Media, Ideology and Hegemony 9789004364417, 9789004357570, 9004364412

Citation preview

Media, Ideology and Hegemony

Studies in Critical Social Sciences Series Editor David Fasenfest (Wayne State University) Editorial Board Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (Duke University) Chris Chase-Dunn (University of California-Riverside) William Carroll (University of Victoria) Raewyn Connell (University of Sydney) Kimberle W. Crenshaw (University of California, la, and Columbia University) Raju Das (York University) Heidi Gottfried (Wayne State University) Karin Gottschall (University of Bremen) Alfredo Saad-Filho (University of London) Chizuko Ueno (University of Tokyo) Sylvia Walby (Lancaster University)

volume 122

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/scss

Media, Ideology and Hegemony Edited by

Savaş Çoban

leiden | boston

Cover illustration: ‘Lenin on the Wall’, photo and permission by Özlem Demircan. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Çoban, Savaş, editor. Title: Media, ideology and hegemony / edited by Savas Coban. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2018] | Series: Studies in critical social sciences, ISSN 1573-4234 ; volume 122 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018035504 (print) | LCCN 2018037846 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004364417 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004357570 (hardback : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Mass media--Political aspects. | Mass media--Social aspects. | Ideology. | Hegemony. Classification: LCC P95.8 (ebook) | LCC P95.8 .M3924 2018 (print) | DDC 302.23--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018035504

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 1573-4234 ISBN 978-90-04-35757-0 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-36441-7 (e-book) Copyright 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense and Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Preface  vii Vincent Mosco List of Maps  ix Notes on Contributors  x Introduction  1 Savaş Çoban 1

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony: Growing, Harvesting, and Marketing the Consuming Audience  4 Burton Lee Artz

2

The Return of Radical Humanism in Marxism and Anarchism? The Art of Refusal, Resistance and Humility  41 Nick Stevenson

3

The Culture of Capitalism  59 Arthur Asa Berger

4

Adorno on Ideology: Ideology Critique and Mass Consumerism  68 Thomas Klikauer

5

Hegemony, Ideology, Media  90 Savaş Çoban

6

Hegemony and the Media: A Culturally Materialist Narrative of Digital Labor in Contemporary Capitalism  107 Marco Briziarelli and Jeffrey Hoffmann

7

Distorted Knowledge and Repressive Power  125 Peter Ludes

8

Counter-Hegemony Narratives: Revolutionary Songs  143 Padmaja Shaw

9 The US Empire’s Cultural Industries, at War: Selling and Subverting the Ideology of Militarism  162 Tanner Mirrlees

vi 10

Contents

Donald Trump and the Politics of the Spectacle  183 Douglas Kellner

11 The US Media, State Legitimacy, and the New Cold War  198 Gerald Sussman 12

American Journalism’s Ideology: Why the “Liberal” Media is Fundamentalist  223 Robert Jensen

13

Media Activism from Above and Below: Lessons from the 1940s American Reform Movement 229 Victor Pickard

14

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production Code (1930–1966) in the Creation of Hegemony  248 Alfonso M. Rodríguez de Austria Giménez de Aragón

15

MH17 as Free-Floating Atrocity Propaganda  267 Oliver Boyd-Barrett

16

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function of Chinese Television: A New Model in a New Era?  299 Junhao Hong and Minghua Xu

Index  329

Preface It is my honor to write the preface to Savaş Çoban’s excellent collection on the media, ideology and hegemony. This book could not be more timely. The recent rise of authoritarian regimes presents many threats to democratic societies and to those who struggle for democracy. Although military and police coercion has played an important role, it is crucially important to understand that most of these regimes received the consent of a large segment of citizens. As a result, to understand this global political upheaval, it is essential to carefully examine the role of ideology and hegemony. Coercive force matters at great deal, but so too does consent. Each of the authors in this impressive collection takes up a different dimension of how consent, or the willing affirmation of a political system and its decision-making process, is social constructed today. Çoban has done an excellent job of framing the issue in his own contribution and also by selecting world-leading scholars to pursue it in great depth both theoretically and empirically. In today’s world, it is unmistakably the case that consent results in major part from media saturation campaigns that now make extensive use of digital technology. Specifically, social media sites like Facebook and Google vastly expand the power of propaganda, fake news, echo chambers, filter bubbles, ads customized to achieve the greatest emotional impact, and mass surveillance. Elites building regimes that aim for total control now have an unprecedented array of tools to influence citizens. The companies themselves admit that they helped deliver the U.S. presidential election to Donald Trump. Whatever, the political views of their top executives, businesses act to maximize profit and, on this point, they have achieved remarkable success. For the first time since records have been kept on the market value of private companies, the five largest in the world are all media and digital technology ­companies. In order of value, these include Apple, Alphabet (parent of Google), Microsoft, Amazon, and Facebook. Moreover, if we simply reverse the first two on the list, we have a list of the five most valuable brands on the planet. They have all profited by using digital tools to build monopolies over specific sectors of the media world. As a result, they enjoy the nearly unfettered ability to deliver audiences to advertisers eager to reach buyers and to provide essential tools to governments keen to control their citizens. These firms and others, like Twitter, are deeply complicit in the social construction of authoritarian regimes because it is financially and politically beneficial to do so. It was therefore no surprise, for example, when the Central Intelligence Agency signed a $600 million deal with the Cloud Computing division of Amazon for data storage and services.

viii

Preface

Media, Ideology and Hegemony contains the full range of topics that provide readers with opportunities to think critically about the new digital world. This includes work on old and new media, on the corporate power structure in communication and information technology, and on government use of media to control citizens. Demonstrating that the new world of media is a hotly contested terrain, the book also uncovers the contradictions inherent in the system of digital power and documents how citizens are using media and information technology to actively resist repressive power. Finally, the collection is solidly grounded in a critical theoretical foundation and respects the importance of a historical understanding. We are entering a new digital world marked by the convergence of technological systems like Cloud Computing, Big Data Analytics, and the Internet of Things. Plugged into a global grid of telecommunications networks, they are providing the foundation for what it is reasonable to call the Next Internet. While offering many opportunities to expand democracy, the Next Internet is currently used primarily to defeat democracy. This is largely because it is even more deeply dominated by the same handful of companies that rose to power in the original Internet. The Next Internet is also being shaped by the U.S. government, especially its military and intelligence apparatus, which operates a massive, worldwide surveillance system and launches weaponized drones that rain death on terrorists and innocent civilians alike. The only challenge the U.S. faces is from China where an entrenched authoritarian government offers citizens growing material prosperity in return for controlling their lives. Major changes are essential to reverse the deepening of both surveillance capitalism and the surveillance state. This book provides what Raymond ­Williams once called the “extra edge of consciousness” that is absolutely essential to create, both on and offline, a better, more open, more equitable, and more democratic world. Vincent Mosco Ottawa, Canada

Maps 8.1 8.2 8.3 11.1

Map of India 147 Telangana and Srikakulam 148 Red Corridor: Maoist insurgents in India, More bloody and defiant 151 Black Sea Region: Ukraine and Russian Borders 214

Notes on Contributors Alfonso M. Rodríguez de Austria Giménez de Aragón has a Degree in Philosophy, a Ph.D. in Social Communication (by the University of Seville) and a Postgraduate Certificate in Human Rights and Citizen Practices (Pablo de Olavide University). He is professor in the Postgraduate Certificate in Audiovisual Communication at the Central American U ­ niversity, Nicaragua (UCA), and belongs to IDECO: Researching Group in Political Communication, Ideology and Propaganda, which is affiliated to the University of Seville. Rodríguez de Austria Giménez de Aragón has published several papers in international scientific journals and participated in conferences in America and Europe. Burton Lee Artz (Ph. D., University of Iowa) is a former machinist and union steelworker, is Professor of Media Studies and co-Director of the Center for Global Studies at Purdue University Northwest. He has published ten books including Pink Tide: Media Access and Political Power in Latin America (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), Global Entertainment Media (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), The Media Globe (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), and Cultural Hegemony in the US (Sage, 2000), and has written dozens of book chapters and journal articles on international media, cultural hegemony, and democratic communication. Artz currently serves on the editorial board for Triple C: Communication, Capitalism & Critique and the conference organizing committee for the Union for Democratic Communications. Arthur Asa Berger (M.A., 1956) is Professor Emeritus of Broadcast and Electronic Communication Arts at San Francisco State University where he taught from 1965 to 2003. Berger has published more than 70 books on the mass media, popular culture, humor, tourism and everyday life. Among his books are Media Analysis Techniques 5/E (Sage, 2014), Media & Society: A Critical Perspective 3/E (Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), Seeing is Believing: An Introduction to Visual Communication 3/E (McGraw Hill, 2008), Ads, Fads and Consumer Culture: Advertising’s Impact on American Character and Society 2/E (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), M ­ edia and Communication Research Methods: An Introduction to Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 2/E (Sage, 2014), The Art of Comedy Writing (Transaction Publishers, 2007), Shop ‘Til You Drop: Consumer Behavior and ­American Culture (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), and Vietnam Tourism (Haworth ­Hospitality Press, 2005).

Notes on Contributors

xi

Oliver Boyd-Barrett joined the School of Communication Studies as Director in 2005, a position he held for three years before deciding to return to faculty in the Department of Journalism. His current research interests include international and national news agencies, news media and the ‘war on terror’, and Hollywood representations of the intelligence community. He was previously Professor of Communication at California State Polytechnic University in Pomona, C ­ alifornia, and has held various appointments at universities in the United Kingdom. Boyd-Barrett has published extensively on educational and management ­communications, international news media, and the political economy of mass communication. He is founding chair of the division for Global Communication and Social Change in the International Communication Association. Marco Briziarelli studies critical approaches to media and communication theory, especially as these fields intersect with broader issues in political and social theory, intellectual and cultural history. Briziarelli is also interested in media and social movements and critical conceptualization of digital labor. His work has appeared in Communciation and Critical/Cultural Studies, Critical Studies in M ­ edia Communication, Triple C, Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, J­ ournalism, Handbook on Global Media and Communication Policy (edited by Robin Mansell and Marc Raboy, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). He is the author of The Red Brigades and the Discourse of Violence: Revolution and Restoration (Routledge, 2014), and the recently published Reviving Gramsci: Crisis, Communication, and Change (Routledge, 2016). Savaş Çoban is an independent researcher. His university education focused on English Teaching. His MSc. degree dealt with Turkish as a Foreign Language. For his Ph.D. he studied Radio-TV. His publications include Azınlıklar ve Dil (Su Publishing, 2005), Hegemonya Aracı ve İdeolojik Aygıt Olarak Medya (Parşomen Publishing, 2013), Media’s Role in the Socialist Era (Amani International ­Publishers, 2013), Azınlıklar, Ötekiler ve Medya (Ayrıntı Publishing, 2014), and İktidar ve Medya (Evrensel Publishing, 2014), Media and Left (Brill Publishing, 2014 / Haymarket Publishing, 2016), Direnişten Komüne Gezi (Siyah Beyaz Publishing, 2015). İnternet ve Sokak (Ayrıntı Publishing, 2015), Haber Okumaları (İletişim Publishing, 2016), Medya ve Sol (Sel Publishing, 2017). Jeffrey Hoffmann studies interpretive and critical approaches to communication, culture, and environment. He is particularly interested in present and historical social and

xii

Notes on Contributors

environmental movements and how they relate to urban social-ecological transformation in urban environments. In taking a cultural-materialist approach, Hoffman studies the ways in which specific political ecologies and cultural ways of relating to and acting in the more-than-human world are felt, understood, and activated in social and environmental movements aimed at transforming the material conditions of production in and of cities. He also studies climate change communication, and is working on his Ph.D. in Intercultural Communication at the University of New Mexico. Junhao Hong is a professor in the Department of Communication at the State University of New York at Buffalo, U.S.A. He is also an Associate in Research at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. He obtained a Ph.D. in communication from University of Texas at Austin, U.S.A., in 1995. His research areas include international communication and international politics, media and society, and the impact of new media and information technology. His publication includes several authored/edited books, dozens of research papers and dozens of book chapters. He serves as an editorial member of a number of referred international journals and academic publishers. Robert Jensen is a professor in the School of Journalism at the University of Texas at Austin and a board member of the Third Coast Activist Resource Center in Austin and the national group, Culture Reframed. He is the author of The End of Patriarchy: Radical Feminism for Men (Spinifex Press, 2017). Jensen’s other books include Plain Radical: Living, Loving, and Learning to Leave the Planet Gracefully (Counterpoint/Soft Skull, 2015); Arguing for Our Lives: A User’s Guide to Constructive Dialogue (City Lights, 2013); All My Bones Shake: Seeking a Progressive Path to the Prophetic Voice, (Soft Skull Press, 2009); Getting Off: Pornography and the End of Masculinity (South End Press, 2007); The Heart of Whiteness: Confronting Race, Racism and White Privilege (City Lights, 2005); Citizens of the Empire: The Struggle to Claim Our Humanity (City Lights, 2004); and Writing Dissent: Taking Radical Ideas from the Margins to the Mainstream (Peter Lang, 2002). Douglas Kellner is George Kellner Chair in the Philosophy of Education at the University of ­California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and is author of many books on social theory, politics, history, and culture, including Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology of Contemporary Hollywood Film, co-authored with Michael Ryan (Indiana University Press, 1988); Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity (Johns ­Hopkins

Notes on Contributors

xiii

University Press, 1989; Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to ­Postmodernism and Beyond (Stanford University Press, 1989); works in social theory and cultural studies such as Media Culture (Taylor & Francis, 1994) and Media Spectacle (Taylor & Francis, 2002); a trilogy of books on postmodern theory with Steve Best; and a trilogy of books on the media and the Bush administration, encompassing Grand Theft 2000 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), From 9/11 to Terror War (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), and Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy (Routledge, 2015). He is the author of Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of M ­ arxism (University of California Press, 1984), and has edited collected papers of Herbert Marcuse, six volumes of which have appeared with Routledge. With Meenakshi Gigi Durham, Kellner had co-edited Media and Cultural Studies. KeyWorks (Wiley-Blackwell, first edition, 2005; second edition 2012), and with Rhonda Hammer, Kellner has co-edited Media/Cultural Studies: Critical Approaches (Peter Lang Publishing, 2009). Kellner’s Cinema Wars: Hollywood Film and Politics in the Bush/Cheney Era was published in 2010 by Wiley-Blackwell, and Media Spectacle and Insurrection, 2011: From the Arab Uprisings to Occupy Everywhere was published by Continuum/Bloomsbury in 2012. Kellner’s latest books are American Nightmare: Donald Trump, Media Spectacle, and Authoritarian Populism (Sense Publishers, 2016) and The American Horror Show: Election 2016 and the Ascendency of Donald J. Trump (Springer, 2016). His website is at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/kellner.html which contains several of his books and many articles. Thomas Klikauer was born in Germany, between Karl Marx’s birthplace to the west, Adorno’s house to the north and Einstein’s place to the south. From his birthplace, he saw Castle Frankenstein and Johannes Gutenberg’s house. Klikauer now lives in ­Sydney (Australia) where he teaches MBAs at the Sydney Graduate School of Management of Western Sydney University. His books on communication include Communication and Management at Work (2007) and ­Management Communication – Communicative Ethics and Action (2008). His book ­Managerialism – A Critique of An Ideology (2013) remains his personal favorite (all published by Palgrave, UK). Currently, he is writing on a book about Media Capitalism. Peter Ludes was Professor of Mass Communication at Jacobs University Bremen ­(2002–2017). He is Adjunct Professor Emeritus of Culture and Media Sciences, Siegen University and founder of the German Initiative on News Enlightenment (1997) at the University of Siegen, which publishes the most neglected German news (Project Censored, Germany). His recent publications include: “Updating

xiv

Notes on Contributors

Marx’s Concept of Alternatives”, in Christian Fuchs and Vincent Mosco (Eds.), Marx and the Political Economy of the Media, Leiden and ­Boston (Brill, 2016, pp. 338–361); “Long-Term Power Presentation Shifts: From Key A ­ udio-Visual Narratives to an Update of Elias’s Theory on the Process of Civilisation”, in: Birgit Mersmann and Hans G. Kippenberg (Eds.), The Humanities between Global Integration and Cultural Diversity (De Gruyter, 2016, pp. ­188–210); “State-transformations and Habitus-Shifts”(Staatenumbildungen und ­Habitus-Umbrüche), in: Erik Jentges (Ed.), Das Staatsverständnis von Norbert Elias (Nomos, 2017, pp. 177–195), and “The Internet of Distorted Perceptions and Detached Enlightenment” (Das Internet der verzerrten Wahrnehmungen und abgeklärte Aufklärung), in Hektor Haarkötter and Joerg-Uwe Nieland (Eds.), Nachrichten und Aufklärung. Medien- und Journalismuskritik heute: 20 Jahre Initiative Nachrichtenaufklärung (Springer, pp. 17–37). Tanner Mirrlees is the Director of the Communication and Digital Media Studies program at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT). His recent research examines the US Empire, militarism and war propaganda. He is the author of Global Entertainment Media: Between Cultural Imperialism and Cultural Globalization (Routledge, 2013), Hearts and Mines: The US Empire’s Culture Industry (University of British Columbia Press, 2016) and the co-editor of The Television Reader (Oxford University Press, 2013). Mirrlees’ writing on militarism, war and media-culture has appeared in scholarly and popular venues. Victor Pikard is an associate professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication. His research on the history and political economy of media has been published in numerous scholarly articles and anthologies, and he has authored or edited four books, including America’s Battle for Media Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Media Activism in the Digital Age (with Guobin Yang) (Routledge, 2017); The Future of Internet Policy (with Peter Decherney) (Routledge, 2018); and Will the Last Reporter Please Turn Out the Lights (with Robert McChesney) (The New Press, 2011). Padmaja Shaw graduated with a M.A. degree in Journalism from Osmania University, India, and a M.A. in Telecommunications from Michigan State University, U.S.A. She completed a Ph.D. in Development Studies and has retired from the Department of Communication and Journalism, Osmania University, India, after teaching there since 1988. She has two tracks of interest: Broadcast ­production

Notes on Contributors

xv

and political economy of communication. She contributes regularly to a media watch website, thehoot.org, and writes a regular column in an English-language daily newspaper, The New Indian Express. Nick Stevenson is currently a Reader in Cultural Sociology at the University of Nottingham. He has recently published a book called Human Rights and the Reinvention of Freedom with Routledge (2017). He is currently working on a series of papers and articles which look at the New Left, Marxism and the development of the alter-globalization movement. Gerald Sussman is Professor of Urban Studies and International and Global Studies at Portland State University. He is the author or editor of six books, including Branding Democracy: US Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe (Peter Lang, 2010) and Global Electioneering: Campaign Consulting, Communications, and Corporate Financing (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). Sussman is an editor at Palgrave Macmillan on the Global Media Policy and Business book series. Minghua Xu is an Associate Professor in the School of Journalism and Information Communication, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, China. She holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. degree from the National University of Singapore. Her research focuses on international communication, cross-cultural communication, media sociology, and new media technology. She is the author of several Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) and Science Citation Index (SCI) articles, media news report, and some articles in China’s top journal. She is also the principle investigator of more than ten research projects supported by China’s National Social Sciences Fund and Ministry of Education Fund. In addition, she serves as an editorial member of Telematics and Informatics and the regional director of the Chinese Communication Association.

Introduction Savaş Çoban The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. marx, 2004: 64

Lenin had known the importance of the media for quite a long time, and argued that it should be presented to the public as an effective political institution, and put to work for recruiting masses. Thus, he briefly states: “Unless we train strong political organizations in the localities, even an excellently organized all-Russia newspaper will be of no avail. This is incontrovertible. But the whole point is that there is no other way of training strong political organizations except through the medium of an all-Russia newspaper.” (Lenin, 2008: 102–103) Meanwhile, the paper, whose main purpose was political agitation and propaganda, had to address the whole nation. “In our time, when Social-Democratic tasks are being degraded, the only way “live political work“ can be begun is with live political agitation, which is impossible unless we have an all-Russia newspaper, frequently issued and regularly distributed. (Lenin, 2008: 104) Lenin believed that an All-Russia newspaper would eventually provide an ideological bond between the members, and be an agent to bring the local independent structures under the roof of the party. Thus, the idea of the journal would in fact be paving the way to make the party both ideologically and organizationally a central structure. Therefore, a newspaper was one that was vital to revolution. Gramsci, with his writings on the term “hegemony,” goes one step further, and emphasizes its semantic significance. His definition of hegemony implies its establishment by consenting submission of the ruled class. ­Hegemony, which isn’t always coercive, would mainly understood as a cultural and ­ideological

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_002

2

Çoban

power, one which works on the basis of the values of bourgeoisie. The term hegemony is attributed to Gramsci in political literature, and perceived to exist not only at the state level but also within the layers of society. Gramsci’s works on hegemony and defining the media’s role within this context were important progresses. He, who put forward the notion that hegemony can not only by coercion but also obtained through public consent, brought another perspective to the subject by putting a spotlight on how newspapers are used to aggravate public opinion. Althusser identified the “Ideological State Apparatus” as the method by which organizations propagate ideology. This contrasts with the Repressive State Apparatus (rsa), by which compliance can be forced and includes the army, police. Ideological State Apparatuses include those used in religion, law, politics, trade unions, media and the family. The relationship between media and propaganda would follow the path as Goebbels started and work for the leaders in controlling masses. In this respect, we can say the methods of Nazism are widely used even after its death. Even we don’t see or hear it, Goebbels is always on our tv channels, newspapers and social media everyday. Media, as a socialization device, is one of the most important tools for creating public consent. Capitalist state controls mass media as well as the economy and all other coercive devices. The guardians of the regime, who always look for new approaches in order to keep public comfortable while controlling them for their very existence, would also use media for this purpose along with the institution of family and educational system. Families are undeniable structures for nursing status-quo, but definitely insufficient by itself. For this reason, all the inputs and outputs in all educational, cultural and social ecologies that surrounds public are in full control; and any individual or group that poses threat to their existence gets filtered from society. Although some virtual freedoms for critics of system and protests are allowed, behind the curtain, it is targeted to prevent them from moving underground and becoming a stronger threat. Media is perceived by an average person to be means of getting information. Also, we are aware of the fact that media and power relationship becoming important factor. In capitalist countries, media is in the control of capitalist powers, and information conveys more of a desired virtuality than of reality itself. Therefore, information presents lies as truth and this information run through medial channels into the public minds. This results into a society where all real problems are covered and what is normal turns into problems. The capitalist mode of production, in this respect, bases itself both economical and ideological exploitation in its reach.

Introduction

3

Capitalists present their ideology everyday in different forms through media outlets. With rediscovery of ideology in the works of media, the concept of power reappeared and construction of truth attracted more skeptical approach (Stevenson, 2008: 69). Although the triangle of Media-ideology-power is questioned by intellectuals and revolutionaries and these groups tries to uncover the truth for public, the hegemony of ideology shows it’s magnitude and manages to make public to turn a blind eye to these critics and even confront them. Capitalism uses media to set up its hegemony and to mend its cracks which can be formed due to hegemony, to make its ideology absorbed and reproduced. Bourgeoisie, not only does it form the conscious of the society via media; television, newspapers and especially social media but also keeps it under control. Hegemony and the ideology are not flexible concepts, yet they do their jobs in terms of maintaining the dominance of the government on and in the social field through the process of regenerating themselves continually. In this respect, media stands in a more important position which carries and spreads the discourse of ideology and hegemony of the government than before. Bibliography Lenin, V.I. (2008) What Is to be Done ? Marxists Internet Archive. Marx, K. and F. Engels (2004) The German Ideology, USA: International Publishers. Stevenson, Nick (2008) Medya Kültürleri, Istanbul: Ütopya Publishers.

Chapter 1

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony: Growing, Harvesting, and Marketing the Consuming Audience Burton Lee Artz Global media practices result from the structured relations of production. The content of global entertainment generally expresses and reproduces the social relations of production for those structured hierarchies of decision-making. Those structures now include a transnational division of labor based on access to the means of production. To fully understand global culture, we must understand those social relations, particularly the power relations, which mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of media (Mosco, 2009: 25), because those relations and practices frame the content of global media programming. Social relations are not analytical abstractions. Social relations include the labor process necessary for production, the social hierarchy in decision and implementation of production, the means by which labor is recruited to participate in the production process, the contribution of creative workers to media production, the organization of consent by labor for an unequal social system, the complementary process of involving labor in the production process as consumers, and as audience commodities, and the symbolic production of meaning through media content. The production of meaning within a dominant culture potentially builds consent for the existing social relations. Each of these components contributes to functioning of the political economy of global media. Political economy in practice affects several aspects of social and culture life. Per Peter Golding and Graham Murdoch (1991) there are three areas that political economy reveals its influence (p. 22). First, the structure of media production under capitalism frames and limits the possible range and social terms of media consumption. Secondly, the programming—its images, narratives, and representations—roughly conform to the structure and its material relations of production: commercial media broadcast entertainment to attract audiences; religious media broadcast entertainment for uplifting souls; public media broadcast entertainment for edification and education. Finally, because political economy is concerned with the “totality of society” (Fornäs, 2013: 12)

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_003

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

5

media production must be investigated for its contribution to the material and cultural inequality of the broader society. Some media are unavailable to individuals and groups with inadequate resources for purchasing the necessary hardware to access the media content, e.g. home computers, wireless connections, Internet service, cable service, and pay-per-view TV require significant amounts of money. In keeping with other investigations (Artz, 2003; Butsch, 2003; CooperChen, 2005; Miller, Gobil, MacMurria, Maxwell, & Wang, 2005; Havens, 2006), transnational media organizational structures and norms are found to all but guarantee uniform practices across companies and uniform formats of entertainment, with creativity restricted to content diversity. Structures of ownership, financing, and regulation organize production norms and practices that create content that social groups interpret and use to reinforce or challenge the existing social relations of production. In shorthand form: ownership~> programming~> social use. This formulaic representation indicates relations and influences, more than strict determinations. Ownership does not simply dictate norms; social relations among groups inform and organize practices. Capitalist owners, corporate managers, production supervisors, writers and creative workers, technical professionals and more all have differential effects on the production process relative to their social position and the relations of power that have been lost or won in previous negotiations for control (Therborn, 2008). Connections between ownership, production, content, and cultural activity appear continually in all global media programming. This contribution can only begin to demonstrate those relations with a handful of illustrative examples. A wide range of media genre exhibit predominant formats and themes: the relations between ownership and professional practices consistently p ­ arallel content that underwrites transnational media corporation (tnmc) marketing goals, anticipates profits from media products and audiences sold as commodities, and provides a fertile culture for advertising other consumer goods. Television and movie genre are not selected by tnmcs for their cultural creativity, but for their expected capacity for attracting audiences and advertisers ­relative to their production costs, restrictions that express and parallel their ideological function of promoting consumerism and spectatorship. As David Marx (2012) outlines in his appraisal of the Japanese cultural market, the industrial organi­ zation of media directly impacts the dominant style of performance and artis­ tic creation. The concentrated capitalist relations of production reserve power for executives who create performers from zero, coordinate all artistic production by all employees, plan long-term marketing, and control all ­media ­content related to the teen idol (p. 36). Havens (2006) discerned similar structural

6

Artz

­influences on media distribution: media buyers exhibited a shared occupational screen, an insular business culture, and a bias in favor of established transnational media producers (p. 160). Richard Butsch’s fifty-year study of ­working class images on U.S. television found that network structures, economic ­imperatives, and the closed culture of network media creators produced negative images of male working class characters couched in an affluent consumerist ideology. The intimate connections between ownership structures and ­programming practices that lead to particular media content appear in global telenovelas, action movies, and animation, among other genre, highlighting major narratives and themes that exist within all transnational media content. To further explain the social and cultural processes of production and consumption and to consider why tnmc television programming and other media content thrives in particular contexts, a cultural hegemony perspective must be included. Cultural hegemony posits that media entertainment and the commercial culture it nurtures contribute to mass consent for the larger social order led by transnational capitalism. Concurrently, if social structures and social relations that organize daily life at work and home provide ample experiences legitimizing media depictions, then consent to the cultural hegemony of consumerism and transnational capitalism arises. 1

Cultural Hegemony

Cultural hegemony as presented here fits within a broader political economy approach that stresses not just structures of production, but social relations that organize human actions and socialize and educate participants to norms and practices necessary for the smooth functioning of transnational capitalism. Social structures of production and politics organize society; culture includes all those practices and meanings that help U.S. make sense of our lives. Culture is often referred to as “a whole way of life” that includes language, signs and symbols, rituals, norms, beliefs, and everyday practices that help U.S. understand the world and express our understanding of our way of life. Yet, “the cultural construction of meaning and symbols is inherently a matter of political and economic power, but at the same time a critique of political economy is about conflicts over meanings and symbols. There can be no separation between the analysis of culture and the critique of capitalism” (Kortright, in Vujnovic, 2008: 435). Cultural meanings that support social structures are not likely to be shared by those who are disadvantaged or disenfranchised by those structures (Derné, 2008: 74). Cultural hegemony posits that “common sense”

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

7

beliefs about the world arise from daily activities organized according to existing social relations, especially wage labor and corporate profit. Capitalism creates and works through distinct social classes that have unequal access to the means of production with unequal distribution of the profits created from labor’s use of technology and machinery. Because we are ­socialized from birth to the norms of inherited hierarchy, individual responsibility, and economic requirements for life, we internalize those norms as natural and learn to accept explanations, beliefs, and ideologies that support the free market, corporate power, and social hierarchy as we experience them. Hegemony is a shorthand expression for a social order that has broad consent for its way of life. Hegemony, as re-considered by Antonio Gramsci (2000), explains that social contradictions between classes, including disparities in wealth and lifestyle, can be muted and accepted as the unfortunate but acceptable outcome of an otherwise desirable social order. Hegemony, as a political r­ elationship, can only exist with the widespread consent of allies and subordinate classes that willingly follow the political and cultural leadership of the hegemonic group (Sassoon, 1987; Artz & Murphy, 2000). ­Without consent, ­hegemony dissipates, challenges by new leaders emerge and attempts to r­ enegotiate consent may be supplemented with coercion to defend the ­dominant group. In the 21st century, building hegemonic relations requires concerted, focused strategies for winning consent across classes, nations, and cultures. The political economy of transnational capitalism encompasses all of humanity engaged in accumulating wealth for corporate shareholders and owners— the notorious 1% and their upper-class subordinates. Such a condition is not ­sustainable on the face of it, hence widespread social unrest always erupts somewhere on the planet. Nonetheless, transnational capitalism has been able to forge widespread consent for its competitive, neoliberal order organized through its political economy of transnational chains of production and distribution. The cultural success of transnational capitalism depends on the transnational capitalist class’s ability to build cross-class alliances, largely through a global perspective that is attuned to the needs and demands of all social forces (Therborn, 2008: 158; Gramsci, 2000). The political economy of transnational capitalism includes all the structures, practices and norms of commodity production from design and mass manufacturing through sweatshops, casual labor, and new media and the socalled new economy. The transnational capitalist political economy includes multiple levels of participation that build consent from different classes of people that sufficiently benefit economically, politically, and culturally (Artz & Murphy, 2000: 24–29). Economically, working men and women benefit from employment and adequate wages which can be used to obtain food, housing,

8

Artz

and leisure activities, other social classes are involved in material production in diverse ways—from ownership, to management, to design, and quality control. Politically, labor has accepted the competitive electoral system as evidence of representation, which has partially brought them into the political process, other social classes are involved in political organization in diverse ways—from policy planning, to administration, enforcement, political party campaigning, and publicity. Culturally, media obscure the existence of social class, providing diverse and entertaining positive images of most social groups and providing a pleasing and confirming outlet for challenges and criticisms (Butsch, 2003; Dines & Humez, 2003; Alper & Lestyna, 2005), while affordable consumer goods reinforce self-interest and individual choice, other social classes create and promote culture in diverse ways—from creation of content, to promotion, participation, and reporting on culture. All social classes contribute to the reproduction of capitalism materially and symbolically in contradictory and complex ways (Garnham, 1990; Bourdieu, 1987; Therborn, 1983). In all, for now, capitalist cultural hegemony has broad (albeit partial) consent across social classes, genders, and ethnic and religious groups in most nations. Wageworkers unknowingly deliver surplus labor and surplus value to their capitalist employers, who thus acquire the resources to maintain and continue exploitation (Therborn, 2008: 164) to the extent they are able to win consent for the social order. Philanthropic capitalists purport to save the world by doing good (Bishop & Green, 2008) with the wealth they extracted from labor. Andrew Carnegie got rich off the labor of thousands of steel workers. The Carnegie Foundation uses the wealth obtained from the exploitation of labor to provide “philanthropic” assistance to worthy middle class and working class endeavors. The Gates Foundation has a similar history based on wealth extracted from creative production workers that is then used to promote Gatespreferred social and political behavior, including promotion of the capitalist system. Intel and Hewlett-Packard expanded to Ireland for its low-wage, high-skill labor and corporate-friendly government regulations. With the arrival of the global in Leixlip, Ireland a national myth was locally created with the enthusiastic support of Intel, Hewlett-Packard, and Guinness (no longer Irishowned but part of Diageo, a transnational beverage company). Van Der Bly (2007) coins the term “banal localism” to explain the town’s quaint attempt at distinction, enthusiastically facilitated by Intel which contributes to local history projects and festivals (from the profits derived from local labor) (pp. 242, 248). In addition to such corporate largesse, governments provide a stabilizing legal framework for the reproduction of capital relations, protecting inheritance, determining taxes and social welfare, and setting limits on the ability of

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

9

labor and others to challenge the social relations of production. In the case of transnationalism, national governments “reform” their regulations and laws to accommodate the needs of transnational firms for low wages, low taxes, and flexible unregulated working conditions. Local labor, creative workers, and subcontractors build sets, write dialogue, and translate consumer values to local cultures. They not only contribute to the hegemony of transnational capital, they contribute to their own consent by directly participating in the capitalist production process, receiving economic and political benefits while they confirm capitalist cultural hegemony in their own cultural work. The transnational capitalist class (tncc) does not personally run this social system. It relies on the commitment and expertise of millions of technocrats, bureaucrats, managers, researchers, politicians, media producers, and corporate directors and entrepreneurs to do the heavy lifting of organizing social relations to ensure tncc profits. To supplement supervisors, lenders, and courts, politicians, advertisers and publicists, and media programmers are charged with building consent for the social order. In return, this layer of “intellectuals for transnationalism” (in Gramscian terms, Gramsci, 2011, Vol. ii: 242–243) are well-compensated and thereby have and are living proof of the accuracy of assumptions about market economics. Deregulation and privatization opens access to personal consumption for the elite, while films, television serials, and advertising glamorize global standards of consumption (Derné, 2008: 99). Consequently, in most every nation members of the capitalist bureaucracy, from technocrats and managers to government politicians, willingly consent to free market rules and values as expressed in the transnational order. “Thus both direct economic pressures and the cultural investment required for successful competition for cultural dominance ensure a tendency for the class structure of the dominant class to reproduce itself and its control over symbolic production” (Garnham, 1990: 85) with the increased likelihood of popular consent for its cultural hegemony. By far the largest class in the world consists of those hundreds of millions of workers who actually produce the wealth of the world through their creative labor power. Their sheer immense majority would suggest that democratic decisions would quickly rearrange the socio-economic order, but for now this working-class majority is not sufficiently well-organized or politically active enough to transform social relations. Part of the responsibility of the managerial social class is to keep labor oriented away from collaborative action, to lead and organize the great mass of humanity according to the tenets of transnational capitalism, especially individual consumption. “The structure of the global capitalist system is maintained through the support of millions of citizens guided by charismatic personalities who routinely take control of the media

10

Artz

and politics to manipulate emotions and logic” (Robinson, 2004: 159). The tncc and its agents prefer to have cooperation from all, because the relations of force tilt to the working class and are not susceptible to permanent coercion by a handful against the many. Even selective coercion is expensive and risky, as it might unleash a backlash that cannot be easily contained—as Mubarak discovered in Egypt in 2012, and de Lozado learned in Bolivia in 2003. Far more effective is leadership by consent. Of course, if consent for capitalist leaderships cannot be won or negotiated with subordinate groups, violence from capitalist quarters will again rise up—as in Egypt in 2013. For consent to be secured, powerful class allies and substantial numbers of subordinate groups must cooperate in the functioning of the hegemonic system (Gramsci, 1971, 2000). Hegemony appears as a consensual culture only so long as the leading group can meet the minimal needs of the majority ­(Sassoon, 1987: 94), or at least obstruct efforts for an alternative social arrangement. Thus, government, educational institutions, churches, political parties, and media institutions work hard to demonstrate and socialize their minions to the practices and beliefs of individualism, market determination of all things social, deference to experts and officials, and above all insisting that collective, social cooperation is misguided irrationality. Therborn (2008) observes that working men and women may consent to the social order because they may be disinterested in the form of rule to which they are subjected; they may be unaware of possible alternative social relations; they may feel individually isolated and powerless to affect change (p. 171). However, this lack of interest, lack of information, and lack of confidence is not a personality trait or a permanent condition. Work rules, school curricula, media entertainment, and the entire panoply of behaviors and activities of daily life contribute to the overall process of reproducing the existing social order, of building consent for the cultural hegemony of consumer capitalism. To be successful, media localize and hybridize entertainment content with familiar, attractive, and culturallyinclusive images. Ironically, evidence marshaled to demonstrate the weakness of U.S. influence (Buckingham, 2007) actually underscores the success of transnational capitalist cultural hegemony. Local products often dominate in domestic markets (Silj, 1998), non-US cultural products have global appeal (Latin ­American music, Chinese martial arts movies, European football) (Cowen, 2002), and a “cosmopolitan” global culture has been adopted by transnational elites (Hannerz, 1996). Brazilian telenovelas, Jamaican reggae music, and Japanese animation are globally disseminated. New forms of hybridity and ethnic diasporas merge with local idioms and traditions, actively producing cultural diversity (Buckingham, 2007: 45). Yet, rather than proving the decline of U.S. influence, all of

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

11

this evidence, all of it, effectively demonstrates that consumerist media entertainment has become hegemonic: culturally internalized and domesticated in nations around the world. In short, commercialized media producers everywhere emulate and consent to the tenets of transnational capitalist leadership, co-modifying and marketing diverse and hybrid cultural products for global trade (e.g., world music, ethnic chic, fusion cuisine). The local can be globalized, as exemplified by Mulan (1995) (Chan, 2002) and C ­ rouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) (Wu & Chan, 2007). “With the global and the local feeding on one another, the boundaries between them are ­blurring and the idea of cultural authenticity is constantly being redefined” (Chan, 2005: 25). Meanwhile, the cultural hegemony of consumerism and global capitalism is being constructed and promoted. In India, Zee TV broadcasts adaptations of global media content and style in Hindi-language serials, Hindi films, and Hindi music that massage transnational media themes into local variations (Derné, 2008: 113–114), facilitating consumerism and self-gratification. As work life and social life become more commercialized and atomized and urban neighborhoods become more isolating, media narratives and images may displace the primary traditional sources of group identity, such as school, ethnicity, religion, even sport and political parties. Television entertainment may then become a “symbolic place” where collective political identities and understandings are reorganized (Nesbit & Myers, 2010: 348). In this sense, transnational media and their local media partners contribute to production of consent for ruling social practices and cultural norms, particularly consumerism and individualism within whatever larger cultural package is on offer from the available tnmcs, such as Europeanidentities, pan-Asian identities, Islamic identities, etc. In other words, the shifting social positions wrought by the changes in production, work experiences, daily life, immigration, and so on, are accompanied by shifting media images that pleasantly confirm the legitimacy of the new social order. In the context of transnational media, individuals integrated into (and benefitting from) the new production relations, with more corporate and work socialization into norms, values, and styles, and with more education, will be more likely to adopt transnational political perspectives provided by tnmc narratives and images. At the same time, pan-Arab identities are increasing among the elite across the Middle East due to shared geo-political interests, common economic positions, and media narratives that avoid criticism of existing hierarchies and inequalities (Nisbet & Myers, 2010). “Local issues are reframed—cast in terms of a wider grand narrative” away from domestic conditions and toward pan-­ Arabic common interests (Lynch, 2006: 35), creating an artificial hegemonic construction allowing for cultural difference without disrupting the Arab

12

Artz

status quo, but bringing Arab capitalist classes into the tncc orbit. Why would tnmc news and entertainment favorably incorporate Islamic cultural practices and avoid criticism of feudal-like relations? In addition to making tnmc content more accessible to viewers, for the tncc, Muslim identities are much preferable to working class or socialist ideologies. In a very convoluted way, it is similar to the anti-communism that unified Latin American capitalist classes in alliance with the U.S. from 1950–1990, subsuming government violence and social inequality beneath an overarching consent for capitalist development policies in the region, accepting the leadership of U.S. business and government as an aid to domestic power. Arab capitalists and feudalists have a shared “pan-Arabism” that is defined by their opposition to democracy covered with the cloak of Islam and their consensus on closely held capitalist private profits. The cultural hegemony of tnmcs and the tncc insists on privatization, commercialization, and stable markets—democracy, equality, elementary social justice, and Christianity are not required. For tnmcs operating in the Middle East, privileging Muslim identities in media content helps focus the attention of working class majorities away from economic disparities connected to local and national politics, stabilizing the cultural hegemony of transnational capitalism and its local allies. A similar capitalist class response obtains to Singapore, a repressive nation in East Asia that has attracted many prominent tnmcs, in its bid to become a global media hub. Transnationals “will not condemn a country simply because of its authoritarian regime. If anything, while liberal scholars assert that it will be an open media environment [with] less stringent regulations that would attract these transnational corporations, it is evident that other factors may prove to be a greater pull in this case—such as Singapore’s strategic location within the profitable Asian market. As long as there are benefits to the bottom line, it is unlikely that tncs will be very much at odds with the issues of democracy” (Wu, 2004: 122–123). Hegemonic leaderships strive for consent, but will employ force if necessary to protect their economic power and social privilege—in the Middle East with U.S. occupation, in Latin America and Asia with military dictatorships, or in Europe with local and national police forces. As Zhao (2008) asserts regarding China and the West, it is often the political stability that can be assured by an authoritarian government that will attract transnational capital. Elsewhere, whenever consent of the majority slips, capitalist-led governments step in to defend the market, corporate privilege, and the rule of law that presumably expresses the democratic will of the people, hoping to buy time for the restructuring of hegemonic relations. Challenges to Jim Crow segregation in the United States in the 1960s was met with violence, while political leaders revised the

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

13

legal terms of discrimination. Challenges to corporate rule in China are met with police force and jail sentences for leaders, while media reassure the “public” that their interests in affordable goods and civil peace are being protected. On occasion, some minor but spectacular concession is given to striking labor, like rehiring staff or reducing lay-offs. Challenges to financial rule in Greece or Spain are met with police action and threats to withhold international loans, while European bankers rewrite the language for austerity and provide enough temporary minor relief to get the people off the street. In media and popular culture, the images of affluence and individual success are continuously broadcast (as determined by producers and networks that unquestionably accept the capitalist value system), while alternative narratives of class solidarity and opposition to ecological destruction or social inequality are absent (or marginalized through negative stereotypical character evaluations and story lines—the black activist is irrational, immoral, corrupt; the revolutionary is irrational, immoral, sells drugs, etc.). Media texts and images emanating from a transnational capitalist cultural hegemony are not explicitly manipulative, nor do these images “make” viewers accept consumerism or individualism. Rather, as Leila Fernandes (2000) explains in her study of media content in India, “images weave together the symbolic fabric of a hegemonic political culture” (p. 612). Transnational media provide narratives and entertainment that confirm and rationalize the familiar patterns of daily life under capitalism, mostly paralleling individual social class positions. In India, “advertising, television programming, and Hindi films all play a role in constructing [and confirming] the experiences of the elite consuming classes as the norm” (Derné, 2008: 93). Non-elite citizens actually are alienated and atomized at work, with little power over what will be produced, and with scant positive representation on television or in film (Alper & Lestyna, 2005). Women and non-dominant cultural groups actually do experience ethnic and gender inequality at work and on the street, while often appearing in negative stereotypes on screen (Dines & Humes, 2010). Working class citizens already are isolated from their neighbors, co-workers, and even themselves as they scramble for survival or advancement against all others, regularly depicted as lovable buffoons on television (Butsch, 20030. The majority of citizens really are excluded from political policy, locally, nationally, and internationally and excluded from both media production and accurate representations. The soldiers in Disney’s Pocahontas (1995) and Mulan (1998), for example, illustrate the typical background role for working class representation in film. The primary control we have is what we eat (within our budget), what we wear (within our budget), and what we do in our leisure time away from work (because we have no rights in the workplace). In mass, urban, anonymous society, we too

14

Artz

often witness on a daily basis the disinterest of others, the faux friendliness of store clerks, and the impersonal bureaucratic behavior of those in charge— the common malaise of all of U.S. in a social order that leaves consumption as the primary expression of self and creativity. In this environment, we relish entertaining images of selfless heroines, direct action superheroes, bumbling authorities, rewarding romantic personal relations, and the positive rewards of self-confidence and self-interest. Content provided by tnmcs satisfies our desires and builds its consumerist cultural hegemony in the process. As commercial TV took root in Turkey following government deregulation and privatization of the media 1994, entertainment media soon predominated. Television reports on “where pop stars shop, which brands they prefer, where they go on holiday” with regular announcements of entertainment events and trendy clubs, but no programs featured average working class Turks or their lives. Meanwhile, an audience of middle class Turkish youth eagerly learn cultural sophistication” according to global consumer norms, while “eager advertisers willingly pay media producers for time and space. Entertainment programs have high ratings in part because they introduce and feature cultural products offering new pleasures and identities to a previously culturallyrestricted society…this new entertainment culture saturates society with ­seductive appeals for participation in the new, globalized world” (Algan, 2003: 185). In the 1990s, the focus of Hindi films in India “shifted decisively towards the lives of the consuming elite” with an “absence of poverty and of servants,” suggesting everyone is rich (Derné, 2008: 95–96). Media don’t cause consumer behavior, media clothe the alienated human frame of capitalism with the comforting cloak of individual consumption. Media thus may be metaphorically accused of disguising the reality of life, but more importantly media warm individuals in a cold world. tnmcs translate global entertainment into languages and cultures that comfort and reassure each locality that it is unique but still an important part of the larger whole. Cultural hegemony expresses the dialectical interchange between the material production of a way of life and the symbolic production of transnational capitalism and its social relations that encompass labor, gender, ethnicity, and cultural experience. Certainly, media narratives and images (like all communication) express ideology, but more importantly, tnmc expressions are historically and psychologically appropriate for transnational capitalist relations. Hybrid media models and localized stories confirm the compatibility between local cultures and the global order. Transnational media thus obtain validity, while their stories establish and explain the ground on which people move, providing appropriate meanings for behaviors and relations already active in daily life outside of media (Derné, 2008; Gramsci, 2011, Vol iii: 170). In this

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

15

transnational political and social configuration, governments do not just police the neoliberal order alone. Transnational corporations, advertising firms, and tnmcs employ marketing agents, publicists, scriptwriters, and programmers to create what is effectively a discipline for consumerism. As much as possible, mass desire is channeled into ritualized forms of consumption that provide profits to corporations and common-sense explanations to the rest of U.S. (Galbraith & Karlin, 2012: 19). Of course, severe and extended contradictions between image and reality may awake a more democratic social consciousness. Too many images that critically challenge justifications of the dominant culture may lead to alternative meanings; too much inequality or injustice that disputes media images may lead to a rejection of both the image and the inequality—as demonstrated by Brazilians challenging the billions spent on hosting the 2014 World Soccer Cup and the 2016 Olympics in the midst of unemployment and poverty and the regular broadcast of popular telenovelas (Artz, 2015). Cultural hegemony understood as the social process of “moral, philosophical, and political leadership that a social group attains only with the active consent of other important social groups” (Artz & Murphy, 2000: 1) expresses the current status of transnational capitalism and the social relations that sustain it. This cultural hegemony of transnational capitalism, often cast as globalization, appears as common sense to broad sections of all social classes across most nations. European businessmen, Dubai construction workers, French college students, teachers, journalists, and politicians from every land, and workers from Chinese factories and Bengali sweatshops to manufacturing plants in Mexico and the U.S. mostly accept the rule of the market and its insistence on individual competition, including the unfortunate but economically justified reduction in social welfare and public service. Absent alternatives, xenophobia and anti-immigrant racism appears in ethnically-divided African nations as well as industrialized nations in Europe and North America (Kalb & Halmai, 2011). Revival of local cultures may devolve into reactionary religious movements, as well (Tomlinson, 1991; Beynon & Dunkersley, 2000). In the midst of civil strife caused by transnational attacks on labor, tncc political leaders appear as calm and compassionate humanitarians. The fugue of competing voices of desperation is orchestrated by capitalist conductors striving to compose social harmony and avoid disintegration from members playing their own tunes. Working classes, ethnic diasporas, gendered labor forces, and disenfranchised youth may have individual goals and collective concerns, but for now individual consumption, the cultural norms of “work hard, play hard, keep your head down,” and the absence of any other reasonable possibility convinces most citizens that “there is no alternative” to the free market and global competition.

16

Artz

Cultural hegemony develops according to class relations and practices. Citizen encounters with global media are framed by their social class, gender, and ethnicity: there are those “doing the moving and the communicating and in who are in some way in a position of control” and there are those who may do a lot of “physical moving, but who are not `in charge’ of the process in the same way” and finally, there are those “who are simply on the receiving end” or those who cannot even afford a movie because of the structural adjustments of transnational capitalism (Massey, in Derné, 2008: 28). Media entertainment incorporates those lived experiences in an apolitical, comforting way, while defending the appropriateness of tnmc leadership by also adapting and diffusing alternative narratives, political challenges, and troubling social contradictions within the dominant frame. Polysemic meanings—decoding by groups to read their own interests and preferences in various hegemonic contents—creatively find consent. The pleasing multi-cultural offerings assure viewers. Media entertainment helps legitimize and naturalize in practice and symbol the tncc regime of market relations, codified as individualism, self-gratification, consumption, deference to authority, and the privileging of apolitical entertainment and spectatorship over citizenship and participatory democracy. This version of cultural hegemony based on political economy updates, revises, and concretizes the political economy approach informing analyzes of cultural imperialism that have prompted insights and criticisms over the last forty years. Cultural hegemony is not primarily a media phenomenon. Cultural hegemony based on political economy inquires as to how media “operate as industries and how their economic organization impinges on the production and distribution of meaning” (Golding & Murdock, 1991: 17). Media disseminate images and narratives defining and defending transnational capitalism, but it is the structural realities of class difference (Derné, 2008; Robinson, 2004), including increased access to consumer goods by national elites, increased access to popular culture and entertainment by working and middle classes, and the lived social relations of production by all that impact the extent of social and political support to globalized free market practices. Consent begins on the factory floor and in the digitally-computerized office: one should be thankful for a job, an income, and recognize one’s personal skill or luck in securing gainful employment—with tacit acceptance of supervision and corporate goals assuring continual reward. Co-workers and families by their actions seem to agree. The culture of daily work reinforces the social relations of wage labor and capitalist profit. Away from work, recreation and entertainment sustain the drudgery—tgif, “Thank God, it’s Friday!” Media messages and cultural pastimes confirm with gratifying consistency that individual success derives

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

17

from personal initiative cushioned with acquiescence to authority. Transnational production has produced not just a transnational capitalist class, but a transnational middle class of small business, managers, and professionals as well. Given their immediate and ongoing economic and material benefit from the structure of transnational capital, an elite global middle class “shares a common aim of promoting a consuming ideology around the world” (Derné, 2008: 121). Swung between a little coercion and a little benefit, labor abides by management’s rules, consenting to wage labor capitalist social relations that provide some modest security, reassured by pleasing cultural images and dominant political messages that legitimize the hegemonic leadership of the transnational capitalist class. Such a complicit culture is the preferred mode of rule of transnational capitalism: cultural hegemony expresses the condition of widespread consent (or tacit acceptance) among diverse classes and ethnic groups for the capitalist structure and practices of wage labor production and consumerist dissemination of social and cultural life. 2

The Production of Cultural Hegemony

What is media power? The power to decide programming, the power to decide media formats and genre, the power to decide who has access to media production, the power to decide media content, its purpose, values, and ideology. The irrepressible necessity for commercial success in the marketplace drives all local and national media to adapt, merge, or disappear. This is even true for the remaining public service media, which can be seen drifting toward advertising and entertainment (Hendy, 2013). The exceptions appear either as community media, political and ethnic subcultures (like “outlaw” music genres in Indonesia, Bodden, 2005), or as part of revolutionary projects for social transformation, as in Nicaragua in the 1980s and contemporary Venezuela. According to the tncc, media are private industries, and as such must abide by market rules. Decision-making power falls to those who own and finance media operations. Media are both economic and cultural, and decisions over both are closely guarded. Culturalist approaches on local resistance or popular hybrid media productions are quite frequently content with analyzes of popular taste and aesthetics, such as many interpretations of South Korea’s hybridized K-pop music (aka Gangnam style) that spread internationally and the “Korean Wave” of music, dance style, video games, and trendy drama on TV that hit East Asian media beginning in the 1990s. In contrast, Keehyeung Lee (2005) argues that the expansive Korean media phenomena resulted from the “convergence

18

Artz

of ­multiple—institutional, cultural, and political—factors and conditions” (p.  15). Leading sections of both the Japanese and Korean capitalist classes were confronting serious domestic economic constraints; Korea was in the midst of the 1997 Asian economic crisis; wto 1995 rules required deregulation of media industries. In 1998, Korea lifted restrictions on foreign direct investment and media mergers; Japan increased its Korean investment from $265 million in 1997 to $2.5 billion in 2000. Sunyoung Kwak (2010) tells of the success of BoA, who at 13 years old was the youngest female pop artist ever in Korea. As part of the developing transnational media process, S.M. Entertainment ­(Korea) and Japan’s avex co-produced BoA’s Japanese debut that was broadcast live via Internet. Promoted as neither Korean nor Japanese, BoA sang in English and Chinese, was marketed regionally through multiple advertising “tie-ups” that feature celebrities advertising consumer goods, and released several albums that set sales records in Japan and Korea and established her as an international pop star (Jang & Paik, 2012). BoA’s success was part of ­Korean-Japanese media firms’ strategy of seeking local entertainers to globally appeal to other local markets. In short order, other Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong media began co-­producing similarly structured transnational flows. The “Korean Wave,” with all of its popular culture cachet, was initiated as part of the economic and cultural strategy of “pan-Asian” production and distribution by newly formed tnmcs following the leadership of larger tnmcs (Sony, Fuji TV, STAR TV, gmm Grammy) (Shin, 2007) in localizing their global reach. Siriyuvasak (2010) refers to this development as “Asianization,” the new “­ double-flow” of cultural products within and across the East Asian region that followed the wto’s determination that cultural products are commodities and the subsequent deregulation across Asia. In much the same way, “governments across the world altered their policies in the direction of marketization—that is, the view that the production and exchange of cultural goods and services for profit is the best way to achieve efficiency and fairness in the production and consumption of texts” and other media (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 300) with leading media firms looking for mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures. This example illustrates how an understanding of cultural hegemony informed by political economy presents a more inclusive account of popular culture trends—beginning with the recognition that diverse social classes cooperate in producing media appropriate for the construction of consent to transnational capitalism. Of course, predictable changes wrought by socioeconomic transformations are impinged on by ingrained cultural traditions, values, and worldviews, including for example, if a society has been shaped by Protestantism, Confucianism, or Islam (Jang & Paik, 2012). The popular music example displays a natural fit for structuring cultural hegemony: pop music

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

19

localizes the experience, p ­ ersonalizes the spectacle of celebrity, expands individual consumption, and secures corporate control over both the economics and cultural content of the media products. Going forward, one can no longer consider East Asian film, Latin American telenovelas, or Dutch reality shows as distinct and organic systems separate from the intense interactions within the transnational entertainment industry. Indeed, much of the flexibility, creativity, and informality of local media production is being standardized within globally organized production and marketing. The structure and ideology of corporate globalization has an indissoluble link with the structure and content of worldwide communications, cultivated by corporate and government-funded academics who argue that information and media technologies are signs of freedom and democratic progress, even as these innovations enable a “world ruled by the logic of social and ­economic segregation” (Mattelart, in Miller, et al., 2005: 51). The ideological link between  daily practice and media content expresses the intimate connection between transnational corporate structures that organize production and the transnational media that produce programs. “Since most private t­ elevision networks have come into existence as a result of the liberalization of television sector in India, they tend to follow a news agenda which appears to champion the benefits of a free market… the large amount of airtime given to news about the corporate world, for privatization and against public ownership, reflects the growing privatization of the media and its dependence on corporate rather than public sources” (Thussu, 2007a: 600–601). The rewards and sanctions organized by capitalist institutions, such as corporations and the legal system, enable as well as constrain (Bourdieu, 1992). Just as other transnational industries control dispersed sites and processes of production, from design to manufacture, so too tnmcs organize new relations of media production across borders. tnmc television companies intersecting with Hollywood, Bollywood in India, Chinawood, and even Nigeria’s “Nollywood” entrepreneurism reproduce and regulate a “new international division of cultural labor” through their “control over cultural markets, international co-production, intellectual property, marketing, distribution, and exhibition” (Miller, et al., 2005: 52). The global media political economy—the ownership, production, distribution, and profit-sharing in the dominant capitalist media entertainment and cultural industries—is not nationally distinct. As capitalism spreads around the world, “it forces people into highly exploitative relations; and it does so regardless of their culture, their background, [their nation]. All it is interested in is profits” (Chibber, 2013). Further, as capitalist enterprises, the media “conform to the economic imperatives that affect other industries. Workers produce values

20

Artz

that owners appropriate. One enterprise expands at the expense of another. Concentration of media power follows an economic course and is “subject to the same constraints” as other capitalist enterprises (Schiller, 1976: 79). tnmcs exhibit to local allies how to profit from advertising, increasing the predominance of commercial media everywhere—organizationally and ideologically disseminating the cultural values of individualism and consumerism (Frith & Feng, 2009: 159). To facilitate its organizational leadership “business publications are among the first media enterprises when introducing international models, styles of practices. They have the role of lighthouse, promoting a market economy, and this role also includes adopting and testing imported journalistic practices” (Koikkalainen, 2007: 188). The rapid growth of Russian business media provides a striking example of capitalist hegemonic leadership and its effective use of communication for training class allies (Vartanova, 2008). For domestic political reasons, transnational politicians may on occasion instigate and manipulate various claims to national patriotism for narrowlydrawn economic and political interests, which can have disastrous social consequences—including genocide (Kalb & Halmai, 2011). In any case, transnational capitalism has rearranged the social relations of production to incorporate nation-state social forces and transform class relations globally and locally. Again, this has not been simply coerced: in Eastern Europe, foreign investment followed economic and social restructuring to “reinforce the tendency to organize the market and the economic organizations in ways similar to, or transplanted from, more economically advanced countries” (Jakubowicz, 2007: 116). Much of transnational investment was “actively solicited by Eastern European businesses, governments, and entrepreneurs” (Hollifield, in Jakubowicz, 2007: 358). The “commercial logic of the market” also influenced media reform in post-Soviet Russia, which became one of the most rapidly growing advertising markets in the world (Vartanova, 2008: 20). Global restructuring includes shifting production sites such that the transnational media “labor economy is dispersed throughout the world” (Govil, 2007: 92), increasingly in global media cities. Production of any particular film includes multiple locales with multiple jobs (from filming and editing to costume design and marketing) performed by many nationally-distinct work forces, entrepreneurs, small businesses, and contractors. Even to identify the nationality of the production studios, private equity firms, and global financial backers taxes attempts at clear categorization. Transnational production has prospered from these cross-border operations, increasingly using “runaway” production to exploit lower wages and corporate-friendly labor laws. Runaway productions are those productions which are “developed and intended for initial release, exhibition, or broadcast” in a

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

21

country and that appear to be made in that country “but are actually filmed in another country” (Film and Television Action Committee, in Miller, et al., 2005: 7). Runaway production obscures the transnational chains of production and the relations of production that mobilize labor according to the needs of the tnmc. In the television and film industries, labor can take manifold forms in local production, from special effects, sound recording, editing, film processing, music and dialogue coaching, to acting, directing, filming, scouting locations, building sets, catering, government relations, set publicity, watching and interpreting (Miller, et al., 2005: 113). With localized tnmc production, jobs are constantly ending and starting, “freelance, franchised or casualized labor” characterizes the flexible specialization that tnmc enact to control their economic interests by controlling the production process (McRobbie, 2002, in Miller, et al., 2005: 114). Transnational regimes of production maximize flexibility in the numbers of workers employed, the wages, hours, and conditions of work, the technology they use, and the locations where they produce, while tnmc ownership structures ensure inflexibly in control over content, decision-­making, and distribution of profits. In the tnmc system, workers are caught in “perennial uncertainty and lack anything beyond temporary wages” (Miller, et al., 2005: 115). Of course, tnmc executives and postmodern theorists celebrate the autonomy of creative workers in this environment of decentralized production and the accumulation of wealth from the labor of those creative workers. 3

The Global Division of Cultural Labor

While it has always been true that that power differentials in social relations have dictated who can speak and when, the transition to transnational capitalism has radically altered how communication is produced and distributed. “The ability to transcend spatial limitations on commerce [with communication technology] has increased the variety, importance, and organization of various up-front and after-market windows worldwide when calculating potential sales revenue” (Havens, 2006: 38)—permitting transnationals “the power to exploit minute spatial difference to good effect,” (Harvey in Havens, 2006: 38) taking advantage of differences in labor costs, tax policies, interest rates, access to ancillary services, and so on. Economists have noted that the global predominance of flexible production schemes resulting from the relocation of production to new industrial sites, increasingly in the developing countries, has been combined with accelerated rationalization measures designed to increase labor productivity at previously established sites. Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs, & Otto Kreye (2004) designate this global structural movement the

22

Artz

“new international division of labor,” arguing that it has led to a manufacturing crisis in industrial countries, as well as to the first steps toward export-oriented manufacturing in the developing countries, and local production controlled by transnational capital merged with national. They see these trends as being largely independent of the policies pursued by individual governments and the strategies for expansion adopted by individual firms. To overcome the social power of organized labor in the industrialized nations, transnational capital exports production elsewhere. “The development of the world economy has increasingly created conditions (forcing the development of the new international division of labor) in which the survival of more and more companies can only be assured through the relocation of production to new industrial sites, where labor-power is cheap to buy, abundant and well-disciplined; in short, through the transnational reorganization of production” (Fröbel, ­Heinrichs, & Kreye, 2004: 15). Labor insecurity is the norm. Companies move away when lower wages, higher tax incentives, or other factors of production beckon. Toby Miller, Nitin Govil, John MacMurria, Richard Maxwell, and Ting Wang’s (2005) investigation of the film industry discovers the same structure of production relations, which they term the “new international division of cultural labor” (nicl) emphasizing the parallel developments in transnational media that characterize all production by transnational capitalism. For instance, the “hallmark of pan-Asian cinema is a push toward market consolidation, creating an enlarged, unified film market that sustains investment in medium-to-large scale movies and marketing” (Davis & Yeh, 2008: 110) through cross-border and cross-media structures that position creative producers, managers, and local work forces within the transnational system. In other words, tnmc production creates media commodities, ideologies, and profits, as it also produces and reproduces the capital relation itself (Therborn, 2008: 137)—the underlying motivation for capitalist cultural hegemony. Transnationalizing production to local sites does not disturb the tnmc “organizational hierarchy or the forms of specialization which stratify the working class and create a social layer of administrators and overseers who rule—in the name of capital—over the day to day operations in the workplace” (Harvey, 1999: 31), no matter what nationality, ethnicity, or gender supplies the workforce or management. The global restructuring of media production has created giant, regional enterprises “with complex links between film, video, television, telecommunications, animation, publishing, advertising, and game design” (Davis & Yeh, 2008: 65)—all based on acquiring multi-national talent and the cheapest creative labor possible. tnmc production forces national governments, small media firms, and local workers to compete among themselves over wages, benefits, and working conditions. In China, Mattel requires

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

23

workers to be on the job 10–16 hours a day, seven days a week (Asian Monitor Resource Center, in Miller, et al., 2005: 122). Apple may be one of the most admired companies in the world with its sleek sophisticated media devices, but the polished image does not correspond to its actual business practices outsourcing labor to contractors in China and elsewhere. Marisol Sandoval (2013) draws our attention to the material source of media production, in her thorough analysis of Apple’s contract labor practices in China. “Before and after information and communication technologies (icts) serve as the instruments of the mental labor of software developer, journalists, designers, new media workers, prosumers, etc., their production and disposal is shaped by various forms of manual work such as the extraction of minerals, the assembly of components into the final product, and the waste work needed for their disposal” (p. 318). Corporate watchdog groups have found that illegal long working hours, low wages, child labor, and poor occupational health and safety are rooted in the unethical purchasing practices of Apple (in Sandoval, p. 322). Beyond the bright side of so-called mental and immaterial labor, one discovers its seamier counterpart—the production of the actual material infrastructure for new media. In this space, rather than illustrating how indigenized media and information technologies contribute to cultural diversity and human freedom, the tnmc environments that localize flexible production appear as nothing less than crasser exploitation maximizing corporate control over labor. The production of media and their content are not “merely a simple reflection of the controlling interests of those who own or even control the broad range of capital plant and equipment which make up the means by which cultural goods are made and distributed. Within the media are men and women working within a range of codes and professional ideologies, and with an array of aspirations, both personal and social. The ambitions can be idealized; much cultural production is routine, mundane, and highly predictable” (Golding & Murdoch, 1991: 25–26). Beyond their technological characteristics and capabilities, radio, film, and television further present restrictions on communication that have been “deeply shaped by advertisers, investors, and other actors within the capitalist class” (Poster, 2008: 688). Overall, the autonomy and creative contribution of these workers is curtailed within transnational production structures that prescribe who does what and who makes decisions on what will be done. Hollywood “has managed to export and even refine domestic disciplinary systems, effectively disempowering and deskilling workers they hire off-shore by monopoly practices” (simultaneously undermining competing local businesses ability to profit)… and this is “happening at the level of popular textual

24

Artz

production, marketing and information—data processing everything from airline bookings and customer warranties to the literary canon and pornographic novels—as well as high-culture limited edition work” (Miller, et al., 2008: 122). Martin Hand and Barry Sandywell (2002) observe that the same is true for new media which increasingly disseminate film and television content: “The Web is no more than a new culture industry elevated by corporate market powers into a position of global hegemony” (p. 202). In contrast, enthralled by the “sixty-five thousand cultural objects” that are uploaded on YouTube daily, Mark Poster (2008) mistakes ease of user production with effective distribution and reception when he asserts that the consumer “has become a user, maker, or creator” and “cultural production has clearly shifted from an elite system with major capital resources” to “a bottom-up mass movement” (p. 692). Sixty-five thousand uploads? Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. has almost that many employees reporting to work every day. Even the millions of total visits to Psy’s “Gangnam Style” video pales compared to Liberty Media, a modest secondtier transnational, that reaches over 160 million households. Every day, STAR TV has well over 100 million viewers in 53 countries in Asia alone. In terms of real media impact, transnational production and distribution have the upper hand when it comes to media access and production. Attempts to circumvent their technological control over distribution (like Napster’s music server) are subject to copyright infringement laws and other government regulation. Simultaneously, tnmcs are constantly on the lookout for creative initiatives that can be herded into their own cultural hegemony, while willing academics and entrepreneurs eagerly line up for the chance to join the ranks of profiteers (e.g., Hartley, 2007). The transnational production regime, Internet and all, keeps the average consumer-blogger on the margins. tnmcs are well positioned to take advantage of efficient decentered sites of production. The new international division of cultural labor (nicl) affects workers at all levels: from janitors, accountants, drivers, and tourism commissioners to designers, scriptwriters, best boys, and radio announcers. Internet networks and digital technologies allow the sharing of off-line editing, special effects production, and musical scores, further encouraging tnmcs to cut costs through cross-border chains of production that maximize profits and minimize wages. One consequence of this restructuring of production is the increased concentration of media ownership, now consolidated across nations. “In the music industry, a mere handful of firms control 80 percent of global CD production, and similar trends are found in newspaper, periodical, and book publications, as well as radio, film, and television” (Poster, 2008: 689). tnmcs rely heavily on “runaway production” for all media productions to establish new norms for the division of labor, but once a film is shot, song

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

25

recorded, or book written, tnmc control over work also crosses borders. Digital taping and transfer permit editing from any location, shared software editing programs allow directors and editors easy and quick exchange for re-editing for the final version. Telecommunications and IT hardware and software not only break down time and space barriers, under the control of tnmc they are also used to depress labor costs and deskill workers. Miller et al. (2005) offer a model of production placing integrated and consolidated transnational media companies at the top of an international system of intermediate zones of production with subordinate labor holding it all up. Local entrepreneurial and media industry production of content “diminishes” centralized global production (Keane, Fung, & Moran, 2007: 44), in location only, not in ownership or media form—and certainly not in distribution capability. Although individual access to media technology in the Internet age is unprecedented, the capacity to reach others is severely limited and always subject to the “off” switch controlled by privately-run servers, as Egyptian democracy activists discovered when their social media challenged the Mubarak regime in 2011. Satellite technology is even more centrally controlled by transnational ­institutions. Lisa Parks (2005) has applauded satellites as new “spheres of cultural and economic activity” providing remarkable opportunities for local cultures to create their own media and share their visions worldwide, overlooking the physical and institutional control residing with tnmcs’ ownership of satellites. Despite claims of a satellite-induced Aboriginal “cultural renaissance” (p. 73), Parks reveals that content and satellite use always depend on economic and political power more than Aboriginal discourse. Australian indigenous ­Imparja have been stymied by advertising imperatives and the erosion of time allotted to local productions by the satellite servers. With underwater cables, fiber optics, satellites, mobile phones, the Internet, and other new media technologies, men and women should have exponentially increased ability to share messages, images, and ideas. Contrary to Poster (2008) and other celebrants of the digital age, “new media technologies [do not] enable anyone to start their own culture industry” (p. 699). Unfortunately, due to the dictates of transnational capitalism, our information age has remained one of unbridled reception of tnmc messages. The power to tell stories drifts to global media networks that have excessive control over communication via satellites and other media technology (Artz, 2007b; D. Schiller, 1999: 66–68; Thussu, 2000). What Miller, et al. (2008) report about Southern California in 1998, has become the model for regionally centralized media cities across the world: “an interconnecting mass, a cluster of technology, labor and capital that operates through contracts and with investments from the studios, rather than ownership by them” providing a “flexible delivery of services by specialized

26

Artz

countries, intense interaction between small units that are part of a dynamic global industrial center, with highly diverse and skillful labor, and a functioning institutional infrastructure” (p. 129). Distribution arrangements with similarly organized and interlocked firms further tnmc influence over media access, as described below. The structures of production vary across regions due to the diverse historical legacies of commercial dominance (US), dual track public and private media development (Europe, Australia), more direct state regulation (East Asia), and state/corporate monopolies (Japan, Hong Kong). The production process still includes creative development and pre-production of the concept, production and filming of the actual program or film, post-production editing, followed by distribution. However, as tnmcs adopt transnational regimes of production, the more interlocked firms have outsourced production to independent studios, paralleling the flexibility of labor relations. At the same time, before outsourcing, tnmcs systematically plan for marketing, syndication, and local adaptations (Keane, Fung, & Moran, 2007: 195). Centralizing creative control reflects the inflexibility and consolidation of the transnational system. Independent studios and repurposing formats for local broadcast provide myriad opportunities for creativity, even for television production which “relies on incremental adjustments to tried-and-trusted formulas” (Keane, Fung, & Moran, 2007: 195). For countries and firms that depend on outsourcing for income, their chief asset is low-paid skilled labor, their chief benefit is access to the techniques and norms of tnmc production. Ultimately, the cultural hegemony of transnational media is the economic and political reward obtained from rapacious free market policies that encourage individual entrepreneurialism and undermine social solidarity among workers on all levels by temporarily but repeatedly subcontracting abroad with smaller independent studios and employing workers in different countries. Deregulation in Britain, for example, produced a “proliferation of networks and the inevitable search for cheap overseas content” …the advantages accruing to the transnational leadership so emulated by local media firms is actually “built on and sustained by the internal suppression of worker rights, the exploitation of a global division of labor” and the dominance of the English language in business transactions (Miller, et al., 2005: 161, 131). In fact, by the year 2000, already 27% of “Hollywood” tnmcs shot productions outside the US, especially Canada, Britain, and Australia. Of course, Disney’s utv and Patagonik, Sony’s SET, and Warner’s Asia productions, as well as dozens of other co-productions by smaller firms (Lionsgate, Weinstein Bros., etc.) in Asia and Latin America are not “Hollywood” productions because organizationally and geographically those studios are “foreign.” Mexico is an attractive site for tnmc television and film production: a union

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

27

carpenter in Los Angeles makes $30/hour, in Baja, Mexico, News Corp.’s Fox carpenters are paid $4/hour. Using Chinese extras and the Beijing Film Studio, the action adventure Kill Bill (2003) disguised China as Japan, to take advantage of low wages and the absence of unions, even shooting action sequences with stuntmen rather than computer-simulated segments that have become more typical. Post-production for many tnmcs filming in Asia has been done in Thailand or Australia, with special effects completed in Hong Kong or the U.S. (Miller, et al., 2005: 151). Following privatization in Czechoslovakia, the government sold off 75% of the public film and television studios, “freeing” 500 skilled media workers, eleven sound stages, and on-site editing laboratories for tnmc purchase. Mission Impossible (1996) was filmed in Prague with government-facilitated non-union, low-wage, highly-skilled creative labor. Mission Impossible revealed on many levels how transnational capitalism had “taken firm root in the Czech Republic” (Millea, in Miller, et al., 2005: 151). From “The Simpsons” to “Ninja Turtles,” 90% of the world’s television cartoons are coproduced in Asia with low-cost, “flexible” labor by skilled animators and programmers. Commercial digital graphics for animation and special effects firms in India offer tnmcs “a major back-end hub” (estimated to grow from $5 to $15 billion) for editing and labor-intensive post-production work in computergenerated images, compositing, color correction, and digital sound ­(Hollywood, 2003). Overall, tnmcs’ international division of cultural labor (nicl) “facilitates the free movement of capital into cheap production locations, contains labor mobility and undermines labor solidarity” as “a mobile elite happily exploits whichever country charges the least (Miller, et al., 2005: 152; Seguin, in Miller, et al., p. 171). Ironically, movies filmed in runaway production countries from China to Czechoslovakia are later “imported” from the production ­studio’s ostensible “home” nation—instances that can be considered actual “imperialist” economic relations. An essential feature of transnational media’s capacity for organizing and profiting from the new international division of cultural labor is the existence of shared cultural business norms sustained through extensive co-productions and joint ventures. In China, local publishers have formed joint ventures with several tnmcs, including Hachette (Elle, Marie Claire, Woman’s Day), Hearst (Cosmo), Condé Nast (Vogue), and Shfunotomo (Rayli, Mina). The local editions receive some text and photos., but more importantly staff from the head offices in Paris, New York, and Tokyo are sent to train Chinese staff and editors, directing and modeling the required business norms of communication, editorial decision-making, content tone and style, marketing, audience research, and managerial practices—cultivating the local publishers in the ways of tnmc operations, including preferences for structure and content of

28

Artz

the medium itself to become more amenable to advertising, such as changing “magazines for reading to magazines for seeing” (Frith & Feng, 2009: 169). Throughout the training, facilitators coach participants and model appropriate business behavior in social interaction, humor, and even affectations. In short, transnational capitalist class solidarity is cultivated and reproduced around shared commercial interests and these agreed upon “best practices” for production, distribution, subcontracting, and labor relations. Local and national media, including those applying for tnmc agreements, look to successful transnational capitalists for economic, political, and cultural leadership. Television producers and network executives see “light entertainment formats as insurance against uncertainty: they offer broadcasters more commercially efficient strategies of maximizing audiences” (Keane, Fung, & Moran, 2007: 198). Genres such as game shows and reality TV attract viewers, limit expenses for scriptwriting and acting, and take advantage of low-cost labor in all local adaptations. Around the world, governments agree on deregulation and commercialization, while tnmcs can expect standardized, equivalent media worker skills and pro-industry attitudes at lowered costs. The combination of work norms across national media labor markets and standardized formats with predominant mediated images echoing individualism assures substantial media profit with minimal labor solidarity across gender, ethnicity, and national borders. For now. Without this global culture of production organized by capitalist social relations, tnmcs could not successfully negotiate cultural hegemony in practice or in image. Whatever hybridity theorists might imagine, common dominant values, attitudes, norms, and behaviors are being cultivated in and by transnational media production. The “professional” norms of skill hierarchy and decision-making that become “common sense” through enforcement and repetition on the job are legally backed by intellectual property copyright protocol and non-compete penalties that prevent workers from developing their own creativity (Bettig, 1997). Because tnmcs are vertically and horizontally integrated and interlocked with other communication technology companies, transnational media business and programming standards are duplicated across media platforms and delivery systems, from television, film, satellite, broadband, and mobile technologies, facilitating a leadership position for tnmcs in new media uses, as well. Democracy and public access to production by the millions of workers and citizens in general never enter the equation of transnational production costs and revenues. Transnational commercial media consolidation and concentration assert the conditions for producing media, including their aesthetics, style, form, and content. Reliance on formats, for instance, maximizes the adaptation of content and the distribution of standardized codes and conventions. The

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

29

formatted television program is not difficult to remake—even improve, as Pokémon (Tobin, 2004), “Ugly Betty” (McCabe & Akass, 2013), and “Who Wants to Be A Millionaire” (Crabtree & Malhotra, 2003; Keane, Fung, & Moran, 2007) demonstrate. Although national governments and cultural organizations, including religious groups, frequently attempt to block “foreign” imports of culturally “inappropriate” values, tnmcs have hegemonically adapted. tnmcs have “stripped away” those questionable elements and “substituted local flavour and values,” so that the hybrid program “provides the dna, the recipe, and the technology for invigorating local television” with commercially-structured and commercially-viable formats (Keane, Fung, & Moran, 2007: 200). Commercial success for tnmcs includes localizing production for local languages and cultures, as well as producing content for segmented national audiences: the cosmopolitan elite who own and manage industries, speak English, and participate fully in world economics and politics; the affluent middle classes, including managers, technicians, academics, politicians, and small business people; the working classes, both skilled creative workers, contractors, builders, and less skilled service workers; the lower working class of manual and casual laborers. Similar structural conditions set the parameters for media distribution as well, although Nobuko Karashima (2011) asserts that the market structure of filmmaking does not constrain cultural diversity because non-tnmc dominated exhibitors provide ample outlets for independent non-major productions. This would be fine, if true. Karashima presents figures that reveal more films are produced and distributed by independents than major tnmcs, but nonetheless, tnmcs films dominate in distribution reach, marketing, and at the box office. Additionally, tnmcs have other outlets in addition to television broadcasting and theater showings for marketing their products: dvd, broadcast licensing to television and Internet firms, and merchandizing. Besides, worldwide theater exhibition is dominated by a handful of firms that have interlocking structures or production-exhibition agreements with tnmcs distributors. Philip Anschutz’s Regal Entertainment is the largest theater chain in the world, with over 7000 screens and $2.68 billion in annual revenues. amc (now owned by China-based Dalian Wanda Group) brings in some $2.6 billion a year from US, Hong Kong, and European theaters. Cinemark has almost 4000 screens located in Latin America, Japan, Taiwan, and Europe. National A ­ musements (which owns cbs, Viacom, and Paramount Pictures) runs 450 screens. Indiabased Cinepolis has theaters in Mexico and throughout Latin America, while Reliance’s big Cinema covers most of West Asia and Malaysia. A smaller transnational theater group, pvr is 40% owned by Australian-based filmmaker Village Road Show. These major exhibitors prefer tnmc products because those

30

Artz

films are heavily marketed, better recognized and preferred by large audiences, and come as part of film packages that assure exhibitors have access to many films at low cost. More importantly, the separation between production and exhibition is not as well-defined as Karashima believes. In television, media content is not haphazardly determined. “Local executives [acting] as intermediaries between viewers and exporters, decid[e] which programmes to purchase and how to schedule them based upon their own understanding of the culture” (Havens, 2006: 3). Tim Havens (2006) found that a small number of buyers filter the international flow of programming, meeting at global trade shows and television genre fairs dominated by transnational media producers who provide incentives and perks to buyers, emit promotional “buzz” for well-funded programming, and exude important business rituals which all but assure tnmc predominance in international sales and distribution (pp. 66–94). Although similar patterns of production-distribution alignment have been true for cinema, it’s about to get even tighter. Warner, Disney, Lionsgate, Universal and Paramount have partnered with amc, Regal, and Cinemark on a satellite-terrestrial digital distribution system that locks in studio productions with theater exhibitions (Giarnina, 2013). 2013 may be the last year that film prints are distributed in the U.S. and this new distribution agreement assures close collaboration and profit-sharing between producers and exhibitors. The transnational capitalist perspective that reorganized the international division of cultural labor has also rationalized the international processes of delivering movies to audiences, further consolidating the gatekeeping leadership of the tncc and its cultural hegemony. Films by major tnmcs have even more assurance of seamlessly reaching a broad public and maximizing profits. 4

The Global Culture of Consumption

A new transnational culture of consumption has grown in tandem with the new international division of cultural labor. As transnational production temporarily undermines labor identities and labor solidarity through temporary and casual labor regimes, defended by national legal systems, consciousness of social class and shared circumstances is muted. The combination of a hegemonic pull to consent for some reward and institutional coercion seeps into everyday life. Lifestyle identities attract otherwise alienated men and women (Machin & Van Leeuwen, 2007: 55). In terms of cultural hegemony, absent other more social relational identities, lifestyle norms are an appealing benefit provided by capitalist class leaders and their media. The accumulation of wealth by the tncc and its managerial and political elite has created an

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

31

international market for the affluent and their interest and ability to purchase high-end consumer goods, consume large amounts of media and culture commodities, including media technology, media content, live concerts, and travel. The Taiwanese consumer culture, for instance, “hungers for diverse Japanese and Korean imports, including mobile phones, electronics, automobiles, cosmetics, clothing, and so on” (Huang, 2012, 1: 8). Consequently, in Taiwan and globally, cosmopolitan elites attract targeted media and advertising. Transnational marketing to this social class both reflects its consuming power and reinforces its prestige and ethos as cultural trendsetters. Subsequently or simultaneously media are produced, priced, and targeted for other social classes based on the lifestyle aesthetic established by elites, contributing to capitalist cultural hegemony both materially and symbolically which is actively consented to by consumer behavior (Garnham, 1990; Lash & Urry, 1994). To reiterate two points made earlier, media both profit directly and facilitate the profit of other tncs; media produce and distribute material products, which also always contain symbolic and social meanings. tnmcs have developed separate TV stations with different languages and formats appropriate for advertisers targeting these different segments. tnmcs have likewise produced audiencespecific films, magazines, newspapers, and music genre. Chua (2006) even discerns “consumer communities” from dedicated fans to occasional consumers that parallel the uneven flows among the targeted transnational East Asian media markets, including fan clubs that are established by the celebrities or production companies themselves as a “means of sustaining consumer interest” (p. 10). Importantly, across all the national accents and social class cultural preferences, themes of consumerism and individualism predominate: independence, freedom, career success, sexual satisfaction, self-gratification, and so on, jump out from all the tnmc produced stories and narratives, serving the interests of transnational capitalism and its yearning for increased profits. On the other hand, media content production that truly represents the popular, that releases creativity and unearths narratives of solidarity for human progress, cannot be consistently expressed through tnmc programming or format; at the most, such narratives can be occasionally smuggled in. Democratic media requires upending capitalist control over production and distribution, including securing decent working conditions, higher wages, and equitable access to media production. The power of individual consumer choice is woefully inadequate for the democratic social construction of work, culture, and their meanings. Fans electing their favorite member of the Japanese idol-band AKB48 “vote” by purchasing a CD—a commercial distortion of democracy (Galbraith & Karlin, 2012b). Following the “Hello Kitty” craze in Taiwan that expressed youth resistance to regimented education and dress, candidates in

32

Artz

the presidential election campaign in Taiwan generated support and profit by marketing stuffed animals as campaign icons to non-political youth (Yang, 2010. In both cases, resistance and political expression was metaphorically available in a commodity—a weak substitute for an informed citizenry. HsinYen Yang (2010) argues that “consumer subjectivities” become a “subversive political rhetoric” because “softening the images of politics add[s] consumerist participation” into the “new vistas for local liberation” (pp. 132, 135). Consumerdriven democracy? Passing off consumer choice as democracy (or pleasure as power in some variants) is a worn-out cliché and will not hold, although noting the denigration of the electoral process to a sales contest seems accurate. More importantly, as argued earlier and demonstrated regularly around the world, the contradictions between the production and content of global capitalist culture and the experiences and conditions of life for labor and its allies will continually erupt in organized political and social resistance—washing away the pretensions of consumption as political power. For the moment, the shiny bubble of transnational entertainment predominates, attempting to cover the fragile, brittle social order with diversionary fun, games, and shopping. 5

Advertising and the Global Consumer Culture

Production of media content for magazines, newspapers, film, television, radio, and the Internet has no consequence until the article, movie, or program reaches readers and viewers, which explains why tnmcs have horizontally integrated production with distribution across companies and borders. To streamline the distribution of media content, tnmcs have ramped up their use of marketing and advertising for their own products. Self-advertising and self-promotion increase the sales of magazines, dvds, video games, mobile applications, and media-branded consumer products from cereal to clothing. Media advertising is essential to the capitalist economic cycle. Profits from production can only be realized by selling the goods. Advertising greases the production process, by influencing consumption. Advertising expenditures topped $557 billion in 2012 (Neilsen, 2013) indicating a vibrant profitable industry and illustrating its importance for all other industries. Globally, the advertising industry has consolidated like the rest of transnational capital. A handful of transnational, interlocked corporations produce and distribute advertising in alliance and consultation with other tnmcs and other transnational corporations. The largest advertising firm in the world, Dentsu Japan, controls about 30% of the market in Japan and East Asia, owns McGarryBowen (US), and recently acquired the Aegis Group, parent to the Carat and Vizeum

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

33

global media networks, expanding its presence in Europe. Dentsu’s 2012 revenue topped $22 billion. Bigger! Better! New and improved! Catch phrases by the industry seem to drive it as well: global ad giants Omnicom and Publicis Groupe merged in 2013 to become Publicis Omnicom Group (which includes ddb, bbdo, Leo Burnett, Saatchi, and other firms) with over $35 billion in assets and $23 billion in revenue. wpp is a full-service marketing-advertising firm that houses Ogilvy & Mather and Grey Advertising, ranked the top ad agency by Forbes in 2012. London-based wpp revenues are about $10 billion annually. There is no space here to provide a full accounting of the advertising industry, which is closely and directly interlocked with transnational media, finance, and consumer goods producers, including: aig, New York Times, Pepsi, PrimeMedia, Nabisco Quebecor, Lazard Freres, Target, Bain & Co., Avis, Heinz, ProQuest, National Geographic, Showtime, Gannett, cbs, Time Warner, the Annenberg School, JP Morgan Chase. The top four firms also have members active in the Trilateral Commission, the World Economic Forum, Council of Foreign Relations, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Directors and shareholders of transnational advertising corporations are part of the transnational capitalist class and fulfill an important economic and political role in securing consent for consumerism, the free market, and the production of corporate profit. Deregulation of media, which is all but complete on a global scale, has unleashed the friendly dogs of advertising. Astride neoliberalism and transnational production, advertising and entertainment media jockey for the speedy development of consumerism. From their review of dozens of studies, Hye-Jin Pack and Zhongdang Pan (2004) learned that “as the market economy develops Chinese consumers are acquiring a more positive attitude toward the quintessential capitalist message form—advertisements” (p. 492). In their own study, they found sufficient evidence of the effects of capitalism and advertising to draw “causal inferences on media impact of consumerist values” with advertising being “a vanguard of the emerging consumer society” (pp. 492–493). Media advertising directly contributes to individualistic and consumerist values, such that exposure to advertisements relates to the acceptance of conspicuous consumption, self-fulfillment, individual indulgence, and the worshipping of affluent lifestyles (p. 495). Frith and Feng (2009) reached similar conclusions in their study of women’s magazines in China, which were largely funded by fashion advertisers, including L’Oreal, Procter & Gamble, Estee Lauder, Shiseido, Kose, Unilever, and Benetton (p. 166). Across Eastern Europe and Russia, a similar neoliberal media process unfolded under the direction of tnmcs and their advertising allies (or in the case of Central European Media Enterprises directly owned by a major advertiser, Estee Lauder). Following deregulation of

34

Artz

the media, Russia became one of the most rapidly growing advertising markets in the world, leading to a search for niche audiences and diversity in entertainment for delivering advertisements (Vartanova, 2008), while public media and social and cultural needs went unfulfilled. Like media content in general, transnational advertising does not always rely on globally standardized specific messages. In most locales, advertising strategies “use well-known nationalist songs, popular commercial film actors and the sponsorship of cultural and sporting events that evoke strong national support” (Fernandes, 2000: 615). In Japan, celebrity idols actually depend on advertising campaigns to market their own careers (Galbraith & Karlin, 2012). In South Korea, K-pop music stars and their marketing managers use social media to speak to their fans about their personal lives and the products they use (Beattie, 2012). Advertising firms consciously attempt to align marketing strategies with specific national and local cultural conditions, making explicit linkages between products and targeted social classes (Fernandes, 2000). All industrial production relies ultimately on the purchase of goods and services, so advertising is crucial for maximizing profits. By influencing consumer behavior, advertising increases product sales and increases the pace of product sales. Certainly, technological changes have altered the speed of delivery of messages and product, while the accompanying transnational media flow steps up the production-consumption cycle because the near instantaneous release of media and products pushes distribution, advertising, and consumer purchasing. Specifically, the “instant obsolescence” caused by advertising campaigns for the latest, newest, or best product increases the speed of consumption (Garnham, 1990: 47). “In a culture in which all social relations and values (including the value of human life) now readily serve as convertible currencies for the marketplace, it becomes extremely difficult at time to catch sight of, let alone critique, the relations of production which underlie such processes of symbolic exchange” (Seaton, 1995). To emphasize the role of media in capitalist cultural hegemony, the ­capitalist circulation of production-distribution-consumption that expresses the process of accumulation of wealth from labor, could be amended as ­production-distribution-advertising-media production—distribution of media content with advertising—consumption. This cycle defines transnational capitalism and its media system: advertising is essential to the worldwide distribution of commodities wherever they are produced. Advertising comprises part of the economic logic of media production—audiences are produced for sale to advertisers who in turn feed audiences persuasive messages intended to increase sales of other products. Sut Jhally (1990) provides an elegant appraisal

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

35

of advertising’s role in media production in which meaning becomes a commodity as well. Advertising has become a crucial component of capitalism, but advertising does more than move products. Advertising provides a “magic system” that transforms commodities into potent social signifiers (Williams, 1980: 170). High heels become a sign of femininity, a sports car becomes a sign of masculinity. Williams explains the history of advertising as a communication practice that moved from description of quality and pricing, to a communication industry that influences the market—a system for financing media like newspapers and television and a system for persuading consumers to change their behavior. “Advertising developed to sell goods…but the material object being sold is never enough: this indeed is the crucial cultural quality of its modern forms” (pp. 182, 184). In this sense, advertising contributes mightily to capitalist cultural hegemony. Advertising whispers, asserts, and blares from far and wide that consumption brings happiness, that consumer choice demonstrates democracy, that living in a world of commodities is the best of all possible worlds. Advertising even offers financial aid to struggling economies: “Cash-strapped Spain towns a prime target for advertisers” who strike deals for landmarks, public buildings, and even iconic statues like Christopher Columbus draped in a Barcelona soccer shirt advertising Qatar Airlines (Kane, 2013: B2). Participating in an advertised and advertising culture tacitly and actively exhibits and reproduces consent for the social order of production for consumption. For transnational capitalism, the best working-class consciousness is brand consciousness, which can organize individual social practices and define identity. The dominance of the celebrity idol in Japanese advertising and media is closely connected with consumer culture, “as consumers looked to idols as models for fashioning their identity”—a “natural fit for advertisers hoping to connect their products to the image of popular performers” (Karlin, 2012: 75). In Japanese television advertising, the celebrity “functions to get the attention of the viewers, and advertising relies on the role of the star to shape audience behavior” through imitation and modeling of celebrity behavior (Karlin, 2012: 79). Advertisers spend millions because they have determined that television images are the prompt, proximity to the star is the desire, and consumer behavior is the cultural outcome. Recognizing that it is difficult to predict consumer taste, advertisers working with television producers create idol groups with many members—more than 48 in some cases—in hopes of cobbling together a large fan base from small groups of fans for individual idols within the group. The mass production and standardization of idols allows for “pseudo-individualism,” similar to the marketing of other products “just for you.” Patrick Galbraith (2012) argues

36

Artz

that the Japanese idol culture is a symptom of consumer-capitalist society: in the world of images, subject and viewing positions constantly emerge and are undermined, even as the idol is real but draws attention to her fiction, audiences experience immediacy and intensity (pp. 200–201)—largely “devoid of political or moral meaning” (Galbraith & Karlin, 2012: 18). These pleasurable movements and desires are facilitated and exploited by advertisers using entertainment, a vital part of the cultural hegemony of consumer capitalism. Celebrating men and women as consumers who think, feel, and act in “selfmotivated, self-interested, and self-reflexive ways” (Dunn, 2008: 79) only shuffles individualism to the top of the deck; it does nothing to build democracy or the solidarity necessary for a less commercial, more humane social order. Advertising does not seek satisfaction; advertising promotes continuous dissatisfaction that can only momentarily be suspended by some immediate purchase of a commodity. If one purchase provided satisfaction, further ­purchases would not be necessary. But advertising, and the capitalist commodity system that relies on its persuasive appeals, must have continuous, n ­ ever-ending, ever-expanding consumption. Desire in advertising and televised images of celebrities can only be reached in the imagination. The permanent lack of actual fulfillment contributes to alienation, which quickly returns after each purchase. In Japan, for instance, celebrity idols are “replaced regularly and endlessly, even destroyed only to be recreated, thereby fueling the continuous movement of capital (Galbraith, 2012: 194). 6

Consent and Consumerism

The dehumanizing essence of capitalism could not be revealed more starkly: human needs and human desires are manipulated as a means to harvest consumer fodder for the never-ending demand for capitalist profits. Obviously, actually satisfying human needs and desires is anathema to such a system. Westinghouse used to produce appliances that would last for decades or longer; to make more profit and keep up with their capitalist competitors, Westinghouse appliances are now made with the expectation of 18-month replacement. Organizing production more rationally for human needs would provide appliances and other goods that work well, last long, and minimize their environmental impact. The marketing of mobile devices provides another clear example of the drive for consumption over rational use. Advertising goods to meet media-instigated consumer wants diverts U.S. from rational public conversations on what kind of world we could devise. Advertising and media entertainment—the twin-headed monster of consumerism has roamed

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

37

the world for decades searching for audiences and consumers, suffocating attempts at human-centered communication. In the 21st century, they finally dominate global culture. Advertising, news, entertainment, and other mediated communication practices in the 21st Century are organized and directed globally by transnational media companies. As transnational industrial enterprises, tnmcs globalize, localize, and rationalize their chains of production and distribution. As producers of media content—communication and symbolic meaning—tnmcs must also produce and distribute narratives, images, and ideologies that will attract audiences as consumers and citizens as participants in the global culture of individualism, authority, and consumerism. The current structure of global media determines the production of audiences and products for private profit, creating media content promoting social and cultural norms amenable to transnational capitalism. For now, without access to mass media, absent alternative cultural practices and meanings, middle class audiences give at least tacit consent to the consumer culture and bureaucratic, authoritarian politics. Hegemony can never be secure for transnational capitalism, however. Every act of production creates social inequality. The drive for profit at the expense of the world working classes and to the devastation of the global environment inevitably creates resistance and the possibility for alternative, more humane social relations. Yet, as the daily experience of citizens conflicts with neoliberal practices and the ideologies expressed in global media programming resistance erupts. From Venezuela and Bolivia, to Tunis and Egypt, and elsewhere, new social movements for justice have and will arise. In the process of resistance and transformation, a new cultural hegemony of democracy, solidarity, and social justice appears on offer. Bibliography Alper, L., & Lestyna, P. (Producers). (2005). Class dismissed: How TV frames the working class [Videorecording]. United States. Media Education Foundation. Artz, L. (2015). Telenovelas: Television stories for our global times. Perspectives on Global Development, 14.1–2, 193–226. Artz, L. (2007). Review. Cultures in orbit: Satellites and the televisual. Lisa Parks. International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics, 3(1), 99–102. Artz, L., & B.O. Murphy (2000). Cultural hegemony in the United States. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Beattie, A.C. (2012, June 11). Marketing’s next wave: The Korean pop star. Advertising Age, 83, 6.

