Meta-halakhah : logic, intuition and the unfolding of Jewish law 9781568219011, 1568219016

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METAHALAKHAH LOGIC, INTUITION, AND THE UNFOLDING OF JEWISH LAW

MOSHE KOPPEL

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JASON ARONSON INC. Northvale, New Jersey London

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This book was set in 11 pt. Berkeley Book by Alpha Graphics. Copyright ',n). The other three categories, collectively named divrei soferim, consist of laws that did not originate at Sinai: laws deduced by the Rabbis through textual interpretation or other means (tz,p"i1), ordinances for safeguarding the Halakhah (mitJ) and ordinances for the benefit of soci~ty (~n). DERABBANAN OR DE'ORAITA?

The term divrei soferim is often used as a synonym for the term derabbanan; the Rambam himself occasionally uses these tenr1s interchangeably1. The distinction between laws which are of Torah origin (de'oraita) and those of rabbinic origin (derabbanan) is fundamental. Laws that are derabbanan are treated less severely in ter11·1s of punishment and handling of ambiguous cases; in cases of conflict, such laws give way to others that are de'oraita. Thus the Rambam's categorization of laws derived from textual interpretation asdivrei soferim is the source of great controversy. 2 First,

l. See, for example, in the introductory chapters of Sefer ha-Mitzvot, principle 2, and in "Letter to R. Pinhas ha-Dayan" (in Hebrew), in Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Yitzhak Shailat Oerusalem: Maaliyot, 1988), pp. 451-454. 2. The Rambam spells out his own view on this issue in the two sources mentioned in the previous footnote. An example of the opposition this view aroused is the concluding comment of the Ramban (Nahmanides) on Sefer ha-Mitzvot, principle 2: "For Talmud scholars this issue is bad and bitter; the matter should be forgotten and left unsaid." For a lengthy discussion of the Rambam's view see Yekusiel Neubauer's Rambam on Divrei Soferim (in Hebrew) Oerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1957).

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laws derived in this way are generally regarded as de'oraita and not derabbanan. Secondly, the Rambam appears to be inconsistent in his use of the term divrei soferim; sometimes a law he refers to as divrei soferim is treated as if it were derabbanan and other times as de'oraita. Although he frequently uses di vrei soferim in reference to laws he obviously regards as derabbanan (including instances of laws derived via textual interpretation3), he identifies other laws as divrei soferim but regards them as having the force of Torah law. For example, although the Rambam states that the possibility of betrothal enacted via monetary payment is divrei soferim (Hilkhot Ishut 1:2) he asserts elsewhere in a case involving such betrothal that the death penalty is invoked, indicating that the betrothal is valid even on the de'oraita level (Hilkhot Mamrim 4:2). DIVREI SOFERIM AS

A META-HALAKHIC CATEGORY

Although ad hoc methods can explain away each of the Rambam's inconvenient uses of the terrr1 divrei soferim, a straightforward solution does exist. For the Rambam the legal question of whether a law carries the severity of de'oraitaor derabbanan is a relatively minor issue: he is much more concerned with the meta-Halakhic question of whether a law belongs to the hard kernel of Halakhah. Roughly speaking, the hard kernel consists of those laws given at Sinai, whether they are in the text,4 commentary on the text, or independent of the text. These •

3. See, for example, Hilkhot Edut 13:1. 4. It is important to note that the category (not listed in Introduction to Commentary on the Mishnah) of laws that appear explicitly in the Torah differs substantially from the two categories listed as Sinaitic, namely, "received interpretations" and "laws (transmitted] to Moshe at Sinai". Laws explicitly written are simply assumed and hence cannot be the subject of a ruling (see Hilkhot Shegagot 14:2). Thus, one guilty of a mistaken ruling, a willfully contrary ruling, or an illegitimately rendered ruling (say, under the influence of alcohol) about a question explicitly ruled on in the Torah does not incur the usual penalties. The Rambam does not list mitzvot of Sinaitic origin but not explicitly written in the Torah (or at least inferable from the text) among

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laws differ legally from others first and foremost on the meta-Halakhic level: with regard to issues such as if and how a law can be created, changed, interpreted, and so on. 5 In particular, while laws originating from Sinai are unchangeable, other laws are merely contingent: divrei soferim may be revised or replaced. Moreover, different interpretations of divrei soferim are resolved in accord with the lenient interpretation. (Significantly the Rambam draws this distinction betweendivrei soferim and Torah law only for the meta-Halakhic issue of resolving uncertainty about correct Halakhah [Hilkhot Mamrim 1 :5]. He does not draw such a distinction [on the de'oraita level] about the non-meta-Halakhic issue of resolving uncertainty over the facts of a case [Hilkhot Issurei Bi'ah 18: 17; Hilkhot Tumat ha-Met 9: 12) .) Finally, divrei soferim must be explicitly identified as such: the failure to draw the distinction between Sinaitic and post-Sinaitic law may be a violation of the prohibition of adding new commandments (-=,..c,n ',~). Indeed, at the very end of his introduction to Mishneh Torah he writes: When a coun, in conjunction with a prophet of that time, adds a commandment by making a regulation, decree or injunction, that is not an addition. After all, they did not say that God commanded us to make an eruv [a fictitious combining of properties) or re~d a megillah [scroll) on the appropriate occasions. And if they had said so, they would be the 613 mitzvot. For example, the rite of the procession with the willow-branch (aravah) which the Rambam lists among the "laws (transmitted) to Moshe at Sinai,, is not listed among the 613 mitzvot. In fact the Rambam on occasion goes so far as to refer to any law not explicitly written in the Torah as divrti soferim. (See, for ex. ample, Commentary on the Mishnah. Kelim 19:12.) Finally. in at least one example (the question of which impurities render one liable for entering the Temple sanctuary) the Rambam's very ruling hinges on which cases are listed explicitly in the Torah as opposed to those merely derived via interpretation (Hilkhot Tumat ha-Met 5:5). 5. Ohr Samt'ach on Hilkhot Mamrim 2: 1; Yitzchak Isaac Halevi, Dorot Harishonim, Part 4, pp. 514-542; Nachum Rabinovich, "Maimonides' Use of the Ter1n Divrti Soferim" in Sefer Higayon, ed. Moshe Koppel and Ely Merzbach Oerusalem: Zomet, 1995), pp. 87-98.

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adding to the Torah. Rather, we say the following: the prophets, together with the court, instituted this and commanded us to read a megillah . . . . Similarly, for all the commandments that are divrei soferim.

The Rambam uses the terrn divrei soferim in the meta-Halakhic sense. As for the conventional derabbanan-de'oraita distinction, some divrei soferim have the force ofde'oraita laws and others do not. Whether a law has such force depends on many parameters: whether it is a new law or merely a definition of a Torah law, what severity the Rabbis chose to assign to the law, and so on. (For example, while the origin of monetary betrothal is divrei soferim, its validity is de'oraita. The Rabbis simply defined the means via which betrothal could be enacted.) This less critical issue is dealt with by the Rambam on a case-by-case basis and is not uniquely determined by meta-Halakhic status.

2. DIVREI KABBALAH THE IMMUTABILllY OF SINAITIC LAW

Where, in the Rambam's view, the line between immutable and contingent Halakhah lies can be more precisely deterr11ined by carefully examining his words. In his introduction to Commentary on the Mishnah, the Rambam writes: The interpretations received from Moshe which are indicated in the text or can be inferred ... can never be disputed. When someone says, 'This is how I have received [the law] ,' the argument is moot .... The idea that disputed laws are also from Moshe, but that along the way there were errors of transmission or forgetfulness . . . is a very ugly and despicable proposition.

In the Rambam's view, because Sinaitic law is unchangeable and errors of transmission do not occur, disputes can arise only with regard to divrei soferim. In fact, this notion may be used as a criterion

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for (partially) deten11ining the origin of a law: if it is subject to dispute, then it i~ not from Sinai. As there is no shortage of counterexamples to this claim,6 we must examine the Rambam's words more closely to appreciate that his view is not quite as extreme as it appears. Note carefully the language used in the passage: When someone says "This is how I have received [the law]," the argument is moot. The Rambam does not argue that differences of opinion regarding Sinaitic law cannot arise; he merely states that they can be easily resolved. He does not promote the (obviously absurd) view that each individual receives perfect transmission of Torah from Sinai but rather that no authority falsely claims to have received a tradition going back to Sinai. 7 His statement that Halakhah cannot be forgotten refers only to collective transmission, not to individuals. Individuals may disagree about Torah from Sinai, but such disputes are easily resolved: only one of them can claim a tradition going back to Sinai. THE IMMUTABilllY OF DIVREI KABBAIAH .

Elsewhere the Rambam makes similar but subtly different remarks. Divrei kabbalah are indisputable and anything that is disputed was surely not received from Moshe Rabbeinu .... If the Supreme Coun expounded using one of the herr,1eneutic principles as it saw fit and ruled that the law was such and was succeeded by another coun which sees reason to ovenum (that law], then [the latter court] should overturn and decide according to what it understands. As it is written: ". . . to the judge who presides at that time"-you need only follow the court in your generation (Hilkhot Mamrim 1:3).

It is of course tempting and plausible to identify the tem1 "divrei kabbalah," which the Rambam uses here to identify the class of im6. See Responsa Havot Yair no. 192. 7. Y. Shailat, Hakdamot ha-Rambam la-Mishnah Qerusalem: Ma'aliyot, 1992); Z. Lampel, The Dynamics of Dispute (New York: Judaica Press, 1992).

