Media and Terrorism in the 21st Century 1799897559, 9781799897552

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Media and Terrorism in the 21st Century Elnur Ismayil Istanbul Medeniyet University, Turkey Ebru Karadogan Ismayil Uskudar University, Turkey

A volume in the Advances in Digital Crime, Forensics, and Cyber Terrorism (ADCFCT) Book Series

Published in the United States of America by IGI Global Information Science Reference (an imprint of IGI Global) 701 E. Chocolate Avenue Hershey PA, USA 17033 Tel: 717-533-8845 Fax: 717-533-8661 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: http://www.igi-global.com Copyright © 2022 by IGI Global. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or distributed in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without written permission from the publisher. Product or company names used in this set are for identification purposes only. Inclusion of the names of the products or companies does not indicate a claim of ownership by IGI Global of the trademark or registered trademark. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Ismayil, Elnur, 1979- editor. | Karadogan, Ebru, 1975- editor. Title: Media and terrorism in the 21st century / Elnur Ismayil, and Ebru Karadogan, editor. Description: Hershey PA : Information Science Reference, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “This book not only reviews the existing literature on relation between media and terrorism but also presents chapters that generate an exchange of ideas and insights between academics and professionals on the role of media and new media in terrorist propaganda from critical international perspective”-- Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2021048768 (print) | LCCN 2021048769 (ebook) | ISBN 9781799897552 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781799897569 (paperback) | ISBN 9781799897576 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Terrorism and mass media. | Terrorism in mass media. | Terrorism--Press coverage. Classification: LCC P96.T47 M4265 2022 (print) | LCC P96.T47 (ebook) | DDC 363.325--dc23/eng/20211110 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021048768 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021048769 This book is published in the IGI Global book series Advances in Digital Crime, Forensics, and Cyber Terrorism (ADCFCT) (ISSN: 2327-0381; eISSN: 2327-0373) British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. All work contributed to this book is new, previously-unpublished material. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors, but not necessarily of the publisher. For electronic access to this publication, please contact: [email protected].

Advances in Digital Crime, Forensics, and Cyber Terrorism (ADCFCT) Book Series Bryan Christiansen Global Research Society, LLC, USA Agnieszka Piekarz Independent Researcher, Poland

ISSN:2327-0381 EISSN:2327-0373 Mission The digital revolution has allowed for greater global connectivity and has improved the way we share and present information. With this new ease of communication and access also come many new challenges and threats as cyber crime and digital perpetrators are constantly developing new ways to attack systems and gain access to private information. The Advances in Digital Crime, Forensics, and Cyber Terrorism (ADCFCT) Book Series seeks to publish the latest research in diverse fields pertaining to crime, warfare, terrorism and forensics in the digital sphere. By advancing research available in these fields, the ADCFCT aims to present researchers, academicians, and students with the most current available knowledge and assist security and law enforcement professionals with a better understanding of the current tools, applications, and methodologies being implemented and discussed in the field.

Coverage • Global Threat Intelligence • Network Forensics • Digital surveillance • Identity Theft • Vulnerability • Hacking • Data Protection • Mobile Device Forensics • Encryption • Cryptography

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The Advances in Digital Crime, Forensics, and Cyber Terrorism (ADCFCT) Book Series (ISSN 2327-0381) is published by IGI Global, 701 E. Chocolate Avenue, Hershey, PA 17033-1240, USA, www.igi-global.com. This series is composed of titles available for purchase individually; each title is edited to be contextually exclusive from any other title within the series. For pricing and ordering information please visit http://www.igi-global.com/book-series/advances-digital-crime-forensics-cyber/73676. Postmaster: Send all address changes to above address. Copyright © 2022 IGI Global. All rights, including translation in other languages reserved by the publisher. No part of this series may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means – graphics, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping, or information and retrieval systems – without written permission from the publisher, except for non commercial, educational use, including classroom teaching purposes. The views expressed in this series are those of the authors, but not necessarily of IGI Global.

Titles in this Series

For a list of additional titles in this series, please visit: www.igi-global.com/book-series

Technologies to Advance Automation in Forensic Science and Criminal Investigation Chung-Hao Chen (Old Dominion University, USA) Wen-Chao Yang (National Central Police University, Taiwan) and Lijian Chen (Henan University, hina) Information Science Reference • © 2022 • 289pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781799883869) • US $225.00 Intelligence and Law Enforcement in the 21st Century Eugene de Silva (Virginia Research Institute, USA) and Asanga Abeyagoonesekera (Parliament of Sri Lanka, Sri anka) Information Science Reference • © 2021 • 253pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781799879046) • US $225.00 Social Engineering and Information Warfare Operations Emerging Research and Opportunities Rhonda L. Johnson (Upper Iowa University, USA) Information Science Reference • © 2021 • 150pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781799842705) • US $145.00 Evaluating Emerging Threats and New Research Opportunities in Digital Crime and Forensics Rhonda Johnson (Upper Iowa University, USA) Information Science Reference • © 2021 • 350pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781799822288) • US $195.00 Confluence of AI, Machine, and Deep Learning in Cyber Forensics Sanjay Misra (Covenant University, Nigeria) Chamundeswari Arumugam (Sri Sivasubramaniya Nadar College of Engineering, India) Suresh Jaganathan (Sri Sivasubramaniya Nadar College of Engineering, India) and Saraswathi S. (Sri Sivasubramaniya Nadar College of Engineering, India) Information Science Reference • © 2021 • 248pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781799849001) • US $225.00 Cyber Security Auditing, Assurance, and Awareness Through CSAM and CATRAM Regner Sabillon (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Spain) Information Science Reference • © 2021 • 260pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781799841623) • US $195.00 Critical Concepts, Standards, and Techniques in Cyber Forensics Mohammad Shahid Husain (Ministry of Higher Education, Oman) and Mohammad Zunnun Khan (Integral University, India) Information Science Reference • © 2020 • 292pp • H/C (ISBN: 9781799815587) • US $225.00

701 East Chocolate Avenue, Hershey, PA 17033, USA Tel: 717-533-8845 x100 • Fax: 717-533-8661 E-Mail: [email protected] • www.igi-global.com

Editorial Advisory Board Azer Babayev, ADA University, Azerbaijan Rüştü Salim Savaş Biçer, Nişantaşı University, Turkey Oğuz Çelikkol, Istanbul Kültür University, Turkey Stephan Engelkamp, King’s College London, UK Ghadir Golkarian, Near East University, Cyprus Rovshan Ibrahimov, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea Özden Zeynep Oktav, Medeniyet University, Turkey Yashar Onay, Istanbul University, Turkey Ozan Örmeci, Kent University, Turkey Nasrin Süleymanli, The Academy of Public Administration, Azerbaijan Cem Tutar, Üsküdar University, Turkey Irfan Kaya Ülger, Kocaeli University, Turkey



Table of Contents

Foreword.............................................................................................................................................. xiv Preface................................................................................................................................................... xv Section 1 Terrorism and Media Chapter 1 It’s a Manhunt and It’s Live: The Aesthetics of the Manhunt and Extreme Right Terrorism................. 1 Georgios Karakasis, University of the Basque, Spain Chapter 2 The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty: A Qualitative Content Analysis.................................................................................................................................... 13 Eren Ekin Ercan, Aydın Adnan Menderes University, Turkey Chapter 3 The Role of Media in the Perception of Syrian Refugees as Terrorists................................................. 28 Devrim Şahin, Eastern Mediterranean University, Cyprus Safiye Kocadayı, Near East University, Cyprus Chapter 4 Relationship Between Education, Media, and Terror............................................................................ 43 Zehra Gelici, Presidency of Religious Affairs, Turkey Chapter 5 Critical Discourse Analysis of The Özgür Gündem Newspaper During Turkey’s Resolution Process: From the Year 2013 to 2015.................................................................................................... 64 Turgül Tomgüsehan, Near East University, Cyprus Devrim Şahin, Eastern Mediterranean University, Cyprus Chapter 6 Terror and Media: Norwegian Media News Analysis of Al-Noor Mosque Attack in Norway.............. 80 Musa Gelici, Presidency of Religious Affairs, Turkey  



Section 2 Counterterrorism and Media Chapter 7 Comparing National vs. International Coverage of Terrorism: A Framing Analysis of the Reina Nightclub Terrorist Attack................................................................................................................... 104 Burcu Pinar Alakoc, University of Chicago, USA Emel Ozdora-Aksak, Bilkent University, Turkey Chapter 8 Media Development Trends as a Counter for Terrorism in Ukraine................................................... 124 Nadezhda Anatolievna Lebedeva, International Personnel Academy, Ukraine Chapter 9 The International Media and Counterterrorism Operations in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges.......... 144 Oluchukwu Ignatus Onianwa, University of Ibadan, Nigeria Chapter 10 Hybrid Warfare in Azerbaijan: A Challenge to National Security...................................................... 164 Vasif Huseynov, Khazar University, Azerbaijan Chapter 11 Emergence of Counternarrative Peace Media in the Northeast of Nigeria: Exploratory Review on Their Impacts and Prospects................................................................................................................ 183 Ibrahim Uba Yusuf, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Adamkolo Mohammed Ibrahim, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Musa Alhaji Liman, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Section 3 Terrorism and Digital Media Chapter 12 Dataveillance, Counterterrorism, and Sustainable Peace in the Age of Algocracy............................. 205 Feride Zeynep Güder, Üsküdar University, Turkey Chapter 13 Performance of Virtual Terrorism in Cyber Space.............................................................................. 224 Farzaneh Ejazi, Wise People Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM), Turkey Chapter 14 IS, Internet, and Terror......................................................................................................................... 237 Rüdiger Lohlker, University of Vienna, Austria Compilation of References................................................................................................................ 254 About the Contributors..................................................................................................................... 293 Index.................................................................................................................................................... 298

Detailed Table of Contents

Foreword.............................................................................................................................................. xiv Preface................................................................................................................................................... xv Section 1 Terrorism and Media Chapter 1 It’s a Manhunt and It’s Live: The Aesthetics of the Manhunt and Extreme Right Terrorism................. 1 Georgios Karakasis, University of the Basque, Spain The aim of this chapter is to add to the existing research of modern right-wing terrorism the concept of the “aesthetics of the manhunt”; namely, the author’s intention is to show that the terrorist attacks in Norway (2011) and New Zealand (2019) by Anders Breivik and Brenton Tarrant, respectively, have transformed the way we understand right-wing terrorism, including the characteristics of a manhunt between a predator and innocent human prey, as well as the use of technology, mainly livestreaming, to aestheticize the terrorist attack and attract more followers via the explicit visualization of this manhunt. Chapter 2 The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty: A Qualitative Content Analysis.................................................................................................................................... 13 Eren Ekin Ercan, Aydın Adnan Menderes University, Turkey The teacher Samuel Paty, who was decapitated on 16 October 2020 for showing cartoons of The Prophet Mohammad in a lecture in France, is an important indicator of the postmodern conceptual debate between “freedom of expression” and “terrorism.” It is not a coincidence that many similar events, especially the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, took place in France. The phenomenon of freedom of expression, which came to the fore during the 1789 French Revolution and its aftermath, made France a historical heir and the target of radical terrorist attacks. In this context, the study examines how the murder of Samuel Paty was interpreted on the websites of Yeni Şafak and Yeni Akit newspapers, which stand out with their Islamic journalism approach. The qualitative content analysis method was used in the study. The focus of the study is how the developments were reported by the newspapers on the day of the murder (October 16, 2020) and after.

 



Chapter 3 The Role of Media in the Perception of Syrian Refugees as Terrorists................................................. 28 Devrim Şahin, Eastern Mediterranean University, Cyprus Safiye Kocadayı, Near East University, Cyprus Research studies about how Turkish public opinion perceives refugees reveal that while refugees may be seen initially as innocent people in dire need of temporary protection, this perception shifts once it becomes evident that their plight could become a permanent situation. The involvement of Syrian refugees in various types of violence, including terrorist acts, gave rise to strong resistance to their presence in Turkey. In addition to the critical discourse of opposition parties and media, the ambivalent messaging of the ruling Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) in the media worsened the general perception of refugees and their relationship to Turkish Society in a manner threatening to stability in Turkey. To ensure a more peaceful life in Turkey, policies that are healthier and more cohesive need to be adopted in order that Syrian refugees can be integrated into the nation’s cultural and social life. Chapter 4 Relationship Between Education, Media, and Terror............................................................................ 43 Zehra Gelici, Presidency of Religious Affairs, Turkey The subject of this study is to uncover the relations between terrorism, media, and education with examples. The purpose of this study is to reveal the effect of terrorist organizations, which try to recruit staff by using the media and educational environments, on education, and to discuss the effectiveness of education in preventing terrorism. Today, terrorist organizations, which use the internet actively, consider virtual media as a serious propaganda tool by taking advantage of the difficulties in the control of virtual environments. For this reason, in this study, which has a qualitative design, media analysis will also be included as well as document analysis. The PKK, which is defined as a leftist organization, and ISIS and similar religion-based terrorist groups that take Islam as their reference will be discussed in the scope of the study, and the way they use the media and the effects of their activities on education and the role of education and religious education in preventing or reducing the effects of terrorism will be discussed in the study. Chapter 5 Critical Discourse Analysis of The Özgür Gündem Newspaper During Turkey’s Resolution Process: From the Year 2013 to 2015.................................................................................................... 64 Turgül Tomgüsehan, Near East University, Cyprus Devrim Şahin, Eastern Mediterranean University, Cyprus The ensuing news commentaries imbued with these various influences that shape the message have to be decoded by the reader in order that he or she can fully comprehend the content. So an accurate accounting of the social issues of governance requires journalists to exercise careful consideration in their use of language and terminology and to show that they fully grasp the background and history of the subject matter being analysed for presentation to readers. Discourse analyses draw on the critical discourse analysis originally devised by ‘Teun A. Van Dijk’, a key approach when seeking to discern or uncover the tenets and influences underlying and shaping much of contemporary journalism. This study examines the institutionalised editorial approach of the Özgür Gündem (Independent Agenda) newspaper in its coverage of Turkey’s peace negotiations with the PKK, taking due note of the newspaper’s ideological bias towards the PKK.



Chapter 6 Terror and Media: Norwegian Media News Analysis of Al-Noor Mosque Attack in Norway.............. 80 Musa Gelici, Presidency of Religious Affairs, Turkey Norway lived its bloodiest terrorist attack when Breivik killed nearly 100 people. This was recorded in history as a difficult test for the media. The Norwegian media exhibited great bias by reporting this bloody act by making judgments on the assumption that Muslims committed it. The media described Breivik as a mentally disturbed person, not as a terrorist. When the answer to the question, Why did Breivik commit this act? was sought, the detailed analysis ended up with the propaganda of Breivik’s manifesto. Breivik became a symbol of anti-Islam and multiculturalism in Europe. Finally, the New Zealand aggressor Tarrant and Norway Baerum Al-Noor Mosque aggressor Manhaus performed two attacks in 2019. They were fueled by the uncontrolled cybersphere where Breivik was idolized. The study aims to examine how the media made news about the terrorist figure devoted to the Breivik brotherhood and those who followed in his footsteps. It aims to make a news analysis of the Norwegian mainstream printed media about the Norwegian Al-Noor Mosque attacks in 2019. Section 2 Counterterrorism and Media Chapter 7 Comparing National vs. International Coverage of Terrorism: A Framing Analysis of the Reina Nightclub Terrorist Attack................................................................................................................... 104 Burcu Pinar Alakoc, University of Chicago, USA Emel Ozdora-Aksak, Bilkent University, Turkey While terrorist incidents are physically, psychologically, and financially costly, they also provide targeted governments with a window of opportunity to engage in public diplomacy in the international arena. In the wake of terrorist attacks, leaders of the targeted countries can try to use media outlets to convey intentionally crafted messages and framing strategies, described generally as public diplomacy, to foster dialogue and shape international public opinion. The success of public diplomacy, however, depends on how far these national messages reach, and how effective they are in swaying international public opinion. Drawing on national and international news sources, this study conducts a framing analysis of 40 new stories covering the Reina nightclub terrorist attack, which took place in Istanbul on New Year’s Eve of 2017. It analyzes the similarities and differences in the national versus international media coverage of the incident and discusses their implications for the effectiveness of Turkish public diplomacy. Chapter 8 Media Development Trends as a Counter for Terrorism in Ukraine................................................... 124 Nadezhda Anatolievna Lebedeva, International Personnel Academy, Ukraine The aim of the chapter is to examine the trends in the development of mass media as countering terrorism in Ukraine. The novelty of the research for the international scientific community lies in the description of Ukraine’s experience in countering information terrorism. This chapter will be useful for theorists studying the manifestation of media terrorism in various countries, as a component of the European context of this problem. For Ukraine, information activities are only developing. The threat of terrorism is not an internal problem, but an external one, which is created by foreign states. Information terrorism has two types of influence. It is material and intellectual. Ukrainian media can resist both types of



influence on society. Media terrorism of foreign countries is aimed at individuals. This chapter focuses on strengthening the communication component of antiterrorist activities, improving the information policy of the state, the inclusion of civil society and public television potential in the system of combating information media terrorism. Chapter 9 The International Media and Counterterrorism Operations in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges.......... 144 Oluchukwu Ignatus Onianwa, University of Ibadan, Nigeria The essence of this chapter is to examine the challenges in the global media reportage of counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria. Boko-Haram and other terrorists’ activities in Nigeria have remained security threats to the stability of Nigeria, the West African sub-region, and the entire African continent. They have succeeded in instilling fear in the minds of the local population, destruction of worships centers and houses. However, the military onslaught against Boko-Haram by the Nigerian defence forces has continued unabated. Through their respective reportage, the global media has continued to produce international context on war against terror activities in Nigeria. In carrying out their tasks, they have faced a series of challenges given the importance of their reports in shaping both local and international public opinion about counter-terrorism operations in the country. These criticisms have emanated from state actors, the security forces, the local media, and domestic opinion. Chapter 10 Hybrid Warfare in Azerbaijan: A Challenge to National Security...................................................... 164 Vasif Huseynov, Khazar University, Azerbaijan The development of new technologies and aggression models has brought new dynamics to interstate conflicts by dramatically augmenting the role and potential of non-military strategies. International broadcasting and social media, cyberspace, and sophisticated intelligence services, among others, effectively serve aggressive powers to pursue their goals without direct military intervention. The chapter discusses this new generation of warfare, termed “hybrid threats” or “hybrid warfare,” through the perspective of Azerbaijan’s encounter with the hybrid threats posed by some of its neighboring countries. The chapter particularly examines the use of hybrid warfare elements by Armenia and Iran and Azerbaijan’s defense strategy against these threats. A long list of sources, news media articles, reports, official documents, as well interviews with the officials that are available on the internet are used in this analysis. Chapter 11 Emergence of Counternarrative Peace Media in the Northeast of Nigeria: Exploratory Review on Their Impacts and Prospects................................................................................................................ 183 Ibrahim Uba Yusuf, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Adamkolo Mohammed Ibrahim, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Musa Alhaji Liman, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria The quest for a solution to the conflict is an issue of national concern. Nowadays, concerted efforts are being made at individual and group levels to sustain peace. The dominant paradigm adopted in dousing the menace of conflicts in Nigeria has been the use of gun and militarisation. However, this approach has been widely criticised as full of human rights abuse and incapable of restoring lasting peace. Furthermore, evidence has shown that violent extremists have made effective use of the media (directly or indirectly), especially cyberspace, to advance their propagandistic aims and radicalism. This chapter



provides an exploratory review on understanding the impacts and prospects of peace media in the context of peacebuilding toward countering violent extremism and sustaining peace through peacebuilding using peace broadcast media in the northeast of Nigeria. Section 3 Terrorism and Digital Media Chapter 12 Dataveillance, Counterterrorism, and Sustainable Peace in the Age of Algocracy............................. 205 Feride Zeynep Güder, Üsküdar University, Turkey History, the story of human beings, has been full of century-old conflicts, fights, and unending wars. Dreaming a peaceful world looks like a pure naïve desire, but ironically, this naivety can be the only salvation for human beings. We all witness a series of outbreaking and cutting-edge technological innovations, and this digitalized world transforms society sharply. New media have tsunami-like effects on people by creating a new culture in digital habitus and metaverse, but the existence of violence, war, and terrorism still linger all over the world. Violence and terrorism only changed their tophos and faces. The study is finalized by briefly exploring the new possibilities of governing the world by algocracy, a new type of democracy regulated by algorithms. Since the search for discourse for sustainable peace perspectives and a world without terrorism is the main leitmotif of this chapter, the methodology of the chapter starts with the essential discussions on counterterrorism, dataveillance, sustainable peace, the role of redemption, and peaceful discourse in digital narrations. Chapter 13 Performance of Virtual Terrorism in Cyber Space.............................................................................. 224 Farzaneh Ejazi, Wise People Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM), Turkey In the 1980s, Barry Collin coined the term virtual terrorism. Nowadays virtual terrorism is very common all over the world. Virtual terrorism threatened computers, networks, and the information stored. Virtual terrorism makes new opportunity for terrorists such as hide identity, no geographical restrictions, international advertising and membership, and targeting more people. They hack into computers and mobile phones. Virtual terrorism can be controlled remotely. The variety and number of virtual terrorist attacks is enormous. Virtual terrorists use pseudonyms, and their true identities are not traced. Virtual terrorists do not want a lot of forces for their activities. Virtual terrorists just need laptops and Wi-Fi. In this research, the question is how virtual identity and internet are so essential for terrorists. In sociological studies, virtual identity is one of the most important and key issues. Virtual terrorists use this virtual and hidden identity to destroy a country’s infrastructure. They are sure that there are no borders or checkpoints in cyberspace. Chapter 14 IS, Internet, and Terror......................................................................................................................... 237 Rüdiger Lohlker, University of Vienna, Austria The chapter presents insights into the non-linear development of the Islamic State (IS) online. Starting with the pre-IS period of Jihadi online activities, the emergence of IS online is analyzed as a swarmlike process across the platforms of the internet supporting the cause of IS via videos, texts, audio, and graphic files. The organizational aspect of these activities is included in the analysis. The online presence



of IS is shown as resilient, being able to reconfigure its activities when needed. A coordinated effort of a non-hegemonic network is needed to confront the flexible online activities of IS built on evidence-based research, using multi-lingual sources, understanding the theological framework of IS and the internet. Compilation of References................................................................................................................ 254 About the Contributors..................................................................................................................... 293 Index.................................................................................................................................................... 298

xiv

Foreword

Terrorist organizations have three main purposes in their actions. These are Revenge, Renown and Reminding. Modern terrorism has adopted the media as the main tool for its own ends. The media is the main tool for terrorist organizations to convey the messages of fear and violence they want to the society. Especially thanks to the widespread use of social media and internet journalism, terrorist organizations can reach their requests easily and quickly. The media reports on terrorist acts not only because it is responsible for reporting an important event, but also because it does not skip this important news that increase the rating of terrorist news. Today’s terrorists exploit this and act in a way that attracts maximum attention all over the world. It is a very common practice for the states fighting against terrorism to try to prevent the fear and anxiety that is desired to be created in the society by restricting the news of terrorism. However, it is claimed that states use the fight against terrorism as a pretext to restrict the freedom of the press, especially in the fight against terrorism carried out in democratic countries. Another claim is that media outlets jeopardize the fight against terrorism by asserting the freedom of the press, instead of avoiding terrorists knowing sensitive information about the security forces’ counter-terrorism operations. The chaotic nature of today’s international security environment, in which terrorist organizations also form alliances with states, will probably continue in the future with the emergence of a new wave of terror by states. However, the credibility of states that openly cooperate with terrorist organizations due to their national interests will be questioned more than ever, and these states will be judged politically, especially in their own national political organs and in the public conscience of states that have been harmed by terrorism. It is also an important moral and ethics requirement for the media to report the activities of terrorist organizations to the public with an impartial eye, regardless of whether they are partners with states or not. The book project edited by Profs Ismayil and Ismayil provides valuable information for those who research in the field of media and terrorism. The new publication will contribute to the existed literature on relation between media and terrorism from a broader perspective. This volume is a good opportunity for an exchange of ideas and insights between academics and professionals on the role of media in terrorist propaganda from critical international perspective. Rüştü Salim Savaş Biçer NATO Joint Force Training Centre, Poland & Nişantaşı University, Turkey

 

xv

Preface

Media, as one of the important tools in spreading terrorist messages in the 21st century, can also cut both ways by playing serious roles in countering terrorism. Terrorism is a complicated issue and it is a rather challenging job to draw sharp lines and embrace the whole sides, owing to the diversity of factors contributing to terrorism and particularly the process of radicalization. This book aims to present different academic perspectives, theories, studies, and arguments related to media and terrorism. The chapters in this book are grouped into three sections. In the first section, Media and Terrorism, the authors mainly focus on relations between media and terrorism from broad perspectives. Offering case studies, authors research the role of traditional and new media and their impact on terrorism. Taking into account that understanding communication in the 21st century is important to have effective counterterrorism. Section 2, entitled Counter-Terrorism and Media, authors try to explain counterterrorism and media relations. The third section is titled Terrorism and Digital Media. Authors examine mass mediated terrorism and political violence and show how terrorists exploit global media networks and information highways to carry news of their violence along with their propaganda. Author of Chapter 1, Georgios Karakasis, in his article, titled It’s a Manhunt and It’s Live: The Aesthetics of the Manhunt and the Extreme Right Terrorism, contributes to the existing research on modern right-wing terrorism and the concept of the “aesthetics of the manhunt”; Namely, the author intends to show that the terrorist attacks in Norway (2011) and New Zealand (2019) by Anders Breivik and Brenton Tarrant respectively have transformed the way we understand right-wing terrorism, including the characteristics of a manhunt between a predator and innocent human prey, as well as the use of technology, mainly live streaming, to aestheticize the terrorist attack and attract more followers via the explicit visualization of this manhunt. In conclusion, Dr. Karakasis offers some thoughts that derive from the analysis of the phenomenon of the “aesthetics of the manhunt”. According to Karakasis, there is no doubt that modern right-wing extremists lack the ideological, political, and social discourse to convince society that their actions are meaningful. There is no cohesion in their argumentation, and they are unable to rationally explain the reasons behind their attacks. Eren Ekin Ercan, an author of Chapter 2, in his article titled The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty: A Qualitative Content Analysis, argues that the teacher Samuel Paty, who was decapitated on 16 October 2020 for showing cartoons of The Prophet Mohammad in a lecture in France is an important indicator of the postmodern conceptual debate between “freedom of expression” and “terrorism”. It is not a coincidence that many similar events, especially the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, took place in France. The phenomenon of freedom of expression, which came to the fore during the 1789 French Revolution and its aftermath, made France a historical heir and the target of radical terrorist attacks. In this context, Prof. Ercan examines in the study how the murder of Samuel Paty was interpreted on the websites of Yeni Şafak and Yeni Akit newspapers, which stand out 

Preface

with their Islamic journalism approach. Ercan also focused on the study to analyze the developments were reported by the newspapers on the day of the murder (October 16, 2020) and after. In Chapter 3, titled The Role of Media in the Perception of Syrian Refugees as Terrorists, authors Devrim Şahin and Safiye Kocadayi, analyze how Turkish public opinion perceives refugees reveal that while refugees may be seen initially as innocent people in dire need of temporary protection, this perception shifts once it becomes evident that their plight could become a permanent situation. According to the authors, the involvement of Syrian refugees in various types of violence, including terrorist acts, gave rise to strong resistance to their presence in Turkey. In addition to the critical discourse of opposition parties and media, the ambivalent messaging of the ruling Justice and Development Party in the media worsened the general perception of refugees and their relationship to Turkish society in a manner that threatened stability in Turkey. Authors argue that to ensure a more peaceful life in Turkey, policies that are healthier and more cohesive need to be adopted so that Syrian refugees can be integrated into the nation’s cultural and social life. The authors conclude the chapter by mentioning that it should be always remembered that refugees are vulnerable and innocent people whose lives could be at risk if deported or returned to the country and conditions they were compelled to flee from in the first place. And to achieve it, the obligation to protect their lives and ensure their rights of access to social services and acceptance in the hosting country is a matter of international responsibility. Author of Chapter 4, Zehra Gelici, in her article titled Relationship Between Education, Media, and Terror, tries to uncover the relations between terrorism, media, and education by offering some examples. The purpose of the author is to reveal the effect of terrorist organizations, which try to recruit staff by using the media and educational environments, on education, and to discuss the effectiveness of education in preventing terrorism. Dr. Gelici argues that terrorist organizations, which use the internet actively, consider virtual media as a serious propaganda tool by taking advantage of the difficulties in the control of virtual environments. For that reason, in the study, which has a qualitative design, Gelici uses media analysis as well as document analysis. Gelici focuses mainly on the PKK, which is defined as a leftist organization, and ISIS and similar religion-based terrorist groups that take Islam as their reference. The author explains also the way how both terrorist organizations use the media, the effects of their activities on education, and the role of education and religious education in preventing or reducing the effects of terrorism. Dr. Gelici concludes the chapter by arguing that the media should pay attention to the words used in news, the examples given, and the images shown are informative and not sensational when they report on terrorism. In this sense, when an act of violence that is committed by a Muslim is given, the news is given in connection with the religion of Islam, and the Muslim identity of the attacker is brought to the forefront. However, it does not seem fair that infrequent cases such as the murder of dozens of innocent children by a person that has a Christian identity by raiding a school, the attacker’s psychological status are brought to the forefront without any emphasis on the religious identity of the attacker. The psychological setting and structures along with the social environment-culture relation must be considered, as well as the factors shaping the personality of the members of terrorist organizations enabling them to grow. In Chapter 5, titled Critical Discourse Analysis of the Özgür Gündem Newspaper During Turkey’s Resolution Process, authors Turgül Tomgüsehan and Devrim Şahin argue that the ensuing news commentaries imbued with these various influences that shape the message then have to be decoded by the reader so that he or she can fully comprehend the content. So it is that an accurate accounting of the social issues of governance requires journalists to exercise careful consideration in their use of language and terminology and to show that they fully grasp the background and history of the subject matter bexvi

Preface

ing analyzed for presentation to readers. Nowadays discourse analyses draw on the critical discourse analysis originally devised by ‘Teun A. Van Dijk’, a key approach when seeking to discern or uncover the tenets and influences underlying and shaping much of contemporary journalism. In their study, authors examine the institutionalized editorial approach of the Özgür Gündem (Independent Agenda) newspaper in its coverage of Türkiye’s peace negotiations with the terrorist organization PKK, taking due note of the newspaper’s ideological bias towards the PKK. Authors claim that printed news discourses and newspapers differentiate from other types of mass media. They have social value in that they reach and can ideologically influence a wide audience. Even though today printed news is disseminated on a much smaller scale of mass, it still carries significant weight among the more qualified populace, most notably those considered to be public opinion leaders. In conclusion, the authors analyze the theme stressed in the news headlines in respect to the “Resolution Process” in the Özgür Gündem newspaper and argue that the news headlines are shaped by statements of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan. It is observed that the PKK has been introduced as the structure representing the Kurds within this process. Statements by BDP and HDP parties representing Kurdish political movements are considered and used while remaining of secondary importance. Furthermore, Tomgüsehan and Şahin argue that regardless of the resolution process, quite radical messages of an uprising against the State are given while emphasizing that war has been declared against the Kurds by the governing AKP party. Statements made by the Government are included but negatively represented to the reader. The Özgür Gündem newspaper is closely following the negotiation process between Turkey and the PKK. Its headlines generally use simple sentence structures, yet compound and complex sentences are also used. The final sixth chapter of the first section is titled Terror and Media: Norwegian Media News Analysis of Al-Noor Mosque Attack in Norway. Author Musa Gelici analyzes the bloodiest terrorist attack in Norway (2011), in which Breivik killed nearly 100 people. For Gelici, the event is also recorded as a difficult test for the media. Dr. Gelici claims that the Norwegian media exhibited great bias by reporting this bloody act in prejudice and by making judgments on the assumption that Muslims had committed it. According to Dr. Gelici, the media described Breivik as a mentally disturbed person, not as a terrorist, soon after it became clear that Breivik had committed this act as a Norwegian. Gelici claims that when the answer to the question “Why did Breivik commit this act?” was sought, the detailed analysis of the subject finally ended up with the propaganda of Breivik’s manifesto. Unfortunately, Breivik became an idol and the symbol name of anti-Islam and multiculturalism in Europe. Finally, the New Zealand aggressor Tarrant and Norway Baerum Al-Noor mosque aggressor Manhaus performed the other two terrorist attacks (2019). They were fueled by the uncontrolled cybersphere where Breivik was idolized. The author aims to examine how the media, which suffered badly in the Breivik massacre, made news about the terrorist figure devoted to the Breivik brotherhood, and who followed in his footsteps. It also aims to make the news analysis of the Norwegian mainstream printed media about the Norwegian AlNoor mosque attacks in 2019. Dr. Gelici concludes the chapter by arguing that the media, which tries to adopt a balanced attitude in the analysis of Manshaus news, does not directly engage in an operation of perception and accusation. However, the fact that media, which reports the traumatic, criminal, and threatening images in the news by using very few images through filtering or using representative images in terms of media ethics in daily life, present the images of the perpetrators who carried out the act without filtering them can mean building role models for candidates to become Breivik and Manshaus, who are in a pathological mood and think that they will serve the country through this kind of acts. In the second section, chapters are mainly focused on the relationship between counterterrorism and media. Authors of Chapter 7, Burcu Pinar Alakoc and Emel Ozdora Aksak, in their article titled Comxvii

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paring National vs. International Coverage of Terrorism: A Framing Analysis of the Reina Nightclub Terrorist Attack, argue that while terrorist incidents are physically, psychologically, and financially costly, they also provide targeted governments with a window of opportunity to engage in public diplomacy in the international arena. According to the authors, in the wake of terrorist attacks, leaders of the targeted countries can try to use media outlets to convey intentionally-crafted messages and framing strategies, described generally as public diplomacy, to foster dialogue and shape international public opinion. For Alakoc and Aksak, the success of public diplomacy, however, depends on how far these national messages reach, and how effective they are in swaying international public opinion. Drawing on national and international news sources, this study authors conduct a framing analysis of forty new stories covering the Reina nightclub terrorist attack, which took place in Istanbul on New Year’s Eve of 2017. In the chapter, Alakoc and Aksak analyze the similarities and differences in the national versus international media coverage of the incident and discuss their implications for the effectiveness of Turkish public diplomacy. Nadezhda Anatolievna Lebedeva, the author of Chapter 8, titled Media Development Trends as a Counter for Terrorism in Ukraine, examines the trends in the development of mass media as countering terrorism in Ukraine. Prof. Lebedeva argues that the novelty of the research for the international scientific community lies in the description of Ukraine’s experience in countering information terrorism. According to Lebedeva, the chapter would be useful for researchers studying the manifestation of media terrorism in various countries, as a component of the European context of the mentioned problem. For Ukraine, information activities are only developing. The threat of terrorism is mainly not an internal problem, but an external one, which is created by foreign states. According to Lebedeva, information terrorism has two types of influence, namely material and intellectual. Ukrainian media can resist both types of influence on society. Media terrorism of foreign countries is aimed at individuals. Since 2014, more attention is paid to the protection of the rights of Crimean Tatars, countering terror by the authorities of the annexed Crimea. Lebedeva argues that Ukrainian legislation in the field of information terrorism and media development needs to be improved. In conclusion, Prof. Lebedeva argues that Ukrainian media have an educational function for other countries. However, there are still problems with freedom of speech in Ukraine, which requires legislative adjustments. Such media as profiles in social networks of politicians may become a platform for condemning terrorist activities and can positively influence the opinion of the electorate during the COVID-19 pandemic. Oluchukwu Ignatus Onianwa, the author of Chapter 9, titled The International Media and Counterterrorism Operations in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges, examines the challenges in the global media reportage of counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria. According to Onianwa, Boko-Haram and other terrorists’ activities in Nigeria have remained a security threat to the stability of Nigeria, the West African sub-region, and the entire African continent. They have succeeded in instilling fear in the minds of the local population, destruction of worships centers and houses. However, the military onslaught against Boko-Haram by the Nigerian defense forces has continued unabated. Dr. Onianwa claims that, through their respective reportage, the global media has continued to produce international context on war against terror activities in Nigeria. In carrying out their tasks, they have faced a series of challenges given the importance of their reports in shaping both local and international public opinion about counter-terrorism operations in the country. These criticisms have emanated from state actors, the security forces, the local media, and domestic opinion. The worldwide outreach of the international media has caused a lot of distress among the security agencies who often complained about media bias and propaganda in their operations. Thus, the author argues that while the global media are important stakeholders in the fight against terrorism they had visage daunting denigration which had eluded their media operations. The xviii

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author criticizes that issue of human rights protection is another nucleus of controversies. Engagement in the investigation of human rights violations by the global media has brought them into a collision course with the Nigerian government and security forces. All these issues have undermined the collective efforts in the fight against insurgency and emboldened the terrorists in the conduct of their operations in Nigeria. Dr. Onianwa concludes the chapter by arguing that worldwide outreach of media has caused a lot of distress among the security agencies who often complained about media bias and propaganda in their operations. Engagement in the investigation of human rights violations by the global media has brought them into a collision course with the Nigerian government and security forces. In all these, being a major non-state actor in the international system the media has the goal of protecting the interests of their host countries and their attitude towards counterterrorism in Nigeria. Thus, they produce narratives that promote the capacity of their host countries to play significant roles in matters of counterterrorism and show how relevant they could be in helping countries like Nigeria engage in the fight against terrorism. Author of Chapter 10, Vasif Huseynov, in his article titled Hybrid Warfare in Azerbaijan: A Challenge to National Security, argues that the development of new technologies and aggression models has brought new dynamics to interstate conflicts by dramatically augmenting the role and potential of non-military strategies. International broadcasting and social media, cyberspace, and sophisticated intelligence services, among others, effectively serve aggressive powers to pursue their goals without direct military intervention. In his chapter, Dr. Huseynov discusses this new generation of warfare, termed “hybrid threats” or “hybrid warfare,” through the perspective of Azerbaijan’s encounter with the hybrid threats posed by some of the neighboring countries. In the chapter, the author particularly examines the use of hybrid warfare elements by Armenia and Iran and Azerbaijan’s defense strategy against these threats. A long list of sources, news media articles, reports, official documents, as well interviews with the officials that are available on the internet, are used for the research of the study. The author concludes that, although Azerbaijan has been able to successfully neutralize Armenia’s hybrid warfare, it needs to carry out comprehensive reforms in its security system to get prepared for more powerful and systemic hybrid warfare by the states with more robust capabilities. Authors of Chapter 11, titled Emergence of Counternarrative Peace Media in the Northeast of Nigeria: Exploratory Review on their Impacts and Prospects, provide an exploratory review on understanding the impacts and prospects of peace media in the context of peacebuilding toward countering violent extremism and sustaining peace through peacebuilding using peace broadcast media in the northeast of Nigeria. The authors conclude the chapter by arguing that counternarrative peace media has come to stay in the region given the daunting security challenges. The peace media have been noted for facilitating the exchange and circulation of peace ideology that is shaping people’s consciousness in the post insurgency recovery era. The peace media circulate particular messages and viewpoints on peace in cities and remote areas. The emergence of these counter-narrative peace media amidst the already established public media raises the question of sustainability in an attractive competitive society. A professional challenge lies in the creation of content distinctly offering the peace agenda. The authors end the chapter by asking the question: would the content address components of peacebuilding and make meaningful impacts? In the third section, contributors analyze the relation between digital media and terrorism. Author of Chapter 12, Feride Zeynep Güder, in her article titled Dataveillance, Counterterrorism, and Sustainable Peace in the Age of Algocracy, argues that dreaming a peaceful world looks like a pure naïve desire, but ironically, this naivety can be the only salvation for human beings. According to Güder, we all witness a series of outbreaking and cutting-edge technological innovations, and this digitalized world transform society sharply. Güder also claims that new media has tsunami-like effects on people by creating a new xix

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culture in digital habitus and metaverse but the existence of violence, war, and terrorism still linger all over the world. Violence and terrorism only changed their tophos and faces. The author finalizes her chapter by briefly exploring the new possibilities of governing the world by algocracy, a new type of democracy regulated by algorithms. Since the search for discourse for sustainable peace perspectives and a world without terrorism is the main leitmotif of this chapter, the methodology of the paper starts with the essential discussions on counterterrorism, dataveillance, sustainable peace, the role of redemption, and peaceful discourse in digital narrations. Author of Chapter 13, Farzaneh Ejazi, in her article titled Performance of Virtual Terrorism in Cyber Space, explains how virtual terrorists use pseudonyms and their true identities. According to Ejazi, virtual terrorists do not want a lot of forces for their activities, rather they just need a Laptop and Wi-Fi. In her research Ejazi, answers the question of how virtual identity and the Internet are so essential for terrorists from the sociological research perspective and claims that virtual identity is one of the most important and key issues. She concludes that virtual terrorists use this virtual and hidden identity to destroy a country’s infrastructure being sure that there are no borders or checkpoints in cyberspace. Rüdiger Lohlker, the author of the final chapter of the book, titled IS, Internet, and Terror, presents insights into the non-linear development of the Islamic State (IS) online. According to Prof. Lohlker, starting with the pre-IS period of Jihadi online activities, the emergence of IS online is analyzed as a swarm-like process across the platforms of the internet supporting the cause of IS via videos, texts, audio, and graphic files. The organizational aspect of these activities is included in the analysis. Prof. Lohlker claims that the online presence of IS is shown as resilient being able to reconfigure its activities when needed. A coordinated effort to a non-hegemonic network is needed to confront the flexible online activities of IS built on evidence-based research, using multi-lingual sources, understanding the theological framework of IS, and the Internet. The author concludes the chapter by arguing that IS emerges from the former jihadi subculture of al-Qa‘ida. Its online activity can be analyzed as the outcome of jihadi history, further development of the formats used before by jihadi organizations and individuals. Following the traces of IS online allows for preliminary findings on the movement of IS online. Thus, the assumption of future diversification is allowed. Attempts to curb the influence of IS on the Internet will have to face the need for a flexible response to all aspects of IS including its claim to represent true Islam. This book attempts to provide a better understanding of the traditional and new media’s role in the world of terrorism and counterterrorism. As editors, we hope that we could contribute to the existing literature on media and terrorism relations from a broader perspective. This volume aims to generate an exchange of ideas and insights between academics and professionals on the role of media and new media in terrorist propaganda from a critical international perspective. The book is not limited to examining the relationship between media and terror, but also to analyzing the difficulties and obstacles faced by states in the new world order. Enjoy reading the book! Elnur Ismayil Istanbul Medeniyet University, Turkey Ebru Karadogan Üsküdar University, Turkey xx

Section 1

Terrorism and Media

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Chapter 1

It’s a Manhunt and It’s Live: The Aesthetics of the Manhunt and Extreme Right Terrorism Georgios Karakasis University of the Basque, Spain

ABSTRACT The aim of this chapter is to add to the existing research of modern right-wing terrorism the concept of the “aesthetics of the manhunt”; namely, the author’s intention is to show that the terrorist attacks in Norway (2011) and New Zealand (2019) by Anders Breivik and Brenton Tarrant, respectively, have transformed the way we understand right-wing terrorism, including the characteristics of a manhunt between a predator and innocent human prey, as well as the use of technology, mainly livestreaming, to aestheticize the terrorist attack and attract more followers via the explicit visualization of this manhunt.

INTRODUCTION There is no doubt that during recent years there has been a rise in right-wing extremism in Western society. Terrorist attacks like the ones in Utøya and Oslo in Norway (2011), Halle and Hanau in Germany (2020), Christchurch in New Zealand (2019) and El Paso in the USA (2019) are just some of the many incidents that prove to the world that the threat of extreme-right violence is active and accelerating at a very fast pace. The “siege” of the Capitol, on the 6th of January 2021, by a heterogeneous mass of different right-wing groups, as well as the appearance of nooses hanging in front of the building – making a clear, grim reference to the Bible of the extreme right, The Turner Diaries- made clear to modern Western society that its pillars, namely liberal values and its democratic institutions, were under attack. Quoting the FBI Director, Christopher Wray, regarding the evolving threat that right-wing extremism poses in the USA:

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch001

Copyright © 2022, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 It’s a Manhunt and It’s Live

I would certainly say, as I think I’ve said consistently in the past, that racially motivated violent extremism, specifically of the sort that advocates for the superiority of the white race, is a persistent, evolving threat (…) It’s the biggest chunk of our racially motivated violent extremism cases for sure. And racially motivated violent extremism is the biggest chunk of our domestic terrorism portfolio, if you will, overall. (Bump, 2021) The same phenomenon is also appearing in Germany, where, in 2021, the Federal Minister of the Interior considered right-wing terrorism and antisemitism to be the main security threats to Germany (Towfigh, 2021). The emergence of right-wing extremism can be understood as a response to the crises the Western world has recently faced. The economic crisis and the COVID health crisis have created a sense of distrust concerning the institutions and the measures taken by the different states and, in many countries, this crisis has taken the shape of a political response whose vessels are the parties of the extreme right. These include Golden Dawn in Greece, the Northern League in Italy and the Alternative for Germany in Germany, among others. Through these parties, the radical right-wing vocabulary has found its way into parliament, paving, the way for its own metastasis into practical extremism. What is new, though, as we will now see, is the extensive use of social media and technology to expand the message of violence and death by the perpetrators. Even though there are manifestos that try to explain the motives for each terrorist attack, what really draws the attention of the people is the visualization of the violence and the intention of the perpetrators to give the audience a “first-person” perspective while committing their acts. We no longer just hear about the attacks; we no longer read about them from a safe distance: through the use of technology and cameras, each one of us becomes an eyewitness, a spectator in the “aesthetics of the manhunt” of right-wing extremism. To explain how this “aesthetics of the manhunt” has emerged, I have divided the chapter into four parts. In the first part, we will see how this idea of terrorism as a “manhunt” emerged with Breivik’s attack in Oslo; an attack that transformed our way of understanding extreme-right violent activity and its perpetrators’ philosophy and political ideology. In the second part, emphasis will be given to Tarrant’s use of technology before and during his attack, focusing mostly on the use of a camera that enabled the viewers to see the whole action from a first-person perspective, giving shape to a new kind of audiovisual experience, namely the aesthetical experience of the manhunt. In the third part of the chapter, we will take a closer look at Breivik’s definition of the enemy, as the latter appears in his manifesto. Through this definition and by creating abstract concepts of the enemy, such as Islam, liberalism and globalization, Breivik tried to create a very broad battleground where the manhunt would take place; a battleground, as we will see, where there is only strife and hunting, and the goal is the maximization of casualties to enhance the ideological impact of his attacks. Finally, I will conclude this chapter by stressing the necessity of integrating into the current analysis of right-wing terrorism the aesthetical element of terrorism as a manhunt, an element that may become a tool for researchers when seeking to interpret right-wing terrorism not only as a political and ideological phenomenon but also as an intention, on the part of the perpetrators, to create their own imagery and discourse of strife and battle, even when the latter is totally unrelated to historical, political or social factors. In other words, right-wing terrorists, lacking the political and ideological vocabulary to justify their actions, may be creating their own utopia, their own political myth: a myth that materializes itself in the form of an endless manhunt against the enemies of the Western world. 2

 It’s a Manhunt and It’s Live

The Beginning of the Manhunt: Anders Breivik There is no doubt that the massacre Breivik left in his wake was one of the bloodiest days Norway has lived through in its modern history. Breivik killed 77 people on the 22nd of July. First, he detonated a bomb inside a car in front of government buildings, leaving eight dead people behind and then, dressed as a policeman, drove to Utøya Island, where the Labour Party’s youth movement was having a summer camp. When the shooting ended, he had killed 69 people before the police managed to arrest him and put a halt to this frenzied killing spree. Even though Breivik did not livestream his attack - despite his fantasizing about livestreaming on YouTube the beheading of the ex-prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, after forcing her to read a text acknowledging the “betrayal” that had taken place in Norway - his mass killing took the form of a manhunt. First, Breivik reached the island dressed as a police officer and secured entry, explaining that he was there to secure the area and protect the people, camouflaged in the perfect way to maximize the damage. Then. according to survivors, Breivik “screamed a battle cry and appeared both joyous and angry” (Koranyi, 2012) while he was killing his victims. During his trial, Breivik admitted that his goal was to kill everybody on the island, and he had a cold-blooded attitude towards it, despite the havoc he created and the desperation of all those on the island. Breivik, Testifying before an Oslo court, he described seeing people curled up and “completely paralysed” as he reloaded his weapon and shot them in the head (…) Earlier, the 33-year-old said he was normally a nice person but had shut off his emotions to carry out the attacks. Before shooting his first victims, Breivik said he had “100 voices” in his head telling him not to do it. But after that moment of hesitation, he said he pulled the trigger, shot two people in the head and moved on. Displaying no emotion, Breivik went on to say he had entered a cafe where several people were hiding. “Some of them are completely paralysed. They cannot run,” he said. “Two people were curled up.” He said he reloaded after running out of ammunition. “People were begging for their lives. I just shot them in the head.” Others pretended to be dead, he added, but he knew they had not been wounded and shot them too. (BBC, 2021) From the above description, we can see that Breivik acted as a predator during his attack. His goal was not just to create fear among the “traitors”, his objective was the complete eradication of the enemy, even though none of them were armed and they were unable to protect themselves. In spite of the fact that “100 voices” were telling him no to do it, Breivik, totally dissociated from his human and moral side, acted as a pitiless hunter. Were it not for the feelings of joy and anger that gave away the (in)humane character of his act, we could suppose that the perpetrator was acting while totally detached from any empathy, sympathy or, in general, any other human feeling. In other words, Breivik wanted to prove to the world that his goal was not only to damage but to eliminate, eradicate and nihilate. His intentions are better reflected in his manifesto 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, written under the pen-name Andrew Berwick, where he states that: By carrying out courageous actions, the Justiciar Knights will illustrate to the people that the powerful are vulnerable. This will inspire admiration and respect, not only with the people but often in the ranks of the military and police as well (Breivik 2011, 1275) Reading between the lines, we can see what courage and power stand for in Breivik’s mind. Being courageous is not understood in the traditional chivalric way. Conversely, courage is here associated 3

 It’s a Manhunt and It’s Live

with pitilessness, the sheer will required to dominate and the announcement of an impenetrable farewell to every possible feeling that could possibly alter the objective of the perpetrator. The State, the institutions and the politicians, following Breivik’s interpretation, are vulnerable because they are not truly powerful. Quoting Breivik: My advice to Westerners, in general, is to arm themselves immediately, first of all mentally with knowledge of the enemy and pride in their own culture and heritage, but also physically, with guns and the skills to use them. Friedrich Nietzsche stated in the nineteenth century that “God is dead.” In the early twenty-first century it would be fair to say that “The State is dead,” the replacement God in which we placed our trust after the other God died. Every single day we get more evidence that the authorities are totally incapable of protecting any semblance of security and freedom for its citizens. The only thing the state still seems to be capable of doing is indoctrinating our children with hatred of their own civilisation and taking away our money so that it can be given to those who colonise our countries and abuse our children, verbally and physically. (ibid. 610) Thus, the State, following Breivik, is not really powerful; it bears the semblance of power, but it is incapable of defending itself against brutal and raw power. In a society where God and the State are dead, only the truly powerful can arise, and this powerful actor is Breivik’s “Justiciar Knight”. Still, this discourse could have been more convincing had Breivik decided to attack the police or military agents. While Breivik understands and interprets power in a very active, raw and direct way, he decided to strike the innocent to prove the state’s lack of power in society. How can a State be powerful when it cannot guarantee the protection and the freedom of its citizens? Where is the power of the State when the youth of a political party is slaughtered unprotected? Nevertheless, Breivik, having decided to attack unarmed and innocent young people, including some children, is not filling the gap of the State’s powerlessness with his own power; he is not becoming the State’s parallel point of reference regarding the use of violence. In other words, Breivik decided to use his power in a context where there could be no direct answer from the State. Hence, in this specific context, Breivik is not challenging the State; by killing unarmed people that have no way to escape, he is challenging his own human nature and values. On Utøya Island, there was no confrontation between two opposing powers, there was only a cruel, gruesome manhunt where the perpetrator felt powerful, strong, and arrogant because the opposite side had no way to counterattack. That massacre was not a duel but a one-sided massacre that may have proven the State’s incapacity to prevent terrorist attacks, but, under no circumstances did it prove the superiority of Breivik’s power. Having created, in his manifesto, his own vague understanding of what an enemy and a traitor is, Breivik could literally attack anyone in Norway, considering the everyone to be a possible threat to the nation and Western society. The fact that he decided to attack the way he did may have qualified him as an effective inhumane predator but not as an agent that could challenge the State’s power. Hunting is not confronting or challenging, and his whole modus operandi (i.e., getting dressed as a police officer, shooting defenceless people in the head, etc.) proves that Breivik did not seek a frontal assault against the State; he just created the perfect conditions for a manhunt to take place. In other words, he managed to transform himself into a predator and the enemy into prey.

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 It’s a Manhunt and It’s Live

The Aesthetics of the Manhunt: Brenton Tarrant On March 15, 2019, Brenton Tarrant, a 28-year-old Australian, shot dead 51 people during his attacks on two mosques in New Zealand, in Christchurch and Linwood. Following these two attacks, he was caught by the police before he could launch his third attack at the Ashburton mosque, putting an end to his killing spree. The whole slaughter was recorded via a GoPro camera, which put the viewer in the shooter’s perspective - as if it were a shooter game - and livestreamed the event on Facebook. During the livestreaming, Tarrant narrated his actions, making comments like “Let’s get this party started” (Hendrix & Miller, 2019). Tarrant was the first lone actor to livestream his attacks, even though, in the past, jihadist terrorists had made use of similar techniques, like Larossi Abballa, who livestreamed the aftermath of the murdering of two police officers in their homes (Bjørgo & Macklin, 2021). Before the beginning of the massacre and while driving to reach his targets, Tarrant was showing the viewers his guns while he was listening to music from a tape made especially for this occasion (Hendrix & Miller, 2019). He had planned the attack well. Months before executing his plan, he flew a drone over Christchurch (BBC, 2020) to scan the area and prepare the attack most efficiently. Two weeks before the attack, Tarrant wrote a manifesto titled The Great Replacement1. This manifesto, which was supposed to be read after the attack, is in the format of a personal self-questionnaire where the author asks himself various questions, including the reasons for the upcoming attack. He also presents his political and ideological ideas and expresses his admiration for Breivik, who gave him his blessings, according to Tarrant, for the attack. Quoting Tarrant (2019): I support many of those that take a stand against ethnic and cultural genocide. Luca Traini, Anders Breivik, Dylan Roof, Anton Lundin Pettersson, Darren Osbourne, etc. But I have only had brief contact with Knight Justiciar Breivik, receiving a blessing for my mission after contacting his brother knights (…) I have read the writings of Dylan Roof and many others, but only really took true inspiration from Knight Justiciar Breivik. (p.24) Unlike Anders Breivik’s manifesto, which was about 1,500 pages long, Tarrant’s text is much shorter, 87 pages, different in its context and written in a much less dense way, mixing many unrelated topics like, among others, references to fascists like Oswald Mosely and videogames like Spyro the Dragon and Fortnite.2 In addition, Tarrant does not try to develop and/or explain at length his political beliefs and his ideology. For instance, when he asks himself if he had always held the political views he held at that time, he says: “No. When I was young, I was a communist, then an anarchist and finally a libertarian, before coming to be an eco-fascist” (Tarrant 2019 p. 23). Nor does he develop what eco-fascism stands for as an ideology or movement. From this, we could easily deduce, especially when comparing his manifesto to Breivik’s, that the main goal of the perpetrator was not to “educate the masses” through his manifesto but to offer a show and a spectacle to viewers, with brutally real visual effects. In other words, Tarrant offered through the livestreaming a “live manhunt”. While Breivik was not able to find an iPhone to make reality of his fantasy of beheading the Norwegian ex-prime minister, nor did he have the technical knowledge to send his manifesto via email to 8,000 addresses at the same time, the same cannot be said about Tarrant. Tarrant used the technology of livestreaming flawlessly, uploading it onto Facebook, proving that the livestreaming of the action was what mattered the most. For Tarrant:

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Digital technology was an integral and integrated component of Tarrant’s attack. His video was not so much for a medium for his message insomuch as it was the message, even more so than his actual manifesto. As Jason Burke observed, the central point of his attack was not just to kill Muslims, “but to make a video of someone killing Muslims”. Tarrant visually choreographed his attack, filming the atrocity using a GoPro camera, which gave the footage the quality of a first-person ‘shoot ‘em up’ movie. Terrorism as theatre’ became terrorism as video game. (Macklin 2019, p. 19) Quoting Marsh and Mulholland (2019): In fact, the entire attack seemed orchestrated for the social media age. Before it took place, a post on the anonymous message board 8chan -- a particularly lawless forum that often features racist and extremist posts -- seemed to preview the horror. It linked to an 87-page manifesto filled with anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim ideas and directed users to a Facebook page that hosted the live stream. Posts on Twitter also appeared to herald the attack. As we have seen before, Breivik inspired Tarrant to attack the mosques. The difference being, though, that while Breivik, orchestrated the tactics for the manhunt in Norway, Tarrant adds to the manhunt all the necessary visual and technological elements to make it a spectacle; unarmed and innocent people (once again) are getting killed while their death is livestreamed, and every viewer can see the massacre from the shooter’s perspective. The viewers, who, unfortunately, were many3, were able to witness firsthand and experience live the death of innocent people who were unprepared for the attack and unable to defend themselves. The spectacle was, once again, the livestreaming of a predator killing its prey. Tarrant, thus, unlike Breivik, added the “aesthetic” element to the manhunt: namely, not only would innocent people die, but, this time, everyone could witness the massacre from the predator’s perspective. In this case, the message was not the manifesto, not even the attack; the message was the image of the attack, the visual effects and the livestreaming of the attack: namely, the spectacle of a live manhunt. What we can observe, when comparing the two attacks, is that there is a paradigm shift. While in the first case, Breivik was more interested in the act itself, in killing the traitors and in spreading the message of this act through his manifesto, in the second case, Tarrant wanted to highlight the aesthetical part of his action; he wanted to make of this manhunt a spectacle. The message, as we have seen before, was not the action, the killing of the prey, but its visualization. Terrorism, thus, through Tarrant’s massacre, started to look for its own aesthetics, as macabre as this may sound. If Breivik was the tactician of the manhunt, Tarrant is the one that makes the manhunt a film, an image, and a piece of macabre and inhumane art. Concluding this part, the author would like to stress the importance of Tarrant’s terrorist attack when it comes to interpreting and conceiving right-wing terrorism. Tarrant showed through his attack that what matters for an attack to become viral all around the world is not only the number of casualties but the visual aspect of it as well. Videos of images of people getting hunted by a cold blood predator flooded the net, creating the new imagery of right-wing terrorism: namely the emergent figure of the predator that knows not only how to hunt but also how to “show off” his hunting skills in front of the audience. Little does it matter whether the manifesto was inconsistent and without any kind of argumentation concerning the upcoming attack; the essence of the attack was the haunting video of a predator feeling powerful and vengeful, hunting unarmed, innocent victims who were scared for their lives. The introducing of his weapons to the viewers, the playlist of songs for this “special occasion”, along with the commentaries of the perpetrator while in action have given shape to the “aesthetics of the manhunt”, to the visual 6

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representation of the massacre, to the importance of the appeal to a dark and grim sentimentality over the power of the word and reason. Tarrant, thus, did not only bring Breivik’s manhunt to another level but he also managed to visualize it in the grimmest and darkest possible way.

From War to Manhunt: The Definition of the Enemy in Breivik’s Manifesto So far, the word manhunt has been used more than once to describe the terrorist activity of the mentioned perpetrators. I have decided to do so because I consider, as I will now show, that the way the enemy is perceived in right-wing terrorism leaves almost no space for concreteness and exactitude, considering as enemy and traitor almost the entirety of the whole modern world with its politicians, institutions and supporters. The enemy, thus, is the whole of modern society and all its ideologies, and it is the responsibility of the very few “resistance” cells to turn the tides of war. The main problem here is that if the concept of the enemy is so vague and includes a multitude of groups, then every single citizen might also be considered an enemy due to his political and ideological beliefs. Unlike the army and the police though, the common citizen has no arms or does not believe that he has to defend himself with arms in his everyday life. Right-wing terrorists, on the other hand, as we will now see, think that they have every right to arm themselves, take the enemy by surprise, and cause as much death and mayhem as they can. Hence, the struggle is not between two armed forces capable of defending themselves, but a struggle between a ruthless, merciless, and armed to the teeth side against an unsuspecting group of people, often with children among them, totally unaware of the massacre lying ahead of them. Of course, the death of innocents has always been a part of terrorism; still, what we see, both in Breivik’s and Tarrant’s case, is that the perpetrators take joy in feeling strong and powerful as they kill “the weak”. They meticulously plan every step they take, they set traps to minimize every possibility of escape by their “prey”, they exclusively target innocent people that fit into their category of enemy, and none of them directly confronts the police. What makes the whole scene even grimmer is the aestheticization of the massacre. Breivik wanted to record, using an iPhone, the beheading of a human being, while Tarrant livestreamed the whole process from a first-person perspective. Tarrant, as we have already seen, perceived the visual part of the massacre as the core of his message, whereas the act and the manifesto played a secondary role. Breivik, on the other hand, made it clear in the police interviews following his arrest, and during his subsequent trial, that his atrocities were merely “the fireworks” to announce the presentation of his manifesto, the distribution of which “was one of the most important motives for the operation. (Bjørgo & Macklin, 2019, p. 15) Both perpetrators, hence, wanted to spread the message in their own way and for their own reasons. What matters most, though, is that the real content of the message was the same, a ruthless hunt and assassination of innocent people and unable to defend themselves: namely, a bloody manhunt. Coming back now to the way Breivik conceived the enemy, we read the following: I’ve suggested before that native Europeans face three enemies simultaneously when fighting against the Islamization of their lands: Enemy 1 is the anti-Western bias of our media and academia, which is a common theme throughout the Western world. Enemy 2 are Eurabians and EU-federalists, who deliberately break down established nation-states in favour of a pan-European superstate. Enemy 3 are Muslims. The Netherlands from 2001 to 2007 is a clear case in point where enemies 1, 2 and 3 have successfully

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cooperated on breaking down the spirit of the native population through intimidation and censorship and by squashing any opposition to continued mass immigration. (Breivik 2011, p. 385) Globalism is the enemy within which needs to be defeated. Globalism does not refer to the impersonal forces of technological globalization (although committed Globalists like to pretend that it does, because this makes their ideological programme seem “inevitable”), but to a Utopian ideology stating that erasing all national cultures and states (especially Western ones) is a positive good which should be promoted and forced down people’s throats. Opposition to this undertaking should be banned as “discrimination,” “racism,” “extremism” and “nationalism” (the terms are used as synonyms). (ibid. 708) The state is turned into an enemy of the very population it is supposed to protect. Swedes pay some of the highest tax rates in the world, and for this, they get runaway crime rates and a government that is actively hostile to their interests. (ibid. 728) In the lengthy passages presented above, we can trace some important elements that constitute the enemy in Breivik’s thoughts. The enemy is the Islamization of the world and those who promote it, the academia and the media that turn against Western values, and the globalization that is bringing down the national borders, eradicating different cultures and nations. The enemy is to be found everywhere, then, since there is no specific reference to a concrete person; conversely, the enemy takes the shape of Hydra with its many heads and appears everywhere. The enemy is a phenomenon, namely Islamization and globalization combined, but enemies are also huge groups like the media and academia. Furthermore, we can assume that the enemy is everyone that does not share Breivik’s ideas of what Western values are. Most importantly, though, the enemy is conceived as every single individual that supports the abovementioned groups. There are no innocent citizens when the interpretation of the enemy is so wide. The world is divided into those who accept Breivik’s ideas and those who oppose them. The benefit of this division, based on an abstract generalization, is that Breivik and his supporters may always be able to justify themselves and their actions, no matter how atrocious these are. In a world full of enemies, only war reigns, and in this war, no one is to be spared, as we can read in the following passage of Breivik’s manifesto: Once you decide to strike, it is better to kill too many than not enough, or you risk reducing the desired ideological impact of the strike. Explain what you have done (in an announcement distributed prior to operations) and make certain that everyone understands that we, the free peoples of Europe, are going to strike again and again. Do not apologise, make excuses or express regret for you are acting in self-defence or in a preemptive manner. In many ways, morality has lost its meaning in our struggle. The question of good and evil is reduced to one simple choice. For every free patriotic European, only one choice remains: survive or perish. Some innocents will die in our operations as they are simply at the wrong place at the wrong time. Get used to the idea. The needs of the many will always surpass the needs of the few. (ibid. 846) Breivik is beyond good and evil: not because he has mastered Nietzche’s thought, bringing it to a higher level, but because this is the way that his attacks may have a greater ideological impact. The bloodier the better; better too many than not enough, even if innocents die during the strikes. It is also interesting to note that he says that the needs of the many will surpass the needs of the few when he clearly considers 8

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himself and his supports a minority group striking against the system, the “brave few” against the many that dominate their lives and the future of the Western world. The only thing that matters, as we can deduce from this passage, is that there will be more strikes, again and again. After all, the key element of these attacks is the creation of an overwhelming feeling of fear and despair. It is quite difficult to imagine a situation in which the people will judge the ideological impact of an attack by the number of victims. The higher the number, the stronger the ideological impact could be easily an excuse for Breivik and his followers for not targeting highly symbolical political figures, organizing, thus, plans that would require precision, tactical and technical skills, as well as expertise that the former attacks clearly lack. Thus, behind the motto “the higher the number the stronger our ideology” lies the perverse idea that the higher the number of dead innocent people, the higher the level of desperation and fear instilled in ordinary people since each one of us could become the potential victim of Breivik’s supporters’ plans. Exploiting fear, despair and death, Breivik has made of his attacks a “theatre of the aesthetics of the manhunt”. Each violent act is a message, be it an introduction to his book/manifesto or a glimpse of his own utopic society. His attacks were based on the absolute necessity of having an audience that would witness them; an audience that would get scared; an audience that would feel weak at the sight of the predator’s slaughter. The art of asymmetrical warfare is less about inflicting immediate damage but all about the indirect long term psychological and ideological damage. Our shock attacks are theatre, and theatre is always performed for an audience (…) The essence of our actions is to convince our enemy that there is nowhere to hide. We are coming for every single one of them, if not today then tomorrow, if not tomorrow then in 10, 30 or even 50 years. We will never forget what they have done and continue to do. It is our responsibility to put a stop to it. (ibid. 835) In the above passage, we can also see the constant threat that no matter where or when the attacks will continue, the predator will patiently wait for the prey and attack whenever he desires. It seems that there is no longer any need to be reminded of the political and ideological differences between the two sides, there is only the desire to show that the world is divided into the truly powerful and the weak; that is, the ones that will start the manhunt and the ones who are doomed to be hunted. The vocabulary used, as well as the hatred with which this manifesto is written, calls for our attention since it obliges us to broaden our scope when having to interpret this kind of attack. Through this type of political terrorism, the perpetrators try to create their own worldview, one which is not strictly based on political ideologies and beliefs but enters into the domain of the manhunt imagery and a discourse the goal of which is to make of the world a big battlefield, where there are is no grief for innocent losses, just a constant battle against an abstract and broad idea of an enemy, be that liberalism, communism, democracy, Islam or any other belief and philosophy that stand in the way of the terrorists. This endless strife, even though it is presented as the necessary tool for creating chaos and disorder, ends up becoming a goal in itself. What matters the most is the domination of the despair in a society full of scared people knowing that these killers will show no mercy, not even to children or the elderly. Breivik, by choosing the whole of society and its citizens as his enemy, is trying to demonstrate that the State is not as powerful as we thought it was and that, soon enough, even the politicians or the elite of Western society will become the targets as well. The symbolism emerging in Breivik’s thoughts and actions is that of a “superman”, one beyond any moral doubts and questions, one that has become one with the act of hunting. The core of this symbolism is the act of hunting as an expression of true power, 9

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while innocent people become the helpless prey. Putting the manhunt at the centre of his ideology and worldview, Breivik implies that what is far more important is not the construction of a new Western society but the violent elimination of the already existing one. His message to his followers is not to think about what will happen after the massacre but to get, every day, prepared for an endless manhunt. The future and the new Western world have no importance in Breivik’s thoughts; the only thing that matters is the perfection and the perpetuation of the manhunt.

CONCLUSION Having seen the three parts of this chapter, I would like, as a conclusion, to offer some thoughts that derive from this analysis of the phenomenon of the “aesthetics of the manhunt”. There is no doubt that modern right-wing extremists lack the ideological, political and social discourse to convince society that their actions are meaningful. There is no cohesion in their argumentation, and they are unable to rationally explain the reasons behind their attacks. Having shaped an abstract concept of their enemies, right-wing terrorism has divided the world into allies and enemies, even though there is no clear understanding of who these enemies or allies really are. This absolute lack of concreteness, nevertheless, has enabled terrorists to target innocent and unprepared civilians, making claims that the loss of innocent people’s lives must not be an obstacle when it comes to planning and materializing their attacks.4 Nonetheless, the fact that the discourse and the ideology of these terrorists is not structured or coherent does not necessarily imply that they do not pose a threat. Quite on the contrary, aware that they are unable to convince others through their ideas and discourse, they are resorting to the forming of myths and imagery to justify their actions. The “aesthetics of the manhunt” is one tool they use to convince future extremists that the aesthetical part is a key part when it comes to committing terrorist acts. The feeling of hunting the innocent while recording the whole action, the use of social media to promote ideas and to broadcast the footage of the recording, the small chat Tarrant had with himself before and during the attack are all characteristics of this distorted version of aesthetics. Right-wing terrorists, knowing that they cannot convince through the use of reason and arguments, try to attract people through an imagery of the powerful predator that knows how to hunt, just like a wolf among sheep. Both Tarrant and Breivik urge their allies and admirers to adopt this “above morality” way of acting and thinking to become Justiciars. Furthermore, they urge those desiring to follow their path to believe that the audience is as necessary, if not more, as the terrorist act itself. There has to be an audience to watch this manhunt, otherwise, it would be totally deprived of sense and meaning. The audience is the second battleground, where right-wing terrorism is making its moves by provoking either fear, disgust or despair, or the perverse admiration of the wannabe Justiciars. Thus, the appeal to sentiments and the idea of the world as a battleground full of enemies where a constant manhunt is taking place are the key elements of the “aesthetics of the manhunt”, an aesthetics that, despite its unfounded political and ideological basis, might become a direct and difficult to control threat, taking into account the extensive reach of social media. The aesthetical element of the image as well as the appeal to people’s darkest fantasies and desires are tools as powerful as the ideas themselves, and this is something that right-wing terrorists are starting to understand.

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REFERENCES BBC. (2012, April 20). Anders Breivik describes the Norway Island massacre. BBC News. Retrieved December from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17789206 BBC. (2019, March 19). Facebook: New Zealand Attack Video viewed 4,000 times. BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47620519 BBC. (2020, August 24). Christchurch shooting: Gunman Tarrant wanted to kill ‘as many as possible’. BBC News. Retrieved December from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53861456 Bjørgo, T., & Macklin, G. (2021). Breivik’s Long Shadow? The Impact of the July 22, 2011 Attacks on the Modus Operandi of Extreme-right Lone Actor Terrorists. Perspectives on Terrorism, 15(3), 14–36. Breivik, A. (2011). 2083: A European Declaration of Independence. Retrieved from: https://info.publicintelligence.net/AndersBehringBreivikManifesto.pdf Bump, P. (2021, March 2). Analysis | FBI director Wray reconfirms the threat posed by racist extremists. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/02/fbi-directorwray-reconfirms-threat-posed-by-racist-extremists/ Davey, J., & Ebner, J. (n.d.). The Great Replacement: The violent consequences of mainstreamed extremism. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Hendrix, S., & Miller, M. E. (2019, March 18). ‘Let’s get this party started’: New Zealand shooting suspect narrated his chilling rampage. The Washington Post. Retrieved December from https://www. washingtonpost.com/local/lets-get-this-party-started-new-zealand-gunman-narrated-his-chilling-rampage/2019/03/15/fb3db352-4748-11e9-90f0-0ccfeec87a61_story.html Koranyi, B. (2012, May 16). Breivik killed with joyous “battle cry” - survivors. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-breivik-norway/breivik-killed-with-joyous-battle-cry-survivorsidUKBRE84F0NH20120516 Macklin, G. (2019). The Christchurch attacks: Livestream Terror in the viral video age. CTC SENTINEL, 12(6), 18–29. Marsh, J., & Mulholland, T. (2019, March 16). How the Christchurch terrorist attack was made for Social Media. CNN. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/15/tech/christchurch-internetradicalization-intl/index.html Tarrant, B. (2019). The Great Replacement. Retrieved from: https://img-prod.ilfoglio.it/userUpload/ The_Great_Replacementconvertito.pdf Towfigh, N. (2021, June 15). Germany believes right-wing extremism biggest security threat to the nation. Anadolu Ajansı. Retrieved from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/germany-believes-right-wingextremism-biggest-security-threat-to-nation/2274757

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ENDNOTES 1



2



3



4



12

For a thorough analysis of this concept and its relationship with extremism, see Davey & Ebner, 2019. Quoting a passage from Tarrant’s manifesto: Were you taught violence and extremism by video games, music, literature, cinema? Yes, Spyro the Dragon 3 taught me ethno-nationalism. Fortnite trained me to be a killer and to floss on the corpses of my enemies. No. (Tarrant 2019, 23). The video was viewed 4000 times before it was finally removed (BBC, 2019). According to Tarrant, even children must be slaughtered in the name of a higher good: Children are always innocent, do you not think you are a monster for killing an innocent? Children of invaders do not stay children, they become adults and reproduce, creating more invaders to replace your people. They grow up and vote against your peoples own wishes, for the interests of their own people and identity. They grow up and take the potential homes of your own people for themselves, they occupy positions of power, remove wealth and destroy social trust. Any invader you kill, of any age, is one less enemy your children will have to face. Would you rather do the killing, or leave it to your children? Your grandchildren? (Tarrant 2019, p. 30).

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Chapter 2

The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty: A Qualitative Content Analysis Eren Ekin Ercan https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0643-6270 Aydın Adnan Menderes University, Turkey

ABSTRACT The teacher Samuel Paty, who was decapitated on 16 October 2020 for showing cartoons of The Prophet Mohammad in a lecture in France, is an important indicator of the postmodern conceptual debate between “freedom of expression” and “terrorism.” It is not a coincidence that many similar events, especially the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, took place in France. The phenomenon of freedom of expression, which came to the fore during the 1789 French Revolution and its aftermath, made France a historical heir and the target of radical terrorist attacks. In this context, the study examines how the murder of Samuel Paty was interpreted on the websites of Yeni Şafak and Yeni Akit newspapers, which stand out with their Islamic journalism approach. The qualitative content analysis method was used in the study. The focus of the study is how the developments were reported by the newspapers on the day of the murder (October 16, 2020) and after.

INTRODUCTION There are important relationships between the cultural framework in society and the media. This situation has a different context, especially in societies that are historically late to industrialization processes and, as a political consequence, modernization is relatively late. It is possible to collect these effects under 3 main headings: a) The effects of traditional culture on modern politics, b) the disconnection between the intellectual group/class and society, and c) religion as the dynamo of all these. DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch002

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 The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty

The aim of this study, which is based on such a perspective, is to examine the view of the Islamist press in Turkey to the secular world in an event axis. In this context, first of all, the phenomenon of modernization and Islam in Turkey was briefly discussed from a historical perspective, the relations between France and Turkey were mentioned, and then information about the murder of Samuel Paty, which was chosen as the sample of the research, was given. Then, the method of the research is explained. The qualitative content analysis method was used in the research. The news about the murder of Samuel Paty on the websites of Yeni Akit and Yeni Şafak newspapers was analyzed. A search was made on the websites of the newspapers by typing “Samuel Paty” and a total of 87 news items were found. All of the news was included in the research.

MODERNIZATION AND ISLAM IN TURKEY: A CONTEXTUAL BRIEF HISTORY The first of the most important breaks in the rise of Islam through politics in Turkey is the developments after The Rescript of Gulhane (1839). Reforms to save the crumbling Ottoman Empire brought some Western-style developments. Three elements stood out especially in the institutional and therefore historical sense: Religion, bureaucracy, and the army (Berkes, 2003, pp. 169-171). Starting from the end, the army was at the center of the idea of saving the empire, along with the lands lost as a result of the Serbian and Greek uprisings. It was thought that if a strong army was formed, the empire would return to its old days (Kahraman, 2008, p. 4-5). Bureaucracy, on the other hand, has made the civil servant class compulsory based on education as an extension of the modern state understanding. A natural consequence of this was the law. In addition, with The Rescript of Gulhane (Tanzimat), the sultan’s powers were limited, tax and judicial regulations were made, and perhaps most importantly, the existence of private property was accepted. In other words, the law was emphasized as an intangible value. Later, when the emphasis on equal citizenship was added to this with the Reform Edict (Islahat) (1856), unrest emerged among the masses who had been living under a traditional religious state for centuries (Avcıoğlu, 1996, p. 229-231). On the other hand, it should be noted that all these modernization attempts are “necessary” and “raw” ideas. Because all these initiatives were seen as a means of saving the state rather than being a project aiming directly at modernization (Ortaylı, 2009, p. 38). Moreover, in both Tanzimat and Islahat thought, the prevention of nationalist thought is at the forefront. The reason behind this is that the nationalist movement that spread all over Europe after the French Revolution was perceived as the cause of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Berkes, 2003, pp. 436-437). Therefore, this situation, which constitutes one of the main lines of the historical and political tension between Turkey and France, has been further reinforced by the spread of thoughts on the nation-state and human rights. One of the best examples of this from the field of the press is the publication of the first newspaper published in the Ottoman Empire by the French. The main purpose of publishing this newspaper called Bulletin des Novalles (1795) in Istanbul was to promote the French Revolution and spread its ideals. Similarly, the newspapers Gazette Française de Constantinople (1796) in Istanbul, Le Spectateur Oriental (1821), Le Smyrnéen (1824) and Le Moniteur Ottoman (1831) were published in Izmir by the French. In addition, the Journal de Constantinople (1846), La Turquie (1866), Impartial (1841), La Réforme (1869), Le Phare du Bosphore (1870), Levant-Herald (1867), Stamboul (1875) are other newspapers published (Topuz, 2003, pp. 3439). Therefore, it is possible to say that there was an important intellectual exchange with the French after the French Revolution in Turkey.

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Another important indicator of this is the important relations of the intellectual bloc known as the New Ottomans, which formed the opposition within the Ottoman Empire, with Paris. When the pressure on the opposition press increased in the Ottoman Empire, prominent Jeunes Turcs (Young Turks) went to Paris, next to Mustafa Fazıl Pasha (Topuz, 2003, p. 40). Another example of this situation is that the first Jeunes Turcs congress was held in Paris in 1902 (Akgün, 2011, p. 8). There is a much deeper exchange of ideas behind this situation, which at first glance seems only conjunctural. According to the article written in 1904 by Yusuf Akçura (1976), one of the leading figures of Turkism thought in Turkey, there are three currents in the Ottoman Empire that are thought to save the state in an intellectual/political sense after the Tanzimat: Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism. Those who defended Ottomanism hate nationalism because for them nationalism was the main idea that led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which was an empire. It is precisely for this reason that the current of Islamism has been opposed to nationalism (Turkism). The practical equivalent of what appears to be Islamism, in theory, is Arab nationalism, the people of the prophet of Islam. Although it is a retrospective reading, this approach, which we can interpret as “political Islam” in a sense, saw the nationalism spread by the French Revolution as a “virus”. The response of Turkish nationalists to this approach was that nationalism emerged not as the cause of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, but as a result of it (Berkes, 2003, pp. 435-437). In this context, we see that the political struggle in the Ottoman Empire was between the view of human rights and nationalism (Turkism) based on the French Revolution and political Islamist thought. On the other hand, administrative law in Ottoman modernization was taken as an example from the French. In addition, French civil law was also considered to be implemented in the Ottoman Empire (Ortaylı, 1983, p. 19). Likewise, Ottoman intellectuals, who were between German idealism and French positivism, preferred French positivism. Another important point is that the language of education in modern educational institutions is French (Farzam, 2019, p. 31; Erdem, 2015, p. 13). Another aspect of France being taken as a model in the Ottoman modernization process and French being the language of education is that modernizing intellectuals, who can be described as “opposition”, went through this education process. Later, almost all of the founding staff of the Republic of Turkey received education from these educational institutions and were influenced by French thought, especially politics (Köçer & Egüz, 2013). In this context, the political thoughts of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who became a captain in the process leading to the announcement of the Second Constitutional Period, which constitutes one of the most prominent historical and political outlets of Turkist thought, and later founded the Republic, are also important. It is known and seen that Rousseau and Montesquieu had effects on the development of Atatürk’s political thought. Especially their approach to social contract and separation of powers is an important indicator of this. Moreover, the effects of the libertarian emphases in the French Revolution can also be seen in the 1924 Constitution. Another anecdote that should not be forgotten is that Atatürk, who speaks French well, read all these texts in their original language (Ada, 2014, pp. 231-234; Bolat, 2005, p. 161). Atatürk’s (1928) views on the French Revolution are as follows: The French Revolution introduced the idea of freedom to the whole world and is still the main source of this idea. But since then, humanity has progressed. Turkish democracy followed the path opened by the French Revolution but developed in its way. Because every nation makes its revolution according to the situation and historical situation that is subject to the pressure and needs of its social dynamics. Aren’t

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we witnessing the repetition of the same event at all times and places? (Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III, 1997, p. 120). As a result, it is seen that France, and especially the French Revolution, is a model for the modernization initiatives that started in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, both intellectually, politically, and educationally. All these modernization attempts were met with the reaction of the religious social masses who are at the center of traditional culture. For this reason, it is a historical phenomenon that conservatives focus on France and code it as “anti-Islamic” since France played a very active role in both Ottoman and Republican modernization.