38

Artz

Bettig, R. (1997). Copyrighting culture: The political economy of intellectual property. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Bodden, M. (2005). Rap in Indonesian youth music of the 1990s: Globalization, outlaw genres, and social protest. Asian Music, 36(2), 1–26. Bourdieu, P. (1987). What makes a social class? On the theoretical and practical existence of groups. Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 32, 1–117. Bourdieu, P. (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Butsch, R. (2003). Ralph, Fred, Archie, and Homer: Why television keeps recreating the white male working-class buffoon. In G. Dines & J.M. Humez (Eds.), Gender, race, and class in media: A text reader (pp. 575–585). ThousandOaks, CA: Sage. Chibber, V. (2013, May). Marxism, post-colonialism studies, and the tasks of radical theory. Interview by J. Farbman. International Socialist Review, 89. Retrieved June27, 2013, from http://isreview.org/issue/89/marxism-postcolonialstudies-and-tasksradical-theory. Chua, B.H. (2006, March 16). East Asian pop culture: Consumer communities and politics of the national. Presentation to Cultural Space and the Public Sphere in Asia Conference. Seoul, Korea. Davis, D.W., & E.Y. Yeh (2008). East Asian screen industries. London: British Film Institute. Derné, S.D. (2008). Globalization on the ground: New media and the transformation of culture, class, and gender in India. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Dines, G., & J.M. Humez (Eds.). (2010). Gender, race, and class in the media: A critical reader. 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Dunn, R.G. (2008). Identifying consumption: Subjects and objects in consumer society. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Fernandes, L. (2000). Nationalizing “the global”: media images, cultural politics, and the middle class in India. Media, Culture & Society, 22(5), 611–628. Frith, K., & Y. Feng (2009). Transnational cultural flows: An analysis of women’s magazines in China. Chinese Journal of Communication, 2(2), 158–173. Fröbel, F., J. Heinrichs, & O. Kreye (2004). The new international division of labour. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Frost, S., & M. Wong (2007, September). Monitoring Mattel in China. Asian Monitor Resource Centre. Retrieved from http://www.amrc.org.hk/alu_article/codes_of _conducts/monitoring_mattel_in_china. Galbraith, P.W. 2012. Idols: The image of desire in Japanese consumer capitalism. In P.W. Galbraith & J.G. Karlin (Eds), Idols and celebrity in Japanese media culture (pp. 185–206). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Galbraith, P.W., & J.G. Karlin (Eds.) 2012a. Idols and celebrity in Japanese media culture. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Global Media Practices and Cultural Hegemony

39

Galbraith, P.W., & J.G. Karlin 2012. Introduction: The mirror of idols and celebrity. In P.W. Galbraith & J.G. Karling (Eds.), Idols and celebrity in Japanese media culture (pp. 1–32). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Garnham, N. 1990. Capitalism and communication: Global culture and the economics of information. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Golding, P., & G. Murdock 1991. Culture, communications, and political economy. In J. Curran & M. Gurevitch, (Eds.), Mass media and society (pp. 15–32). London: Edward Arnold. Govil, N. 2007. Bollywood and the frictions of global mobility. In D.K. Thussu (Ed.), Media on the move: Global flow and contra flow (pp. 84–99). New York: Routledge. Gramsci, A. 2000. The Antonio Gramsci reader: Selected writings, 1916–1935. D. Forgacs, (Ed.). New York: New York University Press. Gramsci, A. 2011. Antonio Gramsci: Prison notebooks. Vols. 1–3. J.A. Buttigieg, Trans. New York: Columbia University Press. Harvey, D. 1999. The limits to capital. 2nd edn. New York: London. Havens, T. 2006. Global television marketplace. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hendy, D. 2013. Public service broadcasting. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hollifield, A. 1993, August. The globalization of Eastern Europe’s print media: German investment during the post-revolution era. Paper presented at Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication. Kansas City, Missouri. Huang, S. 2011. Nation-branding and transnational consumption: Japan-mania and the Korean wave in Taiwan. Media, Culture & Society, 33(1), 3–18. Jhally, S. 1990. The codes of advertising: Fetishism and the political economy of meaning in the consumer society. New York: Routledge. Kane, C. 2013, June 28. Cash-strapped Spanish towns a prime target for advertisers. Chicago Tribune, p. D2. Karlin, J.G. 2012. Through a looking glass darkly: Television advertising, idols, and the making of fan audiences. In P.W. Galbraith & J.G. Karlin, (Eds.), Idols and celebrity in Japanese media culture (pp. 72–93). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Keane, M., A.Y.H. Fung, & A. Moran 2007. New television, globalization, and the East Asian cultural imagination. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Koikkalainen, K. 2007. The local and the international in Russian business journalism: Structures and practices. Europe-Asia Studies, 59(8), 1315–1329. Machin, D., & T. Van Leeuwen 2007. Global media discourse: A critical introduction. New York: Routledge. Marx, W.D. 2012. The jimusha system: Understanding the production logic of the Japanese entertainment industry. In P.W. Galbraith & J.G. Karlin (Eds.), Idols and celebrity in Japanese media culture (pp. 35–55)). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Miller, T., N. Govil, J. McMurria, R. Maxwell, & T. Wang 2005. Global Hollywood 2. London: British Film Institute.

40

Artz

Mosco, V. 2009. The political economy of communication. 2nd ed. Los Angeles, CA: Sage. Nielsen. 2013, April 11. Global ad spends grows 3.2% in 2012. Retrieved from http:// www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2013/global-ad-spendgrows-3.2-percent-in -2012.html. Paek, H., & Z. Pan 2004. Spreading global consumerism: Effects of mass media and marketing on consumerist values in China. Mass Communication and Society, 7(4), 491–515. Poster, M. 2008. Global media and culture. New Literary History, 39(3), 685–703. Robinson, W.I. 2004. A theory of global capitalism: Production, class, and state in a transnational world. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Sassoon, A.S. 1987. Gramsci’s politics. 2nd edn. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Schiller, D. 1999. Digital capitalism: Networking the global market system. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Schiller, H. 1976. Communication and cultural domination. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press. Therborn, G. 1983. Why some classes are more successful than others. New Left Review, 138, 37–55. Therborn, G. 2008. What does the ruling class do when it rules?: State apparatuses and state power under feudalism, capitalism and socialism. London: Verso. Thussu, D.K. 2000. International communication: Continuity and change. London: Arnold. Vartanova, E. 2008. Russian media: Market and technology as driving forces of change. In E. Vartanova, H. Nieminen, & M. Salminen (Eds.), Russian media 2007: Convergence and competition (pp. 20–31). Helsinki: Communication Research Center, University of Helsinki. Retrieved from http://www.hssaatio.fi/images/stories/­tiedostot/ RUSSIAN%20MEDIA%202008%20%20EXTRACTS%2020%20NOVEMBER% 202008.pdf. Vujnovic, M. 2008. The political economy of Croatian television: Exploring the impact of Latin American telenovelas. Communications, 33(4), 431–454. Williams, R. 1980. Problems in Materialism and Culture. London: Verso.

Chapter 2

The Return of Radical Humanism in Marxism and Anarchism? The Art of Refusal, Resistance and Humility Nick Stevenson Writing a few short years ago cultural critic Mark Fisher (2007: 7) coined the term ‘capitalist realism’. What this phrase was able to capture was the current failure to imagine an alternative to the ‘realism’ of the economic system. Capitalist realism suggested the only economics or culture that was possible worked within the confines of the current economic system. The defeat of the Miner’s Strike in 1984–85 and the erasure of an irreverent popular culture (mostly punk and post-punk) that acted as an alternative to the ‘mainstream’ has led to the normalization of capitalism. Such are the dominating features of late capitalism that saturate the life-world of most of the population we have to turn to the mental ill-health of those who can not or will not subordinate themselves to the requirements of the system to locate possibilities for resistance. These ideas that focus on the kinds of psychic rupture required to disrupt the system have their origins in previous waves of theory that sought to capture the ability of dominant ideologies to entirely saturate the social with their norms and meanings. This usually leads to an attempt to locate a form of subjectivity that is dysfunctional to the workings of the system. Felix Guattari (2000: 21) (who appears to have had a profound influence upon Fisher) argues that capitalism seeks to produce a ‘normalized subjectivity’ mostly through the media of mass communication to ensure the efficient working of the system. The mentally ill potentially provide a site of resistance in addition to the opening of alternative subject positions and experimentation with new more discordant forms of knowledge. The rupture within capitalism will not emerge through new laws or bureaucratic norms but with creative avant-garde artists seeking to develop new forms of expression and modes of being. The requirement for more dissident subjectivities then emerges within a context where most people have become entirely domesticated by the dominant consumer society. These somewhat bleak conclusions forget the lessons that are apparent within some of the writing associated with Marxist humanism and anarchism. The deep sense of pessimism concerning the incorporation of human subjects into an oppressive system is linked to the need for avant-gardist strategies to

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_004

42

Stevenson

shock them out of their complicity. Such views historically tend to lead to elite formations of intellectuals becoming detached from the more ordinary processes of campaigning or indeed the everyday labor of social movements. Such a move is heavily invested in modernist and often elitist attempts to shock people out of their supposed normality as opposed to the attempt to listen and ­actively engage with the struggles of ordinary people. In this scenario, the Marxist intellectual always knows what is best for the people often without the need to form complex dialogic relationships, and without the need to do the work of formulating potentially popular programs to improve the life of the most oppressed citizens. Alternatively the anarchist and Marxist humanists traditions I would like to recover were more concerned to look how a different society could potentially emerge, but only over long periods of time and presumably after a number of set-backs and sometimes crushing defeats. The English anarchist Colin Ward (1973) argued that ultimately a more democratic or free society of the future will have to emerge out of the practices of the present. In other words, it is not clear what kind of alternative we are imaging if we argue that the social is entirely dominated by authoritarian practices and repressive ideologies. In this respect, anarchists have historically sought to point to the dangers of organizing resistance along hierarchical lines and insisting most of us no matter how dominated have the potential for some direct action. Colin Ward (1973: 35) argues the ‘habit of direct action is the habit of wrestling back power the power to make decisions affecting us from them’. The anarchist tradition has gone to great lengths to point to how the hierarchies of everyday life systematically seek to thwart human creativity and potential to run our lives more democratically. This simple, but I would argue deeply significant observation, means that we need to be careful of ­Marxist or other critical theories that can only speak the language of domination and control. As Ward (1973: 55) suggests most people ‘go from womb to tomb without ever realizing their human potential, precisely because the power to intiate, to participate in innovating, choosing, judging and deciding is reserved for the top men’. Here I want to preserve the essential insights of these radical humanistic ideas that arguably cross over the anarchist and Marxist traditions. For example, E.P. Thompson (2014a: 66) in arguing for socialist humanism famously rejected the authoritarian socialism evident in the Soviet Union and the hierarchical principles of the Communist Party as they failed to recognize that people ‘are part agents, part victims: it is precisely the element of agency which distinguishes them from the beasts, which is the human part of man, and which it is the business of our consciousness to increase’. Both Ward and Thompson as libertarian socialists sought to highlight the extent to which human agents are capable of resistance and alternatives within the context of sometimes cruel and

The Return of Radical Humanism in Marxism and Anarchism?

43

a­ uthoritarian societies. This is not to argue that they did not both have their failings. Both were often too dismissive of the work done by social democratic parties and trade unions in restraining capitalism, but this is probably more evident from the position of the neoliberal 21st century. They did however offer a rich vein of argument that continues to point to the possibility of alternatives beyond the capacity of capitalism to entirely rule the lives of ordinary citizens. These features potentially extend the argument about capitalism beyond questions of hegemony. As Gramsci (1971: 161) had previously argued ‘hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed – in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic corporate kind’. The dominant understanding in cultural Marxism following Gramsci was to talk of the negotiated rule rather than the absolute authority of the ruling class. These arguments had a tremendous impact upon the development of media and cultural studies during the 1980s and beyond. Instead of simply describing the ideology evident within the news or popular culture researchers sought to look at more subcultural and ­everyday forms of resistance. Dick Hebdige’s (1979) work aimed to spell out the creativity of different subcultural groups (notably punk) in face of the policing of the dominant society. Similarly Raymond Williams (1980: 43) reminded us of the power of Gramsci’s idea of hegemony by arguing that while of course the capitalist class still rules we should remember that ‘no dominant culture, in reality exhausts the full range of human practice, human energy, human intention’. The challenge that ‘capitalist realism’ poses to these frameworks is what happens if in the context of the decline and defeat of the labor movement and a number of alternative sub-cultures when all oppositional practices have become absorbed into the dominant culture? Similarly political theorist Wendy Brown (2010) argues that democracy everywhere seems to be in crisis, but that this is largely met by apathy and public disinterest. The merging together of corporate power and the state has meant that state power is largely interconnected with the accumulation projects of capitalism. The assault of neoliberal rationality has turned elections into personality contests while subjecting social and cultural life to the crude calculus of the balance sheet. Here we need to ask the question as to whether citizens ‘have come to prefer moralizing, c­ onsuming, conforming, luxuriating, fighting, simply being told what to be, think, and do over the task of authoring their own lives’ (Brown 2010: 55). Wendy Brown is asking what if people do not wish to be free and prefer authoritarian rule from above? Here we need to tread carefully as we have been down this road before. ­Herbert Marcuse (1972) had proposed in the 1960s that the capitalist system could both a­ ccommodate sustained forms of criticism by social ­movements while

44

Stevenson

i­ rradicating ­oppositional thought and practice. A technological and c­ onsumer oriented society where the mass media has been brought ­under control of ­consumer capitalism based upon rising standards of living has nullified the interests of the masses in an alternative society. Key in this respect had been the loss in ‘the power of negative thinking – the critical power of Reason’ ­(Marcuse 1972: 23). Within the control society the dominance of the consumer society defines progress as more of the same while incorporating previously oppositional forces like the labor movement into the system. These arguments were of course mirrored by Althusser who tended to explore the importance of external laws, structures and ideologies to the detriment of the creativity of the human subject (Elliott 1993). Here again however we need to remember E.P. Thompson’s radical humanism (Stevenson 2017). In Thompson’s (1995) book length essay he takes Althusser to task for his neglect of history, the division between science and ideology, failure to consider questions of agency and morality, and for neglecting to question the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninism such as the leading role of the revolutionary party. However, it is overwhelmingly Thompson’s distaste with Althusser’s attack on humanism for offering a naïve view of the subject that attracts his ire. Missing from Althusseur’s account of the power of structures is the possibility of human-beings pushing back against the structures of domination and control from above. We need to remind ourselves that despite the considerable gains of capital and the state in recent years that the project for greater autonomy and democracy remains a permanent feature of modern society. Indeed what critics like Colin Ward and E.P. Thompson remind us is that the capacity for increased freedom, autonomy and democracy being won by movements from below should act as a form of hope against the prevailing disposition of cynical indifference. In their analysis, there was no necessary end point in the struggle against authoritarianism or for that matter an entirely libertarian society. Instead there are always opportunities to expand the meaning practice of freedom and democracy in the context of the present. There is something too neat and tidy about the continual stress on the power of elites to control the masses through the media of mass communication. Modern technological capitalism has ­instituted a complex web of power relationships and points of contestation and resistance where we cannot assume that identities have always been incorporated into the system. Indeed radicals who argue this view are more often than not expressing their own sense of frustration and disappointment about the lack of radical change and the increasing power of corporate capitalism. The problem is that considered more politically such views are disabling and prevent the energy necessary to get more involved in everyday forms of citizenship and struggle. There are of course no guarantees that such ventures will succeed and yet the on-going struggle for control over work-places, civic spaces and

The Return of Radical Humanism in Marxism and Anarchism?

45

a number of other ­institutions is a reminder that they are unlikely to be finally defeated. As Rebecca Solnit (2000) argues it is an important task for those of us on the political Left not to say that we are certain to succeed in our task of building a more democratic society, but that without effort there really is no hope of something better. Similarly Noam Chomsky (2012: 308) argues that there are no magic solutions to the problems posed by corporate globalization other than to try and build sustained forms of resistance on the part of political parties and more grassroots social movements. This is less the need for charismatic individuals celebrated by the media or indeed intellectual avant-gardism, but is instead the dedicated work of citizens working together for change over relatively long periods of time. This answer is unlikely to satisfy those looking for instantaneous solutions or who engage in a form of ultra-­Leftism demanding rapid revolutionary change. It does imply however that there is no need to exaggerate the power of the system over our capacity to seek change. 1

The Radical Politics of Refusal

Here I want to question the idea that the dominant culture of our times has been as successful as critics like Brown, Guattari, Marcuse and more recently Fisher claim. It is indeed characteristic of those on the Left to be gloomy about the prospect of radical social change and then to blame the media of mass communication. There is among many Left activists a sense that they are continually marginalized and stereotyped by capitalist run media outlets. This is of course true, but here I want to think whether the continual emphasis upon questions of ideological control serves to displace other features that are perhaps just as significant. These questions have been eloquently raised within media studies by approaches that have highlighted an everyday cynicism and disinterest when it comes to much media content (Couldry, Livingstone and Markham 2010). Indeed instead of the control society I think that those of us who maintain an interest in critical theory need to do some rethinking in this respect. It is not that control does not exist through the media of mass communication, but more that we need to be careful that this does not become overstated. As radical democrats or Marxists instead of stressing ideological incorporation we need to become more alive to the complexity of different forms of contestation and resistance. The critical thinker on the Left most alive to these questions was Stuart Hall. Hall was a powerful strategic thinker receptive to the ideological complexity and historical contingency of hegemonic modes of domination. In this ­respect, Hall (1988: 127) was especially sensitive to the ‘steady and u ­ nremitting

46

Stevenson

set of operations designed to bind or construct a popular consent to these new forms of statist authoritarianism’. Stuart Hall’s project had two intellectual prongs. The first was to take the popular forces of the New Right seriously as a means to gain and win popular consent among the working-class. Within this Hall was an acute critic of what he termed law and order solutions or what he preferred to call ‘authoritarian populism’. It was the ability of the New Right to ideologically connect the idea that there had been a moral break down (evident within permissiveness, crime and the decline in authority) with free market solutions that informed much of his writing. The other strand in Hall’s argument concerned the inability of fellow Marxists and social democrats to respond adequately to the crisis. If the New Right had been able to successfully invade popular common sense then the Left had not taken the ideological and cultural struggle seriously. It had either mistakenly assumed that worsening economic conditions would eventually turn ‘the people’ toward the Left or that a trade union based politics assembled around a defense of the welfare state would eventually win through against the assault of the Right. Stuart Hall (2017a: 221) argues in this respect that the ‘one thing nobody knows is what Labour conceives to be an ‘alternative way of life’. It currently possesses no image of modernity. It provides no picture of life under socialism. It has failed so far to construct an alternative ‘philosophy’ of socialism for modern times’. In Gramscian terms then the struggle for an alternative and more democratic society was ultimately a cultural and semiotic struggle. As I have already indicated questions related to hegemony have a considerable advantage over other forms of ideological critique the extent to which they allow for ideological struggle. Indeed Hall (2017b: 173) persistently argued against what he called ‘economisms’ that sought to reduce every historical moment to a crisis in the economy. Instead he implored progressives to explore the extent to which such questions became refracted through the political sphere that during the early 1980s had become increasingly captured by the New Right. Hall then was a brilliant strategic thinker in terms of the forces that the Left needed to engage with in order to revise and renew social democracy in the context of new times. However despite these considerable insights, the question whether Hall also overstates the power of ideology in cementing the citizen to the social order is worth exploring. It is true that Hall (1988) was especially sensitive to the contradictory nature of ideology and had a well-developed distaste of Left puritanism. Especially significant here was his ability to unsettle those who were sympathetic to his arguments. He reminded fellow radicals that they too could have similar desires to their opponents. Hall (1988: 165) comments that ‘we’re all one hundred per cent committed. But every now and then – Saturday mornings, perhaps, just before the demonstration – we go to Sainsbury’s and

The Return of Radical Humanism in Marxism and Anarchism?

47

we’re just a tiny bit of a Thatcherite subject’. However as Terry Eagleton (1996) has implied sometimes Hall’s writing was overly complicit with the pleasures of the new consumerism and did not explore enough more material questions related to class and the environment. Perhaps more critically there is a considerable concern in other sources that Hall has overstated the extent to which the New Right had become hegemonic (Jessop et al. 1984). This is undoubtedly true, as is the argument that many working-class voters remain deferential to those in positions of power and authority. These features are radically underestimated by those who presume that the political is simply a matter of semiotics and the construction of pleasing and popular images and perspectives. The role that deference and hierarchy continues to play in societies built on the unequal distribution of power should not be underestimated. While Hall seeks to provide an updated Marxism for the consumer age he perhaps does not spend enough time looking at some of the more consistent and persistent features of capitalism. If capitalism is built upon assumptions about hierarchy and status then perhaps the same can also be said about certain strands of Marxism? Given the shadow that Marxism casts over the twentieth century we also need to consider how it became implicated in a system of domination and control. In this respect, Ivan Illich (1976: 148) argues that both capitalism and state ­communism worked through ideas of underdevelopment of the ability of the economy to produce a life of fridges, cars and stereos. Illich (1976: 149) goes on to argue that what is actually required is a ‘cultural revolution’. By this he means not only arguments about the public funding of institutions such as schools and hospitals, but instead we need to think carefully about a set of hierarchical relationships that predominate within these institutions. Illich (1976: 153) argues that the education system is routinely involved in the ‘production of inferiority’ this is because mainstream schooling is involved in the sorting and grading of school children with those least able being branded as failures. Notably Illich is concerned to explore the links between schools and development ideology, but what mostly concerns him is a coercive set of institutional relationships that down grades the autonomy of the learner. Similarly James C. Scott (2012: 70) argues even if we wish to defend universal public education we should seek to recognize the extent to which it produces loyal and obedient citizens as well as industrious and efficient workers for the economy. Dominant institutions tend to imperfectly produce cultural dispositions within the population that are the opposite of the supposed virtues required by democratic citizens. If the citizen has mostly sought to survive in a world ruled by hierarchy then they are unlikely to become independent minded critical citizens the minute they enter the political sphere. The suspicion remains that beyond the ­importance of

48

Stevenson

a critical public sphere that is able to interrogate dominant forms of hegemony many citizens find themselves living much of their lives within institutions that reward obedience and servility. The question I wish to pose in this essay is that despite the undoubted insights of Marxism especially when it comes to the centrality of questions of class in a world ruled by profit that ultimately it has overstated the importance of ideology when it comes to explaining the cohesiveness of class based societies. To repeat the question I wish to explore is whether the hierarchical social relations that we can still find within the family, work-place, school and other institutions are not more significant than questions of ideology when it comes to seeking to understand relations of domination within society more generally. Of course there is no final theoretical answer to this question as it will depend upon the exploration of social contexts. However the question remains as to whether a great deal of Marxist thinking has not overstated the power and importance of ideology in seeking to explain why societies built upon domination continue to cohere. There are perhaps good reasons why some Marxists (although not all) have failed to address this question. For example, Richard Day (2005) has argued that the idea of hegemony is now exhausted. Here the argument is that critical Left perspectives need to reject ‘the hegemony of hegemony’ (Day 2005: 8). By this Day means that we are now at the end of Marxism and need to reject the project whereby oppositional forces seek to establish an alternative hegemony and eventually draw upon state power in order to impose a socialist program. More important is to break with the desire to be dominated. This is an explicitly anarchistic rejection of Marxism and its insights into the way that power operates in the context of a class dominated society. More fundamentally missing from Marxism is a consideration of the ways in which ideas of hierarchy and centralized control becomes normalized through ideas related to the revolutionary party. Murray Bookchin (2004: 109) similarly argues that the Bolshevik revolution ultimately ended in ‘replacing one system of domination and hierarchy by another’. Here arguments around the need for leaders and vanguards and of course the idea of the working class as the leading agent of change in all historical circumstances are all open to question. Indeed what became prized by many Marxists historically was the workers so called respect for hierarchy if only within the revolutionary party. In this sense, Bookchin argues that a number of youth cultural developments during the 1960s had a considerable radical potential the extent to which they turn against hierarchical social relationships. There are then potentially two traditions that can be linked back to Marx. The first seeks to privilege hierarchy, centralization and homogeneity whereas the other more libertarian in orientation looks at the possibilities for self-management, mutual aid and more

The Return of Radical Humanism in Marxism and Anarchism?

49

local forms of ­control in opposition to rule from above by an often distant authority. The aim of more libertarian socialists from a number of different traditions including M ­ arxism and anarchism is to abolish the rule of hierarchy and develop the principle of decentralized self-management as far as possible. Here some of the language and assumptions of Lennist-Marxism needs to be more ­critically interrogated. Of course the problem with posing the question is this way is that it opposes the virtues of liberatarian socialism against the corruptions of Marxism and social democracy. Indeed such arguments would inevitably end with the cancellation of more social democratic projects which have historically won a number of significant rights for working-class people. E. P. Thompson (1978) makes a powerful argument in this respect against a kind of Left purism which insists that the working-class are somehow always involved in the wrong struggles at the wrong time. Thompson was deeply critical of a Marxist analysis that simply dismissed the achievements of working-class struggle like those found in the construction of public health and welfare systems as somehow acting as a ‘defense-mechanism of the capitalist organisation’ (Thompson 1978: 144). While it is equally problematic to view these achievements as being necessarily steps along the road to socialism these institutions stand as testimony to what can be achieved through resistance against the imperatives of capitalism. In this respect, Thompson (1978: 146) (like Stuart Hall) argued for the need to view capitalism less as a closed system, but more ‘a matrix of possibilities for the actualization of human relations’. It was then within the often contradictory conditions of the present we could meaningfully talk about the capacity of human agents to flourish and live good lives. Perry Anderson (1976) reviewing of the history of Western Marxism argues that for all of its philosophical brilliance it failed to connect with the horizons of the working-class. While there were some exceptions to this rule like Antonio Gramsci and Raymond Williams mostly Western Marxism had concerned itself with more philosophical questions. Here I would want to take this observation further by suggesting that such problems can be related to deeper themes within Marxism. Despite Marx’s philosophical brilliance his writing is often more concerned to describe the workings of the capitalist system than it is with the capacity of the working-class to organize resistance from below. For example, Marx’s (1968) ‘Wages, Price, Profit’ is written as if he had discovered the scientific working of capitalism as a system. Indeed much of Marx’s (1995) Capital is written in a similar way with the addition of some less abstract discussions concerning the struggle over the working-day. For Marx capital remains ‘dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour’ (Marx 1995: 148). Marx is however clear that these processes are resisted by

50

Stevenson

the Chartist movement and working-class agitation for a 10 hour day (Marx 1995: 171). C.L.R. James (2009) is right that Marx is aware of the potential of the working-class to revolt against rule from above. In Marx’s description capital is mainly concerned to create surplus value and in doing so exploit the labor power of the workers. Despite the Enlightenment and the development of the ‘Rights of Man’ in the French and American Revolutions, Marx is arguing that more significant in terms of human freedom is the battle against the rule of capital and the emergence of the factory based civilization. Proletarian’s resisting the intensification of labor evident within the factory workers are involved in an act of refusal to which capital will need in turn to respond. However it is no exaggeration to argue that despite these qualifications that Marx’s socalled mature writing is more focused upon the workings of capitalism as a system than working class agency. As Castoriadis (1987: 15) points out the central contradiction within capitalist modernity for Marx is between the forces and relations of production. This contradiction within some of Marx’s more mechanistic writing inevitably leads to the down fall of capitalism. The problem is that too much of Marx’s writing ignores the impact of the class struggle and human agency upon the development of society. If capitalism produces reification, alienation and domination this can never be fully successful as even for the most subjugated there are opportunities to preserve their human dignity. What continues to matter in this context is not only questions of organization and resistance in the present, but equally an awareness of working-class history and memory of previous struggles against the rule of capital. Missing from Marx’s analysis was sufficient emphasis upon the creativity inherent within working-class struggles against the rule of capital. E.P. Thompson (1978: 143) argues that Marx’s great insight was to grasp the dynamism and inner workings of capitalism as a system. However while recognizing this as a major step forward we need to be alive to different traditions of social struggle. This means that the opposition between reformism and revolution is often unhelpful where instead we need to carefully look more historically at the ways the struggle against the rule of capital has changed over time. Ultimately what matters in this respect is working-class organization and pressure. For Thompson (1978: 152) it is ‘the recognition of man’s dual role, as victim and as agent, in the making of his own history is crucial’. We can perhaps leave for another time how much of a mechanistic thinker Marx was, but what is undoubtedly the case is the need for radicals to hold onto the possibility of change emerging against the imperatives of capitalism and a hierarchically organized society. However if Marxism is to maintain its relevance to our contemporary world dominated by capitalism it will need to become not only

The Return of Radical Humanism in Marxism and Anarchism?

51

a philosophy of praxis, but also a way of thinking that is able to connect to the creativity of the class struggle. In addition, we also need to recognize the sorry tale of how Marxism became the means to reaffirm the dominance of state socialist societies. The argument that we can always assume that Marxism is on the side of the oppressed does not bare much critical scrutiny. Here we should remember George Orwell’s scepticism concerning the abstraction of much Marxism and for the way it became complicit in the power politics of the 1930s. Orwell (1968) after his experiences in Spain, often described himself as a democratic socialist and as a supporter of the Labour Party, but he remained especially sensitive to people on the Left who were attracted by totalitarianism. In this sense, Orwell’s observations are similar to those of Czeslaw Milosz’s (1981) arguments seeking to explain how a specific class of Marxist intellectuals in the 1930s became gripped by the confines of totalitarian thought. Milosz (1981: 11) describes how a certain brand of Marxism became caught up with descriptions of humanity not ‘as it is, but as it should be’. For Orwell and Milosz many Communist intellectuals during the 1930s dismissed non-Marxist thought as a form of decadence and more independent forms of thinking were similarly disdainfully dismissed. The historian Tony Judt (2010: 179) has commented in this respect that Milosz’s observations are near to the mark in the European setting. Orwell in this respect remains historically significant not only for his anti-Communism, but also his defense of a culture of independent and critical thinking that can be traced back to Enlightenment based concerns to defend individualism against conformist or group thinking. Notably such features are often missing from arguments about counter-hegemonic strategies that often presume there is a correct way of understanding the current crisis that needs to be reproduced by intellectuals and then offered to the masses. It is not of course that political parties seeking to struggle for more humane alternatives should not offer different ways of understanding the world, but the language of hegemony and counter-hegemony can overstate the internal coherence of ideological conflicts. 2

Radical Humanistic Revolt?

More recently the arrival of the alter-globalization movement has made some radical and innovative moves in this respect. The crisis of capitalism here is met less with revolutionary vanguards, but with vertical movements and passionate forms of protest. These movements have explicitly rejected the idea of ‘taking power’ but have sought to open critical spaces for dialogue and discussion.

52

Stevenson

In this respect, there has been an explicit attempt to reinvent Marxism for the global and information age. John Holloway (2016) has recently outlined the problems with a Marxism that begins from the point of view of domination. In doing this we become ourselves dominated by a theory of domination. Instead Holloway suggests that we start from the position of the global anti-­capitalist movement. That is we begin from the shared recognition that unless we break with capitalism then this is likely to lead to the destruction of humanity, and that as anti-capitalists we wish to revolt against this system because we aim to recapture our dignity. In other words, that we revolt against such a system means that we already have dignity. That in terms of more humanistic traditions within Marxism we revolt not because we are entirely alienated, but because we have human potential and capacities that cannot be satisfied by the system as it currently stands. This view has a deep similarity with E.P. Thompson’s (2014a) argument that socialist humanism needed to recover ethical components from Marxism after state socialism. Marxism then is less about theoretical abstractions but should be explicitly engaged with the moral frameworks of community, co-operation, creativity and self-management. Marxism as a humanism starts from the position that the people always have a ‘latent’ potential for different forms of social life that cannot be satisfied by authoritarian forms of politics. Notably such a position recognizing the creativity of ordinary people and the on-going capacity to make suggestions and democratic interventions is deeply critical of the more pessimistic strains of analysis we encountered earlier. In Holloway’s (2016) terms these features suggest that the anti-capitalist revolts against the system start from our potential to become more than who we are at present. In this respect, rather than starting our analysis from the system we need to recognize our intrinsic creativity and shared humanity. As Castoriadis (1987: 16) argues if capital is organized in such a way that it is compelled to ‘dehumanize’ human labor by turning it into a commodity then human beings if they are to become autonomous will need to resist this process. That we are not entirely (nor could we ever be) dominated by the law of capital means that we maintain our capacity to refuse the rule of capital. Elsewhere Castoriadis (1997a: 250) argues that the struggle for a more autonomous society is built upon the principle of self-management and requires different forms of cultural expression. These new forms of human creation need to take place through ideas of self-limitation given the need to recognize our global inter-dependence upon one another in an age of ecological fragility. A central question would become how we satisfy our needs and desires in ways whereby we increasingly govern ourselves, but simultaneously recognize limits to economic growth. The humanist revolt is based upon the possibility

The Return of Radical Humanism in Marxism and Anarchism?

53

and not certainty of human agency and creativity to resist the rule of capital and to invent alternatives. The broader anti-capitalist movement continues to speak for human creativity the extent to which they organize against and resist the rule of capital. The rule of capital is not only resisted in terms of a narrow range of objectives in terms of improving our economic position, but because they seek to resist the extent to which capital can impose its ideas and mostly instrumental objectives from above. As historian E.P. Thompson (2014b) demonstrated right at the beginning of the rule of capitalism in the eighteenth century it was not built upon inert material we might call workers. Thompson’s studies of this period aimed to reveal that there was a common culture among the English working-class that spoke of the moral freedoms that included the rule of law, the case for democratic representation within parliament and other features. Through this ‘anti-authoritarian’ inheritance the English resisted the rule of capital and was able to ‘make’ itself into a class (Thompson 2014b: 293). Thompson (1978: 175) in this respect is especially critical of intellectual traditions that dismiss the experience of social movements and the creativity of their participants as he claims to have ‘learned, from particular working people, about values, of solidarity, of mutuality, of scepticism before received ideological “truths”, which I would have found it difficult to discover in other ways, from the given intellectual culture’. The revolts against the rule of capital then had no necessary route through historical experience but were shaped by different historical events and experiences that are often local in character. This means that intellectuals who sought to connect themselves to anti-capitalist or other social movements need to be careful of any sense of condescension or indeed idea that they have any right to assume leadership or controlling positions. The issue being that the struggle for a more humane and less exploitative life could only be won through dogged and often stubborn opposition. Hence part of the revolt against the rule of capital is to open the possibility of a more emancipated society where we are no longer ruled by the imperatives of economic reason and the demands of capital. Marxism also often neglects to analyze more informal modes of resistance concentrating heavily upon the overt mobilization of the bodies and passions of the working-class or more oppositional sentiments. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997b: 30) argues in this respect, that when ‘someone refuses to remain a passive object of the educational system or of the factory management or of her husband after having been that of her father, there really is, whether one knows it or not, ‘a positive underside’ to this refusal, another principle that contradicts head on the fundamental principle of capitalism’. In other words, the creative and imaginative possibilities of an alternative more eman-

54

Stevenson

cipated, autonomous society begins with refusal. Clearly if it only remains at this stage then collective action will not gather momentum. However action that seeks to refuse or at least contradict the rule of capital must begin with a sense of rejection. John Holloway (2016: 58) describes this process as sometimes stopping short of out-right defiance, but becoming manifest within a ‘kind of ­reluctance, a dragging of feet’. That is a refusal to turn ourselves into the robots required by the economic system is not only detected within activism of various kinds, but equally can be found expressed within other more mundane activities. ­Holloway goes on that capital will respond to refusal within our schools or factories with new kinds of management in order to regain control, but these may not always have the desired effects. Indeed within the context of a global system where capital can indeed be moved elsewhere more subtle forms of resistance and refusal may become increasingly necessary. While there is nothing inevitable in this process there is a need to recover what is positive in what can be seen as negative. John Holloway (2009) in this respect seeks to recover an idea of dialectics through a re-engagement with Adorno. If many cultural theorists have rejected Adorno as deeply problematic due to his rejection of the meaning that can be found within popular cultural forms and distance from collective resistance against capital then there are other perhaps more neglected aspects of his writing. Here there is a need to recover the possibility of the dialectic not as inevitably leading to closure, but that finds expression through negation. For Holloway (2009) what we might recover from Adornian ideas of negative dialectics is an attempt to think beyond the confines of the system and to imagine a life beyond the walls of the prison. The starting place however is less from abstract theory, but from the crisis of capitalism that can be detected in an ongoing struggle and revolt against its rule. James C. Scott (2012) similarly suggests that we need to investigate the implications of a life lived where the citizenry are mostly governed by hierarchical institutions while being directed from above in ways that seem to reward deference and servility. Indeed this also fits with a bureaucratic logic that seeks to impress ideas of efficiency and measurement from above as if society was a well-oiled machine. Missing from this picture is the possibility of more unpredictable forms of human agency that remain a permanent possibility even within the most controlled and top down societies. Not surprising perhaps that the dominant imaginary of states, schools and business organizations is of the well-ordered and functioning machine. However on closer inspection the life of institutions is full of skepticism and more subtle forms of critique even if for obvious reasons this rarely breaks out into full scale revolt. However a point somewhat neglected by Holloway that resistance against rule

The Return of Radical Humanism in Marxism and Anarchism?

55

from above and capital exist only as a potential among the working-class. Here we would need to recognize the historical possibilities and limitations including the decline of the old working-class and trade unions, and the emergence of a post-­industrial labor market where many feel precarious and insecure. This means that our analysis needs to move from the seemingly ‘innate’ possibilities to resist capitalism to the possibility of building popular programs and of constructing alliances to prevent capitalism’s quest to entirely colonize the cultural and political sphere. Here Holloway and others linked to the antiglobalization movement often reject the democratic politics of state as this inevitably involves being ruled from above. The problem being of course this restricts any social movement to being a protest movement. In this respect, it is not clear what kind of analysis would seek to dismiss the critical role that new popular forces evident within political parties such as Podemos, Syriza and the Labour party could play in the future. To dismiss the critical role that radical social democratic parties could play is to leave the control of the state open to the forces of the political Right. 3

Future Marxism(s)

If there is a need for the future Marxism(s) to investigate the practice of revolt from below against alienation it will continue to need more emancipatory visions. These are unlikely to take any one form, but need to develop imaginative and feasible alternatives to a capitalist driven modernity. Marxism in this respects needs to abandon some of the rigidity that it has become associated with in the past and adopt a more intellectually flexible approach to questions of resistance and critique. If as Walter Benjamin (1996) argues capitalism requires a ‘spirit’ in the sense that it needs ‘true believers’ then Marxism should recognize this is still to be mostly found within the circles of the ruling class. In other words, if there are widespread concerns in the present that the moment of socialism has receded across Europe with working-class anger becoming articulated by racist far right nationalism then we also need to remember this situation can change. The project of capital is structurally incapable of providing a civilization within which everyone can flourish, live meaningful lives while at the same time respecting the biophysical limitations of the planet. This of course does not necessarily mean that it will not be successful in persuading the general population that it works well enough. The reason that many citizens stick with capitalism is not because they necessarily think it is a perfect system. Instead

56

Stevenson

they are rightly mistrustful of the vague promise of revolution and of slogans which are not backed up by detailed proposals. Democratic socialist programs worthy of the name would need to not only break with ‘capitalist realism’, but seek to open people’s horizons to the possibility of a less hierarchical and more democratic world. Especially significant in this venture is the need for social movements to maintain relatively flat organizational structures (where possible) that did not attempt to mimic the organizational features of political parties. However if Marxism is to remain relevant to the future it cannot do so by simply dismissing the role that political parties play in gaining power and governing. If protests movements like Occupy have an important role to play in disrupting the presumed ‘normality’ of capitalism they remain a protest movement unable to propose policies and solutions. If there is something authoritarian about proposing alternative hegemonic strategies there is a need to recognize the structural power of ordinary processes of citizenship. Instead of presuming that the masses are currently blinded by capitalist propaganda radicals need to engage in the more serious and difficult work of both resisting the authoritarian rule of capitalism and seeking to build popular movements for social change. If we can no longer presume that being a Marxist offers a privileged access to ‘the truth’ of capitalism it retains a long and honorable history of seeking to give voice to popular struggles. The task of making Marxism relevant to the 21st century means it will have to spend less time in the academy doing ideology critique, and more time engaging in campaigns and protest movements seeking to engage with the concerns of ordinary citizens. Here the task will be trying to encourage citizens that the world can indeed be a more libertarian and democratic place. The future requires a Marxism that has learned the lesson of humility as it continues its long and uncertain journey toward a society that both restricts and refuses the rule of capitalism. Within this quest it needs to abandon talk of ‘false consciousness’ or a mistaken set of understandings of the system as all powerful. Among the Marxist tradition’s most prized possessions in this respect is what E.P. Thompson (1978: 183) called ‘putting oneself into the school of awkwardness’. By this Thompson (1978: 183) meant that one ‘must make one’s sensibility all knobby – all knees and elbows of susceptibility and refusal – if one is not to be pressed through the grid into the universal mish-mash of the received assumptions of the ­intellectual culture’. Marxism in the school of awkwardness needs to maintain its ability to produce arguments not only among themselves but with the people they are seeking to persuade that a more democratic society is indeed possible beyond the authoritarian set of arrangements that continue to dominate the present. It is this that gives us hope that Marxism can be renewed in the light of the present.

The Return of Radical Humanism in Marxism and Anarchism?

57

Bibliography Anderson, P. 1976. Considerations on Western Marxism, London, Verso. Benjamin, W. 1996. ‘Capitalism as Religion’, Selected Writings: Volume 1. 1913–1926, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp. 288–291. Bookchin, M. 2004. Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Oakland, AK Press. Brown, W. 2010. ‘We Are All Democrats Now…’, in G. Agamben et al (eds) Democracy In What State? New York, Columbia University Press, pp. 44–57. Castoriadis, C. 1987. The Imaginary Institution of Society, Cambridge, Polity Press. Castoriadis, C. 1997a. ‘From Ecology to Autonomy’, in D.A. Curtis (ed) The Castoriadis Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 239–252. Castoriadis, C. 1997b. ‘The Only Way to Find Out If You Can Swim Is to Get into the Water: An Introductory Interview 1974’, in D.A. Curtis (ed) The Castoriadis Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 1–34. Chomsky, N. 2012. How the World Works, London, Hamish Hamilton. Couldry, N., S. Livingstone, and T. Markham 2010. Media Consumption and Public Engagement, London, Palgrave. Day, R. 2005. Gramsci is Dead, London, Pluto Press. Eagleton, T. 1996. ‘The Hippest’, London Review of Books, 7 March 1996, pp. 3–5. Elliott, G. 1993. ‘Althusser’s Solitude’, in E.A. Kaplan and M. Sprinker (eds) The Althusserian Legacy, London, Verso, pp. 17–37. Fisher, M. 2007. Capitalist Realism, Winchester, Zero Books. Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from Prison Notebooks, London, Lawerence and Wishart. Guattari, F. 2000. The Three Ecologies, London, Bloomsbury. Hall, S. 1988. The Hard Road to Renewal, London, Verso. Hall, S. 2017. ‘The Crisis of Labourism’, The Great Moving Right Show and Other Essays, London, Lawerence and Wishart, pp. 172–186. Hebdige, D. 1979. Subculture: The meaning of style, London, Methuen. Holloway, J. 2009. ‘Autonomism. Or Why Adorno? Part 2’, in J. Holloway, F. Matamoros and S. Tischler. (eds) Negativity and Revolution, London, Pluto Press, pp. 95–102. Holloway, J. 2016. In, Against, And Beyond Capitalism, Oakland, PM Press. Illich, I. 1976. Celebration of Awareness, London, Penguin. James, C.L.R. 2009. You Don’t Play with Revolution, Oakland, AK Press. Jessop, B., K. Bonnett, S. Bromley, and T. Ling 1984. ‘Two Nations and Thatcherism’, New Left Review, 147. Judt, T. 2010. The Memory Chalet, London, Heineman. Marcuse, H. 1972. One Dimensional Man, London, Abacus. Marx, K. 1968. ‘Wages, Price, Profit’, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works, London, Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 185–226. Marx, K. 1995. Capital: An abridged edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

58

Stevenson

Milosz, C. 1981. The Captive Mind, London, Penguin. Orwell, G. 1968. ‘Inside the Whale’, The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, An Age Like This, 1920–1940, Volume 1, London, Secker and Warberg, pp. 540–580. Ricoveri, G. 2013. Nature for Sale: The Commons Versus Commodities, London, Pluto press. Scott, J.C. 2012. Two Cheers for Anarchism, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Solnit, R. 2000. Hope in the Dark, Edinburgh, Canongate. Stevenson, N. 2017. Culture, ideology and socialism: Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson, Brookfield, USA, Aldershot. Thompson, E.P. 1978. ‘An Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski’, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays, London, Merlin Press, pp. 92–192. Thompson, E.P. 1995. The Poverty of Theory, Pontypool, Merlin Press. Thompson, E.P. 2014a. ‘Socialist Humanism’, in C. Winslow. (ed) E.P. Thompson and the Making of the New Left, New York Monthly Review Press, pp. 49–88. Thompson, E.P. 2014b. ‘The Free-born Englishman’, in C. Winslow. (ed) E.P. Thompson and the Making of the New Left, New York Monthly Review Press, pp. 291–306. Ward, C. 1973. Anarchy in Action, London, Freedom Press. Williams, R. 1980. ‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’, Culture and Materialism, London, Verso, pp. 31–49. Williams, R. 1983. Towards 2000, London, Chatto and Windus.

Chapter 3

The Culture of Capitalism Arthur Asa Berger Culture is one of the more complicated words we will be dealing with. One of the problems we encounter is that there are a number of different meanings attached to the term. We think of culture two ways: one in terms of aesthetic matters (relative to the arts) and also as a concept used by anthropologists to describe a people’s way of life. There are something like a hundred different definitions of culture used by anthropologists, so I understand. The word “culture” comes from the Latin cultus, which means “care” and from the French colere which means “to till” as in “till the ground.” There are a number of words associated with culture. For example, there is the term “cult” which suggests something religious or sacred. We are continually amazed at the power cults have to shape people’s behavior, to brainwash them—to turn intelligent and educated people into fanatics. Here we are dealing with the power of charismatic personalities and of groups over individuals. If cults can exercise enormous power over individuals and groups of people, can’t we say that cultures also can do the same thing, though not to as extreme a degree, generally speaking. There is also the term “cultivated,” which means either growing something or, in the realm of aesthetics and the arts, sophisticated taste. Just as plants only exist because they are cared for by some cultivator, over a period of time, so people’s taste and cultivation only are developed by education and ­training. It takes time to develop a refined sensibility, to become discriminating, to  ­appreciate texts that are difficult and complex and not immediately satisfying. Bacteriologists also speak about cultures, but they use the term to describe the bacteria that are grown in Petri dishes if they are given suitable media (sources of nourishment). This matter of bacteria growing in media may be an important metaphor for us: just as bacteria need media to grow into culture, so do human beings need cultures to survive and develop themselves. We don’t do it all on our own—even though there is much talk of individualism (a c­ oncept we learn from our cultures) and the so-called self-made man and woman.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_005

60

Berger

In the chart below I show the interesting parallels: Bacteriology

Sociology/Anthropology

Bacteria Grow in media Form cultures

Humans Affected by media Form cultures

Of course we are much more complex than bacteria; in truth, each of us form a kind of medium for countless kinds of bacteria that inhabit our mouths and various other parts of our bodies. Bacteriology involves the cultivation and study of micro-organisms (bacteria) in prepared nutrients and the study of media (what is often called cultural criticism nowadays) involves the study of individuals and groups in a predominantly, but not completely, mass-­mediated culture. Not all culture is mass mediated. Let me offer a typical anthropological definition of culture. This one is quite old but it is useful because it covers most of the bases. It is by Henry Pratt ­Fairchild and appeared in his Dictionary of Sociology and Related Sciences (1967:80): A collective name for all behavior patterns socially acquired and transmitted by means of symbols; hence a name for all the distinctive achievements of human groups, including not only such items as language, ­tool-making, industry, art, science, law, government, morals and religion, but also the material instruments or artifacts in which cultural ­achievements are embodied and by which intellectual cultural features are given practical effect, such as buildings, tools, machines, communication devices, art objects, etc. Let’s consider some of the topics Fairchild mentions. Behavior Patterns. We are talking about codes and patterns of behavior here that are found in groups of people. Socially Acquired. We are taught these behavior patterns as we grow up in a family in some geographical location and are profoundly affected by the family we are born into, its religion, and all kinds of other matters. Transmitted by Means of Symbols. This refers to language and works of art, both of which have a profound impact on our psyches and our consciousness. It also can be understood to refer to communication of all kinds and involving all media: spoken words, facial expression, mass mediated, and so on.

The Culture of Capitalism

61

The Distinctive Achievements of Human Groups. This is important because it points out that it is in groups that we become human and become enculturated or acculturated (two words for the same thing, for all practical purposes). We have our own distinctive natures but we are also part of society. Artifacts in which Cultural Achievements are Embodied. The artifacts we are talking about here are the popular culture texts carried in the various media and other non-mediated aspects of popular culture (or not directly mediated) such as fashions in clothes, food, artifacts (what anthropologists call “material culture”) language use, sexual practices and related matters. We know that a lot of our popular culture, while not carried by the media, is nevertheless profoundly affected by it. We can see, then, that popular culture is a very complicated matter that plays some kind of a role in shaping our consciousness and our behavior. When I say “our” behavior, I mean my behavior and your behavior. You may think you are immune from the impact of the media and popular culture, but that is a delusion that is generated, I would suggest, by the media. The great English poet W.H. Auden once wrote these chilling lines: Each in the prison of himself is convinced of his own freedom. We think we are not affected by the media and popular culture (sometimes called mass mediated culture) but we are wrong. We must make a distinction between affected by and determined by here. Popular culture affects us but it doesn’t necessarily determine every act we do…though some scholars, who believe the media are very powerful, might argue with this point. 1

The Culture of Capitalism

In this essay, I discuss the impact that capitalist economics has on culture and argue that it is important to think about cultural phenomenon when dealing with the impact of capitalism on society. That is, there are certain cultural consequences to living in capitalist societies. Social class is an institution whose function for society is quite debatable. Many social scientists point out that every society is characterized by hierarchies, in which different classes perform, for the most part, different tasks. This stratification (with different people having different statuses) is necessary, conservative social scientists suggest, because it is necessary to motivate people to fill different positions in society. Some positions require more training than others (surgeon as compared with ditch digger), are more difficult and are

62

Berger

given more rewards, both in terms of status and salary. Otherwise, it is argued, it would be impossible to get people to defer their gratifications—to study long and hard—if they weren’t given rewards for this sacrifice. Thus, it is argued, social inequality and stratification is an unconsciously evolved institution in every society, which arises because it is necessary to get different jobs done. Inequality is all-pervasive because it is needed, so the argument goes. There is always an element of upward mobility, to keep the system going and maintain a certain amount of flexibility, but by and large, once a system of stratification is established, it tends to perpetuate itself. The top one percent in the United States is growing increasingly wealthy, thanks to the tax system. Statistics show that the United States has less social mobility than many other countries, which means that the “American Dream,” that one can rise in the world if one has enough will power and is willing to work hard, is no longer operative and no longer shapes the thinking of large numbers of Americans. Surveys reveal that many older Americans believe their children won’t live as well as they live. Stratification not only helps keep a society functioning, but it also imposes strains upon it when the poor people no longer accept their inferior status and insist upon a better division of the economic pie. (There are other arguments about the destructiveness of stratification which I have not cited.) From this perspective the mass media can be looked upon as a socializing institution— serving those at the top who own and control the media—for perpetuating the class system, for “brainwashing” the masses into believing that everything is as it must be. “Whatever is, is right,” said Pope, a poetic spokesman for conservative thinking. 1.1 Ideologies as Socio-Political Codes The term ideology has a long history, and a confusing one. One of the biggest problems in dealing with the term is that it is used in so many different ways and means so many different things to different people. One of the best definitions of the concept of ideology is found in the Introduction to Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner’s Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works. They write (2001): The concept of ideology forces readers to perceive that all cultural texts have the distinct biases, interests, and embedded values, reproducing the point of view of their producers and often the values of the dominant social groups. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels coined the term “ideology” in the 1840s to describe the dominant ideas and representations in a given social order…During the capitalist era, values of individualism, profit,

The Culture of Capitalism

63

competition, and the market became dominant, articulating the ­ideology of the new bourgeois class which was consolidating its class power. Today, in our high tech and global capitalism, ideas that promote globalization, new technologies, and an unrestrained market economy are becoming the prevailing ideas—conceptions that further the interests of the new governing elites in the global economy…Ideologies appear natural, the seem to be common sense, and thus are often invisible and elude criticism. Marx and Engels began a critique of ideology, attempting to show how ruling ideas reproduce dominant social interests trying to naturalize, idealize, and legitimate the existing society and its institutions and values. (p. 6) Marxist ideological analysis claims that the media and other forms of communication are used in capitalist nations, dominated by a bourgeois ruling class, to generate false consciousness in the masses, or in Marxist terms, the proletariat. We must remember that just because people are not conscious of the fact that they hold ideological beliefs does not mean they don’t hold them. Most often they haven’t brought their beliefs to consciousness and may not be able to articulate them. For our purposes, what is important in this definition is the fact that ideologies are coherent socio-political programs (or codes), among other things. Let me now discuss one of the most influential political ideologies, Marxism. I should add that there are a many different kinds of Marxists, each of whom claims to be the true interpreter of what Marx meant. Despite the problem of different interpretations of Marx, most scholars would say that there are a set of basic beliefs and ideas which most everyone would identify as central to Marxism. Some of these would be as detailed below. 2

The Materialist Conception of History

Society, Marx said, determines consciousness, not consciousness society. As he put it, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.” When the “Mode of Production” (the base) is transformed, the legal, political, religious and aesthetic beliefs of men (the superstructure) change also. 2.1 The Need for Revolution Marx saw class conflict between those owning the means of production (the bourgeoisie) and those selling the only thing they own, their labor (the ­proletariat) as the central fact of history. As he said in The Communist Manifesto:

64

Berger

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. His solution was to have the working classes take control of the state, gain control of the means of production, abolish all classes (after a presumably short dictatorship of the proletariat) and with it, abolish history. If history is defined as class struggle and classes are eliminated, then history (as we have known it) is abolished, so to speak. He also believed that the state would wither away, eventually, when man had been communized. 2.2 The Problem of Alienation The reason capitalism must be destroyed is because it produces alienation in man. To quote Marx: … the division of labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long therefore as activity is not voluntary, but naturally, divided, man’s own act becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. There is a debate among Marxists as to whether the concept of alienation is central to Marx’s thought, or whether the need for revolution is more important. Whatever the case, Marx’s ideas about alienation are critical, since alienation leads individuals to have “false consciousness,” and the system of ideas and beliefs produced by this false consciousness that Marx described as “ideology.” In a capitalist society the ideas of the ruling class are the ideas of the masses; the bourgeoisie, by controlling the mode of production and system of economic relations, control, in turn, the ideas of the proletariat. Marx’s attack on capitalism is based on ethics—his belief that capitalism produced goods but along with it alienation. As he says: In what does this alienation of labour consist? First, that the work is external to the worker, that it is not part of his nature, that consequently he does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery, not of well being, does not develop freely a physical and mental energy but is physically exhausted and mentally debased.

The Culture of Capitalism

65

So much for our brief explication of Marxism. What is important for us to recognize is that a Marxist brings to the analysis of any social phenomenon an ideological position which enables him to interpret almost anything along certain lines. This kind of thinking is frequently described (in the case of Marxism or any ideology) as doctrinaire. What happens is that the ideology determines how a person will analyze a given problem. There is a prescribed method of analysis, just as there are prescribed answers, for all subjects. Once you accept the premises of the ideology (whether it be Marxism or One Hundred Percent Americanism or Capitalism), the rest follows almost automatically. When you believe in an ideology, you know the answer, in a sense, before you are asked the question. It is this kind of straight jacketed thinking which disturbs non-ideological thinkers, though it might be argued that it is impossible to escape from some kind of an ideology. This is because analysis that is systematic and structured implies some kind of an ideology and thinking that is not systematic and coherent, that is “random,” is frequently not worth very much. It is this structure and coherence in ideologies that captivates people and accounts for the strong hold ideologies have on them. For the Marxist and for other ideologues, the world makes sense, history is moving in understandable ways, and the outcome of the historic confrontation between the capitalist and communist world is inevitable. It may even be that the logic or structure of the ideology is more important than the specific content, which explains why people can move, with such ease, from one ideological position to its polar opposite. Thus, Communists become right-wing conservatives (and vice versa) merely by doing a flip-flop and accepting the antithetical position. The content is different but the gratifications are the same, because the two systems are structurally similar. 2.3 An Application of Marxist Theory: Donald Duck For an example of the way ideological thinking works, let us look at a book that came out a number of years ago: Dorfman and Mattelart’s How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic. This was written in Chile during the Allende period and deals with what the authors suggest is a hidden ideology in Donald Duck and other Disney works. The thesis of the book is that in the work of Disney, the essentials of the bourgeois capitalist theory of politics and society is promulgated, though in a highly masked manner. That is, if you become a “duckologist” and read the adventures of Donald Duck in terms of their social and political significance, the values espoused, etc., you find that Disney is an apologist for capitalism. For example, one of the basic ploys of bourgeois thinking is to suggest that phenomena which are historical are, instead, natural. What is natural cannot

66

Berger

be changed, so being “natural” is a way of justifying laws and arrangements which benefit only small numbers of people, namely, the ruling class. The authors write “…ideas are conceived as products of a natural force. By making ideas appear beyond the control of the passive recipients and extrinsic to them, it takes the motors of history out of history into the realm of pure nature. This is called inversion.” Generally the authors use some adventure in Donald Duck to back up their analysis. They treat the characters symbolically and the adventures as repre­ sentative of general themes. Dorfman and Mattelart take up the theme of the consumption society as a means of explaining the appeal of Disney’s characters: So the readers love these characters, which share all their own degradation and alienation, while remaining innocent little animals. Unable to control their own lives, or even the objects around them, the characters are perfectly closed around the nucleus of their imperfection. The egoism of the little animals, the defense of their individuality, their embroilment with private interests, provides a sense of distance between the characters and their creators, who are projecting their view of the world onto the animals. The reader as consumer of the lives of the animals reproduces the sense of distance by feeling superior to and pity for the little animals. An examination of How to Read Donald Duck reveals a basically Marxist structure and argument. That is, Marxist ideology is used to explain the significance of different characters and episodes and of Disney’s work in general. Dorfman and Mattelart see Disney’s social philosophy, that is, as basically destructive of the well-being of most of the people who read his comics because the messages in Disney are inherently propagandist. He espouses a kind of individualism that is destructive of the good society, and so, ultimately, self-destructive. Donald Duck and his nephews and all the other characters are, unwittingly, secret agents of a bourgeois conspiracy to brainwash the masses in America as well as in the underdeveloped nations, which are importers of American culture and aspire to the “American Way of Life.” Let me conclude this brief discussion of the book with a passage in which the ideological beliefs of the authors are made evident. This passage is little more than a rewriting of the formulations of Marx about the relationship between society and consciousness. As Dorfman and Mattelart put it: From the moment people find themselves involved in a certain social system—that is, from conception and birth—it is impossible for their

The Culture of Capitalism

67

consciousness to develop without being based on concrete material conditions. In a society where one class controls the means of economic production, that class also controls the means of intellectual production; ideas, feelings, intuitions, in short—the very meaning of life. The bourgeoisie have, in fact, tried to invert the true relationship between the material base and the superstructure. They conceive of ideas as productive of riches by means of the only untainted matter they know—grey ­matter—and the history of humanity becomes the history of ideas. The conservative notion that that history is a record of ideas, violates Marx’s belief that “society determines consciousness, not consciousness society.” How is one to “take” Dorfman and Mattelart? The book cites a number of reviews which see their analysis as absurd. This is to be expected since the idea of meaning in the comics—let alone political ideology—strikes many people as quite ridiculous. For Marxists, however, this study of Donald Duck makes eminently good sense, and is a pretty straight-forward ideological analysis of one aspect of what is often called “the culture industry” or “the consciousness industry.” There is really no resolution to the problem of ideology. Everyone has to have some theory of what makes society work. Even people who have not studied political theory generally have picked up, from their schooling, from the mass media and the whole culture establishment, a notion of what is important in the political arena and a political stance frequently associated with political parties and their platforms. The question we must ask is how coherent is the political thinking of the common man and woman and to what extent are their “ideologies” the product of a kind of conditioning or “brainwashing” of which they are unaware? Bibliography Berger, Arthur Asa. 2014. Media Analysis Techniques 5th Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage. Dorfman, Ariel and A. Mattelart 1971. How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic. New York: International General. Durham, M.G. and D. Kellner (Eds.) 2001. Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works. Malden. MA: Blackwell. Fairchild, Henry Pratt. (Ed.) 1967. Dictionary of Sociology and Related Sciences. Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co.

Chapter 4

Adorno on Ideology: Ideology Critique and Mass Consumerism Thomas Klikauer 1

Introduction: Adorno and the History of Theories on Ideology

Written after his return from American exile to a country that was shaped by Nazi-ideology (Klikauer 2011), Adorno’s “Beitrag zur Ideologielehre” [ideologytheory] of 1954 remains largely unknown. This deficit persists despite Cook’s (2001) reconstruction of some of the basic parameters of Adorno’s overall thinking on ideology reconstructed from several of the latter’s writings. By contrast, this article focuses exclusively on Adorno’s “Beitrag zur Ideologielehre” seeking to clarify three issues: closing the gap in our knowledge of Adorno by explaining his “Ideologielehre” to an English speaking audience; positioning “Ideologielehre” in the established history and body of theories on ideology; and finally, illustrating the contribution of “Ideologielehre” to ideology critique [Idelogiekritik] and our understanding of the ideological mechanisms of the “Culture Industry”. To achieve these three objectives, the paper starts with Cook’s (2001: 2) initial analysis of Adorno’s ideas on ideology. Cook’s project was concerned with Adorno’s “Negative Dialectics”, his critique on liberal ideology and the critique of positivist ideology. Unlike Cook’s general overview, this article focuses on Adorno’s key writing on ideology known in German as “Ideologielehre”. While presenting ‘Adorno’s views on ideology and his conception of negative dialectics’, Cook (2001: 2) offers few excursions into the specifics of Adorno’s “Ideologielehre”. More recently, the aforementioned research gap on “Ideologielehre” can also be detected in Grant’s ‘Ideology as Replication in Adorno’ (2014). Building less on Grant (2014) and more on Cook’s general overview, the focus here is much more specific. Nonetheless, this article reaches beyond simply reproducing Adorno’s most significant work on ideology. As such, this is the first and so far only available summary, interpretation and critical engagement with Adorno’s “Ideologielehre”. Beyond that, it positions Adorno’s work on ideology in the established body of what we know ideology to be. When positioning Adorno’s “Ideologielehre” (1954) in the historical development of theories on ideology, the following theorists remain essential: © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_006

Adorno on Ideology

69

Destute de Tracy (1829), Karl Marx (1845), Mannheim (1936), Antonio Gramsci (1971), Louis Althusser (1976), Gören Therborn (1988), Terry Eagleton (1994), Raymond Geuss (1994), and perhaps also Slavoj Zizek (1989 & 2012). Within today’s established body of writings on ideology, Adorno’s 1954 article takes up an early position of being placed after Karl Mannheim’s “Ideology and Utopia” (1936) but before Gramsci’s “Prison Notebooks” (1971) became known. Adorno’s “Ideologielehre” emerged before significant advancements in the theory of ideology had been made or became known to the sociologicalphilosophical as well as general public. Gramsci’s theory of hegemonic ideology, for example, was written between 1929 and 1935 when imprisoned by the Italian fascist regime. The English version was published as part of the “Quaderni del Carcere” or “Prison Notebooks” in 1971. It was also translated from Italian into German during the mid-1960s (Riechers 1967). While Gramsci wrote before Adorno’s “Ideologielehre”, his work became accessible in English and G ­ erman only after Adorno’s “Ideologielehre”. It seems reasonable to assume that Adorno wrote his “Ideologielehre” without knowing Gramsci’s theory. Written twenty years after Adorno’s “Ideologielehre”, Althusser’s “ideological state apparatus” and, perhaps even more importantly, his “ideological interpellation” also remained unknown to Adorno. The same goes for the post-Althusserian developments on the theory of ideology. In sum, Adorno’s ideology-theory predates many advancements in the theory of ideology. As a consequence, his writings were based on what was known at the time: Destute de Tracy, Karl Marx, Karl Mannheim, and a few others. It is for this reason that any interpretive and explanatory engagement with Adorno’s “Ideologielehre” has to be undertaken in the context of the historical development of theories on ideology. As such, a project that seeks to critically engage with Adorno’s theory of ideology and his ideology-critique does not merely reproduce Adorno’s essay in another language as a simple German-to-English translation but follows an interpretive analytical engagement with Adorno (Cook 2001). Perhaps in Adorno’s understanding of the spirit of the Frankfurt School the task is to retain and to convey the spirit of his critical-emancipatory writings. But it also means a critical-philosophical reflection on Adorno and a critique on developments made in the field of ideology by positioning Adorno in this field (Freyenhagen 2013; Rehmann 2013). Quite unavoidably, key sections of Adorno’s essay had to be translated – again following Cook’s (2001: 18) ‘all translations are my own’ – but these sections are critically interpreted in the light of overall historical and theoretical developments of theories of ideology. Starting with an historical overview of ideology as well as the development of theories about ideologies, four general sections are presented: firstly, Adorno’s presentation of the history of ideology is outlined; secondly, his main theoretical perspectives including

70

Klikauer

his ideology-critique is made accessible; thirdly, Adorno’s ideology-critique is applied to “The Culture Industry”; and finally, a concluding assessment of Adorno’s “Ideologielehre” is offered. To begin with, Adorno’s essay is entitled “Ideologielehre”. The German “­ Lehre” carries connotations to apprenticeship, lessons, teaching, theory and doctrine. Since Adorno’s work was not designed as a vocational training program or apprenticeship, is not a specific teaching lesson nor a doctrinaire composition, perhaps the term “ideology-theory” might appropriately explain what Adorno sought to convey when using the word “Lehre”. But the “Ideologielehre” also falls into one of the two main schools of ideology that emerged since Adorno. In the chronological development of theories of ideology and out of the historical “de Tracy-vs.-Napoleon/Marx” battle over ideology, two main schools of thought on theories about ideology have emerged in recent years. The first school might be called “everything is ideological”. It assumes that every idea and indeed everything is ideological. This perspective creates at least two immediate problems: when “everything is ideological” perhaps conversely “nothing is ideological”; secondly the “everything is ideological” notion means that the concept of ideology looses most of its critical powers while the critical-emancipatory concept of ideology-critique disappears altogether. Today, British political scientist Michael Freeden (1996, 2006, 2007, 2013) and his “Journal of Political Ideologies” appear to be the prime representatives of the “everything is ideological” approach. The second school carries connotations to a critical understanding of ideology capable of highlighting asymmetrical power relationships and forms of domination. The concept of “ideology-critique” falls into this category (Haug 1993 & 1993a; Rehmann 2014; Grant 2014). This post-Tracy/Napoleonic approach defines ideology through its functions and interest. Since the task of many ideologies is to serve specific functions and interests, at least three have emerged from theory development inside the second school. In this u ­ nderstanding, ideology camouflages contradictions, sustains domination and prevents emancipation (Bell 1976; Zarembka 2013; Harvey 2014; Downey et al. 2014: 3). Together with Karl Marx (1845), Antonio Gramsci (1971), Louis Althusser (1976), Gören Therborn (1988), Terry Eagleton (1994), Raymond Geuss (1994) and Slavoj Zizek (2012), Adorno’s work on ideology-theory as well as the critical-emancipatory concept of ideology-critique belongs into this school. 2

Adorno’s Theory of Ideology and Ideology-critique

Perhaps more than the first, the second school sees ideology as a phenomenon connected not just to the ‘real historical movements of society but also as a

Adorno on Ideology

71

form of ‘knowledge that is willingly or unwillingly in the service of particular interests’ (Adorno 1954: 1). And herein lies what might be seen as one of the key dividing lines between philosophy and ideology. Philosophy might be seen as φιλοσοφία (philosophia), the “love of wisdom” serving nobody but itself and therefore creating knowledge for itself rather than for a specific purpose. On the other hand, ideology is not dedicated to a “love of wisdom” but instead always serves a specific purpose, e.g. colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, fascism, neo-liberalism, corporate globalization, etc. As such, it always represents “knowledge in the service of power” (Klikauer 2013: 7; Jaeggi 2009; Chomsky 1987). As a consequence, Adorno sees philosophy as set against ideology. According to Grant (2014: 5), Adorno never gave up on philosophy’s critical potential … Adorno’s essay “why still philosophy” makes the strongest case for philosophy’s role in combating ideological replication. Philosophy finds ‘its lifeblood in the resistance against the common practices of today and what they serve, against the justification of what happens to be the case. Adorno reaffirmed of his position in “negative dialectics”: ‘philosophically, it [the critique of ideology] is central: it is a critique of the constitutive consciousness itself.’ When ideology is seen in opposition to philosophy, a critical version of philosophy is needed to analyze ideology. This leads Adorno to a critique of ideology or “Ideologiekritik”. Seen from this perspective, ideology always takes on a sociological as well as historical dimension. As a consequence, when the social, political and economic function of ideology has changed in history – for example, from nationalism and colonialism to imperialism and to corporate globalization – ideology-critique necessarily has to change with these changes in the functions of ideology. As a result ‘what ideology means and what ideologies are can only be accounted for by placing ideology in a historical movement’ (Adorno 1954: 1). It is for this reason, so Adorno argues convincingly, that any understanding of ideology must – necessarily – start from the historical context and perhaps also from ideology’s historical origins. As a consciousness, Adorno’s “Ideologielehre” positions the conceptual beginning of a theory of ideology around the turn of the 16th to 17th century when English philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626) started to discuss ‘the general conditions of a false content of consciousness’ (Adorno 1954: 2). What Bacon saw as idols and false notions were largely transmitted through language used by religion and church. As a consequence, Adorno located early ideas on ideology in the general realm of a philosophy of language. Like Bacon, Adorno also saw a philosophical understanding of language as indispensable

72

Klikauer

to the comprehension of ideology. This is perhaps because Bacon had noted that ‘words can do violence to the spirit and disrupt everything’ (Adorno 1954: 2). These are, for example, words used ideologically to sustain the domination of religion and church over people. But Bacon also argued that ideology is an issue of individual mentalities setting an early pathway for an understanding of ideology within the historic growth of individualism during the 16th and 17th century. In the words of Adorno (1954: 2), ‘already Bacon’s concept of ideology allows one to speak of subjectivity in relation to ideology’. The notion that ideology is linked to subjectivity and individualism has been carried forward until today, remaining a feature of many theories on ideology –e.g. Lacan’s theory of ideology (Stein 2012: 293; Glynos 2001). On the other hand, Bacon also emphasized the emancipatory power of what today is known as ideology-critique. Bacon and Adorno would agree with the notion that a critique of ideology became a necessary element of any emancipation of bourgeois consciousness from the domination exercise by religion and church. In the history of ideology, the philosophical heirs to Bacon’s initial thoughts on ideology can be found in French philosopher Helvétius (1715–1771) and French-German philosopher Holbach (1723–1789) who, according to Adorno (1954: 2), saw the function of ideology in ‘maintaining unjust conditions, in preventing the achievement of happiness, and the introduction of a rational society’. Perhaps Adorno’s concept of a rational society in his oftentimes quite Hegelian philosophy (Adorno 1993) might carry connotations to one of Hegel’s frequently quoted but also more controversial statements, “the real is the rational and the rational is the real”. Perhaps this is because Hegelian philosophy emerged at a time when Germany freed itself from religious domination and started to develop a rational society when “world history appeared on a horseback” (Hegel) in the form of Napoleon entering Germanic states during the early 19th century. For Hegel as for Adorno, a rational society can never be based on irrationalities, superstition and religion. Instead it is found in rationality (Habermas 1970) and a rationally ordered society (Hegel). But as a negation of rationality, irrationalities are also used in ideologies to camouflage societal irrationalities. Ideologies often rely on such irrationalities, e.g. the Aryan race as an example. But they are in-themselves rational constructs. They rationally construct an irrational perception of what is real. For Adorno, for Helvétius and for the representatives of the second school of ideology, Helvétius (quoted by Adorno 1954: 3) holds one of the key understandings of ideology when noting, ‘if opinions rule the world, it is in the long run the powerful [Mächtige] that determine these opinions’. Although not mentioned by Adorno, Helvétius’ early

Adorno on Ideology

73

understanding of ideology gives an initial indication of what was to become one of the most important statements in the history of ideology: the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. marx 1845

But Adorno’s critique is directed more toward Helvétius who he discusses rather than Marx. His critique highlights that Helvétius’ statement about the function of ideology tends to remain at the surface of ideology focusing on the distribution of opinions while ideologies offer substantially more than simple opinions. For Adorno (1954: 3), focusing on subjectivity and the individual as Bacon did and on opinions as Helvétius offers, distracts from ‘a deeper analysis of ideology and what ideologies mean for society as a whole’. But the focus on individualism remains at the center of what Adorno calls the French school of ideology. This 19th century school focuses on individual motivations as developed by the idéologues with Destutt de Tracy as the main exponent. Much in line with Bacon’s individualistic understanding of ideology, French writer “Condillacs’ sensualism” (Adorno) seeks to return any information and idea received by human beings back to their origin and to the way in which our individual senses receive such information and ideas. But Adorno views this differently. In contrast to Condillac, Adorno saw ‘ideas as negative signs: they live in the cavities between what things claim to be and what they are’ (Cook 2001: 7). According to Adorno’s “Ideologielehre” (1954: 3), Destutt de Tracy and Condillac share a ‘mathematical and scientific orientation’ that both thought is necessary for the understanding of ideology. It appears that de Tracy’s writings on ideology (1829) were very much in line with the positivistic attitude that developed in France between Descartes’ “Discourse on Method” (1637) and Comte’s “Writings on Positivism” (1853). But Destutt de Tracy also hoped that through a confrontation with sensual realities wrong principles will be unable to anchor/lock [festsetzen] themselves in the mind of people. For de Tracy such wrong principles have the ability to prevent the construction of a rational state and society. De Tracy believed that the rigorous methodology of science will be able to end all arbitrariness of opinions. According to Adorno (1954: 4), Destutt de Tracy advocates that ‘false consciousness, what will later be called ideology, will be dissolved once exposed to the scientific method’. For Adorno (1954: 4), de Tracy remains in the tradition of liberal philosophy assuming ‘a harmonious balance of social forces’ within society.

