Massachusetts Shipping, 1697–1714: A Statistical Study [Reprint 2013 ed.] 9780674734999, 9780674734982

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MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING 1697-1714

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING 1697-1714 A Statistical Study Bernard Bailyn and

Lotte Bailyn

1959 THE BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts

© Copyright 1959 by the PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 59-12964 Printed in the United States of America

Preface This publication is a belated solution to a problem I first faced several years ago in preparing an account of the New England merchants in the seventeenth century. Attempting to probe the origins and shaping of an important group in early American society, I found it necessary to touch on all elements of group life: political, economic, and more generally social. For such a comprehensive picture a wide range of sources was necessary, and I was fortunate in being able to draw on the voluminous materials of early New England history which generations of historians, editors, and archivists have made available. But in one area the necessary data were lacking. There were, I found, few records from which quantities could be derived, quantities descriptive not merely of goods and trade but of people: their numbers, the scale of their endeavors, and the magnitude of alterations in their lives. The problem is a general one. A sense of magnitude lies often at the heart of historical understanding. Without realistic notions of scale, without some form of calibration, we cannot answer certain uniquely historical questions of growth and decline and the phasing of change. Nowhere has this sense been more poorly developed and its lack more woefully evident than in our accounts of the origins of American society. Conceptions of early American social development have lacked the anchorage of even approximate quantities. Only in recent years has a start been made on establishing accurate historical positions. In particular, several penetrating studies of Northern mercantile families suggest something of the magnitude as well as of the character of development in the commercial centers. But these are isolated landmarks in a vast domain of history. It was with such considerations in mind and faced with the particular problem of sketching a realistic picture of the merchant group of early New England that I came on volume VII of the Massachusetts Archives. I found it to contain a perfectly preserved

vi

PREFACE

shipping register for Massachusetts during the eighteen-year period 1697-1714. It included information not only about the vessels registered in those years but about the owners of the vessels as well. The Register was by no means an original discovery of mine. A number of scholars had used these records before, but only partially, selectively, mainly for purposes of illustration. It occurred to me that if this information could be comprehensively summarized and tabulated one could answer in a definitive way a number of important questions concerning early American social and economic history. How big was a "big" Northern shipowner of the early eighteenth century? How many ships did he own? Did he tend to concentrate his investments in a small private fleet or did he spread his holdings over many vessels by joining in ownership with others? Was the ownership of vessels concentrated in a few hands or widely distributed? If the latter, how wide was "wide"? What groupings of investors were there? To what extent was American shipping controlled by English merchants? Did the merchants in the colonial metropolitan centers monopolize the shipping of the hinterlands? And what of the vessels? How many were there? How large were they? What shipyards were supplying what markets? I began to transcribe the data by hand into what I hoped would be comprehensive tables. But projection from a short period of work showed the task to be hopelessly time-consuming. Except for sampling or answering very limited questions, tabulation appeared to be possible only for a large team of researchers. The project was put aside. It was resumed only in collaboration with Lotte Bailyn, who, trained in a more rigorous discipline than history and skilled in machine methods of data processing, worked out a program by which the significant information in the Register, in all useful combinations, could be extracted mechanically and be made available for tabular presentation. At this point the project acquired a further dimension, for we welcomed the opportunity to assess realistically the possibilities of applying machine techniques to historical material like the Massachusetts Shipping Register and to explore the problems of procedure. The possibilities, as we hope the Introduction and tables

vii

PREFACE

that follow will show, are large, but so too are the problems that arise. The difficulties, in fact, proved to be far more formidable than we had expected. That our experience in dealing with them might be profitable to others probing by similar methods other sectors of history, we have included as an appendix a Note on Procedure. Our purpose, however, remains historical. By a statistical presentation of the information contained in the Massachusetts Shipping Register for the middle years of the colonial period, we seek to suggest a sense of magnitude by which to understand within a limited area the scale of American development. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the assistance we received in preparing this study. We were particularly fortunate in having available for our use the Peabody House machine facilities of the Graduate School of Education, Harvard University. For the many hours of uninterrupted use of that equipment we are most grateful. We benefited from the skillful advice on the design of the IBM project of John R. Van Tassel and Bernard P. Cohen. Barbara D. Weinberg patiently and accurately entered the microfilmed Register data on to code sheets. The project was made possible in the first place by a subsidy from the Harvard Foundation for Advanced Study and Research. Funds from a grant by the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Ford Foundation were also drawn upon. Without the generous financial assistance of both of these foundations nothing could have been accomplished. BERNARD

Cambridge, Mass. August 1958

BAILYN

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1. The Register Massachusetts

Shipping

3 in 1698

2. Dimensions of the Fleet

13

3. Manufacture of the 1698 Fleet

23

4. Owners and Patterns of Investment

27

Massachusetts

Shipping,

1699-1714

5. The Acquisition of Shipping

41

6. Shipbuilding

48

7. Investors and Investments

56

8. Conclusion

74

THE MASSACHUSETTS O F SHIPPING,

REGISTER

1697-1714

TABLE I. Vessels Registered in Massachusetts as of December 25, 1698

78

TABLE II. Vessels Owned by Massachusetts Towns, 1698

79

TABLE III. Vessels of Other New England Colonies Registered in Massachusetts, 1698

80

TABLE IV. Distribution of Tonnages, 1698

81

TABLE V. Distribution of Vessels by Type, 1698

82

TABLE VI. Place of Build of Vessels Registered in Massachusetts, 1698

84

X

CONTENTS Relation Between Place of Build and Home Port of Vessels Registered in Massachusetts, 1698

86

Home Port of Vessels Built in Other New England Colonies, 1698

88

TABLE IX. Relation Between Residence of Investors and Home Port of Vessels, 1698

90

TABLE X. Concentration of Ownership in Massachusetts Vessels, 1698

92

TABLE XI. Concentration of Ownership in Non-Massachusetts Vessels, 1698

93

Concentration of Sole Ownership in Massachusetts Vessels, 1698

93

TABLE VII.

TABLE VIII.

TABLE XII.

TABLE XIII. Vessels Registered in Massachusetts,

1697-

1714

94

TABLE XIV. Captured Vessels Registered in Massachusetts, 1697-1714

98

Percentage of Total Massachusetts Shipping Held by Massachusetts Towns, 1697-1714

98

TABLE XV.

TABLE XVI. Distribution of Vessels by Type, 1697-1714

100

Shipbuilding in Massachusetts, 1 6 7 4 - 1 7 1 4

102

TABLE XVII.

TABLE XVIII. Registered Vessels Built Outside Massachusetts, 1678-1714

106

Relation Between Place of Build and Home Port of Vessels Registered in Massachusetts, 1697-1714

110

xxa. Place of Build and Year of Registration of Boston Vessels, 1697-1714

116

xxb. Place of Build and Year of Registration of London Vessels, 1 6 9 7 - 1 7 1 4

118

xxc. Place of Build and Year of Registration of Vessels from "Other British Isles," 1697-1714

119

xxia. Home Port of Vessels Built in Boston and Registered Within One Year of Build, 1697-1714

120

xxib. Home Port of Vessels Built in Charlestown and Registered Within One Year of Build, 1697-1714

120

TABLE XIX.

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

CONTENTS

xi

Home Port of Vessels Built in Salem and Registered Within One Year of Build, 1697-1714

122

xxid. Home Port of Vessels Built in Scituate and Registered Within One Year of Build, 1697-1714

122

xxie. Home Port of Vessels Built in Newbury and Registered Within One Year of Build, 1697-1714

122

XXII. Relation Between Residence of Investors and Home Port of Vessels, 1699-1714

124

XXIII. Concentration of Ownership in Massachusetts Vessels, 1699-1714

126

Concentration of Sole Ownership in Massachusetts Vessels, 1699-1714

126

XXV. Location of Holdings of Investors in Ten or More Massachusetts Vessels, 1697-1714

127

XXVI. Changes in Composition of the Massachusetts Fleet, 1697-1714

127

Investors in Ten or More Vessels, 1697-1714

128

T A B L E XXIC.

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

TABLE

T A B L E XXIV.

TABLE

TABLE

T A B L E XXVII.

APPENDIX: A NOTE ON PROCEDURE

135

INDEX

145

Introduction

1. The Register The Massachusetts Register of Shipping covering the years 1697— 1714 1 was a by-product of a broad effort to regulate the commercial economy of England's empire, a response to mercantilist demands for administrative procedures by which to channel the flow of commerce and nourish England's merchant marine. England's policy in regard to shipping had been outlined at the Restoration, but a generation passed before enforcement procedures were fully elaborated. A major provision of the Navigation Act of 1660 restricted trade with England's colonies to vessels of English or English colonial ownership whose masters and three fourths of whose crews were English. The intent of the law was clear but the manner of its enforcement was not. The law simply stated the requirement and bound the governors and the customs officers to enforce it. Only in the case of foreign-built vessels owned by Englishmen was the procedure elaborated. The owners of such vessels were to swear "that no Foreigner directly or indirectly hath any Part Interest or Share therein," upon which they were to be issued a certificate; the customs officers were to "keep a Register of all such Certificates . . . and return a Duplicate thereof to the ChiefOfficers of the Customs at London." The Fraud Act of 1662, aimed at a more rigid enforcement of the system, also limited such registration to foreign-built vessels.It was a generation later, as a result of a commercial crisis brought 1

"Register of all such Ships and Vessels Concerning the Owners and Property whereof Proofe hath been made upon Oath . . . according to y·' directions of . . . An Act For preventing Frauds and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade," Massachusetts Archives (State House, Boston, Mass.), vol. VII, 85-523. The first entry is dated November 23, 1697, the last October 5, 1714. 2 12 Car. II, cap. 18, i, x; 13-14 Car. II, cap. 11, vi.

4

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

on by the pressure of war with France, widespread smuggling, and the fear of Scottish competition in the colonial trade, that the limited registration provision of the earlier Acts was extended to all vessels trading in the plantations. The Act for Preventing Frauds and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade, passed in April 1696, stated that after March 25, 1698, owners of all vessels engaged in trade with the colonies were to take an oath in writing (specified verbatim in the Act) describing the vessel, testifying to the place and date of its build, listing its owners, and stating explicitly "that no Foreigner, directly or indirectly, hath any Share, or Part, or Interest therein." The oath was to be registered by the local customs officers and the certificate of registration given to the ship's master, for whom it became an indispensable official document—in effect, a license to trade. A duplicate of the registration of these oaths was to be "immediately transmitted to the Commissioners of His Majesty's Customs in the Port of London, in order to be entred in a general Register." 3 This clause set in motion in London and in ports throughout the home islands and the overseas plantations the compilation of records which, if they had survived intact, would have provided an extraordinarily valuable body of information on the growth of the English and American shipping industries and on the development of the two societies and economies. Even the portions of the outport shipping registers that have survived, of which there is at least one in England covering the pre-Revolutionary years and two in American depositories, provide excellent material for statistical analysis. The pages that follow contain an attempt to exploit comprehensively one such remnant. 4 3

Michael G. Hall, "The House of Lords, Edward Randolph, and the Navigation Act of 1696," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., XIV ( 1 9 5 7 ) . 496 ff.; 7 and 8 Wm. Ill, cap. 22, xvii, xviii. 4 The central register and the related papers of the London customs house "seem to have disappeared for the whole period from its beginning to 1835." G. N. Clark, Guide to English Commercial Statistics, 1696-1782 (London, 1938), 50. Rupert C. Jarvis reports specifically that the general register of vessels in the plantation trade "from 1696 was lost in the burning down of the London Custom House in 1714"—a loss of precisely those years covered by the Massachusetts Register. "Liverpool Statutory Registers of British Merchant Ships," Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, CV (1953), 109. See Royal Commission on Public Records, Appendices

THE

REGISTER

5

Valuable though records such as the Massachusetts Register are, they have limitations and must be used with caution. T h e major limitations stem from the purpose for which these records were originally compiled. They were drawn up not to collect information but only to enforce the exclusion of foreign vessels from England's colonial trade by facilitating the secure identification of vessels' nationality. It was a licensing system, not a statistical survey, that was created by the registration clause of the A c t of 1 6 9 6 . O n e consequence of this fact was the restriction of the kinds of vessels listed. T h o u g h the A c t included for registration all vessels captured from the enemy, thus in o n e way considerably enhancing the subsequent value of the list, it excluded vessels engaged only in coastal or intra-plantation trade. Thus, not only were such small craft as "Hoys, Lighters, Barges, or any . . . other Vessels . . . to the Second Report . . . (London, 1914), II (Part II), 207, 248; Royal Commission on Public Records, Minutes of Evidence and Index to the Second Report . . . (London, 1914), II (Part III), 35. The Appendices . . . , 242-248, lists the holdings of shipping records in the outports of the British Isles. Of these only Liverpool has preserved its shipping register for the colonial period. For a discussion of that register, see Jarvis' article cited above. For excerpts from the American material in the Liverpool register, see American Neptune, I (1941), 167, 297. How many of the colonial registers are extant is not known, but an extensive digest of Philadelphia's is in print: "Ship Registers for the Port of Philadelphia, 1726-1775," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XXIII-XXVIII (1899-1904). A number of uses have been made of the present Massachusetts Register. The most extensive is the table included by Henry Hall in his "Report on the Ship-Building Industry of the United States," in the Tenth Census of the United States 1880 (Washington, 1884), VIII, 50 ff„ discussed in note 40 below. His figures have been widely copied; for example, by William A. Fairburn, Merchant Sail (Center Lovell, Maine, 1945-55), I, 232-233. Curtis Nettels has done some careful sampling of the data in The Money Supply of the American Colonies before 1720 (University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History, XX, Madison, 1934), 69-70; and Robert Moody has presented certain Carolina material from the Register in "Massachusetts Trade with Carolina, 1686-1709," North Carolina Historical Review, XX (1943), 43-53. Local historians of New England have long been familiar with the Register, drawing from it information relating to the towns or areas of their interest. See, for example, John J. Currier, Historical Sketch of Ship Building on the Merrimac River (Newburyport, 1877), 45-51; and L. Vernon Briggs, History of Shipbuilding on the North River . . . 1640-1872 (Boston, 1889), 336-339, 366-368, 393 ff.

6

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

whose Navigation is confined to the Rivers or Coasts" exempted from registration but so too was the coastal fishing fleet. The only vessels entered were those "as cross the Seas" or trade "from one Plantation to another." 5 The last section of the law illustrates particularly well the difficulties of using such a licensing register for statistical purposes. Paragraph xxi covered the problems created by changes in the identity of the vessels or the owners. A major identification of any vessel is its name, and so the Act stated that if a ship's name was changed the ship must be registered "de novo." The same full reregistration and cancellation of the previous certificate was required when shares in the vessel were transferred from a resident of one port to one of another. But, when there was "any Alteration of Property in the same Port, by the Sale of one or more Shares in any Ship after registring thereof," a simple "Indorsement on the Certificate of the Register before two Witnesses" establishing the nationality of the new owners would be sufficient.6 These stipulations, reasonable for the purposes of the Act, create problems for one attempting to extract summary figures from the registers. Accurate shipbuilding statistics must take account of the fact that some entries, though widely separated in time, duplicate each other, a situation resulting from changes in the vessel's name or from sales of shares outside the original port.7 Also, accurate figures on the ownership of vessels, on investments and ownership patterns, must take account of the fact that transfers of shares among residents of the same port did not require reregistration but only endorsement on the ship's certificate which was not copied into the original book and of which, therefore, no permanent record was kept. 5

7 and 8 Wm. Ill, cap. 22, xix, xx. 7 and 8 Wm. Ill, cap. 22, xxi. For details on procedures expected of customs officers upon changes of masters, of vessels' names, and of ownership, see Henry Crouch, A Complete Guide to the Officers of His Majesty's Customs in the Out-Ports . . . (London, 1732), 90-91. 7 The Act of 1696 did not provide for the difficulties created by the loss of ships' certificates. Legally, de novo registration in such cases was required only in 15 Geo. II, cap. 31, ii, iii (1742), but the practice was common from the first years, at least in Massachusetts. 6

THE REGISTER

7

Fortunately, two circumstances reduce the seriousness of these difficulties, though technical problems, to be discussed in due course, remain. In Massachusetts, if not elsewhere, it quickly became the practice to include in each reregistration the words "as formerly registered." The reregistrations are thus identifiable, and it is therefore possible by comparing them with the other entries to isolate those whose originals appear in the Register and to decide which information in these duplicates should be used. Equally important, the endorsement provision proved impractical and was abandoned. Successive endorsements, an eighteenth-century writer explained, soon covered the available space on the certificates, and as a result "in case of a change of property, even in the same port, the old register was generally given up, and a new one granted." 8 All transfers of property, consequently, not only those from port to port, may be traced in the Register. Further limitations and characteristics of the Register may best be discussed in connection with a sample entry. T h e following is an exact copy of one of the 1,696 entries in the Massachusetts Register from which the data in this study are derived: June 28 th 1699 ship Society

8

Andrew Belcher of Boston in the Province of ye Massachusetts Bay in New England Merchi made Oath That the Ship Society of the sd Port of Boston, whereof Benjamin Allin is at present Master being a Square Stem'd Vessel of the burthen of about One hundred and forty tuns, was built at Charlestown in the Province aboves'! in this present year 1699. and that Jeremiah Dummer of Boston afores1!, the sd Benjamin Allin of Salem in the Province afores·? John Loyd of London Merchant, Robert Rogers and John Kelly English Merch1.8 at Oporto in Portugal, together with him the sd Andrew Belcher are at present Owners thereof. And that no Forreigner directly or indirectly hath any Share or part or interest therein. Sworn before his Ex ey the Earle of Bellomont & Lawr. Hammond DColl r

John Reeves, A History of the Law of Shipping and Navigation (London, 1 7 9 2 ) , 4 2 7 - 4 2 8 . Reeves points out that it was largely the practice of endorsing the certificates upon change of masters that exhausted the available space. Though not written into the original law, endorsement upon change of

8

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

One might note first that the primary identification of vessels was by type and name, the word "ship" in this usage not being synonymous with "vessel" but indicating a particular classification of vessels based primarily on rigging. Similarly, "Merch4." is also meant to indicate a precise classification. Most of the proper names inscribed in the Register are followed by some such occupational description, and, although there was considerable uncertainty as to such classifications, nevertheless the stated occupational description is a significant and usable piece of information. The phrase "of the sd Port of Boston" was also meant to have a particular meaning. Eighteenth-century merchants and seamen "had a clear conception of ships as belonging to one definite port." The criterion for establishing such maritime residence could be exclusively neither the port most frequently contacted in the course of trade nor the residence of the owner or of the majority of shareholders if for no other reason than that both shifted from time to time. The common practice, which was written into law in the extensive revision of the Navigation Acts in 1786, was that "the Port to which any Ship or Vessel shall hereafter be deemed and taken to belong . . . [is] the Port from and to which such Ship or Vessel shall usually trade . . . and at or near which the Husband, or acting and managing Owner or Owners of such Ship or Vessel usually resides or reside." The determining element, in other words, was the operating headquarters of the vessel, the residence of its manager. 9 The phrase "of the burthen of about One hundred and forty tuns" raises the troublesome problem of late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century tonnage measurements. Tonnage figures in that period were often approximations, and a glance at the tonnages in masters was soon made part of the instructions sent out to the customs officers. See Crouch, Complete Guide, 90-91. The question arises as to when the practice described by Reeves began. N o precise answer can be given, but since the Massachusetts Register contains a good number of reregistrations upon change of ownership within the same port, we have assumed it was common from the beginning—from the time the first transfers of originally registered shares were made. 9 T. S. Willan, The English Coasting Trade 1600-1750 (Manchester, 1938), Appendix 6 ("The Registration of Shipping"); 26 Geo. Ill, cap. 60, iii.