MURDER OF SAMUEL PATY Samuel Paty, a history teacher at Conflans-Sainte-Honorine in Yvelines, France, was beheaded by Abdoullakh Abouyedovich Anzorov on 16 October 2020. Anzorov, a Russian citizen of Chechen descent, did this because he showed caricatures of the Islamic prophet Muhammad in class. On the subject, Macron stated that Paty was trying to teach freedom of expression and that it was an “Islamic terrorist attack” and said, “They will not win... We will act.” The cartoons Paty showed in the class had previously been published in Charlie Hebdo, a French humor magazine. The main reason Paty was targeted was that on January 7, 2015, the Charlie Hebdo office was attacked after he published these cartoons. This attack, in which 11 people lost their lives and 11 people were injured, caused a lot of attention and reaction not only in France but also all over the world. When we look at how the murder was committed, a 13-year-old female student, whose name has not been officially revealed, told her father that Paty had shared cartoons insulting Muhammad. The girl’s father filed a criminal complaint against the teacher and started a campaign on his daughter’s social media account. A week or so after this campaign, Anzorov followed the teacher Paty and beheaded him in a street. Later, Anzorov shared a photo of Paty’s severed head on his Twitter account @Tchetchene_270 with the following message: “In the name of Allah, the most gracious, the most merciful, ... to Macron, leader of the infidels, I executed one of your hellhounds who dared to belittle Muhammad, calm his fellow human beings before a harsh punishment is inflicted on you.” Before showing the cartoons, the female student, who started a social media campaign against Paty, who said that her students who might be disturbed by the cartoons could leave the class, stated that she was not actually in the class on the day of the incident and that her friends had shared with her about this situation. After the murder, 11 people were detained, including 18-year-old Anzorov’s grandmother, grandfather, parents, and underage brother. Among those arrested were underage students. All opposition parties, especially the President of the Republic of Turkey Erdogan, condemned the attack and sent condolence messages. Afterward, French President Macron interpreted the event as follows: “Our fellow citizens today must be protected against this evil that is radical Islam. Our determination is complete. The acts will be there. The Republic needs it.” President Erdogan also noted the following: Know your limits for once. Have you ever considered whom you are walking with? Fascism is not in our book. Fascism is in your book. There is neither fascism nor Nazism in our book. We are walking the road with social justice… Macron needs mental therapy.

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 The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty

METHODOLOGY The qualitative content analysis method was used in this study. Qualitative content analysis is one of the powerful methods used especially for analyzing texts. The method, which is based on technical analysis, reveals the context of the text and the general framework of repetitive elements related to this context through categories/themes. In other words, “the goal of these approaches to data analysis is to answer questions of practice and policy in everyday terms, rather than to generate theory.” (Forman &Damnschroder, 2007, p. 41). There are certain stages in qualitative content analysis. The most important of these is the research question. Another important step is to create categories/themes for the text to be analyzed. These categories, on the other hand, become evident in the focus of the research question and by looking at the text examined. Thus, a quantitative framework for research is drawn. Afterward, the presentation of examples of the categories created is also very important. In this way, the reader can both see a general framework of the subject examined with quantitative data and gain a contextual perspective thanks to the examples given (Mayring, 2000). Therefore, as can be seen in Figure 1, content analysis tries to measure, evaluate and interpret the contextual relationships between the research question and the text being examined. In this context, the question of this research is: How does the Islamist press in Turkey deal with the terrorist attack against Samuel Paty? Figure 1. The structure of content analysis Source: Krippendoef, 2004, p. 83

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 The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty

More than one analysis method can be used in qualitative research. The main thing here is that the researcher maintains a qualitative perspective and reveals the contextual qualities of the research with data. Therefore, qualitative content analysis is the explanation of the research question with a qualitative gaze by making use of quantitative and qualitative data (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 8). This approach was also adopted in the design of this study. First of all, themes were created based on the news contexts in the news texts examined, and the repetitive contexts were presented quantitatively. Then, sample sentences were transferred from the news texts related to the themes. Thus, it has been revealed from which perspective the newspapers discussed have approached the event/phenomenon in quantitative and qualitative terms, and it has been tried to contribute to the international literature. The limitation of the study is the news published in Yeni Şafak and Yeni Akit newspapers, which are published in Turkey, regarding the murder of Samuel Paty on October 16, 2020. The reason for choosing these newspapers is that they are the ones that put the political Islamist journalism approach in practice in the clearest way in Turkey. In the research, the news on the internet pages of these newspapers, which are also published in print, were examined. A search was made by typing “Samuel Paty” in the internet archive of news sites and all news was included in the research. While Yeni Şafak newspaper publishes in English and Arabic as well as Turkish, Yeni Akit newspaper publishes only in Turkish.

FINDINGS Quantitative Findings Between October 16, 2020, when the murder of Samuel Paty took place, and December 11, 2022, when the research was carried out, a total of 87 news stories were published. 10 of this news was published in Yeni Şafak newspaper and 77 of them were published in Yeni Akit newspaper. Table 1. Table showing the number of news about the murder of Samuel Paty in the newspapers Newspapers

Number of news

Yeni Şafak

10

Yeni Akit

77

When the news in Yeni Şafak and Yeni Akit newspapers are analyzed, the news is distributed in 8 themes in total. The themes were determined based on the discourses that are at the center of the news and highlighted in the news title and the news entry. The themes highlighted in the news are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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News presenting French President Macron as an anti-Islamist leader, News presenting France as an anti-Islamist country, News presenting the European Union as anti-Islamist, News suggesting that all these attempts are a game and that the real target is Islam, News that disapproves of the murder of Samuel Paty, but suggests that it was used by France as a means of provocation for the oppression of the religion of Islam,

 The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty

6. News that reject calls for reform and argue that Islam does not need reform, 7. News about inhuman or degrading treatment of Muslim children and families after the murder of Samuel Paty. Another category is the news that deals with the messages of condemnation and condolence from different countries. This news was only published by the Yeni Akit newspaper and there is 24 news in total in this category. The distribution of the news according to the themes is given in Table 2. Table 2. Themes related to the Samuel Paty murder news in the newspapers News context

Yeni Şafak

Macron = Anti-Islam Anti-Islamic France

Yeni Akit 9

4

Anti-Islamic EU

18 6

“These are games, the target is Islam.”

2

Provocation

3

7

“Islam does not need reform.”

1

4

Inhuman or degrading treatment of Muslim children and families

2

7

Total

10

53

As can be seen, the news that evaluates France and Macron in an anti-Islamic way is in the first place. In the second place is the news that suggests that all this is a provocation. In the third place is the news about the inhuman or degrading treatment of Muslim children and their families. Although the analyzed news is divided into certain themes, the prominent discourse in the news was taken as a basis within the scope of the research. In other words, some discourses fall under different themes in the same news.

Qualitative Findings: News Examples and Discourses In this part of the research, examples of news related to the themes are included. 3 news samples from each theme were tried to be shared. While conveying the news, first the title and then the news spot was shared. Thus, it has been tried to qualitatively convey how a context is created with news discourse. Macron=Anti-Islam ◦◦ Send henna1 to Macron... Anti-Islamism at record level in France - While Islamophobia, fueled by French President Emmanuel Macron, spread rapidly in the country, there was a 53 percent increase in Islamophobic attacks in France in 2020. ◦◦ Such apostasy has never been seen! Macron, who declared war on Islam, took a step back when he heard about the boycotts - Has been revealed that French President Emmanuel Macron, who turned the wheel after his comments on scandalous cartoons that aroused indignation in the Islamic world, will send an ambassador to Islamic countries to soften relations.

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 The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty

◦◦

Tactless Macron is playing with fire - French President Emmanuel Macron, who declared war on Islam, continues to provoke Muslims with his immoral attitude. Anti-Islamic France ◦◦ The new curtain on Islamophobia from France! It is closed - After the attacks on Islam in France, the Muslim non-governmental organization BarakaCity was dissolved by the decision of the Council of Ministers. ◦◦ Scandalous step in France! 76 mosques to be raided - French Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin announced that they will inspect 76 mosques in the country. Darmanin announced that mosques will be closed if they do not comply with the conditions. ◦◦ Law targeting Muslims passed in France - After the murder of teacher Samuel Paty in France, the bill targeting and criticizing Muslims was accepted and approved by 347 votes against 151 in the National Assembly. Headscarves will now be banned in private companies working for the public benefit. Anti-Islamic EU ◦◦ An arrogant statement about President Erdogan from the French lickspittle Miçotakis - Greek Prime Minister Kiriakos Mitsotakis made an arrogant statement, saying that President Erdogan’s remarks towards French President Emmanuel Macron were “unacceptable”. ◦◦ Europe’s inexperienced leaders marginalize Muslims with their policies and rhetoric - AntiIslamism, which has been increasing in Europe in recent years, deepens with the rhetoric and policies of 42-year-old French President Emmanuel Macron and 33-year-old Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, whose political experiences are discussed. ◦◦ Provocation to insult the prophet in Denmark - Racist New Right Party in Denmark launches a campaign to insult Muhammad. “These are games, the target is Islam.” ◦◦ French Theater - The dirty game of the Macron administration, which declared war on Islam, was once again exposed. The dirty games of the French, who killed the young man who was said to have killed teacher Paty with a knife, instead of catching him, continue. The attacker, whom the French called “He attacked by saying Allah-u Akbar” the previous day, was also a racist Nazi. ◦◦ Muslim non-governmental organization BarakaCity closed in France. Provocation ◦◦ Vile provocation from Macron: Cartoons insulting the Prophet were projected on public buildings - Islamophobia, initiated by French President Emmanuel Macron, spreads across the country. The caricature insulting our Prophet Muhammad and disturbing Muslims was projected on the buildings of government offices. While social media users in Morocco called for a boycott of French products, many social media users changed their profile pictures on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media networks and put the text “Muhammad Rasulullah.” ◦◦ Scandalous words from the French journalist: Muslims should take off the headscarf in memory of Paty - There is no end to the anti-Islam and anti-Muslim statements in France. Finally, French feminist journalist Elisabeth Levy claimed that the headscarf was “the uniform of the enemies of France” and said, “I am surprised that Muslims do not take off their headscarves for a few days to honor the memory of the teacher who was beheaded.”

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 The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty

◦◦

Vile provocation from France!!! Great disrespect to the Prophet - French fascism changed dimensions. “Islamic hostility” led by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, also spread to state institutions. Insulting Islam and Muslims at every opportunity, Macron began to project the so-called Muhammad cartoons on government buildings. “Islam does not need reform.” ◦◦ Washington Post’s Paris representative: “France is trying to reform Islam instead of fighting racism.” ◦◦ French Islamic Community Milli Gorus (CIMG): We never approve of reforming Islam. ◦◦ Milli Gorus France Organization rejects “support for Macron” allegations: “We do not accept French Islam” - The Secretary-General of the French Organization of National Vision, Fatih Sarıkır, stated the news and evaluations that they support the efforts of French President Macron to create “French Islam” and said that they never approve of a situation such as “reforming or changing Islam”. Sarıkır stated that they do not accept the ascription of liberal, secular, Turkish Islam, Arab Islam, French Islam, to the religion of Islam based on ideology or nationality. Inhuman or degrading treatment of Muslim children and families ◦◦ 4 Turkish children aged 10 were interrogated for 11 hours in France - In France, four 10-yearold Turkish children were taken to the police station and interrogated for 11 hours after a discussion at their school about cartoons insulting Muhammad, their homes were raided. ◦◦ The investigation against 2 12-year-old students in France on charges of “making terrorist propaganda”. ◦◦ France has gone mad! 4 children, 3 of them Turkish, were detained for hours - In France, 4 children, 3 of them Turkish, were detained for 11 hours on charges of advocating terrorism. The French state had previously described Islam as “international terrorism”.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION Four main points come to the fore in this study, which examines the murder of Samuel Paty in the Islamist press in Turkey. The first of these is that none of the published news reports directly condemn the murder. The news that is not included in the themes/categories of the study is the most important indicator of this. For example, 4 news stories are praising Tidiane Wone, one of the former ministers of Senegal, to return the Légion d’honneur as a reaction to France, and 2 news criticizing the award of the Legion d’honneur to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Statements made by countries, institutions, and individuals who interpreted the post-murder process in France as “anti-Islamist” practices were reported 18 times. However, no news directly criticizes/condemns the murder. In summary, other news also focuses on statements that “witness” that Europe, especially France, is “anti-Islamist”. The second important point is that the phenomenon of “freedom of expression” is handled from a political Islamist perspective. What is often repeated in news discourse is that the murder of Samuel Paty was an opportunity for France. This “opportunity” is the possibility of anti-Islamist practices due to the murder that took place. In other words, the following discourse is frequently seen in the news: “Rather than mourn Paty’s death, France is elated that it can resort to anti-Islamist practices.” In this way, the beheading of a teacher is trivialized in terms of human rights, and the murder itself is reflected by the reader as a tool. So much so that a subtext such as “Perhaps France itself committed this murder; 21

 The Approach of the Islamist Press in Turkey to the Murder of Samuel Paty

you don’t know” is inserted into the news discourse. The news that all this is a “French Theatre” is the most important indicator of this. Moreover, with the news that Macron is playing with fire, there are even threatening statements. A third point related to this is that Anzorov, who committed the murder, is handled as a passive subject in the news text. For example, the title of the newspaper Yeni Akit dated October 21, 2020, is as follows: “A memorial service was held for the teacher found beheaded in France.” Another aspect of this is the news that the murder was never mentioned in the news and that France had an anti-Islamic attitude for no reason: “After Macron declared war on Islam in France, Muslim associations were raided and mosques were locked. Interior Minister of Internal Affairs announced that they want to dissolve 51 associations.” Another news practice is that the name of Samuel Paty is not mentioned in any news headline. Paty’s surname is mentioned in only one of the 87 news items reviewed. Thanks to all these discursive strategies, the murderer and the victim disappear and thus the context of the news is placed in the discourse that France is anti-Islamist. Finally, the historical effects of France on freedom of expression and democracy are very clear. In Turkey, in the ongoing struggle for modernization since the Ottoman Empire, what France corresponds to as both a political and cultural model is very important. For example, in Turkey, the word “laic” is used instead of the word “secular” both in the constitution and in everyday language. There is a usage that comes from the French word “laïcité”. Therefore, the political Islamist approach in Turkey has some historical conflicts with France, both in daily, political and ideological terms. In this context, the perspective of Atatürk and his friends, the founder of the Turkish Republic, towards France is also important. Therefore, it is a natural phenomenon that political Islamists focus on France, which is the historical source of freedom of expression. On the other hand, the fact that Samuel Paty was never discussed within the scope of freedom of expression in the analyzed news and that only France’s policy after the murder was interpreted as violating the freedom of expression is a very important indicator. In other words, the lack of a clear emphasis in the news discourse that “no matter what happens, nothing is more important than human life” points to troublesome journalism practice in terms of human rights.

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Fransız gazeteciden skandal sözler: Müslümanlar Paty’nin anısına başörtüsünü çıkarsın [Scandalous words from the French journalist: Muslims should take off the headscarf in memory of Paty]. (2020, October 27). Yeni Şafak. https://www.yenisafak.com/ Fransız onur nişanından vazgeçen Senegalli Bakan, AA’nın “Yılın Fotoğrafları” oylamasına katıldı [Senegalese Minister, who gave up the French honor order, participated in AA’s “Photos of the Year” voting]. (2020, December 18). Yeni Akit. https://www.yeniakit.com.tr Fransız Tiyatrosu [French Theater]. (2020, October 31). Yeni Akit. https://www.yeniakit.com.tr Fransız yalakası Miçotakis’ten Başkan Erdoğan ile ilgili küstah açıklama [An arrogant statement about President Erdogan from the French slacker Miçotakis]. (2020, October 26). Yeni Akit. https://www. yeniakit.com.tr Kahraman, H. B. (2008). Türk Siyasetinin Yapısal Analizi I [Structural Analysis of Turkish Politics I]. Agora Kitaplığı. Köçer, M., & Egüz, Ş. (2013). Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye-Fransa Eğitim İlişkileri [Ataturk Period TurkeyFrance Educational Relations]. Turkish Studies, 8(10), 387–393. Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology (2nd ed.). Sage Publications. Limam, A. (2020, 18 October). Paris attacker posted a photo of slain teacher’s body on Twitter before being shot. CGTN. https://newseu.cgtn.com Macron calls Paris beheading ‘Islamist terrorist attack’. (2020, October 17). BBC News. https://www. bbc.com Macron’a kına gönderin… Fransa’da İslam karşıtlığı rekor seviyede [Send henna to Macron… Islamophobia is at record level in France]. (2021, January 30). Yeni Akit. https://www.yeniakit.com.tr Mayring, P. (2004). Qualitative Content Analysis. A Companion to Qualitative Research, 1(2), 159-176. Milli Görüş Fransa Teşkilatı ‘Macron’a destek’ iddialarını reddetti: “Fransız İslam’ını kabul etmiyoruz” [Milli Gorus France Organization rejects the allegations of “support for Macron”: “We do not accept French Islam”]. (2020, November 24). Yeni Şafak. https://www.yenisafak.com/ Murder of Samuel Paty. (2021, December 7). Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org Ortaylı, İ. (1983). İmparatorluğun. In Uzun Yüzyılı [The Longest Century of the Empire]. Hil Yayınları. Ortaylı, İ. (2009). Osmanlı’da 18. Yüzyıl Düşünce Dünyasına Dair Notlar [Notes on the 18th Century World of Thought in the Ottoman Empire]. T. Bora & M. Gültekingil (Eds.), Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi (pp. 37-41). İletişim. Samuel Paty: French schoolgirl admits lying about murdered teacher. (2021, March 9) BBC News. https:// www.bbc.com Senegalli eski Bakan Wone, Legion d’Honneur nişanını Fransa’ya iade etti [Former Senegalese Minister Wone returns the Legion d’Honneur to France]. (2020, November 15). Yeni Akit. https://www.yeniakit. com.tr

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Three teens charged in French teacher’s beheading. (2020, November 6). France 24. https://www. france24.com Tidey, A. (2020, October 21). France beheading: Macron promises crackdown on radical Islam after murder of teacher Samuel Paty. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com Topuz, H. (2003). II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi [Turkish Press History from Mahmut II to Holdings]. Remzi Kitabevi. Washington Post’un Paris temsilcisi: “Fransa, ırkçılıkla mücadele yerine İslam’da reform uğraşında” [Washington Post’s Paris representative: “France is trying to reform Islam instead of fighting racism”]. (2020, October 27). Yeni Akit. https://www.yeniakit.com.tr

ADDITIONAL READING Alam, A. (2009). Islam and post-modernism: Locating the rise of Islamism in Turkey. Journal of Islamic Studies, 20(3), 352–375. Berkes, N. (2013). The development of secularism in Turkey. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315022581 Dursun, Ç. (2006). The struggle goes on: The discursive strategies of the Islamist press in Turkey. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 14(2), 161–182. doi:10.1080/14782800600892218 Ergül, H., Gökalp, E., & Cangöz, I. (2010). From the wrath of Allah to divine judgment: Natural disasters in the Islamist press in Turkey. Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 5(1), 1–20. doi:10.1080/17447140903197233

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS France: It is an important country that has influenced world history, especially the French Revolution. In this study, it is included because the attack was in France. Freedom of Speech: The concept that came to the fore with the French Revolution in world history and is the basic element of democracy. In the study, it was used in the context of evaluating the limits of the freedom understanding of the Islamist press. Islamist Press: The press, which treats the Islamist understanding as an ideology and interprets the news as such. Murder: Taking someone’s life. In this study, it is used in the context of execution related to freedom of expression. Provocation: To provoke a person or group to deviate from its purpose. Samuel Paty: Teacher killed in France on October 16, 2020. Paty was killed for showing cartoons in the context of freedom of expression in class. Terrorism: Intimidation is an attempt to put pressure on a person or social group and to take away their freedom of expression with the aim of killing people, destroying property, intimidating them. Turkey: It is the country that forms the focus of the study. Among the existing newspapers, the two most prominent newspapers with their Islamist line are discussed.

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ENDNOTE 1



Applying henna, one of the ancient Islamic traditions, is a practice performed on the road to happiness, especially marriage.

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Chapter 3

The Role of Media in the Perception of Syrian Refugees as Terrorists Devrim Şahin Eastern Mediterranean University, Cyprus Safiye Kocadayı Near East University, Cyprus

ABSTRACT Research studies about how Turkish public opinion perceives refugees reveal that while refugees may be seen initially as innocent people in dire need of temporary protection, this perception shifts once it becomes evident that their plight could become a permanent situation. The involvement of Syrian refugees in various types of violence, including terrorist acts, gave rise to strong resistance to their presence in Turkey. In addition to the critical discourse of opposition parties and media, the ambivalent messaging of the ruling Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) in the media worsened the general perception of refugees and their relationship to Turkish Society in a manner threatening to stability in Turkey. To ensure a more peaceful life in Turkey, policies that are healthier and more cohesive need to be adopted in order that Syrian refugees can be integrated into the nation’s cultural and social life.

INTRODUCTION Since 2011, issues related to the plight and presence of Syrian refugees has become a reality in and for Turkey (Dal, 2013). The combination of legal and illegal entrants to Turkey has added to the complexity of the issue. In the early phases of the refugee crisis, Turkey followed an open-door policy, welcoming the refugees within its borders. However, that policy has since shifted. Turkey’s changed behaviour is evident in the ambivalent official discourses that have ensued and in such measures as the construction of a concrete wall along the country’s 822-km-long border with Syria, the increased number of security force personnel deployed at entry points plus the increase in observation and measurement filters now DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch003

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to be found in refugee camps. All of the foregoing attests to how Turkey now views the refugees as constituting a threat (Dilek, 2018). The central question examined by this study is what brought about this change in perception. In examining various related socio-political issues, the study pay particular attention to the role media may have played in contributing to the perception of Syrian refugees as ‘‘terrorists’’ (Betts, 2009; Dilek, 2018). The study’s hypothesis argues that in order to adequately understand the refugee crisis, it is important to address how the issue of the language used by political actors and the media concerning refugees can and does raise the level of threat perception directed at refugees. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent takeover of the Taliban having triggered a new refugee crisis from Afghanistan, makes it all the more important to derive lessons how how the discourse of the media worsened the relationship between Syrian refugees and Turkish people. Given this aim, subsequent sections explain the type of problems experienced between the refugees and the indigenous people of hosting countries and then examine the role played by the media in demonising the image and worsening the conditions experienced by Syrian refugees in Turkey. The study’s findings include recommendations that the political discourse should avoid manipulating the refugee issue as a means of threatening the European Union (the EU) or as an incitement intended to extend influence in the context of domestic politics (Betts, 2009; Chimni, 1998). Furthermore, the study concludes that the media should at all times avoid inflammatory language and ensure its coverage shows due respect for the innocence and humanitarian rights of the refugees.

Conflicts Between Indigenous People and Refugees At its simplest, migration can be explained simply as the movement of people from one place to another, motivated by the need for security, whether with the intention of settling on a permanent or temporary basis. In this regard, it is vital to note that migration is a critical phenomenon, one with complex effects that often give rise to new situations for the local communities. Refugees and asylum seekers differ from immigrants insofar as the latter may move of their own choice, whereas the former have been forced by circumstances beyond their control to escape their home country (Wolf, 2001). Either way, whether refugee or migration, the issue has been at the core of the ongoing debate about the exodus of people fleeing their homes in the Middle East and Africa in order to achieve better and more secure life prospects, especially when seeking to settle in EU countries (Betts, 2009; Chimni, 1998; Wolf, 2001). The fact that the two terms have become synonymous with controversy as used in the media and political discourse can be traced to the perception that immigrants and/or refugees represent a threat to the cultural and social coherence of the places they migrate to (Betts, 2009). Therefore, the onus is on the immigrants and refugees to successfully adapt to the lifestyle of the host country communities that receive them. (Topal et al, 2016:38) While states are obliged to accept and protect asylum seekers in accordance with the provisions of the relevant international conventions, they try to limit the flow of irregular refugees, and where possible even to stop them altogether (Chimni, 1998). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2010) stresses the point that refugees are “fleeing armed conflict or persecution”. In sum, since refugees emigrate from their home countries in order to escape from “potentially deadly consequences”, to deny them asylum amounts to a possible death sentence. The 1951 Convention for Status and Rights of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol established certain rights for the protection of refugees from being deported or returned to situations where their lives could be at risk. UNHCR serves

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as the “guardian” for the protection of refugee lives, including their right to be granted access to social services and to be integrated within a host country’s society (Chimni, 1998). Turkey and the EU countries have all ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention (Chimni, 1998). In 1967, Turkey also ratified the Protocol Relating to the Legal Status of Refugees. However, Turkey continued to apply the principle of geographical limitation regulated by the Geneva Convention. Therefore only people from Europe can obtain status of refugee in Turkey. The Syrians in Turkey are not eligible for asylum protection. Therefore they are not having a status of refugee. The official status of Syrians has been defined as under ‘temporary protection’. This case applies to Afghan’s status as well especially because they already pass the first safe country they could stay (Iran) to enter Turkey. Since support for human rights is a condition for EU membership, most European countries place specific importance on its provisions and the protection of refugee human rights (Chimni, 1998). However, growing controversies over refugee and immigrant issues have triggered a rise in nationalist and populist movements within EU member states (Betts, 2009). Jonathan Haidt, for instance, maintains that authoritarian and populist leaders are often so hostile to immigrants and refugees that they hold them responsible for the northerly “spread of the Zika virus”. This hostility derives from the widely held perception, especially prevalent among European societies, by which refugees are viewed “as potential threats to the cultural identity of host states”, particularly where “refugee communities are large”. (Brown, 1993:17) Negative perceptions about refugees can and do have a negative impact when it comes to the protection of their lives and rights. European authoritarian objections to the mass influx of refugees into Europe is manifest in the attempts that have been made to solve the problem and offset the security risk they might pose by providing financial aid to designated hosting countries to help them meet the economic burden of looking after the refugee needs (Betts, 2009). A case in point is the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement, which is contrary to international law and even at odds with EU law. Under this questionable arrangement, the EU give billions of euros to Turkey in exchange for ensuring strict control of its borders to hold back the flow of refugees. Now, there is a move on the agenda to restructure the agreement in order to establish new refugee camps in Turkey specifically to detain the anticipated outflow of Afghan refugees there. To better understand Turkey’s refugee crisis and the possible conflicts arising from the additional adaptation and integration process, it is important to investigate the potential implications of the cultural, ideological, and identity divergence involved (Dal, 2013). The following section examines the available research into the challenges that have limited the successful integration of Syrian refugees into the cultural and social life of Turkey.

Level of Coherence and Integration of Syrian Refugees in Turkey The process that broke out in 2010 known simply as the Arab Spring evolved into a full-scale civil war in Syria in 2011 (Dilek, 2018). Since then, Turkey has become a destination for millions of Syrians seeking protection and refuge from persecution and serious human rights violations. The number of Syrian babies born and registered in Turkey since 2011 has exceeded 200,000, an outcome that has gradually altered what was once Syrian refugee guest status into something more akin to permanence. In this regard, it is essential to note that while the current status and future prospects of Syrian refugees complicates the debate about their precise legal status, it also raises issues about social and economic cohesion (Akçiçek, 2015). Approximately ten years have elapsed since the beginning of the uprisings 30

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in Syria and the migration of Syrian refugees to Turkey. Yet, scholarly attempts to assess how Syrian refugees have adapted to or been received in their new society do not offer much consolation in terms of positive figures. The significant cultural differences between two populations suggest that, to date, things have not gone so well. (Orhan and Gundogar, 2015:8-10). An in-depth examination of existing scholarly studies analysing Syrian refugee conditions and the integration process provides significant insights into the level of adaptation and the changing perceptions Turkish people have of Syrian refugees. Kirisci (2014) maintains that in order to eliminate violence between segments of Turkish society and the Syrian refugee influx, the government in Ankara should have placed greater emphasis on the integration process, especially with regard to “education, employment, health, shelter and other needs of Syrian refugees”. However, requests for integration or harmony often carry a hidden risk in the context of freedoms. Demanding that immigrants should meet certain obligations within the framework of their adaptation to the new societies they seek to become a part of may seem logical, yet asking them to learn the language of the host community or to adapt to the lifestyle of those they live among is in effect to require a re-culturisation. Despite there being a strong belief that integration along these lines will make life easier for immigrants, it should be noted that the downside of such an approach is to expose immigrants who do not meet these implicit expectations to a range of open or hidden pressures (Orhan and Gündoğar, 2015: 16). As Munthe (2011) suggests, while the acquisition of a new language may not be a precondition for a new life, learning the host language is regarded as a measure of adaptation by refugees to their new environment. (Gürsoy and Ertaşoğlu, 2019: 129) So it is that in order to adapt to the society they live in, a great number of refugees from Syria have shown considerable interest in acquiring Turkish language fluency. Another study by Gürsoy and Ertaşoğlu (2019, 129) tells us that while the male refugee population seems to be at an advantage when it comes to integrative initiatives and orientation, female refugees tend more to remain isolated in their new society. Although employment figures are important indicators of refugee integrative orientations, in the case of employment data for Syrian refugees, the numbers portray a hopeless picture, since, according to the same study, nearly half of the Syrian refugees appear to be unemployed. Moreover, Gürsoy and Ertaşoğlu (2019) point out that, due to the patriarchal nature of Syrian families, figures on employment of the female population are much worse. (Gürsoy and Ertaşoğlu, 2019: 137) Similar to the gender-based differentiation, the study also reveals that seemingly moderate figures in terms of “interest towards adaptation” among young age groups significantly declines as the age of the refugees increase. (Gürsoy and Ertaşoğlu, 2019) A poll conducted in September 2018 indicates that 83% of Turks regard Syrian refugees negatively and think that accepting refugees from Syria should be stopped. Notably, there are also important differences among political party bases in this regard. Another survey by the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (Ekonomi ve Dış Politika Araştırma Merkezi – EDAM), indicates a consensus among Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) supporters that the number of refugees should be restricted. On the other hand, participants from the Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi – CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) mostly identified the immediate repatriation of asylum seekers to their countries of origin as their preferred solution to the refugee problem. (Edam Report, 2014) According to a public survey by Turkish-German University’s Migration and Integration Research Centre, 82% of Turks regard Syrians as aliens from a completely different culture, while nearly threein-four Turks believe that Syrian refugees will harm the country’s socioeconomic structure (Kınıkoğlu, 31

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2020:3). The fact that the refugees who migrate to Turkey are mostly Sunni and conservative Muslims coming from Muslim countries heightens the perception that they represent a threat to the country’s social and cultural base (Dilek, 2018). Before the Taliban took control in Afghanistan, generating the last wave of migrants fleeing to Turkey, PEW (a nonpartisan American think tank) research found that 91% of the population of Afghanistan favoured sharia rule, whereas in Turkey, the figure is12%. Based on this, Dağı (2021) points to the possibility of a hidden agenda behind the AKP government’s refugee policy, one which would transform Turkey’s social and cultural structure by making the people more religiously conservative in line with the Muslim migration from Syria, Afghanistan and Africa. In other words, the government could be using the refugee issue as a social engineering tool to hybridize the “modern and secular social/cultural space”, which it has managed to do this to some degree during its rule for 20 years. Muslim immigrants and refugees would help advance the concept of a new state based on the common denominator of Islam instead of the extant Turkish nation-state (Dilek, 2018). Uncertainties and speculations such as these widen the gap between the government’s refugee policies and the opposition’s distrust and further prompt the perception of refugees as a political tool (Dilek, 2018). The aforementioned studies urge the need for Turkey to develop additional integrative and compliance programmes in order to avoid any possible conflict that might arise between the domestic society (Turks) and Syrian refugees (Arabs) in Turkey. Once they have crossed the Turkish border, the challenges Syrians face become increasingly complicated as their lack of social and economic cohesion serves to foster serious demands for adjustment by the Turkish people. With the passage of time, the impact of the migrant/refugee influx becomes more pronounced resulting in myriad problems and unprecedented situations in social, cultural and political spheres in Turkey (Dilek, 2018). Because of the enormous challenges associated with the largescale Syrian refugee migration and settlement, the country’s political stance has undergone change that is visible both in external and internal policy terms. This is readily reflected in the overall content and coverage by Turkey’s major media outlets and in the Turkish peoples’ attitude vis a vis the Syrian migrants.

The Role of Media in Changing Perceptions Towards Syrian Refugees in Turkey A further review of the underlying factors influencing a change in the Turkish peoples’ perception of the Syrian refugees demands a look at the role media have played in the transformation process. Contributing factors vary. They include the high cost incurred for providing prolonged protection to the refugees, a rise in the number of terrorist attacks, growing crime rates, plus the heightened antagonism within Turkish society towards the refugees. Generally, the public, the media, and officials in the opposition parties focused on the security aspect by characterising the refugee influx as posing a significant threat to Turkey’s social, political, and economic way of life. Meanwhile, the ruling AKP administration’s tactical use of the immigrant dilemma, served to compound the problems of the refugee-migrants’ daily lives. Ankara’s response to statements from European circles that immigrants fleeing from Afghanistan would be kept within Turkey’s borders, was partly shrouded in a series of ambivalent messages coming from government officials. On the one hand, they said that “Turkey is not Europe’s refugee warehouse”. At the same time, they pursued a kind of “open door” policy with messages to the effect that “our doors are open to our brothers”. The ruling AKP opened Turkey’s borders to Syrian refugees since 2011 with the very same message -- “our doors are open to our brothers escaping from oppression”. Now, a similar message is being reiterated for Afghan immigrants, one that can be safely argued to have a humanitarian aspect. However, this should not obscure the fact that the Turkish government has cited the refugee issue 32

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in all its negotiations as it bargains with the EU for a quid pro quo and more. In other words, the AKP policy is to hold the refugee issue over the EU by using it as a means of leverage. It is evident that disputes and conflicts between indigenous people and the refugees they host can arise. Furthermore, in time, these can deteriorate into outright discrimination and acts of hatred directed against refugees and migrants in receiving countries (Dilek, 2018). The use of insensitive and pejorative language and descriptives can easily be promulgated and disseminated via an the media, which, after all, play a vital role in shaping the attitude and expectations of ordinary citizens regarding issues such as the refugee situation. The fact that the outcome is in fact an international protection crisis, and that refugees per se are neither the instigators of the crises nor the ones responsible for their attendant costs, that in fact they are the ultimate victims, is often, if not mostly, forgotten (Erdoğan et al, 2017: 19-20). In this sense, a shift in the media’s coverage and discourse by highlighting instead the need to help protect the victims is crucial if social attitudes are to be changed and opinions shifted. Traditional media tools have their own ideological slants when making and reporting the news. Therefore, they are in a position to shape public perceptions – whether viewers, listeners or readers -on any particular issue, especially in a time when the news is no longer considered to be reliable (Betts, 2009). Conflicts between indigenous people and refugees might arise and, in course of time, turn into discrimination and hatred against refugees and migrants in receiving countries. Such discourses can easily penetrate to the society through the media and breed all types of violence including cultural, structural and direct ones (Betts, 2009). A review of print and visual media outlets and their coverage of the Syrian refugees since 2011 offers an important insight into understanding the prevailing situation. In essence, existing sensitive and fragile social acceptance levels of the refugee situation in Turkey cannot be assessed without taking account of the attitudes engendered and reflected in the media. (Erdoğan et al, 2017). The impact of Syrian refugee crisis has been felt especially within Turkey’s social sphere. An example of cultural divergence is that Turkish community’s and Turkish law’s views of marriage are different from those of Syrians’. Turkish civil law prohibits from multiple wives and child marriages (Kiriscioglu, 2014). It should be noted that there has always been polygamy in Southern Eastern parts of Turkey. The number of child marriages and having multiple wives, nevertheless, has obviously increased after the Syrian refugee influx causing social tension especially with the consequent rise in the percentage of divorce cases. This has resulted in thousands of second and third wife marriages in addition to the Turkish first wife. Despite the legal prohibition from it, Turkish men’s tendency towards polygamy has raised this aspect of Syrian culture as a social security threat by Turkish community. In addition, refugee population is inclined to have high crime rate due to their disastrous economic conditions and loss of morality. A case in point is a piece of real news in the Turkish media concerning a Syrian girl who was a Syrian refugee and found a way to get money from Turkish men by using marriage as a pretext. Together with her relatives, she asked a man to pay 40 thousand Tl as a customary condition of marriage, according to Syrian traditions, which they received. However, two days before the wedding, the Syrian girl with her family escaped to another city in Turkey and found another man to fall into the same trap. (TV8 Channel Program-Yaşamdan Hikayeler –Life Stories). At first glance, newspapers, media outlets and surveys measuring public opinion seem to suggest a consensus in Turkey among the public to end protection for Syrian refugees. Yet a deeper look at the recurring media headlines about Syrian refugees from the onset of the crises attests to the fact that the media have played a critical role in shaping today’s prevailing critical perception of Syrian refugees. Up until September 2015, the most commonly used phrase about refugees was “illegal immigrants”, despite the fact that it is not illegal to be an asylum seeker, or to apply for refugee status. However, the 33

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emotive definition of “illegal immigrant” creates a perception that asylum seekers and immigrants are both illegal and criminal. On 19 January, 2015, 333 immigrants from Mersin to Italy were intercepted by the Coast Guard and brought back to Turkey, a story that was featured widely in the media with titles ranging from “333 Illegal Immigrants Arrested” and “Operation Illegal Immigrants” to “Raid on Immigrants”. (Erdogan et al., 2017:10) Immigrants are referred to as illegal because they cross the country border without passport and visa. However, as previously mentioned, they have the right to asylum in another country in line with the conditions specified in the 1951 Geneva Convention, therefore, their right to apply for asylum cannot be ruled out as illegal or inapplicable . Furthermore, referring to “the increasing number of refugees and deaths” on a daily basis, the constant use of titles such as “refugee disaster” and especially the repeated references to “refugee crisis” by mass media outlets significantly contributed to the widespread belief that the crisis is somehow the responsibility and creation of the refugees themselves. Thorbjornsrud and Figenschou (2014) maintain that, “refugees were framed between ‘victim - threat dichotomy’ while male migrants/refugees were shown as a potential criminal, female and child migrants/ refugees were shown as needy and innocent.” While pro-government newspapers framed the refugees in the context of the responsibility to protect, anti-government papers portrayed them as tending towards crime and as a burden on Turkey (Göker and Keskin 2015; Erdoğan 2014). There is a dichotomy when it comes to the refugee image since they are portrayed as being dependent on society’s protection and also as posing a ‘‘threat’’ to society. So media reportage should be more accurate and precise and more respectful, taking due account of the universal values of the refugees’ plight, their rights and their status. To date, there has been no bloody conflict in Turkey between the people and the refugees. However, radical terrorist groups, including jihadists who infiltrated from Syria into Turkey since the onset of the Syrian conflict, have raised fears among the Turkish people about the Syrian refugees in their midst. A widely held concern is whether the Syrians among them are indeed innocent refugees or whether, in the absence of an effective screening system, they might be terrorists masquerading as refugees. The southern provinces of Turkey bordering Syria are especially vulnerable and feel under threat given the massive refugee influx, and the potential terrorists they fear might be among them. Such fears are viewed by many as having been validated given terrorist attacks organized by groups who infiltrated Turkey in the guise of refugees. Dealing appropriately and sensitively with the refugee crisis requires political actors and the media to be extra careful about the language they use in reference to the refugee situation. Language can be as loaded and as lethal in its consequences as any weapon and in this instance media and politicians alike would do well to moderate and monitor their use of language to ensure compliance with human rights and universal values. In particular, political leaders should avoid aggressive rhetoric to help curtail derogatory, demeaning and misleading characterisations of Syrian and other refugees. The bottom line should always be to prohibit the use of defamatory language designed to incite hostility and mistrust. The widespread negative image of refugees held by many people can be attributed in large part to either reckless or targeted use of language that is deliberately demeaning and misleading by media and/ or political actors when reporting or commenting on issues to do with the Syrian refugees. In this way, politicians can manipulate the Turkish public to believe the negative image of the Syrians. This raises tensions even further between two cultures. The people of Turkey should be able to put themselves into the shoes of the Syrian refugees, to be aware of their circumstances and of their blameless intentions. They must empathize with the refugees and show more tolerance and understanding for the situations the refugees face. In sum, regardless of how it may be portrayed in media or in the heat of political rhetoric, 34

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people should approach and question what lies behind the refugee situation in order to understand it before they jump to conclusions and judge it.

CONCLUSION Since the start of the refugee influx from Syria in the early 2010s, Turkey has been one of the countries that has attempted to do its part. It has hosted millions of Syrian refugees. At the outset, the refugees were welcomed by the government and people alike. However, once it became apparent that the situation would be prolonged and not short-term, people started to express their concerns about the long-term consequences especially the adverse impact of hosting an ever-expanding number of refugees. Some of those adverse fears were realised with the onset of terrorist attacks and/or murders, rapes and sexual assaults, and robberies committed by Syrian refugees. Added to these hostile events the discourse of political actors and media have been influential on the changing perceptions of Turkish people towards refugees that began to view the latter not as innocent people anymore but rather as terrorists. Opposition parties especially began interpreting issues related to refugees as a threat to social life and stressed the need to deal with the refugee influx as a security matter. Government, on the other hand, displayed an ambivalence, flagging humanitarian aspects of the issue while using the plight of the refugees to promote aspects of its domestic policies and at the same time leveraging the situation in its bargaining with the EU. That this political exploitation and accompanying rhetoric was reflected in Turkish media only added to the negative image of refugees among the people of Turkey, a factor that served to exacerbate further the existing problems refugees were experiencing in their relations with Turkish citizens. Language has a key role to play in addressing the underlying issues. Politicians and media need to avoid politicising and sensationalising the issue for their own ends. Rather than heightening concerns about motive and overall security, they need to ensure social cohesion by helping promote the integration of the refugees thereby contributing responsibly to the maintenance of Turkey’s internal peace. To ensure a more peaceful life in Turkey, policies that are healthier and more cohesive need to be adopted in order that Syrian refugees can be integrated into the nation’s cultural and social life. Such an approach entails eschewing alarmist discourses that seek to manipulate the refugees’ presence in Turkey in order to gain advantage in the context of domestic politics or to enhance bargaining power in terms of foreign policy. It must be remembered at all times that refugees are vulnerable and innocent people whose lives could be at risk if deported or returned to the country and conditions they were compelled to flee from in the first place. The obligation to protect their lives and ensure their rights of access to social services and acceptance in the hosting country is a matter of international responsibility.

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Doh, J. P., & Teegen, H. (2002). Nongovernmental Organizations as Institutional Actors in International Business: Theory and Implications. International Business Review, 1(11), 665–684. doi:10.1016/S09695931(02)00044-6 Dykstra, A. T. (2016). Assemblages of Syrian suffering: Rhetorical formations of refugees in Western media. Language Discourse & Society, 4(1), 31–48. Oxford Economics. (2020). Africa and Middle East: GCC expat exodus – from a trickle to a deluge. Author. EDAM. (2014). Türk Kamuoyunun Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yönelik Bakış Açısı, Türkiye’de Dış Politika ve Kamuoyu Anketleri 2014/1 [The Turkish Public Opinion Perspective towards the Syrian refugees, Foreign Policy and Public Opinion Survey in Turkey in 2014/1]. Ekonomi ve Dış Politika Araştırmaları Merkezi (EDAM). https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/EdamAnket2014.1.pdf Erdogan, E. (2018). Dimension of Polarization in Turkey. GMF on Turkey. https://www.gmfus.org/. publications/dimensions-polarization-turkey Erdoğan, E., & Semerci, P. U. (2018). Attitudes towards Syrians in Turkey-2017. Istanbul Bilgi University – Center for Migration Research, Ankara. https://goc.bilgi.edu.tr/media/uploads/2018/03/15/ turkish-perceptions-of-syrian-refugees-20180315_Y0gYZoI.pdf Erdoğan, M. (2014). Türkiye’deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum Araştırması [Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research Executive Summary and Report]. HUGO Publications. Erdoğan, M. (2017). Syrians-Barometer 2017: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey. https://mmuraterdogan.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/sb-2017-executive-summary-06122017.pdf Erdoğan, M. (2019). Türkiye’deki Suriyeli ve Diğer Mülteciler [Syrians and Other Refugees in Turkey]. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. https://www.kas.de/documents/283907/7339115/ T%C3%BCrkiye%27deki+Suriyeliler.pdf/acaf9d37-7035-f37c-4982-c4b18f9b9c8e?version=1.0 &t=1571303334464 Erdoğan, M., Kavukçuer, Y., & Çetinkaya, T. (2017). Türkiye’de Yaşayan Suriyeli Mültecilere Yönelik Medya Algısı [The media’s perception of Syrians in Turkey]. Liberal Perspektif Analiz, (5). Erdogan, M. M., Kavukçuer, Y., & Çetinkaya, T. (2015). Türkiye’de yaşayan Mültecilere Yönelik Medya Algısı. Özgürlük Araştırmaları Derneği Yayını. https://mmuraterdogan.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/ oad_c2lgwsk.pdf European Commission. (2015). Special Eurobarometer Survey: Europeans’ Attitudes Towards Security. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/ basic-documents/docs/20150408_1_ memo_eurobarometer_april_2015_v2_en.pdf Fakhoury, T. (2018). Multi-level govenance and migration politics in the Arab world: The case of Syria’s displacement. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(8), 1310–1326. doi:10.1080/13691 83X.2018.1441609 Figenschou, T. U., Beyer, A., & Thorbjørnsrud, K. (2016). Do Marginalized Sources Matter? Journalism Studies, 17(3), 337–355. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2014.987549

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Frelick, B., Kysel, I. M., & Podkul, J. (2016). The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants. Journal on Migration and Human Security, 4(4), 190–22. doi:10.1177/233150241600400402 Frohlich, C. (2017). A Critical View on Human Mobility in Times of Crisis. Global Policy, 8(Supplement 1), 5–11. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12417 Fukuyama, F. (2020). The Pandemic and Political Order It Takes a State. Foreign Affairs. https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-06-09/pandemic-and-political-order Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167–191. doi:10.1177/002234336900600301 Göker, G., & Keskin, S. (2015). Haber medyası ve mülteciler: Suriyeli mültecilerin türk yazılı basınındaki temsili [News media and refugees: The representations of Syrian refugees in the Turkish press]. İletişim Kuram ve Araştırma Dergisi, (42), 229–256. Greenhill, K. (2016). Open Arms Behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis. European Law Journal, 22(3), 317–332. doi:10.1111/eulj.12179 Gürsoy, E., & Ertaşoğlu, L. D. (2019). Syrian refugees’ perception of barriers and bridges towards integration into Turkish society. Language, Culture and Curriculum, 32(2), 128–141. doi:10.1080/079 08318.2018.1542000 Halpin, J., & ... (2018). Is Turkey Experiencing a New Nationalism? An Examination of Public Attitudes on Turkish Self-Perception. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ security/reports/2018/02/11/445620/turkey-experiencing-new-nationalism/ Hoffman, M., Werz, M., & Halpin, J. (2018). Turkey’s ‘New Nationalism’ Amid Shifting Politics: Further Analysis of Polling Results. Center for American Progress. Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2018). Turkey/Syria: Border Guards Shoot, Block Fleeing Syrians. HRW. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/03/turkey/syria-border-guards-shoot-block-fleeing-syrians İçduygu, A. (2015). Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead. Migration Policy Institute Transatlantic Council on Migration. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/syrian-refugees-turkeylong-road-ahead İçduygu, A., & Millet, E. (2016). Syrian Refugees in Turkey; Insecure Lives in an Environment of PseudoIntegration. Global Turkey in Europe Series, Working Paper (13). https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/ gte_wp_13.pdf International Crisis Group (ICS). (2018). Turkey’s Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions. ICS. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/248-turkeyssyrian-refugees-defusing-metropolitan-tensions International Crisis Group (ICS). (2019). Mitigating Risks for Syrian Refugee Youth in Turkey’s Şanlıurfa. ICS. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/253mitigating-risks-syrian-refugee-youth-turkeys-sanliurfa

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Kağnıcı, D. Y. (2017). School Counselors’ Roles and Responsibilities in Cultural Adaptation Process of Syrian Refugee Children. Elementary Education Online, 16(4), 1768-1776. http://dergipark.ulakbim. gov.tr/ilkonline/article/view/5000204742/5000183119 Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu, T. C. (Ombudsmanlık). (2018). Türkiye’deki Suriyeliler: Özel Rapor [Syrians in Turkey: Special Report]. Ombudsmanlık. https://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/suriyeliler/rapor.html Kaya, A., & Kıraç, A. (2016). Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Istanbul. Supporttolife. https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/54518 Kınıklıoğlu, S. (2020). Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Changing Attitudes and Fortunes. Centre for Applied Turkey Studies, SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) Comment No. 5 (February). https://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/ contents/products/comments/2020C05_Kiniklioglu.pdf Kirişci, K. (2014). Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Challenges: Going beyond Hospitality, Brookings paper. Brookings Institute. Koyuncu, A. (2014). Kentin Yeni Misafirleri Suriyeliler [Syrians, The New Guests of the City]. Çizgi Kitabevi. Migration Watch, U. K. (2016). Recent Polls on Immigration. https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/ briefing-paper/361 Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management. (2020). Uluslararası Koruma Kapsamındaki Yabancıların Genel Sağlı Sigortaları hakkında [About General Health Insurance of Foreigners Under International Protection]. Ministry of Interior. https://www.goc.gov.tr/uluslararasi-koruma-sss Montgomery, E., & Foldspang, A. (2017). Discrimination, mental problems and social adaptation in young refugee. European Journal of Public Health, 18(2), 156–161. doi:10.1093/eurpub/ckm073 Nielsen, S. Y. (2016). Perceptions Between Syrian Refugees and Their Host Communities. Turkish Policy Quarterly, 15(3), 99–106. Nieman, A., & Zaun, N. (2018). EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives. Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(1), 3–22. doi:10.1111/jcms.12650 Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey. (2019). 30988 sayılı Bazı Kanunlarda ve 375 Sayılı kanun Hükmünde Kararnamede Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun. [Law on Amendments to Some Laws No. 30988 and Decree Law No. 375]. Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey. Okyay, A., & Zaragoza-Cristiani, J. (2016). The Leverage of the Gatekeeper: Power and Interdependence in the Migration Nexus between the EU and Turkey. The International Spectator, 51(4), 51–66. doi:10 .1080/03932729.2016.1235403 Okyay, A. S. (2017). Turkey’s post-2011 approach to its Syrian border and its implications for domestic politics. International Affairs, 93(4), 829–846. doi:10.1093/ia/iix068 Orhan, O., & Gündoğar, S. Ş. (2015). Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey. Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM). (http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/Raporlar/rapor195/195eng.pdf)

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Özaşçılar, M., Narli, N., & Öztürk, O. (2019). Crime Reporting Behavior Among Syrian Immigrants in Istanbul. Crime and Delinquency, 65(14), 1997–2018. doi:10.1177/0011128718807157 Pelek, D. (2019). Syrian refugees as seasonal migrant workers: Reconstruction of unequal power relations in Turkish agriculture. Journal of Refugee Studies, 32(4), 605–629. doi:10.1093/jrs/fey050 Rustin, M. (2020). The Coronavirus Pandemic and its Meanings. The Revista Brasileira de Psicanálise, 54(2). Saatcioglu, B. (2019). The European Union’s Refugee Crisis and Rising Functionalism in EU–Turkey Relations. Turkish Studies, 21(2), 169–187. doi:10.1080/14683849.2019.1586542 Schinkel, W. (2010). Aspects of Violence: A Critical Theory. Palgrave Macmillan UK. doi:10.1057/9780230251342 Sirkeci, İ., & Cohen, H. J. (2016). Cultures of Migration and Conflict in Contemporary Human Mobility in Turkey. European Review (Chichester, England), 24(3), 381–396. doi:10.1017/S1062798716000119 Stetter, S. (2020). What Fosters and What Hampers Sustainable Peace Education. Report for the Project “Mapping Sources of Mutual Distrust in Palestinian-Israeli Relations”. TaskinsoyJ. (2019). A Delicate Moment in Turkey’s Economic Transition: Can Turkey Survive Mounting Economic Problems without the IMF’s Bailout Package? https://ssrn.com/abstract=3408520 doi:10.2139/ ssrn.3408520 Tuğsuz, N., & Yılmaz, A. (2015). Siyasi Partilerin Mülteci Politikaları [Refugee Policy of Political Parties]. Seta Perspective. http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150703162350_siyasi-partilerin-multecipolitikalari-pdf.pdf Tuncel, G., & Eki̇ci̇, S. (2019). Göçün Siyasal Etkisi: Suriyeli Göçmenlerin Türkiye Siyasetine Etkisi [Political Impact of Migration: The Impact of Syrian immigrants to Politics of Turkey]. Birey ve Toplum Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 9(2), 48–72. doi:10.20493/birtop.648831 UNHCR. (2010). Global Appeal 2008-2009, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees- Turkey. https://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/474ac8e60.pdf UNHCR. (2015). States Parties to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Geneva Protocol. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.pdf UNICEF. (2017). 25 million children out of school in conflict zones. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/ media/media_95861.html Uygun, E. (2020, January 25). The Life Condition of Syrian Asylum Seekers in Turkey and the Effect of These Conditions on the Desire to Migrate to Europe. Psychiatry Investigation, 17(1), 55–68. doi:10.30773/pi.2018.0275 PMID:31995972 Wolf, M. (2001). Will the nation-state survive globalization? Foreign Affairs. Zencir, M., & Davas, A. (2014). Suriyeli Sığınmacılar ve Sağlık Hizmetleri Raporu [Report on Syrian Refugees and Health Services]. Türk Tabipleri Birliği.

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ADDITIONAL READING Çirakoğlu, O. C., Demirutku, K., & Karakaya, O. (2021). The mediating role of perceived threat in the relationship between casual contact and attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey. Journal of Refugee Studies, 34(3), 2984–2999. doi:10.1093/jrs/fez118 Koca, B. T. (2016). Syrian refugees in Turkey: From “guests” to “enemies”? New Perspectives on Turkey, 54, 55–75. doi:10.1017/npt.2016.4 Memisoglu, F., & Ilgit, A. (2017). Syrian refugees in Turkey: Multifaceted challenges, diverse players and ambiguous policies. Mediterranean Politics, 22(3), 317–338. doi:10.1080/13629395.2016.1189479 Sunata, U., & Yıldız, E. (2018). Representation of Syrian refugees in the Turkish media. Journal of Applied Journalism &. Mediaeval Studies, 7(1), 129–151. Yaylacı, F. G., & Karakuş, M. (2015). Perceptions and newspaper coverage of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Migration Letters: An International Journal of Migration Studies, 12(3), 238–250. doi:10.33182/ ml.v12i3.277

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP): In the media preferred an ambivalent discourse regarding refugees which followed the shifting perceptions of Turkish people who are voters. Language of Media and Political Discourse: Plays a significant role in shaping the perception of Syrian refugees in Turkey as terrorists. Alarmist discourses manipulate the refugees’ presence in Turkey in order to gain advantage in the context of domestic politics or to enhance bargaining power in terms of foreign policy. Opposition Parties: Are preferring a critical discourse which worsened the general perception of refugees and their relationship to Turkish Society in a manner threatening to stability in Turkey. Syrian Refugees: Are vulnerable and innocent people whose lives could be at risk if deported or returned to the country and conditions they were compelled to flee from in the first place. The obligation to protect their lives and ensure their rights of access to social services and acceptance in the hosting country is a matter of international responsibility. Syrian refugees are linked with terrorism, an issue which plays a significant role in the security perception of Turkish people as well as European people and thus determines the policies and the relations between both of them. Turkey: A country at the crossroads between the East and West has found itself at the margins of the European normative order, yet also position itself as a protector of common European borders, and ‘European civilization’ as such, against mass influx of refugees. Turkish Public Opinion: Has become a very important determinant for the AKP’s policy decision since the latter’s number of seats depends on the perception and satisfaction of Turkish people. Turkish Society: Plays important role in the issue as being directly influenced by the presence of Syrians. The issue gave rise to strong resistance among Turkish people regarding presence of approximately five million Syrians in Turkey that caused cultural, economic, and structural problems.

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ENDNOTES 1.



2.



3.



4.



5.



42

In 1967, Turkey also ratified the Protocol Relating to the Legal Status of Refugees. However, Turkey continued to apply the principle of geographical limitation regulated by the Geneva Convention. Therefore only people from Europe can obtain status of refugee in Turkey. The Syrians in Turkey are not eligible for asylum protection. Therefore they are not having a status of refugee. The official status of Syrians has been defined as under ‘temporary protection’. This case applies to Afghan’s status as well especially because they already pass the first safe country they could stay (Iran) to enter Turkey. Traditional media tools have their own ideological slants when making and reporting the news. Therefore, they are in a position to shape public perceptions – whether viewers, listeners or readers -- on any particular issue, especially in a time when the news is no longer considered to be reliable (Betts, 2009). Conflicts between indigenous people and refugees might arise and, in course of time, turn into discrimination and hatred against refugees and migrants in receiving countries. Such discourses can easily penetrate to the society through the media and breed all types of violence including cultural, structural and direct ones (Betts, 2009). The impact of Syrian refugee crisis has been felt especially within Turkey’s social sphere. An example of cultural divergence is that Turkish community’s and Turkish law’s views of marriage are different from those of Syrians’. Turkish civil law prohibits from multiple wives and child marriages (Kiriscioglu, 2014). It should be noted that there has always been polygamy in Southern Eastern parts of Turkey. The number of child marriages and having multiple wives, nevertheless, has obviously increased after the Syrian refugee influx causing social tension especially with the consequent rise in the percentage of divorce cases. This has resulted in thousands of second and third wife marriages in addition to the Turkish first wife. Despite the legal prohibition from it, Turkish men’s tendency towards polygamy has raised this aspect of Syrian culture as a social security threat by Turkish community. In addition, refugee population is inclined to have high crime rate due to their disastrous economic conditions and loss of morality. A case in point is a piece of real news in the Turkish media concerning a Syrian girl who was a Syrian refugee and found a way to get money from Turkish men by using marriage as a pretext. Together with her relatives, she asked a man to pay 40 thousand Tl as a customary condition of marriage, according to Syrian traditions, which they received. However, two days before the wedding, the Syrian girl with her family escaped to another city in Turkey and found another man to fall into the same trap. (TV8 Channel Program-Yaşamdan Hikayeler). Thorbjornsrud and Figenschou (2014) maintain that, “refugees were framed between ‘victim - threat dichotomy’ while male migrants/refugees were shown as a potential criminal, female and child migrants/refugees were shown as needy and innocent.” While pro-government newspapers framed the refugees in the context of the responsibility to protect, anti-government papers portrayed them as tending towards crime and as a burden on Turkey (Göker and Keskin 2015; Erdoğan 2014). There is a dichotomy when it comes to the refugee image since they are portrayed as being dependent on society’s protection and also as posing a ‘‘threat’’ to society. So media reportage should be more accurate and precise and more respectful, taking due account of the universal values of the refugees’ plight, their rights and their status.

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Chapter 4

Relationship Between Education, Media, and Terror Zehra Gelici Presidency of Religious Affairs, Turkey

ABSTRACT The subject of this study is to uncover the relations between terrorism, media, and education with examples. The purpose of this study is to reveal the effect of terrorist organizations, which try to recruit staff by using the media and educational environments, on education, and to discuss the effectiveness of education in preventing terrorism. Today, terrorist organizations, which use the internet actively, consider virtual media as a serious propaganda tool by taking advantage of the difficulties in the control of virtual environments. For this reason, in this study, which has a qualitative design, media analysis will also be included as well as document analysis. The PKK, which is defined as a leftist organization, and ISIS and similar religion-based terrorist groups that take Islam as their reference will be discussed in the scope of the study, and the way they use the media and the effects of their activities on education and the role of education and religious education in preventing or reducing the effects of terrorism will be discussed in the study.

INTRODUCTION In its most general definition, education, which is the process of making behavioral changes in people in the desired direction (Ertürk, 1982: 12), can be performed in different ways in every setting and community. When education is performed in a certain discipline with educational stakeholders such as schools, teachers, and students when it is the state and it can also be performed differently by illegal groups such as terrorist groups in different environments, with different tools, or materials. It is possible to mention terrorist groups in the first place among illegal groups. Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted common definition of terrorism (Şimşek, 2016: 319) which means “to discourage” in Turkish (TDK, 1982) and is a Latin expression. As a result, some groups, which are considered terrorists in one region or in a country, can be propagated via education in textbooks in another country. DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch004

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 Relationship Between Education, Media, and Terror

For example, the Partiya Yektiya Demokrat-Yekineyen Parastina Gel (PYD-YPG) terrorist organization, which is one of the many extensions of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane (PKK) terrorist organization, which has caused great brutality and traumas in Turkey, and which has caused the great humanitarian tragedy in Northern Syria, like the PKK, is not recognized as a terrorist organization and even supported in western countries because it is fighting against another terrorist organization Iraq Sham Islamic State (ISIS). The latest example of this organization showing that it is supported by the West was its introduction in a supplementary textbook that was prepared for history lessons in the final year of high schools in France. There are two pages mentioning the terrorist organization YPG/PKK in the training material prepared as a supplementary book for the 2020-2021 academic year. The book, which has a section with the title “A nation without a state: Kurds”, includes chronological data on the history of the Peshmerga, and on the terrorist organization PKK, along with the symbols of the YPG and photographs of armed terrorists in uniforms mentioned in the news dated October 2019 under the title “The End of Syrian Kurdistan” released in the newspaper Le Monde. The news mentioned in the textbook also says that although “Operation Peace Spring” that was launched by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in October 2019 to ensure the security of the borders of Turkey and to prevent the creation of a terror corridor in the south is accepted as a counter-terrorism operation for Turkey, it can be presented as an attack on the Kurdish race using the publication of a media establishment (“Fransada lise yardımcı tarih kitabında terör örgütü”, 2020). It is possible to mention the PKK in Turkey performing activities in educational institutions to recruit terrorists, and being interested in young people at high schools and universities to include in their organizations as another example of the education-terrorism relationship organizations. All of these show that terrorist groups use educational settings or train themselves to either recruit new terrorists or to convey their teachings. For example, when new terrorists are recruited to a terrorist group, the first step is to impose the ideas of the group in a way that will gain the sympathy of the other party, and the second is to have their publications read and to provide the necessary training (Kartal, 2019: 55). Aside from these, they also try to reach more people and gain more sympathizers via the means of media. It is seen that terrorist groups make use of the influence of peer groups on each other in educational environments and use the media intensely as one of the most effective means for propaganda. As a matter of fact, digitalized and individualized media has become one of the most basic tools for terrorist organizations to acquire financial power as much as human resources. For example, a woman who joined the PKK tells the story of her joining the mountain organization after being influenced by the publications of the terrorist organization: After my sophomore year at high school, I started to visit websites about the terrorist organization under the influence of my school friends. I also listened to the ROJ TV and Mesopotamia FM. I was very impressed by the guerrillas I saw around and by the news I heard. I was especially impressed by the fact that female guerrillas fought for their people. We were constantly talking about these issues with the daughter of my uncle, and finally, we decided to join the organization together (Demir, 2018: 19). Based on all these, it is understood that terrorist groups use the media as the instrument of making propaganda, information and gaining new people. No doubt, digital materials are the most indispensable elements of contemporary education methods with the advancing technology. It is an already known fact that channels such as television, the internet, and social media have important effects on people in addressing many sense organs, and the desired goal can be reached more easily in this way. For this 44

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reason, media is often used by terrorist groups as a way of influencing people and gaining militants by brainwashing them. Because the most vital resources of terrorist organizations are the human resources that are brainwashed with the organizational ideology. For this reason, terrorist organizations try to take part in the media, orientate, or affect the media to convey their messages to target audiences and make their propaganda. In actual fact, sometimes they are not satisfied with this and establish their own media channels. For example, the PKK terrorist organization can address its audience with the news agency, television, radio, and internet sites, ensuring that written and visual information and documents regarding its actions are included in other media channels, especially in discussion programs and newspaper columns (Devran, 2015: 90). Again, it is included in the security reports that the ISIS terrorist organization uses the media effectively, especially social media, and this can be noticed by every careful person. People, who are brainwashed by the organizational ideology, which is the vital source of terrorist organizations, are influenced by terrorist organizations in various ways. For this reason, terrorist groups specifically target young people due to their weakness, lack of knowledge, ideal, desire to belong/being valued, dynamic bodies, and use friendship, favoring their fellow countrymen, family/relative relations, social and cultural activities, religious values ​​and ethnicity to attract them to their ranks. Organizations draw individuals into a group dynamic, whose stage, actors, and decor are prepared in advance after dialogue is established. While doing this, organizations also exploit the physiological, psychological, and social needs of individuals, which they cannot cover, and use these as a propaganda element (Terörle Mücadele Daire Başkanlığı, 2020). With this propagandas, the aim is to transform ideas into actions and create a terror setting by influencing the target mass. According to different types of motivations, terrorism can be separated as incorrect and inappropriate interpretations of religious doctrines, the perception of unequal treatment regarding a specific ethnicity, and the desire to apply extremist political ideologies. According to previous studies, it can be argued that terrorism that is based on the falsifying interpretation of religious doctrines also involves religious motivation, justification, organization, and worldview. For this reason, this kind of terrorism is usually performed by those who have the motivation and aim to exploit religion. Such groups misinterpret the divine orders or engage in excessive deception distorting reality. Also, such groups condemn individuals or communities with their distorted versions of religious facts and events (Gunn & Demirden, 2019: 12). ISIS and similar terrorist groups that perform terrorist acts by falsifying religion videotape most of their acts and serve them to the media to make their own propaganda and terrorize people. Again, they also try to spread all the harmful and distorted ideas of theirs through social media. Right at this point, it is important to make people become aware of the propaganda activities of terrorist organizations by informing all segments of society, especially educational institutions, to inform people about social solidarity, and to make discreet decisions when they are exposed to the propaganda of terrorist organizations (Terörle Mücadele Daire Başkanlığı, 2020). In this respect, it is required to produce an antidote against this poison just as terrorism tries to spread its poisonous ideas with the media and trains its militants. It is seen that there is a requirement for an accurate and effective religious education to avoid people giving credit to terrorist organizations that take Islam as their reference. As a matter of fact, it is stated that the emergence of the Boko-Haram terrorist organization in Africa, was the corrupted and neglected religious education system in the country, the Alma Jiri System. In Nigeria, a large part of the Muslim population sends their children to these institutions because of economic difficulties. Unfortunately, some of these children, who do not receive a proper education and who cannot be protected adequately, join the armed people, kidnappers, and terrorist organizations in the country today. As a matter of fact, Abubakar Shekau, who is one of the leaders of Boko Haram, was also edu45

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cated in the Alma Jiri System. This organization, which can be considered as a result of the deteriorating religious education system in the country, is sabotaging the education in the country seriously with its attacks and kidnappings. In actual fact, according to the data of the Nigerian Ministry of Education and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), although 10.5 million children could not go to school in 2015 because of Boko Haram attacks and different reasons, this rate exceeded 13 million in 2018 (Kavak, 2019). In this section, it will be shown with examples that terrorist organizations e.g. PKK, ISIS, and Boko Haram instrumentalized the media to make their own propagandas, use the educational environments to recruit people, and cause great damage to education through their actions in the area where they operated. Also, the need for an effective religious education will be emphasized to reduce the power of terrorist groups which take the religion of Islam as a reference and to dry up their human resources.

BACKGROUND Terror and Terrorism While the term terror denotes horror and fear, terrorism adds continuity and political content to this concept. Terrorism is a broad concept that includes the concept of terror as an organized, systematic, and continuous terror strategy for political purposes. The concept of terrorism differs from the concept of terror as a strategy that adopts the use of terrorist methods in an organized, systematic, and continuous manner for a political purpose (Elazığ Emniyet Müdürlüğü, 2021). For terrorism, there is a need for a series of interrelated terrorist acts directed towards a certain political purpose. In a word sense, terrorism is a method that aims to achieve its goals by planning its political, religious, and ideological goals with its participants with extraordinary acts of violence. In other words, it systematically includes violence to realize its political demands. At this point, the aim is to gain power, to intimidate the society, and to weaken a normally functioning political and economic process in favor of its own interests and to make it perceived as non-advantageous (Then & Loosemore, 2006: 157-158). The motive underlying this aim is to get concessions from a government or the general public, to force various authorities to behave in a certain way, or at least to respect their own views.

Terror and the Media The late 20th century witnessed the globalization of the mass media (Wilkinson, 1997) and the mass media changed what we learned about what was happening in the world (Altheide, 2007). In the following years, digital media tools allowed each user to create their own content, even news. In addition, new communication technologies have created an opportunity for terrorist organizations to convey their messages more easily and freely, and they have seen the media as a powerful tool for their psychological goals as well as these technologies (Weiman, 2005). Additionally, various digital tools such as the internet become a field of activity for terrorists. Especially, with the so-called information revolution that has become more popular with the unexpected rise of the internet since the 1990s, the internet has also provided terrorists and extremists with the opportunities it offers for society, such as communicating, collaborating, and persuading. A significant amount of radical material is already available online and this volume is increasing day by day (Behr, 46

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2013: 3). Terrorists aim to achieve their own goals by creating intimidation among the public or by creating sympathy for their own political and social causes with the documents they publish by taking advantage of the possibilities of the internet, and it is not possible to achieve this without extending it to the public (Bandura, 1990). In addition, it is possible to say that today the media plays an important role in the definition of terrorism or terrorist. For example, the fact that people of Middle Eastern origin or more generally foreign nationals are associated with terrorism, especially in the western media (McQueeney, 2014: 298), and after a while, people regard people of different ethnicity as such is the most striking effect of the media presentation on people. This situation fuels Islamophobia, especially in the West. It is also possible that the news in the media may affect the way people define terror or terrorist as well as having an effect that may lead to the affirmation of terrorist acts, depending on the way the news is presented (Devran, 2015). For example, Fırat Simpil in Turkey lost his life on August 30, 2015, when a bomb planted by the PKK terrorist organization was detonated by terrorists. The headline and the news summary of one of the newspapers related to the event are presented as follows. “Explosion in Diyarbakir: 13-year-old boy dies. In Bağlar quarter of Diyarbakır’s Silvan district, an explosive previously placed on the road which is also used as the road for the construction of the Silvan Dam was detonated by PKK terrorists. Since the explosive was detonated shortly before the military vehicle passed, Fırat Simpil, 13, passing by, lost his life at the scene” (Hürriyet, 2015). The headline of the newspaper states that an explosion took place and a child died in the explosion. In the headline, the explosion was reported in passive language, but in the content of the above statement in the news summary, the perpetrators of the act were stated. As understood from the statement “Since the explosive was detonated shortly before the military vehicle passed, Fırat Simpil, 13, passing by, lost his life at the scene.”, the target was not the child, but a military vehicle, and Fırat, who lost his life, was a passer-by (Şahin, 2017: 60). In this incident, it is understood that the newspapers received information about the incident that “the target was a military vehicle and the explosive detonated early”. However, this type of content may also lead to an interpretation that the terrorists did not target civilians, but that the civilian who lost his life was killed by accident. Since what distinguishes terrorists from other violent elements is that they harm unarmed civilians (Schmid, 2011), this type of news that creates the impression that an “accidental” act took place right after the terrorists’ attacks on civilians makes the explosive itself the perpetrator. It is clear that the terrorist organization that carried the conflict to the settlements is responsible for the deaths. Additionally, this language carries the risk of legitimizing terrorist acts against officials (soldier/ police) (Şahin, 2017: 62). Another point is that the frequent media coverage of terrorist attacks is related to the post-traumatic stress seen in society (Ben–Zur, Gil, & Shamshins, 2012). Such acts are conveyed to people not only through the mainstream media but also by uploading videos to the internet. For example, when the words “beheading video” are typed into the search engine, 257,000 results are obtained. Again, information and documentation that can be used in terrorist acts can be accessed, especially through tools such as the internet. Regarding this, when you write how to make a bomb into the search engine, you get 1.830.000 results. As a result, studies reveal that there are almost no terrorist acts whose traces are not found in the digital environment. Terrorists and extremists can use the Internet for countless purposes, such as radicalizing individuals, making propaganda and information transfer, operational planning, and fundraising (Behr, 2013: 3). Almost all terrorist groups benefit from media tools such as the internet and television as a way to easily achieve these goals. For example, groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or the Abu Sayyaf group use technologies such as electronic mail, mobile phone, SMS, and radio and video tech47

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nologies to communicate with each other and disseminate their messages, in addition to creating their own websites. This allows them to “frame their actions and ideologies as they wish, bypassing government or media censorship.” This freedom obtained by terrorist groups on the internet has brought the concept of the oxygen of terrorism to the literature, as it allows them to breathe and survive. However, governments are also aware of this new field of struggle. This shift in the ‘oxygen of terrorism’ towards the online space has therefore prompted some organizations, including governments, to fight violent extremist websites and demand that major web platforms closely monitor and ‘clean up’ the internet. These groups draw on both psychological and religious sources in their messages and partially bypass traditional media. The media impact of attacks designed to create fear is also a kind of “staging” to seduce new supporters (Marthoz, 2017: 10). For example, the Islamic State group (ISIS) has specialized in communication techniques and social networks, and above all, its activities are presented as a compelling “narrative” of heroism and masculinity that is sometimes mindlessly conveyed by traditional media. Despite these new online battlegrounds, traditional media is still of vital importance. The information and analysis these media owners provide remain the basis of a large segment of public opinion in most countries. Traditional media did not always act responsibly in this great propaganda game and staged the murderous activities of terrorists. For example, the repeated broadcasting of videos showing soldiers parading in Raqqa or ecstatic foreign fighters in 4X4s means “heroizing” the group. Thus, the modern terrorist is created by the media. Secondly, this type of broadcasting takes the terrorist and his powers far beyond his real size. In this way, television brings everyone to the crime scene, arousing feelings of anxiety and fear, and becoming a tool of coercion of the terrorist. Public concern increases the perceived power of the terrorist in his own eyes and the eyes of peer groups and others. This increased power often leads to imitation and the cycle repeats itself (Marthoz, 2017: 12). Therefore, media tools such as television, which are more controllable than the internet, should be well controlled and have broadcast principles that they must follow. Media should act jointly particularly on a subject such as terrorism, which has a great impact on all humanity and countries globally, and at least the desire for getting rating on such an important issue should be in the background.

Terrorism and Education In today’s world, where terrorism comes to life through the media and becomes more and more dangerous, efforts are being made in different fields to combat terrorism every day. Because it has started to be expressed more loudly that terrorism cannot be eliminated only by military measures. At this point, in addition to military methods, education should also be engaged on this issue. The aim of education is, above all, to raise people with good mental health. There are some basic concepts and assumptions, such as enjoying life, being productive, living to the fullest, enjoying work, which also include the common characteristics of individuals with good mental health. All of these can only be possible through self-realization (Aydın, 2004: 84). For this, education and training should have a quality that prepares the individual for life more. The better an education system that advises the individual to live in peace with himself and the society educates the individuals, the easier it will be for them to adapt to the society they live in. All official and civil education and training institutions act in line with this purpose (Biçer, 2018: 135). Tolerance, which ensures that the individual is in harmony with himself first and then with those around him, is a virtue. Education, on the other hand, must be adorned with virtues to achieve its true 48

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purpose. Tolerance seems to be an important element of education. As a matter of fact, researches on this subject show that education necessarily generates tolerance. Because tolerance is inherent in education (Afdal, 2006: 130-133). Tolerance is based on respect. Respect is also to try to understand the views and behaviors of the other person in some way. Accordingly, tolerance is the opposite of disrespect and violence (Haakedal, 2007: 132). Education, in which virtues such as tolerance and being respectful to others will be brought to the person, should also follow current developments and try to follow the path that will be most effective on the students in terms of both the curriculum to be presented to the students and the materials to be used in lectures. For example, the influence of media or digital tools in education should certainly be taken into consideration, and students should be advised on critical media literacy on how to use the media and media tools, how to evaluate what they read or see, or rather how to approach the information encountered in digital environments or media. Media literacy refers to the ability to evaluate, analyze and access media content. It thus provides information that citizens can think critically about news and media (Bergan-Lee, 2018:45). Because, as long as media images are shaped by social ideas and ideologies with social consequences, critical media literacy helps students to question the content of media texts and evaluate them in a wider context. Therefore, students should be encouraged to be critical. It is because critical media literacy can help them become more informed, engage in social activities, and become more politically conscious citizens, and makes students think about the sources of what they read or watch. Regarding terrorism, it was determined that media literacy reduces students’ anxiety. However, students need to follow independent and international media sources with a more balanced and critical perspective (McQueeney, 2014: 299). However, when it comes to preventing violence, the need for education immediately emerges. However, funding is important and necessary for such education. This is because there will be a need for materials prepared according to age groups such as books, simulations, and movies on this subject. A budget should be allocated for these and cooperation with non-governmental organizations is required. In addition to creating the necessary economic infrastructure to benefit from education in the prevention of violence and terrorism, teachers from all fields should also be well prepared at pre-service or in-service levels. Teachers and teacher candidates should have training in pluralism, human rights, existing laws on security. In addition, they should understand the common values of the country they live in and be able to use them as an integrator. Collaboration between institutions is also of great importance to benefit from education in preventing terrorism. To this end, it is important to share information about the legal duties of schools and teachers regarding the prevention of terrorism, how to implement them, migration, polarization, and marginalization, especially by cooperating with the police and judicial authorities. Again, the curriculum should always be adapted to today’s realities and students. Teachers need moral support to be able to fight against violence and terrorism within their field of duty. Society may not always welcome an act if it is not accepted or supported by the state. Therefore, teachers will be able to find a basis for themselves by including the efforts of teachers to be made against violence in the curriculum, and the reaction that they may face will be prevented (“Radicalization awareness network”, 2019: 3). The truth is that education can contribute to this effort by nurturing ethical qualities among young people as well as helping them acquire the knowledge and critical thinking necessary to take effective and productive action in their personal, professional, and public spheres of life. But most of the discourses about education’s role in preventing violence do not take into consideration the difficulty of preparing young people for this responsibility. Because, young people’s involvement in violence is largely ensured 49

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through indoctrination. For this reason, education should raise young people who are resistant to indoctrinations made by anyone. Therefore, education should be designed in such a way that students develop a mindset of doubting and questioning, critical understanding, critical thinking, and questioning. Thus, they can better protect themselves from all kinds of indoctrinations as well as improve their capacity to protect themselves (Mohanan, 2021). Nobel-winning Elie Wiesel is right when he says that the way to eradicate terrorism is through education. One of the highest return investments as a countermeasure against violent extremism is quality education. But, it is not enough to just provide education on this subject. Attention should also be paid to the curricula and the values they promote. Education, whether religious or secular, should promote critical thinking, human rights, tolerance, and respect for diversity of cultures, genders, religions, and lifestyles, and connect people to opportunities for socio-economic growth. It should take into account various country and cultural characteristics and nuances. In this sense, it is necessary to place these values at the heart of education to build sustainable and resilient societies (Dieye, 2018).

Terrorism, Religion and Religious Education Religion, an important factor in every social structure, has been the center of people’s lifestyle and the subject of many studies at all times and on all grounds. In addition to being a social being and human, individuals can describe themselves as religious or members of a religion. While religion exhibits an attitude against terrorism and violence as a whole, the involvement of some people in terrorist acts without experiencing this dilemma can reach a level that threatens the security of other members of society. Again, the fact that some members of religion remain silent by not reacting to the terrorist acts taking place around them brings us face to face with the fact that religion is not explained to society and individuals correctly and effectively, among other things. Although it is not possible to totally eliminate the phenomenon of crime and terrorism in society, one of the most important ways to combat crime and criminals and to reduce it is to provide individuals with the necessary religious education, make the society as a whole to adopt the teachings of the religion that orders respect for people, justice and complying with rules against terrorism with its true nature. On the other hand, religious education and training, which is carried out in line with de facto acceptance, is also considered dangerous for terrorist organizations. In this context, it should be noted that the overwhelming majority of the members of the Hezbollah organization, which has a religious theme, consists of people who lack religious education and training (Yurtseven, 2006). It is important to highlight the humane and unifying power of religion against terrorism. However, to achieve this, it is necessary to learn the religion from the right sources. A conscious, principled understanding of religion, whose nature is known in its full sense, whose reasons and reasons are known and believed, and whose requirements are fulfilled, is required at the level of investigation, not imitation. This can be achieved not only by learning religious education from the family in the traditional sense, but also by the state’s provision of conscious religious education to the individual from a young age within the framework of healthy and correct principles (Karacelil, 2013: 38). Religious education is the one of the key element in preventing young people from engaging in deviant behaviors, separatist and criminal acts (Karacelil, 2013: 31). For example, according to the British Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism, violent radicalization in mosques or other religious institutions accounts for no more than 1% or 2% of total cases (Behr, 2013: 5). However, when the right religious education is not received, individuals are trapped in flawed 50

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ethical belief systems that glorify violence and may resort to violence. For example, suicide bombers of fundamentalist organizations often believe that they are following God’s orders or that they will go to heaven because of their virtuous behavior. In this sense, there is a need for a religious education that can enable students to question and critically interpret what they have learned. Because the religion of Islam encourages people to research, think and use their minds to reach the truth in countless verses of the Qur’an. For this reason, students should be supported by education on critical thinking and questioning about the problems they face. Otherwise, the acceptance of claims without thinking on the basis of blind faith then becomes a pathological habit of mind that makes it suitable for religious and ideological indoctrination. Therefore, it is necessary to educate students with relevant evidence and arguments for such conclusions presented in science and other textbooks (Mohanan, 2021). Again, education should be used effectively to reduce the risk of extremism and radicalization leading to violent extremism and terrorism. A recent UNDP study on courses, which are the centers of extremism in Africa, reveals that quality religious education prevents participation in terrorist organizations. According to this, the likelihood that individuals receiving religious education for six years or more join a group can decrease to as low as 32 percent (Dieye, 2018). This effect of religious education gave rise to the result that it had a place among the pioneering dimensions of education. With religious education and training, the religious perception of the individual and society is formed. The connection and proportion of religious education with one’s becoming religious is in the context of the relationship between education and personality. While religion has existed for the happiness of humanity in general, some members of the religion are committing acts of terrorism in the name of religion, using religious evidence and justifications. Accordingly, religion-themed terror has always existed in the historical process. The understanding of this fraction that carries out terrorist acts is not fundamentally related to their de facto perception of religiosity. As a matter of fact, the groups that carried out such acts in Islam were considered apocryphal and heresy sects (Biçer, 2018: 137). Those who carry out terrorist acts are accused of being extremists by the majority of the leaders and authorities of the religion that they claim to be a member of. Those people in question claim that they are “fighting in the name of religion”. While their target is ‘religion’ and ‘religious’, there is a dilemma as to whether they are ‘religious’. As a matter of fact, as in the case of Hezbollah, militants defined their “religiousness” as weak. It was observed that 46% of the members of the armed wing of the Hezbollah organization had never seen themselves as religious before joining the organization, however, only 5% of them described themselves as very religious. Again, 95% of them admitted that they did not live with a religious consciousness (Özeren &Sözer &Demirci 2010: 161-162). The data here show that joining this organization is not due to a factor arising from religious concerns. Similar assessments are also being made for al-Qaeda members. As a matter of fact, alcohol bottles and porn tapes were found when the cells of al-Qaeda members that carried out terrorist acts in many countries, including Turkey, were busted. In the background of such a relationship, which can be described as inversely proportional in terms of cause and effect, lies whether the individual has the opportunity to acquire sufficient/correct religious knowledge. Accordingly, it is, of course, not possible to claim that those who cannot achieve this acquisition but are involved in the formation of an organization formed by people who create a religious theme in line with their own perceptions have adequate religious education and training (USAID 2003). As a matter of fact, it is seen that the majority of students studying in schools (madrasah) providing religious education and training in the Islamic world do not lend credence to terrorism and hate violence and terrorism. However, schools such as the Taliban madrasahs remain as a minority in the marginal area in the Islamic world (USAID 2003). On the other hand, the education systems of the over51

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whelming majority of the countries whose population is largely Muslim are secular. As in the case of Turkey, most of the people who joined terrorist organizations were educated in official-secular schools and could not receive sufficient religious education in these schools. Because most of the members of this organization are illiterate/literate or those who have not gone further than the primary education level. Accordingly, they did not receive religious education. For this reason, when the level of religiosity and the findings of living with religious consciousness are evaluated together, it is predicted that if the formal mechanisms for the religious field are strengthened, the probability of individuals falling into the organization’s network may decrease (Köksal, 2002). However, achieving this is possible through the effective and widespread activities of formal mechanisms. In other words, it has been considered important for the state to activate similar mechanisms used by organizations in the recruitment process, to focus on practices related to school, family, social life, and the individual’s micro-level social environment (Özeren & Sözer & Demirci 2010: 167).

