Masa Jepun : Sarawak under the Japanese, 1941-1945 9839115065

Citation preview

MASA JEPUN Sarawak Under The Japanese 1941-1945

Bob Reece

© Sarawak Literary Society All rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission o f the society.

ISBN 983-9115-06-5

Printed in Malaysia by

AMPANG PRESS SDN. BHD. 6 & 8, Jalan 6/91, Taman Shamelin Perkasa Batu 3‘4 Jalan Cheras, 56100 Kuala Lumpur, MALAYSIA.

b s . J 9~ n n VATU

In memory o f all those who did not live to see 11 September 1945

OB REECE first came to Sarawak in July 1969 as Malaysia-Singapore correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review of Hong Kong. He had earlier graduated from the Australian National University (Canberra) in History and English and taken an M.A. in History at the University of Queensland where he was a tutor for some years. His M.A. thesis was published by Sydney University Press in 1974 as Aborigines and Colonists at a time when Aboriginal Studies were not in vogue. In 1973 after five years in journalism, including a spell as Foreign Editor of the ill-fated Singapore Herald, he returned to Canberra to write his doctoral thesis on the cession and annexation of Sarawak in 1946. Published by Oxford University Press in 1982 (and subsequently re-printed by the Sarawak Literary Society) as The Name o f Brooke: The End o f White Rajah Rule in Sarawak, this study is recognised as the definitive account of Sarawak’s transformation from an idiosyncratic and isolated family demesne to one of Britain’s last colonial acquisitions. Bob Reece was subsequently invited by the Sarawak Government to contribute an historical chapter to Our Sarawak (Sarawak Literary Society, 1983) which marked the state’s twenty years in Malaysia. He has written substantial introductions to a number of nineteenth century Borneo classics in Oxford University Press’s historical re-print series, the most recent of which was Spenser St. John’s Life o f Sir James Brooke. He is also a major contributor to the Encyclopaedia o f Iban Studies to be published shortly by Sarawak’s Tun Jugah Foundation. Other writings by him on Sarawak history have appeared in edited collections of essays and in journals such as the Borneo Research Bulletin. In 1993 the Sarawak Literary Society published his biography of one of the state’s first major political figures, Datu Bandar Abang Hj. Mustapha: Some reflections o f his life and times. He is currently working on a biography of Tan Sri Ling Beng Siew of Sibu. Bob Reece, who was bom at Henty, New South Wales, in November 1940, is Associate Professor in History at Murdoch University in Western Australia. He is married with three children.

B

Acknowledgements his is a project which I had been nursing in the back of my mind since the early 1970’s when I first wrote about the occupation period in my thesis on the 1946 cession of Sarawak. In his capacity as President of the Sarawak Literary Society, Datuk Amar Leonard Linggi Jugah encouraged me to undertake the task with the Society’s support. My first debt of gratitude is to him and the Society for their generosity and their patience through what proved to be a long drawn out assignment. The Society’s Executive Secretary, Wan Mohammed bin Hj. Wan Ibrahim, was unfailingly good-natured and helpful. Rosenah Hj. Ahmad, K.C. Jong, Dr Otto Steinmayer, Kadri Jili, Victoria Lawrie, Kyoko Postill, Tomohiko Murayama and Chua Chen Choon translated source materials and Dr Steinmayer assisted further with suggestions about the manuscript. Vinson Sutlive, Peter Metcalf and Clifford Sather gave me good advice on anthropological points. Amongst those who facilitated my work were Alfred Mason, Mdm Yayako Maeda, Isao Yamazaki, Masahiko Mochizuki and members of the Japan Sarawak Association who entertained me at Kawasaki and elsewhere in October 1995. Masaharu Yamada, Keith Barrie, Dudley Morgan and Ho Ah Chon provided photographs from their collections and

T

Chen Ko Ting allowed me to reproduce some of his documents. At the Sarawak Museum, I was generously assisted by the Director, Encik Sanib Said, and by Lim Yu Seng and Mrs Khoo. I am also indebted to Dr Ooi Keat Gin for allowing me to see the page proofs of his two-volume collection of documents before publication. My daughter, Laura Reece, transcribed many of the interviews, proof-read the entire manuscript and gave me some useful suggestions on style and structure. Mohd. Yusof, Rosmawati binti Md. Razali and their colleagues at Ampang Press did everything possible to facilitate the book’s production. The list of other people in Sarawak, Britain, Japan and Australia who assisted me with information and friendship is too long to print here. I would like them to know that I greatly appreciate their help and I hope that they will see the book as their acknowledgement. One exception is my good friend Henry Gana whose death in 1996 deprived Sarawak of an outstanding authority on Iban culture and a fine man. My final debt of gratitude is to my dear wife, Lesley, and our children Laura, Anna and Owen. I grossly under-estimated the time needed to do justice to this complex story and they have paid a high price in the process. The occupation became a total pre-occupation.

Bob Reece Fremantle, March 1998

Contents Page Acknowledgements

vii

Abbreviations

xiii

Introduction

xvii

Chapter One: The Brooke Centenary Chapter Two: The Sarawak Japanese

Nissa Shokai - Early Japanese Settlers Mining Exploration North Borneo Yorioka Kikan Chapter Three: ‘Those Beastly Little Japs’

1 9

9 11 13 14 15 18

The China Relief Fund The Malaya Patriotic Fund Sarawak’s Defences The Punjabi Regiment General Percival War Preparations J.B. Archer Oilfields Denial

18 21 21 24 25 25 26 27

Chapter Four: ‘Burong Bangau’

30

The Kawaguchi Detachment The Kuching Air-Raid Christmas Eve The Punjabi Retreat Simanggang Sibu Other Towns Reactions to the Invasion Chapter Five: Exodus and Nemesis

Decisions The Arundells Long Nawang Missionaries North Borneo Prisoners Meanwhile, in Australia ...

30 32 34 35 35 35 38 39 42

42 44 46 49 50 51

X

Chapter Six: Boruneo Kita

Marquis Maeda Maeda’s Death Setsuo Yamada Ken-sanji Simanggang Kaum Ibu Leadership Training Research Chapter Seven: Kempei-tai, Jikeidan and Kyodo-hei

Kempei-tai Jikeidan Kyodo-hei

54 56 61 62 63 64 75 75 77 79 79 80 81

Bowing Ukum Jipun Violence Nudity ‘Comfort Women’ Gambling Social Mixing News and Propaganda Cultural Policy Religion Education Civilian Volunteers Tojo’s Visit Monuments

88 88 90 91 92 93 96 96 98 105 106 109 112 113 114

Chapter Nine: Ethnic Policy

116

Chapter Eight: The Japanese Presence

The Chinese Shu Jin The Malays Islam The Iban Shotguns The Indian Independence League The Punjabis Chapter Ten: Economic Policy

Banking and Currency Commerce Agricultural Production Barter Trading and Black Market Boat-building The Timber Industry Mining Oil Labour

116 120 120 125 127 132 134 136 139

139 141 142 142 143 144 146 147 149

XI

Chapter Eleven: Adaptation and Innovation

Domestic Industries The Science Party JJtai lama-lama magang A Problem Child Chapter Twelve: The Turning of the Tide

153

153 154 155 158 160

The Pontianak Rebellion The Api Rebellion Repercussions in Sarawak The 37th Army The First Air-Raids The Last Squeeze

160 162 163 164 167 169

Chapter Thirteen: Liberation

171

Special Operations Operation Semut Tarakan and Labuan Keningau The Sandakan Death. Marches The Bombing of Sibu Lu Ngee Jin The Sibu Surrender Simanggang The Kuching Surrender 11 September 1945 Batu Lintang Fujino Force

173 174 176 178 179 180 182 184 186 188 189 192 198

Chapter Fourteen: Perang Jipun

204

Pasir Nai Kapit The Attack on Song The Engkelili Raid ‘Butei’ Suzuki Betong Angkatan Perang Majang Desa Chapter Fifteen: ‘B Cow’ '

Collaboration Operation Nipoff The Chinese The Currency Problem Their Chinaplate

204 207 211 211 213 214 215 218

219 228 230 232 233

Chapter Sixteen: The Japanese Legacy

237

Glossary

243

Chronology

245

Bibliography

247

Abbreviations AA AIB AIF ANGAU ARP AWM BBCAU BEM BTM CAB CO DORCA HHMY HUMS HMAS HMS IIL IWM NAW NLA OCDA PKMS POW PRO RAAF RAF RHL SCCAL SEAC SIA SMA SOE SRD SWPA

uss wo

Australian Archives, Canberra Allied Intelligence Bureau (Melbourne) Australian Imperial Forces Australian New Guinea Admininistrative Unit Air Raid Precautions Australian War Memorial Archives, Canberra British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit Borneo Evangelical Mission Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij British War Cabinet Papers, Public Record Office Colonial Office Papers, Public Record Office Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs His Highness’ Motor Yacht (Sarawak) His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Ship His Majesty’s Australian Ship His Majesty’s Ship Indian Independence League Imperial War Museum Archives, London National Archives, Washington National Library of Australia, Canberra Overseas Chinese Defence Association (North Borneo) Persatuan Kebangsa’an Melayu Sarawak (Sarawak Malay National Union) prisoner of war Public Record Office, Kew, London Royal Australian Air Force Royal Air Force Rhodes House Library, Oxford Sarawak Chinese Cultural Association Library, Sibu Southeast Asia Command Special Intelligence Australia (Melbourne) Sarawak Museum Archives, Kuching Special Operations Executive (London) Services Reconnaissance Department (Melbourne) South West Pacific Area United States Ship War Office Papers, Public Record Office

Introduction he Japanese occupation of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo during World War Two is one of the big gaps in the writing about Borneo history. Apart from official Australian and British military accounts of the invasion and liberation1, the main body of writing consists of first-hand narratives by European prisoners of war2 and members of the Semut Allied guerilla parties.3 Borneo has been passed over in the academic analysis of Japanese rule in Southeast Asia. From Sarawak itself, apart from the reminiscences of a handful of Sarawakians4 and brief accounts by John Chin (1981) and Sanib Said (1985), there is only Gabriel Tan’s anecdotal compilation (1997).5 The general secondary accounts are in Runciman (1960) and Reece (1982; 1993).6 In addition, there are references to the period in Lockard (1987).7 Few of these works remind us that Sarawak was administered jointly with Brunei and North Borneo by the Japanese army as an entity known as Boruneo Kita (northern Borneo) and that its experience has to be seen within the wider context of Japan’s Dai Toa Kyoeiken, or Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Most of what has been written about what things were actually like during the occupation has tended to portray it as a kind of nightmare, a grim aberration which came to its inevitable end when Sarawak was liberated by Allied forces between March and September 1945. The tacit wish of most Sarawakians who lived through that era has been to erase the memory of what was a generally unhappy and difficult experience. For some, their war-time activities were also a potential source of embarrassment. These attitudes were encouraged after July 1946 by the British colonial government which traded on the negative aspects of Japanese rule to enhance its own initially tenuous position. In my earlier writing on the period, I suggested

T

that the occupation had an important effect on the political consciousness of the people of Sarawak. If Sarawak had possessed an anti-colonial independence movement supported by the Japanese, as in Indonesia, the Philippines and Burma, there might well have been a different attitude towards the occupation period. As it was, the Malay nationalist movement which developed in Sarawak during the late 1930’s was not pro-Japanese and from early 1946 was committed to the restitution of the status quo ante in the form of Brooke rule. The vigorous anti-cession campaign mounted largely by the Kuching Malays tended to obscure the occupation. Apart from European prisoners of war, the only group who have been anxious to record the occupation are the Chinese who were treated more harshly by the Japanese than other ethnic groups. In particular, the narratives of Fing Kai Cheng, Fau Tzy Cheng and Fiu Yng Tze have provided the most detailed accounts of what life was like under ‘the Japanese iron heel’ in the Sibu area.8 Their work is largely based on personal experience of the occupation. The reminiscences of Fu Ngee Jin are of the same genre.9 The most effective reason for the lack of comprehensive secondary accounts has been the dearth of documentary sources. Apart from a small amount of material in the Sarawak Museum Archives and Sarawak State Secretariat files, almost nothing survives of the Japanese war-time administration’s records. Nor are there more than one or two copies of the newspapers published in Sarawak under its direction. My own chance discovery of some district court records and other Japanese-period material in a curio shop in Kuching’s main bazaar in 1996 only highlights how much must have been destroyed by the Japanese themselves, by the in-coming Australian military administration and by those Sarawakians who had had associations with the Japanese or simply

X Vlll

wished to forget what had happened. Each group had its own interest in obliterating the record of the immediate past. Recently, Ooi Keat Gin has published a twovolume collection of occupation documents for Sarawak which makes source material easily accessible for the first time.10 However, most of the documents still reflect the European experience and there is little on the Japanese administration and the indigenous experience. So far, there has been no systematic attempt to examine the official records for the occupation period in Japanese archives or to make use of the collections of reminiscences by military and civilian veterans which have been appearing in print over the last twenty years, in particular, the two volumes of collected writings by Masaharu (‘Seiji’) Yamada (1969) and the reminiscences of Shoichiro Suzuki (1986)." A general outline of the military administration structure has appeared.12 However, there is as yet no comprehensive secondary account of the occupation from a Japanese point of view. The judgements made of the Japanese administration by Australian and British military authorities tended to reflect the increasing civil disarray that characterised the final twelve months as it focused on preparations for the Allied invasion. There has been a marked tendency to regard the occupation period not as the abortive beginning of a new era of Japanese colonial rule in northern Borneo but as an unpleasant interruption to BrookeBritish rule. Brigadier C.F.C. Macaskie in his final report on the Australian and British military administrations in March 1946 observed that the Japanese regime had no policies to speak of: After invasion, the Japanese attempted to carry on the former machinery of government, but there was soon a complete breakdown in the methods of administration, and the Japanese administration degenerated into mere spoliation enforced by the Army through the medium of the ‘Kempetai’. No attempt was made to carry out or even maintain public works, and their attempt to continue the fiscal system was soon abandoned, and they relied upon such revenue as they could raise by granting gambling licences and monopolies of trade. 13

Alastair Morrison, a retired senior colonial government official, observed thirty years later that ‘the Japanese had neither the resources nor the capacity to provide a fair and efficient government’.14 Similarly in relation to North Borneo, K.G.

Tregonning observed that ‘the Japanese had no long range conception of what they should do ... All departments ofgovernment became at best insufficient, and were usually inoperative’.15 In fact, the Japanese were remarkable for their efficiency in some areas, notching up impressive economic achievements. As well as restoring the Balikpapan, Sarawak and Brunei oilfields to almost pre-war production levels, which was their main priority, they made significant progress towards self-sufficiency in rice-production and laid the foundations of a timber export industry. At the same time, they strove to maintain continuity with the Brooke system of government by co-opting the traditional elites and enforcing existing laws and regulations through Malay magistrates. Military priorities during the final year of the occupation inevitably resulted in the abandonment of longerterm planning and a loss of direction in civil administration. As well as the paucity of documentary sources, the problem for the historian is that there were few notable events in Sarawak during the occupation. While it provides a broad overview of the period, this book is more a thematic exploration of group and individual experience than a detailed history of invasion, administration and re-conquest. Although it seeks to examine the aims and achievements of the Japanese administration in its own terms, as well as by other standards, its purpose is to indicate how the diverse peoples of Sarawak reacted to and were affected by a relatively brief period of rapid and unprecedented political and economic change. After one hundred years of ‘White Rajah’ rule, it was the Japanese occupation which ended Sarawak’s isolation and insulation from the outside world once and for all. Notes 1.

2.

The principal Allied histories of the invasion and liberation of northern Borneo are Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957, and Gavin Long, The Final Campaigns, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1965. For a British view of the post-war military administration, see F.S.V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East, London: H.M.S.O., 1956. Agnes Keith, Three Came Home, 1947; M.P. O’Connor, The More Fool 1: A Piece o f Autobiography, Dublin: Michael F. Moynehan, n.d.; K.H. Digby, Lawyer in the Wilderness, Cornell University, 1981; Frank Bell, Artes in Arduis: Undercover University, Cambridge: Elisabeth Bell, 1990; Peter H.H. Howes, In A Fair

XIX

Ground: or Cibus Cassowarii, London: Excalibur Press, 1994; Christopher Dawson, To Sandakan: The

3.

Diaries o f Charlie Johnstone, Prisoner o f War 194245, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995. Tom Harrisson, World Within: A Borneo Story, London: The Cresset Press, 1959; Bob Long, ‘Z ’ Special U nit’s Secret War: Operation Semut 1. Soldiering with the head-hunters in Borneo, Hornsby [N.S.W.]: Transpareon Press, 1989; Sheila Ross, And Tomorrow Freedom: Australian Guerillas in the Philippines, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989; Gabrielle McDonald, New Zealand's Secret Heroes: Don Stott and the ‘Z ’ Special Unit, Auckland: Reed Books, 1991; G.B. Courtney, Silent Feet: The History o f ‘Z ’ Special Operations 1942-1945,

Melbourne: R.J. & S.P. Austin, 1993. See also, Keith Barrie, ‘Borneo Story’, unpublished typescript, 2 vols., 1992, and Major Jim Truscott, ‘Voices from Borneo: The Japanese War’, unpublished typescript, 1997. I have not attempted to cover the guerilla campaign beyond the experiences of Semut III. 4. 5.

6.

7.

Journal o f Malaysian Historical Society Sarawak Branch, no. 3 (December 1976). John Chin, The Chinese in Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981; Sanib Said, Malay Politics in Sarawak 1946-1966: The Search fo r Unity and Political Ascendancy, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985; Gabriel Tan, Japanese Occupation: A Passing Glimpse, Kuching: Jacamar Sdn. Bhd. 1997. Sir Steven Runciman, The White Rajahs: A History o f Sarawak from 1841 to 1946, Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 253-8; R.H.W. Reece, The Name o f Brooke: The End o f White Rajah Rule in Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1982, pp. 142-157; Bob Reece, Datu Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha o f Sarawak: Some reflections o f his life and times, Kuching: Sarawak

Literary Society, 1993, pp. 68-79. Craig Lockard, From Kampung to City: A Social History o f Kuching, Malaysia 1820-1970, Ohio University, 1987.

8.

Ling Kai Cheng, Huishou wushi nian [Fifty years in reminiscence], Sibu: Methodist Book Room, 1964; Lau Tzy Cheng, Shiwu Jiehou Zhuiji [Recollections of life under the Japanese occupation], Sibu: See Hua Daily News, 1995; Liu Yng Tzu, 2nd edn., Hong Kong, 1969. Tied Xia De Huiyi [Recollections of life under the Japanese iron heel], 2nd edn., Hong Kong, 1969. 9. ‘Occupation Days’, by Lu Ngee Jin as related to Ling Sing Tiong, International Times [Kuching], 14-18 August 1994; 10. Ooi Keat Gin, ed., Empire in the Tropics: Selected Documents and Reports o f the Japanese Period in Sarawak Northwest Borneo 1941-1945, 2 vols., Athens

11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

[Ohio]: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1998. Masaharu Yamada, Boruneo Senki: Kazashita No Kuni [Country below the wind: record of the war in Borneo], Okaya-city [Japan]: the author, 1969, and Boruneo Senki: Sento Hen [Record of the war in Borneo: military action], Okaya-city: the author, 1969 ; Shoichiro Suzuki, Aishoo no Sarawaku [Love and pain of Sarawak], Yamagatacity, 1986. Hiroki Ota, ‘The Organisation of Japanese Military Administration in Northern Borneo’, Seijikeizanshigaku, no. 258 (October 1987), pg. 19-48. This is largely based on a major war-time document produced by Nada Group, Kita Boruneo Gunsei Gaiyo Shown 18 Nendos [Summary of military administration in Northern Borneo 1943-44]. [C.F.C. Macaskie], ‘British Military Administration of Borneo, 10 June 1945 - 15 July 1946’, WO 203/2400, p. 1. A. Monison, Fair Land Sarawak, Cornell University, 1993, p. 14. K. G. Tregonning, Under Chartered Company Rule (North Borneo 1881-1946), Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1958, p. 217.

1 The Brooke Centenary n the morning of 24 September 1941 the town of Kuching was alive with excitement as Sarawak celebrated one hundred years of rule by the ‘White Rajahs’. At the entrance to the grounds of the Sarawak Museum where the Centenary Grand Fancy Bazaar was to be held, groups of people of many races and cultures mingled happily as they waited for the arrival of His Royal Highness, Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, K.C.B., third Rajah of Sarawak, and Her Royal Highness, the Ranee Sylvia, who would officiate at the Official Opening.

Rock Road by Sarawak’s 136-strong Japanese community. It was an interesting gesture at a time when their funds had been frozen as a war precaution. Kuching was then a town of less than 30,000 people of whom about 55% were Chinese, the second largest group being Malays and the remainder Bidayuh (‘Land Dayaks’), Indians, Javanese and Eurasians. The whole of Sarawak itself could boast less than 500,000, mostly in widely-dispersed rural communities of Iban, Kayan, Kenyah and other non-Muslim natives.

Rajah Sir Charles Vyner Brooke

The Ranee Sylvia

At the approaches to the Museum, community groups had erected decorative arches to mark the occasion. The different Chinese clan associations, the recently-established Persatuan Kebangsaan Melayu Sarawak (Sarawak Malay National Union), the Muslim Indian Association and others vied to demonstrate their loyalty to the Brooke raj. One of the more tasteful of these ephemeral creations was the archway erected immediately opposite the entrance to the Museum grounds on

The European population of less than 300 constituted a privileged upper class, living in large bungalows with servants in what was in many ways a typically colonial setting. Brooke ideology emphasised that the Rajah and his government exercised power on behalf of the people and there was rather less social distance between rulers and ruled than in places like Malaya, Indo-China and Java. Nevertheless, on its hill overlooking the town the Sarawak Club remained an inviolable citadel

O

2

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 -1945

of European power and prestige. ‘Asiatics’ were not allowed to be members. While the crowds waited, the Rajah and Ranee were attending a formal ceremony at the old government offices where their subjects pledged renewed loyalty on this historic occasion. At 8 a.m. the battery at Fort Margherita on the opposite bank of the river had fired a 21 gun Royal Salute, the signal for government officials to assemble and for detachments of the Royal Navy, the Indian Army, the Sarawak Rangers, Sarawak Volunteers and Coastguard to line the way from the landing place at Pengkalan Batu.

he was hated by all but a few of his fellow officers. It was even rumoured that he was a Japanese sympathiser. Immaculate in a tropical white suit, he hovered nervously behind the scenes.1 At 8.55 a.m. the Rajah and Ranee disembarked from the State Barge at Pengkalan Batu where they were met by Chief Secretary C.D. Le Gros Clark and Sarawak’s seventeenth hereditary Malay leader, Datu Patinggi Abang Hj. Abdillah. After inspecting the Constabulary Guard, the Rajah met the members of his Supreme Council and Judicial Commissioner H. Thackwell-Lewis at the Rajah Charles Brooke Memorial. He then took his seat

Gerard MacBryan

Hajjah Sa 'erah

It was six years since Ranee Sylvia had set foot in Sarawak. She had become altogether bored with the place, although its exotic appeal continued to be her cachet in Mayfair society. She was trying at the time to get her film script on the first Rajah’s life accepted by Hollywood. Accompanying her as lady-in-waiting was Hajjah Sa’erah, a strikingly beautiful woman of mixed Bidayuh and Melanau parentage who had just returned from living in England for some years. In 1936 she had been taken to London by Gerard MacBryan, the Rajah’s dashingly handsome Private Secretary, after they had been married by Islamic rites in Singapore and travelled to Mecca to perform the haj (pilgrimage). One of the main organisers of the centenary programme, MacBryan had recently returned after ten years in exile. Once more in favour as court entertainer and political adviser in the Astana,

on the elevated stage at the entrance to the government offices where the ceremony was to take place. British and Sarawak flags flew from the clock-tower overhead and draped each side of the stage. The Sarawak Anthem was played, its words sounding rather ironic to those Brooke officers who had been urging more defence assistance from His Majesty’s Government: Gone forth beyond the sea to climes as yet unknown Where calls are made for thee to bear the sword and crown, Advance, God-speed, to save creatures in jungles deep God’s hand shall help the brave, tho’ man’s may rest in sleep. Let Justice signalise and every voice resound A brave man’s enterprise who won the Eastern crown.

3

The Brooke Centenary

Datu Patinggi

Ong Tiang Swee

Let echoing vales redound, by mountain, crag and nook, Sing loud with joyous sound, God bless the Rajah Brooke. Tho’ danger may encroach, and envious tongues draw near, Such evils will approach, to threaten thy career. Stand fast and only heed, those beyond the sea Shall always help in need, and ever pray for thee. Tho’ past and gone in light, thy name is still renown’d And as a chief in might, thy deeds are ever crown’d. Messages were then read out by Mr J.J. Sheehan, M.C.S., representing the Governor of the Straits Settlements and British Agent for Borneo, Sir Shenton Thomas, His Majesty the King, the Secretary of State for Colonies, the British Agent, the Chinese Consul, the GovernorGeneral of the Netherlands East Indies, the Resident of Brunei, the Governor of North Borneo and British service heads in Singapore all joined in congratulating the Rajah and wishing Sarawak well for the future. Chief Secretary Le Gros Clark then read an address on behalf of the Committee of Administration, the Sarawak Civil Service and the people of Sarawak. There was now a general opportunity for the Rajah’s subjects to offer their renewed loyalty and in some cases to demonstrate this in the form of gifts or tribute. In his speech, the octogenarian Datu Patinggi traced the origins of James Brooke’s installation as the first Rajah and Ong Tiang Swee, the venerable Teochiew kapitan china (Chinese headman), spoke on behalf of Sarawak’s Chinese community. Temenggong Koh, the powerful Iban

Temenggong Koh

patriarch from the Balleh region of the upper Rejang river, spoke on behalf of the numerous penghulu (chiefs) who had assembled in Kuching for the occasion. And old man now, Koh had been a feared warrior in his youth and admitted to having taken numerous heads. Wearing a long-sleeved khaki shirt over his chawat (loin cloth), his hair in the traditional upper Rejang labong (turban) and brass weights emphasising his pendulous earlobes, he was an impressive figure. A distinguished orator in the classical Iban tradition, Koh paid the most moving and certainly the most genuine tribute to Brooke rule heard that morning: This is the speech of Penghulu Temenggong Koh, together with the several penghulu and all their followers. During the long time that Sarawak has been ruled by Tuan Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, from the time that rule passed from his grandfather to his father and then from his father to him, all of us elders, together with our women and children, have been healthy and prosperous; there has been nothing to disturb us. During that time, in relation to adat [traditional custom], we have been taught and led by him nobly and justly in the simple truth and thus we, all of us, have followed the just governance of the adat and speech of the Tuan Rajah, from the time his grandfather gave way to his father and then his father to him. It has been already one hundred years that the country has been under the three Tuan Rajahs, and now all things within it, things that were once hard, things that were evil, things that were savage, have become gentle, have all become good, have become tamed. And so we, the elders, together with our women and children, ask of God to ordain

4

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

that the Tuan Rajah keeps the country of Sarawak for ever, and helps his children and grandchildren to follow in the steps and follow the policy of Tuan Rajah Charles Vyner Brooke, and so we Iban will truly be very happy to follow the rule of the Tuan Rajah. And thus we assembled penghulu give these presents to remain pesaka [heirlooms] for you, an Hang [Kayan sword], a spear and a shield, so that you may remember us for as long as the sun and the moon remain in the sky. Loyal speeches were made or sent in by other representatives of ethnic groups from all of Sarawak’s five administrative divisions. Datu Udin, a veteran Melanau chief from Mukah, offered an ancient Chinese ceramic bowl. Messages were also received from the Borneo Company Ltd., Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. and Sime Darby & Co. Ltd., the principal European firms operating in the state. Even the Lord Mayor of Perth in Western Australia sent her best wishes. From London, the Rajah’s younger brother Bertram Brooke, better known in Sarawak as the Tuan Muda, sent a brief message of congratulations. In the spirit of their father’s political will, he had shared the administration with Vyner since 1917, spending six months of the year in Sarawak turn and turn about. A much more conscientious and upright personality than his brother, his parents would have liked him to succeed to the raj instead. His son, Anthony, had at one point been proclaimed Rajah Muda (heir apparent) by Vyner, who had no male issue, but was now out of favour and back in England after expressing bitter opposition to the new constitution. Sitting in his white duck uniform and solar topee on a carved chair brought from the Astana, the Rajah sweltered in the steamy September heat. It had taken an enormous effort of persuasion by the Ranee and a few stiff measures of gin to get him into his suit and go through with the whole performance. Far from being moved by the touching displays of loyalty from his subjects, he looked uneasy and distracted. As he rose to respond to the messages and speeches that had been delivered, it was as if he was overwhelmed by a feeling of terminal weariness with the whole business of being Rajah. Nine months earlier, he had stunned his subjects by proclaiming his intention to introduce a written constitution and issuing an official Order to make it possible.2 This document now surrendered his absolute prerogative powers in favour of a

constitutional monarchy in which an executive of senior government officers, advised by an appointed Council, would wield the real power as they had done before. Now, however, they had some legal protection against the Rajah’s whims and what they regarded as the altogether malign influence of MacBryan. At the same time, they had been forced to agree to the appointment by the British government of a ‘General Adviser’ whose task would be to inform the Colonial Office on the inner w orkings of the Sarawak administration: something which the Brookes and their officers had successfully resisted for one hundred years. Tired of the responsibilities of head of state and chief executive, which he had never enjoyed or even accepted conscientiously, the Rajah had been under increasing pressure from the freespending Ranee and their two younger daughters to make a comfortable financial settlement and retire to Britain, where they had always preferred to live. Inheriting Sarawak through no wish of his own, Vyner Brooke was an unwilling ruler who had at last found a way to cast aside most of his increasingly burdensome authority. Always sensitive to his wishes, MacBryan had brokered a secret financial agreement with the Committee of Administration as a quid pro quo for the Constitution and had received a handsome legacy from the Rajah for his trouble. Announcing that he had put his signature to the new Constitution and its preamble of Nine Cardinal Principles encapsulating the essence of Brooke rule, the Rajah described it as the first step towards native self-government. This, he

The Rajah, Ranee and their two younger daughters, Elizabeth and Valerie.

The Brooke Centenary

Vyner Brooke leaving the Government Offices after the Centenary ceremony, Kuching, 24 September 1941. Behind him are the Ranee and Chief Secretary C.D. Le Gros Clark. (Photograph by courtesy o f K.H. Digby.)

5

6 emphasised, was a goal that James Brooke himself had set out in his statement in 1865 to the effect that ‘the system of government in Sarawak should be to rule for the people and with the people, and to teach the rights of free men with the restraints of government’. In conclusion, he offered the British government a $2,000,000 interest-free loan for the duration of the war, proclaimed an amnesty for all petty offenders and announced his donation of a piece of land to the native community for the erection of ‘a lasting memorial called the Brooke Club’. His last formal act was to swear in the members of the new Supreme Council. Leaving the flag-draped courthouse at the end of the ceremony, the Rajah was preceded by a diminutive Malay policeman holding up the yellow Umbrella of State which symbolised the origins of Sarawak as a Muslim Malay negeri (state) under the overlordship of the Sultan of Brunei. Flanking him was an honour guard of immaculately-uniformed sailors from HMS Vampire, one of the four bunting-festooned Royal Navy vessels at anchor in the river nearby. Under the terms of the treaty negotiated by Rajah Charles Brooke with the Foreign Office in 1888, Sarawak’s defence and foreign relations were the responsibility of the British government. Whether Britain could live up to its role as the ‘protecting power’ would soon be sternly tested. In the comfort of the Astana, the Rajah told the special Reuter’s correspondent sent to cover the Centenary that the people of Sarawak were ‘freer than any other people in the world’. This was an odd boast at a time when much of the world was threatened by rampant fascism but there was no doubt about his sincerity. ‘The reason’, he explained, ‘is they are never exploited. Every individual is encouraged to work for himself and take land for himself which, in the first place, was given him free of tax. I am content that the people of Sarawak are happy and living in peace and without want’. Sarawak, the Ranee agreed, was an ‘ideal state’.3 At 11.30 a.m. the Royal Car arrived at the Museum entrance, depositing the Rajah, the Ranee and their party. After they were greeted by members of the organising committee and the Sarawak Anthem was played again by the Police Band, the Ranee cut the ribbon with a pair of golden scissors and declared the Grand Fancy Bazaar open. After looking around the Tea Garden and the Agricultural and Arts and Crafts exhibitions in the Museum itself, the Rajah and Ranee planted two Australian pines at each end

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 -1945

of the building before retiring again to the sanctuary of the Astana. As the crowds streamed into the Museum grounds, they were enticed by a variety of stalls and sideshows whose keepers were anxious to help them empty their pockets. Here were dollar tickets in a raffle for a house donated by the Rajah; there was a sideshow inviting everyone to kick a dummy Adolph Hitler. Centenary and Victory badges were on sale for 20 cents. That night there was a torch and lantern procession of schoolchildren along Rock Road, some of the lanterns taking the form of illuminated aeroplanes and tanks as well as the more conventional animals, fish and fabulous monsters. Victory lanterns were also prominent as the procession passed by, accompanied by gongs, flutes, cymbals, drums and brass instruments. Later there was a Malay bangsawan (drama group) and a Chinese puppet show to entertain the crowds. The festivities provided a colourful spectacle of the diverse peoples who had been brought together under the more or less benign overlordship of the Brooke dynasty. On the evening of the second day, a Dayak war dance was filmed in new-fangled colour by three cameramen.4 A veteran Iban warrior, decorated in full war regalia of bark head-dress, boars’ teeth bracelets, feathers, animal skins and various charms, was happy to be immortalised in celluloid. Holding his elaborately carved shield in one hand and in the other his parang Hang, he writhed and grimaced through the stylised movements of a life-and-death duel with an invisible opponent. He was succeeded by two young Malay boys, dressed in black baju and songkok, who performed the rhythmic movements of silat, a Javanese form of mock combat that owed more to the traditions of dance and theatre than physical fighting. Amongst the audience were groups of Iban and Bidayuh girls, their bare breasts attracting the interest of cameramen and schoolboys. Malay and Chinese girls were also parading in their finest sarong kebaya and cheong sam. That evening the students of Min Teck School staged a play to a packed house at Starlight Hall while Temenggong Koh, Penghulu Oyong Puso, Gani anak Chaong and other native chiefs were entertained on board HMS Vampire. On the third evening, a beautiful baby competition with sixty-one entries was judged by the town’s four most prominent doctors. The Champion Baby was declared to be Richard Ong, grandson of Ong Tiang Swee. There were more

The Brooke Centenary

Dayak war dances but the participants took too long to ‘warm up’ and the failing light made filming impossible. That night the judging of an unscheduled Fancy Dress Competition was heralded by a Malay brass band and a party of Dayaks in full war dress. A boy from Min Teck School dressed up as Hitler was ‘badly manhandled’ before taking out first prize. Two other boys dressed as Charlie Chaplin and Paulette Goddard took out second prize and a ‘Chinese gentleman’ and his Japanese captive ‘ran away’ with third prize. Judging the competition after attending the first fixtures of the Sarawak Turf Club Centenary Meeting were the Ranee, Le Gros Clark and Dr E. Gibson who then went on to a dance at the Sarawak Club.

Ranee Sylvia congratulating 'Paulette Goddard’ (Ho Ah Chon), co-winner o f the Fancy Dress competition. (Photo­ graph by courtesy o f Ho Ah Chon)

That evening, the Rajah was holding an all­ male dinner party at the Astana to celebrate his 67th birthday. Over port and cigars, the usual jokes were enjoyed. Amongst the guests was a Singapore-based naval reserve officer, Lieut. W.J.B. Johnson, who was not altogether impressed by his host. Writing home a few days later, he related: I attended an historic dinner party at the Astana (palace) the night before the Rajah handed over, only men were invited so [I] went along with Cyril [Le Gros Clark]. The Rajah is a very nice looking and charming man to meet, but unfortunately he seems to have lost interest in governing his country and I think it is just as well that he has handed over, he displayed a lack of interest and ungraciousness throughout the ceremonies, which we thought was a jolly bad show as the enthusiasm of his people was very obviously sincere. The

7 Ranee I think is slightly dotty although she can be quite amusing, and what with the daughters marrying dance band leaders and all in wrestlers they are a pretty rummy lot.5

Another guest was the Singapore-based British journalist, Russell Grenfell, who was charmed by the eccentricity of the whole Centenary carryon but could not help wondering about Sarawak’s vulnerability to Japanese attack. Its defences, he thought, were essentiually a Boy Scout affair.6 A few days after the celebrations, the Ranee left for Singapore with the intention of flying back to Britain via Australia and America. Before her departure, she had been invested by the Rajah as Grand Master o f the Most Excellent Order o f the Star o f Sarawak, an honour established in March at MacBryan’s suggestion to reward the instigators of the Constitution. On 29 October, the day after a final garden party for his friends at the Astana, the Rajah himself left with MacBryan for the Cameron Highlands in Malaya to recuperate. He also planned on going to Australia for a longer holiday. The Centenary celebrations had been a severe nervous strain for this pathologically shy but by no means unintelligent man. Apart from the fancy-dress Hitler and the Chinese gentleman with his Japanese captive, the Centenary celebrations contained few reminders of the bitter wars raging in Europe, North Africa and China and of the increasingly likely prospect of conflict in the Pacific now that the Western powers had imposed an oil and strategic materials embargo on Japan. The only hiccup in official planning was the non-arrival of a special commemorative issue of postage stamps.7 Altogether, it was a welcome opportunity for the little European community to forget its anxieties and let its hair down for a few days. Any twinge of guilt at this self-indulgence could be assuaged by the knowledge that the $30,000 proceeds of the Grand Charity Bazaar would be divided between the China Relief Fund and the Malaya Patriotic Fund. In other parts of Sarawak, the Centenary was marked by regattas, pony racing and various sporting events which also drew large crowds. For all his faults, Vyner Brooke was an extremely popular Rajah whose intimate knowledge of his people had been gained during a long apprenticeship under his ascetic and disapproving father. A special issue of the Sarawak Gazette, edited by former Chief Secretary John Beville Archer, recorded the celebrations in loving detail and attempted to place the Brooke Centenary in a

8

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

suitable historical and ideological context. For the literary-minded Archer, the ceremony of 24 September was ‘the end of one page of Sarawak history, and His Highness the Rajah has by turning over the page started writing a fresh page by granting a Constitution’.8 For Edward (‘Bill’) Banks, Curator of the Sarawak Museum, James Brooke was a pioneer of ‘freelance government’ and a spiritual ancestor of men like Lawrence of Arabia. Both were distinguished, he believed, for their lack of emphasis on religious matters and were ‘singularly fortunate in the fact that neither seemed to have taken the slightest interest in the ladies of their countries, beyond the necessary slight social requirements’. Warming to this theme as an explanation of their political success, he continued: In the preliminary dealings with most Muslims and most heathens this must have been an inestimable advantage, for to be able to meet the young and the old, the fair and the ugly, the flashing eye and the swelling breast and to treat then all with equal and unvarying deference, must in the end have done more than most things to gain the confidence of Arab and Malay peoples, who still erroneously regard strangers as desirous of entering into negotiations with their womenfolk. To have met men of an alien race and religion who through the years gave daily evidence of a lack of such very natural tropical feelings was just what was wanted to cement the final feeling of trustworthiness inspired by their courage, endurance and leadership - the last shred of self-interest had been removed

monuments to Brooke government other than the Brooke Memorial facing the government offices, its right to rule was measured in the services that it rendered to the people: what greater tribute can be paid to the Rulers of Sarawak than the living tributes that the people of Sarawak are free to worship as they chose, free to build schools and educate their children, free to hold property and have that property and their personal rights protected by the government ... ."

For all its shortcomings in areas such as education and health, Brooke rule had protected the people of Sarawak from outside economic subjugation. It had provided an informal and easily accessible system of administration which took the line of least resistance to indigenous customs while preserving individual liberty. It was a system that Sarawak people referred to as perentah, or good government, rather than keraja 'an, with its connotations of hierarchical and formalised authority. Altogether, the Brooke Centenary was an occasion rich in ironies. Not the least of these was that after a century of unique achievement, Brooke rule was about to come to a sudden and inglorious end. Notes 1.

9

Although Banks wrote without a hint of irony, most European readers would have known that his two heroes were ‘otherwise inclined’. They would also have known that neither Charles nor Vyner Brooke had ever demonstrated any Tack of such very natural tropical feelings’. Both Rajahs had studiously ignored the advice on native women that ‘Peachy’ Carnehan gave to Daniel Dravot in Rudyard Kipling’s ‘The Man Who Would be King’. Indeed, Charles had explicitly advocated miscegenation and most of his and Vyner’s officers had enthusiastically practised it.10 Le Gros Clark himself had a child by a beautiful Eurasian girl and Archer had just married his Melanau commonlaw wife of fifteen years. A more convincing analysis of Brooke success was offered by Paul H. Schmucker, an American catechist of the Methodist Mission in Sibu. He believed that while there were no material

2.

There is as yet no biography of MacBryan but his significance is traced in Reece, The Name o f Brooke. For an account of his pilgrimage to Mecca, see O. Rutter, Triumphant Pilgrimage: An English M uslim's Journey from Sarawak to Mecca, London: Hutchison, 1936. Sarawak Government Gazette. Extraordinary, 31 March

1941. The Order was No. C-18 (Constitutional Reform (Provisional Measure)), 1941. 3. Singapore Free Press, 25 September 1941. 4. The original film stock is held by the Sarawak Museum. Other movie films were made at the time but have not been traced. 5. Lieut. W.J.B. Johnson, letter dated 28 September [1941], Letters, 1WM P 456. 6. Russell Grenfell, Main Fleet to Singapore, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987. 7. These did not arrive in Sarawak until after the war. 8. Sarawak Gazette Centenary Number 1841-1941, 20 October 1941, p. i. 9. Ibid., p. xx. 10. SeeR.H.W. Reece, ‘European-Indigenous Miscegenation and Social Status in Nineteenth Century Borneo’, in Vinson H. Sutlive, ed., Female and Male in Borneo: Contributions and Challenges to Gender Studies,

Williamsburg: Borneo Research Council, 1991, pp. 455488. 11. Sarawak Gazette Centenary Number, p. xvii. Original emphasis.

2 The Sarawak Japanese he small Japanese community in Sarawak would hardly have appeared a dangerous threat to security in September 1941. Their only substantial population was on the Samarahan River north-east of Kuching where Nissa Shokai owned a plantation of more than 5,000 acres employing about 200 local workers.1 Its story began in October 1910 when the enterprising Shozo Yorioka arrived by steamer in Kuching to seek 10,000 acres of land to plant rubber, sweet potato, coconut and other crops. An employee of Suzuki Shoten, Yorioka had been sponsored by the company’s Naokichi Kaneko and by Samata Sakuma, the Governor-General of Taiwan, whom he met through his brother.

T

Nissa Shokai Identifying coastal land in the Samarahan River area not too far from Kuching as being suitable for intensive agriculture, Yorioka applied to the Sarawak government for a lease of 10,000 acres and awaited the response of the Rajah who was then in England. Unfortunately, by the time he approved a 99 year lease of 1,700 acres in December 1911, Yorioka had died of malaria in Kyoto at the age of 47. The task was then taken up by his younger brother, Shosuke, who formed Nissa Shokai Kabushiki Kaisha to pursue the project. Under his direction, the virgin jungle was cleared and two further 1,000 acre leases were obtained from the government in 1913 and 1918. On an informal visit to Japan in April 1928 at Nissa Shokai’s invitation, the third Rajah, Vyner Brooke, was impressed with commercial rice cultivation there. Concerned about Sarawak’s reliance on imports for half its rice requirements, he wanted to increase local production. During a meeting with Shosuke Yorioka he asked if Nissa Shokai would provide experts to introduce the same methods in Sarawak. When Yorioka suggested

that it would be better to send experienced farmers, the Rajah was delighted and a further 1,716 acres were subsequently set aside by the government for this purpose. Unknown to the Rajah, Japan’s Ministry for Overseas Affairs had been promoting migration schemes since its establishment in 1929. These were considered important as a safety valve for population pressure and as a means of securing supplies of raw materials and markets for manufactured goods. Sarawak and North Borneo were favoured destinations and the Samarahan experiment was looked upon with great interest. However, Nissa Shokai and its Sarawak staff took pains to ensure that the company’s close relationship with the Japanese government remained confidential.2 Nissa Shokai duly brought in settlers during 1932 and 1933. These were initially recruited from the Okinawa area, mostly from the Iheya islands, in the belief that they would be best suited to endure the inevitable hardships of pioneer settlement. In February 1932, fourteen families were sent and in April a further ten families, but by October most of them had left. Only eight families stayed on to develop the 160 acres initially allocated to rice-cultivation. A further ten families were brought from Hokkaido in May 1933 in the belief that they possessed the necessary determination to succeed but they soon went on strike and within a year had given up farming. Nissa Shokai was subsequently forced to cancel their contracts and take them back to Hokkaido in February 1936. In November 1937, the remaining Okinawans also left and the company was obliged to employ local labour. After visiting the Samarahan estate in September 1935, the Japanese Consul-General in Singapore, Teijiro Tamura, had reported that ‘some of these migrants actually had no experience of farming’ and that it was not a suitable place for an immigration scheme.3

10

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Social gathering ofNissa Shokai staff and families and other Japanese residents o f Sarawak at the Samarahan estate, c. 1938. (Photograph by courtesy o f Sarawak Museum.)

Apart from difficulties with the unfamiliar climate, unpredictable seasons, poor crops, pests and their own inexperience, the Japanese immigrants cannot have felt very welcome in Sarawak. No doubt anticipating some harassment from the local Chinese community resulting from the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in early 1931, a force of no less than twenty police had guarded the first batch of Okinawan immigrants when they arrived in Kuching. Although the retention rate of the new Japanese settlers was very poor, the techniques of drainage and pest-control employed at the Samarahan estate served as a model for local farmers. Two experts were sent to Sarawak by the Ministry of Overseas Affairs to cross a Vietnamese variety of rice seed with the local one and to provide the immigrants with technical expertise. There was a good deal of contact with officers of Sarawak’s Agriculture Department who took them on a tour of the Rejang area and sought their advice on the new wet-padi project at Kanowit.4 By 1937, Samarahan padi was commanding a premium price in Kuching and the

company was planning to increase its area under padi cultivation to 1,000 acres.5The company was also exporting local pineapple suckers to Taiwan to compete with the industry in Hawaii.6 Isolated from Kuching, Nissa Shokai’s Japanese employees Japanese lived a largely self-sufficient existence at Samarahan with their own administrative office, shop, primary school and medical dispensary. Near the estate office on a small rise there was a ceremonial gateway leading to Yorioka Jinja, a modest wooden Shinto shrine built by Shosuke in honour of his far-sighted brother.7 The only other substantial estate, established by the Yamashita Steamship Co. Ltd. in 1917, consisted of less than 1,000 acres at Tanjong Poh, Siniawan. However, from 1909 a handful of individual Japanese rubber planters had also located themselves along the Simanggang and Matang roads to the east and west of Kuching on holdings ranging from as little as 4 to 225 acres. The largest was owned by Hiroshi Kimura on the road to Quop where his orchard displayed his considerable horticultural skills. One of the

11

The Sarawak Japanese

best-known and respected Japanese in the Kuching area before the war, he had lived there since 1920, married to a local Bidayuh woman.8 In Kuching itself, the Japanese could almost be counted on one hand. In India Street there was the shop of Seiji Kuno, better known as ‘Mohd. Tawfek’ or ‘Mohd. Jepun’, an acupuncturist and herbalist who had come to Sarawak in about 1910. Married to a local Malay woman after converting to Islam, he had become tuah kampong (village head) of Senyawau, Samarahan, where he also gave religious instruction. Nissa Shokai had its office at No. 11 India Street above the clinic of a Dr Matsumoto. There were one or two other shops there selling Japanese goods such as shoes, clothing, bicycles and sewing machines at very low prices.9 After the Japanese invasion of China in July 1937, their presence would not have been tolerated in the main Chinese bazaar area. Two or three other Japanese families were well known in the town. The Iwanaga sisters, for example, whose dentist father had died some years earlier, were teachers at St. Mary’s School. In 1937 a Japanese Association was formed to promote social contact and by 1941 there was a Japanese social club at Tabuan Road where the older settlers mixed with Nissa Shokai employees on festive occasions. Two itinerant Japanese hawkers were familiar identities around Kuching. Oshida, a huskily-built man, sold firewood door-to-door from a cart which he pulled unassisted from the Matang road. The other was a jolly little fellow who carried a bamboo pole displaying cheap shirts, towels, underwear and children’s toys, advertising his presence by playing a harmonica. Speaking fluent Hokkien, he was thought to be Taiwanese but no-one really knew anything about his background. He was a familiar Pied Piper figure in the coastal kampongs as well as Kuching itself.10 Not long before the invasion, he mysteriously disappeared. The doyenne of Sarawak’s Japanese community for many years and an informal agent for Nissa Shokai, Madam Nakako Ogawa had married Edward Parnell in the early 1920’s when he was Managing Director of the Sarawak Steamship Co. Half Chinese herself and previously married to a Chinese in Singapore, her brother managed a small rubber estate outside Kuching. She had reputedly come to Kuching with her aunt to establish a bordello in Khoo Hun Yeang St. She also sold flowers to members of the European community at their bungalows. A

strikingly good-looking and hospitable woman, her Sunday curry tiffin was popular with senior government officers. Vyner Brooke was a frequent guest and there were rumours that he and Parnell had been rivals for her favours. At any rate, it was not long before he took Parnell into the government service as Treasurer and by 1936 had promoted him to Chief Secretary. A dispute over the dismissal of a young officer in which the Rajah’s nephew, Anthony Brooke, became involved led to Parnell’s resignation and retirement to Singapore in April 1939." In pre-war Miri there was a dentist, a shop or two, half a dozen prostitutes and some washerwomen. Kuala Belait, the town in neighbouring Brunei which served the newlyestablished Seria oil field, had a Japanese fancygoods shopkeeper and photographer, Suzuki, a dentist and an itinerant medicine-seller.12 Two of the three government wireless operators in Brunei Town had Japanese mothers and the senior operator was on close terms with the Japanese at Kuala Belait.13 At nearby Labuan there was a Japanese shopkeeper and nine prostitutes and washerwomen. For some reason, there were very few Japanese in Sibu. According to a census conducted by the Japanese government in 1935, there were fortynine Japanese families in the Kuching area and seven in the Miri area, giving a total population for Sarawak of only 136 Japanese nationals.

Early Japanese Settlers By the turn of the century, the Japanese were represented in Kuching by a handful of merchants and by the karayuki-scm or nanyo joshigun, the mostly Kyushu-born prostitutes who had dominated the sex trade in Singapore and Malaya since the 1880’s. At least a handful of these women are amongst the names inscribed on memorials at the now almost-forgotten Japanese cemetery at Batu Lintang in suburban Kuching.14 Three young women who died on consecutive days in June 1902 were almost certainly victims of the cholera epidemic which had started a few months earlier at Lingga on the Batang Lupar, killing thousands of Iban about to set out on a major government expedition against the rebels of the upper Batang Lupar and Batang Ai.15 By 1910 when the Japanese population of Sarawak was only sixty, the majority were

12

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Memorial to an early Japanese settler, Kuga Yoshitaro, at the Japanese cemetery, Batu Lintang, Kuching. He died on 28 May 1902

prostitutes. Although their operation in Kuching was minor by comparison with the large industry at Sandakan in North Borneo, no doubt there were some Kuching women amongst the patriotic 1,000 or more karayuki-san in Southeast Asia who contributed funds to the Japanese government during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Accompanying Shozo Yorioka on his visit to Sarawak in 1910, Kiichi Hayashi was dismayed to find that his country was being represented there largely by karayuki-san and their zegen (pimps): There are about sixty Japanese here. About twenty of them are men and forty women. I was surprised to find that most of them engage in that disreputable occupation of prostitution and other employment related to it. It is unbearable to see these fellow countrymen selling their bodies and souls and thus bringing disgrace on our country, which has emerged as a rising nation creating attention from all over the world. 16

Operating in rented Chinese shophouses in Khoo Hun Yeang Street and Kai Joo Lane, the red light area of Kuching’s main bazaar, the

Japanese brothels became one of Kuching’s betterknown institutions. Men now in their nineties who were curious young boys at the time can still remember the women in their bright kimonos sitting on wooden stools during the warm evenings to catch the passing trade. Most of their customers were Chinese kuli (day-labourers) who had migrated to Sarawak without any hope of ever marrying. However, some of the Rajah’s officers were known to resort there after a session at the Sarawak Club. When an Imperial Government order for the repatriation of karayuki-san was vigorously enforced in Singapore in 1920 by Deputy Consul Yamasaki Heikichi in co-operation with the British authorities, some women made their way to Kuching and other Borneo port towns.17 However, the Sarawak authorities seem to have respected the policy and by the mid-1920’s most of the women in Kuching had either returned home or moved on to Miri, the prosperous oil town on the north-east coast. In 1928, Kuching’s European inhabitants could boast that the town was free of brothels.18 In 1910 Kiichi Hayashi had been able to take some comfort in the fact that two enterprising Japanese had started a business in Kuching: I have also met two fine fellow countrymen. Their names are Kiyoshi Ieda and Kagoi Fujino. They have graduated from a commercial school and decided to come here. They learned the Malay language here. It has been three years since they arrived here and they have now opened a shop which sells various kinds of Japanese goods. 19

Shortly before the businessmen arrived, Denshire Shimizu had been the first Japanese to establish arubber plantation in Sarawak, purchasing land on the Matang road outside Kuching. Other small Japanese plantations followed. At a political level, the Sarawak government acknowledged the emergence of Japan as a major power after its humiliating defeat of the Russians in 1905. In May 1914 the Sarawak Gazette recorded the death of the Dowager Empress, which was earlier marked by the lowering of all government flags to half-mast.20 Later that month there was a visit from HUMS Mogami during which a party of Europeans and prominent Malays and Chinese from Kuching were entertained to tea on board and shown the working of some of the guns.21 During the First World War, oil from the Miri field stored at Singapore was an

The Sarawak Japanese

important source of supply for both the Japanese and the British navies.22

Mining Exploration In the 1920’s and 1930’s, Nissa Shokai made sustained attempts to explore Sarawak’s mineral resorces. In 1926 Shosuke Yorioka called on Rajah Vyner Brooke in London to discuss Sarawak’s oil resources. And after his visit to Japan in early 1928 at its invitation, the company was given permission in July 1929 to take samples of coal from the Tatau, Pelagus, Balingian and Bintulu areas. It was also given concessions for the construction of a railway, the cutting of timber for railway sleepers and hydro-electric generation. The lack of British and other outside investment interest in Sarawak, particularly during the Depression years, no doubt strengthened the Japanese company’s bargaining power with the Sarawak government. When Nissa Shokai reported that their exploratory foray had discovered seams of coal at Sungei Pila and Sungei Pelagus, the Rajah granted them a licence in December of that year to prospect in the neighbourhood of the Sama, Murit, Pila and Pegau tributaries of the upper Rejang. Exploratory drilling was delayed by the Depression and in December 1932 Nissa Shokai applied for a five-year extension of the licence on these grounds. This was granted, although the Rajah warned that the licence did not amount to exclusive exploration rights or to an option on mining leases. By 1936 or 1937, Nissa Shokai had located a large coal deposit in an area of jungle to the east of Kapit and was anxious to develop it. In the meantime there was some unusually intensive official and semi-official contact between Japan and Sarawak which was no douht linked with Nissa Shokai’s wish to further its mining interests. In May 1936 HUMS Yuubari, a secondclass cruiser commanded by Rear-Admiral Boshiro Hosagaya and carrying officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, made an official visit to Sarawak. This was the first Japanese naval vessel to arrive since the Mogami and it was treated with appropriate ceremony by the Sarawak authorities. Unknown to them, they were entertaining the man who was to be one of Japan’s most famous naval commanders during the Pacific War.

13 Brought down to Kuching by HHMY Maimuna, the Admiral and his party were accorded a 21 gun salute from the Fort Margherita battery before inspecting a police guard of honour on the Astana lawns. A reception there was attended by members of the Committee of Administration and the heads of the local Japanese community. Dinner at the Astana that evening was followed by Kayan and Iban dancing on the lawns which ended with the Kayan handing the Admiral a final glass to the accompaniment of one of their drinking songs. The next day there was a dinner hosted by Nissa Shokai at the Rest House with speeches from the Admiral and the head of Nissa Shokai. Khan Ah Chong, later to become an active member of the China Relief Fund Committee, also spoke on behalf of the Chinese community. First Division Resident W.F. Dick toasted the guests, ‘recalling the traditional friendship between Japan and Great Britain’. The final occasion was a luncheon on board the Yuubari attended by the Rajah, his youngest daughter Valerie and members of the Japanese community. According to the Sarawak Gazette, Captain Yamamoto, master of the Yuubari, added much to the entertainment and the European guests left the ship knowing at least one word of Japanese: kanpai (cheers). The final exchange of telegrams between the Maimuna and the Yuubari marked the apogee of good relations between the tiny State of Sarawak and the emerging super-power: From Admiral Hosagaya to His Highness the Raj ah:‘On leaving this beautiful country of His Highness I must ask to him to accept the expression of my most sincere thanks’. From His Highness the Rajah to Admiral Hosagaya: ‘Your visit greatly appreciated we all enjoyed your company and hope you may be able to visit us again fullstop Best wishes for a pleasant voyage very many thanks for your charming hospitality Sayonara’. ‘Captain Yamamoto, warship Yuubari Kanpai! Sarawak Officers’ 23

Nissa Shokai also initiated the Ranee’s brief visit to Japan in March 1937 on her way to America by ship. Although she was not a state guest, she was treated like royalty. On her arrival at the Tor Hotel in Tokyo she gave an audience to the

14

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

then seriously-ill President of Nissa Shokai, Shosuke Yorioka, together with other senior company employees and their families. After a quick visit to Kyoto, she was met at Tokyo Station by Marquis and Lady Tokugawa and other notables who then accompanied her on a shopping expedition to the Mitsukoshi department store. Her visit was given extensive coverage by the Osaka Shimbun which also made a newsreel for distribution to cinemas throughout Japan.24 In due course, Nissa Shokai applied to the Sarawak government for a further extension of its exploration licence from May 1937 until December 1939 but the co-operative Chief Secretary, Edward Parnell, apparently chose to treat this as a bid for a coal-mining concession and sought advice from the Colonial Office about how this could be drawn up.25 In July the question of a mining concession was raised in London with the Colonial Office by F.H. Pollard and H.D. Aplin of the Sarawak Government Office at Millbank and was duly passed on to the service departments for comment by Edward Gent, head of the Far Eastern Department. The responses were predictably negative. Wing Cdr. S.G. Strafford replied that ‘Speaking generally we should regard any concession which afforded the Japanese a pretext for penetration into Sarawak as eminently undesirable from the defence point of view’. E.N. Syfret of the Admiralty said they they were against any concession if it was to be near the oilfields: The local defence force when it is eventually formed, will have sufficient difficulty in protecting the oil refineries against aggression from the sea and sabotage, and also the landing grounds without adding further to their difficulties by the introduction of a new Japanese element ... .

Finally, Col. R.B. Pargiter of the War Office replied that From the general defence point of view .... we do not at all like the idea of the intrusion of the Japanese into this territory; while the particular problem of the defence of the oilfields ... would, of course, be rendered still more difficult by the introduction of a new Japanee element ... .

The Secretary of State for Colonies, W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore, subsequently wrote to Sir Shenton Thomas, Governor of Singapore and British Agent for Sarawak, conveying the defence departments’ views and asking him to inform the Sarawak

government that proposals of this kind inevitably involved the British government because of its defence and foreign policy obligations under the 1888 Treaty. While the Colonial Office was clearly opposed to the granting of any concession, it was aware that there were important precedents. As one official noted in late August 1937, The weak point in making any representations to the Rajah lies in the fact that, as he is probably well aware, the Japanese have been granted a number of important mining concessions in Malaya, and that we have always defended the grant on the ground that, if the Japs don’t undertake the work, the deposits would not be mined and Malaya would lose the royalties etc.

When the Rajah was invited to the Colonial Office to discuss the matter with Gent and Under­ secretary of State, Sir Henry Moore, in midSeptember, he made it clear that there was no intention of granting a lease to the Japanese and that he ‘was not in the least anxious to encourage penetration in Sarawak by Japanese, nor the development by them of an important commercial interest in that area ...’. Nevertheless, the extent of Nissa Shokai’s exploratory work thus far had come as an unpleasant surprise to the Colonial Office. ‘We had not previously had any infon. about it’, complained Gent, who had long been unhappy about Sarawak’s independence in internal matters and was pressing strongly for the appointment of a British Adviser as a means of securing some measure of indirect control. ‘To my mind it is good evidence of our necessary ignorance of what is going on in S’wak under the present arrangements’, he told Sir Henry Moore, in December after the matter of the mining lease had been put to rest.26 Anxiety about the Japanese presence in Borneo was beginning to influence Colonial Office thinking by late 1939. As one official bluntly noted: ‘It is clearly most undesirable to leave the Japanese in Sarawak. They would inevitably make any place they get there a further advance base in [their] Imperialistic designs’.27

North Borneo Although Japanese involvement in Sarawak was modest enough, a great deal more had been

15

The Sarawak Japanese

happening in North Borneo where the Chartered Company had actively encouraged Japanese economic enterprises since the years of the First World War when the Kuhara Mining Company purchased the Tawau Government Rubber Estate. Kubota Estate, which was connected with the Mitsubishi group, was granted 11,000 acres in the Tawau area and another company, Borneo ShokusanKabushikiKaisha (Borneo Development Promotion Co.), acquired 10,216 acres at Bilit. By 1939, Kuhara, under the new name of Nihon Sangyo Kabuishiki Kaisya (Nippon Industrial Co. Ltd.), had increased the size of its estate to 44,820 acres and was growing Manila hemp and other crops. By 1941, some hundreds of Japanese immigrant workers had been brought in to work on the Tawau estate under a Japanese government-supported scheme.28 A fishing company, Boruneo-Nippon Suishan Kaisha, was given an extensive concession off the east coast and employed 160 Japanese at Banggi Island where its fleet of fast trawlers was based. It also operated its own cannery at Siamil Island near the entrance to Darvel Bay. The Japanese population of North Borneo in late 1941 was about 1,700, of whom 1,400 were living in the Tawau area. The consular and other needs of the Japanese in Sarawak were looked after by the Japanese Consulate for North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak and Labuan which was established in Sandakan in 1937. News of developments in Japan and the activities of Japanese firms in the 'area were disseminated from Singapore in the Japaneselanguage daily news-sheet, Singapore Nippo, which was also produced in Chinese and English editions. Anxious to counter overseas Chinese support for Chiang Kai Shek, the Japanese used agents to infiltrate branches of the China Relief Fund. In mid-September 1940, the Japanese Consul in Sandakan, Takahashi Taniguchi, paid a twoweek visit to Kuching and a reception in his honour was held at the Government Rest House by the local Japanese community. Leading members of the European community were also invited.29 During his tour, Taniguchi selected suitable sites for airfields, including one on the Nissa Shokai estate. He subsequently summoned Suzuki from Kuala Belait to Sandakan, presumably to report on the oilfields situation. Although there is not a great deal of evidence for their operations, Japanese spy networks seem

to have been active in northern Borneo during the years leading up to the invasion. The precision of the landings and the rapidity of the troops’ advance suggested that the invading forces either knew where to go or had local guides. The Japanese authorities would have been able to appeal to the patriotism of expatriate citizens to supply information and assistance. The nerve centre of these networks would most likely have been Sandakan where the Consul had his own secret coded communication link with Japan and where the Japanese presence was more substantial. The fact that remittances received by the Consulate from Japan in the second half of 1940 were particularly heavy suggests that the intelligence network may have been in the process of expansion during that time. A large number of ‘diplomatic couriers’ also arrived from Tokyo and the consular staff was strengthened. When the North Borneo government protested against further increases, Taniguchi was transferred to Siam and was replaced by Kiichiro Yamoto. Nervous about his additional responsibilities, he had complained to Tokyo about being under surveillance.30 The Japanese fishing fleet based at Banggi Island would have been able to collect useful details on coastal conditions. There were numerous sightings of Japanese trawlers off Sarawak during 1941.

Yorioka Kikan Nissa Shokai’s close links with the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo ensured its co-operation in the vital task of information-gathering. The espionage network in Sarawak, known as ‘'Yorioka Kikan’ (Yorioka Group), was named after Nissa Shokai’s former managing director. The Sarawak manager of Nissa Shokai, Kurasaki, and his Kuching agent, T. Mori, were believed to be active in the organisation.31 Another employee, Tomisaku Matsui, who had gone back to Japan in 1940, was to return as an officer with the invading force.32 Reminiscing after the war, J.B. Archer described a visit to a Japanese restaurant in rural Singapore in 1939 where the waitresses surprised him by knowing exactly who he was and what he did. Shortly after his capture in Kuching in December 1941, he was interviewed by a local Japanese resident now in a position of authority who consulted a thick file containing details of his personal life.33

16

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

The only case of espionage detected by the Sarawak Constabulary’s newly-established Special Branch was a Javanese employed by agents in Sambas who was convicted in August 1941 and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment without the details of his activities being publicly released.34 Rumours were rife throughout 1941 that the Rajah’s own private secretary, Gerard MacBryan, was a Japanese sympathiser. He was said to have advised Japanese on land purchases near military installations and to have cultivated Japanese acquaintances in the Kuching area. These accusations seem to have been based more on malice than fact, but at the time of the invasion MacBryan was on the military intelligence ‘black list’ and a special report on him had been sent to Singapore.35 In North Borneo there were no prosecutions for espionage but in June 1941 the authorities there believed that a deliberate attempt at destabilisation was being made: The Japanese were fostering a very definite whispering campaign designed to shake confidence, inspire fear, sow treachery, and thereby weaken the local Government and popularize themselves.36

In early August 1941, United States Naval Intelligence was alerted by its agent in Sandakan,

Cdr. Murphy, that there were four individuals engaged in espionage for the Japanese in North Borneo. One of them was reported to have been in close touch with a native chief on the west coast and to have obtained government information and documents from him in return for a guarantee of his status in the event of an invasion.37 Nevertheless, the North Borneo government was loath to do anything which would give offence to the Japanese government. As late as September 1940 it approved a visit to Tawau by eight members of Japan’s Kizoku-in (House of Peers) as part of a tour of Japan’s mandated territories in the Pacific.38 The leader of the party, Marquis Maeda, was later to be the first military commander of Japanese-occupied northern Borneo. The only initiative by the Singapore and Malayan authorities to investigate Japanese spying in British Borneo was the despatch of an Indian police inspector to Labuan in 1941 with instructions to establish a counter-espionage network in certain areas of mainland Borneo. However, he was recalled late that year to counter Japanese propaganda amongst Indian troops in northern Malaya.39 There was nothing in Borneo like the celebrated Fujiwara-kikan. The clearest indications that some Japanese nationals had been collecting information for Japanese intelligence in Sarawak came with the invasion, when Kuching’s two well-known itinerant hawkers emerged in uniform after reportedly guiding the task force from the coast. Even before the invasion, the locations of the firing switches for the mines planted to destroy the sea-loading lines at Lutong had to be changed because they became known to the Japanese.40 The suicide at Kuala Belait of the official oilfields photographer, Suzuki, in the last days of the war suggests that he was compromised. *

cAt - .

WM

-

+J2&L * '

Japanese group after completion o f archway, Japanese cemetery, Batu Lintang, 1940

*

*

In December 1940, the Japanese families of Kuching, Matang and Samarahan came together in a symbolic act of community when they restored the old Japanese cemetery outside the town at Batu Lintang and built an arched gateway to commemorate their work. Within a year, most of the European population of Sarawak, Brunei, Labuan and North Borneo would be interned in a barbed wire compound only a few hundred yards away by what Archer called ‘those beastly little Japs’.

17

The Sarawak Japanese

The Brookes and the Economic Development o f Sarawak, 1841-1941, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,

Notes 1.

2. 3. 4. 5 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

17.

18. 19. 20.

21. 22.