THE

REGISTER

9

the Massachusetts Register makes clear that some kind of estimation system was in use in the Bay Colony; the listings are round figures, most often multiples of ten. Such approximations probably tended to scale tonnages d o w n since certain fees were based o n these figures.10

Nevertheless, rough as these figures are, they were based

o n a calculation; the rounding-off was done upon a base figure arrived at by an arithmetical procedure. 1 1 T o n n a g e was the measure of a ship's capacity calculated in units of 4 0 cubic feet ( a conventionalized figure originally based o n the size of the medieval French wine cask, the tun).

T h e exact formula employed varied from place

to place and time to time, but the o n e adopted by the English N a v y in 1 6 7 7 seems to have been widely used in Massachusetts as elseX where: Τ =

(L — 3 / 5 B ) Χ Β χ ^

1/2B

. where L is the length on

deck and Β the greatest breadth. 1 2 The point, however, is less the details of the formula than the fact that the tonnages in the Register, though round figures, are based o n real measurements. Inspection of the list of owners in the sample entry will m a k e 10

E.g., the Massachusetts Rates and Duties Act, 1695, in The Acts and Resolves . . . of the Massachusetts Bay (Boston, 1869-1922), I, 207-208. 11 There is no reason to believe that the Massachusetts tonnage figures were wholly formalized, as Clark reports certain of the English ones to have been in the 1690's. The English ships in the port of London, Clark writes, were "estimated at 112 tons each, the foreign ships there at 125, the English ships in the outports at 72 tons, the foreign at 98." Guide, 51. In Massachusetts the government repeatedly demanded that tonnage figures be as exact as possible. Macpherson's estimate of 50 per cent error in tonnage figures, quoted by Clark, is far too high for Massachusetts. Compare Thomas Irving's testimony of 1792, in Journal of the House of Commons, XLVII (1792), 357. 12 John Lyman, "Register Tonnage and its Measurement," American Neptune, V (1945), 223-225. A simpler version, in effect Length χ Breadth X Depth divided by 94, was written into law for purposes of setting tonnage fees in 6 and 7 Wm. Ill, cap. 12, χ (1695). For the fuller history of tonnage measurements see the references cited by Abbott P. Usher, "The Growth of English Shipping 1572-1922," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XLII (1928), 466 n. The official Massachusetts version of the formula was stated in the Rates and Duties Act of 1695 cited in note 10 above: "the breadth at the main beam within board, the depth to be accounted half the said breadth, and the length three times so much as the breadth, after the usual manner of multiplying, and dividing the product by one hundred." In practice the following formula, taken from a 1695 shipbuilding contract, is more typical of

10

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING,

1697-1714

clear a more intractable limitation of the data. The names, occupations, and residences of all the owners are listed, but the shares each held are not. Consequently, with the important exception of solely owned vessels, there is no way of establishing precisely how much shipping—how much tonnage—each person could claim. This is an important weakness; it obviously limits the effectiveness of any analysis of ownership. But imperfect as it is, the information on ownership that does appear in the Register is extremely valuable. It is, in the first place, possible and useful to note who—which individuals from what places and of what occupations—invested in vessels of each particular location and of each place of manufacture. Further, mere frequency of investment by the various owners is significant. Also, it is revealing to know the various combinations of investors: the patterns of ownership groupings by individuals, towns, and regions. But one seeks to overcome this weakness of the records more completely, for the size of the holdings of the various investors is clearly important. Though only in cases of solely owned vessels can the amount of tonnage owned be known exactly, a sense of the relative amounts held can be obtained by assuming that shares were equal. Investigation of shipping contracts reveals that the range of differences in portions held was relatively small—notably so in comparison with the parcelization of the ownership of cargoes. In the main findings, involving large totals where such differences tend to average out, the assumption of equal shares would appear to be quite realistic. 13 actual measurements: the tonnage was to be derived by "dividing the product of the Multiplication of her length, breadth and hälfe breadth for her depth one into another by Ninety and Five, and after the same rate for a part of a tonn." Massachusetts Archives, LXII, 74. The convenient shorthand phrasing for this formula is that of the 1694 contract printed in American Neptune, II (1942), 338: "half the ships breadth to measure for depth and devide by the number ninety-five." By the end of the eighteenth century measurement procedures were standardized. Compare Samuel E. Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts (Boston, 1921), 14 n; the Tonnage Act of 1773 (13 Geo. Ill, cap. 74); "Tonnage Rules in 1799," American Neptune, I (1941), 295-296. 13 A sampling of shipbuilding and ship sales contracts for this period shows that the kind of fringe participation that was common in the ownership of merchandise was rare in possession of shipping. Whereas shares of

THE REGISTER

11

Nevertheless, the fact remains that, except for solely owned vessels, analysis of the Register will not show the actual amounts held by the investors. The passages and tables below that are based on the assumption of equal shares are clearly labeled. In using them the reader should keep in mind not only these general considerations but also the possibility that these figures contain at least one specific and consistent bias. It would seem to be a reasonable assumption, substantiated by the high correlation between frequency of investment and sole ownership, that frequency of investment and size of investment rose together. If this is true, the principle of equal shares would tend consistently to minimize the holdings of the frequent investors and, at the same time, to exaggerate the holdings of the infrequent ones. A related problem was created by the fact that occasionally names of owners were found to be followed by the words "& Co." In these cases equal distribution of shares would appear to be an even less justifiable assumption than in others, since presumably the individual concerned was representing an unknown number of other investors. But, since such cases were few and since in all probability the number of people involved in associations of this sort was very small, the qualification was ignored for purposes of analysis. The results of this decision would appear to be more realistic than those of the alternative of dropping such entries altogether. cargoes could be splintered down to the most minute fractions, shares of vessels, though occasionally as small as He, were only very rarely smaller than that and most often larger. The common expedient Pares notes of supplementing sailors' wages "by the 'privilege' of loading so many barrels or hogsheads on the outward and homeward voyage on the sailors' own account" was not extended to participation in ownership of the vessel, except possibly in the case of the ship's master. Richard Pares, Yankees and Creoles (Cambridge, 1956), 20-21, 120. Typical of the ownership arrangements preserved in the Jeffries Papers of the Massachusetts Historical Society is that of the President of Boston whose five owners in 1685 divided possession as follows: VA, VS, 1/4, HE, HE (vol. VI, 105); the Richard ( 1 6 9 2 ) : VA, VA, VS, VS, Vi (XVI, 59); the Dolphin ( 1 7 0 4 ) : two equal shares (XVII, 6 6 ) ; the Josiah and Clement ( 1 7 1 0 ) : Vs, VA, VS, VA (XVIII, 16); the Neptune ( 1 7 0 8 ) : sixteen shares divided in the proportions, 2,2,2,1,1,1,3,1,1,2 (XVIII, 5 6 ) . Similarly, in Bristol, England, "Halves, quarters, eighths and sixteenths were the usual fractions into which ownership was divided." Patrick McGrath, "Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth Century," Mariner's Mirror, XL (1954). 284.

12

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

The details of these cases are explained in footnotes to both the text and the tables.14 A final characteristic of the Register provides a starting point for analysis. The registrations fall into two distinct groups. Since there is no indication of the ultimate disposition of the vessels listed, it is impossible to know the size and character of the fleet as a whole once the compilation was under way. All registrations made subsequent to those of the fleet existing at the time of the passage of the Act were either of newly built vessels, of newly captured vessels, or of those whose certificates had been lost or whose names or owners had changed. The initial set of registrations, therefore, is obviously unique; it alone provides material for a cross-sectional picture. The law as passed required all registrations to be completed by March 25, 1698, but because of delays and difficulties the period of grace was extended nine months until December 25, 1698.15 Thus, one may assume that two years and eight months after the passage of the Act all English vessels in the colonial trade had been duly licensed. Registrations up to December 25, 1698, therefore, may be taken as a unit to provide a picture of the size and character of the merchant fleet as it existed at a particular point at the end of the seventeenth century.16 14 In several cases the "& Co." presented no problem since it clearly referred to a combination of the named investors. The total number of vessels whose ownership was made indeterminate by the phrase is thirty-two. 15 Leonard W. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors 1670-1776 (New York, 1935), II, 782-783. 16 One might have expected that since the length of time between the passage of the Fraud Act and the terminal date for registration was so great many vessels registered early would have been sold abroad or lost at sea by December 25, 1698, and therefore that the summary figures as of that date represent not the existing fleet but rather a two and one half year accumulation of holdings, many of which had already been disposed of. But, in fact, the registrations were not stretched out over the whole period of grace. N o registrations at all were made in 1696, and there are only two for 1697. There was, instead, a great bunching of entries in a very few weeks in the spring of 1698 followed by a severe slackening-off until the spring of 1699. Since it is reasonable to suppose that Massachusetts vessels voyaging abroad after the passage of the Act were registered at home upon their return and that losses before the end of 1698 of those so registered would have been few, it is difficult to imagine how a more complete picture of the existing fleet could have been made.

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING IN 1698 2. Dimensions of the Fleet In Table I, which presents the over-all characteristics of the merchant fleet registered in Massachusetts as of December 25, 1698, the vessels are divided into five categories according to region of home port. Since these same divisions will be used in almost all of the tables and in the introductory discussion, it is important to understand exactly what they include. "Massachusetts" refers to all of the territory of the province of Massachusetts as it was known during the years covered by the Register, with the exception of Maine. Maine is included in "Other New England," which also covers New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. "Other America" indicates all English territory on the North American mainland south and west of New England. "British Isles" includes England, Ireland, Scotland, and the Channel Islands. The category "West Indies, etc." includes the West Indies, the Wine Islands (Madeira, the Azores, and the Canaries), Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia. This group of territories will also be referred to in the Introduction as "Atlantic and Caribbean Islands." These divisions vary as to the definitiveness of the material they contain. Figures for the ports outside New England represent only an accidental sampling of the fleets of those towns. Only the information pertaining to the first two groups, covering New England, is close to complete; only the figures for the first, Massachusetts, are definitive. These variations result from the differing probabilities of vessels' certifications appearing on the Boston Register. Most inclusive—

14

M A S S A C H U S E T T S SHIPPING,

1697-1714

and as near complete as any such list of this period could b e — a r e the figures for Massachusetts vessels, for almost certainly this Register was the only one being kept in Massachusetts during these years. Slightly less likely to be complete are the figures for vessels whose h o m e ports were elsewhere in N e w England: though the same Register in all probability served these colonies as well, the N e w York Register m a y have drawn off some of the vessels from Connecticut and R h o d e Island. Vessels from other regions, however, were entered o n this Register only accidentally, either because they had been bought from N e w England shipyards or because there happened to have been a need for reregistration in the vicinity of Boston. 1 7 T h e information pertaining to vessels from outside N e w England, however partial it m a y be, is nevertheless of great value: it 17

We have found no evidence to suggest, and much to disprove, the existence of a second Massachusetts or New England register for these years. In the first place, comparison of the figures in the present Register with other contemporary estimates of Massachusetts and New England shipping makes clear that little if any of it was entered in other registers. More important, the districts for purpose of registration were legally defined "ports," and it is definitely known that in 1707 the official "port" of Boston "extended to all the four Provinces of New England." Though it was correctly said in 1768 that from this original "Extensive District . . . Several other Districts have been separated and divided," none of the changes before 1714 appear to have affected registration. The first of these alterations, the appointment in 1707 of a separate collector for Boston proper, created great confusion precisely because it had not been accompanied by a redefinition of the legal "port." If the creation in 1709 of separate customs collectors for New Hampshire, Salem, and Rhode Island did lead to a limitation of the Boston "port," the change had no discernible effect on registrations. Report of Joseph Harrison and Benjamin Hallowell to the American Board of Customs Commissioners, April 30, 1768, in Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, LVIII (1924-1925), 419-420, 421; Letter from Governor Dudley to the Board of Trade, November 10, 1707, in William A. Shaw, ed., Calendar of Treasury Books (London, 1904), XXI, part II (1706-1707), 332; ibid., XXIII, part II (1709), 255-256. Mr. Rupert C. Jarvis, Librarian of the London Customs House, reports having seen nothing in the English documents at variance with our conclusion on this point. We are most grateful to Mr. Jarvis for his detailed responses to questions concerning registration procedures, and particularly for his kindness in making available extracts from his unpublished study, "The History of the Statutory Registry of British Merchant Ships," Customs Library, London.

DIMENSIONS OF THE FLEET, 1698

15

furnishes average characteristics of vessels and ownership patterns upon which to base comparisons; it provides evidence of New Englanders' investments abroad; and, since no vessel could cross the seas even on a maiden voyage without registration, it gives complete figures on investments by non-Americans in vessels built in Massachusetts. Wherever possible, therefore, this information is included. In Table I the top row of figures, pertaining to Massachusettsbased vessels, shows that Massachusetts' merchant fleet at the end of the seventeenth century consisted of 171 vessels, totaling 8,453 tons, an average of 49.4 tons per vessel. This fleet was owned by 332 individuals. Relatively few of the vessels (28.1 per cent in number, 19.3 per cent in tonnage) were owned by single individuals; on the average 3.4 people joined in ownership. The average tonnage per investor was 25.5. 18 These figures for Massachusetts contrast rather sharply with those of other regions. Vessels from elsewhere in New England were less than half the size of Massachusetts', while those based in the British Isles were, on the average, two and one half times as large as those of Massachusetts; London's taken separately were three times larger than the Bay Colony's. The home islands' ships were five and one half times the size of the few vessels from the lesser New England colonies. Shipping from the Atlantic and Caribbean Islands averaged almost two and one half times the size of the Massachusetts vessels and five times the average of those of New England outside Massachusetts. 18

These figures, like all those presented in the Introduction and in the tables, result from a long process of checking and rechecking; they are as accurate as we were able to make them. But though we have spared no effort to achieve complete accuracy we do not flatter ourselves that we have attained it. Errors are inevitable; they creep in during the original coding process, during the card-punching, and during the entire subsequent analysis. Indeed, even the machines make mistakes, as we discovered to our dismay one day when a hair in the wire brush of the sorter that electrically scans the cards for punches became slightly bent and mis-sorted 4,725 cards, leading to the preparation of a handsome but fantastic table. We do not, therefore, claim flawless accuracy. But we ignored no possibility of checking for errors, and we are confident that whatever inaccuracies remain are minor and in no way affect the sense of magnitude and degree we seek to convey.

16

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

Understandably, the average number of co-owners per vessel tended to increase with the average size of the vessel, though the correlation between the two sets of figures is not perfect. Vessels from the British Isles, averaging 127 tons, were owned by an average of four shareholders; those from Connecticut and New Hampshire, averaging 23 tons, by close to two and one half owners. But the Massachusetts vessels were owned by a larger number of investors than these figures would suggest. It is possible that this represents a real difference in risk-taking on the part of the investors in the Bay Colony's shipping, but the full significance of the point can emerge only from study of the investment patterns, which will be found in Section 4. The eighth column, showing vessels wholly owned by single individuals, provides particularly interesting information. Sole ownership was negligible outside of Massachusetts. That it was not a particularly attractive form of investment for English merchants whose vessels were averaging 127 tons is not surprising, but that it was also unpopular in Connecticut and New Hampshire where vessels were averaging 23 tons, or, as will be seen in Table II, almost equally unpopular in Massachusetts except for Boston and Salem, is less easily explained. Full explanation here too must await the details on ownership patterns, but the information in Table I suggests at least a tentative interpretation. Sole ownership became attractive at the conjunction of two conditions: where the efficient size of vessels was small enough to keep the capital demands and risks within reasonable limits (which appears to have been considerably less than 90 tons), and where mercantile capital had accumulated in individual concentrations large enough to make such investments and risks feasible. Table II presents further details about the Massachusetts vessels. It will be seen that no fewer than fifteen Massachusetts towns claimed seagoing shipping, and these towns were spread along the Atlantic coast from Nantucket to Newbury.19 Aside from Nan1!l

The home ports of two vessels, it will be noted, were entered simply as "New England." Since this designation in all probability was used to refer to Massachusetts vessels, we have included such entries in the totals for Massachusetts but not in those of any particular town within the colony, nor, when

DIMENSIONS OF THE FLEET, 1698

17

tucket they may be grouped regionally as Boston Bay (three towns), North Shore (six), South Shore (two), and Cape Cod (three). Obviously the center of concentration was the Boston Bay area which claimed 76.9 per cent of all ships and 80.1 per cent of the tonnage. Salem, the second port of the province, claimed shipping in number and capacity about one sixth that of the metropolis. All the ports south of Boston combined owned only 5.3 per cent of the ships, representing 4.5 per cent of the tonnage; the ports north of Boston, excluding Salem, also held 5.3 per cent of the vessels, but only 3.3 per cent of the tonnage. The relation between numbers of owners per vessel and average tonnage is again worth noting. Now it becomes clear that not only does the number of owners fail to rise evenly with the size of the vessels, but at the bottom of the scale—in the case of the smallest vessels based in the smallest towns—the number of co-owners rises sharply. In towns like Beverly and Lynn it took the pooling of the resources of the leading townsmen to launch the community's single seagoing vessel. In such places no single individual was capable of capitalizing and assuming the risks of operating alone a vessel in the Atlantic trade. There are, therefore, no solely owned vessels in these towns. Sole ownership is almost exclusively a Boston and Salem monopoly. This interpretation is supported by the equivalent figures for the vessels based in New England ports outside Massachusetts. Table III presents this information. A more detailed breakdown of the data permits a closer examination of vessel characteristics. Table IV shows the distribution of vessel sizes. With two exceptions,-" only Boston and, Salem of the Massachusetts towns had vessels of over 80 tons' capacity; indeed, calculating each port's percentage of Massachusetts, in the total Massachusetts base number. -" One of the exceptions is a vessel listed as belonging to "New England"; its specific home port in all probability was Boston. The other exception is a 200-ton ship whose home port was listed as Scituate. This town, as we shall see below, was a major shipbuilding center, not a commercial entrepôt, and. though the vessel in question was registered in Scituate, its ownership was largely external to that town. The nine-man partnership that owned it is discussed on p. 25.