Effects of Terrorism and Media on Education It is known that many factors such as economics, politics, developments in science and technology affect education. However, the effect of factors such as media and terrorism is more prominent among them. In particular, due to the intimidation strategies adopted by terrorists, the mere possibility of attacks can reduce school enrollment even without destroying infrastructure or killing civilians. Many studies show that various forms of violence can suppress school enrollment and even achievement in many different settings, including Brazil, West, and East Africa, India (Alfano & Görlach, 2020). Besides any direct effect of terrorism on education, news in the media can spread the negative impact of terrorist attacks on education by fueling fears and emotions. A report prepared by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) invites the media not to be the megaphone of terrorism. The media’s conscious or unconscious role as a megaphone of terrorism affects education negatively. For example, in a country such as Kenya, where access to mass media is problematic, it is striking that in areas exposed to terrorism, where access to media news is more possible, school enrollment decreases by 5% compared to places where media news is not accessible. This is an important difference when it comes to education, and the way the media presents terrorist incidents, as well as the terrorist incident itself, can disrupt education. Besides, this result shows that the media has the same effect as a real attack. Unsurprisingly, these effects only apply to households that own the mass media tools and can follow the broadcast/printed materials. For the households who cannot reach the broadcast/ printed materials of the media, there is no relationship between the news about terrorism in the media and school enrollment rates. These findings also highlight the impact of media prominence as a factor that amplifies the already large negative impact of terrorism on education (Alfano & Görlach, 2020). All United Nations Development Programs work on violent extremism, which demonstrates that education has always been a controversial field for radical movements that seek to instill their ideologies, views, and values into society. Therefore, violent extremist groups try to prevent access to education by attacking schools and universities, and women and girls are often deliberately targeted (Dieye, 2018). Unfortunately, they also succeed in this. For example, because of the fact that Boko Haram, which came to the forefront of the world by raiding schools in Nigeria and kidnapping girls, frequently used this method, and families and authorities were stuck between sending children to school on the one hand, and the risk of abduction of children on the other hand. A total of 618 schools in 6 states in the north of the country were closed for fear of kidnapping of students (Sönmez& Arslan, 2021). 52

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Another aspect of terrorism that affects education is the emergence of different problems as education and educational environments come to the fore in preventing violence. There is a concern that efforts made in schools to prevent terrorism, especially in multicultural or ethnically diverse societies, may lead to feelings of discomfort, insecurity, and exclusion for both students and educators. For example, in a school where there are many Muslim students when groups that show Islam as a reference and carry out terrorist acts by distorting Islamic teachings are criticized or information is given against them, the Muslim majority who do not approve of these attacks to a large extent should not be offended, branded as terrorists by others, or disturbed. Otherwise, it may bring terrorist groups closer to their targets and has the risk of increasing polarization and conflicts. Therefore, it seems that a more appropriate approach to preventing radicalization and violent extremism in education can be achieved by facilitating learning environments and promoting social and democratic competencies necessary for “an individual to be successful in life and to contribute actively to a democratic society” (Sjøen, 2019: 160). Although there are different scholarly opinions on whether schools are the right environment to prevent terrorism in the first place, professional narratives are in line with the fact that “good education” should be “anti-extremist” in the broadest and most literal sense. It is about how anti-radicalization education efforts can be grounded in learning environments that have great value beyond preventing radicalization and violent extremism. Based on this belief, educational activities aimed at preventing students from engaging in violent extremism or terrorism should be based on a genuinely good education. Therefore, the narratives expressed by these practitioners align well with the current state of research on anti-radicalization efforts that emphasize the importance of progressive, liberal, and inclusive education. However, against radicalization, it seems that educational prevention efforts are based on many assumptions, and there is little awareness in schools of the limitations of these efforts. While this does not exclude education systems in the task of preventing the radicalization of young lives, it highlights the need to provide educators with adequate training and resources so that these efforts do not compromise the ideals and goals of education. It should not be forgotten that politicizing education in an environment is ethically worrisome (Sjøen, 2019: 176).

FINDINGS AND COMMENTS ISIS as an Example of a Religion-Themed Terrorist Organization ISIS is not a newly emerged terrorist organization, but an organization that we can trace its roots back to the Soviet-Afghan struggle in the 1980s and it was first established by Zarqawi in 1999 around the Iranian border as the Tawhid and Jihad Organization. It settled in northern Iraq in 2001 and became an international terrorist organization fighting against US forces. The organization merged with Al-Qaeda in 2004 and became known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq. With the death of the organization’s founder, Zarqawi, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir was brought to the leadership position, but when the Islamic State of Iraq was declared in October 2006, the leadership passed to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. ISIS, which has started to lose its power since 2007 as a result of the struggle of the Sahwa Councils established by the USA together with the Sunni tribes, put Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi into power in 2010, making the organization active again. The organization took control of Iraq and Syria on a large scale after 2011 and declared the Islamic State in both countries in 2014. Thus, the organization has become an element that threatens the world from its position as a regional power. 53

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ISIS is a terrorist organization that has adopted the Salafist thought, which is based on the lifestyle of the first representatives of Islam, as its main reference point. The ideas developed by people such as Muhammad bin Abdulwahhab and Ibn Taymiyya in the Salafist thought of the Organization were considered the limits of Islam. There is an absolute place for a return to the old, that is, to the pure state, in the organizational unity of thought of ISIS. Everything accepted by thought and reason has been rejected because logic and reason were later included in Islam, and especially transferred science has gained importance. Besides, this organization, which describes those who deviate from their own understanding of Islam, those who do not abide them as an infidel or a hypocrite, considers death legitimate as punishment. In fact, it sees Muslim states that do not live in line with their own beliefs as more infidel than western states and shows them as the first target under the name of jihad. ISIS members seek to reshape the world around them by using violence. The final objective of the organization, when its calls are examined, is to abolish the borders of the country and revive the Islamic caliphate and to proclaim the Islamic Sharia in the Middle East regions and later in the whole world (Abubaker, 2020: 110). Those who define themselves as Salaf describe Salafism as “to accept the religion of Islam in its pure form as in the period of the Companions, to stay away from innovations and distortions, the remains of ancient civilizations and the views of the sects that emerged later”. Thus, while Salafism promises a change and transformation, it expresses the necessity of returning to the “purity” and essence of Islam in the early days. It also argues that force can be used if necessary while returning to the essence. Due to this feature of Salafism, it is evaluated that it is an interpretation prone to exclusion and radicalization. For example, according to Abdul Wahhab, one of the intellectual representatives of Salafism, those who do not accept Wahhabi criteria are polytheists; their life and property are halal. It is permissible to use force to keep people away from innovations. Showing hostility towards the unbelievers is the most distinctive point of the Wahhabis. In particular, the concept of “Al-Wala (Loving believers, making friends with them and helping them) and Wa’l-Bara (hating the unbelievers, staying away from them)” in the Qur’an has been the key to both the message and the jihad for the Wahhabis. For this reason, the main point behind Wahhabis’ warring with many Muslim masses such as Ottomans, Shiites, and Hejaz people throughout history is this principle, which Wahhabism accepts as “jihad against polytheists” (Abubaker, 2020: 101). If we explain the doctrine of Al-Wala Wal-Bara, which is widely used in the Qur’an and hadiths, especially with the interpretation of ISIS and Wahhabism, it states: Become friends and be in solidarity with true Muslims who follow the path of Allah to the end. But whoever is outside of them, exclude them, cut your ties with them, keep them away from yourself, and declare them disbelievers calling them takfir and declare jihad against them’. ISIS makes good use of this doctrine; saying ‘My way is the only true way’, and excludes all religious interpretations other than its own. ISIS uses the takfir mechanism mostly for Shiites and Alawites. Besides; Shiites, Nusayris, Alawites, Druzes, and Yezidis are accused of apostasy by ISIS; and ISIS especially turns their hatred towards them into action disparaging them more than monotheistic religions such as Christianity and Judaism, which are considered infidels. The legacy left to today’s religion-themed terrorist groups from Wahhabi thought, which transforms Salafism into action by isolating it from the purity of belief, is killing women, children, and the elderly without discrimination, looting for religion, jihad mobilization with the idea of booty, killing of those who break the rules as apostates (either apostates or converts), arbitrary penalties, invasion of cities by spreading fear, destroying buildings that are considered centers of innovation, declaring those who are not one of them apostates, that is, infidels, and clearly anti-Shia (Abubaker, 2020: 105).

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ISIS as an Example of a Terrorist Organization Using the Media There is a meaningful link between the media and terrorism, especially when the interests of terrorist groups are considered. But when examining the effect of the media on terrorism, it is necessary to open a separate topic for the internet. Because it can be clearly seen that the internet affects global terrorism in various ways. The Internet, which has become an organizational tool for terrorists, provides a basis for planning, command, control, and communication between widespread groups through a small hierarchy or infrastructure. It is a tool for intelligence gathering through which terrorist groups can access a wide range of material on potential targets, from simple maps to aerial photographs. One of its most valuable uses is to make propaganda to convey the messages, images, and ideas that motivate terrorist groups. Terrorist groups can use websites, e-mails, and chat rooms for fundraising by soliciting donations from supporters and through cybercrime (mainly fraud or theft of financial data such as credit card numbers) (Lewis, 2005: 112). Although there are various reasons for the use of the internet and media for terrorist organizations, all terrorist organizations prefer both written and visual media and virtual environments primarily to make their propaganda and to recruit staff. When the contents of the messages published by the PKK, which is one of these organizations, were examined, it is seen briefly that organization leader Abdullah Öcalan, with his separatist and nationalist discourses emphasizing ethnic differences, emphasized the heroization of those who died during armed conflicts and other actions, and the created myths the disgrace to women in the areas where Kurds lived to be used as propaganda. Based on this point of view, it can be argued that it consists of denying the organization’s statements that it values ​​women and encourage them to become guerrillas, statements on their actions, and sometimes denial about the actions they will find themselves in a difficult situation in the world public opinion, and slander the Turkish army (Işık, 2009). When the publications of the PKK are evaluated in general terms, it can be said that it has an effective discourse that supports non-governmental organizations talking about peace, brotherhood, “stopping the bloodshed”, and respect labor and workers. It can also be argued that this discourse, which also emphasizes ethnic differences and gives extreme importance to the leader, has ultra-nationalistic and even fascist characteristics (Işık, 2009). The PKK expresses fundamental rights and freedoms constantly, to which no one can object, such as a humane life, respect for human rights, equality, and freedom of thought. However, in a way that contradicts itself, it also kills innocent people brutally, tries to prevent investments in the eastern part of the Republic of Turkey, and prevents children from going to schools. As a matter of fact, it even kills the teachers working in that region from time to time. On the other hand, ISIS, which uses the media for its interests, holds various elements of power that allow it to continue its existence, and it is distinctly different from other organizations with these resources. The reason for this distinction lies in the fact that the organization in question has reached larger dimensions in terms of the quality and quantity of its existing resources compared to its peers. In other words, the organization can survive with its various power sources and can provide financial and human support to itself while spreading its ideology. At this stage, it is possible to express the power resources of the organization as “human power, economic power, weapon power, propaganda, and communication power”. Communication and propaganda, which are expressed among the power elements of the organization, occupy a separate position among the power sources, and provide the nourishment of other power sources with the opportunities provided by the technical facilities. Thanks to communication, which is at a key point for the organization, a wide support base is created in terms of both financial and 55

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human resources. Social media and the internet are thought to play a major role in increasing the number of members of ISIS, which is actively using technological applications and the internet, especially in terms of the joining of foreign fighters (Türkoğlu, 2017: 167). Because members can be followed “on the field” through ISIS’s Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and ask.fm accounts, media members get their questions answered, and those who want to join the group are informed. For example, in the dialogues below on the ask.fm site, while promoting the organization, the questions asked of them are answered and guidance is given to those who want to join the organization: Why is ID (Islamic state) killing innocent Christians? ◦◦ It doesn’t kill. Is there a reason why the British are more numerous in the ISIS forces? ◦◦ They are not numerous, they just sound louder. Brother, if I travel, will there be other sisters in Turkey that I can meet and cross the border with, or are there not many? ◦◦ Check out my profile and message my account at KIK (a video sharing site popular with ISIS members). It may take up to a week for me to respond as I am at work. When non-mahram sisters migrate to the Islamic state, who decides who they marry? Do I have a say in this matter? ◦◦ Of course you have a say. There is no forced marriage in Islam. One of the conditions of marriage is consent. Therefore, marriage without consent is invalid. If a person is afraid to fight but can cook for the mujahideen, can she still come there? ◦◦ Yes (Ask.fm). As you can see ISIS, which has “learned the lessons of the social media age well” (Hacızade, 2014) compared to other terrorist organizations, established the “El-Hayat Media Center” in May 2014 and published many videos and digital magazines to organize all propaganda activities to be carried out on the internet. The organization, which called for jihad by calling out its sympathizers in the West in its first video released in June 2014, later elaborated its objectives and established the “Dabiq” magazine to provide a regular flow of information on the agenda. The organization used talented and native English speakers trained in the field of advertising in this magazine (Luizard, 2016: 107). In the next process, magazines that shared similar content with different names were also published, and information and explanations about the targeted country were included. It isfc noteworthy that the organization also uses smartphone applications in addition to social media and digital publications. The organization, which provides the flow of information about personal information and coordinates group activities through these applications, can broadcast continuously in different languages over virtual accounts and can mobilize organizational members (Lister, 2014: 25). As can be seen, the organization makes effective use of the opportunities provided by new communication technologies and tries to reach its potential militants in this way. As a matter of fact, the best example to be given to the practices carried out for this purpose is the speech by the spokesman of ISIS, Abu Muhammad Al Adnani which was translated into seven different languages, including English, Turkish, German, French, Dutch, Indonesian and Russian, and broadcast through the mentioned channels. The translation of the speech into seven different languages and its publication on social media points to the organization’s use of technology and its global goals (Türkoğlu, 2017: 167). To achieve these global goals, the organization also uses social media very actively. 56

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Especially YouTube, one of the social media platforms, is preferred by ISIS because it is an area that can broadcast videos in the desired length. The videos, which are mostly composed of execution, torture, punishment, new order, and threatening propaganda discourses and shot in HD quality, are edited by ElHayat Media and uploaded to video channels. At this point, it is seen that the organization benefits from the effect of the sense of sight, which is a more effective element in learning and influencing people than reading. They are also aware that if written materials are supported with a photo or video or only video is used, the public becomes more selective in perception. Terrorist organizations that use this also choose the internet as a psychological warfare tool. The images or videos of torture, executions, or attacks used spread cyber fear for the threatened person or countries and cause people to worry with the thought that ‘it could happen to us too’. While scenes of violence such as the killing of captured soldiers, cutting off of hands, heads, and necks are broadcast in the images, the social life of the people in the cities captured by ISIS is also reflected in the images. In its videos, the organization includes both intimidation and the Islamic State that it claims to have established in the region and peaceful life elements. Happy children, young people with a gun who are convinced that it is necessary to kill those who oppose Islam, and families who live a quiet life with the rules laid out by ISIS for social life are often shown in these videos (Weimann, 2004:5). The messages and purpose of the organization in 2014 were as follows: As seen in the table with the messages it gave thanks to the new media tools, ISIS created new cells across the border, increased the international danger, infiltrated the countries from within, and ensured the flow of fighters from the continents to the Middle East (Erdin, 2017:128). The organization instantly reaches its followers in both European and Middle Eastern countries by using these new media tools, especially Twitter (Berger & Morgan, 2015:3).

Table 1. Video analyses of ISIS (Keskinkaya, 2015:87) Producing Media Corporation

Video Name

Video Duration

Purpose of the Video

Published on

Al-Hayat Media Center

America and its Allies

2’ 32”

Staff Supply

02.06.2014

Al-Hayat Media Center

No Life Without Jihad

13’22”

A Call for Jihad and Praise for Martyrdom

19.06.2014

Al-Hayat Media Center

The End of Sykes Picot

15’03”

Threat, Call for Jihad

29.06.2014

Al-Furqan Media

Message to America

04’43”

Threatening

19.08.2014

Al-Hayat Media Center

Let’s Go to Jihad

05’26”

A Call for Jihad

02.10.2014

Al-Furqan Media

America and its Allies

01’ 31”

Threatening

03.10.2014

Al-Furqan Media

Listen to Me Part 3

05’33”

Gaining Legitimacy and Reacting to Governments in the Western Public Opinion

12.10.2014

Al-Furqan Media

Listen to Me Part 4

07’48”

Providing Accurate Information

16.10.2014

Al-Furqan Media

Listen to Me Chapter 5

06’30”

Generating Revenue and Responding to Governments in the Western Public Opinion

25.10.2014

Al-I’tisaam Foundationfor Media

Inside Ayn’el Islam

06’30”

Providing Accurate Information

27.10.2014

Al-Hayat Media Center

Our state is victorious

5’09”

A Call for Jihad

09.12.2014

Al-Hayat Media Center

Canadian Abu Muslim

11’23”

Jihad and a Call for Support

13.12.2014

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ISIS, which perpetuates its manhunt by infiltrating popular internet, mobile phone applications, and social media accounts, also actively uses Facebook accounts. Publishing the photos taken with the fighters or supporters in the regions under the control of the organization on Facebook, embellishing them with propaganda sentences, and sharing sentences from the verses of the Qur’an are presented to the world through social media. But, compared to Twitter, YouTube, and other social media channels, Facebook is used less frequently. While using existing social media tools, ISIS has also set up its Facebook site. But the website 5elafabook.com was terminated immediately after it was noticed that it was online. It is possible to show that social media is a wide area in terms of information and human hunting for intelligence agencies, intelligence gathering institutions, groups or illegal organizations, by causing terrorist organizations such as ISIS to use social media intensively. In this way, information about individuals, institutions, and countries can be easily accessed. In particular, Facebook, due to its structure, is a social media that deciphers even the schools and relationship status of people in line with the person’s permission. Groups that want to recruit people for terrorist organizations can easily capture the personal information (name, surname, photos, place of work, schools they graduated, interests, people they support, movies they watch, books they read, their religious and political opinions), friend list, city of residence, whereabouts, current mood, thoughts on country politics or developments of the people they add as a friend (ORSAM, 2016: 11-12).

CONCLUSION The purpose of the present study was to uncover the instrumentalization of the media for its own purposes and the effects of the media on the spread of terrorism by stating the definitions of terror and terrorism. In this respect, the role of the internet and media on radicalization and terrorist activities and their potentials to spread terrorism has become the most important source of concern for the politicians governing countries. This awareness made governments and politicians more conscious, and for example, the strategy of developing expert units to resist terrorist threats from online resources and materials has come to the forefront in the UK (Behr, 2013: 4). In our present day, most terrorist attacks are designed in digital environments, and target not only actual victims but also millions of shocked and shaken viewers all around the world. Such incidents can create a strong temptation to put pressure on the media to attract the audience, focus on violence and sensation, and even be the first to report breaking news and rumors when faced with ongoing waves of technological and financial transformation. However, the media must also confirm the accuracy of news and then publish it. Because journalism has a certain obligation to provide verifiable information for the public interest, viewers have the right to access accurate and balanced information, especially when it may affect their own safety or freedom (Marthoz, 2017). For this reason, the media should pay attention that the words used in news, the examples given, and the images shown are informative and not sensational when they report on terrorism. In this sense, when an act of violence that is committed by a Muslim is given, the news is given in connection with the religion of Islam, and the Muslim identity of the attacker is brought to the forefront. However, it does not seem fair that in frequent cases such as the murder of dozens of innocent children by a person that has a Christian identity by raiding a school, the attacker’s psychological status is brought to the forefront without any emphasis on the religious identity of the attacker. This non-balanced and unfair situation in the news of the media is also found in the frequency of such news. For example, some studies reported 58

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that an attack by Muslims in the media received significantly more news coverage than any other terrorist attack when other factors are controlled even if 96% of terror victims were from Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia in 2016. These representations can fuel stereotypes and divisions, reactions, and counterviolence. As a matter of fact, it was shown that hate attacks against larger groups that were perceived to be associated with a violent attack increased dramatically in many cases. The media can emphasize real dialogue and discussion as an alternative to violence and bloodshed. We may not always be able to prevent terrorism; however, the thing we control is our reactions. We must not allow terrorism to make us live in fear, feed our own prejudices and hatreds, or silence legitimate voices (Marthoz, 2017). In this sense, the media must positively perform its duty. The present study also focused on the effects of terrorism on education and religious education as a factor in reducing terrorism. In this context, one of the most basic ways to prevent terrorist activities when maintaining control over the media is education. Especially in reducing religious-based terrorist acts, the learning of people their religion accurately from the right sources will at least reduce participation in terrorist groups that refer to Islam. Because the religion of Islam, which is the religion of tolerance and peace, and people who believe in this religion truly cannot accept violence in the name of Islam. The religion of Islam, which is against violence and terrorism in terms of its main theme, evaluated this as the most dangerous element for both Muslims and other people warning both Muslims and others in this respect. As a matter of fact, the Qur’an has insistently emphasized in its many verses that the biggest danger people in general and Muslims, in particular, must avoid is instigation, which means outrage, rage, restriction of freedoms, torture, and suppression, is a form of action strictly prohibited in the Qur’an for Muslims to be used in themselves and against beings aside from themselves. However, unfortunately, some groups and supporters distort Islamic teachings and bring concepts such as jihad to the forefront, although at a small rate, when Muslims are considered in general. In this respect, the main problem of these groups is that they are far from accurate religious knowledge. For this reason, it is possible in our present day to argue that jihad, which can be defined as fighting against the self and external enemies and expending all strength for this purpose in the broadest sense, learning the religious orders of a Muslim and living according to these and teaching them to others, trying to encourage the good and forbid the evil to communicate Islam (Yılmaz, 2013: 288), has become a rhetoric that serves to legitimize the terrorism applied by some Muslims. In this way, the religious reference, which plays the primary role in convincing masses about terrorism, appears as jihad as a method. However, it must be emphasized that the fact that jihad has become a rhetoric about terrorism by Muslims themselves, namely, the presentation of terrorism as jihad with religious reference is the outcome of some kind of belief rather than a conscious fiction. Since this method, which is approved by some Muslims, is criticized by other Muslims severely, the root of the problem must be completely related to the way of interpreting Islam. The underlying reason for this differentiation in these interpretations is a direct outcome of the rationalist and literalist (narrative) movements in Islamic thought. In the Islamic thought system, although rationalism deals with the object of knowledge according to a mental thinking system, and rejects the opposite of it, Literalism shows an attitude that is based on the commitment to the text and its written narration. In this context, the literalist approach is based on the visible and read form of the revelations especially in understanding and applying the Qur’an itself, ignoring historical, social, and traditional contexts focusing on a methodology disabling the mind (Arpacı, 2018: 273). For this reason, religion is as much as what is heard and read for a Muslim who interprets Islam in a literal sense, and most of the terrorist organizations, which define themselves as “jihadist” in our present 59

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day are positioning themselves in the Salafiyyah, which is in the literalist current. The intellectual depth of these groups, which are divided into branches such as DEAS, al-Shabab, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda which are known as Jihadi Salafism in our present day is based on Wahhabism (the previous Kharijite thoughts system). In this respect, the idea that education has the most important share in the prevention of terrorist incidents gains serious momentum (Biçer, 2018: 144). For example, reading and interpreting the jihad verses from different sources will bring a better understanding of this issue, and it will become possible to avoid the use of these as the source of terrorism. In conclusion, the psychological setting and structures along with the social environment-culture relation must be considered, as well as the factors shaping the personality of the members of terrorist organizations enabling them to grow. It is not thinkable for people that have healthy souls and bodies to harm themselves and others intentionally. Here, the most important deterrent is the “Supreme” value that the individual will accept and connect with conscience and moral acquisition. In addition to secular and religious education, it is realized by improving the family-oriented social environment culture.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-forprofit sectors.

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Keskinkaya, E. (2015). Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti’nin Yeni Medya Kullanımı. Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Lewis, A. (2005). The Internet and Terrorism. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law. Cambridge University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25659982?seq= 1#page_scan_tab_contents Lister, C. (2014). Profiling the Islamic state. Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, 13, 1–52. Luizard, J. P. (2016). IŞİD tuzağı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Marthoz, J. P. (2017). Terrorism and the media: a handbook for journalists (M. Lourenço, Ed.). Aija Lehtonen. McQueeney, K. (2014). Disrupting islamophobia: Teaching the social construction of terrorism in the mass media. International Journal on Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 26(2), 297–309. Mohanan, K. P. (2021). Preventing violent extremism through education. https://mgiep.unesco.org/article/ preventing-violent-extremism-through-education ORSAM. (2016). Türkçe konuşan DEAŞ destekçileri üzerine Twitter sosyal ağ analizi. Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi. Özeren, S., Sözer, M. A., & Demirci, S. (2010). Terör örgütlerinde militan kimlik profili: Hizbullah örneği. In M. Sever, H. Cinoğlu, & O. Başıbüyük (Eds.), Terörün sosyal psikolojisi. Polis Akademisi Yayınları. Şahin, R. (2017). Yazılı basında terör kurbanı çocuklar. Uluslararası Türk Eğitim Bilimleri Dergisi, 5(9), 57–64. Schmid, A. P. (Ed.). (2011). The Routledge handbook of terrorism research. Taylor & Francis. doi:10.4324/9780203828731 Şimşek, M. (2016). Terörizm: Kavramsal bir çerçeve. Akademik Bakış Dergisi, 54, 319–335. Sjøen, M. (2019). When counterterrorism enters the curriculum. Journal of Deradicalization, 20, 156–190. Sönmez, G., & Arslan, M. E. (2021). Nijerya’da Artan Boko Haram Hareketliliği ve Olası Sonuçları. https://orsam.org.tr/tr/nijeryada-artan-boko-haram-hareketliligi-ve-olasi-sonuclari/ Terörle Mücadele Daire Başkanlığı. (2020). Bilgilendirme ve Önleme Faaliyetleri. https://www.egm. gov.tr/tem/bof Then, S. K. & Loosemore, M. (2006). Terrorism prevention, preparedness, and response in built facilities. Facilities, 24(5/6). Türk Dil Kurumu. (1982). Terör. In Türkçe Sözlük. Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları. Türkoğlu, E. (2017). Küresel bir terör örgütü olarak İŞİD’in dijital dergi kullanımı: Konstantiniyye üzerine bir inceleme. Erciyes İletişim Dergisi “akademia”, 5(1), 162-180. USAID. (2003). Strengthening education in the Muslim World. USIAD.

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Weimann, G. (2004). How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet. United States Institute of Peace. https:// www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr11 6.pdf Weimann, G. (2005). The theater of terror: The psychology of terrorism and the mass media. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 9(3-4), 379–390. doi:10.1300/J146v09n03_08 Wilkinson, P. (1997). The media and terrorism: A reassessment. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(2), 51–64. doi:10.1080/09546559708427402 Yılmaz, Y. (2013). Cihad kavramı ve Hz. Peygamberin (Sav) Mekke ile Medine’deki uygulamaları. İslam Hukuku Araştırmaları Dergisi, 22, 285-387. Yurtseven, Ö. A. (2006). Türkiye’de faaliyet gösteren dini bir terör örgütü olarak Hizbullah. In Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Kocaeli: GYTE.

ADDITIONAL READING Dabner, N. (2012). “Breaking Ground” in the Use of Social Media: A Case Study of a University Earthquake Response to Inform Educational Design with Facebook. Internet and Higher Education., 15(1), 69–78. doi:10.1016/j.iheduc.2011.06.001 Tosun, C. (2001). Din Eğitimi Bilimine Giriş. Pegem Yayınları.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Education: Education is the process of making behavioral changes in people in the desired direction. Media: The concept of media is derived from the plural of the word medium, which means medium or vehicle, concept, information, education, etc. that takes place through the transfer of all kinds of information to individuals or communities. It is defined as the whole of visual and audio tools that have basic responsibilities. Religious Education: Religious education is also defined as the process of deliberately developing behavior in the desired direction through one’s own experiences in religious behaviors. Social Media: Social media are internet and mobile-based tools and devices that allow the production, co-construction and dissemination of words, images (still and moving) and sounds, integrating technology, telecommunications and social interaction. Terror: Considering that the definition of terrorism varies from state to state, it should be stated that each state has its own definition. Therefore, each state has a definition based on the security and interests of its own country. However, as the common point of these definitions, it is possible to define terrorism as intimidation and intimidation, and all kinds of illegal activities aimed at disrupting the social order. Terrorism: Terrorism is a broad concept that includes the concept of terror as an organized, systematic, and continuous terror strategy for political purposes.

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Chapter 5

Critical Discourse Analysis of The Özgür Gündem Newspaper During Turkey’s Resolution Process: From the Year 2013 to 2015 Turgül Tomgüsehan Near East University, Cyprus Devrim Şahin Eastern Mediterranean University, Cyprus

ABSTRACT The ensuing news commentaries imbued with these various influences that shape the message have to be decoded by the reader in order that he or she can fully comprehend the content. So an accurate accounting of the social issues of governance requires journalists to exercise careful consideration in their use of language and terminology and to show that they fully grasp the background and history of the subject matter being analysed for presentation to readers. Discourse analyses draw on the critical discourse analysis originally devised by ‘Teun A. Van Dijk’, a key approach when seeking to discern or uncover the tenets and influences underlying and shaping much of contemporary journalism. This study examines the institutionalised editorial approach of the Özgür Gündem (Independent Agenda) newspaper in its coverage of Turkey’s peace negotiations with the PKK, taking due note of the newspaper’s ideological bias towards the PKK.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch005

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 Critical Discourse Analysis of The Özgür Gündem Newspaper During Turkey’s Resolution Process

INTRODUCTION Printed news discourses and newspapers differentiate from other types of mass media. They have the social value in that they reach and can ideologically influence a wide audience. Even though today printed news is disseminated on a much smaller scale of mass, it still carries significant weight among the more qualified populace, most notably those considered to be public opinion leaders. Saygılı (2006, p. 14) defines mass communication as the unilateral way of conveying information, thoughts and attitudes to communities through control of the mass media. Still an influential medium within intellectual circles, newspapers retain a critical position among the mass media. Inevitably, the ideological operating principles of a newspaper play a significant role in the way it presents and interprets the news it purports to cover. However, what is implied here has less to do with how truth is projected (or distorted) as in the way a newspaper presents the news, and is more about how a given news item can be subject to reconstruction according to the ideological bent of the newspaper’s infrastructure. The restructuring or reconstruction process of reality based on ideological views cannot be considered an isolated or separate process from existing sociality. Media, in which journalism has an integral role, cannot be separated from social reality. Instead, it plays an essential role in its construction. Yet, the information is harmonised to blend and align with the ideological framework and overall values of different media (İşkar, 2014, p. 1). Media eliminate accessed information and acquired data while combining selectively chosen pieces. As Irvan (2014, p. 11) maintains, besides employing conventional approaches, media also recreate, alter and restructure. And, the new content created by media plays a vital role in shaping social and power relations (İşkar, 2014, p. 1). The printed news discourse has a public and professional obligation to inform, supervise and criticise, disclose and create public opinion, as well as to educate and entertain (Saygılı 2006:54). The ability of print press to determine and shape public perception, create specific social motivations, promote change or reinforce rooted convictions and attitudes makes it an essential constituent in forming public opinion. As part of the social dynamic, news functions to legitimise, recreate and reshape economic, political and ideological power forces. The narrative of the news is influenced by the rhetoric of the ruling power or by institutions or individuals who hold power (İşkar, 2014, p. 2). These characteristics mean that news differentiates from the commoditised versions to be found in other printed press. The news industry reflects its stories in articles by presenting them according to established codes and norms. The story, the subject matter of the news reports presented to the newspaper readers in articles as a form of discourse, is the end product of a journalistic process. The reader is the consumer who reads and digests the news discourse. News staff select then shape the narrative of the news articles that a newspaper publishes. In doing so, they impose meaning to the published news. Every newspaper is bound by its values, adhering to its own intrinsic style of discourse and professional rules in determining and presenting its news coverage. Adherance to these unique interpretative guidelines in the written discourse reflects the communication strategies that shape the structure and format of a newspaper’s presentation. These strategies, along with the explicit images and rhetoric, steer the reader towards the preferred point of view (İşkar, 2014, p. 2). It is possible to use a wide variety of methods to expose the hidden discourse present in news discourse. This study uses the principles of discourse analysis of Teun A. van Dijk as a methodology to analyse the type of discourse adopted by Turkey’s Özgür Gündem newspaper to influence public opinion regarding the negotiations carried out between Turkey and PKK (the militant Kurdish Workers Party) from the year 65

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2013 to 2015. The recent increase in reinterpretation of the news in Turkish literature using this method has been especially helpful in revealing the prevailing journalist tenets that have been incorporated into the news discourses (Gölcü, 2009; Bulut and Yaylagül, 2004; Mora, 2008; Erol, 2013). The study investigates the discourse of the visual and written news texts in the Turkish newspaper Özgür Gündem (Independent agenda) in its coverage of Turkey’s peace negotiations with the PKK, as a part of its research method. For the research to be conducted, news texts and headlines on the peace negotiations in the Özgür Gündem newspaper were scanned on the internet and secondary sources. Following the completion of the data analysis, the news texts related to the subject and how the topic was handled in the newspaper were analyzed according to Van Dijk’s critical discourse analysis method. The following section introduces the theoretical framework of Dijk’s critical discourse analysis that helps scrutinizing the superficial fact in the news texts in a subjective way and interpreting their underlying meaning. As newspaper journalists discourse on the news, their reportage, coverage, interpretations of and commentaries on the events of the day tend to reflect their political leanings, no matter the profession’s commitment to objective appraisal. In a world susceptible to the distortions of fake news spin, sometimes their writing can even be propelled by a hidden agenda. So it is that impartial and plain news discourse is or can be coloured by the journalist’s tenets and ideologies. Subsequent sections examine the headlines, the news leads, the images and graphics, the relationship between background and context, information about how major events are presented, and news feeds in order to carry out a thematic and schematic analysis at macro and micro levels. In so doing, the study seeks to unveil ideological elements in the news texts on the peace negotiations that are hinted in selected language forms and thus hard to see. Finally the study states its hypothesis drawn from critical discourse analysis of Özgür Gündem’s news on peace negotiation between Turkey and the PKK by taking due note of the newspaper’s ideological bias towards the PKK. The study concludes by presenting findings that the theme stressed in the news headlines on the negotiation process in the newspaper is influenced by statements of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan that proposes the PKK as a legitimate representative of the Kurds within this process.

BACKGROUND According to Van Dijk, critical discourse analysis has a socio-political context and should be considered a discipline rather than a research method. By making a connection between discourse, cognition, and society, Van Dijk’s theoretical approach explicitly examines the discourse of the socio-political aspect of power abuse, dominance, inequality and injustice. Van Dijk’s critical discourse method relies on discourse theory and considers its level of comprehension and production when analysing the text (Dursun, 2004, 104). In the newly proposed theoretical framework for analysing news media, Van Dijk accepts the news as a form of discourse. According to Van Dijk, news texts are constructed and reproduced within the social power in the form of consistent news pace, utilisation of specifically chosen resources, and selecting the news headings (Parlak et al. 2009, p. 141). Throughout his research, Van Dijk looks at the news text as a whole. Talking about the socio-political aspects of the news is practising discourse. A close examination of news texts will reveal that most of the socio-political beliefs or knowledge regarding what is happening worldwide comes from daily news coverage. The news reporter, the reader and the discourse analyst are all mainly concerned with the

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meaning of the text. The text reveals the semantics, words, sentences, paragraphs – the whole of the discourse, the interpretations, and the rules. An added important function of the text is to ensure local and global coherence by establishing the connection between time, situation, and cause and effect (Sözen, 1999, p. 125). It is assumed that the reader is familiar with some elements of the news item and, consequently, this information is not included in the text. These are the missing links between the text propositions and concepts. These links contribute to local coherence. The public ensures that world information, beliefs, ideology and subjective elements contribute to the text’s local cohesion. The other component of news discourse is global coherence which asserts what we intuitively know about the topics and headlines. News headlines sum up the text and give the most critical information in respect to the news. Theoretically, the headlines are described as macro-proposals that rely on semantics possessed within the text. Style is used to express the same event (news) using different syntax, words, and tone. The choice of style reveals the social and ideological effects, the news actors and events, social communication situations, and information about the journalist’s perspective. Discourse analysis examines not only the text structure but also meanings, ideas and ideologies. The cognitive approach shows the implications that the text might not have but are related to the mental processes of language users (Sözen, 1999, p. 127). Van Dijk’s framework seeks to expose the ideological nature of the news by analysing the sentences used in the news based on the criteria of length, simple or compound, active or passive. The news rhetoric consists of successive sentences and clauses, territorial cohesiveness, choice of words that reflect the ideology intrinsic to the journalist and the newspaper. Other components of rhetoric include interviews and excerpts from the parties and witnesses involved that increase the persuasiveness of the news item, images that indicate the event really did happen, graphics and numerical data that enhance the credibility of the content. All these components of rhetoric form the regulating factors of the microstructure of the news. The major contributing factor behind the coding of the news discourse in terms of political economy and cultural endeavours is the dominant ideology and culture to be found in the background of the mass media. Studies on critical news discourse suggest that the spread of news content to social structures is via the ideological mechanism that operates from the centre of the political institutions (Gölcü, 2009, p. 88). Van Dijk studies the news from a textual and structural aspect by examining the level of comprehension and production and providing explanations to this end. Discourse is a complex communication phenomenon that lacks an independent structure. Thus, its process of production and interpretation must be studied within a social context. While comprehension, memorisation, and reproduction of the news are addressed from the readers’ standpoint, the news text production is analysed at the structural, production and comprehension levels. Considering that all these relationships appear in a broad social context, small and large-scale structures in discourse analysis are the norm. The focus of Van Dijk’s studies at the small-scale structure level concentrates on semantic relations between sentences that provide coherence. At the syntax and word level the focus is on the units that reveal the reality of quotations and news while helping rhetoric in the direct or indirect presentation of information. On the other hand, large-scale structure analysis focuses on the structure of the subject of the news text and its categorical schema. The issue is most apparent in the form of headlines and the leading paragraph. Van Dijk terms the headlines and the leading paragraph (the “intro” in journalistic parlance), that reflect the discourse’s semantic coherence as subjective. A reader who has average knowledge or lacks any particular belief will accept the news item as projected by its author (Dursun, 2004, p. 374). 67

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Van Dijk’s method of analysis queries the issue of ideology-discourse relationship in terms of images, syntax, intonation, consistency, (pre)suppositions, metaphors, reasoning, and so on and looks at power-establishing and power-bearing discourse formats. According to Van Dijk, power emerges as a characteristic of the relationship between social groups and social power relationships. Based on the argument that social power is established and reproduced through linguistic practices, Van Dijk analyses the relation between discourse structures and power structures. He aims to reveal the discursive forms of power. In this context, research is carried out examining all types of communicative phenomena, exceptionally verbal communication, speech patterns and texts, to determine which structures, strategies, and actions create positions of power (Sancar, 2008, pp. 140-142).

ANALYSIS OF MACROSTRUCTURES OF THE OZGUR GUNDEM NEWSPAPER’S APPROACH TO THE RESOLUTION PROCESS This section focuses on how the Özgür Gündem newspaper approaches its news coverage, especially with respect to its published coverage of the resolution process between the years 2013-2015. It examines the headlines, the news story leads, images, the relationship between background and context, information regarding the main event presentation, and news feeds to carry out thematic and schematic analysis at the macro level. 1. On February 19, 2013, under a headline reading “The State Watched”, the attack on the People’s Democratic Congress (HDK) delegation in Sinop made the news. The news source is the Chairman of the Executive Council for KCK (Koma Civakên Kurdistan-Kurdish Communities Union). The introductory lead reads: “The police and Gendarmerie (military police) by abstaining from intervening against the attacks of the racists who gathered outside the building in Sinop where the People’s Democratic Congress delegation was, brought on the attacks and lynching attempts”. The photo used with the story shows a mob trying to break the shielded barricade formed by the gendarmerie. The newspaper projects the event as another example of racist oppression against Kurdish identity in Turkey. It implies that at the back of the event was the racist mentality of the State. The content of the news story stresses that the attack targeted not the People’s Democratic Congress but the resolution process, thereby establishing a contextual relationship between the attack and the process. 2. On May 9, 2013, the headline was “Guerrilla Withdrawal Started: Now Road Cleaning Time”. The source of the news is the Democratic Society Congress, BDP (Peace and Democracy Party). The news content announces that the PKK/KCK has begun withdrawing from Turkey. The opening lead introducing the news story reads: “The most important breakthrough of the ‘democratic resolution process’ that began with the historic step taken by PKK leader Öcalan on Amed Newroz was made yesterday”. The accompanying image show many PKK members proceeding in an orderly walk. The implication that the PKK’s armed elements are “guerrillas” and that the PKK/KCK is the armed element of the Kurdish freedom movement is conveyed as background information. The news content establishes a solid contextual relationship between the Government and the steps to be taken by the Kurds by referring to: “the release of all political prisoners, truth commissions, removal of TMK (anti-terrorism law) and the (election) threshold, education in the mother tongue, signing of the EU Autonomy condition with no annotation”. 68

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3. On April 27, 2014, the headline was “The Kurdish People’s Leader Öcalan: The era has changed character, its either resolution or conflict”. The source of the news is the Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Öcalan. The content entails news regarding the İmralı delegation (an international delegation of jurists, parliamentarians, artists and intellectuals that sought to contribute peace process), which met up with Öcalan for the 17th time. The lead states: “Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Öcalan who met with BDP-HDP delegation made critical comments regarding the resolution process. Öcalan said ‘both in-depth resolution opportunities and conflict possibilities are active at all times.’” The image used is a photo of a menacing looking Öcalan dating back to his younger years. The report refers to Öcalan calling upon the Government to make legislative regulations, underscoring his contextual context relationship with the Government and the solution process. The news content hints at Öcalan’s background and the PKK’s conflict potential by quoting his words that “if the political power wants the armed forces to return to society, it must swiftly realise the necessary legal work”. 4. On October 8, 2014, the headline was “The people’s uprising [in Kurdish: serhildan] against the massacre in Kobani, every street is Kobani”. The source of the news is KCK. The news content is about the Kurdish people’s mass uprisings as a reaction to ISIS. The lead to the item starts as follows: “While YPG/YPJ forces clashed with ISIS murderers in the streets of Kobani, the people’s uprisings have started in Kurdistan, Turkey and Europe. KCK urged millions to turn all streets into Kobani.” The first image that accompanies the news is that of the activists building street fires and setting an armoured police vehicle on fire. The second image is of Amed (Diyarbakir) and shows hundreds of people, their faces masked, continuing with their actions despite the gas thrown at them by the police. The third photo is of Nisebin (Nusaybin) and shows people walking to the borderline amidst rising smoke and fire. The fourth picture shows hundreds of people demonstrating in Brussels to support Kobani. The news account presented the events in Kobani as an attempted massacre of the Kurds of Kobani. It projected background information to claim that disconnected and segmented Kurds will be more susceptible to such killings. Under the slogan support for Kobani, Özgür Gündem is summoning all Kurds to unite. The KCK’s call for all Kurds to the streets exposes the context relationship of KCK in the Kurdish movement. 5. On January 18, 2015, the headline reads “Akdoğan’s massacre threat”. The source of the news is Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan. The news content includes details of the meeting between Akdoğan and the HDP delegation regarding the events in Cizre. The lead opens: “Deputy Prime Minister Akdogan threatened the Kurdish people with massacre”. The photo image used shows Akdoğan standing behind the President. As background information, Özgür Gündem highlights the State’s keenness to use violence as an argument. As to the settlement process, it indicated that AKP is at the point of losing interest in the talks, thereby establishing a contextual relationship between the AKP and the resolution process. 6. On May 28, 2015, the headline says “Either peace or war”. The source of the news is Murat Karayılan, a member of the PKK Executive Council. The news content includes Karayılan’s assessments. The lead statement reads: “Karayılan states that if AKP wins the elections, this would be the start of a war; as such, this election is either an election of peace or that of war.” Karayılan’s photo is used in the news content. Background information includes discrediting the AKP. The news consists of the statement “guards will no longer be targeted” establishing a contextual relationship between HDP and PKK.

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ANALYSIS OF MICRO STRUCTURES OF ÖZGÜR GÜNDEM NEWSPAPER’S NEWS APPROACH TO THE RESOLUTION PROCESS In this section, once again, the Özgür Gündem newspaper’s coverage of news on the resolution process between the years 2013-2015 is analysed at the micro-level. Within this framework, the pattern of discourse is examined with particular emphasis on syntax, word choice, the rhetoric of the news, local and global coherence. 1. In the news headline, the title “State watched” was short and simple. The main emphasis is on the verb watched. The news is presented in a passive sentence structure. The context of the news, presents the attacks on delegates of the People’s Democratic Congress (HDK) as racist. By abstaining from intervening against the events, the Gendarmerie is referred to as the side responsible for the events. The state police and the Gendarmerie are described as AKP’s police and AKP’s military. The word state used by the newspaper is projected as a structure that acts separately from the Kurds and works against them. In terms of the rhetoric, it is observed that the report of Murat Karayılan’s statement to ANF (Fırat News Agency) is made quite discursively, whereas detailed information is given regarding the events that took place. The news criticises the state and military police’s attitude in evoking how the police behaved towards the Kurdish politicians. It uses situation models between this new event and old events to negate the State and the AKP government in the reader’s eye. The news content underlines the racist attack on the resolution process as well as the inadequate measures taken by the police and Gendarmerie. The image that accompanies the news report is a photo of a large crowd trying to break the shielded barricade formed by the Gendarmerie. The specification in the proposition of the headline allows for global coherence in the text. The lead states that: “The police and gendarmerie abstained from intervening against the attacks of the racists who gathered outside the building in Sinop where the People’s Democratic Congress delegation came under attacks and lynching attempts”. There is coherence in the propositions given in the text and the propositions in the headline. The second proposition adds local consistency to the text by incorporating explanations from the first proposition. 2. The headline “Guerrilla Withdrawal Started: Now Road Cleaning Time” is formed with long and compound sentences in the news. The main actor of the news is guerrilla. When, the initiative holder “guerrilla” is considered together with the active sentence structure, “guerrilla” is presented positively. Öcalan is shown as the “Leader of the PKK”. Another word that has been attributed with a meaning is the word “mountain”. It is used to symbolise the rural area where the armed PKK members who struggle with the state are located. The word mountain is also used metaphorically to depict the “PKK”. An important word used by the newspaper to show the rebellious state of the Kurdish people is the word “Serhildan”. The Turkish meaning of this word, “rebellion”, has been ascribed to mean uprising of the Kurdish people. PKK’s armed elements that have started to withdraw from Turkey are portrayed as “guerrilla”. The meaning ascribed to this word is fighters struggling for the Kurdish people. From the perspective of the newspaper, the PKK is represented as Kurdish liberation guerrillas. In addition to the PKK abbreviation, the newspaper also uses KCK, which is the PKK’s executive branch, to refer to the PKK. The resolution process is described as “the democratic solution process”. The word “Amed” is used in place of Diyarbakır, and Nevruz is drafted using the Kurdish spelling “Newroz”. In terms of rhetoric, the news is presented with

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implicit quotations. Portraying PKK as the side that keeps its promises helps it gain credibility in the public eye. The publication uses a photo in which a large number of PKK members are depicted proceeding in an orderly walk as they are taking their weapons and leaving Turkey. Another perception created by the image that has been conveniently used to match the news content is that the PKK is a trained and disciplined structure that carries out the orders it receives. The news headline is presented as a general proposition. The lead states that “The most important breakthrough of the ‘democratic resolution process’ that began with the historic step taken by PKK leader Öcalan on Amed Newroz was made yesterday”. This news “intro” is a specific proposition; after the headline, it is the second proposition that contains more information. The first proposition offers global coherence to the reader, the second proposition along with the first one, in a situational association, presents the reader with local coherence. 3. The news headline reads as “The Kurdish People’s Leader Öcalan: The era has changed character, its either resolution or conflict”. It is formed with long and compound sentences. Öcalan’s statements are interpreted as statements that direct the process. Öcalan is constantly mentioned as “the architect of the process”. Another word that is used to refer to Öcalan is the word “İmrali”, which is used as a metaphor. In the news, the words “Kurdish politicians” refer to those people who are official political members of BDP and HDP, in the Republic of Turkey. The news is drafted in the active sentence structure. When the main actor of the news is evaluated in conjunction with the active structure of the sentence, it is observed that the content of the news revolves around Öcalan who holds the initiative. The PKK is shown as the side that responds positively to all calls made by Öcalan. As to the resolution process, “resolution or conflict” are the expressions used. The resolution process is read as a “peace process”. The long-lasting events that have been going on between the PKK and Turkey are evaluated as “war”. It is clear that this process is carried out with the understanding that it will end with a peace agreement. It has been stated that the expectation of the PKK as the victorious side at the end of the process is the recognition of Kurdish autonomy. The newspaper explains to its readers that this is why the PKK had repeatedly declared ceasefires and taken a break from the armed struggle. Closer scrutiny of the rhetoric reveals that Öcalan’s statements are quoted directly. The image used is the photo of the younger Öcalan wearing a menacing look. When the photo is evaluated in conjunction with the news content, it becomes evident that Öcalan is threatening the Government to make legislative changes or otherwise endure the possibility of conflict. What is expressed by the image and the news content is consistent. There are intellectual implications in the propositions specified in the headline. Political implications are emphasised in this proposition. In the second proposition, the lead states: “Kurdish People’s Leader Öcalan who met with BDP-HDP delegation made critical comments regarding the resolution process. He said that ‘both in-depth resolution opportunities and conflict possibilities are active at all times’.” A relationship is established between the political implications mentioned in the first proposition. In the second proposition, more information follows the headline. Even if the statements of the BDP and HDP parties, which represent Kurdish political movements, are included in the newspaper, it is important to note that these statements are of secondary importance.

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4. The news headline “The people’s uprising [serhildana] against the massacre in Kobani, every street is Kobani” is formed with a long compound sentence. The main actor in the news is the “people”. The news is drafted in the active sentence structure. The content of the news is formed around the main actor, “people”. The newspaper emphasises the word “people” by applying it to the various communities of people living in Turkey. The newspaper denies Turkey’s structure of state. It claims that more than one people live in the country and that, just like the Turks, the Kurdish people also live in Turkey and that their rights have been violated. In so doing, its discourse avoids using the words “Turkish people”. Instead, it prefers to use the wording “the people of Turkey”. The events that started in response to the developments in Kobani are named “Serhildan”. The newspaper defines the Kurdish cantons created in Syria as liberated Kurdistan soil and has called on all Kurds living in Turkey to give all the necessary support to their brothers. It also declares Turkish-origin PKK/PYD Kurds that died in Syria to be martyrs. This approach by the newspaper gives the impression that there is a hidden PKK agenda within the resolution process by establishing an organic connection with the Syrian Kurds. The geography where Kurds live is described as “Kurdistan”. KCK is described as the “advocate” for the Kurdish people. The rhetoric of the news reports the developments in Kobani as incidents. The statements made by the KCK are published in a direct citation. In the information presented in the news, the Kurdish people are called upon to revolt. The images chosen show the clash between the people who have filled the streets and the police. The first image depicts Wan (Van) activists starting fires in the streets and setting fire to an armoured police vehicle. An inscription attached to the image of the vehicle in flames reads: “Resistance fire illuminated”. The second image, of Amed (Diyarbakir), shows hundreds of people, their faces masked, continuing their actions despite the gas thrown at them by the police. The photo caption reads: “The uprising should be made continuous”. The third picture is of Nisebin (Nusaybin) and shows people making their way on foot to the borderline amidst rising smoke and fire. The final image, taken in a square in Brussels, shows hundreds of people demonstrating in support of Kobani. When the news content is evaluated in conjunction with the images, it becomes clear that the Özgür Gündem newspaper seeks to give the impression that the uprising of the Kurdish people is happening everywhere. The text is conceptually summarised in the headline. The news headline is presented as a general proposition. The news lead is expressed as follows: “While YPG/YPJ forces clashed with ISIS murderers in the streets of Kobani, people’s uprisings have started in Kurdistan, Turkey and Europe. KCK urged millions to turn all streets into Kobani.” The newspaper refers to Turkey’s Eastern Anatolia and the South-eastern Anatolia regions as Kurdistan, and when using city and place names, prefers to use Kurdish place names. In doing so, the newspaper supports the separatist Kurdish politics while trying to keep alive the notion that a portion of Turkey’s land is made up of land that belongs to Kurdistan. The news lead offers a specific proposition; it is the second proposition after the headline and entails more information. The first proposition offers global coherence to the reader, the second proposition in conjunction with the first, given the situational association, presents the reader with local coherence. 5. The news headline “Massacre threat from Akdoğan” is short, simple and direct in meaning. The main emphasis is on the word “threat”. Even though statements from the government side are included in the news item, they are negatively represented to the reader. While the newspaper cites reliable news sources that can be confirmed, the news is rendered to reflect positively favour of the 72

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PKK. Yalçın Akdoğan is negated in the news content by use of the passive sentence structure. In the news report, “Kurds” are described as “Kurdish people”. Akdoğan is presented as “the person who threatens with massacre”. While news sources from the Government side issue the message of resolving the problem by democratic improvements, the conclusion can be drawn that the PKK’s understanding of the process is it all boils down to democratic autonomy or self-management. The steps taken by both sides have clearly shown that they want the negotiations to begin and the violence to end. However, it is observed that for each positive step taken, a crisis occurs. The province of Cizre has been referred to as “Cizir”. Police operations in Cizir have been described as police killings. When mentioning the PKK in its news coverage, Özgür Gündem also specifically mentions the PKK’s other embodiments that represent the PKK. In addition, it uses the metaphor “Kandil” to represent the PKK and its elements. The meaning ascribed to the word Kandil encompasses all other elements of PKK outside of Abdullah Öcalan. Observably, the newspaper does not ascribe any negative connotation to the words it uses to represent PKK such as PKK, KCK, HSP. Instead, it ascribes to them solely meanings as representing the Kurdish people. In terms of rhetoric, the statements of Akdoğan are directly quoted. Despite including statements made by the Government, elements are added to the news’s content to reflect the newspaper’s ideological views. Statements from the government side tend to be downplayed. In presenting the news, the threat made by the Government to massacre the Kurds is transferred to the reader. While the remarks made by Akdoğan are perceived as a threat by the newspaper, it also emphasises that the AKP has intensified the violence against the Kurdish population. In the image used, Yalçın Akdoğan is seen standing behind the President. When the image is considered in conjunction with the news, it implies that the Kurdish people were threatened with massacre, reinforced by the suggestion that among the perpetrators of this threat, there stands President Erdogan standing in front of Akdoğan. The proposition specified in the news headline contains intellectual implications. Political implications are also emphasised. In the second proposition, spelled out in the news lead, the statement “Deputy Prime Minister Akdoğan, threatened the Kurdish people with massacre” occurs. A cause relationship with the political implication mentioned in the first proposition is established. By presenting the reader with all these negations, the newspaper aims to direct the reader against the Government and ensure that the news discourse is read in line with the newspaper’s intended ideology. It is worth noting that the newspaper uses affirmative statements when conveying information about the PKK. 6. The news headline “Either peace or war” is kept short and simple, used as a pithy phrase. The choice offered is “the choice of war or peace”. The Kurds are referred to as “the Kurdish people”. Considering that the newspaper denigrates the Government of Turkey without being negative about the PKK, it is clearly understood that the newspaper sees the PKK as representing the legitimate power of the Kurdish people. The newspaper often implies that it doesn’t trust the government of Turkey. When it speaks of the armed tension between Turkey and the PKK, the newspaper prefers to use the word “war”. The meaning the newspaper attributes to its use of the word extends to all state operations against PKK elements. This approach strengthens the position of the PKK in the eye of the public. When evaluating the news in the context of the rhetoric, it has been determined that Karayılan’s remarks are quoted directly and that readers are being urged to vote for HDP.

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By adding an image to Karayılan’s statements that support the HDP, the meaning has been strengthened further. Accompanying the photo is the statement “now we will not target the guards”. Thus is Karayılan’s message to all Kurdish people to increase support for HDP communicated. It has been determined that the news derived from statements made by PKK / KCK could not be confirmed. The newspaper therefore has to add items that affirm or verify or otherwise persuade or present a different perspective since the information attributed to its cited news source cannot be confirmed. The statement contained in the news lead says: “Karayılan states that if AKP wins the elections this would be the start of a war,” therefore, “this election is either an election of peace or that of war.” The proposition specified in the headline and specified in the leading statement is linked in terms of time. There is a causal link between the two propositions. The two statements in these propositions refer to the same event. The two actions are linked. These propositions are at the same time in a conceptual relationship.

CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION The findings of the critical discourse analysis reveal that the theme stressed in the news headlines in respect to the “Resolution Process” in the Özgür Gündem newspaper is moulded and shaped by statements of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan. It is observed that the PKK has been introduced as the structure representing the Kurds within this process. Statements by BDP and HDP parties representing Kurdish political movements are considered and used while remaining of secondary importance. Furthermore, regardless of the resolution process, quite radical messages of an uprising against the State are given while emphasising that war has been declared against the Kurds by the governing AKP party. Statements made by the Government are included but negatively represented to the reader. The Özgür Gündem newspaper is closely following the negotiation process between Turkey and the PKK. Its headlines generally use simple sentence structures, yet compound and complex sentences are also used. The terrorist identity and the violent side of the PKK are hidden in the news headlines. In its news leads, Özgür Gündem places Abdullah Öcalan in the main agenda as the leader of the Kurdish people. Öcalan’s statements are evaluated as statements that steer the process. It is apparent from the paper’s news leads that the Kurdish people are directed towards the policies of the PKK. As the 2015 elections near, it is evident that Özgür Gündem serves propaganda in favour of HDP under the influence of the KCK while implying that the main actors are Öcalan and the PKK. During the resolution process, the newspaper keeps close tabs on events in Syria. The news leads avoid anything negative about the PKK, which it favours. Instead, when its news coverage gets critical about the process it has focused on statements and developments affecting the process. Often the paper makes a point of highlighting appeals made by Abdullah Öcalan in his capacity as leader of the Kurdish People about the negotiation process the day’s leading story. Similarly, statements made by PKK and KCK have also managed to top the news agenda. With regard to the negotiation process, the general reputation of PKK/KCK and its efforts to align with Abdullah Öcalan are evident. The newspaper has projected Turkish public opinion towards the resolution process positively. On the other hand, the PKK has displayed mistrust and anger towards the Government. While it is clear that the newspaper delivers reportage about the Government, it is done with a negative implication. Steps taken by the Government to facilitate the peace process have not been reflected in the news. Another observation is that Özgür Gündem does not offer an especially broad perspective regarding the resolution process negotiations. Most of its sourced news is limited to statements made by Abdullah 74

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Öcalan and the PKK. Some statements come from Kurdish politicians of the HDP and BDP and represent legitimate political views. News from government sources when presented is framed in a negative way. The main events that drive the news are coloured and prioritised according to their ideological perspective. Where attributable open sources cannot be confirmed, the newspaper is forced to look elsewhere for plausible items or else present a different point of view. In turning out its news articles, Özgür Gündem, besides using short, simple and active sentence structures, has also opted for long, compound, active sentences; short, simple, passive sentences; as well as compound, passive sentence structures. The short and simple sentences that the newspaper employs most widely provide the convenience of a quick read and ready understanding. The combination of the short, simple structure of the headlines and news texts, means the newspaper delivers both its content and its views (implicit and stated) to its readers faster. The newspaper can also show a preference for long and compound sentences in the news text. It addresses the news in terms of the agenda regarding Turkey with the help of compound sentences designed to inform the reader through statements about the relevant issues. The active sentences in the newspaper have been used for different purposes. At times, the active subject of a reported event or action has been portrayed in a position of strength and extolled accordingly. Yet, when it suits the agenda, the subject can be made appear weak and passive. Generally, the government side has been presented negatively through the use of passive sentences. The words chosen by Özgür Gündem constitute one of the critical sections in interpreting the newspaper’s discourse analysis. Word choices that reflect the reporter or the newspaper’s worldview contribute to the formation of news discourse. Therefore, words act as indicators in the formation of meaning. The words used in the formation of news articles mostly have a leading influence on the reader. For example, the meaning Özgür Gündem newspaper ascribes to “the solution process” is as follows: The long-standing war with Turkey will end with the efforts and endeavours of the Kurds, but the struggle will continue on democratic grounds on the achievements of armed combat. Özgür Gündem associates the struggle of the Kurdish people with the identity of Öcalan, who is given the title “Leader of the Kurdish People”. Another group of words that the newspaper highlights by ascribing special meaning include official State institutions such as the army and the police. The newspaper presents these institutions as structures operating against the Kurds, under the command of the AKP government. According to the newspaper, the PKK is a structure that has been struggling for a long time for the liberation of the Kurdish people. Even though the newspaper does not explicitly state it, the process is presented as a phase that advances the PKK, which has the initiative to lay down its arms and withdraw. The resolution process for the PKK is a process that will end with the European Autonomy agreement. The final article of the Dolmabahçe Reconciliation prepared by Öcalan refers to an autonomous structuring of the Kurdish people or selfautonomy, the transformation key for a self-governing structure. The newspaper attributes meanings to the news and to the words used in the news, implying that the Kurds predominantly accept and unite around the understanding that the main character of this transformation is Abdullah Öcalan. Any emphasis on the BDP or HDP Parties is kept very low key. The newspaper’s news reports emphsaise that politically these parties are aligned with Abdullah Öcalan and Kandil. Another element prominent in the news is the PKK’s mistrust of the AKP government. While attacks and raids by PKK have not been included in the news, the Government’s armed security forces drive against the PKK have made the headlines and it is the Government that is projected as the side sabotaging the process. Another factor identified over time is that the PKK is dealing not only with the Kurds living in Turkey, but with all Kurds. Even though it first surfaced in Turkey, PKK is actively engaged with events beyond the borders of Turkey. As it operates in whatever regions Kurds may live, the PKK’s 75

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classification is closer to being an international organisation than a local one. It has been detected that the newspaper ascribes the following meanings to “the resolution process”: “Democratisation process”, “Constitutional change”, “Kurdish problem”. Another approach reflected by the words used in the newspaper’s headlines and news texts is disguised in terms used by the Kurdish side when it comes to blaming the Government. While the Kurdish side accuses the AKP government of failing to take certain steps, the newspaper fails to mention the initiatives that the Government awaits on the part of the PKK. By approaching developments from a singular perspective, the newspaper has only allowed for the Kurdish view to prevail. When the cease-fire was broken, the paper held the Government responsible made its view plain in its negative coverage of the Government’s role. The news published in this context portrayed the Government as unreliable. Clearly, an evaluation of all its news headlines and news content, and a review of its word choices show that Özgür Gündem does not view the PKK as terrorists. In the production phase of the news one of the main concerns is the persuasiveness of the news text. News rhetoric is the type of discourse used when giving information. An examination of its news coverage of the negotiations between Turkey and the PKK shows that to ensure and increase its credibility, apart from its use of statistics, Özgür Gündem has also extensively used quotations as rhetoric. Mostly citing from sources close to the ideology that it advocates, the newspaper prefers statements that verify the discourse that it has produced at the macro level. The reason behind the paper’s extensive use of references and statements in quotation marks is seen to serve the purpose of being easily comprehensible and accessible to the reader. In order to ensure its credibility, the newspaper chooses the direct quotation method of citation to support the meaning behind its argument while, by doing so, blocking other alternative ways of interpreting the text. Another rhetorical device that emerges is the reporting of events by the newspaper. It is self-evident that when it comes to conveying information, an attack or an incident by the Government resulting in a death caused by the government side is straightforwardly presented to the reader. In so doing, the newspaper reinforces the perception that the Kurdish people are constantly under oppression and that the PKK is the only defence force that stands between them and this oppression. The approach to news content also uses the concept of time to heighten its impact. This is especially true when presenting news about incidents, when case models are trotted out reminding readers of bitter experiences from the past when the Turkish State followed a similar approach regardless of the resolution process. The news presentation also attempts to preserve the idea of Abdullah Öcalan as the leader and sole representative of the Kurdish People. In statements made by KCK and HDP, Öcalan is widely quoted to help protect his reputation. Another ploy used to enhance the credibility of the news is the selective use of images. The chosen images contribute to and reinforce the line adopted in reporting the particular line and subject of the news item. In the course of examining the semantics of Özgür Gündem, one of the concepts that stands out is the local and global coherence of the text. The newspaper makes a proposition and gives explanations between texts while referring events connected by time, situation, and cause and effect relationship. In some of the texts, by neglecting to clarify terminology, expressions, and text scenarios, the readers, with their social and common knowledge related to that subject, establish the missing links between the concepts and propositions of the text. However, dependence on world knowledge and beliefs in the news has rendered coherence subjective and intellectual. Apart from such implicit cohesion among the propositions used in the newspaper’s news texts, contrasting functional coherence such as, “specification, explanation, opposing or example” have been established. The propositions in the newspaper’s approach 76

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to news can be seen to be primarily connected through the specification/explanation relationship. The specific propositions used in the news texts are found to give more detailed information than the general propositions that preceded them. The propositions in the subsequent sentence entail explanations (demands, rejections) and carry specific assessment and implications and have intellectual functions.

REFERENCES Akdoğan, Y. (2015, Jan. 18). Akdoğan’dan katliam tehdidi [Massacre threat from Akdoğan]. Özgür Gündem Newspaper, p. 1. Bulut, S., & Yaylagül, L. (2004). Türkiye’deki Yazılı Basında Yargıtay ve Mafya İlişkisine Yönelik Haberler [News in Turkey’s Printed Media in Respect to the Relationship between the Supreme Court and the Mafia]. İletişim, 119-142. Deniz, E. D. (2013). Toplumsal Cinsiyet Bağlamında Türkiye Yazılı Basınında Şiddet Haberleri Ve Haber Fotoğrafları [Violence News and News Photographs in the Context of Gender in the Turkish Press]. Selçuk İletişim, 8(1), 192–211. Dursun, Ç. (2004). Haber, Hakikat ve İktidar İlişkisi [News, Truth and Power Relations]. Elips Kitap. Erdoğan, İ. (n.d.). Türkiye’deki Yazılı Basında Yargıtay ve Mafya İlişkisine Yönelik Haberler [Turkish Press in Relation to the Supreme Court and Mafia Relationship]. http://www.irfanerdogan.com/dergiweb2008/19/bulut-yaylagul Gölcü, A. (2009). Haber Söyleminde Medya, Siyaset İlişkisi: 29 Mart 2009 Yerel Seçimleri [Media and Politics Relation in News Discourse: 29 March 2009 Local Elections]. Gazi Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi İletişim Kuram ve Araştırma Dergisi, 29, 85-130. İrvan, S. (2014). Medya, Kültür, Siyaset [Media, Culture, Politics]. Pharmakon Press. İşkar, E. (2014). İspanya İle Eta Arasında Yürütülen Terör Müzakerelerinin Yazılı Basında Ele Alınış Biçiminin Söylem Analizi [Discourse Analysis of the Negotiations between Spain and Eta in Written Media] [Master’s Thesis]. Turkish Military Academy. Karayılan, M. (2013, February 19). Devlet seyretti [State watched]. Özgür Gündem Newspaper, 1. Karayılan, M. (2015, May 28). Ya barış, ya savaş [Either peace or war]. Özgür Gündem Newspaper, 1. KCK. (2014, October 8). Kobani’de katliama karşı halk serhildana kalktı, her sokak Kobani [The people’s uprising against the massacre in Kobani, every street is Kobani]. Özgür Gündem Newspaper, 1. http:// s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents Demokratik Toplum Kongresi [Democratic Society Congress]. (2013, May 9). Gerilla çekilmeye başladı: Şimdi Yol Temizliği zamanı [Guerrilla Withdrawal Started: Now Road Cleaning Time]. Özgür Gündem Newspaper, 1. Mora, N. (2008). Medya Çalışmaları Medya Pedagojisi ve Küresel İletişim [Media Studies, Media Pedagogy and Global Communication]. Alt Kitap.

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Öcalan, A. (2014, April 27). Kürt Halk Önderi Öcalan: Dönem karakter değişti, Ya çözüm, ya çatışma [The Kurdish People’s Leader Öcalan: The era has changed character, its either resolution or conflict]. Özgür Gündem Newspaper, 1. Öcalan, A. (2014, April 27). Kürt Halk Önderi Öcalan: Dönem karakter değişti, Ya çözüm, ya çatışma [The Kurdish People’s Leader Öcalan: The era has changed character, its either resolution or conflict]. Özgür Gündem Newspaper, 1. Parlak, İ. (2009). Medya Gerçekliğinin İnşası Türk Medya Söylemine Eleştirel Bir Bakış [Constructing of Media Reality a Critical Look at Turkish Media Discourse]. Konya: Çizgi Kitap Evi. Sancar, S. (2008). İdeolojinin Serüveni [Adventure of İdeology]. İmge Kitap Evi. Saygılı, N. (2006). İletişim, Kitle İletişimi [Communication, Mass Media]. Girne American University Karmi Campus Press. Sözen, E. (1999). Söylem [Discourse]. Paradigma Press.

ADDITIONAL READING Ciordia, A. (2018). The effects of Kobane in the reconfiguration of the popular geopolitical codes of Turkey Kurdish movement. Turkish Studies, 19(5), 773–798. doi:10.1080/14683849.2018.1484288 Coşkun, G. B. (2020). Media capture strategies in new authoritarian states: The case of Turkey. Journalism, 65(4), 637–654. Ozkahraman, C. (2017). Failure of peace talks between Turkey and the PKK: Victim of traditional Turkish policy or of geopolitical shifts in the Middle East? Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 4(1), 50–66. doi:10.1177/2347798916681332 Rumelili, B. (2015). Conflict resolution and ontological security. Taylor &. Francis. Tezcür, GM (2013). Prospects for Resolution of the Kurdish Question: A Realist Perspective. Insight Turkey, 15 (2).

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Abdullah Öcalan: Terrorist, was the leader of the PKK who has been arrested for more than two decades but still exerts influence on the organization. AKP: Has been the key actor who has played a significant role for the start and ending of the peace negotiations with the PKK. Critical Discourse Analysis: A method used to discern or uncover the tenets and influences underlying and shaping much of contemporary journalism. In a world susceptible to the distortions of fake news spin, sometimes their writing can even be propelled by a hidden agenda. So it is that impartial and plain news discourse is or can be coloured by the journalist’s tenets and ideologies.

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Özgür Gündem: Is a Turkish newspaper which has examine the topic significantly in its coverage of Turkey’s peace negotiations with the PKK. Peace Negotiations: Between PKK and Turkey has been a hot topic in the mid-2010s which raised significant attention from the whole world. PKK: Is a designated terrorist organization which has fought a bloody insurgency inside Turkey. Press in Turkey: Is important to analyse the topic as it tends to reflect their political leanings, no matter the profession’s commitment to objective appraisal. Teun A. Van Dijk: A scholar in the fields of text linguistics, discourse analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and important to the analysis of the study as the one who devised the critical discourse analysis.

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Terror and Media:

Norwegian Media News Analysis of Al-Noor Mosque Attack in Norway Musa Gelici Presidency of Religious Affairs, Turkey

ABSTRACT Norway lived its bloodiest terrorist attack when Breivik killed nearly 100 people. This was recorded in history as a difficult test for the media. The Norwegian media exhibited great bias by reporting this bloody act by making judgments on the assumption that Muslims committed it. The media described Breivik as a mentally disturbed person, not as a terrorist. When the answer to the question, Why did Breivik commit this act? was sought, the detailed analysis ended up with the propaganda of Breivik’s manifesto. Breivik became a symbol of anti-Islam and multiculturalism in Europe. Finally, the New Zealand aggressor Tarrant and Norway Baerum Al-Noor Mosque aggressor Manhaus performed two attacks in 2019. They were fueled by the uncontrolled cybersphere where Breivik was idolized. The study aims to examine how the media made news about the terrorist figure devoted to the Breivik brotherhood and those who followed in his footsteps. It aims to make a news analysis of the Norwegian mainstream printed media about the Norwegian Al-Noor Mosque attacks in 2019.

INTRODUCTION As a driving force that ensures the change, transformation, and development of societies, media is an institution that represents oral, written, printed, and visual communication formats and mass media such as newspapers, magazines, books, brochures, and even television and cinema in its expanded form. Since the 2000s, the internet media has also been included in this term, and even surpassed all communication forms and achieved a leading position. Therefore, the media institution undeniably has a very important influence and responsibility in the opinion, thought, action, and mobilization of the society (Mora, 2008, p.5).

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch006

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The fact that the society changes its way of thinking by developing a subjective view and prejudice with an ideological attitude, based on the judgment and conviction of the person or group chosen by the media as the subject in the news results in marginalization and exclusion (Eravcı, 2010, p.15). There are numerous case studies in the literature in this respect. When going backward from the Manshaus attack in Norway, which is the main subject of the present study, the news of the mosque attack in New Zealand, the mass attack in 2011 by Breivik, and the Al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US are among the tragic events that must be investigated over the media and terror relations. Especially, the shooting of the twin towers on September 11, 2001, in the United States was handled by the media as a terrorist act, and the news served to create a stereotyped terrorist typology at the global level, which has served to transform the premise of “terror equals Islam” into a strong belief by stigmatizing Muslims as terrorists in the minds of Western people (Aydinalp, 2011, p.13). However, the root of the purpose of terrorist acts is to frighten, intimidate, and leave a psychological impact on masses over violent acts. For this reason, the news coverage of sensitive events such as terrorism that may shake social peace must be considered sensitive issues that cannot be used as material for perception work. Because the news on terrorism has the power to dictate how the public should think about social events such as terrorism. Especially the presentation of terrorist news with visual elements means that these visual elements mediate the delivery of the messages of terrorist organizations to masses with multiplied effects (Süllü, 2016, p.90). When the media is presenting the news on terrorism and similar issues, it uses various instruments to shape social and cultural life. These methods that were found with the news analysis are as follows (Gökçe & Gökçe, 2011, p.43): Image Construction: It is the structured and generalized conceptions and mental images of a particular event, phenomenon, or region. Creating Clichés: It refers to “a means of mass production of the same thing”, or “stereotyped and schematically-used expressions”. Clichés give expressions a “certain and universal“ meaning and carry them to an unquestionable presupposition in the minds. Stereotyping: It is “the verbal expression of widespread belief towards a social group or a member of it. The stereotype, which is logically a judgment, ascribes certain qualities to a social group or its members, with an unfair, simplified, and generalized, emotionally evaluative disposition. Creating Prejudice: It means pre-judgment. Prejudice can also be directed at a group or a single member of that group. By definition, it can be expressed as “an oppositional and hostile attitude towards a person from any group just because he/she belongs to that group“. While a stereotype is expressed in words and sentences, prejudice expresses an internal belief and attitude. As for the “language“ used in newspaper news, “language” has a very important place in shaping the news for the media. Because the modalities or various formats used in linguistic expressions make the meaning settled in the interlocutor. In linguistic analysis, it is seen that the five strategies are generally adopted by the media elements (Alghamdi, 2015, p.200). Descriptive and Referential Strategies: The big difference between saying “a terrorist has been arrested“ and “a Muslim terrorist has been arrested“ in a news story is created by referential and descriptive strategies.

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Transitivity and Passivation: Semantic transitivity refers to the semantic relationship between the subject, the object, and the affected, in which an action of the subject affects the object or the affected. However, in passivation, the role of the object or action is emphasized, while the role of the subject is diminished. Example: Mark broke the window. Mark is swimming. Implication and Measurement: Another linguistic tool used by journalists to avoid being held accountable for their claims in news discourse is to use measurement words such as ‘some’, ‘many’, ‘almost’, and ‘almost all’. The modality approach: The ‘interpretation’ or ‘attitude’ approaches, which can be divided into four categories, are: Real, Conditional, Ability, and Optative moods. Therefore, the meaning and image of the news intended to affect the minds are hidden in the detailed references between the sentences in which the news is conveyed.

BACKGROUND Media and Terrorism: The Norwegian Context July 22, 2011: Breivik Massacre July 22, 2011 was a very ominous date as it was the bloodiest terrorist act Norway had ever seen. But at the same time, July 22, 2011 was a date in which the traces of news left in the media would not be forgotten as a criminal record with expressions such as prejudice, accusation in advance, charging, and trial without a solid proof (Eide & Kjølstad & Naper, 2013). Because on July 22, 2011, at 3:25 in the afternoon, a bomb exploded in the Oslo Government Building in the capital of Norway and 8 people lost their lives in an extremely tragic atmosphere. While people were still in the shock of this attack, on the same day, at 17:22, 40 km north of Oslo, on the island of Utoya, where the Labor Party’s Youth Organization held its annual political summer camp, 69 people of various origins coming from every city in Norway lost their lives under a shower of bullets that lasted for hours, and many injured struggled for their lives (Bangstad, 2012, p.351). The threshold, which can be described as critical and historical, was passed right after these attacks and the media declared that the “perpetrator“ or “perpetrators“ were Muslim militants as the act on September 11, 2001. Meanwhile, Muslims on the streets and in public transport were harassed and insulted as a result of the judgmental attitude of the media. When it was finally revealed that the culprit was Anders Behring Breivik, a wealthy, bourgeois, white, conservative, Christian, and nationalist ethnic Norwegian, the Norwegian and Western media were in for a partial shock (Henkel, 2012, p.353). At this point, Breivik was no longer considered a terrorist but a mentally ill figure in the media. This biased approach focused on the media’s justification for his committing this act as a mental patient or a lunatic to hide that he was a terrorist, and in the news based on this justification, it served to the interrogation of Muslims and the counter-propaganda of the perverse ideas idealized by Breivik, without any transparency and filtering (Kirchick, 2012). Therefore, although the media at this point turned its focus to Breivik bypassing the Muslims with the news and the approach it adopted while handling its news, it entrenched Breivik’s “secret Islamization” delusion with secret and open messages as a paranoia throughout the society indirectly and implicitly through Breivik’s cause of action. In both cases, the building blocks of 82

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the convenience of making Muslims the focus of discussion in the media and the public sphere have, in our opinion, been carefully laid over the years (Akdoğan & Gelici, 2020, p.517). Namely, the fact that the media in Norway reflects such a problematic Muslim typology as a reflex in such events should be understood as a habit acquired with the image drawn in the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US. Because only 2 years before July 22, 2011, a report under the title of “Immigration and Integration” was published by IMDI, a unit under the Norwegian Ministry of Immigration and Integration, and in that report, how the media represented Muslims in the post-September 11 period was discussed with scientific data. The report stated that the media mostly focused on Islam and Muslims in their discussions on immigration and integration, the depictions in the media were directed through the image of Islam, and Islam and Muslims were reported as a problem as much as the number of news about the swine flu and the Norwegian Prime Minister, which were among the subjects with high ratings in the media in 2009, the news about Muslims in particular was problem and perception-oriented, the “Muslim identity” of the suspect was emphasized in the crime news, the representation figure was chosen as a stereotypical typology in describing the failure of integration of Somalian Muslims, the news under the headings “hidden Islamization” and “extreme Muslims” were frequently presented with extreme and polarized descriptions, and there was no objective description of Muslims in the media, stereotypes were produced with a negative depiction of Muslims, and in this respect, the Norwegian society developed an attitude and approach that associated Muslims with terrorism and violence (Imdi, 2009).

The New Zealand Attack The justification of the assumptions and claims that Breivik was considered as a role model by “Breivik fans” organized in the online virtual realm over the charisma of Breivik, and that new anti-multicultural attacks might be committed with the same motivation by new perpetrators as candidates soon to become Breiviks (Turner, 2014) were proven over Brenson Tarrant who was a New Zealander aggressor with his bloody act on March 15, 2019. Tarrant, who was an extreme Breivik fan, was live on social media on March 15, 2019 in Christchurch, New Zealand after starting an armed attack on two mosques (AlNoor and Linwood mosques) with Breivik’s method, and captured every moment of the massacre with his Go-Pro camera with a cold-blooded preparation and action style (Quek, Natasha, 2019). In this act in which 50 people lost their lives and dozens of people were injured, Tarrant left Breivik by targeting Muslims in the massacre as the only different method. It is obvious that the terrorist attack of Brenton Tarrant with heavy machine guns was similar to many digital games in terms of discrimination, grudge, hatred, and enmity towards Muslims spread through games, and these images, which were transferred from virtual to real life, were inspired by racist, Breivik-fan microbiologist sites that Tarrant also fed on (Akdoğan & Gelici, 2020, p.517). Ali Murat Kırık reported that the most striking one among these games was the Muslim Massacre, which was a game that was developed by Eric Vaughn in 2008. In this game, it is requested that women in veils and bearded men be killed. At the end of the game, Prophet Mohammed (PbuH) is intended to be killed. Also, according to Kırık, it would not be incorrect to argue that 28-year-old Brenton Tarrant was under the influence of such games, considering that he was 17 at the time when the game was presented. Because there are similarities between the game and the massacre committed (Kırık, 2019). It was also reported in several studies that Breivik played such violent games online passionately.