74

Klikauer

But de Tracy’s ideas about ideology were soon to be challenged when a rather different idea about society emerged. It was set against de Tracy’s ideology and it came from the political-administrative sphere of the state. And it was this opposition to de Tracy that not just framed ideology’s negative connotations but the disapproving and derogative associations of ideology have been carried forward ever since. During de Tracy’s time the main opponent to a science of ideas – de Tracy’s ideologies – was Napoléon Bonaparte (1769– 1821) who abused those studying ideas – foremost de Tracy and Condillac – as ideologists, ideologues, half-intellectuals and doctrinaire dreamers. According to Adorno, (1954: 4) Napoleon complained about those ‘doctrines of the ideologues’ accusing them of using ‘fuzzy metaphysics’ while ascribing ‘to them all the misfortunes that have befallen our beautiful France’. This is the historical point where Adorno’s description of social-political and historical circumstances started to shape the actual usage of the word ideology. In keeping with the Napoleonic intonation of ideology, the French also used ideology to ‘ridicule the spirit of the resistance in Germany to Napoleon’s yoke by giving it the name idéologie or ideology’ (Ricoeur 1986: 5). With this, the negative connotations of the word ideology spread beyond France. But Napoleon may have also committed a political blunder when arguing against the ideologues of de Tracy and Condillac. According to Adorno (1954: 5), Napoleon ‘failed to recognize that the analysis of [de Tracy’s] ideologues was not contradictory to the interest of the ruling elite [Herrschaftsinteresse] as ideology already contained technical-manipulative moments’. Napoleon’s problem was a problem of a fundamental shift in the history of ideology. ­Napoleon’s negative use of ideology occurred at the crossroads between two sets of ideology. On the one hand, there was a historically older ideological use of externally induced religious feelings, spirituality and irrationalism while on the other hand, a more modern usage of ideology as a technical-manipulative mechanism of, as Adorno would call it, “mass-deception” – the subtitle of Adorno/Horkheimer’s earlier work on “The Culture Industry” (1944; cf. Grant 2014) – started to emerge. The new version of ideology refers to what the Frankfurt School of critical theory later would call “instrumental rationality” (Horkheimer 1964; Schecter 2010). On this basis, Adorno correctly diagnosed a fundamental historical shift in ideology, namely from religious feelings, spirituality and irrationality toward more sophisticated and technical-manipulative ideologies. While Adorno appropriately points out the importance of this conversion in the history of ideology around the time of the “de Tracy-vs.-Napoleon” encounter, both versions of ideology have never been mutually exclusive as one can see much later, for example, on Nazi-ideology. Nazism combines technical-manipulative means

Adorno on Ideology

75

with irrationalism in, for example, Riefenstahl’s modern, sophisticated, well rehearsed and minutely choreographed Nazi mass-rallies of Reichstags-Marches (Sontag 1975). It combines rationally constructed but deeply ideological events with an emotional attachment to “leader-people-fatherland” [Führer, Volk und Vaterland]. On Nazi-ideology, Adorno (1954: 6) notes, ‘such ideas [Gedankengut] do not reflect an objective spirit but it is thoroughly manipulative – a means of domination’. Perhaps by using both, the Nazis were able to ‘create a world where people willingly swallow fascist ideology, knowingly practice deliberate genocide, and energetically develop lethal weapons of mass destruction (Zuidervaart 2011: 1). For that, the Nazis created an ideologically framed reaction to social reality. Whether Nazi-, capitalist- or Stalinist ideology, Adorno (1954: 5) emphasizes that it remains a ‘truism that ideologies are a reaction to social reality but this will never be enough’ to explain ideology in total. With that Adorno retains a critique not just of Nazi-ideology but also of the orthodox school of Marxism and its understanding of ideology. Recently, Rehmann (2013) has most exquisitely highlighted Adorno’s and the Frankfurt School’s views on orthodox ideologies in ‘The Concept of Ideology from the Second International to ‘Marxism-Leninism’. Just as Rehmann (2013) explained most recently, Adorno’s (1954: 6) initial critique was directed against the simplistic ortho-communist belief that ‘it is enough to bring about critical consciousness in order to bring society in order’. In that, so Adorno argues, bourgeois thinking represents itself as much as it distorts the true character of ideology. Above that, the second and critical-emancipatory school of ideology-theory remains correct in highlighting that ideology is always justification of domination and its task is always to defend already problematic social conditions – something critical theorist Honneth (1995; cf. Klikauer 2015) later diagnoses as “pathological mis-developments”. Perhaps the height of such a pathological ideology still remains Germany’s Nazi-ideology on which Adorno notes, it is ‘the absurdity of the [Nazi] thesis that it was created to try out how far the Nazis can drive people as long as they only hear Nazi phrase and threats and are kept in the belief that something falls out of the prey for them’ (Adorno 1954: 6; Aly 2005; Sherratt 2013). Since the Nazi Holocaust remains the single most instructive example of the most extreme form of ideology, it is worthwhile to quote Adorno’s passage (1954: 7) at length: the ‘absolute totalitarian shock rests in the decrees of Hitler, Mussolini and Zhdanov who not in vain call their enunciations ideology. It is not the task of a critique on totalitarian ideologies to refute them because they

76

Klikauer

make no claim to be autonomous and consistent – but if they do they do so as a vague shadow only [by contrast, it remains important to] analyze which human dispositions they speculate on; which dispositions they seek to induce into them; and which are in contradiction to the official declamations made by the Nazis. The next question is: why and how modern society produces people who respond to those ideological stimuli and why and how people respond to [Nazi] speakers who are no more than various kinds of Führer and demagogues’. But ideological demagogues are not only to be found in Nazi-Germany. Adorno directs his critique also against the ideology of capitalism as well as Stalinism and adjacent regimes when noticing, ‘the Soviet bloc has converted the concept of ideology into an instrument of torture’ (Adorno 1954: 7). But despite the critique of the Frankfurt School and on Soviet-Stalinism, Adorno’s prime target for ideology-critique remains the system that has been most life threatening to Adorno, namely fascism in all its expressions (Marcuse 1964; Shuster 2014). On the latter as well as industrialism’s and capitalism’s instrumental rationality as expressed in “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber” (Marcuse 1964a), Adorno takes issue with both because the ‘social explanation of false consciousness is used to sabotage consciousness per se [while for] Max Weber the concept of ideology is merely a form of prejudice (and for Pareto there is only) spiritual ideology’ (Adorno 1954: 7). Common to Weber and P ­ areto is their quest to neutralize ideology. The inevitable conclusion for Adorno is that once ideology is reduced to prejudice (Weber) and spirituality (Pareto), it can reign freely. But Adorno not only criticizes the neutralization of ideology, he also remains concerned about attempts to frame ideology as an issue of individual psychology. Instead of focusing on the relationship of people within concrete forms of social existence and socialization, ‘Pareto falls back onto an older, one might almost say pre-sociological standpoint of viewing ideology as a psychological phenomenon’ (Adorno 1954: 8). With that virtually all research on ideology [Ideologieforschung] remains asphyxiated in spheres of privacy. Adorno (1954: 9) continues with ‘the fundamental subjectivism of Pareto that has found its origin in his subjective economics returning the untruth of ideologies not to social relations and objective-descriptive forms of delusion [Verblendungszusammenhängen] but simply to people seeking to justify their true motives retrospectively’. Adorno (1954: 9) concludes on Pareto that his understanding of ideology fits to ‘the ideology of the totalitarian state … the relationship between Mussolini and Pareto’s statements and treatise are well known’. Perhaps even more significant than the Mussolini link is Adorno’s (1954: 9) theoreticalphilosophical conclusion on Pareto,

Adorno on Ideology

77

this version of ideology represents a disentanglement with a philosophical theory of society and thereby creates a faked accuracy [Scheinexaktheit] and [as a result it] sacrifices the knowledge-creating power [Erkenntniskraft] of the concept of ideology. In other words, theories of ideology must remain linked to socio-economic analysis embedded in a philosophical-critical understanding of society as well as its historical contingencies. What Pareto and others seek is a re-production of ideologies justifying the status quo by viewing any critique on the status quo as arbitrary constructions from above. Perhaps more in line with Max Weber than Pareto is Adorno’s discussion of Karl Mannheim’s ‘Ideology and Utopia’ (1936). Unavoidably, Mannheim’s work remains significant for the history of theories about ideology. Adorno (1954: 10) acknowledges this by noting that ‘Mannheim has converted ‘Ideologielehre into an academic branch of the sociology of knowledge’. On Adorno’s critique of Mannheim, Cook (2001: 9) notes, commenting on Karl Mannheim’s complete rejection of ideology as a form of false consciousness, Adorno diagnosed it as an expression of rage against whatever [that] might represent the possibility of something better. In fact Adorno repeatedly claimed that it is not ideology per se that is untrue but rather its pretension to correspond to reality. But with Adorno’s acknowledgment of Mannheim came a critique on “Relationism” (Mannheim) directed against his epistemological attitude of investigating ideology as a value-free study of relationships. In Adorno’s understanding of ideology as well as for critical theory as such – e.g. Horkheimer’s foundation essay “Traditional and Critical Theory” (1937) – Mannheim’s proposal represents a theoretical-philosophical and above all epistemological impossibility. Adorno reiterates that ideologies do not represent untruths in-themselves as they often reflect truth or at least parts of a truth but they become untruths through their relationship to reality. Adorno (1954: 11) emphasizes that ‘actual ideologies become untrue through their relationship to existing reality’. Hence, they become untrue when they ‘present ideas such as freedom, humanity and justice as if they were already realized’ (Adorno 1954: 11). Within the field of ideology-theory, this version of ideology later became known as the “as-if” form of ideology (Rehmann 2013: 209; Morley & Chen 1996). These ideologies frame modernity, democracy, Enlightenment, corporate social responsibility, humanity and so on “as if” these were already established. But Adorno also re-emphasizes the aforementioned “opinion-vs.-ideology” difference. An ideology moves beyond being merely an opinion when it becomes a fully developed mechanism – apparatus (Althusser) – sustaining

78

Klikauer

domination, camouflaging contradictions and preventing emancipation. Unlike simple notions, opinions and vague ideas, an ideology “stands out” and ideologies have a socio-political task to accomplish. Adorno (1954: 12) contents, ‘we can only meaningfully talk of ideology when their spirit [Geistiges] presents itself as something self-contained’ as a fully developed frame, comprehensive and perhaps even closed system of mutually stabilizing references. The easy to recognize linkage between Hegel’s spirit [Geist], Adorno’s “Geistiges” and ideology has been outlined by Cook (2001: 9) when emphasizing, in the “Beitrag zur Ideologielehre”, Adorno maintained that ideology emerges from the social process as something spiritual [ein Geistiges]. As such, ideology is independent, substantial, and has its own standards. While it is untrue because of this separation …. its renunciation of the social formation, the truth-content in ideology also clings to such independence. In other words, what makes an ideology is a socially based development of a self-containing frame of reference that elevates ideology well above simple ideas and opinions. As a consequence, an ideology is a substantial construct in its own right, one that has developed the ability to pretend to exist above and beyond social processes that define society. As such, ideologies depend on a rather interesting “reality-illusion” dialectics which can never be broken. But all ideologies must retain a link to reality as they cannot depart too far outside of what is real. With that ideologies also carry connotations to the realm of mythologies (Barthes 1957; Boer 2011). Like mythologies, ideologies can never exist independent of reality because ‘the hallmark of ideologies today is more likely the absence of this independents’ (Cook 2001: 11). Adorno (1954: 12) underwrites this by highlighting that ‘today, the signature of ideologies is rather the absence of independence [Selbständigkeit] even though ideologies deceive us by pretending otherwise’. What Adorno expresses is the fact that an ideology depends on reality but pretends to be above that. Ideologies can never be autonomous, to use a Kantian term, of reality. But as such ideologies not just maintain a link to reality, they also come with some sort of historical heritage. Quite often, the historical inheritance of ideology is determined by a certain totality that is deeply embedded in their intellectual products. According to Adorno, these are the ideological products that today ‘fill the consciousness of people to a large degree’ (Adorno 1954: 12). But this does not mean that ideology represents consciousness that simply misrepresents social reality. Ideologies are not simply products of, as Adorno calls it, a “deluded mind” [verblendeter Geist]. And the telos of ideology is not just to delude the

Adorno on Ideology

79

mind of people so that a ‘totality of what is assembled can capture and manipulate the masses as consumers’ (Adorno 1954: 13). Today we can safely assume that a socially conditioned false consciousness no longer represents an objective spirit. In this sense, ideologies do not represent a blind mechanism that exists in an anonymity that occasionally surfaces at the societal level. Instead, today’s ideologies are crystallized processes that ‘are scientifically tailored to society’ (Adorno 1954: 13). As a result, present day’s ideologies are deeply embedded in the products of “The Culture Industry” (Adorno & Horkheimer 1944). What Adorno is referring to and Adorno/Horkheimer outlined in “The Culture Industry” (1944) has been even more clearly expressed by one of their main contemporaries, namely in Enzensberger’s “The Consciousness Industry” (1974). Enzensberger enhanced Adorno/Horkheimer’s “Culture Industry” substantially by highlighting the ability of “The Culture Industry” to totally integrate individuals into the ideological apparatus of advanced consumer capitalism (e.g. Freyenhagen 2013). This allows what might in reference to Althusser be called an “ideological media apparatus” of advanced consumer capitalism capable of converting human beings into carriers of some of capitalism’s main ideologies such as mass consumerism, neo-liberalism and Managerialism (Klikauer 2013). It thereby not only pacifies and integrates the working class into petit-bourgeoisie but also creates mass affirmation to capitalism (Marcuse 1966; Gorz 1982; Enzensberger 1974). On the basis of his writings on “The Culture Industry” and “Minima Moralia” (1944), Adorno reached a rather pessimistic conclusion, namely that “there is no right living in the false life” (Adorno 1944 aphorism no. 18; Brink 2010; Freyenhagen 2013: 66). For Adorno, this occurs through film, magazines, illustrated newspapers, radio, best-selling literature of various types among which biographies play a specific role, and now in America, television especially. While Rosenthal’s (2014) recent analysis of “Radio Benjamin” showed the ideological impact of radio before World War ii, by the time of Adorno’s “Ideologielehre” (1954) the end of wwii wasn’t a distant memory, Galbraith’s “Affluent Society” (1958) was still in the making and mass consumerism had only in the usa led to a widespread availability of TV-sets. It is for this historical reason that Adorno notes, “and now in America with television”. With the rise of mass-consumerism in advanced capitalist countries supported by technical inventions (e.g. TV sets) and their mass-availability, Adorno re-directs his ideology-critique toward the already established theme of “The Culture Industry” (1944). Linking “Ideologielehre” (1954) to “The Culture Industry” results in

80

Klikauer

a theoretical-philosophical analysis that completes Adorno’s essay on “Ideologielehre”. But linking “The Culture Industry” to ideology also remains a theoretical project that is still carried forward even today (Bolaño 2015). 3

Adorno’s Ideology-critique and the Culture Industry

Examining “The Culture Industry” in the light of ideology-critique, Adorno (1954: 13) again starts with an historical overview of the role of ideology in “The Culture Industry” by emphasizing ‘historically, the current schemata of the contemporary “Culture Industry” date back to the early days of English vulgar literature around the year 1700 … they already contained most of the stereotypes that grin into our faces from today’s movie- and TV-screens’. But the components of these rather simplistic traits of early mass culture – heroes, villains, authoritarian society, silly romanticism, etc. – are still capable of mentally incapacitating today’s humankind. They do so as key factors of the ideology of the “Culture Industry”. For Adorno, these ideological stereotypes remain a constant feature of “The Culture Industry”. But the real ideological advancement of “the Culture Industry” is that virtually all elements of “The Culture Industry” are capable of pulling into one direction and that out of this emerges a whole – a closed system – that has been constructed by “the Culture Industry”. What Adorno hints at is perhaps an early detection of pre-Gramscian and pre-Althusserian notion of ideology as a “geschlossenes System” – a closed system. Perhaps Adorno sensed one of the truly significant ideological advancements that is the ability of “The Culture Industry” – today’s corporate mass media – to present its ideology as a closed system in which, one might speculate, all parts stabilize the entire construct in a self-supporting cybernetic way (Schwarz 2007: 201). The current setup of “The Culture Industry” and corporate mass media might not be explained through conspiracy theories but rather through an interest symbiosis between corporations that create commercial goods, corporations marketing these goods, multi-national media corporations, and finally ideology inventing and supplying institutions (think tanks, corporate lobbying, certain political parties, managerialist universities, etc.). Just like Gramsci had predicted, but which remained unknown to Adorno by the time of his “Ideologielehre”, Adorno (1954: 13) foresaw one of the key elements of what Gramsci saw as a totalitarian hegemonic ideology, namely that the above mentioned closed system ‘hardly tolerates any escape from the ideological power of The Culture Industry’. Under the culture industry’s closed system of ideology Adorno (1954: 13) anticipated that ‘people are sur-

Adorno on Ideology

81

rounded on all sides’. To achieve that, “The Culture Industry” relies on the scientific achievements of a perverted social psychology [pervertierte Sozialpsychologie] and what has appropriately been called reverse psychoanalysis ­[umgekehrten Psychoanalyse]. Armed with that, ‘the ideology of the culture industry’ (Grant 2014: 3) enhances the regressive tendencies of growing social pressures by transporting them into society. “The Culture Industry” creates a pseudo-reality that cements domination while simultaneously preventing emancipation ­using ideology ‘as glue that bonds individuals and society’ (Grant 2014: 3). ‘Moreover, as Adorno had noted in “Beitrag zur Ideologielehre”, such finely-tuned pseudo-realism prevents what has been decreed from being seen through as something already pre-fabricated for the purpose of social control’ (Cook 2001: 13). But social control manifests itself not only through and in “The Culture Industry”, it also manifests itself in academic fields. While originally studies like those on “The Culture Industry” were located in the field of sociology, they became singled out and disconnected from the latter. With that the study of mass media took possession of its own field under the title of communication research. Adorno describes a process that has been almost completed today, namely the intellectual and scholarly degradation of a sociological study of mass communication, to becoming a sub-field of marketing. Once moved from sociology to marketing, today’s communication studies, so Adorno contends, places particular emphasis on the reactions of consumers to mass advertisement and the interplay between them and corporations. Adorno’s (1954: 13) ideology-critique is directed against today’s communication studies when noting that ‘instead of examining the so-called mass media from the standpoint of ideology-critique, the silent recognition of those media by analyzing them descriptively turns communication studies into an ideology’. In other words, what Adorno is criticizing is an acceptance of the imperatives of corporate mass media within the academic field of communication studies. He rejects the positivist idea of “the given” as “a-thing-in-itself”. Above that, communication studies pretends to be scholarly when merely conducting a descriptive analysis [beschreibende Analyse]. Even though communication studies is an explanatory case of what occurred in many scholarly fields, Adorno’s overall ideology-critique remains directed toward the underlying positivism that influences all too many academic fields (Adorno 1976). What the positivistic-empiricist acceptance of corporate mass media does is to deny a critical analysis of the ‘indescribable violence that those media exercise over people’ (Adorno 1954: 13). Even though much of corporate mass media depict images of brutality and violence, Adorno’s reference to violence is to be understood by what today is known as “structural violence” (Farmer 1996). Perhaps Foucault (1995) wasn’t wrong when showing that the brutality of

82

Klikauer

punishment regimes diminishes as brutality and violence become integrated into a system and is internalized by individuals. What the constant and consistent rehearsing of violence, brutality and “law and order” themes by corporate mass media achieves is ‘a synthetic identification of the mass of people with those norms and societal relationships that – now anonymized – hide behind the culture industry’ (Adorno 1954: 13). In line with Adorno’s understanding, the ideology of “The Culture Industry” does not pretend wrong things but establishes a false relationship between reality and what is presented. Known today, corporate mass media tend to over-represent crime and violence in order to maintain a repressive “law-&-order” apparatus (Reiman & Leighton 2013). But it also presents its ideology as general values and norms and the way society is – all of which is anonymized by “The Culture Industry” so that the engineers of ideology (“The Culture Industry”) remain camouflaged. “The Culture Industry” consciously propagates these ideologies in the background and behind the backs of an impressionable audience (Asch 1955; Adorno et al. 1964). But “The Culture Industry” has hardly ever contained itself to the invention and transmission of ideology, it also – as a true ideological apparatus – restricts access to the public sphere (Habermas 1988 & 1997) set against what it deems unwarranted knowledge. If one sees ideology as “knowledge in the service of power”, then the ideology of “The Culture Industry” sustains its power “over people” (Adorno) by eliminating unwarranted and challenging forms of knowledge. Adorno (1954: 14) recognized this when noting, ‘on virtually everything non-conforming [nicht Einstimmenden] it exercises censorship’. Today’s “Culture Industry” no longer needs an “Index Librorum Prohibitorum”. It simply excludes challenging views from the public sphere often by simply dividing challenging knowledge into “system stabilizing” views, regularly admitted as alibi and fig-leaf forms of critique from “within” and more threatening forms of knowledge “about” the system. The latter is to be excluded and/or covered up by Rawls’ (1980: 522) ‘veil of ignorance’. The pushing of ideology while simultaneously eliminating critique creates mass-conformism that reaches deeply into the most intimate corners of the human soul [“subtilsten Seelenregungen”, Adorno]. Today, “The Culture Industry” accesses these intimate corners of the human soul (Adorno) scientifically through fMRI-technology linked to the latest advances in psychology (Lindstrom 2008). For Adorno access to the human soul and the elimination of unwarranted knowledge – with, of course, the usual tokenistic acceptations (e.g. Avatar) – fulfils the maintenance of the status quo (Peffer 1990). Adorno diagnosed this as a certain solidification of society resulting from being deprived of many real life experiences [Adorno’s “erfahrungslos”, e.g. Louv 2005; Zengotita 2005]. In mass-society, the shift from real life experiences [Erfahrungen] to images as

Adorno on Ideology

83

presented by the corporate mass media has become dominant when a general asphyxiation – Adorno’s “Starrheit” [frozen, solidified] – is consolidated by “The Culture Industry”. But perhaps one of the reasons for the decisive ideological success of “The Culture Industry” (Chomsky 1991) comes with the following (Adorno 1954: 14): the more alienated human beings become through fabricated cultural goods [fabrizierten Kulturgüter] the more “The Culture Industry” can convince people that it is all about you and that this is your world. Of course, Adorno’s “fabricated cultural goods” carry connotations to Benjamin’s “Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility” published in 1936 that remains one of the key reflections not so much on ideology but on modern mass-culture (Benjamin 2008). Beyond that, the core element of Adorno’s ideology-critique is that “The Culture Industry” has made people believe that when they act within the confinements of an asphyxiated society, they believe that they are acting on their own behalf, that they have a choice and that it’s about them. Hence the hallucinogenic shopping illusion that “I can buy what I want”, not what corporations have placed in front of me and what other corporations have marketed to me as a pre-determined setup when walking through a behaviorist-designed shopping center maze (Foxall 1997; Barden 2013). For Adorno, all of this is rather skillfully linked to what Frankfurt School scholar Claus Offe would later call “The Achievement Principle” (1976). Long before Offe’s work, Adorno (1954: 14) saw this as the moment when ‘success and career become the pinnacles of life’. As a result, the ideological power of “The Culture Industry” has been able to convert a previously collective sprit [gesellschaftlich wirksame Geist] into a highly individualized spirit that powerfully supports the prevailing neo-liberal ideology of hyper-individualism. This becomes ‘a spirit that mirrors societal existence and its own conditions by advocating its own norms’ (Adorno 1954: 14) as a given and as unchangeable. It also mirrors the ideology of “tina” (there is no alternative) while reducing dialectical thinking to one-dimensionality (Marcuse 1966). But, and this remains one of the key elements of Adorno, by portraying the norms of the present as a given, “The Culture Industry” cements an asphyxiated social existence by creating a “believe-less belief” [glaubenslosen Glauben] in the present. The “Culture Industry” enhances such a “believe-less belief” through the following ‘paradox: the industry lies when it tells the truth, and it tells the truth when it lies’ (Cook 2001: 13). The outcome of this is that ‘nothing but ideology remains as a recognition of the status quo [it] demands that all conceptual models and human behaviors submit to the

84

Klikauer

superiority of present conditions’ (Adorno 1954: 14). To asphyxiate people in the present, Adorno sees ideology as a key factor highly valuable for the maintenance of the status quo. Hence, Adorno reiterates the task of ideology as arresting the present while simultaneously denying alternatives. He (1954: 14 & Cook 2001: 11f) writes, ‘since ideology hardly states little more than asserting “what is” presented as something that simply is, its own untruth shrinks to the thin axiom that things could not be other than they are’. For Adorno it remains the task of “The Culture Industry” to cement the present by simply cutting off what Kant once called “what ought to be”, confining society to “what is” as the only available eternal truth. With that, reality and ideology become virtually the same. In short, ‘the difference between ideology and reality has disappeared, because ideology now resigns itself to confirming reality by duplicating it’ (Cook 2001: 14). In its finality, all this leads to Adorno’s aforementioned “false life” conclusion. But Adorno’s overall and inescapable conclusion is that ‘it is because reality and ideology have moved so much towards each other and because today’s reality no longer offers any other convincing ideology than reality itself, ideology has become into its own’ (Adorno 1954: 13). In other words, once reality and ideology have merged so that one can no longer recognize reality, ideology has accomplished its final assignment. As a consequence, no further ideologies are needed. Perhaps this annihilated many ideologies such as, for example, fascism, chauvinism, militarism, Nazism etc. in favor of the self-stabilizing realityideology merger under “The Culture Industry”. But despite all the seemingly overwhelming powers of ideology, Adorno (1954: 15) still manages to end his “Ideologielehre” on a rather positive note when saying, ‘it requires only a small intellectual effort to throw [a critical] light at the powerful but in its final consequence rather invalid, empty and trivial appearance [nichtiger Schein] of ideology’. Perhaps this is a final reminder of Walter Benjamin’s ‘it is only for those without hope that hope is given’. 4

Conclusion: Ideology-critique and Its Emancipatory Potentials

Adorno’s “Ideologielehre” was a product of the 1950s when memories of the most life-threatening occurrence of the 20th century – German Nazism – lingered fresh in Adorno’s mind. But it was also a time when Stalinist power furnished with atom bombs was at its peak and so was American militarism, consumerism and McCarthyism. All three systems of domination relied on ideologies – albeit in different ways. Written in the early 1950s, “Ideologielehre”

Adorno on Ideology

85

remains a product of its time as Hegel would have said. Historically, it came after deTracy, Marx, and Mannheim but before Gramsci, Althusser and many others. Theoretically, Adorno’s theory of ideology belongs to the second school of thinking on ideology dedicated to a critique of ideology and a critique of domination and society while simultaneously showing emancipatory potentials. Adorno developed his “Ideologielehre” as a theory to analyze current pathologies such as the ideological elimination of contradictions; sustaining of domination; and finally the prevention of emancipation. In the emancipatory tradition of critical theory, Adorno designed his “Ideologielehre” as teachings on ideology dedicated to critical theory. It was never designed as a simple overview of the history of ideology. While remaining embedded in the history of ideology as well as the historical development of ideology-critique, Adorno’s “Ideologielehre” can be seen as an example of the second school of ideology that locates ideology in a social, political, historical and economic context while remaining dedicated to ideology-critique. As such Adorno rejects positivist-empiricist as well as individualistic attempts to explain ideology. While outlining the dangers of such views, Adorno diagnosed ideology as a product of concrete historical and political interests. At a theoretical level, he shows why and how ideologies must remain linked to reality while they simultaneously distort reality. Based on his earlier work on “The Culture Industry”, Adorno analyzed how “The Culture Industry” not only distorts reality by presenting its ideological version of reality but also how a shift in ideology away from an irrational-spiritual base of ideology and toward more sophisticated technical-manipulative interests enables today’s ideologies not only to infiltrate society but scholarly subjects as well. Adorno’s prime example of communication studies remains closely linked to “The Culture Industry”. Based on his analysis of “The Culture Industry” he is able to construct a key contribution to ideology. He highlights that under “The Culture Industry” reality and ideology move close together. This creates two effects: firstly, it overlays, if not replaces, almost all previous ideologies in favor of maintaining the status quo when present-day society becomes the all guiding norm; while secondly, it creates a society defined by what can easily be identified as one of Adorno’s key philosophical statements: ‘there is no right living in the false life’ showing the pathologies of present societies. Nonetheless, Adorno closes with the fact that ideology’s invalid, empty and trivial appearance can easily be detected. For that the project of ideologycritique remains an essential program of critical theory. But this also creates potentials for a destruction of ideology and for moves toward emancipation, not only from ideology but also from domination.

86

Klikauer

Bibliography Adorno, T.W. 1944. Minima Moralia – Reflections from the Damaged Life (trans. by D Redmond. 2005: www.efn.org/~dredmond/MinimaMoralia, (transl. by E.F.N Jephcott. 1974. London: New Left Books). Adorno, T.W. & M. Horkheimer 1944. The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception, Transcribed by Andy Blunden 1998; proofed and corrected Feb. 2005, webdownload, November 2005. Adorno, T.W. 1954. Beitrag zur Ideologielehre, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, vol. 6, no. 3–4, pp. 360–375; see also: vol. 8 of Soziologische Schriften I: Beitrag zur Ideologielehre. Theoder W. Adorno, GS 8, S. 457 ff.; see also: docs.google .com (accessed: 23rd February 2014), 15 pages. Adorno, T.W., E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D.J. Levinson, & R. Nevitt 1964. The Authoritarian Personality, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Adorno, T.W. 1973. Negative Dialectics, London: Routledge. Adorno, T.W. 1976. Sociology and Empirical Research, in: T. Adorno et al. (eds.). The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, London: Heinemann. Adorno, T.W. 1993. Hegel – Three Studies, Cambridge: MIT Press. Althusser, L. 1976. Essays on ideology, London: Verso. Aly, G. 2005. Hitlers Volksstaat – Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus, Frankfurt: Fischer-Press. Asch, S.E. 1955. Opinions and Social Pressure, Scientific American, no. 193, 31–35. Barden, P. 2013. Decoded: The Science Behind Why We Buy, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Barthes, R. 1957. Mythologies, New York: The Noonday Press. Bell, D. 1976. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, New York: Basic Books. Benjamin, W. 2008. The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media, Cambridge: Belknap Press. Boer, R. 2011. The robbery of language? On Roland Barthes and myth, Culture, Theory and Critique, vol. 52, no. 2–3, pp. 213–231. Bolaño, C. 2015. The culture industry, information and capitalism, New York: Palgrave. Brink, B.v. d. 2010. Damaged Life – Power and Recognition in Adorno’s Ethics, in: Bert von & David Owen (eds.) Recognition and Power – Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chomsky, N. 1987. On Power and Ideology, Montréal: Rose Books. Chomsky, N. 1991. Media Control – The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda, 2nd edition, New York: Seven Stories Press. Comte, A. 1853. Essential Writings on Positivism, (original translation by Harriet Martineau, 1853, reprint 1975 by New York: Harper. Cook, D. 2001. Adorno, ideology and ideology critique, Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 1–20. Descartes, R. 1637. A Discourse on Method, New York: Washington Square Press (1965).

Adorno on Ideology

87

de Tracy, A.L.C.D. 1829. Eléments d’idéologie, 1817–1818, Georgetown (D.C.): Joseph Milligan (1817; www.bl.uk & www.loc.gov). Downey, J., G. Titley, & J. Toynbee (2014). Ideology critique: the challenge for media studies, Media, Culture & Society, vol. 36, no. 6, pp. 878–887. Eagleton, T. (eds.) 1994. Ideology, London: Longman (& London: Routledge, 2013 reprint). Eagleton, T. 2006. Criticism and ideology: a study in Marxist literary theory, London: Verso. Enzensberger, H.G. 1974. The consciousness industry – On Literature, Politics, and the Media, New York: Continuum Book & The Seabury Press. Farmer, P. 1996. On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below, Daedalus, vol. 125, no. 1, pp. 261–283. Foucault, M. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York: Vintage Books. Foxall, G. 1997. Marketing Psychology – The Paradigm in the Wings, London: Macmillan. Freeden, M. (eds.) 2007. The Meaning of Ideology – Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, London: Routledge. Freeden, M. 1996. Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Freeden, M. 2006. Ideology and political theory, Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 3–22. Freeden, M., L.T. Sargent & M. Stears (eds.). 2013. Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Freyenhagen, F. 2013. Adorno’s practical philosophy: living less wrongly, New York: Cambridge University Press. Galbraith, J.K. 1958. The Affluent Society, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Geuss, R. 1994. Ideology, in: T Eagleton. (eds.). Ideology, London: Longman (& London: Routledge, 2013 reprint). Glynos, J. 2001. The grip of ideology: a Lacanian approach to the theory of ideology, Journal of political ideologies, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 191–214. Gorz, A. 1982. Farewell to the Working Class – An Essay on Post-Industrial Socialism, London: South End Press. Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, London: Lawrence & Wishart. Grant, J. 2014. The End of critique? Ideology as Replication in Adorno and Jameson, Culture, Theory & Critique, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 1–16. Habermas, J. 1970. Towards a Rational Society, Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. 1988. Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Cambridge: MITPress (reprint 2006). Habermas, J. 1997. The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society, Volume I & II, reprint, Cambridge: Polity Press.

88

Klikauer

Harvey, D. 2014. Seventeen contradictions and the end of capitalism, New York: Oxford University Press. Haug, W.F. 1993. Elemente einer Theorie des Ideologischen [elements of a theory of ideology], Hamburg: (Argument Sonderband AS 2013) Argument-Press. Haug, W.F. 1993a. Umrisse zu einer Theorie des Ideologischen [outlines of a theory of ideology], www.wolfgangfritzhaug.inkrit.de. Honneth, A. 1995. The Struggle for Recognition – The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Cambridge: Polity Press. Horkheimer, M. 1937. Traditional and Critical Theory, in: M Horkheimer. Critical Theory – Selected Essays, translated by M.J O’Connell. et al., 1972, New York: Herder. Horkheimer, M. 1964. Critique of Instrumental Reason, New York: Continuum Books (internet download: www.marxists.org). Jaeggi, R. 2009. Rethinking Ideology, in: B. de Bruin & C.F. Zurn (eds) New Waves in Political Philosophy, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Klikauer, T. 2011. Not a Psychological Issue – Review of Adorno’s Guilt and Defence, Radical Philosophy, no. 167, May/June, pp. 56–57. Klikauer, T. 2013. Managerialism – Critique of an Ideology, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Klikauer, T. 2015. The I in the We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition, Capital & Class, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 165–167. Lindstrom, M. 2008. Buyology: Truth and Lies about why we Buy, New York: Doubleday. Louv, R. 2005. Last child in the woods: saving our children from nature-deficit disorder, Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill. Mannheim, K. 1936. Ideology and utopia: an introduction to the sociology of knowledge, London: K. Paul, Trench & New York: Harcourt, Brace and company. Marcuse, H. 1964. Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis, Boston: Beacon Press. Marcuse, H. 1964. Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber, republished in: H Marcuse. 1968. Negations – Essays in Critical Theory, Boston: Beacon Press. Marcuse, H. 1966. One-dimensional man: studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society, Boston: Beacon Press (1991). Marx, K. 1845. The German Ideology – Critique of Modern German Philosophy According to Its Representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, and of German Socialism According to Its Various Prophets, www.marxists.org. Morley, D. & K-H. Chen. (eds.) 1996. Stuart Hall: critical dialogues in cultural studies, London: Routledge. Offe, C. 1976. Industry and Inequality – The Achievement Principle in Work and Social Status, London: Edward Arnold. Peffer, R.G. 1990. Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rawls, J. 1980. Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, no. 9, pp. 515–572.

Adorno on Ideology

89

Rehmann, J. 2013. Theories of ideology: the powers of alienation and subjection, Leiden: Brill. Reiman, J. & P. Leighton 2013. The rich get richer and the poor get prison: ideology, class, and criminal justice (10th ed.), Boston: Pearson. Ricoeur, P. 1986. Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, New York: Columbia University Press. Riechers, C. 1967. Philosophie der Praxis: Antonio Gramsci, Frankfurt: Fischer Press. Rosenthal, L. (eds) 2014. Radio Benjamin – Walter Benjamin, London: Verso Press. Schecter, D. 2010. The Critique of Instrumental Reason from Weber to Habermas, London: Continuum Press. Schwarz, B. 2007. On Ideology, (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies – Birmingham University – CCCS), London: Routledge. Sherratt, Y. 2013. Hitler’s Philosophers, New Haven: Yale University Press. Shuster, M. 2014. Autonomy After Auschwitz – Adorno, German Idealism, and Modernity, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Sontag, S. 1975. Fascinating Fascism, New York Review of Books, 6th Februrary 1975. Stein, A. 2012. Event and Ideology, Culture, Theory & Critique, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 287–303. Therborn, G. 1988. The ideology of power and the power of ideology, London: Verso. Zarembka, P. (eds.) 2013. Contradictions: finance, greed, and labor unequally paid, Bingley: Emerald. Zengotita, T. 2005. Mediated – How the Media shapes your World and the Way you Live in it. New York: Bloomsbury. Žižek, S. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso Press. Žižek, S. 2012. Mapping ideology, London: Verso. Zuidervaart, L. 2011. Theodor W. Adorno, plato.stanford.edu/entries/adorno.

Chapter 5

Hegemony, Ideology, Media Savaş Çoban Cultural assumptions include many things such as world-view of human nature, change, time, equity, efficiency, communication, education, individual and state, women and men, religion-state relations. As Marx said, culture is almost everything that the human being created against nature’s creations. Cultural approaches are shaped in the hands of certain ideologies and whether an individual is aware or not, the person’s behavior is shaped and directed with them. Reflections on the ideology of capitalism is presented and social culture is shaped by the mass media. In this sense, the culture of capitalism manufactures different features and different content for the poor and for the rulers. In this context, the ideological foundation of culture is based on the economic infrastructure. With the merging of mass media and nesting with the social culture, popular culture has been far away from reflecting pluralism and the area of struggle in the social sense. Popular culture has become the area of domination and orientation and also the reason for the cultural rupture of the public from past to present. Culture today has become a profitable industry and mass media has also undertaken the most important task for the marketing. In this regard, ‘culture’ is no longer a pure concept but has turned into a concept that has an ideological function and intricately intertwined with the mass media. 1 Hegemony Although mass demonstrations and social discontents along with the crises that capitalism has experienced in recent times are not strong enough to create ‘cracks’ that could fragment hegemony, it turns out that this system presents a danger to humanity. In this context, the concept of ‘hegemony’ and Gramsci must be revisited and the situation must be assessed accordingly. Hegemony originates from the Greek word ‘hegemonia’. It indicates that an element in a system is dominant, superior to others. In Antonio Gramsci’s works, it is discussed as the acquisition of the power by the dominant class with the consent of submissives. Hegemony, which is not a forced regime, is mostly understood as a cultural and ideological method that operates based on

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_007

Hegemony, Ideology, Media

91

­bourgeois values. The concept of hegemony is attributed to Gramsci in political science and it underlines that political phenomenon exists not only at the level of the state but also by encompassing societal relations. To the contrary of this widespread account, Anderson notes that, before Gramsci’s ­adoption, the concept of hegemony had a long prior history in Marxist writings and that it was one of the most basic political expressions of the Russian SocialDemocratic movement from 1890 until 1917. The idea of hegemony was first used in Plekhanov’s 1883–1884 writings. Plekhanov, with the concept of hegemony, said that the Russian working class should not confine itself only with economic struggle against employers but should also wage a political struggle (Anderson, 1988: 30). Lenin, meanwhile, in a letter written to Plekhanov, called for a political newspaper as the sole effective means of preparing the real hegemony of the working class in Russia (Anderson, 1988: 32). According to Anderson, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony usage stems from the description of the working class of the Comintern in the common struggle against the repression of the capital, with other exploited classes, in particular the definitions of the class alliance with the peasantry and the dominance of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat (Anderson, 1988: 35). Getting the concept of hegemony from the Comintern, Gramsci further developed it and carried it to a different point. Gramsci extended the notion of hegemony from its original application to the perspectives of the working class in a bourgeois revolution against a feudal order, to the mechanisms of bourgeois rule over the working class in a stabilized capitalist society and produced a new Marxist theory of intellectuals through the powerful cultural emphasis that he provided to the hegemony idea ­(Anderson, 1988: 41). Gramsci has introduced the concept of hegemony as a concept significantly important to discuss and discourse. Hegemony emerges in every sphere in which political power exists. And, political power exists in every sphere humans exist as a society. One of Gramsci’s most important contributions to Marxism is his analysis of the concept of hegemony. In Gramscian thought, also due to his role as a linguist, language and linguistics take an important place and play a central role. The concept of hegemony has emerged from the model of linguistic relations and the diffusion of the linguistic innovations of the sovereigns in the communities speaking dominant and oppressed languages. In this context, hegemony begins in the language. Hence, one should look into these roots in order to understand the persisting importance of discourse in our time. In this context, according to Gramsci, linguistic relations are a model of cultural influences and relations of reputation, such as the historical traces of past and present power relations, as well as the careful philosophical conception of life and the sloppy sociological conception of life. It is necessary to replace the given

92

Çoban

c­ ultural structures by destroying them and replacing them with new ones for social classes. In this sense, as Raymond Williams puts it, the hegemony creates a culture which encompasses the dominance of a particular class covering all practices of life and the submission of the other class to this latter: The concept of hegemony often, in practice, resembles these definitions, but it is distinct in its refusal to equate consciousness with the articulate formal system which can be and ordinarily is abstracted as ‘ideology’. It of course does not exclude the articulate and formal meanings, values and beliefs which a dominant class develops and propagates. But it does not equate these with consciousness, or rather it does not reduce consciousness to them. Instead it sees the relations of domination and subordination, in their forms as practical consciousness, as in effect a saturation of the whole process of living – not only of political and economic activity, nor only of manifest social activity, but of the whole substance of lived identities and relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense. Hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level ‘ideology’, nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as ‘manipulation’ or ‘indoctrination’. It is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives. It is, that is to say, in the strongest sense a ‘culture’, but a culture which has also to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes. williams, 1977: 109–110

The term of hegemony was an expression of the working class convincing the social strata with whom it would form an alliance in Russia while Gramsci conceptualized it as the approval of the bourgeoisie’s regime by the working class. What brings an ease of transference to this concept is the maining of concept it contains. The aim of Gramsci in determining the differences between the Western Europe and the East is to draw a strategy for the struggle of

Hegemony, Ideology, Media

93

s­ ocialism. The philosopher, who defines the concept of hegemony as a struggle for ­domination over other groups in forming a union of a particular group, has argued that the domination of ruling classes is provided by the consent of dependent groups rather and far more effectively than by force or direct control. He called the apparatuses that provided consent as hegemonic apparatuses and stated that the dominant ideology became a valid and natural discourse through these apparatuses. Thus, according to Gramsci, who developed an understanding of proletariat hegemony, the most favorable conditions for the exercise of the proletariat power can be achieved by this class being both ruling and dominant class at the same time. For this, the intellectual and ethical ruling must come before the dominance of the state. Gramsci holds that the proletariat should establish an interclass alliance-block to accomplish the purpose under question. On the basis of this historical block which will be formed both on an economic and an intellectual level, communists should take part and lead. Gramsci especially emphasized the superstructure theory and developed his ‘hegemony’ concept from it. He explores the theory of superstructure in the ‘Prison Notebooks’ explaining that the superstructure consists of two levels, civil society and political society. According to Gramsci, in superstructures, ‘civil society’, i.e. organizations plentitude tier, which is called ‘private’ in folksay, and ‘political society’ or ‘state’ tier; these tiers corresponds to the function of ‘direct sovereignty’ or commandment, which expresses itself in the state or ‘legal’ judiciary by the function of ‘hegemony’ that the sovereigns imposed on society. These functions are exactly the organizing and linking functions (Gramsci, 1986: 318). The levels of superstructure in social organization are, as we have seen, diametrically opposed, and this contrast is due to the methods used in the preservation and reproduction of power. The structure of the state is quite different from that of civil society, and the reason for existence of the state is to keep the whole society under its sovereignty. When addressing the subject of hegemony, it is also necessary to mention Lenin, where Gramsci is influenced and borrowed the concept. Gramsci, who tackled the concept with a different understanding than Lenin, carried it to another level. In general use, the “hegemony of proletariat” only meant that proletariat leading the struggle and dragging the others together. Lenin, brought a new content to this concept, such as winning all the oppressed classes, strata and groups to the revolution by taking stand against their oppression by the state. The concept was no longer merely to describe the relation of the working class to the other classes; but also, the way of the working class’ policy making. That

94

Çoban

is to say, it described both the leadership of the working class and the way of obtaining this leadership. Lenin based his class leadership understanding upon the power of the working class and its struggle for the political freedom, and his understanding of hegemony can be related to the struggle of the proletariat to seize the state power and to play a leading role in handling the state administration. The struggle for national democratic demands naturally develops within the political independence and working-class democracy. In this context, the national-democratic demands are replaced by the desire-necessity to seize the power in a short time. The hegemony of the working class is assured during this course of struggle. Gramsci was highly influenced by Lenin when he developed the concept of hegemony. In Lenin’s theory, hegemony is based solely on an economic and class basis; yet Gramsci accepts the class basis of hegemony. According to him, hegemony also have cultural, moral and political functions in addition to the economic functions. While the concept of hegemony in Lenin was taken as the leadership of the working class to other oppressed classes, Gramsci developed the concept and added the cultural leadership meaning. Therefore, it can be argued that Gramsci is the actual theorist of the hegemony approach according to how we understand the concept today. Gramsci thinks that hegemony must be ensured before power can be seized. Since Gramsci developed the hegemony theory in the post-war period, hegemony covers all the institutions of civil society and refers to the expansion and spread of the culture and is not limited to the working class as the meaning by Lenin. In Gramsci, the state is not just a political society, it is a combination of civil society and political society. If we come to the fundamental difference between the concepts of hegemony of Gramsci and Lenin; According to Lenin, culture was ‘helpful’ for political purposes, but for Gramsci, culture was essential for seizing the power and cultural supremacy had to be achieved at first. Gramsci’s view is that the class, intellectual and moral leadership, who want to dominate modern conditions, must act beyond their narrow economic interests to take alliance and reconciliation with various forces. Gramsci calls this union of social forces a “historic bloc”, taking a term from Georges Sorel. This bloc constitutes the basis of cohesion for a particular social order, in which this dominant class re­ creates and reproduces the hegemony through the links of institutions, social relations and thought. Also Lenin thinks that force must be used in a struggle against the dominant group in society, and that this struggle will take place in the political society, on the contrary, Gramsci thinks this struggle will be mostly civil society. Because, according to Gramsci, hegemony is the priority of civil society over political society.

Hegemony, Ideology, Media

95

Gramsci did not set sharp boundaries between these concepts when dealing with them. It is important not to overlook this point to understand him. In Gramsci, the distinction between political society (brute force) and civil ­society (hegemony) is only conceptual distinctions. The boundaries of the state and society are clearly defined, and the relations of power intertwined rather than the two separated classes are treated as openly. According to Gramsci, it is important to note that civil society is not generally seen as positive because it is identified with much more rationality than brute force (Crehan, 2006: 153). In Gramsci modern capitalism, the bourgeoisie maintains that economic control is provided by the union of the civil society and the demands of the political-intellectual-political parties in the political sphere. Thus, the bourgeoisie reproduces the rationale of the masses in a sense, going beyond their close economic interests and allowing for the change of forms of sovereignty. Gramsci positions such movements as reformism and fascism. Taylorism and Fordism are examples of this. According to Gramsci capitalism governs not only through pure violence, political and economic enforcement, but also through a dominant culture in which bourgeois values ideologically became society’s ‘common thought’. Thus, a culture of reconciliation develops, and the working class consubstantiates its own good with the bourgeoisie’s good, helps to maintain the existing order instead of opposing and rebelling to it. In ‘Modern Prince’, which is inspired from Machiavelli’s work Prince, he argues that the revolutionary party and working class is the force to raise organic intellectuals and provide alternative hegemony within civil society. Hegemony is also about what the working class has to do to establish the power. To achieve this, the need to win the majority of the working class to the socialist ideas emerges. This strategy depends on understanding the difference between wars of maneuver, which is a total war against the state, and wars of position, which is long term war that requires different tactics. Gramsci warns against the state worshipping that is the result of identification political society with civil society as Jacobens and Fascists have done. He believes that the historical task of the proletariat is to create a ‘regulated society’ and defines the ‘extinction of the state’ as the full development of civil society’s self-regulating ability. Today, hegemony is one of the most controversial topics. It is discussed in various ways, and there are some people who argue that its effects over the spheres that it touches are not as important as the old days. But, in reality, although it is thought that everything is changing very quickly, capitalism and its state apparatus don’t change that much, it just adapts to new situations more easily and find solutions to their problems quickly, even these are temporary

96

Çoban

solutions. In fact, there is not much change in the intellectual sense. The exploiter and the exploited relationship and surplus value remain in place. Capitalism, as a system that lives with crises and internal conflicts, has to build hegemony over the society and should produce the consent. The Marxist ­approach based on political economy aims to see the big picture and does not deal with fractions. In this way, it make inferences over the media and the political economy relations. The main objective of the approach is to examine the close relationships between the holders of money and power on the world. The approach also focuses on the extent and diversity of cultural expression, and the political economy approach in the context of cultural studies is working on Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ (Schudson, 1989: 271). According to Raymond Williams, hegemony does not exist passively as a form of sovereignty, but has to be constantly renewed, rebuilt, defended and changed. Existing cultural values are structured and interpreted in such a way that it serves best to the interests of the sovereigns (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991: 151). In this context, a great importance are given to the hegemony in order both for the state to sustain by repairing itself against crises and cracks and to get approval in social sphere. The power forms of capitalism are in the form of pressure over the majority of society. From this point of view, it is necessary to realize the hegemony of power, which has power means for determining the forms of thinking and behavior to be controlled under the sovereignty of the society, through social sphere. The power tries to form and control the society by using all its ­possibilities. In this process, it tries to ensure society to internalize the power by specifying the consciousness of the society and by the power’s effect on consciousness structures. Hegemony is best understood as the organization of the consent. It is a process in which dependent forms of consciousness are built without resorting to violence or force (Barrett, 1996: 65). It can also be perceived as the production of the consent and the renunciation of rights of some part of the society on behalf of oppressors by a certain consensus. The place, the period and conditions that Gramsci lived played an important role in the development of this concept. As Callinicos states, Gramsci has developed the hegemony concept within the conditions of the time he lived. According to Gramsci, the socialist revolution requires broad ideological and organizational preparation, and may involve the development of class alliances, and in fact semi-industrialized countries like Italy may contain development of class alliances as Gramsci predicted for the northern proletariat and the southern peasants. On this background, he develops the famous hegemony system expressed in ‘Prison Notes’ (Callinicos, 2004: 318). Gramsci, whom we owe the hegemony concept, sees it as the principal means of preserving the social order in capitalist societies and refers ­specifically to

Hegemony, Ideology, Media

97

the means of maintaining the dominance of the ruling class. Hence, Gramsci overemphasizes the superstructure of the society and evaluates its ideological institutions in the struggle at the level of meaning and power. It is stated that it is necessary to establish an ideological hegemony in order to maintain the continuity of capitalism. It is also expressed that ideological hegemony is more important than military and economic power to keep capitalism alive (Rojek, 1995: 21–22). Industrial production or the capitalist system plays a major role in the production of sovereign values. S. Hall considers hegemony to be a social groups sovereignty or power building over others. In other words, hegemony is expressed as sovereignty and dependence in the social relations structured by power (Lull, 2001: 51). In general, hegemony includes different class-related (but not necessarily class-unconscious) forces being named and organized ­under the ‘political, intellectual and moral leadership’ of a particular class (or fractions) or more precisely by its political, intellectual and moral spokesmanship (Jessop, 2005: 171). There are many different definitions and ­interpretations of hegemony, but they all have close meanings.1 According to the historical conditions and characteristics of societies examined in Gramsci’s writings, there are submodels where force and consent, sovereignty and hegemony, state and civil society relationships are occurred in different forms. In a “version” related with Western societies, consent and oppression together become the common dimension of the state (Anderson, 1988: 43). The state has the monopoly of force usage. One side of the coin is sustaining political power by coercion or by knowing/reporting that the state has the means of ‘force’ and that it can use them whenever it wants. The other side of the coin is the ‘consent’. It is essential for governments to ensure consent by means other than the threat of force, in terms of ensuring the legitimacy of political power and, hence, its continuity (Gramsci, 1986: 186). Althusser emphasizes the importance of the ideological means of the state in terms of the provision of consent and draws attention to the different structure of capitalist society from the feudal society by looking at the development history of the societies. Althusser separates the ideological apparatuses and the oppressive means of state and indicates that ideological apparatuses have a very important functionality in the continuation of hegemony in capitalist society. Hegemony and ideology are two concepts that can not be separated from each other. Hegemony is a process that operates through the transfer of 1 Laclau and Mouffe also addressed the difficulty of conceptual expression of the subject; the domain of politics as a zero-sum game playground since rules and actors are never entirely clear. There is a name for a game that does not fit the concept: hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992: 236).

98

Çoban

d­ ominant ideology, consciousness formation and social power experience. Critical approach oriented against all forms of power and sovereignty abuses and focused on ideological basis of sovereignty. Ideology provide a basis to the system of ideas expressed in communication; to all emotions, opinions and attitudes of consciousness groups, or individuals (Lull, 2001: 19). Ideology includes the hegemony and it is a broader concept than hegemony, and it actually establishes intellectual basis and form. The important issue is the which ideology that hegemony serves to. Hegemonic ideology tries to produce ­consciousness / consent in the direction of itself by cultivating sovereign values with mass consciousness. An individual, a member of a family group, an employee of an enterprise, a member of a society, etc., does not respond positively to the all truths of message sender. Even they respond negatively using alternative channels too (Lull, 2001: 19). However, these negative reactions are softened in various ways and consent is reproduced in different forms, thereby providing the hegemony. Hegemony has the flexibility to bend and twist when needed. Hegemony normally involves the sacrifice of short-term interests of the hegemonic class and fractions, and involves compromises to other social forces mobilized behind the project (Jessop, 2005: 171). In some cases, hegemony compromises to ensure its continuity, but these pursuits of other hegemony reproduction methods does only mean gaining time. Now, hegemony is addressed on a global scale. The concept of hegemonic world order is based not only on the regulation of conflict between states but also on the globally designed civil society, the global mode of production that links the social classes that surround the countries (Cox, 1993: 61). With the development of capitalism and the fact that production and consumption have become polycentric rather than monocentric, hegemony has succeeded in making itself up to this new order. As Jessop argues, hegemony can undergo some changes, it is possible to occur short-swinging changes in hegemony at the level of political practices. These include the periods when hegemony is unstable, when the hegemony applied on the power bloc and the hegemony crises applied on the broad masses separated, the hegemonic crises, and even the short periods of hegemonic shifts developing for the benefit of dependent classes such as the petty bourgeoisie or working class and social categories such as the military, bureaucracy and intellectuals (Jessop, 2005: 173). Based on this we can tell that hegemony is trying to stabilize with various movements on a loose ground like an acrobat on a rope. Hence, each ­hegemonic position is based on an unstable equilibrium (Anderson, 1988: 232).

Hegemony, Ideology, Media

99

Wherever the equilibrium is lost, if there is a counter-hegemony produced by the opposition, the present hegemony will be imperilled. According to Marxist understanding, the hegemony of capitalism will eventually be crashed by the working class and the state will be seized by the working class, and will eventually come to an end together with all the ­oppression-­oppressed relations and structures. However, for this to happen, the class consciousness of the working class must be realized, but the d­ eveloping capitalist state is using its hegemony to hinder this realization. The ideological hegemony of capitalism reveals itself in many different forms. Almost every sphere, including economical, military, cultural, social, and moral spheres, leisure time periods in workplace and outside functions as power spheres where capitalism builds its ideological hegemony, reproduces itself, and use all kind of instruments to reinforce its power (Rojek, l995: 18–22). In other words, capitalism spreads its hegemony into every aspect of life. The hegemony relation between the oppressed and the oppressors is based on a equilibrium. The usual situation is based on the supervision of social groups that do not “approve” the ruling of the fundamental class; subordinated classes run into contradiction with the ruling class in a certain degree of evolution of social and economic relations (Portelli, 1982: 27). When this contradiction deepens, the equilibrium begins to deteriorate, and when their hegemony becomes imperilled, sovereigns will put force in action. The ruling class uses more or less ‘legal’ force to resume and maintain its sovereignty. In the case of organic depression periods, the latter situation is even more extraordinary and temporary: the ruling class loses control of civil society and relies on political society for maintaining its sovereignty. (Portelli, 1982: 27) In other words state will use force in the areas where its hegemony having difficulties but normally it doesn’t applies this for a long time. Because long periods of force and coercion can strengthen the counter-hegemony. The political government, that is, the state enforcement apparatus that provides the ‘legal’ regulators of groups that do not accept passive compromises as they are effective; However, this apparatus was created for the whole society against the possibility of depression during command and administration when there is a lack of consensus spontaneously (Portelli, 1982: 25–26). The state’s force apparatus starts to do its real job when consent can’t be produced or when hegemony is imperiled. According to classical Marxist understanding, the working class will eventually rise up together with its allies against the class who exploits itself. In this phase, the state apparatus and hegemony will be dismantled. Gramsci, contrary to the claims, is not a reformist who renounced his revolutionary position. ‘But what happens to the state apparatus, which is regarded as insurmountable to

100

Çoban

Lenin and Marx’s proletarian revolution, on the stage of the insurrection itself, on the offensive and destruction stage?’ Anderson, who asks Gramsci, gives the following answer to the question: Gramsci never separated from classical principles on the absolute necessity of seizing state power through force, but the strategic formula he brings for the West fails to integrate them. A Marxist strategy, putting ‘war of maneuver’ and ‘war of position’ in opposite poles will reach to making a choice between reformism or adventurousness (Anderson, 1988: 111). The problems expressed by Anderson are much discussed and still controversial within the European Left. In the postmodernist view, the hegemony concept was again addressed and examined by Ernest Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Laclau and Mouffe pointed out that political struggle, even for Gramsci, is still a matter of collision b­ etween the classes to choose either this or that. According to the historical necessity principle of classical Marxist theory, it is necessary for the working class to rise up against exploiters eventually. So while hegemony explaining why this is not happening, it brings the historical necessity principle of the classical Marxism into doubt. According to them, the hegemony is a proof of the need to develop a pluralistic Marxism. Since Gramsci’s process of developing his own theory of hegemony is a postwar period, the concept of hegemony is not limited to the communist party, unlike Lenin. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony includes all the institutions of civil society, giving importance to the cultural process. In other words, he extended Lenin’s state analysis. According to Gramsci, the state is not merely a political society, but a combination of civil society and political society. The main difference between the concepts of hegemony of Gramsci and Lenin is that Gramsci is more prominent in the cultural and ideological dimension in the concept of hegemony. On the other side, while claiming that Lenin should be used hard in the struggle against the sovereigns, and that this struggle will take place in political society, Gramsci states that it will be mostly civil society. Because, according to Gramsci, hegemony is the priority of civil society over political society. In this context, what Lenin and Gramsci understand from hegemony is quite different from each other. The sovereigns use the consent method to regenerate their power and to control the society in ordinary times, but they do not hesitate to resort to ­oppressive and coercive apparatuses to remove conflicts and conflicts that arise during extraordinary periods. As Gramsci puts it, it is often a temporary practice to use the difficult devices, that is to increase the weight of the political society in control and administration, and when the conflict is over, the oppressive and difficult devices return to their former positions. As a result, the sovereigns use their difficult devices and consent-generating devices together

Hegemony, Ideology, Media

101

to protect and maintain and regenerate their power, and eventually lead one of them to the scene. The concept of hegemony is indispensable for the revolutionary action of the proletariat. The proletariat, which is the only revolutionary class of contemporary society, should be the leader of the struggle for a totally democratic revolution of the whole people, of the struggle of all laborers and exploited people against the oppressors and the exploiters. The proletariat is revolutionary only to the extent that it is conscious of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat and puts it into practice (Savran, quoted from Lenin, 1998: 62). The actual struggle between the two sides in the oppressor-oppressed relationship takes place in the field of hegemony. The only way to break and crumble the hegemony of the bourgeoisie is to see the power of the proletariat’s own hegemony and reach the consciousness of the hegemony struggle. 2

Media, Hegemony, Ideology

In our day, knowledge is power and power holders are those who determine what “knowledge” is and those who present “knowledge” to the society. Knowledge strengthens people. Those who dominate the media do so to isolate and alienate us. ‘The ruling thoughts of every age are the thoughts of the ruling class of that age. This is one of the great observations of Karl Marx, who is ignored today by the ruling class of the West (Flanders, 2007: 93). This statement, which Marx spoke a long time ago, has lost nothing from its value. It still clearly summarizes and reveals the existing reality. Marx and Engels saw the party as a propaganda means to spread socialist thoughts. Lenin agrees it, but it is not enough for him. He has also seen the party as a means which prepares and carries the revolution. Lenin advocates a party concept of conscious-equipped and professional revolutionaries who will lead the working class in the first period. Lenin was trying to spread two fundamental ideas through the Iskra newspaper in the ongoing political slavery conditions in Russia: first, organizational centrality; second ideological leadership. Lenin moved quickly to control the media after the revolution (at that time the media was just a newspaper). In this sense, for Lenin, who emphasized the importance of the media in his previous work “What Is To Be Done?”, this act was quite meaningful and accurate. Lenin insisted on the importance of a newspaper that will be distributed throughout the whole Russia. Because a central newspaper was important and necessary for the revolution. Lenin, who did not deny the importance of local newspapers, put an end to these debates.

102

Çoban

Lenin conceptualized the importance of the media years ago. It showed that it was a means to organize and to be put in front of masses as a strong political structure. In the meantime, the newspaper, which is a means of agitation and propaganda in political terms, should be called out to whole country. Lenin thought that a newspaper, which would be formed to cover all of ­Russia, would be instrumental in both integrating the party in ideological sense, as well as being a means for organizational integration of local organizations into a party. In this sense, the newspaper thought that he dealt actually tied the party to a central structure both ideologically and organizationally. Lenin is one of the first political thinkers to reveal the importance of the media in this sense. When he was pointing out that the media is a means of propaganda and agitation, he also revealed that it is a valuable means for masses. On the contrary, from the perspective of the capitalist system, the media continues to play an important role in terms of the continuation of the hegemony and the daily reproduction of its ideology. Lenin saw the media as the means by which the revolutionary party reached the masses and spread them the ideology of their class, and in this sense emphasized its place and importance. The thinkers who came after him also took the topic he left and took it further. On the other hand, the newspaper, which was the most important (or even the only) means of communication during the Lenin era, will begin to acquire new siblings as technology improves. The legacy of Lenin, who well assessed the inheritance of Marx, was well appreciated by subsequent thinkers and enabled us to have a point of view that now shows the importance of the media in Marxist sense. Antonio Gramsci’s writings about hegemony and also the position of the media in hegemony were important progresses. Gramsci, who revealed that hegemony could be achieved in this sense not only by force but also by consent, brought a different point of view by saying that newspapers were used for this. In Gramsci’s works, ‘hegemony’ is considered as the ruling class’ getting the power with the consent of subordinates. The hegemony, which is not a forced ruling, is understood as a cultural and ideological method that operates according to the values of the bourgeoisie. The concept of hegemony is attributed to Gramsci in political science literature and expresses that political phenomenon exists not only at the level of the state but also in the context of all social relations. While emphasizing the ideological character of cultural institutions, Gramsci also includes newspapers and magazines. Gramsci divided the newspapers in political sense; ‘popular’ newspapers that addresses the whole society and party newspaper that addresses a ‘limited’ group. With the transition to the party system in political life, the quality of the communication has changed in this sense. In this sense, the entire social

Hegemony, Ideology, Media

103

structure would evolve in the process and he would try to use all the means to secure his hegemony. So, the media has started to serve as one of the important means that the system uses in this sense. Contrary to classical Marxist understanding, Althusser -beside the state’s oppression apparatus- also adds the ideological state apparatuses to the superstructure. He argues that they play an important role in seizing the state power, in renewing the state apparatus and in the reproduction of the production relations, and especially emphasizes the ideology-subject relationship. He analyzes, with his own style and sharp class perspective, how ideology produces subjects from individuals and how they are effective in the reproduction of existing productive relations. According to Althusser, it is not important that the state’s oppression apparatuses are private or public. Along with the political literary contributions of Gramsci and Althusser in this sense, new conceptual explanations brought in intellectual meaning influenced later thinkers. Writings of these two thinkers, whose reflections are still valid today, still provides baseline to many discussions and interpretations. Raymond Williams, as a thinker influenced by Gramsci and Althusser, has revealed hegemony and ideology as facts leading and shaping us. Williams addresses ideology as a system of relatively formal and articulated meanings, values and beliefs that can be abstracted as a “world view” or a “class view”. The most comprehensive of the uses of ideologies is the “meaning and idea production” process. Williams has tried to clarify what the “media” is about. He has dealt with the recently used ‘media’ as a ‘means’. The media is used for the provision of ideological hegemony and propaganda is being made in this sense. The rulers have to spread their ideology to the whole society because if they do not, another ideology will come to appreciate this empty space, poisoning life, even taking power from the rulers. We can easily see this if we look at the revolts and rebellions in the social sense starting from 1917. However, with the technological developments after the World War ii and the mass media being penetrated into every home, every aspect of life, the rulers/oppressors have breathed a sigh of relief. Because now they can reach the masses anytime they want, they can tell them what they want. Not only with these, the media are used for persuasion and propaganda all over the world. 3

Conclusion: Capitalism and Media

Today, with the reawakening of Marxist approach more grounded and welldirected criticisms have been started. Especially baseless and unsubstantiated

104

Çoban

approaches, that see or show the internet and social media as a revolutionary tool, have been started to be criticized and the facts have begun to be seen. In the end, the media, which we can not consider apart from the capitalist production relations, are in the hands of the sovereigns in the sense of control and freedom, and they are free to the extent that they allow. There are unbreakable links between economic and social life and the cultural context. It is impossible to ignore or overlap the link between infrastructure and superstructure. Capitalism sees culture as an industrial material and tries to shape it ­accordingly. Cultural space also includes mass media and relations of production shape these areas as they desire. We can not handle anything in life by isolating it from the economic context. Because the relations of production affect the individual and the social life in every area of life and hold all the production processes, material or cultural. The capitalist system shapes all the relationships within it because of it’s nature. To reproduce its own existence, capitalism has to make use of the media in order to present itself as the best possible system and to preserve the hegemonic nature of this message (Fuchs, 2015: 123). It does not matter who holds property in capitalist relations. Because the changes in media ownership do not change the relations of power too much, because each media owner acts in harmony with the interests of the capital (Shoemaker and Reese, 1997: 141). The relationship between power and the media is in harmony with the general sense, albeit with some problems. Because in the last point interests are intersecting with each other. Capitalism keeps the interests of the ruling class above everything and moves in this direction. Sovereign ideology uses the media intensively to reproduce its ideology and establish hegemony. In this context, it is necessary to pay attention to the economic infrastructure and the ideological and hegemonic approaches of the sovereigns that derive from it in order to look at the media in a critical sense. The capitalist state holds economy and the mass media along with the all means of oppression. ‘Layout protectors’ who have developed various approaches to keep their own existence and to keep it under pressure while not disturbing it are using the media for this purpose after family and education. The families are indispensable means of maintaining the status quo, but they are not enough by themselves. In this sense, in all areas surrounding human beings, inputs and outputs are fully controlled in the fields of education, culture and communication; elements that threaten the order are being combed out. However, in some places there are gaps left for allowing some ‘rebellions’ and system critics. Because to completely prohibit and put obstacles will push the rebellion and insurgents into the underground and eventually these rebellions will be a trouble for the state, will be directed to it.

Hegemony, Ideology, Media

105

The media is seen as a means for knowledge exchanging and ‘knowledgepower’ relationship is becoming an important factor. But in the capitalist countries the media serves for the capitalists and knowledge has transformed into a concept that is used to evaluate what should be seen as real rather than real. In this sense, ‘information’ becomes the knowledge that transforms needed-to-show lies as ‘truth’ instead of showing the reality as truth and this transformed knowledge spread to the society through media channels. This kind of information is used to guide the society, problems are hidden or things that are not problems are shown as problems. Capitalist production relations are based on exploitation in all spheres, which in this sense are both dominant in economic terms and ideologically. Capital owners present their ideologies repeatedly in different forms every day through the media. With the rediscovery of the ideology in media studies, the concept of power re-emerged and began to be looked more critically at the construction of reality (Stevenson 2008: 69). Even if the media-­ ideology-power triangle is questioned by intellectuals and revolutionaries and it was struggled to communicate the truth to the people, ultimately sovereign ­ideology ­demonstrates power of its hegemony and ensures that the society closes its eyes and ears to these criticisms and even make them to react to truths. With the withdrawal of socialism from the historical stage, capitalism which was the only power in ideological sense declared its sovereignty in all areas. Rapid technological changes and transformations in the sense of the media have enabled the capitalist system to move more easily on a global scale, and they have also provided the globalization and communication of resistance against them. In this context, capitalism and anti-capitalists carry on their struggles in the same medium. It is the capitalism which is powerful and it hold this medium but it is not possible for it to desist from it. The street and social media couple have shown many times that they can shake the powers. According to Marx we serve the indicators instead of them to serve us. Only the oracles can say whether we are going to realize this situation and whether we are going to do something for liberation in case of realization (Poe, 2015: 435). Bibliography Anderson, P. 1988. Gramsci, Hegemonya, Doğu/Batı Sorunu ve Strateji, Istanbul: Alan Publishing. Barrett, Michele 1996. Marx’tan Foucault’ya İdeoloji, Istanbul: Sarmal Publishing. Callinicos, Alex 2004. Toplum Kuramı, Istanbul: İletişim Publishing.

106

Çoban

Cox, R.W. 1993. “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method”, Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, Ed.: S. Gill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49–66. Crehan, Kate. 2006. Gramsci Kültür Antropoloji, Istanbul: Kalkedon Publishing. Flanders, Laura. 2007. “Kükreyen Fare: Halk Medyası Kozları Ele Geçiriyor”, Medya ve Savaş Yalanları, Lenora Foerstel (ed.), Istanbul: Yordam Book. Fuchs, Christian. 2015. Dijital Emek ve Karl Marx, Ankara: NotaBene Publishing. Gramsci, Antonio. 1986. Hapishane Defterleri, Istanbul: Onur Publishing. Jessop, Bob. 2005. Hegemonya, Post-Fordizm ve Küreselleşme Ekseninde Kapitalist ­Devlet, Ed: Betül Yarar and Alev Özkazanç, Istanbul: İletişim Publishing. Laclau, Ernesto ve Chantal Mouffe. 1992. Hegemonya ve Sosyalist Strateji, Istanbul: ­Birikim Publishing. Lull, James. 2001. Medya İletişim Kültür, Istanbul: Vadi Publishing. Poe, Marshall T. 2015. İletişim Tarihi, Istanbul: Islık Publishing. Porteli, Hugues. 1982. Gramsci ve Tarihsel Blok, Ankara: Savaş Publishing. Rojek, Chris 1995. Decentring Leisure: Rethinking Leisure Theory, London: Sage Publishing. Savran, Sungur. 1998. Lenin’i Yakmalı mı?. Istanbul: Devrimci Marksist Kitaplık. Schudson, M. 1989. Media, Culture and Society, London: Sage Publishing. Shoemaker, P. ve S. Reese. 1997. “İdeolojinin Medya İçeriği Üzerinde Etkisi”, Medya Kültür Siyaset, Ed: Süleyman İrvan, Ankara: Ark Publishing. Stevenson, Nick. 2008. Medya Kültürleri, Ankara: Ütopya Publishing. Williams, Raymond. 1990. Marksizm ve Edebiyat, Istanbul: Adam Publishing. Williams, Raymond. 1977. Marxism and Literature, New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 6

Hegemony and the Media: A Culturally Materialist Narrative of Digital Labor in Contemporary Capitalism Marco Briziarelli and Jeffrey Hoffmann In this chapter, we propose an approach to media hegemony that revolves around the concept of digital labor and the process of subsumption of media users’ ‘energies,’ which are at the same time voluntarily and coercively ­incorporated into a process of production of value. In a context of informational capitalism (Fuchs, 2009), our goal is to assess an ‘inverse’ culturally materialist approach based on Gramsci (1971; 1975). Inverse in the sense that, while in the cultural materialist project linked to early British Cultural Studies, the preoccupation was to re-integrate culture in the realm of material production of society (Williams, 1977), in the current circumstances of dominance of a culturally and discursively driven conceptualization of power, we intend to re-integrate labor and value production in the understanding of hegemony. Accordingly, we will claim that the capability of this emerging labor modality to transform the productive, extractive and accumulative necessities of current capitalism into a realm of ‘free’ labor represents a hegemonic process in the Gramscian sense, because it generates people’s consent out of a framework of coercion. In fact, looking at instances of social media usages such as Facebook, we argue that digital labor is characterized by a level of fetishist disguise of exploitation under a layer of ambiguous freedom: as we shall see, digital labor is both free and for free (Terranova, 2000): it is voluntary (free) because frequently propelled by self-activation, passion and creative will; but it is also underpaid and very frequently unpaid (for free) because social media users generate content that is then monetized by the digital platform without any economic compensation. In such context, hegemonic implications can be found in the generation of both an ‘objective’ system represented by commercial platforms and a subjective factor—i.e. the shaping of subjectivities through what Marx d­ efines as ‘consumptive production’—which, as already mentioned, comprises a moment of freedom creating consent within the compulsive necessities of ­capitalistic interests. In order to advance our argument, we first provide a literary review of the application of the notion of hegemony in media studies, which reveals a © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_008

108

Briziarelli and Hoffmann

t­ endency to treat hegemony as a discursively constructed cultural process. We understand such an interpretation as developing out the original reading of ­hegemony provided by British Cultural Studies, which ended up trading one kind of ­idealism—the ‘vulgar materialism’ that reduced the complexity of the social field into economicism—for another one that reduced social reality to a reductive culturalism. In order to correct that, we propose our cultural materialist understanding that tries not to privilege either economy or culture, and that connects hegemony to productive practices such as digital labor. We finally turn to the case of Facebook to exemplify how social media platforms, by appropriating and valorizing media users’ disposable time, reproduce neoliberal hegemony. 1

Hegemony and the Media

Despite the recent emergence of post-hegemonic arguments about the need to historicize and therefore problematize the contemporary applicability of the concept (e.g. Day, 2005; Beasley Murray, 2010; Thoburn 2007), hegemony in media studies scholarship is consistently present and accounts for a considerable range of phenomena. Hegemony is often operationalized as a tool for understanding how representations of race, gender, class, sexual orientation, ability status, and linguistic practices are reified and naturalized. For instance, a plethora of media studies look at representations of hegemonic masculinity, demonstrating how it is imperceptibly ingrained in media coverage by constructing and then reproducing boundaries between in and out groups (Atkinson & Calafell 2009; Trujillo’s 1991; Kuehn, Jones, Genovese, & Balaji 2009; Henson & Parameswaran 2008; King 2009; Landau 2009; Shugart, 2007; Skerski 2007). Other studies have addressed the representation of whiteness, race, and institutionalized racism as apparati that support white racial hegemony in the U.S. by undermining the potential for counter-hegemonic imagination (­ Hoerl 2008; Hardin, Dodd, Chance, & Walsdorf 2004; Karniel & Lavie-Dinur 2011; Chidester 2008) and how, at the same time, that mediated content is incorporated by and into common sense (Giannone, 2014; Lewis, 1999; Kumar, 2014; Murea & Josan, 2014; Nauright, 2014; Tian, 2010). Many studies also focus on the ways in which media-produced hegemonic discourses, while creating and maintaining common sense that support the status quo, simultaneously obfuscate material inequities, social domination. These analyses often focused on U.S. economic and cultural imperialism via media discourses (Barlow, 1990; Kellner, 2004; Lucaites & McDaniel, 2004; Roessner, 2014; Dalisay, 2009; Demont-Heinrich, 2009).

Hegemony and the Media

109

Another common way in which communication and media scholars are currently employing hegemony in research is through the analysis of ‘counter-hegemonic discourses’ of alternative media, which consist of communicative practices that either resist or actively present themselves as ­alternatives to the ­hegemonic apparatus (O’Connor, 1990; Sumiala & Tikka, 2013; Wu; 2010). As a node of analysis, counter hegemonic discourses materialize in anything from individual journalists engaging with alternative media to give visibility to ­experiences outside of what is normalized in mainstream ­media (Larsson, 2014), to an organized effort by alternative media to create alternative public spheres, where m ­ arginalized subjects can engage in direct democratic debate and discourse, potentially opposing ruling forces (Ndlovu, 2014). Trying to extrapolate common features from all its applications just mentioned, hegemony appears as a dominant discursive construction that is both reproduced and challenged through mediated discourse. In such a literature, it mostly refers to a configuration of identity-based dominance that, while never complete, tends to colonize many aspects of social life and other subaltern identities via ideological dynamics. It is also a perspective that tends to polarize the social field into ‘hegemonic’ and ‘counter hegemonic.’ Such binary opposition seems to confirm Mumby’s insights about a reductive application of hegemony in our field (1997), as he argues how most of communicationrelated applications of hegemony tend to either reduce it to “dominance” or “resistance” (pp. 349–350). Mumby claims that in doing so those applications neglect that dialectical unity hegemony presupposes between ‘consent’ and ‘coercion,’ ‘emancipation’ and ‘exploitation’ ‘false’ and ‘good consciousness,’ and last but not the least, the indissoluble unity of economy and cultural processes (Briziarelli, 2016). For this reason, we think it is important to revive and revisit an approach such as cultural materialism that can at the same time dialectically unite the ‘­hegemonic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ as well as different aspects of social life. 1.1 A Culturally Materialist Reassertion In our view, cultural materialism does not simply represent a theoretical position toward social phenomena, but also a method to dialectically approach the whole social process, in other words, as a way to understand social relations by exploring the intimate and indissoluble links that connect every aspect of social reality, as in the case of ‘economy’ and ‘culture.’ In line with Read (2003), we think that embracing such perspective appears vital to understanding current circumstances:

110

Briziarelli and Hoffmann

It is no longer possible to separate capital, as the producer of goods and commodities, from what used to be called the superstructure: the ­production of ideas, beliefs, perceptions, and tastes. Capitalist production has today either directly appropriated the production of culture, beliefs, and desires or it has indirectly linked them to the production and circulation of commodities. […] This transformation also entails a fundamental mutation of labor: it is no longer simple physical labor that has to be put to work but knowledge, affects, and desires. In short, capitalist production has taken on a dimension that could be described as “micropolitical,” inserting itself into the texture of day-to-day social existence and, ultimately, subjectivity itself. read, 2003: 2

Read points to the power of capitalism to subjugate more facets of life to its logic of accumulation. Such a subsumption does not only control traditional forms of labor but tends to colonize social life in its entirety to the point that the Operaist intellectual Mario Tronti describes it as the transition from productive activities related to a specific realm such as the factory or the office, to its extension into the “social factory” ( 1966: 3). Tronti argues that the process of value production has increasingly exceeded the boundaries of traditional industrial production. In a rather different kind of debate and circumstance, more than fifty years ago, British cultural theorists such as Thompson, Hoggart, Williams and more posteriorly Hall advanced a similar kind of argument. In fact, this argument was based on the need for an expansive theoretical framework in which cultural phenomena such as media content could be accounted for in terms of their social and historical force in relation to a social process understood in its totality, beyond its texualist forms (thus extending the analysis from literary content to social practices). Thus, in the end they were similarly calling for an expansion of the social bases of value production. Accordingly, Williams (1965: 63) claimed that “the theory of culture is the study of relationships between elements in a whole way of life.” However, based on such a presupposition, Williams wanted to prevent falling into any idealist trap of privileging one factor of social determination over another. Williams did not mean to replace the ontological superiority of economy implied by traditional Marxism—understood as the Marxian base over the merely reflective superstructural factors built upon that base—with ‘culture.’ Rather, culture, as a part of the previously mentioned total social process, represented one possible terrain, together with others, that allowed the ascertaining of the nature of the organization of such an indissoluble whole. Thus, the diction ‘cultural materialism’ expresses the dialectical unity of socially

Hegemony and the Media

111

d­ eterminant elements, namely cultural and economic processes, individual intentions and structural forces, as Hall claimed (1980). Consequently, this perspective re-signified media from means of information and communication to means of production of value and social life. Therefore, cultural materialism represented a way for those intellectuals to precisely interpret historical materialism, not necessarily to avenge ‘culture,’ and certainly not to advocate textualism and the potential for ‘an extremely slack form of pluralism’ (Hall, 1992a: 278–292), which caused a rejection of any hierarchical kind of social determinism. Looking for a theoretical framework that could allow such a project, both Williams and Hall became fascinated by Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, because it provided a dialectical mediation of important tensions that characterized British Cultural Studies theory, such as those between a humanist approach that “dissolves power into fluid ­intentions” and a structuralist approach that “reduces meaning to established positions,” between “voluntarism and determinism, as well as explaining the irresistible ascendancy of Margaret Thatcher (Hall, 1980a). Hegemony seemed to be an answer to the question of “‘a non reductive determinacy’” (Wood, 1998: 401) which, as already noted, was at the heart of the cultural studies project. In this sense, the theoretical environment in which Gramsci sees hegemony operating, namely his absolute historicism (Morera, 2014), refuses “vulgar materialism” and “vulgar idealism” (Gramsci, 1975: 433) as instances of the same kind of social reductionism, since the former idealizes matter and the second idealized consciousness. Thus, from a location within Marxist debates, Williams, and then Hall tried to assert a cultural materialist framework through Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony. What seemed particularly useful to British Cultural Studies, in relation to 1970s and 1980s UK social and political context, was how Gramsci understood hegemony as a terrain of confrontation among classes, their ideologies and, how one class tried, but in the end systematically failed, to bring about cultural, political, and social “unison” (Gramsci, 1971: 182). In such ­context, media became both the terrain and the means to carry out class struggle and to materially reproduce a given social order. Accordingly, for ­Williams and Hall, examining culture meant empirically engaging hegemony as a site of dominance projects, contestations, and cultural wars and ultimately i­rreducible social contradictions (Hall 1980). Both authors, informed by this ­Gramscian perspective, were able to produce seminal works such as Williams’ Marxism and Literature (1977) and Hall’s Policing the Crisis (1978). However, the intention to bring back culture into the material social process has evolved into a paradigm that automatically privileges the cultural and the discursive dimension, which is, for instance, Hall’s very reproach of Laclau and Mouffe’s seminal essay Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy (1985) that,

112

Briziarelli and Hoffmann

­according to Hall, renounced to address the social totality and its determinations and dissolved everything into discourse (Wood, 1998). Laclau and Mouffe (1985) describe hegemony as a contingent configuration, discursively constructed, which can be both constituted and resisted via media and communication practices. Both the contingency feature and the idea that hegemony can be enacted by localized practices of signification linked by a logic of equivalence reflect an understanding that has problematized hegemony as a modern grand narrative of power. Thus, hegemony becomes a fragmented and multiple process functioning differently in different social realms. Despite his problematization of economic reductionism and class ­essentialism, hegemony for Gramsci is still indirectly derived from the ­capability of the class owning and controlling of means of production to universalize its ideology. Whereas for Laclau and Mouffe hegemony becomes an articulatory practice based on the capability of a group to rhetorically and discursively ­construct a chain of equivalence of different social groups’ demands. In this sense, returning to the literature review we offered concerning hegemony and media studies, a commonality among most of those works is their acknowledging the preoccupation to rematerialize culture through the means, paradoxically enough, of an idealization: by tending to reduce the holistic nature of hegemony into the sole realm of cultural and discursive hegemony, thus explicitly or implicitly referring to Gramsci but actually meaning Laclau and Mouffe. Accordingly, in respect to such an idealized culturalist understanding of the concept, we try with this chapter to advance a culturally materialist perspective that corrects the previously mentioned tendency. Therefore, instead of re-incorporating culture into a material realm—as a per the original cultural studies project—we try to re-incorporate labor and value production into the culture realm. Our culturally materialist re-assertion starts with a particular reading of Gramsci. As Anderson (1976: 15) clarifies, certainly Gramsci did not coin the term hegemony, as Lenin and much of the radical circles in Russia at the beginning of 1900 were already using it. However, while the Leninist interpretation hegemony represents a prescription for a practical political strategy of the proletariat in order to assume the position of leadership in respect to other classes, for Gramsci hegemony becomes also, in addition to a political objective of class leadership, an analytic and historic category to understand how capitalist societies reproduce their power arrangements. More in particular, hegemony refers to how those societies were able to create consent out of a condition of oppression, which historically corresponded to the emergence of Fascism in Italy, and the general sense of crisis of both liberal state and liberal economy after 1929 Wall Street Crash (Briziarelli and Martinez, 2016).

Hegemony and the Media

113

Gramsci was not simply interested in examining broad historic conjunctures but also how individuals could operate in such scenarios in politically meaningful ways. For this reason, he meant to provide an understanding of historic-specific social reality in which people’s capability to ‘make history’ resulted from the intersection of a prevalently constraining structured field of social relations and the project of particular political subjects. Thus, history, for Gramsci, necessarily originated through the interaction of general structural constraints and specific political initiatives. In this sense, hegemony consisted of a relatively successful project of a given group to acquire leadership at all levels, economic, social, political and cultural. For Gramsci, such a class project started in the realm of material production. Particularly telling are Gramsci’s considerations about the power of Fordism to shape significant features of US capitalist society. He wrote that “hegemony finds its origins in the factory and the political and ideological factors in such a scenario were actually minimal” (1975, Q22§2). In fact, Fordism with its relatively high wages created an ideal ‘producer and consumer of commodities’ citizen, thus ensuring the element of production and consumption not only of commodities but of consent, a legitimation for the Fordist special order. The exceeding effectiveness of Fordism resided in its capability to create consent but also coercive regulations of the workers’ lives as a whole, both in working and leisure time. Along the lines of the Fordist principle, we try to recover the sense of a Gramscian culturally materialist hegemony that operates through the “spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life; this consent is historically caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production’ (1971: 12). By re-historicizing such an interpretation of hegemony in the context of informational capitalism, we understand media hegemony as part of the process of “saturation of the whole process of living” (Williams, 1977: 110) through the increasingly expanding dominion of (digital) labor and knowledge work. 2

Digital Labor

In the realm of digital labor, making sense of a cultural materialist understanding of hegemony means working with both an anthropological and an historical assumption: on the one hand, we assume that human culture has always played a fundamental role in the material production of human life, even when it is treated in its most idealist meaning, i.e. as a combination of ideas, perceptions, beliefs, values. That is because the fabrication and usage of tools

114

Briziarelli and Hoffmann

and products, and performing labor, necessarily reflect a whole way life in its symbolic cultural aspects. On the other hand, the current historical context of many Western societies has placed media at the center of the capitalist economic production, as commodifying agents, as platforms for production of goods and employment of labor. Not by accident, the vision of a media driven capitalism, as it was foreseen by Adorno and Horkheimer with their ‘culture industry’ thesis (1979), seems to be confirmed by current dictions such as ‘informational capitalism,’ ‘cognitive capitalism,’ ‘digital capitalism’ (Fuchs, 2009). We are not simply talking about the economic role of media but also about a newly acquired social and political significance. The cost reduction of technology and its accessibility have led to a potential democratization of cultural production and distribution, which also led to a fuller integration in the life of media users. Such narrative is well represented by the figure of the producerconsumer, or prosumer (Toffler, 1980), and caused by the “progressive blurring of the line that separates producer from consumer” (p. 267). For Tofler, the age of pro-sumption brings a new kind of political economic democracy, featured by labor autonomy and delocalized self-production. Social media exemplify well the environment in which the pro-sumer also becomes a digital laborer. In fact, when it comes to labor enacted by digital media we particularly refer to the so called Web 2.0 social media operating as flexible platforms, in which previously considered passive audiences now have the agency to participate in the provision of content and the construction of the web environment. The development brought forward by Web 2.0 information technology allegedly allowed a democratization and liberalization of information and communication technologies that led to a “many-to-many” logic (Boyd, 2010). As a result, social media such as Facebook are considered to have acquired a greater transparency and permitted cooperative formation of knowledge and empowered self-expression (Shirky, 2008). Thus, digital labor emerges as the result of the intersection of several factors such as the development of a new mode of production centered around information and communication technology, the emergence of the media using internet platforms, and the overall transition to logic of production that we could define as industrial—regulated from above by control, managers and a legal framework of contract—to a postindustrial one based on self-regulation, self-enactment and development of communicational and relational capabilities of the worker (Beck 2000). In this sense, if production processes always imply the shaping of the subject producing, the self-activation of digital labor seems to fundamentally shape its working subjectivity (McRobbie, 2005).

Hegemony and the Media

115

Acknowledging the centrality of media in current social life, critical scholarship has looked into social media practices in terms of power relations, labor and value creation (e.g. Fuchs, 2012; Scholz, 2008; Willmott, 2010), by ­connecting social media to productive activities such as blogging and social networking, and creating value in digital environments, i.e. digital labor. Consequently, digital labor becomes a key concept for understanding the political economy of social media (Scholz, 2012) and the exploitation of the previously mentioned prosumer. As Andrews (2016: 46) remarks, digital labor facilitates the connection in media studies of hegemony and value creation, which links three main understandings of hegemony: cultural studies, political science and political economy. In such context, digital labor appears as a revealing instance in which culture is a productive process and the social organization of a given community appears in its materialist vestige. In this scenario, hegemony works as a ­powerful mediator between coercive aspects such as the one implied by asymmetrical relations of production (e.g. the constraints generated by social network platform user agreement) and the property relations, which combined legally establish who appropriates the value produced. An important aspect that we should consider is how exactly those media usages can be considered as labor, or more precisely, productive labor. In fact, the idea of digital labor creating value has been challenged based on the fact that most of such labor is not waged and therefore cannot be considered productive labor. Smythe provided a response to that argument in his seminal essay about the Blindspots of Marxism (1977). He intended to bring back communication to the core of the question of material production by advancing the idea of audience labor, and by applying the Marxian concept of ‘consumptive production’ in Grundisse (1973), or the fact that by laboring for the media, the audience also shapes its own consciousness. 2.1 Hegemony and Digital Free Labor The assumption of the concept of consumptive production implies that the social media user consumes an infrastructure and its available products by using, for instance, Facebook. However, at the same time, while the user reproduces it, he/she most importantly produces his/her own subjectivity within the logic, imagery and ideology of Facebook. In this aspect we can understand how Facebook produces the consensual element of hegemony. Thus, in the context in which crowd sourcing has the objective of reducing production costs, a platform such as Facebook increases the production of its commodities by reproducing both user generated content and the very generator of such

116

Briziarelli and Hoffmann

­content, the digital laborer. Thus, the maximization of profits maximizes a hegemonic dynamic of shaping consent for digital laborers. From this perspective, the condition of pro-sumption of social media users creates commodities and their subjectivities. In order to illustrate such an argument, we must look more closely at the notion of digital labor. Fuchs (2015) makes sense of digital labor of social media users by understanding them as cultural transporters of symbolic value. By symbolic value he means those positive semiotic signs and meanings attached to a given commodity that persuade people of the given utility-use value of that product. Such an imaginative appeal functionally links the use value and the exchange value of commodities, thus facilitating the realization of sales. From this point of view, Facebook users generate content that, like a TV show, works as a support for commercials. Thus, by creating the content to which targeted advertising is attached they increase the (symbolic) value of the commodities sold by the clients of the social network who uses the platform for their advertisement. Drawing on a Marxian theory of value according to which value derives from time spent on activities that are generally considered as socially valuable, social media users labor and create value by paying attention to advertising and creating content without receiving any wage. Thus, the more time people spend on those platforms, the more monetizable content and information is produced, thus, more value transformable into profit is produced. As Fuchs (2014) claims, digital labor performed around social media constitutes a way in which informational capitalism commodifies free time and private space in order to convert it into surplus labor. Such promise is delivered to the potential customer within social media users and social media employees by means of communication and information. For this reason, digital labor is not simply communication and media related labor simply because it happens in the media context, but because it actually requires the communication of symbolic value of commodities through the diffusion of advertising. Thus, the digital laborer/user in social platforms such as Facebook or YouTube produces and communicates commodities in the forms of data and attention. Therefore, the essential advertising business implied by social media activity is not mere circulation but enters the sphere of production, and therefore, productive labor. While capital and the time available to individuals have always been in contradiction with one another—because one crude way to increase surplus value is to lengthen time of production—the appropriation and valorization of time in the realm of digital labor also recovers a previously, and for the most part, alienated kind of productive activity. Such activity brings creative and

Hegemony and the Media

117

i­ maginative gratifications because user generated content is (relatively) freely produced at the user’s discretion and not dictated by the platforms. Thus, the digital labor enacted by social media users combines what for Marx are the distinctive features of ‘work’ and ‘labor’ (Fuchs and Sevignani, 2013), thus comprising voluntary, creative and satisfactory work, with waged, ­coercive and exploitative labor. It is certainly easy to link user generated content to work, but where can we find waged and coercive labor in those practices? While social media users are most of the time not ‘rewarded’ with a salary, their work is still productive and must be understood in relation to those categories of workers, like house-workers and slaves that are coerced to work by ‘master-slave’ or patriarchal relations. In the case of social media, the coercion is less direct but still present in the form of missing chances to build social capital in order to reproduce social life as well as working life. In the compelling situation social media laborers allow the advertising to realize the symbolic value attached to any given commodity, i.e. the link between the use value and exchange value of any product by a means of promise of value enjoyment (Haug, 1986). As Fuchs and Sevignani claim (2013), the invisibility of digital labor represents a kind of inverse commodity fetishism in which the concreteness of the immediate benefits and playful environment hides labor. Thus, social media create the impression that users are playing and being exploited and the content of the platform appears as if it were “for free.” Instead, social media users are workers specialized in producing and communicating the symbolic value (or use value promises). As already mentioned, Marx in Capital (1990) understands human practical activity as work as a satisfactory and creative process work and labor as an alienated form in which the workers loose control over the process. Work is both a necessary activity for survival and a means for creative self-expression that generates use values. Conversely, labor represents a social necessity caused by capitalism—that entails alienation, exploitation and the generation of exchange value. Digital labor synthetizes both aspects by comprising passionate work and compelling aspects, free creativity and alienation. Digital production comprising both work and labor, translates into a twofold sense of ‘free’ (Terranova, 2000). That is because it is free as voluntary and without strict regulation, but also for free because wage-less or heavily underpaid. Digital labor thus comprises both free work and free labor: it combines the aspects of the creative, expressive and relational, and communicational capabilities of the working subjects, while free labor, stresses the social relations in which those subjects operate. Such modalities seem to particularly concern

118

Briziarelli and Hoffmann

workers operating with and through media and more specifically digital platforms in which unpaid work mainly refers to the lack of wage compensation for the product created in forms of ‘consumer profiling, data mining, and the sharing economy’ (Scholz, 2016). It is in the ambiguous condition of being free that digital labor synthetizes work and labor elements but, even more significantly for our argument, the synthesis of consent and coercion linked to material practices implied by Gramscian hegemony. 3

The Case of Facebook and the Production of Hegemony

In order to provide an illustration of how digital labor in the social media environment creates the condition for the production of both coercion and consent, therefore, neo-liberal hegemony, we can consider the case of Facebook. The popular social network has been almost consistently ranking in the top three social network sites in the last 10 years, now counting close to two billion subscribers (Statistica, 2017). Facebook lives on the rhetoric of giving “people the power to share and make the world more open and connected” (Facebook.com, 2010). The site is designed to provide a high level of aggregated interactivity through channels such as the “timeline’ ‘news feed” ‘groups,’ sharing ­pictures, videos and utilizing other supported applications (Urista, Dong & Day, 2009). An important aspect of Facebook’s business model is indeed provided by labor performed by its subscribers, linked to the general tendency of neoliberal capital of media business to outsource and crowdsource labor in order to reduce costs of production (Huws, 2003). Through this perspective pro-sumers operate as digital laborers who pay attention to targeted audience, generate content and valuable data provided by their use of the platform via expression of preferences such as ‘like.’ Examples of monetizable data are demographics, personal information about taste and attitudes, and providing access to a network of affective relations (i.e. family and friends), which are sold as commodities to the advertising industry (Scholz, 2010). The more users open accounts and become active content producers the higher is the profit produced according to the logic defined by notions such as “Thank you economy,” “Social Economy,” or the “Gift economy” (Vaynerchuck, 2011). What is it that leads Facebook users to become voluntary pro-sumers in the generation of content and paying attention to targeted advertising, thus also to become unpaid digital laborers? Clearly, there is an important ­component

Hegemony and the Media

119

of consent toward this social medium as its users seem to enjoy the sociability, the ‘unrestricted’ exchange of information, comments. All features of what in media theory could be defined as uses and gratifications, by which we refer to the media and communication theory that focuses on people’s use of media in order to fulfill their needs and wants (Rubin, 2002). As a matter of fact, the specific nature of Facebook led scholars to assess particular kinds of uses and gratifications such as interactive communication, individual usages, asynchronous usages, peer identity building, surveillance and social utility, and efficient online and offline relationship maintenance (Ray, 2007; Lampe, Ellison and Steinfield, 2007). In addition, studies describe the overall sense of feeling connected with a community at different levels such as geographical location, division of labor, value, and beliefs (Urista, Dong and day, 2009). Also notable is the utilization of Facebook as a platform for civic and political engagement (Valenzuela, Park and Kee, 2009). As Briziarelli and Kari Kari (2016) argue, Facebook reflects a sort of technological utopianism that provides an arena to re-appropriate the public sphere, as a potential realm for democratic discussion and deliberation, citizen journalism. According to such a narrative Facebook is regarded as a platform for social and political amelioration through communication. The perception of Facebook for some degree of political activism reveals an important source of normativism toward alternative or improved forms of sociability, whereby people seek alternative definitions of citizenship and political process (De Rosa, 2013). However, the voluntary and undeniably consensual aspects implied by the Facebook practices so far considered hide a level of coercion that leads to defining such production at the level of Marxian exploitation. So, where is the supposed coercive dimension in Facebook? Nobody obliges us to open an account, nobody is obligated to “make friends,” follow their ‘updates,” update our timeline. In the original Marxian analysis, the compelling aspect of capitalism derived from the fact that the worker did not have any commodity to sell other than his/her labor force, which was exchanged for money, and such a condition of necessity lead workers to accept intolerable contractual and working conditions. In the case of Facebook, the situation is conceptually analogous, even though most people are actually not compelled to work for Facebook to earn a living. Yet, as Fuchs argues (2010), in an economy in which sociability, social skills, knowledge and information are vital for the production of value, not being integrated in social networks means for many losing the chance to transform vital social and knowledge capital into chances of finding a good job, and maintain and improve it. Thus, while no physical coercion and no necessity

120

Briziarelli and Hoffmann

due to survival are present, Facebook users experience a level of ideological coercion based on not being left out the social network, fear of missing out on relevant social events, fear of not maintaining reputation and managing impressions. Last but not least, in the context in which knowledge and social relations have been valorized by capitalism, social media users need platforms such as Facebook in order to accumulate the capital made of social relations, recognizable qualification, knowledge, i.e. a good job. There is also another important coercive aspect involved in those practices. On the one hand, as previously mentioned, both the rhetoric that surrounds Facebook and the practices of its users contribute to construct a narrative of socialization of knowledge, and to building one’s social network, participating and even politically getting involved with one’s community. On the other hand, the socialization of people’s collective energies is in the end appropriated by privates, such as the owners of Facebook, and the capitalization of such value is defended and enforced by private property relations and a legally binding contract that manage the relations between the commercial platform and each individual user. Thus, the digital labor implied by Facebook usage helps to reproduce neoliberal hegemony because it reproduces its dominance in ways that create a moment of freedom, and the consent associated to Facebook’s uses and gratification hides an exploitative system that unjustly valorizes users’ labor. In ­doing so, Facebook, through consumptive production, also socializes media users to a broader model of power and capital accumulation. 4 Conclusions In a post-2008 crisis scenario, with its destructive impact against the social fabric and traditional forms of representative politics, many countries in Western Europe and North and South America are experiencing a new political cycle, in which Left and Right forces are aiming at the rhetorical construction of a ‘people.’ In such a context, media possibly become the single most important terrain of confrontation for political subjects aiming at hegemony. However, the reason for that cannot be simply explained in terms of their communicative and disseminating power, but also due to their central role in production of value and subjectivities. Whether we decide to go with a more Gramscian or a more Lalclau and Mouffian understanding, the link of media and hegemony remains fundamental to understanding the current social and political field. In our case, we decided to reassert the value of an ‘inverse’ culturally materialist approach to

Hegemony and the Media

121

media and hegemony by re-incorporating labor and value production with a prevalently culturally driven conceptualization of the notion. Drawing, on the one hand, from Williams and Hall’s project of crafting a materialist perspective that encompasses the ‘whole social process’ and on Gramsci’s insight about hegemony as generated in the moment of production, we claimed that in order to understand the relevance of hegemony in current informational capitalism, we need to look at how value is produced through media practices. Accordingly, we looked at digital labor as a kind of labor that is based on the appropriation and monetization of social media users’ disposable time, particularly in Facebook, as an example of how hegemony is materially produced by those dynamics. Based on a Gramscian definition of the concept, by which hegemony consists of a class project to universalize its political economic interests through a combination of both consent and coercion, we claim that digital labor accomplishes that in its being free and for free. We are not trying in this way to suggest that hegemony works as a kind of false consciousness and that social media users are lured into a ‘capitalist trap.’ We are rather trying to show how in media practices social subjects de facto ­enter into a negotiation of power and into the terrain where a given social ­order is relatively peacefully reproduced. Bibliography Andrews, S.J. 2016. Hegemony, Mass Media and Cultural Studies. Properties of Meaning, Power, and Value in Cultural Production. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Atkinson, J., & B. Calafell 2009. Darth Vader Made Me Do It! Anakin Skywalker’s Avoidance of Responsibility and the Gray Areas of Hegemonic Masculinity in the Star Wars Universe. Communication, Culture & Critique, 2(1), 1–20. doi:10.1111/j.1753-9137.2008.01026.x. Barlow, W. 1990. Rebel airways: Radio and revolution in Latin America. Howard Journal Of Communications, 2(2), 123–134. Briziarelli, M., & S. Martinez Guillem 2016. Reviving Gramsci: Crisis, Communication and Social Change. New York: Routledge. Chidester, P. 2008. May the Circle Stay Unbroken: Friends, the Presence of Absence, and the Rhetorical Reinforcement of Whiteness. Critical Studies In Media Communication, 25(2), 157–174. doi:10.1080/15295030802031772. Dalisay, F. 2009. Social Control in an American Pacific Island: Guam’s Local Newspaper Reports on Liberation. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 33(3), 239–257. Demont-Heinrich, C. 2009. Language, Globalization, and the Triumph of Popular Demand: The Discourse of Populism in American Prestige Press Coverage

122

Briziarelli and Hoffmann

of the Global Hegemony of English. Communication Review, 12(1), 20–49. doi: 10.1080/10714420802716247. De Rosa, R. 2013. Cittadini Digitali. L’agire Politico al tempo dei Social Media. Milano: Maggioli editore. Fuchs, C. 2009. A contribution to the critique of transnational informational c­ apitalism. Rethinking Marxism 21(3):387–402. Giannone, Diego. 2014. The Political and Ideological Dimension of the Measurement of Freedom of Information. Assessing the interplay between neoliberalism and the Freedom of the Press Index. International Communication Gazette, 76(6), 505–527. doi:10.1177/1748048514538927. Gilmour, D.A., & A. Quanbeck 2010. Hegemony: Quiet Control Over Convergence ­Textbook Content. Review of Communication, 10(4), 324–341. doi:10.1080/15358593 .2010.502971. Hall, S. 1980a. Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Problems. In S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe and P. Willis (Eds.). Culture, Media, Language. London. Routledge. pp. 15–47. Hall, S. 1980. Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms. Media Culture and Society 2, 1, pp. 57–72. Hall, S., C. Critcher, T. Jefferson, J. Clarke, & B. Roberts 1978. Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order. London: Macmillan Press. Hardin, M., J. Dodd, J. Chance, & K. Walsdorf 2004. Sporting Images in Black and White: Race in Newspaper Coverage of the 2000 Olympic Games. Howard Journal Of ­Communications, 15(4), 211–227. doi:10.1080/10646170490521176. Henson, L., & R.E. Parameswaran 2008. Getting Real With “Tell It Like It Is” Talk Therapy: Hegemonic Masculinity and the Dr. Phil Show. Communication, Culture & Critique, 1(3), 287–310. doi:10.1111/j.1753-9137.2008.00024.x.