18

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

the largest vessel claimed by any other specific Massachusetts port was listed as 60 tons. For Boston, the median tonnage was 40; for Salem, it was 30; for the Massachuetts ports aside from Boston and Salem, it was 25. The category "Other New England" contains the smallest vessels. The largest registered from a Connecticut town was a 50-ton sloop of Glastonbury. All other vessels from the eight Connecticut and New Hampshire towns represented were less than 40 tons. The median figure is 20. One registration was of a 10-ton sloop from Newcastle, New Hampshire; Guilford, Connecticut, registered a 12-ton sloop—dangerously small vessels, one would think, even for the coastal trade, let alone for voyages abroad. The largest vessels were those from British ports; 6 of the 21 vessels listed from British bases were over 200 tons, and one was 400—a very sizable vessel for the time and place.-1 These large British vessels were all from London; the largest from "Other British Isles" was a 90-ton ship from Exeter. The median tonnage of vessels from London is 100; that of "Other British Isles," 62.5. Table V distributes the registrations by vessel type within home ports and gives the tonnage totals and averages for each such unit. The Massachusetts fleet was largely composed of sloops, brigantines, and ships: 42.7 per cent of the 171 vessels were sloops; 20.5 per cent were brigantines; 18.7 per cent were ships; 8.8 per cent were -1 According to Violet Barbour, the largest merchantmen of Charles II's time had capacities "of from 400 to 800 tons," and she cites the vessels of Sir Henry Johnston later in the century which were "engaged in the trades requiring ships of size . . . . They range from 150 to 800 tons, the average being 432.9 tons." These are extreme figures. The average tonnage of the 124 English-built vessels clearing Bristol in the year 1670-71 was 47.8; of those entering, 43.1. Over a century later, merchantmen were still of approximately the same size. In the 1790's, according to Albion, they averaged only about 100 tons: "only 201 of the 15,000 in 1790 measured over 400 tons. Most of England's commerce to the West Indies, the Baltic, and the Mediterranean was carried on in tubby little vessels about 300 tons in size." Violet Barbour, "Dutch and English Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth Century," E. M. Carus-Wilson, ed., Essays in Economic History (London. 1954), 228-229; Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power (Cambridge, Mass., 1926), 116. The capacity of Massachusetts' vessels in the late seventeenth century was sizable even by later standards: "four hundred tons meant a great ship as late as 1815." Morison, Maritime History, 15.

DIMENSIONS OF THE FLEET, 1698

19

2

ketches; and 8.2 per cent were barks. - Measuring by tonnage one finds a different emphasis since the average ship was almost five times the capacity of the average sloop, and the average brigantine close to twice as large. By tonnage, the proportions of the Massachusetts fleet were, ships, 41.3 per cent; sloops, 22.5 per cent; brigantines, 19.1 per cent; barks, 8.2 per cent; ketches, 5.8 per cent. The configuration of vessel types in the two leading Massachusetts ports was quite different from that of the other towns. Boston and Salem together controlled all but one of the ships, all but two of the brigantines, all the ketches, and all but one of the barks; but 27.8 per cent of the smallest vessels, the sloops, were owned by the lesser Massachusetts towns. The New Hampshire and Connecticut towns registered sloops almost exclusively. Vessels from "West Indies, etc." and from the British Isles, on the average the largest registered, were predominantly ships, though the West Indian ports claimed several large sloops. Among the Britishbased vessels, ships accounted for 71.4 per cent of all those registered and 88.2 per cent of the tonnage. There was, however, considerable variation in the sizes of vessels fitted out as ships. The average ship based in the British Isles was 47.5 tons larger than the average ship of Massachusetts; those based in "West Indies, etc." were still larger than the British; those of London taken separately were the largest of all. The average ship whose home port was London was nearly twice the size of the average Boston-based ship; it was two and one half times the size of ships based elsewhere in the British Isles (Exeter, Taunton, and the Isle of Jersey). 22 Sloops of this period—small, single-masted vessels usually built with a cabin on deck at the stern—were widely employed in the West Indies trade, as were the somewhat larger, two-masted ketches. Brigantines, larger still, were also two-masted; but the ships, which were the largest vessels ordinarily found in the colonial trade and which carried most of the transoceanic commerce, were three-masted. The less c o m m o n barks were also three-masted. Both pinks and flyboats were indeterminate as to rig and hull. For detailed descriptions and illustrations, see John Robinson and George F. D o w , Sailing Ships of New England 1607-1907 (Salem, 1 9 2 2 ) , 9 - 3 3 ; Howard I. Chapelle, The History of American Sailing Ships ( N e w York, 1 9 3 5 ) , l l f f . ; Edgar L. Bloomster, Sailing and Small Craft Down the Ages (Annapolis, 1940), 91ff.

20

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

These first five tables serve to show the dimensions of the merchant fleet registered in Boston in 1698, but it is difficult to gauge the historical reality they represent when they are taken in isolation. A realistic sense of their contemporary meaning can be gained only by contrasting them with comparable statistics of other regions during the same period. Though such figures are difficult to obtain and notoriously unreliable, nevertheless they will suggest a scale by which to assess the Massachusetts statistics. The best estimate of the total tonnage of England's merchant marine at the end of the seventeenth century is an over-all sum of 267,444 tons. Subtracting from this figure for purposes of comparison the tonnage of the coal barges and fishing vessels, one may adjust the figure to 180,469 tons. Of this total for England, London claimed a far greater percentage than any other port in the realm: 46 per cent of the total involved in foreign trade, 20 per cent of the coastal trade. Obviously, the shipping of the ancient metropolis, one of the great maritime centers of the world, was of a different order of magnitude from that of the wilderness boom town of Boston.23 English Merchant Shipping, January 1702 24

London Bristol Boston,

Number of vessels

Tonnage

560 165

84,882 17,338

143 102 115 121 100 109

9,914 8,619 7,564 7,107 6,860 6,819

71,977 10,299

6,443

Mass.

Yarmouth Liverpool Hull Exeter Scarborough Whitby

Adjusted tonnage

5,889 5,120 4,493 4,222 4,075 4,050

23 Lawrence A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws (New York, 1939), 329 n.; compare p. 339. 24 J. H. Andrews, "English Merchant Shipping in 1701," Mariner's Mirror, XLI (1955), 232-235. Andrews does not print the London figures, which will be found in David Macpherson, Annals of Commerce . . . (London, 1805), II, 719 n. The adjusted tonnages were arrived at by reducing the total for each of the outports by the percentage of the combined total of all the outports represented by the fishing and coaling vessels (40.6 per cent) established by Harper. Navigation Laws, 329 n.

DIMENSIONS OF THE FLEET, 1698

21

Nor is it surprising that Boston's shipping, indeed, that of the whole of New England, was dwarfed by that of London. What is surprising is the favorable way Boston compared with the English outports, in fact with every other commercial center in England but London. Subtracting from the January 1702 outport totals the estimated tonnage of fishing and coaling vessels, one finds that only Bristol, the second largest port in England, was superior in shipping to Boston. If the same proportionate reduction is applied to the numbers of vessels claimed by the various ports, Boston in this respect was second only to London.2" But Boston alone of the Massachusetts port towns compared favorably with the English outports; the rest of the Colony's shipping communities appear as insignificant coastal villages when placed against the scale of English towns. In numbers of vessels Salem, the second Massachusetts port, would have ranked 39th among the 79 English towns that claimed any shipping at all and 31st in tonnage. Of the other American towns in competition with Boston, only New York was a serious contender. New York's capacity in this period was estimated, rather generously, by Lord Bellomont in 1700, presumably on the basis of an examination of the shipping registers. He reported that the province of New York owned 124 vessels, as opposed to the town of Boston's 194; only 6 of them, as opposed to Boston's 25, were over 100 tons. When he came to assess the comparative size of Boston's fleet it was not New York or any other colony he chose as a basis of comparison, but the home islands: "There are," the Irish peer concluded, "more good vessels belonging to the town of Boston than to all Scotland and Ireland." 26 25

The numbers of vessels, reduced by the same percentage, are, Bristol, 98; Yarmouth, 85; Exeter, 72; Hull, 68; Whitby, 65; Liverpool, 61; Scarborough, 59. Boston's fleet, it will be recalled from Table II, was composed of 124 vessels. 26 Ε. B. O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, eds., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of . . . New-York . . . (Albany, 1856-87), IV, 790. Bellomont's New York figures are certainly generous. In 1686 Dongan reported New York to have between 31 and 33 vessels averaging 46 tons each; the largest of them ranged from 80 to 100 tons, and of these there were 9 or 10. In 1749 Clinton reported the shipping of New York to consist of 157 vessels totaling 6,406 tons, an average of 41 tons per vessel. Ibid., III, 398; VI, 511.

22

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

Nowhere else in the mainland colonies was there a shipping center rivaling Boston. In 1700 Bellomont reported 24 vessels for the whole of New Hampshire; nine years later the figure had risen to only 30. In 1708 and 1709 Connecticut could not claim over 20 small craft; even Rhode Island, beginning the important phase of its maritime history, possessed less than 30 vessels. Of the 248 vessels that entered Maryland's ports between 1689 and 1693, the great majority were of English ownership; only 17 per cent were owned in Maryland. New England shipowners handled more of Maryland's traffic than did residents of the colony itself. Virginia was even more dependent than Maryland on outside shipping. In 1698 Governor Andros of Virginia stated that the 70,000 inhabitants of that colony possessed a total of 27 vessels. South Carolina in the same year reported only 10 or 12 vessels.-7 In discussing the shipping of Massachusetts and of its metropolis, then, we are dealing with one of the major maritime centers of the Atlantic world. In magnitude its shipping was easily the most important in America; its equivalent was the ancient port of Bristol, second only to London in the British Isles. -7 Nettels, Money Supply, 102; William N. Sainsbury, et al., eds., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series . . . (London, 1860), 1697-1698, §550; 1700, §953; 1708-1709, §§323, 392; V. J. Wyckoff, "Ships and Shipping of Seventeenth Century Maryland," Maryland Historical Magazine, XXXIV (1939), 350; Margaret S. Morriss, Colonial Trade of Maryland, 1689-1715 (Baltimore, 1914), 113.

3. Manufacture of the 1698 Fleet Where was the 1698 fleet built? The Register affords a unique opportunity to fix with precision the year by year production of the Massachusetts shipbuilding industry, but the data it supplies on this point are complete only for the years after 1698 when the Fraud Act was in full effect and every seagoing vessel produced in Massachusetts had to be registered before beginning its first voyage. The figures on production in the earlier years are not wholly recoverable from the Register; to the extent that they are, they will be presented in the comprehensive tables discussed in Section 6. The aim of the present section is not to describe the entire Massachusetts shipbuilding industry at the end of the seventeenth century but only to make clear the physical origins of the segment of its product registered in Massachusetts as of December 25, 1698. Table VI locates the place of build of all vessels registered by December 25, 1698, town by town within Massachusetts, elsewhere by grosser categories. The vessels are listed by type and then totaled for each place of manufacture. Not unexpectedly, Boston was the leading contributor to the 1698 fleet, its yards producing 25.5 per cent of the registered vessels built in Massachusetts and 28.7 per cent of the tonnage. Other results are less predictable. Scituate's shipbuilding role was remarkably large. That town was second only to Boston, accounting for 24.8 per cent of the registered vessels produced in the Bay Colony and 21.4 per cent of the tonnage. It led Salem by a considerable margin and outdistanced Charlestown. Milton is also higher than might have been expected, leading Newbury in tonnage built and ranking sixth in the number of vessels produced. In general, the table shows that shipbuilding in Massachusetts was carried

24

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING,

1697-1714

on widely throughout the province but that the bulk of it was produced in a very few places. Boston and Scituate together built 50.1 per cent of the total tonnage produced in Massachusetts and registered before 1699. The last column in the table permits finer distinctions to be drawn. The average sizes of vessels built in the various towns are significant figures. They show that only one town, Charlestown, was specializing in the production of large vessels. Only two of the fourteen registered vessels built in Charlestown were sloops. The overall average for the town was 136.1 tons, which was far higher than the next largest average, that of the vessels captured from the enemy. Even more remarkable is the fact that the type of vessel most frequently produced in Charlestown, the ship, averaged no less than 191.1 tons. The same type of vessel produced by Salem averaged 140.0 tons, that of Boston, 121.4, that of Scituate, 97.0 tons. Milton produced only one registered vessel of this description, but it was of 300 tons' capacity. Boston and Scituate attained their over-all superiority of tonnage by the production of smaller vessels. Together they built over half of the sloops registered as constructed in Massachusetts. It was the sloop, whose general average capacity was 26.5 tons, that the minor shipbuilding towns most commonly built. New England outside of Massachusetts produced very little of the 1698 fleet. The single town of Scituate produced as much shipping as all the towns in New England outside of Massachusetts combined. The last two rows of Table VI have a particular interest. The figures on English production are extremely low. The British Isles produced only 3 of the 211 registered vessels, which account for a mere 1.9 per cent of the total tonnage. On the other hand, privateering was supplying a surprisingly high proportion of the vessels registered in the trade. Only four towns built more registered vessels than had been captured in the warfare of the 1690's; only three towns produced more tonnage. A somewhat different kind of analysis of the shipbuilding information becomes possible when the vessels are tabulated both by place of build and home port. One may then ask not merely what

M A N U F A C T U R E O F T H E 1698 F L E E T

25

towns built how many vessels, but what shipbuilding towns were supplying what specific markets. Table VII provides these figures. Note first the source of the vessels belonging to the port of Boston. Neither the local Boston yards nor those of Charlestown and Salem produced the most vessels for Boston, but rather the town of Scituate. This South Shore village produced 26.6 per cent of all Boston vessels and 24.9 per cent of the tonnage. Boston and Salem together supplied fewer vessels and only slightly more tonnage. Further, it should be noted that Scituate produced almost exclusively for the Boston market; only 5 of the 38 registered vessels it produced were owned elsewhere. These facts reveal a close and unique relation between Boston and Scituate. In effect, the smaller town was acting as a shipbuilding annex to the metropolis. The shipping needs of the Boston investors surely engrossed the economy of this coastal village. It had no seagoing commerce of its own. The single ship registered as owned in Scituate was in fact owned by a nine-man partnership, three members of which were from Boston, one from London, three from Bilbao, Spain, and only two from Scituate—one of whom soon thereafter moved permanently to Salem as, in all probability, did the other. There were four other main sources of Boston's shipping: Boston itself, Salem, Charlestown, and privateering. The last—shipping acquired in Boston by captures of enemy vessels—is remarkably extensive. Measured in tonnage, captured vessels rank third as a source of supply, after Scituate and Boston but before Salem and Charlestown. Further, it should be noted that Boston was the home port of the largest number of captured vessels. The large figures in the category "Other New England" do not represent real concentration. The spread of shipbuilding in this area is shown in Table VIII. Finally, with regard to Boston, Table VII makes clear the extent to which the Bay city was drawing on the shipbuilding resources of all the available New England yards. It registered more seagoing shipping built in Charlestown, Cambridge, Ipswich, Newbury, Amesbury, Milton, Scituate, Plymouth, Weymouth, Hingham, Taunton, Swansea, and Bristol than those towns registered themselves. Nevertheless, these towns were able to supply whatever small

26

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING,

1697-1714

needs they had with local manufacture. For the most part the shipping registered as based in these towns had been built in the towns concerned. A more precise understanding of the source of the vessels with British home ports is also supplied by Table VII. Charlestown and Boston together produced three fifths of the London vessels registered and 12 of the 21 registered altogether from the British Isles. London itself produced none of these English vessels; the three built in the British Isles were produced in Penreth (Cumberland), Yarmouth, and Cork and totaled 230 tons as opposed to the 9,420 tons produced in Massachusetts. Even more extreme, though not surprising considering local facilities, is the fact that all the vessels from the Atlantic and Caribbean Islands registered in Massachusetts had been built in New England.

4. Owners and Patterns of Investment Who owned the Massachusetts fleet of 1698? The inclusion in the Register of owners' names and residences makes it possible to consider the problem of ownership. Table IX presents the main compilation of data on ownership in the late seventeenth-century fleet. It relates residence of owners to home port of vessels, showing how many investments representing how much tonnage (on the basis of equal shares) were made by how many people from each locality in vessels of each area. The residences of people are listed in the rows town by town within Massachusetts, elsewhere, except for London, in regional categories. The home ports are entered in the columns. They show Boston and London separately; otherwise regional groupings are used. Each cell contains the number of people investing, the number of investments made, and the amount of tonnage these investments represented. Analysis may begin with the larger categories. The third column, totaling the vessels based in Massachusetts, repeats the information of Table I, that the fleet of approximately 8,500 tons was owned by no fewer than 332 individuals in 587 separate investments. Now it may also be seen that most of these owners were residents of Massachusetts (290, or 87.3 per cent). Nine, or 2.7 per cent, were inhabitants of the other New England colonies. Only eight were from the British Isles, a figure equal to that of investors resident in the Iberian peninsula (included in the "Other" residence category). More residents of the Caribbean and Atlantic Islands invested in Massachusetts shipping than did residents of the home islands. In terms of tonnage owned, based on an equal division of shares, Massachusetts residents claimed 91.3 per cent of the fleet; residents of the British Isles 2.1 per cent; and residents of the Caribbean and Atlantic Islands 1.7 per cent.

28

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING,

1697-1714

Clearly, then, the Massachusetts seagoing fleet was overwhelmingly home-owned. British capital was absent to a surprising degree, and what there was of it was quite evenly distributed among Britishers resident throughout the Atlantic world. More individuals in the rest of New England invested in Massachusetts shipping than did inhabitants of the British Isles, though, it is true, these small-town colonials could claim only slightly more than half as much tonnage. British colonials elsewhere in the Atlantic world made half again as many investments in Massachusetts shipping as did residents of the British Isles, though they too controlled less tonnage. As for the rest of New England, the column entitled "Other New England" expresses the striking fact that every share in New England vessels based outside Massachusetts was held by residents of this same general area. Individual holdings were small; it will be noted that no one person invested in more than one vessel. The "Total British Isles" column turns attention to New England investments abroad. The figures are significant. Massachusetts investors controlled a considerable share of the British shipping registered in Massachusetts: a sixth of the investments and over one fourth of the tonnage. Massachusetts residents, it should be added, were the only New Englanders to engage in this business, and in such enterprises they far outnumbered the British colonials resident elsewhere in the Atlantic world. The last column before the totals shows that Massachusetts people, alone of the other residence groups, invested in shipping based in the West Indies, the Wine Islands, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia. Thus far the figures indicate local ownership of shipping only as among provincial or large territorial units. How far down did local control go? Was ownership of vessels within Massachusetts monopolized by Boston, by a few towns, or was it locally owned town by town? The rows and columns in Table IX representing smaller geographical units contain the information needed to answer these questions. From them it will be seen, first, that Boston's vessels, comprising almost three fourths of all Massachusetts shipping, were largely owned by residents of that town. Of the total 261 investors in Boston's ships, 186 or 71.3 per cent were Bostonians; they ac-

OWNERS A N D INVESTMENTS, 1698

29

count for 80.8 per cent of the investments and a possible 84.6 per cent of the tonnage. The town second to Boston in its involvement with the provincial capital's shipping was its Bay neighbor, Charlestown; together the two towns controlled 84.3 per cent of Boston's investments and 86.8 per cent of its tonnage. In character if not degree, this localism was typical of the ownership of vessels throughout the Bay Colony. A separate analysis, not reproduced here, divided the "Other Massachusetts" column into its constituent towns. It revealed that all the ocean-going shipping of Cambridge, Newbury, Gloucester, Beverly, Lynn, Plymouth, Sandwich, and Nantucket was owned by townsmen or by residents of adjacent communities; Ipswich was autonomous except for two Boston investments. Aside from the three Boston investments in Scituate's one vessel, the only community to have a sizable proportion of its fleet owned by Bostonians was Salem. Bostonians owned 19.1 per cent of the investments in Salem's vessels, equaling a possible 17.0 per cent of the tonnage. Though the generalization holds that the seagoing vessels based in the small Massachusetts ports were largely locally owned, Boston's influence was still significant. It held 13.3 per cent of the investments in the shipping of all other Massachusetts towns and a possible 17.1 per cent of the tonnage. Furthermore, its control of shipping was extended by its ability to attract to itself the resources available in the Massachusetts hinterland for investment. Of the investments made by non-Bostonians in Massachusetts shipping, 30.7 per cent were made in vessels based in Boston. Thus Plymouth claimed for itself but a single seagoing vessel which was rated at only 15 tons, though, to be sure, its owner was a Plymouth resident; but, at the same time, Plymouth townsmen held six investments in Boston's vessels, totaling possibly 58.5 tons. Similarly, residents of Charlestown, Marshfield, Weymouth, and Bristol invested more heavily in the seagoing vessels of Boston than they did in vessels of their own. That Massachusetts villagers often chose to invest in Boston's fleet rather than in vessels of their own is not surprising. For, with a few exceptions, the Massachusetts towns listed were combined fishing and agricultural hamlets, not commercial centers. Their

30

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

residents' independent ventures in transoceanic shipping were few. Incapable of sustaining large-scale commercial activity, these villagers chose to invest in an established fleet rather than attempting to build up their own. Boston's importance is further brought out by its near-monopoly of Massachusetts investments placed abroad. Except for two holdings (one by a Charlestownian in a North Carolina vessel, another by a resident of Bristol in one of Antigua), all Massachusetts investments in registered vessels based outside the province were made by Bostonians. Table IX also permits a closer look at the British Isles as suppliers of shipping and at Massachusetts' investments abroad. It will be seen that the owners of the London-based shipping were mainly Londoners, owning thirty-seven of the total fifty-three investments and a possible 64.9 per cent of the tonnage. Bostonians held ten investments, totaling 28.1 per cent of the tonnage. The rest was divided fairly evenly among six investments by residents of Tenerifïe, Bilbao, and Lisbon. A separate compilation dividing the "Other British Isles" column into its smaller components showed that Exeter's vessels were owned by residents of that town, of Topsham, and of nearby Comstock. The vessels from the Isle of Jersey were owned by home-islanders for the most part; there was only one Boston investor. Two of the seven portions of Taunton shipping were held by Bostonians, who also owned one investment in Plymouth ships. As for the opposite side of the picture, British investments in Massachusetts shipping, a detailed breakdown of the "Other British Isles" row in Table IX revealed that only two English cities besides London—Exeter and Bristol—participated and only to a very small extent. Londoners account for only seven of the total 587 investments and 1.6 per cent of the tonnage of the province; only one Exonian and one resident of Bristol participated, each sharing in one Boston vessel. One resident of "England" was also listed as part-owner of a Boston vessel. Such are the general characteristics of ownership, those that relate to residence of owners. But what of the people? Was ownership concentrated in a few hands or widely distributed? What patterns of co-investment were there?