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Baeurum Al-Noor Mosque Terrorist Attack (August 10, 2019) On August 10, 2019, an attack was carried out in Norway in a format similar to the mosque attack in New Zealand. On the eve of Eid al-Adha, Norwegian Philip Manshaus entered the Baeurum Al-Noor mosque with equipment similar to the New Zealand attacker and with the live video recording method during the prayer exit but was neutralized by two people who noticed the situation at that moment. While Manshaus was firing, there were injuries as a result of struggles, but there was no loss of life in the mosque (Aftenposten, 11 Augsut, 2019). The police were called immediately, but the police arrived at the scene within 30 minutes, although the police station was 10 minutes away from the scene. In addition, the police hesitated for a while to enter the mosque. In the first moments when the incident took place and the attacker was held in the mosque, it was stated in the media that “gunshots were heard in Baerum and the incident was tried to be understood”. In the following hours, as new information came from the Norwegian Police, the media stated that the attacker could be a 22-year-old far-right terrorist. It soon became clear that the attacker had posted hateful messages on the online message board EndChan just before the attack, praising the murderous terrorist, the perpetrator of the events in Christchurch, New Zealand in March, for killing 50 people in the mosque. It was even revealed that the terrorist Manshaus wrote about his hatred of Muslims in an online manifesto, referring to US President Donald Trump as a “renewed symbol of white identity”. Another remarkable point was that it was understood after the incident that the attacker had murdered his half-brother at home just before the mosque attack. It was found that the attacker lost his mother at a young age, his father married another woman and they raised their daughter, who was adopted from China when she was 2-year-old, with Manshaus. It was stated that Manshaus, accused of murdering his 17-year-old half-sister at his home in Baerum (Dagbladet, 10 August, 2019), murdered his half-sister under the influence of ethnic nationalist ideas, and even in recent years, Anders Behring Breivik shared his anti-multicultural white racist ideas with his friends at school, and the situation was reported to the police by school administrators and friends. Just like Breivik, Manshaus gave the Nazi salute when entering the Oslo District Court. According to Norwegian media reports, Philip Manshaus, accused of committing a terrorist act and murdering his half-sister, was charged with the murder of his half-sister Johanne Zhangjia Ihle-Hansen (Penal Code 275) and the terrorist attack on the Al-Noor Islamic Center in Bærum (Penal Code 131). It is stated that the maximum sentence he will receive is 21 years in prison (Aftenposten, 19 August, 2019). According to the Aftenposten newspaper, the terrorist Philip Manshaus, who attacked the mosque, was recorded by the Norwegian Police Service in 2018 for sharing his extreme racist views on social media. The attacks on mosques in Oslo, Norway, and Christchurch, New Zealand, require authorities to take the increasingly normalized anti-Muslim sentiments in the media and social platforms seriously. What was similar in both attacks was that the mosque names chosen in the attack were “Al-Noor” Mosques. It is not known if this is a coincidence, but what is known is that the online networks of extremely racist and anti-Muslim groups transcend continents and it is not a coincidence that they mention Breivik as an idol in their common discourse about the act (Vg, 15 October, 2019).

OBJECTIVE This study aims to determine how the post-incident news of attack committed by Philips Manshaus, who followed Anders Behring Breivik’s footsteps and carried out a mosque attack in Baeurum, Norway, 84

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on 10 August 2019 was handled by the Norwegian main-stream printed media with a premise that held Islam and Muslims responsible for the massacre in a biased, ideological, and accusatory manner while keeping the criminal record to one side, immediately after the mass terror massacre committed by the white racist, anti-Islamic and anti-multicultural terrorist named Anders Behring Breivik in Norway on July 22, 2011. Briefly, this study aims to analyze the language and media discourse used by the Norwegian media while reporting Philip Manshaus’s mosque attack as a terrorist act, in the spotlights and sub-titles, and to determine the news policy.

METHODOLOGY Model of the Research This research, which aims to examine the news policy of the Norwegian mainstream media after the mosque attack in Norway, is a qualitative case study. Case studies focus on understanding the current dynamics with a created situation (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.540). Case study models are screening patterns that aim to make a judgment about a certain unit (individual, family, school, hospital, association, etc.) in the universe by determining its depth and breadth, its relations with itself, and its environment (Karasar, 2005, p.75). In this research, the three newspapers with the highest circulation in Norway are considered as a unit. The case is the point of view of the newspapers about the mosque attack.

Study Group The study group of the research consists of Aftenposten, Dagbladet, and VG newspapers with the highest sales figures in Norway.

Data Collection Tools and Data Collection Within the scope of the research, the data were obtained from the official websites of Aftenposten, Dagbladet, and VG newspapers. The news headlines and statements are from the first, fourth, and seventh days of each week for a period of four weeks between one day and 28 days after the mosque attack.

Analysis of Data Document analysis technique was used in the analysis of the data. As a document, the news stories about the mosque attack of the three newspapers published in Norway were used. The data obtained from these documents were analyzed with descriptive and content analysis methods. Descriptive analysis is carried out by summarizing the data obtained in the qualitative research process according to the determined themes. In the descriptive analysis, the original form of the data obtained in the research is preserved as much as possible and direct quotations are included. It is a type of analysis that provides more superficial information compared to content analysis, in which previously unclear themes are revealed since it is examined within the framework of predetermined themes (Yıldırım & Şimşek, 2011, p.26). NVIVO 11

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software was used in the analysis of the data. In addition, a word cloud was created. While creating the word cloud, 50 most repeated words and at least three characters were selected. Within the scope of the research, the researcher and another expert (Assessment and Evaluation Specialist) made the coding independently from each other. Then, 37 codings emerged including 11 sub-themes and 25 codes, and 1 theme. The following equation was used to calculate the consistency:

Consistency 

Number of compromises 1000 Total number of codings

A total of 35 codes were compromised. When placed in the equation, a compromise rate of (35/37) x100 = 94.59% was achieved. It can be stated that the coding consistency in the research was high. Two codes that could not be agreed upon were re-evaluated and a compromise was reached.

FINDINGS AND COMMENTS The News Reported by the Newspapers Themes, sub-themes, and codes of the news about the “Mosque Attack” published by the three newspapers (Aftenposten, Dagbladet, and VG) with the largest sales figures in Norway are given in Table 1. Table 1. The contents of the news made by the newspapers on the subject Theme

Sub-theme

Information About the Murderer

Code

f 50

Terrorist emphasis

26

Image at school

5

Killer’s interrogation

5

Comments from the murderer’s family

2

Informing before the event

2

Iems bought before the attack

2

Caracter analysis

2

Iterview with the lawyer

2

Te murderer’S radicalization process

1

Amament of the murderer

1

Cnnection of the murderer with the victim

1

Te murderer’s sympathy for the Laestian

1

Events

19 Mosque attack

12

Murdered woman

7

continues on following page

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Table 1. Contineud Theme

Sub-theme

Code

Legal Issues

f 18

Police interrogation

12

Psychological investigation

6

Norwegian People

13 Muslim perspective

9 Opinions of the mosque imam

4

Views of the Muslim people

3

Opinions of the President of the Islamic Council

2

Prspective of the conservatives

2

Lbertarian perspective

1

Fars of shooting clubs

1

Police Comments

5

First Information

3

Government

3 Pblic - Muslim public

2

Gvernment officials

1

Intervention/Arrest

2

Similarity to Breivik

1

Late Arrival of the Police

1

Is it an act of terrorism?

1

Total

116

Approach to the Representation of the Attacker According to the table, when the news about the “Mosque Attack” by the three biggest newspapers in Norway is examined, it is seen that a total of 116 codes emerged; 12 sub-themes of the “Information About the Killer” theme and 50 statements related to these sub-themes appeared most. Newspapers mostly referred to the sub-theme “Terrorist emphasis” (f = 26) related to this theme. Examples of expressions related to the “terrorist emphasis” are given below:

Use of the Term Terrorist In 26 of the 116 news stories we examined, it was seen that the term “terrorist” was used in various forms and phrases about Philip Manshaus. … terror suspect Philip Manshaus attended a public high school last year. Former students describe the attack as “unreal” (Aftenposten- 06-13.08.2019).

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After interviewing his family, friends and the terrorist himself, the police believe that Philip Manshaus went through a two-year period of radicalization before the attack on the mosque (Aftenposten- 1524.08.2019). …Philip Manshaus (22) accused of terrorism and murder said during his interrogation with the police that he wanted to kill as many people as possible in the Al-Noor mosque in Bærum (Aftenposten- 1730.08.2019). …Defense Lawyer for murder and terrorism suspect Manshaus …(Dagbladet-12- 16.08.2019). …accused the terrorist Philip Manshaus:….. (Dagbladet- 15- 20.08.2019). About the terror suspect, his school friend….. After the terrorist act of Manshaus, the newspapers in our sample group approached the event cautiously during the hot minutes of the event, did not engage in any bias or manipulation, and when the information became clear in a short time, they named Manshaus as “the attacker accused of terrorism and murder”, “terror suspect” or directly defined him by the term “terrorist”. However, despite the undoubted certainty that the incident was an act of terrorism at the first moment, it was understood that the term “terrorist” was used less frequently in the general context of the news than the characterizations such as murderer, suspect, or attacker, so the frequency of the word “terrorist” was not high. Therefore, it is seen that the media, which was biased, prejudiced, and refrained from calling Breivik a terrorist, did not show the same biased and clear approach to the attacker in the Manshaus attack, but showed a distinct hesitation in calling him a “terrorist”.

Focusing on the Attacker’s School Image In the theme of “Information About the Killer”, apart from “Terrorist emphasis”, the topics “His image at school” (f = 5), “Interrogation of the killer” (f = 5), “Comments of the killer’s family” (f = 2), “Information before the event” (f = 2), “The items he bought before the attack” (f = 2), “Character analysis” (f = 2), “Interview with his lawyer” (f = 2), “Radicalization process of the killer” (f = 2), “Armament of the killer” (f = 1), “The connection of the murderer with the victim” (f = 1), “The murderer’s sympathy with the Laestian community” (f = 1) were also included. Examples of news on the “his image at school” are given below: The story of Philip Manshaus: This is how they saw him change On the surface, everything seemed normal to those who knew him well. How did a shy, poetic, and tough schoolboy become a suspected terrorist and murderer? Philip Manshaus is described as a high school student interested in literature. Now the school has reviewed his texts to see if there is any indication in his writings”(Dagbladet- 10- 16.08.2019). Folkehøgskolen: - Police contacted about terrorist suspects

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Fellow students said that Philip Manshaus (21) had more extreme attitudes in public high school. Now the school administration confirms that they are in dialogue with the police” (VG- 05- 13.08.2019). The news about Manshaus’s School Image reveals the emotional state of having difficulty believing in his claim that he committed this act due to his interest in literature and art and his shy and introverted nature. Reporting on the difficulty of believing that Manshaus, as a city-born, educated person, committed this act of terrorism (or even though he himself declared that he would commit mass murder if he had the opportunity, he threatened to enter and shoot at the mosque with a go-pro camera live with a gun) may mean seeing the reasons that bring such a person with such beautiful characteristics to the point of attempting a terrorist act as legitimate for action in some way. Especially in these news reports, the presentation of large-size pictures of the terrorist in a suit, while giving a nazi salute, smiling, and giving a charismatic gaze without being filtered, serves the criminal thought universe that the terrorist serves. Even if the word “terrorist” is included in the news, depending on the news content or not, it causes the person who is the subject of the news to be glorified as a charismatic figure fighting for the interests of the nation and further encourages the members of the illegal anti-multicultural basin.

Representation of Manshaus on the Media in the Interrogation Process Examples of news on the subject of “The killer’s interrogation” are given below: Interrogation completed with Manshaus on Friday night: On Friday, police questioned terror suspect Philip Manshaus (21) at the Police House in Oslo” (Aftenposten - 09 - 17.08.2019). Defense attorney: Cooperated well with the police On Friday night, Manshaus, accused of terrorism and murder, finally made a statement during a police interrogation” (Aftenposten- 14- 23.08.2019). The expressions used in the newspapers seem to point to Manshaus’s admission of the accusation, and even his lamentation that he arrogantly wanted to kill more people but could not find the opportunity. One thing that can be criticized in the news is the publication of too many photos of Manshaus pointing to the detention and defense process. Because the photos published by the media in these news stories in the first stage of the incident serve to make the attacker, who was blocked by beating in the mosque and arrested with a bruised face, seem like the victim of a terrorist act rather than the perpetrator, and even are a covering and innocentizing approach to Manshaus’s cruel personality who attempted the mass murder. Due to this approach, presentation of the unfiltered large images of Manshaus’s arrogant and sarcastic smile in the following court and interrogation process, and even the irresponsibility of presentation of the photograph of him in the courtroom giving the nazi salute in a way that could be understood as serving the propaganda of a terrorist by the media, moving ahead of the content of the were repeated. Therefore, although the language and content of the news did not highlight a negative and manipulating approach during the court process, it should be kept in mind that the photographs used in the news serve or will heroize the perpetrator as if he has done a good thing. Likewise, such approaches serve as a kind of propaganda tool for anti-multiculturalism and the anti-Islamic environment. The idolization of terrorists, 89

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who are represented with their photographs in the media, as terrorist figures, and as charismatic figures means that they are portrayed as model figures and saviors fighting for the nation to the subconscious or superconscious minds. Because the fact that they dedicated both New Zealand and Manshaus attacks to Breivik and saw Breivik as a commander and idol character with the Nazi salute in court should show us that the photographing of the terrorist figure carries more meaning than one might think.

The Armament and Radicalization Process The newspapers also made news on the topics “Comments of the killer’s family” (f = 2), “Information before the incident” (f = 2), “Item bought before the attack” (f = 2), “Character analysis” (f = 2), “Interview with the lawyer” (f = 2), “Radicalization process of the killer” (f = 2), “Armament of the killer” (f = 1), “The connection of the killer with the victim” (f = 1), “The killer’s sympathy for the Laestian community” (f = 1). Examples of the news are given below: “Philip Manshaus’s father, after his son’s statement: I don’t understand who is behind such brainwashing.” Charged with murder and terrorism, Philip Manshaus (21) admits that he was the one who attacked the mosque in Bærum and killed his half-sister. Manshaus’s father says the case is extremely tragic and incomprehensible” (“Comments of the killer’s family”-VG- 08- 16.08.2019). “Tip-offs on Manshaus” taken within a few weeks: Police and PST interviewed Philip Manshaus (21) on a tip-off. Police received a tip-off about the perpetrator a year ago but chose not to contact him at the time. About a year ago, the police security service received a special tip about Philip Manshaus (21) accused of murder and terrorism.” (“Tipp-off before the incident”- Dagbladet- 06- 13.08.2019) “Philip Manshaus (21) charged with terrorism and murder Must have ordered equipment online before the attack The police are now thoroughly reviewing everything Philip Manshaus may have purchased prior to the mosque attack” (“The items he bought before the attack”- Dagbladet- 09- 16.08.2019). “Terrorist had access to legal hunting weapons There are many legally registered weapons in the house where the registered address of Philip Manshaus accused of murder and terrorism (21) is” (“Armament of the killer”- VG- 04-13.08.2019). “Manshaus visited Laestadian congregations

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NRK writes that terrorist and murder suspect Philip Manshaus (21) called Laestadian communities prior to the attack on the Al-Nur mosque last week. Eiksmarka, 21, is said to have attended various services, youth meetings, and to have been in an Easter meeting at the Bryn prayer house for the Laestadian congregations in Oslo. This claim was confirmed by several members of the congregation to the news channel NRK” (“The killer’s sympathy for the Laestian community”- Aftenposten- 11- 17.08.2019). Apart from the above theme, there are also news stories gathered under the headings of “Incidents” (f = 19), “Forensic Matters” (f = 18), “Norwegian People” (f = 13), “Comments of the Police” (f = 5), “Initial Information” (f = 3), “Government” (f = 3), “Intervention/Arrest” (f = 2), “Similarity to Breivik” (f = 1), “Late Arrival of the Police” (f = 1), “Is it a Terrorist Act” (f = 1).

Attitude and Reflex of the Media on the Event Day The theme of “Events” (f = 19) was divided into two sub-themes as “Mosque attack” (f = 12) and “Murdered woman” (f = 7). Examples of news stories about the “Mosque attack” and “Murdered woman” are given below: “Gunshots at a mosque in Bærum SHOOTING: Police in Oslo reported a gunfight at a mosque in Bærum” (“Mosque attack”- Dagbladet04- 10.08.2019). “Terror attack: See photos from inside the mosque Blood on the floors and walls. Bullet holes. And broken windows. The attack on the Al-Noor Mosque left its mark.” (“Mosque attack”- VG- 12- 17.08.2019). “The dead woman found in the house in Bærum may be from the same family as the arrested man. The man accused of shooting in the mosque on Saturday is now charged with murder and attempted murder. The police will try to question him on Sunday night” (“The murdered woman”-Aftenposten02- 10.08.2019). “The latest news on the man accused of attempted murder yesterday following the shooting at a mosque in Bærum. The man is also accused of murdering a woman” (“The murdered woman”- VG- 03- 10.08.2019). As can be seen, the media’s attempt to report the event by saying “a gunshot was heard in a mosque” at the time of the event and cautiously trying to convey the issue through the police statements show that the haste in the Breivik incident and the news that go beyond the police’s explanation and that contain preconceptions are not included.

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The theme “Forensic Issues” (f = 18) was divided into two sub-themes as “Police interrogation” (f = 12) and “Psychological investigation” (f = 6). Examples of the news about the “Police interrogation” and “Psychological investigation” are given below: “Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen will lead the ‘police assessment’ process regarding the mosque attack in Bærum. Denmark’s Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen will lead the assessment of the police and PST’s handling of the attack on the Al-Noor mosque in Bærum. Dalgaard-Nielsen is a researcher in terrorism, counterterrorism, leadership, and strategy and is head of the Strategy Department at the Defense Academy in Denmark and a professor at the SEROS research center at UiS in Norway” (“Police interrogation”- Aftenposten18- 30.08.2019). “Manshaus’s father: I don’t understand who is behind such brainwashing.” In a four-and-a-half-hour interrogation, Philip Manshaus admitted the facts today, but did not admit his guilt” (“Police interrogation”- Dagbladet- 11- 16.08.2019). “Psychologist will observe the terror suspect Philip Manshaus. Starting Wednesday, psychologist Marianne Teigland will conduct a preliminary assessment of Philip Manshaus” (“Psychological investigation”- Aftenposten- 13- 20.08.2019). “Full observation of Philip Manshaus is requested. After having the preliminary forensic psychiatric testimony, the police are now seeking a full forensic observation of the suspected terrorist, Philip Manshaus (21)” (“Psychological investigation”- VG-1327.08.2019). The theme “People of Norway” (f = 13) was divided into four sub-themes: “The perspective of Muslims” (f = 9), “The Perspective of Conservatives “ (f = 2), “Libertarian perspective” (f = 1) and “Fears of shooting clubs” (f = 1). In addition, the sub-theme “The perspective of Muslims” (f = 9) was divided into three codes: “views of the imam of the mosque” (f = 4), “views of the Muslim people” (f = 3), and “views of the head of the Islamic Council” (f = 2). Examples of news published by newspapers on these issues are given below: “The mosque attack in Bærum: - He is an enemy of humanity Imam Syed Mohammad Ashraf, at the Al-Noor mosque in Bærum, describes Saturday’s terrorist attack as an attack on all Norwegian society and all religious sites” (“Views of the mosque imam”- Dagbladet13- 16.08.2019). Imam after mosque attack: I am concerned about how children are feeling.

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Syed Mohammad Ashraf, Imam of BÆRUM (VG) at the mosque that was attacked on Saturday, says they are still afraid of what happened. He is concerned about what it would be like to come back. - I’m worried about how the children are feeling and I don’t know what will happen when the mosque opens and we are there. “We are still afraid and constantly worried about that,” Ashraf tells VG (“Views of the mosque imam”- VG- 07- 13.08.2019). “Norwegian Muslims seek help from police after mosque attack” Norwegian Muslims across the country do not feel safe after the attack in the mosque in Bærum and are asking for help from the police to keep the mosques safe” (“The views of the Muslim people”- Aftenposten- 12- 20.08.2019). “Head of Islamic Council: Very scary” A shooting was reported just before 16:00 at the al-Noor Islamic Center in Bærum, popularly known as the “Bærum Mosque”. One person was slightly injured and the perpetrator was held by someone who was at the mosque before the police arrived and picked up the suspect” (“The views of the head of the Islamic Council”- VG- 01- 10.08.2019). “God, I hope at least he got a lot of people...” This is how the online forum reacted during the attack on the mosque. In the hours after the mosque attack in Bærum, 26 people pretending to be White Norwegians joined the far-right discussion forum. According to the PST (Norwegian Secret Police Service), they are “a lot” of people. They incite mass murderers and call for a “racial war”. On American discussion forums like 8chan and 4chan, suspected terrorist Philip Manshaus met likeminded people” (“The perspective of Conservatives”- Aftenposten- 07- 16.08.2019). In addition, the newspapers also published news stories on “Police Comments” (f = 5), “Initial Information” (f = 3), “Government” (f = 3), “Intervention/Arrest” (f = 2), “Similarity to Breivik” (f = 1), “Late Arrivals of the Police” (f = 1), and “Is it an Act of Terrorism” (f = 1). Exemplary reports are given below: “Police reveals the name of the 17-year-old who was killed. It was Johanne Zhangjia Ihle-Hansen, 17, who was killed in Bærum on Saturday. Police said at a press conference Monday afternoon that the 21-year-old suspect recorded the attack on the mosque with a Gopro camera he attached to his head.

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- Police lawyer Pål-Fredrik Hjort Kraby says this provides important evidence to the police” (“Police Comments”- Aftenposten- 04- 13.08.2019). “Mosque attack in Bærum AUGUST, 10, 20:44 We do not suspect it is an act of terrorism. Rune Skjold, the police chief and division chief in the Oslo police district, told at a press conference on Saturday night that the perpetrator was a Norwegian citizen in his 20s living in the local community. - Do the police have any idea whether this is a terrorist attempt? - We have no reason to believe. We have no information on that, Skjold tells Dagbladet” (“Police Comments”- Dagbladet- 02- 10.08. 2019). “He is accused of murdering a young woman in Bærum On Saturday night, the police found a dead woman at an address in Bærum. The woman has a close family relationship with the man who was arrested following the shooting at a mosque” (“Initial Information”- Dagbladet- 01- 10.08.2019). “BREAKING NEWS: Police entered the house” A Norwegian man in his 20s was arrested following an armed attack at a mosque. There is now a large police force outside a house in Bærum” (“Intervention/Arrest”- Dagbladet- 03- 10.08.2019). “Therefore, Støre draws a parallel between the mosque attack and the attack on July 22. Jonas Gahr Støre, the Labor Party leader says the photos of a smiling perpetrator and the threat of mass shooting make it appropriate to draw a parallel line with the terror of July 22” (“Similarity to Breivik”- Aftenposten- 05- 13.08.2019). In addition, the theme of “Government” (f =3) was divided into two sub-themes as “Public-Muslim people” (f = 2) and “Government officials” (f = 1). Examples of news are given below: “SIV Jensen: - Our immigration policy will not deviate an inch. - FRP has not experienced any hatred of Islam. We raised our voices against radicalization.

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- We will never apologize for a strict immigration policy. As in the cartoon dispute, we will never apologize for defending the freedom of speech where the Labor Party is and Jonas is a father. - We will never apologize for upholding Norwegian values or for opposing forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and negative social control. This is happening in Norway today and of course, we should discuss it. - And I will not deviate an inch from the immigration policy in the future” (“Public-Muslim people”Dagbladet- 07- 13.08.2019).

Words Repeated Most The word cloud for the mosque attack is given in Figure 1, and the 20 most repeated words are given in Table 2. Figure 1. Word cloud about the news about the mosque attack in the newspapers

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Table 2. The 20 most repeated words about the news in the newspapers about the mosque attack Word

Number of characters

Number of citations

%

Manshaus

8

54

3.50

Police

6

54

3.43

Mosque

6

50

3.24

Philip

6

40

2.59

Bærum

5

33

2.14

Murder

6

31

2.01

Attack

6

27

1.75

Terrorism

9

25

1.62

Suspect

7

20

1.30

Terrorist

9

16

1.04

School

6

13

0.84

Year

4

12

0.78

Accused

7

11

0.71

Man

3

11

0.71

Norwegian

9

11

0.71

Charged

7

0.65

Forensic

8

0.65

People

6

0.65

Saturday

8

0.65

Kill

4

0.65

When Figure 1 and Table 2 are evaluated together, it is seen that the word “Manshaus” is emphasized the most (3.50%), followed by the words “Police” (3.43%), “Mosque” (3.24%), and “Philip” (2.59%) respectively. It can be stated that the words “murder”, “suspect” and “terrorist” are among the 20 most common words which were used regarding the person who carried out the attack. The word “suspect” is more frequently used than the word “terrorist”.

CONCLUSION We analyzed how Philip Manshaus’s armed terrorist attack on Baeurum Al-Noor Mosque near Oslo, the capital city of Norway on August 10, 2019, was reported in Aftenposten, Dagbladet, and VG newspapers, which can be described as the mainstream print media broadcasting in Norway, through a ‘case study’. The data obtained from these documents were analyzed with descriptive and content analysis methods. A total of 37 codes were extracted from the news. A total of 35 codes were compromised. When placed in the equation, it is seen that a compromise rate of (35/37)x100 = 94.59% was achieved. As a result, it can be stated that the coding consistency in the research is high. Two codes that could not be agreed upon were re-evaluated and a compromise was reached.

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When we examine the news spot headlines and sub-headings, it can be said that the reaction given in the first hours after the act reflects a “cautious” attitude. This attitude shows itself in all the 3 newspapers. The collective cautiousness of the media in the mentioned case can also be evaluated as an effect of regret or an effort to correct this negative image due to the hasty and accusatory reflex in the Breivik incident in the past. When we examine the news, we can say that as the details about the attacker were disclosed by the police and it became undoubtedly certain that the incident was a terrorist act, the media moved from being cautious about understanding the incident to characterize the perpetrator as a terrorist, gradually and abstainingly. Here, it is seen that the most common definition for the terrorist (3.50%) is “Manshaus”, followed by the words “Police” (3.43%), “Mosque” (3.24%), and “Philip” (2.59%). Therefore, the state of being cautious revealed an overly tolerant mood that characterized the terrorist with the word “suspect”. Because we can say that in the dataset of the most repeated words in the word cloud, the word “suspect” was preferred more by the newspapers than the word “terrorist” to describe the perpetrator. It can also be stated that the name of the person named “Manshaus” who carried out the attack is among the 20 most repeated words along with the words “murder”, “suspect” and “terrorist”. The fact that Manshaus killed his sister at home before this terrorist act can be seen as the reason why the newspapers described Manshaus as a “murderer”. An important point that can be criticized here is that the frequency of the media describing the perpetrator as a “terrorist” cannot surpass the frequency of the word “murderer” used after Manshaus killed his sister even though the armed attack at the mosque is a clear act of terrorism. Here, the attitude of the media to prioritize a particular act of killing over the perpetrator of a terrorist act with the motivation of mass murder is clear. In the final analysis, it seems that the media, which tries to adopt a balanced attitude in the analysis of Manshaus news, does not directly engage in an operation of perception and accusation. However, the fact that media, which reports the traumatic, criminal, and threatening images in the news by using very few images through filtering or using representative images in terms of media ethics in daily life, present the images of the perpetrators who carried out the act without filtering them can mean building role models for candidates to become Breivik and Manshaus, who are in a pathological mood and think that they will serve the country through this kind of acts.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-forprofit sectors.

REFERENCES Aftenposten. (.2019a, Aug. 11). En person skutt i moské i Bærum – gjerningsperson pågrepet. https:// www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/6jyLMo/en-person-skutt-i-moske-i-baerum-gjerningsperson-paagrepet Aftenposten. (2019b, Aug. 13). Derfor trekker Støre parallell mellom moskéangrepet og 22. https:// www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/Qo3Ryx/derfor-trekker-stoere-parallell-mellom-moskeangrepet-og-22-juli

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Aftenposten. (2019c, Aug. 19). Politiet til Aftenposten: - Philip Manshaus ønsket å skremme muslimer i Norge. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/kJy0o9/politiet-til-aftenposten-philip-manshaus-oensketaa-skremme-muslimer-i-norge Aftenposten. (2019d, Aug. 16). «Gud, jeg håper han får et solid drapstall». Slik reagerte nettforumet under angrepet på moskéen. “Tanrım, umarım sağlam bir cinayet oranı alır.” https://www.aftenposten. no/norge/i/rAe0WR/gud-jeg-haaper-han-faar-et-solid-drapstall-slik-reagerte-nettforumet Aftenposten. (2019e, Aug. 13). Vi ønsker å invitere alle inn, slik at folk som lurer på noe, kan snakke med oss direkte. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/dObOx1/vi-oensker-aa-invitere-alle-inn-slik-atfolk-som-lurer-paa-noe-kan-sna Aftenposten. (2019f, Aug. 10). Politiet: Mann fra området pågrepet, siktes for drapsforsøk. https://www. aftenposten.no/norge/i/50y1KW/politiet-mann-fra-omraadet-paagrepet-siktes-for-drapsforsoek Aftenposten. (2019g, Aug. 13). Politiet frigir navnet på den drepte 17-åringen. https://www.aftenposten. no/norge/i/8mj36r/politiet-frigir-navnet-paa-den-drepte-17-aaringen Aftenposten. (2019h, Aug. 16). Imam om Manshaus: Han er en fiende av islam og menneskeheten. https:// www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/XgeM9b/imam-om-manshaus-han-er-en-fiende-av-islam-og-menneskeheten Aftenposten. (2019i, Aug. 17). Avsluttet avhør med Manshaus fredag kveld: Siktede erkjenner de faktiske forhold. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/LAe45q/avsluttet-avhoer-med-manshaus-fredag-kveldsiktede-erkjenner-de-faktis Aftenposten. (2019j, Aug. 27). Vil ha fullstendig rettspsykiatrisk undersøkelse av Philip Manshaus. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/awpL02/vil-ha-fullstendig-rettspsykiatrisk-undersoekelse-av-philipmanshaus Aftenposten. (2019k, Aug. 13). Derfor trekker Støre parallell mellom moskéangrepet og 22. https:// www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/Qo3Ryx/derfor-trekker-stoere-parallell-mellom-moskeangrepet-og-22-juli Aftenposten. (2019l, Aug. 13). Her gikk terrorsiktede Philip Manshaus på folkehøgskole det siste året. Tidligere elever kaller angrepet «uvirkelig». https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/vQ8v3w/her-gikkterrorsiktede-philip-manshaus-paa-folkehoegskole-det-siste-aaret Aftenposten. (2019m, Aug. 23). Skal fortolkningen av vold bli kappløp om lettvinte forklaringer? Frank Rossavik. https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kommentar/i/awy8n4/skal-fortolkningen-av-vold-blikapploep-om-lettvinte-forklaringer-fr Aftenposten. (2019n, Aug. 30). VG: Manshaus har forklart at han ville drepe så mange som mulig. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/8mvAb2/vg-manshaus-har-forklart-at-han-ville-drepe-saa-mangesom-mulig Aftenposten. (2019o, Aug. 30). Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen skal lede politiets evaluering av moskéangrepet i Bærum. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/kJbjok/anja-dalgaard-nielsen-skal-lede-politiets-evalueringav-moskeangrepet Aftenposten. (2019p, Aug. 31). Politidirektoratet hadde møte med muslimske organisasjoner. https:// www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/wPbG0d/politidirektoratet-hadde-moete-med-muslimske-organisasjoner

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Aftenposten. (2019q, Aug. 20). Norske muslimer ber om politihjelp etter moskéskytingen. https://www. aftenposten.no/norge/i/2GXPyl/norske-muslimer-ber-om-politihjelp-etter-moskeskytingen Aftenposten. (2019r, Aug. 24). Politiet mener radikaliseringen startet sommeren 2017. https://www. aftenposten.no/norge/i/qL7pao/politiet-mener-radikaliseringen-startet-sommeren-2017 Aftenposten. (2019s, Aug. 17). Det sto om liv og død. Likevel brukte politiet 15 minutter til Bærumsmoskeen. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/pL4WXo/det-sto-om-liv-og-doed-likevel-brukte-politiet15-minutter-til-baerums Aftenposten. (2019t, Aug. 20). Psykologspesialist skal observere terrorsiktede Philip Manshaus. https:// www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/9vGqow/psykologspesialist-skal-observere-terrorsiktede-philip-manshaus Aftenposten. (2019u, Aug. 10). Død kvinne funnet i hus i Bærum, skal være i familie med pågrepet mann. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/Wbxwr2/doed-kvinne-funnet-i-hus-i-baerum-skal-vaere-ifamilie-med-paagrepet-mann Aftenposten. (2019v, Aug. 17). Manshaus oppsøkte læstadianske menigheter. https://www.aftenposten. no/norge/i/naO9RQ/manshaus-oppsoekte-laestadianske-menigheter Akdoğan, A., & Gelici, M. (2020). Avrupa’da çevirimiçi örgütlenmenin sanaldan gerçeğe uzanan tehlikeli şöhreti: Anti-İslamist terör. Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi., 13(72), 516–521. Alghamdi, E. A. (2015). The representation of Islam in western media: The coverage of Norway terrorist attacks. International Journal of Applied Linguistics and English Literature, 4(3), 198–203. Aydınalp, H. (2011). Din ve terör. Birleşik Kitabevi. Bangstad, S. (2012). Terror in Norway. American Anthropologist, 114(2), 351–352. doi:10.1111/j.15481433.2012.01430.x Dagbladet. (2019a, Aug. 20). Terrorsiktede Philip Manshaus:- Veldig uvanlig. https://www.dagbladet. no/nyheter/veldig-uvanlig/71504363 Dagbladet. (2019b, Aug. 16). Skal ha bestilt utstyr på nettet før angrepet. https://www.dagbladet.no/ nyheter/skal-ha-bestilt-utstyr-pa-nettet-for-angrepet/71492901 Dagbladet. (2019c, Aug. 16). Historien om Philip Manshaus: Slik så de ham endre seg. https://www. dagbladet.no/nyheter/historien-om-philip-manshaus-slik-sa-de-ham-endre-seg/71497481 Dagbladet. (2019d, Aug. 27). Foreslår fullstendig judisiell observasjon av Manshaus. https://www. dagbladet.no/nyheter/foreslar-fullstendig-judisiell-observasjon-av-manshaus/71531883 Dagbladet. (2019e, Aug. 13). Kvitterte ut Manshaus-tips på noen uker. https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/ kvitterte-ut-manshaus-tips-pa-noen-uker/71485891 Dagbladet. (2019f, Aug. 16). Manshaus’ far: - Forstår ikke hvem som står bak en slik hjernevask. https:// www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/manshaus-far---forstar-ikke-hvem-som-star-bak-en-slik-hjernevask/71499543

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Dagbladet. (2019g, Aug. 17). Forsvarsadvokat:- Han samarbeidet godt med politiet, Forsvarsadvokat:Han samarbeidet godt med politiet. https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/forsvarsadvokat--han-samarbeidetgodt-med-politiet/71499662 Dagbladet. (2019h, Aug. 16). Moskéangrepet i Bærum. https://www.dagbladet.no/studio/moskangrepeti-baerum-/383?post=17176 Dagbladet. (2019i, Aug. 10). Siktet for drap på ung kvinne i Bærum. https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/ siktet-for-drap-pa-ung-kvinne-i-baerum/71478687 Dagbladet. (2019j, Aug. 10). Moskéangrepet i Bærum. https://www.dagbladet.no/studio/moskangrepeti-baerum-/383?post=16917 Dagbladet. (2019k, Aug. 10). SISTE: Politiet har tatt seg inn i boligen. https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/ siste-politiet-har-tatt-seg-inn-i-boligen/71478588 Dagbladet. (2019l, Aug. 10). Løsnet skudd ved moské i Bærum, Atiş Yapilmasi. https://www.dagbladet. no/video/losnet-skudd-ved-moske-i-baerum/a7bXGZWn Dagbladet. (2019m, Aug. 16). Han er en fiende av menneskeheten. https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/ han-er-en-fiende-av-menneskeheten/71498725 Dagbladet. (2019n, Aug. 10). Skyting i moské i Bærum. https://www.dagbladet.no/studio/ nyhetsstudio/5?post=16910 Dagbladet, (2019o, Aug. 10). Siktet for drap på ung kvinne i Bærum. https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/ siktet-for-drap-pa-ung-kvinne-i-baerum/71478687 Eide, E. & Kjølstad, M. & Naper, A. (2013). After the 22 July Terror in Norway: Media Debates on Freedom of Expression and Multiculturalism. Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 3-4. Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management Review, 14(4), 532–550. doi:10.2307/258557 Eravcı, M. (2010). Avrupa’da Türk imajı. Çizgi Kitabevi. Gelici, M. (2020). İslamofobik tutum ve reflekslerin Türk toplumunun uyum süreçlerine etkisi: Norveç örneği. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. Basılmamış Doktora Tezi. Rize. Gökçe, O., & Gökçe, G. (2011). Avrupa’da İslam ve Türk İmajı. Birleşik Kitabevi. IMDi. (2009). Immigrants in the Norwegian media. www.imdi.no/aarsrapport2009 Karasar, N. (2005). Bilimsel araştırma yöntemi. Ankara: Nobel Yay. Kirchick, J. (2012, Sept.). Mocking Justice in Norway. The Breivik Trial Targets Contrarian Intellectuals. World Affairs. Mora, N. (2008). Medya ve kültürel kimlik. Uluslararası İnsan Bilimleri Dergisi, 5(1), 1–14. Quek, N. (2019). Bloodbath in Christchurch: The rise of far-right terrorism. RSIS Commentaries, 47. Süllü, Z. (2016). Terör ve medya. Siyasal Kitabevi.

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Turner, E. G. (2014). “Breivik is my Hero”: The Dystopian World of Extreme Right Youth on the Internet. The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 60(3). VG. (2019a, Aug. 16). Philip Manshaus’ far etter sønnens forklaring: − Forstår ikke hvem som står bak en slik hjernevask. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/LAe4aV/philip-manshaus-far-etter-soennensforklaring-forstaar-ikke-hvem-som-staar-bak-en-slik-hjernevask VG. (2019b, Aug. 27). Vil ha fullstendig observasjon av Philip Manshaus. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/ innenriks/i/jdbxXL/vil-ha-fullstendig-observasjon-av-philip-manshaus VG. (2019c, Oct. 15). Hvite massedrapsmenn finner inspirasjon i hverandre: Det er en «copycat»-tendens. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/P9eo3p/hvite-massedrapsmenn-finner-inspirasjon-i-hverandredet-er-en-copycat-tendens VG. (2019d, Aug. 30). Terrorsiktet i politiavhør: Ville drepe så mange som mulig. https://www.vg.no/ nyheter/innenriks/i/Opq7yO/terrorsiktet-i-politiavhoer-ville-drepe-saa-mange-som-mulig VG. (2019e, Aug. 16). Medelev om terrorsiktede: − Sa jeg ikke skulle tro det som sto om ham i mediene i sommer. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/BRv0Gw/medelev-om-terrorsiktede-sa-jeg-ikke-skulletro-det-som-sto-om-ham-i-mediene-i-sommer VG. (2019f, Aug. 16). Moské-heltene forteller om dramaet: Visste at jeg ville dø hvis jeg slapp ham. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/xPwr5B/moske-heltene-forteller-om-dramaet-visste-at-jeg-villedoe-hvis-jeg-slapp-ham VG. (2019g, Aug. 17). Skyteklubbleder etterlyser lovendring: Instruktører føler seg utrygge. https://www. vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/zGQE2v/skyteklubbleder-etterlyser-lovendring-instruktoerer-foeler-seg-utrygge VG. (2019h, Aug. 13). Terrorsiktet hadde tilgang til lovlige jaktvåpen. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/ innenriks/i/zGkWlv/terrorsiktet-hadde-tilgang-til-lovlige-jaktvaapen VG. (2019i, Aug. 13). Folkehøgskolen: Har blitt kontaktet av politiet om terrorsiktede. https://www. vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/8m76QA/folkehoegskolen-har-blitt-kontaktet-av-politiet-om-terrorsiktede VG. (2019j, Aug. 13). Moské-skytingen i Bærum: Vi må ta en alvorsprat om det tankegodset. https:// www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/i/RREJEx/moske-skytingen-i-baerum-vi-maa-ta-en-alvorsprat-om-dettankegodset VG. (2019k, Aug. 13). Imamen etter moské-skytingen: Bekymret for hva barna føler. https://www.vg.no/ nyheter/innenriks/i/8m76lQ/imamen-etter-moske-skytingen-bekymret-for-hva-barna-foeler VG. (2019l, Aug. 17). Terrorangrepet: Se bilder fra innsiden av moskeen. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/ innenriks/i/y3K5qE/terrorangrepet-se-bilder-fra-innsiden-av-moskeen Yıldırım, A., & Şimşek, H. (2011). Sosyal bilimlerde nitel araştırma yöntemleri. Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Al-Noor Mosque: Names of mosques with the same names chosen as targets in Brenson Tarran’s attack in New Zealand and Manshaus in Norway. Anti-Islamism: The instinct to avoid, fear and flee from Islam and Muslims, although it is not based on any reality. Breivik Massacre: Anders Behrig Breivik carried out on July 22, 2011 in the direction of his extremist anti-multicultural ideas, in the Ministry of Labor and Utoya island in Oslo, Norway, and caused mass deaths. Manshaus Attack: The terrorist attack carried out by Breivik fan Philip Manshaus on the eve of Eid al-Adha, on 10 August 2019, on a mosque named Al-Noor in Baerum city, near Oslo, the capital of Norway. Media Analysis: It is the analysis of newspaper news with descriptive analysis and content analysis methods by centered on the data obtained from newspaper documents. Multiculturalism: Multiculturalism is a word that describes a society in which many different cultures live together. Tarrant Massacre: The tragic terrorist incident in which 50 Muslims were brutally murdered as a result of the Breivik method of armed attack on Al-Nur and Linwood mosques, respectively, by Brenson Tarrant on 15 March 2019 in Christchurch, New Zealand.

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Counterterrorism and Media

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Chapter 7

Comparing National vs. International Coverage of Terrorism:

A Framing Analysis of the Reina Nightclub Terrorist Attack Burcu Pinar Alakoc University of Chicago, USA Emel Ozdora-Aksak Bilkent University, Turkey

ABSTRACT While terrorist incidents are physically, psychologically, and financially costly, they also provide targeted governments with a window of opportunity to engage in public diplomacy in the international arena. In the wake of terrorist attacks, leaders of the targeted countries can try to use media outlets to convey intentionally crafted messages and framing strategies, described generally as public diplomacy, to foster dialogue and shape international public opinion. The success of public diplomacy, however, depends on how far these national messages reach, and how effective they are in swaying international public opinion. Drawing on national and international news sources, this study conducts a framing analysis of 40 new stories covering the Reina nightclub terrorist attack, which took place in Istanbul on New Year’s Eve of 2017. It analyzes the similarities and differences in the national versus international media coverage of the incident and discusses their implications for the effectiveness of Turkish public diplomacy.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch007

Copyright © 2022, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 Comparing National vs. International Coverage of Terrorism

INTRODUCTION Violent and terrifying, most terrorist attacks make the global headlines. When a vehicle plows into pedestrians on a busy street, or when a suicide bomber explodes in the middle of a shopping district killing innocent people and causing destruction, cameras start rolling and bring the tragic footage from the scene of the incident into people’s homes. Studies that look at the relationship between terrorism and mass media suggest that there is a symbiotic relationship between the two: publicity feeds terrorism, and terrorism generates more publicity, increasing news ratings (Wilkinson, 1999; Hoffman, 2006; Peresin, 2007; Koblin, 2015; Nacos, 2016). While media outlets provide terrorist organizations with a credible platform to make and spread their propaganda, terrorist incidents, much to the dismay of their perpetrators, also provide governments of targeted societies with an opportunity to influence public opinion (Melnick and Eldor, 2010; Jetter, 2017; Tuman, 2010; Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006). In the wake of collective social tragedies such as terrorism, political leaders often appear before national and international audiences and give speeches using unifying rhetoric around national solidarity and international cooperation. In this context, terrorist attacks can become strategic communication tools for governments to clarify their positions, ground their political and moral standing, attribute responsibility in ways that align with their national security interests, and justify their policy responses to broader audiences. All of these efforts by political leaders to positively influence international public opinion are known as public diplomacy (Yarchi et al., 2013; Malone, 1985). For public diplomacy efforts to be successful, the political actors in question should employ carefully crafted discursive practices that strategically narrate the incident from the government’s perspective, include distinct labels to distinguish between perpetrators and victims, and justify planned courses of action while resonating with both national and international audiences. In this regard, effective public diplomacy will increase the visibility of strategic discourse crafted by the national government within the international news media following an incident of grand scale. The extant literature on media, terrorism and public diplomacy focuses primarily on different uses of public diplomacy as a communication strategy, engages in cross-country comparative analysis of media portrayals of various terrorist incidents, and elaborates how terrorist groups might seize on targets of opportunity to promote their ideology and violent agenda (Patrick, 2014; Papacharissi and Oliveira, 2008; Yarchi, 2016; Jetter, 2017). What is under-emphasized in this literature is how national governments engage in public diplomacy, namely deploying intentional frames and discursive strategies, in an effort to influence international news coverage, shape international public opinion, and support their nation’s image abroad (Sheafer and Gabay, 2009). When an Islamic State operative attacked the famous Reina nightclub in Istanbul on New Year’s Eve of 2017, Turkey was once again in the spotlight. The Reina nightclub, located in the lively Ortakoy neighborhood, was one of the most exclusive and expensive nightclubs in Istanbul frequented by celebrities, tourists, journalists, businessmen, and other high-profile visitors. Crowded and popular, the nightclub made an excellent target to inflict maximum damage with minimal effort while also garnering substantial media attention. The attack killed 39 people and wounded more than 70 others including Turkish citizens and foreign visitors (Yakici, 2017). The incident was covered by both national and international news sources shortly after it took place. In this paper, we conduct a framing analysis of news stories to understand the similarities and differences in the national versus international media coverage of the Reina nightclub incident. To the extent that Turkish public diplomacy is effective, the national and international coverage of the Reina terror attack should align, and we will see similar discourses, 105

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common themes and frames across different media outlets. In cases where the coverage does not align, we will analyze the differences in the national versus international discourses and discuss their implications for the effectiveness of Turkish public diplomacy.

BACKGROUND Terrorist groups crave recognition, publicity and media attention, and in many instances, try to manipulate media coverage of their attacks to psychologically hurt, shock and control targets beyond their immediate victims. In the words of Brian Jenkins (1974), “terrorism is a theatre” which is carefully calculated and choreographed for groups to gain leverage and spread fear to a wide range of audience. At times, terrorist propaganda and manipulation might succeed in furthering the cause of terrorists. For instance, in response to the domestic outrage created by the news coverage of the 1985 hijacking of the TWA flight 847 by Hezbollah, the Reagan administration pressured the Israeli government into releasing a number of Lebanese and Palestinian detainees in exchange for the release of American hostages held by the Shia militants (Hoffman, 2006). Yet, such government concessions are few and far between, and in many cases terrorist groups fail to accomplish their main policy objectives (Abrahms, 2006). Hence, media attention can be a double-edged sword for the perpetrators of terrorism and does not always end in ways amenable to the terrorist agenda. This is especially true when governments of targeted societies manipulate media coverage of terrorism and promote select frames and discourses in line with their national interests and political agendas. In his seminal work, Goffman (1974) defined framing as ‘embodiments of the principles of organization which govern social events’ (Du and Li, 2017, p. 286). In Goffman’s terms, frames are utilized primarily as methods of interpretation, which help individuals make sense of their social experiences and situations. Using and sharing primary frames, people interpret and assess social events by deeming certain aspects of these as meaningful and others meaningless. Building on Goffman’s work, Entman (2008) defines framing as underlining and headlining certain parts of an incident to advocate a specific perception. Even though state leaders and governments do not have full control over the flow of information on mass media outlets, they use their authority to frame information to their advantage (Marat, 2009). Political actors have an important role in framing events for mass media, they pick a specific viewpoint to define and (re)construct events in order to impact progression of information transfer and opinions of foreign publics in their favor (Canel, 2012). National news agencies, in this regard, have a special role in making sure that certain frames are pushed forward and specific discourses are emphasized to ensure effective public diplomacy and have a strong agenda setting effect internationally. Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004) argue that news selection and framing through giving salience to certain issues is the core of agenda setting to emphasize their relative significance, especially those of international news events. Wanta and Hu (1993) suggest that international news stories, especially conflict-related stories and solid presentations, have a strong impact on the American public opinion, revealing the agenda setting power of international news. A strong example on how these two, public diplomacy and framing, are complementary is the case of terrorism and its communication. Terrorist attacks often necessitate crisis communication as they contain risk and uncertainty, require effective messaging efforts and affect the reputation of organizations (Canel and Sanders, 2010), in this case governments and their national and international policies.

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In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the mainstream media in the US unanimously told a narrative of ‘evil versus good’ and overwhelmingly used the war metaphor, comparing the attack to Pearl Harbor and identifying possible targets for military retaliation. These efforts helped to condition the public to think that the war on terror was imminent and necessary: (…) in the hours following the attacks through midnight, news anchors and correspondents at the three TV networks combined used the word war fifty-seven times and the term war on terrorism or war against terrorism four times… Comparisons to Pearl Harbor were nearly as numerous; anchors, correspondents, and those they interviewed used the term fifty-eight times(…)The attack and the perpetrators were repeatedly characterized as ‘evil’ and repeatedly contrasted to the courageous, unified, good nation wronged by evildoers (Nacos, 2016, p. 409) In addition, the leading news organizations in their post-9/11 broadcasts called for national unity and undivided public support for the decisions and actions of the president including the administration’s counterterrorism policy and accompanying military operations in the wake of the attack (Nacos, 2016). In other words, the majority of the mainstream media coverage of the 9/11 attacks in the US can be said to have supported the framing strategies constructed by the government advocating a nationalist discourse. Another example of the press working alongside the government is in the case of the London bombings dated July 7, 2007, when framing strategies used by the government was generally favored by both the national media and the people (Canel and Sanders, 2010). However, government authorities might not always be successful in conveying their messages to target audiences. Strategic discourse promoted by a political leadership in response to a terrorist incident are not necessarily accepted by national or international media sources. For instance, the coverage of the 2003 Iraq war was remarkably different across the board. In countries that supported the US and the Coalition of the Willing, the invasion of Iraq was justified, and the overall media coverage was supportive of an anticipated military action. However, in countries that opposed the war, the news coverage of the invasion was very graphic and highly critical. According to Nacos (2016) even in countries whose political leadership generally sided with and supported the United States’ foreign and counterterrorism policies, it was hard to find a uniform response among the major media outlets. Thus, effectively managing public diplomacy to influence public opinion becomes especially important during times of crisis such as when terrorism strikes. By focusing on the media framing of the Reina nightclub terrorist attack, this study seeks to analyze whether and how the government of a targeted society might employ certain frames and messages to serve its own interests and shape international public opinion. Based on the preceding discussion, our expectation is that following the Reina incident, Turkish government officials and the national news agency will draw attention to the victimization of the country, call for solidarity and seek international support for cooperation against terrorism. If the government-initiated public diplomacy is effective, then we are likely to see an overlap in the choice of common frames and themes among national and international news media. In cases where national and international discourses are different, we will identify what these differences are, and assess their consequences for the effectiveness of Turkish public diplomacy. With these purposes, this study seeks to answer the following research questions: RQ1. What are the major themes and frames used in the national (Turkish) and international news media pertaining to the Reina nightclub attack? 107

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RQ2. In what ways do these national and international themes and frames align with or diverge from one another? RQ3. Are the perspectives of the domestic actors evident in national and international news media?

METHODOLOGY Data Collection Data for this study were collected on 26 December 2018 via LexisNexis Academic Search Database based on the following key words: Reina terror attacks, Istanbul club terror attack, Istanbul terror attack to make sure that all news articles related to the attack were collected. A total of 40 news stories are included in this study after duplicate stories were removed. Among these, 19 come from Turkey’s national news agency, Anadolu Agency, and 21 come from three major international news outlets: 4 from the Guardian, 8 from the New York Times, and 9 stories from Asharq Alawsat, which is an Arabic international newspaper headquartered in London. Using both national and international news media enables us to have access to a wide range of perspectives and reporting styles and sets the stage for comparison among different media portrayals of the same event. The news stories included in the analysis covers a one-month period from the day of the attack, which was 31 December 2016 until January 31, 2017.

Coding and Analysis This study analyzes the major features of national and international news reporting pertaining to the Reina terrorist attack in the one-month period after the incident. Drawing on prominent messages and issues raised in the news articles, our analysis explores whether the national and international coverage of the same incident converge around similar discourses, or if the coverage varies noticeably as we move from national to international sources. Our framing analysis aims to capture meanings of key messages, issues emphasized, and sources identified. To do that, we analyze three major features of the news coverage about the Reina attack in detail: 1) overall discourse pertaining to the incident in the news stories, 2) facts presented and conclusions reached by the news stories, and 3) perspectives of the domestic actors featured in the news stories. The first part of our analysis focuses on the coverage of the incident, particularly the main discourse and key frames used to define the attack, perpetrators and victims. The second part focuses on the media coverage of the causes and consequences of the Reina nightclub terror incident, claim of responsibility, and discussion of military response and retaliation. The third and final part of our analysis investigates and compares different types of sources featured in news stories to determine whether the perspectives of the domestic actors can be found in both national and international news sources. All news articles included in the analysis were coded conjointly until both of the authors reached an agreement regarding the saliency of certain themes through qualitative inter-subjectivity.

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FINDINGS Framing of the Incident, Perpetrators, and Victims in National vs. International Coverage The terminology used by the mainstream news media while reporting a violent incident matters to a great extent. The ways incidents, perpetrators and victims are described in the news stories significantly affect whether public perception would lean toward validation and sympathy or fear and vilification (Fisher, 2017; Kearns et al., 2019). In this context, we look at the overall discourse and key frames used regarding the Reina terrorist attack in national and international news media over a one-month period after the incident. Our analysis demonstrates that the Reina incident is labelled differently in national and international news stories. In Anadolu Agency news articles, the attack is generally framed as a terrorist incident; twelve out of nineteen news stories refer to the incident as a terrorist attack, terror, or terrorism. Other prominent descriptions used are Istanbul attack, nightclub attack, massacre and new year’s eve attack. In the international news stories, however, the incident is prominently framed as nightclub attack, followed respectively by massacre, and (mass) shooting. Contrary to the framing of the national news agency, international news sources are not too eager to instantly label the Reina incident as a terrorist attack. In fact, the actual words of terror or terrorist attack are rarely used in international news stories, and when they are, they are mostly included in the news articles as part of condemnation messages by international leaders, not as a rhetorical choice of editorial decision. When it comes to the description of the perpetrator, the stories published by the Turkish news agency immediately following the attack had a neutral tone. These stories refer to the perpetrator of the incident as an alleged shooter, or suspect, but as the investigations regarding the attack continue, and details surface, the tone changes from neutral to negative and in these later stories, the perpetrator is frequently referred to as an attacker, or terrorist. In international news reports, on the other hand, most stories refer to the perpetrator as a gunman or attacker. In two of these news stories, ISIS-linked news agencies are cited, which describe the perpetrator as a heroic soldier of the caliphate whose attack was justified on the basis of its target selection, namely the Christians celebrating their pagan feast (“Turkeys Says Suspect is Captured,” 2017). In the national news agency’s stories, victims are referred to as innocent civilians and vulnerable people. In addition, the security guard at the Reina nightclub who was killed on duty on the night of the attack is also frequently mentioned and referred to as a martyr. Only three out of nineteen news stories by Anadolu Agency discuss the nationalities of the victims or list their countries of origin, which include Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Belgium, France, Canada, Russia, and India. Other than nationality, there is little to no information provided on the victims especially on those who were Turkish due to the restrictions on news coverage imposed by the Turkish government. On the contrary, in international news sources it is possible to find stories that share detailed accounts of the backgrounds of the victims, featuring interviews with family members and eyewitnesses. Unlike the Anadolu Agency news articles, international news stories go beyond exclusively reporting the nationalities of the victims and include information on their backgrounds, occupations, ages, and families. Compared to only three national new stories that publish statements of condolences and condemnation by world leaders, ten international stories on the attack include messages by prominent political leaders

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condemning the attack and expressing their condolences, as well as statements issued by foreign ministers or consulates confirming the identities of the victims, who were citizens of their respective countries: Nurana Gasanova, 28, a Russian citizen, also died in the attack, an official from the Russian consulate in Istanbul told RB, a news website…The death of Mr. Rizvi, the Bollywood producer, was confirmed by Sushma Swaraj, the foreign minister of India, who said she was arranging for his family to go to Turkey (Chan and Bilefsky, 2017, January 1, para. 14) Additionally, in both national and international news sources, the number of casualties are reported including the number of people killed and wounded as a result of the attack, and this information is regularly updated as those initially reported injured had lost their lives.

Framing of the Causes and Consequences of the Reina Attack in National vs. International Coverage In the second part of our analysis of the similarities and differences between national and international media coverage of the Reina terrorist attack, we investigate how the Anadolu Agency and international news stories present their facts and draw conclusions with respect to the causes and consequences of the attack. Particularly we analyze the media coverage of the causes of the attack, claim of responsibility and discussion of military response and punishment. In their discussion of the causes of the attack and claim of responsibility, Turkish news articles describe the incident as a terrorist attack carried out by the Islamic State as an act of vengeance in response to the long-running military operations of Turkey in Northern Syria. While clear in terms of attribution of responsibility underlining the involvement of the Islamic State, a few of these news stories also point an accusatory finger at the Western nations for the regional troubles and the rise of terrorism inside the borders of Turkey. In one of these stories, Turkey’s deputy premier at the time is quoted referencing the Sykes-Picot agreement and alluding to the detrimental policies of Western powers in the Middle East wreaking havoc and creating political instability in the region for many years: The big picture is very clear and distinctive. After 100 years, the Sykes- Picot signatories, who won World War I by creating countries with artificial borders and resetting the political order, unfortunately succeeded and are now planning phase two of the pact (Akcay, 2017, January 4, para.2) The parallel drawn between the current political unrest and the Sykes-Picot agreement, which divided the Arab lands under the rule of the Ottoman Empire into British and French spheres of influence in 1916, thereby creating artificial borders in the Middle East, is particularly important because it shifts the responsibility and blame away from domestic policies of the government to the wrongdoings of international actors in the Middle East. These types of accusations often serve to create a hostile environment, which is not particularly conducive to building partnerships with international allies or promoting cooperation against terrorism. In another Turkish news story, it is claimed that the US government had prior intelligence about the attack, a claim that was later denied by the US Embassy in Turkey (Atilgan, 2017). The provocative and accusatory tone of the Turkish government blaming the Western countries for the political struggles of Turkey is not lost on the international news media. An article by the New York Times points out that the government of Turkey blames the US for nearly every crisis that the country 110

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has faced in recent years from the failed coup attempt in July 2016 to the assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara in December 2016, all of which inevitably drive a wedge between the two NATO allies at a critical time: The West symbolized by the United States, is the perennial bogeyman…supporting Turkey’s enemies, including the Islamic State; Kurdish militants; and supporters of an exiled Muslim cleric, Fethullah Gulen, whom Mr. Erdogan blamed for directing the coup (…) Mr. Erdogan, (…) told his audience what he believed Turkey, in facing so many attacks, was really up against: a plot by the West (Arango, 2017, January 4, para. 8) In contrast, while reporting the causes of the attack, international news stories offer more breadth and depth by situating the Syrian civil war in a broader historical and political context as well as discussing the detrimental consequences of Turkey’s military involvement in the region. We see that international coverage is highly critical of the political decisions made by the Turkish government. Some news stories attribute Turkey’s vulnerability in face of terrorism to government’s incompetency and wrongheaded foreign policies in general: Committed to supporting the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Turkey felt the jihadists could be managed while they fought with forces loyal to the Syrian government. But that policy ultimately changed, as Turkey worked to secure its borders, under pressure from its allies as it took in millions of Syrian refugees and as terrorist attacks rocked the country. Turkey began a military intervention in northern Syria in August that put its forces on the front lines against Kurdish militants as well as Islamic State fighters. This turned the jihadists decidedly against Turkey, prompting their leaders to call for attacks there (Arango, 2017, January 2, para.15) Compounding the mistakes in the area of foreign policy, haphazardly designed and poorly handled domestic policies are put forth as possible explanations for Turkey’s becoming an easy target for the terrorist attacks by the Islamic State. These policies included the government’s imposition of an Islamic agenda that challenges the secular way of life in the country and the leadership’s alleged support for Islamic fundamentalism. Additionally the deep polarization of Turkish society along secular and conservative lines, the growing chasm and intolerance between these two groups and the spread of hate speech are highlighted as contributing factors to Turkey’s present day entanglements: (…) the attack on Reina (…) seemed to symbolize one of Turkish society’s deepest divides, between the secular and the pious - a fissure that has grown deeper under Mr. Erdogan, an Islamist who has expanded religious schooling and sought to restrict alcohol sales (…) A recent Friday sermon prepared by the government’s religious authority said that New Year’s revelry belonged to ‘other cultures and other worlds (Arango, 2017, January 1, para. 26) When it comes to claim of responsibility for the attack, some international news stories do not include any claim of responsibility while others reference the Islamic State’s official statement declaring that they are behind the attack. Although not mentioned in the national news reports, international media sources, particularly the New York Times and Asharq Alawsat, also frequently cite the alarming statements released by the ISIS-affiliated Nashir Media Foundation calling for attacks against Turkey such 111

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as “turn holiday season into days of terror and blood” or “turn their happiness and joy into grief.” In a different statement, affiliates of the Islamic State accuse Turkey of “being the protector of the cross” based on which they justify carrying out terrorist attacks in Turkey: ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack the next day and said in a statement that it had been carried out ‘in continuation of the blessed operations that the ISIS is conducting against Turkey, the protector of the cross’ (“Turkeys Says Suspect is Captured,” January 14, 2017) In order to see how the national and international media sources report retaliatory military response in response to the Reina attack, we examine military response and punishment, which account for the unilateral punitive actions taken by the target government against the perpetrators, sponsors and supporters of terrorism. In this context, we look at the convergence and divergence of media coverage around the reporting of the punitive and preventive actions including investigations underway, emergency measures taken, and counterterrorism operations launched. We find that both national and international media sources adopt an administrative discourse while reporting the military measures referencing activities such as regulatory procedures, notices or announcements and judicial decisions taken by the incumbent government in response to the incident. In this context, Anadolu Agency’s news coverage is mostly comprised of short news articles that focus on the immediate responses or emergency measures taken by the Turkish government. The content is therefore limited to the number of suspects arrested based on their alleged links to the terror groupor those detained with aid and abet charges waiting for trial. Other stories discuss the current and previous counterterrorism operations conducted by the Istanbul Police Department’s anti-terror branch and counterterrorism teams in order to locate and arrest terrorists as well as eliminate the hubs and sleeper cells across the city belonging to the Islamic State. These operations included house raids to locate people suspicious of terrorist activity, and to confiscate rifles, ammunition, and other weapons as well as seize passports, documents and digital equipment belonging to the members of the Islamic State (Guldogan, 2018). While international news stories also provide information and updates on government-led investigations that have been underway and number of suspects arrested in relation to the attack, what is different in international coverage is that stories are rich in detail and provide convincing political observations and analyses in general. In so far as the detailed coverage goes, international news sources thoroughly explain various measures taken by the Turkish government in response to the attack such as extended state of emergency, tightened borders, vehicle checkpoints, night raids on houses and special police operations. International news sources also discuss the broader political consequences of the retaliatory military action and counterterrorism measures. For instance, one article in the Guardian raises a poignant concern that following this attack, Turkey would inevitably find itself in the middle of a rekindled conflict with the terrorist groups in the region (Baydar, 2017). Another article in the same newspaper notes that the fight against terrorism helped reveal the weaknesses of existing alliances. Fighting terrorism necessitates timely coordination and cooperation among international actors. However, collective action might not be possible if the target country is convinced that their allies would fall short of these expectations and fail to do their part, which explains why the exiting tensions between different actors have exacerbated: Turkey and Russia stand to take ownership of the ISIS fight, particularly inside Syria. If Al-Bab falls, Erdogan could then claim to have liberated three Syrian towns- Jarablus and Manbij being the others.

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The offensive would geographically isolate Raqqa but politically damage Barack Obama and box in his successor. Turkey(…) intensified its feud with the US claiming that Washington has not been providing it with air cover in Al-Bab and that a failure to back its offensive could lead it to deny access to the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey (Chulov, 2017, January 4, para. 9) International news sources also make frequent references to the news blackout imposed by the Turkish government. A critical news story notes that Turkish government was quick to announce an investigation to be carried out against 347 social media users, who tweeted or used other online platforms to post messages about the Reina terrorist attack. In order to block the news coverage of the attack, the Turkish government took these investigations a step further and announced that those reporting on this incident before the government investigation was completed would be considered supporters of terrorism by a newly invoked law: The Turkish prime minister, Binali Yildirim, immediately cracked down on news coverage of the attack. He directed news outlets to await official government updates. He invoked a law that casts reporting on such attacks as supporting terrorists (Mele, 2016, December 31, para. 18) Given this picture, it is possible to conclude that the international coverage of the Reina nightclub attack is multifaceted, detailed and analytical, whereas Anadolu Agency’s coverage is comprised of short stories that focus on factual statements and immediate outcomes rather than an elaborate analysis of the underlying causes and consequences of the attack.

Framing of the Perspectives of Domestic Actors in National vs. International Coverage In the final part of our analysis, we investigate the types of sources featured to see the extent to which the perspectives of domestic actors such as political leaders, policy makers and journalists are reflected in national and international news media. Our expectation is that the domestic perspective would be evident in the Anadolu Agency news articles, and to the extent that Turkish public diplomacy is successful, the views of domestic actors would also be well received and represented in the international news media. Our analysis demonstrates prominent, yet surprising differences among the national and international coverage of the sources featured. In Anadolu Agency news reports, due to media censorship, the perspectives and voices of different domestic actors are not easily identifiable. Depending on the sensitive content of their messages, the identities of the sources may either be revealed or kept confidential in these news stories. For example, if a state official, religious leader or policy maker makes a statement solely condemning the terrorist attack or expressing their condolences, then their names, titles and positions are openly stated in the news story: ‘the armed attack on the vulnerable people in the first hours of the new year hurt our nation deeply. There is no difference whether this inhuman massacre is carried out in a bazaar, a place of entertainment or a place of worship’ Gormez, head of the Religious Affairs Directorate, said in a written statement that described the attack as savagery (Arik, 2017, January 1, para. 2)

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On the other hand, if the information being shared is deemed sensitive by the Turkish government for the purposes of national security, not only is the identity of the source left anonymous, but the content of the message is kept purposely vague and brief: A comprehensive investigation into the terror attack remains underway, the source, who spoke on condition on anonymity due to restrictions on talking to the media (Akcay, 2017, January 12, para. 2) In so far as the international perspective goes, Anadolu Agency news stories only include statements by foreign leaders who condemn the attack, or social media messages of sympathy and support by prominent political actors: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini tweeted: ‘Our thoughts are with victims and their loved ones. We continue to work to prevent these tragedies’. British Ambassador to Turkey Richard Moore tweeted: ‘Saddened and shocked to see more pain and heartache visited on Turkey as we enter the New Year’ (Arik, 2017, January 1, para. 26) When we look at international news coverage, we see that the sources featured are more diverse and their political commentaries are published in full. When the information shared is sensitive, international news stories, much like their national counterparts, keep the identity of the source confidential, but unlike the national news media, international news do not censor the content of the message. To give one example, the following message was published in the New York Times: A senior United States official, who has been briefed on the investigation and spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss confidential details, said the Turks had recovered the video from a raid on a house in Istanbul. The official said the Turks now believed the killer was from Uzbekistan, not Kyrgyzstan, as many reports this week had first suggested (Arango, 2017, January 4, para. 12) Additionally, we see that a higher number and variety of domestic sources, including not only Turkish political leaders and government officials, but also writers, journalists, academics, and citizens, are being referenced in international news media. As a result, the perspectives, criticisms and concerns of various domestic actors in Turkey in response to the acts of terrorism are more evident in international sources than in national ones. For instance, just three days after the terrorist attack, the Guardian published an opinion piece by prominent Turkish novelist Elif Shafak, where she harshly criticizes the Turkish government for its repeated mistakes in Syria and its role in the rise of intolerance and hatemongering in Turkey, both of which culminated in the Reina atrocity (Shafak, 2017). Similarly, the New York Times published a number of articles in which Turkish journalists and topical experts raise their concerns over enhanced domestic and regional instability, and paint worrisome picture of Turkey alluding to the deep polarization of the country along religious, ethnic and class-based lines under the leadership of Erdogan (Arango, 2017). Opinions and commentaries of Turkish citizens in response to the Reina incident are also widely shared in international sources. When it comes to the government’s perspective, in international news stories, it is possible to find a wide range of official public statements by various Turkish political leaders and decision-makers responding to criticisms over the Reina terror attack. In one of these stories published in Asharq Alawsat, for instance, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is quoted during his meeting with local administrators at the presidential 114

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palace in Ankara, stating that “there is no point trying to blame the attack in Istanbul on differences in lifestyle” (“Ankara Identifies Reina Attacker,” January 5, 2017). Based on the presented evidence, it is possible to conclude that a) the types of sources featured appear to be more diverse and identifiable in international news stories, and b) the perspectives of domestic actors are more evident in international news stories than in national ones. A summary of our main findings from the preceding analysis is shown in Table 1 below. Table 1. Similarities and Differences in the National versus International Coverage of the Reina Attack Category

National News Source

International News Sources

1. Description of the Incident

Terrorist Attack: Reina Terror Attack, Cruel Act of Terror, Terrorism, Inhuman Massacre.

Nightclub attack: Istanbul attack, Reina nightclub attack, New Year’s Eve attack, Assault, Nightclub shooting, Armed Attack. (“Terror” or “terrorist attack” are used infrequently)

2. Description of the Perpetrators

Earlier news stories: Alleged shooter, Suspect. Later news stories: Attacker, Terrorist.

(Lone) Gunman, Attacker.

3. Description of the Victims

Innocent civilians, Vulnerable people. Due to restrictions on domestic news coverage, only nationalities of the victims are reported; no other descriptive information is provided. Number of casualties are reported.

Victims. Detailed victim profiles— nationalities, occupations, ages, and interviews with family members and eyewitnesses. Number of casualties are reported.

4. Causes of the Attack: “Why did Turkey become a target?”

Act of vengeance by the Islamic State in response to Turkish military operations in Northern Syria. Main criticism: detrimental policies of Western nations in the Middle East. Turkish government blames Western nations for regional troubles and rise in terrorism in Turkey.

The war in Syria is situated in a broader historical and political context. Main criticism: Turkish government’s domestic and foreign policies. Turkish government’s imposition of an Islamic agenda and deep polarization within Turkish society along secular and conservative lines.

5. Claim of Responsibility: “Who claims responsibility for the attack?”

Claim of responsibility by the Islamic State.

Either no claim of responsibility is reported; or the Islamic State’s official claim of responsibility is cited. Statements by the ISIS-affiliated Nashir Media Foundation calling for attacks in Turkey are also referenced.

6. Discussion of Military Response and Punishment: “What military actions and counterterrorism measures will be taken in response to the attack?”

News stories are short and brief focusing mostly on immediate responses and emergency measures taken by the Turkish government: Number of suspects arrested and detained, and counterterrorism operations initiated to locate ISIS operatives and their hubs. No discussion of possible political consequences of military action. No discussion of news blackout imposed by the Turkish government.

News stories are lengthy and detailed focusing on military responses and counterterrorism measures taken by the Turkish government: Extended state of emergency, tightened borders, vehicle checkpoints, and house raids. International stories discuss the broader political consequences of the military action. International stories discuss the news blackout imposed by the Turkish government.

7. Sources Featured and the Availability of Perspectives of the Domestic Actors: “Are the perspectives of the domestic actors evident in the domestic and international news media?”

Sources featured are less diverse. The perspectives of the domestic actors are not as evident due to government-imposed news blackout. If the information shared is sensitive, the identity of the source is kept confidential and the message content is brief and vague.

Sources featured are more diverse. The perspectives of the domestic actors are more evident in international sources. Regardless of the sensitive content, messages are not censored, but the identity of the source may be kept confidential.

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DISCUSSION Public diplomacy can be a strategic communication and policy tool in the fight against terrorism. When innocent lives are taken by brutal terrorist attacks, political leaders of targeted societies use available media outlets to reach out to domestic and international audiences to reflect their victimhood and turn the tables on the perpetrators. This kind of outreach may help them gain sympathy, build trust, and sway international opinion in ways favorable to the strategic interests of the nation. Through the use of salient frames and effective rhetoric, political leaders may also seek to foster international support and cooperation against terrorism. Our analysis shows that the dominant political discourse in Turkey regarding the Reina nightclub terrorist attack oscillated between an offensive and defensive rhetoric. As evident in news stories published by the Anadolu Agency, offensive rhetoric is comprised of accusatory statements by Turkish government officials pointing a finger at outside actors for political predicaments that the country is facing. We see that the political leadership in Turkey publicly blames Western powers, particularly the US, for the regional unrest and rise of terrorism in Turkey. This hostile rhetoric filled with accusations generates an undesirable political atmosphere and creates a dichotomy of us-versus-them making it difficult to build trust, find reliable allies or achieve international cooperation against terrorism. Especially in international news stories, the criticisms and rhetorical attacks by the Turkish government are more evident, which creates a slippery slope for image building and less than ideal conditions for the effective use of public diplomacy strategies that may facilitate international cooperation in Turkey’s fight against terrorism. Even though in a number of international news stories the dominant political rhetoric and the choice of strategic discourse appear somewhat positive – for instance, when the then Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesperson Numan Kurtulmus stated that terrorism is a common problem of humanity and that ‘terror has no region, belief, mind and conscious’– such positive messages lose their credibility in the eyes of Western allies because they are generally followed by statements that name and shame Western countries for playing a major role in exacerbating the Middle East crisis. President Erdogan also sometimes sends messages of reconciliation and unity, but we see that the primary target audience for these messages is Turkish citizens, not the international community: Erdogan vowed in a statement that the fight against terrorists would bring the country together. ‘They are working to destroy our country’s morale and create chaos by deliberately targeting our nation’s peace and targeting civilians with these heinous attacks. We will retain our coolheadedness as a nation, standing more closely together and we will never give ground to such dirty games’ (Arango, 2017, January 1, para. 9) Defensive rhetoric, on the other hand, relies on strategies of blame avoidance, and reinforcement of claims of validity and rightness (Mor, 2014). Our analysis shows that the government of Turkey is also heavily criticized by international actors and media for its questionable and unpopular policies both nationally and internationally. When international news stories pointed to a security deficit in Turkey that came as a result of the massive purge following the failed coup attempt, we observe a shift in the government’s rhetoric from offensive to defensive. Turkish government officials resort to this defensive discourse in an effort to avoid blame for their missteps and extricate themselves from further political predicament. For instance, one of the main criticisms raised by international media sources is that the Turkish government’s imposition of a conservative and religious agenda culminating in the denounce116

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ment of New Year’s celebrations as not Islamic, deepened the rift between secular and religious groups in the country. In response, President Erdogan denied these accusations and emphasized that he is the President of 79 million people, and it is therefore his duty “to protect everyone’s rights, law and spaces of freedom” (Arango, 2017, January 4, para. 26). In addition to the interplay between offensive and defensive rhetoric, we find more differences than similarities between national and international coverage of the Reina terrorist attack. Most importantly, while the national news source instantly frames the incident as a terrorist attack, international news sources describe the same incident as nightclub attack or shooting. The differences in framing between national and international coverage can partially be attributed to differences in journalistic form and style. Our analysis highlights the fact that Anadolu Agency news stories are quite short and their content is censored due to media restrictions on the coverage of terrorism. The average word count of the stories published by the Anadolu Agency is around 200, whereas this number goes up to 1000 or even 1500 words in international news sources, which makes possible a more elaborate analysis of the incident, and allows for detailed and multifaceted reporting. Although initially implemented as a protective measure, the media blackout in Turkey seems to defy its purpose by dramatically reducing the capacity of the government to influence international public opinion, thereby weakening the position of the country in the eyes of the international community. What might be other plausible explanations for why these international news sources were hesitant to label the Reina terrorist attack as an act of terrorism in its immediate aftermath? Drawing on the social identity perspective, when terrorist attacks target people perceived as “out-groups” such as ethnic minorities or Muslims, who are generally portrayed as security threats by mainstream media, their victimization may not create the same effect or generate similar feelings of sympathy from the international community as would the victimization of members of in-groups belonging to the majority religion or ethnic group (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). When the perpetrators and the primary targets are both Muslim, this may significantly affect the rhetoric and discursive strategies used in the coverage of the terrorist incident in question, as this case demonstrates. Even though the Reina nightclub represented a secular and modern manifestation of Turkey and people celebrating New Year’s Eve there came from countries from all over the world, from an international perspective, the attack was still carried out in a majorityMuslim country by an extremist organization that operates with a religious ideology. Another possible explanation is the growing authoritarianism in Turkey and its detrimental consequences. According to the Freedom House Report (2019) political and civil liberties in Turkey have deteriorated considerably in the last several years causing a downward trend in the freedom status of the country from partly free to not free. As of the 2019 Freedom House Report, Turkey scores 6 out of 7 in its civil liberties rating and 5 out of 7 in its political rights rating, on a scale where 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. Given the relatively repressive domestic political environment, lack of transparency, and increased media censorship, it is possible that international news sources were not able to gather enough information to reach their internal evidentiary standards for labeling this incident an act of terrorism immediately. Ultimately a combination of news blackout, restrictions on freedom of speech, and the use of offensive rhetoric undermined Turkey’s prospects for finding allies and achieving international support against terrorism in this case. Therefore, Turkey can be said to have missed an important opportunity to use news reporting of a major terrorist attack as an effective public diplomacy strategy.

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FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS While shedding light on the importance of effective use of public diplomacy in the wake of terrorism, this study has certain limitations that should be acknowledged and addressed in future research. First, this study focuses on a short time frame and a single incident of terrorism. The authors analyzed forty stories from four major news outlets using framing analysis. Future research may build on our work by covering a wider range of media outlets or focusing on multiple countries targeted by major terrorist attacks, which would allow for a comprehensive comparison. Additionally, the time frame may also be expanded to see if the differences and similarities in the national versus international media coverage that are highlighted in this study persist over time. The limitations aside, this study makes significant contributions to the literature by providing an in-depth analysis of the Reina nightclub terrorist incident revealing converging and contradictory discourses used by national and international news media.

CONCLUSION This study analyzed how a particular terrorist incident – the Reina nightclub attack in Istanbul – was covered by national and international news sources, and the ways in which differences in framing serve to illustrate the success (or lack thereof) of public diplomacy efforts by domestic political actors in Turkey. By conducting a framing analysis of forty news stories published in the first month following the attack, we found that there were several important differences between national and international coverage of this incident in terms of style and length of reporting, as well as the content of the news stories. First, the national news agency in Turkey was quick to call the Reina attack an act of terrorism, while international sources frequently described the incident as a nightclub attack or mass shooting, and the perpetrator as a gunman or attacker. Second, the stories from the national news agency covering the causes of the attack, claim of responsibility and military responses were short and at times censored (for instance, there was no discussion of the government-imposed news blackout), whereas international news stories were lengthier and more detailed in their discussions, situating the debate in the broader historical and political context. Similarly, the types of sources featured in the stories by the national news agency were limited and perspectives of domestic actors were not as evident as compared to the stories published in international news coverage. Third, our analysis revealed that while the Turkish government mainly accused Western political actors of being responsible for rising terrorism and political unrest in the country and region, international actors, in contrast, mainly criticized the domestic and foreign policies of the government of Turkey, such as Turkey’s military intervention in Northern Syria, as well as increasing polarization within the Turkish society across secular and conservative lines. Our study concludes that these framing differences across national and international coverage indicate serious challenges regarding the effective use of public diplomacy on the part of the Turkish government. Instead of using conciliatory rhetoric, paying homage to the victims, and calling for national unity and international assistance to fight against terrorism, the Turkish government frequently used accusatory remarks and blame attribution strategies, which made it difficult for Turkish political leaders to shape international public opinion. Contributing to this dynamic were the increased media censorship and repressive measures adopted by the Turkish government to block news coverage of the attack, such as a newly invoked law considering the reporting of terror attacks the same as supporting terrorism (Mele, 2016). These measures proved to be particularly counterproductive for the purposes of effectively en118

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gaging in public diplomacy. All of these issues hastened the othering and distancing of Turkey in the international arena, hindering the possibility of the country to find allies on its fight against terrorism, and support its counterterrorism operations. In terms of policy recommendations, there is a role to be played for NGOs and advocacy groups in exerting more influence over strategic framing and discourse in the aftermath of major terrorist attacks. Having a strong civil society presence and voice may ensure that social issues may be framed and promoted by NGOs as part of their own frameworks and agendas. Alternatively, NGOs and civil society groups may try to cooperate with government authorities to make sure that their voices, opinions, and suggestions are included in the framing of tragic incidents such as terrorism. Through the inclusion and engagement of NGOs and civil society groups, both public diplomacy and counterterrorism efforts will be promoted to better serve public and national interests.