The following account of Nissa Shokai is largely based on Yutaka Shimomoto, ‘Japanese Immigrants in Sarawak Before the Pacific War’, Brunei Museum Journal, vol. 6, no. 2 (1986), pp. 148-163. Ibid., pp. 154-5. Ibid., p. 156. Interview with Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, Kuching, 1 August 1995. Sarawak Gazette, 4 January 1937, p. 105. Interview with Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui. See Gabriel Tan, ‘Tribute to a Pioneer’, Sarawak Tribune, 12 June 1997. See Howes, In A Fair Ground, pp. 124-5. Interview with V. Mohd. Jahan, Kuching, 15 January 1997. See Tan, Japanese Occupation, p. 6. For an account of this, see Reece, The Name o f Brooke, pp. 57-68. Mrs Parnell died on 23 June 1944 in internment in Bangalore, India, where she had been taken from Singapore before the Japanese invasion. Parnell survived internment by the Japanese in Singapore and returned to England. Interview with Joe and May Brodie, Miri, 15 December 1995. NAW Record Group 38. For a full list of those buried at the Batu Lintang cemetery, together with its history, see John M. Chin, ‘The Japanese Community Cemetery in Kuching’, Sarawak Gazette, 1996, pp. 19-28. Sarawak Gazette, 1 August 1902. Kiichi Hayashi, Boruneo Shisatsu Houkokusho, cited in Masahiko Mochizuki, Okinawan Migrants o f Nissa Shokai in Sarawak, Naha-shi [Okinawa]: Hiruji-sha, 1994. J.F. Warren, Ah Ku and Karayuki-san: Prostitution in Singapore 1870-1940, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 164-5. Sarawak Gazette, 1 October 1928, p. 211. Mochizuki, Okinawan Migrants. Sarawak Gazette, 1 May 1914, p. 1. Sarawak Gazette, 1 June 1914, p. 125. See Ooi Keat Gin, O f Free Trade and Native Interests:

1997, p. 160, n. 124. 23. Sarawak Gazette, 1 June 1936. 24. Sarawak Gazette, 1 May 1937. 25. Sir Shenton Thomas to Secretary of State, 5 November 1937, CO 531/27, file 53038. 26. Minute by Gent, 2 December 1937, ibid. 27. Anonymous undated minute, ibid. 28. For an account of conditions on the Tawau estate, see Saito Yasuji, ‘Recollections of Labour Conflicts in Japanese Estate, Tawau’, Borneo Review, vol. Ill, no. 2 (December 1992), pp. 259-267. See also, the commentary by Hara Fujio, ibid., pp. 270-277. For a detailed account of early Japanese migration to North Borneo, see Hara Fujio, ‘Japanese Activities in North Borneo Before World War II: Focus on Labour Immigration’, Sejarah, no. 2, 1993, pp. 125-146. 29. Sarawak Gazette, 1 October 1940, p. 266. 30. Eric Robertson, The Japanese File: Pre-War Penetration in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979, p. 127. 31. CO 531/31/2. 32. Digby, Lawyer in the Wilderness, p. 33; Lim Ah Bee to J.L. Noakes, 21 December 1945, Noakes Papers. 33. V.L. Porritt, ed., Glimpses o f Sarawak Between 1912 and 1946: Autobiographical Extracts and Articles o f an Officer o f the Rajahs John Bevilee Archer (1893-1948),

34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40.

University of Hull: Department of South-East Asian Studies, 1997, p. 32. J.L. Noakes, ‘Report Upon Defence Measures...’, RHL MSS. Pac. s. 62, p. 20. ‘Report on Mr. G.T. McBryan’, RHL Brooke Papers, Box 2, File 3. WO 203/1114. Intelligence report by ‘Alsnob’, 1 August 1941, Box 15. North Borneo, Sarawak & Brunei. NAW Record Group 38. North Borneo Company, London, to Colonial Office, 23 October 1940, CO 874/1102. Report on Japanese invasion of Labuan by A.H.L. Humphrey, 6 February 1946, CO 531/32. Intelligence report by ‘Alsnob’, 30 August 1941, NAW Record, Group 38.

3 ‘Those Beastly Little Japs’ he European and Chinese communities in Sarawak had been anxious for some time about when the war might burst into their comfortable but isolated and vulnerable world. Japan’s inevitable attack on China, beginning with the ‘Manchuria Incident’ in September 1931 and escalating into open confict in July 1937, had led to a bitter and bloody war. Japanese atrocities such as the Rape of Nanking in December that year were reported in detail by the Singapore and Malayan newspapers and read in Sarawak. It was in North Borneo that the first Chinese reactions to Japanese aggression were apparent. In May 1932, the semi-official British North Borneo Herald reported that Chinese coolies at Sandakan had been refusing to load Japanese ships but were still handling timber sent to Japan in ships flying other flags. Describing the workers’ attitude as ‘both ridiculous and deplorable’, the newspaper claimed that their patriotic selfindulgence did no harm to Japan:

T

They do, however, cause an enormous loss both to the exporters, who are forced to deplete their timber camps of labour to supply the deficiency, and also, indirectly, to the country of their adoption. In addition, they lose the chance of good pay, without any benefit to themselves except a possible feeling of smug self-satisfaction of having sacrificed themselves for so-called political principles. Whatever else it is, such shortsighted behaviour is not true patriotism. '

Reprinting this article, the Sarawak Gazette expressed its satisfaction that the local Chinese were ‘more reasonable than their fellow country men in North Borneo’.2 There had been no incidents of this kind in Sarawak, although the government had been anxious enough about local reactions to the Manchuria Incident to mount a strong police guard when a party of Japanese immigrants arrived in Kuching in February 1932.3

The China Relief Fund By early 1938, the Chinese communities in Kuching and Sibu had established a China Relief Fund to assist the Nationalist Chinese cause and were supporting an informal boycott of Japanese goods. The organising committee of the Fund in Kuching consisted of the same dialect group leaders who dominated the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and had traditionally arranged the celebrations of China’s National Day, better known as ‘Double Tenth’, on 10 October each year. Prominent amongst these in the first instance was Wee Kheng Chiang, a wealthy Hokkien banker with interests in Singapore and Kuching who had married the daughter of the senior kapitan china, Ong Tiang Swee. However, most of the work was done by Tan Bak Lim, Tan Sum Guan, Ng Siak Kiong, Lee Eng Thoong and Khan Ah Chong (Khan Chong Bak). Chairman of the Kuching branch of the China Relief Fund and a conspicuous figure in the campaign, Khan Ah Chong was a baba (Straits Chinese) who had lived in Malacca and worked as an accountant in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur before moving to Sarawak in 1935 as managing partner in the Sungei Moyan Rubber Estate. Active in public life, he was a founding member of the Kuching Rotary Club and from January 1939 the appointed member of the Kuching Municipal Board to represent the Cantonese. Fluent in English, Khan was closely associated with the European community in Kuching and was a personal friend of the Rajah.4 The Deputy-Chairman, Tan Sum Guan, had been born in Sarawak in 1890 and was also English-educated. His business career began with the Sarawak Chinese Banking Corporation, which he managed, and subsequently involved a grocery store with Sarawak’s first cold storage facility. He was also secretary of the Sarawak Gold Mining

19

‘Those Beastly Little Japs'

Tan Bak Lim

Wee Kheng Chiang

Syndicate and the Kwong Lee Bank. Like Khan Ah Chong, Tan Sum Guan had taken a prominent part in public life before becoming involved in the Relief Fund. In 1922 he was appointed to the Kuching Sanitary and Municipal Board and was one of the founders of the Kuching Chinese General Chamber of Commerce when it was established in 1930. In 1939 he was elected President of both the Kuching Rotary Club and the Kuching Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. In September 1941 he was one of the five Chinese to sit in the newly-constituted Council Negri.5 During the years from 1937 until the Japanese

K Vti K 'it

ft ft ft i ft g ft it nft it ft it

ft\

%

it

ft

it'

K

ft

f-o it

&

4*

& ak u*

& #

ftit

%

ifjt

M L

1

ft\

it!

ft', *1 W it

Khan Ah Chong

invasion of Sarawak, the fund-raising activities of the China Relief Fund focused on the Double Tenth. In late October 1937, a large jumble sale was held at one of the Customs gowdowns in Kuching.6 In the following year there was a variety concert at the Lilian Theatre and a special performance of the Shanghai Magic Show. By 1939, fund-raising activities were being organised throughout the year in Kuching and Sibu, including charity bazaars and various entertainments.8 In mid-November 1941, Sarawak’s total contribution to the China Relief Fund amounted to an impressive $373,3 84.31.9 It was in Sibu that the campaign was strongest. The Sarawak Methodist China War Relief Committee was formed on the initiative of Ling Khai Cheng and Sii Cheng Nam in late 1938 to collect winter clothing for China. On 1 July 1939 this committee was merged with another set up

M « :a \M !•* M ft & W tft

ft

a

ft * St! ft /v St ft

Stj

M

Tan Sum Guan

ft ft

■ft

\ft

ft ft ft

\ft

ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft

K Iftftftftftft^ ftftftftftftftftftftftft j

Receipt fo r the monthly subscription o f $5.00 from Kong Lee Gold Mine, Bau, to the local branch o f the China Relief Fund, 17 April 1941. It is signed by Liew Ngian Fook, chairman o f the branch.

Sibu Chinese Daily News. (Photograph by courtesy o f Sarawak Chinese Cultural Foundation, Sibu.)

20

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to form the Sibu Overseas Chinese ReliefFund Committee. This was under the chairmanship of the senior Hokkien kapitan china, Teo Chong Loh, with Ting Lik Hung as Treasurer and Ling Kai Cheng as

Muslim Chinese delegation to the overseas Chinese, Sibu, 1940

General Affairs Officer. The appearance in Sibu on 1 July of the hand-written and mimeographed Chinese-language Shiwu Xinwen Rikan (Sibu Chinese Daily News) was a direct product of the campaign and a further means of publicising its work. The newspaper also reported the progress of the war in China, highlighting Japanese atrocities. In September, the new Sibu Committee organised a Spiritual Mobilization Campaign and a swearing-in ceremony for new members which attracted wide support. In October, several delegates, including Teo Chong Loh, were sent to a conference in Singapore where they and representatives of other Chinese fund-raising groups from Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines met with Chinese government officials to co­ ordinate the fund-raising campaign. The Sibu Committee also sent six delegates to the next meeting in Singapore in March 1941 and in May of the same year there was a visit from the Sandakan-based Consul-General for China, Toh Van Lai. A highlight of the campaign was the visit to Sibu in early 1940 of the Chinese Islamic South Asia Goodwill Delegation from Chunking which had earlier travelled to Malaya, Singapore, North

Borneo and Brunei. This was another part of the . Chiang Kai Shek government’s diplomatic effort to consolidate links with the Southeast Asian Chinese without alienating their Malay Muslim populations and to raise some desperately needed money.10 They were officially welcomed by Sibu’s senior Malay leaders, Datu Tuanku Mohammed, Abang Mohd. Nor and Abang Hj. Abdul Ghafur. The fund-raising activities of the Sibu Committee were looked after by a women’s group, a concert group and a choir which also carried out publicity and propaganda work. Their activities included musical concerts, sporting competitions, sales of work, fashion parades, tea parties and numerous other events. Chinese schools played a prominent part in the campaign, assisting with musical and theatrical performances which toured the Sibu district. There were teams of schoolchildren selling flowers and even a bread-selling campaign by the town’s hawkers. Altogether, the Committee’s 53 branches throughout the Third Division raised an average of $9,000 per month, of which $4,000 came from Sibu town. Donations to the relief fund were mostly in the form of monthly contributions by companies and individuals, although special donations were made towards the purchase of aircraft and vehicles and there were gifts in kind of medicine, clothing and kitchen utensils. Details of the donated items and the money sent each month to China were published regularly in the Sibu Chinese Daily News. Ling Kai Cheng became so busy with administrative work that he had to leave his job at the Lee Hua Sawmill.

Schoolchildren s flower-selling team, Sibu

It was also in Sibu that the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods was most effective. According to the principal historian of the occupation period in Sibu, Lau Tzy Cheng, ‘The boycott of enemy goods was one of the tasks of the [national]

21

'Those Beastly Little Japs ’

salvation movement, and it was not long before all enemy goods had completely vanished’." Although the beginning of the boycott is difficult to date, it probably began with the establishment of the China Relief Committee in 1938. The heightened sensitivity to events in China can be gathered from an incident in August 1939. A man from Kuching wrote to the Sibu Chinese Daily News that during a visit to the local Vui Neng Association, he had been shocked to see the Japanese flag hanging together with the flags of other countries of the world. In reply, the newspaper’s editor said that he had asked the Association to remove the flag and that the shop which sold it had been asked to destroy its stock.12 A good reason for the effectiveness of the boycott was the activity of self-appointed enforcement groups like the one calling itself‘Sibu Patriotic Iron and Blood Team’. In late August 1939, two shopkeeper brothers wrote an open letter to the same newspaper in which they vigorously defended themselves from Iron and Blood Team’s accusation that they were stocking Japanese goods. They claimed that from the outbreak of the SinoJapanese war they had replaced their entire Japanese stock with goods manufactured in Europe, the United States and India.13 In addition to the money and clothing being sent to China, one hundred or so young men from Kuching and Sibu responded to the call by the Chiang Kai Shek government for drivers and mechanics to drive and maintain the trucks carrying vital supplies along the hazardous mountain road from Burma to Chungking.14 A group of fifty-seven volunteers was given an enthusiastic send-off by Kuching’s Chinese community on 31 July 1939 when national songs were sung by schoolchildren and firecrackers set off.15 One Sarawakian who volunteered in Singapore and served for two years driving truckloads of oil from Kunming to Chungking was Chua Gin Teck. He was subsequently to serve in the Australian Army as a member of ‘Z Force’ and to parachute into the Kelabit highlands of Borneo in March 1945. Sarawak Chinese students caught in China by the war also played their part in its war effort. Chong Boon Shoon, who left Kuching in 1940 at the age of sixteen to further his studies in Chungking, volunteered to join Chiang Kai Shek’s army and was sent to Ceylon via Kunming with the China Expeditionary Force. Trained as a paratrooper, he served in the Burma campaign

before being going to Malaya in July 1945 as part of Force 136 to assist the Communist guerillas in Negri Sembilan and Selangor.16

The Malaya Patriotic Fund The war in Europe prompted the government and the European community in general to establish and promote the Sarawak Branch of the Malaya Patriotic Fund. Committees were set up in all the major population centres and sub-committees were formed for each major ethnic group. In Kuching, Datu Patinggi Abang Hj. Abdillah headed the Malay section and Khan Ah Chong the Chinese section. In Sibu, the respective heads were Datu Tuanku Mohamed and Teo Chong Loh. From the time of its formation, all war support funds raised were split between the China Relief Fund and the Malaya Patriotic Fund. The Sarawak War Effort Fund was an important part of government business after 1939 and District Officers and Residents were expected to administer it as part of their duties. Not surprisingly, some saw it as an imposition on people who could ill afford to make a contribution. From Lubok Antu, District Officer Roger Arundell wrote to Chief Secretary J.B. Archer on 11 July 1940: We have spoken about the war subscription and have so far been presented with about 50 cts incidentally by the poorest inhabitants! I hope that after the coupon issue some more will be forthcoming but as you know the majority of the people here are very poor and this year have not even got any padi. I believe there was a very good response in Betong and the Krian where people are rich and of course do not feel what they have given - they pay more for their weekly cockfights.17

By November 1941 the overall Imperial Patriotic Fund had raised more than $3,000,000, including contributions from the Rajah himself, the government and the rubber industry.

Sarawak’s Defences Under the 1888 Treaty of Protection, Sarawak’s defence was guaranteed by the British government which also controlled its external relations as a protected state. During World War One, Sarawak had not been considered at risk and no defence

22

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

measures were taken by Britain. However, by the early 1930’s the growing industrial strength of Japan and its clear imperial ambitions in China caused British defence authorities to look more closely at northern Borneo. Their principal strategic concern was the security of the oil fields at Miri and at Seria in neighbouring Brunei. It has already been noted that the Miri field had been a major supplier of oil to both the Japanese and the British navies during World War One. Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. had a major contract to supply the Japanese Navy until the imposition of an oil embargo by Britain, the United States and Holland in August 1941. In response to a question in the the House of Commons in July 1939, the Secretary of State for Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, said that the question of Sarawak contributing to the cost of its own defence had never arisen as no British forces were maintained there. He confirmed the government’s commitment to provide protection in the case of an emergency.18 However, the government’s Overseas Defence Committee had been pushing for the previous two years for the establishment of a joint Brunei-Sarawak Defence Force, consisting largely of the oil company’s European staff and charged with the task of hindering enemy landings. This had been resisted by the Rajah, who maintained that defence was a British responsibility and wanted nothing to do with Brunei. Instead, he offered a contribution

of £50,000 towards defence measures on condition that half of it went towards the cost of building airfields in Sarawak. The Royal Air Force had already surveyed potential sites at Kuching, Miri and Bintulu in 1935 and by April 1936 work had begun on a landing field at Bukit Stabar, seven miles from Kuching on the road to Serian. The original length of the field was 700 yards but this was increased to 800 yards in 1937 and the design allowed for a further lengthening to 1,000 yards. The Kuching Landing Ground was opened by Chief Secretary Edward Parnell in the presence of Wing Commander P.E. Maitland from Singapore on 26 September 1938. The first aircraft to make use of it were three single-engined Wildebeestes from the Singapore-based No. 36 Torpedo Squadron.19 The Miri airfield was commenced in late 1936 and after two extensions the first landing was made there in September 1939. Work on the Bintulu airfield also began in late 1936 but was abandoned in October 1939 shortly before completion. Further work on the Kuching airfield began in early 1941 to prepare for heavier aircraft and this was almost completed by the time of the Japanese invasion. In the meantime, the Rajah had expressed concern that the two airfields were not only rarely used by the RAF but were totally unprotected. In the event of the Japanese attack, he suggested, this would make Sarawak an important target.

Squadron o f RAF Wildebeestes from Singapore at the opening o f Kuching airfield, 26 September 1939. (Photograph by courtesy o f Gabriel Tan.)

23

‘Those Beastly Little Japs'

Chief Secretary C.D. Le Gros Clark inspecting the 2/15 th Punjabi Regiment as part o f a recruiting drive fo r the Sarawak Volunteers, Kuching, 13 August 1941. The officer accompanying him is the 2/15th Regiment Commander, Col C.M. Lane, M.C. (Photograph by courtesy o f the estate o f H.E.H. Elam.)

British defence contacts with Sarawak began to increase before the outbreak of the European war in September 1939. The first of these was the visit in April 1937 of four flying boats from the Singapore-based RAF No. 230 Squadron on their return from a visit to Hong Kong. There was a further visit by two flying boats in March 1938 and two Royal Navy surveying vessels called at Kuching on three occasions during the year. On 25 May, five United States submarines accompanied by USS Canopus and Pigeon also negotiated the Sarawak River. If anything, however, these visits only highlighted the fact that Sarawak had no defences of its own. British control of Sarawak’s foreign relations also meant that any initiative which might be regarded as being unfriendly to Japan was discouraged. When a number of Sarawak government officers tried to establish a Sarawak Volunteer Force in early 1940, orders came from Singapore that they were to desist. According to Edgar Elam, one of the prime movers and Deputy Defence Secretary, ‘It was argued that a S.V.F. ... could not be construed as being in any way helpful to the war effort against Germany, and therefore could be construed as a hostile movement against Japan’.21 Sarawak’s somewhat Gilbertian relationship with the British government had been demonstrated

earlier when the British Agent for Borneo, Singapore Governor Sir Shenton Thomas, discovered that Britain’s declaration of war on Germany and Italy did not cover Sarawak and requested its government to make a separate declaration. For once, however, Sarawak was defiant. As the government’s Legal Adviser, K.H. Digby, put it: ‘In our opinion Sarawak was enough of a joke in the eyes of the world already without going out of our way to provide fodder for the war-time music halls, and we firmly decided to leave Germany and Italy alone’.22 In March 1941 the Rajah wrote to Sir Shenton Thomas telling him that Sarawak would continue to contribute to Britain’s war fund to the limits of its ability. In return, however, he expected that the British government would assume full responsibility for Sarawak’s defence, including the cost. This was accepted by the British authorities on the understanding that the Sarawak government would bear the cost of raising and maintaining its local forces. Nevertheless, as Noakes complained subsequently, Despite constant reiteration of the terms of the agreement, the military authorities often expected the Sarawak government to accept financial responsibility for Imperial commitments and hinted at lack of co-operation when reminded of the agreement. 23

24

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 -1945

The Punjabi Regiment Following the March agreement, Lieut. Col. Bruce-Steer was sent to Kuching to report on defence measures and the Singapore authorities subsequently decided to send the 2/15th Punjab Regiment in Sarawak. After helping to suppress the Saya San rebellion in Burma between 1928 and 1932, the 2/15th had been stationed on the North-West Frontier until October 1940 when it was sent to Singapore to look after airfield defence. In December 1940, a company had been despatched to Miri to protect oilfields company personnel and to destroy the oil wells, refinery and airfield in the event of a Japanese attack. At the same time, half a company had been sent to Kuching to protect demolition parties in the event of the denial of the airfield there. A mechanised regiment with a total strength of only 1050 officers and men, the 2/15th had no experience of jungle fighting. The Ferret scout cars that it brought were of little use in a country with only thirty miles of continuous road. At best, it could make no more than a symbolic resistance to a full-scale invasion. In April 1941, another company was sent to Kuching and was stationed at the 7th mile airfield. The remainder of the Regiment arrived on 13 May with its commander, Lieut. Col. J. Peffers, who had been placed in charge of all troops in Sarawak and Brunei. By that time, attap-roofed barracks had been built for the Regiment at Batu Lintang on the outskirts of the town in what had been a rubber plantation. The Punjabis were to prove rather unpopular in Kuching where a rape committed by one of them led people to see them as anything but protectors. The Revd Peter Flowes found them somewhat ridiculous as they rushed around the outskirts of Kuching in their Ferrets.24 Military plans also involved the raising of a number of local units: the Sarawak Volunteers, the Sarawak Coastal Marine Service and a para­ military force of armed police to be known as Rangers. According to the official history of the 2/15th Brigade, the Rangers were envisaged as ‘specialised jungle guerilla troops to act ahead and on the flanks of the main operational area in a harrassing [sic] role’. To this purpose, caches of stores were established in the hills surrounding Kuching and companies were allocated to particular areas. In the area of intelligence, the recentlyformed Special Branch of the Sarawak Constabulary

was taken over by the 2/15th’s Special Force Headquarters which was in close contact with the Sarawak State Defence Office. This had been set up in March 1941 under L.J. Noakes, an ingenious and resourceful New Zealander who had previously worked in Lands and Surveys. Largely because the Sarawak government was not permitted to have direct contact with other governments, there was no effective liaison with Dutch forces in Borneo before the invasion. In August when details of the Javanese espionage case were sent to Singapore for forwarding to the Dutch authorities, Governor Sir Shenton Thomas was asked to sanction direct liaison between Sarawak and Dutch Borneo officials in political and defence matters. The request had to be repeated before official permission was granted but by that time the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbour and it was too late to arrange co­ ordinated action. The commander of Dutch forces in West Borneo, Lieut. Col. D.P.F. Mars, visited Kuching by plane in October and was briefed on Sarawak’s defence scheme without revealing his own hand. It was agreed that liaison officers would be exchanged but this did not take place until the remnants of the 2/15th Brigade were in retreat from the Japanese in West Borneo in January 1942.25 It was also in October 1941 that Noakes wrote a long memorandum to Le Gros Clark setting out his dissatisfaction with the defence situation. He pointed out that the defence measures taken by the British government were totally inadequate and the small force stationed in Sarawak, whilst inviting attack, could provide no satisfactory opposition to a determined invading force, thus bringing the inhabitants of the country suffering out of all proportion to the damage inflicted on the enemy.26

No military aircraft had been stationed at the Kuching airfield, no anti-aircraft guns or aircraft detection devices were in place and there was no protection from naval attack apart from two six-inch guns notionally defending the refinery at Lutong. Sarawak’s only real defence were the four Dutch fighters and eleven bombers based at Singkawang II airfield not far from the border. These were under the overall control of the Royal Air Force commander in Singapore.27 In the meantime the Punjabi Commander, Lieut. Col.

25

'Those Beastly Little Japs'

Peffers, had been transferred to India and replaced by Col. C.M. Lane, M.C.28

Sarawak officials solemnly, ‘you in Kuching must stand and fight’.30

General Percival

War Preparations

Strongly supported by Lane, Noakes was subsequenty authorised by the Committee of Administration to go to Singapore and interview the General Officer Commanding, Malaya, Lieut. General A.E. Percival. Responding to Noakes’ protest at the lack of resources, the General promised two Bofors anti-aircraft guns some time in the next six months and said that he would like to see more men and some RAF aircraft stationed at Kuching. Otherwise, all he had to offer was some bland rhetoric:

During the Munich crisis of September 1938, special committees had been set up by the Sarawak government to deal with defence and food control in Kuching, Sibu and Miri. Order No. F-5 (Food Control) was gazetted to give Residents and District Officers the power to control the supply and price of basic foodstuffs if need be. Acutely aware of Sarawak’s dependence on imported rice, the government decided to store sufficient for three months’ consumption. The laying-in of stocks began in June 1939 and steps were taken to build rice mills at Kuching, Sibu and Miri to encourage local production. Serious preparations for an anticipated Japanese attack were initiated in March 1941 after an invasion scare the previous month. As Defence Secretary, Noakes proceeded in a systematic way to put the state’s economy and government infrastructure on something resembling a war footing. Regulations were gazetted to control the supply of essential food items such as rice and sugar and to establish an Air Raid Precautions (ARP) network of wardens, despatch-riders and ambulance-drivers. In July the Sarawak Volunteers, a force of Sarawakians led by Brooke government officers, was formed and the old Sarawak Rangers were revived as a para-military force. In June, Chief Secretary C.D. Le Gros Clark issued clear instructions to all senior government officers in charge of districts on what was to be done in the event of an invasion. Unless the inhabitants of their districts moved out en masse, in which case they were to accompany them, they were expected to remain at their posts. On the other hand, The Treasurer, Judicial Commisioner and Deputy Secretary for Defence were authorised to leave. Le Gros Clark declined the suggestion that he should also leave, believing that in the Rajah’s absence he should stand by the people. These instructions were confirmed by telegram on 1 December, leaving absolutely no doubt as to what was required. When the news of Pearl Harbour was received early on the morning of 8 December, Sarawak’s modest defence machine was brought into action. The order was given for all Japanese civilians including Nissa Shokai staff to be rounded up

He admitted that air, land and sea forces in the Far East were inadequate, but Sarawak was as well off, at least, as other British possessions and Protectorates. Sarawak, in common with all parts of the British Empire, should show a bold and brave front, continue to co-operate to the best of the country’s ability, and rely on the Imperial Government to do everything in its power to improve defences as more forces became available.29

Instructed by his superiors in Singapore that in the event of an attack he was to hold the Kuching airfield at all costs, Lane decided that with the tiny force at his disposal a static defence was futile. He believed that it made much more sense to offer a conventional defence for only a short time before resorting to a guerilla campaign supported by strategically-placed dumps of food and ammunition. On Noakes’ invitation, Percival visited Kuching in late November to approve the operational plan. Arriving on HMS Vampire on the very day when the official warning of imminent war with Japan was received from the Colonial Office, Percival met Noakes and other senior Sarawak officials. The only concession he would make to the strategic plan was that the Punjabi battalion should concentrate on airfield defence, even if it meant neglecting coastal and river defences against a seaborne invasion. The airfield was to be abandoned only if the strength of the enemy made the position totally untenable. Devoid of any sense of humour, the ill-starred general concluded his remarks with one of the more absurd admonitions ever recorded in military history. ‘There have been too many retreats’, he told the

26

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

and interned in the Government Rest House. At 11 a.m. the Sarawak Volunteers were summoned to the Sarawak Club by Col. Lane and placed on active service. During the following week, emergency orders were issued for the immobilisation of shipping and vehicles and the introduction of a curfew. A special committee was even apppointed under the Judicial Commissioner to draft legislation fora Volunteers’ Compensation Scheme.

J.B. Archer One of the key figures in the defence organisation was John Beville Archer. Appointed Chief Secretary in April 1939 in place of Edward Parnell, he had been forced to resign in May 1941 after coming into conflict with the Committee of Administration, the senior officers who formed the effective executive of government. During his time as Chief Secretary he had taken a keen interest in security measures. Indeed, as he wrote to his sister, Phyllis, in April 1941: Without boasting I may say that I was responsible for putting the whole Defence Scheme into action. When 1 took over from Parnell it was merely a book of rather vague instructions locked away in various safes and there was absolutely no co­ ordination at all and actually only Heads of Department had read it!31

From 1 July when he was appointed Information Officer, it was Archer’s responsibility in the Defence Office to write scripts for wireless broadcasts and other material designed to prepare people for war. These were translated into Malay, Iban and Chinese and played in public places. However, when he visited Miri to observe popular reactions to his programmes, there were not the attentive crowds he had hoped for: Lord, what a flop! One small Chinese boy sucking a sweet, and old Chinese beggar, not right in the head, a Government clerk having a last puff of a cigarette before going into his office, a blank looking young secretary and an intoxicated Tamil sleeping it off. Astonished and deeply hurt, I interrogated the Resident. ‘Oh, no’, he said, ‘noone listens to it as far as I know’.32

The problem was that no-one except some of the Chinese had any conception of what it might be like. For everyone else, as Archer later admitted,

war was ‘one of our “expeditions” where a few Sarawak Rangers and Police accompanied by hundreds of irregulars toiled up rivers and up and down hills chasing a few slippery Dayak malcontents who were always one march ahead’.33 On 10 December, Archer was on night duty at the Secretariat, the nerve centre of Sarawak’s defence system and its communications with the rest of the world. Due to finish work at 6 a.m. and to go back on duty again at 8 a.m., he wrote to Phyllis about the events of the past two days: What a life. I have been in uniform since Japan declared war and suppose I shall remain so. The declaration of war came as a complete surprise at 9 a.m. on Monday. I changed into uniform in the offices where I am. I cast about [for] a revolver, a steel helmet and what not, ran on all sorts of police duties, censor duties, and guarding Japanese internment camp. I can’t say what will happen here. We are defended partially, but 1 don’t think we shall get out of it scot free. Telegrams are pouring in and we can but wait and trust in Providence. I wished to send my wife out to her rubber estate 10 1/2 miles outside Kuching, but she refused to leave me - my bungalow is in a rather prominent position and for reasons which I must not explain here, it will probably be the first to go if the enemy raid Kuching. If we are in it, I don’t think we shall survive!! I really don’t give a damn for myself, but I hate to think of her and other women and children, being blown to bits. We can but do our best to resist those beastly litle Japs. It is rather a miserable existence - complete black-out, of course, and houses in this part of the world are not made for blackouts. It means either being nearly stifled to death, or no lamps of any sort. I am now in a big office with wireless operators working all around me. I have a little camp bed and now and again lie down, but one dare not sleep for long, as messages are coming in frequently ... This is altogether a wretched affair, but we, here, are ready as far as we can and the response has neen very good.34

So concerned was Archer about the coming trouble that he had married Dayang Jami-ah (‘Bilam’) Bida, his Melanau common-law wife of fifteen years standing, in order to ensure that she received half his government pension if he died.35 Early the morning of 11 December, Archer added a note about immediate developments: By this time you will have heard of the loss of the P.[rince] of Wales and Repulse. I suppose we

‘Those Beastly Little Japs ’

J.B. Archer and Bilam. (Photograph by courtesy o f Owen Wright.)

can’t expect to wage war without losses, but this is really a calamity of the highest order. Luckily the weather is not too good, the monsoon has broken, and the Japs may find it awkward to come over here. The campaigns in Libya and Russia are the one bright spot, and noone even in these dark days, thinks that in the Far East we shall fail. I think Sarawak is in for a bad time of it, but we are proud to share the danger and toil you are all suffering now. What a jolly Xmas we shall all have! Actually, I go on duty on Xmas Day from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. on Boxing Day, so there will be [no] Xmas dinner.36 As he finished the note, he heard overhead what were probably Japanese reconnaissance planes. Just before midnight on 23 December, Archer received a wireless message that the Japanese had landed at Sibu Laut to the west of the Sarawak River estuary. For the next six hours he was kept busy burning his files and those of the Secretariat.

Oilfields Denial On the morning of Monday 8 December 1941, Seria oilfield engineer R.G. (‘Tom’) Tyler woke up with a fierce hangover after a heavy weekend. Tuning in to Radio Manila, he heard the news of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour at 6.30 a.m. and then at 8 a.m of the Japanese landing at Kelantan and the bombing of Singapore. It all came as something of a relief to him and the other Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. European staff who had found the uncertainty and tension of recent months hard to bear. Their wives and children had already been evacuated in August after a

27 number of invasion scares. As he wrote in his diary, it was a case of ‘Better the Devil one knows etc.’37 At 9.30 a.m. Tyler received instructions from the General Manager, B.B. Parry, to proceed immediately with the emergency scheme aimed at completely destroying the field and the plant, denying the Japanese access to oil unless they drilled for it themselves. The few flaming gas wells had their heads blown off with gun cotton charges and all plant and machinery was either blown up with explosives or completely destroyed with oxy-acetylene torches. Some field tank groups were fired and finally the main storage stocks of oil were also fired. Tyler’s particular responsibility was to destroy the four field electrical stores: It was a day I shall never forget. I was too busy mostly to give a thought to anything but the immediate job in hand, but there were moments when 1 could reflect on the pitiful nature of our work. The labour of years destroyed in a few hours. The brains, sweat and head-aches that have gone into the establishment of this field, one of the most promising in the world with potentialities that nobody could estimate. All that now remains is a scene of complete destruction - fires everywhere and black columns of smoke reaching in every direction. The first demolitions destroyed the domestic gas, water and electricity supply but there was no need for illumination that evening with so many fires burning: The main pump station and main storage area was a particularly magnificent sight - viewed as a spectacle only. At one spot the blazing oil from burnt tanks had overflowed the firewall into the Seria River and the sight of this burning oil slowly drifting downstream against a background of palls of black smoke with a rising full moon in the East flickering through was a memorable one. Flames from the main fires and burning gas wells were also continually flaring 100 ft or more into the sky. At the same time the rumbling of thunder and flashes of lightning were incessant - and punctuated by occasional detonations and heavier explosions throughout the field as charges were fired on isolated units such as fixed tank group pumps, compressors and other portable machinery. The next morning was spent completing the demolition and paying off the Asian staff. When

28

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 -1945

the troops completed their part of the work, word came that they and all the technical staff were to move to Miri: The bright spot of the day was possibly a magnum of champagne (the last of my wee stock) shared with Pendrian at mid-day on my outside porch. We drank it looking out over a China Sea so tranquil that was difficult to realise we were slap in the war zone. On the way from Kuala Belait to Miri on the morning of 10 December he was able to see the ruins of the refinery: Passing Lutong was interesting. Nothing of the refinery and tank farm remains but blackened ruins and still burning tanks. Some 40,000 tons of oil in storage at Lutong has been destroyed, apart from the plant and machinery. Forty thousand tons is a lot of oil. It is pitiful. With no prospects of a ship to take them away and news of the sinking of the Prince o f Wales and Repulse battleships off the east coast of Malaya coming through the next day, Tyler attended a briefing where Parry revealed his secret plan for them to retreat into the interior: During the afternoon I was told that I was to be a member of a party of 5 decided on as an advance guard to work over the route of evacuation inland. We were to travel ahead and prepare the various camps in readiness for the main party if and when it started from Miri. For months the route has been known and food caches established at various points, and my job was to, if necessary, build temporary kajang houses at these places. From Miri the route lay out through ? Liam to the headwaters of the Baram. Many many days trek, and in the rainy season no sinecure. But ’twould have been an interesting experience. Particularly if we found ourselves marooned over near the Dutch border for months and were reduced to a chawat stage. Perhaps more attractive for one [of] my nudist ideas than some of my colleagues!38 The scheme was abandoned when word came that evening that a ship would be arriving in a few days to evacuate them to Singapore. An important part of the denial exercise was to ensure that the Japanese did not get hold of people who

had both technical and practical knowledge of the fields. Parry and a handful of assistants were to remain in charge until circumstances forced them to make for the jungle. Nevertheless, Tyler had some qualms of conscience about leaving: So we’re now waiting for the complete evacuation from the country, leaving behind us all the senior Asiatic and other labour to whatever may befal [sic]. It recks rather of a completely selfish getaway - rather like leaving a sinking ship, and many of us who have grown up with a respect for our Asiatic force and their loyalty feel very heavily about it. On Saturday 13 December the technical staff were embarked on the 850 ton cargo ship Lipis, together with 300 Punjabi soldiers and some Sikh policemen. ‘Loaded to the plimsolT, it carried as protection one 4" gun mounted forward and eight machine guns. Behind followed the Sarawak government yacht, Maimuna, with more police, 100 Sarawak Rangers and some Sarawak Volunteers. Amongst them was Sub-Inspector Juing Insol from Betong who had been in charge of the police. While Tyler was writing his diary entry at 12.15 p.m. the next day, the alert was sounded: I dashed on deck and there a thousand or so feet up was a Jap. bomber. He dropped 2 bombs one a very near miss which showered me with spray - and then came down and circled the ship several times raking it with machine gun fire from not more than 30-40 feet height, and at times as close as 100 yards. All the time our guns were blazing away at him and at 12.40 he made off heading north; we hope severely damaged. Although the Zip A emerged undamaged, casualties had been high. The officer in charge of the Punjabis had been killed, together with his two machinegunners, during the first few minutes. The captain himself had been shot through the shoulder and the gunnery officer through the thigh. In the bloodsoaked saloon where the injured had been brought, Tyler made himself busy tearing up sheets for bandages and breaking curtain rods for splints. A young English Tommy with a bullet in his chest took up Tyler’s bunk while he slept on deck. Forcing its way through a blinding rainstorm, the Lipis reached Kuching at 5 p.m. the next afternoon to be greeted by most of the town’s European population. When news of the Japanese landing at Miri came on the afternoon of 16

29

‘Those Beastly Little Japs ’

December, Tyler and the other oilfields staff were immediately allocated war work. However, a subsequent message from Singapore Headquarters ordered their evacuation. On the evening of 18 December, once more on board the Lipis, Tyler wondered if they would be attacked again. He also wondered if Parry and the others had managed to escape and if the Japs were already using his radio and his golf clubs on the Panaga course at Seria.

*

*

*

At 11.45 p.m. on Christmas Eve, just as the Revd Peter Howes was preparing to say Mass at St. James’ Church, Quop, there came the sound of field guns, mortars and machine guns from not very far away. Hurrying to the sanctuary to prevent a stampede by his frightened flock, Howes told them that the fighting was at the 7th mile airfield where the Punjabi troops were trying to prevent its capture by the Japanese: There was no cause for us to be alarmed. The Japanese, 1 added, are fighting to drive out the British, not to hurt you. If they win this battle, as they are likely to do, there is no need for you to run away. You will be able to carry on with your farming just as usual.39

This was enough to steady their nerves. Mass proceeded despite the thunder of the heavier guns which sent a shiver through knees and feet during prayers. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5 6. 7.

Sarawak Gazette, 1 June 1932. Ibid.

Shimomoto, ‘Japanese Immigrants’, p. 155. ‘Public Figure Khan imprisoned and tortured by Japs’, People’s Mirror, 27 November 1995. ‘Tan Sum Guan: A man of many firsts’, People’s Mirror, 12 December 1995. Sarawak Gazette, 1 December 1937. Sarawak Gazette, 1 October 1938.

8. Sarawak Gazette, 1 August 1939. 9. Sarawak Gazette, 1 December 1941. 10. For the official record of the tour, see the souvenir booklet published in Singapore in late 1940. A copy is held by the Sarawak Chinese Cultural Foundation Library, Sibu. 11. Lau, Recollections. 12. Sibu Chinese Daily News, 2 August 1939. 13. Sibu Chinese Daily News, 28 August 1939. 14. The total number of Southeast Asian Chinese to go to China as volunteers was 772. It is not known exactly how many of these were from Sarawak. For the Sarawak volunteers and their experiences, see Lau Pak Khui, Kangri Shiqi Sharaoyue Huaqiao Fuwu Shilu [An account of the service of Sarawak overseas Chinese Mechanics in China During the anti-Japanese war], Singapore: Summer Times, 1983. 15. Sarawak Gazette, 1 August 1939. 16. Sarawak Tribune, 25 April 1946. 17. Arundell to Archer, 11 July 1940, original letter in the possession of R.H.W. Reece. 18. Singapore Free Press, 21 July 1939. 19. Sarawak Gazette, 1 October 1938. 20. Sarawak Gazette, 1 May 1937. 21. H.E.H. Elam, notes on Noakes, ‘Report’, opp. p. 3. 22. Digby, Lawyer in the Wilderness, p. 63. 23. Noakes, ‘Report’, p. 19. 24. Howes, In A Fair Ground, p. 124. 25. Noakes, ‘Report’, p. 20. 26. Ibid., p. 23. 27. ‘The War in West Borneo’, CAB 106/138. 28. Charles Malet Lane was born on 19 July 1899 and after winning the Military Cross in France was posted to the Indian Army as an unattached lieutenant in August 1918. He was promoted to major in August 1936. 29. Noakes, ‘Report’, p. 23. 30. Ibid., p. 24. 31. Circular letter by Archer, [April] 1941, Archer Letters. 32. Ibid. 33. Porritt, Glimpses o f Sarawak, p. 31. 34. Archer to Phyllis Wright, 10 December 1941, Archer Letters. 35. Archer to Phyllis Wright, 10 May 1941, ibid. 36. Archer to Phyllis Wright, 11 December 1941, ibid. 37. R.G. Tyler, MS diary 8-18 December 1941, IWM MS 88/8/1. Subsequent quotations from this source. 38. There is no mention of Parry’s scheme, or indeed of Parry himself and his fate, in G.C. Harper, The Discovery and Development o f the Seria Oilfield,

Brunei Museum, 1975. 39. Howes, In A Fair Ground, p. 127.

4 ‘Burong Bangau’ orneo’s significance for Japan in the Pacific War was first and foremost its substantial oil resources which were vital to the Japanese Navy from the outset and increasingly crucial as the conflict became prolonged. The high-grade oil from these easily-accessible fields could be piped directly into ships’ bunkers without any need for refining. As we have seen, the Japanese Navy made extensive use of Miri oil during World War One. And up until the Anglo-American-Dutch oil embargo which took effect from 1 August 1941, it was purchasing large quantities from Balikpapan as well as the Miri and Seria fields. Japan is estimated to have entered the war with sufficient stocks of oil to last two years, which necessitated a war of short duration.1 When it was clear that this would not be the case, the importance of Borneo was further strengthened. Although it was well-known that the Dutch at Balikpapan and Tarakan and the British at Miri in Sarawak and Seria in neighbouring Brunei had put in place denial schemes to be activated in the event of a Japanese invasion, Imperial Headquarters no doubt believed that the damage could quickly be rectified and the fields brought back into full production. Commercial authorities such as Koichiro Ishihara, president of the Ishihara Industrial Marine Transportation Co., said as much publicly in January 1941. Claiming that the Borneo wells were the shallowest in the world, he said that new wells could be bored in two or three months, or a year at the very most.2 Borneo was also of great strategic military importance in Japan’s southward thrust to take and maintain control of the Netherlands East Indies. Possession of the island would safeguard communications with Malaya and facilitate the advance on Java, whose raw materials and labour force made it the ultimate goal of southwards expansion. It was for these reasons that the invasion of Borneo was part of the opening phase of the overall southern campaign.3

B

From the broader strategic perspective, the southern campaign was seen as being crucial to Japan’s global plan. As Deputy Chief of Staff Tsukuida Isao told the Imperial HeadquartersCabinet Liaison Conference on 1 November 1941: There is a strong probablity that our advance to the South will enable Germany and Italy to defeat England. It will also greatly increase the probability that we can force China to surrender and then even the Soviet Union. By seizing the South, we can also stike a heavy blow at America’s source of strategic materials. We should be able to ring off Asia, conquer those countries hostile to us one by one, and defeat America and England.4

With the occupation of Java scheduled to be accomplished by the beginning of March, Borneo was a high priority as one of the stepping-stones. Its landing strips would provide the necessary means of neutralising Dutch and British air strength.5 Writing subsequently about the north-west Borneo operation, Cdr. Sakuo Mikami emphasised that it took precedence over Sumatra and Java ‘in view of the necessity of securing the oil fields as soon as possible, and in view of the possibility of capturing these places readily at the very beginning of the war because of their topography’.6 The invasion of Tarakan and Balikpapan on Borneo’s east coast was subsequently mounted from Davao in the Philippines by a separate task force led by Rear-Admiral Shoji Nishimura.7

The Kawaguchi Detachment In early December 1941 the Kawaguchi Detachment, the nucleus of the task force which had been under secret orders since 21 November to invade the north­ west coast of Borneo in the event of war, proceeded from Canton to Camranh Bay in Indo-China in the first stage of its advance southwards. After conferring at Hainan Island with the commanders

‘Burong Bangau ’

of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Direct Escort Fleet, Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi’s basic plan was that a landing would be made at Miri and Seria to capture and secure the oil field districts and airfields in that area. A part of the force would then re-establish the Miri Oilfield while the main body was to capture the Kuching Air Base as soon as possible.8

Finally consisting of ten transports carrying the 35th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, the 124th Infantry Regiment of the 18th Division, the 33rd Field Anti-Aircraft Battalion and other units and the 2nd Yokusaka Special Naval handing Force, the task force was a little more than three battalions in strength. Significantly, it included a number of companies specialising in oil field work. The convoy was escorted by three destroyers, four cruisers, a submarine chaser, two minesweepers and two reconnaissance aircraft.1’ On the afternoon of 13 December, the very day when the oilfields staff and military garrison were being evacuated from Miri, the convoy forged southwards towards Borneo. Kawaguchi had limited information about his destination. Armed with just one small scale map of Borneo, he knew practically nothing about the weather and the terrain that he would encounter. He had been told in Tokyo that regular troop stength in British Borneo was 1,000 regular soldiers, 2,500 native volunteers and a further 5,600 in Dutch Borneo, but had no idea about aircraft located in the area. The latter consideration made it a very risky business. At dawn on 16 December in rough seas and heavy rain the invasion force of about 5,000 troops landed unopposed at Miri, Lutong and Seria. The one hazard was the worst storm recorded for many years which reduced visibility to a minimum and caused a number of the flat-bottomed landing craft to be swamped, drowning the occupants. Arriving at Miri just after daybreak, the invading force quickly took possession of the town and the nearby airfield and refinery. All the European officers, including the Resident, R.L. Daubeny, had been arrested in their houses by 6 a.m. So complete was the surprise that all confidential documents, codes, cyphers and currency were discovered intact by the invaders. By this time, the General Manager of Sarawak Oilfields Ftd., B.B. Parry, had escaped into the jungle according to plan.

31 Safri Awang bin Zaidell was a young schoolboy unable to understand the full significance of what was happening. Nevertheless, the scene that morning made a vivid impression on him: I heard shouts outside and of people running. ‘Run ... run ... run ... Japanese ... Japanese ships ... they are coming ... run for your lives’. We rushed to the open windows. The road was full of running people. Everyone was heading towards Brighton, beckoning at us to follow them as they ran. But the scene in our house was a complete contrast from that on the road. Mother simply hushed-hushed us and closed all the windows. I do not remember how long we kept ourselves indoor. But the road had quietened. For some moments all was still. 1 remember seeing my mother open one window which faced the sea. ‘Japanese’, she said in a very low voice, ‘There - their flags’. 1 also remember jumping up at once to look out in the direction she was looking. There were indeed flags on the river. Flags - red ball on white - fluttering on landing crafts. Father came to our side and then everybody in the house wanted to have a look at the scene on the river.10

During 17 and 18 December, Dutch bombers based at Singkawang II airfield in Dutch Borneo made eight attacks on the convoy, sinking the destroyer Shinonome and some landing craft. However, by 22 December fifteen Japanese medium attack and fighter aircraft of the 22nd Air Flotilla were using the Miri airfield which had been quickly repaired despite the denial exercise. Delayed by bad weather and damage to the landing barges, the invasion force for Kuching did not leave Miri until 22 December - three days behind schedule. It consisted of the 2nd Yokosuka Special Landing Force, together with an infantry company, a regimental artillery company and an anti-tank company in six transports. The first real taste of what was to come in Kuching was on Monday 15 December when the Lipis limped up the Sarawak River to the town. Commissioned to evacuate the company of Punjabis, together with European officials and oil company employees, from Miri to Kuching, we have already seen that it was strafed by a Japanese bomber on 16 December, the same day that Miri fell. A number of soldiers were killed and the numerous wounded were taken to Kuching’s hospital.

32

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

The Kuching Air-Raid Japanese aircraft had appeared over Kuching on 13, 14 and 15 December but did not attack the town. Then on 19 December at about midday, a formation of fifteen planes appeared. Eight of them peeled off to bomb the 7th mile airfield and the others targeted their bombs on the Borneo Company Ltd.’s petrol depot on the river-side, machinegunning people in the streets as they zoomed overhead at low altitude. Some bombs found their mark and the depot began to spew black smoke. Most fell in a line short of the river-side, starting from Central Road and devastating semi-rural Ban Hock Road where Chinese squatters were living in attap huts. Altogether, eighty-three people were killed or wounded, about half of them women and children. Fifteen minutes after the raid, Noakes inspected the worst-hit parts: The sights ... when I first visited the Ban Hock Road area were dreadful. In one hut 1found a mother, headless and cut to pieces, grasping a small child, dead from a wound which had severed the body; while another child lay a few yards away." At the Tua Peh Kong Temple, an old Chinese dhoby-man had been hit by machine-gun bullets while taking in his dry sheets. In the meantime, ARP volunteers were on the scene to take away the dead and wounded to the hospital where Dr Michael O’Connor and his small staff were already busy caring for the casualties from the Lip is: Soon cars began to file up to the hospital entrance. The cushion-covers were soaked with blood, and they were driven by grimy, dishevelled Europeans and brought Chinese and Malay women, some alive, a few dead, all bloody ... The mortuary overflowed, and eventaually I got all the dead assembled in a nearby Chinese shrine which adjoined a cemetery, and which was presided over by an ancient, wrinkled, expressionless Chinese whose profession was the care of corpses. The next day, as I had feared, I had the utmost difficulty in assembling enough coolies for the burials. The few I did get were Chinese, the Malays having run away, as also had the heads of the communities who were to have co-operated in the burial arrangements. I had mass graves dug; one of them accommodated fourteen bodies, and the vision of the children’s sightless, staring eyes and blood-stained sarongs will be always with me.12

That morning it was the end of term at St. Mary’s and fifteen year old Tra anak Jemat and her friend Susannah anak Daud were in holiday mood as they walked towards the ferry. Both families were associated with the police and lived in government quarters across river: We had just finished with our class at school after listening to Mr Keir the Education Adviser. He was the one who gave out our prizes at the closing of the school for the Christmas holidays. When we reached the tambang [ferry] at Pengkalan Batu, the tambang man said to me and Susie: ‘You’d better hurry up, there’s a burong bangau [white stork] coming today’. I said: ‘what do you mean, burong bangauT. He said: ‘a Japanese plane is coming’. ‘Nonsense’, said Susie. Then we walked and before we reached our home we heard a sound like ‘boom! boom!’. We threw ourselves in the ditch and when we came out we saw the sky was dark on the side of Fort Margherita. So Susie thought there’s a bomb dropped there and killed her father because her father was working there. Then two ARP men came up and told us there was nothing to be afraid of, it was only the BCL [Borneo Company].13 In response to the bombing there was a general exodus from Kuching of everyone who had a place to go to in the countryside, leaving most of the bazaar boarded up and deserted. Many of the better-off Chinese had rubber gardens or coconut plantations towards the coast where they thought that life would be safer until the situation was resolved one way or the other. Most of the datu took their families up-river to Batu Kawa where ancient tradition told them they would be safe.14 For days the few roads leading out of Kuching were jammed with bullock-carts, rickshaws, perambulators, bicycles and hand-carts loaded with personal possessions. Enraged by Kuching’s total vulnerability in the face of the air raid, Chief Secretary Le Gros Clark sent off a stiff message to Sir Shenton Thomas in Singapore protesting at the absence of anti­ aircraft guns and fighter planes. He told the Governor that civilian morale was deteriorating rapidly and that he could not rely on voluntary ARP support or even the local military forces. Sir Shenton could only say in reply that the main battle areas were Libya and Russia where all available equipment was being sent and that Kuching should bear its suffering with patience.15 The Japanese attack on Kuching was only a matter of time, but like the tambang man, there

33

‘Burong Bangau'

Japanese war-artist’s painting o f troops stationed in the Miri-Seria area o f Borneo. (National Archives Washington, Record Group 111, negative no. FEC-47-80828.)

were some people who seem to have had advance warning. For two days before 24 December the kampong people at Santubong were saying ‘Jepun masuk, kulit semua bangsa (The Japanese are coming, they are the same race as us). To the Ricketts family, who were Eurasian, they were saying gleefully ‘Semua semua orang Serani kena tangkap’ (All the Eurasians are going to be locked up).16 Rumours flew around the town of battleships approaching and of ultimatums to Le Gros Clark to surrender. The bazaar was now virtually closed down after those Chinese who were able had fled to the countryside. Some people, including the Ricketts family and Hajjah Sa’erah, went by boat up-river to Siniawan in the hope of escaping across the Dutch border. A Japanese residents had by now been interned in the Government Rest House. On the morning of 23 December, Dutch aircraft reported to Singapore Headquarters that a Japanese convoy off Bintulu was making for Kuching. However, a Dutch attack on the covoy was thwarted when Japanese aircraft from Miri bombed Singkawang II, badly damaging the field and forcing the Dutch to withdraw their aircraft to Palembang. That evening, Kuching finally received a message from Singapore informing the authorities of the approaching convoy and ordering the immediate destruction of the Kuching airfield. This

was done that night by exploding condom-encased explosive charges which had been placed in the drainage system some months earlier. When it had been found that there were insufficent condoms in the Kuching bazaar, further supplies were flown in by the RAF from Singapore. As the Revd Peter

Japanese war-artist’s painting o f marines embarking in landing craft o ff the coast o f Sarawak, late December 1941. (National Archives, Washington, Record Group 111, negative no. FEC-47-80789).

34

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Howes remarked later, ‘the method employed for this sabotage may well have been Sarawak’s own peculiar contribution to the annals of warfare’.17 As the original plan was premised on the defence of the airfield, Col. Lane sought permission from Singapore Headquarters to retreat with his troops to Dutch Borneo but was ordered instead to fight on for as long as possible. Before midnight it was reported by lookouts that Japanese troops had landed at Sibu Laut.

Christmas Eve By dawn on 24 December the Japanese task force had disgorged the last of its landing barges for Sibu Laut and Santubong. This had been achieved despite the torpedoing by two Dutch submarines of the destroyer Sagiri and hits on four of the six transports, one of which was sunk. During the morning, Japanese reconnaissance aircraft dropped pamphlets on the coastal villages and Kuching itself warning people not to offer any resistance. Picturing the devastation caused by German air raids on London, one pamphlet emphasised that this was nothing compared with what might happen if there was any opposition. Other pamphlets made it clear that the Japanese had no quarrel with the people of Sarawak, only with the British who were graphically portrayed as crushing Islam underfoot. People would be safe as long as they did not take part in the destruction of oil stocks, machinery, shipping and other items of strategic importance. This would be punishable with death. By the time, however, there were hardly any people around to read them.18 Bypassing the main Muara Tebas entrance to the Sarawak River, where resistance was expected, the 90-man Japanese landing barges made for the Salak and Santubong entrances further to the west. There were also landings at Sibu Laut. Punjabi detachments were stationed in the Sarawak River delta area but they quickly abandoned their positions after mistakenly sinking a Sarawak government launch. The Salak force went as far as Kampong Semariang north-west of Kuching where it disembarked and walked towards Fort Margherita. The Santubong force went to Lintang and then Bintawa where one group disembarked to walk towards the Fort while the other continued down­ river. Using inflatable dinghies, the camouflaged marines on the north bank swarmed across the river to the main town area and began to look for the

government offices where senior European and some local staff were still on duty. At about 2 p.m. from the window of his car J.B. Archer could see the Japanese moving, into the town: A detachment of soldiers were advancing towards the Police Station out of which dashed a number of Sikh policemen holding up their hands. One or two were apparently so eager to be on the right side with their captors that they advanced with one arm up and the other stretched out to shake hands! I had to decide in a hurry; if I turned left I should have probably got away as others did as the Japanese had not penetrated as far as that. I am no hero but I had given my word that I would stay when the Japanese came in so I turbned right. Just opposite the General Post Office I ran into a posse of them. My driver pulled up. A revolting looking officer pushed what looked like a horse pistol at my head. I glanced around and there was another Japanese doing the same through the other window.19

Bound by the hands and feet and tied together with rope to eleven other European officers, Archer was taken over the river to the Astana and dumped in a store room for the next forty-eight hours without food or water. By about 4.30 p.m. the entire town was in Japanese hands. The only military action had been at the Satok Road suspension bridge where defensive pillboxes had been built. In the meantime, Japanese troops were advancing on the 7th mile airfield in any vehicle they could requisition. Major W. H. Kelley and some companions from the Sarawak Volunteers had already been to the Sarawak Club where they smashed all the bottles of spirits they could find in their own denial exercise before joining the Punjabi retreat. The Japanese blitzkrieg in north-west Borneo had not been without cost. Apart from the loss of the Shinonome and severe damage to the transports on the night of 23 December, the destroyer Sagiri was torpedoed the following night. Dutch aircraft also bombed the convoy, sinking a minesweeper and another transport.20 ‘Roughly speaking’, Cdr. Sakuo Makami reflected later, ‘the offensive against British Borneo proceeded according to schedule. Our sacrifices, however, were great’.21 For days after the invasion of Kuching, Japanese corpses were washed up on the beaches at Buntal and Santubong, making it impossible for the local people to eat seafood for some time. Altogether, Japanese casualties from 16 to 25 December amounted to about 240.

35

‘Burong Bangau ’

The Punjabi Retreat Faced with the likelihood of total annihilation, Col. Lane decided at a conference with his senior officers in the early afternoon of 24 December to retreat to Dutch Borneo. The destruction of the airfield the previous night had removed the main reason for putting up a defence. Deputy Defence Secretary Edgar Elam, who was at the meeting, later recalled Lane’s dilemma: ‘were we to defend what is now a mud heap - no longer an aerodrome - which we can for at least 14 days and then inevitably be captured or are we NOW to withdraw from there, retreat over the border and join up with the Dutch on the border?’.22 To delay would have risked the danger of the Japanese coming up the Sarawak River to Batu Kitang and cutting off their flight into the interior. At 7 a.m. on Christmas Day the remnants of the Punjabi battalion, together with a body of Sarawak Volunteers and some Sarawak Rangers, set off from the 7th mile Bau junction. Major F.G. Milligan gave hip-flasks of whisky to all the Christians to help them along. Reaching Siniawan at 4 p.m., they bought provisions and went on to Bau which they reached two hours later. By 8.00 p.m. they had reached the end of the road at Krokong where all the heavy equipment was jettisoned and local members of the Sarawak Volunteers were paid off. Forging on, they spent the night at Pengkalan Jagoi on the Dutch border. Two Sarawak Rangers, Acting 2nd Lieut. Jonathan Saban from Lundu and an Iban from Simanggang, continued with the force the next day as far as Babang Babang where they decided to turn back. Advised by Kelley to throw away their uniforms but to keep their rifles, they reached Bau on the night of 26 December to find the bazaar blazing. It had been looted and torched by Chinese gangsters.23 Marching on through torrential rain, the retreating force reached Siloeas where they made contact with a Dutch patrol at midnight. On 28 December they reached Sanggau and the next day took up quarters in the huts at Singkawang II airfield which they were ordered to defend. In the meantime, a number of Sarawak officers and other civilians and their families who had followed them went on to Pontianak from where they managed to reach Australia. Not all were so fortunate. F.H. Wright, Assistant District Officer at Bau, had been delayed by the

attack on the bazaar and was caught at Kampong Jagoi Babang on the Dutch side by the Japanese troops who were pursuing the Punjabis. According to Bidayuh porters who had carried the barang (belongings) of the retreating force, his hands and feet were tied together with barbed wire and he was bayoneted to death.24 The Punjabis themselves were finally taken prisoner on 1 April after the Dutch commander had surrendered at Pontianak.

Simanggang It was some weeks before the Japanese made their way to Simanggang. On 12 January, Eliab Bay arrived from Kuching with a letter addressed to N ative Officer Datu Abang Zin Galau authorising him to take over the administration as Japanese Liaison Officer for the Second Division. A member of the Junior Administrative Service, Bay was one of the mission-educated Iban who had been denied entry into the Native Officer Service under the Brooke government’s policy of employing members of the Malay elite in senior positions. Increasingly frustrated by what he regarded as unfair treatment, Bay jumped at the opportunity presented by the Japanese to offer himself as adviser on Iban affairs.25 When District Officer R.A. Snelus told him in no uncertain terms that he had no official standing, Bay went away but returned to take over on 29 January when Snelus was arrested by his own police, together with the Eurasian Dresserin-Charge, Tommy Attenborough, and the Rubber Regulation Officer, W.O. Jongklass. The next day, Bay took a party of police to Betong where he arrested District Officer A.J.N. Richards and took him back to Simanggang. During the arrest, Richards’ face was slapped by ‘Sub’ Juing Insol, an Iban police inspector who had also welcomed the Japanese with open arms. For those like the Eurasian nurse Lena Ricketts who was present, the incident marked the rude beginning of a new era.26

Sibu Although Kuching had suffered the trauma of bombing, its rapid seizure by the Japanese meant that there was an immediate re-imposition of civil order. Most European bungalows were ransacked by the local people, but there was no opportunity

36

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

for the looting of rice stores and other government property. This was not the case in Sibu where almost a month elapsed between the departure of the European officials and the arrival of the Japanese. On Christmas Day at about 2.40 p.m., four Japanese aircraft appeared over Sibu, dropping eleven bombs and killing four people. They then circled the town for about fifteen minutes before returning to base. When planes appeared again over the town the next day, only seven of the 400 ARP personnel were at their posts. Government employees, including wireless and telephone operators, failed to turn up to work that morning to receive their pay: those who had houses or relatives in the countryside had joined the general exodus. Late that night, the first of three parties of Europeans left Sibu by launch for Kapit with the intention of escaping into Dutch Borneo. At 11 a.m. the next day the Resident of the 3rd Division, Andrew McPherson, and his treasury officer were seen off by Native Officers Datu Tuanku Mohammed and Abang Shazali and Ling Kai Cheng: The Resident told us: ‘I have appointed Datu to carry on the administration. You should discuss any matter with him’. He continued: ‘Kai Cheng, you should protect your Chinese community’. I replied: ‘Resident, when are you oming back?’ The small boat left the wharf making up-river. ‘Goodbye’. We three shook our heads and said nothing. 27

At Kanowit, where the bazaar was practically deserted after news of the bombing of Kuching and Sibu, District Officer H.P.K. Jacks and a European woman and her children were picked up by one of the launches. Wireless and telephone silence from Sibu suggested to Jacks that it had already fallen and there was a tearful scene when he said goodbye to his Native Officer. In the last of the launches was McPherson. On 17 November he had told Jacks in Sibu that there was no question of them leaving their posts and that he would ‘just hand over the keys to the Japanese with as much dignity as he could muster’.28 There had been no talk then of evacuation. However, when McPherson sent a message to Sir Shenton Thomas in Singapore on the morning of 25 December asking for advice, he was told: ‘Do whatever you think best’. McPherson, who had served two years as District Officer at Kapit, was determined to make for Long Nawang. An isolated Dutch outpost just

across the border from the ulu Bahau with a small European community including a doctor, it was in wireless communication with Balikpapan. He dismissed as impracticable Jacks’ alternative suggestion of going up the Katibas river and crossing to Putus Sibau in Dutch Borneo. He also rejected his advice that the landas (wet season) rains might make the river levels too high to reach Long Nawang safely.29 By that time, Mrs McPherson was heavily pregnant with her first child and this seems to have been the main influence on his thinking. Left in charge of what had rapidly become a chaotic situation in Sibu town was the hapless senior Native Officer, Datu Tuanku Mohammed. The late afternoon of 26 December saw the first looting of the govemnent rice godowns at Market Road where about 2,000 bags were taken away before dawn. In the process, two looters were killed by falling bags. Leading the frenzied crowds were some of the special constables appointed to take charge in situations of this kind. On 27 December, more looters rushed to the godowns to complete the work of the previous days. Others broke into the Borneo Company Ltd.’s stores and the offices of Sime Darby as well as the Customs godowns to take whatever they could find. On 28 December it was the government godowns at Bukit Lima three miles out of town that suffered. In this situation, even the coolest heads were swayed by uncertainty. Lu Ngee Jin was a police officer at the time: When I saw people ransacking the godowns, carrying away bags of rice and boxes and boxes of goods, I had to fight with my conscience. If I joined the crowd to ransack the godowns, I would tarnish my good image. If I did not join them, where would I get the food to maintain the livelihood of my family? What should I do? At that moment a few friends asked me why I was hesitating. If you don’t take some things home, they said, you will starve to death. You will be sorry then.30

A few thousand bags of rice were taken away before the situation was finally brought under control by the Chinese headmen and other community leaders. Ling Kai Cheng played a key part in this: I heard on the afternoon of December 27 that a large crowd had gathered at Bukit Lima. They were considering ransacking the rice godown near the wharf. I rushed with a few others to the scene and persuaded the crowd not to break into the rice

37

‘Burong Bangau ’

godown. They should instead work jointly to maintain the orderly situation in Sibu for mutual benefit and for the security of the town. I stood on top of an oil drum and spoke in both Foochow and Hockien dialects and I asked Mr Ho Ah Chon to speak in Hakka. Fortunately, the crowd listened to our advice and left the scene.31 The next day the same problem occurred again: On the morning of 28 December, various Chinese community leaders met with leaders from the Malay and Iban communities at the Chung Hua School to discuss how they should deal with the emergency situation in the town. At the same time we heard rumours that the Bukit Lima government rice godown had been broken into and ransacked. This frightening news shocked us. We were all worried that more trouble would occur. Ho Yan Kim rushed to the police station to ask them to stop the crowd from ransacking the rice godown, but to no avail. I called on the community leaders at the school to go to the scene to stop the crowd. Many agreed and I rode a bicycle to the scene. 1 saw a large crowd carrying bags and bags of rice from the godown. I went into the godown and found a large pile of rice still stocked in one corner. I went out of the godown and stood on top of a pile of rice to see if any other community leaders had come to the scene. I saw Tiong Chong Kit, Lau Pang Kwang and Lee Tiao Sheng and 1immediately asked them to join me to try to stop the crowd from continuing ransacking the rice godown, but to no avail. I suddenly hit on an idea. I asked two other people I knew to help me to close the door while I shouted out to the crowd that a large group of soldiers was on the way and that any person seen inside the godown would certainly be arrested. We had closed three of the doors and at that moment there were about 30 people inside the godown. I threatened them and chased them away and closed the fourth door. After a rough count, 1 found there were some 1,700 bags of rice left in the godown. A policeman handed me a big lock and I locked the doors with it. I found four policemen outside the godown and rdered them to guard it. I told them that a large group of field force would soon be coming. Anyone who left the building would be beaten to death. Somebody had stolen my bicycle and I had to walk all the way back to town, braving the rain. I went to make a report to the police, requesting them to send a big team of men to guard the godown. By this time, it was 5.00 p.m. I had not taken my lunch and I had to walk home with an empty stomach.32 According to subsequent Japanese official

Ling Kai Cheng

estimates, two years’ supply of food had been lost in the panic looting.33 By this time, there were strong rumours amongst the Chinese that the Iban were about to take advantage of the situation and descend on the town seeking heads as well as rice. While vigilante groups guarded the outskirts of the town, a group of businessmen combined with the Chinese and Malay headmen, including Datu Tuanku Mohammed, to form a shang tuan (public safety committee) with its headquarters in the Borneo Company Ltd. offices. On 29 December, numbers of Iban arrived at the town centre in boats but were prevented from landing by the committee’s members. After negotiations with Penghulu Nanta and his cousin Penghulu Gani from Bawan Assan who had been summoned by Teo Chong Loh, the community leaders agreed to give each boat a bag or two of rice to send them away. Thus it was that a serious crisis was averted.34 In Sarikei, where more than a hundred Iban from the Julau area gathered outside the town for a similar purpose, the Chinese and Malay townspeople organised a thousand-strong parade to discourage any such intrusion. Following this, there was a successful negotiation which concluded with the Iban taking an oath of friendship over a sacrifice of pigs. Worried by the prospect of more serious problems unless order was secured, the Sibu shang tuan despatched a delegation of three businessmen,

38 Tu Swee Choo, Ong Swee Teck and Wong Ting Chew, to Kuching to invite the Japanese to establish an official post in the town. Subsequently a party from Kuching arrived in Sibu on the evening of 29 January and were given a friendly reception by the shang tuan. When some Malays asked for rice, the Japanese opened up the godowns and gave them six katis (8 lbs) each. The next day the Rising Sun was flying over the town from the villa allocated to them. Within a few days the Japanese officer in charge had put up a public notice in Chinese declaring that the people of Sibu were now citizens of Japan. Until the proclamation of new laws by the Emperor, the old laws would be maintained. No investigation would be made of the robberies that had taken place but every household was to voluntarily hand back its Siamese rice voluntarily or face prosecution. Most people complied with the order but the Japanese employed agents to report anyone who did not. Although members of the China Relief Fund Committee had good reason to be apprehensive about the Japanese, there were individuals who welcomed them with open arms. The story of Ong Swee Teck is a good illustration of the way in which the occupation offered new opportunities to those who for various reasons felt alienated under the old system. Ong had come from Singapore as a trader and had quickly developed a good business supplying cigarettes and liquor to the social elite, with whom he was on excellent terms. Two months before the Japanese arrived, his business failed and he was sued for fraud. His stock was seized and all his friends deserted him. When he was marched in handcuffs from the prison to the court building, no-one would even give himn a cigarette. Released from prison after it was decided that he should be committed for a civil rather than a criminal offence, Ong was determined to revenge himself on his former friends. When the Japanese arrived two weeks later, he was the first person to welcome them at the jetty and offer his assistance. Consequently he became a kempei-tai agent and an adviser on all matters to the military administration.35 It was not until mid-April that a larger Japanese military force arrived from Labuan and this was followed by a group of civil administrators on 23 July. The formal administration of Sibu-shu was proclaimed on 8 August in the presence of the first military commander, Lieut. General Maeda.

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Organised in four departments - kempei-tai, industry, finance and public health - it consisted of only thirty-eight Japanese officials.

