Metro Rail Projects In India: A Study In Project Planning [1 ed.] 0198073984, 9780198073987

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METRO RAIL PROJECTS IN INDIA

METRO RAIL PROJECTS IN INDIA A STUDY IN PROJECT PLANNING

M. Ramachandran With a Foreword by E. Sreedharan

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in India by Oxford University Press YMCA Library Building, 1, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110001, India © Oxford University Press 2011 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First published in 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

ePub ISBN-13: 978-0-19-908853-9 ePub ISBN-10: 0-19-908853-5

Typeset in 10.5/12.7 Adobe Jenson Pro By Excellent Laser Typesetters, Pitampura, Delhi 110 034 Printed in India by G. H. Prints Pvt Ltd., New Delhi 110 020

To my wife, Mallika and my daughters, Sarojini and Anupama who always stand by me solidly and encourage me to move ahead boldly

Contents Foreword by E. Sreedharan Preface List of Abbrevations 1.     Introduction 2.     Metro Rail System in Delhi 3.     Basic Technical Details 4.     Metro in Bangalore 5.     East–West Metro in Kolkata 6.     Chennai Metro 7.     Mumbai Metro 8.     Hyderabad Metro 9.     Jaipur Metro 10.   Metro for Kochi 11.   Some Global Comparisons 12.   Project Planning 13.   Conclusions

Bibliography Index

Foreword Advanced countries generally plan for a metro system when the population of a city exceeds one million and by the time the population reaches the two-million mark, a metro is generally in position. By 2015 India will have 20 cities with a population of more than two million. The distinction of possessing the first metro in the country has gone to Calcutta (now Kolkata) where a 26 km metro line is now in operation. Delhi is the next city with a currently operating metro network of 184 km. Metros are now under construction in five more cities of India. By 2015 India will rank as a developed country and by that reckoning 13 more cities should start planning for their metro systems. It has been increasingly realized that for our large cities, metro rail systems are the only solution to give a fast, reliable, and safe mode of public transport. There is no single publication available today covering the entire gamut of a metro project’s decision-making process. In this background it is a welcome initiative on part of M. Ramachandran to collect all the information related to a metro system and publish it in the form of a book. With the wide experience he has at policymaking levels in the broad infrastructure sector and particularly India’s urban sector, it is only appropriate that he has painstakingly put together the history as well as all economic and other aspects relating to the setting up and operationalization of metro projects in our major cities. Urban transport is the key to the economic growth and quality of life in a city. Dr Ramachandran’s keen interest in infrastructure development and urban improvement have resulted in giving a

significant thrust towards taking up new metro projects as well as expansion of the existing metro networks in the country. I am sure that this book, which comprehensively covers all the developments related to all the metro projects taken up so far or proposed in the country, would be of great value to planners, developers, policymakers, academicians, and all those associated with the sector. The author has his views on the process of decision-making as far as such projects are concerned, but what strikes one is the keenness with which he pursues his passion of documenting development subjects—this being his sixth book. The success of the Delhi Metro and lessons learnt from it is sure to drive many of the cities in the country to plan and implement metro systems. The investment made in a metro system usually comes back to the society in a period of six to eight years. I am happy to see that with this book a single publication becomes available on metros which, while being an authentic source of information regarding various aspects of the hows and whys of metros, is also a good guide for all those keen to plan metro systems for their cities. E. SREEDHARAN Managing Director, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, New Delhi

Preface The metro story—that is, the story of the metro rail system in some of our cities—is still an ongoing one. There are many questions which keep bothering an ordinary citizen. Why this heavy investment system? Do we really need these metros? Who and on what basis decides whether a city needs the system? If a metro really changes the lifestyle in a city, why is it not spreading to a larger number of cities where we really need the much desired relief from the hassles of congestion, pollution, and delays? How is it that while some cities of our country have taken their first steps to have a metro system, many do not even seem to be thinking about it? Those who have travelled abroad would have come back with very pleasant experiences of quick, comfortable travel by the metro/tube. During nearly four years as Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development, I have had the privilege of being part of policymaking for better urban transport systems in our country. As Chairman of metro joint ventures undertaken in four Indian cities, I have also had the opportunity of seeing the metro system evolve closely. I thought it appropriate to bring together my exposures and experiences on the subject of effective means of mass transit and this publication is the outcome of that thought. I hope this book will help many understand the inner workings of the system and will also lead to newer initiaties to have the metro system in more cities. I have been lucky in getting the help and support of many friends and colleagues in completing this endeavour. While I thank all of them, I would like to particularly acknowledge the generous help I got from Satish Kumar of Delhi Metro and Sanjay Bora. I remain

grateful to Nandan Nilekani and E. Sreedharan for their valuable encouragement. Last but not the least, I would like to thank Oxford University Press for publishing this work. M. RAMACHANDRAN

Abbreviations ADB AFC APSRTC ATO ATP ATS BBMC BDA BEML BEST BMRCL BMRTL BMTC BOLT BOOT BRTS BS BSNL BTS CBD CCTV

Asian Development Bank Automatic Fare Collection Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Automatic Train Operation Automatic Train Protection Automatic Train Supervision Bruhat Bangalore Municipal Corporation Bangalore Development Authority Bharat Earth Movers Limited Brihanmumbai Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit Limited Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation Build-Own-Lease-Transfer Build-Own-Operate-Transfer Bus Rapid Transit System British Standards Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Bangkok Transit System Central Business District Close-circuit Television

CDIA CDM CENELAC CER CMRL COMET CRRI CSTC CTC DDA DIAL DMRC DPR E&M EIA EIRR EMU FAR FIRR FSI GCDA GDP GLA GNCTD HDA HKD HKSE HUDCO HV IDBI IDC

City Development Initiative for Asia Clean Development Mechanism European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization Certified Emission Reduction Chennai Metro Rail Limited Community of Metros Central Road Research Institute Calcutta State Transport Corporation Calcutta Tramway Corporation Delhi Development Authority Delhi International Airport Limited Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Detailed Project Report Electrical & Mechanical Environmental Impact Assessment Economic Internal Rate of Return Electric Multiple Unit Floor Area Rate Financial Internal Rate of Return Floor Space Index Greater Cochin Development Authority Gross Domestic Product Greater London Authority Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Hyderabad Development Authority Hong Kong Dollar Hong Kong Stock Exchange Housing and Urban Development Corporation High Voltage Industrial Development Bank of India Interest during Construction

IEC IIT-D IIT-M IL&FS IRR IS ITU-T

JBIC JDA JETRO JICA JMRCL JNNURM JV KMC KMDA KPTCL KRC LRTS LTA MCH MD MMR MMRDA MoU MRTS

International Electrotechnical Commission Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Internal Rate of Revenue Indian Standards International Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Standardization Sector Japan Bank for International Cooperation Jaipur Development Authority Japan External Trade Organization Japan International Cooperation Agency Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Limited Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission Joint Venture Kolkata Municipal Corporation Kolkata Metropolitan Development Area Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited Konkan Railway Corporation Light Rail Transit System Land Transport Authority (Singapore) Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad Managing Director Mumbai Metropolitan Region Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority Memorandum of Understanding Mass Rapid Transit System

MTCC MTO MTP MTRC NCR NCU NFPA NOIDA NUTP O&M OEC OECF PHPDT PIL PIS POM PPP PSU REC RITES S&T SCADA SEZ SIAM SKD SPV TBM TCPO

Metropolitan Transport Corporation of Chennai Metropolitan Transport Organization Mass Transit Project Metro Transit Railway Corporation National Capital Region National Commission on Urbanization National Fire Protection Organization New Okhla Development Authority National Urban Transport Policy Operation & Maintenance Organization for Economic Cooperation Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Japan Peak House Peak Direction Trips/Traffic Public Interest Litigation Passenger Information System Passenger Operated Machines Public–Private Partnership Public Sector Undertaking Regional Engineering College Rail India Technical and Economic Services Limited Signalling & Telecom Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Special Economic Zone Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers Singapore Dollar Special Purpose Vehicle Tunnel Boring Machine Town and Country Planning Organization

TCS TRTA UN UP USD UT VGF WBSTC

Tata Consultancy Services Teito Rapid Transit Authority United Nations Uttar Pradesh United States Dollar Union Territory Viability Gap Funding West Bengal State Transport Corporation

1  Introduction Globally, for the first time in history, more people live in cities than in rural areas. Since these cities contribute substantially to a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and growth, they need high quality infrastructure to facilitate the movement of people and goods and the delivery of basic services to their population. However, the challenge of delivering such infrastructural improvement is very complex. It is not uncommon for cities to have roads, rail network, sewer lines, and hospitals that were built decades or even centuries ago. The problem of inadequate infrastructure holds true for transitional cities which are struggling to cope with demographic change as well as emerging cities where even basic services are lacking. The issue that need to be addressed in this context are complex, with no easy available solution. The solution should address aspects relating to funding, management, maintenance, the efficient running of services, and the need to find infrastructure solutions that are environmentally sustainable. If the residents of any city are asked to list five major areas which need urgent attention and improvement, transportation would come first, followed by electricity, water and waste water, healthcare and safety, and security. If cities are the engines of growth, it is the transport network that keeps these engines working efficiently. When roads and railways are seized by too much traffic, or when ports and airports become overloaded, the economy bears additional costs. In the UK, where many cities (including London) are struggling to keep pace with travel demand, the Confederation of British Industry has estimated that the cost of congestion is £ 20 billion a year.

SOME GLOBAL EXAMPLES Transport problems affect cities at all levels of development, although they may manifest in different ways. While old or obsolete systems pose problems, inadequate investment in transport infrastructure compounds the problem as an undeveloped or an underdeveloped transport system impacts both the richer and poorer sections of the population. With its ageing rail and underground systems and an estimated 30 million journeys taking place every day, London is a good example of how transport investment over the past two decades has barely been sufficient to maintain the system. According to a report, there is acute congestion and overcrowding on all transport networks of London. The city has a population of 7.5 million and only 13 per cent of land space is available as roads. Of the total city trips, as many as 11 million are undertaken by cars and motorcycles. Car ownership, which was 48 per cent of the total vehicle ownership in 1971, had gone up to 65 per cent in 2001. The combined number of daily trips by three other prominent modes of transport, namely underground (4.7 million trips), bus (4.5 million trips), and national rail (1.6 million trips) does not equal the total journeys by cars and motorcycles. With more and more personalized modes of transport taking away road space, central area traffic speed had come down to only 10 mph in the city. Most cities can relate to this situation and it raises very fundamental questions about national planning, in particular about project planning: Who is responsible for the basic issues of city transportation? How can one ensure that regular analysis and listing of possible investment requirements enter the development agenda in cities? To what extent would the federal governments have to participate in the process? And to what extent do cities themselves have the wherewithal to address these problems upfront, not only in terms of identifying issues and their solutions but also in terms of prioritizing and channelizing the huge investments required?

THE SINGAPORE MODEL

We could look to Singapore, whose sound land transport policies have helped establish an efficient and extensive transport network, for some answers. With only 12 per cent of land surface as roads, when the public transport share declined from 67 per cent in 1997 to 63 per cent in 2004, the Land Transport Master Plan committed itself to reversing this decline. It kept a target of a public transport mode share of 70 per cent for the morning peak hours by the year 2020. A survey showed that, between the years 1997 and 2004, the number of car trips in the city had increased by 23 per cent, which was more than double the 10 per cent increase in car population during the same period. It was stated upfront that for a city like Singapore, it would be a big strain on the road network if everyone opted for a car. They started managing road congestion in a holistic manner. This ranged from road pricing as well as the more radical solution of a massive tax of over 100 per cent on new car purchases. Other policy tools such as the vehicle quota system and electronic road pricing are also used to control number of personal vehicles owned by the population and to manage demand on congested roads. The following characteristics of the city’s transport management offer various relevant lessons: •  Public transport is the most efficient people mover and also an environmentally sustainable travel mode. •    The transport system must constantly evolve to cater to changing demographics and the higher expectations of people. •    Public transportation must be planned and built from the commuter’s point of view. •    A hub and spoke model is adopted for the public transport network which involves relying on buses or Light Rail Transit System (LRTS) to serve as feeder services, helping bring commuters to Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) stations and bus interchanges. •    Along with improving public transport, where feasible, road network should also be expanded.

•    Although public transport should remain affordable to the masses, keeping fares at artificially low levels is not feasible; they should therefore be allowed to go up in small regular steps to keep pace with inflation. Lower income group commuters should be extended other benefits such as public transport vouchers. The role of the Land Transport Authority (LTA) in Singapore, which is mandated with the task of overseeing the land transport system of the city state, is significant in many respects. It is a model that cities of developing countries should actively look at for an integrated land transport system. The LTA undertook a year-long review of the 1996 White Paper on Land Transport and then released the ‘Land Transport Master Plan: A People-centred Land Transport System’ in January 2008. An extensive public consultation exercise was undertaken. Members of the public and other stakeholders were invited to share their views. An online survey was made to get public feedback on the proposals. The master plan outlines three strategic thrusts which will shape land transport development and related policies over the next 10–15 years. It aims at building a more people-centred land transport system to support a vibrant and liveable city. All this is an outcome of a realization at the policymaking level that an efficient land transport system plays a critical role in developing a liveable city.

URBANIZATION IN INDIA The 2001 Census of India shows that out of the total population of 1,027 million, as many as 285 million (27.8 per cent of the total population) live in urban areas. As per the 2011 Census figures, urban population is 377 million (31.6 per cent of the total population). The McKinsey study of April 2010 on India’s urban awakening states that in 2008, an estimated 340 million people were found to be already living in urban India, making it 30 per cent of the total population. The study projects that the population of India’s cities will reach 590 million by 2030, a kind of urban transformation of a scale and at a speed unmatched globally except for China. The 2001 Census showed a total of 4,378 urban centres in India. Nearly

63 per cent of all the Class I city (population of one lakh and above) population lived in the 35 million plus population cities. Three cities have a population more than ten million (called megacities in an Asian Development Bank [ADB] study), and four others have crossed the four-million mark. Three of the 12 megacities in Asia are in fact in India. It has also been pointed out that in developing countries, most megacities grow faster than their infrastructure, which results in an uncontrolled urban sprawl that destroys established communities and increases the cost of services. In the global context, the scale of India’s urbanization is going to be immense: by the year 2030, it will have 68 cities with a population of more than one million, 13 cities with more than four million people, and six megacities with a population of ten million or more. Urban India is expected to generate nearly 70 per cent of the GDP by the year 2030. The McKinsey study draws attention to the seriousness of India’s urban agenda. Good cities offer a certain quality of life to their citizens and are an attractive proposition for companies. Cities are also vital for funding development because they generate the lion’s share of India’s tax revenue—about 80–85 per cent. Though urban India has attracted investment on the basis of its strong growth, it is failing many of its citizens. A comparison based on the major quality of life indicators shows that Indian cities fall far short of delivering even a basic standard of living. As the urban population and its income rises, the demand for every basic service will increase five to seven fold. If India continues to invest in urban infrastructure at its current rate (which is very low as per international standards) for the next 20 years, the urban infrastructure will fall substantially short of what is necessary to sustain even prosperous cities. Water supply for the average citizen could drop from an average of 105 litres to only 65 litres a day. With the increase in private car ownership, shortcomings in the transportation infrastructure will have the potential to create urban gridlock. India already has a peak vehicular density of 170 vehicles per lane km, leading to an average peak morning commute between one-and-a-half to two hours. This is a serious pressure point that threatens to compromise urban productivity.

The Wilbur Smith Study on Traffic and Transportation Policies commissioned by the Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India in 2008 points out that although circumstances differ across cities in India, certain basic trends which determine transport demand—such as a substantial increase in urban population, household incomes, and industrial and commercial activities—are the same. These have exacerbated the demand for transport, a demand that most Indian cities have been unable to meet. The main reason for this, according to the study, is the prevailing imbalance in modal split besides inadequate transport infrastructure and its sub-optimal use. The major areas of concern are as follows: •  Public transport systems have not been able to keep pace with the rapid and substantial increases in demand. •  Bus services in particular have deteriorated. •  Passengers have turned to personalized modes and intermediate public transport. •  The economic boom has proved a great opportunity for an urban dweller to acquire personalized modes. (As per the Annual Report of SIAM [Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers] for 2006–7, total passenger vehicle sales, including cars, went up from 6,75,116 in 2001–2 to 13,79,698 in 2006–7.) Total twowheeler sales reached close to 80 lakh in 2006–7. •  Urban road chaos is increasing day by day with ever-increasing car ownership. There is a serious warning here: unless these problems are remedied, poor mobility can become a dampener to economic growth and also cause deterioration of the quality of life. Streets could well become parking lots (which is already the case in many cities). Some of the megacity characteristics as far as vehicle addition and consequent effects are concerned would illustrate this further. In Delhi, 1,200 vehicles get added to roads each day. The 5.4 million vehicles registered in Delhi as on 31 March 2008 alone equal the total number of vehicles in Kolkata, Mumbai, and Chennai combined. Though only a quarter of Delhi’s population owns cars and two-

wheelers, which together convey less than 20 per cent of its people, yet the city roads are choked. Average travel speed on major corridors is 16 kmph. Mumbai has the lowest level of car ownership, with 29 cars per 1,000 residents. In Mumbai, as far as modal share is concerned, walking makes up a huge 55 per cent of all forms of travel. The share of cars is only 5 per cent. Local trains are used by 22 per cent of the population, while 14 per cent uses buses. Average commuting time in the city is 28 minutes, which is less than both New York and London, both of which have an average commuting time of about 40 minutes. Table 1.1 gives an overall idea about the population, basic patterns, and modal share of transport for the seven megacities of India.

URBAN TRANSPORTATION IN INDIA Urban transport unfortunately does not figure as a subject in the Indian Constitution. Since transport and urban development are both mandated to the states, any action regarding urban transport issues is expected at the state or city level. Again, at the state level, there is no clear demarcation of complex urban transport issues. This is evident from the fact that anything related to transport is normally handled by the transport department of the state. The eighteen items of governance which the states are expected to transfer to the third level of governance, that is the urban local bodies, also do not list urban transport as a specific mandate. In this confused scenario, in effect there is no requirement or even inclination to look at city transport issues in detail on the part of either the state government or the city functionaries. Transport departments are traditionally concerned with meeting the annual revenue targets set by the state government, handling permits and licenses, and enforcement. Here, the emphasis is on long-distance bus services, issuing driving licences, registration, permits, etc. The cities already handle complicated issues related to basic services like water supply, solid waste management, sewerage, etc. However, they neither have the mandate nor the capability to look at improvements needed in city transportation. Even if they want to do something in this area, there

are issues of jurisdiction and bureaucracy. For example, a state-level transport corporation may be handling city transport, route finalization and issue of permits would fall in the domain of regional transport authorities, enforcement with the transport department, while suburban train services (if they exist) are directly with the Railway Board. If at all the city wants to think and act in terms of integration of land use and transport planning, the matter would quite often be handled by a remote state-level town planning department. TABLE 1.1 Basic Transport Patterns in Indian Megacities

If this is the state of affairs, how do we move forward? Fortunately, some initiatives have been taken by the Union Ministry of Urban Development. It has issued advisories to all the states, urging them to assign urban transport to their respective urban development departments, to support the preparation of city-specific comprehensive mobility plans, have a statutory body such as a unified metropolitan transport authority to coordinate and guide all city transport related matters (at least for large cities), have

dedicated lanes for buses, create a dedicated city-level transport fund, and so on. When it is a question of taking up a metro system, no city can take this initiative on its own since it is capital-intensive. So it is left to the state to take such an initiative; it depends on the keenness of the state governments to seek the support and help of the central government where necessary. The Government of India has long before recognized that urban transport is a separate area that needs attention. So in 1986 this subject was allocated to the Union Ministry of Urban Development. Until then there was no ministry focusing on this, as the Ministry of Railways handled suburban rail systems only and the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways confined themselves to the Motor Vehicle Act and certain related provisions. With the mandate given to the Ministry of Urban Development, the Delhi Metro got a push, new metro initiatives were supported for as many as six cities, and the funding support made available from this ministry resulted in various cities drawing incomprehensive mobility plans.

National Urban Transport Policy One such key initiative of the Ministry of Urban Development was drafting the National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP) and finalizing it in 2006. Before finalizing it was discussed at a conference of chief secretaries in June 2005. The objective of the policy is to ensure safe and sustainable access to jobs, education, recreation, and other needs for the growing number of city residents. The policy seeks to achieve this by: •  Incorporating urban transportation as an important parameter at the urban planning stage. •    Encouraging integrated land use and transport planning in all cities. •    Improving access to markets and the various factors of production for businesses. •    Investing in transport systems that encourage greater use of public transport and non-motorized modes instead of personal

motor vehicles. •    Establishing regulatory mechanisms that allow a level playing field for all operators of transport services. •  Reducing pollution levels. •  Promoting the use of cleaner technologies. •    Innovation in the use of land as a resource in order to raise finances for investment in urban transport infrastructure. The policy also listed the strategy that needs to be adopted to achieve these objectives. This would consist of measures such as the following: •    Integrate land use and transport planning in the master plan/town planning process. •  Support of up to 50 per cent of the cost involved in developing such plans. •  Equitable allocation of road space focusing on people and not on vehicles. Reserving lanes and corridors exclusively for public transport and non-motorized modes. •    Prioritize the use of public transport by promoting investment and making it more attractive. •  Pricing public transport at different levels of service. •    Encourage all proven technologies for public transport without promoting any specific one. •    Financing for high cost mass transit systems through the mechanism of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and financial support either in the form of equity or one time viability gap financing. This would be subject to a ceiling of 20 per cent of the capital cost of the project after evaluating various parameters. •  Restore the normal role of para transit. •    Give priority to non-motorized transport by the construction of cycle tracks and pedestrian paths. Construction of such tracks

and paths would be supported under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). •    Parking facilitation in a way that encourages the use of public transport. •    Freight traffic movement coordination through dedicated corridors. •    Set up unified metropolitan transport authorities in all million plus cities. This would facilitate coordinated planning, implementation, and management of urban transport programmes and systems. Such authorities would need statutory backing in order to be effective. •  Encourage the development of institutional capacity at the state level through the platform of JNNURM. •    Encourage research, development, and commercialization of cleaner technologies. •  Innovative financing mechanisms using land as a resource. •  Encourage a more liberal use of the private sector, especially in activities like operation and maintenance of parking facilities, construction and management of terminal facilities. •  Increase public awareness and cooperation. •  Take up pilot projects to demonstrate the potential benefits from the policy measures suggested. This could be done in a sample set of cities drawn from different regions and city types so that tested models of best practices can be established for replication. The National Mission on Sustainable Habitat, one among the eight national missions approved in 2010 by the National Council for Climate Change, will encourage preparation of comprehensive mobility plans that enable cities to undertake long-term, energy efficient, and cost effective transport planning. Capacity building in transport planning and land use integration, and optimization of various public transport modes would be one of the enabling measures.

Though the policies are formulated by the Government of India, it is up to the states to implement them. The central government can only monitor progress and extend support wherever possible and desired. At the most the centre can insist that certain urban transport sector reforms must be taken up as part of any funding arrangement. This was attempted when the Government of India partly funded the procurement of good quality buses as part of an economic stimulus package launched in January 2009. Proposals of cities with projects for bus procurement were approved, with the centre agreeing to provide grants ranging from 35–90 per cent of the total bus cost, depending on the population characteristic of the city. This was contingent on the cities’ commitment to undertake certain long overdue urban transport reforms. The central government approved the procurement of a total of 15,260 buses (consisting of low floor, AC, and ordinary buses) for 61 mission cities at an estimated total cost of Rs 4,725 crore. The centre committed to providing Rs 2,092 crore as a grant, with the balance to be raised by the concerned state governments or city bodies. This was a big step in changing the face of urban transportation in the country. It led to a visible change in terms of the introduction of modern, low floor buses, introduction of IT in bus transportation, and even paving the way for dedicated SPVs at the city level in a good number of cities. But the fact remains that all these are one-off measures which do not become part of an overall, comprehensive scheme to change the urban transport scenario.

Options for Congested Cities City and transport planners differ when it comes to workable options for improving a city’s public transport. While the population increases and the city expands, the road length remains more or less the same and the city is a major contributor to the growth process. What is clear is that cities with only 10–12 per cent of their area under roads cannot continue supporting unfettered motorization. Further, once the city is established it becomes very expensive (apart from its social and environmental consequences) to superimpose additional road

infrastructure. It is said that in most cities the emphasis of traffic policy is to keep the traffic moving, which in effect leads to the widening of roads, cars getting priority road space, and pedestrians and cyclists getting crowded out. Motor vehicle ownership and use is growing faster than the population of cities. The pressure on urban systems is thus constantly increasing; the Singapore example shows that unless vehicle use is dramatically restricted through well formulated policies, traffic levels and congestion are likely to increase with income. In such a situation, reduction of road congestion becomes the motivating factor for adopting MRTS. Dinesh Mohan points out that the prevailing mythology is that the construction of metro rail systems will somehow solve all future problems. This remains the one point agenda of almost all transport consultants in India. Unfortunately, he says, the fact is that underground or elevated rail (or road) systems have not solved any of the problems of congestion, pollution, or access for a majority of city residents in any city in the world, especially new cities. But E. Sreedharan, the man behind the success of Delhi Metro, states that a rail-based metro system is inescapable in cities with large population and as the population of a city grows, the share of public transport, road- or rail-based, should increase. All over the world, the practice is that when the population of a city reaches the one-million mark, the studies and investigations needed for a metro system are begun so that by the time the population reaches two-million mark, one or two metro lines are already in operation. While their approach to the problem could vary, the solution to road congestion and constrained road space has to be either tight controls on car use, etc., or encouraging other forms of preferred public transport to serve a larger number of users. The reduction in road congestion, with its consequent economic and environmental benefits, is usually listed as a motivating factor for investment in MRTS. Rail-based systems are preferred for their capacity to carry large numbers of commuters and greater convenience when compared to buses. Of course, there is an argument that congestion is rarely reduced. While planning an MRTS for any city, the context of a strategic structural plan has to be kept in mind. Only then can the

sprawl of business activity and the consequential economies of agglomeration in production be avoided. The more successful metros, like the Singapore Metro, have been developed this way. For the new system to be effective appropriate steps should also be taken to have proper feeder services. Selection of the appropriate MRTS technology is a critical decision. Table 1.2 gives the relative characteristics of various public transport technologies (as given in the NUTP). Busways are the least expensive form of MRTS. This has been tried in countries like Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. Buses generally have a ‘bottom of the market’ image; there have also been questions over the capacity. Some of these concerns have been addressed by the Latin American countries where the bus system has caught on. Welldesigned 23-metre-long articulated buses are used in Curitiba, while electric traction is employed to run such a system in Sao Paulo. The original four-lane busway in Bogota managed 36,000 persons per peak hour, though at a reduced speed level. Electric trolleys are used in Quito. These initiatives show that a strong political commitment and effective public sector planning so as to overcome impediments to finance, ensure priority treatment for public transport in traffic management, and a degree of stability and non-partisanship in policy would be needed if the arrangement is to succeed. If Bogota’s Trans Milenio Bus Rapid Transit Systems draws the world’s attention today, it is because in 1998 the then mayor, Enrique Penalosa, took the risk of telling his people that a metro was not affordable. They decided to opt for a modern, self-sustainable, state-of-the-art bus system. Today, Trans Milenio with an 82 km network carries 1.4 million passengers every day. TABLE 1.2 Characteristics of Transport Technologies

Bus Rapid Transit Systems (BRTS) have been taken up in Indian cities also. The details are given in Table 1.3. Road congestion and loss of time are making people think in terms of alternatives using the road itself. It is interesting to note that a company in the southern Chinese town of Shenzhen has designed a vehicle that moves on the road but doesn’t take up any road space. Shenzhen Huashi Future Parking Equipment is reported to have developed an extra wide (6 m) and extra tall vehicle that can carry up to 1,200 passengers. This vehicle resembles a train, with a passenger compartment that spans two traffic lanes. It is positioned on a pair of fence-like stilts, which leaves the road underneath clear for ordinary cars. This vehicle is designed for a fixed route and would have an average speed of 40 kmph. This arrangement does not require either elevated tracks or extensive tunnelling. This ‘straddling bus’ can ferry as many passengers as 40 normal buses and can save 860 tons of fuel a year, preventing 2,640 tons of carbon emission. Mentougou district of Beijing is testing this technology and the proposal is to have a 9-km route by the end of this year. If the test proves to be

successful, then it is to cover a total of 186 km. One bus is expected to cost about USD 7.4 million. TABLE 1.3 BRTS in Indian Cities   City

Length (in km)

Cost (in Rs crore)

  Ahmedabad   Bhopal   Delhi   Indore   Jaipur      Pimpri Chinchwad   Pune         Rajkot   Vijayawada   Visakhapatanam

   12 + 46    21.715    14.5    11.45    7+    19    23    13.2+    52.5+    36    29    15.5    42.8

  87.60 + 405.72   237.76   190   98.45   75.15   144.04   312.14   62.32+   476.15+   268.65   110   152.64   452.93

Another form of MRTS is the LRTS, which ranges from conventional tramways to the sophisticated, elevated, and completely segregated system as in Singapore. Light Rapid Transit is expanding in industrialized countries in cities with low corridor volumes. Its role seems to be less in cities of developing countries, where the need is for adequate capacity and speed for low income public transport passengers. If it operates at-grade without priority, the system really has no performance advantage over busways. The advantages of this system are that there is less pollution impact and it signals a more permanent commitment to public transport. However, it is an expensive proposition considering the volume and speed it offers. With the exception of the conventional tram systems of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, this system exists in relatively wealthy cities like Hong Kong, Singapore, Tunis, Kuala Lumpur, and Buenos Aires. As of now, it can only be said that LRTS is a low-

capacity prestige system of doubtful value in poorer cities in the early stages of development. Suburban railways are best suited for radial journeys. Although even in relatively well served cities like Mumbai, Moscow, Johannesburg, etc. they cover less than 10 per cent trips they still play an important role. The at-grade crossings they normally have can reduce their speed and capacity. In cases when there is track sharing with freight or long-distance train services as well as frequent grade crossings, this system leads to a reduction in capacity. In spite of all this, several such systems are good candidates for conversion into surface metros at a fraction of the cost of underground or elevated metro systems. Several Asian cities such as Mumbai, Delhi, Manila, Bangkok, and African cities like Abidjan, Maputo, and Cape Town could be converted thus. Another problem is regarding who runs the suburban services. If it is the national railways, then suburban train systems are given low priority and are ill coordinated with other urban transport systems.Some attempts have been made to address such issues. Giving concessions to the private sector in Buenos Aires helped revitalize the suburban system. In Brazil, transfer from the federal to the local system along with a government funded rehabilitation programme has improved the services in major cities. Metros figure as the most expensive form of MRTS but also have the largest capacity and best possible performance. The first railbased metro system started on the completion of the London Metro in 1853, followed by the first elevated railway in New York in 1868. The Paris network started in 1900. It is reported there are now a total of 120 such systems in Europe, Asia, and America. In Africa, Cairo is the only city with a metro system. In 2002, metro networks the world over carried some 150 million passengers per day or 34 times the average daily number of air passengers. With ten car train sets and headways of two minutes, the Hong Kong–China line has carried as many as 80,000 persons per peak hour. Sao Paulo’s east line carries more than 60,000 persons per peak hour. In our country, the Delhi metro (which so far has the largest network in India) now has a daily ridership figure of about 1.2 million.

WORLDWIDE PRACTICES IN DEVELOPING METROS It is a recognized fact that rail-based city mass transport systems are not commercially viable as stand-alone systems but still a large number of cities have opted for a metro system just because that is the workable alternative. Though metros are the most expensive form of MRTS per route km, they have the greatest capacity and best possible performance. Many metros are designed for capacities ranging from 30,000 to 40,000 Peak Hour Peak Direction Trips (PHPDT). There are exceptions—Sao Paulo’s east line has consistently carried above 60,000 PHPDT. A list of the cities with metro is given here in Table 1.4. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 delineate the cities with LRTS and the ones with monorail. In addition, some cities have good BRTS systems also (see Table 1.7). Financing metro systems and supporting them in operation are issues critical to this mode of public transport. Traditionally, federal or city governments have initiated and supported such ventures, although of late there have been some instances of private finance being mobilized as well. The two systems in Kuala Lumpur and one each in Bangkok and Manila are examples of private financing. The Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) of Hong Kong which was established as a government corporation was partially privatized in June 2000. It was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) in October 2000 with 23 per cent of its issued share capital held by private shareholders. As a part of market-oriented efforts to raise finances, the corporation issued the first ever retail bond to be offered by a Hong Kong listed company in May, 2002. It raised a sum of HKD 3.5 billion. Tokyo’s Teito Rapid Transport Authority (TRTA) was privatized in April 2004 to form the Tokyo Metro Co. Ltd. It is the largest subway operator in Asia, carrying 6.2 million passengers every day. The Airport Line in New Delhi is another example of part financing by the private sector with responsibility for operations. The first and second corridors of Mumbai have gone the private partner way and Hyderabad has also taken the same route. The problem in cities like Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and Manila seems to be a shortfall

in ridership. Revenue risk in the Manila project had to be handled by the government in the end. The Kuala Lumpur projects needed restructuring, with the government bailing out the private partner. And the viability of the first purely privately financed Bangkok Transit System (BTS) remains to be proved. A different approach to private involvement has been tried in the existing metro systems in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. In the case of the former, contracts provide for government financing for major rehabilitation and a provision for operating subsidies. In the Brazilian cities, the federal government took charge of rehabilitation before giving concessions under the terms of transfer to the state governments. TABLE 1.4 Cities with Metro Networks Cities

Route length (km) Asian Cities

Tokyo Seoul Shanghai Osaka Guangzhou Beijing Singapore Hong Kong Busan Oslo Taipei Delhi Kuala Lumpur Manila Kobe Kolkata

292 287 145 130 116 114 109 91 90 85 80 65 56 45 41 18 African Cities

Cairo Ankara

65 60

Istanbul

54 European Cities

London Madrid Moscow Paris Berlin Stockholm St Petersburg Hamburg Munich Milan Barcelona Frankfurt Athens Amsterdam Budapest

408 280 278 211 146 108 104 101 98 85 84 58 55 62 33 North American Cities

New York Chicago Washington Los Angeles Atlanta Boston Toronto Montreal Vancouver

368 173 169 127 80 74.5 70 65 49 South American Cities

Mexico City Sao Paulo Santiago Cleveland Miami Baltimore Porto Alegre Buenos Aires

201 105 82 30.6 36 30.9 60 48

Total

5,823 TABLE 1.5 Cities with LRTS

Cities

Route length (km) Asian Cities

Kuala Lumpur Manila Hakodate Hong Kong Kagoshima Nagasaki Kolkata (Tram)

29 30 18 13 13 11.5 62 African Cities

Tunis Abuja Cairo

29.7 15 19 European Cities

Bordeaux Manchester Nottingham Gothenburg Milan Greenable Strasbourg

22.4 37 15 190 286 19.2 25 North American Cities

San Francisco Los Angeles San Diego Portland Dallas St Louis Boston Houston

114.4 35 81.6 80 76.48 73.6 50 13 South American Cities

Rio de Janeiro Frankfurt Hanover Baltimore Total

14 70.6 131.3 40.5 1,615.28 TABLE 1.6 Cities with Monorail

Cities

Route length (km) Asian Cities China

Shanghai Chongqing

30.5 19 Japan

Chiba Kitakyushu Okinawa Osaka Shonan Tokyo

15.5 8.8 12.8 21.2 6.6 16.9 Malaysia

Kuala Lumpur

8.6 Sunway

Jurong Sentosa

1.7 2.1 European Cities

Wuppertal Dresden Russia Moscow

13.3 0.3 4.7 North American Cities

Las Vegas Disney Land-California Disney Land-Florida

6.3 1.5 2.5 Oceania

Sydney Queensland Total

3.6 2 177.9 TABLE 1.7 Cities with BRTS

Cities

Route length (km) Asian Cities

Beijing Chongqing Guangzhou Shanghai Jakarta

16 15 23 250 95 Oceania Cities

Adelaide Auckland Brisbane Perth Sydney

12 8.5 22.5 22.4 90 North American Cities

Calgary Montreal Vancouver Los Angeles Miami San Jose

42 44 40 70 36 41.8 South American Cities

Bogota Curitiba Guatemala Lima Mobiilion Quito Porto Alegre San Francisco

84.7 64.6 11 32.3 22 42 45 167

Santiago Sao Paulo Total

26.3 250 1,573.1

When it comes to raising finances what needs to be addressed carefully is how exactly to capture the impact and benefit of rise in land value along the corridor. Permitting extra floor space index (FSI) along the metro corridor is a method being tried in cities like Mumbai and Bangalore in India. The issue here is that since concentrated development does not take place because of fragmented land ownership (particularly near metro stations), the development gain is not substantial enough to be a significant contributor to metro financing. Even in Hong Kong where land ownership is concentrated, direct contribution to the public funding of metros is only 10–15 per cent of the total capital cost. The French authorities have set up a public transport financing system known as the transport tax. This is a specific tax paid by employers, companies, and administrations in both the public and private sectors with a workforce of over nine and located in an urban transport area with more than 1,00,000 inhabitants. Tax revenues are assigned to public transport and used to finance operating costs and investments. In the provinces, during 2000, transport tax generated was 1.74 billion euros, which represented 41 per cent of all operating and investment costs of provincial urban transport. While these are issues which are yet to be resolved effectively, the fact remains that metro systems are today becoming an urban structuring tool. Mobility policy is developed around it and it is a key factor in improving the quality of life. The metro remains the most acceptable mode of public transport on a large scale in crowded cities. It is termed the most efficient transport mode in terms of energy consumption and space occupancy. It does not produce any local pollutant emissions or greenhouse gases. As a transport mode which runs mostly underground, the metro frees surface space for developments that lead to improvement in the quality of urban life. Also, it provides for the development of residential zones alongside economic activities. This results in other transport modes also

converging. Modal integration is reflected in the development of common fares. Yet another plus point is that it seamlessly incorporates new technologies to improve its performance. Metro systems are also heavy infrastructure opportunities. In addition to huge investments needed to build and maintain them, property and real estate development along metro lines and around metro stations attract investment. It is because of the spreading metro culture in India that companies like BEML (formerly Bharat Earth Movers Ltd) and Bombardier have set up rolling stock units within the country. Overall, metros are a safe, affordable mass transport mode, which also facilitate the sustainable development of large cities. The Wilbur Smith study on traffic and transportation policies and strategies in urban areas of India covered 30 major cities. The report observes that the share of personalized modes of transport (especially two-wheelers) has gone up by leaps and bounds, while public transport has dwindled. Some public transport services have even been pushed out of business. Consequently, street congestion has increased dramatically and overall speed on major corridors has dropped to around 22 kmph. The study suggests focusing transport supply in the mass transport domain, be it in the form of buses, BRTS, monorails, LRTS, or metro systems. Urbanization in developing counties has become the most significant demographic transformation of the present century leading to restructuring of national economies and reshaping of the lives of billions of people. About 90 per cent of global urban growth now takes place in developing countries and it is expected that by the year 2030, the entire built-up urban area in developing countries will triple. This has significance because historically urbanization has propelled the growth of national economies. On an average about 75 per cent of global economic production takes place in cities. In many developing countries, the urban share of national GDP already surpasses 60 per cent. It is in this context that the point that efficient and reliable urban transport systems are crucial for Indian cities is emphasized. Services and manufacturing industries concentrate around major urban areas and they require efficient and reliable

urban transport systems. Thus, due attention must be paid to proper urban transport systems. The 340 million people estimated to be living in Indian cities as of 2008 represent a microcosm of the nation as a whole, having a mix of communities, cultures, professions, and income classes. For all of them, faster and safe movement is important. The paradox is that while the demand for urban transport has been growing rapidly, the supply of urban transport infrastructure has not kept pace. It is in this context that an analysis of the metro rail initiatives in various major cities of India has been made in the following chapters. While those against metro systems may continue to argue for more efficient road-based systems, one fundamental question remains. The question is when city populations reach three million and above, with road space remaining more or less constant and with the ill effects of pollution and increased energy use becoming more prominent, do we have any option other than to go above or below the ground? In the Indian context, starting with megacities, proper urban planning and transport framework will have to provide for a mass movement option. This would facilitate higher levels of growth and organized city life. Other cities in the million-plus category will have to proactively plan for more relevant and comfortable public transport systems.

