Syrian thought and Arab culture as well as to the world heritage? How do these intellectuals and artists, if they indeed exist, compare say with Adonis (Ali Ahmad Said Isbir), the famous Alawite Syrian poet and critic, or with Sadiq al-‘Azm of the well-known and influential Sunni Damascene ‘Azm family, acclaimed as a leading philosopher and political thinker throughout the Arab world and beyond? Michel Kilo, despite his courage and insights, is hardly of the caliber anticipated. Are there others? One might refer to Constantine Zureiq (1909–2000), a theoretician of Arab nationalism and staunch defender of the Palestinian cause. For much of his life following a brief stint in 1945–46 as part of the Syrian delegation to the UN he was a professor of history and politics at the American University of Beirut where he wrote about conditions in the Arab world. Though at times critical of Arab politics he did not attain the incisive level of scathing liberal diagnosis that comes through the writings of ‘Azm, for instance. Despite having spent a good portion of his active life in Beirut, Zureiq never overcame an essentially dhimmi mindset that naturally constrained any truly groundbreaking critiques of Arab and Islamic cultures emanating from his pen. So again, if Zureiq represents the finest that Syria’s Christians have produced intellectually, he too would fall short when assessed alongside either Adonis or ‘Azm. In fact, Zurieq’s lone status as the commanding voice among Syrian Christian intellectuals itself speaks volumes about the nature and See Joel D. Parker, “Turning Perception into Reality: The Asad regime and Syria’s Christian Minority,” Tel Aviv Notes (Volume 8, Number 12), June 26, 2014 http://dayan.org/turning-perception-reality-asadregime-and-syrias-christian-minority. 40

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debilitating impact of dhimmitude mainly within the Greek Orthodox community of Syria, and this even after he relocated to freer Lebanon. Tragically, such dhimmitude is congenitally incapable of transcending its built-in shackles. 41 It might sound insensitive to be harping on the shortcomings of Syrian Christian intellectual acumen when the focus of this discourse has been to highlight the hardships endured by the Christian communities of Syria mainly since the beginning of the antigovernment protests of 2011. But the two are not unrelated. Prevalent among large portions of the Christian communities in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and Egypt, and voiced incessantly by their journalists and critics, is a pervading and virulent anti-Western streak that for many has become visceral resting often on a dubious foundation of conspiratorial convictions. Such hatred by these Arab Christians directed at the West in general, and the United States in particular, has in many cases transcended politics to encompass Western culture as a whole and even how Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant, is understood and practiced in the West. Underlying it all are layers of subliminal blame heaped on the West for having somehow “caused” the torments and miseries of the region’s Christians. Concomitant with this hatred comes a dhimmi embrace of everything Arab and Islamic as the authentic

The inevitable marginalizing of Christian leadership roles in any Arab revolutionary context is a recurring phenomenon: the theoreticians of Arab nationalism were largely Christian, and that ideology ended in the hands of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Baath; Hanan Ashrawi and Azmi Bechara, to name only two, are Christian Palestinian voices that have been relegated to the backseat by other members of the Palestinian Authority who in turn have given way to the ascendancy of Islamist Hamas; during the Lebanon war many communists and other secularists retaining only their Christian names, or having tenuous Christian sociological origins, were promptly massacred when they fell into the wrong sectarian hands. On this marginalizing of the “Arab Christian” by his/her own ideological constituency see George Sabra, “Two Ways of being a Christian in the Muslim Context of the Middle East,” p. 51. 41

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antidote to an imagined predatory West. 42 “Eastern Christianity cannot antagonize the West yet call for its help in times of despair,” wrote a Lebanese Christian parliamentarian irately about the rampant anti-Western sentiments among Syrian Christian refugees being aided by Western relief agencies including governmental ones. 43 The problem stems in part from a false and historically baseless conception dhimmis have of their brand of “Oriental Christianity” [al-Masihiya al-Mashriqiya] as the purer and uncontaminated form of Christianity superior to anything found in the West. 44 The calamities that continue to befall the minorities of the region among them the Christians have been seen by some as the unavoidable consequences of the unraveling of the Sykes-Picot division of the Middle East by the British and French during the First World War into respective spheres of influence. 45 The artificially carved-out states at the time have run their course and that map of the region, a vestige of Western colonialism, is now disintegrating tumultuously a century later. If in fact we are currently witnessing the slow and bloody reassertion of the Middle East’s suppressed primordial ethno-sectarian-tribal aggregates at the expense of a superimposed colonial legacy, then it might make sense to contemplate creative federal options for these composite societies “Underlying this trend of openness to the larger Arab and Islamic context is a deep-seated anti-Western sentiment. The West, it is claimed, is responsible for all the calamities that have befallen Christians in the region, from the Crusades to the Zionist state, and including European interference in the Ottoman Empire, Roman Catholic and Protestant missions, and European and American ‘imperialism’.” Sabra, ibid., p. 47. 43 Basem Shabb, “A Road to Perdition for Arab Christians,” The Daily Star, September 10, 2013. 44 “Orientism” is the term George Sabra has coined to describe this prejudice. Private conversation 29 October 2013. 45 See Itamar Rabinovich, “The End of Sykes-Picot? Reflections on the Prospects of the Arab State System,” Middle East Memo published by the Saban Center at Brookings (No. 32, February 2014); see also John B. Judis, “The Middle East that France and Britain drew Is Finally Unraveling and there's very little the U.S. can do to stop it,” The New Republic, June 26, 2014. 42

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with their heterogeneous fragments that have suddenly littered the landscape. 46 Not being sufficiently numerous or geographically contiguous to have their own autonomous enclave the Christians of both Iraq and Syria would have to settle for inclusion within one or other of the friendlier emerging entities, and they would then rely on legal protections of their rights and constitutional safeguards of their freedoms as an integral and cohesive community independently of demographic growth or shrinkage. However, a grave danger lurks for any future voluntary federal arrangements of this kind that might arise from beneath the rubble of what started as an Arab Spring – this danger is Sunni rump states. The ISIS caliphate covering the predominantly Sunni parts of Iraq and Syria with no outlet to the sea, and thriving on exploitation of residual local Sunni discontent, is a menacing harbinger of similar militant Sunni rump states to come. The breakup of existing Arab states in the Levant or North Africa or the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf area would naturally spawn one or several such Sunni rump states in its wake. These states would serve as potential hotbeds for Sunni extremism, and once radicalized they would embark on subverting adjacent federal coalitions among other enclaves through targeted violence. They would do this simply because the very nature of their grand vision of an apocalyptic caliphate prevents them from coexisting peacefully alongside any entity or enclave or even state that they regard as heretical. This depressing fact means that a federal future for a fragmented Arab polity once the dust settles from the ongoing turmoil would face a daunting and possibly insurmountable challenge from Takfiri-dominated Sunni US Vice President Joe Biden has recommended a “functioning federalism” for Iraq’s three main communities: the Kurds, the Shiites, and the Sunnis. Something similar may lie in Syria’s future. See “Iraqis must rise above their Differences to rout Terrorists,” The Washington Post, 22 August 2014. For an insightful piece on the relevance for Syria of Ottoman practices in local communal autonomy see “What Modern Syria can learn from the Ottomans,” by Toba Hellerstein in Stratfor, March 6, 2016 https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/what-modern-syria-can-learnottomans. 46

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rump states, and given the endemic weaknesses and short shelf-life demonstrated by regional Sunni moderation the slide towards greater militant fanaticism within such Sunni rump states, even if the moderates should initially dominate, seems all but assured. Native minority communities therefore foremost among them the Christians face a bleak future if Takfirism will be allowed to run unchecked in the region. Effective stifling of Takfiri groups before they seize and entrench themselves in territories that metamorphose into Sunni rump monstrosities becomes of paramount importance and urgency if the region is to enjoy any semblance of a peaceful and prosperous and pluralist future among its diverse ethno-sectarian components. There cannot be radicalized Sunni rump enclaves in the midst of any reassembly of new Arab states structured along federal lines. Sunni components of any federal state in the Arab region would naturally be welcomed as an integral part of the tapestry and the full rights of their inhabitants would be guaranteed, but they must be ready to play according to the live-and-letlive rules that govern functioning federal compromises. Only under such conditions can indigenous Christian communities in a place like Syria aspire to a decent and dignified life.

CHAPTER 8 THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING MICHAEL ABI SEMAAN AND TONY E. NASRALLAH INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR (BEIRUT, LEBANON) AND AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

“Innumerable persecuted minorities have found, throughout the ages, a most understanding haven in my country, so that the very basis of our existence is complete respect of differences of opinion and belief. Nothing therefore would please us more, nothing indeed would answer more truly to our fundamental character than the responsible creation and effective implementation of a fundamental bill of human rights, founded on the basis of human conscience at its best and highest.” 1 – Charles Malik in the Drafting Committee of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

That Lebanon has greater freedom than its neighboring Arab countries is an established fact. That this freedom comes from the Lebanese Christians, and that the freedom in Lebanon is in a proportional relation to the active presence of the Christians, is a claim Charles Malik, in the plenary discussion of the Commission’s report on Human Rights (Chair, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt) on 31 May 1946 at about 12.15 p.m. Published in Malik et al., The Challenge of Human Rights. 16. 1

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held by them. The so-called ‘Arab spring’, which began in 2011, has been received with great enthusiasm by both, the Western and Arab powers. The then leader of the Lebanese Christian Katāʾib, or Phalange party, former President of Lebanon Amin Gemayel, stated that “The [2005] Cedar Revolution changed the face of Lebanon, and the people of the region [looked up to it]… so they decided to take our path” 2. Unfortunately, the Christian minorities in the region do not share this early and exaggerated enthusiasm, nor do they share the view that these uprisings are actually a “Spring” at all. For them, the so-called ‘spring’ is a long dark winter of hibernation and cold death than any revival or hope. In many cases, one witnesses a systematic destruction of historic Christian religious sites and artifacts. It is quite hard for such Christians to read the Arab Spring positively akin to some Western powers and to Arab masses. Some Christians – both in Lebanon and in its hinterland – even referred to the movement as an “Arab hell” 3. From the perspective of Middle East minorities, the Arab Spring embeds more of a totalitarian program that wipes out peripheries and minorities into extinction than it brings freedom. The irony amplifies when one notes that many Lebanese Christians do not view the European Middle Ages as Dark Ages, but they do view the Arab Spring as a dark age. While other chapters in this book deal with minorities in different Middle Eastern countries, this chapter zooms into the Lebanese Christians. The Christians of Lebanon do not qualify easily to be a minority, in the same sense as other religious minorities in the region. Lebanon itself is a composite matrix of minorities where not one community can claim a majority. Throughout the last three decades, the number of Christians living in Lebanon has been in a continuous decline. The political power, which the Christians enjoyed since the country’s independence in 1943, was substantially “March 14 Leaders Express Solidarity with Syrian People,” 14, accessed July 29, 2015, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/archive/march_14_ leaders_express_solidarity_with_syrian_people. 3 “Aoun Slams Jumblatt, Sleiman, Says Assad in Control,” The Daily Star, May 6, 2012, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/ May-05/172477–aoun-slams-jumblatt-sleiman-says-assad-in-control.ashx. 2

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 205 depleted when the Ṭāʾif Accord was signed in 1989 and more so when it was forcefully implemented starting October 1990. This Ṭāʾif Accord, which became the new constitution of Lebanon, trimmed the power of the Christian president and redistributed it among the Sunni prime minister and the Shiite speaker of parliament; thus while Christians maintained the primate seat, the effective job of its occupier was little more than mere ceremonial supremacy. In 1932, when the last official census was conducted in Lebanon, the Christians formed 54 percent of the population. Today, the estimates indicate a numerical fall to a maximum of 39 percent of the country’s population. Important as they are, such demographic and the political decline is not the utmost fear of the Lebanese Christians in the Arab Spring. The fear has escalated to a certain degree from losing political power to preserving their property, culture, and existence. This chapter will argue that although Lebanon has managed so far to alienate itself from the “Arab Spring”, the Lebanese Christians are still experiencing a psychological terror fueled with the horrors witnessed by their Syrian and Iraqi Christian brethren. To mitigate and overcome this terror, the Lebanese Christians were left with no other choice but to engage in unlikely alliances and to overlook their historical political disagreements in order to preserve their existence, individual freedom, and ward off the fears of forced displacement and inevitable extinction. Before the Ṭāʾif Accord, it was safe to speak of the Christians as one entity, fairly unified, within the Lebanon’s political arena. Between 1990 and 2005, the Christian political weight was totally marginalized when one of the two main leaders was exiled and the other was imprisoned. 2005 was a fulcrum year in which both Aoun and Jaʿjaʿ returned victoriously to the political scene shortly after the Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon. Yet almost immediately, the two Christian leaders rallied behind the Shi’ties and the Sunnites, and hence the regional Islamic split found its repercussions on the Christian community. The Lebanese Christians and in particular the Maronites became a minor minority until this year, 2016, when they reunited anew. It was this alliance that allowed Aoun to return to the Presidential Palace as President in October 2016, after he was kicked out of that same palace by Syrian warplanes in 1990. The interesting thing is that each of these two leaders – Aoun and Jaʿjaʿ – remained loyal to their Islamic counter-

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parts, with Aoun still maintaining ties with the Shiite-dominated Hezbollah and Jaʿjaʿ with the Sunni-dominated Future movement.

HISTORICAL SURVEY ON LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND MINORITIES

Starting the nineteenth century, the Levantine and the Lebanese Christians have been far more conscientious about the notion of minority and majority than other groups in the region. Many of the European secular movements were imported to the Levant at the hands of native Christians, whether Syrian or Lebanese, with an inclusive mentality of overcoming differences. As Historian Kamal Salibi elucidates: Christian intellectuals, in particular, tried to determine some principle of Moslem-Christian co-operation which would secure the safety and dignity of Syrian and especially Lebanese Christians in predominantly Moslem surroundings. To such Christians the European idea of nationalism, with its secular connotations, seemed to provide a useful clue; but the adaptation of this idea to the special circumstances of Lebanon was not to prove an easy task. 4

After the Second World War, when Lebanon became independent from France, the British historian Albert Hourani, who came from a Lebanese Christian family, wrote a pioneering book on Middle East minorities. The book was produced after his experience in Lebanon. Though the book is outdated today in terms of figures and facts, it remains to be one of the few systematic studies on the region’s minorities. Hourani’s conclusions were “majorities and minorities do not fully form communities with one another” 5and he spoke of collective memories, loyalties and a role the West could play in protecting minorities. Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (New York: Caravan Books, 1977), p. 151. 5 Albert Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World: By A.H. Hourani; Issued Under the Auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 109. 4

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 207 Lebanon played an underrated role in the formation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) through the person of the country’s ambassador Charles Malik. Ambassador Malik suggested an article for the UDHR to protect minorities, but his suggestion was voted out: it was resisted by the United States and France, among other nations, as they deemed their countries capable of assimilating minorities. His intension was to have a clear definition of minorities, (linguistic or ethnic, or even religious), and such minorities would be granted their “own educational, cultural, and religious institutions and to use their own language in the courts.” 6 When the proposal was frustrated, Lebanon’s ambassador tried to introduce a watered down version of it, which too did not find a way out. In his diary he wrote: I fought for the inclusion of the article on minorities. Suggested a mildest possible form: “Cultural groups shall not be denied the right to free self-development.” Was defeated. Americans and Latinos dead against this idea. 7

LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND DHIMMITUDE

Throughout the fourteen hundred years of Islamic rule in the Middle East, more than ninety percent of the Arab Christians − specifically the ones living in Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq − had to survive as dhimmis. The dhimmitude is referred to in the Qur’an as an Islamic system to govern the non-Muslims, mainly the Christians and Jews or “people of the book”, living under Islamic rule 8. Dhimmitude is a system of mercy against the conquered nonMuslims who refuse to convert to Islam or leave the land of their ancestors. While such systems may have been common in previous eras, it is clearly an expired system that humiliates its victims as second degree citizens, and regulates the daily-life legal position of Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2001), p. 119. 7 Charles Malik, Diary (Ms.; Tuesday, June 15, 1948). Cf. Ibid. 8 Habib C. Malik, Islamism and the Future of the Christians of the Middle East, 1st edition (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 2010). 6

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non-Muslims. The dhimmi system requires the subjugated dhimmis to pay a monthly poll tax known as Jizyah to the governing Islamic authority in return for their peaceful stay in the land and property of their ancestors. The Qur’anic verse 29 in Surat Al-Tawbah reads: Fight those who believe not in God nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by God and His Apostle, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizyah with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued. 9

While the Arab Christians were not always subjected to the fullscale of dhimmitude (the Christians of Syria, for example, were spared the Jizyah toll for almost the entire twentieth century), the Lebanese Christians on the other hand, mainly the Maronites, had no stains of dhimmitude anywhere in their history. Between 1990 and 2005, Lebanon Christians were on a steep slippery slope towards dhimmitude. After 2005, the inclination of the slope softened, and now one may even read a halt in the unity of the two main Christian leaders. Christian choices before 1975 were between a spectrum of Christian leaders, but the choices between the Ṭāʿif Accord and 2016 have devolved into following a Christian leader who in turn is a follower of the Sunni political faction or the Shiite one. This marked an early symptom of dhimmitude. It is safe to say that the Arab Spring has increased the symptoms of dhimmitude among Lebanese Christians. An example among others is the 2012 statement of Samir Jaʿjaʿ, the leader of the Lebanese Forces a major Christian party. Jaʿjaʿ proclaimed in a public speech “let the Muslim brotherhood prevail.” 10 However, Jaʿjaʿ justified his statement saying that he believes in democracy and if the Muslim brotherhood was elected through a democratic process, similar to the election of Muḥammad Murṣi in Egypt, then who can stand in against democ-

Holy Qur’an, Surat Al-Tawbah 29. Wassim Raad, “Once Again, Samir Geagea Loses His Bet,” accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.voltairenet.org/article183214.html. 9

10

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 209 racy? 11 Albeit the justification, Jaʿjaʿ’s statement created discontent among many Lebanese Christians, who accused the leader of slipping into dhimmitude. Jaʿjaʿ had to state repeatedly and explicitly his anti-dhimmitude persuasions.

THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND THE ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA

When the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, few were the Lebanese Christians who noticed it or perhaps no one foresaw its magnitude. When the movement spread like fire eastwards to Egypt and then to Libya, the general Christian feeling was somewhere between neutral and positive. The reaction, however, soon intensified and diversified when the wave reached neighboring Syria. At the beginning of the Syrian uprising in March 2011, the Lebanese Christians had mixed feelings about supporting the uprising. For three decades the Lebanese Christians have perceived President Ḥāfiẓ alʾAsad of Syria, and later his son current President Bashār al-ʾAsad, as their number one enemy. A famous statement coined during the 1970s by the iconic Christian militia leader Bashīr Gemayel, who was later elected as President for Lebanon only to be assassinated few weeks later, was, “know your enemy: the Syrian is your enemy” in reference to the Syrian troops of ʾAsad in Lebanon. During the 1989 Liberation war, the then Prime Minister Michel Aoun (who was leading the country in the absence of a president) stated in a televised press conference, “I want to crush the head of Ḥāfiẓ alʾAsad.” 12 The last couple of decades of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon spanning between 1976 and 2005 contributed substantially to the weakening of the Christian political power, and the marginalization and assassination of the most populous Christian “Samīr Jaʿjaʿ,falyaḥkum Al-ʾikhwān Bil Al-Dimuqrāṭiyyah Wa Rūḥ Al-Thawrah,” accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/ Political-Ahram/News/174256.aspx. 12 Khairallah Khairallah, “Michel Aoun: The Opportunist Threatening Lebanon,” Al Arabiya News, May 13, 2014, http://english.alarabiya. net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/05/13/Michel-Aoun-theopportunist-threatening-Lebanon.html. 11

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political figures. However, when in 2005, the Syrian army finally withdrew from the Lebanese territory succumbing to international pressure, the largest and strongest Lebanese Christian political party, Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, reconciled with Syria almost immediately, and the party’s leader visited Bashār al ʾAsad in Damascus in December 2009. At the start of the Syrian uprising, Lebanon was divided into two leading political blocks. The Lebanese Christian political parties were equally split and divided among these two camps. The mostly Christian Free Patriotic Movement and the Al Marada party 13 were both rendered as part of the 8th of March camp, alongside with the Shiite Hezbollah. This political camp was known for its sympathy with the Syrian regime even before the Syrian crisis. On the other hand, the exclusively Christian Lebanese Forces – the second largest Christian party – and the Katāʾib party, both belong to the 14th of March camp along with the Sunni dominated Future Movement. This political camp never reconciled with Syria after its troops withdrew from Lebanese territory in 2005. However, as deep as the divisions could run among Lebanese Christians when it comes to the crisis in the neighboring state, both groups could not overlook the tragedies and sorrows that afflicted the Syrian Christians in their own land and country. Like many of their Lebanese co-religious brethren, some Syrian Christians believed that the uprising in their country will bring forth the liberal reforms that the Christians have always longed for. However, these same Christians soon were faced with slogans such as “Christians to Beirut; Alawites to the coffin”, “on Saturday we kill the Jews; on Sunday we kill the Christians” by fundamentalists. It did not take long for these Christians to understand that this so-called uprising was not more than an oasis for “Sunni supremacist sentiments” who found a fertile ground to bring forth their Islamist agenda and that the fate faced by their Iraqi brethren after the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003 was not too far from theirs. Hence, the targeting of Christian villages, churches and individuals began, and what came to be known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) turned out to impleAl Marada is Christian dominated political party mainly Maronites led by Suleiman Franjieh. 13

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 211 ment substantial groups of Jihadis, Takfiris and Salafis 14. In June 2012, the Lebanese Christians witnessed the forced displacement of around ten thousand Syrian Christians by the groups of the FSA from the city of Al Qusayr which is only a few kilometers away from the Lebanese northern borders. The Salafis were unashamed to sermonize in their mosques that it was a sacred duty to cast away the Christians. 15 Moreover, earlier in 2012, the Christians of AlḤasakah were faced with the slogan “land for peace” which meant that the Christians had to give up their land and leave if they wanted to be left in peace. In Homs, one of the prominent Christian villages called Rablah was besieged by groups of the FSA and around twelve thousand Christians were deprived of their basic needs including food and water for two weeks until the momentum of the war required the FSA withdrawal from the region. 16 Furthermore, in the summer of 2013, the Christians living in Yabrūd – one of the mountainous suburbs of Damascus – were forced to pay the Jizyah penalty tax in exchange of protection and were also treat“Salafism” refers to “the good Salaf” namely to the contemporaries and immediate followers of the prophet Mohammad regarded as having been the purest representatives of Islam and the authentic Muslim lifestyle including dress and mannerisms to be emulated in all succeeding ages by devout Muslims. Jihadis means those driven by the Qur’anic command to wage holy war (jihad) against infidels and all the enemies of Allah. Takfiris is the act of openly accusing of kufr, or heresy, all those who do not follow the strict precepts of Islamic shari’a (law) as understood and practiced by the Salafis and Jihadis and Takfiris, a grave crime that is punishable by death. All three of these designations become interchangeable when applied to the phenomenon of violent and fanatical militant Sunni Islamism” 15 Ulrike Putz, “‘We’re Too Frightened to Talk’: Christians Flee from Radical Rebels in Syria,” Spiegel Online, July 25, 2012, sec. International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/christians-flee-from-radicalrebels-in-syria-a-846180.html. 16 Agenzia Fides (the official Vatican News agency) “Over 12 thousand Christian faithful starving in the village of Rableh: humanitarian law is invoked”, reported this on August 22, 2012. 14

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ed as dhimmis. 17 In the city of Al-Raqqah, ISIS 18 imposed the Jizyah on the Christian inhabitants and released a statement to warn that “If they reject, they are subject to being legitimate targets, and nothing will remain between them and ISIS other than the sword”. 19 Among the sharpest events in contemporary Levantine Christianity occurred in September 2013, when the city of Maʿlūlah – one of the oldest Christian cities in the world, where Aramaic, the language of Jesus, is still spoken – was looted by rebels from the Al-Nuṣrah Front and its historical churches and monasteries were bombed, disgraced, and some were deliberately destroyed. The Lebanese Christians were not oblivious to these tragic events taking place at their closest borders, let alone the destruction of more than 50 historic churches, and ransacking religious idols and artifacts, kidnapping and executing Christian priests, bishops, nuns and other religious figures. These churches were often purpose of pilgrimage to Lebanese Christians. In April 2013, Būlus Yāzijī and Yuḥannā Ibrahīm, two Orthodox Christian bishops were kidnapped in Syria by an undetermined Islamic extremist group. The whereabouts of these bishops remains unknown and their fate is a mystery open only for speculations. 20 Moreover, in December “Syria: Terrorists Plant Bomb in Ancient Cathedral’s Confessional,” Examiner.com, October 16, 2013, http://www.examiner.com/article/ syria-terrorists-plant-bomb-ancient-cathedral-s-confessional. 18 “The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (the Arabic acronym is da’esh), also referred to sometimes as ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), and later metamorphosing into the Islamic State (IS), is the name of an extremist Takfiri group that employs terror and murder on a wide and systematic scale against all who do not adopt its militant interpretation of Islam. This includes other Sunnis as well as Shiites, Alawites, Kurds, Turcomen, Christians, Yazidis, and all other minority communities native to the regions under ISIS control (since June 2014 portions of eastern Syria and western Iraq)”. 19 “Syria Crisis: ISIS Imposes Rules on Christians in Raqqa,” BBC News, accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-26366197. 20 “Syria’s War On Christians: Where Are The Missing Bishops, Priests And Nuns?,” International Business Times, accessed July 29, 2015, 17

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 213 2013, thirteen nuns were kidnapped by the Al-Nuṣrah Front militia from a monastery in Maʿlūlah and were held hostage in Yabrūd, in rural Damascus for three month. The nuns were released in March 2014 after a Lebanese-Qatari-Syrian mediation and 138 Islamist women were released from prison by the Assad regime. 21 These events combined served as an intimidating call for the Lebanese Christians and compelled them to put aside their political hatred for the Syrian regime and regard it as the lesser of two evils. Violent as this regime may be, it is governed by an Alawite minority that will always be hostile to the Sunni Salafists and jihadists rule and will naturally ally itself with other minorities for the prolongation of its own life. Hence, an alliance of minorities would be the most viable solution to face these mayhem extremist Sunni waves of Jihadis, Takfiris, and Salafis which do not recognize the right of existence of any given minority. The Syrian Christians received moral support only, and little sympathy from what was historically perceived as Christendom, or the Western Christian powers. The Syrian Christians would often repeat that the regime and the rebels are all of the same cloth, but when cornered, the Christians admit that the regime is the only hope that Christians in Lebanon and Syria could bet on to preserve their existence. The complexity of the Syrian crisis propelled even some March 14th Christians to question the purpose of the revolution; is it purely to topple down the vicious Assad regime and replace it with a liberal one, or is it to assert fundamentalist Takfiris, whose aims are to eventually overwrite religious minorities by one Sunnite Islamic? Some of the oldest Christian communities worldwide, who survived various challenges for close to two millennia, were suddenly at the verge of extinction. The unprecedented savagery exercised against the Syrian citizens in general, including the Christians, coupled with an equally unexpected neglect from the http://www.ibtimes.com/syrias-war-christians-where-are-missingbishops-priests-nuns-1541590. 21 See the report in Russia Today “Nuns kidnapped in Syria’s Maaloula set free,” (March 9, 2014) [http://rt.com/news/syria-nunsrelease-maaloula-782/].

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Western powers, had an impact of fear on the Lebanese Christians and compelled them to cast their lot with the Assad regime.

THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND THE ARAB SPRING IN IRAQ

In June 2014, when the Sunni caliphate was declared by ISIS in parts of northern Iraq and eastern Syria, the minorities in the Mosul district such as the Christians in Qaraqūsh and Yazidis in Sinjār were offered three choices, either to convert to Islam, to be subjugated as dhimmis, or to die by the sword. More than 125,000 Christians in Qaraqūsh were forced to flee leaving everything behind. 22 The ISIS men “desecrated” the Tomb of the Old Testament Prophet Jonah before destroying it, and removed the cross of Saint Ephrem’s Cathedral (the main church in town) only to replace it with a black ISIS flag, and destroyed the historic statues. 23 Escaping these horrors, the Christians were both internally displaced to Kurdistan, or externally to Lebanon and neighboring countries. Some of the Christians who refused to leave their property thinking that they would be protected if they pay the Jizyah, did not even have a chance of disappointment for they were savagely executed, while others were forced unwillingly to convert to ISIS Islam to avoid the savage death. Moreover, ISIS painted on the doors of Christian homes the letter “N” in Arabic, which means “Nuṣrānī”, (a Qur’anic word that refers to Christians) and added “property of the Islamic State of Iraq”. 24 Lebanon welcomed more than 4,000 Christian Iraqi families who left everything behind. They fled with nothing other than their clothes and shoes, and some even arrived to Lebanon barefoot.

“Iraq’s Christians Persecuted by ISIS,” accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-christians-persecuted-by-isis-60– minutes/. 23 St. Ephrem’s Cathedral, the seat of the Syriac Orthodox archdiocese in Mosul 24 Alissa J. Rubin, “ISIS Forces Last Iraqi Christians to Flee Mosul,” The New York Times, July 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 07/19/world/middleeast/isis-forces-last-iraqi-christians-to-fleemosul.html. 22

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 215 The Church in Lebanon, particularly the Chaldean church to which most of these refugees belonged, had been fostering them as refugees and offering them food and bedding, assisting with their rent and when necessary, covering their health bills. 25 These families who once had prosperous lives even under the regime of Saddam Hussein, were now refugees in Lebanon unable to cover even their most basic needs and were unable to return to their homes. Looking back home is somewhere between a nightmare and an impossibility. One Iraqi Christian refugee in Lebanon, uncertain about the future of her family commented “we cannot ever return to Mosul as we have nothing left there”. 26 The Islamic State has confiscated the Christian homes and properties, and has destroyed everything that pertains to Christianity in the Christian villages and cities. Another Iraqi Christian in Lebanon, who has totally dismissed returning home in Mosul as a possibility, explained that Iraq has been draining of its indigenous Christians since the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the removal of Saddam Hussein. For him, the problem is not ISIS per se, as it goes beyond a well-defined Islamist organization. “The problem is that [ISIS] is there and even if they leave, another group will come. Every time the Christians are forced to leave”. 27 The Iraqi Christians seem to have lost hope as this is not the first time a Christian exodus takes place from Iraq. Before the US led invasion the Christians amounted to 1.4 million of the country’s population, to become 700,000 following the invasion. Today, the few remaining Christians are mostly elderly people, and some remain in the Kurdish city Erbil. The rest are scattered in neighboring countries. One of the Iraqi refugees predicted “four to five “Lebanese Church Struggles to Support Iraqi Refugees – AlMonitor: The Pulse of the Middle East,” Al-Monitor, accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/lebanonchurch-aid-iraqi-refugees-christian.html. 26 “These May Be the Last Christians of the Middle East – Unless We Help | Jane Corbin,” The Guardian, accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/15/middle-eastchristians-islamic-persecution-iraq-war. 27 Ibid. 25

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years” till the Christians will become so few that the Iraqis “will be able to point a finger at them saying ‘he’s a Christian’” 28. The horror stories told by the Iraqi Christians have terrorized their Lebanese brethren in faith, who became more wary about their future in the region. The Lebanese Christians have drawn on the traumatizing experience of their Iraqi and Syrian brethren to disregard their disagreements and open communication channels to unify their position against an uncertain future. Hence, the leaders of the largest Christian parties, Michel Aoun and Samīr Jaʿjaʿ have decided to put aside their historic rivalries and engage in a dialogue in the hope that it will ease the Christian political tension, and strengthen their stand against an ambiguous yet horrifying future awaiting the Middle Eastern Christians.

THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND HEZBOLLAH IN THE ARAB SPRING

Hezbollah, the Shiite militia backed by Iran, has been entangled in the Syrian war since the Takfiri and jihadist groups became the front figures of the so-called Syrian revolution. Since Hezbollah’s creation in 1982, they never enjoyed the support of the Lebanese Christians who were always cautious about Hezbollah’s hidden agenda in Lebanon and the region. For the Christians, the Party of God (Hezbollah) never expressed its views on the Lebanese political scene, and they always considered the party’s aim was to turn the Lebanese political system into ‘Wilayat Al-Faqīh’ or the rule of jurisprudence as in Iran. This was not an implicit aim for Hezbollah as it was clearly mentioned in its 1985 open letter: “We are the sons of the ʾummah [the worldwide Islamic community] – the party of God [Hezbollah] the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard succeeded to lay down the bases of a Muslim state which plays a central role in the world”. 29 However, after accepting the 1989 Ṭāʾif Accord, which clearly stated that Lebanon is a democratic Arab country with no reference to Ibid. Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011). 28 29

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 217 Islam as being the state religion, and that religious pluralism and freedom are protected by the constitution, Hezbollah’s political rhetoric became milder even its intentions were still considered murky by the Christians. On 5 February 2006, the most popular Christian party, the Free Patriotic Movement, led by former Prime Minister and army general Michel Aoun, signed a historic memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah. Aoun initiated what he called the ‘Lebanonization of Hezbollah’. This political move by Aoun brought the Christians closer to Hezbollah and both parties became substantial components of the 8th of March political camp. Although the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, reassured the Christians in a speech in February 2012 that Hezbollah has dropped the aim of creating an Islamic state in Lebanon saying “It is true that in 1982 we had made speeches calling for the rise of an Islamic state in Lebanon, but some leaders who are preaching coexistence today had been calling for partition and federalism back then”, 30 Christians of the 14th of March camp were unable to establish trust with Hezbollah, and never ceased to call for Hezbollah’s immediate disarmament. 31 Nonetheless, when the Takfiris and Jihadist groups such as Al-Nuṣrah Front, Katāʾib Al-Farūq of ISIS and other sister organizations targeted and slaughtered Christians in Syria and Iraq, the Lebanese Christians saw in Hezbollah a strong counter-balance and a support against the restless and ever-growing wave of Takfiris. The Christians saw themselves on the same minority boat as Hezbollah, who are at least equally reviled by the Takfiris. In the Lebanese Christian town of Rās Bʿalbak, where 8,500 Christians dwell at a stone cast proximity to the Syrian borders, the inhabitants have been taking up arms alongside Hezbollah to protect their homes and villages against the Sunni Jihadists of Al-Nuṣrah Front and the Islamic State infiltrating from Syria. There are even credible reports Naharnet Newsdesk 07 February 2012 and 19:38, “Nasrallah Rules Out Govt. Collapse, Urges ‘Real’ Dialogue in Syria,” Naharnet, accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/29255. 31 The Lebanese forces, the Kataeb party, the National block and the national liberal party. 30

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that Christians are being trained by Hezbollah militants, and both are fighting alongside the Lebanese Army. Rifʿat Nasrallah, a Lebanese Catholic businessman and leader of the Christian fighters in Rās Bʿalbak said in a reported interview “The only people who are protecting us are the resistance of Hezbollah, the only one standing with the army is Hezbollah. Let’s not hide it anymore … They accept us as we are, they do not impose on us anything.” Hezbollah and the Christian fighters in the South have introduced a new approach to multi-sectorial game in Lebanon: “Christians and Shiites together, against the Sunni extremists”. 32 In the north of the Biqāʿ Valley in Lebanon, Hezbollah has been creating Lebanese Resistance Brigades from all sectorial denominations particularly Christians and helping them to prepare for unexpected attacks from the Islamic State. 33 A local involved in this Christian elucidated, “What has happened in Mosul has been a message to all Christians of the East that the world will not protect them and that they need to rely on themselves to defend their existence.” 34 Furthermore, a survey conducted by the “The Beirut Center for Research and Information” in February 2014, revealed that more than sixty six percent of the Lebanese Christians were then supporters of Hezbollah in its war in Syria, and regarded the organization as protecting the country from these mayhem Takfiris waves, and therefore indirectly protecting the Christians. 35 One “Christians Threatened By ISIS In Lebanon Turn To Hezbollah For Help,” International Business Times, accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/christians-threatened-isis-lebanon-turnhezbollah-help-1889610. 33 “Hezbollah Calls for Resistance against IS – Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East,” Al-Monitor, accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/hezbollahresistance-arsal-counter-islamic-state-attacks.html. 34 Ibid. 35 The survey revealed that 66 percent of Christians support Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria, in comparison to only 39 percent in June 2013 and 53 percent in February 2014. See: http://english.alakhbar.com/node/22129. 32

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 219 should keep in mind that for political considerations, the Christians belonging to what was the 14th of March did not publicly endorse Hezbollah’s military actions in Syria or in Lebanon, but neutralized their perception of the organization and never failed to show their real sentiments in closed doors discussions. It is impossible to portray the Hezbollah involvement in the thick of the Syrian quasi sectarian conflict as pure merits for the Lebanese Christians. One cannot disregard the immense backfiring the Shiite Party of God has brought forth to Lebanon, which destabilized both the economy and the country’s security. A number of blasts in the populated Shiite Suburbs of Beirut had immediate repercussions on the entire country. 36 While some of these bombings were publicly adopted by Al-Nuṣrah Front as retaliation for Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, other violations in Lebanon remain anonymous – at least officially. Hezbollah’s involvement has exacerbated the Sunni – Shiite tension on the internal political scene, thus pushing the political arena almost into an impasse. Though the Lebanese Christians have no leading role to play in the SunniShiite polarization, yet the collateral damage generated by such tensions have an immeasurable burden on the Christian community.

THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND THE INFLUX OF REFUGEES OF THE ARAB SPRING

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, refugees from the hinterland of Syria have been crossing to Lebanon in massive numbers. The Lebanese government facilitated the process or at least did not impose any restriction for this abrupt influx. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) official data, the number of Syrian refugees registered with the organization as of July 2015 was 1,172,753. 37 However, many refugees who entered Lebanon did not register with the The bombings took place on July 9 and August 15, 2013. In January 2, January 21, February 19 and June 24, 2014. 37 “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, accessed July 29, 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/ syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122. 36

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UNHCR, and some analysts estimate the total number to be closer to 1.5 million. This number is immense, considering that the entire population of Lebanon is less than 5 million, and the entire Christian population is estimated to be slightly more than 1.5 million. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon added to the Syrian refugees in Lebanon sum up to an unnerving number higher than the Lebanese Christians. Given that the Christians viewed the Palestinian refugees at one point as a dreadful enemy and at another point the Syrian regime and to some extent and a good number of the Syrian people were viewed as an equally dangerous enemy, the Lebanese Christians feel overpopulated on their own grounds by former enemies. The Lebanese-Syrian borders run at the length of 375 km and include numerous entry points through which Syrians can infiltrate illegally to the country. This has made it impossible for the Lebanese government to control its borders especially with its limited technological and intelligence capabilities. Therefore, the Lebanese government has been, to a large part, oblivious to the exact numbers of refugees crossing to Lebanon and the civil status of these refugees. This led to the infiltration of many combatants and members of the Jihadi and Takfiri groups escaping from the Syrian army. For instance, Wādī Khālid, which is an area in north Lebanon with high proximity to the Syrian borders, was turned into a safe house for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters, army defectors and jihadist groups who visit the village for training, regrouping and rearmament. 38 Moreover, the city of ʿArsāl in the Biqāʿ became a hotspot for such Jihadist militant groups as it is a mountainous area covered with forests and rocky caves. As the overwhelming majority of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon belonged to the Sunni Muslim faith, 39 the Lebanese Christians became wary about their future and the future of their country. “Wadi Khaled: The Free Syrian Army Base in Lebanon (I),” Al Akhbar English, accessed July 29, 2015, http://english.al-akhbar.com/ content/wadi-khaled-free-syrian-army-base-lebanon-i. 39 Venetia Rainey, “Lebanon’s Refugee Influx Alarms Christians,” Al Jazeera, May 11, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/ 04/lebanon-refugee-influx-alarms-christians-201441913659149837.html. 38

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 221 Drawing from their unpleasant experience with the Sunni Palestinian refugees, whose influx in the 1970s was a cause for the bloody 15 years of war, the Christians have been reluctant in welcoming their Sunni Syrian neighbors. The mayor of Jizzīn, a Christian town in the south Lebanon, commented on the influx of Sunni Syrian refugees to Lebanon in an Al-Jazeera interview by saying that “The changing demographic balance is one of the biggest threats to the Christian community at the moment” and “we don’t want to replicate the same [Palestinian] problem... It’s going to be a way to have the Christians leaving the region, and we won’t allow that” 40. Since the beginning of the Syrian influx, many of the Lebanese Christian parliamentarians warned against the increasing number of refugees in the country and called upon the government to take immediate action. 41 In fear of a recurrence of bloody events similar to those in 1975 with the Palestinian refugees, where the Christians paid the highest price, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement warned on many numerous occasions that armed Syrian refugees are infiltrating the Lebanese community and called for the closure of the borders with Syria in order to put the situation under control. 42 Aoun, the party’s leader, antagonized the Lebanese Sunni community with his statements and was perceived as a racist and as someone accusing the Sunnites of Lebanon of harboring Syrian terrorists and jihadist groups. Initially, the Lebanese Sunni community was welcoming to the refugees with open arms and the UNHCR statistics report shows clearly that the highest concentrations of Syrian refugees existed in areas with a Sunnite majority, specifically in Tripoli, ʿAkkār, Sidon and Beirut. Both ʿArsāl and Wādī Khālid, where Jihadist militias are harbored, are Sunni dominated areas. Hence the Ibid. “Attacks on Syrians in Lebanon: Scapegoating, Par Excellence,” Al Akhbar English, accessed July 29, 2015, http://english.alakhbar.com/content/attacks-syrians-lebanon-scapegoating-par-excellence. 42 “Aoun’s Bloc Proposes Closing Borders to Syrian Refugees,” The Daily Star, August 14, 2013, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon -News/2013/Aug-14/227277–aouns-bloc-proposes-closing-borders-tosyrian-refugees.ashx. 40 41

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perception of the Syrian refugees was accentuated by a sectarian lens. Many Lebanese Christians shared Aoun’s fears as these uncontrolled refugees could easily upset the country’s delicate demographic balance. The then Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jibrān Basīl, a prominent member of Aoun’s Christian bloc, publicly denounced the establishment of camps for the Syrian refugees in Lebanon saying that it would affect the sectarian demography and proposed a coordination with the Syrian government to plan the return of the Syrian refugees to safe areas in Syria. Basīl was accused, on several occasions, of being a racist by the Lebanese Sunni community. 43 Maronite Archbishop and assistant to the Patriarch, Paul Ṣāyyāḥ, warned of the demographic shift due to the Syrian refugees’ settlement in Lebanon which would harm the Christians more than any other sect and would negatively affect the co-existence formula which Lebanon was founded on. Ṣayyāḥ stated “if the formula of co-existence is threatened, the alternative is that the religions can’t live together, and if they can't live together, they will fight each other”. 44 In June 2015, the Christians were alarmed by a letter from the UNHCR high commissioner Antonio Guterres, requesting the Lebanese government to register all the Syrian new born in the Lebanese government, to provide the Syrian refugees in Lebanon with work permits and assist them in finding jobs. 45 For the Christians this meant one thing only, a step into “the naturalization of the Syrian refugees” in Lebanon. The minister of Foreign Affairs Jibrān Basīl commented on the UNHCR letter by explaining that there appears to be as a hidden agenda to naturalize the Syrian ref“Aoun’s Bloc Proposes Closing Borders to Syrians,” The Daily Star, August 13, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily? pass=52fc6fbd5&id=520b17665. 44 Rainey, “Lebanon’s Refugee Influx Alarms Christians.” 45 “Bilwathāʾiq Al-Mu’assasāt Al-Duwaliyyah Taḥuth Lubnān ʿalā Tawṭīn Al-Sūriyīn Fī Lubnān.,” accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.otv. com.lb/beta/v/episode/86–21480. 43

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 223 ugees in Lebanon. 46 The same scenario happened in the 1970’s with the Palestinian refugees fleeing to Lebanon when the international community unsuccessfully tried to force their naturalization on the Lebanese government. If the international community and the UNHCR were successful in implementing the naturalization scenario, this will definitely tilt the balance of power in the favor of the Sunnis with a dramatic landslide. The Lebanese Christians are finding comfort with the equally staunch anti-naturalization group, particularly the Shiites. Besides the cumbersome demographic pressure, the Christians have been afraid that the Syrian refugees in Lebanon will, if not properly administered and monitored by the Lebanese authorities, contribute substantially to the spill-over of the crisis into Lebanon. A reasonable number of the refugees are armed and it is difficult to imagine that these vast numbers do not include ISIS sympathizers and even agents, opting to for the creation of an Islamic Caliphate. Lebanon is surely part of the geographic ambitions of the Islamic State, except that the moment is not yet opportune. Alarming as it may seem, the major Sunni cities in Lebanon, mainly Tripoli (the second largest city in the country and known as the stronghold of Islamists), 47 witnessed rallies by Syrian refugees and Lebanese Sunnis during which ISIS flags were raised and ISIS songs were played. Hence, if these armed refugees with Jihadist ideologies are not controlled, dismantled, and driven out of the country, their perilous spillover of their revolution may be bloody and enduring. The Lebanese Christians have been aware of this sad reality; however, their only hope is a responsible Lebanese government. Although, many of the Christian leaders and religious figures warned that the uncontrolled refugees will eventually invite ISIS and its sister organi“Lubnān Yarfuḍ Ijrāʾan ʾumamiyan Li Tawṭīn Al-Suriyyīn,” AlMonitor, accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ ar/originals/2015/07/lebanon-syria-refugees-unhcr-gebran-bassilrejection.html. 47 Ghassān Rīfī, “Al-Tayyār Al-Waṭanī: Ṭarāblus Qalʿat AlMuslimīn!,” Al-Safīr, accessed July 29, 2015, http://assafir.com/ article/401753. 46

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zation to Lebanon, they were unable to come up with any action plan to prevent it. As the Christians have been crying wolf, the wolf finally arrived. On August 2, 2014, the fears of the Lebanese Christians materialized. In ʿArsāl, the Lebanese army captured one of the most prominent Al-Nuṣrah Front leaders called Abū Aḥmad Jumʿah. Following the arrest, the Jihadists of Al-Nuṣrah Front and sister organizations which were barricading in ʿArsāl, unleashed several attacks on the Lebanese Army. As the army retaliated, an ongoing war broke between both sides. 48 The Lebanese public opinion was shocked to see high numbers of Lebanese Sunnis in the ranks of Al-Nuṣrah Front and other Jihadist organizations combating the Lebanese Army in ʿArsāl. The incident culminated on August 6 2014, when Al-Nuṣrah Front kidnapped ten soldiers from the Lebanese Army and seventeen policemen, and transported them to the rocky mountainous area of ʿArsāl where the Jihadist organization was barricaded. 49 These incidents combined with the attacks on the villages on Rās Bʿalbak has terrorized the Lebanese Christians and compelled them to join forces with Hezbollah – the lesser of evils – to fight these Takfiri and Jihadist monstrous organizations.

***

Whenever Christians are victims of Islamic fanaticism, Muslims would remind the world that these are not the teachings of true Islam, and Islam itself is the victim of a Western conspiracy targeting Islam and tarnishing its image. More and more Lebanese Christians find such an Islamic apology to be reductive and irresponsible By Carol Malouf and Ruth Sherlock in Arsal, “Islamic State Fighters Mass on Lebanon Border and Threaten to Launch Attacks across It,” January 18, 2015, sec. World, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/islamic-state/11354038/Islamic-State-fighters-mass-onLebanon-border-and-threaten-to-launch-attacks-across-it.html. 49 “Sunni Fighters, Lebanese Army Extend Fragile Cease-Fire in Border Town | Al Jazeera America,” accessed July 29, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/6/lebanon-syriatruce.html. The captives are still kidnapped today a year after the event. 48

8. THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB SPRING 225 search for a scapegoat. The Arab Spring has deepened the sectarian split in the Lebanon, and Christians find themselves in the dilemma of calling for Freedom on the one hand, yet terrified of the abuse of this freedom by Muslim fundamentalists. Lebanese Christians were tirelessly requesting a greater Islamic denouncement of ISIS and of Islamic fundamentalism, but were not satisfied with the outcomes. The result of the Arab Spring on all Middle Eastern Christians has been a direct exodus; in the case of the Lebanese Christians the same result is there but indirect. The properties and lives of the Christians in the Middle East have historically been targeted. Whatever the problem may be, it can only be resolved by an internal doctrinal Islamic dialogue in which the Christians cannot wait helplessly for it to happen. Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” is read with approval among the Christians; especially where he theorized that when Muslims try to coexist with non-Muslims, blood must be spilled. 50 The fear of the Christians of Lebanon is not the dread of becoming a numerical minority in a region where minority rights tend to be highly violated; they already are a minority in a country composed of minorities. Their utmost fear is not even dhimmitude, which they have managed to avoid for over a millennium in a region where non-Muslim minorities in the region have been subjected to it. The deepest fear that the Lebanese Christians worry about is forced displacement and extinction. A growing tendency among Lebanese Christians – though still whispered and not yet on rooftops – is to call for a federal system in their homeland. US Vice President, Joe Biden, has recommended a system of “functioning federalism” for Iraq’s Kurds, Shiite and Sunni communities. 51 This might well be a viable solution for Lebanon’s Christians.

Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011). 51 See editorial entitled “Iraqis must rise above their Differences to rout Terrorists,” The Washington Post, August 22, 2014. 50

CHAPTER 9 THE EASY ENEMY: THE SHIA1 AND SECTARIANISM IN THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF AND YEMEN DURING THE ARAB SPRING JESSIE MORITZ AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY The Arab Spring has resulted in the political reinvigoration of Shi‘ite communities in the Arabian Peninsula, but also the use of sectarianism as a tool to limit the spread of protests. The motivations and aspirations of Shia in the region are diverse: Bahrain, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia have seen violent protests and repressive state responses, while in Kuwait the Shi‘ite minority has consistently been embraced by the state. There are, however, a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the experience of Shia minorities across the Gulf since 2011. First, Shia opposition groups have primarily expressed political rather than religious demands and have mobilised almost exclusively where there exists a sense of socioeconomic disenfranchisement from the state. Second, Shia groups have made considerable efforts to emphasise their origins as indigenous to the Arabian Peninsula, challenging rhetoric that seeks to define them as a potential “fifth-column” for Iran. Third, Shia responses to the Arab Spring have been shaped by their historical Note on transliteration: To enhance clarity, the word Shia is used both to invoke the noun and adjective forms of the word Shī‘a/Shī‘ī. The Shi‘ite Crescent is spelled according to common English usage. 1

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position in society and cannot be separated from previous mobilisations. History has similarly molded state responses towards Shia opposition groups, as have fears of a resurgent Iran, resulting in the problematic use of sectarianism as a strategy to stymie the Arab Spring in the Gulf region. This chapter discusses the experience of Shia citizen minorities in the Arab states of the Gulf and Yemen, with a particular focus on refuting claims that Shia opposition groups represent local incarnations of the “Shi‘ite Crescent”.

THE SHIA OF THE GULF AND YEMEN: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Although a complete history of Shi‘ism is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worthwhile to briefly trace the development of Shia communities that exist in the Arabian Peninsula today. As a sensitive political issue, official statistics on the number of Shia present in the Arab states of the Gulf and Yemen are not available, but common estimates place numbers at 7–15 percent of the Saudi population, 25–35 percent of the Kuwaiti population, 30–40 percent in Yemen, 55–70 percent of citizens in Bahrain, 2 5–10 percent in Oman and Qatar, and 10–15 percent in the UAE. 3 These figures are contested – in Bahrain, for example, opposition parties maintain that 70 percent of the citizen population is Shia, but government officials claimed closer to a 50–50 split, due largely to the nationalisation of Sunnis from sub-continental Asia, a process that This makes Shia a numerical majority in Bahrain, however their inclusion in this chapter stems from their vulnerable status and unequal access to power. 3 Drawn from author interviews with Shia and Sunnis in Oman, Qatar and Bahrain and secondary sources such as Laurence Louër, Transnational Shi‘a Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Ahmad Khalid Majidyar, “Is Sectarian Balance in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar at Risk?” American Enterprise for Public Policy Research 6 (October 2013); Pew Research Center, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” Pew Research Center, Washington D.C. (7 October 2009), http://www.pewforum.org/2009/ 10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/ 2

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 229 the opposition portray as a strategy intended to shift the demographic balance in favour of the Sunni royal family. 4 The sensitive nature of Shia demographics in the Gulf stem from fears of a transnational “Shi‘ite Crescent”, where reinvigorated Shia identities tie greater loyalty to clerical leaders in Iran than to their nation. Certainly, Iran and Iraq today form the heartland of Shi‘ism, yet Shi‘ism also emerged organically in the Arab states of the Gulf and Yemen as early as the 7th century and several figures of spiritual importance – such as Ibrahim al-Qatīfī (d. 1539) and ‘Ali al-Khunaīzī (d. 1944) – emerged from Eastern Arabia. 5 While the Shia-Sunni split originated over disagreement over the rightful successor to Muhammad’s leadership, religious practices have evolved considerably since the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E., resulting in a diverse collection of Shia and Sunni sects and sub-sects. 6 The three dominant sub-sects of Shi‘ism – Twelver (or Ithnā‘ashariyya), Ismā‘īlī, and Zaīdī – are all present to some extent in the Arabian Peninsula today. The major theological distinction between the sub-sects is over the succession of Shia Imams: Twelver Shia dispute the identity of the twelfth Imam, Ismā‘īlī (or “Sevener”) the seventh, and Zaīdī (or “Fiver”) the fifth. 7 They also have differing relations with Sunni groups: Zaīdīsm, for example, is accepted as a legitimate sect of Islam by many Sunnis due to its 2014.

4

Author interviews with government and opposition, Bahrain 2013–

International Crisis Group (ICG), “The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Report 45 (19 September 2005), p. 1. 6 Shia favoured Āhl Al-Baīt, or the family of the Prophet in the form of ‘Ali and his sons, Ḥasan and Ḥusaīn, whereas Sunnis favoured leaders elected by shūra [consultation within the Islamic community], the first being Abu Bakr. 7 For further details on Twelver belief and practices see Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrine of Twelver Shi’ism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985); for Ismailism see Vali Nasr, The Shi‘a Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), pp. 75–77; for Zaīdīsm see R. B. Serjeant, “The Zaīdīs,” in Religion in the Middle East: Vol 2., ed. A. J. Arberry, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 285–301. 5

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moderate, rationalist nature and the rejection of the infallibility of Imams, whereas Ismā‘īlī and particularly Twelver Shias are vilified by Wahhābī clerics, due in no small part to Twelver’s stronger theological links to Iran. Twelver Shia, after all, are spread widely across the Middle East, comprise majorities in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain as well as a large minority in Kuwait. In the Eastern region of Saudi Arabia, significant numbers of Twelver Shia reside in villages near Qatif, al-Ahsa, and the Eastern province’s capital, Dammam, as well as a small group in Medina. Twelver Shia are less common in the southern states of the Arabian Peninsula, but small numbers are nonetheless present in Yemen, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. Although Ismā‘īlīs today are more concentrated in Pakistan and Central Asia, they historically controlled significant territories in the Arab states of the Gulf. 8 Today, small communities of Ismā‘īlīs exist along the east coast of Oman, in Najran in Saudi Arabia (as part of the Yam and Hamadan tribes whose territory also extends into Northern Yemen), and among recent migrants to the rest of the Gulf. 9 While globally the Zaīdīs comprise only a tiny minority, roughly one million exist in southern Saudi Arabia and they form over 30 percent of the population in Yemen. 10 Zaīdīs dominated the mountainous interior of Yemen from the 9th century, when Yahya bin al-Ḥusaīn (Ḥusaīn’s son) formed the first Zaīdī state, until the formation of the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962. 11 Despite some tensions, they co-existed with Sunni communities who controlled the coastal region from around the 12th century, and Zaīdī doctrine remains influential in Northern Yemen today. 12 It was in Including sections of ancient Bahrain, the eastern Arabian peninsula, and lower Iraq, see Juan Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi‘a Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), pp. 32–35. 9 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Houthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2010), p. 293; Majidyar, “Sectarian Balance”, p. 3. 10 There are no official estimates available for Zaīdīs in Saudi Arabia but academic estimates usually place the figure at around one million. 11 Excepting some interruptions during the Ottoman Era. 12 See Salmoni et al, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, pp. 64–65. 8

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 231 the context of a Zaīdī political revival in the 1990s that the Ḥūthī movement – a key player in the conflict over the status of Shia minorities in Yemen during the Arab Spring – emerged. Not all Shia communities are indigenous to the region. The Arabian Peninsula has long witnessed migration of groups fleeing persecution or pursuing sustainable sources of food, water, and employment, and the Shia are no exception. Many Shia families have immigrated from Iran or Iraq, such as the ‘Ajam, families of Iranian origin who migrated across the Gulf over the past few centuries. 13 Other groups, such as the Baḥārna (adj. Baḥrānī), are indigenous to Bahrain and eastern Saudi Arabia but have spread throughout the region. While the majority of the Baḥārna are Twelver Shia, others – such as some leftist intellectuals in Bahrain – are not, highlighting the complex interaction between ethnic, regional, tribal and religious identities that characterises the Arabian Peninsula. For these groups, the salient question is how integrated these communities have become in their adopted country and whether they feel a sense of inclusion or persecution by the state.