OWNERS AND INVESTMENTS, 1698

31

Table I made clear that the ownership of Massachusetts vessels was dispersed through a large population of investors, but the full significance of this fact emerges only from the "Total Massachusetts" column of Table IX. It now becomes evident that this large group was almost entirely drawn from the local population: of the 332 individuals involved, 290 were residents of Massachusetts, and of these, 193 were Bostonians. These preliminary figures alone indicate a radical change in the traditional structure of ownership. Typical of the Old World patterns, even in England only slowly changing, was the small shipowning oligarchy that shared more or less equally Bristol's shipping in the early seventeenth century.-8 In Massachusetts, and especially in the town of Boston, the mere numbers involved would seem to suggest by comparison some sort of economic democracy in shipping capital. Was this really the case? The answer largely depends on how evenly the ownership was distributed through the group of investors. Table X attempts to answer this question by listing the owners by frequency of investment; it also presents the total tonnage for each frequency group, necessarily on the basis of equal shares. The configuration suggested by the table is more complex than might have been expected. On the one hand, the table makes clear that the small investors had a preponderance in the over-all ownership of the Massachusetts fleet. No less than 91.9 per cent (305) of the 332 individuals who invested in Massachusetts shipping invested in three or fewer vessels. If the shares in each vessel had been equal, these small owners would have controlled 5,459.1 tons, or 64.5 per cent, of the total 8,457.3 tons.J0 On the other hand, at the top of the list of shipowners there were a very few people who controlled 28

Patrick V. McGrath, "The Merchant Adventurers and Bristol Shipping in the Early Seventeenth Century," Mariner's Mirror, XXXVI (1950), 74-77. 29 Three small vessels from Nantucket included owners who listed "& Co." after their names, making the real number of owners indeterminate. The totals used here, as explained on pp. 11-12, ignore the qualification. If the alternative of dropping these three vessels and their investors entirely from consideration and computing the totals and percentages without them had been used, the total tonnage would have been 5,394.2; and the percentage would have been 64.3.

32

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

an unusually large amount of shipping. The five leading investors 30 held 70, or 11.9 per cent, of the total 587 investments. Moreover, they controlled at least 1,491.2 tons, equivalent to 17.6 per cent of the province's total tonnage. Particularly striking is the fact that the two leaders, Samuel Lillie and Andrew Belcher, both of whom invested in more than twice as many vessels as their nearest competitor, owned 7.7 per cent of all shares in Massachusetts vessels, accounting for at least 10.9 per cent of the entire Massachusetts tonnage. Thus, the true picture of concentration in Massachusetts shipping in 1698 is not a simple one. Ownership was neither so widely distributed as to constitute an economic democracy in maritime capital nor so concentrated as to suggest a shipowning oligarchy. Ownership was widely held throughout the community, but circumstances permitted a considerable concentration of ownership in a small group. The significance of this distribution is further brought out by comparison with similar figures for vessels based in other areas. Table XI gives the distribution of ownership for vessels from New England ports outside Massachusetts, from the British Isles, and from the Atlantic and Caribbean Islands. The first and third parts of this table contrast especially sharply with the figures of Table X, for in both cases no one person invested more than once. And even in the case of the British-based ships, the spread of ownership is smaller than Massachusetts'; no one person or even few people dominated the scene.31 However clearly the patterns of ownership emerge from Tables X and XI, doubts must remain because the shares held by the various owners were of necessity determined arbitrarily in regard to 30

They were, in order of number of vessels invested in, Samuel Lillie, Andrew Belcher, Benjamin Gallop, Benjamin Marston, and Giles Dyer, Sr. See Table XXVII. 31 It is true that the two leading investors could claim a possible 18.3 per cent of the British-based tonnage. In terms of numbers of investments, however, the concentration figures for ownership of vessels based in the British Isles contrast sharply with those of Massachusetts. The top two investors held 7.1 per cent of the investments; the equivalent group in Massachusetts held 16.0 per cent of the investments.

OWNERS A N D INVESTMENTS, 1698

33

tonnage. Any absolute figures on tonnage are particularly valuable, therefore. Such information is available in the case of vessels owned wholly by single individuals. There were 52 such vessels registered in 1698, which is close to a fourth (24.6 per cent) of the total number. More important, all but four of these ships were based in Massachusetts, and hence sole ownership characterized 28.1 per cent of all Massachusetts vessels and 19.3 per cent of the tonnage. The distribution of ownership of these vessels will be found in Table XII. The ownership pattern of solely owned vessels confirms the more general conclusions. The twenty-seven people who owned one vessel each (79.4 per cent of the total number of sole owners) account for 45.4 per cent of the solely owned tonnage, while the two people—a mere 5.9 per cent of the group—who each owned outright five vessels controlled 29.1 per cent of the total solely owned tonnage. But the question of concentration of ownership has not yet been fully answered. First, it is possible that, though small investors together controlled a sizable part of the total tonnage, their holdings were confined to small vessels, and that the large ships were monopolized by the biggest shipowners. To check on this possibility the Massachusetts investors in large Massachusetts vessels—100 tons or over—were isolated and the numbers of their investments listed. It developed that, though the frequent investors held a greater proportion of the investments in these vessels than did the infrequent investors, they by no means had a monopoly. There were only 17 Massachusetts vessels whose capacities were 100 tons or over, but no fewer than 66 Massachusetts residents owned shares in them. And, though the group included the heaviest investors in the province, it also included some of the smallest. Thus, the two most frequent investors in the fleet at large were also among the heaviest investors in the 100-plus tonnage category, but for one third of the group this investment in a large vessel was the only share of shipping held. Over one half of the group invested in only one or two vessels altogether. The median number of total investments in the fleet at large held by Massachusetts investors in vessels of over 100 tons was two. Large vessels were by no means monopolized by the heaviest investors.

34

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING,

1697-1714

There is still another approach to the problem of concentration of ownership. Granted that small holders had an important share in the over-all tonnage, and granted that their holdings were distributed broadly through all types of vessels, were there not combinations of owners, in effect companies or stable partnerships, that held a considerable control of shipping despite the breadth of general participation? The question is an important one, involving not only the issue of concentration of ownership but that of business organization as well. It requires at the start the specific identification of the several hundred individuals who shared the ownership of the 1698 fleet. Who, precisely, were they; what amount of shipping did they hold; what is the significance of the investment groupings they formed? The subdivisions of Table XXVII, which summarizes the investments of the leading shipowners for the entire eighteen-year period of the Register, specify the names and residences of major shareholders in the 1698 fleet, together with the numbers of their investments and the total tonnages held (on the basis of equal shares). The names of the leading investors are for the most part familiar ones; with one notable exception they are found frequently in the other records of the period. One would have expected to find on such a list the names of Andrew Belcher, already reaping large rewards from his wartime contracts with the English navy; Andrew Faneuil, whose trade was secured in a commercial network of family connections and Huguenot ties; and Eliakim Hutchinson whose family's affluence in trade dated back to the founding of the colony. Others, like the Brownes of Salem, Colman, and Hirst are also familiar and it is by no means surprising to find their names well up on the list of shipowners. Less well-known names like Gallop, Marston, and Dyer are also reasonably placed. But the leading shipowner is almost totally unknown. Who was Samuel Lillie? He played no role in public life, founded no great commercial clan. What little is known of him can be easily summarized. He was born in Boston in 1663 the son of a cooper and later merchant who had emigrated from England probably at the Restoration. By 1698 he had succeeded his father at his craft, and, married to Mehitable Frary, who was related to several important

O W N E R S A N D INVESTMENTS, 1698

35

Massachusetts families, had flourished in trade. He was a private man; his name entered the public records only in regard to his marriage and the notarization of business transactions. :,J However obscure Samuel Lillie is to history, the fact is undeniable that by the end of 1698 he had accumulated the largest individual concentration of shipping in Massachusetts. He held over twice as much tonnage (on the basis of equal shares) as Belcher, his nearest competitor, and his 330 tons solely owned are a fifth (20.2 per cent) of the total solely owned tonnage. His later accumulations and his ultimate fate will be traced in connection with later parts of the Register. For purposes of analyzing investment combinations, the total number of investors must be reduced to those who invested frequently enough to provide a pattern of association. Eliminating, then, both those who invested only once ( 2 2 4 ) and those who held shares in only two vessels ( 5 8 ) , we are left with 50 names—the 50 leading shipowners of 1698, all of whom invested in three or more vessels. Did these men form stable groups for shipowning purposes? They did not. There were no fixed investment groupings. Partnerships were, in fact, extremely fluid, formed to finance individual vessels. Thus the leading investor, Samuel Lillie, joined with others in the ownership of eighteen vessels, but in no two cases did he invest with exactly the same group. In fact 52 different names are listed with Lillie's as co-owners, and only 10 appear more than once. Belcher invested with no fewer than 57 individuals, and though 18 names appear more than once, he too repeated no single combination. Gallop associated with 9 other investors, Marston with 23, and Dyer with 30; the combinations were ad hoc: not one was exactly repeated. Study of the remaining 45 leading investors fully bears out this tendency. There is not one single exact repetition of an ownership combination among all those entered into by the 50 leading shipowners of 1698. But though groups were formed ad hoc for each vessel, they were 82

On the leading merchants of the late seventeenth century, see Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 5 5 ) , chap. vii. On Lillie, see Edward L. Pierce, Major John Lillie and the Lillie Family of Boston (Cambridge, Mass., 1 8 9 6 ) , 47, 68 ff.

36

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

not completely random assortments of people. There were a variety of associative principles that linked certain individuals into subgroups which appear, with varying degrees of completeness, as part of ownership groups. In certain instances ethnic, or more generally social, relations appear to have been the basis of combinations. In others, an existing business combination appears to have acquired a force of its own, repeatedly binding a subgroup together through a series of complex variations. Thus, in the case of Andrew Faneuil the basis of the subgroup appears to be ethnic. Faneuil, who as "ffunell" was one of the "persons of the ffrench nation" admitted into Massachusetts in 1691, helped build his family's fortunes in America by drawing on the resources of other Huguenots. He shared in the ownership of six vessels in the 1698 fleet. One he owned with James Leblond of Boston and with Clement Lempriere, then resident in Boston but "of the Isle of Jersey." Leblond shared with Faneuil in the ownership of two other vessels. Similarly involved was George Chabot, and among other co-investors were two of Faneuil's brothers, Benjamin of New York and John of Boston, and John Mariette of Boston. There were men of identifiable Huguenot origins associated with Faneuil in all six vessels; they held about half of the total number of investments.33 More typical and more difficult to characterize are the partnerships entered into by Eliakim Hutchinson. The combinations in which his name appears are shown on the facing page. There are two points particularly to be made here. First, Hutchinson's initial associates were representatives of the older, established Massachusetts families. All the family names listed under the second vessel were prominent in the Bay Colony before the Restoration. Other representatives of the same group, like the Brownes of Salem, appear with Hutchinson in connection with the other vessels. The only person to appear three times as co-owner with this descendant of Anne Hutchinson was Adam Winthrop, Sr. The second point is that the strange combination of co-owners that occurs in the fourth 33

The involvement of the Faneuil family in New England trade may be traced back at least to the middle of the 1670's when they were still residents of La Rochelle. See Bailyn, New England Merchants, 145-147.

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vessel is repeated, with additions, in the fifth. How it was that this assortment of Bostonians, Salemites, and residents of London and Bilbao came together in the first place cannot be discovered from the Register, but once formed it retained its integrity to a large extent, though numerous additions were made to it, in financing the 270-ton vessel listed last. Such a series of shifting alliances is typical of the combinations that appear in the Register. A group is formed for one vessel; one or two of its members drop out for a smaller second vessel; and to this reduced nucleus a number of newcomers are added for a third, larger enterprise. Though total partnerships vary greatly, small subgroups persist. With the thought in mind that beneath the apparent fluidity of ownership groups may lie significant subgroupings, one may return to the records of the two leading shipowners, Lillie and Belcher. Examination of the thirty-nine combinations they entered reveals that the two men engaged in rather different kinds of operations. The list of names associated with Belcher includes many more repetitions, and these recurrent investors appear more frequently on the ownership list of the fleet as a whole than did Lillie's colleagues. Furthermore, Belcher's repeated co-investors tended to restrict their investments to vessels in which Belcher was involved. It would seem that Belcher led a small group into repeated purchases of shares of vessels in which he was concerned. Thus, both John Colman and Daniel Oliver of Boston held shares in six vessels, five of which were also partly owned by Belcher; the same was true of four of the five vessels John Eyre invested in, three of the four Richard Sprague and Edward Shippen partly owned, and all three of those in which Nathaniel Cary was concerned. Lillie's partnerships show no such pattern of repetitions. In only two cases did investors in more than two vessels concentrate a majority of their holdings in vessels associated with Lillie. Most often Lillie's partners were infrequent investors; twenty-three of them invested only once. Thus, nothing like companies in the modern sense existed, and such groupings of investors as there were were highly unstable. Some combinations, like those of Faneuil and Hutchinson, reveal the sub-

OWNERS AND INVESTMENTS, 1698

39

strata of social organization that underlay the uneven surface of business organization. Others indicate the continuing force of existing business associations. Still others, like those of Belcher, seem to show the effect of energetic entrepreneurship which repeatedly rallied men of substantial resources to the financing of shipping. Such were the leading characteristics of the seagoing merchant fleet engaged in the New England trade at the turn of the seventeenth century as revealed by the Massachusetts Register. By contemporary standards it was large. Boston's fleet of 124 vessels with a capacity of 6,443 tons compared favorably with that of Bristol, the second city in the British Isles from the point of view of commerce. This commercial development was not the result of a slow growth over many generations and the gradual accretion of capital. It had begun suddenly a generation earlier, during the 1640's, and had been largely capitalized by numerous London tradesmen and merchants operating through settlers with whom they were associated by social ties formed largely around kinship groupings.34 Subsequent development had been swift. By the end of the century English merchants were still associated with the colonials in possession of shipping, especially when larger risks were at stake, but the colonists to a very great extent owned their own merchant fleet; in fact, they were now looking abroad for investment. The New England shipyards had almost completely supplanted the English as sources of shipping; they were now major builders for the English merchants themselves. Shipping in all its aspects was characterized by relative decentralization. True, Boston and Salem were the home ports of a majority of the seagoing vessels, but this distinction did not preclùde the wide participation of numerous lesser units. Similarly, the out·: standing activity of Boston, Scituate, Charlestown, and Salem in shipbuilding did not exclude the participation of thirty-two other New England towns in the same kind of enterprise. The information contained in the Register up to the end of 1698 reflects, finally, aspects of the distinctive economic profile of the seventeenth-century colonial business community. The most strik34

Bailyn, New England Merchants,

chaps, ii-iv.

40

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

ing characteristic is the breadth of participation in the ownership of mercantile capital. It is a fact that does not fade away before detailed probing: the small holders were not confined in their investments to the smaller vessels, and their effectiveness was not reduced by the force of entrenched investment associations capable of operating as table units. This wide involvement in the possession of shipping is, however, only part of the picture; side by side with it is the other main characteristic—the preeminence of a very few people in this same area of economic activity.

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1699-1714 5. The Acquisition of Shipping The information in the Register relating to the years after 1698 is of a different character, for statistical purposes, than that of the earlier years. It is a record of new acquisitions of shipping only, and, since there is no way of knowing when vessels were sold abroad or lost, there is no way of gauging the size of the fleet at any given time after 1698 nor of knowing the actual holdings of an individual. For the years after 1698, in other words, we have not a static picture of a merchant fleet but a detailed view of additions and replacements and of any alterations in character that might have taken place in the course of the period. Serving as a starting point is Table XIII which is a comprehensive presentation of the new registrations year by year and town by town within Massachusetts, elsewhere, except for London, by larger categories. 35 35

In compiling this table one difficulty was faced which the reader should be aware of; it affects any use made of the figures. As we mentioned in Section 1 above, the Fraud Act, its amendments, and subsequent instructions from the customs office specified conditions under which vessels would be reregistered: when shares were transferred, at first only from port to port but soon also within ports; when vessels' names were changed; and when ships' certificates were lost. It became the practice, in Massachusetts at least, to include the words "as formerly registered" in such reentries and occasionally to state the reason for the duplicate registration. The entries so marked, of which there were 153 in the total list of 1,696 original registrations, are obviously quite different in character from the others and must be treated separately. The procedure adopted for the use of reregistrations was as follows. A

42

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING,

1697-1714

The over-all number of vessels added to the list during the period is remarkably high, especially in view of the size of the 1698 fleet. From January 1699, to October 1714, Massachusetts added to its fleet 1,113 vessels totaling over 58,980 tons—an average yearly addition of 69.6 vessels and at least 3,686.2 tons. Of these new acquisitions, Boston held the overwhelming proportion; 83.8 per cent of the vessels and 89.7 per cent of the tonnage. If these new entries had represented net increases—if there had been no compensating sales and losses—the Massachusetts fleet of 1698 would have been doubled in two years and five months; it would have been wholly reproduced six and one half times in terms of numbers of vessels and about seven times in tonnage during the subsequent sixteen years. The increases indicated by Table XIII are, in fact, so high as to raise the question of whether such growth was normal for early search was made through the entire Register to find the original of each reregistration. By matching the most reliable characteristics of the reregistered vessels (name, place built, year built, tonnage, and rig) with those of every other vessel, the originals of 67 were found. Of these, 3 were among 11 entries completely eliminated as absolute duplicates; the working number of reregistrations, therefore, was 64. It was assumed that the original registrations of the 86 others had been entered in the registers of other ports, and so for purposes of Massachusetts shipping these reregistrations could be counted as newly acquired vessels. But how were the 64 real reregistrations to be used? It was decided to use them in different ways depending on the information wanted. Where shipbuilding statistics were wanted, these 64 entries would be discarded, as they merely duplicated other vessels in the list. Where investments were concerned, a different treatment of the material would be required: names newly introduced as owners in the reregistrations would be considered new investments; names repeated from the earlier registration would not be. The most difficult problem presented by the reregistrations, however, concerned their use in tabulating yearly acquisitions of shipping by the various ports. How was a Boston vessel transferred to Salem upon reregistration to be counted in a list of newly acquired vessels? Only in Boston at the date of original registration? (But it was a Salem acquisition at the later date.) Also in Salem at the date of reregistration? (Then the same vessel would appear twice on the list, making totaling impossible unless a subtraction were made from Boston; yet we were not attempting to subtract other dispositions of vessels once acquired.) The most reasonable solution was to list only the original entries and to indicate in footnotes the additional listings caused by reregistration.