Project Planning Projects are the lifeline of a country’s developmental health. It is important for projects to be properly planned and integrated into the national scheme. Project planning is a process which consists of stages like identification, preparation (including feasibility studies and design), appraisal-sensitivity analysis, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and recommendations. Unless the complete process of project planning is done with methodological vigour, rather than on an ad hoc basis, investments made by the state will yield little or nothing. This study of metro projects in India is an attempt to review how effectively the project planning process has been employed in the case of the metro project in India and lessons that can be drawn

from experience. Projects need a plan and a plan needs projects and this book also looks at how best this integration is taking place.

2  Metro Rail System in Delhi The metro rail system was first introduced in India in Kolkata by the Indian Railways. It only became functional after a long gestation period of 16 years in 1985. There does not seem to have been a clear policy as to what should be done when a city expands and congestion rules. Is there a role for the central government, especially in view of the fact that these large/megacities generate a substantial part of the GDP of the country? When should state governments or city systems actively look at alternate systems of mass transport for the city? The Government of India decided to allocate urban transport as a subject to the Ministry of Urban Development in 1986. This was a much needed step in the right direction because someone needed to look at what had to be done to promote efficient public transport in our cities.

Taking up MRTS in Delhi The population of Delhi crossed eight million by 1991. Accepting projections that this would cross 13 million by the year 2001, an alternate system of public transport was considered necessary for Delhi. Delhi did not have an MRTS. A ring rail was introduced in Delhi in 1975 that covered a distance of 36 km. Though it was substantially upgraded by the time of the 1982 Asian Games, it still served the purpose of avoiding lines for the mainline trains and commuter service being provided was very insignificant. There were only four trains to and fro every day and they catered to only around

6,000 persons. It may be recalled that Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) suburban services were introduced in Bombay in 1928 and in Chennai and Kolkata in 1931 and 1951 respectively. The population of those cities was far less at that time. Various studies were conducted from time to time on the need for an MRTS for Delhi. Some of the important studies include: •  In 1971, a study was conducted by the Central Road Research Institute (CRRI) which recommended MRTS on two corridors, with one feeder connection to the ring railway line. The entire proposed system was to cover over 51.3 km. •    In June 1974, a metropolitan transport team set up by the Planning Commission recommended 76 km of service corridors and 36 km of underground corridor. •  In 1975, the Metropolitan Transport Organization (MTO) of the Railways recommended a service network of 97 km and an underground network of 36 km by 1981, with an expansion of both networks by the turn of the century. •  An inter-ministerial group set up by the Ministry of Railways in 1980 recommended a light rail transit system of 36 km on the east-west corridor. •    Yet another task force constituted by the Ministry of Urban Development in 1987 agreed that the east–west corridor of 36 km should have priority. A light rail transit system or a magnetic gravitation system was suggested in view of considerations of cost. •    The Delhi Master Plan 2001 envisaged a rail system as an alternative to the bus system and recommended 200 km of light rail corridors all over the city. It is worth noting that it was the Town and Country Planning Organization (TCPO) which undertook the first survey on the problems of transport in Delhi in 1957 while preparing a master plan for Delhi.

Traffic surveys conducted by the prospective planning wing of the DDA in 1981 put a daily total of 76.75 lakh of intra-zonal and interzonal trips in Delhi. Out of these, 38.97 lakh were vehicular trips and the remaining were walk trips. Modal split of the vehicular trips showed that 16.7 per cent of the journeys were performed by cars, scooters, etc.; 59.8 per cent were by mass transportation modes such as buses; 17.3 per cent by bicycle; and 6.2 per cent by hired vehicles such as taxies and auto rickshaws. Thus, it is clear that the prominent mode of transport in Delhi at that time was public transport such as buses. In the absence of MRTS, the road-based transportation of Delhi was not able to cope with the needs of its commuters. This led to a rapid increase in the number of all types of vehicles. This can be seen from the figures: the number of cars, jeeps, and taxies in 1977 was 1,00,000, which rose to 2,58,000 in 1988. The two-wheeler population went up from 2,40,000 to 8,89,000 during the same period. Auto rickshaws increased from 16,000 to 47,000, whereas buses only increased from 6,000 to 15,000. At that time the average registration of new vehicles was about 13,000 per month, which was the highest in the country. As per one of the latest reports of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, a total of 6.3 million vehicles were registered in Delhi in 2008–9 of which 1.8 million was cars. Bangalore and Chennai put together registered only 5.9 million vehicles during the same year. It was noticed that the users’ demand for road space was greater than the capacity of the road network. This resulted in lower travel speeds. Traffic congestion nearly doubled the operating cost of various types of vehicles and the average speed of vehicles came down from 40 to 10 kmph. The situation with respect to road safety continued to deteriorate. The total number of accidents increased from 4,032 in 1977 to 6,254 in 1985. The number of persons killed went up from 694 to 1,269 and the number of persons injured went up from 3,874 to 6,366 during this period. There was an increasing trend in vehicular pollution load. It increased from 424 to 865 tonnes per day during the period 1981 to

1986–7. Thus the overall increase was approximately 2.2 times. Fourwheelers emitted approximately 43 per cent of the carbon monoxide discharge. This reduced to 33 per cent by 1986–7. Very little work was done on the impact of vehicular pollution on ambient air quality in heavily congested traffic intersections. However, eight hours air quality monitoring carried out at traffic intersections by Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi (IIT-D) in 1984 showed that carbon monoxide concentration was very high around most of the traffic intersections monitored and that the worst affected areas were Delhi Gate and Vikas Minar. As far as utilization of the existing ring rail is concerned, only four services were in operation, as mentioned. Utilization of ring rail has been the subject of various studies. Most conclude that with laying dedicated lines, change in land use pattern, and provision of feeder bus services, it can serve as an effective mode for MRTS along with other corridors like this. The first National Commission on Urbanization (NCU) suggested in a report in the late-80s that a central urban transportation fund be set up to assist urban authorities in preparing constructive transportation plans and implementation of projects. It suggested a sharing of resources in a 40:40:20 ratio between the central government, the state government, and the urban local bodies. As per the experts, buses in mixed traffic conditions such as those in Delhi were estimated to carry about 10,000 passengers per hour in one direction. The transport demand forecast for 2001 by CRRI showed that about 200 km of roads will need to carry up to 20,000 persons per hour, 135 km of roads up to 30,000 persons per hour, and 33 km of roads up to 40,000 persons per hour. Thus it became clear that the buses alone will not be able to carry the forecast traffic on at least 368 km of Delhi. Expansion of roads to the extent required may not be possible. Capacity of the bus system can be improved by bus priority schemes such as bus lanes and dedicated bus phase; but these have serious difficulties in terms of enforcement problems. Action was initiated in 1989 to have a metro system for Delhi. The east-west corridor from Vivek Vihar to Vikaspuri was identified as a

priority because it had the highest travel density. A task force chaired by the secretary, Ministry of Urban Development confirmed the need for this corridor and Rail India Technical and Economices Services Limited (RITES) was commissioned to prepare a detailed feasibility report. A steering committee headed by the chief secretary of Delhi administration was instituted to guide the process. Delhi’s population in 1991 was 9.3 million. At that time it was projected that the city’s population should ideally be limited to 12.2 million by the year 2001. The total area of Delhi is 1,486 sq. km. The only means of mass transport were buses, which were overcrowded and unreliable. The increasing use of personalized vehicles led to increased road congestion, fuel wastage, and environmental pollution. The growth of Delhi has been in a polycentric form with employment activities like trade, commerce, industry, office facilities, etc. being in dispersed locations. Delhi’s master plan also recognized that there is a high degree of concentrated traffic in certain parts of the east–west and north–south corridors. The first detailed proposal for a metro in Delhi was initiated in September 1990 based on the RITES report. The opening premises were as follows: •    Buses in mixed traffic conditions can carry about 10,000 passengers per hour in one direction. •  The demand forecast for 2001 by CRRI pointed out that about 200 km of roads will need to carry up to 20,000 passengers per hour, 135 km of roads up to 30,000, and 33 km of roads up to 40,000. Thus the buses will not be able to carry the forecasted traffic on at least 368 km of roads. •  The required expansion of roads would not be possible due to a shortage of land. •  At-grade, LRTS are only slightly better than bus ways. •    A grade-separated rail-based high capacity MRTS with an exclusive right of way was found to be the only possible option. The DPR (detailed project report) prepared by RITES had the following features:

•    Delhi’s population in 1991 was 9.3 million. Buses catered to about 5 million commuter trips per day. Mass transport demand was estimated to rise to 11.4 million trips per day by 2001. •    An LRT system would not suit Delhi’s requirement because its ultimate capacity would be only 25,000 PHPDT. Hence, an MRTS was felt to be necessary. •  In the absence of an MRTS, the number of motorized vehicles went up from 1.8 lakh in April 1971 to 25.4 lakh in October 1995. Of these, about 66 per cent were two-wheelers, highlighting the need for a more workable form of public transport. Even at the DPR preparation stage, the total number of vehicles in Delhi was more than the total number of vehicles in Mumbai, Calcutta, and Chennai put together. •    Of the total atmospheric pollution in Delhi, something like 75 per cent was estimated to be from automotive exhausts. Average vehicle speed on Delhi roads were in the range of 15– 18 kmph. More than 10,000 casualties were reported in 1993 on Delhi roads, resulting in one of the highest accident rates for Delhi. •    Transport demand forecasting was worked out on the basis of detailed household travel surveys, speed and delay studies, limitation of road capacity, etc. A ‘do nothing’ situation was also considered, which would have exacerbated the prevailing difficulties and resulted in further problems such as lowered business efficiency, greater need for import of petroleum products, absence of convenient connectivity to the city centre, and tripled pollution levels. An MRTS network of 184.5 km was proposed that would cover the entire National Capital Region (NCR), including planned urban extensions like Najafgarh, Dwarka, Rohini, etc. The first phase covering 67.5 km was to be implemented by 2001. The total 184.5 km was scheduled to be completed by 2011 with 27 km underground, 140 km of rail corridors, and 17.5 km as an at-grade dedicated bus way (Patel Nagar to Najafgarh), and 108 stations were

proposed. The forecast transport demand for 2001 was about 40,000 passengers per hour in one direction. It was expected that this would go up to 80,000 by 2021. A broad gauge system with eight-coach trains running with two-minute headway was also planned. The estimated project cost was Rs 5,378 crore for the whole 184.5 km, with the first phase of 67.5 km costing Rs 2,558 crore. Since 155 km of the system was planned above the ground, the total cost was kept low. An Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) of 25.51 per cent was worked out for Phase I based on the calculation given in Table 2.1. It was estimated that if the passenger demand was according to the forecast then on-going revenue subsidies may not be necessary. One assumption for this was that physical and operational integration of various modes of transport within the city would take place. If fare box revenue turned out to be inadequate, taxing indirect beneficiaries or subsidy from the local government could be considered. TABLE 2.1 Calculation of EIRR for Phase I of Delhi MRTS Capital cost Foreign exchange

Rs 2,555 crore Rs 462 crore Running Costs

Operation and maintenance Depreciation Property development Savings due to reduction of bus service

Rs 148 crore Rs 52 crore Rs 1,650 crore Rs 205 crore

Direct Revenue Fare box at Rs 1.50 per ticket Indirect savings Travel time Fuel consumption

Rs 188 crore

Rs 207 crore Rs 162 crore

Consultation and preparatory work continued till September 1996 when a final decision clearing the Delhi MRTS was taken by the union cabinet. By then, modifications in the original proposal became necessary. A 55.3 km stretch was approved as Phase I. Capital cost would be Rs 4,182 crore at April 1995 prices as estimated by RITES in their DPR. The amount was revised to Rs 4,859.74 crore at April 1996 prices including IDC. This was comprised of the routes covering Viswavidyalaya–Vidhan Sabha–ISBT–Connaught Place–Central Secretariat (11 km underground); Shahdara–ISBT–Sabzi Mandi– Nangloi (25 km elevated); and Subzi Mandi–New Azadpur–Holambi Kalan (19.3 km elevated/at-grade). The first year of full operation of the modified Phase I was expected to be 2005–6. Traffic demand forecast for this year was 31.85 lakh passenger trips per day. The EIRR for this scenario worked out to 25.84 per cent and Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) was 2.8 per cent at a fare rate of Rs 5 per passenger trip. However, it was highlighted that this is similar to almost all rail-based MRTS in major cities of USA, France, and Japan. A decision that gave a substantial boost to the project was that all government land belonging to various ministries would be made available at inter-governmental transfer rates notified by the Ministry of Urban Development. Land belonging to the railways was to be made available on lease rates based on the agreed market price. Land was to be given to the new metro company on a 99-year lease at a nominal rent of Re 1 per annum. The cost of acquisition would be treated as ‘premium’ to be recovered as an interest-free subordinate debt over a 25-year period once the senior debt has been repaid fully. The implementation mechanism approved for the project was totally different from all accepted practices of the time. It was probably the first time that a joint venture (JV) company with equal equity participation by the central government and the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) was created. The Government of Delhi and the Government of India were given the right to nominate an equal number of directors on the board of the proposed company. The chairman was to be a nominee of the

Government of India, whereas GNCTD would nominate the managing director (MD). Two apex levels of decision making were constituted, one a committee of secretaries chaired by the cabinet secretary and the other an empowered group of ministers which can take all projectrelated decisions once a metro project is approved by the cabinet. This has resulted in faster decisions than would have been possible through traditional routes.

FINANCING A corporate model (in the form of DMRC being incorporated on 3 May 1995) was approved with a debt–equity ratio of 2:1. Both the Government of India and the GNCTD were to provide an equity of Rs 1,036 crore each at the rate of Rs 103.60 crore per annum. An interest-free subordinate debt of Rs 218 crore towards the cost of land was created, repayable in the years 21 to 25. Property development was expected to raise Rs 492 crore. The long-term debt of Rs 4,156 crore was to be raised at around 3 per cent per annum, with a ten-year moratorium and ten-year repayment period. Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF, Japan) had indicated that such debt can be provided. The OECF missions had insisted on a government guarantee for loan repayment; the exchange rate risk was to be borne by the government. Yet another important decision here was that being a socially-oriented project, the debt was to be raised by the Government of India and transferred to the DMRC at the same rate of interest. Since the project cannot bear an interest rate of more than 4.7 per cent per annum on a debt–equity ratio of 2:1 and the fares cannot be fixed or escalated in foreign currency terms, the exchange rate risk on the foreign loan was to be borne by the central government as a social cost. A cheap foreign loan was considered a better route because long-term finances of the type required would not be available from the domestic financial market. Added to that would be an interest rate of not less than 18 per cent per annum, which would make the project financially unviable.

While processing the proposal, the possibility of involving the private sector through BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfer) or BOLT (Build-Operate-Lease-Transfer) was also considered. However, both these options involved a larger financial outgo for the government in the context of a minimum return guarantee that any private partner would expect. However, involvement of the private sector in operations and maintenance was a possibility to be considered during operation. Singapore has taken such a step when the entire fixed assets (built at a cost of SGD 5 billion) were leased out to the Singapore MRT Limited at a nominal lease charge of SGD 10,000 per annum plus license charges of SGD 1 million per annum for the use of rolling stock. The government retained ownership over fixed assets like tunnels, railway tracks, station buildings, and platforms, etc. The environmental impact assessment (EIA) conducted in 1995 indicated that air pollution levels would go up from a total of 2,48,977 tonnes per year in 1996 to 4,35,808 tonnes in 2005 in the absence of MRTS. With MRTS, this could be at a level of 3,80,850 tonnes. The pollutants assessed included carbon monoxide, particulate matter, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and hydrocarbons. The EIA also showed that about 73.3 million litres of diesel and 171.7 million litres of petrol will be saved per year due to the project. This was expected to result in a foreign exchange saving of Rs 3,750 million per year by 2005.

HOW THE DELHI METRO CAME INTO BEING Considering the complexities of decision-making in a government system, it was a landmark decision in 1996 to go in for a metro system in Delhi. Unlike the Kolkata Metro which was taken up by the Ministry of Railways, for the first time a metro system was designated to the Ministry of Urban Development of the Government of India. Yet another landmark decision was to have a JV between the centre and the state (in this case with the Delhi government) on an equal partnership basis. The amount of equity was to come from the plan allocation of the GNCTD and the Union Ministry of Urban

Development. It was also decided that the exchange rate fluctuation risk and operational losses, if any, would be shared between the GNCTD and the Government of India in proportion to their shareholding. Emphasis was placed on completion of this project within the stipulated time frame using an appropriate mechanism for implementation. Since there could be no justification for time and cost overruns, the authority responsible for implementation of the project was delegated with adequate powers to undertake the same. Intra-urban rail transport has traditionally been financed entirely by the Government of India; for instance, the suburban rail services in Mumbai and Chennai and the underground metro system in Kolkata. It was recognized that the Railways will not be able to invest further in urban rail projects because of financial losses involved in the operation and maintenance of such projects and the greater priority given to long-distance passengers and freight traffic. Thus, other options need to be considered for cities. The financing of rail-based MRTS projects was examined by the NCU in 1988 and it was observed that: The problem of financing city transport boils down to marshalling the savings which would accrue to the national economy and diverting a part of the same for the establishment, operation and maintenance of mass public transport systems. The approach should therefore be informed by a radically different financial understanding and outlook than going by the simplistic concept of return on investment.

Further, it also suggested that the rationale behind the financing and construction of roads/bridges ought to be logically extended to the provision of mass public transport by the government. In fact, this is an approach a country like Singapore has adopted when it fully financed the construction of the 67 km MRTS project at the cost of SGD 5 billion. Since then, the Singapore government has committed SGD 28 billion to expand the network to 215 km by 2016. An additional 63 km has been planned by 2020. The government has two basic criteria for taking up such a project, namely the economic benefits of the new line must exceed the costs and the operating revenue must cover the operating and maintenance costs and depreciation of the

operating assets. In return, the government will fund the construction of the line and the first set of operating assets. The Singapore government presently adheres to the principle of providing only capital grants for infrastructure development and does not provide operating subsidies to operators. This is meant to ensure that the public transport operators have the required financial discipline to operate efficiently and avoid under-pricing of services. But unlike their European and American counterparts, these operators enjoy some concessions to defray their operating costs. For example, they may retain all retail and advertising revenue generated from train stations, bus interchanges, trains and buses. The 1996 white paper titled ‘A World Class Land Transport System’ emphasizes that buses cannot be the solution for a compact city like Singapore and the importance of a comprehensive rail network. A target was set in the 2008 Land Transport Master Plan for 70 per cent of the morning peak hour trips to be made by public transport by 2020. This stresses the need to expand the metro rail network as fast as possible. A new funding criterion was introduced, which stated that for the metro rail system the second set of operating assets would be paid for through a combination of fare box revenue covering the historical cost of the first set of operating assets and government co-financing for the balance. This arrangement was instrumental in bringing about the north-east line by 2003 as well as the circle line, part of which became operational in May 2009. The state has the right to regulate prices and services of the private operators, currently two, which are responsible for running the metro rail and bus operations. The working group of the first NCU had also suggested that: •    The capital costs of setting up mass urban transportation systems, including the provision of rolling stock, should be met entirely out of funds which do not have to bear any interest or dividend liability. •  The fares should be low enough to secure the utilization of the system to the fullest extent, particularly enabling the poor to earn their livelihood in any part of the city without undue

financial burden. It should also be of a standard to dissuade the higher classes from using expensive personal vehicles. •    Each identifiable component of the city’s economy benefitting from or burdening the urban transport infrastructure must be made to contribute to the capital as well as the operating cost of the system. On operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, the NCU observed that, It is no longer disputed that the accruals from fares and other sources such as sale or lease of shopping and commercial spaces, advertising revenues, etc. can never be adequate to meet the current operating expenses on track and fleet maintenance plus the costs of servicing of capital and provision of replacement and renewals. Urban fares are very low, mass transport system may fail to attract the huge volume of traffic which alone provide the justification for its being established in the first place.

An analysis based on 44 cities across Europe, USA, and Canada shows that only one of these cities was able to meet 80 per cent of its revenue expenditure, while as many as 19 could not meet even 50 per cent of the same. It was observed by the NCU working group that it would be difficult for mass public transport undertakings to cover their revenue expenditure fully from fare box collections, even if it were buttressed by other revenue from advertising, exploitation of strategically located commercial spaces, etc. While deciding the optimum fare, the twin objectives of equity for the poor and incentive for the wealthy to prefer public transport over personalized modes should be kept in view. The NCU also recommended that any deficits of the city transport undertakings in operations and maintenance expenses should be met from a public fund and that such subsidies should not be considered as wasteful outflow from the public exchequer but as the price to be paid for the smooth, orderly, and efficient functioning of cities.

IMPLEMENTATION

In principle, approval was accorded by the Government of India in July 1994 to go ahead with the multimodal MRTS for Delhi covering a distance of 184.5 km with an estimated cost of Rs 7,469 crore at 1992–3 prices. The first phase of 67.5 km was estimated to cost Rs 3,401 crore. While the DPR was initiated as per this decision, the actual project approved in September 1996 was for a 55.3 km Phase I at a cost of Rs 4,859.74 crore. Implementation was taken up accordingly and the routes were commissioned as given in Table 2.2. Some changes were considered necessary during implementation. These were approved by the Government of India in August 2000 and July 2002. The details are given in Table 2.3. The total cost of Phase I was modified to Rs 10,571 crore in December 2002. The project was originally scheduled to be completed by September 2005 but the date was revised to December 2005 due to delays in land acquisition for the Barakhamba Road–Connaught Place–Dwarka corridor. A review of the Phase I corridors was undertaken by DMRC. This showed that there has been no development in the area through which the Rithala–Barwala (6 km) section would pass. There were also indications that development of the area to generate commuter traffic would take at least a decade. A proposal to replace the Rithala–Barwala section with the Barakhamba Road–Indraprastha section was initiated by DMRC in September 2003. While the proposed Rithala–Barwala section was fully at-grade, the Barakhamba Road–Indraprastha section was 2.27 km long, of which 1.65 km was proposed to be underground, 0.20 km as elevated ramp, and 0.42 km at-grade. Capital cost of both sections at Rs 500 crore is nearly the same. This section was supposed to be completed by September 2005 along with the rest of Phase I. Comparison of the two stretches is given in Table 2.4. TABLE 2.2 Implementation of Phase I Route

Section

Date of commencement

Line 1 Shahdara–Rithala (22.06 km) Line 2 Vishwavidyalaya– Central Secretariat (10.84 km) Line 3

Shahdara–Tis Hazari Tis Hazari–Inderlok Inderlok– Rithala

24 December 2002 3 October 2003 31 March 2004

Vishwavidyalaya– Kashmiri Gate Kashmiri Gate–Central Secretariat

20 December 2004

Barakhamba Road– Kirti Nagar

31 December 2005

3 July 2005

Barakhamba Road– Kirti Nagar–Dwarka (25.65 km) TABLE 2.3 Modifications to Phase I Route

Changes

Vishwavidyalaya–Central Secretariat–ISBT– Central Secretariat Shahdara–ISBT–Trinagar–Nangloi

Instead of 11 km underground, 10.84 km was to be constructed underground Modified as Shahdara–Trinagar– Barwala, with 27.84 km in place of the earlier 25 km Modified as Barakhamba Road– Connaught Place–Dwarka with a total length of 22.9 km (with 1.12 km underground) in place of 19.4 km

Subzi Mandi–Holambi Kalan

TABLE 2.4 Comparison of Phase I Options Item

Option I (Phase I with Rithala–Barwala Section)

Option II (Revised Phase I with Rithala– Barwala replaced)

Capital cost

Rs 10,571 crore

Rs 10,571 crore

No. of passengers per day Average lead Passenger km per day Passenger km per day per Rs 1 crore of investment

21.8 lakh

22.6 lakh

7 km 153.3 km 1,450

7.2 km 162.5 km 1,537

Option II, which yields higher ridership, with 80,000 additional passengers per day, was preferred. The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) approached DMRC in 2003 with the proposal to extend Barakhamba Road–Connaught Place–Dwarka corridor to Dwarka sub-city for about 6.5 km. Dwarka sub-city is an urban extension designed to accommodate 10.68 lakh of population by 2001. A cost of Rs 430 crore was estimated by RITES for this 9.5 km stretch with an EIRR of 19.1 per cent and FIRR of 2.39 per cent. However, DDA decided to split it into two phases. The first corridor of 6.5 km was proposed up to the general hospital in Sector 9. The DDA committed to provide land free of cost for the extension as well as for rehabilitating persons, if any. Cost of the work excluding land and rolling stock was estimated at Rs 320 crore. This amount was to be provided as a grant by the DDA to DMRC. The Ministry of Urban Development provided a sum of Rs 80 crore as grant and Rs 80 crore as loan from the ministry-operated urban development fund to DDA and DDA provided the balance from their own resources. Viability of the proposal emerged as follows in Table 2.5. The proposal provided for extending alternate trains operating on Line 3 into Dwarka sub-city. A train frequency of eight minutes would be available to residents of Dwarka. Rolling stock was to be made available by DMRC. Operation and maintenance of all assets for the extended portion would be by DMRC. Additional revenues generated will accrue to DMRC. It was proposed that extension work should be completed by March 2006. A group of ministers authorized to take post project decisions approved this proposal in September 2004.

Here it is worth noting that DDA had earmarked a 30-metre-wide stretch of land for an LRTS to connect the Dwarka sub-city. The DMRC advised the DDA that a stand alone network would not be the correct selection, as an LRTS with a small length with different system parameters will have cost implications. It would be more beneficial if the Barakhamba Road–Dwarka corridor itself is extended. If DDA had gone ahead with the LRTS, it would have meant separate rolling stock, separate maintenance, depot, and additional interchange facilities with the metro, whereas extension of the metro means faster growth of and increased land prices in the sub-city. TABLE 2.5 Viability of Proposal for Extension to Dwarka Sub-city Criterion Additional number of passengers per day Additional passenger km/day Additional revenue Additional operation and maintenance cost

Change in amount 46,000 6.072 lakh Rs 22.94 crore Rs 13.81 crore

Even before the completion of Phase I, Phase II of the project was approved by the Government of India on 30 August 2005 at an estimated cost of Rs 8,118 crore. Then the alignment was further revised from IIT to Qutab Minar on 17 October 2006 at an estimated cost of Rs 558 crore. The total cost for 54.675 km of Phase II, now came to Rs 8,676 crore, details of which are given in Table 2.6. This was further revised to Rs 8,605.36 crore on 7 March 2008 after sanction of the first standard gauge stretch. The Inderlok–Mundka corridor was the first standard gauge (1,435 mm), since till then all Delhi Metro lines were broad gauge (1,676 mm), following the Indian Railways’ pattern, with a total savings in cost amounting to Rs 70.64 crore. Taxes and duties were waived of for Phase II as well. Two extensions were subsequently approved: Dwarka to Dwarka sub-city (6.5 km) was commissioned on 1 April 2006 and

Barakhamba Road to Indraprastha (2.27 km) was commissioned on 11 November 2006. Subsequently, there was a cost revision of Phase I. Completion cost was fixed at Rs 10,571 crore. Thus, project execution of Phase I commenced on 1 October 1998 and was completed by 31 December 2005 within the approved cost. Though the target for completion was ten years, it was finished in seven years and three months. The total length of Phase I was 65.10 km. The manner in which the funds became available is given in Table 2.7. TABLE 2.6 Phase II of Delhi Metro Corridor

Route length (km)

Vishwavidyalaya–Jahangirpuri Central Secretariat–Qutab Minar Shahdara–Dilshad Garden Indraprastha–New Ashok Nagar Yamuna Bank–Anand Vihar ISBT Kirti Nagar–Ashok Park Inderlok–Mundka Total

6.36 12.53 3.09 8.09 6.16 3.36 15.15 54.7 TABLE 2.7

Allocation of Phase I Funds Fund Allocation Government of India equity (14%) Equity of Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (14%) Subordinate debt of Government of India (2.5%) Subordinate debt of Government of NCR (2.5%) JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation) loan (64%) Property development (31%)

Amount (Rs) 1,464 crore 1,464 crore 252 crore 252 crore 6,839 crore 300 crore

Total

10,571 crore

The Government of India and the GNCTD each had 14 per cent equity; 3 per cent came through property development; and 64 per cent was through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) loan. The remaining 5 per cent is an interest-free subordinate debt representing land cost. Final details of sections commissioned in Phase I are given in Table 2.8. TABLE 2.8 Details of Phase I Commissioning Route

Section

Commissioned on

Line 1: Shahdara– Rithala

Shahdara–Tis Hazari

24 December 2002

Tis Hazari–Inderlok Inderlok–Rithala Vishwavidyalaya–

3 October 2003 31 March 2004 20 December 2004

Line 2: Vishwavidyalaya– Central Secretariat

Line 3: Barakhamba Road– Kirti Nagar–Dwarka Extension of Line 3

Kashmiri Gate Kashmiri Gate– Central Secretariat Barakhamba Road– Dwarka Dwarka–Dwarka subcity Barakhamba Road– Indraprastha

3 July 2005 31 December 2005

1 April 2006 11 November 2006

PHASE II With Phase I making progress, the Phase II proposal was actively taken up (see Table 2.9 for further details). The revised financing plan for the original Phase II after savings is given in Table 2.10.

A notable feature of the second phase of the Delhi Metro was that additional corridors were also taken up from time to time. A brief description of these is given below: 1.  An extension from Ambedkar Colony to Sushant Lok in Gurgaon was approved on 17 October 2006. The total length would be 14.47 km (7.42 km in Delhi and 7.05 km in Haryana). The entire route would be elevated. The cost was estimated to be Rs 1,581 crore including central taxes and duties. With the sanction of another Rs 8.44 crore on 4 March 2009 for the shifting of entry and exit points and providing escalators at the metro station in Gurgaon, the revised cost is Rs 1,589.44 crore. TABLE 2.9 Details of Phase II Sl. No.

Route

Length (in km) and type

Commissioned on

1.

Vishwavidyalay a–Jahangirpuri

4 February 2009

2.

Central Secretariat– Qutab Minar

3.

Shahdara– Dilshad Garden Indraprastha– New Ashok Nagar Yamuna bank– Anand Vihar ISBT Anand Vihar– Vaishali Kirti Nagar– Ashok Park

6.36 km (0.94 underground and 5.42 elevated) 12.53 km (11.76 underground and 0.77 elevated) 3.09 km (all elevated) 8.07 km (6.07 elevated and 2 at grade) 6.17 km (all elevated) 2.5 km

July 2011

3.31 km (all elevated)

Scheduled for commissioning in September

4.

5.

5a. 6.

Commissioned in third quarter 2010

4 June 2008 10 May 2009/13 May 2010 January 2010

7.

Inderlok– Mundka (SG)

15.15 km (all elevated)

2010 but trail runs could only be held in July 2011 April 2010

TABLE 2.10 Revised Financing Plan for Phase II Source Equity (28% jointly by Government of India and GNCTD) Subordinate debt for land (4% by Government of India and GNCTD) Pass through assistance (JICA loan; 59% by Government of India) Property development (4.5% by DMRC) Internal accrual (4.5%) Total (excluding taxes and duties)

Amount (Rs) 2,388.39 crore 350 crore 5,081 crore 405 crore 405 crore 8,676 crore

        The funding plan of this section has three components:         In the Haryana portion, Rs 20 crore as cost of land is to be borne by the Government of Haryana; Rs 570 crore as capital cost is to be shared 80 per cent by the Government of Haryana and 20 per cent by the Government of India; cost of rolling stock is Rs 98 crore, which is to be paid by the DMRC. This adds up to Rs 688 crore (excluding taxes and duties).         The taxes for the Haryana portion are as follows—central taxes of Rs 55 crore to be shared by the Government of India and the Government of Haryana in an 80:20 ratio, the central share being an interest-free subordinate debt; while the state taxes of Rs 20 crore is to be exempted or reimbursed by the Government of Haryana. This comes to Rs 75 crore.         In the Delhi portion, Rs 49 crore as cost of land is to be equally shared by the Government of India and the GNCTD; balance cost of Rs 685 crore to be shared as equity of Rs 111 crore each by

Government of India and the GNCTD; Rs 111 crore as a grant by the Government of Haryana and Rs 352 crore as a debt from Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). This would come to Rs 734 crore (excluding taxes and duties).         The taxes for the Delhi portion are: central taxes of Rs 60 crore to be shared equally by Government of India and the GNCTD as an interest-free subordinate debt; the state tax of Rs 24 crore is to be exempted or reimbursed by the GNCTD. This comes to Rs 84 crore.         Thus the total cost for this extension is Rs 1,589.44 crore. Full commissioning, scheduled for September 2010, has been achieved subsequently.         This is the first extension of the Delhi Metro to Haryana. Other key towns of the state falling in the NCR such as Faridabad, Bahadurgarh, etc. are also proposed for getting connected. 2.    The Central Secretariat–Badarpur corridor (20.16 km) was approved on 17 October 2006 at an estimated completion cost of Rs 4,012 crore (including central taxes). It was aimed at providing connectivity between the Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium and Dr Karni Singh Shooting Range at Tughlaqabad for the Commonwealth Games scheduled for October 2010. Of this stretch, 6.1 km is underground and the rest is elevated.         Financing plan for this section is: Rs 612.50 crore as 17 per cent equity each by the Government of India and GNCTD; Rs 117.50 crore as 3.26 per cent subordinate debt each by the Government of India and GNCTD covering land cost; and Rs 2,143 crore (59.48 per cent) as JBIC loan to be passed with the assistance of the Government of India. The total comes to Rs 3,603 crore (Rs 4,012 crore with central taxes). This was commissioned just in time before the Commonwealth Games of October 2010. 3.  A high speed express link from New Delhi Railway Station to the Indira Gandhi International (IGI) Airport was approved on 21 December 2006. The total length was to be 19.2 km and the estimated cost was Rs 3,076 crore including taxes. Of this route,

15.13 km will be underground and the remaining portion will be elevated/at-grade. After approval had been given in principle, investment approval was given on 20 April 2007 (financial details are given in Table 2.11). This is a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement between DMRC, Reliance Energy, and CAF. Civil works have been undertaken by DMRC against the equity of the Government of India and GNCTD and a grant by DDA and the airport operator (DIAL [Delhi International Airport Limited]), while systems work including rolling stock, signalling and telecom (S&T), etc. is funded by the concessionaire. The concessionaire will operate the system for 30 years after which it will revert to DMRC. This link on standard gauge will have a speed of 135 kmph and will ensure a hassle-free journey with a travel time of 18 minutes one way (to the airport). Of the five stations, baggage check facilities will be available at New Delhi and Shivaji Stadium. A multi-level car park will also be available at New Delhi Railway Station. This line has participation by the airport operator also. It was scheduled for completion in September 2010 but could be made operational only in February 2011. With a subsequent decision to extend it up to Sector 21, Dwarka, the 23 km line cost a total of 5,700 crores. 4.    The extension of the airport express link from IGI Airport to Dwarka Sector 21 was approved by the Government of India on 18 January 2008. It comprised a completely underground 3.5 km standard gauge at an estimated completion cost of Rs 793 crore (including central taxes). It was scheduled for completion in September 2010 but became operational when the Airport Line was commissioned. Financing plan of this section is given in Table 2.12. 5.    The extension from New Ashok Nagar in Delhi to Sector 32, Noida was approved in principle on 17 October 2006 and formally approved on 18 January 2008. This 7-km elevated stretch had an estimated cost of Rs 827 crore (including central taxes and duties). It was commissioned in November 2009.