THE ROLE OF IRAN

The Shi‘ite Crescent narrative asserts that clerical leaders in Iran manipulate foreign Shia communities in order to spread the Iranian revolution and foment discord within Sunni-ruled states, resulting in a transnational threat stretching from Iran across Bahrain, eastern Saudi Arabia, southern Iraq, and into Lebanon and Syria; more recently, these allegations have also been directed at the Ḥūthī movement in Yemen. 14 These suspicions were seemingly vindicated when the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran coincided with multiple violent attacks from Gulf-based Shia transnational groups, including a series of bombing attacks in Kuwait, an uprising in and

‘Ajam generally refers to those of Iranian or Persian origin, but can be connotatively used to mean ‘non-Arab’. It would thus be demeaning to refer to a Gulf citizen, Shia or Sunni, who preferences their Arab status as ‘ajamī. 14 See further information and a critique of this narrative in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 40–49. 13

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around Qatif in Saudi Arabia, and, most notably, a 1981 coup attempt in Bahrain by an Iran-linked Shīrāzī group, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB). Some of these events were linked to al-Da‘wa activism, a movement linked to Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Iraq which spread through the Gulf in the 1960s and 1970s, and others to the Shīrāzī transnational movement, formed in the 1970s under the spiritual leadership of Mohammed bin Mahdi al-Ḥussaini al-Shīrāzī, also an Iraqi. Though both strands of Shi‘ite transnational activism have cooperated with Iran at certain points throughout their history, Iran’s actual influence is contested; the relationship might better be portrayed of one of convenience, competing with anti-Persian and nationalist sentiments that reject Iranian clerical authority, and shaped by religious competition between Shia religious centres such as Qom and Najaf. 15 Since 2011, transnational Shia groups have formed only a small, if vocal, minority within Arab Spring movements. Taking the example of Bahrain: a small number of Shīrāzī supporters and other groups with links to Iran were present at the Pearl roundabout as part of Bahrain’s demonstrations in 2011. The most obvious example of this is Amal, a Shīrāzī society founded by followers of Iraqi cleric Hadi al-Mudarrisi and his brother Muhammad Taqi alMudarrisi. There was also evidence of a pro-Iranian Hezbollah group known as Khat al-Imam, which emerged out of the al-Da‘wa political movement. In early 2011, Bahraini Shīrāzīs projected video of Hadi al-Mudarrisi calling for revolution in Bahrain onto large Toby Matthiesen, “The World’s Most Misunderstood Martyr,” Foreign Policy (8 January 2016) http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/08/theworlds-most-misunderstood-martyr/ accessed 23 September 2016; Nicholas Krohley, “Moqtada al-Sadr’s Difficult Relationship with Iran,” Hurst Publishers blog (7 August 2014) http://www.hurstpublishers.com/ moqtada-al-sadrs-difficult-relationship-with-iran/ accessed 23 September 2016; Mohammed Bazzi, “The Sistani Factor: How a Struggle within Shiism will Shape the Future of Iraq,” Boston Review (12 August 2014) http://bostonreview.net/world/mohamad-bazzi-sistani-factor-isisshiism-iraq accessed 23 September 2016. 15

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 233 screens in Pearl roundabout; his presence was later used by state media to emphasise Iran’s role in fomenting domestic unrest. 16 Other Bahraini Shia criticised demonstrators who used symbols or made references to religious figures who could be linked with the Shi‘ite Crescent narrative. Mansoor al-Jamri, editor-inchief of Bahrain’s sole opposition newspaper, al-Wasaṭ, was particularly critical of the Shīrāzīs and their broadcasting of Hadi alMudarrisi’s views in Pearl roundabout. He argued: “The shirazis are not key in the protests, they represent a minority, but their political views and activities in the roundabout are divisive and – together with Hadi al-Mudarrisi’s speeches from abroad – may well lead to a confrontation with the government”. 17 Mainstream opposition societies in Bahrain have devoted considerable effort to debunking the Shi‘ite Crescent narrative. On 14 March 2011, reports spread that al-Wefaq Secretary General Shaikh Ali Salman had claimed he would request Iranian assistance in response to the arrival of GCC Peninsula Shield Force in Bahrain; the forces themselves were invited by King Hamad in order to reinforce state authority, but were depicted by Bahraini opposition as an invasion by a foreign state, particularly since the majority of participating forces were from Saudi Arabia. Despite antipathy towards the intervention, Salman issued a press release within 24 hours rejecting claims he would request Iranian assistance as “fallacious and baseless”, and declaring that he “rejected all forms of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Bahrain”. 18 The best summary of the mainstream opposition view on the Shi‘ite Crescent emerges from the following excerpt from an interview with two Bahrainis, the first a moderate Shia cleric (Speaker 1) and the Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf. Quoted in Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, 39, see also 56. Another founder of al-Wasaṭ was Abd al-Karim Fakhrawi, an Ajami Shia and businessman whose death in April 2011 was attributed by the BICI report to “torture while in the custody of the NSA [National Security Agency]”. See Bassiouni et al., Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, p. 244f. 18 Bassiouni et al., Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, p. 135. 16 17

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second a senior member of secular political society Waad (Speaker 2). When asked whether Iran had any involvement in the protests since 2011, they responded: S1: This is something very important. And since I’m wearing a turban I think it’s good to hear it from me. We refuse to have any intervention from Saudi Arabia or Iran. We are Bahrainis. However, we were Shias before the Iranians were! S2: And we voted against joining Iran in 1970! 19

S1: And we voted against joining Iran. S2: And this is still our position.

S1: And until today, if any voice calls [for joining Iran], the Shias have vowed to every standstead in this country to take a position for whoever says that Bahrain is part of Iran or part of any other country: We are Bahrainis and we refuse, I mean this frame is in itself the new sectarian insult to more the 50 percent of nationals over here. How can you tell us this? I mean, if I look at my history for instance, my father was in prison for calling for democracy in 1961. My uncle was imprisoned in the movement of 1954. My grandfather, my – [interviewee pauses and continues quietly] – we’ve been calling for democracy for decades and decades in this land. Nothing has changed. But today the government sees that the best way to deal with this is to frame us in a sectarian frame, which is linked to Iran. Iran is not our role model. We are looking for a democratic civil state. 20

And later in the same interview:

S1: There was absolutely no Iranian involvement [in the protests]. However, if you tell me that the Iranian media manipulates what’s happening in Bahrain for their own political agen-

This vote refers to a UN-sponsored poll conducted in March 1970, in which Bahrainis overwhelmingly eschewed incorporation into Iran in favour of independence. 20 Author interview, Bahrain 2014. 19

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 235 da, that’s possible. But that does not mean that there’s Iranian – we refuse to have Iranian involvement in Bahrain. We are willing to shout that out, in front of everyone: “we refuse to have Iranian involvement in Bahrain.” What else could we do? We’ve shown that we are free of their influence, and our Western friends believe that. But the problem is that the government needs to save itself, and one of their tactics is portraying us as manipulated by Iran. 21

Ultimately, with little concrete evidence to substantiate the Shi‘ite Crescent narrative, but widespread and entrenched suspicion among loyalists, this chapter adopts the position taken in the report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), also known as the Bassiouni report, which thoroughly investigated both state and societal claims during the early 2011 protests and found no evidence of Iranian involvement in the Bahraini Spring. 22 It is important to note that some government interviewees, particularly those associated with a reformist faction, did not personally ascribe to the Shi‘ite Crescent narrative. “That was clearly brought out in the Bassiouni report as well”, explained a senior government adviser. “Iran very clearly took advantage of the situation a number of weeks later, but it was not the prime instigator or the prime reason why [the uprising] happened”. 23 The Bahraini case highlights the complexity of Iran’s role in Shia political movements within the Arab states of the Gulf and Yemen. Iran has certainly attempted to maintain connections to these communities, yet its actual influence varies, particularly where domestic Shia groups simultaneously hold national, ethnic, and indigenous identities that problematise any conception of a Shi‘ite Crescent. As Ulrichsen argues: “most Shiite organisations and parties in the GCC continued to regard the nation-state as their primary point of reference when articulating demands for reform. They thereby remained rooted in their domestic context and held a far more nuanced attachment to trans-national loyalties than supposed Ibid. Bassiouni et al., Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. 23 Author interview, Bahrain 2013. 21 22

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by suspicious ruling elites”. 24 Even where evidence suggests that Shia political communities have accepted Iranian funds or weapons shipments – as is increasingly the case in Yemen – it is critical to draw a distinction between the pragmatic acceptance of material support, and a situation in which Iran is directing the goals and actions of Shia political movements. 25 Crucially, sect-based identities in the Arabian Peninsula have merged with tribal, national and regional identities to form a complex network of fluctuating loyalties that respond to strategies of governance applied by the state, suggesting that political loyalty is more convincingly shaped by the domestic state-society relationship than interference by Iran. Just as the Shia communities in the Arabian Peninsula do not hold one belief system or form a single network, the response by the state to Shia minorities in the Arab States of the Gulf and Yemen has not been uniform. Three distinct relations with Shi‘ite communities during the Arab Spring are outlined below, from the relative quiescence that has typified Qatar, UAE and Oman, to active support of the state epitomised by Kuwaiti Shia, and finally active unrest and sectarianism prevalent in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

RELATIVE QUIESCENCE: QATAR, OMAN AND THE UAE

While Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have faced violent conflict between government and a largely Shia opposition, Shia minorities in Qatar, Oman and to a lesser extent the UAE have been remarkably quiescent post-2011. Sectarianism is not absent in any of these states, yet nor has it exploded into open vitriol against Shia citizens, for the most part. There are several reasons for the relative quiescence of Shia in Qatar, Oman and the UAE, including their historical assimilation into society, Shia co-option into the elite, lack of economic disenfranchisement, and the greater importance placed Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf, p. 44. Mohsen Milani, “Iran’s Game in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs (19 April 2015) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015–04–19/iransgame-yemen accessed 28 October 2016. 24 25

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 237 on relations between government and Sunni groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Historical processes of nation-building have resulted in Shia being assimilated to a greater degree in these states. They have not formed significant political or religious opposition to the state; to the contrary they have often made concerted efforts to demonstrate their loyalty. 26 For example, as the historical center of Ibāḍī Islam (a form of Islam that is neither Sunni nor Shia), Oman certainly does not fit a dichotomous framework of Sunni vs Shia. The highly educated Lawatiyyas, for example, include some of the most prosperous merchant families in Oman, such as the Sultan family who control the Towell group. Most are not directly involved in politics, choosing instead to exercise influence as part of the economic elite, but some currently hold high positions. Far from a marginalised minority, Omani individuals of Shia heritage have been among those who Omanis protested against in 2011. Ahmad Abdulnabi Makki (Baḥārna) and Maqbool bin Ali Sultan (Lawatiyya), for example, lost their posts of Minister for the National Economy and Minister for Commerce and Industry, respectively, due to allegations of serious corruption and societal opposition. 27 Tellingly, in demonstrations against Makki and Maqbool, the focus was on corrupt practices as Omani individuals and did not descend into sectarian abuse of Shia in general, displaying the level of integration of Omani Shia into society. 28 In Qatar and the UAE, too, Shia efforts to emphasise their national identity have gained greater traction in the absence of a state-driven sectarian narrative aimed at domestic citizens. 29 Governance strategies that promote national unity have strengthened societal assimilation. For example, Qataris and EmiraMajidyar, pp. 5–6. See J.E. Peterson, “Oman’s Diverse Society: Northern Oman” Middle East Journal 58:1 (Winter 2004), pp. 43–35; Marc Valeri, “The Qaboos-State Under the Test of the ‘Omani Spring’: Are the Regime’s Answers Up To Expectations?” Science Po (September 2011); Author Interviews, Oman 2013–2014. 28 Author interviews, Oman 2013–2014. 29 US State Department, Human Rights Practices Report: Qatar (2011). 26 27

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tis, outnumbered at least 5:1 by expatriates, have greater incentives to unite than divide on the basis of confessional identity. Likewise, facing a country split between supporters of the Imamate in the interior, radical leftists from the south and an elite in Muscat, Oman has been focused on nation-building since independence in 1971. There is no space to draw distinctions between Sunni and Shia in this strategy, especially considering the prevalence of Ibāḍīs. These governments also do not appear to perceive a significant threat from their citizen Shia communities, and this is crucial to the status of Shia during the Arab Spring. The scarcity of Shia partially explains this relationship; comprising less than 15 percent of the population, even if radicalised they would be unlikely to pose a serious threat to the state. Moreover, unlike the other states of the Arabian Peninsula, Qatar and Oman have generally had positive relations with Iran, at least on an elite level, thus the “Shi‘ite Crescent” narrative does not engender sectarianism within the state to the same extent. 30 The partial exception to this is the UAE, which appears selectively sectarian and much more concerned about a potential Shi‘ite Crescent. Unlike Qatar and Oman, the UAE has antagonistic relations with Iran – particularly due to a dispute over three islands, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs – and greater sectarian tensions in society. Persecution of Shia in the UAE is difficult to confirm as much of it relies on anecdotal evidence and perceptions of discrimination. Some migrant Shia, for example, chose to declare their religion as Sunni or Christian on formal applications rather than disclose their Shia identity; this suggests that there is a strong perception of discrimination, even if the reality cannot be confirmed. 31 The UAE government clearly identifies a significant threat from regional Shi‘ite movements, sending 500 policemen to help For more on Omani foreign relations see Marc Valeri, Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State (London: Hurst, 2009). For Qatari foreign policy see Mehram Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013). 31 US State Department, International Religious Freedom Report: United Arab Emirates (2011), p. 6. 30

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 239 quell the Bahraini protests alongside Saudi forces in March 2011, and joining the Saudi-led coalition that initiated air and ground strikes against Ḥūthī rebels in Yemen in March 2015. 32 There is also a distinction between discrimination against Emirati citizens and non-citizen migrant workers: while the government forbade Shia citizens from holding a conference in 2012 that would involve inviting foreign clerics, non-citizens – especially recent Iranian migrants – have been actively deported. 33 This suggests the UAE is more concerned about the potential for imported Shi‘ite activism than political mobilisation within their citizen community. Crucially, despite the existence of societal sectarianism, the UAE has not publicly identified Shia as a danger to the Emirati state to the same extent as they have other Islamic political movements. Rather, for these states, the relationship of interest is not with the Shia minority but instead adherents to Sunni Salafī or Ikhwān movements. In Doha, noted several Qataris, the government is much more concerned about young Salafīs who believe the royal family has betrayed Islam than the Shia. 34 Although Wahhābī and Salafī Islam are still prominent in Qatar, Wahhābīsm does not underpin national cohesiveness in Qatar as it does in Saudi Arabia, nor does Qatar have a politically powerful clerical class directing vitriol against the domestic Shia minority. 35 Qatar appears more focused on external competition between their own “Wahhābīsm of the Sea” and Saudi Arabia’s “Wahhābīsm of the desert”, driven by political tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, than in dividing their numerically small society on the basis of sectarianism. 36 Al Arabiya, “GCC Troops Dispatched to Bahrain to Maintain Order,” (14 March 2011) http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/14/ 141445.html 33 Kenneth Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for US Policy” Congressional Research Service Report (24 February 2014), p. 10. 34 Author interviews with Qataris and non-Qatari analysts, 2013– 2014. 35 Mehran Kamrava, “Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalism in Qatar” Middle East Journal 63:3 (Summer 2009), pp. 409–410. 36 Birol Baskan and Steven Wright, “Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion Relations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia,” Arab Studies Quarterly 32

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Moreover, Qatar’s support of Sheikh Qaradawi, a Muslim Brotherhood cleric who regularly rails against regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE, and acceptance of exiled Egyptian Brotherhood supporters, aligns with Qatar’s activist foreign policy as part of a strategy to exert soft power over the region, and has shaped Qatar’s domestic response to the Arab Spring far more than antiShia sectarian strategies. 37 The UAE is similarly more concerned with Sunni Islamist movements, although unlike Qatar they view the Muslim Brotherhood as a serious security threat. The Emirati Muslim Brotherhood, al-Islah, has existed in the UAE since 1974, finding a popular base in Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and the poorer Emirates, and relations with government were cordial until the 1990s when the creeping spread of al-Islah support was deemed a security threat. 38 Relations have been particularly poor since 2011, when members of alIslah aligned with youth groups to form the Emirati “Spring”, with several members signing a March 2011 petition for political reform. The government responded by arresting a host of supporters – including al-Islah’s leader, Sheikh Sultan bin Kayed Al-Qasimi – and revoking the nationality of prominent dissidents. 39 The focus 33:2 (Spring 2011), pp. 96–111; James M. Dorsey, “Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Online (8 September 2013) http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=61189 37 See Matthew Gray, Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013). There is also some suggestion that the state may be behind Sheikh Qaradawi’s increasingly anti-Shia statements, yet again this seems directed at exerting influence over the Bahraini protests than against Qatar’s Shia minority. See Bernard Haykel, “Qatar and Islamism,” NOREF Policy Brief (February 2013), pp. 1–3. 38 Lori Plotkin Boghardt, “The Muslim Brotherhood on Trial in the UAE,” The Washington Institute (12 April 2013) http://www.washington institute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-muslim-brotherhood-on-trial-inthe-uae 39 See commentary on the issue in Sam Bollier, “Q&A: UAE Charges Qatari with Al-Islah Ties,” Al Jazeera (22 November 2013) http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/qa-uae-chargesqatari-with-al-islah-ties-20131121125849199793.html; Ali Rashid Al Noa-

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 241 on Sunni political activism and repressive government responses contrasts distinctly with the almost complete absence of Shia unrest beyond societal allegations of general discrimination. 40 While Oman’s reaction to Sunni Islamist movements has been far more muted than Qatar or the UAE, it is revealing that one of the greatest divisions among Omani reformers in late 2013 was based on their position on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, not between Sunni, Ibāḍī, or Shia. 41 The absence of state-driven sectarianism is important; across the political spectrum, Omanis reported that although sectarian discrimination could emerge from individual prejudices, it was never a state strategy. Oman was also, notably, the only GCC state that declined to join the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015. Moreover, Omani Shia from merchant families were usually loyal to the government, and although some Shia interviewed did express reformist desires, there was not a clear sectarian split between pro-government and pro-reform individuals as there has been in other Gulf states during the Arab Spring, nor have Omani Shia mobilised as a community against the state. 42 None of the discussion thus far should suggest that sectarianism or discrimination are absent in Qatar, Oman or the UAE, yet nor is it a central governance strategy. Some Sunni Qataris, for example, noted that Shia have been discriminated against in Qatar – imi, “Setting the Record Straight on Al-Islah in the UAE,” Al-Monitor (15 October 2012) http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/almonitor/uae-setting-the-record-straight.html#; Said Nasser al-Teniji, “The UAE’s Descent Into Oppression,” The Guardian (3 October 2012) http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/02/uae-descentoppression 40 The UAE government does seem to be concerned with Shia transnational movements in the wake of the Syrian Civil War, deporting any Lebanese Shia with potential links to Hezbollah, yet again this is a move against foreign Shia, not citizens. 41 Reformers reported that individuals who had worked together in 2011 now did not speak because they could not agree on their position on Egypt. Author interviews, Oman 2013–2014. 42 Author interviews, Oman 2013–2014.

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and that this has especially occurred following unrest in Bahrain. 43 Yet while sectarian rhetoric about the Bahraini and Syrian uprisings was rife in interviews, even Qatari Sunnis who described the Bahraini uprisings as engineered by Iran did not then draw a distinction between themselves and Qatari Shia, beyond a tribal distinction based on whose family had arrived first. 44 Crucially, most Shia in Oman, Qatar and the UAE do not feel economically disenfranchised, at least not to the extent of forming opposition. 45 It is economic inequality that has so often been a catalyst for public protest and repressive government responses in the Middle East, and its relative absence in these states is key to the continued loyalty and quiescence of the Shia minority.

ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE STATE: ANTI-SECTARIANISM IN KUWAIT

In many ways, the situation of Shia in Kuwait and the southern states of the Gulf (Qatar, UAE, and Oman) are similar; indeed Kuwait could be considered a variant of the relationship prevalent in those states, whereby diverse groups of Shia display a vested interest in the state’s survival. 46 Kuwaiti Shia have diverse origins, with ‘Ajamī and Baḥārna families arriving in the 17th and 18th centuries, as well as more recent migrants from Iraq, Lebanon, Iran and Southeast Asia, including a sizeable Ismā‘īlī contingent. 47 They have historically formed an important part of the merchant class, with families such as the Marafi Berbahani (‘Ajam origins) and the Matruk (Baḥrānī) among the wealthiest in the country. However, Kuwait’s active political system has forced sectarian issues – which remain an undercurrent in Oman, the UAE and Qa-

Author interviews, Qatar 2013–2014. Author interviews, Qatar 2013–2014. 45 US Embassy Abu Dhabi, “UAE Shi‘a and their Loyalties,” Wikileaks Cable 06ABUDHABI1471_a (15 April 2006) http://www.wiki leaks.org/plusd/cables/06ABUDHABI1471_a.html; Author Interviews in Oman, Qatar, 2013–2014. 46 Louër, Transnational Shi‘a Politics, p. 10. 47 Michael Rubin, “Has Kuwait Reached the Sectarian Tipping Point?” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 4 (August 2013). 43 44

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 243 tar – out into the open. Its relative political liberalisation has allowed the formation of effective political movements, and its location at the crest of the Gulf, between Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, has resulted in the arrival of many Shia political activists, including Mohammed al-Shīrāzī, who built a large Shīrāzī following through the Gulf and Iraq, and competed with members of the Iraqi Da‘wa party who also moved to Kuwait. 48 Although at first this effectively transported Iraqi Shia squabbles into Kuwait, over time the Kuwaiti state made deliberate efforts to widen divisions between Kuwaiti and foreign Shia, with the intention of deflecting Iranian influence. 49 The key development for Kuwaiti Shia, however, was their involvement in the 1990–1991 Gulf War. At a time when the Sunni population remained largely disorganised, Kuwaiti Shia formed a local armed resistance movement upon the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, suffering high rates of arrest, torture and abuse and thus tangibly demonstrating their loyalty to the Kuwaiti state. 50 Despite repeated displays of political loyalty, Kuwaiti Shias have been targeted by open sectarian tensions since 2011, flaring in response to events in Iraq, Syria, and the rest of the Middle East. In April 2011, for example, Kuwaiti Salafīs met to discuss the “Iranian threat” and recommended treating those of Iranian origin with suspicion, and several Shia mosques have been vandalised with anti-Shia slogans. 51 The government response, however, has been proactive, not only embracing but defending their Shi‘ite community. 52 This should not suggest that sectarianism has been absent in the state; as Christopher Davidson notes, it was state-backed newsSee a detailed history of the Shīrāzī movement in Kuwait in Louër, pp. 121–127. 49 Rubin, p. 4. 50 See more on the Kuwaiti resistance movement in John M. Levins, “The Kuwaiti Resistance” Middle East Quarterly (1995), pp. 25–36; see also Katherine Meyer, Helen Rizzo, and Yousef Ali, “Changed Political Attitudes in the Middle East: The Case of Kuwait” International Sociology 22 (2007), p. 300. 51 Mona Kareem, “Shi‘a phobia Hits Kuwait” Jadaliyya (17 May 2011) http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1603/Shi‘a phobia-hits-kuwait52 Rubin, p. 7. 48

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papers that published many anti-Shia articles. 53 Ties to transnational groups such as Hezbollah have historically incited repressive state responses, as in 2008 when security forces summoned 1,500 individuals, mostly Shia, for participating in a public mourning event for a Hezbollah leader; two Shi‘ite parliamentarians were also expelled from the Popular Action Bloc for participating. 54 Kuwaiti news agencies that catered to Shia populations, and bloggers critical of the Bahraini or Saudi regimes have also been suspended, closed or arrested since 2011. 55 Generally, however, the government tried to embody a moderating influence, even when caught in sectarian tensions after Bahrain erupted into mass protests in February 2011 and the GCC Peninsula Shield Force was dispatched as a show of symbolic unity and collective security. Pressured to choose a “side” between the Sunni Al-Khalifa royal family and largely Shia opposition, the Kuwaiti government attempted to tread an intermediate path by sending warships into the Persian Gulf. This was a moderate move: naval forces could not be used to repress the Bahraini protesters yet also indicated a clear message to Iran to stay out of Bahraini domestic affairs. Domestically, it incited opposition from both sides as Shi‘ite parliamentarian Saleh Ashour criticised the government for sending the navy while Sunni Islamists submitted a parliamentary request to question the government for not sending ground troops. 56 Kuwait’s participation in the 2015 military intervention in Yemen followed a similar path. Their contribution of 15 F/A-18 Hornets to the Saudi-led coalition was small but symbolically significant, yet in April 2016 they also hosted peace talks designed to support a negotiated political solution. The talks broke down by Christopher Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchy, (London: Hurst, 2013), pp. 143–144. 54 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009 – Kuwait, (16 July 2009) http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a6452a732.html 55 Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 98; see also US State Department, International Religious Freedom Report: Kuwait (2012). 56 Rubin, p. 6; Kareem. 53

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 245 August, but the repeated interventions of Sheikh Sabah and other senior regime figures to “bring one or the other side back to the table after their routine almost daily walk outs” suggests a genuine commitment to the talks and also reflects Kuwait’s more moderate stance compared to, for example, Saudi Arabia. 57 Kuwaiti Shia have similarly been torn between distancing themselves from international Shia movements, and rejection of repression of Shia in neighbouring Bahrain, although most Shia politicians (and some secular Sunnis) have expressed support for the Bahraini protesters, and decried the intervention in Yemen. 58 Like Oman, Qatar and the UAE, the Kuwaiti government’s central concern is not domestic Shia opposition. Rather, the Kuwaiti government faces the rising influence of conservative Sunni movements, popular protests driven by diverse opposition, and the perceived demographic threat of the bidūn, stateless Bedouins. Although some bidūn are Shia, urban-tribal divisions trump sectarian divisions, with the state focused on maintaining the loyalty of the urban Shia elite even as the bidūn struggle to improve their status within Kuwait. 59 It is thus the social distinction between badū (tribal) and ḥaḍār (sedentary) groups that has been used to divide Kuwaiti society, not sect. 60 Most importantly, due to the state’s refusal to adopt sectarian tactics, the status of Kuwaiti Shia as an assimilated minority is not under serious threat despite some instances of societal sectarianism. Helen Lackner, “Peace Talks in Kuwait: Will they Solve Yemen’s Crisis?” Open Democracy (22 May 2016) https://www.opendemocracy.net/ arab-awakening/helen-lackner/peace-talks-in-kuwait-will-they-solveyemen-s-crisis. 58 Kareem. 59 Kuwait City, “Kuwait’s Effort to Appease Bidoon with Driver’s Licenses Backfires,” Wikileaks Cable 07KUWAIT221_a (16 February 2007) http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KUWAIT221_a.html; Farah al-Nakib, “Revisiting Hadar and Badu in Kuwait: Citizenship, Housing, and the Construction of a Dichotomy,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 46 (2014), pp. 5–30. 60 See Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, p. 95. 57

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ACTIVE UNREST AND SECTARIANISM – BAHRAIN, SAUDI ARABIA, YEMEN

The symbiotic relationship between the Kuwaiti government and its Shia citizens contrasts distinctly with Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, where Shia communities, perceiving persecution by the state, have formed a vocal opposition. All have experienced unrest prior to 2011, but the Arab Spring and repressive government responses have intensified Shia unrest. Most Shia movements in these states have aligned with the youth opposition for at least a portion of the post-2011 period, creating a cross-sectional challenge that greatly alarmed their governments. Unlike the other states of the Arabian Peninsula, government responses to Shia calls for reform in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have been swift, unequivocal, and violent, attempting to draw a transnational picture of the Shia opposition, framing it as a local manifestation of the “Shi‘ite Crescent” and thus delegitimising the movements as externally-driven by an expansionist Iran. 61 Yet the key elements driving protest in these states are not foreign actors but local socioeconomic inequalities, and historical state-building processes that have left these communities marginalised and disenfranchised. Moreover, narratives of the “Shi‘ite Crescent” gloss over differences between sub-sect identities that are key to understanding the demands and cohesiveness of local Shia mobilisations in the Arabian Peninsula.