REFERENCES Abrahms, M. (2006). Why Terrorism Does Not Work. International Security, 31(2), 42–78. doi:10.1162/ isec.2006.31.2.42 Akcay, A. S. (2017a, January 4). Phase 2 of Sykes-Picot is underway: Turkey’s Kurtulmus. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/phase-2-of-sykes-picot-is-underway-turkeyskurtulmus/720297 Akcay, A. S. (2017b, January 12). 35 arrested so far in Istanbul nightclub terror attack. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/35-arrested-so-far-in-istanbul-nightclub-terror-attack/726077 Ankara identifies Reina attacker. (2017, January 5), Asharq Alawsat. https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/ saeed-abdelrazek/news-middle-east/ankara-identifies-reina-attacker Arango, T. (2017a, January 1). Nightclub massacre in Istanbul exposes Turkey’s deepening fault lines. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/01/world/europe/turkey-istanbul-attack.html Arango, T. (2017b, January 2). ISIS claims responsibility for Istanbul nightclub attack. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/02/world/europe/istanbul-nightclub-attack.html Arango, T. (2017c, January 4). In Turkey, US hand is seen in nearly every crisis. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/world/europe/istanbul-attack-nightclub.html Arik, B. (2017a, January 1). Turkey’s top cleric decries Istanbul nightclub attack. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/turkeys-top-cleric-decries-istanbul-nightclub-attack/717945 Arik, B. (2017b, January 1). World condemns Istanbul nightclub attack. Anadolu Agency. https://www. aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/world-condemns-istanbul-nightclub-attack/717936 Atilgan, H. A. (2017, January 1). US denies having intelligence on Istanbul club attack. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-denies-having-intelligence-on-istanbul-club-attack-/718382 Baydar, Y. (2017, January 4). The Istanbul attack marks a new age of terror in Turkey. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/04/istanbul-attack-terror-turkey-erdogan-syriajihadi 119

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Canel, M. J. (2012). Communicating strategically in the face of terrorism: The Spanish government’s response to the 2004 Madrid bombing attacks. Public Relations Review, 38(2), 214-222. Canel, M. J., & Sanders, K. (2010). Crisis communication and terrorist attacks: Framing a response to the 2004 Madrid bombings and 2005 London bombings. In W. T. Coombs & S. J. Holladay (Eds.), The Handbook of Crisis Communication (pp. 449–466). Wiley-Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781444314885.ch22 Chan, S., & Bilefsky, D. (2017, January 1). Victims in Istanbul new year’s attack came from across the world. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/01/world/europe/istanbul-attackvictims-abis-rizvi.html Chermak, S. M., & Gruenewald, J. (2006). The Media’s Coverage of Domestic Terrorism. Justice Quarterly, 23(4), 428–461. doi:10.1080/07418820600985305 Chulov, M. (2017, January 4). Syria: Turkey takes fight to ISIS in assault on western base of al-Bab. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/04/syria-turkey-takes-fight-to-isis-in-assaulton-western-base-of-al-bab Patrick, S. M. (2014). Framing Terrorism: Geography-Based Media Coverage Variations of the 2004 Commuter Train Bombings in Madrid and the. (2009). Twin Suicide Car Bombings in Baghdad. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(3), 379–393. Du, Y. R., & Li, L. (2017). When Press Freedom Meets National Interest: How Terrorist Attacks Are Framed in the News in China and the US. Global Media and China, 2(3–4), 284–302. doi:10.1177/2059436418755761 Entman, R. M. (2008). Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 13(2), 87–102. doi:10.1177/1940161208314657 Fisher, M. (2017, June 20). Complex politics of terrorism label. The New York Times: The Interpreter. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/europe/politics-terrorist-label.html Freedom House. (2019). Freedom in the World 2019: An Annual Study of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Rowman and Littlefield. https://freedomhouse.org/ Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Harvard University Press. Guldogan, D. (2018, January 2). Nearly 1,5000 Daesh suspects held in Istanbul in 2017. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/nearly-1-500-daesh-suspects-held-in-istanbulin-2017/1020666 Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism - Revised & Enlarged Edition. Columbia University Press. Jenkins, B. M. (1974). International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare. RAND Corporation. Jetter, M. (2017). The Effect of Media Attention on Terrorism. Journal of Public Economics, 153, 32–48. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.07.008

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Kearns, E. M., Betus, A., & Lemieux, A. (2019). Why Do Some Terrorist Attacks Receive More Media Attention Than Others? Justice Quarterly, 36(6), 985–1022. doi:10.1080/07418825.2018.152450 7 PMID:33867653 Koblin, J. (2015, November 24). Coverage of Paris Terror Attacks Lifts Network News Ratings. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/business/media/coverage-of-paris-terror-attackslifts-network-news-ratings.html Malone, G. (1985). Managing Public Diplomacy. The Washington Quarterly, 8(8), 199–213. doi:10.1080/01636608509450301 Marat, E. (2009). Nation Branding in Central Asia: A New Campaign to Present Ideas about the State and the Nation. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(7), 1123–1136. doi:10.1080/09668130903068657 Mele, C. (2016, December 31). Terrorist Attack at Nightclub in Istanbul Kills Dozens. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/world/europe/turkey-istanbul-attack.html Melnick, R., & Eldor, R. (2010). Small investment and large returns: Terrorism, media and the economy. European Economic Review, 54(8), 963–973. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.03.004 Mor, B. D. (2014). The structure of rhetorical defense in public diplomacy: Israel’s social account of the 2010 Turkish flotilla incident. Media, War & Conflict, 7(2), 250–265. doi:10.1177/1750635214538621 Nacos, B. (2016). Terrorism and Counterterrorism (5th ed.). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315641270 Papacharissi, Z., & Oliveira, M. F. (2008). News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers. The International Journal of Press/ Politics, 13(1), 52–74. doi:10.1177/1940161207312676 Peresin, A. (2007). Mass Media and Terrorism. Media Research, 13(1), 5–22. Shafak, E. (2017, January 3). The Reina atrocity shows how deeply Islamic fanaticism has taken hold in Turkey. The Guardian, p. D4. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/03/reina-islamicfanaticism-turkey-new-years-eve-massacre Sheafer, T., & Gabay, I. (2009). Mediated Public Diplomacy: A Strategic Contest over International Agenda Building and Frame Building. Political Communication, 26(4), 447–467. doi:10.1080/10584600903297240 Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Nelson Hall. Tuman, S. J. (2010). Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism. Sage Publications. Turkey says suspect in Istanbul Rampage on New Year’s Captured. (2017, January 14). Asharq Alawsat. https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/asharq-al-awsat-english/news-middle-east/turkey-says-suspect-istanbulrampage-new-years-captured Wanta, W., Golan, G., & Lee, C. (2004). Agenda Setting and International News: Media Influence on Public Perceptions of Foreign Nations. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 81(2), 364–377. doi:10.1177/107769900408100209

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Wanta, W., & Hu, Y.-W. (1993). The Agenda-Setting Effects of International News Coverage: An Examination of Differing News Frames. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 5(3), 250–264. doi:10.1093/ijpor/5.3.250 Wilkinson, P. (1999). Politics, Diplomacy and Peace Processes: Pathways out of Terrorism? Terrorism and Political Violence, 11(4), 66–82. doi:10.1080/09546559908427532 Yakici, A. (2017, January 2). Police carry out arrests over Istanbul nightclub attack. Anadolu Agency. https:// www.aa.com.tr/en/todays-headlines/police-carry-out-arrests-over-istanbul-nightclub-attack/718872 Yarchi, M. (2016). Terror Organizations’ Uses of Public Diplomacy: Limited versus Total Conflicts. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 39(12), 1071–1083. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2016.1184064 Yarchi, M., Wolfsfeld, G., Sheafer, T., & Shenhav, S. R. (2013). Promoting Stories about Terrorism to the International News Media: A Study of Public Diplomacy. Media, War & Conflict, 6(3), 263–278. doi:10.1177/1750635213491179

ADDITIONAL READING Baden, C., & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, K. (2018). The search for common ground in conflict news research: Comparing the coverage of six current conflicts in domestic and international media over time. Media, War & Conflict, 11(1), 22–45. doi:10.1177/1750635217702071 Ben Aharon, E. (2021). The “War on Terror” and Public Diplomacy during the Cold War: Israeli–Turkish Relations and the 1980 Military Coup. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 0(0), 1–24. doi:10.1080/ 1057610X.2021.1997134 Creswell, M. H. (2019). Wasted Words? The Limitations of U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 42(5), 464–492. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2017.1392097 Gilbert, D. (2020). The Oxygen of Publicity: Explaining U.S. Media Coverage of International Kidnapping. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 0(0), 1–22. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2020.1792723 Hoffman, A. M., Jengelley, D. H. A., Duncan, N. T., Buehler, M., & Rees, M. L. (2010). How Does the Business of News Influence Terrorism Coverage? Evidence From The Washington Post and USA Today. Terrorism and Political Violence, 22(4), 559–580. Jetter, M. (2019). More Bang for the Buck: Media Coverage of Suicide Attacks. Terrorism and Political Violence, 31(4), 779–799. doi:10.1080/09546553.2017.1288112 Lord, C. (2006). Losing Hearts and Minds? Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror (1st ed.). Praeger. Nacos, B. L., Bloch-Elkon, Y., & Shapiro, R. Y. (2007). Prevention of Terrorism in Post-9/11 America: News Coverage, Public Perceptions, and the Politics of Homeland Security. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(1), 1–25. doi:10.1080/09546550701734028

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Peterson, P. G. (2002). Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism. Foreign Affairs, 81(5), 74–94. doi:10.2307/20033270 Shoshani, A., & Slone, M. (2008). The Drama of Media Coverage of Terrorism: Emotional and Attitudinal Impact on the Audience. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31(7), 627–640. doi:10.1080/10576100802144064 Winkler, C., El-Damanhoury, K., Saleh, Z., Hendry, J., & El-Karhili, N. (2021). Intersections of ISIS media leader loss and media campaign strategy: A visual framing analysis. Media, War & Conflict, 14(4), 401–418. doi:10.1177/1750635219889370

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Counterterrorism: A variety of military and nonmilitary strategies adopted by governments in order to prevent future acts of terrorism. Islamic State (IS): Also known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a fundamentalist extremist group that adheres to Salafi-Jihadist ideology and seeks to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria. It is known for its extreme acts of violence including terrorist attacks and public executions as well as illicit financial flows, and savvy use of social media platforms. National Security: Ability of a state to protect and defend its citizens, borders, economy, and institutions. News Coverage: Reporting, publishing, and broadcasting of news in newspapers, tv programs, or online news platforms. Public Diplomacy: A government’s efforts to communicate with foreign publics for reputation management purposes. Public Opinion: Collective views and opinions held by general publics about a particular issue. Strategic Framing: Rhetorical tools used to construct social reality by intentionally highlighting certain aspects of social events while ignoring others in an effort to manipulate people’s perceptions. Terrorist Attack: Deliberate act of violence perpetrated by non-state actor(s) intended to intimidate and coerce government(s) in pursuit of a political objective.

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Chapter 8

Media Development Trends as a Counter for Terrorism in Ukraine Nadezhda Anatolievna Lebedeva https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4095-2631 International Personnel Academy, Ukraine

ABSTRACT The aim of the chapter is to examine the trends in the development of mass media as countering terrorism in Ukraine. The novelty of the research for the international scientific community lies in the description of Ukraine’s experience in countering information terrorism. This chapter will be useful for theorists studying the manifestation of media terrorism in various countries, as a component of the European context of this problem. For Ukraine, information activities are only developing. The threat of terrorism is not an internal problem, but an external one, which is created by foreign states. Information terrorism has two types of influence. It is material and intellectual. Ukrainian media can resist both types of influence on society. Media terrorism of foreign countries is aimed at individuals. This chapter focuses on strengthening the communication component of antiterrorist activities, improving the information policy of the state, the inclusion of civil society and public television potential in the system of combating information media terrorism.

INTRODUCTION Our world is changing rapidly. In the era of globalization, information is spreading at maximum speed. Its streams rush so swiftly that a layman doesn’t have time to keep track. In a similar vein, the media act as a kind of material confirmation fixator. The information flows have a mentally forming function in society. The problem of reflecting events related to terrorist activities and their counteraction to all kinds of negative consequences becomes relevant taking into account the importance of the media development, their increasing variety, quantity and quality. The concept of terrorism has been known for a long time to human beings. Like any phenomenon, terrorism has its evolution. Its new type is information DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch008

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 Media Development Trends as a Counter for Terrorism in Ukraine

terrorism. The main instruments of this phenomenon are the mass media and the means of global communication - satellites, computers, telecommunications and cable systems. This chapter is an overview of Ukrainian studies examining the media phenomenon and information terrorism in Ukraine and the topic of its countering in a hybrid war. Information terrorism can be understood as a politically motivated activity of groups, terrorist structures, which contributes to the destruction of the infrastructure of man and society, social systems and political regimes. In Ukraine, the conditions for the growth of dangers and threats of an internal and external nature are taking shape. This chapter focuses on strengthening the communicative component of anti-terrorist activities; description of the state’s information policy, taking into account the specifics of hybrid war; inclusion of the potential of civil society and public television in the system of countering information terrorism in the media. This should contribute to the effectiveness of the implementation of the media strategy of Ukraine. Information and communication technologies are in our life. But it is already impossible to see them without a computer. Information terrorism is carried out where innovative technologies. The opinion of electronic media has a significant impact on national stability. This phenomenon becomes an effective weapon in countries where it is possible to quickly influence the consciousness of certain social groups based on simple and well-formed media reports. New electronic media have become a factor that transforms the human psyche in a multicultural environment. Sometimes people begin to lose their cultural identity, the ability to orientate in the information field, which is constantly increasing. The virtual space has become a means not only for the dissemination of information. To change the interaction between society and the print media it is also used by terrorists. They post their information on controlled websites. Then it is quoted by the world’s leading media. Terrorist websites are considered the main source of information. This information is the opposite of the official government position to the public, and the audience becomes the object of propaganda and manipulation. Complex international relations in politics, where information wars are observed, contribute to the embodiment of information terrorism. It is an additional method of informational state destabilization. In general, the strategy of countering terrorism in the information field is a combination of legal, political, economic, technological, humanitarian, educational and cultural events, with the participation of the state and civil society structures. This is a set of measures that affect the occurrence or elimination of this phenomenon. It is especially important for the media that terrorists use information and computer technologies, and the destructive nature of their influence on society through the media is increasing. This is what is media information terrorism. Ukraine faced information terrorism in the process of entering the public life of various political forces, which began to use the media and information resources actively in the power struggle. The oligarchic way of organizing relations in the power of the country has turned the media into a tool for fighting political competitors, the shortcomings of the state’s information policy. The media in Ukraine have also become a vehicle for enrichment. This has led to growing threats to national security within the country. Ukraine faced the external threat of information terrorism in 2014. Ukraine’s reluctance to adequately respond to the aggressor led to the loss of significant territories, an increase in socio-economic tension in society and an exacerbation of the political struggle between the main political forces in the country. This chapter aims to examine the trends in the development of mass media as countering terrorism in Ukraine. Achievement of this goal led to the solution of the following tasks: to generalize theoretical ideas about the role of the information component in the structure of the phenomenon of terrorism; to generalize and clarify the meaning of the concept of “media information terrorism”, based on the tendencies of information confrontation in Ukraine; to clarify the functions of the state and civil society 125

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of Ukraine in countering information terrorism in the media in the face of internal and external challenges. The novelty of this chapter for the international scientific community lies in the description of Ukraine’s experience in countering information terrorism. Methods of analysis, synthesis and system approach are used.

BACKGROUND A sufficient number of Ukrainian scientific works are devoted to the problems of world terrorism. Media terrorism and cyber terrorism as a problem of the information society) is described by Iatsyk (2016). Information terrorism in the modern international arena was studied by Mytyn (2017) and Sventytska, (2007). Democratic values and anti-terrorist activity: conflict of interest are described in Erokhina’s work (2015). Kozyryatska (2018) considered the religious aspect in the Ukrainian media. Saenko’s scientific work (2015) is devoted to information and humanitarian aggression as a defining modern threat to Ukrainian statehood. The work by Gurkovsky (2010) is also interesting for the research. Here are considered some peculiarities of the information weapons use in the global space. Information terrorism as a threat to the national security of Ukraine and its information and legal dimension is described by Leonov & Likhov (2021). Matsyshina’s study (2015) is devoted to the interpretation of the concepts of “terrorism”, “extremism”, “xenophobia”. Kolb, & Pyrozhyk (2021) devoted their research to the concepts of “information weapons” and “information terrorism” as sources of encroachments on the national security of Ukraine. Myslovsky’s research (2017) is devoted to the typological features of news about terrorism on Ukrainian television on the example of TV channels. Types, functions, influences of media are studied by Kuznetsova (2016). The stereotyping and formation of religious phobia in Ukraine by media are described in the scientific work of Gnes (2010). Ivanov, Ozhevana, Petrov, Pocheptsov, Shklyar, & Chichanovsky (2014) considered information terrorism as a threat to national and international security using the concept of Ukraine actualization in English and Ukrainian political media discourse. Romanyshyn (2020) has studied information terrorism and politics. Global information terrorism as one of the manifestations of modern terrorism was taught by Partolenko (2018) and Pugach (2015). “Terrorism is a part of mass management in the era of consumer society” (Zubarieva, 2015, p. 67). The American factor in a process of information globalization was studied by Danylyshyn (2004). Computer terrorism: current status, development forecasts and countermeasures were described by Gavrish, (2009) but more detailed information on this topic is found in the work by Moklyak (2016). If to focus on the mechanisms of counteraction, the works of Baltiy (2011), Pavlenko (2020) and Fornolyak (2018) are interesting. Such scientists as Nikolaienko, Vasylevych, & Komarchuk (2020), Tulyakova (2000) and Andreeva (2009) showed the priorities of military-political security of Ukraine in information coordinates. The scientific work by Laver & Laver (2020) “Wars and political terrorism on the American and their influence on continental migration process” is also very important. The author was assisted by such scientific works as “Formation of the image of military chaplains in Ukraine” by Kalenychenko (2015), “Informal anthroponomy of socially dangerous groups of people in crisis media discourse” by Shulska (2015), “Trends in the development of information terrorism and its influence on international relations” by Mitin (2017) and “Influence of the media on the military campaign: theory and history” by Khlystun (2019). Information security of Ukraine, the issue of information confrontation in the conditions of information war is revealed by many authors: Proshin, (2014), Muntyan, & Matsievskaya, (2017), Gresko, (2004), Ena, (2018). The literature is divided into 126

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three groups: 1. - on terrorism and its manifestations, 2. - media terrorism, 3. - functions and types of media in a hybrid war. In the Ukrainian discourse, the threat of media information terrorism in the national security system is mainly considered in two planes: in the plane of the legal approach that believes it in general and psychological, in particular - is the activity of intimidation of the population and the authorities to achieve criminal intent, for example, it is studied by: Dotsenko (2020), Konakh (2017), Vakulych (2007), Yermolenko (2018). The studies of such scientists as Danilishina (2006), Melnik (2015), Saidakhmetov (2014), Hrubinko (2019), Kosilova, (2010) are also useful.

TERRORISM AND INFORMATION TERRORISM IN THE UKRAINIAN SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION Mandatory components of this specific action have such cause and effect as the purpose of implementation, temporal and spatial characteristics, means and consequences. According to Samsonenko & Miroshnychenko (Samsonenko & Miroshnychenko, 2014, p. 29), the motives of terrorists are often unconscious (self-assertion, heroism, etc.), or objective - religious characteristics, educational outcomes, the influence of society, economic reasons, and so on. In addition, when it comes to lone terrorists, the reason for their actions may be a mental disorder. The purpose of terrorist activity is what they seek to achieve as a result of a terrorist act, what they demand from an indirect object. The purpose may be political, religious, economic or otherwise. The informational essence of terrorism differs from the general concept in those political goals achieved indirectly. Violence is a pretext for manipulation. Terrorism is always informative, regardless of whether it is a global event or a local one. The main task is to intimidate the population to cause panic. Information terrorism is physical violence merging with criminal media use and abuse of digital information networks. Information terrorism is used in various spheres. It is characterized not only by cybercrime, but also by manipulating information “its falsification, and in some cases the submission of deliberately false facts, which results in misinformation to intimidate and introduce paranoid thoughts among the population. This type of terrorism has been elevated to the rank of public policy for a long time total brainwashing and changing perspectives. It is used by ruling elites everywhere” (Samsonenko, & Miroshnychenko, 2014, p. 30). Information terrorism is defined by Zaskalna and Bilushchak (2017) as a negative form of influence on the individual, society or the state by all types of information. The purpose of such influence is to weaken the constitutional order in the country. Such actions are carried out by various forces and means - from the intelligence of foreign intelligence services to domestic and foreign media. Society destabilization is becoming more popular due to information terrorism, either in the domestic state politics, between hostile public figures, or foreign policy relations. A peculiar feature of today life is the ever-increasing volume of information flows and arrays that have led to the formation of the phenomenon of information “explosion”. That is, a person is no longer able to distinguish important information from “garbage” and “consumes” everything in a row. It is very important now to talk about media literacy in Ukraine. Today the user must be able to filter and correctly determine what is important and what is not, what to believe and what is better to check” (Zaslavskaya & Kankovskaya, 2016, p. 38). According to Samsonenko & Miroshnychenko (2014), the availability of information technology significantly increases the risks of information terrorism. The development of social information infra127

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structure contributes to the creation of additional information terrorism risks. In turn, informative terrorism is divided into 1. information and psychological terrorism; 2. information and technical terrorism. The main tactic of information terrorism is the presence of dangerous consequences of a terrorist act with the breadth of disclosure of information and great public response. So, information terrorism, or “cyber terrorism” has all the hallmarks of political terrorism in general, in terms of forms of action in cyberspace. The threat of terrorism on the Internet turned out to be greater than expected due to the total spread of the Internet. Cyber terrorism is a serious socially dangerous threat to humanity. It compares with nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons (Samsonenko, & Miroshnychenko, 2014, p. 32). The means of committing media terrorism are print media, cable media networks, the Internet, e-mail, various electronic toys, and so on. Most modern types of terrorism attribute to media terrorism because the media are an effective tool in the rapid informative dissemination and intimidation of the population. Among the consequences of terrorist activities are economic, social, political and others. Media terrorism is a special type of terrorist activity, which is distinguished by the criterion of using tools to achieve terrorists own goals. The cheapest tools of terrorism are the global media on the Internet. That is from the information field, where reality presence hides the truth. The individual is unable to navigate independently in the unlimited information space under the influence of media terrorism. The task of unreliable reality is not to reflect the truth, but to hide it. This applies to the media on the Internet, as they act as a platform for political games. Cyber terrorism is aimed at infiltrating the information and telecommunications system, intercepting control, suppressing network information exchange and other destructive actions. Its danger is that it has no national borders (terrorist acts can be carried out from anywhere in the world). It is difficult to detect a terrorist because hackers carry out terrorist activities through fictitious computers. This makes it difficult to determine the location (Samsonenko & Miroshnychenko, 2014, p. 35). The development of computer technology has made life easier, on the one hand, but on the other hand, it has created new threats to both international and national security. National security is a concept that characterizes the protection of the state from external and internal threats. One such new manifestation of external aggression against Ukraine’s national security is cyber terrorism on the part of the neighbouring state. The nature of cybercrime makes the problem global because it does not matter where such a crime was committed. Terrorist organizations are increasingly using new information technologies and the Internet with the criminal intention of raising funds, carrying out propaganda or transmitting classified information. In Ukraine at the moment, the main weapon in combating this threat is legislation. This problem has not been so acute before for Ukraine. But with the accession to the global information space, there is a potential threat. The problem of counteracting acts of information terrorism is a complex problem not only for Ukraine but also for the whole world. The hybrid war, that Russia practised in modern conflicts, is aimed at destroying societies, oppression of their will with the purpose to resist large-scale terrorism. The relevance of the topic concerns the attention on the fact that the crime situation in the country remains difficult. The motivation of serious crimes changes, terrorism, economic crime, banditry spreads. The terrorism threatens public security and interests of Ukraine, as the stable environment in and around Ukraine becomes unpredictable and destructive threatening (Omelchuk & Milevskiy, 2016, p. 134).

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It is hard to define the notion of terrorism. Experts do not have a consensus on this subject. Some believe, that terror and terrorism are not concepts that are associated with well-defined and identifiable events. This is caused by the fact that the concepts of “terror” and “terrorism” does not carry the semantic distinction. Terror and terrorism - are the methods of influence, methods of achieving the objectives, methods of struggle, which consist of separate elements that define them - terrorist acts. It is impossible to formulate the concept of terrorism without defining the “terrorist act (Omelchuk & Milevskiy, 2016, p. 135). Iatsyk (2016) thinks that “transition to methods of electronic control by technological processes gives the grounds for the emergence of essentially new type of terrorism – cyber terrorism: intervention in work of components of the telecommunication networks functioning in the environment of computer programs or unauthorized modification of computer data causes disorganization of work of crucial elements of the infrastructure of the state and creates danger of death of people, causes approaches of significant property damage or other socially dangerous consequences” (Iatsyk, 2016, p. 139). Ukraine has always responded to terrorist acts by condemning such actions. So, Ukrainian researcher Artymyshyn (2016), based on transcripts of sittings of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and many Ukrainian periodicals, considered the reaction of Ukrainian politicians and the media to terrorist attacks such as the terrorist seizure of the Dubrovka Theater Center in late October 2002 and the Beslan school building in early September 2004. Perceptions of the terrorist attacks in Dubrovka and Beslan among Ukrainian political circles and journalists varied from official Kyiv support for the actions of Russian security forces during the release of hostages to condemnation by pro-Western politicians and correspondents of unprofessional special forces storming terrorist-occupied buildings. It has become clear to many analysts that Putin’s declared fight against terrorism will change the political system in Russia itself, and therefore strengthening the Kremlin’s position while centralizing the power vertical seemed only a matter of time and the near future for the Russian state soon (Artimishin, 2016, p. 119). The Law of Ukraine “On the Fundamentals of National Security” (Article 7) stipulates that protection against attempts to manipulate the public consciousness, in particular by disseminating inaccurate, incomplete or biased information, is one of the basic tasks in combating information threats. There are: manifestations of restriction of freedom of speech and access to information, dissemination by the media of the cult of violence, cruelty, pornography, computer crime and computer terrorism, disclosure of information that is a state secret, as well as confidential information owned or directed by the state to meet the needs and national interests of society and the state” (Bank, 2016, p. 111). For Ukraine, the informatization of society is in its infancy. In Ukraine, information resources are controlled by private businesses. “The main threats in the field of information terrorism are external, not internal. They are mainly created by foreign states, international terrorists and other criminal groups and organizations that use weak coordination and focus of public administration in combating this dangerous phenomenon” (Bank, 2016, p. 113). Analysis of the scientific literature gives grounds to distinguish between intellectual and material terrorism: a) misinformation, spreading rumours, incomplete, inaccurate information, manipulation of consciousness, zombies of the population are part of information and psychological terrorism; b) 129

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inflicting damage to the enemy’s information environment, suppressing communication lines, artificial reloading of communication nodes. The rule-making legal framework should be a protection against information threats that arise during the functioning of the state in the global environment. To ensure the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens, mechanisms to counter the sources of information terrorism must be put in place. These mechanisms are formed by a set of legislative acts that provide fair penalties for violations of the public interest system. According to Bank (2016): Despite the existence of some important legal acts, Ukrainian information legislation does not prove to be an effective system of protection of national interests. This is especially felt in the context of armed conflict and anti-terrorist operations. Dissemination of false information, imposition ideas and views that contradict the democratic values ​​of citizens, the impact on public consciousness, the incomplete reflection of statistics - all these and many other actions are aimed at discrediting our country in the international political and cultural-ideological space (Bank, 2016, p. 116). Lyubovets & Korol (2017) note that the information space of Ukraine, like each country, has a structure that is quite individual and depends on the history of traditional and non-traditional media, which are now better classified according to time requirements as digital and hybrid. The peculiarity of postSoviet countries today is that the inherent features of the national information space (the real hierarchy of the status of sending content - from the centre to the regions, the real presence of pro-Putin global media holdings, the presence of national (state) language and Russian allow us to make an experimental division of information space for four types of dynamic-situational models of content flows: - hierarchically centralized; - hierarchical-interregional - hierarchical-horizontal; - hybrid models of combining hierarchies and horizontal communication and content environments (Lyubovets & Korol, 2017, p. 48). Ukrainian researchers focus on the definition of global hybrid terrorism. It is defined as “global hybrid terrorism as the technological and creative involvement of the potential of dynamic streaming communication and content influences in global social horizons by hybrid methods and means of creative and military nature for the public dominance of terrorist styles in individual territories and the international arena” (Lyubovets & Korol, 2017 p.50). Now in Ukraine, there is an interesting combination and at the same time aggregate functioning of segmental components of information space among themselves. Conventionally, these are the following components: • • • • •

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information fields of direct hierarchical construction and dependence, horizontal communication and content environments, a combination of the previous two positions in one regional dimension (region, settlement, etc.), information field of Ukraine: central section (Kyiv, in the future Dnipro, Odesa, Kharkiv, Lviv may be added), virtual-public augmented reality (Lyubovets & Korol, 2017, p. 51).

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Shachkovska (2017) notes that terrorism has acquired a systemic character. Its emergence has been facilitated by technical progress as well as the development of the media and ways of informative transmitting. It has greatly increased the propaganda effect of terrorist acts. Information terrorism is a new, specific type of terrorist activity, the emergence of which is primarily due to the formation of the information society, the characteristics of which are: an unprecedented increase in the role and importance of information in all spheres of human life; involved in the production, storage, processing and use of information (Shachkovska, 2017, p. 118). The rapid growth of computer technology and their introduction into the management of strategically important structures of the state leads to an increase in their vulnerability to disproportionately faster to resist such threats, and the use of cyber-attacks should be seen as a means of warfare and terrorist acts in a new area, on land, sea, air and space (Shachkovska, 2017, p. 122). The protection from external propaganda, misinformation, imposition of destructive values ​​and the production of its consolidating symbols that can unite society in difficult times, raise the fighting spirit of the nation are the most important areas of informative security during armed conflicts. For Ukraine, this is a painful issue as a result of recent events, especially in the information war with the Russian Federation. The state policy of ensuring information security of Ukraine is a component of the national security policy. Kolb & Pirozhnik (2021) structure the phenomenon of “information terrorism” according to two types of influences - material and intellectual. Researchers consider “media terrorism” to be a variety of intellectual terrorism and threats to national security. Under the influence of media terrorism, the individual becomes unable to navigate independently in the unlimited information space on available data, because manipulative media are presented as tools (“information weapons”) to construct not objective but unreliable, i.e. the necessary reality for a certain sub of information activities (Kolb & Pirozhnik, 2021, p. 42). Erokhina (2015) notes that the specificity of the regulation of the Ukrainian media is that the social norms included in the regulatory system, include, along with legal and corporate moral and ethical imperatives, which may be not just national but corporate and in no way Indeed, it is difficult to say that Ukrainian legislation does not respond to threats to national security, but it is difficult not to notice that this reaction is chaotic, disordered, overdue (Erokhina, 2015, p.5). Shulskaya, (2015) believes that the unofficial anthroponomy of socially dangerous groups of people in the crisis media discourse provided a brief overview of the unofficial nominations of DNR and LNR militants that function successfully in media texts. This testifies to their mass character in Ukrainian journalism, due to the socio-political crisis in the country. “Authors of various materials, putting the nickname of a terrorist in the title or giving it later in the text, do not even think that this promotes socially dangerous groups of people and act as a source of propaganda of criminal ideas among their readers. In this regard, all Ukrainian publications should prevent the spread of this negative phenomenon at the nomination level, as well as deter any terrorist influence through information channels” (Shulskaya, 2015, p. 4). Thus, the author of this chapter generalized Ukrainian scientific theoretical ideas about the role of the information component in the structure of the phenomenon of terrorism.

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DISCUSSION Media in Ukraine and the Problem of Terrorism As it’s known, the issue of Crimean Tatars holds the lead in the Ukrainian news of recent years. Kozyryatska (2018) found that in the “top news of the world-known caricature scandals” directly related to the insult of religious feelings, the issue of migration crisis associated with the influx of migrants to Europe from the war-torn countries of the Middle East and Africa; the problem of terrorist attacks (attack on Charlie Hebdo; the triple terrorist attack in Yemen, the November terrorist attacks in Paris, etc., for which the Islamic State terrorist group often claimed responsibility). One way or another relate to ethno religious issues, fall into the matrix of “the fate of the ethnos - migrants - terrorism”, the emphasis in which is shifted from ethnic to Islamic component” (Kozyryatska, 2018, p. 59). Among the studies on the religious dimension of the Ukrainian media, the largest share is those related to Christian content (Kozyryatska, 2018, p. 58). Ukrainian media cover the most high-profile terrorist attacks in Russia, Chechnya, and North Ossetia. They are influenced by the Russian informative field before 2014. The Western vector also shaped the unfriendly image of the Muslim world: in media reports of terrorist attacks, the emphasis was usually on the religious component, “Islamic terrorism.” The events related to ethno religious issues coverage is influenced by the geopolitical situation in the country and the world, as well as social upheavals, which serve as an informational reason and are viewed through the prism of a particular ethnic group or religion. Ukraine had a certain background in the ethno religious issue, inherited from Soviet times: prejudice against Muslims due to negative rhetoric in the Soviet media’s news of the war in Afghanistan. Thus, the stereotypes formed or terrorist attacks), as well as in Crimea, in which Crimean Tatars took part. Therefore, the rhetoric of the messages was not always positive (Kozyryatska, 2018, p. 60). In recent years, when talking about the situation in Crimea, they still focus more on the ethnic component, rather than Islam. In general, in 2014–2018, the media began to mention the deportations of the Crimean Tatar people, the life of the ethnic group after the occupation of the island, and write about Crimean Tatar immigrants. This is also due to the Crimean Tatars on Ukrainian statehood position, their participation in the ATO (Anti-terrorist operation in the East of Ukraine), etc. Thus, the geopolitical situation and social upheavals in the country prompted journalists to use the binary semantic opposition “own” (Ukraine) and “foreign” (foreign) (Russia), which is a new historical context that has acquired a different sound, as previous scholars have noted its use solely as the opposition of two civilizations, cultures - Western and Eastern topics in 2018, in online media there were still publications about “radical Islam” in Ukraine, but this is still on the margins of journalistic research (Kozyryatska, 2018, p. 60). To counter-terrorist activity, it is necessary to keep in mind the peculiarities of the use of electronic media. From a similar point of view on the researched problem, Korenkov (2017) notes that with the advent of social media, terrorists have previously gained an influential propaganda tool: they can recruit and train thousands of their supporters around the world in real-time and continuously. In response to bans and restrictions on some social media, they find new, no less powerful channels of communication. One example of such adaptability are resources from social media such as Twitter and Facebook to Telegram. Studying the reasons for the transfer of terrorist media resources to Telegram, determining 132

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the structure of terrorists’ dissemination of information through this social media for 26 days Korenkova analyzed more than 8.5 thousand messages published on 15 Russian-language channels in Telegram. The main emphasis in Telegram is to build a flexible and robust structure that can be quickly restored if one or more of its components are removed (with structure, which regularly disseminates information about the activities of the organization). There was also the question of the effectiveness of deleting pages as a tool to counter propaganda in the Telegram. This is also seen as ineffective because proponents of ID create a huge number of new channels. Deleting pages is not an effective method of combating the terrorist network in Telegram. Other methods of counteracting informational influence should be used, which would be based primarily on the analysis and research of the context of publications, identification of sources of propaganda and counteraction of the network at all levels identified in the study (Korenkov, 2017, p. 131). Based on the works of Ukrainian scholars, several current issues in the field of Ukrainian media may be identified: 1) the mention of threats in connection with the ethnic component; 2) stereotyping of through religious identification with terrorism; 3) the existence of two directions in the study of the problem of coverage. They are of the outlined issues by the Ukrainian media: events related to the life of the Crimean Tatars (when the Soviet Union was), and events related to the problems of migrants, terrorist attacks, caricature scandals; 4) the use in the Ukrainian media of the opposition “one’s own and another’s” as an opposition of two worldviews - Western and Eastern, two-state ideologies - Ukraine and Russia.

Trends in the Development of Ukrainian Media in the Coverage of Events To counter terrorism, in the author’s opinion, it is important in the media to evoke sympathy for civilians who are injured or maybe injured or to be killed. This technique is an effective mechanism that can unite society to eradicate this terrible phenomenon. Sokolova (2015) identifies journalistic empathy (empathy) as a separate means of influence. “Journalistic empathy is the most effective means of influencing participatory journalism, that it has its mechanisms of implementation” (Sokolova, 2015, p. 75). The researcher gives the following definition: journalistic empathy is the empathy of certain emotions by a journalist, with the help of which he reflects a social problem. The general concept of empathy is considered from two angles: identification with the feelings of another person and empathy for the emotions of another person. The journalist reflects the social problem in his material with the experience of emotions close to the emotions of the main characters of the journalistic material, but does not put himself in the place of the heroes and does not imagine that he could get into such a situation. Another way to reflect the social problem is to identify with the main characters: the journalist puts himself in the place of the main character, he clearly understands that he may get into a similar or the same situation (Sokolova, 2015, p. 76). Journalistic empathy is a means of influencing the audience, the main mechanism of which is emotions and projecting these emotions into one’s own life to form the conclusions necessary for the media product. There are several types of journalistic empathy: - empathy for the emotions of the main characters

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with identification; - empathy for the emotions of the main characters with the division; - empathy for the emotions of the main characters with identification and division. Journalistic empathy as a means of influence can have several ways of realization: - influence on oneself through the experience of states similar to the state of the protagonist of social history; - influence on the recipient through the projection of certain states on the life and feelings of the recipient. This means that the mediator must be interested in the social history and, most importantly, be interested in solving the social problem that appears in that story, consciously or unconsciously will exert influence through acquaintance with a social problem (Sokolova, 2015, p. 76). Journalistic empathy is a mechanism for the implementation of psychological influence, which consciously or unconsciously uses the hero of social history in communication with a journalist to convey information to create journalistic material. Journalistic empathy as a mechanism of influence can be realized consciously, unconsciously and semi-consciously, while the means of influence can be realized only consciously because it is used to achieve a certain goal. The ideal scheme of journalistic empathy realization in the Ukrainian media as a counteraction to terrorism does not consist in a casual arrangement of textual and visual mechanisms. Detailed calculation of possible states-results is used. Photos that cause such a state result as “pity” are very important. This is a strong state that will evoke a response in the social space. Sayenko (2015) believes that there is an acute problem of ensuring a “unified information policy and the formation of a single information space in modern Ukraine in the escalation of threats to our country in the humanitarian sphere, the need to analyze the features of information and propaganda component of modern wars on the example of the aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine” (Sayenko, 2015, p. 106). The process of building separatist “statehood” in eastern Ukraine is carried out with the large-scale military, material, informational assistance and coordination of the Russian side. Our country has become a testing ground, and the ultimate goal is the information space far beyond the borders of Ukraine and Russia. The zone of Russian propaganda is constantly expanding (Sayenko, 2015, p. 106). Comparing the differences between traditional and hybrid wars, one of them is: discrediting the foreign and domestic policies of the enemy country by conducting an active information campaign using special methods of “zombification” of society with broad involvement of both governmental and non-governmental organizations, widespread propaganda and counter-propaganda, “dirty” information technology, as well as robbery and looting, theft of humanitarian aid, drug trafficking, smuggling of resources, kidnapping (Sayenko, 2015, p. 106). The diplomatic dimension then appears in the Ukrainian information space. Batyukova (2021) describes the emergence of a new leak in international media relations. Reshaping of the responsibilities of the media currently plays the role of foreign policy leaders. Media tools can influence the dynamics of conflicts and collective identity formation. Media diplomacy performs several tasks, namely: -formation of a positive image of the state in the international arena with the help of media tools; -promotion of national interests of the state; -propaganda or anti-propaganda; -raising awareness of the state in the world. 134

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Among the media of diplomatic activity in Ukraine should be noted the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the bulletin of the Department of Information and Public Relations, which regularly publishes problematic articles, speeches of ambassadors, various information about veterans of the diplomatic mission (Batyukova, 2021, p. 104). In addition, media diplomacy is also used through such tools by official accounts of civil servants (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and Clubhouse). These platforms are often called “new media”, but their use by subjects of international relations and influence on foreign policy is studied insufficiently through the concept of media diplomacy in modern realities. Media diplomacy plays an important role in shaping external relations between states, shaping the country’s image as a powerful actor in the international arena. Media diplomacy originates from the foreign policy principles of US policy. The system of media diplomacy of Ukraine has not been formed yet. The main problem is the low popularity of domestic media abroad (Batyukova, 2021, p.104-105). Internet tools of media are also interesting. Alekseenko (2021) notes that the Ukrainian blogosphere is developing for a much shorter period than its foreign counterparts. However, it confidently demonstrates active growth and is no different from blogs on the World Wide Web. Today, a person who runs his blog on the Internet has the opportunity to present information objectively and independently. The most important thing is that this process takes place regardless of the policy pursued by the editorial office and the format chosen by the media. To express one’s own opinion, correcting it in the course of communication with readers, as well as being able to clarify some aspects of information, i. e. the flow of information in this format of social communication appears free and “evolutionarily” unlimited (Alekseenko, 2021, p. 378). A blog provides the possibility of a subjective relationship. The author of the blog interacts with other participants of a certain platform in comments, discusses, accepts advice and generally listens to the opinions of his readers. This is a kind of diary, the main feature of which is the availability of other network users. People who run their blogs have the opportunity to communicate with like-minded people from different countries, different races and different other features (Alekseenko, 2021, p. 379). In the Ukrainian media space, such an information method as interviews is quite common. Bakun (2021 a) views it as a method of gathering information. It should be noted that gathering information is already a counteraction to information terrorism. Depending on the purpose of the journalist, the interview is divided into: informational - reaction to political conditions in the country where the interviewer seeks to get answers from politicians to socially important questions (surveys of this type are typical of news programs on state TV channels); image biographical an interview in which a politician appears as an outstanding person is not always objective, usually has an agitation effect on the audience (such interviews are portrayed by Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Gordon in the author’s program “Visiting Dmytro Gordon” argumentative - presentation of a politician’s thoughts on a particular event that will happen in the future (such interviews are published in the form of stories in news programs such as “Windows”, “TSN”, “Today”, etc.); provocative - mutually provocative conversation between a politician and a journalist, using questions that may negatively affect the emotions of the respondent (this type of interview is popular on Ukrainian television in the TV program leaflets by Natalia Moseychuk “Right to Power”) (Bakun, 2021 (a), p. 382).

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The success of the interview is due to its use in problem studies, in the study of public opinion. The information obtained through such surveys becomes known not only to journalists but also to government officials, the general public. Interviews in the Ukrainian media play an important role in democratizing modern society. Interviews are the best way to gather information. In modern Ukraine, there are certain trends in the development of online publications that are changing. This type of media has brought a lot of new qualities and principles to journalism. The Internet can make information fast, multimedia and hyper textual, taking into account the wishes of the audience. Online publications not only change, but they also change related areas of human activity (Bakun, 2021 (a), pp. 384). As a result of all the above, media with new types and genres of Ukrainian journalism are emerging. The media journalism of the modern Internet space differs significantly from the traditional one. Information Internet competition provokes an active struggle for the attention of the audience, so an important aspect is a way of presenting particular information. Due to the diversity of Internet users, the main thing is still the content of messages. Therefore, the way of presentation and content involves constant interaction with the target audience, studying it as an object and an equal participant in the dialogue. Online journalism in the context of the latest communications should be “participatory journalism” (Berdnik, 2021, p. 387). There are bloggers on every social network. Such activity brings money, it is a job. Bloggers aim to convey interesting or useful information to their readers. Political communication as a social information field of politics has also recently moved to the blogosphere, creating a new type of journalism. The topic of political blogs is growing strongly in Ukraine. There are several Russian-speaking influential bloggers in the information space. In their materials can be seen the fight against terrorism. The activities of each of them may be studied separately. It should be the subject of further scientific research. At the moment in Ukraine, there is an evolution of media journalism in the genre of investigations Bykovska (2021). A journalistic investigation has the right to exist exclusively in a democratic society where there is freedom of speech. Investigative journalism notes four specific features: - Investigative journalist conducts his / her research work without relying on other people’s research; - The investigation sheds light on those offences that do not have authentication (Bykovska, 2021, p. 397). The information processed by investigators is hidden by someone on purpose. The investigation begins where the information is inhibited. Such work anticipates certain threats. The logical conclusion of a journalistic investigation as a genre that can detect terrorist activity should be to correct situations. Journalistic investigations also, of course, affect society. This can be both positive and negative. Some investigations have no effect. In Ukraine, freedom of speech is a major value for the media. The media want society and public authorities to promote, not hinder, their activities. According to Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine, “Everyone has the right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information orally, in writing or otherwise - at his discretion.” That is, there is a “de jure”, but sometimes there is no “de facto” (Zhidenko, 2021, p. 428). Ukrainian researcher Zhydenko drew attention to the blocking of TV channels “112 136

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Ukraine”, “Newsome” and “ZIK”. The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine has decided to apply the necessary sanctions to stop funding from the temporarily occupied territory and the aggressor state (Zhidenko, 2021, p. 429). There is an opinion that the authorities control and restrain the actions of journalists. There is an imitation of freedom of speech. Over time, this can negatively affect media development. State intervention in the media sphere should be minimal. The state of freedom of speech in Ukraine and the world is not very optimistic. The balance between national security and freedom have to be maintained. Currently, working in the media is considered a challenge for every individual. In Ukraine, there are “many obstacles to media development: significant control of journalism, insufficient protection of modern media by public authorities. But regulating relations between social institutions will help resolve issues and ensure the right of journalists to be free in their judgments” (Zhidenko, 2021, p. 431). In the context of this chapter, an interesting example is that the function of the media has a profile in the social networks of political figures due the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Kiknadze (2021) in Ukraine, Facebook has received a great share of attention from politicians and top officials. Kiknadze (2021) notes the accounts of the president, prime minister, head of the National Security and Defence Council, all ministers, most deputies and every well-known opposition politician. And most accounts and official pages are very active. The most popular accounts are Poroshenko’s (more than 2 million subscribers), Zelensky’s (more than 1 million), etc. The concentration and activity of politicians on Facebook may be explained. Facebook is the most popular social network: 9 million Ukrainians use it. The audience of the social network Facebook in Ukraine includes politically active, intelligent people of all ages with a high level of affluence. Facebook is a tool to get the news. And politicians use it with varying degrees of success. Television channels that oppose terrorism in Ukraine are the program “TSN” on 1 + 1, “Facts” on ICTV and “Details” on Inter. Today there is a rich choice of media. Each has its format, subject matter and fights for its reader or viewer. But no matter what unique content the media produces, information programs remain at the core. News is the fulcrum of any broadcaster’s broadcast network, and all other programs are located in the intervals between issues. Each news has its value because it is in the public interest and aims to inform the consumer audience. General interest arises when certain factors are present, such as intimacy, emotion, conflict, the severity of consequences, and curiosity, and thus a connection with the public is established (Chorna, 2021, p. 482). The modern format of the information text is the crown of the evolution of media journalistic genres. On the Internet, the news got rid of everything superfluous to most effectively convey information to an inattentive audience. They have become universal - probably that’s why they are so fiercely copied. In addition, journalists should publish their materials only if they comply with generally accepted journalistic principles and norms. It is necessary to single out the basic standards of information journalism, which are important for both television and radio, press and online publications. These standards are a balance of opinions and points of view, reliability, accuracy, completeness, separation of facts from comments and efficiency. Even in the age of the Internet, the news is and remains the basis of journalism. Therefore, suitable and tested rules that serve to ensure quality journalism are of particular importance for their selection and presentation, writes Chorna (Chorna, 2021, p. 483).

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CONCLUSION Summing up the results of this study, it should be noted that in the context of media development, information terrorism has become more relevant, which is a new, specific type one and is due to the improvement of innovative technologies. For Ukraine, information activities are only developing. The threat of terrorism is not an internal problem mainly. But an external one, which is created by foreign states. Information terrorism has two types of influence. It is material and intellectual. Ukrainian media can resist both types of influence on society. Media terrorism of foreign countries is aimed at individuals. Being under the intellectual effect of hostile media, the individual cannot independently navigate in the information space. The Ukrainian media covered in sufficient detail the topics of terrorism on religious grounds. Since 2014, more attention is paid to the protection of the rights of Crimean Tatars, countering terror by the authorities of the annexed Crimea. Ukrainian legislation in the field of information terrorism and media development needs to be improved. An important mechanism in countering terrorist activities is the emotional component of the content of articles, television reports, and journalistic investigations. The blogosphere, the improvement of the interview genre contributes to the distraction of the individual from the destructive media resources in Ukraine. Ensuring a unified information policy and the formation of a unified information space can counteract the terrorist activities of the neighbouring country that has occupied part of Ukrainian territory. Thus, the latest mechanisms and techniques can be called. They are journalistic empathy, media diplomacy, the formation of a single information space, the development of the blogosphere using interviews and investigative journalism. The media are also tools for influencing the dynamics of existing conflicts and the formation of a collective identity. Currently, the Ukrainian media play the role of a leader in public policy. Media diplomacy performs several tasks. First, the formation is of a positive image of the state in the international arena. This is the promotion of the national interests of Ukraine. Ukrainian media have an educational function for other countries (regarding the identity of the country). However, there are still problems with freedom of speech in Ukraine, which requires legislative adjustments. Such media as profiles in social networks of politicians may become a platform for condemning terrorist activities and can positively influence the opinion of the electorate during the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the Ukrainian media perform the useful function of countering terrorism in their development.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research received no grant from any organization.

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Pavlenko, L. G. (2020). Coverage problems terrorist threats in the News: Impact on information audience other socially important topics (news release for example of Ukrainian radio channel national public broadcasting company Ukraine). Young Scientist, 85, 84–92. Petrishin, G. R. (2021). Information terrorism: Sources of formation and activation in Ukraine. Gabitus, 21(21), 44–50. doi:10.32843/2663-5208.2021.21.7 Proshin, D. V. (2014). David Rappoport, fourth wave terrorism and European jihadists. Scientific works. Political Science (Wellington, N.Z.), 236–248. Pugach, V. G. (2015). Information terrorism and politics. Faces, 11(1), 6–11. Romanyshyn, N. (2020). Application of Corpus Technologies in Conceptual Studies (based on the Concept Ukraine Actualization in English and Ukrainian Political Media Discourse. In COLINS (pp. 472-488). http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2604/paper35.pdf Saidakhmetov, D. (2014). Ukrainian media coverage of hostilities in eastern Ukraine: Professional and ethical aspect. Bulletin of Lviv University. Series. Journalism, 39(1), 104–108. Samsonenko, K. O., & Miroshnychenko, O. P. (2014). International legal and domestic aspects of the fight against informational terrorism. Legal Systems, 3, 25-39. Sayenko, I. V. (2015). Information and humanitarian aggression as a definitive modern threat to Ukrainian statehood perspectives. Perspectives on Political Science, 4(66), 103–109. Shachkovska, L. S. (2017). Information terrorism as a phenomenon of modern international politics. Ukr-turkmen visnuk, 2, 115-123. Shulskaya, N.M. (2015). Informal anthroponomy of socially dangerous groups of people in crisis media discourse. Notes of the Onomastics, 18, 802-812. Sokolova, K. (2015). “Journalistic empathy” as the main suggestive mechanism of participatory journalism. Education of the Region, 3-4, 75-85. Sventytska, O. V. (2007). Information terrorism as a phenomenon of modern international politics. Academic Press. Tulyakov, V. O., & Tulyakov, V. A. (2000). Fear of terrorism as a criminogenic factor. URL:http:// dspace.onua.edu.ua/bitstream/handle/11300/4115/Tulyakov%20V.%20O.%20Strah%20pered%20teroruzmom%20yak%20kruminogennuj%20%20chunnuk.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Yermolenko, D. O. (2018). Legal regulation of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Zaporizhzhya National University. Zaskalna, A., & Bilushchak, T. (2017). Question of information confrontation in the conditions of information war. Information, Communication, Society, 38-39. Zaslavskaya, N. B., & Kankovskaya, A. R. (2016). Information terrorism as a phenomenon of modern international politics. Science of St. Petersburg State Pedagogical University, 160-162.

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Zhidenko, A. V. (2021). Freedom of speech as a challenge for modern mass media. In Modern international relations: current issues of theory and practice. National Aviation University. Zubarieva, M. A. (2015). Mass management in the era of consumer society. Scientific and Theoretical Almanac Grani, 18(2), 63–67.

ADDITIONAL READING Altheide, D. L. (2007). The mass media and terrorism. Discourse & Communication, 1(3), 287–308. doi:10.1177/1750481307079207 Archetti, C. (2013). Terrorism, Communication, and the Media. In Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media (pp. 32-59). Palgrave Macmillan. Ebrahimi, M. (Ed.). (2022). Information Manipulation and Its Impact Across All Industries. IGI Global., doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-8235-0 Freedman, D., & Thussu, D. K. (Eds.). (2011). Media and terrorism: Global perspectives. Sage. Matusitz, J. (2013). Terrorism and communication. Sage (Atlanta, Ga.). Rascão, J. P. (2020). Freedom of Expression, Privacy, and Ethical and Social Responsibility in Democracy in the Digital Age. International Journal of Business Strategy and Automation, 1(3), 1–23. doi:10.4018/ IJBSA.2020070101 Weimann, G. (2014). New terrorism and new media (Vol. 2). Commons Lab of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Blog: An online journal, an Internet diary, the main content of which is systematically added entries. Countering Terrorism: The identification, prevention, suppression, disclosure, and investigation of a terrorist act. Cyberterrorism: The use of the internet for terrorist purposes. Development: A process of transition from one qualitative state to another, more perfect one. Information: Knowledge about something, regardless of the form of their presentation. Media: A broad concept that includes means of communication, ways of transmitting the information. News: Operational information that is of political, social, or economic interest to the audience. Terrorism: The use or threat of violence and seeks to create fear.

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The International Media and Counterterrorism Operations in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges Oluchukwu Ignatus Onianwa University of Ibadan, Nigeria

ABSTRACT The essence of this chapter is to examine the challenges in the global media reportage of counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria. Boko-Haram and other terrorists’ activities in Nigeria have remained security threats to the stability of Nigeria, the West African sub-region, and the entire African continent. They have succeeded in instilling fear in the minds of the local population, destruction of worships centers and houses. However, the military onslaught against Boko-Haram by the Nigerian defence forces has continued unabated. Through their respective reportage, the global media has continued to produce international context on war against terror activities in Nigeria. In carrying out their tasks, they have faced a series of challenges given the importance of their reports in shaping both local and international public opinion about counter-terrorism operations in the country. These criticisms have emanated from state actors, the security forces, the local media, and domestic opinion.

INTRODUCTION Terrorism is the greatest threat to international security. Globalization has significantly influenced the spate of terrorism for event in one part of the globe has a direct or an indirect impact on others (Amina et al, 2020, p.1). For decades, new type of terrorism has been quietly gathering ranks in the world. Through their operations they mercilessly slaughter thousands of people of all races and religion (Sageman, 2005, pp.1-2). With greater resources and less political concerns, terrorist groups constitute a significant danger to humanity (Bruce, 1954, p.62). DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch009

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Media coverage of terrorism matters. Terrorism is a means of sending a message and the media provide the channel by which that message is carried, beyond the immediate victims, to reach a mass audience (Mark, 2007, p.283). Media and terrorism are intertwined such that one cannot exist without the other. They work together in delivering messages that shapes public attitudes and perception about terror activities across the globe. This chapter examines aspects of the media communication on counterterrorism operations in Nigeria. However, it implements specific focus on the international media reportage of counterterrorism in Nigeria. The international media in this context are the media that are outside the sovereign States like Nigeria besieged by terrorist activities. The study adopts a narrative approach for data analysis and relied on primary and secondary sources for data analysis namely books, journal articles, foreign and local online newspapers and internet sources. Through their reportage, the global media has continued to produce international context on war against terror in Nigeria. The worldwide outreach of the international media has caused a lot of distress among the security agencies who often complained about media bias and propaganda in their operations. Engagement in the investigation of counterterrorism operations by the global media have brought them into collision course with the Nigerian government and security forces. These have undermined the collective efforts in fight against insurgency and emboldened the terrorists in the conduct of their operations in Nigeria.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS Terrorism and Media Different scholars have attempted to define the concept of terrorism. Yet, the term is so loaded with conceptual problems that a totally accepted definition of it still does not exist. Laqueur (1999) argues that “terrorism is the use or the threat of the use of violence, a method of combat, or a strategy to achieve certain targets… It aims to induce a state of fear in the victim that is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian rules… Publicity is an essential factor in the terrorist strategy.” Bruce (2006) stated that, “terrorism is ineluctably political in aims and motives, violent or, equally important, threatens violence, designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target, conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia, and perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government and the civilian population in furtherance of political or social objectives (FBI, 28 CFR, Section 0.85). Victoroff (2005) identified two core components underlying the basis of contemporary terrorist definitions. Firstly, terrorism involves aggression against non-combatants; and secondly, the terrorist action in itself is not expected by its perpetrator to accomplish a political goal but instead to influence a target audience and change that audience’s behaviour in a way that will serve the interest of the terrorist. Media are communication outlets and tools use to store and deliver information or data. The term covers all the means of communication which have functions such as informing, raising awareness, education, socialization, entertainment and agenda setting including all kinds of oral written and visual images (IGI Global, 2021, p.1). Defleur and Dennis (1981) defines mass media as a device for moving 145

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messages across distance or time to accomplish mass communication process. It can be looked at as not only mechanical devices that transmit and sometime store messages, television, camera, radio, microphone, printing press, but also institutions that use these channels to transfer messages. According to Paul Wilkinson (1997) where mass media is concerned in the context of terrorism generally centres on ‘four main objectives’: to convey the propaganda of the deed and to create extreme fear among their target groups; to mobilize wider support for their cause among the general population and international opinion by emphasizing such themes as the righteousness of their cause and the inevitability of their victory; to frustrate and disrupt the response of the government and security forces, for example by suggesting that all their anti-terrorist measures are inherently tyrannical and counterproductive and to mobilize, incite and boost their constituency of actual and potential supporters and in so doing to increase recruitment, raise more funds and inspire further attacks.

Theoretical Construct Since the emergence of terrorist activities across the globe especially the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 terrorism research has gained momentum evolving to become interdisciplinary in theoretical assumptions exploring the nature, motivation and application of terrorism. There are different types of theories on terrorism that has been formulated. First is the instrumentalist theory which emphasizes that terrorism is a means to a political end. Government and adversary are analyzed as if engaged in a typical conflict, in which each party’s are aimed at influencing the behaviour of others. Terrorism is par excellence a strategy of surprise, necessary for small groups who must compensate for weakness in numbers and destructive capability. Explanations of why surprise occurs frequently emphasize the defender’s lack of preparation as much as the adversary’s intentions and capabilities (Crenshaw, 2008, pp.13-14). There is a wide spectrum of theories on the role of the media in terrorism. Mahmoud (2013, pp.609615) argues that the news media are driven by competition and profit, and subsequently thrive on violence and controversy. They profit from sensationalizing stories as much as possible, as it boosts their ratings and viewer numbers. Thus, the media are happy to broadcast the violence of terrorist attacks, giving a platform to perpetrators of violence and expanding their impact across the globe. The way mass media approaches the reporting of terrorism has evolved rapidly over the last several decades with the impact of globalization and development of communications technology (Jessica, 2020, p.8). Another theory is symbiotic relationship. Experts on terrorism contend that there is a symbiotic relationship between the terrorists and the media. According to this argument, the terrorists need media coverage to advance their cause, while the media need the drama of terrorist attacks to fill their pages and news broadcasts, thereby maximizing their audience and their profits (Mark, 2007, p.284). Media accelerates public opinion on domestic and international issues giving voice to the voiceless. Scholars argued that the media and terrorism have a symbiotic relationship each exploits the other and terrorism has no meaning without media coverage in this age of information and communication technology. Terrorists use mass media for both tactical and strategic purposes (John, 2008, pp.127-146). Wilkinson (1997, pp.51-64) noted that the relationship between terrorists and the mass media tends inevitably to become symbiotic once terrorist violence is under way. For the mass media organisations the coverage of terrorism, especially prolonged incidents such as hijackings and hostage situations, provides an endless source of sensational and visually compelling news stories capable of boosting audience or readership figures. The fight against terrorism has become a global priority championed by the military through a 146

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state-centric security approach. However, the role of the foreign media in the counterinsurgency campaign cannot be overemphasized. Little wonder the former Prime Minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher, was widely quoted as saying that “Publicity is the oxygen of terrorism” (Muller et al., 2003; Vieira, 1991). The main objective of terrorists is to spread the message of fear to as many people as possible, including those not directly involved in the attack; and of course, the mass media play an important role in the dissemination of terror messages (Onwuzuruigbo, 2017, p.23).

TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: BOKO HARAM AND ISWAP Since independence the Nigerian State has witnessed intense political violence that paved way for growth of domestic terrorist ideologies. In the process of nation-building and political emancipation internal crisis ensued among different ethnic groups which affected good governance and political leadership. The result was the emergence of one internal crisis and another up to the outbreak of civil war in 1967. The propensity of the Nigerian State becoming a terrorists’ haven grew further in the 1970s and 1980s following the strong revival of radical Islamic fundamentalism from the Middle East, North Africa to the West African sub-region. According to Central Intelligence Agency’s report (1985): …Giving wider scope for political instability in countries beset by such problems as corruption, mismanagement and ethnic and religious cleavages spread of Islamic fundamentalism with its simplistic promises of economic and political recovery will increase the appeal of radical ideologies particularly in Nigeria… The fundamentalists’ intense commitment to proselytization probably would result in increased levels of violence…Eventually, support for the transformation of Nigeria…into Islamic states which is the militants’ ultimate goal will grow as the number of fundamentalists…increases. Islamic radicals are likely to regard their countries’ political, economic and military dealings with the West more skeptically than government leaders. The Islamic revival is usually characterized by anti-modern and anti-Western thinking…The probability of growing anti-Western bias will increase…Radicalized Islamic communities will aggravate longstanding ethnic and religious jealousies, increase the potential for widespread violence and pose greater threats to moderate governments (pp.7-8). The environment of socioeconomic and religiously-oriented insecurities led to the emergence of militant Islamist groups including the Maitatsine sect and the Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram. Most authors generally agree that the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, more widely known as Boko Haram, first appeared in 2002. However, some scholars have traced the emergence of the group back as far as 1995, when it existed as a little-known Muslim youth organisation called Shabaab. During this period, it was under the leadership of a man known as Lawan Abubakar, who situated the group’s headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State, in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. Lawan was reported to have departed for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, and the group’s control was transferred to the late Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. There are additional accounts that trace Boko Haram’s emergence to a group of Muslim students from the University of Maiduguri. This particular account suggests that it was this band of individuals that came in contact with Mohammed Yusuf, who, following conviction about his newfound ideology, altered the message of his religious sermons to the extent that he was later prevented from preaching at the Indimi mosque in Maiduguri around the year 2000 (Akinola, 2013, p.2). 147

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The sect had earlier established a base called Afghanistan in Kanamma village in northern Yobe state. In Maiduguri, Mohammed Yusuf was already drawing youth to himself through his preaching about the excesses of government officials, culminating in his frequent declaration of secular education as haram (forbidden) to Muslims. His preaching attracted youth from Yobe and Borno states, as well as neighbouring countries Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The group sustained intermittent hit-and-run attacks on security posts in some parts of Borno and Yobe until the July 2009 antigovernment uprising in Nigeria. The remote cause of the July 2009 revolt is often traced to the fatal shootings of sect members on June 11, 2009, by security forces involved in Operation Flush, following a clash with sect members for not wearing crash helmet while on their motorbikes for a funeral procession. In retaliation, the members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station on July 26. This raised the curtain for a wave of unrest that swept through Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe states. The revolt ended on July 30, 2009, when Mohammed Yusuf was finally captured in his residence in Maiduguri. After a few hours in police custody, the police killed Yusuf extrajudicially; police officials claimed that he was trying to escape. Over eight hundred people, mainly sect members, were killed during the revolt, and hundreds more were arrested. Nigerian authorities’ methods in repressing the 2009 revolt proved to be crucial in the deadly escalation of Boko Haram’s violent attacks (Onuoha, 2014, pp. 3-4). Since the demise of Yusuf and other followers, Boko Haram operations, which started in Borno, later spread to other parts of the north (Osumah, 2013, p.1). Attempts were made at exploring the dialogue option with the insurgents. Then on 26 August 2011, Boko Haram carried out its most notorious attack to date using a suicide car bomber to blow up the United Nations building in Abuja. At least 18 people were killed, and many more were injured when the blast destroyed the lower floors of the building (James, 2012, p.69-70). To date, Boko Haram has unleashed attacks which attracted tremendous attention of the media both locally and internationally. While the fight against Boko Haram was ongoing the terrorists in Nigeria opened a new frontier with the emergence of Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) which gained ground and momentum following the death of the leader of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau. The ISWAP and Boko Haram have been engaged in infighting for superiority among factions resulting in the elimination of many Boko Haram fighters from both sides. Following massive protests against his leadership style after he had eliminated some top Boko Haram Commanders including Abu-Fatima, his Chief of Staff who doubled as the Operation Commander ISWAP concluded that with all the mistakes, Shekau was derailing against the main cause they had charted for themselves and that it was time for him to be tracked down and be eliminated also (Kingsley, 2021, p.2). Shekau who gained notoriety after kidnapping of about 300 school girls in 2014 killed himself in May 2021 rather than surrendered after ISWAP-allied rivals attacked his base camp in Borno state in northeastern Nigeria. In an audio communication, ISWAP commander Abu Mussab Al-Barnawi claimed that Shekau killed himself while on the run from ISWAP fighters. Soon after the initial reports of Shekau’s death, in-fighting between Nigeria’s two rival jihadist factions intensified. ISWAP fighters moved against Boko Haram commanders who refused to surrender and join their ranks. The two factions have skirmished in the past since ISWAP split from Boko Haram in 2016, objecting to Shekau’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians of Muslims origin and use of women suicide bombers. Bakura’s faction is one of the Boko Haram elements operating in the Lake Chad area where they have access to porous borders with Chad and Niger. ISWAP fighters took over Shekau’s stronghold in the Sambisa forest in their bid or consolidation (Punch, 2021, p.1-2).

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Similarly, Abu-Musad Albarnawy was reappointed as the new leaders of ISWAP in the Northeast by the ISIS leadership and commenced the coordination of all activities of the insurgents under one umbrella for easy movement of funds, weapons, and materials (Kingsley, 2021). ISWAP and Boko Haram continued to attack different villages and security formations in the Northeast (Teniola, 2022, p.2). The fundamental factor behind the rise of terrorism in Nigeria is poverty and deprivation. Although Nigeria has enjoyed a decade of growth, the nature of this growth seems not to have eased the longstanding patterns of regional inequalities, ethnic and social cleavages between the Muslim-majority north and the Christian- majority south. Poverty levels in the north-east and north-west are 40% higher than those in the southern part of the country, and unemployment is very high plus lack of education that is prevalent in the North. Politics of resource control and the opulent behaviour of northern elites amid mass poverty have fostered a deep sense of popular grievance (Adesoji et al, 2018, p.38) and breed radicalization and indoctrination of the youths into indulging in acts of terrorism.

THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN TERRORIST RECRUITMENT Terrorists cannot do without followers. They carry out their operations with huge number of fighters they recruited via media sources. Since its inception, Boko Haram has been able to recruit large number of fighters that help the leadership execute their operations. ISWAP has been able to expand very quickly to Nigeria due to a large number of fighters it recruited. According to Nwachukwu (2021) “the terrorists have always taken advantage of the vulnerable in the society, particularly women and children to advance their cause. Recall that the terrorists groups, ISWAP and Boko Haram have in the past used women and children as suicide bombers. They have also conscripted children and minors, who they engaged as child soldiers, and women… who they can easily indoctrinate, manipulate and cheaply manage financially.” There is no uniform recruitment process for all extremist organizations (Omenma et al, 2020, pp.8-10). The process is equally not an abrupt event, but a process that occurs over time (Borum, 2011). It can be voluntary or non-voluntary, but it is a structured process. Recruitment occurs in a variety of social spaces, such as music, shows, mosques, schools, parties, family networks, neighborhoods, and online. There are definite, though non-linear processes associated with recruitment. Ideology, religion or politics are all tools of radicalization. Boko Haram identify with Wahhabism and Salafism ideologies, which instruct Muslims to practice the norms and values of Islam in their “pure” forms. The terrorist groups remind Muslims of jihad, seen as fard ‘ayn, a personal religious duty, which every true Muslim is obliged to complete, such as zakat (almsgiving), hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca), salat, daily prayers), sawm, fasting during Ramadan, and the shahada accepting Muhammad as God’s messenger. Boko Haram takes advantage of the high poverty rates to mobilize recruits based on religious ideology (Agbiboa, 2015, p. 8). Through the instrumentality of social media terrorists groups manipulate people’s mind and coerce them to join their movement. According to Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, Monguno, “terror groups used social media platforms to propagate ideologies, recruit youths, radicalize them… In addition to recruiting via social media, terrorist group espcailly ISWAP also recruit new members by distributing pamphlets to residents of communities under their control.” In 2020 the Nigeria’s Minister of Communication and Digital Economy Pantami warned that terrorists now use social media as a medium for communication and recruiting new followers in perpetrating crimes in Nigeria. According to him “It is evident that terrorists are exploiting social media, encrypted communications and the dark web to spread propaganda, recruit new followers and coordinate attacks” (Akpojotor, 2020, p.1)., 149

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Terrorists discovered that social media can be important tools for recruitment of fighters, supporters and for dissemination of their world views. They struggled to figure out how to use social media to make an impact, even though their numbers are minuscule in comparison to the overall user base. It’s highly organized social media campaign uses deceptive tactics and shows a sophisticated understanding of how such networks operate (Chris et al, 2017, pp.313-345).

The Media Strategy of Nigerian Islamist Groups Terrorists groups make use of different media strategies in order to project their image to the world. One of such strategy is propaganda or public relations machinery. According to Nigeria’s Minister of Information, Lai Mohammad, “Having lost in the field, Boko Haram was turning to the press and social media to spread its violent and extremist interpretation of Islamic law, and to give the impression that it still holds territory. The media should not give the militants oxygen of publicity they desperately need” (Elebeke, 2017, p.1). Social media space is the greatest channel that the terrorists utilizes to attract heavy followers. Individual terrorists have social media handles such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, and even Yahoo accounts. These social media are very useful in coordinating their activities, communicating with newly recruited members, putting across videos, pictures, and live streaming of attacks carried out by the terrorists groups. These attacks are showcased to influence new members towards believing in this cause and also send a message to the world regarding their capcacity and ability to engage in military confrontation with the state. Similarly, Audu (2017) argued that Boko Haram, like other jihad terrorist groups, needs publicity. Boko Hara’s propaganda approach can be split into three eras; pre-2010, post-2010 and post-affiliation with ISIS. The jihadi group formed in 2002 and had its first open confrontation with the Nigerian security forces in 2009. During the first period, it engaged in aggressive preaching and radicalization of members. This was done through Friday sermons, public lectures, debates with opposing ulama or clerics and the publication of books and pamphlets. While many jihadist groups have shown themselves adept at using social media to further their propaganda efforts, Boko Haram arrived late in the game. In 2010, the year then Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau declared jihad, one Boko Haram member even posted a message on the Ansar al-Mujahideen jihadist web forum that “we lack vibrant media experts in the video production…we are seriously lacking expertise, which is presently harming our efficiency. Later, Boko Haram became on par with most other jihadist groups in exploiting online media, using it to promote its attacks and sharia punishment and to engage in debates with rival factions (Audu, 2017, p.2). Boko Haram’s online presence is one important aspect of their maturation that cannot be ignored and seems to have contributed to the rapid increase in their strength. Due to the group’s online outreach, representatives of Boko Haram become active in the online networks used by jihadists to fundraise and share information such as weapons manuals and tactical advice (Insite Blog, 2011, p.1). Boko Haram equally publishes video clips online as part of its media strategy. The first arm conflict between Boko Haram and security forces in July 2009 led to the death of the group, including its founder and pioneer leader. Its headquarters were demolished and it went underground, resurfaced in mid-2010. Boko Haram announced its return via a video published on the internet. At the end of June that year, Muhammad Yusuf’s deputy, Abubakar Shekau appeared in his first online video, his face masked and an AK-47 rifle in the background. Shekau refuted the claims that he had been killed in the 2009 confrontation in Maiduguri. The clip launched Shekau as Boko Haram’s leader after Yusuf as well as its spokesperson. 150

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He began to regularly address his target audience via video and sometimes audio posted online. Since the first clip, and until Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISISI in 2015, the group relied extensively on this medium. Not only has it used video to claim responsibility for attacks and brag about successes, it has used it to reiterate the group’s beliefs and communicate with a broader audience ((Audu, 2017, p.4). Radio has been another key medium for the jihadis, allowing them to reach millions who may not have internet access. The most popular radio stations with the widest coverage in northern Nigeria are the Hausa services of the BBC, VOA, Deutsche Welle, and more recently, France International. Boko Haram has used these stations to spread its propaganda to people its online recordings would not reach otherwise. Boko Haram started using this medium after its re-emergence in 2010, though the group gave its first interview to international media in 2009 to BBC Hausa ((Audu, 2017, p.5). Boko Haram closely monitors media coverage, and often responds to it. Similarly, in a bid to silence negative publicity, the insurgents have threatened to and indeed did attack some outlets whose coverage is critical of Boko Haram (Audu, 2017, p.6). Boko Haram became formally affiliated to ISIS in March 2015, opening yet another new chapter in its propaganda history. The group’s videos immediately started showing signs of ISIS’ influence. The very first video the group released after its affiliation, footage of two beheaded men accused of spying, mirrored those of ISIS. With the affiliation, the quality and professionalism of Boko Haram’s videos improved markedly; their iconography and higher resolution were made to resemble ISIS productions. The group started embellishing its videos with professionally designed graphics and first-rate opening sequences and branded photographs of its militants and the areas it controlled to demonstrate successes. The clips included jihadi anthems used by ISIS, improved sound quality, and well-presented subtitles in English, French, Arabic, and Hausa (Audu, 2017, p.7). But Boko Haram borrowed a leaf from ISIS’ media strategy, too. Previously, the group published its videos directly on YouTube and distributed them to international media outlets like AFP through middlemen (Audu, 2017, p.2). Since 2014 onward, their strategy changed into more use of social media platforms more use of videos, creating multiple accounts. Even after those accounts have been taken down on Twitter, they begin creating more and more accounts. In North Eastern Nigeria they use Facebook mostly as a way to communicate with individuals (Slutzker, 2018, p.1). Violet Tsagka (2018) states that “starting in 2013 social media increasingly played a role in Boko Haram’s messaging. They actively posted communications through Facebook due to the platform’s wide coverage among the population in Northern Nigeria, using it to then drive communication to other social media platforms such as Telegram, a securely encrypted messaging application. Using Facebook freed Boko Haram from their dependency on mainstream media, and it also brought the group closer to its target audience. Since the beginning, we have seen messaging against democracy and Western-style education from both factions, Boko Haram and ISIS- West Africa (Slutzer, 2018, p.1-3).

International Media and Counterterrorism Operations The entry of international media in the theater of counterterrorism operations in Nigeria coincided with the intensification of Boko Haram activities such as the bombing of strategic government buildings and international organisations like the United Nations and killing of innocent people and the unbearable attacks launched against villages and communities in the Northern Nigeria that led to the displacement of millions of people.

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The abduction of school girls in Northeastern Nigeria by Boko Haram terrorists heralds the international media reporting of counterterrorism in Nigeria. On April 14, 2014, Boko Haram fighters broke into Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, in northeastern Nigeria and forcibly took away 276 girls from the school. Later, fifty-seven of the schoolgirls jumped off the truck conveying them and managed to escape. The story appeared in many international headlines. The videos also gave a text and photo exclusive that saw it widely quoted on breaking news channels and international media. Given the intense media attention accrued to the Chibok incident, many media scholars argued that such a wide event only succeeded in promoting the terrorists’ agenda and motives to the international community (Kayode, 2020, p.2). Major component of the Chibok incident is the international media criticisms of the Nigerian military capacity to denigrate the terrorist group. What deepened the global media criticisms of the military was the damming testimonies gathered by Amnesty International that Nigerian security forces failed to act on warnings about Boko Haram’s armed raid on the state-run boarding school in Chibok which led to the abduction. According to Al Jazeera (2021) “The fact that Nigerian security forces knew about Boko Haram’s impending raid but it failed to take immediate action needed to stop it, will only amplify the national and international outcry at this horrific crime. The military could not assemble the troops needed to suppress the attack, due to poor resources and a reported fear of engaging with the often better-equipped insurgent group.” The kidnapping led to the #BringBackOurGirls media campaign championed by Oby Ezekwesili, Aisha Yesufu, Bukky Shonibare, Hadiza Bala Usman and others which, in turn, sparked an international response. Almost six years later, out of the 219 girls that were taken away, 107 girls have either been found or released by Boko Haram after it struck a deal with the Nigerian government. At least 112 girls are still missing (Kayode, 2020, p.3). At this juncture, the attention of the international media had focused on the ability of the Nigerian Armed Forces to defeat Boko Haram and its affiliates in the country. A few months after taking over as Nigeria’s Head of State, President Muhammadu Buhari assured the international community that Boko Haram terrorists would be defeated as soon as possible (BBC News, 2015, p.1). Later, the international media launched analysis about the Nigerian government assertion that Boko Haram and ISWAP have been technically defeated. On 24 December 2015, the Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari told the BBC in an interview that the militant group could no longer mount conventional attacks against security forces or population centres. It has been reduced to fighting with improvised explosives devices (IED) and remained a force only in its heartland of Borno state. The jihadists had been all but driven out from Adamawa and Yobe states, and their way of operating curtailed. Boko Haram has reverted to using Improvised Explosives; indoctrinating young guys…they have now been reduced to that. But articulated conventional attacks on centres of communication and populations…they are no longer capable of doing that effectively (BBC News, 2015, p.1). Similarly, Nigeria’s Information Minister, Lai Mohammed on 27 December 2015 reaffirmed that Boko Haram was on the precipice of being wiped out. He argued that “all insurgent-held territory had been reclaimed and that Boko Haram no longer possessed the operational capabilities to achieve its raison d’être, the creation of dawlah…or Islamic state…in northeastern Nigeria” (Vanguard, 2019, p.1). Such assurances would have been made to the Nigerian public who bear the brunt of terrorism. This was the view of many international media. According to CNN “it was a promise that the Nigerian Head of State would also reiterate to fellow Nigerians, who eagerly waited for him to make good his promises and act with the decisiveness that Buhari had accused his predecessor, Goodluck Jonathan of lacking. 152

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Yet, as 2015… the specter of Boko Haram loomed as large as ever over Africa’s most populous state” (Ryan, 2016, p.2). However, despite the assertion that the terrorists have been decapitated technically they have intensified their operations to the highest proportion especially in the northeast where the Islamic group began its insurgency in 2009. The BBC analysis was that the government position does not relate to the reality on the ground for there are still many challenges facing the Nigerian military in their counterterrorism drive. An overreliance on a military strategy to confront Boko Haram is at the heart of the state’s inability to deal with the threat of Boko Haram and other terrorists. The second factor why Boko Haram and ISWAP have not been defeated according to BBC is their ability to recruit more people in their group. Borno State Governor Babagana Zullum told the BBC that the insurgents were even recruiting people who had previously been forced from their homes by the conflict itself. Thirdly, lack of equipment and corruption endangers the government inability to defeat Boko Haram and ISWAP (Ishaq, 2021, p.2). The widespread influence of Boko Haram and ISWAP is critical hotline news in the global media. Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State has had a great impact on the African group’s longevity. According to Ryan (2021): What we do know is that Boko Haram has become the largest ISIS affiliate anywhere and has increased its jihadist credentials within an area of sub-Saharan Africa where the prevailing social, political and economic climate is seen as conducive for the organisation. The inconvenient truth is that Nigeria has not defeated Boko Haram but simply reversed the gains that the terror group has scored against it…No victory can be declared in this way until the day that the Nigerian government can secure both land and human life from Boko Haram’s deadly reach. Despite claims to the contrary, it is a day that will now have to be ushered in with the dawn of a new year (p. 1). When Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau died it featured strongly in the global media. However, CNN maintained that it is not the first time that Shekau has been declared dead, only for him to later resurface in videos taunting his detractors. This shows that global media never accepted a hundred per cent of Shekau’s death. Rather remained skeptical over the possibility of such incident (Stephanie, 2021, p.2). They lacked hundred percent confidence on the Nigeria’s military’s capacity to crush the terrorists in the country talk more about killing its leaders giving the fact that the counterterrorism operations in the country have lasted for so long. After the Shekau era, the direction of global media reportage terrorist leadership in the country moved to the ISWAP. Bulama Bukarti argued that “Shekau’s death could lead to the end of a violent rivalry between the two groups, enabling ISWAP to absorb Boko Haram fighters and consolidate its hold on terrorism in northeastern Nigeria. That would allow ISWAP to focus its attention on the government and military whose war efforts are languishing” (Eromo, 2021, p.2). ISWAP swift killing of Shekau paved the way for international media interests in their activities. ISWAP opened a new chapter in the counterterrorism war involving the Nigerian military. They let the media know that even though Shekau is dead the battle is not yet over. The evidence is the series of attacks they unleashed against the counterterrorism forces in Nigeria and the West Sub-region. Unlike Shekau’s group which often violently targeted civilian populations, ISWAP under Al-Barnawi targeted the Nigerian military and those who aided them. But it drew heightened global concern when it began targeting civilians working for international aid organisations in the northeast in a series of kidnappings and killings (Voice of America, 2021, p.2). 153

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The death of ISWAP leader Al-Barnawi was all over the international media raising discussions and analysis about Nigeria’s counterterrorism battle. Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff General Lucky Irabor, announced the death of the ISWAP leader saying that “I can authoritatively confirm to you that Al-Barnawi is dead. As simple as that. He is dead and will remain dead (BBC News, 2021, p.1). The international media don’t look for what to report rather events make themselves available for them anytime. In this age of social media, these perspectives are picked up by the global media for analysis and reportage. Distresses over terrorist attacks against the Nigerian military caused the international media to wonder whether they have the boldness to win the war on terror. Washington Post report on 10 May 2015 revealed that the Nigerian military is so broken; its soldiers are refusing to fight the war on terror. It argued in the report that, “as the Nigerian military battled Boko Haram over the past years, scores of soldiers made a decision that would put their lives in grave danger they refused to fight. It was not for lack of bravery they said. It was for lack of weapons. At least 66 of the soldiers have been found guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad…The cases have opened a window into the Nigerian military, once one of the strongest in Africa but now struggling to combat an Islamist insurgency of several thousand fighters” (Kevin, 2015, p.2). Even when they are recording success in the counter-insurgency operations the Nigerian military seems not to be acquiring positive ratings from top media around the globe. CNN argued that “much of the criticisms and pessimism is fair; there certainly have been several catastrophic military decisions if Nigeria’s severe year fight with Boko Haram are taken as a whole” (Farai, 2021, p.2). The Nigerian Army has continued to be downplayed in its quest to defeat terrorism in Nigeria. Again, the terrorists feed fat from the negative reports that come from the international media concerning the Nigerian security forces while it denigrates the military’s morale and capacity building to intensify more effort to crush terrorism in the country. The resultant effects are the potentiality of such reports to further undermine the country’s national security and deepen distrust between the military and the Nigerian populace (Jonathan and Ochoa, 2018, pp.1-2). Human rights abuses are highly central in the reportage of counterterrorism in Nigeria. Both the terrorists and the Nigerian military have been implicated in the reportage of gross human rights abuses and counterterrorism. On 14 March 2014 Al Jazeera report quoted the UN sources that Nigerian security forces have committed gross human rights abuses in their fight against a near five-year insurgency by Boko Haram…Fighter bombed targets in the city. These have served to alienate communities, and create fertile ground for Boko Haram to cultivate recruits (Al Jazeera, 2021, p.2). On 6 July 2015 New York Times reported how Boko Haram carried out a violent campaign against Nigerian civilians with two deadly attacks in Jos City in Plateau State. The attacks killed at least 44 people. Gunmen and suicide bombers struck popular restaurants and a mosque shooting worshipers who had gathered for Quranic readings during Ramadan. The attacks brought the death toll from the Boko Haram attack to more than 200 (Adam, 2021, p.1). Defection and rehabilitation programme established by the Nigerian government specifically for Boko Haram members is another issue that attracts global media attention in the context of counterterrorism operations in Nigeria. In 2016, the Nigerian military launched Operations Safe Corridor an initiative for the deradicalization and rehabilitation of ex-Boko Haram members. The operations aim to reintegrate repentant or defected Boko Haram members into society. More than 500 ex-Boko Haram members have already completed the programme (Femi, 2021, p.2). The media are not sure whether it would bring out peace and tranquility in the war-torn region. The ex-Boko Haram members have been confined at the camp in Goudoumaria in Niger. Washington Post 154

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report on 20 November 2018 states that “lured by the local governor’s promises of amnesty, the defectors at the camp in Goudoumaria risked death by escaping one of the world’s most bloodthirsty terrorists groups. But for over a year, they have languished in the remote outpost, without work or school as a distraction, waiting or officials in the country’s capital to decide who among them should be put on trial and who should be pardoned (Max, 2018, p.1). Security of the inmates is another focus of the international media. For instance, on 4 December 2021, at least four different explosions rocked the Maiduguri metropolis. The explosions were suspected to have been masterminded by the terrorist group firing rockets in different directions. One of the explosions landed at one thousand housing estates near Hajj Transit Camp where the repentant Boko Haram members are being housed (Ndahi, 2021, p.2). Such an attack has proved once again the porosity of Nigeria’s intelligence architecture that did not have any premonition of such incident. It further paints Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operations in an awful light, thus, feeding the global media news that throws the line of incompetency and lack of capacity to tackle the terrorist activities in Nigeria.