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mutable laws, with the laws of Sinaitic origin and then conclude that the class of immutable laws, those given at Sinai, is fixed. All other laws are contingent and forever remain so; they may be overturned at any time. The Rambam, however, uses the terrn divrei kabbalah in a different sense elsewhere (Hilkhot Tumat ha-Met 5:5, 19:6). Moreover, a slightly different interpretation of the ten11 divrei kabbalah helps resolve several difficult passages in the Rambam's writings. First of all we find in the Mishnah: And why do they record the opinion of an individual with [the opinion of) the many, since the law is in any event according to the opinion of the many? So that if the court prefers the opinion of the individual, it may rely on him (Eduyot 1:5).

The Rambam comments: The purpose of recording the opinion of the individual with the opinion of the many . . . is so that the court may rule according to that individual's opinion (Commentary on Eduyot 1:6).

If the Rambam views all non-Sinaitic laws as contingent, why is there a need for a minority view on which to rely? Any court should be able to overturn the earlier ruling based solely on its own understanding of the issue. 8 Second, in Hilkhot Mamrim the Rambam writes, One who contests the ruling of the Supreme Court ... must be punished by death even if he were citing from tradition and said 'This is 8. It is true that the Rambam's comments on the Mishnah are often inconsistent with his rulings in Mishneh Torah; he clearly changed his mind here with regard to the need for the court that overturns a ruling to be "greater in wisdom and number" than was the earlier court. Nevertheless, it is obviously preferable to reconcile the Rambam's apparently contradictory comments on which rulings can be overturned.

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how I received it from my teachers' and they say 'This is what we understand to make sense' (Hilkhot Mamrim 4: 1). '

If we are compelled to accept a claim of "This is how I have received it," why do we not accept the view of the dissenter in this case instead of punishing him as a "rebellious elder"? Finally, the Rambam is uncharacteristically verbose in both of the pas.5ages from the first chapter of Hilkhot Mamrim cited above. In the first passage, "Divrei kabbalah are indisputable and anything that is disputed was surely not received from Moshe Rabbeinu,'' the second half of the pas.5age seems to be nothing but a rej,eat of the first half. In the second passage he writes, "If the Supreme Court expounded using one of the herrneneutic principles as it saw fit and ruled that the law was such and was succeeded by another court which sees reason to overturn [that law], then •[the latter court] should overturn." The Rambam could simply have written something like: "A law which was derived via textual interpretation can be overturned . . ." The narrative appears longer than necessary. DIVREI KABBAIAH THAT ARE NOT SINAITIC

To understand what the Rambam means by divrei kabbalah we must first appreciate the difference between the introduction to the Commentary on Mishnah, which is descriptive, not prescriptive, and Hilkhot Mamrim. In the forr11er, the Rambam merely distinguishes between objectively different categories of law, while in Hilkhot Mam rim he instructs the court as to when it can overturn an existing law. Because the court may not always be certain into which category a particular law falls, the Rambam must provide the court with an identifiable criterion for deciding when a law can be overturned. The tern1 divrei kabbalah, which the Rambam uses in Hilkhot Mamrim, thus refers to undisputed laws not explicitly written in the Torah, of sufficient antiquity that their origin is either unknown (i.e., they may or may not originate from Sinai) or known to be from Sinai. The category of

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divrei habbalah is a readily identifiable, growing superset of the Sinaitic laws. 9 This assertion answers all three questions raised above. First, the point of the Mishnah in Eduyot is that so long as a dissenting view is preserved, a law may not be classed with divrei habbalah and may thus be overturned. Recording a dissenting view facilitates the later adoption of that view by ensuring that the majority view remains contingent. Second, the.claim of "This is how I have received it" is compelling only when the claim is that the received tradition traces back to Sinai (for example, Mishnah Yadayim 4:3); otherwise it can be rejected. Finally, the language of the Rambam in the first chapter of Hilhhot Mamrim may be read as follows, "Divrei habbalah are indisputable"a given court may not dispute anydivrei habbalah, whether known to be from Sinai or not. A law given at Sinai has always been in the class of divrei kabbalah and can never have been disputed. Hence "anything that is disputed was surely not received from Moshe Rabbeinu"-a disputed law can not have originated from Sinai. The language of the Rambam is similarly precise for instances where disputes are allowed. "If the Supreme Court expounded using one of the hen11eneutic principles as it saw fit and ruled that the law was such and was succeeded by another court which sees reason to over-

9. In the preface to his commentary on She'iltot, R. Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin [NeZIV] assigns a similar meaning to the tertn .., ..~. although this tertn is usually identified as referring to "laws (transmitted) to Moshe at Sinai". In the essay "Shnei Sugei Masoret• inShiurim le-Zekher Abba Mari z•l Oerusalem: Makhon Yerushalayim , 1983), R.Joseph B. Soloveitchik dramatically extends NeZIV's principle. In attempting to explain how the Rambam can anachronistically list the law that "in Ammon and Moav the tithe of the poor should be given even in the seventh year" among the "laws (transmitted) to Moshe at Sinai," R. Soloveitchik concludes that the entire category of "laws [transmitted] to Moshe at Sinai" is roughly identical with that category of laws I have just identified as di vrei kabbalah (see the epigram of this chapter). The difficulty with this radical interpretation is that the Rambam (in his introduction to the Commentary on Mishnah) explicitly defines the ter111 "laws (transmitted] to Moshe at Sinai" as laws that "were received by Moshe as God commanded them" .

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tum [that law], then [the latter court] should overturn.'' The right of a court to overturn a law is limited to those cases in which it is aware of the specific post-Sinaitic origin of that law, that is, to cases that are not di vrei kabbalah. According to the Rambam a sharp and essential distinction exists between the immutable hard kernel of Halakhah and the contingent body of law surrounding it. But this hard kernel is never defined once and for all. Contingent laws can achieve a level of entrenchment in which they are so universally accepted that their non-Sinaitic origins fade from consciousness. Matters of interpretation, so long as they are still recognized as mere interpretations, are always contingent. Universal practice, divorced from any particular origin in interpretation, is fixed forever. Ever so slowly the hard kernel of Halakhah grows.

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8 AND THE AUTONOMY OF

MAN

Halakhic man knows that there is no royal road leading to the transcendent realm ..Man's whole being is stamped with the indelible imprint of corporeality, concreteness, and sensation. And whither shall he go from their presence, and whither shall he flee from them? Yea, if he ascends to a heavenly existence, there will they be; yea, if he takes the wings of the abstract and the supernal, there would their hand lead him. Halakhic man does not believe that one who is held captive in the prison house of bodily existence can free himself from all vestiges of material existence, can snap the fetters of the body and the yetz.er and ride in his majesty through the skies. -R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man

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1. THE AUTONOMOUS SELF At the end of Chapter 6 I suggested that Halakhah differs from other evolutionary systems in the sense that part of the definition of a law's fitness is the contribution of that law toward the creation of an environment in which Halakhah continues to evolve. Halakhah itself constitutes a cultural framework within which an individual can be autonomous, and this autonomy of individuals in tum constitutes the wellspring for the continuing creation of more evolved Halakhah. To explicate this idea we must first explain what we mean by the autonomy of an individual. A process is autonomous when it is in principle capable of nonmodelable behavior; people are autonomous in this sense because they possess an intuitive mode not limited to computable or even modelable behavior. Nevertheless, the (somewhat arbitrarily chosen) examples of behavior in the intuitive mode noted at the end of Chapter 2-bicycle riding and grammatical speech---..can be simulated computationally: although a person does these tasks without the conscious use of rules, there are nevertheless rules governing them. Do people do anything intuitively that cannot be simulated computationally? One can argue that all the tasks a person ·perforrrts are merely instances of maximizing a computable utility function and as such are modelable. Yet just because a person chooses to perforn·1 modelable activities, it does not follow that the entire tangled web of a person's activity choices is modelable. Behavior may be locally modelable (that is, it may consist of locally modelable subroutines) but ne~d not be globally modelable. We might say that a person's individuality is expressed in the totality of activities which he chooses to perfor1,,~1 even if, when all is said and done, everybody puts on their pants-;and their tefillin (phylacteries)-pretty much the same way. In this chapter, I expand on the idea of individuals' global nonmodelability to make two complementary claims. First, an autonomous person has an intuitive, hence not necessarily modelable, sense of rightness. An autonomous person operating within the framework

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of Halakhah has an intuitive sense of the right Halakhah (even beyond those laws already formalized). Second, the very nature of Halakhah·is to encourage and cultivate that autonomy in individuals.

2. CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOUL SICKNESS THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DAWN OF CONSCIOUSNESS

To say that a phenomenon is autonomous is to make a negative statement, namely, that the phenomenon is not bound to be modelable. A human being's autonomy is experienced by him as the apparent ability to make conscious choices. To better understand the relationship between being autonomous and making conscious choices, consider the primary source of psychological theorizing in the Torah: the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. As consequences of Adam and·Eve's eating from the Tree of Knowledge, they become embarrassed by their naked bodies; they are to die; reproduction and sustenance are achieved only with great difficulty. What is the relationship between this act of eating and its consequences? If eating from the Tree of Knowledge refers to the evolution of human consciousness, the consequences can be understood as the dark side of making conscious choices: We cannot choose to be nonmodelable. To choose is to choose a model, to choose an identity. Fortunately such choices are provisional; we can subsequently choose to transcend any previous choice of model. Of course no mechanical process exists for choosing to transcend models (such a process would itself be a model). Transcending models is instead an ongoing struggle to hear an ''inner voice" that cuts across all models. 1 Whoever does not hear this voice is not autonomous. The voice, 1. The reification of an individual's non-modelability (properly described in terms of what it is r,ot rather than what it is) as an "inner voice" must be understood as a mere literary device. This inner voice is a picturesque representation of the individual's autonomy and is not in any way external to the individual .