YEMEN

Relations between the Sunni-majority government and Yemen’s sizeable Shia minority have not always been strained, excepting some tensions between Shafi’ī Sunni and Zaīdī Shia groups in the 1960s. The roots of the 2004 Ḥūthī conflict, however, can be traced back to historical processes of state-building and governance since the 1970s. At first, the governance strategy of Ali Abdullah

61

an Gulf.

See a detailed overview of this phenomenon in Matthiesen, Sectari-

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 247 Saleh’s 62 regime (1978 – 2012) did not include attempts to exert direct control over northern Yemen, preferring to materially co-opt northern tribal leaders to maintain a semblance of control. 63 The Northern governorate of Sa’dah, the historical heartland of Zaīdī Shiism, has thus been controlled in practice by tribal leaders following Zaīdī Islam, and formed largely autonomous communities with family, tribal and religious networks across the mountainous Northern region; they are not assimilated into the state as are Shia minorities in Oman, Qatar, the UAE or Kuwait. Geographical obstacles to government service provision, combined with a practice of distributing greater economic resources to those close to the Al Saleh family, has resulted in the northern governorates being among the least developed in Yemen. 64 The material dissatisfaction felt by the Shia communities in the north perpetuated a sense of disenfranchisement from the central government. The increased presence of Wahhābī Sunnis in Yemen since the 1990s further contributed to the alienation of Yemeni Shia, especially as Wahhābī clerics claim Ḥūthīs are actually Twelvers, thereby justifying war against them. 65 Shia in Yemen’s north have thus faced a dual threat from a state that does not incorporate them and Wahhābīs, Salafīs, and the Muslim Brotherhood party, al-Islah, who actively campaign against them. The interlinkage of confessional, tribal and national identities is crucial to the status of Shia in Yemen; the Ḥūthī rebellion, sparked by a government attempt to arrest Husayn Badreddin al-Ḥūthī, an influential Zaīdī religious and political leader, in June 2004, was not simply a Shia movement but a movement of the tribal north against the non-tribal south, developed against underdeveloped, periphery against centre. Saleh is, himself, Zaīdī Muslim, yet it is the greater relationship between his regime and the Zaīdīs in general that is the subject of this chapter. 63 Salmoni et al, p. 3. 64 Ibid., p. 21. 65 Debates over the Zaīdī or Twelver status of Ḥūthīs is heated and occurs on the news pages of regional think tanks, personal pages, and in comments sections of academic articles. 62

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The government of Yemen has sought to exacerbate existing divisions in order to weaken the Ḥūthī movement and reassert control over Yemen, differentiating between backward, violent, tribal northerners, and the developed elite in the South. Labelling the Ḥūthī and their Hashimi leadership as a radical fifth column seeking to form a conservative Islamic state is a familiar accusation, redolent of the “Shi‘ite Crescent” narrative. 66 Yet such assertions completely ignore the Zaīdī origins and beliefs of the Ḥūthī movement; Zaīdī Shia are unlikely to naturally submit, theologically or politically, to the authority of Twelver Iran. Perhaps the best depiction of the Ḥūthī issue in Yemen is from a 2010 comprehensive RAND report: At its base, the confrontation between the Ḥūthī family and the Saleh regime…is not a confessional opposition movement challenging the legitimacy of the GoY [Government of Yemen] – nor a local manifestation of the transnational “Shi‘ite Crescent.” Rather, it is a conflict in which local material discontent and Zaīdī identity claims have intersected with the state center’s methods of rule and self-legitimation. As the conflict has proceeded, however, differences between the Ḥūthīs and the GoY have taken on the hues of both tribal and confessional strife. 67

The transformation of the Ḥūthī movement over time is an important point: although opposition movements may not emerge as Shia movements per se, the existence of socioeconomic dissatisfactions in a Shia community combined with repressive government tactics can transform the movement into a sectarian struggle. In the post-2011 period, Ḥūthīs formed a loose coalition with revolutionary youth and reformists in Yemen and helped to force Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down in 2012. However, when the ensuing regime, led by President Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi, proved unable to See an example of this rhetoric in Ali Saeed, “Houthis Look to Establish Shiite State Along Saudi Border” Yemen Times (11 February 2012), http://www.yementimes.com/en/1524/report/369/Houthis-lookto-establish-Shiite-state-along-Saudi-border.htm 67 Salmoni et al., pp. xv-xvi. 66

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 249 cement its political legitimacy, and the UN and GCC-sponsored National Dialogue of 2013–2014 failed to produce national unity, Saleh formed an opportunistic alliance with the Ḥūthīs to support their military advance on the capital. By September 2014, the Ḥūthīs had taken over many government buildings in Sanaa and by early 2015 the alliance had ousted Hadi from power, forcing him to flee to Aden and, subsequently, Saudi Arabia. Hadi’s removal to Saudi Arabia, however, served to further internationalise and escalate the Yemeni conflict, particularly after Saudi Arabia initiated air strikes in an attempt to drive back Ḥūthī forces and reinstall the Hadi government. 68 The mobilisation of the GCC Peninsula Shield Force to reinforce the authority of a favoured ruler is reminiscent of their use in Bahrain in 2011; in both cases, the utilisation of the Shi‘ite Crescent narrative formed an important justification for GCC military intervention. 69 Contextualising ongoing conflict between the Ḥūthīs and the more tenuous grouping of international and domestic actors supporting exPresident Hadi are the fluctuating loyalties of secessionist groups such as al-Hirak, trouble in Hadramawt, and resurgent al-Qaeda and ISIS forces operating throughout central Yemen; within this context, both Sunni and Shia Yemenis face intensifying sectarian tensions and a massive humanitarian crisis.

SAUDI ARABIA

Yemen’s ongoing negotiations with its Shia minority have also had transnational ramifications. Saudi Arabia, nervous of Yemeni instability spilling over the border and fearful of Iranian exploitation of Shia discontent, has made several concessions since 2011 to the restive Ismā‘īlī community living in Najran, including closing an Jillian Schwedler, “Is the Houthi-Saleh Alliance Cracking?” Atlantic Council (29 February 2016) http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/mena source/is-the-houthi-saleh-alliance-cracking 69 See for example Eyad Abu Shakra, “Iran Seeks to Complete the Crescent,” Al Arabiya (18 September 2016) http://english.alarabiya.net/ en/views/news/middle-east/2016/09/18/Iran-seeks-to-complete-thecrescent.html 68

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anti-Shia channel owned by wealthy businessman Abdul Rahman Al-Tayyar in March 2012. 70 The largest Saudi Shia community, however, has fared less well as a result of the Arab Spring. A considerable swathe of eastern Saudi Arabia near Dammam and al-Hofuf historically formed part of ancient Bahrain, hence many of the Shia living in this region are Baḥārna, practice Twelver Shi‘ism, and have formal and informal ties with the Shia living on the island of Bahrain. The Saudi government views transnational ties between Saudi and Bahraini Shia with trepidation, mindful of the potential for political activism in Bahrain to invigorate Saudi opposition. The historical connection between Baḥārna on the island and mainland are activated by a powerful myth whereby the glory days of simple Baḥārna communal life were disrupted by greedy conquerors – the Al Khalifa royal family in Bahrain and Al Saud on the mainland – and since this time the Baḥārna have been subjugated and persecuted (although as Laurence Louër notes, this myth may be more powerful in Bahrain than al-Ahsa or Qatif). 71 Regardless, the function of Wahhābīsm as a foundational pillar of the Saudi state relegates Saudi Shia to second-class status. 72 As in Yemen, then, Saudi Shia are actively rejected by the state, and have formed largely autonomous communities with strong personal, family and religious networks. Saudi Shia were unsurprisingly among the earliest to join antigovernment demonstrations in 2011, although it is important to note that these same communities had been restive before, notably in 1979 in Qatif and 2009 in Medina, well before any “Arab

Petr Lvov, “Saudi Arabia’s Religious Problems Set the Premise for a Schism in the Kingdom” New Eastern Outlook (3 November 2013) http://journal-neo.org/2013/11/03/rus-konfessional-ny-e-problemysaudovskoj-aravii-sozdayut-predposy-lki-dlya-raskola-korolevstva-chast-2/ 71 Louër, pp. 29–30. 72 US State Department, Report on International Religious Freedom: Saudi Arabia (2011). 70

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 251 Spring”. 73 The Saudi “Spring” has been more disparate than other Gulf states – it is better understood as distinct mobilisations of reformists, women’s rights activists and Shia groups with differing goals and independent networks rather than a cohesive movement. As in neighbouring states, the demands of Shia opposition activists were not limited to Shia-specific rights: they called for greater political freedom and participation, an independent judiciary, a constitution, and the release of political prisoners. 74 However, crosssectarian co-operation was short-lived, especially as Shia in the eastern region highlighted regional concerns that alienated their reformist counterparts in the Nejd, such as demands to release nine “forgotten” Shia prisoners allegedly linked to the Khofar Towers bombing of 1996. 75 Shia antipathy to Saudi state stems from more than sectarian governance strategies; it is linked with a history of economic underdevelopment and disenfranchisement. The Eastern province of Saudi Arabia holds the majority of Saudi oil, including the lucrative Ghawar Field, and is a vital resource for a government with a bloated bureaucracy, high youth unemployment and widespread corruption. Yet like the northern region of Yemen, the Shia communities around Dammam, al-Ahsa and Qatif are among the least developed. Lack of development, the decline in agriculture (the traditional occupation of Shia in eastern Saudi Arabia) as a result of the oil industry, coupled with perceptions of Sunni and foreign exploitation of oil resources has resulted in sense of exclusion that has coloured Shia political mobilisation during the Arab Spring. 76 As one cleric stated in 2008: “we live on top of the oil, I see how it

Mai Yamani, “Saudi Shi‘a are Standing Up,” The Guardian (11 March 2009) http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/ mar/11/saudiarabia-islam 74 Frederic Wehrey, “The Forgotten Uprising in Eastern Saudi Arabia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2013), p. 3. 75 Ibid., pp. 11–12. 76 Yitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi‘a in the Modern Arab World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 49. 73

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is being taken out of our soil every day. But you also see that our areas are poor, and we do not get a fair share of the oil income”. 77 Having witnessed the swift downfall of governments in Northern Africa, the Saudi government took immediate action to reduce unrest domestically, releasing almost 130 billion USD in social aid and in March 2011. 78 Their move was unsuccessful, as increasing numbers of Saudi Shia emerged onto the streets to protest Saudi hegemony, becoming the “largest and longest protest movement in Saudi Arabia’s modern history”. 79 Concurrently, state media emphasised the sectarian nature of protests, tying both the eastern province and Bahraini protest movements to Iranian efforts to reassert control over the Gulf. So pervasive were efforts to portray the protests as sectarian in nature that some groups, such as the Free Youth Coalition (al-Intilāf al-Shabāb al-Aḥrār), released a statement countering the narrative, in which they stated that all of the organisers of the March 11, 2011 protests were, in fact, Sunni. 80 Violent repression accompanied the sectarian narrative, with particularly deadly clashes occurring on 3 October 2011 in alAwamiyyah, early November 2011 in Qatif, and across the region following the July 2012 arrest of a high profile Shīrāzī cleric, Nimr al-Nimr. 81 The March 2015 initiation of air strikes in Yemen, comShi‘a cleric, quoted in Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf. 1190 of 3792. Ulf Laessing, “Saudi King Back Home, Orders $37 Billion in Handouts” Reuters (23 February 2011) http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2011/02/23/us-saudi-king-idUSTRE71M22V20110223 79 Toby Matthiesen, “A Saudi Spring? The Shi‘a Protest Movement in the Eastern Province 2011–2012” The Middle East Journal 66:4 (Autumn 2012), p. 629. 80 See original post in Arabic from March 7, 2011: https://www.facebook.com/notes/%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AA%D9 %84%D8%A7%D9%81–%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8 %A7%D8%A8–%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8 %A7%D8%B1/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%84/132905360113230 81 Al Jazeera, “Violence Erupts Following Arrest of Saudi Shi‘a Cleric” (9 July 2012) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/ 07/20127921837294422.html 77 78

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 253 bined with domestic moves, such as the early 2016 execution of alNimr and earlier court decisions that sentenced several Shia protesters – including the teenage nephew of Nimr al-Nimr – to death, suggest a tightening of control over Saudi Arabia’s Shia population. Even as the Saudi state has reiterated its support for its Shia minority following repeated bombing attacks by ISIS militants, its 2014 terrorism regulations, which include a definition of terrorism as “calling, participating, promoting, or inciting sit-ins, protests, meetings, or group statements in any form,” do not bode well for the status of Saudi Arabia’s restive Shia minority. 82

BAHRAIN

Bahrain’s Shia community has similarly faced direct state repression and attempts to delegitimise their demands as sectarian and foreign-driven. Like the Shia of Saudi Arabia, Bahraini Shia initially expressed political rather than religious demands and have mobilised almost exclusively where there exists a sense of socioeconomic disenfranchisement from the state. Political mobilisation in Bahrain has long had an impact in Eastern Saudi Arabia, and the crossnational impact of repression against Saudi Shia in terms of rallying Bahrainis should not be understated. However – contrary to the “Shi‘ite Crescent” narrative – the major drivers of unrest in Bahrain are domestic and political in nature. Historically, Bahraini Shia formed a lower class of pearl divers and farmers, especially since the conquest of the island of Bahrain by the Al Khalifa family in 1783. 83 Inequality between Baḥrānī Shia and Sunni merchants has persisted as Bahrain’s economy transformed into an oil-based economy, then one based heavily on financial services and banking as oil reserves dwindled. Although some Shia families are among the merchant elite, most form a low-

AhlulBayt News Agency, “Saudi Arabian Court Hands Death Sentence to Teenage Shia Protester,” (29 May 2014) http://www.abna.ir/ english/service/middle-east-west-asia/archive/2014/05/29/612002/ story.html; Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: New Terrorism Regulations Assault Rights,” (20 March 2014) http://www.hrw.org/news/ 2014/03/20/saudi-arabia-new-terrorism-regulations-assault-rights 83 For a history of Bahraini Shia, see Nakash, Reaching for Power. 82

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er class of Bahraini citizens, alleging that they do not receive equal economic benefits to their Sunni compatriots. 84 Although official statistics on the breakdown of security forces in Bahrain are not available, the 2011 BICI report, which investigated abuses that occurred during the intense protests and government crackdown in February and March 2011, documented numerous cases of antiShia abuse and rhetoric by security forces, supporting the common perception that security forces in Bahrain are primarily composed of naturalised Sunnis imported from sub-continental Asia, with loyalist Bahraini Sunnis in key officer positions. 85 Yet Bahrain does not have a virulently sectarian history. While some areas in Bahrain – such as the Shia villages along the Budaiya highway – are generally populated by either Sunni or Shia, Isa Town and Manama are mixed, and Bahrainis interviewed who grew up in either lamented the rise in sectarianism as unnatural for Bahrain. 86 Intermarriage between Sunni and Shia was not uncommon, resulting in half-Sunni, half-Shia children colloquially known as “Su-Shi”s. 87 Previous protest movements in Bahrain crossed sectarian lines, particularly within leftist groups that agitated for change in the 1950s and 60s, and decades of migration have left Bahrain with a diverse society. Tellingly, the earliest protests of 2011 at the Pearl Roundabout in Bahrain were attended by both Sunni and Shia, and chants at the protest included: “No Sunni, No Shia, Just Bahraini”. 88 However, cross-sectarian opposition to Al Khalifa governance in the earliest stages of the “Bahraini Spring” greatly alarmed the Author interviews, Bahrain 2013–2014. Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), “Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry” (23 November 2011). 86 Although sectarian rhetoric did sometimes occur during elections, as Shia and Sunnis gravitated towards different political parties (Author interviews, Bahrain 2013–2014). 87 Author interview with Bahraini self-described ‘SuShi’, Bahrain 2013. 88 Al Jazeera, “Bahrain: The Stories that Aren’t Being Covered,” (May 6, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/05/ 2012568151358932.html. 84 85

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 255 state and its paternal neighbour, Saudi Arabia. Like the Saudi government, the Al Khalifas attempted to engender a narrative in which the protesters were delegitimised as sectarian agents of Iran, intent on tearing apart Bahrain’s social fabric and installing a Shi‘ite puppet state. 89 Describing the protests as sectarian was a selffulfilling move, although the use of Twelver Shia slogans during protests such as “Yā Ḥusaīn!” (in reference to Shia’s reverence of Ḥusaīn as a martyr against oppression) also served to alienate Sunni reformers. 90 Contrary to the original intentions of the Bahraini Spring, intensification of sectarianism in Bahrain resulted in societal conflict, as Sunni youth rushed to defend against a perceived threat to their community. Sunni and Shia youth – many of whom attended school together – met on the streets as combatants, particularly following a decision to take the protests to the neighbourhood of Rifaa, Sunni heartland. Said one Bahraini: The protesters wanted to protest in front of the king’s court. A lot of Sunnis think that the government is lenient, despite everything. They think that the government is lenient with the Shia. So that is why they said: “if the government is going to allow them, we are not going to allow them”… my friend he opened his trunk for me and he showed me the sticks and everything that he had prepared. And even though he lives in Isa Town he said: “tomorrow I’m going to Rifaa and I am going to defend Rifaa and,” according to him, “I’m going to be a martyr tomorrow”. 91

As unrest continues, two contradictory narratives of the Bahraini Spring have emerged: a government-driven narrative of Iranian agents and violent extremist Shia, and an opposition-driven narrative of a despotic and illegitimate government, encouraged by conRaihan Ismail, “Propaganda War Marks the Second Anniversary of the Bahraini Spring” Open Democracy (11 April 2013) http://www.opendemocracy.net/raihan-ismail/propaganda-war-markssecond-anniversary-of-bahraini-spring 90 Author interviews with moderate Sunni reformers, Bahrain 2013– 2014. 91 Ibid. 89

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servative Saudis, repressing the rightful inhabitants of Bahrain. While state press services cover reports of Molotov cocktails used against policemen by “thugs”, 92 Shia opposition networks such as the Bahrain Freedom Movement cover arrests of activists in house raids as part of “The Al Khalifa terror machine[’s]…intimidation campaign against Bahrainis”. 93 With even the basic facts contested and ongoing unrest, there is little space for reconciliation and efforts to solve the crisis through national dialogue have been so far unsuccessful. 94 Moreover, as the political impasse continues and a solution remains elusive, hard-line elements in government and opposition increasingly gain power. Shia youth, for example are increasingly venting frustration at formal political parties like alWefaq and turning to more extreme forms of protest, while on the government side, the revocation of prominent cleric Isa Qasem’s Bahraini nationality in June and dissolution of al-Wefaq in July 2016 have limited Shia formal political representation and contributed to ongoing unrest. 95

CONCLUSION

The experience of Shia of the Arabian Peninsula has been mixed since 2011 – from direct persecution and open conflict in Yemen, See for example Bahrain Ministry of Interior, “Molotov Cocktail Damages Shops Near Sitra Police Station” (5 May 2014) http://www.policemc.gov.bh/en/news_details.aspx?type=1&articleId=2 2770 93 The Bahrain Freedom Movement regularly sends email updates on the situation in Bahrain. The quote here is from their 7 May 2014 update. 94 Author interviews with participants in National Dialogue, Bahrain 2013–2014; Sandeep Singh Grewal, “Six-Month Dialogue Deadline ‘is Crucial’” Gulf Daily News (11 May 2014) http://www.gulf-dailynews.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=376716; National Democratic Opposition Parties, “Bahrain Opposition: Internal Political Dialogue Doors are Shut” Ahlul Bayt News Agency (7 May 2014) http://www.abna.ir/ english/service/bahrain/archive/2014/05/07/607017/story.html 95 Shi’a youth interviewed claimed that burning tires was the only way to highlight the urgency of their cause, as formal dialogue had “achieved nothing” (Author interviews, Bahrain 2013–2014). 92

9. SHIA AND SECTARIANISM IN THE GULF AND YEMEN 257 Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, to relative quiescence in Qatar, the UAE and Oman, and active embrace by the state despite societal tensions in Kuwait. However, several points regarding their political mobilisation and status during the post-2011 period have remained accurate across the region. Shi‘ite opposition groups have primarily expressed political rather than religious demands and have mobilised almost exclusively where there exists a sense of socioeconomic disenfranchisement from the state. Although these demands and tactics may become more sectarian over time, initial protests were a response to a governance practices that left the majority of Shia without benefits or access to decision-making structures. Where socioeconomic dissatisfactions were absent, as among Shia within the economic elite, Shia were strongly supportive of the government and worked to protect their benefits through loyalty to the wider political system. The extent to which Shia have been historically assimilated into the state also plays a key role in shaping both the political mobilisation of Shia during the Arab Spring, and the state response. Shia communities in the Arabian Peninsula are not isolated; protests in one will likely result in protests in another. Yet Shi‘ite groups have made considerable efforts to emphasise their origins as indigenous to their respective nation-states, challenging rhetoric that seeks to define them as a potential “fifth-column” for Iran. Although Iran has almost certainly attempted to manipulate Shia communities to their advantage, to frame Shia unrest as a “Shi‘ite Crescent” overlooks historical state-society relations, sub-sect identities and local sources of discontent that have shaped dissent (and loyalty) in Shia communities across the Gulf and Yemen. Rather, it seems more convincing that the Shiite Crescent narrative has served as a way to delegitimise socioeconomic demands and justify a repressive response against Shia minorities in order to preclude a cross-sectarian challenge to the state during the Arab Spring.

PART III: OTHER MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ARAB SPRING

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CHAPTER 10 PALESTINIANS AT HOME AND IN THE DIASPORAS AND THE ARAB SPRING BERNARD SABELLA AL-QUDS UNIVERSITY AND BETHLEHEM UNIVERSITY, PALESTINE INTRODUCTION

The major transformations taking place in the countries of the Middle East that have become known as the “Arab Spring” pose special challenges to Palestinians irrespective of place of residence. These challenges span political, demographic and socio-economic dimensions that reflect on a history of refugee experience since 1948 and on the vicissitudes of political compromises and attempted negotiations since the Oslo Accords of 1993. The impact of the “Arab Spring” on Palestinians in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya and the Palestinian Territories needs to be measured by particular manifestations and or effects in each of these countries. The demographic move of Palestinian refugees out of Syria primarily into Lebanon creates once again the cycle of seeking refuge and the precariousness of Palestinians with their stateless status. Likewise, in Egypt and Libya, Palestinians were faced with various ramifications that have either physically dislodged them, in spite of their relatively small numbers, or made them a target of political discourse. Palestinians in Jordan have opted for the most part to remain onlookers on the transformations going on around them. The fact that some refugees from Syria, among them Palestinians, have moved into the cramped refugee camps of Jordan, similarly to what happened in Lebanon, highlights the difficult social and economic situation of these camps and the overall pressures that are placed 261

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on the host countries and UNRWA, with the limited resources at their disposal. In the Palestinian Territories, the “Arab Spring” was for the most part a media event to be followed and discussed. There was no enthusiasm, among the population, to start its own “Arab Spring.” The ongoing Israeli occupation, the internal division between Fateh and Hamas, the difficult economic and fiscal situation, the despondency of the population over the nature of political life and the pressures on the Palestinian Authority to resume peace talks with Israel were all factors that contributed to the inertia. Politically the developments that have accompanied the” Arab Spring” have placed the Palestinian problem lower on the list of regional priorities as each Arab country was preoccupied with its own internal transformations. The dramatic changes in Egypt within a year of the election of Mohamed Morsi have contributed to a roller coaster for the fortunes of the Hamas government in Gaza from an up during his presidency to a low after his demise. The “Arab Spring” with the strategic interest of some of the region’s more powerful and influential states to contain a nuclear Iran have joined to make the Palestinian Authority more amenable to accepting the American offer to restarting the negotiations with Israel.