Other Towns The occupation of Limbang by a party of 125 soldiers from Brunei took place on the afternoon of 31 December. Chong Ah Onn recalled the moment: at about 5 p.m. whilst we were having evening tea we saw a big crowd of Iban women rushing towards our quarters. They were dragging their children in a very disorderly manner, and some had babies under their arms, crying as they came ‘Parai Kami! Parai Kami!’ Meaning, - ‘We die! We die!’36

The Japanese had occupied the police barracks where the women had been living but had shown no violence towards them. District Officer J.G. Anderson and Native Officer Abang Hj. Mustapha bin Abang Hj. Ghafar were locked in the cells of the District Office but after Anderson was sent to Kuching under armed guard, Abang Mustapha was allowed to resume his duties.37 Reflecting that they had all begun the New Year as Japanese subjects, William Wong Tsap En of Limbang wrote to his children describing the atmosphere in which this had happened: Not a single shot was fired, and it appears the public took things as a show, as a joke - for on January 1st when invaders left for Brunei with launches &c, crowds in good clothes lines the wharves, roads and shops just to have a good see and perhaps a welcome. No one sheds tears because our Resident was caught and most people laugh. But our Native Officer was handcufed and led down to launch like a dog. Why, no one could explain, and after a time he was released. So the Resident was taken to Brunei and made to sleep, sit, eat &c in the Customs shed in Brunei for a few days as a show to the public.38

Wong had been favourably impressed by the Japanese officers but he drew a clear distinction between them and their soldiers: The leaders I observe are educated people who before this war were in high positions. One who came to our house for vegetables must have been Manager of a Bank. Their faces are refined, fingers refined, and legs refined, which proved before this

39

‘Burong Bcmgau ’

The first meeting was formal. Twenty Japanese soldiers stopped at the wharf, greeted the people, and then their leader gave a short speech which was translated into Malay. After the speech several soldiers went to the government offices, where they picked up the supply of arawak money. Then before they left, the Japanese told the people to carry on their normal lives and instructed the government staff to continue as before.41

Native Officer Datu Tuanka Taha was mistaken by the Japanese fo r a European when they came to Marudi. (Photograph by Dudley Morgan.)

war they were people of some standing. But the soldiers I cannot write about in this strand [sic], as opposite as N to S.39

The occupation of Marudi also took place on the same day, a week after the shooting down of a Dutch bomber by Japanese Zero fighters not far from the bazaar: The actual landing party arrived in Marudi ... on 31st December 1941, a small party, led by a Marine Captain who spoke fluent English. Before coming to Marudi, the officer of the Kubu was informed. The office staff, Capitan China, and some others were on the wharf to welcome them. They went straight to the office and put up a Japanese flag. The office staff and some dignitaries were present. The Japanese M.P. ‘Kampeitai’ gave some speech and later went to look at the officers, one after another, who were standing nearby. When he reached one of the S.A.O.’s who smiled he gave him a slap on the cheek and strolled away.40

The next day the Japanese party returned to Miri, leaving Native Officer Datu Tuanku Taha in charge. With his pale skin and Arab features, he had been mistaken at first by the Japanese for a European. It was to be a few months before a Japanese guncho, Suzuki, took over from him. Lawas was also visited by the Japanese from Brunei at about this time:

Native Officers Abang Hj. Adenan and Tuan Bigar anak Deboi Bern, together with Chief Clerk Hugo Low, remained in charge until the arrival of a Japanese administrative officer. Mukah was also occupied in January when a party of one hundred Japanese marched into the town after arriving from Miri. They left a garrison of five men and a kempei-tai officer whose job it was to keep the local Chinese under surveillance. The sabotage of the electricity generator there before their arrival infuriated the Japanese who held the local Chinese Catholic priest responsible. It was not until 30 January that the Japanese reached Kapit. That morning about twenty Japanese soldiers under a Lieut. Mitsui arrived by launch from Sibu and required the people in the bazaar to kow-tow (bow) to them. One of the soldiers then took some tar and wrote on the wall of fort Sylvia four characters meaning ‘bloodless occupation’.42 A party of Japanese subsequently reached Belaga, but there was no attempt to penetrate beyond these posts into the more remote interior. The permanent Japanese presence at Kapit was one man who acted as Police Chief and guncho for the whole area. It was some time before he was joined by two commercial men who ran a trading company in the bazaar and the Nomura Kaisha manager who took over the Borneo Company Ltd. timber establishment at Seputin on the opposite bank of the Rejang.

Reactions to the Invasion Both the Ranee and the Rajah were initially quite bitter in their public criticism of Britain’s failure to defend Sarawak. In the United States, where she had travelled after the Centenary, the Ranee lashed out at the inadequacy of defence arrangements. Speaking again at an Overseas League luncheon in London on 19 February, just five days after the fall of Singapore, she still did

40

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

The Ranee in New York, late 1941

The Rajah in Australia, January 1942

not know what had happened to the Rajah. Under the headlines

the British High Commission in Canberra persuaded him not to pursue the issue publicly.44

SARAWAK’S ‘PITIFUL’ DEFENCES AIRFIELD WITHOUT AIRCRAFT

Notes 1.

The Times daily reported her complaint: ... We all knew that there was not a hope for Sarawak from the first. Fifty years of my husband’s work and 30 of my work with him there has been wiped out in only five days. All of our people have been taken prisoner, and my husband is missing. I have not the slightest idea whether he is in Australia or whether he has actually made his way back to Sarawak. The defences of Sarawak were in a pitiful array. The front door was invulnerable, but there were a hundred-and-one back doors where the Japanese entered unmolested. We had been asked by the British Government to cooperate financially in the construction of an airfield. Well, there it stood. An excellent litle airfield, lonely and depressed, without a single aeroplane on it. The Punjab Regiment, which had been sent to Sarawak for the British protection to which we were entitled, just used it for football ... ,43

The Rajah made remarks of a similar kind to the Sydney Daily Telegraph but pressure from

2.

3. 4.

Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan Volume V The Surrender o f Japan, London: H. M.S.O., 1969, p. 286. Cited in Joyce C. Lebra, ed., Ja p a n ’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 45. Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957, p. 179. Cited by Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan’s Role in World War II, New York: Pantheon Books, 1968, p. 139.

5.

Cdr. Sakuo Mikami, ‘Naval Operations in the Invasion of Netherlands East Indies Dec. 1941 - Mar. 1942', Japanese Monograph No. 10, n.d., Library of Congress.

6. 7. 8.

Ibid. Ibid.

Col. Itsu Ogawa and Lieut.-Col. Ino Sei, Operational Record fo r Borneo, Japanese Studies in World War

II, p. 254. This appears to be an early draft for their more detailed Borneo Operations 1941-1945, Japanese MonogaphNo. 26, [Tokyo]: Foreign Histories Division, Headquarters United States Army Japan, 1957. Ogawa was the senior adjutant of the Kawaguchi Detachment. 9. Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, p. 180. 10. ‘Saz’ [Safri Awang Zaidell], ‘Growing up in War-Time Miri’, Sarawak Gazette, July 1981, p. 40. 11. Noakes, ‘Report Upon Defence Measures’, Appendix I.

12. M.P. O’Connor, The More Fool I: A Piece o f

41

‘Burong Bangau ’

Autobiography, Dublin: Michael F. Moynehan, n.d., pp.

13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

140-141. Interview with Datuk Tra Zehnder, Kuching, 21 January 1997. Personal information. ‘Report by Mr. H.E.H. Elam’, WO 106/3301. V.L. Porritt, ‘More bitter than sweet: Lena Ricketts’ experiences during the Japanese occupation of Sarawak 1941-1945', Sarawak Gazette, March 1995 p. 46. Howes, In A Fair Ground, p. 126. J. Gilbert, ‘Account of the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak’, WO 106/4661. Porritt, Glimpses o f Sarawak, p. 35. Mikami, ‘Naval Operations’.

19. 20. 21. Ibid. 22. Notes by H.E.H. Elam, 1965, on Noakes, ‘Report’, opp. p. 77. 23. Interview with Jonathan Saban, Lundu, 11 June 1997. One Ranger, a Malay from Santubong, remained with Lane’s party and was eventually evacuated to India. 24. Interview with Michael Sadin, Bau, 7 December 1995. 25. For more detailed discussion of Eliab Bay’s background, see Reece, The Name o f Brooke, pp. 139-141. 26. Personal information from Lena Ricketts, Perth, Western Australia. 27. Ling, Fifty Years.

28.

‘Report by H.P.K. Jacks’, 27 March 1942, typescript in the possession of R.H.W. Reece.

29. Ibid. 30. ‘Occupation Days’, narrated by LuNgee Jin and recorded by Lim Sing Tiong, International Times [Kuching], 1418 August 1995. 31. Ling, Fifty Years. 32. Ibid. 33. Nada Group, Kita Boruneo. 34. Ling, Fifty Years. 35. Lu, ‘Occupation Days’. 36. Chong Ah Onn, ‘The Occupation of Limbang’, Sarawak Gazette, 31 July 1965, p. 183. 37. Utusan Sarawak, 7 January 1961. 38. James Wong Kim Min, ed., The World according to William Wong Tsap En: ‘No Joke Jam es’, Singapore: Summer Times, 1985, p. 410. 39. Ibid., p. 409. 40. Bar am 1968 Regatta Souvenir Programme. 41. L. Edwards and P.W. Stevens, Short Histories o f the Lawas andKanowit Districts, Kuching: Borneo Literature Bureau, 1971, pp. 49-50. 42. Yao Ping Hua, ‘Those Momentous Days in Kapit’, Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1956, p. 94. 43. The Times, 20 February 1942. 44. Daily Telegraph, 14 January 1942.

5 Exodus and Nemesis ome Sarawak officers decided to heed Chief Secretary Le Gros Clark’s repeated order of early December 1941 to stay at their posts in the event of an invasion, thereby accepting the inevitability of imprisonment at least and execution at worst. Le Gros Clark did not regret his own determination to remain behind. Writing on 24 January 1942 from ‘Zaida’ bungalow where the civilian prisoners had been temporarily interned after transfer from the Rest House, he explained his decision:

S

For long I have been appalled at the calamity gradually approaching this innocent people of SARAWAK. By the inexorable march of circumstances forced on this Government of SARAWAK by the clash of Imperialism, forced on a people who had little or no say in the development of these circumstances, war has come to SARAWAK with all its sufferings and hideous results. With these people of SARAWAK, among whom I have spent many years of my life, and in whose interests I have I believe devoted my unselfish and loyal services, I have determined to remain and to share with them their sufferings during this period of trial. I do not regret this decision. I am glad that I have abided by it. I am proud to share with my companions in captivity this honour of hardship during this war which affects the lives of millions throughout the world. I would not have it otherwise.1

There were others who were inclined to reject this attitude as passive fatalism and to believe that they would be altogether more useful outside the domain of Japanese control. Some no doubt fought a battle in their minds before they made their momentous decision. Those attached to the Sarawak Volunteers who were obliged to retreat to Dutch Borneo with the remnants of the Punjabi Regiment had the advantage of acting under military orders. Oilfields staff were ordered to leave for fear of their knowledge being useful to the Japanese. Other

Europeans employed by commercial firms such as the Borneo Company Ltd. were determined to get out at any cost.

Decisions Many harsh things were said at the Batu Lintang prisoner of war camp in subsequent months about those government officers who had fled to Dutch Borneo, but as an internee K.H. Digby found it difficult to be judgemental about it all: From the standpoint of European prestige, it was probably a good thing that some of us stayed behind to share the troubles that Sarawak was to endure, but most of us who stayed who had no strong personal ties in the country would have gone too if we had thought quickly enough. In my opinion the majority of us who stayed did so because it seemed to be the obvious thing to do. We had neither the patriotic sentiment, nor sufficient foreboding of the future, nor the positive certainty that the Japanese would really turn up, which induced our escaping friends to make their decision and take flight without reference to anybody.2

When W.S.B. (‘Bunny’) Buck, District Officer at Sarikei, heard the news about Kuching on Christmas Day and could not raise Sibu on the telephone, he assumed that the Japanese had arrived there as well. Ordering his cadet assistant, W.G. Morison, to accompany him, Buck decided to escape through Dutch Borneo. As Binatang was also rumoured to have been taken, they and some other Europeans made their way overland to Saratok and from there to Debak. Hearing further rumours that the Japanese were in Betong, they went on to the Skrang river where a Chinese launch took them to Engkelili and then Lubok Antu.3 Finding three officers from the 2nd Division already there, they spent some time discussing the situation. The Resident, G.R.H. Arundell, was not

T

43

Exodus and Nemesis

'Zaida the bungalow which served as the first prison fo r European civilians in Kuching in early 1942. It was here that Le Gros Clark wrote his letter. (Photograph by Ho Ah Chon.)

prepared to issue any instructions and it was a matter of each individual deciding for himself. The news from the Dutch side was that officials there had been ordered to stay. Three members of the group subsequently decided to escape across the border. Morison and the District Officer for Betong, Anthony Richards, who had come out with him to Sarawak as cadets in 1938, decided to return to their posts.4 Thinking about it many years later, Richards found it difficult to say exactly why he had turned back: I suppose I could say I reckoned I had a duty to my own district - we were as parochial as that for as long as it might last. I wasn’t a military man so 1 wouldn’t be much use anywhere else. Really

I suppose it was a sign of not wanting to change, going back home in other words, what was one’s temporary home, and not rushing about.5 Morison’s feelings were similar: If I had been on my own I would probably have remained at Sarikei. My thinking on the way to Lubok Antu which finally made up my mind to return to Sarikei was a combination of somewhat disjointed thoughts. First and foremost I had a very strong and yet somewehat strange feeling that if I left Sarawak then I knew deep within me I would never return to Sarawak. This was something I very much wanted to do. After the war Buck was 1believe reprimanded for leaving while his junior assistant remained but I always had considerable sympathy for Buck for the action he took. He had a wife

44

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

and family to think about. 1 was not married at the time so in a sense I was more expendable if such was to happen. But also, at the back of my mind, was the old-fashined idea that persons in positions of responsibility and authority should not cut and run at the first hint of danger.6

Morison was eventually arrested at Sarikei by his own Native Officer and taken to Sibu by a party of Japanese who also picked up J.C. Barcroft from Mukah. Richards, as we have seen in the previous chapter, was arrested at Betong by a party led by Eliab Bay. Taken back to Simanggang, he was put in the cells to join District Officer A.R. Snelus and a number of others. After a few days they were taken down to Kuching by barge and brought ashore near the Borneo Company Ltd. offices. In a display of zeal that the Japanese would probably have thought unnecessary, ‘Sub’ Juing marched them in handcuffs down the length of the main bazaar before delivering them to the Central Police Station. As Richards recalled it, The Japanese were straightforward enough. They were in command and they simply bundled us about but without being cruel or unduly harsh. The collaborating local people were obviously trying to curry favour with the Japanese and they were a bit rough. But their companions who were perfectly ordinary constables treated us politely as they always had done.7

Rather than being impressed, the mostly Chinese spectators in the bazaar were horrified by this contrived spectacle.

The Arundells Less fortunate than Morison and Richards were Gilbert Roger Harris Arundell, Resident of the Second Division, Lubok Antu, and his wife and family. Appointed as a cadet in the Sarawak Service inNovember 1922, Arundell was posted to Kuching, Mukah and Simanggang before becoming Acting District Officer, Kalaka and Lower Saribas, in December 1928 and Bau and Lundu in January 1930. Invalided from the Service in January 1932, he returned in October 1933 and after serving as a travelling District Officer and magistrate, became District Officer, Lubok Antu, inNovember 1935. By this time he had taken an Iban wife, Sendie anak Tuai Rumah Bangka, from Rumah Entanak, Betong, and married her both by Iban

adat and by civil ceremony before the District Officer. This made him one the very few in pre­ war Sarawak to formalise his relationship with a native woman by European custom. Sendie bore him a son, Nillie, and they also adopted Attak, the son of the rebel Kendawang (then in exile at Lundu) and his wife, Mujah. Arundell’s contemporary in the Sarawak Service, K.H. Digby, provided some insights into this extraordinary man: His personality was a peculiar cross between that of an English country squire and ... a primitive Sea Dayak. In England he was a hunting, shooting and fishing enthusiast, and insofar as he possessed any political opinions at all, he was an extreme reactionary. His very accent was fruity enough to be mistaken for a caricature. In Sarawak, on the other hand, he lived and spoke, and probably thought, as a Sea Dayak.8

Arundell entered with great zest into the seasonal routines of hill padi-farming and became a kind of honorary penghulu. Known by the Iban as ‘Tuan Rundo’, his knowledge of their language and adat was legendary. Tattooed in traditional style, he was skilled in ngajat (warrior dance), penca (sword dance) and kuntau (bare-handed self-defence). He was also good at fishing with the jala (throwing net). The Iban believed the reason he was the best orang kulit puteh (white man) ever to administer the government in Sarawak was that he felt himself to be one of them. Arundell had no illusions about his adopted tribe but he believed that the so-called civilized nations were in no position to be critical of them. One evening in the old kubu at Lubok Antu in 1940 he described to the visiting Senior Medical Officer, Dr Michael O’Connor, the utter ruthlessness of the Iban in head-taking: ‘It was’, remarked Arundel, ‘just as if one Dyak said to another: ‘here’s old Engkang asleep - let’s pinch his head for a joke!’. And they did. Cowardly and horrible and savage and uncivilized, you’ll say? Quite right. But who are we white people to boast or feel superior, when in this fifth decade of the twentieth century after Christ we’re staging what may turn out to be the greatest slaughter in history?’9

After receiving messages that the Japanese were in Kuching and that the European officers had abandoned Sibu, Arundell held a meeting with the native headmen at Simanggang on 31 December and decided to consult the Dutch

officials from Pontianak and Sentang. After meetings at Engkelili and Lubok Antu, some of the European officers from the Division decided to make for Pontianak and others to return to their posts. When he subsequently heard that the Japanese were in Simanggang, Arundell wanted to go down and surrender himself. According to one account, the Iban orang kubu (fort man) at Lubok Antu

discouraged him, believing that he should escape to safety. Sendie also disagreed and persuaded him that they could avoid the Japanese by hiding up­ river. However, Arundell had been suffering badly from malaria and this had prevented him from going back to Simanggang earlier. The party, consisting of Arundell, Sendie, her adopted mother and the two children, travelled up the Batang Ai to Nanga Merpi where they hoped

46

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

to find sanctuary. However, Tuai Rumah Rangga felt uncertain about his ability to provide protection and he sent them on as far as Sungei Panah, ulu Mujan, where they were taken under the care of Arundell’s friend Penghulu Ramba and his brothers, Rantai and Ngindang. Their guide was Mikai fromKubau. One of the rebel leader Asun’s followers, Mikai had earlier lived with the Arundells as part of the family when he was a baju hitam (prisoner) at Simanggang. The longhouse people built a separate hut for them about a day’s journey away where they grew padi and other crops to support themselves. In August 1942 the Arundells were tracked down and murdered by the notorious Kanowit head-hunters and rebels, Pong anak Uka, Ijau anak Genbaw, Unieng anak Ringgir and Ajin anak Bandi while Mikai was away hunting for wild boar. The four had been released from gaol in Simanggang by the Japanese in late January 1942 and were determined to revenge themselves on Arundell, who had played a leading part in pursuing and prosecuting them during the campaign against Asun and his followers ten years earlier. According to the Iban account, there had been a strong prior indication that a tragedy was looming: One day a barking deer entered Arundell’s hut. This was very rare and in accordance with Iban adat he informed Penghulu Ramba and the other longhouse people. Tuai Rumah Ramba believed that this was a bad omen and asked Arundell to ward off the evil spirits by making an offering. The next morning Arundell cooked some rice and tuak [rice wine] in bamboo to offer to the spirits."

That very night the four men entered the hut when everyone was asleep and killed the whole party, including the family dog, with their parang Hang (warriors’ swords). The next day they were seen washing their blood-stained swords in the river. When they were confronted by Penghulu Ramba’s people, the killers denied the charge and accused them instead. When the Japanese came to investigate, they decided to take the four men and their accusers down to Simanggang to determine the issue. The argument continued until Ramba challenged Ijau to settle it by a customary selam a i’ (diving contest), in which the man who stayed under water the longest was seen to have truth on his side. All this was witnessed by the Japanese:

Ramba’s men appointed a champion and Ijau’s men appointed a champion. Japanese officers lined the banks and acted as umpires. The contestants entered the river, grasped their respective poles, submerged themselves, and Ijau’s horse appeared first. Great was the rejoicing of the house of Penghulu Ramba. The losers filed the usual complaint that the holder of the victor’s pole had pressed his man’s head under water, until their own champion, whose pole-holder was far too honest to attempt such a disreputable trick, had come up, but as usual it was disregarded.12

The four were then punished by the Japanese and Rantai was beaten and gaoled by the kempeitai for his part in sheltering the Arundells.13 When other Iban heard about the incident, they were horrified. Tedong anak Barieng recalled later: I was upset and furious with Pong and Ajun and their friends because I knew Tuan Rundu very well. Since they killed him just as the Japanese were coming, why did they need to kill a white man? They were really stupid \jugau amat]. When I chanced to meet with Pong’s people, I scolded them, saying: ‘You’re stupid! What was the purpose of killing the white man? He did the right thing when he was governing us. What’s the point of killing him?’14

Long Nawang The massacre of forty-one European men, women and children at Long Nawang in Dutch Borneo by Japanese marines in August and September 1942 was one of the most horrific events of the occupation in Borneo. It has been described in detail many times and was the inspiration of a powerful novel by Hugh Hickling, a former Judge of the High Court of Northern Borneo.15 Central to the story was Andrew McPherson, Resident of Sibu and former Secretary of Native Affairs, who had conceived a plan to escape from the Japanese and seek sanctuary at the tiny Dutch government outpost of Long Nawang on the Kayan River in Dutch Borneo. We have already seen that after the invasion of Kuching, McPherson and the other Europeans in Sibu had headed up-river. After assembling at Seputin near Kapit on 28 December, the party of twenty-three Europeans (eighteen men, three women and two children) set off again in seven boats to negotiate the Pelagus rapids and make for Long Bahau above Belaga. Some time in early January 1942, Oyong Layang, a Kenyah whose longhouse was near Long

47

Exodus and Nemesis

Nawang, received a wireless message that McPherson was on his way there via Belaga. His father, Uyong Lejau, called on the Kenyah to go to the Ulu Rejang to meet McPherson’s party and assist them on the last part of their journey. In the meantime, an advance party consisting of Jacks and two others reached Long Nawang and persuaded the Dutch authorities there to send forty porters to assist the main party from their side of the watershed. The Kenyah duly met McPherson and his party at Sungei Sait on 18 January and accompanied them on the journey to Long Nawang where they arrived on 22 January. One of those who also assisted the party was Penghulu Oyong Puso. The weather had been very wet and the party had had to make numerous river crossings. McPherson and two others were suffering from malaria by this time. Balikpapan had already fallen to the Japanese on 24 January and there was no longer any wireless contact. At a general meeting, McPherson announced that he was not fit to travel but that anyone who wished to go should do so. In the event, Jacks and three others set out on 30 January for Long Iram and Samarinda where it was thought they might still be able to escape by plane from the advancing Japanese. Five or six other Sarawak officers who were unfit to travel decided to return to Belaga and surrender.16 They were the fortunate ones. McPherson told Ujong Lejau that he could not go to Samarinda because his wife was due to have a baby at any time. In the event, the rest of the party decided to stay at Long Nawang, no doubt believing that the war would be short-lived and that they would be safe from the Japanese in such a remote place. There was plenty of rice, vegetables and fruit at Long Nawang and a herd of forty cattle as well as pigs and goats. Arms and ammunition held in the fort were available for protection if need be. McPherson and his wife stayed at Pasang Gram’s longhouse near the Dutch fort and the rest of the party stayed near Tangai’s longhouse, except for the troops who were quartered in a tangsi (barracks) near Kampong Kenyah. On 2 February the party was joined by Donald Hudden, District Officer at Marudi, and B.B. Parry, General Manager of Sarawak Oilfields Ltd., together with four Dutch airmen whose Surabayabased bomber had been shot down by Japanese Zero fighters on the Baram river near Marudi. Parry had managed to make his way from Miri after

Donald Hudden

supervising the last details of the oilfields denial scheme. After staying almost two weeks, Hudden set out by himself for Long Berang on the Sungei Bahau, upper Baram, where he hoped to persuade his good Kayan friend, Penghulu Taman Koleh Arank, to hide him from the Japanese. This was only a few days’ walk away but he was attacked and beheaded by a party of Iban some time in May before he could reach there. The most authoritative account of Hudden’s fate came from a Murut headman called Sigar from Belawit in Dutch Borneo who passed it on to the Revd Hudson Southwell on the upper Limbang before his party’s surrender to the Japanese in late September 1942: Hudden is reported to have built a hut about 3/ 4 hour from a Kelabit village in the Ulu Baram. Two Ibans accompanied by two Punans (or Kelabits) came to this village and were known to have evil intentions towards Hudden. They said they had been sent by the Japanese and so prevented any opposition. They stayed at this Kelabit house for three weeks and ingratiated themselves with Hudden, finally borrowing his gun on pretext of shooting pig. That night they returned and murdered him with spears. Sigar said that he got the information from Muruts who saw the murderers carrying the head.17

48

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

The four men thought to have been responsible were Tangi, Elos, Gindang and Bau, Iban who had left the Pelagus area in 1938. Two of them had at one time been imprisoned by Hudden at Marudi. As well as Hudden, they had killed a number of Punan.18 In April, forty Dutch and Indonesian soldiers under the command of Lieut. D.J.A. Westerhuis arrived at Long Nawang. They were part of the garrison force at Tarakan which had escaped to the mainland on the arrival of the Japanese. Westerhuis had brought his wife with him. In early August the party was also joined by two American missionaries, Revd Jackson and Revd Sandy, from nearby Pitjuman. Mrs Jackson and her baby accompanied them. On 19 August two Kenyah men arrived from Bakon, about three hours walk from Long Nawang, and told their relatives that there were more than 70 Japanese troops on their way to the outpost. The Japanese had forbidden anyone to carry the news of their presence to Long Nawang but the two Kenyah managed to slip away. Westerhuis questioned them but rejected their story, believing that it was other Dutch troops retreating from the coast. So confident was he that he did not even bother to send out a patrol to investigate. Westerhuis also refused all requests from his native troops for ammunition for their rifles. That night, many of the Kenyah went off on a fishing expedition. Early the next morning the 76 Japanese marines from Raroun Division arrived at the east bank of the Kayan River, accompanied by some Kenyah guides. Officially described as a ‘punitive expedition’, it had taken them four weeks by boat and foot to reach the remote Dutch outpost. However, their progress had been facilitated by no less than two hundred conscripted Dayak porters. Commanded by Capt. Shima Mora, the marines were heavily armed in expectation of resistance. In his diary that morning, a Japanese petty officer expressed satisfaction that they had arrived unnoticed. ‘Today is the day of the attack’, he wrote. ‘Looking down on the enemy from the hill, it is apparent that he has no knowledge of our presence’.19 Oyong Layang described what followed: At dawn we were suiprised and were so frightened, our womenfolk cried with fear. The Japanese soldiers kept sentry below our houses. We were not allowed to come out from our houses and anyone who tried to run away would be shot. We stayed indoors and after some time heard shots from a machine-gun

shooting at Mr Macpherson’s house. Mrs Macpherson was shot through the thigh while feeding her child on a chair. Mr Macpherson carried them to the bed and went down putting up his his hands. So the Japs stopped firing and fired at the house where the other Europeans occupied. Five Europeans from Sibu died and one from Dutch [Borneo].20

The Japanese had attacked with rifles, light machine-guns and ‘knee’ mortars at 8.30 a.m. when the Dutch troops were out on parade in front of the barracks. Westerhuis, who had been hunting with some of the Kenyah, had the keys of the armoury with him and so the troops had no ammunition. When the firing started, everyone except Westerhuis made for the jungle; waving a white flag, he was mown down by machinegun fire. The Japanese then advanced across the suspension bridge to the settlement. Apart from three Dutch and British soldiers who escaped in the ensuing panic, all the remaining European men were eventually rounded up and put in two cells at the fort for interrogation. The women were allowed to stay in one of the houses and Mrs McPherson was given medical treatment by the Japanese for her wound. With one exception, the Dutch native troops were allowed to make their way back to their homes in Tarakan. This was a man called Kailola who had been captured at Tarakan and released as an ‘Asiatic’ but had subsequently joined up with Westerhuis’ group. On 26 August at 9 a.m. the Japanese held a meeting to plan the execution of their prisoners, including the three soldiers who had been recaptured by some Kayan and brought back to the settlement. Most of the day was spent digging two mass graves in readiness. The execution was carried out at 5 p.m. on the hillside at the rear of the barracks and the bodies were buried on the spot. Although the Kenyah had been warned off, eleven years old Tusau Padan and his father concealed themselves behind bushes and saw the survivors of the first volleys being shot, bayoneted and pushed into the graves. The next day Capt. Mora and forty-five of his men set off for Samarinda, leaving Lieut. Okino in charge of the remaining twenty-five marines. In his diary record of the expedition, the Japanese petty officer made no specific reference to the women and children, but he left with Capt. Mora’s party before their fate was decided. According to Oyong Layang, after the execution

49

Exodus and Nemesis

of the men the Kenyah headmen asked the Japanese not to kill or ill-treat the women. They were held in the house for two weeks, being allowed out each day for exercise. Then for some reason Okino decided to imprison them in the fort. According to Oyong Layang, ten Japanese came to the house near Kampong Kenyah where the six women and four children were living, put them in gunny sacks and carried them to the fort. There they remained for another two weeks until 23 September when they were all taken out and killed. According to Tusau, the children suffered the most cruel deaths: forced to climb arecanut palms, they were impaled on the upraised bayonets when they slipped down in exhaustion.22 Mrs McPherson and her baby were brought from across river on a stretcher to share the others’ fate and they were all buried on the hill next to the men. The Kenyah, who had been banned from going near the fort, heard the sound of machine-guns and bombing ‘as if a big battle was going on’.23 Mrs McPherson’s cook and two Kenyah women then came with news of what had happened. Shortly afterwards, the remaining Japanese set out on the return journey to Samarinda and the Kenyah were able to inspect the burial place which was subsequently known by them as liang belanda (the Dutch grave). Why the Japanese found it necessary to kill the entire European party at Long Nawang has never been made clear. Despite strenuous efforts by the military authorities after the war, it proved impossible to trace the Japanese officers who had been responsible. The logistics of getting the prisoners back to Samarinda and having to look after them may have seemed too difficult. However, as escapees who had defied the order to surrender, the Long Nawang refugees were technically enemy operatives and could be executed in accordance with Japanese military regulations. One person who was particularly distressed to hear of the McPhersons’ fate was Tedong anak Barieng of Nanga Merirai on the Balleh who had known them well. Visiting their grave at Long Nawang, he was overcome by the thought that they might have been saved if only McPherson had talked to him first before going up-river: The Kenyah people cried to see me grieving over the wife and her child. As the saying goes, it was like the fingernail and the flesh, his wife and child with me. His wife had spoken with me and said: ‘We’ll flee to you if the Japanese come’. But I was

upset when Tuan Jefferson [McPherson] turned his back on me and did not tell me, when he suddenly left to go straight up-river. If he had told me, I would have sheltered him at Merirai and he wouldn’t have died.24

Temenggong Koh also expressed his extreme disappointment, believing that he could have hidden then in the mountains of the upper Melatai and Kotai.25 However, the iron determination of the Japanese to pursue European fugitives meant that they would probably not have been safe anywhere. Donald Hudden’s death was more like that of the Arundells in that Iban rather than Japanese were directly responsible. However, the Japanese were believed to have played their part by instigating the murderers to track him down in the ulu Baram.26 They would have been told of his escape and it was their policy to pursue any European who attempted to avoid arrest and internment. As much as anything else, they would no doubt have been concerned about the influence that such a popular and influential officer might have had on the people of the interior and their acceptance of Japanese supremacy.

Missionaries In contrast with the fate of the Arundells and the Long Nawang party was the experience of the Borneo Evangelical Mission (BEM) workers and their families who took shelter in the remote interior of the Limbang and Trusan rivers when news came of the Japanese invasion. In January 1942, Roland and Mary Bewsher and Hudson and Winsome Southwell, together with Mrs Anderson (wife of the Resident of the 5th Division, J.G. Anderson), the de L. Clifford planter family, a Catholic priest and two other Europeans established themselves in three attap (leaf thatch) houses at Aroh Linoh on the Medihit River, a tributary of the Limbang. In March the Southwells and Mrs Anderson moved further into the interior to the Ulu Trusan where they planted padi and vegetables, opened a school and continued their missionary work amongst the Murut. In late May they were joined by an American missionary from Dutch Borneo, John Willfinger. On the afternoon of 26 July the idyllic isolation of Aroh Linoh (lit., the stream of pleasant thoughts) was shattered by the arrival of a Japanese patrol accompanied by a large party of natives. Some

50

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

months later in Kuching’s Batu Lintang prison camp, Roland Bewsher recorded the event in vivid detail: Capt. Nakasima and (MP) Takitomo, 13 Nip soldiers wfith] 99 Iban and Muruts (15 perahus) raced in fr[om] Penghulu’s (Tama Kulin’s) path and were making past our hut to main house where four were playing bridge. (Pat had just bid 1 diamond. Ann and Jo resting). Time 2.15 pm. I called to them (passing Nips) and two branched off with bayonets levelled at me. I was calling to Mfary] asleep in r[oom] w[ith the] twins ‘Don’t be alarmed darling the Japs are here’. They looked menacing. I was turned around. A cord [was] produced and and [my] hands tied tightly behind [my] back. Mary [was] ow out, pale and w[ith] right knee weak w[ith] shock, sat on dias, twins whimpered. They made to tie her but did not when twins began to cry. I turned to see Dayak Apai Anggas in warcoat and headdress and vile face. ‘Lain tabek ini’ [This is a new kind of greeting] I said and was beginning to talk when guard standing at the head of steps turned and clouted me on mouth after kicking back w[ith] heel, steel plated, into my shin. Others now on ground. George, putting specs in pocket, and Monty for no reason were clouted on face by Capt holding revolver. Ah Mee with bayonets thru wall, door being closed, opened door was fronted w[ith] revolver, tied to post while house searched then brought to stand w[ith] rest of us by Dapur steps. Order given to unload rifles (light, long and new). Ex Penghulu Belulok at head of Dayaks. M[ary] and George thought we were to be shot but force lined up and numbered before us. Were sat down under guard who’d kicked me and was cruellest of all. Others (more relaxed) began smiling and showing riendliness. Dapur and store rifled and 100 eggs taken fr[om] Monty’s house. They had fine feed, Dayaks also being given salt fr[om] above dapur. We, after troops, were served tea (rich with milk held for us) by impatient guard - scalding.27 The next day they were taken down by prahu to Limbang and on to Brunei. After intensive interrogation, they were then sent to Kuching by ship in September to be interned at Batu Lintang camp with the other European prisoners. After news arrived of the arrest of the Bewsher party, the Murut insisted that the Southwells remain hidden in the deep jungle and they subsequently moved to huts at Pa Matang on the Dutch side of the border. However, on 19 September a letter arrived from the Japanese

authorities in Brunei demanding their surrender and threatening to punish anyone who had been helping them. Joining two other BEM workers, Frank and Enid Davidson, and some other Europeans who had been hiding in the lower Trusan, they all surrendered to the Japanese on 11 October at Sundar. From there they were taken to Brunei and subsequently to Batu Lintang for internment.28

North Borneo Prisoners By this time the Europeans who had been interned in North Borneo after a brief period of liberty had also been transferred to Batu Lintang. Amongst them was Hilda Bates, a Lancashire nursing sister who spent some months looking after the women and children at Tenom before being brought up to Jesselton and confined in the Roman Catholic convent there. On 20 September the forty-six women and children were taken in cattle trucks to the wharf and put on board a tiny cargo boat where they were allocated the forward hatch. Five days later after a rough voyage along the coast, they disembarked at Kuching: Some of us were in clean frocks and battered hats, looking sunburnt and fresh. The nuns looked weary and bedraggled, their white habits grey and their headdresses limp, but they still smiled and did what they could to help tho’ some of them had been very sick. One of our number was dresesd as for Ascot, in a beautifuly tailored frock, high heeled shoes, a very ultra modern hat and gloves - also a handbag of latest fashion and stockings! Another had on a badly hanging art silk flowered frock, over a pair of green shapeless airtex pyjama trousers, on her head she wore a puce snood and topped this by a shiny black boater trimmed with blue and pink lovers’ knots! Tired looking mothers, loaded with bundles, hung on to children who were longing to break away after five days confinement. The parrot screamed, the Nips shoutedf,] the children whimpered - and so we landed.29 Rushed by truck from the wharf to Batu Lintang camp at break-neck speed, they were deposited in front of a line of huts guarded by barbed wire: standing outside were the oddest collection of men we’d ever seen - even in Borneo. They wore pyjamas, no jackets, shower heads (tonsures) and long beards to their waists, most were shoeless or wore wooden clogs. They talked exitedly [sic] in an unknown language - later defined as Dutch, and we discovered

Exodus and Nemesis

them to be the Dutch Rftoman] C.[atholic] fathers from Borneo. After this their luggage was searched and thrown on to the road: We bundled everything back into cases and were about to heave them along when an enormouse [sic] herd [oft grey clad sisters with loud voices rushed at us, seized cabin trunks as if they were handbags and marched us to our quarters. There were about a hundred and twenty of these Dutch nuns.

Meanwhile, in Australia... As we have already seen, the Rajah and MacBryan left Sarawak in late October for a holiday in Australia. Hearing the news of Pearl Harbour as they were approaching Brisbane by ship, the Rajah decided to seek assistance from the Australian government to return to Sarawak. In the meantime he cabled Chief Secretary Le Gros Clark on 16 December: I deeply regret not being with you in Sarawak to share this time of anxiety and trial through which you are now passing. I send you this message of good wishes and encouragement coupled with an expression of my full confidence that notwithstanding these days the tide will soon turn. I am hastening to return to Kuching to join you with the utmost speed possible and you may expect me to arrive in the near future.30 Le Gros Clark was instructed to inform the District Officer of Upper Sarawak (Bau-Lundu area) that the Rajah would be returning via Dutch Borneo and that appropriate arrangements were to be made. This must have been just about the last thing that Le Gros Clark wanted at the time, but it at least showed that the Rajah was not one to desert a badly leaking ship.31 By 25 December when the Rajah and MacBryan reached Surabaya, Kuching was no longer in radio contact. Proceeding to Bandung, they met Major-General T. van der Poorten, Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch East Indies, who informed them that Kuching had already fallen. It was agreed that MacBryan should travel to the Dutch Borneo-Sarawak border to assess the situation on the R ajah’s behalf. He accompanied Lieut. Col. A.L. Gortmans who was to share with Lane the command of all Dutch and British forces in Borneo. A guerilla warfare

51 expert with a legendary reputation in Aceh, ‘Jan Oorlog’ Gortmans was keen to organise an antiJapanese resistance movement in Borneo. Armed with a letter of authority from the Rajah, MacBryan’s mission was to assess the support that could be obtained from the Iban for a guerilla campaign and to encourage the escaped Sarawak officers to offer their services to the Dutch. As the Rajah later told Sir Ronald Cross, Britain’s High Commissioner in Australia, It was evident to me and the General that the attitude of my Dayak subjects who comprise the backbone of the fighting population was of vital importance to the future because the time would come when we should take the offensive and their presence in the interior of Borneo as the most skilled jungle men in the world might well be invaluable as a strong pro-British asset.32 The Rajah’s assessment was that the Japanese would only be able to control the coastal areas and that they would not attempt to move into the interior. Frustrated by the lack of all news from Kuching, the Rajah was concerned about the fate of the Europeans who had not got away and was not critical of those who had. ‘God knows what will happen to the Chinese!’, he wrote to his brother Bertram from Bandoeng. ‘I think the natives will get off alright as propaganda given out by the Japs is all pro-natives’.33 Arriving at Pontianak on 31 December, MacBryan was told in no uncertain terms by the Sarawak officers who had escaped across the border that the Iban had made a realistic assessment of the military situation and were highly unlikely to throw away their lives against superior Japanese arms. He also aroused hostility when he attempted to withdraw from the bank the government funds which had been deposited there by the Sarawak Treasurer, B.A. Trechman. In the meantime, the Sarawak Government Agent in Sydney, Cecil Pitt Hardacre, had flown to Pontianak and was arranging with the Dutch authorities for the evacuation of the women and children and some of the men who had escaped from Sarawak. The quid pro quo insisted on by the Dutch was that six of the Sarawak officers would remain at the disposal of the Southern Pacific Command. Their task would be to locate reliable natives and use them to gather information about conditions in Sarawak. Accompanying Gortmans to Ledo, a Dutch

52 airfield nor far from the Sarawak border, MacBryan met Col. Lane and the remnants of the Punjabi battalion. Lane, who had been responsible for sending a security report by B. J.C. Spurway on MacBryan to Singapore before the invasion, hardly needed a warning from Edgar Elam, Sarawak’s Deputy Defence Secretary now in Pontianak, not to allow him to cross the border. He commissioned Spurway to prepare another security report for Singapore, which described MacBryan as a ‘possible ... Quisling on his way back to form a puppet State in Sarawak with himself as head, a position he is well fitted to hold due to his influence over natives and landed interests’.34 The Singapore authorities took note of this and MacBryan was duly arrested by the Dutch on 3 January on the request of Sir Shenton Thomas. The local Dutch commander, Lieut. Col. D.P.F. Mars, wanted him shot on the spot. However, he was taken to Palembang by ship and subsequently to Batavia where he was kept incommunicado. Then on 11 January he was escorted by plane to Singapore and on arrival there was served with a warrant of arrest under the Defence Regulations of the Straits Settlements and lodged in Changi Prison.35 Fortunately for MacBryan, his case was taken up by Sir Roland Braddell, a prominent Singapore lawyer who appealed to Sir Shenton Thomas to produce the evidence against him or release him. MacBryan was subsequently released and made his way to Perth by ship, using the Rajah’s influence to gain entry to Australia despite being listed as an undesirable immigrant. On 30 January he travelled by plane to Melbourne where the Rajah had in the meantime made his temporary base. By then, of the six Sarawak officers co-opted by the Dutch as intelligence gatherers, two had been killed and two badly injured when their plane returning from Australia was attacked by Japanese fighters off Timor. This, together with the rapid Japanese advance in west Borneo, persuaded Southern Pacific Command to call off the operation. All remaining Dutch and British forces in Borneo were obliged to surrender to the Japanese at Pontianak on 9 March. That MacBryan was a Japanese spy seems highly unlikely. Most of the ‘evidence’ set out in the two reports made to the Singapore authorities seems to have been unsubstantiated hearsay, revealing more about his fellow officers’ envy and hatred for him than anything else. MacBryan was known to have had some associations with Japanese

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

in Penang during the time when he was working for the British Tobacco Co. but the evidence of this was subsequently destroyed. Chief Secretary Le Gros Clark and Defence Secretary J.L. Noakes were both satisfied that there was no substance in the accusations made against him. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that MacBryan saw a role for himself under a Japanese regime as an adviser on native affairs. Alternatively, his image of himself as a Southeast Asian T.E. Lawrence may have suggested to him the possibility of becoming a guerilla leader against the Japanese. However, he was hardly the military type and would have been singularly unsuited to work of that kind. His great strength was in political intrigue, principally among the Malays who were the least likely group to have been enrolled in such a movement. All that can be said is that the Japanese invasion offered MacBryan new and exciting possibilities for the exercise of his erratic genius. It has been suggested that MacBryan persuaded the Rajah to return to Sarawak after the invasion of Miri in order to intervene with the Japanese on behalf of his people.36 This seems unlikely, although the Rajah had flirted with the idea of neutrality before Pearl Harbour and subsequently tried to make contact with the Japanese authorities in Sarawak through the Argentine Consul in Sydney.37 Notes 1. 2. 3. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15.

Le Gros Clark Papers, RHL MSS. Pac. s. 84. Digby, Lawyer in the Wilderness, p. 48. W.G. Morison, ‘Personal Experiences During Japanese Occupation of Sarawak’, RHL MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 155. Transcript of undated interview with A.J.N. Richards, IWM Department of Sound Records, Accession no. 006245/05, p. 9. Personal communication from Mr W.G. Morison, 29 November 1997. Richards interview transcript, p. 16. Digby, Lawyer in the Wilderness, p. 77. O’Connor, The More Fool I, p. 127. Interview with Datuk Tra Zehnder, Kuching, 12 December 1997. Nendak, n.d. Digby, Lawyer in the Wilderness, p. 79. This account is based on the following sources: Sarawak Tribune, 19 January 1947; Digby, Lawyer in the Wilderness, pp. 77-80; interview by John Postill with Tuai Rumah Semumok Baroh, Layang anak Jelian, 11 February 1997, transcribed by Rosalyn anak Kerya and translated by Kadri bin Jili. Cited in Sutlive, Tun Jugah, p. 102. H. Hickling, Lieutenant Akino, republished as Crimson

53

Exodus and Nemesis

Sun Over Borneo, Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications,

16.

17. 18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

1997. The principal source of information on the massacre is Semut III officer Lieut. F.R. Oldham’s report made at Long Nawang on 18 September 1945 for the Australian army authorities and subsequently transmitted to the British, Dutch and American governments. A copy can be found in the National Archives, Washington, RG 38 Records of the Chief of Naval Operations. Office of Naval Intelligence Monograph Files. Box 13. For an account of the party’s journey from Sibu to LongNawang, see W. McKerracher, ‘Report on proceedings before, leading up to and covering the evacuation of the Borneo Co.’s staff from Sibu and the Rejang Timber Concession’, 2 May 1942, Griffin Papers, RHL MSS. Pac. s. 109. Jacks, ‘Report’. Jacks, Schiotling, W. McKerracher and T.E. Walter reached Samarinda safely and managed to get a plane to Bandoeng. Jacks and McKerracher eventually escaped from Tjilatjap to Perth. Walter and Schiotling were taken prisoner by the Japanese. Noakes, ‘Report’, p. 106. Harrisson files, SMA. WO 325/7. The identity of the officer and his unit were not established. However, he named 3rd class petty officers Yoneda, Oto, Yokota, Udaka and Nishiwaki as members of the party. ‘Statement made by Oyong Layang, age 42, Kenyah of Long Nawang, on 3rd May, 1946, before Dayak Native Officer Bennet Jarrow, Sibu’, WO 203/5991. Interview with Tusau Padan by James Ritchie, 1995. For a biographical note on Tusau Padan, see Sarawak Gazette, 1996, pp. 123-6. Ibid. A similar story about the children and the trees is repeated by Robert Payne, The White Rajahs, London: 1960, pp. 174-5.

23. Interview with Tusau Padan. 24. Interview with Tedong anak Barieng, 1995, by Nichol anak Ragan, transcribed by Shirley Vilin Ikok and translated by Dr Otto Steinmayer. 25. ‘The Speech of Temenggong Koh’, c. 1953, MacDonald Papers, Durham University Archives, 38/10/8. 26. Personal information from Professor Peter Metcalf. 27. Diary of Roland Bewsher, 5 July 1942 - 26 November 1943, Bewsher Papers. 28. Southwell, ‘Memoirs’, Chapter 9. 29. Hilda Bates, ‘This is Something’. 30. AA A981 (Sarawak 2: Visit of Rajah). 31. Sanib Said, Malay Politics in Sarawak, p. 29, writes mistakenly that the Rajah was at the Cameron Highlands when Kuching fell and that rather than attempt to return to Sarawak, ‘proceeded to Australia ...’. 32. Vyner Brooke to Sir Ronald Cross, 31 January 1942, CO 531/30, File 53079. 33. Vyner Brooke to Bertram Brooke, 31 December 1941, RHL Brooke Papers MSS. Pac. S. 83. 34. ‘Report on Mr. G.T. McBryan’, RHL Brooke Papers, Box 2/3. In June 1946 Spurway withdrew all that he had written about MacBryan in the report when the latter brought a legal action against him. 35. Vyner Brooke to Sir Ronald Cross, 31 January 1942, !oc. cit.

36. Personal communication from C. Pitt Hardacre, 3 October 1976. 37. H. E. Jones (Commonwealth Investigation Branch) to Secretary, Dept, of External Affairs, 12 March 1942, AA 981 (Sarawak: Visit of the Rajah... to Australia).

6 Boruneo Kita he north-west Borneo operation was practically completed with the capture of the Dutch airfields at Ledo and Singkawang on 27 January and the towns of Pamangkat and Sambas the same day. Pontianak was taken two days later. Some Japanese units had pursued the Punjabis overland while others had gone by sea. In Sarawak itself, only a handful of fugitive European civilians remained to be rounded up. On 15 March the Kawaguchi task force handed over control of Sarawak to Nakahata Unit (4th Independent Mixed Regiment) and was transferred to the Philippines. On 5 May the Borneo Defence Force (also known as Nada 9801 Unit or Nada Group and from 22 September 1944 as the 37th Army) was established as a garrison force into which Nakahata Unit and the existing military administration were absorbed. Initially, Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo had considered that only two infantry battalions would be sufficient to defend the entire area and support the military administration, but the garrison finally fixed upon was three battalions. This was still a remarkably small force to control a very large area and its thinly-dispersed population. Furthermore, half the troops in the Kuching area were sent to New Guinea in mid-1943.' It was not until late 1944 that military strength was increased in anticipation of an Allied attack on the east coast of North Borneo. In the meantime, it had been necessary to establish some form of administration to control civil affairs until a more permanent system could be designed. In Kuching, a gunsei-bu (military administration board) was established under Major Nozoki whose first task was to locate former government employees and get them to return to work. Locating himself in the old Court House building, Nozoki assumed the role of the pre-war Resident of the First Division, employing Native Officer Abang Openg and other local staff from what had been the Divisional Office.

T

Anxious to restore normality, Nozoki quickly issued food control regulations designed to prevent loading and to restore prices to pre­ invasion levels. Other notices indicated the administrations determination to collect quit-rents from property owners and to maintain government services. However, it was not until November that the old civil court system was re-established. From the outset, Japanese policy was to govern the three British Borneo territories as one entity, known as Boruneo Kita. Meaning ‘Northern Borneo’ in Japanese and ‘Our Borneo’ in Malay, the name’s serendipitous ambiguity reflected both Japan’s possession of the area and the hoped-for co­ operative relationship with its inhabitants. Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo were arranged in five shu, or provinces: Kuching-shu (1st and 2nd Divisions, together with west Borneo and the Natuna Islands), Sibu-shu (3rd Division), Miri-shu (4th and 5th Divisions, together with Brunei), Seikai-shu (west coast of North Borneo, together with Labuan) and Tokai-shu (east coast). The director-general of each province had been appointed before the invasion and was answerable directly to the military commander-in-chief.

Takuno, the first director-general o f Kuching-shu

Boruneo Kita

The Japanese gunsei-bu (military administration board) and local staff, Kuching, c. May 1942. (Photograph by courtesy o f Sarawak Museum.)

56

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Under the provincial governor were a number of ken or prefectures with their own locallyappointed heads. The prefectures of Kuching-shu were Kuching and Simanggang; those of Sibu-shu were Sibu and Bintulu; the prefectures of Mirishu were Miri and Brunei; the prefectures of Seikaishu were Jesselton, Bohoto (including Labuan), Kota Belud and Keningau. Those of Tokai-shu were Tawau, Sandakan, Lahad Datu and Beruran. Under the command of the Defence Force’s Chief Staff Officer from early May, there were five discrete divisions of government: kempei-tai, administration, industry, finance and accounts and intelligence. In addition there were maritime and communication bureaux established under the administrative division. Significantly, the control and administration of the immediate oilfields area of Miri and Seria remained the direct responsibility of Tokyo headquarters. The vital importance of its oil resources meant that the area was directly integrated into the Imperial war economy. At the same time, the stationing of a large protective force in the Miri area suggested to Tokyo that it should be the headquarters of the military administration for the whole of Boruneo Kita. Dutch Borneo, by contrast, came under the control of the Japanese navy and was administered as one unit with the Celebes, the lesser Sundas and the Moluccas. The one exception was the Pontianak area which was transferred from army to navy control in mid-1942.

In the following year he visited the battlefields in France. In 1920 after returning to Japan he served in Paris as part of the Japanese negotiating team at Versailles and spent some time with the peace­ keeping force on the German-Czech border. After further military study in France from 1921 he was appointed military attache once more in London in 1927. Back in Tokyo in the early 1930’s, he served as principal of the Imperial Military Academy where he pursued his interest in military tactics and logistics. Promoted to the rank of Major-General in March 1933 and Lieut. General in December 1936, he seemed destined to enjoy an outstanding military career. He had also become an authority on Japanese and European art, assembling a large private collection.3 In 1937, Maeda was sent to Manchuria in command of the 8th Infantry Division and it was there that he suffered a major humiliation. After serious disagreements with Army Command on the conduct of the war, including criticism of the Kwangtung Army (of which Tojo was Chief of Staff) for under-estimating the Soviet Union’s military capacity and of the 3rd Army’s reckless

Marquis Maeda The first commander of the Borneo Defence Force was Lieut. General Marquis Toshinari Maeda, a member of one of Japan’s old feudal families which owned large tracts of land at Kanazawa in Ishikawa prefecture.2 Born in June 1885, he was adopted from a lesser branch of the family in 1900 owing to the lack of a male heir and duly inherited the family title. Graduating from Teikoku Rikugun Shikan Gakko (Imperial Military Academy) in Tokyo in 1911 at the age of twenty-six, he topped the class in which Hideki Tojo was a less distinguished member. In 1913 he went to Germany for further study at his own expense and was placed under the guidance of the Japanese military attache at the Berlin Embassy. At the outbreak of war in August 1914 he went to London and was appointed military attache there in 1916.

Marquis Maeda outside Prime Minister Tojo s residence at Komaba, Tokyo, on 20 April 1942 after his appointment as Commander o f the Borneo Defence Force. (Photograph by courtesy ofM . Yamada.)

57

Boruneo Kita

Marquis Maeda at Tachikawa airfield, Tokyo, 25 April 1942. On the right is 1st Lieut. Masaharu Yamada. (Photograph by courtesy o f M. Yamada.)

advance into China, he was relieved of his command on 27 January 1939 and placed on the reserve list. He subsequently turned his attention to the affairs of Kizoku-in (House of Peers) and to writing haiku verse under the nom de plume of Baido (lit., plum blossom cottage). His appointment as Commander of the Borneo Defence Force on 20 April 1942 seems to have come as a complete surprise to him: he was overcome with emotion when called to the Imperial Palace to receive his commission from the Emperor. Why such a high-ranking general like Maeda should have been sent to a quiet backwater like Borneo calls for some explanation. At this point he was 57 and had only a limited experience of active service, during which he had fallen out dramatically with the military hierarchy. His cosmopolitan and English-speaking background meant that he was not trusted by the more chauvinistic ruling group who were supporting his contemporary, Tojo. His keen interest in Japanese traditional culture and liberal ideals also alienated him from the more extreme nationalists within the army hierarchy. He had seen the attempted coup d ’etat by young officers of February 1936 as a sign that values needed to be changed. However, he was a highly-respected

Daiyong Bucho (logistical commander) and this was no doubt one of the reasons why he was chosen to head the Borneo Defence Force. Perhaps the fact that he visited North Borneo briefly with other members of the House of Peers in October 1941 suggested that he had some knowledge of the area. However, the main reason for his appointment was no doubt Tojo’s wish to do something for his old classmate. Maeda’s departure for Borneo on 25 April 1942 was treated w ith full cerem ony. Commissioned by Army Command to take him there was a two-engined Mitsubishi aircraft called Yae Dake, the first Japanese plane to have flown non-stop from Japan to the west coast of the United States a few years earlier. Tachikawa airfield were a host of other dignitaries as well as his second wife and their two sons and two young daughters. Tojo sent his personal assistant. After spending ten days in Saigon where he had discussions with Field Marshal Count Terauchi, Commander of the Southern Army, Maeda left on the morning of 5 May for Miri ‘Be careful’, Terauchi warned him as they walked towards the aircraft. ‘It would be less than a joke if this turns out to be your last flight!2 Throwing himself into the work of placing the military

58

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

administration on a permanent footing, he did not even take time off to play a round of his beloved golf. After inspecting the oil fields at Miri and Seria, he took immediate steps to ensure that the best technical expertise and equipment were obtained from Tokyo so that production could be resumed as quickly as possible. Maeda was fortunate in some ways to have under him as Sanbo-cho (Chief of Staff) MajorGeneral Yoshinobu Manaki. A brilliant officer with a keen interest in military strategy, Manaki was a great admirer of General Rommel and had studied his campaigns while serving as military attache in Berlin in 1940. As Chief of Staff of the 25th Army under General Tomoyuki Yamashita, he was one of the architects of the highly successful Malayan campaign in which mobility played such a crucial part. Present at the British surrender at Bukit Timah, Singapore, in February 1942, Manaki had subsequently been given the task of organising the military administration of Malaya. Appointed Chief of Staff to the Borneo Defence Force on 10 April 1942, he remained in that position until March 1945 when he was given his own command elsewhere. Due to his single-minded determination and his experience

Major-General Yoshinobu Manaki (left) and Lieut. Masaharu Yamada. (Photograph by courtesy ofM . Yamada.)

over almost the entire period, he was the most significant figure of the occupation administration in Boruneo Kita. Every document that was generated had to pass through his hands, making him the de facto chief executive. An upright and ascetic figure, stern and highly disciplined, Manaki was described by one contemporary as ‘a type of Tojo’.4 Totally dedicated to the Imperial cause, he was at the same time limited by his military priorities. He had very little understanding of economics or of the pyschology of the people he was dealing with in Sarawak. Every inch a professional soldier, he had no patience with Maeda’s liberal and cosmopolitan values. Nevertheless he shared his love of golf, ballroom dancing and Scottish whiskey. One of the more curious events of the early period in Miri was the surprise arrival by fishing boat of Kenji Yamazaki, a former left-wing member of the Japanese Diet. Dressed in filthy clothes and wearing a samurai sword, with a thick beard and glittering eyes, he looked for all the world like a seventeenth century hikoshi (pirate). At a loss what do with this reputed Communist, army flier Capt. Matsaharu Yamada and his superior, Major Tsuneo Yano, decided to introduce him to Manaki. When the Army Minister replied to Manaki’s request for information about Yamazaki by saying that he was dangerous and should be sent back to Tokyo immediately, the tough little Chief of Staff was furious. He protested that Yamazaki had changed his ideas and that he had a letter of introduction from a former chief of police, Oguri. Telling the Army Minister that the Borneo Defence Army would be responsible for him, Manaki evidently suggested to Maeda that Yamazaki could be usefully employed as head of one of the interior prefectures. While he was a highly unorthodox appointment, Yamazaki’s administration of Keningau prefecture in North Borneo seems to have justified Manaki’s and Maeda’s confidence in him.5 Maeda was determined to establish the Japanese presence in northern Borneo as both permanent and legitimate. In the first instance this meant coming to terms with the traditional Malay rulers. His first official visit was to the young Sultan of Brunei, Ahmad Tajuddin, who had been crowned in 1940 after a long minority under his two uncles. Maeda assured him that his religious authority would be respected and that there would be continuing financial support.

59

Boruneo Kita

Sultan ofPontianak’s palace on the River Kapuas. (Drawing by Sgt. A. Krigsman, May 1942.)

„ »

* ’

B i t'

Marquis Maeda and Major Yano with the Sultan o f Pontianak and his retinue. 12 April 1942. The Sultan is in a white uniform on the right. His Japanese second wife is in the centre, next to Major Yano.

60

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Marquis Maeda with the Sultan o f Brunei, Ahmad Tajuddin

Marquis Maeda at Sibufor the installation o f the military government there in August 1942. Seated next to him is the director-general o f Sibu-shu, Major-General Senda. On the extreme right is Takeda, Kenchiji (Mayor) o f Sibu, and next to him is Setsuo Yamada. (Photograph by courtesy o f Sarawak Museum.)

61

Boruneo Kita

On 12 May he also paid an official visit to the Sultan of Pontianak, the 72 year old Sharif Mohamad Al-kadri, whose second wife was Japanese. A brass band and uniformed boy scouts and police greeted Maeda and his party when they crossed the river to the royal jetty. The Sultan himself was dressed in a white uniform decorated with golden lions. From the upper balconies of the story-book palace, beautiful women looked down on the party. In the reception hall, Maeda was conducted to a special throne and waited on by seven or eight female servants who held his sword and cooled him with fans of golden feathers. The Sultan made an elegant speech in Maeda’s honour and presented him with a traditional kris before the mandatory group photograph was taken. Describing this interesting and unusual scene, the journalist Yosimichi Hatta was reminded of the Japanese fairy-tale hero Urashima’s visit to the castle of the Queen of the Sea. Enchanted by his surroundings, Urashimaya ended up spending most of his life there without noticing the passing of the years. However, Maeda was sensible enough to know that after half an hour it was time to leave. Nevertheless, Maeda fell victim to the spell of the White Rajahs. Spending the day in Kuching on what was supposed to be a brief visit, he stunned Manaki with a telegram announcing that he wanted to move his headquarters there and ordering the necessary arrangements to be made immediately. The Chief of Staff was not at all pleased about this and the transfer took much longer than it should have done, being completed only in July. Relations between the two men were subsequently strained. Installing himself in the Astana, which he no doubt felt was a more appropriate residence than the Sarawak Oilfields Ltd. rest house on the beach at Miri, Maeda gave orders that the vines covering its tower should be cut down and the entire building painted white. Determined to make a clean break with the Brooke regime, his symbolic act was greeted with surprise by the people of Kuching who knew the old story about the harm that would come to anyone who tampered with the building’s appearance. In June, Maeda and Manaki went to the Natuna Islands, north-west of Kuching, which came under his authority. Maeda’s last official function was in August when he officiated at the installation of the military administration of Sibu-shu, unveiling a commemorative wooden

The wreckage o f Marquis Maeda's aircraft being retrievedfrom the sea offBintulu, 18 October 1942. (Photograph by courtesy o f M. Yamada.)

obelisk on the river-front. A month later he was dead, drowned after the aircraft in which he was travelling crashed into the South China Sea.

Maeda’s Death Intent on visiting Labuan on 5 September where the airfield he had ordered was now ready for

Ceremony fo r the reception o f the ashes o f Marquis Maeda, Capt. Usui and Pilot Officer Yarn at Tokyo Station, November 1942. On the left is Manaki and in the middle is Lieut. Yamada. (Photograph by courtesy o f M. Yamada.)

62 limited use, Maeda and his personal assistant, Capt. Usui, had to use a single-engined chok kyoki (reconnaissance aircraft). All the larger planes had been commissioned to take Manaki and other officers to a conference in Saigon with Terauchi. Normally, an officer of his rank would not have been permitted to use such a small aircraft. However, Maeda was a flying enthusiast and no doubt welcomed the opportunity. In the past, he had created consternation by asking pilots to do aerobatics while he was a passenger. Following the north-east coast as far as Bintulu, pilot officer Ano turned sharply towards Labuan, at the same time switching over from one gravityfeed fuel tank to the other. During what should have been a routine operation, the engine stalled and the plane fell into the sea about three kilometres from shore. From the intensive investigations made subsequently, it appeared that Ano erred in making the switch at less than the minimum prescribed altitude of 1,000 metres.6 When wireless communication between the aircraft and Kuching ceased at about 11 a.m., there was general consternation at headquarters and a massive search was undertaken using all available aircraft and boats. It was not until 17 October that the wreckage was finally spotted in the shallow waters off-shore and the bodies of the three men recovered. On the morning of 7 November, funeral rites were celebrated at the Sarawak Club where the bowling alley had been turned into a shrine. Local produce of various kinds was placed before the three coffins, together with branches of the traditional tamagushi tree brought by some of the 2,000 people who attended. The ceremony was conducted by Manaki with the assistance of five monks who were serving in the army. Terauchi, who had come from Saigon for the occasion, announced that Maeda had been posthumously promoted to General and elevated by the Emperor to Sho Nii, the senior level of the second highest Court rank. The island of Labuan was henceforth to be known as Maedajima in his honour. The man who had played a key role in the search for the missing aircraft was Capt. Masaharu (‘Seiji’) Yamada, the army pilot who had been placed in charge of all airfield construction in Borneo. It was his task, together with two of his subordinates, to take back to Tokyo the cremated ashes of the three men and to be present

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

at the round of solemn funeral ceremonies that followed. Called in by Prime Minister Tojo to explain the crash, Yamada spent some hours providing a detailed account of the circumstances. When Tojo asked finally if there was anything that he could do for him and his colleagues, Yamada suggested that archery sets and baseball equipment would be greatly appreciated in Kuching, where there were few facilities for recreation.

Setsuo Yamada Although an administrative structure had been in place since mid-1942 and the general lines of ethnic and economic policy were apparent, a proper civil affairs policy for Boruneo Kita was not enunciated until the latter part of 1943 when a number of initiatives were taken. One reason for the delay was the loss of some of the original civil affairs staff in the landing craft sunk or damaged by Dutch bombers near Santubong before the landing on 24 December 1941. It was the arrival in Miri of Shiseikan (Administrator) Yamada in April 1942 which put an end to the drift and gave the military administration a clear and positive focus. Setsuo Yamada, a native of Hiroshima, had been recruited to work in Sarawak through the instrumentality of Marquis Maeda. They had become close friends when Maeda was military attache in London and Yamada was studying

Shiseikan Yamada

63

Boruneo Kita

zoology at Oxford. With his fluent English and cosmopolitan experience, Yamada was an ideal choice to take charge of civil affairs in British Borneo. He was seconded from the Ministry of the Interior and sent to head the Borneo Defence Force’s Intelligence Division. After a year he was appointed Kenchi-ji (governor) of Kuching. Yamada’s arrival brought about a significant change in the nature o f the m ilitary administration. According to Manaki, who worked closely with him for more than two years, his main emphasis was on continuity: He suggested a new policy of military administration based on his profound knowledge and analysis of the former policies employed by the British [Brooke] government. His suggestions concentrated on the maintenance of the status quo ante as far as possible, at least for a time, so that the new administration could minimise the local people’s confusion. His purpose was to bring peace of mind to the people and to ensure that they were co-operative towards the new administration.7 Yamada was personally responsible for the construction of Kuching’s first swimming pool and took a keen interest in the Sarawak Museum, which Maeda had insisted be kept open. He was a pleasant and informal man who was often to be seen bicycling around Kuching.

Ken-sanji Yamada’s first responsibility was reflected in a military decree of 1 October 1943 establishing a system of ken-sanji-kai, prefectural advisory

Phillip Jitam

councils, for the whole of Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo as a means of consolidating the military administration.8 This policy, which was to be implemented by 8 December 1943, had been announced in principle by Prime Minister Tojo in a speech of 16 July 1943 and was subsequently outlined in some detail in August in Boruneo Syubi-gun Shomu K itei (General Affairs Regulations of the Borneo Defence Force). The document devoted one section to ‘Regulations with regard to Participation of Local People in Political Activities’, stating in its preamble that As the local people have not been sufficiently educated and are not interested in participating in political matters, the opportunity of taking part in political affairs should be mimimised. However, the future expansion of the range of possibilities will be considered. Each prefectural head had the task of nominating a maximum of fifteen ken-sanji or councillors from the indigenous leadership to draw on their advice in the formulation of policy and to use them to facilitate its implementation. People from ‘third countries’, in other words Chinese and Indians, were limited to temporary membership. The only other stipulation on membership was that in Brunei the Sultan was to be an honorary sanji. In effect, the ken-sanji-kai system was a purely advisory body similar to Sarawak’s old Council Negri but organised on a decentralised basis. The fact that the sanji were required to meet only twice a year suggested that they were not considered to be a vital part of government. Seeking to maximise the propaganda effect of the initiative, the announcement on 1 October was required to stress the following points:

Charles Mason

Ong Kuan Hin

64

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

(a) Japan’s real intention of giving local people permission to participate in local activities (b) The right of participation is a ‘privilege’ given only to the people of northern Borneo, not to the people from third countries [i.e., Chinese and Indians], However, in future similar rights might be given to them (c) Expediency will be pursued in the case of those who have been classified as from third countries due to an unauthorised nationality law (d) The more progress in education, the more positions will be opened up for local people. The membership of the Kuching ken-sanji-kai reflected a conservative acceptance of the status quo ante in its recognition of the pre-war ethnic elites. Representing the Malay elite were Datu Patinggi, Datu Pahlawan (Abang Hj. Mustapha), Abang Openg and Tuanku Bujang while Datu Amar Abang Hj. Suleiman and the Minangkabau book-seller and Persatuan Melayu Sarawak President, Haji Abdul Rahman, represented the new class of educated Malays. Representing the Chinese were the patriarchal Ong Tiang Swee, his son Ong Kuan Hin, Cantonese Association leader Lee Eng Thoong, Ng Siak Kiong, Khu Sze Hng, Wee Boon Chew, Ong Seng Chai, Chang Swee Thin and Lim Kong Gan. Representing the Iban were Phillip Jitam and ‘Dr’ Charles Mason. All were notified of their appointment in late November and were duly presented with the Medal of Honour by Kuching Shicho (Mayor of Kuching) at the installation ceremony on 8 December 1943. In practice, Datu Patinggi and Ong Tiang Swee were little more than figureheads and played no significant part in the organisation’s work. Under Ken-chiji Yamada’s enthusiastic direction, the Kuching sanji met regularly with him and other senior Japanese administrators over the next two years. Reflecting Yamada’s influence, proceedings were conducted and records mostly kept in English. Concerned that members should be fully aware of economic and public works developments, Yamada arranged inspections and briefings for them. After their initial meeting at the Maderasah Melayu on the morning of 15 February 1944, members were taken on a tour of

the boat-yard at Sungei Priok, the rubber-to-oil factory, the gunny sack factory at Kampong Bandarshah and the 7th mile airfield. From the few records that survive, it is clear that the sanji were expected to advise the administration on the implementation of policies such as self-sufficiency in food and industrial development. In August 1944, Phillip Jitam was appointed to a sub-committee concerned with improving the supply of basic commodities. In the same month, he was commissioned to make a detailed report on the economic position in the coastal area near Kuching, particularly in relation to padi production.9 The sanji were also expected to advise on the collection of funds and materials such as scrap metal for the Japanese war effort. They were given responsibility for organising cultural events to mark important occasions such as the anniversary of Dai Toa Senso (Pacific War), the Emperor’s Birthday, War Heroes’ Day, and visits by dignitaries.