Hoerl, K. 2008. Cinematic Jujitsu: Resisting White Hegemony through the American Dream in Spike Lee’s Malcolm X. Communication Studies, 59(4), 355–370. doi:10.1080/10510970802467403. Horkheimer, M. and T.W Adorno. 1979. The Dialectic of the Enlightenment. Trans. by J. Cumming. London. Verso. Karniel, Y., & A. Lavie-Dinur 2011. Entertainment and Stereotype: Representation of the Palestinian Arab Citizens of Israel in Reality Shows on Israeli Television. Journal Of Intercultural Communication Research, 40(1), 65–87. doi:10.1080/17475759.2011.55 8385. Kellner, D. 2004. The Media and the Crisis of Democracy in the Age of Bush-2. ­Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies, 1(1), 29–58. doi:10.1080/14791420420001 80917. King, C.S. 2009. It Cuts Both Ways: Fight Club, Masculinity, and Abject Hegemony. Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies, 6(4), 366–385. doi:10.1080/14791420903335135.

Hegemony and the Media

123

Kumar, A. 2014. Looking Back at Obama’s Campaign in 2008: “True Blue Populist” and Social Production of Empty Signifiers in Political Reporting. Journal Of Communication Inquiry, 38(1), 5–24. doi:10.1177/0196859913512330. Lampe, C., N. Ellison, & C. Steinfield 2007. The Benefits of Facebook “friends”: Social Capital and College Students’ use of Online Social Network sites. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 12(4), 1143–1168. Landau, J. 2009. Straightening Out (the Politics of) Same-Sex Parenting: Representing Gay Families in US Print News Stories and Photographs. Critical Studies In Media Communication, 26(1), 80–100. doi:10.1080/15295030802684018. Larsson, S. 2014. Battling Mainstream Media, Commentators and Organized Debaters: Experiences from Citizens’ Online Opinion Writing in Sweden. Nordicom Review, 35(2), 77–89. Lewis, J. 1999. Reproducing Political Hegemony in the United States. Critical Studies In Mass Communication, 16(3), 251. Lucaites, J.L., & J.P. McDaniel 2004. Telescopic Mourning/Warring in the Global Village: Decomposing (Japanese) Authority Figures. Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies, 1(1), 1–28. doi:10.1080/1479142042000180908. Marx, K. 1973. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. New York: Penguin. Marx, K. 1990. Capital: A Critique of Political economy. New York: Penguin. Morera, E. 2014. Gramsci, Materialism and Philosophy. London: Routledge. Murea, R. & I. Josan. 2014. Progress and Control: Positivism and the European Epistemological Hegemony. Journal Of Media Research, 7(3), 72–88. Nauright, J. 2014. Sport and the Neo-liberal World Order. Catalan Journal Of Communication & Cultural Studies, 6(2), 281–288. doi:10.1386/cjcs.6.2.281_1. Ndlovu, E. 2014. The Re-emergence of Diasporic Radio in Independent Zimbabwe. ­Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies (Routledge), 35(3), 54–72. doi:10.1080/0256 0054.2014.957225. O’Connor, A. 1990. The Alternative Press in Bolivia and Ecuador: The Examples of Aquí and Punto de Vista. Howard Journal of Communications, 2(4), 349–356. Ray, M. 2007. Needs, Motives, and Behaviors in Computer-mediated Communication: An Inductive Exploration of Social Networking websites. The International C ­ ommunication Association, San Francisco, CA. Retrieved June 20, 2010 from http:// www.allacademic.com/meta/p169242_index.htm. Roessner, L.A. 2014. Sixteen Days of Glory: A Critical-Cultural Analysis of Bud Greenspan’s Official Olympic Documentaries. Communication, Culture & Critique, 7(3), 338–355. doi:10.1111/cccr.12053. Rubin, A. 2002. Media Uses and Effects: A Uses-and- Gratifications Perspective. In J. Bryant & D. Zillmann (Eds.). Media effects: Advances in Theory and Research (2nd ed., pp. 525–548). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

124

Briziarelli and Hoffmann

Shugart, H.A. 2007. Crossing Over: Hybridity and Hegemony in the Popular Media. Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies, 4(2), 115–141. doi:10.1080/14791420701296505. Skerski, J. 2007. From Prime-Time to Daytime: The Domestication of ­Ellen DeGeneres. Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies, 4(4), 363–381. doi:10.1080/1479142 0701632964. Sumiala, J.M., & M. Tikka 2013. Broadcast Yourself-Global News! A Netnography of the ‘Flotilla’ News on YouTube. Communication, Culture & Critique, 6(2), 318–335. doi:10.1111/cccr.12008. Terranova, T. 2000. Free labour. Producing Culture for the Digital Economy. Social Text 18(2):33–57. Tian, D. 2010. The Hegemonic Role of the United States in the U.S.-China Copyright Disputes. Journal Of Intercultural Communication, (23), 6. Tronti, M. 1966. Operai e Capitale. Torino: Einaudi. Trujillo, N. 1991. Hegemonic Masculinity on the Mound: Media Representations of Nolan Ryan and American Sports Culture. Critical Studies In Mass Communication, 8(3), 290–308. doi:10.1080/15295039109366799. Urista, M.A., Q. Dong, & K.D. Day 2009. Explaining Why Young Adults use MySpace and Facebook through Uses and Gratifications Theory. Human Communication, 12(2), 215–229. Valenzuela, S., N. Park, K.F. Kee 2009. Being Immersed in Social Networking Environment: Facebook Groups, Uses and Gratifications, and Social Outcomes. Cyber Psychology & Behavior 12(6), 729–733. Wood, B. 1998. Stuart Hall’s Cultural Studies and the Problem of Hegemony. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 3. pp. 399–414.

Chapter 7

Distorted Knowledge and Repressive Power Peter Ludes 1

Existential Truths

The holocaust and the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were historically unprecedented and extreme threats to the survival of humankind. The communication about such total experiences requires special efforts, mainly in overcoming cultural and generation-specific domain assumptions. Wolff (1974: 648) characterized existential truths as “the result of the most rigorously imaginable intrasubjective experience … testing what is offered against the least doubtful truth one has managed to hold on to”. All inquiries time and again must be checked by probing their designs, procedures, and results in the light and darkness of one’s generation’s most important experiences, one’s scrutiny of the historical situation and one’s subjective certainty of having reached new ground, valid both in existential and scientific terms. Since Wolff’s lifetime (1912–2003), the existential conditions for the acquisition of personal truths, of social information and knowledge have shifted toward mass and network mediated standards and types of truth seeking. ­Moreover, media and ever more Information and Communication Technologies are often used as weapons in political, economic and cultural battles for gaining or defending hegemonic symbols, privileges and power exercise. “Gramsci’s fully articulated concept of hegemony involves four integrally and dialectically related ‘moments’: first, hegemony as social and political leadership; second, hegemony as a political project; third, the realization of this hegemonic project in the concrete institutions and organizational forms of a ‘hegemonic apparatus’; and fourth, ultimately and decisively, the social and political hegemony of the workers’ movement.” (Thomas, 2013: 24f) The subject’s access to unique-universal truths must in our present age push through mediated dis-/information, entertainment and superficial attention. All of these internalized habits and widely shared world views need to be tested by the exercise of immediate personal human reason, as best we can, affirming only those existential truths that withstand such intra-subjective probing. In order to transfer Wolff’s traditional concept of existential truths to contemporary experiences and discourses, we must specify some criteria for and

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_009

126

Ludes

­conditions of existential in contrast to scientific truths (Noeth 2013) and connect Wolff’s original concept to current networks of outrage and hope (Castells 2012), in full awareness of the continuous danger of human self-annihilation, contradictory types of evidence, and long-term threats across generations. Since the beginning of the 21st century, dominant imaginations (Mansell 2012), anxieties, or hopes have been deeply shaped and framed for more people by the Internet. Thereby emerged the potential of shared mediated experiences and immediate responses in real time via mass self-communication (as Castells coined this communication upheaval). Wolff himself still basically relied on the subject’s immediate access to unique-universal existential truths, rooted in “Enlightenment epistemology” (Moon, 1993: 308) and offered only few accounts of how to communicate them to others in order to share similar orientations. For deep-level inquiries, immediate experiences and personal discourses remain major components (Psathas 2003 and Habermas 2012), especially concerning what is considered as factual (Pfeiffer 2013). The assumptions and convictions gained in these special contexts are usually taken for granted also in order to identify mediated presentations to be considered of special importance. But even if and when widely shared worldviews arise that combine immediate certainties with mediated communication, they need to be tested again by personal experiences, on which first trust is based (Quandt 2012, see also Morgner 2013). Existential truths are rooted in the skin-deep awareness of openly diverse evaluations and anxieties, hopes and dreams, taboo zones and “holy,” unquestioned sites. But these fundamental experiences are perceived and evaluated in terms of hybrid experiences combining mediated and immediate encounters of “media life” (Deuze 2012). They are grounded in techno-economic-­military efforts. For example: “Vannevar Bush was the director of the M ­ anhattan ­Project ... developing the atomic bomb. ... The theory and design of internet and its protocols (such as hypertext) can be considered to be inspired by Bush’s suggestions for a hypermedia artifact that establishes links between different types of information.” (Deuze, 2012: 71) In contrast to Habermas’s theory of communicative action, which alerted us concerning the colonization of the life-world as early as 1981 and in ­contrast to recent and current emphases on the “mediation” or “mediatization” of everything (Livingstone 2009; Couldry and Hepp 2017), existential truths and long-term horizons must take into account that the life-world has already been colonized to a high degree, during the past decades, e.g., by the identity models and habits enhanced by commercial mass and network media, their messages, protocols, codes, and via new means of surveillance. (See Ludes 2017a and b.) Constructive alternatives to repressive hegemonies therefore “call into being

Distorted Knowledge and Repressive Power

127

a coalition of the rebellious subalterns, engaged in acts of self-liberation of hegemonic politics – a pedagogical laboratory for unlearning the habits of subalternity and discovering new forms of conviviality, mutuality and collective self-determination” (Thomas, 2013: 33). It is especially difficult to arrive at common grounds and common sense across several generations. But even when assuming that the telos of understanding is built into human discourses, language nevertheless relies on culture- and media-specific words and grammars, different kinds of reasoning and convictions that are time-bound and not universal. Spoken and written languages and verbal or textual discourses are also embedded in non-verbal communication and shared understandings of acceptable beginnings, endings, and rules. References to shared memories of arguments and facts, problematic assertions and taken for granted experiences contextualize each and every element of total experiences and any discourse. In recent political and media developments, networks of outrage and hope have become decisive in overcoming fear and coordinating social horizons and activities: “Throughout history, social movements ... usually stem from a crisis of living conditions that makes everyday life unbearable for most people. … Fear is overcome by sharing and identifying with others in a process of communicative action.” (Castells, 2012: 218f.). Existential truths as elements of long-term means of communication imply the radical questioning of personal experiences and schemes of relevance for problems lasting beyond one’s individual life course. Mass and network mediated historical memories and we-identities point to potentially collective starting-points for existential truths. Since the end of the 20th century, realtime satellite television and the Internet allow billions of people to share mediated experiences, yet often with fundamentally different perspectives and concerns. Historically new origins and modes of existential doubts thereby transform feelings of certainty and call for shifts in evaluation patterns and habits. Interacting via networks of technical media re-configures personal experiences and social communication. For example, not only persons sharing the same space and time and growing older together may be interpreted as being in one’s personal reach, but also virtual friends, followers, or fans. Gaining certainties turns ever more complicated, the more we think and live beyond the immediate presence, beyond our home country and mother tongue. Does this mean to give in to a new fluidity or superficiality? But almost life-long and even trans-generational certainties are prerequisites for adequately meeting those challenges, which require shared relevance hierarchies across cultures and generations. Yet they also require the continuous preparedness for questioning these certainties in the light of new experiences

128

Ludes

and developments. In this sense, existential truths bridge the semantic and existential gap between one’s uncertainty of continuities and one’s trust into the continuous reliability of a few selected and critically confirmed past patterns of experience and relevance. Unger (2009) coined the term of “sociologists in exile without return” and also referred to Wolff. Transgressing state borders and the boundaries of specialized morals, aesthetics, and sciences, always aware of the responsibility for suffering people and the endangered human species, Wolff contributed to radical existential and scientific doubts and their overcoming. His focus remained in the West. Shared doubts and convictions are inescapable prerequisites for agreements on the bases, characteristics, and (desirable) consequences of knowledge. This diagnosis requires taking into account social power, which represses the opportunities for existential truths. Since power was the most eminent concept and concern in Elias’s work, it is necessary to focus in the next section on its interdependencies with the conditions for gaining knowledge. 2

Knowledge and Power

“Macht” and “Wissen” (“Power” and “Knowledge”) were the concepts indexed most often in Elias’s Collected Writings in German, with 1.575 and 1.043 counts, clearly ahead of society (963), civilization (857), and social sciences/sociology (741) (Kunze 2013). In many writings (see the excellent selection by Mennell and Goudsblom 1998), Elias discussed power as an aspect of every human relationship. In an interview, Elias (1984, reprinted in his Collected Works 2013) focused on some major connections between knowledge and power: People (groups or individuals) can withhold or monopolize what others need, i.e. food, love, meaning, security etc., thereby constituting asymmetric power balances. Within these figurations, “knowledge” functions as a means of orientation and communication, learned from the elders and handed down in some parts to future generations. Especially the easier and cheaper access to learning institutions and the mass media has broken down many previous barriers to the diffusion of knowledge. The enormous widening of the access to and scope of what is considered as reliable knowledge has contributed to the power of public opinion. State societies in which the educational level is comparatively low and oriented toward pre-scientific models are at a disadvantage. The literate urban population of industrialized states cannot be governed the same way as earlier illiterate agrarian populations. Access to better and more comprehensive means of orientation increases the power

Distorted Knowledge and Repressive Power

129

potential of the ­ordinary people. The rise in the standard of knowledge has been one of the main levers of f­unctional democratization. Yet, the financing of research needed for knowledge advancement is limited to state governments or top business groups. They can often decide (in connection with experts from science) which research will be financed. As scientific research becomes expensive, those who finance them tend to guard the results as their property. Elias argued further that scientific discovery has historically become, to a much higher extent than ever before, an institutionalized routine, a planned social process. Due to the gradual and partial increase of scientific insights for school and mass mediated knowledge, some standards for defining information and knowledge have become more steady and continuous in many fields. Research has become one of the most important industries. A vast network of educational institutions has the function of transmitting specific sections of a country’s (or even global) social fund of knowledge to new generations. The collective fund of knowledge has become vast and the acquisition of ever more school, university and professional knowledge as well as of publicly shared mass mediated bits of information and ranking orders, has grown into indispensable standards of what everybody should know. As societies become wealthier and more differentiated, the occupation with symbols is organized as a social specialty. In his utopian tale “The Great Struggle of the Intellectuals”, which Elias (2013: 235–246) inserted into the interview, he outlined some potential for interactive public debates on a large scale. Meanwhile such a networked communication has become technically possible with the easy access to various online social forums. In clear contrast to chat rooms and Facebook, but a little foreshadowing Ted lectures and comments functions for some online social forums like Wikipedia, Elias postulated, however, public debates of eminent experts to which 60 to 90 % of the population pay close attention for, e.g., two hours. Those who attend these debates as an actively listening audience would be allowed to pose five questions. After the replies, all participants who had been involved should vote. Elias specified two fundamental prerequisites for such public debates: (1) Considerably higher educational levels of the general population as well as cognitive and emotional competences and interests far beyond currently dominant common sense or occupational specialization. (2) Moreover, fossilized and corrupted or distorted knowledge had to be weeded out from schools, universities, and educational institutions in general. Historical remedies would allow all men and women a clearer, wider, more certain and factual orientation about the internal and external affairs of their country and indeed of humanity.

130

Ludes

In this utopian tale, public debating contests become almost as popular as soccer. The preference for the presentation of knowledge in a clear, simple and vivid literary form gains the upper hand. Greater accessibility of the specialists’ knowledge, their advances and discoveries, opens new sources of interest and enjoyment for the public. All that makes it easier to raise the educational standard of the population. The new information improves human orientation in the social and natural worlds. It also raises a country’s peaceful competitive capacity in the economic, technological and culture spheres and generally the world affairs. Yet, there is a widening gap of understanding between the public and the experts as well as between the experts themselves. New institutional means are needed to provide regular channels of communication between the different groups of people. Social scenarios or literary utopias as a kind of thought experiment should clarify present conditions because one always has to reckon not only with one possible future. Repeatedly both Elias and Wolff transcended their sociological diagnoses via artistic means of expression (Ludes 1997, cp. Elias 2004). Since there are many concrete limitations to the experience of existential truths and their expression in social scientific terms), the author (1989b and 2012) also published thought and feeling experiments in terms of a multimedia play, including actors like the “Wolf-pair” (Kurt H. and Carla Wolff) and “the detached prophet” (Norbert Elias) in “Project Shalom”. But more pertinent are globally institutionalized endeavors for the development of so-called knowledge societies. 3

Knowledge or Power Societies?

Wolff highlighted that traditional concepts were unable to prevent the endangerment of human survival and that we must aim at existential turns for meeting unprecedented challenges. Yet the existential conditions for the acquisition of personal truths, of social information and knowledge have shifted toward mediated modes of truth seeking. New types of hybrid experiences combine and mix mediated and immediate encounters, and provide ever more people with a wide array of different kinds of reasoning and convictions, shared memories of arguments and facts, problematic assertions and taken for granted experiences. From the outset, Elias focused on some major connections between the long-term developments of knowledge and power as well as their institutionalizations: People (groups or individuals) can withhold or monopolize what others need, including existential or scientific meaning. The easier and ­cheaper

Distorted Knowledge and Repressive Power

131

access to learning institutions, the mass media and the widely improved educational level are the main levers of functional democratization. The social fund of knowledge must be forwarded to new generations in terms of indispensable standards of what everybody should know. Therefore, the occupation with symbols has been organized as a social specialty of symbol creators and managers. Considerably higher educational levels of the general population as well as cognitive and emotional competences and interests far beyond currently dominant common sense or occupational specialization must allow for weeding out fossilized and corrupted or distorted knowledge from schools, universities, and educational institutions in general. Wolff focused on individual experiences for acquiring and testing existential truths. Elias highlighted long-term institutionalizations of power and knowledge as well as knowledge as a power source and power as steering, controlling, or corrupting knowledge. What remained in the limits of Elias’s utopian tale from the eighties of the past century has, however, meanwhile already been confronted explicitly in United Nations and unesco documents and strategies: International groups of scholars, politicians, and citizen activists have focused on the question of how different types of knowledge can actually come into the reach of most people. They also confronted the issue of how this broadening of knowledge must challenge and overcome traditional power institutions. Inquiries into “Knowledge societies for peace and sustainable development” (Mansell and Trembley 2013) have distinguished between instrumental “knowledge to do” and a certainty about who and how “to be”. The citizens of such knowledge societies also must learn to peacefully “co-exist,” guided by “explicit” as well as “tacit” knowledge. Explicit knowledge refers to “justified (true) belief that is coded in formal, systemic language. It can be combined, stored, retrieved and transmitted with relative ease and through various means, including modern ict” (undesa, 2005: 151). Tacit knowledge is information combined with experience, context, interpretation and judgment. It is acquired through one’s own experience or reflections on the experience of others. It is intangible, without boundaries and dynamic. Due to the global prominence of the Western academia, most scholarly knowledge regarded as universal nowadays has, however, been flawed by a significant Western bias (Featherstone and Venn 2007), which endures also in the extreme global inequalities of the access to basic means of survival and information. “No society, whether formally colonized or not, is now outside the economic, political and cultural world created by European empire and the global neoliberal economy. Epistemologies of the South exist in complex but strong relations with

132

Ludes

the North, not in isolation nor in rupture. These relations are practical, significantly institutionalized, and massive. They are also ridden by tensions, and constantly in change. The long shadow of colonial history falls across whole domains of knowledge.” (Connell et al. 2017: 29) Moreover, it is decisive to focus on distorted knowledge and forced ignorance for “a non-knowledge society leads to a rationality that does not simply move beyond risk, but is about a shift from a rationality of security and risk towards creative strategies and enhanced capacities for coping with inevitable ignorance and surprise” (Gross, 2016: 398). In the first decades of this century, global economic inequality is higher than intra-national disparities or colony-colonizer discrepancies in historical pre-revolutionary situations. A recent Oxfam report (2017: 1) specified that “just eight men own the same wealth as the poorest half of the world. As growth benefits the richest, the rest of society – especially the poorest – suffers. The very design of our economies and the principles of our economics have taken us to this extreme, unsustainable and unjust point.” Moreover, “Billionaires, multi-millionaires, and the corporate business community now spend more on lobbying and campaign donations to advance their own interests than ever before.” (Gans, 2014: 2484, cp. Ludes 2017a) This usage of power to distort publicly available and dominant sources of knowledge cautions us against a too rigid distinction of knowledge and power, as already emphasized in Elias’s treatise. The killing, torturing, or starving of millions of people is too rarely the topic of widely spread news or social scientific teaching and research. Yet there “is no more urgent social task in rich countries than to tackle vital inequality, the inequality of life, health, and death.” (Therborn 2014) In order to confront these challenges, Habermas (2012) and Hessel (2011) argue for building more on the Human Rights declaration of the United Nations. As Montiel (2012: 16) argues more explicitly: “Peace, democracy and development will only be achieved if we guarantee the principles of communication as a human right, the right to communicate for all.” In this context, fundamentally similar questions confront many human beings time and again: How can “I” be sure of me or of anything, what are the most decisive challenges at hand and beyond? For billions of people worldwide, the answer is just to survive. The challenges of “Who am I and what would be my adequate responses to fundamental individual and collective crises?” are conditioned by unquestioned traditions harshly sanctioned by religious, military, educational, family, or other force and power institutions. Moreover, if we ask “How can we be sure at all and how can we communicate our personal (existential) truths to others?” meaningful communication and

Distorted Knowledge and Repressive Power

133

shared goals show far beyond current modes of experience and domain assumptions. Questions like “How can people from widely varied cultures and generations share ­existential evidence?” and “How can this prepare more collectively shared horizons and actions?” remained unasked and unanswered in Wolff’s and Elias’s (elements for) theories. The holocaust and the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were historically extreme examples of systematic killing, prepared by various types of instrumental knowledge (Malesevic, 2013: 281 and 284f.). In the first decades of this century, hundreds of millions of people suffer from near-starvation, physical violence, torture, or sometimes even systematic extinction. Discourses on or the sharing of existential truths between victimizers, the surviving victims, and more or less detached mass and network-mediated observers appear as highly improbable. Such a set of interrelated shared memories and horizons implies questions concerning the relative durability of the results of total experiences, i.e. of the continuities and discontinuities of personal and collective developments (until further radical doubts or upheavals). In order to do so, I will start with a unesco report, which has been based on the world summits on the information society, i.e. on the expertise of contributors from most cultures worldwide as well as from representatives of politics, economy, science, and civil activism. This “final report” focuses on “universal access to information and knowledge, quality education for all, and respect for linguistic and cultural diversity” (Mansell and Trembley, 2013: ii). According to it, all “forms of knowledge should contribute to the creation of peaceful societies” (p. 1), which combines instrumental knowledge with existential survival necessities, while taking into account the diversity of the concrete situations lived by people in different parts of the world. In line with Elias’s focus, knowledge “refers to articulated sets of meaningful observations, analyses, and interpretations that are developed over time and available for each generation to be discussed and criticized ... In industrial and post-industrial societies, much knowledge is mainly created through organized scientific activity” (Mansell and Trembley, 2013: 6; see also Mansell, 2016: 2). A corresponding “Smart Knowledge Society” will rise according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (undesa, 2005: 46) as “one in which institutions and organizations enable people and information to develop without limits and open opportunities for all kinds of knowledge to be mass-produced and mass-utilized throughout the whole society”. Yet more probable is a “Warped Knowledge Society”, “where institutional transformations occur but are careful to stop before they disrupt the prevailing balance of power. These tend to focus on only a narrow spectrum of the application of mass-produced knowledge.” (undesa, 2005: 58). This report also

134

Ludes

s­pecifies some institutional changes necessary to overcome this danger. In order to come closer to these goals, despite extremely discrepant life conditions, I ­suggest adding the transformation and combination of the concepts of (1) existential truths (in the tradition of Wolff) and (2) long-term alternative figurations (as referred to by Elias, e.g., in 1984 and elaborated by the author in 1989a). (1) Wolff (1974) offered autobiographic examples for his own experiences of surrender-and-catch as well as examples from reports by his students in his doctoral seminars at Brandeis University, in which the students were asked to relate their most important, life shattering experiences as best they could. As the selected transcripts from such accounts show, all students had experienced totally involving break ups of their previous convictions and prejudices. They had questioned all of what they had believed or trusted in before and given in to existential doubts. Thereby they converted to fundamentally new concepts, moral rules, or aesthetic tastes. Such experiences could imply completely new perspectives on another person, like “falling in love,” or onto God, in religious conversions. They are accounted as very seldom, at most a few times during one’s lifetime, like mystical encounters impressing new kinds of evidence for a longer period of time – until further occasions for surrender-and-catch. Recent topics for essays by students who apply at international universities appear to have picked up some of these perspectives, e.g.: “Some students have a background or story that is so central to their identity that they believe their application would be incomplete without it. If this sounds like you, then please share your story.” Or: “Describe a place or environment where you are perfectly content. What do you do or experience there, and why is it meaningful to you?” It should, however, also be remembered that Wolff emphasized the historical shift of the nuclear bombs in 1945 for questioning all existential or scientific insights gained before this rupture or without taking it into full account. Yet, he did not complement his call for radical consequences to be drawn from this historical upheaval with insights from the – probably equally important – ­historical event of the United Nations Charter of 1945. (2) Wolff’s concept of existential truths remains bound to personal experiences. In order to transfer the special insights of individual existential truths to occasions for groups, across generations, his concept of (transcendental) subjectivity must be suspended. This farewell to a focus on individuals living in the present has already been achieved by Norbert Elias’s (esp. 1939/2012) process sociology as well as via the activities of unesco (Boafo, 2012: 38) (see also Knoblauch 2008 and Dreher and López 2014) and must be elaborated in the final section.

Distorted Knowledge and Repressive Power

4

135

Alternatives to Repressive Power and Distorted Knowledge

Sustainable social alternatives to repressive power and distorted knowledge or to “warped knowledge societies” necessitate common long-term mass and network mediated means of orientation, communication, and coordination. Since the second half of the last century, TV became globally by far the most important mass medium. Its major information programs are professionally condensed for centennial and annual reviews. Thereby they shape and frame collective audio-visual memories and ranking orders for publicly relevant knowledge as well as general standards of what is and should be considered as power or knowledge. These TV reviews are not based on individualistic preferences but on the professional observations and the decisions taken by journalists and are increasingly based on quota measurement, surveys, and other types of audience research. They constitute the most widely disseminated audio-visual mass self-observations of modern societies. Therefore, regular TV information programs can be considered as more pertinent for widely observed behavior standards for more encompassing figurations than previously analyzed books on good manners or individual experiences – not only due to their wider scope and repetition, but also due to the ever more vivid character of moving visuals in hybrid realities. Mass mediated Key Audio-Visual Narratives thereby shape horizons, repertories of experience and habits and function as frameworks for alternatives in current and future power relations and knowledge transformations. For example: The TV centennial reviews from Brazil, China, Germany, and the U.S. show a continuation of national priorities and perspectives and imply a continuation of historical experiences and evaluations, a repertory of stereotypes for very few countries, issues, actors, but hardly any preparation for global risks or new (types of) crises. More particularly, these mass mediated self-observations of Brazil, China, Germany, and the United States focus on easily visible actors and events and international wars almost taken for granted as fate in Brazil and Germany, as national and the party’s mission in China and moral vision in the United States. (Ludes 2016.) The globally similar format of TV news and documentary reviews implies a shared mode of narrating and of remembering decisive past events for future horizons. (See also the methodological contributions to video analyses by Bateman 2013 and 2014 and Knoblauch 2011.) For example, the key centennial mass mediated audio-visual narratives of China show long periods of wars for ­gaining control of centralized state institutions. In terms of mass mediated knowledge, they hardly reach the level of insights in the “great debate of intellectuals” sketched by Elias nor any profound awareness of the

136

Ludes

­ istorical upheaval of the human potential for self-annihilation, emphasized h by Wolff. Rather than accepting this dichotomy between mass mediated public unawareness and the intellectual and moral concerns of Elias and Wolff, this concluding section aims at clarifying insights into mediated and routinely re-confirmed long-term means of orientation and communication in order to bridge the semantic and existential gaps between what in older times was phrased as theory and practice. As Hill (2013: 326f) states, leading us more concretely beyond Wolff and Elias: “One of the primary means by which narratives help individuals make sense of the world is by organizing actions and events into ­intelligible sequences. The ease and speed at which most events are recognized and (unconsciously) incorporated into individual experience is a testament to the organizing power of master narratives. ... More specifically, master narratives are the stock set of stories drawn from a particular culture that circulate frequently and widely among the members of the culture and embody the culture’s shared understandings. As a result, the more we are exposed to our culture’s master narratives, the more likely we are to use them to make sense of everyday life. In doing so, master narratives become a natural part of our interpretative process, escaping conscious detection as they continually work to organize our perception of the world.” Few companies, especially Alphabet, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, and Amazon currently dominate the virtual and hybrid public sphere. They are to a historically new degree beyond (national) legal and public control. Tens of thousands of surveillance professionals have turned potential technologies of freedom into information and communication technologies for repression. In addition, in terms of the access to mass and network media, we live in a variety of repressive hegemonies. If we use traditional majority rules, any talk of global information or communication is misleading. Existential threats are “Gates-” or “Windows-keepers,” which shape and frame the inclusion or exclusion of information and knowledge. More global are the formats in which mass and network media present information, ­entertainment, commercials or the various mixtures of these major genres. Widely used mass and network media re-produce similarly standardized formats, from book chapters or newspaper articles to radio or television broadcasts and the design of websites and social forums. But these common formats are usually put into national and increasingly generation-specific contexts, based on and framed by particular education institutions, languages, and hierarchies of relevance. A “Smart Knowledge Society” presupposes the synergy of the three major types of knowledge sketched above, first of the “knowledge to do”, namely “the

Distorted Knowledge and Repressive Power

137

basic knowledge we need to survive in our particular civilization (undesa, 2005: 91–97). Second, knowledge “to be” is based on the mass production of “new meaning” that is useful in shaping people’s minds. It is about human convictions and values (which change over time) (undesa, 2005: 105–107). Last, but not least, leading us beyond previous insights from both Wolff and Elias, knowledge “to coexist” removes the distance or barriers between “us” and “the others”. (undesa, 2005: 112–114) For “we focus on the importance of freedom of expression and freedom of information, universal access to information and knowledge, quality education for all, and respect for linguistic and cultural diversity” (Mansell and Tremblay, 2013: ii). If one takes Elias’s utopian tale and Wolff’s trust in existential truths as concluding frameworks, we can see that none of the prerequisites and characteristics they had emphasized has been established in any society – despite the widespread availability of the necessary technological networks of communication. Moreover, any world wide web partially continues and is highly interconnected with traditional print and broadcast media as well as personal communication and experiences. These Information Technologies are organized by profit-driven companies and by power-driven political institutions. Therefore, the cheaper and easier access to mass self-­communication is shaped by profit and power interests, involving less emancipative than repressive traits. Commercial interests, national perspectives and myths abound. The Key Audio-Visual Narratives in contemporary mass and network media offer few answers to why something happened, and hardly name any causes, reasons, or patterns of developments: They convey a history of often unconnected events, almost beyond learning (by seeing), beyond clear criteria for little biased knowledge or for power based on some legitimacy. One must conclude that the exercise of repressive power and the professional steering of distorted knowledge are disseminated and re-confirmed by the major memory, opinion, and option shapers of the mass and the network media. In these perspectives, the fundamental patterns of the narratives of mass mediated knowledge contribute to more general standards of what to take into account in national and international communication. There is a clear broadening of the scope of access, a partial professionalization of mass mediated contents, and a higher share in these endeavors by ever more people, with increasing opportunities for some networks of communicative feedback. As Innerarity (2012: 8) states: “Knowledge is becoming pluralized and decentralized; it is more fragile and debatable ... knowledge weakens power, at least in the sense that power now seems to require a much wider array than

138

Ludes

what was previously considered authoritative knowledge.” More fundamentally, Therborn (2013: 167) observes: “Inequality runs much deeper into human lives, causing millions of unnecessary, premature deaths, stunting lives across generations, producing humiliations, unfreedom, insecurity and anxiety for continent-sized populations across the globe.” Mansell and Trembley (2013: ii, 1) draw new conclusions from these socio-political, techno-economic and cultural trajectories: All “forms of knowledge should contribute to the creation of peaceful societies” and “take into account the diversity of the concrete situations lived by people in the different parts of the world. They should aim at ensuring that knowledge societies involve them in their own enlightenment, empowerment and achievement ... a condition of living where everyone can enjoy tolerance and respect.” (Mansell and Trembley, 2013: 4.) The understanding of knowledge here is similarly broad as in the sociology of knowledge. It “refers to articulated sets of meaningful observations, analyses, and interpretations that are developed over time and available for each generation to be discussed and criticized” (Mansell and Trembley, 2013: 6). Correspondingly, the UN and unesco have begun to prepare and coordinate international efforts toward intergenerational figurations of responsibility, fighting distorted knowledge and repressive power. Human beings need to develop further long-term means of communication and coordination, which take into account existential truths. This implies, e.g., the narration of such experiences across generations via mass and network media. Thereby ever more realistic perceptions and communications of knowledge and power relations may emerge, which are shaped by and again shape themselves the master narratives of ever more groups of people. For existential truths as elements of intergenerational dialogues are conditioned by the following figurations: a suspension of traditional certainties (as focused upon in section 1), the development of knowledge and power as means of orientation, communication, command, and control (discussed in section 2), and the implementation of non-repressive knowledge for reducing the killing fields of inequality via globally relevant strategies of action (as sketched in section 3). Only thereby emerge frameworks for alternatives to repressive power and distorted knowledge that coordinate „the realization of this hegemonic project in the concrete institutions and organizational forms of a ‘hegemonic apparatus’” and constitute “a pedagogical laboratory for unlearning the habits of subalternity and discovering new forms of conviviality, mutuality and collective self-determination” (Thomas, 2013: 25 and 33, quoted in Section 1). The UN and unesco strategies for knowledge societies underestimate the conditions for such efforts.

Distorted Knowledge and Repressive Power

139

It is especially remarkable that the concentration of the major search engines and social forums of the World Wide Web has reached levels far beyond any previous concentrations of “knowledge power” for print or broadcast media. This current globalizing monopolization interferes with the ecology of a multitude of multi-sensory personal, print, broadcast, and network media. Expert debates on long-term developments, which must be checked time and again by individual existential truths, can enlighten us about the social imbalances of technological communication networks and their particular biases. But all these modes of experience and communication are undergoing fundamental upheavals. They require innovations in social communication that convey existential doubts and truths beyond short-term insights, across cultures and generations. Acknowledgements I owe cordial thanks to all contributors to the symposium “Kurt H. Wolff and Existential Truths” in the Villa Vigoni, October 28th–31st 2013, financed by the German Research Foundation (dfg), organized by Prof. Consuelo Corradi, Lumsa, Rome, and the author, with the support of Prof. Immacolata Amodeo and Dr. Caterina Sala. Further thanks are due to the participants of the international conference in Munster, September 2016, on “Changing Power Relations and the Drag Effects of Habitus“, where I offered a keynote (cp. Ludes 2017b) – as well as to Dr. Jan-Peter Kunze for valuable advice on an earlier draft. Bibliography Backhaus, G. 2003. Vindication of the Human and Social Science of Kurt H. Wolff. Human Studies, 28: 309–335. Bateman, J. A. 2013. Looking for what Counts in Film Analysis: A Programme of Empirical Research. In Multimodal Communication, edited by D. Machin (301–329). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Bateman, J.A. 2014. Using Multimodal Corpora for Empirical Research. In Routledge Handbook of Multimodal Analysis, 2nd ed., edited by J. Carey (238–252). Abingdon: Routledge. Boafo, K. 2012. Communication and Human Rights: UNESCO’S Role, in A.V. Montiel (Ed.). Communication and Human Rights. Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinaras en Ciencias y Humanidades. International Association for Media and Communication Research. (37–50). Mexico.

140

Ludes

Castells, M. 2012. Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Connell, R., F. Collyer, J. Maia, and R. Morrell. 2017. Toward a global sociology of knowledge: Post-colonial realities and intellectual practices. International Sociology, 2017, Vol. 32(1): 21–37. Couldry, N. und A. Hepp 2017. The Mediated Construction of Reality. Cambridge and Malden: Polity. Deuze, M. 2012. Media Life. Cambridge and Malden: Polity. Elias, N. 1939 in German and 2012 in English. Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes. Zweiter Band: Wandlungen der Gesellschaft. Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation. Basle: Haus zum Falken. (On the Process of Civilisation. Translated by E. Jephcott with some notes and corrections by the author. The Collected Works of Norbert Elias, Vol. 3, Dublin: University College Dublin Press.). Elias, N. 1984 and 2013. Knowledge and Power: An Interview by Peter Ludes. In N. Stehr and V. Meja (Eds.), Society and Knowledge: Contemporary Perspectives in the Sociology of Knowledge and Science (203–241). New Jersey: Transaction. (The Collected Works of Norbert Elias, Vol. 17, Interviews and Autobiographical Reflections (202– 246). Dublin: University College Dublin Press.). Elias, N. 2004. Gedichte und Sprüche = Gesammelte Schriften 18. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Featherstone, M. & C. Venn. 2006. Problematizing Global Knowledge and the New Encyclopaedia Project. An Introduction. Theory, Culture & Society, 23: 1–20. Gross, M. 2016. Risk as zombie category: Ulrich Beck’s unfinished project of the ‘nonknowledge’ society. Security Dialogue, 2016, Vol. 47(5): 386–402. Habermas, J. 2012. Nachmetaphysisches Denken II. Aufsätze und Repliken. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Hessel, S. 2011. Engagez-vous! Entretiens avec Gilles Vanderpooten. Aube: La Tour d’Aigue. Hill, M.R. 2013. Developing a Normative Approach to Political Satire: A Critical Perspective. International Journal of Communication, 7:324–337. Innerarity, D. 2012. Power and knowledge: The politics of the knowledge society. European Journal of Social Theory, 16(1): 3–16. Knoblauch, H. 2011. Videoanalyse, Videointeraktionsanalyse und Videographie – zur Klärung einiger Missverständnisse. sozialer sinn, 12: 139–145. Kunze, J.-P. 2013. Key concepts and specifics of conceptual work including translation issues in Norbert Elias’ œuvre. Presentation given at the Workshop: Lost or ReGained in Translations and On-line? Semantic Tagging, Jacobs University Bremen, April 12th, 2013.

Distorted Knowledge and Repressive Power

141

Livingstone, S. 2009. On the mediation of everything. Journal of Communication, 59 (I): 1–18. Ludes, P. 1989. Kulturtheorien als Intermediaspiele Essen: Blaue Eule. Ludes, P. (Ed.) 1997. Sozialwissenschaften als Kunst. Originalbeiträge von Karl Mannheim, Norbert Elias, Kurt H. Wolff und Agnes Heller. Constance: UVK. Ludes, P. 2007. Existential Truths as Prerequisites for a Globalizing Discourse Theory. In G. Backhaus and G. Psathas (Eds.), The Sociology of Radical Commitment: Kurt H. Wolff’s Existential Turn (115–136). Lanham etc.: Lexington Books. Ludes, P. 2016. Long-Term Power Presentation Shifts: From Key Audio-Visual Narratives to an Update of Elias’s Theory on the Process of Civilisation. In B. Mersmann & H.G. Kippenberg (Eds.): The Humanities between Global Integration and Cultural Diversity. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 188–210. Ludes, P. 2017a. “State-transformations and Habitus-shifts” (Staatenumbildungen und Habitus-Umbrüche), in: E. Jentges (Ed.): Das Staatsverständnis von Norbert Elias, Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 177–195. Ludes, P. 2017b. “The Internet of Distorted Perceptions and Detached Enlightenment” (Das Internet der verzerrten Wahrnehmungen und abgeklärte Aufklärung), in H. Haarkötter and J.-U. Nieland (Eds.): Nachrichten und Aufklärung. Medien- und ­Journalismuskritik heute: 20 Jahre Initiative Nachrichtenaufklärung, Wiesbaden: VS, pp. 17–37. Malesevic, S. 2013. Forms of brutality: Towards a historical sociology of violence. European Journal of Social Theory, 16(3): 273–291. Mansell, R. 2012. Imagining the Internet: Communication, Innovation, and Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mansell, R. 2016. Governing knowledge societies: competing models and norms. In: Proceedings of PANAM 2015 Colloquium, Governance and Public Service Media in Knowledge Societies. PANAM Network, Montreal, Canada. Mansell, R. & G. Tremblay 2013. Renewing the knowledge societies vision: towards knowledge societies for peace and sustainable development. WSIS+10 Conference. ­U NESCO, Paris. Mennell, S. & J. Goudsblom (Eds.) 1998. Norbert Elias. On Civilization, Power, and Knowledge. Selected Writings. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Montiel, A.V. 2012. Prologue. In A.V. Montiel (Ed.), Communication and Human Rights. Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinaras en Ciencias y Humanidades (15–16). International Association for Media and Communication Research. Mexico. Moon, S. 1993. Eurocentric elements in the idea of “Surrender-and-catch”. Human S­ tudies, 16: 305–317. Morgner, C. 2013. Trust and Confidence: History, Theory and Socio-Political Implications. Human Studies, 36: 509–532.

142

Ludes

Noeth, W. 2013. Wolff’s concept of existential truth compared to Peirce’s pragmatic concept of truth. Presentation at the Symposium “Kurt H. Wolff and Existential Truths”, Villa Vigoni, October 31st, 2013. Oxfam Briefing Paper 2017. AN ECONOMY FOR THE 99%. Oxfam: Oxfam International. Pfeiffer, L. 2013. Fiktion und Tatsächlichkeit. Momente und Modelle funktionaler Textgeschichte. Hamburg: Shoebox House. Psathas, G. 2003. Kurt H. Wolff: A Brief Biography. Human Studies, 26: 285–291. Quandt, T. 2012. What’s left of trust in a network society? An evolutionary model and critical discussion of trust and societal communication. European Journal of Communication, 27(1): 7–21. Therborn, G. 2013. The Killing Fields of Inequality. Malden: Polity. Therborn, G. 2014. The Inequality of Life and Death. Social Europe. August 6th. Thomas, P.D. 2013. Hegemony, passive revolution and the modern Prince. Thesis Eleven 117(1): 20–39. UNDESA 2005. Understanding Knowledge Societies. In twenty questions and answers with the Index of Knowledge. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Unger, C. 2009. Reise ohne Wiederkehr? Leben im Exil 1933 bis 1945. Darmstadt: Primus. Wolff, K.H. 1974. Trying Sociology. New York, London, Sydney, and Toronto: WileyBlackwell.

Chapter 8

Counter-Hegemony Narratives: Revolutionary Songs Padmaja Shaw India has been a repository of a wide variety of musical traditions—from classical, folk, devotional, semi-classical to revolutionary. Almost all the political formations in India have a cultural wing that generates musical content to entertain their followers during public gatherings. The radical revolutionary groups however use music, dance and theatre as a tool for mobilization and political education. There appears to be a more organic relationship between the music and its field of influence, which is often not the case with other political groups. Globally, the commercial mass media grew into an instrument for consolidation of capitalism. In India, media technologies were introduced soon after their emergence in the West, though its political economy remained feudal, pre-industrial and largely agrarian. Late 18th century saw the introduction of newspapers and early 20th century the electronic media like radio and television in India. Newspapers (1780) and radio (1923) entered the country while India was still a colony of the British Empire, soon after their appearance in Europe and the United States. After its Independence from the British in 1947, till the 1980s, under the strong influence of International Structuralist economists like Raul Prebitsch and Gunnar Myrdal, India protected its indigenous industries by encouraging local production through import substitution and import restrictions. It was a welfare economy under a Constitution that reaffirmed itself as socialist and secular in 1976. Newspapers were always in the private sector as commercial operations. Television made its entry in 1959. Radio and television began as state monopolies and have become privatized commercial enterprises since the mid-1990s. Private and global television and radio also began operating since. The rapid expansion of television since the mid-1990s foreshadowed the opening up of India’s economy to globalization, with the media industry leading the way for global cultural influences. The firm turn towards capitalist development followed from the state withdrawing from its welfare obligations, divesting from publicly owned corporations, and opening up most industries for private © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_010

144

Shaw

and global investments through foreign direct investment and foreign institutional investments. Entertainment industry – television, film and ­advertising – were opened up to foreign investment. Major global media corporations ­became important media entities in India. Through this history of relentless centripetal pressure on India driving it toward capitalist development, and the cooption of its cultural resources for commercial exploitation, a strong centrifugal force of revolutionary resistance has been at work, aided by small but coherent cultural campaigns. This paper will describe some of the cultural interventions that have successfully built counter-narratives to the hegemonic mainstream media and have kept the core ideas of revolutionary politics alive across generations since the early 20th century. 1

Hegemony and Counter-hegemony

Herbert Marcuse (Marcuse, 1978: 1) begins his book, The Aesthetic Dimension, thus: “In a situation where reality can be changed only through radical political praxis, the concern with aesthetics demands justification.” After the success of Bolshevik revolution in 1917, wherever radical revolutionary praxis took root in India, culture by way of literature and song was found essential for mobilizing, building and sustaining cadre. In a mediatized society now, the challenge of countering the mainstream media’s relentless pursuit of capitalist culture poses a challenge. Gramsci and the Frankfurt School problematized the historic role of capitalist media from various perspectives. Gramsci’s conception of hegemony elaborated Marx’s formulation that the dominant ideas of an era tend to be the ideas of the ruling classes. Hegemony is the acceptance of these dominant ideas without resistance by people even when those are inimical to their own welfare. Gramsci also drew our attention to the powerful institutions of hegemony within modern societies—family, schools, media, and religion. The Frankurt School scholars provided a critique of the role of capitalist media in producing cultural commodities that worked to legitimize capitalist mode of production and production relations. They have called such media enterprises that are mass-producing and commodifying culture, cultural industries (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944). The working class that was to be the vanguard of revolutionary politics gets co-opted as consumers of massproduced goods marketed through mass-produced advertising and entertainment, thus helping to stabilize the capitalist system. The immediate concern was the role media played in creating “false consciousness” that made the ordinary consumers of media to believe, imbibe,

Counter-Hegemony Narratives

145

and acquiesce to the exploitative values they promote (Marcuse 1972). Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, in their classic work The Cultural Industry (1944: 30–31) say that “The people at the top are no longer interested in concealing monopoly as its violence becomes more open, so its power grows. Movies and radio need no longer pretend to be art. The truth that they are just business is made into an ideology in order to justify the rubbish that they routinely produce.” Within the Frankfurt School tradition, Herbert Marcuse had addressed the ways open to a revolutionary movement to overcome the hegemonic power of the mainstream communication. Marcuse (1964) says, “The totalitarian tendencies of the one-dimensional society render the traditional ways and means of protest ineffective – perhaps even dangerous because they preserve the illusion of popular sovereignty. This illusion contains some truth: “the people,” previously the ferment of social change, have “moved up” to become the ferment of social cohesion.” The Great Refusal, as formulated by Marcuse, refers to the weakening of the revolutionary vanguard classes such as the industrial proletariat under capitalism, partly because of the media of mass communication co-opting the classes into participating in capitalist consumerism. Marcuse sees the counter force to this in the “radical act” of individual refusal to accept bourgeois values, way of life and its institutions (Kellner, 1984: 277). The radical student movements in Europe in the 1960s represented to Marcuse this ability to refuse. Marcuse was closely associated with the ferment in European politics at the time, recognizing through the rise of civil rights movements the possibility of radicalization and transformation of popular consciousness (Kellner, 1984: 278). In the absence of a radical organized revolutionary force as vanguard, Marcuse sees the Great Refusal coming from a large number of individuals outside the democratic process as a possible way to challenge the dominant narratives. Marcuse says, …underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colours, the unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process; their life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game. When they get together and go out into the streets, without arms, without protection, in order to ask

146

Shaw

for the most primitive civil rights, they know that they face dogs, stones, and bombs, jail, concentration camps, even death. Their force is behind every political demonstration for the victims of law and order. The fact that they start refusing to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period. marcuse, 1964: 166

While according to Marcuse, the bourgeoisie is no longer the ruling class in advanced industrial capitalism, in India, it has powerful proxy sources of hegemony in caste and religious leadership even when its all-encompassing economic dominance is weaker. The hegemony of elite culture of classical arts and literature that the upper classes and castes patronized found its strength and persistence in the religious practices. The Great Refusal of these came from subaltern groups and the marginalized people who began celebrating their own folk forms and their idioms of expression. This Great Refusal in a sense also propelled the radical revolutionary politics and kept it alive for 50 years in the face of brutal state repression. The following section briefly outlines the context of the revolutionary politics in the South India. 1.1 Context The South-Central province of India, till 2014 known as Andhra Pradesh, has been divided into Andhra Pradesh and Telangana (See Maps 8.1 and 8.2 below1). The two areas have very different historical experiences but a common revolutionary past, and they share a common language, Telugu, which is spoken in a wide variety of dialects. When India attained independence from the British rule, Andhra province that was under the Madras Presidency was integrated into the Indian Union in 1947. The vii Nizam of Hyderabad ruled Telangana region, like the 564 other provinces in India then ruled by Maharajas and Princes. When the freedom movement was raging in the British ruled area of Indian subcontinent as an anti-imperialist struggle, in Telangana it took the dual form of both antiimperialist and anti-feudal struggle. 1 The orange colored area in Map 8.2 is the old united Andhra Pradesh. It is the Telugu language speaking area. It was bifurcated into Andhra Pradesh and Telangana areas in 2014. Telangana area was an independent kingdom ruled by the Nizam of Hyderabad. Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra were under the direct colonial administration of the British Empire. Srikakulam district where the uprising took place is located to the North of Visakhapatnam in Coastal Andhra.

147

Counter-Hegemony Narratives

Telugu Speaking Region Jammu & Kashmir

Himachal Pradesh Punjab Uttaranchal Haryana Delhi Rajasthan

Arunachal Pradesh Sikkim

Uttar Pradesh

Assam Nagaland Meghalaya Manipur Tripura Jharkhand Mizoram West Bengal Bihar

Gujarat

Madhya Pradesh Chattisgarh

Orissa Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh

Goa Karnataka

Tamil Nadu Lakshadweep Islands

Map 8.1

Kerala

Andaman & Nicobar Islands

Map of India Source: redrawn from The Caring Hand, http://thecaringhand .org/de/elderly.html.

The revenue collectors in the Telangana region under the Nizam were largely from landed gentry belonging to the upper castes. They imposed brutal forms of feudal exploitation through the practice of (Vetti) bonded labor where labor from not just agricultural workers but also from occupational castes like potters, blacksmiths, washermen and barbers was extracted under coercion. This

148

Shaw

Visakhapatnam telangana Hyderabad

a co

l sta

ra

a

h nd

Kurnool rayalaseema

The three regions of Andhra Pradesh Map 8.2

Telangana and Srikakulam Source: redrawn from Indileak (2014), http://www.indileak.com/ wp-content/uploads/2014/02/telengana-map.jpg.

was compounded by other forms of social and cultural exploitation that was sanctioned under the rigid caste system in India. (Tirumali, 2016: 419) According to Tirumali, the landlords were “de facto rulers … Supremacy was established over wastelands, government lands, trees, tanks, streams and tank beds in the villages. (They) became virtual rulers and their power of arbitration extended to land ownership, caste conflicts and domestic quarrels… Their ­dispensation of justice was unilateral and authoritarian…” (Tirumali, 2016: 424) From 1920s, the emergence of All India National Congress, Andhra Mahasabha, the peasant associations (Rythu Sanghas) and Comrades’ Association

Counter-Hegemony Narratives

149

under the leadership of the left (which later became the Communist Party in 19412), brought coherence to the demands of the dispersed sections of the working people. Specific demands for cultivable land, right to access to water and forest resources, and better wages emerged. The progressive leadership was drawn from the rich peasantry and from educated employees. The exploited communities began to rebel against the landlords (Tirumali, 1996: 165). The resistance was village centric and direct. The left political formations began training the peasant/artisan communities in ideology and armed resistance to confront the violence from the landlords and their henchmen. By mid-1940s, with the onset of Second World War and widespread shortages of food, the privations of the poor intensified. The peasant unrest led to an armed rebellion that lasted between 1946 and 1951. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, which was banned and was operating underground, 3000 villages were declared liberated zones. Land was confiscated and redistributed. This was viewed with great alarm by the newly formed central government of independent India, which was still in the process of consolidating its political power (Sundarayya, 1973a: 3–19). Unlike most other maharajas, the vii Nizam of Hyderabad refused to integrate with the newly Independent India in 1947. The Indian army through a military operation called “Operation Polo” forcibly integrated the Hyderabad state into the Indian Union in 1948. The army operation achieved two purposes. One is to crush the NIzam’s civilian militia called the Razakars who were notorious for their brutality, and to crush the nascent Communist Party-led armed peasant uprising that was under way in Telangana. The Communist Party was banned and its leadership went underground. The government of India more or less restored the status quo of village power structure soon after (Sundarayya, 1973b: 22–52) The Telangana Armed Peasant Struggle, while acknowledged as an inspiring chapter in the history of the left movement in India, set off a debate about the role left politics should play in independent India. Whether to accept the parliamentary democracy or to pursue revolutionary politics and to establish the dictatorship of the working class was the central question. Communist Party of India came to power through democratic elections in the Southern state of Kerala in 1957, but was soon destabilized by the central government. Kerala, Tripura and West Bengal continue to elect Marxists to power through electoral process. 2 I. Tirumali, The Political Pragmatism of the Communists in Telangana, 1938-48, Social Scientist, Vol. 24, No. 4/6 (Apr.–Jun., 1996), pp. 165–183. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3517795.pd f?refreqid=excelsior:f11e381bdf0cef20ec68b64ffc133f84.

150

Shaw

The Communist Party split in 1964, when two divergent positions emerged – one in support of parliamentary democracy (Communist Party of India—cpi) and the other, in support of the armed rebellion option (Communist Party of India-Marxist cpm). However, both the parties have now become the parliamentary left (Sundarayya, 1973b: 22–52). In May 1967, another armed peasant struggle unfolded in North Bengal in a village called Naxalbari, which was brutally crushed in the following months. Another faction, Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), emerged from these developments and became synonymous with armed struggle to capture state power. Around the same time, other parts of India like Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Bihar and Punjab, witnessed armed insurgencies by peasantry led by left groups. Though there are several groups operating under the broad rubric of Maoists or Naxalites, the groups have tried to organize a unified party, Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004 for coordination of their operations across the states. The party is believed to be active across the central belt of India, stretching from the Southern states up to Nepal, in what has come to be known as the Red Corridor (see Map 8.3 below). Their main areas of operations are the forest-dwelling communities. A low intensity war has been in progress since 1967 for 50 years, with newer areas coming under the influence of the groups. The intensified assault of neo-liberal policies that have opened up the forest and mineral resources to Indian and global corporations since the 1990s has escalated the war between the forest-dwelling communities (adivasis or indigenous tribes) who seek to defend their rights to life and livelihood with the support of the armed Maoists and the militarized Indian state. New policies have also created enclaves of export industries where labor laws are not applicable and the agriculture sector has been in crisis over the last decade, driving thousands of farmers across the country to suicide. 1.2 Culture and Revolt: Beginnings Over the 50 years of its chequered existence, the movement has developed an extensive programme of spreading awareness about its ideology and goals through a gamut of journals, publications, literary work, dance, theatre, and songs using folk forms that are rooted in people’s culture. A significant feature of these insurgencies was the participation of women in large numbers as armed combatants. In the late 1960s when the Maoist insurgency began to spread, only print media and state-run radio, neither of which had much access to the rural ­hinterlands, existed. The mass media were in the Telugu dialect spoken only

151

Counter-Hegemony Narratives

n

Delhi

n

d

i

a

p

a

ND HA K R HA

Naxalbari l bangladesh

CHHA TTI SGA RH

J

i

e

Mumbai ANDHRA

Lalgarh ORISSA

WEST BENGAL

Bay of Bengal

PRADESH

750 km

Arabian Sea Map 8.3

Districts affected by Naxal conflict, April 2009 Highly Marginally affected affected Moderately affected Source: satp.org

Red Corridor: Maoist insurgents in India, More bloody and defiant. Source: redrawn from The Economist, 22 July 2010, http://www .economist.com/node/16650478.

in two districts of coastal Andhra. Because entrepreneurs from these districts owned and operated most media enterprises like newspapers, films, radio and television, the Telugu dialect from the region became the dominant dialect of the media. The urban, educated, upper-class, upper-caste individuals had exposure to and engaged with the media while the rest were steeped in the rural folk culture and its creative resources. The educated middle class led the earlier armed struggle of the peasantry in Telangana as well. The cultural wing of the then Communist Party of India, Praja Natya Mandali, used the dominant forms of drama, poetry and novel. The troupe also experimented with popular traditional folk forms like B ­ urrakatha.

152

Shaw

Dhanaraju (2012: 1–7) in his paper describes the various popular folk forms that were deployed to mobilize people to join the struggle. The ban on the Communist Party in the mid-1940s drove many of the poets and writers either underground or into the film industry, which began to emerge as a major source of popular culture. When the Srikakulam movement began in 1967, the cultural intervention experimented with folk forms in newer ways. People like Subbarao Panigrahi arrived in Srikakulam, and to mobilize the people, they immediately began to tap into the locally familiar cultural forms like Jamukula Katha, which were not progressive in their original form, and began to radicalize the content by infusing political messages (Kumar, 2006; Venugopal, 2008; Banerjee, 1989). Subbarao Panigrahi was a priest at a local temple. He would mingle with the local communities and conduct literacy classes and create songs, dramas and stories in language that was easily understood by the people (Venugopal, 2008). The popular folk forms were instruments of hegemony and control over the community, often embedded in superstitions and religious beliefs. Panigrahi infused these forms with emancipatory messages. In “Why do we need this rule?”, though not composed in folk form, Panigrahi (1972: 34–35) says: If people’s hardships cannot be solved Why do we need this rule? Death or tomorrow we’ll decide What’s there to think? Small farmers’ back is broken Tax has gone up for the small trader Millionaires’ guardsmen Landlords’ henchmen Those who snuggle up to the powerful Why do we need such a nincompoop state? There’s nothing of our own Even after independence Hankering after alms from overseas Do we need such a rule of the wretched? Strangling the poor Unconcerned about the people. Devouring in excess This is a state for the rich. However long you wait Your life will be of tears Those who have reduced you to this

Counter-Hegemony Narratives

153

Don’t deserve to be forgiven, brother. Translated from Telugu In the popular marching song “We are Communists” he says: We are communists, we are the toilers …. We are against all injustice And uphold all that is fair. We shall overcome all hurdles And reach our destination. We are communists .. (refrain) Can you stop the rays of the Sun By putting up your hands? Can you stop the waves of popular upsurge By putting us behind bars? We are communists…. Original was in Telugu. BANERJEE, 1989: 65

2

Revival and Repression

Revolutionary Writers’ Association (virasam, acronym for Viplava Rachayital Sangham) which formed in 1970 had as its members most of the major writers of the time—Sri Sri, RV Shastri, KV Ramana Reddy, Cherabandaraju, Varavara Rao, C Vijayalakshmi, Jwalamukhi, Satyamurthy, Nikhileshwar, Ashok Tankasala—who brought about a revolutionary change in Telugu literature. And whose songs and poetry formed the cultural core of the movement. An article written by Pranay Krishna on The Cultural Aspect of The Naxalbari Uprising’ says that Virasam declared Panigrahi as its source of inspiration and brought out a compilation of his songs in 1972 after his death in 1969. Panigrahi was shot dead by the police in an “encounter”3 (an armed confrontation), considered one of the first such incidents in which five people along with Panigrahi were killed. 3 The police or paramilitary forces shoot to kill Maoists instead of capturing them and following due process. Often they are arrested and deliberately killed even when there is no armed confrontation and the killings are passed off as “encounters”. Many civilians fall victim to this when they are killed on suspicion of being Maoists or of being their sympathizers. The forces are not held to account for these killings and are often rewarded with cash incentives, awards and promotions.

154

Shaw

In all the political meetings of the groups, their cultural wings are given substantial space. All meetings begin with songs. Speeches are generously interspersed with songs, even if the gatherings take a lot longer than the scheduled time. Some of the singers themselves are writers, orators and ideologues. While the speeches address specific issues, the songs speak of sacrifices, martyrdom, hardships and trials faced by laboring classes, capitalism, global politics and their impact on governance in the country, class collusion, future society, and revolutionary tasks before the movement. Venugopal explains the role the cultural troupes played in the reconstruction of the movement: One, various streams of the movement like students’ wings, agricultural laborers’ wings, women’s wings etc. maintained deep structural relationships with their own causes but came together in solidarity for all other causes. The broad understanding of the larger goal of achieving a people’s democracy helped in building solidarities and constructing a broad platform (2008: 153). Often, in newer areas of expansion, it was the songs that have already become popular and known to the people that would pave the way for building the organizations. The power of popular songs has been a source of mobilization in the earlier phase as well. In early 1940s a song written by an ordinary foot soldier, Bandi Yadagiri, in the armed struggle against the feudal rule of the then Nizam of Hyderabad became an anthem for resistance in all subsequent movements of various vintages in the Telangana region. The song is composed in folk style and is easy to sing. The lyrics of the song say: (Bandenaka bandi gatti, padaharu bandlu gatti, e bandlo vothavu koduko, Nizamu sarkaroda?) Cart after cart, sixteen carts in a row, in which cart will you be riding, you ruler of Nizam state? … (Chuttumuttoo Sooryapeta, nattanaduma Nallagonda, nuvvu undedi Hyderabadu, dani pakka Golakonda, Golakonda killa kinda, nee gori kadtam koduko, Nizamu sarkaroda) Suryapet will encircle you. Nallagonda will take the lead. You live in Hyderabad. Beside that is Golkonda. Under the Golkonda fort, we’ll bury you finally! The lyrics find an unfailing popular response even after thousands of performances in public gatherings. It was also used in a film, Maa Bhoomi, about the armed uprising. The folk singer of the song in the film, Gaddar, born Gummadi Vittal Rao, went on to achieve phenomenal popularity, after going underground to join the armed insurgency of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist group. Associated with Jana Natya Mandali, a revolutionary cultural group, Gaddar worked for decades in spreading revolutionary ideas among people. Discussing the idea of “National-Popular”, Gramsci (2012: 208) remarks that the Italian intellectual is far removed from the people, that is the “Nation”. He says, “They are tied instead to a caste tradition that has never been broken

Counter-Hegemony Narratives

155

by a strong popular or national political movement from below. This tradition is abstract and ‘bookish’…” A somewhat similar predicament existed in the standard Telugu language recognized for formal use in books, literature and journalism, which led to the delegitimization and marginalization of the local dialects. The revolutionary poets like Gaddar and Vangapandu Prasad Rao began to use only the local dialects and evocative imagery in their songs. The leadership of Communist Parties were mostly drawn from upper-class, upper-caste groups whose main channels for ideological discourse tended to be newspapers, essays, poetry, novels and short stories. Belonging to the subaltern caste, singing about the subaltern experience in language and form familiar to the people, Gaddar’s revolutionary message found resonance in the most remote areas of the state among the poor working people (Kumar, 2006). Gaddar has written some 2000 songs and sung them all over the Telangana districts. Another song about a migrant youngster coming to the big city to eke out a living as a rickshaw-puller (Bhadram Koduko) also was used in a film and became very popular. The song cautions the youngster about the dangers lurking at every turn on the streets. He has come to the city to escape the oppression of the powerful but the rich and powerful people in the city are no different. The trials faced by the poor in the city are no different either but he must discover the new path that is possible for the future. Kumar (2006) in his comprehensive analysis of Gaddar’s work says, “Gaddar had given equal importance to the situation of workers in transition from feudalism to capitalism. Capitalism works on the extensive use of machines and produces goods on large scale. Its ultimate goal is profit … It commodifies everything…In the song “Yentrametla tirugutuvundante” Gaddar explains the process of production of goods by machines and how it sucks the blood of the laborer. One may get the essence of capitalism from this song in relation to exploitation of workers.” Gaddar has an elaborate repertoire of themes ranging from the role of World Bank/imf in the global economy, the dominance of global corporations in everyday life, unpaid labor of women, lives of policemen who are themselves poor and sacrifice their lives to protect a corrupt state and its politicians, plight of students, and girl children. The songs are rich with cultural and social experience of the subaltern classes, couched in humor, irony, and sometimes rage. After coming over-ground and surviving an assassination attempt, he continues to popularize revolutionary ideas. In one of the songs Gaddar evokes the impact of globalization (Adigadugo amerikodostundu): Look, Look, Look The American is coming

156

Shaw

The American is coming with sackfuls of bombs With loaded guns And has stepped on the heart of mother India … Godrej company greets him with “Good Morning” Hindustan Lever is saying “Hail Motherland” Cargill company is putting up its collar Tatas and Birlas are keeping up the refrain The Prime Minister is pressing his feet The Chief Minister is licking his face Where is this American? He’s become the Colgate brush and jumping around your teeth As Seiko watch he’s beeping around you Becoming Gillette blade he’s shaving your faces Having become the colour TV, he’s winking at you! Where’s the American? In our fresh water, he’s mixing our sugar Mixing cocoa poison and making coca cola Enticing us with the colour of rum and making us take shots Our coconut water is called stinking water He has set up a fight between coca cola and coconut water, see! And so on … (Godrej, Tata and Birla are major Indian industrial houses, Cargill and Lever Brothers are the multinationals. The critique is about the comprador nature of the Indian state and how we are all co-opted into it). Gaddar’s emergence as a cultural force began in the days when television was yet to establish itself as a cultural phenomenon. After the 1980s and 1990s when the television boom began, films and film-based music shows overwhelmed public taste for about a decade on mainstream media. 3

Counter-hegemony and the Great Refusal

The politically powerful coastal Andhra capitalists who are perceived to be the cause for the underdevelopment of the Telangana region in popular perception, own and dominate the Telugu film industry and the television industry (Shaw, 2014: 143–157). When the separate Telangana movement revived, the commercial film-based culture on popular television was roundly rejected by the people. The resistance poetry and song popularized by Gaddar and others like Goreti Venkanna and Vimalakka became the main source of popular

Counter-Hegemony Narratives

157

mobilization. In fact, by 2012, entertainment television channels in Telangana began to schedule prime time slots for these singers. Ironically, the political formation they represent ideologically remains banned to this day. The singers, poets and artists are targeted by the state in various ways. Arrests under draconian Public Security Acts, cases of sedition and often elimination through encounters are common. Much like the British colonial administration and the feudal lords, the democratic government of India does not allow space for debating political alternatives; in this instance alternatives to neo-liberal capitalism. By 2010, Internet and its possibilities, made widely accessible through mobile technologies, emerged as a significant alternative to the groups that were traditionally marginalized and neglected by not just the mainstream media, but also the mainstream culture. The more the mainstream avenues of public information neglected people’s issues, the more popular internet-based alternative sources of information became. Gaddar himself has written and sung over 2,000 songs and the later artists who were inspired by his work produced several more thousands of songs that kept refreshing and contemporizing the discourse, addressing new challenges that were emerging. Most of this work is now available on YouTube. The culture mass-manufactured by the mainstream media found its counternarrative in the songs that Gaddar and others created, framing them in the context of the ongoing class struggle. There are other song-writer/singers like ­Vimalakka and Goreti Venkanna who have also attained popularity during the ­Telangana movement. Many promising young singers who were part of Gaddar’s team like Diwakar, Padma and Prabhakar have lost their lives in the movement. Vimalakka sings iconic revolutionary songs written by the great poet-­ revolutionaries of the region. Her songs also are set to the folk forms, and the lyrics are already familiar to the working people. She, like Gaddar and others, is an orator who intersperses her speeches with inspirational songs – songs of sacrifice, songs that challenge caste, social and economic inequalities. She leads a troupe, Arunodaya Samskrutika Samakhya, and is the President of Telangana United Front. Her father was a revolutionary in the 1940s Telangana Armed Peasant Rebellion and she is married to the leader of Janashakti faction of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). Since 1995, she has been leading the cultural activities, but also works for unionizing workers of unorganized sector like indigenous cigar rollers (a cottage industry). She was arrested, accused of possessing arms in 2017 for her activities with the unorganized labor. She is out on bail and continues with her political and cultural activities.

158

Shaw

Sumanta Banerjee (1989: 2) insightfully comments that, “To understand India today, it is essential to listen to these poets – both the middle class writers of the cities and the more earthy poets of the villages.” Much of the poetry and song that has found such resonance in people’s consciousness has been written while the writers and singers were being hounded, imprisoned and under threat. Banerjee (1989: 18) alerts us to this in his anthology of poetry, “While reading these poems, one should remember that many were written not in sedentary domesticity, but in some dark cell in a jail, or in a secret hideout in a forest, or while on the run escaping the police.” 4

Response of the State

To quote the security assessment report of Routray (2009), “In January 2008, the Warangal district administration distributed free direct-to-home (dth) receiver systems and colour television sets in the remote areas in the district’s Eturnagaram, Tadavai, Gobindraopet, Venkatapur, Kothaguda and Gudur subdivisions to outscore Maoist influence and propaganda machinery in the state. In February 2008, the Visakhapatnam district administration, under its “Call for Peace” program, also distributed television sets with dth systems to “wean away tribals from the influence of Maoists and sensitize them on various development activities”. Nine years later in 2017, the central and state governments are preparing to “unleash an information offensive against the Maoist extremists by launching 24x7 channels in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the two states worst affected by Left Wing Extremism. The government will also begin distributing Doordarshan boxes free in the remote and interior areas of states hit by Maoist insurgency” (Mahajan, 2017: 12). The state has for long implicitly believed that mainstream media are a potent tool for depoliticization, and an instrument for establishing the hegemony of the capitalist development model that allows for forcible eviction of the adivasis from the forest lands and river banks to accommodate mining and big dam projects contracted out to Indian and multinational corporations. The demands for fair livelihood, right to life, and land that was the cause for the Telangana Armed Peasant Rebellion in 1948 remain unfulfilled to this day in democratic India. In fact, the neo-liberal model of development is in the process of reversing whatever little gains that have been made in these years. The battle lines are drawn quite unambiguously, as the state refuses to recognize the Constitutionally guaranteed rights of the people and the Maoists continue to mobilize people to resist this model of development.

Counter-Hegemony Narratives

159

5 Conclusion At the height of the revolutionary mobilization in Srikakulam, the song sung by Vangapandu “Empillado eldamostava” became very popular. The song entices the youth saying, “hey young man, shall we go? hey young woman, shall we go? To the anthill in Srikakulam? Parrots swing around with knives it seems; sheep seem to have gobbled up tigers, mice are chasing the cats away; hey young man, shall we go? hey young woman, shall we go?” A commercial film producer wanted to use the refrain of the song for a raunchy dance number in his film and faced immediate public outrage. The writer/singer of the original song also objected to the cooption of the revolutionary song into a commercial film (Swathi, 2010). In the preface to the Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse (1978: xi) says “… a work of art can be called revolutionary if, by virtue of the aesthetic transformation, it represents, in the exemplary fate of individuals, the prevailing unfreedom and the rebelling forces, thus breaking through the mystified (and petrified) social reality, and opening the horizon of change (liberation).” Setting out the central theses of Marxist aesthetics, Marcuse (1978: 1) says, “there is a definite relation between art and material base, between art and the relations of production. There is a definite connection between art and social class.” He says, “… the only authentic, true, progressive art is the art of an ascending class. It expresses the consciousness of this class ... A declining class or its representatives are unable to produce anything but “decadent” art.” Banerjee (1989: 14) tells us, these poets took care to maintain the essential spirit of the long unbroken tradition of these art forms with their own poetic rules and their own scales and rhythms. He says, “It was a period of political upheaval, aimed at overthrowing the State power, paralleled by a similar attempt in the cultural field to discard the language of the stablished elite for a new mode of expression that would move with the strains and stresses that belonged to the everyday life of the common people. … The conflict between the language of classical metaphors and aristocratic forms on the one hand and the earthy speech of the masses on the other…” The state, as a deliberate strategy, is spreading the reach of commercial television to establish the hegemony of the “decadent art” that is produced by the dominant classes and castes who control these media. Even as the state periodically succeeds in physically eliminating revolutionaries, newer ranks emerge as it has not changed the material conditions that produced the revolutionaries in the first place. It is also not clear how the tradition of folk writers and singers will sustain themselves in future. But it certainly produced a vibrant treasure of inspiring poetry and songs for the people, whose appeal seems to cut across class and caste boundaries.

160

Shaw

Bibliography Adorno, T. and M. Horkheimer 1944. “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass ­Deception.” In The Cultural Studies Reader. Simon During (ed.). Routledge: NY. pp. 29–43. Banerjee, Sumanta. 1989. Thema Book of Naxalite Poetry. Thema: Kolkata. Dhanaraju, Vulli. 2012. “The Telangana Movement (1946–1951): Folklore Perspective.” International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow. Vol. 1, No. 8, pp. 1–7. Kellner, Douglas. 1984. Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, University of California Press: USA. Kumar, Keshav. 2006. Popular Culture and Ideology: The Phenomenon of Gaddar. http://untouchablespring.blogspot.in/2006/11/song-of-gaddar.html. Accessed: 0406-2017. Mahajan, Nitin. 2017. “Centre’s Media War against Maoists.” Deccan Chronicle. 1 June, p. 12. Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. https://www.marxists.org/ebooks/marcuse/one-dimensional -man.htm. Marcuse, Herbert. 1972. Counter-Revolution and Revolt, Beacon, USA. Marcuse, Herbert. 1978. The Aesthetic Dimension: Towards a Critique of Marist Aesthetics. Beacon: USA. Panigrahi, Subbarao. 1972. Erupu: Collection of Songs Subbarao Panigrahi. VIRASAM: Hyderabad. Routray, Bibhu Prasad. 2009. “Andhra Pradesh: From tactical retreat to disordered flight”. SAIR, Vol. 7, No. 36, 16 March. www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/7_36 .htm#assessment1. Accessed: 03-06-2017. Shaw, Padmaja. 2014. “The Public Sphere and the Telangana Movement”. Public Sphere and the Media in India. Media International Australia, No 152, August. pp. 143–157. Sundarayya, P. 1973a. “Telangana People’s Armed Struggle, 1946–1951. Part One: Historical Setting.” Social Scientist. Vol. 1, No. 7 (Feb.). pp. 3–19. https://www.jstor.org/ stable/pdf/3516269.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:00bd840458af5acb78f0e0db862b2929). Accessed: 04-06-2017. Sundarayya, P. 1973b. Telangana People’s Armed Struggle, 1946–51: Part Four: Background to a Momentous Decision. Social Scientist. Vol. 1, No. 10 (May). pp. 22–52. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3516280. Accessed: 04-06-2017. Swathi, V. 2010. “Whose Song is this Anyway?” The Hindu. 12 August http://www .thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/Whose-song-is -this-anyway/article16532460.ece. Accessed: 03-06-2017.

Counter-Hegemony Narratives

161

Tirumali, Inukonda. 1996. “The Political Pragmatism of the Communists in Telangana, 1938–48.” Social Scientist, Vol. 24, No. 4/6 (Apr.–Jun.). pp. 164–183. http://www.jstor .org/stable/pdf/3517795.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:f11e381bdf0cef20ec68b64ffc133f84. Tirumali, Inukonda. 2016. “Telangana Peasant Struggle, 1940–1956.” In Modern Andhra and Hyderabad: AD 1858–1956. Emesco: Hyderabad. pp. 419–431. Venugopal, N. 2008. “Three Decades of Jana Natya Mandali.” In Kallamundari Charitra. Swetcha Sahiti: Hyderabad. pp. 143–163.

Songs Mentioned in the Paper Bandi enka bandi katti https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XM6_PlRzCHs. Bhadram koduko Gaddar https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZiwUcKytX-8. Adigadugo amerikodostundu https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HNVNrAKGVsg. Vimalakka https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9LCBNtRgxw https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=rlODCazCotU&list=RDrlODCazCotU#t=174 https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=Z304mTg6pXg.

Chapter 9

The US Empire’s Cultural Industries, at War: Selling and Subverting the Ideology of Militarism Tanner Mirrlees 1

Introduction: The US Empire, to be Continued?