SYRIA: DISPLACEMENT OF PALESTINIANS

The “Arab Spring” with its consequences for the respective societies that have experienced it and for the Palestinians across the Middle East remains a crucial challenge for the future of the region and for the prospects of a solution to the Palestinian problem. While some are warning that there may be eventually a Palestinian Arab Spring against the Israeli occupation, there is doubt that such a development – if it occurs – would have a predetermined course that can be controlled. As the uprising in Syria, which started in March 2011, turned into an ongoing devastating civil war, over fifty percent of the more than half-a-million Palestinian refugees in the country were displaced, either internally or as refugees once again seeking shelter in either Lebanon, with an estimated 80,000 refugees, or Jordan where 11,000 Palestinians sought refuge. Aside from the humanitarian trauma experienced by these Palestinians, there were the pressures exerted on them, particularly in the Yarmouk refugee camp, a virtual neighborhood of Damascus, to join forces with the

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rebels or with the pro-Assad Syrian forces. Caught in the middle, the Yarmouk refugees experienced some of the most distressing situations as they went hungry, without adequate health care and without the minimum conditions for survival. 1 But aside from the humanitarian cost, and the destruction of the Yarmouk camp, there was political damage to the Palestinian cause as Syrians became preoccupied with their internal agenda of changing the regime or of saving it. Prior to the beginning of the uprising, President Assad expressed his belief that there would be no “Arab Spring” in Syria as the country is at the forefront of confronting Israel. His statement was in keeping with the manner in which Arab regimes, since 1948, have used the Palestinian issue to deny their citizens the basic rights and to justify spending billions of dollars on arms purchases. Preserving the Palestinian cause was not a convincing argument to thousands of Syrians who went to the streets demanding the fall of the regime and a new political, social and economic agenda, sort of a Syrian bill of rights. Palestine and the Palestinians were not the issue, it was Syria with its woes and problems. But the Palestinians paid the price and caught between the forces, they had to choose sides at a time when such an act would have spelled further disaster to them. Most stayed neutral but some Palestinian fringe groups chose sides, at the expense of the whole community. The Palestinian National Authority felt responsible to help assuage the difficult living conditions in the Yarmouk refugee camp and insisted that Palestinians in Syria adopt a position of neutrality and that they do not interfere with the internal affairs of the country. This is the position that the National Authority has adopted prior to the developments of the “Arab Spring”; it became an imperative, for the survival and security of Palestinians particularly in Syria, to highlight this policy yet once again. 2 The crisis in the Yarmouk refugee camp continues unabated. On May 25 2014 the UNRWA spokesperson, Chris Gunness, expressed his agency’s concern “about the desperate humanitarian situation of the over 18,000 civilians trapped in Yarmouk.” See http://www.unrwa.org/crisisin-yarmouk 2 For a brief analysis of the complex relationships between the Assad and the Palestinians, see Sam Badger and Giorgio Cafiero’s “Assad & the 1

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PALESTINE SIDELINED

The lesson learned from the Syrian situation is that Palestine and Palestinians were no longer the preoccupation of the masses or for that matter the regime itself as it fought for survival. Likewise the developments that went on in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia during the “Arab Spring” transitions reinforced similar conclusions. In Libya, Palestinians had always been vulnerable to the whims and wishes of the deposed Muamer Qaddafi as he offered his own positions on the Palestinian issue and imposed on Palestinians living in Libya moves that dislodged them, such as his demand of Palestinians in Libya post-Oslo accords to go back to the Palestinian Territories, in order to prove that the peace accords were a sham and that Israel would not allow them back. Between 50,000 to 70,000 Palestinians, according to Dr. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, a researcher at the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford University resided in Libya in 2012. The exact numbers, however, are difficult to establish because many were forced out of the country or are not duly registered with the authorities. 3

LIBYA: HOME EVICTIONS

When the revolution started in 2011, Palestinians had no interest in taking part. But like in Syria, they were caught between the proregime and anti-regime forces and hence were targeted and their homes ransacked showing their vulnerability. But of particular concern to Palestinians still living in Libya is the Housing Law 4 which specified, when promulgated, one housing unit or apartment per family and granted the remaining units or apartments to families with no property, including Palestinians. The subsidized housing to Palestinians helped them find some stability, in spite of the occaPalestinians,” in Foreign Policy in Focus, April 3, 2014. http://fpif.org/assadpalestinians/ 3 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Elena, “Palestinian Refugees Affected by the 2011 Libyan Uprising: A Brief Overview,” pp. 7–12, Journal of Palestinian Refugee Studies, Volume 2, Issue Number 1, Spring 2012, the Palestine Return Center, p.8. http://www.reemkelani.com/docs/JPRS%20–%20 Spring%202012%20edition.pdf

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sional whims and wishes of Qaddafi, but with the revolution of 2011, families who originally owned the housing units or apartments demanded to have them back or to hike the subsidized rent to actual market prices. Eviction of Palestinian families became the norm and this was also reflected with some anti-Palestinian sentiments. Once again the issue was not Palestine or the predicament of Palestinians, irrespective of their contributions to Libya and its economy and society, but internal and personal considerations that outweighed Pan-Arab sentiments and orientations. 4

EGYPT: HAMAS AND ITS ROLE?

In Egypt, the developments surrounding the rise and fall of President Mohammed Morsi of the Moslem Brotherhood drew into the political discourse the role of Hamas in Gaza, an affiliate of the international Moslem Brotherhood, in internal Egyptian affairs. The natural affinity between Egypt’s Moslem Brotherhood and the Palestinian Hamas Movement led to accusations, often unsubstantiated, of the involvement of Hamas in bolstering the rule of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt. As a result, anti-Palestinian sentiments proliferated as reports spoke of incidents in which Hamas has been involved in providing arms or in military acts that led to the killings of Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai Peninsula. A process of demonizing Palestinians in the media went side by side with the overthrow of President Morsi from power on July 3rd 2013. The anti-Palestinian sentiment led to practical steps by the post-Morsi government that restricted entry of Palestinians through Cairo airport on their way to Gaza, the closure of the Rafah crossing with Gaza Strip, the only international crossing for Gazans, and the destructions of hundreds of illegally dug tunnels on the border between Gaza and Egypt connecting Gaza’s economy to that of Egypt. In addition, hundreds of Palestinians who purportedly were granted Egyptian citizenship and or long term visas, including See Rebecca Murray’s “Eviction Worries for Palestinians in New Libya,” in The Electronic Intifada, 29 August 2012. http://electronic intifada.net/content/eviction-worries-palestinians-new-libya/11623 4

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some key figures in Hamas, had their citizenship and visas withdrawn. 5 Egypt’s official position, nevertheless, on relations with the Palestinian Authority continued to be supportive of the efforts of President Mahmoud Abbas at bringing internal reconciliation agreements and accords to fruition between Fateh and Hamas. In fact, the recently concluded agreement in April 2014 between the two rival political factions was advanced, among other factors, by the promise of the Egyptian government that upon the formation of a National Unity Government in the Palestinian Territory, the Rafah crossing will be opened around the clock in coordination with the new Palestinian government to be formed. 6 The anti-Palestinian, and also anti-Syrian rhetoric as there were Syrian Moslem Brotherhood sympathizers to the Morsi regime, were in contrast to the traditionally strong supportive position of Egypt of the Palestinians in general and of the Palestinian cause in particular. But of concern is that some key and popularly respected media personalities used their television fora to incite against Palestinians and Syrians, in line with incitement against “some Egyptian citizens because of their religious or political backgrounds.” Apparently, anti-Hamas and anti-Palestinian sentiments are not a new phenomenon in Egypt, in spite of the usually strong identification of the masses with Palestinians and their vicissitudes in confrontations with Israel such as during the two Intifadas and the attack on Gaza in 2008. 7 A piece written by Hanine Hassan, “Why are Egyptian media demonizing Palestinians?” The Electronic Intifada, July 23, 2013 explores the reasons for targeting Palestinians post President Morsi’s demise. http://electronicintifada.net/content/why-are-egyptian-media-demon izing-palestinians/12632 6 In private conversation with a Fateh official close to the negotiations with Hamas, May 19, 2014. 7 Hanine Hassan, “Why are Egyptian media demonizing Palestinians?” The Electronic Intifada, July 23, 2013 explores the reasons for targeting Palestinians post President Morsi’s demise. http://electronicintifada. net/content/why-are-egyptian-media-demonizing-palestinians/12632 5

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GAZA STRIP: EGYPT’S SECURITY CONSIDERATION

Clearly, Egypt would like for the Hamas-run Gaza Strip to go back to its former state, i.e., being part of the Palestinian National Authority and providing guarantees pertaining to Egypt’s national security. This was stated by the Egyptian Ambassador to the National Authority. 8 A recent court ruling in Egypt characterized the Moslem Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. By extension this label could apply to Hamas with domestic, regional and international implications. But Egypt has refrained from such labeling so far and accordingly contributed to the recent agreement between Hamas and Fateh to form a National Unity Government. On the other side, the court ruling that banned all activities of Hamas in Egypt is a clear indication of the kind of pressure that the new regime in Egypt is practicing over Hamas in order for the movement to get in line with Egypt’s security considerations. 9 Hamas spokespersons have been adamant in denying the reports and rumors that the movement was involved in either training Moslem Brotherhood members or in helping to carry out attacks within Egypt against public or private targets. Salah alBardawil, a prominent Hamas official, called on Egypt to stop what he called a “campaign to defame and incite against Palestinians.” He asserted the movement’s interest in the stability of Egypt and non-interference in its internal affairs. Another Hamas official in Beirut characterized the accusations as lacking credibility. The official said they were aimed at drumming up hype about what he described as a “fictitious foreign enemy” in an attempt to show that there is a foreign conspiracy in Egypt. “Hamas recognizes Egypt, its people and the weight of its role in the region. The movement is keen on its stability and security as a nation that borders Palestine.

Mr. Yasser Othman, Egyptian Ambassador to the Palestinian Authority as quoted by Adnan Abu Amer in “Hamas, Egypt ties hit new low,” in Al Monitor Palestine Pulse, January 7, 2014. http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/hamas-egypt-relations-tensionssisi.html 9 Al Jazeera, “Egypt Court bans Palestinian Hamas group,” 5 March 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/egypt-courtbans-palestinian-hamas-group-2014348358109790.html 8

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Hamas is fighting the Israeli occupation, but not any Arab entities.” 10 As of May 2014 and in anticipation of General Sisi winning the presidential elections in Egypt, set for June 3rd, Hamas has sent out clear signs that it is toning down its Moslem Brotherhood links in order to safeguard relations with Egypt and its new President. According to one Hamas source, the movement is to stress more its “national agenda over its ideological dimension.” Another Hamas official stated that “[T]here is a trend shared by Hamas and Egypt not to close the door to bilateral engagement after the presidential election.” 11

JORDAN: DEMOGRAPHIC BALANCE AND PRESERVING THE STATUS QUO

In Jordan, the Palestinians make up a sizeable segment of the population if not the majority. But in effect various gerrymandering measures are employed to constrain their political influence and the role they play in such sensitive institutions as the army and the security apparatus. Gerrymandering also helps limit the number of Palestinian members of the lower house of parliament. Nevertheless, except for 125,000 Gazans who remain stateless since the 1967 war, all other Palestinians in Jordan are offered citizenship and as such many are integrated within the social, political and economic life of the country. The sensitivity of the JordanianPalestinian balance and the interests of Palestinians in Jordan to support their compatriots in the Palestinian Occupied Territory did not contribute to massive “Arab Spring” like mobilization in their midst. But some significant protests did take place in late 2011 and during 2012 that joined both discontented indigenous Jordanians Adnan Abu Amer, “Hamas, Egypt ties hit new low,” Al Monitor Palestine Pulse, January 7, 2014 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2014/01/hamas-egypt-relations-tensions-sisi.html 11 Adnan Abu Amer, “Hamas tones down Brotherhood links to improve Egypt ties,” Al Monitor Palestine Pulse, May 13, 2014. http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/gaza-egypt-hamas-brotherhoodelections.html 10

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and Palestinians mostly identified with the Moslem Brotherhood. The Palestinian refugee camps remained, nonetheless, quiet and there were no major protest events within them. Both internal and external factors led to the muting of the protest movement in Jordan. 12 Of importance in quieting down the protest movements was the decision of the King and his government to introduce reforms both constitutional and practical that would affect the living conditions and the exercise of basic rights of Jordanians. A second internal factor was the way the security establishment dealt with the protests, avoiding lethal interventions that can lead to further escalation and greater mobilization of potential protesters. A third internal factor was, as mentioned above, the delicate balance between the two population groups. If the protests were to gain ground then this balance would be in jeopardy and the initial priorities of protests could degenerate into intergroup tension and lead to possible confrontation.

EXTERNAL FACTORS: COSTS OF SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR AND DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

Two external factors, however, further muted the potential of mass protests in Jordan. One was the degeneration of the Syrian “Arab Spring” protests into a disastrously and humanely costly civil war with hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees flooding into the country. This development put new humanitarian pressures and demands on the Jordanian government and in fact affected the lives of all Jordanians. The predicament of the Palestinian refugees in Syria, and in particular in the Yarmouk refugee camp, was a reminder that instability of Jordan can lead to similar unwanted scenarios within the country. It is not simply wisdom of mass protests organizers that came into play to tone things down but a common sense that militated against the widening of protests. MISSINGPEACE, “Jordan and the Arab Spring,” April 12, 2012 for an analysis of the protests in the country and the relatively limited involvement of Palestinians in them. http://missingpeace.eu/en/2012/ 04/jordan-and-the-arab-spring/ 12

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Another external factor was clearly the developments in Egypt especially the poor performance of President Morsi and the Moslem Brotherhood during his presidential tenure. This has affected the ability of the Jordanian Moslem Brotherhood to argue for a model of government that would adequately respond to the socioeconomic and political needs of Jordanians. With the demise of Morsi, the Moslem Brotherhood in Jordan and other protest mobilizers opted to stop their protests. 13 The sense of relative stability in Jordan remains precarious, nevertheless, as pressing needs of close to 1 million Syrian refugees, the presence of Iraqi refugees and the more than 2 million Palestinian refugees have made of Jordan a difficult land indeed. Poverty, unemployment particularly among youth and the regional situation all come into play to add to the challenges of the country that needs not only constitutional reform, that usually takes time to become effective, but concrete plans on how to generate thousands of new jobs; to stop the increasing gap between rich and poor and to preserve a viable Middle Class that could remain a mainstay of the Kingdom and its stability.

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND ISRAEL

In the Palestinian Occupied Territory, the Palestinians were at first supportive of the “Arab Spring” developments in neighboring countries. Those with political Islamist orientations were elated to see the advances of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and the strengthening of the Islamist opposition to the Assad regime in Syria. Hamas, which had its offices in Damascus, eventually moved out as it was no longer possible to hide the divergence with the regime. But, like in Jordan, the initial “euphoria” of the Islamists and those who support them was brought down by the realities on the ground in both Egypt and Syria. The failure of the Moslem Brotherhood and the demise of President Morsi dealt a heavy blow to Hamas and other Islamist groups to tighten their grip, not only Osama Al Sharif, “Is Jordan’s ‘Arab Spring’ over?” Al Monitor, September 15, 2013. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/ 09/jordan-arab-spring-over.html 13

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on the Gaza Strip but to extend it as well to the rest of the Palestinian Territory. The bloodbaths in Syria and the aftershocks of its civil war did not also bode well for an Islamist takeover. There were smaller political groups and factions in Palestine, particularly those on the left of the political spectrum that saw the initial events and developments of the “Arab Spring”, particularly in Syria but also in Egypt, as aligned with US and Western interests. The generosity of the Arabian Gulf allies of the West to rebels in Syria and to the cause of Islamization across the Middle East is proof enough for Palestinian leftist groups of the accuracy of their assessment. 14

HAMAS IRAN RUPTURE

The disagreement of Hamas with the Assad regime led not only to its moving out of its offices in Damascus but more important to a 2012 break in relations with Iran, a major financial and logistical supporter of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement. Even though there were renewed contacts between Hamas and Iranian officials in the first half of 2014, Iran did not renew the level of financial support to what it was prior to 2012. Ahmed Youssef, a Hamas official, characterizes the relationship with Iran as strategic irrespective of differing positions on such contentious issues as Syria. 15 In fact, the fortunes of Hamas, or its misfortunes, can be tied to the developments in both Syria and Egypt. Some perceive the agreement of Hamas to go on with Palestinian reconciliation efforts as a result of its financial woes caused by the dwindling of support, not only from Iran but also from Qatar, for its own particular reasons. The developments in Egypt also forced Hamas to review its own performance in government and to weigh its pluses and minuses. Some would suggest that Hamas, given the experience of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt may opt to remain in the political opposition, knowing that it would continue to have Sam Badger and Giorgio Cafiero, “Assad & the Palestinians,” in Foreign Policy in Focus, April 3, 2014. http://fpif.org/assad-palestinians/ 15 Adnan Abu Amer, “Iran resumes monetary aid,” Al Monitor Palestine Pulse, March 24, 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/ 2014/03/iran-hamas-finance-economy-resistance-axis-gaza.html 14

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quite substantial support among Palestinians. The weight of running a government would be lifted from its shoulders while being in the opposition could prove advantageous in the long run. Within Hamas not all are supportive of this position but clearly Hamas, like Palestinians in general, is not immune from the repercussions of the “Arab Spring” and its after-effects. 16

DISCONTENTED PALESTINIANS IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK

The discontent of Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with their respective governments did not translate into mass movements of protest, in imitation of what happened in neighboring countries. Some argue that the despondency of Palestinians because of their political system and the division between Fateh and Hamas remained in check because of the ongoing Israeli occupation which is the ultimate power in the Palestinian Territory. 17 The argument goes on to elaborate that whoever would take over, as a possible result of successful mass protests, would end up performing in the same manner as the present system. In Gaza, the overthrow of Hamas, in spite of some of its failures since 2007 when it militarily took over the Gaza Strip, was never a mass objective because the political alternative would not be any better. Palestinians, however, are restless with what is going on in neighboring countries and its impact on the political prospects for a resolution of the long standing conflict with Israel. Arab counIn addition to Abu Amer’s piece in Al Monitor, private conversations with Gazans conclude that there is a majority within the Hamas Movement for shifting from assuming governmental functions to those of the opposition. 17 Sari Nusseibeh, President of Al Quds University and a prominent Palestinian intellectual argued in a 2012 University of Birmingham symposium on the Arab Spring that “Palestinians have had to take matters into their own hands in the past 40 years of occupation.” He went on to argue that “Palestine’s unique history and experience being under Israeli occupation have made Palestinians feel ‘sovereign’ for a while.” http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/ptr/departments/theologyandreli gion/events/2012/middle-east-symposium.aspx 16

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tries are preoccupied with their own internal concerns and on strategic matters some of the Arab states are clearly in alliance with the US and Israel on containing the Iranian nuclear prospect. Accordingly, the Palestinian problem, in spite of continuing recognition of most Arabs, as illustrated in a 2011 public opinion poll, that it is a cause for all Arabs, 18 has taken less urgency as neighboring Arab states deal with their internal challenges and what they perceive as a strategic nightmare of a nuclear Iran.

THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF PALESTINIAN CONDITIONS

Palestinians live in precarious socio-economic and political conditions. Periodically this precariousness is reflected in limited mass protests as when these happened in 2012 when the Palestinian Public Employee Union rose up against the Fayyad government. These protests may have been influenced by the protests in the Arab world but on closer look they were more related to internal power politics that pitted the Fateh movement against Salam Fayyad and his government. Eventually the Fayyad government resigned but the structural and financial complexity of running a government, under ongoing military occupation with its constraints and pressures, remains formidable and dependent also on the approval and good will of donor countries, including some of the Arab countries that do not necessarily approve of the governing system in the Palestinian Territory. 19 One can argue that the recent Gaza agreement in April 2014 to form a National Unity government is the fruition of the “Arab Spring”, especially the developments in Egypt. Many remain doubtful that the Unity government, when formed, will herald a radical See Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, The Arab Opinion Project: The Arab Opinion Index, which in its 2011 poll found that 84 percent believe that the Palestinian cause is a cause for all Arabs and not only a Palestinian issue. 16,173 respondents from 12 Arab countries were interhttp://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8–4e4aviewed. 8bc5–fc91660608b0 19 Al Ahram Weekly Online, 13 – 19 September, 2012, Issue No. 1114, “Palestinians revolt against Palestinian Authority, http://weekly.ahram. org.eg/2012/1114/re1.htm 18

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transformation in relations between Fateh and Hamas or that it will lower the level of despondency felt by Palestinians. But given the political realities of the region and the failure of the efforts of Secretary of State John Kerry at advancing a peaceful resolution to the conflict with Israel, the formation of a Palestinian Unity government would certainly not worsen the overall conditions in which Palestinians find themselves, in spite of threats to cut foreign aid and to hold Israeli-collected customs dues, but it may not make these conditions any better in the short and medium terms.

ISRAEL: INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

Israel argues that the developments of the “Arab Spring” spell instability and increased insecurity. Accordingly, Israel cannot move into final status talks with the Palestinians at this juncture. The efforts of Secretary of State John Kerry at advancing peace talks between the two sides received a cold shoulder from Mr. Netanyahu and his right wing coalition government. The “Arab Spring” seen from this perspective was not good for the prospects of peace advancement. 20 In the long run, however, the absence of a peaceful settlement between the two sides would leave things open-ended. No one can predict the outcome of the present control arrangements of Israel over the Palestinians and the ongoing settlement activities and annexation of Palestinian land in the West Bank on future developments. One possible outcome could be an “Arab Spring”-like outburst by Palestinians that could spill over to Palestinians inside Israel. Such an eventuality even if discounted at present could further complicate relations between Israelis and Palestinians. Neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis would benefit from such an eventuality as the turmoil and instability that it would generate would definitely be costly to both and as it would impact negatively the lives of both Israelis and Palestinians at home. Striking a peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians could at least remove the uncertainAndrea Dessi, “Israel and the Palestinians After the Arab Spring: No Time for Peace,” IAI Working Papers 12, Instituto Affari Internazionali, 16 May 2012. http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1216.pdf 20

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ty that any “Arab Spring” like development would generate. But this remains more like a wish than a realizable proposition.

CHAPTER 11 A SPRING ABROAD: EXPLORING THE CASE OF TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE1 CLAIRE DEMESMAY, SABINE RUSS-SATTAR, KATRIN SOLD*

DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSWÄRTIGE POLITIK (BERLIN), UNIVERSITÄT KASSEL, AND PHILIPPS-UNIVERITÄT MARBURG, CENTER FOR NEAR AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES “All what happens there concerns us” 2

The events of 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya generated unprecedented social and political dynamics in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA). What has been optimistically termed the “Arab Spring”, with reference to regime changes and the opening up of political spaces, has experienced an incalculable follow-up This study draws its data from a mixed methodological basis, using existing research papers, statistical data from the IOM and other IGOs as well as press and internet site analysis. Its empirical core, though, is constituted by semi-structured interviews and background talks with members of the Tunisian diaspora in France (Demesmay), Italy (Demesmay) and Germany (Sold). The text reflects the developments until summer 2014. 1 We are grateful to Sunniva Greve for the style and language editing of this chapter. 2 Interview with Mohamed Bhar, chairman of Fédération des Tunisiens Citoyens des deux Rives, 28 April 2014. *

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with the dramatic destabilization of Libya and Syria, now known as the Arab Fall. This ambivalent evolution in the MENA countries inevitably poses complex migration challenges and vast risks for minorities. As the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is eager to emphasize, however, it also gives rise to fresh migrationrelated opportunities: in the optimistic assumption of the IOM, the governments and expatriate communities of Egypt and Tunisia, the leading countries in this on-going historical transformation, have begun “to move from a position of mutual suspicion to a position of mutual cooperation through an inclusive political process”. 3 The role of diasporas has, indeed, gradually shifted to centre stage, at least in the international debate on migration and development. The last ten years focused on economic aspects, in other words, financial remittances and technological know-how. At this historical moment of accelerated political transformation in the MENA region, however, we consider it of primary importance to examine Arab expatriate social and political remittances and their potential. This is particularly true of the perspective on minorities taken in this volume. Members of migrant diasporas are not merely numerical minorities in their countries of origin and of destination, but frequently experience the vulnerability of this position, either as witnesses or victims of discrimination. From this it could be deduced that diaspora members also tend to support and defend minority rights in their home countries – an assumption that remains to be empirically confirmed. In the following chapter we confine ourselves to exploring the impact of the events of 2011 on Arab diasporas. This merely constitutes the first and mainly descriptive step in the frame of our research agenda. It is, however, essential if we are to grasp the evolution of relations between the MENA countries in transition and their migrant minorities living abroad, and to evaluate the empirical basis for the IOM assumption and its future perspectives. What is IOM (International Organisation of Migration), Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa. Supporting countries in Transition, IOM Information Series 2013, www.egypt.iom.int. Accessed June 16, 2014. 3

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 279 the genuine relationship of Arab diasporas to their sending countries? How do they respond to political change there? More specifically, this chapter summarizes an explorative case study on the Tunisian diasporas in Europe in 2014 and maps the changes in their associative networks and activities in France, Italy and Germany – the three major European destination countries. The Tunisian diasporas were chosen because the revolutionary movement took root in Tunisia in November 2010; Tunisia is also commonly considered to be the most likely candidate for durable democracy in the MENA region. The Tunisian case stands out for several reasons: its comparatively high degree of national integration (no tribal divides), its educated population and the solid foundation of its civil society. 4 It is furthermore of particular interest, as the ousted Ben Ali regime had already institutionalized emigration and diaspora policies and politics. 5

I. THE ARAB DIASPORAS AND TUNISIANS ABROAD: MAIN FEATURES AND DESTINATIONS

Since the latter half of the twentieth century, the MENA region has seen massive emigration. 6 With the notable exception of large oilproducing countries such as Libya and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, between five and 20 per cent of nationals from Arab countries live abroad. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this amounts to approximately two million first-generation emigrants from Egypt and Morocco, and up to a million emigrants Steve Coll, “Letter from Tunis. The Casbah Coalition. Tunesia’s Second Revolution”, The New Yorker, April 4, 2011 link: http://www.new yorker.com/magazine/2011/04/04/the-casbah-coalition. Accessed May 2, 2014. 5 Thibaut Jaulin, “The Tunisian State and the Tunisians Abroad”, in eds. Samina Mohey Eldine et al, A Study on the Dynamics of Arab expatriate Communities: Promoting Positive Contributions to Supporting Democratization and Political Transition in Their Homelands, League of Arab States and International Organization of Migration (IOM), Cairo (2012), pp. 91–105. 6 Migration from and to the Middle East and Northern Africa is not a modern phenomenon. 4

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from Algeria and Tunisia. 7 Broadly speaking, migrant flows from Machrek primarily move in the direction of the Gulf States and, to a lesser degree, the Americas, while flows from Maghreb concentrate on Europe. Both short- and long-term migrants are found in all three destinations, including second-generation migrants. Acquiring in-depth knowledge of the Arab diasporas is not without obstacles, since the countries of origin and of destination use different group definitions and categories – if at all – in their official statistics. The most obvious limitation is that regular migrants are registered, while figures on irregular migrants are merely estimated. Sociologists not only complain about the lack of information, but also about its inconsistency arising from conceptional difficulties. Indeed, the key concept of this case study – the scientifically contested term diaspora – is a striking example. 8 As a rule, the term stands in policy discourse for expatriate communities and immigrant groups and their descendants living outside their country of origin. As rightly criticized, the term has been commonly used to refer to “various types of immigrant groups with very different characteristics”. 9 Thus immigrants may share a regional, national or ethnic origin and, in this sense, belong to the African, Algerian or Arab “diaspora”, but they hardly form a homogeneous community. Depending on the migration history of the receiving country and the opportunities it provides, the political and socio-demographic characteristics of the emigrant population Philippe Fargues, Emerging Demographic Patterns across the Mediterranean Region and their Implications for Migration through 2030, Migration Policy Institute, November 2008, p. 11. Available at: http://www.stranieriinitalia. it/briguglio/immigrazione-e-asilo/2011/maggio/fargues-migrmediterr.pdf. 8 Steven Vertovec, The Political Importance of Diasporas. Centre on Migration, Politics and Society Working Paper n° 13, University of Oxford (2005). 9 Nora Ragab, Elaine McGregor, and Melissa Siegel, Diaspora Engagement in Development: An Analysis of the Engagement of the Tunisian Diaspora in Germany and the Potentials for Cooperation. Report commissoned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University (2013), p. 5. 7

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 281 may vary considerably. For this reason, we prefer to use the plural form in the following, that is, “Tunisian diasporas”. The legal status of diaspora members, for instance, is diverse. As immigrants, they can retain their original nationality and citizenship, become a citizen of the receiving country or choose to be a citizen of both countries. In the case of Tunisia, anyone born of Tunisian parents automatically acquires the inalienable right to Tunisian citizenship. Consequently, a member of the second or third immigrant generation with, for instance, German citizenship is still officially seen as “Tunisian”. 10 For this reason migrants with a Tunisian background often have dual citizenship. Statistics issued by the Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTA) indicate a higher number of “Tunisians living abroad” 11 than those published by the host countries, since the latter do not include nationalized immigrants in this category. 12 According to the most recent data available from Tunisian consulates, which dates from 2009 and serves as a database for the 2013 Report on Tunisia from MPC, 13 1,098,200 Tunisians live abroad, 83 per cent (911,400) of whom reside in Europe, with France as the foremost destination (54.5 per cent), followed by Italy (13.9 per cent) and Germany (7.8 per cent). The first decade of the twenty-first century saw a growing diversification of destinations, although France remains a priority. In 2009, major expatriate See Law No. 63–6 of 1956, Article 30 of the Tunisian Citizenship Law (‘Code de la Nationalité Tunisienne’). 11 The category “Tunisian living abroad” is defined as follows: every Tunisian citizen who has resided for at least two years abroad and did not spend more than 180 days per year in Tunisia. 12 Katharina Katterbach, Tunesia’s Diaspora Policies – Supporting Integration in Host Countries and Mobilizing Resources for Home County Development. Report commissoned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), n-German Chamber of Commerce (March 2010), p. 8. 13 MPC-Team (Migration Policy Centre), Tunisia. Migration Profile. Report based on the South CARIM database. 2013. RSCAS/EUI (European University Institute), Florence (June 2014), p. 3. Available at: www.migrationpolicycentre.eu. 10

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communities were also located in Arab countries (14.5 per cent), notably in Libya (7.9 per cent). The situation changed radically after the uprising in the region. According to IOM data, 345,238 migrants who had fled the civil war in Libya reached the Tunisian border in 2011. Of these, 136,749 were Tunisian nationals. 14 Discerning the features of contemporary Tunisian diasporas and their diversity presupposes an understanding of the history of modern Tunisian migration, which can be divided into five phases 15 to date: 1956–1962 Phase I is characterized by the mostly spontaneous departure of low-skilled migrants, with France as the chief destination. 1963–1974 Phase II is characterized, on the one hand, by the regulated migration of low-skilled labour to Europe on the basis of bilateral agreements on temporary migration with France (1963), Germany (1965), Belgium (1969), the Netherlands and Hungary. At the beginning of the seventies, on the other hand, the Libyan oil industry acted as a magnet for irregular migration. 1974 to 1983 Phase III is characterized by family reunification in European destination countries, particularly in France and Germany, where migration policy restricted further immigration to the reunion of families. 1983–2011 Phase IV is characterized, in geographical terms by the redirection of Tunisian migration flows. In the Arab region, they shifted from their previous destination of Libya to the Gulf States. In Europe, migrants headed for new host countries, notably Italy, Spain and Greece. In socio-demographic terms, particularly in the nineties, there was a Ibid., p. 5. ICPMD-IOM. MTM: A Dialogue in Action. Linking Emigrant Communities for more Development. Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practicies. ICMPD, IOM, Vienna (2010): Tunisia, p. 3. 14 15

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Since 2011

growth in the number of skilled or highly skilled migrants, since expansion of the Tunisian education system did not coincide with labour market development. 16 Phase V: According to media coverage, the postArab Spring phase seems to be characterized by a dramatic surge in irregular migration from Tunisia. As some studies indicate, however, this may have been less of a surge than a rerouting of previously existing flows in terms of emigration from Tunisia. 17 The current massive displacement of the population is due to civil wars in Syria and in Libya. The number of authorized migrants almost doubled compared to the average annual outflow value for the 2005–2010 timeframe and increased from 26,085 to 50,391 (2011–2012).