        The financing plan for this section is as follows: The cost of land is Rs 321 crore, which is to be borne by NOIDA (New Okhla Industrial Development Authority), UP; capital cost of network of Rs 611 crore to be shared by the Government of UP and Government of India in an 80:20 ratio; and the cost of rolling stock of Rs 93 crore is to be borne by DMRC. This comes to a total of Rs 736 crore (excluding taxes and duties). The central taxes amount to Rs 69 crore and will be borne by the Government of India and Government of UP in an 80:20 ratio as an interestfree subordinate debt. The state taxes of Rs 22 crore are to be exempted or reimbursed by the Government of UP. This would make a total of Rs 91 crore.         Thus for the first time, Delhi Metro has been able to establish seamless connectivity with a prominent town in the NCR. The Metro Railways Amendment Act, 2009 gave an enabling provision for legal cover of metro operation in the NCR (as well as metropolitan cities and metropolitan areas in the country) under the Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 and the Delhi Metro Railway (Operations and Maintenance) Act, 2002. 6.    Extension of the metro link from Dwarka Sector 9 to Dwarka Sector 21, fully elevated, with a length of 2.76 km was approved on 18 January 2008 at an estimated completion cost of Rs 356.11 crore (including central taxes). It was scheduled for commissioning in September 2010 and has since been commissioned. The capital cost of Rs 275 crore is to be funded by DDA and the cost of rolling stock (Rs 81.11 crore) will be met by DMRC. TABLE 2.11 Financing Plan for Express Link to Airport Share and Percentage Grant by airport operator (DIAL) to DMRC for civil works inside the airport (12%)

Amount (Rs) 350 crore

Equity by the Government of India towards civil works outside airport (19%) Equity by the GNCTD (19%) Equity by concessionaire to maintain debt–equity ratio of 70:30 (15%) Domestic debt at 10% by concessionaire (35%) Total

599 crore

599 crore 461 crore 1,067 crore 3,076 crore

TABLE 2.12 Financing Plan for Extension of Airport Express Link Share and Percentage

Amount (Rs)

Equity by Government of India (20%) Equity by GNCTD (20%) Grant by DDA (27.42%) Investment by concessionaire (9.77%) Domestic debt by concessionaire (22.81%) Total

158.60 crore 158.60 crore 217.40 crore 77.50 crore 180.90 crore 793 crore

The entire Phase II network other than the subsequent additions got completed by October 2010, thereby providing good connectivity to travellers during the October 2010 Commonwealth Games. Only the 3 km Ashok Park to Kirti Nagar stretch remains scheduled for commissioning as of July 2011. The total Phase II length will be 121.62 km and completion cost for the original part is Rs 19,258.91 crore. Till April 2010, Rs 13,880.50 crore had been spent. This includes the approved extensions.

Proposed Phase III DMRC has prepared a plan for a 138.90-km-long Phase III. This would mean further expansion of the network in Delhi and the NCR

area. Beyond this, they have also proposed a Phase IV, which would be 88.2 km long. As per latest decisions being taken, a 103-km-long Phase III costing about Rs 35,000 crore, with the centre and GNCTD contributing 35.74 per cent of the cost, DDA chipping in Rs 1,500 crore, and the rest coming from JICA plus other sources, is expected to be taken up to be completed over a five-year period.

Legal Cover The Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 and the Metro Railway (Operation and Maintenance) Act, 2002 provide the legal basis for metro construction and operation in Delhi. Metro railway is defined by the Delhi Metro Railway (Operation and Maintenance) Act, 2002 as a ‘rail-guided mass rapid transport system having dedicated right of way, with steel wheel or rubber-tyred wheel coaches, but excluding tramways, for carriage of passengers’.

Fare Fixation Mechanism As per Section 33 of the Delhi Metro Railway (Operation and Maintenance) Act, 2002 the fare structure is fixed by a Fare Fixation Committee, appointed by the Government of India. The committee consists of a chairman who will be a serving/retired judge of a High Court and two other members, one each representing the Government of India and the Government of Delhi. The recommendations made by this committee are binding on the Metro Railway Administration. In Delhi, the first such committee was appointed in December 2003, second in October 2005, and third in June 2009. The present fare structure for Delhi is the lowest in the world after Kolkata. It is based on the fares proposed by the third Fare Fixation Committee. TABLE 2.13 Fare Structure of Delhi Metro

Distance (km) 0–2 2–4 4–6 6–9 9–12 12–15 15–18 18–21 21–4 24–7 27–31 31–5 35–9 39–44 >44

Fare (Rs) 8 10 12 15 16 18 19 21 22 23 25 27 28 29 30

LESSONS What lessons do we learn from this massive project undertaken in Delhi over a 16-year period? Delhi’s population has reached 1.6 million. More than 90 per cent of its 1,483 sq km is urbanized with the remaining area also rapidly catching up. It has a road length of about 28,000 km with around 21 per cent of its land under roads. This is comparatively high compared to road share in other large Indian cities. It has a total of 54 lakh vehicles registered (as of 2008) with no data on the number of vehicles from adjoining areas travelling through on a regular basis. About thousand vehicles are added to the city every day. Delhi, it is reported, has as many car users as the rest of the three megacities namely, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai put together. Mumbai has only 29 cars per 1000 residents (this is the lowest among megacities), while Delhi has 66. As cities grow, transport infrastructure has to keep pace. Cities like New York, London, and Berlin were able to invest in mass transit early on. So their networks have developed over a century to link these cities and their job markets. Mexico City was one of the first

twentieth-century megacities to start building its underground system in the late 1960s. Today it has a 200-km-long network. Shanghai got its first underground metro line a little over a decade ago. It is in this background that Delhi’s historic step to effect a major improvement in its public transport system is to be seen. The proposal for an MRTS was under discussion for about two decades till the first big step was taken in 1994. But then at least it was recognized that the rapid growth of population of Delhi cannot be wished away. If the transport problems were not tackled on priority, it was realized that not only will the city become unliveable but that it would prove costly in the long run in terms of higher fuel consumption, greater pollution, and longer time taken to reach places. Various factors contributed to the timely completion of the phases of the metro project. The central government recognized the critical importance of such a vital project in the national capital and provided decision making and support upfront. Setting up a one of a kind JV with the participation of the central and NCR governments, mandating property development so that the metro can have access to additional resources, reducing dependence on governments for subsidy, the central government’s critical role in raising the cheapest possible loan in the form of JICA funding, and providing two levels of major policy decision-making meant a big difference as far as timely project planning and implementation is concerned. The Kolkata Metro took 16 years to start functioning, whereas in Delhi a 65 km network became fully functional in a period of seven-and-a-half years. The Delhi Metro started making operational profits from day one. It has been able to set benchmarks for project execution, qualitym, and delivery within cost and time. The Government of India has been especially considerate in providing for a subordinate debt as far as this metro’s financing is concerned. This in effect means the loan is to be repaid only after the senior term debt is repaid, which offers a major financial cushion. In Phase I, the subordinate debt provision was 5 per cent of the project cost, to be used exclusively for land acquisition. In Phase II it was 4 per cent—again to meet land acquisition costs. In addition, Rs

390 crore was provided as subordinate debt towards the cost of taxes and duties for certain corridors subsequently approved, wherever customs duty and excise duty exemption was not agreed to at the time of approval. While the subordinate debt option eases the overall financials, a loan from JBIC (which worked out to 60.56 per cent for Phase I and 51.76 per cent for Phase II) meant that the complicated process of approaching various financial institutions could be avoided. Market borrowing would not have been a very practical proposition because the metro is a social sector project; it is not commercially attractive and may not be in a position to generate high return on investment. Increase in the project returns is slow as ridership stabilization takes time. Moreover, the cost of borrowing is far below that of commercial borrowing in JBIC borrowing. For DMRC, the rate of interest for such a loan was 2.3 per cent in the beginning, which later came down to 1.2 per cent. It is a fact that for this kind of longer tenure, a proper hedging mechanism may not be possible to cover the variations in the foreign exchange rate. The apprehension that a substantial amount may become payable on account of exchange rate variation has not come true, as the Delhi Metro experience shows. JBIC funding also provided the added advantage of building confidence among international contractors that funds will not be a constraint in the implementation of the project. It further goes to the credit of DMRC that the healthy relationship with JBIC led to their extending loan assistance to three other major metro projects in the country. Further, though the project was for Delhi, it was envisaged that the method of funding, implementation mechanism, and policy decisions made in this regard will all become applicable for MRTS projects in other metropolitan cities as well. Today Delhi has a world-class metro system carrying 1.6 million passengers every day. Trains operate from 6 a.m. to 11 p.m. with a frequency of three-and-a-half minutes during peak hours. Fares vary from a minimum of Rs 8 to a maximum of Rs 30 for a distance above 44 km. The fare structure of Delhi is probably the lowest in the world except for Kolkata Metro. The revenue generated through property development came in handy to procure additional train sets for lines with overcrowding.

The Delhi Metro has not only been able to bring about a change as far as respectability of public travel is concerned, but by having stations which are neat and clean, avoiding littering, spitting, or graffiti a distinct change in social behaviours has been brought about. If the metro culture has spread in the country, the Delhi metro can naturally take the credit for that. Cities and state governments have been encouraged to consider the metro rail system as a desirable option and assistance from the Delhi Metro both for preparation of DPRs and implementation has been significant. Delhi Metro has either prepared or is in the process of preparing DPRs for 14 other Indian cities. Even private participation in metro is a workable proposition in India today with Mumbai opting for PPP for the two corridors which have been taken up, Hyderabad awarding the work to a private partner for the new proposed metro and even a private metro coming up in Gurgaon (Haryana) as a 4 km (revised to 6.1 km) feeder link from Sikandarpur station of Delhi Metro to DLF Phase II costing Rs 1,085 crore. Outside the country, feasibility studies were prepared for Damascus and Colombo and consultancy for operations and maintenance was rendered to Jakarta Metro. From a ‘project’ point of view the Delhi Metro is a good example of proper and timely decision-making as well as implementation. It provides adequate justification for highly relevant social projects being taken up, even when the FIRR is low. It has set in motion a process of making cities think in terms of prioritizing more desirable but at the same time affordable public transport option.

DELHI METRO TODAY The Delhi Metro was implemented by the DMRC as a joint ownership by the Government of India and Government of Delhi. It has completed 65 km of Phase I in a record time. It became a 186 km network by September 2010 and cost around Rs 29,800 crore. The metro has been making operational profits from the first day. It has set benchmarks for project execution quality and delivery within cost and time as well as in operations and maintenance. Credit for setting

these milestones and starting a new chapter in timely project execution should go mostly to the energetic leadership of a visionary, E. Sreedharan, who is the MD of the corporation. In this case, the government made exceptions and the board of the company has delegated more power and authority to the MD than a normal company would and the result is there to be seen.

3  Basic Technical Details This chapter vies an overview of the basic technical details related to a metro system.

RAIL-BASED MASS RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM A rail-based MRTS is characterized by short inter-station distances of about 1 km, scheduled speed of 32–6 kmph, stoppage time of 20–30 seconds at each station, and trains running in peak hours at an interval of three to five minutes. A metro can be underground, elevated, or even at ground level in the outskirts of cities. Depending upon the PHPDT, metros can be differentiated into three categories: heavy (with a carrying capacity of 50,000–90,000 PHPDT); medium (with a carrying capacity of 30,000–50,000 PHPDT); and light (with a carrying capacity of 25,000–30,000 PHPDT). Box 3.1 Features of a Metro Interstation distance Schedule speed Frequency of Trains (Design) PHPDT (Design) Light Medium Heavy

1–1.1 km 32–5 kmph 3 minutes 2 minutes 25,000–30,000 30,000–50,000 50,000–90,000

Sub-systems are designed to ensure that trains run regularly, safely, at short intervals, provide comfort and on-board information to passengers. Thus the salient features of a metro can be summed up as follows: Rail-based metro consists of the following systems: (i)      Permanent way. (ii)     Stations. (iii)    Electric power supply system and traction system. (iv)    Signalling and telecommunication system. (v)     Rolling stock or trains. (vi)    Fare collection system. (vii)   Passenger facilities. (viii)  Safety features—fire detection and fire suppression. (ix)    Ventilation and air conditioning of underground stations. (x)     Operation control centre.

PERMANENT WAY A permanent way comprises of two rails. The distance between two rails is called gauge. Three types of gauges are prevalent, namely broad gauge (1,676 mm or 1,600 mm), standard gauge (1,435 mm), and metre gauge (1,000 mm). The Indian Railways have a broad gauge of 1,676 mm. Most of the metros in the world have adopted standard gauge. Standard gauge permits sharper curves, especially where metro alignment has to follow existing major arterial roads. During the last decade, 20 new metros have been constructed in various cities in the world. All these metros have gone in for standard gauge, though the main line gauge in some of these countries was different.

Underground Route Whether the metro should be elevated or underground is a critical decision based on certain basic considerations. The underground

route is chosen in congested built-up areas. It can be a single tunnel housing track for both directions; or it can consist of twin tunnels housing one track for each direction. Construction of the underground section is done through two methods.

FIGURE 3.1: The Tunnel Boring Machine

Underground section by Tunnel Boring Machine This type of construction is adopted under buildings or busy roads where an open cut is not feasible or desirable. The Tunnel Boring Machine (TMB) keeps an adequate cushion below the ground (about 4–6 m over the tunnel) while boring.

Underground Section by Cut and Cover This is adopted where ground/road surface is available and occupation for the construction period will not inconvenience surface movement. In this process, the surface is cut/dug to the required depth and width, a tunnel/underground carriage is built, and thereafter it is covered with earth.

Elevated Route/Viaduct This is adopted for construction over or beside roads. Unlike road flyovers, a viaduct (elevated structure)—to accommodate tracks in two directions of the metro system—is built on single piers (founded

on piles) normally located on the road medians. This ensures that road traffic will move unhindered while metro trains operate on the viaduct structures. The superstructure of the viaduct is made up of supported single box girders of varying spans (20–37 m). Since transporting pre-cast girders of this length through busy roads is not practical, a segmental construction method is used for the superstructure. Match casting technique is employed for casting of box girder segments to enable formation of full span. Segments are cast in a separate casting yard and transported to the site, where they are lifted by crane and placed over the launching truss. After dry matching of the segments of one span, epoxy coat is applied at their ends and temporary pre-stressing using high tensile bars is done. Bearings are installed at both ends of the girder. Thereafter, tensile cables are threaded in situ and post-tensioned from one end. These bridges are economical, especially when access to the construction site is restricted. They also cause least disturbance to road traffic, are capable of faster execution, and are aesthetically appealing. The bridge is built in short sections and is made of concrete that is either cast-in-place (constructed fully in its final location) or precast concrete (built at another location and then transported to their final location for placement in the full structure).

STATIONS A station in a metro system is the regular stopping place of train where the commuter boards/alights from the train. On arrival here, the commuter purchases a ticket and obtains travel information. He/she then proceeds to the platform to board the train. On the return journey, the commuter leaves from the same place while exiting the paid area. Design considerations of the station relate to: •  Operational requirements. •  Traffic, road, and pedestrian requirements. •  Utilities.

FIGURE 3.2: Typical Elevated Station with Segmental Viaduct

•  Structural requirement. •  Passenger forecasts and entrance location requirement. •  Convenience and disruption due to constructions. •  Future expansion. The design of station must meet the objectives of the general public, operator, and the passengers. For the general public, it is desirable that the station has: •  An attractive welcoming image. •  Urban design impact. •  A distinct corporate image. •  Inter-changeability with other modes of transport. •  Parking facilities. The operator’s considerations in a station’s design are: •    Ease of use in different conditions, that is, normal, peak, offpeak, abnormal, and emergency. •  Ease of management and maintenance. •  Provision for future expansion in terms of ticket windows, gates, escalators, stairways, lifts, etc. •  Provision for advertising to generate additional revenue. The passengers of the metro would look for: •  Safety. •  Time taken to complete journey.

•  Appearance. •  Security. •  Protection from rain and direct sunlight. •  Comfortable environmental conditions. •  Access for all sections of society. The layout of station is influenced by: •  Track geometry. •  Sizing of passenger handling facilities. •  Emergency evacuation. •  Electrical and Mechanical (E&M) equipment space requirements. •  Operational accommodation. •  Fire safety compartmentation. •  Passenger circulation, comfort, ease of use, safety and security. •  Constructability of the stations. Stations are of three types, intermediate, interchange, and terminal. They may also be categorized as at-grade, elevated, and underground. The platforms are either side or island platforms. The level of the platform is generally 1 m above rail level. The rail level varies between ±12–15 m from the ground, depending on whether the station is elevated or underground. The platforms are generally designed to hold the number of persons of a full train plus passengers of two missed headways under emergency conditions. The net area is provided at the rate of 0.2 sq. m per person. Platform length is determined by the designed train length. With nine-coach trains planned for Phase III, Delhi Metro will have 210-mlong platforms as against the present 140 m designed for six-coach trains. Typically the concourse contains the fare collection system and divides it into the unpaid and paid areas. The passenger enters the unpaid area and after buying ticket passes through the gates to the

paid area. The access to the platform is designed through the paid area. The concourse area is calculated at 1 sq. m per passenger and is based on peak minute flow after allowing area for queuing space in front of ticket windows and gates, stairways, escalators, lifts, etc. The unpaid area may have small shops, booths, etc. depending on feasibility, commercial viability, and space considerations.

TRACTION AND POWER SUPPLY The operation of an MRTS is energy intensive, since all aspects of it depend upon electric energy. The electric power supply for a metro system is generally divided into the following categories: (i)  Traction supply for running trains. (ii)  Auxiliary supply for station lighting, ventilation, air conditioning, elevators and escalators, fire fighting and pumping, signalling and telecommunications, etc. (iii)  Auxiliary supply for workshops, depots, and other maintenance infrastructures. Reliability of power supply is vital and in fact a prerequisite, since any disruption can cause large number of passengers to be stranded, congestion at stations, and also loss of other facilities like illumination and signage. Power supply arrangements for a metro system need to take into account: •  Reliability of source. •  Redundancy in system design to ensure continued transmission and distribution of electric power in case of failure of one equipment. •  Degree of maintenance possible without disrupting operation. •  Reliability of remote operation. •  Overall economic considerations. Traction supply at three levels have been established for the metros; these are 600 V/750 V dc, 1,500 V dc overhead, or 25 kV ac catenary system. Third rail systems of 750 V dc are laid along the

track and do not have an overhead structure. This voltage level is limited to light and medium capacity metro. Overhead 1,500 V dc or 25 kV ac can cater to medium/ heavy capacity metros. The level of traction voltage/system is generally chosen on the following considerations. •  Design capacity of PHPDT, including future requirement. •  Trustworthiness of the system. •  Energy efficiency in relation to transmission and maintenance. •  Aesthetics. •  Overall techno-economic considerations. Keeping in view the high need for reliability, power supply for the traction system is obtained at high voltage (HV) level from utility agency/agencies at 66 kV or 220 kV. This HV supply is stepped down to a 33 kV/11 kV level for auxiliary loads. For traction purposes, it is stepped down to 600V/750 V dc, 1,500 V dc, or 25 kV ac depending on the specific traction system. The traction sub-stations are located at the same level as the metro stations, be it on ground level, underground, or elevated. Auxiliary power supply requirements are met by either taking power supply from a local company (if supply is reliable) at 400 V, three phase or by laying a medium voltage cabling system (33 kV or 11 kV) inside the tunnels or elevated viaducts with auxiliary substations being set up at various stations. Traction supply is fed to the catenary system or third rail, while the 33 kV/11 kV power supply is distributed in the entire corridor through ring main cable arrangements. Auxiliary sub-stations (33/0.415 kV) are set up at elevated/underground stations with dry typecast resin transformers to feed three phase 415 V auxiliary loads. In underground or elevated metro stations, electrical clearances are restricted and there is limited room for running cables and other conductors. Selection of cables, equipment, and protection system is based on regular availability.

Standby Diesel Generator Sets In the unlikely event that all the input power sources trip or there is grid failure, the power supply to stations for essential lighting, signalling, telecommunication, fire-fighting, fare collection systems, and tunnel ventilation system is maintained by diesel generator sets with low noise levels. The whole system is designed with a central point of operations and control with the help of supervisory control through online station acquisition and operation of switches using supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA).

SIGNALLING AND TRAIN CONTROL The main function of the signalling system is to ensure safe train separation and movement at close intervals without collision. In rail transport, the basic requirements of signalling remain safety and throughput, but its role is much greater than just that. Rail transport differs distinctly from road transport in two ways—very long braking distances due to inertia and fixed path of movement with no manoeuvrability for the driver to change track. In the initial period of train running, it used to be the station master’s responsibility to set the routes in the track manually and prevent movement of trains on occupied tracks. With the increase in number and frequency of trains, it would now be unimaginable to leave the entire responsibility of safety of travelling passengers and rolling stock to be managed manually. The risk of an error on the part of the human element is high, which could lead to a hazardous or unsafe situation. This risk is minimized by the use of signalling. The basic design principle of signalling systems is ‘fail-safe’, that is, failure on safe side. At the same time, heavy investment in infrastructure and rolling stock necessitates optimization of its capacity to provide the best services to the public. These requirements of the metro are generally achieved by adopting ‘distance to go’ Automatic Train Protection (ATP) and Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) sub-systems which:

•  Provide a high level of safety by ensuring continuous safe train separation. •    Eliminate accidents due to driver passing signal at danger by continuous speed monitoring and automatic application of brake in case of disregard of signal/warning by the driver. •    Provides safety and enforces speed limit on section having permanent and temporary speed restrictions. •    Improves capacity with safer and smoother operations. The driver has a continuous display of target speed/distance to go status in his cab enabling him to optimize the speed potential. This works even in bad weather. •  Increases productivity of rolling stock by increasing line capacity and train speeds, thus enabling trains to arrive at destination sooner. •    Improves preventive maintenance of signalling and telecommunication equipment by monitoring system status of trackside and train-borne equipment. Signalling and train control systems are designed to meet the required headway during peak hours. With advancements in electronics and computer-based technology, the following principal sub-systems for train control and signalling systems are in use: •  Automatic Train Protection (ATP) with cab signalling and track to train communication through coded audio frequency track circuits. •  Automatic Train Operation system (ATO). •  Automatic Train Supervision system (ATS) with automatic route setting and automatic train regulation. •  Computer Based Interlocking system both on the main line and depot. The sub-systems of the signalling and train control system are designed conforming to stringent international standards like CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization),

IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission), BS (British Standards), IS (Indian Standards), ITU-T (International Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Standardization Sector), etc.

Telecommunication The telecommunication system acts as the backbone for signalling systems as well as other systems such as SCADA, Automatic Fare Collection (AFC) system, etc. It provides telecommunication services to meet the operational and administrative requirements of the metro network, such as: •    Supplementing the signalling system for efficient train operation. •  Exchange of managerial information. •  Crisis management during emergencies. •    Passenger Information System (PIS), that is, integrated passenger announcement system and passenger information and display system within the station and from central control to each station. •  Centralized clock system. •  Train destination indicator. •  Instant online radio communication between central control and moving cars and maintenance personnel. •  Data channels for signalling, SCADA, AFC, etc. Electrical and Maintainence SCADA is not envisaged as part of the telecommunication system.

Telecommunication System and Transmission Media (i)   Fibre Optic system is the main telecommunication bearer. (ii)  Telephone exchange of small size.

(iii)    Mobile radio communication through digital trunk radio technology. (iv)    Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) system to provide video surveillance and record function for the operations to monitor each system totally from the operation control centre.

ROLLING

STOCK OR

TRAINS

This is the mainstay of the system. It has to transport passengers and meet the required transport demand forecast. The size of coaches is governed by internal factors, while the number of coaches relate to PHPDT. Generally, the width of coaches varies from 2.7–3.2 m with the coach length being between 21–2 m. For a scheduled speed of 35 kmph (including station stoppage time of 20–30 seconds), the travelling distance of 1 km is covered in 80–5 seconds. For this, the train needs to accelerate very fast, achieve a speed of 70–80 kmph and brake very fast without causing jerks. This requires high energy during acceleration and quick cut off during braking. Further efficient working of the system depends upon the proper functioning of the train. A failure, particularly in midsection, can disrupt the entire service. Factors governing the selection of equipment and technology are: •  Optimized scheduled speed. •  Passenger safety and comfort features. •  Proven equipment with high reliability. •  Energy efficiency. •  Lightweight equipment and coach body. •  Aesthetically pleasing interiors and exteriors. •  Flexibility to meet increase in traffic demand. •  Low lifecycle cost. Metro trains have a driving cab at both ends, which enables starting of the train without reversal at an interval of around two minutes. Propulsion equipment is housed below the floor, giving full

area above the floor for passengers. The present day technology of propulsion system permits regeneration of energy during braking. This technology is being deployed by metros in India to save energy. Delhi Metro’s coach size is either 3.2 m by 21.6 m or 2.9 m by 21.6 m with eight coaches finally (four coaches initially) and six coaches finally (four coaches initially) respectively. Bangalore Metro has 2.9 m by 21.0 m coach size with three coaches and six coaches. Passenger safety and comfort features deployed in metro trains are: •  Wide passenger doors for swift evacuation and entrance during short dwell time. •  Automated door closing mechanism ensures that trains will not move unless doors are closed. •  Air conditioning of trains with adequate fresh air. •  Low noise level inside the train. •  Driver to passenger communication in case of emergency (talk back facility) is available. •    Passenger information announcement system.

display

systems

and

station

•    Automatic Train Protection is a continuous train protection system to ensure safe distance from the next train. •  Fire retardant material. •    Emergency door with emergency facilities to ensure welldirected evacuation of passengers. •  Gangways to ensure free passenger movement between cars in case of emergency.

FARE COLLECTION SYSTEM Ticket issue and fare collection of large number of passengers requires an efficient and proper operating system. To achieve this objective, the metro ticketing system is designed to be simple, easy to use/operate, and maintain, easy on accounting facilities, capable

of issuing single/multiple journey tickets, amenable for quick fare changes, and require lesser manpower. Thus now, computer-based automatic fare collection systems are used. For multiple journeys, store value smart cards are utilized and for the single journey, the media is utilized as a contactless smart token. Automatic fare collection systems are favoured over manual systems on account of: •  Less number of staff required. •  Less possibility of leakage of revenue due to 100 per cent ticket check by control gates. •  Recycling of tickets fraudulently by staff is avoided. •  Efficient and easy to operate, faster evacuation both in normal and emergency times. •  System is amenable for quick fare changes. •  Management information reports generation is easy. •    The system has multi-operator capabilities, in that the same smart card can be used for other applications also. •    Automatic Fare Collection systems are the worldwide accepted systems for metro environment. Retractable flap type control gates are used, which offer high throughput, require less maintenance, and are the latest internationally. The tripod turnstile type or flap type gates offer fewer throughputs and require more maintenance.

FIGURE 3.3: Control Gates Box 3.2 Brief Details of Technology in Use Standards Fare media

Gates

Station computer and AFC network

Description (a) Contactless smart card for multiple journeys (b) Token for single journey Computer-controlled retractable flap type automatic gates at entry and exit of following types: •  Entry •  Exit •  Reversible •  Reversible Handicapped Gate— gate for disabled people The fare collection equipment is connected in a local area network with a station server controlling the activities of all the machines. These station servers are linked to the central computer situated in the operational control centre through optic fibre communication channels. The centralized control provides real time data of earnings, passenger flow

Ticket Office Machine (TOM)

Ticket reader and portable ticket decoder

analysis, blacklisting of specified cards, etc. Manned ticket office machines are installed in the stations for selling tickets to the passengers in addition to POMs for automatic ticket vending. Ticket readers are installed near TOM for passengers to check information stored in the ticket.

Passenger Operated Machine (POM) Passenger Operated Machines (Automatic Ticket Vending Machines) are also deployed to avoid standing in queues at ticket booths and provide them international standard service.

PASSENGER FACILITIES This would mainly consist of staircases, escalators, elevators, signage, walkways for the physically challenged, and toilets. The number and size of staircases/escalators are influenced by the number of passengers expected in peak hours and flow rates in both normal and emergency conditions. Their total capacity should be adequate to evacuate passengers in an emergency from the platforms to a safe area (for example, the concourse) in four minutes. Elevators are designed basically to take care of the requirements of physically challenged passengers/wheel chair turning, with operating buttons suitable for blind persons also. Signage is provided to direct/guide the first-time user. The key objective is to convey necessary information in a clear and logical manner using the minimum means. An overall system-wide strategy and uniform approach (generally according to international standards) is adopted for the convenience of the passengers. Minimum toilet facilities at each station are provided separately for men and women. Walkways for the blind are constructed of ductile tiles that can partially guide a blind person from entrance to

platform. They are designed so that this does not hinder the movement of other passengers.

SAFETY FEATURES—FIRE DETECTION AND FIRE SUPPRESSION The stations are designed in accordance with the stipulations of codes like NFPA 2007 (National Fire Protection Association) and provide a safe environment against fire. The various measures taken are: •  Fire prevention. •  Fire control. •  Fire detection systems. •  Means of escape. •  Access for firemen. •  Means of fire-fighting. Fire prevention measures are designed to minimize the risk of outbreak of fire by appropriate choice of location and installation of materials and equipment. The risk is reduced by: •    Use of non-combustible or smoke retardant materials where possible. •    Provision to inspect and reach out to all the areas of the stations. •  Provision for special storage for combustible materials. •  Prohibition of smoking. •  Good housekeeping. •  Staff training and procedures. Fire control measures include methods to control the spread of fire and smoke by proper compartmentalization of fire risk areas, smoke extraction, and smoke containment. Compartmentalization helps to limit the extent of fire by separating the affected area from the other areas with fire rating materials of prescribed fire resistance periods.

All openings connecting the two fire compartments are sealed and ducts are provided with dampers. The main structural elements are designed to have a fire resistance period of two hours in elevated stations and four hours in underground stations to ensure that the structure can survive the fire without undue risk of collapse. Fire detection systems are planned to detect fire at the earliest possible time to limit damage. Typically, heat/smoke detectors are planned in the plant room areas. Both automatic alarms and manually operated call boxes are installed in the stations. The staircases and escalators are planned in the public area to facilitate evacuation of stations within four minutes from platform to concourse and six minutes to a point of ultimate safety as per international norms. Non-public areas are compartmented and fully covered by the fire detection and automatic alarm system. Escape from the non-public areas is planned to a point of safety. A dedicated path from the ground to the station control room is planned that will not be affected by the evacuating passengers. The staircase is pressurized and fitted with a sprinkler system and a firefighting hydrant. The stations are provided with water-based fire fighting systems, except for electrical equipment rooms where gas-based systems are installed. A hydrant system with an underground water storage tank of 50,000–1,00,000 litres capacity is planned at each station. Pumps electrically powered on direct current are designed to ensure an assured supply of water. In the tunnels, water hydrants are provided with a tapping outlet at intervals of about 50 m. All aspects of fire prevention and control are to be scrutinized and approved by the local fire service before the commissioning of the system.

TUNNEL VENTILATION AND STATION ENVIRONMENT CONTROL In underground tunnels and stations, it is essential to ensure tolerable environmental conditions for passengers during all seasons. A large number of passengers occupy the concourse halls and the platforms, especially at the peak hours. The platform and concourse

areas have a limited access from outside and do not have natural ventilation. Provision of forced ventilation in the stations and inside the tunnel is essential. The safety of the passengers in case of fire also needs to be given adequate importance. For this purpose underground stations and tunnel are designed to ensure proper tunnel ventilation and environmental control under various conditions of usage. The tunnel ventilation and environmental control system is designed to provide: •  An acceptable environment in tunnel and station track way for the operation of trains. •  Pressure relief during normal operation. •  Heat removal during abnormal condition or maintenance. •    An effective means of smoke flow during conditions like fire when passengers and employees can evacuate safely and also the fire fighting personnel can reach an incident location. •  An acceptable environment condition in the stations so that the passengers, employees, and equipment would not suffer any adverse effects. Considerations for tunnel ventilation and station environment are: •    System parameters, such as the size of tunnel, size of train blocking the tunnel area, design frequency of trains, signalling system, type of traction, length and topography of the tunnel section. •  Design considerations, such as the climatic condition of the city, pollution levels at surface, subsoil temperature, noise level inside the subway area, and consideration of thermal shock. •  Acceptable temperature and comfort level coping with the heat load from trains and passengers. •  Evacuation of passengers in emergencies.

OPERATION CONTROL CENTRE

This is the nerve centre of all metro train operations. The exact locations of trains are displayed here and all train operations are monitored live. Centralized operations like adjustment of dwell times, coordination of various train activities, and management of emergency situation and abnormalities take place here. This location also has centralized control of power supply for traction and nontraction purposes.

4  Metro in Bangalore With rapid growth in the city’s economy, particularly in information technology and biotechnology, and with mounting pressure on the city transport infrastructure, the Government of Karnataka decided to go ahead with an MRTS project through PPP in 1993. Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS) was commissioned to carry out a feasibility study. They recommended an elevated LRTS for six routes with about 25,000 PHPDT. The corridors identified were: •  Yeshwantpur to Kanakpura. •  Hudson Circle to Indira Nagar via MG Road and Airport. •  Yeshwantpur to Mayo Hall via Mekhri Circle. •  Jayanagar to Mayo Hall via Koramangala. •  Chord Road to Kanakpura via Banashankari. •  Ulsoor to Mekhri Circle and Hebbal. The total cost for this project (excluding land) was estimated at Rs 2,025 crore (at 1994 prices). The state government had even incorporated a company under the name of Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit Ltd (BMRTL) to implement the project. However, the project didn’t take off even after fixing a private partner due to a number of reasons. Bangalore’s population has reached seven million, with an area of 564 sq. km. The metropolitan area of Bangalore has over 26 lakh vehicles, with 900 vehicles getting added every day. The area under roads is 12 per cent and the modal share of public transport is at 45.7 per cent.

The state government commissioned the DMRC in 2002 to propose a metro system on two busy corridors, the east–west corridor of Baiyappanahalli to Ring Road Junction and the north–south corridor from Yeshwantpur to RV Road up to JP Nagar. These cover the two priority corridors of the previously identified LRTS system but with the provision of an underground section in the central business district (CBD). The two lines cross at Majestic, close to the city railway station. The DMRC in conjunction with RITES conducted a detailed traffic survey along major corridors and a road network inventory for all major roads. This was through household surveys, bus terminal and bus stop survey, classified traffic volume survey with volume survey at screen line, and mid-block speed and delay survey. The distribution of trips by purpose was 53 per cent for work, 22 per cent for education, and 25 per cent for others. The maximum projected range of PHPDT on the system was 20,000 in 2007 and 40,000 by 2010. The routes chosen, that is, the east–west and north–south corridors, were to provide the high population density areas connectivity to the heart of the city. In the DPR proposal, an average inter-station distance of 1 km was kept, with a minimum distance of 0.67 km and a maximum of 2.04 km. A detailed environmental impact assessment was carried out. A comprehensive environment management plan was drawn up both for construction and operation phases to minimize the negative environmental impacts. The estimated cost of the project at April 2003 prices was Rs 3,975 crore, including land cost. The project completion was scheduled for 2007 with a completion cost of Rs 4,379 crore with escalation. Interest on loan during construction was estimated at Rs 610 crore. Thus, the total completion cost worked out to Rs 4,989 crore. There are some important recommendations included in the 2003 DPR. These are: •    Based on the experience of implementing Delhi Metro, it was suggested that a SPV with adequate powers would be an

effective organizational arrangement to subsequently operate the metro rail project.

implement

and

•  An SPV on the same lines as Delhi Metro would entail an equal number of directors from both the governments, with a state government nominee as the MD and the secretary, Union Ministry of Urban Development as chairman. •  To avoid delays usually associated with the bureaucratic process of decision-making, the board should be vested with full powers needed to implement the project. •    Conditions are still not conducive to try the concessionaire approach for metro rail systems in all the cities. The model suggested was an SPV on the lines of DMRC with equity partnership of the central and state governments as the concessionaire approach has not been tried for any rail-based urban transport project in India so far. Moreover, conditions were still not conducive to opt for this approach in metro rail systems. Implementing a metro project in a congested metropolis is a major challenge. In terms of size, magnitude, and technical complexity, there are no parallels. These have to be carried out in a difficult urban environment without dislocating city life. Clearance from local authorities relating to cutting of trees, diversion of utilities, management of road traffic, etc. have to be organized in time, for which an efficient and competent project implementing agency is a must. Metro projects cannot be executed the way government agencies usually execute projects. It was estimated that a delay of one day would increase the project cost by Rs 47 lakh. Competent and skilled personnel to man such an organization would be difficult to mobilize. It was suggested that a two-tier organization with well-defined responsibilities be set up. At the apex would be the Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation (BMRC), which should be a lean but effective organization with full mandate, accountability, and free from political and bureaucratic control. The second level will be a project management team. These general consultants will be engaged on

contract basis and will be fully responsible for planning, design, and project management. The project proposal could be taken up for approval by the Government of India in April 2006. Details of the final proposal approved by Government of India at the cabinet level are given below.

FINAL PROPOSAL FOR BANGALORE METRO Corridors 1.    East–west: from Baiyappanahalli to Mysore Road. This corridor will have a total length of 18.1 km, of which 3.4 km would be underground, 0.35 km at-grade, and 14.35 would be elevated. There would be a total of 18 stations. 2.    North–south: Yeshwantpur Railway Station to Jayanagar. This corridor will have a length of 14 km with 11.3 km elevated, 3.3 km underground, and 0.3 at-grade. There would be a total of 14 stations.