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however, is rarely audible and grows increasingly faint as a person becomes entrenched in a fixed identity. An autonomous person chooses again and again, never once and for all. ANXIETY AND THE NEED TO CHOOSE

Our existential anxiety is rooted in the fact that the inner voice calls a person to nonmodelability but at any given moment that person must choose a fixed identity. 2 The inability to function with this anxiety lies at the root of sickness of the soul, which can be thought of as lying on a continuum defined by two poles. At one pole is the denial of the possibility of authentic choice, of the inner voice. At this extreme the 2. Compare this with the discussion of Kierkegaardian psychology found in Ernest Becker, Denial of Death (Free Press: New York, 1973), especially p. 66: "(M]an is a union of opposites, of self-consciousness and of physical body .... Man emerged from the instinctive thoughtless action of the lower animals and came to reflect on his condition. He was given a consciousness of_his individuality and his part-divinity in creation, the beauty and uniqueness of his face and his name. At the same time he was given the consciousness of the terror of the world and of his own death and decay. This paradox is the really constant thing about man in all periods of history and society; it is thus the true "essence" of man .... The fall into self-consciousness, the emergence from comfortable ignorance in nature, had . one great penalty for man: it gave him dread, or anxiety. Man's anxiety is a function of his sheer ambiguity and of his complete powerlessness to overcome that ambiguity, to be straightforwardly an animal or an angel. He cannot live heedless of his fate, nor can he take sure control over that fate and triumph over it by being outside the human condition.,, See also the related remarks by R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik in "Majesty and Humility,,, Tradition 17:2 (Summer 1978): 25-37: "Man was created of cosmic dust. God gathered the dust, of which man was fashioned, from all parts of the eanh, indeed, from all the unchaned lanes of creation. Man belongs everywhere ... man is a cosmic being.... In shon, cosmic man is mesmerized by the infinite number of opportunities with which his fantasy presents him. He forgets the simple tragic fact that he is finite and monal, and that to reach out for infinity and eternity is a foolhardy undenaking.... Man is committed to one locus. The Creator assigned him a single spot he calls home. Man is not cosmic; he is here-minded."

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person locks himself into a fixed model: the pursuit of points in some game which he invests with ultimate significance, such as wealth or power. He is trapped in a rut, he is depressed. We might think of such behavior as being computable. The other pole is the refusal to choose any model, the refusal to commit. At this extreme the person behaves incoherently, inconsistently. We might think of such behavior as being random. The refusal to commit to any model (even provisionally) is self-defeating because the resultant randomness is trivially modelable and hence not at all an expression of autonomy. 3 The continuum defined by these poles of computability and randomness is now familiar to us as the set of modelable behaviors. The elements of this continuum have in common that the inner voice is silenced and there is no growth, no authentic choice. Autonomy entails an ongoing process of assuming identities and transcending them. Paradoxically, the quest to immortalize oneself by assuming an immutable identity or refusing to assume any identity results not in immortality but in the death of the authentic self. 3. In Denial of Death, p. 76, Becker goes further and identifies what I call sickness of the soul with character disorder. ~[S)chizophrenia is an attempt by the symbolic self to deny the limitations of the finite body; in doing so, the entire person is pulled off balance and destroyed. It is as though the freedom of creativity that stems from within the symbolic self cannot be contained by the body, and the person is tom apart. This is how we understand schizophrenia today, as the split of self and body, a split in which the self is unanchored, unlimited, not bound enough to everyday things, not contained enough in dependable physical behavior.... If schizophrenic psychosis is on a continuum of a kind of norr,1al inflation of inner fantasy, of symbolic possibility, then something similar should be true of depressive psychosis.... Depressive psychosis is the extreme on the continuum of too much necessity, that is, too much finitude, too much limitation by the body and the behaviors of the person in the real world, and not enough freedom of the inner self, of inner symbolic possibility. . .. The schizophrenic is not enough built into his world-what Kierkegaard has called the sickness of infinitude; the depressive, on the other hand, is built into his world too solidly, too overwhelmingly." The terms depression and schizophrenia are used by Becker in a somewhat metaphorical sense that should be distinguished from the usual diagnostic sense of the terms used by practicing psychologists.

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Let us return now to the story of Adam and Eve. Having gained consciousness, and hence self-consciousness, Adam and Eve could no longer live naturally and instinctively. The two processes characteristic of all organisms, reproduction and metabolism, became unnatural for them. More significantly, they were forced to choose identities, finite models of being, and could no longer simply be autonomous. This situation was the death with which they were threatened. The bodies of which they had become conscious served as symbols of their finitude, in the sense of limited choices and of finite life spans; as such, these bodies were the source of anxiety and shame. 4 No SHORTCUT To INFINITY

What constitutes authentic living? Is there an alternative to the continuum of soul sickness? Might we simply yield once and for all to the inner voice, be perfectly authentic, stand without arn1or before God at every moment? 5 Unfortunately this is a logical impossibility. Autonomy can be expressed only in the context of a life of creative 4. The tendency, which results from the acquisition of consciousness, toward yielding the struggle for autonomy by choosing a fixed identity once and for all, is called the yetzer ha-ra, the evil inclination. In this sense Adam and Eve are said to have developed a yetzer ha-ra only after eating from the Tree of Knowledge (Rashi on Genesis 2:25). Moreover, after eating from the Tree of Knowledge, Adam and Eve had to construct models of the world, rather than immediately relating to the world. In this sense, after eating from the Tree of Knowledge, they became "creators of universes" (n,o',,.s, .,,~"). See Bereishit Rabba 19:4. 5. This appears to be Kierkegaard's approach. See Becker, Denial of Death, p. 89: "The self must be destroyed, brought down to nothing, in order for selftranscendence to begin. Then the self can begin to relate itself to powers beyond itself. It has to thrash around in its finitude, it has to 'die,' in order to question that finitude, in order to see beyond it. To what? Kierkegaard answers: to infinitude, to absolute transcendence, to the Ultimate Power of Creation which made finite creatures... . [A]nxiety 'is the possibility of freedom', because anxiety demolishes 'all finite aims,' and so the 'man who is educated by possibility is educated in accordance with his infinity.'"

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action, of substantive identities that can be transcended only with great difficulty. 6 The autonomous individual must not only live "real life" but must do so in the context of an appropriate community. This is true for two reasons. First, human beings are finite and hence modelable; their potential for nonmodelability can continue to be realized in this world only in the context of an autonomous community or culture that persists after they die. Second, only certain comm\lnities can create conditions in which the inner voice remains audible, in which autonomy is possible in the context of creative acti~n. In short, we must live in a cultural context that does not drive us toward sickness of the soul. 3. TELEOLOGY OF HALAKHAH FREEDOM AND LIFE

Several sources bear out the claim that the Rabbis regarded Halakhah as precisely the type of system that leads to increasing autonomy. According to the derashah of R. Elazar b. Azaryah, 6. See the remark of Rav Soloveitchik in the epigraph to this chapter. Rav Soloveitchik explicitly repudiates Kierkegaard's view in The Lonely Man of Faith (New York: Doubleday, 1992), p. 107: "[F]or Kierkegaard, faith supersedes the majestic posture of man. The world of faith rises upon the ruins and debris of the world of majesty. This thesis is unacceptable . .. to the Halakhah, which insists upon the dialectical movement between these two worlds." Rav Soloveitchik's own view is expressed in that essay (p. 82) as follows: "If one would inquire of me about the teleology of the Halakhah, I would tell him that it manifests itself exactly in the paradoxical yet magnificent dialectic which underlies the Halakhic gesture. When man gives himself to the covenantal community, the Halakhah reminds him that he is also wanted and needed in another community, the cosmic-majestic and when it comes across man while he is involved in the creative enterprise of the majestic community, it does not let him forget that he is a covenantal being who will never find self-fulfillment outside of the covenant and that God awaits his return to the covenantal community." This dialectic is not merely described but manifested in Rav Soloveitchik's works.

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"The words of the sages are like spurs and like nails well planted are the words of the masters of assemblies, which are given from one shepherd." Why are the words of the Torah likened to spurs? To teach you that just as the spur directs the cow in its furrow to bring forth life to the world, so the words of the Torah direct those who study them from the paths of death to the paths of life (Hagigah 3b).

The Torah is meant to increase life: its words direct those who learn them from the ways of death to the ways of life. Just as the spur keeps the cow on the straight and narrow for the purpose of generating further life, the Torah keeps people on the straight and narrow in order to increase life, autonomy. In fact, autonomy itself is freedom, so that by limiting freedom the Torah is ultimately increasing freedom itself. " ... carved on the tablets" (Exodus 32: 16). Do not read it as harut, 'carved,' but rather [as if it said] herut, 'freedom.' Because there is no free man except for one who is involved in the study of Torah. And whoever studies Torah, transcends himself (Avot 6:2).

This passage may be compared with the following: And what did God have in mind? This is what He had in mind: every nation and kingdom that would come and accept the Torah would exist eternally. As it is written, "The tablets were the work of God and the writing is the writing of God, carved (harut) on the tablets." Don't read it as harut "carved," but rather [as if it said] herut "freedom". There is no truly free person but he who is not ruled by the Angel of Death. As it is written: "From ·Matana (ilJr'O) to Nahliel (',M,',nJ) and from Nahliel to Bamot (~). ~ From the giving of (7rn) the Torah they acquired ('1',rn) idolatry and from idol worship the Angel of Death came upon them (n,c M:::l) (Eliahu Zuta, Chapter 4).