Simanggang In padi-growing areas the assistance of the kensanji was enlisted to increase production, including the promotion of empakap (double-cropping) which had rarely been practised in Sarawak before. At its first meeting in Simanggang on 10 January 1944, the regional ken-sanji received long homilies from Ken-chiji Beppo and Police Chief Yanagihara explaining Japanese policy and the work of the ken-sanji-kai before their views were sought on double-cropping and other matters. From the remarkably free exchange that followed it is possible to gain some useful insights into the issues of the time: padi production and the practicability of empakap, food prices, the availability of consumer goods, trade with Dutch Borneo, education and the maintenance of adat lama. The wide representation of ethnic groups, together with people like Abang Zin and Eliab Bay who were working for the Japanese, makes the record of this meeting a unique document of life during the Japanese occupation.10

65

Boruneo Kita

Butir2 Meshuarat KEN-SANJI, Simanggang-Ken, yang di adakan di Simaggang pada 10 haribulan Ichi-gatsu, 2604, pada kali yang pertama [Minutes of the first Ken-Sanji meeting, Simanggang-Ken, held at Simanggang on 10 January 1944] Present:

Mr Beppo (Kenchiji) Mr Takei (Kencho) Mr Yanagihara (Pejabat Rumah Pasong) Mr Fujita (Treasurer) Mr Koshinuma (Post and Telegraph) Councillor Datu Abang Zin Councillor Mr Edward Jerah Councillor Mr Eliab Bay Councillor Father Martin Nanang Councillor Orang Kaya Jaul Councillor Orang Kaya Sambau Councillor Pengarah Lambai Councillor Pengarah Isek Councillor Penghulu Grinang Councillor Tuan Sait Councillor Abang Haji Drahman Councilor Abang Bokeng Councillor Tuan Haji Julaihi Rinkji Sanji Poh Bak Tang Rinkji Sanji Chin Han Kwang Mr Samuel Jonathan Tinker Abang Ali Abang Haji Draup Mr John Nichol [Kassim] Mr Eng Yaw Huat Mr Eng Yaw Joo Interpreters:

Mr [Shoichiro] Suzuki Mr [Nabuo] Iwanaga Secretaries:

Mr Wei Chong Jen Mr Patrick Empenit [Adam] After salutations of Sai Keirei [bowing] to the Rajah Astana [Emperor] were given by all present, the honourable Mr Takei and the honourable Mr Beppo declared the meeting open by saying ‘I now declare the first meeting of Ken-Sanji, Simanggang-Ken, open’. After this, Mr Beppo gave a speech, which is summarised as follows: ‘I want you all to know that as from the day we landed here, Borneo is under Japanese military rule and we have formed Kens. After that we have formed the administrative structure of Ken-Sanji and all the appointed members of Ken-Sanji are expected to assist in the administration of the government.

66

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

‘The Ken-Sanji was instituted on 8 Juni-gatsu 2603 and each of the appointed members has been given a bintang keraja’an [government medal] as a special honour in Kuching on the day the members of the Ken Sanji were appointed. ‘The rules and regulations of Ken-Sanji must be understood by you all because to know them is a serious responsibility. ‘Borneo has never had a proper government because when the whites were ruling here they excluded the people from matters pertaining to the government and hence there was no meeting of minds between the rulers and the ruled. The whites ruled and the people just did as they were told to do. The whites brought hardship to the people because they were here only for their self-interest. They took charge of everything and placed themselves in high positions and did not care for the people. Furthermore, they cheated the people through their lies. ‘During that time, the people did not live in ease and comfort and the white men never once tried to show them the way to improve their way of life. Everyone knew of their treachery because they were mean and wanted everything for themselves and did not care for the people. ‘They cared only for what they could obtain here. They appeared to be good but they harboured bad intentions. Therefore, we must now think very carefully. ‘Currently, Japan and the white nations are at war. In India every day people are dying because of shortage of food. What caused this shortage of food? The food produced by India is taken to the white men’s countries and this proves to the world the evil deeds of the white people. ‘They are famous for their lies and I will now relate an example. During the Great War twenty years ago many nations helped the white men to fight against their enemies and to their allies they promised: ‘We will help you to prosper when the war is over’. But when the war was over and peace came they forgot their promise. This was the lying and cheating they did towards those who had helped them. If they could do something like that, they are capable of lying in other matters too. ‘The Japanese always consult with the people they rule in all matters pertaining to the welfare of the people. The white people also ruled others but they did not want to see the people advanced. They knew how to develop and improve the way of life of the people, but because of their evil hearts they refused to teach the people how to go about it. This is because they were selfish and thought only of what they could get out of the countries that they ruled. ‘That was how the whites ruled the people before - only now they try to be more careful. ‘Now I would like to say something about the Japanese government so that I can compare our intentions with those of the British government in relation to ruling the people. ‘Japan is an ancient nation, so ancient that people say it is God’s own country and its Emperor Tenno Heika is also considered to be a God. The Tenno Heika dynasty has remained unbroken for 2604 years. Other ruling dynasties in other countries have had their lineages broken. What is the cause? In my opinion, it was because these people were evil and the proof of their evilness is that they were too worldly and the nobles were always fighting each other to exercise their strength and power so that the strongest could become king. This situation never existed in Japan and thus the Tenno Heika dynasty has remained unbroken. What caused this dynasty to be unbroken is the purity and goodness of the Emperor, and so God has anointed him to be the ruler of the world. ‘Japan is not like other countries. The Japanese government cares for the people. It always tries to bring prosperity to the people and to find ways and means to do it. The Japanese government is blessed by God and because of this everything it does is good.

Boruneo Kita

‘The governments of other nations are not so blessed and because of this people are thrown into turmoil. Because their governments are evil the people are never at peace. ‘Because Japan is God’s own country and its Emperor is considered as a God, Japan is far superior to other countries in the world. We Japanese always do what God tells us to do, i.e., what the Emperor bids us to do. The Emperor’s words are God’s words. If the people do what he tells them to do, they have a good life. Other countries are bad - if they do what they are told to they suffer. The Japanese government is directed by God and when the people do what they told to do they will have a good life. ‘The Japanese government always has good intentions towards the pople. If the poeple do not do things properly, we correct them; we do not punish them. ‘After I finish this speech we will all discuss improvements to be made in the administration of the people, i.e., the rules and regulations that have been used from before till now. You all know that God is good. Those who do not obey God are evil. In whatever we do, we must be sincere so that those under us will benefit. Therefore, we in the government must not think only of ourselves. If we do so, other people can never learn from us. Do not do evil, only good, because this is what God wants. ‘We have just been appointed as members of Ken-Sanji and if we do our work well and sincerely, our country will prosper. We have just entered a new year and we should begin it with new and good intentions and resolutions. ‘Now I want to relate why Japan entered into this war. ‘The whites and the Americans are involved in this great war for their own ends. They came to these countries in the South like the missionaries before them who pretended to teach good but whose intentions were evil, solely to get what they could. The British and Americans are supplying war armaments to Chiang Kai Shek, such as guns, aircraft etc. They are doing this to get something out of it later. Both Britain and America are happy to see China and Japan constantly at war so that when they are weakened by war they [Britain and America] could easily attack Japan and push Japan from its position as one of the powerful nations in the world. But Japan cannot easily be defeated because now it has captured so many countries. Japan will continue to advance and will not be defeated; Britain and America had better not try. If Japan could easily be defeated, it’s pointless to have its naval might which it used to attack Hawaii. Hawaii was strongly fortified by the British and the Americans but all their warships were destroyed by the Japanese navy. The Japanese navy also destroyed a big British warship in Malaya. Because of this, Churchill and Roosevelt met to plan new strategies. Japan is always victorious in battles at sea and even on land - as when it captured Singapore. ‘From Singapore, Japan captured Sumatra, Java, Batavia, Borneo, Celebes and Papua New Guinea. From there, Japan pushed on to the Solomon Islands where it established a base for its attacks by air on Australia. In naval skirmishes off the Solomon Islands, hundreds of enemy vessels were destroyed. Japanese always fight to the end and they never give up until they win. ‘Due to constraints of time, I must shorten my speech. ‘Japan is mighty and I am sure that you have seen this for yourselves. Nobody in the world can defeat us. ‘Japan is blessed by God. God is sincere and if we are not sincere like God, surely we would have lost the war. Japan is at war, but we are waging war not to reap the benefits from it for ourselves. The British and American way of managing the war is chaotic and meaningless and they bring problems to themselves because they have evil intentions. God is not evil and

67

68

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

those who asre evil, God brings defeat to them. The Japanese follow God’s will in this war. We can decide to win or lose, but because the Japanese are loyal to God and go according to God’s wishes, we will never lose - we will always win. ‘We do not know how long this war is going to last, but we have to go through it to the end. We in Borneo must assist fully in this effort because if the assistance is not given wholeheartedly, calamity will befall the people. Because the Ken-Sanji members could not yet understand the objectives of Ken-Sanji, Mr Beppo went on to explain: Ken-Sanji means the people are united to participate in the administration of their country. He also said that the members could ask questions on any matters that they wished to be discussed: ‘We have four items on the agenda, but you can bring up other matters as well during the meeting’. Mr Yanagihara (of the Police Department) stood up and gave a speech. This is a summary of it: ‘This war, like other wars, has brought hardship to everyone, but we have to be patient because we do not know how long it is going to last. If we find that we cannot get any necessities we might become discouraged and ready to admit defeat. But be patient. ‘In this world there are people who are hard-working and those who are lazy. The lazy always want to ask help from the government. Such people are no good and short-sighted in their thinking. They are not good for the advancement of the country because they are not sincere. ‘I hope that we can all think in the long term and not be like the lazy people. If we find in our district that there are lazy people, we should teach them not to behave in such a way. All officers at police stations like to help people who have such problems; they like to teach the lazy people about the wishes of the government so that they can be useful to the country. If the people understand this and co-operate they will have a better way of life and the country will benefit. ‘I sincerely hope that you all understand what I am talking about. Police stations are very important; if they do not exist, a country will not be strong. If a country does not have police stations, it will not be strong. If a country does not have police stations, it will be in trouble because bad deeds will spread quickly. We all have to educate the people to follow the right path in order to prevent them from any wrong-doing or ‘deviationist’ thoughts. ‘I exhort you all to “clean externally and internally”. For example, if you have a house you have to clean the outside and inside regularly. If you don’t clean, germs will breed everywhere and these will bring illnesses to the occupants of the house. When you return to your districts, clean your own house to show an example to your people so that they too will clean their houses to prevent the accumulation of germs that cause diseases. ‘Do not repeat any propaganda of the enemies of the people and cause them to be frightened. The British and the Americans are very good at making propaganda to frighten people and make people prefer them. When they were defeated in clashes at sea, on land or in the air, they lied and said they had won. We have to be aware of such propaganda. Do not believe them. I know that in Borneo people are constantly receiving ‘news’ or propaganda because the British and the Americans put out this propaganda every day. ‘If any of your hear any propaganda, let us know so that we can discuss it carefully and then if necessary we can inform the people about it.

Boruneo Kita

‘Remember! Japan has never lost a war; and you all know it is a fact that the British had to run back to their own country. Then they put out propaganda to the people. But in Borneo you can see who is the victor. ‘Now I want to touch on the price of goods, the people who buy them and the quality of the products. ‘The people must assist us in this matter. I know that there are people who are hoarding essential goods. If you know of people who are doing this, please inform us at the police station. First advise them and if they won’t listen to reason, inform us. ‘Now I want to tell you about how to greet officials. ‘Most people do not know how to do this. 1 will teach you all how to do it and when you go back to your districts your are to teach it to your people. ‘Saluting is not the way of greeting in the countries of the South. That is the Western way. This is what you do in the South: 1. For unidentified government staff, e.g., soldiers, police etc., use the right hand for saluting. Do not take off you hat. If you are in a building, bow at 15 degrees. 2. For Malays who wear songkok, bow at 15 degrees. Do not take off your songkok. 3. For people who wear hats, take off the hat and then bow at 15 degrees. That’s how you show respect. Saluting as done before [the war] is not allowed. Mr Beppo:

‘We have other things to discuss about your own districts. We will continue the meeting at 2.30 p.m. The meeting adjourned for lunch at 1 p.m. The meeting recommenced at 2.30 p.m. and after ‘keirei’ had been given to Mr Beppo, he said: ‘Now you can all raise any questions for discussion.’ Pengarah Isek:

‘I have nothing much to say because I sincerely believe in the government. I know that the Japanese and the local people are agreed in all matters and if we are lacking in certain skills the Japanese are ready to teach us at any time. In particular, in agriculture the Japanese are very skilful and our people are happy to receive their advice. We would like to thank them. ‘About asking for things from the government: we have not done that because we know of the present world situation. The country’s security is controlled by the government and the government has control over the development of the country. The government has also formulated and decided on matters for making life better for the people. What else could we ask for? We sincerely hope that the Japanese will be the victors at the end of this war, so that they can continue to look after us and bring peace and prosperity to the world. Mr Beppo:

‘As I said this morning, in the rules and regulations of Ken-Sanji, in keeping the country safe and bringing prosperity to the people, it is not only the government that has to think of ways and means of achieving this. The members of the Ken-Sanji have to be involved in the process so that together we can educate the people in the correct way of doing things. The government

69

70

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

alone cannot do this work because the people have to be involved. That is the reason why the Japanese government had the Ken Sanji system in Japan itself. And because we all have similar skin colour, we have the Ken-Sanji system here so that we can educate the people, advise them so that we can improve their lot and inform them of the way of life of other people around the world. ‘We Japanese always walk about in the towns and districts to observe the people, but we are not satisfied with this way of fact-finding because we are not able to talk to everybody. We cannot talk to everybody because there is more pressing work to be done. During \Ken-Sanji\ meetings you must all tell us what is happening in your districts because we do not know anything at all about them. Tell me all that you know so that we can put our heads together and solve whatever problems you have and the people can be happy under our rule. ‘About essential goods which were plentiful before but scarce now: the cause of their non-availability is the great war. It is not because they are not produced or available in Japan. The real reason is that all the shipping freighters have been requisitioned by the Navy. As this war is still going on, we cannot hope for these goods to be imported from other countries. ‘Therefore, we have to depend on ourselves, i.e., encourage the people to grow more food. We know that essential goods are difficult to obtain, so we have to find ways to live. Do not hope for aid from other countries. ‘We have to think of ways of doing it. This is to be done in Simanggang-Ken because goods cannot be imported from other countries. I hope that you all have some ideas and I sincerely welcome your opinions so that we can make life better for the people. ‘I know that there is a shortage of essential goods such as salt, nipah palm sugar, fish and vegetables. All these we can produce in Simanggang-Ken and if we do not produce them the 90,000 population of Simanggang-Ken will suffer greatly. ‘We do not have cotton here and it’s difficult to solve the problem. ‘In Simanggang-Ken, everyone has a rice farm and hence we are not short of rice. We can supply rice to Kuching because there people are wage-earners at the Sungei Priok shipyards, at the airport, or they work for the government or in the private sector. Also, they do not have much land for farming. In Simanggang-Ken we have all kinds of work, but first we have to think about what kind of work we should do so that it can bring benefit to many people. ‘The guncho meeting will be held tomorrow and at that meeting you can put forward details of matter pertaining to your districts. At this [Ken-Sanji] meeting we discuss only the main issues. I hope that members of the Ken-Sanji will attend the meeting tomorrow to listen to the discussions. Datu Abang Zin:

‘Last year the farmers in Simanggang-Ken planted padi empakap according to government order but it was all destroyed by disease. It seems that in Simanggang-Ken, i.e., at Engkala, Batang Ai and Batang Undup all farming of empakap padi failed. Because of this, the farmers asked me to ask permission for them to grow other crops [instead of rice] next year. In my opinion, bi-annual planting of padi is not viable because our soil and climate are different from other countries such as Japan and China. Furthermore, growing empakap padi is wasteful because the [padi plants] failed. If the farmers are allowed to grow other food crops such as tapioca, yam, sweet potato, com, etc., their labour will not be wasted.

Boruneo Kita

Mr Eliab Bay:

‘I agree with my friend Datu Abang Zin. The empakap system of padi farming is a failure because of plant disease. Last year, the empakap system was a little better at Sungei Batu but even there the harvest was not worth the effort put in by the farmers. The padi grains were mostly empty because of the strong wind and hot sun and lack of rainfall. ‘In my opinion, its is better for them to revert to a single annual planting and to be allowed to grow other food crops for the rest of the year. Abang Bokeng:

‘In Betong, the empakap system of padi-farming was a total failure. The farmers did not get even a gantang of padi because the grain was all eaten by rats. ‘In my opinion, it is better to abandon the empakap system and revert to a single annual planting. ‘I also agree that during the off-season, farmers should be allowed to grow other food crops. Father Martin Nanang:

‘If the empakap system of growing padi is not allowed and the farmers are told to grow tapioca, yam, sweet potato, com, vegetables etc. during the off-season of annual padi-planting, they may also have a surplus of these crops. Could the government buy the surplus and re-sell it to other regions such as Kuching, where there is a shortage of food? In my opinion, because the government has ordered the farmers to follow a certain way of farming, they [the government] should buy and re-sell what the farmers produce so that the farmers will not suffer any loss. I agree with my colleagues who have spoken about the empakap system of padi-farming because our soil and climate in Borneo are different from those of Japan and other countries. Pengarah Lambai:

‘In padi-farming, we Dayaks have many pantang [tabus] or things we can or cannot do, and because people nowadays disregard the pantang, their padi crops are always damaged by disease or rats. Before, for incest between a father and daughter or mother and son, the couple will be punished by aur tampang method of death - they are asked to perform the sex act again and while one is on top of the other a sharp stake of bamboo is pierced through their bodies until they die. But because of the changing times this punishment has been abolished by the leaders and replaced by a fine of eight pigs for the man and six pigs for the woman. The pigs are slaughtered to wash away the bad luck befalling our land because of the unnatural act. But even this alternative punishment has been abolished by the British. They allowed only half of the adat, together with a fine of $200 for the man and $100 for the woman ... ‘Furthermore, in petty cases where it is difficult to decide the outcome, in my opinion it is best to revive the custom of ‘trial by water’ because in such cases the official court verdict is never acceptable to the unsuccessful party and endless quarrels result. ‘All such customs mentioned already are connected with padi farming among us Dayaks, and because they are important I hope that the government will allow us to revive them. Father Martin Nanang:

‘Concerning the single annual planting of padi, if the government allows the farmers to grow other food crops during the off-season, in my opinion those farmers who used to make nipah

71

72

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

palm sugar and salt, to fish and make belacan [prawn and chilli paste], kajang, blowpipes, attap roofing and other activities that produce commodities necessary for the people, should be allowed to return to doing these things because man does not live by padi and vegetables alone. Datu Abang Zin:

‘We know that we are facing privations now and that both the rich and the poor are suffering as a result. The people should be told about the problems of the country so that they are fully aware of the seriousness of the situation. I appeal to the government to open up a centre in Simanggang-Ken where people who are really needy could go and find work to earn a living. The rich do not need to use this facility because they still have money to support themselves. Orang Kaya Sambau:

‘I am speaking for Lubok Antu district. There are now many Chinese there. They are starting to farm padi too, but they are not established yet. These people bring problems to us people in Lubok Antu who work hard because they will bring about a shortage of food. I don’t mean that they should be chased out of Lubok Antu, but my intention in bringing up this matter is so that the government can advise them - to make them do farming as we Dayaks are doing so that they can produce enough food for themselves. ‘If they live at Undup, they must follow the farming customs of Undup. But since they now live in Lubok Antu they should be made to follow our ways. ‘At the moment, they rely solely on barter trade with us Dayaks - they exchange their vegetables for our padi. Even then, their vegetable plots are not productive because of neglect. These Chinese at Lubok Antu are lazy - they live like leeches by doing pawnbroking business. Tuan Sait:

‘In the empakap system and the annual system of padi farming, the most important thing for both these is the day of putting their seeds in the ground. If this day is fixed for all, I am sure that the harvest will be plentiful. Last year in Lower Skrang we all had a good harvest because we all planted on the same day. It does not mean that we had no padi disease problem, but because the padi was everywhere the disease was not confined to one area only. If it is possible, I appeal to the government to have a fixed day for planting the seed in Simanggang. If this is done, the farmers will feel more confident about getting a good harvest. Mr Beppo:

‘What do you want in this matter? Do you want the government to fix the day of planting [for everybody], or do you think that all the farmers will agree to your request? Penghulu Gerinang:

‘All the farmers under my care in Lower Skrang follow what I tell them to do in all matters relating to a uniform planting day, but I don’t know about farmers in other places. I don’t have any problem with this in my area because the farmers there know the advantages for everybody of planting on the same day. This practice has been carried on there for generations ever since the Dayaks began to farm padi.

Boruneo Kita

Pengarah Isek:

‘In Betong, the Dayak and Malay farmers have experimented with the empakap systen of padifarming described by Tuan Sait and quite a few of them produced fairly good harvests. Those that failed were attacked by disease or by rats - and this was caused by planting at different times. Father Martin Nanang:

‘I would like to ask the government to open the mission school in Munggu Sabun. I am bringing up this matter because recently two Japanese officials came to visit and they asked me why the school was not re-opened. I immediately replied that the government is responsible for re-opening the school because they have taken away all the equipment that belongs to the mission. If we cannot receive financial assistance from the government, I regret that I cannot do anything about re-opening the school. As we Dayaks have skills in farming, boat-building and other activities for living, I strongly appeal to the government that if it intends to improve the way of life of the Dayaks, to give us financial aid to re-open the school so that my people can be educated. Other schools in Simanggang must also be re-opened and if the government agrees to this, I think children between 8 and 12 years old should be given free education. After that their parents should bear the cost. Mr Chin Han Kwang

‘Please excuse me for my bad Malay. I have only a few matters to put forward and I have written them down here. (The paper was passed to Mr Beppo and Mr Suzuki read the contents.) Mr Chin Han Kwang asked the following questions: 1.

Could the government lift the ban on the importation of essential goods from Indonesian Borneo? In my opinion, if the government could do this, surely we could solve the problem of the shortage of these goods. Also, if these goods are imported into our country, the cost of livng will be less and will thus lessen the burden of our people.

Mr Yanagihara (the officer in charge of the police station) answered: ‘As far as I know there is no ban on the importation of goods from Indonesian Borneo or from other countries. But imported goods are checked by the police so that prohibited items are not brought in and if we find any then they are to be confiscated’. Chin Han Kwang:

2.

Would it be possible for the government to increase the prices of vegetables, fish, pork, etc. to give some incentive to the producers to increase production. This request is made because the cost of living has gone up so much and the producers need to produce nore in order to keep up with the high cost of living.

Mr Beppo:

‘I would like to remind you all that not all issues and requests brought forward and discussed at this Ken-Sanji meeting can be decided and resolved immediately. I want you all to understand that at Ken Sanji meetings you bring up and I listen to all matters and problems that occur in the respective areas under your charge. We can only make decisions and find solutions after we have carefully discussed those issues and problems and everybody is in agreement with the solutions we have decided on. The decisions and solutions accepted must bring

73

74

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 -1945

benefit to the country. Therefore, I suggest we bring the issues and problems raised today at the guncho meeting tomorrow where they can be discussed in detail. Any resolutions and decisions made [at the meeting] will be accepted and adopted for the good of the people. ‘Now I would like to discuss the empakap system of padi farming: 1. Last year, farmers were told to plant padi twice a year, but the second planting was not a success. Why? 2. Where is the most fertile soil where the second planting can be done? 3. Why did the second planting not produce good harvests? 4. You have asked not to make a second planting of padi. What other food crops do you plan to grow instead of rice? 5. After harvesting those alternative food crops, who will buy them and how do you propose to market them? ‘Please give me the answers to these questions. ‘You can bring up the empakap issue again tomorrow during the guncho meeting. ‘Concerning the Dayak custom of sacrificing pigs to avoid bad luck befalling the land because of a case of incest, we have to study this very carefully before I can give you an answer. Pengarah Lambai:

‘We wish to revert to the adat lama [old custom]. Previously, the fine for incest was a sacrifice of 8 pigs for the man and 6 for the woman, together with $200 for the man and $100 for the woman. I do not wish to revive the ancient custom of death by spiking the couple involved in incest. It is better to pay the fine in cash now because there is a shortage of essential goods. Mr Beppo:

‘I have already said that such matters must be studied first. We will discuss them tomorrow. ‘I hope that by tomorrow we shall have the solutions and answers to all issues that have been brought up today. We must be rational and not make hasty decisions. We will adopt only what is good for the people and discard whatever is not suitable. ‘I hope that you have understood Mr Yanagihara’s explanation. He said that you must all inform the police (at the police station) immediately if you see any wrong-doing. Do not be afraid to report it to us even if the offender is your younger brother. ‘I am pleased that you have brought up many matters at this Ken-Sanji meeting. We will hold other Ken-Sanji meetings later. Before I close this meeting I would like to appeal to you all not to act or make decisions on your own without consulting others. ‘Please bring up issues and matters concerning your district at the guncho meeting tomorrow. Please understand fully what we have discussed and what you have heard at this meeting today, because you will have to explain it all to your own people when you return to your district.

75

Boruneo Kita

Kaum Ibu

£

Barbara Bay Beyond the records of this meeting on 10 January 1943, very little is known of the workings of the ken-sanji system in other parts of Sarawak. Although individuals appear to have been appointed sanji elsewhere, including Sibu, Miri and Kapit, there are no records of their meetings. It seems likely that at Kapit, at least, sanji such as Penghulu Jugah anak Barieng acted informally and that there were no properly constituted meetings. Nor was there any clear understanding of their status beyond the notion that it invested them with some kind of authority. According to Sng Chin Joo, a businessman in Kapit and a friend of Jugah, None of us knew what sanji meant, we didn’t know how to interpret it in Iban. It’s Japanese for some sort of rank, for a person of power. I don’t know what Jugah did as a sanji but just as people were afraid of the Japanese, it carried over to him as well. [In those days] if we did something wrong and someone like Jugah found out about it, he couldn’t punish us, but the Japanese could make things painful. So everyone was afraid of him. If people talked to him, they watched what they said." Other Iban to receive bintang keraja’an from the Japanese were Jugah’s brother, Tedong, and Penghulu Gani of Bawan Assan near Sibu. However, as we shall see later, these were not related to sanji status.

It was probably Yamada who also instigated the Japanese sponsored kaum ibu (w om en’s association), in Kuching with Malay, Iban and Chinese representatives. Appointed as Iban representative was Barbara Bay, the first Sarawak woman to obtain a nursing qualification and a powerful role model for the women of her community. Chinese women were represented by Mary Ong, the grand-daughter of Ong Tiang Swee and the first Chinese nursing sister, and the Malays by Chegu Lily Eberwein, the besteducated Malay woman in Sarawak and first headmistress of the Permaisuri Melayu school. Indian women were represented by Mrs Gopal, the wife of an Indian doctor. They had very little idea of what the Japanese expected of them and before the meetings were abandoned there was a lot more giggling than serious discussion. The members were no doubt unsure at first of what the Japanese expected them to do. However, they were required to assist in organising the singing and dancing for concerts on ceremonial occasions and to set an example to their communities by planting and tending plots of tapioca. They also had the embarrassing task of collecting jewellery and metal for the war fund.12

Leadership Training A more ambitious training programme for future leaders was established in Kuching some time in late 1943. Although there were no plans to encourage an independence movement in Sarawak, the Japanese were clearly interested in encouraging a new style of Japanese-educated leadership which would replace the traditional ethnic elites as a loyal and disciplined class of governors. Suitable candidates of two age levels from all the major ethnic groups of the three Borneo territories were quietly selected and put through a three month training course at St. Joseph’s School, which served as their barracks. Physical fitness and endurance were strongly emphasised, together with a competence in Japanese language and a general knowledge of Japanese culture. There was a physical training instructor, a Japanese language teacher and an interpreter. One of those selected for the younger group of about fifteen boys was Hamdan bin Sirat, a

76

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

discussions on a wide range of subjects. Altogether, it was rather like belonging to a Communist cell. Hamdan found the ‘brainwashing’ oppressive but could not help admiring his teachers: I mean they are very disciplined ... [They] really discipline us and then, you know, any mistake and they really tell you, correct your mistake there and then ... and you must be frank to them if you have problems you tell them, you know this sort of thing. And of course classes [are] very punctual, you know ... normally our teachers ... are always there before you know, before, always in the class ... before we come, we arrive. And to show, you know they really, they never ... once ... really come later than all of us. They will always be there.13

Mohd. Sobertg bin Tamin in Japanese uniform, 1942. (Photograph by courtesy o f the family o f the late Mohd. Sobeng bin Tamin.)

relative of Abang Openg, who completed his Senior Cambridge at St. Joseph’s in 1940 and worked as a clerk under Abang Hj. Mustapha in the District Court. He was chosen because of his proficiency in Japanese language after an intensive course at the Maderasah Melayu. The two groups sat together at lectures and took part in secret

The commando-style military training was very taxing and one of Hamdan’s colleagues, Mohd. Salahuddin from Mukah, found it almost more than he could manage. The intention was that once they had completed their course, the most promising graduates would be sent to Japan for further cultural and ideological immersion before being deployed in different areas of the Boruneo Kita administration. However, the increasing threat posed by Allied aircraft meant that the plan was

Mohd. Sobeng bin Tamin and members o f the meteorological section, Kuching, 1942. (Photograph by courtesy o f the family o f the late Mohd. Sobeng bin Tamin.)

77

Boruneo Kita

frustrated. One of those selected to go from the senior group was Awan Rekan, an Englisheducated Singgi Bidayuh who had been working as guncho in the Bidayuh area of the First Division: They wanted to take me to Tokyo for training as officers, myself and ... [Charles Mason], Tuanku Bujang, Datu Bandar, Edward Jerah, and a Chinese. We had everything with us. We had our hair cropped, like Japanese. Three star uniform and cap. They kept us in St. Joseph’s quarters. Nobody knew. It was very secret. So in the morning ... we woke up and went to the 7th mile airfield. We were already getting in the plane when the [Japanese officer] was shouting after that. ‘Cannot, cannot! Must come back. You cannot go because American planes, there are a lot there waiting. Better not go’. So we gave back all the things.14 The only people from these groups who eventually managed to get to Japan were Pengiran Yusoff from Brunei and another Malay from North Borneo who were in Hiroshima when it was bombed. One of the younger group of Sarawakians who had been selected for training was Mohd. Sobeng bin Tamin. A native of Mukah, he had learned Chinese at primary school before attending St. Joseph’s School in Kuching. There he was supported by the Sarawak Museum Curator, Edward Banks, who employed him part-time. When the Japanese arrived he served as a clerk in the Education Department for six months, but the knowledge of meteorology that he had gained from Banks led to him being posted to the Borneo Defence Force’s meteorology section at the 3rd mile for two years. The plan was that after further training in Japan he would eventually become a meteorology instructor but he balked at this and managed to convince the Japanese that he should not be sent away.15

Research We shall see in Chapter 10 that Setsuo Yamada took initiatives in the areas of wooden boat-building and minerals exploration. Another of his responsibilities was research. In December 1942 a team of about twenty researchers arrived in Kuching to form a ‘think tank’ attached to Borneo Defence Force Headquarters in Kuching. With expertise in economics, agriculture, forestry, tropical

medicine, anthropology, geology, mineralogy and a range of other areas, their work was intended to inform policy-making for the whole of Boruneo Kita. One of its members was 30 years old Yoshihiko Seki. A graduate in economics from Tokyo University in 1936, he joined Showa Kenkyukai (Institute to Promote Pacific Relations) three years later. This had been established in 1937 by the liberal Diet member, Yusuke Tsurumi, after the ‘China Incident’. He was an opponent of Japan’s involvement in China, believing that it woud end in disaster. He also saw himself increasingly as a diplomatic bridge between Japan and the United States. The Institute’s mission was to solve Japan’s economic and population problems through peaceful means. Migration was one of its interests, Tsurumi at one point proposing to the Foreign Ministry that Holland be asked to sell part of Dutch New Guinea to Japan if the United States had no objections. Seki’s job in the research section was to translate French and German publications on Southeast Asia into Japanese. When the Institute was co-opted at the beginning of the Pacific War to form part of Imperial Headquarters’ research department, Seki volunteered to work in Nanpo and was assigned to Boruneo Kita. Holding the honorary rank of lieutenant, he and his uniformed colleagues were some of the many gunzoku (co-opted civilians) sent to Borneo and other parts of occupied Southeast Asia. Seki’s team was led by Akio Kasama, who had been head of the Institute’s General Affairs Department in Tokyo. In Sarawak, Seki’s main responsibility was to increase rice production and in that connection he travelled to Simanggang and spent some time in Iban longhouses on the Batang Lupar. Apart from encouraging the Iban to cultivate wet rice rather than hill rice, he was also interested in finding out whether their land tenure system could be made more flexible in order to facilitate more production. He learnt enough Malay to be able to converse with them and to learn that it was a long time since the orang kulit puteh had paid a visit. While it was easy enough to teach the Iban how to cultivate wet rice, it was another matter to provide an effective incentive for them to do so. There were no traditional mechanisms for the disposal of a surplus and as the occupation progressed, there were no supplies of cloth and

78

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

prepare for the Allied counter-attack. Fortunately for Seki, Kasama insisted on taking his berth on a ship which was sunk returning to Japan in early 1945.16 Notes 1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

6. 7. Lieut. Yoshihiko Seki, Kuching, 1943. Enclosing this photograph in a letter to his wife, Mariko, Seki wrote that one o f his unexpected responsibilities was dog-catching. (Photograph by courtesy o f Professor Y. Seki.)

other commodities to offer in exchange. As we have already seen, double-cropping was a failure in the Simanggang area. Seki wrote reports for the authorities in Singapore and Tokyo but there was little opportunity to pursue his research after April 1944 when he was transferred with the entire research team to Jesselton. There they were assigned to the logistical section of the Borneo Defence Force Headquarters as it began to

8.

9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Special Operations Executive. Far East: Australia, HS 1/248. The principal sources of information on Marquis Maeda used here are the two volumes published in Kanazawa by the Maeda Biographical Committee in 1986 and 1991. The first of these covers his life in general; the second focuses in more detail on his military career. An earlier source is the memorial volume published in Tokyo in September 1943 on the first anniversary of his death. I have to thank Mdm Yayako Maeda for her kindness in giving me access to these books. This formed the basis of an exhibition in Kanazawa in early 1998. Interview with Professor Yoshihiko Seki, Tokyo, 7 October 1995. For an account of Yamazaki’s career in North Borneo, see Sayaka Iwata, Haran no minami-juuji-sei: Yamazaki Kenji no isshoo [Adventures under the Southern Cross: a life of Kenji Yamazaki], Tokyo: San-ichi Shobo, 1994. Yamada, Boruneo Senki: Kazashita No Kuni. Yoshinobu Manaki, ‘Reminiscences of Administrator Yamada’, in Setsuo Yamada, ed., A Book ofReminiscences fo r Setsuo Yamada, Tokyo, 1976, pp. 345-8. Extract of Tokyo broadcast, 1 October 1943, Sarawak Government Agency, Sydney, Circular no. 5/43, 12 October 1943. Jitam Papers. SMA, JAP/1. Interview with Sng Chin Joo by Professor Vinson Sutlive, Kapit, 1 September 1987, translated by Dr Otto Steinmayer. See also, Sutlive, Tun Jugah, p. 104. Interview with Chegu Lily Eberwein, Kuching, April 1974. Interview with Tan Sri Hj. Hamdan bin Sirat, Kuching, 10 January 1997. Interview with Awan Rekan, Kuching, 23 February 1993. Interview with Mohd. Sobeng bin Tamin, Kuching, 3 July 1995. Interview with Professor Yoshihiko Seki.

7 Kempei-tai, Jikeidan and Kyodo-hei he establishment of Borneo Defence Force headquarters in Kuching in June 1942 significantly altered the tone of the military administration. What had been a relatively easy­ going regime gave way to to a much more formal government in which strict protocol was observed. The instruments of social control became painfully apparent through the operations of the kempei-tai and jikeidan. At the same time, the establishment of the kyodo-hei signalled the m ilitary administration’s interest in conscripting the local youth for auxiliary military service.

T

Kempei-tai Kuching was the northern Borneo headquarters of the kempei-tai (military police) whose presence reflected the military administration’s ultimate reliance on physical force and intimidation to control the population. The Japanese equivalent of the Nazi Gestapo, it struck dread into the hearts of people wherever they went. With its own tight command structure and communications system and an office in every major population centre, the kempei-tai constituted an occupation government in miniature. Operating with virtual autonomy from the rest o f the military administration, which held it in healthy respect, it was accountable only to the local Commanderin-Chief and the War Ministry. In addition to its role of controlling the population and monitoring anti-Japanese elements, the kempei-tai was called in to deal with any signs of rebellion. It also dealt with prisoners of war and other matters to do with collecting intelligence. Although there is no documentary evidence for its code of practice in northern Borneo, a manual entitled Notes for the Interrogation o f Prisoners of War issued in Burma in August 1943 indicates that torture was an accepted, if not altogether recommended, method of extracting information:

Care must be exercised when making use of rebukes, invectives or torture as it will result in his telling falsehoods and making a fool of you. (a) Torture. This includes kicking, beating and anything connected with physical suffering. This method is only to be used when everything else has failed as it is the most clumsy. Change the interrogating officer after using violent torture, and good results can be obtained if the new officer questions in a sympathetic manner. (b) Threats. 1. Hints of future physical discomforts, for example, torture, murder, starvation, solitary confinement, deprivation of sleep. 2. Hints of future mental discomforts, for example not being able to send letters, not to be given the same treatment as the other prisoners of war, to be kept back until the last in the event of an exchange of prisoners.1

During the first five months of the occupation, there was minimal interference with most of the population of Kuching in their daily lives. However, the establishment of the Borneo Defence Force headquarters in Kuching inevitably resulted in a strong kempei-tai presence. Based in a large Chinese house in Jalan Jawa which rapidly became notorious as a place of ill-treatment and torture, the kempeitai established a system of close surveillance using a network of local informers. These were carefully recruited from all races and included women and girls. Initially, as we shall see in the following chapter, the kempei-tai concentrated on rounding up and investigating Chinese in Kuching and Sibu whose support for the China Relief Fund and other public actions before the war suggested that they were anti-Japanese. The modus operandi of the kempei-tai was extremely successful in instilling fear into the hearts of the population. As the Sarawak Tribune put it later, ‘The very sight of a KP man was enough to make the more nervous of us tremble in our shoes’.2 Inevitably, kempei-tai informers and other

80

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Kempei-tai headquarters, Jalan Jawa, Kuching. (Photograph by Ho Ah Chon.)

people used the organisation as a means of revenging themselves on those who for various reasons had earned their enmity. The Tribune recalled in January 1946: ‘These were the times when anyone could be arrested and tortured if information was given against him by someone else prompted by jealousy, grudge or revenge’.3 It was during the last eighteen months of the occupation that the kempei-tai were most active. As the Americans continued to win the war in the Pacific and the Japanese command prepared for the inevitable Allied counter-attack on Borneo, the kempei-tai became almost paranoid in its pursuit of suspected spies and other ‘anti-Japanese’ elements. It also intensified the search for conspiracies amongst the prisoners of war at Batu Lintang, with results that will be described in Chapter 12. A late expression of this fixation was the preparation in June 1945 of execution lists of English-speaking and therefore educated people of all races who might be of assistance to the Allies in the event of the anticipated invasion. Finally, it was the kempei-tai that maintained an iron control over the population until the very moment of the Australian landing at Kuching on 11 September 1945.

Jikeidan Supplementing the kempei-tai was the jikeidan, or local vigilante organisation, established in Kuching on 1 June 1943. Based on Japan’s traditional system of group responsibility for individual action, the jikeidan divided all urban and semi-rural areas into sections of thirty households. The head of each of these was responsible for the organisation of regular night patrols and air raid drill in the event of attack. The section leader was also required to report on all movements of people, petty crimes and anti-Japanese actions or talk. In the interior, each longhouse constituted a jikeidan section. Every able-bodied man between the ages of 16 and 50 was required to participate in the organisation. Above the local sections, there was a complicated hierarchy of branches and committees at subprefectural, prefectural and provincial levels. Members of the local elites were appointed to some of these positions, notably Abang Hj. Mustapha in Kuching. On 8 June 1943 he became Fuku Rengo Dan Cho (Deputy Divisional Chief) of Kuching Rengo Jikeidan and on 8 December Kuching Shi Jikeidan Cho (Divisional Chief). However, the

Kempei-lai, Jikei-dan and Kyodo-hei

exodus of people from Kuching meant that it was difficult to make the system work and Abang Hj. Mustapha had to rely on the assistance of Ong Kee Hui and other members of the Japanesesponsored Chinese Young Men’s association to obtain volunteers. In effect, the jikeidan facilitated surveillance in populated areas and acted as an informal and unpaid intelligence network. It enabled the kempeitai to identify malcontents and anyone else who might be disposed to support the Allied cause. Anyone who did not turn out for night patrol duty was effectively signalling his lack of support for the Japanese regime. An effective means of securing community control, the jikeidan system also encouraged malicious and vindictive informing. Nevertheless, it came into its own during the first half of 1945 when the authority of the administration was sorely strained by air raids, currency collapse and other signs of Japan’s increasing weakness. Another use for the jikeidan structure was to facilitate the mobilisation of forced labour for work on airfields, roads and other public works and the collection of ‘subscriptions’ and items such as metal to assist the Japanese war effort. Writing in October 1945 to his former boss, J.L. Noakes, senior government clerk Chin Shin Sen described the way in which the initial aims of the jikeidan had been left behind: As was usually the case, the Japanese never kept their word, for before one month had passed the number of these aims and objects was arbitrarily increased three-fold, including the guarding of telephone lines, the clearing and cleaning of roads and drains, and other Municipal Departmemt responsibilities. Later, subscriptions were forceably [sic] collected, and worst of all labourers were conscripted from every household for forced labour at the Sungei Priok Shipyard, the 7th Mile Aerodrome and the Batu Kawa Road Air-strip.4

Kyodo-hei In early October 1943, Borneo Defence Force headquarters in Kuching received an order from Tokyo to recruit and train a North Borneo Volunteer Corps or militia drawn from all groups except the Chinese. This had already been suggested to General Yamawaki by Lieut. General Masazumi Inoda on a visit to Kuching on 22 August 1943 and had been initiated on a modest scale.5 However, the official directive meant that it was

81 now a high priority. Refrred to officially as giyugun (volunteer army) but known in Sarawak as kyodo-hei (local militia), the Corps’ establishment reflected a policy decision by Imperial General Headquarters that regular troops be freed from the responsibility of guarding strategic installations and supervising forced labour in the construction of airfields and roads. It also reflected the intention of withdrawing regular troops to other theatres and using the kyodo-hei as a security force while pre-war Japanese immigrants and newly-arrived commercial people got on with the task of securing economic resources. The policy adopted in Sarawak was to recruit the sons of the Kuching datu as NCOs: each senior perabangan (traditional elite) family was required to provide one ‘volunteer’. These included Abang Tawfek (grandson of Datu Patinggi Abang Hj. Abdillah), Abang Taha (son of Datu Hakim Abang Hj. Mohidin), Abang Hadi bin Abang Sulai, Hj. Bohari, and Wan Abdul Rahman and Wan Abubakar (the sons of Tuanku Bujang of Sibu). Some were even issued with a sword. Most of the rank and file of the kyodo-hei was made up of Iban, principally from the Second Division, although some members were recruited from the Third Division and others from North Borneo. In Sarawak, recruitment was one of the responsibilities of Iban and Bidayuh guncho (district officers) appointed by the Japanese. Apart from the strong attraction of jadi askar (becoming a soldier) for people from a warrior culture, it also meant clothing, regular meals, cigarettes and the possibility of sending back money or food to their own people. With no avenues now to bejalai, to make the traditional expeditions in search of cash income and adventure, joining the kyodo-hei represented the one opportunity to get out into the world beyond the longhouse. Indeed, some were sent to Singapore for further training and may even have gone to Japan. Dawi bin Abdul Rahman, an 1ban-speaking medical dresser from Kuching who was employed at the hospital in Sibu during the war, accompanied the recruiting teams up the Katibas, the Balleh and other more remote areas of the upper Rejang to assist with medical examinations of the longhouse people: I examined them because they [the Japanese] trusted me so much especially with the language. It was easy for me to conduct the job, to conduct the examination, the eyes examination. I was even

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 -1945

82

Kyodo-hei recruits exercising, Kuching, c. 1944.

allowed to use the stethoscope. Yes, anything that I found unusual, in the heart or somewhere, then I would report to the doctor: ‘Doctor 1 found out some curious sound here’, something like that, then sometimes [if] they confirmed that this sound is a little strange or whatnot, we send the man for x-ray examinations, for further examinations.6 Some of the longhouse men were so keen to volunteer that they played down their physical ailments:

Japanese army uniforms. In addition to their food, they were given cigarettes and a small amount of money each week which some passed on to their families. Digat anak Chingkin, from Rumah Engkamat, Langkang, near Simanggang, volunteered in late 1943 and together with some friends joined a large group of recruits there. In his account he explained some of his motives for joining the kyodo-hei:

All the time, they were very enthusiastic for the kyodo-hei. At times there are occasions when they are limping, they say something in Iban which means ‘no, no, no I want to do it, never mind [the] limping, I can do’. If people can live they think that they can also live with the limp ... they didn’t want to be rejected, but what to do, they’re limping after you, 1 mean, a soldier?

When I was employed by the Japanese, I was very young then and I had to do what I was told by the elders. Insul, Liap, Imang and Gilbert from Simanggang applied to become soldiers. Everyone could become soldiers, young and old. Those who were married and had children also could become soldiers. The oldest were above fifty, the youngest were sixteen years old. If we were healthy, they would only check our eyes. If we could walk, then we could follow other people.

Most of the training was done in batches of thirty or forty men at a time at the old Kuching police depot across river. The new recruits’ heads were shaved Japanese-style and they wore

1 left Pak Bajang the longhouse of my grandfather. Only two from my longhouse joined me. We learnt that those who became soldiers enjoyed a good life, having trousers, shirts. We Ibans suffered a

Kempei-tai, Jikei-dan and Kyodo-hei

lot staying in the interior then. We had no shirts and no trousers. The old folks unashamedly wore loincloths made from tekalong [tree bark]. Those who had old p u a ’ kum bu [traditional finely-woven cloth] made them into shorts. We wore those shorts when we went to Simanggang that night. It was about six months after the Japanese came when we joined up as soldiers. These days, our group could be called second rangers because there were people who had joined earlier than us. The Japanese called us kyodo-hei. It was about the end of 1942 when we were recruited as soldiers. The elders wanted to bring us back home but this was not allowed by the Japanese as we had to do our duty to defend our motherland. Under Japanese rule, life would be better, there would be more goods and an abundance of clothing and money, according to them. We had money but we had nothing to buy. If we had padi, it was all taken by the Japanese. When we thought of the suffering we had, we agreed to become Japanese soldier. Some refused to join. There were seven of us who were willing to go with me, including some from Betong, Skrang, Balau, Geran, Banting and Lingga. Two boats had been waiting to bring us to Kuching. It took some time for the crew to start the engine because it had to be tunu [heated] using a ngena angin [compressor] and this had to be repeated four or five time before it ran. It used coal fuel then. We left Simanggang about midnight aboard the M.V. Konghai. There were more than one hundred of us on board. It took five nights for us to reach Kuching. We did not travel during night time. We stayed overnight at Lingga, Sebuyau and Sadong. In the boat at meal time we shared the rice. The Japanese told us that once we reached Kuching, conditions would be better. Wherever we stopped, the Japanese took bread, bananas, and pineapples from the Chinese shops. They did not pay, they just took the goods. The Chinese had to give them because they were scared of the Japanese. Everyone was scared of the Japs, the Chinese and the Malays. We Iban were a bit daring. It was about 6.00 p.m. when we arrived at Kuching at Pangkalan Jawa, what people call the Dock Yard now. At Kuching we stayed at the old mosque. After three nights we moved to the depot, the present bridge. There we were taught how to shoot and how to march and were given guns, shoes, shirts, trousers and hats. The guns were about six feet long. They were heavy. We were trained until we were able to perform ourj ob [nadai dikirapengelam a, lit. no time limit]. Those who learnt faster were promoted. Upon entry we were given one star, then

83 two stars and three stars and until we reached the rank of those who could carry swords, like those who receive the crown now. During training we were given a salary of 40 Japanese dollars in kind, like bananas, pineapple and other food. We drank coffee once a week and we shared the rice, eating from round bowls. During training the language used was Japanese. No other language was allowed. Anyone who used English by mistake and said ‘yes’ was slapped and punished. If they scolded us, we said ‘hai’, which means ‘au’ [yes] and we stood still and paid attention. That’s what they liked. Then they would think of us as very brave. About six in the morning we were ready for training, standing in line wearing loin-cloths Japanese style [caw at sty le J e p u n ] and without guns. After marching, they asked us to drink. Then we went to class. We learnt Japanese, alphabet, arithmetic, parts of the body and questions and answers. We ate twice a day. We shared the rice for there was not much rice to eat. Tapioca was plentiful. We learnt from 8 in the morning to 12 noon. Then from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. We were not allowed to go anywhere. Only at night did we rest because it was dark. During training we were allowed to go out once a week, on Saturday for half a day only. We were allowed to go out in two batches: the first batch from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m.; another group from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. No one was allowed to go out at night. When it was sleeping time, everybody had to go to sleep. At night, the Japanese checked the beds in case some people sneaked out. If we wanted to go out we had to inform them; if not and we were caught we would be arrested, slapped and ordered to stand for two to three hours. For sleeping we were given pillows and blankets that had been used by other people, full of lice. There was no soap for washing, and many of us suffered from itchiness. After completing our training at the depot I left for Krokong and became the head of the group there. Less than two months after my arrival we heard that the Americans were winning and that the Japanese had surrendered. The Japanese collected all the guns from us as we were not allowed to have guns any more. We were left with just our uniform. So we returned to Kuching by ourselves on foot. The kyodo-hei was organised into five infantry companies, a construction company and a sea transport company. Each company included about sixteen Japanese personnel - three officers, three NCOs and ten privates. There were also some native warrant officers and NCOs. Total strength

84

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

varied from 90 to 120. Most of the training groups were formed in Kuching but there were others in Miri, Jesselton and Sandakan.7 Apart from basic military drill and physical exercise, the recruits were taught enough Japanese for them to understand simple military commands. Any form of insubordination or lack of attention earned a brisk slap from the Japanese training officer in charge. Bohari bin Hj. Su’ut had his face slapped twentyfour times so that the skin became tough and it didn’t hurt any more. More serious offenders were put inside in a cramped wooden cage in the sun for a whole day. The recruits drilled with wooden sticks and were only issued with captured British Lee-Enfield rifles when they completed their training. They were then posted as guards at strategic points such as bridges and crossroads, rice godowns, airfields and arms dumps. Towards the end of the war, many were sent to Krokong to help prepare arms dumps for the Japanese retreat. Others like Bohari were employed filling in the craters made during the Allied bombing of the 7th mile airfield after March 1945: They called us when the airport was bombed by the Allies, big holes, they called us to fill and make it level again; the whole night until morning working; killing. If there was enough food it would have been alright.8

drilling and the possibility of shouldering a rifle. To be a soldier had always been one of the favoured careers of young Iban men ever since the Brookes began to employ them as orang kubu (fort men) in the 1850’s. The war also meant that opportunities for traditional bejalai were no longer possible.10 To join the kyodo-hei was the only escape from the monotonous and taxing daily routine of farm work, fo r the longhouse elders, sending off young men offered the possibility of obtaining access to desperately scarce commodities such as cloth. 1

** .*

i

At times they had been used to unload ships: Actually we are soldiers but sometimes we are like labourers. If a steamer brought 2,000 bags of rice, we had to carry them to the wharf. They called for us on the phone. Rice is O.K. but salt, you know, some of our boys had rashes.9

In July 1944, 2nd Infantry Company, which had been recruited in the Sibu area and trained in Kuching, was sent to Sibu. With a total strength of 120 men, it was commanded by Lieut. Mitsura Kato and under him was Lieut. Sato. There were also six native NCOs including Warrant Officer Umpi anak Rantai. Lrom Sibu, twenty men were sent on to Keningau in North Borneo and some others to Sandakan. Although most of the Malays were unenthusiastic soldiers, many young Iban men volunteered to join the kyodo-hei and embraced its military regime with some enthusiasm. They were impressed with the martial spirit of the Japanese which echoed elements of their own culture. They were attracted by the uniforms, the

Listen Baling anak Luang

Listen Baling anak Luang was recruited into the kyodo-hei from the Sibu area in October 1943 and was sent down to Kuching for training. Posted to the 2nd Infantry Company, he was despatched to Sibu in July 1944. His sometimes blood-chilling experiences may not have been altogether typical but they illustrate how the kyodo-hei functioned and how its recruits fared during the last days of the war: I worked with the Agricultural Department for two years and after that, because I was drafted, I became a Japanese soldier. I was a member of the kyodohei. In the two years I was commanded by the Japanese, I experienced a lot of things. The people who commanded me during that time were Penghulu Kulleh, Penghulu Bennet Empam, and Umpi anak Rantai. My duties were like this: I was in charge of 24 persons and I taught them how to drill, how to shoot, and I taught them Japanese language. I knew Japanese at that time. I also taught them how

Kempei-tai, Jikei-dan and Kyodo-hei

to run. After we had learnt the Japanese soldiers’ adat, we were ordered to stand guard at each crossroads in Kuching. We stood guard together and lived with the Japanese soldiers. After that, our group was divided into two; one group went to Sandakan and one to Sibu and I was with the people who went to Sibu ... The group who were going to Sabah set out first and we set out later. The time we spent waiting in Kuching turned out to have a whole lot of new experiences. When we slept at night we always had nightmares. After a while the Japanese ordered me on guard duty and I headed the committee of the night guard. Suddenly one night I heard a cry from those who were sleeping. I ran there and saw a really big cat come out of the mosquito-net of the people who were asleep and having nightmares. I wanted to shoot that cat but I was afraid of hitting people. During the time we were in Kuching, there was one Chinese man who was stealing our things at the canteen and he was caught. One day a Japanese officer came and said to me, ‘Barinsan’ - because then ‘Barinsan’ was my name with the Japanese, I wasn’t called ‘Baling’ - ‘Barinsan,’ he said. ‘Yes, Tuan,’ I said. ‘Tomorrow you will all accompany kem pei-tai Officer Yashima to kill the Chinese, one of you from Simanggang side, one from here,’ he said. Then I asked, ‘Who is the person from Simanggang, Tuan?’ He answered, ‘Peter Pinch’. I said I didn’t want to. ‘It is not possible,’ he said, ‘the Big Tuan will punish you - if you don’t want to do it, you will get hit six times,’ he said. ‘Apu!’ I said to myself, ‘I’m dead!’ Then I asked the late Balleh and the late Wong. ‘I’ll do it,’ said Wong. The two of them jumped at the chance. I asked a person we called Yuriguchi to ask the officer. The officer answered: ‘Not possible’. He wanted to slap the two of them. That night I didn’t want to sleep. ‘How can I kill a living human being?’, I said inside my heart. Day came and we were ordered by the officer to get ready. We had to get ready our rifle and bayonet and grind the bayonet very sharp. Then I asked, ‘Where is the man who is to be killed, Tuan?’ ‘Oh, he’s already in the room,’ he said. The two of us, Peter Pinch and I together, turned pale in the face and our hands shook. After that came the big Tuan of the kem pei-tai ; we stood to attention and saluted him. Then he asked the officer, ‘What are the names of these two men?’ He asked me first, using Japanese: ‘N am ae w a ?’ Then I answered, ‘B ar in de a rim a su \ After that he asked Peter Pinch and he answered as I had just done. Then he said: ‘all ready?’ ‘All ready, Tuan,’ I said and then the door was opened. I saw the man who was to be killed already standing in front

85 of a post. His arms were stretched out and his face was wrapped in muslin cloth; he had no shirt on and he was wearing only a pair of drawers. On his chest there was marked a circle and the two of us, Peter and I, were told we had to stab him with the bayonet right there in his chest where the circle was. After that we were ordered by the kem pei-tai officer to stand to attention. ‘Genki-o d a s e !\ he said. That was intended to give us heart. Then the two of us stood facing the man who was to be executed. ‘Mae, ato, mae, ato.r the officer called. That meant ‘push in, pull out, push in, pull out’. ‘TsukeV he said, which meant ‘stab’. Then 1 stabbed the man. When I stabbed him the first time his head didn’t drop; the second time I stabbed him his head did drop. After that, Peter stabbed him as well. Each of us stabbed him twice. That was our work while we were in Kuching waiting to go to Sibu. After that I was no longer afraid; I had already killed a man together with someone else. The second time I killed a Javanese. That Javanese was strong: if there had been a four gallon bucket full of water, you could have hung it on his finger. Wong and I were ordered to kill him. This Javanese was kebal. Officer Sato was with us at that time. Sato ordered the two of us, Peter and I, to open this Javanese man’s trousers and see why he couldn’t be stabbed. In his trousers was a charm, wrapped up in black cloth. After the charm had been removed he was no longer kebal and it felt like poking a cucumber, his flesh. I wanted to take the charm but the Japanese ordered me not to. After some time in Kuching we started off for Sibu. After arriving there, I was ordered by the Japanese, together with Enjum anak Kunsil Jarau and Gelau anak Penghulu Masam of Song, to take people to Bintulu. We set out for Bintulu with two Japanese soldiers but we happened to swamp our boat... We had already been two days at Bintulu when a white people’s plane came and bombed the airfield. In the morning the airfield was bombed and then in the evening the holes were filled in by the coolie work­ force. Then one morning Gelau asked us two, Enjup and me, to rub him with a charm. He asked us to rub him all over his body. After we had rubbed ourselves with that charm there was the sound of a woman’s voice speaking by our side. ‘If the bombs come, close your eyes,’ she said. Around ten o’clock in the morning there came another white-people’s plane which bombed the Bintulu airfield again. There were five of us, including the two soldiers, under one of the Japanese planes. The other planes were completely destroyed by machine-gun fire but the

86

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

plane where we five were sheltering had the luck not to get hit. It wasn’t even grazed. We returned from Bintulu bringing back 28 people to join the kyodo-hei. After some time in Sibu there were many, many troubles, more troubles than can be told. We heard the news that the white people were going to come and that night our group discussed escaping. ‘Don’t hurry, wait until things are really definite,’ 1 said. After that there were reports of a force of white people being seen, they were seen by my grandfather, Penghulu Nanta of Bawa Assan, and Tuai Rumah Sagong at Bukit Lima. After that our group talked it over again and many ran away. After that, one night the Japanese ordered me to keep guard, and I said to our group: ‘Tonight I am on guard; you get ready the things to be carried when we run. If I wake you, get up’. ‘Right’, they said. At that time we were at Bukit Asik in a big Chinese house. That night a Japanese was on guard with me. We two were to stand guard from evening right through until the next morning. After a while, around two o’clock in the morning, I saw that his appearance had changed very much and that he had begun to yawn repeatedly. ‘Sir, you go to sleep first. I will make you get up if the kempei-tai come,’ I said. ‘Yes, yes, fine, fine to sleep,’ he said. He went to sleep and while he was sleeping I woke up the group. Our group then started offbecause everything had been made ready. I then woke Sebum, father of the present William Minggu, and also Lat, Irung, and Indau. Balleh set off and didn’t meet with any Japanese. As much as could be carried, we carried. When we had already been running for about an hour and a half, I heard something crashing in our direction. ‘Get down!’ I said, warning the group. Then Sebum called, ‘Baling!’ he said. ‘What?’ 1 said. ‘We’re dead!’ he said. ‘What, have you been hit?’ I said. ‘No,’ he said. ‘Then you’re alive,’ I said. ‘Really, this stuff can’t possibly be carried if we’re pursued further by the Japanese,’ he said. ‘Impossible to leave it,’ 1 said. ‘I’ll follow,’ I said, directing the group. We then crossed Sungei Merah and came to a large empty marshland; then we walked to Teku’, towards our garden there. Irong and Endau went to my uncle Dingun’s house and stayed there. We three wanted to return to our house in Sungai Aup. Next day we started out by way of the Golf Course road - formerly there was a golf course. We passed through jungle and a Chinese coffee-garden and came to our house in Aup [Igan River]. In April 1945 when the Japanese were planning their retreat into the interior in the event of the anticipated Allied attack, members of the

kyodo-hei were detailed to mark the three different escape routes from Kuching to Dutch Borneo. Bohari bin Hj. Su’ut and five other Malays, accompanied by twelve Japanese soldiers, were taken to Sibu Laut by boat and from there by military aircraft to Pontianak. Not long after the plane had taken off again and they were leaving the airfield, it was bombed by an American B29 and they had to shelter in a rubber estate for some hours. Split into three groups, they set off for Kuching, marking the different trails with signs in Japanese. Wherever there was a split in the trail, they had to mark the direction of Pontianak with an arrow. In ordinary clothes and equipped with two hand grenades each, they were told only to use these if they were attacked. They were also told to be on the look-out for American soldiers parachuting into the jungle. Their orders were to walk from 6 a.m. until dusk and then find a longhouse or kampong where they could obtain food and spend the night. After sixteen days they returned to Kuching, still on the look-out for American airmen, only to hear that the Japanese had surrendered." Joshua Bunsu from Rumah Unggi near Banting was recruited at Simanggang in early 1943 after his brother, a policeman at Engkelili, told him that the Japanese were looking for young men. At that time he had finished Standard 4 at St. Paul’s School, Banting, and could not find any work. It was humiliating for an educated young man not even to have any clothes to wear. He enjoyed the four months training course in Kuching and quickly became proficient in Japanese, being able to use katakana script. ‘Our brain was still working from school’, he recalled. All the twenty or so Banting area recruits stayed together in a dormitory under the command of Tumba from Betong. Altogether there were about 1,000 in his detachment, including some Dusuns from North Borneo. After training, a group of about 500 of them were despatched to Sandakan and from there to Sungei Kumpang to build a road from Tawau to Mostyn Estate where there was a large Japanese settlement. Some time in July when they had been relocated to Merotai for more road-building, Allied bombers virtually destroyed Tawau. Joshua and his companions were collected together by their senior Japanese officer and told that they were now discharged - that they should make their way back to their homes as best they could. They were

87

Kempei-tai, Jikei-dan and Kyodo-hei

issued with rice and other provisions and sent on their way. They were allowed to keep their rifles but not to have ammunition. After a series of unsuccessful efforts to find transport, they set off on a gruelling 27-day walk from Sandakan to Ranau, during which a number died from malaria. From there they walked to Tenom where another kyodo-hei detachment under Jonathan Banggau was based. The Japanese disarmed them and after a day of feasting and dancing, they were give 20 yards of cloth each and as much rice as they could carry before being sent on their way. Walking up the Padas River gorge to Sapong Estate, they encountered the Australians who had just captured the 37th Army headquarters there. Supplied with rations and a letter authorising them to ask for assistance from other Australian units, they made their way to Merapok on the coast and from there by boat to Lawas. Some stayed on at Tenom and Sipitang where they had found Dusun and Murut wives for themselves. Eventually Joshua reached Bawan Assan down-river from Sibu where he spent some time staying with Jonathan Banggau before returning to Banting. This epic journey from Tawau to Banting took him about six months.12 While many Iban were happy to join the kyodohei, the Bidayuh of Sarawak’s First Division had to be conscripted. After the war, Awan Rekam and Botek, the two guncho appointed to administer the Bidayuh areas, were accused of recruiting more than two hundred yound men by threatening that they would be killed if they did not agree. When Orang Kaya Japar and Tua Kampong Munggu of Kampong Sadel went down to Kuching to intercede with the Japanese officers and plead that they be used instead on airfield construction, they were beaten by ‘Sub’ Juing Insol and kept in the cells at Central Police Station for 33 days.13

Altogether, only about 2,000 kyodo-hei recruits had been trained by the end of the war, reflecting a general loss of enthusiasm amongst the Iban and the growing belief by late 1944 that the Japanese were losing the war. Other reasons subsequently given to Allied interrogators by Capt. Ryuji Okeno, Commander of the Miri company, for what he regarded as the failure of the scheme were: the language problem; the harsh attitudes of some of the Japanese soldiers in charge of training; and the general dislocation by air raids towards the end of the war which caused the recruits’ duties to become more onerous while their education and discipline were badly neglected.14 Notes 1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

Cited by Lord Russell of Liverpool, The Knights o f Bushido: A Short History o f Japanese War Crimes, London: Cassell, 1958, pp. 216-7. Sarawak Tribune, 10 January 1946. Ibid.

Copy of letter in the possession of R.H.W. Reece. Joyce C. Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia Independence and Volunteer Forces in World War II, Hong Kong: Heinemann, 1977, p. 116.

6. 7. 8.

Interview with Hj. Dawi bin Abdul Rahman, Kuching, 9 January 1997. Following quotation from this source. Interrogation of Lieut. Takumi Makaida, WO 208/3114. Interview with Hj. Bohari bin Hj. Su’ut, Kuching, 28 June 1997.

9. Ibid. 10. For a full discussion of this custom and its ramifications, see Peter Kedit, Iban Bejali, Kuching: Sarawak Literary Society 1993. 11. Interview with Hj. Bohari bin Hj. Su’ut. 12. Interview with the Revd Joshua Bunsu, Sibu, 19 December 1995. 13. Tua Kampong Munggu to Commissioner of Police, Kuching, 26 December 1945, SMA I 17/C12 (Box No. 42). 14. Bulletin no. 237, Item 2178, WO 203/6317.

8 The Japanese Presence he immediate and abiding impression made by the Japanese in Sarawak was of their roughness and their bullying, particularly in enforcing the protocol which required everyone to salute Hinomaru (the Rising Sun flag) and to make a low bow when passing any Japanese sentry on guard duty, even when riding a bicycle or sitting in a rickshaw. As there were sentries posted at every major intersection and every government office, it was impossible to avoid them. Almost everyone who lived through that time has a story to tell about being slapped or seeing someone else slapped for failing to observe the unwritten law.

T

Bowing Bowing was not at all out of keeping with Chinese custom and it seems at first surprising that the Sarawak Chinese should have found it so distasteful. However, as N.I. Low wrote about Singapore: our bowing is so different from Japanese bowing. When we bow, we relax the muscles and bend like willows before a gentle breeze, overcome by respect, genuine or simulated. When a Japanese bows, he stiffens all his muscles and bends smartly, like a marionette, his trunk at right angles with his legs. The stomach exercise involved is too strenuous for us indolent Chinese.1 The Japanese soldiers on sentry duty were not beyond playing unpleasant tricks on people: Sometimes a sentry would walk around nearby for a breather and to stretch his tired feet and left the sentry box unattended. Members of the public who had got wiser would dutifully bow before the sentry box even if it seemed empty to be on the safe side! Call it humour or whatever!,J some naughty sentries would play trick by hiding behind the sentry box and giggled on seeing people bowing before the

empty box... Sometimes a sentry would be a distance away urinating but kept an eye on passers by who might not bow to the empty sentry box.2 Polycarp Sim, later headmaster of St. Joseph’s School in Kuching, was one of those who were cruelly fooled in this way. One Sunday morning he cycled past what he thought was an empty sentry box on Rock Road near the government rice-mill (now Wisma Saberkas)\ He rode past thinking it was safe but was startled by a loud yell ordering him to stop. The soldier, who had been hiding behind the sentry box, came out and slapped Polycarp on both cheeks. Then he was ordered to bow three times before the sentry ... He was glad however that his glasses were not smashed.3 In Sibu, Lu Ngee Jin described how elderly people, who found it difficult to adapt to these new ways, were sometimes treated: One Malay datu was too old to be able to learn the correct way of making the salute. A Japanese asked his son to teach him. When the Japanese found that the datu could not follow his son, he ordered the son to beat him as a lesson. The son could not disobey the order. He at first hit his father lightly. The Japanese was furious and assaulted the young man and ordered him to continue to beat his father. In the end, both the datu and his son suffered serious injuries.4 The Japanese were also inclined to use harsh and insulting language when people did not conform to protocol or seemed to resist telling the truth. Bakayaro! (fool) was a common exclamation which was firmly etched in people’s minds. Like armies of occupation throughout human history, the ordinary Japanese soldiers often behaved in a cavalier fashion. They shocked the people at Quop by shooting down coconuts rather

89

The Japanese Presence

C I R C U L A R

.

Heads of Departments are requested to inform their staffs that,whenever they meet any motor-car flying a yellow flag, they must stop (and if they are riding on bicycles they must dismount)-, take off their hats, stand at attention,and bow in a proper manner, rassengers in motor vehicles and rickshaws may remain seated-in their vehicles (which must stop) and bow. Yellow flags indicate the presence og officers of high rank ( from Major-General upwards. 2. When officers of the rank of Major-General and upwards visit offices, the office staff must stand at attention and bow. Any Government employee meeting such officers anywhere else must also do like wise. 3. The following illustrations show the gorget patches wor* officers by these^ high-ranking officers:-

w

#

fo r KUCHING SHIUCHO

Kuching,9th Shichi-gatsu2602.