Gauge Unlike in Delhi, standard gauge instead of broad gauge was chosen. This would ensure that the line is able to traverse through comparatively narrow roads, sharp curves, and undulating topography.

Land 26.39 hectares of government land and 18.85 hectares of private land were to be allocated for this project.

Cost Details of the project cost is outlined in Table 4.1.

Implementation This is planned through a between the Government of India and the Government of Karnataka with equal equity participation. TABLE 4.1 Project Cost for Bangalore Metro Expense Construction cost IDC (interest during construction) Financing charges: pre-operative expenses Total with taxes and duties Total at current cost (decision stage)

Amount (Rs) 4,551 crore 353 crore 25 crore 4,929 crore 5,747 crore

Period The project is planned for five years, with the first stage of the 7-km elevated corridor from Byappanahalli to Chinnaswamy Cricket Stadium on MG Road to be commissioned in three to three-and-ahalf years.

Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) and Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) The Economic Internal Rate of Return was estimated at 26 per cent. The FIRR works out to 7.49 per cent. Both these values are comparable to such projects all over the world. The Project Investment Board at the Government of India level while considering the proposal observed that FIRR is less than the 12 per cent required for infrastructure projects. However, the EIRR is more than 20 per cent, which may justify the investment.

Fare Structure

The fares decided upon were: •  Rs 5: up to 2 km •  Rs 8: 2–6 km •  Rs 10: 6–12 km •  Rs 12: More than 12 km

Sensitivity Analysis Based on construction cost higher by 10 per cent and ridership lower by 10 per cent and construction cost higher by 5 per cent and ridership lower by 5 per cent FIRR decreases by 0.54 per cent, by 1.26 per cent, and 0.88 per cent respectively.

Legal Framework The Mysore Tramways Act, 1906 with suitable amendments is applicable to this project.

FINANCING In JVs with equal participation of the Government of India and the state government, the overall project cost is normally divided into equity, subordinate debt, and senior term debt or loan from multilateral institutions. Subordinate debt, generally to meet land costs, taxes and duties, is the debt whose repayment has a subordinate status in relation to the normal debt, which is referred to as the senior term debt. Repayment of the subordinate debt falls due after the senior term debt and thus is for a longer duration. Subordinate debt plays an important role in capital intensive projects with a long gestation period and where generation of revenue gets stabilized after a much longer time when compared to other infrastructure projects. Senior term debt is the main debt which constitutes a vital part of the investment plan. This is given generally against some security. All the four JV metros in the country have the benefit of getting a JICA loan as senior term debt. These are soft

loans under overseas development assistance programme of the Government of Japan. The liberal terms of JICA funding include a ten-year moratorium and 20 years for repayment. The loan is disbursed on tranche basis based on a yearly appraisal of progress. Rate of interest normally ranges from 1.5–2 per cent, depending on the nature of the project. The approved institutional arrangement was converting the existing Bangalore Metro Rapid Transit Ltd into a JV company of the Government of India and the Government of Karnataka, with the two promoters having equal shares. The company will have ten directors on the board, five each from the two governments, with the secretary, Union Ministry of Urban Development, as chairman and the MD appointed by the Government of Karnataka with prior consent from the Government of India. Since during implementation several problems are likely to arise, for expeditious decisions in such matters it was agreed to set up a high powered committee under the chairmanship of the chief secretary of Karnataka. Legal cover to undertake construction was proposed under the Mysore Tramways Act, 1906 with suitable amendments. A debt–equity ratio of 70:30 was agreed upon between the Government of India and the Government of Karnataka for this project. An equal share of 15 per cent of the equity was decided between the two governments. A subordinate debt of 10 per cent was taken up by the Government of India, while the Government of Karnataka took up a subordinate debt of 15 per cent. While approving the project, the following points were delineated: •  If the central government taxes and duties are waived, then the current cost of the project would be Rs 5,453 crore (Rs 6,395 crore at completion). In either case, the Government of Karnataka would waive its taxes, which amounted to Rs 177 crore. Government of India’s contribution would be 15 per cent equity and 10 per cent subordinate debt, while the contribution of the Government of Karnataka would be 15 per cent equity, 15 per cent subordinate debt, and 45 per cent senior term debt.

•    Any cost escalation due to a change in the scope or the approved time cycle of the project is to be borne by the Government of Karnataka. However, any cost escalation due to a change in the statutory levies and duties, exchange rate variation, or price escalation within the approved project time cycle will be shared equally between the project promoters. •  The Government of Karnataka is to bear the entire cost of land through interest-free subordinate debt. •  The Government of Karnataka has to ensure that electric power is made available to the project on a no-profit, no-loss basis. •    The Government of Karnataka must ensure that price-based measures to promote and facilitate metro ridership is part of an integrated traffic rationalization plan for the entire city with a view to ensuring that the projected ridership is realized. •    The Government of Karnataka should give high priority to the integration of various modes of transport that would act as feeder to the proposed metro. •  The Government of India will not finance cash losses and capital expenditure during the operational phase. Its requirements would need to be financed by the SPV and/or the Government of Karnataka from their own resources. The new SPV will implement the project and raise senior term debt from the market without seeking any government guarantee. However, the company was authorized to offer the following comforts to the lender: •  Revenue generated to be escrowed after allowing operation and maintenance charges. •    The first mortgage to be taken on movable and immovable assets. •  Assignment of all project contracts and insurance documents. •    Assignments of contractor guarantee, performance bond, and liquidated damages.

•    Creation of a second charge in 51 per cent equity held by the promoters. Break-up of the cost is given in Table 4.2. When the project was being appraised at the Government of India level, based on the experience with Delhi Metro, various key factors which need to be taken into account at the project appraisal stage were actively addressed. TABLE 4.2 Total Project Cost for Bangalore Metro Sl. No.

Description

Current Cost (Rs crore)

Completion Cost (Rs crore)

1.

Construction cost Land acquisition Alignment and formation Station buildings (elevated and at-grade) Permanent way Operations Control Centre and administrative building Traction and power supply Ventilation and air conditioning Signalling and telecommunica tion (including cable diversions) Automatic Fare Collection

600

600

1,215

1,428

589

676

194 31

227 36

352

430

78

96

273

334

69

85

2.

installations at stations Depots Rolling stock General charges at the rate of 8 per cent (including contingency at the rate of 3 per cent) Total construction cost Pre-operative expenses Guarantee charges Upfront fees Arrangement fees Documentation fees Total Interest during construction Total project cost

148 709 293

166 853 351

4,551

5,285

12 10

14.37 14.39

2

31.63

25 353

31.63 433

4,929

5,747

One such issue was the traffic demand projection. Estimation of traffic demand was based on primary surveys. The DPR showed that out of a total of 58.52 lakh trips performed in the city, vehicular trips were 48.74 lakh. The highest amount of trips, 53 per cent, were work-related and a survey showed that 48 per cent of the commuters were willing to shift to a metro if the distance to the station is up to 250 m. Based on the final assignment of traffic on the total network, transport demand projections showed 8.2 lakh passengers per day by the metro by the year 2007, 10.2 lakh by

2011, and 16.1 lakh by 2021. The maximum range of PHPDT on the system by the year 2007 was projected as 26,000. The experience with Delhi Metro has shown that the traffic demand projections have been quite off the mark from actual ridership; thus the 8.2 lakh trips per day for the Bangalore Metro seems to be an overestimate. The concern expressed was that unrealistic projections cannot be the basis for a reliable revenue model as it may lead to open-ended operational subsidy since uncertainty associated with ridership build-up and the consequent revenue risk cannot be fully mitigated. The solution found was for the state government to ensure price-based measures to promote and facilitate ridership by the metro. Such measures would essentially form part of an integrated traffic rationalization plan for the entire city. What if there are cash losses during initial periods of operation? It was expected that the state would bear this, as the Government of India, the other equity partner, has no control over what can become an open-ended operational cash subsidy. Issues relating to appropriate modes of transport for urban agglomerations were taken up. It was accepted that the compatibility of the existing railways network—acting both as a feeder and an evacuator—needs to be looked into from the point of possible long term operational and financial advantages. The integration of various modes of transport, both existing and proposed needs to be studied comprehensively. The state will have to prioritize such integration. Since the Bangalore Metro, unlike its Delhi counterpart, is opting for a standard gauge, it was felt that the implication of both the gauges must be compared and stated upfront. A universal argument is that standard gauge is the globally accepted system for metros, and that broad gauge was opted for in Delhi mainly because of Indian Railways’ viewpoint of the possibility of rolling stock becoming available from domestic coach factories. In fact, this has so far not happened in the Delhi Metro. While opting for a rail-based metro system a proper analysis of alternatives, available and proven technologies and facilities, and of their techno-economic implications is a must. This would include a

consideration of capital costs, recurring costs of operation, cost of rehabilitation, and settlement in the context of rapid urbanization. To what extent is the local population involved in the process of recommending a metro option? It is an accepted principle that public investments must essentially address the public good and until this is not transparently established and perceived as such, smooth execution of projects of this type could be a problem. The state government assured that a dialogue with the stakeholders has been carried out. Doubts have been expressed by stakeholders regarding the reasonableness and appropriateness of the proposed metro, as also the desirability of the alignment passing through MG Road and Cubbon Park. Of course, many would have preferred an underground alignment on these important stretches, but cost becomes a critical issue. Also, to what extent a major landmark like the Cubbon Park can be disturbed was and continued to be an issue of intense public debate from an environmental point of view. The need for a fresh and objective look at the appropriateness of the proposed alignment in light of preventable demolition of structures and consequent economic costs and social trauma, along with disturbance to the ecological health and beauty of the city, were also taken up. On the cost and financing issues, it was recognized that hidden or implied subsidies through a waiver of taxes/duties should be discouraged. This is necessary to move towards a transparent fiscal system and also for reflecting true cost and return while taking investment decisions. A cost estimate/rate of return based on calculations without waiver of taxes and duties was preferred. A waiver would have amounted to an additional subsidy by the Government of India to the tune of approximately Rs 490 crore. The cost estimate for this metro project was 25 per cent less than that of the Delhi Metro. Consequently, there were doubts regarding the reasonableness and reliability of the cost estimates. The Government of Karnataka informed that they had undertaken a due diligence of the DPR. A detailed financial appraisal has also been carried out.

APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION The Government of India’s approval for the project was conveyed to the state government on 11 May 2006. The 33-km-long metro was to be completed in five years. Project financing approval referred to a current cost of Rs 5,453 crore with a completion cost of Rs 6,395 crore. Government of India’s equity was fixed at 15 per cent and its subordinate debt at 10 per cent. Government of Karnataka’s equity would be 15 per cent and subordinate debt at 15 per cent and there would be no waiver of taxes and duties by the Government of India, while the Government of Karnataka would waive its taxes and duties. Any cost escalation due to changes in the statutory levies and duties, exchange rate variation, and price escalation within the approved project time cycle would be shared equity between the project promoters. Any other cost escalation due to change in scope beyond the approved project time cycle would be borne by the Government of Karnataka. Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited (BMRCL) was authorized to implement the project and raise a senior term debt from the market without seeking any government guarantee. This was subject, however, to the condition that the foreign loan, if any, will be regulated by the Government of India. The following comforts could be offered to the lender: •  Revenue generated to be escrowed after allowing O&M charges. •  First mortgage on movable and immovable assets. •  Assignment of all project contracts, insurance documents. •    Assignments of contractor guarantee, performance, land, and liquidated damages. •    Creation of second charge on 51 per cent equity held by the promoters. Implementation of the project was initiated through the following steps: •    Registration of the new company, namely BMRCL was accomplished on 2 September 2005.

•  A general consultant was engaged on 31 October 2002. The empowered committee reviewed the project in October 2008. The project authorities indicated that the Byappanahalli–Cricket Stadium (7 km) elevated stretch is targeted for completion by February 2011, the Yeshwantpur–Swastic section by June 2011, the underground section by June 2012, and the final part up to Mysore Road and RV Road by August/September 2012. Attention was drawn to the constraints such as problems in land acquisition, nonavailability of officers from the Railways, demolition and dismantling of religious structures, delays in materialization by the general consultants, steep escalation in the cost of cement, steel, fuel, and lubricants, etc. Once implementation had started, the Government of Karnataka decided in November 2008 that the north–south corridor of the metro needs to be extended in the north side from Yeshwantpur to Hesaraghatta Cross Road by a length of 5.6 km, at an estimated cost of Rs 1,082 crore, and on the south side from RV Road terminal to Puttenahalli Cross by a length of 3.7 km. The latter extension would be elevated, with three stations beyond RV Road, at Banashankari, JP Nagar, and Puttenahalli Cross at a cost of Rs 681 crore. The former extension will have stations at Outer Ring Road, Peenya Industrial Area, Peenya Village, Jalahalli, Dasarchatti, and Hesarghatta Cross. These extensions were considered necessary in view of huge developments in and around Peenya up to Hesaraghatta Cross. This is an industrial area which has also had huge residential development on both sides. Earlier, the depot was planned at Yeshwantpur, which in view of the high cost of an elevated depot and no scope for future expansion, is now planned at-grade at Peenya. Without the depot at Peenya, the north–south corridor cannot be made operational. The 2003 DPR for Phase I of the project had stated that the original two corridors would need to be extended in future years. The extension from RV Road terminal to Puttenahalli Cross will meet the high potential traffic around the Outer Ring Road besides serving densely populated areas such as Banashankari, Jayanagar, and JP

Nagar. It will also have traffic integration at Banashankari with BMTC (Bangalore Metropolition Transport Corporation), with monorail and buses at the Ring Road Junction. As per the DPR, with regard to the northern extension from Yeshwantpur to Hesaraghatta Cross, the EIRR works out to 30.85 per cent and the FIRR to 3.5 per cent over a 32-year period of operation. With respect to the southern extension, the EIRR is 21.6 per cent and the FIRR is 5.26 per cent over a 32-year period of operation. These investments are to be made with a view to increasing the economic benefits to the society at large rather than yielding high financial rates of return. Incremental traffic due to the northern extension was projected as 1.53 lakh per annum in 2011 and 2.82 lakh in 2021. For the southern extension, this will be 0.47 lakh and 0.58 lakh respectively. Though the proposal was approved by a group of ministers at the Government of India level earlier, a formal order to this effect was issued in January 2010. This order also lay down that the project shall be covered under the Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 and the Delhi Metro Railway (Operation and Maintenance) Act, 2002 as amended from time to time. This was done because by this time the Government of India had amended the two legislations to extend their jurisdiction to all metropolitan cities in the country including Bangalore. Till then, the legal cover for this metro was under the Mysore Tramways Act, the coverage of which is indeed debatable as far as modern day metro systems are concerned. The financial details for the northern extension are given in Table 4.3. TABLE 4.3 Northern Extension of Bangalore Metro Finance Description Equity by Government of India and Government of Karnataka at 15% each on completion cost with central taxes

Amount (Rs) 324 crore

Subordinate debt by Government of India (10%) Subordinate debt by Government of Karnataka (15%) Senior term debt (45%) Total

108 crore 162 crore 488 crore 1,082 crore

The financial details for the southern extension are given in Table 4.4. TABLE 4.4 Southern Extension of Bangalore Metro Finance Description

Amount (Rs)

Equity by Government of India and Government of Karnataka at 15% each on completion cost with central taxes Subordinate debt by Government of India (10%) Subordinate debt by Government of Karnataka (15%) Senior term debt from Indian Bank/JICA (45%) Total

204.30 crore

68.10 crore 102.15 crore 306.45 crore 681.00 crore

The approved funding pattern for the entire project (42.3 km) is given in Table 4.5. Thus, the original project concept and its financial profile underwent a change during implementation. The original 33 km became a length of 42.3 km; the approved cost became Rs 8,158 crore and the completion target became September 2012. While the project should have started on approval in 2006, it actually started only in January 2007. Subsequently, the preliminary ground work itself took quite some time and thus the project could take off only in the middle of 2008. TABLE 4.5

Funding for Bangalore Metro Description Government of India equity (15%) Government of Karnataka equity (15%) Subordinate debt—Government of India (10%) Subordinate debt—Government of Karnataka (15%) Senior term debt (45%) Total

Amount (Rs) 1,223.70 crore 1,223.70 crore 815.80 crore 1,223.70 crore 3,671.10 crore 8,158.00 crore

A total of 57 government properties and 752 private properties had to be acquired for the project. This process took some time. About 2,500 trees had to be removed for the alignment. As compensatory afforestation, 15,000 saplings were planted in 2006–7 through Bangalore Development Authority (BDA), Bruhat Bangalore Municipal Corporation (BBMC), and the forest department. These trees were nurtured and maintained by BMRCL at a total project cost of about Rs 75 lakh. The company felt the need for revising the total cost, which was endorsed by the board in 2010. Revision on the following basis has become necessary: •  Land cost has increased from the sanctioned cost of Rs 670 .16 crore to Rs 1,408.42 crore. •  Civil engineering costs are up from Rs 3,237 crore to Rs 5,737 crore. •    Signalling and telecom and automatic fare collection goes up from Rs 655 crore to Rs 815 crore. •  Depot costs are up from Rs 210 crore to Rs 419 crore. •  Rolling stock to cost Rs 1,749 crore in place of Rs 1,459 crore. •  General charges up from Rs 507 crore to Rs 674 crore. Overall, the total project cost becomes Rs 11,608 crore in place of the sanctioned completion cost of Rs 8,158 crore. The broad reasons

for the increase are: general increase in land prices, increase in the cost of steel and cement, geological conditions requiring greater quantity of tunnelling in hard rock and mixed ground conditions, viaduct cost going up based on open competitive bidding, provision to be made for a full-fledged depot at Peenya, etc. Costs of certain components of the Bangalore Metro, it was noted, are higher compared to the DMRC. The main components of escalated cost are the underground stations, viaduct stations, and depots. Such a big revision in the project cost is bound to raise substantial questions as to whether the original estimation of cost was sound, whether the appraisal process anticipated these situations, and whether any other option is available to complete the project as planned and with the required additions. Litigation also affected project implementation. As in January, 2010, there were 31 writ petitions pending in the High Court—five public interest litigations (PILs), writs relating to the project itself, land acquisition, apportionment of compensation, and termination of contract. Utilities relating to Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd (KPTCL) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (BSNL) had to be shifted, which have been completed. The Commissioner of Railway Safety Southern Circle (Railways), Bangalore, has been notified by the Government of India for safety certification. A JICA loan of ¥ 44,704 million was approved for the project. This works out to approximately Rs 2,200 crore. For the balance of Rs 3,024 crore, ADB is to sanction about USD 200 million, which works out to about Rs 920 crore, and Korea Exim Bank agreed to process the loan of € 133 million, around Rs 850 crore. In addition, Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) has agreed to sanction a loan of Rs 1,200 crore. The project is presently under implementation.

REVIEW IN TERMS OF PROJECT PLANNING This discussion will focus on only four out of the several stages of project planning—identification, preparation, appraisal, and implementation. Here, though identification was done through a

proper process, it took time. There could be an argument here that alternatives analysis was not undertaken. One reason put forward for this is that all these studies are undertaken by promoters of such systems rather than by independent consultants commissioned by transport planning authorities, with safeguards incorporated in the terms of reference. What is to be observed in this case is that the project decision was taken probably only when both the central government and state government could work together. A metro for the city was recommended as early as in 1982, then again in 1983 when Southern Railway produced a comprehensive commuter rail development plan. Another study was undertaken in 1988 that focussed on the commuter rail and the next one in 1993 shifted the focus back to a two-line metro. In 1994, the emphasis was on a light rail-based, six route, partially elevated network. This project, to be taken up on a PPP basis, went beyond the proposal stage. But it got stuck when the private partner asked for higher public participation. However, given the moderate ridership and issues which would have arisen even if property development was included as a substantial ingredient, such a venture may not have taken off at that time. While deciding on implementation, some part of the financing was left open-ended as the SPV had to raise a loan from the market. It is apparent that correct details of debt and consequent financial burden were not included in the financial analysis before approval. Enhancement in the total cost of the project that has occurred during implementation leads to the conclusion that costing was not undertaken thoroughly. Implementation has not been a smooth process when compared to the Delhi Metro process, and the reasons for this would be worth examining when the project is complete. Did the change in MDs have an impact? Could the company get the required technical staff and professional support? Did the empowered committee mechanism play an effective role in finding timely solutions to management issues which arose, especially considering the fact that this is the first JV metro project taken up outside Delhi which was taken up? Could some of the implementation delays have been avoided or better handled? A

proper answer to these questions could emerge once a post-project evaluation is undertaken. Also, risk analysis was not undertaken as is normally required in a thorough project planning process as the concept of risk is not adequately addressed in these types of projects. This should be viewed seriously considering the fact that the first Kolkata Metro took more than 15 years to materialize.

5  East–West Metro in Kolkata Kolkata is the only city in the country which has all modes of transport, from a metro railway and trams to hand-pulled rickshaws, in addition to buses and all other normal vehicles. A stage had been reached when the city roads were being used beyond their capacity and the heterogeneous modes often resulted in traffic jams. In 2006, when a DPR for an east–west metro corridor was taken up, the existing Indian Railways-run metro system was operating between Dum Dum and Tollygunge. It was about 16.5 km with a ridership of 3.2 lakh passengers on weekdays. Work on this metro was started in 1969 and it was commissioned in 1984. A circular rail system from Dum Dum to Princep Ghat for about 13 km provided limited passenger service catering to about 25,000 passengers on an average on a weekday. Tramway service was started in Kolkata in 1873 and about 200 trams were in active service carrying about 1.8 lakh passengers on an average weekday. The cities of Kolkata and Howrah are connected by ferry services introduced in the 1970s, which cater to about three lakh passengers per day. The city bus system is being operated by a good number of government and private operators, such as Calcutta State Transport Corporation (CSTC), Calcutta Tramway Company (CTC), West Bengal Surface Transport Corporation (WBSTC), and private bus syndicates such as Bengal Bus Syndicate, Joint Council of Bus Syndicate, and other chartered bus/hired bus operators. Prior to the metro becoming operational, the city had about nine lakh registered vehicles, of which the major public transport and intermediate public

transport modes accounted for 16,000 buses, 25,000 taxis, and 8,000 auto rickshaws. When we look at Kolkata’s problems we are essentially taking into account a larger urban agglomeration consisting of Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC), Howrah Municipal Corporation, Salt Lake City, and the larger Kolkata Metropolitan Development Area (KMDA). The total population of this area at the time of study in 2001 was 5.8 million. Road space in Kolkata is only about 6 per cent as compared to Delhi’s 21 per cent, Mumbai’s 18 per cent, and Chennai’s 16 per cent. Average speed in the city is 10–15 kmph.

INDIA’S FIRST METRO Planning and executing India’s first metro took quite a number of years. Though a survey by the French Metro was commissioned in 1949, nothing much happened after that. Then the Planning Commission appointed a metropolitan transport team in 1969 followed by the visit to Kolkata in 1970 by a Russian company, Technoexport Ltd of Moscow to undertake a survey as per a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the two governments. After following the approval procedure by the Ministry of Railways/Railway Board, a metro project was decided on and its foundation was laid by the than prime minister in December 1972. Work went on for years and the first stretch of 3.4 km from Esplanade to Bhowanipur was commissioned in October 1984. Various small stretches of the 16.45 km route from Dum Dum to Tollygunge were commissioned from time to time between 1984–95, while the full stretch was opened on 27 September 1995. While the project cost of Phase I (that is, Dum Dum to Tollygunge) is Rs 1,716.95 crore, a Phase II from Tollygunge to New Garia at a cost of Rs 2,749.71 crore has also been approved. Two stretches of this phase, namely, Tollygunge to Kavi Nazrul which is 5.887-km long and Kavi Nazrul to Kavi Subhas which is 2.77-km long were opened in August 2009 and October 2010 respectively. The Kolkata Metro operates at a peak frequency of six minutes and the average number of passengers using the system every month is now 132 lakh.

It can be seen that the effort involved in getting India’s first metro started was huge and the entire process became very time consuming. Based on the subsequent metro experiences in the country, a question arises, would the pace of implementation be faster if the state government is involved in the process as an equal partner?

STUDIES CONDUCTED The KMDA master plan for the horizon year 2025 was prepared on the basis of the work of a working group set up by the state government. The KMDA master plan for traffic and transportation in Kolkata Municipal Authority (KMA [2001–25]) made a large number of proposals related to improvement in transport network and mass transport facilities. These included: •  Extension of metro from Tollygunge to Thakurpukur and Joka. •    Construction of an east–west metro from New Town to Ramrajtala. •    Feasibility study to examine prospective role of LRTS along BT Road, EM Bypass, BK Expressway, Dum Dum–Barrackpore Expressway, Foreshore Road in Howrah, DH Road, Kazi Nazrul Islam Avenue, and Joka Outer Ring bus terminals. •  Intermediate Ring bus terminals. •  Inner Ring bus terminal. Various studies were undertaken to see how Kolkata Metro ridership can be improved, the most recent being the study undertaken in 2003–4 as to how to improve ridership. The recommendations included fare rationalization and introduction of a feeder bus system on selected interchange stations, re-routing of certain bus routes which run parallel or in direct competition to metro. Primary traffic surveys carried out as part of feasibility of a metro railway from Tollygunge to Garia in 2000–1 estimated that about 1.24 lakh passengers will use the extension by 2010. A large number of these passengers are likely to be suburban rail and bus

passengers who will interchange or shift to metro railway, once the extended portion becomes functional. Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in its study of the east–west corridor from New Das Nagar to New Town recommended a metro route from Sealdah to Salt Lake City via Maniktala and in New Town area the alignment was to follow its periphery with a depot in the CBD near Bagjhola canal. The DPR for the east–west corridor was completed by DMRC and submitted in March 2006.

PROJECT DETAILS The DPR for the Rajarhat to New Das Nagar east–west corridor, as desired by the Government of West Bengal, involved a detailed traffic demand analysis. This showed that about 14 per cent of trips in the study area are on foot, 48 per cent by bus, 5.1 per cent by train, 8.3 per cent by two-wheeler, 8.5 per cent by shared auto rickshaw, 3.5 per cent by metro, 3.31 per cent by cycle rickshaw, 3 per cent by cycle, etc. About 30 per cent of the trips are for work, 9 per cent for education, 11 per cent for other purposes, and about 50 per cent were return trips. Transport demand forecast for the study area showed that while the population of the area will reach 67.44 lakh in 2011, employment will go up from 19.84 lakh in 2001 to 22.60 lakh in 2011. Four alternative MRTS alignments were considered and demand analysis for the proposed east–west MRTS corridor indicated that the alignment of Alternative IV will provide the maximum daily passengers as well as passenger km. This stretch is supposed to cover New Das Nagar to Sealdah and Narkeldanga Main Road, then to EM bypass, onto the western edge of Salt Lake City up to the Maniktala Road crossing, and finally entering Salt Lake City towards Central Park. The total MRTS network was expected to carry 11.95 lakh trips and 90.98 per km in 2011.

Traffic Forecast

The project forecast 23,064 PHPDT in 2011 and 27,749 PHPDT in 2021. The designed PHPDT for 2011 is 11,790, which is to go up to 15,720 by 2021.

Route Length New Das Nagar to Salt Lake Sector V would have a length of 18.65 km with 9.124 km underground, 8.552 km elevated, and 0.973 km at-grade. Eight stations would be underground, nine elevated, and one station would be at-grade.

Gauge Standard gauge (1435 mm) is invariably used for metro railways the world over; in India, the national railway gauge is broad gauge (1,676 mm). Thus, whether the east–west corridor should go in for broad gauge or standard gauge was examined in detail. The considerations were: •  The existing north–south corridor of the metro is operating with a broad gauge and coaches of 2.74 m width and a tunnel diameter of 5.2 m. The proposed coach width for the new corridor is 2.88 m with the same tunnel diameter. •  Alignment has to pass through heavily built-up areas for optimal passenger utilization. This imposes severe restrictions on the selection of curves, since in India no ‘right of way’ has been reserved for metro systems. The major arterial roads may often have sharp curves and right angle bends. In such a situation, adopting standard gauge is advantageous. •    In standard gauge, optimized state-of-the-art rolling stock designs are available off the shelf. •    Because of a very large market, constant upgradation of technology takes place for standard gauge coaches. •    For the same capacity, the gross weight of a metro coach is lower for a standard gauge than for broad gauge. Standard

gauge rolling stock thus results in recurring saving in energy consumption. •    Once the technology for standard gauge coaches is absorbed and a manufacturing base is set up in India, there will be considerable scope for the export of coaches. •  Sometimes it is argued that adoption of broad gauge for metro would enable inter-running of metro trains with Indian Railways. Inter-running is technically not feasible, as the two systems have different rolling stock characteristics, signalling systems, headways, tariffs, moving dimensions, and loading standards. •    Track gauge is not a technical parameter but a planning parameter for a metro system. •  With standard gauge, the capital cost will be 2–4 per cent lesser than for broad gauge. •    Possibility of BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) route for financing the metro will be feasible only with standard gauge. Since inter-running is not feasible, the choice of gauge for a metro system should be based solely on technical and economic considerations, according to which standard gauge turns out to be superior.

Route The route identified for the corridor is New Das Nagar–Das Nagar– Narsingh Dutta Road–Kadamtala–Howrah Maidan–Howrah Station– Mahakaron–Central Station–Bow Bazar–Sealdah Station–Phool Bagan–Swabhoomi–Salt Lake Stadium–Bengal Chemical–City Centre– Central Park–Karunamayee–Salt Lake Sector V. The section from Das Nagar to Kadamtala (3.95 km) will be elevated and at-grade; Kadamtala to Subhash Sarovar (9.125 km) will be underground; and the section from Subhash Sarovar to New Town (15.575 km) will be elevated. An underground crossing of Hooghly River is a notable characteristic of this metro. The rail level at the Hooghly River would be at about 35 m below ground level.

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) The positive environmental impacts identified are: •  Reduction in traffic congestion. •  Quick service and safety. •  Less fuel consumption. •  Reduction in air pollution. •  Better roads. •  Employment opportunities. Negative environmental impacts are: •  Impacts due to project location—change in land use estimated to be 83.40 hectares (both government and private land). •  Loss of trees—854 trees likely to be lost. •  Loss of historical and cultural monuments—nil. •  Impacts due to project construction—soil erosion and health risk at construction site, traffic diversion and risk to existing buildings, impact on water quality is estimated to be nil. •    Impacts due to project operation— such as oil spillage during change of lubricants, cleaning and repair processes, noise due to operation of trains (however, this is offset by the reduction in vehicular traffic noise by about 7–9 per cent), accident hazards, water supply requirements, station refuse generation, and visual impacts. A checklist of impacts was prepared, an environmental management plan was drawn up, and an environmental management system proposed. Environmental costs added up to Rs 56.86 crore. The environment management plan consisted of compensation for loss of trees, compensatory afforestation, compensation for resettlement, monitoring of water, monitoring of air/noise during construction and operation, establishment of environment division and provision for bins at stations for refuse.

Cost Estimate The overall capital cost for the east–west corridor at June 2004 price level was estimated as Rs 3,457.93 crore excluding taxes and duties. However, when the project was taken up at the central government level in 2008, cost details and financing arrangements were modified (see Table 5.1). TABLE 5.1 Cost Estimate for East–West Corridor Description

Amount (Rs)

Government of India equity (15%) Government of West Bengal equity (15%) Subordinate debt—Government of India (10%) Subordinate debt—Government of West Bengal (15%) Senior term debt—JBIC (45%) Total

701.50 crore 701.50 crore 467.50 crore 701.50 crore 2,104 crore 4,676 crore

Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) For the purpose of calculating FIRR, a completion cost of Rs 4,195 crore has been taken into account, operation and maintenance costs placed at Rs 169.33 crore for the first year of operation (that is, 2011), with fare box revenue to be calculated on the basis of a fare structure varying from Rs 8–19 for various slabs ranging from a minimum distance of 0–2 km to a maximum of 18–21 km. Other revenues such as property development and advertisement amount to 5 per cent of the fare box revenue. Thus, the FIRR works out to 1.09 per cent.

Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR)

Economic appraisal was carried out within the broad framework of social cost-benefit analysis techniques. This is based on the incremental costs and benefits and involves a comparison of these in both scenarios, that is, with and without the project. In the analysis, the cost and benefit have been estimated in terms of market prices and then converted using appropriate shadow prices to derive the economic value. The EIRR for the project has been arrived at using the ‘discounted cash flow’ technique. Evaluation assumptions are: •  Price level of June 2004. •  First year of operation taken as 2011. •  Last year of operation is 2043. •  Construction period will be five years from 2006–11. •  Daily to annual factor is taken as 340. Project costs comprise of capital cost, operation and maintenance cost. The project will yield tangible and intangible savings due to an equivalent reduction in road traffic and certain socio-economic benefits. Introduction of MRTS will result in a reduction in the number of buses, lowered usage of private vehicles, decreased air pollution, and increase the speed of road-based vehicles. This in turn will result in significant social benefits due to a reduction in fuel consumption, vehicle-operating cost, and passenger travel time. Reduction in accidents, pollution, and road maintenance costs are the other benefits to the society. The evaluated and quantified benefits include: •    Capital and operating cost (on present congestion norms) of carrying the total volume of passenger traffic by existing MRTS, bus system, and private vehicles in case the MRTS project is not taken up. •  Savings in operating costs of all buses and other vehicles due to decongestion including those that would continue to use the existing transport network even after MRTS is introduced. •    Savings in commuting time of MRTS users because of faster speed of MRTS.

•  Savings in commuting time of those passengers continuing with existing modes, because of reduced congestion on roads. •  Savings on account of prevention of accidents and reduction in pollution with the introduction of MRTS. •  Savings in road infrastructure and development costs that would have been necessary if MRTS were not introduced. •  Savings in fuel consumption because of fewer vehicles on road with the introduction of MRTS. In the absence of universally acceptable norms, quantification of some social benefits such as reduced road stress, better accessibility to facilities in the influence area, economic stimulation in the microregion of the infrastructure, overall increased mobility, and improving the image of the city have not been attempted. The expectation is that by 2011, the MRTS corridor will carry 10.80 lakh trips of which the east–west corridor would carry 5.5 lakh trips. Savings from operating costs due to decongestion has been estimated to be Rs 101.22 crore in 2011, passenger time savings cost has been estimated as Rs 459.17 crore for 2011, benefits because of accidents prevented would equal Rs 3.24 crore, and savings in cost due to prevention of vehicular pollution in 2011 is expected to be Rs 47.38 crore. Based on all these, the cost benefit streams for a 32-year period has been worked out. Thus the EIRR works out to 13.43 per cent for the project.

PROJECT DETAILS WHEN TAKEN UP FOR APPROVAL When the Government of West Bengal in 2007 asked for central assistance for this project, certain changes were made. The final details taken into consideration at the approval stage in June 2008 are discussed below.

Alignment Since traffic potential beyond Howrah Station towards Das Nagar area is comparatively lower, only Howrah Station to Salt Lake Sector

V segment was to be taken up, according to the state government’s decision. This would cover a length of 13.77 km. Break-up of the route length is: •  5.77 km elevated with six stations. •  8 km underground with six stations. The completion cost was worked out to be Rs 4,676 crore. The break-up is given in Table 5.2. The state government committed to provide about 40 acres of government land worth around Rs 600 crore free of cost at Salt Lake Central Park for depot purposes. The land to be acquired from the Railways, port trust, and private land only has been included in the cost. The state government has earmarked land for the rehabilitation of 620 persons to be evicted. TABLE 5.2 Breakup of Completion Cost Description Land Civil engineering Permanent way Depot Traction and power supply Signalling and telecommunication Resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) Miscellaneous utilities Rolling stock Sub-total General charges (5%) Total cost Design charges on total cost (1%) Total cost Contingencies Interim consultancy charges

Amount (Rs) 126.06 1,897.40 78.10 280.00 290.42 185.00 30.00

crore crore crore crore crore crore crore

51.375 crore 467.20 3,405.55 crore 180.85 crore 3,586.40 crore 39.24 crore 3,625.64 crore 158.53 crore 5.00 crore

Capital cost estimate without taxes and duties Central taxes and duties Total estimated cost (2007 prices) Interest during construction Price escalation Final completion cost

3,789.17 crore 289 4,078.17 234 364 4,675.40

crore crore crore crore crore

TABLE 5.3 Financing Plan for Kolkata Metro

Equity Subordinate debt Senior term debt (JBIC) Total

Government of India

Government of West Bengal

Total (Rs)

701.50 (15%) 467.50 (10%)

701.50 (15%) 701.50 (15%)

1,403 crore 1,169 crore 2,104 crore (45%) 4,676 crore

Financing Plan The FIRR was put at 5.59 per cent and EIRR at 15.78 per cent.

Gauge Standard gauge was chosen since the line has to traverse through the narrow roads, sharp curves, and undulating topography of the city.

Implementation Period The whole project has a proposed implementation period of six-anda-half years. The elevated section of 5.77 km can be commissioned in five-and-a-half years.

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Rail-based projects are not required to obtain environment clearance from the central government. However, an EIA has been carried out as part of the DPR and an environment management plan has been prepared for implementation.

Legal Cover Since the original Kolkata Metro is already covered under the existing central legislation, no project is to operate under the Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act 1978, and Calcutta Metro Railways (O&M) Act 1985.

Institutional Arrangements The project is to be implemented through a SPV as an equal equity JV between Government of India and Government of West Bengal. There will be ten directors on the board with secretary, Ministry of Urban Development as chairman. The MD is to be appointed by the Government of West Bengal with the concurrence of the Government of India. Four directors each are to be appointed by the Government of India and the Government of West Bengal.

Fare Structure for 2014–15 The fare structure proposed is a range from Rs 8 for 0–6 km to Rs 16 for more than 12 km. The existing north–south corridor has a fare ranging from Rs 4–8 and there has been no fare revision since 2002.