For readers immersed in the annals of Empire, it is well known that the United States (US) is no ordinary State in the world system. The US is an Empire, but a unique post-colonial Empire whose national security strategy since 1945 has strove to build, integrate and police a world system of sovereign clients that share its model: capitalism, the liberal State form, and the consumerist “way of life.” The US Empire combines tools of coercion and persuasion to achieve its goals. In the former “hard power” strategy, it uses threats, bribes, punishments and outright warfare to deter, contain, and directly dominate opponents. With the latter “soft power” strategy, it aims to elicit the consent of others to its leadership, to attract and co-opt them (Bacevich 2004, 2010, 2013; Blum 2004; Cox and Stokes 2012; de Grazia 2005; Dower 2017; Cull 2008; Harvey 2003; Klein 2007; Mirrlees 2016; Mooers 2016; Perkins 2009; Panitch and Gindin 2012; Snow 2003). As of late, though, the US Empire is said to be in relative decline, perhaps even headed toward a full-fledged collapse. For proponents of ­decline, the 20th “American Century” is over and the prospect of the 21st century being American-centric is thwarted by a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Internally, the US faces numerous economic problems (a permanent account deficit due to borrowing more money from the world than it makes by selling to it) and geopolitical troubles (overstretch as ­result of trying to make the world in its image with permanent and boundless wars). Externally, the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South ­Africa (brics), which together account for about 30 percent of world gdp and about 45 percent of the planet’s population, heralds a massive shift in concentrations of global economic, military, and cultural power away from a American-centric unipolar world order to post-American multi-polar global disorder (Chomsky 2012; Desai 2013; Escobar 2014; Harris 2016; Zakaria 2008).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_011

Selling & Subverting the Ideology of Militarism

163

The idea that the US Empire is in decline is not novel, as hopes and fears of American decline have come and gone since the mid-1970s and been a recurring theme in elite foreign policy discourse. In the early months of the Donald Trump presidency, a January 2017 National Intelligence Council (2017: 6) report noted that the “post–Cold War, unipolar moment [for the US] has passed.” Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, former cia official John E. McLaughlin (2017) claimed that “the world will be without a hegemonic power—that is, without a country so powerful as to exert dominant influence and advance policy with little reference to others.” General. ­David H. Petraeus (2017) concurred with McLaughlin, saying that the post–Cold War era of “US domination of the world” is ending. Yet, other elite geopolitical thinkers are not convinced. Former Secretary of State James Baker (2016) and head of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations claims that even though “much of the rest of the world” is beginning to catch up with the US, the US will “remain the world’s preeminent leader for the foreseeable future.” Thomas Donilon (2016), a former US National Security Advisor, says declinism is “myth” that fails to address the US’s “strategic assets and liabilities” and is confident that the US “will continue to be the world’s leading and most powerful nation for a long time to come.” Whether or not the US Empire is in decline is uncertain, and predictions about a coming post-American and perhaps new Chinese century proliferate. The world system is undoubtedly undergoing significant changes. But for the short term, the US remains the world system’s only Empire, as America’s economic might, military preponderance, and cultural industries are without rival. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the persistence of the US Empire’s power and show how this power is structurally and ideological reinforced by a nexus of the US Department of Defense (DoD) and the US-based cultural industries, when the US is at war. The first section presents an up-to-date overview of the US Empire’s structural power. The second section demonstrates the centrality of war to the growth of the US Empire, and then focuses on the symbiotic links and connections that bind the DoD to the cultural industries and support the production of media and cultural goods that prop up the ideology of militarism. The conclusion highlights some mediatized and cultural “sites of struggle” over the US Empire, war and militarism. By demonstrating the continuity of US Empire and showing how the DoD and the US-based globalizing cultural industries support the p ­ roduction and circulation of media commodities that communicate the ideology of ­militarism to the world, this chapter supports critical political economy of

164

Mirrlees

communications research on Empire, communications, and the ideology of militarism (Hardy, 2014: 196–197). Boyd-Barrett (2015) says theories and empirical studies of the nexus of Empires, media industries and ideology remain important for many reasons: they center on the differential and “unequal relations of power” between some nation-states and media corporations and others; ­reflect “an acquired heritage of at least half a century’s thinking, research and debate”(6); and, point to the “incontestable” recognition of “empire as a long-established historical and institutional reality”(6) that in both territorial and non-­territorial forms of economic and military influence relies upon the media to bring about “profound changes in commercial, social and cultural activity”(6). For almost five decades, political economists of communications have explored the US Empire’s reliance upon the cultural industries to prepare for, wage and glorify war. In 1969, Herbert I. Schiller (1969: 206–207), the preeminent North American political economist of US Empire and communications, boldly declared that “American power, expressed industrially, militarily and culturally has become the most potent force on earth and communications have become a decisive element in the extension of United States world power.” Schiller examined the “the important role of communication corporations in the ­military-industrial complex” (McChesney, 2001: 48), as well as the rise of a “military-industrial-communications complex” (Mosco, 2001: 27). Extending studies of the “­military-industrial-complex” (mic) (symbiotic relationships between the military, industrial corporations, and higher education) Schiller (1992) interrogated the DoD’s links with US communications and cultural industries and found that the “same forces that have produced the militaryindustrial-complex in American society-at-large have accounted for the rise of a powerful sub-sector, but by no means miniature, complex in communications.” This “military-industrial-communications-­complex” (micc) is an “institutional edifice of communications, electronics, and/or cultural industries” that reinforce DoD and media corporate power (Maxwell, 2003: 32). Schiller (1992: 75–122) showed how the DoD supported communications and media corporations, first by subsidizing their research and development (R&D) of market-oriented communications technologies, second by procuring their finished innovations as commodities, and third, by hiring them to service its wartime “mind management” exigencies. To demonstrate the continuity of the US Empire’s capitalist, military and communications power in the 21st century and highlight this power’s expansion and reinforcement by war, this chapter following section forwards a political-economic overview of the US Empire’s current power resources and the cozy ­relationships between the DoD and the cultural industries that drive

Selling & Subverting the Ideology of Militarism

165

the production and circulation of war-servicing communication technologies and war-ideology carrying cultural products. 2 The US Empire Today: Economic, Military, and Communications Power Primacy With regard to its combined economic, military and communications and cultural power, the US is no paper tiger. It is the world system’s most significant superpower, a post-colonial Empire like no other. Relative to would be contenders for primacy—China, and even the brics as a whole—the US’s combined economic, military and media-cultural power remains intact, even preeminent. In terms of economic power, the US is numero uno. The US’s share of global gross domestic product (gdp) has been falling for the past fifty years or so, from about 40% in the 1960s to about 24% in 2016. Yet, the US’s nominal gross domestic product (gdp) is around $18.5 trillion, a sum is larger than the entire gdp of the European Union ($17.1 trillion) and bigger than the brics ($16.9 trillion). With a mere 4.4% of the world’s population (319 million people on a planet of seven billion), the US’s hold of nearly a quarter of world gdp is outstanding. China, home to about 20% of the world’s population (more than 1.35 billion people), accounts for 15.5% of the global nominal gdp (though it has surpassed the US in purchasing power gdp). Also, the US dollar still continues to be the global financial system’s reserve and most used currency, with central banks and corporations looking to the Federal Reserve to back their holdings (Mauldin 2015; Wallace 2017). In 2016, cross-border business transactions in US dollars amounted to $28.2 trillion: the US dollar accounts for almost half of the world’s total (50%); the Euro is second (29%) and the yen is in third (6% of the total) (Mauldin 2015; Wallace 2017). Additionally, the US is still the world system’s central headquarters for most of the biggest and most global corporations. The 2016 Forbes Global 2000 ranks the world’s biggest corporations in four metrics (sales, profits, assets and market value), and the US tops the ranking. The US is home to 586 global giants, a sum larger than its next three competitors combined: Japan (220), China (200), and the United Kingdom (94). Together, the brics total 313—Brazil (19), Russia (25), India (56), China (200), South Africa (13)—a sum 273 short of the US (Forbes 2016; Schaefer and Murphy 2016). Additionally, much of the world’s ruling class is US-centered, as most of the planet’s billionaire business elites are American. The US is home to 540 billionaires. Of the top 500 billionaires

166

Mirrlees

in the world, all of the brics billionaires combined does not equal the number of American billionaires: Brazil (32), Russia (36), India (101), China (319), South Africa (3) (Forbes 2017). Fourteen of the world’s top twenty richest people are American: Bill Gates (Microsoft), Warren Buffet (Berkshire Hathaway), Jeff Bezos (Amazon.com), Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook), Larry Ellison (Oracle), Charles Koch (Koch Industries), David Koch (Koch Industries), Michael Bloomberg (Bloomberg LP), Larry Page (Google), Sergey Brin (Google), Jim Walton (Wal-Mart), Robson Walton (Wal-Mart), Alice Walton (Wal-Mart), and Sheldon Adelson (Casinos) (Forbes 2017). The US’s national capitalist strength is coupled with its continuing transnational military dominance. The DoD’s budget for 2016 was about $611 b­ illion, a gargantuan sum that accounts for 36% of the world’s total defense expenditure and which is much larger than the budgets of the globe’s next top four military spenders combined (sipri 2017). The DoD’s budget nearly triples the size of China’s ($215 billion), the world’s second largest defense spender, is more than eight times Russia’s ($69 billion), the third biggest spender, is over nine times Saudi Arabia’s ($63.7 billion), the fourth top spender, and is almost eleven times India’s ($55.9 billion), the fifth top spender (sipri 2017). The DoD’s budget does not include outlays reserved for non-DoD national security agencies such as the clandestine Central Intelligence Agency (cia) and “black budgets.” Since winning the White House in 2016, US President Donald Trump has nonetheless promised to increase the US defense budget to 40% of the world’s total (Engelhardt 2017). In the US Empire, “military spending is hardwired into really existing capitalism” (McChesney, 2014: 24). While war is costly to society it is immensely profitable to US-based defense firms (McCarthy 2015). A portion of the US’s war chest is plundered by US-based defense corporations, five of which rank among the top ten biggest war and security-servicing industries in the world: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman (Forbes 2016). All of these are major dod contractors and procurement clients that prop up the DoD and its insatiable demand for a ready supply of commercially available technologies for war (Ausick 2015; Turse 2008). While these US-based defense industries rake in billions by selling war-serving hardware and software to the DoD, they also turn a profit by selling weapons to US client states and allies around the world. In fact, the US is the biggest exporter of arms to the world: Saudi Arabia was the top recipient of American-made arms from 2011–2015, followed by the United Arab Emirates, and then Turkey, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, India, Singapore, Iraq, and Egypt (Bender and Gould 2015; Browne and Cohen 2016). In terms of firepower, the US controls an estimated 6,800 nuclear warheads (compared to China’s 260, Russia’s 7000 and

Selling & Subverting the Ideology of Militarism

167

India’s 110) and maintains almost 1,000 military bases across more than sixty countries, many propped up with a Status of Forces Agreement with host client States (Davenport 2017; Johnson 2004; Vine 2015). Russia has bases in nine countries (the most recent implant is in Syria) (Piven 2015) and China is building some floating bases on coral islands in the South China Sea (Bender 2015). Clearly, no country rivals the US’s military-­industrial-complex and the US is indisputably the world’s dominant war-making and selling power. The immense capitalist and military power of the US Empire is complemented by concentrations of communications and cultural industries power. Seven of the world’s top ten broadcasting and cable companies are based in the US: Comcast, Walt Disney, Time Warner, Time Warner Cable, cbs, Viacom, and Dish Network (Forbes 2016). Moreover, the US is home to: two of the top five advertising firms (Omnicom Group and Interpublic group); two of the top five communications equipment firms (Cisco Systems and Corning); three of the top five computer hardware firms (Apple, Hewlett-Packard E ­ nterprise and HP); three of the top five computer service firms (Alphabet, ibm, ­Facebook); four of the top five computer storage device firms (emc, Western Digital, SanDisk, NetApp); three of the top five Internet and catalog retail firms (Amazon.com, eBay, Liberty Interactive); three of the top five publishing companies (Thomson Reuters, Nielsen Holdings, McGraw-Hill); two of the top five game firms (Activision-Blizzard and Electronic Arts); two of the top five semiconductor firms (Intel and Qualcomm); four of the top five computer software and programming firms (Microsoft, Oracle, VMware, Adobe Systems); and, two of the top five telecommunication firms (at&t and Verizon Communications) (Forbes 2016). Hollywood continues to rule the world box office. 91.2% of the top ten highest worldwide grossing films released each year between 2000 and 2015 were made and owned by one of the six major Hollywood studios (Box Office Mojo 2017). In 2016, Hollywood again was the owning source of the top ten highest worldwide grossing flicks of the year: Captain America: Civil War, Finding Dory, Zootopia, The Jungle Book, Batman v Superman: Dawn of Justice, The Secret Life of Pets, Deadpool, Suicide Squad, The Mermaid, and X-Men: Apocalypse. These blockbusters brought millions of spectators into theatres across the world’s major cities, from São Paulo, to Moscow, to New Delhi, to Shanghai to Cape Town. Marvel Studios’ blockbuster flick Captain America: Civil War, for example, placed among the top ten highest-grossing films in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (Box Office Mojo 2017). Large cultural industries certainly exist in other countries, especially in the brics (Nordenstreng and Thussu 2015; Tunstall 2008). Yet, US companies are still dominant, as they are the most significant owners of the world system’s technological infrastructure,

168

Mirrlees

the means to service and access this infrastructure, and the lion’s share of the means of producing, distributing and exhibiting the commercialized informational and cultural goods pulsing through it each day. Together, they prop up a US service trade surplus and asymmetrical cultural flows between the US and other countries. In sum, the US is the world’s capitalist economic juggernaut, home to the largest and most globally expansive coercive apparatus and is headquarters to the biggest communications and cultural industries. Despite the remarkable rise of the brics, none of these countries rival the US. Moreover, the brics are arguably facilitating and legitimizing their own integration into the neoliberal capitalist circuitry of the US Empire while simultaneously trying to hollow it out (Bond and Garcia 2015). The future of the world system is nonetheless uncertain: the US faces new challengers to its primacy and it is by no means stable or loved by all, as there are numerous non-integrated states and nonstate actors that frequently act in ways that make Washington unhappy. Ongoing conflicts between the US and China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and other countries, as well as cross-border battles with isis, point to the actuality of state and non-state actors pursuing interests non-aligned with the US Empire. The US Empire is beset by real problems and challenges as the world system undergoes significant economic, political and cultural-ideological changes. Its power nonetheless persists, and this power is brazenly projected in each and every war it wages. 3 The US Empire at Permanent War: The Economics and Ideology of Militarism From 1945 to the present day, the growth and expansion of the US Empire, territorially and imaginatively, has been tied to war—preparing for it, waging it, and legitimizing it (Dower 2017). The US Empire claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of coercive force within its territorial borders and projects it beyond them, declaring and waging war; recruiting, housing, training, and deploying soldiers; allocating public wealth to firms for the R&D of weapons technologies; and initiating and coordinating gargantuan PR campaigns to justify its incursions and manage blowback (Blum 2004; Dower 2017; Klein 2007; Parenti 2004; Scahill 2013; Turse 2012). From the Second World War to the present day, the US national security state has intervened in at least thirty countries to force changes to their internal structures and values and thwart the growth of non-capitalist societal developments (Blum 2004; Klein 2007; ­Parenti 2004; Scahill 2013; Turse 2012). It has conducted overt and covert coercive operations

Selling & Subverting the Ideology of Militarism

169

in China (1945–46, 1950–53), Korea (1950–53), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954, 1967–69), Indonesia (1958), Cuba (1959–60), Vietnam (1961–73), the Belgian Congo (1964), Laos (1964–73), Peru (1965), Cambodia (1969–70), Chile (1973), Nicaragua and El Salvador (the 1980s), Beirut (1982–84), Grenada (1983), Libya (1986, 2011), Panama (1989), Iraq (1991–99, 2004–12), Somalia (1992–93), Bosnia (1995), Serbia (1999), Sudan (1998), Syria (2012–), Yemen (2015–), Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan (2001–), Venezuela (2002), Haiti (1994–95, 2004), Iran (2005–), Pakistan (2008–), and Ukraine (2012–). Following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the US launched a Global War on Terror (gwot). From 21st-century president to president— from Bush to Obama and now, to Trump—the US-led gwot has continued without clear boundaries, territorial or temporal. In 2016 alone, the DoD’s operations encompassed 70% of the world and it struck opponents in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Yemen (McCarthy 2017; Turse 2017). The DoD also deployed Special Forces commandos to about one hundred and thirty countries for “kill or capture” missions, intelligence gathering and to train allied forces to fight mutual enemies (McCarthy 2017; Turse 2017). Furthermore, the DoD has mobilized in Belarus, Latvia, and Lithuania to surround Russia and pivoted to contain a rising China. World peace does not seem imminent. In 2017, Commander-in-Chief Donald Trump has relished his war-making powers. After filling key posts in his administration with generals, Trump “unleashed these generals” from public oversight by giving them “total authorization” to “ratchet up wars across the world” (Schmitt and Cooper 2017). In the absence of Congressional debate, Trump has attacked Syria, dropped the “mother of all bombs” on Afghanistan, and overseen drone strikes almost every two days (Engelhardt 2017). Wars, however, are deadly. Over seven thousand American soldiers have been killed and many more have suffered injuries and post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd) since the gwot began. 1.3 million Afghanis, Iraqis and Pakistani have perished while thousands killed by US forces elsewhere remain out of sight (Lazare 2015). The gwot’s pre-emptive invasions, unilateral drone strikes, and human rights affronting torture terrorize and cause immense human suffering. And those surviving and enduring the US Empire’s wars come to resent and even loathe “America.” Hatred, radicalization and blowback produce new threats to US security, and new DoD campaigns to contain or eliminate these threats with new rounds of coercion and persuasion. As per the U.S. National Military Strategy of 2015, Russia, Iran, North Korea and China are “acting in a manner that threatens” the “national security interest” and “the probability of U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low, but growing” (Feaver 2015). As the deadly cycle of violence repeats, keeping

170

Mirrlees

publics compliant with or consenting to the Empire’s wars weighs heavily on the practitioners of imperial mind management. Getting American and transnational publics to think about and perceive war in a specific way, persuading and pushing people to accept the wars of the US Empire as always already being necessary, good and right, influencing the subjectivities, hearts and minds of millions, is a strategic priority. In this regard, the US Empire’s wars rely upon the production and reproduction of an ideology that deflects public attention away from the real geopolitical and corporate interests served by war, obscures the real-politicks pursued and the profits accumulated through war, and buries the lives destroyed it. The ideology of militarism therefore pervades society. This ideology represents the nation as a unity secured by war as opposed to one divided by class inequality, racism and sexism, and represents “the nation’s strength and well-being” to its subjects “in terms of military preparedness, military action, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals” (Bacevich 2010, 2013). Moreover, the ideology of militarism glorifies the State’s use of coercion not diplomacy to achieve American security in a world divided between a righteous American “us” and an evil and threatening (usually Muslim) “them,” presents the DoD as the solution to every problem that vexes America, and reduces patriotism to support for war (Bacevich 2010, 2013; Johnson 2004). The ideology of militarism is produced and reproduced by a number of actors and circulated across a variety of sites, but one significant source of it is the cultural industries. 4

The DoD in the Cultural Industries: Militarizing Technology, Pop Culture and Social Media

The DoD and the cultural industries are not the same, so the differences between them will be flagged before highlighting how these two different types of organizations come together in militarizing media and cultural synergies that produce and reproduce the ideology of militarism. The DoD is a US Federal Government agency headquartered at the Pentagon in Washington, DC, but its hundreds of military bases and installations are spread across the globe. The dod is headed by a Secretary of Defense, who is a key national security policy advisor to the US President. The dod controls the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force. It also runs the Defense Intelligence Agency (dia), the National Security Agency (nsa), and R&D agencies that often partner with universities and corporations such as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ­(darpa) and the Defense Logistics Agency (dla). The dod also operates

Selling & Subverting the Ideology of Militarism

171

services schools including the National Defense University (ndu) and the National War College (nwc). The DoD (2016) employs approximately 1.3 million active duty personnel and 742,000 civilian personnel. The DoD’s mission “is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country.” The dod spans the planet, waging war to secure land, air, sea and space against threats to America. The US cultural industries are the privately owned media and communication companies that coordinate and aim to turn a profit from the financing, production, distribution, promotion and exhibition of technologies, services and cultural goods for markets in the US and elsewhere. These companies are run by chief executive officers (ceos) who exercise decision-making powers over the financing, production, distribution and exhibition of technologies, services and cultural goods. The cultural industries are “most directly involved in the production of social meaning” because they “deal primarily with the industrial production, reproduction and circulation of texts” that communicate meaning about the world and are open to interpretation by audiences (Hesmondalgh 2007). The dod and the cultural industries are different types of organizations with different structures and goals. The dod is part of the political sphere (the US Federal Government) and the cultural industries, the economic one (capitalism). They dod wages war in world affairs; the cultural industries make technologies, services and cultural goods to be sold in US and trans-national global markets. The dod serves US national security goals, as authorized by the President (and sometimes Congress); the cultural industries pursue profit, as expected by financiers, ceos and shareholders. While geopolitics compels the DoD into wars and capitalist logics drive the growth US cultural industries, the DoD relies upon the labor power of the cultural industries’ workforce to serve war exigencies. From the formation of the Committee on Public Information (cpi) in World War i, to the Office of War Information in World War ii, to psychological operations units in the Cold War, and to the rise of information operations in the gwot, the DoD has recruited the cultural industries into its image and message-making operations. Routinely, the cultural industries have helped the DoD to manufacture militarizing and war-servicing technologies, services cultural products that help it wage and “manufacture consent” to war (Anderson 2006; Anderson and Mirrlees 2014; Boggs and Pollard 2007; Der Derian 2001; Martin and Steuter 2010; Mirrlees 2016; Stahl 2010). Almost every U.S.-based communications and media company identified in the Forbes Global 2000 2016 list has at some point since 2001, been a dod contractor. With the exception of Facebook, EA and Activision-Blizzard, all the companies have benefitted

172

Mirrlees

from DoD procurement contracts, and they’ve turned a profit from the dod by selling it everything from video services to radio and TV equipment to telecommunication networks to antennas to processed film to research know-how to software to iPhones to central processing units to PR (InsideGov.com 2016). So, although the DoD and the cultural industries are different and pursue distinct interests (the former, national security and the latter, profit-­ maximization), war often brings them together in mutually beneficial and ­synergistic ways. In what follows, the geopolitical-economic nexus of the DoD and the cultural industries—symbiotic mergers between the DoD’s war-­ making exigencies and the cultural industries’ profit logics—is further demonstrated with a few concrete examples. One example of the dod and the cultural industries nexus is in the R&D of information and communication technologies (icts). The DoD has supported many information age innovations such as computer electronics, artificial intelligence, satellites, and even the Internet (Ruttan 2006; Schiller 2008). Today, darpa brings together DoD agencies, universities and corporations to “advance knowledge through basic research and create innovative technologies” to “prevent strategic surprise from negatively impacting US national security and create strategic surprise for U.S. adversaries by maintaining the technological superiority of the U.S. military” (darpa 2017). Through darpa, the DoD allocates public monies to private corporations that research and develop war-servicing icts to give the US the competitive edge in battle. In 2015, for example, the dod allocated $171 million to a consortium of Silicon Valley high-tech companies (including Apple) to support R&D on wearable technology, as part of its newly launched Flexible Hybrid Electronics Manufacturing Innovation Hub (Hennigan 2015). Another concrete R&D linkage between the dod and the cultural industries is the Institute for Creative Technologies (ict), based at the University of Southern California, near icann (the world’s only Internet governing body) and Electronic Arts (one of the U.S.’s largest video game firms). Established in 1999 with a DoD grant, the “ict brings usc’s computer scientists together with artists, writers and cinematographers, creating compelling and immersive training systems” (usc ict 2011). A second example of the convergence of the DoD and the cultural industries is in the co-production of PR-servicing “militainment” The key DoD agency that links with to assist and influence the cultural industries’ production of war-themed entertainment is the Public Affairs Office (pao). The pao runs the dod’s Special Assistant for Entertainment Media (dodsaem) to support the cultural industries’ production of military-themed TV shows, Hollywood films, music videos, sports events and digital games. The dodsaem is headed by Phillip M. Strub, whose office is located in the Pentagon, Washington, DC.

Selling & Subverting the Ideology of Militarism

173

It oversees the Office of Army Chief of Public Affairs, the Navy Office of Information West, the Air Force’s Office of Public Affairs–Entertainment Liaison Office, the Marines’ Public Affairs Motion Picture and Television Liaison, and the Coast Guard’s Motion Picture and TV Office. Located in Los Angeles, these offices are the go-to place for entertainment firms looking to get the dod to assist their productions of militainment. The DoD has backed numerous popular cultural productions to ensure they carry positive stories about and symbols of the DoD to publics around the world. The US Army’s Entertainment Liaison Office report for the period of January 2010 to April 2015, for example, lists hundreds of Army-supported militainments: reality TV shows (American Idol, America’s Got Talent, and The X-Factor); day-time talk shows (The Oprah Winfrey Show); TV documentaries (bbc, History Channel and National Geographic documentaries); Hollywood blockbusters (Godzilla, Transformers, and Superman: Man of Steel) music videos (Joseph Washington’s “We Thank You”); ­professional sports leagues (nfl nba, nhl and nascar); and, digital war simulation games (first-person shooters like EA’s Medal of Honor) (Secker 2017). A third example of a DoD interlink with the cultural industries is in ­cyber-space—war’s latest global battle-space. Web 2.0 companies such as Facebook (social networking) YouTube (video-sharing), Twitter (microblogging service), Pinterest (content sharing) and Instagram (mobile-photo sharing) are ubiquitous and the use of these and other digital media platforms are routine, even compulsory (Fuchs 2014). They are also fast becoming the global battle-spaces for asymmetrical information wars, fought by the DoD’s Cyber Command against a plurality of state and non-state actors all over the world (Gillan, Pickerill and Webester 2008). As a former program manager of $50 million dollar DoD-supported study of “Social Media in Strategic Communication” says: “the use of social media and the Internet is rapidly becoming a powerful weapon for information warfare and changing the nature of conflict worldwide” (Waltzman 2015). The dod is developing new information warfare strategies for the Web 2.0 age. US-based giants—Google, Facebook, Twitter— are global digital capitalism’s dominant players, and the dod is now leveraging the Inter-networks, interactive sites and populated platforms for computer network attacks, surveillance and PR (Christensen 2008; Deibert 2013; Harris 2014; Powers and Joblonski 2015). The dod hosts websites, moderates blogs, socially networks via Facebook pages, operates YouTube channels and uploads videos to them, manages Twitter accounts and posts photos to Pinterest. By spreading its content through the websites that intersect with the daily lives of billions of people, the dod bypasses the watchdog and gatekeeping powers of the news media. The dod uses the social media to turn the manufacture of ­consent into a direct DoD-to-public affair by diminishing the intermediary

174

Mirrlees

role of journalists. Also, by using social media platforms that it does not own or pay to use but which are some of the most visited and trafficked in the world, the dod can reduce costs associated with circulating war spin while potentially increasing its reach. Concretely and evidently, the DoD and the cultural industries come together and the result is the militarization of communication technologies, popular culture and social media. 5

Conclusion: Cultural Sites of Struggle over Militarization

This chapter has held a mirror to the continuing structural power of the US Empire and the DoD-cultural industries nexus. The dod’s pursuit of strategic supremacy and the cultural industries’ pursuit of profit intertwine in significant ways, bringing the business of war and creativity into a strategic alliance. To prepare for, promote, glorify and sell the wars of the US Empire as a way of life around the world, the culture industries are vital. The militarizing technologies and products of the US Empire’s cultural industries tell American publics they must continue waging wars “over there” so that they do not have to fight “over here” and tell publics around the world that these wars will secure them too. By generating militarized national unity against enemy threats, local and global, they neutralize class antagonism between the owners and the workers, the rich and the poor. At the same time, the concrete links and connections between the DoD and the cultural industries foment a transformation—embodied, affective and audio-visual—of the civic and subjective experience of war. The US Empire’s 20th century war propaganda aimed to engineer public consent to war by making a rational case for why America fights and who the nation must fight. Early 20th century war propaganda and mid-to-late century virtuous and spectacular war logics still persist and many “militainment” products communicate the ideology of militarism (Andersen 2006). Yet, 21st century militainment frequently invites its subjects to immerse themselves within as opposed to passively watch simulations and interactive spectacles of war. In contrast to the presumed rational subject of early war propaganda’s virtuous rhetoric and the deactivated and pacified subject of spectacular broadcast war TV, the US Empire’s contemporary cultural industries increasingly recruit and immerse “virtual citizen-soldiers” (Stahl, 2010: 33). Instead of selling subjects moral fairy-tales about war or inviting subjects to lean back and blissfully watch war on TV with pizza and beer, interactive militainment enables subjects to lean

Selling & Subverting the Ideology of Militarism

175

forward into war, bringing them “into proximity to a vision of the soldier and battlefield” all the while moving them “further away” from the point of public deliberation about military violence and toward the point of this violence’s execution (Stahl, 2010: 64–65). Although the US Empire’s cultural industries and ideology-carrying products aim to constitute and reproduce obedient subjects, influence national and trans-­national consciousness and shape behavior in accordance with war, the ­effects are ­uncertain. Where there is structure, there is also agency: top-down attempts to influence and manage hearts and minds face bottom-up resistance. From its earliest days, the US Empire has been protested by progressive social movements of American anti-imperialists (Seymour 2015) and 21st century social movements for peace are part of a long trans-national history of anti-war dissent (Tyrell and Sexton 2015). Pacifist and anti-imperialist movements and ideologies are nonetheless growing. While the US Empire’s cultural industries remain a big source of the reigning ideology of militarism, in the global digital age, the producers of stories about and images of the US at war are no longer few, but many. An abundance of cultural products—national and trans-national, corporate-owned and State-­supported, professional and amateur, allied and enemy-operated—now compete for attention and influence in a growing global battle for hearts and minds. To shed light upon the sources that may interrupt the smooth operations of the US Empire’s cultural industries and push beyond the intended goals and effects of the ideology of militarism, I conclude with an overview of emerging sites of anti-war struggle within and around the cultural industries. Some of these include: – Struggles over the public policies of the DoD that militarize the cultural industries on behalf of US Empire. The DoD’s militarization of the cultural industries is the result of public policy. For example, the dodsaem’s assistance to the cultural industries’ production of militainment is rationalized by a dod policy: “Instruction 5410.16—DoD Assistance to Non-Government, ­Entertainment-Oriented Media Productions,” issued on July 31, 2015. The purpose of 5410.16 is “to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and prescribe procedures for DoD assistance to non-Government entertainment media productions such as feature motion pictures, episodic television programs, documentaries, and electronic games”(1). To de-militarize the ­cultural industries, this DoD cultural policy formation needs to be made transparent, opened to public deliberation and replaced by pacifist cultural public policy. In a time when Trump slashes public arts funding that ­supports cultural peace, the DoD’s war cultural policy gobbles up public

176

Mirrlees

resources. Reformist cultural policy proposals that dis-articulate the DoDcultural industries nexus are essential to de-militarizing the American cultural sphere. – Struggles over the stories about and images of war’s reality by cultural workers within the US Empire’s cultural industries. The DoD does not own or exert direct control over the cultural industries. The cultural industries are sometimes a site of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggle between Right-wing and Left-leaning cultural workers, and some firms, apropos the contradictions of cultural production, may release media goods that convey subdued or full-blown criticisms of the DoD at war. Documentaries like Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004) lambast the Bush Administration’s gwot. Redacted (2007) and Green Zone (2010) represent the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a crime; and, Team America (2004) and Tropic Thunder (2008) parody war as a stupefying media spectacle. Digital games like Special Ops: The Line (2012) immerse players in war’s many horrors (Morwood 2014; Payne 2014). As demonstrated by the existence of cultural products that critique war the DoD and the cultural industries do not always march in lockstep. The ideology of militarism is therefore not total or totalizing, and cultural workers sometimes have the power to oppose and resist DoD influence. Although many of the US cultural industries’ products carry the militaristic ideology of the US Empire, some also communicate counter-ideologies that express an antiwar ethos. – Struggles over the stories about and image of war’s reality by trans-national, alternative and activist media organizations that are not aligned with the US Empire’s cultural industries. To service the US Empire’s war propaganda exigencies, the cultural products of the US Empire’s cultural industries may fail to represent, under-represent or simply mis-represent the realities of war. In response, non-American international broadcasters (e.g., Dohabased Al-Jazeera), non-profit news organizations (e.g., D ­ emocracy Now, The Intercept, The Real News Network), and non-governmental organizations (ngos) (e.g., Veterans for Peace and Wikileaks) create and circulate stories about and images of war that destabilize the status quo. Al-Jazeera shows the world the human consequences of war, Democracy Now gives expression to the peace movements and Wikileaks sheds light on misdeeds and corruption that in a previous age would likely remain in the dark. These organizations have their own partisan mandates and political agendas, but they nonetheless play a vital role as a platform for voices, views and stories often marginalized or disappeared by the DoD-serving cultural industries.

Selling & Subverting the Ideology of Militarism

177

– Struggles over the stories about and images of war’s reality by prosumer activists using the Internet, World Wide Web and social media. The new digital media are being used by a plurality of groups—hegemonic and counter-­ hegemonic—to create, tweet, upload, like, share and comment upon wars in hopes of shaping public opinion about war’s causes and consequences. The US Empire’s cultural industries harness the intellectual and creative labor power of many “professionals”—DoD information warriors and trickster spin-­doctors—to make militainment products, but more and more people with no formal training in making media and who are not employed by the dod or for-profit companies are developing and using low-cost cultural production hardware and software to create their own personalized stories about and images of war without pay or the expectation of it. Web 2.0 sites encourage and expect “prosumers” to engage in productive labor, “from producing commercials to engaging in online word-of-mouth endorsements, to integrating brand messages into their own communication platforms” (Napoli, 2010: 512). These prosumers—soldiers and civilians—are also productively using new digital tools to engage in the labor of creating and sharing original, derivative and remixed content for and against wars. As indicated above, the struggles for and against the geopolitical-economy of the US Empire’s wars are also ideological struggles undertaken by a plurality of actors through the cultural industries, digital technologies and cultural products. These sites of struggle facilitate the clash of ideas by actors that will to maintain and extend or bring an end to the 21st century US Empire’s wars. They are where non-violent battles for hearts and minds are waged and staged, legitimized and de-legitimized, won and lost. Bibliography Andersen, Robin. 2006. A Century of Media, a Century of War. New York: Peter Lang. Andersen, Robin., and Tanner Mirrlees. 2014. “Special Issue: Watching, Playing and Resisting the War Society,” Democratic Communiqué, 26 (1): 1–186. Ausick, Paul. 2015. “Top 10 US Defense Contractors.” 24/7 Wall Street, August 16. Bacevich, Andrew. 2004. American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bacevich, Andrew. 2010. Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War. New York: Metropolitan Books. Bacevich, Andrew. 2013. The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War. New York: Oxford University Press.

178

Mirrlees

Baker, James A. 2016. “Testimony: Examining America’s Role in the World.” Bender, Jeremy. “China Sea.” Business Insider, August 10. Bender, Jeremy., and Skye Gould. 2015a. “The world in terms of Russian and US arms exports.” Business Insider, April 3. Bender, Jeremy., and Skye Gould. 2015b. “This map shows where the world’s 3 biggest arms exporters are sending their weapons.” Business Insider, May 20. Blum, William. 2004. Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press. Boggs, Carl., and Tom Pollard. 2007. The Hollywood War Machine: Militarism and Popular Culture. London: Paradigm Publishers. Bond, Patrick., and Ana Garcia. 2016. BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique. Chicago: Haymarket Books. Boyd-Barret, Oliver. 2004. “Judith Miller, The New York Times, and the Propaganda Model.” Journalism Studies, 5(4): 435–449. Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 2015. Media Imperialism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Browne, Ryan., and Zachary Cohen. 2016. “Here’s who buys the most weapons form the U.S.” CNN, May 25. Chomsky, Noam. 2012. “‘Losing’ the World: American Decline in Perspective.” The Guardian, February 14. Christensen, Christian. 2008. “Uploading dissonance: YouTube and the U.S. occupation of Iraq.” Media, War & Conflict, 1(2): 155–175. Cox, Michael, and Doug Stokes. 2012. US Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cull, Nicholas J. 2008. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DARPA. 2017. “About DARPA.” https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/about-darpa. Davenport, Kelsey. 2017. “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance.” Arms Control Association, April 17. de Grazia, Victoria. 2005. Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th Century Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Deibert, Ronald J. 2013. Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace. Toronto: Signal. Der Derian, James. 2001. Virtuous War: Mapping the Military Industrial-Media-­ Entertainment Network. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Desai, Radhika. 2013. Geopolitical Economy: After US Hegemony, Globalization and Empire. London: Pluto Press. Dimaggio, Paul. 2009. When Media Goes to War. New York: Monthly Review Press. Donilon, Thomas. (2016, May 12). Testimony. Examining America’s Role in the World. Dower, John. 2017. The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World War II. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Selling & Subverting the Ideology of Militarism

179

Engelhardt, Tom. 2017. “The Honeymoon of the Generals, or Why Trump’s Wars Should Seem so Familiar,” TomDispatch, April 23. Escobar, Pepe. 2015, “The 21st century belongs to China: Why the new Silk Road threatens to end America’s economic dominance.” Salon, February 24. Feaver, Peter. 2015. “How to Read the New National Military Strategy.” Foreign Policy, July 6. Forbes. 2016. “The World’s Biggest Companies 2016.” Forbes, May 26. https://www .forbes.com/global2000/. Forbes. 2017. “The World’s Billionaires.” Forbes, January 15. Fuchs, Christian. 2014. Social Media: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage. Gillan, Kevin, Jenny Pickerill, and Frank Webster. 2008. “The Information Environment of War.” Sociology Compass 2(6): 1833–1847. Gould, Skye., and Jeremy Bender. 2015. “Here’s how the U.S. military spends its billions.” Business Insider, August 29. Hardy, Jonathan. 2014. Critical Political Economy of the Media. New York: Routledge. Harris, Peter. 2016. “How to Live in a Multipolar World.” The National Interest, January 3. Harris, Shane. 2014. @War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex. New York: Harcourt. Hennigan, WJ. 2015. “Secretary of Defense unveils $75-million investment in Silicon Valley venture.” Los Angeles Times, August 28. Hesmondhalgh, David. 2007. The Cultural Industries. Thousand Oaks: Sage. InsideGov.com. 2016. http://government-contracts.insidegov.com/. Jablonski, Michael., and Shawn M. Powers. 2015. The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of Internet Freedom. Chicago: University of Ilinois Press. Johnson, Chalmers. 2004. The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. New York: Metropolitan Books. Johnson, Chalmers. 2010. Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope. New York: Metropolitan Books. Klein, Naomi. 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf. Krugman, Paul. 2015. “Errors and Lies.” New York Times, May 18. Lazare, Sarah. 2015. “Body Count Report Reveals At Least 1.3 Million Lives Lost to USLed War on Terror,” Common Dreams, March 26. Martin, Geoff, and Erin Steuter. 2010. Pop Culture Goes to War. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Mauldin, John. 2015. “Bitcoin 2.0 has a better chance of becoming the world’s reserve currency than China’s yuan.” Business Insider, December 12. Maxwell, Richard. 2003. Herbert Schiller. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. McCarthy, Niall. 2015. “The War on Terror Has Cost Taxpayers $1.7 Trillion,” Forbes, February 3.

180

Mirrlees

McCarthy, Niall. 2017. “U.S. Special Operations Forces Deployed to 70% of the World’s Countries in 2016.” Forbes, February 17. McChesney, Robert. 2001. “Herb Schiller: Presente!” Television & New Media, 2(1): 45–50. McChesney, Robert. 2008. The Political Economy of Media: Enduring Issues, Emerging Dilemmas. New York: Monthly Review Press. McChesney, Robert. 2014. Blowing the Roof Off the Twenty-First Century. New York: Monthly Review Press. McLaughlin, John, and David H. Petraus. 2017. “The State of the World: National Security Threats and Challenges.” Full Committee Hearing, February 1. Mirrlees, Tanner. 2016. Hearts and Mines: The US Empire’s Culture Industry. Vancouver, BC: UBCPress. Mooers, Colin. 2006. The New Imperialists: Ideologies of Empire. Oxford: One World Press. Morwood, Nick. 2014. “War Crimes, Cognitive Dissonance and the Abject: An Analysis of the Anti-War Wargame Spec Ops: The Line.” Democratic Communiqué, 26(1): 107–121. Mosco, Vincent. 2001. “Herbert Schiller.” Television & New Media, 2(1): 27–30. Murdock, Graham. 2006. “Notes from the Number One Country.” International Journal of Cultural Policy, 12 (2): 209–227. Napoli, Phillip. 2010. “Revisiting ‘Mass Communication’ and the ‘Work’ of the Audience in the New Media Environment.” Media, Culture and Society, 32(3): 505–516. National Intelligence Council. 2017. “Global Trends: Paradox of Progress.” Nordenstreng, Karl, and Daya K. Thussu. 2015. Mapping BRICS Media. New York: Routledge. Nye, Joseph. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Toronto: HarperCollins. Panitch, Leo., and Sam Gindin. 2012. The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire. New York: Verso. Parenti, Michael. 2004. Superpatriotism. San Francisco: City Lights Books. Payne, Matthew. 2014. “WarBytes: The Critique of Militainment in Spec Ops: The Line,” Critical Studies in Media Communication, 31(2): 265–282. Perkins, John. 2009. The Secret History of the American Empire: The Truth about Economic Hit Men, Jackals, and How to Change the World. New York: Plume. Piven, Bernard. 2015. “Russia expands military footprint abroad with new Syria base.” Al Jazeera, September 18. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/18/russia-for eign-military-bases.html. Reed, John. 2013. “Surrounded: How the U.S. is encircling China with military bases.” Foreign Policy, August 20. Rutherford, Paul. 2004. Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War against Iraq. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Selling & Subverting the Ideology of Militarism

181

Ruttan, Vernon. 2006. Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? Military Procurement and Technology Development. New York: Oxford University Press. Scahill, Jeremy. 2013. Dirty Wars: The world is a battlefield. New York: Nation Books. Schaefer, Steve and Andrea Murphy. 2016. “The World’s Largest Companies 2016.” Forbes, May 26. Schiller, Dan. 2008. “The militarization of US communications.” Communication, Culture and Critique, 1(1): 126–138. Schiller, Herbert I. 1969. Mass communication and American Empire. Boston: Beacon Press. Schiller, Herbert I. 1973. The Mind Managers. Boston: Beacon Press. Schiller, Herbert I. 1976. Communication and Cultural Domination. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Schiller, Herbert I. 1992. Mass Communication and American Empire. New York: August M. Kelley. Schiller, Herbert I. 2000. Living in the number one country: Reflections of a critic of American Empire. New York: Seven Stories Press. Schiller, Herbert I., and Joseph D. Phillips. 1970. Super*State: Readings in the militaryindustrial complex. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Schmitt, Eric, and Helene Cooper. 2017. “Trump Unleashes the Generals: They Don’t Always See the Big Picture,” New York Times, April 20. Secker, Tom. 2017. “US Army Entertainment Liaison Office Reports: 2010–2015.” SpyCulture. Seymour, Richard. 2012. American Insurgents: A Brief History of American Anti-­ Imperialism. New York: Haymarket Books. SIPRI. 2017. “World military spending: increases in the USA and Europe, decreases in oil-exporting countries.” Stockholm. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Snow, Nancy. 2003. Propaganda Inc.: Selling America’s culture to the world. New York: Seven Stories. Stahl, Roger. 2010. Militainment Inc. New York: Routledge. Timm, Trevor. 2017. “It’s not just Syria. Trump is Ratcheting up Wars Across the World,” The Guardian, April 10. Tunstall, Jeremy. 2008. The Media Were American: US Mass Media in Decline. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Turse, Nick. 2008. The Complex: How the Military Invades Our Everyday Lives. New York: Metropolitan Books. Turse, Nick. 2012. The Changing Face of Empire: Special ops, drones, spies, proxy fighters, secret bases and cyber warfare. Chicago: Haymarket Books. Turse, Nick. 2017, “The Year of the Commando: US Special Operations Forces Deploy to 138 Nations, 70% of the World’s Countries.” TomDispatch.com, January 5.

182

Mirrlees

Tyrrell, Ian., and Jay Sexton. 2015. Empire’s Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. United States Department of Defense (DoD). 2017. “5410.16: Department of Defense Assistance to Non-Government, Entertainment-Oriented Motion Picture, Television and Video Productions”/“DoD Assistance to Non-Government, Entertainment-­ Oriented Media Productions,” January 26, 1988/July 31, 2015. United States Department of Defense. “About the Department of Defense.” January 1, 2017a. United States Department of Defense. “Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs OASD(PA).” 2017b. Vine, David. 2012. “How US taxpayers are paying the Pentagon to occupy the planet.” Al Jazeera, December 14. Vulliamy, Ed. 2002. “Venezuela coup linked to Bush team.” The Guardian, April 21. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/21/usa.venezuela. Wallace, Tim. 2017. “Global markets turn back on euro as economic woes reinforce dollar as the currency of choice.” Telegraph, January 23. Waltzman, Rand. 2015. “The U.S. is Losing the Social Media War.” Time Magazine, Oct. 12. Zakaria, Fareed. 2008. The Post-American World. New York: W.W. Norton.

Chapter 10

Donald Trump and the Politics of the Spectacle Douglas Kellner Guy Debord described a “society of the spectacle” in which the economy, politics, social life, and culture were increasingly dominated by forms of spectacle.1 This collected volume updates Debord’s theory of the spectacle for the 21st century and the age of digital media and digital capitalism. We now live in an age, where the digitally mediated spectacle has contributed to right-wing authoritarian populist Donald Trump becoming US president, and Debord’s concept of spectacle is now more relevant than ever to interpreting contemporary culture, society, and politics. Donald Trump lived the spectacle from the time in New York as a young entrepreneur and man about town he performed his business and personal life in gossip columns, tabloids, and rumor mills. Trump used PR advisors to promote his businesses and himself to eventually become a maestro of the spectacle when his popular TV-show The Apprentice made Trump into a national celebrity. Trump ran his 2016 presidential campaign as a media spectacle with daily tweets that became fodder for TV news, and rallies where he would make outrageous comments that would be replayed endlessly on cable and network news. Trump thus dominated news cycles by making outrageous comments, insulting and negatively defining opponents, and helping construct daily media events through which he was able to define the news agenda. In this study, I argue that the election of Donald J. Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election is the culmination of the politics of the spectacle that was first described by Debord. Explaining the Trump phenomenon is a challenge that will occupy critical theorists of U.S. politics for years to come. My first take on the Trump phenomenon is that Donald Trump won the Republican primary contest and then achieved a shocking upset victory in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election because he is the master of media spectacle, a concept that I’ve been developing and applying to U.S. politics and media since the

1 Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle (1967) was published in translation in a pirate edition by Black and Red (Detroit) in 1970 and reprinted many times; another edition appeared in 1983 and a new translation in 1994.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_012

184

Kellner

mid-1990s.2 In this study, I will first discuss Trump’s use of media spectacle in his business career, in his effort to become a celebrity and reality-TV superstar, and in his political campaign out of which he emerged as President of the United States of Spectacle.3 1

Donald Trump: Master of Media Spectacle

I first came up with the concept of media spectacle to describe the key phenomenon of US media and politics in the mid-1990s. This was the era of the O.J. Simpson murder case and trial, the Clinton sex scandals, and the rise of cable news networks like Fox, cnn, and media msnbc and the 24/7 news cycle that has dominated US politics and media since then.4 The 1990s was also the period when the Internet and New Media took off so that anyone could be a political commentator, player, and participant in the spectacle, a phenomenon that accelerated as New Media morphed into Social Media and teenagers, celebrities, politicians, and others wanting to become part of the networked virtual world joined in. The scope of the spectacle has thus increased in the past decades with the proliferation of new media and social networking like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, Skype, and the like that increases the scope and participation of the spectacle, which make Debord’s concept of the spectacle all the more relevant in the contemporary era. By “media spectacles” I am referring to media constructs that present events which disrupt ordinary and habitual flows of information, and which become popular stories which capture the attention of the media and the public, and circulate through broadcasting 2 On my concept of media spectacle, see Douglas Kellner, Grand Theft 2000: Media Spectacle and a Stolen Election, Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001; Media Spectacle. London and New York: Routledge, 2003a; From September 11 to Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003b; and Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy. Boulder, Col.: Paradigm Press, 2005. 3 In American Nightmare: Donald Trump, Media Spectacle, and Authoritarian Populism (Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers, 2016; second edition, American Nightmare: Election 2016, Authoritarian Populism, and the Ascent of Donald J. Trump), I examine how Trump embodies Authoritarian Populism and has used racism, nationalism, xenophobia, and the disturbing underside of American politics to mobilize his supporters in his successful Republican primary campaign and in the hotly contested 2016 general election. 4 I provide accounts of the O.J. Simpson Trial and the Clinton sex/impeachment scandal in the mid-1990s in Media Spectacle, op. cit.; engage the stolen election of 2000 in the Bush/Gore presidential campaign in Grand Theft 2000, op. cit., and describe the 9/11 terrorist attacks and their aftermath in From 9/11 to Terror War, op. cit.

Donald Trump And The Politics Of The Spectacle

185

­ etworks, the Internet, social networking, smart phones, and other new media n and communication technologies. In a global networked society, media spectacles proliferate instantaneously, become virtual and viral, and in some cases becomes tools of socio-political transformation, while other media spectacles become mere moments of media hype and tabloidized sensationalism. Dramatic news and events are presented as media spectacles and dominate certain news cycles. Stories like the 9/11 terror attacks, Hurricane Katrina, Barack Obama and the 2008 U.S. presidential election, and in 2011 the Arab Uprisings, the Libyan revolution, the UK Riots, the Occupy movements and other major media spectacles of the era, cascaded through broadcasting, print, and digital media, seizing people’s attention and emotions, and generating complex and multiple effects that may make 2011 as memorable a year in the history of social upheaval as 1968, the year in which events in France decisively shaped Debord’s dialectic of spectacle and insurrection, a model still highly relevant today.5 In today’s highly competitive media environment, “Breaking News!” of various sorts play out as media spectacle, including mega-events like wars, 9/11 and other spectacular terrorist attacks, extreme weather disasters, or, in Spring 2011, political insurrections and upheavals. These spectacles assume a narrative form and become focuses of attention during a specific temporal and historical period, that may only last a few days, but may come to dominate news and information for extended periods of time, as did the O.J. Simpson Trial and the Clinton sex/impeachment scandal in the mid-1990s, the stolen election of 2000 in the Bush/Gore presidential campaign, or natural and other disasters that have significant destructive effects and political implications, such as Hurricane Katrina, the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, or the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear catastrophe. Media spectacles can even become signature events of an entire epoch as were, arguably, the 9/11 terrorist attacks which inaugurated a historical period that I describe as Terror War. I’ve argued since 2008 that the key to Barack Obama’s success in two presidential elections is because he became a master of media spectacle, blending politics and performance in carefully orchestrated media spectacles (Kellner 2009 and 2012). Previously, the model of the mastery of presidential spectacle was Ronald Reagan who everyday performed his presidency in a well-scripted and orchestrated daily spectacle. Reagan was trained as an actor and every night Ron and Nancy reportedly practiced his lines for the next day’s ­performance

5 See Douglas Kellner, Media Spectacle and Insurrection, 2011: From the Arab Uprisings to Occupy Everywhere. London and New York: Continuum/Bloomsbury, 2012.

186

Kellner

like they had done in their Hollywood days. Reagan breezed through the day scripted with a teleprompter and well-orchestrated media events, smiling frequently, and pausing to sound-bite the line of the day. Now in the 2016 election, obviously Donald Trump has emerged as a major form of media spectacle and has long been a celebrity and master of the spectacle with promotion of his buildings and casinos from the 1980s to the present, his reality-TV shows, self-promoting events, and now his presidential campaign. Hence, Trump is empowered and enabled to run for the presidency in part because media spectacle has become a major force in US politics, helping to determine elections, government, and more broadly the ethos and nature of our culture and political sphere, and Trump is a successful creator and manipulator of the spectacle. I would also argue that in recent years U.S. wars have been orchestrated as media spectacle, recalling George W. Bush’s 2003 Iraq shock and awe campaign for one example. Likewise, terrorism has been orchestrated as media spectacle since the 9/11 attack that was the most spectacular and deadly attack on the US heartland in history. As we know too well, school and mass shootings which can be seen as a form of domestic terrorism, have become media spectacle with one taking place in 2015 in Virginia on live TV, while the stock market, weather, and every other form of life can become part of a media spectacle. Hence, it is no surprise that political campaigns are being running as media spectacles and that Knights of the Spectacle like Donald Trump are playing the spectacle to win the presidency. Trump’s biographies reveal that he was driven by a need to compete and win,6 and entering the highly competitive real estate business in New York in the 1980s, Trump saw the need to use the media and publicity to promote his celebrity and image. It was a time of tabloid culture and media-driven celebrity and Trump even adopted a pseudonym “John Baron” to give the media gossip items that touted Trump’s successes in businesses, with women, and as a rising man about town.7 6 See Michael D’Antonio, Never Enough. Donald Trump and the Pursuit of Success (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015); Gwenda Blair, The Trumps (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); and Michael Kranish and Marc Fisher, Trump Revealed. An American Journey of Ambition, Ego, Money and Power. New York: Scribner, 2016. Blair’s chapter on “Born to Compete,” op. cit., pp. 223ff., documents Trump’s competitiveness and drive for success at an early age. 7 Marc Fisher, Will Hobson, “Donald Trump ‘pretends to be his own spokesman to boast about himself.’ Some reporters found the calls disturbing or even creepy; others thought they were just examples of Trump being playful.” The Independent, May 13, 2016 at http://www.inde pendent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-elections/donald-trump-pretends-to-be-his-own -spokesman-to-boast-about-himself-a7027991.html (accessed August 9, 2016).

Donald Trump And The Politics Of The Spectacle

187

Trump derives his language and behavior from a highly competitive and ruthless New York business culture and an appreciation of the importance of media and celebrity to succeed in a media-centric hypercapitalism. Hence, to discover the nature of Trump’s “temperament,” personality, and use of language, we should recall his reality-TV show The Apprentice which popularized him into a supercelebrity and made the Donald a major public figure for a national audience. Indeed, Trump is the first reality-TV candidate who runs his campaign like a reality-TV series, boasting during the most chaotic episodes in his campaign that his rallies are the most entertaining, and sending outrageous Tweets into the Twitter-sphere which than dominate the news cycle on the ever-­proliferating mainstream media and social networking sites. Hence, Trump is the first celebrity candidate whose use of the media and celebrity star power is his most potent weapon in his improbable and highly surreal campaign.8 He represents a stage of spectacle beyond Debord’s model of spectacle and consumer capitalism in which spectacle has come to colonize politics, culture, and everyday life with the chief manipulator of the spectacle in the United States, Donald J. Trump, now becoming president. In the following sections, I will discuss how this startling development in the history of spectacle took place. 2

Donald Trump: Authoritarian Populist

While Trump does not have a party apparatus or ideology like the Nazis, parallels to Nazism appeared clear to me last summer at Trump’s August 21, 2015, Alabama mega-rally in Mobile, Alabama. I watched all afternoon as the cable news networks broadcast nothing but Trump, hyping up his visit to a stadium where he was expecting 30–40,000 spectators, the biggest rally of the season. Although only 20-some thousand showed up, which was still a “huge” event in the heat of summer before the primaries had even begun in earnest, Trump’s flight into Alabama on his own Trump Jet and his rapturous reception by his admirers became the main story of the news cycle, as did many such daily events in what the media called “the summer of Trump.” 8 For my take on celebrity politics and the implosion of entertainment and politics in U.S. society, see Douglas Kellner, “Barack Obama, Media Spectacle, and Celebrity Politics” in A Companion to Celebrity, Edited by P. David Marshall and Sean Redmond. Malden, MA. and Oxford, UK. Wiley-Blackwell, 2015: 114–134. See also Mark Wheeler, Celebrity Politics. Cambridge, UK: Polity 2013. The best study of Trump, the media, and his long cultivation and exploitation of celebrity is found in Timothy L. O’Brien, TrumpNation: The Art of Being the Donald. New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2016 [2005].

188

Kellner

What I focused on in watching the TV footage of the event was how the networks began showing repeated images of Trump flying his airplane over and around the stadium before landing and then cut away to big images of the Trump Jet every few minutes. This media spectacle reminded me of one of the most powerful propaganda films of all time—Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will ¬– a German Nazi propaganda film of 1935. Triumph focuses on Hitler flying in an airplane through the clouds, looking out the window at the crowds below, landing, and driving through mass crowds applauding him as his proceeded through the streets of Nuremburg for a mass rally. The crowds along the way and in the stadium greeted Hitler with rapture as he entered the spectacle of a highly touted and orchestrated Nuremburg mass Nazi rally that Riefenstahl captured on film. I do not know if the Trump operatives planned this parallel, or if it was just a coincidence, but it is clear that Trump, like Hitler, has organized a fervent mass movement outside of the conventional political party apparatuses. The anger and rage that Fromm attributed to Nazi masses in Escape From Freedom is also exhibited in Trump’s followers as is the idolatry toward their Fuhrer, who arguably see Trump as the magic helper who will solve their problems by building a giant wall to keep out the threatening Other, a Fairy Tale scenario that Fromm would have loved to deconstruct.9 Like followers of European fascism in the 1930s, Trump’s supporters over the years have suffered economic deprivation, political alienation, humiliation, and a variety of hard times, and they appear to be looking for a political savior to help them out with their problems and to address their grievances. Trump proposes magical solutions like a wall along the Mexican border that will keep out swarms of immigrants that he claims are taking away jobs in the U.S., as well as committing waves of crime. Trump claims he will create millions of “great” jobs without giving specific plans—a claim refuted by his problematic business record that includes many bankruptcies, hiring of foreign workers to toil on his projects, some of whom he does not pay, and failures to pay many subcontractors who worked on his projects.10 9

10

The notion of “the magic helper” to whom the follower submits in the hopes their problems will be solved is found in Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom, op. cit., pp. 174–178; on “authoritarian idolatry,” see Sane Society, op. cit. p. 237f. Escape from Freedom not only critiqued Nazi ideology, the party apparatus, the concept of the Fuhrer, and the psychology of Nazi mass followers of Hitler in Escape from Freedom, but was also fascinated by fairy tales and magical thinking in National Socialism, a theme he expanded in later writings like The Forgotten Language: An Introduction to the Understanding of Dreams, Fairy Tales and Myths. New York: Random House, 1988. On Trump’s business failures, see Wayne Barrett, Trump: The Greatest Show on Earth: The Deals, the Downfall, the Reinvention. New York: Regan Books, 2016 (revision of 1992 book

Donald Trump And The Politics Of The Spectacle

189

Trump thus presents himself as a Superhero who will magically restore the U.S. to greatness, provide jobs and create incredible wealth, and restore the U.S. to its rightful place as the world’s Superpower. In this Fairy Tale, the billionaire King will fight and destroy all the Nation’s domestic and foreign enemies and the Superman will triumph and provide a Happy Ending for the U.S. people.11 While Trump plays the role of the Ubermensch (Superman or Higher Man) celebrated by the Nazis and embodies their Fuhrerprincip (leadership principle), Trump is a very American form of the Superhero, and lacks the party apparatus, advanced military forces, and disciplined cadres that the Nazis used to seize and hold power. Like other rightwing American populists, Trump bashes the Federal Reserve, the U.S. monetary system, Wall Street hedge fund billionaires, and neoliberal globalization, in the same fashion as Hitler attacked German monopoly capitalism. While Hitler ranted against monopoly capitalists, at the same time he accepted big donations from German industrialists, as brilliantly illustrated in the famous graphic by John Heartfield “the meaning of the Hitler salute” which showed Hitler with his hand up in the Nazi salute, getting bags of money from German capitalists.12 Just as Hitler denounced allegedly corrupt and weak party politicians in the Weimar Republic, Trump decries all politicians as “idiots,” “stupid,” or “weak”—some of the would-be strongman’s favorite words. In fact, Trump even attacks lobbyists, and claims he alone is above being corrupted by money, since he is self-financing his own campaign (which is not really true but seems to impress his followers).13

11

12

13

Trump: The Deals and the Downfall); O’Brien, op. cit.; D’Antonio, op. cit.; David Cay Johnston, The Making of Donald Trump. New York: Melville House; and Kranish and Fisher, Trump Revealed, op. cit. See also and “The Art of the Bad Deal. Donald Trump’s Business Flops, Explained,” Newsweek, August 8, 2018: 24–33. On the centrality of the role of a Superhero in U.S. culture and politics, see Robert Jewett and John Lawrence, The American Monomyth. New York: Anchor, 1977 and Robert Jewett and John Lawrence, The Myth of the American Superhero. Grand Rapids, Mich: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002. Trump’s campaign follows this model of the redemptive Hero who will slay America’s enemies and return the Kingdom to peace and prosperity. See the Heartfield images at https://www.google.com/search?q=John+Heartfield:+the+ meaning+of+the+Hitler+salute&biw=1600&bih=1028&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ& sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjt4KvV-N7LAhVM6WMKHUPABGMQsAQIJg (accessed March 22, 2016). After bragging how his campaign was self-funded during the Republican primaries, Trump released a statement showing that much of the money he spent was paid into his own companies; see Nicholas Confessore and Sarah Cohen, “Donald Trump’s Campaign, Billed as Self-Funded, Risks Little of His Fortune.” The New York Times, February, 5, 2016 at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/06/us/politics/donald-trumps-campaign-billed-as -self-funded-risks-little-of-his-fortune.html?_r=0 (accessed July 29, 2016). During the Fall

190

Kellner

Trump has his roots in an American form of populism that harkens back to figures like Andrew Jackson, Huey Long, George Wallace, Pat Buchanan and, of course, the American carnival barker and snake oil salesman.14 Like these classical American demagogues, Trump plays on the fears, grievances, and anger of people who feel that they have been left behind by the elites. Like his authoritarian populist predecessors, Trump also scapegoats targets from Wall Street to a feared mass of immigrants allegedly crossing the Mexican border and pouring into the States, overwhelming and outnumbering a declining White population.15 Trump’s followers share antecedents in the Know Nothing movement of the 1850s, the Ku Klux Klan movement which achieved popularity and media in the 1920s, with Donald’s father Fred Trump arrested at one of its rallies,16 and the movement that made George Wallace a popular candidate in the 1960s. Like the alienated and angry followers of authoritarian populist movements throughout the world, Trump’s admirers had suffered under the vicissitudes of capitalism, globalization, and technological revolution. For decades, they have watched their jobs being moved overseas, displaced by technological innovation, or lost through unequal economic development amid increasing divisions between rich and poor. With the global economic crisis of 2007–08, many people lost jobs, housings, savings, and suffered through a slow recovery under the Obama administration. The fact that Obama was the first black president further outraged many who had their racism and prejudices inflamed by eight years of attacks on Obama and the Obama administration by rightwing media and the Republican Party. Indeed, Donald Trump was one of the most assiduous promotor’s of the “birther” myth, erroneously claiming that Barack Obama was born in Africa

14 15

16

Presidential election, Trump is forced to court donors and raise funds, thus undercutting his claims to be the only self-financing candidate. See Lauren Langman and George Lundskow, “Escape From Modernity: Authoritarianism and the Quest for the Golden Age,” Paper delivered at “The Psychodynamics of Self & Society,” Eighth Annual asa Mini-Conference, Seattle, August 18, 2016. Trump’s vision of Latin American immigrants pouring over the border into the U.S. is a fantasy, as studies have shown that more Mexicans are returning to Mexico after working in the U.S. than coming into the country, illegal or not; see Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, “More Mexicans Leaving Than Coming to the U.S. Net Loss of 140,000 from 2009 to 2014; Family Reunification Top Reason for Return.” November 19, 2015 at http://www.pewhispanic .org/2015/11/19/more-mexicans-leaving-than-coming-to-the-u-s/ (accessed September 3, 2016). Kranish and Fisher, op. cit., pp. 27–28. It was not clear from police and media reports whether Fred Trump was marching with the Klan or was just part of the crowd that got involved in a melee with the police.

Donald Trump And The Politics Of The Spectacle

191

and was thus not eligible to serve as President of the United States.17 In the 2008 presidential election, Trump made a big show of insisting that Obama show his birth certificate to prove he was born in the U.S., and although the Obama campaign provided photocopies of the original birth certificate in ­Hawaii and notices of his birth in Honolulu newspapers at the time, Trump kept insisting they were frauds and many of his followers continue to this day to believe the myth that Obama was not born in the usa.18 Yet unlike classic dictators who are highly disciplined with a fixed ideology and party apparatus, Trump is chaotic and undisciplined, viciously attacking whoever dares criticize him in his daily Twitter feed or speeches, thus dominating the daily news cycles with his outrageous attacks on Mexicans, Muslims, and immigrants, or politicians of both parties who dare to criticize him. Trump effectively used the broadcast media and social media to play the powerful demagogue who preys on his followers’ rage, alienation, and fears. Indeed, by March 2016, media companies estimated that Trump received far more media coverage than his Republican Party contenders, and by June MarketWatch estimated that he had received $3 billion worth of free media coverage.19 Yet, at his whim, Trump bans news media from his rallies, including The Washington Post, if they publish criticisms that he does not like. Like followers of European fascism, the Trump’s authoritarian populist supporters are driven by rage: they are really angry at the political establishment and system, the media, and economic and other elites. They are eager to support an anti-establishment candidate who claims to be an outsider (which is only partly true as Trump has been a member of the capitalist real estate i­ndustry 17 18

19

On the birther myth, see Michael D’Antonio, Never Enough. Donald Trump and the Pursuit of Success. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015, pp. 283ff. Public Policy Polling reports that a “new poll finds that Trump is benefiting from a gop electorate that thinks Barack Obama is a Muslim and was born in another country, and that immigrant children should be deported. 66% of Trump’s supporters believe that Obama is a Muslim to just 12% that grant he’s a Christian. 61% think Obama was not born in the United States to only 21% who accept that he was. And 63% want to amend the Constitution to eliminate birthright citizenship, to only 20% who want to keep things the way they are.” Public Policy Polling. “Trump Supporters Think Obama is A Muslim Born in Another Country,” September 01, 2015 at http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/ main/2015/08/trump-supporters-think-obama-is-a-muslim-born-in-another-country .html (accessed August 3, 2016). Nicholas Confessore and Karen Yourish, “$2 Billion Worth of Free Media for Donald Trump,” The New York Times, March 15, 2016 at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/up shot/measuring-donald-trumps-mammoth-advantage-in-free-media.html?_r=0 (acces­ sed August 6, 2016)and Robert Schroeder, “Trump has gotten nearly $3 billion in ‘free’ advertising.” Marketwatch, May 6, 2016 at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/trump-has -gotten-nearly-3-billion-in-free-advertising-2016-05-06 (accessed August 6, 2016).

192

Kellner

for decades, following his father, and has other businesses as well, many of which have failed).20 Trump provokes their rage with classic authoritarian propaganda techniques like the Big Lie, when he repeats over and over that immigrants are pouring across the border and committing crime, that all his primary opponents, the media, and Hillary Clinton are “big liars,” and that he, Donald Trump is the only one telling the truth—clearly the biggest lie of all.21 Trump’s anti-immigrant and racist rhetoric, his Islamophobia, and his xenophobic nationalism plays into a violent racist tradition in the U.S. and activates atavistic fears of other races and anger among his white followers. Like European fascism, Trump draws on restorative nostalgia and promises to “Make America Great Again.” Thus, to mobilize his followers, Trump arguably manipulates racism and nationalism and plays to the vile side of the American psyche and the long tradition of nationalism, America First-ism, and xenophobia, wanting to keep minorities and people of color outside of the country and “in their place.” Gun rights fanatics were one of Trump’s strong core constituencies and never had a candidate (who previously had no visible connection to gun culture) so rabidly defended gun rights and attacked Clinton and Democrats who were allegedly dead-set on taking guns away from men who had little else to cling to.22 Trump also played on the fears, grievances, and resentments of evangelicals who feared that in a secular culture their religious rights would be curtailed,23 and nationalists who believed the nation was in decline and resented as well liberals who allegedly pushed civil rights agendas that favored people of color. An article in The New Yorker by Evan Osmos describes Trump’s followers as “The Fearful and the Frustrated” with the subtitle: “Donald Trump’s nationalist coalition takes shape—for now.”24 The reporter has been following Trump’s 20 21

22 23

24

On Trump’s business failures, see Note 10 above. At the Republican convention, Trump insisted that “you won’t hear any lies here,” For documentation of Trump’s Big and little lies, see Hank Berrien, “Lyin’ Donald: 101 Of Trump’s Greatest Lies,” Dailywire, April 11, 2016 at http://www.dailywire.com/news/4834/trumps -101-lies-hank-berrien (accessed August 8, 2016). On Trump’s appeal to gun owners, see Daniel Hayes, “Donald Trump Takes Aim,” The New York Times, August 20, 2016 at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/opinion/campaignstops/donald-trump-takes-aim.html?_r=0 (accessed August 24, 2016). In an article subtitled “How the Christian right came to support a thrice-married adulterer,” see Daniel K. Williams “Why Values Voters Value Donald Trump,” The New York Times, August 20, 2016 at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/opinion/sunday/why-values-vot ers-value-donald-trump.html (accessed August 24, 2016). Evan Osmos “The Fearful and the Frustrated: Donald Trump’s nationalist coalition takes shape—for now” The New Yorker, August 31, 2015 at http://www.newyorker.com/maga zine/2015/08/31/the-fearful-and-the-frustrated (accessed July 22, 2016).

Donald Trump And The Politics Of The Spectacle

193

campaign and interviewing his followers and the article reveals that Trump has not only attracted Tea Party followers, but also white nationalists with journals like The Daily Stormer “who urged white men to ‘vote for the first time in our lives for the one man who actually reps our interests.’” Osmos interviews all over the country other members of far right neo-Nazi, white supremacist, and ultra nationalist groups and concludes: From the pantheon of great demagogues, Trump has plucked some best practices—William Jennings Bryan’s bombast, Huey Long’s wit, Father Charles Coughlin’s mastery of the airwaves—but historians are at pains to find the perfect analogue, because so much of Trump’s recipe is specific to the present. Celebrities had little place in U.S. politics until the 1920 Presidential election, when Al Jolson and other stars from the fledgling film industry endorsed Warren Harding. Two decades ago, Americans were less focused on paid-for politicians, so Ross Perot, a self-funded billionaire candidate, did not derive the same benefit as Trump from the perception of independence.25 Like fascists and authoritarian populists, Trump thus presents himself as the Superhero leader who can step from outside and solve the problems that Washington and politicians have created. In the form of authoritarian ­idolatry ­described by Fromm,26 his followers appear to believe that Trump alone can stop the decline of the United States and make it “great” again. Over and over, Trump supporters claim that he is the only one who talks about issues like immigration, problems with Washington and politics, and the role of money in politics. Trump promotes himself as the tough guy who can stand up to the Russians and Chinese, and to “America’s enemies.” In the Republican primaries, he presented himself as “the most militarist” guy in the field and promised to build up the US military, and to utterly destroy isis and America’s ­enemies, restoring the U.S. to its superpower status, which he says was lost by the Obama administration. Trump embodies the figure to excess of strong masculinity that Jackson Katz describes as a key motif in recent U.S. presidential elections.27 With his bragging, chest-pounding, and hypermacho posturing, Trump provides a promise of restoration of White Male Power and a­ uthority that will restore America to its’ greatness. 25 26 27

Osmos, op. cit. On Fromm and “authoritarian idolatry,” see Sane Society, op. cit. p. 237f. See Jackson Katz, Man Enough? Donald Trump, Hillary C, and the Politics of Presidential Masculinity. Northampton, Mass.: Interlink Publishing Company, 2016.

194

Kellner

Macho Superman Trump will make “America Great Again” and vanquish all its enemies. Indeed, “Make America Great Again” is perhaps the defining motif of Trump’s presidential campaign—a slogan he puts on his baseball caps that he hands out or sells to his supporters. The baseball hat makes it appear that Trump is an ordinary fellow, and links him to his followers as one of them, a clever self-presentation for an American authoritarian populist. Sporting a baseball cap on the campaign trail is especially ironic, given that Trump appears to have borrowed this fashion from award-winning, progressive documentary filmmaker Michael Moore who is perhaps the anti-Trump in the U.S. political imaginary. Further, in his speech at the Republican convention, this shouting red-faced, orange-haired demagogue presented himself as the “voice of the forgotten men and women”—a Depression era phrase of the Roosevelt administration which Trump inflects toward his white constituency who believes they have been forgotten and passed over in favor of the rich, minorities, and celebrities. In the speech and on the campaign trail, Trump uses the discourse of national crisis also deployed by classic fascist and authoritarian regimes to describe the situation in the U.S. and the need for a savior to solve all the problems. In contrast to the Nazis, however, Trump tells his followers that it’s his deal-making skills as a supercapitalist billionaire which credentials him to be the President, and he induces his followers to believe he will make a “great deal” for them and “Make America Great Again.” The slogan “Make America Great Again” refers for some of Trump’s supporters to a time where White Males ruled and women, people of color, and others knew their place. It was a time of militarism where U.S. military power was believed to position America as the ruler of the world—although as the ambiguous Cold War and U.S. military defeats in Vietnam and the uncontrollable spaces of Iraq and Afghanistan, this era of American greatness was largely a myth. Yet the slogan is vague enough that Trump’s followers can create a fantasy of a “great” past and dream that Trump will resurrect it—a fantasy conceit nourished by many authoritarian leaders in the 20th century. Trump is replicating this phenomenon of authoritarian populism and his campaign exhibits in many ways the submission to the leader and the cause found in classic authoritarian movements. Yet Trump is also the embodiment of trends toward celebrity politics and the implosion of politics and entertainment which is becoming an increasingly important feature of U.S. politics (see Note 6). Further, Trump is a master of PR and promoting his image, and would even call up journalists pretending to be a PR agent to get gossip items planted about him in newspapers (see Note 5). More disturbing is the oft-played ­footage of Trump mimicking a New York Times reporter with a

Donald Trump And The Politics Of The Spectacle

195

disability.28 I­ ndeed, there is a sinister side to Trump as well as the cartoonish and creepy side. Trump is thus an authoritarian populist and his campaign replicates in some ways the submission to the leader and the cause found in classic authoritarian movements. In some ways, however, it is Mussolini, rather than Hitler, who Trump most resembles. Hitler was deadly serious, restrained, and repressed, while Trump is comical, completely unrestrained, and arguably unhinged.29 Curiously, on February 28, 2016, Trump used his Twitter feed to post a quote attributed to Mussolini, which compared the Italian dictator to Trump, and in an interview on nbc’s “Meet the Press” that morning said: “It’s a very good quote,” apparently not bothered by being associated with Mussolini.30 There were also news clips that showed Trump speaking, chin jutting out in Mussolini-like fashion, and making faces and performing gestures that seemed to mimic characteristics associated with Mussolini.31 Like Mussolini, Trump has a buffoonish side which his mobocracy finds entertaining, but which turns off more serious folks. Trump is the embodiment of trends toward celebrity politics and the implosion of politics and entertainment which is becoming an increasingly important feature of U.S. politics.32.

28 29

30 31

32

See the video at cnn, http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2015/11/26/donald-trump-mocks -reporter-with-disability-berman-sot-ac.cnn (accessed August 9, 2016). In a classic example of Freudian projection, over the weekend of August 6–7, Trump accused Hillary Clinton of being unbalanced, coming unhinged, and being mentally unstable, previously the charges being deployed against Trump which I discuss below using Fromm’s categories. See Jose A. DelReal, “Trump, in series of scathing personal attacks, questions Clinton’s mental health,” Washington Post, Aug. 7, 2016 at https://www.washing tonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/08/06/trump-in-series-of-scathing-personal -attacks-questions-clintons-mental-health/ (accessed August 10, 2016). In a speech in West Bend, Wisconsin, on August 16, 2016, Trump called Clinton a “bigot,” a charge frequently tossed at him. Maggie Haberman, “Donald Trump Retweets Post With Quote From Mussolini,” The New York Times, February 28, 2106 at http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/02/28/ donald-trump-retweets-post-likening-him-to-mussolini/ (accessed August 8, 2016). Media Matters Staff, “Ted Koppel Compares Donald Trump To Benito Mussolini. Koppel: Trump And Mussolini Both ‘Say Very Little In Terms Of Substance, But The Manner In Which They Say It Gets The Crowds Excited,’” Media Matters, December 16, 2015 at http://mediamatters.org/video/2015/12/16/ted-koppel-compares-donald-trump-to-beni to-muss/207564 (accessed August 9, 2016). See Note 8.

196

Kellner

3 Conclusion Reading a stack of books and countless articles on Trump and following his life closely since he has announced for presidency, I see Donald J. Trump as a paragon of what Herbert Marcuse called “one-dimensional man.”33 Trump’s one-dimension is his gigantic ego that must be fed with unlimited amounts of adulation, money, power, and attention. His ego extends to his family that no doubt he sees as extensions of himself or part of his business enterprise (which they literarily are). Trump seems to have no life-long friends, no interests or hobbies beyond his business and now political enterprise, no interest in culture or ideas, beyond those he can exploit in his business or political campaign, and, as, biographers have noted, he does not seem to be burdened with selfhood that involves depth, self-reflection, or self-awareness, let alone self-criticism, beyond an overwhelming sense of self-importance. Trump has a gloomy pessimistic view of the world encapsulated in the philosophical vision that: “Man is the most vicious of all animals, and life is a series of battles ending in victory or defeat. You just can’t let people make a sucker out of you.”34 Winning is all for one-dimensional Trump, the only purpose of life, the only thing worth pursuing, and the organizing principle of The Donald’s existence. To win, Trump will do anything, raising the specter of what would an unhinged Trump do with nuclear weapons under his control, and what destruction might his unrestrained Ego and uncontrollable Id unleash upon the world if Trump is threatened in any sort of way. It is also worrisome to contemplate that Trump has developed a large following through his demagoguery and that authoritarian populism constitutes a clear and present danger to U.S. democracy and global peace and well-being. How we deal with these issues is the crucial challenge of the contemporary moment. Bibliography Barrett, Wayne. 2016. Trump: The Greatest Show on Earth: The Deals, the Downfall, the Reinvention. New York: Regan Books (revision of 1992 book Trump: The Deals and the Downfall). Blair, Gwenda. 2000. The Trumps, New York: Simon and Schuster. D’Antonio, Michael. 2015. Never Enough. Donald Trump and the Pursuit of Success, New York: Thomas Dunne Books. 33 34

Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. Donald J. Trump cited in Kranisch and Fisher, op. cit., p. 94.

Donald Trump And The Politics Of The Spectacle

197

Debord, Guy. 1994. The Society of the Spectacle, New York:Zone Books. Fromm, Erich. 1988. The Forgotten Language: An Introduction to the Understanding of Dreams, Fairy Tales and Myths. New York: Random House. Fromm, Erich. 1990. Sane Society, New York: Holt Paperbacks. Fromm, Erich. 1994. Escape from Freedom, New York: Holt Paperbacks. Katz, Jackson. 2016. Man Enough? Donald Trump, Hillary C, and the Politics of Presidential Masculinity. Northampton, Mass.: Interlink Publishing Company. Kellner, Douglas. 2001. Grand Theft 2000: Media Spectacle and a Stolen Election, Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. Kellner, Douglas. 2003a. Media Spectacle. London and New York: Routledge. Kellner, Douglas. 2003b. From September 11 to Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. Kellner, Douglas. 2005. Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy. Boulder, Col.: Paradigm Press. Kellner, Douglas. 2012. Media Spectacle and Insurrection From the Arab Uprisings to Occupy Everywhere. London and New York: Continuum/Bloomsbury. Kellner, Douglas. 2015. “Barack Obama, Media Spectacle, and Celebrity Politics” in A Companion to Celebrity, Edited by P. David Marshall and Sean Redmond. Malden, MA. and Oxford, UK. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 114–134. Kellner, Douglas. 2016. American Nightmare: Donald Trump, Media Spectacle, and Authoritarian Populism (Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers, 2016; second edition, American Nightmare: Election 2016, Authoritarian Populism, and the Ascent of Donald J. Trump). Kranish, Michael and Marc Fisher. 2016. Trump Revealed. An American Journey of Ambition, Ego, Money and Power. New York: Scribner. Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press. O’Brien, Timothy L. 2016. TrumpNation: The Art of Being the Donald. New York: Grand Central Publishing. Wheeler, Mark. 2013. Celebrity Politics. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Chapter 11

The US Media, State Legitimacy, and the New Cold War Gerald Sussman O wad some Pow’r the giftie gie us To see oursels as ithers see us! It wad frae monie a blunder free us, An’ foolish notion robert burns

The 2016 US presidential election drew worldwide attention, pitting a billionaire “populist,” Donald Trump, never previously elected to office, against a well-oiled machine politician, Hillary Clinton. Outgoing president, Barack Obama, had broken the color barrier in 2008 as the first elected black American president, but his progress report after 8 years in office, was notably thin. Clinton hoped for her own breakthrough as the country’s first female chief executive. At the outset of the campaign, the Clinton camp must have relished running against such an unpolished eccentric like Trump, whose support even within his own Republican Party was shallow. But just as the Brexit referendum a few months earlier shocked the British nation and the rest of the world, with a sudden demand to leave the European Union, so too did the Trump victory in November of that year. It was a victory the Democrats and their allies amongst the mainstream media (msm), the “deep state” intelligence apparatuses, the Pentagon, Wall Street, and other elite stakeholder groups did not intend to accept. How did the Democrats, who supposedly represented working-class interests, manage to lose the election in key downtrodden industrial states that were strongholds of the party or previously won by Obama: Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan? And how were the country’s msm implicated in this unexpected, and for perhaps billions of people around the world, shocking outcome? For one thing, the coverage of Trump, almost all negative, far exceeded that of Clinton, and Clinton’s coverage far exceeded that of Democratic Party candidate Bernie Sanders, according to a study by the Harvard

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_013

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

199

­Shorenstein Center.1 Both Sanders and Trump were marginalized by the msm and in different ways sabotaged during the primary campaigns by their respective partisan national party committees. With Sanders coming close but failing to get his party’s nomination, his mantle of “anti-establishment candidate” was passed on to Trump, who managed to upset Clinton and the Democrats in their former strongholds, the midwestern “rustbelt” states and Florida, bypass the elite gatekeepers, and thus win the election. Although the label apparently convinced enough voters, it is, of course, a farce that a billionaire tycoon like Trump could be considered “antiestablishment,”2 as his business empire is engorged with profits derived from the neoliberal world order that he claimed during his campaign to abhor. His assault on Syria in April, 2017, and his dismissal of détente-leaning Michael Flynn as national security advisor and Stephen Bannon from the National Security Council, both within the first 100 days of his administration, demonstrated that Trump was not up to seriously challenging the dominant forces within the ruling power structure. It also demonstrated that the “deep state,” that is, the power of the core intelligence agencies and their elitist allies, could adjust to the unexpected victory of as inexperienced and undisciplined executive as Trump in preserving the economic and military agenda of the “Washington consensus.” This reassertion of oligarchical power within America’s political structure, following the unusual Sanders and Trump campaigns that critiqued businessas-usual political mechanics, is predictable, as both the Democrats and Republicans fully endorse the neoliberal economic regime and the neoconservative pursuit of regime change around the world. As Justin Lewis demonstrated in a 2001 book, the two parties pursue the same broad policies, as if they were merely two wings of a single capitalist party, even as they present themselves to the public as radically different alternatives. In reality, according to Lewis, they have differed mainly on ideological matters, such as abortion and gay rights (the “culture wars”), where no money is at stake – and today even gay rights is now largely accepted by the more right-leaning Republicans.3 The Pew Research Center finds that as American citizens become more polarized 1 Thomas E. Patterson, “News Coverage of the 2016 General Election: How the Press Failed the Voters,” Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy. 7 December 2016. 2 Susan Page and Brad Heath, “How anti-establishment outsider Donald Trump was elected the 45th president of the United States,” usa Today, November 9, 2016. 3 Justin Lewis, Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and Why We Seem to Go Along with It, New York, 2001.

200

Sussman

in their beliefs, they are increasingly interpreting the political realm through ideological lenses, more than on certain issues that actually affect their lives.4 There are a number of reasons why Americans are turning more to ideology. But chief among them, I would argue, are related to neoliberal economic restructuring. The conversion of the US economy within an informational mode of production focuses resources less on a home-grown industrial economy, the tasks of which are largely now done offshore, and more on a selling economy – necessitating the marketing, advertising, sales, and public relations associated with commodities produced abroad and the deepening of cultural commodification at home.5 Indeed, there has been a rapid growth of these industries in the neoliberal era, advertising alone, pushed by social media, up to 19% of US gdp (2014).6 Secondly, this shift in the technological means of production was enabled by neoliberal policy decisions that had the effect of de-­industrializing America, casualizing labor, creating social fragmentation and disorder at home and abroad, and increasingly incorporating home life into the sphere of production – what Italian Autonomistas call the “social factory.” In this order of disorder, citizens become increasingly alienated from a system that reduces social protections, potentially leading to a legitimacy crisis, thereby requiring the state, with its allies in the mainstream media (msm), to continually attend to reconstituting public consensus (pace Gramsci) through their endless “weapons of mass distraction.” Ideology is a vestige of power. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to discuss the role of the state and the mainstream media (per Althusser, a core “ideological state apparatus”)7 in reproducing state legitimacy and to discuss this vital function as it pertains to the corresponding need of a military and economic superpower to construct external enemies. The construction of such enemies serves to mold and mobilize national public consciousness, which has the effect of diverting attention from existing and potential internal crises and thus protecting established authority. Enemies are important to a superpower like the United States, which

4 Pew Research Center, “Political polarization in the American public,” 12 June 2014 http:// www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-1-growing-ideological-consistency/. 5 Gerald Sussman, “Introduction to the Propaganda Society,” in G. Sussman, Ed., The Propaganda Society: Promotional Culture and Politics in Global Context, New York, 2011. 6 See for example: Katie Richards, “Study: Ad Industry Accounted for 19 Percent of U.S. gdp in 2014. New findings from ana and The Advertising Coalition,” AdWeek, 17 November 2015. 7 Althusser argued that “no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses” (italics in original). See his essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Toward an Investigation)” in Slovoj Žižek, ed., Mapping Ideology, pp. 100–140, especially p. 112.

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

201

since the Second World War has relied on a high level of military spending as a pillar of its economic growth and technological development. For most of the post-war era, the principal enemy of the US has been the Russian state (and previously the Soviet Union). Drawing on the experience and lessons of the earlier phase of the Cold War (1945–1991), the Obama administration spun Russian reaction to nato troops on its borders as evidence of their aggression, generating a tense situation that some have called the “new cold war.” The ideology of international conflict contributes to greater militarization of the culture and political economy and at the same time attempts to resolve the social contradictions and dislocations that occur from the polarizing effects of the neoliberal model of global capitalist growth, including the downturn in real wages and purchasing power for workers and the demise of state legitimacy. 1

America and the Crisis of State Legitimacy

Evidence of the breakdown of the institutional framework and legitimacy of the US state is the fact of radically reduced confidence in government and in the mainstream media. The 2016 election didn’t have the lowest voter turnout in US postwar history, but it was far lower than almost any developed country in the world, less than 54% (according to cnn); Donald Trump received less than 26% of the eligible vote of the people; Clinton received a little more than 26%. Neither demonstrated a popular mandate, as the largest bloc, nearly half, 46%, did not vote. Comparing US “off-year” congressional elections with, for example, that of the Russian Duma (parliament) during a non-presidential race, the US turnout in 2014 was 36%, while the Russian turnout in 2016 was 48%, a record low (65% in the 2012 presidential election) for that country. Beyond election turnouts, Gallup found that trust in the central organs of democracy in the US is extremely low. In their September 2016 survey, 55% believe that on domestic policy government is doing not very much or nothing good at all; in foreign policy the same measures came to 50%.8 A mere 32% expressed much or some trust in the mainstream media, the lowest level ever recorded.9 According to Gallup, this contrasted considerably with the same measures tested in Russia: Trust in the Russian government was found to be 64% (2014), trust in Vladimir Putin’s leadership (2017) was 81%,10 and trust in 8 9 10

Gallup, “Trust in Government,” no date (circa September 2016). Art Swift, “Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low,” Gallup, 14 September 2016. Julie Ray and Neli Esipova, “Russian Approval of Putin Soars to Highest Level in Years.” Gallup, 18 July 2014; Tass (news agency), “Gallup: Putin’s Popularity in Russia ‘Unfaltering,’” Russia Beyond the Headlines. 29 March 2017.

202

Sussman

state media on coverage of Ukraine and Crimea (2014) was 76%. Trust in the Ukrainian government and media (end of 2016), on the other hand, was extremely low.11 What explains the loss of confidence in the American msm? There is a question about whether the US government defends the integrity of a free press. The Obama administration, including his former attorney general Eric Holder, was no more a defender of a free and independent media, a foundation of a liberal democratic society, than its successor or predecessor, who dismissed the msm as simply producing “fake news.” Holder “allowed the f.b.i. to use intrusive measures against reporters more often than any time in recent memory. The moral obstacles have been cleared for Trump’s attorney general to go even further, to forget that it’s a free press that has distinguished us from other countries, and to try to silence dissent by silencing an institution whose job is to give voice to dissent.”12 One of the few independent journalists in the msm, New York Times national security reporter James Risen, narrowly escaped going to prison after living in limbo for 7 years for refusing to reveal his sources on leaks that led to his reporting on US sabotage of Iran’s nuclear program and the National Security Agency’s (nsa) warrantless surveillance on Americans’ phone and email conversations, among his other exposés. Intercept editor Glenn Greenwald, who played a central role as a Guardian reporter in publishing the materials on state surveillance leaked by Edward Snowden, has argued that most of the media defend only those of their own who stay within the bounds of conventional reporting: And yet, in so many cases, especially when the government targets journalists who aren’t popular among or working within these mainstream outlets, not only do the journalists ignore it or acquiesce to these efforts to punish and criminalize and attack independent journalists, they become the leading cheerleaders … they [the msm] only pay attention when they themselves are attacked.13

11

12 13

Julie Ray and Neli Esipova, “Russians Rely on State Media for News of Ukraine, Crimea,” Gallup, 25 July 2014. The Kiev International Institute of Sociology found in its poll (undertaken only in the regions under its control) that: “A total of 13.7% of respondents trust [President] Poroshenko while 69% do not,” 82% do not trust the Ukrainian parliament, and 76.3% do not trust the country’s national media (only 2.4% do). Tass News Agency, “Poll Shows Only 13% of Ukrainians Trust Poroshenko,” 1 February 2017. Dana Priest, reporter for the Washington Post, cited in James Risen, “If Donald Trump Targets Journalists, Thank Obama” New York Times, 30 December 2016. Glenn Greenwald, “Jailed Reporter Barrett Brown on Press Freedom, fbi Crimes & Why He Wouldn’t Do Anything Differently,” Democracy Now! 12 May 2017.

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

203

Even Risen received no support from his own newspaper, the Times, leading him to publish on his own, which made him more vulnerable to threats by the government.14 Others were not so lucky. Risen noted that the Obama Justice Department, relying on the rarely used 1917 Espionage Act, “prosecuted nine cases involving whistle-blowers and leakers, compared with only three by all previous administrations combined.” The Obama administration “has repeatedly used the Espionage Act, a relic of World War I-era red-baiting, not to prosecute spies but to go after government officials who talked to journalists.” The Justice Department and fbi, he reported, “spied on reporters by monitoring their phone records, labeled one journalist an unindicted co-conspirator in a criminal case for simply doing reporting and issued subpoenas to other reporters to try to force them to reveal their sources and testify in criminal cases.”15 The bestknown cases of Obama administration repression of journalists and leakers are Edward Snowden and Julian Assange, both living in forced exile for their whistle-blowing efforts, and Chelsea Manning, a young US Army private who was sentenced to 35 years in a maximum security prison, commuted after 7 years. Manning was charged with providing leaked military and diplomatic material to WikiLeaks that included documentation of atrocities committed by US forces in Afghanistan. Greenwald comments that when he first started publishing the Snowden leaks, “it wasn’t, you know, [Director of National Intelligence] James Clapper or [nsa director] Keith Alexander going on TV calling for my imprisonment; it was [cnn political analyst] David Gregory or [New York Times columnist] Andrew Ross Sorkin or other journalists who work at The New York Times.”16 The documented breakdown of confidence in the state and the msm and the spectacular dissolution of working-class identity with the Democratic Party has radically transformed American political culture. The immediate result of this is the rise of Donald Trump, the least respected US presidential candidate and president in the postwar era, probably all-time, who won the 2016 election in a stunning upset over one of the similarly least liked opposing candidates over the same period. It was not only the White House that the selfassured Democrats had lost. In 2009, the party held both houses of Congress and the White House, controlled 27 state legislatures (compared to just 14 for the Republicans) and have since lost all three federal governing institutions, 14 15 16

Sarah Ellison, “What Was New York Times Reporter James Risen’s Seven-Year Legal Battle Really For?,” Vanity Fair, April 2015. Risen, op cit. Greenwald, op cit.

204

Sussman

most governorships, and 919 state legislative seats. Republicans now (mid2017) control a record 33 governorships, with only 16 under Democrats and one independent, along with 67 (or 68%) of the 98 partisan state legislative branches in the country, the highest ever. Democrats are in charge of just 13. Of the 32 Republican-controlled state legislatures, 24 have Republican governors. Democrats control both branches in just 7 states.17 In 2009, the Democrats held 52% of state senate and 57% of state house seats and 28 of 50 governorships across the country. Today, Republicans are firmly in control of all branches of government, including the US Supreme Court. In many, if not most democracies, such a devastating turn of events would automatically lead to the expulsion or voluntary withdrawal of the defeated party leadership. In Britain, for example, the failure of the ruling Conservative leadership under David Cameron to defeat the Brexit initiative induced him to step down as prime minister. The year before, Ed Miliband relinquished his post as Labour leader following his party’s defeat at the polls; the same was true for Britain’s Liberal Democrat and ukip leadership. Yet, in the US, after the massive 2016 defeat, the dominant right wing section of the Democrats (the Clintonites) retained power and indeed doubled down, putting their loyalists back in control of the House and Senate minority leadership positions plus a neoliberal, Tom Perez, as the head of the Democratic National Committee (dnc), the party’s governing body. The difference between the US and other market economies is quite striking. It’s as if the dominant über-marketoriented political culture in the US brooks little necessity for expressing responsibility or shame for defeat. A failed political campaign is simply regarded as a public relations problem that needs better experts in public perception management. The msm focused so little of its attention on the corruption of Hillary Clinton, stunning evidence of which was exposed by WikiLeaks (which the msm largely ignored), that the Democrats felt little pressure to purge their ranks. Rather than concede defeat, the Democrats worked with the “deep state,” the eyes and ears of the neoliberal ruling class, to restore a degree of normalcy to the political process and to protect the country’s reputation amongst its foreign allies. The “deep state” is an unelected and largely unaccountable power formation, akin to what President Eisenhower famously called the “militaryindustrial complex,” which is not a conspiracy so much as representing a coalition of long-standing state interests. Nowadays, the “deep state” could be said to include the leadership of the key intelligence and security organizations, 17

National Conference of State Legislatures, 12 March 2017. http://www.ncsl.org/research/ about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx.

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

205

along with the military and its defense and surveillance industry allies, the top banking and finance sectors, the Treasury Department, the oil and energy oligarchs, and zionist neocons. These groups are all presently allied with the right-wing, hawkish faction in the Democratic Party and the anti-Trump neocon Republicans, including the latter’s party veterans, John McCain and Lindsey Graham. The journalist John Light notes that the “deep state” has earlier origins: “In the 1950s, the derin devlet – literally, ‘deep state’ – began bumping off its enemies and seeking to confuse and scare the public through ‘false flag’ attacks and engineered riots. The network ultimately was responsible for thousands of deaths.”18 Was Trump’s aggression in Syria in April 2017 a reversal from his campaign pledge to work with Assad to defeat isis, and a reflection of the preponderant power of the “deep state” over the executive branch? The Trump victory posed a fundamental concern for the power elite, as the new administration looked less like a government and more like a radical social movement, led by organizers such as the far right’s Breitbart News chair Stephen Bannon. Apart from his dissolute and juvenile behavior, Trump caused alarm among the political class and their “deep state” allies along three major concerns. One is that he expressed strong doubts about the wisdom of free trade agreements, such as the proposed Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership, that his predecessor had been working so tirelessly to procure on behalf of the transnational corporate players. Second, taking a page from Bernie Sanders, he challenged Hillary Clinton for relying on the deep pockets of Fortune 100 patrons for her campaign financing. No ceos from Fortune 100 companies backed Trump’s campaign, although he most likely sought their support, and indeed a number of them contributed significant amounts of money to his inauguration events.19 And, third, Trump downgraded the importance nato and called for a policy of cooperation with Russia and Syria, especially toward a proposed coordinated assault on isis, which the dominant sections of the power elite that seek confrontation with the former and regime change in the latter country oppose. Overall, the establishment, above and below the radar, worried about Trump’s capacity to manage the affairs of the state and placate its financial oligarchs, a task for which they had more confidence in Hillary Clinton, whom they overwhelmingly backed.

18 19

John Light, “The Deep State, Explained.” Moyers & Co. 31 March 2017. http://billmoyers .com/story/the-deep-state-explained/. Madeline Farber, “No ceos at Fortune 100 Companies are Backing Donald Trump,” Fortune Magazine, 24 September 2016. http://fortune.com/2016/09/24/fortune-100-compa nies-donald-trump/.