Oficer-in-Charge, Kuching Civil Court.

Circular setting out the protocol to be observed with senior Japanese officers. (By courtesy o f Chen Ko Ting.)

than asking for them. They would often take chickens and fruit without offering payment; they were notoriously addicted to pisang (bananas) and would knock on shop doors late at night demanding them. At times, the Japanese soldier asserted himself in a way that seemed to reflect a greater concern for dumb creatures than for his fellow human beings: A farmer was cycling to town with some 20 poultry for sale. The chooks were tied by the legs and suspended upside down from the bicycle handles. That was the common mode of carrying chickens for decades. A soldier noticing this ordered the farmer to come down from the bike. The poor man was soundly slapped and told to carry the chickens in an upright position.5 News of the incident spread quickly and for the rest of the occupation, doomed chickens were accorded the dignity of being transported to their fate in the sitting position. The fundamental clash of cultural values involved in these everyday encounters was analysed perceptively by N.I. Low, who witnessed them first­ hand in occupied Singapore. The sentry epitomised the irresistible power and authority of the Japanese

Imperial State and the rigid social philosophy that underpinned it: How could the Japanese soldier, accustomed to giving instant and unquestioning obedience to orders, and on occasion to receiving them, how could he understand the slovenly Chinese who seemed inclined to greet an order with airy badinage and to brush it aside with the wave of a hand? How could he, to whom chastisement was a matter of routine, which he received from a superior and administered to a subordinate, how could he understand the resentment that smouldered in the eyes of the Chinese whom he so justly punished? No wonder he was exasperated, and dealt all the more savagely with the offenders. The Chinaman, on his side, with his inherited and ingrained misprizing of all that appertained to war, was incapable of understanding the Japanese sentry. How could he know that the Japanese was such a fanatic for discipline, loving it for its own sake, as the key to the enigma of life, that to him a command was sacrosanct, tardy compliance with which was not a mere peccadillo, as the Chinese fondly imagined, but an affront to the Emperor himself? As for failure to bow to him, the sentry, it was sacrilege, for he, the sentry, was the viceregent for the nonce of Tenno Heika

90

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

- that very god of every god, child of the Moon Goddess, holding sway over gods and men.6 The official propaganda line propounded by the Japanese was of H akko-Ichii (Asian brotherhood). Thus it followed that their relationship with the Sarawak people was totally different from that of the grasping British imperialists with all their notions of racial and cultural superiority. Nevertheless, many Japanese made it clear that they wanted to be addressed as Tuan (Sir). This was not enforced in the same way as saluting and bowing, but people very quickly learnt that it was good policy to play up to the amour propre of the status-minded Japanese in this way.7 Behind the wires at Batu Lintang, the European prisoners were permanently subjected to the Japanese system of hierarchical discipline. Agnes Keith, the Canadian wife of a North Borneo forestry officer, described the ritual of bowing: In Kuching we learned how to bow seriously. We had printed instructions, demonstrations, and practice. The Nipponese orders for bowing were: Incline the body from the waist to a fifteen-degree angle, with head uncovered, hands at the side and feet together; remain thus to the count of five (silent); then recover. (If not knocked down. ... To bow one was supposed to put everything on the ground, remove hat, hair band, scarf, sunglasses, eyeglasses (if the guard so wished), throw away the inevitable stinking, newspaper-wrapped cigarette, and arrive at the fifteen-degree angle swiftly enough to escape a slap for not bowing.8 From 1944 there were many more Korean and Taiwanese conscripts whose lowly position in the Japanese social hierarchy disposed them to assert themselves in unpleasant ways. Hudson Southwell described how they behaved at Batu Lintang: The Japanese guards usually did not exceed the practices which were accepted within the hierarchy of the military, but there was one notorious exception, who would purposely roam around until he found someone doing something he didn’t like and then brutalize him. The other guards we particularly dreaded were some of the non-Japanese conscripts. Rather than being content with slapping a prisoner heavily on the face, these conscripts would sometimes close their fists before impact, knock the person down, and then proceed to kick him viciously with their heavy army boots. This more violent treatment was normally reserved for the P.O.W. soldiers, but occasionally civilians were treated very roughly also.9

Ukum Jipun If there was a clash of cultural values between the Japanese and the Chinese over things like bowing, this was completely overshadowed by different understandings ofjustice. Forthe Japanese, an offender was normally picked up on the advice of an informer and was assumed to be guilty; punishment was automatic once the confession had been offered or extracted. There was no question of possible innocence. For the Chinese, innocence • was something to be insisted upon unless the weight of evidence provided irrefutable proof of guilt. In practice, securing the confession could inflict suffering far worse than the actual punishment. Rulers and ruled regarded each other as being entirely perverse. The more summary forms of physical punishment for petty offences made a powerful impression. Although not a large number of people suffered impromptu slaps and beatings, and even fewer the more refined punishments of kena jemur (exposure to the sun) and the dreaded ‘water treatment’, incidents of this kind quickly gained wide currency. Another technique used by the Japanese for petty offences was public shaming. In Kuching and Sibu, petty thieves were paraded around the town wearing large placards which proclaimed their crimes.10 At Simunjan on one occasion a man caught stealing a chicken had to walk around the bazaar wearing it strung to his neck and beating a gong to draw attention to his humiliation." From the Japanese point of view, this was far harsher punishment than a physical beating. Even the Iban, who thought of themselves as being physically tough, were horrified by what they regarded as unnecessarily cruel and humiliating punishments for trivial offences. The Japanese, in their view, were berat (heavy-handed). At Betong, for example, two petty thieves had their hands tied together with gunny rope soaked in oil which was then set alight.12 In another instance, some Chinese staying at a longhouse near Betong were punished for no good reason: Two Chinese went fishing near the longhouse early in the morning. They didn’t know that Japanese people spent the night in the longhouse, and took some villagers fishing too. The Chinese were arrested, tied up to a pole in the open gallery of the longhouse, and forced to spend the day looking at the sky.13

91

The Japanese Presence

Iban attitudes towards Japanese justice were characterised by the expressions adat jipun salah (the Japanese way of doing things is wrong) and adat jipun endah manah (the Japanese custom is rotten). Ukum jipun (Japanese justice) became a term for punishment out of all proportion to the offence. Nevertheless, there was at least some evidence that Japanese tactics worked effectively as a deterrent to theft in particular. In Sibu, R.K. Bhattacharya noticed that it completely disappeared: Yes, there were no thieves at all, you can put your gold watch by the road side, no-one will take it. They know the next morning the whole thing will be finished, everyone will be killed. That’s one thing they did that taught a lesson, that you must not steal, particularly the fuel, rice, food stuff, clothing, these are the things, essential items, they are not allowed ... There are a lot of informers, they go and tell that you had it.14 From November 1942 when the pre-war civil court system was revived under local magistrates using the Sarawak Penal Code, summary justice was less common in the major towns but it continued elsewhere.

Violence Outbursts of ill-treatment and brutality by individual Japanese were sometimes the result of circumstances that had nothing to do with Sarawak and the situation there. To take one example, at some time in 1943 a Japanese soldier posted at Simanggang called out all the towkays to the kaki lima (fivefoot way in front of their shops) and proceeded to beat them up savagely one by one until he reached the end of the line and started again. It was later revealed that he had just received a letter informing him of his brother’s death while fighting in China.15 We shall see that a similar scene was enacted in Simanggang in September 1945 by an Australian soldier who was similarly affected. Some of the rough treatment can be attributed to the ordinary Japanese soldier whose training had not modified behaviour derived from his peasant background. The more extensive use of Korean and Taiwanese conscripts also introduced people who were prone to kick out against the local population to compensate for their own lowly status. These were the men with whom Sarawak people increasingly came into contact as the

occupation went on and whose actions coloured the general perception of orang jepun. Linked with the tendency towards roughness was the deliberate use of physical cruelty. The notorious methods of torture practised by the kempei-tai made some kind of brutal sense as a means of extracting information but they left an indelible impression. The modus operandi of the kempei-tai was extremely successful in instilling fear into the hearts of the population. As the Sarawak Tribune put it in January 1946, ‘The very sight of a KP man was enough to make the more nervous of us tremble in our shoes’.16 Inevitably, kempei-tai informers and other people used the organisation as a means of revenging themselves on those who for various reasons had earned their enmity. The Tribune recalled: ‘These were the times when anyone could be arrested and tortured if information was given against him by someone else prompted by jealousy, grudge or revenge’.17 Nevertheless, some people were called in so many times that they were able to school others on how to behave and how to answer questions. One technique, which had resonances of a famous scene in Thomas Mann’s The Confessions o f Felix Krull, was to feign insanity: The Kempeitai had arrested a number of suspects. They were questioned and every denial made was followed by brutal beatings and water treatment. One man noticed that and was prepared when his turn came. The following ensued: Kempeitai:‘Are you planning to rebel against the Japanese Government?’ Answer: ‘Yes, Sir’. Kempeitai:‘Are you the ring-leader?’ Answer: ‘Yes, Sir’. Kempeitai: ‘What weapons have you got to fight us’?’ Answer: ‘Our navy is somewhere on the seas and our planes are behind the mountains. Here we have sticks and parangs. He was not beaten. They let the ‘madman’ go a few days later.18 The local poet ‘Mah Jong’ expressed the feelings of many people in his post-war lines on ‘The Kempeitai’: Kempeitai is the military police, They struck fear in me, if you please, They are doctors to human guinea pigs, Keep away from them, if you please. They feared no God, they were maniacs, they say.

92

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

They looked to do unto others, What they would rather others stay, Judge then O God the inhuman race, Put to a charge you will find out, you see, With firewood for their drum sticks, An excruciating pain in the ribs, You will scream out, ‘Alas daddie’. I wished, how I wished that I hadn’t been born, To answer the charge hot as Hell, My epidermis would not have been torn, 0 what a woeful tale to tell, Out of the frying pan into fire, Another test would be my dole, The thirst quencher would serve my pyre, To God I would commend my soul, Up to the last 1 should never admit, Though they’d have me everything told, Though their swords high above them they would lift, 1 am still MASTER of my SOUL.19

Nudity Many people in Sarawak were alienated by the Japanese attitude to basic bodily functions and to nudity. Ordinary soldiers were prone to urinate openly in the street in front of women and children, something which was socially abhorrent to Chinese, Malays and Iban. Whether it was a deliberate affront or an act of contempt rather than an unthinking habit is not clear. At any rate, the

Japanese Mayor of Kuching at one point issued an order that it should cease henceforth.20 Japanese soldiers were also prone to practise the traditional custom of mixed-sex communal bathing whenever the opportunity arose. Lu Ngee Jin described how this became a source of embarrassment in Sibu: The people had to bathe and wash their clothes on the river bank. The Japanese soldiers would come to join the people bathing in the river. They jumped naked into the river and and played with the women and children. Anyone who dared to laugh at them or leave the river would be caught and tortured. They even walked naked along the kampong roads. Anyone who dared to peep through the windows would be caught and tortured as well.21 Even the more sophisticated wives of Japanese commercial employees living in Kuching’s residential areas astounded their local servants and their neighbours by walking around naked in their houses. Unused to Sarawak’s fierce mid-summer heat, they took every opportunity to divest themselves of their clothes, even going to the outside toilet wearing nothing more than a parasol. Female servants were surprised to see their new Japanese tuan going around the house naked or in nothing more than a very brief loincloth.22 When Ong Poh Lin turned up to give badminton lessons to Japanese women office workers, he was surprised

Chinese mansion in Padungan requisitioned as a hostel fo r Japanese female office workers. (Photograph by courtesy o f Gabriel Tan.)

93

The Japanese Presence

to find them running around naked in the large house in Padungan which had been requisitioned to serve as their hostel. He cheekily inquired of the matron in charge whether they would be naked during the lessons as well.23 Sarawak people were also confronted with tonsorial nudity. Many Japanese soldiers and even some officers had their heads shaved. It was required of all the kyodo-hei recruits and was imitated by policemen, jikei dan members and other young men who were keen to be identified with authority. One advantage of this was that it marked them out as being either Japanese or proJapanese and therefore potential informers.24 Another peculiarity of the Japanese which did not endear them to local people was their fetish for naked swords. The proudest possession of those entitled to wear them, swords were drawn out and displayed and their razor sharpness demonstrated as a mark of special favour. On occasion, the owner would show his skill in sword­ play, slashing and decapitating invisible opponents.25 The sinister connotation of swords as instruments of decapitation was not lost on the Chinese audience in particular. Photographs had circulated before the war of executions in China. One of the intimidatory techniques of the kempei-tai was to apply a cold sword edge to a blindfolded victim’s neck in simulation of this intention.

‘Comfort Women’ While there were instances of rape during the first days of the invasion in Kuching, it was not a serious problem during the occupation unless the conscription of young girls for the military brothels can be regarded as systematic rape. Apart from this, there was a general complaint that Japanese soldiers were prone to enter houses unannounced looking for food or girls or both. Community leaders and people with Japanese friends managed to have large signs in kanji and hiragana script placed in front of their houses declaring their property out of bounds by order of the commanding officer, Kuching.26 As in other parts of occupied Southeast Asia, the Japanese military authorities took immediate steps to ensure that their troops in Borneo were sexually serviced. Apart from other considerations, this was made necessary by the official ban on sexual intercourse with local women and the

Telegrams from Tokyo Headquarters to Taipei, 1942, requesting the despatch o f 'comfort women' to Sarawak. (By courtesy o f Sarawak Chinese Cultural Foundation, Sibu.)

punishment for contracting venereal diseases. On 12 March 1942, army headquarters in Tokyo sent a message to the chief of staff in Taiwan informing him that three procurers had been appointed to select fifty Taiwanese women for despatch to Sarawak as ianfn (comfort women). Three months later, another message informed him that the first batch had not been able to satisfy the demand and that a further twenty were needed.27 In all probability, these women were sent to Miri while it was still the headquarters of the Borneo Defence Force, lanjo (military brothels) were established at nearby Kuala Belait in Brunei where a large Japanese garrison protected the oil field installations. Fifty Taiwanese and Korean women were placed in the Chung Wah School and another thirty were accommodated at the old Recreation Club building in Seria. May Brodie, who was living in Kuala Belait at the time, met them frequently on the road and was able to converse with them in English or Hokkien: Some of these comfort girls used to pass our house ... each morning they took turns to go to medical for check up or whatever it is. And a few of them, they want me to make dresses for them, and I sew some of my dresses for them, my long gown and all of that. And then 1 asked [one of] them: ‘Who sleeps with you every day? How many? ‘Plenty,

94

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

day time, ordinary soldiers, night time, all the big shots, officers’. ‘So that’s why all of you walk like that’, I said.28 The only surviving documentation of the despatch of comfort women to Borneo relates to the seventy or so women mentioned in the telegrams of early 1942, all the other records having been destroyed towards the end of the war. However, contemporaries recall that Korean and Javanese women were brought to Kuching for the same purpose. In recent years, one of the Javanese ‘comfort women’ sent to Sandakan has spoken out of her experiences but research on the subject has largely overlooked Borneo where none of the women have identified themselves.29 In Sarawak itself, the sense of shame at having been a ‘comfort woman’ has so far proved to be stronger than any wish to expose the oppression and injustice that it involved and to claim compensation from the Japanese government. The main military brothel in Kuching was the former Borneo Company Ltd. Manager’s bungalow on Bukit Mata, overlooking the Sarawak River on the site now occupied by the Sarawak Hilton Hotel. The Chung Wah School at the top of Pig Lane (now Park Lane) and the boarding house of St. Mary’s School (the old Ong family house) were also used for the same purpose. These establishments

were managed on a business-like basis by madams and a charge was levied according to rank. Every ethnic Japanese soldier was entitled to use them, including the guards at Batu Lintang who were regularly taken off by truck from the camp for their ration of Yoshiwara (sex).30 In addition, local women of a higher class were recruited for the senior officers’ club situated in the Chan family mansion on Tabuan Road. One unusual form of guard duty for kyodohei members in Kuching was to prevent Taiwanese and Korean soldiers from entering the Bukit Mata brothel. This responsibility was allocated to Bohari bin Hj. Su’ut when he completed his training in Kuching in late 1943: They picked me to be something like [a guard]. In the evenings myself and Wan Yusufs brother, we have to go out dressed as civilians except the instruction is ... go to the prostitutes’ headquarters, we had to look for that house, the BCL Manager’s house. Only Japanese are allowed to go to that house. Taiwanese no. These girls are mostly Indonesian ... Javanese. They did not know that we were Malays. They thought that we were Japanese ourselves. Then we told them ‘we are not Japanese, we are the local Malays here’. They were very happy indeed, those people. I think there were 20 plus of them. Every room, two girls. Mostly for ordinary soldiers. Then these girls told

The principal Japanese military brothel in Kuching was the Borneo Co. Ltd. manager’s bungalow on the crest o f Bukit Mata Kuching, directly above the fuel depot on the river bank.

The Japanese Presence

us they were sent here not to be like this. They were sent here as clerks, as typists. Naturally they were not happy, but they cannot do anything, they are under army laws. Nobody can escape ... No other soldiers are allowed to enter that house except Japanese soldiers.31 Ong Kee Hui passed by St. Mary’s hostel one evening and heard a homesick Javanese girl mournfully singing Bangawan Solo (On the Banks of the Solo River). The women were given regular health-checks and it was assumed that any soldier who contracted venereal disease must have done so by having sex with outside women and was thus subject to punishment on two counts. Penicillin tablets were consequently in great demand on the black market and when supplies were exhausted, an ingenious British prisoner of war at Batu Lintang fabricated replicas from tapioca flour and sold them to one sufferer until the latter’s rapidly worsening condition made the deception apparent.32 Lena and Dora Ricketts were pretty Eurasian nurses working at Kuching hospital who were very nearly conscripted by the kempei-tai for one of the brothels at the suggestion of a local procurer. According to Lena, During the occupation, the Japanese brought in Taiwanese and Korean girls, and we treated quite a few of them in the hospital. I am sad to say four local women used to go around the kampungs looking for young girls for the Japanese officers’ brothels. One of them was in the Borneo Company Manager’s bungalow at Bukit Mata and another was in Pig Lane. One of the women, who I will call Min, was a mixed Melanau and Bidayuh married to a high ranking European Brooke officer, another was a Chinese married to an Anglo-Indian who worked in rubber, the third was a Chinese who had been the mistress of a European Brooke officer and the fourth was a Chinese married to a local civil servant. Most of those forced into the brothels were Chinese girls, although there were some Iban girls from the town. These girls were not prostitutes. They were seventeen and eighteen-year old girls from good homes. After the women forced their parents to hand them over, they were put straight into the brothels. There they were placed under the charge of a Japanese woman and not allowed to go out.33 All that saved the Ricketts sisters from a similar fate was the intervention of Col. Tsuga, Commandant of Batu Lintang camp, who

95 emphasised the value of their work in the hospital. In Sibu there was an officially-supervised brothel at Happy Garden where Taiwanese and Korean girls were supplemented by local girls recruited with the assistance of the Dochokai or friendship club set up in mid-1942 at the insistence of the military government. Smaller towns such as Lawas also had their complement of Taiwanese and Korean girls.34 Despite these official arrangements, it was not long before some Japanese began to look for local women, attempting to recruit them for own private convenience as ‘keeps’. High-ranking officers had no more trouble in finding live-in companions in Kuching and Sibu than their Brooke counterparts had done. To take just one example, the glamorous Hajjah Sa’erah, Gerard MacBryan’s wife and the Ranee’s lady-in-waiting in September 1941, lived with a Japanese naval officer in one of the big bungalows in Kuching during the occupation. In more remote places such as Lundu and Simanggang, military administration and civilian personnel were able to make similar arrangements, usually with Iban women. The prospect of access to scarce commodities such as rice, sugar and cloth no doubt helped to make the Japanese attractive in their eyes. Initially, it was Japanese official policy that de facto marriages to local women should be either prohibited or strictly limited. However, in early 1943 a directive was received from Tokyo that legal marriages between non-military personnel and local women were permissible and could be expedited by telegram communication with the home authorities responsible for these matters.35 The Japanese were not always successful in their efforts to obtain local women and various ruses were used to thwart their intentions. Andrew Jika Saban told the story of a visit by six Japanese soldiers and their American-educated lieutenant to Kampong Stunggang near Lundu in mid-1942: They were searching for, what do you call it, women for the brothels. They said they were looking for wives. In fact they wanted to make use of these girls. To enjoy sexual desire, you know. And I told them, ‘these are all married girls. They are all married women. That is my wife, I have got three wives here’. So I bluffed them ... I told my cousins and my friends, my relatives who were gathering in my own language which the Japanese could not understand, that every one of us must pick any one, just take any one as their wife. And we did it, so the Japanese got nothing.36

96

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Similarly, headman Ling Chu Ming of Bukit Lan in Sibu fabricated documents to show the Japanese that most of the girls in his area were already married.37 Indeed, the number of early marriages increased dramatically during the occupation for just this reason. By and large, the Japanese seem to have respected married women, even when they suspected that they were shamming. In late 1944 and early 1945, the Taiwanese and Korean girls were repatriated by the Japanese but the Javanese girls were left to fend for themselves. In all probability, many of them joined the small Javanese communities which had been established on the Serian and Matang roads before the war. Lena Ricketts described what became of the locally-conscripted girls: After the war, most families took their daughters back into the family home, but some disowned them, even though their daughters were not to blame.38

Gambling There was another area in which the Japanese departed dramatically from the practice of the Brooke government. After the kempei-tai with its extensive network of informers and the jikei dan or vigilante organisation, the principal means of social control exercised by the new administration in Sarawak was gambling. Before the war, the Brooke government had followed the system practised in the Malay States and the Straits Settlements by which the monopoly over legal gambling was ‘farmed’ or sold to an individual or for a fixed period of time. While the Japanese were quick to overturn this system and to proclaim its immorality, they realised that for the Chinese in particular gambling was a compulsion which would distract them from more dangerous activities. They also came to see that selling gambling licences to individuals was an easy way of raising revenue to pay for ambitious works projects like boat-building, airfields and roads. The administration even conducted its own lottery an tickets were distributed for sale in rural areas by the local guncho. Until this time, the only legal game had been fan tan but ho lo, chap jee kee and pai kaw were now permitted and gambling licences were issued readily by the authorities for the payment of a fee. In Kuching, as many as forty individual licences were issued each day and there were gambling

booths the whole length of India Street.39 In other places such as Limbang and Lawas there was no official surveillance and gambling was almost continuous. In Sibu, the Japanese authorities licensed one gambling ‘farm’ in the form of a large makeshift ‘casino’ built with kajang (palm frond matting) walls and attap (leaf) roofing. Situated near the Chung Hwa school, it was packed with people from 11 a.m. to 11 p.m., brightly lit with gas lamps. Attracting as it did most of the criminal population, it allowed the Japanese to keep a careful eye on them.40 In the meantime, the gambling craze spread like wildfire, becoming a way of life for rich and poor and influencing the whole social ambience of Sarawak’s main population centres. Recklessness only increased when Japanese currency began to dive in late 1943.

Social Mixing The stereotype of the rough and sometimes brutal Japanese did less than justice to the officers and commercial men who came from educated and cultivated backgrounds. People like Ong Kuan Hin and ‘Dr’ Charles Mason who had some association with Setsuo Yamada, for example, were impressed by his courtesy and became close friends with him.

R.K. Battacharya (Photograph by courtesy o f R.K. Bhattacharya.)

Those Sarawak people who worked for the military administration or were employed by Japanese commercial firms seem to have had a

97

The Japanese Presence

generally good experience as long as they were prepared to work hard. Employed in the Sibu office of the Yokohama Specie Bank, R.K. Bhattacharya was impressed with its efficient mode of operation which was based on the American banking system. He also appreciated the punctuality, discipline and strong work ethic of the Japanese office staff: But [the] Japanese - one thing I have to say. They are shrewd workers. If they say they will come at eight o’clock ... they will do exactly the same thing. Three o’clock means three o’clock, one o’clock means one o’clock. Work is work. They say: ‘We do not believe in slow-slow, we want fast-fast’. The first day I entered in the Japanese bank they did not ask me any other question. They say you stay back. 1 start work right now ... They say no, you are working from now, right now. That... is something in them that you can admire.41 Making friends with the successive managers and other Japanese businessmen who came to the bank, Bhattacharya came to appreciate them as social companions. Sometimes they held parties to which local people were invited: the commercial Japanese that I met we used to sit down and drink - sometimes we got saki, you know ... And we found them back then quite jovial, we forget about the whole thing. We did not discuss the war you know ... and they used to [be] singing songs, they liked dancing very much, you know, and things like that. Quickly they picked up some Malay songs, they could sing some Malay songs. And the local ... people used to sing the Japanese songs ... and have a very happy gathering in fact.

that on one occasion he slapped a Japanese for insubordination. Frank Hayward, a Eurasian who worked in the Kuching town administration, often entertained Japanese colleagues at his house in Rubber Road. While he was working at Miri in charge of oil well-sinking, Joe Brodie felt that the Japanese technical staff treated people as they would other Japanese: they are not bad, but if you make a mistake they beat you up. That is their way. The general manager will beat up the assistant general manager, he will beat up the cashier, the cashier will beat up the office manager, it goes on. If a Japanese lady typist makes a mistake, they slap her, too.42 Fortunately for Brodie, the chief engineer, Sato, had been educated in the United States and spoke fluent English. There was no slapping in his department. When friendships were formed at work between Japanese and local people, there were still some sensitive areas. Raymond Reggie Adai was an Iban telephone operator at the military hospital in Kuching where he became friendly with Cpl. Murata, a pharmacist. One day in late 1944 a Japanese officer came to the hospital for treatment and his driver, a European internee, asked Raymond for a glass of water. Murata kicked Raymond gently to indicate that he should not oblige but he went

Through his work in the current accounts section of the bank, Bhattacharya made many Japanese friends. Some learnt to speak Malay and other languages: Would you believe me, there is one chap, working in the Post Office, he could speak Hindi, and he came to our house one day, to my father’s, and I say: ‘Hey, I’m surprised, how can you speak?’ He said: ‘Oh I studied in the foreign language [institute]’. ‘What is the purpose you did it?’ ‘So maybe when you march to Chittagong or Calcutta or Delhi 1 will not find any difficulty at all, I will speak your own language’. In Kuching, ‘Sub’ Juing Insol fraternised socially with high-ranking Japanese officers. So confident was he of his status in the new order

Muslim Indian with Japanese naval officer. (Photograph by courtesy o f Sarawak Museum.)

98

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

ahead and gave him the water. At this, Murata turned to Raymond and, without saying a word, slapped him across the face. Startled at this treatment from a man he considered his friend, Raymond asked him: ‘Why did you do that to me?’ The Corporal replied: ‘You gave water to our enemy’, to which Raynond responded: ‘Your enemy is not my enemy, I did not fight against him’. At this point Murata, who was obviously very angry, said: ‘It is just as well it was me who saw you giving the driver a glass of water. Anybody else might have reported you to the kempei-taf ,43 Raymond also made friends with Watanabe, a Japanese private who was working in the administration. They both liked dancing and often went out together to the Kuching kampongs for gendang sessions where Malay girls challenged young men in a ritualised dialogue of verse and song. Watanabe also used to visit Raymond’s house, bringing cigarettes, rice and other luxuries for Raymond’s father. A few days before the Australians landed, he came to the house with a bundle of clothing, saying that he would not be needing it where he was going.

Japanese map o f East Asia. (By courtesy o f Sarawak Museum Archives.)

_

News and Propaganda The invasion of Kuching by the Japanese had been achieved without any civilian loss of life after the 19 December air-raid. This was due in part to the dropping of leaflets explaining to the local population their intentions and indicating the dire consequences of resistance. Another leaflet featured a red map of East Asia and Southeast Asia (including northern Australia) which highlighted Japan’s territorial conquests. Yet another was a colour poster showing a British boot crushing Islamic mosques underfoot. All this material had been carefully prepared, indicating that planning had been going on for some time. During the first week or two in Kuching, artists attached to the invasion force were busy painting large wall-pictures in prominent parts of the bazaar, depicting the courage and might of the Japanese soldier. Others portrayed him assisting his Asian brothers towards a more advanced stage of development. One of these, situated on the corner of Gambier Street and Rock Road, showed a uniformed Japanese officer stretching out his hand to assist a Malay youth. Similar wall paintings and posters were to appear in Sibu, Miri and other towns. This was an entirely new medium of communication for the people of Sarawak and it made a favourable impression on the Malays and Indians at least. The other powerful symbol of the new order was the introduction of the Japanese calendar and the setting of all clocks to Tokyo time, previously one hour ahead of Kuching. This meant that government employees and others bound by office hours had to get up before dawn to get to work in time. The day when Kuching was captured, 24 December 1941, was now referred to as Show a Juuroku-nen Juuni-gatsu Nijuu-yoka. It was entirely predictable that the Japanese administration should make a high priority of controlling and disseminating information on the progress of the war and other matters. A number of journalists arrived at Miri in May 1942 to serve in an information section at Borneo Defence Force headquarters. Within a short time they were hand-printing Nikkan Nada Shimbun (Daily Nada News) in Japanese using reports received from Domei Tsushinsha, the official news agency whose regional centre was now

.

The Japanese Presence

Cover o f Shashin Shuu-hoo (Photo Weekly), a war-time magazine publicising Japanese achievements in the Nanpo.

99

100

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

It is the dawning of energy and development. Let us go through the mountains and jungle drinking muddy water if we have to. Even in the intense heat of the equator we smile, imagining our abundant resources.

m #} JL ±

_*

+*

* A. # /h*

H

Japanese occupation calender

Singapore. This was designed for circulation to all members of the Borneo Defence Force. From July 1942, there were daily broadcasts in Kuching where three large loudspeakers were erected. In addition to news, there were lectures by local leaders and physical exercise sessions using Japanese music. In November, simulcasts of important news began and the Propaganda Department had its staff increased to 21. By early 1943 there were daily newspapers in Kuching in Chinese and rumi (romanised Malay). These were sent to Brunei and North Borneo for distribution. Some copies of the Syonan Times also reached Kuching from Singapore, together with Syonan Pictorial and Japanese-language magazines focusing on the occupied territories in Southeast Asia. In its issue for 21 July 1943, for example, Shashin Shuu-hoo (Photo Weekly) carried a feature story about a Japanese army band visiting Kuching. A series of photographs pictured the band marching down Rock Road, together with close-ups of the audience at the Sungei Priok boat-yard and of children trying out instruments. This was probably the occasion of the composition of ‘The Song of Borneo’ with lyrics by Pte. 1st Class Michio Wakagi of the Borneo Defence Force’s air arm. It is dawn and we can hear courageous cries, Let us advance to the place soaked with warriors’ blood, Marching with the banner of re-construction flying. There are rivers, green and jungle. Oceans of resources spread out beyond the horizon, Filled with treasures and secret valleys of concealed wealth.

Here we are, you and I and all us. We are firmly bound with a common aim. We work hard to collect flax, kutch and tree tallow in order to obtain victory. We share brotherhood, peace, as well as a sun-flag. Our loud cheers ring out from great Borneo to the Emperor’s palace. Let us celebrate our victory that will surely come true tomorrow.44

After headquarters were moved to Kuching, the Malay section of the information office was located in a shophouse opposite the Post Office. It was run by Yusuf bin Shibli, a Sarawak Malay who had recently returned from Mecca, and Mohd. Johari bin Anang, a schoolteacher who had been one of the founders of the Persatuan Kebangsaan Melayu Sarawak in 1939. Only one or two copies of Kiuching Jit Poh and Khabar Harian Kuching are extant, but it is clear that both newspapers consisted largely of translations of reports received from DomeiJ5 Local news seems to have been limited to reports of the activities of the Overseas Chinese Association, the Indian Independence League and other Japanese-sponsored organisations. Although these newspapers lacked credibility, their reports made it possible to follow the progress of the war in various theatres and in particular to deduce the impact that the Americans were having in the Pacific. Ong Kee Hui recalled the amusement he derived from the Chinese-language newspaper when his grandfather, Ong Tiang Swee, had it read out to him by one of his clerks: I used to laugh like hell! I said: ‘Do you believe all of that? Whatever they say, the fact is, this thing is happening, the tide is turned you know. Now the Allies are here’. So we can just interpret it the way we want it. So when they report a battle in New Guinea for example, we know the Allies are there already, and when the battle of the Coral Sea, and the battle of the Midway Island was reported and enormous losses to the Allies, the Japanese were triumphant, we know that’s where they are now, it won’t be very long before they get down to the Philippines, and within striking distance of the Japanese home land. So we know the end should not be very far off, but we didn’t expect the atomic bomb, which finished the war so soon. That was unexpected.46

The Japanese Presence

101

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941

1 02

Inevitably, the censorship imposed by the Japanese authorities on war news resulted in some curious anomalies and inconsistencies. Recalling this, Sarawak Tribune editor Dennis Law wrote in February 1946: It was very surprising to find that news of [the] Axis [powers] were published and many of us wondered why we were told about Allied victories in Italy and the 7 term ultimatum offered to the Italian Government. Later we were informed of the acceptance of these terms by the Badoglio government; a few days before we were told most emphatically that the ultimatum would be contemptuously ignored. Mussolini’s rescue by German para toopers was mentioned with triumph! German losses and retreats were infrequently admitted until Allied pamphlets dropped over Kuching compelled the authorities to publish news of street fighting in Berlin and later, Germany’s capitulation following Hitler’s death. Allied victories at sea and in the Philippines and even at Okinawa were [then] admitted. On the other hand, it was very amusing to the more discerning readers to see the childish attempts at concealing Allied victories which were first denied and then admitted. The usual practice was to remain silent about Allied victory and to disseminate stories of disagreements and enmity among Allied Commanders as in the North African front. A few months later, they published accounts of Italian air raids on military objectives in Tripolitania which they had not yet admitted to be in Allied possession. Or they would mention that American naval units were approaching one of the islands held by them and their invincible navy was repelling them with great losses of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, planes etc. to the enemy. ‘Our losses were 2 destroyers slightly damaged and 6 of our planes deliberately crashed the enemy’. This habit of sinking American ships on paper became so regular that everyone concluded that America must be a wonderful country to have lost so many ships and to continue fighting the Japanese. Soon we were told that the Japanese pilots were inflicting ‘considerable damage to enemy installations on the island’. Later we learned of another American naval unit approaching another Japanese held island. And so on.47

The local Chinese propaganda newspaper was allowed into Batu Lintang until July 1943 when it was inexplicably banned and its possession treated henceforth as a very serious offence. In February 1944, Lieut. Nagata regaled the prisoners with his own news bulletin:

-

1945

1. Castelnova had been bombed by the Americans, and 300 nuns killed; an outrage which had incensed the Vatican. 2. Chandra Bose’s forces had encircled two American Divisions which were in danger of annihilation in the State of Bengal. 3. There was no change in the war situation in the Pacific.48

In April 1945 when it was known to the prisoners that the Japanese navy had suffered disastrous losses in the Pacific, Nagata announced that Japanese planes had attacked an American fleet north of Formosa, inflicting extraordinary damage: Aircraft Carriers Battleships Cruisers Destroyers Other types Transports

13 sunk 7 33 30 50 130

12 damaged 12 12 15 or damaged

The Japanese losses were: Battleships Cruisers Destroyers

1 sunk 1 sunk 3 sunk 49

Undetected by the Japanese despite their

strong suspicions, a secret radio code-named ‘Mrs Harris’ had come into operation in early 1943, providing access to BBC and Voice of America news bulletins. Built and operated by two RAF signals experts in the British prisoners’ camp, Warrant Officer Leonard Beckett and Warrant Officer E.R. Pepler, news was passed on to the civilian section: One of them gave a summary of the news through the wire to [R.G.] Aikman, who stored it in his photographic memory. He then, once a week, relayed this, visiting each hut in turn. The relay was carefully organised so that numbers walking up and down on the parade ground remained a constant, trickles of the informed replacing those who strolled off to be informed.50

When the supply of electric power was cut off from the camp in late 1944, a crude but effective dynamo was ready to be put into use: a machine had been constructed, ostensibly to peel tapioca, consisting of a wooden drum, studded with nails and harnessed to the remains of an ancient bicycle. The pedals turned the drum, which hacked

The Japanese Presence

103 Southeast Asia during the occupation, mostly reflecting wishful thinking. Sometimes Japanese propaganda was unintentionally amusing, as with this release in early 1945: Our arch-enemy Roosevelt is now dead. In an interview with press correspondents in this subject in London, Churchill was alleged to have said, ‘My turn will be next!’54

Posterfo r a Japanese film about the capture o f Singapore. The Japanese propaganda effort relied heavily on the use offdm.

the skin off the tapioca. But they could also turn a dynamo that had been ‘acquired’ by mechanics whose duty it was to repair Japanese transport.51

In the meantime, copies of the Chinese newspaper had been found in the military camp and the man who collected them was beaten into revealing the names of his contacts in the civilian camp. Nine prisoners, including Camp Master Le Gros Clark, were arrested in September 1944 and sentenced to terms of imprisonment in North Borneo. Their fate will be described later. It was at this time, too, that Edric Selous, who had been Secretary for Chinese Affairs before the war, committed suicide by cutting his wrists with broken glass. A brilliant linguist who had acted as interpreter for the prisoners, he was under suspicion of being part of a conspiracy and killed himself in the belief that torture would force him to reveal the names of his contacts.52 Some of the news from ‘Mrs Harris’ penetrated beyond the perimeter of Batu Lintang through organised contacts, but otherwise Sarawak was cut off from reliable information about the war. In that atmosphere it is not surprising that the most extraordinary rumours abounded. During the Solomon Islands campaign in 1944, it was rumoured in Kuching that Hong Kong had been captured by Nationalist Chinese troops and that the Japanese Commander in Borneo had been given ten days to surrender. It was also said that the Nationalists were invading Indo-China and Siam. American submarines were believed to be operating in Sarawak waters and to be buying food from the crews of sailing vessels.53 Similarly wild rumours were current in Singapore and other parts of

Japanese news reels on the progress of the war and life in other occupied territories, together with feature films, were shown regularly at Borneo Gekijo (Borneo Theatre, formerly the Lillian Theatre) in Kuching and the To-a Gekijo (East Asia Theatre, formerly the Rex Cinema) in Sibu. These were controlled by a fim company known as Eiga Haikyu-sha which worked directly under the kempei-tai from the Sarawak Steamship Co. offices in Kuching. One of the most popular films was about the Opium Wars in China, an example of Western imperialism which the Chinese and the Japanese could join in condemning. It ran for three weeks to packed houses. Travelling film shows were taken into the countryside by Ong Poh Lim, a pre-war badminton champion who was recruited by the kempei-tai for the job.56 The Nada Group Propaganda Department filmed such events as Maeda’s meeting with the Sultan of Brunei for use in newsreels in Japan. More ambitiously, it also edited an hour-long documentary on a scientific expedition to Mount Kinabalu shot by Nihon Eiga-sha (Japan Movies Inc.), a well-known commercial company from Tokyo, in June 1943. Made before the Api rebellion, it presented to the home audience a picture of exotic tropical tranquility in which a benign Japanese administration extended its tutelage to colourful but backward native peoples. The final ascent to the summit was suitably marked by hai-keirei and the re-naming of the peaks to commemorate Japanese military heroes. A bottle was left behind containing a genealogical chart of the Showa dynasty.57 Locally-organised propaganda teams were sent into the rural areas wherever transportation was possible. One such team was led by Felipe Oniza Allas, a Filipino musician who had served in the police band before the war and owned a photographic studio opposite the Post Office known as Terang Bulan (Full Moon). Together with his Bidayuh wife and children, he toured

104

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Japanese scientific expedition at the summit o f Mount Kinabalu, 24 June 1943. This was the basis o f a propaganda film, 'Kinabalu-sanLeader o f the party was 2nd Lieut. Kohashi (right). (Photograph by courtesy o f M. Yamada.)

the coastal areas of the First Division in late 1942 to give open-air variety concerts. These featured popular Indonesian songs of the day, Terang Bulan, Sapu Tangan (Wipe Away the Tears) and Bangawan Solo, together with humorous sketches, acrobatic routines and popular Japanese songs such as Shi Na No Yoru (Night in China).58 Although there was no consistent attempt on the part of the administration to inculcate Japanese ideology, high-ranking individuals frequently invoked its basic ideas in their public speeches within the context of Dai Toa Kyoeiken and Japan’s divinely-ordained role of assisting the undeveloped nations of Southeast Asia towards self-realisation. Writing in Singapore’s Syonan Times, a local journalist using the pseudonym ‘Charles Nell’ produced a series of articles in March 1942 which provided the most comprehensive statement of Japanese political ideology and its cultural context.59 At the local level, Japanese officials in Sarawak sometimes used the official ideology of ‘same skin’ Asian brotherhood to chide people for their slothfulness in the way that elder brother might dutifully admonish younger brother. On frequent occasions the Police Commissioner at

Simanggang, Yanagihara, would call people together at short notice to stand in the local cinema where he would lecture them on the need to work hard. John Nichol Kassim, an Iban police inspector working under Yanagihara, heard these speeches so many times that more than fifty years later he could recall the actual words: You people, all of you are lazy. You don’t plant padi, you don’t tap rubber. You eat, you sleep, you make children. The monkeys can do that, which means that all of you are monkeys! We Japanese come to make you blood-brothers. We have the same skin. The white men treated you as servants and looked down on you, treated you like dogs! We come here to rescue you.60

Drawing his samurai sword and slashing the air to emphasise the point, Yanagihara only succeeded in scaring people further. The need to translate his speech from Japanese into Indonesian and then from Indonesian into local pasar melayu (bazaar Malay) made the whole performance oppressive. Yanagihara’s successor, Shoichiro Suzuki, was more subtle in his approach. When Allied propaganda pamphlets were dropped on the bazaar

105

The Japanese Presence

in March 1945, he countered their impact by making use of documents found in the Kuching Secretariat relating to the secret agreement made by the Rajah in March 1941 to accept a written constitution in return for a payment of S$2,000,000. This is how he represented it to the local people: The Rajah has sold Sarawak to the Allies and pocketed large amounts of money before disappearing to Australia This Rajah who sold his country and ran away; his propaganda claiming to seek the peace and happiness of people is a lie. The colonial policy of the whites over one hundred years was terrible. We Japanese are like you, people of Asia. We Japanese are warriors seeking independence and liberation forthe peoples of Asia, so let us fight together hand in hand to bring peace and prosperity.61

Suzuki’s enthusiasm took him beyond the limits of official policy. Headquarters in Kuching responded to his speech with an order that there were to be absolutely no public utterances suggesting that the Japanese government recognised the legitimacy of independence movements in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. It was not official policy to hold up the goal of independence for Sarawak under Japanese tutelage. There was never the slightest suggestion that Boruneo Kita would ever be anything other than a colonial dependency of Japan. When Yoshihiko Seki of the headquarters research section in Kuching wrote a paper suggesting that the intention of the Japanese occupation was to encourage future independence and to prepare people for it, Major Yano was furious. In his view, material of this kind would only encourage the Chinese and others to resist the Japanese army.62 Nevertheless, the authorities encouraged local people to speak out in criticism of the Brooke regime and in support of the new order. An important function of the Japanese-sponsored community organisations was to provide the military regime with some semblance of popular support by echoing its propaganda. On public occasions their leaders were often called on to make speeches supporting the regime and its policies and condemning both Brooke government and the Allied cause. Thus on 5 September 1943, the first anniversary of General Maeda’s death, loyal speeches were delivered by Hsu Tung-su, Director-General of the Overseas Chinese Association, Li Jungh-sian representing the Chinese who had been brought

in to work in the boat-yards, S.C.S. Chakraverty of the Indian Independence League and Datu Pahlawan Abang Hj. Mustapha representing the Malays. On this occasion, Abang Hj. Mustapha played up to the expectations of the Japanese while expressing some of the dissatisfactions which had lain beneath the tranquil surface of Brooke rule: Our ancestors were discontented under the British rule for the past century. The British received exorbitantly high salaries, their lowest being higher than the highest salaries of the native inhabitants. All commercial enterprises, yielding high returns were monopolized by the British and the profits derived were remitted to England, thus leaving no funds for the development of North Borneo. The Anglo-Americans acted in a similar manner everywhere throughout East-Asia. Although we were dissatisfied we obeyed them because we possessed no power to overthrow them. Japan, clearly understanding this situation, valiantly fought and expelled the Anglo-American powers from East Asia and is now constructing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Fortunately, North Borneo has been spared from protracted fighting and its people are at present supplied with sufficient food and work. Therefore they are extremely grateful to the Japanese Forces. The Japanese forces are safe-guarding the whole of East Asia and will never fail to win victories. We must not be misguided by any propaganda from the enemy. We must not forget that the Japanese forces, while fighting on the one hand, are constantly thinking of our welfare. We are praying for the prosperity of Japan and the brave fighting forecs of Japan and fervently hope for the successful accomplishment of the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.63

Cultural Policy The main aim of Japanese cultural policy in Sarawak was that Japanese should become the language of administration and education in place of English and that pro-Western values promulgated by Christian religious institutions and secular literature should be discouraged and replaced with ‘Asian’ (i.e., Japanese) values. Government business was conducted largely in Malay as before, but from early 1942 all government servants were required to attend daily after-work language classes at the Maderasah Melayu.64

106

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

The military administration made it clear from the outset that the possession of English-language books and other reading matter would be considered anti-Japanese. The same applied to photographs of the Brooke family, the British royal family and other Europeans. It was even more dangerous, however, to have photographs of Chiang Kai Shek and anything relating to the China Relief Fund Committee. Finally, English and Mandarin language gramophone records were prohibited and on one occasion there was a ritual bonfire of them on the central padang (square) in Kuching.65 Japanese records were in plentiful supply, although needles had to be constantly ‘re-cycled’ by sharpening them on a fine rhinestone.66 Fear of the kempei-tai descending upon them led families to destroy or hide any material of this kind. In Sibu, for example, Ting Lik Hung buried in a bottle in his garden all the group photographs of his graduation from military College in Nanking and of the Sibu China Relief Fund Committee of which he had been a prominent member. Unfortunately for Sarawak’s historical record, outright destruction of incriminating literature, letters and photographs was more common. Nevertheless, there was no interference with the Chinese language other than the temporary closing down of Chinese-medium schools. Chinese shopkeepers and artisans retained their shop signs and continued to conduct their business in Chinese. As we have already seen, a Chinese-language propaganda newspaper was published in Kuching.

Religion During the round-up of Europeans in the days after the invasion, all Anglican, Catholic and Evangelical missionaries had been detained and taken to Batu Lintang camp except for two Tyrolese priests in Kuching, Monsignor Aloysius Hopfgartner and Fr Peter Aichner, and two nuns who happened to hold Austrian citizenship. They were allowed their freedom and were able to say mass throughout the occupation to congregations substantially reduced by the exodus of Chinese to the countryside. However, St. Joseph’s and St. Teresa’s schools and other church buildings were taken over. The only indigenous Catholic priest in Sarawak, Fr John Chin, was not treated so well. On 10 June

1942 he was ordered to vacate the boys’ school and the mission quarters in Sibu. After bringing the nuns back from Mukah to the Sungei Dassan school, he was arrested just as he was going to the altar for the Mass of the Assumption. Detained for the next 34 days, he was questioned over his involvement with the Malaya Patriotic Fund. He was subsequently beaten and given the ‘water treatment’ for his alleged sabotage of the Mukah electricity plant on the eve of the invasion. After release he was constantly on the run to avoid the Japanese.67 St. Thomas’s Cathedral was taken over as a food store and both St. Thomas’ and St. Mary’s schools were requisitioned for military use. At one point, St. Thomas’ School was used to billet more than 300 Chinese workers brought from China to work in the boat-yard at Sungei Priok. However, Anglican services were maintained in Kuching, Quop, Betong, Simanggang and other places by the handful of indigenous Anglican priests and catechists. At Simanggang, the Revd Martin Nanang persuaded the Japanese not to use his church as a store and to allow him to re­ open the school. Japanese policy was more anti-European and anti-Chinese than anti-Christian and there was no systematic attempt to prevent religious worship. Amongst the Japanese there were Catholics from Nagasaki and others who had been educated in Christian colleges in the United States. One notable example was Col. Tsuga, the Batu Lintang commandant, who had attended a Methodist university in Washington. Another was Takeda, the Harvard-educated Mayon of Sibu. There were some instances where the antiEnglish language policy of the administration broke down at a practical level. It was an ironic touch, for example, that the young lieutenant ordered to destroy English-language religious materials at Lundu was an American-educated Christian. Andrew Jika told of how the hymnals and prayer books from Christ Church were saved: He went into the church and kneeled down to say his prayers. Then he came out and told me that, according to the instructions from the top, all religious books will be burnt. He said: ‘Would you do that?’ and I said: ‘Yes, I will do it’. So I collected all the hymn books and all the prayer books and old bibles, hid them in my uncle’s house and the priest’s house. And I got hold of a few pieces of paper, waste paper, 1 burnt it off and then I got the ashes, put them inside an envelope

107

The Japanese Presence

Japanese naval band performing in Kuching

■- * \ 1

' f

Japanese naval band marching up Rock Road, Kuching

108

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Japanese correspondence relating to the threatened confiscation o f Methodist Church property in Sibu. (By courtesy o f Sarawak Chinese Cultural Foundation, Sibu.)

and brought them down to Lundu town as proof that I had obeyed the orders.68 In Sibu, the Methodist Church was allowed to function as before until almost the end of the occupation period. In early 1943 Ling Kai Cheng obtained permission from the military administration to hold a meeting of the Methodist mission at the Fook Yuan Hall on 24 and 25 March where he reported that all church property was in good order and that congregations had been able to attend weekly services. On 9 March 1945, however, an order was issued by the military administration proclaiming all Methodist Church property to be enemy property and therefore liable to immediate confiscation. This posed a dramatic challenge for Ling Kai Cheng who had only a few days to make a response: It was a headache of a problem. How should we argue against the order? That night, I knelt before the Lord asking for help. I remembered all the supporting documents and began to search for them.

Next morning I went to the government office to meet with the chief officer in Sibu. I submitted the missionary rules and regulations, meeting records and office bearers over past years, missionary magazines and other supporting documents and books. I also explained the contents to the officer. I told him that the enemy property management committee had not carried out proper investigations before the office issued an order to the mission. Such actions had created misunderstanding. After questioning, the chief officer asked me to submit an appeal to the office concerned, enclosing all supporting documents which should include the original copies and their English and Japanese translations. The appeal letter and the supporting documents would be forwarded to the General Commander of the Japanese Army in Borneo for consideration. The same afternoon, Yao Siaw King, Khoo Nai Cheng and I drafted the appeal letter, and 1 asked Wong Hieng Kai, Yong Kuet Siong, Lu Ngee Jin and Lu Kii Chong to translate the letter and other documents into English and Japanese. All the documents were completed on 21 March and were signed by Wong King Ho and myself and were submitted to the chief officer. A letter was received on 10 June. It carried an order marked Treasury No. 54, repealing the ‘Methodist Mission properties are enemy property order’.69 The only major problem Ling had experienced before this was the embarrassing matter of a speech made by Director-General Takeda which one 'of his (Ling’s) friends thought should be translated into Chinese and printed by the Methodist Church’s press for general distribution. The problem arose in the context of Takeda’s description of the Japanese as ‘saving’ the backward peoples of Asia: One of the sentences referred to ‘Great Japan the Saviour’, a term which annoyed me very much. Three days later, the chief officer sent people to collect 20 copies of the document. I told them the document had not been printed yet. He again sent men to ask for the document a few days later. I had not printed it yet. The following day, the officer came personally to my office. He said: ‘Kai Cheng [I know] you are very busy [but] please print the speech as soon as possible. I want to send the document to the general commander in Borneo’. I replied: ‘You can print it yourself. He said: ‘You print it better’. Then I told him bluntly that he had made a good speech. But as a Christian, I could not propagate “Great Japan the Saviour”. ‘Jesus is the Saviour that I know’. He said that I should not be so stubborn. I told him that I was a responsible Christian. After that he left.70

109

The Japanese Presence

Takeda had intervened on an earlier occasion on Ling’s behalf: One day a Japanese army officer came with me to the church, wanting to remove the lamp shades for use at military headquarters. 1 would not agree. He then asked whether I was aware of his position or not. I said no. He then pointed his finger at his nose and said: ‘I am the manager of the army headquarters’. He said that big lamp shades could only be found in the church and that they should be given to army headquarters. I told him: ‘The lamp shades belong only to God. 1 have no power to give them to you’. He was very angry and shouted at me. I was a bit frightened. He said that he was going to report it to his superior officer and he told me to meet him at 4 p.m. at his office. I went there at the appointed time. However, before I entered the office, another officer told me: ‘Our senior officer has asked you to go home because there is nothing to discuss.71

Education All schools in Sarawak had already closed for the Christmas holidays when the Japanese arrived and the main English-language mission schools remained closed for the entire occupation. In Kuching, as we have already seen, St. Joseph’s was used as a military barracks. St. Teresa’s School was used as the District Court. The office and one of the dormitories of St. Thomas’s School were demolished before it was taken over in 1943 as a school for the children of Japanese living in Sarawak. The Catholic and Methodist mission schools in Sibu and other centres also remained closed. In the interior, some Anglican schools were allowed to resume teaching when the medium of instruction was Iban and not English. At Simanggang for example, the Revd Martin Nanar.g was able to persuade the local Japanese official tore-open St. Luke’s School, although no financial support was provided. Chinese schools posed a major problem for the Japanese. Many of the teachers had been staunch supporters of the China Relief Fund and had organised their pupils in money-raising events. However, some schools in Kuching, Sibu and Miri were allowed to open from April 1942 on condition that instruction in Japanese language was part of the curriculum and after their teachers and text books had been approved. Malaymedium government schools had re-opened in

Gerunsin anak Lembat (,second from right) and friends before the occupation

February. From early 1943, all schools were required to teach 14 hours of Japanese language a week. To facilitate this, military and civilian personnel were seconded as teachers and the military administration provided materials. The intention was that Japanese should become the standard language of communication. The main instrument for introducing Japanese language into the schools was through a system

Japanese teacher with Sarawak-born Japanese students, Kuching. (Photograph by courtesy o f Madam Y. Takahashi)

110

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

of intensive language courses. Kuching’s main government school, the Maderasah Melayu in Jawa Road, was taken over for this purpose and renamed the Nihongo Yoseijo (Japanese Language Training School). From early 1943, teachers were brought to Kuching from all over the state for four-month intensive courses in Japanese. They were expected to develop a good grounding in the language, including katakana script, so that they could use it as the medium of instruction when they returned home to become teachers. Gerunsin Lembat and Peter Tinggom from Saratok were members of one such group of twenty-seven people, mostly Iban, in early 1944. Accommodated at the Maderasah Melayu where the course was held, their daily routine began with early morning physical exercises to music broadcast locally by Rajio Taiso. They were also expected to spend part of their day cultivating sweet potatoes and other crops in the school compound, which was entirely dug up for that purpose. The headmaster was a kind man and Gerunsin went away impressed with the energy and competence of the teachers.72 Peter Tinggom had topped the class. Another Iban who was brought to Kuching for this course was Jonathan Saban who returned to teach at Lundu for the remainder of the occupation. In Kuching and Sibu, all government servants were required to attend language classes every afternoon or evening. This was taken very seriously at first by the administration and names were marked off rolls to record attendance. Much of the teaching was done by soldier volunteers whose enthusiasm made a strong impression. Japanese songs were used extensively to impart the language. Amongst some of the English-educated Chinese, the strong emphasis on Japanese language had an unintentionally negative effect. Believing that the Allies would eventually return, it seemed to them a waste of effort to learn Japanese. At the same time, it was a form of passive resistance not to learn Japanese and to learn Chinese instead. Ong Kee Hui and some of his former schoolmates from St. Thomas’s got together and employed a young bi-lingual Chinese to instruct them every evening using a July 1940 textbook designed for the Malayan Chinese: During the war I must say, I was very anti-Japanese. I wouldn’t learn the language even. I wouldn’t

learn the language. They tried to make people learn Japanese, I refused to learn it. I say why, I’ll be wasting my time, I’d better learn Chinese, because I was not Chinese educated. So during the war I took advantage of that, instead of learning Japanese I was learning Chinese. The Japanese of course don’t know the difference. So 1acquired a working knowledge of Chinese during the occupation ... I can say, I owe that to the Japanese, they make me learn Chinese.73 As for the Chinese-educated the reaction was more complex. On the one hand, learning Japanese was seen by them as a form of capitulation to the brutal power that was attacking China. On the other hand, the close similarity between Chinese and Japanese written script made Japanese easily accessible to them. The Malay and Iban reactions were not so problematic. The Japanese language was taught effectively in those primary schools that were re-opened, p a rtic u la rly through songs remembered to this day by some people who were students at the time. The discipline and dedication of Japanese teachers had a powerful impact and over a longer period it seems likely that significant acculturation would have taken place, as it had in Taiwan and Korea after decades of Japanese colonial rule. From his experience in the ranks of the kyodo-hei, the nationalistically-inclined young Senawi bin Suleiman could believe that with more time the process of Japanisation would have been effective with the younger generation.74 Familiarity with the Japanese language brought practical benefits. Employees of commercial firms had no hesitation in picking up a basic competence when it helped to secure their employment and qualified them to receive a weekly ration of rice. In Sibu, R.K. Bhattacharya became a fluent speaker through his work in the Sibu office of the Yokohama Specie Bank although all his bosses were Englishspeakers. As the occupation wore on towards 1945, the administration’s initial enthusiasm to establish Japanese as the official language waned. There was no longer any insistence that government servants should attend language classes and English became more acceptable. Compulsory physical exercise was also gradually abandoned, as was the morning ceremony of raising and saluting the Rising Sun.

111

The Japanese Presence

Hnb

Yasuko Ohsawa with Japanese soldiers co-opted as language teachers, Kuching, c. 1943 (Photograph by courtesy o f Mdm Y. Takahashi.)

Prime Minister Tojo arriving at Kuching airfield, 7 July 1943

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

112

Civilian Volunteers Some of the Japanese civilians who came to Sarawak and North Borneo were young women who volunteered to work as teachers or typists to help the war effort. Yasuko Ohsawa volunteered to go to Sarawak in April 1942 when she was twenty years old. There had been an air raid on Tokyo the previous month and she decided that as it was no longer safe there, she might as well play a useful part in the Nanpo. ‘Borneo is a very peaceful place’ she was told, ‘and you will be away from all the politics’.75 Although her mother was strongly opposed to the idea, she arranged through an organisation called Konan Gakuin to which her brother belonged to go out to Borneo with students from there and from Senmon Gakko (polytechnics). Konan Gakuin had been advertising for volunters through notices posted in schools, secretarial colleges and public offices. Embarking on the Yoshino-maru at Yokohama with thirty other girls, Yasuko was only a few days out to sea when a sister ship in the convoy, the Taiyo-maru, exploded and sank after being attacked by an Allied submarine. The girls had

originally been allocated berths on the Taiyo-maru and the arrangements were only changed at the last moment when some commercial people were put on board in their place. ‘We watched the ship until it sank completely’, she recalled, ‘and somehow we started singing “Umi Yu Ka Ba” [When I Travel on the Sea] and cried’. I’ve never forgotten it.’ From Taiwan she sailed on the Yoshinori-maru to Saigon and from there to Miri in a small ship called the Dainichi-maru which (strange as it may seem) was carrying horses. She and four other girls were immediately put to work as typists in the temporary military headquarters there. Able to type in both English and Japanese, she was more useful than some of the other girls who had only just finished typing schoool. However, the typewriter that she brought with her had rusted during the voyage and gave her lots of trouble. When the military headquarters moved to Kuching in July, Yasuko went with it and set up office in the old Court House building. Occasionally she was sent across to the Astana when General Maeda had some special task for her. Working back late one night, she was thrilled when he thanked her and gave her a yokan (sweet) in

Tojo talking to a Malay shipwright at the boat-building yards, Sungei Priok, during his visit to Kuching. (Photograph by courtesy o f M. Yarnada.)

113

The Japanese Presence

es

Monument commemorating the establishment o f the Japanese military administration at Sibu, August 1942

Memorial to Marquis Maeda on the beach at Bintulu. (Photograph by Ho Ah Chon.)

appreciation. Paid 70 yen a month, she was expected to send this home to her family but also received a generous local allowance of about twice that amount. In early 1943 she gave up clerical work and became a teacher at the Nihongo Yoseijo Gakko (Japanese language school) at the Maderasah Melayu in Kampong Jawa. She subsequently taught for two years at the National School established at St. Thomas’s for the children of Japanese civilians, particularly those who had been in Sarawak before the war. Acutely conscious that their children could not read or write Japanese, these families were the moving force in getting the school started. Amongst the dozen or so local Japanese children who attended were Yoshie Hayashi, son of Yoshijiro Hayashi who owned a rubber plantation on the Matang road, and the Kuribiyashi brothers whose father, Jinzaburo Kuribayashi, had a farm on the Serian road. There were also Saburo (‘Sablo’) and Youko Kuno, the children of Seiji Kuno, ‘Mohd. Jepun’. In late 1944, Yasuko became ill and tests suggested that she might have contracted tuberculosis. She was already a heavy smoker there was never any shortage of cigarettes during the war. Sent to Singapore for further investigations,

she was told that she did not have tuberculosis but the army doctor examining her advised her to return home anyway. ‘You should go back to Japan’, he said, ‘otherwise you might not be able to go back, ever’. After spending about two months in a military hospital in Manila, she was shipped backed to Tokyo in January 1945.

Tojo’s Visit A high point of the Japanese presence in Sarawak was Prime Minister Hideki Tojo’s surprise visit to Kuching on 7 July 1943 as part of a tour of the occupied countries. It will be recalled that when Capt. Matsaharu Yamada went to Tokyo in October 1942 to deliver General Maeda’s ashes, Tojo had promised to provide archery sets and other sporting equipment for the Japanese working in Kuching. There was little other reason for him to come to Sarawak, which (apart from its oil and its airfields) was of secondary importance at a time when the fortunes of war were changing so dramatically. He had recently been informed of the death of Admiral Yamamoto, his best naval commander, and of the loss of the Japanese garrison in the Aleutians. There were also signs of a strong Allied offensive in the Pacific.

114

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 -1945

Arriving at the 7th mile airfield, Tojo was greeted by the Chief of Staff, Major-General Manaki, and driven with military escort to the administration headquarters in the old Court House building. All along the way, a conscripted crowd of adults and schoolchildren waved Japanese flags and shouted slogans as he passed. Strict orders had been given beforehand through an administration circular that all windows and doors of houses and shops on the route had to be closed. The kempei-tai went around to ensure that no-one would be watching from first-floor shop-house windows, prompting some people to think that they were concerned about an assassination attempt. In fact it was simply a matter of protocol.77 After a briefing on the work of the administration, Tojo was taken to Sungei Priok to inspect the wooden cargo vessels under construction there. Once again, the route was lined with people. Delighted to see this positive development at a time when Japan’s merchant fleet was suffering heavy losses, Tojo chatted happily through an interpreter with the Malay shipwrights. He was so impressed that he awarded a special commendation to the yard and allocated a large sum of money to the Borneo Defence Army as a welfare fund for the workers. Later that day he inspected the school for the children of Japanese nationals which had been set up at St. Thomas’s. One of the teachers at the time was Yasuko Ohsawa who recollected a nervous moment during the great man’s visit: The students were so nervous. A fly landed on the head of a boy called Kuribayashi, but since they all had to stand still and straight, so ... I remember even Mr Tojo laughing.78 Tojo was notorious for being a pre-dawn riser who liked to make his own inspections of things without any guidance. However, he was housed at the Astana, which meant that he was prevented by the river from taking an informal look at the town before proper ‘supervision’ could be provided. His last duty was to present the traditional archery sets and baseball equipment which he had promised Capt. Matsaharu Yamada in Tokyo in October 1942.

posters at street corners, there were few visible signs of outward change in Japanese-occupied Sarawak. The new names given to such buildings as the Lillian Theatre in Kuching and William Tan’s Rex Cinema in Sibu did not take on common currency. One conspicuous symbol of the war which Japan was continuing to wage elsewhere was a huge stockpile of defused 500 lb and 1,000 lb aerial bombs captured at Banjermasin and transported to Kuching where they remained for many months stacked along Rock Road towards St. Joseph’s Church. The principal physical changes were of a negative kind. Government buildings, roads and other facilities took on a neglected look after a time and people’s standards of dress deteriorated as clothes were patched and ‘re-cycled’ or made from gunny sacking. Cars and buses disappeared from the roads due to the shortage of petrol, while bicycles, trishaws and bullock-carts came into their own. A wooden obelisk was erected on the river front at Sibu to commemorate General Maeda’s launching of the provincial administration in July 1942 and an inscribed kinenhi (memorial post) of belian (iron wood) was later planted on the beach at Bintulu as a memorial to his death the following September. A stone tablet was also erected at Labuan, which had been re-named after him. *

*

*

Hidden away on the outskirts of Kuching, the Batu Lintang prisoner of war camp was the most powerful reminder of the new order. Within its barbed-wire enclosures, supervised by an eccentric Japanese ‘dugout’ colonel and his staff of unprepossessing guards, more than 2,000 European civilians and British, Australian and Punjabi prisoners-of-war had entered in July 1942 into a captivity which was only to end on 11 September 1945. Subsisting on increasingly meagre rations, supplemented by the few vegetables that they could coax from the poor soil and gifts or purchases received illegally from local people ‘through the wire’, they fought a constant battle against malnutrition, sickness and despair. Notes

Monuments Apart from the ubiquitous Rising Sun flying from government buildings and some propaganda

1. 2. 3.

N.I. Low, When Singapore was Syonan-To, Singapore: Times Books International, 1995, p. 82. Tan, Japanese Occupation, p. 84. Ibid.

The Japanese Presence

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

Lu Ngee Jin, ‘Occupation Days’. Ibid.

Low, When Singapore was Syonan-to, p. 5. Tan, Japanese Occupation, pp. 112-3. Keith, Three Came Home, p. 136. Southwell, ‘Memoirs’, Chapter 10, p. 6. Tan, Japanese Occupation, p. 81. Interview with John Ngumbang, Kuching, 22 January 1995. Interview with Hj. Razali Sabang, Kuching, 18 December 1995. Personal communication from Veronique Beguet, 17 December 1997. Interview with R.K. Bhattacharya, Kuching, 12 December 1995. Interview with Datuk John Nichol Kassim, Kuching, 18 January 1995. Sarawak Tribune, 10 January 1946 Ibid. Sarawak Tribune, 8 February 1947. Ibid. Tan, Japanese Occupation, p. 84. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 85-6. Ibid., p. 122. Ibid., p. 94. Ibid., p. 97. Ibid., pp. 54-5. Central Daily News [Taipei], 23 February 1992. The

two telegrams, which were classified as confidential and only to be preserved for three years, somehow escaped destruction and were found in the Japanese Defence Force archives by a Japanese socialist M.P. inquiring into the comfort women issue in 1992. G. Hicks, The Comfort Women, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995, p. 76, says that 73 Taiwanese comfort women were sent to Sarawak but does not provide the source of his information. Interview with Joe and May Brodie, Miri, 15 December 1995. See Hicks, The Comfort Women, p. 104. Howes, In A Fair Ground, p. 148. Yoshiwara was a famous old red-light suburb of Tokyo which became synonymous with commercial sex. Interview with Hj. Bohari bin Hj. Su’ut, Kuching, 28 June 1997. Howes, In A Fair Ground, pp. 148-9. Porritt, ‘More bitter than sweet’, p. 48. Interview with Pemancha Ah Chiok (Ngan Chiok), Lawas, 18 January 1996. Yamada, Boruneo Senki: Kazashita No Kuno. Interview with Andrew Jika, Kuching, 3 July 1995. Personal information from Tan Sri Ling Beng Siew. Porritt, ‘More bitter than sweet’, p. 48. Sarawak Tribune, 23 January 1946; Tan, Japanese Occupation, p. 71. Tan, Japanese Occupation, p. 70.

115 41. Interview with R.K. Bhattacharya. Following quotations from this source. 42. Interview with Joe Brodie, Miri, 15 December 1995. 43. Interview with Raymond Reggie Adai, Kuching, 1995. 44. Published in Recollections o f Borneo during the War o f Dai-Toa, [Tokyo], April 1966. 45. Noakes Papers. 46. Interview with Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, Kuching, 1 August 1995. 47. ‘News and Rumours During Japanese Times’, Sarawak Tribune, 16 February 1946. 48. Howes, In A Fair Ground, p, 156. 49. Ibid., pp. 156-7. 50. Ibid., p. 156. 51. Ibid. 52. Digby, Lawyer in the Wilderness, p. 106. 53. ‘News and Rumours’, loc. cit. 54. Sarawak Tribune, 31 January 1947. 55. Tan, Japanese Occupation, p. 69. 56. Ibid., p. 119. 57. A copy of ‘Mount Kinabalu’ is in the possession of Masaharu Yamada who kindly allowed me to view it. 58. Interview with Raymond Allas, Kuching, 14 January 1996. 59. Syonan Times, 25-31 March 1942. 60. Interview with Datuk John Nichol Kassim. 61. Personal communication from Shoichiro Suzuki, 1975. 62. Interview with Professor Yoshihiko Seki, Tokyo, 7 October 1995. 63. Nippon Times [Singapore], 11 September 1943. 64. Governmnent circular, SMA. 65. Tan, Japanese Occupation, pp. 99-100. 66. Ibid., p. 100. 67. J. Rooney, Khabar Gembira: A History o f the Catholic Church in East Malaysia and Brunei (1880-1976),

London: Burns & Oates Ltd., 1981, p. 198. 68. Interview with Andrew Jika. 69. Ling, Fifty Years. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. Interview with Tan Sri Gerunsin Lembat, Kuching, 31 July 1995. 73. Interview with Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, Kuching, 1 August 1995. 74. Interview with Hj. Senawi bin Suleiman, Bintulu, 13 December 1995. 75. Interview with Mdm Yasuko Takahashi, Japan Sarawak Association Report, vol. 11 (1997), translated by Kyoko Postill. Subsequent quotations from this source. 76. Ho Cheah Min, ‘Rizhi Shiqi De Huiyi' [Memories of the Japanese Occupation] ’, copy of manuscript in the possession of R.H.W. Reece. 77. Interview with Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, Kuching, 1 August 1995. 78. Interview with Mdm Yasuko Takahashi.