ACQUISITION O F SHIPPING, 1699-1714

43

eighteenth-century Massachusetts or whether peculiar circumstances during those years accounted for the increases. One particular possibility comes to mind. The privateering of the War of the League of Augsburg (King William's War in the colonies) affected the totals of the 1698 fleet. Did the War of the Spanish Succession (Queen Anne's War) which was under way, legally at least, during eleven of the years covered by the Register, significantly affect the yearly additions to the Massachusetts fleet? The answer may be established from the information in Table XIV, which shows the yearly contributions to the Register by successful privateering. It will be seen that, though in some years a sizable percentage of the Massachusetts total came from this source, the over-all contribution was small. In two years, 1702 and 1711, privateering contributed over 10 per cent of both numbers and tonnage of the newly registered Massachusetts vessels; in 1702 fully a quarter of the total Massachusetts tonnage was derived from this source. In two other years, 1703 and 1710, the tonnage though not the number of vessels added from captures was over 10 per cent of the Massachusetts total. But these were exceptional years. In three of the war years no vessels at all were added from this source. In all, only 46 of the 1,113 vessels of Massachusetts home ports registered after 1698—4.1 per cent—had been captured from the enemy, and at most 6.6 per cent of the tonnage. The striking increase in registrations was not, therefore, the result of an unusual influx of captured vessels, but rather of the more normal conditions affecting acquisitions. It is clear from the numbers involved that Massachusetts' shipping in this period was in rapid flux. Production was remarkably high; vessels were being replaced rapidly. As a consequence, whatever changes might have been under way in the characteristics of the fleet would have been greatly sped up by this replacement process. What significant differences were there between the 1698 fleet and the vessels registered thereafter? 36 36 The difference in the character of the statistics derived from registrations before 1699 and those from the acquisitions in the following sixteenyear period mentioned on p. 12 must be kept in mind throughout these comparisons. Clearly the acquisition period ( 1 6 9 9 - 1 7 1 4 ) is not entirely inde-

44

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING,

1697-1714

The most evident change indicated by the figures in Table XIII is suggested by the fact that a growing percentage of the newly registered vessels was listed under the town of Boston as home port. As the older vessels were disposed of, the overseas fleet was becoming increasingly concentrated in the Bay city. The details of this development are shown in Table X V which contains the percentages of the total Massachusetts registrations claimed by Boston, by Salem, and by all the other Massachusetts towns taken together. Boston held 73.4 per cent of the vessels in the 1698 fleet and 78.3 per cent of the tonnage. Its holdings in the additions of the next four years rose, particularly in the case of tonnage figures. In the quadrennium that followed, 1703-1706, the percentages reached 91.5 and 95.6 for numbers and tonnages repectively. Of the total number of registrations from 1699 to 1714 Boston claimed 83.8 per cent in numbers and 89.7 per cent in tonnage. At the same time, Salem's percentages dropped sharply: from 12.4 and 12.1 per cent to an average for the sixteen following years of 6.0 and 4.1 per cent. During the final four years Salem claimed only 1.6 and 0.9 per cent of the new Massachusetts registrations. The other Massachusetts towns taken as a unit also dropped in their relative holdings of the new registrations, though it should also be noted that a few of these lesser towns were increasing their holdings while Salem's declined. In particular, Plymouth and Newbury were acquiring new vessels at a rate higher than one would have expected from their 1698 registrations. Other changes related to vessel sizes and types seem to have accompanied this growing concentration of Massachusetts' overseas shipping in the single port of Boston. A few of the vessels registered after 1698 were extraordinarily large. One, the ship Thomas and Elizabeth of Boston, built in Taunton, Massachusetts, in 1711, and registered in February 1712, was pendent of the 1698 fleet; an indeterminate number of the vessels registered by the end of 1698 were in operation throughout at least some of these later years. Since the Register gives no information on the disposition of vessels this number cannot be established. The comparisons presented rest on the assumption that the rate of disposal was not systematically greater for some portions of the fleet than for others.

ACQUISITION O F SHIPPING, 1699-1714

45

rated at no less than 600 tons. This vessel, the largest recorded in the Register, of monstrous size by Massachusetts standards and large in fact by any eighteenth-century measure, was owned by no fewer than 42 individuals, including one company, from Boston and London. All but one of the named investors were also coowners of the third largest vessel registered, the 400-ton Sea Nymph. It too was a ship, had been built in Taunton in 1711, and was based in Boston. In these years Boston also registered two vessels of 300 tons each, six between 200 and 270, and nine of 200 tons. 37 Such entries dramatize the increasing magnitude of commercial enterprise. Indeed, taken alone they overdramatize the general character of growth during the period, for against them must be balanced such entries as those of the two five-ton sloops that Boston also registered during the same years. Averages are perhaps the safest index to the over-all shift in sizes. The average capacity of Massachusetts vessels registered in the years under study rose steadily if not sharply. The average capacity of the vessels in the 1698 fleet had been 49.4 tons. The average of all Massachusetts vessels whose tonnages are known, registered between January 1699 and October 1714, was 53.5 tons. But this comprehensive picture of modest growth obscures sharp and significant variations in detail. The increase was in fact very unevenly distributed. Closer calibration of the figures follows the contours of regional variations discussed above. The general increase in vessel capacity resulted entirely from Boston's singular influence. The average of its vessel sizes rose from 52.0 to 57.3 tons, while the equivalent figures for all the rest of Massachusetts taken together dropped from 39.8 to 33.9 tons. Salem's decrease was particularly sharp: from 47.5 to 35.7 tons. It is possible to see the changing characteristics of the Massa37

Registration of the Thomas and Elizabeth and the Sea Nymph will be found on pages 420-421 of the Register. The second largest vessel listed was the 500-ton Thetis of London, a ship captured from the French and registered in 1711 under the ownership of the captains of the two capturing vessels as representatives of "Companies" (pages 3 9 8 - 3 9 9 ) . Most of the vessels 200 tons or over were of London home ports: eleven of 200 tons; three between 200 and 270 tons; four between 300 and 370 tons. Barbados registered one of 200 and one of 300 tons. One 300-ton vessel had no home port stated.

46

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

chusetts fleet in even greater and more significant detail by arranging the data so as to reveal the relation between sizes and types of vessels, a relation that reflects anticipated uses and hence has broad implications for commercial enterprise.38 Table XVI contains this information and includes the equivalent figures for the early period for purposes of comparison. An inner shift was taking place in the composition of Boston's overseas fleet. Its growth was not evenly distributed among the various vessel types. The city's relative and absolute increase in tonnage was largely concentrated in ships as opposed to sloops, brigantines, ketches, and barks; the percentage of ships rose from 21.8 to 29.7 per cent in numbers and from 43.7 to 52.2 per cent in tonnage. Elsewhere in Massachusetts the exact opposite tendency was in motion. The proportion of ships among the vessels claimed by all the rest of Massachusetts declined from 11.1 to 4.4 per cent, and, since the average size of these vessels also declined from 136.0 to 81.2 tons, the drop in tonnage proportions was even more severe: from 38.0 to 10.7 per cent. Congruently, there was a rise in the popularity and size of brigantines, and, most important, an increase in the number of the smallest vessels registered, the sloops. Thus the phasing of regional differentiation noted first in connection with the differing proportions of new shipping registered by the various Massachusetts ports after 1698 is found also in the alterations in vessel sizes and types. The significance of these associated changes may best be seen against the history of the region's economy. In the early years of Massachusetts' commerce, fifty years before the Register was begun, hopes for commercial success were universally high. A well-indented coastline offered dozens of good sites for harbors. Emigrants with surplus capital were as likely to turn up in Springfield or in Cambridge as in Boston; indeed, for a time they were more likely to turn up in New Haven than anywhere else in New England. Consequently, for a decade and more, seagoing commercial activity was to be found in a large number of communities north and east of the Hudson: from Springfield, down the Connecticut and along the Sound to Newport, the South Shore, 38 See, for example, Robinson and D o w , Sailing Ships of New 9 - 3 3 ; Hall, "Ship-Building Industry," 5 - 2 8 , 6 1 - 6 2 .

England,

ACQUISITION OF SHIPPING, 1699-1714

47

and north to Maine. A similar degree of decentralization was to be seen also in the units of enterprise. With foreign capital controlling major enterprises, local effort consisted of small investments widely scattered. In the generation that followed, the process of growth went forward. It brought with it a measure of concentration. There took place a geographical settling as regular channels of trade were defined. A few orbits were clearly established, and to them were gradually drawn most of the scattered and weakly independent efforts. Centers of high hopes, especially New Haven, declined into insignificance, and Boston in the Massachusetts Bay became the single most important commercial town. It came to dominate the commerce of New England by its monopoly of the primary circuit of trade emanating from England. 39 All of this is reflected in the data contained in the Shipping Register: Boston's growing control of overseas shipping and the relative decline of the other towns, especially Salem; the increase in unit size of shipping in Boston and the decline in Salem and elsewhere; and Boston's unique reliance on the type of vessel, the ship, best suited for overseas trade, in contrast to the outports' increasing concern with the smallest vessels, the sloops, best suited for local and coastal enterprises. There is implicit in these tendencies toward concentration and specialization a growth not merely in numbers but in economic maturity. The dimensions this process had reached by the early eighteenth century cannot, however, be measured by external characteristics of shipping alone. The forms of ownership are even more important indications. This topic will be examined after the full statistics on shipbuilding have been considered. 39

Bailyn, New England Merchants,

23-32, 49-60, 94-98.

6. Shipbuilding The previous discussion of shipbuilding was limited to questions concerning the production of vessels registered only through 1698 —vessels constituting the Massachusetts merchant fleet of that date. In the complete story of shipbuilding as revealed by the Register, these production figures for the early fleet have a separate usefulness as a basis of comparison for later developments. That the Registry data are an invaluable source of information on shipbuilding has long been recognized, and some of the most exhaustive attempts to exploit this material have been directed toward establishing production figures. All but one of these efforts have been deliberately partial, however, and the one comprehensive summary that exists covers only one aspect of shipbuilding and is not wholly accurate.4" 40

On the earlier uses of the Register for statistical purposes, see note 4 above. A sampling of the table in Hall's "Ship-Building Industry," pp. 50-59, and an attempt to reconstruct his tabulation procedure revealed not only the normal amount of minor errors but also a systematic difficulty. In searching for the originals of the entries marked "as formerly registered," Hall placed heavy emphasis on mere duplication of vessel names. This led him to discard as duplicates some entries that were not duplicates and, since the physical specifications of vessels that happened to have the same names were often very different, it led him also to distrust the accuracy of the entire registration system upon which his table was built. His general view that tonnage figures were understated when duties were involved and overstated when vessels were rented to the government may well be correct; but his statement that many vessels were entered several times in the Register "and often at a different rating each time, the burden varying 10 or 20 tons f r o m the original register, and one extreme case was found where a ship was documented once as of 130 tons and afterward as of 20 tons" is false. Such variations in tonnages would have defeated the licensing purpose of the Register. Hall's gloomy view of the Register results largely from his own tabulation procedures.

SHIPBUILDING

49

Accurate analysis of the shipbuilding information in the Register must take into account two kinds of shortcomings in the data. First, a considerable number—seventy-five—of the original entries are reregistrations of vessels entered elsewhere in the Register; these must be identified and discarded at the start. Second, important limitations were imposed by the registration process itself. Besides the fact that only seagoing vessels were registered, it should be noted that production before 1697, if not before 1698, is in all probability barely reflected in the Register since there is no reason to expect thai even a sizable number of the vessels built before 1697 were still in service and still in Massachusetts when the law went into effect. For those early years the figures represent only a sampling of the whole. Furthermore, for the years that followed, 1697-1714, the Register is probably complete only for Massachusetts, since all seagoing vessels built in Massachusetts, but only those, had to be entered in the Massachusetts Register in order to make their first voyages—even if only to reach their owners abroad. The core of the accurate shipbuilding statistics available in the Register, therefore, consists of vessels built in Massachusetts between the years 1697-1714. The other material is valuable in many ways, but only this portion of the whole has the advantage of probable completeness. Table XVII has been compiled with these limitations in mind. It relates only to shipbuilding in Massachusetts. The figures are given town by town for each year after 1696; production before that date is summarized. The names of the shipbuilding towns have been arranged in the table so as to bring out the regional clusterings of production centers. The towns are listed in geographical order, from Newbury, Salisbury, and the other Merrimac towns on the north, south around the Cape to Swansea, Bristol, and Rehoboth off Narragansett Bay. One might notice first the extent to which these figures bear out the tendencies noted in connection with the production of the 1698 fleet. The main shipbuilding center was still the Boston Bay area. The shipyards of Boston and Charlestown together produced 43.2 per cent of all registered vessels built in Massachusetts and more

50

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

than 53.2 per cent of the tonnage. 41 The discrepancy between these two percentages is an indication of the above-average size of the vessels concerned. The average capacity of all registered Massachusetts-built vessels of known tonnage was 60.4 tons, but the average of those built in Charlestown was 96.8 tons; Boston's average was 69.3. Most other towns of high production obviously built smaller vessels. Salem's average tonnage was 52.0; Scituate's, 48.2; Newbury's, 47.1; Gloucester's, 46.4. Table XVII makes clear that of the Boston Bay shipyards, only those of Boston proper were increasing their production role. Charlestown's proportionate contribution was in fact declining. Table VI showed that Boston had built 25.5 per cent of the Massachusetts-built vessels and 28.7 per cent of the tonnage of the 1698 fleet. But, of the total 1,250 registered vessels built in Massachusetts towns whose names are stated, the Bay City produced 35.0 per cent in number and 40.1 per cent in tonnage. Charlestown's percentages fell from 9.2 and 20.2 of the 1698 fleet to 8.2 and 13.2 of the total registered Massachusetts production. Elsewhere in Massachusetts similar declines in the proportionate contribution of the established yards accompanied the increased production of Boston. Salem's proportions dropped from 16.3 and 12.2 per cent to 11.2 and 9.7 per cent. Scituate's decline was especially severe: from 24.8 and 21.4 per cent to 12.7 and 10.2 per cent. But, while these earlier leaders were failing to maintain their eminence in the growing over-all production, others were rising quickly. One production center in particular, hardly noticeable in the early years, gained rapidly in the years covered by the Register. The last five towns on the list are located on streams that empty into Narragansett Bay, and their increasing production is noteworthy. Taunton, which had built only two vessels of the 1698 fleet, contributed thirty-eight to the total registered by the end of 1714; the other four towns in that region accounted for another thirty-five. Moreover, the vessels produced in these southern yards were considerably larger than average; consequently, their importance in the tonnage 41

Since the vessels built in "Massachusetts" could have been built in any Massachusetts town, they have been eliminated from the base figure in computing percentages for any specific town in the colony.

SHIPBUILDING

51

totals is greater than mere numbers of vessels would suggest. In fact, the average size of vessels of known tonnage produced in Taunton—96.2 tons—was second only to that of Charlestown. The average capacity of all vessels of known tonnage built in the five Narragansett towns was 75.9 tons. There was one other region of notable production increase: the Merrimac River area, of which the leader was Newbury. Though the totals for the Merrimac area are small, the increases are significant. Newbury's production rose from 5.9 per cent of the vessels of the 1698 fleet and 3.2 per cent of the tonnage to 8.7 and 6.8 per cent of the total respectively. There are a few lesser towns whose roles are also worth noting. Gloucester maintained a small but steady production through the middle years of the period; in 1706 its production amounted to 17.3 per cent of the registered vessels and 12.8 per cent of the tonnage produced in that year by towns in the Bay Colony whose names were specified. Milton's surprising production of the early years fell away to almost nothing. At the same time the production figures for the neighboring towns of Duxbury and Plymouth, while still only a small part of the total Massachusetts production, were higher than the earlier figures would have suggested. Not all of the registered vessels had been built in Massachusetts, of course, and Table XVIII presents the registered production of all places outside the Bay Colony. Of these other sources, the most prolific in these war years was privateering or other seizures from the enemy listed under "captured": 65 vessels totaling 5,991 tons.4The most important of the other contributing colonies was Connecticut. The total of all of the non-Massachusetts sources taken together was 22.5 per cent in number and 22.0 per cent in tonnage of the total registrations. The significance of shipbuilding statistics derivable from the Register lies not merely in the magnitudes involved but in their relation to other information, especially to the home ports of registry. This relation establishes facts of importance about the marketing of vessels and, at least inferentially, about the capitalization of shipbuilding and the effect of the industry in America on external 42

See Table XIV and p. 43 above.