International Media and Counterterrorism: Government Reactions Government reactions to the global media engagement in the reportage of counterterrorism in Nigeria are often moody. Ever since the Nigerian government told the BBC that “Boko Haram has been technically defeated” whereas they have intensified their operations with increased kidnapping of schoolchildren by other sub-terrorist groups known as bandits the global media appear to lose confidence in the Nigeria government’s postulations on counterterrorism. Occasionally, the government of Nigeria is not happy with the report of the Nigerian soldiers being accused by human rights groups of carrying out mass atrocities including torturing and executing suspects. This is because of its damaging effects on the country’s global image (BBC News, p.1). The Nigerian military has time after time denied all the news reporting of the international media on the counterterrorism operations this includes the role of the Nigerian military and other security forces engaged in human rights violations. This is because of the implication of such reports to their request for military assistance from the world powers needed to flush out terrorists from the country. President Muhammadu Buhari criticized the US for refusing to grant such a request to Nigeria based on human rights abuses. He said that the human rights violations were unproven; Boko Haram was winning not because of the military’s incompetence but because the US had denied Nigeria access to appropriate strategic weapons aided and America had unwittingly aided and abetted the terrorists as a result (Adam, 2015, p.1). All these come about due to intense international media reports of counterterrorism in the country which don’t favour the government on many occasions.

CONCLUSION Terrorism is a potent source of news for international media. It is a top priority in the global media reportage and agenda for the advancement of freedom of speech, information and democracy. With the advent of sophisticated technology the media has contributed to revolutionizing the information space as regards the reports of terrorist activities around the world. The media are described as oxygen of publicity to the terrorists for without them groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP would have a very limited local and international impact. It is the media that spread the terrorist’s message and help give 155

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it publicity which is a form of communication. The mass media through television, in particular, have proved an effective tool for terrorists because of the images and pictures they broadcast to the public. The killings and atrocities committed by both the terrorists would have been swept under the carpet if not for the media. Their reportage is in the best interest of the public opinion and also useful for foreign policy formulation by their host governments. Through their reports, the media provide policy directions and help shape attitudes and behaviours towards matters of counterterrorism. The global media has continued to produce international context on war against terror activities in Nigeria. Their worldwide outreach has caused a lot of distress among the security agencies who often complained about media bias and propaganda in their operations. Engagement in the investigation of human rights violations by the global media has brought them into a collision course with the Nigerian government and security forces. In all these, being major non-state actor in the international system the media has the goal of protecting the interests of their host countries and their attitude towards counterterrorism in Nigeria. Thus, they produce narratives that promote the capacity of their host countries to play significant roles in matters of counterterrorism and show how relevant they could be in helping countries like Nigeria engage in the fight against terrorism.

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Ibrahim, A., & Mike, E. (2014). In the Home of Peace: A Siege of Fear. Voice of America. https://www. voanews.com Ifeanyi, N. (2021 November 8). Nigeria facing new dimension of threats-Defence minister. News Agency of Nigeria. https://nannews.ng/nigeria-facing-new-dimension-of-threats-defence-minister-/ IGI Global. (2021). What is Media. https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/media/18142 Ishaq, K. (2021, May 17). Nigeria’s Boko Haram militants: Six reasons they have not been defeated. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57117296 Jacob, Z. (2017). Electronic Jihad in Nigeria: How Boko Haram Is Using Social Media. Terrorism Monitor, 15(23). https://www.jamestown.org/program/electornic-jihad-nigeria-boko-haram-using-social-media-/ James, J.F.F. (2012). Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Joint Special Operations University 7701 Tampa Point Boulevard MacDill AFB/FL/33621. Jazeera, A. (2014, March 14). UN: Nigerian forces committing human rights abuses. https://america. aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/14/human-rightsnigeriansecuritybokoharm.html Jeff, V. (2005). The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(1), 3–42. https://doi.org / 10.117/0022002704272040 Jenkins, B. (1985). Terrorism and Personal Protection-Essay by an Impressive Array of Experts. Butterworth. Jillian, S. (2018). The online frontline: Inside Boko Haram’s social media and a movement to push back. Creative Association International. http://www.creativeassociationinternational.com/stories/the-onlinefrontline-inside-boko-haram-social-media-and-the-movement-to-push-back/amp Jonathan, M., & David, O. (2018). Agenda-Setting Theory in the US Media: A Comparative Analysis of Terrorists Attacks in France and Nigeria. Global Media Journal, 16(13). Joseph, M., & Max, A. (2021). Terrorism in Africa: Explaining the Rise of Extremist Violence against Civilians. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2021/04/09/terrorism-in-africa-explainingthe-rise-of-extremist-violence-against-civilians/ Kanayo, U. (2021, May 21). Defence Headquarters vows diligent protection of Nigeria, citizens. The Guardian. https://guardian.ng/news/defence-hqtrs-vows-diligent-protection-of-nigeria-citizens-/ Kassim, A. (2018, May). Boko Haram beyond the headlines: Analyses of Africa’s enduring insurgency. United States Military Academy: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Kevin, S. (2015, May 10). The Nigerian military is so broken its soldiers are refusing to fight. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/the-nigerian-military-is-so-broken-itssoldiers-are-refusing-to-fight-/2015/05/06 Kingsley, N. (2020 November 2). Military Deploys More Troops in North-East to rout insurgents. Thisdaylive. https://www.thisdaylive.com

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Kingsley, O. (2021). NSA, Mongonu in France explains why Boko Haram/ISWAP members are surrendering in droves. Vanguard. https://www.vangaurdngr.com/2021/11/nsa-mongonu-in-france-explainwhy-boko-haram-members-are-surrendering-in-droves-/amp Laqueur, W. (1979). Terrorism: A Penetrating Study of the Origins. Ideology and Sociology of Terrorism. New York: Little Brown. Laqueur, W. (1999). The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. Oxford University Press. Lukeman, A. (2021). Terrorists recruiting through social media platforms in Nigeria. https://www. icirnigeria.org/national-security-adviser-says-terrorists-are-recruitng-through-social-media-platformsin-nigeria/ Madunagu, E. (2005). Aspect of our Own Terrorism. http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/articles/aspects_of_our_own_terrorism.htm Mahmoud, E. (2013). The New Era of Media and Terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 36(7), 609–615. Marc, S. (2005). Understanding Terror Networks. International Journal of Emergency Mental Health, 7(1), 5–8. doi:10.9783/9780812206791/PubMed Mark, T. (2007). The Media and the Terrorist: Is There a “Right”. Way to Cover Political. Martha, C. (1987). Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational approaches. Journal of Strategic Studies, 10(4), 13-31. doi:10.1080/0140239870843731 Martin, E. (2021, September 13). Analysis: The 20-year war: 9/11’s enduring legacy in Nigeria, other African countries. Premium Times. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top/news/484580-analysisthe-20-year-war-9-11s-enduring-legacy-in-nigeria-other-african-countries.html Martin, L. J. (2008). The Media’s role in international terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 8(2), 127-146. doi:10.1080/1057610850843559 Max, B. (2018, November 20). Boko Haram brought terror to Niger. Can a defectors program bring peace? Washington Post. https://www.washigntonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/11/20/feature-bokoharam-brought-terror-to-nigercan-a-defectors-program-bring-peace/ Ndahi, M. (2021 December 4). Breaking: Explosions rock Maiduguri metropolis as terrorists attack Borno capital. Vanguard. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/12/breaking-explosion-rock-maidugurimetropolis-as-terrorists-attack-borno-capitl/amp/ Nigerian Army. (2015). Nigeria: Army Chief in Maiduguri-Changes Code to Operation Lafiya Dole. https://www.army.mil.ng/?page_id=162 Njadvara, M. (2021, April 12). Army chief tasks media on anti-terrorism fight. The Guardian. https:// guardian.ng/news/army-chief-tasks-media-on-anit-terrorism-fight/

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Omego, C. U. (2015). The Role of the Mass Media in the Fight against Terrorism and the Instrumental Use of Women in Boko Haram. An International Journal of Language, Literature and Gender Studies LALIGENS Ethiopia, 10(l4/2), 78-96. doi:10.4314/laligens.v4i26 Omenma, J. T., Hendricks, C., & Ajaebili, N. C. (2020). al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment Strategies. Peace and Conflict Studies, 27(1), 2. Advance online publication. doi:10.46743/1082-7307/2020.1460 Onwuzuruigbo, D. U. (2017). Communication Audit of Cable News Network (CNN) Online Reports of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria (2012-2016). International Journal of International Relations, Media and Mass Communication Studies, 3(5), 19-34. www.eajournals.org Osumah, O. (2013). The Response of the Nigerian Defense and Intelligence Establishments to Boko Haram Security Challenge. https://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/06/the-responses-of-the-nigerian-defenseand-intelligence-establishments-to-the-boko-haramsecurity-challenge/ Paul, W. (1997). The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(2), 51–64. Peter, C. (2016). Nigeria’s Army Establishes Offices to Handle Human Rights Violations, 1. https://www. voanews.com/amp/nigerias-army-establishes-offices-to-handle-human-rights-violations/3199696.html Reuters, (2021, June 7). ISWAP militant group says Nigeria’s Boko Haram leader is dead. https://www. reuters.com/world/islamic-state-african-province-says-nigeria-boko-haram-leader-is-dead-2021-06-06-/ Ryan, C. (2016, January 1). Opinion: Boko Haram and the defeat that never was. https://www.cnn.com/ cnn/2016/01/opinion/nigeria-boko-haram-fight-/index.html Saeed, A. (2014). Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau: A Ruthless leader with twisted ideology. https:// www.edition.cnn.com/2014/05/07/world/africa/abubakar-sheka-profile-/index.html Siteintel Group. (2011). Boko Haram Representatives Solicits Guidance and Assistance on Jihadist Forums. Insite Blog on Terrorism and Extremism. https://www.news.sitintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/ about-us/21-jihad/1145-boko-haram-representative-solicits-guidance-and-assistance-on-jihadist-forums# Solomon, O. (2022). Boko Haram, ISWAP recruiting Child soldiers-Army. Punch. https://www.punch. com/boko-haram-isawp-recruitng-child-soldiers-arm/%3famp Stephanie, B., & Nimi, P. (2021). Nigerian army investigating reports that Boko Haram leader died blew himself up to avoid capture. https://www.cnn.com/cnn/2021/05/21/africa/army-investigate-abubakarshekau-boko-haram-leader-death-intl/index.html Teniola, T. (2022). Analysis: How Boko Haram, Lake Chad Basin’s security dilemmas can be tackled. Premium Times. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/features-and-interviews/507555-analysis-how-bokoharam-lake-chad-basins-security-dilemmas-can-be-tackled.html United States Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2002). Terrorism 2002–2005. https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005 United States Government. (2018). National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America. White House.

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United States Government. (2011). Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the US Homeland. Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives 112th Congress 1st Session December 2011. United State Government Print Office. Vanguard News. (2019). Boko Haram technically defeated, I stand by my words-Lai Mohammed. https:// www.vanguardngr.com/2019/10/boko-haram-is-technically-defeated-i-stand-by-my-words-lai-mohammad-2/amp/ Violence? (n.d.). https://www.iwp.edu/media-terrorism/ Watch, E. (2021, October 13). Nigeria Military Says Leader of IS-Linked Group is Dead. Voice of America & Associated Press. https://www.voanews.com/amp/nigerian-military-says-leader-of-is-linkedgroup-is-dead-/6271672.html Weimann, G. (2014, October 3). Social Media’s Appeal to Terrorists. Insite Blog on Terrorism and Extremism. Retrieved from http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/295-social-media’sappeal-to-terrorists Wikibooks. (2021). Introduction to Mass Media and International Media. https://en.m.wikibooks.org/ wiki/introduction_to_Mass_Media/International_Media

ADDITIONAL READING Laqueur, W. (2003). No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. Continuum. Livingstone, W. D. (1984). Terrorism and the Media Revolution. In N. C. Livingstone & T. E. Arnold (Eds.), Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism. Lexington books. Nacos, B. L. (2002). Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Onuoha, F. C. (2010). The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crisis Explained. African Security Review, 19(2), 54–67. doi:10.1080/10246029.2010.503061 Townshend, C. (2002). Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Boko Haram: Boko Haram, officially known as Jamāat Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Dawah wal-Jihād, is a terrorist organization based in northeastern Nigeria, which is also active in Chad, Niger, and Northern Cameroon. Counterterrorism: It an exercise aims to reduce the risks from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

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International Media: International media is a concept that grew from many theoretical approaches and technological advances. It is communication from varied media that shape our global context through various political, economic, social, and cultural factors. ISWAP: The Islamic States West Africa Province is a militant group and administrative division of the Islamic State: a Salafi jihadist militant group and unrecognised proto-state. ISWAP is primarily active in the Chad Basin, and fights an extensive insurgency against the states of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Nigeria: Nigeria, officially known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is a country in West Africa. It is the most populous country in Africa; geographically situated between the Sahel to the north, and the Gulf of Guinea to the south in the Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria borders Niger in the north, Chad in the northeast, Cameroon in the east, and Benin in the west. Nigeria is a federal republic comprising 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, where the capital, Abuja, is located. The largest city in Nigeria is Lagos, one of the largest metropolitan areas in the world and the second-largest in Africa. Operations: It is performance of a practical work or of something involving the practical application of principles or processes.

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Chapter 10

Hybrid Warfare in Azerbaijan: A Challenge to National Security Vasif Huseynov Khazar University, Azerbaijan

ABSTRACT The development of new technologies and aggression models has brought new dynamics to interstate conflicts by dramatically augmenting the role and potential of non-military strategies. International broadcasting and social media, cyberspace, and sophisticated intelligence services, among others, effectively serve aggressive powers to pursue their goals without direct military intervention. The chapter discusses this new generation of warfare, termed “hybrid threats” or “hybrid warfare,” through the perspective of Azerbaijan’s encounter with the hybrid threats posed by some of its neighboring countries. The chapter particularly examines the use of hybrid warfare elements by Armenia and Iran and Azerbaijan’s defense strategy against these threats. A long list of sources, news media articles, reports, official documents, as well interviews with the officials that are available on the internet are used in this analysis.

INTRODUCTION The security threats that modern states encounter in conflicts with other states evolve rapidly and attain new forms and targets thanks, inter alia, to the development of new technologies and aggression models. States deploy not only military strategies but also those that can be characterized as “non-military,” targeting the society, media, cyberspace, etc. of the other side. In the literature, this new generation of warfare has been termed “hybrid threats” or “hybrid warfare,” thereby denoting the “creative combination of synchronized non-military and military-strategic deployment” (Aqdas 2021). While this is a challenge for all types of states, those of smaller size and capabilities are particularly threatened in the face of this new generation of warfare. However, it should not be perceived as an instrument employed only by the so-called great powers. This is, as an element of modern warfare, also deployed by smaller states primarily, but not always, in their conflicts with states of comparable size.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch010

Copyright © 2022, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

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Azerbaijan, a former Soviet state situated between Russia in the north and Iran in the south, has been a target of the hybrid warfare waged by different states. However, in contrast to some fellow post-Soviet states in the neighborhood, Azerbaijan, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has never been drawn into a direct military confrontation or all-out hybrid warfare with Russia. Moreover, Azerbaijan has built quite a constructive relationship with Moscow in the economic and cultural domains. Although occasionally faced with hybrid threats from Russia and Iran in different forms, Azerbaijan’s main problem has been with its western neighbor, Armenia. Having occupied twenty percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories, Armenia has posed an existential threat to Azerbaijan, its citizens, territorial integrity, and independent statehood. Hybrid warfare is an instrument by virtue of which Armenia hoped to prevail in this conflict as, in other major domains, including military and economic, it significantly lagged behind. The 44 Day War between September 27 and November 10, 2020, and the liberation of the occupied territories demonstrated that Azerbaijan had succeeded in developing appropriate mechanisms to counter the hybrid warfare of Armenia. Not only did Armenia wage a war against the units of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan, but also sought to affect its public opinion, influence ethnic minorities in the country, stir up more separatist movements, encourage societal upheaval against the government, benefit from the potential of online social networks and other media channels, and more. Thanks to the solidarity of its people against threats of national significance and the harmonious functioning of its institutions under strong pressure, Azerbaijan succeeded in successfully countering the threats posed by Armenia in the interwar period (1994–2020) as well as during the 44 Day War. However, considering that Azerbaijan’s opponent in this confrontation was Armenia, a country with a tiny population and limited economic and military capabilities, it is critical for Azerbaijan to ponder whether it would succeed in defending itself against such attacks from larger states. This has gained significantly more urgency as Azerbaijan, shortly after the 44 Day War, has found itself facing increasingly aggressive hybrid attacks from its southern neighbor, Iran. An analysis of the official documents and policies of the Republic of Azerbaijan indicates that there is still a need for the country to carry out comprehensive reforms to be able to counter potentially more systematic and powerful hybrid warfare in the future. Against this backdrop, this paper examines Azerbaijan’s defense policies against hybrid threats and suggests policy recommendations to bridge the gaps and develop a resilient early-warning mechanism against hybrid threats. The paper uses a wide range of sources, including news media articles, reports, official documents, as well interviews with officials that are available on the internet. The paper is based on the following structure: The section after these introductory remarks presents theoretical debates about the concept of “hybrid warfare/threats” and clarifies the terminology to be used. The paper proceeds with a discussion about hybrid threats to which Azerbaijan has been subject since the restoration of its independent statehood in 1991. The final section before the conclusion presents a critical analysis of Azerbaijan’s defense system vis-à-vis hybrid threats. The paper ends with a short conclusion.

Clarifying the Concept and Terminology The terms “hybrid war” or “hybrid threat” are used by many analysts to describe multiple dimensions of interstate conflicts and wars in the modern world. The confrontation between Russia and the West, the U.S.A.–China rivalry, the U.S. war in the Middle East of the past two decades, and so on are often characterized as hybrid wars. The existing literature, however, does not reach a consensus on the defi165

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nition of this term. The term is widely employed in the Western literature with respect to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in particular, and Russia and the West in general. Russia’s actions have provided the favorite study case for the Western academic research community and think-tanks in their analyses concerning hybrid wars. However, it is important to note that Russia is not seen as the only state that seeks to reach its foreign policy objectives via such hybrid instruments. Josef Schroefl and Stuart Kaufman, characterizing “wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan” as “hybrid wars,” argue that those are type of wars “in which elements of ethnic or tribal conflict, ideologically-based insurgency, factional squabbling and organized crime are inextricably intertwined, with the same actors playing multiple and partially conflicting roles” (Shroefl & Kaufman 2014: 862). The term “hybrid warfare” was introduced to scholarly debate by William J. Nemeth in 2002 in his analysis about the wars in Chechnya, Russia’s Caucasian region. He characterized this as “the contemporary form of guerrilla warfare” and “a continuation of pre-state warfare” that has become more effective thanks to “modern technology and modern mobilization methods” (Nemeth 2002). Frank G. Hoffman, whose works intensified discussions about hybrid wars, defined this as a type of warfare “fought by countries or political groups and involve different methods of warfare, including conventional potential, irregular tactics and formations, mass violence and force, and criminal incidents” (Hoffman 2007: 58). The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine in 2014 popularized the terms “hybrid wars” and “hybrid threats” and triggered more discussions about them—not only among academics, but also policymakers. The Western analytics mostly referred to the ideas of Russian General Valery Gerasimov, the current Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia and First Deputy Defense Minister, to get insights into the Russian understanding of hybrid wars. In a similar vein to Frank Hoffman’s concept, Gerasimov highlights transformations in contemporary conflicts in which command and control structures are decentralized, strategic, operational and tactical spheres of operations are combined, and the significance of non-military approaches to warfare has increased (Królikowski 2017: 12). However, whereas Hoffman focuses on the use of hybrid elements by combat detachments as part of military strategies, Gerasimov also lists non-military means deployed with this purpose and thereby underscores the importance of psychological and informative activities (Królikowski 2017: 12). The bulk of the policies analyzed through the prism of hybrid wars had long been discussed in the political literature as part of strategies used against enemies. Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian general and military theorist, underscored the importance of reaching out to the population of the enemy to affect their minds and feelings and thus to bring about a “gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance” (Clausewitz 1973: 93). This is of supreme significance in times of open military confrontations when the exhaustion of the popular will of the enemy would significantly affect the fate of the war. The utility of the “hybrid warfare” elements is not, however, limited to the periods of active military operations. These are also employed by states during peaceful times to impact the policies of the target state, to exploit its vulnerabilities, cause desired shifts in its policies, and sometimes even to undermine its stability and prosperity. A study by Dumitru Mînzărari, a Moldovan scholar and former military officer who served for the Moldovan Ministry of Defense, defined a set of objectives that the populationcentered aggression mechanism may pursue: • •

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directing a loyal ethnic group to act in a way that favors the aggressor, in obvious support of the aggressor’s preferred policy; directing a critical segment of the population, which may be inimical to the aggressor, to oppose a policy that is disliked by the aggressor;

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•

creating deep social fissures inside a society by inciting some segments of the population to challenge or threaten other groups (e.g., inciting separatism or religious or ethnical tensions; political polarization).

Towards this purpose, a variety of legal and illicit methods, and military and non-military tactics are utilized that directly impact and involve populations (Gardner 2015). A communication issued by the European Parliament and Council on April 6, 2016, titled “Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats,” listed “Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalize, recruit and direct proxy actors” among the vehicles deployed in hybrid wars (Europejska & Zewnętrznych 2016). “These conventional and unconventional methods (i.e., diplomatic, military, economic, technological)”, the document said, “can be used in a coordinated manner by state or nonstate actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare” (ibid.). The threats posed by the deployment of hybrid warfare instruments by an adversary, therefore, necessitate the development of an effective early warning mechanism. This is, however, arguably more complicated than creating defense systems against traditional threats. The ambiguous and fuzzy nature of hybrid threats, their projection in non-linear, non-standard and varied forms, and the weak signals they send out before materializing make it difficult to adequately counter them (Kuosa 2014; Cullen 2018; Rietjens 2020). This necessitates, primarily, the development of a complex set of instruments to reduce dependency on the actions of a single actor; the promotion of internal diversity in the warning mechanism to match that of the adversary; the integration of deductive and inductive methods, as well as qualitative and quantitative methods, in collecting information and producing a systemic framework for monitoring the situation and creating an alert; the establishment of better interfaces with local communities through different channels, possibly also including non-governmental institutions; the development of effective information management to deal with, among others, the information overload; and, finally, effectively communicating the warning to decision-makers or the population at large (Rietjens 2020). Scholars and experts tend to agree that creating a functional early warning mechanism is a difficult, but not impossible, task. So, too, is effectively fighting against the hybrid threats (Rietjens 2020).

Armenia’s Hybrid Warfare against Azerbaijan In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan was subject to fully fledged aggression by Armenia that resulted in the displacement of up to a million people from their homes and the occupation of 20 percent of the internationally recognized territories of the country. The resolutions of the UN Security Council, adopted in 1993 in the middle of this tragedy and calling for the immediate withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the occupied lands, was never implemented by Armenia. The negotiations, over three decades, mediated by the Minsk Group of the OSCE failed to deliver any breakthrough owing to Armenia’s then-undeclared objective of feigning negotiations and prolonging the occupation. This was admitted by Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in November 2020—after Azerbaijan had liberated its occupied territories in the 44 Day War (September 27–November 10, 2020). “Since 1998, there has been only one topic in the negotiation process, in the negotiation content. The territories must be handed over to Azerbaijan. The policy of the Armenian side was to prolong this process,” he said on November 16 before the Armenian parliament (Ghazaryan 2020).

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For the purpose of prolonging the occupation and forestalling Azerbaijan’s attempts to recover lost territories diplomatically or militarily, Armenia mobilized all the available resources. In addition to building gigantic military installations and defensive lines along the frontiers of the occupied territories, planting thousands of mines in the region, and occasionally provoking armed escalations, Armenia extensively deployed instruments that scholarly debates analyze as elements of hybrid warfare. Armenia’s hybrid warfare against Azerbaijan was formed on the basis of several guiding targets: • • • •

provoking discontent among ethnic minorities against the policies of the Azerbaijani government and encouraging them to pursue separatist goals; inciting anti-government sentiments among the general population; creating tensions and provoking clashes between various social groups; intimidating the people by overstating the military potential of Armenia, assuring them of potential catastrophic losses in any armed conflict with Armenia, and directing them to oppose the Karabakh policies of the Azerbaijani government.

The Armenian government had hardly any physical access to the unoccupied parts of Azerbaijan, which prevented them from establishing pro-Armenian non-governmental institutions or other forms of initiatives or movements for spreading the Armenian narratives in Azerbaijan. Nor has Armenia any broadcasting opportunities towards the territories of Azerbaijan via television or radio channels. This situation has forced Armenia to deploy other instruments including, inter alia, modern technology, online news outlets in the Azerbaijani language, and social media. Broadcasting in the Azerbaijani or Turkish language via online news outlets and other media channels is part of Armenia’s hybrid war strategy. These services in local languages follow the aforementioned objectives and regularly propagate fake news targeting the Azerbaijani and Turkish peoples. The use of local languages deceives the ordinary people and some unprofessional media representatives in Azerbaijan and Turkey as they mostly fail to see the forces behind and republish them in their own media channels, thereby boosting their outreach. Facebook pages such as Hərbi Media (in Azerbaijani: Military Media), Facebook profiles imitating Azerbaijanis, websites like Arevelkcenter.com, and the Azerbaijani and Turkish language services of Public Radio of Armenia are examples of such internet resources that have been mobilized with this purpose. The Facebook page of Hərbi Media, operating near the end of 2020, sought to misinform Azerbaijani users during the 44 Day War by publishing provocative content about the number of Azerbaijani casualties and the allegedly desperate situation of the Azerbaijani army in the operations. They also targeted the ethnic minorities of the country and sought to convince them that the members of these minorities constituted the majority of the losses of the Azerbaijani side. The news portal Arevelkcenter.com, affiliated with various research and media institutions of Armenia, produces content primarily in the Russian and Turkish languages. Arevelkcenter publishes “analytical” articles concerning Azerbaijan and Turkey that seek to provoke social fissures and clashes, and antigovernment discontent in those countries, as well as provoking clashes between the Azerbaijani and Turkish peoples. An article published by this website on February 25, 2019, and widely republished in the Azerbaijani and Turkish “yellow press,” targeted one of the most sensitive national issues for the Turkish population: PKK Terrorism. Attempting to incite anti-Azerbaijan sentiment among the Turkish people, the article argues that “Azerbaijan is one of the biggest supporters of the PKK” (Arevelkcenter. com, 2019). Intentionally or not, some Azerbaijani opposition members provided input for this article 168

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that the authors gladly utilized. The archive of the Arevelkcenter is rich with such articles seeking to cause trouble for the Turkic foes of Armenia. Over the years since the very beginning of the post-Soviet period, the ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan have been another target of Armenian propaganda. According to the 2009 census, ethnic minorities constitute 8.4 percent of the population in Azerbaijan. They include Lezgis (180,300), Talyshs (112,000), Avars (49,800), Akhiska (38,000), Kurds (6,300), Jews (9,100), and Sakhurs (12,300). The efforts of the Armenian government and diaspora with respect to these people have been overarching as Armenia hoped that further separatism in the territories of Azerbaijan would distract the attention and resources of the Azerbaijani government from the Karabakh issue and weaken it internally by provoking social unrest and political chaos. The narratives of the Armenian propaganda in this direction cover a wide range of aspects of the lives of these ethnic minorities. Above all, they persistently try to persuade these groups that their number is much higher than they suppose or that is presented by the official census of Azerbaijan. They seek to convince them that they should not reconcile with the “oppressive” policies of the Azerbaijani government and, thus, could replicate the “success” of the separatist movement of the Karabakh Armenians and obtain political autonomy before declaring full independence from Azerbaijan. These narratives came into play soon after Armenia consolidated control over the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Through promoting “self-determination”1 as the legal basis of the separatist movement of the Karabakh Armenians, they embarked on campaigns to export this idea to other regions of Azerbaijan where the ethnic minorities are settled in peace. The Talyshs, settled primarily in the southeastern part of Azerbaijan, have, as one of the two largest groups amongst the ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan alongside the Lezgis, been a major target of Armenia’s propaganda.2 Armenian sources dispute Azerbaijan’s official figures about the size of this ethnic group, claiming that “The real number of the Talysh population is considerably higher – 400 [thousand]. However, this figure is kept secret for a further assimilation of the nation with the Turks of Azerbaijan” (Panorama.am, 2016). There are Armenian “experts” who even put this number at much higher, at 1–1.5 million (Horizonweekly.ca, 2019). The fact that the nationalist leaders of the Talyshs, seizing the opportunity caused by political turbulence in Baku, succeeded in establishing the short-lived “Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic” in 1993. This covered seven southeastern Azerbaijani districts and made Armenians believe that the group had the potential, at least, to cause trouble to Baku. A wide range of instruments have been mobilized to materialize this potential, such as encouraging the Talyshs to fight for greater autonomy or even an independent Talysh state. These have included international broadcasting, political and academic initiatives, providing various platforms to the representatives of the Talyshs, and occasionally making public statements directly addressing the Talyshs and other ethnic minorities based in Azerbaijan. For example, in 2013, Armenia launched a radio channel from the then-occupied Shusha city of Azerbaijan in the Talysh language. Broadcast one hour every day, the channel started its programs with largely cultural content and gradually incorporated increasingly political themes. According to the reports of the Azerbaijani media, it was clear from the diction of the radio presenters that Iran-based Talysh were employed at the station. Additionally, the YouTube channel Ozodə Tolışstoni Sədo Radio Channel has published 2143 programs over the eight years since its launch in early 2013. This propaganda has also been disseminated on “academic” platforms. In May 2005, Yerevan State University’s Iranian Studies Department and the Yerevan-based Center for Iranian Studies hosted an international conference on the Talysh issue titled “First International Conference on Talysh Studies.” 169

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The move was widely read by observers as Armenia’s attempt to “resurrect the issue of autonomy for the Talysh ethnic group in Azerbaijan” and possibly to complicate the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace negotiations and prolong the occupation (Socor, 2005). The conference hosted self-proclaimed leaders of the “Talysh movement,” members of a Talysh diaspora group based in Moscow, and experts from Armenia and Iran (Socor, 2005). Six years later, Armenia organized “The Second International Conference on Talysh Studies” in a similar format but with the attendance of specialists from not only Russia and Iran but also Georgia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and Canada (Eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu, 2011). Self-styled academic and other conferences and events addressing the ethnic groups in Azerbaijan are regularly held in Armenia (Ghazanchyan 2019). In the course of the 44 Day Karabakh War, Armenia sought to benefit from the propaganda campaigns it had carried out towards the ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan for long years. On October 4, 2020, in an appeal directed at the Talysh and Lezgis people, Arayik Harutyunyan, the leader of the Armenian separatist regime in Karabakh, said “his government is ready to help them, by all possible means, to gain their independence” (Hetq.am, 2020). Inciting those people to protest against the Azerbaijani government, he asserted that hundreds of representatives of those minorities “have already died on the battlefield and… Baku is using them as cannon fodder.” Armenian media outlets disseminated the message in multiple languages including Azerbaijani and Talysh—albeit with no success. Armenia’s hybrid war against Azerbaijan is not limited to the society and domestic politics of Azerbaijan. Indeed, more systematically and with much larger resources, Armenia has carried out disinformation campaigns against Azerbaijan on a global scale. The Armenian diaspora settled in many countries around the world and their lobbying and influence over the domestic politics of the host states proved to be a very influential factor in the conflict. The Armenian lobby distorted the most basic facts about the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, presenting it as the aggression of a Muslim country against a Christian country and as the continuation of the so-called Armenian “genocide” of the early 20th century, which had nothing to do with Azerbaijan. These campaigns, and others, inflicted myriad of challenges and problems on Azerbaijan. For example, France, where the Armenian lobby is a significant political force, has never shied away from making manifestly anti-Azerbaijani moves in internal and international politics. In the course of the First Karabakh War, France maintained a pro-Armenian position in the UN Security Council discussions about the war and sought to exculpate Armenia for the invasion although it was carrying out ethnic cleansing against Azerbaijanis at the time those discussions were being held (Aghayev 2020). According to recently declassified State Department cables concerning the Armenia– Azerbaijan conflict, France’s UN Ambassador watered down the language of the UN Security Council resolution proposed by the U.S.A. and other members of the Council and succeeded in minimizing its consequences for Armenia (Clinton Digital Library 2019). At the insistence of France, the perpetrators of the invasion were mentioned as “local Armenian forces” (i.e., not Armenia as a state) and the conflict was treated “not under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as an ‘act of aggression,’ but under the weaker Chapter VI as a dispute that should be settled peacefully” (Aghayev 2020). These anti-Azerbaijani policies of French governments persisted throughout the entire conflict period and achieved another milestone in the aftermath of the 44 Day War when the French politicians went so far as to unanimously adopt legislative documents calling for the recognition of the independence of a puppet entity called the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” that was once established in the sovereign territories of Azerbaijan. Responding to a question by a Russian journalist about the hybrid attacks of Armenia against Azerbaijan, the country’s President Ilham Aliyev primarily mentioned the international aspect of these attacks:

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Indeed, for decades, Armenian propaganda, which works quite effectively in many countries, as well as the structures of the Armenian diaspora, have created a false image of the conflict. After all, even if you look at the beginning of the war and the decisions that were made by some states, it simply defies any logic. When Azerbaijan was occupied, the US Congress passed the ill-fated Freedom Support Act Amendment 907, which deprived Azerbaijan of any assistance, including military, from the United States. We, the affected country, were essentially discriminated against. And as a justification for this amendment, it was argued that Azerbaijan was blocking Armenia. Imagine: the Zangilan region, Gubadli, Lachin and Kelbajar are occupied - and this is called the blockade of Armenia! (Azertag, 2021).

Hybrid Threats Azerbaijan Faces from other Directions Armenia is not the only country with which Azerbaijan has been in hybrid warfare since the country regained its post-Soviet independence. Similar threats, though to varying degrees, were posed by the other two neighbors of the country, Russia and Iran. Although, unlike many post-Soviet states in the neighborhood, Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia were maintained mostly in a friendly atmosphere, some political forces in Russia, primarily those aligned with Armenia, sought to pressure Azerbaijan through different means with a variety of objectives. The presence of Armenians in many prominent media instruments and political bodies in Russia increased the scope of these attacks. It is important to note that there are even some prominent media outlets in Russia that are led by Armenians and prioritize a pro-Armenian interpretation of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia; due to this fact, those agencies are often seen by Azerbaijani observers as “Russia-based Armenian media” (1news.az, 2017). For example, media outlets such as the Regnum news agency and LifeNews TV Channel, and media personalities like Aram Gabrelyanov (general director and president of the News Media group, which also includes LifeNews TV Channel), Margarita Simonyan (editor-in-chief of the RT TV channel and the international news agency Rossiya Segodnya), and film directors Ruben Dishdishyan and Tigran Keosayan are some of those who extensively propagate anti-Azerbaijani narratives in the Russian media (1news.az, 2017). They seek to incite anti-Azerbaijani sentiment among the Russian population and eventually affect the policies of the Russian government. Forces aligned with Armenia have also sought to provoke interethnic conflicts in Azerbaijan and thus assist Armenia’s policies that are carried out with the same goals. Over the years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, numerous conferences and events have been held in Russian cities in which separatist elements claiming to represent Azerbaijani ethnic groups are provided platforms to communicate and self-organize (Shafee 2008). The friendly relations between the governments of Azerbaijan and Russia have, nevertheless, succeeded in staving off the destructive interventions of the pro-Armenian groups and never let the hybrid attacks against Azerbaijan become a central element in Russia’s policies. The 44 Day Karabakh War served as a test for Azerbaijani–Russian relations. While the Armenian-dominated Russian media outlets and political groups consistently propagated anti-Azerbaijani narratives and disinformation campaigns throughout the war, Russia’s official policies were little affected by this. The Kremlin made clear that the territories where the hostilities took place are internationally recognized parts of Azerbaijan and the conflict should be resolved in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Azerbaijan’s encounter with Iran has, however, been loaded with more challenges and controversies. The restoration of Azerbaijan’s independent statehood in the early 1990s triggered alarm in Tehran as Iranian leaders felt threatened by its potential impact on the domestic stability and national security of Iran. The existence of up to 25–30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran and the potential spillover of 171

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the emergence of an independent Azerbaijani state across the border has been a source of concern for Iranian political and security elites. Iran has also been displeased by the close economic and military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel and sought to undermine this by deploying the potential of its both hard- and soft-power arsenals. This hybrid warfare of Iran against Azerbaijan has been arguably much more powerful and impactful than that of Armenia. Unlike Armenia, Iran has had physical access to Azerbaijan and founded a number of institutions to spread the message of Iranian clerics among the Azerbaijani people. One result was that Iran allied with Armenia and covertly supported the Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan. As confirmed by the former leaders of Armenia, Iran’s shipment of fuel to the Armed Forces of Armenia was instrumental in Armenia’s successful operations against the counteroffensive of Azerbaijani troops during the First Karabakh War of the early 1990s (Haqqin.az, 2020). According to recently declassified information, Azerbaijan had also detected Iran’s military supplies to Armenia in this period and protested this at the highest level (Azpost.info, 2021). In the aftermath of the war, parts of the disassembled houses and other infrastructure from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan were brought to Iranian markets and sold cheaply to locals. A long list of Iranian companies operated in the occupied Karabakh region throughout the period of the occupation and even attempted to continue these illegal activities after the 44 Day Karabakh War. Moreover, Iranian leaders, from the very beginning of the post-Soviet period, launched various initiatives for exporting Shiite ideology to Azerbaijan and wielding soft power over the minds and feelings of ordinary people. According to the Shiite doctrine promoted by Iran since the 1979 revolution, a supreme leader will rule over the Shiite world until the return of the 12th Imam Mahdi. The formulation of the legitimacy of the supreme leader in this divine form is used to present him as the leader of all Shiites, including those beyond the borders of Iran. The more foreigners subscribe to the Shiite ideology, the more power the Iranian leader obtains to influence their opinions and actions and, through them, the policies of their governments. Hence, immediately after the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Iran rushed to build the necessary institutions in Azerbaijan for propagating this ideology and recruiting followers. In the early 1990s, the post of Special Representative of the Supreme Leader of Iran Islamic Republic was established in Azerbaijan. Held by Ayatollah Sabri Hamdani until 1996, this role was later entrusted to Ali-Akbar Ojagnejat, who held this position until October 2021, when Azerbaijan shut down his office amid tensions between Baku and Tehran. Before this, for a while, he also headed the Iranian Cultural Center in Azerbaijan. This position further enlarged his portfolio and enriched his toolkit for communicating with Azerbaijani society. The Azerbaijani media reports that, in accordance with Iran’s political structure, the institution of Special Representative of the Supreme Leader maintains a higher status than Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Baku and all ministers who visited Baku were obliged to meet the special representative and get instructions from him (Hurriyyet.az, 2021). Ojagnejat was known in Baku as an influential orator with impressive verbal skills for persuading listeners and changing their minds and feelings. According to Rafig Aliyev, former head of the State Committee for Work with Religious Organizations of Azerbaijan and director of the IRSHAD Center for Islamic Studies, Ojagnejat is “a very strong propagandist” and “few people are able to disobey him when he speaks.” According to Rafig Aliyev: Ojagnejat was preaching in our mosques in the 2000s. By the decision of the State Committee, his sermons were banned. He left this job for about 5 years. He continued his sermons only in Nardaran mosque [a village close to Baku where Islamic traditions have been historically strong]… He played a negative role

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against Azerbaijan in the Nardaran events [in 2015, when a group of people took up arms against the state] and other issues. He was the curator not only of Azerbaijan, but also of the North Caucasus and Central Asia. He had the ability to control the whole region, and he did. (Hurriyyet.az, 2021) In addition to dispatching Iranian-trained Azerbaijani students to different parts of the country, the representative institutions of the Iranian government in Baku have gone as far as financially backing the radicalization of some groups in Azerbaijan. For instance, in 2011, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of National Security and the Prosecutor General’s Office blamed the Iranian Cultural Center for financing the activities of unregistered radical religious group called Jafari (Azerbaijan-news.az, 2011). According to some observers, Iran might use such proxy groups against the Azerbaijani government in case of the escalation of tensions between the two states (Mamedov, 2021). Iran has also mobilized a great many media outlets and television channels as part of its policies to directly communicate with Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijani service Sahar TV, broadcast since the 1990s, is a prominent example in this category. The channel transmits programs critical of the domestic and “Zionist” foreign policies of the Azerbaijani government and consistently raises controversial issues, thereby seeking to provoke discontent among Azerbaijanis toward the government. An Azerbaijani media outlet, analyzing the use of fake news, insinuations, slander, groundless accusations, insults, and threats by Sahar TV, concluded that “Sahar regularly subjects the actions of the Azerbaijani government to unfounded criticism and makes up fake stories about the alleged persecution and mistreatment of the Talysh people” (Caliber.az, 2021). Although Azerbaijan suspended the licenses of all foreign television broadcasts several years ago, Sahar TV is still accessible to its audience through various means. Some locals in the southern part of Azerbaijan, talking to the press in 2008, praised the “critical” programming of the channel and its transmission of content that is “hidden” in Azerbaijan (RFE/RL, 2008). Similar to Armenia, Iran has also targeted ethnic minorities, primarily the Talyshs, in Azerbaijan and sought to mobilize them against Baku. According to Fazil Abbasov, head of the AssA-Irada news agency and AzerNEWS Weekly, Iran aims to create parallels in Azerbaijan to the nationalist sentiments of the ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran. Commenting on a series of events about Talysh history organized in 2011 with the support of the Iranian government and attended by Alakram Humbatov, who calls himself the leader of Talysh independence movement, Abbasov asked: “I wonder why the Iranian authorities, who have forbidden ethnic groups, except the small Armenian minority, to read and write in their own language and to research their history, all of a sudden are holding a scientific event devoted to the false Talysh history” (Azernews.az, 2011). Iran’s hybrid attacks against Azerbaijan also target Azerbaijanis based in other countries. According to reports, Iran’s propaganda institutions, in particular the Moscow-based Moscow Islamic Center, the Husseiniyya Shrine, and the International Ahl al-Bayt Society, have developed a complex network in Russia and been able to attract a large number of Azerbaijanis living in that country. “The Moscow Islamic Center works mainly among low-income Azerbaijanis living in Russia, attracting them to its events. It is clear that it is easier to ‘recruit’ low-income families for financial gain. It is reported by the Azerbaijani media that the protests in front of the Azerbaijani embassy in Russia over the events in Nardaran [in 2016] was organized by this Center.” It is important to add that the Moscow Islamic Center has been operating since 2014 and is led by Haji Sabir Akbari Jiddi who, concurrently, was the representative of the religious leader of Iran in Russia. These organizations, by effectively creating anti-Azerbaijani platform for believers from Azerbaijan, primarily from the Southern part of the country where Shiite

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ideology is stronger, “are also under the control of the Russian special services and, if necessary, can be used against our country,” as the aforementioned report adds (Teref.az, 2017). Iran also seeks to deploy the potential of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia to incite separatism in Azerbaijan. Since the Talysh diaspora is particularly centralized in Russia, Iranian intelligence services and propaganda instruments have developed effective interfaces with them. It is reported that the separatist Talysh figures sought to draw support from the Iranian government after they failed to get the necessary backing from Moscow in the early 1990s (Shafee 2008). In the years that followed, close cooperation evolved between these figures and various institutions of Iran. Azerbaijani media and other institutions have warned against Iran’s policies for stirring up separatism in Azerbaijan by, among others, manipulating Russia-based Azerbaijanis in the southern part of the country and deploying them as agents of separatism. “An analysis of the activities of Iranian intelligence services in relation to the Ahl al-Beit communities in recent years suggests that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is now seeking to foment separatism in the southern region of Azerbaijan and form radical Shiite groups controlled directly from Tehran,” reports Haqqin.az (Haqqin.az, 2021). The agency, however, fleshes this out, explaining that Russia is not the only country where Iran’s propaganda targets Azerbaijanis and agitates them against Azerbaijan. The report states: Iran’s security services are systematically working to spread Shiism… in Georgia, and it seems that they have achieved serious results. Their activities [in this country], as in Russia, began in the early 2000s and were localized in the regions inhabited by Azerbaijanis. It is noteworthy that back in the 1990s, almost 90 percent of Azerbaijanis living compactly in two or three regions of Georgia professed Sunni Islam. Now 60 percent of them identify themselves as Shiite [converted thanks to the efforts of Iranian emissaries]. Similar activities of the Iranian propaganda institutions have also been observed in the Ukraine, where Ukrainian citizens of Azerbaijani origin have been attracted by the activities of Iranian agents (Haqqin.az, 2021). In a move that underlined the hybrid nature of the threats posed by Iran against Azerbaijan, Tehran has recently also started to deploy military means and flexed its muscles to intimidate its northern neighbor. On October 1, 2021, amid the crisis triggered by the illegal entry of Iranian trucks to the Karabakh region, Iran launched military drills near its northwestern borders that caused concerns in Baku. “Every country can carry out any military drill on its own territory. It’s their sovereign right. But why now, and why on our border?” asked Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev in September 2021 (President.az, 2021). He underscored that it was the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union that Iran had planned such a show of force so close to its northern borders. Iranian officials did not conceal that the holding of the exercises at this particular time was a response to the close ties between Azerbaijan and Israel. “We do not tolerate the presence and activity against our national security of the Zionist regime next to our borders and will take any necessary action in this regard,” stated Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian at a meeting with Azerbaijan’s new ambassador on September 30 (Iran International, 2021). Although tensions subsided in late October after Tehran adopted a law banning its logistics companies from illegally entering the Karabakh region through Armenian territory, the crisis indicated that relations between the two countries are fragile and prone to sudden escalations.

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Azerbaijan’s Defense against the Hybrid Warfare The 44 Day Karabakh War was a critical and notably fateful period for Azerbaijan that put all its security system to the test. Armenia resorted to all possible means to inhibit Azerbaijan’s counteroffensive operations: these included launching missile attacks against civilian settlements beyond the zone of hostilities, attempting to incite inter-ethnic conflicts, and organizing extensive disinformation campaigns in global media. Armenia’s efforts helped little in changing the tide of the war. Azerbaijan achieved a resolute victory on the battlefield and liberated the Karabakh region that had been under illegal occupation for three decades. This victory was possible thanks to the remarkable national solidarity and well-organized security system. Azerbaijan nevertheless faces a list of other security challenges in the aftermath of the war of 2020, for example: remaining tension and periodic flare-ups in Armenia–Azerbaijan relations; occasional incidents with Russia’s peacekeeping forces in the Karabakh territories; Russia’s failure to ensure the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from the region in line with the trilateral (Russia–Armenia–Azerbaijan) ceasefire deal of November 10, 2020; and the emergence of new security threats, as manifested by the latest crisis in Iran–Azerbaijan relations. These challenges necessitate the development of robust military defense systems including a well-thought-out strategy and an effective early warning mechanism against hybrid threats. The analysis of Azerbaijan’s official documents and existing policies shows, along with strengths, some shortcomings that would jeopardize the country’s national security in the case of a confrontation with a more powerful adversary. Above all, the concept of hybrid warfare has yet to be incorporated into Azerbaijan’s official documents and narratives about the security policies of the state. The National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan, adopted in 2007, does not mention the term “hybrid warfare” and overlooks hybrid threats in general. The document has not been renewed since that time and, therefore, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the state’s perceptions and policies based on this document. The official narratives of the Azerbaijani leaders, however, give some clues about their understanding of hybrid warfare and the government’s defense policies vis-à-vis this. Although President Ilham Aliyev has never used the term “hybrid warfare,” he often, as quoted in the previous sections, discusses Azerbaijan’s countermeasures against the information warfare of adversary states. A more detailed presentation about hybrid warfare was given by Hikmet Hajiyev, Assistant to President Aliyev on foreign policy, in his former position as a spokesman at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2018, talking about Armenia’s aggression against Azerbaijan, he said Azerbaijan had been subject to Armenia’s “information aggression” and “information war” along with “physical war” since the late 1980s (APA, 2018). Conceptualizing this as “hybrid war,” he said: “With the sole purpose of disguising its responsibility for illegal use of force and occupation of Azerbaijan’s territories and ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijani people from the seized lands, Armenia resorted to 4D propaganda—’Deceive, Disform, Distort and Disorient’ the international community.” Hajiyev has, nevertheless, commented neither on the hybrid attacks addressing the domestic society of Azerbaijan nor the hybrid threats Azerbaijan encounters from other states. The “perennial” war situation with Armenia since the early days of Azerbaijan’s independent statehood has led the country to develop necessary instruments and societal awareness against the hybrid attacks of the Armenian side. The sacred meaning of Karabakh for most Azerbaijanis, regardless of their ethnic or religious background, has generated a notable national solidarity that it was not possible for

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Armenia to break down, notwithstanding all its attempts. The attacks in the information space and via social media, especially during the 44 Day War, were abruptly countered by the Azerbaijani people and transmitted to the security services of the country. The address of the separatist leaders of the illegal regime Armenia installed in Karabakh to the ethnic minorities of Azerbaijan at the beginning of the Second Karabakh War were mocked by the representatives of these minorities. Nor did the efforts to propagate rumors about alleged corruption and authoritarianism of the Azerbaijani government succeed in inciting societal upheaval in the country. Even members of opposition parties, who are traditionally critical of the government, declare support to the officials when tensions escalate with, and the country is threatened by, Armenia. It is important for the country to preserve this vigilance in the aftermath of the Karabakh War. The settlement of the conflict and the liberation of the occupied territories should not cause either the society or the government to relax. As long as revanchist forces remain in the political scene of Armenia and vow to return the lost territories, Azerbaijan needs to maintain and further strengthen its resilience against the hybrid threats posed by its archenemy. Azerbaijan appears to be less prepared for hybrid attacks from other directions, as the latest crisis in the country’s relations with Iran demonstrated. Because Azerbaijan was more threatened by Armenia, it seems to have downplayed the threats posed by Iran until the aftermath of the settlement of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. The government and security services of Azerbaijan were, therefore, caught off guard when tensions suddenly escalated in 2021 and the elements of Iran’s hybrid warfare surfaced. A number of flaws in Azerbaijan’s security system vis-à-vis hybrid threats posed by the non-Armenian adversaries are described below. First and foremost, Azerbaijan did not take any strict measures against the illegal activities of the representative institutions of Iran until late 2021. Although the propagandist activities of Ali-Akbar Ojagnejat, the Special Representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader, were known to the public and, likely, to the security apparatus of Azerbaijan, he continued his mission for three decades, reportedly protected by diplomatic immunity. Frequent calls from society about the threat posed by Ojagnejat and his propagation of the ideals of the Iranian revolution were not adequately addressed. A similar attitude was demonstrated by the Azerbaijani side to the Iranian Cultural Center, whose financial backing to the extremist groups in Azerbaijan was verified by the Azerbaijani security services in 2011. The Center acts as an agent of Iranian propaganda against Azerbaijan and its cultural and political values. Although Ojagnejat’s office was shut down in early October 2021 by the Azerbaijani government, citing coronavirus concerns, the Iranian Cultural Center is still functional. This lax attitude by the security services of Azerbaijan with respect to the Iranian-related hybrid threats is also seen in their approach to the people who travelled freely around the country disseminating Iranian propaganda and to the websites operated by pro-Iranian Azerbaijanis. For instance, only after their images were widely shared on social media did Azerbaijan’s security services interrogate women who preached at a funeral of a fallen Azerbaijani soldier in mqid-2021 and called upon their relatives to protest against the “Zionist” policies of the Azerbaijani government. There were reports that these people particularly target the families of martyrs and abuse their vulnerabilities. The internet resources in these campaigns provide another, arguably more far-reaching platform for these propagandists. Although some measures have previously been taken against websites and radio and television channels propagating Iranian propaganda, the security services of Azerbaijan became more vigilant only after the threats those outlets posed were tangibly felt. It was reported in October 2021 that Azerbaijan shut down a list of such websites and interrogated their owners.

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This situation necessitates a reconsideration of Azerbaijan’s security approaches with regard to hybrid threats. Above all, the national security document of the state needs to be updated in light of the overarching changes in the security environment in which Azerbaijan exists. There is also a need for the development of a hybrid warfare doctrine that includes adequate consideration of the modern challenges and the synchronization of this document with the country’s security doctrine. It is equally important for the early warning mechanism against hybrid threats to be operationalized as part of the permanent activities of the relevant institutions. Hybrid threats should not be seen as something that appear only occasionally, when tensions with an adversary become strained. As one author aptly put it, countermeasures against hybrid wars should be treated as a round-the-clock operation and perceived as a way of life, rather than a set of campaigns (Fedyk 2017). It is of great importance for Azerbaijan’s security institutions to diversify the sources of information and develop a complex set of instruments for keeping in check those social, political, and religious groups who serve the interests of other countries. Toward this end, promotion of direct and stable communication with local communities through different channels, possibly including non-governmental institutions, is crucial to the security architecture of Azerbaijan. These instruments would allow the relevant institutions to receive warning signals that would facilitate protecting domestic peace and stability against the hybrid attacks of other states.

CONCLUSION Through analyzing hybrid warfare as a combination of military and non-military strategies, this paper built its empirical analysis primarily on the model proposed by Dumitru Mînzărari, a Moldovan scholar and former military officer who served in the Moldovan Ministry of Defense. According to this framework, three major objectives were defined that may be pursued by the aggressor power deploying the instruments of hybrid warfare. It was suggested that the aggressor may target a loyal ethnic group or a critical segment of the population, encouraging them to advocate the aggressor’s preferred policy or oppose policies disliked by the aggressor. Creating deep social fissures inside a society, inciting some segments of the population to challenge or threaten other groups (i.e., incite separatism, religious or ethnical tensions, or political polarization) is considered to be another objective that can be observed in hybrid warfare. These elements have been identified in the hybrid threats Azerbaijan has been subjected to since the restoration of its independent statehood in the early 1990s. The most serious challenge to Azerbaijan’s national security was posed by its western neighbor, Armenia, which occupied up to twenty percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories and kept them under occupation until the 44 Day Karabakh War in late 2020. Azerbaijan had to defend against Armenia’s hybrid attacks during both the period of occupation and the 44 Day War. The paper concludes that Azerbaijan succeeded in successfully countering the threats posed by Armenia thanks to the solidarity of its people against threats of national significance and the harmonious functioning of its institutions under strong pressure. Azerbaijan had more difficulty fighting against Armenia’s hybrid warfare at the international scale. This dimension of hybrid threat, which is not covered by the model of Mînzărari, cannot be underestimated in the case of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. The Armenian diaspora settled in many countries around the world and their lobbying and influence over the domestic politics of the host states proved to be a very influential factor in the conflict. The Armenian lobby distorted the most basic facts about the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, presenting it as the aggression of a Muslim country against a Christian country and the con177

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tinuation of the so-called Armenian “genocide” of the early 20th century, which had nothing to do with Azerbaijan. These campaigns inflicted myriad challenges and problems for Azerbaijan, as manifested by France’s controversial anti-Azerbaijani moves in both domestic and foreign policies. The paper also examined the policies of Russia and Iran—the two other countries from which Azerbaijan has received hybrid attacks. It is important to reiterate that, unlike many post-Soviet states in the neighborhood, Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia were maintained mostly in a friendly atmosphere and not subject to political or military clashes. However, some political forces and media channels in Russia, primarily those aligned with Armenia, sought to pressurize Azerbaijan through different means, with a variety of objectives, and create problems in the relationship between Baku and Moscow, though with little to no success. However, the hybrid threat from Iran against Azerbaijan has been much more challenging. Iran has sought to export Shiite ideology to Azerbaijan and recruit followers who would consider the Iranian Supreme Leader as their own leader. In a similar vein to Armenia, Iran has also tried to wield power over the minds and feelings of the ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan by communicating with them, both in Azerbaijan and abroad, through various measures including international broadcasting, religious projects, education programs, and humanitarian initiatives. The rise of tension in Azerbaijan–Iran relations in the aftermath of the 44 Day War demonstrates that these relations are prone to sudden escalations, if not confrontations. Therefore, this paper suggests that the existing security structure of Azerbaijan, though it has been effective enough to neutralize the hybrid warfare of Armenia, might not as effective in an encounter with more powerful and systemic hybrid threats from larger states such as Iran. The importance of the update of the national security document of the state, last issued in 2007, and the development of a hybrid warfare doctrine is stressed in order to thoroughly reconsider the state’s security policies and the security environment in which it operates. It is equally important to operationalize an early warning mechanism against hybrid threats as part of the permanent activities of the relevant institutions. Hybrid threats should not be seen as something that appear only occasionally when tensions with the adversary become strained. It is of great importance for Azerbaijan’s security institutions to diversify the sources of information and develop a complex set of instruments for keeping in check those social, political, and religious groups that serve the interests of other countries. Towards this end, promotion of direct and stable communication with local communities through different channels, possibly including nongovernmental institutions, is crucial to the security architecture of Azerbaijan. These instruments would allow the relevant institutions to receive warning signals that would facilitate protecting domestic peace and stability against the hybrid attacks of other states.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research was financially supported by a fellowship of the George Marshall Foundation. The usual disclaimer applies.

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REFERENCES Aghayev, N. (2020). How the French Ambassador watered down UNSC documents on Armenia’s invasion of Kalbajar. Available at: https://medium.com/@nasimiaghayev/how-the-french-ambassador-watereddown-unsc-documents-on-kalbajar-5d8f3afd2a0c APA. (2011). Hikmat Hajiyev: Armenia continues hybrid war against Azerbaijan. Available at: https:// apa.az/en/xeber/foreign-news/xeber_hikmet_hajiyev__hybrid_war_going_on_agai_-274595 Aqdas, T. (2021). Hybrid Wars: Technological Advancements and the Generational Evolution of Warfare. Small Wars Journal. Available at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-wars-technologicaladvancements-and-generational-evolution-warfare#_ednref5 Arevelkcenter.com. (2019). Azerbaycan PKK’ya yardım etmeye devam ediyor [Azerbaijan helps the PKK]. https://arevelkcenter.com/news-in-turkish/azerbaycan-pkkya-yardim-etmeye-devam-ediyor Azerbaijan-news.az. (2011). MTN və Baş Prokurorluğun həyata keçirdikləri birgə əməliyyat-axtarış tədbirləri nəticəsində Azərbaycanda radikal dini qruplaşmanın üzvləri zərərsizləşdirilmişlər [Members of radical religious group neutralized in Azerbaijan as a result of joint search operations carried out by the Ministry of National Security and the Prosecutor General’s Office]. Available at: https://www. azerbaijan-news.az/posts/detail/mtn-ve-bas-prokurorlugun-heyata-kecirdikleri-birge-emeliyyat-axtaristedbirleri-neticesinde-azerbaycanda-radikal-dini-qruplasmanin-uzvleri-zerersizlesdirilmisler-473 Azernews.az. (2011). History of Talyshes brought up in Iran to sway attention from Azeri protests: paper editor. Available at: https://www.azernews.az/nation/37095.html Azertag. (2021). President Ilham Aliyev`s interview with Russian influential “Natsionalnaya oborona” magazine. Available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President_Ilham_Aliyevs_interview_with_Russian_influential_Natsionalnaya_oborona_magazine_VIDEO-1884395?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_3_Zyo5_sc2qnA2R6A1X074kBFXKl5jKLew1iy.F1q8I-1635356911-0-gqNtZGzNAqWjcnBszQrR Azpost.info. (2021). Heydər Əliyev İran istehsalı olan mərmini Rəfsəncaniyə verdi… – Prezident Ermənistanın top atəşinin altına necə düşüb? [Heydar Aliyev gave the Iranian-produced shell to Rafsanjani… - President came under Armenian artillery fire?”]. Available at: https://azpost.info/heyd%c9%99r%c9%99liyev-iran-istehsali-olan-m%c9%99rmini-r%c9%99fs%c9%99ncaniy%c9%99-verdi/ Caliber.az. (2021). Иранская фейко-пропаганда против Азербайджана [Iranian anti-Azerbaijani fake news propaganda: Sahar TV]. Available at: https://caliber.az/ru/post/36942/ Clausewitz, C. (1976). On War (P. Paret & M. Howard, Eds. & Trans.). Princeton University Press. Clinton Digital Library. (2019). Declassified Document Concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Available at: https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/100499 Cullen, P. (2018). Hybrid threats as a new ‘wicked problem’ for early warning. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu. (2011). Yerevan hosts International Conference on Talysh Studies. Available at: https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/18970/

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Europejska, K., & Zewnętrznych, E.S.D. (2016). Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats. A European Union Response. Fedyk, N. (2017). Russian “New Generation” Warfare: Theory, Practice, and Lessons for U.S. Strategists. Small Wars Journal. Available at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/russian-%E2%80%9Cnewgeneration%E2%80%9D-warfare-theory-practice-and-lessons-for-us-strategists-0 Gardner, H. (2015). Hybrid Warfare: Iranian and Russian Versions of” Little Green Men” and Contemporary Conflict. NATO Defense College. Ghazanchyan, S. (2019). Exposing Azerbaijani lies: Armenia hosts conference on indigenous peoples of the region. Available at: https://en.armradio.am/2019/12/06/exposing-azerbaijani-lies-armenia-hostsconference-on-indigenous-peoples-of-the-region/ Ghazaryan, D. (2020). Pashinyan Admits Military Gamble to Impact Karabakh Negotiations Failed. Available at: https://hetq.am/en/article/124367 Haqqin.az. (2020). Иранские грузовики в Карабахе… Азербайджану стоит призвать к ответу посла Ирана! [Iranian trucks in Karabakh ... Azerbaijan should call the Iranian ambassador to account!]. Available at: https://haqqin.az/news/175399 Haqqin.az. (2021). Иран идет на Азербайджан «мягкой силой»… посредством третьих стран [Iran goes to Azerbaijan with “soft power” ... through third countries]. Available at: https://haqqin.az/ news/222256 Hetq.am. (2020). Artsakh President Says His Government Will Help Azerbaijan’s Talysh and Lezgins to Gain Their Independence. Available at: https://hetq.am/en/article/122532 Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. Horizonweekly.ca. (2019). The Talysh people expect cooperation from Armenia. Available at: https:// horizonweekly.ca/en/the-talysh-people-expect-cooperation-from-armenia/ Hurriyyet.az. (2021). İranın dini agenturası 30 ildir Azərbaycanda hansı işlərlə məşğul olub? - Ocaq Necatın əsl fəaliyyəti [What has the Iranian religious agency been doing in Azerbaijan for 30 years? The real activity of Ocaqnejat]. Available at: https://hurriyyet.az/az/post/iranin-dini-agenturasi-30-ildirazerbaycanda-hansi-islerle-mesgul-olub---ocaq-necatin-esl-fealiyyeti-348996 Iran International. (2021). Iran Leader Warns About ‘Military Presence’ Of Israel In Azerbaijan. Available at: https://www.iranintl.com/en/20211003344495 Królikowski, H. (2017). Hybrid Threats and Warfare, Are We Really Facing Something New? International Security, 9, 9–21. Kuosa, T. (2014). Towards Strategic Intelligence – Foresight, Intelligence, and Policy-Making. Dynamic Futures. Mamedov, E. (2021). How Azerbaijan’s anti-Iran policies are backfiring. Available at: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/10/22/how-azerbaijans-anti-iran-policies-are-backfiring/

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Nemeth, W. J. (2002). Future war and Chechnya: a case for hybrid warfare (Doctoral dissertation). Naval Postgraduate School. news.az. (2017). Армянский след: какие медиа-структуры в России контролируют армяне? [Armenian trace: which media structures in Russia are controlled by Armenians?]. Available at: https://1news. az/news/20170727112828852-Armyanskii-sled-kakie-media-struktury-v-Rossii-kontroliruyut-armyane Panorama.am. (2016). Anti-Talysh front becomes active in Azerbaijan: ‘Azerbaijani Turks are owners of this land’. Available at: https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2016/04/03/Anti-Talysh-frontAzerbaijan/1555034 President.az. (2021). Ilham Aliyev’s interview with Turkish Anadolu Agency. Available at: https:// en.president.az/articles/53249 RFE/RL. (2008). Azerbaijani Audience Gets A Taste Of Iranian ‘Soft Power’. Available at: https://www. rferl.org/a/Azerbaijan_Gets_Taste_Iranian_Soft_Power/1182664.html Rietjens, S. (2020). A warning system for hybrid threats – is it possible? The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. Schroefl, J., & Kaufman, S. J. (2014). Hybrid actors, tactical variety: Rethinking asymmetric and hybrid war. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 37(10), 862–880. Shafee, F. (2008). Inspired from abroad: The external sources of separatism in Azerbaijan. Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 2(4), 22–33. Socor, V. (2005). Talysh Issue, Dormant in Azerbaijan, Reopened in Armenia. Eurasia Daily Monitor. https://jamestown.org/program/talysh-issue-dormant-in-azerbaijan-reopened-in-armenia/ Teref.az. (2017). Tehranın Rusiyadakı anti-Azərbaycan şəbəkəsi - ilginc faktlar [Tehran’s anti-Azerbaijani network in Russia – interesting facts]. Available at: https://teref.az/gundem/66310-tehranin-rusiyadakianti-azerbaycan-shebekesi-ilginc-faktlar.html

ADDITIONAL READING Cornell, S. E. (2015). Azerbaijan Since Independence. Routledge. Huseynov, V. (2019). Geopolitical Rivalries in the “Common Neighborhood”. Ibidem-Verlag.

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ENDNOTES 1



2



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It is worth remembering that the separatist movement of the Armenians began with the irredentist purpose of unification of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast of Azerbaijan with Armenia. The issue of “self-determination” was put forward later because, apparently, the Armenians thought that this would have more chance of drawing support from the international community (Shafee 2008: 202). Armenia has been less actively engaged with other ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan and often referred to them in the context of the Talyshs.

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Chapter 11

Emergence of Counternarrative Peace Media in the Northeast of Nigeria: Exploratory Review on Their Impacts and Prospects Ibrahim Uba Yusuf University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Adamkolo Mohammed Ibrahim University of Maiduguri, Nigeria Musa Alhaji Liman University of Maiduguri, Nigeria

ABSTRACT The quest for a solution to the conflict is an issue of national concern. Nowadays, concerted efforts are being made at individual and group levels to sustain peace. The dominant paradigm adopted in dousing the menace of conflicts in Nigeria has been the use of gun and militarisation. However, this approach has been widely criticised as full of human rights abuse and incapable of restoring lasting peace. Furthermore, evidence has shown that violent extremists have made effective use of the media (directly or indirectly), especially cyberspace, to advance their propagandistic aims and radicalism. This chapter provides an exploratory review on understanding the impacts and prospects of peace media in the context of peacebuilding toward countering violent extremism and sustaining peace through peacebuilding using peace broadcast media in the northeast of Nigeria.

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch011

Copyright © 2022, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

 Emergence of Counternarrative Peace Media in the Northeast of Nigeria

INTRODUCTION Since the end of the cold war in the early 1990s, the world has become unpredictable in terms of conflict and search for peace. It has become a major part of the global discourse how violent conflicts are increasing daily leading to a violent breach of the peace in society, the abuse of human rights, threat to traditional cultures and obliteration of boundaries. Unfortunately, terrorism and other forms of violent conflict have taken centre-stage in the global arena (Ngige, Badekale & HammanJoda, 2016). Many countries especially the poor and developing ones such as Nigeria are suffering from various forms of conflicts and insecurity, a situation that is of great concern to the regional and global community even though conflicts, generally, are inevitable especially in multicultural societies such as Nigeria (Ibrahim & Hassan, 2017; Ibrahim & Nguru, 2020; Ibrahim & Nguru, 2020; Ngige et al., 2016). Ever since independence, in 1960, Nigeria has suffered devastatingly from a myriad of conflicts – from the coup in 1967 through to the Boko Haram insurgency which is currently ravaging the Northeast of the country – that have threatened not only the peace in society but also the existence of one Nigerian nation. Hence, the quest for a sustainable and lasting solution to the conflict is an issue of enormous national concern. This necessitated the making of a series of coordinated efforts at the individual, group, national and even international levels to maintain the peace and secure livelihoods and continuity of traditions and culture. Furthermore, this challenge speaks volume why Nigeria must strive to achieve the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) especially SGD 16, which focuses on peacebuilding and sustainability of culture. Nigeria may be a prosperous nation in terms of human and natural resources but over the last two decades, it has lacked the peace to harness those resources for nation-building. The quest for a solution to the conflict is an issue of national concern. Nowadays, concerted efforts are being made at individual and group levels to sustain peace. The dominant paradigm adopted in the dousing the menace of conflicts in Nigeria has been the use of gun and militarisation. However, this approach has been widely criticised as full of human rights abuse and incapable of restoring lasting peace (Abdulazeez, 2016; Ibrahim, 2021; Ibrahim & Hassan, 2017). The academic community has advocated for a multi-faceted approach to ending the conflict, suggesting a research evidence-based and alternative narrative (alternative media) approaches. Evidence has shown that violent extremists have made effective use of the media (directly or indirectly) especially the cyberspace to advance their aims, “whether through engagement, propaganda, radicalisation or recruitment”. This study is interested in understanding what can be done, and how to counter their extremist propaganda, which can incite or glamorise the use of violence. Much of the emphasis to date has been placed on the militarisation of the counter-violent extremism campaigns. While governments need to secure the nation and be seen to be doing so, there are severe limitations on the effectiveness of this response, for example, unspeakable number of casualties, wanton abuse of human rights and the limited capacity of the military (Langer, Kaufhold, & Runft, 2019). Since the eruption of the Boko Haram conflict in Maiduguri in 2009, research interest has tended to focus on either the humanitarian and peace situations in the Northeast or social, economic, environmental and security effect of the 12-year conflict in society; little attention has been paid to exploring the influence of alternative media on countering insurgency and promoting peacebuilding in conflict zones. The present research is influenced by the research void that has emerged due to inadequacies of past research to situate alternative radio, or radio for peace broadcast as a counterinsurgency model in the counter-narrative broadcast research even though the literature has highlighted the role radio for peace can play in promoting peace, post-conflict community resilience, and livelihoods support. This is 184

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sequel to the challenge posed to the Boko Haram insurgents – who, hitherto, had monopolised vernacular propaganda narrative – by the emergence of alternative counter-narrative, or counterinsurgency radio broadcast radio stations focusing on the Boko Haram conflict-ravaged Northeast region, e.g., Dandal Kura Radio, Radio Ndarason, Lafiya Dole FM, Radio Nigeria Peace FM, and so on in addition to the persistence of insecurity and conflict in the Northeast. Therefore, looking at how violence has taken centre-stage globally, Galtung (2005) suggested that to deal with the disturbing situation, there is the need to get rid of offensive weapon systems – an assertion that implies that other avenues of resolving conflicts need to be explored – counterinsurgency, or counter-narrative radio broadcast inclusive. UNESCO notes that “the mass media have an important contribution to make to the strengthening of peace (UNESCO, 1978, p.1)”. Counter-narrative, a deliberate and strategically planned use of media with peacebuilding, conflict prevention and post-conflict resilience slants in focus could help transform cultural violence into the culture of peaceful coexistence and create avenues for countering insurgency and extremist ideology (Njoku, 2018). Research shows that audio is the most widely understood communication format among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Northeast Nigeria. Nearly 65% of the IDP population in Borno prefer to receive information by radio. Hence, people affected by the conflict in linguistically diverse Northeast Nigeria need to give and receive critical information in multiple languages. Options for doing so are currently limited; however, rethinking how to use vernacular-based counterinsurgency radio narratives to target audiences could change that (see Nwagbara, 2013).

The Emergence of Peace Media in Northeast of Nigeria The widespread use of media to promote peace, to help healing and peacebuilding after armed conflict mostly happens after civil wars, the break-up of states and insurgencies (Endsor et al., 2010). In recent times, there has been growing interest in alternative approaches to counterinsurgency. One such potential solution is provided by ‘counter-narratives’, ‘alternative radio broadcasting’, or ‘peace radio’; attempts to challenge extremist and violent extremist messages, whether directly or indirectly, through the media, especially radio (Reppie, 2016; Ferguson, 2016). Counter-narratives are intentional and direct efforts to deconstruct, discredit and demystify violent extremist messaging, whether through ideology, logic, fact, or humour (Briggs & Feve, 2013). This implies that radio broadcasting for peace, or counter-narrative communication is reactive and confrontational, not discursive as Crossick and Kaszynska (2012) corroborate, an increasing proportion of armed conflict now takes place within states, and civilians are less the unfortunate victims of collateral damage and more the deliberate targets of the warring parties. In that context, using the media to deal with individual and collective trauma, and bringing together people whose traumatic experiences are often at the hands of fellow citizens has come to the fore. Alternative radio, or radio for peace counter-narratives are therefore identified as being a form of strategic communication and having a fixed objective (Bamberg & Andrews, 2004; Briggs & Feve, 2013; Ferguson, 2016; Langer et al., 2019). Importantly, alternative, or vernacular radio counter-narratives have been shown to contribute significantly toward the promotion of counterinsurgency, peace, and sustainable livelihoods development, especially at the grassroots/community level (Nwammuo & Salawu, 2018: Obukadeta, 2019). In fact, the concept of creating counter-narratives using alternative, or peace

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radio broadcast to push back against extremist recruitment and propaganda has become well established in recent years (Silverman, Stewart, Birdwell & Amanullah, 2016). The emergence of peace media in Borno State, marks a milestone in media history in Nigeria. They are specialized media organizations that promote specific ideology non-violence response to conflict. Peace media can be viewed from the prism of conflict transformation, resolution, reconciliation, and management and are engaged in open advocacy for the attainment of peace in the troubled region. Notable of such radio outlets include the following Radio Hadin Kai (108 FM) formerly, radio Zaman Lafiya, Lafiya Dole, a military radio station established in 2015, became the first peace media to emerged in region. The radio station, a media component of the counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism insurgency affecting the region, funded by the military became a tool of strengthening military-civil relations, and educating members of the public on the significance of peace. The radio station from establishment to date has been consistent in changing its name and motto. This is not farfetched from the change in the name of operational names of the Theatre by Chief of Army Staff. Historically, the radio station started as Zaman Lafiya during the time of Lt. Gen. Ihejirika. Subsequently, the then Army Chief Lt Gen Buratai established the Theatre Command Operation Lafiya Dole, domiciled in Maiduguri. The change in name is further amplifies the apprehensions on the state of the radio station after the end of Boko Haram insurgency. The emergence of the security radio station is viewed with two concerns: military control of information on insurgency and providing a narrative from the perspective of the military to help address misinformation or underreporting of the security happenings in the Northeast. Dandal Kura FM (private station) initially started operation on shortwave, with funding support from United States Agency and International Development and the Department for International Development. It later commissioned an FM station and is currently transmitting on 98.9 frequency modulation. With the slogan for Voice for Peace, Dandal Kura has from establishment to date, been consistent in peacebuilding advocacy through its programming. Umar and Yusuf (2021) in a study ‘sustainability of peacebuilding through broadcasting: a comparative study on the performance of public and private radio stations’, acknowledged how Dandal Kura and Radio Ndaraso International allocated more airtime (free and paid) to programmes that promote the ideals of peacebuilding—trauma healing, conditions of nonviolence, equity and community trust. Radio Ndarason International (private station) broadcast on shortwave across the globe. It started operation in 2015 with the aim of providing a platform for the people of Lake Chad region and promote indigenous perspective to the discourse of the Lake Chad crisis. With headquarters in N’Djamena. The station broadcast in Kanuri and Kanumbi languages and is dedicated to stimulating constructive dialogue involving the conflicting parties in the region.

The Elements of Peace Media Media, generally, may promote peace as a social responsibility. The question is, will promoting peace alone suffice to tag the media as peace? In this section, the following elements serve as yardstick for such pronunciations. These include: 1. Open advocacy for peace 2. Encourages constructive communication 3. De-escalation orientation narrative 186

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4. Political economy These elements highlighted here may not be exhaustive. Based on these elements, it is safer to infer that there are three ideal radio stations that can be called peace counter narrative media. These are Radio Hadin Kai, Dandal Kura and Radio Ndarason International. Apart from the slogan of the radio stations, the contents, mission, and operations of these media organisations suggests their potentialities to be called peace media.

Peace Media: Activism and Social Responsibility Nexus Media work is synonymous to activism and advocacy. As potent tools, mass media have become alternative ways of communicating with policy makers and triggering public debate or reactions. Media activism is not a new phenomenon. It is a broad form of activism that utilises the media for social crusade. This crusade can be radical or sometimes liberal. The primary goal is to engender change. Stephansen (2017) notes that media activism is understood as activists’ use of the media to further other aims. Using the media to achieve a vigorous purpose, is therefore considered activism. This purpose can be political, religious, or socially inclined. Trere and Kuan (2021) submits that media activism can be divided into activism that has media as an object to be revolutionized or reformed, or the strategic employment of media to achieve political causes. Rentschler (2007) identified four (4) broad typologies of media activism, media reform movements, the alternative press, flak and the strategic use of public relations and news writing techniques. Considering the modus operandi of the peace media, balancing between peace media and social responsibility, the typologies media reform movements and alternative press can be aligned. This chapter argues that media role is to amplify peace messages through its content. Media activism in this context is to supplement efforts of government and the security agencies to achieve lasting peace. This media strategy, is, of course, an activism in it sense. Through this, audience are informed on what is right and wrong and their voice is heard. Media generally, whether specialized or mainstream, have a responsibility to play in de-escalating conflict. Conflict has become a staple of the media that cannot be overlooked. In conflict situations, the media is expected to observe conflict-sensitive approaches in creating content. This way, the media can intensify peacebuilding initiatives.

Media Typology: Peace Communication Actors and Interventions Media can play a positive role in peace building and conflict prevention. Recognition of this has led to an increase in media/communication-related programmes and peacebuilding, with joint interventions including training of journalists, and content development for pro-peace programmes. However, there are significant challenges in the design and implementation of such programmes, and even more so in evaluation. While some interventions have produced positive results (e.g., reduced election-related violence), the evidence is limited, and causal links between interventions and impact are difficult to establish. This highlights the need for further research (Idris, 2020). This review is based on a mixture of academic papers and the grey literature. “The literature has been largely gender-blind and does not mention persons living with disabilities” (Idris, 2020, p. 2). The term “media” refers to both mass media (television, radio, newspapers) and social media (for example, 187

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Facebook, Twitter, and blogs) because these are used today as sources or tools for news and information (Betz, 2018, p. 2). Peacebuilding is defined as “a process that facilitates the establishment of lasting peace and attempts to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing the root causes and effects of conflict through recognition, institution building, and political and economic transformation” (Idris, 2020, p. 2). In this review, peacebuilding in the broadest sense includes conflict prevention as well as post-conflict peace restoration (Idris, 2020). Recognizing the media’s growing importance in conflict situations, governments, non-governmental organizations, multilateral organizations, broadcasters, and community activists have stepped up their efforts to use the media to prevent, manage, and settle disputes (Arsenault et al., 2011, p. 5). Media interventions (programmes) come in a variety of shapes and sizes. They can be distinguished by form (e.g., television, radio, social media), audience, and function, among other factors. “While the role of the media in conflict prevention and media assistance interventions does not change per se” (Betz, 2018, p. 15), “timing is critical when considering the roles of the media in conflict prevention and media assistance interventions.” While the role of the media does not change per se, the demands of the media, and thus media support, are likely to vary depending on the conflict phase.” Build-up, real conflict, ceasefire, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, and nation building are the five core stages of the ‘conflict cycle.’ According to the author, ‘media interventions must be tailored to this cycle’ (Betz & Williams, 2017, p. 2). According to Arsenault et al. (2011, pp. 7-8), conflict-related media and communication interventions include the following. • • •

Media monitoring involves scanning the media for evidence of destructive content such as incitement to violence or extremism. Monitoring can provide early warning of impending conflicts or escalation of old ones. Media professionalization programmes are designed to encourage media independence and objectivity and improve standards in editorial and reporting. These efforts include training for journalists, editorial training, and encouraging the use of a variety of sources. Peace, preventive, and conflict-sensitive journalism training aims to build journalists’ awareness of the potential pivotal role they can play in mediating or exacerbating conflict. Such initiatives entail working with journalists to find a means of reporting that balances two different positions or that peacekeeping objectives emphasize objectivity.

International broadcasting typically refers to radio or television (but increasingly also online) content directed at foreign audiences rather than domestic audiences. Most of the international broadcasters are funded by the government. In conflict situations, these broadcasts may provide important sources of information when local sources of information are silenced or absent. In pre-conflict situations, they may serve as platforms for practicing preventive diplomacy. • •

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Promoting an enabling environment includes interventions that strengthen media law and regulations that prevent incitement to violence, government monopoly on communication platforms, and censorship. Social marketing or media for development programmes use existing media outlets to convey messages about specific peacebuilding issues through mediums such as radio dramas, public service announcements, and discussion roundtable programmes.