9 Ethnic Policy he civil affairs policy to be adopted in northern Borneo was not formally enunciated until 12 October 1942 when Imperial Headquarters issued Directive No. 1308, entitled ‘Outline of Territorial Rule over Occupied Lands in the Southern Area’. Setting out policy for Burma, the Philippines, Malaya and Sumatra and Java in considerable detail, the Directive specified only three principles to be observed in northern Borneo:

Describing most as Muslims, the pamphlet urged respect for their religion and customs and avoidance of ‘unnecessary friction’. It continued:

(A) Native princes will be utilised, in accordance with former social ranks and abilities, as an organ of the military government (B) Her role of being a source of supply of important resources - especially petroleum must be maintained (C) The Chinese residents’ political influence will be suppressed as speedily as possible1

The East Asia War was a race war in which the Japanese would drive out the whites and restore the lands and liberties of subject Asian peoples, uniting them in a natural brotherhood under Tenno Heika. Nevertheless, brotherhood was not to be taken too literally in practice. The purity of the Yamato race and its preservation were vital elements of official ideology. Japanese national pride and leadership were to be maintained by a policy of strict social segregation. In Kita Boruneo, there were to be separate quarters for Japanese nationals and different facilities in such places as hospitals. Japanese were discouraged from wearing native clothing such as sarongs and from miscegenation, although, as we have seen, the latter was impossible to police. Aceptingthe inevitable, the administration decreed that anyone of part-Japanese descent should be educated as if they were Japanese. Japanese national dignity was also to maintained by not wearing yukata (casual summer clothing) and by refraining from urinating, nakedness, drunkenness, fighting, singing with a loud voice and even reciting poems in public. An organisation called Kita Boruneo Toa Kai (Northern Borneo Toa Group) was established to preserve a sense of community

T

In the pamphlet Read This Alone - And The War Can Be Won issued to all troops despatched to Nanpo in December 1941, the main elements of ethnic policy were clearly laid out. The overseas Chinese were described as becoming wealthy ‘by deceiving the naturally lazy natives and colluding with the British, Americans, French and Dutch ...’2 Although the Chinese had contributed funds to the Nationalist government, they generally lacked racial and national consciousness and were motivated largely by money. The natives were dispossessed slaves groaning under the oppression of white men’s rule. The bounty of the tropics had also debilitated them: countries of great natural blessings, where it is possible for men to live in nakedness and to eat without working breed large populations of idlers. What is more, after centuries of subjugation to Europe and exploitation by the Chinese, these natives have reached the point of almost complete emasculation. We may wish to make men of them again quickly, but we should not expect too much... .3

To the natives - whether you look at the matter from a geographical or a historical viewpoint - the British, the Americans, the French and the Dutch are armed robbers, whilst we Japanese are brothers. At least, we are indubitably relatives... .4

The Chinese The negative attitude of the Japanese towards the Borneo Chinese was entirely predictable. Since

Ethnic Policy

July 1937, Japan had been bogged down in an effort to conquer China. Although Japanese forces had been able to seize cities, ports and railway systems, they found it more difficult to win control of the countryside where both Nationalist and Communist guerilla groups constantly harassed them. Consequently, large numbers of troops and resources were tied up in a way that had not been anticipated. One prominent Japanese writer has suggested that the atrocities committed by Japanese troops in China, notably the Nanking massacre of December 1937, were the result of the mounting frustration felt by an army which had been confident of rapid victory.5 This confidence had been fed for decades by a semi-official racist ideology suggesting that the Chinese were an inferior race who should be brought under Japanese hegemony.6 By late 1937, Chiang Kai Shek had been forced to retreat from Nanking and establish himself in the western city of Chungking. However, he was being strongly supported both by the Americans and by the overseas Chinese who poured in their contributions to assist the war effort. We have already seen how extensive was the work of the China Relief Distress Fund in Sarawak from 1937. This support was bitterly resented by the Japanese who invaded Sarawak, particularly those who had served in China, and led them to treat the Chinese as suspect as well as inferior. In the short term, the principal concern of the military administration in Sarawak was to re­ establish good order. However, an incident within a few months of the invasion gave it a useful opportunity to flex its muscles against the Chinese. Realising that petrol would now be in short supply, some Chinese stole twenty drums from the lightlyguarded dump at the 7th mile airfield. The incident was reported and the men were caught and taken for questioning. Announcing three days before the event that they would be executed at the Sarawak Turf Club, the military authorities let it be known that the adult population of Kuching was expected to attend. At about 4 p.m. when a large crowd had assembled, the men were brought to the scene on the back of a truck. Dressed in khaki shorts and grey shirts, they were blindfolded and tied to stakes on the race track. Seven soldiers under the command of a young officer trooped on to the green turf and stationed themselves facing the condemned men some

117 eighteen feet away. There was dead silence as the soldiers took aim and at a given command they pulled the triggers of their rifles. The seven men slumped dead. Relatives ... were allowed to claim the bodies later that evening.7

The execution sent shock waves through Kuching and news of the unprecedented event reverberated to all comers of the state. The execution of a criminal had been a rare occurrence during Brooke rule and had always taken place at Fort Margherita or some other location remote from the public gaze. More than anything less, the incident made it clear to the people of Sarawak that the style of their new rulers would be very different from that of the Brookes. For the Japanese administration, it was vital that a strong message be sent to the community about the inviolability of defence installations and supplies. At a more basic political level, it was an illustration of the strategy celebrated in the old Chinese adage of sha j i xia hon (killing a cock to frighten the monkeys’). It was also a gesture towards those Japanese who believed that all the members of the pre-war China Relief Fund should be taken out and shot. At a practical level, it may have had some positive results. Very few major crimes involving property were committed during the occupation period and it was perfectly safe for people to leave their doors and windows open at any time of the night or day. The first clear statement of policy towards the Chinese was made to selected community representatives by the acting director-general of Miri-shu in June 1942. In his speech he revealed typical attitudes of the Japanese officer class which had been coloured by events in China. Essentially, he was emphasising that the Sarawak Chinese had to demonstrate their loyalty and expect tough treatment if they did not. One expression of loyalty was respect for the Japanese army, something which had not been to his satisfaction so far: I, the Governor of Miri state also Acting Administrator of this State by the order of the Commander General of Borneo Military Forces. My orders must be respected and failure to do so will be severely punished. It is very wrong and spiteful of the Chinese not to pay any respect to the Nippon Officers when they meet them on the roads or elsewhere, for merchants to sell goods at high price, for merchants to hoard their goods, for coolies and rickshaw pullers to do any unrespectable [disrespectful] acts. All these are

118

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941

-

1945

unpleasant sights and acts, and which must be stopped. Nippon already have destroyed the English and American, and have also swept away their powers from the South Ocean. However, Chiang Kai Shek is on their side and is still depending on them for help, which they cannot give, to carry on making trouble with Nippon. Nippon now therefore has determined to destroy absolutely the Chiang Kai Shek Government. Until it is abolished, Nippon has no more enemies and strong armies and navies, and most of the large colonies of our enemies have already been captured by us with properties. Nippon therefore, will have no more trouble even if the present war will last longer than expected. Nippon must win and Nippon is strong enough to win. If the Chinese people will keep on to their bad and hostile feelings towards us, I shall have to use other means to take away such behaviour. The Chinese people are all pro Chiang Kai Shek. You are not all just simple immigrants from China looking for your livelihood but actually you are all working for the Chungking Government. During the last five years Chinese people have been keeping Chiang Kai Shek by sending funds for his troops and Govt. You also put pressures to all the business of the Nippon people, in Borneo as well and making living very hard for them. You arose anti Nippon feeling amongst yourselves and the Natives. You make them to despise the Nippon people with disregard of law which forbids absolutely all these acts. On the outbreak of the east Asian war you Chinese were on the side of England, America and Holland against Nippon. You Chinese are therefore the enemy of Nippon. Now, in West Asia the English, Americans and Hollanders have all been destroyed miserably. And with Borneo captured, you the Chinese people suddenly changed your mind. Instead of being against us you say you are with us. By these words of changing the mind you wish to make us think that everything is settled here between Nippon and Chinese, this is wrong, you cannot make us behave or have our confidence in your people who are not against us but with us. The Commander General has authority on his own to punish death or by death, to take all your property or to drive you away from Borneo if you are found guilty oftreason ortreachery. It must be remembered that I am watching after the people and their daily acts, and I do hope their acts will not be unfaithful. I shall give any decision when I think fit to do so. All Chinese are hereby reminded again to be more careful, respectable [repectful] and abide by my Orders.8

Major Tsuneo Yano. (Photograph by courtesy o f M. Yamada.)

Until the October 1942 Directive, the Japanese military administration received very little guidance from Tokyo on the policies that should be adopted towards Sarawak’s different ethnic groups. The only hints given by Prime Minister Tojo were that on the one hand, the co-operation of subject peoples was vital, and on the other that the Chinese and their organisations should be subjected to close scrutiny. After the establishment of the Borneo Defence Force in July 1942, the question of how to deal with the economic and political power of the Chinese was at the top of the agenda but there was no clear idea of how this could be tackled. As with so many other matters, it was the personal experience of senior officers which influenced the policies eventually adopted. Chief of Staff Manaki took the pragmatic view that the skills of the Chinese were needed to make things work properly. He deplored the wholesale massacres of Chinese that followed the taking of Singapore. On the other hand, Staff Officer Tsuneo Yano, formerly an intelligence chief in central China and a powerful figure in the administration, believed that the Chinese could never be trusted and refused to make use of them. Yano ’s attitude was hardened by a chance happening witnessed by Capt. Matsaharu Yamada who was accompanying him on an early morning stroll: We saw a horse passing in front of us ridden by a very beautiful Chinese lady. I couldn’t believe my eyes. Yano’s face suddenly became red with anger. He was angry because the Chinese lady

Ethnic Policy

had passed without asking permission. So Yano shouted: ‘You are very rude! Stop!’ Afterwards we found out that the beautiful lady was one of the daughters of the former mayor of Kuching, Mr Wong [Ong Tiang Swee], Yano called in the heads of the military police and the local police and gave strict instructions on how to treat the Chinese people in general. After that incident the treatment of the Chinese became more strict than before. It became worse as time went on and led to the Api incident in [October] 1943.9

Once the Borneo Defence Force headquarters was established in Kuching in July 1942 with its kempei-tai component, the first targets of investigation were the organisers of the China Relief Committee whose support for the Chiang Kai Shek government was seen as an act of treachery. Taken in for questioning by the kempeitai, most were released after beatings and torture but two or three were never seen again and presumably died as a result of their treatment. Khan Ah Chong, who was ‘full of defiance’ when interrogated, was badly tortured and kept in confinement for much of the occupation.10 Chien Chiang Poa, the Kuching committee chairman, received similar treatment. Of the others, Tan Sum Guan, who had good reason to fear the Japanese because of his generous support for the Fund, suffered a severe heart attack on the day of the invasion and died two weeks later on the eve of Chinese New Year. Wee Kheng Chiang, who no doubt headed the wanted list, had gone to Singapore after the Centenary celebrations and spent the first year of the occupation in hiding. Another English-educated Chinese who had been outspoken in his criticism of the Japanese was the Chartered Bank’s compradore (local agent) in Kuching, Tan Soon Tye. Transferred to Singapore just before the invasion, he was last seen being taken away with others by the Japanese in trucks heading for Changi beach where hundreds of Chinese were machinegunned.11 As in Kuching, one of the first actions of the kempei-tai in Sibu in August 1942 was to make mass arrests over four days of twentyseven people, most of them members of the China Relief Committee.12 After a month of intensive interrogation and torture, all were released. Amongst them was Ling Kai Cheng, who had been active with the Sibu Committee. Accused of being an anti-Japanese agent because of his

119 work for the relief funds, he was treated with ‘gross contempt’ and tortured: Early on the morning of 15 August the Japanese military police came to my house and arrested me. They carried away two sacks of documents and books ... I was put in the military police cell, a dark room measuring eight feet by three feet, and had to sleep on the cold cement floor. My heart was shivering during the cold night. Tiong Chung Lo was detained in the adjacent cell. One morning, Mr Tiong knocked on the wall and spoke to me. The military police discovered our movement. They came in and dragged us out of the cells and beat us with their shoes, warning us not to do it again. On the night of the 32nd day of our detention, the military police opened the door and ordered us to get out of the cells. They shouted at us and ordered us to climb into a car. I thought it was time now for me to go to Heaven. We were driven to the prison along Race Course Road where we were ordered to get out of the car and went into the prison cell. There I found all my friends. We were very happy and greeted each other. The next day, our height was measured; finger and toe prints were made and we were asked to sign some documents. At 4.00 p.m. the same day we assembled at the hall to listen to the lecture of a Japanese officer who cautioned us: ‘We sympathised with the pleadings of your wives. You are all temporarily released and allowed to go home. But, should you commit an offence, you will be arrested and then either drowned in the sea or shot’. We left the prison at 6.00 p.m. on 16 September. We had been detained for 33 days. Fortunately we were able to walk home alive. 13

Nevertheless, a spy was employed to shadow Ling so that he continued to live in a world of suspense and fear. Another detainee subjected to severe beatings and the ‘water treatment’ was Lu Ngee Teck, who finished his education in Foochow in China and had been been actively involved in the China Relief Fund. In 1939 he was part of a group which visited the Nationalist Chinese Army and refugee camps and brought back many photographs which he then exhibited publicly in Sibu to assist the fund­ raising effort. Fortunately for him, he managed to get a message out from gaol to his family to destroy all the compromising photographs before the kempei-tai raided his house.14 In Jesselton on 13 June 1942 the Japanese published a sharp warning to the Chinese:

120

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

The overseas Chinese have for the past five years since the China-Japan incident helped the Chungking government war-fund by subscriptions. The Chinese have maltreated, oppressed and denounced overseas Japanese. Such anti-Japanese conduct is intolerable. Since the outbreak of the war in East Asia, the Chinese acting with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies have resisted Japan. They have behaved as an enemy, by helping the enemy. When Japanese troops repulsed Great Britain, America and the Dutch East Indies and then occupied Borneo, the Chinese changed their attitude and pretended that they knew nothing. Let not the Chinese forget that the power of seizing them and putting them all to death rests with one decision ofthe Japanese High Command. Although the Chinese are now allowed their freedom, it is only temporary to enable the Japanese to watch their movements. Now let the Chinese reflect deeply and come to their senses before another notice.15

Within days, three leading members of the local China Relief Fund Committee were arrested and sent to kempei-tai headquarters in Kuching.

Shu Jin The treatment of the China Relief Fund organisers in Kuching and Sibu was punitive to a point but was also designed to secure the co-operation of the traditional Chinese leadership on pain of further incarceration and torture. In Kuching, the military administration moved quickly after July to dissolve all Chinese clan and community organisations and to establish in their place the Kakeo Kokokai (United Overseas Chinese Association). The short-term aim was to make it responsible for collecting the $750,000 Shujin (life-redeeming money), imposed on the Sarawak Chinese for supporting the Chiang Kai Shek government against Japan. The long-term intention was to have a broadly-based Chinese association which would help to implement Japanese policy and ensure the co-operation of the Chinese as a whole. This was never very likely in view of the Japanese plan to reduce their economic and political power. Sarawak’s share of the shu-jin was modest by comparison with the $50,000,000 demanded collectively from Malaya and Singapore.16 The town of Malacca alone had to raise $5,000,000 despite the fact that only $1,500,000 in Straits currency was circulating there at the time of the

invasion. North Borneo had to find $1,000,000. Neverthless, collecting the money was an extremely onerous responsibility, not only because of the dislocation of commercial activity but because the amount had to be paid in pre-war Sarawak currency. Agreement had to be reached on the liability allocated to each of the dialect groups in Sarawak’s three new administrative divisions and these in turn had to allocate individual liability as an 8% levy on the accepted value of property. Chinese pockets were highly sensitive at the best of times and this was a payment which brought no return. Those who had not contributed so generously to the China Relief Fund did not see why they should have to bear the penalty. Altogether, it was a task which demanded the utmost tact and diplomacy from the Association’s leaders and they were subsequently to pay a heavy price for their mediation. In addition to the ‘blood debt’, there was the collection of an annual poll tax of $6 on all Chinese (other races paid 50 cents) and the supply of forced labour for such projects as airfields construction. The labour was usually provided by members of the Chinese Young Men’s Association which was formed as an auxiliary body to the Kakeo Kokokai. The Chinese were also expected to contribute generously to Japan’s war fund through cash donations or the purchase of war bonds. The collection of quit rents advertised by an official notice on 26 January 1942 meant an additional levy of 5% on all landed property and mining lands. In Sibu, the pattern was similar. In September, all Chinese clan and other associations were ordered to take down their signboards and to merge into one co-operative organisation known as the Dochokai (harmony society). As in Kuching, the membership of the pre-war China Relief Fund Committee was effectively co-opted to run the Dochokai and its various branches throughout the lower Rejang area. The Sibu Chinese were perhaps more fortunate than their counterparts in Kuching because of the relatively liberal policy of Major Takeda. However a new kempei-tai head from North Borneo introduced his own reign of terror in 1944.

The Malays Japanese policy towards the Malays reflected the Japanese perception of them as the victims of

Ethnic Policy

121

REGULATIONS GOVERNING HEAD TAX. The following rules regarding the payment of head tax shall rome into operation with effect, from 1st Shies i-gatsu, 2002. 1. All persons residing in Borneo, with the exception of Japanese nationals, shall pay head tax as prescribed hereunder. 2.

The tax payable by the persons above-mentioned shall be as follows :— Chinese nationals Malays and others

...

...

...

$6;00 per person per annum .50

3. In the cas.- of a person of uncertain nationality, 'such nationality will be decided by the General Administration Board. 4. The head of each family shall bo responsible for the payment of the head tax in respect of every memltcr of his or her family. 5. The proprietor of a firm shall be responsible for Ihe payment of the head tax in respect of every person in his or her employ, except in the case of any j»erson wluxe tax has already been paid under rule 4 above. 6.

Tax shall be payable between the 1st day of Shich i-gatsu and the 31st day of Ju-ni-gatsu every

• 7. Should the persons referred to in rules 4 and 5 fail to pay the head tax for which they are respon­ sible, a fine not exceeding $100 in respect of each of the persons for whom tax has not been paid shall be imposed on them in accordance with Military Law. 8. Any person who, for any special reasons, is unable to pay his head tax shall report liis reasons to the Chokan of the Shin in which such tax-payer is residing. The Shiu Chokan will use his discretion as to whether the tax paj’able by such person shall be reduced or whether such person shall l>e exempted from payment. 9. Those persons who have already paid their head or door tax for this year are exempted from the payment of the tax prescribed in rule 2 for the current year, viz. 2002.

m

m

A

>k »T A i fiij & m

n

m m as

fftj ' 15 f -te

■b

m -fc m A m B m m m

—

-

«

i

4c •

&

m

-tmi ft

m 3i.

m m

*

% m h

» ®;fl8

nm Wi ■ A*fc M fJc m» ff® £ ffn few S IS ■ m tc & lit t T & ■£*0' mm

m

_.

m

—

* A ft ail * * m&i %

m

Wifi

u

2. m m

• m

W® mm

in Jc

m m m =

ft

^ * s 4(-< 5•_*:

1

a

a

m m m

Japanese order setting out head tax regulations.

A.

$L

z:*5

m m ft % m ’ r * K ftM - & A m ail f t m m z. m n & iW f# m z. t # • %

&

m me a *n a &

tL Eg -

:m &

•B

ffl

122

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

jtttH A

1 4 S 'l

a

t

Hi

S itte r

ft # >3?

Fi

3 4

i t . &

^ ^ .9

0 H ^

.

M-

a & W K W i'k J fM lei

m X ■ m .

« ii l& M ,

5f

-&r -& • -®r JS.

4

b

3 '7 # '7 # W ,^7,2- ^ W iT a s^ -fc .* * tM » :•& $ & ro -

& H 0 ■$> * * >r

m JKV « • ^ m

¥ • & m

i s

5 M • • # 3t

IS ft

a a B B B

« «• ^ //c r

#

7

£

W * n --^ & 0

g

# 7 5 # $■

aj

i

/H2.0

if e

*fi

% ii A vh &. i5 t u

_. _ / 0

# ^ ^ # ¥ #

i

P ± « S tfi B (ep^gS B S fi^)

^

«

K i t ,

jL i- a

•6J *t 3S « « *

r~r— »----ffi 1ft «

*a i&X4±Ar*ti4,\

W M m m

>&

M

i

u

O

$ .

A M# Mf o H

* v&$t’c -z -A ) A;2 ^ - •< »

% ' m t ^4^)00 H £ $ -% . *('i_^Jl) — . iarj W $ 4 t% } £ 7 coo Z O s & t J ij; t/tf-COO - ^ ?, X & f c l b &oab « *> (» ^ ^ ^ P 7>m !6, .t it m $4*7;

Sgt. Keith Barrie and friends at Sibu, September 1945. (Photograph by courtesy o f Keith Barrie.)

So there was the Doc. seated on a box in front of the parade, shirtless and capless, holding a forked stick in front of him indicating to each of the individuals in the parade to put their equipment in it so that he could turn it around for inspection without the necessity to touch the member ... ,55

The Kuching Surrender In Kuching, news of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 8 and 11 August had been picked up by the secret radio at Batu Lintang and the next day it was passed on to Ong Kee Hui. He decided to have an immediate private celebration under his house with a bottle of champagne hidden away for the occasion. A Japanese pilot friend came to his house later to tell him the news and warn him of what the ordinary soldiers might do but at the time he was at a meeting of the Chinese Young Men’s Association: I was in the middle of a meeting but I had to go out. He took me to the middle of the street so that nobody else can hear and told me: ‘We have lost the war’. Of course I knew it but I didn’t tell him that I knew it.57

189

Liberation

of USS Doyle C. Barnes: The ceremonials were simple. The location was on the forecastle just forward of Kapunda’s superstructure and abaft a 4" gun mount. A small table 3 1/2 ft square, draped with the British Union Jack, stood alone off to the port from the centre of the deck with one chair. Three copies of the surrender document and four pens were placed on top of the table. Nearby at either end of the foredeck were guards of honor, from the Australian Army and Navy. The official guards, representing the Australian Army and Navy and the U.S. Navy stood facing inboard on the port side ... With General Yamamura, who had his sword in hand, facing him, Brigadier Eastick read in English the surrender terms of the Japanese Army forces of Sarawak, between the southern Dutch frontier and the Rajang River to the north. The interpreter reported this to Yamamura who also scanned over a copy which had been written in Japanese. First he demurred acceptance stating that he had not received official word that his superior, Lieut. Gen. Baba, had signed in Labuan for all Borneo Japanese Army forces. Brigadier Eastick told him that the surrender had been signed in Labuan and that General Baba had agreed to send this word to Kuching, and then ordered Yamamura to then and there sign. Yamamura took out his glasses and slowly affixed them. He was then offered the chair and sat down to sign the surrender. The pen blotted the paper. He smiled for the first and only time expressing any emotion. He then signed all the papers - time 1440, this being the last and most important Jap stronghold in all Borneo. Yamamaura then resumed his position facing Brigadier Eastick, who informed the interpreter that he now required the Japanese general to hand over his sword. With steady hand but with painful slowness he extended his sword held horizontally with both hands to Brigadier Eastick, as cameras clicked on all sides. The Brigadier accepted the sword with a few well chosen words in behalf of his country and her allies. Yamamura saluted with dignity and Brigadier Eastick returned the salute smartly. The ceremony was then over. Yamamura was advised that inasmuch as he had been ill with malaria for several days he was dismissed but that his staff would remain aboard for further conference. He saluted again and was escorted by the Brigade Major to the boat to be taken ashore.58

11 September 1945 The landing of the first party of Australians at Ban Hock wharf at about 5 p.m. on 11 September

was witnessed by crowds whose behaviour was remarkably subdued. Relief and happiness at liberation was dampened by fear of the kempeitai who remained very much in control of the situation until the last moment. The one dramatic signal of deliverance earlier that day was the raising of the Union Jack and the Sarawak Flag at Fort Margherita. This courageous coup was performed by Lau Chai Lim who had been a member ofthe Sarawak VolunteersNo. 1 Company demolition squad in October 1941. Informed by some escaped prisoners from Batu Lintang a few days earlier that the Australians were due to arrive in Kuching on 11 September, he bicycled into town together with his twenty year old son, Lau Kok Hua, carrying the flags and his service rifle and pistol which he had kept hidden for the duration of the war. Making their way to Fort Margherita, which they found deserted, they waited until they saw the first Australian patrol boats approaching before hoisting the flags on tree branches. Needless to say, the appearance of the flags caused a sensation amongst the onlookers on the town side of the river who had been eagerly awaiting some indication that liberation was not just another rumour. As one of the crowd recalled a year after the event: The sudden appearance of the Sarawak Flag, side by side with the Union Jack over Fort Margherita shortly before noon, sent the blood tingling through our body, as we gazed lovingly and rapturously at that first concrete sign that served to confirm the passing of four years of fantastic nightmare ... . 59 Possibly the first to land at Ban Hock Wharf was an Australian Army photographer who had gone ahead of the main party in an RAF launch: I wish I could describe the curious feeling it gave us to go ashore with armed Japanese guards patrolling the wharves (without so much as a glance at us), and thousands of people crowding the streets, a few looking happy to see us, but the majority just staring as if they had never seen a white man before, no doubt afraid to make any demonstration for fear of Jap reprisals. In no time we were engulfed in a sea of curious faces Chinese, Malay, Indian and hybrid - and as we moved down the street the human tide moved with us. Those who were riding bicycles, dismounted and joined the pedestrians. A few came forward to offer their hands and express their relief at

190

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

our coming. A number smiled strenuously in their eagerness, but the general quiet was rather disturbing. We were just getting used to this Lilliputian atmosphere when everyone scattered, darting into side streets and into doorways, and racing down the street towards us was a small English car flying the Japanese flag. Standing in the back of the car with his hands clasped on his sword hilt was an arrogant figure wearing the armband ofthe dreaded KEMPEI-TA1... We learnt later that Kempei-Tai patrols had spent the day racing round the streets, slashing with their swords at crowds gathering by the wharves to welcome our troops.60 Amongst the Australians to land later that afternoon from ‘HMAS Rattlesnake’, one of the local ‘snakeboats’ used by Australian guerillas on the Borneo coast, was Sgt. Chua Gin Teck. A tough little Sarawakian who had worked in circuses in Southeast Asia before driving trucks on the Burma Road, he had joined the British Army in Singapore just before the Japanese

attack. Evacuated to Perth by ship, he had subsequently joined the Australian Army and was selected for ‘Z Force’ partly because of his knowledge of local languages. Parachuting in to Bario with Semut I in March, he had helped to train Kenyah and Iban recruits to harass the Japanese. This is how he described the scene when he went ashore: It was round about 5 p.m. Kuching time on the 11th September 1945 when we arrived at Ban Hock Wharf ... by the side of the slipway. Then we walked up Ban Hock Wharf slowly comes to near the clock tower. There we met a Japanese officer - he’s a blue-flag officer. He was so annoyed with the citizens and was chasing them, pulling his sword out he was chasing all those citizens out ofthe way by the centre of the road ... Then myself and the sergeant by the name of Shepherd ... and another one is Carter ... the three of us goes in three directions, goes up to the officer. That blue flag kneeled down and handed his sword and his pistol to the sergeant. From there we escorted the

Crowd greeting the Australians at Ban Hock Wharf, Kuching, 11 September 1945. (Photograph by Lieut. A. W. Horner. Australian War Memorial negative no. 118582.)

191

Liberation

Australian soldiers stacking confiscated Japanese swords and other weapons at the river-front, Kuching, 11 September 1945. (Australian War Memorial negative no. 120729.)

sergeant up to the Sarawak Rest House ... From there we leave him there near the guardhouse. Also there is a Japanese guardhouse. There the Japanese guard kneeled down too and handed his sword. After that... we put our kit down. I myself strolled down, that was dark already - down the main road - Rock Road - then comes to Carpenter Street. There there’s no light ... people selling

this with the pelita lamp, boxes, they are selling something there. I was so astonished, what are they doing there. I just walked past looking at them selling these Japanese cigarettes some odds and ends, Japanese goods there. Looking at them, these people were so, the public was so astonished about me. Is he Chinese? Dressed in uniform they thought I am an Australian or an American or what. I never said. Later I asked one of the elderly men there, I talked to him in Chinese. He was so surprised. ‘You are Chinese?’, he said. ‘Yes. Could you please let me know whether my brother, he’s an ex-police here by name Ong Heng Hoe?’ These people said ‘yes, yes!’ But I said, ‘where is he staying now?’ ‘He’s not in Kuching town, he’s over at sea side’. 1 said ‘why he go to the sea side?’. ‘Because his duty is finished and got to hide over to sea side’. I asked them whether they could help me sending news down to my brother saying that your brother Mr Chua is in Kuching now. I handed a few packets of Craven A cigarettes ... some biscuits and army cake. I hand it down. I gave one packet. I said you please hand it down. They were so happy and everyone was crowding me out. Whatever I got, cigarettes, anything, I just gave to the kids, they were so happy. Later that night they sent me back, those kids all followed me up to the Rest House. That

[Photos here o f Chua in uniform and Chua today - both vertical] Australian troops disarming Japanese. Pengkalan Batu, Kuching, 11 September 1945. (Australian War Memorial negative no. 118544.)

192

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Australian troops marching through Kuching, September 1945

night I couldn’t sleep. 1was thinking ‘why Kuching is so different now?’61 The next day the five hundred or so soldiers and sailors of ‘Kuching Force’ marched around the central padang several times, no doubt to create the illusion that they were more numerous than they really were. Greeting them from many of the shophouses were Chinese Nationalist flags

brought out after long concealment - but no British or Australian flags.

Batu Lintang From the steps of his office at Batu Lintang camp at 2 p.m. on 24 August, Col. Tsuga had made an em otional speech to the prisoners, acknowledging the Japanese surrender and describing the killing of hundreds of thousands of people at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. ‘It is peace for you’, he told them, ‘but I have lost everything. I sent all my family to Hiroshima, and they are all dead’.62 Tsuga did not realise that thanks to the secret wireless and the pamphlets air-dropped on 19 August his audience was well aware of all that had happened: He said that he had good news for us, the war was over - he read a pamphlet and we looked as tho’ we’d never seen it before. He stated that owing to the wicked bombing of the Americans the Emperor had asked for peace to save the lives of millions of Japanese women and children, but that the Army wished to fight on. He said that he was cut off from Tokyo and had no orders so we must carry on as usual.63

Sgt. Chua Gin Teck, September 1945. (Photograph by courtesy o f Chua Gin Teck.)

Tsuga warned them that there were 5,000

193

Liberation

Japanese troops in the Kuching area and that some local commanders might not obey the Emperor’s surrender order. He advised the prisoners to stay within the compound whose perimeter the guards would protect. In the meantime, Allied air drops of clothing and medical supplies, even toothbrushes and tooth powder, were being arranged. From 30 August, supply planes came over at 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. each day to pass on messages and take orders. Fresh bread and butter appeared for the first time in three and a half years. Bundles of clothing were dropped and distributed by the four Australian women in the camp:

in bed, the Crooner was carried up on a stretcher and the leading commedian [sic] - a boy of about 25 - broad Lancashire standing about 6 ft 4 weighed 7 stone and had to be helped along. But nothing daunted him, he grinned from ear to ear, scratched his scabies and was funnier than ever. Hardy the dancer - used to be Cicely Courtnage’s agent he could barely stand let alone dance ... He was resplendant [sic] in Barbara’s bathing suit and a mission frock!65

On 8 September the British Tommies gave what was to be the last camp concert. Sister Bates described it:

On 1 September Col. Tsuga had formally handed over control of the camp to the senior officers amongst the prisoners but it was not until the afternoon of 11 September that Australian soldiers entered the compound, formally taking over control from the Japanese at 5 p.m. Sister Bates wrote: ‘They were the tallest and handsomest men we’d ever seen - they laughed with us and treated us like women’. That afternoon the camp was visited by Brigadier-General Eastick, whose sheer physical size was a source of wonderment for the internees summoned to the parade ground. Hudson Southwell recalled the scene:

Several of the original band were missing, the female impersonator looked as tho’ he should be

Within seconds the civilian barracks were deserted - everyone was on the road, half-running, hobbling

Very strong servicable [sic] garments [wrote Sister Bates], What tickles us most was that the Small Women’s fitted our outsize! Some women[,] Australians ... Fashion books were dropped today, clothes appear much the same but hats and hair!64

Prisoners at Batu Lintang Camp waving to Allied aircraft, August 1945 (Australian War Memorial negative no. 129037)

194

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

towards the square. Behind us we could see the women and children pouring out of the gate, and the soldiers moving slowly, weakly, laboriously. I waited for Winsome and spotted her quickly in this expectant mass of humanity. We pressed forward. A staff car pulled up, and a big, heavily built officer got out. There was a spontaneous gasp of surprise at his size: ‘Sir, we have not seen so much meat on bones for years!’, someone said. ‘Oh’, he laughed. ‘Wait until you see General Wootten tomorrow’.66 Agnes Keith described her emotions during the speeches made by Eastick and the American naval commander, Captain Jennings: While Eastick is speaking we in the crowd come a little nearer to realizing that we are free. We are beyond words, our hearts hammer and bang, our pulses throb, our throats ache, we weep and we cheer. We strike each other’s backs and clasp hands. The children are held high in the air. But they are quiet now because our tears astound and frighten them. Harry attempt to lift George on to his shoulder, but he is still too weak; a friend lifts George up instead. Then over this hysteria Captain Jennings speaks. Here are his words: ‘Today is my first experience of this sort. It is worth many a battle, and many a long, hard night on the sea. This what we have been fighting for’. It is the one perfect speech that I have ever heard, it is the only speech I ever wish to hear, but it finished composure. Captain Jennings himself, they tell me, ended his words in tears. Anyway, no one was ashamed of crying that day 67 The final words of Eastick’s address undid the evil spell of three and half years: ‘You are all FREE people!’, he roared. J.B. Archer had the satisfaction of hauling down the Rising Sun and raising a Sarawak flag which he had obtained from some Chinese friends through the wire earlier that day. The only Japanese present at the proceedings was the courageous Col. Tsuga, ‘a desolate little figure, at the back of the crowd, with his sword trailing dismally behind him’.68 ‘Come on, cobber, you won’t need that any more’, said one of the lanky Australians as he removed it.69 When Tsuga was taken away shortly afterwards, it seemed to the Revd Peter Howes that his treatment was unnecessarily harsh:

A jeep drove up, hauling a trailer. Suga was ordered to sit on the floor of the trailer, and that was the last we saw of him; holding on to the sides as it bounced mercilessly over the parade ground and out through the main gate, It seemed a pointless humiliation, inflicted merely because the man was an enemy; for there had been no trial.70 For Howes, even the ritual act of public humiliation of one of their principal tormentors was by no means a satisfying experience: The burly Korean sergeant, who had so efficiently beaten up the guards and the rest of us, was also hauled away in a trailer, with a large placard around his neck on which was written, ‘THE BIGGEST SHIT IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA’. He was driven slowly around the bazaar, while onlookers were encouraged to pelt him with any filth they could lay their hands on. Again one wondered. He had always appeared to have only just enough intelligence to obey orders.71 By this time ‘Mrs Harris’ had been brought out of hiding and shown to the ex-prisoners who marvelled at the unlikely combination of tin, corrugated iron and other scraps which made up the secret wireless. A thanksgiving ceremony was held in the square the next morning by the Australian army chaplains. ‘It was a beautiful service’, wrote Sister Bates, ‘and every time the word FREE was mentioned you could see and hear swallowing’.72 General George Wootten, all 22 stone of him, also came to the camp to fulfil Eastick’s promise. ‘I’ve never seen such a huge man as the General’, she exclaimed. ‘Each authority gets larger! He must be 70" around the middle’.73 On this occasion, the Punjabi and British military prisoners, who had suffered worst of all from ill-treatment, starvation and disease, formed a guard of honour using rifles taken from their Japanese guards. During the following days the very ill were taken to Labuan by Catalina and arrangements were made to transport the others by ship to Australia. It was not until they reached Labuan that the full significance of their new situation dawned on some of the ex-prisoners. Warrant Officer E.R. Pepler, one of the two secret wireless operators, wrote later: The most touching incident of our lives for many a year, came when we arrived at Labuan. As there was no place to dock the ship anchored off shore and D.U.K.W.’s came out to take us ashore. Up the rope ladders on the side of the

195

Liberation

Brigadier-GeneraI Eastick adressing liberated civilian and military prisoners, Batu Lintang. 11 September 1945. (Australian War Memorial negative no. 116933.)

Thanksgiving ceremony at Batu Lintang, 12 September 1945. Officiating is the Anglican Bishop o f Sarawak, Francis Hollis, who had also been interned. (Photograph by Lieut. A. W. Horner. Australian War Memorial negative no. 118589.)

'-H

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

i

196

Brigadier-General Eastick with Col. Tsuga, commandant of Batu I.intang. (Australian War Memorial negative no. 116924.)

General Wootten talking to newly-freed civilian prisoners at Batu Lintang. 12 September 1945. They were greatly impressed by his girth. (Australian War Memorial negative no. 118599.)

Liberation

197 For those like Sister Bates who were in reasonable health and remained in Kuching, life was a hectic round of lunch parties and endless talk: Forces pour in - we can’t even change our clothes, they stay to meals on our beds and talk! Never were there such talkers. In the middle of it all an American pops his head in the window and calls ‘Say, Honey, hold everything’ and snap goes the camera!75

J.B. Archer (centre) and other newly-freed Sarawak government officers hoisting the Sarawakflag at Batu Lintang, 11 September 1945

ship swarmed large bronzed Australian [sic] who picked us up in their arms, despite protest, and carried us down to the waiting D.U.K.W.s. In the D.U.K.W.s were Australian nurses who tended to us and handed out smokes, etc. I saw many an ex prisoner with tears streaming down his cheeks. It was as though we were just realizing that we were free by seeing so many neatly dressed and lovely Aussie nurses.74

On 18 September came the sobering news that Col. Tsuga had committed suicide at Labuan by cutting his throat with a kitchen knife and that official plans for the massacre of all the prisoners on 17 or 18 August had been discovered in his quarters at Batu Lintang. When the Australian soldiers learnt of this, they could barely be restrained from indiscriminately assaulting the Japanese guards and other prisoners who were now interned in the camp. The Australian journalists attached to 9th Division Headquarters in Labuan were puzzled by the newly liberated prisoners’ lack of vengeful feeling towards their recent captors, particularly when news came of the Long Nawang massacre. How their guards were to be treated had been a favourite theme during internment. Agnes Keith had heard women say: ‘Wait until our turn comes! Then we’ll make them suffer as they made us. 1 should like to get hold of their Japanese women and children and make them live as we live!’.76 Nevertheless, there was not a single reported retaliatory attack on the guards or the camp officers by the ex-prisoners.77 The same could not be said, however, about the Australian soldiers who subsequently supervised the guards and other war crimes suspects at Labuan while they were awaiting trial by the military court.78 Thirty years after the event, Anthony Richards recalled his feelings on release: apart from small incidents and niggles, things that bore very heavily at the time no doubt - if I could remember them - when we were finally released I don’t think any of us took this revengeful view that some of the journalists about the place were taking at the time ... . 79

RAF Warrant Officer L. T.A. Beckett, one o f her two creators, explaining the mysteries o f ‘Mrs Harris ’to General Wootten. (Australian War Memorial negative no. 116951.)

So psychologically accustomed were the civilian prisoners to respecting uniformed authority that they found themselves bowing to the Australian soldiers.80

198

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

The Punjabi officers and soldiers were not so restrained in their behaviour towards the Japanese prison guards. Visiting Batu Lintang, Sgt. Chua Gin Teck was horrified to find the Indians forcing some guards to drink boiling water on pain of having their heads kicked with hobnail boots. ‘They got no law, we got no law’, they told him when he protested. The Australian officers knew what was going on but were reluctant to interfere.81 Nor were the authorities prepared to give credit to the Japanese on those rare occasions when it was due. When a military observer prepared a report in early 1946 entitled ‘Jap Girl Helped Punjabi PWs Despite Beating’, it was quickly ‘killed’ by the British Military Administration’s information people: Remnants of the 2/15 Battalion, the Punjab Regt., who heroically resisted overwhelming formation of the Japanese 37 Army in the 1942 invasion of Sarawak until they were overrun, paid tribute to the bravery of Miss Aki Takata during their confinement in Kuching POW Camp. Miss Takata was employed on the staff of the camp for two years, during which time she assisted the prisoners of war despite frequent beatings and fines. The population of Sarawak, which is completely pro-British, depended on her to smuggle to the sepoys food which they stole from Japanese stores. The majority of the prison inmates are convinced that her hatred for Japan was only equalled by their own. She now wishes to return to China, where she spent the greater part of her life. Before returning to India, the sepoys implored the British Military authorities to do all in their power to assist this Japanese but humane girl.82 It would be interesting to know what became of Miss Aki Takata.

Fujino Force News of the official Japanese surrender had reached most Japanese units and there was no commander prepared to defy the Emperor’s order. However, three units that carried out the planned retreat deep into the interior were not in wireless communication with headquarters and did not surrender until some time later. The first of these was the ?? which was trained at Ranau in late 1944 and despatched to Kuching on foot, each man carrying about 30 kilos of arms

and food. Amongst them was Yoshinori Kochi, who had been conscripted in September 1944. Reaching the area between Lutong and Miri, they turned inland in the hope of living in the mountains. From there they heard the shelling of Labuan and the coast on 9 and 10 June and decided that discretion was the better part of valour. Surrendering to a party of Australians whom they encountered on the Miri-Riam road, they were relieved of their watches and other valuables by the soldiers with cheery ‘thank you’s. Unable to communicate with the Australians but a keen observer, Kochi was struck by three things about them. Firstly, they were wearing strong leather boots which contrasted dramatically with his own ragged rubber footwear; secondly, they had matches, the lack of which had been a constant bane of life in the damp jungle; thirdly, they seemed to place very little value on their rifles, slinging them around as if they were of no value. This was absolutely shocking for a Japanese soldier who had been told in no uncertain terms during his training that the chrysanthemum flower stamped on his rifle butt signified that it was the personal property of Tenno Heika and should be guarded with his life, never to be surrendered unless the symbolic emblem was removed to preserve Imperial dignity.83 Kochi and his companions had gone through a kind of hell in their pointless trek into the jungle. Neverthless, they were fortunate to have escaped the fate of another party of seventeen in the same area who were killed and their heads taken by the Iban. The only man to escape the slaughter had left to deliver a message. The third group was the 64th Independent Forward Anti-Aircraft Company which had taken part in the defence of Lutong refinery against the Australian beach landings on June 10. Giichi Okita was an oil engineer who had worked for some time at the Balikpapan refineries until the heavy Allied bombing beginning in late 1944. Each day he huddled with his staff in trenches originally dug by the Dutch while as many as 400 US planes rained down 250 kilo bombs. Injured by shrapnel and with the plant virtually destroyed, he was then called up as an ordinary soldier and sent to Keningau in North Borneo for a short course in military training before being posted to Lutong. Despite their inexperience and the rough

199

Liberation

behaviour of their officers towards them, the civilian conscripts of the 64th performed creditably during the Lutong landing, using guns captured from the Australians in Singapore in February 1942. They managed to sink one or two of the landing craft and earned warm congratulations from the commanding officer in the Miri area. However, they were in no position to stem the Australian tide. Their orders were to retreat southwards to ‘Point B’ and re-group before going on to the Baram River. They were to establish themselves there until such time as they received further instructions. With only a simple map and compass to guide them and carrying whatever food and equipment they could manage, the 460 men trudged into the labyrinthine and inhospitable jungle. ‘Point B’ was reached after two weeks but it took another month to reach the Baram. By now they had changed out of their uniforms into civilian clothes and were carrying only rifles and mortars to protect themselves. Without tents or any other waterproof gear, they had to sleep in the jungle under leaves. On the way, their numbers had been reduced by dysentery, malaria and malnutrition, as well as periodic ambushes by Iban armed with rifles as well as sumpit. Fortunately for them, the Iban were wildly inaccurate shots, being much more accustomed to shotguns, but there were still some losses. At the end of August when their whole situation seemed utterly hopeless, an American reconnaissance plane which had been given their rough position dropped pamphlets informing them of the surrender and directing them to return to Miri. Back they slogged towards the coast, their boots in tatters and their food supply almost exhausted. Sometimes they were able to shoot pigs in the jungle to keep them from starvation. Nevertheless, many died along the way and by the time they reached the outskirts of Miri on 10 October their numbers had been further reduced to only 60. Okita himself was suffering from malaria and had to be hospitalised at Batu Lintang. Even this experience paled into insignificance against the extraordinary story o f ‘Fujino Force’. Retreating according to plan after completing the denial exercise at Seria on 10 June, oilfields staff and their families joined the military

garrison under Capt. Fujino at Labi. Thwarted by Australian attacks, they struck inland towards the Beruan River (a tributary of the Tutoh) and after suffering various hazards including attacks by Australian-armed Berawan guerillas, eventually reached the foot of Mount Murud where they had hoped to base themselves. When the area proved to be useless for agriculture, they pushed on to the Limbang and the Upper Trusan. There they were attacked by a guerilla force under Major Rex Blow and Major Tom Harrisson and after rejecting a number of surrender demands, including one from General Baba himself, Capt. Fujino finally gave up his sword to Harrisson on 29 October.84 According to the official Australian account, there were at that time 346 in the Japanese party.85 The following account of Fujino Force was written by one of the survivors, Yonosuke Kagaya, in collaboration with Koichiro Asano. During his internment at Labuan after the surrender, Kagaya wrote notes on his experiences with a pencil on can labels. The dates, place names and sequence of events are not always accurate but he creates a vivid impression of what it was like during their disastrous retreat into the interior. 86

By th e o rd e r o f Hie M a je sty , th e Em peror, th e Jap an ese V im p e ria l Army has su rre n d e re d u n c o n d itio n a lly to th e A llie d '. P ow ers. As a r e s u l t o f t h i s o rd e r 1 have su rre n d e re d to th e G.O.C. 9 th A u s tr a lia n D iv isio n e l l th e Japan ese armed fo ro e s in B r i t i s h Borneo and th e IL.TOENa Is la n d s . T h e re fo re I oonacnd t h a t you s h e l l c a rry < fo llo w in g o r d e r s , i m p lic itly and w ith o u t

3.

(C)

On a r r i v a l a t OKOtIG you w i l l prooeed p e rs o n a lly to th e A u s t r a l l a n 'l i n o s . You w i l l be accompanied by one Ott^er O f f ic e r and one o r d e r ly . Your p a r ty w i l l S eo o iS ptaialju-anarm ed and you w ill c a rry a w hite fla g .

(D)

The C.O. o f th e a .H .F . In UKONG a r e a w ill g iv e you o rd e rs as to th e d is p o s a l o f e l l yo u r weapons and th e c o n c e n tra tio n o f your tr o o p s . You w ill obey th e s e o rd e rs w ith o u t q u e s tio n .

These o rd e rs a re c a r r ie d to you by 2nd L ie u t OUORI who is an O f f ic e r from my H ead q u arters a t SAPOIIG. He a c ts w ith f u l l a u th o r ity from mq. F a ilu r e to o b serv e any o f th e se o rd e rs w i l l r e s u l t in d r a s t i o punishm ent.

U . BABA, L ie u te n a n t G eporal, Commander 37 Jap an ese Army.

Surrender order from General Baba delivered to Fujino Force. (By courtesy o f Sarawak Museum Archives.)

200

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

THE ORDEAL OF THE SERIA UNIT IN BORNEO

by Yonosuke Kagaya and Koichiro Asano On 9 June 1945, we received the order to blow up the Seria oilfield, the so-called ‘Ha-go Operation’. We had received intelligence the day before that the British fleet had taken control of the Brunei gulf and commenced a landing. For the previous month we had been told not leave our posts without completing the ‘Ha-go’ operation. This operation was to blow up the whole Seria field so that our enemies would not be able to make use of the field when they occupied the area. I remember it was 18.00 hours on 10 June 1945 when a siren went off for one minute and we all prayed in silence before commencing the operation. Who could possibly have held back their tears when we were about to blow up the oilfield to whose complete restoration our comrades had devoted three years of enormous sacrifice. The operation took only two hours. The fires lasted for more than a few days and according to the British broadcast could be seen as far as 100 kilometres at sea On 20 June the British main force finally began to invade Seria and we fled towards Labi. On the way there we received an order from Miri headquarters to form the Seria District Unit. In Labi other groups from [Kuala] Belait and Brunei, kempei-tai and also some Japanese civilians joined the group which grew to more than 600 strong ... . We planned to stay at Labi and do farming but because of the constant atttacks from the British army we had to abandon the plan. We also realised that our food stocks for the Unit would only last three months. If we wanted to contact Miri headquarters we had to make a move straight away, otherwise it would become very difficult to go on across the swampy ground in the rainy season. After a meeting, we decided to to leave Labi for the Beruang River on 1st July. Second Lieut. Toyota went to Miri to contact headquarters but never came back. We all left Labi for Pinan, the biggest

fortress on the Beruan River. People were allowed to carry only two months’ supply of bread, canned food, sugar, salt, miso powder and shoyu [soy sauce] powder. All of us were carrying thirty rifle bullets each and those connected with the army had rifles. People who did not have rifles carried spears. On the way to Pinan we received intelligence that the British were already there so we changed our plans and decided to go further into the interior. Some people deserted the unit. Some were Chinese or others who knew the natives. 12 July. We realised that our plan to reach Miri headquarters was impossible and decided to flee to Mount Mulu and farm there. Walking along the river was very dangerous as we would have been exposed to British aircraft and to local people, so we had to venture into the jungle, making our way by cutting trees and bushes. The only guides we had were a 1/ 500,000 map and the magnets in our wrist watches. In the first week when we reached the Beruan River, we were attacked by the natives. Two of our people were killed and one seriously injured. At this point we realised that the local people were well equipped with automatic rifles. Most of the people we had hired to carry out food had run away and we now had a serious problem carrying food and other necessities. On 20 July we found a village at Long Beruan but all the people had run away. All the food except unhulled rice had been taken away by them. We took the rice and distributed it amongst ourselves, and we also took chickens and pigs. We stayed at this village for a few days to recover from our exhaustion and then pushed on. We walked along the River Beruan, coming across several small villages much smaller than Long Beruan ... . About 10 August we arrived at a small village called Benasa with only a few huts. This was already quite a way up river, more than 50 kilometres from Seria, and from here

Liberation

on there were only narrow paths used by the Kayan. Here again we were attacked by the natives and we found that they had hand grenades. We had already used up all the food we had brought from Labi and had only one month’s supply that we had acquired from the local villages. Salt became very valuable and seasonings in general were scarce. It had become our daily routine to put unhulled rice in a steel helmet and separate the husk from the rice by hitting the helmet with sticks. The regulated amount of food to be consumed each day was reduced from 300 grams to 200 grams. We left Benasa for Mount Mulu walking through the jungle. The rainy season had started and the ground became a swamp. Sometimes we had to cut down trees over the river so that we could cross and make marks on trees as signposts. When we finally reached the foot of Mount Mulu we were very disappointed to find that the whole area was covered with limestone. There was no way we could engage in farming here as we had planned to do. We had to change our plans again. This time we decided to go to Batu Rusan, located north­ west of the Limbang River. We wanted to take over a community called Murudu where Chinese were said to live and take a rest there before finally reaching our destination. About 14 August we finally reached the Murudu community where there were only two houses. We arrested some people and took food. While we were staying in this community, five natives carrying a white flag came to us and handed us a note. In this note, which was written in English in pencil, it said ‘On August 15 Japan proposed a cease-fire, therefore fighting in the Pacific area has ceased for the time being. Negotiations are taking place in Tokyo. You should abandon your arms and surrender, in which case we guarantee your protection. Stop invading local villages and surrender. We are now in Murudu. We had a meeting. The five natives who brought the note were questioned and we found out that in Murudu there were about two hundred natives with weapons under the command of British officers. They had automatic rifles and hand grenades and would not attack us if we decided to surrender. To verify the authenticity of this information we

201

decided to take these five people hostage but the next day we heard shooting from the direction where our scouts were and we released them. The scouts brought back another note which was left on a tree. It said: ‘Return those five hostages and if you disarm after releasing them we will protect you’ and was once more signed by Mr Anderson. We were attacked again by natives on the morning of 5 September. After our attackers retreated we realised that one woman had suffocated her child to death because it would not stop crying. My colleague, Mr Goto, was shot in the thigh and died three days later. The food shortage had become so acute that the daily ration was reduced to 100 grams. It was each person’s responsibility to divide their share and manage it. Some people decided to leave the Unit and carry on by themselves. It was an extremely difficult time. We had to walk under a blistering sun more than ten kilometres a day with very little food. One night a young man was caught stealing another’s food. Next morning the head of the Unit, Lieut. Fujino, gathered everyone together and announced: ‘Someone stole another’s food last night. We are going to hang him as a lesson to everyone’. I was very sorry for him. The situation was bad enough for the older men. The shortage of food msut have affected him as a young man much more than others. We lacked seasonings and meat, not to mention vegetables. The shortage of vitamins and protein was very serious and everyone’s physical strength weakened day by day. Even carrying daily necessities became a burden and some people abandoned their extra clothes. At this point some people killed themselves. We were running out of first aid kits as many people were suffering from Nanpo [tropical] ulcers on their hands and legs. We were walking towards the highest peak of the upper Limbang. In September wre sacrificed the lives of twentyfive people in the Unit. After that, many people dropped out and many died of illness. A colleague of mine fell from a bridge and broke his hip bone. He could not walk any more and killed himself because he did not want to become a burden to others.

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

202

In mid-October, I suddenly lost consciousness as we were walking up a hill. In a while I came to and after a long rest decided to catch up with the Unit. I had a rifle with me in case I became a burden on others and decided to kill myself but at that time I told myself that I should not give up. Luckily with some help I rejoined the Unit. People helped me carry my share and a lieutenant let me wear the clothes he was carrying so that I could throw away my heavy clothes. He was carrying these special clothes to wear when we finally got together with other groups. One colleague drowned in the river as we were crossing. I myself almost drowned but luckily was saved by others. However, after that I could not lift my thighs any more. I had to climb hills on my hands and knees and on flat paths I used walking sticks in both hands. My friend thought that I would not live long and indirectly asked me if I wanted to make a will. I declined his offer. About 20 October we discovered many pamphlets which said ‘To Lieut. Fujino, Chief of Seria District Unit. We are under a cease­

fire now and negotiations are taking place. Your Unit should disarm and report to XXX and surrender to the Australian force accompanied by Lieut. Matsumoto. From Baba, Army Commander-in-Chief. However, we could not contact any other groups to find out the truth and there was no signature by Commanderin-Chief Baba, so we decided to ignore it. We reached Batu Rusan on 24 October. There we were resisted fiercely by the natives and after five days of fighting we lost many lives ... 28 October. A group of about ten people came carrying a Japanese flag so we stopped shooting. Lieut. Matsumoto and an Australian officer were with them. It took three hours for Lieut. Matsumoto to persuade the Unit to surrender. We finally gave up. I could not stop crying and hid myself for half an hour. All our weapons were taken from us. There were more than 600 people when the Unit was formed but now there were only 280 of us left. We became prisoners of the Australian Army. After a week to recover we were made to walk about 100 kilometres in one week and were then sent to Labuan Island.

Notes 1.

2.

3. 4.

The best source on Macaskie is his unpublished autobiography, ‘End of an Era: Borneo Reminiscences’, RHL MSS. Pac. s. 71. ‘Future Constitutional Policy for British Colonial Territories in South-East Asia’, 14 January 1944, C.M.B.(44) 3, War Cabinet Records, CAB 98. John Robertson, Australia at War 1939-1945, Melbourne: Heinemann, 1981, p. 177-9. See Peter Charlton, The Unnecessary War: Island Campaigns o f the South-W est P acific

5.

6.

j

9. 10.

1944-45,

Melbourne: Macmillan, 1983. For a detailed official account of British wartime planning and, the origins of 50 CAU, see F.S.V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East 1953-46, London: H.M.S.O., 1956, pp. 171-5. The only published reference to Conlon’s Borneo scheme is Richard Hall, The Real John Kerr, His Brilliant Career, London: Angus & Robertson, 1978, pp. 5260 pp. 48-63. I have referred to it in more detail in my own unpublished paper, ‘Alf Conlon, The Fall of Singapore and British Borneo’, Australian Historical Association Conference, Canberra, 1990. For Conlon’s policy on PapuaNew Guinea, see Brian Jinks, ‘Australia’s Post-War Policy for New Guinea and Papua’, Journal o f Pacific History, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1982), pp. 86100 and ‘Alfred Conlon, The Directorate of Research

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

and New Guinea’, Journal o f Australian Studies, no. 12 (June 1983), pp. Personal communication from Peter Ryan, 21 September 1976. Bemacchi to Percival Dingle, 31 July 1945, Macaskie Papers, RH, MSS. Pac. s. 71. There are veiled references to the problem in Donnison, B ritish M ilitary Adm inistration, pp. 172-8 and Long, The Final Campaigns, pp. 396-405. Personal communication from Capt. D.F.A.E.D. Morgan, Special Operations Executive. Far East: Australia, HS 1/259. Powell, War by Stealth, p. 155. See also, I.B. Withers, ‘Secret Intelligence Australia’, unpublished MS, 1994. Powell, War by Stealth, pp. 154-5. Sylvia Brooke to Jack Golden, 17 July 1942, CO 531/ 30. Minutes by W.L. Monson, C.E.G. Gent and others on the Ranee’s letters to Golden of 4 and 17 July, ibid. Personal communications from Major W.L.P Sochon, 9 Sepetmber 1974 and 12 October 1974. Sochon, ‘Semut III Party Report’, p. 4.

16. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. For the official account of the landings, see Long, The Final Campaigns. See also, Peter Stanley, Tarakan: An Australian Tragedy, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997. 20. Porritt, ‘More bitter than sweet’, p. 51.

203

Liberation

21. O’Connor, The More Fool I, p. 198. Bates, ‘This is Something’, and Pepler, ‘Batu Lintang’, also give details of the plan. 22. Interrogation of Lieut. Nohara Masakazu, Papers of C.D. Le Gros Clark, RHL MSS. Pac s. 84. 23. WO 235/883. 24. An account of the Sandakan and similar death marches in other occupied areas can be found in Russell, The Knights o f Bushido and Hugh Clarke, Prisoners o f War. For more detailed accounts of the Sandakan march, see Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1989, and Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II, Boulder (Col.): Westview Press, 1996, pp. 45-78. A documentary film about Sandakan was broadcast on ABC Television in Australia in 1995. 25. Cited in Russell, The Knights o f Bushido, p. 122. 26. Wong, ‘No Joke James ’, pp. 428-433. See also, Monks, Brunei Days, p. 59. 27. J.R. Black, ‘Rough Notes on Service in British Borneo with BBCAU’. 28. Long, The Final Campaigns, p, 488. 29. Interview with Jonathan Saban, Lundu, 11 June 1997. 30. SMA. 31. Ling, Fifty Years. 32. Interview with R.K. Bhattacharya, Kuching, 12December 1997. 33. Interview with Salih Ahmad, Kuching, 14 January 1997. 34. Hj. Yusuf Heaton, ‘Memories of the Japanese occupation of Mukah’, P eople’s Mirror, 15 November 1986. 35. Interview with Tedong anak Barieng, Kapit, 36. Interview with Listen Baling anak Luang by Nichol anak Ragan, 14 June 1995, transcribed by Shirley Vilin Ikok and translated by Dr Otto Steinmayer. 37. Personal information from Mr Ross Bradbury, Perth. 38. Sarawak Gazette, 2 June 1947, pp. 100-101; 2 August 1948, pp. 150-151. Porritt, Glimpses o f Sarawak, p. 50. 39. Lu Ngee Jin, ‘Occupation Days’. 40. Ibid. 41. Courtney, Silent Feet, p. 103. 42. Ibid. There is no official corroboration of this incident. However, the party involved was probably led by a British officer, Major J.R. Wooler, who was subsequently withdrawn by Sochon. It is not clear from Sochon’s official report whether this was because of the incident, because of Wooler’s unauthorised initiative to get the Japanese in Sibu to surrender or because of the cancellation of Operation Hippo. 43. Sochon narrative, ibid., p. 107. 44. Sochon narrative, ibid., p. 111. 45. Sochon narrative, ibid., p. 112. 46. Sochon narrative, ibid, p. 114. 47 Interview with Tan Sri William Tan, Kuching, 18 January 1995. 48. Kearney to Ditmas, 21 September 1945, ‘Report on occupation of Simanggang’, copy in the possession of

Mr Ross Bradbury. 49. Porritt, ‘More bitter than sweet’, pp. 52-3. 50. Ibid., p. 53. 51. Hj. Yusuf Heaton, ‘A story of three arrests’, Part 3, P eople’s Mirror, 10 March 1996. 52. Personal information from Mr Ross Bradbury, Perth. 53. Courtney, Silent Feet, pp. 103-4 and Howes, In A Fair Ground, p. 132. See also, Sarawak Tribune, 11 November 1959 and Sarawak Gazette, 30 November 1959. 54. Barrie, ‘A Borneo Story’, vol. I, p. 110. 55. Ibid., p. 115. 56. Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, ‘The Japanese Occupation’, Journal o f the Malaysian Historical Society Sarawak Branch, no. 3 (December 1976), p. 13.

57 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

Interview with Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, Kuching, 1 August 1995. AWM. Hj. Yusuf Heaton, ‘An event from 50 years ago’, P eople’s Mirror, 20 and 21 November 1995. Anon, to Col. Treloar, AWM A266 492/15/10. Interview with Chua Gin Teck, Kuching, 20 December 1995. Southwell, ‘Memoirs’, Chapter 12, p. 5. Bates, ‘It is Something’. Ibid. Ibid.

Southwell, ‘Memoirs’, Chapter 12, p. 8. Keith, Three Came Home, pp. 281-2. Digby, Lawyer in the Wilderness, p. 65. Richards Interview Transcript, p. 50. Howes, In A Fair Ground, p. 165. Ibid., p. 166. Bates, ‘It is Something’. Ibid.

Pepler, ‘Batu Lintang’. Bates, ‘It is Something’. Keith, Three Came Home, p. 292., Pepler, ‘Batu Lintang’ p. 48. Keith, Three Came Home, pp. 191-2. Richards Interview Transcript, p. 50. Southwell, ‘Memoirs’, Chapter 12, p. 9. Interview with Chua Gin Teck. WO 203/3974. Interview with Yoshinori Kochi, Tokyo, 23 September 1995. 84. A detailed account of the efforts to capture Fujino Force can be found in Harrisson, World Within, pp. 313-4, 328-330. See also, Long, The Final Campaigns, pp. 564-5. Donnison, British Military Administration, p. 184, gives the surrender date as 8 November but. this appears to be a mistake. 85. Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 565. 86. Yonosuke Kagaya and Koichiro Asano, ‘Seria Butei: Boruneo Aishi’, Japan Sarawak Association Report, No. 7 (1993), pp. 41-65, trans. by Kyoko Postill.

14 Perang Jipun ar between the Iban and the Japanese erupted for the first time in the Kapit area in early June 1945 when the Semut III party under Sochon was still camped at Sungei Pila. At this time the Japanese had no knowledge of the Australian guerilla landings in the mountains. However, the Iban knew that the Japanese were retreating inland from the coast and news of the white men coming from the sky travelled quickly down-river in the form of riddle-messages like the one later recorded by A.J.N. Richards:

W

Babi belang siko manok belang siko nadai celum sarambar, enggau gawa ’ ka orang ke udah parai, end’ ngaga kereja nya' apai-indai aki’-ini’ idup magang, pulai ka menoa tu ’ lalu badu’ parai. (One white pig and one white fowl, with no dark colours on them at all, are the things to redeem those who have died, when the rite is performed fathers and mothers, grandparents and all will live again and come back to earth, risen from the dead.)1

Pasir Nai The first Iban attack on the Japanese in the Rejang was at Pasir Nai at the head of the Pelagus rapids where a party of five retreating Japanese and nineteen Chinese porters were being guided up­ river by fifty or sixty Iban from the Balleh under Penghulu Sibat of Nanga Gat.2 Tedong was asked to join the group: You’re coming along, apaiT, said Sibat. ‘Never mind me coming with you, but you’d better be careful because the country is troubled these days’, I told him. After that the Japanese started up-river and we decided to live and eat with them. One of the Japanese said: ‘We are all anxious because the British have begun to arrive, but let us not quarrel, don’t kill your friends. Fight the British together with us and help us’, he said. ‘There’s no point in us killing each other because we Iban

sincerely trust in the Japanese government’, I answered. ‘Arigato’, he said.3

By early June, Sochon’s group had heard reports of Japanese moving up into the interior. We have already described in the previous chapter how he arranged with Penghulu Oyong Puso for the ambush of three Japanese retreating from Bintulu towards Belaga and the similar exploit by Puso’s brother. By 10 June, there were further reports of a large party of Japanese making their way up-river from Kapit. Sochon decided to organise the Iban to attack them somewhere in the Pelagus rapids area. However, the Balleh Iban under Penghulu Sibat (the grandson of Temenggong Koh) who were guiding the Japanese feared reprisals and were loth to co-operate. Sochon then considered ambushing the Japanese in the rapids above Sungei Pila but after a conference on 17 June with Penghulu Gerinang and Penghulu Ugak who had been with Sibat earlier, it was decided that they should return to Pasir Nai and arrange an attack when the opportunity rose. In the meantime, however, the Iban at Pasir Nai had taken the situation into their own hands. Sochon described the outcome: At about 7 o’clock that night a party of excited Dyaks arrived at our camp carrying two or three Japanese heads and announced that the Japanese had been killed about 10 o’clock that morning. The Baleh Dyaks, seeing a favourable moment, on their own initiative attacked and killed [the] Japs as they were loading their stores into prahus. Unfortunately there were amongst the Dyaks a number of hot-blooded youngsters, and a number of Chinese prisoners who were with the Japanese, also had their heads taken.4

Sgt. Keith Barrie recalled the excitement of the Iban:

205

Perang Jipun

Australians training guerilla volunteers c. June 1945 (Photograph by courtesy o f Keith Barrie.)

One of them, I think Penghulu Gerinang, a stringy bloodthirsty looking character^] grabbed my hand with his bloodstained right hand to greet me, carrying in his other hand the fresh head of one of the victims which had been hollowed out, like the melon heads we used to make up when I was a boy. For me [it was] a horrible sight and I rather emphatically told Gerinang to take it away. Anyway there was a great recital of the action, liberally embellished with what I began to discover was the natural inclination of the Ibans for exaggeration.5 Sochon desribed the subsequent arrival of the main Iban party and the confused excitement that reigned: As we were trying to get some sort of sense out of the highly excitable natives, more Dyaks came out of the jungle. The less flamboyant of them had the delicacy to carry their gruesome spoil in sacks, but the true object of this manouevre was shortly revealed not to be consideration for the Europeans’ finer sensitivities, but proof of battle prowess, as they tipped up the sacks and a cascade of heads tumbled on to the ground. It took a long time for us to get them calmed down to the stage where they could explain, more or less oherently, what had happened, and how they had come to attack the Japanese party. The sorry record of Japanese brutality in Sarawak could not dispel the pang of sympathy we felt for the men whose heads now littered the ground before us.6

Amongst the twenty-nine heads were those of several unfortunate Sikh policemen who had been with the Japanese. That night and for the following few days there were great celebrations at Penghulu Sundai’s longhouse opposite Sungei Pila where Sochon and Barrie were the increasingly uncomfortable guests of honour: The ceremony of the feeding of the heads was led by the women of the longhouse who walked up and down the communal verandah intoning some ritual with the heads cradled in their arms while they pushed rice into their ... mouths. For me a rather macabre and spine-chilling function but none the less fascinating as it was really an historical spectacle which I hoped not to witness again.7 Sochon also recorded his distaste for the grisly proceedings: All day long Barrie and I lived with the inescapable stench of human heads roasting over a slow fire, and as the days wore on, became sickened with the savagery. It had certainly never entered my head that my entire operations would be delayed for several days while I participated unwillingly in a ceremony which depended for its length upon the curing of a human head.8 There was no point comnplaining about it to Penghulu Sundai, who would only tell them: sigi’ adat nyalai p a la ’ mimsoh (it is the custom to smoke enemy heads).