52

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

economies. Table XIX, comprehending all the relevant data in the Register, shows the full correlation between place of build and home port of the vessels. The information relating to Massachusetts in both categories is detailed down to the individual towns; otherwise, with the exception of London, only the totals for regional groupings are shown. The correlations shown by Table XIX are revealing indeed. The table makes clear, in the first place, the degree to which Boston was absorbing the great bulk of small-town ship production. Boston itself built only 28.0 per cent of its own vessels (excluding the six built in "Massachusetts") and 30.1 per cent of its tonnage. The other main contributors to its tonnage were Scituate ( 11.0 per cent), captures (7.4 per cent), Chariest own (6.3 per cent), Taunton (5.0 per cent), Newbury (4.9 per cent), and Salem (4.8 per cent). It should be particularly noted that these percentages represent a good part of the total production of these towns. The blanks in the table when seen against the solid line of Boston's vessels are graphic testimony to Boston's power as a shipping market, to the extent of its control of Massachusetts' shipping. Almost every town contributed some vessels to Boston's fleet; only a few of them sold vessels elsewhere. One limitation of Table XIX can be overcome by a further tabulation: it does not show changes in time in the amounts supplied to the home ports by the producing centers. To indicate such changes three particularly significant rows of figures have been extracted from Table XIX and the information in them rearranged and supplemented so as to demonstrate the relevant time sequences. The first of these, Table XXa, shows the amount produced for the Boston fleet by each town, first among the registrations of 1697-1698, then among those of each subsequent four-year period. Now further details of Boston's own rising production for its own needs can be seen. The chronology of the decline of Salem, Charlestown, and Scituate stands out, as do the stages of the rise of Newbury, Taunton, the minor New England towns, and, for these war years, of privateering as a source of shipping. Perhaps the most significant data in Table XIX will be found in the entries in the bottom rows, which show the number of vessels in

SHIPBUILDING

53

the Register owned in England and in the British possessions of the Atlantic world. These rows enable one to see in concrete terms the extent to which the New England shipyards were supplying overseas markets, and, indeed, the extent to which English complaints against competition from New England were justified.43 The British Isles received from Massachusetts alone in this period over 19,000 tons of shipping; from all of New England they received 187 vessels totaling at least 20,601 tons. The vessels produced in New England for this English market were unusually large. The average size of Massachusetts-built vessels registered with British home ports was 117.3 tons, which should be compared with the general average of 60.0 tons. The average size of the fourteen vessels Salem built for English use was 137.5 tons, and the average of the thirty-one Charlestown built for English buyers was 149.0 tons. If the twenty-eight vessels Charlestown produced for London are taken separately, the average is no less than 158.6 tons. Other British possessions in the Atlantic world also drew on New England's shipbuilding. Fifty-eight vessels totaling 3,241 tons, whose home ports were in the West Indies, the Wine Islands, Nova Scotia, or Newfoundland, had been built in Massachusetts; another 524 tons had been built elsewhere in New England. Taking these figures together with those for all of the British Isles we find that 29.9 per cent of the 75,267 tons known to have been built in Massachusetts before 1715 had ended up with home ports in Britain or its possessions outside the mainland colonies. Again, the time sequence is important. Table XXb shows the increase in Boston's contribution to London's shipping registered in Massachusetts. Boston had produced 27.3 per cent of the London tonnage registered in Massachusetts by the end of 1698; of London's tonnage registered thereafter and built in towns whose names were specified, it contributed 39.3 per cent. The rise in contributions of Salem, Newbury, and "Other New England" should also be 43

English fears of American, particularly New England, competition in shipbuilding had been expressed at least since Josiah Child's Discourse Upon Trade ( 1 6 6 8 ) . The most notable complaint came in 1724 in the form of a "Petition of the Master Shipwrights of the River Thames" submitted to the Board of Trade. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1724-1725, §383 end. 1.

54

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

noted. Table XXc contains the same arrangement of data for the English outports taken as a unit. The correlations between place of build and home port of vessels in Tables XIX and XXa-c are revealing, but they tend to gloss over the problem of the directness of the connection between builder and owner. That is, there is no way of knowing from these tables alone the sequence of purchases and exchanges—if there were any —that might have intervened between the initial sale of the vessel and the time of registration. Perhaps what appears to be production for the English market really was production for the local market, only later transferred abroad. This problem can be dealt with by a rearrangement of the data. Those entries that in all probability reflect direct sales from the producing towns to the owning towns can be isolated by matching the dates of build with the dates of registration and discarding all vessels registered over a year after the date of build. Those remaining after this selection has been completed were most likely built for the home port registered: sold directly from the listed place of build to the listed home port. They represent a probable minimum of the extent to which Massachusetts shipyards were supplying overseas markets. Since separate tables of these immediate exchanges must be composed for each place of build, only the most important shipbuilding centers have been selected for presentation. Tables XXIa-e show the numbers and tonnages of vessels produced in the five main shipbuilding towns (Boston, Charlestown, Salem, Scituate, and Newbury) that were registered in Massachusetts within a year of the date of their build. These were the vessels most probably sold directly to the listed home port. Comparing these five tables with Table XIX one is in a position to gauge the extent to which the distribution of Massachusetts-built vessels resulted from direct investments in shipbuilding or from business dealings subsequent to the initial transaction. The details are complex and need not be analyzed fully here, but the general conclusion is evident. Vessels listed with overseas home ports were mainly built in Massachusetts for the particular port concerned. For example, 91.1 per cent of the vessels with English home ports built in Boston were registered within a year; twenty-seven of the

SHIPBUILDING

55

thirty-one English-based vessels built by Charlestown were similarly registered; thirteen of Salem's fourteen; eleven of Newbury's twelve. Similar comparisons between Tables X X I a - e and Table X I X reveal the consistency of such proportions. Thus doubts about the extent of English involvement in Massachusetts shipbuilding based on possible discrepancies between date of build and date of registration of English-based vessels are dispelled. Vessels with overseas home ports were overwhelmingly newly built. They were in all probability constructed on orders from overseas entrepreneurs.

7. Investors and Investments The first tabulation of data bearing on ownership of the vessels registered after 1698 is similar in form to the compilation of the earlier material of the same type presented in Table IX. There must be at least one difference, however. The tonnage-per-owner figures, based on an equal division of shares, cannot be used for these later years, for when, as frequently happened in this period, vessels were reregistered, the number of owners often changed, and in such cases it is obviously impossible to set tonnage figures for those who remained owners throughout. With the exception of these estimates, then, Table XXII shows the basic information relating to ownership of vessels registered between January 1699 and October 1714. The far right column of this table, presenting the totals, contains what is perhaps the most remarkable piece of information to be derived from the Register. It shows that no fewer than 903 residents of Massachusetts owned some part of the shipping registered after 1698. Of these, the astonishing total of 544 were residents of Boston. Something of the relative magnitude of this figure may be gained by considering that the total population of Boston in 1710 was 9,000. Since the average family in this period had six members, and since the overwhelming majority though not all of the adult males in Boston were heads of households, a reasonable estimate of the number of adult males in Boston would be one fifth of the total population, or 1,800. Close to one out of every three adult males 44 in the town of Boston during the first decade of the eighteenth century, therefore, was part-owner at least of a seagoing vessel. Such popular involvement in the ownership of vessels was not equally characteristic of all of Massachusetts, but there were high 44

The exact proportion is three out of ten. The fact that nine of the Boston investors were women does not affect this figure.

INVESTORS AND INVESTMENTS, 1699-1714

57

proportions in at least a few of the other towns. Population figures for all Massachusetts towns in 1710 are not available, but if the ratio between Boston's 1710 adult male population and its 1690 militia figures is applied to the other militia figures of that year, it may be said that in Charlestown one out of every four adult males held shares in shipping; in Salem, two out of every nine; in Gloucester and Newbury, one out of every six.45 Who were these hundreds of Massachusetts shipowners? What was the character of this shipowning population? What are the implications of such numbers for the economy of the province? One approach to answers to these questions lies through inspection of the occupations and titles of prestige listed by the owners. The occupations officially stated by owners in the Register make clear the breadth of popular participation in the ownership of vessels, the degree to which the possession of shipping capital in this period had been parcelized. The list of owners includes not only merchants but people claiming a variety of humbler occupations. No fewer than 154 of the Boston investors who stated their occupations called themselves mariners; nine claimed to be shipwrights; five, blacksmiths; five, coopers; four, shopkeepers; two, traders; two, carpenters; two, sailmakers; one, baker; and one, ropemaker. Nor was the participation restricted to the male part of the population: nine of the owners from Boston were women; four of these listed themselves as widows. More significant than the variety of modest occupations stated by the owners was the size of the group claiming to be merchants. At first glance it would seem that the town of Boston was simply one great guild of merchant-shipowners, since no fewer than 207 owners—11.5 per cent of the adult male population—gave their occupations as merchant. But these 207 Bostonians were by no means all merchants in the traditional sense of that term. The use of this title in colonial America was lacking in precision just as the occupation itself had lost its once-traditional distinctiveness. In early 45

Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness (New York, 1938), 143 n.; Evarts B. Greene and Virginia D. Harrington, American Population Before the Federal Census of 1790 (New York, 1932), xxiii, 19—21; Herbert Moller, "Sex Composition and Correlated Culture Patterns of Colonial America," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., II (1945), 124-126.

58

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

eighteenth-century Boston people called themselves merchants who in Europe, including England, with its firmer institutional constriction of economic life and its clearer social stratification, would never have pretended to such occupational dignity.4" A dramatic illustration of the confusion and imprecision in occupational designations, reflecting deep-seated tendencies toward occupational mobility and a confusing flexibility in occupational roles, lies in the fact that sixteen of the Bostonians who called themselves merchants, elsewhere in the Register listed other occupations. Most often the alternative was mariner, but not always. One person used ropemaker alternatively with merchant; another, shipwright; another, shopkeeper. Moreover, no fewer than fifteen of the Boston shipowners who called themselves merchants stated also that they themselves were the masters of the vessels in whose ownership they shared. In four of these cases the individual concerned did not even list mariner as an alternative occupation. In Boston, then, claims to the title of merchant were extraordinarily widespread. It was an occupational designation that could be assumed easily by anyone involved in trade or maritime activity, and it was not used exclusively when adopted. This expression of occupational mobility was to a much lesser extent evident in the other Massachusetts towns. Thus, although besides merchants and mariners there were among the Newbury shipowners a trader and a weaver; in Salem, two traders, two shipwrights, and a blockmaker; in Charlestown, a shipwright; and elsewhere in Massachusetts, a trader, three shipwrights, a carpenter, and a cooper—none of Newbury's nine shipowners who stated their occupations, only two of Charlestown's thirty-five, and three of Salem's thirty-seven gave more than one occupational title. Elsewhere in Massachusetts not one of the seventy-four shipowners who listed their occupations gave alternatives. However different these lesser Massachusetts towns may have been from Boston, the fact remains that participation in shipowning was remarkably widespread. Throughout the province the shipowning population extended far beyond the boundaries of a merchant-shipowning "class" defined in any traditional sense. It 46

Bailyn, New England Merchants,

chap, vii, esp. pp. 194-195.

INVESTORS AND INVESTMENTS, 1699-1714

59

constituted a wide social spectrum. This social span was largely composed of a broad band of small entrepreneurs for whom artisan occupations touching maritime affairs furnished access to investment in shipping and to mercantile activities that made the designation of merchant seem reasonable, at least as an occasional usage. But it also included the complex reality behind what has loosely been called a "merchant aristocracy." The Register contains information of a particular kind on this upper group, for titles of prestige as well as occupational designations were included in the entries. The honorific title Esquire, applied by the end of the seventeenth century to all magistrates and to a very few others as a mark of social distinctiveness, appears frequently in the Register.47 But it appears only in particular circumstances. Fifteen Bostonians used the appellation Esquire; all but three of them used merchant as well, either together in the same entry or separately in other entries. Only one resident of Boston who used the term Esquire used any other occupational title than merchant. 48 Similarly, among the three Bpstonian shipowners who called themselves Gentlemen the only alternative designation used was merchant. Elsewhere in Massachusetts such titles of distinction appear quite infrequently, but when they do they are found either unassociated with other occupational descriptions or only with merchant. Only three residents of Salem used the title Esquire; all three also identified themselves in other entries as merchants. The three Charlestown Esquires and the one in Newbury gave no other titles or occupations. Of the four individuals who called themselves Esquires in other Massachusetts towns none claimed a specific occupation; one of the two Gentlemen gave merchant as an alternative. This peculiar use of prestige titles suggests that within the wide spectrum of the merchant-shipowning group there was an inner area of distinction. It lacked precise boundaries, and was defined not by institutional or legal demarcations but by an effective degree 47

On the use of Esquire and o n titles of prestige in general, see Norman H. Dawes, "Titles of Prestige in Seventeenth-Century N e w England," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., V I ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 6 9 - 8 3 , esp. 7 1 - 7 3 . 48 John Foster, who was listed simply as a merchant once, as both merchant and Esquire twice, and as Esquire alone twenty-one times, appeared once also as a mariner.

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MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

of common agreement.49 Its implications run deep. In the environment of colonial America where traditional landmarks on the social terrain were indistinct, there was already by the early eighteenth century evidence of what would become the characteristic American practice; not of giving up efforts to mark out an elite sphere but, out of necessity, of substituting voluntary, informal, vague, and highly impermanent demarcations for the more precise boundaries defined by more stable social and economic institutions. The great spread of participation in Massachusetts shipping was horizontal as well as vertical: its range extended not merely down into the middle and lower regions of colonial society, but abroad, into England and its commercial enclaves throughout the Atlantic world. Examination of the column in Table XXII labeled "Total Massachusetts" shows the extent of this non-American participation. Seventy-nine residents of the British Isles owned shares of Massachusetts' shipping registered between 1699 and 1714, though it would be more accurate to say Boston's shipping since there was only a single investment by a resident of the home islands in a vessel based in any other Massachusetts town than Boston. The fourteen entries under "Other British Isles" represent not a heavy concentration in a single outport but considerable spread. The town second to London in investments in Boston's shipping was Exeter, with only four investments by four individuals. Taunton followed with two investments; and the rest was held by residents of five towns in the west of England and in Dublin and Glasgow. Almost as many residents of England's Atlantic possessions shared in ownership of Boston's shipping as did residents of the British Isles proper. Most of the fifty-nine investors listed in the "West Indies, etc." category gave addresses in the Caribbean Islands: nineteen were residents of Barbados, ten of Nevis, eight of Jamaica, six of Antigua, five of Montserrat, four of St. Kitts, and 48 The only shipowner resident in Massachusetts who claimed a legal title was Charles Hobby, who was a baronet. His use of the title was irregular. He appears in the Register twice as Baronet, once as both Knight and merchant in the same entry, eight times as Esquire, once as merchant and Esquire combined, and twice simply as merchant.

INVESTORS AND INVESTMENTS, 1699-1714

61

one of Providence Isle. But participation by Englishmen living overseas was not restricted to West Indians. English inhabitants of Oporto (eight) and Lisbon (one), Portugal, of Madeira (four), Newfoundland (one), and Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia (one) also invested in Boston's shipping. Thus, though none of the investors in Boston's or Massachusetts' fleet came from so far afield as the two "English Merch1" resident at Archangle in Rousha" who in 1713 shared ownership in the 150-ton George Augustus of London newly built in Boston, support was widely recruited throughout the Atlantic ports—throughout the length and breadth of England's Old Empire. The question arises whether this geographical spread of investment represents a significant shift in the location of preponderant ownership. Analysis of the proportions of Massachusetts shipping held by the various regional groupings listed in Table XXII and a comparison with the equivalent data for the early period found in Table IX furnish the answer. There was no important shift in the geographical location of ownership; with one possible exception the proportional holdings by residential areas of the shipping of all the localities represented in the table remained essentially unchanged. To begin with the most important point, external control of Massachusetts shipping remained negligible. In 1698 residents of Massachusetts claimed 91.0 per cent of the investments in their fleet; they held 88.5 per cent of the investments of the vessels registered after that year. Residents of the British Isles owned only an insignificant part of the fleet in 1698; they could claim only 4.0 per cent of the investments thereafter. Even upon closer calibration the proportions remain surprisingly constant. Bostonians held 69.5 per cent of the new Massachusetts investments; they had owned 67.0 per cent of the shares in the earlier fleet. They also retained almost to the percentage point their high claim to shares in their own vessels (80.2 as opposed to 80.8 per cent), a fact of particular importance in view of the growing concentration of Massachusetts shipping in the port of Boston. The percentage of investments made by residents of other Massachusetts towns in Boston's vessels declined from 9.4 to only 7.3.

62

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

There appears to be a similar constancy in the proportion of Boston's holdings in the shares of vessels based abroad. The most important of these, investments by Bostonians in vessels of the British Isles registered in Massachusetts, remained essentially unchanged in percentage terms: 15.4 per cent of all investments in this shipping after 1698 as opposed to 16.7 per cent in the early period. The one possibly significant change in the geographical location of investments concerns the shipping of the lesser Massachusetts towns. The residents of these communities held a greater share of the shipping they registered after 1698 than they had of the vessels they listed as of 1698. To put it another way, and perhaps more realistically, Boston's interest in the shipping of the minor Massachusetts ports declined with the lessening in relative importance of these towns as mercantile centers. In 1698 Bostonians held 13.3 per cent of the investments in the shipping of all Massachusetts ports but Boston; of shares in the new acquisitions they claimed only 9.0 per cent. At the same time the holdings of the residents of these towns in their own vessels taken as a unit rose from 80.8 per cent of the whole to 85.2. The entries under the home port category "West Indies, etc." have a peculiar interest. Almost all of these vessels were based in the larger Caribbean sugar islands whose economy, by the early eighteenth century, was closely tied in with powerful English commission houses.50 But the islands' shipping—at least that part of it reflected in the Massachusetts Register—was not directly dominated by absentee English entrepreneurs. English investments in the West Indian shipping registered in Massachusetts were almost nonexistent. Thirty-three of the total 142 investors, however, were Bostonians. It should also be noted in this connection that residents of Boston alone of Massachusetts residents ventured widely abroad. Fifty-eight Bostonians held shares in British shipping, but only six residents of other Massachusetts towns did so. And only one of these six was from Salem: the only person in the town to invest in shipping based outside Massachusetts. 50

K. G. Davies, "The Origins of the Commission System in the West India Trade," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., II (1952), 89-107.

INVESTORS AND INVESTMENTS, 1699-1714

63

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the problem of ownership distribution in the Massachusetts fleet concerns the distribution among individuals: the degree to which ownership was concentrated in the hands of a few among the large number of shareholders. Section 4 made clear the peculiar character of ownership concentration in the Massachusetts fleet as it existed in 1698. The problem now is to decide whether in the process of rapid replacement a significant change in this balance took place. In seeking to answer this question we are hampered to some extent by the lack of tonnage-per-owner figures to compare with those presented in Section 4. Nevertheless, Table XXIII, which shows the distribution of ownership in all Massachusetts vessels registered between 1699 and 1714 in terms of numbers of investments, provides at least a first approximation to an answer, and it may indicate whether the problem is worth pursuing further. Table X showed that in the 1698 fleet the small owners—those who invested three or fewer times—held 69.7 per cent of the total number of investments. Table XXIII shows that the equivalent lower portion of the investor group in the later period taken as a whole—91.9 per cent, or 1,027 people—held 1,541 investments: 52.1 per cent of the total number—a drop of 17.6 per cent. Conversely, the five leading investors in the early period—1.5 per cent of the whole group—controlled 11.9 per cent of the 587 investments. Of the 2,957 shares in the vessels added to the Massachusetts fleet after 1698, the same top percentage (seventeen people) controlled more than twice as large a percentage of the investments: 24.1 per cent.51 These figures certainly suggest that a decisive and significant change in the balance of ownership had taken place. Confirmation of this trend may be found in the one category of vessels in which tonnage-per-owner figures are available and entirely reliable: the solely owned vessels. Table XXIV shows the distribution of ownership of vessels possessed entirely by single individuals, in terms of both numbers of investments and tonnages. Analysis of the com51

If the relation between investments and tonnage existing in the earlier period had been maintained in the later, the leading 1.5 per cent of the investors would have held not 17.6 per cent as in 1698, but 35.6 per cent of the tonnage registered between 1699 and 1714.