206 2

Sussman

The Delegitimization of Donald Trump via the Russian “Conspiracy”

What immediately followed the election was a barrage of hostile actions toward the new president from the Democrats and core sections of its ruling class allies. One of the Obama administration’s surveillance state initiatives, when not spying on foreign heads of state and on American citizens, was to listen in on the campaign associates of candidate Donald Trump and presumably Trump himself. The cover for this was the story concocted by the Democratic Party’s private security consultants that the Russian government had broken into the email files of the dnc and Clinton campaign manager John Podesta, and that spying on Trump was simply an effort to track what else the Kremlin was up to. With Trump’s shocking presidential victory, the Obama administration only then began to publicly insinuate that Trump was compromised by his relationship to the Russian leadership, that his election win was the result of Russian “hacking.” This was crucial to a future possibility of impeaching him on constitutional grounds of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The mainstream media had been running with the “hacking” story both before and after the election, putting out headlines such as: – New York Times – Spy Agency Consensus Grows that Russia Hacked d.n.c. – New York Times – U.S. Says Russia Directed Hacks to Influence Elections – abc News – Obama Orders Review into Russian Hacking of 2016 Election – SLATE – The Latest Evidence that Russia was Behind the dnc Hack. – cnn – US Sees More signs Russia Feeding Emails to WikiLeaks – nbc News – Why Experts Are Sure Russia Hacked the dnc Emails – Washington Post – Secret cia Assessment Says Russia Was Trying to Help Trump Win White House – Washington Post – Russian Government Hackers Penetrated dnc, Stole Opposition Research on Trump – Time magazine – 2016 Election: Russian Hackers “Could Fake Evidence of Electoral Fraud,” Warn U.S. Officials The msm’s partisan imagination didn’t stop at the claim of Russia’s attempts to rig the American election. The Washington Post went into a wild conspiratorial frenzy, with a headline titled, “Russian Operation Hacked a Vermont Utility.” Discovering their error, the paper issued a retraction in a later edition, which was buried in a reprint of the original story – as if, as a matter of compromised reporting standards, they chose to not wholly deny the original claim. With serious credibility problems with the American public, the major dailies apparently were not too convincing. A cnn/orc poll found that a

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

207

­ ajority had little confidence in the hacking story (32% saying it is “somewhat m likely” with 24% not believing it at all); 58% said that even if the Russians had hacked the Democrats, it would not have impacted the outcome. Another 56% said that nonetheless the US should try to improve relations with Russia.20 Mocking the hacking allegation, Putin asked, “Is America a banana republic?” Indeed, the notion of a theft of the election of the most powerful security state in the world by a country with 1/10 its gdp, 1/18 its budget revenues, and 1/9 its military spending would seem quite absurd, even more irrational considering that the US outspends in defense the next 8 largest country spenders combined and dedicated more than a trillion dollars on national security (28 times the Russian amount) in fiscal year 2017.21 The Russian “hacking” story originated with “research” done by a private security firm, CrowdStrike, in the pay of the Democratic Party. In the space of just one day, the firm concluded that it was the Russian government that committed the hacks. Although the fbi was denied access multiple times to the dnc’s allegedly hacked computer servers to perform its own analysis, in a confusing act of jurisdictional intervention, the cia confirmed the conclusion as accurate, but it is also possible that the agency misled the private investigation by faking the source of the leaks in the first place.22 In Washington’s disinformation environment, it is WikiLeaks that effectively has become the “newspaper of record.” Its early 2017 “Vault 7” dump of cia documents exposed the agency’s ability through its “Marble” software to mask its own hacking fingerprint, digital traces that leave behind clues that cause malware analysts to wrongly attribute the embedded code to other countries, such as Russia or China, thereby misleading forensic investigators. What this revelation should highlight is that the biggest hacker in the world is not Russia or China, but America’s cia, with all its false flag techniques and malware storage bins.23 And despite the long history of public deceptions ­perpetrated 20 21

22 23

Jennifer Agiesta, “cnn/orc Poll: Most Say Russian Hacking Didn’t Change Election Outcome.” cnn, 17 January 2017. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2015) US$ m., 2007–2016,” sipri, 2017 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/ Milex-constant-2015-USD.pdf; Jacob Shapiro, , “A Tale of Two Economies: Russia and the US,” Geopolitical Futures, 29 November 2016; cia, “World Factbook: Budget,” 2017. Danielle Ryan, “WikiLeaks’ cia Dump Makes the Russian Hacking Story Even Murkier – If That’s Possible,” Salon.com, 12 March 2017. Microsoft’s president and chief legal officer, Brad Smith, blamed US intelligence agencies, including the cia and the National Security Agency, for “stockpiling” software code used by the hackers in a massive attack in more than 150 countries in May 2017. Times of Israel, “Microsoft Partly Blames US Government for Global Cyberattack,”15 May 2017.

208

Sussman

by the cia over the decades, the Democratic Party nonetheless partnered with the agency, and other “deep state” organizations and elite interests, and a highly collaborative mainstream media to fictionalize an account of Russia being responsible for the party’s devastating defeat in 2016. The dominant state interests were using the construct of a traditional external enemy to explain Trump’s victory as a secret and dark relationship between his campaign and the “evil empire” and to pave the way for his removal from office. The official story was not, however, universally accepted within its ranks. Discussing the official US intelligence community assessment, issued in January 2017, on alleged Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election, George Beebe, a former cia Russia analyst, commented that the New York Times read the study as detailed and damning of Russia, whereas: “People that work in the information technology industry, cyber experts on the other hand, had quite a different reaction…. [They] generally found it sloppy and weak in the use of evidence…. The report says this is an operation that is explicitly ordered by President Putin with specific goals in mind. The forensic evidence we have in the public domain is not particularly impressive in this regard….” Beebe compared the hacking story to the fake wmd report on Iraq, which led to the US invasion of that country.24 To date (mid-2017), neither cia nor Democratic Party officials have actually presented any unimpeachable evidence of Russian state involvement in the alleged hacking, nor have the mainstream media. But that hasn’t stopped the msm from repeating the allegation, again and again, but never with fresh or convincing data and rarely even using the qualifying term “alleged.” One cannot help but be reminded of the words of one of the great champions of propaganda, Adolf Hitler, who wrote in his infamous treatise, Mein Kampf (1924), that “the most brilliant propagandist technique … must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over … persistence is the first and most important requirement for success.”25 The mainstream media’s lapse in not insisting on hard evidential confirmation and its complicity in spreading what amounts to an unsubstantiated (fake) news story raises the question, who are the real hacks? Does msm complicity with the state represent a new political turn on the part of the “fourth estate”? Why do the msm quite consistently ignore c­ ritical contextual factors behind US Cold War propaganda, including a history of 24 25

C-Span, “Russia and the US Elections,” 26 January 2017; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,” 6 January 2017. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Mannheim, Boston, 1943, pp. 42, 179–185.

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

209

state disinformation? In the investigation of official statements about Russian election interference, the msm might recall the many earlier conspiratorial claims about Kremlin interference in US political life. Franklin Roosevelt’s vice president, Henry Wallace, was under investigation by J. Edgar Hoover’s fbi as having Soviet ties. Hoover was also quick to assume that Martin Luther King, the Black Panther Party, and the anti-war movement were instruments of the Communist Party usa, a presumed conduit of Soviet interference, and of the oft-repeated “world communist conspiracy” that was a standard trope during the early phase of the Cold War. Speaking at a public hearing, Hoover stated that the “Communist Party of the United States is a fifth column if there ever was one.”26 Communism, now substituted by other isms (terrorism, nationalism, socialism), has long been a bogeyman in American political culture, ideologies that oppose the “American way of life.” One would think that given the msm’s self-proclaimed “watchdog function,” the media might weigh supposed Russian transgressions against democracy against America’s own history of overrunning legitimate governments abroad. Between 1946 and 2000 alone, according to a study of Dov Levin of Carnegie Mellon University, the US interfered in 81 separate elections (including Russia). This does not include invasion of countries, support for military coups, and other forms of economic and political destabilization and intelligence manipulations, such as its embargo of Cuba, the long list of official economic sanctions, and cia penetrations of foreign political parties and social movements.27 The US also has an extensive record of inflicting violence on other countries. Since the end of the Second World War, an estimated 20 million people in 37 countries died by US hands or sponsorship, including 5 million in Indochina, almost 3 million Koreans, Chinese, and Americans and its allies during the Korean War, more than 1 million in Iraq, some 2 million in Indonesia and East Timor through aided assaults, and many millions more in direct invasions or sponsorship of dictatorships that carried out slaughters (Marcos, the Shah of Iran, Pinochet, Suharto, Diem, Thieu, Zia, Somoza, and many other US client leaders).

26 27

Hoover made this claim at the hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 26 March 1947. Available at Digital History: http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/ disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3632. Nina Agrawal, “The U.S. Is No Stranger to Interfering in the Elections of Other Countries,” Los Angeles Times, 21 December 2016. WikiLeaks revealed in March 2017 the fact that the cia had been surveilling French political parties and candidates leading up to the 2012 election. See Tyler Durden, “Wikileaks Unveils ‘Vault 7’: The Largest Ever Publication of Confidential cia Documents,” ZeroHedge website, 8 March 2017.

210

Sussman

Since 2000, in its attempts to construct global legitimacy, the US extended its “democracy promotion” efforts in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and other regions of the world, backed by the cia, the congressionally-funded but underthe-radar National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, the US Agency for International Development, Freedom House, George Soros’ “Open Society Foundation,” and associated above- and below-ground organizations labeled with democraticsounding keywords. During the “Arab Spring,” the US “democracy-building campaigns played a formative role in fomenting protests than was previously known, with key leaders of the movements having been trained by the Americans in campaigning, organizing through new media tools and monitoring elections.” Students from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere have received American funding and training on how to use technology and marketing techniques to organize protest movements.28 Most of these efforts have had little success in bringing about genuinely democratic transitions. The post-Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe became a target of opportunity for regime change. Stephen Cohen sees a “new cold war” emerging from this initiative. Blatant interference in Ukraine’s politics alarmed the Russian government that had had its own dose of American meddling in the 1990s when the American economist Jeffrey Sachs, head of Harvard’s International Institute for Development (hiid), was sent to Russia to introduce economic “shock therapy” – for which the Institute itself financially benefited. Further US interference occurred when Yankee political consultants, with the active support of the US president at the time, Bill Clinton, helped run the 1996 Boris Yeltsin presidential campaign.29 Pouring millions of dollars into Yeltsin’s coffers ($2.1 billion, making Russia the third largest US recipient of bilateral foreign aid), the Clinton administration rewarded the Russian president for adopting America’s economic shock therapy program, regardless of the evidence that it devastated the Russian economy and social structure.30 The World Bank and 28 29

30

Gerald Sussman, Branding Democracy: Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe, New York, 2010. See also: Ron Nixon, “U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings,” New York Times. 14 April 2011. Janine R. Wedel. Shadow Elite, New York, 2009. hiid received a kickback of $40.4 million for the US-sponsored aid project to Russia, offered without benefit of bidding, a scandal that ended the Institution in 2000. See, also, the Time magazine cover story featuring a Boris Yeltsin caricature – “Yanks to the Rescue: The Secret Story of How American Advisers Helped Yeltsin Win,” 15 July 1996. With Clinton’s blessing, a group of American consultants in 1996 went to work for Yeltsin’s campaign. Yeltsin failed to require a non-disclosure agreement from his American advisers, which resulted in an embarrassing cover story in Time magazine that made the Russian president look sadly dependent on foreign patronage. See Gerald Sussman, Branding

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

211

imf bailed out his government with a $22 billion rescue package, turning a blind eye to Yeltsin’s 1993 use of military force to dissolve the Russian parliament and other repressive measures. In 2012, according to Time magazine, the then president Dmitri Medvedev admitted to opposition leaders that the 1996 Yeltsin election was actually rigged against the real winner, Communist Party leader, Gennadi Zyuganov,31 an outcome that neither Yeltsin nor the US was prepared to countenance. 3

Russia and the US: Competing Legitimation Struggles

Following Putin’s election as president in 2000, the compliant disposition of the Russian state toward the US dramatically shifted, a time, starting with the invasion of Iraq, when public confidence in US institutions went into steep decline. As trust in the US government (and most European governments) plummeted, Russian citizen attitudes reflected a considerably more favaorable disposition toward their national institutions.32 Bogged down with wars throughout the Middle East and Africa, US could no longer coerce Russia, as it did during the Yeltsin years, into the fold of its neoliberal world empire, a failed effort that stiffened the Russian inclination to be independent of the US. While Putin was committed to developing a market economy in his own country, it has also been his government’s resolve to build up Russia’s defenses and act as a world player without necessarily getting America’s permission, particularly with regard to Syria and the isis threat. The US, especially the neocon sections of the Obama administration, viewed an autonomous and active Russian state with deep concern. For their part, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians have seen the handwriting on the wall after initially experiencing the negative effects of US efforts to dismantle their socialist economy. Next came the breakup of the entire Yugoslavian state, beginning with the Clinton administration’s bombing attack on Bosnian Serbs in 1995 (Operation Deliberate Force) and the adding of US and allied troops to Bosnia (“Operation Joint Endeavor”), contributing to the ethnic and geo-political reshaping of the region. This was followed by

31 32

Democracy, and Freke Vuijst, “De Kunst van het Campagnevoeren” (The Art of Campaigning). Vrij Nederland. 16 February 2008. Online edition. Simon Shuster, “Rewriting Russian History: Did Boris Yeltsin Steal the 1996 Presidential Election?” Time magazine, 24 February 2012. Pew Research Center, “Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government,” 23 November 2015; Daisy Sindelar, “Russia: Public Trust in Government Up, in Contrast to Global Trend,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 December 2015.

212

Sussman

the bombing of Russian ally Serbia in 1999, causing its dismemberment with the Washington-backed secession of Kosovo. In 2004, the US and its regime change organizations played a significant role in blocking Viktor Yanukovych from assuming the presidency of Ukraine.33 A US-backed coup a decade later forced him under the threat of assassination to resign the presidency and flee the country. Since the fall of the ussr, the US has pushed nato’s expansion into 13 of its former republics and Warsaw Pact allies despite an oral agreement between Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and US secretary of state James Baker – an accord confirmed by “hundreds of memos, meeting minutes and transcripts from U.S. archives” and backed by “iron-clad guarantees” that nato would not be extended “one inch eastward”34 – in exchange for Soviet cooperation on the reunification of Germany. Ukraine would be the 14th new nato membership country, creating an unwelcome military fortification on Russia’s western perimeter, which readily can be seen as yet a further threat to their national security and a provocation to war. The US msm have paid almost no attention to these contextual factors that led to the civil war in Ukraine and the ethnically Russian Crimean region’s breakaway and reintegration with Russia. From the Russian perspective, the reintegration of Crimea was entirely defensive. Interestingly, if the map (Map 11.1, circa 2016) is any indication, Google was not committing to the Russian “invasion” of Crimea thesis, as suggested by the neutral color it assigned to the region – or at least remaining neutral. Further to the point of interference in the ussr and their former constituent republics, the mainstream media have a long history of collaboration with a succession of US administrations in the service of the Cold War. In an earlier phase, circa 1945–1980, a key instrument of “defense of freedom” broadcasting was radio. The Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty led the political warfare assault on the ussr and Eastern Europe with the intention of overthrowing their communist governments and encouraging defection from the Soviet alliance. A “Crusade for Freedom” was set up by the US government to secretly funnel private money to rfe and to conceal the cia’s funding role to that station. rfe was widely blamed (or credited) for instigating the failed 1956 Hungarian uprising. More recently, rfe took an active role in blaming Russia for the Ukraine crisis in the Donbas region.35 33 34 35

This is discussed at some length in Sussman, Branding Democracy, op cit. Joshua Shifrinson, “Op-Ed: Russia’s Got a Point: The U.S. Broke a nato Promise,” Los Angeles Times, 30 May 2016. Timothy Alexander Guzman, “The ‘Panama Papers’ and ‘Regime Change’: Who is Behind ‘The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ (icij),?” Global Research, 8 April 2016.

213

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

Kyiv

ukraine russia Kerch Simferopol Sevastopol

Novy Svet Yalta Black Sea

Istanbul

Map 11.1

turkey

Black Sea region: Ukraine and Russian borders Source: redrawn from Google Maps (2016)

From the 1950s until exposed in the late 1970s, according to investigative reporter Carl Bernstein, more than 400 journalists from the American mainstream media covertly worked for the cia, funneling information to the agency from its overseas posts.36 And between 1948 and 1953 alone, Hollywood produced 70 explicitly anti-communist films,37 while left-leaning directors, screenwriters, and actors were blacklisted in the industry. Early television news reports were regularly scripted by the Department of Defense.38 The Pentagon, the fbi, Homeland Security, and the cia have been active agents in Hollywood to the present.39 Even American children were drawn into the Cold War propaganda 36 37 38 39

Carl Bernstein, “The cia and the Media: How America’s Most Powerful News Media Worked Hand in Glove with the Central Intelligence Agency and Why the Church Committee Covered It Up.” Rolling Stone, 20 October 1977, pp. 55–67. Tony Shaw and Denise J. Younglood, Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds, University Press of Kansas, 2010, pp. 20–21. Nancy Bernhard, U.S Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947–1960. Cambridge, 1999. Tanner Mirrlees, Global Entertainment Media: Between Cultural Imperialism and Cultural Globalization, New York, 2013.

214

Sussman

war, as the Bowman Gum company issued a series of “Fight the Red Menace” bubblegum cards in 1951, with easy-to-read instruction designed to instill in kids an enemy view of the Soviet Union and “Red” China. What is the US justification for attempting to isolate Russia in the new world (dis)order? First, the new cold warriors, especially the neoconservatives in the Democratic Party, assert that Russia is an aggressor state, citing its alleged “invasion” of South Ossetia in 2008. On 26 December 2016, Dan Lamothe, a Washington Post national security reporter, and formerly an embedded journalist in Afghanistan, told viewers on C-Span that Russia is an imperialist state. His evidence? He claims that Russia “invaded” Georgia in 2008. But even the New York Times, a reliable echo chamber of the State Department, had to admit on 6 November 2008 that its earlier report (of 8 August 2008) that Russia initiated the conflict in that autonomous region was false. There has since been a broad consensus among informed reporters, though not Lamothe, that it was the president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, who attacked South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeepers who were stationed there to prevent Georgian attacks on nearby Russian towns. Russia chased out the invaders and left South Ossetia with its autonomous status intact. The leading German weekly, Der Spiegel, reported at the time that, according to the EU investigative mission head, Heidi Tagliavini: “In the Mission’s view, it was Georgia which triggered off the war when it attacked (South Ossetian capital) Tskhinvali with heavy artillery on the night of 7 to 8 August 2008.”40 Following the Georgian invasion, the pro-US Saakashvili increasingly came under internal criticism for corruption and authoritarianism and fled Georgia in 2013 while under criminal investigation. With the backing of Ukraine’s president, Petro Poroshenko, Saakashvili briefly served as a failed governor of Odessa. Meanwhile, Georgia stripped him of his citizenship. The second widely cited “evidence” of Putin’s imperialist behavior is the US msm allegation that Russia “invaded” Crimea in 2014. This is another Western media distortion stripped of context, which ignores the Crimean referendum held to separate from Ukraine and rejoin Russia. The narrative fails to note that largely Russian-speaking Crimea had been part of Russia for hundreds of years before Khrushchev gifted it to a Ukraine that was then part of the ussr.41 The circumstances of the secession vote was that it occurred in the aftermath of 40

Benjamin Bidder, “EU Investigators Debunk Saakashvili’s Lies,” Der Spiegel, 1 October 2009. 41 The New York Times, as Robert Parry has noted, continually referred to the Crimean secession referendum in 2014 (officially tallied at 83% turnout and 97% approval) as a Russian “invasion,” as if the coup against a constitutionally elected president that year had greater legitimacy. Robert Parry, “The Dumbed-Down New York Times,” Consortiumnews.com, 27 August 2016.

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

215

the US-supported coup earlier in the year that illegally and unconstitutionally deposed Viktor Yanukovych from the presidency. Even the current (2017) president Poroshenko admitted to the fact that the overthrow was “unconstitutional” (i.e., a coup).42 This began a series of reprisals by the coup regime against the ethnic Russian population, pushed by its neo-Nazi faction – reminiscent of the Stepan Bandera-led fascist movement in the Second World War that assisted the German military in the murder of millions of Ukraine’s Russians, Jews, Gypsies, and Poles. In July 2016, the Kiev city government made its political sympathies plain by renaming a major artery to honor that Nazi collaborator. Crimea’s March 2014 irredentist vote in favor of reunification with Russia won with overwhelming 97% support, with an 83% turnout.43 The Obama administration and its legions in the mainstream media, which condemned the “annexation” of Crimea, failed to explain how it was significantly different from the Kosovo secession that the US supported following the massive US and nato bombardment of Serbia that ended its control over the province – as if the coup against a constitutionally elected president in Kiev had greater legitimacy. Moreover, one might ask, how does the US justify the secession of Texas from Mexico in 1836 and its later absorption into the US (1845)? And does Scotland not have the right to secede from the UK? Selective perception it appears. Instead, the Obama administration, for domestic political and ideological reasons, insisted on interpreting the conflict between western and eastern Ukraine as Russian interference. The poor state of American diplomacy, long dominated by ideological rather than pragmatic thinking, has been quite inept in its understanding of the facts on the ground and often ignoring or distorting the realities that don’t conform to a set agenda. A former State Department official, now a professor at the University of Rhode Island, Nicolai Petro, has argued: The West seems to be under the impression that everything that is happening in Ukraine is Russia’s fault, and therefore, if Russia would just back away or change its policies, everything would return to normal. I think that’s a misreading of the situation. I think most of what is happening in the Eastern Ukraine is the result of unresolved indigenous problems.44 42 43 44

Tyler Durden, “Ukraine’s President Poroshenko Admits Overthrow Of Yanukovych Was A Coup,” 22 June 2015. cbs News, “Official Results: 97 Percent of Crimea Voter Back Joining Russia,” 17 March 2014. In “Ukraine Update: Report from Odessa,” OpEdNews.com 26 June 2014. https://www .opednews.com/articles/1/Ukraine-Update-Report-fro-by-Nicolai-Petro-Odessa_Ukraine _Ukraine-Coup-140625-91.html.

216

Sussman

Such commentary as this is heresy within what passes as rational foreign policy analysis in Washington, at least for the Democrats. Since the Truman presidency, Russophobia arguably has been a rhetorical and legitimating mainstay, more frequently employed by Democrats as if to constantly have to disprove the old Republican shibboleth that Democrats, are weak on national security. A conservative British journalist, Peter Hitchens,45 asserted that in 2014 nato and the EU had undertaken “a bureaucratic, economic and legal invasion of Ukraine” in an effort to bring that country into its orbit, which he calls “a postmodern form of territorial aggression.” The EU’s motives, according to Hitchens, are more political than economic, as it has no real intention of bailing out a country in such derelict condition. For the US, with a new pro-US regime in Kiev, the State Department calculated that the oligarchs would lean toward American capital and in defiance of Russia join nato. A ned “Resource Summary” for FY 2013 says that in “helping new democracies succeed,” this goal “(f)or Eastern and Southeastern E ­ urope … is best met through these countries’ accession to the European Union and nato.”46 The EU has since refused to include Ukraine in its ranks, and although the US and nato have sent “advisors” to Ukraine, they has yet to add it as a new member. One establishment foreign policy analyst, Michael Mandelbaum, had earlier warned that “the expansion of nato to Russia’s borders is a gratuitous provocation that can only rebound against the West.”47 In regard to Russia-Ukraine relations, there is no evidence that Moscow had any prior plans to interfere in Crimea. On the other hand, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs Victoria Nuland was caught communicating with the US ambassador in Kiev, Geoffrey Pyatt about US plans to “midwife” the coup and “glue this thing,” i.e., setting up a post-Yanukovych government. “Yats [Yatsenyuk] is the guy” (for prime minister), she told Pyatt. And indeed Yats it was. Leaked US cables make clear that prior to becoming president, Poroshenko was one of the favored informants for the Embassy in Kiev and for other US high officials.48 45 46 47 48

Peter Hitchens, “Who is the Aggressor?: Some Thoughts on the Continuing Crisis.” Daily Mail, 22 March 2014. National Endowment for Democracy, “Resource Summary” for Fiscal Year 2013 https:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/181143.pdf. Cited in Perry Anderson, “Imperium and Consilium,” New Left Review, 83, September/ October 2013, P. 165. See, for example, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, “Ukraine: Our Ukraine Insider Poroshenko On Rada Majority Coalition Talks, Tymoshenko,” 28 April 2006. Another leaked cable from the US embassy in Kiev the same year noted that “Poroshenko was tainted by credible corruption allegations.” See, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, “Ukraine: Eur Das Kramer And Ovp Dnsa Wood’s 5/23 Meeting With Our Ukraine’s Roman Bezsmertny,” 26 May 2006. In a 2009 exchange between Poroshenko and US secretary

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

217

On the matter of which country, Russia or the US, best qualifies as an “aggressor state,” according to a massive worldwide opinion poll, that status in the post-Soviet era appears to belong to the United States. A 2013 Gallup poll of 68 countries found that the US is viewed as by far “the biggest threat to world peace” (24% of respondents – compared to Pakistan at 8%, China at 6%, ­Afghanistan, Iran, Israel and North Korea each at 4%).49 It is notable that Russia, with one-ninth the amount of US military spending, was not ranked among the leading threats. Citing the US for this distinction, with 4% of the world’s population but 48% of global military spending, should come as no surprise. If one were to count the number of invasions and “collateral damage” imposed on other countries in the past 50 years or to compare the number and reach of overseas military bases, or the production, sale, and use of weapons, the answer would simply reinforce that conclusion. As of late 2016, Russia has 25 military bases beyond its borders (all but two, a tiny naval installation in Syria and a repair facility in Vietnam, located in a neighboring, former Soviet, republic); the US has an estimated 800–1,000 bases and military installations in more than 70 countries and territories, and in many that surround Russia and China. (China, another threat in the US imaginary, has no overseas bases.) 4

Russophobia and State Political Ideology

Regardless of his other shortcomings, including a limited capacity for governing, Donald Trump, whose presidential tenure could be short-lived, did not create the new cold war tensions with Russia, the frostiest relationship between the two countries since the Reagan-Brezhnev years. It was the Democrats under state secretaries Hillary Clinton and John Kerry and defense secretary Ashton Carter that eroded ties with Russia, threatening a “no-fly zone” confrontation in Syria, while planning for and sending permanent US troops to Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Romania. This is the first time Russia has been so threatened on its entire western border since the Nazi invasion in the Second World War, handing the incoming Trump administration an international crisis that could lead to a nuclear confronation. Relentlessly hammered by the msm and the Democrats, including Hillary Clinton, who continued to insist

49

of state, Hillary Clinton, the US secretary “emphasized that the United States envisioned [for Ukraine] multiple pathways to nato membership.” See Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, “Secretary Clinton’s December 9, 2009 Meeting With Ukrainian Foreign Minister Petro Poroshenko,” 18 December 2009. Post Editorial Board, “US is the Greatest Threat to World Peace: Poll,” New York Post, 5 January 2014.

218

Sussman

that her defeat in the 2016 election was caused by Putin’s50 and fbi director James Comey’s political interference, Trump began to abandon his campaign promises to seek rapprochement with Russia and not interfere in the Syrian political conflict. Clinton made an extremely graceless and undiplomatic comparison of ­Putin to Hitler, an insult not only to the Russian president but to the memory of the 27 million Russians who died in the ultimate defeat of Naziism. She made much of the fact that during the presidential campaign, Trump had given an interview on rttv (Russia Today) but neglected to point out that the program was hosted by an American, the long-time liberal and talk show pillar of cnn, Larry King, on whose program both she and her husband had each appeared multiple times. The msm, particularly the New York Times and Washington Post, continually attacked Trump’s alleged subordination to the Kremlin. New York Times op-ed columnist, Nicholas Kristof, ran a piece called “Donald Trump: The Russian Poodle.” The other unofficial voice of the “deep state,” the Washington Post, ran a headline: “Trump’s Continued Defense of Putin Confounds Republicans.” Glenn Greenwald put it aptly:“anyone who advocates better relations or less tension with Moscow is a likely sympathizer, stooge, or even agent of Putin.”51 Lost in all the kerfuffle was the significant detail that Bill Clinton had been given $500,000 by a Russian investment bank with reputed ties to the Kremlin for his and his wife’s Clinton Foundation, just after Secretary of State has arranged for the selling-off of 20% of the US uranium supply to Russia.52 Echoing these anti-Russia sentiments is Carl Gershman, the National Endowment for Democracy’s (ned) president since its founding in 1983, who’s been involved in regime change initiatives against nationalist and former socialist states from the outset. In a September 2013 Washington Post op-ed, he called on the US to engage in more direct intervention in Ukraine as part of a concerted strategy to bring former Soviet states into the fold of the neoliberal economic and military structure. An eager apparatchik of the new Cold War, 50

51 52

To date, there is no hard evidence to back up what the Democratic Party and most of the msm have concluded – that the Russian state and Putin himself were behind the leaks that exposed the corruption of the Democratic National Committee, which has sabotaged the candidacy of Democrat Bernie Sanders, the emails of Clinton’s campaign director, John Podesta, and other revealing emails of Clinton herself while she was secretary of state. See Gerald Sussman, “America’s Russian Dybbuk,” CounterPunch, 12 January 2017. Glenn Greenwald, “What’s Behind Barack Obama’s Ongoing Accommodation of Vladimir Putin?” The Intercept, 9 September 2016. Deroy Murdock, “How the Clintons Sold Out U.S. National Interests to the Putin Regime,” National Review, 7 April 2017.

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

219

Gershman asserted that in the US march to the east, “Ukraine is the biggest prize.” His institutional partner, the cia, concurs: “After Russia, the Ukrainian republic was the most important economic component of the former Soviet Union.”53 Apart from its function as a state legitimating apparatus, the mainstream corporate media’s unwillingness to criticize US policy in Ukraine is tied to their historical Russophobia. The New York Times, Washington Post, Guardian, bbc News and other mainstream western media have spoken with near singularity in oversimplifying the conflict as “pro-Ukraine” (i.e., “pro-West”) versus “proRussia”. They largely overlook the ethnic and economic complexities and alliances in Ukraine’s western and eastern regions, and they did little to challenge the Poroshenko government’s labeling of the armed resistance in Donbas as “terrorist.” One New York Times headline, for example, “Ukraine Presses ProRussia Militants After Fighting Spreads to a Port City,” conveys the impression that resisters in the east, including those burned to death in the Odessa Trade Unions building, were simply instruments of the Russian state and had no legitimate grievances against the Kiev government. The story didn’t, for example, consider the threats of the new Kiev government to ban the Russian language, the loss of livelihoods in the east with the ending of trade with R ­ ussia and the Eurasian Customs Union, the austerity program that would come with EU membership (an objective that Yanukovych had opposed, leading to street protests in the capital), Kiev’s refusal to repudiate the far right and neo-Nazi elements in the government, and the abandonment of Ukraine’s non-aligned political status. Given the dark record of the US in having supported some of the most brutal regimes in human history and having destabilized or helped overthrown numerous independent governments and national leaders, its “democracy promotion” hypocrisy rings quite hollow. In the case of Ukraine, that country’s oligarchy, less than 0.000003% of Ukraine’s population holds 80 to 85% the country’s gdp/wealth, much of it stashed offshore.54 But the absence of democracy or democratic institutions in an allied state is obviously not critically important to the US. What is important is the global ambitions of its leading institutions: the “deep state” of intelligence organizations and other elite interests, allied with transnational corporate entities, foreign states and their 53 54

Carl Gershman, “Former Soviet States Stand up to Russia: Will the U.S.?” Washington Post editorial, 26 September 2013; cia, World Fact Book: Ukraine, 2015. Jean-Arnault Dérens and Laurent Geslin, “New Deal, Same Players,” Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2014.

220

Sussman

domestic lobbyists, the mainstream media, the military-industrial complex, the energy sector, much of the elite intellectual and political class, and other high-powered partners. Competition between states is one thing, but confrontation is quite another. If world peace has any chance, it will require cooperation, albeit begrudgingly, between the US and Russia. Anything else would lead to global suicide. The US has already pushed its allied forces to the perimeter of Russia, which no respectable country can countenance. One should only remember how radically the US behaved when the ussr placed a single military installation in Cuba to appreciate what it means to Russia, a country continually invaded in its modern history by the West, to be surrounded by a hostile nato that has been steadily encroaching on its near abroad. For domestic consumption of its citizens and allies in Europe, the US state and its media collaborators keep trumpeting a new cold war narrative that Russia is behaving as an aggressor, when it should be clear that the opposite is much closer to the empirical reality. It is crucial that the US recognize Russia’s legitimate sovereign rights and interests. Otherwise, in this situation, as the ancient Chinese saying goes, “a single spark can start a prairie fire.” The fear is that that fire could be nuclear. Bibliography Anderson, Perry. 2013. “Imperium and Consilium,” New Left Review, 83, September/October 2013, P. 165. Bernhard, Nancy 1999. U.S Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947–1960. Cambridge. Bernstein, Carl. 1997. “The CIA and the Media: How America’s Most Powerful News Media Worked Hand in Glove with the Central Intelligence Agency and Why the Church Committee Covered It Up.” Rolling Stone, 20 October 1977, pp. 55–67. Bidder, Benjamin “EU Investigators Debunk Saakashvili’s Lies,” Der Spiegel, 1 October 2009. Board, Post Editorial 2014. “US is the Greatest Threat to World Peace: Poll,” New York Post, 5 January http://nypost.com/2014/01/05/us-is-the-greatest-threat-to-world-pe ace-poll/. C-Span. 2017. “Russia and the US Elections,” 26 January 2017; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,” 6 January 2017. Dérens, Jean-Arnault and Laurent Geslin, 2014. “New Deal, Same Players,” Le Monde Diplomatique, April.

The US Media, State Legitimacy, & the New Cold War

221

Ellison, Sarah. 2015. “What Was New York Times Reporter James Risen’s Seven-Year Legal Battle Really For?” Vanity Fair, April http://www.vanityfair.com/contributor/ sarah-ellison. Gershman, Carl. 2015. “Former Soviet States Stand up to Russia: Will the U.S.?” Washington Post editorial, 26 September 2013; CIA, World Fact Book: Ukraine. Greenwald, Glenn. 2017 “Jailed Reporter Barrett Brown on Press Freedom, FBI Crimes & Why He Wouldn’t Do Anything Differently,” Democracy Now! 12 May 2017. Greenwald, Glenn. 2016. “What’s Behind Barack Obama’s Ongoing Accommodation of Vladimir Putin?” The Intercept, 9 September 2016. https://theintercept.com/ 2016/09/09/whats-behind-obamas-ongoing-accommodation-of-vladimir-putin/. Guzman, Timothy Alexander. 2016. “The ‘Panama Papers’ and ‘Regime Change’: Who is Behind ‘The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ (ICIJ)?” Global Research, 8 April 2016. Hitchens, Peter. 2014. “Who is the Aggressor?: Some Thoughts on the Continuing Crisis.” Daily Mail, 22 March 2014. Hitler, Adolf 1943. Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Mannheim, Boston, 1943, pp. 42, 179–185. Lewis, Justin 2001. Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and Why We Seem to Go Along with It, New York; Columbia University Press. Mirrlees, Tanner 2013. Global Entertainment Media: Between Cultural Imperialism and Cultural Globalization, New York; Routledge. Murdock, Deroy. 2017. “How the Clintons Sold Out U.S. National Interests to the Putin Regime,” National Review, 7 April 2017. National Endowment for Democracy. 2013. “Resource Summary” for Fiscal Year 2013 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/181143.pdf. Page, Susan and Brad Heath. 2016. “How anti-establishment outsider Donald Trump was elected the 45th president of the United States,” USA Today, November 9, 2016. Patterson, Thomas E. 2016. “News Coverage of the 2016 General Election: How the Press Failed the Voters,” Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy. 7 December 2016. Pew Research Center. 2015. “Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government,” 23 November 2015; Daisy Sindelar, “Russia: Public Trust in Government Up, in Contrast to Global Trend,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 December 2015. Ray, Julie and Neli Esipova. 2017. “Russian Approval of Putin Soars to Highest Level in Years.” Gallup, 18 July 2014; Tass (news agency), “Gallup: Putin’s Popularity in Russia ‘Unfaltering,’” Russia Beyond the Headlines. 29 March 2017. Ryan, Danielle. 2017. “WikiLeaks’ CIA Dump Makes the Russian Hacking Story Even Murkier – If That’s Possible,” Salon.com, 12 March 2017. Shaw, Tony and Denise J. Younglood. 2010. Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds, University Press of Kansas, pp. 20–21.

222

Sussman

Shifrinson, Joshua. 2016. “Op-Ed: Russia’s Got a Point: The U.S. Broke a NATO Promise,” Los Angeles Times, 30 May 2016. Sussman, Gerald. 2010. Branding Democracy: Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe, New York; Peter Lang Inc. Sussman, Gerald. 2011. “Introduction to the Propaganda Society,” in G. Sussman, Ed., The Propaganda Society: Promotional Culture and Politics in Global Context, New York; Peter Lang Inc.

Chapter 12

American Journalism’s Ideology: Why the “Liberal” Media is Fundamentalist Robert Jensen Evaluation of a news media outlet’s coverage of a subject often focuses on a critique of how stories are covered, suggestions for how stories can be improved, and ideas for stories that currently aren’t being covered.1 Such an evaluation of XYZ’s environmental coverage would be useful, but it also is crucial to consider more basic questions about the ideological framework in which the coverage goes forward. Talk of journalism’s ideology typically meets resistance, given that journalists routinely assert that they are non-ideological. If “ideology” is defined as a rigid, even fanatical, devotion to a set of ideas no matter what the evidence, then it is a good thing for journalists (and everyone else) to avoid ideology. But if ideology is understood as the set of social attitudes, political beliefs, and moral values that shape one’s interpretation of the world, then everyone works within an ideological framework, including journalists. Then the task is to understand competing ideologies, including one’s own, and not to imagine that anyone, or any institution, transcends ideology. There are three key elements to the dominant ideology of the contemporary United States—involving world affairs, economics, and ecology—which can be best understood as forms of fundamentalism. Moving beyond the religious roots of the term, we can understand fundamentalism as any intellectual, political, or moral position that asserts a certainty in the truth and/or ­righteousness of a belief system. In that sense, the United States is an especially fundamentalist country. First is national fundamentalism, a faith in the benevolence of the United States’ projection of power around the world. From this fundamentalist ­position, the United States acts in its own interests but always to advance the 1 This essay is my response to an editor at a U.S. news organization who was soliciting feedback for a review of the organization’s coverage of environmental news. From a conservative point of view, this newsroom is part of the “liberal media.” My goal in the essay was to step back from that superficial, diversionary label and evaluate the deeper ideological commitments that shape mainstream news.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_014

224

Jensen

greater goal of creating a just and peaceful world. Even when there is a consensus that U.S. policy has failed, such as in Vietnam or Iraq, the unquestioned assumption is that the United States’ intentions were noble and actions were morally justified. When journalists cannot step back to evaluate these claims, their accounts of the world inevitably reinforce the fundamentalism, even when those reports are critical of some of the specific ways that U.S. policy is executed. Second is economic fundamentalism, the steadfast belief in the moral claims of capitalism and the efficiency claims of the corporation. From this fundamentalist position, corporate capitalism is not only the best, but the only viable, way to organize economic activity. Even when the system fails to deliver on its promise of shared prosperity and rationality, the only available responses are assumed to be minor shifts in limited government oversight. When journalists cannot step back to evaluate these claims, their accounts of the economy inevitably reinforce the fundamentalism, even when those reports highlight market failures and the corrosive nature of concentrated wealth. Third is technological fundamentalism, the unquestioned assumption that the use of high-energy/high-technology is always a good thing and that any problems caused by the unintended consequences of such technology can be remedied by more technology. From this fundamentalist position, the industrial model is unchallengeable and any proposed solutions to environmental problems must conform to that model. Even when those solutions continue to create more problems, alternative paths based on different models are unacceptable. When journalists cannot step back to evaluate these claims, their accounts of the problems and potential solutions reinforce the fundamentalism, even when those reports present data that suggests that the solutions are inadequate or even counterproductive. These three fundamentalisms are, of course, related. Aggressive U.S. foreign policy around the world typically serves the economic interests of a relatively small number of people; the capitalist growth imperative and conventional economic activity undermine the health of the ecosphere; military action is a tool for dealing with the conflict that emerges from, or is intensified by, ecological degradation and resource scarcity around the world. All three of these ideologies also are in crisis, as the post-wwii dominance of U.S.-dictated economic arrangements erodes and the instability of the ­systems becomes more obvious. In each case, we can ask whether any ­current crisis is merely cyclical or more structural. Are relatively stable systems going through inevitable periodic corrections, or are the systems themselves ­running down? If the crisis in any one of these systems is structural, what is our best

American Journalism’s Ideology

225

guess on the time frame of the process of systemic change (which will be planned or chaotic, depending on our choices)? Given human intellectual limits, it is folly to make definitive claims about, or offer precise timetables for, such questions and processes. But our inability to know definitively and precisely does not absolve us of our obligation to come to the best judgments we can, since public-policy decisions must be based on some account of what we expect will happen. No one can predict the future, but everyone is responsible for our actions that create the future. Obviously, reasonable people can disagree on these questions, and in a healthy political system striving for informed democratic deliberation, it is important for citizens to be exposed to all relevant opinions. Journalists’ task is not to settle these questions but rather help circulate the ideas, striving to identify and amplify the relevant competing points of view. The key term in those two sentences is “relevant.” If journalists are trapped within ideologies that prevent them from identifying the full range of relevant views, they will fail at their central task. When faced with such criticism, mainstream journalism’s reflexive defense mechanism—“Look, conservatives hate us and liberals hate us, and so we must be doing something right”—is a shallow and inadequate response. A more useful approach would be for journalists to critically self-reflect on the ideological assumptions that define their reporting (such as the absence of foundational critiques of nationalism and capitalism) and how their professional practices (such as a heavy reliance on official sources) limit mainstream journalism’s ability to contribute to democratic dialogue. The implications of this analysis for coverage of international and economic stories requires careful argument, though the broad outlines are fairly clear (the stunted coverage of the 2003 Iraq invasion and nafta negotiations of the early 1990s offer clear examples). The role of technological ­fundamentalism in journalism, which has not been as widely discussed, deserves more attention. I’ll address three aspects—how environmental issues are reported, the demand to focus on solutions, and the nature of the preferred solutions. Contemporary journalism has long struggled to report on complex and multifaceted issues that aren’t tied to specific events. Wars and elections are comparatively easy; social movements that develop over time and the daily reality of institutionalized oppression are hard. But the first and most important step in covering what are typically called “environmental issues” is to understand that any single issue is but one part of multiple, cascading ecological crises the world faces.

226

Jensen

The plural—crises—is crucial. Look at any measure of the health of the ecosphere—groundwater depletion, soil erosion, chemical contamination, increased toxicity in our own bodies, the number and size of dead zones in the oceans, accelerating extinction of species and reduction of bio-diversity—and ask a simple question: Where we are heading? Remember also that we live in an oil-based world that is rapidly depleting the cheapest and most easily accessible oil, which means we face a huge reconfiguration of the infrastructure that undergirds modern life. Meanwhile, the desperation to avoid that reconfiguration has brought us to the era of “extreme energy” using more dangerous and destructive technologies (hydrofracturing, deep-water drilling, mountain-top removal, tar sands extraction). And, of course, let’s not forget global warming/ climate disruption. Whatever assessment we make of a specific issue, an honest accounting of the state of the ecosphere should leave us frightened. Scientists these days are talking about tipping points2 and planetary boundaries,3 about how human activity is pushing the planet beyond its limits. The problem is not just those who deny the nearly universal scientific consensus on climate change, but a much wider and deeper denial about the fragile state of the ecosystems on which our lives depends. Reporting on any environmental issue has to place any specific story in this context, no matter how resistant people are to this blunt accounting. A common response to this analysis is “we know the problems, and so let’s focus on solutions.” That’s ironic, since it’s obvious that we don’t “know” the problems. The capacity of the ecosphere to support life, including large-scale human societies, is the product of complex interactions—among organisms, and between the living and non-living world—about which we know surprisingly little. This rush to solutions based on flawed assumptions of the depth of our ecological understanding is another feature of this denial. We know a lot through science, but scientists are the first to recognize how much of the complex working of the world remains unknown. One reasonable conclusion is that the most responsible and viable solutions to these problems start with an immediate decrease in human consumption, especially of energy and non-renewable resources. Given that somewhere between a quarter and a third of the world’s population now consumes too little to guarantee a minimally decent life, that means the obligation to reduce falls on 2 See the June 7, 2012, issue of Nature. http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v486/n7401/ index.html. 3 See the September 23, 2009, issue of Nature. http://www.nature.com/news/specials/ planetaryboundaries/index.html..

American Journalism’s Ideology

227

the affluent sectors of the world, which means major changes in ­lifestyle in the United States and similarly situated societies. Given the limited ­effectiveness of individual action and market mechanisms, there’s an immediate need for discussion of limits that would have to be enforced by mutual coercion (that is, collective action through some form of government). But rather than factor this into discussion of solutions—a difficult conversation in any system but especially in the growth-obsessed modern consumer capitalist system— policymakers, and the culture more generally, ignore this dimension. As a result, technological fundamentalism defines the boundaries of the debate. Technology has to save us, and the unintended consequences of technology are, when considered at all, relegated to a footnote. For example, industrial agriculture has seriously degraded the amount and fertility of topsoil, and yet the dominant conversation about agriculture focuses on intensifying the industrial approach. In mainstream journalism, we find stories about the latest development in battery storage capacity or solar panel innovation. But stories about the need for the human species to immediately and dramatically lower this drawdown of the planet’s non-renewable resources—and the moral, ­political, and economic changes that would be required for such a process—are rare. Journalists may fear that pursuing such stories will open them up to criticism that they are biased. In some sense of the term, that’s true—such stories indicate a bias toward taking seriously the data that is readily available. But, of course, not addressing these issues is also biased, toward denial of the data. Again, reasonable people can disagree, but today mainstream journalism is failing to engage all relevant views on the state of the ecosphere. To return to the initial question: How well does XYZ cover environmental issues? My answer: Badly, but no worse than other media outlets that accept the ideological limits and professional practices of mainstream journalism. My proposal for change would begin with an ideological self-assessment by management and working journalists, at both the personal and institutional level. What assumptions about the way the world works guide XYZ’s reporting? Are those assumptions undermining comprehensive coverage in ways that marginalize or eliminate key questions and opinions? From there, journalists could begin the process of shaping the goals of the network, not just for the next program or even the next year, but for the coming decades, during which we almost surely will face much greater impediments to achieving social justice and ecological sustainability, making these questions more compelling. Last thought: When I present this kind of analysis, I’m sometimes told, “That’s a reasonable critique, but the problem is that people can’t handle it.” Whenever someone tells me that people (assuming that term refers to “­ ordinary” people

228

Jensen

who aren’t part of the journalistic/intellectual establishment) can’t handle it, I interpret it to mean that the person I’m speaking to can’t handle it and finds it easier to displace that fear onto an abstracted public. That reaction is understandable. These multiple, cascading crises are a lot to handle, perhaps more than humans are equipped to bear. But however unfair that burden may be, denying the evidence and ignoring the implications of the evidence is not a winning strategy.

Chapter 13

Media Activism from Above and Below: Lessons from the 1940s American Reform Movement Victor Pickard American media history is often sanitized of its contentious past.1 To suggest that the “winners” have been the sole authors of this history would be an overstatement, but most historical accounts downplay popular resistance to what would become the dominant commercial media model. To the extent that it is pondered at all, our current media system is often assumed to be part of the natural order of everyday life. However, many features of the American media system actually trace back to resolutions borne from repeated c­ onfrontations over the design and democratic purpose of communication institutions. During these policy fights over media’s normative role in a democratic society, grassroots activists, DC-based regulators, and commercial media industries grappled over competing visions. The following study aims to reorient our understanding of American media policy history by reinserting this conflict at the heart of the media system’s design. Drawing from a historical analysis that I expand on elsewhere,2 I emphasize that media reform efforts—advanced by both public interest-oriented policymakers from above and grassroots advocates and activists from below—are a mainstay of American media history. In doing so, I draw attention to a largely forgotten history of media reform activism, particularly during the 1940s. My main purpose for foregrounding this “usable history” is to bring a number of lessons and implications drawn from these earlier contestations into focus and show their relevance for the challenges facing media reformers today. 1

American Media’s Normative Foundations Rooted in Conflict

Most Americans are taught in school that an independent press is necessary for democratic self-governance, but rarely do we stop to reflect on what this really 1 This chapter was previously published in Journal of Information Policy, Vol. 5 (2015), pp. ­109–128, Penn State University Press. 2 Victor Pickard, America’s Battle for Media Democracy: The Triumph of Corporate Libertarianism and the Future of Media Reform (Cambridge University Press, 2014). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_015

230

Pickard

means. How did we as a society determine media’s primary role as a democratic force? How did we decide upon media institutions’ obligations to the public? How was the relationship between the state, the polity, and media institutions constructed, and how has this arrangement changed over time? Such inquiries require historical analyzes that trace policy discourses and trajectories back to moments of conflict when normative foundations were fought over and assumptions about media’s democratic role ossified. This approach highlights contingency; it reveals that outcomes were neither foreordained nor natural. At key junctures in this media system’s development, amid multiple sites of struggle, certain claims won out over others. Thus, the contours of our media system have resulted more from contestation than any consensual notion of what media should look like.3 In many ways, a history of media is, in fact, a history of media reform. More specifica y, it is a history of often-failed attempts to decommercialize the American media system. “Media reform,” as I use it, refers to activist attempts to make structural changes to a media system, usually through policy interventions. American history is punctuated with moments of struggle and reform in which politicized groups saw media as a crucial terrain of contestation.4 An overview of this history benefits from the inclusion of case studies in which conflicting interests and their respective discourses are cast into sharp relief. These moments tend to occur during what previous scholars have termed “critical junctures”5 or “constitutive moments”:6 periods of rapid change marked by crisis and opportunity. This essay draws from archival materials to reflect on past struggles to change the American media system, focusing on the especially contentious debates of the 1940s. As activists, policymakers, and media industries grappled over the normative foundations that governed major communication and regulatory institutions, a reform agenda was taking shape at both the grassroots social movement level and inside elite policy circles. In an effort to inform future media reform efforts, this essay examines the tensions within this nascent media reform movement, many of which are still negotiated by media reform groups today. It pays particular attention to the retreat 3 See, for example, Robert McChesney, “Conflict, Not Consensus: The Debate Over Broadcast Communication Policy, 1930–1935,” in Ruthless Criticism: New Perspectives in U.S. Communication History, ed. William Solomon and Robert McChesney (Minneapolis: University of ­Minnesota Press, 1993), 222–257. 4 For an examination of media reform as a social movement, see Robert A. Hackett and ­William K. Carroll, Remaking media: The struggle to democratize public communication ­(London & New York: Routledge, 2006). 5 Robert McChesney, Communication Revolution (New York, New: New Press, 2007). 6 Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

Media Activism from Above and Below

231

from a structural critique of the commercial media system in the immediate postwar years. Historicizing media reform efforts and policy debates allows us to address the question of how we got here, and it restores contingency and deferred alternatives—ideas which merit recovery not only because they correct the historical record by reclaiming resistance, but also for their potential to inspire future reform efforts. This kind of critical historical analysis problematizes and politicizes current media policies. To varying degrees, resistance against the media system is always present. During critical junctures—or whatever “pivotal moment” metaphor we choose—this resistance peaks, opening up windows of fleeting opportunity. At the same time, it is during these moments of crisis that a media system’s normative foundations become concretized. Recovering forgotten alternatives like activist and noncommercial models sheds light on larger paradigmatic shifts. For example, it shows that the ideological consolidation that girded a commercial, self-regulated media system emerged from the 1940s largely intact and further inoculated against structural challenges despite activist efforts. The rise and fall of this postwar media reform movement holds several key lessons for contemporary media activists. Before explicating these implications, however, I will first discuss a historical and theoretical framework that brings these struggles into focus. Next I discuss some specific 1940s reform initiatives and their parallels in our current political moment. ­Finally, I draw some general lessons from the history of this failed media reform movement. 2

A Gramscian Approach to Power and History

Like all social phenomena, media policy does not spring fully formed from Zeus’s head; rather, it emerges from a multiplicity of sociopolitical influences. In making sense of these inherently messy processes, a historical analysis of media policy invites a particular theoretical model: one that underscores contingencies without obscuring the evolving contours of power relationships. At its best, this kind of theoretical approach encourages and guides action by underscoring the stakes and by bringing political arrangements and power structures into focus. In general, historicizing is valuable in that it allows us to see contemporary relationships, practices, and institutions as historical constructs contingent upon contemporaneous factors instead of simply natural phenomena. By applying this approach to current media debates, we can reimagine the present and reclaim alternative trajectories. A number of theoretical approaches fall under the rubric of historical research. Although high theory is unnecessary for understanding the history of

232

Pickard

American media reform, a particular framework may prove useful if we are to understand recurring patterns of struggle. Combining intellectual, social, and political histories, my theoretical approach to understanding how power operates and history unfolds vis-à-vis media processes and institutions can best be described as Gramscian. Fleshing out patterns like contingencies, contradictions, conjunctures, and ruptures, this analysis assumes that all historical processes transpire over time in complex dialectical interplays, especially between hegemonic forces and the disempowered. Rendered correctly, such historical approaches avoid over-determination. The critical media studies scholar Deepa Kumar reminds us that Marxist methods enable an understanding of “the world in all its complexity” and thereby “opens up the possibility for change.”7 Despite an emphasis on showing how power ensures its own preponderance, this approach does not assume that policy outcomes always reflect the most powerful interests’ intentions and, as such, are predetermined. Rather, a Gramscian critique allows for various kinds of agency in the form of engagement with and resistance against dominant power structures. Much Gramscian theory centers on the notion of “hegemony,” a contentious political process by which elites control that which passes as “common sense.”8 These power relationships are inherently unstable, and constantly open up new terrains for political struggle between dominant interests and those they attempt to subjugate. They must be recreated daily, constantly opening up new areas for resistance. Stuart Hall notes that hegemony “should never be mistaken for a finished project.”9 A Gramscian historical framework restores the promise of change, allows for unexpected outcomes, and assumes that ­human events reflect not societal consensus but ongoing conflict. This conflict is greatest during realignments of what Gramsci termed “historic blocs” of the ruling elite. Such reconfigurations produce new political opportunities, which in turn allow for new policy formations. Gramsci referred to these periods in which historic blocs are challenged as “conjunctural moments.” A conjuncture marks the immediate terrain of conflict. Explicating this useful concept, Gramsci wrote: A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed 7 Deepa Kumar, “Media, Culture and Society: The Relevance of Marx’s Dialectical Method in Marxism and Communication Studies,” in The Point Is to Change It, ed. Lee Artz, Steve Macek, and Dana Cloud (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 83. 8 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1972), 323, 334, 419, 425. 9 Stuart Hall, The Hard Road to Renewal (London: Verso, 1988), 7.

Media Activism from Above and Below

233

t­hemselves…and that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts…form the terrain of the “conjunctural,” and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organize.10 Those points in American history when industry control of major media institutions was challenged serve as conjunctural moments. During the Depression and the New Deal, for example, a counter-hegemonic regime was struggling to take hold as historic blocs were in flux. New alliances were forming, serving as an impetus for what Gramsci termed a “crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony” and a “crisis of authority.”11 “If the ruling class has lost its consensus,” Gramsci argued, “this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies.” According to this Gramscian analysis, “the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born.”12 The ultimate failure of these counter-hegemonic attempts makes them no less significant. As cultural historian Michael Denning argues in his examination of the “Popular Front,” a coalition of left wing radicals, New Deal liberals, and political progressives that drove reform during the 1930s and 40s, these efforts often have lasting material effects even in failure. He notes how a prolonged “war of position” unfolded during the Great Depression and World War II, between conservative forces and a Popular Front social movement that attempted “to create a new historical bloc, a new balance of forces.” Denning argues that the “post-war settlement” that eventually emerged—exemplified by the corporatist arrangement of big labor, big capital, and big government— resulted from “the defeat of the Popular Front and the post-war purge of the left from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (cio) and the cultural apparatus.” “If the metaphor of the front suggests a place where contending forces meet,” Denning observes, “the complementary metaphor of the conjuncture suggests the time of the battle.” Based on this view, Denning sees the history of the Popular Front as “a series of offensives and retreats on the ‘terrain of the conjunctural.’”13 This focus on evolving historical patterns of power struggles and shifting institutional life cycles around conjunctural moments brings Gramscian analysis 10 11 12 13

Gramsci, “Selections,” 178. Ibid, 210, 275. Ibid, 275–276. Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Labouring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century (London: Verso, 1996), 22.

234

Pickard

into conversation with concepts associated with historical institutionalism. At first glance, Gramscian theory and historical institutionalism may seem like an odd pairing. After all, the latter seeks to move beyond grand theorizing and basic material explanations for institutional change that do not adequately explain all variations of institutional behavior.14 However, historical institutionalism assumes that larger macro-level historical and political relationships—the focus of much Marxist analysis—are mediated through interconnected institutional discourses, habits, and imperatives to impact micro-level processes. Both Gramscian theory and historical institutionalism focus on how struggles over foundational assumptions during times of crisis can result in intellectual paradigm shifts. Furthermore, in seeking to shed light on sharp breaks from the past, combining these theoretical models can help account for how m ­ oments of equilibrium are ruptured, ushering in a new set of policies that may result in new institutional arrangements. Both theoretical approaches also assume that institutions and their relationships reflect historical experiences of conflict and compromise among organized constituencies. Among other types of inquiry, historical institutionalism tries to make sense of how some trajectories are chosen over others.15 Thus, discerning “paths not taken” is as significant as identifying the chosen trajectories and resulting path dependencies.16 The most important overlap in the two frameworks is found in Gramsci’s notions of crisis and conjuncture and historical institutionalism’s focus on “critical junctures.” The concept of critical junctures brings into focus how ­institutional regimes and relationships see long periods of relative stability and path dependency punctuated by sudden systemic jolts, in which new opportunities for change arise. Much of the literature within policy studies shows how decisions made during such periods profoundly impact systemic development.17 As Kathleen Thelen notes, “Politics involves some elements of chance (agency, choice), but once a path is taken, then it can become ‘locked in’ as all the relevant actors adjust their strategies to accommodate the prevailing 14 15 16 17

Theda Skocpol, Peter B. Evans, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Theda Skocpol, “Why I am a Historical-Institutionalist,” Polity 28, Fall (1985): 103–106. Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” in Historical Institutionalism, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 693–721. See, for example, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Longman, 2002); Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

Media Activism from Above and Below

235

pattern.”18 Robert McChesney has applied this theory specifically to understanding media reform, and argues that the US media system is undergoing a critical juncture in the early twenty-first century.19 Critical junctures tend to invite more public engagement with and scrutiny of media systems than less contentious periods and typically emerge during times of technical, political, and social change. During these moments, radical ideas that were previously deemed beyond the bounds of permissible discourse are suddenly granted more legitimacy. Thus, this theoretical and historical framework brings into focus recurring moments of contestation when a media system’s normative foundations are challenged and, possibly, redefined. 3

Waves of Media Reform

Periods of media reform are often marked by an explosion of activist media. Indeed, activist media have been a crucial resource for American social movements and marginalized groups who have often resorted to contesting representations in the mainstream press or creating their own media to advance political causes. Revolutionary pamphleteers helped mobilize the struggle for independence against the British. A vibrant abolitionist press galvanized reformers in the decades preceding the Civil War. A popular working class press was integral to the burgeoning labor movement in the first half of the twentieth century. In the early 1900s, the advertising-supported socialist newspaper The Appeal to Reason reached nearly a million subscribers and helped advance socialist candidate Eugene Debs’s presidential ambitions. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an ethnic press provided support for various marginalized cultural groups.20 In the 1960s, an underground press helped sustain the civil rights and antiwar movements. Today, digital social media are central to media reform efforts. In the twentieth century, media reform struggles have increasingly centered on questions of policy to effect change in the structures of media themselves. The 1930s and 1940s witnessed targeted policy reform efforts, particularly toward broadcast monopolies and the newspaper industry, when both elites and grassroots activists considered a relatively wide range of policy options. In the 18

Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 385. 19 McChesney, Communication Revolution, 9–12. 20 Juan Gonzalez and Joseph Torres, News for All the People: The Epic Story of Race and the American Media (London: Verso, 2011).

236

Pickard

1930s, a spirited media reform coalition attempted to establish a more publicoriented broadcast system, while the Newspaper Guild challenged the commercial publishers’ ownership and control of print media.21 These efforts were ultimately crushed, but they established footholds for future reformers to carry on various struggles, particularly during the 1940s, as I show below. Antiwar, civil rights, and other social movements advanced media reform projects in the 1960s. During this time, public broadcasting was established, the Fairness Doctrine enjoyed its golden age, and reform groups coordinated around a number of key policy issues.22 Within the New World Information and Communication Order (nwico) debates in the 1970s, a global media reform movement, perhaps the first of its kind, took place around communication rights. Many of these reform initiatives would later reemerge during the World ­Summit on the Information Society (wsis) debates in the early 2000s.23 More recently, issues like media ownership and internet policy—as well as ongoing struggles over representation and alternative media—have galvanized vibrant media reform movements. Media democracy, media justice, and media reform movements coalesced in the late 1990s to take on different aspects of the corporate media system. These movements often took advantage of new digital media, especially the Internet. The rise of Internet-based activism would help drive a radical indy–media movement in the early 2000s that established Independent Media Centers in communities across the country and globe.24 A similar emphasis on changing the media system helped establish the formidable media reform organization Free Press that would successfully engage and organize broad constituencies around what had previously been seen as obscure media policy issues. For decades, these issues had typically been negotiated behind closed doors and beyond public scrutiny, but media reformers proved that an engaged public could quickly change that calculus. In 2003, nearly three million people wrote letters to the Federal Communications

21

Ben Scott, “Labor’s New Deal for Journalism: The Newspaper Guild in the 1930s” (PhD diss., University of Illinois, Urbana, 2009). 22 Mark Lloyd, Prologue to a Farce: Democracy and Communication in America (Urbana: ­University of Illinois Press, 2007 ); Milton Mueller, Brenden Kuebris and Christina Page, “Reinventing Media Activism: Public Interest Reform in the Making of U.S. Communication-Information Policy, 1960–2002,” Information Society 20, no. 3 (2004): 169–187. 23 Victor Pickard, “Neoliberal Visions and Revisions in Global Communications Policy from nwico to wsis,” Journal of Communication Inquiry, 31, no. 2: (2007): 118–139. 24 Victor Pickard (2006). Assessing the Radical Democracy of Indymedia: Discursive, Technical and Institutional Constructions. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 23, No. 1 (2006): 19–38.

Media Activism from Above and Below

237

Commission (fcc) contesting plans to loosen media ownership restrictions.25 In 2006, over a million people petitioned the fcc in favor of a then-obscure policy called “net neutrality” designed to maintain a nondiscriminatory internet.26 In 2012, 4.5 million people signed a petition to roll back two proposed internet piracy bills that would have given government and corporations tremendous power over web content.27 In the summer of 2014, nearly four million people submitted comments in response to the fcc’s proposed open Internet rules. Similar activist energies have coalesced around a series of large national media reform conferences, which attract thousands of attendees. It is tempting to assume that these increasingly common reformist manifestations are unique to this period in American history. However, as this brief historical sketch suggests, these waves of activism are, in fact, continuities of ongoing media reform traditions. One of these historic moments of media reform holds particular contemporary relevance, both in terms of forgotten antecedents and important parallels. For the remainder of this paper I focus on the post–World War ii media reform movement. 4

The Rise and Fall of the Postwar Media Reform Movement

Although I discuss the postwar media reform movement in more detail elsewhere,28 a brief synopsis is useful here. The 1940s saw widespread public discontent with commercial media institutions, stemming from a perceived lack of local accountability, the rise of media monopolies, and increasingly obtrusive advertising. Radio was subject to especially vehement public criticism, and the newspaper industry underwent a crisis that prompted policymakers to call for structural reform.29 The disintegration of the liberal New 25

Eric Klinenberg, Fighting for Air: The Battle to Control America’s Media (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 238–244. 26 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Patti Waldmeir, & Richard Waters, “Google Action Tests Power of Cash vs Votes in Washington,” The Financial Times, July 18, 2006. 27 “sopa Petition Gets Millions of Signatures as Internet Piracy Legislation Protests Continue,” Washington Post, January 19, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ economy/sopa-petition-gets-millions-of-signatures-as-internet-piracy-legislation -protestscontinue/2012/01/19/gIQAHaAyBQ_story.html. 28 See Victor Pickard, “The Air Belongs to the People: The Rise and Fall of a Postwar Radio Reform Movement,” Critical Studies in Media Communication, 30, no. 4 (2013): 307–326. 29 For newspapers, see David Davies, The Postwar Decline of American Newspapers, 1945–1965 (Westport: Praeger, 2006); for radio, see Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Waves of Opposition: L­ abor, Business, and the Struggle for Democratic Radio (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006).

238

Pickard

Deal ­consensus, reactions from threatened business elites, and a rightward shift in the political landscape led to sociopolitical turmoil and uncertainty. Technological changes were also dramatic; broadcasting was still a relatively new medium, especially given the rise of FM radio, and television lay just over the horizon. These factors combined to produce a fleeting opportunity for a fairly radical overhaul of an entrenched media system—reforms that would be unthinkable during less contentious times. At this time, political elites in Congress, the Supreme Court, the White House, and the fcc aligned with labor, educators, and civil rights groups to negotiate a number of crucial policy debates about the role of media infrastructure in a democratic society. The resolutions of these debates helped define the relationships between media institutions, various publics, and the state: the fcc forced nbc to divest itself of its Blue Network, which became abc; the Supreme Court’s 1945 antitrust ruling against the Associated Press called for government to encourage “diverse and antagonistic voices” in media; the 1946 fcc Blue Book, which outlined broadcasters’ public service responsibilities, advocated for more local news, public affairs, and experimental noncommercial programming; the 1947 Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the Press established journalistic ethics; and the 1949 Fairness Doctrine mandated public interest parameters for broadcasters. The logic driving these reform efforts is best described as “social democratic” in the sense that it assumed a progressive role for the state in protecting media’s public service responsibilities from excessive commercial imperatives.30 The massive governmental programs of the New Deal changed fundamental expectations about government and the role of civic participation. Beginning in the late 1930s, the US economy was under pressure from the federal government to ramp up war production, restoring financial health after a disastrous economic depression. In the early to mid-1940s, the United States was directly involved in a world war, which ushered in a period of government and corporate propaganda and limited speech in some ways, while reorganizing priorities for telecommunications and media policy. At the same time, the New Deal agenda, which arrived later and stayed longer at the fcc than other areas of government, focused on breaking up monopolies and imposing public interest obligations on companies that commanded much of the economy. By the mid-1940s, progressive policymakers’ concerns about commercial capture squandering radio’s democratic potential were further bolstered by increasing dissent from below, which manifested as a media reform coalition composed of dissident intellectuals, civil libertarians, African American 30

Pickard. America’s Battle for Media Democracy, 4–5.

Media Activism from Above and Below

239

groups, religious organizations, educators, labor unions, and other progressive activists.31 These groups pressured broadcasters and the fcc via petitions, call-ins, and letter-writing campaigns, urging them to democratize the public airwaves and to improve programming.32 This public pressure challenged the ascendant libertarian notion of media industry self-regulation, and prompted policy measures like the fcc Blue Book. The Blue Book documented the lack of diversity in typical radio programming, and it established criteria that defined and protected the “public interest.” But it also encouraged more engagement from local communities to help keep broadcasters accountable. The neighborhood or community listener council was a signature model of 1940s radio activism.33 Although there was no single leadership formula or blueprint for the creation of these institutions, the veteran reformer and media scholar Charles Siepmann stated that the “idea of such councils is the federation of interest in radio of all social groups in a given community—­ independent of influence or financial support by radio stations.”34 Throughout the mid- to late 1940s, reformers placed much hope on listener councils’ potential.35 Usually created by local communities—sometimes organized by parents, educators, and various civic organizations—listener councils fostered active engagement with radio programming. By the mid-1940s, listener councils were established in Cleveland, Columbus, and New York City, and in more rural areas like central Wisconsin and northern California. As these councils emerged across the country, reformers advocated for their broader deployment to counter commercial broadcasters’ control of broadcasting, especially 31 32

33

34 35

Ibid., 9–37. Other groups involved in 1940s media reform campaigns include the aclu, Jewish organizations, and women’s groups. For an interesting case study of the latter that was often proindustry and anti-media regulation, see Jennifer Proffitt, “War, Peace, and Free Radio: The Women’s National Radio Committee’s Efforts to Promote Democracy, 1939–1946,” Journal of Radio & Audio Media 17, no.1 (2010): 2–17. A related model was the “radio listening group.” Thousands of these groups sprang up across the US during the 1930s and 1940s. For an in-depth review of listening groups’ deployment in the US and in other countries, see David Goodman, “frec and Radio Listening Groups,” ica Conference, San Juan, May 2015. See also Radio’s David Goodman, Civic Ambition: American Broadcasting and Democracy in the 1930s. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Siepmann, 1950, 78. See, for example, Dorothy McFadden, “Voice for the Listener,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 1944, X7; Jack Gould, “Listeners Council: An Active Organization would Benefit Radio”, New York Times, Jan. 4, 1948, X9; Robert Lewis Shayon, “TV Programing Changes: Don’t Look Too Much to fcc–for it looks to…” The Christian Science Monitor, Sep 14, 1950, 6; “Listener Council Movement Backed as Means to Improve TV Programs,” The Christian Science Monitor, Sep 19, 1950, 12.

240

Pickard

their dominance over programming selections and their reliance on excessive advertising. Some reformers hoped that the councils could extend to the state level,36 and coordinate nationally, thereby harmonizing their standards and survey techniques with the fcc and potentially with an overarching public national council. They proposed that councils receive local government support or be volunteer-based to provide institutional backing for groups collecting research on the state of broadcasting. Armed with this data, listener councils could pressure radio stations to privilege localism with the threat of presenting their critical evaluations to the fcc during broadcasters’ renewal procedures.37 The potentials of listener councils generated a lot of support from 1940s media reformers, even if this model never became a major force within policy debates. Especially as the 1940s progressed and the fcc seemed to falter in its activist agenda, many progressive policy elites hoped for an aroused public to step into the breach. For example, Charles Siepmann saw listener councils as the “community’s best safeguard against the exploitation of the people’s wavelengths and the surest guarantee [that radio stations consider]…its needs.”38 By devising blueprints for high-quality local programming, Siepmann opined, the councils serve as “watchdogs for the listener, ready and able to protest the abuse of airtime and to promote its better use.”39 Siepmann and other reformers hoped that an engaged public could succeed where the fcc had failed to police a commercial media system into being more public service oriented. Robert Shayon, another prominent supporter, referred to a “Listener Council movement” and saw them as an instrument for potential democratization of broadcasting.40 He endorsed Siepmann’s “eight functions of a listener council,” including the following: collect and publicize essential facts on the present state of broadcasting; facilitate and encourage discriminative listening to worthwhile programs; bring pressure on stations to eliminate abuses; voice the needs of the community by preparing blueprints of worthwhile programs to be executed by a station; provide listeners with opportunity to meet and discuss their interests in radio and television; alert listeners to important developments in radio and television by means of bulletins and circulars; carry its members’ 36 37 38 39 40

In some states, for example in New Jersey, successful state-level councils were established. See McFadden, 1944. See Llewellyn White, The American Radio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 122–125, 222–234. Charles Siepmann, Radio’s Second Chance (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1946), 51–52. Ibid., 50–52. Shayon, Robert. Television and Our Children (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1951), 71–82. Similarly, McFadden, 1944 referred to a “growing movement” toward establishing listener councils.

Media Activism from Above and Below

241

views to the fcc regarding matters of policy raised in public hearings before the fcc or to the renewal of a given station’s license; and influence not only radio and television but also the press by correspondence and prepared articles on radio and television as a social force.41 The listener council seemed like the ideal vehicle to advance a more socially responsible broadcast system, but the model was also at risk of becoming appropriated by commercial stations who established their own industry-friendly listener councils. Ultimately the model never became the social force that reformers had envisioned. Many activist groups participating in the 1940s media reform coalition also created their own alternative media, contested negative imagery in mainstream media, and exploited openings within commercial media to disseminate their political messages. Labor unions succeeded in buying a number of stations and instructed their members on producing their own shows or insert labor-friendly scripts into commercial radio programming. The left-leaning cio galvanized reformers with its Radio Handbook, a pamphlet that contained instructions for getting on the air and promoting “freedom to listen” and “freedom of the air.” It insisted that workers had not exercised “their right to use radio broadcasting.” “Labor has a voice,” the pamphlet stated, and “the people have a right to hear it.” Although broadcasters owned radio stations’ equipment, “the air over which the broadcasts are made does not belong to companies or corporations. The air belongs to the people.”42 The handbook instructed activists on how to gain radio time for a labor perspective via different techniques and formats, including the Straight Talk, the Round Table Discussion, the Spot Announcement, and the Dramatic Radio Play. It encouraged activists to generate good publicity and coordinate with consumer groups, cooperatives, women’s organizations, and religious organizations.43 Beyond labor-related concerns, this media reform coalition shared major grievances, critiques, tactics, and strategies with which to engage in media policy debates in Washington, DC. Media reformers continuously pressured the fcc and commercial broadcasters to include diverse perspectives in radio programming. Their objectives often would converge around specific policy interventions, especially with progressive allies at the fcc. However, sometimes at critical moments (like when the fcc Blue Book was being released) there was a lack of communication and coordination between insidethe-beltway progressive policymakers and grassroots activists.

41 42 43

Ibid., 74, listed in Siepmann, 1950, 78. Congress of Industrial Organizations (cio), Radio Handbook (their emphases), 1944, 6. Ibid., 25.

242

Pickard

That the air belonged to the people, that the radio spectrum was a crucial public resource that should be protected from commercial interests, was a unifying rallying cry deployed by disparate activist groups.44 But although the movement was successful in realizing a number of high-water marks in terms of progressive policy reforms, it ultimately failed, largely as the result of a ­corporate backlash that used Cold War politics to red-bait and silence reformers. Even attempts at relatively light and innocuous regulations (such as requiring media institutions to be more locally accountable) were pounced on by industry representatives and conservatives in both major parties as evidence of socialist sympathies. As the anticommunist hysteria reached a fever pitch in the late 1940s and early 1950s, progressive policy elites were essentially chased out of DC while more radical left-leaning activists were b­ lacklisted. Once this reform movement was demobilized, its initiatives were variously ignored, contested and co-opted by industry-friendly arrangements. I refer to this elsewhere as the “Postwar Settlement for American Media,” which ­cemented a self-­regulating, commercial media system based on a “corporate ­libertarian” ­arrangement that continues to shape much of the media with which ­Americans interact today.45 The media reformers would, however, succeed in advancing some progressive policies, including the policy that would develop into the Fairness ­Doctrine, and their discursive gains would set the stage for future victories like e­ stablishing the public broadcasting system in the late 1960s. 5

Lessons from the 1940s Media Reform Movement

There are a number of reasons that the rise and fall of the 1940s media reform movement remains relevant today. The recent collapse of commercial journalism makes the 1940s reformers’ inability to effect structural change and the passed-over alternatives especially timely for reexamination. The persistence of similar crises suggests that many of our media problems are structural in nature and therefore require structural alternatives. Specifically, given the failure of the market to provide viable journalism, structural alternatives like nonprofit and/or worker-owned newspapers, as well as more proactive regulatory interventions and resources devoted to public media, are worthy of

44 45

Pickard. The Air Belongs to the People. Pickard. America’s Battle for Media Democracy, 5–6.

Media Activism from Above and Below

243

­reconsideration.46 Another parallel is that the issues facing new media businesses in the 1940s have returned today: questions of gatekeeping (e.g., net neutrality); corporate capture of policy discourse and regulatory agencies (as well as, at least for a time, renewed efforts toward red-baiting),47 and questions of spectrum allocation and management.48 As the fcc and other regulatory agencies take up questions regarding the future of journalism and broadband provision, they would do well to remember that the lack of clear public interest standards can be traced back to earlier policy battles. And finally, just as a media reform movement was coalescing in the wake of World War ii, a vibrant one is emerging now, albeit in fits and starts. History can provide guidance and help steer this new movement away from past mistakes. Indeed, the purpose of this research is not to mourn a lost golden age or to lament what could have been. Rather, it aims to draw linkages between previous struggles and alternative futures, to learn lessons from past failures, and to see contemporary media reform movements as part of a long historical tradition. This kind of research also reminds us that our media system could have developed differently. If policy initiatives proposed by 1940s reformers had been given fair consideration we would likely have a different media system today, one based more on public service and less on commercialism. But beyond the general historical lesson that affords a long, properly contextualized view of social change, there are at least three key lessons for today’s media reformers that can be gleaned from the decline of the 1940s movement: (1) Media reformers must continuously cultivate a strong inside/outside coordination between progressive policymakers and grassroots social movements. (2) Media reformers must maintain a strong structural critique and a “big picture” long-term vision. (3) Media reformers must interconnect with other social movement struggles and political issue networks. The first lesson is fairly intuitive for contemporary reformers: it is imperative to maintain a strong inside/outside strategy that keeps regulators connected to the grassroots (and not only to corporate lobbyists). Had progressive p ­ olicymakers

46 47 48

Victor Pickard. “The Great Evasion: Confronting Market Failure in American Media Policy,” Critical Studies in Media Communication, 31, no. 2 (2014): 153–159. Sascha Meinrath and Victor Pickard, “The New Network Neutrality: Criteria for Internet Freedom,” International Journal of Law and Communication 12 (2008): 225–243. Victor Pickard & Sascha Meinrath, Revitalizing the Public Airwaves: Opportunistic Unlicensed Reuse of Government Spectrum. International Journal of Communication, 3, (2009): 1052–1084.

244

Pickard

in the 1940s coordinated more with community activists, they may have been able to better withstand the ensuing onslaught. In more recent times, a similar vulnerability arguably occurred in the United States around net neutrality and other internet policy issues that focused too much on a Washington, DC strategy and failed to connect with less technocratic circles. Moreover, when liberal regulators come under pressure from industry—as they inevitably will—they will require popular support, which is difficult to maintain while compromises are being hatched behind closed doors, often in the public’s name but without public consent. Second, we learn that media activists retreat on structural reform at their own peril. Postwar media reformers faced many difficulties beyond their control, but the movement’s decline was also partly due to their failure to maintain a structural critique of the commercial media system. In the early 1940s, reformers were trust-busting media conglomerates, but by the end of that ­decade they were trying to shame media corporations into being good. A structural approach recognizes that, short of public ownership, the most effective safeguard against an undemocratic commercial media system is a combination of aggressive government regulation at the federal level, and local control and oversight at the community level. In light of the current struggle to prevent an overly commercial and concentrated media system from becoming more so, it is instructive to recall a time when the fcc fought to bolster public interest safeguards instead of throwing them out. For a reinvigorated media reform movement to rise up, however, will require an intellectual project that maintains a clear structural critique, one that penetrates to the root of the problem with a commercial media system. This structural critique could potentially unite diverse constituencies and lead to not just reform, but transformation of the media system. This brings us to the third and final lesson: We are reminded that media reform rises and falls with other political struggles and social movements. More coalition-building between diverse social movements and issue-based coalitions is paramount. For example, we must convince voting rights activists, the movement against the carceral state, anti-death penalty activists, the environmentalist movement, and the civil rights movement, among others, that media reform should be a central piece of their platforms. However, we also have to seek out ideologically diverse coalitions. This does not just mean linking arms within “strange bedfellow” alliances with conservatives around issues like excessive commercialism, media concentration, and indecency; it also means liberals should be finding common cause with more radical social movements. An article in The Nation from the founding editor of the socialist magazine Jacobin reminded liberal reformers that they needed radicals to

Media Activism from Above and Below

245

advance their issues, as history shows that radicals often provide punch and coherence to liberal reform agendas.49 In other words, American media policy advocates should be aiming for a new “popular front,” one that unites inside-the-beltway liberals with more radical grassroots activists and intellectuals. While DC-based policy liberals understand the political process and can remain focused on steering reform initiatives through legislative and regulatory channels, radicals can maintain a “big picture” structural critique, remind liberals what is at stake, and focus on the long-term vision. Given that new models for media policy formations typically exist at the margins of political discourse, it is incumbent upon activists and intellectuals—including radical scholars—to bring those alternatives to light, challenge dominant ideologies and relationships, and assist reform movements working toward a more just and democratic media system. This level of engagement also requires a kind of intellectual labor for successful media reform, one that draws attention to the underlying discourses, paradigms, and narratives that do so much to shape the parameters of policy debates. Although a lack of vision too often hinders our imagination of what is possible in terms of media reform, this intellectual project stands to benefit greatly from a long historical view, drawing lessons from previous media reform campaigns to inform future struggles. Bibliography Berins Collier, Ruth and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena, the Labor ­Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Davies, David. 2006.The Postwar Decline of American Newspapers, 1945–1965. Westport, CT: Praeger. Denning, Michael. 1996. The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century. London: Verso. Fones-Wolf, Elizabeth. 2006.Waves of Opposition: Labor, Business, and the Struggle for Democratic Radio. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Gonzalez, Juan and Joseph Torres. 2011. News for All the People: The Epic Story of Race and the American Media. London: Verso. Goodman, David. 2011. Radio’s Civic Ambition: American Broadcasting and Democracy in the 1930s, New York: Oxford University Press. 49

Bhaskar Sunkara, “Letter to ‘The Nation’ From a Young Radical,” The Nation, May 21, 2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/174476/letter-nation-young-radical#axzz2fuJjTC5K.

246

Pickard

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. Hackett, Robert and William Carroll. 2006. Remaking media: The struggle to democratize public Communication. London & New York: Routledge. Hall, Stuart. 1988. The Hard Road to Renewal. London: Verso. Kingdon, John W. 2002. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman. Kirchgaessner, Stephanie, Patti Waldmeir, and Richard Waters. 2006. “Google Action Tests Power of Cash vs Votes in Washington.” The Financial Times, July 18, 2006. Klinenberg, Eric. 2007. Fighting for Air: The Battle to Control America’s Media. New York: Metropolitan Books. Kumar, Deepa. 2006. “Media, Culture and Society: The Relevance of Marx’s Dialectical Method in Marxism and Communication Studies.” In The Point Is to Change It, ed. Lee Artz, Steve Macek and Dana Cloud, New York: Peter Lang. Lloyd, Mark. 2007. Prologue to a Farce: Democracy and Communication in America. ­Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. McChesney, Robert. 2007. Communication Revolution. New York: New Press. McChesney, Robert. 1993. “Conflict, Not Consensus: The Debate Over Broadcast Communication Policy, 1930–1935.” In Ruthless Criticism: New Perspectives in U.S. Communication History, William Solomon and Robert McChesney (ed), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. McLaughlin, Lisa and Victor Pickard. 2005. “What is Bottom Up About Global Internet Governance?” Global Media and Communication 1, no. 3 (2005): 359–375. Meinrath, Sascha and Victor Pickard. 2008. “The New Network Neutrality: Criteria for Internet Freedom.” International Journal of Communication Law and Policy 12 (2008): 225–243. Mueller, Milton, Brenden Kuerbis, and Christiane Page. 2004. “Reinventing Media Activism: Public Interest Reform in the Making of U.S. Communication-Information Policy, 1960–2002.” Information Society 20, no. 3 (2004): 169–187. Pickard, Victor. 2006. “Assessing the Radical Democracy of Indymedia: Discursive, Technical and Institutional Constructions,” Critical Studies in Media Communication, 23, no. 1 (2006): 19–38. Pickard, Victor. 2007. “Neoliberal Visions and Revisions in Global Communications Policy from NWICO to WSIS,” Journal of Communication Inquiry, 31, no. 2 (2007): 118–139. Pickard, Victor. 2013. “The Air Belongs to the People: The Rise and Fall of a Postwar Radio Reform Movement,” Critical Studies in Media Communication, 30, no. 4 (2013): 307–326. Pickard, Victor. 2014. “The Great Evasion: Confronting Market Failure in American ­Media Policy,” Critical Studies in Media Communication, 31, no. 2 (2014a): 153–159. Pickard, Victor. 2014b. America’s Battle for Media Democracy: The Triumph of Corporate Libertarianism and the Future of Media Reform, Cambridge University Press.

Media Activism from Above and Below

247

Pickard, Victor and Sascha Meinrath. 2009. “Revitalizing the Public Airwaves: Opportunistic Unlicensed Reuse of Government Spectrum.” International Journal of Communication, 3, (2009): 1052–1084. Pierson, Paul and Theda Skocpol. 2002. “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science.” In Political Science: State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, New York: W.W. Norton. Scott, Ben. 2009. “Labor’s New Deal for Journalism: The Newspaper Guild in the 1930s.” PhD diss., University of Illinois, Urbana, IL. Shayon, Robert. 1951. Television and Our Children. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. Siepmann, Charles. 1946. Radio’s Second Chance. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. Siepmann, Charles. 1950. Radio, Television and Society. New York: Oxford University Press. Skocpol, Theda. 1995. “Why I am a Historical-Institutionalist.” Polity 28 (Fall 1995): 103–106. Skocpol, Theda, Peter B. Evans, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 1985. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Starr, Paul. 2004. The Creation of the Media. New York: Basic Books. Stone, Deborah. 2001. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. New York: W.W. Norton. Sunkara, Bhaskar. 2013. “Letter to ‘The Nation’ From a Young Radical.” The Nation, May 21, 2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/174476/letter-nation-young-radical #axzz2fuJjTC5K. Thelen, Kathleen. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 369–404. Washington Post. 2012 “SOPA Petition Gets Millions of Signatures as Internet Piracy Legislation Protests Continue.” January 20, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ business/economy/sopa-petition-gets-millions-of-signatures-as-internet-piracy -legislation-protestscontinue/2012/01/19/gIQAHaAyBQ_story.html. White, Llewellyn. 1947. The American Radio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 14

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production Code (1930–1966) in the Creation of Hegemony Alfonso M. Rodríguez de Austria Giménez de Aragón 1 Introduction In the book The Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11, the American philosopher Richard J. Bernstein asserts that the Clash of Civilizations is in fact a clash of mentalities (“a general orientation – a conception or form of thinking that determines the way we face, understand and act in the world”) that goes beyond civilizations (2005: 39). On the one hand, we find the ethical, political and religious fundamentalism, which is unfortunately a very common trait in political leaders of different civilizations that are willing to destroy and kill people in the name of (their) God. They seem to believe that they are doing the right thing and fighting evil, as they believe in absolute, moral certainties and simplistic dichotomies of good and evil. On the other hand, we find what Bernstein calls “fallibilism,” i.e., to acknowledge that our convictions are not enough to consider ourselves in possession of the truth. Fallibilist mentalities claim that their beliefs are always subject to debate and review. Bernstein says that in politics, the fundamentalist mentalities make use of the ethical and religious Manichaeism to interpret the world according to their interests, in absolute terms, and thus justify, among other things, the impossibility of peaceful coexistence. By the extent of his influence and political power, George W. Bush was the best example of this kind of mentality in the Western world. Merely days after the 9/11 terrorist attack, he proclaimed a consistent crusade: “This crusade … this war on terrorism is gonna’ take a while.” Bush made his declaration of war in moral and religious terms, not in political terms: “This is a new kind of evil.” And he took Manichaeism to extremes (as lots of politicians did before and after him): “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_016

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production

249

Though we have a better example from January 2017. New walls are being built in the usa and the World: tangible walls to divide countries and mental walls to divide the people within countries. What remains inside the walls is progressively smaller and all the things and people standing outside are the Other, a threat, the enemy, the evil. Bernstein confirms the American tradition of both kinds of mentalities with these words: We need to probe the mentality that neatly divides the world into the f­orces of evil and the forces of good, to understand its sources and its appeal. For this is an outlook that is currently widespread in A ­ merican culture, from Hollywood to Washington, although it has a much ­longer ­history, reaching back to the ancient form of Gnosticism and ­Manichaeism. It stands in sharp opposition to other mentality that is more open and fallible, and has a robust sense of the unpredictability of contingences—an outlook that demands questioning and inquiring along with firm resistance to concrete evils (2005: 12). This chapter is a small contribution to the understanding of such a widespread mentality by focusing precisely on Hollywood, the greatest centre of cultural dissemination (in terms of scope) that humanity has ever known. In Hollywood’s history, we find a key event that helps understanding the huge expansion of the Manichaean mentality throughout American (and Western) ­society: the Motion Picture Production Code of 1930, also known as The Hays Code. First of all, I will analyze the establishment of the Code from a historic point of view. I will try to point out the political, ideological and economic reasons that were hidden behind the alleged moral motivations of the Code. The aim of these political and economic forces was very clear: to create hegemony over a society that was passing through a crisis of trust in the capitalist system. I think that the importance of the Code in the creation of hegemony has not been emphasized enough yet. Providing Hollywood is the world’s biggest dreams factory in the world, the Code is the frame in which all these dreams were confined. Then I will address the Code itself, sketching the representations of the world that were totally forbidden and the representation of the world—the worldview—that was propagandized. We will find that the forbidden worldview is generally consistent with what Karl Popper calls «open society», and that the promoted worldview is widely consistent with a closed, Manichaean, fanatic and fundamentalist mind.