206

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

As the bodies at Pasir Nai had not been disposed of and there was the danger that any floating down-river would alert the Japanese to the event, Barrie was sent by Sochon on 20 June to inspect the site of the massacre. This was the old Borneo Company Ltd. bungalow on the left bank of the river at the head of the rapids: When we arrived I was appalled to find the headless corpses scattered at random around the grounds of the house which stood in a clearing on a wide natural bench at the top of the bank above the river beach ... No sooner had we arrived than the excited recital of events resumed. Among other things, I was conducted up to the house where the Japs had been cornered by one of the younger Dayaks, who turned out to [be] the brother of Penghulu Jugah ... and a wild-eyed excitable character he certainly was. When in the house we went into the room where he had personally disposed of one of the Japs and drawing his parang proceeded to give me a rather realistic re-enactment of the occasion ... .9 After spending the night at the bungalow, the Japanese had been making preparations the next morning to continue their journey. Already planning to attack them, Penghulu Sibat and his people persuaded the Japanese to wrap most of their weapons and ammunition in waterproof sheeting as protection while going up the rapids. Jeba anak Undit was a witness to the attack:

off limping; his gun had only one cartridge. My uncle was digging for tuba [poisonous root used in fishing] and clearing undergrowth in his garden when he saw a Japanese at Nanga Amang who raised his gun towards him. Seeing him like that my uncle jumped and the gun went off and hit him. Now the gun of the Japanese was useless and my uncle’s knife was blunted. The two of them fought hand to hand there; they rolled over and fell into the water. Soon after that the Japanese was beaten because he had not eaten for a long time ... . My uncle returned to the longhouse and told the people that there was a Japanese in the ulu who had already been beaten by him in hand-to-hand combat. He asked them to bring him in. The whole longhouse went up-river to the ulu and saw the Japanese leaning there alone and in bad shape ... And that was the end of the Japanese." Following the Pasir Nai attack, there was another conference between Sochon and the penghulus at Sungei Pila where it was decided that they should go down-river and keep in touch with him by runner on the movements of the Japanese. As soon as he received reinforcements and more arms by air, Sochon began to move down towards Kapit. He also ordered an air strike on the town and sent a patrol consisting of Lieut.

The Japanese asked us to put our barang [gear] in our boat and to load their boat as well. We were supposed to paddle them [up-river to Belaga]. When all the things had been carried down, Adin did a ngajat [war dance], drew his parang and struck one of the Japanese - too short at first and then again and again until he was killed. Another Japanese got up holding his gun and tried to swim away. Because we Ibans had been specially asked to attack the Japanese, we had to deceive them. If they weren’t tricked, how were they to be killed? 10 Garai anak Siba described how two wounded Japanese who escaped across the river in a boat were also caught: After arriving at the other bank, one Japanese went ashore and the other was still in the boat. Pushed by his companion, he floated down and grounded at Pulau Lungga. Engang’s and Nasat’s people saw him there. Seeing that he was very much alert, they ran away. The the poor Japanese walked

Garai anak Siba. (Photograph by Bob Reece.)

207

Perang Jipun

the sho-cho, who seemed intent on taking revenge on any Iban he met. The ruse he hit on was to send two Iban policemen to tell ‘Tucho’ before dawn on the morning of 23 June that the up­ river Iban were descending to loot the bazaar and that some penghulus were waiting at the fort to discuss the situation with him. Tedong described what happened then:

Dayaks were great Head-hunters. The Dayak used to be the world's most notorious head-hunter. British and Dutch administrations have frowned so much on this form of sport that it has almost died out—almost, but not quite. Customs die hard. The Dayak women had a strong vested interest in the matter. Anyway, your head is safe enough if you behave yourself. The men usually wear nothing but blue or red loincloths, the women tight-fitting sarongs, with or without upper garments. The men either don't wear a hac, or, if they do, it is a nondescript sort of affair, probably a battered old. felt hat. That helps to distinguish them from the coastal Malays. They wear head ornaments for dance, feast, or tribal ceremonies—great gaily coloured head-dresses made from feathers—or crowns made of long quills from the ‘‘fretful porcupine”. Feasts and dancing go better with music anywhere. The Dayaks like music—even if it only comes from a drum, "iou may have to get used to it—all day and all night. The drums throb for a hundred and one reasons, mostly of little consequence to you—but you never know! They can have an unfriendly meaning— so be on your guard. It isn't wise to play about with native drums in the villages — you may offend.

Advice on Dayaks in an Australian army handbook fo r Borneo, early 1945

Baker, Sgt. Barrie and ten Iban volunteers to observe the results. When they reached Kapit on 25 June, Barrie found that the 2,000 or more Iban gathered there after the first air strike had already dealt with the handful of Japanese. ‘As there were only a limited number of heads available’, Sochon explained in his official report, ‘their patience had run out, and they attacked and killed five of the Japs on the 23rd’. A second air strike on 25 June had destroyed the wireless station but had also set fire to the bazaar.

Kapit The killings at Pasir Nai had helped to precipitate the mayhem at Kapit where only a handful of Japanese were stationed. Two were businessmen looking after Borneo Sangyo Stores in the bazaar; there was also the sho-cho, Chief of Police and District Officer, who was living in the Methodist Church quarters at Panto nearby. One or two others were living at the timber company office at Seputin, across river. After the Pasir Nai attack, Tedong had the unenviable task of dealing with his blood-brother,

The Japanese who were killed at Pasir Nai were headless because their heads had been taken by the Ibans. One body floated down the river and was washed up against the floating wharf at Kapit. From that time, the Japanese called Tucho was suspicious. He was very angry to see the corpse of the Japanese. He asked me who had killed his countryman. T don’t know, Tuan’, I said. ‘There’s a rumour I’ve heard that the British killed him’. ‘What do you think, Tedong?’ he asked me. ‘1 don’t know, Tuan’,’ I said. T have no idea’. I became anxious [because] when I said that, I was only pretending that I didn’t know. Tucho and I were good friends and we had promised that we would not give trouble to each other’s people. After [the body was washed up] he fled and I looked for him for three days and three nights but could not find him. ‘Don’t you worry’, I said, speaking to my people, ‘because he is my blood-brother’. I wanted to go into the office to look for him but was asked not to by Sumbang’s people and Belayung’s people who didn’t want me to die at the hands of the Japanese. On the third night we had a discussion at Sebau’s house. He was not brave enough to attack Tucho because he had already defeated the white people, so the story went, and had won three big medals. He had raised the flag and taken Sarawak; Sarawak was quickly finished and all the Punjabi soldiers ran away because of him. Three white people’s countries were seized by him. ‘I’m not [brave enough]’, Sebau said. ‘If you don’t want to fight him, you are all [still] brave people’. I said. ‘Leave it to me’, I said to him. ‘Then’, said Antau, ‘how is it that you are brave enough when everybody else doesn’t want to do it?’ ‘We are not born twice and we never die twice’, I said. It happened that Tucho was found that day; he had been hiding at the foot of Bukit Panto. I met with Limbi and Sigung, his escorts, and they asked me not to meet with Tucho because he was very bad-tempered now and was not able to see anybody. ‘If the Iban do not kill the Japanese, then certainly our people won’t die’, they muttered. ‘I’m not bothering him’, I said, ‘because I’ve already made an oath with him’.

208

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

209

Perang Jipiin

Kapit town, June 1945. (Photograph by courtesy o f Keith Barrie.)

I asked the two of them to call out to him that I was waiting on the tanju about six feet away from the top of the steps. Then I heard them tap on the door and I hid myself in case they had been bribed. Hearing me, Tucho called out from inside. ‘Who’s that?’, he said. ‘Tedong’, said the two of them. ‘Where is he?’ ‘Not far from here’, they said. Then the two of them were behind me and I was in front. Hearing me, he came out. 1 ran to hide behind a durian tree not far from Gung’s house ... there was high grass beside the built up path there. When I reckoned that he had come close enough and while he was turning around, I shot him. If I had struck him with a parang it wouldn’t have

worked because that Japanese was very tough. Then I asked Gung to chop his head off and although he chopped five times the head was not separated and we [finally] had to saw it off. Then the head of the Japanese that I killed was taken away by my late father so that he could smoke it. I am sorry now that I killed him because there was a letter found [on him] by people after he died which said ‘Tedong is the only Iban who is good towards us Japanese’.13 Nevertheless, as Tedong also said, ‘If I had not killed him, Kapit would have been finished because he was very angry that the Japanese had been killed by the people at Pasir Nai’.14

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

210

Later the same morning after an air raid had caused chaos in the bazaar, prisoners being held in the cells at Fort Sylvia were freed by Tedong and his brother, Penghulu Jugah: There was a wire fence and I jumped over it, bringing the keys to the doors of the gaol when I saw my relatives there. I saw two white people, some Foochows and other Chinese who had been gaoled by the Japanese as well. There was only one door to the gaol that I couldn’t open. Then I asked the prisoners to come out, all of them. They had been in gaol for three weeks; they had eaten only one bowl of kangkong [green vegetable] each day. If I had not helped them, the people in the gaol would have died.15 Amongst them was Harry Buxton, a Eurasian forestry officer who had earlier been employed by the Japanese to supervise construction of the airfield at Bintulu. Before the Allied landing at Labuan, he had been taken to Kapit where he faced the likelihood of execution: And then the prison door burst open and I heard them calling my name: ‘Buston! Buston!’ And two pairs of hands reached in and pulled me out - Jugah and Tedong. Jugah embraced me and said, ‘You’d better get out of this place as soon as possible’. And he ordered some of his men to get a boat and race me up-river, while he went down to Song. 16 When an RAAF Spitfire strated the Kapit bazaar the next day in response to Sochon’s request, Jugah tried to get Tedong to shelter in the dug-out made by the Japanese: ‘Never mind’, I said. Jugah frowned. ‘Don’t worry’, 1 said ... There was a person not far from us who was hit by a fragment of a bomb and died on the spot. But we two didn’t get hit. A Japanese named Sukai started to get into the bunker [lubang tanah]. Seeing this, Nyanggau pursued him ... He got into the bunker with the Japanese and stabbed him with his spear. Then the Japanese stabbed him right through the nipple. He only had time to get himself out of the bunker and ask Gerinang to prop him up. As soon as Gerinang embraced him, he died. The Japanese also died in the bunker after being stabbed by Gerinang.17 So enraged were the Iban at Nyanggau’s death that they hacked out the liver of the Japanese and ate it on the spot. Amongst the participants in this grisly ritual was Tedong:

it’s really true that he was gutted. I was among those who ate his liver. The Japanese who was stabbed by Nyanggau was indeed gutted. Human liver smells very strong. After that I asked Penghulu Gerinang to eat liver together with me. Gerinang shut his eyes trying to swallow the liver but finally he couldn’t.18 When the Iban went to Seputin to deal with the Japanese rafting station manager there, they searched the elephant barn where he was believed to be hiding. A surprise was in store: One of the Japanese had gone up into the loft and was thought to be sleeping inside his mosquito net... All the lights out and there was no cooking fire. When the Ibans climbed up towards him, the Japanese heard the sound of their feet because it was a wooden building. He held his rifle like this [with two hands over his body lengthwise] inside his mosquito net. When one of the Ibans struck at him through the mosquito net, he hit the rifle. Because the rifle was steel and the parang was steel, there was a sound like ‘kringV and the sparks flew up. ‘Wahl, I can’t do it!’, said the Iban. ‘He’s kebal. My parang didn’t touch him!’. The Ibans fled and the Japanese escaped. He got a prahu and paddled down from Seputin. When he reached Panto he found that his countryman [Shucho] was missing ... As he wasn’t brave enough to stay in the house by himself, he hid in the bit of forest behind Panto in a stand of tarap. Then at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon he was discovered by the Ibans who surrounded him and killed him.19 In the meantime, groups of Japanese were continuing to move up-river. Warned of its approach, Lieut. Baker’s patrol shot up a Japanese launch crowded with soldiers when it arrived at the Kapit jetty just after midnight. Some on board were killed but the survivors managed to take it back to Song where the Japanese had decided to set up their headquarters. Another Japanese launch arrived later but with insufficient numbers to deal with what they thought to be a large force, the SRD patrol retreated to the mouth of the Balleh. On 3 July a patrol of eighty Japanese armed with machine-guns came up-river from Song and removed everything of value from Fort Sylvia. On their way back, they fired at every longhouse and Iban they saw by way of reprisal. Similar attacks had been made earlier on the Iban of the Katibas. It was not until 6 July that it was safe for

Perang Jipun

211

the Semut III party to make Kapit its headquarters and continue training Iban and Chinese recruits for the intended attack on Song. One of those who had volunteered earlier at Pelagus was Jinggut anak Attan, younger brother of Penghulu Nyanggau, who at that time was only fourteen: Before the Australians went to Kapit, the Iban displayed their courage and attacked the Japanese there. This was the reason my brother died. So 1 asked to join the Australian army to fight the Japanese. Then Major Sochon said: ‘You’re still too young. You can’t even carry a rifle yet’.20 Nevertheless, he was given a uniform and taken along as a cook.

The Attack on Song Iban volunteers, most of them armed with parang and sumpit, played an important part in the attack on Song where there was a substantial Japanese garrison force. When air-strikes on the bazaar drove the Japanese into the jungle, the Iban were waiting to deal with them: At a pre-arranged time the aircraft would bomb and strafe Japanese positions. On their appearance in the sky the enemy promptly went into the jungle and sat under a bush, waiting for the aircraft to leave. But before they could reoccupy their defensive positions, the guerillas would rise out of the next bush and decapitate the Japanese. To counter this the Japanese dug slit trenches on the edge of the jungle to which they would retire. Unfortunately they built roofs on the trenches as a protection against chance bullets. The Dayaks took to sitting on the the roofs during raid and removing the heads of the Japanese as they stuck them out when the raid was over.21 Sitting in a Catalina and helping to direct five Kittyhawk fighter-bombers to targets during one of these strafing raids on Song was Temenggong Koh. He had earlier managed to escape from Song where the Japanese had been holding him hostage against the continuation of Iban attacks along the Katibas. Sochon had somehow got a message to him purporting to be a request from people to return home because of a mysterious illness affecting his wife and other people at his longhouse.23 Koh later said that by directing the bombing he saved many Malay and Chinese lives.24 Others,

perhaps uncharitably, said that he had used it to revenge himself on some of his old enemies. It is certainly true that when he saw a party of Iban below positioned to ambush the fleeing Japanese, Koh ‘got very excited and was dancing around the back of the “Cat” waving his parang over his head pleading to be put down beside his colleagues so he could join the fray’.25 In fact, the Iban of the Katibas had been preventing any Japanese movement out of Song towards Kapit: Using their own methods of killing and ambushing, i.e. cutting trees practically through, tying them with rottan to steady them, then cutting the rottan as a prahu load of Japs was passing underneath - using similar tactics on jungle paths. This method plus blow pipes definitely kept the Japs to known and well cleared paths and they would not venture far afield.26 Capt. David Kearney was also able to ambush a Japanese launch on the Sungei Poi between Kapit and Kanowit, killing about forty of the eighty Japanese on board. By 27 July the Japanese had evacuated Song after suffering 81 casualties from air-raids and ambushes and retreated to Kanowit, where the same story was played out. After a Liberator air strike on 7 August, the Japanese took the remaining liquor in the bazaar and most were drunk by the time they retreated by launch to Sibu that night. In late July, Sochon had been taken by Catalina to Labuan where he was able to tell the General Officer Commanding 9th Division, MajorGeneral G.F. Wootten, that Semut III had accounted for 150 enemy killed. What proportion of these had been the work of Iban he did not attempt to estimate but it must have been significant. In retrospect, Temenggong Koh felt that the Iban had done much more to defeat and kill the Japanese than the ‘tuans’, who were ‘only for show during the fighting’. He was bitter that the Iban effort had gone largely unacknowledged: it was the Ibans who attacked and destroyed the Japanese; the Europeans won the fame and great names out of it but it was the Ibans who did the fighting and killing.27

The Engkelili Raid By early 1945 the Iban of the Batang Ai were feeling increasingly hostile towards the Japanese.

212

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Although their padi harvests had been good, they were obliged to give up a good part of them for worthless tin medals and military scrip with which they could buy nothing. The Japanese also took away antiques from the longhouses and sometimes asked people to give up their daughters. There was considerable resentment, too, towards what were calledpelandokjipun (collaborators, lit. pets of the Japanese). These were the Iban Malay and Sikh police who were working for the military administration and were thought to be privileged as a result. The other grievance was the confiscation of their shotguns which has already been described. Pengarah Jimbun, Pengarah Sambau, Penghulu Ngali and Penghulu Ningkan all agreed that something had to be done. It was at about this time that the first news reached the Batang Ai of the Allied landings di pucok kayu’ (in the tree tops) and the Pasir Nai incident. It was also said that the orang kulit puteh were seeking assistance in fighting the Japanese and would pay money for any heads that were brought in. Encouraged by this evidence that the tide of war was changing, about two hundred Iban raided the government post at Lubok Antu in early July. Attacking the wooden kubu (government office),

Pengarah Jimbun o f Batang Ai (Photograph by courtesy o f Sarawak Museum.)

they seized the confiscated shotguns, threw the treasury safe into the river and burnt the building to the ground. They also looted the godown further down the hill towards the river where their requisitioned padi was stored, taking salt and sugar as well as two hundred sacks of padi. Although the kempei-tai had paid occasional visits to Lubok Antu, there was no permanent Japanese presence there and only one Iban pelandok jipun guarded the fort. Later that month the Iban of the Ulu Ai, Emperan, Ulu Lemanak and Ulu Skrang, led by Penghulu Kana and Pengarah Jimbun from Telok Sumpah, decided to attack the government post at Engkelili. This was a much more serious proposition than Lubok Antu because the kubu there was a permanent police post manned by about ten Japanese soldiers and ten pelandok jipun - Sarawak Malay and Iban police officers including Sgt. Dublin and Cpl. Hj. Amin from Simanggang. No doubt the garrison had been strengthened after what had happened up-river. As well as ten rifles, the garrison had two light machine-guns and about a hundred hand grenades. They were expecting an attack and had dug trenches in front of the kubu from which they could fire in safety. After planning the attack for some weeks, the force of more than a thousand Iban converged on Engkelili in early August. Maiohl Baka semutl (there were many people, just like ants). The night before the attack, Pengarah Jimbun made a bedara ’ (sacrifice) to bring good luck to their mission and to make them all invulnerable. Before dawn the Iban positioned themselves with their payan (bamboo) shields and weapons on the hill overlooking the kubu. Only a few had shotguns. They had also made screens of banana trunks to push in front of them as further protection. The Japanese allowed them to advance a considerable way down the hill, shouting and beating their gongs, before opening up a deadly fire. Rentap anak Jemut was only a twelve year old boy at the time but he took part in the foolhardy charge with the best and bravest of them, protected by his wild boar and mouse deer charms: the attack began at early dawn, around 5 a.m., and lasted until 5 p.m. As we came in large numbers towards the kubu, the Japanese started shooting at us. We only used parangs, spears and two or three shotguns but we had no cartridges. There was constant shooting from the kubu because there

213

Perang Jipun

Suzuki was extremely nervous about the task he had been given. As he wrote many years later, I could not help feeling as if I were going into the jaws of death. A strange langour came over me. I felt as if all my blood was flowing from my body.30

Rentap anak Jemut, December 1996 (Photograph by Bob Reece.)

were so many of us. As the day got brighter the Japanese could see us very clearly - those wearing bright red labong [turbans] made an easy target for them. Not many were killed but there were many wounded. We were dead tired.28 The Iban paid a high price for the attack, suffering fifty or sixty dead and wounded while the defending force suffered only one fatality. Frustrated at their inability to take heads, the retreating Iban killed a family of Chinese from the Engkelili bazaar so that they could at least take something home to show for their efforts.29 The Japanese subsequently abandoned the police post, enabling the Iban to burn it and the grain store to the ground.

‘Butei’ Suzuki After Engkelili, the Japanese command in Kuching realised that it was vital to conciliate the Iban of the Second Division in order to prevent any further attacks. Their anticipated retreat into the interior in the event of the imminent Allied attack made this all the more important. Suzuki, who had been disciplined earlier for his ‘soft’ treatment of the Iban over the shotguns issue and transferred to Kuching, was brought back to Simanggang under the command of kempei-tai Warrant Officer Kakimoto of Kaki-kikan (Kaki Command) for some serious fence-mending. Needless to say,

Together with five Iban policemen and in civilian clothes, Suzuki set off from Simanggang collecting information along the way. It took a week to get to Engkelili where he then tried to contact the local Chinese kapitan and Iban chiefs. Much time was spent organising a formal meeting with Penghulu Jimbun’s people who had mounted the attack. Daily messages were sent reminding them of ‘Butei’ Suzuki’s good work at Simanggang and emphasising his wish for a permanent friendship with them. After two weeks of waiting, word finally came that they would meet him the following morning: We prepared gifts such as alcohol, a pig and chickens. Most importantly, we did not forget to have some big jars ready ... During the night before the meeting I kept my sleeping place secret, holding several hand grenades, a pistol and a Japanese sword with me. The large party of Iban arrived at 8.30 a.m., which was later than Suzuki had expected. Relieved that they had come to talk and not to fight, he still found their appearance intimidating: [The chief] was wearing a hat made of bark and decorated with feathers and he was holding a spear and a sword. In addition, others standing behind him were armed with hunting guns and swords. If I failed to persuade them, I would be killed on the spot. I could not help praying to God for success. We sat on the grass together in a big circle and started to negotiate. From the meeting place, we could see the ruins of the sub-prefectural office which had been burnt down during the attack. Heads of spears occasionally glinted in the sun. Many copper-coloured faces with glittering eyes were glaring at me. Although we offered them some alcohol, none of them accepted. The Iban admitted that they had initiated the attack on Engkelili in order to get rid of the Japanese army. However, they had been surprised when the Japanese responded so unsportingly with machine-guns and grenades:

214

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

According to the chief: ‘These killed many of our men who were sheltering behind their wooden shields, so we cannot forgive the Japanese. We came here to cut off your head [in revenge] as you are one them’. I explained: ‘The Japanese have never attacked you since we occupied this country. We have been fighting against the British who took your land away, to give your land back’. When the Iban told him that three orang kulit puteh in the interior had asked them for assistance against the Japanese and were offering $100,000 for every Japanese head that was delivered to them, Suzuki had a brilliant answer: I asked them to imagine this situation: an adult encouraged a child to hold a razor blade with its bare hand, offering $100,000 in return. The child suffered a deep cut to its palm. I said: ‘Who was the most guilty? The razor blade is the Japanese army and you are the child. The adult is the British. Just as a razor blade doesn’t cut a child by itself, ifyou had not attacked the police post, the Japanese army would not have fired. This inspired feat of oratory satisfied Pengarah Jimbun and his people who proceeded to hold a traditional peace-making ceremony, including the ritual killing of a pig, to rid themselves of the evil spirits who had been responsible for all the misunderstanding. Just as the feast was coming to an end, a police messenger arrived with a telegram from headquarters in Kuching informing Suzuki that Kanto Brigade would lay down its arms on 21 August. It was already 29 August, two weeks after the Imperial surrender, and Suzuki was able to tell the Iban that the war was over. He also took the opportunity to air a final piece of propaganda: ‘Now it will be possible for all the yellow races to achieve the independence that we have been dreaming about for years. All of us must do what we can to develop our own countries instead of being ruled by other races’. No sooner had I finished my speech than the audience jumped for joy. I will never forget the scene with everyone shouting and jumping about with happiness..... Even though the incident was one of the less important happenings in human history, it was my great satisfaction and an unforgettable memory that all of us, rebels and Japanese, could become friends in such a short period of time.

Betong Despite Suzuki’s efforts, other up-river Iban had smelled the Japanese defeat and the opportunities that it offered for looting and head-taking. People from Ulu Layar, Ulu Spak, Skrang, Lemanak, Engkari, Batang Ai, Delok, Nanga Merpi and Lubang Baya joined forces with some of the Iban who had attacked Lubok Antu and Engkelili. Several thousand warriors, led by Penghulu Ulin anak Penghulu Ujit from Spak, converged on the Buloh Antu-Padeh area with the intention of attacking the Japanese in Betong and looting the bazaar. Ulin had earlier been arrested and gaoled in the fort there by the Japanese for some reason and had sworn to revenge himself on them. Walking through the jungle in a single column several kilometres long, they carried their parang and sumpit together with a supply of food on their backs. The longhouse people along the way who knew ‘Butei’ Suzuki and feared for his safety tried in vain to dissuade them: When the advance guard were passing Buloh Antu and Padeh, the local people asked the rebels where they were going and for what purpose. They replied that they were going to fight the Japanese. The locals became worried that Butei Suzuki might be attacked and have his head taken, so they shouted: ‘There is a Japanese man called Butei Suzuki in Betong. He is such a nice man and he is our blood brother, you fools! He has tried to help the Ibans in all sorts of ways. Japan helped us to get rid of the white rulers. And that cannon, which was taken from our ancestors when they fought the whites and was returned by Butei Suzuki. Why are you attacking someone who has done nothing wrong. You’re the bad ones! The rebels were incensed by these taunts and chased the people back to their longhouses, at least to the entrances of their houses because, being Iban, they did not want to venture inside. As the war-party advanced relentlessly towards Betong, however, an unfavourable omen caused them to re-consider the expedition. Forty years later when he returned to Betong, Suzuki’s Iban friends told him the story of what had happened: Suddenly in the jungle, right in front of the chiefs, a bird called embuas started to chirp loudly. What it meant was: ‘Stop fighting. You will lose anyway.

Perang Jipun

Shoichiro Suzuki and Datuk John Nichol Kassim, c. 1995 (Photograph by courtesy o f Gabriel Tan.)

If you fight, you will never be able to go back to your homes and see your wives and children again’. The bird was considered to be a messenger from the spirits of the jungle. The rebels heeded its message and immediately turned back and went home. That is how the attack was prevented.32

In his account, Suzuki neglected to mention another significant detail. The father of his Iban mistress had heard of Ulin’s plan and went to warn his daughter in Betong. All that night Suzuki and his men worked to prepare an ambush on the road near the District Officer’s bungalow, only to find that the raiding party had dispersed.33 Returning to Simanggang, Suzuki was captured there during the SRD attack on 7 September and kept in solitary confinement in the cells until he was transferred with the garrison members to Kuching.

Angkatan Perang Majang Desa No account of the Iban onslaught on the Japanese in the last stages of the occupation would be complete without reference to the Angkatan Majang Desa (AMJ), the armed movement by the Iban of the upper Kapuas River in Dutch Borneo.34 (Majang was the term used by people on the Dutch side to refer to all the Iban of the watershed area, including those on the Sarawak side.) Inspired and organised by Temenggong Mandi (‘Pang Dandan’) of Kunyil in March 1944,

215

the AMJ drew support from many parts of west Borneo. There was a long history of resistance against the Dutch in the Sanggau region and their defeat by the Japanese offered an opportunity to achieve autonomy. There is no evidence that the AMJ was in any way linked with the Pontianak conspiracy of late 1943, although news of the execution of its ringleaders at Mandor in early 1944 would certainly have reached Kunyil. In immediate terms, the emergence of the AMJ seems to have come largely as a reaction to the ill-treatment of Iban employed in the down-river timber camps, including Durian and Pampang Sansat. For example, after some unpaid and hungry workers originating from Suak Garong had left their work-place to seek food, Yamamoto, the Japanese manager in charge of the timber camp, went to their longhouse and cruelly beat some of the people there. In a subsequent incident at Sekucing Labai on 13 May 1945, eight Iban attacked and killed a Japanese overseer called Osaki who Had earlier demanded one of their young female relatives as his wife and threatened to behead her father if her did not agree. As news of the Sekucing Labai killing spread and the despatch of the mangkok merah (red bowl) signalled a general summons to war, there were further attacks on the Japanese.35 Workers at the Nicirna sawmill at Pulau Jambu decapitated their Javanese manager. Inevitably, the Japanese sent an expedition to punish Temenggong Mandi’s people but its boats were obstructed by logs which they felled across the river. When the Japanese under kempei-tai commander Takeo Nakatani eventually established a temporary base at Kunyil itself, they were ambushed by Temenggong Mandi and thirty of his followers: They arrived at Kunyil at noon and surrounded the house used by Nakatoni as his headquarters. Four of them, Pang Suma, Pang Dosi, Pang Lyo and Jarnpi, were in the forefront. Pang Suma with his parang drawn jumped into the house, Jampi stood guard at the front steps, Pang Dosi and Pang Lyo blocked the back entrance. The others stood at the ready some distance away. Nakatoni and his men were taken by surprise. They were seated at lunch having a big feast to celebrate a Japanese national day. Pang Suma quickly decapitated Nakatoni.36

Two other Japanese in the house were also killed and later that day Temenggong Mandi tracked down and killed Yamamoto who had

2 16

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

thought that Allied aircraft were Japanese reinforcements. Furthermore, the surrender of Japanese forces in west Borneo to the Australians at Pontianak did not take place until October 1945. In the meantime, there continued to be a state of open warfare between the Iban and the Japanese. It is difficult to estimate how many were killed in these fierce and sometimes sustained engagements but it is clear that they were more substantial than the conflicts on the the Rejang and the Batang Ai in Sarawak. Nor did Temenggong Mandi and his followers have the benefit of the Allied arms and intelligence that Temenggong Koh and his people had received. Notes 1. 2. Temenggong Mandi (centrej with his two nephews (Photograph by courtesy o f S. Jacobus Frans.)

escaped and was hiding in a Chinese house across the Embuan River. Anticipating further retribution, Temenggong Mandi ordered the mangkok merah to be sent again to all parts of the interior, including Sarawak, to muster more support. In late June a force of Iban managed to capture the supply depot and the Japanese administrator’s office at Meliau but were driven away by Japanese reinforcements brought in from Pontianak. On 18 July when they returned to attack Meliau again, they found it deserted but subsequently intercepted the fleeing Japanese and engaged them in a pitched battle. This cost the lives of Pang Suma, Temenggong Mandi’s bravest war leader, together with his brother and nephew. The Japanese managed to re-occupy Meliau in mid-August but by that time the Iban were cutting their communication routes and ambushing their convoys and patrols. Temenggong Mandi also despatched a forced under Panglima Pang London to Sekadau to attack the administrative office there. Another force seized Sanggau town but were betrayed by three Javanese and many Iban were killed when the Japanese recaptured it. The struggle continued for some time after the Japanese surrender at Sanggau and other places distant from Pontianak where the Iban

3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

A. Richards, An Iban-English Dictionary, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 37. For a fictionalised account of the Pasir Nai incident and other events described in the following narrative, see Lim Beng Huat, Chaos at Lubok Belaga, Kuching: Borneo L iterature Bureau, 1977. The most comprehensive first-hand account of events in Kapit can be found in Yao Ping Hua, ‘Those Momentous Days in Kapit’, Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1956, pp. 92-6. Interview with Tedong anak Barieng by Professor Vinson Sutlive, Kapit, translated by Dr Otto Steinmayer. Major W.L. Sochon, ‘Semut III Party Report’. Keith Barrie, ‘Borneo Story’, vol. I, p. 77. Sochon narrative, cited in Courtney, Silent Feet, p. 96. In this later account, Sochon suppressed the fact that some of the heads were also of Chinese. He also introduced another version of the Pasir Nai massacre, . according to which Sundai’s people slaughtered the Japanese as they were leaving one evening to visit his longhouse. Barrie, ‘Borneo Story’, p. 78. Sochon narrative, cited in Courtney, Silent Feet, p. 97. Ibid., pp. 78-9. Interview with Jeba anak Undit, Nanga Sejunggur, Pelagus, January 1994, translated by Dr Otto Steinmayer. Interview with Garai anak Siba, Nanga Benin (Pelagus), January 1994, translated by Dr Otto Steinmayer. Sochon, ‘Semut III Party Report’. Interview with Tedong anak Barieng. Ibid. Ibid.

Cited by Sutlive, Tun Jugah, p. 113. Interview with Tedong anak Barieng. Ibid. See also, Sutlive, Tun Jugah, p. 113. The story was confirmed by Hj. Dawi bin Abdul Rahman, interview, Kuching, 9 January 1997. 19. Interview with Sng Chin Joo by Professor Vinson Sutlive, Kapit, 1 September 1987, translated by Dr Otto Steinmayer. 20. Interview with Datuk Temenggong Jinggut anak Attan

Perang Jipun

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29.

by Professor Vinson Sutlive, 8 July 1987, translated by Dr Otto Steinmayer. Courtney, Silent Feet, p. 102. Sochon, ‘Semut III Party Report’. Barrie, ‘Borneo Story’, vol. I, p. 92. ‘Temenggong Koh: Reminiscences’, Borneo Research Bulletin, vol. 25 (1993), p. 163. Barrie, ‘Borneo Story’, p. 93. Sochon, ‘Semut III Party Report’. ‘The Speech of Temenggong Koh’. Koh made the same point in his radio broadcast of 1955. See ‘Temenggong Koh: Reminiscences’, p. 163. Interview with Rentap anak Jemut, Lubok Antu, December 1997, translated by Kadri bin Jili. Interview with Hj. Razali Sabang, Kuching, 18 December 1995.

217

30. Personal communication from Shoichiro Suzuki, 1976. Subsequent quotations from this source. 31. Shoichiro Suzuki, ‘A True Story: How a Little Bird Stopped a Rebellion’, Japan Sarawak Association Report, vol. 8 (1993), pp. 25-28 and Love and Pain o f Sarawak.

32. Suzuki, ‘A True Story’. 33. Michael Buma, Tban Rising in 1945’, Journal o f the Malaysian Historical Society Sarawak Branch, no. 3 (December 1976), p. 20. 34. The following summary is entirely based on the detailed account in S. Jacobus E. Frans, Sejarah Perang Majang Desa Melawan Jepang, Pontianak, [1981]. 35. Amongst the Iban in Sarawak, the summons was called bungai jarau (lopped flower). 36. Frans, Sejarah Perang.

15 ‘B Cow’ rom 11 September 1945 until 5 January 1946 the military administration of the three Borneo territories was under the control of the British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit (BBCAU), better known as ‘B Cow’ or ‘BB Cow’. Based at Labuan under the command of Brigadier C.F.C. Macaskie, it divided up northern Borneo into seven departments for administrative purposes: Brunei (Wing Cdr. K.E.H. Kay), Labuan (Lieut. Col. J.R. Black), Kuching (Major W.P.N.L. Ditmas), Marudi (Major R.G. Talbot), Sibu (Lieut. Col. J.K. McCarthy), Jesselton (Lieut. Col. W.E.H. Stanner) and Sandakan (Lieut. Col. H.M. Tasker). Although Brigadier-General Eastick visited the Natuna Islands and Pontianak to investigate the situation, the Australian 9th Division was not responsible for their administration.

F

Union Jack being raised by Australian soldiers at the ruined cinema, Brunei Town, 14 June 1945. Brigadier-General Windeyer was enraged by this (Australian War Memorial negative no. 111737.)

Considerable ill-feeling had been generated amongst the British officers by A.A. Conlon at Ingleburn and Morotai by his veiled intentions in Borneo and his efforts to remove or discredit some of them, including Macaskie himself. However, this was not reflected in the organisation’s working relationships between Australian and British officers in Borneo. The one exception was in Brunei where Wing Cdr. Kay infuriated Brigadier W.J.V. Windeyer by flying the Union Jack rather than the Australian flag from the local cinema after Brunei Town had been liberated on 12 June.1 As its popular name suggested, ‘B Cow’ was to provide welcome sustenance in the form of tinned milk, butter, flour and other items for people who had not seen these luxuries for some years. At places like Miri and Labuan where Allied bombing had been particularly destructive, the supply of food rations made the difference between life and death. The supply of cloth was also of vital assistance. During November 1945, no less than 100,000 yards were issued throughout the three territories. Medical supplies and treatment saved many lives, notably the Javanese ramusha at Miri and Brunei. One of the main problems with food supplies, particularly rice, was that everyone regarded themselves as being entitled to receive a ration. At the administrative level, BBCAU officers, some of them from the pre-war Sarawak service, acted as de facto Residents and District Officers. They also took charge of the police, medical, public works and other government departments in an effort to bring the three states back to normal after the disruption and neglect of three and half years. One of their first problems in the Kuching area was with the hundreds of Javanese and Chinese labourers imported to work in the boat­ yard at Tanah Puteh. This area had to be cleared to accommodate Japanese prisoners.

B Cow'

219

Brigadier C.F.C. Macaskie (seated, thirdfrom left) and other BBCA U officers with Datu Patinggi Abang Hj. Abdillah at his house, Darul Kornia, September 1945. Capt. R.H. Morris is seated secondfrom left.

Transferred from Labuan to take charge of the Miri area, Lieut. Col. J.R. Black had a huge task in front of him to restore basic facilities and local industries: Brickworks, engineering shops, salvaging two vessels in the Miri Creek, re-erecting and repairing buildings, having furniture made, salvaging and repairing MT etc etc - repair of roads, reopening water and sea transport to outstations etc. Re­ establishing town markets, shops and so on.2 Inevitably, many BBCAU officers were inexperienced in their areas of responsibility for example, an officer with a ship’s captain’s certificate as his only qualification was made Harbour Master for Kuching. Inevitably, too, there was a significant amount of corruption in the illegal sale of basic stores to local shopkeepers and the trade in cigarettes and other luxury items. Choo Poh Hin arranged with the Australian skipper o f ‘HMAS Tigersnake’ to sell canteen-supplied cigarettes on the black market and split the profits. As he recalled later, ‘the police were looking for me, but what to do? Everybody needed to survive’.3 Food prices were high and there was very little work available. Although the tally of unloaded cargo should always have been kept on the wharf itself in Kuching, when landing craft came into Pending

it was done at the government godowns. This made it possible for whole truckloads of milk-powder, rice, flour, medicines and cloth to be diverted into the black market without official knowledge.4 Atabrin was being sold in the Kuching bazaar for five Straits Dollars per tablet. Cakes made from Australian relief flour were also available.5 There were a number of minor prosecutions of soldiers and civilians at Labuan and Kuching for this activity but the high prices on the black market ensured that it went on virtually unchecked. More importantly, the distribution of rice was inefficient and not always equitable. Eastick’s attempt to control its price on the open market was totally unrealistic.

Collaboration One of the vexed issues facing the military administration was identifying and punishing people who had co-operated too enthusiastically with the Japanese. From the outset, Capt. R.H. (‘Dick’) Morris and other staff manning the newly-reopened District Office were besieged by people complaining about collaborators.6 The main concern of the Australians was in locating known Japanese war criminals and sending them to Labuan to await trial. However, they were also

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

220

interested in identifying and detaining collaborators, particularly if their actions had brought suffering to others. This responsibility was set out in the orders issued at Labuan to ‘Kuching Force’ and was carried out by military intelligence in co-operation with the re-established Sarawak Constabulary. The United States CounterIntelligence Corps was also involved in the early stages.7 When Andrew Jika reported for duty at Kuching’s Central Police Station after arriving from Lundu on 12 September 1945, he was immediately assigned to the Criminal Investigation Department where he had served before the war. His task was to investigate reputed collaborators and gather evidence against them for their prosecution. His immmediate boss was Capt. J. (‘Joe’) Marlow, a tough Lancashire cop who had previously been attached to Scotland Yard. By this time the people who were known to have given information to the kempei-tai or to have openly assisted them were being systematically hunted down. In the main bazaar area, groups of Chinese armed with sticks shouted ‘pak seeV (beat him to death) whenever they spotted a chow kow (running dog). On 15 September the Australian army news-sheet in Labuan reported that the main activity of the previous day in Kuching had been the rounding up of collaborators by the populace: Every hour or so the comparative quiet of the town is broken by wild yellings and shouts in different tongues as packs of Chinese and natives smoke a collaborator out of his lair and chase him pell mell down one of the main strets. Only the fortunate can evade the sticks and fists by gaining the protection of AUSTRALIANS.8

One of the Australians who took pity on the victims was Sgt. Chua Gin Teck. The day after his arrival he was surprised by what he found going on in the streets: Here and there I see noticing there all those folk going after ex-collaborators. Everyone, Malay and Chinese hunting all around. I don’t know what they are doing. Then I understand they are going after collaborators. On one occasion at Padungan they are all those opium smokers, old men, go after the opium. I noticing all them going into the shop and get hold all of those opiums out, put it in the police station. Those fellows they are so very, very ill-hearted. That old lady he [they] just stripped her naked. 1 was so angry I wanted to hit those old men. 1 said ‘Why should you do it in such a way?’ He [they] says ‘you does not know, they are so bad when the Japs here. You should know it’. I say ‘How could I know?’. He [they] say, ‘she’s very cruel’. I say ‘now you better drop all this off because you are all free now, you are so happy’. Also another occasion at Hj. Taha Rd. ... a collaborator was rounded [up] by the public they hit him like anything. I was in a jeep and stopped them from hitting him. I get him over and put him in the police station. ‘This is the safest place for you’. He was a Chinese. He was a Henghua fellow. Two days later his mother comes request me please let him out. I say ‘if he goes out, who to [be] responsible [for] your son? People are always going after him’. I said ‘I’ll find a way provided he got something then he can survive. I can escort him to another place provided he knows how to survive’. Later, very early in the morning, I sent him to Pending. ‘It’s up to you’. That was one thing that I thought myself I done something good for them.9

There were numerous gatherings of this kind in the streets which had to be dispersed by the Australians. Chinese leaders were called in to calm their people and assure them that justice would be done to collaborators.10 One of the victims was the notorious plain clothes detective and kempei-tai informer, Lim Chiew Cheng, who was caught and beaten in the open market but managed to get away from the crowd. Told about this, Andrew Jika decided to help him:

Collaborator hunt, Kuching, c. 12 September 1945 (Photograph by courtesy o f C. T. Edmunds.)

I went to the place where he was hiding himself. He had sent word, asking me to come and bring him out. I took him over to the police station and put him in the cells to protect him.

‘B C ow '

Within a few days there were half a dozen more of these terrified men being held in custody for their own safety. One of them was Ramnath Jatli who had been a strong public supporter of Chandra Bose and his Indian Independence League and was reputedly used by the kempeitai to report on the loyalty of members of the Indian community. When this had been in doubt with any individual, the repercussions had been grim. As Jika recalled, On the slightest suspicion this kempei-tai would grab the man and pull him over to an interrogation room and slap him and watering with salt water, pour it into his mouth.

Needless to say, anyone closely associated with the Japanese was suspect. Felipe Oniza Allas was a Filipino musician who had been recruited as a bandsman in the Sarawak Constabulary in 1925 and had retired to a rubber garden at Batu Kawa given to him by the Rajah. As we have seen, he worked for the Japanese as a travelling entertainer-cum-propagandist for a time but when his garden was resumed for an airstrip he was reduced to working in a coffee shop patronised by Japanese military and civilian officers. Suspected of being a kempei-tai informer, he was rescued by two sappers of the 2/7th Field

221

Company, Royal Australian Engineers, from a mob beating him with iron bars and sticks." No evidence could be found to support the accusations made against him but he was placed in the cells for his own safety. During the weeks after liberation there were wild rumours going around Kuching about planned attacks to get hold of alleged collaborators being held in custody. Frustration mounted when it seemed that they were not going to be prosecuted and punished. Andrew Jika heard one story that the Chinese from the Tanah area beyond Penjunjau were coming down to attack the Central Police Station where some collaborators were being held. However, when he and Capt. Marlow went out to investigate they found that there was no sign of anyone on the road. Echoing the Chinese Rebellion of February 1857, there was another rumour that the Chinese from Bau were coming down in boats to attack Kuching. Andrew Jika took it seriously enough to go down to the suspension bridge over the Sarawak River at Satok Road and wait for two hours but there was not a boat to be seen. Yet another story had thousands of Dayaks about to converge on the town to loot and burn. Jika’s problem was to find people who could come forward and provide concrete information against alleged collaborators: It was very difficult to find evidence of collaboration. Very difficult, there were so many people coming in to say that so and so is a collaborator, and so and so is a collaborator. But 1 said ‘where is the proof? Tell me or show me the proof, the evidence to prosecute this man as a collaborator and then it is an easy matter to handle. But without that as I say you cannot, the man is still innocent.

Thus it was that even some of the most feared and hated kempei-tai informers could not be prosecuted. One of them was Lim Chiew Cheng who had kicked Jika when he was sleeping in the five foot way in Kuching towards the end of the war:

Capt. ‘J o e ’Marlow (centre) was an important figure in liberated Kuching. On the left is Major W.L.P. Sochon and on the right, Capt. Dudley Morgan (Photograph by courtesy o f Dudley Morgan.)

He was assaulted, brought down to the police station, and then to my office you see and I saw he was crying, sitting with his back against the wall. Almost crying. He said in Malay ‘please help me’. So I said ‘There is one chap who reported to me that one night you kicked him while he was lying in the way at Khoo Heng Yeang Street ... Do you remember that you kicked him?’ ‘No, no, I didn’t, I didn’t create any problem with

222

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 -1945

people’. ‘No, don’t you tell me lies, sir, it was me whom you kicked’. And I pointed down below because there were so many people down there shouting for him, you see. ‘Jika!’, they were saying, ‘throw down that Lim Chiew Cheng!’ They wanted to beat him again. So I got him almost to the window there and showed him. ‘You see the people down there, they want you. I’ll bring you down there and then you’ll see. You’ll see the consequence of it, because of your bad behaviour during the Japanese occupation. Now what happened to you, why didn’t you follow them back to Tokyo?’ Then he was asking for mercy and what not, so I said ‘OK, send him down to the cell again’, and I tried to find out all the evidence against him. But I couldn’t find any. They simply said ‘Oh, he was a bad Kempeitai informer at that time’. So I said ‘How bad was he? Just prove it’. And there was no proof. So the chap walked away.12 There were also bitter recriminations in Miri against people who had worked too closely with the Japanese. The deaths by starvation of about 3,000 Javanese and Chinese romusha during the last months of the occupation had created a particularly volatile situation. On one occasion when a Chinese collaborator was being tried in a building near the market, Lieut. Col. J.R. Black had to intervene to prevent a crowd of Chinese women from lynching him. ‘The cry was “what are you wasting time for? Give him to us and we wil deal with him’” . Black had to move the court to Miri Island for security against the hostile townspeople. In his recollections of that time, Safri Awang Zaidell wrote: At street corners some placards were planted. ‘Mr ... was Japanese spy; ‘Mr .... was bad’; ‘Mr .... was cruel’; ‘Imprison Mr ...’. Mr ... was one of those men who had served the Japanese too well during the war ... ,14 During the following weeks, Safri’s policeman father had the difficult task of dealing with the repercussions of the war-time period: Back in uniform, father was kept busy. The immediate few weeks were tough for him. There were lootings and murders. War debts were paid blow for blow, death for death. Bottles flew at our unfortunate ‘Mr Spy’ as he was escorted by police. Law and order had to be maintained. Prosecutions made.15

Australian intelligence officers worked with the police to identify and prosecute collaborators but their main interest was in hunting down war criminals. As we have already seen, there had been massacres of Australians and Indians by the Japanese at Miri and Kuala Belait towards the end of the war. In Sibu, there was a similar pattern of rough justice towards those who had acted as kempei­ tai informers. However, there were none of the restraints that had been imposed in Kuching where the Australians were present in sufficient numbers to enforce control. Indeed, there was a readiness to allow the collaborators ‘to repay their debts to the people’, as the local saying went. During the first few days after the informal surrender by Sibu’s Japanese commander on 16 September, there was an open season on chow kow. Many collaborators were badly beaten before large crowds and it seems likely that at least as few were killed: One prominent man was ambushed as he cycled over a bridge near the former Sacred Heart School. He was hit with bamboo sticks and kicked until he lost consciousness. Another man, now quite wealthy, who previously worked for the Japanese Kempeitais, suffered terrible injuries when he was cornered by a hostile crowd in Sibu market.16 During the following months, there was also considerable antagonism towards the leadership of the Dochokai who were unfairly portrayed as ‘puppets’ of the Japanese. Writing to the BBCAU in Sibu in late November 1945 when popular sentiment against collaborators was still on the boil, Teo Chong Loh and Ling Kai Cheng explained just how difficult their task of mediation had been during the occupation: All the works which we carried out, were either ordered by the ‘Kempeitai’ or the Military Govt, and all the while, the Japs, put spies to investigate how we were doing them and also spies to look after our movements either in our office or at home. Sometimes we tried to go against their oppressive orders and get them modified a bit, giving them very sound reasons. Just because our reasons were sound and the Japs could not get around them they lost their temper and were displeased, and threatened us by telling us ‘You people are not glad to work for us. If so we will bring our Military Law into operation’. All the threats which we had to bear were beyond the

B C ow '

223

misrepresented by those who had no real knowledge of what things were like. At the same time, he reminded Fisher that the extreme vulnerability of the Chinese was something that had been beyond their control:

Teo Chong Loh (Photograph by courtesy o f Dr Chew Peng Hut.)

understanding of the public, as we were helpless and hopeless to fight against the Japs. The public did not know that on many occasions, the ‘Kempeitai’ unsheathed their swords and threatened us and how we suffered to gain security and safety for our community in the 3rd Division. Most of the people, not knowing our sincere efforts to assist them to our utmost within our power, even accused us for [sic] whole-hearted co-operation with the Japs.17

In an earlier letter to Capt. J.C.B. Fisher, Ling had given a more personal account of his experiences with the Japanese: The time I spent and the pain 1 undertook to point out all the unjust policies of the Japanese Government were compensated by the fact that the suffering and hardships of my own countrymen ... under their mal-administration were lessen [sic] to a large extent due to my constant solicitation and ceaseless efforts. I wish, if I may emphasise the point [that] in none these affairs [did] I have a selfish aim and that I did it purely for the good of my own people. As a result I was hated and marked by some of the inhuman Japanese whose plans to burden the Chinese with all sorts of hardships and sufferings were frustrated by my complaints. To them in their own words I was a naughty little man and the public enemy no. I.18

His final plea reflected his concern that his war-time role had been misunderstood and

The Overseas Chinese had enjoyed the protection of the Sarawak Government, but since the launching of the Japanese aggression campaign on the South Sea Islands the sufferings of the people, who are like babies deprived of their nursing mothers, under the maladministration of the enemy and the shackle of their imperialism, are really beyond the power of human expression. Personally I was no exception to these sufferings and under the iron hoof of the enemy I had to bear all the hardships patiently and quietly. Sometimes 1 was compelled to carry out duties which hurt my inmost heart but by no means willingly. In my conscience I was and am never their willing agent to do harm to my own countrymen.19

In the meantime, people in the rural areas had been taking justice into their own hands. Most of these incidents went unrecorded but one dramatic case was the murder at Serian of an Iban policeman called Atoh who had interfered with girls during the occupation. This incident took place during the invasion of the area from Balai Krangan to Tebakang and Serian by Dayaks from across the Dutch border led by Penglima Buyong, Rajah and Kilat. Reports in late September that 2,000 Dayaks were massing at Serian in readiness for an attack on Kuching prompted the despatch of a patrol under Capt. Marlow which dispersed them across the border.20 During the three days when Serian was in Dayak hands, Atoh had been tied to a rubber tree in front of the District Office and tortured before being killed and his liver cut out and eaten. His head had been cut off and salai (smokedried) under a big tree near the bazaar. The leader of the invading party had also imposed headtaxes on the Chinese, requiring all the shopkeepers to put lights on the five-foot way at night and to keep their doors open. There were rumours of another cross-border invasion in early October but investigations showed that these were unfounded.21 At Quop near Kuching, William Nais saved the lives of two former Bidayuh guncho, Awan Rekan of Singhi and Munggu of Serian, by hiding them in a cave for some days until the people

224

wanting to attack them went away. They had been blamed for the collecting of padi and the recruiting of young men for the kyodo-hei during the occupation.22 Similar retaliation took place in more remote places like Lawas and Limbang where a number of collaborators were killed before law and order was re-established.23 However, there were no further reports of ritual cannibalism. Most of the retribution seems to have been free of racial antagonism but there were some exceptions, particularly where the individual concerned had played on racial feeling. One such case was the murder of an Indian called Muttu Samy at Gading near Bau on 14 October 1945. A crowd of Chinese dragged him from the house where he was staying and took him to a nearby suspension bridge where they threw him into the shallow stream forty feet below. The four Chinese accused of murdering him later claimed in their defence that he had given out anti-Chinese and anti-Allied propaganda during the occupation and that this had caused considerable trouble with the Dayaks, resulting in the murder of about eight Chinese.24 In another case, a Chinese informer from Bau who escaped to Singkawang in Dutch Borneo was tracked down and killed there. He had told the Japanese where the Bidayuh hid their padi.25 Many other people disappeared mysteriously at the end of the occupation and were never seen again. The difficulty of collecting firm evidence against well-known collaborators meant that whenever possible they were charged with other offences. Thus Juing Insol, who had been intimately involved with the Japanese and had been put into gaol at Simanggang by the Australians on their arrival there, was successfully prosecuted for assaulting Tommy Attenborough, the Eurasian medical dresser, during the early days of the occupation. He was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. The only successful prosecution for collaboration took place in the Resident’s Court in Kuching in early March 1946 when two Indians and a Chinese were accused of various offences involving assault and extortion. In view of its uniqueness, the case is worth examining in some detail. Amongst other things, the evidence given in court illustrated the modus operandi of the kempei-tai with which all three men were closely linked and how this relationship was exploited by them.

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

At the beginning of the trial, Sarawak Tribune editor Dennis Law expressed his satisfaction that the administration was taking action at last. Reflecting on the many individuals who had profited at the expense of others during the occupation and the atmosphere of terror they had helped to create, he wrote: Their masters gave them umlimited power to deal with the public, and taking advantage of these they abused such authority by putting people into trouble on personal grudges and minor offences that contradicted their whims or wishes. The extent of the torture and sufferings that one had to endure when one fell foul of these people was so unbearable that the fear of having to go through such an experience haunted everybody. One had to be careful in what one talked or said, on the trade that one did and in the friends that one made in order that one should not fall foul of them, as the consequences of such an indiscretion were only too apparent.26

The Resident’s Court was crowded with spectators when the trial began on 6 March. There had been mounting dissatisfaction with the protection given to collaborators by the police in Kuching and the delay in bringing them to justice. The first accused, Ramnath Chatli, was the secretary of the Kuching branch of the Indian Independence League. A senior police detective until 1943, he had since worked as a plain clothes detective for the kempei-tai. The second, Puran Singh, was chairman of the Indian Independence League and was also a former policeman. The third, Lim Chiew Cheng, had been a detective in the Criminal Investigation branch before the war. The three, together with Abdul Hayee and four other Muslim Indian businessmen, D.M. Deen, A. Mohd. Seynel, A. Mohd Yacob and H. Yacob, had been taken in by the kempei-tai in March 1945 and accused of anti-Japanese activities. The real motive behind the arrests seems to have been the frustration felt by the Indian Independence League leaders at the unwillingness of these prominent Muslim Indian merchants to declare themselves as supporters of Chandra Bose, to donate money to help his cause, or to allow their sons to join the Sarawak detachment of the Indian National Army. There was also a growing belief on the part of the kempeitai that the Muslim Indians were anti-Japanese. After questioning, Puran Singh and Lim Chiew Cheng were released, but only after being

225

‘B C ow '

Muslim Indians taken in by the kempei-tai on 13 September 1944. Seated (l. to r.): Hj. Abdul Hai, Hj. Said Sahib. O.A. Mohd. Yaacob, Darvish Mohideen (D.M. Deen) Standing: H. Mohd. Yaacob, Mohd. Ismail, Mustaq Ahmad, Kader Ghani, H.N. Abdulhamid (Photograph by courtesy ofS.M. Jahan.)

told by Ramnath Chatli that the fate of two of the others would depend on their paying him $1,000. In the meantime, the others were accused of being spies for the Allies and possessing a radio set and were subjected to water torture. Three were released but Deen was confined to a cell in kempei-tai headquarters at Jalan Jawa for almost two years, kept alive with food smuggled in by his family. Towards the end of the war he was taken with twenty or thirty other prisoners to Krokong to act as porters for the Japanese retreat into the interior. However, he managed to escape and float down-river all the way from Buso to Kuching where he was hidden by friends until the Australians arrived.27 The ‘evidence’ against the four Muslim Indian merchants had been provided by Ramnath Chatli, who had a long association with the kempei-tai. In November 1943 he and one or two others had assaulted a Chinese, Soong Than Bow, and dragged him screaming to Padungan police station on the charge that he had falsely posed as a detective. Some time in 1944, Ramnath Chatli

had also brought about the arrest of a Malay businessman, Nor Hassan, who was taken to kempei-tai headquarters and asked if he had been spreading war news. He denied this and was released a day later. On the following day, Ramnath Chatli told him that he was wanted once more by the kempei-tai on a serious charge. Instead of taking him to Jalan Jawa, however, he invited him to a coffee shop where he demanded $200 as payment for protection. Nor Hassan was only able to pay him $140. In their defence, the three accused claimed that the money had been donations to the Indian Independence League. The Resident of the 1st Division, Lieut. Col. L.G. (‘Sammy’) Lohan, had the difficult task of assessing two totally contradictory versions of why the money had been paid. However, it was clear to him that the three accused were ‘the favourites of the Kempeitai’ and that the salient fact of the case was ‘the fear of the Kempeitai by not only people who had been inside but by all others in the country ...’.He consequently found the three men guilty of most of the charges,

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

2 26

sentencing Ramnath Chatli and Lim Chiew Cheng to ten years’ imprisonment and Puran Singh to seven years. Describing them as unworthy to be citizens of Sarawak, he recommended to the Chief Secretary that they be deported.28 As if to demonstrate the even-handedness of the law, the trial took place a few days later in the Resident’s Court of four Chinese accused of murdering Mutu Sammy at Bau the previous October. Chew Fah Cheong was found guilty of murder and the other three of abetting murder but with a recommendation of mercy.29 By the end of March 1946 it was clear that further prosecutions for collaboration were most unlikely. It was announced from London on 29 March that ‘as an act of clemency’ the British government had decided ‘not to institute any charges against people who would ordinarily be charged with collaboration with the enemy in British territories in South East Asia’. In cases where people had already been convicted they would be pardoned. However, ‘charges would still be enforced in cases of collaboration where brutal acts and atrocities were involved’.30 This new policy had been made necessary by the political situation in India where it had been agreed that nationalists who had collaborated with Subas Chandra Bose would not be punished. Although this announcement must have caused deep disappointment and bitterness, especially amongst those who had suffered at the hands of the kempei-tai and their informers, there was nothing they could do about it. They did not even see the point of writing to the Sarawak Tribune or the Chinese newspapers to protest against this act of betrayal by the protecting power to whom they had remained loyal throughout the war. Ong Kee Hui recalled how people felt about the collaboration issue: There was a lot of resentment that these people could co-operate with the Japanese and nothing was done to punish them. And, but it is difficult, I know, I put myself in the place of the British. How do you assess whether a chap had to do it, or was doing it willingly? It is a very difficult question, whether he is obliged to do it, or he did more than was necessary. It’s very difficult to assess. And putting up a trial, for instance, [to] try these chaps for collaboration, it’s not a very pleasant thing to do. Most chaps would want to forget it, to say to hell with it, you know. Because there are good and bad, but obviously

there are some glaring cases which obviously need some action and to let this chap off just like that did not sort of satisfy some people. There are some doubtful people, but there are some very obvious cases, and those obvious cases were not dealt with, and that’s what people resent.31

In sharp contrast with the m ilitary administration’s treatment of collaborators was its energetic prosecution of people caught stealing government property. In the early morning of 15 January 1946, three well-known Chinese thieves were shot dead while trying to plunder clothing from the government godown at the Ban Hock Wharf.32 Ten arrests were made and at the subsequent trial all were sentenced to heavy gaol terms. Nor was there any sympathy from the authorities for those who did no more than take back the rice which had earlier been requisitioned by the Japanese. In January 1946, six men were found guilty of stealing government-owned rice from a shophouse at the 12th Mile, Simanggang Road, and sentenced to three weeks’ imprisonment with hard labour. According to the Sarawak Tribune report, All the six accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of theft, and for defence said that they were forced to surrender their padi to the Japanese Govt, during the Japanese Occupation. They were not allowed to retain their own padi for [their] own consumption, and though the Japanese promised to give them in return for their padi, matches and other commodities, they did not keep up to their promise. They said that they were faced with starvation at the moment, and went to said shophouse to recover what they had surrendered. They have intended to use the padi for their own consumption and not for sale.33

There was also a determined effort to punish anyone who had been involved in the killing or ill-treatment of Europeans during the early days of the occupation. Although the killers of Donald Hudden could not be definitely identified, the four Iban who had murdered the Arundells were brought to trial in Sibu in late November 1946 and found guilty in the Resident’s Court in Kuching on 14 January 1947.34 After the rejection of their appeal by Chief Justice R.Y. Hedges in the Supreme Court in early February, they were sentenced to be executed by firing squad.35 Nevertheless, most of the evidence against them was circumstantial and it was only their reported

227

B C ow '

boasting about the killings to other Iban that could be adduced as proof.36 When the sentences were referred to Mountbatten in Singapore for approval, he commuted them to life imprisonment. Lieut. Col. J.K. McCarthy, who heard the initial case in Sibu as Resident Commissioner, was ‘impressed with the attitude of the few old-time white residents who were there at the time for there were no howls for blood’.37 Nevertheless, the main antipathy towards those who had worked with the Japanese was shown by some of the former Brooke officers who bitterly resented what they saw as treachery. ‘Sub’ Juing Insol was a special object of antagonism, both for the circumstances of the arrest of Anthony Richards at Betong in January 1942 and the senior position that he had occupied in the Japanese military administration for much of the war. However, the only charge that could be brought against him was his assault on the Eurasian medical dresser, Tommy Attenborough, in the cells at Simanggang in January 1942. For this he was gaoled for seven years. Eliab Bay, Iban adviser to the Japanese military administration at Simanggang, was acquitted on charges of collaboration on 31 December 1945 when no firm evidence against him could be adduced. Nevertheless, he remained a marked man. A fortnight after his case was heard, he received a letter from the Chairman of the Promotions Board informing him that he was dismissed from government service and that he was not entitled to the government’s contribution

Juing Insol, 1981 (Photograph by Bob Reece.)

to his superannuation fund. D.C. White reputedly sabotaged his efforts to find a clerical job with Shell in Brunei by sending a telegram suggesting that he should not be employed. Appealing against his dismissal, Bay claimed that he had been forced to join the Japanese administration. During that time, he claimned, ‘the citizens were well treated and nothing eventful happened’. His main responsibility, he added, was to supervise the padi-planting group at Bijat where farmers had had the best harvests since the opening of the irrigated area. He suggested that some of the reasons for his dismissal were ill-founded and partisan, originating from Malays who resented the appointment of Iban by the Japanese to responsible positions in the war-time administration: If Government thinks that my dismissal came through the various reports submitted by the Iban, I strongly beg the Government to investigate the matter fully through a reliable officer ... I doubt that the report received by Government causing my dismissal has not in any case, [been] done by the Iban themselves, but they they were backedup by the other races through ... jealousy in order to overthrow all the Iban officers from ... [government positions] ... hence it will be an easy matter for the other party to handle illiterate Ibans as that of one hundred years ago.38

Newly released from Batu Lintang Camp and declining the suggestion that he return to England to recuperate, J.B. Archer was appointed Political Adviser to BBCAU in early November. One of his preoccupations was the arrest of what he regarded as arch-collaborators on capital charges and the gaoling and deportation of others. The Australians, however, were authorised only to detain such people as Chakraverty, Juing Insol, Eliab Bay and others while police inquiries were made. The proclamation legally constituting courts was not published by the military aithorities at Labuan until early December and there could be no trials of collaborators or anyone else until then.39 Frustrated by this response, Archer tried again with the British military administration in early 1946. In February he told Macaskie at Labuan that in the files left behind by the Japanese administration there was ‘clear evidence’ that Datu Patinggi Abang Hj. Abdillah had tried to persuade them to return the Turtle Islands to him in return for his support:

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

2 28

In his letter to the Jap G.O.C. he not only says that he will help the new regime in every way because ‘they have the interests of the Asiatic people at heart’ but ends up with ‘I shoud like to assure you of my loyalty towards the new regime, and to express my good wishes for the success of the new Government’. And that is one of the men who represented ‘the whole community of Sarawak’ the other day. It makes me almost sick.40

He subsequently told Eastick, by then in Australia, that ‘all the Datus except one were as near collaborators as doesn’t matter’.41 Archer’s great regret was that most of those whom he regarded as the worst offenders got off: The real collaborators were men who deliberately joined forces with the enemy and informed on their friends. They were permitted to retain most of their property and, in some cases, added to their possessions. Through tale-bearing, their friends and other loyal persons were tortured, persecuted and killed.42

In the strongly anti-Japanese atmosphere of the post-war years, there was an unwillingness on the part of some veteran Brooke officers to acknowledge the realities of life during the occupation period. For example, people who had been given medals or badges by the Japanese or had kept' items of uniform from their time in the kyodo-hei were well advised to throw them away. Documents and photographs indicating any form of association with the Japanese were also destroyed. People who had become fluent in Nippon-go magically lost their facility overnight. Penghulu Jugah of Kapit, who was a sanji under the Japanese, wisely disposed of his bintang keraja’an before the arrival of the Allied forces. By contrast, his brother Tedong did not see why he should throw away something which acknowledged his work in the logging industry. Inevitably, this brought him into conflict with two senior government officials, 3rd Division Resident R.G. Aikman and District Officer John Fisher at Kapit after the war: ‘That honour [pangkat] of yours given by the Japanese,’ said Tuan Fisher, testing me, ‘do you acknowledge it?’ ‘I acknowledge it,’ I said, ‘as a sign that I worked well with them.’ ‘Why do you? Is it going to be your precious possession to hand down later?’, he asked me. The one belonging to Engkamat’s father, to Gani from

Bawa Assan, the white people had asked him to relinquish. Then Tuan Aikman said: ‘You’re stupid. Why don’t you take notice of what Tuan Fisher says? Is that medal your heirloom from Japan? Tuan Fisher has asked you to throw it away, so throw it away’. ‘Where’s the one that belongs to Jugah?’, he said. ‘The one belonging to Jugah is already thrown away’, I said. ‘If you follow suit, that would be good’, he said. ‘All the medals cannot be thrown away’, I replied, ‘because later on I want to know the place where I worked’.43

Operation

N ip o ff

There had been few opportunities for direct recriminations against the pre-war Sarawak Japanese after the surrender. However, when the task of repatriating all army and civilian personnel was being undertaken by the military authorities there was considerable vindictiveness. At various times individual Australian soldiers were heard to suggest that the best thing to do with the Japanese was to tip them into the sea. However, they had nothing to do with the screening process that determined which pre-war residents were to stay and which were to go. The concentration of military and civilian personnel at Krokong and their despatch by ship to Japan went off smoothly enough. Eventually a total of 8,094 were sent back to Japan, including 633 civilians. When he visited their camp and inspected the wholesome rations being issued to them, Archer felt aggrieved at the good treatment they were receiving. As Political Adviser to the military administration he was the decisive figure in the repatriation of pre-war Japanese residents. This process caused considerable distress to families and provoked some tension between Archer and some of the British officers. There were no official guidelines supplied for the screening, which meant that he had an entirely free hand.44 Apart from the vengeful feelings that he and some other internees had developed during their three and a half years in Batu Lintang, Archer suspected that many of the pre-war residents had been spies and were thus responsible in part for the invasion. Capt. R.H. Morris, an Australian officer serving with BBCAU, believed that Archer had been psychologically damaged by the internment experience:

229

B C ow '

J.B. Archer was certainly animated by overpowering emotions in the period following his release. Le Gros Clark, Selous and others of his friends had been killed by the Japanese and the burial ground ... was full of people he knew who had died from illness, starvation or as the direct result of Japanese brutality. He felt things very deeply indeed and initially anyway was quite unforgiving. I personally interceded with him over the cases of some of the Japanese who had been pre-war residents of Sarawak and concerning whom there was a good deal of evidence that they had used their position to help at least some Sarawak people. J.B.A. however pressed for their repatriation to Japan and it was done. 45 Amongst the pre-war residents taken to Krokong to await deportation were Mrs Josephine Hatonoko Day, the Japanese widow of Frederick George Day, a retired Sarawak government officer who had died some years earlier, and their adopted Chinese daughter, Kimiko. Mrs Day had lived in Sarawak for no less than 35 years. Although she implored her daughter to stay in Kuching with her blood relatives, Kimiko insisted on being with her mother. Eventually the latter’s serious illness persuaded the authorities to allow her to remain in Sarawak.46 On the other hand, Mrs Iwanaga

and her two Sarawak-born schoolteacher daughters who had been interpreters for commercial firms during the occupation had to go back to Nagasaki. Their brother, Nabuo, who had been an interpreter at Batu Lintang, was awaiting trial at Labuan on war crimes charges.47 One of the unsuccessful appeals was on behalf of Seiji Kuno, ‘Mohd. Jepun’. Writing in late November in support of his being allowed to stay in Sarawak, Abang Hj. Mustapha testified that he was ‘the only [local] Japanese who had not changed his behaviour towards the public especially the Native’.48 From 1942, he had acted as interpreter in the District Court where Abang Hj. Mustapha had been Chief Magistrate. He had also acted as a go-between for the police and the kempei-tai with the local people. ‘As a long resident of this country’, Abang Hj. Mustapha attested, ‘he knew more of the customs and feelings of the Native and always fought on behalf of them’.49 Finally, he pointed out that Kuno had managed to obtain $900 a year from the Japanese Director of Religion and Education to support the Kuching Mosque when its funds were almost exhausted. One more long-term Japanese resident, also married to a local Malay woman, was Tsunao

Japanese soldiers on tbeir way to the Krokong holding camp, September 1945. They were allowed to keep their rifles a v security against attack (Photograph by courtesy o f the estate o f Sir Thomas Eastick.)