Since current socio-demographic comparables are either nonexistent or inaccessible, creating a valid profile of Tunisian diasporas in Europe generated by these five waves of migration is not an easy task. A study conducted by IOM Tunisia in 2011 drawing samples from the three major European destination countries found that craftsmen (26 per cent) and salesmen and service staff (18 per cent) were the most common occupations. 62.3 per cent worked in the tertiary sector, 32.1 per cent in the industrial sector and 5.1 per cent in the agricultural sector. 18 According to data from 2009 on Tunisian expatriates in OECD countries, 50.5 per cent had a low level of education and were employed as machine operators (22 per cent), as craft or trade related workers (17.5 per cent), and in the service industry (12.7 per cent). With the arrival in Europe of The unemployment rate of the highly skilled increased from 8.6 per cent in 1999 to 22.9 per cent in 2010 (the overall unemployment rate remained at 13.3 per cent). 17 Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich. Migration after the Arab Spring, MPC Research Report 2012/09, European University Institute, Florence (2012), p. 4. 18 Ragab, Diaspora Engagement in Development, p. 10. 16

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highly skilled migrants in the 1990s, this picture calls for adjustment. Furthermore, the characteristics of the stock and inflow of migrants in a certain year should be differentiated. In the – exceptional – year 2011/2012, the Tunisian migration influx to Europe contained a male emigrant share of 83 per cent, 19 while the share of female Tunisian diaspora members in Europe has since the 1980s remained at a little over a third of the stock population. With education gaining in significance as a migration motive in relation to labour, the gender aspect is likely to become more balanced in the future. Students now make up almost 10 per cent of Tunisian migrants to Europe. The lack of comparables only allows for a comparative profile related to Migration Phase IV for the different occupational sectors. Table 1 France Germany

Italy

Unskilled workers

40.2

48.9

70.3

Employees

14.8

5.4

2.0

Host country Occupational field Skilled workers Self-employed TOTAL

28.0 15.5 100

27.2 18.5 100

14.4 13.3 100

Source: OTA data 2006 20

In the context of our study, it is vital to bear in mind that sociodemographic features in destination countries vary as a result of their individual migration histories, leading to separate patterns of social and political engagement. Ibid., p. 9. Cited in Hassen Boubakri. “La Tunisie et ses migrations”, In Accueillir n°249–250 (March/June, 2009), pp. 43–47, at 46. 19 20

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II. THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: TUNISIA’S DIASPORA POLICIES

Long before 2011, Tunisia drew up policies to maintain links with its emigrants, as did many other Arab states with significant emigrant groups abroad (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon and Morocco). It established one of the most extensive consular networks since the 1960s and supported the creation of so-called Amicales des travailleurs tunisiens associations in France, which the ruling Socialist Destourian Party (PSD) used to monitor the political activities of emigrants workers. 21 When Zine al-Abidine ben Ali came to power in 1987, diaspora policies were institutionalized comprehensively. Responsibility was concentrated in the hands of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Solidarity and Tunisians Abroad (MASSTE). In 1988, the Office of Tunisians Abroad was established as MASSTE’s executive body to coordinate various programmes targeting the diasporas. 22 It also placed social attachés in Tunisian embassies and consulates. Ben Ali’s last Presidential Programme 2009–2014 defined the diaspora as a focus of development, 23 the main objective of which was to secure economic remittances. 24 During Ben Ali’s twentythree years in office, Tunisians residing abroad officially had the right to vote in presidential elections. The OTA also organized an annual conference of Tunisian Migration on the National Day for Tunisians abroad. Since all political engagement had to pass through the central party, however, the diaspora did not have a voice in the real sense of democratic inclusion. All Tunisian associLaurie A. Brand, Citizens abroad. Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006, pp. 92–132. 22 For an overview, see Andrea Frieda Schmelz, The Tunesian diaspora in Germany. Potentials for economic development. Report commissoned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Berlin, (September 2010), p. 23. 23 ICMPD-IOM 2010: Tunisia 9. 24 According to OECD data, remittances amounted to five per cent of Tunisian GDP in 2008. As only a small part went to productive investment, the contribution to the country’s development was modest (Schmelz, The Tunesian diaspora in Germany, pp. 17–20). 21

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ations in France had to be members of the Council of the Tunisian Communities in France (CTFC), which was under the control of Ben Ali’s Constitutional Democratic Rally (the former Socialist Destourian Party (PSD), renamed in 1988). Labour union and social protests as well as organisations of political Islam were specifically targeted. 25 The uprising in 2011 finally re-opened the door to political opponents in exile: Moncef Marzouki, a physician who had headed the Tunisian League of Human Rights, lived in exile in France and was to be elected interim president; Rachid al Ghannoushi, who was forced to spend twenty-two years in exile in London and founded the moderate Islamist Ennahda, now one or the most popular political parties in Tunisia. Exiled opponents were not alone in returning to Tunisian politics. Other diaspora members also found their way back, some of whom joined the first interim government: Jalloul Ayed (Finance), Medhi Houas (Trade and Tourism), Yassin Brahim (Transport and Equipment) and Eyes Jouini (Economic and Social Reform). 26 Houas and Jouini are members of ATUGE, an association that links the alumni of elite universities (Grandes Ecoles) and has branches in Tunis, Paris and London. ATUGE pledges strict political neutrality and prides itself in never having solicited its member to vote for Ben Ali, unlike other key Tunisian associations under the old regime. 27 The declared aim of the interim Tunisian government was to strengthen ties with the diasporas. October 2011 saw the nomination of a Secretary of State for Tunisian Expatriates. In addition, the newly elected government opened up channels for political participation, enabling diaspora representation in the Tunisian Constituent Assembly with eighteen of the 217 seats. Vincent Geisser, “Quelle révolution pour les binationaux?, Le rôle des Franco-Tunisiens dans la chute de la dictature et dans la transition politique”, in: Migrations société, Vol. 24, No.143 (September/October, 2012), pp. 155–178. 26 Jaulin, “The Tunisian State and the Tunisians Abroad”, p. 97. 27 Véronique Soulé, ‘France-Tunisie Retour d’élites’, Liberation (5 April 2011). 25

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 287 Thus, Tunisians at home and abroad had the opportunity to vote in free elections for the first time in October 2011. Registration and voting abroad was conducted in embassies and consulates in Paris, Marseille, Berlin and Rome, as well as in Ottawa and the Arab Emirates. 152 candidates and an impressive, not to mention confusingly large, number of lists were eligible for election to the eighteen seats. What it meant for expatriates to be able to vote can be gleaned from a comment by Dali Chammari, the moderate Progressive Democratic Party (which merged in 2012 into the Republican Party) candidate for the Northern France district: “Up until now, Tunisians in France were seen only as people who bought up real estate back home – people border guards could shake down every summer when we came back for vacation. Now we’ve finally got an amazing opportunity to make ourselves heard.” 28 The election turn-out in Tunisia ranged from 39 to 64 per cent, while the diasporas reached an average of 29.7 per cent. Above average mobilization (more than 35 per cent) was observed in the districts of Northern France, North America and Arab countries. Compared to international experience in long-distance voting, the rate of participation should be understood as a success considering the high organizational costs for the voters. 29 Interestingly, the political results of the diaspora voting came comparatively close to those in the Tunisia homeland, with the Islamic Ennahda topping the polls at 36.6 per cent (Tunisia: 37 per cent). Nevertheless, the constellations in the individual host countries varied considerably, with the vote in Germany particularly dispersed. The first parliamentary elections under the new Constitution of 2014 took place in October 2014, and revealed a shift from the broad support for the moderate Islamist Ennahda party to a backing of the liberal wing of the political landscape, as the secular Ni“Tunisians Mobilize for Landmark Ballot”, in ahramonline (October, 20, 2011). http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/24640.aspx. Accessed July, 14 2014. 29 Thibaut Jaulin, “Géographie du vote à distance : l’élection tunisienne de 2011 à l’étranger”, L'Espace Politique, 23 | 2014–2 (4 July 2014). Accessed August 2, 2014. http://espacepolitique.revues.org/3099. 28

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daa Tounes party has become the biggest party. In the first free presidential elections on 23 November and 21 December 2014, it was also the leader of the secularist Nidaa Tounes party, Beji Caid Essebsi, who claimed victory over the interim President of Tunisia, Moncef Marzouki. Both major Tunisian political parties, Ennahda as well as its most important rival, the ideologically wide ranging alliance Nidaa Tounes, had stepped up their activities abroad, as also others like the secular, social-democratic Ettakatol have. Almost all political parties in Tunisia have vowed to enhance the political rights of expatriates. 30 In addition to political participation, the Tunisian diasporas have also been promised their own civil society representation in the future, the Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l’étranger. 31 By mid-2016, after 5 years of consultation, however, it had not yet been institutionalized because of administrative problems and the lack of consensus with regard to the council’s composition and mode of election. 32 This notwithstanding, the – sometimes – polemical debate Samir Bouzidi, Le volet “Tunisiens de l’étranger” du programme des partis politiques passé au crible (2011). Accessed from: http://www.tunisiensdu monde.com/a-la-une/2011/10/le-volet-%C2%AB-tunisiens-de-l%E2% 80%99etranger-%C2%BB-du-programme-des-partis-politiques-passe-aucrible/ 31 Mohamed Nachi, Transition to Democracy in Tunisia. Learning about Citizenship in a national and transnational context, Symposium “Transition to Democracy in Tunisia”, Université de Liège, Social Science Information (SSI) (2016), p. 14. 32 A video document of a debate in Belgium (Centre Culturel Tunisien, Brussels, 14 May 2016) in the frame of the Council project is accessible under the title “Comité de vigilance pour la démocratie en Tunisie: Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l’Etranger: Rencontre avec les deputes à Bruxelles” on youtube https://youtu.be/E2Fzw-769JQ, up-loaded by Comité de vigilance pour la démocratie en Tunisie. May, 15, 2016. On May, 9, 2016, the Coordination of associations for Immigration and Tunisians Abroad (CAITE) published a very critical statement on the new draft law. Szakal, Vanessa: Tunisians abroad dissatisfied with proposed representative authority. Published June 6, 2016. https://nawaat. 30

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 289 on the design of this institution may be interpreted as evidence for the evolving political culture, and a sign that the Arab Spring has here borne fruit for the diasporas.

III. MAPPING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE

The Tunisian diaspora in Europe can be mapped along criteria such as time of migration, reasons for migration, skill levels and socio-economic characteristics, level of integration in the host country or the organizational structure of the diaspora community. Applying the last criterion, this chapter provides an overview of the institutional landscape of the Tunisian diaspora in France, Germany and Italy, with emphasis on its transformation since the upheavals of 2011. The analysis will therefore concentrate on the associations and civil society organizations set up by Tunisians living abroad. The first generation of migrants, who came to Europe in the 1960s, built up a number of associations to strengthen the cohesion of the diaspora community and its ties with the country of origin, to foster cultural exchange with the host countries and to provide practical assistance to members of the community. A broad and active network of Tunisian diaspora organizations emerged notably in France, home to the largest Tunisian community in Europe. Respondents state, however, that mounting control of the diaspora community by the Tunisian state and a growing sense of mistrust and resignation within the community itself had led to a decline in civic engagement during the 1990s and 2000s. The collapse of the Ben Ali regime in 2011 constituted a turning point. Statistical data and statements by representatives of Tunisian associations in France, Germany and Italy indicate that the Tunisian diaspora has undergone radical change since the so-called Arab Spring, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.

org/portail/2016/06/06/tunisians-abroad-dissatisfied-with-proposedrepresentative-authority/

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Quantitative and qualitative changes Reliable statistics on the number of Tunisian associations in France, Germany and Italy is rarely accessible and information tends to vary according to the source. The Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTE) lists a total of 154 Tunisian diaspora associations for the year 2011, with a majority of 65 associations registered in France, followed by Italy (25 associations) and Germany (8 associations). Interviews with representatives of Tunisian diaspora organizations and researchers working on the topic, 33 on the other hand, suggest far higher figures as of 2011. The collapse of the regime brought an end to administrative and ideological control of the diaspora by the government and thus to the formal and psychological barriers to civic engagement. As a result, the institutional landscape of the Tunisian diaspora in Europe experienced a sea change. While some associations, in particular those close to the Ben Ali regime, ceased their activities in the aftermath of its overthrow, 2011 saw the creation of countless new associations in their stead. A key reason for this growing interest in cooperation and exchange within the Tunisian diaspora community is the “renewed sense of belonging” 34 that many Tunisians developed after the upheavals of 2011. Tunisians in Europe are willing to foster their country’s progress with financial remittances as well as personal engagement and political involvement. One respondent from Italy declared “Before 2011, I never socialized with other Tunisians. In 2011, I changed. I began to feel Tunisian”, 35 while a representative of a German association explained how the revolution had renewed a sense of solidarity and an interest in political developments in Tunisia and replaced the “growing sense of distance” 36 that had prevailed in recent decades between Tunisians and their Background discussion with Johanne Kübler, Migration Policy Center, European University Institute (EUI) Florence (24 April 2014). 34 Interview with Hamza Chourabi, chairman of Verein zur Förderung der Demokratie in Tunesien e.V. and project manager of Contre l’oubli, Gedenkstätte Hohenschönhausen (27 May 2014). 35 Interview with Youness Rhouma, coordinator of Comitato Immigrati Tunisini in Italia, 25 March 2014 36 Interview with Hamza Chourabi, op. cit. 33

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 291 home country. The successful uprising led to stronger identification of Tunisians with their own country and a rediscovery of their national identity, which had been weakened abroad or sacrificed as a reaction to the rise in Islamophobia following 11 September 2001. Thus most of the newly established diaspora organizations in Europe have a marked political profile. A great number see advocacy and demonstrations of support for the political transformation process in Tunisia as one of their principal tasks. Most of them provide information and raise public awareness in host countries about the Tunisian process of transition. At the same time, European branches of Tunisian political parties have also enjoyed a surge in popularity. Categories of Tunisian diaspora organizations Despite the process of politicization undergone by most members of the Tunisian diaspora in recent years, the organizational landscape remains fragmented and diverse. The findings of qualitative interviews conducted with representatives of diaspora organizations in France, Germany and Italy in 2014 and the web presence of various diaspora organizations confirm the existence of four organizational types in the institutional landscape of the Tunisian diaspora in Europe: (I) political and religious associations; (II) social and humanitarian associations; (III) academic, business and professional associations, and (IV) cultural associations. 37 The categories reflect the chief characteristics of the associations and their fields of activity. The dividing lines between them are blurred, however, and overlapping can occur. (I) Political and religious associations The political organizations of Tunisians living abroad have a strong tradition in Europe. Growing repression by the Tunisian regime during the 1960s and 1970s led to a wave of political migration to Europe and politicization of the migrant worker community For a slightly different categorization that refers only to the Tunisian diaspora in Germany, cf. Ragab et al, Diaspora Engagement in Development. 37

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abroad. Political exiles and students, notably in France, founded a number of diaspora associations that denounced human rights abuses in their home country. Despite tight control by a network of partisan organizations dependent on the Tunisian regime, some of these associations, e.g., the French umbrella organizations Fédération des Tunisiens pour une Citoyenneté des deux Rives (FTCR) and Association des Tunisiens en France (ATF), resisted repression and intimidation and still play a significant role in Tunisian civil society in Europe today. In the wake of Ben Ali’s demise, most organizations that had been close to his central party and were originally established as watchdog organizations either ceased their civic activities – if there had been any at all – or changed sides. At the same time, traditionally independent and newly established political associations attracted a great deal of attention in the European Tunisian community. This also holds true for the European branches of Tunisian political parties that had become active in France, Germany and Italy, notably during election campaigns for the Tunisian Constituent Assembly in October 2011. Although they occasionally overlap with civil society organizations, they are not the subject of this analysis. Most political diaspora organizations established during the Arab Spring have a twofold mission: firstly, to support the principal demands of protesters in their home country, such as democratic transition, the fight against corruption, and economic progress, and, secondly, to raise awareness about the Tunisian transformation process among the people in their European host countries. 38 Several organizations deal with a single aspect of the transformation process, such as transitional justice (e.g., Verein zur Förderung der Demokratie in Tunesien, Germany) or political migration (e.g., Comitato immigrati tunisini in Italia, Italy). One subgroup of the Tunisian diaspora in Europe has gained currency since 2011: the political Islam movement. Its influence increased after the electoral success of the Islamist Ennahda party in Tunisia in 2011. Moreover, it relies on a wide network of organiInterview Mohamed Bhar, director of the Fédération des Tunisiens Citoyens des deux Rives. 38

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 293 zations and religious groups frequently linked to religious communities and places of worship. Several respondents stated that the network is in possession of substantial assets as a result of close ties with the Ennahda party in Tunisia and possibly with powerful sponsors in the Gulf region. (II) Social and humanitarian associations There is a strong overlap of political organizations and those engaged in social and humanitarian projects. Almost all of the younger diaspora organizations are involved in development aid projects in the form of financial or material donations. Many organizations, however, are exclusively concerned with social and humanitarian issues and show no evidence of political affiliation. They advocate immigrant rights in their host countries in the field of education, health, social services or give administrative support. The focus of their advocacy work depends on their country of residence. Diaspora organizations based in Italy, for example, pay particular attention to irregular migration and asylum (Comitato imigrati tunisini in Italia, Associazione PONTES dei Tunisini in Italy), whilst organizations in France and Germany tend to address issues such as citizenship and integration assistance. Besides advocacy, diaspora organizations carry out or support humanitarian projects in Tunisia that target people in need. They provide them with food, medicine or clothes and organize sponsorships for families or children (e.g., El Kantara – Die Brücke, Germany; Tunicare, Germany; Jasmin, Tunisie Liberté Démocratie (JTLD), France; Collectif de solidarité active pour la Tunisie: Cosa-Tunisie, France). Moreover, numerous organizations support educational and training projects that foster social development, especially in the rural areas. (III) Academic, business and professional associations Many of the Tunisian student, business and professional associations in Europe have a long tradition. During the early migration period of the 1960s and 1970s (to France and Germany) and later in the 1980s (to Italy) (AHK Tunisia 2010:10), low-skilled Tunisian workers came to Europe within the framework of bilateral government contracts. A large number of today’s diaspora organizations have their origins in Tunisian workers’ associations, such as

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the French Fédération des Tunisiens pour une Citoyenneté des deux Rives (FTCR), which dates back to the Union des travailleurs immigrés tunisiens founded in 1974. The 1990s saw an increase in the academic, scientific and business-related motivation for migration from Tunisia to Europe, with a growing number of students sent to European countries on scholarship or exchange programmes. The respective associations seek to enhance academic and technological exchange between Europe and Tunisia and to foster investment and the transfer of knowledge. The most powerful business and professional networks exist in France, which boasts a significant number of Tunisian graduates of national universities. The most outstanding example is ATUGE (Association des Tunisiens des grandes écoles), the alumni network of French elite education establishments, which was founded in 1990. Today, many of the over 4000 ATUGE members hold key positions in France and Tunisia – the example of the transition government has already been mentioned above. Several members of the network were appointed ministers in the Tunisian transitional government in 2011. Compared to France, student and business organizational structures in Germany and Italy are weak. Most associations are affiliated to a single university (e.g., Tunesische Akademiker Gesellschaft, Technical University of Munich; Verein der tunesischen Akademiker in Stuttgart) and have limited influence on business cooperation. The tendency of almost all Tunisian diaspora organizations to politicize also applies to student and business associations. The majority of these associations were established after the revolution to support economic development in Tunisia by fostering investment and exchange between Europe and Tunisia (e.g., Tunicomp, Germany). (IV) Cultural associations This category covers a wide range of friendship associations and family- or region-related organizations, as well as art and other cultural associations. Established for the most part by migrant workers and their families – who arrived in Europe within the framework of family reunification – these organizations seek to strengthen ties among Tunisians in the host country and preserve their cultural heritage.

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 295 Furthermore, their aim is to encourage cultural exchange between Tunisians and the peoples of France, Germany and Italy in an effort to enhance mutual interests and intercultural exchange 39 In the aftermath of the revolution many of these cultural organizations extended their activities to include political information, for example by organizing public debates, exhibitions or film screenings related to the Tunisian process of transition.

IV. DIASPORA REACTIONS TO THE UPHEAVAL

The overwhelming majority of Tunisians in Europe had shown reserve since the 1990s when it came to politics in their home country. Discussions on the situation in Tunisia were nonetheless a constant in receiving countries, while the end of the decade and the emergence of new media saw the gradual establishment of antiregime “online resistance spaces”. 40 Despite the freedom of speech and opinion granted to Tunisians in Europe – similar to every other European inhabitant – many felt under observation by the secret service and official Tunisian representatives, notably in consulates. This produced an atmosphere of suspicion. 41 Group cohesion suffered as a result and politics was a subject handled with circumspection, not least to avoid jeopardizing trips back home. With the events of 14 January 2011, the situation changed utterly. Since Ben Ali’s departure from the country it once again became legitimate to follow political events in Tunisia and express an opinion. Moreover, the upheavals in the home country kindled a need in members of the Tunisian diaspora to speak out and act correspondingly. Since 2011, the Tunisian diaspora in the three countries under review has shown evidence of an “awaken-

Ragab et al, Diaspora Engagement in Development, p. 21. Romain Lecomte, “Internet et la reconfiguration de l’espace public tunisien: le rôle de la diaspora”, in tic & société, 3(1–2) (2006), pp. 200– 229. 41 Interview with Saida Ounissi, Fondation Jasmine, 9 May 2014. 39 40

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ing”, one that is manifested in a powerful process of mobilization and politicization. 42 Insurrection and the liberation of words: All-round communication For most of the diaspora community this need for expression was set in motion by the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi and generated multiple avenues of communication defined by similar forms of expression. Thus in the early period of the upheavals members of the diasporas used virtual and personal formats like online forums, demonstrations and private talks. One immediate expression of the need for communication was the daily search for the latest news on the course of events in Tunisia. This was achieved with traditional means of communication such as television reports 43 or telephone calls to relatives and friends at home, and to a great extent via social networks. Facebook – far more than Twitter, which remains in the hands of a small number of activists 44 – played a crucial role in this context. By permitting the transmission of appeals and information, it created the framework for “360–degree communication” within the community. 45 Communication of this kind was not only common between Tunisians in the home country and those in the diaspora but also between Tunisians in the various diaspora countries worldwide. Contact was made via virtual platforms in an attempt to establish the reaction in western countries to the upheavals and to connect with the Tunisians who lived there. Background talk with Johanne Kübler, Migration Policy Center, EUI Florenz (24 April 2014), and with Bettine Josties and Ines Schwerdtner, HU/FU Berlin (24 April 2014). 43 Mohamed El Oifi, “Al-Jazira, scène politique de substitution”, Le Monde diplomatique, n° 686 (2011). 44 Thomas Poell and Kaouthar Darmoni, “Twitter as a multilingual space: The articulation of the Tunisian revolution through #sidibouzid”, in NECSUS – European Journal of Media Studies, vol. 1/1 (2012), pp. 14–31, at 26. 45 Interview with Faouzi M’Rabet, director of Centro culturale della Tunisia Roma, 27 March 2014. 42

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 297 Meetings with representatives of the Tunisian diaspora at local or national level were another response to the need for information and debate on the events in Tunisia. The members of Association des Tunisiens de France, for example, began early on to meet twice or three times a week in order to follow the political events together and agree on a suitable response. 46 Likewise in Germany, where Tunisian diaspora political activities were rather weak, people watched the events “day and night” and in the company of friends. 47 In Italy, where Tunisian diaspora associations merely had sporadic contact with each other prior to the regime change, the upheavals led to debate with Tunisians or Italians with a Tunisian background. Independent of their political affiliation, many of them met during anti-Ben Ali demonstrations and kept in touch through social networks. 48 The collected statements from the three countries under review suggest a multi-layered communication pattern: in the interests of encouraging further debate and drawing attention to the demands at issue, the new media are perceived in most cases as a complement to rather than a substitute for more traditional forms of expression such as personal meetings and demonstrations. This all-round communication contributes internally to the creation of a collective sense of belonging, which in turn fosters commitment to the future development of the country; identification of this kind in a situation of upheaval with uncertain outcome is crucial. First and foremost, however, communication served to externalize and spread the protest. The exported revolution: Reaching the European public eye Since the consequences of the upheavals extend way beyond the borders of Tunisia and affect the receiving countries of the Tunisian diaspora, it is vital that its representatives in Germany, France and Italy gain the attention of the European public. Particularly since the issues related to the Tunisian situation have shifted to the

Interview with Mohsen Zemni, chairman of Association des Tunisiens de France, 28 April 2014. 47 Interview with Hamza Chourabi, op.cit. 48 Interview with Ouejdane Mejri, chairman of PONTES, 24 June 2014. 46