250 2

Rodríguez de Austria

Concepts of Hegemony and Frame

The concept of hegemony, as I address it here, refers to the fact that a set of ideas, attitudes and practices become so dominant that we forget that they are rooted in the exercise of power, and that we could make other choices. So, this hegemonic set of ideas, attitudes and practices appears to be the embodiment of the “common sense,” and the rest of ideas are presented as potential threats for the society and the “good sense” (Phillips, 2007: 151). The ruling class, which exerts the institutionalized political power, disseminates, through the instruments of direct or mediate information, a unitary conception of the world that legitimizes its own domain, presenting it as natural, necessary, and for the interest of all the people. The ruling class uses this ideology as the basement of his power and influence over the society. Therefore, they exert not only a political direction, but also a moral and intellectual direction, cultural in a broader sense: a hegemony, precisely. bobbio and matteucci, 1981: 773

Hegemony is a complex concept. In order to understand how it works, I will try to draw attention to its main characteristics. 1. The hegemony is not absolute. 2. The hegemony is dynamic and plastic. 3. The hegemony is carried out by different social groups. 4. The hegemony is built over premises and not over arguments. Let’s say a few words about each one. Hegemony is never absolute: the mainstream always co-exists with counterhegemonic currents of thought. In fact, the smartest move of the ruling class is to assimilate these counter-hegemonic currents and transform them into fashionable and superficial behaviors. The main purpose of hegemony is to shape society for the good of the ruling class. However, hegemony can also be shaped by society in order to survive. Therefore, hegemony is dynamic and very plastic. Of course, there is a limit for these changes: they must never jeopardize the power of the ruling class. The core of hegemony (the very one thing than cannot be changed) is the exertion of vertical power. It does not really matter who has the power. The shares in factual power are always in a dynamic balance. The ruling class is defined by just one feature: it is constituted by the people who exert vertical power over the others. They are in fact a class because they exert power in a

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production

251

collaborative manner, as a whole. We will see how the Hays Code, which was created as a tool of propagation of the hegemonic mentality, could be established only because the religious, political and economic lobbies were acting in concert. Finally, the last characteristic I mentioned before is probably the most important from the perspective of this chapter: hegemony is based on premises, not on arguments. That is, hegemony is more related to the cognitive—­ premises—than to the rational—arguments—. The social groups and agencies that create, sustain, and develop the cultural hegemony are more interested in the structure of a mind than in its content. They are more interested in the way we think rather than the thoughts ­themselves. They are more interested in how people think, rather than what people think. They have no doubt that the first step controls the second. Then, the greatest triumph for these agencies is “to teach people how to think.” On the other hand, the biggest failure is to let people have the control over their own process of thinking, because they may be able to come up with ideas that confront and deny the premises of the established order. Therefore, one of the main tasks of the agencies that feed—and are fed by—the hegemony is the creation and implementation of a framework concerning the limits of the common sense, in other words, the implementation of a framework regarding what things are thinkable and what things are not. A frame within people’s minds that make them receive, understand and interpret the facts according to the rules and limits of the frame. This is what Erving Goffman calls a “primary framework”: a set of concepts and theoretical perspectives that organizes experiences and guides the thoughts and actions of individuals, groups and societies. Primary frameworks vary in degrees of organization. Some are neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates, and rules; others—indeed, most—others appear to have no apparent articulated shape providing only a lore of understanding, an approach, a perspective. Whatever the degree of organization, however, each primary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms. goffman, 1986 [1974]: 21

If the task of the hegemonic forces is to define the common sense and to set down the limits of the thinkable, the best tool they can use is a primary framework by which its users understand the established order as natural, desirable

252

Rodríguez de Austria

and unavoidable. From this point of view, the best discourses are not the ones that set down a content—the rational discourses—, as we generally think. By the contrary, the best discourses are able to (1) set down a content, and (2) create the frame by which the content must be understood. In fact, the real value of this kind of discourses (discourses that create hegemony) is the summoned frame (Lakoff, 2007). Let’s see an example to clarify this idea. If I said, “The United States of America lost the Vietnam War,” most readers would agree with the sentence. When I ask in front of an audience “who agrees with the sentence?”, most people raise their hand (providing that they are informed about the History of the usa). I did not make up this sentence, but read it in history books and heard of it a lot of times on TV. A lot of people would say that it is actually a fact. However, the reason of the general agreement being reached is because the sentence creates its own frame, that is, the war is won or lost in accordance with the military aims of the United States, in this case to stop the reunification of North and South Vietnam under a Communist leadership. If we accept this frame, we are forced to admit that the United States lost the war because they did not obtain what they wanted: to defeat North Vietnamese troops. Nevertheless, what happens if we leave this frame and start to consider another one? For instance, by asking ourselves how many soldiers died on each side; or how many civilians; or how many hectares of land were burnt in each country … Then we will have created a new frame (a more rational one, indeed), in which the United States won the war. Once the framework is set down properly, all ideas from outside the limits are perceived as potential threats (Lakoff, 2007). This is important because the framework’s user frequently identifies his or herself with the framework, so an idea or action against the framework is perceived as an idea or action against oneself. Carrying this view to its last consequences, as the Right-Wing ideology does, we can say that the mere existence of the Other may be perceived as a threat. As far as I am concerned, the crucial question here is the following: who does decide who we are and who they are? The answer might be: The owners of the hegemony. Educational Systems, Organized Religions and Mass Media are the main means used by Power to communicate, teach and influence people. The basis of the creation and maintenance of primary frames is the control of Communication. The Power has to control, directly or indirectly, the forms and contents of social communication. The logic of Power says that indirect control is always preferable in Democracy. This way, the Power remains in the shadows and the responsibility for the hegemonic ideology goes to “the society as a whole.”

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production

253

The dominant economic class does not, for the most part, produce and disseminate ideology directly. That task is left to writers and journalist, producers and teachers, bureaucrats and artists organized for production within the cultural apparatus as a whole -the schools and mass media as a whole …. gitlin, 2003: 254

Myths, stories, parables, plays and films perform designed social interactions in designed contexts. The myth is the first tool to interpret the world, in a way that oral narration is logically the first and best way to create primary frames. Therefore, one of the basic tasks of Power is to control how and what myths are narrated. This is the reason why the leading philosophers in Plato’s Republic would control the speech of the poets. Plato was very rigid in this matter: the poets that did not follow the rules of the philosophers would be banished from the Polis. In Plato’s opinion, only the elite of philosophers should have the power to interpret the world and define reality. In Berger and Luckmann’s words: Reality is socially defined. But the definitions are always embodied, that is, concrete individuals and groups of individuals serve as definers of reality. To understand the state of the socially constructed universe at any given time, or its change over time, one must understand the social organization that permits the definers to do their defining. Put a little crudely, it is essential to keep pushing questions about the historically available conceptualizations of reality from the abstract “What?” to the sociologically concrete “Says who?” (1967: 134). Within the field of the Media and more specifically within the field of films the answer is obvious. Says who? Says Hollywood. The US film industry moved from the East coast to the West coast in the early 20th century. After a few years, Hollywood became the largest factory of myths and stories in the History of mankind. The Hollywood film industry was very concentrated and centralized, meaning that a few owners had a great power in their hands, the power to decide what myths would (or would not) be brought to the big screen. (Karl Marx expressed a general theory of this power in The German Ideology: “The ideas of the ruling class are the dominant ideas in every age”). The statistics are a proof of this global power. The percentage of Hollywood films released in the rest of the world ranges from 40% to 90%. “For example, in the United Kingdom, the proportion of Hollywood films from the total went

254

Rodríguez de Austria

from 95% in 1925 to 81% in 1928, and 65%in 1937. In France, the respective percentages were: 70%, 63% and 45%” (Sánchez Ruiz, 2003: 27). In 1985, 41% of cinema tickets bought in Western Europe went to Hollywood, and the percentage raised up to 75% ten years later (Miller et al., 2001: 17). Mainstream Hollywood is the result of a historical process not exempt from struggles, alignments, purges, impositions and fissures. One of the key moments was lived between the years 1930 and 1934. That is, the years ranging from the formal adoption of the Hays Code to its effective implementation. 3

The Production Code Administration

The struggles for the control of the film industry are as old as the industry itself but the early 1930s came with several special features. The films began to have dialogue. The Jazz Singer, directed by Alan Crosland and released in 1927, is considered to be the first film with fully synchronized sound. This technological innovation led to radical changes in film language. For example, there was no more need for exaggerated performances of the silent characters: they were able to talk about their inner emotions and many other things. This expansion of expressive capacity came simultaneously with the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. The happiness of the so-called decade of Jazz vanished in a few weeks. Poverty and despair spread among the lowest strata of society. The roads were covered with hundreds of thousands of people who wandered from town to town and city to city looking for work. These two variables—sound and the Depression—created a whole new set of aesthetic demands requiring that the old Formula be placed within a new context. roffman and purdy, 1981: 15

Hollywood films, as is expected of any cultural expression, began to reflect the social situation. But the owners of the industry didn’t like the depictions of the social consequences of the Depression. People need to see happy stories in order to forget the sad reality of everyday life. In 1927, William Hays, president of the Motion Picture Production and Distribution of America (mppda), had tried to implement a set of recommendations to be taken into account in filming. They were known as “Do not and Be Careful”. “Do not and Be Careful” recommendations were a complete failure. Nobody in Hollywood gave a dime

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production

255

for them. Everybody knew that the Catholic Church was lobbying Hays, and everybody knew that Catholics were still going to the cinema: There was no reason to take account of the recommendations and make less attractive and profitable films. In 1930, a new code was written and supposedly adopted by the industry. The creators were the Jesuit priest Daniel Lord and the journalist Martin Quigley. Jason S. Joy and James Wingate from the Studio Relations Committee were responsible for the good observance of the code. But Joy and Wingate were too lax in the application of the code and they lost a lot of fights against the Producers Appeal Board (in fact there is no difference between the films before and after the Code in those years), so after four years of failures and the increasing pressing of the lobbies, Will Hays decided the final coup. He created an office exclusively dedicated to the application of the code, the Production Code Administration or pca, and at the same time he abolished the Producers Appeal Board. This time the producers submitted. They accepted the provisions of the code and within a few months they took the “healthy” habit of sending the scripts to the pca, to avoid filming scenes that would not been approved. This historical event is traditionally understood as the claudication of the industry to the pressures exerted by the Catholic and Protestant Churches and the Legion of Decency. The fascinating aspect of this conflict was that Lord’s position, backed by Hays and the Catholic Church, was accepted almost without a whimper. Why the producers would adopt a code that, if interpreted literally, would eliminate important social, political and economic themes from movies and turn the industry into a defender of the status quo remains a mystery. Why would the industry, enjoying an all-time high of ninety million paid admissions per week, agree to such severe restrictions on content and form? black, 1994: 42

In my humble opinion, the Catholic Church did not have enough power to impose the code. I believe the reasons which “turned the industry into a defender of the status quo” were not just the pressure of religious groups. First, it must be remembered that in 1932, after Roosevelt came to the presidency, the Federal State was about to regulate films contents through the Code Authority for the Motion Picture Industry. The origin of this code was the National Recovery Administration, created by Roosevelt in the context of the “New Deal.”

256

Rodríguez de Austria

The owners of the industry feared more the real power of the bureaucrats of the nra than the pressing power of the Catholic Church. Secondly, it must be remembered that the real owners of the film industry were not the Hollywood producers, but the New York bankers to whom the producers were accountable. Hays succeeded because “the pca derives its authority from, and ultimately served to, the board of directors of the mppda, the New York bankers and moneymen behind the industry, not the on-site studio executives in Hollywood” (Doherty, 1999: 9). After several conflicts with unruly producers like Walter Wanger and the consequent calls to order from the East Coast, the producers realized that they had no choice. “Bank of America President A. P Giannini, one of Hollywood’s most powerful financial backers, cemented the new arrangements by stating flatly that the film would not receive financing without prior clearance from the pca” (Doherty, 1999: 326). The profit’s argument, commonly used by producers against censorship, didn’t work this time. Maybe the producers knew how to make money with films, but they lack the whole picture about economy. By contrast the bankers were experts in political economy. Moreover, the bankers were very interested in contemporary social and political movements. One of these social and political movements was decisive, although ­indirectly, for the adoption of the code: the Communist Revolution of 1919. The end of the First World War brought economic prosperity to the United States and Communism to Russia. Many glances turned toward the planned economy of the Communist system during the Great Depression as an alternative to Capitalism, which was not capable of providing economic prosperity and social ­stability at the same time. To reflect this, Hollywood started to show the failure of Capitalism in films like Heroes for Sale (William Wellman, 1933), The Power and the Glory (William K. Howard, 1933) and Little Man, What Now? (Frank Borzage, 1934). The bankers and moneymen of New York, the real owners of the film industry, were not willing to spend their money on films that depicted the failure of their economic system. Of course, they were also not going to put a cent into films in which their goodness, power and leadership were questioned. Instead they decided to use the code as a tool of social control. Hollywood was not a nest of Communists but there were a few people (especially writers) with “dangerous minds.” Besides, President Roosevelt was also trying to control Hollywood under the umbrella of the National Recovery Administration. The core of the New Deal was very simple: politics had to control economy in order to prevent instability and crisis (John Maynard Keynes). The control over Hollywood was just a branch of control over the social discourse in usa tried by Roosevelt. But the

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production

257

President did not gain control over Hollywood’s discourse: the auto-censorship code became a wall against political inferences. As a result, the censorship vanguard led by the conservative wing of the Catholic Church suddenly found itself supported by the US economic establishment. The Catholic Church thought they had won the war but what really defeated the Hollywood producers was the monster behind the Church. William Hays put Joseph Breen in charge of the Production Code Administration. Breen was an extreme right radical Catholic, sexist, racist and a rigid moralist (Black, 1994; 1998; Doherty, 2008), so he started a crusade against “sin” and “immorality” in Hollywood cinema. Breen’s moral (and political) crusade concealed a less visible ideological and economic crusade, but he wasn’t aware of this situation: During the first years as the chief of the pca Hays taught him that the code was not only a tool to defend US society from immorality, but also a tool to defend the status quo: Capitalism and Liberalism. Breen had to learn the spirit of the code and the importance of its unwritten elements. In 1966, the Production Code was replaced by the current system of classifying films by age: the motion picture content rating system. The difference between the systems is important: the motion picture content rating system ­regulates the access to certain content, not the content itself. In other words, it is an open-minded system. In any case, thirty years were enough to conform, along with other influences that marched in the same direction, the mentalities of millions of people, through the most powerful instrument of ­communication until the massive implantation of television. 3.1 The Code: Morality and Politics The core of the code was obviously morality. Moralists pointed out the ­detrimental influence that films could have on feeble-minded people, who were the majority of society according to Breen. In Reasons Supporting the Preamble of the Code, the writer asserts that film is the most widespread and influential art, therefore the film industry must be more responsible than the rest of the arts. Indeed, since films are watched by many different people (“mature, immature, developed, undeveloped, law abiding, criminal”) the permissiveness must be less than in other cultural creations that are reserved for a selected and formed minority, such as literature or theatre. The promoters of the code, due to their ultraconservative mentality, insist on the detrimental influence that films can have over “the immature, the young or the criminal classes” (Reasons Underlying the Particular Applications, iii, ii, Sex). The immature groups were, obviously, the lower classes, but what can we say about the presumed existence of the “criminal classes”?

258

Rodríguez de Austria

According to the code, films had to avoid all kinds of sordidness and “scabrous” issues, such as extra-marital relations, abortion or interracial relationships. It had to be avoided to encourage low passions, fewer childbirths and less alcohol abuse. Furthermore, the sanctity of marriage had to be respected, and religion and its ministers were not to be satirized. Vulgarity, obscenity, blasphemy, irreverence, nudity and insinuating dances were completely ­forbidden by the code (Particular Applications i–xii). Although it was not mentioned explicitly, homosexuality was banished from screens. Since 1934 it has not been possible to watch films like the following: – Madam Satan (Cecil B. DeMille, 1930). A selfless wife discovers the infidelities of her husband, but instead of getting angry she plots to seduce him again. She disguises herself in a voluptuous dress and achieves her goal, which is teaching her husband that he has nothing to seek outside home. – The Sign of the Cross (Cecil B. DeMille, 1932). In this film, the lower passions are constantly stimulated; one of the scenes takes place at the Roman circus where a naked Christian slave woman is tied to a stick and left at the mercy of a gorilla, whose interest seems to be purely sexual. – The Story of Temple Drake (Stephen Roberts, 1933). A naughty young girl, whose grandfather is an honorable judge, is raped by a bootlegger. After that, she freely decides to leave her home and live with her rapist. She feels an irresistible attraction toward his brutality and sexual prowess. One day this man makes a terrible mistake: he tries to hold the girl against her will, so she kills him in order to recover her freedom. – Call Her Savage (John Francis Dillon, 1932). A married woman keeps on having an affair with an American Indian man. She ends up getting pregnant by her secret lover and giving birth to a girl who, from childhood, “does not like her father.” The young girl, played by Clara Bow, can be seen whipping her best friend (another young American Indian), taking her fastener off and using it to heal her friend’s wounds, and playing and rolling around on the ground with a huge dog: a scene that is profoundly disliked by the actress’ father. – Safe in Hell (William Wellman, 1932). A young woman whose fiancé goes to war is forced to work as a prostitute in order to survive. Because of this, she becomes an alcoholic. Once her fiancé is back, they get married and she ­decides to stop drinking. However, this is not easy. Every time she tastes a drop of alcohol, she goes crazy. From a narrative point of view the basic moral requirement of the code was that good had always to succeed. This was indisputable. But the divergences arose when the plot of the film “delighted excessively” in the enjoyment of

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production

259

“bad” life choices and practices. This situation was very common in gangster films, whereby seventy minutes depicted the benefits and pleasures obtained through criminal activities, and only the last five minutes showed that, at the end, “crime never pays”. In the opinion of the pca, censoring this brief end in which “bad guys” are finally punished did not repair the damage caused to the impressionable spectators. The censors were probably referring to the young and the “criminal class” when they said that these people might think that a criminal career would be worth it. Even if later in the film the evil is condemned or punished, it must not be allowed to appear so attractive that the audience’s emotions are drawn to desire or approve so strongly that later the condemnation is forgotten and only the apparent joy of the sin remembered. 3.2 Reasons Underlying the General Principles On the other hand, the moral conduct of the characters, as well as their opinions, had to be reflected: as a rule, good characters should always be performed by stars and the bad characters should be performed by the supporting actors. As censor, Joseph Breen said: “You can’t leave to the discretion of an immature mind the decision on whether the characters have acted right or wrong” (Black, 1994: 173). A consequence of the clear distinction between good and bad actions was that “grey areas” disappeared from the screen. According to Joseph Breen, most of the audience was unable to assimilate that people are not good or bad by their birth or that it is possible to be both good and bad at the same time. The obligation of portraying evil as absolutely undesirable being and good as an absolutely desirable being reinforced Manichaeism in Hollywood films. It was not enough that the villain was punished at the end. They had to be like Midas King and ruin all the things they loved, betray their friends and, mostly, die sad and alone. They could only be redeemed by death (Waterloo Bridge, James Whale, 1931) or by the greatest tragedy, i.e. the loss of a child (Three on a Match, Mervyn LeRoy, 1932). Realism and the quality of the plot were secondary matters. In fact, PCA’s people did not like too much realism. Films were supposed to be entertaining and the reality of poor people was not very funny. In addition to the moral dispositions, the code offered a few rules about political correctness in films. For example, “white-slavery shall not be treated” (there was no problem with non-white-slavery). It was also forbidden to portray the Government or Courts of Justice as unfair or corrupt. It was allowed to portray particular cases but the reputation of the institution should never be

260

Rodríguez de Austria

harmed. Laws were, of course, always good. To think (or to make people think) that a law could be unjust was seen as a Communist heresy. From the point of view of the creation of primary frameworks, the regulations of the code about Politics institutions tried to impose the “bad [or rotten] apples frame”. The political and economic system cannot be corrupt, it does not allow, nor of course fosters, corruption within it. The malfunctioning of the system, which causes crises such as Great Depression, are due only to rotten apples that have been hidden in the basket. This is the suggested framework in the film The Washington Masquerade (Charles Brabin, 1932) in order to depict and defend the position of President Herbert Hoover confronting the Great Depression: He is “really an okay guy who’s been betrayed by a few rotten apples” (Roffman and Purdy, 1981: 57). The frame was established. It is in fact one of the most used frameworks in political communication. Bernstein, for example, refers the use of the “rottenapples” argument by Bush Government in the torture scandals at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prisons: “Why has this happened? Why have Bush and his cohorts been so reluctant to face up this blatant evil? Of course, there are political reasons for downplaying its significance, for seeing it as the actions of a few ‘bad apples’ (2005: 98).” The argument fits into one of the status quo’s favorites frames (reinforced by the code): The goodness and fairness of the institutions, including the army, was beyond doubt and discussion. The possibility that the army did not fight for peace and democracy was in fact unthinkable. People who admit that possibility are a threat. A political system, called liberal democracy, in the hands of an economic oligarchy whose interests differs from the interest of the common citizens, was absolutely unthinkable. That possibility was outside the limits of the common sense. 3.3 The Code: Ideology and Economy The key to understand the aims of a censorship code is sometimes more related to the underlying meaning than to the text itself. That is the case of the Hollywood Production Code. Daniel Lord S.J. knew this difference very well: It was the 1932 schedule, not the 1931 products, that alarmed Lord. He was deeply disturbed, he told Hays, to find the industry so deeply concerned with social problems. A year earlier Lord believed most films could be cleaned up by removing a scene or two. Now the problems involved the whole idea behind the film. Upcoming movies expressed a “philosophy of life.” In script after script he found frank discussions of “morals, divorce,

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production

261

free love, unborn children, relationship outside the marriage, double standards, the relationship of sex to religion, and marriage and its effects upon the freedom of women.” Equally dangerous were films that featured “defiance of the laws” and youthful rebellion against authority. […] Although at a certain level these complaints were predictable, insiders were shocked when Lord declared: “no matter how delicate or clean the treatment, these subjects are fundamentally dangerous” and unfit subjects for film. black, 1994: 62

The problem was the idea behind the films, “philosophy of life”, the system of beliefs, the worldview or Weltanschauung that the films reflected. The problem, thus, was not that the films were portraying social problems (albeit in significant ways). The true problem was that these films were putting debates on the table, in which social problems were discussed. This is important due to the propensity for debate, which is one of the main features of the fallibilism (and pragmatism), a philosophy which does not believe in absolutisms and tends to discuss concrete cases and review one’s own beliefs continuously. Lord was probably alarmed by films like Three on a Match (Mervyn LeRoy, 1932), in which a successful woman falls into a downward spiral to debauchery and alcoholism; or the famous Scarface (Howard Hawks and Richard Rosson, 1932), based on Al Capone’s life; or Blonde Venus (Josef von Sternberg, 1932), where Marlene Dietrich seeks a lover who pays for the treatment of her sick husband and ends up becoming a prostitute. He would also be alarmed when he watched I Am A Fugitive From a Chain Gang (Mervyn LeRoy, 1932), based on the autobiography of Robert E. Burns, where he describes how he is unfairly imprisoned and tortured until he manages to escape and start over in another State of the Union. Some years later, when he becomes a successful businessman, the Court of Georgia makes him a proposal: to turn himself in and be declared not guilty by the Court, so he could clean his criminal record. However, the judge raised the sentence instead and sent him to the same prison. This time, Robert was tortured more severely, until he managed to escape again. A few films in the following year were even more “problematic.” Beyond social problems such as poverty, prostitution, or criminality, the abundance of films that undermined the political and economic foundations of the system was unprecedented. In Baby Face (Alfred E. Green, 1933), Barbara Stanwyck manages to climb the social ladder using her body and sex as an instrument. Heroes for Sale (William Wellman, 1933) portrays the misadventures of a World War l hero, hooked on morphine because of the injuries from b­ attlefield.

262

Rodríguez de Austria

When his addiction comes to light, he is sacked and rejected by his own town. He also gets sent to jail and condemned to a life of hunger and behind bars. Wild Boys of the Road (William Wellman, 1933) portrays the story of two boys who decide to stop being a burden to their impoverished parents. They become vagrants and members of young gangs. The groups end up being beaten by police and are not allowed to enter the towns they pass by. In Gabriel Over The White House (Gregory LaCava, 1933), the President of the United States is corrupt and unfaithful, and also a gambler and a drinker. He is clearly depicted at the service of the economic power. After having a car accident, he is inspired by an archangel and somehow becomes a benevolent dictator who fights the Congress in order to give hope and job opportunities to the lower class. The “new” President speaks personally with an “army of unemployed” individuals that marches on Washington and turns it into an army of workers at the service of the State. In Gabriel Over The White House, we can find a certain resemblance with President Roosevelt and the difficulties he faced to start the New Deal and the public investment program. Gabriel and The President Vanishes were a ­production of Walter Wanger, the last disobedient director in Hollywood (­perhaps because he relied on the support of the new government. (Rodríguez de Austria, 2017). The President Vanishes (William Wellman, 1934) depicts how a few men of the economic elite try to force the President to take part in a war in Europe. In response to the President refusal, the lobby starts to bribe Senators and conducts a campaign of Agitation & Propaganda in order to infuse people with belligerent feelings. The lobby’s resemblance with the Committee on Public Information during World War i was very clear. In fact, the similarities between lobby members (a banker, an industrialist, a judge, a mogul of the Press…) and historical characters did not go unnoticed by the American audience. The film even warned viewers about the raising of fascism during the Great Depression in the United States. The case of The President Vanishes is a good example of the two different views about the code. When Joseph Breen saw the film he didn’t like it but he didn’t find anything objectionable from his moral view. The President Vanishes met the criteria of the code so it was approved. But the censor didn’t feel very sure so he sent the film to Hays. Hays’ view was less moral and more ideological. “Once again projectors rolled into mppda headquarters. After Hays and his board of Directors saw the film, Breen was ordered to withdraw the pca seal of approval. In Hays’ view the film was ‘communist propaganda, subversive in its portrait of American Government, contrary to the accepted principles of established law and order, and perhaps treasonable’ (Black, 1994: 250).”

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production

263

Although the code did not show any regulations on the portrayal of poverty, labor exploitation, or their consequences, its message was clear: justified strikes in factories would be censured from going on screen. The executives in the Hollywood industry, as owners of other kinds of industries, made things very clear: they would not invest a cent in a film containing a counter-hegemonic discourse. In fact, strikes and workers’ movements were seen with tension and worry by the censors. A famous and recent film by Sergei M. ­Eisenstein was precisely entitled The Strike (Stachka, 1925). The ghost embodied by Eisenstein, the ghost of Communism, was intended to be exorcized by the spirit of the code. Strikes and problems coming from a bad economic distribution were totally abolished from the big screen, as well as mass movements. American Madness (Frank Capra, 1932), Cabin in the Cotton (Michael Curtiz, 1932), Gabriel Over The White House (Gregory LaCava, 1933) were the last films of this kind. As an example, we can mention Black Fury (Michael Curtiz, 1935), which was released a year after the implementation of the code. In Black Fury, workers are deceived and led to strike by a perverse private-police company, but they have no real reasons to go on strike, since their working conditions are very fair: they live in houses with a covered porch where they leisurely smoke after a hard day of work. The film ends with the benevolent and paternal owner of the factory restoring the lost brotherhood with the help of the workers. No more films like Skyscraper Souls (Edgar Selwyn, 1932) or The Match King (Howard Bretherton y William Keighley, 1932) were produced. In these films, a capitalist tycoon is portrayed as an immoral person whose main interest is money. By the way: this portrayal was inconceivable in films of the previous decade, when these characters were the people who brought wealth to the country (Doherty, 1999: 58). In Employees’ Entrance (Roy Del Ruth, 1933), starring as the two mentioned films by Warren William, the unscrupulous and tyrannical tycoon is the only businessman who survives and succeeds in the capitalist jungle depicted in the film. This time, the light is not so unfavorable, even though the “shark” gives a beautiful young woman a job in exchange for sex and threatens to fire his secretary (just because she had bought a dress in the competition) and does not think twice to ruin an industrialist who made a delayed delivery. The censors succeeded enormously when applying the code’s meaning: The pca reports for the period 1935–1940 are telling. In 1935 Breen told Will hays that 122 films, or 23.5 percent of the total Hollywood production, fell into the “social category.” By the next year the total had fallen to 104 or 19.4 percent and, as Breen continued to invoke “industry policy,”

264

Rodríguez de Austria

the numbers continued to decline. By 1938, he proudly reported to Hays that only 12.4 percent of industry films dealt with social issues, and in 1939 a mere 9.2 percent, or 54 films, were seen as having social significance. In 1941 Will Hays contentedly told a Senate investigating committee that less than 5 percent dealt with social or political issues. black, 1994: 287

One of the main takeaways of the ideological reform accomplished by the code was: in a Democracy, Capitalism is not perfect, but is the best socio-economic system despite its terrible crises. There is no conflict of interest among different social groups in Capitalism. Those in power (bishops, judges, politicians, police officers, militaries, business upper class) are always good, even if there are some rotten apples that tend to receive their due punishment. The social, political and economic order, and the existing status quo, is the best possible social organization. Our system is the light; outside the system reigns darkness, chaos and evil. Most times, the upper classes are somehow educated, decent and beautiful, while the lower classes are immature, easily influenced, ugly, potentially criminal and simple-minded. Virtues of the former are wisdom, goodness, organization, honesty and authority. The virtues of the latter are trust, obedience, enthusiasm at work and a desire to climb the social ladder. Both share an unwavering sense of duty. Crime is always caused by the inherent evil of some people. There is no other possible explanation. Poverty is always the fault of the afflicted, but not of a system full of opportunities for determined and hardworking people. The nature of women is to be submissive and sexual objects. Etc. 4

Conclusion: The Hegemonic Worldview

Humans, in contrast to the rest of living beings, have a very complex system of communication. We are symbolic animals. Symbols are inherent to our development as species and as human beings. Symbols are not only our system of communication but also the instrument through which we understand reality. It is a classic the example of Eskimos and their dozen words to refer to the ­different states or types of snow. Where a Westerner just sees a landscape of ice and snow, an Eskimo recognizes a lot of different nuances, and has a language to name them. Their social environment has taught them from childhood to recognize the different types of snow, and the word with which each one is identified has provided a fundamental aid in this learning.

The Role of the Hollywood Motion Picture Production

265

With the application of the above example to the field of morality, we will find a person who sees just a good or evil landscape and a person who is able to recognize different nuances between good and evil. As it happens in the case of the snow, one of the keys is still language: this person has a language based on education and experience to express these nuances. But if this language disappears, if these definitions cease to exist or no one teaches them, the following generations will learn exclusively the Manichaean language of absolutes good and evil, and they will have mentalities tending to fundamentalism. Facing a situation of crisis that made the system falter, the economic, political and religious powers, as limbs of the same body, worked together in order to reinforce hegemony. Schools, media and pulpits, the main agents of the symbolic universe, redoubled their efforts in the consolidation of a general primary frame of reference. Beyond the limits of the frame, and in the shade, were the radical, the irrational, the untruly, the madness, the unthinkable. All stories outside the frame were forbidden and all ideas were banished. The universe showed on the big screen was reduced drastically. Diversity of characters, feelings, relationships, disappeared. The guidelines of the frame were: 1. Economy: private property, free enterprise and Capitalism were natural institutions. Other social organizations were aberrations contrary to nature. 2. Politics reduced to personal leadership. That is, there was no need to pay attention to, and be concerned about, social and political institutions. 3. Anthropology: Competition and individualism were natural feelings, community and cooperation were artificial and contrary to human nature. 4. The pillars of society were the patriarchal and nuclear family, and heterosexual and hetero-normative relationships. These institutions were sacred and there should be no deviations from the norm. 5. Morality: narrow and Manichaean. 6. There was no community. People together were only a mass, incapable of autonomous. A mass that was only able to follow its leaders. 7. Good citizens had full confidence in political and economic institutions and the people who embodied them. 8. Social problems were always personal, non-structural problems. For example, crime was always a moral or psychological problem, not a social problem caused occasionally by poverty. It is difficult to measure the role of the Motion Picture Production Code in the establishment of this hegemonic frame. However, if we remember the cited statistics presented by Breen to Hays, the influence of the code in the

266

Rodríguez de Austria

i­ mplementation of the hegemonic frame was devastating. Even today, in more than one sense, we live in a world partially modeled by the Hollywood Motion Picture Production Code. Bibliography Berger, P.L.; T. Luckmann 1967. The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of knowledge. London, Penguin Books. Bernstein, R. 2005. The Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11. Cambridge, Polity Press. Black, G. 1994. Hollywood Censored: Morality Codes, Catholics, and the Movies. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Black, G. 1998. The Catholic Crusade Against the Movies, 1940–1975. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Bobbio, N.; N. Matteucci 1981. Diccionario de Política. Madrid, Siglo XXI. Doherty, T. 1999. Pre-Code Hollywood. Sex, Immorality, and Insurrection in American Cinema 1930–1934. New York, Columbia University Press. Doherty, T. 2008. Hollywood’s Censor: Joseph I. Breen and the Production Code Administration. New York, Columbia University Press. Gitlin, T. 2003. The Whole World is Watching. Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left. Berkeley, University of California Press. Goffman, E. 1986 [1974]. Frame Analysis. An Essay of the Organization of Experience. Boston, Northeastern University Press. Lakoff, G. 2004. Don’t Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate. White River Junction, Chelsea Green Publishing. Miller, T.; N. Govil; J. Mcmurria; R. Maxwell 2001. Global Hollywood. London, British Film Institute. Phillips, P. 2007. Spectator, audience and response. In Nelmes, J. (Ed.) Introduction to Film Studies, pp. 143–172. London, Routledge. Rodríguez De Austria, A.M. 2017. The President Vanishes (W. Wellman, 1934): Una crítica al negocio de la guerra [The President Vanishes (W. Wellman, 1934): A Criticism of the War Business]. Comunicación. Revista Internacional de Comunicación Audiovisual, Publicidad y Estudios Culturales, N° 15. Roffman, P.; J. Purdy. 1981. The Hollywood Social Problem Film. Madness, Despair, and Politics from the Depression to the Fifties. Bloomington, Indiana University Press. Sánchez Ruiz, E. 2003. Hollywood y su hegemonía planetaria: Una aproximación histórico-estructural. Guadalajara, n° 28 de la Colección de Babel de la Revista Universidad de Guadalajara.

Chapter 15

MH17 as Free-Floating Atrocity Propaganda Oliver Boyd-Barrett 1 Introduction A Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777–200ER, en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur (the Malaysian capital) on July 17 2014, was flying at 33,000 feet over separatist-held territory in southeastern Ukraine when it broke apart in midair and crashed outside of Hrabove, near Torez in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, killing all 298 passengers and crew members. Victims came from 10 ­nations. Almost two-thirds, 193, were Dutch; 43 were Malaysian and 28 Australian. An investigation into an event of this kind is the responsibility of the International Civil Aviation Organization (icao). On this occasion and under Washington pressure, investigation was entrusted to the Netherlands, on the grounds that two thirds of the passengers were Dutch (Parry 2016a). In the immediate aftermath and before any investigation, Kiev authorities, supported by the usa and allied powers, accused Russia or Russian-supported separatists/rebels in eastern Ukraine, or both. Of all possible scenarios this refrain echoed most loudly in western mainstream media (wmm) during the lead-up to publication some 15 months later of the report of the official investigation into the cause of the tragedy, conducted by the Dutch Safety Board (Dutch Safety Board 2015), the preliminary findings of the criminal inquiry of the Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team (JIT) in September 2016 and the JIT’s ­final report in May 2018. The dsb pronounced on the cause (a ground-to-air missile) but not the culprits. The jit declared that the missile came from ­Russia, but left identification of individual culprits to a final report due in 2018. This “final report” said that several dozen suspects were under consideration, related to Russia’s 53rd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade based in Kursk, and promised future indictments (surely knowing that the chances of any persons indicted would ever appear in court or that the JIT’s evidence would ever be subject to detailed interrogation were slim). I shall argue that the MH17 tragedy has been exploited as atrocity propaganda in much the same way as other classic instances of the genre. To be effective, atrocity stories need to be perceived as real by the majority of their listeners. They do not have to be either true or false to work as tools for the

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_017

268

Boyd-Barrett

propagandists (Jowett and O’Donnell 2015). Their purpose is to smear opponents as ruthless and barbarous. They excite compassion for victims, and provoke hatred for alleged perpetrators. Such raw emotions are resources on which a government may draw for popular support as it prepares for war or its possibility. They are common in periods leading up to war, and often contribute prominently in pretexts given for war (such as “­ humanitarian intervention”) that are used to mobilize public opinion, annihilate anti-war sentiment and threaten the enemy. Examples cited by Jowett and O’Donnell include false stories of German soldiers killing and eating babies, in the lead-up to World War One. In 1990, PR corporation Hill and Knowlton constructed a narrative, wholly or mostly false, that Iraqi soldiers occupying Kuwait City removed babies from incubators and left them to die. The story helped the administration of George H.W. Bush arouse outrage among a hitherto apathetic public in anticipation of the 1991 US-led liberation of Kuwait and invasion of Iraq. The George W. Bush administration manufactured an alarm in 2002–2003 about wholly or mainly non-existent “weapons of mass destruction” that it claimed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had amassed, falsely branding Hussein as an immediate threat, thus preparing the world for the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2015). Regardless of who was actually responsible for shooting down MH17 – the case is deeply contested and will likely continue to be such – the tragedy was exploited by the post-coup regime of Ukraine, the usa and its allies, as part of a broader campaign to demonize Russia and in particular its President, Vladimir Putin. In addition to standard propaganda tactics of personalization and simplification (focusing public outrage on one highly visible leader deemed “authoritarian” or worse), MH17 provided a high-profile event that could be drawn upon to mobilize outrage. It was simpler to grasp and less morally ambiguous than either Russia’s annexation of Crimea or its mainly indirect support for the separatists/rebels in eastern Ukraine. Its main flaw was that even if culpable, Russia had no motive to have acted with intentionality – had less motive, even, than Ukraine itself. By pointing the finger more or less exclusively toward Russia, propagandists could assign blame and make Russia look obdurate and defiant whenever it protested its innocence. 2

Study Objectives

My overriding objective to which this study is a contribution is to understand the propaganda strategies that lie behind the construction of pretexts for war, both in general and with specific reference to the evolution of US foreign policy since 2001. There is a rich literature on propaganda (see, for example, Jowett

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

269

and O’Donnell, 2015; Stanley, 2016). In-depth examination of specific instances may help us detect evolution and innovation in propaganda practice. Making the findings of any such investigation available to the public sphere enriches public discussion of matters of great importance and contributes to the possibility of democratic discourse. In so far as disclosure may deter actors from aggression it may offer protection from needless loss of life. My secondary objectives are to illuminate the merits of claims that Russia or Russian-back separatists were responsible for shooting down MH17 as well as to look at the merits of claims that Ukraine was responsible. I shall draw attention to the possibility that contestation over who shot down MH17 served as propaganda by diverting attention away from the issue of why air-space was still open above a war zone in July 2014. In passing I shall call attention to western mainstream media’s (wmm) elevation to the status of reliable news sources institutions that may be anything but. 3

Basic Context

I shall briefly sketch the immediate context in which the MH17 tragedy occurred. For fuller accounts and a more comprehensive list of citations, see Sakwa (2015) and Boyd-Barrett (2016). The main context is one of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. There is a long and intimate relationship between these countries. Kiev was the first capital of Russia in the 800s. Ukraine was a component part of the Soviet Union, and became independent when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Many ethnic Russians live in Ukraine. Ukraine had a population, according to its 2001 census, of 48 million people (sinking to 45 million by 2014, according to the World Bank [2016]). Of these some 78% were ethnic Ukrainians, 17% were ethnic Russians, and 6% were descendants of Belarusians, Tatars, Romanians, Lithuanians, Poles and others. Ethnic Russians were distributed unevenly but were concentrated in the eastern and southern regions where they comprised 58% of Crimea, 39% of Luhansk, 38% of Donetsk, 26% of Kharkov, 25% of Zaporozhe and 21% of Odessa. In the cities of these regions the proportion of ethnic Russians was higher (Sakwa, 2015: 10–11). Crimea had been assigned to Ukraine by Soviet President Khrushchev in 1954. Whether he acted in accordance with Soviet law at the time is contested. Russia retained access to Sevastopol and its Black Sea fleet after Ukrainian independence in 1991. Because ethnic Russians in Crimea widely perceived the post-coup regime of 2014 to be extremely nationalistic and anti-Russian they supported separation from Ukraine and annexation with Russia. Polls and other evidence show consistently strong support in Crimea for Russian annexation (see GfK poll cited by unian, 2015; Kelly, 2015; Rapoza, 2015; Parry 2015d).

270

Boyd-Barrett

West Ukrainian dislike is rooted in memories of Stalinist collectivization in the 1930s and its toll of two million famine victims. Anti-Russian sentiment is the other side of the coin to Ukrainian fascist movements from before, during and after WW2 (enjoying US support during the Cold War). The 2014 Maidan protests that led to the ouster and exile of democratically elected President Yanukovych – who would have had to stand for re-election within months – gave voice to popular outrage against corruption in general and in particular against Yanukovych’s last minute abandonment of an EU Association agreement that would have integrated Ukraine even more tightly into the EU/nato orbit. The agreement would be packaged with an imf loan that would, and did, introduce an austerity regime that was already tearing ­Europe apart and did not compare favorably with an alternative Russian loan on offer. As in the case of the first (and disastrous) Ukrainian “color revolution” in 2004, the 2014 coup d’etat showed flagrant evidence of US support. The Maidan protests appear to have provoked brutal over-reaction on the part of police. This provided an opening for disciplined Right Sektor (proto-fascist) paramilitaries to take charge. There is evidence of murderous tactics on both sides. Maidan’s success encountered bitter ethnic Russian resistance in Crimea, as we have seen, and also in Odessa and Mariupol (where protest was brutally extinguished) and in eastern Ukraine or the Donbass. Prevailing sentiment in the Donbass takes the form of demands for autonomy – not, as in Crimea, for annexation with Russia. In the Donbass, resistance found expression in civil war (that persists) and declarations of independence by the self-declared People’s Republic of Donetsk and the People’s Republic of Luhansk. The basis for a settlement was negotiated in February 2015 (the “Minsk ii” agreement) between representatives of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany and overseen by the Organization of Security and Co-Operation in Europe (osce). This was to have taken effect by the end of 2015 but did not. Major hurdles included the opposition of Ukrainian right-wing paramilitary forces to any form of election that would cede significant autonomy in the Donbass, and the challenge of foisting any measure of federalism on a highly centralized state. There is a broader context. Its articulation varies considerably between US, EU, Russian and Chinese interests. It may be said to reflect the perceived threat of domination of the global polity and economy by the usa, and US fear of resistance to its domination. Mutual perception of threat principally has its roots in the rise of the brics economies – Brazil, Russia, India, China and, some would add, South Africa. Many western strategists (they include President Carter’s senior security advisor Zbigniew K. Brzezinski [Brzezinski 1998]) have concurred that control of Eurasia, the landmass that separate Western Europe from Russia and China, is one condition for global dominance.

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

271

Dissolution of the Russian Federation and of Russia itself would help the usa, as would ­extension of the US/nato and EU orbit into countries in or adjacent to the Federation, such as Ukraine. A tighter alliance between Russia and ­China would be a problem for the usa as would, in the wake of Britain’s “Brexit” vote in 2016, any interest by EU members in reducing US-stoked tensions with Russia. The possibility that Donald Trump might win the 2016 US presidential election and seek relations of “normalcy” with Russia was far from the horizon. 4

The Significance of MH17

The significance of MH17 was greater than it might have seemed initially. From the strategic perspective of conflict between US/nato and Russia, MH17 had no necessary significance – such incidents, accidental or otherwise, are common in international conflict. But from the perspective of conflict propaganda MH17 provided usable atrocity imagery that helped shape the symbolic environment in a manner conducive to potential war between nuclear powers (Russia, nato/usa and EU) and could be evoked at any time to strengthen the western case against Russia. It was similar in this respect to persistent western claims in 2002–2003 that Saddam Hussein had “gassed his own people” (Iraqi Kurds) in 1989, even though the incidents occurred in the aftermath of the 1980–1988 Iraq-Iran war, the usa helped furnish the materials and the attacks may conceivably have been committed by Iran. This is why I call such atrocity propaganda “free-floating”: its relationship to solid evidence may be fragile and is easily detached, at will, from a specific context for convenient application to any number of others. Russia’s agreement in response to the Crimean people’s request to annex Crimea (often referred to by western politicians and wmm as Russia’s “seizure” of Crimea) together with the alleged shooting down of MH17 by Russia or Russian-backed separatists/rebels, were primary pretexts for US and EU sanctions against Russia. These inflicted significant damage to the Russian economy. Ironically they also inflicted significant damage on the economies of both Ukraine and Europe, because of Russian counter-sanctions and negative impacts on trade. 5

The Nuclear Dimension

Any propaganda that contributes to the escalation of tensions between nuclear powers acquires a practical significance for the survival of the human

272

Boyd-Barrett

species. mit missile expert Theodore Postol expressed concern early on in the conflict that there was a sophisticated effort to ready US nuclear forces for direct confrontation with Russia. He noted that technical disparities between the opponents can increase the danger of nuclear war and claimed that Russia lacked a working space-based early warning system that could detect ­incoming ­missiles below the earth’s horizon (Postol, cited by Deutsch, 2015). Russians would have six minutes to decide whether to counterattack. Similarly, Veteran foreign policy consultant, William Polk, a Kennedy adviser during the Cuban missile crisis, worried that with the escalation of nuclear tensions came multiple possibilities of technical error that could ignite all-out war amid likely fallibility of decision-making (Polk, 2015). In short, the Ukraine crisis helped reignite Cold War tensions, accentuating fears of nuclear confrontation, whether planned or accidental. A former nato Deputy Supreme Allied Commander predicted that Russia would attack nato in 2017 (Robinson, 2016). In May, nato deployed the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system in Romania and planned a further deployment in Poland in 2018. Russia protested that such systems are anything but “defensive” since they qualify as launch areas for US missiles. nato forces engaged in large-scale military exercises close to the Russian border in Poland and in Ukraine from June 2016. Meanwhile, Russia tested prototypes of the S-500 Prometey air and missile defense system capable of destroying icbms, hypersonic cruise missiles and up to 10 ballistic missile warheads before these should re-enter the atmosphere (Escobar, 2016). 6

Broader Study: Mainstream/Alternative Media Sources of Conflict Discourses

This chapter is part of a broader study (Boyd-Barrett, 2016) that examines ten critical discourses relating to the Ukraine crisis concerning the causes of the 2014 coup d’etat; the status of the imf as a source of financial aid; the nature of the Maidan protests; the nature of the post-coup regime in Kiev; the broader political and economic contexts; the nature of resistance to the post-coup regime in Crimea, Odessa and the Donbass; demonization of Putin; the shooting down of MH17; the nature of Russian support for ethnic Russian separatists/ rebels in eastern Ukraine; and the imposition of western sanctions against Russia. The study draws on careful monitoring over a two year period of several mainstream daily print media. These were China Daily, Guardian, Independent, Kyiv Post, Los Angeles Times, Moscow Times, New York Times, RT.com, unian. In addition, several alternative media were monitored on a daily basis. These

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

273

included: Alternet.org, Antiwar.com, clg, Common Dreams, Consortium News, Information Clearing House, Huffington Post, Salon.com., Truthout.org. Finally, certain media were monitored on a regular, but not a daily basis. Within the realm of mainstream media these included but were not limited to Agence France Presse, Bloomberg, bbc, Economist, Reuters, Sputnik. Amid alternative media they included Fair.org, The Intercept, MediaLens.org. 7

On Shooting Down Planes

The shooting down or hijacking of planes, sabotage and other incidents related to planes and airports has held a long-standing fascination for both terrorists and media scholars. International air travel (sometimes domestic too) is quintessentially about border crossings. When something goes wrong two and often many more countries (depending in part on passenger lists) are implicated and interested, as are their media. If ratings, readers and publicity are the rewards for attracting public attention, then airline incidents offer potential multiplier effects. Civilian airliners frequently carry large numbers of men, women and children. Their numbers over-represent the more privileged classes from the more privileged countries. A single, compact air catastrophe yields endless media narratives of tragic loss, often encapsulated in visual record of smashed fuselage and mournful detritus – teddy bears, dolls, and passports. A classic media study by Robert Entman helped embed the concept of “framing” within analysis of media coverage (Entman, 2003). Entman looked at two objectively similar international events – the 1983 Soviet shoot down of a Korean civilian airliner and the 1988 U.S. shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner. Despite the similarity of events, the Korean airliner shooting down was portrayed in US mainstream media as an intentional and deliberate attack by the Soviets. This framing was consonant with a larger Cold War narrative about the usa’s principal nemesis, the Soviet Union, which President Reagan dubbed the “evil empire,” a status that helped sustain media attention. In contrast, even given similar circumstances and equivalent uncertainty as to what had actually happened, the shooting down of the Iranian airliner was framed by the US media as an unfortunate, tragic mistake and given far less news attention. It was scarcely surprising that in the light of MH17 US media did not conjure much interest in a previous shooting down in Ukraine airspace, the 2001 shooting down of a Russian civilian airline flying from Russia to Israel on October 4, killing 78. Kiev denied the shooting for 9 days, then said it probably was responsible for an “accidental hit from an S-200 rocket fired during exercises” in Crimea. Kiev recanted in 2011, but offered no substitute explanation.

274

Boyd-Barrett

Vulnerability of such events to multiple, sometimes contradictory propaganda games was represented by the Lockerbie explosion in 1988. Pan Am Flight 103 flew from Frankfurt to Detroit, via London and New York, on 21 December. It was destroyed by a terrorist bomb, killing all 243 passengers and 16 crew over Lockerbie, Scotland. Western intelligence agencies initially blamed Iran or the Palestine Liberation Army (possibly acting on behalf of Iran); even today periodic stories suggest Iranian responsibility. In at least one regard this may not have occasioned surprise since, as we have just seen, an Iranian ­airliner was shot down by the usa just a few months previously. But in 1988, the West was still reeling from the apparent murder of a policewoman in ­London by gunmen in the Libyan embassy, and President Reagan was convinced Libyans were behind the infamous Berlin discotheque bombing of 1986. Libya was preferred terrorist monster du jour. Lockerbie was used to demonize Coronel Gadhafi, and even justify his assassination many years later “on humanitarian grounds” in 2011 when nato bombing destroyed his regime and opened up Libya to factious Jihadist elements that Gadhafi had successfully kept under control. This was long after Gadhafi had accepted responsibility for Lockerbie (a Libyan agent was found guilty, served his time and was released on compassionate grounds shortly before his death) and paid compensation. None of this should mean that we know for certain that the Gadhafi regime was indeed responsible. It may have suited Gadhafi to accept responsibility in return, as he expected, for membership of the club of countries subscribing to the Washington Consensus. Some testimony indicates that the cia may have faked some of the evidence against Libya. (Recent accounts of the Lockerbie bombing include books by Chasey, 2016; MacAskill, 2016; and Kerr, 2013). 8

MH17 & John Kerry: US “Evidence”

Washington supported Kiev’s claims that MH17 was struck by one of possibly three buk self-propelled fire installations (buk 312) of Russian origin allegedly manned by the pro-Russian eastern Ukraine resistance. One source attributed responsibility to a buk 312 supposedly located in rebel-held Snizhne. The “evidence” relied on a Ukraine government audiotape in which resistance commanders acknowledged responsibility for the shoot down. A key part of the recording appeared to have been made hours before the crash. Additionally, the tape was patched together, indicating that the conversation in question was not continuous (Parry, 2014a; 2014b; 2014c).

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

275

So just as a year previously the US Secretary of State John Kerry had rushed to judgment as to the responsibility of the Assad regime for its alleged use of chemical weapons in Ghouta (the charges could not stick) so in the case of MH17 he was quick to accept Kiev’s assertions of Russian responsibility, confidently proclaiming US omniscience on August 12 2014: “We saw the take-off. We saw the trajectory. We saw the hit. We saw this airplane disappear from the radar screens. So there is really no mystery about where it came from and where these weapons have come from.” kerry, quoted by Parry, 2016d

This was 15 months before release of the report of the dsb (which did not assign culpability) and over two years before release of the jit report. Actual evidence in support of Kerry’s assertions still had not been released to the public at the time of writing. Kerry’s assertions did not align closely with statements from other members of his team. Referring to speculation that MH17 had been fired on by a Russian buk ground-to-air missile Air Force Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, US commander of nato forces in Europe said “We have not seen any of the [Russian] air-defense vehicles across the border yet.” Rear Adm. John Kirby, Pentagon press secretary also demurred: “defense officials could not point to specific evidence that an SA-11 surface-to-air missile system had been transported from Russia into eastern Ukraine” (quoted by Parry, 2014c) US satellite evidence was not submitted to the dsb investigation in time for its final report in October 2015. In February 2016 the Dutch head prosecutor claimed that there were no satellite images, allegedly because of cloud cover on the day in question. Yet radar satellites of the kind that would be accessible to the US State Department were working at microwave frequencies to see through clouds. The Dutch Prosecutor conceded there was radar evidence which, mysteriously, his team was still in process of acquiring. Ukraine had not run primary radar surveillance on July 17 2014 supposedly for reasons of malfunction or maintenance. So it had no other means for ensuring air safety over the war zone in eastern Ukraine other than closing air space, which it did not do. Ukraine’s secondary radar system would not have tracked military aircraft since these do not identify themselves with transponders. In March 2016 the US submitted evidence to Dutch prosecutors but it remained classified. Russia claimed (but appeared to have retracted by the time of the jit report) to have detected a possible warplane in the vicinity of MH17. Primary radar data was not saved, because eastern Ukraine was

276

Boyd-Barrett

o­ utside its jurisdiction. Russia claimed to have offered its visual screen images to dsb / jit but that these were discounted by investigators (Parry, 2016c), perhaps because they implicated one or more Ukrainian military jets flying close to MH17 (the source of air-to-air missile theories of the shooting down of MH17 that neither Kiev nor the dsb favored) or perhaps because forgery was suspected (as claimed by Bellingcat.com, see Higgins, 2015; also Bodner, 2015b). 9

Evidence of Separatist or Russian Culpability: Strelkov

Donetsk separatist leader Igor Strelkov (aka Girkin) reportedly uploaded a post on Russian social media site Vkontakte to celebrate the downing of what he thought was a Ukrainian AN-26 jet. This posting was said to have been ­removed subsequently. A pro-American source (Fitzpatrick, 2014a) cited similar “confessions” in Russian media, notably the pro-Kremlin newspaper Vzglyad. These indicated that separatists had the means to bring down Ukrainian jets by July 14, means that likely included one or more buks either provided by Russia or stolen from Ukrainian forces. Another possibility was that missiles were fired from Russia. The independence of such evidence was uncertain. Alexander Borodai, Prime Minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic, reportedly called a Russian media contact forty-nine minutes after the crash to say that separatists had likely shot down a civilian airliner. As with the articles from Vzglyad, above, this evidence came from The Interpreter by Catherine Fitzpatrick (Fitzpatrick, 2014b) which in turn was backed by US propagandist organization Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. The article acknowledged that interviewee Dmitry Muratov, editor of Moscow opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta considered that Borodai likely had made the statement attributed to him, but Borodai himself denied it. Within days of the attack his spokesman claimed that rebels lacked the equipment to shoot down a plane flying as high as MH17. It was scarcely surprising that noted anti-Putin intellectuals such as Muratov, or politicians like Duma member Ilya Ponomarev, should side with Ukrainian and Western versions of events. A story from leading US news agency Associated Press (AP) datelined July 25 claimed that a buk missile launcher actually stopped in front of AP journalists in Snizhne, where “a man wearing unfamiliar fatigues, speaking with a distinctive Russian accent, checked to make sure they weren’t filming.” The story cited an unnamed “rebel” as saying later that the separatists shot down a civilian airliner in error (Karmanau and Leonard, 2014). It is unclear whether these journalists were the actual authors of the news report. The report was written

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

277

over a week after the shooting. “Unfamiliar fatigues” do not have to be Russian, and a “distinctive” Russian accent was hardly strange among ethnic Russian speakers of the Donbass living in close proximity to the Russian border. Would a buk missile launcher on a stealth mission from Russia to Snizhne have drawn attention to itself by stopping in front of a group of journalists working for a western news agency with the intent to seize their film had they in fact been filming? Thus there were multiple reports from Ukrainian sources before, on and after July 17, that claimed knowledge of sophisticated Russian weaponry in the hands of either or both Russians and ethnic Russian separatists, weaponry that possibly included one or more buk missile launchers. There were also reports that Russia was itself deploying Russian equipment from within Russian territory in support of ethnic Russian separatists. An AP story date-lined July 17 (Leonard, 2014) asserted that an AP reporter (presumably one of the AP reporters cited in the July 25 story above) had seen a buk launcher in Snizhne prior to the shooting. If true, the reporter or ­reporters were possibly in Snizhne (not normally a place that would likely attract western attention) to investigate shootings against Ukrainian Sukho-25 planes either by rebels or from Russian territory, and to explore Ukrainian allegations of sophisticated equipment being supplied to the rebels from Russia. Why is this significant? Four months earlier, some international airlines decided not to fly over eastern Ukrainian airspace. These included Korean Air, Asiana Airlines and British Airways. The International Civil Aviation Organization warned governments in April of the risk to commercial airliners flying over Ukraine, and the American Federal Aviation Administration advised “extreme caution.” If there was any reason for Ukraine to keep open its airspace in eastern Ukraine, or for airlines to continue to fly over it, it would be the tenuous proposition that civilian airlines are generally required to maintain altitudes of above 30,000 feet and that ethnic Russian separatists (despite some claims to the contrary, as we have seen) did not have the firepower to reach such altitudes. Both Ukrainian and, across the border, Russian military had access to numerous buk missile systems, and Ukrainian military had many such systems located in contested areas of eastern Ukraine. In other words, there was never at any point during the fighting a time that civilian airlines were not at grave risk of being fired upon, whether by accident or for any other reason, from buk missile systems with a reach of up to 80,000 feet. A growing rumble of concern had surfaced well before July 17, from both Ukrainian sources and wmm, of successful attacks on Ukrainian military jets by ethnic Russian separatists, amidst allegations of the deployment of sophisticated Russian weaponry in eastern

278

Boyd-Barrett

Ukraine or the support of such weaponry from the Russian side of the border and indications – even visual sightings – of buk missile launchers. In these circumstances it is difficult to understand why Ukraine had not shut down its airspace over eastern Ukraine before July 17 or, given that Ukraine had not shut down its airspace, why international airlines did not simply divert their flight paths to avoid the obvious and imminent dangers that were so clearly present. Should such evidence have raised questions as to criminal negligence on the part of Ukrainian authorities and international aviators? Could it be that Ukrainian authorities simply did not believe their own propaganda about equipment allegedly deployed by the Russians in support of ethnic Russian separatists? If they did believe it, there was no conceivable excuse for not shutting down east Ukrainian airspace. If they did not believe it, why did the Ukrainians have their own buks in eastern Donestsk – who were they going to fire at? Perhaps Kiev authorities reasoned there might be some plausible scenario in which they would need to fire their buks. Ukrainians and wmm had made much of the possibility of a Russian “invasion.” They could not predict when exactly such an invasion might take place, or if the feared invasion might simply take the form of penetration of Ukrainian airspace by Russian fighter planes. So why did not the Ukrainians, as a responsible and necessary precaution, shut down their airspace to civilian flights anyway? Alternatively, did Kiev believe its own propaganda and calculate that an international civilian airliner would indeed be shot down by separatists or ­Russians (especially if Ukrainian jets routinely flew behind or above civilian airliners as camouflage) and that this would provide Kiev a major propaganda coup? Or did Kiev itself plan to shoot down such an airliner and then blame the separatists or Russians or both (a high-risk strategy given US satellite surveillance, unless the usa was party to any such conspiracy)? Or did civilian airliners seem so valuable as camouflage for Ukrainian military planes that Ukrainian authorities decided to keep the skies open just for that purpose? 10

Ukraine Responsibility?

Russia first contended that the missile that brought down MH17 was fired from the air, most likely from a Ukrainian military jet that possibly mistook MH17 for the plane then carrying Vladimir Putin back to Russia after a trip to Latin America and that was passing over Ukrainian air space around the same time as MH17. Russia seemed less committed to this theory by the time of the dsb report in 2015 but it was consonant with claims by investigative journalist

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

279

­ obert Parry that cia analysts had considered the possible involvement of a R prominent but rogue Ukrainian oligarch who may have paid for MH17 to be brought down either to strike at Vladimir Putin or in order to embarrass Russia with charges of having downed a civilian airliner. A German Correct!V journalistic investigation published shortly before the dsb report offered an explanation for the presence of Ukrainian jet fighters close-by, namely that Ukraine used civilian aircraft as “human shields” (Correct!V 2015). 11

On the Strange Elevation of Questionable Sources

From at least 2011 (some sources suggest a much earlier date) US-­supported Sunni “rebels” (also backed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and the uae) sought to overthrow the Allawite/Shia Assad regime worked alongside or in collaboration with Al Qaeda affiliate al Nusra, even though these were not altogether distinguishable from the “official” enemy in Syria and Iraq namely isis, and even though the US formally considered all these groups as terrorist organizations, against whom they were indeed fighting in Iraq. From this cess-pool there emerged two sources of information frequently cited by western media, first for reports about Syria and later, so far as one of these organizations was concerned, about Ukraine. These were the self-styled Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (Syria) and Bellingcat.com (Syria, Ukraine). There were curious parallels. The Observatory was founded by Abdul Rahman, appearing as if from nowhere in 2006 and was based in Coventry U.K. At least in its early years it appears to have a been a one-man operation. It was associated with shadowy neo-conservative influences, and seemed to depend largely on “moderate Islamic” and other “rebel” sources to whose accounts it appeared uncritically sympathetic. wmm took to citing it routinely, as though they might a trusted and proven news agency (Skelton, 2012), just as they treated later similar manifestations of this phenomenon such as the Syria Campaign, and the White Helmets. Like the Observatory, Bellingcat.com also appeared as though from nowhere – emerging from the blog “Brown Moses,” established in 2012, and taking form as Bellingcat in July 2014, a few weeks before the downing of MH17. This was based in Leicester, UK, a short highway drive from the Observatory in ­Coventry. It seemed at first to possess barely any salaried personnel, although a 2016 source cited “15 staff and volunteers” and noted a growing collaboration with the neoconservative think tank Atlantic Council (James, 2016) and, in Russia, with a Russian investigative group known as the Conflict Intelligence Team (cit) co-founded by Kirill Mikhailov and Ruslan Leviev who later,

280

Boyd-Barrett

­curiously, turned their attention to the Russian presence in Syria. An RT.com story alleged friendly links to UK intelligence. Bellingcat.com focused on presumed misdeeds of Washington’s official enemies (notably the Assad regime in Syria; Putin’s Russia) and depended principally on a mixture of social media, Google and gps sources. In its Syrian coverage founder, Elliott Higgins worked closely with Dan Kaszeta, a consultant formerly of the US Army Chemical Corp, and its work was treated as a key source in New York Times, New Yorker and Human Rights Watch that sought to establish Syrian regime culpability for the chemical weapons attacks on Ghouta in the summer of 2013. Here, its arguments were based on missile direction, missile range, the reported presence of hexamine in soil and other residues, and the view that only the Syrian government would have been capable of such a missile attack. Each claim was contested by missile experts Richard Lloyd and Theodore Postol (Lloyd and Postol, 2014; see also Schofield, 2014) who argued that the missile direction was from the North not the Northwest and that the improvised missile had a range far too short – only 1.2 miles whereas a 3.5–6 mile range would have been necessary to hit East Ghouta from Syrian government positions. There was no scientific source, they claimed, for the idea that hexamine is minimally suitable as an acid neutralizer for the making of sarin bombs. Rebel forces would have been perfectly capable of constructing the missiles in question – all they needed was access to a machine shop with modest capabilities. In later incidents involving chemical weapons (barring the use of “barrel bombs”) Islamists were usually identified as the likely culprits, not least because after 2013 the Syrian regime had surrendered known stocks of chemical weapons up to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In Ukraine, Bellingcat.com’s principal claim to press attention was to have provided social media and other evidence for what it claimed was the itinerary of the actual Russian buk missile launcher responsible for shooting down MH17 as it moved from Russia to eastern Ukraine and, carrying one less missile, back to Russia. This evidence has been influential on many media investigations including the previously-cited Correct!V Investigation, and Australia’s 60 Minutes show. But former bureau chief for the International Herald Tribune, Patrick Smith, was skeptical: Manipulating social media “evidence” has been a parlor game in Kiev; Washington; Langley, Virginia, and at nato since the Ukraine crisis broke open. Look at the graphics included in the presentation. I do not think technical expertise is required to see that these images prove what all others offered as evidence since last year prove: nothing. It looks like the

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

281

usual hocus-pocus….Examine the Bellingcat web site and try to figure out who runs it. I tried the about page and it was blank. The site consists of badly supported anti-Russian “reports” – no “investigation” aimed in any other direction. smith, 2015a

Dutch documentarist Peter Vlemmix complained that much of the so-called social media evidence on YouTube had disappeared; some of the images, he found, were actually Ukrainian images of their own buk missile launchers, of which they had 27 (Vlemmix, 2015). Veteran investigative reporter for ­Consortiumnews.com, Robert Parry, was also doubtful: Higgins has spread misinformation on the Internet, including discredited claims implicating the Syrian government in the sarin attack in 2013 and directing an Australian TV news crew to what appeared to be the wrong location for a video of a buk anti-aircraft battery as it supposedly made its getaway to Russia after the shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in 2014. parry, 2015d

Elsewhere, Parry concluded: A central flaw in the Internet-based approach is that it is very easy for a skilled propagandist in a government dirty-tricks office or just some clever jerk with Photoshop software to manufacture realistic-looking images or documents and palm them off either directly to gullible people or through propaganda fronts that appear as non-governmental entities but are really bought-and-paid-for conduits for disinformation. parry, 2015b

Parry found it suspicious that Bellingcat had collaborated with usaid-funded Organized Crime and Corruption Report Project, had been part-funded by billionaire George Soros’s Open Society, and was usually “critical of governments that have fallen into disfavor with the United States and then are singled out for accusations of corruption.” He wondered about Bellingcat’s collaboration with (1) The Atlantic Council, a conduit for pro-nato ­propaganda which partnered with Higgins for a report about Russian involvement in Ukraine; and (2) Soros-financed hrw (which, like Bellingcat, pushed claims of Assad government responsibility for the sarin gas attack in Ghouta in 2013).

282

Boyd-Barrett

As if to conform Parry’s suspicions, Higgins had become a senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab and Future Europe Initiative, as of February 2016. He was one of five authors of an Academic Council report on Russia’s role in Syria, which called for US missile strikes in Syria (James, 2016, ibid), and wrote an article on the “new generation of digital detectives (who) fight to keep Russia honest.” James (2016, ibid) cites a Die Spiegel article that apologized for its “uncritical recycling of Bellingcat allegations that the Russian Defense Ministry manipulated satellite image data to supports its position on MH17. The article cited an expert in digital image forensics, Jens Kreise, who deemed Bellingcat’s “error correction” analysis subjective, “nothing more than reading tea leaves.” If Bellingcat.com was merely an amateur operation it appeared very informed: as early as July 28 2014 the site quoted Ukrainian counterterrorism chief Vitaly Nayda’s reference to undisclosed communications intercepts that documented how the “launcher rolled into Ukraine across the Russian border aboard a flatbed truck” – an early advance on the conclusions of the jit report over two years later. Critiquing a television investigation for Australia’s 60 Minutes, Parry (2015e) considered the image of the buk missile returning to Russia was problematic. On some videos of lesser significance, he observed, the 60 Minutes team did successfully superimpose its own shots over shots taken from social media to demonstrate similarity. But 60 Minutes did not succeed in doing that for the crucial “getaway” video. Instead, its correspondent simply stood in front of an intersection near Luhansk and claimed it was the same intersection that appeared in the “getaway” video, even though there were in fact significant differences between the two, a problem that Parry considered 60 Minutes had failed to rectify in a later update. 12

Australian Autopsy

Australian parties to the jit investigation gave evidence to an inquest into the deaths of Australian victims in Victoria, in December 2015. These were reluctant to feed the “Russia must be guilty” meme. Members of the Australian Federal Police and Dutch police and prosecutors said that dsb had failed to provide “conclusive evidence” of what type of munition destroyed the aircraft (Helmer, 2015a). Their doubts linked to statements by the Dutch State ­Prosecutor Fred Westerbeke that no more than 25 pieces of metal had been recovered, and by Australian pathologist David Ranson, in his reports to the Coroner, that no shrapnel had been identified in scans of the bodies of the

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

283

passengers and that this finding was inconsistent with the possibility that the plane had been hit by a buk missile (the jit report claimed evidence of shrapnel in the bodies of cockpit crew). Detective Superintendent Andrew Donoghoe, the senior Australian policeman in the international MH17 investigation, said a “tougher standard than the dsb report” is required before the criminal investigation could identify the weapon which brought the aircraft down, or pinpoint the perpetrators. Dutch prosecutors require conclusive evidence on other types of missile,” Donoghoe said, intimating that “initial information that the aircraft was shot down by a [buk] surface to air missile” did not meet the Australian or international standards of evidence. Helmer, 2015b

Donoghoe told the inquest that the Australian Federal Police (afp) were unable to provide their forensic evidence because to do so would require Ukraine’s permission – another party to the jit – which had not consented to the disclosure of findings. 13

jit Progress Report of June 2016

The jit’s progress report in June 2016 (jit 2016) seemed a curiously unnecessary step. It underlined the challenges of having to train investigators in appropriate investigative methods and indicated enthusiasm for a consensual approach. Participating governments – the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Malaysia and Ukraine (but not Russia) – had the right to block the release of information to the public. Working in Kiev, team members reported positively on collaboration among themselves and with Ukrainian authorities. These authorities included Ukraine’s intelligence agency, the sbu, a significant source of evidence. The consistently critical voice of investigative reporter Robert Parry (Parry 2016b; 2016c) identified these disclosures as potential conflicts of interest. Indeed, jit’s frankness even hints at a possible subterfuge to warn its ­audience against taking its ultimate findings too seriously. Parry reminded readers of a 2015 earlier Dutch police assurance that all buks in Eastern territory on June 17 2014 were under Ukrainian control (which might explain the focus of alternative investigators like Bellingcat.com on a buk allegedly driven into the Donbass from Russia) and that the rebels had only

284

Boyd-Barrett

man-portable air-defense systems ­ ­ ( MANPADS) incapable of firing up to 33000 feet. Because front lines were shifting rapidly on that day it was hard to know where government and rebel lines actually lay. Parry alluded to cia sources that kept open the possibility of MH17 having been targeted by a “rogue” Ukrainian unit that mistook MH17 for the official plane flying Vladimir Putin back to Russia from Latin America that day. Parry also remained open to the possibility of an air-to-air missile, in view of seven eyewitness statements in Ukraine who reported seeing a warplane just b­ efore MH17 was hit. Even as late as spring 2016, a possible air-to-air missile was also referenced in a bbc documentary – protested by Ukrainian ­authorities – The Conspiracy Files: Who Shot Down MH17 (Rudin, 2016). Russia – which had once championed the air-to-air theory and had claimed satellite evidence of a ­fighter jet in the vicinity of MH17 – announced a few days before presentation of the 2016 jit report that new newly-discovered private radar data confirmed that  MH17 was struck by a buk, but from a launch site in U ­ krainian-held territory. 14 The jit Preliminary Report September 2016 A preliminary report of jit’s findings was presented on September 28th 2016 in the Dutch town of Nieuwegein. It was a summary of evidence that the jit deemed “irrefutable,” and which removed “any kind of doubt about the cause of the crash.” The report claimed to result from the labors of 100–200 investigators; examination of over one thousand wreckage parts; 40 requests for legal assistance; and scrutiny of 5 billion Internet pages, 500,00 videos and photos, 200 witnesses, 150,000 telephone intercepts, and 6000 official reports. While the full evidence, if ever published, might conceivably be irrefutable, possibly removing all doubt, this report could not possibly have achieved these ends since it provided very little evidence and some of the evidence that it did provide was open to alternative interpretations and judgments. In essence, the report confirmed the 2015 Dutch Safety Board’s finding that MH17 had been brought down by a buk missile. Indeed, this explanation had dominated western mainstream media within a day of the downing of MH17: the Daily Mail edition of July 18 2014 provided considerable detail about buk missile launchers and even carried a photo of a launcher near Torez, possibly from the same video used by jit. The speed with which such precise detail was available to mainstream media raises questions as to the possibility of prior preparation of such evidence by intelligence sources.

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

285

Going further than dsb, the jit’s summary pinpointed the site from which the missile had been launched – a field in Pervomaysk, six kilometers south of the village of Snizhne, territory that it claimed had been controlled by separatists. The jit asserted that the buk was of a newer type – BUK TELAR – that combined both radar and transport erector launcher components. Allegedly in response to a request for help from separatists, the BUK was driven from Russia to the launch site in a convey of three vehicles on July 16 2014, was used to fire on MH17 (probably mistaken for a Ukrainian military plane) on July 17, and driven back later that day, arriving in Russia on the morning of July 18. The report alleged that about 100 persons in total – unnamed – would have been involved. It conceded that involvement was not necessarily tantamount to culpability. No individuals, nor the Russian government, nor even its armed forces were directly accused. The jit preliminary report was a strange document, its translation shaky and sometimes colloquial, with inexplicable transitions from first person singular to first person plural. The report’s language of certainty sat uneasily with its brevity and diversity of formats – approximately two pages, three animations, YouTube videos from a variety of news outlets and some telephone ­intercepts. The report explained that the jit did not want to reveal everything, since to do so might play into the perpetrators’ hands; the evidence contained in the report was merely a selection to illustrate how the jit had arrived at its conclusions. Witnesses were encouraged to come forward, especially insider witnesses. The report indicated that their cooperation might give them immunity from prosecution or earn mitigation. This raised suspicion as to whether the jit’s certainty was feigned in an attempt to encourage the guilty to confess. The report claimed that many additional witnesses had come forward in response to just such an invitation in the Dutch Safety Board’s report. Why otherwise bother with a preliminary report at all? There are four major concerns with the jit preliminary report: Membership: One of the prime suspects (although never acknowledged as such by the jit), namely the government of Ukraine or its military forces, was a very influential member of the investigation team. The prime suspects investigated – the separatist forces and Russia – were excluded from participation. Ukraine’s interests were represented on jit by the Ukrainian intelligence service, sbu. The sbu had a clear conflict of interest, since it is required to safeguard information that could be ­harmful to Ukrainian interests. The sbu provided a great deal, perhaps most of the evidence and worked closely with jit investigators in Kiev. Their c­ ollaboration extended over two years, during which time the

286

Boyd-Barrett

i­nvestigators were vulnerable to all manner of possibly compromising situations. As previously noted, members could veto disclosure of any of their information. Some sbu personnel have had a troubling reputation for fraud and criminality. Motivation: Granted, the jit report did allow for the possibility, even likelihood, that the attack was an unfortunate mistake. This was a welcome and common sense clarification in the light of previous US and Ukrainian claims of Russian or separatist intentionality. It is difficult to imagine any circumstances in which either separatists or Russia would have considered for one moment that shooting down an international civilian airliner could be in their interests. Unacknowledged by the jit was the possible interest of the Ukraine or its allies in staging a false flag assault that could then be pinned on Russia, thereby contributing to a broader campaign of vilification and demonization of Russia. Another conceivable Ukrainian motivation, rejected by the jit, was that a plane flying Russian president Vladimir Putin passed over Ukraine on that same day and might have constituted the intended target for Ukrainian forces. Alternative Scenarios: The report does not investigate the important alternative theory that Ukraine, not Russia, not the separatists, was responsible for shooting down MH17. jit’s entire attention is premised on the likelihood of Russian guilt. Had it been interested in Ukrainian culpability it would have provided detailed information as to the whereabouts and deposition of the many Ukrainian-held buk’s in the vicinity at that time. Their presence had been noted by Dutch (mivd) intelligence in 2015. mivd considered that Ukrainian buks were the only anti-aircraft missile systems in the area on July 17 that would have been capable of shooting down MH17 (McGovern, 2016). (Note: all the buks, by definition, whether in Ukrainian, separatist or Russian hands are ­Russian-made). jit ignored the issue of culpability on the part of Ukraine, especially, and of civilian airlines for allowing civilian aircraft to continue to fly over Eastern Ukraine, even though it was a war zone in which as many as ten aircraft had been shot down in previous weeks. Why a buk from Russia? More curious even than the question as to whether the separatists or Russia had any conceivable interest in shooting down MH17 is the question of what purpose was served by ­transporting a buk missile launcher into Eastern Ukraine. jit provided as evidence a single mobile intercept, open to various interpretations, that it claimed as proof that separatists – under heavy attack from the

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

287

­ krainian air force, without an air force of their own, and thought to have U only ­m anpadS at their disposal (reaching 4000 to 10,000 feet, although separatist forces had apparently used a non-buk air defense system to bring down a Ukrainian transport plane at 21000 feet a few days before) – had requested a buk from Russia. But why? The Ukrainian attack aircraft from which they needed protection were of greatest threat to them at altitudes greatly below the 33,000 feet at which mh17 was flying. The buk missile launcher carried only four missiles. buk missile systems are very expensive – $60–70 m ­ illion – and each missile costly. Why would Russia have agreed to transport something of such value, capable of carrying only four missiles, to a battle zone in which the separatists needed protection from a considerable number of Ukrainian attack f­ighters? Why was the launcher placed so far back from the frontlines, near Snizhne, if its purpose was to shoot down Ukrainian warplanes attacking separatists on the front lines (a question raised in the commentary of McGovern, 2016)? Why would the buk crew fire at anything when the only planes in that vicinity visible to radar, according to the jit, were three civilian aircraft all flying at high altitude? And why would the launcher have immediately returned to Russia? Critical comment, generally from outside mainstream media, covered a broad range of additional concerns: Almaz-Antey: Had the jit been overly dismissive of evidence offered it by Almaz-Antey, the Russian buk manufacturer? The report did not use Almaz Antey’s secret evidence of the missile’s characteristics (Clarke, 2016) but instead studied a “similar” missile from the US in modelling its impact on MH17. Missing Evidence: Lantier (2016) concluded that the report provided insufficient evidence to support its claims. No data was released from MH17’s black box, nor Moscow’s radar data, nor US radar and satellite data. There were only wiretaps, photos and a few brief videos posted – by unidentified users – to Ukrainian social media and apparently collected by Ukraine’s sbu. The evidence did not fit the description of either “credible” or “independent.” Lantier suspected that Dutch authorities themselves were unconvinced, given what they knew about the unreliability of sbu. US data that supposedly proved the location of the launch-site in separatist-held territory, was not included. The jit’s explanation that it could not give away too much and that what evidence it supplied was

288

Boyd-Barrett

merely illustrative, left a great deal to trust, did not guarantee that the relevant evidence would ever be published – particularly since team members could veto publication of their own data – and begged the question as to why jit bothered with a preliminary report. There were many references to unnamed “witnesses.” Use of computer simulations in place of video, radar, or satellite evidence, invited skepticism as to whether they had been drawn solely to support a pre-determined theory. The report cited new evidence from a freshly identified Ukrainian “mobile radar,” secret Ukrainian air traffic controller tapes and secret US satellite imagery. Since none of this was published it could not be verified independently. The report came too late to include consideration of evidence of civilian radar data offered by Almaz-Antey, one of whose subsidiaries was ­Utyos-T civilian radar station deployed near Ust-Donetsky village in ­western Russia and suggesting a different missile trajectory than indicated by jit evidence. Ambiguous Evidence: Intercepted telephone conversations appeared to have been provided exclusively from an interested and problematic source – Ukrainian intelligence (sbu). The intercepts did not explicitly say anything about buk missiles actually being deployed inside Ukraine or about shooting down a plane or about the need to get the missiles out of the Ukraine afterwards. Parry (2016) considered that the t­ elephone intercepts were selectively interpreted and contrary ­information ­ignored. The report attributed “incriminating meaning (to the intercepts) not clearly supported by the words.” jit appeared to ignore the implications of its own evidence that on the night of July 16–17 Ukrainian military convoys pressed deeply inside separatist controlled territory, casting doubt on the confidence of claims as to which was Ukrainian-held and which was separatist-held territory. Ukrainian troops appear to have been operating near the highway routes that the alleged buk missile battery would have used, and could have been in possession of a Ukrainian buk. Route: The route that the buk trailer was supposed to have taken from Russia was bizarrely circuitous, suggesting that the jit route depiction was constructed to fit with “social media” images of a buk, some of which could even indicate the trailer was moving towards Russia where the jit report claimed it was headed further into Ukraine. The one phone intercept to support the claim that the buk/telar system was brought into Ukraine from Russia did not use the word buk. The word “line” in the intercept is conveniently translated as “border” by the jit. The disputed location of the so-called “getaway” video of a buk missile system missing one missile is asserted as fact without an e­ xplanation

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

289

as to how the jit reached its conclusion that the location was near Luhansk. Damage: Helmer (2016) questioned why no evidence was presented that the buk team knew what they were aiming at or intended the result that occurred. He argued that the buk launcher should have been visible to the pilots since it was almost straight ahead of them. But the cockpit’s voice recorder, whose tape had not been released publicly, apparently contained no such record. A buk missile contains 7800 metal fragments but only 20 had been recovered. jit mentions the presence of shrapnel in the bodies of cockpit crew, but none was evidently found in the bodies of passengers. Helmer explained why he believes this indicated that the missile approached not head-on from the East, as claimed by jit, but from the South (Helmer, 2016, ibid). In further support of this thesis, the two engines received different amounts of damage, with the starboard engine sustaining more.

15

Broad Lessons

In the face of any significant threat of international conflict it goes without saying that all media should behave with utmost caution and skepticism in face of all significant claims, especially when these are closely associated with ­highly-prejudiced sources that are known to routinely engage in propaganda and disinformation, which would include but certainly not be limited to government agencies – regardless of whether these are agencies of perceived “friendly” or “enemy” nations. Caution is more than ever required in conflicts that implicate the possible use of nuclear weapons. The sad reality is that this responsibility requires herculean and heroic professionalism on the part of journalists in the face not simply or even mainly of implacable “authoritative” sources, but of their own editors, managers and colleagues, many of whom have long been conditioned through routine expose to – or collusion with – ideologies both purposively and unreflexively disseminated by political, educational, media and other cultural and informational sources. Mainstream news media employers are generally networked into corporate and state-­related institutions whose own interests, ideologies and perspectives have gravely debilitating blind spots whether for economic, political or ideological reasons. The only goal worthy of the responsible journalist is a full and honest accounting that contributes to the health of democratic dialogue within and between nations, helps avoid war, and preserves lives as well as the safety and security of the

290

Boyd-Barrett

­human species. The practice of such professionalism may not actually or always be possible within wmm. Additionally, evidence offered by unofficial sources whose methodologies are questionable, motivations suspect, and whose findings suspiciously align to only one party’s interest, should not be attributed high salience. This is not so say that only those sources that profess “neutrality” and “objectivity” should be accorded greatest weight. In practice these values are sometimes reducible to mere routines that produce neither neutrality nor o­ bjectivity. Passionate commitment to a point of view is not irreconcilable with a good-faith and public commitment to honest fact finding and ­interpretation, ­especially when it is courageous in its accommodation of unwelcome evidence. Especially in the context of pre-war propaganda-of-pretext ­shenanigans it is extremely dangerous to assert or to infer intentionality on the evidence of behavior that could as easily or more reasonably be interpreted as accidental. Journalists should be alert to the possibility that the stories or angles of stories that attract the attention and approval of wmm may be serving to distract from more important issues, whether to attract ratings or because of owner-management collusion with other centers of power. Such imbalances must be contested within and between news organizations. Finally, while official international investigations of matters of great sensitivity are generally significant it also clear that they rarely survive without accommodation to political realities and this weakness is not infrequently a fatal flaw. Postscript The Dutch JIT report of May 2018 – the much anticipated “final” report, was much less “final” than expected. It concluded that MH17 was struck by a BUK surface-to-air missile controlled by Russia’s 53rd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade based in the city of Kursk. The report claimed to have “legal and convincing evidence which will stand up in a courtroom” and that it expect to issue indictments in the future. In the author's estimation, the chances of this case ­actually being defended in a court of law are slim. The report itself did not contain much of the actual evidence to which it ­referred. Once again there was a curious pairing between the JIT report and a report in the same week from the propaganda agency, the Atlantic Council a­ffiliated Bellingcat.com which identified a specific Russian ­ military ­commander as responsible. The JIT evidence is appears to be the same as ­presented by ­Bellingcat in 2016. The Bellingcat report on the The 53rd

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

291

­ nti-­Aircraft Missile Brigade was published in February 2016. Russia claimed A that the particular BUK missile said to have hit the plane had actually been destroyed in Russia in 2011. Russia also claimed that a tape recording critical to the JIT case with either non-existent or a forgery. See JIT 2018. Bibliography Boyd-Barrett, O. (2016) Western mainstream media and the Ukraine crisis: A study in conflict propaganda. London: Routledge. Boyd-Barrett, O. (2015) Media Imperialism. London: Sage. Brzezinski, Z. (1998) The grand chess-board. Basic Books. Cartalucci, T. (2014, Sept 19) Dutch MH17 Investigation Omits US “Intel.” Fabrications and Omissions Supportive of US-NATO Agenda Directed against Russia. Global Research, available at://www.globalresearch.ca/dutch-mh17-investigation-omits-us -intel-fabrications-and-omissions-supportive-of-us-nato-agenda-directed-against -russia/5402970 (last accessed 1 December 2014). Chasey, W. (2016) The Lockerbie cover-up. Bridger House Publishers. Clarke, N. (2016, October 2). Plane politics: MH17 “truth” enforces and the New ­McCarthyism. RT Op-Edge. Available at https://www.rt.com/op-edge/361371-plane -politics-mh17-truth-enforcement (last accessed November 13, 2016). Collins, M. (2014a, Aug. 5) Eyewitness Evidence of Machine Gun Fire on MH17. The Peoples Voice, available at http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices .php/2014/08/05/eyewitness-evidence-of-machine-gun-fire (last accessed 27 ­December 2014). Collins, M. (2014b, Dec. 17) Shooting down MH17 – BUK 312 story false says Ukraine crew member. Global Research, available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/shooting -down-mh-17-BUK-312-story-false-says-ukraine-crew-member/5420405 (last accessed on 26 December, 2014). Correct!V (2015) Flight MH17 – Searching for the truth. Correct!V, available online at https://mh17.correctiv.org/english (last accessed 12 July 2016). Deutsch, J. (2015, July 16) Russia, Ukraine and US hegemony. Counterpunch, available at http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/07/09/russia-ukraine-and-u-s-hegemony (last accessed 23 July 2015). Ditz, J. (2014a, July 23) State Dept Contradicts Intel Community, Says Putin Directly to Blame for MH17 Claims Even More Secret Evidence Proves Putin’s Involvement. A ­ ntiwar.com, available at http://news.antiwar.com/2014/07/23/ state-dept-contradicts-intel-community-says-putin-directly-to-blame-for-mh17 (last accessed 11 August, 2014).

292

Boyd-Barrett

Ditz, J. (2014b, July 18) Despite hysteria on Malaysia Airlines MH17, little solid evidence “smoking gun” evidence from Ukraine spies of dubious origin. Antiwar.com, available at http://news.antiwar.com/2014/07/18/despite-hysteria-on-malaysia-airlines -mh17-little-solid-evidence (last accessed 6 August, 2014). Dutch Safety Board (2015) MH1t Crash. Final Report. Dutch Safety Board, available at http://www.slideshare.net/socialmediadna/dutch-safety-board-report-on-mh17 -crash-english (last accessed 12 July 2016). Entman, R. (2003) Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Escobar, P. (2015, April 6) Eurasian emporium or nuclear war? Asia Times, available at http://atimes.com/2015/04/eurasian-emporium-or-nuclear-war-pepe -escobar/. Escobar, P. (2014, July 23b) The Tragedy of MH17: A Chessboard Drenched in Blood. Asia Times, available http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/CEN-01-230714 .html (last accessed 10 August 2014). Fitzpatrick, C. (2014a, August 13) Novaya Gazeta Editor: Boroday Called Moscow Press About Downing of Civilian Airliner. The Interpreter, available from http://www. interpretermag.com/novaya-gazeta-editor-boroday-called-moscow-press-aboutdowning-of-civilian-airliner (last accessed 21 January 2016). Fitzpatrick, C. (2014b, July 27) Evidence of Separatists’ Possession of BUK System Before Downing of MH17. The Interpreter, available from http://www.interpretermag .com/evidence-of-separatists-possession-of-BUK-system-before-downing-of-mh17 (last accessed 21 January 2016). Forbidden Knowledge (2014, Dec 23) MH17 Witness Passes Lie Detector Test. Forbidden Knowledge, available at http://www.ForbiddenKnowledgeTV.com/page/26916.html (last accessed 26 December 2014). Giraldi, P. (2015, July 14) MH17: The Blaming Putin Game Goes On. Who shot down MH-17? Somebody knows. The Unz Review, available at http://www.unz.com/ article/mh17-the-blaming-putin-game-goes-on (last accessed 23 July 2015). Hartog, E.(2015, October 14) Russian Media, Officials Continue Assault on Dutch MH17 Report. The Moscow Times, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/­ article/russian-media-officials-continue-assault-on-dutch-mh17-report/539129 .html (last accessed 21 December 2015). Head, M. (2015, July 30) Russia vetoes MH17 tribunal push by US allies. World Socialist Web Site, available at http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/07/30/mh17-j30.html (last accessed 31 August 2015). Helmer, J. (2016, September 30) John Helmer: Four MH17 Questions – The Answers to Which Prove the Dutch Police, Ukrainian Secret Service, and US Government Are Faking the Evidence of the MH17 Shootdown. Naked Capitalism. Available at http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2016/09/john-helmer-four-mh17-questions

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

293

-the-answers-to-which-prove-the-dutch-police-ukrainian-secret-service-and-us -government-are-faking-the-evidence-of-the-mh17-shootdown.html. (Last accessed November 13, 2016). Helmer, J. (2015a, December 16) MH17 coroner contradicts himself, ignores Australian forensic evidence, rules in favour of DSB. OpEdNews, available at https://www. bing.com/news/search?q=)+MH17+Coroner+Contradicts+Himself%2c+Ignores+ Australian+Forensic+Evidence%2c+Rules+In+Favour+Of+Dutch+Safety+Board &qpvt=)+mh17+coroner+contradicts+himself%2c+ignores+australian+forensic+ evidence%2c+rules+in+favour+of+dutch+safety+board&FORM=EWRE (last accessed 18 December 2015). Helmer, J. (2015b, December 16) Australian police, Dutch investigators break with DSB at first coroner’s inquest into MH17 crash. Naked Capitalism, http://www .nakedcapitalism.com/2015/12/john-helmer-australian-police-dutch-prosecutors -break-with-dutch-safety-board-at-first-coroners-court-inquest-on-mh17-crash .html (last accessed 17 December 2015). Herszenhorn, D. (2015, June 28) Dutch Say Separatists in Ukraine Block Inquiry Into Malaysia Jet Crash. New York Times, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/ world/europe/dutch-say-inquiry-into-malaysia-jet-crash-is-being-blocked-in -ukraine.html?_r=0 (last accessed 28 June 2015). Higgins, E. (2015, June 12) New July 17 satellite imagery confirms Russia produced fake MH17 evidence. Bellingcat.com, available online at https://www.bellingcat.com/ news/uk-and-europe/2015/06/12/july-17-imagery-mod-comparison (last accessed 12 July 2016). James, S. (2016, October 13) The Bellingcat research collective: War propaganda masquerading as “citizen journalism.” World Socialist Web Site, available at http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/10/13/bell-o13.html (Last accessed on November 13, 2016). Joint Investigation Team (JIT) (2018) Summary of the MH17 Joint ­Investigation Team pressconference of May 24, 2018 JIT. Available online at http://www .whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/news-on-the-joint-investigation-team -­pressconference-of-may-24-2018/. Joint Investigation Team (JIT) (2016) MH17: Six aspects of the criminal investigations explained. JIT, available online at om.nl/mh17-ezine-juni2016/e-zine-en.html (last accessed June 29 2016). Jowett, G., and V. O’Donnell (2015) Propaganda and Persuasion. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Karmanau, Y. and P. Leonard (2014, July 25) There’s increasing evidence that pro-Russian rebels shot down the plane. Business Insider, available online at http://www .businessinsider.com/mh17-story-2014-7.