2 30

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Miyachi who had lived in Sarawak for thirty years and had three children. On 9 January 1946 his wife, Lamok binte Bakar, petitioned the military administration: During the Japanese occupation he has nothing to do with the Military except when called to look after the Dahan and Sungei Tengah rubber estate. He has also been doing his utmost ability in helping both the Chinese and the Malays when they were in trouble although he has to bear all the ill feeling of the I.J.A. [Imperial Japanese Army].51 When this was forwarded to Archer for advice, he refused her appeal. The one successful appeal was made to Brigadier-General Eastick by the Revd Peter Howes on behalf of Hiroshi Kimura when the Australian commander paid a visit to Quop.50 Writing to Eastick in March 1948, just a few months before he took his own life, Archer expressed his great personal satisfaction in managing to deport most of the pre-war Japanese residents:

All the bloody Japs have gone with the exception of four very old inhabitants - some comic little ‘security’ officer tried to alter my ruling, but I appealed straight to Mountbatten (whom I know slightly) and he got sat on!!52

The Chinese We have already noted that stories circulated during and after the war credited China with making the main contribution to the defeat of Japan. These were encouraged by Kuomintang broadcasts from China which were picked up in Sarawak. The emergence of China as one of the Four Powers at the Yalta Conference prompted a new wave of patriotic feeling, some even believing that Sarawak would or should in future be governed by China. When the members of ‘Kuching Force’ marched through the streets of Kuching as liberators on 12 September 1945, they were greeted with Nationalist Chinese flags rather than Sarawak or British ones. Some Chinese were puzzled that they had not been liberated and occupied by Chiang Kai Shek’s victorious forces.53

The Kimura family o f Quop were some o f the very few pre-war Japanese residents allowed to remain in Sarawak after the war. Second from the right is Hiroshi Kimura (Photograph by courtesy o f Jonathan Saban.)

B C ow '

231

of the morning there were many native and Chinese dancers and a lion and Dragon procession ... ,54

Chinese street celebrations in Kuching to commemorate the Rajah s birthday and the Allied victory, 26 September 1945 (Photograph by Sgt. F.A.C. Burke. Australian War Memorial negative no. 120718.)

While the Australian authorities could not help being impressed by the three days of Victory and ‘Double Tenth’ celebrations organised by the Chinese communities of Kuching, Miri, Sibu and other towns, there was also a feeling that they were claiming far too much for China’s role in the Allied victory and that there was a new assertiveness which might pose problems in the future.53 In Miri, the determination of the Chinese to mark the liberation reflected both the grim times they had been through and the belief that China was now a world power. On 21 September the Victory parade and celebration for the benefit of the 2/13th Battalion, Australian Imperial Forces (AIF), had a strongly Nationalist Chinese flavour: A stage was erected in the centre of the town, also a triumphal arch over which was written in Chinese ‘Celebration of the Final Victory’. First there was the official ceremony held on the stage, on which assembled the Chinese leaders, the headmen of the local Malay villages and representatives of the army ... The proceedings opened with the singing of the Chinese National Anthem followed by a speech by a Chinese leader. This ... consisted mainly of welcome to the liberators of Miri-Lutong ... At the conclusion a Chinese victory song was sung. For the remainder

That evening there was a concert with dancing girls and humorous sketches depicting aspects of life under the Japanese. It was the celebration of ‘Double Tenth’ in Kuching that set off the only major instance of racial strife at the end of the war. For some time there had been simmering antagonism amongst the imported Cantonese and Shanghainese boat­ yard workers towards the Kuching Malays, whom they regarded as having had an easy time of it during the occupation. For their part, the Malays resented the assertive new style of the Chinese who regarded their mother country’s emergence as a world power as giving them a new status. On the morning of 11 October there was sporadic fighting between Chinese and Malays in Kuching’s main bazaar area and by 9.30 a.m. more than 1,000 crudely-armed Chinese had gathered near the Brooke Dockyard with the apparent aim of attacking the mosque and the kampongs behind it. Fortunately, some passing Australian officers noticed the crowd and with the assistance of a truckload of Iban police and some Australian soldiers who came by at the crucial moment managed to disarm and disperse the rioters without incident. A twenty-four hour curfew was imposed on the whole town, after which there was no further trouble.55 Not surprisingly, this burgeoning of Chinese nationalist feeling was also clearly marked in Sibu where the pre-war China Relief Fund had been active and Japanese persecution of its leaders intensive. The change in attitude of the Sibu Chinese was remarked upon unfavourably by C.D. Adams, a pre-war Brooke officer who had been recalled to serve as adviser to the military administration. After many years’ experience in the Third Division, he had retired from the Sarawak Service in 1937 before the China Relief Fund got underway. Consequently, the new assertiveness of Chinese community leaders came as a shock to him. One of the principal issues was the Allied bombing of the market in June 1945 which had left more than 150 people dead. The senior kapitan china, Teo Chong Loh, made it clear to Adams that compensation would have to be paid for the lives lost and the damage incurred. No doubt it was the compensation issue, together with the unsatisfactory distribution of

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

2 32

essential commodities such as rice and the policy towards collaborators, which caused Adams to complain to Macaskie in mid-November 1945 that ‘the Chinese got on their hind legs and tried to dictate the policy as regards collaborators and refused to be ruled by Malay magistrates in future’.56 Later that month he reported that the Chinese traders in Sibu were trying to keep the Japanese-issue notes at the same level as Sarawak and Straits currency. ‘They have the idea that China is one of the Four Powers’, he complained, ‘and that they have the power to dictate’.57 Lieut. Col. J.K. (Keith) McCarthy, the BBCAU officer in charge of the Sibu area, was an Australian with almost twenty years’ experience in Papua New Guinea and a more understanding attitude: The Chinese wanted a better deal - a bigger say in the running of the country. They were a tough lot and hard workers and some of the bankers and businessmen wealthy. After the surrender at Sibu there was left a great dump of fuel and oil carefully guarded in a wire enclosure. The supplies were greatly needed for prahus and boats on the river but Kuching delayed their decision on its distribution and 1 had to guard it. Losing patience, the Chinese tunneled through the enclosure and successfully stole the lot. Adams and some of the old hands at Sibu were shocked and demanded dire penalties but I refused to treat it very seriously. Probably the Sibu police were in the theft and in any case the thieves were not caught. After all, these people had just been freed from the Japanese rrule and one did not want to start off by being hard on them. 58 Lim Ah Bee, who had been chief draftsman in Lands and Surveys before the war under J.L. Noakes wrote to his former boss in December 1945 advising him that the restoration of the status quo ante would need to be delicately managed: The Chinese need careful handling. They have just emerged from centuries of oppression and [are now] elevated to one of the World Powers. This may dazzle them for a bit, and they are apt to overdo things. Every care should be taken to guide them as their eyes become accustomed to the clear light of freedom. For this purpose a really able and public-spirited leader is community but also to the country.59

The Currency Problem The status of Japanese-issue currency was another vexed issue. On 12 September the Australian military administration decreed that from that moment the Japanese dollar was no longer acceptable as legal tender. Whether the order was motivated by a spirit of vindictiveness towards the defeated enemy and the belief that those possessing large amounts of Japanese currency could only have acquired it through collaboration, or simply reflected the ignorance of the distant Australian military bureaucracy, is not clear. Regardless of its origins, it seriously affected many people. For those who had worked hard for Japanese timber companies and whose earnings had been deposited in bank accounts, or for juar/z'-growers who had been paid for their produce in military scrip, the decision was devastating. At Kapit, for example, Tedong anak Barieng found that the wages paid to him had disappeared overnight: There were nine of us. We worked eight days and eight nights and our wages were one thousand dollars apiece. At that time the Japanese money, which I saved, was valued at a high rate, and British [Sarawak] money that had been given to me was low rated. There was a Chinese from Sarikei married to a Chinese woman there and he took Japanese money at a high rate. So our wages would have turned into ten thousand British money for us nine people. But it wasn’t possible because it was already banked through a Japanese telegraphic transfer. When the war was over, that thousand of [my] money was gone and remains gone until this day. When the British came, I told them about it but I couldn’t get it back. At that time when the Japanese came, a sack full of British money was thrown out. If I had arrived early at Seputin then, that money would not have been thrown out.60 For people who were not so well off, the currency decree was nothing short of disastrous. Government employees and small traders who had no savings in pre-war dollars were left high and dry. The more canny individuals, noting the galloping deflation during the last months of the occupation, had used their Japanese currency to buy goods or property before the surrender. In Kuching during the very last days, Choo Poh Hin decided to get rid of all the duit pisang that his

233

‘B C ow '

family had collected from the sale of coconut oil and given to their father: Then of course my father was not very aware of the Japanese situation so then I told my daddy, I said ‘this currency is worthless, you better give everything to me’. So he gave me everything so I came down to Kuching and bought a lot of Japanese goods so that at the last minute I spent a few hundred thousand dollars buying things. I went to enjoy the curry and rice - 120 Japanese dollars for a plate of curry and rice. The next day I went again and they said it [Japanese currency] is illegal.6' Likewise, in Sibu, Ling Beng Siew had been using all the money paid to him as wages by Nomura Kaisha to buy scrap rubber which he stockpiled at Bukit Lan. Even the money he made from the sale of benzine and diesel fuel produced by boiling up scrap was spent on purchasing more scrap. Towards the end of the war, he told his father that the Japanese dollars would be of less value than toilet paper. Others, like Khoo Peng Loong at Sarikei, stockpiled large quantities of pepper for which there had been no war-time market. Most fortunate of all were the owners of godowns requisitioned by the Japanese who were able to take possession of the goods stored there. Some individuals who purchased motor vehicles and machinery from the Japanese during the chaotic last few weeks before liberation had their bargains confiscated by the authorities. One man even claimed to have bought the Kuching power station. The situation was further complicated by the extensive ‘cannibalisation’ that had gone on with car and truck engines, frames and bodies as owners attempted to recover vehicles requisitioned by the Japanese. Insensitive to the widespread problems caused by their currency policy, BBCAU officers only reported the difficulty they encountered in destroying the stockpiled billions of newly-printed duit pisang that they found in the Japanese administration’s safes. Ironically, the now worthless notes proved almost impossible to burn. Another short-sighted policy imposed by the BBCAU was the non-acceptance of Sarawak currency in their canteens, postal offices and other service departments. According to a BBCAU report for the last three months of 1945, a black market was operating in Straits currency, $100 Straits being worth $125 Sarawak. It was believed

that this was an effort to boost sales of illegallyobtained army materials and stores.63 For some years after liberation the courts were deluged with claims made in relation to debts and property transactions during the occupation. This was an issue which caused at least as much bitterness as collaboration, often dividing families and friends. It was not until late 1949 that the Sarawak Government Gazette published an ordinance containing a table which set out the value of Japanese currency at different times during the occupation. Based on a schedule prepared in Malaya in response to similar problems there, the sliding scale at last provided some clear guidelines for magistrates and judges.63 Furthermore, it was not until March 1948 that the Sarawak Supreme Court determined that decisions made by the civil courts during the occupation under Sarawak law, ‘or will such regulations as the enemy was lawfully entitled ro prescribe’, were prima facie valid. This ruling exempted the period up until November 1942 when civil courts had been re-established.

Their Chinaplate Brigadier Eastick was given a warm farewell by all communities when he left Kuching on 17 December 1945, handing over to a New Zealander, Brigadier H.H. Goss. However, the final transfer of authority to the British Military Administration at Labuan did not take place until 5 January 1946. The initial understanding had been that Singapore-based SEAC would take over

Australian soldiers with the Owen family, Satok Road, Kuching, 11 September 1945. There was close rapport between the A ustralians and the local people (Photograph by courtesy o f Mr J. A. Owen O.B.E.)

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

234

Private F. Cassilis, 2/14th Pioneers, making friends with a Chinese woman and her baby at the BBCAU compound, Labuan, 14 June 1945 (Australian War Memorial negative no. 109584.)

responsibility in October but various delays meant that the relieving 32nd Indian Army battalion could not be sent to Borneo by Mountbatten until late December. In retrospect, Ong Kee Hui attested to the different attitudes and style of the Australians during their brief stay in Sarawak and how their social relations contrasted favourably with those that had existed between Europeans and local people before the war:

one of the few places which the Japanese had left untouched.65 In Miri, by the same token, J.R. Black found that ‘the hospitality of the Dyaks and Chinese community to the Australian soldiers was enthusiastic and sincere’.66 When the members of 2/13th Battalion left by sea, they

They are very good. That is why we find the Australians so different. They are more friendly, they do not assume the, you know, God Almighty attitude ... They are easy to get on with. So they are very popular and we made a lot of friends ... Actually we were sorry to see them go.64 In Sibu, J.K. McCarthy created a lot of goodwill towards the Australians by opening up the previously exclusive Island Club to Malay and Chinese membership. Very much a W. Somerset Maugham-style establishment, it was

Australian soldiers taking a ricksaw ride, Kuching

‘B Cow ’

were farewelled by a considerable crowd, ‘many unashamedely in tears as they saw their soldier friends leaving for the last time never to meet again’.67 Lim Ah Bee was a reticent man who did not get to know any Australians personally but he observed them with considerable perception: from what 1 can see, I am of the opinion that they are rattling good fellows and it is a pity to see ... their excellent reputations spoilt by recent arrivals by their exuberance. It seems to me they are nursing a grouse somewhere.68 One ‘grouse’ was their feeling that as the Australians had fought and shed blood to liberate Borneo, it ought not to be handed back to those ‘bloody Poms’ to play Lord Muck again over the natives. Resentment smouldered beneath the surface and sometimes burst into flame. When Robert N icholl, a new ly-arrived British intelligence officer, turned up to take over the education department, his Australian counterpart simply flung an armful of files at him.69 J.B. Archer regarded the Australian soldiers as good-natured and surprisingly unprejudiced towards the local people but was critical of the way they taught both sexes to drink seriously. Teaching the local girls how to dance was another matter: There were a few who did know something about it before the war, but the rest took to it like ducks to the water. Lanky six foot soldiers slithered about in enormous army boots and tightly clasped bepowdered little Chinese girls of only about four feet tall.70 A handful of makeshift ‘cabarets’ quickly sprang up to service the social needs of the liberators, one of them being partly owned by the enterprising Hajjah Sa’erah. Inevitably, there were drunken brawls as the Australian and British servicemen played out their old rivalries. Capt. Joe Marlow was sometimes hard pressed to keep the peace. There was also trouble about the supply of home-made arrack (rice spirit) and other alcoholic drinks rapidly produced to satisfy the famous Australian thirst. On the evening of 30 September, Marlow and another officer were attacked by three drunken soldiers at the corner of Khoo Hun Yeang St. after they tried to prevent them from buying alcohol from a shop.71 A week later an official order decreed that the sale of

235

alcoholic drinks to troops was strictly forbidden. Nevertheless, there were no reported rapes or robberies by the Australians whose behaviour contrasted extremely favourably with that of their Japanese predecessors. Altogether, the Australians left behind a strong legacy of appreciation and goodwill. In his farewell editorial of 8 January, Dennis Law of the Sarawak Tribune noted that their stay since 11 September 1945 had been marked by close friendship with the local population. Singling out Brigadier-General Eastick for special praise, he emphasised that Australia could not have sent a better man for the job: His general kindliness to all he met, his constant efforts to better the life of the people of Kuching, and his readiness to listen to our problems and to do what he can to help in solving them is common knowledge ... . As for the Australian soldiers, he added: Before they leave us, the Sarawak Tribune would like to take the opportunity on behalf of its readers, the people of Kuching, to express our appreciation of their friendship and help in these, the most critical days in the history of Sarawak. We thank you for our liberation from the Japanese, and for the friendliness of the average Australian soldier to our people. Not only in Kuching, but in the countryside as well, the general feeling is ‘Australia Banyak Bagus’ [Australia is great]. The local poet ‘Mah Jong’ paid his own tribute, echoing the Cockney rhyming slang the Australians had introduced: Au revoir we hope to you, And not good-bye we say today. Who knows what kind fate has in view What land, what day, when shall we say, In Kuching or in Australia We’ll meet again in regalia? Forgive the poor welcome we gave, When you set foot here to relieve The town with hearts of joy in wave Defied the Japs, no more to grieve. You are their friend, their chinaplate; You are the mate, their cobber great. Alas! with sadness must we part, With sigh and loving still in heart, But the friendship sweet and that art For’er from us will not depart ‘Till we meet again’ we hope to say And not good-bye to you today.72

2 36

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Conversation with Michael Cogan, Perth, 14 February 1995; see also, Monks, Brunei Days, p. 47. J.R. Black, ‘Rough Notes on Service in British Borneo with BBCAU’. Interview with Choo Poh Hin, Kuching, 22 January 1997. Interview with Dato’ John Pike, Long Wittenham (Oxfordshire), 5 March 1996. Personal communication from R.H. Morris, 1 March 1998. Ibid.

Monks, Brunei Days, pp. 68-9. Platypus, 15 September 1945. Interview with Chua Gin Teck, Kuching, 20 December 1995. Police report for the week ending 18 September 1945 by Capt. J. Marlow, Kuching Force Diary, AWM 2268. Personal communication from R.FI. Morris, 1 March 1998. Interview with Andrew Jika, Kuching, 5 July 1995. Black, ‘Rough Notes’. ‘Saz’ [Safri Awang Zaidell], ‘Growing up in War-Time Miri’, Sarawak Gazette, July 1981, p. 48.

15. Ibid. 16. Tan, Japanese Occupation, p. 98. 17. Teo Chong Loh and Ling Kai Cheng, ‘Report on the works forced by the Japanese Military Government on to the Overseas Chinese of Third Division, Sarawak during their occupation’, 26 November 1945, SCCAL. 18. Ling Kai Cheng to Fisher, 18 September 1945, SCCAL. 19. Ibid. 20. Kuching Force Diary, 21 September 1945, AWM A2663

1/5/62. 21. Sarawak Gazette, 2 December 1946, p. 63; Digby, Lawyer in the Wilderness, p. 76. 22. Interview with Datuk William Nais, Kuching, 12 December 1995. 23. Interview with Pemancha Ah Chiok (Ngan Chok), Lawas, 18 January 1996. 24. Sarawak Tribune, 18 March 1946. 25. Interview with Michael Sadin, Bau, 7 December 1995. 26. Sarawak Tribune, 6 March 1946. 27. Sarawak Tribune, 3 January 1993. 28. Sarawak Tribune, 11 March 1946. 29. Sarawak Tribune, 18 March 1946. 30. Sarawak Tribune, 30 March 1946. 31. Interview with Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, Kuching, 1 August 1995. 32. Sarawak Tribune, 22 January 1946. 33. Sarawak Tribune, 31 January 1946. 34. Sarawak Tribune, 15 January 1947. 35. Sarawak Tribune, 3 February 1947. 36. Sarawak Tribune, 3 February 1947. The case had an interesting twist in the judge’s decision that the biological rather than the adoptive parents of Sendie should benefit from her inheritance. This was contrary to Iban adat. 37. Personal communication from J.K. McCarthy, 31 December 1975. 38. Undated letter, Eliab Bay Papers. 39. British Borneo Military Administration Gazette.

40. Archer to Macaskie, 11 February 1946, Macaskie Papers, File 5. 41. Archer to Eastick, 11 March 1948, Eastick Papers. 42. Porritt, Glimpses o f Sarawak, p. 56. 43. Interview with Tedong anak Barieng by Professor Vinson Sutlive, Kapit, translated by Dr Otto Steinmayer. 44. WO 203/5662. 45. Personal communication from Mr R.FI. Morris, 12 June 1976. 46. Interview with Mrs Mary (Kimiko) Koh, Kuching, 8 December 1995. Mrs Day died on 29 January 1946 (see Sarawak Tribune, 1 February 1946). 47. Iwanaga was ultimately sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. There was never any suggestion that he had physically harmed anyone. 48. Abang Hj. Mustapha to Native Officer, Kuching, 30 November 1945, SMA Box no. 39, Jap/6. 49. Ibid. 50. Howes, In A Fair Ground, pp. 170-171. 51. Lamokbinte Bakar to Native Officer, Kuching, 9 January 1946, SMA I 17/C9 (Box no. 39), Jap/6. 52. Archer to Eastick, 11 March 1948, Eastick Papers. 53. Personal communication from R.H. Morris, 1 March 1998. 54. Lieut. G.H. Fearnside, ed., Bayonets Abroad: A History o f the the 2/13th Battalion A.I.F. in the Second World War by Ex-Members o f the 2/13 Battalion. A.I.F., Sydney, n.d. [1953], p. 405. 55. Edward Brandah to Anthony Brooke, 16 October 1945, Brooke Papers, Box 22; personal communication from R.H. Morris, 12 June 1976. 56. Adams to Macaskie, 15 November 1945, Macaskie Papers. 57. Adams to Macaskie, 27 November 1945, ibid. 58. Personal communication from J.K. McCarthy, 26 April 1976. 59. Lim Ah Bee to J.L Noakes, 21 December 1945, Noakes Papers. 60. Interview with Tedong anak Barieng. 61. Interview with Choo Poh Hin, Kuching, 22 January 1997. 62. Colony of Sarawak. No 18 of 1949. An Ordinance to regulate the relationship between Debtors and Creditors in respect of debts incurred prior to and during the period of the enemy occupation of Sarawak. Sarawak Government Gazette, Supplement No. 29, 12 December 1949, pp. 867-881. 63. ‘Report on Military Adm of Civil Affairs in Southern Sarawak - Period 25 Oct-24 Dec. [28 December 1945], WO 203/5991 64. Interview with Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, Kuching, 1 August 1995. 65. Personal communication from J.K. McCarthy, 31 December 1975. 66. J.R. Black, ‘Rough Notes’. 67. Ibid. 68. Lim Ah Bee to J.L. Noakes, 21 December 1945, Noakes Papers. 69. Interview with Robert Nicholl, Steyning, West Sussex, 13 June 1993. 70. Porritt, Glimpses o f Sarawak, pp. 55-6. 71. SMA K/59. 72. Sarawak Tribune, 4 January 1946. ‘Chinaplate’ was Australian rhyming slang for ‘mate’.

16 The Japanese Legacy arawak had been spared the death and destruction suffered elsewhere in Southeast Asia during World War Two, including other parts of Borneo itself. There had been no massacres of the kind that were perpetrated by the Japanese in Singapore, Malaya, North Borneo and Pontianak. Although Tawau, B alikpapan, Sandakan, Jesselton, Brunei Town and Victoria (Labuan) had been virtually levelled by Allied bombing, Kuching emerged relatively unscathed. In Sibu, Allied bombing raids had destroyed the new market and much of the town centre, together with some outlying settlements near the airfield. Miri was also badly bombed and the wooden bazaars at Mukah, Kapit, Song and Kanowit had been destroyed by bombing or by the consequent fires. However, the most serious damage to the economic infrastructure and to industry itself was inflicted by sustained Allied bombing of the oilfield at Miri and the refinery at Lutong. Rubber and pepper smallholdings were badly neglected and over-grown. Otherwise it was only the sago industry that was affected.1 The economic effects of the occupation particularly of the difficult final twelve months - were quickly alleviated and were essentially short-term in their significance. Supplies of food,

S

medicine and other consumer goods became more regular as shipping links with Singapore and the rest of the outside world were renewed. There was a gradual resumption of exports, particularly of rubber, the price of which was hitting previously unimaginable heights. By March 1946, oil from Miri was being exported to Australia once more. The Chinese banks and the Chartered Bank re­ opened for business. Utilities including electricity were quickly restored to something like pre-war standards and government departments began to operate again, sometimes hampered by the destruction or disappearance of records and furniture.2 Roads and bridges were repaired after long neglect, government buildings were re­ painted and roadside grass was scythed regularly once again. Demographically, the occupation had witnessed accelerated population growth. A marked pattern of earlier marriages, together with the non­ availability of contraceptives and the retreat to a more simple life, had produced a higher birth-rate. The social and political impact of the occupation is more difficult to demonstrate but was significant in its long-term consequences. In the first place, it brought about a marked deterioration in fundamental human faith and a

Jesselton ( ‘A p i) before and after the Allied bombing raids which began in late 1944. Sarawak suffered relatively little destruction during the war

2 38

general blunting of conscience. As N.I. Low aptly put it in relation to Singapore, ‘the dragon’s tooth of distrust had been sown among us’.3 The combined effect of the kempei-tai and their extensive network of paid informers, together with the jikeidan neighbourhood vigilante structure and the general scramble for survival, had been to break down trust between individuals and plant suspicion in its place. It was a case of ‘every man to himself and the Devil take the hindmost’. Collaboration left its legacy of bitterness and nowhere was this more clear than within the Sarawak Constabulary, some of whose members had co-operated rather too readily with the kempeitai. The failure to prosecute these official collaborators and to strip them of the material benefits they had acquired during the occupation was a source of sharp discontent within the force itself as well as the community. There was also resentment towards those who had profited through their financial dealings with the Japanese, the black market and the purchase of property and goods at bargain prices towards the end of the occupation. When the impact of the occupation was discussed in the columns of Sarawak’s only English-language newspaper, the Sarawak Tribune, during the immediate post-war period it was the decline in moral standards that provided the focus for most comment. Most importantly, the war-time gambling epidemic was widely believed to have corrupted the spirit of young people who could no longer see the point of working hard. Comment on the gambling issue was stimulated by the rumours dating from as early as the Australian landing at Kuching in September 1945 that the pre-war gambling ‘farm’ or governmentregulated monopoly would be re-established. In its editorial of 24 January 1946, the Sarawak Tribune reflected that although money had been easily earned during the Japanese occupation, ‘there were countless numbers of people who were involved in severe financial straits and domestic trouble caused either directly or indirectly by gambling’. Consequently, it opposed any such proposal to promote public gambling as ‘ridiculous, unscrupulous and harmful’. In the meantime, there had been numerous prosecutions for the kind of street gambling that had gone on during the Japanese time.

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

In another editorial of 4 March, the Sarawak Tribune proclaimed that ‘the Japanese occupation had been largely responsible for the deterioration of the general moral [sic] of the public’. There was a feeling that standards of sexual morality had slipped, particularly within the Malay community. On 21 March, the Sarawak Tribune published a letter from ‘Meo Periculo’ noting the highly undesirable changes that had taken place under the Japanese: Nowadays, it is observed that a large number of Malay boys in the early teens have indulged themselves prematurely in such entertainments as ‘gendang’ and even in some other sorts of vicious amusements to a very excessive extent. In pre­ war days boys of this age could hardly be found around this sphere of life. Of course everyone can have something suitable and agreeable to his age to amuse himself with. But the indulgence of present young boys is much against customary course of life. They tasted too soon the tonic which is strictly and morally meant for their elders and their uncles. This not only drives them to luxurious and licentious habits but hinders their educational progress as well. Its danger to health is too obvious as to need detail [sic] description. In the Sarawak Gazette of 1 October 1946, the first issue since liberation, the always fairminded K.H. Digby wrote that it was difficult to find anything positive to say about the Japanese. They had been kind to women and children and their lower standard of living meant that there was a relative absence of social barriers during their time. Some departments, notably the Land Office, had ‘displayed an efficiency not commonly expected of a military administration’. However, even allowing for the fact that it was a military occupation and ‘should not be compared with a civil administration in normal conditions’, he thought they had kicked the ball into their own goal: The Japanese had ... plenty of sticks with which to beat the authorities they had supplanted, but they ruined their whole cause by far exceeding those authorities in the severity and cruelty of their administration. What use was it for an officer to make a speech on the iniquities of the British, when, on the same day, a sentry assaulted a Mahomedan woman for failing to bow to him? More importantly, he reflected that their

The Japanese Legacy

claims to Asian brotherhood had been no more than a sham: The attempt of the Japanese to claim kinship and a common interest with the other peoples of Asia was bogus from the start. They forfeited all title to such a claim when they grafted on to their indigenous culture all the worst faults of the nations of Europe, and allied themselves to the most reactionary elements to be found there. Japanese fascism was only less brutal than German or Italian fascism because it was less through, and therein lies the root of the whole horrible story. At a social level, the discriminatory ethnic policies practised by the Japanese caused resentment. The Chinese generally believed that the Malays had been more generously treated, ignoring the fact that they had been worse off economically due to their relative lack of assets. For their part, the Malays resented the way in which some Chinese towkays had hoarded rice, sugar and other scarce commodities and profited from high prices on the black market during the latter part of the occupation. No doubt there was an element of resentment, too, behind Iban attacks on the Chinese of the upper Rejang towards the end of the war. On the negative side, the Japanese had encouraged race-consciousness. On the positive side, there was the beneficial impact of significantly increased contact between Chinese, Malays, Iban and Bidayuh and a breaking down of the pre-war division of labour. As a largely small-holder economy, Sarawak had experienced to some degree the occupational specialisation that characterised the plural societies of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Commercial plantations and other foreign-owned industries were the exception. In the 1930’s the Chinese dominated banking, trading, skilled occupations and pepper and vegetable farming; the Malays were either government servants, labourers or fishermen; and the Iban, Bidayuh and other indigenous nonMuslim peoples were subsistence farmers, collectors of jungle produce and unskilled labourers. During the occupation, many urban Chinese and even some Malays were forced to become padi-planters. The Iban no longer had the opportunity to bejalai from the longhouse and were forced back into intensive padi-planting. Altogether, there was a good deal more interaction in rural areas where the Chinese had fled both

239

to avoid the Japanese and to wrest a living from the land. While there were many disputes between Chinese and Malays and Iban over the use of padi land in native areas, increased contact necessitated a greater knowledge of each other’s language and customs. Reform of the native landtenure system became inevitable. While many Chinese learnt how to plant padi, they also taught the Iban and the Bidayuh how to cultivate pepper vines and Chinese vegetables. By the end of the war, Sarawak’s diverse peoples knew more about each other’s way of life than they had done during Brooke times when a degree of residential segregation had been imposed in accordance with a political strategy of ‘divide and rule’. One expression of this increased contact was the greater incidence of inter-racial adoptions. Having observed this in Miri when he was there with BBCAU, J.R. Black later wrote: ‘In facing the occupation of a common enemy, recognition of their common humanity and extending mutual help the races had become mixed up’.4 Another positive effect was the repopulation of the longhouses and the revival of traditional skills and customary knowledge. The occupation represented an Indian summer of indigenous cultural life before economic forces and education combined in the post-war decades to dilute and even destroy ancient ways. The last months of the occupation had seen open warfare between the Japanese and the Iban and other groups, offering unprecedented opportunities for taking heads and reviving old ceremonies. Most significant were the intangibles: the attitudes and values which brought Sarawak out of an era of benign paternalism and launched it on the path towards self-determination. At the political level, there were some positive changes. The occupation and liberation were seen by some contemporaries as having roused the people of Sarawak out of a deep sleep to a new awareness of the world around them. On 17 April 1946, shortly before the Rajah’s return for the Council Negri meeting to vote on the Cession Bill, the Sarawak Tribune reflected on the recent past: The people of this State have gained many bitter experiences under the Japanese occupation and as a result they have been shaken from the slumbering state of 1941 to one of pep and vitality in 1946. They begin to notice and understand things which hitherto had passed them unobserved. Their

240

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

state of transition is a healthy sign and if under proper guidance would go a long way to assist in the establishment of a far better and happier world to live in. The occupation meant that people were more prepared to accept change - in the form of the Rajah’s cession of their country to Britain in early 1946 - than they would have been in 1941. Fifty years after the event, Ong Kee Hui reflected on the impact of the Japanese occupation on European prestige: The supremacy of the Europeans [was] no longer something which [was taken for granted by people]. In other words they say that well, if the Japanese can take these chaps down and put them where they were, so can we. And that of course gave rise, particularly in Indonesia, to defections to the Independence movement. And I think psychologically there is that fact, that we are just as good as the average European. That I think is a very strong impact psychologically on the average inhabitant of this place.5 It is true that many of the people who were placed by the Japanese in positions of authority or were put through special training courses with that end in mind emerged as political leaders after the war. On the other hand, the traditional leadership, especially of the Chinese, was compromised by its association with the Japanese.

Ong Kee Hui

The vacuum was filled by assertive young Chinese-educated intellectuals who were more culturally chauvinistic and more leftist than the pre-war kapitan.6 There is also the question of the residual effect of the occupation experience on Sarawak people’s attitudes towards the Japanese. Sarawak did not experience the wholesale massacres of Chinese perpetrated in Singapore, Malaya and

Japanese civilian veterans and friends at a reunion, Kawasaki, Japan, October 1995 (Photographs by Bob Reece.)

The Japanese Legacy

241

of course North Borneo. However, some Chinese families, particularly those whose fathers or grandfathers were tortured or even killed by the kempei-tai because of their connection with the China Relief Fund, will continue to feel bitter. There were some non-Chinese who felt that the Japanese set a good example in their honesty, punctuality and discipline in their work habits and that they had the potential to inculcate a more independent set of attitudes than prevailed under the Brookes. According to R.K. Bhattacharya, *

what they taught during the period, the Japanese did, ‘Stand on your own feet, work hard. You can look after yourself if you do so’. But they went a little beyond by humiliating people, by slapping people and ... other vicious things like this. Otherwise 1 think that they were going on alright. In the beginning they were well respected. But at the end, I think, everyone turned against [them].7 The folklore of the occupation is revealing in its own way. The Japanese were held responsible for a plague of giant ‘African’ snails which descended on Sarawak at about the same time as they did. Known to this day as tekuyongjepun, the voracious creatures devoured everything in

their path. The Japanese were also held responsible for the disappearance of kerang and other shellfish from the beaches for the duration of the occupation. Needless to say, shellfish re­ appeared in large numbers in September 1945. The Bidayuh believed that the Japanese had stolen padi ‘souls’ and conducted ceremonies after the occupation to restore them. Ukum jipun went into the Iban language as the term for unnecessarily cruel punishment. On the positive side, the Iban called the suit of hearts in cards terup jipun after its resemblance to the Rising Sun. The most telling legacy of the period, however, is the duit pisang, the ‘banana dollar’ which can still be found in unused piles in Kuching’s curio shops. Even the strength of today’s yen and the dominance of Japanese cars, machines and other goods throughout Sarawak cannot spoil an old joke. More than anything else, the worthless currency symbolised the Japanese military administration’s increasing economic irresponsibility and its failure to deliver material security in a highly materialistic society. If it had managed to make available rice and consumer goods in plentiful supply, perentah jepun would probably have commanded the support of much of the population.

Japanese war-time building, India Street, Kuching. (Photograph by Bob Reece.)

242

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Monument in Kuching to Capt. Lionel Matthews, M.C., the eight Sabahans executed with him at Setapok, Batu Kawa, on 2 March 1944, and the five Sarawakians who died after torture at kempei-tai headquarters, Jalan Jaw a, fo r aiding prisoners o f war at Batu Lintang (Photograph by Ho Ah Chon.)

Few signs remain in Sarawak today of the Japanese occupation, apart from the airfields at Bintulu and Sibu which were built by forced labour. The wooden memorials at Sibu and Bintulu disappeared at the end of the war and the Serian bridge was eventually demolished.8 A memorial behind the Sarawak Museum to the five Sarawakians who died at the hands of the kempeitai in 1944 is largely forgotten.9 Few people remember the name of Albert Kwok, son of a Kuching dentist, who led the rebellion in North Borneo in October 1943. Nor is the Australian liberation of Kuching on 11 September 1945 commemorated in any way. The India Street building remains as the most conspicuous evidence of the Japanese interregnum. Flardly a trace can be found of the Batu Lintang prisoner-of-war camp but the nearby Japanese cemetery is kept in good order, its wood and stone memorials telling their own story of the Japanese in Sarawak. For most people, masa jepun was a time of duress and anxiety rather than personal tragedy. At a personal level, it was a test of individual determination and adaptability as life was stripped

of many of its ordinary comforts. As Ong Kee Hui saw it, Another lesson that many people can learn is how you can reduce life to its very essentials: shelter, food and clothing. With these, one can get by. In a country like this, no one need starve if he is prepared to work.10 Notes 1. 2.

Sarawak Tribune, 26 June 1946.

One vital department which recovered quickly was Land and Surveys, whose records had been buried by a senior clerk. 3. Low, When Singapore was Syonan-To, p. 94. 4. Black, ‘Rough Notes’. 5. Interview with Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, Kuching, 1 August 1995. 6. See Chin, The Sarawak Chinese, pp. 100-101. 7. Interview with R.K. Bhattacharya, Kuching, 12 December 1995. 8. The stone tablet at Labuan commemorating Marquis Maeda’s death remains intact. 9. Previously referred to as ‘The Heroes’ Memorial’, it was originally located on Rock Road near St. Joseph’s Church. 10. Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, ‘The Japanese Occupation’, p. 14.

Glossary abang adat apai arrack arigato attap baba baju bangsawan barang belian bintang keraja’an burong Bushido cheong sam chow kow cutch Dai Toa Kyoeiken Dai Toa Senso damar dapur datu dhoby duit pisang dukun empakap garam gawai giyu-gun godown gula guncho gunsei-bu gunzoku hai-keirei Hakko-Ichii Hinomaru ianfu ianjo ilang jepun, jipun jikeidan kajang kaki lima

Sarawak Malay elite title traditional custom uncle, father rice spirit thank you leaf thatch Straits-born Chinese shirt, blouse Malay drama group belongings iron wood government medal bird chivalric spirit, ideology Chinese women’s costume traitor, collaborator (lit., running dog) tanning bark (mangrove) Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Pacific War tree resin cooking hearth Sarawak traditional Malay chief washing, laundry Japanese military scrip (‘banana dollar’) shaman double-cropping system of ricecultivation salt Iban ceremony volunteer force store, warehouse sugar administrative officer military administration co-opted Japanese civilian bow, salute Asian brotherhood Rising Sun (flag) ‘comfort woman’ (military prostitute) military brothel (see parang ilang) Japan, Japanese Japanese-sponsored vigilante organisation palm-frond matting five foot way (footpath in front of shops)

kampong kapitan china kati kaum ibu kebal kempei-tai ken kena jemur kenchiji kinenhi kow-tow kubu

Malay village Chinese headman 1.3 lbs women’s association invulnerable Japanese military police prefecture exposure to the sun governor of prefecture memorial post bow fort (erected by the Brooke government) kuli day labourer kumiai monopoly kyodo-hei Japanese-sponsored militia labong Iban turban landas rainy season lemambang traditional bardic ritual leader (Iban) makan eat, food malu embarrassed, shy manang shaman mangkok merah Iban summons to war (lit., red bowl) minyak oil minyak kelapa coconut oil minyak getah oil made from boiling rubber Nanpo Southeast Asia Nanyo Southern Ocean (South China Sea) negeri Malay state ngayap Iban traditional courtship ngajat Iban war dance nipah riverine palm Nippon Japan Nippon-go Japanese language orang kubu fort man orang (kulit) puteh European padang town square padi rice pangkat honour, rank, decoration panglima war leader pan tang tabu, restriction parang native machete, slashing sword parang ilang Kayan sword used in warfare pelandok jipun collaborator (lit., ‘pet of the Japanese’) pengarah senior Iban headman pengiran Brunei aristocratic title penghulu Iban headman perabangan Sarawak Malay traditional elite

MAS A JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

244 perang perentah pesaka pikul pisang prahu pua’ kumbu romusha ruai rumah sanji sarong kebaya selam ai’ semut shang tuan shiseikan sho-cho silat sirat

warfare, fighting governwent heirloom, heritage 133 lbs banana boat finely woven Iban cloth unskilled worker longhouse verandah (enclosed) longhouse councillor, adviser Malay women’s costume diving contest ant public safety committee commissioner local official Malay dance (simulating combat) loin cloth

songkok sumpit, sumpitan tambang tangsi tanju temenggong Tenno Heika towkay tuah kampong tuai rumah tuak tuan tuba ukum jipun ulu umai zaibatsu

Malay cap (of black velvet) blowpipe ferry boat barracks longhouse verandah (not enclosed) senior Iban chief Japanese Emperor businessman, shopkeeper village headman longhouse headman rice wine Sir poisonous root used for fishing Japanese justice remote interior, up-river farm, garden large Japanese industrial and trading combine

Chronology July 1941 7 December 1941 8 December 1941

Sarawak Volunteer Force formed Japanese troops land at Kota Bharu Denial of oil installations at Seria, Miri and Lutong 14 December 1941 Punjabi troops and European oilfields employees leave Miri for Kuching on M.V. Lipis 16 December 1941 M.V. L ipis attacked by Japanese aircraft Japanese occupy Miri, Lutong and Seria Dutch bombers attack Japanese convoy 19 December 1941 Japanese bombing raid on Kuching 23 December 1941 Dutch reconnaissance aircraft sight Japanese convoy 150 miles from Santubong Denial of 7th mile airfield, Kuching 24 December 1941 Japanese invasion force lands at Sibu Laut and Santubong and captures Kuching 25 December 1941 Japanese bombing raid on Sibu town Punj abi Regiment retreats from Kuching 27 December 1941 Japanese aircraft attack Jesselton wireless station 31 December 1941 Japanese occupy Limbang and Lawas 5 January 1942 Japanese aircraft attack Sandakan 9 January 1942 Japanese occupy Jesselton Japanese take Balikpapan and occupy 19 January 1942 Sandakan 29 January 1942 Japanese occupy Sibu 30 January 1942 Japanese occupy Kapit Dutch commander surrenders at 15 March 1942 Pontianak 5 April 1942 Borneo Defence Force established 20 April 1942 Marquis Maeda appointed Commander of Borneo Defence Force Massacre of European men at Long 26 August 1942 Nawang by Japanese marines 5 September 1942 Death of Marquis Toshinari Maeda in plane crash off Bintulu 20 September 1942 Massacre of European women and children at Long Nawang by Japanese marines 11 October 1942 Surrender of Southwell and Davidson parties at Sundar 14 January 1943 Lieut. Wink and Lieut. Moore put ashore from submarine near Miri 7 July 1943 Visit to Kuching by Prime Minister Hideki Tojo 6 October 1943 First Python party lands on North Borneo coast

9 October 1943 13 December 1943 19 December 1943 21 January 1944 April 1944 24 June 1944 22 September 1944 16 March 1945 25 March 1945 16 April 1945 1 May 1945 10 June 1945 13 June 1945 19 June 1945 20 June 1945 23 June 1945 1 July 1945 6 July 1945 6 August 1945 9 August 1945 11 August 1945 2 September 1945 6 September 1945

9 September 1945

11 September 1945

12 14 17 26

September September September September

1945 1945 1945 1945

29 October 1945 5 January 1946

Albert Kwok Rebellion (Jesselton) Visit to Kuching by Subas Chandra Bose Albert Kwok surrenders to Japanese Albert Kwok and followers executed Borneo Garrison Army FIQ begins to move to Jesselton, North Borneo Tojo’s resignation Establishment of 37th Army Landing of Semut I party at Bario First Allied aircraft over Kuching Landing of Semut II andIII at Bario Australian 9th Division landing at Tarakan Australian 9th Division landing at Labuan Liberation of Brunei Town Liberation of Limbang Australian landings at Seria, Lutong and Miri Air attack on Kapit Australian 7th Division landing at Balikpapan Execution of C.D. Le Gros Clark and four others at Keningau, North Borneo Bombing of Hiroshima Bombing of Nagasaki Japanese Emperor announces surrender Signing of Instrument of Surrender on board U.S.S. Missouri, Tokyo Bay Liberation of Simanggang by SRD Signing of Instrument of Surrender at Labuan Australian and Japanese representatives meet at the mouth of the Sarawak River to arrange Kuching surrender details Signing of Instrument of Surrender on board H.M.A.S. Kapunda, Pending Landing at Kuching o f ‘Kuching Force’ Liberation of prisoners of war from Batu Lintang camp Betong liberated by SRD Simanggang liberated by SRD Japanese surrender at Sibu Last oil-well fires put out at Miri and Seria Surrender of Fujino Force Australian 9th Division hands over control of northern Borneo to 32nd Indian Infantry Brigade at Labuan

Bibliography 1.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(I)

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Public Record Office, Kew: CAB 98/41 War Cabinet Papers

CO 531 CO 537 CO 874 CO 938 HS 1 WO 106 WO 172 WO 203 WO 208 WO 235 WO 252 WO 311 WO 325

Borneo Correspondence Supplementary Correspondence British North Borneo Company Papers Sarawak Correspondence Special Operations Executive: Far East Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence War Diaries of South East Asia Command Military Headquarters Papers, Far East Directory of Military Intelligence Judge Advocate General’s Office: War of 1939-45: War Crimes Papers Topographical and Economic Surveys War of 1939-1945: Military Deputy Judge Advocate General: War Crimes Files War of 1939-1945: War Crimes Group: Southeast Asia: Files

Imperial War Museum:

Japanese Studies in World War II No. 22. [Col. Itsui Ogawa], Borneo Operations 1941-42. AL 1099. Box 22. Japanese Monograph 26. Borneo Operations 1941-45. AL 5256. Pepler, E.R., ‘Batu Lintang Secret Radio and generator’, typescript 53 pp. 88/3/1. Johnson, Lieut. W.J.B. RNVR, Photocopies of letters. Misc 2608. Bates, Miss H.E., ‘It is Something’ [typescript based on original prison camp diary]. 91/35/1. Tyler, R.G., MS. diary (8-18 December 1941). 88/8/1. Humphrey, A.H., Typescript of diary 1942-45. 67/191/1. Rhodes House Library, Oxford:

Brooke, Sir Charles Vyner, Letters, mainly to C. Pitt Hardacre, Sarawak Government Agent, Australia, concerning Sarawak affairs, Jan. 21-June 26, 1942. Brooke Papers, MSS. Pac. s. 83. Elam, H.E.H., Letters and cables home, 1939-45. MSS. Pac. s. 65. Griffin, Alan, Papers relating to his service in Sarawak, 1942-62. MSS. Pac. s. 109. Clark, Cyril Drummond Le Gros, Correspondence before internment at Kuching, 1941; camp note book; correspondence concerning his murder by the Japanese at Keningau, North Borneo. MSS. Pac. s. 84. Macaskie, C.F.C., Correspondence concerning his work as Chief Civil Affairs Officer in British Borneo following the recapture of the territory from the Japanese, 1945-47; ‘End of an Era: Borneo Reminiscences’. MSS. Pac. s. 71. Morison, W.G., ‘Personal experiences during Japanese occupation of Sarawak’, 20 January 1946. MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 135. Noakes, J.L., Report Upon Defence Measures Adopted in Sarawak from June 1941 to the Occupation in December 1941 by Imperial Japanese Forces. Also an Account of the Movement of British and Sarawak Military Forces During the Japanese Invasion of Sarawak. MSS. Pac. s. 62. Richards, A.J.N., Letters home, 1938-42, 46-50; letters to B. Walsh-Atkins, 1938-40, 1945-57. MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 213. University o f Durham:

Malcolm MacDonald Papers

248

MASA JEP'UN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

Sarawak Museum Archives:

Documents transferred from Director’s Room, 2 boxes [Harrisson Papers, Boxes 1-2] Packet J.J./K.K. Packet C/A/d3 Box M/M I 17/C9 (Box no. 39) I 17/C11 (Box No. 41) I 17/C12 (Box no. 42) I 17/C13 (Box no. 43) I 17/C14 (Box no. 44) Australian War Memorial Archives, Canberra:

AWM 54 AWM 67 AWM 2663 Pictorial collection National Archives, Washington:

Record Group 38: Records of the Chief of Naval Operations. Office of Naval Intelligence Monograph Files Record Group 111: Army Signal Corps Private Collections:

Archer Letters Bayang Papers Bewsher Papers Black Papers Chen Ko Ting Collection Eastick Papers Jitam Papers MacBryan Papers Morris Papers Noakes Papers (II) NEWSPAPERS Nippon Times [Singapore] Syonan Times [Singapore] See Hua Daily News [Sibu] Singapore Free Press Sarawak Gazette Sarawak Tribune

(III) PUBLISHED WORKS Collections o f Documents'.

Archer, J.B., Lintang Camp, Kuching Sarawak. Official Documents and Papers Collected fro m the Records o f the Civilian Internment Camp (No. 1 Camp) at Lintang, Kuching, Sarawak, During the Years 1942-1943-1944-1945, Kuching: Government Printing Office [1946]. Buck, W.S.B., ‘Brookes in Exile (1941—)’, Sarawak Museum Journal, Vol. X ,Nos. 17-18 (New Series), July-December 1961, pp. 59-81. Ho Ah Chon, comp., “SarawakHistorical Events" 1941-1945, Kuching: See Hua Daily News Bhd., 1995. Ooi Keat Gin, Empire in the Tropics: Selected Documents and Reports o f the Japanese Period in Sarawak Northwest Borneo 1941945, 2 vols., Athens [Ohio]: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1998. Books and Articles:

Akashi, Yoji, ‘Japanese Military Administration in Malaya’, Paper given at International Conference on Asian History, University of Malaya, 5-10 August 1968. ------------------ , ‘Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese, 1941 -45', Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (September 1970, pp. 61-89. Australian Military Forces, The Borneo Book fo r Servicemen, [1945].

Bibliography

249

Bell, Frank, Artes inArduis: Undercover University , Cambridge: Elisabeth Bell, 1990. Browne, Courtney, Tojo: The Last Banzai, London: Corgi Books, 1967. Charlton, Peter, The Unnecessary War: Island Campaigns o f the South-West Pacific 1944-45, Melbourne: Macmillan, 1983. Chater, W.J., Sarawak Long Ago, Kuching: Borneo Literature Bureau, 1969. Chin, John, The Sarawak Chinese, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981. Chong Ah Onn, ‘The Occupation of Limbang’, Sarawak Gazette, 31 July 1956, pp. 181-3. Cook, Haruko Taya and Theodore F., Japan At War: An Oral History, New York: The New Press, 1992. Costello, John, The Pacific War, 1941-1945, Quill, 1981. Courtney, G.B., Silent Feet: The History o f ‘Z ’Special Operations 1942-1945, Melbourne: R.J. & S.P. Austin, 1993. Dawson, Christopher, To Sandakan: The Diaries o f Charlie Johnstone, Prisoner o f War 1942-45, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995. Dennis, Peter, Troubled Days o f Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-46, Manchester University Press, 1987. Digby, K.FL, Lawyer in the Wilderness. Preface and notes by R.H.W. Reece, Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University, 1980. Donnison, F.S.V., British M ilitary Administration in the Far East 1943-46, London: H.M.S.O., 1956. Dower, John W., War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, New York: Pantheon, 1986. Edwards, L. and P.W. Stevens, Short Histories o f the Lawas and Kanowit Districts, Kuching: Borneo Literature Bureau, 1971. Evans, Stephen R., Sabah (North Borneo) Under the Rising Sun Government, 2nd impression, Singapore: the author, 1991. Fearnside, Lt. G.EL, ed., Bayonets Abroad: A History o f the 2/13 th Battalion A.I.F., in the Second World War, Sydney: Waite & Bell [1953], Fong, Hon Kah, A History o f the Development o f Rajang Basin in Sarawak, Sibu [Sarawak]: Cultural Heritage Committee, Dewan Sura, 1996. Foong Choon Hoon, comp., The Price o f Peace: True Accounts o f the Japanese Occupation, Singapore: ASIAPAC Books, 1994. Francis, Simon, ‘Wartime Intelligence Reports on Borneo’, Borneo Research Bulletin, vol. 29 (1993), pp. 137-141. Frei, Henry P., Japan’s Southwards Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World War II, Melbourne University Press, 1991. Gailey, Harry A., War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbour to Tokyo Bay, Presidio Press: Novato [California], 1995., Gallagher, R.D., Main Fleet to Singapore, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987. Goodman, Grant K., ed., Imperial Japan and Asia: A Reassessment, New York: Columbia University, 1967. Hall, Maxwell, Kinabalu Guerillas: An account o f the Double Tenth 1943, [Kuching]: Borneo Literature Bureau, [n.d.]. Hall, Richard, The Real John Kerr: His Brilliant Career, London: Angus & Roberston, 1978. Harper, G.C., The Discovery and Development o f the Seria Oilfields, Brunei: Brunei Museum, 1975. Harrisson, Tom, World Within: A Borneo Story, London: The Cresset Press, 1959. He Wen-Lit, Syonan Interlude, Singapore: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1992. Hickling, Hugh, Crimson Sun Over Borneo: A Novel, Kuala Lumpur: Pelandok Publications, 1997. Hicks, G.L., The Comfort Women, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996. Horton, A.V.M., ‘Operation “Oboe Six” (June to August 1945)’, Sarawak Gazette, July 1985, pp. 40-50. --------------------- , ‘A Note on the British Retreat From Kuching 1941-1942, Sarawak Museum Journal, vol. XXXVI (New Series), December 1986, pp. 241-147. Horton, D.C., Ring o f Fire: Australian Guerilla Operations Against the Japanese in World War II, Melbourne: Macmillan, 1983. Howes, P.H.H., In A Fair Ground: Or Cibus Cassowarii, London: Excalibur Press, 1994. Ienaga, Saburo, The Pacific War, 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II, New York: Pantheon Books, 1968. Iriye, Akira, The Origins o f the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, New York: Longman’s, 1987. Kato, Masao, The Lost War: A Japanese Reporter :s Inside Story, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1946. Keith, Agnes, Three Came Home, New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1947. Kell, Derwent [Marcus Clarke], A D octor’s Borneo, Brisbane: Boolarong Publications, 1984. Keogh, E.G., The South West Pacific 1941-45, Melbourne: Grayflower, 1965. Kirby, S. Woodburn, The War Against Japan Volume I The Loss o f Singapore, London: H.M.S.O., 1957. ------------------------ , The War Against Japan Volume V The Surrender o f Japan, London: H.M.S.O, 1969. Kratoska, Paul H., ed., Malaya and Singapore During the Japanese Occupation, Singapore: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies Series No. 3, 1995. Lebra, Joyce C., Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army, Singapore: Donald Moore, 1971. --------------------- , ed., Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents, Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1975. --------------------- , Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Forces in World War II, Hong Kong: Heinemann, 1977. Lim, Julitta Shau Hua, From An Army Campy To A Teacher's College: A History o f Batu Lintang Teachers’ College Kuching, Sarawak, Kuching: Julitta Lim, 1995. Lockard, Craig, From Kampung to City: A Social History o f Kuching Malaysia 1820-1970, Ohio University, 1987. Long, Bob, ‘Z ’Special U nit’s Secret War: Operation Semut 1. Soldiering with the head-hunters in Borneo, Hornsby [N.S.W.]: Transpareon Press, 1989. Long, Gavin, The Final Campaigns, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1963. Low, N.I., When Singapore Was Syonan-To, 2nd edn., Singapore: Times Books International, 1995

250

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

McCarthy, Len, Medics At War: An Abridged History & Anecdotes o f the 2/13 th Field Ambulance (A.I.F.) 1940-1945, Perth: Nam Publications, 1995. McCoy, Alfred W., Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation, New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University, [1980]. Macdonald, Malcolm, Borneo People, London: Jonathan Cape, 1956. Meyers, Ramon H. and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, Princeton University Press, 1982. Milligan, Major F.G., ‘The Punjab Regiment in Borneo’, Sarawak Gazette, 31 October 1956; 30 November 1956. Moffitt, Athol, Project Kingfisher, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1989. Monks, T.S., Brunei Days, Lewes [UK]: The Book Guild, 1992. Morison, Samuel Eliot, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968. Morrison, Alastair, Fair Land Sarawak: Some Recollections o f an Expatriate Official, Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University, 1993. O’Connor, M.P., Vile Repose, London: Ernest Benn, 1950. ---------------------, The More Fool I: A Piece o f Autobiography, Dublin: Michael E. Moynihan, n.d. --------------------- and Granville Pratt Willis, Escape at Dawn, London: Robert Hale, 1961. Ogawa, Col. Itsu, and Lieut. Col. Masashi Ino, Borneo Operations 1941-1945, Japanese Monograph No. 26, HQ. US Army Japan, Tokyo, 1957. Ooi Keat Gin, O f Free Trade and Native Interests: The Brookes and the Economic Development o f Sarawak, 1841-1941, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997. Payne, Robert, The White Rajahs o f Sarawak, London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1960. Porritt, V.L., ‘More bitter than sweet: Lena Ricketts’ experiences during the Japanese occupation of Sarawak 1941-1945', Sarawak Gazette, March 1995, pp. 46-53. ------------------, ed., Glimpses o f Sarawak Between 1912 and 1946: Autobiographical Extracts and Articles o f an Officer o f the Rajahs John Beville Archer (1893-1948), University of Hull: Department of South-East Asian Studies, 1997. Reece, R.H.W., The Name o f Brooke: The End o f White Rajah Rule in Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982. ------------------ , ‘European-Indigenous Miscegenation and Social Status in Nineteeenth Century Borneo’, in Vinson H. Sutlive, ed., Female and Male in Borneo: Contributions and Challenges to Gender Studies, Williamsburg: Borneo Research Council, 1997, pp. 455-488. Reece, Bob, Datu Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha: Some reflections o f his life and times, Kuching: Sarawak Literary Society, 1993. Reid, A.J.S., ‘The Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites: Northern Sumatra in 1942', Journal o f Asian Studies, Vol. XXXV, No. 1 (November 1975), pp. 49-61. Robertson, Eric, The Japanese File: Pre- War Japanese Penetration in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1986. Robertson, John, Australia At War 1939-1945, Melbourne: Heinemann, 1981. Ross, Sheila, And Tomorrow Freedom: Australian Guerillas in the Philippines, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989. Russell, Lord, of Liverpool, The Knights o f Bushido: A Short History o f Japanese War Crimes, London: Cassell, 1958. Rutter, Owen, Triumphant Pilgrimage: An English M uslim ’s Journey from Sarawak to Mecca, London: Hutchison, 1937. Sakai, Saburo, Samurai, London: White Lion Publishers, 1957. Sandin, Benedict, Sources o flban Traditional History, Sarawak Museum Journal Special Monograph no. 7, ed. by Clifford Sather, December 1994. Sanib Said, Malay Politics in Sarawak 1946-1966: The Search fo r Unity and Political Ascendancy, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985. Sato, Kenryo, Greater East Asia War Memoirs, Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1966. ‘Saz’ [Safri Awang Zaidell], ‘Growing up in War-Time Miri’, Sarawak Gazette, July 1981, pp. 40-48. Shimamoto, Yutaka, ‘Japanese Immigrants in Sarawak Before the Pacific War’, Brunei Museum Journal, vol. 6, no. 2 (1986), pp. 148-163. Shinozaki, Mamoru, Syonan - My Story, Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1975. Stanley, Peter, Tarakan: An Australian Tragedy, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997. Sutlive, V.H., Tun Jugah o f Sarawak: Colonialism and Iban Response, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1992. Tan Chee-Beng, Communal Associations o f the Indigenous Communities o f Sarawak: A Study o f Ethnicity and National Integration, Institute of Advanced Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1994. Tan, Gabriel, Japanese Occupation Sarawak: A Passing Glimpse, Kuching: Jacamar Sdn. Bhd., 1997. Tan Yeok Seng, The Extortion by Japanese Military Administration o f $50,000,000from the Chinese o f Malaya, Singapore: Nanyang Book Co. Ltd., 1947. Tanaka, Yuki, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II, Boulder [Col.]: Westview Press, 1996. Taylor, Brian and Pamela Heyward, The Kuching Anglican Schools 1848-1978, [Kuching]: Lee Ming Press, [1978]. T’ien, Ju-K’ang, The Chinese o f Sarawak: A Study o f Social Structure, London School of Economics, 1950. Tsuji, Masanobu, Singapore 1941-1942: The Japanese Version o f the Malayan Campaign o f World War II, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988. Wigmore, Lionel, The Japanese Thrust, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957. Wong, James Kim Min, ed., The World according to William Wong Tsap En: ‘No Joke Jam es ’, Singapore: Summer Times Publishing, 1985. Yao Ping Wa, ‘Those Momentous Days in Kapit’, Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1956, pp. 92-96.

Bibliography

(IV)

251

UNPUBLISHED WORKS

Barrie, Keith, ‘Borneo Story’, 2 vols. typescript. Oki, Akira, ‘Interim report: Minangkabau During the Japanese Occupation’, typescript 46 pp., 1976. Okuno, Katsumi, ‘Describing the Japanese occupation: a case of West Kalimantan’, typescript 17 pp. Reece, Bob, ‘Alf Conlon, the Fall of Singapore and British Borneo’, Paper given at Australian Historical Association Conference, Canberra, 1990. Southwell, Hudson, ‘Memoirs’. Truscott, Major James, ‘Voices from Borneo: The Japanese War’, typescript.

2.

JAPANESE LANGUAGE SOURCES

(I)

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Defence Agency Military History Archives, Tokyo: ‘K uchin' Syu Gunsei Setsumei-syo [Explanatory account of the military administration in Kuching province], 1945-46. Boruneo Syubi-gun Shomu Kitei [General affairs regulations of Borneo Defence Force], 20 November 1944 Kita Boruneo Gunsei Gaiyo [Summary report of the military administration of northern Borneo], 1946 ‘M iri ’ Chiku No Sento Keika [Record of the battle in the Miri area] Rabuan ’ To Fukin No Sento Keika [Record of the battle at Labuan, Brunei area] Nishijima Collection, Waseda University:

Nada Shudan [Nada Group], Kita Boruneo Gunsei Gaiyo Showa 18 Nendo [Status of the military Administration in northern Borneo, 1943-1944], September 1944. (II) PUBLISHED WORKS Fuminjirareta Minamino Shima [Documents of the Pacific War] vol. 5, Tokyo: Kadokawa, 1988.

Kagaya, Yonosuko and Koichiro Asano, ‘Seria Butei: Boruneo Aishi’ [The ordeal of the Seria unit in Borneo], Japan Sarawak Association Report, no. 7 (1993), pp. 41-65. Iawata, Sayaka, Haran-no minami-juji-sei: Yamazaki Kenji no isshoo [Adventures under the Southern Cross: a life of Kenji Yamazaki], Tokyo: San-ichi Shobo, 1994. Izeki, Tsuneo, Nishi Boruneo Jiken: Kensho ‘Pontianak Jiken ’ [The West Borneo massacre incident: an analysis of ‘the Pontianak affair’], Tokyo: Fuji Shuppen, 1987. Kaisoo no Shoogun. Teitoku: Bakuryoo no mita shoosui no sugao [Memoirs of generals and admirals from the point of view of staff members], Maru, vol 17 (15 March 1991). Mochizuki, Masahiko, Boruneo-Sarawaku ookoku no Okinawa imin [Okinawan immigrants in Sarawak, Borneo], Naha-shi [Okinawa]: Hirugi-sha, 1994. --------------------------- , Interview with Ms Yasuko Takahashi (nee Ohsawa)’, Japan Sarawak Association Report, no. 11 (1997). Ota, Hiroki, [The organisation of Japanese military administration in northern Borneo], Seijikeizanshigaku [Politico-Economic History Society of Japan], 258 (October 1987), pp. 19-48. Suzuki, Matsuji, Boruneo to Saya [Borneo and I], 1982. Suzuki, Shoichiro, Aishoo no Sarawaku [Love and pain of Sarawak], Yamagata-city: the author, 1986. ------------------------ , ‘Kotori ga sensoo o tometa: Hontoo no hanashi’ [How a little bird stopped a war: a true story] Japan Sarawak Association Report, No. 8 (1994), pp. 25-28. Yamada, Matsaharu, Boruneo Senki: Kazashita No Kuni [Country below the wind: record of the war in Borneo], Okaya-city [Japan]: the author, 1969. ------------------------ , Boruneo Senki: Sento Hen [Record of the war in Borneo: military action], Okaya-city: the author, 1969. (Ill)

FILM

Netherlands Film Archives, den Haag: Nanpo Hodo 17 (August, 1944) Sultan [of Brunei] in North Borneo Nanpo Hodo 38 (May 1945) Japanese Emperor’s birthday in Borneo Private collections: Kinabaru-san [Mount Kinabalu], 1943. Copy in the possession of Masaharu Yamada.

252

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945

3.

MALAY LANGUAGE SOURCES

(I)

UNPUBLISHED WORKS

Sarawak Museum Archives:

Peringatan Peperangan Dai To A Sen (Peparangan Asia Timor Raya). Pidato Tuan R.M.S. Soewignjo Juru bahasa daripada kantor Dai Nippon Kempei Tai, Sibu, 22 Ju-ni-gatsu, 2602. 1 17/C9 JAP/2. Butir2 Meshuarat KEN SANJI, Simanggang Ken, yang di ada kan di Simanggang pada 10 hari bulan Ichi-gatsu, 2604, pada kali yang pertama. I 17/C9 JAP/2. Private Collections:

Sarawak Japanese administration records in the possession of Chen Ko Ting (Kuching) and R.H.W. Reece (II) PUBLISHED WORKS Undang-Undang Perurusan Perkerjaan Bagi Kita Borneo. Kepada Sekalian Di-Bawah Perintahan, [Kuching], Showa 18, 18

Haribulan Go-gatsu. Frans, S. Jacobus E., Sejarah Perang Majang Desa Melawan Jepang, Pontianak, [1981]. Yanis, M., Kapal Terbang Sembilan, Pontianak: Yayasan Perguruan Panca Bhakti, 1983. (III) NEWSPAPERS Khabar Harian Kuching

4.

CHINESE LANGUAGE SOURCES

(I)

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Ho Cheah Min, ‘Rizhi Shiqi De HuiyV [Memories of the Japanese occupation], copy of manuscript in the possession of R.H.W. Reece. Sarawak Japanese administration documents in the possession of Chen Ko Ting (Kuching) and R.H.W. Reece. (II) PUBLISHED WORKS Chia, Y.T., Shenshan Youjidui Kangrishi [A history of the anti-Japanese Kinabalu guerilla movement], Tawau: Tawau Daily News, 1978. Chua Chung Toi, ed., Shiwu Huazu Shiliaoji [Selected historical materials on the Chinese of Sibu], Sibu: Sarawak Chinese Cultural Association, 1992. Lak Pak Khui, Kangri Shiqi Shaloyue Huaqiao Jigong Fuwu Shilu [An account of the service of Sarawak overseas Chinese mechanics in China during the anti-Japanese war], Singapore: Summer Times, 1983. Lau Tzy Cheng, Shiwu Jichou Zhuiji [Recollections of life in Sibu under the Japanese occupation], Sibu: See Hua Daily News, 1955. Lee, S.C., ed., Shenshan Yingliezhi [The heroes ofKinabalu], 1993. Ling Kai Cheng, Huishou Wushi Nian [Fifty years in reminiscence], Sibu: Methodist Book Room, 1964. Liu Yong Tzu, Tied Xia De Huiyi [Recollections of life under the Japanese iron heel], 2nd edn., Hong Kong, 1969. Lu Ngee Jin, narr., ‘Chenian Suiyue’ [Occupation days], See Hua Daily News, 14-18 August 1995. (III) NEWSPAPERS Shiwu Xinwen Rikan [Sibu Chinese Daily News], Sarawak Chinese Cultural Foundation, Sibu

5.

IBAN LANGUAGE SOURCES

Nendak , Kuching: Borneo Literature Bureau.

6.

DUTCH LANGUAGE SOURCES

Nortier, J.J., De Japanse Aanval op Nederlands-Indie Deel 2 Borneo, 2nd edn., Rotterdam: Ad. Donker, 1992.

1

Bibliography

PERSONS INTERVIEWED Sarawak:

Abang Amin bin Abang Hj. Shafiee Raymond Allas Awan Rekan Baki anak Resol Tuan Hj. Awang Baja bin Awang Besar Listen Baling anak Luang R.K. Bhattacharya Hj. Bohari bin Su’ut Mr Joe Brodie Mrs May Brodie Chua Gin Teck Revd Joshua Bunsu Mr John Chin Choo Poh Hin Chu Hung Sheng Hj. Dawi bin Abdul Rahman Digat anak Chingkin Chegu Lily Eberwein Puan Hajjah Fatimah binte Abdullah Garai anak Siba Henry Gereji Tan Sri Gerunsin Lembat Tan Sr Hj. Hamdan bin Sirat Ho Ah Chon Nabuo Iwanaga Jeba anak Udit Andrew Jika Datuk Temenggong Jinggut anak Attan Tan Sri Ling Beng Siew Mohd. Ma’amon bin Nor Mr Alfred Mason Mohd. Maidin Marican Datuk William Nais Rufus Nanang Nasat anak Jembu Pemancha Ah Chiok (Ngan Chok) John Ngumbang Datuk John Nichol anak Kassim Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui Hj. Othman bin Kipli Datuk Racha Umong Raymond Reggie Adai Michael Sadin Mohd. Sobeng bin Tamin Rentap anak Jemut Jonathan Saban Salih Ahmad Hj. Senawi bin Suleiman Sng Sen Joo Tedong anak Barieng Datuk Tra Zehnder Datuk Wan Abubakar Datuk Wan Yusuf bin Tuanku Bujang Tan Sri William Tan Varisalu Mohd. Jahan United Kingdom:

Mr W.G.N. Combe Right Revd. P.H.H. Howes

253

254

Mrs Jean Kennedy Capt. D.F.A.E.D. Morgan Mr W.G. Morison Dato’ John Pike Mr A.J.N. Richards Revd A.J.M. Saint Mr Ian Urquhart Australia:

Mr Keith Barrie Mr Ross Bradbury Mr R.H. Morris, O.B.E. Mr Johnnie Owen Miss Lena Ricketts Mr Alex Wee Japan:

Yoshitaro Egawa Hiroshi Hashimoto Kazuo Kawamata Yoshinori Kochi Mdm Yayako Maeda Yokuro Morita Kingo Nemoto Giichi Okita Professor Yoshihiko Seki Shoichiro Suzuki Mdm Yasuko Takahashi Hiromi Uchida Matsaharu Yamada Zensaku Yoshida

MASA JEPUN - Sarawak Under the Japanese 1941 - 1945