64

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

parable figures for the 1698 fleet (Table XII) made clear that the two leading owners of solely owned vessels—5.9 per cent of the group—had held 20.8 per cent of the investments in these vessels and 29.1 per cent of the tonnage. Comparison of these figures with their equivalents from Table XXIV shows a radical change: the same top percentage of owners of the 386 solely owned vessels registered in the sixteen years after 1698 held 49.5 per cent of the investments in this category, and a minimum of 54.6 per cent of the tonnage. Examination of solely owned vessels, then, amply supports the impression of an important shift in concentration of ownership. It therefore seems reasonable to seek means beyond those used in analysis of the shipping of the early period to probe the character and to assess the dimensions of this development. The data must be reanalyzed in such a way as to avoid the limitations of both previous tables and locate precisely the center of the change. Table XXIII was limited by its exclusive concentration on mere numbers of investments: it is at least possible that the increased percentage of investments claimed by the upper 1.5 per cent of the investors reflects not a material increase in control of shipping but simply a multiplication of holdings in small vessels. Table XXIV, on the other hand, though it included accurate tonnage figures, was limited to solely owned vessels: since this group formed only about a third of the total registrations (34.7 per cent), it might misrepresent the general development. In Table XXV all elements of the situation are brought together in a different arrangement that not only avoids the weaknesses of both previous compilations but locates the heart of the change in ownership concentration. The rows in this table divide all Massachusetts vessels into three tonnage categories: those 100 tons and over, those between 31 and 99 tons, and those 30 tons and under. The columns cross these divisions by three others which separate the vessels according to the number of people who held shares in them. The nine major cells that result represent nine categories of what might be called risk-units. The unit of greatest risk is that of the upper-left cell: vessels of 100 tons or more owned by single investors; the bottom-

INVESTORS AND INVESTMENTS, 1699-1714

65

right cell represents the exact opposite: vessels of 30 tons or less owned by five or more people. Two sets of numbers are entered in the cells: the percentage of the total investments in each category owned by the biggest investors (defined as those who invested in ten or more Massachusetts vessels throughout the Register) ; and the percentage of the group involved in each category that such investors constituted. Subdivisions contrast the percentages of their holdings in Massachusetts' 1698 fleet with those in Massachusetts vessels registered in the subsequent sixteen years. Looking first at the top row of the table, one can see that the frequent investors increased their holdings in some, but not all, of the largest vessels (100 tons or more), and the difference is important. They did not increase their proportion of investments in large vessels where the risk was small—where the total number of shareholders was five or more—but only where the co-owners were few. Thus, if two to four investors were involved not only did the percentage of their claims rise, but they themselves constituted an increasing portion of the investing group; but where five or more investors were concerned and hence where the risk was most widely spread, the percentage of their holdings in the largest vessels declined.52 The interest of the most frequent investors in the medium-sized The figure in the highest risk category for the 1698 fleet can hardly be used for comparison since there was only one vessel in this category by the end of 1698 and it was owned by a leading investor. Increased concentration in this category of vessel may nevertheless be seen by dividing the later period into four quadrenniums. The percentage of the investments held by leading investors rose from 80 per cent for the years 1699-1702 to 83, 83, and 90 per cent in the subsequent four-year periods. It should be pointed out that the definition adopted for isolating the leading investors (ten or more investments throughout the period covered by the Register) precludes absolute comparisons between figures for the 1698 fleet and those for the subsequent sixteen years. By definition a leading investor has a higher probability of appearing in the longer period ( 1 6 9 9 - 1 7 1 4 ) than in the shorter ( 1 6 9 7 - 1 6 9 8 ) . The total figures bear this out: 33 per cent of the 1698 investments were in the hands of leading investors; 40 per cent of the later acquisitions were. It is to be expected, therefore, that percentages would rise somewhat in all cells of the table. The degree of rise and the fluctuations among the cells are what indicate the significant changes in the pattern of ownership.

66

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING,

1697-1714

vessels ( 3 1 - 9 9 tons) followed a similar pattern. Their investments increased when they themselves owned the ships outright or when they entered into combination with no more than three others; but when the number of shareholders rose to five or more the percentages of investments they held decreased. For the smallest ships the pattern is slightly altered: investments held by the frequent investors increased in the case of the solely owned vessels and remained essentially the same for ships of medium risk; they did, however, increase again for the lowest risk vessels.53 A further demonstration of the point involved will be found by examining not the rows of the table but the columns, and particularly the second column, in which the risk element is kept at a constant value of between two and four owners. In this medium-risk category the concentration of holdings by the frequent investors increased markedly only in the case of the larger vessels. In ships over 100 tons the high investors held a much greater proportion of the investments after 1698 than they did in those of that year, and they also constituted a larger proportion of the group investing; in ships between 31 and 99 tons they still held a larger percentage of the investments, but the group had become more open: frequent investors comprised a smaller percentage of the people participating; in the smallest vessels of all they also formed less of the group and here their investment percentages barely rose at all. Table X X V has demonstrated that the increasing holdings claimed by the frequent investors, far from being a mere multiplication of low-risk investments, were in fact increases in investments in the larger vessels where ownership and hence risk was shared by the smallest number of people. But general conclusions drawn from this fact would be questionable unless it can also be demonstrated that this area of increasing interest by the frequent investors was 53

The figures in the lowest risk category represent an exception to the general conclusions from the table. This exception results from the fact that not one of the investments in vessels of this category registered by the end of 1698 was made by a leading investor. The general trend is apparent, however, when the registrations in the years 1699-1714 are divided into fouryear periods. In the years 1699-1702, 53 per cent of the investments in this type of vessel were made by leading investors; percentages for subsequent quadrenniums are 43, 11, and 19.

INVESTORS AND INVESTMENTS, 1699-1714

67

not a decreasing portion of the newly registered fleet: if the kinds of vessels in which the larger shareholders were increasing their holdings were declining in number relative to the whole, the rise in investments still would not indicate a net increase in control of shipping. To cover this possibility Table XXVI has been prepared. In organization it follows precisely the plan of Table XXV, recreating the nine major risk categories subdivided by the two contrasting time periods. But the percentages entered in the cells are no longer the percentages of each category held by the big investors but rather the portions of the total number of vessels that each category and subcategory includes. Now, by comparing the entries in the same cells of the two tables, we are in a position to establish the absolute, not merely the relative, importance of the increasing holdings of the leading investors. The relation between the two tables concludes the argument. The vessel categories in which the major shipowners were increasing their investments were those whose proportional contribution to the fleet was growing. The increases in proportions of the total number of vessels that took place will be found in much the same cells in which the increases in investments of the most frequent investors had earlier been seen: in the high-risk cells, where large tonnages were combined with small numbers of investors. Thus, to retrace the path followed in discussing Table XXV, the percentage of vessels 100 tons or over in the fleet as a whole increased only when such vessels were solely owned or when they were owned by groups of from two to four. But, when the risk in these largest vessels was less, their proportional contribution to the fleet as a whole declined. The same pattern is seen for ships between 31 and 99 tons. The smallest vessels (30 tons and below) show a decrease for all levels of risk. Finally, the two-to-four column shows that when numbers of owners are held constant, increases in the relative size of the vessel group stand in direct proportion to tonnages. The relative number of vessels owned by two to four people rose when the vessels were 100 tons or over; they rose also when the tonnages ranged from 31-99; but they fell when the tonnage figures were 30 or less.

68

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

There can now be little doubt as to the meaning of the original ownership concentration figures for this period. In the successive replacements of the Massachusetts fleet as it had existed at the end of the seventeenth century, the leading shipowners—the sixty individuals who owned part of ten or more of Massachusetts' vessels recorded in the Register—owned an increasing portion of the province's shipping: they held increasing control of the growing part of the fleet, which was composed of the largest vessels involving the greatest risk. Concentration of ownership was indeed rising; the balance of holdings between the large and the small investors was shifting significantly. Who were these major investors? Was there a change from the earlier period in the entrepreneurial groupings they formed as shipowners? Table XXVII contains the names, residences, and summaries of the holdings of all those who invested in ten or more of all the vessels listed in the Register. The figures for each of these sixtynine individuals are divided first into categories of home ports of the vessels they invested in; they are then subdivided within these groups into time periods: 1697-1698 and 1699-1714. In each of these time periods there are separate listings of numbers of investments and of tonnages, the latter being the sums of the known tonnage-per-owner figures. A separate column lists the vessels and tonnages each person owned alone. The last two columns total all the subtotals and thus present the accumulated investments of the leading shipowners. Several of the names, especially those at the top of the list, are familiar from the early period. The two leaders of the 1698 fleet, Samuel Lillie and Andrew Belcher, still head the list of grand totals, though in terms of numbers of investments their positions have been reversed. Benjamin Gallop, third in 1698, is now seventh; Marston and Dyer, previously fourth and fifth, are now twenty-ninth and thirty-first. To such familiar names are added a large group of Bostonians who had held shares in the 1698 fleet but whose involvement had been minor; their holdings had risen rapidly in the decade and a half thereafter.

INVESTORS AND INVESTMENTS, 1699-1714

69

There is thus a good deal of continuity in personnel through the entire eighteen years of the Register. To be sure, there were a few important new arrivals from outside, such as John Lloyd of London and Timothy Harris of Oporto, but most of the newcomers were connected in one way or another to well-established Boston merchants. Thus, Jonathan Belcher, the future governor, who returned from his first European trip in 1705 and immediately became deeply involved in shipping, was the son of Andrew Belcher. It was with the prominent Boston merchant Louis Boucher that the Londoner Paul Boucher appeared as a shipowner in Massachusetts; and the two Wentworths, whose family roots in Massachusetts went back to the origins of the colony, had mercantile connections throughout the community. The totals for the most frequent investors are impressive almost to the point of improbability. Belcher invested in 137 vessels and held altogether, if shares had been equal, over 3,000 tons. Lillie invested in fewer vessels, but his actual control of shipping appears to have been greater. He owned outright 42 of the 108 vessels in which he was concerned, representing close to 2,500 tons. Many of his other investments, as will become clear, were in effect also sole ownerships. The only sudden break in the even decline of totals comes between Lillie and Clarke, the third listed, who invested in 39 fewer vessels than Lillie and held some 1,600 tons less. Thereafter the figures decline regularly and slowly, leveling off at the bottom of the list where twelve individuals held shares in 10 vessels each, with an average total tonnage of approximately 235. What is known of the personal histories of some of these leading shipowners suggests that the totals were not only high but too high. Shipping, like trade itself in this period, was full of risks. There were, to begin with, the risks of the seas which neither rudimentary forms of locally obtained marine insurance nor expensive and irregularly available foreign'underwriting were sufficient to overcome. Perhaps equally important, however, were those basic conditions of the economy, especially the monetary shortage and the lack of impersonal financial institutions, that made it difficult to resolve profits into securities and to maintain reserves—a difficulty for which the limited amount of urban real estate was an insufficient

70

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING,

1697-1714

solution. Instead of cash payments for sales, there was a further exchange of goods; instead of securities for profits, there was a further reinvestment." 4 Both may have been excellent for the growth of the commercial economy, but both heaped up dangers for the diligent entrepreneur, who was logically drawn to involve his full resources in immediate transactions. Reverses could mean disaster. The careers of some of the leading shipowners provide dramatic illustration. Consider the fate of Samuel Lillie. Linked by marriage to a veritable dynasty of merchant princelings, this prominent shipowner of 1698 continued to pile up investments in vessels, alone and in a great variety of combinations. By early 1707 Lillie was easily the biggest shipowner in the western hemisphere; he probably would have ranked high on any list of European shipping magnates as well. But his investments totaled in Table XXVII cover not the entire period but only the years before 1707, for in that year he went bankrupt. The immediate cause of Lillie's downfall was his inability to satisfy his pressing creditors, especially Edward Bromfield and Francis Burroughs, merchants and shipowners of Boston. Once they had brought his credit into question by a court action, Lillie was suddenly overwhelmed with demands for immediate payment of a great variety of obligations. Even his apprentice, Jeremy Condy, joined the crowd, suing his employer for £.325 in back wages. Lillie tried to limit the spread of the conflagration by pledges and partial payments, but the blaze was not to be stopped by such measures. He had no choice but to liquidate his fleet of vessels. Threatened with arrest for debt, he gave his wife power of attorney and in the fall of 1708 fled the country, settling in London where he attempted to recoup his fortunes. There is some evidence of his reinvolvement in American trade, but in 1727 he again went bankrupt. He returned to Boston in 1730 "broken in age and infirmities." 55 r4

' Bailyn, New England Merchants, 99-100. The intricate tangle of litigation in which Lillie was caught in 1707 and 1708 has been preserved in the Suffolk County Court Files, Boston, Massachusetts. There is a handy guide to these papers in Pierce's Lillie, pp. 7 4 - 7 5 . 55

INVESTORS A N D INVESTMENTS, 1699-1714

71

To what extent Lillie's failure was due to his own mismanagement and poor judgment cannot be discovered from the records (though his tendency to invest alone, indicated by the figures in the "solely owned" column, is suggestive), but the effect of such personal failings as might have existed was exaggerated by the delicacy of the situation in which security was difficult to attain even for the most affluent and successful. Perhaps it is correct to attribute the collapse of Lillie to incompetence, as one is surely inclined to do in the case of the insolvency of that flamboyant adventurer, that "gay man" and "free liver," Sir Charles Hobby. '0 But must the same be said of Louis Boucher? This leading merchant, associated with a group of influential English and American Huguenots experienced in trade, owned ten vessels outright and invested altogether in fiftythree vessels. He had claims to something like 2,000 tons of shipping. In October 1714, he too declared himself bankrupt. '7 The systematic difficulty of translating the fruits of enlarged enterprise into security may help explain the character of investment groupings in the period 1699-1714. It will be recalled that the partnership combinations in the 1698 fleet were almost completely ad hoc, a situation that may reasonably be explained by the limitation of capital available to any given individual or group of investors and by the need to spread risks. These conditions continued to exist for the great majority of investors; their groupings, therefore, remained varied and highly unstable. The interesting question is whether the leading investors—those who had, at least to some extent, overcome these limitations—had begun to form stable partnerships, shipowning companies, in effect, with permanent forms of organization. The most important set, which includes a large part of the Bromfield-Burroughs suit, is the collection of 58 items listed as File No. 7169. Condy's suit, which contains some remarkably detailed apprenticeship records, may be followed in 7182, 7253, and 7439. 56 Thomas Hutchinson, The History of . . . Massachusetts-Bay (Lawrence S. Mayo, ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1936), II, 114; Oliver A. Roberts, History of . . . the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Massachusetts (Boston, 1895), I, 341. 57 Boston News-Letter, October 11, 1714; May 23 and June 13, 1715.

72

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

Examination of the investment combinations of the leading shipowners reveals evidence of tendencies in this direction. The biggest shipping magnates increasingly participated in fairly stable investment patterns; but they also continued to draw upon the scattered resources of many small investors. Instances of repeated combinations may now be found. They are, however, still infrequent; those that existed were largely based on personal ties; and they existed side-by-side with a great array of one-time associations. Thus, Andrew Belcher, for whom success in trade and powerful links to officialdom provided as much security as could be found in the world of colonial commerce,58 invested with approximately 150 different individuals in the sixteen years after 1698. The vast tangle of his partnerships defies close analysis, but its general characteristics are clear. He shared ownership with most of the leading investors of the time, and also with many of the lesser ones including the masters of his vessels. There is, however, a persistent association among the many combinations Belcher entered. Andrew and his son Jonathan formed what might be called a core partnership that remained constant throughout the period. Together, the two owned ten vessels; they held eleven others together with one other partner; six with two other partners; and five with three others. Two of the five-man groupings were exact duplicates of each other. Lillie's investment pattern shows another form of stability. His partnership associations remained highly unstable; though certain names do recur, the most frequently repeated, Penn Townsend and David Jeffries, occur only three and four times respectively. More important, there is not one single exact duplicate in the entire list of Lillie's partnerships. The sense in which the pattern of his investments may be said to have clarified is that sole ownership became an increasingly important form of investment for him. Between 1699 and 1714 he owned thirty-seven vessels alone. Furthermore, many of his other investments probably came close to exclusive ownership, for in fourteen cases his only partner was the ship's master who had probably received a small share in lieu of wages. In a different, though also restricted, sense Louis Boucher's partnerships formed a pattern. His main associations were with a group r8

'

Bailyn, New England Merchants,

195-196.

INVESTORS AND INVESTMENTS, 1699-1714

73

of London Huguenots with whom he joined in a variety of combinations. One strand in this ethnic network was particularly strong. The core partnership in Boucher's case was the one he formed with his London kinsman, the merchant Paul Boucher. With him the Bostonian joined in ownership of five vessels; with him and other London Huguenots, in ever-changing combinations, he shared thirteen others. Here and there among the hundreds of groupings involving the lesser shipowners there are other repetitions of small partnerships. Thus, for example, Nicholas Roberts of Boston joined with John Shippen of London to finance eight vessels; Roberts also invested in the two other vessels in which Shippen was concerned. Occasionally larger combinations attained at least temporary stability. Thus the four-man partnership of John Colman and Charles Hobby of Boston together with Richard Eyton and Carlton Vanbrough of London owned four vessels totaling 610 tons. The two Londoners and Colman came together also in a fifth case. To such a limited but still significant extent, then, had the instability of entrepreneurial groupings in the shipping of 1698 given way to fixed shipowning associations in the sixteen years of great expansion that followed. Though important elements of stability may be seen in the patterns of investment, this form of business enterprise was still highly personal, still full of risks, still structured so as to favor a broad popular participation.

8. Conclusion This study was undertaken not to illustrate a particular interpretation of early American economic and social development but only to make available a new kind of historical data and to test the procedures necessary to create such information. We believe that the tables that follow and the Note on Procedure fulfill these original purposes. But, as the preceding discussion will have suggested, the answers to the questions we have asked of the material point to a particular view of economic development in the early years of the eighteenth century. It remains to bring this view into sharper focus, thereby to suggest something of the broader implications of the statistics drawn from the Massachusetts Register of Shipping. The data illuminate a critical stage in the process by which the struggling, formless, frontier economy of seventeenth-century America matured into the orderly commercial world of the eighteenth century. It was a complex process, for what took place in these middle years of the colonial period was not simply a recovery from the confusion and extreme disorganization of settlement and a return to a familiar and traditional order. The obvious disarray of the settlement decades gave way to more regular arrangements; but certain attributes of the earlier disorganization, far from being overcome in the passage of time, became permanent, became built into the situation and formed the basis of future developments. At the very end of the seventeenth century the Massachusetts shipping industry, large by any contemporary measure, still bore the marks of its recent origins. Despite the preeminence of Boston and the importance of a few leading shipowners, its essential features were its high degree of decentralization, the multiplicity and smallness of its units of operation, and the impermanence of its entrepreneurial groupings. In the course of successive replacements of

CONCLUSION

75

the seventeenth-century fleet alterations in all of these characteristics appeared. Boston's role as both shipping and shipbuilding center increased while the importance of the hinterland ports declined. The units of operation grew in size as the tonnages rose and the average number of co-owners fell. This growth in risk-taking and enterprise was centered in a relatively small group of leading entrepreneurs who gathered into their own hands an increasing portion of the province's shipping. Finally, partnership combinations of investors tended toward greater stability; patterns of associations became more evident. These changes are evidence not merely of growth but of increasing economic maturity and an increasing tendency of the commercial structure to approximate familiar patterns. But, despite movements in this direction, important differences remained. The growth in centralization of the industry, the increase in size of the units of operation, in the concentration of ownership, and in the stability of associations was limited: powerful forces in the society and its economy constrained their free development, kept in motion opposing tendencies. The accumulation of capital in the metropolis and the consolidation of the routes of trade allowed Boston to magnify its commercial role, but not by any means to the exclusion of the lesser towns. The size of operations did not grow beyond the reach of small investors. Above all, despite growing concentrations in individual hands, the remarkable diffusion of ownership through the population not only continued but increased. In this last characteristic of the early Massachusetts shipping industry—in the fact that a broadening distribution of the ownership of shipping developed together with an increase in the holdings of leading entrepreneurs—there lies a rich vein for historical speculation. For only in part was it the result of local and temporary conditions: the dangers of risk-taking, the modesty of personal capital accumulations, and the lack of impersonal organizations for pooling the available capital. It rested also on more permanent elements in the American economy, elements which would in time be modified but not eliminated: natural wealth, rapid and continuous expansion, and favorable institutions. In this small corner of the economy, as elsewhere, wealth, natural and inert, was abundant;

76

MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING, 1697-1714

its magnitude dwarfed the capacity of those favored by circumstance fully to exploit or engross it. Rapid and continuous growth in shipping as in other enterprises wrenched loose the incipient dominance of personal or group control and multiplied initial opportunities. Institutional constrictions were weak when they existed at all; and government was a friend of enterprise. There lie embedded in the Register, finally, not merely clear evidences of a forming economy, but also the less clear signs of an emerging social order. The broadening of popular participation made affluence for many a tangible possibility. Traditional definitions of occupational role and social status weakened and blurred. The desire to set oneself apart remained, but the forms of its satisfaction were less evident and more elusive. When every petty shopkeeper could call himself merchant only to find himself joined in elevation by ropemakers, carpenters, and sailors, what dignity was there in such a designation? Of such subtleties of human relations and self-imagery, difficult in any case to pin down for precise examination, this statistical compilation can only furnish passing glimpses. But the tables that follow will, we trust, serve more fully the humbler purpose for which they were devised: to furnish a means by which to understand the scale, in one small area, of America's early development.