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•

•

Citizen journalism initiatives give people without professional training in journalism on web- or mobile-based tools to create, augment, or validate traditional media on their own or in collaboration with others. These initiatives are critical in conflict areas where traditional media are biased or lack resources. Crowdsourcing techniques are becoming increasingly popular in conflict environments. Crowdsourcing initiatives invite citizens to use geo-maps, blogging, SMS services, or other webbased technologies to collect and share information on issues such as election fraud, violence, and humanitarian crises.

Arsenault et al. (2011, p. 5) and SFCG (2011, pp. 8, 18) provide an overview of some of the actors involved in media/communication and peacebuilding: •

• •

Non-governmental organisations such as DFID (UK), USAID (USA), “Press Now (Netherlands), Developing Radio Partners, Intermedia, Equal Access, Fondation Hirondelle (Switzerland), Internews Network (USA), IREX (USA), and Panos are some key examples of organizations working on building media capacity and promoting messages about peace. They also work with local partners to produce culturally sensitive radio and television programmes aimed at developing collaborative problem-solving and mutual understanding. International broadcasters including Voice of America, BBC World Service, Deutsche Welle, Al Jazeera, and France 24 seek to enable free flow of information across national borders and foster cross-cultural understanding between target and broadcasting countries. Frontline SMS and Ushahidi are two organizations that employ current communication tools (mostly SMS texting) to promote conflict prevention and peacebuilding. They use horizontal communication channels such as crowdsourcing and crowdfeeding to interchange sender-receiver roles.

Evidence Reviews on the Effect of Mass Media and Peacebuilding The media can act as a driver of peace in many ways: building bridges between people and groups, improve governance, increased knowledge of complex issues, provide early warning of potential conflicts; as an outlet for expressing feelings, and as a catalyst for action to promote peace. The types of media and communication interventions for peacebuilding can be very diverse, including media monitoring; media professional programmes; peace journalism training; international broadcasting; promote an enabling legal and regulatory environment; using the media to convey peacebuilding messages; citizen journalism initiatives; and crowdsourcing initiatives to collect and share information. The type of intervention will depend on the context, in particular on the phase of the “conflict cycle.” The main actors involved in media and communication and peacebuilding programmes include non-governmental organizations, e.g., Internews, Search for Common Ground, and multimedia; International broadcasters, such as BBC World Service and Voice of America; and technology-oriented organizations, such as Frontline SMS and Ushahidi. There are several challenges to implementing such interventions: the willingness and interests of media owners, fewer readers/viewers of peace stories compared to stories of violence and conflict, the reluctance of journalists on the grounds that the media must be objective, resource limitations, legal and regulatory restrictions; and a lack of media communication. Regarding the evidence for the impact/ 189

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effectiveness of media and communication and peacebuilding interventions, the main findings of this review are as follows:

Evidence-Based Reviews A review by Schoemaker and Stremlau (2014) found that the contribution of the media in war to peace transitions and the role of new information and communication technologies is insufficient evidence to prove it Gagliardone et al., 2015). By reviewing and comparing the literature on the role of ICT in nation building and peacebuilding in Africa. They also found that the empirical evidence for the successful use of ICTs was weak. Consider rapid evidence assessment (REA) for 2016 commissioned by the Department for International Development in a range of interventions, including media and communications interventions, to prevent or mitigate armed violence in developing and middle-income countries (Kramer et al., 2016). No consistent body of evidence has been found in general, but the findings suggest that radio, television, and digital media can positively influence people’s attitudes toward “others.” According to Idris (2020, p. 3), notable examples in countries outside Nigeria include in Kenya, training of journalists in peace journalism as well as a range of peace interventions implemented by the media themselves contributed to a significant decrease in election-related violence in the 2013 elections compared to the 2007 elections. In March 1995, Burundi, a non-governmental organisation Search for Common Ground (SFCG) established Studio Ijambo. It is an ethnically balanced team of journalists who produce radio programmes (particularly soap operas) to promote dialogue, peace, and reconciliation. Programmes are being listened to Studio Ijambo It is widely appreciated and has led to changing people’s behaviour towards other ethnic groups, as well as advancing governance issues. During the post-genocide in Rwanda, a radio series (Musekeweya, meaning ‘New Dawn’) was created to teach listeners about the roots of violence, the importance of independent thought, and the dangers of excessive respect for authority. A study found that it altered perceived norms of open expression and local responsibility for community problems, but attitudes toward interaction across social lines were resistant to change. While in Nigeria, the UK-funded aid agency Department for International Development (DFID) sponsored radio programmes aired by BBC Media Action on issues related to governance was shown to have improved citizens’ ability to challenge officials, resolve conflicts and participate in civic life. Training journalists in peace journalism in the run-up to the 2015 elections enabled the media to play a large role in educating the public about the need to avoid violence, which led to largely peaceful elections. Some positive impacts were achieved by the Nigerian Stabilisation and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) in strengthening the peace architecture, expanding community participation in building peace, and positively influencing policies and practices in the arena of conflict to reduce violence, but the sustainability of its effects is uncertain.

Role of the Media in Peacebuilding, Conflict Management, and Prevention Information is power and insight can influence public discourse. In this way, perceptions can be changed through access to the media. Different types of media are used globally to distribute knowledge and ideally a free media is a tool and sign of democracy. Freedom of expression is not only the essence of healthy media, but also a fundamental human right and vital to a democratic structure. It symbolises freedom of expression, the right to information, and the representation of different opinions in a heterogeneous society. In any preventive culture, effective and democratic media is an essential and indispensable part 190

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of societies trying to move towards peace and democracy (Auwal, 2017; Auwal & Ersoy, 2020; Kuusik, 2010; Pfister, 2021). He said Harry S. For unbiased information. Not giving people the possibility of political participation and not allowing them to express themselves freely is an important cause of conflict. On one hand, free, independent, and pluralistic media provide a platform for debate and different opinions. On the other hand, the media can be misused for propaganda purposes, to incite hatred and spread rumours and thus artificially create tensions (Janrike, 2017). The transmission of ideas is also not limited to traditional media such as newspapers, television, or radio. Arguably, traditional media has priority in this, however, new technologies, the Internet and digital content must also be considered in this context (Auwal, 2016; Dimmick, Chen, & Li, 2004; Liu, Chen, & Li, 2017). A lack of information, at any point in a conflict, can make people desperate, restless, and easy to manipulate. The ability to make informed decisions strengthens societies, promoting economic growth, democratic structures, and a positive outlook for the future. For this very reason, the United Nations Millennium Declaration stressed the need to “ensure the freedom of the media to fulfil its primary role and the right of the public to access information (Ishak, 2020; Kuusik, 2010). The press does not need a justification for its existence. Its service to society is a justification. Journalism can not only help distribute information, but it can also counter hate speech and create an environment of balanced opinions, and information balance (Idris, 2020; Kuusik, 2010). For the media, it can be difficult to find a balance between preventing speech harm and protecting individual expression. However, being able to find this balance is especially important in conflict situations. Responsible journalism not only republishes press releases, but truly cares about getting an honest, balanced, and fair account of events. To achieve this, journalists must stay away from judicial representations and describe reality without frills (Donsbach, 2004; Yusha’u, 2009). If democracy is to function properly, society needs access to news and information; There is a need to analyse the status quo, debate, practical information, and exchange as well as entertainment and to be provided by the media. Defining conflict and defining conflict areas is not easy and no two places are alike. Journalists need to know what to expect just by looking to define their project goals (Bakken & Rustad, 2018; Pate & Idris, 2017). In the event of a crisis or conflict, the international media can attract worldwide attention. Media is a pervasive part of daily life especially in industrialized countries, and as such it can shed light on conflicts anywhere in the world. Since most armed conflicts these days have governmental rather than regional causes; Parties are often concerned with making sure that most people are on their side, which carries a lot of potential for misrepresentation and trying to control the distribution of information. For this very reason, the intervention of free and impartial global media is important not only to the public but also to the people directly affected (Kuusik, 2010; Plaut & Klein, 2019). However, the number of disputes that receive international attention is minimal; Therefore, local media is vital in this context (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Saleem & Hanan, 2014). Broadcasting news using community radios can help reach people in different regions, even in different languages more easily. In this way people can be dealt with directly and their personal experiences and lives can be integrated much better than foreign media. However, the danger of manipulation and inflammation of ethnic tensions cannot be ignored. Another advantage of local media, especially radio, is that in border areas messages of peace can be conveyed to combatants and refugees in transit alike (Askerov, 201). Democratic media structures need more than this; It is critical that the use of information within the community is not formally passive, but it is essential that the population actively participates in the creation and transmission of content (Baú, 2015; Kuusik, 2010).

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Internal conflicts do not happen spontaneously but tend to have a history. Local media usually have a deeper understanding of the existing political structures, the participants in the conflict as well as the changes that preceded the outbreak of violence. So, the media can not only influence society before the conflict by recognizing and properly addressing the problem but also afterwards. Unlike international media covering conflicts, local media is a recognized part of society with the ability to accelerate and amplify or reduce concerns. One should not forget that the press can play a role in the escalation of conflicts, which also indicates the possibility of achieving positive goals. The media have the power to defuse tensions before they even reach a tipping point and monitor government, opposition, and society with a critical eye (Kuusik, 2010). By providing reliable information and reaching a large audience, the media helps manage conflict and promote democratic principles. In the aftermath of conflict, reconciliation and community development can also be encouraged (Auwal, Salisu, & Sabo, 2017; Lindley, 2021). A measure of peacebuilding can enhance peace journalism. Peace journalists try to reveal the underlying causes of the conflict and the true goals of all participants while making sure that all conflict victims are humane. Journalists do not try to exploit the loss and suffering but they make sure the reporting is balanced and they also show how easy it is to manipulate the news. Part of the ethical guidelines for this type of reporting is to get people out using peaceful measures, speaking out against war and violence, and documenting suffering and loss on all sides. Possible solutions and trying to prevent further conflict escalation are at the heart of peace journalism too (Kuusik, 2010). The proposed framework for media to use for peacebuilding could employ various strategies such as conflict sensitive journalism and peace journalism; peace-promoting entertainment media; regulating the media to prevent incitement to violence; and civilian media that promote peace (Mu’azu, Ibrahim, & Ahmed, 2017). Journalists do not shy away from difficult, sensitive, or uncomfortable topics such as human rights abuses. In this context, journalists can be considered helpful to all human rights defenders because they have adhered to ethical and ethical standards in reporting as well as addressing important topics in a manner that can be productive for all concerned (Kuusik, 2010; Pate & Idris, 2017). Help from public opinion is and should always be the goal of any report because without reaching a broad audience that can act, the influence of the media is limited at best. Therefore, undemocratic governments try to harass and persecute journalists to maintain their commitment and prevent them from exposing misconduct and abuse of power. This practice can increasingly be observed in democratic countries as well and is highly criticised (Plaut & Klein, 2019). It should be noted that even though democracy is the rule of the majority, a true democratic framework requires and ensures accountability of those who are elected. This includes protection against gender discrimination, protection of minority rights, protection of freedom of expression, and most importantly that they do not have the right to justify any abuses by passing new laws (Kuusik, 2010; Mogekwu, 2011). The media can be of great help in conflict management and peacebuilding. However, their power is also limited, as they will never be able to eliminate armed conflicts. The media can be a good tool in a healthy and working environment, but more ethical and responsible reporting is needed to ensure lasting peace and security. The role of the media is twofold: on the one hand, the media report and reflect on pressing issues and can help question established concepts and ideas. On the other hand, it can be used for propaganda purposes and instead of revealing the facts, try to cover things up and thus restrict people’s freedom and right to obtain information (Kuusik, 2010). Regardless, the potential of the media in conflict and post-conflict situations remains net positive and has unfortunately been inadequately exploited to date (Mu’azu et al., 2017; Priest, 2013).

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Bi-Focal Roles of the Media in Conflict Incitement and Conflict Prevention/Peacebuilding The media can play a role in fuelling or exacerbating conflict, as, for example, in Rwanda where the use of Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) to demonise the Tutsis, lay the groundwork, and then literally drive the killing once the genocide began” (UN official, quoted in Betz, 2018, p. 4). urge RTLM Listeners pick up machetes and take to the streets and “kill cockroaches” (Bratic & Schirch2007, p. 7). Similarly, broadcasters in the Balkans have polarized communities “to the point that violence has become an accepted tool for redressing grievances” (Bratic & Schirch, 2007, p. 7). The media, on the other hand, has the potential to be a positive force. According to Manoff, “The basic functions of media are the same as those involved in conflict-resolution processes” (1998, cited in Betz, 2018, p. 18). He emphasized five major responsibilities of the media: ‘channelling communication to overcome misperceptions; framing and analysing conflict; recognizing interests; defusing suspicion; and providing emotional outlets’ (Manoff, 1998, cited in Betz, 2018, p. 18). Betz and Williams (2017, pp. 12-13) discuss the role of the media in conflict resolution and peacebuilding: • •

• • • •

Bridge Builder - Media can be used to build relationships. It can support greater cohesion and understanding between people who consider themselves different from each other. It can give a voice to the most marginalized in society. Helps improve governance – Fact-based, independent, transparent, accountable, and impartial reporting can hold officials accountable and make public administrations more transparent. It enables citizens to be active stakeholders, to understand policies and to use impartial information provided to exercise their human rights. All of these are necessary to prevent conflict. Increases knowledge of complex issues – these include issues such as corruption, political injustice, marginalization, lack of economic opportunity, and struggles with identity that may lead to violent extremism. It can help people think critically about and discuss these issues. Provides early warning of potential conflicts and may create stress to address conflict. Outlet for feelings - the media can allow people to express their fears and frustrations and share experiences and advice with others. It can also connect people with authority, enabling open communication and dialogue. Motivation for Peace - The media can motivate people to take action and participate in community events.

According to Bentz (2018), “if the goal of conflict prevention is to shift from polarization to positive relationships, the media can be an effective tool to build these relationships by changing behaviours and attitudes” (p. 18). She goes on to say that the media’s impact on behavior is multidimensional, and that it is more likely to work on attitudes and ideas that form behavior rather than directly affecting people’s actions (Betz, 2018, p. 18). Betz (2018, p. 18) notes that “if the goal of conflict prevention is to move from polarization to positive relationships, the media can be an effective tool for building these relationships by changing behaviours and attitude.” However, she adds, the media’s influence on behavior is complex and they are more likely to act on attitudes and opinions that shape behaviours rather than directly influencing people’s actions (Betz, 2018, p. 18).

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Implementation of Solutions to the Challenges Implementing media and communications activities to promote peacebuilding/conflict prevention has several hurdles. Media ownership has a significant impact on the role of the media, particularly their propensity to play a peacebuilding role. Privately owned media have economic interests (e.g., dependency on advertising revenue), and owners may be linked with specific political parties/support specific ideas that they wish to promote through their newspapers, television stations, and other outlets. One big issue is that peace does not sell, whereas violence does: the media considers conflict to be more ‘newsworthy’ - the journalistic principle of ‘if it bleeds, it leads’ is widely used (Bratic & Schirch, 2007, p. 8). Those in charge of the media, according to Bratic and Schirch (2007, p. 8), favour four values: immediacy, drama, simplicity, and ethnocentrism, all of which make using the media for peacebuilding problematic. Another difficulty that may occur is the media’s reluctance to be objective and simply report the news (Bratic & Schirch, 2007). The media can also suffer from economic constraints, which means that they cannot invest in staff training, investigations, and the production of high-quality programmes. The media can face legal, regulatory, and other governmental restrictions; This increasingly applies to social media as well, with platforms such as Facebook and Twitter increased censorship. Finally, the effectiveness of media/communication interventions can be limited by a lack of media outreach, for example, due to limited internet access, and a lack of literacy (Betz & Williams, 2017, pp. 10-11). Arsenault and colleagues (2011, p. 5) cautioned that “even the most well-intentioned media campaigns, if poorly designed, can exacerbate tensions and obstruct peacebuilding efforts.”

Evaluation of Media’s Role Another major challenge is evaluation: how can the success of media and communications activities be determined? Betz and Williams (2017, p. 3) identify the following issues: • • • • •

The desired outcomes of communications interventions are not clearly defined, for example, health and sanitation programmes, and direct benefits cannot be measured to the same degree. There are no globally agreed upon quality standards or specifications for what makes “good communication”. Conducting conflict research poses practical challenges. For example, it can be dangerous to researchers; They have limited access to beneficiaries, and face resource constraints. Group contact can reach many people including the most isolated - this is a benefit and a curse because it makes it difficult to assess the impact. It is difficult to attribute change to media interference only when other factors are likely to play a role.

Betz (2018, p. 5) highlights the lack of data showing how many conflicts are avoided and which methods work best because ``measures of success in conflict prevention are difficult to obtain because the optimal outcome – absence of conflict. It can theoretically be achieved without any intervention at all.

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Findings from Reviews of Evidence Challenges to assessment are underlined by reviews of evidence of the impact of media/communication interventions on conflict. Did Schoemaker and Stremlau (2014) assesses the evidence used in arguments regarding the role of the media in conflict and post-conflict situations. They focused on two broad areas of the literature: first, the contribution of war media to peace transitions, and second, the role of new ICTs such as the internet and cell phones. They found serious loopholes, with most of the evidence in the “grey literature” or policy documents. and they concluded (Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014, p. 191). In the current literature, there is insufficient evidence to support broad and ambitious claims about the role of media and technology in contexts of violent conflict and the transition to media, influencing political choice, and empowering end users more broadly. This is not to say that these claims are incorrect, but they are unproven. Gagliardone et al. (2015) reviewed and compared the literature on the role of ICT in nation building and peacebuilding in Africa, with a particular focus on Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. They examined whether claims about the transformative power of ICTs are supported by evidence and whether local knowledge has been considered by ICT-based initiatives. They found that empirical evidence for the successful use of ICTs to promote peacebuilding and state building was weak. The literature examined was found to show a simplistic assumption that ICTs will drive democratic development without sufficient consideration of how the public actually uses ICTs. Evidence for the role of ICTs in peacebuilding efforts was scant. Most documents surveyed supported the potential of ICTs to promote peace but tended mainly to provide descriptions of how the technologies were or could be used, with little evidence of actual impact (Idris, 2020, p. 3). Consider rapid evidence assessment (REA) 2016 commissioned by DFID on a set of interventions to prevent or mitigate armed violence in developing and middle-income countries (Kramer et al., 2016). In addition to interventions focused on economic development, alternative conflict resolution, governance, etc., the commission has considered media and communications interventions. You have not found a comprehensive, consistent body of evidence on the media and communication. The most substantial body of evidence in the 12 studies identified examined the impact of radio (and television) programming on intergroup attitudes to maintaining peace. The findings suggest that radio, television, and digital media can positively influence people’s attitudes toward “others.” However, the association from attitudes to behavior (violent or peaceful) has not been explored in this literature and it is not clear how meaningful changes in attitudes are to mitigate and prevent conflicts and whether these changes are permanent or easily reversible in a conflict situation. (Kremer et al., 2016, p. 38).

Governance of Radio Programmes in Nigeria Between 2012 and 2016, BBC Media Action ran four weekly radio shows in English, Pidgin, and Hausa on over 190 radio stations across Nigeria, thanks to a DFID-funded project. The two debate programmes and two dramas aimed to promote more accountable state-society relations, make societies more resilient to conflict, and allow citizens to participate in public discourse and hold their leaders accountable. Public service advertisements (PSAs) were broadcast on television in the run-up to the 2015 elections, urging Nigerians to vote peacefully. The project’s impact was assessed using three representative quantitative surveys and nine qualitative studies involving audiences, governance, and media professionals, as well as partner radio stations. It reached out to over 12,000 Nigerians in total. 195

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The programmes collectively reached an estimated 64.6 million individuals. According to the research, the debate and discussion programmes were successful in allowing individuals to directly question officials, and viewers loved hearing a varied spectrum of perspectives and beliefs. The dramas were effective at showing people how to resolve conflicts, question officials, and participate in civic life. By presenting scenarios that people could connect to, their tales helped ordinary people and leaders understand their rights and obligations, as well as how democratic processes function. Even after controlling for other factors that may influence these outcomes, people who were exposed to these factual and drama outputs knew more, debated more, and participated in politics more (such as age, income, education, and interest in politics). An expert panel, on the other hand, identified many issues that prohibited leaders from being held accountable, including fear, low expectations of reaction, a lack of structures that allow individuals to do so, distrust of the law, and corruption. The project’s training, mentoring, and capacity-building efforts equipped broadcast partners with little or no experience with valuable production and editing skills, allowing them to produce and broadcast trustworthy and participatory governance programmes. According to Dean (2018, p. 18), other factors that were considered were as follows: The Kenyan government responded significantly to the 2007/8 violence by enacting new legislation making hate speech a felony and requiring all mobile phone users to register before acquiring a card. Sim card (viral hate text messaging was also a feature in the 2008 violence). The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) was a five-year DFID-funded initiative led by the British Council that ran from 2012 to 2017. The NSRP’s goal was to raise awareness of conflict in the Nigerian media and increase opportunities for citizens to participate in governance and peacebuilding. The programme included the following activities (NSRP, 2014, p. 2): • • • • •

• •

Media mapping of target countries, to better understand how local grievances and violent conflict are reflected in the media, to analyze how citizens obtain and consume media information, and use social media. The study informed the design of other works under the programme. Conflict sensitive communications training for journalists. Media relations training for key security agencies and senior government officials, with the aim of improving relations between these organizations and the media to allow for greater cooperation in reporting violent conflicts in the country. Mentoring media houses – training senior journalists, mostly editors, to serve as internal mentors, techniques, and content of conflict sensitive reporting in their media houses. Provide technical equipment to support interactive media programming and audience participation (e.g., talk shows, telephone programmes, social media), with the aim of increasing participation of marginalized populations (including women and girls) in discussions and advocacy around conflict and its causes. Measuring change in conflict sensitive reporting (media monitoring). Develop an online postgraduate course in Conflict Sensitive Communication.

The final evaluation of the programme, conducted in 2017, focused on how the programme: a) strengthened social institutions (the peace architecture) working to resolve and mediate conflict; b) involved broader society in conflict resolution, including marginalized communities (particularly women and youth); and c) influenced policy and practice in conflict management. WYG and UKAID (2017,

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p. x) The evaluation discovered a significant reduction in perceived violence in the programme’s target areas over the course of the programme’s implementation, as well as a concrete strengthening of the peace architecture because of NSRP activities (WYG & UKAID, 2017: xi). However, there was no information on how far these were linked, and what role the NSRP may or may not have made through strengthening social institutions that strive to settle and mediate conflict. NSRP worked at the local, state, and federal levels to strengthen the capacity of its platforms, initiatives, interventions, and society as a whole to influence key actors/institutions in the conflict arena and bring about positive policy and practise changes that would result in increased stability and reduced violence. The study discovered that the NSRP had successfully promoted policy or practice change 38 times, although it was uncertain how long the beneficial influence would last (WYG & UKAID, 2017, p. xiii).

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS Future research should provide further understanding of the role of peace media, particularly broadcast media in context and conflict analysis, consider the interaction between local information systems, global media networks and audiences, know and understand the audience, giving a voice to all people including the most marginalised and excluded - from the start, promote regulatory reform of the media as part of peace settlements and their implementation, ensuring the safety of media workers, ensure that interventions apply the “do no harm” principle as well build links with other peacebuilding and state building institutions. This review emphasises the scarcity of evidence demonstrating the causal impact of peace media interventions. More research is needed, particularly on changes over time and in different contexts; other factors influencing impacts; how interventions and impact are linked; the role of different forms of communication and media channels; the role of media and technology in hybrid spaces of governance; and from a national range of geographic contexts because much of the available evidence is focused on continental Africa. Future research should also include recommendations for evaluating future peacebuilding programmes not only in the northeast but in the whole of northern Nigeria and the need to explore the use of social media in peacebuilding.

CONCLUSION The foregoing arguments suggest that counternarrative peace media has come to stay in the region in view of the daunting security challenges. The peace media identified in this chapter, have been noted for facilitating exchange and circulation of peace ideology that is shaping people’s consciousness in post insurgency recovery era. Accessed through various platforms, the peace media circulate particular messages and viewpoints on peace in cities and remote areas. The emergence of these counter narrative peace media amidst the already established public media, raises the question of sustainability in an attractive competitive society. A professional challenge lies in the creation of content distinctly offering the peace agenda. This raises the question: would the content address components of peacebuilding and make meaningful impacts?

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As emerging specialised media, the chapter suggests that the counter narrative peace requires funding to sustain their operations. It argues that absence of sustained funding may negatively affect the services rendered, result to abrupt closure or unnecessary off air. It is necessary to introduce a complimentary source of funding apart from grants from interested NGOs and subvention from government to boost operations.

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Ibrahim, A. M., & Nguru, M. N. (2020). Media narrative creation of inter-religious conflict and its repercussion on national development in Nigeria: A dialectic discourse on the media’s role as an instrument for conflict construction and management. New Media and Mass Communication, 91, 30–43. doi:10.7176/NMMC/91-04 IDMC. (2019). Nigeria: Country information. Retrieved 12 November 2019 from https://www.internaldisplacement.org/countries/nigeria Idris, I. (2020). Media/communications on peacebuilding/social cohesion/changing prevailing narratives on conflict. Helpdesk report, Knowledge for Development (K4D). IOM & DTM (2020 June). Northeast Nigeria: Displacement report 32 (June 2020): Assessment on displacement trends in the six conflict-affected states. New York: International Organisation for Migration and Displacement Tracking Matrix. Ishak, M. S. A. (2020). Expanding shrinking communication spaces. The Journal of Development Communication, 31(2), 88–89. Jarikre, M. (2017). The media and post-election peacebuilding in Nigeria, 1999–2015. Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 5(2), 289–305. doi:10.18588/201711.00a011 Kuusik, N. (2010 August 28). The role of the media in peace building, conflict management, and prevention. E-International Relations, 1-3. https://www.e-ir.info/2010/08/28/the-role-of-media-in-peacebuilding-conflict-management-and-prevention/ Lindley, D. (2021). Promoting peace with information: Transparency as a tool of security regimes. Princeton University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctv18zhdj0 Liu, Y., Chen, W., & Li, J. (2017). Transformation and development of traditional media in new media environment. In New Media and China’s Social Development (pp. 25–46). Springer. doi:10.1007/978981-10-3994-2_3 Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. P. (2013). The local turn in peace building: A critical agenda for peace. Third World Quarterly, 34(5), 763–783. doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.800750 Maine, S., & Onkware, K. (2018). Media peace intervention programs influencing peace building since Kenya 2007 elections. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 8(10), 828. doi:10.29322/IJSRP.8.10.2018.p8281 Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. (2016). Designing qualitative research. Sage. Mason, J. (2002). Qualitative research (2nd ed.). Sage. Mogekwu, M. (2011). Conflict reporting and peace journalism. In search of a new model: Lessons from the Nigerian Niger Delta crisis. In I. S. Shaw, J. Lynch, & R. A. Hackett (Eds.), Expanding peace journalism: Comparative and critical approaches (pp. 239–260). Sydney University Press.

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Mu’azu, A., Ibrahim, M., & Ahmed, A. (2017). Peace after the security storm in North Eastern Nigeria. Kaduna Journal of Sociology, 5(1), 68–75. Ngige, C. V., & Badekale, A. F., & HammanJoda, I. (2016). The media and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: A content analysis and review. International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, 3(1), 58–65. Njoku, G. (2018). The political economy of deregulation and commercialisation of radio broadcasting in Nigeria, 1992-2017: An assessment of access, participation, content, and peacebuilding (Unpublished doctoral thesis). Universität Autonoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain. NSRP. (2014). National stability and reconciliation programme. Component brief: Making media support peacebuilding initiatives. National Stability and Reconciliation Programme. http://www.nsrp-nigeria. org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/E187-NSRP-4.3-Media-and-Conflict-Sensitivity-FINAL-WEB.pdf Nwagbara, G. U. (2013). Indigenous language news and the marginalisation of some ethnic groups in the Nigerian broadcast media. Studies of Tribes and Tribals, 11(2), 153–160. doi:10.1080/097263 9X.2013.11886677 Nwammuo, A. N., & Salawu, A. (2018). Is British Broadcasting Corporation reclaiming hegemonic control of African media landscape through indigenous language-based programming approach? An analytical discourse. AFFRIKA: Journal of Politics, Economics and Society, 8(2), 7–29. doi:10.31920/20756534/2018/V8n2a1 Pate, U. A., & Idris, H. (2017). How journalists survived to report: Professionalism and risk management in the reporting of terror groups and violent extremism in North East Nigeria. In U. Carlsson & R. Pöyhtäri (Eds.), The assault on journalism: Building knowledge to protect freedom of expression (pp. 159-170). University of Gothenburg. Pfister, D. S. (2021). Networked media, networked rhetorics. Penn State University Press., doi:10.1515/9780271065809 Plaut, S., & Klein, P. (2019). “Fixing” the journalist-fixer relationship: A critical look towards developing best practices in global reporting. Journalism Studies, 20(12), 1696–1713. doi:10.1080/146167 0X.2019.1638292 Priest, S. (2013). Critical science literacy: What citizens and journalists need to know to make sense of science. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 33(5-6), 138–145. doi:10.1177/0270467614529707 Rao, S. (2014). Sending messages to reduce violent conflict. GSDRC Helpdesk Report 1050, University of Birmingham. http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq1050.pdf Reppie, N. H. (2016). Model kontra narasi terorisme dalam penanggulangan terorisme di Indonesia (Master’s thesis). Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta. Saleem, N., & Hanan, M. A. (2014). Media and conflict resolution: Toward building a relationship model. Journal of Political Studies, 21(1), 179.

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Schoemaker, E., & Stremlau, N. (2014). The media and conflict: An assessment of the evidence’. Progress in Development Studies, 14(2), 181–195. doi:10.1177/1464993413517790 SFCG. (n.d.). Burundi Program Overview. Search for Common Ground. https://repositories.lib.utexas. edu/bitstream/handle/2152/4576/3671.pdf?sequence=1 SFCG. (n.d.). Communication for Peacebuilding: Practices, Trends and Challenges. Search for Common Ground (SFCG). https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/communication-for-peacebuildingpractices-trends-challenges.pdf Silverman, T., Stewart, C. J., Birdwell, J., & Amanullah, Z. (2016). The impact of counter-narratives: Insights from a year-long cross-platform pilot study of counter-narrative curation, targeting, evaluation and impact. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Stephansen, H. C. (2017). Media activism as movement?: Collective identity formation in the World Forum of Free Media. Media and Communication, 5(3), 59–66. doi:10.17645/mac.v5i3.1034 Trere, E., & Kuan, A. (2021). Digital media activism: A situated, historical and ecological approach beyond the technological sublime. doi:10.1515/9783110740202-011 Umar, M. A., & Yusuf, I. U. (2021). Sustainability of peacebuilding through broadcasting: A comparative study on the performance of public and private radio stations in Borno State. In Communication and Metacommunication: A Discourse on Media and Society. University of Jos Press. UNESCO. (1978). Declaration on fundamental principles concerning the contribution of the mass media to strengthening peace and international understanding, to the promotion of human rights and to countering racialism, apartheid, and incitement of war. Retrieved from https://www.unesco.org/en/ ev.phpURL_ID=13176&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.htm WYG & UKAID. (2017). Final Evaluation Report. National Stability and Reconciliation Programme. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/701037/Nigeria-Stability-and-Reconciliation-Programme-Volume-1.pdf Yin, R. K. (2011). Qualitative research from start to finish. Guilford Press. Yusha’u, M. J. (2009). Investigative journalism and scandal reporting in the Nigerian press. Ecquid Novi. African Journalism Studies, 30(2), 155–174. doi:10.1080/02560054.2009.9653400

ADDITIONAL READING Adeyanju, C. G. (2018). The mass media and violent conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, 4(03), 73–87. Njigua, G. W., & Manyengo, T. (2018). Role of media in conflict: A case of 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya. International Journal of Social Sciences and Information Technology, IV(V), 652–657.

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Paluck, E. L., & Green, D. P. (2009). Deference, dissent, and dispute resolution: An experimental intervention using mass media to change norms and behaviour in Rwanda. The American Political Science Review, 103(04), 622–644. doi:10.1017/S0003055409990128 Rohwerder, B. (2015). Social media and conflict management in post-conflict and fragile contexts. GSDRC Helpdesk Report 1184, University of Birmingham. http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq1184.pdf Translators Without Borders (2019 May). “Are they listening?” The challenges and opportunities of multilingual audio communication in Borno State. European Union Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid. Uzuegbunam, C. E. (2018). Mainstream media, social media and peace-building in Nigeria: Old challenges, new opportunities? The Nigerian Journal of Communication, 15(2), 519–534.

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Section 3

Terrorism and Digital Media

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Chapter 12

Dataveillance, Counterterrorism, and Sustainable Peace in the Age of Algocracy Feride Zeynep Güder Üsküdar University, Turkey

ABSTRACT History, the story of human beings, has been full of century-old conflicts, fights, and unending wars. Dreaming a peaceful world looks like a pure naïve desire, but ironically, this naivety can be the only salvation for human beings. We all witness a series of outbreaking and cutting-edge technological innovations, and this digitalized world transforms society sharply. New media have tsunami-like effects on people by creating a new culture in digital habitus and metaverse, but the existence of violence, war, and terrorism still linger all over the world. Violence and terrorism only changed their tophos and faces. The study is finalized by briefly exploring the new possibilities of governing the world by algocracy, a new type of democracy regulated by algorithms. Since the search for discourse for sustainable peace perspectives and a world without terrorism is the main leitmotif of this chapter, the methodology of the chapter starts with the essential discussions on counterterrorism, dataveillance, sustainable peace, the role of redemption, and peaceful discourse in digital narrations.

INTRODUCTION The role of dataveillance as counterterrorism practices is based on the premise that it is possible to control and prevent terrorism by data surveillance. However, these practices have limited validity. To reach a secure world, tight and perfect systems are necessary to protect and fight against organized illegal groups. In addition to this, some sociological and historical inferences denote that the complexity of terrorism cannot be solved fully if we ignore certain layers and factors. The situation is rather complicated than it appears. Numerous dynamics that are correlated to terrorism must be taken into consideration. DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch012

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Dataveillance, alone, will not be enough to stop terrorism. Here, dataveillance can be regarded as the new surveillance technique. To decrease the number of people who prefer terrorism instead of political interactions or diplomacy needs different strategies. This chapter mainly questions the role of personal dataveillance as counter-terrorism monitoring. The underlying reason to pose this question comes from the assumption that prevention of evil before it is committed is possible. These premises have brought us back to Kant’s philosophy of perpetual peace. To reach a new world order without terrorism, it would be wise to resort to the serene soul of Kant and his lucid mind by revisiting his founding manifesto on perpetual peace. It is highly important to search for solutions from his lens and analyze his manifesto particularly to pave the way for a new world design free from violence and terror. This manifesto offers practical answers for certain questions as to how we can stop terrorism and how we can prevent violent things before they are going to happen (Caranti, 2017).

BACKGROUND In the post-modern world, dataveillance, the surveillance of data to detect the activities of terrorists and ordinary people, is thought to control, prevent and finally solve the problem. What is the most needed action here can be to fight against the root of the illness, not the symptoms. Hostility among people and nations has its tradition with a very long past. Some cases are frozen and stuck in history and they are inherited and stay on the shoulders of new generations. Therefore, instead of overrating the dataveillance activities, new discourse must be sought in every platform. We need to find the language of conciliation, peace, redemption and, forgiveness. Kant here highlights the importance of ending hostilities among men: A state of peace among men who live side by side with each other is not the natural state. The state of nature is rather a state of war; for although it may not always present the outbreak of hostilities, it is nevertheless continually threatened with them. The state of peace must, therefore, be established; for the mere cessation of hostilities furnishes no security against their recurrence (Perpetual, 2012). If human beings and nations cannot start from the zero point, then a certain type of infrastructure can be developed by relying on Kant’s philosophy of peace. The function of these new Kant readings can allow a human being to navigate by the algorithms of peace instead of the accumulated grudge and chaos. And if we are now talking about the possibility of sovereignty of algorithms and perpetual peace, algocracy can be the answer that is a democracy based on algorithms. Dataveillance practices must be integrated with algocracy as a new possibility for a new world design. In this digitalized world, data collected from dataveillance practices can serve to establish a better world. Since the search for discourse for sustainable peace perspectives and a world without terrorism is the main leitmotif of this chapter, the methodology of the paper starts with the essential discussions on counterterrorism, dataveillance, sustainable peace, the role of redemption, and digital narrations. Alternative strategies for dataveillance are discussed by giving their overt advantages and disadvantages compared to the existing and traditional surveillance-based approaches (Danaher, 2020). In addition to the polarized ideologies, digital media have also problematic discourse and contents. Aggressive discourse in social media is contagious. Here, peace-building discourse emphasizes the role of social media contents that have redemptive discourse especially their narrations of history. The redemptive discourse is believed to deal with the polarisation of societies and lift the heavy spirit of politics.

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Today, the scenery of politics is rather complicated where cities, countries, and streets are full of traumatized people. Even ordinary citizens did not witness a terror attack, they are psychologically suffering from terrorism. Prejudices, stereotyping thinking, xenophobia, and racism can be conceived as hard shields to protect people from the assault of others. Although globalization and media promote the idea of building cultures without walls, countries have built more and tighter walls than ever. Arıboğan, here, underlines that the very existence of walls in the borders is not for real enemies or protection and defense (Arıboğan, 2017). These psychological walls are the symbolic representation of those restless mindsets. It is challenging to reach a peaceful society, as people all over the world cannot have a peaceful mindset that is free from vengeance, grudge, revenge. Genuine and meaningful communication to lead a peaceful life requires conscious effort and these practices should not be taken for granted. To provide sensitivity, it is necessary to construct a collective language in the social field by professionals working in the field of communication science as well as the experts in the field of psychology. They should work together to build a new language that prevents social polarization. The underlying reason for this proposition comes from the need to shed some new light on dataveillance, counterterrorism, the redemptive discourse, perpetual and sustainable peace from different angles. To pursue the goals mentioned, the first part of the chapter starts with a discussion that analyzes contemporary terrorism in terms of the roots of violence. The first part of the chapter is expanded by discussions on terrorism and the discourse of redemption in media. This part is followed by interrelated titles in search of sustainable peace in the age of algocracy and dataveillance for the prevention of terrorism. The second part of the study investigates sociological and philosophical discussions on the roots of evil and terror. Here terrorism is correlated to human evil and violence which play an inseparable role in the history of humans. In addition to these restless roots, the ideology of race and the logic of exceptionalism is also given as the essence of many conflicts. History puts the burden on the shoulders of people. Here, an important question has been thrown to underline the importance of human history which is full of violence.: “Can we start with a clean slate free from the ruins of the past?”. After this question, the second part is concluded by two more parts as challenges of new political discourses for peace and digital habitus, media, and new discourses of terrorism. The third part of the study is elaborated by discussions on peacebuilding public spheres in the age of algocracy. The study is finalized by a question on sustainable peace from deliberative democracy to algocracy (Bächtiger, et.al 2018).

CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM History is full of leaders like Churchill, who once declared that he had nothing to offer the British people but blood, tears, and sweat. This is a typical morale speech done by politicians with the belief that victory at all costs should be reached (Churchill Society, 2021). The story of men, then, is the story of wars and conflicts where the scenery is full of assassination, accidents, extermination, mass massacres, victims, and violent acts (Güder, 2016). In general, wars are usually planned, calculated, and prepared for a certain enemy beforehand. The dynamics of terrorist acts follow a similar path. Preparation and calculation of the fight allow everything to happen within a scheme of a plan. However, the characteristics of terrorism are quite different from 207

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the official wars declared by the countries. The agenda of the countries’ war declarations are expected to be set by legitimate rules. Therefore, they usually have impunity. In addition to this, we must separate random violent deeds and crimes from the acts of calculated grudges and acts of revenge. This age is full of asymmetric war. The division of the opposing parts is blurred (Tarhan, 2010). The view of the literature on terrorism reveals that most of the analysts refer to a distinction between the old terrorists and the terrorists of their times, regardless of when they wrote about them. They refer to the terrorism of their times as “new terrorism” or “contemporary terrorism”. This clearly shows that terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon. Depending on the regime of truth within which it is made, the definition of terrorism differs not only from one society to another but also from one particular period to another. Walzer highlights the distinction between two terrorism types as contemporary and old terrorism. The political code of “contemporary terrorists” is different from the old ones. The distinction between contemporary and old terrorism is important for the scope, objectives, and context of this paper (Cebeci, 30). To understand the differences between these two types of terrorism, Walzer claims that old terrorism had a political code that had a moral distinction between who could and could not be killed. It follows that contemporary terrorism is a “new form of violence” which means the rise of “non-state actors in international affairs” (Sloan qt. in Cebeci, 2012: 30).

Terrorism and the Discourse of Redemption in Digital Media Redemption is a very controversial topic. Before delving into the relationship between the victims of terrorism and the terrorist, the mentality of terrorism and violence have to be analyzed from different perspectives. At this point, we need to give reference to Levinas and his philosophy of forgiveness and the discourse of redemption. Levinas had a very interesting life story. He had to survive in the Concentration Camps. Interestingly, after having witnessed and lived the tortures of the holocaust in Concentration Camps, he developed the philosophy of forgiving and redemption. a sense of forgiving to those who showed them the cruelest and pure violence towards them. It is not an easy state of mind to reach. It challenges the feeling of being the victim of past events. He discussed that the “spirit of freedom,” a broad category of political freedoms is found in the redemptive discourses and especially in the practices of Christianity.1 In the Christian salvation narrative, every moment has the potential of deliverance from sins and the power to break with the chains of the past. This argument brought us the belief that through the inward embrace of the life of the cross, the believer “triumphs over time.” (Giannopoulos, 2019, 219). People who are traumatic from a violent act transfer symbolic guns to the future generation to take their revenge. Acts of terrorism and the roots of violence originally come from that psychosocial stance. Even the absence of a real witness of the person a song, a story, a memory traveling throughout the time can invite that act of taking revenge. Starting a new world, having a gaze like an innocent baby seems hard for many cultures. The present-day many geographies transfer their heavy sad, tragic, traumatic stories like a snowball to the shoulder of the next generation. Many politicians use that emotional sensitivity to get the votes. Benjamin proposed that history is the accumulation of past ruins, even the angel of history could not return to correct these wrongs. The strong wind forced the winds of history and angels Even though his/ her mind remained in the past s/he has to flap her wings to the future reluctantly. It is claimed that even God himself cannot correct the injustices experienced in the past (Benjamin, 1940). 208

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Therefore, these unclosed accounts of the past are diabolically sought today by new violent actors. There appeared so many questions to be answered. What do the main actors of terror want from ordinary people? Don’t they repeat the same mistake? What kind of logic can one think of attacking innocent children and ordinary people, unaware of the mistake made by their ancestors? The stories of victims and the stories of tyrants are disguised in the dusty pages of history. Songs, hidden and untold stories, the fresh narration of the events, and alternative ways of representations fulfill the counter-terrorism acts. We can likely mourn the lost by commemorating the victims, keeping the events alive by telling stories, and doing various activities in the digital media? Mourning practices should not be considered as a crime a crime-like activity allowed by the official authorities, the painful stories passed on by previous generations provide an opportunity to discharge its heavy load. Social engineering requires allowing ceremonies, protests to reduce the excessive pressure of this pressure cooker. As we all witnessed, the world is haunted by a terrible ghost called terrorism. After September 11, terrorism has been one of the most serious problems in the world which have expanded in scope and severity over time. Terrorism can be held in three areas physical, media, and public opinion. They are correlated directly with each other. To understand the complexity of terrorism, we need to focus on each of them (Tulga, 2020). There are countless violent stories from the past that can be counted as old terrorism. The capital punishment of Socrates, the assassination of Caesar, John F. Kennedy, Bobby Kennedy, and many more can be accepted as the old form of terrorism. Some terrorists are caught, judged, and sent to prison for their deeds. Redemption can be given to those who felt regretful for their events. For example, St. John Paul II showed his mercy and forgave his would-be assassin Mehmet Ali Ağca. When they met, the discourse of this meeting was very interesting. Agca asked him “Why aren’t you dead?”. John Paul II had a strong belief in the Blessed Mother that she guided the bullet that struck for him and missed the target. He forgave Agca and said that redemption is always greater than man’s sin and the ‘sin of the world.’ (Boyle, 2018). This discourse can set a good example that even criminals and killers can be given a chance for redemption. On the other hand, redemption is a very heavy meal for many people. It takes time to digest some mistakes, assassins, extermination, and murders. Sometimes nobody forgives anybody. Take the example of Bobby Kennedy’s murderer Sirhan who was pardoned after 53 years of imprisonment. Michael Moore here questions his release and criticizes the criminal justice system by arguing that the justice system is not only about justice. It is something that ought to monitor and prevent crimes to protect society. Sending those people to prison was not to rehabilitate them, not for revenge, not even to punish them. However, as argued, prisons don’t function well as they are supposed to make us safer. They are the places that keep the convicts away from there. Sirhan is no exception. Michael Moore believed that Sirhan must have kept away from society because he didn’t kill Bobby Kennedy in a random act of passion. His murder was a pre-premeditated politically motivated one (Moore, 2021). The key idea here is the digestion of some violent, horrible, and cruel deeds are beyond the scope of the justice system. There are some events to be pardoned and many not in the eyes of the people. The methodology of redemptions and the discourse to build a better world free from violence and terror are beyond the scope of this study. The redemption policies for a peaceful society and its sustainability should be inherent and internalized all over the world. Counterterrorism activities, therefore, should carry widespread and correlated perspectives that include the re-narration of history, the peaceful dis209

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course in conventional and digital media, Last but not least, the dominant peace mindset that praises freedom, equality, and fraternity of subjects and people’s in all over the world must be internalized in public opinion. They are correlated directly with each other. To understand the complexity of terrorism we need to focus on each of them (Tulga, 2020).

In Search of Sustainable Peace in the Age of Metaverse Sustainable Peace is the substitute for Perpetual Peace which was delineated by Immanuel Kant. Since Kant, the history of the world has undergone a series of changes. However, it is ironic that everybody plunged into the world of metaverse without having solved the problems of the past. Metaverse and violence are beyond the scope of this study but what is certain now is that the world has transformed drastically and these changes are supposed to invoke better alternatives for human beings. As “Homo Ludens”, we human beings are just players (Huizinga, 2006). Using that definition, a unique world, free from violence, should offer its players a play where the rules are meticulously written well and just. In present circumstances, the players are not playing life on equal terms. This is not fair game. The idea of equality and sustainable peace seems so far-fetched from the reality that we need to analyze what is wrong with human beings particularly when it comes to ending terrorism. If history repeats itself, we have already signs of a dystopic future from the lens of the present time. While we are now busy with cutting-edge and controversial innovations in 2021 such as metaverse, avatars, and transhumanism, the future does not seem so bright. Therefore, it takes systematic and collective togetherness to establish new politics for a better world design. The idea of justice all over the world may sound like a cliché and a romantic ideal, however, the lessons of the past should teach us to stop the injustice. So the aim of the fight should be not to win a war, get soil, or reach wealth. The axiom of the fights should immediately be diverted towards injustice. People should fight against the belief that one nation, one people, one race, one gender, or one species has the right to dominate, control, use and exploit another with impunity (Phoenix, 2020). The priority of sustainable peace ought to be on the agenda of the leaders and the daily life routines of ordinary people. As counter-terrorism activities, it would be wise to search and promote new sociological ways and historical approaches to healing the wounds of people. What is certain here is that nothing will be achieved with naïve random and sporadic acts against organized hatred, grudge, and systematic wickedness. To heal the wounds of the past, to rekindle the passion for a better world, the violence inherent in human beings must be analyzed in terms of its motives, conditions, and forces. A healthy society breeds a healthy population.

Surveillance for Counter-Terrorism September 11, 2001 attacks, was a historical turning point that has a tsunami-like effect all over the World. When the attacks happened in New York, the videos and the photos depicting the planes plunging into the towers and their final collapse were shocking. People witnessed the commencement of a new era in terms of terrorism. This was not taken as an ordinary attack; it was a very well-prepared attack. It was a real trauma for many Americans. A super country that defines itself as the only super country in the world has serious security deficiencies. This feeling of vulnerability towards terrorism, challenge the politicians, lawmakers, and American citizens. These attacks could have been prevented before they had 210

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happened. As a result of this safety lack, The USA Congress passed the Patriot Act after September 11 to prevent future terrorist attacks. So, the Patriot Act is believed to protect people from diabolic acts of terrorism What is certain here is that global terrorist networks work in a very professional way (Public Law, 2001). However, following sophisticated terrorists is a challenging job. They easily evade detection. So, international terrorists are sophisticated and trained to thwart surveillance by rapidly changing locations and communication devices such as cell phones. On the other hand, while tracking terrorists they can be tipped off too early to an investigation, they might flee, destroy evidence, intimidate or kill witnesses, cut off contact with associates, or take other action to evade arrest. Therefore, we need to enhance our ability to prevent, investigate, and prosecute acts of terror. But in the mid of this stunning data flow and feeds, people voluntarily share their daily life, emotions, likes, dislikes, and open their private life to the public. It is inevitable to escape from the dark side of the web which consists of millions of synoptical gazes collecting and classifying data.

The Dataveillance and Deep Web for Counter-Terrorism As a type of surveillance, dataveillance is described as the systematic monitoring of one’s digital actions or communications which is quite different from typical surveillance as here instead of following people physically, their data are closely and systematically monitored. We can classify two types of dataveillance as personal and mass dataveillance (Clark, 1994). Since social media and digital activities dominate the way we communicate and live. It is much more logical to follow people’s digital footprints that they left and scrutinize their twin data. Dataveillance or metadata can simply be described as monitoring people’s digital activities. National and international cybersecurity services have to take all digital correspondences into account and profile people. However, the surveillance activities can turn to a social sorting as labeling people according to their social and economic categories. Coding and organizing personal data can influence and manage people and populations. Lyon argues that information itself can be the means of creating divisions. Such categories would carry consequences (Lyon, 2003: 2). Naturally, these dataveillance or metadata activities can create little hells for many people (Lyon, 2003: 17-77). In addition to this, dataveillance as counterterrorism has much more validity for contemporary terrorists. Within the new paradigms of surveillance practices particularly on social media and other digital platforms, dataveillance can be used to collect information for suspected ones and especially people with hidden agendas. To track the potential malicious use of digital media, both local and international communities gather to increase awareness to collaborate cooperation. Pursuing digital technologies for security reasons to detect demonic aims has risen new arguments that those activities can be seen as trespassing the rights of privacy and freedom of communication. Amidst uncertainty, we still cannot predict what outcomes will come especially in terms of privacy violations. People are volunteer to give up their liberty for security. But, these temporary solutions cannot sort the problems out at the core. Lyon called them blanket solutions for the politics of terrorism (Lyon, 2003: 79-80). However, following people through their data is not easy as there is an unknown number of hidden networks, called the Deep Web. The dark world of anonymity has a dangerous side. Communicating secretly free from being gazed at by the authorities attracts many people. But we cannot escape from the 211

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malicious use of AI by terrorists or criminals via the Dark Web. They could afford to hire the smartest hackers to realize their dark aims. Despite all the worst scenarios, we still need AI for counter-terrorism as in this digital culture, we have to connect, communicate and act accordingly. Unfortunately, we are mostly baffled by the speed of the technology and can lose the ability to keep pace with the AI algorithms to make rational and reasonable decisions (Pearce, 2013, p. 11-19).

THE ROOTS OF EVIL AND TERROR The necessity to increase awareness towards violence or the potentiality of evil acts shapes the general frame and contents of the counter-terrorism acts. It would be too naive to have a different attitude towards organized malice. Any organized crime spirit has its own historical and geographical roots that pass from one generation to another. In the context of violence and chaos, counter-terrorism activities can function as the defense mechanisms of a body. Here the malicious aims to take revenge from the ancestors, accumulated grudges against certain cultures can be seen as cultural and social viruses that damage the healthy body. Here the metaphor of healthy and happy cultures in this digital age leads us to a future where the World has everything for the good deeds of humanity by underlying the positive sides of human traits. Cultures are vulnerable to revenge heritages. Like the genetics grudge, suffering and revenge codes may have been transferring from one generation to another. The roots of the many problems are not coming from a sudden decision to kill or destroy others but a long and accumulative desire of taking the revenge of the past. To start with a clean slate in a world without having any transferred grudge or anger takes different cultural, sociological, and geographical conditions. When we look back to the history of terrorism, it actually goes back a very long time, but it was lost, ignored, or even altogether suppressed. This absence comes from the sporadic nature of terrorism. It did not appear at all times with equal intensity, there were periods relatively free of it (Laquer, 2016). As a result, for Laquer when terrorism reappeared after a period of relative calm there was the tendency to regard it as a new phenomenon, without precedent. The roots of bad spirits innated to the dark side of human beings caused thousands of wars following from one another. People killed each other sometimes without knowing the original aim. A reckless leader can finish millions of lives. Nietzsche called this situation the eternal recurrence cycle of violence. No matter how hard and violent the acts the world keeps turning, time passing, and even the loudest cry has been forgotten under the sky. Not finding any of these cries for help are sent to the dark depths of the universe. For Nietzsche, the eternal return, by exposing to us an affirmative attitude towards life which can free us from our rage and revenge against time (McNeil, 2021: 42). Nietzsche discusses that a psychologically affirmative attitude towards life can liberate and redeem the will of human beings. For him, the tyranny of the past and the human will’s ‘spirit of revenge’ harbor against its past. Such liberation enables the will to become an innocent and creative will to power. Nietzsche believes that the idea of eternal return changing our perception of time as we are situated in time will end our negative relation to time. We can reach a much more positive relationship with it. It follows that the thought of the eternal return will free us from our nihilism, and our anger and hatred that we hold against time (McNeil, 2021:42-100).

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The Ideology of Race and Logic of Exceptionalism The history of inequality generally stems from the dominant ideology of white supremacy. When a government started to discriminate the others, the logic of elimination is tied closely to the logic of exceptionalism. Hannah Arendt defines this logic as race thinking which is based on the idea of settlers as the chosen people. So, the so-called hierarchy of races constitutes many political constructions of knowledge (Kautzer, 2019). Therefore, the ideology of race owes some race-thinking associates such as dignity and importance of one race over another. This is mainly the cause of many rooted terrorist activities. That white supremacist ideology leads to race-thinking practices that feed anger, grudge, and vengeance among races, nations, and people. Freeing society from these outlooks, staying away from the apartheid policies, practices of racial segregation, and discrimination can clean the roots of many terror activities. Fearmongering can be a typical tactic used by many leaders to pull an audience and get high votes. To control and manage people, political leaders usually employ the existence of the enemy. Many states and countries use methods of exclusion such as forced migration, confinement, coercive assimilation, and mass killing using law and religion that was constructed by a racialized framework of citizenship and nationality. The violence they used is legitimized by the complex legal and religious structural systems. However, every activity has its conclusion reason, and outcome. Terror sympathizers are usually found by the members of the victims of these activities. Labeling normal people as terrorists ignores the reality of having a peaceful society. Social media surveillance is following one’s digital traces by chasing one’s twin data has shaped the many digital surveillance activities for counter-terrorism (Melgaço and Monaghan: 2018, 100).

Can We Start with A Clean Slate Free from the Ruins of the Past? Dealing with the unsolved crisis of history and collecting post-memory among the ruins of the past, particularly in digital habitus takes time and patience for sustainable peace. Conciliation, compromise, and peace politics particularly in the digital world have been the most neglected ways of counterterrorism acts. It is partly neglected because many of the deep-rooted human conflicts that seize our attention today are not ready for formal mediation and negotiation. In addition to these complicated situations, peace discourse is neglected because it is not easy to set a peace agreement with those who use violence and grudge as their activity (Cebeci 2012). It follows that to change the mindset of those people and heal the past wounds of certain communities is almost impossible because of the accumulated grudge and pain. Most people feel the burden of the tragedy of the previous generations on their shoulders and they usually need a place to discharge themselves. Here, everybody should feel the necessity to find a mutual aim to end violence. It is really hard to start with a clean slate for the people who are in charge of peace settlements. Peace lies behind the hills. To make it worse, terrorism is now everywhere. A terrorist attack can happen at any time and everywhere and it is not possible to escape from it. This wild and long past full of violence and terrorism brings us to a point where we need to pose the question of whether monitoring and surveillance practices are sufficient or convenient to prevent violence and terrorism in the long run.

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The surveillance and dataveillance practices are usually following the symptoms of the crazy and uncontrolled anger of those parts. However, tracking the mindset of those people or seeking the rationale and motivation of those terrorist attacks prove that there loomed constellations of past cases, unfair situations, past failures, losses, traumas, and tragedies of the past. To track the potential malicious use of the web, both local and international communities gather to increase awareness to collaborate cooperation. Pursuing digital technologies for security reasons to detect demonic aims has risen new arguments that those activities can be seen as trespassing the rights of privacy and freedom of communication.

Challenges of New Political Discourses for Peace To cope with the complicated terrorism situations and divert the psychology of terrorists from negative sides to positive ones requires wise, planned, and multifarious approaches that embrace both parts of sides. To achieve these, politicians must develop new discourses and agendas that include different kinds of protection paradigms. Therefore, it would be wise to foster sustainability of peace along with a philosophy of peace that should be activated to end the vicious cycle of violence and terrorism. The underlying reason for this study comes from the very idea that if we focus on the roots of violence and terrorism and offer alternative ways to end it, then, dataveillance can have a positive aim. In the same vein, for the sake of a much more democratic world, and the sustainability of peace all over the world, new political discourses and new narration platforms should be developed. In the same line, Nacos discusses the challenges of these peace initiatives by giving specific examples and concludes that these attempts should not be one-sided as each party must have the willingness to set their negotiation agenda and agree on a visible compromise. Implementation of the negotiated agreement, visible compromises, process of truth, and conciliation can have a chance to resolve the century-old conflicts. This mindset attempts to transform these terrorist acts’ motivation to kill wildly towards lasting, nonviolent, and political solutions (Nacos, 2019: 276). In addition to setting negotiation agenda, collective healing practices such as building peace and reconciliation discourses, particularly in digital media, which build bridges and heal the past wounds, surveillance cannot be even needed in the first step. In this context, dataveillance can be used to understand what motives and urges led the terrorists to plan, organize and commit their acts. Utilizing novel approaches to change those people’s minds, in the long run, is a very challenging process. It involves and correlates psychological, political, and sociological aspects.

Films on Peace, Surveillance, and Terrorism The ethical discussions of using AI-based surveillance systems have attracted many sci-fi scenarios. For example, The series Omniscient shows us the danger of surveillance in a futuristic World. The plot of the series comes from the original surveillance question posed by the Roman poet Juvenal as Quis custodiet Ipsos custodes? The question is translated as “who will guard the guards?” (Harman, 2010). That emphasizes the dangerous side of surveillance. We need another high level to control the mechanism of surveillance to be protected from abuse or manipulation. It is our natural right to know who will protect us from the protectors. If like in the series, we allow the systems to invade our security by giving up our privacy, then we start losing control of our lives, and the freedom to taking decisions (Keller, 2020).

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In addition to this, there is also a deep-rooted fear that has still haunt us: the possibility that one-day machines become smarter than human beings (Baker, 2020). Counter-terrorism practices can be a beforehand punishment given to potential criminals. A year after September 11 attacks, Spielberg released the movie Minority Report whose plot and philosophy reflected the zeitgeist to free the world from the criminals. It depicts a future in Washington, D.C., in which people are arrested by a special police force. They work based on predictions that they will commit murders in the future (Minority Report). Digital tracking systems can have several ways to pursue that goal. On the other hand, if surveillance is used to gather and classify, dataveillance and labeling can function as counter-terrorism (Kuhn 2017). However, it would be a hot topic to label some people as potential criminals. In Minority Reports some people are labeled as potential criminals. This knowledge can easily give the right to execute those people before the very act of committing a crime. So violence, killings from the people who hold powers can prevent violent acts. Here the lens of the intelligence services focuses them. In the same vein, any kind of innocent demand to initiate a wave of peace among each side can be read as naivety. The Girl from Oslo narrates a story where a Norwegian diplomat reveals secrets to get her daughter out of ISIS captivity (Keller, 2021). The plot depicts and represents a world of people who once showed indifference to peace initiation and showed their sides. When they become the victim of terrorism, they start to realize the real face of the situation. This film is interesting as the younger generations in their twenties have no idea about the depths of violence and terrorism they are facing. Although they provide fresh solutions to the problems, it appears unrealistic and even silly. It takes courage to take the risk of being seen as silly, outdated, or romantic to find better ways to replace violence. Any peaceful system intrinsically carries the possibility of a future war. In the same line, as prophesied in the infamous Baghdad scene of the movie The Tiger and The Snow, we have learned nothing from centuries of wisdom. The reason for the wars is because the world started without men and it will finish without men.

Digital Media and New Discourses for Counter-Terrorism Terrorism and Media have always been correlated with each other. The media has been considered are responsible for highlighting terrorism. For that reason, modern terrorism is conjunct to media terrorism. The extreme form of violence has an information value and therefore deserves to be reported. Unfortunately, this approach has been exploited by today’s terrorists and they made their voice heard all over the world (Jařab, 2005). It is thought that terrorism was always, to a large extent, about public relations and propaganda. And upon technological revolution terrorism change its nature by digitalizing it as cyberterrorism. The more it digitalized the more the nature of terror changed from a physical one to a psychological one. It affects people’s minds and causes panic. So this is their new weapons and threat, come into play (Tutar, 2019). Modern terrorism has been considered media terrorism. The media are attracted by extreme terrorist acts not only because they must report on any major event but also because the dramatic and spectacular aspect of terrorism fascinates the general public. Today’s terrorists exploit this and act in a way that will attract maximum attention around the world. Terrorism should not affect the importance of freedom of expression and information in the media as one of the essential foundations of a democratic society. This freedom carries with it the right of the public to be informed on matters of public concern, including terrorist acts and threats, as well as the 215

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response by the state and international organizations to them. The fight against terrorism should not be used as an excuse by states to restrict the freedom of the press. As far as journalists are concerned, they should avoid playing into the hands of the terrorists by restricting the dissemination of graphic photos and over-sensational information. Online surveillance of social movements is also a relatively new phenomenon that, we will argue here, was still in an early moment of development during the period analyzed. It seems that it takes time to develop online tactics that present practices that are bound to the subjacent political and ideological evolution of control practices (Blay, 2013; Benedicto, 2015). As Umberto Eco stated in his book Inventing the Enemy, the existence of an enemy is essential for many authorities to control and govern the masses (Eco, 2012). So, the language of the leaders is a potential weapon to manipulate, explode, or abuse the situation. Counter-terrorism should be implemented in the discourse of the leaders and politicians pursuing them to have positive discourse. Their word naturally reflects the values and assumptions to form a hostile climate. The fight for terrorism starts in the language. This is called terror language which serves the purposes of propaganda. So, language comes before logic. Emotional war paves the way for the actual fight for terrorism (Steuter and Wills, 2008). Our language shaped the way we frame everything; the war, our public debate. Steuter and Wills warned us to be careful the way we use language as the actual war starts in the language we use. When we select and report only certain facts, through overlooking or distorting others of equal relevance, through the associations, we conjure to describe our opponents, we neglect or invalidate genuine discussion and debate, and promote instead public hysteria, panic, and witch hunts. In the end, we confront the misrepresented and confused enemy who is never understood. In a similar vein, as Daniel Dafoe reported “there were a hundred thousand people who are ready to fight to the death against someone without knowing whether he was a man or a horse”. The mirror of language, thus, ultimately reflects us both the constructed image of the other, and also, something of ourselves (Steuter and Wills, 2008).

Digital Media Narration for Perpetual Peace and Redemptive Discourse Digital media for peaceful purposes can reach millions of people very quickly. The situation is hopeless. Dataveillance may be here used to monitor the words and shares used by potential criminals. So what happens if we point these lenses towards the content? The content date may have a different spelling. Maybe we can find the healing power of the internet if we make dataveillance something that gives data to new forms of discourse. So how can these types of digital narratives be used? Although the emergence of a new narrative language in digital media is not taken as seriously as official history or documentaries as a type of popular culture narrative that is considered ephemeral and informal, it is now taken into account by legislators. These photographs present visuals and narrative language that will contribute to peace, climate problems, human rights, freedom, and equality conditions to reinterpret and even reshape history. The high-impact, appealing visuals and highly manipulated images in which the events are told also include alternative truths. In this respect, Ricoeur approaches the narrative history approach cautiously. Ricoeur stated that the temporality of societies and the temporality of individuals are different from each other, so there are two different narratives. The story and narrative language are different from the narratives in practical life for history and from literary narratives in many ways (Delice, 2011). The mission of digital media should be to build peace and end the war. However, the pervasive use of hatred speech leads us to ignore the use of digital media for better purposes. Social engineering and mind manipulation is data repository to be used for peace, not war. The contents of 216

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the digital media narrations of the past play a big role to create a peaceful discourse. The mind of the people should never be left free of control. Coercive mind control methods and techniques reprogram the thought and reshape beliefs (Jones, 2015).

SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Kant’s Perpetual Peace Helene Cixous defines Kant’s texts as the monuments of the soul. We will never forget them as they have proved that they are still valid and political. His texts became like small biblical manifestos for a better humanity. They are indelible (Cixous, 2012). Similarly, Senneth asked whether Kant was a philosopher of the peacefulness of rest or a philosopher of a much more active engagement. He concludes that he is probably more on the side of active peace. Senneth deduces that the issue Kant raises about peace allows us to substitute the ivi sustainable for perpetual related mostly to civil society (Sennneth, 2012). For Kant, true politics are expected to pay respect to morality. Politics by itself is a difficult art, as it must work with morality, therefore, for perpetual peace, the union of morality and politics should never be parted even they conflicted. Therefore, he underlines two important doctrines. First, the civil constitution of every state should be republican. Second, a cosmopolitan federation as the legal obligations, in the end, should protect the citizens’ freedom internally and cosmopolitan peace. Here, to reach a perfect order, general laws must be harmonized with the freedom of citizens. The power of authority over law, as in phrased in Latin as auctoritas non-veritas facit legem, then, should be controlled (Habermas, 1991). In summary, Kant sees publicity as the one principle that could guarantee the convergence of politics and morality. For him, the public sphere can function as the principle of the legal order and as the method of enlightenment (Habermas, 1991). Perpetual peace is highly related to the context of this paper as a counter-terrorism approach. Therefore, the dream of a world without war and violence, Kant needs to be re-read over and over in this postmodern world. His words resonate freedom of human beings and guide us through the methodology of right thinking to set a peaceful world. For him tutelage, authority over someone, hinder people to think freely so enlightenment can be reached mostly by the public sphere as he denotes: “For any single individual to work himself out of the life under tutelage which has become almost his nature is very difficult. But that the public should enlighten itself is more possible; indeed. If only freedom is granted, enlightenment is almost sure to follow.” (Habermas, 1991: 60). Within the context of counterterrorism, the algocracy seems like a new ideal type for government organizations. It is the newest version of professional bureaucracy that reduces and quantifies the uncertainty of decision-making processes. It is different from the infocracy that uses technology to improve the machine bureaucracy. The algocracy rationalizes the exercise of rational-legal authority in the professional bureaucracy. The transformation of government bureaucracy in the ‘age of algorithms’ is borrowed by Max Weber’s ideal type which is a thought construct that entails the main, symptomatic characteristics of an empirical phenomenon, and therefore it can be used to understand and explain cultural developments (Lorenza, et.al. 2021). The existence of algocracy and its function must be taken into account not for dealing with the standardization of work but the artificial advice based on data analysis. There is a dominant fear that the rise of algocracies will undermine our freedom. Danaher based his argument on the threat of epistocracy and 217

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use the term the ‘threat of algocracy’. The nature of the threat in algocracy can be fought by resistance and accommodation. However, there appears no ultimate solution unless we value social decision-making. The discussion denotes that decision-making processes in algocracy constrain and limit opportunities for human participation (Danaher, 2020).

Peacebuilding Public Spheres in The Age of Algocracy In addition to these detecting practices, public spheres in the digital world can be developed. “Public sphere”, introduced by Habermas as new discourse and speech platforms that can open new ways and opportunities to increase sustainable peace. This sphere can open algocracy where the complicated dynamism of terrorism should be fought in diplomatic and communicative ways. Here, for Habermas, no problem will be unsolved if you use proper communication. (Habermas, 1991). In the digitalized world, the general loss of meaning in the social field drags the mass into a sense of numbness. Therefore, the implosion of meaning has changed the structure of the social sphere in digital culture. Many of the deep-rooted human conflicts that seize our attention today are not ready for formal mediation and negotiation. People do not negotiate about identity, fear, historic grievance, and injustice. Sustained dialogue provides a space where citizens outside government can change their conflictual relationships (Saunders, 1999). Understanding the historical evolution of terrorism and the terrorist mindset requires meticulous study that embraces history, present age, and countless dynamics. Unstable situations in international relations convey new adversaries, motivations, strategies, and tactics. Hoffman here takes our attention to the factors that lead to sustaining terrorist movements instead of sustaining peace (Hoffman, 2017). Reaching sustainable peace is like walking on the thin ice, as many steps and dynamics play a big role. For Lederach for peacebuilding, we need to get marrying wisdom, insight, and passion. This can be realized only by moving beyond “traditional” diplomacy, which often emphasizes top-level leaders and short-term objectives. Therefore, we need a holistic approach that includes wider participation in the process such as peacemakers, long-term perspectives, and an infrastructure that empowers resources within a society and maximizes contributions from outside. It takes wise and pragmatic approaches to search for the dynamics of contemporary terrorism and reach an integrated framework for peace (Lederach, 1998).

Sustainable Peace from Deliberative Democracy to Algocracy For sustainable peace, the society and the governing system must have inclusive approaches like in deliberative democracy which is a form of democracy in which deliberation is central to decision-making. People vote their decision to reach a consensus which means majority rule. It is important for the content of the study as it is different from traditional democracy. Authentic deliberation is more than the act of voting. Deliberative democracy is, therefore, considered as the conglomeration of representative democracy and direct democracy (Bächtiger, et.al 2018). Deliberative democracy recognizes a conflict of interest between the citizen participating, those affected or victimized by the process being undertaken, and the group entity that organizes the decision. As discussed above, it is a challenging standpoint to offer a system that can work just and fairly for the whole people all over the world. In the counter-terrorism context, political discourse and the system can employ cutting-edge approaches for the benefit of human beings. By wisely utilizing the technological 218

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advances of the cyber era, a system of algocracy coded by approaches of sustainable peace, the modern substitute of perpetual peace can create a utopia on this planet Earth. This approach and aim will shape the ways of using dataveillance for counterterrorism. The possibility of being governed by positive logic rather than resentment, which was anger and accumulated anger, can open a new cultural and digital oasis. The problems that do not end for centuries are leaving all the weight of history to the new generation. This is trying to get rid of this heavy burden. Dreaming sustainable peace is not naivety, not stupidity, but a very noble request (Baker, 2020). The discussions on algocracy are shaped by three major questions. The first problem rotates on privacy and surveillance issues (Polonetsky & Tene, 2013). Here, Big Data plays an immense role by having updated algorithms. Sorting and developing data use machine learning algorithms that require mass surveillance. Naturally, this always poses a threat to privacy. The second question related to algocracy is the debate about bias and inequality. People are classified according to their credit scores. Recorded patterns in large databanks of past behaviors are used to guess and predict future behaviors. However, we are skeptical about these databanks. The classification system and categories are drawn from databank are expected to be biased. People who are the outsiders of the system, then, would be the ones who would suffer from biased perspectives. Studies have been done trying to highlight the biases that arise in different domains, such as the apparent racial bias of the predictive policing and predictive sentencing algorithms that are widely used in the United States. The third question is on the debate about transparency and procedure. People are concerned about machine learning algorithms as they can be governed by dark and hidden agendas. Therefore a World without terrorism the ones who write the algorithms should carry perpetual peace algorithms (Danaher, 2020: 2) However, this is a challenging request as a historian, Harari warned not to underestimate human stupidity (TED, 2018). On a similar ground, Kant warned in his perpetual peace manifesto that “no conclusion of peace shall be held to be valid as such when it has been made with the secret reservation of the material for a future War” (perpetualpeaceproject, 2012).

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS Contrary to the current pessimistic and dystopic perspectives, this study proposes a better scenario for the future. If algorithms are inspired by the philosophy of perpetual peace by Kant and the redemptive discourse by Levinas determine the content of the system, there is still hope for humanity to form a new world system that is free from violence, war, and terror. This naivety to desire peace everywhere and for every nation must be imposed on the algocracy. A future without terrorism can only be designed by taking the lessons from the centuries of wisdom and the harsh realities of the past. Future academic studies on terrorism and a desire to build a convenient political system in this digitalized world, algocracy can provide the right answer for humanity if its content, methodology, and system are designed by the principles of Kantian perpetual peace.

CONCLUSION This study discusses the possibilities of algocracy for a better world and highlights that sustainable peace can be ultimately reached in a culture where perpetual peace and redemptive discourse are valid 219

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in the algorithms of algocracy. It is not possible to end the violence only with monitoring or surveillance activities. We need to take care and cure this old, wounded, and tired world. Putting on different lenses to search for a suitable approach to stop terrorism challenges the way politics and international benefits. The study tries to throw light on counter-terrorism which is expanded by the discussions on the roots of evil and terror. Prevention, monitoring, and any kind of surveillance can be futile if we do not analyze the roots of the evil and the main motivations that pave the way to violent terrorist acts. Here, the roots of terrorism are elementary to deal with the problem. Peace ought to be the priority of the leaders, ordinary people, and media. It would be wise to search and promote new sociological ways and historical approaches to healing the past wounds of people. What is certain here is that nothing will be achieved with naïve random and sporadic acts against organized hatred, grudge, and systematic wickedness. To heal the wounds of the past and to rekindle the passion for a better world, the violence inherent in human beings must be analyzed in terms of its motives, conditions, and forces. Contrary to the pessimistic and dystopic perspective, this study proposes a better scenario. If algorithms are inspired by the philosophy of perpetual peace by Kant and the redemptive discourse by Levinas determine the content of the system, there is still hope for humanity to form a new world system that is free from violence, war, and terror. This naivety to desire peace everywhere must be imposed on the algocracy. Therefore, if accomplished, this would be the ultimate salvation of human beings.

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Kulić, V. (2018). Orientalizing Socialism: Architecture, Media, and the Representations of Eastern Europe. Architectural Histories, 6(1), 1–6. doi:10.5334/ah.273 Laqueur, W. (1997). A history of terrorism. with a new introduction by the author. Little, Brown. Lederach, J. P. (1998). Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies Publisher. United States Institute of Peace. Lewis, J. (2005). Language Wars the Role of Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political Violence. Pluto Press. Lorenz, Meijer, & Schuppan. (2021). The Algocracy as a New Ideal Type for Government Organizations: Predictive Policing in Berlin as an Empirical Case. Information Policy, 26, 71–86. doi:10.3233/IP-200279 Lyon, D. (2003). Surveillance as Social Sorting. Privacy Risk and Digital Discrimination. Routledge. McNeil, B. E. (2021). Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence. Palgrave MacMillan. doi:10.1007/978-3-03055296-1 Melgaço, L., & Monaghan, J. (2018). Protests in the Information Age: Social Movements, Digital Practices, and Surveillance. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315212357 Moore, M. (2021). Bobby Kennedy, His Killer and a Conscience Confronted, what to do with Sirhan Sirhan? What to do with us? Retrieved December 21, 2021, from https://www.michaelmoore.com/p/ bobby-kennedy-his-killer-and-a-conscience Nacos, B. L., & Yaeli Bloch-Elkon Robert, Y. S. (2011). Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion. The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London. doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226567204.001.0001 O’Boyle, D.-M. C. (2018). Advent with Our Lady of Fatima. Sophia Institute Press. Pearce, A. (2013). Deep Web for Journalists: Comms, Counter-surveillance. http://perpetualpeaceproject.org/resources/ Phoenix, J. (2020). Oscar. Retrieved December 21, 2021, from https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=qiiWdTz_MNc&ab_channel=Oscars Public Law. (2001). Public Law 107–56—Oct. 26, 200, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act Of 2001. Retrieved November 2021. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf ReportsM. (2021). https://www.aclu.org/video/minority-report-meets-no-fly-list Saunders, H. H. (1999). A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts. London: Palgrave Macmillan US. doi:10.1057/9780312299392 Sennetth, R. (2012). Perpetual Peace Part 1. Defining Peace. Syracuse humanities. Retrieved December 21, 2021, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xMFdzWLdEM0&t=335s&ab_ channel=syracusehumanities Stephen, H. M. K. (2003). The Media and the War on Terrorism. Brookings Institution Press.

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Tarhan, N. (2010). Asimetrik Savaş & Politik Psikoloji. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. Tulga, A. Y. (2020, Summer). The Role of Mass Media in Terrorism and Its Effect on Individuals. İnsan & İnsan, 7(25), 47–64. doi:10.29224/insanveinsan.695346 Turner, B. S. (1994). Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism. Routledge.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Algocracy: Algocracy is a democracy based on algorithms and Artificial Intelligence. Dataveillance: The surveillance of digital data or digital identities, treats, and digital twins to detect the activities of people. Perpetual Peace: It is a type of peace developed by Kant. Redemptive Discourse: It is a discourse developed by Levinas, based on the philosophy of forgiving. Sustainable Peace: It is the updated version and substitute of Kant’s Perpetual Peace.

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Chapter 13

Performance of Virtual Terrorism in Cyber Space Farzaneh Ejazi Wise People Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM), Turkey

ABSTRACT In the 1980s, Barry Collin coined the term virtual terrorism. Nowadays virtual terrorism is very common all over the world. Virtual terrorism threatened computers, networks, and the information stored. Virtual terrorism makes new opportunity for terrorists such as hide identity, no geographical restrictions, international advertising and membership, and targeting more people. They hack into computers and mobile phones. Virtual terrorism can be controlled remotely. The variety and number of virtual terrorist attacks is enormous. Virtual terrorists use pseudonyms, and their true identities are not traced. Virtual terrorists do not want a lot of forces for their activities. Virtual terrorists just need laptops and Wi-Fi. In this research, the question is how virtual identity and internet are so essential for terrorists. In sociological studies, virtual identity is one of the most important and key issues. Virtual terrorists use this virtual and hidden identity to destroy a country’s infrastructure. They are sure that there are no borders or checkpoints in cyberspace.

INTRODUCTION Now days use the internet and novel technologies is more increased among terrorists and they can achieve their targets. Virtual terrorists usually have political targets. Virtual terrorism is happening in the 21st century very rapidly. Researchers, sociologists, practitioners, and scholars try to explore and analyze virtual terrorism in some aspects such as political, sociological, and psychological. In the present era, terrorists also use cyberspace and electronic gadget to exchange information, make a plan, do attacks, get funding, prepare equipment, information gathering, and find followers (Ponnusamy & Rubasundram,2019:159). As the modern world is relying on computers, social media, and networks to carry out day-to-day activities, these computers, social platforms, and networks have become increasingly the aim options for countries conducting spying or prevented operations, terrorist and criminal organizations, or simply DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch013

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 Performance of Virtual Terrorism in Cyber Space

hackers. The impact of cyber-attacks on a country, an organization, or individuals can be very cheap. So, network attacks are more and more complicated and unexpected (Lavigne & Gouin,2014:185). The origin of the term virtual terrorism can be to the early 1990s when the quick expansion in internet use and the discussion about appearing “information society” causes many studies on the possible hazards faced by the highly networked. (Weimann,2015:150). In the 1980 century, Barry Collin claimed the term virtual terrorism, who is research at the Institute for Security and Intelligence in California and . In the 1980s “virtual terrorism is the conjunction of terrorism and cyberspace” (Ogun, 2012: 208). Virtual space terrorism is a novel kind of terrorist activity in which aimed actors try to inflict severe damage without the use of a real-world destructive world. One of the most well-known researchers on virtual threats, the American Professor of information security “ Dorothy Denning, “Virtual Terrorism described as “Politically attacks that cause serious harms, such as severe economic unpleasant or sustained loss of power or water, could also be portrayed as Virtual Terrorism” (Ogun, 2012: 209). Virtual space was considered as a safe and suitable communication media until a few years ago has been belonged as a warfare interest by the US government. Governments and private organizations around the world unanimously understand cyber- attacks and damages as one of their huge harms (Rajivan et al,2013:1). Many articles and books explore the aspect of virtual terrorism in the political field but in this current chapter, this chapter explores how virtual identity and the internet are significant for virtual terrorism. We discuss and consider the dimension of sociological virtual terrorism, virtual identity, and the internet. On the other hand, some articles explore and use just political and psychological theories for this subject but in research has used sociological theories too and more focus on the sociological aspect. The research question in this article is how virtual identity and the internet are so vital for terrorists.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH There are extremely articles and books about virtual terrorism and cyberspace but all of them more focus on political dimensions and it is not related to this chapter but in the theories, I have pointed out. But this article try to examine the sociological aspect of virtual terrorism.

Theories In this article, I have used political, sociological, psychological theories. In the early 1990s, Ulrich Beck, “German sociologist said the term “risk society” to describe a society defined by the anticipation of disaster, stemming from an awareness of the unintended side effects of modernization. The Chernobyl nuclear incident, global financial crises, transnational terrorism, and mounting evidence of environmental degradation generated a realization that geographic distance no longer offered protection from far-flung hazards and disaster. Moreover, these hazards and disasters were increasingly understood to be selfinflicted the price that modern societies paid for progress. Modernization, as Beck said, has produced unanticipated and unintended side effects” (Kaminska, 2021). Based on Graham’s “point of view the internationalism of the Internet lies not merely in the fact that it connects people across nations, for many human devices and activities do this. The point is rather that the use and exploration of the Internet are wholly indifferent to international boundaries. People who are otherwise strangers are linked by common interests which have nothing to do with nationality. In this

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respect, the Internet is to be contrasted sharply with what philosophers call ‘civil society, whose characteristic is that it connects strangers by uniting them within one political rule or realm”(Graham,1999:46). In Graham’s “view, one of the most important features of the Internet is internationalism (Mousavi, 2017:196). Graham emphasizes that international relations so far have been mainly in the form of relations between governments, but with the formation of cyberspace, there is now a growing space of communication and cooperation between individuals and nations, so that governments, even in coordination with each other, They have little control over it” (Mousavi,2017:197). One recent contribution to modern social theory is “Manuel Castells with the overarching title The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Castells explores the emergence of a new society, culture, and economy in light of the revolution, beginning in the United States in the 1970s, in informational technology (television, computers, and so on)” (Ritzer,2011:569). At the heart of Castells’s “analysis is what he calls the information technology paradigm with five basic characteristics. First, these are technologies that act on information. Second, since information is part of all human activity, these technologies have a pervasive effect. Third, all systems using information technologies are defined by a “networking logic” that permits them to affect a wide variety of processes and organizations. Fourth, the new technologies are highly flexible, allowing them to adapt and change constantly. Finally, the specific technologies associated with information are merging into a highly integrated system” (Ritzer,2011:570). Based on John R. Suler, “virtual space is a psychological space. Suler has claimed eight aspects of cyberpsychology. These aspects including1. Identity, 2. Social, 3. Interactive, 4. Text, 5. Sensory,6. The reality,7. Temporal, 8. Physical aspect. Identity aspect includes self-presentation in a particular online environment” (Sartonen et al,2020:182). Mark M. Pollitt defines virtual terrorism as “the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents’’ (Pollitt,1998:8). Hua and Bapna “define virtual terrorism as “an activity implemented by computer, network, Internet, and IT intended to interfere with the political, social, or economic functioning of a group, organization, or country; or to induce physical violence or fear; motivated by traditional terrorism ideologies” (Broeders,2021:4). In summary, based on Manuel Castells and Graham internet as new technology is flexible and international. In modern eras as Beck reminds us the internet has hazards and we can see the performance of virtual terrorism in cyberspace do illegal activities.