Other Special Arrangements Like in the other JV metros in the country, certain high-level facilitation mechanisms have been put in position for the Kolkata Metro also. These include a high power committee chaired by the chief secretary of West Bengal to expeditiously take decisions on

issues relating to land acquisition, diversion of utilities, shifting of structures in the project alignment, rehabilitation of project affected people, etc. An empowered committee of secretaries was also constituted, chaired by the cabinet secretary at Government of India level, with the chief secretary of the state as a member. A group of ministers at the Government of India level with the chief minister of the state as a member will take policy decisions and review the progress of the project.

Approval Conditions The following conditions also formed part of the project approval vide sanction letter of 30 July, 2008. 1.        The Government of West Bengal would ensure price-based measures to promote and facilitate metro ridership, as part of an integrated traffic rationalization plan and a comprehensive mobility plan for the Kolkata city. This would be done with a view to ensure that the projected ridership is realized. 2.        Integration of various modes of transport which would act as feeder/evacuation systems to the proposed metro, including adequate parking space at stations and improvement in bus service, would be given high priority by the Government of West Bengal. 3.    In view of the long-term desirability of integration of operation and management of the north–south metro with the proposed metro, the Government of West Bengal would continue the dialogue with the Ministry of Railways with the involvement of the Ministry of Urban Development in the dialogue process. 4.        A statutory arrangement shall be provided for periodic fare revision for not only the proposed metro, but also for other competing modes of public transport. No money (except for the formation of the SPV) would be released for project implementation till the Government of West Bengal issues an order for fare revision of the other modes of transport. A mutually agreed schedule for periodic revision of fares for the

metros as well as other modes of transport will also be incorporated in the MoU to be signed with the state government. 5.    The state government would ensure that land acquisition does not become a reason for delay in implementation of the project. 6.    The Government of West Bengal would bear the entire cost of land (including escalation) through interest-free subordinate debt. 7.    Any cost escalation due to changes in the statutory levies and duties, exchange rate variation, and price escalation within the approved project time scale shall be shared equally between the project promoters. Any other cost escalation due to change in scope or delay beyond the approved time cycle shall be borne by the Government of West Bengal. 8.        Government of India will not share any cost towards procurement of additional rolling stock in the second year of operation, as this would not be a part of the project cost. 9.    The Government of India will not finance cash losses and capital expenditure during the operational phase and its requirements would be financed by the SPV and/or Government of West Bengal from its own resources. 10.    In case the SPV is not being able to repay the loan (as and when it becomes due) on account of cash losses, the responsibility for the same shall be borne by the Government of West Bengal and not by the Government of India. 11.  Government of West Bengal would ensure that electric power is made available to the project on a ‘no-profit no-loss’ basis.

IMPLEMENTATION After approval by the Government of India, Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation, a JV company with equal equity participation of the central government and state government was registered on 9 July 2008 for the implementation of the project. Project activities were initiated immediately after the MoU between the Government of

India and the state government was signed in October 2008 and the general consultant was appointed in February 2009. Soon after the implementation process started, it was noticed that there are certain issues with reversing facilities of trains at the terminus of Howrah which need to be addressed. In the original DPR it was stated that the Howrah Station of the new metro would be located below the erstwhile parcel shed of the Howrah Railway Station. But when the issue of the exact location of the metro’s Howrah Station was discussed with the Railway authorities, it emerged that construction of the station would be possible only if an amount of Rs 40 crore is paid to the Railways to shift the DRM office and other utilities. Since there was no such provision in the project document, further discussions were held with the Railways and it was considered appropriate to shift the metro’s terminal station to Howrah Maidan, about 1 km away. Howrah Maidan is the CBD and various government offices are located near it. The advantages of the shift would be: (i)    Reversal facilities with scope for future expansion beyond Howrah Maidan could be ensured. (ii)  Ridership will increase as it would cater to a large population of Howrah. (iii)    There will be considerable incremental income due to such increase in ridership which will resultantly compensate the enhanced project cost for extension of the terminal station. There is no additional cost for construction of the underground station at Howrah Maidan because one of the stations originally included in the alignment namely Bowbazar Station was to be abandoned. Since the location of the Bowbazar underground station is very close to the Sealdah underground station (about 870 m) and is not very important from the ridership angle, and also since there is strong resistance to land acquisition, the state government recommended that this station be dropped.

Additional Costs Involved

However, it was estimated that an additional Rs 168 crore would be needed for increasing the rail length by about 900 m to Howrah Maidan. An amount of Rs 26 crore is to be paid to Railways as the cost of shifting various utilities of Howrah Station. It would cost Rs 4 crore for shifting of other utilities of electrical installation at Sealdah Railway Station. The cost of the environmental management plan for the shifting would be Rs 58.36 lakh. Thus, the total cost of this revision would be Rs 198.58 crore and the EIRR then becomes 15.06 per cent, while FIRR is 5.67 per cent. This takes the total project cost to Rs 4,874.58 crore. About 75 per cent of this additional cost of Rs 198.58 crore will be funded by JBIC as loan and the balance cost of 25 per cent would be funded by the state government. The board of directors approved this proposal on 18 November 2008, the empowered committee recommended it on 9 February 2009 and the group of ministers approved this on 19 February 2009. Details of the revised project cost are given in Table 5.4. The revised corridor length is 14.58 km, with 8.84 km underground and 5.74 km elevated. The revised route alignment is: •    Salt Lake Sector V–Karunamayee–Central Park–City Centre– Bengal Chemicals–Salt Lake Station (all six are elevated stations). •    Phool Bagan–Sealdah Station–Central–Mahakaran–Howrah Station–Howrah Maidan (all six are underground stations). The designed PHPDT for 2004 was 37,000. It was noted that there are only marginal changes in FIRR and EIRR; as a result of this revision, the former becoming 5.67 per cent and the latter 15.06 per cent. The project is presently under implementation with a completion target of October 2014.

EXTENSION OF THE OLD METRO There have been changes with regard to the original metro being operated by the Railways. Esplanade to Bhowanipur section was commissioned in 1984, services between Dum Dum and Tollygunge

were introduced in 1995, further extensions from Tollygunge to New Garia (also) materialized subsequently. One recent development is that large scale expansion of this metro has been sanctioned by the Ministry of Railways in 2010 with the approval of Joka–BBD Bagh (16.72 km), Dum Dum–Barasat (20.41 km), Dum Dum–Barrackpore (19.75 km), and Kavi Subhash–Biman Bandar (32 km) stretches. The Metro Railway itself has now become the seventeenth zone of Indian Railways. This additional 111-km metro network in Kolkata appears to be an impressive proposal but what has to be seen is how much time this will take to materialize. Also the ‘turf’ issue between the Ministry of Railways which now suddenly seems to be in an expansionist mode in the city of Kolkata and the Ministry of Urban Development which is mandated to take up metro systems seems to have emerged as a critical issue to be watched as to what direction it will take. Also, the public is left to search for an answer as to what happened to the approval condition when the east–west metro was taken up—that the dialogue regarding integration between the two metros should continue. TABLE 5.4 Revised Project Cost of Kolkata Metro Description

Amount (Rs)

Government of India equity (14.39%) Government of West Bengal rquity (14.39%) Government of India subordinate debt (9.59%) Government of West Bengal subordinate debt (15.41%) Senior term debt (46.22%) Total

701.50 crore 701.50 crore 467.50 crore 751.08 crore 2,253.00 crore 4,874.58 crore

6  Chennai Metro Following in the footsteps of Delhi, Kolkata, and Bangalore, the state of Tamil Nadu also took the initiative to plan for a metro for Chennai. It is the fourth largest city in India with a population of eight million spread across 1,172 sq. km, with a vehicle population of around 26 lakh. The state government had a feasibility report prepared for a metro in 2005 and then a DPR in November 2007. Rapid industrial and commercial growth of the city as well as its importance as a state capital has caused considerable migration into the Chennai metropolitan area. Haphazard development of settlements and growth of slum areas has led to heavy concentration of population in some pockets. Trip generation rate in the city which was 0.8 per capita per day in 1971 increased to 1.14 in 1984 and to 1.44 in 2005. Bus usage has been growing rapidly in the city. As per a DPR, compared to 298 routes, a fleet of 1,794 city transport buses, and 24.86 lakh passengers per day in 2005, these figures went up to 611 routes, 3,084 buses, and 40.84 lakh passengers per day in 2007–8. As per 2005 figures, walk (with 32.7 per cent share) dominated the number of trips per day; buses came next with 25.8 per cent. Share of two-wheelers was 19.1 per cent, whereas train share was only 2.5 per cent. Vehicle population of the city reached a figure of over 16 lakh in 2005, the growth rate being 14 per cent. Because of the increase in vehicle population, the volume of traffic vis-à-vis the capacity on almost all the major roads started creating major traffic problems. A 1992 study showed that 33.8 per cent of total road length had a volume/capacity ratio of more than one during peak hours. Arterial roads leading to the CBD bear the brunt of traffic due

to concentration of commercial and other employment-related activities. There is the additional problem of lack of organized parking that also leads to reduced road capacity. There is no doubt that public transport system is an efficient user of space and energy. As population and number of vehicles in a city grow the share of public transport, both road- and rail-based should increase. A general ballpark estimate would be that when the population of a city reaches five million, the share of public transport should reach about 75 per cent. In the case of Chennai, its population has crossed eight million, but the share of public transport is at 50 per cent only. Even though an MRTS along the Buckingham Canal was commissioned for the city by the Railways, its ridership was much lower than expected. Thus the problems of public transport continued unsolved and the public transport system continues to be road-based.

STATUS OF MRTS Phase I of the Railways-operated Chennai MRTS from Chennai Beach to Tirumalai was sanctioned by the Railways at a cost of Rs 306.19 crore. Its implementation stretched over a 14-year period (1983–97). The total distance covered by the metro is 8.96 km with nine stations. Work on Phase II, from Tirumalai to Velachery, started in 1996 and went on till 2007. The sanctioned cost for this 11.38 km stretch with nine stations is Rs 875.58 crore. The cost sharing arrangement is that the Ministry of Railways provides one-third and the balance two-third is by the state government. Phase II extension for 5 km from Velachery to St Thomas Mount was sanctioned during 2006–7 and work has commenced. The approved cost is Rs 493.74 crore, of which 33 per cent is contributed by the Railways with the balance 67 per cent coming from the state government. The completion of Phase I is scheduled for January 2011, Phase II for June 2011, and Phase II extension for March 2012. When completed, the MRTS network will be 25 km long with five stations at-grade and 16 elevated.

The MRTS network for Chennai was intended to complement the commuter rail services that run on railway tracks shared with longdistance trains. This is being considered akin to a modern metro network but the duration of implementation is long. Even though the state government has a stake, it does not seem to be critical. Further, the very alignment of the proposed metro does not seem to address the heavy demand corridors.

JUSTIFICATION FOR A METRO Chennai has a road network of 2,780 km, with 80 per cent of its road network having a right of way less than 20 m. With an estimated vehicle population of 26 lakh in March 2008, Chennai was facing rising transport congestion due to rapid economic growth. Vehicle population was growing at the rate of 14 per cent per annum with 950 new vehicles getting registered every day. The share of twowheelers in the total population reached 76 per cent. About 40 lakh passengers were using buses every day, whereas the suburban railway system (commissioned in 1930) was serving only nine lakh passengers per day. In a bid to offer other solutions, an elevated Mass Transit Project (MTP) jointly funded by the Railways and the state government was introduced. This carries one lakh passengers per day. A stage had come when the existing road and rail network proved to be inadequate to meet increasing traffic intensity. Then the question was what type of metro to opt for? Rail-based mass transit in cities can be light rail, medium capacity metro, or heavy capacity metro. A medium capacity metro system with the train generally comprising of three to six coaches with train headway of three minutes was considered ideal for a city like Chennai. The feasibility study carried out between December 2003 and May 2004 by DMRC at the request of the state government covered seven corridors, details of which are given in Table 6.1. Out of the seven corridors, three corridors were selected for traffic forecast, deatils of which are given in Table 6.2. Considering these details, it was decided that corridors 1 and 2 should have a metro system by 2011. Corridor 3 may be required only by 2016.

This report was submitted in October 2004 to the Government of Tamil Nadu and it was decided that a DPR should be prepared for the following two corridors: Corridor 1

NH 45 (Airport)–Guindy– Saidapet–Anna Salai–Gemini– Spencers–Tarapore Towers– along Cooum River up to Rippon building–Central Station–Broadway (Prakasam Road)–Old Jail Road–Toll Gate TABLE 6.1 Proposed Corridors for Chennai Metro

Corridor

Route

Corridor 1

NH–45 (Airport)–Guindy–Sardar Patel Road–Kotturpuram High Road–Cenotaph Road–Anna Salai– Gemini–Spencer’s–Tarapore Towers– Along Cooum river till Rippon Building–Central Station–Broadway (Prakasam Road)– Old Jail Road– Thiruvottiyur High Road (up to Tiruvottiyur) Along Poonamallai High Road (Corporation limits)–EVR Periyar Salai–Rajaji Road (North Beach Road) covering Koyambedu–Anna Nagar Arch–Aminjikarai–Kilpauk Medical College–Egmore–Central– Fort–Beach Ambathur Industrial Area (Mogapair)–Ring Road–Arcot Road– Panagal Park–Thyagaraja Road– Eldams Road–Luz Church Road–RK Mutt Road–Adyar Bridge–Lattice Bridge Road–Tiruvanmiyur

Corridor 2

Corridor 3

Corridor 4

Porur–Kodambakkam (Arcort Road)–Panagal Park–Thyagaraja Road–Eldams Road–Luz Church Road–Kutchery Road–Kamrajair Salai Ring Road Radhakrishnan Salai– Nungambakkam High Road– McNickols Road–KMC Along NH 5

Corridor 5 Corridor 6

Corridor 7

TABLE 6.2 Traffic Forecast for Chennai Corridors Corridor

Length

No. of passengers

Passenger km (lakh)

PHPDT

Corridor 1 Corridor 2 Corridor 3

31.54 km 13.54 km 21.68 km

5.46 lakh 3.20 lakh 4.14 lakh

33.12 13.92 15.86

32,900 27,600 18,000

Corridor 2

Central Fort–Chennai Central– along EVR Periyar Salai– Vepery, Kilpauk Medical College, Aminjikarai–Shenoy Nagar–Anna Nagar East–Anna Nagar–Thirumangalam– Koyembedu–CMBT–along IRR– Vadapalani, Ashok Nagar, SIDCO Nagar, and join Guindy

A draft DPR was prepared accordingly and was submitted in March 2007. After discussions with the Government of Tamil Nadu, the final DPR was prepared for the following two corridors: Corridor 1

Washermanpet–Broadway (Prakasam Road)– Chennai Central Station–Rippon building along Cooum River–

Tarapore Towers–Spencers– Gemini–Anna Salai–Saidapet– Guindy Chennai Airport Corridor 2

Chennai Central–along EVR Periyar Salai–Vepery, Kilpauk Medical College, Aminjikarai– Shenoy Nagar–Anna Nagar East–Anna Nagar– Tirumangalam–Koyambedu– CMBT–along IRR– Vadapalani–Ashok Nagar– SIDCO–Alandur–St Thomas Mount

The DPR gave two options: a fully underground system or a partlyunderground/partly-elevated system. The state cabinet, while considering the DPR, opted to make the portion of Corridor 2 in Anna Nagar/Shenoy Nagar as underground based on a number of legal, social, and environmental factors. In the revised supplementary project report submitted in May 2008, DMRC proposed that it is advantageous to start the underground section from Chennai Central itself. Details of the corridors finally recommended to be taken up by the state government are as follows: Corridor 1

Washermanpet–Broadway (Prakasam Road)– Chennai Central Station–Rippon building along Cooum River– Tarapore Towers–Spencers– Gemini–Anna Salai–Saidapet– Guindy Chennai Airport

This would have a total route length of 23.085 km of which 14.3 km would be underground, with 11 stations, and 8.78 km elevated, with seven stations.

Corridor 2

Chennai Central–along EVR Periyar Salai–Vepery, Kilpauk Medical College, Aminjikarai– Shenoy Nagar–Anna Nagar East–Anna Nagar– Tirumangalam–Koyambedu– CMBT–along IRR– Vadapalani–Ashok Nagar– SIDCO–Alandur–St Thomas Mount

The total route length of this corridor would be 21.96 km, of which 9.69 km is underground and 12.26 km is elevated. There would be a total of 18 stations, with an equal number underground and elevated.

SPECIFICS OF THE PROPOSAL The proposal sent by the Government of Tamil Nadu to the Ministry of Urban Development for central funding of the project in 2008 had the features discussed below.

Cost Estimated project cost according to the DPR of August 2008 was Rs 14,685 crore with central taxes (escalation factor of 5 per cent per annum included). When the project proposal was taken up for approval by the Government of India in January 2009 the estimated project cost was taken as Rs 14,972 crore including escalation and central taxes.

Fare Structure Fare structure was worked out by escalating the then prevalent ordinary bus fares of the Metropolitan Transport Corporation of Chennai by 20 per cent. For example, for the 0–2 km slab, the

ordinary bus fare of Rs 2 in 2006–7 was escalated at the rate of 20 per cent in 2008–9. This was then doubled, resulting in a metro fare of Rs 5 in 2008–9. For 2013–14 this was again escalated (when the metro is supposed to become functional) as Rs 6. But this calculation gives a fare structure lower than the estimated Delhi Metro fares for 2013–14, making the project unviable. Thus, the Delhi Metro fares fixed by the Fare Fixation Committee in 2005 and duly escalated at the rate of 5 per cent for every two years were taken as the fare structure for Chennai Metro. Details about the proposed fare structure are given in Table 6.3. The Metropolitan Transport Corporation of Chennai (MTCC) is running air-conditioned Volvo buses since September 2007. The fares for this service range from Rs 10–63. This service, which could be considered a competitor for the metro, is receiving good patronage. Though the metro will be faster and more convenient, these higher fares have not been taken into account while working out the metro fares.

Train Operation To start with, four corridors are proposed to be operated, with a headway of 3.5 minutes for manned PHPDT of 24,968 in 2016 for Corridor I and 24,324 for Corridor II. TABLE 6.3 Proposed Fare Structure for Chennai Metro Distance (km) 0–2 2–4 4–6 6–9 9–12 12–15 15–18 18–21

Fare (Rs) 8 10 11 14 15 17 18 19

21–4 24–7 >27

20 22 23

Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) and Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) Based on total investment cost, additional investment required for rolling stock in later years, operation and maintenance costs, depreciation, replacement cost, revenue from fare box, traffic, and other revenues, FIRR works out to 0.86 per cent based on completion cost with central taxes only, and to 1.4 per cent based on completion cost excluding taxes. Metros serve a larger social requirement while simultaneously leading to sustainable economic impact through the facilitation of easy and affordable mass public transport. Therefore, when a metro project is taken up for decision, financial analysis alone is not considered adequate and economic analysis becomes relevant. Economic analysis is carried out within the framework of ‘with’ and ‘without’ the project. While doing a cost benefit analysis, costs such as capital cost of infrastructure, operating cost, capital and operating cost of residual buses and private vehicles that would continue to move on the roads even after metro becomes functional are taken into account. The benefits taken into account are capital and operating cost of carrying total traffic by existing bus system and private vehicles if the metro is not implemented, savings due to decongestion in vehicle operating cost of all buses and other vehicles that would continue, savings in time of metro users, savings in time of those who will continue to use existing modes because of reduced congestion on roads, and savings on account of prevention of accidents and pollution. Savings in fuel consumption on account of less vehicles on road and decongestion effect are included in vehicle operating cost. Thus the EIRR without taxes, in the case of Chennai Metro works out to 16.22 per cent. It is interesting to note some of the figures worked out while calculating EIRR (see Table 6.4).

The EIRR of 16.22 per cent is well above the Planning Commission norm of at least 12 per cent, implying that the economic benefits accruing out of this project are substantial and will yield high savings to the economy as a whole.

Financing Plan The DPR had given different financing options. If a JV pattern between the Government of India and the state is to be followed, 15 per cent each of the equity (Rs 2,203 crore each) will be given by the two governments, 10 per cent subordinate debt by the Government of India and 1.5 per cent by the state government, with a JBIC loan at 58.5 per cent. This would add up to a total of Rs 14,685 crore. If a BOT model is to be considered for an assured rate of return of 14–16 per cent, the Government of India will have to provide Rs 2,937 crore as Viability Gap Funding (VGF), state government will have to provide VGF at 66.37 per cent, land to be provided free of cost by the state government would equal 8.35 per cent, concessionaire’s equity will be 1.76 per cent, and concessionaire’s debt at 12 per cent, per annum interest would be 3.52 per cent against the total cost of Rs 14,685 crore. If a PPP model is opted for, to ensure a post-tax return of 14 per cent to the concessionaire, the grant required was calculated as Rs 13,910 crore. Of this, 86.37 per cent would be equity by the two governments, 8.35 per cent would be land cost by the state government, 1.76 per cent will come in as equity by the concessionaire, and 3.52 per cent will be the concessionaire’s debt market borrowing at 12 per cent interest per annum. The final financing plan approved by the Government of India in January 2009 is given in Table 6.5. TABLE 6.4 Savings that would be Effected with Implementation of Chennai Metro Description Vehicle operating cost savings due to overall reduced road vehicles (for 2013–14)

Amount (Rs) 1335.53 crore

Vehicle operating costs saved on account of decongestion effect (in 2013–14) Value of passenger time saved (in 2013–14) Benefits due to less pollution Reduction in accidents Reduction in road infrastructure

209.47 crore

339.57 crore 180.10 crore 8.30 crore 6.75 crore

TABLE 6.5 Approved Financing Plan for Chennai Metro Equity

Subordinate debt

Senior term debt (JICA)

By Government of India (15%) By Government of Tamil Nadu (15%) By Government of India (5%) By Government of Tamil Nadu (59.22%) 59.22%

Rs 2,190 crore

Total

Rs 14,600 crore

Rs 2,190 crore Rs 730 crore Rs 844 crore Rs 8,646 crore

Gauge Standard gauge was approved for this metro taking into account the fact that traversing through comparatively narrow roads and sharp curves is easier with this.

Duration The project is to be completed in 2014–15.

Implementation Arrangement The project is to be implemented by a JV in the form of a SPV of the Government of India and the Government of Tamil Nadu, to be called

the Chennai Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. The then existing SPV of Chennai Metro Rail Ltd (CMRL), a state government PSU (public sector undertaking) was to be converted into a joint ownership company with equal shareholding of the two governments. This was done in June 2009. The SPV, on the lines of the existing Delhi Metro, Bangalore Metro, and Kolkata Metro, will have ten directors on the board, five each from the two governments, with the secretary of the Union Ministry of Urban Development as chairman, and an MD nominated by the state government with the prior concurrence of the Government of India.

Legal Framework Legal cover for the project will be through the Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 and the Delhi Metro Railway (Operations and Maintenance) Act, 2002 with suitable amendments. While approving the project in January 2009, the Government of India also laid down the following conditions: 1.      The Government of Tamil Nadu will ensure price-based measures to promote and facilitate metro ridership, as part of an integrated traffic rationalization plan and a comprehensive mobility plan for the Chennai city to ensure that the projected ridership is realized. 2.      Integration of various modes of transport that would act as feeder/evacuation systems to the proposed metro, including adequate parking space at stations and improvement in city bus services to introduce modern ITS-enabled buses would be given high priority by the Government of Tamil Nadu. 3.      A suitable arrangement, independent of the SPV, shall be provided for periodic fare revision for not only the proposed metro, but also for other competing modes. A mutually agreed schedule for this periodic revision of fares will also be incorporated by the Ministry of Urban Development in the MoU to be signed with the state government.

4.   The state government would ensure that land acquisition does not become a reason for delay in implementation of the project. 5.      The complete cost of land acquisition and resettlement (including escalation) shall be met by the state government through its share of subordinate debt and the balance of Rs 91 crore through equity. In case of escalation of land acquisition cost, the subordinate debt component of the state government shall accordingly be increased. 6.   Any cost escalation due to changes in the statutory levies and duties, exchange rate variation, and price escalation within the approved project time scale shall be shared equally between the project promoters. Any other cost escalation due to change in scope or delay beyond the approved time cycle shall be borne by the Government of Tamil Nadu. 7.      The Government of India will not share any cost towards procurement of additional rolling stock in the second year of operation, as this would not be a part of the project cost. 8.   In view of the fact that the extent of ridership on the proposed metro as well as the revenue generation by the SPV besides fares (through property development, advertisements, etc.) would depend entirely on the policies/action plans of the state government/urban local body, the Government of India would not finance cash losses and capital expenditure during the operational phase. Its requirements would be financed by the SPV and/or the Government of Tamil Nadu from its own resources. 9.   In case the SPV is not able to repay the loan (as and when it becomes due) on account of cash losses, the responsibility for the same shall be borne by the Government of Tamil Nadu and not by the Government of India. 10.      The city also needs to come up with a parking policy and advertisement policy as advised by the Ministry of Urban Development.

11.   Land use densification around the stations needs to be done to increase the ridership and decrease the overall travel demand. 12.      The state government would set up a dedicated urban transport fund in consultation with Ministry of Urban Development through levy of dedicated taxes as envisaged in NUTP 2006 to create pool of resources for the replacement of assets and operational subsidies, if any, not only for this project but other urban transport projects as well. 13.      In view of the long-term desirability of integration of the Chennai MTP being operated by Ministry of Railways with the proposed metro under the proposed SPV, the Government of Tamil Nadu should initiate a dialogue with the Ministry of Railways under intimation to the Ministry of Urban Development so that the latter can involve itself in the dialogue process. 14.   The Ministry of Urban Development will take necessary steps in regard to standardization and indigenization of rolling stock across all metro systems. 15.   The Ministry of Urban Development will work out details with regard to a central agency for safety certification of all metro systems. The project is currently under implementation.

7  Mumbai Metro Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) is India’s largest megapolis. It has a total area of 4,350 sq. km and a population of 20.5 million (as of 2005). Seven municipal corporations, 13 municipal councils, and several villages constitute this region. Eleven million trips are made every day in the area using different modes of transport, of which rail forms 48 per cent, buses account for 44 per cent, and private vehicles 8 per cent. Increase in vehicular population combined with a limitation on expansion of the road network resulted in traffic congestion in most parts of the city. Some figures relating to this are: •  Though Asia’s first railway line was laid in 1853 in Mumbai, the suburban rail system has not been able to cope with the everincreasing transportation demand. Suburban rail traffic increased by six times whereas the capacity increased by only 2.3 times in the last four to five decades. •  Vehicular population of the region went up from 0.35 million in 1981 to 2.37 million in 2004. •  Private vehicles went up from 0.84 million in 1996 to 1.86 million in 2004. •    Taxi population in the region increased from 47,000 in 1996 to 74,000 in 2004 and auto population went up from 1,10,000 to 2,20,000 during the same period. •  While the share of private vehicles went up from 7 per cent in 1993 to 14 per cent in 2005, the share of public transport trips came down from 88 per cent in 1993 to 76 per cent in 2005.

Though the city has the most extensive urban rail system with 300 km of suburban rail served by 95 stations with a traffic of 6.4 million people every day, the passengers have to suffer an unprecedented overcrowding. It is reported that 4,500 passengers travel per train against the carrying capacity of 1,750. Each minute, the trains arriving at the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus or the Church Gate Station bring 2,000 persons into the centre of the city. On average, 13 people get killed every day in rail-related accidents. The city’s roads account for 11 per cent of its surface. With increasing vehicle population, no separate parking space and 70 per cent of private cars being driven by chauffeurs, the exceptional density of the city naturally results in unusual transport patterns. At the same time, it is also characteristic of Greater Mumbai that about 55 per cent commuters walk to work, with most having a walking time of around 15 minutes. But with the urban sprawl going beyond the reach of suburban railways and the vehicular population expected to reach 90 lakh by 2031, the need for an efficient and sustainable transport network was strongly felt. Inadequate public transport has already resulted in an increase in private vehicle usage, chronic road congestion, inhuman travel conditions in the suburban trains, and environmental deterioration. It was in this scenario that the Government of Maharashtra commissioned the DMRC in 2003 to arrive at a suitable network for the Mumbai Metro, to suggest the priority/sequence of implementation and to prepare a DPR for the priority corridor.

EARLIER STUDIES A number of transportation studies were earlier carried out which discussed the travel pattern, network characteristics, degree of traffic saturation, etc. The following major studies deserve mention: 1.  Mass Transport Study of 1969—Travel projection was done up to 1981 in the study. This formed the basis for identifying the 6th and 7th rail corridors in the city in the present DPR. 2.    Techno-economic feasibility of the 7th corridor—Indian Railways carried this out in 1974. It was based on this that the south–north

corridor running underground from Colaba to Bandra (17.38 km) and east–west elevated corridor (4.1 km) from Bandra to Kurla with a spur of 4.1 km length to the airport was fixed. 3.    East–West Rail Corridor Study of 1975 (commissioned by the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority [MMRDA])—It was based on this study that the Mankhurd–Vashi–Panvel section was taken up and completed. 4.  Comprehensive Transport Study for MMR (commissioned by World Bank and MMRDA in 1993)—Strategy recommended covered an investment of Rs 11,300 crore for transport improvement covering investment of Rs 7,000 crore in rail, Rs 570 crore in buses and ferry, and a highway programme of Rs 3,730 crore. 5.    Mumbai Metro Study (by the Mumbai Metro Planning Group)— This examined the feasibility of the 7th rail corridor as a heavy metro. 6.    MRTS Study (by TEWET, a German company)—This identified a total metro network of 57 km with an estimated cost of Rs 12,000 crore. 7.  Skybus Metro Study (by MMRDA)—This has links with the Konkan Railway Corporation (KRC) proposal for development of a new transport system in the form of the Skybus. Since this system was not implemented anywhere, it was decided that this needs to be examined on a 2-km pilot section.

METHODOLOGY ADOPTED BY DMRC With a view to broadly identifying the most feasible and advantageous network section for inclusion in the master plan, earlier studies, land use plans, suburban rail improvement plans, etc. were examined and a preliminary network of 200 km was identified. Then intensive site reconnaissance surveys were carried out, probable alternative corridors were discussed with representatives of local authorities and finally a network of 146.5 km was selected as the master plan for the Mumbai Metro. While doing so, criteria such as feasibility of the minimum values for system parameters, maximum

intermodal integration, need to cover previously unserved areas of population and employment concentration, easy connectivity to depot sites and the rail system were kept in view. The DMRC also associated with Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai (IIT-M) and Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) for travel demand estimation. After examining various aspects, the following metro network, as given in Table 7.1, was recommended for the city of Mumbai. TABLE 7.1 Recommended Metro Network for Mumbai

It was estimated that the cost of the total length of 146.5 km would be Rs 19,525 crore at April 2003 price level. Phasing was based on the criteria of ridership per unit length of the corridor (with 40 per cent weightage), ridership per unit investment (25 per cent

weightage), sectional traffic loads (25 per cent weightage), and environmental impact (10 per cent).

NEED FOR A METRO It is well accepted that a public transport system is an efficient user of space and energy with reduced air and noise pollution levels. As the population grows, the share of public transport in the city should also increase. The DMRC project report argued that for a city with a population of one million, the share of public transport should be between 40–50 per cent, and that this should progressively increase, reaching a value of about 75 per cent when the population touches the five-million mark. In the case of Mumbai, with a population crossing 12 million, the 88 per cent share of public transport can be considered good. Noting that this share has come down from 91 to 88 per cent, corrective measures in the form of additional mass transit corridors are required to meet the expanding demand. Some of the relevant statistics in this context are discussed below. Private vehicle registration which was 1,08,146 in 1971 reached 8,28,769 in 2002 for the Greater Mumbai area. This means an increase of private vehicle population from 18.11 per thousand people in 1971 to 68.3 in 2002. Within the Mumbai area, the western and central zone railways handle a daily volume of about six million (mostly commuter) trips and approximately two lakh long-distance travellers. Within the city of Mumbai, many suburban stations are less than 1.5 km apart and in some cases even less than 1 km. Stations located so close by reflect a metropolitan urban railway characteristic rather than a suburban system. The road network of Mumbai is characterized by very few cross links with continuity across all radials. The central road corridor is severely congested with high pedestrian movements and less traffic, the eastern corridor carries a large volume of truck traffic and suffers badly from long-term parking and informal roadside vehicle maintenance activities. The roads of Mumbai are not only a means of transport provision but also function as parking areas for vehicles. All this leads to congested movement on roads.

With over 3,000 buses, Brihanmumbai Electric Supply and Transport (BEST) Undertaking is the largest provider of bus services in the region. However, due to financial limitations, replacement gets delayed. At the time of the study, about 25 per cent of the fleet was more than ten years old. Road traffic is a major source of air pollution and data showed that air pollution due to road traffic has increased by almost 400 per cent over a period of two decades.

BENEFITS OF A METRO PROJECT It was expected that the following benefits would accrue from the proposed Mumbai Metro project: •    About 90 per cent of population will be covered by rail-based system. •    Mass transport modal share will go up from 85 per cent to 88 per cent. •  About 30 per cent trips each could get sifted from the existing suburban system and the bus system. •    Relief to traffic on major roads by a 12 per cent reduction in vehicles. •  Reduction in air pollution. •  Enhanced passenger safety. •  Saving in fuel cost. •  Reduction in congestion. •  Provision of more regional linkages.

System Selection The first corridor to be taken up was the 11.6 km Versova–Andheri– Ghatkopar section. The DPR recommended standard gauge over broad gauge taking into account the ground reality of Mumbai city. In view of the strong arguments traditionally raised by the Indian

railways in support of broad gauge (1,676 mm), it is worth noting as to the basis on which standard gauge (1,435 mm) was recommended for Mumbai Metro. These are: 1.    Metro alignments in a city have to pass through heavily built-up areas. Since alignment generally follows the roads, standard gauge is advantageous as it permits sharper curves. 2.  Standard gauge requires 1 in 7 and 1 in 9 turnouts, which occupy lesser length, and are more feasible compared to the 1 in 8½ and 1 in 12 turnouts required for broad gauge. 3.    For standard gauge, optimized state-of–the-art rolling stock designs are available off the shelf. This is not so for broad gauge, where new designs for rolling stock have to be specially developed. 4.    Because of the availability of a very large market, constant upgradation of technology has taken place for standard gauge coaches. Thus, upgraded technology is available on a continual basis for standard gauge. 5.  For the same capacity, the gross weight of a metro coach is lower for standard than for broad gauge. 6.  Once technology for standard gauge coaches gets absorbed and a manufacturing base for them is set up in India, there will be good export potential. 7.    The argument that with broad gauge, inter-running of metro trains with Indian Railways is possible is not correct, as the two systems have different rolling stock characteristics, signalling systems, headways, tariffs, moving dimensions, and loading standards. 8.  Track gauge is not a technical parameter for any metro system, it is a planning parameter.

Station Locations The following station locations were recommended for the Versova– Ghatkopar section.

Train Operation Plan Four car trains with five-minute headway was projected for 2011. The PHPDT indicated for 2011 is 31,126, which will increase to 39,316 in 2021 and 50,912 in 2031.

Cost Estimate Overall cost estimate for the corridor worked out at June 2004 prices was Rs 1,488 crore, excluding taxes and duties, details of which are given in Table 7.2. TABLE 7.2 Recommended Station Locations for Corridor 1 Sl No.

Name of the station

1. 2.

Versova DN Nagar Station (to serve as an interchange between the Colaba–Bandra– Charkop corridor and the Versova–Andheri– Ghatkopar corridor) Azad Nagar Andheri Western express highway Chakala Airport Road Marol Naka Saki Naka Subhash Nagar Asalpha Road Ghatkopar

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

TABLE 7.3

Daily traffic projection for 2031 5,810 58,470

1,84,630 2,87,230 59,930 78,040 70 70,900 61,020 70 9,550 3,81,850

Overall Cost Estimate for Corridor 1 Sl. No.

Description

1. 2.

Land Alignment and formation Station buildings Permanent way Traction and power, lifts and escalators Signalling, telecom, and AFC Depot Rolling stock Resettlement and rehabilitation Miscellaneous utilities, road works, and civil works Total of all items except land General charges at 3% on all items except land Total of all items (1– 12) Contingencies (3% on all items) Grand Total

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

Cost (Rs crore) 304.65 243.54 127.00 54.80 116.38 157.31 130.00 238.00 7.00 33.21

1,107.23 33.22

1,445.10 43.35 1,488.45

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Environmental impacts of this MRTS corridor would be covered by provision for various protection works, additional compensatory measures, compensation for loss of trees, compensatory afforestation and fencing, monitoring of water quality, air/noise pollution during construction, and the establishment of an environmental division. The positive environmental impacts of the project identified are:

•  Reduction in traffic congestion. •  Quick service and safety. •  Less fuel consumption. •  Reduction in air pollution. •  Better roads and employment opportunities. The negative impacts are: •  Due to project location. •  Due to construction works. •  Due to project operation. A set of measures to be taken during implementation was drawn up based on environmental baseline conditions, planned activities, and assessment of impacts. Mitigation measures include preparing an environmental management plan for compensation for the loss of land, loss of trees, afforestation and fencing, relocation/resettlement, water supply and sanitation, and pollution, noise, and vibration control. Total costs for environmental mitigation and management works out to Rs 9.92 crore. The plan should be implemented in phases so that optimum benefit flows.