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political arena in Europe, they see it as indispensable to publicize their objectives in the receiving countries. The public channel has of necessity become inevitable and is used parallel to the traditional informal channels of political communication like background talks. This was the overriding aim of the anti-Ben Ali demonstrations initiated among others by the Association des travailleurs maghrébins de France (ATMF) and the Association des Tunisiens en France (ATF) in Paris and Marseille in January 2011 and the sit-ins organized simultaneously by the Comitato Immigrati Tunisini in Italia (C.I.T.I.) in front of the Tunisian Consulate in Milan. Resistance supporters addressed these signals to the Tunisian regime, on the one hand, to increase pressure on Ben Ali and his milieu and to the political decision-makers in the receiving countries, on the other, to garner support for their cause. Tweets – and to a lesser degree Facebook entries – addressed them in part, as witnessed by the strategically selected language used in the social media: #sidibouzid Tweets alternated between Arabic, French and English depending on the message and consequently the addressees. 49 These channels do not, however, supersede the background discussions traditionally conducted by the associations in their specific networks, whether press or politics. 50 These have remained stable over time and were employed as of 2011 to push their agenda and publicize it in the receiving societies. By relying on open communication, the Tunisian diaspora associations in Europe hope to reach a wider public, to sensitize people to the challenges their country faces and to draw attention to their demands. Whether public meetings such as the “Village du Jasmin” in Paris, which was attended by 100,000 visitors in May 2011, information days in schools, photography exhibitions or media appearances by wellPoell and Darmoni, “Twitter as a multilingual space”, pp. 21–23. For the associations, which are firmly anchored among the French Left, this refers to French left-wing parties from the Greens to the Socialist Party. At the same time, Islamists use their own channels to contribute regularly, for example, to the Islam debates in France. Interview with Saida Ounissi, op. cit. 49 50

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 299 known figures – what counts is emerging from the veil of secrecy and convincing people with the tools of an open society. One example of the pertinence of public communication is the handling of the refugee issue. Interlocutors in Italy state that their specific intention is to “sensitize” people in Italy “for this taboo topic”, 51 and “make them aware of the inhumane nature of the law”. 52 For this purpose they take recourse to cultural events, video campaigns and petitions. At the same time, they avail of the classic channel of political decision-making, addressing their demands to politicians in Italy and Tunisia. Individual associations perceive the outcome of this activism differently. While the C.I.T.I. coordinator emphasizes the difficulty, for example, of gaining an audience with the Italian Minister for Integration, the chairman of Associazione PONTES dei Tunisini in Italia speaks of “excellent results” with reference to legislation on fingerprint exchange. Discussions between the association and other NGOs from Italy and Tunisia with representatives of the Italian Ministry for the Interior and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs over a period of twelve months seem to have borne fruit. Together and apart: Efforts to converge To a certain extent this widespread focus on communication brought the individual Tunisian diaspora groups closer together, both within and outside of the receiving countries. They were united through their common concern about the “teenagers coming across the sea” 53 and other issues related to Tunisians abroad. They were, however, quick to withdraw to the confines of their respective national spheres for the purposes of public action. In the early months following the collapse of the regime, efforts were concentrated on arranging provisional accommodation for the refugees who had left Tunisia abruptly with little or no preparation. In addition to regular contact and information work, numerous associations supported the refugees during this time, Interview with Ouejdane Mejri, op. cit. Interview with Youness Rhouma, op. cit. 53 Interview with Youness Rhouma, op. cit.. 51 52

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either with accommodation in reception centres, advice on everyday matters or communication with the administration. All of the interviews show evidence of “solidarity by the migrants of yesterday with the new arrivals”. 54 This gave rise to increased cooperation between diaspora representatives. C.I.T.I., for example, works with NGOs in Italy that take care of migrants – independent of the country – as well as with Tunisian diaspora associations in Tunisia and France; there seems to have been no contact with Germany. Likewise later on, when emergency measures were under way and the focus shifted to legislation on asylum and immigration – particularly in terms of mobility and labour migration – the associations endeavoured to join forces and establish contact with representatives of the diaspora in their receiving country as well as in other European states. The Assises de l’immigration tunisienne initiative, which assumed cross-border features, symbolizes this cooperation. Associations from several countries, with a strong French representation, collected the demands of Tunisians abroad in a “grievance notebook” and presented it to the Tunisian government in the summer of 2011. 55 Ratification of the United Nations convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers, renegotiation of the bilateral agreement between Tunisia and the EU member states on labour, and rejection of the mobility agreement proposed by the EU were some of the demands. Although during this period common concern for the fate of the refugees and migrant workers led to cross-border cooperation, also among European countries, subsequent political activism remained for the most part within the realm of the respective nation state. This is because circumstances for refugees and migrant workers differ greatly from country to country, as seen in the case of Italy, where the situation is defined by two distinct features. First of all, Italy is the most important country in the EU for Tunisian migrants, a fact that was brought to the collective European consciousness by the media reports on Lampedusa. On the other hand, Interview with Faouzi M’Rabet, op. cit. Assises de l’immigration tunisienne et des Tunisien(ne)s à l’étranger. Cahier des doléances, http://www.reseau-ipam.org/IMG/pdf/ Cahier_de_Doleances_MPV3_Mabrouki_Tunis.pdf. 54 55

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 301 Italian immigration laws, which were tightened in 2009, are exceptionally strict compared to Germany and France; up until autumn 2013, illegal immigration was considered a criminal offence. In this context, the primary aim of Tunisian diaspora associations is to improve reception conditions for migrants in Italy, i.e., to change national legislation. Their efforts to establish contact in other countries, moreover, are frequently defeated by language difficulties. Many thirdgeneration migrants speak the language of the receiving country only and are not familiar with Tunisian Arabic, a strong obstacle to debate. The desire of a Parisian association to seek contact in Spain and Portugal, for example, was frustrated by the language barrier. 56 The Assises de l’immigration mentioned earlier and for the most part comprised of French-speaking countries (France, Canada, Switzerland) are likewise organized on the basis of language similarity. For the Tunisian diaspora the experience is tantamount to a paradox. There is an unmistakeable irony in this period of identification with Tunisia, where diaspora associations encounter language barriers otherwise typical of European nation states and see themselves as German, French or Italian. Back to Tunisia: Bringing together what belongs together Although advocacy on issues related to Tunisians abroad takes place primarily in the respective national public sphere, once the political affairs of Tunisia come into play the dividing line between the two becomes fuzzy again. It is then that the collective sense of belonging bolstered by the regime change reawakens and crossborder networks are reactivated “to gain a global perspective on the transition period”. 57 Mobilization of the diaspora prior to the election indicates that there is no strict separation between Tunisian internal affairs and the interests of the Tunisian diaspora in European countries. Here political activism on the part of the associations appears to be strategically designed. Depending on the subject matter, message and target audience, they are active at national 56 57

Interview with Mohsen Zemni, op. cit. Interview with Ouejdane Mejri, op. cit.

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levels or rely on cross-border cooperation – either between Tunisians and their receiving country and/or with European countries. As seen in the first stage of the upheavals in early 2011, this reactivation occurs notably in advance of highly symbolic political events such as editing the new constitution or organizing elections. Thus the election of the Constituent Assembly in October 2011 provided the opportunity to establish regular contact with Tunisian diaspora associations far beyond the borders of Europe. It forged a link between the internal affairs of Tunisia and other countries, particularly since 18 of the 217 seats fell to representatives of the diaspora (France 10, Italy 3, and Germany 1). Interest in the election soared in these countries, especially in France, as members of the diaspora were addressed both as Tunisians and as emigrants. In the context of the election in October 2011, a number of interlocutors criticized the election campaign in the receiving countries as unsatisfactory. Party programmes were frequently ignored; emotions took priority over rational arguments. 58 Due to the highly organized election campaign and the recourse to a mosque network and to European religious communities, 59 Ennahda profited most from this situation – and won half the seats in the three countries under review (France 4, Italy 2, and Germany 1). The upheavals and the organization of free elections was the signal for numerous dissidents to return to their native land and become politically active. Based on their long experience of oppositional work abroad, some also founded their own party. Ahmed Ben Salah, for instance, who for a long time had led the opposition Mouvement de l’unité populaire in exile, founded the Parti de l’unité populaire in Tunisia in March 2011. Many young diaspora bloggers likewise returned home in the same year and stood for election for seats abroad. 60 Other members of the diaspora were more concerned with securing the democratic framework for the election – and the election campaign – in a completely impartial manner. Hence associations such as PONTES made efforts to encourage Tunisians abroad to vote. Yet others were involved in guaranteeing orthodox Interview with Faouzi M’Rabet, op. cit. Interview with Hamza Chourabi, op. cit. 60 Background talk with Bettine Josties and Ines Schwedtner, op. cit. 58 59

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 303 election procedures in Germany, France and Italy. To this end the association Uni*T – Union pour la Tunisie, which was founded at the beginning of 2011 with the aim of paying heed to the development of a democratic state in Tunisia, sent “coordinators” to the polling stations in northern France. Three years later, the electoral arrangements are still a major topic in the work – and cooperation – of diaspora associations. Tunisian civil society has shown concern that “disturbances” might harm the course of the parliamentary elections, especially abroad, in October 2014. 61 The association Dynamique citoyenne des Tunisiens à l’étranger, for example, warned that diaspora Tunisians in particular are affected. As a general policy, recognition of Tunisians living abroad and their fair participation in elections has been a core demand of the organized diaspora since 2011.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

If we were to press the findings from our exploration of the impact of the Arab Spring on Tunisian diasporas into a single formula, we would opt for “A Spring abroad”. The “associative effervescence” 62 observed in France in the aftermath of 14 January 2011 was also evident in Italy and Germany. There is clearly a renewed sense of belonging among Tunisians at home and in the Tunisian community abroad. The sentiment of pride generated by the socalled Second Tunisian Revolution catalysed an impressive process of linking diaspora organizations and uniting the people concerned. In his study on trans-nationalization, Ludger Pries saw a dialectical connection between the national (re)affiliation of emigrants with their country of origin and the generation of transnational social spaces. 63 This reinvigorated sense of belonging among Tunisians, however, does not make the Tunisian diasporas a homogeneous Notification of the Dynamique citoyenne des Tunisiens à l’étranger, Faire barrage au hold-up de la Nahda sur le Conseil des Tunisiens à l’Etranger (11 July 2014). Translation by the authors. 62 Geisser, “Quelle révolution pour les binationaux?” 63 Ludgar Pries, Die Transnationalisierung der sozialen Welt (Frankfurt/ Main: Suhrkamp, 2008). 61

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group. On the contrary, as in Tunisia itself, the politicization of associative activities has accentuated ideological cleavages, not least since political Islam is now part of a social and political space previously outside its purview. As many interviewees stressed, the Second Tunisian Revolution overthrew the old “culture of silence”. It remains to be seen whether this will ultimately become a civic culture that can come to grips with open political conflict and ideological cleavages. There is some evidence to support an optimistic view of Tunisia’s political perspective, at least in terms of the Tunisian diasporas and their potential for “political remittances”. Our findings show that Tunisian diasporas, our research object, have only begun to blossom in the “Spring abroad” and resemble a “diaspora” in its substantial meaning as defined by Vertovec (2005): “Belonging to a diaspora entails a consciousness of, or emotional attachment to, commonly purported origins and cultural attributes associated with them. Such origins and attributes may emphasize ethno-linguistic, regional, religious, national or other features.” 64 In the case of the Tunisian diasporas, this attachment is now based on political features. More empirical research is needed, but we assume that pride in the revolution has helped to generate the kind of political ego required for civic culture, the basis of durable democratization: a political subject aware of its capacity to make change happen. The activities of the Tunisian diasporas prove Vertovec right in his prediction that “[C]oncerns for homeland developments and the plight of co-diaspora members in other parts of the world flow from this consciousness and emotional attachment.” 65 Indeed, we found a growing humanitarian engagement in Tunisian emigrant civil society. In France and Italy, there was remarkable solidarity with the most vulnerable migrant minority in the European diasporas: refugees. 66 Vertovec, Political Importance of Diasporas, p. 3. Ibid. 66 This observation is confirmed by the findings of Katharina Natter (2015): “On the one hand, Tunisian associations in Europe such as the Democratic Association of Tunisians of France (ADTF) and the Union of Tunisian Migrant Workers (UTIT) began operating in Tunisia, linking the 64 65

11. EXPLORING THE TUNISIAN DIASPORAS IN EUROPE 305 The scant response of the Tunisian diasporas in Germany to this issue may be due to the national context: differences in the existing associative networks and in the composition of the diaspora groups themselves, notably of incoming migrant groups – Italy and France face irregular migration to a greater extent. We suggest that further research focus on the mid- and longterm effects of the so-called Arab Spring on political culture in Tunisia and the Tunisian diasporas. To what extent will members of the diasporas become involved in political life in Tunisia in the long run? Will they make a specific contribution to the democratization of their homeland? And if so, how will it differ from that of their countrymen in Tunisia? Finally, both academics and policy-makers should give more attention to the diaspora potential for social and political remittances. At least rhetorically, NGOs and IGOs have already discovered the diasporas as the new hopefuls and vectors for democratization. 67 To be realistic, though, policy-makers should bear in mind that “[m]igrants to the West may convey secular values to their origin countries. For transfers to operate in the expected direction, however, migrants must be well integrated in the society of their destination country. Failed integration may act otherwise and produce the rejection of mainstream values and models of the host society.” 68

call for more migrants’ rights in Europe to requests for better treatment of migrants in Tunisia. On the other hand, associations such as the Centre of Tunis for Migration and Asylum (CeTuMa) and the Association of Families Victims of Irregular Migration (AFVIC) were created in Tunisia, providing support for refugees and the families of irregular migrants who had died crossing the border.” 67 See, for instance, Eldine et al., A Study on the Dynamics of Arab expatriate Communities. 68 Fargues and Fandrich, Migration after the Arab Spring, p. 2.

CONCLUSION In this volume, we have endeavoured to shed light on eleven minorities in the Middle East in the early years of the so-called Arab Spring. Specifically, we sought to answer two questions: in what ways have various minorities demonstrated involvement in the Arab Spring? Secondly, what shall the outcome of the Arab Spring be for minorities? Some minorities were enthusiastic participants in the early protest movements against prevalent autocratic regimes. As the contributors to this volume have ably demonstrated, events shifted rapidly and certainly not as the earliest participants had, perhaps naïvely, hoped. Other minorities were hesitant to join opposition groups, however, given that their respective governments – albeit autocratic and thus by definition a (literal) minority as well – in some ways still provided protection against the potentially hostile majority. Better the devil you know than the devil you do not, so the saying goes. Nonetheless, if many joined in the early protests, they were only to be soon bitterly disappointed by the increasingly dominant extremist alternatives. While Middle Eastern society has throughout history featured a mosaic of minorities, it has become much less diverse and much more monochrome since the early twentieth century due to such factors as conflict, genocide, and emigration. Unfortunately, this pattern has thus far only accelerated in the twenty-first century with the destabilization of much of the region, events surrounding the Arab Spring, and, not least, related tensions between the Sunni and Shi’ite powers, notably Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively, but also Turkey, Qatar, and their proxies. This reality is self-evident for minorities such as the various Christian confessions in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere in the Middle East, including Egypt and Palestine. Other minorities such as Ismailis, Druze, and Alawites also face similar pressures and depend upon tribal loyalty and regional – often tactical – alliances for 307

308 MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES AND THE ARAB SPRING existential survival. Kurds and Amazigh, on the other hand, being more numerous and rather geographically rooted, have in many ways benefited from the Arab Spring and the demise of regional autocracies. Nonetheless, their future is quite tenuous featuring hostile, powerful neighbours and often rather fickle international patrons. While Palestinians under the rule of Fatah and Hamas and the ever-present realities of Israeli security have largely not been affected by the Arab Spring directly, events in Egypt and Syria have had political and financial impacts. On the other hand, the Arab Spring has had a direct impact on the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians based in refugee camps spread throughout Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Finally, we are also reminded that the effects of the Arab Spring have not been limited to the Middle East alone, but have also had international ramifications, not least amongst the diaspora communities in Europe such as the Tunisians. The instability in the Middle East in recent years involving political and military conflict, extremism, as well as the lack of economic opportunity for many, has led to an increased uncertainty for both the majority and the minorities. As communities, minorities are much less able to weather the storm until Middle Eastern nations realise stability, civil tolerance, and opportunity. There is not one minority discussed in this volume that was not involved in some fashion at some stage to some degree with the Arab Spring. While some embraced the movement in its early days as an agent of positive change, as the years have turned events have moved far beyond what anyone could have expected. Ironically, and in tribute to its instigator, it is in Tunisia that the positive elements first inspiring the Arab Spring have been the most realized. Nonetheless, the forces unleashed by the Arab Spring have still not settled, and the future is far from certain. The contributors to this volume have attempted to shed light on the early years of the Arab Spring and its effect upon minorities, but as events move so quickly, more studies are inevitably needed.

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INDEX Al-Askari, Hasan 113 Al-Assad, Ḥāfez 24–26, 82, 95, 102, 106, 111, 115, 129, 130n1, 136, 182n12, 209 Al-Assad, Māher 95 Al-Awamiyyah 252 Al-Azhar 49 Al-Bakr, Ahmad Hasan 82 Al-Balous, Wahid 140 Al-Bardawil, Salah 267 Al-Baruni, ‘Abd al-Qasem 54–55 Al-Baruni, Isa 51–53 Al-Baruni, Sulayman 48–51, 77 Al-Da‘wa 232 Al-Daher ad-Din Allah 132 Al-Darazi, Nashtakin 132 Al-Fida’ 160, 161n22, 164n27, 167n32 Al Ghannoushi, Rachid 286 Al-Hakim 131–132 Al-Hamra 167 Al-Hariri, Rafiq 126 Al-Hasakah/al-Hassakah 36n52, 40n64, 211 Al-Hirak 249 Al-Hofuf 250 Al-Ḥusaīn, Yahya bin 230 Al-Husayni, Karim Shah 148 Al-Husayni, Muhammad Amin 110

‘ ‘Abdul Ḥamīd II 49, 84 ‘Afrin 26, 31, 33–34, 40n64 ‘Ajam/‘Ajami 231, 242 ‘Akkār 221 ‘Ali ‘Aziz 309 ‘Amudah 33n42, 38 ‘Ayn al-‘Arab 33–34, 36 A Abbas, Mahmoud 266 Abdul-Jalil, Mustafa 71 Abou Moslih, Hafiz /Abou Mosleh 135, 299 Abou Nohra, Joseph 176 Abu Musa 238 Abu Shakra, Eyad 249 Aden 249 Adonis 197 Afghanistan 59 Aga Khan IV 148–149 Āhl Al-Baīt/Ahl al-Bayt 116– 117, 229n6 Ahl al-Kitāb 83 Ahrar Al-Sham 144 Ajami, Fouad 136, 139, 143 Al-‘Azm, Sadiq 197 Al-Ahrār, al-Intilāf al-Shabāb 252 Al-Ahsa 230, 250–251 Al-Akhbar 139 Al-Arabi, Tayyar al-Tawheed 142

327

328 MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES AND THE ARAB SPRING Al-Ḥūthī, Husayn Badreddin 247 Al-Islah 240, 241n39, 247 Al-Islam, Saif 65 Al-Jamri, Mansoor 233 Al-Jinan 167 Al-Jurf, Nassar 160 Al-Kafat 168 Al-Karamat, Shoyouk 140 Al-Keib, Abdurrahim 70 Al-Khalifa 244, 250, 253–256 Al-Khattab, ‘Umar bin 179 Al-Khawabi 147, 151–152 Al-Khunaīzī, ‘Ali 229 Al-Ma’bada 38n38 Al-Maghut, Muhammad 158 Al-Mahdī, Muhammad ibn Hasan 113 Al-Mazraa 142 Al-Mudarrisi, Hadi 232 Al-Mudarrisi, Muhammad Taqi 232 Al-Muli, Ayda 161 Al-Nasser, Gamal Abd /Gamal Abdel Nasser 60, 110, 198n41 Al-Nimr, Nimr 252–253 Al-Nusrah Front 212–213, 217, 219, 224 Al-Obeidi, Ali Pasha 54 Al-Qaeda 2, 102, 119, 186, 190n26, 249 Al-Qahtaniyah 38n58 Al-Qamishli 26, 28–29, 33–35, 40n63, 41 Al-Qatīfī, Ibrahim 229 Al Qusayr 102, 185, 211 Al-Raqqah/al-Raqqa/Raqqa 168, 187, 188n23, 191, 212 Al-Rumi, Aisha 63 Al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir 232

Al-Sadr, Musa 115 Al Safa, Muhammad Jabir 110 Al-Salām School 86 Al-Salamiya 170 Al-Sanusi, Sayyid Idris 52–58, 60–61 Al Saud 250 Al-Sha‘ar, Abdallah 162 Al-Shamali Muhammad 151– 152 Al-Shirazi, Ayatollah Hasan Mahdi 115 Al-Shīrāzī, Mohammed bin Mahdi al-Ḥussaini 232, 243 Al-Sisi, Abdel Fattah 74, 268 Al-Tayyar, Abdul Rahman 250 Al Thaqafiya, Al Thawra 63 Al-Wasaṭ 223 Al-Wefaq 233, 256, Al-Zaytuna 49 Alawites/‘Alawites 11, 85, 86n19, 89, 95, 101–128, 136, 139, 144, 148, 150, 182–184, 187n21, 212n18, 307 Alcatel 92 Aleppo 11, 21n10, 23n17, 26n25, 80, 86–87, 90–91, 96–97, 102n2, 115n48, 120– 121, 162, 170, 177, 186–187, 192, 196 Alexandretta 25n21, 91 Algeria 46, 47, 48, 50, 58, 62– 64, 280, 285 Allah 157, 178n7, 211n14 Amal 116, 232 Amazigh 10, 45–77, 308 Amazigh Association 63 Amazigh World Congress 64 American Air Force 58

INDEX American University of Beirut 1, 197, 203 Americans 37, 93 Amicales des travailleurs tunisiens 285 Amirate 55 Ankara 26 Antioch 105n12, 175–176, 187n21 Aoun, Michel 118n60, 193n35, 204–206, 209, 216– 217, 221 Apollinarianism 176 Arab Emirates 287 Arab Fall 278 Arab Federation 54 Arab Gulf 141 Arab identity 47, 60, 62, 110, 134 Arab Ismaili Qasimis 149 Arab League 54, 55n28 Arab League Trusteeship 55 Arab Nation 55 Arab nationalism 23, 24, 46– 51, 82, 84, 110–113, 117, 128, 197, 198n41 Arab Revolution 17n1, 29 Arab Spring vii, 1–3, 6–10, 12, 17, 18n3, 40–42, 46n4, 79, 81, 92, 101, 104, 107, 109, 118, 128, 144, 148, 150, 152, 155n12, 172n39, 191, 195– 196, 200, 204–205, 208–209, 214, 216, 219, 225, 227–228, 231–232, 236, 238, 240–241, 244n55, 246, 250–251, 257, 261–264, 268–275, 277, 283, 289, 292, 303, 305, 307–308 Arab States 81, 112, 129, 200, 201, 228–230, 235, 236, 273, 279n5, 285 Arabia 89, 195, 229

329 Arabian Gulf 271 Arabian Peninsula 200, 227– 231, 236, 238, 246, 256–257 Arabization 58, 60, 94n41 Aramaic 189, 212 Armenia 80, 84, 87–88, 90, 95, 187n20 Armenian 11, 79n2, 80–81, 84–96 Armenian Catholic Patriarch of Cilicia 91 Armenian Gregorian Catholicos of Sis 91 Arsal/‛Arsāl 220–221, 224 Ashour, Saleh 244 Asia 228, 230, 242, 254 Arslan, Talal 142 Assad regime 11, 25, 34n46, 87, 94, 97, 130, 165n29, 182–183, 185, 213–214, 270–271 Assises de l’immigration tunisienne 300 Association des travailleurs maghrébins de France 298 Association des Tunisiens de France 297 Association des Tunisiens des grandes écoles 294 Association des Tunisiens en France 292, 298 Associazione PONTES dei Tunisini 293, 299 Assyrians 85, 96, 177 Ayed, Jalloul 286 B Ba‘athist/Baathist 21, 86, 89, 93–94, 117 Baath/Bath 24n18, 25n19, 62, 94n41, 130, 181n11, 182n12, 192, 196–198

330 MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES AND THE ARAB SPRING Baghdad 5n5, 25n20, 62, 180 Bagratid Kingdom 84 Bahārna 231, 237, 242, 250 Bahrain 1, 12, 18, 227, 228– 236, 239n32, 242, 244–246, 249–250, 253–257 Bahrain Freedom Movement 256 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 233, 235, 254n85 Bahraini Shīrāzīs 232 Bahraini Spring 235, 254–255 Baḥrānī 231, 242, 253 Bal‘aas 168 Balamand Declaration 194 Balkans 84 Banū Numayr 113 Banyas 119, 123 Barnabas Fund 177 Barrani, Sidi 52 Bashar al-Assad 21, 27, 32n40, 81, 87, 94, 95, 106, 120, 121, 124, 126–127, 142, 145, 176, 182–184, 209–210 Basīl, Jibrān 222 Bayda 123 Bchamoun 135 Bedouin 148, 151, 245 Beirut 184, 197, 210, 218–219, 221, 267 Bekaa Valley/BiqāʿValley 195, 218 Belgium 282 Ben Ali, Zine el Abidine 1, 17, 279, 286, 289–290, 297– 298 Benghazi 56, 58, 67, 70, 73 Berbahani, Marafi 242 Berber Spring 64 Berbers 4, 6, 10–11, 46n3, 63, 66–73

Berlin 17, 277, 287 Bey, Jamil Mardam 107 BICI report 233n17, 254 Biden, Joe 200n46, 205 Bin Halim, Mustafa 58 Bouazizi, Mohamed 1, 296 Brahim, Yassin 286 British 3, 22n13, 23n16, 52– 53, 55–57, 109n25, 134, 135n25, 199, 206 Budaiya 254 Byzantines 114 C Cairo 49, 55, 118, 120, 131, 132n8, 265, 279n5 Caliphate 131, 144, 191n30, 223 Canada 96, 177n6, 301 Canary Islands 64 Caritas 90, 194 Caucasus 87 Cedar Revolution 92, 204 Central Asia 230 Chalcedon 176n4 Chaldean 85, 177, 215 Chechen terrorists 187n20 Cherbisc, Yusuf 51 Christendom 213 Christian 5n5, 6, 8n8, 9n8, 11–12, 72n85, 79–81, 83, 85–86, 88–92, 96–97, 118– 119, 136, 144, 146, 175–180, 183n14, 184–186, 188–199, 201, 204–206, 208– 219, 221–223, 238, 307 Christianity 5n5, 6n6, 9n8, 84n9, 90, 93, 175–176, 179– 180, 194, 199, 215 Christian Solidarity International 184n15 Christmas 91, 192n32

INDEX Christological 176 Cilicia 22n11, 91, 105n12 Circassians 85, 93 Clash of Civilizations 225 Code of ‘Omar 83–84 Collectif de solidarité active pour la Tunisie: CosaTunisie 293 Comitato Immigrati Tunisini in Italia 292 Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 65 Communist Kurdistanian Party 34 Constantinople 180 Constituent Assembly 302 Constitutional Declaration 61 Constitutional Democratic Rally 286 Copts 17, 93 Council of Churches and Christian Relations 185 Council of the Tunisian Communities in France 286 Crusades 199n42 Cuba 188 Cultural Revolution 63 Cyprus 192 Cyrenaica 48, 53–57 D Daesh 5, 10, 146n61, 187n21 Damascene ‘Azm 197 Damascus 21, 23n17, 25–27, 87, 90, 97, 120–121, 124, 126, 132n6, 134, 143, 167, 175, 177, 179, 189, 211, 213, 262, 270, 271, 309 Dammam 230, 250, 251 Dara‘a 41 Darwish, Issam John 195

331 Dayr az-Zor 26n25 Declaration of the Establishment of the Authority of the People 61 Defense Brigades 25 Deir Attiyah 189 Democratic Union Party (PYD) 21, 26, 31–39, 43 Democratic Yekîtî 28n29, 31n37, 32n39 Deraa 137, 139 Desert Fathers 176 Die Brücke 293 Doha 66n60, 69n73, 73n94, 123n86, 239 Druze/Drūzes 6, 11, 83, 85, 102, 109, 119, 129–146, 149–150, 171–172, 182, 307, 309–310, 316, 318–320, 323 Druze Lebanese Democratic Party 142 Duhok 36 E Easter 91 Echmiadzin 95 Eddine, Khaldoun Zein 139 Egypt 1–2, 6n7, 8, 17, 22, 24, 48, 52–56, 58, 62, 74, 89, 93, 111n34, 112, 129, 176n4, 178, 179n10, 198, 207–209, 240–241, 261–262, 264–268, 270–271, 273, 277–279, 285, 307–308 El Barouni, Nadi 64 El Kantara 293 Emirates 239–240 Emirati Muslim Brotherhood 240 English 227, 298 Ennahda 286–288, 291–293, 302