The Massachusetts Register of Shipping, 1697-1714

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TABLE V DISTRIBUTION

O F VESSELS B Y TYPE,

1698

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

Sloop

Ship

Brigantine

Ketch

Tot. Av. No. Tonn. Tonn.

Tot. Av. No. Tonn. Tonn.

Tot. Av. No. Tonn. Tonn.

Tot. Av. No. Tonn. Tonn.

Boston Charlestown Cambridge Salem Ipswich Newbury Gloucester Beverly Lynn Scituate Plymouth Yarmouth Sandwich Barnstable Nantucket "New England" Total Mass. New Hampshire Connecticut Long Island North Carolina London Other Br. Isles Total Br. Isles West Indies, etc.

47 4 1 5 2 1 2 1 1

27

32 1

TOTAL

Home Port

— —

1,296 94 18 120 65 30 40 30 15 — —

27.6 23.5 18.0 24.0 32.5 30.0 20.0 30.0 15.0 — —

2,814

104.2

480

120.0

1

200

200.0

32

3,494

109.2

30.0 40.0 35.0 48.3

11 4 15 4

2,060 290 2,350 670

187.3 72.5 156.7 167.5

26.5

51

6,514

127.7

1 2 1 1 3 1 73 2 6 2

15 55 20 15 65 20 1,898 30 157 30

15.0 27.5 20.0 15.0 21.7 20.0 26.0 15.0 26.2 15.0

1 1 2 3

30 40 70 145

88

2,330

82

35 1

36

210

42.0

278

27.8

15

488

32.5

— —

1 1

30 70

30.0 70.0

—

1

70

70.0

45.5

17

588

34.6

1,488 40

46.5 40.0

60

60.0

10

30

30.0

—

1,618 20

46.2 20.0

1,638

TABLE

V—continued

D I S T R I B U T I O N O F V E S S E L S B Y T Y P E , 1698 CLASSIFICATION Bark Tot. No. Tonn.

Pink Av. Tonn.

13

635

48.8

_

_

Tot. No. Tonn.

Flyboat Av. Tonn.

Tot. No. Tonn.

60

60.0

60

— 60.0

1

1

14

695

— 49.6

— 1

— 60

— 60.0

1 1

1 1 2

40 65 105

40.0 65.0 52.5

1

70

70.0

1

70

16

800

50.0

2

130

TOTAL

Av. Tonn.

200 200

200.0 200.0

—

—

—

70.0

—

—

—

65.0

1

200

200.0

Tot. No. Tonn.

Av. Tonn.

124 5 1 21 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 2 171 3 6 2 1 15 6 21 7

6,443 134 18 998 125 60 40 30 15 200 15 55 20 15 65 220 8,453 50 157 30 30 2,270 395 2,665 815

52.0 26.8 18.0 47.5 41.7 30.0 20.0 30.0 15.0 200.0 15.0 27.5 20.0 15.0 21.7 110.0 49.4 16.7 26.2 15.0 30.0 151.3 65.8 126.9 116.4

211 12,200

57.8

Home Port Boston Charlestown Cambridge Salem Ipswich Newbury Gloucester Beverly Lynn Scituate Plymouth Yarmouth Sandwich Barnstable Nantucket "New England" Total Mass. New Hampshire Connecticut Long Island North Carolina London Other Br. Isles Total Br. Isles West Indies, etc. TOTAL

TABLE

VI

PLACE OF B U I L D OF VESSELS R E G I S T E R E D IN MASSACHUSETTS,

1698

CLASSIF ICAT ION Sloop

Place Built Boston Charlestown Cambridge Salem Ipswich Newbury Gloucester Beverly Lynn Salisbury Amesbury Milton Scituate Plymouth Weymouth Hingham Taunton Swansea Bristol Total Mass. Other New England New York Carolinas British Isles Captured TOTAL

Ship

No.

Tonn.

No.

Tonn.

No.

Tonn.

13 2 1 7 1 4 1 1 2

440 45 18 140 30 140 15 30 30

14 9

1,700 1,720

7 3 2 1

335 140 83 60

-

—

4

560

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

17 —

487

—

—

—

—

40

2 —

1 2 54 28 4 2

40 40 1,495 726 82 27

—

—

—

—

88

—

—

—

2

2,330

164

No. 1 — . —

—

1

55 —

313

—

1

— —

1 1 4 7 1 1

35 —

30 35 200 335 60 50

40

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1

30

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

— —

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

— .

—

5,414 160

30 — —

11

—

40 2

Tonn.

—

2

—

—

—

—

300 970

1 10

Ketch

Brigantine

30 6

1,383 255

—

15

448

—

—

—•

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1 8

90 850

51

6,514

84

—

-

—

36

1,638

—

1 1

70 70

17

588

TABLE VI—continued P L A C E O F B U I L D O F VESSELS R E G I S T E R E D I N M A S S A C H U S E T T S , 1698 CLASSIFICATION Pink

Bark

No.

Tonn.

No.

4

200

1 1

40 20

1

2

70

-

3

190

1

1 13 2

—

Flyboat

Tonn.

No.

TOTAL

Tonn.

—

—

—

50

—

—

—

-

50 620 120

—

—

—

—

60

—

—

—

—

—

70

—

2

57.8

211

—

800

12,200

200

—

16

Boston Charlestown Cambridge Salem Ipswich Newbury Gloucester Beverly Lynn Salisbury Amesbury Milton Scituate Plymouth Weymouth Hingham Taunton Swansea Bristol Total Mass. Other New England New York Carolinas British Isles Captured

1

—

1

69.4 136.1 35.2 46.1 30.0 33.3 15.0 35.0 15.0 30.0 35.0 100.0 52.9 60.0 50.0 20.0 82.0 40.0 30.0 61.6 33.2 20.5 13.5 76.7 107.3

130

—

60

2,705 1,905 141 1,153 30 300 15 70 30 30 35 500 2,012 60 100 40 164 40 90 9,420 1,261 82 27 230 1,180

200

—

—

Place Built

1

—

—

1

Av. Tonn.

—

—

60

—

Tot. Tonn.

39 14 4 25 1 9 1 2 2 1 1 5 38 1 2 2 2 1 3 153 38 4 2 3 11

—

1

No.

—

85

TOTAL

Table RELATION BETWEEN

PLACE

REGISTERED

VII

OF BUILD IN

AND

PLACE

h κ O o Η ζ

H J. O o η Ζ

h Ä O O Η Ζ

HOME

MASSACHUSETTS,

Ν . h a, O o O o H Z h z

PORT

OF

VESSELS

1698

BUILT

ta A O O H Z

h A O o Η Ζ

h ä ta Ä ta V O O O O O O H Z H Ζ Η Ζ

ta à ta O O O H Z H

1 — — — —

40 — — — —

— 1 — — —

— 1 — — — — — — — — 2 — _ —

— 30 — — — — — — — — 70 — _ —

— — 1 — — — - — — — 2 — _ —

2

70

2

Home Port Boston Charlestown Cambridge Salem Ipswich

21 1.230 1 40 — — 1 30 — —

8 1 — — —

665 3 40— — 1 — — — —

123 — 18 — —

10 535 1 30 5 155 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 14 603 — — 1 35 — — — — — — 1 40 — —

Gloucester Beverly Lynn Scituate Plymouth Yarmouth Sandwich Barnstable Nantucket "New England" Total Mass. Other New England New York Carolinas London Other Br. Isles Total Br. Isles West Indies, etc.

— — — — — — — — — — — — — —- — — — — — — — — — —. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —• — — — — — — — — — —• — — — — — — —. — — — — — - — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —. 2 50 — — — — 1 15 — — — — 1 20 — — — — — — — — — — 26 1.370 9 705 4 141 25 1.153 1 30 8 260 — — — — — — — — — — — — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 30 — — — — — — — — — — 5 620 41.000 3 205 — — _ _ _ _ _ _ ι 40 8 825 41,000 — — — — — — 1 40 4 480 1 200 — — — — — — — —

TOTAL

39 2.705 141,905 4

141 25 1,153 1

30

86

9

300

1 — — — — — — — — — 1 —

15 — — — — _ — — — — 15 — _ _ — —

— 15 — — —

— — 15 — — — — — — — 30 — _ — — — — — — — — — _ _ — — — — — — — — 1

15

30

— — — — —

— — — — —

1 — — — —

35 — — — —

— — — — —— — — — — 1 — _ —•

— — — — — — — — — — 30 — _ —

— -— — — — — — — — — 1 — _ —

— — — — .—. — — — — — 35 — _ —

1

30

1

35

4 — — — —

— — — — — — — — — — 4 — _ — 1 _ — — _ _ — _ _ — 1 — — — — — 5

200 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 200 — _ .— 300 _ 300 — 500

TABLE V I I — c o n t i n u e d RELATION BETWEEN PLACE OF BUILD A N D

HOME PORT OF

REGISTERED IN MASSACHUSETTS, PLACE

VESSELS

1698

BUILT •a

3 O tí

CO

O Ζ

•3 3 O ε

A

as

I

ε c O Η

c c ¿ H Ζ

o Ζ

Ε «

e ο

G Β

3 α Η

Λ

C Η ο Η Ζ

c S ο Ρ Ζ

3 S «S

•ES η

VI c Η

ο Ζ

υ Ζ υ •C

C c o h Ζ

e c H

1

50

M

a

o >
J < Η Ο Η c Η

ο Ζ

S S H o m e Port

33 1,602 1 60 1 25 —

1

25 —

1

200 —

_ — —

—

2 100 1

20

1

64 1

40

1

—

—

1

.

20

—

—

—

—

30 —

18 1 3 2

100 — 85 —

1 1

15 25 —

_

1

36 1,852 1

60

2

100 2

40

1

64 1

40

2

80

27 9

1

10

—

_ — —

—

—

—

—

—

. —

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1 100

—

—

—

60 — 60 — 100 —

—

—

—

—

—

1 100

—

—

—

1 1 1

—

38 2,012 1

2 100

2

40

2 164 1

40

3

90

—

—

—

2

—

15

989 3 62 207 — — 1 20

2 —

1

30 —

—

—

1

30 — 35 —

—

—

82

2

1 60

735 3 62 14 —

38 1,261 4

87

670 124 5 1 2 230 21 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 — — — — . 1 1 3 1 200 2 27 — — 101,100 171 9 — — — — — 2 1 — 2 140 1 15 80 6 1 90 — 1 80 21 3 230 7 27

27

7

3 230 11 1,180

6,443 134 18 998 125 60 40 30 15 200 15 55 20 15 65 220 8,453 207 30 30 2.270 395 2,665 815

211 12,200

Boston Charlestown Cambridge Salem Ipswich Newbury Gloucester Beverly Lynn Scituate Plymouth Yarmouth Sandwich Barnstable Nantucket " N e w England' Total Mass. Other New Englai New Y o r k Carolinas London Other Br. Isles Total Br. Isles West Indies, etc. TOTAL

TABLE VILI HOME

P O R T O F VESSELS BUILT IN O T H E R

NEW

PLACE

ENGLAND

COLONIES,

BUILT

O

li

•J ί

HZ

h Ζ

Η Ζ

HZ

1698

HZ

Η Ζ

μ-|

fi =3

HZ

* £

HZ

HZ

Home Port Boston Charlestown Salem Plymouth Yarmouth Barnstable Hampton, Ν. H. Newcastle, N. H. Glastonbury, Conn. Haddam, Conn. Middletown, Conn. Saybrook, Conn. New London, Conn. Guilford, Conn. London Antigua TOTAL

2 70 1 60 1 70 2 120 2 55 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1 14 1 20

— — — — — — — — — — — — 2 40 110 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

1 15 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1 15 — — — — — — — —

— — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —· — — — — — — 4 110 2 120

1 — — — —

50 — — — —

1 10 2 65

88

— 1 — — —

— 35 — — —

— — 1 — —

— — 25 — —

— — — — 1

1 35 2 40 2

— — — — 15

85

— — — — — 12 — —

— — — — —

— — — — —

— — — — —

— — — — — — 1 30 — — — — — —

1 12 4 170 3 69

T a b l e Vili—continued H O M E PORT O F VESSELS BUILT I N OTHER N E W E N G L A N D COLONIES, 1698 PLACE

BUILT

υ s g·

'3cτ ε Ρ* δ Ζ S Η

Η Ζ

3 Ζ S Η

Η Ζ

co ϋ Η

s Η Ζ

•α c«

, R. I.

υ

HZ

υ Ό Λ Λ

HZ

j< H O H HZ Home Port

2

30

1 60

4 135

1 60

1

1 60

20

1 25

1

1

25 1

25

18 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2

30

1 60

I

20

5 155 2 120

1 35

1 25

89

1 25

2

75

735 14 100 85 15 25 15 40 10 50 35 25 20 15 12 30 35

38 1,261 381,261

Boston Charlestown Salem Ipswich Plymouth Yarmouth Barnstable Hampton, Ν. H. Newcastle, Ν. H. Glastonbury, Conn. Haddam, Conn. Middletown, Conn. Saybrook, Conn. New London, Conn. Guilford, Conn. London Antigua TOTAL

TABLE I X RELATION B E T W E E N RESIDENCE O F INVESTORS A N D HOME O F VESSELS,

H O M E Boston

Residence o f Investors Boston Charlestown Cambridge Maiden Salem Ipswich Newbury

Other Mass.

InPeo- vestple î t e s T o n n . 0 186 10 1 —

370 16 1

5,456.0 142.0 10.0 —

—

41.7 22.0 8.6 8.0 20.0

5 1 1 1 1

5 2 1 1 1

1

1

16.9

6 1 1 1

6 1 2 1

58.5 5.6 23.8 16.9

Gloucester Beverly Lynn Marblehead Plymouth Weymouth Marshfield Yarmouth Sandwich Barnstable Harwich Dartmouth Bristol Nantucket Total Mass. Other New England Other America London Other Br. Isles T o t a l Br. Isles West Indies, etc. Other'

221 9 3 5 2 8 10 10

413 5,860.2 99.2 10 5 98.4 5 82.6 2 27.4 8e 130.0 12 116.9 10 142.8

TOTAL"

261

458

a 6 e d

InPeo- vestple irías 11 8 2 2 17 10 5 3 5 6 1 1

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

-

—

—

—

5 —

5 —

—

6.447.5

1

—

—

—

—

2 2 2 1

-

30.2

16 8 2 2 37 11 5 3 6 6 1

2 2 2 1 1

1 —

—

3 82

7 113 —

1

1

1

2

—

1 1 3

—

2 1 3 120

PORT

1698

Tonn.

P O R T Other New England

Total Mass. InPeo- vestple ili'ts

Tonn.

193 14 3 2 19 10 5 35.0 4 30.0 6 15.0 6 5.0 2 15.0 7 — 1 — 1 22.5 3 20.0 2 17.5 2 1 10.0 1 7.5 — 5 64.9'' 3 1,642.7 2 9 0 — 9 10.0 3 50.5 5 — 2 50.5 8 20.0 12 66.6 10

393 e 5,972.7 25 e 233.6 3 40.5 2 7.6 42 848.3 13 106.8 6 86.1 4 43.0 7 50.0 6 15.0 2 21.9 7 73.5 1 5.6 2 23.8 3 39.4 2 20.0 2 17.5 1 10.0 1 7.5 5 30.2 7 64.9 d 534 e 7,717.9 10 99.2 6 108.4 7 133.1 2 27.4 10 e 180.5 14 e 141.9 13 209.4

1.789.8

587 e 8,457.3

306.7 86.6 30.5 7.6 806.6 84.8 77.5

332

InPeo- vest-

Other America InPeo- vest-

5.0 15.0

—

—

—

2

22 —

22 —

207.3 —

— 3

22

22

207.3

Total tonnage-per-owner figures, computed on the basis o f equal shares. This column does not represent the sum o f the figures in the " p e o p l e " columns for reasons explained in Table I, note d. Includes investments in vessels listed as coming from " N e w E n g l a n d . " All o f these investments are in Nantucket vessels which involve " c o m p a n i e s . "

90

40.0

60.0

TABLE I X — c o n t i n u e d RELATION BETWEEN RESIDENCE OF INVESTORS A N D O F VESSELS, HOME London InPeo- vestpie m'ts 10

10

Other Br. Isles

Tonn,

InPeo- vestpie m'ts

637.0

Tonn, 71.0

14

14

Tonn,

West Indies, etc.

10

637.0

4

InPeo- vestpie 6 m'ts

Tonn.

58.3

203 410 15 26 3 3 2 2 42 19 10 13 5 6 4 4 6 7 6 6 2 2 7 7 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 6 6 3 7 302 553 31 32 6 9 38 48 23 24 62 73» 30 32 14 18

6,744.0 248.6 40.5 7.6 848.3 106.8 86.1 43.0 50.0 15.0 21.9 73.5 5.6 23.8 39.4 20.0 17.5 10.0 7.5 47.7 64.9 d 8,521.7 306.5 148.4 1,660.0 289.2 1,969.2 927.6 330.5

708.0

1,471.7

4 21 25

4 22 26 —

71.0

14

14

708.0

55.2 261.8 317.0

41 22 63 2 5

1,526.9 261.8 1,788.7 46.6 121.1

84

2,664.4

33

37

—

—

33 2 3

37 2 4

1,471.7 46.6 113.9

—

1

1

7.2

36 21 57 2 4

48

53

2,269.2

30

31

395.2

77

β 1 ΰ

—

—

TOTAL

InPeo- vestpie m'ts Tonn,

1 10

PORT

PORT

Total Br. Isles InPeo- vestpie m'ts

HOME

1698

3

17.5 75.8

16

16

739.1

19

19

814.9

445

Includes one investor whose residence is listed as " E n g l a n d . " Investors whose residences were either in the Iberian peninsula or unknown. Totals of tonnages differ from figures previously given because of rounding errors.

91

717

12.203.9

Residence of Investors Boston Charlestown Cambridge Maiden Salem Ipswich Newbury Gloucester Beverly Lynn Marblehead Plymouth Weymouth Marshfìeld Yarmouth Sandwich Barnstable Harwich Dartmouth Bristol Nantucket Total Mass. Other New Engla Other America London Other Br. Isles Total Br. Isles West Indies, etc. Other' TOTAL»

—1