Fare Structure Fare structure has been estimated at 1.5 times the ordinary bus fare prevalent in 2009. At the time of DPR preparation, the existing bus fares were merged into three slabs and 2009 bus fares were obtained by escalating the BEST fares by an overall factor of about 10 per cent. This fare was then rounded off to the closest rupee. Further, fares have been escalated once every two years at the rate of 5 per cent per annum. Table 7.4 sums up the proposed fare structure for 2009. TABLE 7.4 Projected Fare Structure for 2009

Distance in km 0–3 3–6 7–8

Bus fare 2004 (Rs)

Bus fare 2009 (Rs)

1.5 times bus fare (Rs)

Metro fare in 2009

3 5 7.5

3.3 5.5 8.25

4.95 8.25 12.38

5 8 12

Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) and Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) The FIRR worked out on the basis explained above is 7.56 per cent over a horizon period of 30 years of operation. Running expenses for 2009 is taken as Rs 75.39 crore, the projected fare box revenue is Rs 114.73 crore, and with property development, the total revenue will be Rs 120.46 crore. The net costs flow for FIRR for the year was taken as Rs 180 crore. Economic appraisal of the MRTS corridor was carried out within the broad framework of social cost benefit analysis technique. It is based on incremental costs and benefits and involves comparison of project costs and benefits in economic terms under the ‘with’ and ‘without’ project scenario. Project costs taken into account include capital cost, operation and maintenance cost. The benefit stream evaluated includes capital and operating cost of carrying total volume of passenger traffic by existing bus system and private vehicles if MRTS is not taken up, savings in operating costs of all buses and other vehicles due to de congestion, savings in time of commuters using MRTS, savings in time of those passengers continuing on existing modes, savings on account of prevention of accidents and pollution, savings in road infrastructure, and savings in fuel consumption on account of less number of vehicles on road. Quantification of some social benefits such as reduced road stress, better accessibility to facilities in the influence area, economic stimulation in the micro region of the infrastructure, increased business opportunities, overall increased mobility, facilitating better planning and upgradation of influence area and improving the image of the city could not be

attempted since universally acceptable norms do not exist for the same. Some of the key benefits projected are: •  Out of the total 8.56 lakh trips along the corridor in 2011, 4.28 lakh would be by MRTS, reducing the number of buses plying on the corridor by 2010. •  Savings from operating costs due to the effects of decongestion by the MRTS will be Rs 55.60 crore in 2011. •    Reduction in fuel consumption will mean a saving of Rs 47.22 crore. •    Passenger time saving works out to an estimated Rs 133.57 crore. •    Benefits due to accidents prevented would be Rs 1.39 crore in 2011. •  Benefit due to prevention of vehicular pollution is expected to be Rs 10.13 crore. Project EIRR in economic terms using shadow prices comes to 21.53 per cent for this corridor. Sensitivity analysis shows that with a 10 per cent increase in cost, the EIRR would be 20 per cent, while with reduction in traffic materialization by 10 per cent it would be 21.04 per cent. With 10 per cent reduction in traffic and a 10 per cent increase in cost it would be 19.55 per cent.

Financing Options and Implementation The DPR states that a variety of models can be theoretically considered for financing of metros ranging from completely government owned to totally privatized companies. Both have benefits and drawbacks. While a completely owned government arrangement assures the required flow of funds, it lacks transparency and is shadowed by bureaucracy. The completely private ones would not serve the social sector but would be lured by the objective of profit maximization. Very few metros all over the world are able to cover their operating costs and therefore grants and subsidies for operating as well as additional investments become necessary. Since

the governing objective of setting up these systems is social, the fares are set at levels which are publicly and politically acceptable. One model could be a corporate one involving the formation of a SPV to own/implement and also operate the project. There is a possibility of involving a private sector entity as an equity holder. The financial structure of the project can thus be determined in such a way that a part of the capital cost is contributed on equity and the remaining is borrowed as senior or subordinate debt from the government, financial institutions, banks or bilateral/multilateral organizations. Another source of funding (extensively used in the case of Hong Kong Metro) is funds from real estate development of government-alloted land that can be used for financing capital expenditure. The viability of the project depends to a large extent on the rate of interest and the tenure of the debt. Public-Private Partnership is another model that can be used in such a scenario. Such partnerships can take various forms, such as supply and service contracts, management contracts, leases, concessionaire, JVs, and divestiture. The concessionaire approach was generally not used in rail-based urban transit systems (though later Mumbai has done this and Hyderabad is considering using it) in India because project construction costs are very high. This calls for a huge amount of debt to be raised from the market. It has also been stated that there is no precedent to justify the development of mega transport projects under the BOT in India, except the Konkan Railway. This was the first effort by the Indian Railways to use a corporate enterprise for construction of a railway track. The finance for this corporation came from the promoters (namely the Ministry of Railways, the state governments of Goa, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Kerala) and from the issue of tax-free bonds. Funds could be secured at an average cost of 11 per cent. This is an outcome of the inability of major debt market players to provide resources for large projects. The other most important factor in the lack of reliance on the market is the failure of project developers to come out with a risk mitigation mechanism acceptable to the lenders. The DPR recommended either the SPV model based on the JV approach of Delhi Metro or the PPP route. Generally, an MRTS project

needs very high cost infrastructure and the project is taken up through government support. There are very few examples of undertaking an urban transport project through PPP. However, it was felt that this corridor can be implemented through PPP due to following reasons: •  The corridor is very busy and congested. •    This will provide link between the central and western railway suburban systems, connecting suburbs on the east and west sides. •  Considerable reduction in journey time is possible. •    Metro is more reliable, efficient, and provides more comfort at very reasonable price. •  Commuters in Mumbai are habitual of public transport, as seen by the modal share of public transport of 88 per cent. •  Length of the corridor is only 12 km and so this does not entail a very high cost for private participation. •    The likelihood of connecting with north–south corridor exists, which will help in increase in ridership. There are certain risks associated with the implementation of large infrastructure projects that get enhanced with implementation through PPP. The major risks identified are—risks in the areas of construction, revenue, operating, financial, legal, commercial, exchange rate, policy, guarantees, exclusivity, and speed of process. Risk mitigation measures were also listed, essentially through provisions in the agreement. The DPR suggested that the response to PPP may not be encouraging, unless the government agreed to give an upfront subsidy of Rs 500 to 750 crore to the project; this is excluding the equity participation.

Legal Framework

The Government of Maharashtra considered taking up the implementation of this metro under the Indian Tramways Act, 1886, amended from time to time. It was cautioned that to categorize this line as a tramway merely because it lies wholly within a municipal area may not stand the test of judicial scrutiny. Tramways differ from metros in that the former do not have dedicated right of way, their coaches operate either singly or in twos, they have low maximum speed, and they do not have a signalling system. The subject of ‘railways’ as per the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution falls in the Central List and since metro rail projects come under the category of railways, such projects logically become a central project. To facilitate the first metro system in the country, the Calcutta (now Kolkata) Metro, the Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 was enacted. This act was initially applicable to Calcutta but there is a provision in the act allowing the central government to extend it by a notification to the metropolitan cities of Mumbai, Chennai, and Delhi. This was also extended in the case of Delhi in 2000 when Delhi Metro was coming up. The central government had to enact another legislation titled Delhi Metro Railway (Operation and Maintenance) Act, 2002 for operational purposes. It can now be extended to all metropolitan cities.

Viability Gap Funding (VGF) The Government of India’s scheme of Support to Public Private Partnerships in Infrastructure was announced in 2005. It provides for financial support to bridge the viability of infrastructure projects undertaken through PPP. Among others, PPP projects in urban transport are also covered under this scheme. The requirement is that the project should be implemented for the project term by a private sector company, which will be selected by the government or a statutory entity through a process of open competitive bidding. The grant, one time or deferred, is provided with the objective of making a project commercially viable and the total grant is not to exceed 20 per cent of the total project cost. The two metro projects of Mumbai are the first such projects to opt for VGF. Hitherto, the other two

state governments (Karnataka and West Bengal) had followed the pattern of JVs. The PPP model can work for a city like Mumbai for various reasons. Ridership is expected to be sound, private partners are willing to come forward, they are confident of raising the required debt from the financial institutions, and they are assured that even with the government-stipulated low fare structure, the project can be viable.

FOLLOW-UP ACTION AFTER MASTER PLAN PREPARATION Following the phasing, MMRDA got DPRs prepared for the Versova– Andheri–Ghatkopar, Colaba–Mahim–Charkop, and Bandra–Kurla– Mankhurd corridors. As decided by the Government of Maharashtra, the Versova–Andheri–Ghatkopar corridor was taken up for implementation on a PPP/BOOT basis. The DPR projected a ridership of 3.8 lakh per day to start with which could go up to eight lakh per day. The PHPDT was projected as 22,000 to start with and is expected to go up to 38,000 by 2035. The tender process was initiated in August 2004, but the process took some time as technical bids could only be received in May 2005 and financial bids in January 2006. The project was awarded to Reliance Infrastructure and Veolia Transport consortium with MMRDA participation with equity on a PPP basis. The project cost is Rs 2,356 crore, with a concession period of 35 years. The VGF will be Rs 650 crore. During the construction period 85 per cent of the VGF is to be released and the balance within six months of commissioning. The concessionaire can collect and keep fare box revenue, advertisement revenue, and revenue from utilization of 100 sq. m at each station for passenger amenities. An Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) consortium has provided the debt, amounting to Rs 1,194 crore. Interest would range between 9–9.5 per cent. The concessionaire’s estimation of return on equity would be about 14.5 per cent. The Government of India was approached by the state government for VGF support under the scheme mentioned earlier. However, since the project action was initiated before the scheme was announced, the Government of India decided to support the project with a central

assistance of Rs 471 crore. The balance VGF of Rs 179 crore is being met by the state government. Government of India released Rs 235.50 crore as additional central assistance (representing its VGF share) in 2009–10 and the second instalment of Rs 235.50 crore was scheduled for release in 2010–11. Final financial details are given in Table 7.5. After the issue of letter of intent in June 2006, the concession agreement was signed in March 2007 with an agreed project duration of five years. A new company called Mumbai Metro One has been made for this project, with MMRDA having 26 per cent, Reliance 69 per cent, and Veolia Transport 5 per cent equity. The board has three MMRDA nominees, while Reliance has seven. Project work commenced in February 2008. Though the five-year period would finish in 2012, it is expected that the project would be ready sometime in 2011. One of the major implementation problems faced was that of getting railway clearance to cross the track at Andheri— this took two-and-a-half years. Land is to be provided free by the government and cost of shifting utilities is to be borne by MMRDA. TABLE 7.5 Final Funding Pattern for Versova–Andheri–Ghatkopar Corridor Description VGF from Government of India Balance VGF from Government of Maharashtra Equity by MMRDA Equity by Reliance Equity by Veolia Debt Total

Amount (Rs) 471 crore 179 crore 133 354 26 1,194 2,356

crore crore crore crore crore

Second Corridor The Government of Maharashtra decided to take up the second corridor of Phase I, the 31.87 km Charkop–Bandra–Mankhurd

corridor also as a BOT/PPP project. This corridor will connect the central and western suburbs, reducing the current travel time by half. This corridor will have 27 stations, all elevated. They are: •  Charkop •  Malad •  Kasturi Park •  Bangur Nagar •  Oshiwara •  Samarth Nagar •  Shastri Nagar •  DN Nagar •  ESIC Nagar •  JVPD Juhu •  Vile Parle •  Nanavati Hospital •  Arya Samaj Chowk •  Khar (M) •  National College •  Bandra •  MMRDA •  Income Tax Office •  Bharat Nagar •  Complex Road •  Kurla •  SG Barve Marg •  RC Marg •  Shivaji Chowk

•  BSNL •  Mankhurd (M). TABLE 7.6 Metro Fare Structure as of 2009–10 Distance (in km) 0–3 3–8 8–12 12–15 15–20 20–5 25–30 >30

Fare (Rs) 8 10 12 14 17 20 22 24

This fare structure will be increased by 11 per cent every third year from the fourth year of operation. Depot and stabling facilities have been planned at both ends of the corridor. The total cost of the project is Rs 8,250 crore with viability gap funding of Rs 2,298 crore. Of this amount, the Government of India is to provide Rs 1,532 crore as VGF. The Government of Maharashtra will provide Rs 766 crore as VGF. The debt–equity ratio is 70:30. The concessionaire for the project is an SPV comprising of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd, SMC Lavalin (Canada), and Reliance Communications. The agreement was signed in January 2010 with a concession period of 35 years. Commercial operation is scheduled to begin in 2013–14. The concessionaire can use one floor above each station for commercial purposes. The land for the metro depot is to be provided by the state government free of cost. Financial details of the project are given in Table 7.7.

PROJECT PLANNING

This is a project that has been conceived in the right way by first preparing a master plan and then prioritizing the phases. The need for the project comes out very clearly and an investment decision was taken based on a proper appreciation of the resource scenario. The step-by-step process of project planning was followed meticulously as far as identification and project decision were concerned. While metro projects in other cities such as Kolkata, Delhi, Bangalore, and Chennai were taken up through direct government initiatives and project financing was dependent on government initiatives, in Mumbai it was always felt that the potential for high ridership in this mega city would naturally justify private participation. It is to the credit of the Government of Maharashtra that the project features could attract private participation. This also paved the way for other state governments in India to think in terms of a PPP in the metro sector, even though its nature is basically a social project. The state government rightly nominated the MMRDA as the nodal authority to take up and oversee this entire process. This provided the requisite flexibility in structuring the project details and the concession process. While MMRDA has the full mandate of the state government, at the same time it could also negotiate the various details of the private participation process. TABLE 7.7 Details of Financing Plan for Mumbai Metro Description Debt–equity ratio Equity by MMRDA Total VGF at 30% VGF from Government of India VGF from MMRDA

Amount 70:30 None Rs 2,298 crore Rs 1,532 crore Rs 766 crore

There is sufficient outgo from the central government as well in the form of a 20 per cent VGF, but this is in line with the provisions outlined in the NUTP and VGF guidelines. This is the first project where the Government of India has been able to move away from its traditional role, either through one of its ministries or in partnership

with the state government. Once the first corridor is commissioned and the second one also becomes operational, this experiment will provide lessons as to how such participation can be successful with no risk of frequent disruptions due to the shortcomings in the concession system. For Mumbai, the alignment of these corridors is even more important because a smoother, faster, east–west connectivity becomes available. The fact that both are elevated systems meant that the more complicated issues related to underground corridors have not come in the way of implementation. Of course there have been some irritants related to crossing the rail systems but there are lessons to be learnt from this. Both the NUTP and the reform agenda drawn up by the Union Ministry of Urban Development sufficiently emphasize the need for setting up a unified metropolitan transport authority for big cities with necessary statutory backing. A body like this, in which the Railways and others connected with city transport and administration would have been represented, could have addressed and resolved such issues much faster. The legal framework applicable to a metro system like this will have to be sorted out satisfactorily. In order to guarantee passenger safety and evolve standard operating procedures, this metro system will have to learn from the metro experiences of other cities. Although the central government has provided for extending the jurisdiction of the central metro legislation to metropolitan cities like this, the state government’s concern seems to be how the structuring of the concession agreements and operational issues vis-à-vis the concessionaire can be proactively and systematically addressed by the state as partner when central provisions prevail. The way this PPP arrangement works in Mumbai would naturally provide guidance while handling future metro projects in other cities, especially if the government’s role in terms of funding a substantial part of the project finance is to be restricted.

8  Hyderabad Metro The DMRC prepared the DPR for Phase I of the Hyderabad Metro in June 2003 at the request of the Government of Andhra Pradesh and RITES assisted them in the process. The metropolitan area of Hyderabad is spread over 1,905 sq. km, and is larger than the cities of Delhi, Kolkata, Bangalore, and Chennai. The city’s population grew from 4.67 million in 1991 to 6.38 million in 2001. The public transport system of the city mainly consists of buses, with a 45 per cent modal share. There were 2,605 buses operating on 874 routes as of 2001. However, there has been a decrease in the number of passengers carried per bus per day from 1,580 in 1996–97 to 1,180 in 2001–2. This indicates the growing use of motorized two-wheelers and auto rickshaws. Their increased popularity could be due to their lower operating costs, higher frequency, and door-to-door service. Thus these vehicles instead of becoming complimentary have become competitive with the bus system.

EARLIER STUDIES The Hyderabad Development Authority (HDA) in association with Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH) and Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) commissioned the services of Regional Engineering College (REC), Warangal in 1983 to prepare a comprehensive traffic and transportation study for the city. Among others, this study recommended measures, such as junction improvements, terminals for intermediate public transport, expansion

of road network, expanding bus services, going in for a track-guided system, or a 51.5 km LRTS. As early as 1988 RITES, New Delhi had carried out a feasibility study for LRTS in Hyderabad and proposed the implementation of a 22.5 km LRTS in three phases. The corridors were: •  Phase 1: Balanagar to Khairatabad (9.5 km). •  Phase 2: Khairatabad to Charminar (7 km). •  Phase 3: M J Market to Dilsukhnagar (6 km). There was no follow-up action on this study. Subsequently, IL&FS was asked to update the revenue and cost estimates of the RITES feasibility study in 1993. Three different LRTS corridors were recommended at this stage but implementation was not taken up due to various factors. The Government of Andhra Pradesh decided in 1994 to call for expression of interest for LRTS not only in Hyderabad but also in Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada, and Guntur; RITES was commissioned to take up the project. Though RITES went to the extent of shortlisting three consortia, nothing materialized, since the government was not willing to provide any major concessions. The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) carried out a study in 1994 on the feasibility of an MRTS project in the city and the routes from Balanagar to Afzalganj (14.9 km) as Line 1 and Afzalganj to Dilsukhnagar (5.7 km) as Line 2 were recommended. There was no follow up action on this report as well. Then a joint study for Hyderabad multi-modal suburban commuter transportation system was carried out by Indian Railways and the Government of Andhra Pradesh. To expedite the implementation of the MRT component, the state government engaged the DMRC in February, 2003. The DMRC proposed two corridors, namely, Miyapur– Chaitanya Puri (25.6 km) and Secunderabad–Charminar–Falaknuma (12.6 km).

WHY A METRO

With its population of 6.38 million, Hyderabad is the fifth largest metropolis in the country. There were a total of 1.56 million motor vehicles in the city in 2001. With only 6 per cent of the total city area under roads and a total road length of 365 km, Hyderabad has the highest density of road vehicles. The city’s existing railway system has a total route length of 148 km, but the trains carry only 0.5 per cent of the total commuters. Strengthening and upgradation of the railway network was taken up but this would not be a total solution. The DMRC study found that peak traffic demand on the two busy corridors of Miya Nagar–Chaitanya Puri and Secundrabad–Falaknuma were in the range of 22,000–26,000 PHPDT, which is likely to go up to 40,000–60,000 by 2021. Therefore, road-based public transport will not meet the requirement and a metro system is needed.

CORRIDORS IDENTIFIED Of the alternative combinations of routes considered, the corridors given in Table 8.1 were recommended as the most feasible. TABLE 8.1 DMRC Recommended Corridors Sl. No.

Corridor

Length and total volume of passengers

1.

Miyapur–Chaitanya Puri

25.58 km

2.

Secunderabad– Charminar–Falaknuma

7.33 lakh passengers in 2008 12.48 km 3.78 lakh passengers in 2008

Type of Metro and Other Details A medium capacity metro system was recommended for both the corridors to keep down capital and operating costs. A rail-based

system is justified by the projected PHPDT of 36,010 for Corridor 1 and 24,120 for Corridor 2 in 2008. Standard gauge was recommended as it will be cost effective. A total of 25 stations for the Miyapur to Chaitanya Puri corridor and 14 for the Secunderabad–Falaknuma corridor were proposed. The train formation is to be a basic unit of three cars, comprising of a driving motor car on each end and a trailer car in the middle. Taking into account the traffic scenario, a three-minute headway for Line 1 and five-minute headway for the second line was recommended. During lean hours, a 15-minute headway would be sufficient. Depots were proposed at Miyapur and Falaknuma.

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) The impacts, both positive and negative on the environment were analysed. It was found that this MRTS project, in general, will create positive impacts on the traffic flow, road congestion, and associated ambient air pollution with respect to the studied parameters like particulate matter, sulphur dioxide, and NOx on both the corridors. The various benefits listed are: •  Minimizing road accidents. •  Smoke and fume from the heavy vehicles and two-wheelers will be reduced. •  Noise levels will considerably decrease. •    Fuel consumption will also be reduced due to the reduction in vehicular traffic. •  Stress on the road will decrease to some extent. •  Journey time in the corridor will be reduced. •    Health problems arising due to air and noise pollution of vehicular traffic will reduce. •  The suburban areas in the corridors will develop as a result of easy access to the city.

Cost The overall capital cost of the metro at April 2003 price level works out to Rs 3,204.28 crore, excluding customs duty, sales tax, and works tax. Completion cost, inclusive of escalation and IDC, works out to Rs 4,206 crore. The break-up of costs is given in Table 8.2. TABLE 8.2 Capital Cost of Hyderabad Metro Sl. No.

Item

1. 2.

Land Civil engineering works Electrical works Signalling and telecom works Depots Rolling stock Total Contingency, etc. Grand total

3. 4. 5. 6.

Cost (Rs crore) 143.37 1,315.55 347.03 353.09 128.39 679.50 2,966.93 237.35 3,204.28

Fare Structure Taking into account the existing bus fare, etc., metro fares for the year 2008 have been worked out, details of which can be seen in Table 8.3. TABLE 8.3 Fare Structure for Hyderabad Metro Distance (in km) 0–2 2–4 4–8 8–12

Fare (Rs) 5 6 8 10

12–16 16–20 >20

11 13 15

Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) and Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) The estimated EIRR works out to 25.6 per cent and FIRR as 7.73 per cent.

Financing Models For the financing of the Hyderabad Metro, complete government funding is one possible option. But this means a heavy financial burden. Kolkata Metro is a classic case of a completely government owned and operated metro. But it has not been a great success, such that other states could emulate. Another option is a corporate model, meaning the formation of an SPV on the Delhi pattern. There is a possibility of involving some private sector entity as equity holder. In addition to government funding, on the lines of the Delhi Metro, a JBIC loan or some such arrangement will have to be made. Different forms of PPP can be considered as another option. But at the time the DPR was drawn up, the concessionaire approach had not been adopted in the rail-based urban transit system in India. A study of the potential for generation of revenue through property development was carried out. The property market scenario in Hyderabad is encouraging in comparison with other cities in the country. According to an assessment made by L&T Infocity, the real estate market in this city is encouraging due to various factors including the IT-driven demand. Although an expected net return of Rs 400 crore was envisaged if the lands indicated in the report are made available, considering the uncertainties in the real estate market and the extent of land that would eventually materialize for property development, a conservative figure of about Rs 100 crore spread over the last two years of construction period was assumed.

If the construction and operation of the metro is to be handed over to a concessionaire, the latter would expect a firm commitment from the government as to the location and extent of government and semi-government lands that were to be made available. The DMRC therefore suggested that the state government set up a task force to identify and earmark such lands. The final implementation options suggested were either the Delhi Metro model, where 40 per cent of the project cost comes as equity contributed by the central and state governments and the balance is raised as debt from bilateral/multilateral organizations; or the concessionaire provides the balance beyond the government equity of 40 per cent.

Legal Cover The need to have a legislation to provide legal cover to the construction stage was highlighted in the DPR.

STEPS TAKEN FOR IMPLEMENTATION The state government decided to opt for the PPP arrangement for the project and went in for bids in 2008–9. The 71-km long, Rs 12,410 crore project had a provision for VGF when bids were invited. It made the news nationwide in August 2008 that the city will get its metro free of cost since the lowest bidder, the Satyam group, instead of availing the VGF, offered the government an amount of Rs 1,240 crore (calculated at present value) as negative VGF. In effect, the state government was offered Rs 30,300 crore over the life of the concession period (35 years). This amount worked out to Rs 1,240 crore at the bidding stage when discounted at 13.5 per cent per year to get its present value. Although five consortia were shortlisted for the process, one did not bid finally and that bid which came closest to the successful one had offered to pay the government Rs 151 crore. Subsequent developments are a real eye opener as far as the financials/performance of such companies and the practicality of

their offer is concerned. Since the selected concessionaire Mytas Metro Ltd failed to achieve financial closure by the due date, the agreement with them was terminated by the state government in July 2009. Their bid security of Rs 60 crore along with Rs 11 crore they paid to the state government as a first instalment was forfeited. The state government once again invited bids for this 71.16-kmlong, Rs 12,132 crore project. The project now consists of three high density corridors namely Miyapur–LB Nagar (28.87 km with 27 stations), JBS–Falaknuma (14.78 km with 16 stations), and Nagola– Shilparamam (27.51 km with 23 stations). The provision for PPP is that up to 40 per cent of the project cost, that is, a maximum of Rs 4,853 crore can be given as VGF by the central and state governments together, subject to competitive bidding. The Government of India has committed to provide an amount of up to Rs 2,363 crore, which is 20 per cent of the estimated project cost. Financial bids were opened after the second bidding process on 14 July 2010. It is reported that three of the six pre-qualified bidders who purchased bid documents participated in the bid. L&T Metro Rail Ltd bagged this project in July 2010 with a projected VGF of Rs 1,458 crore. They achieved financial closure in April 2011 for Rs 16,375 crore (increased project cost including real estate component) with L&T providing Rs 3,439 crore as equity and a consortium of ten banks agreeing to provide loan. Break-up of the final total project cost is given in Table 8.4. The first phase of construction is to take 36 to 42 months. Concession period for the project is 35 years (including a five-year construction period) and is extendable by an additional 25 years. The project allows the right to develop 18.5 million sq. feet of transitoriented development within the air space of the 269 areas of land earmarked for depots, parking, and circulation area in stations. Of this, 61 acres would be government land and government spending on acquisition of 204 acres of land, shifting of utilities, relief and rehabilitation, structural compensation, improvement of alternative roads, etc. is expected to be Rs 1,980 crore. TABLE 8.4

Break-up of Total Cost of Hyderabad Metro Description

Amount (Rs)

Equity 3,439 crore Debt 11,478 crore VGF 1,458 crore Total 16,375 crore (Metro rail component is Rs 14,132 crore and real estate component is Rs 2,243 crore.)

LESSONS What are the lessons which emerge from this entire exercise? What is clear is that only when the government concerned takes firm steps to take forward the metro process, will the city get its mass transit system. There are no hard and fast provisions today whereby governments are prompted to take such a step at the right time, before the city traveller is continuously subjected to congested systems and loss of valuable time due to traffic snarls, congestion, etc. It is also true that governments may deliberate about the subject for years without taking clear decisions. There is also the critical issue prioritizing as far as allocation of scarce public resources is concerned. There is no hard and fast rule about the timing of an MRTS project or its relative importance among other urban initiatives. One has not come across any solid instance of a private sector proposal for a metro project emerging and such an effort meeting with success. There is a very strong need to have parameters as to what stage of city development should serve as an indicator to organize MRTS for cities. Even with the strong support of the Government of India, not more than six cities in a huge country like ours have some metro work taking place. This is when we already have 35 cities with a million plus population in addition to the seven mega cities. The Hyderabad Metro project generated considerable discussion as to whether public purpose projects like metros should have real

estate development as a major component or not. On what basis did Mytas opt for a negative bid knowing that metros are not so viable and that private metros have not succeeded anywhere in the world? Was it the attractive property development option that led them to opt for a negative VGF? Did the state government agree to part with large chunks of government land which could be commercially exploited? There is no transparency regarding the actual details. In the latest bidding process, the provision is that 269 acres of public land will be earmarked for the project for development of three depots, parking, and circulation area at the stations. The concessionaire can commercially exploit the airspace over these lands at their cost. This would work out to 18.4 million sq. feet of built-up area. Land ownership will be retained by the government and the commercial property would be handed back to the government when the concession period ends. Thus this is the second metro project after the Delhi Metro where raising revenue through property development has been made part of the project process. This provision probably contributed to the VGF being limited to 12 per cent. Another aspect which comes out clearly in this case is that projection of traffic figures and the reliability of the calculated PHPDT is extremely important to determine the investment decision for a metro. The appropriateness of corridors selected on the basis of density of traffic has not been disputed. However, there is a need to have additional confirming factors which will reinforce the project developer’s faith in the possibility of achieving the projected ridership figures. Also, much more needs to be done as far as inter-modal integration, especially with reference to the metro system, is concerned. The metro cannot be a stand-alone system, as it requires feeder connectivity and prompt availability of last mile connectivity. Hence cities have to become more committed and proactive in institutionalizing such integration. There should be statutory decision-making systems which can see to it that this happens. Otherwise, the spread of two-wheelers and three-wheelers will continue, irrespective of huge investments in metro systems.

Provision for sufficient parking at stations is an equally critical measure in enticing city travellers to opt for the metro rather than continue using personal vehicles. As far as project planning is concerned, the Hyderabad Metro project conformed to most of the requirements except for having a clear-cut criteria of prioritization in implementation. Unfortunately, in our economic decision-making process there is no universally acceptable methodology to calculate the potential loss incurred due to absence of properly laid down principles as to when such essential projects are to be taken up. Seoul is a recent international example of PPP in metro projects. The Seoul Metropolition Government decided to construct line 9 through BOT model. Seoul Metro Line 9, a consortium comprising construction investors and financial investors, was appointed to construct and operate a 25.5 km line from Gaehwa to Gangnam. The project is eligible for revenue generation support if at least 50 per cent of revenue projected is generated. This line is operational since 2009. This is an instance when the government opted for the PPP route because it knew there would not be adequate ridership. The private operator, Seoul Line 9, a JV between Veslia Transport (Korea) and Hyundai Rotem, has opted for a customer-oriented approach, with reduced staff, tickets being available at all convenience stores, and rewarding people who perform better. Would this lesson be relevant for private metros in our country?

9  Jaipur Metro One of the most recent developments in the scenario of metro planning in Indian cities is the signing of Memorandum of Agreement between the Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Limited (JMRCL), a wholly-owned company of the Government of Rajasthan, and the DMRC in August 2010. This agreement empowers the DMRC to execute certain parts of the project envisaged in the DPR for a metro in Jaipur. The DMRC prepared the DPR for this city in January 2010, giving details of a 17.35-km route. This is Corridor 1 from Durgapura to Ambabari; they also identified a 11.56-km-long Corridor 2 from Mansarovar to Badi Chaupar. The DPR argues that the existing roadbased urban transport system of Jaipur city has already come under stress leading to longer travel time, increased air pollution, and a rise in the number of road accidents. The share of public transport has fallen from 26 to 19 per cent. It has been emphasized in the report that when the travel demand is more than 10,000 PHPDT, a metro system is unavoidable. Jaipur city with its present population of 3.29 million has a travel demand of 36 lakh passenger trips every day, with 3.6 lakh trips during peak hour. The justification given for a light to medium metro system is that with the growing population, travel demand is expected to grow steeply. With the growing economy and inadequate public transport services, passengers will shift to private modes, which is already evident from the high vehicle ownership trend. Jaipur, the capital city of Rajasthan, saw its population grow from 1.51 million in 1991 to 2.32 million in 2001. The DPR estimates the population of 2009 as 3.29 million, expected to go up to 3.6 million

in 2011 and 5.4 million in 2021. The city has a bus system operated by the Rajasthan Roadways and private operators, the two together operating 327 buses in 2007. A BRT project has been approved under JNNURM, which is under implementation. It has been argued that a BRT can at best cater to a PHPDT of 10,000–12,000. Also, it will occupy two lanes of the road, and unless the roads are more than three lanes in each direction, BRT is not feasible. Survey results show that two-wheelers account for the highest share in the city with 22 per cent of the modal share, walk comes next at 26 per cent, public transport at 19 per cent, taxi and cars at 8 per cent each and auto rickshaws and bicycles at 6 per cent each. This shows that there is a need to increase the share of public transport substantially. It has been projected that the total ridership for Corridor 1 in 2014 will be 2.93 lakh passengers per day and for Corridor 2 it will be 2.06 lakh per day.

OVERVIEW OF PROJECT DETAILS Durgapura to Ambabari corridor was proposed with total length of 17.35 km, of which 5.09 km would be underground and 12.25 km elevated. A total of 18 stations have been proposed for this corridor, five of which will be underground. The PHPDT is projected as 11,313 in 2014, to go up to 16,898 in 2021. It has been proposed to initially have four car trains with six-minute headway; the headway could then be reduced to four minutes in 2021. The total cost for this corridor without taxes is estimated as Rs 3,481 crore. Corridor 2 covers the route between Mansarover and Badi Choupan. It will have a length of 11.56 km, 2.78 km underground and 8.77 km elevated. A total of 11 stations are planned on this stretch, with three underground. The estimated PHPDT in 2014 is 10,026, and expected to increase to 15,104 in 2021. For this corridor, four car trains with seven-minute headway have been planned, with a planned reduction in headway to 4.5 minutes in 2021. At August 2009 prices, the total cost of this stretch will be Rs 2,194 crore without taxes. The project is expected to be completed by March 2015.

Since there is no connectivity between the north–south corridor (Corridor 1) and the east–west corridor (Corridor 2), two depots have been proposed at Durgapura and Mansarover terminals to transfer trains from one line to another.

Cost Estimates Detailed cost estimates of the two corridors are given in Table 9.1. Total taxes and duties for Corridor 1 is Rs 516 crore, and for Corridor 2 the amount is Rs 323 crore.

Fare Structure The Delhi Metro fares fixed by the Fare Fixation Committee in 2009 have been taken and duly escalated at the rate of 5 per cent for every two years. The suggested minimum and maximum fares for the 2015–16 are Rs 9 and Rs 28 respectively.

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Based on the project particulars and existing environmental conditions, potential impacts have been identified. Based on the environmental baseline conditions, the set of measures to be taken during implementation and operation to avoid, offset, or to reduce adverse environmental impacts to acceptable levels have been listed. TABLE 9.1 Corridors 1 and 2 (Without taxes)

Legal Cover This is envisaged under the two central legislations applicable to other metros in India.

Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) and Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) The FIRR, with only central taxes included, works out to 1.27 per cent. The EIRR works out to 18.7 per cent. A sensitivity analysis also has been carried out. Various models of funding such as totally government supported, BOT and PPP have been considered in the DPR. The cumulative cash balance at the end of 30 years, including the construction period, is

possible to the extent of Rs 67.2 crore with JICA loan and Rs 2,892 crore with market borrowing at 11 per cent per annum, after meeting all operational expenses, interest payment, and loan repayment. On this basis, the corridors have been recommended for implementation. The DPR also recommended that since this project is primarily a social project it should be implemented and operated under an SPV owned by the Government of India and the Government of Rajasthan, as that will entail lesser contribution of funds from both.

PRESENT STATUS After the DPR became available in January 2010, the state government has decided to go ahead with implementation of Stage I. This is one part of Corridor 2, namely Mansarover to Chandpole, covering a distance of 9.25 km. All works other than signalling and telecom and rolling stock have been entrusted to the DMRC to be undertaken on the basis of ‘deposit work’. The completion cost of the stretch (including cost of land) is Rs 1,966 crore and excluding land cost is Rs 1,841 crore. A PPP solution may be explored for signalling and rolling stock. The work assigned to DMRC as per the agreement signed on 5 August 2010 is estimated to cost Rs 1,250 crore with the condition that this must to be completed in three years and seven months.

COMMENTS This is a bold initiative by the Government of Rajasthan to go ahead with the project, although partially, immediately after submission of the DPR. It is worth noting that unlike other cities which have taken up metro projects, this state government has decided to find the plan funds required without waiting for any support from the central government. An option to find a private partner for signalling and rolling stock has been left open. There is also a standby arrangement that DMRC itself could be asked to take this up. Thus an investment decision has been taken by the state government

itself even though the FIRR of the project is low. This is in line with the decisions taken by the Government of India whenever metro projects were taken up as JVs because the social significance of the project is predominant. If DPR alone is the basis for the decision regarding the Jaipur Metro project, and if it is a tailor-made proposal, one of the basic requirements of project planning, that is, undertaking an alternatives analysis, does not seem to have been taken into account. The rationale for opting for only one part of one of the corridors also has not emerged. This project initiative also negates the argument that cities with larger populations should first be taken up for a metro. This is thus a unique instance of a state government taking a bold decision to go ahead with a metro for its largest city, keeping the ultimate objective of preparing well in advance for congestion reduction and offering affordable, most relevant mode of mass transportation. This case could offer various interesting points for study once the first stage is commissioned. Jaipur is a city where the bus system is not very prominent and much effort does not seem to have been made to popularize the bus network first. A BRTS corridor has been taken up, with a pilot corridor of 7 km from Ajmer bypass to Panipat at a total cost of Rs 75.15 crore and then a second corridor of 19 km at a total cost of Rs 144.04 crore as per project approval under JNNURM. It was not considered necessary to wait to see the outcome of this once it is fully functionalized. This is a city where a unified metropolitan transport authority system has been set up and the state has been able to at least identify the plan fund required for taking up a big project like the metro. It would also be interesting to examine why a corridor with less ridership has been prioritized for implementation and what would the economics be when operationalized in about two-and-a-half years from now. It would also be worth observing whether the identified part of the project is to be completed during the period of the government in power; this would mean a lot for the political element as far as such investment decisions are concerned. The required drill seems to have been followed so far, as far as the project planning steps are concerned. Though it is worth noting that

the DPR provides justification in a certain manner and the agency preparing the DPR itself is to take up implementation also. Does this mean that an in-principle decision to have a metro has been taken at the political/government level and the rest of the action followed? Can the government of India continue to insist on or at least imply that a national ranking of cities on the basis of population, congestion, ridership, etc. will be one of the main factor which would influence its decision making to support such projects even though different states with varying scenarios are involved? Also, the fact that the state has decided to go ahead without PPP, one of the permanent points emphasized at the national level for such projects, means that in planning and resource allocation, the national entity has endorsed the fact that this size of plan resources from out of the state’s outlay is available. It is of interest to note that the Government of India conveyed an ‘in-principle’ approval in taking up Stage I of the project. The proactive stance of state government can also be seen in the first step they take to have a separate company to initiate basic action even before project financing is tied up and the role of the central government has been worked out. Chennai is a good example of this, where once the state government decided to go ahead with the metro, a separate SPV was set up and preliminaries initiated. This also meant some saving in time as the SPV was able to line up various first steps, saving time and money, by the time approval came through from the Government of India. In Jaipur also, the state government set up a new company known as JMRCL to facilitate its aim of starting construction by April 2010. This has meant lot of saving in time since there is a definite entity of the state government which is mandated to go ahead with the preliminaries. What needs to emerge now is a streamlined, coordinated working arrangement, since JMRCL is only one among the various organizations involved in the process of city development, some of the others being the city municipal corporation, the Jaipur Development Authority (JDA), water and sewerage board, unified metropolitan transport authority, etc. We have to move beyond the present concept of meetings where inter-

agency issues are discussed to making them definite coordination mechanisms. The experience so far shows that even with priority attention at the level of the state chief minister and at the level of the chief secretary, in big cities decision-making and implementation with regard to various implementation issues all take more time than what one expects in a time-bound scheme of a large, important project.