Taken together, these sources suggest a three-way equation between Torah, freedom, and life: Torah equals freedom and freedom equals

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life; thus Torah equals life. In fact, even the complementary equation is given explicitly: idolatry equals death. 7 According to these sources the Torah promotes autonomy, a notion that unifies life and freedom. Can we now answer yes to the question of whether the mitzvot have a defining purpose? Yes and no. Although Halakhah does seek to increase human autonomy, this fact does not enable us to generate all of Halakhah in mechanical fashion. A defining purpose for Halakhah may exist, but it is not one that can serve as a~ algorithm for deciding what Halakhah is. THE PuRPOSE OF ffALAKHAH

I would like to argue that an analysis of its content gives an indication that Halakhah is intended to create conditions in which autonomy is possible. This claim, however, is somewhat audacious and I must settle for the less dramatic claim that Halakhah guides people away from the two poles: identities that are too structured and those that are insufficiently structured. With this hypothesis in mind, let us now consider some central classes of mitzvot and see how the balancing of too much structure and too little structure is manifested by them. Prohibition of Idolatry

The simplistic view of the prohibition of idolatry is that one may not bow down to statues, but the Torah is obviously interested not only in the physical act of bowing (although that too is forbidden). Rather, the 7. Even the equation between the absence of freedom and idolatry is made explicit in at least one source: R. Yohanan b. Zakkai's students asked him: Why, of all the organs in the body, is the servant's ear pierced [if he chooses not to go free]? He answered: The ear

which heard at Mount Sinai "You shall have no other God" now went and acquired another master. The refore the ear must be pierced for not practicing what it heard. In the past, the people of Israel were servants to servants, from now on they are servants of God (Pesikta Rabbati 21 :21).

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Torah forbids fetishism: the complete devotion of the self to that which is bounded. The Torah demands that we remain autonomous by devoting ourselves to the unbounded God through engagement in a nonmoclelable Halakhic process. Idolatry is a diminution of the autonomous soul.8 Indeed, "[F]rom idol worship the Angel of Death came upon them." Shabbat 'Six days a week you shall work·and perfor111 your activities and on the seventh day [make] Shabbat for the Lord your God' (Exodus 20:9). Six days a week one engages in ordinary human activity, the modelable subroutines discussed in the first section of this chapter. But on Shabbat one must symbolically withdraw from such activities; we might think of this withdrawal as "assuming the meditative stance". Uninterrupted and unreflective engagement in modelable activities destroys our free spirit, while meditation detached from constructive activity leads to spiritual sterility. 9 The seventh day of creation, on which God rests from constructive activity, represents the introduction of nonmodelability into the world and is an integral part of creation. 10 This nonmodelability is manifest in three domains: the physical universe, the autonomous individual or culture, and history. Concomitantly, the liturgy of Shabbat is organized around three themes: the creation of the world, the Exodus from Egypt, and the End of Days. Abstinence

Many mitzvot involve limiting our physical enjoyment of the world. By preventing us from becoming unreflective prisoners of our base instincts, the Torah prevents modelability. 8. See E. Fromm, You Shall Be as Gods (New York: Holt, 1966). 9. Compare H. Cox, Turning East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), chap. 6. 10. See Genesis 2 :2: "And God finished on the seventh day" and Rashi's comment there. ·

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R. Yanai said: whoever fllows his inclinations is compared to an idol worshipper. How do we know this? It is written: 'You shall not have a strange god within you and you shall not wo1:5hip any foreign deity' (Psalm 81:9)-do not let the stranger within you rule over you (JT Nedarim 8: 1).

The Torah, however, seeks not maximal abstinence but proper balance. Although hedonism is prevented by the rules of the Torah, one must not become completely abstemious either; an ascetic fetish also results in modelability. R. Elazar ha-Kappar Berabbi said: Why does the Torah say [of the nazir, who abstains from wine), '[A)nd make atonement for him for he sinned against the soul' (Numbers 6: 11)? Against what soul did he sin? Simply that he denied himself wine. Now it can be inferred that if this man who denied himself only wine is ter111ed a sinner, how much more so is this true of one who is ascetic in all things (Nazir 19a).

Ritual Cleanness

The greatest psychological impediment to human autonomy is the inevitable awareness of one's own mortality. The futile tendency to repress this awareness instead of facing it squarely is manifested in the refusal to choose an identity. 11 Obsession with death, on the other hand, is manifested in too much structure, in the denial of possibility. The laws of ritual cleanness are designed to prevent both the repression of the awareness of death and the obsessive preoccupation with it. All instances of uncleanness are symbolic of physicality and hence of the inevitability of death. (Even birth signifies finiteness: not only does one not live forever, one has not lived forever.) The·Torah forces people to face death squarely by loading it with

11. E. Becker, Denial of Death, p. 76: "Schizophrenia is the attempt by the symbolic self to deny the limitations of the finite body."

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ritual consequences; contending with these consequences makes it impossible to avoid confronting death. The Torah, however, allows people to overcome in ceremonial fashion the uncleanness resulting from death and in this way seeks to prevent obsession with death. Empath:y Hillel suggested that the love of our fellows (.u,i1 n:::iilM) is the defining principle of the Torah. Only healthy, living, free souls are capable of empathy for others; those who exploit themselves exploit others. Selflessness is thus a manifestation of the autonomous personality, the fostering of which is the Torah's objective. 12

4. FLUENCY BUMPING INTO THE RULES OF GRAMMAR

If the Torah seeks to liberate people, then should not the optimal Torah be the empty Torah? For people to be free, ideally no bounds should be placed on them; by limiting people's options, the Torah is making them less free. This view is plainly wrong: it is analogous to the argument that a language, a grammar, allows the most expressiveness precisely if there are no rules. Yet surely the empty grammar does not facilitate the most expression. On the other hand, enforcing an artificial balance between too much and too little structure hardly ensures individual autonomy. A successful language must foster fluency: people who learn the basic rules must ideally be able to express themselves completely unselfconsciously, without constantly bumping into rules of grammar. They must find that these rules are intuitive or that they can develop an

12. David Weiss writes eloquently on the issue of ethics and Halakhah in The Wings of the Dove (Washington, DC: Bnai Brith, 1987).

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intuition for them. People adapt themselves to grammars, but not all grammars can be adapted to; in fact, the class of grammars which people can learn is extremely restricted. Similarly, those who know and understand Torah must be able to metaphorically express themselves in an unself-conscious way; the Torah must facilitate fluency. TORAH AS IDOLATRY

The Rabbis take for granted that fluency in Torah is attainable: R. Yehoshua b. Levi said: What is the meaning of the verse, "And this is the Tora~ which Moshe set (cu,)" (Deuteronomy 4:44)? If he is meritorious it becomes for him a medicine (o,) of life; if not, a deadly poison (c:o). That is what Rabba [meant when he] said: If he is fluent in it, it is a medicine of life for him; if he is not fluent in it, it is a deadly poison. R. Shmuel b. Nahmani said, R. Yonatan asked: It is written, "The precepts of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart" (Psalm 19:9). But it is also written, "The word of the Lord is purified[= smelted]" (Psalm 18:31). If he is deserving, it rejoices him; if not it smelts him. Resh Lakish said: This can be derived from the passage itself: if he is deserving, it purifies him for life, if not it purifies him for death (Yoma 72b).

The Rabbis argued that for people who are fluent in it, Torah is an ideal vehicle for full self-expression. Autonomy is possible within the bounds set by the Torah, which are neither suffocatingly strict nor too loose to be effective guides; these bounds instead guide a person on a continuing path of nonmodelability. However, for a person who is not fluent in Torah, who has failed to internalize it, commitment to Torah is a yielding of autonomy, a for1r1 of death. Even Torah can be a fetish, an idol. "[R. Gamliel] would say: Make His will your own will, so that He will make your will His own will" (Avot 2:4). R. Gamliel asserted that our challenge is to generate a personal intuition of what is right corresponding to the goodness toward which the Torah directs us. In this way we naturally live with the rules set by the Torah, rules formalizing our own intuition of the good.

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THE INDIVISIBILITY OF TORAH AND ITS PRACTITIONERS

In chapters 6 and 8, I have come to two complementary conclusions. On the one hand the ongoing unfolding of Torah requires that its practitioners be autonomous. For the Torah to continuously develop and evolve forever, for its infinitely deep structure to unfold, the interpreters of Torah-not only those who interpret actively but also those who live the Torah and thereby implicitly interpret it-must be able to understand the good in an unbounded way; otherwise the Torah becomes bounded as people are bounded. On the other hand, for people to be autonomous the Torah must allow it and must encourage them in this path. Thus people's autonomy requires the nonmodelability of Torah: were the Torah incapable of infinite expansion, it would impose bounds on its practitioners' potential for autonomy and would not provide the tools nece$clry for continuing expansion. It is often said that to the extent that one's vocabulary is limited, the ideas one is capable of expressing, indeed having, are limited. 13 The same is true of cultures: were the Torah not capable of infinite expansion, the horizons of its practitioners would be limited. It makes little sense to speak of individual autonomy independent of the Torah's autonomy. When we are not autonomous, neither is Torah: we ourselves sustain and enhance it. Were Torah not autonomous, we could not be autonomous, for we live according to it. Torah together with its practitioners forms an autonomous system. I call this claim that the Torah and the people who live by it fonr1 a single autonomous system the fundamental proposition of meta-Halakhah. We will see that this fundamental proposition is the cornerstone of Jewish belief. •

13. The so-called Whorf-Sapir hypothesis that perception itself is shaped by language appears to be unsubstantiated. Nevertheless, it is clear that complex thought requires complex language.