294

Boyd-Barrett

Katchanovsky, I. (2015) The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine. Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, San Francisco September 3–6. Kelly, A. (2015, February 6) One year later, Crimeans prefer Russia. Truthdig.com, available at http://www.truthdig.com/eartotheground/item/one_year_later_crimeans _prefer_russia_20150206?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed& utm_campaign=Feed%253A+Truthdig+Truthdig%253A+Drilling+Beneath+the+ Headlines (last accessed 10 February 2015). Kerr, M. (2013) Adequately explained by stupidity? Lockerbie, luggage and lies. Matador. Koshiw, J.V. (2015) MH17. The story of the shooting down of the Malaysian airliner. Charleston, SC: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform. Lantier, A. (2016, September 30). JIT investigation blames Russia for MH17 crash in Ukraine. World Socialist Web Site. Available at http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/ 2016/09/30/mh17-s30.html (last accessed November 13, 2016). Lantier, A. (2014, Nov 22) Netherlands covers up secret pact controlling ­investigation of MH17 crash. World Socialist Web Site, available at http://www.wsws.org/en/ articles/2014/11/22/mh17-n22.html (last accessed 15 December 2014). Leonard, P. (2014, July 17) Ukraine: Air Force jet downed by Russian missile. Yahoo. com, available at http://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-air-force-jet-downed-russian -missile-102817809.html (last accessed 23 January 2016). Leurs, R. (2014, Oct. 27) Chief MH17 Investigator on German Claims: “We Will Need Evidence,” Spiegel Online International, available at http://www.spiegel.de/ international/world/mh17-chief-investigator-says-no-actionable-evidence-yet-in -probe-a-999485.html (last accessed 1 December 2014). Litvinova, D. (2015, August 24) Russian Foreign Minister Accuses Netherlands of Concealing Facts About MH17. The Moscow Times, available at http://www-cf. themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-foreign-minister-accuses-netherlands -of-concealing-facts-about-mh17/528545.html (last accessed 31 August 2015). Lloyd, R. and T. Postol (2014) Possible Implications of Faulty US Technical Intelligence in the Damascus Nerve Agent Attack of August 21, 2013. MIT Science, Technology, and Global Security Working Group. MacAskill, K.. (2016) The Lockerbie bombing: The search for justice. Biteback Publishing. Maybury, G. (2015, May 25) Propaganda v Impropaganda – MH17, Brand 60 Minutes and shell-game journalism. OpEdNews.com, available at http://www.­opednews .com/articles/Propaganda-v-Impropaganda-by-Greg-­M aybury-60-Minutes_ Blowback_International_Investigations-150525-589.html (last accessed 4 June 2015). McGovern, R. (2016, September 30) Russia-Baiting and Risks of Nuclear War. C ­ onsortiumnews.com. Available at https://consortiumnews.com/2016/09/30/russiabaiting-and-risks-of-nuclear-war (last accessed November 13, 2016).

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

295

McGovern, R. (2015, August 17) Propaganda, Intelligence and MH-17. Consortiumnews. com, available at https://consortiumnews.com/2015/08/17/propaganda-intelligence -and-mh-17 (last accessed 31 August 2015). New York Times Editorial Board (2015, July 23) Russia’s empty gesture on the downed Malaysian jet. New York Times, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/ opinion/russias-empty-gesture-on-the-downed-malaysian-jet.html?_r=0 (last accessed 24 July 2015). Parry, R. (2016, September 28) Troubling caps in the new MH-17 report. ­Consortiumnews. com. Available at https://consortiumnews.com/2016/09/28/troubling-gaps-in-thenew-mh-17-report (last accessed November 13, 2016). Parry, R. (2016a, June 13) MH-17 ProbeTrustsTorture-Implicated Ukraine. Consortiumnews .com, available online at https://consortiumnews.com/2016/06/13/mh-17 -probe-trusts-torture-implicated-ukraine/. Parry, R. (2016b, May 24) More game-playing on MH17? Consortiumnews.com, available online at https://consortiumnews.com/2016/05/24/more-game-playing-on-mh-17 (last accessed June 29 2016). Parry, R. (2016c, April 26) From Brady to MH-17. Power defines reality. Consortiumnews. com, available online at https://consortiumnews.com/2016/04/26/from-brady-to -mh-17-power-defines-reality (last accessed June 29 2016). Parry, R. (2016d, January 21) Kerry Pressed for MH-17 Evidence. Consortiumnews. com, available at https://consortiumnews.com/2016/01/21/kerry-pressed-for-mh-17 -evidence (last accessed 23 January 2016). Parry, R. (2015a, November 20) Tangled Threads of US False Narratives. Consortiumnews .com, available at https://consortiumnews.com/2015/11/19/tangled-threads-of -us-false-narratives (last accessed 20 December 2015). Parry, R. (2015b, October 20) MH-17 Case: “Old” Journalism vs. “New.” Consortiumnews .com, available online at https://consortiumnews.com/2015/10/20/mh-17-case -old-journalism-vs-new/. Parry, R. (2015c, July 10) MH-17 Case Slips Into Propaganda Fog. Consortiumnews. com, available at https://consortiumnews.com/2015/07/09/mh-17-case-slips -into-­propaganda-fog (last accessed 16 July 2015). Parry, R. (2015d, June 8) Cold War II to McCarthyism II. Consortiumnews. com,  available online at https://consortiumnews.com/2015/06/08/cold-war-ii-to -mccarthyism-ii (last accessed 12 July 2015). Parry, R. (2015e, May 28) A reckless “stand-upper” on MH17. Consortiumnews.com, available at https://consortiumnews.com/2015/05/28/a-reckless-stand-upper-on-mh-17 (last accessed 7 June 2015). Parry, R. (2015f, March 22) Crimeans keep saying no to Ukraine. Consortiumnews.com, available at https://consortiumnews.com/2015/03/22/crimeans-keep-saying-no-to -ukraine (last accessed 24 March 2015).

296

Boyd-Barrett

Parry, R. (2015g, January 19) The Danger of an MH-17 “Cold Case.” Consortiumnews .com, available at consortiumnews.com/2015/01/19/the-danger-of-an-mh-17-cold -case (last accessed 4 March 2016). Parry,R.(2014a,September9)Malaysia AirlinesWhodunnit Still a Mystery. Consortiumnews .com, available at http://consortiumnews.com/2014/09/09/malaysia-airlines -­whodunnit-still-a-mystery (last accessed 10 September, 2014). Parry, R. (2014b, August 3) Flight 17 Shoot-Down Scenario Shifts. Consortiumnews. com, available at http://consortiumnews.com/2014/08/03/flight-17-shoot-down -scenario-shifts (last accessed 10 August, 2014). Parry, R. (2014c, July 20) Airline Horror Spurs New Rush to Judgement. Consortiumnews. com, available at http://consortiumnews.com/2014/07/19/airline-horror-spurs-new -rush-to-judgment/ (last accessed 5 August, 2014). Paul, R. (2014, July 21) What the Media Won’t Report About Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17. Ron Paul Institute, available at http://ronpaulinstitute.org/archives/featured -articles/2014/july/20/what-the-media-won%E2%80%99t-report-about-malaysian -airlines-flight-mh17.aspx (last accessed 21 July 2014). Polk, W. (2015, August 28) Pushing the edge on nuclear war. Consortiumnews.org, available at https://consortiumnews.com/2015/08/28/pushing-the-edge-on-nuclear-war (last accessed 31 August 2015). Postol, T. (2014) Whose sarin? London Review of Books, 2014:10 Vol.36. Rapoza, K. (2015, March 20) One year after Russia annexed Crimea, locals prefer Moscow to Kiev. Forbes, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/03/20/ one-year-after-russia-annexed-crimea-locals-prefer-moscow-to-kiev (last accessed 24 March 2015). Reuters (2015, March 14) Villagers tell their story on MH17 downing over Eastern Ukraine. The Moscow Times, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/ article/villagers-tell-their-story-on-mh17-downing-over-eastern-ukraine/517406 .html (last accessed 17 March 2015). Roberts, P. (2014, July 17) What Happened to the Malaysian Airliner? Paul Craig Roberts, available at http://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2014/07/19/happened-malaysian -airliner-paul-craig-roberts (last accessed 11 August 2014). Robinson, J. (2016, May 18) The outbreak of nuclear war within a year between the West and Putin is “entirely plausible,” says former NATO chief (while promoting his novel about a 2017 war with Russia). Daily Mail, available online from http://www .dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3596977/The-outbreak-nuclear-war-year-West-Putin -entirely-plausible-says-former-NATO-chief-promoting-novel-2017-war-Russia .html#ixzz4D1u5gl5r (last accessed June 29, 2016). Rudin, M.. (Dir) (2016) The Conspiracy Files: Who shot down MH17? London: BBC. RT (2016a February 19) Dutch investigators say no sat images of MH17 crash exist, enquiry could last years.RT.com, available at http://rt.com/news/333025-dutch-investigator -mh17-letter (last accessed 19 February 2016).

Mh17 As Free-floating Atrocity Propaganda

297

RT (2016b, January 21) Biased, low quality, full of omissions’: Russia launches fresh attack on Dutch MH17 report. RT.com, available at https://www.rt.com/ news/329494-mh17-investigation-biased-omissions (last accessed 21 January 2016). RT (2015, July 16) Israeli-made air-to-air missile may have downed MH17 – report. RT. com, available at http://www.rt.com/news/310039-mh17-israeli-missile-version (last accessed 23 July 2015). RT (2014, Nov 28) Malaysia excluded from MH17 probe – for “not pointing fingers at ­Russia”. RT.com, available at http://rt.com/news/209759-mh17-investigation -malaysia-excluded (last accessed 15. December 2014). Sakwa, R. (2015) Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the borderlands. London & New York: I.B. Tauris. Schofield, M. (2014, January 16) New analysis of rocket used in Syria chemical attack undercuts US claims. Star-Telegram, available at http://www.star-telegram .com/2014/01/15/5488779/new-analysis-of-rocket-usedin.html?storylink=addthis#. Ute6sbgLS0s.twitter&rh=1 (last accessed January 19, 2015). Schrad, M. (2015, June 28) Will There Be Justice for MH17? The Moscow Times, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/524533.html (last accessed 20 July 2015). Skelton, C. (2012, 13 July) The Syrian opposition: Who’s doing the talking? The Guardian, available online at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/12/ syrian-opposition-doing-the-talking. Smith, P. (2015, June 3) We are the propagandists: The real story about how The NYT and the White House has turned truth in the Ukraine on its head. Salon.com, ­available at http://www.salon.com/2015/06/03/we_are_the_propagandists_the_real _story_about_how_the_new_york_times_and_the_white_house_has_turned_truth _in_the_ukraine_on_its_head (last accessed 9 June 2015). Stanley, J. (2015) How propaganda works. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Steinberg, S. (2014, August 29) Continuing media silence on the fate of flight MH17. World Socialist Web Site, available at http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/08/29/ mh17-a29.html (last accessed 6 September 2014). UNIAN (2015, February 4) Poll: 82% of Crimeans support annexation. UNIAN Information Agency, available online at http://www.unian.info/politics/1040281-poll82-of-crimeans-support-annexation.html (last accessed 12 July 2016). Vlemmix, P. (2015, March 13) FLIGHT MH17 Why we still don’t know what happened – Peter Vlemmix Keep it Real (E1). Youtube.com available at https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=Y5kTf6EAMBA (last accessed 4 June 2015). Werth, C. & C. Williams (2014, September 9) Dutch report: Malaysia jet downed in Ukraine by “high-energy objects.” Los Angeles Times, available at http://www .latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-malaysia-ukraine-crash-investigation-20140909 -story.html (last accessed 10 September 2014).

298

Boyd-Barrett

Wesolowsky, T. (2015, September 23) Cybersleuth Points To Russian Tank Unit In Eastern Ukraine. RFE/RL, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-ukraine -cybersleuth-askai707-tanks-bellingcat/27265175.html (last accessed 5 December 2015). Whitney, M. (2014, September 4). The downing of Malaysia Flight 17. Sinister pretext for war with Russia. Counterpunch, available at http://www.counterpunch. org/2014/09/04/sinister-pretext-for-war-with-russia (last accessed December 15, 2014). World Bank (2016) Population, total. World Bank Data, available at http://data .worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (last accessed 11 January 2016). Zolfagharifard, E. and J. O’Callaghan (2014, July 18, updated July 23) How flight MH17 was obliterated in just 12 seconds: BUK missile system carrying 150llbs of explosives fired at doomed Malaysian jet with 95% accuracy. Daily Mail.com. Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2697068/How-MH17-obliterated -just-12-seconds-BUK-missile-carrying-150lbs-explosives-fired-doomed-Malaysian -flight-95-accuracy.html (last retrieved November 12, 2016). Zuesse, E. (2014a, December 26) Another MH17 Cover-Up: Hiding a Key Autopsy. The People’s Voice, available at http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices .php/2014/12/26/another-mh17-cover-up-hiding-a-key-autop (last accessed 26 December, 2014). Zuesse, E. (2014c, Nov. 5) Western News-Suppression about the Downing of MH-17 Malaysian Jet. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/11/western-news-suppression -downing-mh-17-malaysian-jet.html (last accessed 15 December 2014). Zverev, A. (2014, July 23) Exclusive: Ukraine rebel commander acknowledges fighters had BUK missile. Reuters, available from http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2014/07/23/us-ukraine-crisis-commander-exclusive-idUSKBN0FS1V920140723 (last access August 11 2015).

Chapter 16

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function of Chinese Television: A New Model in a New Era? Junhao Hong and Minghua Xu In China, television has been widely believed to play a central role in shaping fundamental socio-political processes within the nation-state and has been inevitably manipulated by the ruling class as a political and cultural tool. In the era of globalization in which liberalized markets, transnational media companies and sophisticated communication technologies have become commonplace, it seems reasonable to argue that “the ability of nations to determine the nature of their own television provision has been fatally undermined by the irresistible twin forces of technological change and the liberalization of world markets”. This opinion, held by many liberalists, suggests that maintaining continued protection for television at the national level is an illusory goal, and overt government interventions are becoming less visible and less necessary (French, 2000: 43). China has always been regarded as one of the most restrictive governments in its adoption of rather conservative policies in terms of the regulation of television. However, since the Chinese government adopted economic reforms since the late of 20th centuries, Chinese television has witnessed rapid commercial development, an increase in marketized operations enjoyed by its television actors and a proliferation of entertainment content on television screens (Hong, 2016). Lee (1990) has once captured the “de-emphasis of ideology” on Chinese television during the commercial reform. First, as he documented, the state’s political influence has become less and less intrusive. Second, the relative de-emphasis on ideology has made it possible for various cultural genres, such as entertainment shows and other less political material, to flourish. Third, television has been manipulated to promote economic modernization instead of class struggle, leaving China to be “far less totalistic in the ideological arena”. After China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (wto), there has been renewed emphasis on the symptoms of the “de-politicalization” of Chinese television. The concern is that political usage of Chinese television would be challenged as new policies have been made to turn media institutions into enterprises that are scheduled to become more responsive to the market. Joint-ventures with regional and western capital have © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004364417_018

300

Hong and Xu

been found common and the party-state’s monopoly over media production is gradually giving way to competition. The ideological control began to relax and a rampant growth of television commercialization would drive audiences away from the party-state serious propagandist work (Meng, 2001; Zeng, 2005; Zhang, 2006). The traditional portrait of Chinese television regulation as being an “authoritarian” model or one that focuses on “ideological indoctrination” seems to inevitably face serious challenges from the rapid commercial changes, simultaneously bringing out some arguments like “decentralization”, or rather, “de-monopolization” of television. Commercialism has been believed to constitute a powerful force in providing more autonomy to television workers, weakening the state’s control power and ultimately leading to the undercutting of ideological uses of television. Nevertheless, in the context of contemporary China, it has been documented that commercial reform by no means necessarily undermines the Party-state political manipulation over its media system and the ideological tone conveyed by media messages (Zhao, 2000; Ma, 2000; Lu, 2003; Fung, 2008; Lee, He and Huang, 2008; Hong, 2011). Lee et al. (2008) argue that in a post-wto era Chinese press has been conglomerated into “Publicity Incs” to possess a twotier operation system to remain its propaganda work, which means that the “parent papers” are oriented toward the wishes of the party bosses while the “offspring papers” cater to the wants of the masses. Within such an innovative operation, Chinese newspaper has been able to serve the party while please the market at the same time. “This institutional ‘innovation’ can be viewed as part of the state corporatist policy in which power marries money in a tacit manner” (2008: 13). The assumption that commerce has always gone against established power becomes contestable, at least in the context of Chinese media. Through investigating the intricacies of Chinese television’s commercialization process in a post-wto era, this article puts forward the argument that the market-oriented television reforms are very likely to provide the conditions for the co-existence or co-operation of politics and the market. In particular, it is suggested that an increase in the marketable operations of television workers does not necessarily imply that the state’s control power is sacrificed. Second, with the empirical findings obtained from the fieldwork conducted in television organizations, this article observes that Chinese television producers have developed an innovative strategy, which this article tends to conceptualize it as “Transformative Mediation” narrative measure, to please the party-state and the market at the same time through promoting party’s ideology by means of injecting more commercial components into television contents. Finally, this article argues that the privatization of television production area does not necessarily lead

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

301

to a weakening of the state’s political control over the operations of television. Instead, the party-state is still able to effectively control the production and consumption of television contents due to a wide adoption of “Transformative Mediation” among Chinese media professionals. As such, the political function of Chinese television has not been undermined with the ongoing commercial reform. Chinese television actually becomes capable of enhancing propagandist effectiveness by softening explicit propaganda messages and the producers have been led to a cooperative, albeit less ideologically antagonistic, relationship with the party-state. 1

Commercial Reform with Chinese Characteristics

Some important features of Chinese tv regulation are necessary to be introduced here. The commercialization of the Chinese broadcasting system took place as part of a more general process of economic liberalization fostered by the Chinese government for economic growth and as a response to external pressure from the West (Hong and Hsu, 1999). wto accession has been widely regarded as a crisis for the once stable and heavily regulated Chinese broadcasting industry, signifying intensified commercialism as well as the possible intrusion of foreign competitors (Redl and Simons, 2002;Keane and Donald, 2002). Therefore, the contemporary regulation environment can be featured as the dilemma over whether “to let television serve as a political mouthpiece” or “to let television operate as a commercial enterprise”. Such a regulatory dilemma has always been reflected by the fact that the Chinese government adopts politics-first and market-promoting policies at the same time. Influenced by such contradictory regulations, Chinese television operators have been requested to consider “political-correctness” as their most important mission while they are also forced to pursue market revenues on their own. This regulatory dilemma tends to be the result of Chinese officials’ contradictory attitudes of utilizing television. How to exploit TV as a propaganda tool while making it financiallyindependent? Struggling to pursue a balance has heavily influenced the policymaking process of the Chinese leadership. 1.1 Television Privatization without Independence Searching for a proper Chinese term to indicate the on-going TV reform in a post-wto period clearly reveals how the party-state is afraid to loosen its political control while pushing the commercial development of television. The ­Chinese term “Shangye Hua” (commercialization) or “Siyou Hua” (­ privatization) might be the most proper term to indicate the commercial reform. Using these

302

Hong and Xu

two terms, however, becomes problematic since both these two words tend to fit with the occurrences of media deregulation, privatization and liberalization which the authority is reluctant to see. Guo (2004: 9) once criticized that “commercialization” is a word that is condemned by the officials in China, as it places too much emphasis on the profit-seeking incentives of television and weakens its ideological function – to serve the Party. In finding a rather political inoffensive and neutral word in Chinese, “Chanye Hua”(marketization1) was selected as it stresses the necessity of providing market-oriented services other than the private ownership and liberalized operation of television. This term was finally accepted by the party-state and has subsequently become the orthodox concept for indicating the TV reform in the post-wto era. Thanks to these “warm-up” practices, the commercial function of Chinese television has been finally embraced by the new generation of the Party leadership. However, such a bumpy process of the official affirmation has yielded a situation where the market-oriented Chanye Hua reform of Chinese television must proceed with some preconditions imposed, which are that: (1) the ownership of television remains state-controlled and (2) the political function of television remains the foremost priority. Under such circumstances, the television system in China generally does not operate with a purely commercial or market-driven mechanism, but has to reconcile between the market rules and political supervision. This situation has heavily influenced the following commercial reform policy, named “stvpb”, which attempts to privatize the production area of television sector, and caused a malformed relationship between the private ­producers and state-owned broadcasters. This article attempts to investigate the dynamics created by the interplay of different forces in Chinese media market through the lens of stvpb policy. The article particularly focuses on this policy as the findings collected by exploring the implications of stvpb policy provides a vivid picture of how media workers are capable of balancing between the political and market forces in China. Certainly, this policy is one of the Chanye Hua reforms, other reform measures such as the contractual 1 “Marketization” has been used here to indicate “Chanye Hua” since it seems to be more appropriate than the words mentioned above, like “commercialization” or “privatization”. Marketization not only distinguishes itself from commercialization as it does not necessarily or naturally link itself to private ownership of television but also highlights the implicit official attitude toward television that “shiye danwei, qiye hua guanli”, which means that television ownership remains state-owned, the ideological function of television remains foremost, and the operation of television responds to market disciplines. Unique Chinese characteristics have yielded the situation that Chinese TV regulation transits from a political-oriented pattern into a market-oriented one, but must proceed with these mentioned-above preconditions imposed.

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

303

employment scheme, separate TV commercial agencies, massive broadcasting of commercials, reliance on sponsorships, and the rating-based scheme, are all contributing to shaping the dynamics and intricacies within a market-state context. Due to the limited space of this article, other reform measures have not been discussed. 1.2 Limited Embrace of Independent Production Shortly before China’s accession into the wto, the Separation of TV program Production and Broadcasting (stvpb) was adopted as an important reform measure for the Chinese television system. The stvpb policy regulates that the area of television production, which was traditionally restricted from private investment, opens up for non-state participants. In the past, state-owned TV stations operated as both producers and broadcasters as the party-state insisted on maintaining a direct control within the whole TV system. Since this policy was issued, private production houses have been granted admission for independent production. Nowadays, state-owned TV stations become responsible for purchasing contents from private production houses, except for news programs, and arranging them for broadcasting.2 This institutional shift toward independent production was carried out to redress the old logic of production caused by the planned economy. In the pre-reform era, the entire system was dominated with an in-house model, requiring programs to be made inside TV stations. The party-state controlled the circumstances of program-making and broadcasting. To ensure all cultural and symbolic operation politically safe became the foremost assignment for those state-funding TV stations. Without incentive to seek what audiences truly preferred, the state broadcasters soon lost their acuteness to mass aesthetics. This has not only led to the low efficiency of state TV stations but also made the so-called mainstream programs endorsed by the party-state unpopular among the Chinese viewers. To get rid of these stubborn illness caused by the planned economy, a commercial outsourcing-model in which production is sub-contracted out to the independent sector has been introduced. A large amount of independent producers who are quite in tune with the market have participated in and various market-desirable cultural formats have emerged and gradually washed out the politically-corrective but culturally-boring contents that have dominated the Chinese television for a long time. 2 Although the main responsibility of production has been transferred into the hands of the labor market, this does not mean that TV stations will no longer produce programs by themselves. In a later period of stvpb, TV stations sometimes produce low-cost programs by themselves in order to ensure that these programs have a better fit with the channel’s features.

304

Hong and Xu

Certainly, the nature of the market, as many studies have proclaimed, serves for one of the catalysts for such an institutional change (Xu, 2000; Guo, 2001; Xiong and Liu, 2002). Nevertheless, it does not naturally indicate that the Chinese part-state gives unreserved embrace to private production while it pushes the Chanye Hua reform. In the policy-making process of stvpb policy, this article argues that, the anxiety of party-state is an influential impediment for introducing independent production in China, which means that the party-state would not lose its control over program-making unless it has to. Independent production has its prototype derived from a US “publishing model” in which production is sub-contracted out to the independent sector. During the 1990s, the independent production moment occurred in Europe due to the privatization of public channels and the licensing of new commercial channels (Keane, Fung and Moran, 2007: 194). Nevertheless, it occurred in China much later due to a propensity to maintain control of content. As some scholars noticed, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a strong voice for independent production had already emerged in mainland China (Guo, 2001). The party-state was not responsive to such an appeal at the time, and the relevant policy was only issued when the party-state was compelled by the pressure to cope with the relevant wto principles. According to the wto “National Treatment Principle”,3 foreigners are given with the same treatment as one’s own nationals in the service area which government has made a commitment to this. Being conflict with this principle, some old television policies in China, such as No.16, which forbade both domestic private and foreign organizations from engaging in the area of television production,4 has to be abolished. China has made commitments in the Audiovisual service, “Subject to China’s right of content censorship of audiovisual products, foreign service providers are permitted to set joint ventures (they must comply with relevant Chinese regulations) and engage in distributing and selling of audiovisual products (excluding movies)” (State Council, 2002). As a result, in 2004, new policies, including No. 34 and No. 44, were enacted to allow foreign broadcasters to participate in the area of television production.5 3 This principle is formulated in gatt Article 3. It is also found in the other two main wto agreements (gats Article 17 and trips Article 3). Details can be red from wto website: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (accessed on 20 Oct, 2010). 4 No 16 Document can be viewed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2003-05/31/content _897446.htm (accessed on 20 Oct, 2010). 5 No. 34 Document can be viewed on http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2004/08/20/2007 0924095834880560.html (accessed on 20 Oct, 2009); No. 44 Document and “Notice of No. 44” can be viewed on http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2005-03/07/content_2660086.htm (accessed on 20 Oct, 2010).

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

305

Since it is inevitable that foreign competitors will come, it is understandable that the reform policy stvpb was adopted by the Chinese party-state as a temporary expedient to allow domestic private investments to join in first and the foreign ones later. Just before China’s accession to the wto, the stvpb policy was put into practice. Local privately-owned independent TV production companies were thus encouraged to grow quickly under such circumstances. Xu Guangchun, the vice minister of the Publicity Department of the ccp Central Committee and director of sarft, has confirmed that: We need to utilize the wto’s relevant regulations well in order to protect our national culture and broadcasting industry…we should carefully examine these regulations, such as the National Treatment Principle, to protect ourselves…we should first open up to local participants any area that will inevitably be opened up to foreigners; we should first permit domestic private investment in any sector that will inevitably be permitted foreign investment. xu, 2002

The TV production area has not been opened up to domestic private capital until the party-state faces external pressure, although such an appeal had already been waged during the early 1990s. The hesitance of the party-state to lose its control over program-making is evidenced by its holding back of the practice of stvpb policy. Serving more as a temporary expedient, this reform policy for privatizing the television production area has been adopted by the party-state as a way of coping with global competition other than to de-monopolize its television service. Its formation process has not grown naturally from the bottom up but has been imposed by the leadership from the top down. Intrinsically, it is incompatible with a political system built on the philosophy and logic of a centrally planned economy. This reform policy lacks a well-formed basis of upholding independent production from the beginning, and very possibly results in an unbalanced relationship between the private sellers and the state buyers. 1.3 Inequality Between Private Producer and State Broadcaster The stvpb has broken the in-house production model which had sustained for decades in Chinese television system. Nevertheless, its empirical complexity has made it too optimistic to claim that independent production in China would enjoy a promising future. In general, independent production makes profit by selling the ready-made programs to TV stations. However, independent producers have their vulnerabilities in lacking guarantees for

306

Hong and Xu

their programs being broadcasted and always undergo through an unpredictable censorship in China, which has depressed their role of seller during the program trade. On the contrary, state-owned TV stations, the potential buyers for independent production, have been authorized by the party-state to continue possessing a monopoly of broadcasting channels and enjoyed tremendous privileges offered with the authority’s courtesy, such as tax breaks, resource allocation, political and monetary rewards. Such a lopsided policyorientation has yielded a malformed relationship between the state buyers and those private sellers, namely the former has been entitled to protectionist policies and the latter has been placed at a disadvantage and become too weak to negotiate with the former. An interview with a marketing manager in the Guangxian, an independent production company in Beijing, provides a vivid description of the difficulties that private producers are faced with: We have several topics to choose in the beginning…we need to negotiate with the TV stations first…to discuss which topic they like and then we can start to shoot the program…but they (the TV stations) don’t want to sign a contract with us because they are not sure whether the program can pass the censorship of sarft (State Administration of Radio Film and Television)…(As such) we have to put some money in to produce a sample and give it to them to see how…you know, we have put a lot of money into preparing these samples, it is not a small amount of money, we need to pay for the studio, the staff, the attended audiences…TV stations won’t invest until they are sure our samples can be accepted by the sarft…if it can’t pass the censorship, the losses have to be incurred by us! Every year, we have spent a lot on this (Since such information about censorship is sensitive in China’s media, all the producers asked for an anonymous interview) Actually, in most cases of program trade, the buyers benefit more from the agreements than the sellers. TV stations can always arbitrarily depress the selling price of the ready-made programs and shall not be liable for any loss if terminate the contract through blunt excuses, such as a political ban from the Party censors. One program produced by the Guanhua, another independent production company in Beijing, encountered such a problem. The author was informed by the chief producer that this program had already been provided to a provincial TV station for more than a year. During the period of the Seventh National Chinese

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

307

Communist Party (ccp) congress in 2007,6 the sarft suddenly tighten its censorship and criticized his program for containing too many entertainment scenarios that were harmful to younger audiences. In response to the sarft’s criticisms, the chief producer revised the majority of the program and even almost decided to rename it in order to reduce the “harmfulness”. Nevertheless, the provincial TV station refused to continue their contract due to the political ban from the sarft and instead, broadcasted other “politically correct” programs to get through this sensitive period. Even worse, this program was not able to be resold to other TV stations because the provincial TV station had reserved its copyright. As a result, the chief producer had to cease production and undertake all the expenses that had been incurred so far. The hired staff was dismissed and some of them left Guanhua to look for other kind of jobs. Since such a high production risk often results in a large amount of losses, many independent production companies face serious financial problems and have to go through a much complicated censorship procedure to ensure the “safeness” of programs. The procedure includes four segments: First, independent producers should submit their selected topics to a buyer TV station for filtration and get the feedback on which topic is feasible; Second, the independent company begins actual shooting and the program is pre-censored by the chief producer in this company; Third, the ready-made program is sent back to the TV station for one more round of examination. After all these procedures have finished, the final version will be submitted to the sarft for a fourthround of censorship. In addition to such a complicated process of program scrutiny, independent producers have adopted a variety of strategies to avoid “political risk” to minimize financial losses, such as being more cautious in topic selection and the way of story-telling with strict self-political-consciousness, which will be elaborated in the next section of this article. Overall, It may seem like an exciting development that independent production are broking the television framework which had all along been monopolized by state workers. However, empirically, TV stations build unfair cooperative relationships with private producers, and the latter have to choose to cooperate or even rely upon the state-owned TV stations to minimize their production risks caused by the rude censorship. What is ironic about this phenomenon is that TV stations are still running under a protectionist-regulatory 6 This period was from September to November 2007, shortly before the seventh national congress of the ccp. sarft issued an internally circulated policy that all producers should pay more attention to the “political correctness” of their programs during this period. This policy highly recommended that producers create programs to promote socialism and the achievements of the ccp.

308

Hong and Xu

system, but production companies are forced to compete according to the market disciplines. It is interesting to observe that the most common manner for programming of independent producers in China is not independent production, but predominantly cooperation with state-owned TV stations or with semi-government bodies, such as the China Media Group (cmg) and Shanghai Media Group (smg). Within such a cooperation pattern, private producers either cooperate with state broadcasters with the programs’ copyright reserved to the former, or even become a sub-company of the TV station. Few of them can survive independently and continue providing their own programs to the market. Consequently, state broadcasters profited with the favorable conditions provided by the authority and achieve market dominant positions. In 2005, programs made by private producers alone made up a total of 2100 hours, only 16% of total programming in China’s media market. In contrast, programs with copyright reserved to TV stations made up 11,170 hours, 84% of total programming. According to the data collected by csm media research, more than 90% of television entertainment programs are made by TV stations, with 4.5% coming from cctv, 52.1% from provincial TV stations and the rest, 10%, from private producers (Xie, 2007). Another survey conducted by csm media research showed that among the eight largest production companies that have been responsible for more than 20% of total programming hours in China, only one is an independent production company while the rest, 7 production companies, are either state-invested or under the direct control of TV stations (sarft, 2006: 171). Overall, private producers have suffered from a drop of circulation while state broadcasters have possessed absolute advantages in China’s media market. 2

Transformative Mediation: An Innovation of Narrative Strategy to Secure Ideology

The content creation of independent TV production companies has thus become more subjective to official ideological requirements due to their disadvantaged position. Independent producers have to resort to strict selfcensorship since they are uncertain how far they can go and would rather self-consciously follow the state’s ideological guidelines than incur the risk of having to pay a political penalty. As a result, the Socialist Mainstream Melody (shehui zhuyi zhuxuanlv), the genre most unlikely to be refused by the official gatekeepers, naturally becomes the priority for private producers.

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

309

A Socialist Mainstream Melody (shehui zhuyi zhuxuanlv)7 generally indicates the cultural works that reflect socialist progress. It also includes the products that promote the normative behavior and values of nationalism and collectivism. This expression was first formulated at the 1987 National Conference for Cinematic Production and soon became popular afterward among propaganda and cultural departments and television artists (Zhang, 1994: 2). Socialist Mainstream Melody defines itself against those commercial products by promoting superior education and orientation to its audiences. ­Numerous Socialist-themed blockbusters and TV dramas have been produced in mainland China, backed by huge government financial support. However, as C ­ hinese popular culture becomes increasingly commercialized, the “mainstream melody” appears to be ideologically overbearing and sermonic to ­Chinese audiences. Instead, a large amount of market-desirable formats, such as action movie, romantic story, and suspential serial, have promptly obtained the viewers’ preference. While the central authority imposes its own content preferences upon independent commercial producers, it is a great expense for them to follow the official requirements as this may lead to a loss in ratings. A special narrative strategy featured as political self-consciousness, which I conceptualize as “Transformative Mediation”, has been creatively and widely employed by independent producers to negotiate with official censors. Before this article proceeds, the concept of transformative mediation needs to be articulated.8 Terms like “cultural mediation” and “transformative approach” have been developed since the 20th century in attempts to explore the possibilities of solving cultural conflict and problem. Though these two concepts were put forward in different research area, they are assumed to be possible approaches to mediate social conflict (Geertz, 1960; Robert and Joseph, 7 “Socialist Mainstream Melody” (社会主义主旋律) is not a specifically-defined term in the extant Chinese literature. It has always been used by the Chinese to generally indicate cultural products that promote nationalism, collectivism and socialism. I have widely researched the extant literature for its specific definition. However, very few studies, especially in English have provided a concrete idea to it. Yin Hong (2002) and Michael Keane (2005) are the ones who tentatively provide a definition in English. Since this term has a very wide range of meanings, it may be explained in different ways by different groups of people. The criteria of how to gauge “Socialist Mainstream Melody” depend on how media officials interpret it and how a specific cultural product has been interpreted by its audiences. It thus creates spaces for producers to negotiate with the authority regarding to the boundary of mainstream and non-mainstream. 8 This term has once been conceptualized as “Juxtaposition” by one of the author Xu, M.H.(2013).

310

Hong and Xu

1994). As summarized by Della Noce, Bush & Folger (2002), the transformative approach to mediation takes an essentially view of relational ideology and assumes that people have the capacity to change the quality of their interactions to relief potential social conflict. Specifically in the cultural domain, as Natalie Rothman demonstrates in her book on early modern Venice, commercial brokers and religious converts are regarded as active participants in mediating cultural dispute by means of reworking cultural boundaries, for example, of what it means to be a “Christian” and “Turk” (Rothman, 2011). In mediation process, scholars claim that people interaction is dynamic and possible to be changed to reflect the others’ interests. The most important factor is that cultural differences are changeable in the process of mediation through the efforts of those who purport to mediate and bridge them. In the Chinese media sphere, the rapidly shifting relations between the state and the market are subject to change too. As it is no longer possible to pinpoint with accuracy what is cultural difference between commercial and official culture, it is worth an examination to find out how Chinese media professionals would re-define the boundaries between these two genres. A transformative approach employed in cultural mediation process which will be articulated below can exactly describe the situation. By adopting “Transformative Mediation” approach, to a great extent, media professionals become capable of relieving the conflict between the political and commercial interests that they have to face with for a long time. Transformative Mediation has been conceptualized in this article as a narrative strategy that combines the spirit of the Socialist Mainstream Melody with the expressive techniques of the commercial style. By finding an optimal point where political and commercial interests are both gratified, Transformative Mediation has been proven to be an effective way for independent producers to fulfill ideological mission and achieve economic profits at the same time. Such a narrative innovation creates spaces for independent producers to rewrite mainstream melody with an increased amount of commercial components while not irritating the Party censors. It is a key skill that enables independent producers to mediate between divergent needs and demands. Take Drawing Sword (Liang Jian) for example. It was a top-rated TV serial in 2005, a product of Hairun Movies & TV Production Company, a well known private production company in China. This drama employs a lot of commercial presentation skills to depict a traditional mainstream theme – that of the altruistic spirit and positive image of ccp members. Drawing Sword depicts the legendary life of Li Yunlong, a general of The Eighth Route Army of Communist Party who fights in the anti-Japanese War and China’s civil war. Li Yunlong becomes an orphan after his parents are killed

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

311

by the Japanese soon after he is born. Li is adopted by kind people who live in a poor village. He receives little education and is an illiterate. Nevertheless, Li is a smart soldier and is very talented in utilizing military skills. Based on a farmerlike wisdom, he never acts according to regular military rules and defeats his enemies with shrewd ideas. Attracted by his talents, Tian Yu, a beautiful nurse working in the Communist Army, falls in love with Li and marries him after the ccp wins in China’s civil war. Unlike traditional mainstream dramas in which ccp members are depicted as unrealistic ideal heroes and as such, are not accepted by audiences, the leading character in Drawing Sword Li Yunlong, is portrayed as a normal and adorable person who simultaneously possesses strengths as well as shortcomings. Traditional mainstream dramas tend to adopt a “Gao Da Quan”9 portrayal of ccp heroes who behave flawlessly and sacrifice themselves to fulfill national tasks without hesitation. Such a “God-like” image attributed to ccp heroes always seem unreal and out of reach to audiences. Examples include the mainstream drama Kong Fansen, where Kong frequently goes to remote Tibet for the Party’s work but leaves his aged mother alone and uncared for; in the drama The World of Jiang Shuqin, Jiang decides to assist another woman in childbirth in the middle of the night despite the fact that she herself is going to give birth as well. Being unbelievable, audiences stay away from the programs that portray these “selfless” behaviors of ccp heroes. Compared to these traditional mainstream dramas, Drawing Sword is attractive to audiences as Li Yunlong’s personality is somewhat “common” or “secular”. He is not a perfect hero, but he is a righteous and fearless soldier with some “blemishes”. Although Li is depicted as an uncouth soldier who likes to curse and swear, he is accommodating to his wife and comrades; although a little egoistic with his personal desires, he is duteous and loyal to the nation. He is not a soldier with self discipline and violates army rules from time to time, but he robs advanced weapons and leather coats from Japanese enemy and shares these booties with his poor soldiers who suffer from hunger and cold. Liu Chen, a mid-age male engineer working in Lucent Technologies Company in Beijing, says: At that time when no one can have a stable life, the low education of Li Yunlong is understandable and realistic. I really respect such tough ccp soldiers because they are fearless to fight against Japanese enemies. They 9 Gao Da Quan refers to a traditional image of ccp member portrayed by the mainstream program who is depicted to be too perfect to be a real man and too unrealistic to be accepted by ordinary audiences.

312

Hong and Xu

(Tu Ba Lu) are smart and flexible enough that the well-equipped Japanese cannot win the war. It is because of these fearless soldiers that our ordinary people can have happy lives and receive higher education in the new era. Drawing Sword appears interesting to audiences because it gives a vivid portrayal of ccp heroes who have anxieties, fears, desires and passions just like ordinary persons. Drawing Sword redefines the “ccp hero” and successfully enables audiences to sympathize with him easily and accept what the Mainstream Melody wants its viewers to know. It does this by making use of the Transformative Mediation strategy to employ the commercial expression techniques – giving a humanizing image to ccp members. This drama has broken narrative conventions of mainstream, introducing greater complexity into plot and characterization. Such a “humanizing” image with hybrid personalities, other than a God-like portrait given to ccp heroes, has something to do with a desire to rectify an “unrealistic” or even “blind” worship toward ccp leadership since the Cultural Revolution. It signifies a tendency among Chinese cultural workers for catering to the mass aesthetics in a commercial media landscape and their aspirations to challenge the dominant official explanation of mainstream in their cultural productions. In the past, the Party’s image had remained overwhelmingly positive in front of the public and largely untouched by popular entertainment. However, Drawing Sword made an alarm for Party propagandists and censors that mainstream drama would lose its political function if continues to deliver an unpopular image of the Party to its viewers. Concessions need to be made in a contemporary entertainment era that mainstream works are necessary to be clothed by a popular form. The innovation of Drawing Sword lies primarily in its endeavor of popularizing the Party’s propaganda work. The strategy this drama employed – Transformative Mediation – moves us beyond a domination/resistance model that frames much of our understanding of Chinese media. With the reference to an above-mentioned concept “Party Publicity Inc” first proposed by He (2000), “Transformative Mediation” conceptualized in this article indicates a different picture from it. He’s concept of “Party Publicity Inc” has put more emphasis on exploring the ambiguities and contradictions of the interplay of politics and economics, assuming that these two are inherently antagonistic forces. The dynamics created by the interplay of the two has engaged in a pulling game, or what He calls a “tug-of-war”. As such, He argues that Chinese press has shaken off its old role as ideological brainwashing and converted into a business-like entity. The gradual movement of Chinese press toward a “Party Publicity Inc” is taking place, manifested by a

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

313

separation of publicity messages from other information, in order to become responsive to market demands. In this article, “Transformative Mediation” has been conceptualized, however, to indicate a potential cooperative relationship between the politics and economics. Focusing on content creation of private cultural workers in C ­ hinese media market, the empirical findings have reflected that Transformative Mediation moves us beyond a domination/resistance model and proposes an alternative way of understanding that a partnership between the official censors and media professionals is possible to be developed. On one hand, strict and unpredictable censorship and high-risky content creation have yield cultural workers in China become subjective to the party-state’s ideological guidelines in order to reduce political penalty. On the other hand, consistent test and innovation of narrative measures have consistently broadened the Party censors’ tolerance about popularizing publicity messages and pushed them to offer more freedom for Chinese writers in telling a story. Chinese media professionals have gradually reconfigured their role as “cultural partners”, or even more radically “cultural brokers”, other than define themselves as pure party-paid mouthpiece with complete ideological loyalty. They, in a moderate manner, fight for a possible space that political regulators and commercial writers can be both satisfied. Under such circumstances, Transformative Mediation appropriately offers an optimal point from which the relationship between the political and economic forces is satisfactorily reconfigured. As the censorship criterion about “how can entertainment enter into the political” is readdressed from time to time, the adoption of Transformative Mediation reveals a coexistence of compliance and resistance of cultural workers. It represents a key skill that sutures differences and mediates between divergent forces in the rapidly changing Chinese media landscape. 3

Transformative Mediation: A Dominant Narrative Measure in the Future

Nowadays, private producers become active participants in the reworking of mainstream dramas and their effort suggests that the boundary of the political and the entertainment gets to be flexible and negotiable as a result. In recent years, the party-state also realizes that its “propaganda work” is hardly effective if it continues to lose audiences (Xu, 2015). Transformative Mediation has been widely adopted by private producers since it is not only easier to please the Censorship Review Committee, but also the party regulators hope to use Transformative Mediation as an effective method to promote political

314

Hong and Xu

ideology. Since the success of Drawing Sword, it can be apparently observed that a lot of private production companies have become interested in shooting the “Red Classics”10 TV dramas. The survey shows that more than 40 pieces of “Red Classics” drama were licensed for shooting by the sarft between 2002 and 2004 (Wu, 2004). Examples are Soldiers Sortie (Shibing Tuji) and My Colonel and My Corps (Wo De Tuanzhang Wo De Tuan) which gained huge popularity in the last 2 years. Soldiers Sortie was even sold to Japan at US$10,000 per episode, a record price that Chinese TV dramas have ever made (Wang, 2008). A proliferation of Red Classics has been matched with the fact that Chinese censorship appears to be “a flower in the mist”. In Chinese media landscape, it may not be possible to point out with accuracy “what should properly be regarded as so-called mainstream”. “What should exactly be the boundary between the political and the popular?” “On what terms, or on what basis, can entertainment enter into the political, vise versa?” Answers to these questions are not pre-given by state cultural gatekeepers. Media professionals are searching for and creating answers on a day-to-day basis. This is consistent with Bai’s finding (2012) that, Chinese media professionals stay closely with the state ideology other than challenge it. To rework and dignify their tie to the political mainstream, the producers emphasize the ideological common ground that they supposedly share with the political regime. They show no interest in questioning the Party’s right to rule and situate themselves within, not outside, the system. Private producers might sympathize with social underdogs and criticize official wrongdoing, but only on terms that do not challenge the structure of domination. This has been vividly revealed by the words of an interviewee in the Yinhan Chuanbo, one of the top private production houses in Beijing: It is interesting that our programs always tend to be more conservative (or left) than those produced by TV stations since we cannot afford a huge financial lose if our programs are refused by the official censors… We have produced a lot of revolutionary mainstream programs, much more than the TV stations. You can have a look at what they (the TV stations) produce. They call it mainstream, but our programs are more “mainstream” than their mainstream…Even our entertainment programs contain a lot of politically correct components since we need to get an easier pass of censorship…For example, our entertainment reports show like Jacky Chan expressing support for Beijing Olympic Games and Jay Chou call on patriotic values among adolescents. 10

It generally refers to the works directly associated with revolutionary culture which molds the socialist subject.

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

315

In fact, the information collected from Yinhan Chuanbo exactly shows how private producers survive in China. The better they internalize the ground rules, the more likely they are to enjoy the guarantee of economic interests. Their economic interests are subordinated to their political mission. Only by serving the party-state’s political interests would they be granted living space. The future for private producers in China thus becomes gradually understandable and foreseen. On one hand, the Chinese party-state attempts to improve upon the effectiveness of its propaganda work by softening the ideological tone of its mainstream programs. Media officials have begun to recast a new image that seeks to persuade people through an acceptable rather than the “preaching” manner used in the past. As a result, the party-state hopes to upgrade the quality of socialist mainstream programs by giving more freedom to media workers to search for an appropriate manner that is acceptable to themselves and to audiences at the same time. In the future, the way for ccp to do propaganda work will no longer be “indoctrinatory”, but gradually become “flexible and soft”. On the other hand, media workers have also become aware of the future that “serving the party-state and satisfying the audience” is going to become a dominant guideline for them in creating media content in China. Transformative Mediation has been found to offer a perfect balance between the demands of these two sides. It is thus viewed by media workers as an effective way for them to survive in such a state-market context. Challenging or bypassing the state’s ideology may not be a wise action for them to take. Instead, staying close to the Chinese authorities while keeping audiences interested has been the alternative to which they would like to refer and ensures their survival and profits in the future. Certainly, staying close to the Chinese authorities does not mean a rigid and invariable promotion of political ideology. It requires producers to capture precisely the changes in contemporary politics and discover the extent of the boundaries – “where is the freedom” with which the authorities can really tolerate to allow them to creatively tell a story. Actually the limits of censorship are flexible to the point that Chinese producers can continue to negotiate with the official censors. As the Chinese authority attempts to shape a “modern and democratic” image for itself by granting a limited amount of freedom to media workers, it has provided opportunities for producers to stretch the censorship bottom line. For instance, Lurk (Qianfu), a top-rating TV drama in 2008, is a good example that demonstrates how Chinese producers manage to find out “where is the freedom” and adapt to a changing political climate. The story of Lurk begins in early 1945, shortly before the full outbreak of civil war between the Communist Party and the kmt. Yu Zecheng is sent by the kmt Military Council (Jun Tong)

316

Hong and Xu

to assassinate an ex-kmt leader who has just defected to the Japanese. Yu completes the task, however, is appointed to take more assassination assignments which seem antithetical to his patriotic beliefs. At the same time, Yu is selected by the Communist undercover agents as a prime target for inciting defection. In face of his conflicting beliefs, which way will Yu choose? This TV series is an exciting espionage battle of the wits that realistically portrays the life and hardships of a spy. Stepping away from the black/white or good/bad portray of civil war characters, Lurk moves into the gray area and does not shy away from commenting on the faults of both the kmt and the Communist Party. Traditional mainstream dramas were regarded as negative carriers of the party’s propaganda work because they often blindly praised the Communist Party without objectively judging history. By making stereotypical portrayals of the ccp, the kmt and the Japanese, the old mainstream dramas predominantly portrayed the Japanese as brutal enemies who killed thousands of Chinese without mercy, depicted the kmt as a self-serving ruling party afraid to fight against the Japanese, and praised the ccp as a selfless force that put aside its conflicts with the kmt and sacrificed its political interests to “serve the people”. It cannot be said that these stereotypical depictions have distorted Chinese history, but such a rigid and invariable black/white narrative strategy has oversimplified these three military forces and tends to provide a too perfect yet boring image to ccp members, invoking much dissent among Chinese audiences. Lurk successfully passed the strict censorship by depicting kmt nationalists in a somewhat positive light because of the recent up-and-up relationship between the ccp and kmt. The mainland leadership is currently seeking an unprecedented friendly relationship with Taiwan. Such a political shift opens a window for producers to depart from the traditional unilateral portrayals of the kmt, finding a limited “creation space” to provide a moderately positive portrayal of kmt nationalists. Interestingly, spy stories such as Lurk actually have their roots in criminal and suspense series which were forbidden to be aired during primetime by sarft since 2004. As these stories overwhelmingly focused on the anti-corruption themes that Chinese audiences love to watch, the sarft was worried that the popularity of such anti-corruption stories may invoke discontent among the Chinese people toward current social inequalities. The producers who were shooting or planning to shoot anti-corruption stories had been placed in an awkward situation as they had already spent a lot on pre-production. In order to retrieve their loss, these creative producers keenly captured a contemporary political change and skillfully re-weaved their old stories into the anti-Japanese or anti-kmt backdrop. On one hand, they promote the Communist Party’s altruistic spirits through anti-enemy ­stories.

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

317

On the other hand, they shift the corruption scenarios to kmt officials to keep those commercial presentation approaches, such as suspense, mystery, violence, crime and romance, to make their stories exciting. By providing a psychological buffer zone that the state ideology keeps unchallenged but clothed by a commercial form, the producers do not irritate ccp censors. With such Transformative Mediation-featured adaptations, the old anti-corruption stories have been changed into mainstream-style spy stories. They are thus merely “new wine in old wineskins”. Gao Qunshu, a commercial Chinese director whose political intuition has been sharpened by years of constantly negotiating with the official censors confessed that “the television drama Rush 1937 (Daofeng 1937) is rewritten by me. Criminal stories are changed into anti-Japanese stories; I turn the trash into wealth!” (Kuai, 2009: 30). The adaption of spy stories has vividly shown how contemporary Chinese producers are able to negotiate with the TV censors and attempt to stretch their bottom lines in the state-market context. As China’s politics varies from time to time, “the degree of freedom” becomes flexible as well. As a dominant narrative strategy with potential for expansion in the future, Transformative Mediation is also adapting itself to become flexible enough so that producers can creatively tell their stories and still remain under the guidelines of “ideologically serving the party-state”. Under such a model of regulation in which the party-state remains the center, the market forces have been gradually led to a collaborative relationship with the party-state other than challenge it. The rendering approaches to content creation tend to be commercial-style, with the values orientated toward the mainstream yet with political flexibilities. 4

TV Regulations and Its Ideological Functions

With the state’s unreserved embrace of the market economy, Chinese television today is no longer a simple party mouthpiece in China. It has become a profit-seeking business with the increased involvement of commercial considerations. Based on the historical relevance of Western experiences, some tend to take such a view that increased commercialism in post-wto China may lead to a crackdown of the Party’s monopolistic control over television. It seems inevitable that Chinese television will step away from the ideological straitjacket imposed by the Party and become more liberalized and democratized. Nevertheless, China’s unique approach to developing the commercial operation of its broadcasting system has resulted in television practitioners in the Chinese market operating according to commercial imperatives but still being subjected to close censorship and regulation by the party-state. This a­ rticle

318

Hong and Xu

finally argues that the ideological function of Chinese Television has been reinforced from three aspects. First, a broadened concept of ideology in contemporary China has provided more space for TV producers to create politically-correct stories. These stories still serve an ideological function although they do not explicitly promote political doctrines. Second, although the amount of explicit propaganda content has decreased in television programs, the effectiveness of state propaganda work has actually been improved by employing more commercial presentation techniques to promote the state’s ideologies. Third, although private producers have been granted admission into the area of television production, their content creation process has been heavily influenced by the state’s political control and their “political self-consciousness” has caused them to adhere to the state’s ideological requirements more closely than state broadcasters. 4.1 A Broadened Concept of Ideology The ideology of a nation-state is subject to change over time, and cannot be seen as a static set of doctrines. As Hartley has pointed out, the evolution of ideology should be seen as “an active practice” that operates on the level of common sense and everyday consciousness (1994: 143). No matter how it varies over time, the fundamental nature of ideology, as Thompson has argued, is to “serve to establish and sustain relations of domination” (Thompson, 1990: 58). The ccp’s ideology has often been defined as a set of rigid dogmas, such as Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The narrow scope of ccp’s ideology, however, seems to already be incompatible with the rapidly changing social context in China. Since the Party began to adopt market reforms in the 1980s, a broader conception of political ideology has been proposed with the inclusion of ideas about promoting national and personal economic development as well as success through the market. Zhao (1998: 5) has persuasively argued that “although the party has not relinquished Marxism, L­ eninism and Mao Zedong Thought, it is counting on ‘delivering the goods’ rather than on ideological doctrines alone for its legitimacy”. Television has been strongly manipulated to promote the party-state’s policies and directives, in order to persuade people about the correctness of economic-oriented policies and to inform them about the positive results of these policies. As Zhao has observed, the increasing presence of a variety of entertainment forms with reduced explicitly propagandist content during the 1980s and 1990s does not mean that the media is no longer doing ideological work or dominating politically. The promotion of economic success on television is no less ideological than the promotion of class struggle during the Mao era. Although the ideology of national and personal development through the market has replaced the

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

319

popularity of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, its grip on the people is no less totalistic. The state’s ideology is subject to change in the 21st century as well. A broader conception of the current political ideology in China has been extended from the explicitly political to the social and psychological dimensions. By including more values in what the state encourages, such as continuing to promote personal economic success and showing more respect to Confucian philosophy, the barriers between political ideology and folk morality and everyday consciousness in China become more and more indistinguishable. The state’s broadened ideology through the inclusion of Confucian values implies a tendency for the new generation of Chinese leaders to attempt to improve the acceptability of its propaganda work in order to retain its governance by involving more moral values in political ideology, or say, to seemingly “de-­politicize” it to respond to a rapidly changing social situation. This broadened ideology consequently allows more room for Chinese television producers to create mainstream stories that may not promote rigid doctrines (Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought) but that may still contain ideological aesthetics and serve an ideological function. For example, the cctv commercial TV drama A Native of Beijing in New York (Beijing Ren Zai Niuyue) promotes the ideological values by presenting a complex official sentiment toward the West. Another cctv historical drama Yong Zheng Dynasty (Yongzheng Wangchao) puts forward the ideological values of calling on social justice by presenting a positive image of the ancient emperor. A recently popular anti-corruption drama In The Name of People (Renmin De Mingyi) emphasizes the ideological values of strengthening Party discipline with unprecedented censorship tolerance about political issues. Other types of dramas, such as family dramas and love stories, also serve as vehicles for state propaganda work by taking a mainstream tone of calling for social stability and harmony although they do not explicitly promote rigid doctrines. This article argues that political ideology advocated by the contemporary Chinese regime is different from that in previous times. The studies arguing for a de-ideologization of Chinese television tend to base their arguments on narrow perceptions of ccp ideologies, such as the rigid dogmas of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong without considering the new development of ideology. Based on a critical understanding of ideology as a dynamic concept, propaganda cannot be narrowly defined as a set of symbolic forms (i.e., delivered by television) to promote explicit doctrines and dogmas. Propaganda should be generally understood as “the attempt to transmit social and political values in the hope of affecting people’s thinking, emotions, and thereby behavior” (Cheek, 1985: 52). Therefore, as long as the symbolic forms delivered by

320

Hong and Xu

television serve to sustain party-state governance, even though they do not explicitly promote Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, they continue to do the party-state’s propaganda work and serve the ideological function of television. 4.2 Effectiveness of Propaganda Work With the empirical effects of the Chanye Hua reform, Chinese television is less likely moving into a highly commercialized phase in which private capital is gaining dominance over state capital, but very possibly evolving into a new stage in which the state broadcasters, especially cctv, are gradually achieving a monopolization of the media market due to the privileges they are guaranteed by the party-state. Furthermore, in this new stage, the increasingly commercialized operations of television practitioners can be granted by the state only with some preconditions imposed. First, television ownership should be placed under strict state control; second, the “political attribute” of television should remain more important than the “commercial attribute”. Under such circumstances, a seemingly increased level of commercial operation and a reduction in explicitly propagandist television content does not necessarily result in the concession of state control over television and the withdrawal of its propaganda work. In fact, the ideological function of television has not been impaired at all despite a decrease in explicitly propaganda content being shown on television screens. The Chinese authority has realized that state ideology can actually be better promoted by embracing more elements of commercial television services into its propaganda work. There is now the recognition that if mainstream programs keep losing audiences, the “propaganda work” is hardly able to achieve its effectiveness. As one of the objectives for the state to push the Chanye Hua reform, current television programs do cut down on the amount of explicitly propagandist content and added in more components of commercial expression, such as entertaining, suspenseful and romantic scenarios, in order to make them more attractive. In the meantime, propaganda work is not withdrawn from such commercial expressions of television but rather, is wisely embedded within the commercial content using a special narrative strategy. Transformative Mediation, the strategy of promoting the spirit of the socialist mainstream melody by employing commercial expression approaches, has been widely exploited by Chinese producers to fulfill political requirements while achieving economic profits at the same time. By utilizing such a narrative strategy, the socialist mainstream melody no longer has overbearing boring and sermonic tones. Diverse types of Chinese mainstream programs, such as Red Classics, dynasty serials, anti-corruption serials, family dramas and

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

321

even youth dramas, have now gained a high level of popularity among Chinese viewers, especially the young viewers aged from 20s to 30s as the majority of viewership of these mainstream television dramas (Zhong, 2008). As a result, the state’s propaganda work to promote political ideologies and values of the ruling party can now be consumed and accepted by audiences in a more smooth and effective manner. 4.3 Political Influence on Television Content Creation With the increased autonomy of television operators, is it possible that what they have produced will bring severe challenges to the dominant ideology? Nevertheless, far from this scenario, private producers in China do not enjoy full autonomy and their content creation has been heavily influenced by political forces. What they create actually tends to be subject to even more political requirements and is even more conservative (of left) than that of state broadcasters. The main reason for this phenomenon is that the state still has a tight grasp on broadcasting resources and censorship, and private producers appear to be too weak to negotiate with it. With the right to broadcasting and censorship still tightly held in the hands of the government, private producers, both domestic and foreign, cannot survive without collaborating and even relying on the monopolistic state media to ensure that their programs can be aired on television channels. They cannot afford to lose funds, refinance and reshoot their programs, if their television content is defined as “offensive” by the state censors. As the number of times that a program is refused increases, the production risk increases as well. As a result, private production companies tend to choose topics that are the most unlikely to be refused by the censors in order to reduce their production risk. Ideologically-friendly content and the socialist mainstream melody that are highly recommended by TV officials have thus become the safest choices for them. In contrast, anti-ideology and anti-mainstream content is intentionally evaded by private producers for fear of penalty. The empirical findings indicate a “political self-consciousness” that is widely shared among private producers in China. In order to more easily pass through strict censorship and to ensure that their programs are aired on TV, private producers would rather make the sacrifice to please Chinese television authorities by producing more ideological TV content. For example, they may add in a lot of politically correct content to promote the state ideology in their programs. They also love to adopt the Transformative Mediation strategy to decorate their commercial dramas in order to ensure the political correctness of their programs. For example, some producers have creatively adapted traditional crime and suspense series that inevitably include easily-banned commercial

322

Hong and Xu

components such as crime, violence and sex scenarios into “commercialized” socialist mainstream stories. They have done this by placing the stories within the context of an anti-Japanese or anti-kmt backdrop, and promoting the altruistic spirit of ccp members through these anti-enemy stories while still applying commercial presentation approaches, such as violence and crime, to add excitement to these stories, which thus invites less political intervention from the authorities. More and more private production companies are now become interesting in shooting Red Classics mainstream dramas. For example, the Beijing Xiaoma Benteng private production company11 produced a mainstream drama called My Brother Name Shunliu (Wo de Xiongdi Jiao Shunliu) in 2009; another private production company, Tianyi Yingshi,12 produced the mainstream drama Soldiers Sortie (Shibing Tuji) in 2006. These Red Classics dramas not only look safe enough to be accepted by the censors but are also more likely to be aired on prime time, which may result in more market profits for them. Besides mainstream dramas, even the entertainment programs produced have been flavored with some politically correct topics. For instance, entertainment reports may show movie stars expressing support for Beijing’s Olympic Games and invoking patriotic values among adolescents. Sometimes, entertainment programs produced by private producers tend to be even more conservative (or left) than those produced by state broadcasters. In sum, although the commercial reform has opened up the sphere of tv production to private producers, it has nevertheless also limited their operations by placing them in a powerless position. The processes of creating content, such as the selection of topics and the utilization of narrative strategies, have consequently become increasingly subjected to political influence from the party-state. 5

Conclusion: A Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Model and An Inevitable Path for Ideological Regulation in the Country

Market reforms do not signify a shift toward the liberal state in China. “There is no hint that the Chinese state is peacefully evolving into a liberal state because 11 12

Xiaoma Benteng (小马奔腾) is a private television production company in Beijing. It was founded in 1998. More details can be found on its website http://www.htvfilm.com.cn/ intro.asp. Tianyi Yingshi (天意影视) is a private television production company in Beijing. It was founded by famous producer Wu Yi, director Kang Honglei and Huayi Brothers, one of the most well known private production companies in China. Details can be found on its website http://www.tianyi.tv/.

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

323

of the ‘liberating force’ of the market”. Instead, the Chinese state has been recasting itself into a modern authority – something akin to a “bureaucraticauthoritarian regime” – with a seemingly decreasing authoritarian character, but still maintaining its political power more and more by regulatory and administrative means rather than by strong coercive orders. The Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Model (BA) was introduced by O’Donnell (1973) to indicate a close relationship between increased modernization and authoritarian government. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, modernization theorists optimistically expected an increase in democracy in economically advanced third-world countries. However, large-scale economic growth and industrialization in some countries in Latin America and East Asia in the late 1960s and 1970s did not lead to the development of democratic institutions; instead, as argued by O’Donnell (1973; 1978), they were associated with military takeovers and the rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism. In the BA model, strong intervention on the part of the government appears to be required in order to guarantee social stability so that new transfusions of international capital can be obtained which may be sought through repression of the political and economic demands of the masses (Im, 1987, Lee, He and Huang, 2008). This model’s broad theoretical implications included the authoritarian Asian regimes of South Korea (Park, Kim and Sohn, 2000), Taiwan (Lee, 2000) and Singapore (Sim, 2001) as being “noted for justifying their suppression of press freedom and civil liberties on the grounds that economic growth is predicated on social stability”. The Chinese leadership has also consistently claimed that its economic reform has brought enormous benefits to people and made China mighty and proud in the world arena. Yet, some have argued that China’s impressive record of economic growth is achieved at the expense of social justice, such as the widening gap between the rich and the poor. The concept of Bureaucratic-authoritarianism is thus useful in examining the relationship between China’s rapid economic development and its dictatorship, as this newly industrialized country shares many similarities with the countries mentioned above (Lee, He and Huang, 2006: 581). The possible rise of a BA regime in China has been echoed in other schools of thought in China as well. These are known as Neo-conservatism and the New Left, and they have gained prominence since the early to late 1990s. As Fewsmith (2001) has described, China’s political and cultural landscape from the 1990s to the present has been largely defined by the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. This crackdown muted the intellectual ferment of the 1980s which included protests against corruption and privilege and appealed for democracy. Neo-conservatism gained currency after this period of chaos in the early to mid 1990s, finding its roots in neo-authoritarianism. It argued for a middle path between the traditional conservatism of the Old Left and the

324

Hong and Xu

wholesale marketization pushed by radical reformers. Rejecting the liberal call of the 1980s inspired by Western liberal democratic theory, Neo-conservatism demanded a greater role for the state to ensure the success of economic reform and to move toward indirect (elite suffrage) democracy in China. Another school of thought, “The New Left”, came into being in the mid to late 1990s. It also rejected the idea that Western-style liberal democracy was the only way to make social progress and argued for a strong state to bridge the gap between the haves and the have-nots. Regardless of their differences in ideas on the role of the market, both these two schools of thought consistently call for strict government controls in China at the expense of civil rights and freedom of speech. Although the Tiananmen event did not change the beliefs of Chinese liberals, it did mute their voices and relegate them to a marginal place in China’s contemporary discourse. These two schools of thought that have gained currency in China’s contemporary politics have prepared the grounds for the acceptance of such an authoritarian state in China. As the major state institutions are bureaucratized to accommodate to the capitalist economy, however, there is no indication that the Chinese media will become something akin to the model of liberal media in Western capitalist societies. On the one hand, unlike the romanticized view of a democratic market, the state continues to exert blunt forms of censorship and can punish dissenters with direct orders without legitimate regulations. Examples of this include the actress Tang Wei of Lee Ang’s movie Lust Caution. Tang Wei was punished by an internally-delivered political ban not to appear on any movie, television show or even advertising in China. Such an unpredictable regulatory pressure has forced media actors to seek the support of the state and to promote the authorities’ interests instead of those of the masses. On the other hand, the media sector has been pushing for Chanye Hua reform, which transforms the media from a propaganda apparatus into more business-like but still state-owned enterprises that will serve the state and satisfy the market at the same time. The state grants limited democracy and operational autonomy to media workers through a series of legal and administrative means. This satisfies both media workers and consumers as Transformative Mediation has been widely employed as an effective strategy by media workers to continue their job of ideological delivery on behalf of the party-state by providing “attractive” and “interesting” propagandist messages to their audiences. Although the media sector has been bureaucratized to operate and has enjoyed relative autonomy, this does not necessarily mean an increasing detachment of the media from the state. The leadership of the party and the media sector in China is always intertwined within such state-owned

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

325

media enterprises. This has resulted in what Ma (2000: 28) describes as “the state becomes both an actor and a regulator of the market”. For example, the newly appointed cctv president, Jiao Li, serves as a media business leader and a top Party propaganda official at the same time. The media sector maintains an alliance with the state for winning support. Meanwhile, the state has also attempted to transform itself into a modern authority by tolerating and allowing limited freedom to the media sector as long as the latter continues to serve the interests of the party-state. Bureaucratic-authoritarianism seems to be the appropriate model for analysis. Neither the traditional “Authoritarian Model” nor the “Liberal Model” can adequately address the fundamental changes to contemporary Chinese media. In the state-market complex, the market actually limits social discourses and reinforces dominant ideologies in the Chinese media forum. The state remains the center and exerts powerful control over the country’s media. In fact, there seems to be no reason for media actors to challenge the party-state’s interests if their profits can be assured. It makes no difference whether their profits are derived from a freely competitive market or a protected and distorted one. This is especially so if the giant broadcasting groups are consolidated with political commands. Overall, the market-orientated reform with unique Chinese characteristics has resulted in the fact that excessive political interventions rather than market principles play a dominant role during the reforms. Those seemingly neoliberal policies adopted by the Chinese state with empirical complexities are less likely to move the Chinese media into a free competition mechanism in the future, which is far from a platform from which various media capital can contest freely and fairly. Instead, it is more likely to move it into a new stage in which the state will continue to exercise its strong control power and media practitioners are led to a cooperative, albeit less ideologically and culturally antagonistic, relationship with the former. Bibliography Bai, R. 2012. “Cultural mediation and the making of the mainstream in postsocialist China”, Media Culture and Society 34(4). Bush, Robert A. Baruch and Joseph P. Folger 1994. The promise of mediation: responding to conflict through empowerment and recognition. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Cheek, T. 1985. “Redefining Propaganda”, in P. Kenez (ed.) The birth of the propaganda state: Soviet methods of mass mobilization, 1917–1929, New York: Cambridge University Press.

326

Hong and Xu

Della Noce, D.J., R.A.B. Bush, & J.P. Folger, 2002. Clarifying the theoretical underpinnings of mediation: Implications for practice and policy. Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, 3(1), 39–65. Fewsmith, J. 2001. “The emergence of neo-conservatism”, in J. Fewsmith’ in J. Fewsmith (ed.) China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. French, D. 2000. “Television and the Liberalisation of Communication Markets”, in Richards, French, D. and Michael (ed.) Television in contemporary Asia, New Delhi: Sage Publications. Fung, A. 2008. Global capital, local culture: localization of transnational media corporations in China. Peter Lang. Geertz, C. 1960. The Javanese Kijaji: the changing role of a cultural broker. Comparative Studies in Society and History 2(2): 228–249. Guo, Z. 2001. “The Market and Management of Television Programs in the Age of Globalization”, in W.X. Chen and Z.R. Hu Broadcasting in the age of globalization, Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press. Guo, Z.Z. 2004. ‘WTO, Media Industrialization and Chinese Television’. A Working Paper of Institute for Broadcasting Economics. Cologne University, Germany. Hartley, J. 1994. “Ideology”, in T. O’Sullivan (ed.) Key concepts in Communication and Cultural Studies, 2nd edition, New York: Routledge. He, Z. 2000. Chinese Communist Party Press in a Tug-of-War: A Political-Economy Analysis of the Shenzhen Special Zone Daily. in C.C. Lee(ed) Power, Money, and Media.Illinois: Northwestern University Press. Hong, J.H. and Y.C. Hsu 1999. “Asian NICs’ Broadcast Media in the Ear of Globabilization”, Gazette, vol. 61, no. 3–4, pp. 225–242. Hong, J. 2011. From the World’s Largest Propaganda Machine to a Multipurposed Global News Agency: Factors in and Implications of Xinhua’s Transformation Since 1978. Political Communication. 2011, 28 (3):377–393. Hong, J. 2016. The role of media in China’s democratisation. Media Development, 2016(49). Im, H.B. 1987. “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea”, World Politics, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 231–257. Keane, M. 2002. “Facing off on the final frontier: the WTO accession and the rebranding of China’s national champions”, Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy, vol. 105, pp. 130–146. Keane, M. 2005. Television drama in China: remaking the market. Media International Australia (Culture and Policy) (115), pp. 82–93. Keane, M., A. Fung, and A. Moran 2007. New Television, Globalization, and The East Asian Cultural Imagination. Hong Kong University Press.

Commercial Reform and the Ideological Function

327

Kuai, L.H. 2009. “Gao Qunshu: I am the best commercial director in China”, Southern People Weekly, 12 October, pp. 29–31. Lee, C.-C. 1990. “Mass Media: Of China, about China”, in C.-C. Lee Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism, New York: Guilfor. Lee, C.-C. 2000. Power, Money, and Media: Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Lee, C.-C., Z. He and Y. Huang 2006. “Chinese Party Publicity Inc conglomerated: the case of the Shenzhen Press Group”. Media Culture and Society Vol. 28(4): 581–602. Lee, C.-C., Z. He and Y. Huang 2008. “Chinese party publicity Inc. conglomerated: the case of the Shenzhen press group” in K. Sen, T. Lee (Eds.) Political Regimes and the Media in Asia. Routledge, New York, NY. Lu, Y. 2003. “quanli yu xinwen shengchan guocheng” [Power and the process of news production], Twenty-First Century, 77, pp. 18–26. Ma, E. 2000. “Rethinking media studies: The case of China” in P Curranand (ed.) DeWesternizing Media Studies. London: Routledge. Meng, J. 2001. “The Expansion of Cultural Imperalism and the Rebound of Chinese Culture”, Modern Communication, no. 1, pp. 23–31. O’Donnell, G.A. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Berkeley: University of Cailfornia Press. Park, M.-J., C.-N. Kim and B.-W. Sohn 2000. “Modernization, Globalization, and the Powerful State: The Korean Media”, in J. Curran and M.-J. Park (ed.) De-westernizing Media Studies, London: Routledge. Redl, A. and R. Simons 2002. “Chinese Media: One Channel, Two Systems”, in S.H. Donald, M. Keane and Y Hong. (ed.) Media in China: Consumption, Content and Crisis, London: Routledge Curzon. Rothman, N. 2011. Brokering Empire: Trans-imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. SARFT 2006. Report on Development of China’s Radio, Film and Television, Social Sciences Academic Press (CHINA). Sim, S.F. 2001. “Asian Values, Authoritarianism and Capitalism in Singapore”, Javnost/ The Public, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 45–66. State Council, L.A.O. 2002. Compilation of the Legal Instruments on China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization (Chinese version), China Legal Publishing Hourse (zhongguo fazhi chubanshe). Thompson, J.B. 1990. Ideology and Modern Culture: critical social theory in the era of Mass Communication, Cambridge: Polity Press. Wang, J. 2008. ‘Soldier Sortie gains a high popularity in overseas market’ (Shibing Tuji, chixu refa, Xusanduo, fengmi haiwai), Wenhuipo, 11 Mar, 2008 http://paper.wenweipo .com/2008/03/11/OT0803110001.htm.

328

Hong and Xu

Wu, X.D. 2004. “Red Classics” adaption: must respect history memory. (hongse jingdian gaibian: bixu zunzhong lishi jiyi). China Youth Daily, 2004-05-27(3). Xie, Y.G. 2007. where is the future for independent production companies? (minying gonsi, lu zai he fang), [Online], Available: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4772a 33101000axv.html?tj=1. Xiong, J. and Y Liu. 2002. “The Problems and Impacts of the Separation of TV Program Production and Broadcasting”, Contemporary Communications, no. 3, pp. 4–7. Xu, F.Z. 2000. “The Problem of Chinese Television Reform and Its Solution (zhongguo dianshi gaige de wenti ji duice)”, Modern Communication (Xian Dai Chuan Bo), vol. 4, pp. 9–16. Xu, G.C. 2002. “WTO and Broadcasting Reform”, News Battlefront (Xinwen Zhanxian), no. 7, July, pp. 1–5. Xu, M.H. 2013. Television reform in the era of globalization:new trends and patterns in post-WTO China. Telematics and Informatics Volume 30, Issue 4, November 2013, Pages 370–380. Xu, M.H. 2015. Chinese TV Drama in a regional market. Telematics and Informatics. Volume 32, Issue 1, Pages 98–107. Yin, H. 2002. “Meaning, Production, Consumption: The History and Reality of Television Drama in china”, in S.H. Donald, M. Keane and H. Yin Media in China: Consumption, Content and Crisis, Rchmond: Routledge Curzon. Zeng, Q.R. 2005. Giving Protection on the Cultural Heritage of TV Drama (Shou Wang Dian Shi Ju de Jing Sheng Jia Yuan), Bejing: Communication University of China Press. Zhang, J.B. 1994. ‘Strike Up the Music of the Times: On the Mainstream Melody and Television Drama’, Chinese Television no. 9, pp. 2–5. Zhang, Z. 2006. Globalization and China National TV Culture Security, Beijing: Communication University of China Press. Zhao, Y.Z. 1998. Media, Market and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line., Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Zhao, Y.Z. 2000. “From commercialization to conglomeration: the transformation of the Chinese press within the orbit of the Party state”, Journal of Communication, 50(2):3–26. Zhao, Y.Z. 2008. Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict. Rowman and Littlefield. Zhong, W.Y. 2008. People Daily, 21 Feb, [Online], Available: http://ent.people.com.cn/ GB/1083/6911838.html.

Index 1940s 149, 152, 154, 157, 229, 230, 231, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244 2016 U.S. Presidential Election 183 Adorno, Theodore xii, 54, 57, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 114, 122, 144, 145, 160 Advertising x, 5, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 116, 117, 118, 144, 167, 191, 200, 235, 237, 240, 324 Alienation 36, 50, 55, 64, 66, 89, 117, 188, 191 Alternative Media 109, 236, 241, 272, 273 Althusser, Louis 2, 44, 57, 69, 70, 77, 79, 80, 85, 86, 97, 103, 200 American Empire 177, 180, 181 Atrocity 267, 271 Authoritarian Populism xiii, 46, 184, 194, 196, 197 Breen, Joseph 257, 259, 262 Capitalism v, viii, x, xiii, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 27, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67, 71, 76, 79, 86, 88, 90, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 143, 145, 146, 154, 155, 157, 162, 166, 171, 179, 180, 183, 187, 189, 190, 224, 225, 256, 257, 264, 265, 293, 327 Capitalist Realism 41, 43, 56, 57 Censorship 82, 256, 257, 260, 304, 306, 307, 308, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 319, 321, 324 China viii, xv, 12, 13, 22, 23, 27, 29, 33, 38, 40, 124, 135, 136, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 178, 179, 180, 207, 209, 214, 217, 270, 271, 272, 299, 300, 302, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 313, 315, 317, 318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328 cia 163, 166, 178, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 214, 220, 221, 275, 279, 284 Clinton, Hillary 192, 195, 198, 204, 205, 217 Coercion vii, 2, 7, 10, 17, 30, 97, 99, 107, 109, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 148, 162, 169, 170, 227

Cold War vi, 163, 171, 178, 194, 199, 201, 202, 203, 205, 207, 209, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 243, 270, 272, 273, 295 Commercial Media 4, 20, 28, 229, 231, 237, 240, 241, 242, 244, 312 Commercialization 12, 28, 300, 301, 302, 328 Communication viii, x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xv, 14, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 60, 63, 81, 85, 90, 98, 102, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 145, 164, 165, 171, 172, 173, 174, 177, 180, 181, 185, 230, 231, 233, 236, 237, 238, 242, 244, 247, 248, 253, 258, 261, 265, 299, 326, 327, 328 Communism 12, 47, 51, 209, 256, 263 Conjunctural Moments 232, 233 Consent vii, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 46, 90, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 107, 109, 112, 113, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 161, 171, 173, 244 Consumerism v, 5, 6, 11, 13, 15, 20, 31, 33, 36, 37, 40, 47, 68, 79, 84, 145 Consumption 4, 6, 9, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 57, 66, 98, 113, 220, 2276, 301, 327, 328 Corporate Media 236 Counter-hegemonic 51, 108, 109, 176, 177, 233, 250, 263 Crimea 202, 212, 214, 215, 216, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 294, 295, 296, 297 Critical Junctures 230, 231, 234, 235 Critical Media Studies 232 Critical Theory xii, 45, 74, 77, 85, 88 Cultural Hegemony v, x, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39 Cultural Industries v, 19, 144, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179

330

Index

Culture v, x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 51, 53, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 74, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 121, 122, 123, 124, 127, 130, 136, 140, 144, 146, 150, 151, 152, 156, 157, 160, 163, 170, 174, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 186, 187, 189, 192, 196, 200, 201, 202, 204, 205, 210, 223, 228, 233, 234, 246, 247, 250, 305, 309, 310, 314, 325, 326, 327, 328

Frankfurt School 69, 74, 76, 83, 144, 145 Freelance 21 Fromm, Erich 188, 193, 197

Debord, Guy 185, 187, 197 Defense 46, 49, 51, 66, 163, 166, 170, 171, 177, 179, 182, 205, 207, 212, 213, 217, 225, 272, 275, 282, 284, 287 Democratic Theory 324 Deregulation 9, 14, 18, 26, 28, 33, 302 Digital Labor v, xi, 107, 108, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121 Distorted Knowledge v, 125, 130, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 139 Dominant Culture 4, 15, 43, 45, 95 Dominant Ideology 93, 98, 223, 321

Hays, William 249, 250, 251, 255, 256, 257, 260, 262, 264, 266 Hegemonies 127, 136 Hegemony v, vi, vii, viii, x, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 43, 46, 48, 51, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 115, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 142, 143, 144, 146, 152, 156, 158, 159, 178, 200, 232, 233, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 265, 291 Historical Materialism 106, 111 Historicizing 113, 231 Hitler 75, 188, 189, 195, 208, 218, 221 Hollywood vi, xi, xii, xiii, 19, 23, 26, 27, 39, 167, 172, 173, 178, 186, 213, 248, 249, 253, 254, 256, 257, 259, 260, 262, 263, 266 Hybrid experiences 126, 130

Engels, Friedrich 3, 57, 62, 63, 101 Entertainment x, xiv, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 122, 126, 136, 144, 157, 172, 173, 175, 178, 181, 182, 187, 194, 195, 213, 221, 299, 307, 308, 312, 313, 314, 318, 322 Environmental Issues 225, 227 Existential Truths 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142 Facebook vii, 107, 108, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 129, 136, 166, 167, 171, 173, 177, 184 Fascism 71, 76, 84, 89, 95, 112, 188, 191, 192, 262 fcc (Federal Communications Commission) 237, 238, 239, 240, 241,  242, 244 Films 9, 11, 13, 14, 29, 30, 31, 151, 156, 167, 172, 188, 213, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264

Gatekeeping 30, 173, 243 Global Media v, xi, xv, 4, 5, 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 25, 33, 37, 39, 40, 144, 236, 246 Gramsci, Antonio xi, 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 14, 39, 43, 49, 57, 69, 70, 80, 85, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 111, 112, 113, 121, 123, 144, 154, 200, 232, 234, 246 Greenwald, Glenn 202, 203, 218, 221

Ideological Hegemony 97, 99, 103 Ideology critique v, 56, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 76, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 ımf (International Monetary Fund) 155, 211, 270, 272 Inflexibility 26 Intellectual xi, 1, 19, 28, 38, 42, 45, 46, 53, 56, 60, 67, 73, 78, 81, 84, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 103, 110, 136, 139, 154, 177, 220, 223, 225, 227, 232, 234, 244, 245, 250, 323 Intelligence vii, viii, xi, 163, 166, 169, 170, 172, 180, 198, 199, 204, 207, 208, 209, 213, 219, 220, 274, 279, 280, 283, 285, 285, 286, 288, 294, 295

331

Index Investigation 22, 200, 207, 209, 214, 269, 275, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 285, 291, 293, 294, 297 Knowledge Societies 130, 131, 135, 138, 139, 141, 142 Labor Movement 43, 44, 234, 235, 245 Lenin, V.I. iv, 1, 3, 91, 93, 94, 100, 101, 102, 112 Long-term xiv, 5, 126, 127, 131, 134, 135, 138, 139, 141, 243, 245 Mainstream Journalism 225, 227 Mainstream Media 109, 123, 144, 156, 157, 158, 187, 198, 200, 201, 206, 208, 212, 213, 215, 220, 267, 268, 273, 284, 287, 291 Marcuse, Herbert xiii, 43, 44, 45, 57, 76, 79, 83, 88, 144, 145, 146, 159, 160, 196, 197 Marx, Karl xiv, 1, 3, 5, 39, 48, 49, 50, 57, 62, 63, 64, 66, 69, 70, 73, 75, 85, 88, 90, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 117, 123, 144, 232, 246, 253 Marxism v, xii, xiii, xv, 38, 41, 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 63, 65, 75, 88, 91, 100, 106, 110, 111, 115, 122, 160, 232, 246, 318, 319, 320 Mao Zedong Thought 318, 319, 320 Mass Communication 44, 45, 81, 123, 124, 145, 180, 181, 326 Materialism 40, 58, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 123 Media Activism vi, xiv, 230, 237, 247 Media Democracy xiv, 229, 236, 238, 242, 246 Media Entertainment 6, 10, 11, 16, 19, 36, 178 Media History 229 Media Justice 236 Media Policy xv, 229, 231, 236, 238, 241, 243, 245, 246 Media Reform 20, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246 Media Spectacle xiii, 176, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 195, 197 mh17 vi, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298 Middle East 11, 12, 210, 211

Militainment 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 180, 181 Militarism v, xiv, 84, 162, 163, 164, 168, 170, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 194 Morals 60, 128, 260 nafta 225 nato 201, 205, 212, 215, 216, 217, 220, 222, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 280, 281, 291, 296 Norbert, Elias xiv, 130, 135, 140, 141 Normalization 41 Normative 140, 229, 230, 231, 235, 265, 309 Obama, Barack 169, 185, 187, 190, 191, 193, 197, 198, 201, 202, 203, 206, 211, 215, 218, 221 Peace 13, 131, 132, 141, 158, 169, 175, 176, 181, 189, 196, 207, 217, 220, 239, 260 Political Economy 4, 6, 7, 16, 18, 19, 39, 40, 96, 115, 123, 143, 164, 179, 180, 201, 256, 326, 328 Political Control 301, 318 Popular Culture x, 13, 16, 18, 41, 43, 61, 90, 152, 160, 174, 178, 309 Political Economy of Media xiv, 180 Postwar 100, 201, 203, 231, 237, 242, 244, 245, 246 Post-wwıı 225 Privatization 9, 12, 14, 19, 27, 300, 301, 302, 304 Propaganda vi, vii, x, xiv, 1, 2, 56, 86, 101, 102, 103, 158, 174, 176, 178, 181, 188, 192, 200, 208, 209, 213, 220, 222, 238, 262, 267, 268, 269, 271, 273, 277, 278, 281, 290, 291, 293, 294, 295, 297, 300, 301, 309, 312, 313, 315, 316, 318, 319, 320, 321, 324, 325, 326 Public Media 4, 34, 242 Putin, Vladimir 201, 207, 208, 211, 218, 221, 268, 272, 276, 278, 279, 280, 284, 286, 291, 292, 296 Reconfiguration 226 Regime Change xv, 199, 205, 210, 212, 218, 221, 222 Repressive Power v, viii, 125, 135, 137, 138, 139 Revolutionary Songs v, 143, 157 Riefenstahl, Leni 188

332 Russia 1, 20, 33, 34, 91, 92, 101, 102, 112, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 176, 180, 201, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 256, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 290, 292, 293, 294, 296, 297, 298 Russophobia 216, 217, 219 Security 17, 128, 132, 140, 157, 158, 162, 163, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 199, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 212, 213, 214, 216, 270, 290, 294, 328 Social Classes 7, 8, 15, 18, 31, 34, 92, 98 Social Democracy 46, 49 Social Movements xi, 37, 42, 43, 45, 53, 56, 127, 139, 175, 209, 225, 235, 236, 243, 244 Social Phenomena 109, 231 Socialism 40, 42, 46, 49, 52, 55, 58, 87, 88, 93, 105, 188, 209, 307, 309 Socialist Program 48 Soft Power 162, 180 State Legitimacy vi, 198, 200, 201 Stratification 61, 62 Subcultural 43 Television vi, xiv, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 79, 122, 127, 137, 143, 144, 151, 156, 157, 158, 159, 173, 175, 180, 182, 213, 220, 238, 240, 241, 247, 257, 282, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 326, 327, 328 The Culture Industry 67, 70, 74, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 160 The Great Refusal 145, 146, 156

Index tncc (Transnational Capitalist Class) 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 30 tnmc (Transnational Media Corporation) 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22,   23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 Totality of Society 4 Transnational System 22, 26 Transnationalizing 22 Trump, Donald vi, vii, xiii, 163, 166, 169, 175, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 203, 205, 206, 208, 217, 218, 221, 271 Ukraine ix, 169, 202, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 279, 280, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 291, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298 us Foreign Policy 178, 268 us Media vi, 184, 198, 235, 273 War Propaganda xiv, 174, 176, 208, 213, 220, 290, 292 Western xiii, 49, 57, 92, 97, 114, 120, 131, 132, 167, 212, 214, 215, 217, 219, 248, 249, 254, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277, 279, 284, 288, 291, 298, 299, 317, 324 WikiLeaks 176, 203, 204, 206, 207, 209, 216, 217, 221 Williams, Raymond viii, 35, 40, 43, 49, 58, 92, 96, 103, 106, 107, 110, 111, 113, 121 Wolff, Kurt H. 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 134, 136, 137, 139, 141, 142 Working-Class 9, 35, 38, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 55, 94, 198, 203 wto (World Trade Organization) 18, 300, 301, 302, 304, 317, 326, 328