Concept of Terrorism “Terrorism is not a novel phenomenon to the world but the modern era of terrorism has begun at the end of the twentieth century onwards. Terrorist organizations have very often started their terror activities around the world and beyond territorial boundaries. The world also came to know that the members of the terrorist organizations are using advanced technologies and innovative methods in their missions or processes’ (Hossain,2018:137). Claude Berrebi, however, “considered that the word ‘terrorism’ is wide and it may be difficult to define terror in the view of one country”. Claude Berrebi then “referred the definition which was provided by the US State Department as, the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated

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violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”(Hossain,2018:138). In 2017, Sociologist David Altheide “argues convincingly that terrorism not only is eroding the democratic basis of American Institutions but also creating a culture of entertainment revolving around the consumption of terrorism-related news. As Altheide reminds us without the fear of terrorism, Donald Trump would never reach the presidency”(Korstanje,2020:4). “Terrorism involves acts of violence and endangers human lives. Terrorism is intentional. To impose a demand on a group of civilians. Terrorism affects the policies of governments by force and threats. Terrorism wants to force the government to do something through kidnapping, assassination and murder” (Chomesky, 260:2002). “Terrorism is the threat of violence and the use of fear to force, persuade and attract people’s attention” (Williams, 2008:274). “Terrorism can be defined as the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups that otherwise have no official political power” (Giddens,1989:399). “Terrorism trends include terrorism and insurgency, internationalization, suicide terrorism, learning speed, media developments, targeting economic targets, mass casualties, and weapons of mass destruction” (Williams, 287-288:2008). “The word terrorism has a background in the French Revolution of 1789. Initially, thousands of aristocrats and later many other citizens were persecuted by the political authorities and given to guillotines” (Giddens,1989:402). “Terrorism became a perspective, orientation, and a discourse for ‘our time’, the way things are now, and how the world has changed” (Atheide,2009:67). “Surely, terrorism causes higher levels of anxiety and very well interrogates on our fears as never before. These days, terrorism has been commoditized, packaged and sold as a spectacle” (Karstanje,2020:9). In a brief, traditional terrorism is related to a political issues, political target, assassination, kidnapping and involves the act of violence and it will threaten human life in the real world.

Virtual Terrorism “Virtual terrorism is a generic term for various activities in cyberspace; it involves several different organizations, groups, and individuals”(Heickero,2014:554). “Virtual terrorism is a contested concept and more and more attention” (Broeders,2021:3). “Virtual terrorism happens in cyberspace and virtual terrorists use various tools, Which they operate from remote destinations, and various computers in different locations” (Tehrani & Manap,2013:690). Virtual terrorism is “generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Stohl,2006:230). Virtual terrorism can be termed as “The politically motivated use of computers and information technology to cause severe disruption or widespread fear” (Venkatachary et al, 2019:2). “Virtual terrorism has become popular in recent years and it is a global issue which involves the government of a country and worldwide organizations, especially with the rapidly developing technology and the increasing dependence of the human race on the internet and social media. Although virtual terrorism has been acknowledged as a major risk internationally, there does not seem to be an agreed or universal definition of virtual terrorism” (Ponnusamy & Rubasundram, 2019:159).

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Virtual terrorism is “the use of computer network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures (such as energy, transportation, government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population.” The premise of virtual terrorism is that as nations and critical infrastructure became more dependent on computer networks for their operation, new vulnerabilities are created – “a huge electronic Achilles’ heel” (Lewis, 2002:1). “Virtual terrorism is the use of cyberattacks to create terror incidents. The advantages of virtual terrorism are that it is cheaper and easier to carry out than a physical attack and can be done from remote locations outside of the state under attack. The disadvantages of virtual terrorism are the lack of dramatic loss of life and the visible threat that causes the desired terror. Virtual terrorists do use the internet to steal credit card numbers or valuable data to provide financial support for their operation” (Davis,2021:13). The term virtual terrorism unites two significant modern fears: fear of technology and fear of terrorism. Both fears are evidenced in this quote from Walter Laqueur, one of the most well-known figures in terrorism studies: “The electronic age has now made virtual terrorism possible. The conjunction of technology and terrorism make for an uncertain and frightening future” (Conway,2007:1). “These days virtual space provides for virtual terrorists’ new attack opportunity to inflict damages (Holbrook, 2015:121). Virtual terrorism means the person using online means to cause damage to inflict in pursuit of a special ideological agenda” (Holbrook, 2015:122). “Virtual terrorism refers to tactics aimed at disrupting a country’s crisis infrastructure” (Hafezniya, 2012:265). “Virtual terrorism is hacking an information system and it is bringing direst harm to infrastructures” (Janbek, 2011:11). “They hack into computers and mobile phones. Virtual terrorism has feathers such as: targeting people, use of internationally unknown computer groups, no geographical restrictions, hiding identity, international advertising, and membership, expanding the scope of terrorism to financial, banking, economic and municipal services issues. Virtual terrorism uses computer malware to advance their goals” (Hafezniya, 2012:267). “There are so many reasons that virtual terrorism is attractive to terrorists, including Virtual terrorists do not want a lot of forces for their activities, they need a personal computer and Wi-Fi connection to the Internet, like many Internet users terrorists use pseudonyms, and it is difficult for the police to trace the true identities of terrorists, They are sure that there are no borders or checkpoints in cyberspace and remain unknown, The variety and number of virtual terrorist attacks are enormous, Virtual terrorism can be controlled remotely” (Hafezniya, 2012:268). “Terrorists and other players may be developing methods and strategies to conduct large-scale digital attacks with deadly intent. Examples of possible targets include financial systems, civilian air traffic, health care, and energy systems such as nuclear power plants. This should be seen with the perspective that the costs of carrying out these kinds of operations continue to decrease”(Heickero,2014:556). “Cyber operations are carefully planned with a clear idea of aims and effects. Often only a few people need to be involved in such attacks, but the results may still be devastating. Virtual terrorists concentrate on civilian rather than military targets since they are much more vulnerable. Looking at the consequences for society, the effect is much greater. Additionally, there will probably be more media coverage of a civilian target. Virtual terrorists have changed their targets. The players have moved from generally quite simple methods to very rational, sophisticated, and purposeful behavior. One of virtual terrorism is al-Qaeda and their use of Information Technology to achieve their ideological and political aims” (Heickero,2014:557).

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Concept of Identity “Identity is a very broad, and ambiguous and unclear concept” (Buckingham,2008:1). “Identity has been an important focus for many disciplines, including sociology, philosophy, political theory, anthropology, gender studies, and psychoanalysis” (Vignoles,2017:1). The concept of identity holds an extensively explored and colorful history in sociology. The foundational work of Erik Erikson “regarding identity development in the 1950s”. In the most general sense, identity responses to the question of who am I (Nagy&Koles,2014:3). “With the advent of the Internet and the virtual world, online and remote interactions between humans have expanded, and therefore in the new situation, the identity and the way it is expressed have come to the attention of researchers with a new perspective in sociological studies, virtual identity and how it is created online is one of the most important issues” (Mousavi, 2017: 96). The sociologist Ervin Goffman “declared that people show themselves based on context and audience. When someone goes out with friends will act differently from they would in a job interview. As a matter of fact, Symbolic Interaction refers that we show ourselves slightly differently to different people. Identity is flexible and changeable” (Marwik, 2013:2). Anthony Giddens “is probably the best-known exponent of a broader argument about the changing nature of identity in what he terms “late modern” societies. Giddens argues that many of the beliefs and customary practices that used to define identities in traditional societies (such as those of organized religion) are now less and less influential. In this “post- traditional” society, people have to make a whole range of choices, not just about aspects such as appearance and lifestyle, but more broadly about their life destinations and relationships. They are offered a plethora of guidance on such matters by experts of various kinds and by the popular media (for example, in the form of lifestyle news, makeover shows, and self-help books), although ultimately the individuals are required to make these choices on their behalf”. As a result, Giddens “suggests, modern individuals have to be constantly “self-reflexive,” making decisions about what they should do and who they should be”. Giddens considers “identity as a fluid and malleable” (Buckingham,2008:9). Anthony Giddens “claimed identity as a project, something can be actively worked on. According to this point of view, people construct their identities through the media they consume” (Marwick,2013:3). Alice E.Marwick in her article (Online Identity) “points out that Identity in social media sites is often expressed through customization. People creating blogs, homepages, and online profiles can use a variety of digital tokens such as pictures, avatars, icons, nicknames, fonts, music, and video to represent themselves” (Marwick,2013:6). The philosopher Hubert Dreyfus is “concerns about the impact of the internet on identity and that is the problem of anonymity and nihilism when there is no physical connection” (Kirmayer et al, 2013:168).

Virtual Identity and Virtual Terrorism “Virtual terrorism uses fake IP addresses or anonymous ones to conceal their real location and actual identity. They have enough technological tools to pretend that the attack came from elsewhere”(Tehrani and Manap,2013:690). “The anonymity of perpetrators is often alleged as a core feature of Internet-based communication” (Brunst,2010:4). Mousavi suggested in his book (The Second World), “virtual world mainly consists of two categories of environments: text-based environments: text-based environments, simulated and visual 229

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environments, so virtual identity will have two main parts, which are textual identity and visual identity. Textual virtual identity is a collection of written information and signals that we present in interaction with others in cyberspace. Text virtual environments such as email, chat rooms, and Facebook. Visual identity is the same as real, graphic images, avatars, or animated characters. There is visual identities in simulated environments such as Skype, Second life, game net, virtual reality” (Mousavi, 2017:97). In sociological studies, virtual identities are one of the key issues (Mousavi, 2017:156). According to Mousavi “virtual identity is a conscious, hybrid, flexible, social, and masked identity. Anonymity in cyberspace makes rise to masked identity” (Mousavi, 2017:100). The main benefit of the virtual world is that of anonymity or controlled anonymity, which denotes the possibility for identities to show some correct information (Kultan & Schmidt,2012:23). When some articles were investigated, it seemed they did not straightforward research on Virtual Identity but it pointed anonymity of the Internet. The origin technologies such as social media, blogging, virtual places, and communities make cyberspace (Kirmayer et al,2013:167). The Internet offers so many opportunities to terrorists and one of them is the anonymity of communication (Ogun, 2012: 205). CIA, “said that the Internet allows terrorists to work remotely and anonymously to attack huge damage (Benson, 2014: 298). Anonymity allows violent groups to carry out their acts with relative impunity by dividing their operational wing from their propaganda wing” (Benson, 2014: 299). Anonymity is the essential importance of clandestine processes like transnational terrorism (Benson, 2014:302). Al-Qaeda “is known in ways of acting anonymously on the internet to conceal their activities. In the planning for September 11, they used the internet and e-mails to a high degree. For instance, communications between the terrorist cells inside and outside the US were based on internet telephone applications. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of the brains behind the attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC), communicated with at least two of the hijackers via special internet chat software. Computers found in Afghanistan show that al-Qaeda collects information on targets via the internet” (Heickero,2014:264). “The anonymity is so attractive for terrorists. Because of their extremist beliefs and values. Terrorists need anonymity to exist and operate in social environments that may not agree with their ideological views or their activities. The internet provides this anonymity, universal access with the options of posting messages, sending emails, or uploading or downloading information” (Weimann, 2015:21). “Virtual terrorism is more anonymous than traditional terrorist method. Like many internet surfers, terrorists use online nicknames or log on to a website as an unidentified guest user, and makes it harder for security agencies and police forces to track down their real identity” (Weimann, 2015:153). Koehler claimed that “The internet provides a perceived constraint-free space and anonymity. This provokes or motivates individuals to speak or act out more radically online as they would normally do offline”(Bertram,2016:231). “The virtual terrorists hide their true identity and activities, including using the anonymous protection of the Deep and Dark Web, hiding behind religious and other non-profit oriented bodies, etc” (Ponnusamy & Rubasundram,2019:159). “The anonymity of attacker makes it difficult to identify and prosecute the intruder as numerous geographical and legal restrictions are challenged” (Ponnusamy & Rubasundram,2019:160). “A crucial characteristic of Virtual terrorism that needs to be addressed is its borderless exposure, anonymity and reduced risk, which in turn motivates the terrorist” (Ponnusamy & Rubasundram,2019:161).

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Internet and Virtual Terrorist “Virtual terrorists could also take advantage of the Internet to steal credit card numbers or valuable data to prepare financial support for their operations” (Lewis,2002,8). The Internet is a new thing, and new things can appear more hazards than they are(Lewis,2002:12). Users in communities see cyberspace more in terms of cyber places where they “have strong interpersonal feelings of belonging, being wanted, obtaining important resources, and having a shared identity” (Jordan,2009:204). Cyberspace sense, “cyberspace is a system of social relations, even if many of the participants in those relations are technological or nearly automated. It is therefore constituted by a large range of articulatory practices. Cyberspace encompasses all forms of networked digital activities; this includes the content of and actions conducted through digital networks” (Wills and Ashenden,2012:111). In 1999, Lesig argues “that cyberspace is not one single type of space but, rather, many places, with a divergent range of values and norms. Spaces express their norms and values through their” (Wills and Ashenden,2012:112). “The Internet has had a transformative effect in modern societies, becoming an empowering tool for individuals and growing indispensable part of citizens’ lives. Amongst its many positive features, it permits the sharing of knowledge and information to a previously unthinkable degree, permits long-distance communication between individuals, facilitates the growth of online communities of similarly thinking people, and constitutes a huge engine of economic growth. Yet, like any technology, the Internet also has negative ramifications, such as its effectiveness as a platform to conduct illegal activities, including terrorism” (Argomaniz,2014:251). “The internet provides terrorists with a platform with which to reach a mass audience and an important means of fundraising. Also, it provides terrorists with much greater direct control over their message compared to the traditional television and print media” (Anderson,2003:25). Information technology has arguably become the signature phenomenon of the contemporary historical moment; today one-third of the planet’s population has access to the Internet (Warf et al,2015:2). For example,” the Internet has affected several aspects of the terrorism enterprise in the United States: radicalization, communication, organization, and the gathering of information” (Mueller & Stewart,2015:176). Although it is known that “virtual terrorists already routinely use the Internet for purposes such as spreading propaganda or conducting internal communication”(Brunst,2010:1). Terrorists use the Internet to achieve their goals. The Internet makes a special arena for virtual terrorism. Since the late 1980s, “the Internet has proven to be a highly dynamic means of communication, reaching an ever-growing audience worldwide. The development of rising complicated technologies has created a network with a truly global reach and relatively low barriers to entry. Internet technology makes it easy for an individual to communicate with relative anonymity, quickly and effectively across borders, to an almost limitless audience. The benefits of the Internet technology are numerous, starting with its unique suitability for sharing information and ideas, which is recognized as a fundamental human right” (United Nations Office,2012:3). The contemporary western societies created internet and communicate many of internet users around the world. This universal network is such a service platform for share news, debate, ideas, interests and opinions. Internet is a powerful tool for international terrorism. Terrorists consider social networks including: Twitter, Facebook and YouTube have possibilities to reach their goals since the beginning of the 21st century (Galily et al, 2016:7). Many scholars believe that the Internet has an important key role for terrorists (Hunter &El, 2020:2013).

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Terrorists gradually are using the Internet as a tool of communication and interaction (Ogun, 2012:204). “Nowadays Internet is the most tremendous tool for Virtual Terrorism” (Ogun, 2012: 213). One of the developments in militant movements has been their use of new media to propagate their actions, develop their aims, and convey their complaints to the people. Old media such as television in combination with new media such as the internet, mobile phone, broadband, and DVDs have all made these aspects more effective (Williams, 2008: 285). “New media technologies, internet, and computer-mediated communication permit terrorists more freely and easily to transmit messages. Terrorists consider the internet as a significant and essential communication platform. Because internet is cheap and universal communication tool and they can enrich and boost their communication strategies” (Weimann, 2015:17). “The network of computer-mediated communication is ideal for terrorists-as-communicators: it is decentralized, it cannot be subjected to control or limitation, it is not censored, and it let access to anyone who wants it. Websites are only one of the internet’s services used by contemporary terrorism; there are many other facilities in cyberspace— e-mail, chat rooms, e-groups, forums, virtual message boards—that are used more and more by terrorists. Thus, for example, Yahoo! has become one of Al Qaeda’s most important ideological bases of operation. They utilize several aspects of the Yahoo! service, including chat functions, e-mail and, most importantly, Yahoo! Groups” (Weimann,2011:769). The use of the social media platforms by the terrorist organizations has been expanding significantly, becoming one of the essential ways of communicating, rec and trading with the members and followers of such terror organizations among the world (Hossain,2018:137). Social media is a group of internet or cyber-based applications that let the creation of user-generated content, such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, etc. However, blogs are the earliest form of social media (Hossain,2018:138). Terrorists and terror groups are using social media and other Internet or cyber platforms in many ways, particularly for the aim of operational communication, intelligence gathering, technical information sharing, and training, etc. Since 1999, the advent of terror groups on the Internet has been observed and their activities on several forums, such as al-falluja, al-fidaa, al-shmukh, blogs, and other social media platforms, are consistently extending (Hossain,2018:140). Terrorists depend on social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, Chat rooms, and Youtube (Weimann, 2015:18). Terrorists use online message and Chat rooms to share their information (Weimann, 2015:19). By 2014 many rebels in Iraq and Syria were using Twitter as a platform for propaganda, with strange rebels often retweeting already tweeted comments. Twitter is cheap, easy to use, and tweets can now contain images as well as text and links to other platforms. Tweets can easily be forwarded to all members of an address list (Howells,2019:16). Professor Weimann, states that 90% of organized terrorism on the Internet is being done through the channels of social media. He further states that with the internet being borderless, it is very easy for them to recruit new members without geographical limitations. The terrorist organizations are not restricting themselves to Twitter; in ten years of research Weimann has found their activities in many social media areas such as chat rooms, Myspace, Facebook, YouTube and others”(Howells, 2019:19). Terrorists reach out to possible members with friend requests, upload videoes, and introduce issues in chat rooms. Some users do not check who they are making friends with, so it is easy for terrorists to in filter many other groups (Howells, 2019:20). Social media like blogs and sites need users and people to self -consciously make virtual depictions of themselves and post (Marwick, 2013:1). Social Media refers to the interaction among people and youth in which they create, exchange and share up- to- date ideas and information in a virtual areas 232

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(Weimann,2015:126). Facebook is the world’s largest social network, user’s create a personal profile and account, add other users as friends, and exchange messages and communicate with each other. Twitter is a social networking platform that lets groups and individuals stay connected and exchange information (Weimann, 2015:127). Terrorists have three essential reasons to use these platforms are by far the most popular area for the audience in an extending digital age. Second, social media prepare a user reliable and friendly service for free. Third, the older version of terrorist websites effectively was waiting for fans to arrive (Weimann,2015:128). Evan Hohlmann, a virtual terrorism expert, “argued that ninety percent of the terrorist activity on the internet takes place using social networking tools”(Hossain,2018:141). Rising numbers of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria(ISIS) and Al-Qaeda, have used the Internet as a media to develop their cause and carry out terrorist processes. The groups had effectively collected the large number of fans, donors, and supporters due to its powerful propaganda’s; particularly reaching out to youths desires for aim (Ponnusamy & Rubasundram,2019:159). The harms of attacks escalate as the expanding of online users is constantly rising. The hazards of cyber-attacks increase along with the quick development of computer technology (Ponnusamy & Rubasundram, 2019:163).

METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION According to Graham’s point of view, the internet is internationalism so there are no borders. Cyberattacks being costly, network attacks are increasing more and more. With the increase of using Wi-Fi and the internet vast of people inform about acting virtual terrorism on the other hand virtual terrorists have a virtual identities and no one gets to know them. Virtual terrorism is mixed with terrorism and cyberspace and it has political and economic harms. But on the other hand, it has sociological harms too such as hiding identity and reaching out to youth. They can make a nickname for themselves so anonymity in the internet and connection is the most opportunity for them. In The 21 century cyberspace is a perfect and interesting space for youth and teenagers because virtual terrorism has used social media therefore couple of youth and teenagers absorbed and followed them. Virtual terrorism is reaching more followers. Internet and virtual identity are flexible and both of them are useful tools for virtual terrorism. Virtual terrorism is international and can adopt with the internet and do not need the border. Virtual terrorism and terrorism both involve groups and individuals in the 21century. But virtual terrorism become a global issue and involve the government of the country due the increase in social media and the internet. Virtual terrorism is using visual identity such as YouTube and uploading videos but they are using more texted based environment such as Facebook, chat rooms, emails, and Twitter so they have a textual virtual identity. For example, Al-Qaede was using textual virtual identity due to using emails and chat rooms and collecting information. They expand their network and find more audiences. Al-Qaede and ISIS have used the internet to collect donors and followers and do illegal activities. Internet and cyberspace in the 21 century is a perfect arena for virtual terrorism to act. Based on review articles and books, the internet is so helpful and useful for virtual terrorism because the internet is faster, easier, and cheaper for them and makes a great opportunity for terrorists. We explore sociological aspects of virtual terrorism, the internet, identity, and virtual identity. Internet and virtual identity let virtual terrorists be more flexible and anonymous. Anonymously is a major key and sociological aspect of virtual terrorism. 233

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REFERENCES Anderson, A. (2003). Risk, Terrorism, and the Internet. Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 16(2), 24–33. doi:10.100712130-003-1023-7 Argomaniz, J. (2014). European Union Responses to Terrorist use of the Internet, Cooperation and Conflict. Sagepub. Atheide, D. (2009). Terrorism Programming. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2(1), 65–80. Benson, D. C. (2014). why the Internet is Not Increasing Terrorism. Security Studies, 23(2), 293–328. doi:10.1080/09636412.2014.905353 Bertram, L. (2016). Terrorism, the Internet and the Social Media Advantage: Exploring how terrorist organizations exploit aspects of the Internet, Social Media and hoe these same platforms could be used to counter-violent extremism. Journal for Deradicalization. Broeders, D., Cristiano, F., & Weggemans, D. (2021). Too Close for Comfort: Cyber Terrorism and Information Security across National Policies and International Diplomacy, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Routledge. Brunst, P. W. (2010). Terrorism and the Internet: New Threats Posed by Cyberterrorism and Terrorist Use of the Internet. In M. Wade & A. Maljević (Eds.), A War on Terror? The European Stance on a New Threat, Changing Laws and Human Rights Implications (p. 51). Springer. Buckingham, D. (2008). Introducing Identity. Institute of Education, University of London, Center for the Study of Children, Youth and Media. Chomesky, N. (2002). Pirates and Emperors, Old and New: International Terrorism in the Real World. Academic Press. Conwey, M. (2007). Cyberterrorism: Hype and Reality, Political Science. Dublin City University. Davis, E. V. W. (2021). Shadow Warfare Cyberwar Policy in the United States, Russia, and China. Rowman and Littlefield. Galily, Y., Yarich, M., Tamir, I., & Azran, T.S. (2016). The Boston Game and the ISIS Match: Terrorism, Media and Sport. American Behavioral Scientist, 1-11. Giddens, A. (1989). Sociology. Polity Press. Graham, G. (1999). The Internet: A Philosophical Inquiry. Routledge. Hafezniya, M. R. (2012). Political Geography of Cyber Space. Samt Publisher. Heickero, R. (2014). Cyber Terrorism. Electronic Jihad, Strategic Analysis, 38(4), 554–565. doi:10.10 80/09700161.2014.918435 Holbrook, D. (2015). A Critical analysis of the role of the internet in the preparation and planning of acts of terrorism, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. Tandfonline, 8(2), 121–133.

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Hossain, M. D. (2018). Social Media and Terrorism: Threats and Challenges to the Modern Era. South Asian Survey, Sage Publication. Howells, K. (2019). Social Media Networking and Tactical Intelligence Collection in the Middle East. International Journal of Cyber Warfare & Terrorism, 9(2), 15–28. doi:10.4018/IJCWT.2019040102 Hunter, L. Y., Griffith, C. E., & Warren, T. (2020). Internet Connectivity and Domestic Terrorism in Democracies. International Journal of Sociology, Routledge, 50(3), 201–219. doi:10.1080/00207659. 2020.1757297 Janbeck, D.M. (2011). Terrorism in the Age of the Internet: The Case of Muslim Arab Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Journal of Religious and Theological Information, 5-15. Jordan, J. W. (2009). A Virtual Death and a Real Dilemma: identity, trust, and Community in Cyberspace. Southern Communication Journal. Kaminska, M. (2021). Risk Aversion Is at the Heart of the Cyber Response Dilemma. Available: https:// www.cfr.org/blog/risk-aversion-heart-cyber-response-dilemma Karstanje, M. E. (2020). Terrorism in the Website: Society 4.0 and Fundamentalism in Scrutiny. International Journal of Cyber Warfare & Terrorism, 10(1), 1–14. doi:10.4018/IJCWT.2020010101 Kirmayer, L. J., Raikhel, E., & Rahimi, S. (2013). Cultures of the Internet: Identity, Community and Mental Health. Transcultural Psychiatry, 165-191. Kultan, J. (2012). Identity and Threats in the Virtual World, Management. Information Systems, 7(4), 21–25. Lavigne, V., & Gouin, D. (2014). Visual Analytics for Cyber Security and Intelligence, Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology. Sagepub, 11, 175–199. Lewis, J. A. (2002). Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Marwick, A. (2013). Online Identity. In J. Hartley, J. Burgess, & A. Burns (Eds.), Companion to New Media Dynamics, Blackwell Companions to cultural Studies (pp. 355–364). Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118321607.ch23 Mousavi, S. K. (2017). The Second World (Introduction to the Sociology the Virtual World). Behineh Publisher. Mueller, J., & Stewart, M. G. (2015). Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and the Internet: The American Cases. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, Routledge, 8(2), 176–190. doi:10.1080/17467586.2015.1065077 Nagy, P., & Koles, B. (2014). The Digital Transformation of Human Identity: Towards a Conceptual model of Virtual Identity in Virtual Worlds. Convergence: The International Journal of Research in to New Media Technologies, 1-17. Ogun, M. N. (2012). Terrorists use of Internet: Possible Suggestions to Prevent the Usage for Terrorists Purpose. Journal of Applied Security Research, 203-217.

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Pollitt, M. M. (1998). Cyberterrorism-Fact or Fancy? Computer Fraud & Security, 2(2), 8–10. doi:10.1016/ S1361-3723(00)87009-8 Ponnusamy, S., & Rubsundram, G. A. (2019). An International Study on the Risk of Cyber Terrorism. International Journal of Recent Technology and Engineering, 7, 159–163. Rajivan, P., Janssen, M. A., & Cooke, N. J. (2013). Agent-Based Model of a Cyber Security Defense Analyst Team. Proceeding of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 57th Annual Meeting, 1-5. 10.1177/1541931213571069 Sartonen, M., Simola, P., Loven, L., & Timonen, J. (2020). Cyber Personalities in Adaptive Target Audiences. Emerging Cyber Threats and Cognitive Vulnerabilities. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-816203-3.00009-5 Stohl, M. (2006). Cyber Terrorism: a Clear and Present Danger, the Sum of all Fears, Breaking Point or Patriot Games? Crime Law Soc Change, Springer Science. Tehrani, P. M., & Manap, N. A. (2013). A rational Jurisdiction for Cyber Terrorism. Computer Law & Security Review, 29(6), 689–701. doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2013.07.009 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Vienna. (2012). The Use of the Internet for Terrorists purposes. United Nations. Venkatachary, S. K., Prasad, J., & Samikannu, R. (2019). Cybersecurity and Cyber Terrorism -in Energy Sector- a review. Journal of cyber Security Technology. Vignoles, V. L. (2017). Identity: Personal and Social. Oxford Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology. Warf, B., & Fekete, E. (2015). Relational Geographies of Cyberterrorism and Cyberwar, Space and Polity. Routledge. Weimann, G. (2011). Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 765-781. Weimann, G. (2015). Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Williams, P. D. (2008). Security Studies: An Introduction. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203926604 Wills, D. B., & Ashenden, D. (2012). Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber Terror, and Risk, Space and Culture. Sage Publication.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Cyberspace: It is virtual world created by links between computers and servers.

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IS, Internet, and Terror Rüdiger Lohlker https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3927-0783 University of Vienna, Austria

ABSTRACT The chapter presents insights into the non-linear development of the Islamic State (IS) online. Starting with the pre-IS period of Jihadi online activities, the emergence of IS online is analyzed as a swarmlike process across the platforms of the internet supporting the cause of IS via videos, texts, audio, and graphic files. The organizational aspect of these activities is included in the analysis. The online presence of IS is shown as resilient, being able to reconfigure its activities when needed. A coordinated effort of a non-hegemonic network is needed to confront the flexible online activities of IS built on evidence-based research, using multi-lingual sources, understanding the theological framework of IS and the internet.

INTRODUCTION Due to the non-linear character of the phenomenon of jihadism online and, especially, the Islamic State (IS) this chapter is organized as an analysis of the emergence of the phenomenon throughout a certain period of time. The concept of weak emergence is the most appropriate approach to Internet phenomena that to not lend itself to conventional linear narratives. To quote Mark E. Bedau: “An innocent form of emergence – what I call ‘weak emergence’ – is now a commonplace in a thriving interdisciplinary nexus of scientific activity – sometimes called the ‘sciences of complexity’ – that include connectionist modeling, non-linear dynamics (popularly known as ‘chaos theory’), and artificial life.” (Bedou 1997: 375) Since this not the place to discuss the concepts of weak or strong emergence (for definitions cf. Deguet/Demazeau/Magneau 2006) we simply use weak emergence (cf. Bedou 1997 and Bedou 2011) as a guiding concept combining it with the understanding that Jihadi online activity is best to be understood as a swarm reconfiguring itself again and again as a reaction to emerging threats and can be described as creating by its operation its own ecosystem (Fisher 2019, Fisher 2017, Fisher 2015). Due to the structure of the field and the lack of evidence-based knowledge in academic research this chapter will refer to original research and refrain from a lengthy discussion of the literature. DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-9755-2.ch014

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The chapter will introduce jihadi online activities from its emergence end of the 1990s, its transformations after 2001 according to the media of the Internet integrating references to offline jihadi media (magazines, videos, other offline material presented online): magazines, homepages, blogs, forums. Since the material published at this stage is not lost it can be interlinked with the emergent IS-sphere. This non-linear process does not lend itself to a linear narrative. Thus, we have to switch to one of the main fields of IS online operations: videos. The analysis of these videos as a tool for IS online operations is followed by an analysis of social media in general as a battlefield for IS. A summary of IS in its general online form opens the space to discuss the diverse local and regional fields of actions. Since the alleged defeat of IS has not happened yet we will continue following the recent reactions or reconfigurations of the IS swarm. Due to the characteristics of IS online operations going this means that there is an open end.

BACKGROUND Towards a History of IS And Online Jihadism The ecosystem of the global movement calling itself Islamic State (IS, al-dawla al-islamiyya) is well known for the effective use of the platforms of the Internet for disseminating propaganda, uniting its supporters around a coherent theology of violence (Lohlker 2021, Lohlker 2016) most of it published in Arabic language (for an overview cf. Lohlker 2022). We will start with a history of jihadi online activities since the 1990s, then turn to the specific online history of IS and follow its traces across several platforms and the mutual communication of these platforms.

Before September 11, 2001 There are a few examples of jihadi online activities before 9/11. These examples will allow for some insights into the structure of these activities. Due to the technological development around 2001 the main hubs of online jihadism were homepages. Nida‘ul Islam: the Australia-based homepage was divided into two sections: English and Arabic language. The material of the Arabic language section covered more jihadism-related material. Both sections published, esp., interviews with leaders of jihadist organizations. The most famous may be a long interview with Usama bin Ladin or the leader of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).1 Jihaad ul-Kuffaari wal Munaafiqeen: A website active since the 1990s presents many texts with jihadist content. It is a good example of the text-based discourses dominant in the beginnings of online jihadism due to the techncal development of the Internet at that time. Some material is still online.2 almurabeton.org: The website of the Egyptian al-jama‘a al-islamiyya, one of the national underground movements before the emergence of transnational jihadism. The website is published in Arabic with many texts on the theology of this organization and declarations. The visualization is the then state of the art using animated GIFs to structure the website. Later versions were static, not using dynamic elements anymore. The site was hosted in Geneva and online from the end of 1998 until 2002 according to the “Internet Archive“. Globally speaking, jihadi material is to be found – due to the technical limits of the time – as text files and image files (cf. Lohlker 2002).3

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After September 11, 2001 After the attack of September 11, 2001, the number of Internet sites dedicated to jihadi issues increased dramatically – at least the number known by conventional research on jihadism online. The real communication among jihadis takes place partly in the non-digital realm, esp., using video cassettes displaying lectures or war footage, e. g., from the Chechen war(s).

Homepages For the period before the emergence of social media, we may stress the role of some homepages that provided all the knowledge needed by jihadis for their fight. We will take ozooo3 (now offline) as an example (Lohlker/Prucha 2007).4 This site provides propaganda material triyng to support the mobilization for the jihadi cause, a sub-page illustrated by the clownfish Nemo (cf. below) offers videos of speeches of prominent jihadi activists, jihadi operations, and of killed jihadi fighters. Another sub-page provides a wide array of technical and military knowledge, other pages present jihadi hymns (anasheed), and ITrelated issues. Some of the military handbooks were translations of US-military handbooks other papers refer to the experiences of the fighters in Afghanistan. This highly diverse approach is transformed into the social media presence of IS. An interesting aspect may be the illustrating dominating the branding of the site: 1) the clownfish Nemo from the film Finding Nemo of 2003, indicating of jihadi online culture fading into popular culture and appropriating it and 2) a picture of a naked baby subtitled Allah‘u ekber, indicating the will to normalize jihadi worldviews as part of ‚normal‘ life and a relation to a Turkish-language sub-audience.

Magazines Jihadi online magazines are still an essential part of jihadi online communication since its beginnings; there are well-known magazines like Sawt al-Jihād (Prucha 2010) or Mu‘askar al-Battār (Guidère/ Morgan 2007; cf. Cigar 2009). Even non-jihadi militant groups like the Taliban are running magazines for many years now. IS publishes and published many journals for different audiences (cf. below). The English-speaking audiences6 and possible followers were addressed with English language journals like Dabiq (e. g., Droogan/Peatie 2017). There were also magazines of IS in French, German, Spanish, Russian (e. g., Istok), Indonesian. Some of these magazines merged with the successor of Dabiq called Rumiyah, another English-language magazine; the Turkish-language magazine Konstantiniyye were merged with Rumiyah as was the French-language magazine Dar al-Islam. Nevertheless, most of the magazines were in Arabic. Some other languages like Somali or Amharic were used by IS. The most important magazine of IS, however, is the Arabic language weekly al-Naba‘ regularly appearing until today.7 Other Arabic language journals were published for a limited time: journals published in Western European languages became popular in the media and academic research but disappeared from the publishing agenda of IS. Newer English journals like The Sawt al-Hind cover India, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bangla Desh; there is a new magazine called Arakan on the Rohingya minority. Another new magazine is Yalghar, assault, in Urdu. The story of jihadi online magazines is still to be written; most of them, however, were published in Arabic.

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Figure 1. A Jihadi video outlet in 20075

Blogs The history of blogs dates back to 1990 but since the end of the 1990s, they became increasingly popular. In the Arab and Islamic world blogs started at the beginning of the 2000s, jihadi blogs emerged around 2005. Esp., the jihadi blogs published in Lebanon are of interest since there are some indications that bloggers who were interested in Lebanese issues focused since 2010/11 on Syria (cf. Lohlker/Telič 2013). There is a small number of blogs related to IS still active. There are jihadi blogs still available. Some of them have not been updated for many years. Others still provide jihadi material. For the jihadi online sphere, the most central website was a kind of homepage cum blog called Minbar al-tawhid wa‘l-jihad – now offline.8 The Minbar was a text oriented dedicated to the writings of the prominent jihadi writer and activist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Wagemakers 20212) and a broad array of other writers, classical and contemporary; being included could be assessed as an accolade in jihadi circles. It can be aptly described – if some reference to Lenin is allowed – as a “collective organizer“ of jihadism in the time before IS (Lohlker 2007). The content of the first section comprises texts on Islamic dogmatics (‘aqida) the ‚people of the paradise‘, for jihadis this means: jihadis, the attributes of God, the principle of association and dissociation (al-wala‘ wa‘l-bara‘), one of the core dogmas of jihadism, the leadership of the Islamic community until the day of resurrection, etc. The most important sub-section provided contemporary and classical texts on military Jihad. The section on ‚Books and studies‘ provided longer texts like ‚The jahiliyyah

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of the 20th century,‘ ‚The fight between Western and Islamic thinking,‘ ‚The near enemy,‘ all written by prominent authors of the jihadi subculture. The following chapter offers many texts about problems of Islamic law in general, a significant sub-section is dedicated to the writings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. An under-researched section presented jihadi poetry (Holtmann 2013). This is only a selection of the many sections of this website. The content was also disseminated in downloadable packages (haqiba) of many megabytes still available online.

Forums The most important way of communication for jihadis has been the Internet forums, some of them online for a long period. These web forums can be understood as the successor of the Bulletin Board Systems of the older internet (Ramsay 2013: 79-80). The forums developed a visual language of their own: “On the right-hand side […] will be the name of the forum written in elaborate, calligraphic script. To the left there will be a generic set of familiar symbols: a Qur‘an, a Kalashnikov, a horseman. Below this there will be scrolling text, usually advertising the latest releases from ‚Islamic media foundations‘ of the various groups the forum supports (usually Al Qaeda affiliates) and below this a succession of colourful flash banners advertising further releases. Only after scrolling some way down do we come to the forum‘s various sub sections.“ (Ramsay 2013: 81) The sub-sections contain recent communiqués of armed groups. Other sub-sections include discussions on Islamic/jihadist theology, news from the Islamic umma, a general section, a closed administrative section, special sections for, e. g., material in non-Arabic languages, for technical matters and IT-security (often of modest quality), for women, on Arabic language and grammar, sometimes ‘virtual training camps’ (Stenersen 2008). The online forums were a means for the survival of jihadism after the breakdown of its sanctuary in Afghanistan (Prucha 2015). Some elements of the online activities of al-Qa‘ida and other jihadi groups were appropriated by IS.

Videos: The New Level Emerging from Islamic State The main aspect of the online communication of IS perceived by experts and the media are videos. Although pre-IS jihadism also used videos, the new video culture of IS is visually more state of the art than, e. g, videos of al-Qa‘ida and other organizations. The videos produced by IS show a state-of-theart level of visuality and technical development. The content shown extends from military operations, e. g., videos from a drone perspective visualize explosions during IS operations, a diversity of military operations (during the current war of attrition ambushes became more important), during the period of territorial control in Iraq and Syria the constructive character of IS was stressed for propaganda purposes to attract recruits to the territory of IS9, executions and alleged Islamic punishments (e. g., cutting hands for theft), kangaroo courts to kill alleged spies, execution videos, technical instructions, and illustrated anasheed (Islamic hymns), and killed jihadi fighters (so-called martyrs). These videos are embedded in an organizational infrastructure disseminating these videos online. “Similar to a business strategy, the need to digitise the real world so as to retain a competitive advantage in an increasingly commoditised environment remains a strategic imperative. Al-Hayat Media, the official media channel of Isis, operates in an organic manner, overseeing several other media divisions such as Wilayat Ninawa, Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Fallujah, Al-Furat, Ad-Dijlah, Kirkuk and Ar-Raqqah and

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empowering each province to provide unique updates pertaining to its own developments.“ (Mahzam 2015: 1) There are several media outlets disseminating video footage to the online audience of IS. To name but a few: Al-Furqan, presenting video series Salil al-sawarim, ‚The clanging of the swords‘ (Prucha/ Fisher 2019) (cf. below), Tala‘i‘ al-Islam, Hadm al-aswar, Halummu, and the wilayat, provinces, of IS producing videos of their own. An important outlet is still al-Hayat. “Al-Hayat often relies on its online “fan base” in closed chat groups or forums who will look out for the most recent release of videos, media statements and periodicals. The data is then pushed across various social media spheres, such as Twitter, Facebook and Google+ [and others], so that it can continue to be accessed through many sources. The value of [IS]’ digital engagement, therefore, can be measured not just from the absolute number of “likes” or shares generated from the original posting, but through the multiple platforms on which the posting is made available for download and redistribution.“ (Mahzam 2015: 1-2) IS videos “have an online lifespan have an online lifespan of a few hours on YouTube before it is flagged as abusive and taken down. However, when the content is shared through [multiple] video-hosting sites [...] the original file can be downloaded and re-distributed on other platforms for later viewing. […] After efforts to clamp down on [IS]-linked social media accounts increased, [IS]’ online supporters have found alternatives to Facebook and Twitter to spread the messages [cf. below]. […] Major shifts in the publishing domain and print media, and the significance of reader relationship in this generation provide an impetus for Isis to thrive on cost-effective digital publications.“ (Mahzam 2015: 2) A famous case of the dissemination is the video Salil al-sawarim mentioned above. This video allows for insights into the working of IS online communication at Twitter and then on telegram (Fisher/Prucha 2019). The main findings of evidence-based analysis of this video (in short: SAS4) are: •

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“– The “Islamic State”, in particular, has not only mastered the use of the Internet and social media, but also produces and publishes a large amount of coherent visual content in Full HD video. This is quite evident in SAS4, which set the standard for subsequent IS videos, showing a coherent application of theology (=ideology) on conquered territory. SAS4 popularised foreign fighters Lavdrim Muxaheri (Kosovo) and Salman Turki (Bahrain), who gained their own online fan cultures within wider IS fandom. Salman Turki is idolized as a martyr and ‘kept alive’ by fan-created content, whereas Lavdrim Muxaheri has been featured in other IS videos. IS pitches SAS4 as one of the first videos to show the ‘Reconquista’ of Iraq by IS soldiers following the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. combat troops. Furthermore, it is also one of the first videos to show a high degree of applied theology on retaken/conquered areas in Iraq. The concept of “repentance” (tawba) features prominently among the applied theology, and IS “weaponises” it to replenish its ranks and consolidate Sunni tribal areas, as well as cities in Iraq. A strong point of the SAS4 video shows the “Muslim identity”, as preached by AQ and now IS, put into practice as a uniting identity marker to fight for the establishment of an “Islamic State” and subsequently as “the caliphate”. Arabic was the language most associated with the initial release of SAS4, and the majority of users stated a location in the Middle East, more specifically Baghdad. However, European and North American locations were not uncommon. […]

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On each platform, especially on social media platforms, there are clusters on mutually reinforcing accounts, which create a level of resilience that allows jihadists to have a persistent presence on the platform. The release of SAS4 highlights the multiplatform zeitgeist, which has become a feature of the jihadist social media phenomenon. Accounts on one social media platform are used to reinforce the content on other social media platforms, creating mutually reinforcing connections across platforms.” (Fisher/Prucha 2019: 151-152)

Social Media as Another Battlefield The analysis of IS online communication easily lends itself to effective big data analysis. Fisher analyzed the resilience of the online operations of al-Qa‘ida on Twitter as a swarm enabling jihadis to maintain a highly resilient activity online (Fisher 2015). A recent study (Fisher/Prucha/Winterbotham 2019) shows a persistent resilience of IS online activities. The findings of this study are10: • •

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•

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The jihadist information ecosystem is a large and complex network, connecting a vast array of platforms across the surface and dark web. Despite claims to the contrary, jihadist content is widely accessible via mainstream social media and the surface web. As of 2019, while jihadists prefer to communicate with core supporters on Telegram, they also use Telegram to coordinate efforts to exploit (‘raid’ in their terms) other platforms to achieve greater reach and build resilience for the jihadi information ecosystem. Adopting a multiplatform communication paradigm (MCP) rather than focusing of individual platforms will be key to developing next-generation approaches to online disruption and content removal. This research built a model depicting the flow of internet traffic to content shared by jihadi groups. The model shows different online platforms fulfil different purposes for jihadist groups, and this makes their communications harder to disrupt. As a result, when developing disruption approaches it is essential to differentiate between how links to material are shared and where the specific content is actually stored online. While previously online jihadi activity was focused on posting content directly on major platforms, the research shows major platforms are now often used to share URLs instead to facilitate access to content stored elsewhere. The major platforms are therefore being used as ‘beacons’ directing users to the material. Over half of known sources of traffic in the data came from just three platforms – Facebook, Telegram and Twitter. At least 50% of the actual content captured in the model is then stored on specific websites run by jihadists or theologically aligned groups. As these are smaller and obscure servers this takes time to locate and remove. Major platforms search for jihadist content on their servers using techniques such as image hashing – but in many cases, these platforms are being used as ‘beacons’ to share URLs but the content itself is stored on other platforms. This makes the content much harder to detect by the original domain owner. jihadist movements disseminate some of their content through texts, which tend to be uploaded to a different and diverse group of platforms from those used to store audio-visual content. Texts often remain undetected due to the majority being in Arabic and because PDFs or Microsoft Word documents can be uploaded via more platforms than audio-visual content. 243

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•

jihadist networks also share a wide range of extremist Salafist documents. This type of content is often not removed due to the complexity of defining what is actually jihadi content as opposed to some extreme Salafist material. This type of content is at times endorsed, reshared and in some cases re-published with Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) media organisation logos but remains available. “ (Fisher/Prucha/Winterbotham 2019: 2-3)

Hence, the jihadisphere of IS emerges as a dynamic web of activities interwoven all along with the Internet. Any attempt to claim that IS has been erased from the Internet or at least one platform is premature (cf. below).

IS ONLINE: AN INTERIM SUMMARY There is a shared assumption in mainstream research on jihadism that there is a distinction between official and in official IS media following the distinction between official (rasmi) media and those of the followers (helpers, ansar, in IS-speak). Since we introduced the concept of an IS ecosystem online with interdependent or symbiotic parts we will leave this distinction aside and simply speak of IS-related online activities. IS used social media for propaganda and recruitment for some time: YouTube and other video platforms for disseminating visual propaganda, Twitter for texts and images, linking to videos, Facebook for several purposes. After the restrictions against IS online activities increased IS and its followers to other platforms, esp., messenger services like telegram. After 2019 the increasing restrictions cause a reconfiguration and multi-platform orientation of IS communication improving its resilience. IS became (in)famous for its visual publishing practice and its state of art videos and images (cf. above). This sector of communication is interrelated with texts, audio files, and the military operations of IS. Another important part of the online communication of IS is audio files. These audio libraries contain speeches of leading personalities of jihadism accepted by IS, lectures on jihadi theology (durus), online Fatwas, by web radio called idha‘at al-Bayan. Islamic/jihadi hymns (anasheed) are of utmost importance providing the emotions increasing the effects of videos but are offered also independently Videos and audio files are of utmost importance for IS as shown above. Nevertheless, texts are still available online. A study of a telegram channel called The Library of the Caliphate demonstrates that “the jihadi movement thrives on lengthy documents that sets out their theology, beliefs, and strategy.“ (Prucha/Fisher 2020) This individual library contains 908 pdf documents with 111,000 pages. And there are other libraries run by IS and its followers available online. Other libraries are the maktaba al-himma, a series of publications on jihadi theology republished again and again. Another textual form is short quotations from important jihadi personalities and older Islamic texts an indication that jihadi theology can be reduced to short forms even slogans like baqiyyya, i. e., IS remains, lasts on, survives. One aspect often neglected is the Turkish-language material of IS. This material is dispersed among the IS social media profiles but it was, nevertheless, able to motivate Turkish foreign fighters to join IS (Öztop 2021). Some platforms also offer material in Albanian (cf. below).

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Figure 2. Structure of an IS online platform

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Iran, South Asia, Indonesia, Philippines, Sub-Sahara As a global phenomenon IS turned into a global ‚war of attrition‘ affecting regions outside the Arab world. IS communication is organized in local languages like Somali, Bahasa Indonesia, Persian, Pashto, Urdu, Bengali, Hindi, even Dhivehi, the main language of the Maldives. Conceding that material in these languages has been produced for the online communication of IS and for videos the main language of IS communication is still Arabic. Sunni underground groups in Iran publish at several platforms, e. g. at telegram, in Persian. In South Asia, there are some magazines published by wilayat of IS for India and the Rohingya in Burma in English language. Other material and news on the region, e. g., the IS-Khorasan is published at other IS-related platforms in Arabic; some videos are available. For Indonesia, there are several platforms, esp. blogs, homepages, social media sites, video sites, etc. spared from online restrictions due to the ignorance by international organizations, industry, and other parties interested. Nevertheless, there is a growing attempt to curb jihadi influence in the Bahasasphere in Indonesia (e. g. Lohlker 2017). Activities like the siege of Marawi in Marawi are published on several online platforms often at platforms used by IS. The operations in Sub-Sahara Africa are covered in English (esp. West Africa) or in Arabic; Somali is also used. All the platforms related to IS are used. The materials published are texts, videos, cartoons, pictures of any kind.

Attacking IS Online and Counter-Strike of IS After Europol announced in December 2019 another “mission accomplished“ in the “war on terror“ claiming they had thrown out from telegram in cooperation with the platform. IS immediately reacted with building new accounts, profiles, groups, rooms, etc., at other platforms (Lohlker 2020). Some of these platforms are: Element: Element is a cross-platform application. It is a Matrix-based end-to-end encrypted and decentralized messenger and collaboration app. There are several channels and groups available. A very specific aspect is the presence of the dissident scholars of IS11 opposing the new leadership.12 The material offered covers a broad specter: many shorter text posts, pictures, graphics, cartoons, links to longer texts on the IS theology of violence, videos, audio files. Hoop: Hoop messenger is a free, simple, secure, and fast app. A whole array of channels and groups provides the official IS communication and many private rearrangements of material according to the theology of IS. A characteristic feature is the interlinkage to other platforms where IS communication takes place. Linking back to Twitter, telegram or YouTube is a regular operation. The dominant language here is Arabic. TamTam: TamTam is a messenger with channels, videos, and chats. It has a reputation for being a safe communication platform – at least to some extent. The genuine IS presence at TamTam started at least in November 201913 and received a boost end of December after the announcement of Europol. Some of the channels are duplicates of telegram accounts. Although the platform has been very active in closing down chats and channels related to IS, there is still a lot of activity of IS and its followers at TamTam. The languages used are, e. g., Arabic, Albanian, Bahasa Indonesia, and Persian.

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There is IS activity on almost every platform available on the Web. Thus, the remarks may just be understood as giving an idea of the flexibility and resilience of IS online. Other platforms like chathaven or rocketchat as does WhatsApp (Kiefer 2017) became interesting fields of IS propaganda and communication. The dreadful notion of the dark web appears also when experts talk about IS on the web. Leaving aside the simple truism that most of these experts never applied their assumed expertise on the phenomenon called dark web, the understanding of the difference between deep web and dark web is at least among the expert bubble spurious. A continuous feature is a discussion on Internet safety (cf. Holzgruber 2019) and reliability of the platforms used by IS; these discussions started in the older Internet forums. Recently (December 18, 2021), the Qimam Electronic Foundation warned against the products of Cellbrite as tools to break into cellphones. Links to other platforms are regularly announced enhancing the resilience of the online communication of IS. New platforms are mentioned as new opportunities to spread IS communication. Another feature of IS online communication is the grey zone between the basic theology going back to Wahhabism at the first, introductory level and IS-related material at other levels, even technical material produced by the Al-Saqri Corporation for Military Sciences. This strategy is used by IS‘s new leadership and by the dissenters. E. g., the Internet presence qalam al-khilāfa, roughly translated: the Pen of the Caliphate, starts with writings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792 CE), the eponym of the Wahhabi reform movement, and comments on it. The article and the video section present articles again by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb but also by the IS oppositional scholar Abū Mālik al-Tamīmī. Other sections present material from the two main outlets of the IS dissenters. The tutorials on the other hand present technical help on protecting electronic devices against surveillance and attacks. This partly has been originally published by IS outlets like Al-Saqri. Thus, we easily notice a combination of different sources flow into the larger IS subculture including also self-proclaimed dissidents opposing the new leadership of IS. However, there may be some internal strife among IS writers but IS as an organization still shows a persistent presence online. Since 2019 research on IS and its followers using the platform TikTok indicate that new platforms are immediately used to promote IS-related videos.

Games Like other fields of online extremism al-Qaeda and now IS are using games for their purposes. This may be linked to the common use culture of gaming, using, e. g., skins that they present a structure that is different from the dominant US imaginary. IS games are not a predominant structure in the current IS online activities. IS (and Hay‘at Tahrir al-Sham) are copying (sometimes the style) of, e. g., the computer game ‚Call of Duty‘ for their videos (Dauber 2019) and Salil al-Sawarim (Al-Rawi 2018; cf. Above). Even less researched is the use of computer games as a tool for recruiting new followers. “In 2013, documents leaked by National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden revealed that both the NSA and the Britain’s General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), were tracking Islamic extremists using video games such as World of Warcraft and Second Life. In 2016, officials in the United Arab Emirates claimed that young Emiratis were being recruited by ISIS using online games. There is also proof of this trend on the Deep and Dark Web. As recently as January 2019, Islamic State outlets used Telegram groups to provide supporters with specific instructions for how to use gaming platforms to recruit new members. The use of video games is a sufficiently prominent recruitment 247

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strategy that a member of the Islamic State’s deep web forum recently requested that the Flames of War 2 propaganda video be formatted to run on PlayStation Portable devices. The content of modern video games also generates concerns. One game in particular, Counter-Strike, allows players to simulate terrorists trying to perpetrate a terrorist attack. Dubbed the “Gaming Jihad,” terrorist organizations have exploited violent multi-player first-person shooter games and violent imagery to attract young recruits. In 2014, the Islamic State even developed a propaganda film designed to look like the popular video games Call of Duty and Grand Theft Auto to appeal to young gamers by glorifying and fantasizing video game violence.“ (Concentric 2019) To avoid the shortcomings of games analysis and violence in general, the functions of games should be researched in more detail and strictly evidence-based. Figure 3. Is fantasy of the battlefield inspired by gaming visuals

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GUIDES TO TERRORIST OPERATIONS Overlapping aspects of IS communication online and offline are based on the history of jihadism. The files provided training material for military and terrorist activities and are inspired by these activities. Some material dating back to the times of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union are still to be found online. There are media outlets of IS dedicated especially to this practical aspect of jihadism, e. g., alSaqri. Issues presented are the use of poisons, explosives, buildings, e. g., a silencer, sniping, surveillance cameras. Other outlets present, e.. g., information about drones. Surprisingly, there is a lack of evidence-based research in this field (cf. Lohlker 2020a, Lohlker 2019a, Lohlker 2019b)

RECOMMENDATIONS There have been discussions about IS being a state or not since the proclamation of the IS Caliphate. These discussions ignored that IS is a global and transnational network transgressing state boundaries. Being active on the Internet expresses this specific trait of IS as a non-nation-state actor using all tools available for modern actors worldwide. I. e., constructing a global brand helping to attract followers all around the world and unite it behind a clearly defined program, establishing a global network of persons and – localized (Smith/Solomon 2020 and Smith/Schulze 2020) – organizations, creating a global subculture based on a shared theology including elaborate discussions or very short references to this theology, diversifying this subculture by including many languages (Lohlker 2019), and disseminating knowledge about operational aspects (including the Internet). And moving across all platforms available online. These aspects of IS demonstrate the need for a multinational approach based on a non-hegemonic structure combining as many forces as possible to fight IS, esp., the technology sector. A state-led coalition operating in a nation-state framework will not help at all.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS A multinational approach will have to take account of the resilience and flexibility of the online operations of IS and the emergence of new fields easily exploited by IS. Thus, a combination of content and technical analysis and actions will be a desideratum of further action and research to counter the terrorism of IS (and other forms of terrorism online).

CONCLUSION IS is a phenomenon emerging in the subculture of jihadism and reaching a new level of online activism. All phenomena of IS online have to be understood as the result of previous developments in the jihadisphere and as a reaction to – up to now: unsuccessful – attempts, The reconstruction of the emergence of IS and reconfiguration across all platforms of the Internet demonstrates the flexibility and resilience of IS on the Web.

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IS emerges from the former jihadi subculture of al-Qa‘ida. Its online activity can be analyzed as the outcome of jihadi history, a further development of the formats used before by jihadi organizations and individuals. Following the traces of IS online allows for preliminary findings on the movement of IS online. Thus, the assumption of future diversification is allowed. Attempts to curb the influence of IS on the Internet will have to face the need for a flexible response to all aspects of IS including its claim to represent true Islam (Lohlker 2022a).

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Fisher, A., Prucha, N., & Winterbotham, E. (2019). Mapping the Jihadist Information Ecosystem Towards the Next Generation of Disruption Capability. Royal United Services Institute. Guidère, M., & Morgan, N. (2007). Le Manuel de recrutement d’Al-Qaïda. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Holtmann, P. (2013). Casting Supernatural Spells and Fostering Communitas: Avu Yahya Al-Libi‘s Qasida Poetry. In R. Lohlker (Ed.), Jihadism: Online Discourses and Representations (pp. 103–120). Vienna University Press. Holzgruber, C. (2019). ‘Now you see me – now you don’t’: Analysing jihadist’s Online Privacy-Enhancing and Counter-Surveillance Strategies. In R. Lohlker (Ed.), World Wide Warriors: How jihadis Operate Online (pp. 157–191). Vienna University Press. Kiefer, M. (2017). Lasset uns in scha’a Allah ein Plan machen. Fallgestützte Analyse der Radikalisierung einer WhatsApp-Gruppe. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Lohlker, R. (2002). Cyberjihad – das Internet als Feld der Agitation. Orient, 43(4), 507-536. Lohlker, R. (2017). Rewiring the Islamic Net? Creating an Alternative to the Online Propaganda of IS (Islamic State). In The Future Information Society: Social and Technological Problems. World Scientific. Lohlker, R. (2019). Multilingual again: Recent Linguistic Developments of IS. DOI doi:10.25365/phaidra.95 Lohlker, R. (2019a). Reconfiguring the Swarm: IS rethinking Strategy and Technology. In R. Lohlker & T. Abu-Hamdeh (Eds.), jihadism Revisited: Aspects of a Terrorist Phenomenon (pp. 169–181). Academic Press. Lohlker, R. (2019b). Collective Organizers: Lone Wolves, Remote Control, and Virtual Leadership. In R. Lohlker (Ed.), World Wide Warriors (pp. 9–41). Vienna University Press. Lohlker, R. (2020a). Jihadism Reconsidered: The Industrial Revolution of Terrorism. In S. M. Khasru (Ed.), The Digital Age, Cyber Space, and Social Media: The Challenges of Scurity & Radicalization (pp. 41–56). IPAG. Lohlker, R. (2021). New jihadi Theology 2.0: The Theology of Violence IS Style. Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 111, 137–152. Lohlker, R. (2022). Dschihadistischer Terrorismus. In Terrorismusforschung: Interdisziplinäres Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Praxis. Nomos. Lohlker, R. (2022a). Jihadism and True Islam: Discourses and Realities. In EICTP Vienna Research Papers on Transnational Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Trends and Scenarios of Transnational Terrorism. Forecast, Anticipation and Prediction of Defining Trends against the Backdrop of Uncertainty. Vienna: EICTP. Lohlker, R., & Prucha, N. (2007). Dschihadismus im Internet: Die praktische Seite. SIAK-Journal, 4, 4-11. https://dx.doi.org/10.7396/2007_4_A Lohlker, R., & Telič, A. (2013). Die Rolle von ‘Social Media’ in der syrischen Revolution. In Syrien: Hintergründe, Analysen, Berichte. Vienna: Promedia.

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Lohlker. (2016). Theologie der Gewalt: Das Beispiel IS. Vienna: Facultas. Mahzam, R. (2015). The Electronic Digitisation of ISIS: Building a Multi-media Legacy. RSIS Commentary, 228. Öztop, F. A. (2021). Motivational factors of Turkish foreign terrorist fighters in ISIS. Middle Eastern Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2021.1978984 Prucha, N. (2010). Die Stimme des Dschihad: “Ṣawt al-ǧihād”: al-Qāʿidas erstes Onlinemagazin. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač. Prucha, N. (2015), Online territories of terror: How jihadist movements project influence on the Internet and why it matters off-line (Ph.D.). University of Vienna. Prucha, N., & Fisher, A. (2020). Why we focus on Arabic – Stating the obvious for the oblivious. https:// onlinejihad.net/2020/05/31/why-we-focus-on-arabic-stating-the-obvious-for-the-oblivious/ Ramsay, G. (2013). Jihadi Culture on the World Wide Web. Bloomsbury Academic. Rüdiger, L. (2007). Eine Bibliothek des Dschihad: Minbar at-tauḥīd wa’l-ǧihād. Von Chatforen bis Cyberjihad. Muslimische Internetnutzung in lokaler und globaler Perspektive. Rüdiger, L. (2020). Islamic State is dead, long live… https://phaidra.univie.ac.at/o:1064238 Smith, T., & Solomon, H. (Eds.). (2020). Exporting Global Jihad: Vol. 1. Critical Perspectives from Africa and Europe. I. B. Tauris. Smith, T., & Solomon, K. E. (Eds.). (2020). Exporting Global Jihad: Vol. 2. Critical Perspectives from Asia and North America. I. B. Tauris. Stenersen, A. (2008). The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp? Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(2), 215-233. Wagemakers, J. (2012). A Quietist jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Cambridge University Press.

ADDITIONAL READING Abu Rumman, M. (2016). The Secret of Attraction: ISIS Propaganda and Recruitment. Friedrich-EbertStiftung. Ashour, O. (2021). How ISIS Fights: Military Tactics in Iraq. Edinburgh University Press. Cigar, N. (2009). Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency. Potomac Books. Guidère, M., & Nicole, M. (2007). Le mauel de recrutement d’al-Qaida, Peris. Seuil.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Forum/Internet Forum: Virtual place to exchange views, messages, and other data; a place to discuss these data and disseminate it; used by Jihadis (cf. below) as an organizational tool. Islamic State: Abbreviations are IS or ISIS, a terrorist organization emerging in Iraq and Syria; now operating globally. Jihadi: A member of the Jihadist movement. Jihadism: A modern transitional terrorist movement using the concept of military Jihad as a marker for identity. Jihadisphere: The sector(s) of the Internet Jihadis (cf. above) use for their online activities. Messenger: Apps used to exchange messages among users. Salafi: A modern transnational Islamic movement claiming to be the only representative of authentic Islam and propagating an exclusive theology.

ENDNOTES 1



4 5 6 2 3

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12 10 11

13



https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/LADIN.htm and https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ph2.htm (retrieved July 16, 2021). E. g., https://firqatattawheed.wordpress.com/256-2/ (retrieved July 16, 2021). Most of the material is offline now, some of it isstill available online. It presents the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq, a precursor organization of IS. All illustrations are from archived material of the author. We may assume the Western media and security authorities are addressed, who devoured eagerly everything written in English, ignoring most of the Arabic material. Partly at least available, e g., in Turkish, Uzbek, Russian, Pashto, Persian, or English. Most of the material is still available online. These videos are replayed again and again to provide a historical background to present-day IS. ‚Jihadist‘ refers to IS. https://www.jihadica.com/caliph-incognito/ (retrieved July 24, 2021) https://newlinesinstitute.org/syria/isiss-new-leadership-past-lessons-in-a-new-strategic-environment/ (retrieved July 24, 2021) https://theprint.in/tech/tamtam-is-new-isis-favourite-after-leaving-telegram-london-bridge-attackwas-claimed-here/328728/ (retrieved July 4, 2021).

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About the Contributors

Elnur Ismayil is an Assistant Professor at the Istanbul Medeniyet University. Mr. Ismayil received his PhD from Political Science department (GraSP) at the WWU Münster, Germany. His PhD thesis was about Russia’s Military Interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. His research interests are Terrorism, Foreign Policy and Security issues. His works has been published in different national and international journals. He is a Chairman of one of the leading Turkish think tanks, namely BILGESAM specialized in foreign policy and security issues. Ebru Karadoğan received her BA degree in the Department of Radio TV and Cinema from Marmara University in 2001, and then her MA degree in Media and Communication Systems from Istanbul Commerce University in 2003. She received her PhD degree in Radio TV from Marmara University in 2011. Her research interests cover topics like Uncanniness of Daily Life and its Notation in Literature, Film and Media, Culture Industry, and Surveillance Studies. *** Burcu Pinar Alakoc is an Associate Instructional Professor at the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago, and a research fellow at the Chicago Project on Security & Threats (CPOST). She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Colorado-Boulder. Her research focuses on political violence, terrorism, migration and refugee studies. Her work has been published in Comparative Politics, Terrorism and Political Violence, International Journal of Conflict and Violence, Journal of Political Science Education, and Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Farzaneh Ejazi received Bachelor degree from Payame Noor University (in 2012), and received her Master in Sociology from Shahed University (in 2017). She participated and presented papers in the following International Conference: The Society for the Study of Social Problems on Saturday, and presented it titled as Situation of Learning and Teaching during Covid-19 Pandemic in Iran. Ejazi is a member of The Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP) since February 2021. Her research interests are internet and new technology, sociology of mobile phone, virtual space, and sociology of education. Eren Ekin Ercan graduated from Anadolu University Department of Journalism in 2010. Having completed his master’s degree in Gazi University Journalism in 2014, ERCAN received his PhD from Anadolu University / Journalism in 2018 with his thesis on the TRNC press. Having books, articles and papers published in national and international journals, ERCAN continues his academic studies as 

About the Contributors

an Associate Professor at Aydın Adnan Menderes University, Faculty of Communication, Journalism Department. His interests include journalism, media sociology, modern and postmodern theory, and visual culture. Musa Gelici was born in Eskişehir in 1981. He graduated from Sakarya University Faculty of Theology in 2002. In 2008, he completed his master’s degree at the Sakarya University with thesis titled “Comparison of Protestant Business Ethics and Ahi Business Ethics”. In 2020, he completed his doctorate at Recep Tayyip Erdogan University (Turkey) with thesis titled “The Effect of Islamophobic Attitudes and Reflexes on the Adaptation Process of Turkish Society (Norwegian Example)”. Musa Gelici is specialized in sociology of religion, media, immigration and Islamophobia. Currently he is employed at the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Türkiye. Zehra Gelici, born in 1980 in Giresun, Türkiye, graduated from the Faculty of Theology at the Sakarya University. In 2007, she completed her master’s degree at the Sakarya University, thesis titled as “Analysis of Mystical Television Programs in Terms of Religious Education”. She completed her doctorate at the Marmara University (Turkey) in 2016 and her thesis titled as “Religious Education in Turkish and Norwegian Public Schools”. Next to her research in the “Child Development” issues at the Istanbul University (Turkey), Zehra Gelici specialized in the fields of religious education, media and pre-school religious education. Feride Zeynep Güder graduated from English Language & Education at Atatürk University in 1994. She received her MA in English Language & Literature at Istanbul Kültür University in 2004. In 2012, she completed her Ph.D. in journalism at Istanbul University. She has been working at Üsküdar University since 2016. She gives lectures mainly on “Political Communication”, “Media and Truth”, “Media and Ideology”, “Postmodernism”, and “City and Memory”. Her academic research interests cover city and memory, political communication, identity, dataveillance, digital media, and ideology. She published several national and international papers, book chapters and gave presentations related to her academic interest. She was given the Best Presentation Paper Award in the USA and was selected as the best paper in Barcelona in 2013 and 2020 respectively. She is the author of two books: “Voyeuristic Gaze” and “The Language of Persuasion and Media”. She translated Mark Poster’s book Foucault Marxism and History. Feride Zeynep Güder has been a member of Euromersive Istanbul. Her recent publications and readings are mainly on metaverse, AI, XR, redemptive discourse, perpetual peace, and algocracy. Vasif Huseynov studied International Relations (BA), Global Political Economy (MA) and Political Science (PhD) in Baku (Azerbaijan), Kassel (Germany) and Göttingen (Germany), respectively. His studies (2011-2018) in Germany were supported by full scholarships of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). He has worked for, among others, the German Parliament, the Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies (SAM), and ADA University in Azerbaijan. Dr. Huseynov works presently as a senior advisor for the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and as a contributing analyst for Commonspace.eu and the Jamestown Foundation. He teaches politics at Khazar University in Baku. Dr. Huseynov’s articles have appeared in, among other outlets, Caucasus International, CES Working Papers, Eastern Journal of European Studies, the Diplomat and the Jamestown Foundation. He is the author of the book titled “Geopolitical Rivalries in the ‘Common Neighborhood’: Russia’s

294

About the Contributors

Conflict with the West, Soft Power, and Neoclassical Realism” (2019) published by Ibidem Press and distributed by Columbia University. Onianwa Oluchukwu Ignatus is a Nigerian Historian specializing in the Transnational Diplomatic and Military History of the Nigerian Civil War and Biafran Studies. He obtained his PhD from the University of Ibadan in 2019 He is the author of the book: Britain’s Injurious Peace Games in the Nigerian Civil War Washington DC and London: Academica Press, 2018) and Once Upon a Time in Biafra: Memories, Foreign Visitations, and Life Experiences in the Nigerian Civil War, 196-1970 (Washington DC and London: Academica Press. He had worked with the Swiss Military Academy ETH Zurich, Switzerland on a book project titled “Captivity in War”; “Visions of African Unity” with the International Studies Department University of Utrecht, Netherland and International Studies Group at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein South Africa; A Tight-Embrace: Euro-Africa Relations” with the Department of Political and Social Science, the University of Bologna, Italy and “Human Rights Breakthrough of 1970” with the Department of International Studies University of Trento Italy. Onianwa is currently working with the Department of History and Political Science Alabama State University on “Africa: A Globalizing World, and the Challenges of Peace, Security, and Development“. A Research Team Member with Department of History, Philosophy and Religious Studies Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond Kentucky USA on the book “African Experience. Onianwa is a Research Team Member on the Palgrave Handbook on Nigeria and Its History and Routledge Encyclopedia of African Studies (REAS) and Palgrave Handbook on Social Problems. A contributor in the Strife Journal of the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London. Georgios Karakasis is a Doctor in Philosophy (University of the Basque Country, UPV/EHU). He obtained his Degree in Political Sciences and Public Administration at the University of Athens. He also has two Master’s Degrees in Humanities (UPV/EHU) and Phenomenology of Terrorism (University of Granada) and a PhD in Philosophy (UPV/EHU). His main interests include the ideology and philosophy of neo-fascism, the thought of Julius Evola and the philosophy of later Martin Heidegger. He is currently teaching Constitutional Law at the University of the Basque Country. Safiye Kocadayı is a PhD. Candidate at the Department of Law of the Near East University. Her current research interests include refugees and immigrant issues as well as the current events in Turkey. Nadezhda Anatolievna Lebedeva is a Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Сultural Studies, professor of the International Personnel Academy (Kyiv, Ukraine), works at the Kherson State Agrarian and Economic University, full member of the Eurasian Academy of Television and Radio. She is the author of more than 100 scientific articles. The focus of her research is the cultural and social aspects of regional development. She graduated from the Kherson State Pedagogical Institute in 1996. After graduating from the postgraduate course at the Kherson State University, became a lecturer at the History of World Culture and Literature Department of the Kherson State University. In June 2008 was enrolled in the doctoral program of the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management in Kyiv, specializing in Cultural Studies. She was awarded the medal “For Civil Courage” of the Afghan Veterans’ Ukrainian Union for the book “My Afghan” by Nikolay Vishnyak”. Participation in the creation of documentary films and scientific articles are marked by membership in the Eurasian Academy of Television and Radio (November 2012). The monograph “Cultural Aspect of Alexander Elagin’sCreativeness” was 295

About the Contributors

awarded by the 1-st place in scientific direction ”Cultural Studies” in 2017 and became the winner of the competition for educational projects “Interclover - 2017” in the nomination - ”Research Project”. Musa Alhaji Liman is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Mass Communication, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria. Ruediger Lohlker is Professor of Islamic Studies, Oriental Institute, University of Vienna (Austria), since 2003-; Head of a training course for Imams, a training course for prison Imams and Imams in Hospitals, University of Vienna (Austria), 2010-2020; teaching at the universities of Göttingen, Kiel, and Giessen (all Germany), Xi’an (PR China), Yogyakarta (Indonesia) and others; worked as a database consultant in Rabat (Morocco); several international academic activities, (co-)editor of several series Prof. Lohlker’s main research fields are Modern Islamic movements, Jihadism, history of Islamic thought, Islam and Arab world online, history of sciences. Mehdi Mohsenian Rad holds a bachelor’s degree in journalism and radio and television, a master’s degree in mass communication research and a doctorate in sociology. He has published seventeen books. His communicology book has been reprinted twenty times. Mohsenian Rad is a full professor at the Faculty of Culture and Communication in Iran. Emel Ozdora-Aksak is an assistant professor at the Department of Communication and Design at Bilkent University, Ankara Turkey. She received her Ph.D in Mass Communication from the University of Florida in 2009 completing her dissertation research in Brussels, Belgium working closely with Turkish associations. She later worked for the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Turkey Country Office as a communication specialist before transferring back to an academic career. Her research interests include organizational communication, corporate social responsibility, (international) public relations, public diplomacy, and refugees and migration. She has received two research grants from the Arthur Page Center for Integrity in Public Communication to research Syrian refugees and other vulnerable communities in Turkey. Her research has been published in Discourse and Communication, Public Relations Review, American Behavioral Scientist, Voluntas, and Business Ethics: A European Review. Devrim Şahin is a researcher of the Eastern Mediterranean University - Cyprus Policy Centre (http:// cpc.emu.edu.tr/staff.asp). His current research interests include efforts to bring together complexity thinking and peace studies. He has also been part of UNDP funded NGO’s in Cyprus that was awarded “The Marriage, Knowledge and Branding Award for Peace” for the longest inter-communal partnership in peace-building efforts. His article titled “Time For a Nahost-Politik” was featured amongst the top 20 inspirational ideas at the 2016 McKinsey Awards. Turgül Tomgüsehan is an Associate Professor of Communication who originally graduated from Ankara Police Academy and studied an undergraduate program in Law at Near East University. He continued his academic studies with his master’s dissertation on Public Relations of Police and receiving a Ph.D. in the field of Communication. He is among the scenarist of Doctor Dilara movie which was shown at the Cannes Film Festival in 2015. His two novels, “Sırlar Adası” and “Ada Karanlığı”, are published in Cyprus and Turkey.

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About the Contributors

Omid Vatandoost received his BS. in Culture and Communication from Imam Sadiq University and later his MA. in Policy Studies from Imam Sadiq University. As of his research interests in social media, crisis, and organizational communication, he has published articles like “The role of Star Link mission on degrading authoritarian governments’ power across the Middle East.” in 2020. He also has research experience to complete a handbook project of “Medialogy” and updating some parts of the book “Norms in the Three Holy books of The Torah, The Evangel, and The Quran” authored by Dr. Professor Mehdi Mohsenian Rad, and area research on Radio Rwanda (Radio RTLM) role in Rwanda massacre in 1994. Ibrahim Uba Yusuf is a Lecturer at the Department of Mass Communication, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria. Currently, he is undertaking a PhD programme sponsored by DAAD at the University of Maiduguri and University of Hildeshiem, Germany. His PhD thesis is titled: Contributions of Culture Industry to Peace building through Hausa home videos in Parts of Northern Nigeria. His research interests include broadcasting, film and media studies, Islam and media and peace building.

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Index

A

F

Abdullah Öcalan 55, 66, 69, 73-76, 78 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 28, 31, 41 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) 28, 31, 41 aesthetics 1-2, 5-6, 9-10 algocracy 205-207, 217-223 Al-Noor Mosque 80, 84, 88, 91-92, 96, 102 Anti-Islamism 19-20, 102 Azerbaijan 164-165, 167-182

Forum/Internet Forum 253 freedom of speech 13, 26, 95, 117, 129, 136-138, 143, 155

B

I

Baeurum Mosque Attack 80 blog 36, 60, 124, 135, 143, 150, 161-162, 235, 240, 250 Boko Haram 45-46, 52, 60, 62, 144, 147-162, 184-186, 198-199, 201 Breivik 1-11, 80-85, 88, 90-91, 93-94, 97, 100-102 Breivik Massacre 82, 102

identity 12, 30, 58, 68, 74-75, 83-84, 114, 117, 121, 125, 134, 138, 158, 193, 198, 202, 218, 224-226, 228-231, 233-236, 242, 253 international media 49, 104-105, 107, 110-112, 116, 118, 122, 134, 144-145, 151-155, 162-163, 191-192 Islamic State (IS) 44, 48, 53, 56-57, 62, 104-105, 110-112, 123, 132, 140, 148, 152-153, 163, 233, 237-238, 241-242, 244, 247-248, 250-253 Islamist press 13-14, 17, 21, 26 ISWAP 144, 147-149, 152-157, 160-161, 163

C conflict resolution 78, 159, 183, 193, 195-196, 201 countering terrorism 124-125, 138, 143 Counternarrative 183, 197 counterterrorism 62, 92, 104, 107, 112, 119, 121, 123, 144-145, 151-156, 161-162, 205-207, 209, 211, 213, 217, 219, 222, 235 Crisis Management 183 critical discourse analysis 64, 66, 74, 78-79 Cyber Space 224, 234, 251 Cyberterrorism 124, 140, 143, 199, 215, 234, 236

D dataveillance 205-207, 211, 214-216, 219, 221, 223 digital narrations 205-206

H hybrid threats 164-167, 171, 175-181 hybrid warfare 164-168, 171-172, 175-178, 180-181

J jihadi 60, 150-151, 237-241, 243-244, 246, 250-253 jihadism 237-241, 244, 249, 251, 253 jihadisphere 244, 249, 253 Justice and Development 28, 31, 41

K Kant 205-206, 210, 217, 219-221, 223

L Language of Media and Political Discourse 41

 

Index

M

S

manhunt 1-7, 9-10, 58 Manshaus attack 81, 88, 102 Media Analysis 43, 102 Media discourse analysis 80 murder 13-14, 16, 18-22, 25-26, 58, 84, 88-91, 96-97, 209, 227

Salafi 163, 253 Samuel Paty 13-14, 16-23, 25-26 social media 2, 6, 10-11, 16, 20, 43-45, 56-58, 63, 83-84, 113-114, 123, 132-133, 149-151, 154, 157-160, 162, 164, 167-168, 176, 187-188, 194, 196-197, 203, 206, 211, 213, 224, 227, 229-230, 232-235, 237-239, 242-244, 246, 251 Strategic Framing 119, 123 sustainable peace 40, 205-207, 210, 213, 218-219, 223 Syrian refugees 28-41, 111

N national security 104-105, 114, 123, 125-129, 131, 137, 139-141, 149, 154, 164, 171, 173-175, 177179, 220, 247 network 49, 52, 121, 128, 133, 135-137, 161, 173, 181, 189, 224-226, 228, 231-233, 237, 243, 249 news coverage 59, 65-66, 68, 73-74, 76, 81, 104-109, 112-114, 118, 122-123 newspapers 13-14, 18-19, 26, 33-34, 42, 47, 65, 80, 85-90, 92-93, 95-97, 121, 123, 145, 187, 191, 194 non-military strategies 164, 177 Norwegian media 80, 84-85, 100

O opposition parties 16, 28, 32, 35, 41, 176 Özgür Gündem 64-66, 68-70, 72-79

P peace media 183, 185-187, 197 peace negotiations 64, 66, 78-79, 170 peacebuilding 183-190, 192-197, 199-202, 207, 218 Perpetual Peace 205-206, 210, 216-217, 219-220, 222-223 Philip Manshaus 80, 84-85, 87-93, 96, 98-99, 101-102 PKK 43-47, 55, 61, 64-66, 68-76, 78-79, 168, 179 political discourse 28-29, 41, 116, 218 Provocation 13, 18-21, 23-24, 26 public diplomacy 104-107, 113, 116-123 public opinion 28, 33, 37, 41, 48, 55, 65, 74, 104-107, 117-118, 122-123, 136, 144, 146, 156, 165, 192, 209-210, 222

R

T Tarrant 1-2, 5-7, 10-12, 80, 83, 102 Tarrant Massacre 102 terror 11, 43-47, 51, 58-59, 61, 63, 80-81, 85, 87-89, 91-92, 94, 99-100, 105, 107-109, 112, 114, 116, 118-119, 121-122, 129, 138, 141, 144-145, 147, 149, 153-154, 156, 160, 199, 201, 206-207, 209, 211-213, 215-216, 219-220, 222, 226, 228, 232, 234, 236-237, 246, 252 terrorism 1-2, 6-7, 9-11, 13, 21, 24, 26, 41, 43, 45-53, 55, 58-60, 62-63, 81-83, 88-90, 92-94, 97, 100, 104-107, 109-114, 116-147, 149, 152-162, 164, 168, 181, 184, 199, 205-216, 218-236, 249-252 terrorist attack 1-2, 6, 11, 16-17, 25, 59, 80, 83-84, 92, 96, 102, 104, 107-110, 113-114, 116-117, 121, 123, 132, 213, 248 terrorists 2, 5, 7, 9-11, 28-29, 34-35, 41, 43-44, 46-48, 52-53, 55, 76, 81, 89, 106, 112-113, 116, 125, 127-129, 132-133, 144-150, 152-160, 162, 206, 208-209, 211-216, 224-225, 227-228, 230-233, 235-236, 248 Teun A. Van Dijk 64-65, 79 Turkish Public Opinion 28, 37, 41, 74 Turkish society 28, 31-32, 38, 41, 111, 118

V Van Dijk 64-68, 79 virtual identity 224-225, 229-230, 233, 235 Virtual terrorism 224-233

redemptive discourse 206-207, 216, 219-220, 223 religious education 43, 45-46, 50-52, 59-61, 63 right-wing terrorism 1-2, 6-7, 10

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