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MEANING OF

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Every definition of God engenders heresy; definition is spiritual heresy. Even defining Intellect and Will, and even the notion of Divinity itself and the tenr, "God," constitute definition. If not for the keen awareness that all these are but sparkling flashes of that which transcends definition, these too would engender heresy. -Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Kook, Orot

1. THE CONTENT OF EMUNAH BASIC QUESTIONS

Certain problems arise when trying to characterize what is generally called emunah ("faith''). 1

1. Faith is only a tentative approximation of the concept oftrnunah which I attempt to explicate here; I use the untranslated Hebrew ter111 throughout this chapter.

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The Rambam enumerated thirteen principles of emunah; others, more or fewer such principles. The source of these principles, the basis on which their formulators decided them, their underlying characteristic structure·- these make up the first problem. The next problem has to do with whether emunah is more or less basic than action, than mitzvot. Judaism is often said to differ from other religions in being fundamentally without dogma and defined solely in tenr1s of mitzvot, with emunah a mere epiphenomenon. But it is also said that the mitzvot are meaningless without emunah. or are no more than a mear"5 of expressing emunah. Another problem concerns the relat~onship between emunah and reason. If the principles of emunah are such that a perfect reasoner would assent to them on the basis of reason, then the content of emunah is trivial; if they ·are not, then emunah is foolish. The final problem deals with the relationship between emunah and imagination. The notion that a lack of imagination is a great virtue because it leads to greater emunah seems peculiar. Does a person who is sufficiently imaginative to entertain an alternative to a particular principle have a character flaw? To resolve these problems, I attempt a fresh look both at the content and at the meaning of emunah. EMUNAH AND META-HALAKHAH

The fundamental proposition of meta-Halakhah is that the Torah and the Jewish people constitute an autonomous system. I maintain that this proposition is the com~on ground of all proposed sets of principles of emunah. 2 For purposes of exposition, the fundamental proposition can be divided into three sub-propositions. First, people can intuitively

2. The general idea that the content of emunah amounts to cenain meta-Halakhic propositions was previously suggested by Walter Wurzburger, "Meta-Halakhic Propositions," in The Leo Jung Jubilee Volume, ·ed. M. Kasher, N. Lamm, and L. Rosenfeld (New York: Jewish Center, 1962): pp. 211-221 . As far as I can tell, Wurzburger deserves credit for the ter1r1 meta-Halakhah.

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understand Torah. Second, people who are fluent in Torah are autonomous. Third, although any individual lives only a finite amount of time, the autonomy of the society of practitioners and interpreters of the Torah continually increases. The analogy between emunah and the fundamental proposition of meta-Halakhah becomes clear when we compare these three propositions with three of the most commonly proposed principles of emunah: revealed Torah, reward and punishment, and Mashiach. Revelation

The first principle of emunah:-the prophetically revealed Torah-is nothing more than the first proposition that people are capable of immediate, intuitive comprehension of Torah. When and where the revelation took place is not the critical issue. The real issue is that the Torah is revealed to people, that people have the ability to intuit Torah. 3 1

Reward and Punishment

The second principle of emunah-reward and punishment for mitzvot and transgressions is a simplified version of the second proposition that the Torah increases human autonomy. Let us understand what we mean by the ter1ns reward and pun~shment. Ben Azzai said: Run to perfonn an easy mitzvah and flee from transgression. Because one mitzvah leads to another and one transgression leads to another. For the reward of a mitzvah is a mitzvah (iT'l~ m~o i~) and the price of a transgression is a transgression (Avot 4:2).

Doing a mitzvah for its own sake and not for the sake of a reward is not acting randomly or in an externally detem~1ined way, but is autonomously choosing to do the mitzvah. A person's truest reward 3. The intuitive nature of this revelation is alluded to by the midrashic report that, after trying and failing to teach the Torah to Moshe for forty days, God finally gave the Torah to Moshe as a gift (Shemot Rabba 41 :6). See Chapter 4 above.

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in this world is nothing other than being autonomous the highest, indeed the only, good that exists. A mitzvah is thus its own reward in the tautological sense that if a person is autonomous, he or she is autonomous. Strictly speaking, this suggests that the statement m~c n,~c i:XO is the assertion that the reward of mitzvah Xis mitzvah X, that very same mitzvah. In fact, however, a more likely interpretation of Ben Azzai's intent is the nontautological assertion that the reward of mitzvah X is mitzvah Y, another mitzvah: the reward for being autonomous is the possibility of continuing to be autonomous. In another Talmudic discussion of reward and punishment we read: The school of R. Yaakov says: There is no mitzvah in the Torah whose reward is stated along with it, in which resurrection of the dead is not implicit. In connection with honoring parents, it is written: "That your days may be prolonged and it may go.well with you" (Deuteronomy 5:16). In connection with the law of sending the mother [bird] away from the nest, it is written: "That it may be well with you and you may prolong your days" (Deuteronomy 22:7). Now in the case where a man's father said to him, go up to the top of the building and bring me some young birds, and he went up to the top of the building, sent the mother away and took the young ones, and on his way down fell and was killed-where is this man's length of days and where is this man's well-being? Rather, "your days may be prolonged" refers to the world that is unending, and "it may go well with you" refers to the world that is altogether good (Hull in 142a).

The true reward is not in this world but in the "world that is altogether good,". that is, the World to Come. The Rambam has an uncharacteristically lengthy discussion of reward and punishment in which he reconciles the view that the reward for one mitzvah is another mitzvah with the view that the reward for mitzvot is in the World to Come: What then is the meaning of the statement found everywhere in the Torah that "[I]f you obey, it will happen to you thus; if you do not

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obey, it will be otherwise" and all these happenings will take place in this world, such as prosperity and failure? . . . All those benedictions and maledictions are to be explained as follows: if you have setved Goel with joy and obsetved His way, He will bestow upon you those blessings and avert frorn you those curses, so that you will have leisure to become wise in the Torah and occupy yourselves therewith, and thus attain life hereafter, and then it will be well with you in the world which is entirely blissful and you will enjoy length of days in an existence which is everlasting. So you will enjoy both worlds a happy life on earth leading to life in the World to Corne. For if one does not acquire wisdom and good deeds here, he does not have with what to merit [hereafter] (Hilkhot Teshu vah 9: 1).

If the true reward is in the World to Come, then what are all those promises about rain? The Rambam answers that God's tending to people's needs as a reward for mitzvot is a means of rewarding one mitzvah with another mitzvah. Once people are doing mitzvot; God rewards them by creating the external conditions enabling them to continue doing mitzvot. But the true reward is indeed in the World to Come. The good resetved for the righteous is life in the World to Corne-ia life which is immortal, a good without evil. Thus it is written in the Torah: "[Tl hat it may be well with you and that you may prolong your days" (Deuteronomy 22:7). The traditional interpretation of this is as follows: "[T]hat it may be well with you," in a world altogether good; "[T]hat you may prolong your days," in a world unending, that is, the World to Corne. The reward of the righteous is that they will attain this bliss and abide in this state of happiness; the puni~hrnent of the wicked is that they will not attain this life but will be cut off and die. He who does not attain this life will be dead, in the sense that he will never live again but will be cut off in his wickedness and perish like the brute beast. This is the penalty of excision, referred to in the Torah, as it is written, "[T]hat soul shall utterly be cut off, his iniquity shall be upon him" (Numbers 15:31). This has been traditionally interpreted as follows: "cut off," in this world; "utterly cut off' in the World to

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Come. This means that this soul after its departure from the body in this world, will not attain life in the World to Come but will be cut off from that life as well . . . (Hilkhot Teshuvah 8:1).

The Rambam's view of the World to Come can be restated in our tern1s. Although I have argued that the soul has the theoretical potential to realize a nonmodelable course of action, it never gets a chance to play itself out ad infinitum in this world. Once we are bound in time by our mortality, the whole process of the soul's actions is finite. But in the World to Come an individual's autonomy is fully realized. If a person is autonomous, potentially nonmodelable except that the process ter111inates, then the World to Come is a world in which termination does not take place, in which the infinite soul realizes its nonmodelability unencumbered by the finite body.4 Mashiach

Finally the third proposition, the increasing autonomy of Jewish society, is usually referred to simply as the inevitability of Mashiach, the third principle of emunah. Mashiach is not an abstraction but a real world phenomenon. "There is no difference between this world and the messianic era but for servitude to kingdoms'' (Berakhot 34b): the Jewish people will be truly free and autonomous; they will rule themselves. This statement refers not to mere political sovereignty but to cultural independence embracing more and more aspects of life. As the interactive process between Torah and its practitioners evolves toward an ideal, a threshold that can be identified asMashiach is·passed. This process must evolve naturally: thus we are commanded "not to force the end" (Ketubot 11 la). 4 . See Bava Metzia 85b: "He who subjugates himself to the words of the Torah

in this world will be free in the World to Come." This idea is perhaps more poignantly expressed in the following joke: Gan Eden is where the righteous do nothing but study Torah every minute of every day. Gehennom is exactly the same thing for everybody else.