332 MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES AND THE ARAB SPRING Ephesus 176n4 Erbil 215 Ersal 146 Essebsi, Beji Caid 288 Ettakatol 288 Euphrates 25n21, 26, 162 Europe 6, 12, 18n3, 49, 65, 96, 141, 187n20, 194, 279– 284, 289–295, 298, 302, 304n66, 308 European 3–6, 46, 48–49, 65, 84, 124, 127, 134, 182n12, 199n42, 204, 206, 279, 282– 283, 290n33, 292, 294–297, 300–302, 304 European Union 300 F Facebook 196 Faddūl, Father Simon 90 Fascist 51 Fateh 262, 266–267, 272–274 Fatimid 131, 150, 153, 172 Fatwa/Fatwas 110n27, 114n46 Fayyad, Salam 273 Fédération des Tunisiens pour une Citoyenneté des deux Rives 292, 294 Fertile Crescent 179n10 Fezzan 57 First World War/World War I 11, 22, 50–51, 90, 199 Foreign Affairs 109n24, 222, 236, 299, 318 Foucault 149 Fourzol 195 France 22n11, 51, 81, 136, 206–207, 279, 281–282, 284–287, 289–298, 300–305 Franco Syrian 136 Frazee, Charles 194

Free Army 140 Free Officer Movement 61, 62n47 Free Patriotic Movement 193n35, 210, 217, 221 Free Syrian Army 2, 21, 31, 37, 102, 124, 141, 144, 185, 189, 193, 210–211, 220 Free Youth Coalition 252 Freedom Mountain group 69 French 3, 47–48, 82, 90, 109, 126, 134, 137, 180n10, 182, 199, 292, 294, 298, 300–301 Fuccaro, Nelida 23 G Gaza 12, 117, 262, 265–268, 271–273 GCC 233, 235, 239n32, 241, 244, 249 Geagea, Samir 205–206, 208– 209, 216 Gemayel, Amin 204 Gemayel, Bashīr 209 General National Congress (GNC) 71–72 Geneva Peace Talks 32 Genocide 80, 177n5 Georgia 175 Gerges, Fawaz A. 137n35, 138, 143 Germany 277, 279, 280–285, 287, 289–295, 297, 300–303, 305 Ghajar 105 Ghat 73 Ghawar Field 251 Ghouta 124 Gnostic 104, 115 Golan Heights 105, 140 Government of National Accord 75

INDEX Gramscien 149 Greater Lebanon 182 Greater Syria 8, 175 Greece 84, 186, 282 Greek 176, 189, 195 Greek Orthodox 85, 90, 111, 176, 187n21, 189, 194 Green Book 63 Gregorian 90–91 Gulf 12, 37, 102, 141, 171, 200, 227–233, 235–236, 241–246, 251–252, 257, 271, 279–280, 282, 293 Guterres, Antonio 103, 222 H Hadi, Abdrabuh Mansur 248–249 Hadramawt 249 Haftar, General Khalifa 66, 74–75 Hama/Hamah 23n17, 112, 120, 122, 151, 157n17, 162– 163, 170, 177 Hamadan 230 Hamas 117n59, 118, 262, 265–268, 270–272, 274, 308 Hasaka 185 Hatay 105 Havana 188 Hawran 135 Hezbollah/Hizballah 11, 101– 102, 115–117, 123, 193, 206, 210, 216–219, 224, 232, 241n40, 244 High Negotiations Committee 32 Homs 80, 102n2, 120, 122, 127, 162, 177, 185, 189, 192, 211 Houla 123

333 Hourani, Albert 2–4, 47n5, 82, 83n8, 108, 206 Houas, Medhi 286 Houthis 12, 248n66 Hubbard, Ben 157, 164, 166, 170–171 Human Rights 203n1, 237n29 Ḥusseīn, Saddām 82, 93, 181n11, 184, 215 I Ibadi/Ibādī 49, 75, 237–238, 241 Ibadi Mosques 75 Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies 118 Ibn Nusayr, Lord Muhammad 113–115 Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmed 114 Ibrahim, Yuhanna 187, 212 Idlib 139–140 Ikhwān 239 Imam 104, 113, 115–116, 132n8, 148–150, 172, 229– 230 Imamate 49–50, 131n4, 153, 238 Imazighen 45, 47, 51, 56–59, 61n46, 64–66, 68–70, 73–77 India 175 Indonesia 180 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 278, 279n5, 282–283, 285n23 International Religious Freedom Report 238n31, 244n55, 250n72 Inter-Services Liaison Department (ISLD) 52 Intifadas 266 Iran 4, 22, 103, 115–117, 126, 128, 141, 150n6, 180, 193,

334 MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES AND THE ARAB SPRING 216, 227–232, 234–236, 238, 242, 244, 246, 248, 249n69, 255, 257, 262, 271, 273, 307 Iranian 11, 90, 125, 128, 231– 236, 239, 243, 249, 252, 255, 271, 273 Iranian Revolution 113 Iraq 9n8, 10–11, 19, 21–24, 31n36, 37, 39, 40n64, 82, 89, 92–94, 97, 102, 110–111, 113–114, 117, 127, 144, 176n4, 178, 180, 181n11, 184, 187n21, 188, 191, 193– 195, 198, 200, 207, 212n18, 214–215, 217, 229–232, 242–243 Iraqi 31, 35n50, 94, 97, 113, 127, 191, 205, 210, 214–216, 232, 243 Isa Town 254–255 Isbir, Ali Ahmad Said 197 Islam 5–6, 9n8, 38, 51, 58, 61, 65, 75, 77, 82–83, 85–86, 89, 93–94, 98, 101, 103–104, 109, 111–116, 125, 139, 145, 170–171, 178–180, 182n12, 186–188, 191, 195, 207, 211–212, 214, 217, 224, 229–230, 237, 239, 247, 286, 292, 298, 304 Islamic 4–5, 19n6, 29n33, 35, 38, 41, 46, 48–50, 58, 61, 63, 65, 75n101, 83n9, 93n40, 102, 104, 106, 110–119, 122, 128, 133–134, 144–146, 165, 170–171, 173, 178–180, 191, 196–199, 205, 207, 208, 211–213, 216–217, 223–225, 229n6, 239, 248, 287 Islamic Front 124 Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) 232

Islamic Republic of Iran 116 Islamic Revolution 4, 191, 196, 231 Islamic State (IS/ISIL/ISIS) 2, 5, 10, 32n40, 37, 39, 102, 144, 187, 191, 193, 212n18, 214–215, 217–218, 223–225, 249, 253 Islamism 18n6, 48, 58, 94, 165, 172, 178, 208, 211n14, 240n37 Islamist 3–5, 11, 17–18, 37– 39, 41–42, 46, 50, 66, 74–76, 80, 102–103, 112, 118, 124, 127, 144, 168, 170, 184n16, 186–187, 189–190, 192, 198n41, 210, 213, 215, 240– 241, 270–271, 286–287, 292 Islamist Jihad 192 Islamist Spring 41 Islamization 162, 165, 271 Islamophobia 291 Isma‘īlis/Ismailis 6, 11, 13, 85, 102, 147–157, 160, 163–164, 166–168, 170, 172–173, 229–230, 242, 249, 307 Ismaili Council 151, 155, 160, 162, 164, 167, 169 Israel 8, 11–12, 22, 62, 93, 112, 117–118, 122, 132n9, 184n16, 262–263, 266, 272– 274 Israeli 26, 93, 101, 105, 117, 141, 262, 268, 272, 274, 308 Ibrahim, Issam 120 Istanbul 49–50, 180, 309 Italian 46, 48, 51, 54, 57, 77, 299, 301 Italian Ministry for the Interior 299 Italians 48–52, 297

INDEX Italy 48–51, 53, 55, 156n13, 161n23, 279, 281–282, 284, 289–295, 297, 299–305 J Jabal al-Arab 142 Jabal Gharbi 49 Jabal Nafusa 48, 59, 64–65, 67, 69, 70, 73 Jabhat an-Nusrah 37–38 Jabhat Fatah al Sham 102 Jacobite 90 Jadid, Salah 106, 111, 130n1 Jadu 68 Jafa‘ari/Jafaari 116 Jarjour, Riad 80, 98 Jasmin, Tunisie Liberté Démocratie (JTLD) 293 Jasmine Revolution 1 Jazīra/Jazirah 23–24, 34, 36, 40, 91 Jesus Christ 175, 176, 189, 212 Jewish 5n5, 83, 180, 184n16 Jews 4–6, 9n8, 56, 83, 85n16, 132n9, 179–180, 184n16, 207, 210 Jihad 6n6, 83n9, 144, 180n10, 192 Jihadi/Jihadist 178, 184, 186, 189–190, 193, 195–196, 217, 220, 223–224 Jirar Reisian 80, 86 Jizyah 208, 211–212, 214 Jizzīn 221 Jordan 11, 93–94, 130n1, 175, 178, 198, 207, 261–262, 268–270 Jordanian 93, 268–270 Jordanian Moslem Brotherhood 270 Jouini, Eyes 286

335 Julian Calendar 91 Jum‘ah, Abū Ahmad 224 Junblatt, Kamal 135 Junblatt, Walid/Walid Jumblatt 109, 135, 140–141, 204n3 K Kabyle 47–48 Kalayjian, Ani 96 Kassab 177, 187n20 Katāʾib/Kataeb 204, 210, 217 Kenya 26 Kerry, John 274 Khabbazi, Muhammad Ahmad 167 Khat al-Imam 232 Khofar Towers 251 Ki-Moon, Ban 126 Kilo, Michel 196–197 King Hamad 233 King Idris 58, 60–61 Kobanî 33–34, 39–40, 43 Kuhn, Ranall 152 Kuftaru, Ahmad 24 Kurdification 29 Kurdish 10, 17, 19, 21, 23–33, 36–43, 76, 82, 86, 91–94, 127 Kurdish Democratic Equality Party 28n29 Kurdish Democratic Left Party 28n29, 34n46 Kurdish Democratic Party 28n29, 31n36 Kurdish Democratic Patriotic Party 28n29 Kurdish Democratic Peace Party 31n36, 34 Kurdish Democratic Union Party 28n29, 31n37 Kurdish Freedom Party 30n36

336 MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES AND THE ARAB SPRING Kurdish Future Movement 28, 28n29 Kurdish Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 39, 31n36 Kurdish Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK) 25n20, 31n37 Kurdish Marxist-Leninist Organisation 25 Kurdish National Council (KNC) 21, 28, 30–32, 34– 36, 38n54, 40n63 Kurdish Progressive Party 31n37 Kurdish Reform Movement 28n29 Kurdish Spring 40–41 Kurdish Union Party 28n28, 28n29, 30n36 Kurdishness 24 Kurdistan 21, 33–36, 94, 214 Kurdistan Democratic Party – Syria (PDK-S) 28n29, 35 Kurdistan Patriotic Union/ Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 25n20, 31n37 Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 39 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 21, 25–26, 31–34, 36, 36n52, 39–40 Kurds 4, 6, 10, 18n2, 20–21, 23–27, 29–30, 32n38, 38–41, 43, 81, 85–86, 96, 107, 111, 187n21, 197, 200n46, 212n18, 225, 308 Kuwait 1, 12, 227–228, 230– 231, 242– 245, 247 Kuwaiti 244–246, 228, 236, 242–243

L Lamlum Pasha 53–55 Lampedusa 300 Latakia/Ladhqīia 91, 106, 121–123, 177 Latinos 207 Lawatiyyas 237 League of Nations 22, 82 Lebanese 82, 101–103, 105, 111, 115–116, 126, 128, 134–135, 140–142, 145–146, 158n19, 180–182, 190, 193n35, 199, 204–206, 208– 225, 241n40 Lebanese Army 218, 224 Lebanese Forces 208, 210, 217n31 Lebanese Resistance Brigades 218 Lebanon 4n3, 8, 11–12, 22, 25–26, 80n3, 82, 84, 90–95, 105–106, 108–109, 115, 117–118, 123, 126, 130–131, 134–137, 141, 143n52, 145– 146, 175, 181–182, 188, 193–195, 198, 203–210, 213–225, 231, 242, 261–262, 285, 307 Levant 11, 37, 101, 103–104, 106–110, 113–116, 126–128, 150, 158n19, 176, 187n21, 195, 200, 206, 212n18 Levantine 109, 119, 206, 212 Liberal Kurdish Union 34 Libya 1–2, 5, 10–11, 46–47, 50–52, 55–76, 195, 209, 261, 264–265, 277–279, 282 Libyan 46–49, 51–53, 55–66, 68–72, 74–75, 264n3, 282 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 61 Libyan National Amazigh Congress 68n68

INDEX Libyan National Assembly 57 Libyan Revolution 60, 67 Libyan Tamazight Congress 65 Liwa’ al-Tawhid 186 London 170, 286 M Maaloula/ Maʿlūlah 189–190, 212–213 Machrek 280 Magarief, Mohamed 71 Maghreb 45–46, 64, 280 Makki, Ahmad Abdulnabi 237 Malik, Charles 203, 207 Maliki School 61 Mamluk 8n8, 114 Manama 254 Mandate 3, 4n3, 106n16, 131, 134–135 Maʿnī 134 Manzikert 114 March Camp 210, 217 Maronites 82, 85, 93, 117, 135, 137, 176, 178–179, 194, 205, 208, 210n13, 222 Marseille 287, 298 Marzouki, Moncef 286, 288 Mashriq 45, 58 MASSTE 285 Matruk 242 Maysaloun 142 Medina 230, 250 Mediterranean 105, 126–127, 194n36 Melkites 85 Mersin 105 Mesopotamia 127 MI6 52

337 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 42, 45, 105, 277– 279, 285n21 Middle East Council of Churches 98 Millet 83 Misiyaf 150 Misurata 75 MO4 52 Mohammad/Muhammad 82– 83, 113, 178n7, 211n14 Morocco 46, 46n3, 58, 62, 64, 66, 180, 279, 285 Morsi, Mohammed 208, 262, 265–266, 270 Moslem/Muslim 4–6, 8, 51, 55n28, 61, 64, 75, 77, 83–84, 86, 90–93, 101–102, 107, 110, 112, 115, 121, 130, 136, 147n1, 150n5, 178–179, 183n14, 196, 198n41, 206, 208, 211n14, 216, 220, 225, 228n3 Moslem Brotherhood/Muslim Brotherhood 2, 115, 122, 126, 155, 237, 240–241, 247, 265–271 Mosul 127, 191, 214–215, 218 Mount Al-Muqatam 132n8 Mount Lebanon 131, 134 Muasher, Marwan 143 Mubarak, Hosni 8 Muheen 189 Mukasa, Sahar 133 Mukhābarāt 95 Mumin Shahis 149 Mu’mini 149–151 Murzuk 73 Muscat 106n17, 238 Muslims 4–5, 8–9, 17, 51, 75n101, 82, 85, 87, 89, 95, 98, 104, 110, 115–116, 134,

338 MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES AND THE ARAB SPRING 136, 178–180, 195–197, 207, 208, 211, 224–225 Mussolini, Benito 51 N Nabak 189 Nahas Pasha 53 Najaf 232 Najran 230–249 Nalbandian, Bishop Armash 89 Nasrallah, Hassan 146n61, 217 Nasrallah, Rif‛at 218 National Academy of Sciences 87 National Amazigh Libyan Conference (NALC) 68 National Assembly 57 National Authority 263, 267 National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces 31 National Defence Forces (NDF) 123 National Dialogue 249, 256n94 National Transitional Council (NTC) 70 National Unity Government 266–267 Nationalist Party 56 NATO 123 Na‘us, Hassan 169 Nayiry 90 Negus, Steve 157, 164, 166, 170–171 Nejd 251 Nersisyan, Tevos 88 Nestorius 176 Netanyahu, Binyamin 274 Netherlands 282

NGOs 299–300, 305 Nisan, Mordechai 19n6, 106n14, 130–131, 136n28 Nusayris/Nusairis 103, 104n9, 115 O Obama, Barack 124 Obari 73 Öcalan, Abdullah 26, 35 OECD 283 Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTA) 281, 284–285, 290 Old Testament 189, 214 Oman 106n17, 228, 230, 236– 238, 241–242, 245, 247, 257 Omani 237–238, 241 Operation Dawn 74 Orient Net 161 Oslo Accords 261 Ottawa 287 Ottoman 3–4, 8, 47n5, 48–51, 81–84, 89–90, 109, 114, 131, 134, 158n19, 168, 175, 180, 187n20, 197n46, 199n42 P Pacini, Andrea 85 Pakistan 230 Palestine 12, 62, 84, 175, 176n4, 178, 207, 263–265, 267–268, 271, 307 Palestinian 12, 118, 197–198, 220–221, 223, 261–274, 308 Palestinian Arab Spring 262 Palestinian Hamas Movement 265 Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement 271 Palestinian National Authority 267

INDEX Palestinian Occupied Territory 268, 270 Palestinian Public Employee Union 273 Pan-Arab 4–6, 23, 54, 60–62, 265 Pan-Arabism 4, 53, 62 Paris 196, 286, 287, 298 Party of God 216, 219 Party of Modernity and Democracy 120 Pashamyan, Arax 86 Patriarch Kirill 188 Patriarchate 95 Pearl Roundabout 232, 233, 254 Peninsula Shield Force 233, 244, 249 People of the Book 83, 179, 191, 208 People’s Defense Units 32, 34n47 Persian 232 Persian Gulf 244 Phalange 204 PONTES 293, 297n48, 299, 302 Pope Anicetus 176 Pope Francis 188 Popular Action Bloc 244 Portugal 301 Progressive Democratic Party 287 Prophet Jonah 214 Protestant 85, 90, 96, 198, 199n42 Provence 139 Q Qaddafi, Mu’ammar 65n58, 67, 70–71 Qadmus 150

11,

339 Qalamoun/Qalamun 102, 189 Qaraqūsh 214 Qarrah 189 Qasim Shahis 149 Qasimi 147, 149–151 Qatar 68, 103, 228–230, 236– 242, 245, 247, 257, 273, 307 Qatari 190, 213, 237–242 Qatif 230, 232, 250–252 Qom 232 Qur’an 179, 185n18, 207 R Rableh/Rablah 185, 211 Rafah 265–266 RAND 248 Ras al-‘Ayn/Ra’s al-‘Ayn 38 Ras al-Khaimah 240 Rās B‛albak 217–218, 224 Rastan 162 Red Crescent 160, 163, 168 Red Cross 161n24, 169 Refugee Studies Centre 264 Rifaa 255 Roj Peshmerga 39, 40n63 Rojava 35 Roman 60, 85, 176n4, 188, 189n42 Roman Catholicism 85, 91, 176–177 Rome 287 Roosevelt, Eleanor 207n6 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 203n1 Rumaylan/Rumailan 34 Russia 79n1, 103, 124, 188n24, 190n27, 213n21 Russian 187, 188, 192

340 MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES AND THE ARAB SPRING S Sa‘adeh, Antun 111 Sadad 189 Sadat, Anwar 112 Safavid Empire 180 Saint Gregory 90 Saint John of Damascus 179 Saint Maroun 176 Saint Paul 175 Saint Sarkis (Sergius) 90 Salafī/Salafist 2, 114, 119, 170, 178, 196, 211, 211n14, 213, 239, 243, 247 Salah, Ahmed Ben 302 Salamiya 147, 150–155, 157– 163, 165–171, 173 Saleh, Ali Abdullah 246, 248 Saleh, Maryam 157, 170, 240 Salih, Yassin al-Haj 123n84, 157 Sanaa 249 Santa Claus 91 Sanusi Order 52 Saudi Arabia 1, 37, 61, 103, 141, 227, 229–234, 236, 239–240, 244–246, 249–251, 253, 255, 257, 307 Ṣāyyāḥ, Paul 222 Sebha 73 Second Tunisian Revolution 303–304 Second World War/World War II 22–23, 46, 51, 206 Sevener 229 Sha‘aban, Ibrahim 56–58 Shabiha 123 Shafi’ī Sunni 246 Shahabīs 134 Shaikh Ali Salman 233 Shari‘a 57, 72, 170 Sharjah 240

Shaykh Ali Aziz al-Ibrahim 116n54 Sheikh Abu-Rabi‘ al-Baruni 57 Sheikh Qaradawi 240 Sheikh Sabah 245 Sheikh Sultan bin Kayed AlQasimi 240 Sheikhs of Dignity 140 Shi‘a/Shi’ite 2, 4, 11–12, 18, 82, 97, 101–102, 104, 106, 110, 113–117, 119, 122–123, 126–128, 149–150, 170, 172, 180, 182n12, 187n21, 191, 193, 200n46, 205–206, 208, 210, 212n18, 216, 218–219, 223, 225, 227–230, 235, 242–243, 248n66, 251–252, 257, 307 Shi‘īsm/Shi‘ism/Shiism 89, 125, 180, 228–229, 247, 250 Shīrāzī 232, 243, 252 Sidon 221 Sinai Peninsula 265 Sinjar/Sinjār 191, 214 Sirte 75 Six Day War 112 Socialist Destourian Party (PSD) 285–286 Soueida 135, 139–140, 145– 146 Southeast Asia 242 Spain 282, 301 Special Operations Executive (SOE) 52 Special Units 25 Steele, Jonathan 156 Stephanous, Andrea Zaki 80, 93n40 Stuttgart 294 Stylites 176 Sublime Porte 90 Sudan 178

INDEX Sultan Abdul-Hamid II 49 Sultan, Maqbool bin Ali 237 Sunnah 116 Sunni 2, 4–6, 8, 9n8, 11–12, 17–18, 37, 61, 75, 82, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93–95, 97, 101–102, 104, 106–107, 109–112, 114, 118–119, 121, 124, 126–130, 136–137, 139, 141, 143, 151–152, 159, 171, 178, 180–181, 183–184, 190–191, 193–194, 196–197, 200–201, 205–206, 208, 210–211, 213–214, 217–225, 229–231, 237–245, 248–249, 251–255, 307 Sunnism 150 Suwaida/Suweida 171, 177 Sykes-Picot 127, 135, 199 Syria 1, 2, 5, 8, 10–12, 17–26, 28, 30–31, 34, 36n54, 39–42, 76, 80–96, 98, 101–131, 135–152, 154–155, 157–158, 160, 165, 172n39, 175–180, 182–188, 190–196, 198, 200–201, 207–214, 217–219, 221–222, 231, 243, 261–264, 269–271, 278, 283, 307, 308 Syriac 177, 187n21, 189, 214n23 Syrian 2, 10–12, 18n2, 21, 23– 27, 29–41, 43, 80, 85–98, 101–107, 109–113, 115–129, 136–139, 141–155, 157–158, 163–167, 170–173, 176, 180–191, 193–194, 196–199, 204–206, 209–211, 213, 216–217, 219–223, 241–242, 263–264, 266, 269–270 Syrian Arab Army 121 Syrian Arab Republic 86, 103n5, 106n15

341 Syrian Ba‘ath regime 116 Syrian Civil War 11, 118n65, 241n40 Syrian Democratic Forces 34n47 Syrian Jazira 23n17 Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 112 Syrian National Council 18n2, 31, 144 Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) 111 Syrian Spring 148 T Tā’ef agreements/Ṭā’if Accord 82, 205, 216 Takfiri/Takfirism 178, 184, 186–187, 191, 195–196, 200–201, 211–213, 216–218, 220, 224 Talbisa 162 Talib, ‘Ali ibn Abi 104, 113, 116 Tall Abyad 39n59, 40n64 Tall Brak 38 Tall Hamis 38 Tamazgha 45, 68n68 Tamazight 48, 59–60, 65, 67– 69, 71, 75 Tannukhī emirs 134 Tanẓīmāt 3, 48n7, 84 Tartous/Tartus 127, 177 Tawheed 131, 133n15 Tebu 76 Technical University of Munich 294 Tripolitanian Committee 52, 53, 54 Third World 148 Tikriti Sunni clan 82

342 MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES AND THE ARAB SPRING Tira Association for Tamazight Culture and Language 69 Tobruk 75, 77 Tocquevillian 22 Tounes, Nidaa 288 Tripoli 48, 54–55, 57–58, 61– 62, 65, 72, 74–75, 77, 221, 223 Tripoli-Cyrenaica Defence Committee 54–55 Tripolitania 46, 48–54, 56–57 Tripolitanian Defence Committee 54–55 Tripolitanian Republic 50, 54 Tripp, Charles 138 Tuareg 72n87, 76 Tulul al-Humr 167 Tunesische Akademiker Gesellschaft 294 Tunicare 293 Tunicomp 294 Tunis 48–49, 54, 129, 279n4, 286, 300n55, 305n66 Tunisia 1, 17, 50, 62n48, 129, 209, 264, 277–283, 285–288, 291–297, 299–305, 308 Tunisian 1, 12, 279–286, 288– 305, 315–317, 321 Tunisian League of Human Rights 286 Turkey 10–11, 21, 25–26, 37, 39–40, 84, 89, 102–103, 105–106, 114–116, 120, 126, 158n20, 175–177, 186, 307 Turkish 21, 25–26, 82, 86, 89, 93, 103, 105n12 Turkmen 85–86, 94, 212n18 Twelver Shi‘a 106, 113, 115, 127, 150, 172, 247 Twitter 296, 298n49

U Umayyad 175, 180 UN Charter 126 UN Commissioner 57 UNESCO 189 UNICEF 169 Union of Kurdish Teachers 36 Union of Tunisian Migrant Workers (UTIT) 304n66 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 228, 230, 236–242, 245, 247, 257 United Arab Republic (UAR) 24 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 52–56, 63, 81 United National Front 56 United Nations (UN) 57, 65, 75–77, 84n14, 112n39, 126, 147, 197, 234n19, 249, 300 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 103n5, 219–223 United States of America 31– 32, 39, 96, 103, 113, 117, 123–124, 193, 198–200, 207, 215, 225, 237–239, 271, 273 Unity Brigade 186 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 203, 207 University of Aleppo 87n23 UNRWA 262 V Valley of the Nazareans 177 Vatican 185 Vilayet of Tripolitania 48 Village du Jasmin 298

INDEX W Waad 234 Wadi al-Nasara 177 Wādī Khālid/Wadi Khaled 220–221 Wafd Party 53 Wahhab 142 Wahhabi/Wahhābī/Wahhābīsm 114, 230, 239–240, 247, 250 Wali 116 Washington, D.C. 190 West 62, 76, 93, 122, 125, 170, 176, 195, 198–199, 206, 271–272, 274, 305 West Bank 12, 272, 274 Western 3, 34, 36, 39, 61, 63, 89n31, 97, 108, 147, 158n19, 170, 179, 182n12, 189, 196, 198–199, 204, 213–214, 224, 271 White Carnations for Salamiya 158 Wikileaks 245n59 Wilayat Al-Faqīh 216 Workers’ District of ‘Adra 167 Y Yabroud/Yabrūd 190, 211, 213

185, 189–

343 Yafran 68–69 Yarmouk 262–263, 269 Yazidis 10, 187n21, 191, 212n18, 214 Yazigi, Boulos / Būlus Yāzijī 187, 212 Yazigi, John X 187n21 Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) 32, 34, 36–40 Yekîtîya Star 34 Yemen 1, 12, 227–231, 235– 236, 239, 241, 244–252, 256–257 Yemen Arab Republic 230 Yemeni 247, 249 Young Turks 48n7, 49 Youssef, Ahmed 271 YouTube 103n3, 119n66, 158n20, 164 Z Zaīdī/Zaīdīsm 229–231, 246–248 Zeno, Basileus 166, 171 Zintan 74 Zionist 62, 199n42 Zurayk, Rami 137 Zureiq, Constantine 197