10  Metro for Kochi Kochi, the commercial and industrial capital of Kerala, is a fastgrowing city. Though the population of the city as per the 2001 census is 13.55 lakh, the state government pointed out that the population of the Greater Cochin Development Authority (GCDA) area was 1.81 million as per the 2001 census, with a population density as high as 6,300 persons per sq. km in the central part of the city. The population of Kochi has been growing at the rate of 1.4 per cent per annum in the past and the population of the city as of December 2008 had reached 2.5 million. It was also the state government’s assertion that a large number of developmental projects are on the anvil in the Greater Cochin area, such as Smart City, Info Park, Fashion City, Vallarpadam international container transhipment terminal, port-based SEZ, etc. All these projects will have a huge employment potential, which will further escalate the growth of population of the city. It was noted that Kochi’s rapid urbanization and commercial development in the recent past has resulted in a steep rise in travel demand, putting its transport infrastructure under stress. The government of Kerala commissioned a comprehensive study of the transport system for the Greater Cochin area by RITES in 2000–1. The RITES study established the need for an alternative mass transport system for the region and recommended a metro rail system between Alwaye (now Aluva) and Thrippunithura towns. Then in December 2004 the state government engaged the DMRC to undertake a detailed traffic and transportation study for the city. A DPR was submitted in July 2005, which recommended an LRTS from

Aluva to Petta on Thrippunithura Road with a route length of 25.25 km. The estimated project cost at the time of DPR preparation was Rs 1,965.55 crore including taxes and duties. The city bus service is the most common mode of public transport with public transport modal share being 51 per cent. About 350 buses cover the city and total daily trips worked out to 26.34 lakh with an average trip length of 5.5 km. After public transport, walking accounted for 16 per cent of the modal share, two-wheelers 14 per cent, cars 9 per cent, auto rickshaws 6 per cent, and cycles 5 per cent. Road length in the city is 614 km, with two-lane roads accounting for 73 per cent and the rest being four-lane roads. The maximum road width is 20 m (quite narrow), and the average travel speed on major roads was 25 kmph. In the absence of a mass transport system, there has been a steep increase in the number of personal vehicles in the area. The number of registered vehicles which was 68,271 in 1987 became 4,46,959 in 2003. Of these 64 per cent are two-wheelers. The justification given for a metro in Kochi was that experience has shown that in cities like Kochi (where roads do not have adequate width and which cater to mixed traffic conditions), road transport can optimally carry 8,000 persons per hour per direction. It is not feasible to operate buses beyond 10,000 PHPDT in a mixed transport scenario. The Greater Cochin area with an employment of seven lakh has a travel demand of 14 lakh passenger trips per day with 2.4 lakh trips during peak hours With travel demand expected to grow steeply, inadequate public transport, passengers will shift to private modes, further aggravating congestion. The state government took up this proposal for central support in 2005 itself. They had decided to implement it on BOT basis, but soon it became clear that with the expected rate of return, BOT will not be viable. Then the state approached the Government of India for permission to implement the project on the DMRC model with 50 per cent equity participation from the Government of India. Though the DPR had suggested implementation through a concessionaire, while accepting the report, the state government examined all options such as BOT, PPP, and the DMRC model. The state felt that

implementation of the project on a BoT basis would not be feasible unless the BOT operator obtained a return of 14 per cent (post tax) on equity. Financial analysts indicated that VGF to the extent of twothird of the project cost will be needed in such a case, which would not be viable. Moreover, the fare levels have to be kept low to make the system affordable to the common commuters.

PROJECT DETAILS The following route was selected: Aluva-Kalamassery–Edappally–Kaloor–Madhava Pharmacy– Maharaja’s College (MG Road)–Ernakulam South–GCDA–Vyttila-Petta on Thrippunithura Road. The total length of this section would be 25.253 km, all elevated, with 21 stations.

Gauge Standard gauge was recommended for this project.

Traffic Forecast The estimate given for the year 2011 was 3.8 lakh passengers per day. TABLE 10.1 Forecast of Traffic over a 25-year Period Year

PHPDT

Trip length

2011 2015 2020 2025

13,681 17,663 21,065 23,621

7.33 8.46 9.55 10.02

Train Operation

It was proposed to have trains running with a five-minute headway in 2011, which could be reduced to a three-minute headway in 2025.

Fare Structure The proposed fore structure is given in Table 10.2.

Cost Estimate The estimated cost as per May 2005 prices is Rs 1,965.55 crore, excluding taxes and duties, a break up of which is given in Table 10.3. TABLE 10.2 Proposed Fare Structure for Kochi Metro Distance (in km)

Amount (Rs)

0–2 2–4 4–6 6–9 9–12 12–15 15–18 18–21 21–4 24–7

8 9 11 13 15 16 17 19 20 21 TABLE 10.3 Break-up of Cost for Kochi Metro

Item Land (25.3 hectares) Alignment and formation Station buildings Depot Pathway

Cost (Rs crore) 210 379.23 210.00 100.00 126.25

Traction and power supply Signalling and Telecom R&R hutments Miscellaneous utilities, etc. Rolling stock General charges Design charges Contingencies Total

286.13 146.14 25.00 75.76 264 48.38 37.42 57.25 1,965.55

With an estimated escalation factor of 5 per cent per annum, the project was expected to cost Rs 2,239 crore on completion (with an assured project period of 2006–7 to 2011–12). Although construction was expected to be over by March 2010, cash flow would extend up to March 2012 because of payments to various contractors.

Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) and Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) Assuming a total operation and maintenance cost in 2011 as Rs 117.40 crore, and taking into account 10 per cent equipment replacement after 20 years, fare tax revenue, etc., the estimated FIRR worked out to 5.3 per cent. Benefit stream that has been evaluated and quantified for EIRR calculation were •    Capital and operating cost of carrying the total volume of passenger traffic by existing bus system and private vehicles in case metro project is not taken up. •  Savings in operating costs of all buses and other vehicles due to de-congestion. •  Savings in time of commuters using the metro. •    Savings in time of those passengers continuing on existing modes because of reduced congestion on roads.

•  Savings on account of prevention of accidents and pollution with introduction of metro. •  Savings in road infrastructure and development costs that would be required to cater to increase in traffic, in case metro is not introduced. •    Savings in fuel consumption on account of less number of vehicles on road and decongestion effect with introduction of metro are included in those of vehicle operating cost. Reduced road stress, better accessibility to facilities in the influence area, economic stimulation in the micro region of the infrastructure, increased business opportunities, overall increased mobility, facilitating better planning and upgradation of influence area, and improving the image of the city are some of the social benefits, quantification of which have not been attempted because universally acceptable norms do not exist for such an action. Transport demand on the metro corridor, reduction in traffic congestion and fuel consumption, passenger time saving, safety, reduced air pollution, savings in road infrastructure are factors taken into account and the value of project cost and benefits has been expressed in terms of market prices. On this basis the EIRR was worked out as 17.76 per cent.

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) The positive environmental impacts of the metro project were found to be: •  Reduction in traffic congestion. •  Quick service and safety. •  Less fuel consumption. •  Reduction in air pollution. •  Reduction of noise level. •  Better roads.

•  Employment opportunities. The negative impacts identified are: •    Impacts due to project location, such as change in land use pattern, loss of trees, soil erosion, and health risk at construction site, traffic diversions, and risk to existing buildings were found to be negligible. •  Impacts due to construction works. •  Impacts due to project operation such as water pollution, noise, accident hazards, reuse from metro station. An environmental management plan and a monitoring plan were proposed in this regard.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN Stating that the Delhi Metro project has shown that an SPV vested with adequate power is an effective institutional arrangement to implement such a project, the DPR recommended forming an SPV under the Companies Act as a PSU of the state government. Since the viability gap will have to be shared equally by the state and central governments, both should have directors on the board. Once the SPV is formed, implementation could be either through funds provided by the government or through a concessionaire on BOT basis. After examining various options, the DPR recommended execution through a concessionaire on BOT basis. The concessionaire’s contribution will comprise his own investment of Rs 400 crore together with a loan of Rs 871 crore to be raised from the market. The concessionaire will get a return of 12 per cent on his investment and for this purpose the required upfront grant as viability gap would be Rs 635 crore. This grant is to be shared equally between the central and state governments. In addition, the state government will provide land valued at Rs 210 crore for the project and raise Rs 125 crore by permitting additional FSI along the corridor.

It was also pointed out that there is not much scope for property development along the corridor. However, there is scope to permit additional FSI for all properties falling within 500 m on either side of the alignment.

WHY A METRO The advantages of a metro system are: •  It requires one-fifth of energy per passenger km compared to a road-based system. •  It causes no air pollution. •  Noise level is lesser. •    Occupies only about 2 m of the road width in case of an elevated system. •  Carries same amount of traffic as five lanes of bus traffic or 12 lanes of private motor cars. •    Is more reliable, comfortable, and safer than road-based systems. •  Reduces journey time by anything between 50 and 75 per cent, depending on road conditions. Though the DPR was prepared in 2005 and the state has been in constant touch with the central government for approval of the project, no decision has been taken so far. While accepting the project report, the state government examined various options of financing such as BOT, PPP. It was the state government’s view that implementation of the project on BOT basis will not be feasible unless a return of 14 per cent on equity is assured to the BOT operator. Financial analysis indicated that funding to the extent of two-third of the project cost will be needed for this. On the option of PPP, assuming that the entire civil cost will be borne by the government with a concessionaire funding all the systems and rolling stock (with the mandate to operate and maintain the system for 30 years), the state felt the need to have a concessionaire who can get

14 per cent post-tax return on investment with its debt portion serviced at 12 per cent, as financial analysis showed that total outflow on VGF would be two-thirds of the project cost. In view of all this, the state government maintained that implementation of the project should be on a JV pattern with equal equity participation from the two governments and loan from a multilateral like the JICA.

IS METRO FOR KOCHI THE IDEAL SOLUTION? This question has often been raised from the city and by those examining the proposal. While, if we follow a hierarchy of population and size of the city, Kochi may not be the ideal candidate for support from the Government of India, the question is that if a state takes the initiative to have MRTS should the proposal be considered or not. A CDIA (City Development Initiative for Asia) pre-feasibility study on urban transport in Cochin points out that urban development is outstripping the capacity of the government to provide for transport in the future. As a result, numerous transport network links and intersections in and near the CBD area are either at capacity or exceeding it. Traffic flows on MG Road (2.5), Banerji Road (3.7), and SA Road, which are all key bus routes, are currently at or over capacity with estimated volume/capacity ratios of in excess of one being reported. The city has inadequate levels of road network, with journey times becoming unrealistic. Banerji Road has proved inadequate for current traffic flows and MG Road has effectively become a two-lane road in sections. Buses carry about 73 per cent of the city’s passenger traffic. It is reported that 868 buses operating on 160 routes, provide the bulk of transport. With 614 km of road length in the city, a rapid rise in private vehicle ownership, and the inadequate road width for the current volumes (and virtually no scope for adding roads), traffic is often at a standstill. Lack of sufficient parking facility in the city has made roadside parking a regular feature, thereby taken away further road space. In such a scenario, either going underground or elevated would be the only feasible proposition.

This is a classic example of a state government wanting a workable option in the form of a metro to enhance the quality of life in one of its major cities, but not in a position to take up the project on its own and is waiting for years for the central government to extend support. If it was a case of PPP, it would probably have got initiated by now. It is in instances like this that the common citizens who are residents of a city like Kochi are left with no acceptable answers as to what basic economic rationale lies behind project decision-making.

11  Global Comparisons As cities expand, the urban transport system becomes more and more salient. Although city-specific circumstances may differ, certain basic trends that determine transport demand, such as a substantial increase in urban population, household incomes, and industrial and commercial activities, are the same. There is an opinion that whereas some infrastructure problems of cities such as lack of water primarily affect the poorer areas, congestion, crowded trains and traffic-linked pollution are clearly visible at all levels of society. There is also a clear and direct link with city competitiveness. Mega cities are engines of the global economy and it is the transport network that keeps them working efficiently. When roads and railways seize up, or when ports and airports become overloaded, the cost the economy has to bear is high. In the UK, where many cities including London are struggling to keep up with travel demand, the Confederation of British Industry estimates that the cost of congestion is £ 20 billion (USD 38 billion) a year. It is now proven that transport problems affect cities at all levels of development, even though these problems may manifest in different ways. With its ageing rail and underground systems, London (where an estimated 30 million journeys take place every day) is a typical example of an investment in transport that has barely been able to maintain the system, leave alone cope with the increasing demand. As a result, congestion and overcrowding is acute on all London transport networks. But London has a noteworthy system as far as good urban planning is concerned. The Greater London Authority (GLA) headed

by the mayor and individual borough councils share responsibility for urban planning. The city follows a unique cascaded model of urban planning that works largely because of a clear mandate and roles assigned to the various organizations involved in London’s urban planning effort. The GLA creates the 20-year statutory master plan and the local borough development plans have to be in line with this. London’s metropolitan master plan starts off with the city’s vision and key socio-economic forecasts, including population and employment. These forecasts are then translated into a broad land-use plan and key initiatives in transportation, among other areas. The London master plan includes even detailed peak transport planning. Another city that serves as a guiding light in transport planning is Singapore. Singapore’s rise from a congested city to a thriving financial centre is considered a breathtaking experience. Analysts say that at the heart of this transformation is a robust urban planning system which is the responsibility of the urban development authority. Singapore created its first land use/concept plan in 1971 and has since created two more in 1991 and 2001. These plans, in addition to acting as anchors to the city state’s 40–50-year development strategy, also provides broad guidelines for key projects and policies to serve the expected demand for physical and social infrastructure such as MRTS. Singapore is one place where the policymakers believe that their transport system should constantly be reviewed to cater to the changing demographics and the higher expectations of the people. It is recognized there that developing city-specific transport policies has its own challenges. Daily travel demand in Singapore is projected to increase by 60 per cent from 8.9 million journeys a day to 14.3 million by 2020. This is due to an increase in population as well as tourists coupled with increased economic activity. As Singapore is a small and densely built-up city state with limited land, they recognize that it is not sustainable to build more roads indefinitely to cater to the increased travel demand. Roads take up 12 per cent of the land while housing occupies 15 per cent. Hence, it is recognized that transport policies have to make the best use of limited resources to meet the additional demand using existing infrastructure.

They also realize that to make public transport the chosen mode of travel, there is a change in will and mind-set needed. Based on analysis, it is clear that public transport is the most efficient people mover and so it is an environmentally sustainable mode of travel. An MRTS train carries an average of 1,100 passengers at any one time during the peak period while a single deck bus can carry only 80 passengers. The average occupancy per car is one to five persons, meaning more than 50 cars would be needed to move one bus load and more than 700 cars would be needed to move a train load of passengers. For a city like Singapore, if everyone chose to travel by car it would create a tremendous strain on the road network. A survey by the LTA of Singapore showed that between 1997 and 2004, the number of car trips increased by 23 per cent, more than the 15 per cent increase in car population over the same period. This increased propensity to drive meant that the share of public transport mode declined from 67 per cent in 1997 to 63 per cent in 2004. To reverse this decline, the Land Transport Master Plan proposed a target of achieving a public transport mode share of 70 per cent for the morning peak hours by the year 2020. In Singapore, the hub and spoke model has been adopted in the public transport network. This entails relying on buses or LRTS to serve as feeder services, bringing commuters to MRTS stations or bus interchanges. Every day, nine million journeys are made in Singapore; about 40 per cent is by private vehicles. There is increasing emphasis on the point that if demand for road usage is not managed well, traffic congestion will become commonplace. Policy tools such as the VQS to control the growth in vehicle population and the ERP system to manage demand on congested roads are effectively employed. It is also a fact that globally, demand management as a solution to congestion remains an emerging concept. It is yet to become a priority in city transport planning. Road pricing in Singapore involves a massive tax of over 100 per cent on new car purchases. Wherever demand management in the form of road pricing has been tried, it has delivered good results. Congestion is reported to have been reduced by about 30 per cent both in London and Stockholm. They

have also experienced 10–20 per cent reduction in fuel emissions and road accidents. The London transport authority reports that congestion charging brought in a net revenue of € 174 million in 2005–6. There are only a few places in the world where such projects have been undertaken. In Shanghai, it is reported that car ownership was historically suppressed through high fees and limited permits; but in Mumbai, despite the congestion and pollution, road taxes and parking fees are low. Urban travel in India predominantly occurs through walking, cycling, and public transport. Despite the high growth rate of motorized two-wheelers and cars in the last two decades, car ownership is in 3–13 per cent of the households and two-wheelers in 40–50 per cent. A World Bank Urban Transport Strategy Review shows that in Asia, the determination of transport performance appears to be generating a rapid growth of motorized two-wheelers that are faster than bicycles and buses. The new two-wheelers are so inexpensive that even the relatively poor can afford them. A study in Delhi showed that with an average per capita income of less than USD 2,000 a year, over 80 per cent of households have two-wheeler motorized vehicles. A point to be noted is that while in industrialized countries motorization occurred over a period of 50–80 years, in India it is occurring over a much shorter period. The changes in Indian cities have only exacerbated the demand for transport—a demand that most cities have not been able to cope with. The main reason for this is the prevailing imbalance in the modal split, besides inadequate transport infrastructure and its suboptimal use, as brought out in a study by Wilbur Smith Associates for the Ministry of Urban Development. The finding is that public transport systems have not been able to keep pace with the rapid and substantial increase in demand over the past few decades. Bus services in particular have deteriorated and this relative output has been further reduced, as passengers had to turn to personalized modes and intermediate public transport. Car ownership in India is still lower than that in a developed country. But the public transport system in every city has fallen short of the increasing demand, infrastructure shortages are increasingly

leading to traffic snarls and gridlocks, and unless these problems are addressed, poor mobility can become a major dampener to economic growth. This is the context of message of the NUTP announced by the Government of India in 2006. The policy talks of incorporating urban transportation as an important parameter at the urban planning stage rather than being a consequential requirement, bringing about a more equitable allocation of road space with people rather than vehicles as its main focus, enabling the establishment of quality-focussed multimodal public transport systems, and providing seamless travel across modes. Some important conclusions of the Wilbur Smith study which covered 30 cities across the country are: •    About 53 million vehicles were plying on Indian roads as of 2001. •  Annual rate of growth of motor vehicle population in India has been about 10 per cent in the decade 1991–2001. •  The number of two-wheelers is growing faster than cars. •    In metropolitan cities alone, 32 per cent of all vehicles are plying, with these cities constituting about 11 per cent of the country’s total urban population. •  Cities like Bangalore, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Nagpur, and Pune show a vehicle growth higher than the mega cities like Delhi and Kolkata. •    Cities such as Gangtok, Bikaner, Raipur, Amritsar, Patna, Agra, and Varanasi do not have standard bus services. •    There are a number of pointers that indicate that mass transport will be the only way forward, be it in the form of buses, BRTS, monorails, LRTS, or metro systems. It is the experience all over the world that as cities grow and become richer, vehicle ownership goes up more rapidly than the available road space, leading to increased congestion, more pollution, etc. Once certain levels are reached, MRTS becomes the only feasible alternative. An MRTS consists of a spectrum of urban

public transport; it may use specific fixed-track zones or exclusive and separated potentially common-user road track. This would include metros, suburban railways, LRTS, and bus ways. Around 11 billion journeys a year occur in developing countries on rail-based metro systems. An MRTS can no doubt increase the efficiency of a city’s economy by reducing travel costs and by maintaining a higher level of city centre activity. Reduction of road congestion with its consequent economic and environmental benefits becomes the key factor in decisions regarding investments in MRTS. Its capability to carry large volumes and its superiority over buses in attracting car users also makes rail-based metro systems a preferred mode for reducing road congestion. As a road space comparison, a metro can generally carry the same amount of traffic as nine lanes for buses and 33 lanes of private motor cars. Metro also has the advantage of reducing journey time by anything from 50–70 per cent, depending on road conditions. Rail-based transport system started globally in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first rail-based metro line got completed in London in 1853. New York City got its first elevated railway in 1868. The first line of the Paris network came up in 1900. Underground or elevated rail and surface trains were the only mode of mechanized transport up to the 1920s. In fact, rail technology decided the form of the large cities of the nineteenth century in Europe and USA, when larger cities expanded to 10 km in diameter with a population of one to two million. London now has 1,140 km of metro rail network, New York has 550 km, Paris has 798 km, Tokyo has 612 km, Singapore has 138 km, and Hong Kong has 259 km. Tokyo is a city where nearly 80 per cent of a 35 million population use public transport to go to work. This figure for other mega cities like New York and London is 50 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. The history of subways in Tokyo started in 1927 when a 2.2 km stretch was opened as a private enterprise. It took 12 years to complete the full stretch, known as the Ginza line. In 1941, TRTA was founded in to speed up the development of the transportation network in Tokyo. Between 1941 and 2004, the year in which privatization took place, TRTA constructed and commissioned over

168 km railway lines. The government decided that TRTA shall be privatized when its mission was completed. So Tokyo Metro Co. Ltd, popularly known as Tokyo Metro was formed as a special purpose company in April 2004. Tokyo Metro is probably the largest railway operation in Asia with a network of nine lines covering a distance of 195.1 km. About 6.2 million people use the metro every day. Tokyo Metro is still financed by the national government and Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The fare range in 2008 was from ¥ 160 per adult for the 1–6 km section to ¥ 300 for the 28–40 km section.

SMRT CORPORATION IN SINGAPORE Singapore MRT Ltd was established in 1987 to operate the city state’s first MRTS. Singapore LRT Private Ltd was set up in 1997, which two years later become the first operator for Singapore’s pioneer CRT system. SMRT corporation Ltd was incorporated in March 2000. As a holding company, it owns SMRT Trains Ltd (formerly Singapore MRT Ltd) and SMRT Light Rail Private Ltd (formerly Singapore LRT Private Ltd). In December 2001, the company acquired SMRT Road Holdings Ltd and thus became Singapore’s first multimodal land transport operator, providing bus and taxi operation in addition to its MRT and LRT business. SMRT Corporation has been listed in the Singapore Stock Exchange since 2000. TABLE 11.1 Details of Income of Tokyo Metro for 2007 Income: ¥ 340.9 billion Description Fare revenue Miscellaneous transportation revenue Affiliated business Non-operating income Track lease

Per cent 85.8 10.4 2.4 0.7 0.7

TABLE 11.2 Details of Expenditure of Tokyo Metro for 2007 Expenditure: ¥ 264.8 billion Description Personal expenses Running expenses Depreciation Interest expenses Various taxes Operating expenses on related business Others

Per cent 33.2 29.8 23.9 7.61 2.8 2.0 0.7

SMRT Trains’ first license to operate the MRTS was granted by Singapore’s LTA in August 1987 for ten years. This was later extended to a 30-year license in April 1998. The license fee payable by SMRT Trains is 1 per cent of the gross annual tax revenue. SMRT Trains purchased the MRT system’s operations assets from LTA in April 1998 for about SGD 1.2 billion. To assist SMRT Trains in this purchase, the LTA provided a grant of the same amount. This is amortized by SMRT Trains, treating it as deferred income over the life of the assets. SMRT Trains fully paid for the operating assets by April 2002 and became the owner of the operating assets such as trains, escalators, lifts, control systems, automatic fare collection system, etc. However, the infrastructure of the MRTS system such as tunnels, tracks, viaducts, and station structures continue to be the property of LTA and are leased to SMRT Trains at an economical annual fee. Fares charged by SMRT Trains must be approved by the public transport council. SMRT Trains cover a route length of 138 km. Singapore’s rail network will reach 278 km by 2020. In the financial year 2008, 469 million trips were made on trains and SMRT Trains and SMRT Light Rail followed the LTA stipulated standards. In 2008, 97 per cent of the trains arrived within two minutes of the ‘schedule’, surpassing LTA’s 94 per cent criterion. Trains started within two minutes of the schedule 98.5 per cent of the time, compared to LTA’s requirement of 96 per cent. The availability of train services stood at

99.96 per cent against the stipulated 98 per cent. Thus, they performed higher than the standards set for them in every way. This performance can be benchmarked against the world’s top operators, which belong to the Nova and Community of Metros (COMET) benchmarking groups. SMRT Trains is benchmarked against 20 major metro operators in key cities such as Berlin, Hong Kong, London, Madrid, Montreal, New York, and Shanghai. In 2008, they were first in manpower efficiency in the global ranking, achieving 99.6 per cent in the best performer rating for punctuality and 95.8 per cent for safety. During the financial year of 2008, revenue for SMRT Trains was SGD 802.1 million, whereas operating expenses was SGD 645 million. Return on equity was 22.8 per cent. Revenue from MRT operations amounted to SGD 436.9 million, an increase mainly due to growth in average daily ridership.

COMPARISON OF DELHI METRO Set up in May 1995 under the Indian Companies Act as a JV of the Government of India and GNCTD, with 50 per cent shareholding each, DMRC has the responsibility for both construction and operation. About 1,300 train trips are operated per day with 17 train sets, each having four coaches. Average ridership reached a figure of 9.84 lakh in April 2010 and crossed one million in May 2010. Trains operate from 6 a.m. to 11 p.m. with a frequency of three-and-a-half minutes during peak hours. The system is making an operational profit from day one. Of the revenue, 30 per cent is from non-fare box collection. Present fare structure ranges between a minimum of Rs 8 and maximum of Rs 30. Delhi Metro is gradually changing the travel style of the public in Delhi. The benefits of Phase I has been evaluated by CRRI. This has meant 57,953 vehicles off the road, resulting in an annual saving of Rs 276.24 crore due to operating cost. This accounts for little over 2,600 mt of pollutants not being let into atmosphere. Reduction in travel time resulted in a saving of Rs 947.07 crore. Reduced fuel consumption led to a saving of Rs 181 crore. On an average, a

commuter saves about 33 minutes in travel time, which is equal to a saving of 0.44 million man hours a day. Increase in vehicle speed results in savings amounting to Rs 240.18 crore. Reduction in road accident is 51 and others 204. The entire cost of Phase I of the Delhi Metro has been recovered by the city in 2010. Further, Delhi Metro is the first railway project in the world to be registered by the UN under the Clean Development Mechanism, which will enable it to claim carbon credits. Certified Emission Reduction (CER) would be earned for the use of regenerative braking system in its rolling stock, leading to an overall saving of about 30 per cent electricity. These CERs are sellable and translate into an income of Rs 1.2 crore per year. The New York Times in an article on 13 May 2010 reviewed the Delhi metro project as: In a country where government projects are chronically delayed and budgets are busted, the metro is on track to finish its 118 mile network by fall, right on schedule and within its $6.55 billion budget…. The Delhi Metro manages to defy just about every stereotype of urban India. It is scrupulously clean, impeccably maintained, and almost unfailingly punctual…. Despite cheap fare, less than 20 cents for the shortest ride and about 67 cents for the longest, the system manages to turn an operating profit.

12  Project Planning As I mentioned in my earlier book, An Alternative Approach to Project Planning in Public Works—The Indian Context (2009), project planning has the following stages: •  Identification. •  Preparation (including feasibility studies and design). •  Appraisal, sensitivity analysis, and making recommendations. •  Selection. •  Negotiation and approval. •  Implementation and monitoring. •  Transition to appropriate administration. •  Monitoring, evaluation, and recommendations. We will now examine, on the basis of the above sequential stage process, whether this process was followed as far as Indian metro projects are concerned, and what we can ultimately learn about the nature of the projects and their overall positioning in the national development scheme.

IDENTIFICATION All the metro rail projects discussed so far were identified and the initial feasibility and DPR exercise were undertaken by the concerned state governments. Technical feasibility and economic viability were examined. A proper analysis of the alternatives available was not

done in a balanced manner, although this needs to be looked into at the identification stage itself. This is why the need for taking up a metro project should be examined on the basis of two criteria, a comprehensive mobility plan for the city as well as integration of land use and transport planning; and an alternative analysis of whether a metro is the right and cost effective option at this stage. In the Chennai Metro proposal, the point argued was that as the population of a city grows, the share of public transport (road or railbased) should increase; a city with one million population should have a 40–45 per cent share of public transport. With further growth, as the city population touches the five-million mark, this should reach 75 per cent. Chennai’s population has crossed eight million and public transport share is only 50 per cent, having decreased in the previous decade; the apprehension was that it would reduce further without immediate corrective measures. The other point was whether the public transport system should be road or rail-based. This will depend on the traffic density during peak hours on the corridor. Experience has shown that in mixed traffic conditions, which is prevalent in most of our cities, buses can optimally carry about 10,000 persons per hour per direction. When PHPDT exceeds 10,000, average bus speed comes down, journey time increases, air pollution soars, and commuters are put to increased inconvenience. Thus, when a corridor’s traffic density during peak hours crosses this figure, a rail-based mass transport in the form of a metro system should be considered. A metro system would become absolutely necessary if the traffic density on a corridor reaches 20,000 PHPDT. A daily ridership of 5,72,000 in 2011 going up to 10,64,000 in 2026 was projected for the two corridors proposed for the Chennai Metro. The Kochi Metro proposal has still not been approved at the time of the writing of this book, despite being identified properly. An early decision does not seem to be possible because when the central resources are also involved, it becomes a matter of prioritization and justification. India has 35 cities with a million plus population; if one were to strictly go by the hierarchy of population, Kochi figures at number 11. The question then is that if a state identifies a city, would political consideration play a role in decision-making at the

central government-level or it is purely an economic decision. Of course, when the central government has to chip in with central resources, appraisal and analysis would tend to outweigh the identification undertaken at a state level.

PREPARATION A feasibility study is the first step in this stage. In all the metro cases studied, such a study has been undertaken and initial feasibility has been established before proceeding to the next step of DPR preparation. The project objectives have been stated, scope of the project has been well defined, and technical aspects have been discussed. Although this is not the kind of project that benefits a specific set of beneficiaries, the potential clientele have been identified along with the proposed corridors through analysis of trip details, purpose of travel, etc. However, what has been noticed is that the ridership projected in the project report quite often does not materialize. This could be due to a combination of factors, such as lack of planned expansion of network; poor initiation of intermodal linkages; and stagnant fare structure of other modes over a long period of time.

Resource Requirements Resource requirements are clearly known at the time the project is taken up for investment decision but quite often the technical detailing is not complete. It may require additions and/or modifications subsequently. This is so in all of India’s on-going metro projects. In the case of the Delhi Metro, extension of the Barakhamba Road–Connaught Place–Dwarka corridor into Dwarka sub-city and substitution of the Rithala–Barwala section with the Barakhamba Road–Indraprastha section are examples. For the Bangalore Metro, a revision of cost became necessary three years into implementation due to factors like escalating land cost, tenders being higher than the estimated amount, essential modifications in alignment, etc.

In the case of the Kolkata Metro, dropping a station (Bowbazar) and extending the length by 900 m was a practical necessity, after beginning implementation. In Chennai, since a sufficient number of escalators had not initially been planned, they had to be added once implementation started. In general, what is being emphasized is that these are dynamic situations and some modifications, even involving cost revision, may become necessary in the interest of implementation. We have not reached a stage in the country where every aspect of the metro system can be detailed perfectly at the stage of making a DPR. But one major positive factor is that once the central cabinet approves the project, a separate group of ministers is constituted, which is authorized to take such quick decisions. This has worked well in the case of metros and is significant in terms of timely implementation and modification of decisions.

Finances Working out the sources of finance is an important aspect in the project planning process. It is noteworthy that in all the four projects with central government share as equity and subordinate debt, the state share was more or less clearly worked out in the beginning. Loans on soft terms are provided by JICA under the overseas development assistance programme. For Phase I, the loan was ¥ 162,751 million (equal to Rs 6,402 crore) with an interest rate of 2.3 per cent, later reduced to 1.8 per cent. There is a moratorium for ten years and repayment is spread over 20 years. While a loan from JICA supported the Delhi, Kolkata, and Chennai projects, in the Bangalore project though 45 per cent of the total cost had to be raised (Rs 2,494 crore), the then JBIC had only agreed to provide a loan of Rs 1,795 crore. The financial institutions had confirmed their willingness to provide a senior term debt without government guarantee. While approving the project, the SPV was mandated to offer the following comforts to the lender: •    Revenue generated to be escrowed after allowing operations and maintenance charges.

•  First mortgage on movable and immovable assets. •  Assignment of all project contracts and insurance document. •    Assignment of contractor guarantee, performance land, and liquidated damages. •    Creation of second charge on 51 per cent equity held by the promoters. The project documents clearly address infrastructure requirements, institutional aspects, and economic/social aspects. The creation of a new SPV being a requirement to take up the project has meant that the projects are implemented uniquely. The fact that this is neither a central nor a state PSU has given it sufficient operational freedom within its mandate, while the required legislative control is very much there. Equal participation of senior officers from both the governments as members of the board of directors, autonomy of the board in decision-making, and sufficient support from central and state bodies has contributed greatly to the timely implementation of these projects. Metro rail projects are highly capital intensive in nature. As such, their financial rate of return would be very low and sometimes can even be negative. But the primary consideration is the positive externalities in terms of benefits to the society and so the economic rate of return would be critical. For heavy density corridors, railbased systems are definitely superior to buses. This is so because metros provide higher carrying capacity, enable smoother and safer travel, helps save on time, occupy less space, and carry traffic equal to nine lanes of bus traffic and 33 lanes of motor cars. If a PPP arrangement is feasible, this option could be taken with VGF support. This is what Mumbai has done for its first two corridors. When the Chennai Metro, which is by far the largest single metro project taken up for consideration, the Government of Tamil Nadu was asked to consider the PPP option. After a detailed examination of the pros and cons, they took a well-considered decision that Chennai Metro is not amenable to a PPP because of:

•    A high debt service burden and its impact on fares. The financing required is very long-term, which a private concessionaire cannot access. If financing is to be squeezed into 10–15 years, debt service becomes higher and high fares may be required. •  Though theoretically VGF can be used, in effect the process of determining the amount payable is complex. •    Since there is no model of concession agreements for metro projects, risks are high. •    Manner of selection of the concessionaire, fixation of viability gap subsidy, determination of fares, changes which may be needed in project design, or even fare structure during implementation could get. •    International experience shows metro projects are generally owned and operated through public sector SPVs and not through PPPs. Though three metros were taken up in Asia namely Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila, the two Kuala Lumpur projects subsequently needed restructuring, with the government effectively bailing out the private partners. •    Chennai already has an elevated MRTS operated by the Railways, so here is a need for proper coordination between metro and suburban rail. A private concessionaire would ask for various considerations regarding fare structure to ensure viability of the concession, which would be difficult to negotiate and implement. •    Since the networking, interconnections, and linkage effects of the new metro would substantially boost the ridership of the existing MRTS suburban rail and bus systems, part of the financial benefits of the metro will accrue not to the metro SPV but to the MRTS and Railways. This could create further complications. In certain circumstances, another option of partial PPP could be thought of, as was done in the case of the high speed express link

from New Delhi Railway Station to IGI Airport. Here, the civil infrastructure cost was borne by the government (represented by the SPV) and the remaining by a private concessionaire who is given the right to run the metro for a certain period. The Airport Express line is 22.694 km long, with 15.08 km underground, 0.89 km at-grade, and the balance elevated. Against the projected completion cost of Rs 3,869 crore, civil works amounting to Rs 2,082 crore was undertaken by DMRC. The systems (including rolling stock, signalling and telecom, etc.) costing Rs 1,786 crore was done by the concessionaire, Reliance Energy in partnership with Constructions Y Auxiliar De Ferrocannibes SA of Spain. Debt–equity ratio for their part is 70:30 with the concessionaire being permitted to operate the system for thirty years. The concessionaire collects the fare and also generated revenue from other sources. One-way fare from New Delhi Railway Station to the airport will be Rs 150. The concessionaire pays a license fee and concession fee of Rs 51 crore per annum with a provision for a 5 per cent increase every year and a formula to share part of the gross revenue also. If taking up a metro is a must and the above two options are not workable, then it will have to be a government-owned system like the Ministry of Railway owned north– south metro in Kolkata, or a modified form of JV between central and state governments as in Delhi, Bangalore, Kolkata (east–west corridor), and Chennai. However, the north–south metro of Kolkata has been consistently incurring losses and does not have proper integration with other modes of transport. The Delhi Metro, on the other hand, could complete 65 km of line in a record time, has been making operational profits from day one, and has set benchmarks for project execution, quality, and delivery within cost and time. If we look at the global situation, it can be seen that no metro project has succeeded so far on a purely BOT basis. Seoul Line 9 could be in a category by itself. As such, it may take more time for good private initiatives to develop in India, keeping in mind the situational constraints. These include the fact that fare structure has to be affordable for common persons, there is not much scope for revenue other than fare tax, and even if property development or

revenue through additional FSI/Floor Area Ratio (FAR) is facilitated, it takes time to effect this. Though railways or rail-based projects in India are exempted from an environment clearance requirement, an EIA is invariably done for the metros and an environment management plan is taken up for implementation at a later point.