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That the three fundamental principles-revealed Torah, reward and punishment, and Mashiach--can each be thought of as facets of the process of Torah and people developing infinitely bears out the contention that the true content of emunah is the single proposition of Torah and its practitioners constituting an autonomous system. 2. THE NATURE OF EMUNAH EMUNAH AS PERSPECTIVE

Most of the questions I raised at the beginning of this chapter deal less with the content of emunah than with its very nature, to which I now tum. Emunah does not consist of assigning truth values (true/ false) to sentences about the world; it involves the way we relate to the world itself and not the way we relate to sentences about the world. Emunah does not require language. The mistaken notion thatemunah is constitu·t ed by sentences has led to much confusion and grief, especially because it is unclear which sentences even correspond to substantive propositions about the world. Much more can be said about whatemunah is not, but first we must consider a simple categorization of different types of propositions. A proposition is falsifiable if there exists a possible event contradicting the proposition. For example, the proposition "All ravens that will ever live will be black" is falsified by the appearance of a nonblack raven. A proposition is verifiable if there exists a possible event that renders the proposition true once and for all. For example, the proposition "Not all ravens that will ever live will be black" is verified by the appearance of a nonblack raven. (As these example suggest, a proposition is verifiable if and only if its negation is falsifiable; indeed the same example which serves to falsify/verify a proposition serves to verify/falsify the negation of that proposition.) While the proposition "All ravens that will ever live will be black" is falsifiable, it is not verifiable: no number of sightings of .black ravens is sufficient to ensure that all future ravens seen will be black as well. Analo-

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gously, the proposition "Not all ravens that will ever live will be black" is not falsifiable. So long as we do not see a nonblack raven, we can say nothing definitive about the truth or falsehood of either of our propositions, but the moment we see a nonblack raven, the first proposition is seen to be false and the second true, regardless of any future observations. After the observation of a nonblack raven, each of these propositions ceases to be active. From a psychological viewpoint, once a proposition has been either falsified or verified it loses its grip on us. Any proposition that is either falsifiable or verifiable (or both5) can potentially cease to be active, but not every proposition is either falsifiable or verifiable. For example, the proposition "There will live an infinite number of black ravens" is neither falsifiable nor verifiable. Such a proposition therefore necessarily remains forever active and never loses its grip on us. Propositions that are neither falsifiable nor verifiable I call perspectives; they frame experience by circumscribing the range of possible infinite courses of events (as perspectives can never be finitely verified) but do not in any way circumscribe the range of possible finite courses of events (as perspectives can never be finitely falsified). 6 Assuming a perspective is altogether different from lending assent to a falsifiable or verifiable proposition. The perspectives people assume-;and such must exist, for there is no "view from nowhere"are far more basic to their essence than any of the falsifiable or verifiable propositions to which they may lend their assent. · I can for1nulate the main point of my argument in these tenns: 5. Unlike truth and falsehood, verifiability and falsifiability are not mutually exclusive. The proposition "Every raven in this box is black" cannot be both true and false, but it is both verifiable and falsifiable: there exists a possible event that verifies it (all the rav.ens in the box are seen to be black) and a possible event that falsifies it ( one of the ravens is seen to be nonblack). 6. For this reason, a strict logical positivist would argue that what I call perspectives are meaningless. I accept the basic positivist premise that a sentence is meaningful only if there is a criterion for distinguishing its truth from its falsehood. I do not accept the stricter premise that this criterion must be experimentally testable and hence finite.

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emunah is the assumption of a perspective, not the assent to a proposition. The fundamental proposition that the system of people and Torah is autonomous is a perspective that circumscribes the range.of possible courses of events in the limit but is compatible with any course of events in the finite run. It is a means of framing our experiences of events, not of predicting events. If we interpret the fundamental proposition positing the inevitability of Mashiach too strictly by stating that Mashiach will arrive by date X, the proposition is falsifiable. If we interpret it too weakly by stating that Mashiach will eventually arrive and that will be that, it is verifiable. The only interpretation rendering the belief in Mashiach a perspective is the one affim1ing that the Messianic process will continue to unfold ad infinitum. 1 I have argued that the content of emunah is the single proposition that Halakhah and the practitioners of Halakhah constitute an autonomous system. But this proposition is "merely" a perspective, neither verifiable nor falsifiable. Have I philosophized emunah right out of existence? Not exactly. In the sense that a perspective yields no testable predictions, it is content-free. Nevertheless) assuming a perspective is not meaningless; indeed it means everything. 8 7. The status of this proposition as a perspective is unhar1ncd by adding the words "including, though not exclusive to, the coronation of a human Messianic king". 8. Perhaps contrary to prevailing wisdom, the fewer assertions we demand assent to, the better. The more potentially falsifiable content one as.sociates withernunah, the more fragile is one's religious commitment. For example, to predicate a commitment to Halakhah on the assertion that the modern theory of geology is largely false amounts to weakening the commitment, not strengthening it. Consider the viability of aversion of Judaism that stands or falls on, say, the belief that the world is flat. It is, of course, natural that people seek to strengthen their commitment by proving that some religious-sounding proposition is true. This can sometimes develop in bizarre directions, as with the currently in-vo~e trend of discovering special properties adhering to the letter sequence of the Written Torah. It is unclear exactly what the existence of these properties proves beyond the (important) claim that the Torah is Something Special. In any event, since the a priori probability of these properties actually holding is vanishingly small compared to the probability of methodological flaws, cynics may be forgiven for drawing different conclusions. .

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Ends of Halakhah

BELIEVING IN AUTONOMY AND BEING AUTONOMOUS

To assume the perspective that there is an infinite unfolding process involving Torah and man, it is necessary and sufficient to live autonomously according to the Torah. People who do not autonomously live the Torah, who are not fluent in Torah, who have not merged their souls with the Torah, cannot imagine this process of unfolding. In order to feel it, to adopt the perspective of unfolding, one must simply live it. Living autonomously according to Torah is a necessary condition for maintaining correct emunah, that is, perspective. But this way of living is also a sufficient condition; living autonomously according to Torah allows o~e ipso facto to recognize the possibility of living· autonomously according to Torah. Thus to have proper emunah it is both necessary and sufficient to be fluent with Torah, to live autonomously according to the Torah, to merge one's soul with the Torah. There is thus complete identity of emunah, of faith in the possibility of living Torah autonomously, with actually doing so. The Torah does not demand assent to a set of propositions; it demands that we assume that perspective inherent in the autonomous perfon11ance of mitzvot. In this sense, autonomy (C''n) and faith (.tJicM) are identical. R. Simlai expounded: 613 mitzvot were given to Moshe-365 negative commandments, like the number of days in the solar year, and 248 positive commandments, like the number of organs in the human body .... David came and founded these (613) on eleven [fundamental principles] .... Isaiah came and founded them on six [fundamental principles] .... Habakkuk came and founded them on a single [fundamental principle] as it is written, "[A]nd the righteous man is autonomous through faith (;rrr ,ru,c~ P"~)" (Habakkuk 2:4). (Makkot 24a)

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THE STATE OF

TODAY

The redemption of Israel is compared to four things: to harvest, to vine-cutting, to spices and to a woman bearing a child. To a harvest: if a field is reaped before its time, even its straw is no good, but if in its proper time all its yield is good. To vine-cutting: when the vineyard is gathered before its time, even the vinegar made from it is not good, but if gathered in its time, its vinegar is also good. To spices: if spices are gathered when they are moist and soft, they do not give off scent, but if gathered when they are dry, they give off scent. To a woman bearing a child: if the woman gives · birth before the time, the child does not live, but if at the right time, the child lives. R. Aha said in the name of R. Yehoshua b. Levi: "I the Lord will hasten it in its time" (Isaiah 60:22). If you are not worthy, [redemption] will occur at its due time; if you are worthy, I will hasten it. -Epilogue to Midrash Shir HaShirim 129 Digitized by

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Ends of Halakhah .

1. HEALTHY AND SICK SOCIETIES THE ILLS Of SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

Let us consider some of the sociological consequences of the claims made in this book. We wish to achieve the unself-conscious practice of Halakhah. Ideally, a community should be so fluent in Halakhah that its members know what is right and wrong unself-consciously. Such an ideal state can be achieved only through prophecy; indeed, this state is tantamount to prophecy. Jewish society sometimes has more healthy intuition for Halakhah and sometimes less: Jewish history is in this sense cyclical. There are periods when Halakhah develops in an intuitive way, and there are periods of breakdown, which the Talmud refers to as "the Torah is forgotten by Israel" ("'--iurc ;n,n itn:n7J). Then there are attempts to remedy those breakdowns by for1nalizing Halakhah (it::,',itit ,,o''). Halakhah goes through phases of being forgotten and then reestablished. A period in which "the Torah is forgotten by Israel" is typically a transitional period following a cataclysmic event, when the old models do not work in a natural way anymore. People have the nagging sense that the old model is not perfectly suited to the new situation, and self-consciousness increases. Self-consciousness never disappears in the absence of prophecy, but there is more or less of it, depending on circumstances. The less that collective intuition for Halakhah exists, the more it is necessary to build models for Halakhah. But since Halakhah is by its very essence not modelable, model building is necessarily only approximate. When we approach Halakhah in a self-conscious manner, we are inevitably not going to capture its totality perfectly. The very essence of a nonmodelable phenome~on is its infinite sophistication: its structure cannot be pinned down. Inevitably we either lose some structure by missing patterns that are larger than our view allows or impose apparent structure that is in fact merely accidental. In either

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case, the lack of an intuitive grasp of Halakhah leads to underestimating its sophistication. CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM

It is not true that some people see too much structure in Halakhah and others see too little: most people understand that structure must be balanced with nonstructure. But in the absence of perfect Halakhic intuition, people are forced to choose between the liberal and conservative approaches, identified with R. Yehoshua and R. Eliezer respectively (Chap. 6, Sec. 3). Some may choose to overgeneralize the data, to preserve with great fidelity any local patterns in existing Halakhah, possibly at the expense of a sense of rightness not already implicit in the existing H~lakhah. Alternatively, some may choose to underfit the data, to consider only the large patterns, and to ignore those that seem too inconsequential to be meaningful. These two approaches cannot be reconciled: either we assume a distant perspective, see the forest but miss the trees, or we assume a narrower perspective, see the trees but miss the forest. In necessarily choosing to view Halakhah from . far or from· near, we inevitably miss something. There will always be those who look at Halakhah and see structure only in the details. They may say, "The big, broad perspective is not our problem. We can let the Master of the Universe worry about that. What we have to do is to focus our attention on the microscopic level, on the details of Halakhah. We deal with the fine-tuning, but the big picture is not our problem." And there will always be others who may say, "Let's look at the grand sweep, at what Halakhah is really all about. What is essential, not merely accidental or marginal? There we should focus our attention." Most people take a position somewhere in the middle, but only a prophet is able to maintain both perspectives simultaneously, to fully appreciate both the details and the grand sweep.

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Ends of Halakhah

2. WHERE ARE WE NOW? THE CURRENT DICHOTOMY

The present is a period of poor Halakhic intuition, in which "the Torah is forgotten by Israel":. the Holocaust, the establishment of the state of Israel, the rapid development of technology, rampant secularization, and other considerations have created a radically new situation. After cataclysmic changes, when the internalized approaches no longer work, there is typically a growth of self-consciousness along with greater polarization. 1 Today this polarization is manifested in a number of.parameters distinguishing the poles of a spectrum ranging across different segments of the Torah-observant community: for example, Zionism, historical or scientific approach to Jewish texts, openness toward secular culture, emphasis on universal aspects of Halakhah, tolerance for minor deviation within Halakhah by individuals or various subgroups. All of the differences concerning these issues can be understood as manifestations of the single fundamental dichotomy between the conservative and liberal views. Consider the issue of Zionism. According to a conservative approach we should not engage in futile speculation about future events and where we are situated in the redemptive process. Even if we wish to speculate about such matters, such speculation should not play any role in practical decision making. If God wants Mashiach to come now, He can take care of that without our political involvement. In contrast, according to a liberal approach we think the State of Israel is part of the redemptive process, and consequently we want to participate in its development. We choose our goals in accordance with our sense of where history is going and why. l . This self-conscious relationship with Halakhah may be contrasted with what Haym Soloveitchik calls ..mimetic" Halakhah. See H. Soloveitchik, "Rupture and Reconstruction: The Transfon11ation of Contemporary Orthodoxy," Tradition28,4 (1995): 6'1 130.

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The State of Halakhah Today

With regard to historical study ofJewish texts, a liberal view would consider a text within its historical and social context so that the invariants can be distinguished from the transient and peripheral, perhaps functions of social conditions or ideology. The conservative view would collapse the time element and assert that Halakhah simply is what it is. Preoccupation with the development of Halakhah misses the point. As to the issue of secular culture, the liberal perspective is that general enlightenment is both a prerequisite for and a consequence of the study of Torah and hence the Torah mandates that such enlightenment be sought using all available tools. On the other hand, the conservative perspective is that the Torah defines enlightenment and hence anything that is not Torah in the strict sense merely compromises it. In reference to universal values, a conservative instinctively feels that greater emphasis needs to be placed on those aspects of Halakhah that are particularist, that set Jews apart from non-Jews. Excessive emphasis on those aspects of Torah that are merely manifestations of universal values may lead to the unwitting dilution of Torah by those values. Conversely, a liberal feels that precisely those aspects of Torah that are universally significant should be the primary focus of attention. After all, if Torah is a vehicle for achieving righteousness, then those ritualistic aspects of Torah that appear to be arbitrary are merely one possible means of achieving a broader objective. Hence a certain degree of flexibility can scarcely be expected to incur any real cost in currency that counts. Concerning individual self-expression (or deviation) within Halakhah, the difference between the liberal and conservative approaches focuses on the extent to which Halakhah must speak to the individual's sensibilities. The liberal regards a person's ethical sensibilities as one of the deter1r1ining factors in the definition of Halakhah. The conservative holds that the Shulhan Arukh must define one's sensibilities and not vice versa. In sum, the issues that distinguish these two distinct approaches are manifestations of the dichotomy between focusing on the forest

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and focusing on the trees. So long as there is no prophecy and hence no ideal perspective, people must choose one approach or the other. GETTING CARRIED AWAY

Although an ideal perspective is unattainable, it is important to avoid the consequences of adherence to either extreme position. In particular, the liberal view taken to an extreme runs the danger of imposing external values on Halakhah. A definite idea of the good, be it political correctness, nationalism, self-expression or whatever, forces the Torah into a straitjacket. To the extent that forr11alized Halakhah is not consistent with a given view of what is right, such a person must find loopholes or alter the Torah. Halakhah then tends to lose its distinctive character: the features making Halakhah distinct from other approaches and systems are deemphasized, comers get rounded, rough edges smoothed, and details made fuzzy. Halakhah is put into a neat, presentable package. A parallel danger arises from an overly conservative view. Those who see Halakhah only on the local level are threatened by universal values: they must emphasize avoiding the watering down of Halakhah as it becomes universalized. This view leads to cynicism: people convinced that their sense of rightness is leading them astray, that this sense is an obstacle to be overcome so that they can do what the Shulhan Arukh says without invoking other values, become cynical, distrusting themselves. They have lost their internal compass, their sense of what to do and what not to do. They must seek gurus and may even feel guilty about sometimes thinking that they know the right thing to do. Ultimately believing themselves not perrnitted to think, they approach Halakhah by overemphasizing details cut loose from even the principles that originally generated them. 2

2. In the atmosphere of this approach, a reference to a three-volume work on the laws of kippot can be made (and taken) only half in jest.

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3. PROGNOSIS: THE DEATH OF IDEOLOGY MESSIANISM AS CRISIS OF

f AITH

The most salient feature common to current manifestations of the two approaches to Halakhah outlined above,-,a feature more significant than all that distinguishes them-is the recent tendency of both to harden into consciously articulated ideological positions. The shared self-consciousness of these positions is highlighted by a very significant shared trend: Messianism. Earlier we defined faith as living with the Torah in an unself-conscious way, with a sense of the process. When there is a loss of confidence in this process, a crisis of faith, the concomitant loss of patience leads in tum to Messianism; people are too impatient to allow the process to unfold at its own pace. This tendency toward Messianism has been pronounced across the spectrum of the Torah-observant community. Perhaps the three most aggressive ideological movements within this community over the past several decades have been Gush Emunim, Habad, and the Yeshiva world. Each is in some way Messianic: Gush Emunim emphasizes the Messianic aspect of the redemption of the land of Israel, Habad the role of the Rebbe as Mashiach. Many elements in the Yeshiva world, while ostensibly rejecting Messianism as espoused by Habad and Gush Emunim, simply act as if Mashiach were already here; everyone is entitled, indeed obligated, to sit and learn indefinitely "each man under his vine", in what may be thought of collectively as a kind of Malthusian kollel. This Messianism is not a resurgence but a crisis of faith. In each case the Messianic aspect is overemphasized precisely because the old models do not work and people are overly self-conscious, unconfident about the unfolding process. Part of the nature of such Messianic movements is their inevitable failure: one cannot jump ahead. Indeed the degree of simultaneity with which these Messianic movements have begun to deteriorate, for reasons political, biographical, and economic, is astonishing. I believe this failure to be a harbinger of a

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generally emerging failure of ideology. Although the tendencies toward liberal and conservative positions are natural and unavoidable, the ideologies sanctifying these tendencies inexorably spiral toward their respective logical extremes, which must inevitably collapse. A HAPPY ENDING

Ironically, the very failure of ideologies, and in particular of Messianic movements, brings in its wake true progress toward Mashiach. Although attended by trauma and chaos, these failures unleash a vast reservoir of stifled creative forces. After all, the autonomy of the Jewish people and its Torah remains intact even when temporarily unrealized, bottled up in one model or another. Is it unrealistic to believe, then, that we stand on the brink of a period of enorr11ous creativity directed toward the translation ofJewish political autonomy into Jewish cultural autonomy? In. the final analysis, this cultural autonomy will be given its highest expression not in the writing of yet more books, but rather in the everyday life of a people returned to its ancestral homeland, living its own culture as naturally and unselfconsciously as it speaks its own language. The making of many books is without limit and much study is a wearying of the flesh. The sum of the matter, when all is said and done: Fear God and observe His commandments for this is the totality of man (Ecclesiastes 12:12-13).

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APPENDIX

This appendix includes the Hebrew original of each citation in the text which was translated from Hebrew. The number in parentheses before each citation is the page in the text on which the translation first appears.