APPRAISAL, SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS As has been seen, both financial and economic appraisals are undertaken for these projects and they are adequately addressed both at the time of project appraisal and decision-making. All these project reports have been prepared by the DMRC and the DPRs themselves analyse financing options, financial viability, and economic impact. The project viability appreciation worked out generally stated that the two Internal Rate of Revenue (IRR) values are comparable for such projects all over the world. A sensitivity analysis also is undertaken by varying the parameters like construction cost and ridership, traffic reduction, etc. and drawing conclusions about the viability of the project. Although recommendations are made about the acceptance, modification, or rejection of the project, any such change in the FIRR did not affect a positive decision being taken on project implementation. The data for some cities is discussed below. In the case of Bangalore, the EIRR was 26 per cent and FIRR was 7.49 per cent. The FIRR decreased by 0.54 per cent when a cost increase of Rs 575 crore was taken into account along with ridership variations. For the Kolkata Metro, EIRR taken into account was 15.78 per cent and FIRR was 5.54 per cent. Increase in capital cost by 10 per cent meant a change in the EIRR to 14.6 per cent and FIRR to 4.93 per cent.

SELECTION

The first major step is the decision of the concerned state government to go ahead with the project. In all the cases, once the state government decided to take up the project, it has been possible to get a final approval at the central government level. One of the prerequisites for an investment decision at the Government of India level is the availability of plan funds with the Ministry of Urban Development, since equity funds are made available from the budget allocation of the ministry. During the appraisal process at the Government of India level, the inter-ministerial consultations address this issue and both the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance have to endorse this. So what is important is that the Ministry of Urban Development should be able to get the type of allocation required to support these metro initiatives in the country, while a decision to take up a particular proposal from a state itself may be subject to various other points of consideration. A basic question which will arise is what should be the basis for opting for a metro system for a city—should it be population, should it be city specific situation, or justification for a particular corridor because of intensity of movement of people irrespective of the total population of the city, or even city-specific situations such as other modes reaching saturation levels (maybe due to road constraints) or there being no feasibility of first opting for less capital-intensive modes? Should both the FIRR and EIRR be at reasonable levels as the requirement for all other projects? In the case of a sociallyrelevant project like the metro, would a strong EIRR be justification enough to select the project even though the FIRR may be very low? There is a general recognition that cities with a population of over three million should opt for a metro rail system on corridors which have huge ridership. But while taking an investment decision there should be back up of a comprehensive mobility plan of the city so that trip movements, intensity of travel, etc come out clearly and there should also be a proper appreciation of the positives and negatives of alternatives possible. Various relevant considerations like urban form, level of demand, direction and extent of urban sprawl, trip length, city aesthetics, etc. could jointly contribute to the process of decision-making to opt for a metro. There could also be cities and

situations where, while a BRTS is proposed or is in operation, a railbased metro is also needed, just because the travel demand is going to be so high. Once this step is crossed, a careful examination of whether a PPP/BOT model is feasible should be explored. Depending on a proper appreciation of whether a PPP is feasible, the state government concerned will first have to decide in what manner the metro project is going to be implemented and then seek financial support from the Government of India in clear terms.

NEGOTIATION AND APPROVAL Broadly, the options possible for metro financing are: •  Government financing. •  Local borrowing and local taxation. •    Non-government financing, such as loans by financial institutions, public borrowing through bonds, leasing finance. •  Foreign loans, aid or loans by institutional agencies. •  Private investment. •  Non-conventional sources such as dedicated levies. •  Property development of air space above MRTS facilities. Globally, there are a number of instances of full government financing, such as in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Full foreign aid was used in Bogota, Istanbul, Mexico City, and Pusan. A combination of foreign aid and government support facilitated the Cairo (73 per cent foreign aid), Manila (30 per cent equity), Santiago (60 per cent aid from France), and Tunis (75 per cent from Germany) metros. Experience shows that metro systems impose a heavy fiscal burden unless the systems are very heavily patronized and fares are kept high. An instance of the former would be the Hong Kong–China line, with ten car train sets and a headway of two minutes, it carried as many as 80,000 passengers per hour in the peak direction. Leaving it all to private initiative does not seem to be a practical

proposition even today. We have the example of a rich city like Pusan in Korea whose metro had to be transferred back to the national government. The other prominent examples of mobilization of private funding are those of two systems in Kuala Lumpur and one each in Bangkok and Manila. Though all these came into existence without any time or cost overruns, they have fallen short of the estimated ridership, meaning a setback in revenue calculations. The revenue risk in the Manila project had to be taken over by the government and the two Kuala Lumpur projects had to be restructured with government intervention. Viability of the BTS, the first wholly privately financed initiative, remains to be seen. Another basic issue which comes up in the context of private funding of metros is that this arrangement does not encourage integration with other modes of transport or even other MRTS lines whenever they exist. Thus an integrated urban transport system, which is the prime objective of constructing a metro, does not come into being. In the Indian context, the experience has been that for a metro project with low FIRR, the JICA loan facility which has a ten-year moratorium period and a 20-year repayment window enables stabilization of metro revenues. This facilitates timely repayment of principal and interest by the SPV itself. The cost of borrowing is much lower than commercial borrowings and such an institutional funding provides a certain confidence level to international contractors. Since a high return on investment is not possible in the case of a metro, if at all commercial lending is to be considered, interest rates will be higher than other bankable commercial project loans. Funds to be raised through other instruments like bonds are not very relevant because of their short maturity tenure of seven years or so. Also a metro SPV, being of recent origin, does not get a good credit rating which tends to make the coupon rates of such bonds higher. The appraisal process in India is such that by the time the proposal is to be placed before the cabinet, all concerns would have been addressed, funding would have been tied up, and phasing as per the project requirements would have been worked out. Naturally the debt–equity ratio is taken into account and if the debt part is

properly lined up, approval is a smoother process. In the case of all the metro projects taken up as JVs, the debt part has been tied up with JBIC or its present form of JICA. This means the decisionmaking level is assured of the fact that after approval, smooth implementation and timely completion is possible. The financing arrangement for various metros, as well as different corridors of Delhi Metro, given in Tables 12.1–12.13 offer lessons about the various dimensions government support can take in metro projects. TABLE 12.1 Funding Plan for Phase I of Delhi's MRTS Description

Amount (in Rs)

Government of India equity GNCTD Subordinate debt by Government of India Subordinate debt by GNCTD JBIC loan Property development by DMRC Total

1,464 crore 1,464 crore 252 crore 252 6,839 300 10,571

crore crore crore crore

TABLE 12.2 Funding Plan for Phase II of Delhi's MRTS Description

Amount (in Rs)

Government of India equity Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi equity Subordinate debt by Government of India Subordinate debt by GNCTD JICA loan Property development Internal accrual Total

1,194.19 crore 1,194.19 crore 175 crore 175 5,056.97 405 405 8,605.36

crore crore crore crore crore

TABLE 12.3 Funding Plan for Gurgaon Extension (Haryana portion) of Delhi Metro Description

Amount (in Rs)

Land by Government of Haryana Grant by Government of Haryana Grant by Government of India Rolling stock by DMRC Sub-total

20 456 114 98 688

crore crore crore crore crore

TABLE 12.4 Funding Plan for Gurgaon Extension (Delhi portion) of Delhi Metro Description

Amount (in Rs)

Subordinate debt for land by Government of India Subordinate debt for land by GNCTD Government of India equity GNCTD equity JICA loan Sub-total

24.50 crore 24.50 crore 111 111 352 734

crore crore crore crore

TABLE 12.5 Central Taxes for Gurgaon Extension (Haryana portion) of Delhi Metro Description

Amount (in Rs)

Government of India Government of Haryana Sub-total

55 crore 20 crore 75 crore TABLE 12.6

Central Taxes for Gurgaon Extension (Delhi portion) of Delhi Metro Description Government of India GNCTD Government of Haryana

Amount (in Rs) 30 crore 30 crore 24 crore

Sub-total

84 crore TABLE 12.7

Shifting of Entry/Exit Points and Provision of Escalators in Three Stations at Gurgaon Description

Amount (in Rs)

Government of India Government of Haryana Sub-total Grand total (Tables 12.3–12.7)

2.59 5.85 8.44 1,589.44

crore crore crore crore

The funding plan for the extension to Noida was for an amount of Rs 827 crore, with the Government of India, Government of Uttar Pradesh, and DMRC contributing. The section from Central Secretariat to Badarpur had a total cost of Rs 4,012 crore, of which Rs 2,143 crore was a JICA loan. The Metro link from Dwarka Sector 9 to Sector 21 had a cost of Rs 356.16 crore, with the DDA contributing Rs 275 crore. No loan was taken for this section. TABLE 12.8 Airport Express Link to Dwarka Sector 21 Description

Amount (in Rs)

Government of India equity GNCTD equity Grant by airport operator Grant by DDA Equity by concessionaire Concessionaire debt Total

757.60 757.60 350 217.40 461 + 77.50 1,247.90 3,869

crore crore crore crore crore crore crore

TABLE 12.9 Funding Plan for Bangalore Metro Description

Amount (in Rs)

Government of India equity

1,223.70 crore

Government of Karnataka equity Subordinate debt by Government of India Subordinate debt by Government of Karnataka JICA loan Local government sources Total

1,223.70 crore 815.80 crore 1,223.70 crore 2,877.75 crore 793.35 crores 8,158.00 crore

TABLE 12.10 Funding Plan for East–West Corridor of Kolkata Metro Description

Amount (in Rs)

Government of India equity Government of West Bengal equity Subordinate debt of Government of India Subordinate debt by Government of West Bengal JICA loan Total

731.18 crore 731.18 crore 487.45 crore 731.18 crore 2,193.56 crore 4,874.58 crore

TABLE 12.11 Funding Plan for Chennai Metro Description Government of India equity Government of Tamil Nadu equity Subordinate debt Government of India (for central taxes) Subordinate debt Government of Tamil Nadu JICA loan Total

Amount (in Rs) 2,190 crore 2,190 crore 730 crore 844 crore 8,646 crore 14,600 crore

In the two PPP metro lines in Mumbai, investment decisions were taken by the state government and the VGF from the Government of India actually facilitated timely action and contributed to the stability

of the project. The details of financials are given in Tables 12.12 and 12.13. TABLE 12.12 Funding Plan for Line 1 of Mumbai Metro Description

Amount (in Rs)

Equity of MMRDA (state government partner) Equity of PPP (Reliance) Debt VGF grant by Government of India VGF grant by Government of Maharashtra Total

134 crore 354 crore + 26 1,192 471 179

crore crore crore crore

2,356 crore

TABLE 12.13 Funding Plan for Line 2 of Mumbai Metro Description Equity by MMRDA Equity by concessionaire Debt VGF grant by Government of India VGF grant by Government of Maharashtra Total

Amount (in Rs) 431 1,227 3,869 1,532 766

crore crore crore crore crore

7,185 crore

IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING The Delhi Metro is the only one that has commissioned a full phase and is about to complete Phase II as well. This shows that the unique JV arrangement and the functional freedom given to the board and the MD have been facilitative in completing the work in time or early, and also remaining within the approved cost. It is educational to find out the implementation strategy adopted by Delhi Metro. It consisted of:

•    A fast decision-making process was introduced, thus, eliminating too many layers. Delays in processing files and taking decisions were questioned and when necessary, responsibilities fixed. There was enough delegation of power to the field functionaries so that day-to-day matters could be solved at their level; there was no need for them to come to the corporate office. •  A very pragmatic and successful contract management style was adopted. Contractors were carefully selected, payment terms were made, and problems and claims of contractors were promptly addressed. Independent safety and quality assurance teams were constituted to monitor the work of contractors. The philosophy followed was that contractors should not be allowed to fail and their key role was recognized. •  While awarding contracts, DPR provision was not allowed to be exceeded. This was a very notable aspect of the implementation. However, if an excess was unavoidable, a corresponding saving had to be identified. •    The organization was kept lean. Usual functionaries in such organizations such as clerks and peons were not employed. Departments were not allowed to build an empire. •    All engineers were cautioned that each day of delay in the project would cost the organization an amount of Rs 1.43 crore. This was one of the driving forces that helped the company adhere to targets. •    For every segment of the project, an external and an internal target were fixed. The external target was the one committed to the government, whereas the internal target would be 3–4 months in advance. All works were planned to adhere to the internal targets. This helped because even if there were some unavoidable slippages, they would still manage to keep to the external targets. When targets slipped, innovative solutions would be adopted to make up for the time cost.

•    It was impressed on everyone that the project was being implemented with two-thirds of the cost being borrowed and that DMRC had the responsibility to service and pay back the loans. The need for austerity and economy was emphasized. Very stringent monitoring of establishment and general charges was maintained. •    Controlling cost was the Emphasis was on adopting construction sequences. All designs and so ingenuity competitive prices.

result of economy in all areas. correct engineering solutions and contracts were with competitive of the contractor brought in

•    A pragmatic approach to land acquisition meant the affected persons were not put to undue hardships, thereby prompting them to willingly hand over this land. Phase I of the Delhi Metro was approved for a length of 55.3 km in September 1996 at an estimated cost of Rs 4,860 crore (April 1996 prices); it ultimately became a 65.1 km project and was completed at a cost of Rs 10,571 crore on 16 December 2002. Another 6.5 km of the Dwarka sub-city extension was finished at a cost of Rs 320 crore on 30 September 2004. The DPR had put the projected time schedule for the original 55.3 km as ten years, when the modified network was completed and operationalized in seven years and three months, within the approved cost. Though the Bangalore Metro project is not yet complete, the initial phase of implementation shows some delays that could affect the final timelines. Tenders took more than the expected time, not having enough number of professionals meant extra time in preparing technical details, time taken in positioning the general consultants added to delays, and court matters meant a setback to the time targets. Complications which arise with some of the contractors also contributed to delays. While the elevated stretch may be commissioned by the beginning of 2011, the underground stretch will take another two years or more.

TRANSITION TO APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATION This is expected to be a smooth step in the case of the metros being studied because the SPV that handles construction is to run the system as well. While the partnership arrangement of the central and state governments would remain, operational responsibility would be with the SPV. The state government must ensure price-based measures to promote and facilitate metro ridership and integration of various modes of transport which would act as feeder/evacuation systems to the metro. It is also laid down that expenditure during the operational phase would need to be financed by the SPV or the concerned state government. For the Rs 6,402 crore (60.5 per cent of project cost) JBIC loan taken in Phase I by DMRC, there was a moratorium of ten years with a repayment schedule extending to twenty years thereafter. When the decision to take the loan was made it was also noted that the Rupee–Yen relationship has been fluctuating with a very marginal appreciation of Yen during the previous decade. The ten-year moratorium enabled the company to generate sufficient funds for repayment of interest and principal in time. The first repayment became due in February 2007, which was paid promptly by DMRC. As of 31 March 2010, DMRC had repaid the principal and interest, amounting to Rs 95.83 crore and Rs 471.73 crore respectively.

MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS Apart from monitoring the progress during implementation, it is useful to monitor the impact of a project on society. Among the cases reviewed here, only the Phase I of Delhi Metro is amenable to an analysis of this kind. The benefits and the gains of the society have already been listed elsewhere in this book. Delhi Metro has become the first rail-based project anywhere in the world to be registered by the United Nations (UN) under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which will enable it to claim carbon credits. Under the project, DMRC will be able to earn CERs for the use of regenerative braking system in its trains. Under this system, while

applying brakes, the kinetic energy released starts a machine known as a converter–inverter, which acts as an electricity generator and supplies the electrical energy back to overhead electrical lines. This leads to overall electricity saving of about 30 per cent. These CERs are sellable and translate into an income of Rs 1.2 crore per year. Another area where DMRC is working is to claim carbon credits is for the modal shift of commuters from road vehicles to the metro system, leading to a reduction of tail-end emission of such vehicles, which contribute to global warming. The innovative structure of the company and the way in which DMRC has emerged as a successful model of timely and effective project execution are significant contributions by themselves. Today, rail-based metro is recognized as a workable model in the country and the success of this metro has prompted other large cities to actively look at this option. The consultancy strength added because of its implementation experience has given the opportunity to Delhi Metro to prepare DPRs in Bangalore, Kolkata, Chennai, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, Pune, Jaipur, and Kochi metro projects. Further, DPR preparation is on for the cities of Ludhiana, Lucknow, Kanpur, Navi Mumbai, and Greater Noida. Feasibility studies were prepared for Damascus and Colombo metros as well. The lead given by Delhi Metro in spreading the metro culture in the country has resulted in new developments as far as indigenization is concerned. Tunnelling using TBMs has now caught on in the country. In Phase II of the Delhi Metro, most of the civil works are being executed by Indian companies. Rolling stock for metros had earlier invariably been imported. But the domestic demand has resulted in BEML (a PSU) and Bombardier (a private manufacturer) setting up rolling stock manufacturing facilities in Bangalore and Vadodara. Indian components in track work and power supply has also increased substantially. But there is a counter theory also. One expert opinion points out that international empirical evidence and the Delhi experience shows that metro rail systems do not relieve congestion and neither is pollution reduced, and is thus impractical for cities that do not have a very dense and large CBD. The experience of the Delhi Metro is cited to support the

argument that ridership rates have been low and there is no positive change in terms of actual reduction in pollution, road traffic, or congestion. It is pointed out that the original RITES feasibility study justified the economic feasibility of the systems by projecting a daily ridership of 3.1 million passengers by 2005. This was later reduced to a projected demand of 2.18 million passengers per day on the first three corridors and then further reduced to 1.5 million a day in 2005. The system was actually operating at around 0.6 million passengers per day at the end of 2007 and reached the one million figure in 2010. Though such viewpoints need to be examined carefully and proper conclusions drawn, it remains a fact that in today’s circumstances of increasing city transport problems, metros, though expensive, provide the largest capacity and best possible efficiency parameters.

13  Conclusions There is no doubt that, at a time when Delhi’s urban transport problems were getting more and more complex, the bold decision to have a metro in the city has made a big difference. There are many factors that make it an urgent matter to augment mass transport facilities in Delhi—the average annual growth rate of the population is 4 per cent, six million vehicles were registered in Delhi as on 31 March 2009, and about 1,200 vehicles are added daily, while road space is more or less the same, bus ridership has decreased by 17 per cent, and the number of person trips per day has increased by 22 per cent over an eight-year period. The Delhi Metro carries about 1.6 million passengers a day and this figure will grow with the commissioning of new lines. During the first phase 65.10 km of the metro system were completed and another 121.62 km were added as part of Phase II by October 2010. The Delhi Metro is planning further expansion to reach a 413.8 km network when Phase III and Phase IV are taken up and completed. Presently, about 1,300 train trips take place daily, with 70 train sets and 280 coaches in operation. There are various landmarks which the Delhi Metro has been able to achieve: Phase I was completed ahead of time; work was completed within estimated completion costs; the unit cost of construction remained one of the lowest; it is the first metro to get ISO 14001 certification for Environmental Management System; and the first metro to earn carbon credit. It also has a lean organization, with 934 employees in the project section and 3,788 employees for operation and maintenance. The company has been making

operational profit from day one, is repaying the JBIC loan, and has 30 per cent of its revenue from non-fare box collection. It has an impressive safety performance and has been able to attain standards in punctuality and train operations. It has also been able to generate revenue through property development, which comes in handy when more rolling stock has to be procured. It has also been able to initiate the process of PPP in the metro system: it has undertaken the civil works of the 22.7 km Airport Express Line, with the equity contribution of the two participating governments and grants by the airport operator as well as the DDA, and the systems work (including rolling stock, signalling, and telecom) being undertaken by the concessionaire. The concession period is thirty years. The various benefits for Delhi in the form of savings in fuel cost, increase in vehicle speed, reduction in accidents and pollution, have been listed earlier. The metro is assumed to have paid back to society the costs incurred by 2010, thereby justifying the project’s higher EIRR (19.96 per cent overall). This is strong justification for taking up mass transit projects like metros as social projects based on the EIRR rather than insisting on a high or even moderate FIRR. The fact that fares have been kept at reasonable levels makes it all the more acceptable in terms of providing an affordable transport facility to the common man. The DMRC’s success is attributed to an innovative company structure, a unique work culture, and organizational values reflected in a lean but effective organization, punctuality, professional competence, a quick decision-making process, and the sufficient delegation of powers. Today, the public proudly claims this organization as a model for project execution; DMRC also serves as a good example of efficient, transparent, and effective public-sector functioning. The company has been able to share its expertise with other needy cities by extending advice on alternative mass transit modes and providing consultancies. If the metro is coming up in major cities like Kolkata, Mumbai, Chennai, Bangalore, and Hyderabad, a substantial part of the credit goes to the pioneering role and professional guidance of the DMRC. These initiatives not only provide acceptable options for mass transport in the cities, but

have also led to other initiatives such as setting up manufacturing facilities in the country itself as well as the development of a professional cadre to undertake metro execution and subsequent operation. All this is not to deny that there are sceptics who argue that the heavy investment being made in metros is not the right solution for our mass transit problems, especially because our cities are not oriented to having a CBD. They would argue for more investment in BRTS and better buses, as well as for the promotion of nonmotorized modes of transport. However, in the ultimate analysis, there is no doubt that the metro as a stable and desirable form of mass public transport will need to be promoted. The detailed project planning process—identification, preparation, appraisal, selection, negotiation of approval, implementation and monitoring, transition to an appropriate administration and monitoring, evaluation, and recommendation—needs to be followed when taking up metro projects for all Indian cities, so that the investment decision is fully justifiable. Decisions taken at the right time—that is, making the metro available when the city needs such an option—is particularly important, as this affects the very basis of a city’s overall economic development. Besides having a proper metro policy in position, in which private participation should be encouraged and be made possible, the rules also need to be clearly laid down. A proper analysis of alternatives is a must before opting for this mode, and care has to be taken that fares remain at affordable levels. A proper metro master plan should be drawn up in the beginning, so that the network extends to all relevant areas. If Delhi is to achieve a 55 per cent modal share of total trips for public transport against the present 43 per cent, if the increasing congestion on roads and the consequent loss of time, energy, etc. are to be addressed, promoting MRTS in the form of metro along with other modes seems the only possible option. Otherwise, measures like those worked out by Singapore’s LTA, such as the vehicle quota system (to limit the number of newly registered cars) and the area liaising scheme (to manage cars entering the CBD during peak hours), would become necessary. What has to be kept

in view is that as cities grow, vehicle ownership and use are bound to grow more rapidly resulting in more congestion and traffic generated air pollution. There is proof that car ownership increases with per capita income and what follows is a decline in the quality and quantity of public transport. The key message is that decision makers and policy formulators need to take this seriously and act promptly. Also, these discussions point to the need for a well-formulated, balanced metro policy which would not only encourage but also mandate cities to take up metro projects when a certain level of population and development is reached, with the process being facilitated by a transport policy framework.

Bibliography BOOKS AND ARTICLES Mohan, D, 2008, Mythologies, Metros & Future Urban Transport, TRIPP Report Series, New Delhi: Indian Institute of Technology. Ramachandran, M, 2009, An Alternative Approach to Project Planning in Public Works, The Indian Context, Hyderabad: ICFAI University Press. Vijaya Lakshmi, K, 2006, ‘Mumbai Metro Rail Project—An Overview by PRK Murthy’, Urban Transport Journal (December).

REPORTS DMRC, 2010, Detailed Project Report, Jaipur Metro (Phase I) (January). ———, 2008a, Updated Detailed Project Report—Chennai Metro Rail Project(August). ———, 2008b, Detailed Project Report of RV Road–Puttenahalli Cross Extension of North–South Corridor of Bangalore Metro (June). ———, 2006, Detailed Project Report—East–West Corridor of Kolkata Metro (March). ———, 2005a, Detailed Project Report, Kochi Metro Project—Alwaye Petta Corridor (July). ———, 2005b, Detailed Project Report—Mumbai MRTS Project, Versova– Andheri–Ghatkopar Corridor (February). ———, 2003a, Detailed Project Report—Hyderabad Metro (Phase I) (June). ———, 2003b, Detailed Project Report—Bangalore Metro (Phase I) (May)

Globescan and MRC McLean Hazel, 2008, Megacity Challenges: Stakeholders Perspective (research project sponsored by Siemens).

A

Mc Kinsey Global Institute, 2010, India’s Urban awakening: Building inclusive cities, a sustaining economic growth (April). Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India, 2006, National Urban Transport Policy (April). RITES, 1991, Integrated Multi Modal Mass Rapid Transport System for Delhi — Techno Economic Feasibility Report (July). Wilbur Smith Associated, 2008, Study on Traffic and Transportation Policies and Strategies in Urban Areas in India (May).

Index Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) 130 Asian Games 27 BEML (formerly Bharat Earth Movers Ltd) 24, 180 Bangalore 23, 29, 101 Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) 82 Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit Limited (BMRTL) 69 Bangalore Metro 76, 110 analysis of alternatives 78 challenge 71 coach size 63 completion target 81 cost 69–70, 72, 75–8, 83 Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 73, 80 extensions 80 fare structure 73 Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) 73, 80 financing 73, 81–2 funding plan 176 gauge 72 implementation 72, 80 Light Rail Transit System (LRTS) 69 land 72, 82 legal framework 73 litigations 83 project approval 78–9 project financing 79 project review 79, 83 review 179 routes 71–2 sensitivity analysis 73

standard gauge 77 Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Ltd (BMRCL) 71, 79 Bangkok 18, 20, 168 Bangkok Transit System (BTS) 20, 172 Beijing 17 Berlin 49, 162 Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) 83 Bogota 12, 16, 172 Trans Milenio Bus Rapid Transit System 16 Bombardier 24, 180 Brazil 12, 18, 22 Bruhat Bangalore Municipal Corporation (BBMC) 82 Buneos Aires 17–18, 22 CAF 45 Cairo 18, 172 Calcutta Metro Railways Act 95 Central Road Research Institute (CRRI) 28, 30, 162 Certified Emission Reduction (CER) 163, 180 Chennai 6, 29, 31, 49 population 101–2 road space 86 suburban rail services 35, 102 vehicular population 101–2 Volvo buses 106 Chennai Metro 145, 168 cost 106 cost projection 110–11 Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 107–8 fare structure 106–7 feasibility 103 gauge 109 Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) 107 financing plan 108–9 funding plan 176 implementation arrangement 109 justification 103 legal framework 110 Phase I 102 Phase II 102 proposed corridors 104 sanction 102 savings with implementation 108

train operation 106 Chennai Metro Rail Corporation Ltd 109 Chennai Metro Rail Ltd (CMRL) 109 China 4 City Development Initiative for Asia (CIDA) 154 Colombo 52 Commonwealth Games 45, 47 Community of Metros (COMET) 162 Companies Act 152, 162 Confederation of British Industry 1, 155 Constructions Y Auxiliar De Ferrocannibes SA 169 Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) 34, 38–40, 44–8, 51–2, 70–1, 83, 105, 113– 14, 115, 130–2, 135, 140, 143–4, 147–8, 169–70, 175, 178–80, 183 Delhi Metro Railways (Operations and Maintenance) Act 47–8, 81, 110, 124 Damascus 52 Delhi 6, 101 administration 30 Government of Delhi 48, 52 transport problems 28–31 Master Plan 2001 28 population 49 road space 86 Delhi Development Authority (DDA) 40–1, 45, 48, 175, 183 Delhi Metro 8, 12, 20, 27–32, 35, 50, 70, 77, 84, 110, 122, 134, 152 benefits 162 coach size 63 cost 78 cost recovery 173 DLF Phase II 52 Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) for other cities 180 Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 32, 183 fare structure 49, 51, 106 Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) 33, 52, 183 funding plans 173–6 IGI Airport 45–6, 169 ISO 14001 182 implementation 38 landmarks 182 New Delhi Railway Station 44, 46, 169 Delhi Metro Railway (Operations and Maintenance) Act 110, 124 Phase I 33, 38–9, 41–2, 52 Phase II 41, 43, 47

funding plan 43 Phase III 48, 58 Phase IV 48 review 161–3, 173–5, 177, 182–4 to Haryana 45 Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) 27 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 34 Fare Fixation Committee 48, 106 French Metro 86 global transport solutions 157–9, 181–4 Government of Andhra Pradesh 130–1 task force 135 Government of Haryana 44 Government of India 11, 34, 50, 71, 79, 95 announcements 158 approvals 41, 74–75, 78, 80, 97, 109, 145 assistance to Hyderabad Metro 136 assistance to Mumbai Metro 125, 127 availability of plan funds 171 JVs 97, 110–11, 124, 140, 144, 162 Ministry of Finance 171 Ministry of Railways 8, 28, 35, 86, 96, 100, 102–3, 111, 169 Ministry of Road Transport and Highways 8, 29 Ministry of Urban Development 5, 8, 27, 33, 35, 70, 74, 96, 100, 110–11, 129, 158, 171 secretary 30, 95 urban development fund 40 National Commission on Urbanization (NCU) 30, 35, 37 National Council for Climate Change 10 Planning Commission 28 Railway Board 8 state urban development departments 8 Town and Country Planning Organization (TCPO) 28 Government of Japan 74 Government of Maharashtra 113, 123, 127–8 Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) 33–5, 44–5, 48, 162 Government of Karnataka 69, 74–5, 78–80 JV with Government of India 74 Government of Kerala 148 Government of Rajasthan 143–4

Government of Tamil Nadu 103–5, 168 JV with Government of India 109–11 Government of Uttar Pradesh (UP) 46–7 Government of West Bengal 87–8, 93, 95–7 High Court 48, 83 Hong Kong 17–18, 24, 160, 162, 172 Mass Transit Railway Corporation 18 Metro 122 Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) 20 Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) 83 Hyderabad 20, 122 multi-modal suburban commuter transportation system 131 population 130 public transport 130 vehicular population 131–2 Hyderabad Development Authority (HDA) 130 Hyderabad Metro and PPP 134 corridors recommended 131–2 cost 133 Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 134 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 133 fare structure 134 feasibility study 131 financial bids 136 Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) 134 financing models 134 implementation 135 justification 131 Light Rail Transit System (LRTS) 131 legal framework 135 Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) 131 Phase I 130, 136 property development 137–8 type of recommended metro 132 viability gap funding (VGF) 135–8 India 2011 Census 4 Asian Development Bank (ADB) study 4 Bus Rapid Transit Systems (BRTS) 16, 141, 144, 159 fragmented land ownership 24 improving public transport 11

McKinsey study 4 Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM) 5 urban infrastructure 5, 158 urban road chaos 5–6 urban transportation 6–7, 16, 158–9 urbanization 4, 25 Wilbur Smith study 5, 24–5, 158 Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi (IIT-D) 29 Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai (IIT-M) 114 Indian Railways 27, 54, 77, 131, 168 Metropolitan Transport Organization (MTO) 28 Indian Tramways Act 123 Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) 125 Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS) 69, 131 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) 50–1, 99, 108, 134, 167, 173, 179, 183 Jaipur population 140–1 vehicular population 141 Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) 145 Jaipur Metro and PPP 143, 145 corridors 140–1, 143 cost estimates 142 Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 143 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 142 fare structure 142 Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) 143–4 legal cover 143 Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd (JMRCL) 140, 145 Jakarta Metro 52 Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) 87, 131 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 42, 48, 50, 74, 83, 143, 153, 167, 173 Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) 10, 141, 144 Karnataka Forest Department 82 Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd (KPTCL) 83 Kochi 147 Greater Cochin Development Authority (GCDA) 147 public transport 148 urbanization 147

Kochi Metro and PPP 153 benefits 151, 153 cost estimate 149 Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 151 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 152 fare structure 149–50 financial analysis 153 Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) 151 gauge 149 implementation 152 justification 153 traffic forecast 149 train operation 149 viability gap funding (VGF) 148 Kolkata 6, 31, 49, 101 Calcutta State Transport Corporation (CSTC) 85 Calcutta Tramway Company 85 Howrah Municipal Corporation 86 Kolkata Metropolitan Development Area (KMDA) 86–7 Kolkata Municipal Authority (KMA) 87 Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) 86 Salt Lake City 86 Kolkata Metro 27, 35, 84–5, 110, 124 alignment 93 approval conditions 96 carrying capacity 92–3 cost estimate 91, 94, 98 east–west corridor 85–9, 100 Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 91–2, 99, 170 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 90–1, 95 fares 48, 51, 96 Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) 91, 95, 99 financing plan 94 frequency 86 funding plan 176 gauge 88–9, 95 Howrah Maidan 98 Howrah Station 98 implementation period 95, 97–8 legal framework 95 north–south corridor 89, 169 extension 99–100

Phase I 86 Phase II 86 route length 88, 90 traffic forecast 88 Konkan Railway Corporation (KRC) 114, 122 Korea Exim Bank 83 Kuala Lumpur 18, 20, 168 L&T Infocity 135 L&T Metro Rail Ltd 136 Legislation Motor Vehicle Act 8 Light Rail Transit System (LRTS) 3, 17, 40–1 London 2, 6, 49, 155, 157, 162 Metro 18 Manila 18, 20, 168 Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) 3, 11–12, 17, 184 busways 12 rail–based 53–4 metro rail see also Project Planning analysis of alternatives 78 Automatic Fare Collection (AFC) 61–4 Automatic Train Operation (ATO) 61 Automatic Train Protection (ATP) 60–1, 63 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) 60–1 capital intensive 168 definition 48 eco-friendly 24 elevated route 55 fire detection systems 67 fiscal burden 172 floor space index (FSI) 23 funding criteria 36 integration with Indian Railways 117 passenger facilities 65–6 Passenger Information System (PIS) 61 Passenger Operated Machine (POM) 65 permanent way 54 preventive maintenance 61 rolling stock 62–3 safety features 60, 66 signaling 60–1 station environmental control 67–8

stations 56–8 surface 17 systems 12, 27 telecommunication system 61–2 traction and power supply 58–9 tunnel ventilation 67–8 types of 53 underground 54–5 viability gap funding (VGF) 168 Metro Railways Amendment Act 47 Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act 47–8, 80, 95, 110, 124 Metropolitan Transport Corporation of Chennai 106 Mexico City 49 Mohan, Dinesh 12 Mumbai 6, 23, 31, 49, 51 Brihanmumbai Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking (BEST) 116 comprehensive transport study 114 population 112, 115–16 road network 116 road space 86 suburban rail services 35, 112–13 vehicular population 112–13, 116 Mumbai Metro and PPP 122–4, 128–9 benefits 116, 121 corridors 126, 129 cost 120–1 Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 120–1 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 119–20 estimated cost 115, 118–19 fare structure 120, 127 Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) 120 financing options 121 funding pattern 126, 128 funding plan 177 implementation 124–5 justification 115 legal framework 123, 129 project planning 127–8 recommended network 115 savings with implementation 121 standard gauge 117 station locations 118 system selection 117

train operation plan 118 traffic forecast 125 viability gap funding (VGF) 124–8 Mumbai Metro One 125 Mumbai Metro Planning Group 114 Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) 112 Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) 114, 125, 128 Sky Bus Metro Study 114 Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH) 130 Mysore Tramways Act 74, 81 Mytas Metro Ltd 136–7 NOIDA (New Okhla Industrial Development Authority) 46 National Capital Region (NCR) 32, 47–8, 50 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 66 National Mission on Sustainable Habitat 10 National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP) 8–9, 12, 111, 128–9, 158 New York 6, 49, 159 Nova 162 Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF, Japan) 34 Penalosa, Enrique 16 Planning Commission 86, 108, 171 Population of India rural 1 urban 1, 28 Project Planning 26, 164 see also Metro Rail appraisal 170 Bus Rapid Transit Systems (BRTS) 171 Chennai Metro 165, 168 Delhi Metro 166 Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 170–1 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 170 finances 167 Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) 170–1, 173 identification 164 Internal Rate of Revenue (IRR) 170 Kochi Metro proposal 165 Kolkata Metro 166 negotiation 172 preparation of feasibility study 166 recommendations 170 resource requirements 166

review of Delhi Metro 177–84 selection 170 sensitivity analysis 170 Public–Private Partnership (PPP) 45, 51, 69, 84, 109, 122–4, 134, 138–9, 153, 168, 183 partial 169 Rail India Technical and Economic Services Limited (RITES) 30–1, 70, 130–1, 147, 181 Railway Safety Southern Circle (Railways), Bangalore 83 Regional Engineering College (REC), Warangal 130 Reliance Communications 127 Reliance Energy 45, 169 Reliance Infrastructure Ltd 125, 127 Rio de Janeiro 22, 172 SMC Lavalin 127 Sao Paolo 18, 172 Satyam Group 135 Seoul Metropolitan Government 138–9, 169 Shanghai 49, 157, 162 Shenzhen Shenzhen Huashi Future Parking Equipment 16 Singapore 2–3, 11, 17, 36, 156–7, 160, 172 Land Transport Authority (LTA) 3, 161–2, 184 Land Transport Master Plan 2–3, 36, 157 Metro 12 SMRT Corporation 160–1 trains 162 transport management 3, 156 Singapore MRC Limited 34 Southern Railway 84 Soviet Union 17 Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) 9, 11, 70, 75, 84, 97, 109–10, 122, 127, 134, 145, 152, 167, 173, 179 Sreedharan, E 12, 52 standards BS (British Standards) 61 CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization) 61 IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) 61 IS (Indian Standards) 61 ITU–T (International Telecommunication Union–Telecommunication standardization sector) 61

Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) 114 Technoexport Ltd, Moscow 86 The New York Times 163 Tokyo 160 Rapid Transport Authority 20 Teito Rapid Transit Authority (TRTA) 160 Tokyo Metro Co. Ltd 20, 160 expenditure 161 Tokyo Metropolitan Government 160 tram systems 17 Transport problems affecting cities 2, 6, 11, 24–5 vehicular pollution load 29, 31, 34 United Kingdom Greater London Authority (GLA) 155–6 United Nations (UN) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 163, 180 United States of America 36 urbanization developing countries 25 transport systems 155 Viability Gap Funding (VGF) 124–8, 135–8, 148, 168 West Bengal Surface Transport Corporation (WBSTC) 85 World Bank 114, 158