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Appendix

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Appendix

llnl' 0,1:, ,n,, ,,n,n ,nnyn n,,n ,n, 'lN 1N'il 01N inN, Nnw 111:i o,wynn ,:, ll1N ,~n 11>'.lN inN 0)1~ µn) inN ,-N - ,,nN ilYl1rJ

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Appendix

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Appendix

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INDEX •

Abstinence, 114-115 Adam and Eve, autonomy of, 107, 109-110 Akiva, R., 48 Torah of, 7-8 Anshei Knesset ha-Gedolah (Men of the Great Assembly), 62 Anxiety, and choices, 108-109 Artificial intelligence, and modelability, 28-30 Autonomy, 134 and evolution of Halakhah, 88, 116-117 of individuals, 105-112 means of achieving, 111-112, 115-117, 120-125

problem of, 11-13, 15-32, 3439 of Torah and Jewish people, 118, 120,122-124 Axioms and theorems, 8, 13, 34 Babylon, and restoration of Torah, 60 Ben Azzai, on mitzvot, 121-122 Characterization, and autonomy, 12-13 Choices, and autonomy of individuals, 106-107 Church's thesis, 27-29 Cleanness, ritual, 115 155 Original from

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

Index

156 Cognitive processes, and modelability, 28-32 Community, Jewish, 118, 120 polarization within, 132-134 relation to Halakhah, 40, 130136 separateness of, 46-4 7 Complexity, 38-39 and intuition, 31, 68 and liberalism vs. conservatism, 76, 78 of patterns, 17-19, 25 Computability, 27-28, 106 and cognitive processes, 28-32 and modelability of patterns, 23-24,26 Computational modes, vs. intuitive, 13, 79-87, 106 Conservatism. See Liberalism Conventionalists, vs. realists, 35-37 Courts to settle halakhic disputes, 7475, 83-84, 98-100 Torah interpretations by, 65 Cultural autonomy,Jewish, 136 Culture. See Community, Jewish Custom. See Tradition Death and idolatry, 110-111 and ritual cleanness, 115

Derashot on novelty of Torah, 5-6 relation to laws, 66-68 Descriptions. See Minimal descriptions Determinism, 83

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Dialectics, and "forgotten laws," 49-53 Disputes, Halakhic, 82-90, 95-96 courts to decide, 98-102 Distinctions, minimizing, 86-87 Di vrei kabbalah, 98 Divrei soferim, 93 Economy. See also Minimal description minimizing distinctions, 86 Elazar b. Azaryah, R., 5-6 Elders. See Leadership, Jewish Eliezar, Rabbi, and Rabbi Yehoshua, 79-86 Elijah, Torah contradicted by, 54 Empathy, as principle of Torah, 114 Emunah (faith), 119-128 Entrenchment, and immutability, 93 Evolution ofHalakhah,88,102 ofTorah, 117-118, 121 Extrapolation, of laws, 82 from minimal descriptions, 74 vs. intuition, 79 Ezra, and formalization of Halakhah, 59-61 Faith (emunah), 119 and Messianism, 13 5-136 Falsification, and emunah (faith), 125-127 First principles, deriving details from, 13

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Index

•

"Forgotten laws," 97 restoration of, 49-53, 55-56 For,nalization, of Halakhah, 39-41, 48 by Anshei Knesset ha-Gedolah, 61 effects of, 73-75, 88, 130-131 by Hillel, 63-65 and liberalism vs. conservatism, 79 by Otniel, 50-54 and prophets, 52-53, 56 and restoration of "forgotten laws," 56, 61 vs. intuition, 76-77 Freedom. See also Autonomy and Torah, 111-112 Gamliel, Rabbi, 82-84, 11 7 Haggai, 55-56 Halakhah, 54, 64-65. See also For1r1alization; Torah and autonomy of individuals, 106-107,111-112 evolution of, 88-100 origins of, 3-9, 34-39, 61-62, 65-68, 94-96 purposes of, 9-11, 13, 113 relation to community, 130136 Hatzaddik, Shimon, and formalization of Halakhah, 59 Her1neneutic principles, 66-68 Hilhhot Mam rim (Maimonides), 99 Hillel, Rabbi, 57, 116 for111alization by, 66-68 vs. Shammai, 10, 73

157

Hypotheses, 128 and predictability, 21-2 4 verification of, 125-127 Identity, of individuals, 107-111 Idolatry, 113 Immutability of Halakhah, and entrenchment, 93-101 Incompleteness theorem, 26 Infinite strings, and modelability of patterns, 20-25 Inner voice, and autonomy of individuals, 107-111 Interpretations, Torah, 53, 100 multiple, 9, 61-62, 74, 84, 88 process for, 3 7-41, 5 7, 64-65 by prophets, 53-54 during Second Temple period, 59-61 of text vs. ideas, 60, 62-63, 65 Intuition, 117 and cognitive processes, 13, 3032 and evolution of Halakhah, 89, 91 in generation of Halakhah, 35, 37-41 of Oral Law vs. written Torah, 47-48 understanding Halakhah through, 120-122 vs. extrapolation, 79-80, 87 vs. formalization, 50-53, 76-77 vs. hermeneutic principles, 6465 Intuitive modes, vs. computational, 13, 79-83, 106

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158

Index

Jews. See Community, Jewish Joshua, 53 Judges. See also Courts interpretations by, 39 Justification, of Halakhah, 68 Knaz, Otniel hen, 49-54 Kohanim (judges), interpretations by,39 Language, 27-28 · as metaphor for Halakhah, 3 738,46-47, 116 Laws. See Halakhah Leadership,Jewish, 53, 60-61, 64-65 Liberalism, vs. conservatism, 7987, 131-134 Life, through Torah, 111-112 Logic, in Torah interpretation, 60 Maimonides ("Rambam"), 75, 124 on immutability, 98-105 on World to Come, 124 Majority opinions. See Voting, on Torah interpretations Malakhi, 55-56 Mashiach, 124, 128 · and Messianism,. 135-137 Messianism, 135-136 Meta-Halakhah or1gins of, 79-81 Rambam on, 94-96 on Torah as living system, 120122

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Minimal descriptions and extrapolation of laws, 7778, 82 of patterns, 17-25, 20-23 , 2728 Mishnah, 33-34, 61, 100 Maimonides on, 94, 96, 97, 98 Mitzvot, and rewards and punishments, 121-124 Modelability, 27-28, 32, 114-115 and artificial intelligence, 28-30 and autonomy of individuals, 106-111 and Halakhah, 34-41, 74-76, 91-92 of patterns, 22-25 Moshe, Rabbeinu, 48 mourning for, 49-50 Torah of, 7-8, 47-48 Nonmodelability, 118, 128. See also Modelability of Halakhah, 95-96, 134-136 of individuals, 110-111 of patterns, 25-27 Novelty, in Halakhah, 4-8, 80-81 and prophets, 5 7-60 "Ockham's Razor," 17, 86 Oral Law, and written Torah, 4548 Otniel hen Knaz, 49-54 Overfitting data, 38-39 and complications, 17, 80 and underfitting, 18-20 Overturning, of Halakhah, 100103

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Index Patterns descriptions of, 17-25 Halakhic, 76 Perspectives big picture vs. details, 131-133 and emunah, 126-130 Polarization, within Jewish community, 132-134 Predictability and autonomy, 15-17 and characterization, 12-13 and modelability, 17-25 Productive sets, and modelability of patterns, 26-2 7 Prophecy, end of, 59 Prophets intuition of, 57-60 perspectives of, 131-134 roles of, 59-60, 65 Propositions. See Hypotheses Punishment, and reward, 121-124 Rashi, and prophets, 60 Realists, vs. conventionalists, 35-37 Redemption, and conservatism vs. liberalism, 132 Restoration of "forgotten laws," 49-52, 5960 of Halakhah, 64 Rewards, and punishment, 121-12 4 Rightness, sense of, 76-77, 106107, 117 and conservatism vs. liberalism, 79-80, 131, 134 and evolution of Halakhah, 90, 91

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Scholars, 89 Anshei Knesset ha-Gedolah as, 62 interpretations by, 63-64 Torah study by, 76-77 vs. prophets, 53-54 School of Hillel, vs. Shammai, 73-76 Second Temple period, and restoration of Torah, 61 Second-order rules, 84-86 Se If-consciousness, about Halakhah, 38, 53-54, 130, 135 Shabbat, 114 Shammai, vs. Hillel, 10, 74-76 Shukhan Arukh (God's Code of Law),35-37,133, 134 Sinai, revelation at, 53 completeness of, 3-5, 65 of Oral and Written Law, 45-48 strength of laws from, 33-34, 93-100 Soferim, interpretation by, 63-66 Sophistication and complexity of patterns, 25 and evolution of Halakhah, 40, 91 Soul sickness, and autonomy of individuals, 107-111 Structure, balance of, 113-116, 130-131 Survival of the fittest, 88-92, 106 Talmud, 122 on halakhic disputes, 73, 75 on role of prophets, 52-55

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Index ·

160 Temporariness, of halakhic suspensions, 54 Theorems. See Axioms and theorems Torah, 6. See also Halakhah compared to Mishnah, 33-34 contradicted by prophets, 53-54 fluencyin,116-120,121,128 interpretations of, 7-8, 63-64 leading to freedom and life, 111116 as living system, 13-14, 118, 120-122,124,126-130 oral and written, 45-48 restoration of, 60 revelation of, 121. See also Sinai Tradition, 64 and evolution of Halakhah, 8586, 97 transmission of, 56, 61

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Transmission, of Halakhah, 59, 97-100 Truth, of propositions, 34, 12 5127 Verification, and emunah (faith), 125-127 Voting, on Torah interpretations, 74-75 and majority opinions, 84-85, 100 World to Come, rewards and punishments in, 122-124 Yehoshua, Rabbi, 79-87 Yosi b. Yeozer, 76-77 Zekhariah,55-56 Zionism, in conservatism vs. liberalism, 132

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Moshe Koppel is senior lecture in mathematics and computer science at Bar-Ilan University. Forrnerly a visiting member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, Dr. Koppel is the author of dozens of publications in theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence. He is also co-founder and co-editor of the journal Higayon: Studies in Rabbinic Logic. Dr. Koppel lives in Gush Etzion with his wife and three children.

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